RELIGIOUS RESURRENCE AND RELIGIOUS TERRORISM: A STUDY OF
THE ACTIONS OF THE SHI'A SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS
IN LEBANON

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
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By

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The purpose for undertaking this case study of the Shi'a in Lebanon is threefold. First, as a hypothesis-generating case study, its objective is to formulate relevant hypotheses about religious resurgence and religious terrorism. This study achieves this objective by formulating 14 general and nine special hypotheses, and testing and confirming the latter.

Second, the purpose of this study is also to explore the trajectory of the Lebanese Shi'a's sectarian mobilization. This exploration permits the conceptualization of geo-cultural immobility and its effect upon a religious minority. It deduces that the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility is directly related to their active religious resurgence.

The third purpose is to study the changes in the objectives and tactics of a religious minority, that of the Muslim Shi'a in Lebanon. This research is able, via its primary and secondary data, to show a relationship between the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence and their use of religious terrorism.
This study introduces the concept of geo-cultural immobility. A minority's geo-cultural immobility is identified as an imposed low geographic mobility within a nation with low cultural pluralism. It establishes the Lebanese Shi'ites' geo-cultural immobility, to which it attributes their religious resurgence. This Lebanese Shi'a religious resurgence is proven in this research to produce zealots needed by religious terrorist organizations.

This study also introduces and defines religious terrorism as violent acts performed by elements of a religious organization or sect, growing out of a commitment to communicate a divine message. It distinguishes between religious terrorism, secular terrorism, and fighters for religious freedom, which are based on the actors' motives, affinities, and consciousness of the maliciousness of their acts.

The primary and secondary data and the quasi-experiment in this research support its special hypotheses. They indicate a statistical correlation between eight Lebanese Shi'a cultural and religious attributes: (1) age, (2) marital status, (3) extent of Shi'a Imam's militancy, (4) personal religious commitment and religious resurgence, (5) zealotry, (6) geo-cultural immobility, (7) imprisonment of family members, and (8) willingness to commit terrorism.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to understand the current Lebanese Shi'a sectarian and religious movements and their use of terrorism are hindered by the lack of relevant studies. Until recently, the subject of terrorism, now a dominant part of our daily news, largely has been ignored. This is evidenced by the 1936 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences statement that terrorism "remains interesting only to antiquarians." Three decades later, the second edition of the Encyclopedia does not even address the subject of terrorism, illustrating the level of importance accorded to this phenomenon by scholars of that time.

Lack of concern with terrorism also was common during World War II, when we applauded French, Norwegian, and Malayan civilians shooting German or Japanese civilians in the streets, in cinemas, in cafes, or in their beds. Now, as then, we tend to justify some of these actions as acts of brave freedom fighters. Our interest persistently colors our perceptions and blurs the distinction between terrorism and freedom fighting. After World War II and up to 1960, our lack of concern with terrorist activities continued because
terrorism took place not in Europe and the United States but in the former colonial territories, out of sight of most Westerners.

Since the late 1960s, however, political terrorism has attracted the attention of scholars and become a preoccupation of Western governments because of the danger it poses. Journalists and scholars increasingly reflect a change in attitudes toward political terrorism in their writings about the depredations of West Germany's Baader-Meinhof gang, Italy's Mafia and Red Brigade, the Palestine Liberation Organizations, the Klu Klux Klan, and the Irish Republican Army. Yet, until the mid-1980s, no one addressed the phenomenon of religious terrorism. In this research, religious terrorism is distinguishable from other forms of terrorism and violent acts because it is performed by elements of a religious organization or sect, and grows out of a commitment to communicate a divine message (Appendix A). This assumption is attributed to the lack of cross national studies which would confirm or deny the validity of such distinction.

Religious and ethnic movements have emerged since the 1960s demanding various forms of political autonomy for some culturally distinct regions (Tiryakian and Rogowski, 1985; Ajami, 1981; Norton, 1984). Unlike religious terrorism, this contemporary religious and ethnic resurgence has generated theoretical ferment among scholars (Olzak, 1986; Caplan,
1987; Antoun and Hegland, 1987). Some have attempted even to identify the conditions under which political mobilization in pursuit of religious and ethnic objectives is most likely to occur (Nielsen, 1977; Norton, 1984; Hechter, 1987).

Today, a sizable body of literature on political, collective, and civil violence has emerged. These studies have produced a variety of theories to explain violence and political terrorism, but again, little or no attention has been given to other possible types of violence, such as religious terrorism. This is true even though religious terrorism can be traced back to the first century Jewish Sicarii, and the medieval Christian millenarian sects. Both of these groups displayed extraordinary inventiveness and a wide range of shock tactics during protracted guerrilla wars against their enemies. More relevant to the research on religious terrorism are the Assassins or Nizaris, a Shi'a sect founded about 900 years ago by the religious order of Hassan Iben Sabah. Group membership was composed of Fedai (devoted ones) who killed at the command of their religious leader. The Fedai believed that killing the unrighteous guaranteed their own salvation.

This researcher is convinced that religious zealotry comparable to that of the Nizaris may be seen behind the recent bombing of the American Marine barracks and embassy in Lebanon, the assassination of President Sadat in Egypt, the torching of abortion clinics in the United States, and the
downing of the Air India jet over the Atlantic. Such acts are committed by groups bound together by religious beliefs. The lack of scholarly research on religious resurgence and religious terrorism motivated this study.

As a result, there is a need for theoretical research in the area of religious resurgence and religious terrorism. More specifically, there is a need to investigate the linkage between religious resurgence—defined here as a movement that emphasizes obedience to perceived religious teachings and guidelines instead of traditional civil laws (Appendix A)—and religious terrorism. In addition, there is a need to distinguish between fighting for religious freedom—defined here as self-restrained violent operations against perceived illegitimate and oppressive forces (Appendix A)—and religious terrorism, both of which are possible outcomes of religious resurgence.

This research will study the religious resurgence of a specific sect in one specific region, the Lebanese Shi'a and their use of terrorism. It is hoped that this research will attract and generate future scholarly interest capable of delivering the required cross national analysis needed for generalization and theoretical formation. Recent studies which speculate on the conditions instigating the Lebanese Shi'a's political mobilization in pursuit of sectarian objectives help us to understand Lebanon and the Shi'a within.
Lebanon and the Shi'a Within

Until the 1970s, Lebanon enjoyed a unique political and economic environment in the Middle East. Its parliamentary system, based on the French Basic Laws of 1875, endowed the country with stability, freedom, and prosperity. The Lebanese political environment was described by Michael Hudson (1985, pp. 36-37) as having:

1) A particularistic "mosaic" society; 2) an authoritarian and hierarchical family structure; 3) religious institutions that are politically influential; 4) power dispersed in religious sects, regional groupings, economic pressure groups, and ideologically oriented political movements; 5) a distinct entrepreneurial habit that has produced both a small class of merchant princes and a large, stable petty bourgeoisie; 6) a cult leadership, historically the result of feudalism, which has produced factions of notables, each with a local clientele; and finally, 7) territory that is about three-quarters the size of Connecticut, with five geographically well-defined regions and a population about one-quarter the size of New York City's.

The most unusual characteristic of the political process in Lebanon is confessionalism, which is the separation of all public institutions and the disbursement of all governmental resources on a sectarian basis. The balance of power among
the 17 religious sects in Lebanon was maintained by confessionalism instituted under the original constitution of 1926. At the time of Lebanon's independence from France in 1943, the concept of confessionalism was rejuvenated by Lebanon's first institutional manifestation, the National Pact (Al-Nithaq Al-Watani). This pact, which was an informal agreement between President Bechara al-Khoury (a Maronites Christian) and Prime Minister Riad Sulh (a Muslim Sunni), set the tone for the domestic and foreign policy goals of the state.

Consequently, the Lebanese state since its inception has dispersed resources and employed personnel strictly on a sectarian basis. Under this pact, positions in the governmental structure are allocated by a six-to-five ratio in favor of the Maronites Christians, based on the 1932 population census, the second and only official census in the history of the state. The six-to-five ratio has been retained and continues to determine the internal political structure of the state, notwithstanding the civil war and demographic changes that have taken place in Lebanon since 1932. Changes to this confessional ratio persistently have been resisted because Lebanese Maronites Christians fear losing political advantage. The non-Maronites sectarian groups continually call for a national census and point to the woefully inadequate population statistics. Table 1, below, presents the census and recent official estimates of
population in Lebanon.

**TABLE I**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1974 (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>355,668</td>
<td>392,544</td>
<td>544,822</td>
<td>700,154</td>
<td>769,558</td>
<td>1,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>199,182</td>
<td>226,378</td>
<td>318,201</td>
<td>377,544</td>
<td>423,708</td>
<td>0,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>42,426</td>
<td>45,999</td>
<td>61,956</td>
<td>81,764</td>
<td>87,788</td>
<td>0,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>5,964</td>
<td>14,218</td>
<td>14,622</td>
<td>0,079</td>
<td>0,018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Catholic</td>
<td>12,651</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>5,911</td>
<td>5,699</td>
<td>0,018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>43,633</td>
<td>53,047</td>
<td>71,711</td>
<td>62,268</td>
<td>88,131</td>
<td>0,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>81,409</td>
<td>76,522</td>
<td>106,658</td>
<td>130,858</td>
<td>148,927</td>
<td>0,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>25,462</td>
<td>58,007</td>
<td>67,139</td>
<td>63,679</td>
<td>0,084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>6,712</td>
<td>12,641</td>
<td>14,365</td>
<td>0,033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>253,366</td>
<td>383,180</td>
<td>541,647</td>
<td>691,883</td>
<td>928,937</td>
<td>1,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>124,786</td>
<td>175,925</td>
<td>222,594</td>
<td>271,734</td>
<td>285,698</td>
<td>0,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>104,947</td>
<td>154,208</td>
<td>300,698</td>
<td>397,107</td>
<td>613,605</td>
<td>1,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>17,001</td>
<td>18,354</td>
<td>23,041</td>
<td>29,633</td>
<td>0,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9,819</td>
<td>6,596</td>
<td>12,677</td>
<td>13,876</td>
<td>0,018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: 1922 and 1932 are official census figures, cited in Himadeh (1936); Estimates: Hourani (1946); Tabbarah (1954 and 1956).
The demographic changes in Lebanon are not properly reflected in the 1932 census. The non-Maronites' contemporary claim of woeful inadequacy of the 1932 confessional distribution may be substantiated by the problems reflected in Table 1, above: (1) inequitable distribution of resources mainly caused by drastic sectarian demographic changes, such as the recent and unparalleled population growth of the Shi'a, presently the largest Lebanese sect (Joseph, 1986); (2) the unreliability of the estimated statistics. The statistics provide room for discrepancy and whimsical selections, as shown in Table 2, below;

Table 2
Evaluative Presentation of the Lebanese Population, 1953-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method Utilized</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>1,416,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Doxiadis Mission</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>1,445,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>IRFED Mission</td>
<td>Projections &amp; Sampling</td>
<td>1,626,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>2,151,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Mazure Mission</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>1,940,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Ministry of Plans</td>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>2,179,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Civil State</td>
<td>Administrative Evaluation</td>
<td>2,367,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Projections</td>
<td>2,614,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ministry of Plans</td>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>2,126,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Courbage &amp; Fargues</td>
<td>Adjustment</td>
<td>2,265,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) the inclusion of non-resident Lebanese living abroad and their descendants in the governmental estimates; and (4) the extent of the Lebanese outmigration in the recent years, which has affected mostly the Maronites (Joseph, 1986). This outmigration, as shown in Table 3, below, has depleted the
valuable human resources the Maronites need to maintain numerical superiority.

Table 3
Distribution of Maronites and Lebanese in General Residing Outside Lebanon, 1959.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North America</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>692,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The unpopular Lebanese confessional allocations, based on a ratio of six to five in favor of the Christians, dictate that there must be six Christian members of the government for each five non-Christians. This division, as shown in the Table 4, below, is also translated into parliamentary representation, with the Maronites Christians having 30 representatives, other Christian groups 24, Druze six and Muslim groups 39.

Table 4
Parliamentary Seats According To Confessional Distribution, 1947-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term in Office</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>AO</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-72</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M-Maronites; GO-Greek Orthodox; GC-Greek Catholic; AO-Armenian; Orthodox; AC-Armenian Catholic; P-Protestant; S-Sunni; D-Druze; SH-Shi'a.

Source: Inst. of Middle Eastern & North African Affairs, (1972)
This structure also determines the allocation of senior governmental positions. The president is a Maronites, the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament is a Shi'a Muslim.

Contemporary researchers attribute Lebanon's continuing instability to confessionalism. The size of the various groups is a key to understanding Lebanon's fragile existence (Soffer, 1986). Thus, confessionalism is viewed by most as the main reason for the continuing civil violence in Lebanon.

Lebanon's difficulties with confessionalism may be seen in the frequent turnovers of Lebanese cabinets. In the 30 years since independence, Lebanon has had 43 different governments, each averaging only 9.1 months in office. Lebanon's inability to maintain a government, attributed to the relative short term in power of governments, may denote the extent of the instability and divisions of the Lebanese political institutions.

One direct consequence of this frequent turnover of cabinets is the expansion of presidential powers at the expense of the cabinet and parliament combined, as discussed by Michael Hudson's (1985, pp. 47-48) following narration:

Under the 1926 Constitution the popularly elected parliament elects the President of the republic, who names a prime minister who in turn must form a cabinet that will hold the confidence of the parliament. Members of the cabinet are responsible collectively and individually for
all the acts of the government. In theory, both president and cabinet are responsible to the parliament. In practice, however, the president had developed independence by making use of certain powers granted him through the French (who, not unreasonably, assumed that they could always control his election). These powers include the right to promulgate "urgent" legislation by decree, to veto bills, to dissolve the parliament, and to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet. As a result, it has always been the president, not the parliament, that brought down governments. Prime ministers and cabinets have never been able to initiate legislative programs without presidential backing. The president has even been able to persuade the parliament to amend the constitution to permit him a second term, and the parliament has been too divided and dependent to resist effectively. This is one of the reasons that the opposition has occasionally taken to the streets. Instead of being a figurehead, the president is a participating umpire; instead of being a government, the cabinet is the battleground of notables; and instead of being a legislative body, the parliament is sounding board for local leaders.

An even more significant consequence of confessionalism is the unwillingness of national leaders to pool resources behind national interests. This aspect of Lebanon's politics
is explained by Malcolm Kerr (1966, p. 188) as follows:

The leaders are not a team; there is no such thing as a majority opinion; the state can carry out isolated individual acts, but no coherent program. .. .national consensus exists only in the negative form of mutual rivalry and suspicion and an awareness by each group that satisfaction of its own wants must mean the negation of another's. ..

Confessionalism, the legalization of sectarianism, not only has affected the governmental process but also has supported the formalization of relations among sects in Lebanon. Private social organizations and governmental agencies provide services and cater employment on sectarian basis. This feature of confessionalism is discussed by Joseph (1986, pp. 75-76):

Public agencies were more and more constituted on a sectarian basis and the sects increasingly came to have organizations which represented them in all areas of public life. Hospitals, clinics, charity associations, sports clubs, cultural clubs, scouts, and youth service organizations recruited from and served a clientele defined in sectarian terms. Even the schools took on a sectarian character as they were predominately Muslim or Christian. The government directly subsidized these sectarian agencies, even sectarian schools, at the expense of governmental alternatives.
This formalization of relations among sects forces individuals, in an effort to attain satisfactory public services, to manipulate formal confessional quotas through personal networks of friends, patrons, and relatives. Thus, they create a web of inter- and intra-sectarian relations. These relations, based mainly on sectarian and kin ties, are conducted as patron-client type relations. They are also at the root of power of the Shi'a Lebanese traditional political leadership.

A Shi'a za'im, the patron in these relationships, traditionally receives blind political support from sect members in his area. In exchange for such loyalty, individual followers obtain tangible economic favors. These patron-client relations, within which people satisfy their need and find security, tend to lessen class distinctions and intensify the sectarian aspect of Lebanon. Class conflict thus tends to be transposed into sectarian differences. These patron-client relations, however, are restrictive to client and patron alike. Clients are restricted in that the only avenue open to them for the procurement of governmental jobs, public and private sponsorship, and personal services is through their za'im. These restricted opportunities, coupled with the effect of familial, religious, and cultural ties, restrain the mobility of the Shi'a, and particularly their youth. Such constraints on the Shi'a have increased the sect's geo-cultural immobility, as discussed in Chapter
Four. The concentration of the Shi'a in less-developed regions, one of the aspects of their geo-cultural immobility, is shown in Table 5, below:

Table 5
Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon 1950, and 1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban District</th>
<th>Percentage Of Population of District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maronites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachaya</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahleh</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less Developed District

| Akkar          | 18        | 4              | 2       | 5      | 52    | 61   | 0      | 18     | 0      | 1      |
| Zagharta       | 90        | 89             | 3       | 5      | 6     | 4    | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      |
| Koura          | 28        | 21             | 63      | 67     | 8     | 3    | 4      | 1      | 0      | 1      |
| Hermel         | 3         | 1              | 0       | 0      | 6     | 5    | 62     | 89     | 0      | 0      |
| Baalbeck       | 12        | 7              | 2       | 3      | 12    | 5    | 68     | 81     | 0      | 0      |
| Saida          | 8         | 2              | 0       | 1      | 18    | 26   | 62     | 67     | 0      | 0      |
| Merjayoun      | 6         | 12             | 14      | 16     | 13    | 8    | 45     | 61     | 0      | 0      |
| Tyre           | 6         | 4              | 0       | 1      | 4     | 2    | 80     | 87     | 0      | 1      |

The patron's authority and political influence are also restricted by confessional allocations and quotas to his immediate area or over his sect. In such a position, his political subsistence requires him to maintain sufficient followers and sect members within his zone of influence in order to remain a member of the Lebanese parliament. To enhance his authority, the patron needs to preserve the status quo and governmental stability. This requires him to
integrate consensually with elites of other sects, thus becoming a protector of confessionalism. In fulfilling these conditions, most Shi'a leaders, unlike the leaders of other Lebanese sects, became permanent fixtures in the Lebanese confessional institution, as illustrated in Table 6, below:

Table 6
Longevity of Selected Shi'i Great Land-owning and Parliamentary Families: Shi'a za'ims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>Year of Initiation</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Chambers (Ministerial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As'ad</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammada</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haydar</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalil</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oseiran</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usayran</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zayn</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: Dekmejian (1975); and Baaklini (1976).

Shi'a youth, as a result of having their ambitions persistently limited by the conservatism of their sect's traditional leaders, became discontented with the status quo by the early 1970s. Their exclusion from active political participation left them with no effective political alternatives. This growing frustration spurred the progressive Shi'i to experiment with non-traditional means of participation, via religious-political movements.

Shi'a Religious and Sectarian Political Movements

The emergence of Islamic and Shi'a sectarian political organizations may be attributed to three Lebanese Shi'a
features: (1) the Shi'a political leadership's unwillingness to address contemporary and progressive sectarian needs; (2) the Shi'a's predisposition to find in Islam an alternative to deficient political conditions; and (3) the existence of a catalyst, a charismatic religious leadership. These political movements were influenced by one Iranian initiative, a naturalized Lebanese charismatic religious leader, Imam Mousa el-Sadr.

Imam Mousa el-Sadr, born in Qom in 1928 and educated in Tehran, Iran, is the son of Ayatollah Sadr al-Din el-Sadr, an Iraqi Shi'a revolutionary who fled to Iran and helped in the foundation of the Shi'a's biggest theological center in Qom. Mousa al Sadr is also a cousin and brother-in-law to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir el-Sadr, who was executed by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980 for the instigation of a Shi'a uprising. He is also the grandson (maternal side) of Ayatollah Hussein Qummi, an opposition leader to Shah's Reza's regime in Iran. He came to Lebanon shortly after the Shah of Iran deprived the Imam of his Iranian nationality in 1957. By the age of 31, he became the Mufti (religious judge) of Tyre a coastal city in south Lebanon, a most unusual feat, and President Chehab granted him his Lebanese nationality by a special presidential decree in 1961. Soon thereafter, his status in the Shi'a community became well known, and Augustus Norton (1985) said of him: "Of those contending for the leadership of the Shi'a community, the
most important was no doubt a charismatic religious leader, Musa al-Sadr."

By the late 1960s, Sayyid (a title identifying a descendant of Ali's) Mousa el-Sadr became known as "Imam" Mousa el-Sadr, a title also setting him apart from other clerics. The title of "Imam" endowed him with sectarian political authority and entitled him to obedience by followers. As an Imam he set about to improve his followers' socio-economic conditions, and by these efforts, according to Ajami (1981, p. 183), he accomplished the following:

In his first decade in Lebanon, Sayyid Musa put together a coalition of educated civil servants, professionals and men with new money. He sought, as he put it, to change the "psychological outlook" of the Shi'a community; he provided an alternative to the parties of the left and the rule of the feudal families. His first institutional creation was the Higher Shi'a Council to represent the corporate demands of the Shi'ites before the state. This was a break with the Sunni establishment, and a search for an independent Shi'a path. It was an effort blessed and aided by the Maronites elites.

Elected in 1969 as the chairman of the Shi'a's newly formed Supreme Shi'a Council, Imam Mousa el-Sadr thus became the leading Lebanese Shi'a cleric. Under his leadership, according to Augustus Norton (1985, p. 61), Shi'ism, "the religion of lament, was undergoing transformations into a
faith of activism." A religious leader, a social and political reformer, a rebel, and a rejectionist, Mousa el-Sadr succeeded in providing the Shi'a with an alternative to traditional political leadership.

As a reaction to confessionalism, and in an effort to address all Lebanese minorities' relative privation, Mousa el-Sadr formed in 1974 with Gregoire Haddad, a Catholic archbishop, a broad-based movement, Harakat el-Mahrumeen (Movement of the Deprived). Originally, Harakat el-Mahrumeen was a multi-sectarian political action movement aimed at mobilizing the Lebanese poor to lobby the Lebanese parliament and regime collectively. The movement's intentions, as the following excerpts from its charter indicate, were to work within the Lebanese political system:

The Mahrumin Movement does not work for the good of a particular sect or party. Its principles are the prosperity of all people, and its battle is for the sake of all. It distinguishes between religious commitment and sectarian fanaticism that impedes the nation's path to progress. It likewise sees in its progressive religious program the guarantee for eliminating the taint of fanatic sectarianism from religion. It works to prepare a sound foundation for change and to set up the forces to aid in carrying out the process of change. And finally the Mahrumin Movement is a movement of all the people, it embraces their needs it devises solutions, it acts
quickly to implement these, it fights on the side of the deprived to the end, it is a movement of all honorable Lebanese, those who feel presently deprived, and those who are anxious for their future, it is a Lebanese movement toward a better world.

By 1976, the Lebanese civil war affected this inter-sectarian cooperation by draining Harakat el-Mahroumeen of all non-Shi'a members. This movement, now a Shi'a sectarian organization, won the overwhelming support of dispossessed Shi'a, as may be seen in Norton’s (1987, p. 105) following remarks:

The Shi'a journey out of self-contempt and political quiescence was led by the charismatic mullah as far as one man could take it. Musa al Sadr walked between raindrops. He had given political activism the sanction of religious symbols; he linked to the larger Shi'a world lonely people who had felt isolated and cast adrift. Through the mechanism of Harakat el-Mahroumeen, Mousa el-Sadr also prevailed in displacing many well-established Shi'a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly exposing their exploitation of the sect in pursuit of personal gains. As a result, many Shi'a political leaders forfeited much of their influence and legitimacy. These included the House Speaker for more than 21 years, Sabri Hamadeh, as well as Kamel El-Assad, Adel Osseiran, and Kazem Khalil, to name a few.
A. Harakat El Mahroumeen

Harakat el-Mahroumeen, the Lebanese Shi'a's first sectarian movement, became a political alternative to an unpopular and ineffective Shi'a traditional leadership. Its goals, as set forth in its original charter, aimed to struggle peacefully and "relentlessly until the social grievances of the Shi'a's (and other deprived Lebanese) were satisfactorily addressed by the government."

In time, however, Imam Mousa el-Sadr's hope of changing the political conditions through peaceful means faded, in face of the strength and solidarity of the traditional political leadership rooted in confessional institutions. He realized that there is "... no alternative for us except revolution and weapons." In this militant mode, he eloquently echoed Imam Ali's famous words at a rally in Bourj-el-Barajnet, a suburb of Beirut, "Arms are the adornment of men, and a symbol of manhood," and he continued, from now onward, the movement is that of "rejectionists... we are avengers... we are a people who revolt against any kind of oppression." The Imam warned his opponents that he would urge his followers to "attack and occupy the palaces and mansions of the rich and powerful if the grievances of the poor and oppressed were left unheeded" (Augustus Norton, 1985). Imam Mousa el-Sadr's frustration and disposition to bear arms led to the creation of an armed militia in support of Harakat el-Mahrumeen, known by the acronym Amal (Hope),
with which name Harakat al-Mahrumeen subsequently came to be identified.

By 1975, the civil war consumed Lebanon. In this conflict, Amal played a major role by providing the Shi'a and their territories with needed protection. Chaos evolved as other ethnic, political, and sectarian militia joined the fray under the auspices of invading Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian forces. These actions hindered the Lebanese government from restoring order. Consequently, the desire of the leadership of Amal to stop the fighting coopted it to assist the national and confessional government in the attempt to reestablish peace. Since then, Amal has steered a relatively moderate and steady course.

Unlike the Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese Shi'a sectarian movement, Amal, retained its nationalistic identity under the banner of Lebanon, working within the Lebanese political system. Amal's behavior in the continuing Lebanese civil unrest is described by Augustus Norton (1987, p. 142):

The movement stands for the reimposition of governmental authority throughout Lebanon, the disarming of all militia and paramilitary organizations, and the reform of the political system so that political office is allocated by merit rather than by the government. . . Amal has, in effect, participated in Lebanese political developments on two levels: First, as a guardian of the Shi'a community, it has not been reluctant to use
political violence to pursue its interests and protect its constituency. Second, as a populist movement, it has become ever more aggressive as the representative of Shi'a interests in Lebanon's multisectarian political system.

Although Amal did not follow the Iranian Revolutionary pattern by seeking to overthrow the Lebanese confessional government, it maintained, until recently, close ties with the Islamic revolutionaries of Iran. The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has been an important source of pride and inspiration to Shi'a everywhere. The dual nationalities of its founder and charismatic leader, Imam Mousa el-Sadr, revived and nurtured this Lebanese-Iranian Shi'a attachment. Once the Iranian Revolution formed a government, Imam Mousa el-Sadr was the way and the means to better relations. Thus, the Imam blessed, encouraged, and even consummated the Lebanese-Iranian Shi'a marriage of convenience. This interdependence follows the pattern of every other Lebanese sectarian community in that each sect has an external sponsor to strengthen, support, and insure its standing. This traditional dependence on external forces by sectarian groups in Lebanon has become an "addiction that perpetuates... confessionalism... and the conflict" (Azar, 1984).

The solidarity with Iran and Amal's internal cohesiveness was embodied and maintained by the charisma of Imam Mousa el-Sadr, as evidenced by developments consequent
to the disappearance of the Imam in 1978. With the absence of the Imam, the Lebanese Shi'a's inter- and intra-national unity began to decline. The consequent emergence of competitive, Iran-backed splinter groups from Amal's main political stream buttresses this observation. One such offspring is the organization of Islamic Amal, formed in Baalbeck by Hussein el-Musawi.

B. Islamic Amal

The disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr created a leadership vacuum in the Beqa' region and an apparent opportunity for Sayyid Hussein el-Musawi to fill it. Hussein el-Musawi's subsequent initiative in 1982 to assume the regional leadership of Baalbeck may be attributed, among other reasons, to his being a Sayyid, a descendant of the blessed house of Ali. Since kinship (Ali to Mohammad) is so bound up with the Shi'a faith itself, the leadership position of a Sayyid is accepted by Shi'a as axiomatic. Asyad (plural for Sayyid) is a genealogical category referring to an entire family and may include the poor and the rich, and the learned as well as the illiterate. The authority of the Asyad families is accepted, in the general field of morals, as trustworthy. Even though this authority inherited by the Shi'a Asyad is religious in nature, in practice it encompasses the whole sphere of social and political behavior. Sayyid Hussein el-Musawi, a school teacher in Baalbek, capitalized on the growing dissatisfaction in his region with
Amal's apparent moderation, attributed to its willingness to work patiently within the Lebanese political system. In short, the Sayyid's birthrights, personal ambitions, the disappearance of Imam Mousa El-Sadr, the success of the Iranian revolution, and the presence of Iranian revolutionary guards and their resources at his disposition in Baalbek made it possible to form the Islamic Amal.

Islamic Amal is a regional Shi'a sectarian organization which emphasizes its Islamic identity and rejects the authority of confessional institutions and the legitimacy of the present Lebanese constitutional government. Its influence is limited to the Beqa' valley from which it derives its membership. Islamic Amal membership is estimated to be around 700 lightly equipped elements, the primary components of which are Sayyid Musawi's family, friends, and relatives. Sayyid Musawi forged by late 1983 a link with Hizbollah, an Islamic movement closely allied to Iran.

C. Hizbollah

Unlike the Shi'a sectarian organizations Amal and Islamic Amal, Hizbollah is a religious movement committed to the rule of Islam. In its appeal to all Muslims and the downtrodden of the world, Hizbollah 1985 Manifesto declares:

... we in Lebanon are not a closed organization, a party, nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are a nation tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological and political bond, namely Islam. . .
We, the sons of Hizbollah's nation, consider ourselves a part of the Islamic nation in the world.

Lebanon, in view of a leading cleric of Hizbollah, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, "is an impure realm that has to be cleansed," and in which "the Shi'a state that found its fulfillment in Iran should be duplicated... by Hizbollah" as a step toward a world's central Islamic state. In addition to liberty and freedom from imperialism, Hizbollah's objectives include Israel's obliteration from existence, Phalange (Maronites militia) submission, and the consolidation of the international liberation movements. Hizbollah's zealots' attempts to achieve these objectives are guided by the "Quran, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and religious opinions made by the jurisprudent," and are under the supreme and single command currently "embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-khomeini" in Iran.

Hizbollah in Lebanon found in Imam Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah what the Shi'a had found a decade earlier in Imam Mousa el-Sadr. After the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr, Imam Fadlallah amassed his own following in Bourj-El-Abed, a suburb of Beirut, and became a central figure in the Shi'a community. Imam Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah is, according to the editor of a Lebanese magazine, Monday Morning, "one of the most important figures in the Islamic political movement today." Born in Lebanon in 1934, Imam Fadlallah
studied in Iraq under Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khaw'i. Imam and Sayyid Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah is a theologian and a scholar. He is the author of many publications, for example, *Al-Islam wa-Muntiq al-Quwa* (Islam and the Theory of Force), and *Al-Hiwar fi-al-Qur'an* (Dialogue in the Qur'an). The present influence and popularity of the Imam extends far beyond the Lebanese Shi'a. In 1986, Sayyid Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah identified himself and his beliefs to *Monday Morning* as:

... a person who lives to fulfill my duty as a human being, as a Moslem, and as a citizen, in order to raise the standards of the people who nobody cares for to a higher level. Consequently, I believe that every human being should consider all his resources as a trust from God for others... Violence is not the natural means to resolve any problem in the beginning. I believe that everything can be solved by dialogue, and all issues can be resolved through sound methods that respect the humanity of the human being, and seek to change the convictions of people through persuasion.

In short, Sayyid Fadlallah voiced strong opposition to confessionalism and sectarianism, and he claims to stand for ethical behavior in politics, urging all Muslims to live their Islam in their politics by seeking to convert enemies into friends.

By providing the Lebanese Shi'a an alternative to the
parties of the left and the rule of the feudal families, Imam Mousa el-Sadr seeded the Lebanese Shi'a religious resurgence, the fruit of which are all the above religious and sectarian movements. Even though these organizations reveal a fragmented sect made up of competitive groups, none of which is able to restore its unity, they also support the sect's religious resurgence under investigation.

Prelude to the Study of Shi'a Religious Resurgence and Terrorism

This research is an attempt to understand the religious resurgence of the Lebanese Shi'a and their increased use of terrorism. It is conducted by a researcher with a knowledge of the region in which he was reared. The researcher's family belongs to the Twelvers sect, many of whom are taking part in its religious resurgence. As a result, he is speculating on why his friends and relatives would resort to religious and sectarian organizations as an alternative to their traditional political leadership. Also, the features said to lead to and explain terrorism in the literature are not compatible with what this researcher perceives to be the factors leading his friends and relatives to terrorism.

In this research, even though the Islamic cultural context possesses unique formative attributes, an attempt will be made to identify the "modal personality" of the religious terrorist, Lebanese Shi'a-style. This composite
personality profile of the Shi'í religious terrorist will be
based on empirical observations, the social-psychological
theory, Dekmejian (1985) formulations, and those of Erikson,
Durkheim, Adorno, Faraji, and DiRenzo, all of which are
particularly insightful to explain the characteristics of the
radical Lebanese Shi'í.

Building upon some of these researchers' ideas, and
others taken from the literature on terrorism, the researcher
began with a preconception based upon his personal obser-
vations that these violent acts were motivated by religious
beliefs, undertaken as religious duties, guided by religious
leaders, for the fulfillment of spiritual gains. The lack of
appropriate discussion of these aspects in the literature on
terrorism led the researcher to postulate that there is a
distinction between political terrorists motivated by
political rights and terroristic acts motivated by religious
duties, which he calls religious terrorism. Thus, a
distinction is proposed between what is called here religious
terrorism and all other forms of terrorism labeled as
political terrorism.

The literature, furthermore, makes no distinction
between terrorists and freedom fighters. The researcher
believes that there is a difference between freedom fighters
and terrorists, based upon self-imposed restrictions.
Freedom fighters' self-imposed operational codes, which
restrict their options and objectives, make them
distinctive. Terrorists generally lack such self-discipline (Appendix A).

To help us visualize these motive-based suppositions, a heuristic presentation is offered. The potential terrorist, depicted by this emblem — —, is subject to personal, economic, psychological, social, and other environmental factors, as can be seen in Figure 1. His motives dictate his identity. So, if he consciously undertakes terrorist actions and is motivated by a stronger affinity for media attention, equity, liberty, and/or sympathy from the international community, he is a political terrorist. Thus, the inherent maliciousness in terrorist actions taken consciously in the terrorist "struggle for political power" (Laqueur, 1984), singles out the actor as a political terrorist.

On the other hand, if the potential terrorist is pursuing his own salvation by answering a perceived divine message, then he is a religious terrorist. To a Shi'i religious terrorist, killing the infidel has God's blessing and is not considered to be either unethical or immoral, let alone criminal, as stated in Chapter Two and Chapter Six. Thus, the Shi'i religious terrorist is distinguished from a political terrorist by the unconsciousness of the maliciousness in the violence of his acts as he pursues his own salvation.

The affinity, consciousness, and motive-based distinctions
shown in Figure 1, below, help us visualize what is a political terrorist (section A) and what is a religious terrorist (section B).

**Figure 1. Section A.**
Terrorists' Differentiation by Affinity, Consciousness, and Motives

A PROSPECTIVE
POLITICAL TERRORIST
CONSCIOUS OF THE MALICIOUSNESS OF HIS ACT

\/
Psychological
Economic Social <---- MOTIVATED BY
Personal ( ) Environmental

\/
\/
\/
\/

Affinity To

Support, and or Sympathy of National and International Communities

**Figure 1. Section B.**
Terrorists' Differentiation by Affinity, Consciousness, and Motives

A PROSPECTIVE
RELIGIOUS TERRORIST
UNCONSCIOUS OF THE MALICIOUSNESS OF HIS ACT

\/
Psychological
Economic Social <---- MOTIVATED BY
Personal ( ) Environmental

\/
\/
\/
\/

AFFINITY TO

PERSONAL SALVATION
To further clarify these actions that are based on affinity, consciousness, and motive, the researcher proposed to compartmentalize actors according to the extent of self-imposed control on their violent actions, as is shown in Figure 2. The stronger one's affinity to political or religious motives, the weaker is his self-imposed control and the greater is his willingness to sacrifice in attaining his goals. The extent of the affinity motivating the individual terrorist thus determines the amount of self-control he is willing to exert upon his actions. Actions performed in zones II and IV of Figure 2 are identified as terrorism.

![Figure 2. Terrorists Differentiation By Operational Codes](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELF-IMPOSED CONTROL</th>
<th>LACK OF SELF-IMPOSED CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIGHTERS</strong> FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ZONE OF OPERATIONS I.</td>
<td><strong>RELIigious TERRORISTS ZONE OF OPERATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIGHTERS</strong> FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ZONE OF OPERATIONS II.</td>
<td><strong>RELigious TERRORISTS ZONE OF OPERATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREEDOM FIGHTERS ZONE OF OPERATIONS</strong> III.</td>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL ZONE OF POLITICAL TERRORISTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIGHTERS</strong> FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ZONE OF OPERATIONS</td>
<td><strong>RELigious TERRORISTS ZONE OF OPERATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distinctive characteristics of the three types of violent actors, identified as religious terrorists (located in zone II), freedom fighters (located in zones I & III), and political terrorists (zone IV), are listed in Table 7, below. The distinctive characteristics of these violent actors are attributable to differences in their motives, leadership, moral ethics, operational codes, recruitment process, personal gains, rationale, commitment, consciousness of the maliciousness in their acts, goals, and even in their age and economic stability.

This schema has an inherent problem. It is based on observations of one particular group's violent activities, the Lebanese Shi'a. It attempts to deduce generalizations about terrorists worldwide. The motivation of the individual Lebanese Shi'i to act violently is the basis of the conception of this schema. It is also the key to assess properly the type of Lebanese Shi'a terrorism. Until further research is conducted permitting a cross national observation and analysis of this phenomenon, this exploratory study assumes these generalizations to be valid.
Table 7
Affinity, Consciousness, and Motive Differences Among Terrorists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGIOUS TERRORIST in Zone II.</th>
<th>FIGHTER FOR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS in Zones I&amp;III.</th>
<th>POLITICAL TERRORIST in Zone IV.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOTIVATED BY</td>
<td>PERCEIVED RELIGIOUS DUTIES</td>
<td>RELIGIO/POLITICAL DUTIES/WRIGHTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALICIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTION</td>
<td>UNCONSCIOUS OF THE</td>
<td>CONSCIOUS OF THE POLITICAL RIGHTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFINITY TO</td>
<td>PERSONAL SALVATION</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS/POLITICAL OBJECTIVES/GOALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUIDED BY</td>
<td>RELIG. LEADER</td>
<td>RELIG/POL/LEADER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORAL/ETHICAL CODES</td>
<td>UNRESTRICTIVE OF OPERATIONS</td>
<td>RESTRICTIVE OF OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT</td>
<td>PERCEIVED GUIDELINES</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES</td>
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<td>RECRUITED AS</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS BELIEVER(AFTER)</td>
<td>MILITANT WITH RELIG/POL.CONVictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECRUITED BY</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS</td>
<td>RELIGIOUS/POLITICAL MOVEMENTS</td>
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<td>GAINS PRIMARILy</td>
<td>PERSONAL/SPIRITUAL</td>
<td>SPIRITUAL OR POLITICAL</td>
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<td>RATIONALITY IS</td>
<td>BASED ON FAITH</td>
<td>RATIONAL LOGICAL</td>
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<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>BLIND</td>
<td>LUCID</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE &amp; ECONOMIC</td>
<td>EFFECTIVE FACTORS</td>
<td>LIMITED EFFECT</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>INTANGIBLE &amp; TANGIBLE</td>
<td>TANGIBLE WELL DEFINED</td>
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The ZONE within which the Mode of all violent activities of a person and/or a group fall, is the ZONE of that group shown in Figure 2.
Search For An Approach

The relationship between religious resurgence, zealotry, and religious terrorism postulated here is yet to be researched. Addressing these relationships forces the researcher to draw upon his limited understanding of the motivations of the Lebanese Shi'a.

Several factors seemed to cause the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence. As shown in Chapter Four, the Lebanese Shi'a's low geographic mobility, coupled with Lebanon's low cultural pluralism, led to the sect's geo-cultural immobility. The Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility, in turn, increased the sect's dissatisfaction with its political parties and traditional political leadership. The Shi'a sought remedy through the only remaining alternative available to them: religion and religious leadership. This religious leadership, in turn, became the catalyst of the Shi'a's religious resurgence.

The geo-cultural immobility of certain religious minorities, such as the Amish, the Bahá'í, and even the Druze, is self-imposed as a means of preserving their cultural and religious integrity. This research distinguishes between those religions and sects that encourage self-imposed geo-cultural immobility and that of the Lebanese Shi'a. This was possible by distinguishing between what is called here open and closed religions or sects. In this research, an open
religion is defined as follows: Any religion open to new members and characterized by high emphasis on the conversion of nonbelievers by preaching its divine message, via missionaries. A closed religion, on the other hand, is one that has low emphasis on seeking outside recruits.

The idea of open and closed religions led to the following reformulations presented in Figure 3. Geo-cultural immobility imposed upon a relatively deprived minority of an open religion such as the Shi’a in Lebanon, as later shown in Chapter Five, coupled with dissatisfaction with political leaders, will create a vacuum refillable by a charismatic religious leadership. The presence of such a catalyst eventually leads to religious resurgence. Based upon this conceptual denouement from geo-cultural immobility to religious resurgence, the researcher speculates that the motivation for religious terrorism might be traced heuristically in Figure 3.

**Figure 3**

Relationship Between Geo-Cultural Immobility, Religious Resurgence, and Religious Terrorism
The following detailed presentation illustrates a series of three consecutive schema representing the three developmental phases of the changes that might lead a geo-culturally immobilized Shi‘i to terrorism. Phase I is depicted by Figure 4, below. The purpose of this schema is to present the features that are deemed responsible for the Shi‘a’s geo-cultural immobility in Lebanon.

Geo-cultural immobility is a low level of geographic mobility of a specific population in a nation with limited cultural pluralism. As postulated in Chapter Four, the geo-cultural immobility of the Shi‘a in Lebanon is the primary instigator of their sectarian political movements. Among the distinctive features of the Lebanese Shi‘a geo-cultural immobility are: inherent socio-demographic characteristics; a distrusted, feudal, and self-centric political leadership, coupled with national and governmental indifference; clandestine political parties and political machinery; and a Lebanese confessional environment covering all the above characteristics with a veil of legitimacy.
Phase II is depicted by Figure 5, below. The purpose of this schema is to present the features that are deemed responsible for Shi'a religious resurgence in Lebanon. As postulated in Chapter Five, geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon induced dissatisfaction with their political leadership, which in turn created a leadership vacuum. The opportune existence of a charismatic religious leader will displace this vacuum. This charismatic religious leader, once in control and through his religious movement, will trigger religious resurgence. Shi'a religious resurgence in Lebanon is depicted as the cumulative byproduct of their geo-cultural milieu; their dissatisfaction with their political leadership; the presence of a charismatic religious leader; and the susceptibility of the Shi'a masses.
Phase III, the final phase, is depicted by Figure 6, below. The purpose of this schema is to present the features that are deemed responsible for the Shi'a's religious terrorism in Lebanon. As postulated in Chapter Six, this terrorism is a cumulative byproduct of the Shi'a's religious beliefs; national and international crisis milieu; the presence of competing Islamic and Shi'a sectarian national and inter-national organizations; the recruitment of Shi'a zealots; and their susceptibility to terrorism.
An attempt to empirically assess the effect of geocultural immobility on the Lebanese Shi'a, their religious resurgence, and their acts of terrorism grew out of these conceptions. A panel of two groups of Shi'a Lebanese students was studied. One group of students was given scholarships to colleges in the United States, while the other group remained within the Lebanese Shi'a milieu, and served as a control group. A more detailed discussion is provided in Chapter Five and Chapter Seven. Also, a number of Lebanese Shi'a members of militant sectarian and religious organizations were surveyed in Beirut to identify their common characteristics and inclinations toward terrorism. A more detailed discussion is found in Chapter Six and Seven.
Purpose

The rationale for undertaking a case study of the Shi'a in Lebanon is threefold. First, as a hypothesis-generating case study, its objective is to formulate relevant hypotheses. Some of those will be tested here, but others must await subsequent studies. This may aid the theory-building process in this area that has not received sufficient study.

Second, an exploration of the trajectory of Lebanese Shi'a sectarian mobilization may have comparative relevance for other societies (Horowitz, 1985). A decline of secular, populist nationalism during the early 1970s and the rise of radical interpretations of religion, have been pointed out by Eric Davis (1987) and others, not only in the Middle East but in other Third World sectors. It is a goal of this study to better understand and even predict the path of similar religious movements.

Third, changes in the objectives and tactics of religious minorities are worthy of study. These changes, among others, have led to the sectarian conflict in Lebanon, and have been a key factor in the disintegration of what was one of the Third World's few stable parliamentary democracies.
Questions

1. What causes the Shi'a's religious resurgence? What is the milieu necessary for religious resurgence? What is the role of a charismatic religious leadership in religious resurgence? How does the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility relate to their religious resurgence? What is the extent of the Lebanese Shi'a religious resurgence?

2. What causes the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility? What is the role of the Shi'a's traditional leadership in their geo-cultural immobility? What is the role of the Lebanese political parties in the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility? What is the role of Lebanon's confessionalism in the Shi'a geo-cultural immobility? What are the features of the Lebanese Shi'a geo-cultural immobility?

3. What motivates a religious terrorist? What motives distinguish a religious terrorist from secular terrorists? What is the relationship between religious resurgence and religious terrorism? What is the link between religious resurgence and religious terrorism? What is the relationship between the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility and their acts of religious terrorism?

4. Does Ashura (described in Chapter Two) in Muharram increases the likelihood of a Lebanese Shi'i religious
terrorism? Does Ashura in Muharram increases the willingness of a Lebanese Shi'ī to commit suicidal terrorist acts?

Answers to the above questions should help clarify the phenomenon of terrorism undertaken by the Shi'īa sect in Lebanon. In this study, a number of assumptions have been developed about the relationships between the geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'īa and their acts of terrorism.

Assumptions

The following assumptions, derived from a perceived deficiency in the literature, as well as personal observations, interviews, and the primary data in this research, are useful for testing the following special hypotheses:

1. There is a distinction between Shi'ī political and religious terrorists and their activities. This distinction is based on the religious motivation of the Lebanese Shi'ī terrorist.

2. There is a distinction between Lebanese Shi'ī religious or political terrorists and Lebanese Shi'ī fighters for religious or political freedoms. This distinction is based on the extent of the Lebanese Shi'ī terrorists' self-imposed controls.

3. There is a distinction between open and closed religions. This distinction is based on religions attitudes and efforts
toward outside recruits.

Hypotheses

Two kinds of hypotheses, which stem from the logic of this research, were generated. One set of these hypotheses, the special hypotheses, will be tested in this study. Testing of the other set, the general hypotheses, is deferred due to the present lack of needed data.

General Hypotheses

I. General hypotheses pertaining to religious terrorism:

1. Incidents of religious terrorism requiring self-immolation are higher during the 40-day period following religious anniversaries that commemorate martyrdoms than during the rest of the year.

2. Incidents of religious terrorism are higher during the 40-day period following religious anniversaries that commemorate martyrdoms than during the rest of the year.

3. Support for religious terrorism is stronger among zealots than among religious believers.

4. Imprisonment of elements of a militant religious organization increases that organization's willingness to commit religious terrorism.

5. Willingness to commit religious terrorism is
stronger among youth of a deprived religious minority of an open religion than among its adults.

6. A religious terrorist is less conscious of the maliciousness of his act than a secular terrorist is.

II. General hypotheses pertaining to religious resurgence:

1. Religious resurgence is stronger among youth of a religious minority of an open religion than among its adults.

2. Religious resurgence is stronger among individuals of a religious minority of an open religion with fewer financial constraints.

3. Religious resurgence of a minority of an open religion is stronger under a religious leadership than under a secular leadership.

4. Religious resurgence of a minority of an open religion requires a charismatic religious leader and a weak political leadership.

III. General hypotheses pertaining to geo-cultural immobility:

1. A religious minority's perception of its geo-cultural immobility increases its dissatisfaction with its traditional political leadership.

2. A religious minority's perception of its geo-
cultural immobility increases its support to its charismatic religious leaders.

3. A religious minority's perception of its geo-cultural immobility increases its religious resurgence.

4. The geo-cultural immobility of a minority of an open religion is less tolerated by its youth than by its adults.

Special Hypotheses

The following special hypotheses are deduced for testing in this research.

I. Special hypotheses pertaining to religious terrorism:

1. Incidents of religious terrorism by Lebanese Shi'a zealots, requiring self-immolation, are higher during the 40-day period following Ashura than during the rest of the Muslim lunar year.

2. Incidents of religious terrorism by Lebanese Shi'a zealots are higher during the 40-day period following Ashura than during the rest of the Muslim lunar year.

3. Imprisonment of elements of a Lebanese militant Islamic religious organization increases the willingness of elements of that organization to commit religious terrorism.

4. Support for religious terrorism in Lebanon is
stronger among Shi'a zealots than among other Lebanese Shi'a.

5. Willingness to commit religious terrorism is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than among adults.

II. **Special hypotheses pertaining to religious resurgence:**

1. Religious resurgence is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than among adults.

2. Religious resurgence of the Lebanese Shi'a is stronger among the followers of militant Imams.

III. **Special hypotheses pertaining to geo-cultural immobility:**

1. Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more likely to become religious zealots than Lebanese Shi'a with higher geo-cultural mobility.

2. Lebanese Shi'a's perception of their geo-cultural immobility increases their religious resurgence.

Three distinctive tools, one primary data set, one secondary data set, and a quasi-experiment will be utilized in the testing of the above special hypotheses. Next, it is deemed necessary to review pertinent literature needed to attain our goal. Summary of this task is Chapter Two.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This review focuses on three subjects: religion, terrorism, and certain relationships between them. The following review of the literature shows, among other things, that attention has been focused mainly on political terrorism, with little or no emphasis accorded to religious terrorism. The literature on various aspects of religion and violence is broad and diverse, but much of it is not pertinent to the purpose of this study. This review merely scans many of these topics to ensure that applicable theories are not overlooked. It begins by considering the works on political violence and the causes of civil strife; political terrorism, a specific form of violence, is next explored; then the writings on religion, society, and revolution are examined to see if they help to explain the phenomenon of religious terrorism. Under the studies of religion, society, and revolution, this researcher examines works on liberation theology, religions of resistance and religious fundamentalism, the concepts of just wars and vengeance, the importance of kinship and commitment, as well as the specific characteristics of the Shi'a sect.
Political Violence

Acts of terror are so often associated with violence that the two terms frequently are used synonymously. In this research, a distinction is made. Terror is presented as an "extreme form of violence." More precisely, terror is violence which goes beyond the norms generally accepted as necessary violence.

Writings on revolution, political violence, and instability span much of the history of Western political thought. Aristotle, one of the first writers on the subject, felt that inequalities of wealth and power were at the root of political instability and violence. Machiavelli unhesitatingly counseled violence to his prince. Later, Marx and Lenin considered revolution inevitable because of the dialectic of materialism. To date, Leninists are still leading advocates of violent change. Contemporary writers continue to be interested in the subject of political violence and instability. They attempt to explore empirically the causes of political violence and to assess cross national and global patterns of violence.

One representative and particularly important study for this research is that of Ted Robert Gurr. In 1968, Gurr examined violence in 114 nations in an attempt to construct a comprehensive theoretical model. He concluded that collective violence is a byproduct of collective strain and
relative deprivation, which are caused by forms of economic or political discrimination practiced within nations. Gurr's article is based on the frustration-aggression hypothesis borrowed from Dullard's psychological theory. Gurr molds these hypotheses specifically to political violence, transforming individual psychological precepts into social concepts and settings. Gurr postulates that "the most generalized social-psychological precondition of civil strife is people's perception of a discrepancy between social value expectations and value capabilities," which he calls relative deprivation. In other words, relative deprivation is the discrepancy between "what people think they are justifiably entitled to and what they think they can obtain."

The preconditions of violence are Gurr's main concern as he studies the "instigating" and "mediating" variables that lead to civil strife. Instigating variables, according to Gurr, are the social-psychological preconditions that provide the stimulus for violence; mediating variables are the environmental and social conditions determining the outcome. Thus, Gurr's instigating variables refer primarily to the motivational, psychological variables, and his mediating variables take into account many aspects of social structures.

Gurr's article is particularly important to this research, for it introduces into the discussion such factors as the use of force and repression by government, the
perceived legitimacy of the regime, and the political culture of the society. Also, the model of relative deprivation seems applicable to today's under developed countries.

Political Terrorism

Chronologically, the literature on political terrorism can be traced to the Russian terrorists of the late 1870s, who were apparently the first to develop a "theory" of terrorism. Nicholas Morozov, in the party program of the "Narodnaya Volya" (The People's Will) in 1879, outlined the terrorist theory in this manner:

Terroristic activity, consisting in destroying the most harmful person in the government, in defending the party against espionage, in punishing the perpetrators of the notable cases of violence and arbitrariness on the part of the government and the administration, aims to undermine the prestige of the government's power, to demonstrate steadily the possibility of struggle against the government, to arouse in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and their confidence in the success of the cause, and finally, to give shape and direction to the forces fit and trained to carry on the fight...

From the 1870s until the 1960s, little or no further attention was given to terrorism. A period of hibernation in terrorist theory ended in the late 1960s, when Eugene
Walter (1969) revived scholarly interest in terrorism. His works treated terrorism from a political point of view, considering the political implications of terrorism and viewing it as a struggle for recognition.

The present status of theories of terrorism may be seen from a survey of concerned authors conducted by Alex Schmid in 1982. He asked what they thought about the state of development of theories in terrorism. Some of the more colorful responses were: "... confused, garbage, irrelevant" (Morris); "... confused and confusing, often intentionally" (Lador—Lederer); "... hopeless" (Merari); "... quantitative research based theory is in its infancy" (Gleason); "... things were coming along slowly" (Ochberg); "... we are still in a state of pre-theory, without cumulativeness and without historical evidence" (Crenshaw); "... the present state of theory is primarily in the sphere of propaganda rather than social science" (Young).

Since the purpose of this paper is not to impose a theory on a field in which none exists, the approach taken here will be to focus on the major themes in the study of terrorism. Most contemporary researchers appear to focus on the causes and origins of terrorism. They cluster around the study of two main themes. One theme may be seen in the study of what causes terrorism, through their study of the instigating and mediating factors leading to terrorism. The other theme may be seen in the study of why terrorism is selected,
through the study of terrorism's unique means of communicating and symbolizing the extent of the actor determination, commitment, and grievances. These factors are the psychological, socio-political, and economic variables instigating terrorism, and the means of communicating and symbolizing the actors' extent of commitment, and grievances.

A. Factors Instigating Terrorism

1) Psychological Factors. In the early 1970s, Ted Gurr (1970, p. 37) posited the political violence theory, which held that: "... misery, frustration, grievance and despair which leads to terrorism have political roots..." This political violence theory is based on Freudian psychoanalysis and is derived from a conceptual framework developed by a group of Yale psychologists in the 1930s. Its originator, Dullard, held:

...that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. More specifically, the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression.

Building on these psychological foundations, Gurr substituted Relative Deprivation (R.D.) for Dullard's Frustration Aggression as the explanation for violence. The operationalization of the concept of relative deprivation, however, has never been satisfactorily resolved. In 1978,
Lawrence C. Hamilton made an interesting attempt to synthesize a theory of terrorism based on Gurr's (R.D.) but admitted that:

...relative deprivation itself is as elusive of measurement as the psychological state of frustration or beliefs about the effectiveness and justification of political violence.

Many subsequent theories regarded the terrorist as a peculiar personality with obvious identifiable character traits. In this scheme, those who engage in violence (criminal or other) are necessarily "abnormal," deviating from the rules and norms of society. Thus, terrorism came to be viewed as a byproduct of the terrorist personality. In 1982, Berger founded his psychological theory on this view. He states:

...terrorists tend to resemble each other, regardless of their cause. Most of them are individuals for whom terrorism provides profound personal satisfaction, a sense of fulfillment through total dedication, to the point of self-sacrifice, and a sense of power through inflicting pain and death upon other human beings.

This theory, applied in the preventive field, has lead to the construction of a behavioral profile of the hijacker. In 1986, Charles A. Russell constructed such a profile (Appendix B) based on information on some 350 internationally known terrorists from 18 different infamous groups involving
11 diverse nationalities. He stated: "One can draw a general composite into which fit most of those terrorists from the 18 urban guerrilla groups examined."

Although many have criticized the idea of a "terrorist personality," there is value in a psychological approach to the problem of terrorism. As Brian Crozier (1960, p. 172) put it:

... Men do not necessarily rebel merely because their conditions of life are intolerable: it takes a rebel to rebel. Look at it another way: some men or groups of men will tolerate more than others. If one describes conditions of life as intolerable, one begs the question: To whom?

2) Socio-Political Factors. Many contemporary scholars, however, do not agree with the psychological-based theories of terrorism. They contend that the causes of terrorism are to be traced to social/political factors. This view is stated by Matelet, who wrote: "Society contains in itself all the crimes which will be committed; in a sense, it's her who commits them."

Several authors have also concentrated on the social/political causes of terrorism. Harry Eckstein (1972, p.15), for example, has distinguished between social/political factors that are: Precipitants (the almost always unique and ephemeral phenomena which starts the outbreak of violence) and Preconditions (those circumstances which make it possible
for the precipitants to bring about violence).

The effort to identify and define all the aspects leading to terrorism has forced many authors to place a strong emphasis on international terrorism. One such work is that of Brian M. Jenkins (1977, p. 128), who states:

Transnational terrorism was born of the marriage between the urban guerrillas and the student activists, where the emigrant guerrilla fed on the latent violence of the student movement, exploited the students' causes and contacts, and learned new tactics.

Jenkins examined the causes of terrorism in several international settings. He looked at the failure of Latin American rural guerrilla movements, which pushed the rebels into the cities, the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War in 1967, which caused the Palestinians to abandon hope for a conventional military solution to their problem, and the reactions of students in Europe, Japan, and the United States, which led to the formation of small extremist groups dedicated to armed struggle. Jenkins also points out that while much terrorism is involved in some national struggles, in others, such as Indonesia, terrorism has hardly played a role.

A rationale for the selection of terrorism as a tactic was offered by Martha Crenshaw (1978, pp. 133-35) in her account of the Algerian independence struggle. She noted that terrorism was used by the FLN, an Algerian resistance
organization, mainly because it was the only alternative available to this group. She made her case as follows:

In the case of the FLN, the dominant reason for choosing terrorism appears to have been its expected utility in achieving the insurgents "goals" despite the unquestionable influences of psychological, social, and organizational factors. . . Struggles for freedom elsewhere, particularly in neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco, served as inspiration to the FLN and also as a challenge . . . Terrorism, a low cost and easily implemented strategy, was the only feasible alternative for the new nationalist organization because the FLN lacked both the necessary material resources (money, arms, soldiers) and active popular support. When a committed core of leaders agreed that violence was the only solution to the impasse in which they found themselves, their inability to push the mass of the Algerian people into open opposition or to mount large-scale guerrilla warfare encouraged them to adopt a strategy of terrorism.

Compare this statement with that of Trotsky (1911, p. 8), who wrote:

. . . Terrorism should be studied in relationship to all other forms of social/political violence and non-violent insurgency. It is the intensities and the relationships of one to the other where the theories can be best tested.
A similar view was stated more recently by Schmid (1982, p. 241) as follows:

... most frequently terrorist groups are splinter groups from broader political movements, and it might be that the life-cycle of these movements can tell us something about the decision to opt for terrorist techniques.

3) Economic Factors. A newer perspective on political terrorism has been proposed by McFarland (1986). He suggests that political terrorism be viewed as a sort of business. According to this approach, coercive terroristic acts are employed by organizations not only to attain political goals, but also to collect taxes from people or groups to provide it with needed resources.

The economic assessment of terrorism also points up that acts of terrorism have an economic impact. An example may be seen in the devastating effects terrorism had on tourism in Europe during the 1985 and 1986 seasons, which in turn led to American and European summity looking for solutions to preempt or combat terrorism.

B. Terrorism as Means to Attract Attention

1) Communication Means. An approach for understanding political terrorism comes from an analysis of communication theory as propounded by Brainerd. In his view:

Terrorism has properties that define it as an act or form of socio-emotional communications in which the act,
the victim, or the effect has inherent meanings to the terrorists.

Compatible with Brainerd's view, Jenkins (1975, p.15) uses the metaphor theater in speaking of terrorism: "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead." Martha Crenshaw (1981, p. 386.) also expressed the same idea when she wrote: "The most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention. . ." "... You can't be a revolutionary today without a television set--it's as important as a gun," says Jerry Rubin (1986, p. 101). Similarly, Paul Wilkinson (1977, p. 110) contends that terrorism can best be understood as: . . . unconventional psychological warfare aimed ultimately at bringing about a climate of fear and collapse in an incumbent regime or target group.

2) Symbolic Means. The symbolic concept of terrorism provides two crucial distinctions between terrorism and revolution, and between terrorism and other forms of violence. If, according to Thornton (1943, pp.85-87), the objective is the acquisition of useful objects (money, weapons, etc.) or the denial of such resources to the enemy, this action is robbery, assassination, sabotage, etc.; "if, on the other hand, the objective is symbolic expression, we are dealing with terror."

Thornton (1943, p. 114) asserts that: "The relatively high efficiency of terrorism derives from its symbolic
nature." Symbolic violence can be used not only to
propagandize the overthrow of a system, but also as a means
of interest articulation to effect the system's output.
Terrorism permits the frustrated communicator to maximize
significance and minimize getting caught.

This review of the literature illustrates that most
approaches to, or theories of, terrorism pertain mainly to
political terrorism. They do not address the phenomenon of
terrorism motivated by religious beliefs. The actions of
religious terrorists have most often been ignored or
neglected in explaining the occurrence of such incidents of
terrorism. One explanation for this oversight may be that it
is easier and less critical of the status quo to treat the
terrorist groups as pathological deviations from the "norm,"
than it is to address it as behavior that grows out of, or
is caused by, religious beliefs.

Religion, Society, and Revolution

In some respects, it is not surprising that modern
social science and students of modern history have paid
little attention to the theme of religion and revolution.
This is true, particularly in view of the tendency for many
social scientists and historians to see religious beliefs
performing either an integrative or a neutral function in
societies, and groups and among people. Interest in the
impact of new and traditionalistic religious movements on society has grown since the 1970s much more than interest in the historic millenarian movements, the most likely sources of religious terrorists and revolutionaries.

Despite the general lack of interest by political scholars, the relationship between religion and violence has attracted the attention of some theorists. The review of this literature first addresses general studies on religion and society. Next, writings on revolutionary theologians and the religion of resistance are explained. Then the concepts of the just war as a part of the more militant religions are discussed, and the beliefs of the Twelvers sect of Shi'a Islam are considered. The effects of sect, kinship, and commitment on individual behavior are then reviewed. The religious phenomenon of fundamentalism also is examined for its relevancy to this study. Finally, the idea of vengeance as another violent phenomenon is tackled.

Marx, for example, described religion as the opiate of the masses, deadening their awareness of earthly exploitation by offering the misty hope of salvation in the world to come. Weber (1961) and Durkheim (1973) both considered religious sentiment as being bound up with beliefs and practices pertaining to revealed bodies of doctrine, and thus centering upon the ideas of a transcendent, supernatural realm. Accordingly, religious sentiment was seen by these writers as a phenomenon of an earlier, more superstitious age that could
not realistically play a part in the continuing construction of modern societies.

Weber (1921) compared northern Europe's development with southern Europe. One of his conclusions is that southern Europe's development lagged behind that of the north, attributable perhaps to the resistance to change imposed by Catholicism. Another conclusion is that northern Europe, because of Protestantism and the Protestant ethics, developed capitalism. Thus, in Weber's opinion, religious beliefs may promote or hinder economic growth.

Durkheim sought to go beyond the old distinction between faith and reason, by uniting them into the concept of civil religions. He saw religion performing significant roles of helping to integrate society by providing a means for setting and identifying concepts of morality. "Man had become a God for man..." said Durkheim. If nothing else, Durkheim's works have lead to those of the "Romantic" theorists. Included within this "Romantic" grouping would be such theoreticians as those of the Ecole sociologique, the functionalist school of social anthropology, and the Chicago school of history of religions.

These "Romantic" theorists, according to Bruce Lincoln (1986), have sought to show the multitude of ways in which religious ideas, institutions, and behaviors (including myth as a subset of ideas and ritual as a subset of behaviors), serve the maintenance of society in a positive fashion. They
have pointed to the ways in which religion affects social integration; influences institutions and patterns of organization; provides a coherent set of ethical values and behavioral norms; furnishes a sense of meaning, purpose, and worth; and sustains hope in the face of suffering and death. Such members of the "Romantic" theorists school as Wilhelm Muhlmann, Peter Worsley, Halevy, Hobsbawm, Norman Cohn, Bernard Topfer, Gerschon Scholem, and Kenelm Burridge also stimulated the reexamination of many episodes within the history of western Europe, including such messianic, millenarian, and heretical movements as the Italian Lazzarettisti, the medieval Taborites and Pastoureaux, and the activities of Sabbatai Sevi.

Nevertheless, most contemporary theologians rule out violence as an appropriate method to effect social change. Such well-known theologians and religious leaders as Gandi and Martin Luther King, Jr., fall within this group, although they advocated non-violent approaches for bringing about social equity.

Still another proponent of religion to bring about social justice is James H. Cone, who emphasizes (1984, p. 193) the need on the global scale for "... a vision of freedom that includes the whole of the inhabitants of the earth." According to Cone, this global vision will analyze the causes of hunger, poverty, monopoly, exploitation, and other social ills. The intellectuals must not allow them
selves to be imprisoned by ideas promoted by their predecessors. Rather, they must actively pursue new venues of approach and knowledge.

Many Middle Eastern theologians’ attitudes and behaviors are parallel to those theologians in the West. Thus, they mainly do not support violence. Like their Western counterparts, they have taken upon themselves the task of guiding their followers. Such a view may be seen in Pottenger’s (1984, p. 91) observation that:

Theologians find that the most difficult form of violence to incorporate is terror, because the terrorist must regard victims as objects. And nothing could be more antithetical to the Christian injunction, than to demonstrate love for one’s enemies.

A somewhat similar call for religious involvement in change comes from a Middle Eastern religious scholar, Ali Shariati. He chastises the system of worship and of education that creates ivory towers for theologians and intellectuals, isolating them from the people. He attacks both the nonconstructive passivity of some clergymen and the non-involvement of the intellectual class. He wrote (1980, p.5):

... The most important shortcoming plaguing the Third World is the lack of communication between the educated class and the populace. This lamentable gap between the learned clergyman, the learned man, and the
layman can be narrowed by interaction.

The call for mass involvement by theologians in Iran, in Shariati's view, is one way to close the communication gap. Shariati and Cone both have called for cooperation between the intellectuals and laymen under the blessing of the clergymen. This echoes Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., who attempted to promote justice and to eradicate class distinction in the United States by exhorting the black Ph.Ds to work with the "no Ds" in that struggle.

Generally, passive resistance is advocated today in "liberation theology." According to Pottenger (1984, p. 35):

Liberation theology is not a homogeneous body of doctrines but rather a broad philosophical movement comprised of diverse arguments on theological and social issues. . . .

Liberation theology recognizes the reality of the pronounced social injustice in most developing Third World nations. Liberation theologians provide different political prescriptions. In Latin America, according to Pottenger, liberation theology combines the ethical implications of Christianity with Marxist social analysis to establish and justify various approaches to political action. Western liberation theology primarily grows out of Christianity and thus has limited impact throughout much of the world, since Christianity is practiced by relatively few in the Third World nations outside Latin America.
Again, most theologians rule out violence as an appropriate method to effect social change. A few, however, notably Gustavo Gutierrez (1973), Juan Luis Segundo (1976), Hugo Assmann (1976), Jose Miguez Bonino (1975), Jose Comblin (1979) in Latin America and Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah in Lebanon, present differing arguments on the legitimacy of using violence to bring about changes in society. The members of this group of theologians who endorse violence tend to be members of the "marginal intelligentsia," to use Jean Baechler's phrase. Out of the actions of this "marginal intelligentsia" group has emerged a phenomenon called the "religion of resistance" by Bruce Lincoln, the focus of the following.

A. Religion of Resistance

Activists who practice the philosophy of religion of resistance refuse to accept the status quo (Appendix A) and call for action to bring about social change. These actions constitute a threat to the interests of the dominant groups in society—a threat regularly answered by suppression which, in turn, may lead to reactive acts of terror.

Some Western scholars and journalists accuse contemporary Shi'a liberation theologians of being involved in the active turmoil in the Middle East and Near East and in worldwide terrorist activities. Imam Khoumayni, initiator of the 1979 Iranian religious revolution, and Mousa el-Sadr,
founder of the Shi‘a militant organization El-Amal in Lebanon, are often named by Westerners as activists advocating the use of violence to bring about change. Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah is also credited with instigating and encouraging resistance to authority in the pursuit of equality, via his public addresses to Muslims in Lebanon and abroad.

Contemporary thought about Imam Koumayni, as expressed by Hrair Dekmejian (1985, p. 133), holds that Imam Koumayni has introduced the Shi‘a to the era of mass politics, and his political future depends largely on the degree to which the demands and desires of the masses are met. In part, this may be the reason the Imam has opened new fronts (such as the continuing conflict with Iraq) to keep the masses occupied.

The thoughts of Imam Koumayni, Imam Mousa el-Sadr, and others, in the view of Nikki R. Keddie (1986, p. 28), have led to the resurgence of Islam in Muslim politics. This resurgence is rooted in a broader religious revivalism that has encompassed personal and political life. It has been accompanied by more religious programming in the media, proliferation of religious literature, and the growth of new Islamic associations and movements. One such movement, the Shi‘a in Lebanon, according to Augustus R. Norton (1984, p. 174), is devoted not only to its traditional task of converting non-Muslims, but also to the "Islamization" of Muslim populations, that is, to enforce traditional Islamic
practices on all Muslims.

B. Concepts of Just War

Islam justifies violence in one specific case, which is the just war. Islam seeks to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth, and there is no concept of separation of religion and politics as there is in Western thought. Muslims are not to refrain from politics, since they are to submit all aspects of their lives to Allah's will. Jihad or holy war is considered just if fought for justifiable reasons in agreement with the tenets or sanctions of Islam and the mores of society (Farah, 1970).

The theological meaning of the term "jihad" is exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world (Farah, 1970). Jihad, in the broadest sense, does not necessarily mean war or fighting, since exertion in Allah's path may be achieved by peaceful means as well as through violence. The individual's reward for participating in jihad is the achievement of salvation, since the jihad is Allah's direct way to paradise.

Islamic jurists have distinguished four different ways in which the believer may fulfill his jihad obligation: by his heart, his tongue, his hands, and by the sword. Thus, the jihad may be regarded as Islam's instrument for carrying out its ultimate objective of turning all people into Muslims.
In the Shi'a legal theory, not only would the failure of a non-Muslim to believe in Allah justify waging a jihad, but also, the failure of a Muslim to obey the Imam of his time makes him liable for punishment by a jihad. One very important point to note is that the Imam is believed to be an infallible ruler and is the only one who can judge when the jihad should be declared and under what circumstances it would be advisable.

Just war also restricts revolutionary activities, especially terror. The immediate aim of a just war is punishment, and punishment requires rules and limits. Moreover, the ultimate object of a just war is to reconcile the parties so that peace may be restored. The doctrine presupposes that the offending party may have a right to exist after punishment and repentance, that there are universal standards for gauging actions and infractions, and finally, that there are differences between what humans can and should do to each other and what God will do.

Christian liberation theologians have had a difficult time justifying violence to bring about social change. The presuppositions of traditional Christian theology in effect suppress what liberation theologians take to be the Bible's revolutionary message, "the exhortation to side with the poor and oppressed" and to reconstruct the world accordingly. Furthermore, many Orthodox Christians feel that as Christians they must either support the status quo or refrain from
politics altogether (Pottenger, 1984).

The concept of just war, nonetheless, has influenced the development of international law. A code legitimizing the violence of war has evolved over the centuries. The international law of war provides that all combatants are entitled to particular rights and are obliged to accept specific limitations in return. There also are distinctions between the statuses of combatants, noncombatants, and neutrals. The contemporary version of the just war doctrine is that only self-defense justifies coercion, a doctrine that is incorporated in the United Nations Charter. When the view that only self-defense justifies coercion is applied to the question of terrorism, those subjected to "colonial" or "racist" governments rationalize that, by definition, they are "victims of aggression" and as a result are not only justified in taking up arms, but also free from the normal moral restraints pertaining to soldiers concerning neutral persons and territories (Dugard, 1974). In this sense, the universal concept of just war is sometimes used to justify terrorism.

C. The Twelvers Sect in Shi'ism

Since this study is a case study of the Shi'a Twelvers sect, it is important that we review the religious views of this sect. The origins of the Shi'a sect is traced in Chapter Three. The Shi'a's practice of Islam is
characterized by their special emphasis upon the role of Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. The Shi'a contend that Ali, attributable to his kinship to the prophet, is the true successor of the Prophet Mohammed and the rightful leader of all Muslims.

The importance of kinship in the Shi'i faith is further illuminated in their beliefs that Ali's twelve descendants (known as Imams) have inherited his position and spiritual power and that "... the twelfth and last Imam is considered to have disappeared in the ninth century but is to return on judgment day" (Bill, 1984). This missing Imam, known as Imam Mehdy, in the meantime, is personified by Mujtahids, "learned clerics who have the capacity to interpret events until the return of the hidden Imam" (Bill, 1984).

Over time, the Shi'a broke into separate sects. Our focus will be on one of these, the Twelvers sect, due to its overwhelming majority in Lebanon. Much of the information historically provided on the Twelvers sect is based on materials written by members of opposing Islamic sects, which is suspect of being marred by prejudice. The Shi'a sect began as a coalition of followers of Imam Ali Ben Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad and a prominent political personality of Islam. Imam Ali was described by Johann Jakob Reiske, the great 18th-century German Arabist, as a paragon of virtue. He compared him to the philosopher king Marcus Aurelius.
One of the early writers on the Twelvers sect was Rocoldo Da Monte Croce, a crusader who, during his stay in Iraq, met and talked to members of the Twelvers Shi'a in areas where they constituted a significant portion of the population. He recorded the belief of local Twelvers that Ali's rights had been usurped, although he mistakenly identified Mohammad as the usurper, and he stated "...the Twelvers are less evil (minus mali) than the majority Sunnis."

Among the first Western scholars to note the differences between the two major groups of the Twelvers theologians, the Akhbaris and the Mujtahids, was Arthur Comte De Gobineau in 1900. He described the differences between the two groups in social, not merely religious, terms, and he also explained the nature of the Shi'a religion. In his *Three Years in Asia*, he portrays Shi'ism as being utterly alien to the spirit of original Islam. He singles out two elements in support of his view: first, the veneration of the Imams; second, the assumption by the Persian mullahs of the role of priests, with the attendant prerogative of interpreting the Quran to the uninitiated. In Gobineau's view, the entire corpus of Shi'a tradition is designed to buttress the mullahs' position. In another publication, *Religions and Philosophies in Central Asia*, he depicts Shi'ism as a manifestation of Persian protest against the Arab occupation of their land. Equating Shi'ism with Persian nationalism was
in vogue among 19th-century scholars.

Such sweeping generalizations about Shi'ism could also be found in the writings of Alfred Von Kremer, who, around 1868, spoke of the "fanatic excesses of the Shi'is and their wild intolerance toward other Muhammadans-Islam." In stark contrast, the French orientalist Carra de Vaux declared some 30 years later that Shi'ism represents "free, liberal thought struggling against the inflexible narrow-mindedness of Sunni orthodoxy." Perhaps such statements reveal more about their authors' preconceptions than about Shi'ism.

Information about Shi'ism perhaps can best be obtained by perusing original Shi'i texts. But this approach was not used until the late 1960s. Several texts since then have been published, particularly in Najaf (Iraq) and in Iran, focusing greater attention on the tenets of Shi'ism. Despite this new emphasis on Shi'ism, writings on the Twelvers sect has lagged behind that of other branches of Islam. The first international colloquium devoted entirely to Twelver Shi'ism did not take place until 1968 in Strasbourg, Switzerland. Only a few of the participants at this conference were specialists on Shi'a Islam. The Strasbourg conference proved to be an isolated event. Although significant progress was made in the following decade, Shi'ism did not become a subject of central importance in Islamic studies until recently. One of the most-studied features of the Twelvers Shi'a's is their folk-Islamic popular aspect preserved in the
Hussein-Kerbelá-Ashura-Ta'ziyeh complex.

D. Shi'a Ashura in the month of Muharram

Ashura is a 10-day period of mourning commemorating the massacre of Imam Hussein, the son of Imam Ali, who was martyred at Karbala (Iraq) in 680 A.D. Narration of this incident is provided in Chapter Three. Ashura begins on the 10th day of the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic lunar year. The Lebanese Twelvers Shi'a have kept this popular, folk-Islamic aspect of this tradition alive in their regions. The preservation of Karbala's agonizing memories, vivid in Ashura traditional passion plays, in turn, has kept the Lebanese Shi'a and the Shi'a world-wide united.

The Arab historian Ibn Kathir (774) makes one of the earliest descriptions of the mournful days of Muharram, Ashura. A translation of one of these references in Shi'ism And Ashura In South Lebanon (Massaoui, 1964, pp. 61-65), says:

On the tenth of Muharram of this year (A.H. 352) ... the markets are ordered closed. Men and women, wearing coarse woolen hair cloth, go into the markets with their faces uncovered/unveiled and their hair disheveled, beating their faces and wailing over Hussein ibn Ali ibn Talib. ... In front of the mourning processions, camels are seen draped in green cloth upon which women and children are riding. The heads and faces of the women and
children are bruised and wounded as though by arrows and they appear to be weeping and wailing. Then a company of armed men passed shooting their guns into the air (this observation demonstrates the mixture of drama and life). After them, came coffins followed by the governor of the city and other notables of the government. All entered the great mosque of Shiraz. There a mulla mounted the pulpit and recited eulogies, and all wept.

This tradition has kept alive the memory of Imam Hussein, whose "character attained a mythical entity in the minds of" the Shi'a followers. Hussein became a "sacred hero who, after his tragic death, reached the frontier of eternal values." The language of "the poet his mourners made him immortal," and the role of the myth began to manifest itself "from within the ritual of mourning which itself became a kind of worship." Odes eulogizing the Imam are recited annually during the mourning ceremonies of Ashura, inducing weeping among mourners. One of these odes, in Mazzouli (1964, p. 73), state:

The blood of the friends of the Prophet Muhammad is flowing: Our tears pain plentifully. Let there be infinite curses and blame upon his enemies in the past and the future. Distress yourselves about what befell the children. Now listen to the story of the martyrdom and how they deprived Hussein of water; and when he was fighting on the plain of Kerbela how they behaved meanly
and unjustly. They cut off the head of a descendant of the Prophet in that fiery land. But the Imam lives, his foot in the stirrup and mounted upon his horse. He will not be killed. Then the sinners and the merciless attacked the Prophet's Family. Fly to salvation while there is still the chance, hurry! Shemr the bastard of Ibn al-Baghi struck his sword on the ground while laughing. This is a kindness to the Prophet and is pleasing. Then the soldiers of the Banu Hind moved out with the heads of the descendants of the Chosen Prophet fixed to the points of their lances. The angels in heaven bewailed their deaths and have wept so copiously that their tears flowed like rivers... 

Lebanese Shi'a, in seeking spiritual identification with the plight of their Imam Hussein, participated with genuine feeling in the mourning ceremonies and gatherings in Muharram. Ashura thus became the impetus for the appearance of theatrical roles, enacted annually in Shi'a strongholds such as the city of Nabatiyah in south Lebanon.

Ashura odes and the reenactment of Karbala incidence are implicated here in inducing and encouraging young Lebanese Shi'a to martyrdom and self-immolation via religious terrorism. The intensity of this commitment within this sect has been a major feature in the Iranian revolution and the Lebanese Shi'a terrorism commanding world-wide attention.
Monotheistic religions historically have been founded on faith and commitment. Martyrdom has always been the ultimate symbol of devotion, measuring the strength of a person's faith and commitment. The study of commitment is deemed essential because martyrdom may be called for by religious terrorism.

Individual commitments, in Roger Trigg's (1973) view, depend on two distinct elements. They presuppose certain beliefs and also involve a personal dedication to the actions implied by the beliefs. Accordingly, the extent of one's devotion to a cause suggests the strength of his beliefs and determines the nature of his commitment. Thus, the phenomenon of commitment might provide this researcher with a means of understanding the religious fervor suspected in religious terrorism.

Arthur Koestler (1967, p. 61) points out how:

The total identification of the individual with the group makes him unselfish in more than one sense... It makes him perform comradely, altruistic, heroic actions, to the point of self-sacrifice and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of the group.

In other words, the self-assertive behavior of the group is based on the self-transcending behavior of its members. This often entails sacrifice of personal interests, and even
life, in the interest of the group. To put it simply, the
egotism of the group feeds on the altruism of its members.

A study of the phenomenon of religious commitment is
hampered because: (1) Most research clusters around the
study of organizational commitment (see definitions and Table
8 below), with little or no emphasis on religious commitment.
Despite this handicap, this literature is deemed relevant
because the Shi'a sectarian movement in Lebanon is embodied
in two organizations, the Amal and the Hizbollah. (2) There
is no consensus on what constitutes commitment, shown by the
following four somewhat divergent, definitions of
organizational commitment from the literature:
1. An attitude or an orientation toward the organization
which links or attaches the identity of the person to the
organization (Sheldon, 1971).
2. The process by which the goals of the organization and
those of the individual become increasingly integrated or
congruent (Hall and Nugaim, 1968).
3. A partisan attachment to the goals of an organization, to
one's own goals and values... (Buchman, 1974).
4. A state of being in which an individual becomes bound by
his actions and through these actions to beliefs that sustain
the activities and his own involvement (Salancik, 1977).

The following typology of organizational commitments
(Table 8) was made to represent the various views of the
major writers. As can be seen, Etzioni appears to be the
only writer to attach the moral aspect to commitment.

A few writers have addressed the issue of religious commitment. Wittgenstein (1958) is one who makes a distinction between organizational commitment and religious commitment. He rejects the role of reason in religious beliefs and religious commitment. Religious commitments are based on faith. He thus rejects completely the idea of a commitment being right or wrong or justified or unjustified by reason, and any reference to the truth or falsity of religious commitment is seen as misplaced as the reference to the truth or falsity of religious belief. He indicates that different religions constitute different forms of societies with different conceptual systems. Since each religion provides its own commitment criteria, it is impossible to stand outside all and adjudicate between them.

Tillich (1957), like Wittgenstein, agrees that it is logically impossible for someone to criticize another man's commitment when he does not share it. If he does share it, then, of course, there would be no point. Tillich (1957, p.59) says:

If a Protestant observes a Catholic praying before a picture of the Virgin, he remains... unable to state whether the faith of the observed is valid or not. If he is a Catholic, he may join in the same act of faith. There is no criterion by which faith can be judged...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>TYPOLOGY</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETZIONI (1961)</td>
<td>MORAL INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>A positive and high-intensity orientation based on internalization of organizational goals and values and identification with authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CALCULATIVE INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>A lower-intensity relationship based on a rational exchange of benefits and rewards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALIENATIVE INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>A negative orientation that is found in exploitative relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANTER (1968)</td>
<td>CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT</td>
<td>Dedication to organization's survival brought on by previous personal investments and sacrifices such that leaving would be costly or impossible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COHESION COMMITMENT</td>
<td>Attachment to social relationships in an organization brought on by such techniques as public renunciation of previous social ties or engaging in ceremonies that enhance group cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTROL COMMITMENT</td>
<td>Attachment to organizational norms that shape behavior in desired directions resulting from requiring member to disavow previous norms publicly and reformulate their self-conception in terms of organizational values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALANCIK (1977) &amp; STAW (1977)</td>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR APPROACH</td>
<td>Viewed in terms of a strong identification with and involvement in the organization brought on by a variety of factors (attitudinal commitment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH</td>
<td>Viewed in terms of sunk costs invested in the organization that bind the individual irrevocably to the organization (behavioral commitment).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Despite the above philosophical argument that one cannot judge the validity of others' faith, much of the religious conflict grows out of the religious groups' attempts to superimpose their own values on others.

F. Fundamentalism

Another contemporary world-wide religious phenomenon, to which political violence is sometimes attributed, is the rise of religious fundamentalism. The tendency to seek authority in Scriptures based on their infallibility constitutes one of the most significant features of the fundamentalist stance. According to Lionel Caplan (1987, p. 7):

... fundamentalism has come to identify conservative evangelicals inside the mainline Protestant denominations, as well as the charismatic sects which comprise what is now the fastest-moving current within the Christian world. Fundamentalism denotes an aggressive and confident religious movement against modernism. It has been identified by Eric Sharpe (1985) as an emblem of reaction and rejection to progressive-modernist movements.

Fundamentalism's interpretation of the Scriptures, particularly the passages on creation, causes it to be anti-science in orientation. Many writers, such as Dessouki (1981), Nagata (1979), Vatikiotis (1982), Firth (1981), and Zubaida (1987) project the Western Christian perspective upon Islam, depicting an Islamic fundamentalism ravaging the Third
Yet, since its inception, Islam has anticipated and complemented science. Islamic canons are continuously reinterpreted by contemporary Imams/Mullahs and scholars to illuminate their validity in an evolving milieu. "Islam cannot be understood as a fixed repository of commands and prohibitions but... the end result of a long process of jurisprudence" (Humphreys 1979, p. 164). There may be resistance to the changes caused by modernization in certain Islamic societies, and there may be attempts to superimpose Islamic values on others, but this cannot be interpreted as a return to the text as found in Christian fundamentalism.

G. Sect and Kinship

Islam, like Christianity, is divided into many sects, and to understand the various beliefs, thoughts, and behaviors of the factions fighting in Lebanon, it is necessary to recognize the significance of sectarian and kinship groups. Sectarian institutions in the Middle East have had important relationships with kinship groups. They regulate marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody, and have great influence over the socialization process which gives these groups access to, and control over, the family (Dekmejian 1985).

Kinship, according to Halpern (1963, p.7), had a stronger bond of loyalty than Islam and the state in the early Arab empires. "Familialism is so embedded in the minds
of people of the region that all other social groupings, including the state, have been viewed as extensions of the family" (Patai, 1967, p. 351). The strength of kinship in the Arab Middle Eastern countries, according to Kalaf (1968), may be seen not only in the social relationships which it directly organizes, but also in the influences over other relationships such as patron-client and employer-employee. Kalaf (1968) observes that sectarian organizations have been tremendously strengthened by their association with kinship. Accordingly, the bonds of kinship allow sectarian relationships to bridge class lines to establish economic and political relationships.

Kinship and sect have been mutually reinforcing for other reasons, as well; for instance, both presume membership by common descent (Khuri, 1972). Khuri observes that members of families are usually of the same religion and that a gathering of relatives is usually simultaneously a sect gathering. Thus, kinship can be used to mobilize people for sectarian organizations and a sectarian perspective. Kinship groups in Lebanon react as a unit to aggression against one of their members, according to Chamie (1976). In such conflict, an individual fights on the side of his kin (rich and poor), defending and/or revenging family honor against another kinship unit.
H. Vengeance

Another type of violent act, which may be relevant to this research, grows out of the desire for vengeance. Vengeance may be motivated by individual desires for revenge, animosities arising out of familial differences, and religious/sectarian differences. Religions are full of stories about vengeance. The book of Psalms (58: pp. 10-11), for instance, says:

The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth
the vengeance: he shall wash his feet
in the blood of the wicked.

So that a man shall say, Verily there
is a reward for the righteous.

Erich Fromm (1973, p. 273) defines vengeance as a spontaneous form of aggression, an explosion of destructive impulses that begins by special circumstances, usually those perceived as threatening survival. Vengeance, Fromm says, is incredibly destructive because of its "innate" intensity and its spontaneous reaction to perceived, unjustified suffering inflicted on the individual or group. He argues that this form of aggression is different from "defensive aggression" (that is, aggression that seeks to preserve life) for two reasons:

1) The vengeful, aggressive act is performed in cold blood, after the damage has been done, and therefore is not a defense against immediate danger.
2) It is of great intensity, often crude, vicious, and insatiable.

Ernest Van den Haag (1975) provides us with a somewhat different definition of vengeance. According to him, vengeance is an individual or collective reaction aimed at the satisfaction of the desire for retaliation by the injured party. Here, its private character is recognized. The initiator of the action is the individual or group that has been wronged, not an external source of authority commissioned to administer justice by inflicting punishment. The vengeful act is begun arbitrarily, by whichever party feels offended, and does not seem to be defined by pre-existing rules in proportion to the immediate "offense."

Vengeance has the power of an instinct, according to Marongiu and Newman (1987). The "lust for vengeance" and the "thirst for revenge" are so powerful that they rival all other human needs. Accordingly, people will sacrifice their own lives, undergo tremendous hardship, and devote their entire lives to see that vengeance is done. They have found that it is carried out by many different types of people, together and alone, and in many different settings throughout the world. The vehement and horrifying nature of the vengeful act is enough to convince them of its instinct-like power.

Even contemporary Americans hold favorable attitudes toward vengeance. The Gallup Organization, in an effort to
test the American value and perception of vengeance, interviewed by phone 1,009 adults on February 28 and March 1, 1985, and asked them this question: Do you feel that taking the law into one's own hands, often called vigilantism, is justified by circumstances? They obtained the following results:

- Always: 3%, Sometimes: 68%, Never: 23%.

More relevant to this research is the blood feuding in the Middle East, which is addressed by Marongiu and Newman (1987). The blood feud has displayed an incredible affinity for revenge, while resisting the influence of contemporary civil laws. While the origin and persistence of these acts of vengeance may be influenced by the severe economic circumstances in the region, justification for vengeance can be traced to the blood feud sanctioned by religious beliefs since the pre-Islamic Arabia. Furthermore, Marongiu and Newman (1987, p.72) present vengeance not only as a desire for justice but also as a religious duty:

If vengeance was not pursued, then blood guilt fell upon the remaining kin. The idea of revenge or "thar" became a religious obligation from which a basic code of conduct evolved.

Thus, vengeance as a social and religious custom may serve also as a justification for religious terrorism.

From the preceding review of the literature, it can be seen that there is no work that can be used to fully explain
the phenomenon occurring in Lebanon which we have called religious terrorism. Some of the material provides interesting approaches which may be adapted to study the phenomenon of religious terrorism. One point the literature makes is that our views of reality depend on our cultural values. K. J. Holsti (1985, p.7) make this point as follows:

How we see the things in international life that intrigue or depress us depends to a certain extent on our geographical vantage point. No matter how we try to compensate for our cultural biases we can never "know" the real world in its entirety. We will have biases, priorities, and prejudices that are deeply ingrained by our education, national culture, diplomatic history, and the daily headlines all of which typically express national rather than global perspectives.

This also means that individual behavior may not always appear to be rational to the observer, for he may not place the same value on outcomes as the actor. Some, such as Simon (1957), have claimed that man's behavior can be predicted if we know how he perceives the situation and how he values various outcomes. If this is valid, the behavior of the Lebanese religious terrorist must be understood as a result of both the person's values and the situation. In Chapter Five, an attempt will be made to explore the phenomenon of religious terrorism by the Lebanese Shi'a from both an individual and a cultural perspective.
CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF SECTARIANISM AND THE SHI'A
IN LEBANESE POLITICS

Religious sects throughout history have played a major role in forging today's confessional Lebanon. An understanding of the roots of these religious schisms in Lebanese society, therefore, is essential. These roots, nourished by intermittent religious revivalism in Lebanon, have bloomed many times into political conflicts, thus hindering national unity. Contemporary religious resurgence of the Shi'a is the latest fruit of these historical schisms. This chapter is a sketch tracing the political roles historically played by religious sects, particularly the Shi'a in Lebanon.

Phoenicians

The Phoenicians, about 3000 B.C., were one group of Canaanites Arabs living in a small part of the Levant, the present day Lebanon. Geographically, this mountainous area is insufficient to sustain a growing population. Being on the Levant led the Phoenicians to become sea merchants (Ismail, 1965). In time, their familiarity with the sea, trade relations with the West, and ties to landlocked Arab...
countries established Lebanon's economic advantage in the Middle East.

The Roman Empire

The Romans ruled Lebanon from 64 B.C. until 395 A.D., and after the fall of Rome, the Byzantium (Constantinople) ruled until the coming of Islam. The Phoenicians experienced a change in their spiritual awareness as they adopted their rulers' new faith, the Christian religion (Hitti, 1965, pp. 59-63). Nourished by Roman order, trade flourished in the port cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Berytus, and new industries such as dyeing and silk manufacturing developed in Phoenicia. Increasingly, differences appeared between the seagoing and landlocked Canaanites, preparing the way for the eventual gap between contemporary Lebanese Christians and Muslims.

Rise Of Islam

In 635 A.D., the Muslim Arabs conquered Greater Syria, including Lebanon. Arabization and Islamization of the region took place, and Arabic replaced Greek and Syriac as the primary language of the area. Muslim Arabs originally were tolerant toward the people in Mount Lebanon, allowing them to continue their religious preferences and trade with the West (Hitti, 1965, pp. 80-88). Thus, Mount Lebanon's economic superiority over its Muslim rulers persisted as Lebanese Christians maintained trade relations with the West.
Crusades

By 1124, the Byzantine Empire regained control of the Lebanese coastline during the first Crusade, which was proclaimed by Pope Urbane II in 1095 at the Council of Clermont-Ferrand in France. The resilient relationship between the Lebanese Christians and France, a major participant in the Crusades, began at this time. This relationship widened the gap between the Christians and Muslims in the area. In this gap, the roots of many later conflicts between Lebanese sectarian groups found ample room to grow.

The Ottoman Empire

The economic prosperity of Lebanon (attributed among other things to its strong ties with the West and their Middle Eastern representatives, the Mamluks) ceased after their enemy, the Turkish forces, captured Constantinople in 1453 (Hitti 1965, p. 142). From the ruins of Byzantine, Lebanon witnessed the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, Fakhr-al-Din Al-Mani I, a Muslim, was installed as Sultan of Mount Lebanon by the Ottoman emperor. The appointment of a Muslim family to rule drove the sectarian wedge deeper between the people of Mount Lebanon.

French Influence in Lebanon During the Ottoman Empire

French foreign policy under Louis XIV (1643-1715) en-
couraged trade with Catholic Maronites in Lebanon. France funded educational missions during this period, targeting primarily the Maronites communities in Mount Lebanon. As a byproduct of these French institutions and support, Maronites communities prospered. In contrast, the social and economic growth of unexposed Muslim communities, living in other, isolated parts of Lebanon, fell behind.

1858 Crisis

By the 1840s, the Christians' responsiveness to French education and cultural influences "outdistanced them from their Muslims neighbors in the economic and social race" (Hitti, 1965, p. 191). This distance between the two is described by Hitti (1965, p. 210) as:

... mainly due to the impact of the West and resulted in transforming a medieval society to a modernist one. Proximity to the sea, preponderance of the Christian element, and a tradition of Western orientation made the people especially receptive of the new stimuli.

These cultural and economic ties with France account for Lebanon's Christians' inclination to support French interest in the region, against the will of Lebanon's Muslim rulers and the interest of the Ottoman Empire. On September 10, 1840, the sovereignty of Lebanon's Muslim rulers was reinforced as Ottoman troops landed on its shores.

In 1858, a successful Christian peasant uprising against
high taxes stripped the Muslim feudal lords of their lands, thus ending the amirate, a system of inherited governance. In its place, the "Mutasarrifiyah" (governorship) system was set up by an Ottoman-appointed governor.

To implement this new system, the Turkish governor partitioned Lebanon into two districts: a northern district administered by a Christian quaim maqam (sub-governor); and a southern district under the administration of a Lebanese Muslim quaim maqam (Harik, 1968, pp. 229-240). This Mutasarrifiyah system introduced a temporary peace among the communities, led to a major build-up of schools, roads, and hospitals, and instituted widespread administrative reforms. The prevailing liberal atmosphere under this regime contrasted sharply with that of the feudal Muslim families. The friction produced by this contrast depleted the Muslim feudal families' powers. Nevertheless, it intensified religious differences and tensions.

In 1862, Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman foreign minister, tasked a commission to assess the religious conflicts in Lebanon. This commission concluded that the partition of Lebanon was a direct cause of its persistent religious tensions. It proposed that Lebanon be reunited under a Christian governorship appointed by the Turkish sultan. The irony is that by following this advice, the Turks ensured the longevity of these religious disturbances.
Up to World War I

The persistent inequity in the distribution of resources between Christians and Muslims nourished their antagonism, despite Lebanon's relative economic prosperity in the region prior to World War I. This conflict was not attributable to one group fighting another, but rather to one group prospering while the other lagged behind.

From World War I To 1920

The Ottoman Empire entered World War I as an ally of Germany. Under Turkish martial Law, hundreds of Lebanese suspected of sympathy to France were executed, and a blockade was set along Lebanon's coast. The Turks punished Christians and Muslims alike, somewhat lessening the gap between the two groups, as thousands of people died of widespread famine.

At the end of World War I, during the San Remo Conferences in Italy in April, 1920, Syria and Lebanon were placed under the French Mandate, in accordance with Article 22 of the Versailles Treaty. The French Mandate rejuvenated France's relationship with the Lebanese Maronites, reviving Christian-Muslim conflicts. The French high commissioners prevented Muslims from attaining the Lebanese presidency by postponing national elections, appointing Christian presidents, and extending the presidency of Christian incumbents.
France did much to increase economic development during the period through improvements in the Lebanese educational system, in agricultural practices, and in standards of living and public health. However, this French Mandate, by incorporating Jabal’Amil and the Beqa’ valley with Mount Lebanon, also added two concentrated regions of Shi’a to a Lebanon that was already supersaturated by religions.

The Shi’a in Lebanon

The French Mandate’s incorporation of Jabal’Amil and the Beqa’ valley to Lebanon in 1920 increased the Lebanese Shi’a population by 21%. The Shi’a presence in Lebanon may be traced back to the seventh century, when the sect was formed. The Shi’a sect began as a coalition of followers of Imam Ali Ben Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad, after the martyrdom of Ali’s son, Imam Hussein at Karbala (Iraq) in 680 A.D. Narration of the Karbala incident is provided by James Bill’s (1984, p. 437):

... badly outnumbered, Hussein’s tiny band was massacred by the military forces of Yazid, the recognized political head of the major Muslim community of the day. This incident... has come to symbolize the Shi’i experience that of a suffering minority group long oppressed for its beliefs by an unjust and unbelieving establishment.

From inception, the Shi’a thus were organized as a
protest against the Muslim leadership, who had passed over what the Shi'as perceive to be the legitimate rights of Imam Ali and his descendant. Some of the Shi'as fled to Jabal'Amil and Beqa' valley in the seventh century after the Karbala incident. From that time onward, according to Cobban (Cole and Keddie, 1986, p. 47):

... the Shi'is of Lebanon were reduced to the status of dissenters, at first from the Christianity of the Crusader kingdoms and then, for long centuries, from a surrounding orthodoxy dominated by the Sunnis.

The French Mandate and their allies, the Maronites, were able to maintain the Shi'a of Jabal'Amil and the Beqa' in check and in isolation by coopting the Shi'a feudal leadership. Until recently, the sect served to support and protect the interests of its political elites and upper classes. Shi'ism was used to promote solidarity and unity around the existing social structure, maintaining loyalty to their elites.

Independence

Lebanon gained independence on November 26, 1941. In 1943, an unwritten agreement was approved between the Christian and Muslim leaders, which became known as the National Pact (National Covenant). The Pact defined the shares of the various confessional communities in the formal governmental structure, and consisted of basic rules.
regarding governance of the country and orientation of Lebanon's policy. It "preserved the preeminent position of the Maronites under the French Mandate" by allocating to them the presidency; it gave the premiership, the second most powerful post to the Sunnis; and it allocated the speakership of the parliament to the Shi'a (Salem, 1973, p. 23). The Pact did unite Lebanon under one flag, and according to Fouad Ajami (1983, p. 108):

... two dominant ideas were brought together in the Lebanese polity that the French fashioned and whose independence they granted in 1943: a Maronites concept that stressed Lebanon's Christian identity, and a Sunni Arab conviction, upheld by the merchants of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, that the country was a piece of a larger Arab world. The impoverished and quiescent Shia fit into neither concept. They were Lebanon's hewers of wood and drawers of water.

This Covenant fortified the link between religion and government, and served to widen the gap between the various political-religious sects.

Arabism And The Regional Struggle For Power

In the 1940s, many Lebanese and external entities attempted to incorporate Lebanon into their proposed restructuring of the Middle East. King Abdullah of Jordan clamored for the reunification of Greater Syria with himself
at its head, providing Lebanon with an option to join. Iraqi political leaders wanted to include Lebanon in their Fertile Crescent State with Baghdad as its capital. Syria agitated for the return of the Lebanese Beqa' valley lost in 1920. Lebanese elements, as well, in seeking union with their neighbors, gravitated Arab-ward and aggravated anew the Christian-Muslim conflicts.

The differences in attitudes and aspirations toward nationalism, between the Western-oriented Maronites and the Arab-oriented Muslims, are illuminated in Hitti (1965, p.214):

The political awakening which sparked Arab nationalism came as a logical sequence to the intellectual awakening. Modern nationalism was a product of late eighteenth-century revolutionary France... Western-educated Lebanese were its logical liaison officers. Moslems hesitated to accept the novel doctrine, and when they did, it was mixed up with Pan-Islam and tied to the rising aspiration of the masses. As a secular movement with the emphasis on economic values and transcending loyalty to a community, irrespective of religious affiliation within a geographic unity, nationalism clearly conflicted with Islam.

1958 Crisis: Egypt, Syria, And Lebanon

By the early 1950s, the newly established military
governments in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq instituted similar
economic policies, nationalizing most of their economic
sectors. Lebanon, with its laissez-faire policy and its
relative stability, attracted Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf
oil capital. Beirut became the only center for most regional
investments (Qubain 1961, p. 5).

The Lebanese economic boom of the 1950s mainly provided
benefits to urban and predominantly Christian communities,
and led to the dissatisfaction of predominantly rural Muslim
communities. This dissatisfaction was reflected in the 1957
presidential election. Kamil Shamoun, a Christian
presidential candidate, was able to secure a majority of
support in the Chamber of Deputies and won the 1957
presidency against the wishes of several key Muslim leaders.
President Shamoun's election was a major factor in the Muslim
leaders' encouragement of a subsequent peasant uprising
(Chamoun 1963). The Lebanese Muslim leadership's rejection
of Shamoun's presidency was further antagonized by Arab
nationalism emanating from Egypt and Syria.

During this period, President Jamal Abdel Nasser of
Egypt encouraged Arab nationalism, even pan-Arab nationalism.
The 1956 Suez conflict between Egypt and Israel served to
increase the internal tensions in the region. Syria sided
with Egypt on the Suez question, and both countries, along
with Saudi Arabia, severed diplomatic relations with France
and Great Britain. Iraq and Jordan broke their diplomatic
ties with France (Qubain 1961, p. 38). During this conflict, Lebanon chose to remain neutral.

As a result, on March 13, 1958, Syria severed its economic ties with Lebanon, forcing it to seek protection under the Eisenhower doctrine. This American doctrine promised Lebanon military protection in exchange for the Lebanese support of American policies in the Middle East (Hitti 1965, p. 231). While this stance no doubt was in accord with the views of most of the Lebanese Christians, it was decidedly against the wishes of many of the Muslims, as shown in Table 9 below, by the sudden surge of violence between 1957-1958.

Table 9
Violence in Lebanon, from 1950-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types Of Violence</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>51</th>
<th>52</th>
<th>53</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>56</th>
<th>57</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>59</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>61</th>
<th>62</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>64</th>
<th>65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protest Demonstrations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths/Domestic Violence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sanctions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Interventions</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lebanese Christian-Muslim split led Muslim rebels to assassinate a Lebanese Christian opposition leader on May 8, 1958. This assassination served, according to Mansfield (1973, p. 403), as a "signal for the National Front to begin an armed insurrection."

American forces were called upon by President Shamoun, and order was quickly restored in Lebanon (Hitti 1965, p. 232). There was, in reality, very little opposition by Lebanese to the use of American force, but the gap between the two religious groups was not bridged, and this internal conflict has yet to be resolved. Thus, the contemporary sectarian political movements of the Shi'a in Lebanon, in light of the religious overture projected by this historical sketch, are only echoes of past sectarian outcries.

Events Leading to The Shi'a Political Movements, 1972

In recognition of the Shi'a's considerable numerical presence in Lebanon, the National Pact bestowed upon the sect in 1943 the speakership of the parliament. The speakership position is primarily a symbolic one, deprived of significant political power. This National Pact endowment ranked the Shi'a political power as last among the major Lebanese sectarian groups. This confessional order is implicated by many as a leading factor in the contemporary political movements of the Shi'a.

To others, these Shi'a political movements were
precipitated by the failure of Intra Bank. Intra Bank held, in 1966, more than 17% of Lebanese total assets, and most of the Shi'a feudal families liquid assets. The failure of this Bank in 1967 deprived the Shi'a's traditional leadership of their primary source of power, thus breaking up their monopoly over their sect's politics.

This Lebanese bank failure, coupled with perceived confessional inequities, are two mediating factors to the political movements of the Lebanese Shi'a. The primary instigating factor, the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility, is addressed in Chapter Four.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE SHI'À IN LEBANON: FROM FEUDALISM TO GEO-CULTURAL IMMOBILITY

This chapter presents the features that are deemed responsible for the Shi'a geo-cultural immobility in Lebanon. Geo-cultural immobility is a low level of geographic mobility of a specific population in a nation with a limited cultural pluralism. As postulated in Chapter One, the geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon is the primary instigator of their sectarian political movements.

Among the distinctive features of the Lebanese Shi'a geo-cultural immobility, depicted in Figure 4, below, are: inherent socio-demographic characteristics; a distrusted, feudal, and self-centric political leadership, coupled with national and governmental indifference; clandestine political parties and political machinery; and a Lebanese confessional environment covering all the above characteristics with a veil of legitimacy. The primary objective of this chapter is to explore and understand the features of the Lebanese Shi'a geo-cultural immobility.
The Lebanese Shi'a Socio-Demographic Characteristics

The Shi'a were originally concentrated, as stated in Chapter Three, in two regions: Jabal'Amil and the Beqa'. Lebanese sectarian schisms, Shi'a za'im'ism, and confessionalism collectively maintained the Shi'a on their historical reservations. Aspects of these two regions of present-day Lebanon are described by Ajami (1981, p. 134):

The first of these was Jabal'Amil (Mount'Amil), which is the part of the Mount Lebanon range that lies in South Lebanon, between the Shouf and Northern Galilee. The second area was in the northern reaches of the Bekaa, around the towns of Ba'albek and Hirmil. Each of these two major groups of Shi'is followed a distinctive path of
development. Jabal'Amil was nearly always able to support a steady form of rainfed agriculture. Its society was settled and became dominated by handful of large landlords, who exercised strong feudal power over their cultivators. . . The northern Bekaa was very different from Jabal'Amil. There, settled agriculture was seldom feasible. The driest part of Lebanon, this region could support only a seminomadic society. The Shi'is from there were clans people, living under the same kind of honor code that regulated the life of seminomands throughout the great deserts of the Syrian interior. . .

Many of the Shi'a were attracted to Beirut by the modernization process spurred by President Chehab's regime in the early 1960s. The first and only migration of Shi'a families from Jabal'Amil and Baalbek to the southern suburbs of Beirut became a flood from the late 1950s onward. This rural-to-urban migration away from agrarian employment, according to Karl Deutsch (1961), should have been an indicator of Shi'i social mobilization. Some features of this mirage of social mobilization are changes observed by Ajami (1981, pp. 189-192):

By the early 1980s fully one-third of Lebanon's whole Shi'i population was found in Beirut. The large-scale Shi'i migration to Beirut accelerated the process of social change within the sect. In addition, in the city, Shi'is from Jabal'Amil and the Bekaa mingled for the first
time; and they went through many of the same traumatic experiences there together. Urbanization thus helped weave the interests of what were now three distinct areas of Shi'i settlement into something like a single national Shi'i constituency. . . . forty percent of the population of south Lebanon, and about twenty-five percent of the population of al-Beqa'a had emigrated. . . From 1960 to 1980 the percentage of the total labor force employed in agriculture declined from thirty-eight percent to eleven percent, with most of those displaced moving to the services sector which increased from thirty-nine percent to sixty-two percent of the labor force over the same period.

The Shi'a's recent displacement into urban areas may be attributed to several factors. One factor is the Shi'a uprootment induced by the Israeli incursions into south Jabal'Amil. Another factor is the inability of the Shi'i farmer, handicapped by comparatively low-yielding land and traditional farming technology, to compete in an open Lebanese market with other national and international sources. A third factor may be attributed to the absence of government agricultural subsidies, or even government regional support as indicated by Table 10, below. Shi'a regions incorporate 2,759,648 square kilometers, which is more than 68% of the Lebanese agricultural land. Yet the Shi'a regions routinely have received less than 1.1% of the
national budget. Most of the national monuments, historical areas, and tourist areas, which constitute Lebanon's primary source of income, are located in the Shi'a regions, yet traditionally, they have received less than 8% of the national budget. Similarly, one would expect an area of this size and importance to receive more than 2% of the national budget for public works, and more than 4% for regional development.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Allocation</th>
<th>Budget Percentage</th>
<th>Shi'a Regions' Share Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>157.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Revitalization</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Tourism Promotions</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Projects</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Improvement</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Lebanese budget for 1972 was 980.4 Millions L.L. ($320M)

Compiled From: Lebanon's Official Budget Documents (1972).

The limited and inequitable governmental investment in the Shi'a regions is paralleled by the lack of investment by the national private sector. Table 11, shows that banking, credit, lending institutions, hotels, hospitals, and
restaurants, among others, are practically nonexistent, reflecting the economic plight of these Shi'a regions.

Table 11
Indicators of Private Investment in Lebanon by Region: 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>In Non-Muslim Regions</th>
<th>In Shi'a Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Exchangers</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinemas</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacies</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookstores</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol Stations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Schools</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A fourth factor which may be implicated in the Shi'a displacement is the minute number of governmental jobs confessionally allocated to or administered by Shi'i. Tables 12 and 13 show that, as of 1969, fewer than 5,100 Shi'i, members of the largest sect in Lebanon (Joseph, 1986), held governmental positions out of a total of 24,000 positions. It is also noteworthy that Shi'a-allocated positions are primarily unskilled and laboring positions, and that only three top administrative positions out of 65 were allotted to the Shi'a.
Table 12
Distribution of Lebanese Civil Service Positions by Ministry and Sect, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th># of Christian Employed</th>
<th># of Muslim Employed</th>
<th># of Shi'i Employed</th>
<th>Total Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Prime Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Council</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Inspection Administration</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts of Accounts</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Disciplinary Council</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
<td>6,367</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>14060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Water &amp; Electrical</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Economy</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Post, &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>3,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number Unknown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lebanese Civil Service Council (1970).
### Table 13
Distribution of Sects in Lebanon’s Civil Service Administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>GC</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dir. General</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Heads</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administ.</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Magis-</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trate P.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Diplo-</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matic P.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M=Maronites; GC=Greek Catholic; GO=Greek Orthodox; RC=Roman Catholic; CP=Christian Protestant; AC=Armenian Catholic; S=Sunni; SH=Shi’a; D=Druze.
Compiled from: Michael Hudson (1985, p.320); and Lebanese Ministry of Information.

The inadequate public employment of the Shi’a is compounded by the scarcity of jobs in the Shi’a’s private sectors. As shown in Table 14, the scarcity of commercial, tourism, industrial, and construction industries in Shi’a regions, coupled with a concentration of these plants in other sectarian regions, increasingly forced the Shi’a out of their agricultural lands and into the cities.

By the presidential elections of 1968, the parliamentarians ended the progressive era of President Chehab and his anti-feudal policies. This election reinstated a representative of the traditional, confessional, and conservative politics and resuscitated the Shi’a za’im’ism.
Table 14
Distribution of Lebanese Industrial Plants
Per region, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Plant or Production</th>
<th>Number and Location</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mt. Leb.</th>
<th>North Leb.</th>
<th>Shi'a regions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food, Liquor &amp; Tobacco</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>3048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garments</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>2427</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>7128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Product</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>3467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper &amp; Pub.</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum &amp; Byproducts</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metallic</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel &amp; Metal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools &amp; Machines</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fahis (1979, p. 77).

Beirut, being the dominant magnet to this rural-to-urban migration, became a microcosm of Lebanon as Shi'a, like other Lebanese internal emigrants, joined the city's segregated inhabitants. Simply put, Shi'a "emigrants congregated in urban districts with their sectarian co-religionists." The following presentation in Table 15 is based on a study of Beirut by the Lebanese Salwa Nassar Foundation, and shows that 89% of the Shi'a were concentrated in three southern suburbs of Beirut.
Table 15

Beirut's Sectarian Demographic Representation and Percentage of Sectarian Concentration, 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Location of Concentration</th>
<th>% of Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christians:</td>
<td>Ashrafiya, Ayn al-Rummana, Harat-Hrayk.</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Basta, Hamra, Burj Hammud, and Mazraa.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi' a</td>
<td>Bourj-el-Barajnet, Ghubayri, Shiyyah.</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This urbanization did not eradicate the Shi'a's sectarian isolation, as is evident in Table 15, above. The crucible of Beirut, Hudson notes, "does not appear to be molding less particularistic Lebanese citizens. . . . Urbanization appears to fortify, rather than diminish Lebanese parochialism. . . ."

The status of the average Shi' i family was not improved. In his dissertation, Augustus Norton (1984, p. 46) states:

Lebanon's Shi'a have long been considered the most disadvantaged confessional group in the country. By most, if not all of the conventional measures of socio-economic status, the Shi'a fare poorly in comparison to their non-Shi'a cohorts. . . . the Shi'i was the least likely, in comparison with his cohorts from other recognized sects, to list his occupation as professional/technical, business/managerial, clerical or crafts/operatives, and the most likely to list it as farming, peddlery, or labor.

Even the status of most of the urbanized Shi'a who took
residence in the southern suburbs of Beirut was static. Haley (1979, p. 25) describes Bourj-el-Barajnet, the nucleus of the Shi'a community in Beirut, simply as a "sprawling collection of huts, shacks, tents, and permanent buildings spread out over a wide area flanking the main road to Beirut Airport." Despite this migration, the economic and social status of the agrarian and urban Shi'i have remained constant. The average Lebanese Shi'a family, as may be seen in Table 16, earned less than $150.00 per month, which is less than half of the national average.

Table 16
Comparative Distribution of 550,000 Lebanese Families
Average Monthly Income with Over 143,000 Shi'i Families, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Of Income Distribution</th>
<th>Less than $150.00</th>
<th>From $150-300</th>
<th>From $300-450</th>
<th>From $450-600</th>
<th>Over $600</th>
<th>Unlimited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>174,500</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>73,500</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'i</td>
<td>87,800</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>61.39</td>
<td>31.46</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: ABC Omnibus Survey (1975); and Fahis (1979, p. 113).

The extent of poverty among the Lebanese Shi'a families may be illuminated by Table 17, below. As shown, the majority of the Shi'a do not possess basic household equipment, such as electric stoves and refrigerators. Only a few have such modern necessities as telephones, air conditioners, and televisions. One would also expect the
mobility of this sect to be quite limited, since less than 14% of the Shi'a own cars in regions with no public transportation.

Table 17
Percentage Distribution of Ownership of the Following Household Items Per Lebanese Family, Per Region, 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Item</th>
<th>Total Pop.%</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mt. Leb.</th>
<th>Nth Leb.</th>
<th>Shi'a Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape player</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape Recorder</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washer</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Stove</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec. Stove</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Processor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum Cleaner</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec. Iron</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawing Mach.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Conditar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: ABC Omnibus Survey (1975); and Fahis (1979).

In addition to the many other indicators of the Shi'a's relative privation, their poverty is visible also in their substandard education. While 73% of the Lebanese are literate, only 21% of the Shi'a are. In 1971, only 6.6% of the Shi'a had a secondary education, whereas 15% of the Sunni, and 17% of the Christians had similar training (Tabbarah, 1980). Only 13% of Shi'a students attend secondary schools, according to Hudson (1985). This is at least five points fewer than all other sects. This
The educational deficiency of the Shi'a is partially due to their confessional education allotment. The national government spends less than $2.50 per Shi'i student per year, as may be seen in Table 18.

Table 18
Comparing Lebanon to 95 Other Nations and the Shi'a to Other Sects Within, on a Variety of Political Indices: 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Rank among Other Nations</th>
<th>Per Million</th>
<th>Total Averages</th>
<th>Special Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Education Expenditure</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Over 36 Millions</td>
<td>$14.04</td>
<td>$ 2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Percentage of students in Pop.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Per Million</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- School Enrol-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ment Rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enrollment in Higher Education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Primary School Students/1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secondary School Students/1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- University School Students/1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Educational Index</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Literacy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Foreign Mail</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Letters/lit. Per Capita</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Domestic Mail</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Telephones Per Thousand Pop.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radio Owners per 1000 Pop.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Television Owners/1000 Pop.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mass. Radio Per Thousand Pop.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Scientific Capacity</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Average Scientific Journals</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of Newspaper readers</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Food Supply Per Cap. Per Div.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Physicians Per 1 Million Pop.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>740</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pop. A. Pop. Growth Rates</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- area and pop. density</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Persons per Sq.Km</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Defense Expenditure</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Over 30 Millions</td>
<td>$11.7</td>
<td>$ 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- GNP Per Capita and Growth Rates</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>of the 1120Millions(GNP)</td>
<td>$ 803</td>
<td>$ 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Per Capita Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Passenger Vehicles Per 1000 Pop.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Energy Consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Distribution of Male labor force</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Endogamic Marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agricultural Area</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agriculture Share of GDP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Industrial Share of GDP</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diplomatic Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following statistics on crime, shown in Table 19, support the truism that poverty begets crime. In every category, especially in those dealing with crimes against property, the Shi'a regions lead the nation.

Table 19
Comparative Summary Of Criminality in Lebanese Sectarian Territory December 1 to January 82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Muslim Territory</th>
<th>Pred. Shi'a Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size 1,804,000 Sq.Km</td>
<td>2,759,648 Sq.Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density/Sq. Km</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Crime:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Murders</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Robbery</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud/Swindles</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Smuggling/Dealing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism/Explosives</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Clashes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Crimes by Month</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile Thefts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thefts in Millions L.L.</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The physical relocation and consolidation of the Lebanese Shi'a in isolated camps on the outskirts of Beirut are apparently the primary byproducts of the Lebanese Shi'a's only migration. The social and economic gap between the Shi'a agrarian, as well as slum dwellers, and other Lebanese sects, remains unchanged. On this subject, Sharif (Hagopian and Farsoun, 1978, p. 11), characterized the contemporary
plight of the Lebanese Shi'a regions as follows:

These regions have the fewest paved roads per person or per acre. Running water is still missing in all villages, slums, and towns although water pipes were extended to many areas in the early Sixties. Electricity networks were erected at about the same time, but they are inoperative most of the time. Sewage facilities are available only in large towns and cities. Outside the larger centers telephone service is completely absent except for a single manual cabin which is usually out of order. Doctors visit the villages once a week and sometimes only once a month. Clinics are maintained only in large villages and do not function regularly. Hospitals and pharmacies are found only in the larger population centers. Elementary school is usually run in an old unhealthy house provided by the village. Intermediate schools were introduced to the large towns in the mid-Sixties.

This rural-to-urban migration away from agrarian employment, according to Karl Deutsch (1961), should have been an indicator of Shi'i social mobilization. He postulated that rural-to-urban migration is attributable to an expansion of the politically relevant strata and differentiation of the population; changes in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world;
and an increase in political demands.

None of the important changes in the Lebanese Shi‘i attitude and behavior required by this phenomenon of social mobilization have taken place under the supervision of the Shi‘a’s self-centric traditional leadership. Simply, the Shi‘a regions are not part of the rapid modernization process ravaging Lebanon. This comparative deficiency in the social mobility of the Shi‘a is seen as an unevenness in the Lebanese social mobilization, in Michael Hudson’s (1985, p. 81) statements: “Lebanon is undergoing rapid, but uneven, social mobilization,” and also “it is scarcely an exaggeration to speak of two Lebanons.”

Shi‘a cultural and religious characteristics are also apparent in their uncommonly high endogamic marriages and their birth rates. The Shi‘a’s higher growth rate is tearing apart the fabric of confessional Lebanon. Fertility differences between women of the various Lebanese sects are shown in Table 20. On the average, a Shi‘i woman bears seven children and has the highest infant mortality rate in the nation.

Table 20
Number of Birth per 1,000 Married Women by Religion in Lebanon: 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>---</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>---</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Non-Catholic</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Shi‘a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Born</td>
<td>3,869</td>
<td>3,558</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>5,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living</td>
<td>3,670</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>4,365</td>
<td>5,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>5,176</td>
<td>6,576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The alarming growth of the Shi'a population, due to their high birth rate, has spilled over into other regions and threatens the confessional order. The traditional competition for scarce confessional resources is further aggravated by the fierce inter-sectarian competitions in the open job market.

Collectively, all of these peculiarities have led to the shunning of the Shi'a by other sects, whose security and stability are threatened increasingly by the unparalleled growing number and demands of the Shi'a. The shunning of the Shi'a dealt the final blow to their social mobilization, which, according to Almond and Powell (1971, p. 187), requires "... exposure to new structures and processes of communications." The limited inter-sectarian communication between the Shi'a and other sects impelled the poor, relatively deprived, politically ill-represented, and traditionally agrarian Shi'a to develop the stigma of an under-class.

This under-class stigmatization is evident in the often-repeated statement by Imam Mousa el-Sadr, the Lebanese Shi'i charismatic religious leader, that "we are not Mitwalleyhs." Mitwalley is a pejorative name by which other sects unfavorably identify the Lebanese Shi'a. The Shi'a, be it in their original strongholds or in their newly adopted slums south of Beirut, never were incorporated as equals into the Lebanese cultural pluralism.
Cultural pluralism refers to the peaceful coexistence of different sects which differ in norms, values, patterns, and ways of behavior. The ultimate responsibility for the creation and structural institution of cultural pluralism is directly that of the political leadership, and indirectly that of the state. Support of this rationale is found in the analysis of M. Crawford Young, Cultural Pluralism in the Third World (Olzak and Nagel, 1982, p. 124):

"...the nation-state is the authoritative arena for interaction, encounter, cooperation, conflict, and struggle over the exercise of power and distribution of societal resources. ... The nature of the nation-state is one important factor: its ability to construct a public ideology in which all cultural groups find a place, its capacity to sustain its legitimacy by at least minimal levels of performance, its skill in managing the public domain with perceived "fairness" and above all in avoiding actions that arouse deep anxieties and fears about communal survival among particular segments. ..."

The doctrines, ideology, and organizational form of Lebanon prohibited the nurture of cultural pluralism. Thus, the liability and responsibility for the Shi'a's geo-cultural isolation and immobility is primarily attributed to the unwillingness of their traditional political leadership and to the indifference of the national government.
Shi'a Feudal Political Leadership

The most profound truth of Lebanon, according to Fouad Ajami (1981, p. 73), is "... as old as the land: the primacy of the religious sect and the clan, and the will of the 'big man' leading a particular sect." In this section we will start by focusing on the affect of this "big man," the za'im, who was introduced in Chapter One.

Za'im, in the Lebanese sense, is:

... a political leader who possesses the support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests of as many as possible from amongst his clientele.

Shi'a za'ims, traditionally members of landowning families, are relics of the Ottoman Empire. They were endowed, until recently, with inherited prestige and political positions by the Lebanese confessional hierarchy. Only a few families dominated the Shi'a's traditional political leadership. Among the names of those Shi'a families that have until recently enjoyed such high regional and sectarian standing, we find those of the As'ad family in South Lebanon, the Haidar family in Beqa', and the Hammadeh family in Baalbek. The dominance of these families may be seen by their longevity in the Lebanese Parliament. Each Deputy from these Shi'a parliamentary families listed in Table 6, averaged 25 years in the 30-year-old Parliament.
These families handed down from father to son the Shi'a's allocated confessional positions in Lebanon's Parliament. Evidence of the closed-family domination of the Shi'a political machinery may be found in Landau's (1980, pp. 256-57) work:

... 10 per cent of the Shi'a parliamentary families produced nearly one-fourth of the deputies and occupied more than one-third of all available seats. In some instances, it is one man (Sabri Hammada), or fathers and sons. . . al-As'ad, al-Zayn. . . brothers-in-law Hammadeh-As'ad who perpetuate family succession. . . Nearly all the Shi'a deputies, with an eye on their imminent retirement, made strenuous efforts to bequeath their political capital and influence to their children.

A further illustration of the strength of kinship ties, critical to the assessment of the Shi'a and their political leadership, may be seen in the kinship pattern of Shi'a Parliament Members shown in Table 21. In the 30 years since independence, from 1941 to 1972, a total of only 29 different individual Shi'i Deputies have served in the Parliament out of a total of 443 Deputies. The pattern of kinship among this tightly knit group of Shi'a Deputies shows that at least 18, or more than 62%, have had other family members in the Parliament.
Table 21

Kinship Ties Among 29 Shi’a Lebanese Parliamentarians, 1941–1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinship Ties</th>
<th>Number Of Deputies Inter-Related with this Type of Kin</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fathers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nephews</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers-in-law</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Relatives</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These Shi’a-dominant families were the wealthy land-owning Shi’a aristocrats, as indicated in the following Tables 22 and 23. These Tables, made from studies of the social classes of the Lebanese Parliament by Harik (1972) and Baaklini (1976), show that 47% of the Shi’a Deputies were classified as landowning aristocrats and that fewer than 18% held additional education-produced professions. In comparison, only 9% of the 414 non-Shi’i Deputies were classified as aristocrats, and more than 43% of them held additional education-produced occupations.

Table 22

Percentage Distribution of Shi’a and Lebanon’s MP Over Social Class in the 1968–74 Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aristocracy</th>
<th>High Class</th>
<th>Upper Middle Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Lower Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shi’a</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23
Percentage Distribution of Shi'a and National Members of Lebanon's Parliament Over Occupation 1968-1974 Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Landlord</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Doctor</th>
<th>Lawyer</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The division of social classes is in accordance with family background and social status.
Compiled from: Harik (1972); Baaklini (1976).

This description of the Shi'a za'im justifies Hottinger's conclusion that the Shi'a political machinery is a "feudal institution."

The Shi'i in Confessional Lebanon

A Shi'i gave his vote to his traditional political leader (za'im) in the hope of receiving direct economic advantages, public employment, or support in his dealings with authorities. An illustration of such reality is found in Joseph's (1978, p. 118) book:

... the Za'im provides benefits to individuals in need, in return for political support. In the villages a large percentage of individuals receive jobs usually in some government office through a Za'im... Very frequently they have no other choice.

Through this patron-client relationship discussed in Chapter One, the Shi'a's "wants" were addressed by their za'im without having to enter the political system. Thus, the
Lebanese Shi'a's political socialization, encompassing the continuing cycle of citizenship training and political education from generation to generation, led individuals to seek personal gains from their za'im rather than to organize and collectively impose demands on the system. The Shi'a political socialization provided for "built-in restraints" in the form of attitudes, values, and norms that attempt to keep "wants" from overloading the Lebanese political system. The Shi'a political socialization process contrasts with Almond and Powell's (1969) system theory concept, where political socialization promotes inputs into the political system. The Shi'a za'im performed the role of an input inhibitor, and the political socialization of the Shi'a was traditionally limited to their communal socialization. Support for this observation may be found in Koury (1972, p. 113):

... Shi'ites has its own type of political or communal socialization which is restricted to only those people who belong to that particular group and differs from that of other sects of the society.

Thus, the Shi'a za'im had a negative effect on the development of programmatic Shi'i politics and Shi'i party involvement.

Shi'ism, addressed in Chapter Three, was used to promote solidarity and unity around the existing social structure and to maintain loyalty to their elites. A Shi'i voted and campaigned for his za'im's person or family regardless of the
za'im's beliefs, ideology, goals or programs, which most often were nonexistent. This can be seen in Table 24, below, which shows the lack of party affiliation among Shi'a Deputies in Parliament, in contrast with most non-Shi'a Deputy Members.

Table 24
Distribution of Party Members in the Lebanese Chamber (1964-72) by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total in Chamber</th>
<th>Deputies Affiliated With Parties in Chamber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-SHI'A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHI'A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqa'</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ajami (1981, p. 156) also stresses this lack of party affiliation among Shi'a parliamentary Deputies accordingly:

... a deputy is the representative of his district, his sect, and his group before he is the representative of socialism or administrative reform. Liberal democracy is sought through particularistic rather than universalistic channels.

Due to this practice, the patron-client relationships between a Shi'a za'im and his followers ensured the stability and perseverance of the Shi'a za'im'ism from the days of the Ottoman Empire to present-day Lebanon. Shi'a za'im'ism has
persisted until recently, embodied in its political leadership in spite of the end of feudalism in contemporary Lebanon.

The Shi'a patron-client relationship was reinforced by the electoral laws in the Lebanese parliamentary elections. Even though Lebanese electoral laws represent "a progression toward increasing the opportunity for participating in the election" (Baaklini, 1976), they require eligible citizens to vote in their ancestral homes regardless of where they are or have been living. Lebanese electoral laws, in effect, restricted parliamentary nominations in the Shi'a regions to feudal families. Until recently, once they came into power, these feudal families became quasi-permanent members of the Lebanese Parliament and tended to monopolize key positions such as the Parliament Speakership. Table 25, shows the longevity of these Shi'a families as speakers of the Lebanese Parliament.

Table 25
Shi'a Presidents of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies (1946-1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Initial Entrance</th>
<th>Presided From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad al-As'ad</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1951-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adel Oseiran</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1953-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein el-Husseiny</td>
<td>Baalbeck</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1978-88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Shi'a's traditional leadership integrated consensually with other confessional elites and grew into the Lebanese government's guarantor of stability. This harmonious coexistence among the Shi'a traditional political leadership within the confessional order was deliberately fashioned to preserve their positions and future ones for their children. Support for this observation is found in Arnold Hottinger's (1961, p. 135) study, Zu'ama'in Historical Perspective:

The Shi'i Zu'ama, particularly if they were from more remote localities, had little reason not to collaborate with the government. Their position with their followers was secure; it depended much less on their politics than on their landed property and personal influence over their clients. These same deputies and ministers were returned year after year to the different assemblies.

Maintenance of this harmony discouraged Shi'i parliament members from introducing legislation into the Parliament, despite their sect's economic and developmental privation. The traditional political leadership purposely watered down their sect's needs in order to achieve consensus and stability. As can be seen in Table 26, Shi'a representatives introduced collectively fewer than 1.5% of the total bills in any one legislative session from 1953 to 1972.
Table 26
Number and Percentage of Bills Introduced by Shi'a Deputies into the Lebanese Parliament, Compared to Those Introduced by Government and Other Sects Deputies from 1953 to 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Bills</th>
<th>Total#</th>
<th># Introduced by Government</th>
<th># Introduced By Non-Shi'a &amp;.%</th>
<th># Introduced by Shi'a &amp;.%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-58</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-64</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>23.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-70</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>35.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-72</td>
<td>4157</td>
<td>3271</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>20.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: Baaklini (1976, 243); Official Register Of Chamber Of Deputies (1988).

In light of the above, it may be argued that Shi'a politicians have sustained stability by maintaining "just enough" responsiveness in their district to pacify their constituents.

National confessional elites occasionally rushed to the aid of their Shi'a counterparts when the stability of the latter was threatened. On such rare occasions, additional political powers were provided to these self-centered Shi'i traditional leaders by the national government. The logic behind such behavior is that consensually integrated elites can persist only so long as members have the will and the political capacity to contain potentially deep conflicts and to keep the political and social issues manageable. Otherwise, too little power given to Shi'a traditional leadership may create new power centers which may displace, by one means or another, the incumbent elites leading to social disorder. Thus, more stability for a confessional Lebanon meant a
government less responsive to popular demands. It also meant a political arena in which few people are influential and a system in which unpopular, self-centered minorities rule.

The physical relocation and consolidation of the Lebanese Shi'a in isolated camps on the outskirts of Beirut did ease the sect's isolation and irreversibly set in motion the challenge to confessionalism and their traditional leadership. Obviously, a group that has grown in size and density has more potential for political power, but until that potential is properly organized and committed to collective ends, the group is not politically able. Thus, the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility was not only due to their feudal political leadership's personal interest in retaining power, which dictates that they target and purposely immobilize progressive elements of their sect by inhibiting their political participation. The Shi'a geo-cultural immobility also stems from their inability to collectively express and formulate their political demands as otherwise expected.

Lebanese Shi'a in Political Parties

The Shi'i youth inhibited from active political participation became discontent with the Lebanese confessional system. Branded as a Shi'i, a youth's opportunities were significantly curtailed. Fewer than 16% of them were admitted to colleges and universities in 1973-
1974, as shown in Table 27, even-though they constituted more than 37% of the national youth. By having their education, employment, and ambitions smothered by the conservatism of their sect's traditional leaders, Shi'a youth increasingly perceived confessional inequities.

Table 27
Distribution of Shi'i Students in the Student Body of The Lebanese University for the 1973-1974 School Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College Of</th>
<th>Total Number of Students</th>
<th>Number of Shi'i Student</th>
<th>% of Shi'a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law,Politics &amp;. Economics</td>
<td>3,606</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>17.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>3,496</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>14.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature &amp;. Human Science</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>15.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>13.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>20.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>14,826</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>15.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 61.3 % of all Lebanese university students in Lebanon attend this university.


A limited number of mobilized Shi'a youth began to realize their interests were being represented by a clique of wealthy landlords and za'ims. In their view, these traditional leaders were obstacles to effective power, and reform within the present system is chimerical. Such new attitudes and growing discontent with the Shi'a's traditional political leadership were paralleled by a growing involvement
The increasing support for political parties by Shiʿi youth can be seen in the results presented in Table 28, below, of a survey conducted by Professor Halim Barakat eliciting university students' attitudes toward political parties in Lebanon in 1967. As is seen, 69% of Shiʿa, compared with 35% of non-Shiʿa, preferred parliamentary candidates to belong to a political party. Also, only 21% of the Shiʿa, compared with 55% of the non-Shiʿa students, preferred candidates not to be party members. It is noteworthy that this survey sampled mainly the opinion of the upper-class Shiʿi, since no more than 15% of qualified Shiʿa youth may attend Lebanese colleges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefers Candidate to belong to a Party</th>
<th>Non-Shiʿa Students</th>
<th>Shiʿa Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefers Candidate Not to be a member of a Party</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increase in party affiliation was the Shiʿa youth's first and primary means to bring about change, rather than relying on sectarian or religious movements. Unlike those in other sects, Shiʿa joined the realm of clandestine and transnational parties which demanded an end to sectarian inequity,
social reform, equality, and income redistribution. This new Shi'i initiative and alternative form of political participation, as illustrated in Table 29, was of a radical leftist tone, like the Social Nationalist Party (formerly the Syrian National Party), the Communist Party, and the Baath Party, to name a few. Most of these non-sectarian radical parties recruited, besides the newly converted Shi'a, from various minority sects and autonomous voters. The few socially mobilized Shi'a youth were led by radical lawyers, university professors, and students.

### Table 29
Attitudes of Political Parties in Lebanon Towards Basic Principles of the National Pact, Parties Affiliates, and Percentage of Partisan Shi'a 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party's Name</th>
<th>Opinion of Nat. Pact</th>
<th>Religious Affiliations</th>
<th>Concentration of Shi'a</th>
<th>% of Shi'a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akel Messiah Co</td>
<td>Against, because it divided the nation</td>
<td>G; S</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba'th</td>
<td>For it as a stage for change</td>
<td>S; SH</td>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Against it</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist</td>
<td>Against it</td>
<td>S; SH</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kataeb</td>
<td>Strongest supporter</td>
<td>H; GC; AC; SH</td>
<td>Beirut; Mt. L.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>Against it</td>
<td>D; SN; S; MI</td>
<td>Beirut; Mt. L.</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese National</td>
<td>For it within limit</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Bloc</td>
<td>For it</td>
<td>M; SH</td>
<td>Mt. &amp; North L.</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberals</td>
<td>Advocate limited change</td>
<td>H; GO; GC; SH</td>
<td>Mt. Lebanon</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress, Socialist</td>
<td>Against it</td>
<td>D; S; S; SH; G</td>
<td>Mt. Lebanon</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes: For the following abbreviations: H: Hebraic; G: Greek Orthodox; GC: Greek Catholic; A: Arab; AC: Armenian Catholic; L: Lebanese, S: Sunnis, Sh: Shi'a. Compiled from Comptes Rendus (Legislative, Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Educational) for Lebanon [1963-1972], and from other sources. The data is based on the 1972 elections.
The parties which most Shi'a joined were clandestine organizations, operating covertly and ineffectively toward the attainment of transnational and collective goals. Nevertheless, the Shi'a were able to achieve temporarily, in the early 1960s under President Chehab's regime, more equitable employment and representation in government by supplanting some of the old notables, thus reducing sectarian tensions. The results of this unprecedented Shi'a involvement in political parties may be seen in the tangible increase in the number of party representatives nominated for the 1960-64 parliamentary elections in Table 30, below.

Table 30

Number of Organized Party Representative Nominated for the Following in Lebanon's Parliamentary Elections, 1943-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut+Mt. Leb.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North, South &amp;. Beqa'</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite this increase in political participation, however, the Shi'a were not able to successfully develop and integrate nontraditional, non-clandestine political actions groups or parties that could maintain their interest. Other sects, such as the Maronites, the Sunni, and the Druze, have maintained powerful and effective political parties, such as
the Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises), the Destour, the National Bloc, and the Progressive Socialist Party. These are sectarian parties operating nationally to ensure their respective constituents' interests.

In short, the Lebanese Shi'a's inherent socio-demographic characteristics; their feudal and self-centric political leadership, coupled with their ineffective political parties and political machinery; and Lebanon's confessional and low cultural pluralistic environment all indicate the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility. This Lebanese Shi'a geo-cultural immobility provided the "crisis milieu" necessary for their charismatic religious leader, Imam Mousa el-Sadr, to reinstall in them Shi'ism and its fervor. Chapter five, next, will assess the relationship between the Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility and their active religious resurgence.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Shi'a In Lebanon: From Geo-Cultural Immobility To Religious Resurgence

The purpose of this chapter is to present the features that are deemed responsible for the Shi'a's religious resurgence in Lebanon. As postulated in Chapter One, the geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon induced dissatisfaction with their political leadership, which, in turn, created a leadership vacuum. The opportune existence of a charismatic religious leader can displace this vacuum. This charismatic religious leader, once in control and through his religious movement, will trigger religious resurgence. This denouement is depicted in Figure 5, below.

Figure 5
From Geo-Cultural Immobility to Religious Resurgence
The Shi'a's religious resurgence in Lebanon is depicted as the cumulative byproduct of their geo-cultural milieu; their dissatisfaction with their political leadership; the presence of a charismatic religious leader; and the susceptibility of the Shi'a masses. The primary objective of the chapter is to illuminate the relationship of the above features and the Shi'a religious resurgence.

Even though many researchers attribute the contemporary religious mobilization of the Lebanese Shi'a to confessiona-lism and economic inequity, these factors contribute only to the sect's geo-cultural immobility. Chapter Four shows that the Shi'a's chronic privation and political frustration led only to their increased involvement in political parties, not to the formation of religious or sectarian organizations. The opportune existence of Imam Mousa el-Sadr, the Lebanese Shi'a contemporary charismatic religious leader in this particular Shi'a milieu, was necessary and sufficient to impel his religious sectarian political movement into religious resurgence.

The Susceptibility Of The Lebanese Shi'a To Religious Charisma

The Lebanese Shi'a had been involved mainly with progressive, clandestine, and transnational parties prior to their first sectarian political movement. These clandestine parties were ineffective, as seen in Chapter Four. Neverthe-
less, they were instrumental in illuminating to the Shi'a the extent of their privation relative to other Lebanese sects. These radical parties were unable to get enough parliamentarians elected to bring about major change. The failure of these parties to bring in new members in 1964, the first election after they were authorized by ministerial decree, may be seen in Table 31. None of their members were elected out of 18 Shi'a-allocated seats in the 1964 parliamentary elections, and only one Shi'i party member was elected in the 1968 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National #</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Shi'a #</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: Michael Hudson (1985, p.239); Fahis (1979); Landau et al., (1980).

Nevertheless, they were able to divert Shi'a autonomous voters from supporting their traditional sectarian leadership. Also, the traditional leadership's loss of its monetary resources in the Intra Bank failure in 1967 curtailed its power to marshal the remaining mobilized voters support.

Evidence of the diversion of Shi'a voters away from their traditional leadership during the zenith of these
parties may be deduced, among other factors, from Table 32. Even though the Shi'a population was growing rapidly, its voting participation declined considerably during the 1960-1964 period. This decline in voter participation also reversed the "greater annual increase trend in voting participation in Lebanon's socially and economically less advanced provinces" (Landau, 1980, p. 219). In the Shi'a regions, voter turnout from 1947 to 1957 increased by at least 5% each election. In 1960 and 1964 elections, however, voter participation dropped to a record low, decreasing by 40% or more.

Table 32
Voting Participation, Percentage, and Percentage Increase in the Following Lebanese Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Non-Shi'a Regions</th>
<th></th>
<th>Shi'a Regions</th>
<th></th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beirut, Mt. &amp; Nth Leb.</td>
<td>South Leb.</td>
<td>Beqa'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>21,599</td>
<td>53,138</td>
<td>32,893</td>
<td>29,179</td>
<td>31,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>21,998</td>
<td>61,932</td>
<td>48,645</td>
<td>35,814</td>
<td>31,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>51,660</td>
<td>124,977</td>
<td>90,082</td>
<td>75,107</td>
<td>48,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>65,500</td>
<td>124,854</td>
<td>100,246</td>
<td>83,832</td>
<td>71,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>71,436</td>
<td>167,107</td>
<td>110,093</td>
<td>65,009</td>
<td>54,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>42,637</td>
<td>178,266</td>
<td>168,073</td>
<td>67,131</td>
<td>58,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from: Michael Hudson (1985); Fahis (1979); Landau, et., al. (1980); Baaklini (1976).
By the mid-1960s, large groups of Shi'a had moved out of their rural communities where they were held in check by their elites and into urban arenas with the potential for mass political participation. Yet, neither the political parties nor the Shi'a's traditional political leadership were able to manage and control the sect's rapid urbanization or to provide the sect with confessional equity. Tangible evidence of the Shi'a's latent but popular discontent is indicated by the extensive decrease in the number of Shi'a voters electing traditional elites to the Parliament. This is shown in Tables 33 and 34. As is indicated, there was a 50% decrease in votes cast in support of elected traditional elites, most of whom received fewer than 60% of the total votes.

Table 33
Comparative Presentation of the Shi'a and Mean Percentage of Total Voters Received by Winners in Seven Lebanese Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>Total Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>63.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>59.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 34
Comparative Presentation of Shi'a and National Percentage of Lebanese Parliamentary Electoral Contests in Which the Winners Received Less than 60 Per Cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This inability of the parties and the leadership to provide the Shi'a with confessional equity led to the sect's dissatisfaction and discontent. Discontent with their political machinery increased the sect's susceptibility, by default, to the appeals of religious movements. The Shi'a urban agglomerations, characterized by housing shortages, unemployment, and a virtual lack of social services, "renders the newly urbanized elements particularly vulnerable to recruitment by charismatic leaders or their agents" (Dekmejian, 1985, 172).

Additional support for the sect's susceptibility to the appeals of religious movements may be found in Eric Davis's recent study of religious resurgence in Egypt and Israel (Antoun and Hegland, 1987). Accordingly, in both Egypt and Israel, the strength of religious organizations is partially a result of the failure of the elite to take account of the growing strength of the rural lower-class migrants to the urban areas. These citizens in both countries have become
dissillusioned with the unresponsiveness of the political elites and their ideologies and are turning to religious nationalism. Also, unless the left in both Egypt and Israel are able to develop "more organizational strength... the religious movement will continue to expand its influence" (Antoun and Hegland, 1987, p. 54).

Charismatic Religious Leadership And Religious Movements

The Lebanese Shi'i became aware of the full extent of his sect's political discontent through the preachings of Imam Mousa el-Sadr. Imam Mousa el-Sadr, then only a religious figure, was able to expose and enflame the Shi'a's latent political discontentments and to extend their hope of overcoming them. By late 1960s, Imam Mousa el-Sadr's charisma was "winning the hearts and mobilizing the Lebanese Shi'a everywhere" (Norton, 1985, p. 59). He identified the sect's confusion and perceived its susceptibility to his appeals. The charismatic leadership of Imam Mousa el-Sadr is identified in Dekmejian's Islam In Revolution, where he states:

Generally, the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic... The charismatic founders include such powerful personalities as... Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr (Hizb al-Dawah of Iraq); and Imam Musa al-Sadr (Amal of Lebanon)... The opportune presence of such a catalytic religious
leader was essential to the organization of the contemporary Shi'a religious-political movements. The Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility provided Imam Mousa el-Sadr the complementary crisis milieu, with its characteristics of a "crisis in legitimacy of elites, ideology and institutions" (Dekmejian, 1985, p. 47). The geo-cultural immobility of the Shi'a in Lebanon also provided the stage for the rise of Imam Musa al-Sadr to political prominence. Viewing with concern the influence of leftist parties among young Shi'a and the ineptitude of the traditional Zu'ama, he decided to enter the political fray.

Imam Mousa el-Sadr's first political venture was the foundation of the Shi'i Supreme Council (SSC) on November 19, 1967. Much to the chagrin of the Shi'a's traditional political leadership, Imam Mousa el-Sadr used the SSC to advance his popularity. Through his religious preaching and political diatribe, the Imam was able to animate and rally hundreds of thousands of Shi'a behind him. This following provided the Imam with the needed base to claim the Lebanese Shi'a political leadership by 1968.

The identification of Imam Mousa el-Sadr in Chapter One as a rebel and a rejectionist was not based only on his geneology. As a reaction to confessionalism, and in an effort to address all Lebanese minorities' relative privation, Mousa el-Sadr himself led demonstrations, sit-in protests, and hunger strikes. In 1974, he formed with
Gregoire Haddad, a Catholic archbishop, a broad-based movement known as Harakat el-Mahroumeen (Movement of the Deprived).

The ease by which Imam Mousa el-Sadr was able to mobilize the Lebanese Shi'a may be explained by Anthony Oberschall's research. One of Obershall's (1973, p.129) proven hypotheses states:

The more segmented a collectivity is from the rest of the society and the more viable and extensive the communal ties within it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the collectivity into an opposition movement.

Through the mechanism of Harakat el-Mahroumeen, as we have seen in Chapter One, Mousa el-Sadr prevailed in displacing many well-established Shi'a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly exposing their exploitation of the sect in pursuit of personal gains. As a result, many Shi'a political leaders, such as the House Speaker for more than 21 years, Sabri Hamadeh, as well as Kamel El-Assad, Adel Osseliran, and Kazem Khalil, to name a few, forfeited much of their influence and legitimacy. Thus, the Shi'a feudal families' unwillingness to address contemporary and progressive sectarian needs presented the charismatic Imam the sect's political leadership on a silver platter.

Harakat el-Mahroumeen supplemented Imam Mousa el-Sadr's personal charisma and dedication. Through its ideology,
objectives, and goals, the Imam formulated and presented the Shi'a with a set of compelling political principles, and presented the national government with a set of compelling demands. From the national government, Imam el-Sadr demanded a "fundamental reordering of priorities." The state, he argued, "ought to invest much more in the Shi'i areas, to improve their economic infrastructure, employment opportunities, and educational and health services."

Harakat al-Mahroumeen-Amal, one of Imam Mousa el-Sadr's major accomplishments, is the main source for the contemporary Shi'a's political movements and the propagation of their religious resurgence in Lebanon. Support for the centrality of religious leaders in religious movements may be found in the recently published research on religious resurgence. Hrair Dekmejian (Antoun et., al., 1987, pp. 141-173) analytical framework examines the role of charismatic leadership in the cases of the Mahdi (in Egypt) and the Messiah (in Israel). Dekmejian states: "In the absence of a leader with charismatic potential...the process of charismatic development cannot be initiated regardless of the intensity of crisis"; both "a leader with charismatic potential" and "circumstances of turmoil" are necessary for "the development of charisma and a charismatic movement."

This catalytic importance of a charismatic religious leadership is so overwhelming that "religious and ideological movements may be fruitfully studied as extensions
of the leader's personality as it reacts with the social milieu of his time."

From A Sectarian Political Movement To Religious Resurgence

Not long after Harakat al-Mahroumeen was in full swing, the doors that previously were closed in the face of the Shi'a started to open, and the Shi'a's fate changed for the better. Imam el-Sadr's movement as a spokesman for the Shi'a interests stood for the economic and social advancement of the Shi'a and for a greater Shi'a share of political power. Most significantly, the movement organized and politically motivated the Lebanese Shi'a for the first time.

Many of the newly urbanized Shi'a, who had discovered themselves cast adrift as slum dwellers, found employment in Harakat el-Mahroumeen's militia, Amal. In addition, Harakat el-Mahroumeen was able to penetrate and extract resources of the Shi'a professionals and businessmen for a Shi'a region-building effort. Thus, for the first time, the sect's collective increase in size and power was channelled through the movement towards collective ends.

By 1972, Imam el-Sadr's movement did not only "allow people to feel purified and personally better organized by virtue of membership" (David Apter, 1965, p. 139), but provided the Shi'a unemployed with needed jobs. In the 1972 parliamentary election, 18 of the 19 Shi'a Parliament Deputies nominated by Imam Mousa el-Sadr were elected by the
Imam's followers. This new parliamentary coalition established the South Lebanon Reconstruction Council, and allocated LL. 130 million (about $40 million) to improve conditions in Shi'a regions by building schools and hospitals and developing industries.

When funds began to flow in from the national government, the rest of the Arab world joined in support. As schools, shops, clinics, hospitals, and industries proliferated in Shi'a regions, so did the popularity of the Imam. By 1968, Imam Mousa el-Sadr posters and graffiti of his speeches glutted Shi'a villages, towns, and cities. Tens of thousands of people mustered to attend speeches by Imam Mousa el-Sadr, given most often in mosques in conjunction with Friday-noon prayers. This unprecedented influx of followers and believers to mosques, coupled with the sudden availability of endowments and funds in the coffer of the SSC, led to an increase in mosque building throughout the Shi'a regions. The mosques' proliferation was paralleled by that of husseiniyyahs centers, as shown in Table 35. Husseiniyyahs are structures where Shi'a congregate for sectarian consensus building, funerals, religious functions during the month of Muharram (Chapter Two), festivities, and other related activities. As Table 35 shows, the number of mosques and husseiniyyahs more than tripled in the 1965-74 period, to a total of nearly 100. This boom in "mosque and husseiniyyah construction is particularly a vivid evidence of the trend of
priorities, if not proof of the depth of religious conviction" (Bill, 1984, p. 386).

Table 35
Comparative Distribution of Mosques And Husseiniyyahs in the Following Lebanese Shi'a Areas, from 1955 to 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayda</td>
<td>1M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 3H.</td>
<td>5M; 4H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 2H.</td>
<td>6M; 3H.</td>
<td>10M; 6H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatyah</td>
<td>1M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 2H.</td>
<td>2M; 3H.</td>
<td>4M; 4H.</td>
<td>6M; 5H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjaeyoun</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; 1H.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>5M; 3H.</td>
<td>6M; 6H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beka'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>5M; 2H.</td>
<td>7M; 3H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sshmoustar</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 2H.</td>
<td>4M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirmil</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>3M; 1H.</td>
<td>4M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabi Sheet</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeb Jenin</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>3M; 1H.</td>
<td>4M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut &amp; Suburbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamra</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naba'</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goubayry</td>
<td>0M; OH.</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>5M; 2H.</td>
<td>6M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj-El-Barajnet</td>
<td>1M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; OH.</td>
<td>2M; 1H.</td>
<td>3M; 1H.</td>
<td>6M; 2H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10M; 3H.</td>
<td>16M; 5H.</td>
<td>18M; 12H.</td>
<td>44M; 23H.</td>
<td>63M; 36H.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: M=Mosque; H=Husseiniyyah.
Compiled from: The Supreme Shi'a Council (SSCNL, 1975).

The sudden surge in mosques and husseiniyyahs increased the demands for Shi'a clergies required to man them. As Table 36 shows, there has been a considerable increase in the number of Mullahs, Khatibs, Mujtahids, and Imams. They are part of three different categories of Twelvers Shi'a religious specialists. The Mullahs, and a higher rank of the Mullahs, the Khatibs, specialize in history and ritual, whereas the
Mujtahids or jurists are trained mainly in religious law.

The Mujtahids are divided into four categories—Mufti, Qadi, Faqih, and Ma’dhun—attributable to different training in the Shi’a’s two main seminaries in Najaf—Iraq or in Qom—Iran. A Mujtahid becomes an Imam after the publication of his Message (thesis).

Table 36
Comparative Distribution of Shi’a Clergy in the Following Lebanese Shi’a Areas, from 1955 to 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayda</td>
<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>2M;1Q.</td>
<td>2M;1Q.</td>
<td>1I;3M;2Q.</td>
<td>2I;1MU;3MJ;5M;3Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>1I;2M;</td>
<td>1I;2M;</td>
<td>2I;1MU;</td>
<td>1I;1MJ; 2I;1MU;6MJ;9M;4Q</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1I.</td>
<td>1Q.</td>
<td>2M;2Q.</td>
<td>2M;3Q.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatyah</td>
<td>1M.</td>
<td>2M;1Q.</td>
<td>2M;1Q.</td>
<td>1M;1K;3M.</td>
<td>2MJ;5M;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjaeyoune</td>
<td>1M.</td>
<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>2M;1Q.</td>
<td>1I;2MJ;7M; 1I;3MJ;1F;9M;2Q</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqa</td>
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<td>1I;2M;</td>
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<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>1I;1Q.</td>
<td>1MJ;5M;2Q. 5MJ;1F;16M.</td>
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<td>Jeb Jenin</td>
<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>1M;1Q.</td>
<td>1MJ;5M;2Q. 2MJ;6M;2Q.</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2M.</td>
<td>3M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3M;1F;</td>
<td>5M.</td>
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<td>1M;1Q.</td>
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<td>1MJ;5M.</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>2I;16M;</td>
<td>8Q;22M;1MJ;7I;19MJ;1F;10I;2MU;4Q. 2I;1MU;10Q. 62M;19Q;IK;97M;22Q;4F;IMA;36MJ.</td>
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</table>

Note: M=Mullah; K=Khatib; MJ=Mujtahids; MU=Mufti; Q=Qadi; F=Faqih; MA=Ma’dhun; I=Imam.
Compiled from: The Supreme Shi’a Council (SSCNL, 1975).
The growing cast of religious specialists provided the seeds for new Islamic organizations. In these mosques, husseiniyyahs, and religious organizations, Islamic principles, goals, ideology, and laws were preached, attracting into them increasing numbers of Shi'a of all social classes.

This contemporary attraction to religion is not limited to the Lebanese Shi'a regions. It is a Third World phenomenon, as may be seen in Eric Davis's (Antoun et. al., 1987) study. He states that there has been a strong decline in secular, populist nationalism during the early 1970s and a rise of radical interpretations of religion not only in the Middle East but in many other Third World sectors.

In addition, the publication of these religiously sponsored programs, debates, and theses of newly initiated Imams increased the total number of religious publications. Although there is no official tabulation of what is published in Lebanon, the Annual Bibliography of Arabic Books printed in Lebanon provides a guide to Lebanese publications. This bibliography, an outgrowth of the Arab Cultural Club's annual Arab Book Fair, provides the data for Table 37. A survey of the 24 bibliographies the Club publishes for the period from 1956-1982 indicates that publication of Islamic religious books rose from 1.43 % in 1960 to 6.72 % in 1970, to 18.22 % in 1981. Thus, a growing proportion of the Lebanese public is including Islamic religious books in its readings.
Table 37

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<td>History</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>1855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1956, 22 publishing houses participated, in comparison to 87 publishing houses in 1981. Non-Arabic publications, and publications from universities and other Arab countries were not included.


Paralleling the increase in mosques, husseineiyyahs construction, religious organizations, and mosque attendance, and the increase in the number of clergy and publication of Islamic religious books, there was a sudden decrease in secular youth entertainment centers, gambling halls, and
casinos in the Shi'a-predominant regions. As may be seen in Table 38, in 1965 there were more than 300 secular entertainment centers operating in the Lebanese Shi'a regions. By 1980, this number had dwindled down to fewer than 34, reflecting a change in the Shi'i inclination toward secular activities.

Table 38
Comparative Distribution of Entertainment Halls in the Following Lebanese Shi'a Areas, from 1965 to 1984

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<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sayda</td>
<td>2C; 35E; 19G; 71Y.</td>
<td>1C; 9E; 15G; 43Y.</td>
<td>2E; 21Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>1C; 29E; 11G; 45Y.</td>
<td>1C; 20E; 2G; 18Y.</td>
<td>9E; 5Y.</td>
<td>3Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatyah</td>
<td>2G; 1Y.</td>
<td>1G; 1Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjaeyoun</td>
<td>2E; 6G; 5Y.</td>
<td>1C; 1E; 8G; 3Y.</td>
<td>2Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beka</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbeck</td>
<td>7E; 14Y.</td>
<td>5E; 6Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schmoustar</td>
<td>1E; 1Y.</td>
<td>1E.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirmil</td>
<td>2E; 3G; 1Y.</td>
<td>4E; 2G; 1Y.</td>
<td>1E; 1Y.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabi Sheet</td>
<td>1E.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeb Jenin</td>
<td>1C; 3E; 2G; 2Y.</td>
<td>2E; 3G; 1Y.</td>
<td>1E.</td>
<td>1Y.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut &amp; Suburbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamra</td>
<td>28E; 24G; 35Y.</td>
<td>8C; 32E; 30G; 35Y.</td>
<td>2C; 18E; 25G.</td>
<td>15E; 8G; 9E; 5G</td>
<td>15C; 160E; 91G.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C = Casino; E = Entertainment Club; G = Gambling Hall; Y = Secular Youth Center.
Compiled from: Local Baladiyahs Records; Interviews With Amal’s Representatives, and Amal’s (1988).

In summary, mosque construction, private and public religious contributions, mosque attendance, the number of clergy, and the number of religious organizations all
quadrupled in the 1968-1978 period, after a steady stagnation for nearly a century. Publication of Islamic religious books increased considerably during the 1970s, and remain at the highest level in Lebanon's history. Concomitantly, the major decline in the number of operational casinos, gambling halls, entertainment centers, and secular youth centers in the Shi'a regions illuminates an ongoing change in the attitudes and behaviors of the Lebanese Shi'a. Collectively, most of these changes are also identified as universal indicators of religious resurgence by Wuthnow (1979).

Wuthnow's (1979) study provides a set of indices to measure personal religious involvement. Insurmountable difficulties were encountered in gathering some data, called for by Wuthnow's indices and needed to assess the extent of Lebanese Shi'a's personal religious involvements. The only available long-term study of the Lebanese Shi'a's personal religious involvement is from the early 1970s. Thus, this study is limited in its capability to sort out long-term trends of Shi'a personal religious involvement from short-term fluctuations.

ABC Omnibus, a Lebanese polling institute, polled Lebanese Shi'a in regional surveys in 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985. After the initial survey, they found that Shi'a were more and more likely to say that religion is personally important to them, were more and more likely to pray, and were more and more convinced that religion could solve the
world's problems. Also, the proportion of youth receiving religious training has increased by tenfold from 1972 to 1984. The perseverance of this trend provided this research with an indicator of the increase in the Shi'a's personal religious involvements. Thus, and in conclusion, the universal and personal indicators of religious resurgence support the proposition that the Lebanese Shi'a have been undergoing a resurgence since late 1960s.

Attempts to Illustrate the Effect Of Geo-Cultural Immobility

A quasi-experiment was designed to supplement this research primary data set, in illustrating the effect of geo-cultural immobility on the personal religious involvement and perceptions of Lebanese Shi'i youth. Two panels of Lebanese Shi'a students were studied. One panel of 25 students was interviewed and asked, immediately after they arrived in the United States to attend college, to respond to questionnaire A (Appendix C). Two years later, after they had been exposed to the American culture and way of life, they were interviewed again and asked to respond to the same questions.

The second panel, consisting of 57 students attending two Western universities in Lebanon, served as a control group. All of the elements of this panel were of the same class, educational level, religion, sect, and Lebanese Shi'a regions. This control panel was tested and retested by the
same instrument within the same time frame. From the pre-
and post-exposure responses, this researcher hopes to find a
change in the first panel's personal religious involvements
and their attitudes toward religion and politics. The
Methodology and findings of this quasi-experiment will be
given in Chapter Seven. In Chapter Six, next, the relation-
ship between the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence and
its acts of religious terrorism will be explored.
CHAPTER SIX

The Shi'a In Lebanon: From Religious Resurgence To Religious Terrorism

The purpose of this chapter is to present the features that are deemed responsible for the Shi'a's religious terrorism in Lebanon. Their religious terrorism is a cumulative byproduct of their belief in Jihad; national and international crisis milieu; the presence of competing Islamic and Shi'a sectarian national and international organizations; the recruitment of Shi'a zealots; and the latter's susceptibility to terrorism.

Violent actions are byproducts of motives and means. Religious resurgence promotes the creation of militant organizations, a mean which, in turn, nurtures the zeal of believers into acts of terrorism. The researcher thus presents religious terrorism as the interaction of religious resurgence and militant organizations. The primary objective of this chapter is to illuminate the relationships of the above features which attract the Shi'a to religious terrorism. This denouement is presented in Figure 6, below.
Many researchers attribute the contemporary Lebanese Shi'a terrorism to the PLO and foreign intervention, economic and confessional inequity, continuing sectarian conflicts, and Lebanon's recent civil war. These may have enticed the Lebanese Shi'a to organize militarily in face of a perceived threat, yet these do not provide sufficient motives for a Shi'i to undertake acts of terrorism or self-immolation. It is postulated that the following factors collectively have synergized the Shi'a into religious terrorism. These factors are: the absence of the Lebanese Shi'a's charismatic religious leader, Imam Moussa el-Sadr; the presence of many bureaucratic and aspiring religious leaders and their calls to Jihad; the precedence of martyrdom in Shi'ism; and the reliance on kinship recruitment by Islamic militant organizations.
The Lebanese Shi’a’s Trail to Lebanon’s Civil War

Evidence suggests that the Lebanese national political leadership feared the increase in Palestinian power in Lebanon by 1968 (Deeb, 1980). Anticipating armed conflict with Palestinian forces, the Lebanese government attempted to cut off supplies of arms to the Palestine Liberation Organizations’ bases in North Lebanon, the Beqa’ valley, and Beirut’s suburbs. By August 28, 1969, the situation in Lebanon had deteriorated to the point that intermittent fighting occurred between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian guerrillas in North Lebanon. The latter sought support as Muslim brothers from the Lebanese Muslims National Movement, against the Lebanese national government, whom they perceived as being pro-Christians’ interests. This alliance gave to an essentially secular struggle for political influence a religious overtone (Haley and Snider, 1979).

The Cairo agreement signed on November 3, 1969, between the Palestinian liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and the Lebanese government, temporarily lessened the civil conflict in Lebanon. As a result of this agreement, Lebanon gave the Palestinian guerrillas more freedom of action within its southern Shi’a regions bordering Israel. Despite the agreement, however, clashes between armed Palestinians and Lebanese Civil and Armed Forces in North Lebanon and Beirut suburbs continued (Deeb, 1980).
In 1970, President Sulayman Franjiya promised to get rid of the Deuxième Bureau. This military intelligence bureau, which had been in existence since the early 1950s, had been excessively utilized to silence Lebanese political opposition. The Deuxième Bureau's elimination was in accordance with the Lebanese government's proclaimed efforts to implement more democratic policies and fewer authoritarian policies toward civil order.

During the Six-Day War in October, 1973, between the Arabs and Israel, Lebanon remain neutral as it had in 1948, 1956, and 1967. Lebanon's Christian leadership argued that Lebanon's active business sector dictated its position in order to provide the Arab nations with needed financial support.

The Palestinians based in southern Lebanon increased their guerrilla attacks on Israel. Consequently, Israeli Mossad commandos killed three prominent leaders of the Palestine Resistance Movement (P.R.M.) in their residences in Beirut on April 10, 1973. Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government's weak response to Israel's actions led to a new series of clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese national forces nationwide (Haley and Snider, 1979). This increased internal conflict damaged the tourist sector and thus Lebanon's national economy, and it shattered the already fragile national unity.

The Palestinian Liberation Organizations' need for sup-
port and bases in South Lebanon enticed them to arm and train their hosts, the Shi'a and their militia by 1974. The Palestinians, acting to preserve their armed presence in Lebanon and their bases in its southern Shi'a regions, shielded themselves from the Lebanese national and Christian forces behind the Shi'a. Thus, they pitted the Shi'a and other Muslims against the Phalange and even their national government, enflaming religious tensions and provoking Lebanon's un-civil war.

Support for the above observations may be seen in the identity of the forces involved in the various phases of the Lebanese civil unrest. The Lebanese civil war went through four distinct phases, and in each, there were significant changes in the role and participation of Lebanese political groups and foreign forces.

The first phase of the civil war (February-May 1975) was dominated by the conflict between radical elements of the Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Phalangist militia. The conflict was sparked by a series of clashes in April, 1975.

During the second phase of the war (June-December 1975), the conflict broadened to include the participation of a coalition of right-wing Christian political parties and militias, the Lebanese Front against a collection of leftist Druze forces, Shi'a and Muslim militias, the National Movement, and radical Palestinian forces, the Rejection
Front. The Lebanese Front fought to preserve the existing political order in Lebanon, i.e., confessionalism, while the National Movement and the Rejection Front sought to achieve a comprehensive, structural change in the political system.

Phase three (January-May 1976) introduced yet another new dimension of the Lebanese civil war. It marked the entry of the full-scale military involvement of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Up to this point, Palestinian military activity was limited primarily to the participation of the Rejection Front groups, but rightist attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in and around Beirut in January, 1976, forced the PLO establishment to join forces with the National Movement. In this period, the rightists forces attempted to carve out a Christian state based on Mt. Lebanon. They were supported by other rightists in the Lebanese Army who participated in the bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese Army disintegrated as large numbers of Muslim and leftist soldiers defected and founded the Lebanese Arab Army to fight alongside the National Movement.

The fourth and final phase of the war (June-October 1976) began with a full-scale Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. During this period, the conflict was dominated by a loose Lebanese Front-Syrian Forces-Amal alliance against the coalition of Shi'a and Islamic militant organizations, Druze leftist forces, and now a predominantly Palestinian Rejection
Front. This indicates the drift of Amal’s forces away from their previous ally, the Palestinians, and the beginning of their present animosity.

This Lebanese civil war officially ended in October, 1976, with the Riyadh Conference at which Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian leaders, under the auspices of the Arab League nations, negotiated a peace settlement. The conference resulted in a cease-fire among Lebanese groups and a timetable to withdraw and disarm all non-governmental personnel. Despite the end of this Lebanese civil war, Lebanon’s traditional sectarian conflict and the Amal-Palestinian animosity continued.

The Lebanese civil war not only reinstated sectarian animosity and reinflamed secular conflicts, but also nurtured the growth of militant Shi’a, Muslim, and Christian organizations. The Lebanese militant Shi’a and Islamic organizations, offspring of Amal, are the fertile breeders of zealots and the focus of this chapter.

The Militant Shi’a And Their Organizations

The militancy of the Lebanese Shi’a was accelerated by three events, which inadvertently contributed to the growth of their military organizations: (1) the first major Israeli invasion of Lebanon, launched on March 11, 1978; (2) the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr during his visit to Libya in August 23, 1978; (3) and the toppling of the Shah by the

These three events and Amal's post-civil war politics facilitated the recruitment of its Shi'a supporters by other Islamic militant organizations. This Shi'a desertion of Amal's ranks may be attributed to its post-civil war support of the national confessional government (Norton, 1987). In early 1980s, Amal's leadership accepted and maintained a ministerial position in the national government, even when the Lebanese Army invaded its regions and disarmed its militia.

Amal's moderate positions in the midst of Lebanon's deadly sectarian conflicts was its poison pill. The Israeli invasion, and Amal's inability to protect its constituents from the Israeli forces' whimsical incursions into the already ravaged Shi'a southern region, increasingly weakened Amal's hold over its main stream of constituency. Coupled with the disappearance of Imam Mousa al-sadr and the substitution of his charismatic religious leadership with a bureaucratic secular one embodied in Nabih Berri, these factors collectively dealt Amal's popularity the irreparable blow.

Berri's bureaucratic leadership style falls within Dekmejian's patterns of evolution of Islamic organizational leadership in Islam in Revolution (1985, p. 63). Accordingly, "the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic while their successors are bureaucratic types
operating within a collective leadership. . . Among the bureaucratic types are. . . Nabih al-Barri (Amal of Lebanon). . .

This successor of Imam Mousa el-Sadr in the leadership of the Lebanese Shi'a movement is a secularly oriented centrist, a lawyer and a businessman. Although Berri is committed to the eventual elimination of sectarianism in Lebanese politics, he is suspected of pro-Western inclinations, and his leadership is unacceptable to many Shi'a radicals.

The toppling of the Shah of Iran in January, 1979, by the Islamic Revolution, dealt Amal the final blow to its monopoly of political leadership over the Lebanese Shi'a. The Islamic Revolution in Iran enhanced the appeal of Amal's radical dissenters for a similar Islamic political system. These radical and aspiring religious leaders exploited the southern Lebanese Shi'a's widespread suffering under the Israeli forces, alienating them against Amal.

To attract followers and gain popularity, these aspiring religious leaders provided the dissatisfied Shi'a with a target for hostility. This rationale is supported by one of Anthony Oberschall's (1973, p. 123) proven hypothesis:

If a collectivity is disorganized or unorganized along traditional communal lines and not yet organized along associational lines, collective protest is possible when members share common sentiments of oppression and targets
for hostility.

In the early 1980s, many of these religious leaders began to blame the United States and its allies for the Lebanese Shi'a's predicaments. A series of verbal attacks made the enraged Lebanese Shi'i believe that the United States and Western allies were behind Lebanon's confessionalism, depleted economy, and the Israeli forces' destruction of Lebanon's southern Shi'a regions.

Consequently, tens of thousands of Lebanese Shi'i marched in Beirut, Baalbeck, and many southern Lebanese cities against the United State and the West. These public marches, assisted and provoked by zealots and Islamic religious organizations, provided these aspiring charismatic religious leaders with the sought-after "crisis milieu."

This crisis milieu set the stage for radical Shi'a leaders to demonstrate to the Lebanese Shi'a and the down-trodden of the world their capability of delivering them from the Yankee and other foreign dominance. They orchestrated the destruction of the latter's symbols in Lebanon. Spectacular terrorist attacks were carried out against the U.S. Marines, French Detachments, and Israeli barracks. Two religious terrorists on October 23, 1983, and a third one on November 4, 1983, with cruise-missile-like-efficiency, drove three trucks loaded with explosives into their objectives. These religious terrorists, through their self-immolation in their perceived Jihad to deliver their nation from Western
dominance, also delivered to their Imams an overnight mass popularity.

Imam Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, one of these aspiring charismatic and radical religious figures, exploited the political tenor of this moment by breaking off with Amal. Born in a Shi'a village, Ainata, in south Lebanon near the Israeli border, trained in Najaf, Iraq, and presently residing in Bear el-Abed, a suburb of Beirut, Imam Fadlallah is one of the contemporary and most influential Lebanese Shi'a clerics. He was able to amass sufficient followings of dissatisfied Shi'a to open a Hizbollah "franchise" in Lebanon, even though he publicly denies being its founder.

Hizbollah, as shown in Chapter One, is not the only radical Shi'a group operating in Lebanon, but it is clearly the most significant for this study. Hizbollah, an Islamic international and non-sectarian movement, is more of a political state of mind than a cohesive grouping. Hizbollah consist of Muslims with high personal religious involvements and commitments world-wide. In Lebanon, Hizbollah consists not only of Muslims with high personal religious involvements but of young, newly politicized Lebanese Shi'a with high religious commitment. The goals of Lebanese Hizbollah, as identified in Chapter One, are the restructuring of the Lebanese Muslim individual and collective life, and the rebuilding of Lebanon's politico-socio-economic system on the foundation of Islam.
From Sectarian Organization to Religious Organizations

Amal’s adoption of the centrist politics of its bureaucratic leadership popularized radical Shi’a and Muslim organizations, increasing competitiveness for recruits. One such offspring is Hizbollah. Hizbollah’s success in removing foreign forces from Shi’a regions, via religious terrorism, attracted in blocs religiously mobilized Shi’a. This development coincides with Obershall’s (1973, p. 125) third proven hypothesis:

In a segmented context, the greater the number and variety of organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is that bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will take place.

Hizbollah’s sudden attractiveness seriously challenged Amal for the leadership of the Lebanese Shi’a communities by the early 1980s.

From Religious Organization to Organizations of Zealots

Hizbollah facilitated and enhanced interactions among Muslim faithful, clustering believers into religiously guided and inspired factions. In religion, the distinctions between action, intent, and motives are blurred, with motives and
intent being equal to or more important than actions towards
the attainment of perceived religious aims. According to
Marc Shell (1988, p.79):

It is one tack of Measure for Measure that religious
authority conflates intent with act and political
authority separates them. Secular authority, on the one
hand, can and must concern itself only with visible or
audible action... Religious authority, on the other
hand, looks into and must govern the invisible, silent
hearts of men.

As stated, religion conflates intent with action.
Religious resurgence promotes community among the faithful,
herding believers into religious activities. Within these
activities, the intents and motives of the individuals are
synergized by their interactions as the:

.... minds of ordinary men are likely to be swayed
less by appeals to abstract values, virtues, and ide-
ologies than by obligations and conformity to their
closest colleagues in face-to-face relationships" (Shils,

Believers, in these religious factions, are thus transformed
into religious zealots. Support for this rationale may be
found in Nagata's research (Antoun et al., 1987) on the
Muslim religious resurgence among Malays. Accordingly, the
pressures of social interaction and personal connection can
modify Muslim believers into zealots, because "pressures of
the social environment have a power of their own."

This modification of a Muslim believer into a zealot may be identified by distinguishable personality characteristics. A modal personality profile of a Muslim zealot is found in the "Psyche of the Mutaasib" (Dekmejian, 1985, p. 136). Accordingly, a Mutaasib, a Muslim zealot, is molded as follows:

In the case of younger converts, intense commitment produces "premature integrity" at an early age, marked by an extreme rigidity in beliefs... they tend to be aggressive in their dealings with unbelievers... In the quest to impose their own beliefs and behavioral codes upon society, Islamic Mutaasib display a high degree of activism... Their intolerance stems from the dogmatic content of their creed and their total identification with its strict precepts. Closely related is their unforgiving attitude toward all "deviationists," which reflects a belief in an unforgiving God... The Mutaasib is apt to see "evil forces" at work in a hostile environment... He displays a deep distrust of people and governmental institutions to which he ascribes malevolent intentions. He is inclined to divide the world into rigid categories according to clearcut stereotypes... they display the highest sense of idealism and devotion to their cause. Convinced of the absolute truth of the Islamic message and mission, the destruction of the "sinful" state and society
becomes the supreme virtue. . . they reject the easy path in their social, sexual, and political activities. They manifest rigid discipline, an austere lifestyle (taqashshuf), and readiness to struggle and sacrifice. . . they pledge absolute obedience to Allah, the Prophet, and to the charismatic leader of the movement through the oath (bayath). . . His behavior is conditioned by strict conformity to group norms as promulgated by the leader.

These zealots are the ferment and foundation of radical Islamic organizations. These organizations, in turn, like their founders, have their own distinguishable characteristics. The apparent definable hierarchy, cohesive leadership, and organizational structure of one such organization, the Malays Islamic religious movement in Nagata (Antoun et al., 1987), from a bottom-up view dissolves into "an amorphous aggregate of small social fragments." These loosely integrated series of "cells and nodes of a discontinuous network" are also characteristics of most contemporary Islamic religious movements, according to Ibrahim (1980), Ansari (1984), and Eric Davis, John Voll, and Nagata in (Antoun et al., 1987).

The organizational structure of Hizbollah in Lebanon is no different. A bottom-up view of this Hizbollah reveals an amorphous aggregate of small social cells. These continually multiplying cells are based on no more than five members, each with high religious fervor. The cells are tightly knit,
with informal, personal, and kinship ties just like their international counterpart. Interaction among elements within these homogeneous cells and their new recruits metamorphose the latter into zealots. This transformation may be explained as a byproduct of a nurtured affinity for salvation, which, in Shi'a terms, may be satisfied by self-immolation. The process through which the instilled affinity for salvation may lead a Shi'i into self-immolation and terrorism is described by Arthur Koestler (1967, p. 61) as follows:

The total identification of the individual with the group makes him unselfish in more than one sense. . . It makes him perform comradely, altruistic, heroic actions, to the point of self-sacrifice and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of the group. . .

From Zealotry To Religious Terrorism

Hizbollah's new cells are formed from the mitosis of its matured cells of zealots, as revealed through personal observations and interviews with active Hizbollah elements. This cyclical process is triggered as newly transformed zealots seek new recruits and become, in turn, the nucleus for new cells. In this process, recruits are sought within generation lines, local residential neighborhoods, mosques, and schools.
Typically, three recruitment mechanisms are employed: kinship, friendship, and worship. In seeking new recruits, zealots observe kin, friends, and worshipers in neighborhood mosques. If the prospective candidate observes all of his daily prayers, he may be approached to attend private religious discussions. If, during these discussions, a potential member is perceived to be committed to Islam, a believer in Jihad, a follower of the same Imam, and capable of becoming politically conscious, he is recruited.

The formation of these Lebanese Shi'a secret cells, with rigid recruitment procedures and conspiratorial tendencies, is in response to four apparent features: their commitment to revolutionary change; national and foreign governmental repressions; Amal's competitiveness with other militant organizations in Lebanon; and their negative perceptions of their society.

This cyclical recruitment process is not unique to Hizbollah. Other Islamic militant organizations in Egypt and Malaysia, according to Ibrahim (1980), Anzuri (1984), and Nagata (Antoun et. al., 1987), employ similar procedures. Accordingly, horizontal networks of "small cliques of equal-status, same-generation peers" provide the means both to convey information about the Islamic movement and to apply pressure to join them.

Hizbollah's close ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran provided them access to the technical and material support
from Iran's Revolutionary Guards stationed in Baalbeck. Hizbollah's leaders utilized the 2,000-plus Iranian Revolutionary Guards for terrorist training and indoctrination of their followers. In their commando training bases in Baalbeck, Nabi-Sheet, Yanta, and Shaara, many Shi'a graduates are transformed into religious terrorists, Lebanese Shi'a-style. This transformation is completed as Hizbollah bases provide them training in subversion and material upon requisition, their living Imam enlightens their religious duty to Jihad, and Imam Hussein's death at Kerbala illuminates for them the way to redemption and a precedence for martyrdom (Chapter Two). Upon their graduation, these properly indoctrinated zealots are unleashed on their own to proceed in their Jihad as they deem fit.

This pattern of zealot transformation into religious terrorist coincides with Smelser's (1962) stages for the development of collective violent organizations. According to Smelser's first two stages, it must be structurally conducive for the recruit to become a member of a secret organization, and there must be some sort of strain working on the recruit which he or she would like to alleviate. As is previously stated, Shi'a with strong religious commitments and strenuous affinities for salvation are approached and recruited. By being approached, organizational membership is made available and structurally conducive to a believer who wishes to become a member. Thus, a believer is expected to
join if he perceives in the organization an outlet for his strenuous affinity for salvation.

Simmel's third and final stage for the development of violent organizations states that: It must be structurally conducive for the group to engage in violence. As previously illustrated, the Lebanese Shi'a zealot are properly groomed and supplied with the tools and potential targets for terrorism, thus, making it structurally conducive for these zealots to engage in violence.

Building upon the findings, interviews, and surveys conducted by this research and others taken from Dekmejian's (1985) study, it was possible to identify the distinguishable "modal personality profile" of the Shi'i religious terrorist. It is distinguishable in that it is dissimilar from any of the political terrorist personality profiles provided in Appendix B. A young Shi'i zealot's devotion is marked by "intense commitment, an extreme rigidity in beliefs, aggressiveness, and intolerance toward unbelievers." Toward dissenters, a Shi'i zealot displays "deep distrust," and ascribes "malevolent intentions." By pledging "absolute obedience to Allah," Imam Ali, and his contemporary Imam, a zealot is "convinced of the absolute truth of the Islamic message," and his only goal in life is reduced to his Jihad "the destruction of the sinful," his "supreme virtue." A young Shi'i zealot's "readiness to struggle" is manifest by "an austere lifestyle." At that time, a Shi'a zealot is
ready to sacrifice his life and the lives of infidels, and he embodies the "modal personality" of a religious terrorist. This modal personality give substance to this research's fundamental notion that some of the contemporary Lebanese Shi' a's violent acts were motivated by religious beliefs, undertaken unconsciously of their maliciousness as religious duties, guided by religious leaders, for the fulfillment of spiritual gains.

In conclusion, to the Shi'i religious terrorist, killing the infidel has God's blessing and is not considered to be either unethical or immoral, let alone criminal. Thus, the Shi'i religious terrorist's unconsciousness of the maliciousness of his terrorist acts, and his pursuit of his own salvation, earns him a distinction from a political terrorist. This affinity, consciousness, and motive-based distinctions are presented in Figure 1, section B.

Field Test

Questionnaire B (Appendix C) is the primary data set utilized to test most of the special hypotheses in this research. This questionnaire attempts to deduce the extent and effect of Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility, religious resurgence, and zealotry upon the elements of their militant organizations. The extent of these grassroot elements' willingness to commit religious terrorism and their political objectives provide this research with a tool needed to test
pertinent hypotheses. Description of the testing procedure of this questionnaire and its findings will be presented in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER SEVEN

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings and conclusion from this research. Three different research tools were utilized to test the special hypotheses of this research.

Test and Findings of Special Hypotheses I. One and Two

A data set of Lebanese violent activities was used to test special hypotheses I. 1 and 2. They are:

I. 1. Incidents of religious terrorism by Lebanese Shi'a zealots, requiring self-immolation, are higher during the 40-day period following Ashura than during the rest of the Muslim lunar year.

I. 2. Incidents of religious terrorism by Lebanese Shi'a zealots are higher during the 40-day period following Ashura than during the rest of the Muslim lunar year.

The data set published by the Lebanese Center for Documentation and Research (Beit-al-Mustaqba, 1988) identifies all violent acts and threats of such acts attributed to or claimed by all Lebanese Muslim terrorists and their organizations from 1967 to 1987. This data set
provides the date, type, object, method, target, and identity of Lebanese perpetrators for each terrorist act. From this data set, all violent activities attributed to or claimed by Lebanese Muslim religious organizations with known Shi'ite affiliation were extracted. This permitted the compilation of Tables 39 and 40.

Table 39 presents the number of violent acts and acts requiring self-immolation committed by religiously motivated Muslim terrorists. Religious motives are attributed to the activities of the following organizations: Islamic Jihad, Islamic Al Fajr, Islamic Liberation Organizations, Islamic Tawhid, Islamic Front, Muslims for the Liberation of South Lebanon, Hizbollah, Muslim Amal, Muslim Martyrs, Al-Fath, Al-Haq, Al-Jihad, Junud Allah, Al-Tahrir al-Islami, and the Young Muslim Mujahidin. The religious motives of these organizations, with known Shi'ite affiliation and bases in Lebanese Shi'ite regions, are inherent in their organizational self-identifying names, their avowed purposes, and public proclamations accompanying their acts of terrorism.

Hypotheses I. one and two make reference to Ashura. As stated in Chapter Two, Ashura is a 10-day period of mourning commemorating the massacre of Imam Hussein, the son of Imam Ali, who was martyred at Karbala, Iraq, in 680 A.D. The anniversary celebration of Ashura begins on the 10th day of the month of Muharram. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar year. The lunar calendar year, like
the solar calendar year, has 12 months. However, the years differ from one another in that the number of days in the lunar calendar year is 354, while, normally, the solar year has 365. Thus, the lunar calendar does not coincide with the seasons, and the first day of Muharram moves ahead 11 days each solar year.

Lebanese Shi'a, in seeking spiritual identification with the plight of their Imam Hussein, participate with genuine feeling in the mourning ceremonies and gatherings during Ashura. These passion plays in Ashura not only revive the painful memories of Imam Hussein's massacre, but also revive annually the Shi'i's commitment to Shi'ism and to the Shi'a community. The reenactment of the Karbala massacre in Ashura, with its drama of self-flagellation, becomes an impetus to religious violence, and this research expects an increase in religiously motivated violent activities in the 40-day period following Ashura. Thus, a considerable increase in the number of violent activities attributed to or claimed by these Shi'a and Muslim terrorist organizations and undertaken during this period following Ashura would verify hypothesis two.

Table 39 provides a tally of the number of violent activities attributed to or claimed by the previously identified religious organizations. The table indicates that out of 100 violent acts perpetrated by the Muslim terrorist organizations with predominantly Shi'a affiliations from 1978
to 1987, 56 of such acts occurred within 40 days of the end of Ashura. This means that out of 365 days in a year, 56% of the Lebanese Shi'a's religious terrorist activities occur in only a 40-day period. The probability that 56% of all Lebanese Shi'a's terrorist activities occur by chance in a specific 40-day period out of the year is 0.00702, which constitutes a demonstrable relationship between Ashura and terrorism.

Table 39
Comparison of the Annual Number and Percentage of Terrorist Acts Claimed by or Attributed to Terrorists Organizations with Shi'a Affiliation Performed During Each 40-Day Period from the End of Ashura, from 1972 to 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Muharram Begins on</th>
<th>Religious of Terrorist Incidents</th>
<th>Annual Number of Violent Acts</th>
<th>Annual Number of Suicidal Acts</th>
<th>Annual Percent of Violent Within 40-DAY of Ashura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973 Feb. 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Jan. 27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 Jan. 16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 Jan. 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 Dec. 23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 Dec. 12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 Nov. 30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Nov. 19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Nov. 8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Oct. 28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Oct. 16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Oct. 5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Sept. 24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Sept. 13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 Sept. 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Aug. 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Total----</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled From: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
Table 39 also indicates that none of the religiously motivated terrorist activities took place prior to 1978. This fact buttresses the claim made in Chapter Six that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on March 11, 1978, the disappearance of Imam Mousa el-Sadr on August 23, 1978, and the Iranian Islamic Revolution in January, 1979, all led to the formation of these Islamic militant organizations. These Islamic militant organizations, in turn, recruited Lebanese Shi'a for terrorism. The table also indicates Amal's lack of control after 1978 and its weakness in policing its regions.

Lebanese Shi'a-style suicidal acts of terrorism requiring self-immolation are limited in this research to those committed by driving a motorized vehicle loaded with explosives, which detonate upon the vehicle's impact or when its engine is shut off. The immensity of the personal religious commitment by self-immolation is displayed by Lebanese Hizbollah's members "who alone are capable of carrying out suicide bomb attacks," according to Hojatalislam Karmani, a member of the Iranian Islamic Shoura (Parliament) Council.

Table 40 points out that seven out of eight suicidal acts of terrorism, attributed to or claimed by the Muslim religious organizations from 1978 to 1988, were committed within the 40-day period after Ashura. The probability that seven out of eight total terrorist incidents would occur by chance in a specific 40-day period out of 365 days is 0.001,
which also constitutes a demonstrable relationship between Ashura and terrorism. These data confirm that Lebanese Shi’a’s religious terrorist activities, including those requiring self-immolation, are higher during the 40 days that follow Ashura. Tables 39 and 40 identify a pattern distinctive of that of political terrorism by supporting the relationship between religious affinity for salvation and terrorism.

These two findings gives credit to the concept of religious terrorism formulated in this research. The intensity of the Lebanese Shi’i religious terrorism, according to Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin, makes political terrorism such as "The Palestinian Organizations' terrorism ... seem like children's games."

Table 40
Comparison of the Number and Percent of Suicidal Terrorist Acts Claimed by or Attributed to Terrorists Organizations with Shi’a Affiliation Performed During Each 40-Day Period from the End of Ashura, from 1982 to 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total #</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Suicidal Terrorist Acts Performed During MUHARRAM PERIOD

Compiled From: The Lebanese Center for Documentation (1988)
Test and Findings of The Remaining Special Hypotheses

Questionnaire B (Appendix C) is the primary data set utilized to test all of the remaining special hypotheses in this research. This questionnaire was administered to 60 Shi'a thought to be actively involved in Shi'a and Islamic militant organizations in Lebanon. Persons were non-randomly, non-proportionally selected for interview from guards manning roadblocks in the various factional territories in Bourj-El-Barajnet, a suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, from April 8, 1988 to April 14, 1988. Data extracted from this questionnaire were used to test the following special hypotheses:

Pertinent Hypotheses

I. Special hypotheses pertaining to religious terrorism:
   I. 3. Imprisonment of elements of a Lebanese militant Islamic religious organization increases the willingness of elements of that organization to commit religious terrorism.

   I. 4. Support for religious terrorism in Lebanon is stronger among Shi'a zealots than other Lebanese Shi'a.

   I. 5. Willingness to commit religious terrorism is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults.

II. Special hypotheses pertaining to religious resurgence:
II. 1. Religious resurgence is stronger among Lebanese
Shi'a youth than adults.

II. 2. Religious resurgence of the Lebanese Shi'a is stronger among the followers of militant Imams.

III. Special hypotheses pertaining to geo-cultural immobility

III. 1. Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more likely to become religious zealots than Lebanese Shi'a with higher geo-cultural mobility.

III. 2. The Lebanese Shi'a's perception of their geo-cultural immobility increases their religious resurgence.

Questionnaire Validity: A panel of five judges, composed of a comparative politics expert knowledgeable about the Middle East, three area experts skilled in social science research methods, and one Lebanese Shi'i theologian were asked to validate this questionnaire. Each judge was asked to indicate if the questions are a valid instrument. Three of the five judges validated each question before it was included in the questionnaire.

Analysis of Questionnaire B: This questionnaire was submitted to Amal and Hizbollah groups. Hizbollah are particularly known for their religious fanaticism and have repeatedly claimed responsibility for acts of terrorism.

This questionnaire attempted to identify patterns of association among variables indicative of the level of the Lebanese Shi'a's religious fanaticism and responsible for
their religious terrorism. Thus, this questionnaire attempted to provide the needed data to test the remaining special hypotheses of this research.

This data set is the primary data set for this research. It contains eight categories of attributes of the two Lebanese Shi'a and Islamic militant organizations, Amal and Hizbollah. These attributes are: age; geo-cultural mobility; imprisonment of family members; marital status; Imam's militancy; religious resurgence; willingness to commit terrorism; and zealotry. These variables are coded as shown in Table 41, below.

Table 41
Coding System of Operationalization of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element's Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (Youth = respondent 19 years old or younger).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (Adult = respondent over 19 years old).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy of Lebanese Shi'a Imam (as ranked by 3 of the Judges on the Panel).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High [attributes of Imam 1 (Fadlallah); 2 (Khomeynei)].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low [attributes of Imam 3 (el-Sadr) and 4 (Khouey)].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imprisonment Of Family Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (due to family member's presence in jail).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (due to the lack of any family member in jail).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geo-Cultural Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (due to residence outside Shi'a regions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (if never resided outside Shi'a regions).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (if married or have dependent children).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (if Single).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (due to a Yes answer to question 11).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (due to a No answer to question 11).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness to Commit Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (due to a Yes answer to question 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (due to a No answer to question 2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zealotry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High (due to a Yes answer to questions 8, 9, and 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Low (due to a No answer to any of questions 8, 9, &amp;10).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The choice of employable statistical methodology was limited by: (1) the lack of precise quantitative data on geo-cultural mobility; and (2) the relatively judgmental nature of the data on the militancy of Lebanese Shi'a Imams, religious resurgence, religious zealotry, and willingness to commit terrorism. However, it was possible to utilize a coding system to rank the variables.

Contingency table analysis was selected as the best method to analyze the data set. To test the strength of the relationship between the above attributes, correlation coefficients are used.

To identify patterns and associations between the eight variables, eight cross-tabulation tables have been constructed. These tables will be analyzed by inspection and by the use of phi(϶), a correlation coefficient which is used to estimate association in a 2 X 2 table. The range of phi lies between -1.00 and +1.00. Chi Square, a test for assessing the statistical significance of cross-tabulated variables, is also used.

Findings: Tests of the remaining seven hypotheses are presented in Tables 42-48. These tables show the absolute frequencies and the column percentages for each relationship. They also contain a chi-square estimates of statistical significance among the variables in each relationship, and the phi coefficient of correlation between
the two variables in each table.

The relationship between Amal and Hizbollah's Shi'a elements who have members of their families in jail and their willingness to commit acts of terrorism to secure their release, is presented in Table 42, below. It is an attempt to test special hypothesis I. 3. This hypothesis states: Imprisonment of elements of a Lebanese militant Islamic religious organization increases the willingness of elements of that organization willingness to commit religious terrorism.

More than 78% of those respondents who have members of their families in prison say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism to secure their release. But only 59.37% of those who do not have close members of their families in jail, say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism to secure their release. The correlation between these two variables is 0.20. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is not statistically significant. While the percentage difference, about 12%, is not extremely large, the relationship is in the predicted direction, and can be taken as supportive of hypothesis I. 3.
The relationship between Amal and Hizbollah's Shi'a zealots and their willingness to commit acts of terrorism, is presented in Tables 43 A and B, below. They are an attempt to test special hypothesis I. 4. This hypothesis states: Support for religious terrorism in Lebanon is stronger among Shi'a zealots than other Lebanese Shi'a.

About 75% of all the zealots among both Amal and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism. But only 43.18% of the non-zealots in both Shi'a groups, say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism. The correlation between these two variables is 0.24. The chi-square indicates that the relationship is nearly significant statistically. Thus, this outcome offers modest support for the expectations of hypothesis I. 4.
In Islam, believers are required to marry to fulfill their religious duties. Yet Shi'a canons prohibit a Shi'i from willingly endangering his life and the livelihood of his dependents. Thus, for this research to properly test special hypothesis I. 4, the marital status of each respondent zealot was considered. Thus, the relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's married Shi'a zealots, and their willingness to commit acts of terrorism is tested, and the result of which are present in Table 43, B.

Some 80% of all the unmarried zealots among both Amal and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism. On the other hand, 72.72% of the married zealots say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism. The correlation between these two variables is 0.075. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is not statistically significant. The small number of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>Zealot</th>
<th>Not Zealots</th>
<th>Zealots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>56.81%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willing</td>
<td>43.18%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{Chi-square} = 3.73 \text{ with } 1 \text{ df...significance} = 0.063 \]

\[ \Phi = 0.24 \]
respondents found in this table makes this research cautious about interpreting it too forcefully, of course. Nevertheless, this relationship is in the predicted direction, and can be used to reinforce previous supportive findings for hypothesis 1.4.

Table 43 B
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Married Zealot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willing</td>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>72.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phi = 0.075
Chi-square = 0.0970 with 1 df...significance = 0.755

The relationship between Amal’s and Hizbollah’s Shi’a respondents’ age and willingness to commit acts of terrorism, is presented in Tables 44 A and B. They are an attempt to test hypothesis I. 5. This hypothesis states: Willingness to commit religious terrorism is stronger among Lebanese Shi’a youth than adults.

A total of 71.42% of both Amal’s and Hizbollah’s Shi’a elements 19 years of age old or younger say they are willing to commit acts of terrorism, in comparison with 34.37% of their older cohorts. The correlation between these two
variables is -0.369. The chi-square indicates that the relationship is statistically significant. Due to the setup of this table, the correlation is negative, but the relationship is in the predicted direction and can be taken as supportive of hypothesis I. 5.

Table 44 A
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>Age in Years</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 and Under</td>
<td>Over 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>65.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willing</td>
<td>71.42</td>
<td>34.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \Phi = -0.369 \]

Chi-square = 8.2103 with 1 df...significance = 0.004

Further indication of the nature and direction of the relationship between age of respondents and their stated willingness to commit terrorism, is provided in Table 44 B. Table 44 B indicates that respondent willingness to commit terrorism decreases with age. No adult over the age of 22 stated his willingness to commit terrorism. The correlation between these two variables is -0.646. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is statistically significant, and can be used to enforce previous supportive findings of hypothesis I. 5.
Table 44 B
Willingness to Commit Terrorism and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commit Terrorism</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unwilling</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willing</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 19.6636 with 1 df...significance = 0.141

The relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents' age and the extent of their religious commitment, is presented in Table 45, below. It is an attempt to test special hypothesis II. 1. This hypothesis states: Religious resurgence is stronger among Lebanese Shi'a youth than adults.

A total of 83.87% of both Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents who indicated strong personal religious commitments are at or below the age of 19. And about 75% of the adult cohorts in both groups indicated strong personal religious commitments. The correlation between these two variables is 0.1. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is not statistically significant. This relationship is, however, in the predicted direction, and may be used as a modest support of hypothesis II. 1.
Table 45
Religious Resurgence and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Age in Years</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 and Under</td>
<td>Over 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td>16.12%</td>
<td>24.13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td>83.87%</td>
<td>75.86%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Φ = 0.1

χ^2 = 0.6007 with 1 df...significance = 0.438

The relationship between the extent of militancy of Amal’s and Hizbollah’s Shi’a respondents’ Imams and the strength of their religious commitment, is presented in Table 46, below. It is an attempt to test special hypothesis II. 2. This hypothesis states: Religious resurgence of the Lebanese Shi’a is stronger among the followers of militant Imams.

A total of 62.5% of both Amal’s and Hizbollah’s Shi’a respondents who identified themselves as followers of Imams who in turn are more militant, indicated a strong personal religious commitment. At the same time, none of the Shi’a respondents who identified themselves as followers of less militant Imams indicated religious resurgence. The correlation between these two variables is 0.5. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is statistically significant, and provides a strong support of hypothesis II. 2.
Table 46
Religious Resurgence and Imam's Militancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Extent of Imam's Militancy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Militant</td>
<td>More Militant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phi = 0.5
Chi-square = 15.000 with 1 df...significance = 0.000

The relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents' geo-cultural mobility and the strength of their religious commitment, is presented in Table 47, below. It is an attempt to test special hypothesis III. 1. This hypothesis states: Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more likely to become religious zealots than Lebanese Shi'a with higher geo-cultural mobility.

About 39.58% of both Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents who listed prior residence outside predominately Shi'a regions in Lebanon, indicated a strong personal religious commitment. But 66.66% of the respondents who never resided outside Lebanese Shi'a regions indicated a strong personal religious commitment. The correlation between these two variables is -0.047. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is not statistically
significant. This relationship is, however, in the predicted direction, and can be taken as very modestly supportive of hypothesis III.1.

Table 47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Resurgence</th>
<th>Extent of Geo-Cultural Mobility</th>
<th>Less Mobile</th>
<th>More Mobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>60.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.66%</td>
<td>39.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{Phi} = -0.047\]

\[\text{Chi-square} = 2.8451\text{ with 1 df...significance} = 0.092\]

The relationship between Amal's and Hizbollah's Shi'a respondents' geo-cultural mobility and the extent of their religious zealotry, is presented in Table 48, below. It is an attempt to test special hypothesis III.2. This hypothesis states: The Lebanese Shi'a's perception of their geo-cultural immobility increases their religious resurgence.

More than 43% of those who have previously resided outside Lebanese Shi'a regions are identified as zealots. In comparison, 45.45% of those respondents who have never lived outside Lebanon's predominantly Shi'a regions are identified as zealots. The correlation between these two variables is 0.0147. The chi-square indicates that this relationship is
not statistically significant. The relationship is, however, in the predicted direction, and can be considered as mildly supportive of hypothesis III. 2.

Table 48
Religious Zealotry and Geo-Cultural Mobility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Zealotry</th>
<th>Extent of Geo-Cultural Mobility</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Mobile</td>
<td>More Mobile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a Zealot</td>
<td>54.54% (24)</td>
<td>56.25% (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zealot</td>
<td>45.45% (20)</td>
<td>43.75% (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (44)</td>
<td>100% (16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

φ = 0.0147
Chi-square = 0.0138 with 1 df...significance = 0.907

Summary of Findings: In this chapter we have presented data testing nine special hypotheses concerning religious terrorism, religious resurgence, and geo-cultural immobility. These special hypotheses were divided into three sections. In Section I, hypotheses one and two concern the effect of Ashura on the Lebanese Shi'a terrorist activities. These hypotheses predict that religious terrorism is strongly related to religious anniversaries commemorating martyrdom. The data show that most of the Lebanese Shi'a terrorist activities occurred in the 40-day period following Ashura. The likelihood of this relationship to happen by chance is
nearly zero. This is a significant finding. It shows the importance of religious events in some trends of terrorist acts, and gives substance to the concept of religious terrorism introduced in this research.

The remaining hypotheses in Section I deal with the effect of age, religious commitment, imprisonment of family members, and terrorism. These hypotheses suggests that youth, zealots, and those who have members of their families in prison, are more likely to be willing to commit acts of religious terrorism than others.

In general, the data tend to support these research hypotheses. While not all of those relationships are strong, and some are even not significant statistically, this researcher feels that, since the pattern of results of these tables is in the predicted direction, the results are substantively meaningful. That is, Lebanese Shi'a youth, zealots, and those with family members in jail are more likely to commit terrorism than others.

In Section II, hypotheses one and two concern the effect of age and militant Imams on the extent of the Lebanese Shi'a's religious commitment and religious resurgence. These hypotheses expect religious resurgence to be strongly related to age and the extent of the militancy of the Shi'i Imam.

To a considerable degree, the data support these hypotheses. And the pattern of results of the tables and statistics presented in this chapter are uniformly in the
predicted direction of the special hypotheses. That is, Lebanese Shi'a youth and followers of militant Imams are more susceptible to religious resurgence.

In Section III, hypotheses one and two concern the effect of geo-cultural immobility on the extent of the Lebanese Shi'a religious commitment, and religious resurgence. These hypotheses expect religious resurgence to be negatively related to the extent of the Lebanese Shi'i geo-cultural mobility.

These hypotheses are supported in varying degrees by the data. And the pattern of results of these statistics is in these hypotheses predicted direction. That is, Lebanese Shi'a with low geo-cultural mobility are more susceptible to religious resurgence and religious zealotry.

From this analysis, we can conclude that geo-cultural immobility increases the religious resurgence of Lebanon's Shi'a youth, leading them to zealotry. These zealots tend to be followers of more militant Imams and are more likely to commit religious terrorism within the 40-day period after Ashura.

Test and Findings of The Quasi-Experiment

To further illuminate the multi-dimensional effect of geo-cultural immobility on the Lebanese Shi'a, a quasi-experiment was conducted. Two panels of Lebanese Shi'a students were studied. One panel of 25 students was asked,
immediately after they arrived in the United States to attend college, to respond to questionnaire A (Appendix C). Two years later, after they had been exposed to the American culture and way of life, they were interviewed again and asked to respond to the same questions.

The second panel, consisting of 57 students attending two Western universities in Lebanon, served as a control group. All of the elements of this panel are of the same class, educational level, religion, sect, and Lebanese Shi'a regions. This control panel was tested and retested by the same instrument within the same time frame. From the pre- and post-exposure responses, this researcher found a change in the first panel's personal religious involvement and attitudes toward religion and politics.

**Methodology:** Questionnaire A consists of three sections. Section I. of the questionnaire consists of demographic data on each respondent. It is used to identify the individuals that are members of the same Shi'a sect, the respondents' Imam, and the extent of their affiliation to religious organizations. Questions to be answered by respondents for analysis are located in Sections II and III of the questionnaire.

To gather attitudinal information on the effect of geo-cultural immobility and susceptibility to religious resurgence, a Likert type scale was developed in Section II. In this study, four categories were assigned: Strongly Agree = 4
points, Agree = 3 points, Disagree = 2 points, and Strongly Disagree = 1 point. "No opinion" was not used.

Open-ended questions are used in Section III, to permit respondents to formulate and express, in their own words, their thoughts and perceptions of the level of their sect's geographic mobility, Lebanon's level of cultural pluralism, confessional equity, and the popularity of their political leadership. The mere identification of their sect with geographic isolation, Lebanon's confessional inequity, sectarian segregation, discontent with political leadership, merited each respondent four points per comment. On the other hand, lack of any comments on the above in questions 23 to 27 merited each respondent 1 point per question.

Questionnaire Validity: The same panel of five judges identified previously also was asked to validate this questionnaire. Three of the five judges validated each question before it was included in the questionnaire.

Analysis Procedures: As shown by Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science, (1985, P. 313), "When the research design is of the before-after type... the mean difference of the individual scores form a normal or T distribution." A procedure for analyzing such matched pairs is called the paired T Test. This paired T test assumes that the distribution of differences is at best normally distributed. If the population of differences is not at best approximately normally distributed and it is not possible to
drew a larger sample, we may use a test known as "the sign test... This test is a non-parametric test so that it does not depend on the functional form of the parent population..." Business statistics., (Daniel, and Terrell, 1983, p. 212).

In short, the matched Pairs T Test is used to analyze pairs of observations to see if the mean of the Xs equal the mean of the Ys. The matched pairs are reduced to a single sample by taking differences between the two observations in the matched pair. These differences are usually denoted by $D_i = X_i - Y_i$, from a single sample of observation.

Upon collection of the data, the questionnaire was scored and processed. It should be kept in mind that neither group was randomly selected, and that the purpose of this analysis is not to illustrate the statistical significance of this experiment, but to explore a potentially interesting set of data related to the central concerns of this study. This analysis is speculative, tentative, and exploratory.

Results: This questionnaire examines whether geo-cultural mobility affected group one's personal religious involvement. Both groups' initial answers were highly correlated, since both groups originally regarded Islam as a viable political solution and a way to fulfill their political needs. The perceptions of the control group practically remained unchanged in the follow-up questionnaire.

The comparison of the initial scores with those of two
years later, however, indicated substantial changes in group one's answers. These changes occurred after group one's relocation within a high cultural pluralism and exposure to the American way of life. This, in turn, affected the level of their personal religious involvement and social tolerance. All of the above are based upon the assumption that education, kinship, finances, and religion are controlled for variables.

Thus, the sum of answers to questions 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, and 27 served as a measure of the strength of each respondent's personal religious commitments. As expected, the simple correlation between the scores of group one and group two differ statistically after group one's members were relocated and exposed to a nation with high cultural pluralism. After two years of residence in the United States, the attitude of group one toward politics, order, governments, and Islam differed significantly from what they have had previously and those of group 2 remaining within the Lebanese sectarian environment. This is due to the average D1= 18, taken from the sum of differences to answers to questions 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, and 27.

Findings of this quasi-experiment provides this research with an added dimension to the extent of the effect of geo-cultural immobility. Geo-cultural immobility is proven to have a demonstrable effect on the militant Lebanese Shi‘i and
its educated youth.

Conclusion

The purpose of undertaking this case study of the Shi'a in Lebanon was threefold. First, as an hypothesis-generating case study, its objective was to formulate relevant hypotheses about religious resurgence and religious terrorism. This study achieved this objective by formulating, in Chapter One, 14 general and nine special hypotheses. The search for an approach, questions, and assumptions presented in Chapter One permitted such formulation. This study also presented, in Chapter Seven, tests of the latter hypotheses. Chapter Seven moved this research forward, toward the theory-building process in the study of the phenomena of religious terrorism.

A second purpose of this study was to explore the trajectory of the Lebanese Shi'a's sectarian mobilization. This exploration was carried out in Chapter Four and Five. It was advanced by Chapter Five's dissection of the complex process of religious resurgence and the explication of a simple explanation for it. This explanation focuses on the concept of geo-cultural immobility, introduced in Chapter Four. Geo-cultural immobility of a minority is defined as its low geographic mobility in a nation with a low cultural pluralism. Chapter Five demonstrated that the Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility is directly related to their ongoing religious resurgence.

The third purpose was to study the changes in the
objectives and tactics of a religious minority, that of the Muslim Shi'a in Lebanon. This research was able, via its analysis of primary and secondary data in Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven, to show a relationship between the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence and the use of religious terrorism. Chapter Six shows that the Lebanese Shi'a's religious resurgence produces zealots needed by religious terrorist organizations. This study introduced in Chapter One the term religious terrorism, and defined it as violent acts performed by elements of religious organizations or sects, growing out of a commitment to communicate a divine message. After reviewing pertinent literature, this study felt the need to distinguish between religious terrorism, secular terrorism, and fighters for religious freedom, a distinction which is shown to be essential to the proper understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. All of these concepts are essential to understand the motives behind the acts of terrorism undertaken by Lebanese Shi'a, and the linkage between terrorism and the Lebanese Shi'a religious resurgence.

The primary and secondary data and the quasi-experiment in this research all support, in varying degrees, the special hypotheses. As shown in Chapter Seven, the data form a pattern showing a relationship between the eight Lebanese Shi'a cultural and religious attributes employed here, and religious resurgence and religious terrorism.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that Lebanese Shi'a's geo-cultural immobility increases the religious resurgence of its youth, leading them to zealotry. Young Lebanese Shi'a with high religious commitments tend predominantly to support more militant Shi'a Imams. And they are more likely to commit religious terrorism, within the 40-day period after Ashura, than Lebanese Shi'a adults. Those with family members in jail, as well, are more likely than others to commit religious terrorism.

In order to provide a means of predicting future Lebanese Shi'a religious terrorist activities, this study provides a model personality of a Shi'i religious terrorist. This model personality profile is portrayed in Chapter Six.

The concepts of religious terrorism and geo-cultural immobility introduced by this research, its proposed organization of the study of terrorism, its distinction between terrorism and freedom fighting, as well as the demonstrated relationships between geo-cultural immobility, religious resurgence, and religious terrorism clearly has comparative relevance for other societies facing similar issues. This study provides an added dimension to, and its hypotheses permit a better understanding of, the phenomenon of terrorism, the ultimate goal of this study.
APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS, MEASURES, AND VARIABLES
Charismatic Religious Leader: Charisma: like beauty, exists in the eye of the beholder, for as Weber said "what is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to his charismatic authority (weber, 1947, p.359). Indeed the rule of an elite is legitimate in any sense used here, if and only if the nonelite believe it is. Thus authority is to some extent a function of a leader's compliance with the expectations of his followers. For this reason legitimacy can constrain or sustain elite in power.

Defined in line with Webber theories, or simply through sloppy paralance by Jack Plano and Roy Olton, in The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition as: "Leadership characterized by a mystical or spiritual messianic quality that elicits widespread emotional popular support often bordering on reverence. Charismatic leadership tends to merge with the spirit of nationalism and to become identified with, or symbolic of, the state itself (in this particular case study, symbolic of the religion or sect itself)."

Charismatic Religious Authority: Rests upon the uncommon and extraordinary devotion of followers to the sacredness or the heroic force or the exemplariness of an individual and the order revealed or created by him. In my opinion, Charisma, properly understood, and contextually put is not so much a gift of individual personality as it is the following called forth by one who is able to catalyze latent discontents and extend the hope of overcoming them. Moreover, lacking the traditional indications of legitimate authority - titles, training, ordination, trappings of office, and so forth - religious charismatic leaders regularly have recourse to an altogether different and superior source of legitimacy: the sacred itself, claiming that their authority rests on revelations, descendence, or visions, direct experience of transcendent reality.

Thus, The charismatic leader, particularly in that region of Lebanon, and for the Shi'a appears to his followers to be the personification of truth, one who is beyond the fears and ambitions of ordinary mortals, and is the chosen instrument for the realization of the sect destiny. He then easily become the leader of a movement, in this particular case of the Shi'a movement in Lebanon.

Charismatic Religious Leader may be measured by the number or percentage of attendance gathered at a specific individual meeting or speech in comparison to others of equal or above that individual position (be it official, religious, or social status), and or the sway of votes obtained by that leader favorite or protegee, and or by the leader ability to mobilize sectional resources.
Consociational Democracy: Where democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures. So the high level of integration of its elites, by its top leaders is what could be called Consociational Democracy. Which could dissolve eventually the social and cultural tensions that originally required it. Raymond Aron wrote: "A unified Elite means the end of Freedom, But when the groups of the Elite are not only distinct but become a disunity it means the End of the State..."

Deprivation (Relative): Defined by Ted Gurr (1970) as actors' perceptions of discrepancies between their value expectations (the goods, services, and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled), and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods, conditions, and services that they think they are able to get and keep). It can be measured by:
1- Economic Discrimination: Defined as systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases.
2- Political Discrimination: Is defined in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice of social groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed characteristics. And measured by a factor analysis and/or average of the per capita income; level of industrialization; number of hospitals, doctors, schools, colleges, parks, projects; and employment opportunities in civil services, armed forces, departmental head quotas.
3- Potential Separatism:
4- Dependence on Private foreign capital.
5- Religious cleavages.
6- Lack of Educational Opportunity.
Also their is measures for Mediating variables such as:
1- Potential and size of coercive forces.
2- Institutionalization.
3- Facilitation
4- Legitimacy.
Gurr have abandoned relative deprivation as an explanatory principle and replaced it with "Strain." Strain means according to Gurr: Relatively invariant structural constraints on the equitable distribution of values (valued social goods and conditions) within and among societies (in Gurr and Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960's", pp. 138-40 ).
Ijtihad: (As defined in Encyclopedia Britanica, 15th Ed. p. 820.) For the Shi'ah, it is the independent interpretation of a muqallid, and have been maintained as a living principle and as a mean of communicating with the "hidden Imam" (spiritual leader expected to return on the Last Day as the Mahdi).

Legitimacy (government): Defined in terms of popular compliance, and psychologically by reference to the extent to which regime directives are regarded by its citizens as properly made and worthy of obedience. It can be measured by indicators of popular compliance with governmental directives such as: Number of prohibited demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, civil disorders, and rebellions.

Millennialism & Millenarian Groups: (As defined in the Encyclopedia Britanica, 15th Ed. p.200.) Millennialism (from the latin word for 1,000) is a philosophy of history viewed from a Christian theological standpoint and a religious movement now associated with such modern Protestant sects as the Adventists, Jehovah's Witness, and certain segments of many Protestant denominations. There have been many millennial groups and individuals throughout church history. The term is derived from the imagery of the New Testament Book of Revelation (Rev.20), in which the writer describes a vision of Satan being bound and thrown into a bottomless pit and of Christian martyrs being raised from the dead and reigning with Christ for 1,000 years. This 1,000-year period, known as the millennium, is viewed as a time during which man's yearnings for peace, freedom from evil, and the rule of righteousness upon earth are finally realized through the power of God. In short and as a branch of eschatology—that area of theology dealing with last things, such as death, immortality, the last Judgments, the end of the world, the rewards of the Just, and the punishment of the damned—millennialism is concerned with the earthly prospects of the human community. Millennialism is thus the cosmology (study of order) of eschatology, its chronology one of future events, comparable to the historical record of the past.

Failure of political leadership: Defined as the failure of incumbent political leaders to perform adequately the required functions necessary to maintain popular support. It can be measured by an objective observer, by a positive/significant decline in the number or percentage of votes, obtained by incumbent political leaders from his constituency.
Political Participation: Defined in terms of Mobilized versus Autonomous Participation: Many people who vote, demonstrate, or take other actions that appear to be political participation do not act with the personal intention of influencing government decision-makers. For the immediate actor did not seek to influence government decision-making. Someone else (the landlord, the warlord, the union leader...) did intend to do so. Through coercion, persuasion, or material inducements they are able to mobilize others in pursuit of their objectives. As taken from Samuel Huntington, and Joan Nelson (1976). Page 7. The extreme case of political participation leads to revolutions. For the political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them (Huntington 1968). Political participation also expands because more people become less poor and because more people become more politically conscious. It is possible to measure participation in terms of the different types of collective organizations through which participation is organized and which commonly form the bases for such participation: among which are:

1-Class: Individuals of similar social status, income, and occupation.

2-Communal Group: Individuals of similar race, religion, language, or ethnicity.

3-Neighborhood: Individuals residing in geographical proximity to each other.

4-Party: Individuals who identify with the same formal organization attempting to win or maintain control of the executive and legislative branches of government.

5-Faction: Individuals united by sustained or intense personal interaction with each other, one manifestation of which is the patron-client grouping...

It may be measured by the sum of individual decisions about participation in a social setting, that is the individual decisions resulting in a participant population with a particular composition in demographic terms. The relation between individual demographic or attitudinal characteristics and political activity on the individual level will determine in part the extent to which and the way in which the composition of the participant population differs from the composition of the population as a whole.

Religion (Open): Any religion open to new members and characterized by an emphasis on the conversion of non-believers by preaching its divine message via missionaries. It will be identified and measured by an objective observer by the sponsored number of missions in accordance with the definition.
Religion Of The Status Quo: Bruce Lincoln identifies it as: "...the religion of the dominant party that disseminates a characteristic ideology through all segments of society, propounding a set of fundamental values and principles which, while expressed in terms of lofty abstraction or eternal truth, nevertheless serves to further the interests of those who hold power. Most often, this ideology is couched in religious or para-religious forms. It is this ideology and the institutional means for its propagation that I would call the "religion of the status quo". Whatever other tenets may be included in such a religion, I would expect to find present a legitimation of the dominant party's right to hold wealth, power, and prestige; an endowment of the social order with a sacral aura, mythic charter, or other transcendent justification; and a valorization of suffering within this world, concomitant with the extended promise of non-material compensations for such suffering.

Social mobilization: Defined by Deutsch "...in effect, has two dimensions: First, it is an indicator of the modernization process (but not identical with the process of modernization as a whole) Second, it speaks to the consequences of modernization. As an indicator, the concept subsumes a wide range of variables that when measured over time signal the extent of the changes that are taking place in a given country.

Taqiyah: (Taken from the Encyclopedia Britanica, 15th ed. p. 819.) (Arabic: "Caution"), "in Islam, the practice of concealing one's belief and foregoing ordinary religious duties when under threat of death or injury to oneself or one's fellow Muslims. The Qur'an allows Muslims to profess friendship with the unbelievers and even outwardly to deny their faith if doing so would save them from imminent danger on the condition that their hearts contradict their tongues. Muhammad himself was regarded to have set the first example for the application of Taqiyah when he chose to migrate to Medina rather than face his powerful enemies in Mecca. Some rules have been laid down as to when a Muslim may or may not use Taqiyah. The threat of flogging or temporary imprisonment and other discomforts that remain within tolerable limits do not justify the use of Taqiyah. A person without responsibilities toward women or children may not use it under any circumstances short of direct and express threat of life. Oaths taken with mental reservation are justified on the basis that God accepts what believed inwardly. Consideration of community rather than private welfare is stressed in most cases.

The Shi'a made Taqiyah a fundamental tenet because
of their suffering from persecution and political defeats throughout their history. They held that Ali himself was adhering to the principle of Taqiyah when he did not express his firm belief in his divine right to the succession of Muhammad during the reign of his three predecessors.

Ultimately, it is left to the conscience of each individual to judge, when the situation arises, whether Taqiyah is absolutely necessary and whether his private interests or those of the religion and the community are being served.

Taqlid: Also taken (from Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 820.) In Islam, it means, the unquestioning acceptance of the legal decisions of a specific theologian as authoritative.

Religious Terrorism: a) Terrorism: 1) It is defined by the U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals as: A tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes. 2) Yonah Alexander (1975) a pioneer researcher, defines terrorism as: A tactic employed by nonstate actors involving the threat or use of fear-inducing forms of violence in an attempt to attain certain political objectives. (This definition has achieved a significant degree of citations, and international acceptance.

The above two definitions, in this researcher opinion, must be restricted to the identification of Political terrorism. A distinction is made in this research between Religious and Political terrorism based on the following:

Religious Terrorism: defined here as Violent acts performed by elements of a religious organization/sect, growing out of a commitment to communicate a divine message.

Religious terrorism is distinguishable from political terrorism in that:

A. Religious terrorism is a method of communicating forcefully a perceived divine message and/or will.

B. Performed by elements of a religious organization/sect.

C. Most violent acts of religious terrorism are not restricted to the influence of governmental decision making.

D. Religious terrorism are operations that are not solely executed for the purpose of fulfilling personal gains, or the satisfactions of non-religious grievances.

E. A religious terrorist violent acts are distinguishable from those of a fighter for religious freedom, whose Combative operations are restricted to areas under enemy control, for the purpose of removing perceived illegi-
timate and oppressive forces/elements. And unlike religious terrorism, a fighter for religious freedom does:

1) not intend to inflict loses upon individual/non-collective entities.

2) Perform his preemptive/reactive operations within the zone of enemy influence and control.

3) operations that are not solely executed for the purpose of fulfilling personal gains, or the satisfaction of individual non-religious grievances.

4) Have a religious operational code that govern his tactics.

Terrorism (Religious) may be measured by an objective observer by the number of religiously motivated arsens; assassinations; bombings; hostage-takings; kidnapping; skyjackings.

Violence: According to Smelser"For any manifestation of collective behavior to take place six determinants must come into play, and should be measured independently.

1-Structural Conductiveness: For a given human configuration must provide social space for a corresponding mode of collective behavior...

2-Structural Strain:

3-Growth and Spread of a Generalized belief that defines and explains the strained situation to the people who experience it.

4-Precipitating Factors: The sparks needed to ignite the volatile mixture of stages 1 to 3.

5-Mobilization of Participants for action: Which is the obvious fact that people must cooperate to act in concert.

6-Operation of Social Control: The extent and timing of Counter-Collective action by authoritative power holders.
APPENDIX B

SUGGESTED POLITICAL TERRORIST PROFILE
The chief assumption underlying most of the following attributes and theories is that the terrorist is in one way or the other not normal and that the insights from psychology and psychiatry are adequate keys to understanding. Some terrorists are certainly psychotics but whether all criminal, and political terrorists fall under this label is questionable.

General Attributes

1. A terrorist is a person engaged in politics who makes little if any distinction between strategy and tactics on one hand, and principles on the other.

2. A terrorist is a person prepared to surrender his own life for a cause considered transcendent in value.

3. Terrorist is a person who possesses both a self-fulfilling prophetic element and a self-destructive element.

4. A terrorist is a person for whom all events are volatile and none are determined.

5. A terrorist is a person who is (a) young; (b) most often of middle class family background; (c) usually male; and (d) economically marginal.

6. A terrorist performs his duties as an avocation.

7. A terrorist does not have a particularly well-defined ideological persuasion."
Special Attributes

1. Inconsistent mothering plays a role in the making of a terrorist (Jonas as Cit. in Micholus 1980, p.361).

2. Terrorists suffer from faulty vestibular functions of the middle ear, which correlates with a history of learning to walk late, dizzy spells, visual problems and general clumsiness (Hubbard as Cit. in Russell 1977, p.33).

3. Grave political violence can be found especially in those countries where fantasies of cleanliness are frequent (Frank, 1976, p.49).

4. Terrorists are Zealots who seek aggressive confrontations with authority in the name of social justice. Zealotry is thereby defined as "low rule attunement, high social sensitivity and low self-awareness" and contrasted to moral realism and moral enthusiasm as the two other basic moral attitudes (Hogan, 1978, p. 18).

5. The terrorists (In Quebec) generally reject the father and the values he represents, are impatient with the constitutional process and accepted norality, and combine an above-average intelligence with emotional immaturity. The affective qualities of them seem to be replaced by instincts—sexual lust, craving for notoriety and thirst for power (Morf, 1970, p.116).

6. Neither politics nor ideology make terrorists: The politics of sex are more influential in terrorism than the
politics of Mao, Trotsky or Ho Chi Minh. It is just that the latter, as a rationalization, seems so much more respectable and the terrorist, above all, craves respect (Cooper, 1977, p.6).

7. Terrorism arises periodically when the persons who are predisposed to violent actions are stimulated more strongly than before. The contemporary epidemic of psychological disorders started in 1963 with the assassination of President Kennedy. Indicators of group unrest and violence as well as of mental disorders, drug addiction, criminality, etc. were rising before that time. .. An epidemic of terrorism occurs when increasing numbers of action groups are constituted and held together and when they are capable of executing series of operations (Possony, 1986, pp.90-91).

8. Terrorists show three main character traits: (1) their handling of their own emotions is disturbed, which shows itself in fear to engage in real commitments. The fear of love leads them to choose for violence; (2) their attitude towards authority is disturbed, whereby a principally negative attitude towards the "old authorities" is combined with an uncritical subjection under the new counter-authorities; (3) a disturbed relationship with their own identity. Having failed to develop an identity of their own they try to get one by the use of violence (Salewski, as Cit. in Russell, 1977, p. 37).
9. Terrorism is an urge to destroy oneself and others born out of radical despair, a new form of "disease unto death" which manifests itself by way of the inability to be part of the community, the loss of the capacity to understand reality and an aimlessness due to "methodological atheism" (Kasch, 1979, p. 52).

10. Terrorism might in part be due to a failure of the socialization process, especially resulting from a lack of felt authority or an anti-authoritarian education. Education has to restrain, forbid and to suppress in order to adapt children to pro-social behaviour. Education as it is presently practiced often favours the achievement of personal advantage which can result in blindness towards the community. The failure is not only one of the families but also of the universities and certain publishers who spread anarchist literature in cheap editions (Schwind, as Cit. in Micholus, 1980, p. 143).

11. Characteristic for the terrorist is the need to pursue absolute ends. The meaning of the terrorist act is localized in the violence (Kaplan, 1981, p.42).

12. Terrorists tend to resemble each other, regardless of their cause. Most of them are individuals for whom terrorism provides profound personal satisfaction, a sense of fulfillment through total dedication, to the point of self-sacrifice; a sense of power through inflicting pain and death upon other human beings (Berger, 1976,p.8).
APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRES A AND B
QUESTIONNAIRE A:

SECTION I.

1. ___ _SECTION___ RE Li C Ti o n___ ___ _____ S E C T ___________ IMAM__________RE Li C Ti o n

2. _____ED U C A T I O N _ L E V E L _ ___ ___ I N S T I T U T I O N _____

3. The last Change Date in applicable ______  Justification

4. IMMEDIATE FAMILY STATUS: CLASSE _______ NUMBER _______ ANNUAL INCOME ___

FREQUENCY______________________________PERIOD____________________LEBANON

SECTION II.

PLEASE INDICATE YOUR DEGREE OF AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH OF
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: (Note: Our government means contemporary
Lebanese governments legitimized by the 1942 Constitution).

STRENGTH: AGREE: AGREE: DISAGREE: DISAGREE

1.- We are only trustees, to Allah's gift of Life.

2.- Our religious preference is indicated on our passports, as a brand and a mean of res-iriction from travel abroad by our government.

3.- None of our contemporary political leaders have the best interest of our sect at heart.

4.- Our present form of government is deprived of our support for it lacks legitimacy.

5.- The present deprivation of our sect members have been due primarily to past reliance on political leadership.

6.- Lebanon is a confessionational democracy.

7.- Religious martyrdom is a duty.

8.- Our future Constitution must be based on Islam.

9.- Perceived religious ends vindicate any mean(.

10.- Terrorism is a justifiable tool in a Muslim arsenal.

11.- Terrorism is a form of political participation.

12.- None of our present political leadership is capable of guiding us into a better future.

13.- I perform all my religious duties daily.

14.- Political governments can not provide us satisfaction.

15.- The wishes of my Imam are my command.

16.- Lebanon is a part and parcel of and for the Muslim nation.

17.- I have control over my destiny.

18.- The United States is Satan in disguise.

19.- Western culture could only lead us into temptation and away from Islam.

20.- Depict please, on the continuum and by increasing order from the most to the least important, the following: Money; Spouse; Child; Father; Brother; Sister; God; Cousin; Country; Sect/Religion/Member; Leader/Deer.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10----.
Section III.
21- State the title of the three non-educational, fictional, professional books recently read/reviewed by you.

22- Are you familiar with what Ahmed El-Assad have replied when asked to assist in the provision of a new high school (it had to do with the education of his son Kamel), if so restate in your own words his response.

23- Briefly Describe Lebanon (Politics, culture, language, religion):

24- Briefly Describe the Lebanese People:

25- How should the above relationship be?

26- Briefly Describe Lebanon (past/present/future) Role in the Middle East.

27- Briefly Describe Lebanon (future) Role in the International Arena.

-Respondent Comments:

SECTION IV: Date Completed: __________ Respondent: __________ Date: __________
Questionnaire B:

A.

ReadBlock _______ Location ____________________________

RESPONDENT: 1-Age______ Sex_____ Race_______ Religion______ Sect________
Nationality_________ Birth Place_____________________
Adherent to Imam________________ Based at__________
Level of Education (Years)______ Achieved at_______
Familiarity With Additional Language(s)________
Annual Income ______ Type of Present Employment:
Farming ( ); Manual Labor ( ); Mechanical ( ); Civil
Service (Governmental( ); Technical ( ); Educational-
al ( ); Managerial ( ); Temporary ( ); Unemployed ( );
Others ________________________ For How Long _______ Expected
Duration (future) ___________ Why?________________________

2-Marital Status _____ Spouse Age _____ Spouse Employed
Number of Children_____ Average Age of Children_____
Number of Children Employed _____ Attending Schools____

3-Number Of Persons Residing with Respondent______ Total
Annual Income of Household $ _______ Number of Contribu-
tor(s)_______

4-Does Respondent Resides With: Father/Mother( );
Brother( ); Sister( ); Cousin( ); Average Age of House-
hold_____

5-Has Respondent Ever Resided in Other: City( ); Region /
Mohafaza ( ); Country: __________/____________/_______

6-Does Respondent Receives A Needed And Continues Financial
Support From A Non-House Hold Resident( ); Rela-
tionship To Provider_________; Country in which Provider
Resides______________ Annual Amount __________

7-Does Respondent Support Financially A Non-House Hold
Resident( ); Is Such Obligation In Due To Kinship( );
or Other Reasons ___________ Country In Which The Sup-
ported Resides_________; Annual Support $ ______

8-Does (Eastern Block)/(Western Block)/(Non-Aligned) Coun-
tries Constitute Respondent Alternative Residence of
Choice, & Why? ________________________________

9-If permitted would you emigrate to the UNITED STATES?
Does any of your close relative live in the U.S.____

10-Depict please, on the continuum and by increasing ord:
from the most to the least important, the following:
Money; Spouse Child; Mother/Father; Brother/Sister;
God; Cousin; Country; Sect/Religion; Heaters; Leader
Cause.

_________ 5 _______ 4 _______ 3 _______ 2 _______ 1 _______ 0 _______ 10 _______
B.

1. Are there any close members of your family in jail for: Political Reasons, Religious Beliefs, Others

2. Would you commit acts of terrorism, and even take the life of innocent people to secure their release?

3. Are you capable of altering your destiny? Why?

4. Are you willing to change your present status (Residence, Employment, Profession)? Why?

5. Do you identify/consider yourself to be: (Lebanese), (Arab), (Lebanese Arab), (Muslim), (Arab Muslim), (L/M).

6. Do you view Lebanon as being Intrinsically: (An Independent Nation), (Part of the Arab Nation), (Part of the Islamic Nation), (Part of Western/Eastern Civilization).

7. Do you consider yourself to be politically active?

8. Do you consider your activity to be motivated/elicted/condoned by your religious leader(s)? Why?

9. Do you consider your activity/actions/performance to be of (Considerable) (Some) or (No) importance?

10. Do you have any worldly obligations that would prohibit you from voluntarily sacrificing your life for this religious cause? If Yes, What is it?

11. Do you observe/Obey all of your religious duties? Why?

12. What are you fighting for?

13. What are this organization/movement/group objectives?

---ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, QUESTIONS, AND ISSUES ARE SOLICITED---
1. The English Romantic, Thomas De Quincey, who was one of the first students of the first documented religious terrorist movement, provides us with an ideal example. He tells us an account of the Sicarii's ability to produce panic or paralyzing fear.

When the countryside had been cleared of bandits, another type sprang up in Jerusalem known as the Sicarii who committed murders in broad daylight in the heart of the city. The festivals were their special seasons, when they would mingle with the crowd, carrying short daggers concealed under their clothing, with which they stabbed their enemies. Then, when they fell, the murderers joined in the cries of indignation and, through this plausible behavior, were never discovered. The first to be assassinated... was Jonathan the high-priest, after his death there were numerous daily murders. The panic created was more alarming than the calamity itself; everyone, as on the battlefield, hourly expected death. Men kept watch at a distance on their enemies and would not trust even their friends when they approached. Yet, even while their suspicions were aroused and they were on their guard, they fell; so swift were the conspirators and so crafty in eluding detection.

The Sicarii, De Quincey noted, realized that a man is potentially most vulnerable when he considers himself entirely secure. They struck in broad daylight when a victim was surrounded by witnesses and supporters and on occasions universally regarded as sacred. Their assaults were intended to prove that no circumstance or convention could provide immunity, reducing potential victims to a state of complete uncertainty, creating the most profound sense of terror possible. Lacks of similarly pertinent, and contemporary works on religious terrorism forces us to refocus our attention on broader readily available theological literatures regarding violence.

2. Millennialism not limiting itself to the prospects of
the individual in this world and the next, millennialism attempts to answer in vivid imagery such questions as:
What will be the final end of this world? Will mankind ever fulfill the agelong dream of dwelling in an earthy paradise or will all men be destroyed in a cataclysm of fire brought on by their own folly or God's judgement?

The four main periods in the Judeo-Christian millennial tradition are:

A. The rise and development of apocalyptic millennial views from about 200 BC until AD 200;
B. The creation of a countervailing allegorical interpretation of the millennium under the Church Fathers Origen and Augustine and the dominance of that theory in Christendom until the 17th century;
C. The re-emergence of a belief in the literal fulfillment of millennial prophecies and the association of those prophecies with a progressive and optimistic philosophy of history from about 1650 to the 20th century; and
D. The recent emergence of sectarian groups that have given new expression to the earliest tradition of apocalyptic and pessimistic millennialism.

3. The tactical characteristics of Amal's membership were conservatively identified in Norton's work. Accordingly, Amal's:

...leaders and members are not particularly well trained...it is not unreasonable to surmise that the organization can field up to 5,000 lightly armed militia men on very short notice. Since the strength of the organization derives from the Shia villages and urban quarters of Lebanon, rather than from an armed force in being, it stands to reason that Amal is less well equipped to mount significant military operations than it is to participate in local "defensive" actions. Furthermore, few of the members devote their full energies to the movement,
since members are not paid (in contrast to a number of contending groups in Lebanon) but are indeed expected to pay dues to the organization... The membership of Amal tends to be quite young, aged 15 to 25, and is usually armed with more enthusiasm than expertise or education. In contrast, the leadership tends to be older, aged 25 to 40, and significantly better educated than the membership as a whole. Many at the intermediate leadership level are teachers by profession, and a number of these men have attended universities abroad. As a nascent populist movement, Amal often has great difficulty controlling all of its branches. In fact, it is not uncommon for Shi'a villagers to identify themselves as Amalists and operate quite independently of the movement. In an important sense, for a Shi'ite to say "I am with Harakat Amal" is a political statement rather than an indication of actual membership. In one major town in South Lebanon that is strongly pro-Amal, fewer than 100 of the 1,500 male adults were card-carrying members in 1981, yet the strong sympathies of the nonmembers are readily mobilized to action when the situation warrants. The relationship of Amal to the Shi'a religious leadership in Lebanon is close, but even in this sphere many local imams resist the authority of an organization that is led by nonclerics. On several occasions the acting chairman of the Shi'a Higher Council (Musa al-Sadr is still considered chairman), Shaykh Muhammed Shams al-Din, has had to intervene to convince individual imams to follow the movement's directions.

4. Hizbollah principles are outlined in their letter addressed to all the downtrodden of the earth:

We are free downtrodden men. We exclude nobody because we are eager for all to hear our voice, understand our word, comprehend our projections, and study our plan. We, the sons of HizbAllah's nation, consider ourselves a part of the Islamic nation in the world, which is facing the most tyrannical arrogant assault from both the East and the West—an assault intended to deprive this nation of the content of the message with which God has blessed it so that it may be the best nation known to the world, a nation that encourages virtue and discourages vice and that believes in God. The assault is also aimed at usurping this nation's wealth and resources, at exploiting the capabilities and skills of its sons, and at controlling all its affairs.

We, the sons of Hizb Allah's nation, who vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the
nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, the rightly guided imam who combines all the qualities of the total imam, who has detonated the Muslims' revolution, and who is bringing about the glorious Islamic Renaissance.

Therefore, we in Lebanon are not a closed organization party nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are a nation tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological and political bond, namely Islam, whose message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muhammad, may God's peace and prayers be upon him and upon his kinsmen. God has established Islam as a religion for the World to follow, saying in the venerable Quran: "Today I have perfected your religion to you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam." . . . The main sources of our culture are the venerable Quran, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and religious opinions made by the jurisprudent, who is the authority on tradition among us. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application.

As to our military power, nobody can imagine its dimensions because we do not have a military agency separate from the other parts of our body. Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent. God is behind us, supporting us with His care, putting fear in our enemies' hearts, and giving us His dear and resounding victory against them.

. . . We have opted for religion, freedom, and dignity over humiliation and constant submission to America and its allies and to Zionism and their Phalangist allies. We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and invaders out of it, and to determine our fate by our own hands.

. . . Our people could not withstand all this treason and decided to confront the imams to infidelity of America, France, and Israel. The first punishments against these forces were carried out on April 18 and the second on October 29, 1983. By that time, a real war had started against the Israeli occupation forces, rising to the level of destroying two main centers of the enemy's military rulers. Our people also escalated their popular and military Islamic resistance to the point where they forced the enemy to make its decision on phased with-
drawal—a decision that Israel was compelled to adopt for the first time in the history of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict.

...For the sake of the truth, we declare that the sons of HizbAllah's nation have come to know well their basic enemies in the area: Israel, America, France and the Phalange. ...Our sons are now in a state of ever-escalating confrontation against these enemies until the following objectives are achieved: Israel's final departure from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the Liberation of Venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation. The final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country. Submission by the Phalange to just rule and their trial for the crimes they have committed against both Muslims and Christians with the encouragement of America and Israel. Giving all our people the opportunity to determine their fate and to choose with full freedom the system of government they want, keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we urge to choose the Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country.

...we do not wish to impose Islam on anybody and we hate to see others impose on us their convictions and their systems. We do not want Islam to rule in Lebanon by force, as the political Maronism is ruling at present. But we stress that we are convinced of Islam as a faith, system, thought, and rule and we urge all to recognize it and to resort to its law. We also urge them to adopt it and abide by its teachings at the individual, political, and social levels.

If our people get the opportunity to choose Lebanon's system of government freely, they will favor no alternative to Islam. Therefore, we urge adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine.

We declare that we aspire to see Lebanon as an indivisible part of the political map opposed to America, world arrogance, and world Zionism and to see Lebanon ruled by Islam and its just leadership. This is the aspiration of a nation, not a party, and the choice of a people, not of a gang.

...This Islamic resistance must continue, grow, and escalate, with God's help, and must receive from all Muslims in all parts of the world utter support, aid, backing, and participation so that we may be able to uproot this cancerous germ and obliterate it from exis-
tence. While underlining the Islamic character of this resistance, we do so out of compatibility with its reality, which is clearly Islamic in motive, objective, course, and depth of confrontation. This does not at all negate its patriotism, but confirms it. On the contrary, if this resistance's Islamic character were effaced, its patriotism would become extremely fragile.

We address all the Arab and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the Muslims' experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable, with God's help, of breaking the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes. . . . We strongly urge on all the oppressed of the world the need to form an international front that encompasses all their liberation movements so that they may establish full and comprehensive coordination among these movements in order to achieve effectiveness in their activity and to focus on their enemies' weak points. Considering that the imperialist world with all its states and regimes is uniting today in fighting the oppressed, then the oppressed must get together to confront the plots of the forces of arrogance in the world.

All the oppressed peoples, especially the Arab and Muslim peoples, must realize that Islam alone is capable of being the idea to resist aggression, since experiences have proven that all theosophic ideologies have been folded forever in the interest of American-Soviet detente and other forms of detente.

. . . Only Islam can bring about man's renaissance, progress, and creativity because "he lights with the oil of an olive tree that is neither eastern or western, a tree whose oil burns, even if not touched by fire, to light the path. God leads to His light whomever he wishes" (Augustus Norton, 1987).

5. In 1986, Sayyid Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah identify himself to Sandra Maleh, a news reporter for Monday Morning as:

a person who lives to fulfill my duty as a human being, as a thinker, as a Moslem, and as a citizen, in order to raise the standards of the people who nobody cares for to a higher level. Consequently, I believe that every human being should consider all his resources as a trust from God for others. As such, a person who uses his resources in an irresponsible manner betrays this trust.

. . . contrary to all the distorted images portrayed by the media, I am not a person who operates on the assumption that violence is the best method in life. I
believe that everything can be solved by dialogue, and all issues can be resolved through sound methods that respect the humanity of the human being, and seek to change the convictions of people through intellectual persuasion. This is the best method. I believe that in all cases violence is like a surgical operation that the doctor should only resort to after he has exhausted all other methods. The claim that I am the leader of Hezbollah is baseless and untrue. I am not the leader of any organization or party. It seems that when they could not find any prominent figure to pin this label on, and when they observed that I was active in the Islamic field, they decided to settle on me. It could be that many of those who are considered to be part of Hezbollah live with us in the mosque and they might have confidence in me...

... Imam Khomeini represents an authority. He is a great and inspiring Islamic leader, and, as such, we hold him in high esteem, and believe that he represents a nature and inspiring Islamic leadership.

... We believe that political sectarianism is no good for Lebanon. As such, we feel that its abolition could solve many of Lebanon's problems and could help extricate Lebanon from its present tense situation. Such a move would at least provide temporary relief.

Midlarsky and Tanter, on the other hand, in an analysis that is also limited to Latin American states, postulate that a J-curve of social development is conducive to revolutionary...

6. The Feierabends studied primarily the relationship of systemic frustration to political instability, modernity, and rates of socioeconomic change, measured by means of ecological variables, as well as of coerciveness of regime and international conflict. They concluded that any abrupt change or variation in social conditions is likely to create a gap between expectations, and achievements; a gap between wants and satisfaction as indicated by the GNP per capita, caloric intake, and number of radios, newspaper, telephones, and physicians which inevitably leads to violence.
violence. Their hypothesis is that if within the life of a society a continuous and prolonged era of social improvement is interrupted by a sudden, sharp reversal (the J-curve), an intolerable gap between expected and actual need-satisfaction ensues. Accordingly, a revolutionary outbreak in Latin America is the likely consequence of the J-curve of development, due to sudden and rapid improvement or deterioration in socio-economic conditions brought by a change.

Bwy’s study also explores deprivation, coerciveness, and legitimacy as predictors of violence in Latin America. He concluded that, the sources of violence are the vast and rapid social changes caused by the modernization process in Latin America, and that the level of coerciveness of each Latin American regime, relative to the size and loyalty of its respective army, and its legitimacy, explain and determine the susceptibility of its citizens to collective violence.


8. Both Weber and Durkheim considered religious sentiment in the traditional sense (that is, as being bound up with beliefs and practices relative to revealed bodies of doctrine, centered upon the ideas of a transcendent, superna-
tural realm) to be a phenomenon of the past, in the special sense that such sentiments could not realistically play a part in the on-going construction of modern societies.

Both of the two major classical sociologists were post-Christian in the two-fold sense of being themselves non-believers and believing in the redundancy of religion (as traditionally conceived) as being of significance in the definition of societal situations and the primary institutional orders of societies. However, Durkheim soughts to go beyond the old distinction (as he saw it) between faith and reason, by — in effect — uniting them at a higher level of civil religions celebrative of societal identities and moralities centered upon humanity. "Man had become a god for man, said Durkheim. The problem was how, rationally..."

If nothing else, Durkheim work have lead to those of the "Romantic " theorists. According to Bruce Lincoln in (Religion and Revolution), "...for their part, the "romantic" theorists have sought to show the multiple ways in which religious ideas, institutions, and behaviors (including myth as a sub-set of ideas and ritual as a subset of behaviors) serve the maintenance of society in a positive fashion.

Thus, they have pointed to the ways in which religion effects social integration; charters central institutions and patterns of organization; provides a coherent set of ethical values and behavioral norms; furnishes a sense of meaning, purpose, and worth; and sustains hope in the face of
suffering and death..." Included within this "romantic" grouping would be such theoreticians as those of the Ecole sociologique, the functionalist school of social anthropology, and the Chicago school of history of religions. And as a result of the work of such scholars as Wilhelm Muhlmann, Peter Worsley, and kenelm Burridge, that has stimulated the reexamination of numerous episodes within the history of western Europe, including such messianic, millenarian, and heretical movements as the Italian Lazzarettisti, the medieval Taborites and Pastoureaux, and the followers of Sabbatai Sevi, as assessed by such scholars as E.J. Hobsbawm, Norman Cohn, Bernard Topfer, and Gerschon Scholem.

9. Even the major revolutionary upheavals of modern Europe have come in for re-examination, as the religious content of the English Civil War and the French Revolution have been newly assessed by Christopher Hill, Michael Walzer, Christopher Dawson, Michel Vovelle, and others.

10. Working from Chinese data, Yuji Muramatsu showed how the leaders of popular religious movements consistently came from what he termed a "middle stratum" of monks, sorcerers, out-of-work priests, fortune-tellers, and degree-holders who had failed to win a place within the official bureaucracy, all of whom thus fell between the literati and the peasant class.
11. This definition is based on a Qur'anic injunction which runs as follows: O ye who believe Shall I guide you to gainful trade which will save you from painful punishment? Believe in Allah and His Apostle and carry on warfare (jihad) in the path of Allah with your possessions and your persons. That is better for you. If ye have knowledge, He will forgive your sins, and will place you in the Gardens beneath which streams flow, and in fine houses in the Gardens of Eden: That is the great gain (Q. LXI, 10-13).

12. Simon (1957), among others, has pointed out that the economic man view does not present a realistic picture; "people simply do not behave in the rational manner. They do not have full knowledge either of all possible behaviors or of all outcomes. They are not capable of making highly complex computations every time they have to make a difficult decision, and their behavior is not always obviously rational to observers".


15. Two problems with the assessment of voter registration in
Lebanon. A reasonable but by no means definitive estimate of the gap between officially registered voters and the actual voting population can be obtained from two sets of data. The first was provided for us by a former high ranking official in the Securite Generale, and the census taken by the Ministry of Planning and adjusted by the demographers Courbage and Fargues. On the basis of this Landau, et. al., (1980) states, "we have found the number of Lebanese citizens of voting age, 21 years old and over, to be less than the number of officially registered voters by 20%..."

The voter turnout should be 65.45% in the 1960 rather than 52.5. The second problem is: the comparison between urban and rural turnouts were rural turnout is believed to be higher than urban one. Which hold valid only in Beirut, and not in other cities as Tripoli, Sidon and Zahle.

16. Provides a crude picture of the magnitude of this variation. On every indicator of social mobilization with the exception of radios, the Beirut area stands far ahead of the peripheral regions. Lebanon's other city, Tripoli, is a very distant second. Great Beirut (which now includes the major surrounding towns of Mount Lebanon province) has generated and absorbed the prosperity of the independence era, while outlying regions in the southern and northern provinces show little material change. These regional imbalances are a formidable obstacle to developing a positive national consensus, particularly since the outlying regions are predominantly Muslim and only recently (1920) have become Lebanese.
Social mobilization, writes Deutsch, "may tend to strain of destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life."

17. Comparing Lebanon to other nations (over 95) on a variety of politically relevant indices (World Handbook of Political & Social Indicators, 1976). Indices are:

A. Age of national institutions: Ranked 67.5; his consolidation of modernizing leadership was from 1920 to 1941; his current constitution was established in 1926; and became independent in 1943.

B. Military Manpower: Ranked 54; total number of personnel is 12000, which is equated to 1153.8 personnel for 1000km(2); and also represent 8.2 personnel per 1000 individual of the working age of the population.

C. Internal Security Forces: Ranked 82; which is the total of 3250 individual; and about 313 individual for each 1000Km(2); and also 2.2 individual for every 1000 individual of the working age of the population.

D. Party Fractionalization: Ranked first in 1964;

E. Press Freedom: Ranked 40;

F. Voter Turnout: Ranked 95; number of voters as percentage of electorate is 53.4; in 1964.

G. Protest Demonstrations: There were 1 in 1948; 3 in 1949; 3 in 1950; 3 in 1951; 5 in 1952; 1 in 1953; 1 in 1954; 1 in 1955; 2 in 1956; 8 in 1957; 10 in 1958; 1 in 1960; 1 in 1961; 2 in 1967; total of 42.

H. Riots: there were 5 in 1949; 12 in 1951; 10 in 1954; 5 in 1956; 30 in 1958; 7 in 1959; 1 in 1960; 1 in 1963; 1 in 1964; 1 in 1965; 3 in 1967; and a total of 76.

I. Regular Executive Transfers: there were 2 in 1951; 6 in 1952; 2 in 1953; 1 in 1954; 1 in 1955; 2 in 1956; 4 in 1958; 2 in 1960; 1 in 1961; 2 in 1964; 1 in 1965; 2 in 1966, and a total of 26. In comparison to 3 in the U.S.A., 3 in Mexico, and 2 in north Vietnam for the same
time period.

J. Literacy: Was ranked 33, in comparison to 13 for France, the USSR, and the United States, and 3 for Denmark.

K. Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization: Was ranked 95 with Austria and China.

L. Christian Communities: Was ranked 66; with a 1% percentage Protestant in 1968; and 28% Catholic in 1968; of the total of 45% Christian in 1968.

18. Survey Validity Judges

Bill, James. A University of Texas, Government Department professor, and author of several books dealing with the Middle-East.

Enayat, Hamid., formerly a professor of political science and chairman of the Department of Politics (1971-1977) at Tehran University, and is currently a Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and lectures on Modern Middle Eastern History. Author of: 1982, Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press


Shayik Berro, Mohamed. Author of several Islamic (Shi‘a) Exegeses, and is a Shi‘a Imam of the Shi‘a largest concentration in Dearborn, Michigan.


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