MEDIA AGENDA-BUILDING EFFECT: ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC APARTHEID ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES ON SOUTH AFRICA, 1976-1988

Dissertation

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By

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The mass media's role in informing the American public is critical to public support for government policies. The media are said to set the national agenda. This view is based on the assumption of selective coverage they give to news items. Media coverage also influences the salience the public attaches to issues.

However, media agenda effect has been challenged by Lang and Lang (1983). These scholars, in their media agenda-building theory, argued that the success of media effect on national agenda is dependent on group support.

In order to test this theory, time-related data on South Africa crises, media coverage of South Africa, American public reactions, congressional, and presidential apartheid-related activities, between 1976 and 1988, were analyzed. Congressional anti-apartheid policies were the dependent and others, the independent variables. The theory made analysis of the data amenable to the additive
adopted to test for the significance of the interactive variables, indicated that these variables were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid policies. The additive model was subsequently analyzed. The time series multiple regression analysis was used in analyzing the relationships. Given autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems associated with time series analysis, the Arima (p, d, q) model was used to model the relationships. This model was used to indicate support, or nonsupport, for the time series regression analysis.

The result of the additive model indicated that South African political crises were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid actions. It also showed that the relationship between the American public reactions and congressional anti-apartheid policies was greater in comparison to all other independent variables. The presidential actions taken against South Africa were negatively related to Congress' anti-apartheid actions. Television had the greatest relationship with congressional anti-apartheid actions compared to newspapers and magazines.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions of Media Agenda Setting Function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Agenda-Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Agenda-Setting on:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections and Voting Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper-Television Differential Effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and Agenda-Building Research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Analysis Methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding Technique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category Construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability and Validity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DESCRIPTION OF SOUTH AFRICA EVENTS</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Apartheid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Media Coverage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Series Regression Analysis Assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arima (p, d, q) Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIST OF TABLES ........................................... v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ................................. vi
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                                 Page
1. Result Showing Differences between Additive and Interactive Regression Models  33
2. Correlation of Variables in the Interactive Model and their R-Squares with Each Regressed on Others  34
3. Result of AR(1) Coefficient Estimates Showing Independent Variables' Relationships with Congressional Anti-Apartheid Policies  118
4. Regression Results of Variables in the Arima (0, 1, 1) Model Analyzed  125
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Model Analyzing Relationships between South Africa Crises, Media Coverage, American Public and Congress' Anti-Apartheid Actions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relationship between Media Agenda-Setting and Agenda-Building Processes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The media's watchdog role is indisputable toward democracy's survival (Merton and Lazarsfeld, 1952; Siebert, 1956; Graber, 1988). This attribute, referred to as the "surveillance function" by Lasswell (1966), is the media's ability to adequately reflect public opinion to decision-makers, and a feedback from them to the public. In a democratic society, the media, by nature of their responsibility, help to monitor elected officials' behavior which, if not checked, might curtail the people's basic freedoms.

It is this surveillance function of democratic media that makes the study of the relationship between media and Congress crucial to the testing of various hypotheses concerning the media and democratic principles. Although the media are said to set the public agenda, there are arguments to the contrary. It has been stated that the mass media may not successfully accomplish their agenda effect without support from intervening group interests. Lang and Lang (1984) contend that a combined effort by the media and affected groups is essential at influencing national agenda.
This argument helps to comprehend the media's agenda-setting role with and without group support.

Lang and Lang's media agenda-building theory will be tested by using data on South-African crises to examine the influence of mass media coverage, and American public and presidential anti-apartheid actions on congressional South African policies between 1976 and 1988.

Purpose of the Study

This study will analyze the extent to which media agenda, American public, and presidential anti-apartheid actions on South Africa influenced Congress' apartheid policies. The media agenda are said to be effective on the public; but without group support, Lang and Lang (1984) contend, media agenda are powerless. Media agenda-building concept, according to this view, is the process whereby media coverage generates public pressure and support for or against an issue being debated. This theory states that media agenda are not solely responsible for policy makers' selection of various issues competing for their attention. And in order for media agenda to gain priority over other issues, there is a need for public support along the lines of argument espoused by the mass media. Utilizing data on media coverage of South Africa between 1976 and 1988, this study will test the different effects of media political
crisis coverage, American public, and presidential anti-apartheid actions on Congress' South Africa policies.

Without media coverage, it might be argued that the public would experience a dearth of information on South Africa. Because the media give priority to some news, at the expense of other news, these issues are viewed as salient by the public. The series of intermittent protest activities against the South African government between 1976 and 1988 were first brought to the attention of Americans by the media. The public, capitalizing on media coverage, organized activities for and against the South African government. Media emphasis on South African political crises, which were closely followed by public apartheid activities, suggests a possible association between South African events, media coverage, American public, and congressional actions on apartheid. These associations can be related to Lang and Lang's (1981) media agenda-building theory. First, according to their analysis, media coverage is essential at informing the public of important issues that must be addressed. Second, depending on the nature of media coverage, the issue may or may not generate public controversy. The more interest the public shows about a problem, the more likely it may end up on the policy makers' agenda. Given Lang and Lang's (1984) media agenda-building analysis, it might be proposed that the greater the public reaction accompanying media coverage
of an issue, the more likely that problem will end up on the congressional agenda. In other words, an issue which generates less controversy and public reaction might not be included on the national agenda. In relating this proposition to the present study, it is argued that the combination of media crisis coverage and American public anti-apartheid activities or media crisis coverage and presidential anti-apartheid policies would encourage Congress to initiate policies on apartheid.

As depicted in Figure 1, media coverage of South Africa is related to events in that country. Media coverage, in turn, directly influences public opinion, the Presidency and Congress. However, media's direct impact on the Congress, under the agenda-building theory, would be considered minimal except accompanied either by public or presidential actions on apartheid. On the contrary, South Africa events, media coverage, and American public's anti-apartheid activities can directly affect Congress, independent of each other. In view of this argument, the present study will examine whether the individual or media-composite variables are more related to congressional anti-apartheid activities against South Africa's apartheid policies.
To comprehend the importance of media agenda effect on the public, it is essential to first analyze the assumptions underlying such a relationship. It is argued that the more prominence an issue receives from the media, the more salience the public attaches to the problem. The agenda setting concept, therefore, is the process where the media give preferential treatment to certain issues at the expense of others, a process capable of impressing the importance of problems on the public.

Agenda setting assumes that the frequency coverage of an issue is an indicator of the seriousness the public attaches to the news event. As a result, the public takes
its cue on issue salience from the value the media place on it (Greenberg and Garfinkle, 1963; Avistendahl, 1968; Watt and Berg, 1978; Weaver, 1984; Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Manheim, 1987).

It also assumes that the media assist individuals to mentally organize activities (cognitive map) (Tolman, 1932; Shaw and McCombs, 1977; McCombs, 1981). This impact is due to the public's need for orientation and their inability to pay attention to all problems simultaneously. The further an individual is from the location of a problem, the more likely the dependence on the media for explanation. Analyzing the cognitive map concept, media scholars (Bandura, 1965, 1973 and 1977; Jeffrey, 1976; Tan, 1985) argued that because the public is severely limited in things they cannot directly experience, they depend on the mass media for such remote information. These scholars also stated that the media perform a crucial socializing role by organizing and presenting a few of the many, complicated problems to the public. Tan (1985) suggested that the media pay attention to issues that would create an impact in their lives. By strategically giving more time and space to some news items, the media convince the public of the salience of these issues (Weaver et al., 1975; Zucker, 1978; Graber, 1984). In seeking reasons on which to base decisions, the public recalls the salient issues.
It is further assumed that the media do not mirror societal reality, instead they carefully filter and shape reality (Funkhouser, 1973; Lang and Lang, 1983; Weaver, 1984b; Graber, 1988). This results in media news being skewed and, eventually, failing to portray the events correctly. Funkhouser's (1973) analysis of the 1960s events and Graber's (1988) study of the media's influence on domestic and foreign policy issues, reveal that the media do not adequately reflect society's agenda; media agenda do not always match real world issues.

Another assumption is that there is a difference between the forms of the media and their impact. Weaver et al. (1981), for instance, contend that while newspapers are prime movers in organizing the public's agenda, television has a short-term impact. These scholars contend that newspaper space is not as restrained as television time; therefore, the former's agenda impact might have a longer effect on the public. Given television's restricted time, its agenda effect is prominent at a time frame closest to the resolution of an issue. For instance, if newspaper and television give coverage to South Africa; this assumption states that the former's agenda impact would be effective throughout the period, especially at the early stage. Television, on the other hand, has its agenda impact at the later stage.
A related assumption is the view that media's effect on the public differs according to the issue covered. Two different issues given coverage by the media at the same time are likely to generate divergent public reactions. According to Zucker (1978), there are two different types of issues: obtrusive and unobtrusive. Obtrusive issues are ones that the public have sufficient knowledge and information about; the public, as a result, do not need media assistance in order to comprehend this type of problem. Conversely, unobtrusive issues are those the public cannot experience firsthand because of the distance involved. Although such issues might directly affect the public, they lack pertinent information. This explains the public's dependence on media news for essential knowledge in assessing such issues. Utilizing Zucker's (1978) distinction between obtrusive and unobtrusive issues, Lang and Lang (1983); Weaver et al., (1981); Graber (1984); and Weaver (1984) found that the agenda-setting theory is most effective when applied to unobtrusive rather than obtrusive issues.

These assumptions are valuable in analyzing media agenda influence because the assumptions state conditions under which media coverage can affect public agenda. An example is Zucker's (1978) obtrusive-unobtrusive issue distinction which provides guidelines on why the media's coverage of South African political crisis attracts public
This results from the public's limited direct access to events that occur in that country and therefore creates a dependency situation on media news. Given this premise, it is possible that both public and politicians' anti-apartheid actions in the United States are predicated on the type of news the media disseminate about South Africa.

However, given the limitations created by the media assumptions analyzed above, support could be found for the argument presented by agenda-building theory proponents stating that media agenda could only be effective when followed by public support.

Media Agenda-Building

Democracy's foundation is built on various values; one of the most essential is freedom of the press. A test of any self-acclaimed democracy is the degree of its media's freedom. Because the citizens depend on the media for information and education, the media's role in setting the public's agenda is essential. Given their role in shaping and sustaining America's democracy, the mass media wield greater control through their inclusion of issues on the national agenda. By their display, timing, and location of news events, the media provide the salient events.

The present study will utilize the argument presented by both media agenda-setting and agenda-building scholars
in examining events in South Africa and the role of media coverage in generating congressional actions and public opinion on apartheid. In defining media agenda-setting, McCombs and Shaw (1972) stated that it is the ability of the mass media to reorder issue priorities of the public in a way that the latter accepts. Erbring et al. contended that media agenda behavior is that "process by which problems become salient issues around which policy alternatives can be defined and support or opposition crystallized" (1960, p. 45). Behr and Shanto argued that media agenda-setting is the amount of media attention devoted to particular issues "which determines the degree of public concern for these issues" (1985, p. 39). Lang and Lang posited that agenda-setting is the concept by which the mass media are "constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, and have feelings about" (1966, p. 456). Later, they argued that media agenda-setting is the proposition that "people learn from the media what important issues are ... perceptions people have of the large universe, of the things they cannot see for themselves" (Lang and Lang, 1981, p. 448).

In their analysis, Weaver et al. defined media agenda effect as a process by which "consumers of the media learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a
news story and its position" (1975, p. 459). McCleod et al., on the other hand, defined media agenda-setting on the assumption that "an audience member exposed to a given medium agenda will adjust his or her perceptions of the importance of issues in the direction corresponding to the amount of attention devoted to those issues in the medium used" (1974, p. 135). Watt and Berg defined it as a concept that "the media will affect the salience of issues perceived by the audience, rather than affecting audience behavior or attitude" (1978, p. 217). Tipton et al. suggested that the media's agenda-setting function is the "media's influence on political information the public has and the issues the public considers salient" (1975, p. 118). In his definition, Beniger stated that in the agenda-setting function of the media "individuals note the distribution of media coverage among topics" and pattern their behavior accordingly (1978, p. 444).

Media agenda-building effect, on the other hand, is the process where media agenda generate public reactions and controversy on a problem, thereby forcing such an issue onto policy makers' agenda (Lang and Lang, 1981). According to this view, media coverage of a problem that fails to gain public support may not be included on the national agenda. Conversely, a problem which is supported by the public but lacks media backing will fail to reach the
national agenda. In other words, agenda-setting is the first step in the media's agenda-building process.

Figure 2. Relationship between Media Agenda-Setting and Agenda-Building Processes

As shown in Figure 2, media coverage of an issue alone, according to Lang and Lang (1983), is not sufficient to generate an agenda-building process. However, it could also be argued that media coverage and public opinion can, independently, influence congressional agenda. It all depends on the nature of the issue involved, resources controlled by the groups affected, the timing, and officials' interest in the problem.

If, according to Kingdon (1984), the placement of issues on the agenda is influenced by the opening of policy windows and leadership composition of Congress and the White House, it could be argued that media coverage and American public actions can, at different times, affect the placement of issues on the national agenda based on the
political mood of the nation.

The view that media agenda have great potential at influencing the public's agenda has been countered by Lang and Lang (1981). These scholars contend that the media alone cannot achieve the success attributed to them by the agenda-setting theory. Instead, Lang and Lang (1983) argued that efforts from major political interest groups are necessary for media agenda success. In applying their agenda-building concept to the apartheid situation in South Africa, it might be suggested that media coverage of that country's crises will only be effective with the support of the Presidency, the American public, and groups that are concerned about South Africa. Both media agenda-setting and agenda-building theories complement each other. The former is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an agenda-building process which might not occur without media agenda taking place. Therefore, the success or failure of media news agenda, according to the agenda-building theory, depends on the reaction it gets from the public and political groups. If media agenda emphasize non-apartheid news, the public might not have a basis upon which to react against the South African government. But the greater the media apartheid-related coverage, the more the public will be exposed to the issues, consequently reacting on the basis of what is presented by the media. As a result, it is proposed that political rather than non-political crises
are associated with public reactions toward apartheid.

This study will examine media agenda-building effect on Congress' anti-apartheid policies which, in turn, will be analyzed as a function of media political crisis coverage, the American public, and presidential actions on apartheid. This analysis is conditional depending upon sufficient statistical evidence that there is interaction among the independent variables. Where this evidence is not supported, individual independent variables (South Africa crises; newspaper, television and magazine political crises coverage; American public and presidential anti-apartheid activities) will be tested against congressional anti-apartheid actions. These analyses are vital in order to test the agenda-building theory for differential effects between individual and media composite variables and congressional anti-apartheid actions.

It might be suggested that even without media coverage Congress could obtain information on foreign policy matters. However, they may not act on such information without the public's input. For instance, congressional studies (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Kingdon, 1981) concluded that members of Congress, given their reelection interests, attempt to capitalize on any public issue supported by their constituents. In relating these studies' findings to the apartheid issue, it could be argued that the more media coverage emphasizes apartheid-
related issues, the more public opinion escalates against the South African government. And because Congress reacts to public problems that generate controversy, congressional members would initiate actions supporting public demands. The media's capability to affect the national agenda, according to the agenda-building analysis, needs the efforts of the public and interested groups whose influence might, through the media, be brought to bear on the policy makers.

Description of Variables

The dependent variable in this study is the series of congressional anti-apartheid actions initiated between 1976 and 1988. South Africa crises, media coverage, American public, and presidential anti-apartheid actions are the independent variables. Congress' anti-apartheid actions will be analyzed as functions of these variables, either as media composite or individual variables.

Dependent Variable

The United States government, between 1976 and 1988, exhibited various actions which have severely affected United States-South Africa relations. Congress, between 1960 and 1988, enacted a series of laws that restricted relations between the two countries. In 1969, for instance, it terminated the special sugar quota privilege reserved
for South Africa. In 1971 and 1972, the lawmakers passed legislation limiting American business activities in the country. In 1977 they legislated an arms embargo against South Africa; and in 1978 and 1979, they further restricted United States' business relations with the country. President Reagan, in 1986, severed monetary and trade ties between the two nations. Ali (1987) reported that since the beginning of 1985, Congress has initiated more than forty-one separate bills on South Africa. Of this number, ten have dealt with economic sanctions against the country. The effect of South Africa political crises, media coverage, American public, and presidential anti-apartheid actions on Congress' South Africa policies will be examined.

Independent Variables

The independent variables in this study are South Africa political crises; media (newspaper, television and magazine) political crises coverage; American public, and Presidential anti-apartheid actions. However, if there is insufficient statistical evidence to support the assumptions of the agenda-building theory in this study, each individual variable will be tested against congressional anti-apartheid actions.
South Africa Crises

The occurrence of an event or incident motivates media coverage and generates news. Because of events directly linked to apartheid between 1976 and 1988, the media had more opportunities to inform the American public of these events. It is hypothesized that the more political crises occur in South Africa, the greater the media coverage. There were many crisis-related events between 1976 and 1988; therefore it is imperative to utilize strict criteria in selecting particular events to analyze. The following criteria are used in the selection process:

First, to be considered a political crisis, the event must have occurred in South Africa within the time frame analyzed.

Second, the event must meet the definition of crisis. A crisis is defined here as any natural or man-made event that disrupts the peace of the community and results in loss of lives and destruction of property.

Third, it must pit government law enforcement agents against a section of the mass public—or two or more sections of the mass public—in a confrontation for economic, political or social control.

Since many sources documented events in South Africa during this period, it is necessary to develop a selection criterion. For a crisis to be included for analysis, it must have been recorded in The New York Times Index, Facts
on File, Kessing's Contemporary Archives, The Washington Post, and the Times of London. The calendar of crises in South Africa is listed in Appendix B.

The Prestige Press

The selection of the prestige media for analysis is based on their circulation and influence. The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor, for example, belong to a genre of opinion-formulating media whose editorials and news are taken seriously by governments the world over (Merrill, 1968; Weiss, 1974; Gormley, 1975; Merrill and Fisher, 1980). Defining the prestige press, Merrill (1968) stated that they are reliable and responsible quality newspapers marked by an absence of hysteria that always characterizes other print media. Given their solid financial stability and independence, the prestige press emphasize "strong opinion on political topics, international relations, economics, social welfare...[and a desire to] influence opinion leaders" (Merrill, 1968, p. 36). Tunstall argued that the prestige press maintain their "own staffs of national and foreign correspondents that cost far more than can be justified in purely economic terms" (1977, p. 28).

The prestige press serve as an information channel to national policy makers (Carter, 1959; Bingham and Just, 1962; Bagdikian, 1972; Bacchus, 1974). Due to close links
with government, Pool (1967) suggested that prestige press attract policy makers' attention on important foreign policy issues. Such influence places them in a unique position to directly affect diplomatic policy between governments (De Young, 1977).

It is due to the influence of the prestige press that governments have been compelled to manipulate these groups of mass media for negative diplomatic reasons on their governments' behalf (More, May 1978). Even then, some prestige press owners acquiesce to government in order to foster policies favoring the formers' views (Haberstam, 1976 and 1978; Ferguson and Rogers, 1986; Aronson, 1970; Minor, 1970; Powledge, 1971; Krieghbaum, 1972; Gates et al., 1977; Schoor, 1977; Gates, 1978). There is, therefore, little argument concerning the important position the prestige press occupy; that position generates the possibility of influencing foreign policy decisions. This position, according to Rosenau (1961), differentiates this group of papers from those he referred to as "non-quality" media that treat important foreign policy matters in a "simplified, abridged, and erratic fashion" (1961, p. 28).

Almond stated that the prestige media "create a kind of laboratory atmosphere in which foreign policy ideas can be tested out through the use of responsible speculation and imagination" (1956, p. 378). It is this quality that separates the quality press from other media, thereby
placing them at an advantageous position in which they are capable of setting foreign policy decision-making agenda. Sigel (1973) referred to the New York Times and the Washington Post as the "central nervous system[s] of the American polity." Haberstam (1979), supporting this view, stated that the New York Times has risen to be the most influential paper in the world. Not only do the quality press influence public opinion decisions, they also impact the agenda formation of television and other newspapers (Dinsmore, 1969; Batscha, 1975).

Newsweek, Time, and the U.S. News and World Report share similar characteristics with the prestige newspapers. In comparison with other magazines, these three are globally circulated and their editorials and news are relied upon by government officials, scholars, and business elite (Pool, 1967; Weiss, 1974). The inclusion of news magazines and other prestigious periodicals is important because they, together with the selected newspapers being analyzed and national television, form the core of what is referred to as the prestige media (Merrill and Fisher, 1980). Given this view, the exclusion of news magazines and network television from a study which examines media influence on Congress will be unrealistic.

The television network news--ABC, CBS, and NBC--will represent the electronic media. Like their print counterparts, the national networks are regarded as the
broadcast medium's elite. Their influence on national and international news coverage is greater than the influence of local television. Network news is analyzed alongside the prestige press because both share similar qualities. The prestige press and networks, because of their financial success (Compaine, 1979; Dreier and Weinberg, 1979; Hamelink, 1977 and 1983; Sterling and Haight, 1978; Brosnan, 1978; Parenti, 1986), provide fast and comprehensive news coverage. Analysis of the network news and prestige press will, therefore, provide a reasonable test of the media's agenda-building pattern on congressional South Africa policy.

American Public Anti-Apartheid Activities

The American public is instrumental to the achievement of national agenda. As a representative democracy, public opinion, in whatever form, is essential to democratic decision making. In relating this view to the apartheid situation in South Africa, it could be suggested that if the public does not demonstrate an interest in an issue, it might be difficult for the agenda-building process to achieve its desired effect on decision-makers. Given the basic premise of media agenda-building, it could be proposed that the South African apartheid problem did not receive much government attention until the public demonstrated its interests. It therefore could be implied
that public actions might have instigated Congress to initiate decisions on which their apartheid policies were based. In 1978, for example, Congress and the United States Commerce Department placed restrictions on both countries. When the Reagan administration's "Constructive Engagement" policy was enacted in 1985, an economic sanction was imposed on South Africa.

Public and private institutions began reacting against apartheid. For instance, in 1978, the Ohio University Trustee Board eliminated $52,000 of stocks from American corporations with business links to South Africa (New York Times February 13, 1978, p. 16). In 1984, some states and local governments, following precedents by colleges and universities, withdrew their investments from corporations dealing with South Africa. By mid-1987, prominent American corporations in South Africa pulled out of the country or were at the verge of doing so (Business Week, September 23, 1985, pp. 104-112).

Presidential Anti-Apartheid Actions

The role of the Executive in affecting foreign policy decision-making cannot be overemphasized given the constitutional powers bestowed to this branch of government. Although the president is responsible for foreign policy matters without Congress' approval of funds, such policies may not be implemented. The 1973 War Powers
Resolution Act is an example which demonstrates Congress' attempt to control presidential foreign policy decisions. Congress-Executive rivalry for control of foreign policy matters makes it essential for this study to analyze the association between them. This competitive attitude between the two branches of government was exhibited in 1986 when Congress overrode President Reagan's veto and placed severe restrictions on economic and military relations between the United States and South Africa. The Reagan presidency, more than any before it, made policies that greatly affected relations between the two nations. This situation, therefore, makes it imperative to analyze the possible effect the presidency might have had on congressional apartheid policies between 1976 and 1988.

Hypotheses

This study's major assumption states that although media coverage is effective in deciding policy agenda, such effort would prove futile without group support. Although the media are, independently, capable of influencing national agenda, Lang and Lang (1983) argued that such a possibility is not feasible except when group support complements media coverage. However, this argument has to be supported by the F statistic test in order for the interaction variables (media merged with other independent variables) to be included in the analysis. To test the
agenda-building theory that interactive media variables influence congressional anti-apartheid actions, the following hypotheses were stated:

1) An increase in media (MEDIA) political crisis coverage is associated with an increase in congressional anti-apartheid actions (CONGRESS).

2) An increase in media coverage and American public anti-apartheid activities (MPUBLIC) is associated with an increase in congressional anti-apartheid actions (CONGRESS).

3) An increase in media coverage and presidential anti-apartheid actions (MEXECUTIVE) is associated with an increase in congressional anti-apartheid actions (CONGRESS).

4) An increase in American public and presidential anti-apartheid actions (PEXECUTIVE) is associated with an increase in congressional anti-apartheid actions (CONGRESS).

5) An increase in media coverage, American public and presidential anti-apartheid actions (INTGROUPS) is associated with an increase in congressional anti-apartheid actions (CONGRESS).

However, if Lang and Lang's (1983) media agenda-building theory is not supported by the F statistic designed for testing the presence of interactive actions
between variables, the alternative hypotheses will be tested against congressional anti-apartheid actions.

Operationalization

To test the effect of media political crisis coverage, American public, and presidential anti-apartheid actions on Congress' apartheid policies, data on these variables were obtained and analyzed. The frequency of news and editorial items on South Africa political crises in selected United States prestige media for each year, between 1976 and 1988, were collected and categorized.

Operationalization of the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable analyzed is Congress' anti-apartheid actions. Analysis of relationships between congressional anti-apartheid policies and the independent variables is necessary in order to test for the differential influence of single and media composite independent variables on Congress.

Defining effect of the independent variables on congressional anti-apartheid actions is necessary for purposes of data analysis. Some studies, for instance, have used roll-call voting records in analyzing congressional actions (Miller and Stokes, 1963 and 1966; Erikson and Stokes, 1976 and 1978; Fiorina, 1974). Others have either used questionnaire or interview formats (Fenno, 1978; Kingdon, 1981).
Operationalization of Congressional Actions

In this study, congressional actions toward South Africa are defined as the number of recorded bills, resolutions, joint resolutions, hearings, and investigations that were conducted in the United States Congress during the period analyzed. Muzur (1981) and Yeric and Todd (1989), for example, utilized similar data in analyzing relationships between media coverage and public opinion. The criterion for inclusion as congressional action is that the subject matter concern South Africa and be recorded as an item brought before Congress in the Congressional Index, Congress and the Nation, Congressional Information Service Index (CIC Index), Congressional Committee Hearings Index, and the Congressional Daily Digest. This method is necessary for purposes of this study because the total number of apartheid actions deliberated upon, either in support of or against apartheid, is of importance.

Operationalization of Independent Variables

There are numerous variables that affect decision makers' policies. While Fenno (1978), for instance, lists three major factors affecting decision-making by congressmen, Kingdon (1981) analyzes nine groups whose actions influence decision-making in Congress. Given data limitations, it is not possible to measure all of the variables analyzed by these scholars. However, because this study
examines the role of the media and group influence on congressional apartheid actions, three groups have been selected based on Kingdon's (1981) typology of those whose actions affect the congressional decision-making process. These include the Executive, mass media, and the American public.

South Africa Political Crises

Because different forms of crises occurred in South Africa during the period analyzed, a distinction is made between crisis and non-crisis events. Since this study is concerned with the analysis of political crisis, crisis events were categorized into political and non-political crises. Political crisis is operationalized as all individual and group activities taken against the South African government because of its apartheid policy. Such actions include riots, arsons, assassinations, and overt protest actions.

Media Coverage

The mass media's major roles are informing and educating the public. A by-product of this function is that of setting the public agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). If the agenda setting concept assumes that the media shape the way the public determines salient issues, it might be suggested that a symbiotic relationship exists between the
public and the media: the public depend on the media for news it needs in solving complex problems; the media in turn, depend on the former as both a news source and consumer of information. This study is designed to examine the differences between individual and media composite variables' effect on Congress' apartheid policies.

Political crisis news are operationalized as events and actions (given coverage by the media) of any individual or group whose position (support or non-support) for apartheid policy led to disruptions of the public peace in South Africa between 1976 and 1988. Such actions, for example, include riots, revolts, demonstrations, arsons, sit-ins, and assassination of prominent political figures.

American Public Anti-Apartheid Activities

If the public largely determines the way certain issues are handled by decision makers (Rosenau, 1963), it is, therefore, important to examine the relationship between the public and policy makers. To achieve this purpose, this study will analyze the association between public apartheid activities and congressional apartheid actions.

Public apartheid activity is operationalized as all actions that were organized and carried out by groups and individuals in support or non-support of apartheid policy in the United States between 1976 and 1988.
Executive Anti-Apartheid Actions

The presidency is an embodiment of authority in America's democratic system. Apart from powers this office derives from the Constitution, each president brings his own unique pattern of decision-making to office. Because the presidency's role juxtaposes congressional law making authority, it is essential that the relation between these two offices be analyzed. The Reagan administration, for instance, initiated laws that ran counter to most congressional South Africa policies during the period analyzed. The effect of these decisions by the Executive on Congress are discussed in this research. This variable is operationalized by examining presidential support or non-support of United States-South Africa policy in the years 1976-1988.

Composite Variables

In order to test the agenda-building theory, it was essential that the MEDIA variable be merged (by multiplicative methods) with other independent variables to test their effect on congressional anti-apartheid actions. The agenda-building theory presents one of the criteria for merging these variables. This is because the theory states that group support is essential for media agenda success. The second and third criteria are based on results obtained from the F-test and violation of the multicollinearity
assumption. If the F-test, which determines inclusion of interaction coefficients, is positive, these variables will be included in the analysis; if not, the individual variables will be examined. Also, if the interactive variables are highly correlated with each other, the additive and not the interactive variables will be analyzed. The additive variables are:

South Africa political crises (CRISIS);
Newspaper political crises coverage (NEWSPAPERS);
Television political crises coverage (TV);
Magazine political crises coverage (MAGAZINES);
American public anti-apartheid activities (PUBLIC);
Presidential anti-apartheid policies (EXECUTIVE).

The interactive variables are:
Newspaper, television and magazine political crises coverage (MEDIA);
Media political crises coverage and American public anti-apartheid activities (MPUBLIC);
Media political crises coverage and Executive anti-apartheid actions (MEXECUTIVE);
American public and presidential anti-apartheid actions (PEXECUTIVE);
Media coverage, American public and presidential anti-apartheid actions (INTGROUPS).

All variables in this study were standardized by using the z-score method. This is important because it provides a
mean distribution of zero and a standard deviation of one, making it possible to use a uniform unit rather than raw data of observed variables in the analyses.

Lang and Lang's (1983) media agenda-building theory lends itself to the interaction of the variables that affect congressional apartheid policies. In relating these variables to the theory, it could be contended that in order for Congress to react to South Africa apartheid-related crises, either media coverage and American public; media coverage and Executive, or all three factors' anti-apartheid activities must be involved.

To analyze these relationships, two regression models were proposed: the additive and interactive.

1) The additive model specifies that individual variables (CRISIS, NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, PUBLIC and EXECUTIVE) are capable of influencing congressional anti-apartheid policies, independent of others. This argument is expressed by the equation:

\[ Y(\text{CONGRESS}) = a + b_1x_1(\text{CRISIS}) + b_2x_2(\text{NEWSPAPERS}) + b_3x_3(\text{MAGAZINES}) + b_4x_4(\text{PUBLIC}) + b_5x_5(\text{EXECUTIVE}) + e \]

2) The interactive model comprises both additive and composite variables. This model states that the effect of MEDIA on CONGRESS is dependent on their interaction with EXECUTIVE and PUBLIC. This argument is expressed by the equation:
In this model, the conditional effects of the individual variables in relation to the composite ones are analyzed. Both models were compared and the interactive coefficients (MEDIA, MPUBLIC, MEXECUTIVE, PEXECUCIVE, INTGROUPS) tested for statistical significance to determine whether or not they contribute more explanation as compared to the additive model. Details of this statistical test are explained in Appendix G.

In using the F-test, the null hypothesis tested is that a relationship exists between coefficients of the interactive independent variables \( b3x3 = b4x4 = b5x5 = b6x6 = b7x7 \). The null hypothesis will be rejected if the level of significance is .05 or less. Rejection of the null is indication of a nonlinear relationship between the coefficients of the interactive independent variables analyzed. Also, to be included in the analysis, the interactive variables' coefficients must be statistically significant; that is, they must show a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

The t-test was utilized in testing the significance of the regression coefficients. The hypothesis for this test states that the population coefficient for each of these
variables equals zero. However, according to Cohen and Cohen (1983), where the t-test value is greater than 2.0, it shows

Table 1. Result Showing Differences between Additive and Interaction Regression Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Seb</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig t</th>
<th>R-S</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDITIVE MODEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const.</td>
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<td>.5960</td>
<td>6.378</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.3647</td>
<td>28.955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA(x1)</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.0336</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.6896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC(x2)</td>
<td>.4080</td>
<td>.0710</td>
<td>.4300</td>
<td>5.764</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE(x3)</td>
<td>.8020</td>
<td>.2650</td>
<td>.2500</td>
<td>3.024</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERACTION MODEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const.</td>
<td>3.0830</td>
<td>.6580</td>
<td>4.688</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.4470</td>
<td>17.095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA(x1)</td>
<td>.0008</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.9050</td>
<td>1.801</td>
<td>.0647</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC(x2)</td>
<td>.5350</td>
<td>.0910</td>
<td>.5630</td>
<td>5.899</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE(x3)</td>
<td>.8030</td>
<td>.4870</td>
<td>.2500</td>
<td>1.649</td>
<td>.1012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPUBLIC(x1x2)</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>-.7980</td>
<td>-1.087</td>
<td>.2789</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXECUTIVE(x1x3)</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>.0009</td>
<td>.4160</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>.7015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEXECUTIVE(x2x3)</td>
<td>-.0410</td>
<td>.0270</td>
<td>-.2690</td>
<td>-1.550</td>
<td>.1234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTGROUPS(x1x2x3)</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>-.3770</td>
<td>-.328</td>
<td>.7436</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that the relationship examined is significant at the .05 level. In that case, the null is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. This leads to the conclusion of an existing relationship in the population examined.
In multiplicative regression analyses, t-test results are not interpreted as that of statistical significance of the general effect of one variable on another. Like coefficients of the regression equation, t-tests are the "statistical significance of the conditional effect of one variable on another at a particular value of a third variable" (Friedrich, 1982, p. 820).

Table 2. Correlation of Variables in the Interactive Model and their R-Squares with Each Regressed on others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONG</th>
<th>MED</th>
<th>PUB</th>
<th>MPUB</th>
<th>PEX</th>
<th>MPE</th>
<th>EXE</th>
<th>MEXE</th>
<th>RSQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONG</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.455</td>
<td>.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.651</td>
<td>.391</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPUB</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEX</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>.651</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPE</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>.391</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.505</td>
<td>.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXE</td>
<td>.455</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>.505</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXE</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.764</td>
<td>.991</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONG=CONGRESS; MED=MEDIA; PUB=PUBLIC; MPUB=MPUBLIC; PEX=PEXECUTIVE; MPE=INTGROUPS; EXE=EXECUTIVE; MEXE=MEXECUTIVE; RSQ=R-SQUARE

The F-statistic, in Table 1, indicates that the interactive model's (R-Square = .4470) relationship with congressional anti-apartheid policies is greater than the additive model (R-Square = .3647). However, the F-value of 0.1729 is less than the critical value of 2.21 at the .05 level; thus, this value does not support the inclusion of the interactive variables in the analysis. Also, none of the interactive coefficients (MPUBLIC, MEXECUTIVE,
PEXECUTIVE and INTGROUPS) is significant. The additive model also shows MEDIA (comprising newspaper, television and magazine political crises coverage) is not significant enough to be analyzed as an interactive variable. As a result, the additive regression model will be analyzed. Even if the interactive model were accepted for analysis, Table 2 shows that the multicollinearity assumption would be violated because of the highly correlated independent variables.

Since analysis of the interactive model was not supported, the additive model will be analyzed. The regression equation for this model is as follows:

\[ Y(\text{CONGRESS}) = a + b_1x_1 (\text{CRISIS}) + b_2x_2 (\text{NEWSPAPERS}) + b_3x_3 (\text{TV}) + b_4x_4 (\text{MAGAZINES}) + b_5x_5 (\text{PUBLIC}) + b_6x_6 (\text{EXECUTIVE}) + e \]

This regression model contends that each variable's (CRISIS, NEWSPAPERS, TV, MAGAZINES, PUBLIC and EXECUTIVE) effect on congressional anti-apartheid actions is independent of the other variables.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examines the literature central to agenda setting and agenda building. While there are differences in them, it is their similarities that are of importance to this study. In order for the media agenda-building process to materialize, it is essential that the media first set the agenda—a process where the media prioritize issues based on the allocation of space and time. Agenda-building combines media agenda setting and group effort to influence national agenda. This process cannot take place without the mass media or the public first determining the nature of the problem. For a group-initiated issue to find a spot on the agenda, it needs media support. In turn, media-generated problems need group backing before they can be placed on the policy agenda. This review will analyze the historical role of the media in setting public agenda, the various areas researched, and media effect in the agenda-building process.

The general idea of media impact on public agenda evolved in Lippmann's (1922) analysis of the power of mass communications. This study stated that people depend on their mental imaginations rather than reality in assessing major sociopolitical and economic decisions. According to Lippmann (1922), this is due to lack of time, interest, knowledge and opportunities people have in adequately
comprehending and analyzing issues in their environment. They, therefore, rely on any information capable of simplifying the numerous problems they confront daily, hence their dependence on media news. The media, on the other hand, capitalize on the weakness of the public and deliberately present them simplified and inaccurate versions of events (Doob, 1948). The concept of total media effect in shaping public attitude toward an issue was the reason why business, government, and politicians began to utilize the media in reaching the public (McCombs and Masel-Walters, 1981). The view that the media are capable of influencing public perception of an issue is comparable to a stimulus-response effect where the public reacts to media information without a mediating influence. This concept, referred to as the "hypodermic needle" or the "magic bullet" effect, dominated media research in the 1930s. According to Chaffee and Hochheimer, this view of complete media impact on the public is the notion that "all subjects will receive some critical feature of the message that will change them in the same way" (1985, p. 94). Explaining models of media effect on the public, Dominick (1983) attributed the hypodermic needle model to Lasswell and associates' 1930s war propaganda studies (see, for instance, Lasswell, 1927; Lasswell et al. 1939). He stated that the "magic bullet" model, a derivative of medical metaphor, is based on the assumption that as media campaign
messages diffuse through the population, like the effect of the medicinal needle; "they seem to pass through many without any noticeable impact on their thought or behavior ... but a substantial minority who are seeking political orientation are affected when the content of the message coincides with their current needs" (Dominick, 1983, p. 94).

However, in the 1940s, the view of the media's direct effect on the public without any mediating circumstances was refuted. One of the most influential studies is the analysis of the 1940 presidential campaign in Erie County, Ohio, by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). Their study indicated that low interest voters were not affected by media coverage of the campaign, rather that interpersonal relationships were capable of mitigating media effect. This concept, which introduced the "limited effect" model of media influence on the public, presupposed that the public was capable of minimizing direct media effect on their decision-making by carefully filtering out news coverage that did not correspond to their predispositions. The concept of limited media impact on the public, however, was challenged in the 1960s. Klapper (1960) argued that there were given conditions and situations under which the media could directly affect public agenda. Blummer and McQuail (1969) observed that the public depend on media news because of their use and gratification needs.
Media Agenda-Setting on Elections and Voting Behavior

Although various studies have analyzed media agenda effect on the public, the most cited is McCombs and Shaw's 1972 study which empirically tested this concept. In this study, they analyzed media effect on voters in the 1968 presidential election campaign. Respondents from Chapel Hill, North Carolina, were asked their views on the most important issues of the election in an attempt to examine the correlation between their answers and media coverage of what they considered salient issues of the campaign. McCombs and Shaw's (1972) findings indicated a substantial correlation between media-emphasized and what undecided voters regarded as the important issues in the election. These scholars concluded, therefore, that media agenda setting function was a determining factor in influencing voter election priorities.

Using data from the 1974 National Election Study conducted by the Michigan University Center for Political Studies, Erbring et al. (1980) examined the agenda-setting effect in relation to issues and specific audiences, and how media news coverage stimulates both issues and increases audience interest. Contents of national newspapers' front pages, local unemployment and crime rates in 1972 and 1974 were used for analysis. This cross-sectional study showed that different media affect the audience in different ways depending on the issues
involved. Their study also revealed that interpersonal relationships among the public influences media effect on the public, thus supporting the earlier finding of Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). Erbring et al. (1980) argued that the prevailing "media effect" defined as "a mirror-image relation between the agenda of a news source and the agenda of the audience" (Erbring et al. 1980, p. 45) shows nothing about the processes that determine agenda setting. Instead, they proposed an "audience contingent effects" model which assumes that media agenda interact with an audience's pre-existing knowledge to produce a change in issue salience. This model emphasizes the significance of an audience and the issue they are concerned with as necessary combinations that generate media agenda effectiveness.

Weaver et al. (1981) also analyzed media agenda effect on respondents selected from Evanston, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Lebanon, New Hampshire in the 1976 presidential election. This study compared newspaper and television effect and examined at what stage each of the medium's agenda would affect the respondents'. Contents of four newspapers and the evening news of the three major national television networks, including a Chicago local news broadcast, were analyzed. This process was used to determine factors that shaped the panelists' grasping of the issues and candidates involved in the presidential election. Their findings support the conclusion of Erbring
et al. (1980) that audience members' prior knowledge of issues facilitates media agenda-setting effect. This study supports the view that different medium have a different agenda impact on the audience, and that newspaper agenda influenced television's during the primaries. However, they observed that voters' agenda correlated more with television than newspaper coverage toward the end of the primary election.

Media agenda effect on local elections have also been analyzed. In one study, Pool (1963) contended that the press are more influential in local than national elections. His reason is based on the notion that because local elections have numerous candidates contesting different offices—and sometimes the ballot contains many referenda—voters have no time to inform themselves well enough on the issues and candidates. So they depend on any available information, usually the media's, to cast their vote for local elections. This situation, according to Pool (1963), is not true for national elections. This is because voters have fewer candidates to vote for nationally, and know much about them and the major issues involved.

Tipton et al. (1975) emphasized a minimal media agenda effect on local elections. This study analyzed the media's agenda effect on the 1971 Kentucky governor's race and the Lexington mayoral election. A sample of voters and content analysis of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Lexington
Herald, the evening edition of the City Leader and two local television and radio news contents, comprised the data set. Asked to name the medium from which they obtained most of their information about the campaign, 47 percent of the respondents named newspaper; 36, television. Their finding indicated the differential effect of newspaper and television agenda on the audience, a finding which supports the studies of Weaver et al. (1981) and Erbring et al. (1980). However, correlation between newspaper and public agenda was greater than that of the electronic media and the public's. They concluded that in comparison to the mayoral campaign, the state gubernatorial election had greater media coverage, with newspaper agenda effect greater at the local level than television and radio agenda.

Palmgreen and Clark's (1977) research examined the differential media agenda-setting effect between national and local media and issues. They analyzed the relationship between a 1973 Toledo, Ohio, audience and the local media network evening news agenda pattern. Their findings indicated that media emphasize more national than local issues, and that the media also have weaker agenda-setting influence on local problems compared to national ones. They concluded that newspaper, more than television, agenda are more effective on local issues; television is more effective on national agenda. This study, conducted in a
non-election period, also shows that television agenda is most effective with important and controversial issues. Examples of these include the national presidential election campaign and scandals on the magnitude of Watergate. On the other hand, newspaper indicated a greater influence of public agenda over a relatively stable time period in comparison to television. This confirms Weaver et al. (1981) agenda-setting effect of newspaper and spotlighting impact of television.

Bowers (1973) examined media agenda effect on twenty-five senatorial and gubernatorial elections in 1970. He analyzed each state's two largest newspapers and the top five issues of the election and how the campaign advertisements influenced voters' attitudes. He found that, unlike previous studies in which the media were said to directly set the public agenda, "voters, indirectly through the candidate, set the media's agenda" (Bowers, 1973, p. 555). His finding indicated that public influence on the agenda occurs only in a short time frame during a campaign period; as different from a long time frame where the media's agenda influence voters prior to candidates' campaigning.

In similar media agenda effect analysis, Patterson and McClure (1974), analyzed the effect of television news and political advertising on voters in Syracuse, New York, during the 1972 presidential election campaign. Their
findings, contradicting previous studies, show that political advertising messages had more influence on low than high interest voters. Their study also revealed that television network news had no direct and independent effect on voters, and that television news "adds little to the average voter's understanding of election issues" (Patterson and McClure, 1974, p. 54).

The view that media coverage can influence public agenda in local off-year elections was analyzed by Williams and Larsen (1971) whose study examined media effect on local, national, and international issues. Using data based on national television coverage, this study analyzed the correlation between what respondents indicated were the salient issues and what the media emphasized in their coverage. These scholars concluded that the media do set agenda on local issues during non-election years. Newspapers, they stated, best affected respondents with high level of political information on local and national issue agenda; radio, although not comparable to newspapers in its agenda effect, was also able to affect respondents' agenda.

Media Agenda-Setting on Public Opinion

Media coverage also influence public opinion. To demonstrate this view, Funkhouser (1973) examined the relationship between media agenda and public perception of
events that occurred in the United States in the 1960s. He used the Gallup Survey data between 1965 and 1970 on the public's perception of the Vietnam War, race relations, inflation, crime, campus unrest, and other major issues. He then compared national news magazines' coverage of these issues and what the media indicated as salient. Results of this study revealed a strong correlation between media coverage and public opinion. However, his findings also indicated that media coverage of the Vietnam War, urban riots, student unrest and crime declined before these events peaked. This is an indication that media coverage fails to reflect reality.

Replicating Funkhouser's (1973) study, Mackuen and Coombs, in 1981, analyzed major domestic issues between 1960 and 1977. Their results were compared to the coverage by Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report for the same period. Their findings support Funkhouser's (1973) observation that the media agenda pattern fits the way the public orient themselves to political issues. However, media agenda effect is not direct but mediated by the public's capability of independently evaluating issues in their environment. This finding indicates that the media may not be able to affect public agenda because of their awareness of the issues as they affect them directly.

Lang and Lang's (1983) analysis of the relationship between media agenda and public opinion, as it relates to
the Watergate scandal, sheds more light on the understanding of media agenda influence. They contended that media agenda play an important role in shaping the salience the public attaches to issues. Using respondents' answers to the Gallup surveys published between June 1972, after the Watergate break-in and May 1973, when the Ervin Committee started its investigation, they argued that media agenda were far ahead of public opinion on Watergate. However, in 1973, the pattern changed as public opinion on the scandal peaked due to increased media coverage. These scholars hypothesized that the media by themselves are incapable of dictating public agenda because "the gradual saturation of news content with Watergate depended on political developments in which the press itself was only one of several movers" (Lang and Lang, 1983, p. 58). In order words, although media coverage is necessary for an issue to be accepted as salient, a collective effort by politicians, citizens, and government is necessary for it to be included on the policy agenda.

Television agenda's effect on the public was analyzed by Behr and Iyengar in 1985. Utilizing Gallup, Yankelovitch, and the University of Michigan public response surveys on what the public indicated were the most important problems the country was facing between 1974 and 1980, they compared public responses to what the CBS television evening news regarded as the salient issues.
Results of their research indicated that television coverage affects public agenda and reflects real-world conditions, at least on issues of unemployment, inflation and energy.

Media Agenda Setting on Public Policy

The view that media agenda influence public policy and officials have been analyzed by various researchers. While some scholars hold that media agenda shape governmental policy-making processes, others disagree. In his analysis, Crenson (1971) showed that local newspaper agenda is essential in forcing government officials to enact policies they regard as unimportant. He used two case studies to illustrate his analyses—East Chicago and Gary, Indiana—where officials attempted legislating clean air bills in 1947 and 1955, respectively. In the case of East Chicago, the business community attempted working against a City Council legislation regulating their business activities. And in Gary, Indiana, the local steel workers' union was to thwart efforts of those working for clean air legislation. Then, using the National Opinion Research Center's 1966 and 1967 data on the response of political leaders in fifty-one American cities, Crenson (1971) found that among groups that influenced air pollution control, local newspapers' agenda came third after city officials and the local Chamber of Commerce.
Describing the relationship between media coverage and government officials, Sigel (1973) noted that the media are able to affect government agenda because of the competitive atmosphere existing among them. Citing a 1971 incident when the Washington Post leaked a news story on Kissinger's United States-China negotiations, Sigel (1973) stated that the news story affected the outcome of the meeting. He contended that media news influence policy making because in most instances the media are the "source of much of the important information that the government gets about itself and its own parts (Sigel, 1973, p. 186).

Focusing his media agenda study on the state level, Gormley (1975) examined the relationship between newspaper coverage and North Carolina legislators' agenda during the 1973 assembly session. He extracted issues considered by the media to be salient from five major newspapers' front and editorial pages. He then asked senators to complete a questionnaire on the importance of various issues. His findings showed that newspapers set the political elite's agenda. However, newspaper ranking of some issues was much higher compared to that of the legislators.

The effect of media agenda on a specific policy area was analyzed by Lambeth (1978) who examined national elite press agenda coverage of governmental decision makers on energy policies in the 1970s. His findings indicated influence of the press on national policy makers' energy
issues. However, he found that legislators viewed the press as least influential in their energy policy legislation.

Lamert, analyzing journalists' impact on decision makers, stated that the media serve as an important information link between policy makers and the public. He contended that the decision whether or not to report a story affects the information each group knows about the other. According to Lemert, the media define the information that officials get about public reaction to an issue and that "the way information about citizen attitudes is defined and organized can more subtly alter the kinds of information decision makers think they have" (Lamert, 1981, p. 192).

In their exploratory experimental study, Cook et al. (1983) examined the nature of television agenda effect on the public, interest group leaders, policy and policy makers. Collaborating with a team of journalists, the researchers worked with an experimental and control group, a group of governmental policy makers from the Chicago mayor's office; United States Department of Health and Human Services Personnel; Illinois State legislators and seven interest groups. The purpose of this study was to test whether a television program on fraud problems in home health care influenced the policy agenda of these groups. Findings from this research revealed that media presentation had a greater influence on those exposed to
the televised program than those who watched other programs. They also found that the program affected decision makers' perceptions of issue salience because their views correlated with what the program stated as the most important issues. However, results of this study indicated a negative effect of media agenda on interest group elite.

In a subsequent study modeled after Cook et al. (1983), Protess et al. (1985) examined the effect of media agenda on public officials. Analyzing the effect of the Chicago Sun-Tribune investigative coverage on the handling of rape cases by government officials, this research utilized a quasi-experimental method in analyzing the relationship between media coverage, public agenda, and policy makers. Their findings indicated a minimal effect of media agenda on public attitude toward rape in comparison to non-rape crime issues.

The third in the series of studies attempting to analyze the effect of media investigative coverage on the public and policy makers was conducted by Leff et al. (1986). This study examined the influence of a local television station's coverage of police brutality on the public and policy makers. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, these researchers asked respondents to view a 1983 televised program "Beating Justice." Evidence of media agenda effect was found for officials who were exposed to
the televised program in contrast to the control group.

Newspaper agenda influence on crime news was analyzed by Pritchard (1986). Data were gathered from police and court records and from the evening and Sunday news coverage of the Milwaukee Sentinel. This research examined the effect of newspaper coverage on prosecutors' handling of plea bargaining with accused persons. His results indicated that prosecutors patterned their cases based on the important issues covered by the newspaper.

Analyzing the exposure by the Washington Post of how the federal government in 1977, through the United States Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), attempted concealing production of the neutron bomb, Linsky (1986) revealed that media coverage exposed and shaped congressional voting on the issue. He contended that from June 6, 1977, when the Post exposed the news, NBC and the New York Times' coverage showed the series of lies government officials evolved in covering up the bomb issue. Media coverage eventually led Congress to vote down the measure. In another example, Linsky (1986) reported that media coverage in 1983 of the abuses on recipients of funding from the Social Security Administration led to effective changes of governmental policy in this area. Linsky's (1986b) interview with 500 former and twenty government officials indicated that 96 percent conceded to the view of positive media agenda effect on federal policy.
These examples show that media coverage affects government officials and their policy.

Although these studies and empirical examples indicated positive media effect on public policy, other studies revealed that media effect on policy is minimal. Paletz and Entman (1981), although acknowledging the power of the press in influencing public agenda, argued that during campaigns presidential candidates manipulate the media to their own advantage. Citing examples from the Carter and Reagan campaigns of 1976 and 1980, this research showed that presidential candidates deliberately manipulated the media into believing they initiated programs. In the media-Congress relationship, they contended that failure of the media to give in-depth analysis of congressional activities robs the public of adequate knowledge of what goes on in Congress, eventually making it possible for the law makers to successfully keep damaging information from getting to the public. Blanchard (1974) lends support to the view that government officials and politicians do manipulate the mass media for their own benefit. He based his contention on the notion that Congress is covered by part-time journalists. Their average age, education, experience and income also support this view.

media and public agenda. In this longitudinal study, respondents were instructed to record their pattern of media usage. Basing analysis of this research on "schemata theory"—development of mental images to help select and organize information in a meaningful way (Graber, 1988, p. 27)—she found that the public is capable of stemming media agenda. She contended that this is possible because media news that fail to correlate with already formed images will be rejected and not assimilated.

Newspaper-Television Differential Effect

Media agenda-setting effect has also focused on the differences between newspaper and electronic media. It has been argued that because of their technological nature, newspaper and television agenda impact is not uniform for the same audience. Shaw and McCombs' (1977) study on the relationship between respondents' attitudes toward television and newspaper coverage in the 1972 presidential campaign election is analyzed to shed light on this issue. Using contents of the Charlotte Observer and network evening news, the researchers analyzed the different medium's agenda effect on the respondents. Their findings indicated that newspaper agenda correlated more with the public's during pre-campaigning in June than did television whose agenda, however showed the reverse was true in October during the heat of the presidential campaign.
Explaining these differences, Shaw and McCombs argued that "the agenda-setting roles of newspapers and television stem, in part, from basic differences in the two media of communication ... influenced by technology, and technological restraints" (1977, p. 97). Support for this conclusion was given by Tipton et al. (1975) who examined the media agenda-setting effect in Kentucky's gubernatorial and Lexington's mayoral elections of 1971.

In the analysis of the 1974 congressional elections, Carey (1976) also found that newspaper agenda were more important than television's. Utilizing contents of the three network evening news programs, news magazines (Time, Newsweek, and the U.S. News and World Report), and the New York Times, Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, this research found that although newspapers and news magazines devoted coverage to the campaign issues, "newspapers placed greater value on media coverage of the campaign" (Carey, 1976, p. 54) compared to television and news magazines.

In their study, Benton and Frazier (1976) distinguished the effect of newspaper and television agenda on the public. Basing their research on examination of the national economy in 1975, they tested the proposition that the media presented different news agenda to different groups depending on their information background. Utilizing contents of the three network evening news programs, two
Minneapolis metropolitan daily newspapers, and *Time* and *Newsweek*, respondents were asked to list causes, solutions and policy makers associated with the nation's troubled economy. The findings indicated a high correlation between media and public agenda. However, newspaper coverage showed a greater fit with public agenda when compared to agenda of television and news magazines. Where newspapers seem to have been setting the agenda for newspaper-oriented respondents, it also set the agenda for television-oriented respondents.

Support for this conclusion is found in McClure and Patterson's (1976) analysis of the 1972 presidential election campaign. Patterning their research after Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) Elmira voting analysis, they interviewed respondents before, during and after the election. They hypothesized that for agenda setting to occur, heavy media users would increase the salience they attach to media-emphasized issues more than light users. They concluded that although agenda-setting effect was recorded for television and newspaper, an "increase in salience attached to the issues of Vietnam and government spending were strongly and significantly related to the level of newspaper exposure" (McClure and Patterson, 1976, p. 24).

Although newspaper agenda was not compared with television's, Zucker (1978) contended that television
agenda impact on public opinion is tremendous. Utilizing responses from 1973 and 1975 polls on the most important problem the country was facing and coverage of the network news, Zucker (1978) found that changes in public views on pollution, drugs, energy, living cost, unemployment and crime exhibited a perfect fit with what national television gave maximum coverage.

Confirmation for the findings of Weaver et al. (1981) and Iyengar and Kinder (1982) on the effect of television coverage on public perception of issues, was repeated by Iyengar and Kinder (1987). They analyzed television agenda effect on the public in relation to the president's handling of his responsibilities. This research was patterned after their 1982 study in which respondents were made to view distorted television news on American national defense issues. This study made available tampered television news to respondents who were instructed to name the country's most important problems and evaluate the performance of presidents in office. They based their analysis on "priming theory" (the view that since people are not capable of paying attention to everything, they attempt to "satisfice—-to find good enough solutions to their problems and good enough sources of action": Simon, 1979; quotation from Iyengar and Shanto, 1987, p. 137). They argued that since the public does not possess answers to every problem because of limited time, they rely on
television news (which, according to them, features the president on almost every news story) in assessing presidential performance in office. They further argued that since television news is nation- and president-centered, compared to newspaper news, television agenda on the president will correlate more with public perception of his performance in office. Their conclusion indicated that television influenced public opinion assessment of presidential performance.

In her analysis of how the public can effectively control media agenda influence, Graber (1988) examined the differences between newspaper and television effect on respondents questioned in Evanston, Illinois, in 1976. Forty-eight percent of the news they watched was attributed to newspaper coverage, compared to 27 of television and 25 from other media sources.

Eyal (1981) contended that media agenda research indicates differential agenda effect because of the lack of consistency in conceptualization and measurement. He noted that because researchers in the area adopt new measurement systems instead of replicating and clarifying previous studies, results of media agenda effect will continue to be inconsistent. To avoid this problem, he recommended that future media agenda research should consider contributions predecessors in the field had made and distinguish among intrapersonal, interpersonal, and perceived community
agenda. He also stated that a media agenda time frame formula should be based on theories that have been tested. And finally, Eyal (1981) stated that television agenda, limited to political advertising, must be diversified in order to yield new results in newspaper-television agenda effect (Eyal, 1981, p. 231).

Media Agenda-Setting on Foreign Policy

The media's influence on foreign policy decision-making has been analyzed. Although there is no indication of an empirical study formally testing the agenda-setting function of the American mass media on specific foreign policy issues (Larson, 1984, p. 142), there are, however, studies that have detailed media influence on foreign policy agenda. Almond (1956), for instance, referred to the media as opinion elite because they help shape the public's mind on matters of foreign affairs.

Cohen (1963), describing the press's impact on foreign policy issues, contended that policy makers rely on the prestige press coverage in formulating decisions. He argued that press agenda on policy issues affect the salience which State Department officials attach to problems. In the relationship between the public, press and foreign policy, Cohen stated that the press coverage of an issue does not directly affect the public, but the "few direct and heavy readers" (1963, p. 262) who, in turn, influence people less
prone to monitoring the news on any given foreign policy problem. In analyzing media agenda effect, Cohen stated that although "It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963, p. 13).

In his analysis of the influence of mass media on government foreign policy initiators, Batscha (1975) stated that the media act as critic, advocate, policy maker and visualizer of governmental events. The seventy-five foreign correspondents he interviewed had divergent views on whether or not television should play the role of government critic. Fifteen percent of them supported the view that television should act as government's advocate which he defined as the act of editorializing on a policy stance taken by government. A majority of his respondents argued that the roles of government critic, advocate and policy maker (media engaging in trial balloons or the leak of government secrets to test the reception of a policy on the public) should be reserved for newspapers and not television. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents, however, agreed that the only area television influence is most felt is in helping the public visualize foreign policy events as they occur.

Rubin (1977), analyzing the media and their coverage of foreign events, argued that the prestige media have the
money and manpower for a thorough coverage of foreign events; however, because foreign affairs news is not interesting, the media, by trying to dramatize it, end up giving coverage to foreign policy issues that skew public perception of problems. Supporting the view of biased foreign news reporting by the prestige media, Rosenblum (1979) contended that only small fractions of what foreign news correspondents send home are reported. Such news, he stated, is often dramatized to attract readership (1979, p. 174). Citing media coverage of Zaire and the Cuban rebellion, Paletz and Entman observed that because the American public does not show significant interest in foreign affairs news, the media present news that is "replete with violence and destruction [news which] concerns potential threats to American diplomatic and economic interests ... reported to conform to familiar expectations and stereotypes" (1981, p. 216).

Cohen (1983) argued that because the public is linked to officials through media informal contacts and because many officials equate public opinion on an issue to what the media report, the media capitalize on this relationship to influence foreign policy decisions. He stated that the media carefully use their role as opinion formulators and transmitters of information to set agenda on foreign policy.

Larson's (1984) analysis of network television global
news coverage between 1972 and 1975 adds a new dimension of media effect on public perception of foreign policy events. He argued that local media global news coverage is dependent on national media broadcast. And because the public is less interested in foreign policy issues the media, especially the networks, seize the opportunity to influence public agenda on international news (1984, p. 141). His findings indicated that network television evening news agenda gave more coverage to industrialized compared to developing nations. His study indicated that Third World nations' news coverage by the elite media is mostly crisis-related. Support for this view was provided by Graber (1984) in her analysis of the role of the media in American politics. She contended that the slant of coverage given foreign news events is capable of distorting the issue for the public. Graber (1984) cited examples of how the media withheld criticism against Iranian leaders in the 1979 hostage conflict and how they slowed down on reporting vital information about America's breaking of Japanese military codes during the Second World War. She stated that "support of the status quo also means that news people usually are willing to withhold news and commentary when publicity would severely complicate the government's management of foreign policy" (Graber, 1984, p. 327). Howlana (1984), in his study of the prestige media agenda effect on the United States-Iranian hostage crisis, stated
that the media agenda on the issue negated public perception of Iranians. He stated that "the media in many instances acted as an alternative source of information for diplomats when government channels were closed off during the U.S.-Iranian conflict" (Howlana, 1984, p. 81).

Although media agenda affects the way the public and officials view foreign policy issues, Lovell (1985), citing President Reagan, argued that the effective usage of the media by the president was not a guarantee that his foreign policy proposals were always accepted by the public. He reasoned that media coverage of Reagan's policies gave the public adequate opportunity to scrutinize what the president failed to inform them.

The media's role in influencing American foreign policy and diplomatic channels between it and other countries was the focus of Newsom's (1988) research. He contended that because decisions on many foreign policy issues are deliberated mostly on the public stage, the media's middleman role between the public and government officials makes it possible for them to affect foreign policy debate. He argued that the media cooperate with government in not publishing security matters and issues that concern American lives abroad. Newsom, supporting Lovell's position that the media's coverage assists the public in rejecting presidential policies, contended that "it is the press—and not the government that makes the
final decisions" (1988, p. 54) on such matters.

Given the view that only a small fraction of the public are knowledgeable and concerned about foreign policy affairs (Almond, 1956; Paletz and Entman, 1981; Larson, 1984; Newman, 1986), Sankari (1987) contended that the media will find it hard to convince the policy elite due to their vast knowledge in policy issues. Using media coverage of the United States-Iran hostage conflict, Sankari reasoned that the president and his officials, and not the media or the public, shaped the two nations' relations during the crisis.

Media and Agenda-Building Research

The central thesis underlying the media agenda-building process is the argument that although the media are influential at setting public agenda, the media agenda alone are not entirely responsible for influencing public agenda. If agenda-setting is the process where "increased coverage by the media on an issue causes increased perceptions of it as salient among the public" (Smith, 1987), agenda building extends the argument further: group involvement is necessary for the success of media agenda. According to Lang and Lang (1981), problems go through two primary stages before they get legitimized as an important national problem. First, the media, by nature of their coverage, place the problem before the public. Second,
political figures and politically concerned interests then mobilize "constituencies with promises, by fixing blame or courting support for some kind of political action" (Lang and Lang, 1981, p. 58). This theory contends that media coverage is a springboard from which interested groups organize actions (Westley, 1976). This is done because media coverage of an issue generates public controversy. Where political interests do not get involved in debate of an issue, the problem does not become part of the policy agenda. But where the informed publics (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Westley, 1976) overtly express different kinds of interests, policy makers are forced to respond to the problem emphasized by the media (McCombs and Stone, 1981).

This study applies this argument to South Africa's apartheid policy and actions of the American public. Agenda-building theory explains that, first, it is essential that the media give coverage to the problem. And that the more coverage the media devote to apartheid problems, the more the public is involved in debating the issue. The controversy generated by the process compels the decision makers to act by including the issue on their agenda. However, where the media fail to keep the debate on apartheid going, the less likely it is that the problem will be included on the policy makers' agenda.

According to Cobb, classical agenda-building is a process "by which demands of various groups in the
population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials" (1976, p. 28). This process is reinforced by the nature of media coverage. Given this definition, the question becomes at what stage does the media influence play a significant role in the agenda building process? Cobb (1976) lists four basic stages: initiative, specification, expansion, and entrance. The media's agenda can affect the public's at any of these stages. The media could, for example, be responsible for initiating and expanding a problem as well as specifying the parameters under which the public and governmental officials could handle the debate relating to the issue. The media also expand the problem's realms by their constant coverage at strategic news pitch hours. Even when the problem gains entrance onto the governmental agenda, the media owe it to the public they represent to keep them informed until the resolution of the issue (Lipsky, 1968).

Not all issues the public and media become deeply involved in are included on policy agenda. Downs (1972) stated that a problem can get access onto the official agenda if it affects a majority of the public. He also revealed that the magnitude of suffering caused by political or social arrangement in the society is capable of forcing an issue among those considered by policy makers. However, should the media relax its coverage of an issue, the problem may not be included on the agenda
(Downs, 1972). The nature of media coverage also determines whether or not a crisis issue is added to an agenda examined by policy makers (Lipsky, 1972). In other words, controversial issues which are given maximum media coverage are more likely to be discussed by the policy makers.

Public involvement in an issue, however, does not guarantee its inclusion on the government's agenda package because media coverage and the degree of public involvement determine whether or not an issue is included on the agenda (Lipsky, 1968; Downs, 1972; Westley, 1976; Smith, 1987). Among conditions listed by Peters (1982) on how problems get on the agenda are the effect of the problem, its linkage to other existing ones, and its relationship to symbols that affect the nation's political values. Outside these parameters, an issue must generate controversy within and among affected interests, including governmental decision makers, in a manner such that media involvement will intensify the situation among all concerned interests.

In explaining the full impact of agenda building, it should be realized that the participation of those affected by an issue is necessary for the success of the process. If one of the contributor's roles is expunged, the theory's explanatory power may be jeopardized. DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1976) referred to the relationship between these major agenda players as "tripartite audience-media-society" linkage. This explains the process where media coverage is
supported by interested groups affected by the issue and the media, at other instances, give adequate coverage to a problem that emanates from the public so as to guarantee its inclusion on the policy agenda.

The need for the public to organize its structure of attitudes, or cognitive map, as stated by some social psychologists, forces individuals to depend on media news. DeFleur and Rokeach (1976), in confirming this position, stated that societal conflicts, insecurity and the fear of the unknown that prevail in societies, encourage an audience-media dependency relationship. The greater the insecurity, the more answers the audience seek from the media. The public, therefore, reacts to a situation that affects them based on the nature of media coverage.

A similar explanation given the media-public relationship could be deduced to analyze that between the public and congressmen. Although the public has limited power in controlling Congress members' votes (Kingdon, 1981), it is argued that where a constituent's "active public" becomes involved in a controversial issue then members of Congress are apt to give concern to the swaying of the opinion among their electorate before casting a vote on the matter. The fear of destroying a future political career by constantly ignoring constituents' demands, weighs heavily on the minds of Congress members. Confirming this view, Cohen stated that "the prospect of electoral
accountability induces a sensitivity to public preferences between elections whenever important decisions have to be made" (1983, p. 185). Dahl supported this view by stating that elected leaders "keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents constantly in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject" (1961, p. 164). If elected officials, presumably, are representing the views of those who elected them to power, they should not take too different a stance from what their electors back home demand (Rouke, 1969). Page (1976), for instance, stated that the president and Congress, in contemporary American politics, are expected to be much more responsive to public opinion than state government and judicial officials. This is because actions taken by these groups of decision makers are in the full glare of voters, a majority of whom are more interested in national than local elections (Paletz and Entman, 1981; Larson, 1984).

Not all scholars, however, accept the argument on a linear relationship between the public and their elected representatives. McConnell (1966) and Parenti (1986) stated that interest groups' influence is greater than public opinion's effect on members of Congress. The argument of these scholars is predicated on the view that because of public apathy toward politics (Campbell, Angus et al., 1960; Nie et al., 1976; Neuman, 1986), the public inadvertently cede their power of influencing elected
officials to very powerful interests whose economic and political success depend on their active participation in the democratic process.

The view of a partial or moderate influence of the public on Congress was expressed by Miller and Stokes (1966 and 1963). Their role-call analysis of congressional response to public policy preferences indicated that Congress does respond to public opinion. However, due to difficulties of measuring causal direction in public-congressional policy response, Erikson and Stokes (1976 and 1978) argued that neither voters nor law makers influence each other. Criticizing their findings, Page (1983) countered that the conclusions by scholars are limited because they restrict their analysis to the microlevel of individual members of Congress and not necessarily reveal much about the responsiveness of the political system as a whole. Using aggregate data and a list of issues, Erikson (1976) found consistency between public opinion and policy enactment on highly salient issues. With the use of a change-oriented design, Page and Shapiro's (1980 and 1982) analysis found consistency between the movement and congruency of policy and opinion toward the same direction. This conclusion supports Monroe's (1979) study with similar findings.

However, Page and Shapiro (1982), like Zucker (1971), Downs (1957), McConnell (1966), and Schattschneider (1960),
concluded that policy-opinion linearity is higher on salient than non-salient issues. Miller and Stokes (1963), confirming these findings, concluded that on issues of social welfare, foreign policy controversies, and civil rights, congressional roll-call behavior indicates strong constituent influences.

The existing symbiotic relationship between electors and the elected furnishes an explanation for why members of Congress carry out policies supported by active groups in their constituencies (Arrow, 1951; Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978). Also, the need for societal benefits encourages voters to actively participate in politics, especially when problems require the help of representatives they rely on for their fair share of goods and services (Davis, 1970; Weber and Shaffer, 1973). Evidence abounds, for instance, on the view that the greater the level of public participation on any problem, the more the likelihood that policy makers would lean toward supporting such issues (Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Weber et al., 1972; Weisberg, 1978; Devine, 1970). Using national sample data, Uslaner and Weber (1983) concluded that elected public leaders respond to demands of public opinion. This is possible because constituencies tend to elect representatives whose views are not at variance with theirs (Cnudde and McCrone, 1966; Fiorina, 1974; Pitkin, 1967).

The media's role is vital in maintaining Congress-
public relationship. The former is responsible for informing the public of what decision makers are doing. They also convey public perceptions of important issues to officials. This middleman role places the media in a strategic position of influencing public policy as explained by the agenda-building theory.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter will address the method of analysis utilized in this study. The study analyzes the relationships between media coverage of South Africa crises, American public, and presidential and congressional response to apartheid. Content analysis has been adopted for this purpose. Content analysis, as used in this study, is the process of examining prestige media news coverage of South Africa. The content analyzed comprises all news items concerning the country but with special attention to political crisis news. This analysis is important because of the argument presented by the media agenda-building theory. The theory states that the mass media are not solely responsible for placing issues on the public agenda. Analysis of media news content on South Africa, as it relates to public opinion, presidential, and congressional anti-apartheid actions will, therefore, help to test the effect of media coverage on Congress' policies on apartheid.

In discussing methods for analyzing media content, Krippendorff defined a research method as a "procedure of networks describing steps through which scientific information is processed" (1980, p. 49). Holsti stated that a research design is a plan "for collecting and analyzing
data in order to answer an investigator's question" (1969, p. 26).

Krippendorff's content analysis design is modeled to enable media research to:

1) estimate some phenomena in the context of data;
2) test the suitability of one method of content analysis; and
3) test hypotheses (1980, p. 50-52).

Using simple interrogative techniques of content analysis research design, Holsti also proposed three areas in which media analysts could fashion suitable designs for their studies. The first, which attempts to answer questions of what, how, and to whom, "describes characteristics of communication" (1969, p. 26). The second answers questions based on why and who and "makes inferences as to the antecedents of communication" (p. 26). This analysis, according to Holsti (1969), is the process of encoding media content. The third design poses the question: "with what effect?" which Holsti (1969) said is the decoding process of media content.

The agenda-building theory is based on the assumption that media coverage and group effort are essential in influencing national decision agenda. This is due to the mutual benefits each derives and expects from the other (McCombs and Weaver, 1973; Weaver, 1977 and 1978; Rogers and Dearing, 1987; Lang and Lang, 1981; Cobb and Elder,
1971 and 1983). This argument lends itself to Krippendorff's (1980) and Holsti's (1969) designs for testing hypotheses on media agenda effect.

The customary methodology for testing media agenda is to first state hypotheses on the relationship between media news and public response to a problem. Next, news items presented by the media on the problem are extracted by the content analysis technique. These items are administered to groups of respondents who are provided instructions on ranking them. Where there is a perfect fit between media news and the respondents' rankings, the media are assumed to have influenced the latter's issue salience, depending on time lags involved. According to research findings on time lags in media agenda effect, data on public usage of media correlates best with the preceding two months of media content (Eyal, 1981; Weaver et al., 1981; Singer and Ludwig, 1987). A conclusion that the mass media news affect public agenda is supported where a cause-effect relationship is exhibited by both media and respondents, that is, where media data are collected in lagged sequence before respondents are asked to rank the issues. If the media's correlation is greater than the respondents', a causal inference is assumed (McCombs, 1977).

Shaw and McCombs (1972), for instance, used the method where hypotheses on the relationship between media news and public response were first stated. They then analyzed
contents of media news from where a set of issues was presented to an audience for analysis. Their findings suggested positive evidence of media effect on the public agenda priority. Weaver et al. (1981) used a comparative analysis approach to analyze the relationship between media news and public response. They first stated their hypotheses based on the different effect of newspaper and television coverage on the public. Their study found support for newspaper as a greater agenda setter in comparison to television. Other agenda setting studies (McCombs, 1977; Iyengar et al., 1982; Cook et al., 1983; Graber, 1988) have used the hypotheses-media content-audience design to analyze media effects on the public.

The method adopted in this study is that of hypotheses-media content-public response design. This method is utilized because mass media effect on congressional apartheid policies is analyzed. Because comparison between the various media is not involved in this study, the hypotheses-media content-audience design was not adopted. An advantage of using the hypotheses-media content-audience method is that it presents an opportunity to test the agenda-building theory as it relates to the effect of media coverage with or without group support on congressional anti-apartheid actions.

First, several hypotheses on the relationships between media coverage of South Africa crises, American public,
presidential, and congressional anti-apartheid activities were stated. Next, media coverage on South Africa as indicated in the indices was collected by coding all South Africa news items as published by the prestige media between 1976 and 1988. Then apartheid-related actions of the American public were tallied from some of the prestige newspapers and magazines' indices analyzed. This design differs from Shaw and McCombs (1972), Weaver et al. (1981), and Graber (1988), in that only the effects the media agenda have on decision makers' South Africa actions are analyzed, not elections. Also, congressional anti-apartheid actions are specified as the dependent variables; South Africa political crises, media coverage, American public, and presidential activities on apartheid, are the independent variables. No attempts were made to survey or interview members of Congress to obtain their reaction on apartheid. A survey of policy makers' anti-apartheid behavior which dates back in time is subject to recall error on the part of the respondents. In addition, turnover of Congress members, deaths, and possible uncooperative attitude from both law makers and federal government officials are disadvantages to this approach in the context of the current study.
Content Analysis Methodology

The content analysis methodology, according to Guido, is a "formal system for drawing conclusions from observation of content" (1981, p. 119). This method is valuable for measuring media content because it provides an objective, systematic and quantitative description (Cartwright, 1953) for gathering and analyzing data scientifically. Berelson provided a definition that exemplifies its utility: content analysis is the "research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (1952, p. 18). This method of analyzing media data states the procedure for determining units of analysis, category construction, recording units, and content coding. It is almost impossible to analyze media performance without actually conducting a content analysis of print and broadcast media.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the small frame of content that has been carefully and systematically drawn from an entire context of a print or broadcast news. Holsti (1969) suggested that units of media analysis comprise either a single word or symbol, a theme, character, sentence or a paragraph. Although he recommended these as the most appropriate and useful units in content analysis, he argued
that the major difficulty with thematic analysis is its
time consumption and limited measurement boundaries.

This study's unit of analysis is the story. This is
appropriate because it analyzes the relationship between
South Africa crises, media coverage, American public,
presidential, and Congress' apartheid actions. The
directionality of a story or writer's bias is not used
because each article is placed in a separate category. What
is vital to this research is the presence of an article,
the time it was published, and whether or not it relates to
apartheid. There was no need for the length or placement
of articles. Media indices were appropriate enough for
this study.

The use of a television story being a unit in content
analysis has been criticized by Holsti (1969b) who argued
that it presents a problem when news items fall into two
categories. Such an occurrence might introduce elements of
bias if not handled adequately. Frank (1973) suggested the
use of "hard" or "soft" approaches in analyzing a tele-
vision unit, the former the examination of seconds, story
placement, and frequency word counts and the latter, the
analysis of news segments and stories. Sperry (1981), in
his study of media coverage, employed both approaches in
his analysis of television news; Lichty and Baily (1978),
in their study of media agenda effect, supported the use of
a television story as a more acceptable unit of analysis.
Defending the use of a television story as the analysis unit, Hofstetter (1976) stated that stories are planned and perceived by journalists as "united wholes" rather than bits and pieces of disparate news stories. There was, therefore, no need for analyzing television programs and news on apartheid. Television indices are appropriate for this study.

Coding Technique

In content analysis, the coding method adopted may affect the validity of the research findings. This study's unit of analysis is the story, and it examines the placement of South Africa news items as recorded in the indices of the newspapers analyzed. The Readers' Guide to Periodic Literature is used for coding news items from the magazine/journals; Television News Index and Abstracts is used for television news content.

The frequency of citations in these sources was counted and tallied under categories determined prior to analysis. Sections of the index where South Africa news were entered helped in this process. Headings and subtitles indicated to what category a story belonged.

News entries from the news magazines and journals analyzed were obtained and coded from The Readers' Guide to Periodic Literature. This same procedure in gathering data in the coverage of events in the 1960s by Newsweek, Time
and the *U.S. News and World Report* was used by Funkhouser (1973). He concluded that although there is a correlation between media coverage and public response to the news, the media failed to mirror societal reality. This method has the weakness of depending on what the editors of the indices consider to be the coverage of news stories for specific events. In order to check the replicability of the classifications within the indices, an analysis of one year's data from a microfilm entry for the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* on South Africa coverage was conducted. The three yielded almost the same number of stories recorded in the indices of these newspapers. A further check was done by comparing the index entries to those of the *Times* of London. Both internal and external checks on indices used found no support for significant difference.

**Category Construction**

Having decided on the units of analysis for measuring the content data, the next step is to specify the groupings for the news items. The utility of categorization in content analysis lies in the fact that a specific media content can be subdivided into different subject matter areas.

Krippendorff suggested that a minimum requirement for formulating categories is that they be exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. Budd et al. (1967) suggested that media categories might include news, editorial, fictional news materials and time. However, Stempel (1981) specified three criteria that content analysis categories must meet: categories must be pertinent to objectives of study; categories must be functional; and categories must be manageable or economical (1981, p. 123). North et al. (1963) emphasized the importance of validity, reliability and objectivity as important criteria for category construction. Attempts have been made to meet these specifications in this study by separating the different kinds of South Africa news analyzed.

Two major categories have been constructed: crisis and non-crisis news on South Africa. The view that media agenda are best tested against unobtrusive rather than obtrusive issues has been analyzed (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Zucker, 1978; Weaver et al., 1981; Lang and Lang, 1983). Since apartheid protests have been prominent in South Africa’s history, emphasis is concentrated on analyzing crisis news which corresponds to unobtrusive media news.

In order to further distinguish between the types of crisis news which might have affected apartheid-related activities in the United States, crisis news was further subdivided into two areas: political and non-political crisis news. The former is crisis related to apartheid; the latter is crisis that had nothing to do with apartheid.
Taylor and Jodice (1983) specified that protest actions, for purposes of analysis, must be distinguished into major categories in order to facilitate analysis of the data. They grouped protest demonstrations into:

1) Those using unconventional means (arsons, assassinations, and the destruction of property);

2) The open letter method for expressing discontent (presentation of signed protest letters to government officials itemizing grievances the protesters want remedied); and

3) Politically motivated suicide (protesters, feeling very strongly about their actions, take their own lives in order to persuade leaders of the seriousness of their demands).

Taylor and Jodice's (1983) category for demonstrations using unconventional means correspond with this study's political crisis news. Studies that have used crises as the focus of their study include Larson (1984) and Singer and Ludwig (1987).

In the present study, media are first categorized into three broad areas: newspapers, news magazines and journals, and television network news. Second, American public, presidential, and congressional apartheid activities are categorized into two areas: pro- and anti-apartheid. This separation is to distinguish the direction of public support for the South Africa apartheid system.
Reliability and Validity

For media content analysis research findings to be robust, two major critical tests must be accomplished: reliability and validity. Violating these requirements destabilizes the foundation on which the norms of this method of scientific research are based.

Reliability

Reliability, according to Stemple, is the "consistency of measurement" (1955, p. 449). By this definition, content analysis reliability measure is the capability of a researcher's study being successfully replicated by other researchers who, using the original specified measuring instruments and operationalization, obtain the same results, conclusions and findings (Budd et al., 1967; Angell, 1964). Reliability, therefore, underscores the importance of having "relative absence of errors of measurement in a measuring instrument" (Kerlinger, 1964, p. 443). Holsti (1964) suggested that well-constructed and formulated categories improve content analysis reliability. The categories of this study were constructed with these criteria in mind. A reliability test was conducted using the following procedure:

First, pages of sections labelled "South Africa" in ten of the indices used were given to two graduate students: one from journalism, the other, history, for
coding. Instructions for this process are detailed in Appendix A. Second, to evaluate the coders' agreement score, Scott's (1955) formula for measuring reliability was adopted. This formula is appropriate because "the most convincing measure that expresses the amount of agreement in reliability data is the extent to which the table of observed co-occurrences resembles the table with the maximum agreement rather than that in which agreement is merely [by] chance" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 134). This formula, ranging from .00 to .10, yielded a reliability of .88 (see Appendix A). This score is higher than the average acceptance of reliability score (Browner et al., 1969; Gerbner et al., 1979). Krippendorff stated that in content analysis reliability tests, variables should be accepted "only if their reliability is above .80" (1980, p. 147) percent.

To justify this result, suggestion by Janis et al. was adopted. They recommended that reliability tests in content analysis "may be tested by determining the degree of correlation between the frequencies obtained when different analysts independently analyze the same contents" (1943, p. 56). This means that both coders' frequencies should be correlated. When this was done for both coders' scores, their correlation coefficient yielded the value of .89. This score confirms the result obtained from adopting Scott's (1955) reliability formula.
Validity

Unlike reliability, validity attempts to find out whether a researcher's study "produced the desired information" (Budd et al., 1967, p. 68). The validity of a content analysis study is not aimed at any one specific measurement instrument, but at the entire research design of the study. Holsti contended that an acceptable reliability score and an adequate sampling technique might be necessary but not sufficient validity conditions because validity by itself "does not exist independently of other aspects of the research process" (1955, p. 143). This means that the total research procedure, including a well-constructed design aimed at achieving the desired end, are all necessary for a study's validity. Deutschmann (1963) suggested some ways of meeting content analysis validity tests: the acceptance, at face value, that the measuring instruments actually measured the study's goals and usage of different measuring tools which, if providing similar findings, results in validity. Ralph and White (1963) stated that results of a study, when successfully compared to others, in terms of its findings, may strengthen a study's validity. When results of a study accurately predicts the future, the study's measurements are said to be valid.

To strengthen the validity of this study, different types of statistical analyses are used based on data
collected in time-related sequence. Also, findings and conclusions will be compared to previous studies in the literature.

Data Collection

Data were collected and analyzed on South Africa crises, media coverage (newspaper, television and magazine), and American public, presidential, and congressional anti-apartheid policies. Events related to South Africa were tallied from written documents related to each area.

Editorials on File was used to count the number of editorials that fell under crisis and non-crisis and political and non-political crisis news. These were merged with similar findings obtained from newspaper indices. Because of this arrangement, entries on editorial opinion in the newspaper indices were excluded in the tallying to avoid duplication.

Three major groups of national/regional media form the data base for quality media. These include: (1) national and regional newspapers, (2) national news magazines/journals, and (3) national television network evening news.

National/Regional Newspapers

Newspapers selected must meet at least two of these criteria:

1) Common agreement of what constitutes a quality
media by at least two of these three authors: Kadushin et al. (1971), Weiss (1975), and Merrill and Fisher (1980).

2) Weekly circulation must exceed 390,000 as recorded in the *Newspaper Rates and Data* (1989) and the *Gale Directory of Publications* (1989).

3) An index covering the periods 1976-1988 must be available.

Given these criteria, ten newspapers were selected for analysis:

1. *Atlanta Constitution*
2. *Chicago Tribune*
3. *Christian Science Monitor*
4. *Houston Post*
5. *Los Angeles Times*
7. *San Francisco Chronicle*
8. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*
10. *Washington Post*

**National News Magazines and Journals**

Magazines selected for analysis had to meet the following criteria:


2. Annual news content or coverage must be recorded in
the Readers' Guide to Periodic Literature.

3. Must be national and or international circulation magazine or journal with news-editorial viewpoint as recorded in the Consumer Magazine and Agri-Media Rates and Data (1989).

Magazines and journals that met these criteria and included in the study are:

1. Commentary
2. Commonweal
3. Foreign Affairs
4. National Review
5. Nation
6. New Republic
7. Newsweek
8. New York Times Magazine
9. Time

National Television Network News

The criterion adopted for selecting network news is that they have their evening news recorded in the Television News Index and Abstracts between 1976 and 1988. Only three major networks—ABC, CBS and NBC—aired evening news that met this criterion. Their news on South Africa were tallied and analyzed.

Congressional Actions

Congressional apartheid actions were tallied from the Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, Congressional Index, Congress and the Nation, Congressional Information Service Index (CIS Index), Congressional
Committee Hearings Index and the Congressional Record Daily Digest. All bills and resolutions, media news-editorials, tendered documents, reports, remarks in the House and Senate, memoranda, and any form of speech that was made in a committee hearing or on the Senate or House floor in support of or against apartheid, were all tallied as indicators of congressional behavior toward South Africa. Entries were categorized under apartheid and non-apartheid actions.

Presidential Actions


American Public Anti-Apartheid Activities

American public apartheid activities are recorded in great detail in the New York Times Index, Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor. Although other indices record major events which occurred at strategic times; they are not on a daily basis. The World Handbook of Social and Political Index, compiled purposely for research, obtains
its entries mainly from the New York Times and other indices. Data in this book is inappropriate for this study because it does not provide monthly public actions.

To avoid depending on only one index for gathering public apartheid activities, a simple formula was utilized. Three indices:--the New York Times, Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor--were used in tallying the number of public apartheid activities. An event was tallied if it had entries in all three indices. Where an event was recorded in one index, confirmation was sought in the Times of London index. If the event was recorded there, it was accepted and tallied; if not, the event was not used in the study.

South Africa Events

The same procedure for collecting American public anti-apartheid activities was adopted in counting the monthly number of events that occurred in South Africa between 1976 and 1988.
CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTION OF SOUTH AFRICA EVENTS

The history of South Africa in terms of settlement patterns, differences, and relationships between various peoples shed important light in comprehending the problems of race relations in that country.

History of Apartheid

According to Nelson (1981), the history of pre-European South Africa reveals that the San and Khoi tribes, popularly referred to as Bushmen and Hottentots respectively, were the aborigines of this area for millennia. He stated that their predominant occupations were farming, fruit gathering and animal husbandry. He indicated that about 400 A.D. ancestors of the Bantu-speaking people migrated from the north around the Zambezi River into the present geographical area known as South Africa. These occupants of the area did not have any contacts with the outside world until about the 15th century during the Dutch and Portuguese voyages. Initially, these voyagers did not find the South African coast a favorable stopping point. The Dutch East India Company, in 1647, developed an interest in the area after one of their ships had an accident at the Cape of Good Hope. Having experienced the Cape weather, fertile and abundant land, those involved in the accident went back to Europe with
news favorable for a settlement.

The Amnesty International (1978) report indicated that in 1652, the Dutch East India Company established a temporary settlement at Cape Town. This was supposed to be a temporary station where ships from Europe to India could stop for refreshments. Jan Van Riebeeck, the official representative of the company, established friendly relations with the Khois by trading cattle with them. This report further stated that in 1659, the Dutch settlers declared a war on the Khoi tribesmen on the allegation that they raided the settlers' stock. As the settlement expanded, the need for more farmers became acute. Because the indigenes were reluctant to serve the Dutch, slaves were imported from other African countries. From 1679, German and Dutch settlers streamed into the Cape colony from Europe on the promise of free land. According to Nelson (1981), French Huguenots, fleeing from religious persecution at home, found a safe haven in The Netherlands. From there most of them headed to South Africa. The expansion of the original Cape Town settlement created the demand for more land. This resulted in a series of confrontations between the settlers and the natives. With their superior weaponry, the Dutch successfully displaced and pushed the Khoi and San much further north. As the Boers (as the Dutch settlers came to be called due to their expeditionary movements of searching for greener pastures
for their herds and settlement for their burgeoning families from Europe) expanded their settlement further from their original Cape Town settlement, they encountered resistance from the Xhosa, Nguni and other Bantu tribes whose years of rigid settlement patterns made them more formidable to Dutch northern expansion. Between 1771 and 1819, the series of Bantu-Boer confrontations resulted in the Kaffir wars. Boer victory in these wars compelled the Bantu tribes to sign treaties that guaranteed them huge expanses of land.

The United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs (1985) records show that from the outset, the Dutch East India Company did not encourage a northern expansion of their employers because of administrative and financial costs. However, employees of the company were eagerly converting the area into a permanent Dutch colony. In 1795, this record indicated that the Boers rebelled against their government for two reasons: failing to provide adequate protection against the Bantus and preventing their expansionist program. Although the republic created after the rebellion was short-lived, the settlers wrote a constitution which empowered them, among other things, to control and enslave the blacks.

According to Nelson (1981), the British government claimed all Dutch colonial territories after France's defeat in the Anglo-Franco War. And because The Netherlands
supported France in the war, their South African possession was also confiscated. Between 1795 and 1803, the British imposed their sovereignty over the area. This action ended the Dutch East India Company's rule over their South African settlement. The new British administration guaranteed the Boers most of the rights the company denied them. New laws were introduced such as the 1869 Coloured Labor Ordinance which required all non-whites to carry proof of residence and employment. Also this ordinance required that permission must be obtained to change employment or residency.

The first problem between the Boers and the British administration, according to Nelson (1981), was on the issue of slavery which was outlawed in the British Empire in 1807; in 1833 all slaves in the Empire were emancipated. The Boers, needing slave labor, were displeased with these laws. Prohibiting the sale and purchase of slaves resulted in equality for everybody in the colony, an idea the Boers did not welcome. They accused the British of taking sides with blacks and against them. And the British missionaries and courts staffed by Britons were unwilling to persecute blacks because of their previous status as slaves. It was the disagreement with these policies that forced the Boers to migrate from their original Cape Colony further north. This was to prevent contacts with the British administrators.
Amnesty International (1978) recorded that in 1836, the Boers began moving north. This movement, commonly referred to as the "Great Trek," brought the Boers into the Ndebele territory. This meeting resulted in new Boer-Bantu confrontations. The Boers, because of their sophisticated war arsenal, routed every black resistance to their expansion. As Boer territories increased, the British administration at the Cape granted them a limited form of self-government. This way, numerous states were founded. These include the Orange Free State with its constitution established in 1854, the Republic of Natal, 1839; and the Transvaal, 1856. At the turn of the 19th century, the Asian population at the Cape had increased. Nelson (1981) stated that these were slaves brought to the colony by the Dutch East India Company.

The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1867 and diamonds in the Vaal region in 1872, he said, worsened the relationship between all groups in the region. First, since partial self-government was granted the Boers in the Cape Colony, Orange Free State and the Transvaal, the British conceded ownership of these minerals to the Boers. Second, the discovery of exotic minerals encouraged European immigration to South Africa. The more new immigrants poured into the area, the more the Boers created laws and regulations removing basic human rights and freedoms from blacks. With time, the Boer-British relationship
deteriorated. The disagreement was over ownership rights of lands with minerals. The ensuing struggles caused the Anglo-Boer War of 1899. However, in 1902, the Boers surrendered to the British and a peace treaty was signed. Part of the treaty called for the surrender of Boer forces and acceptance of British sovereignty. In return, the Boers were granted internal self-government. The British also agreed not to extend political and economic franchise to the blacks. In 1905, the British Liberal Party granted political autonomy to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Blacks and Asians were not given any political role in the new government. In 1907, a constitutional convention was called by all four Boer colonies of South Africa to form a permanent union. In 1909, a new constitution for the four colonies was enacted by the British parliament. The new state became known as the Union of South Africa in 1910.

The new constitution, according to Nelson (1981), granted little or no powers to blacks and Asians in the dominion. The first election, held in 1911, was contested by the South Africa Party (formed by the four Boer colonies of Natal, Transvaal, Cape Colony, and the Orange Free State). In 1912, the National Party (formed by British whites) was created. This was a splinter group from the South Africa Party. Both parties agreed to limit rights of the blacks hence the 1913 Natives Land Act was passed which
limited the areas in which blacks could be allowed to own property. This amounted to less than ten percent of the country's total land mass.

Nelson (1981) indicated that initially, voting rights, based on ownership of property, were granted all South Africans regardless of race, creed or color. Since blacks and Asians were not property owners, they could not vote. The seriousness of these laws forced South African educated blacks to organize and demand equality and justice. One of the first organizations was the Cape Native Education Association founded in 1882. In 1887, a bill was passed in the South African Parliament increasing the property rights for voting. This disqualified all blacks and Asians from voting. In 1896, Mohandas K. Gandhi began opposition to the white supremacy government in South Africa. In 1909, educated black South Africans called a constitutional convention known as the National Native Convention. They sent a proposal to the British Parliament protesting the South African constitution. Their efforts were thwarted by the reluctance of the British government to accede to their demands for equality and justice in South Africa. Remaining undaunted, blacks again in 1912 formed the South African Native National Congress. Their aim was to unite all South African blacks to fight against injustice and to demand equality under the law.

Nelson (1981) stated that the First and Second World
Wars changed the history of South Africa. He said that during these wars, many labor unions were formed by the different groups to protect their rights. The white labor unions, more than others, were able to gain concessions that protected their control over jobs. One such law was the 1926 Mine and Works Act which legally barred blacks from holding any skilled mining job. Others include the Hostility Law of 1927 which made it illegal for anyone to encourage black hostility against whites and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930 which empowered the Justice Minister to ban anybody from entering any part of the country at any point in time.

Blacks, according to the United States Department Bureau of Public Affairs (1985) records, opposed these laws; in 1919, the African National Congress (ANC) called a strike against the pass laws (requiring non-whites to possess identification before being allowed into certain white areas).

In Nelson's (1981) opinion, the 1929 elections marked a turning point in the race relations of South Africans. This, according to him, is because the Nationalist Party, attempting to defeat the South Africa Party, campaigned on the basis of limiting non-whites' political and economic rights. The Nationalist Party won the election and increased property qualifications for black voters. In 1934, according to Nelson (1981), the Nationalist Party ran
a campaign based on promises to enact the Representation of Natives Bill. Enacted in 1936, this law eliminated blacks from the voters' registration; they were to be represented nationally by four white senators. The Native Land and Trust Bill increased the area to be occupied by blacks from ten to thirteen percent. Also in 1937, legislation was passed limiting the movement of blacks. In 1943, the Nationalist Party, after forming a coalition with minor parties, called itself the National Party. The 1948 election was modeled after that of 1929 as party leaders promised to further limit blacks' rights. Based on its 1949 campaign promise, the party outlawed intermarriage and equality under the law for blacks became illegal. This was the genesis of apartheid: official laws guaranteeing white dominance, segregation of the races and discrimination based on color.

Nelson (1981) reported that in 1950 a variety of laws were enacted. These include the Population Registration Act which provided for classification by race of all South Africans and the Group Areas Act which unified regional and local segregation laws. These laws demarcated residential, business and social activities in the country. The Suppression of Communism Act empowered the government to declare any organization and publication unlawful. In 1951 and 1952, the use of pass laws was extended to black females. In 1951, the Bantu Education Act was enacted. This
law empowered the South African government to give a separate education to blacks. The 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act forced the provision of separate public amenities based on race. In 1956, the Industrial Conciliatory Act mandated the labor minister to reserve certain jobs for blacks.

Amnesty International (1978) report showed that black resistance to official apartheid laws was severely punished and the ANC strike actions against apartheid were forcibly crushed by police. In 1952, the ANC began a passive campaign against the pass laws. In June 1955, Congress of the People, comprising Asians, blacks and Coloureds (product of mixed marriages) and a few white sympathizers, adopted the Freedom Charter. This charter called for a South Africa devoid of racial segregation. In 1958, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a splinter group, from the ANC, was formed. This radical group forced the ANC to adopt stricter measures against apartheid.

On March 21, 1960, a demonstration was planned by the PAC and ANC. This led to the "Sharpyille Massacre" in which the police, opening fire on unarmed but peaceful demonstrators, killed sixty-eight blacks and injured numerous others. These two organizations were banned; its leaders, Nelson Mandela, Albert Luthuli, and Sobukwe, were given various prison sentences. The more black resistance against apartheid increased, the more government initiated
discriminatory laws against them. One of these laws was the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. This law empowered the government to limit blacks' movement and residential areas to homelands. Blacks resisted this law which was determined to further exclude them from the economic, social and political mainstream of South Africa.

In the 1970s, black South African students, having borne the brunt of apartheid too long and with the notion that their parents had completely failed to gain social justice and equality for blacks, began to clamor for changes in the apartheid system. The National Union of South Africa Students (NUSAS) and the South African Students Organization (SASO), comprising black majority and Asians, started to call for equality and social justice for all South Africans. The Black Consciousness Movement, the black group within SASO, headed by Steve Biko, started a national campaign reeducating blacks to stand up for their rights and be proud of their heritage.

The resistance to apartheid generated many confrontations between the police and blacks in South Africa between 1976 and 1988. This period marked the beginning of organized black resistance to apartheid.

Thirteen political crisis events have been selected, based on the definition of political crisis established earlier (disturbance of the public peace caused by reaction against government racial policy of apartheid). They have
been separated into eleven groups of events. Each represents the occurrence of a crisis or a period when two or more crises took place that generated government action.

**PHASE ONE**

This occurred in 1976 when students protested against the use of the Afrikaans language as a tool of instruction in schools. This began March 15 and lasted throughout the year. It was during this period that the "Soweto Riots and Massacre" of school children by South Africa law enforcement agents occurred.

**PHASE TWO**

Nineteen seventy-seven was rife with student unrest. This increased on June 16 and continued throughout the year. Activities during this period were aggravated by the arrest, detention and eventual death of Steve Biko, a renowned black consciousness leader, in police custody.

**PHASE THREE**

Two similar events occurred in 1978: destruction of black settlement by the South African government and the Crossroads squatters' forcible removal from their permanent homes. The first took place on January 16 when the destruction of a black settlement in Cape Town left nearly 15,000 homeless. Again, on September 15 and November 30, the Crossroads squatters' forcible removal affected about 20,000 blacks. These actions resulted in riots and civil disobedience.
PHASE FOUR

This period involved three major events between 1979 and 1980. The first was the hanging of Solomon Mahlangu, a black political activist, which caused riots, deaths and civil disobedience in many black townships between April 6 and July 24, 1979. In March, 1980, campus riots began as a result of the unequal and racially biased government education policy. By May, these disturbances were gradually subsiding when, in June of the same year, another round of campus unrest occurred. The last was caused by a government ban on student activities commemorating the 1976 "Soweto Riots and Massacre."

PHASE FIVE

Three incidents occurred between January and August of 1981. First, another round of campus unrest was triggered by the government's compulsory education program that affected 45,000 black children in 200 schools. The government ordered students to attend school as a means of ending tension, school boycotts and unrest that occurred in the previous years. Second, the government banned two prominent black-owned newspapers, the Post and Sunday Post. And third, on August 19 police raided a black squatter's settlement with about 2,000 inhabitants left homeless. This event resulted in riots and unrest.

PHASE SIX

This period involved the announcement, on May 1, 1982,
by the President's Council Commission recommending a constitutional proposal that would indirectly empower the president to appoint non-whites of mixed race and Asian descent to his cabinet but excluding blacks. On July 30, when President Botha initiated legislative reforms implementing the commission's recommendations, waves of riots, bombings and destruction of government property by blacks followed.

**PHASE SEVEN**

Four major bombing incidents occurred in 1983. These events took place in Natal and Johannesburg on February 12 and 18 respectively, and in Pretoria on May 20. The latter affected the South Africa Airforce headquarters. On May 23, the Airforce, in retaliation against the May 20 bombing attack at its Pretoria headquarters, struck a suspected ANC settlement at Maputo, capital of Mozambique, leaving many casualties.

**PHASE EIGHT**

This period witnessed another incident of student riots and boycott of classes which started April 26, 1984. This was aggravated in July when rent and tax increases were announced resulting in more unrest. By August, these disturbances spread to more black townships resulting in death and loss of property.

**PHASE NINE**

This phase comprises four different events in 1985. On
February 18, a riot occurred in Cape Town. The riot was caused by rumors that 100,000 black squatters were to be relocated. The second, was an incident of police firing on a crowd of 4,000 black mourners killing more than seventeen. Third, on July 20, President Botha, attempting to clamp down on the continued unrest declared a state of emergency in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and thirty-four other large cities and towns. Finally, on November 2, the government imposed a ban on mass media coverage of unrest.

**PHASE 10**

Five events that occurred between 1986 and 1987 are analyzed in this phase. June 12, 1986, the government declared a state of emergency due to continued riots. Again, on April 11, 1987, the government tightened the ten-month-old state of emergency initiating new laws that banned protest activities that were staged on behalf of political detainees. April 16, Alan Boesak, a prominent church leader and anti-apartheid spokesman, organized and encouraged mass protests in defiance of the government ban on such activities. April 23, 1987, police opened fire on rail workers who had been on strike, killing six. Finally May 6 of the same year, a "whites only" election was being held to elect parliamentary representatives excluding blacks. This resulted in more than 500,000 blacks staying away from work and school.
PHASE 11

This includes two events that took place in 1988. The first, on June 6, occurred when the Trade Union Federation called its workers to carry out a three-day strike against the government. More than one million blacks stayed away from work. This resulted in riots that caused seven deaths and destruction of property. The second, on June 10, occurred when the government renewed the existing two-year national state of emergency due to continued riots and civil disobedience.

In the wake of events in South Africa between 1976 and 1988, the media responded by providing coverage of these activities. According to media agenda setting research, newspaper agenda is more effective at influencing the public agenda (McClure and Patterson, 1976; Weaver et al., 1981; Graber, 1988). McCombs and Shaw (1972), for example, contend that various news medium, due to technological variation, give an unequal amount of coverage to news events. Newspaper, because of its ample space, is hypothesized to give more space-time ratio to South Africa political crisis news than television.
CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze the additive regression model which examines the relationship between each independent variable (SAPK, NPKV, TPKV, MPKV, PUBLIC and EXEC) and the dependent variable (CONGRESS). Congress' anti-apartheid policies will be analyzed as functions of these independent variables. This analysis is essential in testing for the differential effect of each variable on Congress and how well the data fit the additive model. This is to examine their interactive action with congressional anti-apartheid actions.

Where the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the absence of an autocorrelation, results based on this model will be used to analyze findings in this study; if not, the Arima model will be utilized. The major advantage of this model is that it generates an autocorrelation function (ACF) and a partial autocorrelation function (PACF). These statistical methods indicate the presence or absence of autocorrelation problems in the data analyzed.

As a longitudinal study, data on the variables were gathered for each month from 1976 to 1988. The time series regression analysis provides an effective means for testing the stated hypotheses based on monthly data of South Africa crises. The time series statistical analysis is a method
where "estimates are made of the values of a variable from
a knowledge of the values of one or more other variables,
and the measurement of the errors involved in this esti-
mation process" (Hamburg, 1977, p. 357). This method is
useful in measuring the relationship between the variables.
For instance, to analyze the causal effect between South
Africa political crises and media political crisis
coverage, the time series regression model was utilized. In
this case, political crises events become the independent
variable (cause) and media coverage the dependent variable
(effect). This same model is used when relationships
between other independent variables and congressional
apartheid actions (dependent variable) are examined.

An example of a time series simple regression model is
the equation:

\[ Y_t = a + b x_t + e_t \]

In this regression equation:

- \( y_t \) = the dependent variable at time \( t \) or the trend value
  for a given period where a trend "refers to a smooth
  upward or downward movement of a time series over a
  long period of time" (Hamburg, 1977, p. 445). This is
  therefore, the variable on which research intends to
  find the effect other variable(s) have on it.
- \( a \) = the value of the slope constant which tells one how
  fast the trend line increases or decreases. At this
  point, the regression line cuts across \( Y_t \) producing
a value of zero for Xt.

\[ b = \text{the value of the yt intercept (the value of yt when } x = 0) \text{ indicates a change in yt for each unit of the slope. This also shows the increase or decrease of the trend line in a series.} \]

\[ xt = \text{the independent variable whose effect on yt (dependent variable) is being estimated by the equation. xt is therefore the time sequence number for any given period, depending on what is being analyzed (weeks, months, or years).} \]

\[ et = \text{error component in the regression equation. This comes about as a result of various data collecting measurement errors that may have occurred in the analysis process. Since every value cannot be adequately accounted for, especially when only one independent variable is given to explain a dependent variable, this error term is included in the equation to explain values that are unaccounted for (Katz, 1982).} \]

This type of regression equation first examines the relationship between a dependent and an independent variable. Second, it estimates the strength of relationship between the variables being analyzed using the R-Square (coefficient of determination). The regression analysis is a mathematical "method by which estimates are made of the values of a variable from knowledge of the values of one or
more other variables, and the measurement of the errors involved in this estimation process" (Hamburg, 1977, p. 357).

Time Series Regression Analysis Assumptions

The regression analysis model is affected by many assumptions. If they are not dealt with, findings of estimates of the relationship analyzed may be incorrect. The use of an interval level data in a regression analysis is assumed. Although nominal and ordinal level data could also be used, this has to be under certain conditions; an example is the use of dummy variables on one of the variables analyzed.

A linear relationship is also assumed. This assumption, according to Hanushek and Jackson (1977), implies that the effect of a variable, for example x, is constant and does not depend upon any other variable for its occurrence. In this model, one unit change in variable x yields an average change in another variable, y. When this problem occurs in repeated samples on the same observation, one can never expect to receive the exact y value (Katz, 1982, p. 68) because the independent variable is measured with error. As a result of this error, the more samples of y that are obtained, the more error is being accumulated, and a researcher has more difficulty in obtaining the correct value of y. This, according to
Hanushek and Jackson (1977), means that the mean value of each observation's error term will be the same for all observations. Therefore, "the sum of errors for any one sample and the sum of errors for repeated samples of y for any particular x tend toward zero" (Katz, 1982, p. 68).

The error term in a regression analysis is assumed to have a constant variance for all observations (homoscedasticity) and therefore is independent and uncorrelated with the error terms at other observations. When error terms at different observations are correlated, an autocorrelation problem is said to be present.

Another assumption of a regression analysis is that of multicollinearity. This is the problem caused when two or more independent variables in a regression equation are strongly correlated. Where this occurs, it becomes difficult to distinguish effects of each of the variables and to determine the real causal effect on the dependent variable.

One of the problems generated by violating these assumptions is that it becomes difficult to test the null hypothesis (a = 0 and b = 0) using the t-test statistic because the standard error of the estimate will be skewed and thereby provide a misleading t-statistic. An incorrect t-value generates a much smaller estimator compared to an increased t-value. This situation causes one to accept rather than reject the null hypothesis.

Another assumption which may occur when the error term
fails to have a constant variance for an entire observation (a situation caused by an error variance increasing simultaneously as x increases) is heteroscedasticity. Its presence results in autocorrelation problems in a time series analysis (Katz, 1982, p. 77).

Of the assumptions associated with the regression analysis model, one that specifically affects time series analysis is that of autocorrelation of independent variables in an equation used for a particular observation. According to Mendenhall and McClare, autocorrelation is a situation caused by "error terms in a time series regression analysis being highly correlated with one another" (1981, p. 461) from the same time series model at different points in time. Hoff also states that "autocorrelations are statistical measures (in numerical values) that indicate how a time series is related to itself over time ... measures how strongly time series values at a specified number of periods apart are correlated to each other over time" (1983, p. 54). The implication of these definitions is that in a time series regression result, when a higher than average observation is followed by a similar observation at an identical time period, followed by the same process, but with lower than average observations; the autocorrelation between these two observations is positive. However, a negative autocorrelation results when a higher than average observation tends to be
accompanied by a lower than average observation at identical time periods (Nelson, 1973, p. 25). Where the presence of an autocorrelation goes unnoticed in a time series regression model, it boosts the regression coefficients. This provides wrong estimates of the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. A common problem caused by an undetected autocorrelation in a time series regression model is referred to as first order autocorrelation: a process where the positive autocorrelation diminishes rapidly as distance between time points or the lag increases (Mendenhall and McClare, 1981, p. 461).

Different solutions are recommended for removing autocorrelation problems in a time series regression analysis. The two most important ones are to lag the independent variable and to use the first order autoregressive models. In using a lagged independent variable model to remove an autocorrelation problem, the dependent and independent variables on an observation at two different times are paired. The independent variable is allowed to lag (subtracting one observation period in such a way that it falls short of the dependent variable) behind the dependent variable. For example, for a lag process to occur between a dependent y and an independent x variable, the observation period for x might be skipped back (one, two or more weeks, months or years, depending on the unit
of analysis used) while the $y$ variable maintains its original status. The disadvantage of this process is that the more time periods of an independent variable that are lagged, the more degrees of freedom are used up in the analysis. If, for instance, the observation period is twelve calendar months and one employs two lags to the independent variable, such an analysis will be left with only ten months of observations, eliminating two degrees of freedom in the process.

The first order autoregressive model is used to resolve the assumption that the error term in one period of observation in a time series regression analysis is a function of the error term in a later time period. According to Hanushek and Jackson, this situation is one in which "each error term is related only to the immediately preceding one" (1977, p. 149) and not to others. One way of detecting an autocorrelation problem is an inflated $t$-statistic value. If an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model generates a $t$-test statistic of more than a .3 value, it indicates a violation of the autocorrelation assumption.

The Durbin-Watson ($d$-statistic) test is effective at testing for a first order autocorrelation. This test has two basic functions: first is the statistical test of the null hypothesis that successive error terms are correlated; second is that it is an appropriate way of estimating the correlation (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, p. 165). The $d$-
statistic ranges between 0 and 4. Mendenhall and McClare contended that if residuals in the time series equations are uncorrelated, which means a lack of relationship, the value of d equals 2 or higher. If the residuals are positively correlated, the value of d is less than 2 and 0 if highly correlated (1981, pp. 274-276). Where the autocorrelation problems are not resolved by using the lagged independent variable and the first order autoregressive models, the Arima (p, d, q) model will be applied in analyzing the data. This method is appropriate because it takes away the autocorrelations from the variables and produces a clean series devoid of trends. Residuals from the clean series are afterward used in analyzing relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Another advantage of the Arima model is that it produces a Q-statistic which provides additional tests for determining whether the residuals are correlated. According to Hoff, one "compares the Q-statistic with a critical test value. If the Q-statistic is larger than the critical test value, then you conclude that the residual autocorrelations being tested, as a whole, are significant" (1983, p. 94).

In this study, the lagged and first order autoregressive models were applied in testing for the presence of positive autocorrelation between the variables analyzed. The data were lagged twice. If the d-statistic,
after the first lag, was less than two, the data were
lagged a second time. And if the d-statistic did not
improve, the first order autoregressive model was used. In
utilizing this model, results of the coefficients and a d-
statistic were produced using the additive regression
equation. A significance value of .05 was established. The
table of critical values suggests a lower and upper bound.
For data that exceed 100 cases, as used in this study, the
Durbin-Watson recommended lower and upper bounds are 1.65
and 1.69. The presence of an autocorrelation is indicated
when this standard is not attained. In order to remedy this
condition, the data will be subjected to a first differ-
encing test. This is a method for transforming data with an
autocorrelation problem. To eliminate the problem, the
lower variable values are subtracted from subsequent higher
ones to provide a new or transformed data set. This method
eliminates any series or trend from the pattern and
provides a stationary regression model fit to analyze the
data.

The Micro-Crunch (1988), SPSS-PC (1988), and SAS
(1984) statistical packages were used in this research.
Their output produced results of the estimates which
include R-Square, mean, and standard deviation for the
regression coefficients. Values of residual autocorre-
lations for the variables and a d-statistic were also
produced.
Results

This section analyzes estimates of the coefficients obtained from the time series analysis. Because the agenda-building theory's view that the media need group support in order for news coverage of issues to influence public agenda was not supported, efforts will be made to examine the individual effect of the independent variables on congressional anti-apartheid actions. It is proposed that congressional actions could be affected by external and domestic situations. Based on its constitutional relationship with the executive arm of government, congressional members do get information on foreign policy issues. This being the case, it is possible that they could be influenced directly by the crises in South Africa regardless of media coverage, the American public, and presidential anti-apartheid activities. This is why the apartheid crisis was included in the regression analysis as one of the possible variables likely to sway congressional attitude toward initiating policies against apartheid.

Table 3 indicates that each individual variable is a better predictor of congressional anti-apartheid actions compared to the interactive factors. Among the non-media variables, this model implies that congressional apartheid policies were least affected directly by the goings on in South Africa. This is because a one unit increase in South Africa political activities, on the average, decreased
Table 3. Results of Coefficient Estimates Showing Independent Variables' Relationships with Congressional Anti-Apartheid Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ind Var:</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
<th>Prob</th>
<th>R-Sq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Const.(a)</td>
<td>3.960</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>4.671</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.4795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPK</td>
<td>-.198</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>-1.642</td>
<td>.1027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPKV</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.5537</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPKV</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>2.224</td>
<td>.0277</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPKV</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>.1690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>2.568</td>
<td>.0112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXEC</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>.4118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congress' anti-apartheid policies by .198. In contrast to direct influence from the country, the American public's anti-apartheid activities were more related to congressional apartheid actions. A unit increase in their actions resulted in Congress initiating an average of .232 actions per month. This result is supported by a substantial t-value of 2.568. The relationship between the executive and Congress is positive, given the slope value of .232. However, this value, compared to the American public anti-apartheid activities, is not significant. This result supports Mackuen and Coombs (1981), Cook et al. (1983) and Graber's (1988) findings that the role of the public in shaping national agenda cannot be underestimated, especially on controversial matters.

Among the media variables, television political crises coverage explains more variance in congressional anti-apartheid policies compared to newspapers and magazines.
A monthly unit increase in television coverage caused an average of .125 actions to be taken against South Africa by Congress. During the same period, newspapers only explain .008 and magazines .198 variance in congressional anti-apartheid actions. The finding that television coverage is more related to Congress' apartheid policies is supported by Shaw and McCombs (1977) and Weaver et al. (1981). Their studies indicate that although television is not the prime mover in setting national agenda, it spotlights major controversial issues. Zucker's (1978) distinction of the role of television and newspaper lends support to the finding in this study in terms of its influence in shaping national agenda in unobtrusive issues. Palmgreen and Clerk (1977) and Iyengar and Kinder's (1982) media analysis confirm the view that because television brings live coverage to the public, it has the potential to influence the agenda compared to newspapers. The overall explanatory power of this model is significant because the R-Square explains 48 percent of the total variance in congressional anti-apartheid actions.

Although this time series regression model explains the relationship between the independent variables and congressional actions against apartheid, the d-statistic at 1.318 (after two lags) falls below the standard range set for a negative autocorrelated series. Because findings already made might be based on wrong estimates of the
regression coefficients, based on the d-statistic, the Arima (p, d, q) model was utilized in fitting the data.

Arima (p, d, q) Model

The presence of an autocorrelation in a time-series analysis, if not resolved, might constitute wrong estimates of the variables analyzed. One method for preventing this problem is through the use of the Box-Jenkins (1976) Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (Arima p, d, q) model. This method is used in order to provide more support for results obtained from the time series multiple regression analysis. While these results could be useful for supporting conclusions on the relationship between Congress and the independent variables examined, McCain and McCleary caution that "while OLS regression estimates of time-series parameters are not biased per se, the estimates of standard deviations (and hence, of significance tests) are biased" (1976, p. 235). Because estimates of coefficients from the time series analysis might be biased, it is appropriate to subject the data to different statistical analysis. Such results could corroborate or refute those initially obtained. This is necessary given the autocorrelation problems experienced in utilizing the multiple regression analysis.

Since the purpose of the Arima (p, d, q) model is to eliminate the problem of biased estimates of error in a
time-series data analysis, this model will achieve stochastic or "white noise" (clean data devoid of trends or circles) where all autocorrelation or trend problems are eliminated from the data being analyzed. The Arima \((p, d, q)\) model is characterized by three major structural parameters: \(p\), \(d\), and \(q\).

\(p\) = determines the autoregressive pattern or order of the model; it identifies the relationship between present and past values of observations in a series. Because previous values in a series affect current ones, the \(p\) in this model assists the researcher to predict future values on the basis of contemporary observations. If the value of \(p\) exceeds zero, it indicates a direct relationship between past and present observations.

\(d\) = shows the number of times the data have been differenced: a method for eliminating a trend or an attempt at making a series stationary.

\(q\) = indicates the order of a moving average of the Arima model, which shows whether the error of a series persists throughout the observation period or is limited to a few values. This process helps to convert the nonstationary series to "white noise."

To be able to utilize the Arima \((p, d, q)\) model, the data were first differenced so as to rid the series of the
autocorrelation problems identified while using the time series multiple regression model. After differencing the data, the "noise" model was identified through the autocorrelation function (ACF): correlation between a time series and its lags and the partial autocorrelation functions (PACF). While the ACF determines the p, the PACF interprets the q in the Arima model. Because these three structures are closely associated in the Arima model, it was difficult to determine which specific structure adequately fits a series; hence a model-building process allowed the computer to decide what model suited the series being analyzed. Three procedures were used in accomplishing this process: identification, estimation, and diagnosis.

In the first stage, the plot of the series was inspected in order to identify whether or not it was stationary; where a nonstationary series was obtained, the data were subjected to a continuous transformation process until a stationary series was attained. After transforming the data, the values of p, d, and q in the model were obtained.

In the second stage, estimation, values of p, d, and q that were derived from the identification stage, were used by the computer (SPSS/PC + Trends) to calculate estimates of the coefficients, residual and confidence limits needed to fit the series.

In the third stage, diagnosis, the results obtained in
the second stage were utilized in diagnosing the model's adequacy to the series. The ACF and PACF statistics identified by correlograms or graphs helped in identifying the appropriate Arima \((p, d, q)\) model. Where values on the plots layed within the plotted confidence intervals, the model indicated "white noise"; otherwise, the model was not suitable for the series. The presence of spikes on the plot indicates values of \(p\), \(d\), and \(q\) in the model.

APPENDICES H and I demonstrate that the ACF and PACF in the series are not stationary because of the high order spikes in lags 1 through 7 (APPENDIX H) and lags 1, 5 and 8 (APPENDIX I) do not exhibit any decay process. As a result, this data were further differenced. After the differencing exercise, the ACF and PACF produced an Arima \((0, 1, 1)\) model. The ACF and PACF in APPENDICES J and K show a randomly distributed series.

The estimation process, which comes after correctly identifying the Arima model to use, was done by checking the Q-statistic (labeled Box-Ljung). Generally, if the Q-statistic value is significant at the .05 level, the model does not fit the series; however, where the Q-statistic is not significant, the model fits the data. APPENDICES H and I indicate a non-statistically significant series in all the lags. The "white noise," the final product shown on APPENDICES J and K, supports the acceptance of the Arima \((0, 1, 1)\) model as suitable for examining the relationship
between the variables analyzed in this research. The AIC and SBC statistics (indicating how well this model fits the data) at 974.590 and 995.894, support the results provided by the Arima (0, 1, 1) model.

The coefficient values in this model partially support results obtained by the time series multiple regression analysis. Although the values are slightly different, this result indicates that one unit increase in CRISIS reduced congressional anti-apartheid actions by an average of -.1476. Among the media group of variables, NEWSPAPERS are negatively related to Congress' apartheid actions compared to television and magazines. This is because a monthly unit of coverage by newspapers decreased congressional anti-apartheid actions by -.0027 on average. This finding corroborates what was obtained by the time series regression analysis and fails to support McCombs and Shaw (1972) and Weaver et al.'s (1981) argument that newspaper, compared to television, coverage is more important at influencing national agenda. The findings, however, support for Palmgreen and Clerk's (1977) study on the importance of television in setting national agenda.

The relationship between the Executive and Congress' anti-apartheid actions is negative. A monthly unit increase in presidential anti-apartheid policies reduced Congress' anti-apartheid actions by -.0063. This result indicates that the president's policies on apartheid were not
substantial enough to prevent Congress from taking serious actions against South Africa.

The relationship between the American public (PUBLIC) and congressional anti-apartheid activities is also positive. This result confirms the one obtained from the time series multiple regression model. Apart from television's relationship with congressional anti-apartheid policies, the American public's activities against apartheid is the next important variable.

Table 4. Regression Results of Variables in the Arima (0, 1, 1) Model Analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SEb</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
<th>Approx. Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MA(1)</td>
<td>.7064</td>
<td>.0580</td>
<td>12.1620</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS</td>
<td>-.1476</td>
<td>.1151</td>
<td>-.2818</td>
<td>.2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE</td>
<td>-.0063</td>
<td>.2649</td>
<td>-.0239</td>
<td>.9810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
<td>.1515</td>
<td>.0833</td>
<td>1.8189</td>
<td>.0710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>.1513</td>
<td>.0522</td>
<td>2.8970</td>
<td>.0043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGAZINES</td>
<td>.2254</td>
<td>.1427</td>
<td>1.5793</td>
<td>.1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPAPERS</td>
<td>-.0027</td>
<td>.0139</td>
<td>-.1926</td>
<td>.8476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MA(1), comparable to a constant of a regression model, indicates that when all the variables were held at a zero constant, Congress initiated an average monthly anti-apartheid policies of .7064. This result is significant at
the .05 level. The d-statistic, at 1.8673, shows the absence of an autocorrelation problem, an indication that the coefficients exhibit the correct estimates of the relationship between the independent variables and congressional anti-apartheid actions. This result also supports those obtained by the time series regression analysis.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the question of whether the media are capable of influencing national agenda without support from various groups affected by an issue. Data on South Africa crises were analyzed in testing the agenda-building theory. The theory, as proposed by Lang and Lang (1983), presupposes that the media and other group influences are instrumental in forcing issues on national agenda—not mass media coverage alone.

To test Lang and Lang's (1983) theory, the relationship between individual variables (South Africa political crises; newspaper, television and magazine political crises coverage; American public, and presidential anti-apartheid activities) and media-composite variables (media political crises coverage and interaction variables formed with American public and presidential anti-apartheid activities) on congressional anti-apartheid policies between 1976 and 1988, were analyzed. Hypotheses were developed to examine the differential effects of individual and media-composite independent variables on Congress. The F-test was used in determining the model to examine between the additive and interactive models. The test indicated that media-composite variables were not statistically significant enough to be included in the analysis.
The time series multiple regression and Arima \((p, d, g)\) models were utilized in estimating the relation between the dependent and independent variables. These statistical methods were employed, first, because the data were gathered in monthly sequence and therefore amenable to time-related statistical analysis. Second, due to the presence of autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems in the data analyzed, the Arima model was adopted as a safeguard against any findings based on wrong estimates of the variables. The results indicate that South Africa political crises, presidential anti-apartheid policies, and newspapers coverage were negatively related to Congress' anti-apartheid actions. All other variables had positive relationships with congressional anti-apartheid actions. It might be suggested that the reason for South African political crises negative statistical value is due to the view that the occurrence of a crisis in the country, independent of domestic group pressure on government decision makers, is not enough to force Congress to act unless group actions complement the crises.

The relationship between the American public anti-apartheid activities and congressional actions against South Africa is greater than that of the newspapers and magazines. In using the Arima model, the relationship between presidential and congressional anti-apartheid actions is less than that of the American public anti-
apartheid activities. The effect of television on national agenda was reinforced by findings shown in the regression analysis. The relationship between television's political crisis coverage and congressional anti-apartheid actions is greater than that of newspapers and magazines. Results from the Arima (0, 1, 1) model confirm those obtained from the time series regression analysis.

Results from analyzing data on South Africa crises are quite contrary to what Lang and Lang (1983) proposed in their media agenda-building theory. Where they argued that the media alone, independent of other political groups, cannot affect issues on the agenda, the data examined in this study indicated otherwise: individual medium coverage, independently, influenced congressional apartheid agenda. However, the view that mass media agenda, due to technological differences, do not have a uniform effect on the public was confirmed. Television had more effect on congressional anti-apartheid policies than newspapers and magazines. This result supports the agenda-setting theory which contends that the media are capable of setting public agenda, a view that corroborates findings by Weaver et al. (1975), McCombs and Shaw (1972) and Graber (1984).

The view that the public is capable of affecting national agenda, independent of media coverage, was also supported in this study. According to MacKuen and Coombs (1981), mass media agenda cannot directly influence public
agenda because the public is capable of independently evaluating issues. The agenda-building theory is not supported by the data analyzed in this study because the interactive model coefficients were not statistically significant. And so the related hypotheses were untested. The agenda-building theory would have been supported were the composite variables' regression coefficients statistically more significant than individual factors. But the data analyzed indicated otherwise; instead the variables were, independently, more significant than their composite factors.

Mass media influence on public officials is supported by the data analyzed. However, the effect of individual medium political crises coverage on Congress is more significant than a combination of all three groups: newspapers, television and magazines. The effect of television political crisis coverage on congressional anti-apartheid action is greater than newspapers and magazines because of the nature of the study which analyzed political crises. According to Iyengar (1979) and Iyengar et al. (1982), television is most effective when controversial issues are involved because support for an issue is enhanced by live coverage. Other findings that support the effect of media coverage on government officials include Sigel (1975), Lambeth (1978) and Linsky (1987).

According to the data analyzed in this research, it is
concluded that individual medium influenced the behavior of Congress toward the crises in South Africa between 1976 and 1988.

The data support the view that the American public are not as politically apathetic as previously stated by some scholars (Nie, 1976; Cohen, 1983; Larson, 1984). This is because the effect of the American public anti-apartheid activities on congressional policies against South Africa was greater than the other independent variables analyzed. This comparison suggests that the American public was able to influence congressional anti-apartheid policies in the years examined.

The prestige media concentrated more attention on the coverage of political, compared to non-political, South African crises. The implication of this view is that the public may have been deprived of receiving balanced news coverage of South African events. If this view is correct, the media coverage may not be helpful in educating the American public. This is because public reactions toward an issue may be based solely on what the media coverage emphasize.

Suggestions for further study in the area of media agenda-building theory is necessary based on these findings. Since this study is based on a time-series model examining the role of the media and other groups in affecting congressional apartheid agenda, it is suggested
that future studies examine current crises in South Africa's apartheid system alongside respondents' views and media habit. This type of analysis should differentiate between the various media effects. Also, there is need for such cross-sectional study to offer respondents the opportunity to identify the medium that affects their views on any recent apartheid crisis.

The tracking of public opinion result is very limited on the apartheid policy problems. Because pollsters only address issues of major concern to the public, the South African apartheid issue was featured only at periods when the United States was involved in making major decisions on apartheid or when a crisis of large magnitude erupted in the country. As a result, it became difficult to adequately track public opinion views on the problem. It is therefore suggested that a study based on the examination of apartheid employ the agenda-building theory and incorporate a panel of respondents in the investigation. This type of study would effectively track public opinion attitude toward apartheid, the role of the media, and the combined effect of media-public as an independent variable.

It is also suggested that a comparative study be attempted on the differences between the United States prestige and local media in their coverage of apartheid. This is important because most local newspapers give limited coverage to international issues; when they do,
such news coverage borders on sensational issues or controversies. Such a study might also compare the reaction of the public across state boundaries, with the introduction of state legislatures' attitude toward apartheid as different from the United States Congress' apartheid policies.

The American prestige media were analyzed in this study. Since the South Africa apartheid problem is an international dilemma, it is suggested that a comparative study be carried out to examine coverage of apartheid by what is generally considered "global elite media" across international boundaries. Such a study might compare industrialized against nonindustrialized nations and democratic against nondemocratic political systems. Such a research could easily show how the prestige media in different nations differ in their coverage.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A. Coders’ Instruction Manual

Included in this package are special "Coders' Instruction Manual" which detains how to tally data on to the various data sheet. Also included is one sheet each of an index from these sources:
a. New York Times  
b. Washington Post  
c. Christian Science Monitor  
d. Editorials on File  
e. Facts on File  
f. Readers' Guide to Periodic Literature  
g. TV Index and Abstracts  
h. Congressional Record Daily Digest  
i. Keesings' Contemporary Archives  
j. State Department Bulletin

Included also is a package labelled: Extra Media Source. Contained in this package are indices for the:
a. Chicago Tribune  
b. Houston Post  
c. San Francisco Chronicle  
d. St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Read each sample index carefully and follow these instructions on how to code your results onto the coding sheets.
1. **South Africa Events**

These are news events that occurred in South Africa between 1976 and 1988 and are recorded in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Kessing's Contemporary Archives*, and the *Facts on File* indices.

First, using the *New York Times* index sheet, locate a South Africa event. Then check for the same event in the other five sources listed in this category. If the same event is listed in at least three of the indices, check the *Times* (London) for the same event. If it is recorded here, then code that incident in the appropriate area in the coding sheet given.

**Coding Sheet for South Africa Event:**

Four areas are designated on the coding sheet:

a. *South Africa crisis news (SAK)*

b. " " non-crisis news (SANK)

c. " " political crisis news (SAPK)

d. " " non-political crisis news (SANPK)

1. **Crisis News:** These include events or incidents involving riots, earthquakes, natural or man-made disasters, protests, assassinations and any event that disturbs the peace of any community.
2. Non-Crisis News: These are the direct opposite of crisis news or what is regarded as soft news. They are human interest stories, scientific discoveries, entertainment, sports, features, etc.

3. Political Crisis News: Events in this section are subcategories from crisis news. However, these are crisis news involving politics, political figures, and events. Examples include riots or protests against government policy, assassination of a political figure, etc.

4. Non-Political Crisis News: These are news events also coded under crisis news. They are crisis news on work-related accidents, volcanic eruptions, natural disasters, etc; their occurrence is in no way related to political activities.

NOTE: Each event coded under crisis news must also be placed either under political or non-political crisis news categories. The sum total of crisis news will equal that of political and non-political crisis news.

Media Coverage

These are mainly news coverage on South Africa as recorded in the newspaper indices provided. These should be coded separately under:
(a) Newspapers  (b) News magazine/journal and (c) Television.

All newspaper and television news must separately be coded in the four major categories described in South
Africa events above in the appropriate code sheets with the years written above each code sheet. The magazine/journal index entries from the Readers' Guide to Periodic Literature should be coded if such news event was entered from any of these news magazines or journals:

1. Commentary
2. Commonweal
3. Foreign Affairs
4. National Review
5. Nation
6. New Republic
7. Newsweek
8. New York Times Magazine
9. Time
10. U.S. News and World Report

News from these sources should be coded as crisis, non-crisis, political or non-political crisis events.

American Public Apartheid Activities:

Recorded events that occurred in the United States between 1976 and 1988 in support or non-support of apartheid constitute this category. They are coded as pro- or anti-apartheid event. The former is any public action that demonstrates support for South Africa apartheid; the latter, one that shows disapproval for the system.
In coding these news events, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and the *Christian Science Monitor* indices must be used. Tally an event under its appropriate category if it appears in at least two of these indices; if not, check to see if this same event was recorded in at least two other indices provided in the package labelled "Extra Media Source". If it is, code it; or else, reject it.

Presidential Apartheid Actions:

Actions taken by the presidents, their aids, assistants or officials in the Executive arm of government in support or non-support of apartheid constitute what should be recorded in this category. Code each action as pro- or anti-apartheid. Directions for this are same as specified for American Public Apartheid Activities above. Official statements, bilateral agreements, reception or exchange of each nation's officials or ambassadors, etc. are regarded as indicators of presidential apartheid activities. Where any of such activity is done to foster the U.S.-South Africa relations, such an incident should be coded as pro-apartheid; if not, it should be recorded as anti-apartheid.

Congressional Apartheid Actions:

These are actions taken by members of Congress in support or non-support of apartheid and are to be coded as
pro- or anti-apartheid. The former include bills, resolutions, laws, media materials read in committee or the floor of the Senate or House, speeches, reports, documents tendered to foster U.S. South Africa relations. The latter are the same indicators but made to exhibit non-support for apartheid.

Percentage Count:

Having coded these materials, carefully count all tally marks under each category and enter results on the appropriate sheets labelled "Percentage Count".
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B. South Africa Political Events  
Time Table between 1976 and 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1976</td>
<td>March 15-Dec. 20</td>
<td>Students boycott classes in protest against the use of Afrikaans as instructional tool. Soweto riots and massacre increase tensions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. 1977</td>
<td>June 16-Dec. 30</td>
<td>Students boycott schools; riots increase. Steve Biko, a world-renowned black consciousness leader, arrested, detained and eventually dies in police custody.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 1978</td>
<td>Jan. 16-22</td>
<td>Destruction of Cape Town black shanty quarters leaving 15,000 homeless</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 15-Nov. 30</td>
<td>Crossroads squatters' forcible eviction of 20,000 permanent dwellers for possible relocation in &quot;homelands&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1979</td>
<td>April 6-July 24</td>
<td>The hanging of Solomon Mahlangu, a black political activist, which precipitated riots and civil disobedience.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Month</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>5. 1980</td>
<td>March 15-May 20</td>
<td>Students' unrest in protest against unequal and racially biased education. Students' rioting caused by government ban on activities commemorating the 1976 &quot;Soweto Riots and Massacre.&quot;</td>
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<td>June 15-Oct 16</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. 1981</td>
<td>Jan. 21-28</td>
<td>Government compulsory education program for 45,000 black children at 200 schools ordering them to attend school as means of ending tension that caused school boycotts and unrest in previous years. Government bans prominent black-owned newspapers the Post and Sunday Post.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 19</td>
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<td>Police raid black squatters' settlement with about 2,000 inhabitants. This action results in riots and rallies staged in their support by the general public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1982</td>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>The President's Council Commission report issues on constitutional proposal that would indirectly give the president broad authoritarian powers to appoint non-whites of mixed race and Asian descent to his cabinet: blacks ex-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
eluded because of cultural and other differences. President Botha initiates legislative reform of Indian and Colours limited representation in government excluding blacks.

July 30

8. Feb 12 Bomb damages South Africa government offices in black residential area in Natal Province.

Feb 18 Johannesburg bomb blast destroys government buildings injuring 76 blacks.

May 20 Car bomb outside headquarters of South Africa Airforce in Pretoria: 16 killed and more than 188 injured.

May 23 South Africa Airforce planes, in retaliation against the May 20 car bomb at its Pretoria headquarters bomb suspected African National Congress (ANC) settlements at Maputo, capital of Mozambique

9. 1984 April 26 Students boycott classes in protest against racially segregated education system.

July 15 Government rent and tax increase start riots in black townships.
Aug. 20-Dec. 30  
Riots in many black townships against the inauguration of the nation's new constitution. Bombs, rocket attacks and protests planned and executed to coincide with government organized activities.

10. 1985  
Feb. 18  
Cape Town squatters' riot caused by rumors that about 100,000 of them were to be relocated in homelands: results in 5 dead and 60 injured.

March 21  
Police opened fire on approximately 4,000 crowd of black mourners: more than 17 fatally injured.

July 20  
President Botha declares indefinite state of emergency in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and 34 other large cities and towns to discourage continued riotings.

Nov. 2  
Government-imposed media ban results in arrests and detention of local and foreign journalists; worldwide condemnation of apartheid.
11. 1986       June 12       State of emergency declared by the government due to continued riots and civil disobedience: more than 1,000 detained.

12. 1987       April 11      South Africa government tightens 10-month-old state of emergency and initiates new laws forbidding protests on behalf of any political detainees.

April 16       Alan Boesak, prominent church leader and anti-apartheid spokesman, organizes and encourages mass rallies in defiance of government ban of such activities.

April 23       Rail workers' continued strike culminated in police opening fire on them: at least 6 killed.

May 6          Election for whites only parliamentary representatives: blacks ineligible to vote: more than 500,000 of them stay away from work and school in protest.

13. 1988       June 7-10     Trade Union Federation calls a 3-day strike: more than one million blacks stayed home from work; seven killed on the first day.
June 10

Government renews existing 2-year-old national state of emergency to stem waves of continued riots and civil disobedience.
APPENDIX C. Major Variables Analyzed in the Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>B. EXECUTIVE</td>
<td>Presidential anti-apartheid actions</td>
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<td>C. PUBLIC</td>
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<td>D. CONGRESS</td>
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<td>E. MCRISIS</td>
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150
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX D. Correlation Coefficient of Major Variables

(For space convenience the original variable names have been removed and replaced with letters which correspond with those specified in Appendix C)

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152
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX E. Correlation Coefficients for Mass Media Variables

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NKV = Newspaper Crisis Coverage
NNKV = Newspaper Non-Crisis Coverage
NPKV = Newspaper Political Crisis Coverage
NNPKV = Newspaper Non-Political Crisis Coverage
TKV = Television Crisis Coverage
TNKV = Television Non-Crisis Coverage
TPKV = Television Political Crisis Coverage
TNPKV = Television Non-Political Crisis Coverage
MKV = Magazine Crisis Coverage
MNKV = Magazine Non-Crisis Coverage
MPKV = Magazine Political Crisis Coverage
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APPENDIX F
APPENDIX F. Mean Values for Media Variables

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APPENDIX G. Procedure Utilized in Analyzing Differences between the Additive and Interactive Models

The following method was suggested by Mendenhall and McClave (1981) for testing the hypothesis that the interactive coefficients $b_4=b_5=b_6=b_7=0$.

1) Analyze the additive model using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. In the case of this study, the additive regression equation analyzed is as follows:

$$ Y (CONGRESS) = a + b_1x_1 \text{(MEDIA)} + b_2x_2 \text{(PUBLIC)} + b_3x_3 \text{(EXECUTIVE)} + e $$

2) Analyze the interactive model using the OLS regression analysis. And in this study, the additive model is as follows:

$$ Y (CONGRESS) = a + b_1x_1 \text{(MEDIA)} + b_2x_2 \text{(PUBLIC)} + b_3x_3 \text{(EXECUTIVE)} + b_4x_1x_2 \text{(MPUBLIC)} + b_5x_1x_3 \text{(MEXECUTIVE)} + b_6x_2x_3 + b_7x_1x_2x_3 \text{(INTGROUPS)} + e $$
3) Compare the standard error of both models by calculating the difference between their errors: SSE1= 5.926 and SSE2= 5.598

$$\text{SSE}_1 - \text{SSE}_2 = 212.179 - 209.643 = 2.536$$

Note that if the interaction factors contribute to the model's explanation, SSE2 will be much smaller than SSE1; and the difference between the two will be large.

4) Test the hypothesis that the interaction coefficients $b_1=b_4=b_5=b_6=b_7=0$ by using the formula:

$$F = \frac{\text{SSE}_1 - \text{SSE}_2}{k-g} \div \frac{\text{SSE}_2}{N-(K+1)}$$

Where $\text{SSE}_1$ = Additive regression error

$\text{SSE}_2$ = Interactive regression error

$k-g$ = # of parameters in $H_0$:

$K+1$ = # of independent variables in $\text{SSE}_2$ (including constant term)

$N$ = Number of data points

Since $\text{SSE}_1= 5.926$; $\text{SSE}_2= 5.598$; $N= 156$; $k-g= 5$; $N-(K+1)= 149$

$$F = \frac{0.328/5}{5.598/149} = 0.1729$$

5) Check obtained $F$-value on Table of Critical Values for $F$-Statistic at pre-assigned alpha level.

$V_1= k-g$ (numerator degree of freedom) = 5

$V_2= N-(K+1)$ (denominator degree of freedom) = 149
Rejection area = F > alpha

And since F = 0.1729, the critical value of F at F.05 = 2.21 (from table).

Since the calculated F at 0.1729 is lesser than 2.21, the null hypothesis that b1=b4=b5=b6=b7=0 is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. This shows that the interactive terms cannot be included in the regression model.
APPENDIX H
APPENDIX H. Arima (p, d, q) Model Showing Autocorrelation Function (ACF) of Nonstationary Series of Residuals in the Data Analyzed

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Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations * Two Std. Error Limits .
Total Cases: 156    Computable First Lags: 155
APPENDIX I. Arima (p, d, q) Model showing Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) of Non-Stationary Series in the Data Analyzed

Partial Autocorrelations: CAAA
Pr-Aut- Stand.
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Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations * Two Std. Error Limits .
Total Cases: 156  Computable First Lags: 155
APPENDIX J. Arima (0, 1, 1) Model Showing Autocorrelation Function (ACF) of Stationary Series in the Data Analyzed

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Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations * Two Std. Error Limits .
Total Cases: 156 Computable First Lags: 154
APPENDIX K. Arima (0, 1, 1) Model Showing Partial Autocorrelation (PACF) Function of Stationary Series in the Data Analyzed

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Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations * Two Std. Error Limits .
Total Cases: 156  Computable Fir Lags: 154
APPENDIX L. Regression Correlation and Covariance Matrixes in the Arima (0, 1, 1) Model Analyzed

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


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Reports


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