THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY: INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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A dearth of pre-existing research in the field prompted this thesis on whether traditional econometric analyses of war deterrent alliances are applicable to modern alliances for counter terror purposes. Apparent foundational and contextual differences between the two types of alliances and the costs and benefits member nations derive from each lead the author to theorize that factors contributing to the formation of each alliance are fundamentally similar. Multiple types of statistical models are used to measure variables from the Correlates of War and Polity datasets combined with custom variables in a new dataset concerning major transnational terrorist attacks and the resultant alliances in testing the effect of traditionally contributing formation factors on alliances against terrorism. The results indicate that some contributing factors are similar, extant analysis tools have utility and that further investigation is justified.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the years following the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, social science has been inundated with studies on terrorism, terrorist organization formation, and how terrorists respond to counterterror measures. Conversely, very little has been written on the matter of how nations interact with terrorists or how they work together to deter terrorism. The literature on traditional alliances for the purpose of deterring war is extensive and extends into many theories of political science. Scholars seeking an answer to the central questions of alliances – why nations join them and how they work – draw on theory from international relations, democratic peace, comparative politics and international organizations, economics, and international law to formulate their provisional answers and developmental observations, all of which operate in what is essentially the arena of rational choice theory: an analysis of alliances is essentially one of costs and benefits. As a political scientist that is interested in transnational terrorism and the development of more advanced and effective counterterror policies, I wonder what the research of the past may tell us about a relatively unexamined problem that extends into the future: do countries ally against terrorism for the same reasons they ally to deter war?

Where political science has run short in examining transnational terrorism is also potentially the avenue of research that could be most helpful and applicable to the real world. The stated goal of the so-called War on Terror is to eradicate terrorism, but do the same factors motivate alliances against terrorism that motivated alliances to eradicate or defend against specific threats in the past?
Alliances in the sense of the literature presented here are generally seen as methods of collective security or defense, and are again built on rational choice derived from cost-benefit analysis. Essentially, the alliances are engineered to deter war or the naked aggression of international conflict initiation. Aggression perpetrated by non-state actors is occasionally examined in passing but not in the analogous sense that countries may ally against violence perpetrated by non-state actors for reasons similar to why they ally against violence perpetrated by other states.

The findings of this work indicate that there are indeed similarities between the contributing factors in traditional war deterrent alliances and the contributing factors in counterterror alliances. While these results support my hypotheses that the contributing factors in each alliance are similar, or that because alliances today must be formed to deal with different, asymmetrical threats as opposed to the threats that inspired iconic international alliances such as NATO, they do indicate that extant methods of analysis are useful. Thus, traditional ideas about alliances can be combined with new specific research practices on transnational terrorism to contribute - quite significantly - to scholarly research on the subject of terrorism at the dawn of a new century.

This work is arranged in the following structure: I begin by examining past research on alliances and transnational terrorism, thoroughly exploring the methods used to empirically examine each subject. The second section of the paper introduces my theory and hypotheses, as well as the extant research and datasets I utilize in measuring the effects of traditionally contributing factors to war-deterrent alliances on counterterror alliances. I also explain, in detail, the new aspects of the dataset I created in an effort to extend alliance analysis to transnational terrorism. The following section
of the paper is a concise examination of each case I have included in my dataset and the elements of each that factor into the qualitative analytical processes used to propel this research. The final section of the paper details my findings and the results of my hypothesis tests, as well as an assessment of this thesis and the implications for future research found herein.

In the following section I examine some major ideas about alliances between nations and the econometric analysis of those alliances borne of rational choice theory; I explore some perceived problems with those alliances and the research methods embraced concerning same; and I introduce some brief treatments of terrorism in alliances research, as well as some ideas about transnational alliances that could be extracted and mapped on to alliances against terrorism. In doing so, I endeavor to take the first step toward providing a better understanding of how counterterror alliances are formed and how they work once they begin providing collective defense against terrorism.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In reviewing the literature on alliances (and by extension, that literature concerning terrorism related to the work on alliances), I examine several aspects of the subject and present the relevant findings here. First, the impetus for alliances are examined, again in the context of rational choice and cost-benefit analysis, the core of econometric views of alliance formation and function. The standard reason for alliance – defense – is examined economically as a public good.

The development of the economic theory of alliances is then illustrated, and the examination of non-standard impetuses for alliances follows. The inclusion of this development is necessary as it outlines how alliances may also be formed to meet specific threats rather than just for the general provisions of defense and deterrence.

Finally, I discuss econometric research and analysis on terrorism, the ‘specific threat’ with which this research is primarily concerned. The problems and shortcomings with the alliance analysis and terrorism research, both generally and specific to this thesis, are then presented and discussed.

Why Countries Ally

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser proposed that alliances work in an economic sense, in that the defense provided by such an alliance is a public good and that the aspects of military alliances can be thoroughly vetted and explained econometrically in an extended cost-benefit analysis (1966). For Olson and Zeckhauser (and the many scholars who followed), the public good provided by military alliance is
deterrence. The rich, powerful country shoulders most of the cost of providing the
deterrence while the smaller country reaps the benefit of the deterrence. In citing the
work of Olson and Zeckhauser and expanding on it, Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley
provide a particularly useful example of this: NATO, in which over many years the
United States contributed 75% of the defense spending and only received "35% of the
NATO defense benefit (2001, 872)."

In an earlier work, Sandler and Jon Cauley examined whether the size of the
alliance affects the costs and benefits received by members of the alliance. They
determined that optimal alliance size is in part determined by costs and benefits. A new
entrant forces member nations to incur costs in keeping defense levels the same - here,
defense is a public good shared among member nations in an alliance - even though
the total amount of potential targets and states the member states must defend
increases (1975).

How states choose their allies seems to be a decision calculus relatively free of
cultural constraints, and this is fitting if alliance formation is viewed as a rational choice
exercise. While nations certainly can (and do) form alliances based on the strength of a
shared culture, region, ethnicity, ideology, or religion, Simon and Gartzke found that
these factors are not strict requirements or determinants, citing this: “It appears that the
super-power led alliances of the cold war were more ideological in nature than alliances
have been in the last 180 years (1996, 633).” Systems do not need be similar in order
for governments to ally. Also, most alliances shared commonalities with the Warsaw
Pact and NATO. When these alliances were removed from the findings, the correlation
between regime type and alliance dropped significantly (628).
The basic ideas of why countries ally are often discussed within the same context (or treated as an extension of) why countries do or do not go to war. In a joint project featuring John O'Neal, Frances O'Neal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett, the authors pondered whether trade interdependence makes countries less likely to engage in international conflict. They find trade interdependence to be statistically significant and to have a negative correlation with the probability of militarized conflict (1996). The authors established, at least to a degree, that trade interdependence makes nations less likely to go to war, especially among contiguous pairs of states, and this relationship was even stronger among contiguous dyads. Democratic regimes were also included in the test and their findings generally support that contiguous, trade interdependent democracies are not likely to go to war with each other (O'Neal et al. 1996 14-16, 18-19).

Recent international responses to major terrorist attacks such as 9/11 and the Bali bombing demand a research consideration of government type and the behavior patterns of certain kinds of governments. To meet that demand, treatments and analyses of regime type behavior were included in this review of literature.

As a generality, democracies are normally perceived as being less likely to get into armed conflicts with other nations, but detailed examinations sometimes yield surprising results about the correlation between regime type and war fighting. Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali set out to show that democracies are less likely to attack or get involved in international conflicts. Their findings actually compete with those ideas, quantitatively showing no significant association between regime type and conflict. The measure of dyads, though, showed that there actually are strong signs that democratic
dyads are less likely to attack each other. The idea that democracies are less likely to initiate conflict may be a matter of context and regime-type distribution: Maoz and Abdolali found that democracies are unlikely to attack other democracies and are also disproportionately likely to initiate disputes against other types of regimes (1989).

Non-standard Alliance Catalysts and International Law

While many alliances are engineered for the general purpose of deterring war, some alliances, like the Allied Powers in World War II, form in response to and in order to deter a specific threat. In examining some primary differences between the Gulf War and the War on Terror, Christopher Greenwood considered how processes may differ when a state’s actions prompt international cooperation and are perceived as an act of war, and when a state’s actions are considered to be criminal:

Again, the categories of threat to the peace and armed attack are not mutually exclusive. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the [UN] Security Council had no hesitation in treating the invasion as a threat to—indeed, a breach of—international peace and security, and ordering measures (including, eventually, military measures) against Iraq. Yet it also reaffirmed the right of self-defense of Kuwait and its allies and, in so doing, clearly treated the invasion as an armed attack. (2002, 307)

The international community considered 9/11 to be both a criminal act by international law standards as well as an armed attack that could merit organized military response. Fittingly, the response included both militaristic and law enforcement activity. Specifically citing the NATO agreement the day after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that "...if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all (308).” In this case, the “attack against them all” was perpetrated by a non-state actor – a transnational terrorist organization.

Similar resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council asserted the United States’ right of self-defense against armed attacks, which characterize the 9/11 attacks not only as a criminal act but "...also as a threat to international peace and security (309).” Thus, those responsible for 9/11 are sought and detained by law enforcement agencies, both internationally and domestically.

Additionally, international organizations felt justified in the wake of 9/11 in taking steps to secure international security, despite the future issues concerning the legitimacy of the United States' military actions as a response to 9/11 in the opinion of the membership of the United Nations. Greenwood argues specifically that despite the assertions by the United States and its allies that Security Council Resolution 1373 authorized the United States to use military force, it did not authorize the United States to do any such thing, and in fact differed significantly in detail and application from Resolution 678 of 1990, that which authorized states acting in concert with the Kuwaiti government to take military action against Iraq as the invading aggressor nation, the explicit authorization of the Gulf War (310).

Alliances against Terrorism and Research Shortcomings

Even the most generally accepted ideas about alliances have been challenged by new scholarship in recent years. This may be as a result of a changing world that no longer adheres to significant findings that quite functionally described past events and
terrorism in the time before 9/11. These new ideas about alliances have no doubt been shaped, at least in part, by the formation of alliances against non-state actors like al-Qaeda, as opposed to alliances formed to defend or deter against the aggression of a state actor.

Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch questioned the basic idea of how democracies function within alliances. Surprisingly, they found that democracies are apparently less likely to intervene in wars on behalf of allies than non-democracies are. While domestic factors do act as a constraint on foreign policy in some instances, the authors find that the incentives and cost-benefit analyses for a democratic leader when deciding whether to help an ally via significant alliance / defense engagement are quite different than when that same leader is considering whether to enter into a formal alliance. Domestic constraints like public opinion are less powerful factors upon decisions as to whether to enter formal alliances than upon decisions of whether to meet treaty conditions (2004).

These findings were conditional as well as provisional. In a selection effect worth noting, the authors reported that the behavior of nations at war as a measure of alliance reliability is problematic: war itself is a possible confounding effect on alliance behavior due to the fact that one of the main purposes for forming an alliance is to deter war. Thus, if war actually occurs, the effectiveness of the alliance to begin with may have been doubtful. This is different from an alliance against terrorism, where the point of the alliance is to destroy or deter a terrorist organization. A terrorist attack does not imply a failure of diplomacy or an ineffective wartime alliance. It simply implies target desirability and the efficacy of the terrorist organization (790).
Unexpected and Unintended Consequences

Counterterror policies may result in the unintended consequences of increased terrorist mobilization, substitution, and the further diffusion of terror to nations less able to defend themselves than the countries from which the policies originate. This is an important factor to consider in studying alliances formed against terrorism from an economic perspective, considering how these unintended consequences affect an alliance member’s ability to derive a defense benefit from the alliance. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the rest of the Coalition of the Willing are perhaps the largest counterterror operations in history. The effectiveness of that policy as a deterrent to terrorist activity is questionable.

Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) showed that counterterror policies may in some cases increase the ability of terror organizations to recruit. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2005, 516-517) showed that government crackdowns on terrorism may fail to prevent increased mobilization by the organization. In testimony to Congress concerning the Iraq War in February of 2005, Porter Goss, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, both stated that “Islamic extremists” were using the Iraq War as a recruiting tool (Priest and White 2005).

Problems and Shortcomings

Relatively unexamined ideas that are basic to constructing any economic theory of transnational terror remain. For example, the concept of free riders in the War On Terror goes unexamined in the literature I have encountered. Sandler and Cauley
identify that there are indeed problems in defense alliances with free riders – in that some states contribute little or nothing but gain great benefit from alliance membership (1975). By extension, one could project that in the War On Terror, the problem of free riders exists but is different in character. What of small nations that contribute only a few troops and fewer resources to the alliance and yet gain both aid from the United States and the shared benefit of allied defense? They incur very little cost, and while we are cognizant of the substitution effect, most small nations are unlikely to be targeted by al-Qaeda even with diffusion or target substitution. This is indicative of a favorable environment for building a global counterterror alliance, or indeed for its own organic development among rational state actors.

Countering the idea that free riders are the weight under which any major power leading a global defense initiative against terrorism is likely to labor is the economic theory of clubs. According to Sandler and Cauley, this theory says that optimal club size is infinite when the good is universally shared (347). If I were to stratify the world into societies – for the sake of argument, into competing sides comprised of al-Qaeda’s transnational terror network and The Rest Of The World - can any scholar say that within those societal universes that defense as a public good is not universally shared? If defense against transnational terror perpetrated by non-state actors is universally shared among all states, are there no free riders? Is each nation in The Rest Of The World a part of the non-terror alliance by default even if they don't specifically join The – or any - War on Terror?

For a potential answer, we may expand the economic analysis of these security collectives into the free market. John Conybeare took another look at the economics of
war alliances and examined them like stock portfolios, determining that when additional states are added into a war alliance, the risks of the alliance are lowered because together the member states manage risk better together than apart, calling it the portfolio model (1994). Thus it is possible that, regardless of free riders contributing disproportionately to the collective security, there may be no downside to including as many countries as wish to be in the alliance, because the larger the alliance is, the lower the risk of being in the alliance in the first place. This would both encourage alliance behavior and the formation of a global security collective.

On the specific issue of globally shared defense: in studying security collectives after the end of the Cold War, Brian Frederking asserted that the world political order did not change significantly as a result of 9/11. Rather, Frederking argues that since the end of the Cold War, the world has been moving towards an institutionalized global security. In example, he cites the arguments about whether the West should intervene in Yugoslavia against Milosevic and notes that they were incredibly similar to the argument about whether the United States should invade Iraq (2003, 363).

The struggle, then, is over norms - and what the global security collective should look like. In his article about constructivism in collective global security, Frederking claims that systemic international security is a social construction. Moreover, while US foreign policy carries a great deal of weight in determining what is and is not socially accepted in the international community as normative behavior, it cannot solely alter the paradigm, even in the wake of something like 9/11. Essentially, international tension over the United States' activities in Iraq and Afghanistan do not subvert the global security collective against terrorism as a norm, even if the United States seeks to
subvert the collective security idea by declaring a ‘war on terror’ or, as Frederking terms it, a 'war social arrangement' (2003, pp 376-377).

Bruce Russett took pains to categorize the kinds of alliances states join, and of the typologies he fleshes out with factor analysis, a “Dominance” type alliance – in which one major power allies with smaller states and provides benefits to those smaller nations for their cooperation – seems to fit the War On Terror best. This is the ‘world war’ kind of alliance: it has at least one major power present, has certain stratification between the military power of the main power and the smaller powers, and probably comprises “a substantial portion of the world’s population (1971, 270).”

The author also discusses “Integrated Defense” alliances, of long duration, that are against a single or specific threat. Integrated Defense alliances are characterized by plenty of high-level official contact, military basing, integrated force commands, and a low probability of intra-alliance fighting, even though some members of this kind of alliance may sit out some parts of the conflict the alliance is involved in. In some ways, the rolling response to al-Qaeda's attacks on Western nations - the ongoing, multi-part, coalition war against al-Qaeda elements and the Taliban in Afghanistan - is a fitting example.

To be sure, none of Russett’s strict delineations of alliance type map directly onto an alliance against transnational terrorism, but some systemic and structural similarities indicate that although comparing war deterrent alliances and counterterror alliances may be analogous to comparing apples and oranges, we are at the very least still comparing fruits; that they stay within the same comparative universe will make Russett’s typologies useful later.
Finally, many aspects of research on the decision-making processes of states are oversimplified, and I wish to address this by way of using more sophisticated determinants of action to paint more fully the picture of causal relationships in the formation of counterterror alliances. Zeev Maoz and Dan Felsenthal have in the past addressed a problem with International Relations studies concerning why states do and do not take certain actions: the fact that most are boiled down to games of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, or Stag Hunt (1987). The authors contend this method is a problem for four reasons:

1) Boiling International Relations down to a binary choice artificially oversimplifies the complexities faced by nations in the decision making process as it is relevant to the international community and each state’s role within it; and

2) Political scientists have difficulty nailing down which problems and processes are best represented by which type of game – e.g. is deterrence represented better by a Prisoner’s Dilemma variant or by Chicken? The problems here are multitudinous - case selection bias, primacy determination and move initiative, normative projections of what decisions are good or bad, cooperative or deterrent; and

3) Most real IR problems involve more than two actors, and only dyads are supported by the regular games used for analysis; and

4) Representations of IR issues as symmetrical games are problematic, because not everyone will be affected similarly by choosing the same path - in an arms race, the same decision can harm one country more
than another. These problematic aspects, especially the third and fourth, are manifest in counterterror alliances and counterterror policy - specifically in matters of substitution and the complicated nature of multi-national alliances against non-state transnational terrorist organizations - and must be weighed heavily in any attempt to analyze such alliances.

Towards a Theory on Alliances Against Terrorism

The crux of all the material presented above - the core idea behind these international alliance theories – is standard rational choice theory. Faced with a decision brought on by a shared threat, enemy or aggressor, nations elect to join alliances or not based on a cost-benefit analysis.

More sophisticated analyses of alliance joining behavior and the economics of the alliance itself have been performed (Conybeare’s portfolio model, Gartzke and Gleditsch on democracies, Greenwood on alliance impetus and others presented previously); and certainly, the alliances of the War on Terror show that ideas such as Russet’s on alliance type and composition persist in descriptive accuracy.

However, the basic idea and motivations behind deterrent alliances remains the same: a nation joins an alliance for defense in reaction to a threat, and the theories presented here attribute that decision to rational choice. Olson and Zeckhauser illustrated and examined the economic sense behind joining a defense alliance in 1966. Thirty years later, Simon and Gartzke outlined that new alliances are formed and constructed similarly to old or extant alliances and with similar motivation - i.e. for
defense against a shared threat. They also showed that regimes need not be similar to
ally successfully, and this idea was fleshed out later by O'Neal's group in 1996, who
showed that regime type is no pre-requisite or litmus test. O'Neal and company also
showed that extant relationships matter, which was illustrated more specifically
concerning alliances by Gartzke and Gleditsch in 2004 by way of examining alliance
joining behavior.

Christopher Greenwood's work in 2002 reinforced the core idea again - that
nations join alliances in response to a threat - and he refined the measure of the
decision calculus to show that nations also form alliances and act in response to
specific incidents. Sandler and Cauley's work showed that free riders have every reason
to join an alliance if any threat exists at all, because benefits of membership far
outweigh the cost.

From these basic ideas about alliances, a picture of the cost-benefit analysis of
alliance behavior begins to resolve. If a nation is threatened by an aggressor, the cost-
benefit analysis centers on whether the cost of allying with similarly-threatened nations
is worth the benefit of defense. If a nation has been previously targeted by a present
and active aggressor, or is actively targeted by a present aggressor, any rational choice
must reflect those conditions: does it cost more to join an alliance, or does it cost more
to do nothing to deter the aggressor?

Counterterrorism Policy and Consequences

Rosendorff and Sandler in 2004 and Bueno de Mesquita in 2005 showed that
counterterrorism policies and actions sometimes have unintended consequences, and
while the responding nation(s) may wish to deter terrorist activity in all of its various forms - recruitment, mobilization, public opinion battles, and operations - reactive policies sometimes have the opposite effect.

Below I examine additional factors concerning terrorism and alliance response, within the following context: Given that the alliance theory outlined above deals specifically with state aggressors and the deterrence of war between states in the traditional sense, alliances against terrorism must differ because terrorism is fundamentally different than a traditional act of war.

The asymmetrical character of transnational terrorism - that the terrorist organization is a non-state actor with no innocent civilian lives to protect, no borders to defend, no uniforms to wear or flag to fly, and no national identity to defend - changes the nature of the alliance, because the reciprocal model and defense benefit derived is fundamentally altered. A terrorist organization's financing may be disrupted but its currency cannot be divested from international markets. A military force may move against the terrorist organization but there is no capital to seize or border to redraw. It may be that there is not even a central traditional "leader," elected or despot, from which to accept surrender or with whom to make treaty. Nuclear annihilation or a joint international military operation of overwhelming force in return for aggression or unjust war is a well-defined response and deterrent, an answer the traditional war-deterrent alliance can promise to make good on against an offending rogue state. Counterterrorism is far less easily defined and far more difficult to pursue.
An Economic Theory of Alliances (Against Terrorism)

As previously stated, the substitution effect – the occurrence of a terrorist organization *substituting* a less defended or less costly target to attack for one that is more costly to attack – is a concern in alliances against terrorism, specifically to alliance members with fewer resources or capabilities than prime terrorism targets such as the United States. Is there an occasion of substitution since 9/11 to be found in the bombings in London in 2005 and Madrid in 2004? Why have European nations been attacked directly and successfully while no major terror attacks have occurred inside the United States since 9/11? In attempting to apply the work of Sandler and Hartley to alliances against terrorism, a basic question forms immediately: Is defense against terrorism a pure public good?

Fundamentally, an alliance against terrorism is different than an alliance meant to deter war. By definition and convention of alliance literature, the public good of deterrence extracted by all parties in a collective security agreement is non-excludable and non-rival. In this case, "non-rival" explicitly means that "one ally's consumption of a unit of defense does not detract, in the least, from the consumption opportunities still available to the other allies from the same unit (Sandler and Hartley, 2001, p 871; previous largely paraphrased from Olson's 'The Logic of Collective Action')."

However, the buildup of defense against terrorism in one nation has been proven to encourage terrorists to attack other targets in other nations, a phenomenon known as substitution. Substitution targets are still valuable: an attack against a substitution target still strikes against the coalition in which one member has built up defenses against
terrorism, but the substitution target carries a lower opportunity cost than an attack on the built-up state itself.

In 2006, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler investigated the distribution of transnational terrorism since 9/11 and sought also to find whether transnational terror had been transferred to nations other than those who had committed vast resources to improving homeland security and counterterror practices. They found signs of cost-benefit analyses and rational decision calculus within terrorist strategies similar to those found in international alliances that deter against violence originating from state actors. Directly, they determined that when presented with increased costs or hardened targets, terrorist organizations will substitute a less costly target - interests of the main target located in another country, or another desirable and associated target country with fewer resources and / or defenses (Enders and Sandler 2006).

That terrorists are rational actors individually and as a collective has often been examined. This consideration is important to this thesis because the behavioral examination of allying nations and terrorist organizations as they are presented here is predicated on the assumption of rational choice behavior. Investigating for rational choice behavior in terrorists as individuals presents the extension that terrorist organizations are likewise rational actors, and as such are likely to engage in rational choice behavior like substitution. At both the individual and group levels, Martha Crenshaw explored the subject from a psychological perspective in an effort to determine how terrorist rationality works, never arguing that terrorists operate as anything other than rational actors (1981). Recently, Walter Enders and Xuejuan Su exploded the unit of analysis from individual to organization, investigating how terrorists
as rational actors engage in strategic learning about counterterror legislation and alliances, seeking to circumvent those policies and adjust their organizational structure, goals, and plans accordingly (2007, 36-39).

That Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 were bombed specifically because of state participation in a proactive counterterror operation cannot be ignored. Spain’s participation in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the Madrid bombing, which was followed within days by the government being voted out of power. It is quite possible – and has been asserted - that Spanish citizens, concerned about further “backlash” from terrorists, voted strategically in favor of a less aggressive counterterror policy (Siquera and Sandler 2007). In 2006, Al Jazeera broadcast a martyr video made by Shehzad Tanweer, one of the leaders of the 7/7 London bombing cell. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were cited by Tanweer as motivations and justifications for the attack. The message directly correlated the 7/7 bombing (and by implication, even Tanweer’s radicalization) to the UK government's participation in the Iraq War (Conetta 2006).

I assert that there is a preponderance of evidence that what Sandler, Bueno de Mesquita, and others have postulated separately is true: counterterror policies, whether enacted domestically by a single nation or worldwide by an international alliance, may result in increased attacks and the increased ability of a terror organization to mobilize and recruit. In the latter case, terror organizers may actively use evidence of those policies as propaganda devices, whether or not the nation has engaged in activities that endanger human rights, weaken the rule of law, or could otherwise be perceived as overdeterrence or oppressive activities. Extensive research has shown that terrorists organize well and learn strategically to overcome counterterror policies (Enders and
Sandler, 1993; Enders and Sandler, 2000; Enders and Sandler, 2002; Sandler and Enders, 2004; Enders and Sandler, 2006). The question of what we know empirically about counterterror alliances is more difficult to answer and must be extrapolated.

The Hegemon and the Normative Security Collective

With this in mind, one could argue that within a security collective, the rich and militarily robust state that contributes far more to the collective than the smaller state that has traditionally acted as a free rider may now actually be driving terrorists to attack the smaller state; attacking the main contributor state is too difficult, or too complex, or certain to fail. If this is true, then joining counterterror alliances - or participating in a global counterterror collective - is irrational and undesirable.

In a traditional alliance sense and as an example, the defense benefit that the United States consumes - by A) being a part of an alliance against terrorism and B) being the United States - is no longer entirely non-rival; indeed, the defense benefit of other states may be weakened by the very presence of the United States within the alliance. In matters of allying against terrorism, the defense benefit in an alliance against terrorism is distributed unevenly among the coalition members. A smaller country may be placed at greater risk for terrorist attack by allying with the hegemon against terrorism, and must expect to gain some other benefit than deterrence for being a part of the alliance.

Additionally, Sandler and Hartley look back to Olson and Zeckhauser, who describe deterrence as the main benefit nations gain from alliance. In a traditional war alliance, the enemy attack is forestalled "based on a pledged retaliatory response of
devastating proportions (Sandler and Hartley 2001, 872)." In the example provided by Sandler and Hartley, the threat of nuclear annihilation and the utter destruction of the offending state are held out as the imaginable consequence for aggression against a NATO member. In contrast, a transnational terrorist organization may have no state to destroy. It may not be possible to threaten such an actor in the same fashion as NATO may tacitly represent or actively make military threats on an institutionalized state.

Transnational terrorism is difficult to deal with because there are no answers that are strictly ‘right’. Amos and Stolfi (1982, 43-44) argue for globalization as an impetus of transnational terror. As globalization leads to the intrusion of Western cultural and social constructs into the Middle East, those constructs are perceived as a robust unit, as “a larger web of economic transactions that threatens local authority and sense of place.” Amos and Stolfi also describe an increase in difficulty for antiterrorist policies and counterterrorism initiatives as a byproduct of globalization. The projection of Western force and interests throughout the world, and particularly in the Middle East, makes defense against terrorism more logistically difficult for the simple reason that the number of available targets is enormous and their geographic dispersal is wide, and so the resources required to defend against transnational terrorism are vast. This in combination with the United States’ general foreign policy difficulties in the Middle East foments discord and increases the likelihood of attack on US interests in a foreign country by a third party.

Economic analyses of terror and substitution further indicate that Western interests such as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries with large amounts of resources and interests located in other, poorer host countries
may create problems for those host countries. When confronted with the increased resources committed by those Western nations to preventing terrorism domestically, terrorists as rational actors determine the costs of attacking those nations directly to be prohibitive. Thus, terrorists decide to attack resources in other countries, countries that lack the defense capabilities to protect themselves adequately. Sandler and Peter Rosendorff classified these attacks as “collateral damage” and attributed some of this activity to terrorist’s rational reaction to counterterror policies. Sandler and Rosendorff also postulated that a correlation exists between stringent counterterror policies and increased recruitment ability for terrorists (2004, 657-659).

Why Do Countries Ally Against Terrorism?

The joint product model - roughly, in which both public and private goods are produced within an alliance - explains what the alternative or additional motivations might be for a state to ally with another state against terrorism. Olson’s exploitation hypothesis and concerns about free riders over-consuming a public good become less relevant when a joint product model is observed among states engaged in specific actions. Sandler and Hartley offer an example of a model in which a majority of the benefits are excludable and not purely public, like ally-specific benefits (for our purposes, counterterrorism training and sharing specific intelligence on a certain terrorist group) and damage-limiting protection may actually result in the model becoming more efficient and equitable, resulting in a greater match between benefits received and burdens carried on a relative basis (1975, pp 445-446).

Russett’s stratification of alliances naturally dovetails with an idea of non-public
goods being doled out by the major power in the alliance to compensate for the smaller state's troubles. The smaller state, if threatened by the terrorist organization, may seek the aforementioned intelligence or training benefits. A smaller state with a less direct concern about terrorism or the specific terrorist group in question - perhaps the state has not previously been targeted by the organization, or perhaps it is not contiguous to a primary target of the organization in question - may seek other non-public and ally-specific goods, like developmental aid, debt relief, or increased access to markets to cultivate heightened trade interdependence.

In Russett's 'Dominance' typology, little cultural or geographical demand is placed on the participants. According to this typology, the participants need not be geographically contiguous (or indeed, even close together) or culturally similar (1971, 270). Specific to Russett's example, economic and military aid was proffered by the major power in return for basing rights or similar assistance from the small powers, and the diplomatic channels were open but "institution-building was avoided (272)."
Specifically, the smaller state was sufficiently stable and developed to offer and accept various goods and, for our purposes, would require no nation-building or regime change to participate.

The modern alliance against terrorism drawn from disparate theories, then, is exemplified in the two operations in Afghanistan that followed the attacks of 9/11: the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO - 'Dominance' alliances between the US and smaller nations, like Costa Rica; and 'Integrated Defense' alliances between the United States and relatively smaller states that are still rich with resources and well-developed, like the United
Kingdom. Within the context of previous research on traditional alliances, a directed study on counterterror alliances can draw together the disparate ideas presented previously about war deterrent alliances, why such alliances are formed, and the economic underpinnings of such alliances. In adapting those ideas for application to counterterror alliances in our modern world, I assert that a new manner of thinking in which researchers – and, indeed, policy makers - may consider counterterror alliances is possible. The first task, though, is to determine whether nations choose to ally against terrorism for reasons different than those readily accepted as catalysts for alliance as war deterrent.

In this review of literature I have presented several studies that examine the motivations for nations to join defense and deterrent alliances, what drives nations to meet (or, in the case of some domestic factors, fail to meet) the terms of those alliances, what benefit each nation may draw from membership, what costs each nation may incur from membership, and how those costs and benefits are distributed among alliance members. I have reviewed work that explores the democratic peace and how regime type influences interaction among nations with shared threats and alliances as well as how the perception of aggression against a state may affect how potential alliance members view their own role in dealing with such a threat and how other nation’s actions are perceived as they pursue military or law enforcement approaches to dealing with such aggression, be it terrorism or not. I have cited findings that discount cultural or systemic similarities as pre-requisites for alliance and, in several works on terrorism, have examined how counterterrorism policies and responses to terrorist attacks affect the decisions and capabilities of terrorist organizations.
The literature presented here also shows us generally which matters a nation concerns itself with when determining whether to join a classic war-deterrent alliance: Is there a threat? Do I share that threat with other nations? Does history - the past actions of the aggressor, the existing relationships with nations that share a common threat - inform as to how real the threat is, or what the cost of alliance will be? And, with regard to counterterrorism alliances: If terrorism fundamentally differs from the recognizable, classifiable threat of an aggressor state or group of states, can counterterror alliances possibly form owing to similar motivation?
CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Thus far I have identified the form and function that traditional war-deterrent or defense alliances take, and we have identified the previously acknowledged key factors in the formation of those alliances: shared threats, previously existing alliances, regime type, defense as a shared benefit, geographical concerns, capabilities concerns, and historical and behavioral indicators about the aggressor. I have also identified several ways in which terrorism, as asymmetric warfare, differs fundamentally from traditional warfare and aggressive state behavior. Owing to those fundamental differences between terrorist organizations and states, I derive my theory, clearly stated: Nations ally against terrorism for different reasons than they ally to deter war.

Working from that theory, this work takes several factors known to contribute to traditional alliance formation - whether a nation has been previously attacked by the aggressor, whether a nation is secondarily attacked or threatened buy an aggressor, whether a nation has a pre-existing alliance with a target nation, and whether a nation is a democracy - and tests the effect of those factors on international alliances formed in response to transnational terrorist attacks.

Some previous work in this field also suggests that a global security collective - a global war on terror - either has developed or is currently under development. To test whether a global security collective is an active entity, this work is limited to several attacks by al-Qaeda, and measures whether nations grow more likely to join counterterror alliances as al-Qaeda mounts more attacks against different countries.

In testing these variables, the work both examines the applicability of traditional
war-deterrent contributing factors to transnational terrorism, and also tests whether alliance formation and joining behavior in response to a mounting global terror threat differs significantly from alliance formation and joining behavior in response to war and/or the threat of international conflict.

Hypotheses

In the present work I consider the following in forming my hypotheses, drawn from the literature’s assertions on alliances, terrorism, and how national decisions are made. The main assumption herein is that alliances against terrorism are similar enough to war deterrent alliances to examine the former with tools and measures generally used to study the latter, but that terrorism is different enough from war to necessitate a distinct line of study.

In the previously discussed findings on alliance theory, international relations were shown as active factors in the rational choice cost-benefit analysis of alliance joining behavior. Thus, I first examine whether a nation that may choose to join the counterterrorism alliance is currently in a deterrence alliance with the targeted nation, i.e. NATO, ASEAN, or some similar arrangement. Although the threat of terrorism is different in many cases from the threat around which the original alliance was formed, a terrorist attack is a threat or aggression against a state and therefore may inspire support or intervention from extant allies:

Hypothesis 1: States that are already allied with a state primarily targeted by a transnational terrorist attack are more likely to join an alliance against the aggressor terrorist organization than other states.

The main factor in classic war deterrent alliance behavior was threat, and a need
for defense. With that in mind, the next test is whether a nation has previously been attacked by the terrorist organization that perpetrated the attack in question, and if, during the attack in question, each nation was a secondary target and suffered loss of property, interests, or the lives of citizens as a result of the attack. This would imply a ‘shared threat’ between nations and provide alliance formation as a possible rational choice for the potential alliance member just as shared threat was and is a determinant in alliance formation for war deterrence. My hypotheses examine the conditions of such shared threats between nations and assert that such a shared threat - both to specifically involved or targeted states, and the idea of a burgeoning global security collective that is responsive to and deals with a persistent threat from a single terrorist organization - makes alliance-joining more likely.

Hypothesis 2: States that were previously attacked by the same terrorist organization as a state primarily targeted by a transnational terrorist attack are more likely to join an alliance against the aggressor terrorist organization than other states.

Hypothesis 3: As a transnational terrorist organization perpetrates more attacks, states become more likely to join a counterterrorism alliance against that organization.

Hypothesis 4: Secondary target states of a transnational terrorist attack are more likely to ally with the primary target state against the aggressor terrorist organization than other states.

Taken together, the literature on international law and the War On Terror by Greenwood as well as the findings on democracies by Gartzke and Gleditsch inform us that matters and issues outside the scope of the traditional yes / no decision calculus of states within international relations affect how decisions on foreign policy are made. This leads me to reject Frederking’s assertion that a global security collective is inevitable. Rather, I hypothesize that in the modern world, domestic pressures and
geopolitical considerations may restrict the decision-making ability of developed states with democratic regimes, discouraging automatic alliance against a socially constructed global threat, even though they are often the targets of transnational terrorism.

Some states are targeted by real terrorist organizations but the idea of a monolithic global terrorism threat, one that might inspire a global alliance against terrorism in general, for instance, is socially constructed. Terrorist organizations represent specific, regional, asymmetric threats. These are certainly threats worth taking seriously, and they often present clear risk and danger in regions other than the home region of the organization, and that is what makes them transnational in nature. That being said, transnational terrorist organizations do not represent a threat to the entire world simultaneously, if only due to logistics, projection and capabilities. As an alternative example, North Korea may represent a global threat, but they have a uniformed military and nuclear weapons, and represent the possibility of state terrorism and state aggression rather than a non-state transnational terrorist organization.

With this fully in consideration, recall that while similar regime type does not necessarily pose a pre-requisite for alliance, the behavior of democracies was well examined by Gartzke and Gleditsch and their work illuminated some counterintuitive findings, notably that democracies were less likely to intervene or get involved in armed conflict, even in some cases where treaty conditions or alliances previously existed. They noted war as a possible confounding effect in and of itself, and postulated that wartime behavior may be distinct from alliance-joining behavior, as the latter is a decision made outside of the context of existing armed conflict with a different set of domestic political motivations and pressures.
The cases I present here fit with Greenwood’s more specific typology of alliances formed in response to specific incidents: in his work, an invasion; in mine, a terrorist attack, and so I assume a decision-making state similar to Gartzke and Gleditsch’s confounded wartime. I argue, in fact, that the time following a terrorist attack is compressed and intense in a manner that is different than the context of wartime but similar enough as to likewise stand distinct from alliances formed under more peaceful conditions. In light of that, I maintain Gartzke and Gleditsch’s findings on war deterrent alliances as the base of the hypothesis and test it within the context of alliances against terrorism.

Hypothesis 5: Democracies are more likely to refrain from joining an alliance against the aggressor transnational terrorist organization than non-democratic states.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

The main focus of the empirical analysis presented hereafter is to measure the effect of traditional war deterrent alliance contributing factors on whether a state will choose to join an international counterterror alliance. I utilize a quantitative approach to examine why countries choose to ally against transnational terrorists. As a concise definition and for the purpose of this work, "transnational terrorism" describes aggressive, destructive acts perpetrated by a specific, transnational, non-state terrorist organization, meaning that the attack or support for and direction of the attack came from a nation different than the one in which the attacked target is located, or involves transnational, transboundary externalities. As such, “transnational” may describe non-state actors directing attacks in other countries than where those actors are primarily based, or may primarily target a nation outside of that nation’s boundaries and within the boundaries of another. More simply, I quote Sandler and Enders from February 2002’s “An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism:

Transnational terrorist incidents are transboundary externalities, insofar as actions conducted by terrorists or authorities in one country may impose uncompensated costs or benefits on people or property of another country.

I have chosen to examine this kind of terrorism specifically because it is of a sufficient nature and scale as to engender an international alliance response, thus creating a choice for each nation in the world at the time of the attack, a decision opportunity for each country in the world. I have intentionally disqualified other kinds of terrorism, such as entrenched, persistent terrorism in response to territorial conflicts, as is found in the Israel / Palestinian conflict or in the unspectacular, sustained insurgency
activities in Iraq, which tend to involve suicide bombings and IED attacks on a smaller scale than the attacks represented here; or nationalist separatist terrorism, as in the case of the IRA in Northern Ireland or the Red Army Faction in West Germany. The former is likely to result in a more traditional war alliance, as the terrorist organization is a direct agent of a state, even though that state is engaged in asymmetric warfare; the latter is terrorism within a state against that same state, usually formed and operated in an effort to overthrow a government. Both are fundamentally different than transnational terrorism as I define it here and as such are not considered.

In addition, I have not considered many types of state-sponsored terrorism. Such terrorism normally consists of sustained campaigns against or within a nation, and while many of these activities could be considered transnational in nature due to support from nations exterior to where the group operates and mounts attacks, they do not fit the definition I use within this study – in most cases of state terrorism, the organization that perpetrates the terrorism is still centrally located and engages in entrenched, persistent terrorism as opposed to large-scale, spectacular attacks.

Finally, I have not included attacks against purely military targets, such as the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. This decision springs from an effort to maintain a certain attack demographic across the data set, which in this case consists of transnational terrorist attacks against non-military targets - a more "traditional" terrorism as opposed to asymmetric or guerilla warfare.

To test my theory, I will examine the details of several well-known but substantively differing incidences of transnational terrorism perpetrated by al-Qaeda: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993; the US Embassy

The attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001 – the former by formative elements of al-Qaeda, and the latter, famously, by the full-fledged organization, include very obvious instances of transnational terrorism, and certainly in 9/11 we find the most spectacular example in human history of such an attack. While 9/11 represents a statistical outlier both in number of casualties and in alliance response behavior, the inclusion as a case is necessary, and an examination of the nature and scope of that outlying data is likewise required.

The 1998 bombings of the US Embassy in Tanzania and Kenya are included because this coordinated attack is representative of precisely the scope and gravity of attack this work is concerned with: a spectacular, coordinated, multi-target attack against major power interests in a foreign country by al-Qaeda, the transnational terrorist organization of primary concern.

Finally, the nightclub bombing targeting Australian citizens in Bali in 2002 and the transit bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 by al-Qaeda cells represent a continuation of the transnational nature of al-Qaeda’s operation into the 21st century. Important considerations in the analysis of transnational terrorism, including the concept and probability of target substitution, are represented within these cases, as the professed motivation for those attacks was the involvement of each primarily targeted nation in the international alliance formed against the responsible terrorist organization.
in the wake of 9/11. Separated by time and target location, each attack is unique and worthy of examination.

The unit of analysis is country-event-year. Country determines the country in question, and for each year every country in existence during that year is included in the sample, the logic being that every country has the option to choose to ally against terror, whether it ultimately does or not. The Event in question is the terrorist attack and all relevant results from said attack. Year reflects the year in which the examined terrorist attack took place (1993, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005).

Year is not, in the form of a single year, an exact representation of the temporal range of this study. This is due to the fact that the major international alliances against the terrorist group responsible for an attack sometimes do not formalize or codify until some time after the event occurred. The state in question makes the decision to join or not to join the specific alliance based on a number of factors over a period of time - For example, some nations that joined the counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan in response to 9/11 did not actually deploy in 2001.

Thus, the data for the event in 2001 actually reflects a decision made over one or more years by a state on whether to join an alliance that endures as I write this, even in transition to a new administration in the United States, in January of 2009. For the sake of inclusion and clarity, all data used reflects the year of attack, save for the data on whether the nation joined or did not join a counterterror alliance, which is extrapolated and based on whether a nation joined an alliance against the group responsible for the attack, regardless of when the alliance was finalized. For the purpose of controlling any bias or statistical noise caused by other events external to the specific attack in
question, any activity – alliance joining or otherwise - that takes place more than five years after the attack was not included.

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable describes whether a country joins in an alliance against the transnational terrorist organization that perpetrated the attack in question. In this work, the transnational terrorist organization is al-Qaeda.

As the dependent variable, whether a nation joined an international alliance in response to a terrorist attack is operationalized as a binary variable, in which the country in question in the year in question receives a score of 1 if any quantifiable tangible contribution at all was made to the alliance - this includes a contribution of law enforcement or investigative or intelligence agency resources, or providing resources or troops to the military action taken up by the alliance against the terrorist group. Arrest, detention, and extradition of suspects in terrorist attacks also qualifies as tangible support if the suspects are not extradited to an asylum nation.

This is an imprecise operationalization at best, especially considering the weaknesses Maoz and Felsenthal detail in boiling the decision-making processes of states down to over-simplified yes / no dichotomies. It is, however, sufficient for these analytical purposes - it describes not only alliance-joining behavior but also a specific level of commitment, e.g. the contribution of tangible support. The possibilities for expanding the dependent variable to describe the actions of each state in greater detail are numerous, but the choice of a simpler method within the scope of this work is intentional. The idea presented here is to catch the scope of possible alliance behavior.
rather than to examine the kinds of tangible support alliances formed in a granular fashion.

To my knowledge and at the time of this study, a dataset describing whether states chose to ally against terrorism in response to specific events does not exist. As such, the data on which nations decided to join counterterror alliances have been drawn from a variety of sources, including scholarly works, news sources, and official reports. The data are coded with a binary variable describing the level of alliance intensity and in each case was corroborated to the best of my ability across several sources and source types whenever possible. For each case, this included scholarly research articles and books, peer-review journal articles, news wire archives, and official government documents. As a result, the data are exactly fitted to the concept I wish to measure through the activation of the dependent variable – whether a state joined a counterterror alliance against al-Qaeda with significant commitment.

Within my dataset, I sought to include all countries able to join a burgeoning alliance against terrorism which, for our purposes, means every country in existence at the time of alliance formation, measured at each country-event-year decision node. Where evidence was found of an alliance against terrorism - a contribution of tangible military or law enforcement assistance, intelligence support, logistics or materials – plainly, personnel and resource engagement - the country was scored appropriately (1) for the event in question. Where no evidence of alliance behavior was found, or where evidence of support for the aggressor terrorist organization is found, that country was scored 0.
Limiting the Set

As each nation’s score on the PolityIV scale is also included as a derived independent variable measuring regime type and level of democracy, I chose to limit the scope of my nations similarly to PolityIV’s dataset limitation – a nation must have a population numbering more than 500,000 to be included.

Table 1: Summary of Dependent Variable (Final Data) (ct_alliance1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Joined / Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Center</td>
<td>5/161</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy Bombings</td>
<td>4/160</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11</td>
<td>43/160</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>7/161</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>5/161</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London 7/7</td>
<td>6/161</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70/964</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across all data, the summarization of the counterterrorism alliance dependent variable illustrates alliances formed against al-Qaeda following terrorist attacks including and following 1993’s World Trade Center bombing. The number of nations joining alliances was still only 70, representing 7.26 percent of the total cases in which countries could have joined alliances against al-Qaeda in the years since they actively began perpetrating attacks.

The majority of states joining counterterror alliances come from the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, part of the international alliance formed in response to 9/11 and lead by NATO and the United States, respectively. This alliance was defined by and formed for the purpose of regime change in Afghanistan and striking against the Taliban.
Independent Variables

Of the independent variables, I used several elements generally codified as explanatory indicators in international war and peace and regularly employed as indicators of joining behavior in war deterrent alliance models - regime type and level of democratization, state stability, military expenditure, and extant alliances. I was inspired to employ these variables as control elements by the subject-specific literature I reviewed, particularly the work by Olson and Zeckhauser, Sandler and Hartley, Maoz, O’Neal, Russett, Simon, Gartzke, Gleditsch, and others. Like those scholars, I extrapolated these data from from well known, often used and established sources: the information on democratization and state stability was drawn from the PolityIV dataset, and information on military expenditures and extant alliances were taken from the latest versions available of the Correlates of War dataset. Along with these are two additional independent variables which I personally coded – whether a country was a secondary target in the attack in question or had been previously targeted by the aggressor terrorist group – and these data were drawn from the same collection of scholarly, official, and news sources as were used to determine which nations joined counterterror alliances.

Extant Alliance (ext_ally_bin)

This variable is adopted from the Correlates of War Alliances dataset, and measures whether a nation had a pre-existing military alliance with the primary target country at the time of the attack. A score of 0 indicates no alliance existed. If, according to the Correlates of War Alliances dataset, an alliance existed, the type of alliance is
notated thus within that dataset: a score of 1 indicates entente; a score of 2 indicates a neutrality or non-aggression pact; and a score of 3 indicates a mutual defense agreement. When a NATO member is the primary target nation, NATO membership is indicated by a score of 3. NATO membership was coded for inclusion within this variable as it is not included in the Correlates of War Alliances dataset.

In the interest of simplifying the modeling process of this data, the more robust COW variable was boiled down to a binary. Scores of 0, 1, and 2 as previously described were assigned a score of 0. All scores of 3 were assigned a score of 1. This variable measures the concept of Hypothesis 1, based on the assertion that pre-existing alliances do not make nations more likely to ally.

I make the argument that the Coalition of the Willing differs from a traditional mutual-defense relationship of the sort we examine here. Where NATO might be the arch example of a mutual defense alliance, the Coalition of the Willing is a wholly different beast, being an alliance primarily composed of states agreeing with other states to aggress on a major-power-defined objective: Iraq.

The Coalition of the Willing was not formed for the purpose of defense or deterrence, and it is not meant as a literal, functional deterrent against open aggression or even as a defense mechanism for sovereign boundaries, national interests, or the lives of citizens. The Coalition is also not open-ended, or permanent; rather, it is designed to terminate along with the war for which it was formed. It is instead the placement of terrorist attacks outside of the realm of asymmetrical warfare and into the domain of international militaristic aggression. As such, in the two cases I examine that occurred after the establishment of the Coalition of the Willing in 2003 – those being the
7/7 London bombings of July 2005 and the Madrid bombings of March 2004 – the Coalition of the Willing is not counted as a pre-existing alliance for the purposes of the model, where NATO or certain aspects of ASEAN or ANZUS are.

Primary Target (prim_target)

This variable measures whether a nation was the primary target in the terrorist attack in question. It is a binary variable, and each nation receives a score of 1 if it is the primary target of an attack, and a zero if it is not. This variable is a control and is presented for data clarity – each attack may only have one primary target.

Previously Targeted (prev_targ)

This variable is also a binary, and scored similarly to prim_targ. If a nation was previously targeted by the aggressor terrorist organization, the nation receives a score of 1. If a nation was not previously targeted it receives a score of 0. I limited this measurement to include only attacks by specific groups and not satellite organizations; attacks directly upon a nation or its interests and not casualties or damages suffered as a secondary effect of an attack; and incidences up to but not more than ten years before the attack in question. The idea reinforced by a positive score in this variable is that the nation in question shares a common threat with the primary target nation, as is described in Hypothesis 2.

Secondary Target (sec_targ)

This variable is also a binary, and scored similarly to prim_targ. If a nation was
secondarily targeted in the terrorist attack in question – which includes unintended or specifically premeditated property damage or damage to the interests of a particular nation, or if a nations’ citizens are killed in the attack – then the nation receives a score of one. If the nation was not secondarily targeted, it receives a score of 0 for the event. The idea reinforced by a positive score in this variable is the nation in question shares a common threat with the primary target nation, as is described in Hypothesis 4.

Military Expenditure (in thousands / log) (log_milex)

As drawn from the Correlates of War capabilities data, this independent variable presents the log of a measurement in thousands of the military expenditure of a nation for the given year. Various state capabilities are examined as an indicator of willingness to ally and go to war with other nations, and this variable – regularly included in the literature on alliances cited here as a significant factor in alliance formation - is included here in an effort to determine if the same can be said for alliances against terrorist organizations.

Democracy (democracy)

This independent variable is a binary value generated from the Polity IV Score in this dataset. The Polity IV dataset classifies a regime as a democracy if the Polity IV score is 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. Thus, if a given country has a score within this range, it has a democracy score of 1. If a given country has a Polity IV score lower than 6, it has a democracy score of 0. This variable measures the concept presented in Hypothesis 5,
the assumption that democracies are more likely to refrain from joining a counterterror alliance.

Weighting Variable (qaeda_weight)

To test whether each additional attack by a single organization affects alliance joining behavior, I employed the variable qaeda_weight, an ordinal assignation of each attack indicating the number of attacks that meet my inclusion criteria that occurred prior to the attack in question. 1993, being the first major attack that could be attributed to identifiable al-Qaeda elements, has a qaeda_weight of 0. The African embassy bombings in 1998 have a score of 1, 9/11 has a score of 2, and so on. This measures the concept presented in Hypothesis 3.

Methodology

As the dependent variable is in my initial analysis a binary, I utilized a logit regression and odds ratios to test the effects of the independent variables on whether a given nation would join a counterterror alliance, as logit regression results should indicate whether the classical alliance-determinant factors act upon the likelihood of a state joining a counterterror alliance. Additionally, a logit regression provides the same information about my ‘new’ variables specific to transnational terrorist attacks, and each state’s interaction with the terrorist organization, such as if they had been previously attacked or had suffered losses in the attack in question. Standard Wald tests and likelihood ratio tests were performed on all variables as simple hypothesis and reference markers.
CHAPTER 5
CASES/EVENTS

Criteria for Case Selection

In selecting cases, I created a sample that is illustrative rather than exhaustive. I included only "modern" terrorist attacks by maintaining the 1993 World Trade Center as the chronological start point. I also limited my sample to attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda, for several reasons. First, each terrorist attack had to be transnational in nature, and sufficiently successful and spectacular as to possibly engender an international alliance response, and each case here fits that bill: the New York World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, September 11, the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002; the Madrid train bombings in 2004; and the attacks on London's transit system in July of 2005. By further limiting the sample set to al-Qaeda attacks, I am also able to fully engage the underlying idea of a global security collective developed in response to a persistent threat, and, simply, to test whether a series of attacks perpetrated over time by a single terrorist organization are more likely to engender an alliance response.

Ramzi Yousef and the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing

The first bombing of the World Trade Center was the first large scale operation on American soil by what would eventually become al-Qaeda. It provided some major harbingers of doom that went unheeded in the years between it and 2001. Khalid

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1 The details of this event are largely paraphrased from news sources and academic texts, listed under RAMZI YOUSEF AND THE 1993 WTC BOMBING in the CASE / DATA SOURCES section of the Appendix.
Sheikh Mohammed, now known to be an originator of the 9/11 plot, is, in fact, Yousef’s uncle, and he contributed some minor financing and guidance in the plot.

Israel and policy towards Israel by the United States were cited as motivating factors by Yousef and his co-conspirators. The event itself followed closely on the heels of the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, now known to be a seminal operation by al-Qaeda elements inside the United States. Mahmud Abouhalima was implicated along with El Sayyid Nosair in Kahane’s assassination, and the two men both figured prominently in the 1993 WTC bombing. Both were also counted among the field operatives of Omar Abdel-Rahman, the so-called "Blind Sheikh" (Reeve 1999).

Why 1993 is Important

This attack represented the keystone counterterrorism policy event in the ‘pre-9/11’ era. The primary action of the United States government in response to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was one of law enforcement. The activities following the bombing and the resultant hunt for Ramzi Yousef and co-conspirators Mahmud Abouhalima, Mohammad Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Abdul Rahman Yasin and Ahmad Ajaj were police work rather than military action, although military agencies participated in the search spearheaded by FBI (Clarke 2004).

Previous Alliances

Mostly of note are the general treaties and agreements of the United States at this point, including NATO and NATO’s member nations as well as the major non-NATO
ally status shared by Japan, Israel, Australia, South Korea, and Egypt, all officially codified in 1989.²

**Alliances**

After the bombing, Yousef fled to Quetta, Blochistan, his home province in Pakistan. Pakistan offered official intelligence assistance in cooperating with the federal government and engaging in joint operations with the State Department Diplomatic Security Service, including a raid on Yousef's home in Quetta. Yousef was eventually captured in Pakistan and extradited (Lance).

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a suspected associate of Ramzi Yousef, was arrested by federal authorities after several ties between Khalifa and the 1993 bombing were found in ensuing investigations. The Philippines government sent evidence concerning the tangential Bojinka plot - a plan to detonate bombs mid-flight on a dozen US-bound flights engineered by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - to the US after Khalifa's arrest. He was deported to Jordan to stand trial at his own request after a conviction for theater bombings in that nation had been overturned. The Jordanian court acquitted him, and Khalifa went on to live in Saudi Arabia, dying violently in 2007 in Madagascar (Cosgrove-Mather, Fielding).

Egypt apprehended Mahmoud Abouhalima, a co-conspirator of Yousef's, after he fled the United States on February 27 to Egypt via Saudi Arabia. Egypt delivered him to United States custody, and he was later tried and convicted for his role in the bombings, sentenced to 240 years like his co-conspirators (Childers and DePippo; Reeve 1999).

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² Title 10 – USC Sec. 2223; Title 22 – USC Sec. 2318
The most unlikely cooperation came from Iraq, a nation that some investigators sought to connect to the World Trade Center bombing. Abdul Raman Yassin returned to Iraq after being released by federal agents investigating the World Trade Center bombing. He had been arrested on the same day as Salameh and driven to the FBI headquarters in Newark, where he underwent questioning. After being very cooperative with investigating agents, the FBI let Yassin go and drove him back to his residence. He later fled to Iraq (Kohn).

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz claimed in 2002 that the Iraqi government had offered to extradite Yassin twice, first in 1994 and then in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. He claimed the offer was made without condition. US intelligence officials corroborated that an offer was made but insisted that untenable conditions were attached to the offer.\(^3\)

\textit{Israel as Secondary Target}

Over a thousand people were injured in the 1993 attack, and six died. Four were employees of the Port Authority, one worked at the Windows on the World restaurant atop the tower, and one was a dental equipment salesman (Lance; Hirschkorn). The US was the primary target of this attack and US citizens perished. According to interviews and news reports following the bombing, Ramzi Yousef viewed an attack on New York as an opportunity to strike at Israel as well.

Yasin tells Stahl that the twin towers were not the terrorists' first choice. Ramzi Yousef, the so-called mastermind of the '93 attack, had something else in mind. "[Yousef] told me, 'I want to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn.'" But after scouting Crown Heights and Williamsburg, Yasin says, Yousef had a better idea. "Ramzi Yousef told us to go to the World Trade Center... 'I have an idea we

\(^3\) US 'Refused Iraq's Terror Suspect Offer.' BBC 2002
should do one big explosion rather than do small ones in Jewish neighborhoods," Yasin says. They figured the World Trade Center would serve as a more efficient target. "The majority of people who work in the World Trade Center are Jews," Yasin says. (David Kohn, “60 Minutes: The Man Who Got Away.”)

Israel as Previous Target

El Sayyid Nosair, later convicted for his involvement in the WTC bombings in 1993, was the prime suspect in the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, who was murdered after giving a speech in New York City in 1990. Nosair was convicted only of firearms charges in that case. Media reports cited a Senate Intelligence Committee report indicating that Nosair’s legal defense in the Kahane assassination was largely funded by Osama bin Laden (Smith 2002).

US Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya

On August 7, 1998, explosives loaded into two trucks were detonated by suicide bombers in near simultaneous attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks occurred at approximately 10:30 AM local time. Casualties were high in Kenya, with some 4,000 injured and 212 killed. In Tanzania, 11 locals died and 85 others were hurt.

The disparity in casualties was the result of how each attack was carried out. In Nairobi, the bomber was able to get the truck into the rear parking entrance of the Embassy itself; in Dar es Salaam. The closest the bomber could get was several dozen feet from the outer security wall. (Ressa 2003)

4 The details of this event as I relate them here are largely paraphrased from cross-corroborated news sources and academic texts, listed under 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN TANZANIA AND KENYA in the CASE / DATA SOURCES section of the Appendix.
Investigations showed that local members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad were responsible for the attack, with the group operating essentially as an affiliated subsidiary of al-Qaeda. The groups would officially merge in June of 2001. Many in senior leadership positions in al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were later revealed to have played a direct role in planning the broad scope and details of the attack (Benjamin and Simon 2002).

### Primary Target

The primary target of this terrorist attack was the United States. The perpetrators of the attack were trained and equipped by al-Qaeda, with some attending camps in Afghanistan. The motivation for the attack centered generally on the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Region, and specifically on the circumstances surrounding the extradition of several Egyptian Islamic Jihad members for the alleged involvement in the 1990 assassination of Egyptian politician Rifaat el-Mahgoub in Cairo. The day of the attacks, August 7, marked the eight year anniversary of US troop deployments in Saudi Arabia. (Wright 2006)

### Secondary Targets

The secondary targets of these attacks were Tanzania and Kenya. Some 200 Kenyans were killed and thousands were injured; 83 Tanzanians were hurt and 11 died.

### Prior Targets of al-Qaeda

Throughout the development of the organization, al-Qaeda has been affiliated
with or absorbed numerous Islamist terrorist organizations. For the definitional purposes of this study, the groups with primary membership involved in these bombings are referred to as al-Qaeda, being Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda proper. In 1998, former targets of these groups included Egypt, Israel, and the United States.

**Extant Alliances**

Extant alliances the United States were numerous in 1998, including agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Egypt. The United States is also a member of NATO, and as such had specific mutual defense agreements with Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

**Response Alliances**

In response to the Embassy bombings, President Clinton engaged in several military actions against purported al-Qaeda targets, including cruise missile strikes on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. The United Nations Security Council officially condemned the bombings via Resolution 1189. No nation offered explicit combat support, but significant contributions were made by foreign nations.

Pakistan was responsible for the apprehension of several suspects in the bombings, both individually and through aid to the FBI. Germany and the United Kingdom also made a number of apprehensions. German authorities captured bin Laden adviser Mamdouh Salim near Munich in September of 1998 and extradicted him to the United States (Benjamin and Simon).
UK officials rounded up seven suspects indicted in the embassy bombings in a late September 1998 raid called Operation Challenge. Several suspects were extradicted to the United States but mounted legal challenges against British attempts to extradite them to the United States.\(^5\)

\textbf{September 11}\(^6\)

On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda operatives launched a terrorist attack against symbolic and critical infrastructure targets inside the United States. Four passenger jets were hijacked. Two were flown into the World Trade Center towers in New York City. Another was crashed into the Pentagon in Virginia. The fourth jet was on course towards Washington D.C. when passengers overtook the hijackers, resulting in the plane crashing in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, were perpetrated by al-Qaeda, an international militant Sunni Islamic terrorist organization (Hoge, Jr. and Rose, 2001). The international affairs considerations of both the 9/11 attacks and the operations that followed are discussed at length in previous sections, and so I will not give an elongated description of the attack nor its implications upon my study here, only to say that it is by all means a transitional event in both the persecution of transnational terrorism and in attempts, methods, and strategies in countering transnational terrorism.

\(^6\) The details of this event as I relate them here are largely paraphrased from cross-corroborated news sources and academic texts, listed under SEPTEMBER 11 in the CASE / DATA SOURCES section of the Appendix.
Primary Target

The primary target of the 9/11 attacks was undoubtedly the United States. Major financial and governmental landmarks were attacked utilizing methods engineered to generate a truly spectacular attack in scope, perception, financial and infrastructural damage, and loss of human life.

Secondary Targets

The target selection of the 9/11 hijackers led to citizens of a diverse multitude of nations being killed. These nations included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Philippines, Brazil, China, Congo Brazzaville, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Lithuania, Moldova, Nigeria, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

In both my collected research and in the world at large, I have found that 9/11 largely marked the end of traditional, law-enforcement philosophies in efforts to combat terrorism, and the beginning of the military response philosophy, led by the United States as an overarching force. I find this to be especially true in Western Europe and, of course, in the United States.

If scholars were to claim that counterterrorism had such a thing as a post-modern period, we are currently living in it. The attacks following September 11 exemplify the shift in philosophy that in some nations was gradual (observe the law enforcement approach in the Bali bombings of 2002) or, in the case of Madrid in 2004 and the July 7 bombings in London, where the immediate adoption of and participation in the
militaristic counterterrorism approach resulted directly in transnational terrorist attacks, as we will see presently.

**Previous Alliances**

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States carried a number of previously existing alliances in September of 2001, including agreements with Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States is also a member of NATO, and as such had specific mutual defense agreements with Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

**Previously Targeted by al-Qaeda**

Until 9/11, the nation most targeted by al-Qaeda was the United States, in such incidences as the bombing of the US Embassies in Africa and the bombing of the USS Cole as significant examples. As for al-Qaeda in general and at large, prior to the 9/11 bombing al-Qaeda and seminal elements from Egyptian Islamic Jihad mounted attacks during the 1990’s in Egypt by Zawahiri and Egyptian Islamic Jihad elements which would come to comprise a core of al-Qaeda’s membership in the ensuing years. These attacks ranged from botched attempts to assassinate state officials to the successful bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 1995 (Wright 2001).

If, as one may argue, the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane in Manhattan in
1990 is viewed as an early (if not the earliest) transnational terrorism attack performed by al-Qaeda, the justification for classifying it as an attack against Israel comes largely from Kahane’s role as a fiercely anti-Arab Zionist advocate and not for any role he might play as an official state leader, owing to his consideration by the state of Israel as a borderline domestic terrorist and agitator.

The assassination of Kahane was a strike by militant Islamic elements against the Jewish cause via a vocal proponent of Zion, but I find it difficult to classify it as an attack against Israel. If anything, it is a terrorist attack with one man as the target and the United States as a secondary target, but such a classification makes no difference in the function of my model, and so, in this case, I leave it alone.

Further previous targets stemming from Jemaah Islamiah attacks against Indonesia and the Philippines are detailed in the following case.

_Alliances as a Result of 9/11_

The invasion of Afghanistan by NATO-led multinational forces with the approval of the United Nations as well as the coalition forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom was perhaps the largest proactive counterterror operation in history. An international law enforcement action against transnational terrorist organizations writ large, the operation in Afghanistan differed significantly in composition and mission from the Coalition of the Willing formed for the purpose of invading Iraq: a huge multinational group of 43 countries at its highest point, the Coalition of the Willing was criticized as being a force comprised mainly of troops from the US, the UK, and Australia with token contributions from other nations enticed with trade or aid deals (McClure).
While one could make the argument that Al-Qaeda’s well-documented connections with the Taliban damaged the country and that incidences such as the massacre at Mazar-e-Sharif (Cooper) and the assassination of Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in early September 2001 (Harding) should be classified as terrorist actions against Afghanistan. The predominant power in Afghanistan at the time of 9/11 and during the resultant military operation was the Taliban. In effect, the gears of government in Afghanistan aided and abetted Al-Qaeda until the Taliban was overthrown.


Nations contributing significant operational and intelligence support during Operation Enduring Freedom were Armenia, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Nations contributing troops, personnel, air craft, naval support, and other specifically combat-oriented support were Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom.  

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7 Department of Defense Fact Sheet - International Contributions in the War on Terrorism, 2002; CRS Congressional Report on International Cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001
Nations contributing troops and other combat forces to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force were Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. These nations include NATO members, member nations of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and other nations. (NATO ISAF) These contributions are coded as response alliances for the purposes of my model and supersede any other classification derived from force deployments classified as an aspect of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance also contributed heavily to fighting against the Taliban and other terrorist elements during the War in Afghanistan and continue to do so currently. This contribution classifies Afghanistan as a member of a Level 2 alliance for the purposes of my model.

A Note on Research Focus

Early drafts of this work considered the Coalition of the Willing as the prime alliance formed in response to the attacks of September 11, and further consideration of the nature of counterterrorism alliances led me to believe that the operations in Afghanistan are far more representative of a defensive, response-oriented alliance, geared towards deterrence as well as the prosecution of those responsible for the attacks.

8 "Afghan Forces Kill Top Militant." BBC News
Thus, 9/11 represents a unique event in my dataset now as it did before, but for
different reasons: I consider it to be a hybrid response of law enforcement, investigative
work, international diplomacy, and military response. Where other attacks exhibited
overt law enforcement investigations and responses (Bali, Madrid, 7/7, and the 1993
World Trade Center attack) the operations in Afghanistan encompass military and law
enforcement responses (As well as diplomatic responses) and so became the focus of
my collected data and analysis rather than the Coalition of the Willing and the resultant
regime-change-oriented action by the United States in the invasion of Iraq.

Bali

In the early morning hours of October 12, 2002, two sizable and near-
simultaneous suicide bombings occurred in Kuta on Bali in Indonesia. Centered in a
tourist district, one suicide bomber detonated his explosive charges from a satchel
inside an establishment popular with tourists called Paddy's Pub. Several seconds later,
a secondary suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside of the Sari Club directly
across the street from Paddy's Pub as club-goers fled the first bomb. 202 people were
killed and 209 were injured (Wise).

The transnational terrorism group initially thought to be responsible for the attack
was Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a radical Islamist terrorism group that operates in Southeast
Asia and has documented ties to al-Qaeda via Hambali and other JI leadership. (Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, “Detainee Biographies”; Treasury Department,
“Treasury Designates Four Leaders of Terrorist Group Jemaah Islamiyah”)

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9 The details of this event as I relate them here are largely paraphrased from cross-corroborated news
sources and academic texts, listed under BALI in the CASE / DATA SOURCES section of the Appendix.
Later, this connection was confirmed, as Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s spiritual leader, was arrested and eventually convicted for various conspiracies, including blessing the Bali attacks. Several dozen people were eventually arrested and notable convictions included men believed to be directly involved in the bombing. Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim, otherwise simply known as 'Amrozi', was convicted and sentenced to death for his role, as were Imam Sumadra and Ali Gufron. Amrozi’s younger brother Ali Imron received a life sentence after acknowledging his part in the attack and expressing remorse.

Hambali was pinpointed by admitted emir Ali Gufron as a source for funding for the Bali bomb, and funding had proven necessary: the car bomb outside Club Suri was of sufficient construction and magnitude to detonate at thermobaric levels, generating enough explosive and incendiary force to ignite atmospheric oxygen (Wise).

Hambali was eventually detained by the United States and is currently being held in an undisclosed location. Despite freely participating in investigations after 9/11, once the United States had Hambali in custody, access to interview or interrogate the prisoner was not granted to Indonesia or any other government throughout George W. Bush’s presidency and Hambali’s detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This policy changed shortly after the Obama administration took power in Washington, and after years of rejected requests, media reports indicate that Indonesian national security officials were finally able to meet with Hambali in March, 2009.

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11 Malaysian Insider, “Jakarta Finally Gains Access to Hambali.”
Primary Target

Australia was primarily targeted in the Bali bombings for participation in the war on terror and cooperation with the United States. Shortly after the Bali attacks, al-Jazeera took receipt of and broadcast a tape reportedly from Osama bin Laden, threatening further violence against Australia and citing Australia’s participation with the Coalition of the Willing and military operations in Afghanistan and other activities in East Timor as cause for the Bali bombing (Parkinson).

Secondary Targets

Australia lost more citizens in the Bali nightclub bombings than any other nation. Other countries suffering the loss of citizens included Indonesia, Great Britain, the United States of America, Germany, Sweden, Holland, France, Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Taiwan.

Previously Targeted

Jemaah Islamiah, a group that essentially operated as a wholly owned and fully funded subsidiary of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia (Gunaratna; 9/11 Commission Report) but that is now mostly defunct, attempted to bomb the embassies of the US, Britain, Israel, and Australia in Singapore beginning in October 2001, as a retaliation against the US bombing of Afghanistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Bonner and Mydans). Hambali and other operatives of Jemaah Islamiah have also been connected to or implicated in several attacks between 2000 and 2002, including
an assassination attempt against the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia in Jakarta\textsuperscript{12}; a string of church bombings in Jakarta and other cities on Christmas Eve in 2000\textsuperscript{13} as well as bombings in Manila in 2000 and an attempted series of bombings of American passenger aircraft in Asia in 1995\textsuperscript{14}. These attacks classify the US, the UK, Israel, Australia, Indonesia, and the Philippines as previous targets of Jemaah Islamiah or their primary agents.

\textit{Previous Alliances}

Australia participated in a number of alliances at differing levels of commitment, including a mutual defense alliance with the United States, both in logistics\textsuperscript{15} and in defense within terms of the ANZUS agreement\textsuperscript{16}. Australia also participated in a defense intelligence agreement with South Africa at the time of the Bali bombings.\textsuperscript{17}

Australia is also an informal partner in ASEAN, which formed a joint cooperative on counterterrorism efforts in October 2002\textsuperscript{18}, including the United States and other ASEAN nations.

\textit{Resultant Alliances}

Australia and Indonesia specifically codified a joint operations agreement in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] \textit{BBC News}, “Bali Bomber Back In Court”
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}, “Jemaah Islamiyah” | see also \textit{Asia-Pacific News}, “Indonesia Captures ‘Emir’ of Regional Terrorist Network”
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] (CDLSA, http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/treaties.nsf/AllDocIDs/A34B16593B5BC1B0CA256B06001025AC)
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] ANZUS treaty text - http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] FOR THE RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OF DEFENCE INTEREST: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2001/15.html
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] ASEAN SEC - http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
investigating the Bali bombings. Expertise and personnel from the United States (FBI), the United Kingdom (Scotland Yard), Germany, and Japan were instrumental in analyzing the attack and tracking down those responsible. Counter-terrorism funding from Singapore was increased significantly along with that from the US and the UK in the wake of the Bali bombings of 2002 (Wise).

Madrid

On March 11, 2004, four commuter trains on Madrid's busy transit system were bombed. Ten explosive devices were detonated remotely. Some 1,600 people were injured and 191 people died in the attack.

Claiming Responsibility

The Spanish government initially laid blame on Euskadi Ta Askatasuna despite considerable aberrations in attack technique and approach from those regularly employed by ETA. Although some normative aspects of ETA attack methods were present, the attack (and particularly the sophistication of the explosives used) immediately resembled an al-Qaeda operation (Ramos 2005).

GIA (Algeria's Armed Islamic Group) and the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group were also suspected of ties to the attacks for some time, but the Spanish judicial investigation showed that neither group played a direct role or as large an institutionally-seated role as al-Qaeda and remnants from al-Qaeda’s Madrid cell that had been functioning in Spain prior to being broken up and detained after 9/11. The bombers used methods and materials that are usually the hallmark of al-Qaeda attacks, but the
cell that carried out the attack differed from al-Qaeda proper in a number of ways. The plotters were not mujahideen and had not been to training camps. The person chiefly suspected as the main al-Qaeda organizer in Spain (the Syrian-born Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) was captured by Pakistani forces in 2006 and turned over to the United States.\textsuperscript{19}

The US then refused to grant the Spanish government access to him during the 11/3 trials in 2007, leading to a palpable rift between the two nations on counterterrorism procedure.\textsuperscript{20} Twenty-one individuals were eventually convicted for their role in the attacks.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Primary Target: Spain}

The primary target for this attack was Spain, which the attackers sought to punish for the government’s cooperation with the United States in the Middle East. The attack had politically motivated timing, being set for three days prior to the national election. Media reports and public opinion polls indicated that the Madrid bombing itself - as well as the Aznar government’s handling of initial investigations – were motivators in the incumbent government being voted out of power.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Times Online: Spain furious as US blocks access to Madrid bombing "chief" - http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1391123.ece
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Reuters: Court finds 21 guilty of Madrid train bombings - http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL308491320071031?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Gordon, Phillip. "Madrid Bombings and US Policy." Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
\end{itemize}
Secondary Targets

The total number of victims was 191. There were victims from seventeen countries: 142 Spanish, 16 Romanians, six Ecuadorian, four Poles, four Bulgarians, three Peruvians, two Dominicans, two Colombians, two Moroccans, two Ukranians, two Hondurans, one Senegalese, one Cuban, one Chilean, one Brazilian, one French, and one Filipino. The total number of victims was higher than in any other terrorist attack in Spain, far surpassing the 21 killed and 40 wounded from a 1987 bombing at a Hipercor chain supermarket in Barcelona. On that occasion, responsibility was claimed by the Basque armed militant group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("Basque Fatherland and Liberty"), or ETA (Vidino).

Previously Targeted by Al-Qaeda

Although ties to al-Qaeda turned up in investigations, the general consensus on this attack is that the aggressor group represented a new, largely self-directed al-Qaeda cell, operating without direct guidance from the upper echelons of al-Qaeda leadership (Ramos). Evidence pointed to Islamic extremists that function as the prime representatives of al-Qaeda’s new network in Europe, operating independently while not directly managed by al-Qaeda’s central leadership, in this specific instance possibly taking direction from material accessed regularly from al-Qaeda websites. (Burke 2007)

As a proper cell, this specific group had not previously targeted Spain, and my research shows no evidence of an attack by al-Qaeda against Spain prior to the Madrid bombings. As for al-Qaeda in general and at large, the roster of previous attacks is the
same as that considered in the 9/11 event: Egypt was a popular target for the EIJ which would later become a significant part of al-Qaeda’s proper membership. Pakistan was a secondary target in the Egyptian Embassy bombing in 1995. Jemaah Islamiyah’s ties to al-Qaeda were well known by 2004 and they had actively directly attacked or plotted against Australia, Israel, Indonesia, the UK, the US, and the Philippines, as detailed in the Bali case presented here.

Previously Existing Treaties/Alliances

This attack occurred after September 11, and Spain was a member both of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Spain was (and is) a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and thus has a mutual defense agreement with the following nations: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were in the process of becoming NATO members at the time of the Madrid attacks but did not assume full membership until March 29, 2004, some weeks after the bombing.  

Of particular note is the counterterrorism alliance formed in the years before the Madrid bombings between Moroccan authorities and Spain. The Moroccans believed that Jamal Zougam was connected to Afghani mujahideen veterans operating against Morocco and asked Spain to track him. French counterterrorism authorities also joined this joint action of investigating Zougam due to his connection to French terrorist David

23 NATO Member nations - http://www.nato.int/STRUCTUR/countries.htm
Courallier. Investigations determined that Zougam was loosely connected to Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, an al-Qaeda emir running the cell in Madrid who was also an active recruiter. Most of that cell was detained in the wake of 9/11 but Zougam escaped notice from the local authorities, appearing to be a member of marginal importance at best.

Despite Moroccan and French (and eventually, Italian counterterrorism special forces) participation in heavy surveillance and agitation of radical Islamic terrorist activity in those countries and in Spain, even to the point of connecting him to offers of financial support to Mohamed Fazazi, “the Moroccan imam who had preached fiery sermons at Hamburg’s al Quds mosque to the future 9/11 hijackers”, Zougam never ranked high enough on the priority list to be arrested or even placed under consistent surveillance. Lorenzo Vidino, author of Al-Qaeda in Europe, pinpointed the failure of law enforcement and counterterrorism officials of three nations – not with insignificant resources devoted to combating terrorism - to corral Zougam and his other low-profile but ultimately high-value colleagues as “one of the most dramatic examples of the current inability of European legal systems to effectively deal with the threat of Islamic terrorism.” (301)

Alliance Response

Spain received assistance from the United States, Morocco, from France via the Joint Inquiry Corps, and from Italy in the form of investigative police officers. (Ramos; Vidino)²⁴

Also of note is an analytical point about Spain’s initial response to the attack: had the government not asserted so vehemently (and stubbornly clung to) the idea that ETA had perpetrated the attacks, the opportunity for greater international cooperation may have existed where it was instead squandered. As the realization that al-Qaeda elements were responsible for the bombings signaled the visceral reality of militant Islamic terrorism on the European continent, foreign ministers like Germany’s Otto Schilly lobbied other EU nations hard for summits and increased cooperation in combating terrorism. That further realization also distressed members of the UN Security Council, whom Spain had lobbied to officially condemn the attack using language that specifically blamed ETA.

As concerns about Islamic terrorism were grounded in reality but had not been a specific focus prior to the Madrid bombing for many nations, a different approach by the Spanish government in its investigations of the attacks may have engendered a greater degree of cooperation and possibly even – in considering the massive network of connections between groups functioning independently as agents of al-Qaeda in Western Europe - prevented future attacks.

On July 7, 2005, three bombs were detonated on London Underground trains almost simultaneously at 8:50 AM. One bomb was detonated some minutes later on a Metro 30 bus at Tavistock Square. 52 people were killed and dozens more were injured.

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25 Deutsche Welle - Germany calls for urgent European summit on terror - http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1142855,00.html
26 Global Policy Forum - UN loses face over hurried vote on Spain bombing - http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/190/32946.html
The four bombers were killed. Mohammad Sidique Khan, Dewsbury, bombed the Tube at Edgware Road. Shehzad Tanweer, Leeds, detonated his bomb at Aldgate. Germaine Lindsay bombed Russell Square and had lived in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire. Hasib Hussain of Leeds bombed the 30 Bus at Tavistock Square almost an hour after the initial explosions at around 9:47 a.m.  

**Primary Target: The United Kingdom**

In 2006, Al Jazeera broadcast a martyr video made by Shehzad Tanweer, one of the leaders of the 7/7 cell. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were cited by Tanweer as motivations and justifications for the attack:

> For the non-Muslims in Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this... Your government has openly supported the genocide of more than 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah... What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks which will intensify and continue to until you pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq... You will never experience peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace. (Conetta 2006, 3-4)

This coincides with a belief widely held by the British general public and EU citizens that the UK's participation in the Iraq War and the Coalition of the Willing resulted in this bombing (Rai).

Mohammad Sidique Khan also appeared in a martyr video that was later broadcast by al-Jazeera, in which the case of grievances against the United Kingdom as motivation for the attacks is made plain. From the official House of Commons report:

> The focus of the video is on perceived injustices carried out by the West against Muslims justifying violence through his own twisted interpretation of Islam.

The key passages are:

> Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this

---

27 United Kingdom Cabinet Office - Intelligence and Security Committee: Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005
world has to offer. Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated. Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a solider. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation....

I myself, I make du’a to Allah....to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the...of this cause.

Sufficient ties are apparent to link the 7/7 cell to al-Qaeda in a fashion similar to the Madrid cell - part of a larger network that is hugely decentralized but still thriving on interconnectedness and operating on behalf of the larger whole. The connections with the cell responsible for the 21/7 bombings that occurred a few weeks later - and even to the Glasgow airport attack of 2007 and the transatlantic airplane/liquid explosives “Bojinka” plot - are robust and continually reinforced. (Books, forthcoming; Vidino)

As for previous attacks on other entities, the United States and Spain were quite notably attacked by a-Qaeda within ten years before the 7/7 bombing. Other nations directly attacked by al-Qaeda prior to the 7/7 bombing included attacks during the 1990’s in Egypt by Zawahiri and Egyptian Islamic Jihad elements which would come to comprise a core of al-Qaeda’s membership in the ensuing years. These attacks ranged from botched attempts to assassinate public figures to the successful bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 1995.28

Secondary Targets

The majority of casualties were Britons, but citizens from Poland, Grenada, Turkey, New Zealand, Iran, Romania, Afghanistan, France, Mauritius, Nigeria, Italy, Australia, Israel, and Ghana were also killed. British property and interests were damaged and some financial fallout followed. In all, fifteen nations lost citizens in the attacks (Rai).

Previously Extant Alliances

The United Kingdom is a member of NATO, and thus has a mutual defense agreement with the following nations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. (NATO) That the United States and the United Kingdom have engaged in multiple joint counterterrorism initiatives and shared intelligence and resources in combating al-Qaeda along with the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11 is well-known.

Previously Targeted by al-Qaeda

The UK is no stranger to terrorism, but al-Qaeda had yet to directly attack the UK prior to 7/7. Noted terrorist operative Dhiren Barot had been arrested in 2004 for his role in an extensive role to bomb financial centers in transnational attacks in the United States and London, with planning going as far back as 2001. Seven others were
detained in connection with that plot after the investigation broke in 2004.\textsuperscript{29}

As we advance to this stage in al-Qaeda’s timeline, the roster of former targets grows in direct relation to the pervasiveness of the al-Qaeda global terror network. Previous direct targets of al-Qaeda and its closely associated groups – considered here, EIJ and JI, specifically - within ten years of this attack now includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, the Philippines, Australia, Spain, and Indonesia.

\textit{The Post-7/7 Alliance}

A majority of the work in investigating the 7/7 cell, the follow-up 21/7 attacks, and the law enforcement issues in dealing with both was performed by domestic and interior agencies of the United Kingdom. Notable exceptions include the arrest of Haroon Rashid Aswat by Zambian authorities\textsuperscript{30}; counterterrorism ‘cooperation’ with Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa\textsuperscript{31}; and the use of the European Arrest Warrant to facilitate the extradition of Hussain Osman, a 21/7 bomb plot suspect who fled to Italy in the aftermath of that botched attack, from Italy to the UK with the aid of Italian law enforcement.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, the list of nations allying with the UK in the aftermath of 7/7 to investigate both that and the later 21/7 bombing includes the United States, Zambia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Italy.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Guardian}: Trial begins over plan to bomb British and US targets - http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/02/terrorism.world
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Home Department Report to Parliament} - Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, July 2006
\textsuperscript{32} CNN. “Profile: Hussain Osman.”
CHAPTER 6

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Table 2: Effect on Counterterrorism Alliance Decision – Full Data (Binary Logit)

| Variable          | Coefficient | p > |z| |
|-------------------|-------------|-----|---|
| Military Expenditure | 0.312       | 0.000* |
| Extant Alliance   | 1.12        | 0.001* |
| Secondary Target  | 1.16        | 0.001* |
| Previous Target   | 0.944       | 0.050* |
| Democracy         | 0.285       | 0.428  |
| Al-Qaeda Weight   | -0.123      | 0.162  |
| N                 | 883         |       |
| Log Likelihood    | -189.492    |       |
| Pseudo R2         | 0.201       |       |

*p< .05

The binary logit regression results show interesting relationships between traditional alliance determinants and the alliance behavior of nations in response to transnational terrorism. Positive correlations are displayed between alliance-joining behavior and military expenditures, previously existing alliances, whether a nation was a secondary target of the attack in question, and whether a nation had been previously targeted by the transnational terrorist organization in question. These relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Notably, military expenditure is statistically significant and whether a nation is a democracy is not. Here, the nets are cast wide - even to some relatively undemocratic countries - after 9/11 when counter-terrorism shifted from international law enforcement / cooperation to military / active combat operations. That shift towards military action
carried the pre-requisite of having enough of a military – even if it were small - to contribute in the first place.

Interestingly, Al-Qaeda as a threat to global security is not statistically significant - and negatively correlated to boot.

Next, I utilized odds ratios to examine the same set:

Table 3: Effect on Counterterrorism Alliance Decision (Binary Logit w/ Odds Ratios)

| Variable             | Odds Ratios | p > |z| |
|----------------------|-------------|-----|---|
| Military Expenditure | 1.37        | .000* |
| Extant Alliance      | 3.05        | .001* |
| Secondary Target     | 3.18        | .001* |
| Previous Target      | 2.57        | .050* |
| Democracy            | 1.33        | .428 |
| Al-Qaeda Weight      | .884        | .162* |

*p< .05

Here the odds ratio picture of counterterrorism alliance behavior becomes clear. Increased military expenditure makes a nation more likely to join a counterterror alliance. A previously existing alliance with the primary target nation takes on great importance, showing that extant allies are three times more likely to join a counterterrorism alliance. Likewise, being previously targeted in an attack by the same group makes a nation more than twice as likely to join. Even more statistically striking - if not unsurprising - is that secondary target status makes a nation over three times more likely to join a counterterrorism analysis. These three factors are significant at the .05 level, although the relationship between being previously targeted and joining a counterterrorism alliance is not as strong as the other three significant factors.

That being said, my model clearly shows that military expenditure, previous
target status, secondary target status, and extant alliance status act strongly and significantly upon whether a nation joins a counterterrorism alliance across our set of attacks, groups, and years.

Hypothesis Tests

These significant relationships support my first, second, and fourth hypotheses. In Hypothesis 1, I argued that a previously existing alliance with a primary target nation would make a given nation more likely to ally against the aggressor organization, and these results agree with that assertion and do so in a relatively substantive way. In Hypothesis 2, I argued that a nation having been previously targeted by a transnational terrorist organization would positively influence whether it allied with a targeted nation against that group. The results support that assertion.

In Hypothesis 3 I examined the idea of the global security collective, a concept theorized by Russett and Frederking, among others. The test group in this work is al-Qaeda, representing a mounting global threat that strikes in multiple locations against multiple states. The findings indicate that there is no global security collective, or at least not one that may be empirically classified with behavior including significant contributions to alliances resulting from attacks by al-Qaeda. This disproved Hypothesis 3, which assumed that persistent attacks by a single organization would engender increased alliance joining to combat that shared threat.

In Hypothesis 4 I argued a similar shared threat claim, positing that being secondarily targeted in an attack by a transnational terrorist organization would make a nation more likely to join forces in combating the aggressor organization, and these results show support that assertion.
In Hypothesis 5 I argued that, independent of relationships with the primary target nation, democracies would be more likely to refrain from joining counterterror alliances than other nations. This assertion was contradicted across multiple iterations and methods of analysis.

September 11 as Outlier

In this field of cases - and indeed, in any and all case studies or quantitative analyses of this ilk - the terrorist attack against the United States in 2001 represents an outlier. The event was catastrophic and enormous; the casualties were incredibly high for any kind of terrorist attack; the response was highly irregular, the first major international militaristic response to a non-state actor's attack on a single country. For these reasons, I feel certain that this event should be included in any analysis of transnational terrorism. For these same reasons, it is logical to present iterations of my quantitative analysis with this event removed. In this, it may be possible to gain a greater albeit rudimentary understanding of how September 11th has affected international counterterrorism alliance behavior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Joined / Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Center</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5/161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7/161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5/161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London 7/7</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6/161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>27/804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This simple summary of the dependent variable with 9/11 event data removed illustrates a major difference: with 9/11 included, alliance joining totalled 70 of 964, or over 7 percent. Here we see an average of behavior emerging and, indeed, persisting even beyond the massive alliance formed in response to 9/11.

Table 5: Effect on Counterterrorism Alliance Decision – 9/11 Removed (Binary Logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
<th>p &gt;</th>
<th>z</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extant Alliance</td>
<td>.389</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Target</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Target</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.728</td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda Weight</td>
<td>-.122</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 735
Log Likelihood -73.685
Pseudo R2 0.3632

*p< .05

The results clearly delineate some shifts in factor importance. Extant alliances become insignificant while military expenditure maintains statistical significance. The significance of whether a nation was secondarily targeted in the attack and whether a nation was previously targeted by the same terrorist group retain their statistical significance. The power of secondary target status as a contributing factor is slightly weakened, and the relationship between previous target status and alliance joining behavior is strengthened.

The implications of this iteration of the model show the influence of 9/11 on the model as a whole. Here, previously existing alliances play a less important role in
determining the counterterrorism alliance joining behavior. In fact, extant alliances don’t matter. Instead, capabilities and incidental conditions play a stronger role. If a nation was attacked previously or in the same terrorist attack as the incident in question, that nation was even more likely to join the alliance in response to those attacks; additionally, greater military expenditure is positively correlated to alliance joining behavior. Democracy status and the persistent threat of al-Qaeda remain insignificant.

Some shifts in odds ratios are worth mentioning, specifically that counterterror alliance joining behavior of previous or secondary target nations becomes four times more likely to occur, an increase for both variables over the model including 9/11.

Expanded Data

For the interest of examination, I also ran an iteration of this same model with data from several other terrorist attacks included: the 1972 Munich Olympics attack by Black September against Israeli athletes; the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut by Hezbollah in 1983, and the bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 by Libyan state terror agents in 1988. The results reinforce the findings from the smaller data set.

Table 6: Effect on Counterterrorism Alliance Decision – Expanded Data
(Binary Logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
<th>p &gt;</th>
<th>z</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extant Alliance</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Target</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Target</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.024*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.574</td>
<td>.618</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda Weight</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p< .05
Military capability, previous alliances, and secondary and previous target status all maintain statistical significance, and all of these relationships are strengthened. The most interesting result from this iteration of the model concerns the weighting of the ongoing attacks from al-Qaeda - here the relationship is even weaker than it was in the iteration that contained only al-Qaeda events occurring after the Cold War. Essentially, we find that alliance joining behavior hasn't changed.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

It is interesting to note that the results presented here, both in the main study and the expanded model, show that nations have a tendency to treat terrorist attacks (and the threat thereof) in the same manner that individual aggressor states were mitigated as threats during and before the Cold War. The response to 9/11 represents the singular example of a "global security collective" response to terrorism, and it wouldn't have happened had the United States not sold the idea so hard, or so extensively purchased participation with foreign aid, utilizing its position as the world's last superpower to do both.

The results of this work indicate two central facts which may also be interpreted as norms. First, counterterror alliances are usually formed along the same motivational lines as traditional non-war alliances - specifically, if a nation is targeted or threatened by a terrorist attack, that nation will seek collective a collective defense response to that threat. Second, very little about how states respond to threats has changed since the Cold War, even though the threats a nation will most likely face have changed significantly. As a global society, nations don't engage if they aren't engaged. There is no proactive, massive, worldwide counterterrorism effort, despite the persistence of a real global threat of the variety presented by al-Qaeda.

This work required a careful consideration of case selection, aimed at examining a robust and representative sample of events and data. It required that I engineer a dataset and analytical approach, one unique to the subject and heretofore unperformed. In the course of this study, I investigated my theory of alliances in the pre- and post-9/11
eras against al-Qaeda, an example transnational terrorist organization. My goal was to determine whether countries join counterterror alliances for similar factors that motivate them to join war deterrent alliances. War-deterrent alliances are a more traditional form of alliance that has been studied extensively, whereas alliances against transnational terrorism organizations have not.

This lack of examination prompted me to investigate the applicability of extant theories on collective defense, econometric analyses of defense alliances, and how ideas about war deterrent alliances might be applied to transnational terrorism. The so-called War on Terror is an important political consideration in foreign policy and international relations in the world in which we live, and a seemingly natural progression into a global defense collective that some scholars have identified as a result of past conflicts and forecast as forthcoming.

Quite by accident, evidence of a significant change in international relations was obviated by the dataset I constructed in pursuit of this study. It is no secret that many things changed in global politics after 9/11, and the enormity of the allied response to those attacks was obvious, as was the unprecedented nature of the response itself.

Having faced transnational terror attacks before – indeed, even an attack by agents of the same transnational terrorist organization (al-Qaeda) and against the same target (the World Trade Center in New York City) – there would not necessarily be an empirical or even a scalar indicator that the United States would mount a new kind of operation, that it would aggressively seek to build an international allied counterterrorism response to 9/11. The obvious question is – What changed? The obvious answer is in two parts: 9/11 was spectacular on a scale that was previously
unimaginable; And the philosophy of those in charge of dictating the response, the political decision-makers in the administration of President George W. Bush, was the formative force in generating the new kind of response.

That the alliances forged and policies enacted to combat transnational terrorist attacks occurring after 9/11 both differed from and resembled those that occurred prior to 9/11 is also illustrative. The United Kingdom and Spain are major world powers, and they reacted differently to attacks that were, while admittedly smaller, still spectacular. The United Kingdom, fully engaged and partnered with the United States in the international allied response to 9/11, engaged in a more traditional law enforcement action in investigating 7/7 while expanding international counterterrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups. It also instituted ever more austere domestic anti-terrorism efforts, with debatable results. Spain withdrew from Iraq but increased participation in Afghanistan, displaying a commitment to combating terrorism that was often glossed over or ignored by pundits and politicians in the United States, many of whom derided Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq as appeasement to terrorists. Both of these countries engaged in these responses in the world that stood after 9/11, and while their response actions were certainly influenced by that event, the same actions showed that a massive international militaristic response to terrorism is not the new norm.

Alliances in response to terrorism – investigation, intelligence sharing, cooperative law enforcement actions, international criminal law considerations – have developed and changed as the nature of transnational terrorism has also developed and changed, both before and after Al-Qaeda flew planes into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. In the era after 9/11, each nation responds to transnational terrorist
attacks in the global environment created by that event, but not all policy decisions will be directly informed by it.

Ideally, the main contribution of this paper is a beginning, an initialization of empirical analysis concerning how nations work together against terrorism. Even with a robust dataset and rigorous analytical methods, my findings are highly provisional and the data universe I examine is merely illustrative and in no way exhaustive – it is merely a sample of what social science could potentially examine given the proper motivation and energy. This thesis grew from a pilot study in the purest sense, and even in an expanded form still represents only a first dip into a rich and relatively unexplored area of political science. The treatment of complex factors I have engaged in is simplistic but not useless. With a fairly limited dataset including a relatively small number of events for analysis, a causal relationship between contributing factors in traditional war deterrent alliances and whether countries join counterterror alliances was established, making the case for further study.

The driving force in social science concerning transnational terrorism has thus far been a focus on the terrorists themselves, usually as individuals - their motivations, whether they act rationally, and how they react to defensive consolidations and anti-terror legislation. The motivations of states as they act against terrorists and respond to attacks are largely unexamined, either qualitatively or quantitatively. A personal goal of mine in this study is to open a new avenue of thinking about transnational terrorism and contribute research that may aid governments in crafting anti-terror legislation and foreign policy that combats terrorism while minimizing unintended policy results and mitigating opportunities for target substitution. I explicitly believe that it is much more
effective to stop terrorism years before it happens than to respond to it minutes after an attack. Understanding how nations work together after an attack may help states and stakeholders discover effective ways to proactively cooperate.

In short, if governments can gain a better understanding of terrorist organizations and what methods of cooperation against those terrorist organizations are effective, governments can then use those methods to disrupt terrorism in both the short term and long term. The short policy analysis description for what I have found in this study is this: I have produced a very basic but empirical guide for governments to use in determining potentially fruitful alliance-seeking behaviors following a transnational terrorist attack, and have included what I assert is a broad enough sample to encompass and account for much of the nuance and variability in modern transnational terrorist attacks.

In light of how our world has viscerally changed due to transnational terrorism and the policy decisions that follow in the pursuit of combating it, any step towards helping nations understand each other and how they react to terrorism on a macro level is a step in the right direction towards peace in our time. Admittedly, it is a small step, but it is one worth taking.

With this work at a stage of provisional completion, future research on counterterror alliances could be advanced to more closely examine the economic aspects of those alliances and the classification of the defense-as-good those alliances produce, perhaps resulting in an economic theory of counterterror alliances. This thesis is strong because it provides a guide to further research while producing some findings of interest in its own right; it is weak because it is fundamentally incomplete and
insufficiently addresses the universe of possibilities concerning transnational terrorism and international counterterror alliances, an empirical data issue that can be addressed but also one that may be impossible to fully mitigate. One need only pick up a paper in any country in the world to see that the data universe could be expanded to enormous proportions to examine transnational terrorism with a global eye, or that this study could be replicated but in a region-specific fashion, so as to only focus on the Middle East, or South East Asia, or Western Europe, or Eastern Europe.

Where I had initially assumed that counterterror alliances are wholly different from war deterrent alliances, I was wrong. However, this study’s results imply that the similarities in contributing factors between war deterrent alliances and counterterror alliances merit further examination.

If it were not research in this particular vein, work would still be required: while numerous attempts have been made to understand why terrorists operate the way they do, very little effort and scholarship has been dedicated to understanding why nations organize against terrorism in the manner they do, or if the policy approaches adopted by the major powers that lead these counterterror alliances are working or making the problem worse. The value of scholarly work on transnational terrorism is potentially immeasurable, especially if more effective policies and a broader understanding of how foreign policy, international relations, and transnational terrorism interact may be gained.
APPENDIX A

CASE / DATA SOURCES
Correlates of War


PolityIV


1993 World Trade Center Bombing


“Information technology: additional responsibilities of Chief Information Officers.” 10


1998 US Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya


**September 11**


Madrid

ASEAN SEC - http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm


7/7 | London


APPENDIX B

RESEARCH ON OTHER TERRORIST ATTACKS
Munich / Black September


Beirut


APPENDIX C

ALLIANCES AGAINST TERRORISM (AAT) CODEBOOK
The Alliances Against Terror dataset was initially authored by Josh Berthume as a pilot study in examining why states decide to ally against terrorist attacks. The plan for the data was conceived as a way of testing variables traditionally considered to be factors in collective security or war-deterrent alliances as indicators of a state's likelihood of allying with a state targeted by a terror attack against the non-state actor that perpetrated the attack.

The final product involved an examination of modern-era terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and extensive background research on multiple terrorist organizations, terrorist attacks, and resultant international responses.

Included Variables

The variables included the AAT dataset are a hybrid of coded values and values drawn from extant datasets. The datasets used include Polity IV and various data drawn from the Correlates of War project.

A word on research design - I chose to adopt the limitations for inclusion imposed by the Polity IV dataset on my own data, specifically along the following guidelines contained within the Polity IV Project: "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006, annual, cross-national, time-series and polity-case formats coding democratic and autocratic "patterns of authority" and regime changes in all independent countries with total population greater than 500,000 in 2006." Thus a state must have a population exceeding 500,000 and be 'an independent country' to be included in my findings.
country

The name of the country in question.

ccode

The country code for each nation as per COW.

year

The year of the terrorist attack in question.

ct_alliance

Whether a potential ally state chose to ally with the primary targeted country against the terrorist group that perpetrated the attack, and the degree to which the potential ally contributed to efforts against the terrorist group. A score of 0 indicates that the state supported the terrorist group in some way or did not significantly help or hinder the actions by the targeted country against the terrorist group; a score of 1 indicates material support short of military support; and a score of 2 indicates military contribution, personnel contribution, or any use of force of or defense and security forces, including the arrest and extradition of a terrorism suspect. (This measure was simplified to a binary 0/1 variable (ct_ally_bin), for the purpose of the final research product, a score of 1 indicating military support and a score of 0 indicating anything else.) In the case of the "9/11" data, all values indicated are for the year 2003, the year the United States invaded Iraq; however, the eventual alliance contribution of each member of the 'Coalition of the Willing' is coded as the weight of the alliance. For instance, Moldova was a proclaimed member of the Coalition by 2003 but did not send troops to join the
multinational force until 2004, Moldova’s ct_alliance score is coded as 2 because military contribution was the highest level of contribution to the examined alliance.

polity

The PolityIV score for each nation in the year of the activity against the terrorist organization.

durability

The PolityIV durability score for each nation in the year of the activity against the terrorist organization.

prim_targ

Whether a nation was the primary target in the terrorist attack.

sec_targ

Whether a nation was a secondary target in the terrorist attack - this includes collateral damage to property and deaths of citizens or nationals.

prev_targ

Whether a nation was attacked by the terrorist organization in question, limited to a) specific groups (not satellite organizations) and b) incidences up to but not more than ten years before the attack in question.

cow_ext_alliance
Whether a nation had a pre-existing military alliance with the primary targeted country at the time of the attack. This data is determined specifically by NATO membership in the case of NATO members as well as the Correlates of War Alliances dataset, version 3.02. If an alliance is extant, the degree of alliance is notated thus: a score of 0 indicates no alliance; a score of 1 indicates entente; a score of 2 indicates a neutrality or non-aggression pact; and a score of 3 indicates a mutual defense agreement. NATO membership when a NATO member is the targeted nation is indicated by a score of 3. These values are the reverse of values as coded in the Correlates of War Alliance datasets for ease of coordination and interpretation with the originally coded values for ct_alliance, which indicates greater commitment by increasing values.

cow_mil_expend

The military expenditure of a nation for the given year, in thousands.

democracy

A binary deal-down each nation’s Polity IV score. Scores greater than 5 are coded as 1, and scores 5 and below are coded as 0.

Mothballed variables (Insufficient data / not informative in final analysis)
cow_conf_NSA

A dataset on militarized engagements of non-state actors in the Correlates of War project; unfortunately, measures only to 1975.
cow_contig_main

Whether a nation is contiguous to the primary targeted nation as derived from the Correlates of War Contiguity dataset. Although this value is derived from another source, the gradations of contiguity found in the COW Contiguity dataset are not represented; instead, two nations are either contiguous (separated by a land border, a river, or fewer than 400 miles of open water, indicated by a score of 1) or they are not (indicated by a score of zero).

cow_trade_interd

Decent dataset from COW but no data after 1992, after which my most of my incidents take place.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


