THE ROLE OF THEODOR BLANK AND THE AMT BLANK IN
POST-WORLD WAR II WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT

DISSERTATION

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By

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During World War II, the Allies not only defeated Germany; they destroyed the German army and warmaking capability. Five years after the surrender, Theodor Blank received the responsibility for planning the rearmament of West Germany starting from nothing. Although Konrad Adenauer was the driving force behind rearmament, Theodor Blank was the instrument who pushed it through Allied negotiations and parliamentary acceptance.

Heretofore, Blank's role has been told only in part; new materials and the ability now to see events in a clearer perspective warrant a new study of Blank's role in the German rearmament process. Sources for this dissertation include: Documents on Foreign Relations of the United States; memoirs, among them those of Konrad Adenauer, Georges Bidault, Lucius Clay, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Ivone Kirkpatrick, Harold MacMillan, Kirill Meretskov, Jules Moeh, Sergei Shtemenko, Hans Speidel, Harry S. Truman, Alexander Vasilevsky, and Georgiy Zhukov; contemporary reports from newspapers, among them the Times (London), New York Times, Le Monde, Pravda, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung,
Rearmament involved the interrelationship of vast, diverse interests: the conflict between East and West, national and international fears, domestic problems, and the interplay of leading personalities. When the Amt Blank, the planning organization, became functional on 1 December 1950, it consisted of nineteen people; in 1955, when it became the Defense Ministry with Theodor Blank the Defense Minister, it had a staff of one thousand. Cast in the milieu of the Allied negotiations on West German rearmament, this dissertation chronologically focuses on the role that Blank and the Amt Blank personnel played in the planning, negotiations, and domestic issues related to rearmament.

Blank's diplomatic skills and managerial ability were key factors in transforming West Germany from a conquered area to a sovereign state, a member of NATO with approval for its own armed force, within a five-year period.
DISCLAIMER

The author is at present employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. All of the views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Central Intelligence Agency or the United States Government.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. FROM DEFEAT TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC, (1945-1949)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. NATO, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND SECURITY (1949-1950)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE AMT SCHWERIN (1950)</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE AMT BLANK (1950)</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. PETERSBERG TALKS (1951)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. PARIS NEGOTIATIONS (1951-1952)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY I (1952-1953)</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY II (1953-1954)</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. ACCESSION TO NATO (1954-1955)</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. DEFENSE MINISTRY (1955-1956)</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. D.</td>
<td>Auser Dienst (not on active duty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBV</td>
<td>Assembly of Bavarian Farmers</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGS</td>
<td>Bundesgrenzshutz</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Socialist Union</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>German Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DViD</td>
<td>German Administration of the Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Advisory Commission</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDJ</td>
<td>Freie Deutsche Jugend</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>KVP</td>
<td>Kasernierte Volkspolizei</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDAP</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvemnet Républicain Populaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
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<td>NATO SG</td>
<td>NATO Standing Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>National People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Socialist Unity Party of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMAD</td>
<td>Soviet Military Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Socialist Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPD</td>
<td>People's Police Center</td>
</tr>
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<td>WBEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZfH</td>
<td>Center for Home Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, April 1951</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, 15 September 1951</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, 9 July 1952</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, 15 March, 1953</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, 1 January 1954</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Amt Blank Organization, 1 November 1954</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Defense Ministry, 7 June 1955</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to discover and analyze the roles of Theodor Blank and what became known as the Amt Blank (Blank Office) in post-World War II West German rearmament. At the end of World War II, there was a complete collapse of German society. The Allies not only defeated Germany; they also destroyed its army, personnel records, and war-making capability. Five years after this collapse, Theodor Blank received from Konrad Adenauer the responsibility for the German part in planning the rearmament of West Germany starting from nothing. Heretofore, Blank's role has been told only in part, but new materials and the ability to see events in a clearer perspective now warrant a new study of Blank's role in the German rearmament process.

The rearmament process did not take place in vacuo. It was much more than an internal German problem. It involved the interrelationship of vast, diverse interests, the growing conflict between East and West, national and international fears, and the interplay of leading personalities. International events, at times on opposite sides of the globe, had a marked impact on the rearmament process.
Internal German events also affected the process. Although this dissertation is not a study of the domestic politics of West German rearmament, it too played a major role, and an examination of relevant political developments is essential. In summary, one must consider the roles of Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank in the context of the changing international, European, and East Bloc situations, as well as see them in the context of the dynamics of domestic German fears and interests.

The Bundeswehr was born on 12 November 1955 in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The simple inaugural ceremony, in a vacant commercial garage before the backdrop of a huge replica of the German Iron Cross, prompted no outward display of emotion, and the German news media treated it routinely. Theodor Blank, the new Defense Minister, officiated at this ceremony and welcomed the first officers into the new army. Among those 101 officers were former Wehrmacht generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger and Colonel Johan Adolf Graf Kielmansegg, who had played a

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1New York Times, 13 Nov. 1955, sec. 1, 1. Former German officers serving in the Amt Blank were highly conscious of their military rank, and throughout the talks and negotiations, Theodor Blank insisted that German military officers be addressed as "General," not "former General." Accordingly, except for a few instances throughout this dissertation, former German officers are identified by their rank in the Wehrmacht. It is understood, however, that there were no active duty German army officers between the surrender in 1945 and the formation of the Bundeswehr in 1955.
prominent role in planning for the organization, acceptance, and implementation of rearmament.\(^2\) The inaugural ceremony marked the beginning of a German military establishment whose goal, to be reached by 1960, was a strength of five hundred thousand men organized as a twelve-division ground force, an air force of 1326 planes, and a twenty thousand man navy.\(^3\) Under the terms of contracts with the Western Allies, the FRG would provide these forces as a contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense force.\(^4\)

West German rearmament involved external and internal problems. The major external problem was the difficulty the Western Allies had in getting France to approve the German role in the defense of the West and the provision of material and moral support. Internal problems were difficult: opposition to rearmament was strong, West Germany did not have the industrial capability to support rearmament, and labor leaders feared rearmament because of


past experience with the Nazis.\(^5\) The external and internal problems, while depending on decisions by different groups, were closely related and intertwined. The Western Allies were also concerned about West German rearmament, but for different reasons.\(^6\) They had to contend with the dynamics of East Bloc prodding, which served as a reminder of the perceived threat to West European security. The Soviet Union orchestrated this East Bloc harassment which "turned the cordon sanitaire inside out and made those states once a buffer against Russia a buffer against the West."\(^7\) This inversion caught a divided Germany in the middle.

The driving force behind West German rearmament was Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the first German leader to make a serious proposal for a West German contribution to the defense of the West.\(^8\) His magisterial leadership during


\(^7\) Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th ser., vol. 425 (1946), col. 540 (Edelman).

these critical years provided constant guidance. Adenauer's ability to concentrate on topics of importance and leave the minutiae for subordinates was one of his strong qualities. A cunning manipulator of men and situations, he picked able subordinates, gave them sufficient guidance and authority, and allowed them to function freely, while simultaneously insuring that he knew what was happening at all times. He tolerated neither incompetence nor insubordination, and he expected total loyalty. Rearmament had to be managed by a man who enjoyed Adenauer's complete confidence.

Adenauer required a man of unusual talents. The man charged with this task had to possess qualities acceptable to the majority of West Germans and Western diplomats. After a careful political calculation, Adenauer named Theodor Blank to head the Dienststelle (department). Since it was to have a distinctly civilian appearance, no general


could be the chief. Qualifications for the new defense chief were political knowledge in military organization, political visibility to the Bundestag and the public, proper political party influence, loyalty only to the Chancellor, and ability to negotiate with the Allies. Blank had almost all of these. He had extensive World War II experience as an officer, but not as a professional soldier. He was a successful Bundestag deputy with his own constituency, and the public saw him as a supporter of Adenauer. He was one of three chairmen of the IG Mining Trade Union (the union with the largest actual Christian Democratic Union membership). Blank, however, lacked experience in international relations.

The ability to work well with officials of other nations was important because there was a close connection between the potential West German defense contribution and foreign policy. Although for all practical purposes in October 1950 Blank became the FRG defense minister, the office of the new deputy approached closely a department of foreign affairs. The Amt Blank, as the Dienststelle came

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15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Fischer, Verteidigung, 34.
to be called, was Adenauer's instrument of foreign policy whereby the FRG could gain its sovereignty through leverage created by its defense contribution. To this end Blank expended a large part of his effort negotiating in the international arena. Generals were personae non gratae at that time, and Adenauer wanted a man who would accomplish FRG goals without arousing working class hostility toward an army. Hence, it was a wise decision of Adenauer to give a trade union man the responsibility to negotiate and to plan a possible German rearmament. Adenauer chose Blank also because he was one of the pillars of the newly founded political bloc, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Furthermore, Blank was not suspected of having been a Nazi or of harboring secret militarist tendencies.

Theodor Blank was born in 1906 at Elz on the Lohn in the upper Rhine valley in the state of Hesse. The son of a cabinet maker, he was the third of ten children. Blank left school at the age of fourteen to work as a carpenter's apprentice, and at the age of twenty-five he became the

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19Ibid.; Time, 6 Dec. 1954, 33-34.

20Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8/9 June 1955, 3; Map, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1: 800,000 (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Zentrale für Tourismus).
general secretary of the Christian Factory and Transportation Workers' Union in Dortmund.\textsuperscript{21} In 1933, after Blank refused a lucrative Nazi offer to enter their Labor Front, the Nazis expelled him from the union.\textsuperscript{22}

At the age of twenty-nine, Blank returned to the Gymnasium in a suburb of Essen, and graduated with honors.\textsuperscript{23} He subsequently studied mathematics and physics at the University of Münster for two years and pursued a course in engineering science in Hanover until 1939 when the Wehrmacht drafted him for six years and sent him to several countries in Europe. A natural leader, he received a battlefield commission for bravery in France in 1940. At his highest rank, lieutenant, he commanded an armored infantry company and received several decorations including the Iron Cross, First Class.\textsuperscript{24} At the end of World War II, Blank rejoined the labor movement and became chairman of a miners' union in Essen.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{24} Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8/9 Jun. 1955, 3; Newsweek, 5 Feb. 1951, 36-38; Commonweal, 17 Apr. 1953, 49-51.
the Ruhr.25 By 1950, he had married and fathered two sons and a daughter.26

Blank was a powerful speaker, and in 1949 gained a seat in the Bundestag as a delegate of the CDU from the Westphalian district of Borken-Bocholt.27 He retained this seat throughout his tenure as chief of the Amt Blank and even later as Defense Minister.28 He was, moreover, intimately familiar with the history of the Weimar Republic and its shortcomings.29 His military service and experience with the Nazis gave him a strong dislike for dictatorial authority.30

Blank's gruff personality demanded respect.31

Commentators described Blank as a blunt, shrewd politician


26Newsweek, 5 Feb. 1951, 36-38.


30Commonweal, 17 Apr. 1953, 49-51.

and an enemy of ultranationalism. His grating voice and extravagent gestures complemented his unconventional manner and rumpled clothes. A tough but shy unmilitary man, Blank had the background that indicated he would consider the rearmament problem from a non-militaristic and non-nationalistic view.

When the Amt Blank became functional on 1 December 1950, it consisted of nineteen people, including secretaries and drivers. By 1955 the Amt Blank had a staff of 1000, added responsibilities and functions, and in mid-year became the West German Defense Ministry. The initial members were prominent reformers and liberals. Adenauer appointed Blank Defense Minister on 7 June 1955, by which time West German rearmament had become an accepted fact at home and abroad. By 1955 Blank had four years of experience negotiating with the Western Allies on the rearmament issues, and Western representatives held Blank in high

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33Newsweek, 12 Jul. 1954, 28-33.


36Ibid; Fischer, Verteidigung, 128; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8/9 Jun. 1955, 3.
Theodor Blank supervised the functions of the new ministry from its inception in June 1955 until Adenauer dismissed him as Defense Minister in October 1956. Blank's position, both in the Dienststelle and in the Defense Ministry, demanded that he plan for and supervise a bold rearmament program, deal with the Western Allies, and conduct a campaign to allay his countrymen's fears of militarism. He also had the responsibility of overcoming active opposition from political, social, and religious groups.

Blank's responsibilities were overlapping and restricting. The planning part of the Amt Blank began in October 1950 in the Ermekeil Barracks in Bonn with no personnel, no material, and no organization. It was necessary to create the planning instrument before it could function. The Amt Blank underwent four major organizational changes between 1950 and 1955. Smaller organizational


40 Ibid.; Fischer, Verteidigung, 34.

changes and the assignment of additional staff were continuous. The Amt Blank's activity included all planning and work required for the preparation and disposition of the military forces.

One of Blank's initial responsibilities was to lead the group of Germans engaged in technical talks with representatives of the Allied High Commission at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn. When this phase ended in July 1951, Adenauer appointed Blank to head the German delegation at the European army negotiations in Paris.

To Blank there was never any question of avoiding rearmament. From his perspective West Germany had the choice of joining the Western nations in a defensive alliance or of becoming a neutral state, as the Soviets desired, and inviting aggression from the East. If the Germans wanted peace, they had to join the West and rearm.

Under Blank's leadership, once the decision was final, the Amt Blank made plans to rearm rapidly. French inaction, however, compelled a delay on the decision from 1950 to 1954 and during that time the plans of the Amt Blank changed.

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44 Fett, "Grundlagen, "Militärgeschichte, 173.


dramatically.  This dissertation will examine the five initial years, with Blank as the main focus, and follow in some detail Blank and his organization from October 1950 through October 1956.

This study will also focus on answering several specific questions. Why was West Germany rearmed? How was FRG independence implemented? Why did France propose and later reject the European Defense Community? Why did Adenauer select Theodor Blank? What was Theodor Blank's prime role in rearmament? What was the Amt Blank's role? Did the Amt Blank achieve its goals? What were the Amt Blank's major problems? How did the Amt Blank overcome those problems? Why did Adenauer dismiss Blank in October, 1956? What was the position of the Western Allies during the period from 1945 to 1956? How did the East Bloc react to the rearmament process? Answers to these questions will facilitate an understanding of post-World War II problems in Europe.

Sources for the dissertation include: Documents on Foreign Relations of the United States; memoirs, among them those of Konrad Adenauer, Georges Bidault, Lucius Clay, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Ivone Kirkpatrick, Harold MacMillan, Kirill Meretskov, Jules Moch, Seregi Shtemenko, Hans Speidel, Harry S. Truman, Alexander

Vasilevsky, and Georgiy Zhukov; contemporary reports from newspapers, among them the *Times* (London), *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *Pravda*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *Das Parlament*; Parliamentary Debates; and interviews with such persons as Johan Adolf Graf Kielmansegg. Unfortunately, United States State Department documents on Germany for the period from 1955 through 1956 have not yet been published, and the German records for that period are not yet open. The papers of Ambassador David Bruce covering the European Defense Community (EDC) negotiations in Paris are open and provide information on Blank's activity.

An analysis of the roles of Blank and the *Amt Blank* has become possible within the past few years because of the release of classified documents for the period 1950 to 1956. United States State Department documents on Germany through 1954 have been published, and some German documents on the rearmament process have become available. A conversation with German historians at the Militär Archiv in Freiburg revealed that certain German historians have had access to the closed German records and have written historical works using those records. The historians identified these works for their accuracy. Graf Kielmansegg was most helpful by granting two interviews, which provided numerous details on *Amt Blank* organization, personnel, functions, and problems.

These sources have made possible the reconstruction of
Amt Blank and Defense Ministry activities from October 1950 through October 1956, including the interim obstacles and successes, portrayed in a logical, chronological sequence with respect to the domestic and international roles that Blank and the Amt Blank played in the rearmament process.
CHAPTER II
FROM DEFEAT TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1945-1949)

The period from 1945 to 1949 was characterized by a deterioration in East-West relations. The World War II alliances fell apart soon after the victory and gave way to fear, prejudice, and suspicion. The Allied conferences, which planned for administering the conquered areas, became sources of conflict and misunderstanding between the East and West. The Soviet Union sought reconstruction of her devastated countryside and security against another invasion from the west. The West interpreted Soviet actions as expansive; the Soviets interpreted Western actions as aggressive. Both sides considered it necessary to establish governments and organize armies in their respective zones of Germany.

Five times during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Germans attacked their neighbors. In 1864, in concert with Austria-Hungary, Prussia attacked Denmark and took Schleswig-Holstein. In 1866, Prussia attacked and defeated Austria-Hungary, thus becoming the dominant German state. In 1870 Prussian forces humiliated France with a military defeat, the results of which made the German Empire, after its creation in 1871, the major land power in
Europe. World War I, despite the defeat of Germany, aggravated French fears of a resurgent and aggressive Germany whose primary objective was again to dominate the entire continent, and some observers believe that the failure to demolish German war making potential after World War I was a cause of World War II. The Versailles Treaty in 1919 provoked a spirit of revenge within Germany which led to open belligerence in 1933 when Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor. Under Hitler's direction this spirit was an element in the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, the act of aggression which began World War II.

After the fall of France in 1940, Britain stood alone in Europe to face the onslaught of the Nazi Blitzkrieg. After Hitler attacked Russia in 1941, Britain signed a military treaty with the Soviet Union on 26 May 1942, an event demonstrating Winston S. Churchill's resolve to sign a pact with the devil himself if necessary to defeat Hitler.¹

The Allies sought means to defeat and curb German militarism. In a letter to Anthony Eden on 21 October 1942, Churchill said that the European family needed a Council of Europe through which to act in concert.² On 6 November 1942, Stalin said that it was unsuitable to destroy every

²Ibid., 562.
organized force in Germany. In January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that the Axis powers must surrender unconditionally to the Allied forces. The other Allied leaders agreed to this policy of unconditional surrender and made it one of the Allied war aims, and it had an effect on the Allied attitude as the liberating troops closed on Germany from east and west. It meant that no part of Germany would escape Allied conquest and occupation.

The unconditional surrender policy implied the destruction of the prevalent political philosophy in Germany. Allied leaders also considered it necessary to reeducate the Germans. Roosevelt believed that the occupation of Germany had to convince the Soviets that the United States wanted to cooperate, and in his view, Germany would be the proving ground for this cooperation.

3Fischer Verteidigung, 24.


7Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 227.
Germany Committee of the State Department in 1943 was planning for post-war Germany and expected to employ Germans in Military Government.\(^8\) Although there is no evidence on the role Germans played in post-war Soviet plans, the Soviet Union formed two groups of Germans during World War II: the "National Committee for a Free Germany," organized 12-13 July 1943, and the "Union of German Officers," organized 11-12 September 1943.\(^9\)

Surrender terms and occupation policy were important. The Soviets and British had surrender terms in draft by 1943, and the United States' surrender document came a year later.\(^10\) At the Moscow Conference in October 1943, the foreign ministers established the European Advisory Commission (EAC) to deal with immediate problems of the post-surrender Germany.\(^11\) The Soviets submitted a proposal on occupation zones on 18 February 1944. The draft EAC Protocol containing surrender terms prepared by the United States was ready on 25 July 1944.\(^12\)

\(^8\)George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 174; Murphy, Diplomat, 228.

\(^9\)Fischer, Verteidigung, 24.

\(^10\)Kennan, Memoirs, 167-168.


After the French surrender in 1940, Britain and the United States sought a leader for those Frenchmen who wanted to continue the fight. Initially, Churchill and Roosevelt ignored Charles de Gaulle, but later elected to support his leadership of the Free French, and in 1944 de Gaulle went to Moscow where he signed a Franco-Soviet military alliance against future German aggression.

A major problem in the West was that France and the Benelux countries demanded security against Germany, and they hesitated to accept German political and economic recovery. Yet, as early as 17 August 1944 it was evident that the British wanted a strong Germany between them and the Soviet Union. In 1944 Churchill tried to promote an early meeting with Roosevelt and Stalin to discuss the political issues of the peace, but Roosevelt would not agree to such a meeting until after the January 1945 inauguration. Churchill, impatient, went to Moscow in October 1944, met Stalin, and made an agreement on spheres of influence in East Europe. In 1944 Eisenhower paid little attention to plans for post-war Germany. He did not consider German recovery to be his responsibility. He wanted to continue

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13U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 474.


15Kennan, Memoirs, 174; Murphy, Diplomat, 228.
the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), but the Soviets opposed it.  

As of 4 September 1944, there was no post-war United States' plan; with no presidential guidance, the State Department, War Department, and Treasury Department worked on it. Furthermore, to ensure continued German weakness, planners in the United States, under the purview of Henry Morgenthau, were considering in 1944 a proposal for reducing the standard of living in Germany to a subsistence level (Morgenthau Plan). Because the Allies feared a revival of German militarism, Roosevelt wanted to dismember the Third Reich. He approved the Morgenthau Plan, but Secretary of War Stimson later talked him out of it.  

During the campaigns of World War II, the Allies resolved that there should never be a repetition of the five wars spawned by the Germans during the preceding one hundred years. Accordingly, the Allies made plans to insure that Germany could never again destroy the peace and tranquility

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16Murphy, Diplomat, 228.
18U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, 517-521.
20Murphy, Diplomat, 227.
of the free world. They perceived the Prussian military system as the root of the German problem, and they sought measures to eliminate all vestiges of that system.

The first priority following the Allied victory was to be a total denazification of Germany, accompanied by complete demobilization and demilitarization. Germany would never again have any type of military establishment, and the Allies would remove or destroy all German industry capable of manufacturing war material or equipment. The London Agreement of 14 November 1944, "Proceedings of the Allied Control in Germany," established Allied control of Germany.21

At Teheran, Stalin favored dismemberment of Germany and at Yalta he wanted the other Allies committed to that goal. Conversely, at Yalta, Churchill wanted a European counterweight to the Soviet Union and favored a united Germany.22 At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the Allies avowed their purpose of destroying German militarism and Nazism. They decided to disarm and disband all German military forces, break up the German General Staff, remove or destroy all German military equipment, and eliminate or control all German industry that could produce military equipment. Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union (the

21Fischer, Verteidigung, 17–18.

22Bohlen, Witness, 183.
Big Three) agreed that, as the supreme authority in Germany, they could take all steps necessary to accomplish this goal.\(^{23}\) The Yalta Agreement of 4 February 1945 proposed to tighten Allied control of Germany.\(^{24}\) The Big Three also agreed that France would have an occupation zone in Germany, with Stalin saying that the French, smarting from the humiliation of defeat, would be tempted to abuse their power merely to reassert their pride.\(^{25}\)

At Yalta the Soviet goal was to prevent a third invasion of Russia and to protect the Soviet system. Stalin believed he could not depend upon capitalist Britain or the United States for help.\(^{26}\) He also agreed to restraints, which he never observed.\(^{27}\) There was early evidence of Soviet disregard for these agreements. Within two weeks of the Yalta Conference, the Soviets intervened in Rumania and established a puppet regime.\(^{28}\) On 2 April 1945 Secretary of


\(^{24}\)Fischer, Verteidigung, 17-18.

\(^{25}\)Murphy, Diplomat, 238.

\(^{26}\)Bohlen, Witness, 178.


State Stettinius became aware of a deterioration of United States-Soviet relations. In a telegram on 3 April 1945 Stalin accused the United States of collusion with the Germans to enable a rapid advance by Western forces toward the east. Roosevelt was angry at this accusation and replied with a denial on 5 April 1945 just before he left for Warm Springs, Georgia, where he died on 12 April 1945. After the Yalta Conference and before Roosevelt died, the Soviets were not honoring the Yalta Agreements on Poland. The West was not satisfied with the manner in which the Soviets were managing the reestablishment of a Polish government. Roosevelt sent numerous messages to Stalin on these violations, but the Soviets ignored them. The Soviets also ignored the Declaration on Liberated Europe in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and other East European states.

Unconditional surrender served as an excuse for not considering political objectives seriously during the war. This attitude made the occupation punitive and provided few


[31] Ibid., 207-208. A guarantee to establish democracy in East Europe, Declaration on Liberated Europe, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 971-973.
plans for the post-war period. The post-war German government consisted of military governors exercising supreme powers, with the Allied Control Council as the governing agency. Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay became deputy to General Eisenhower for military government on 17 April 1945.

As victory came closer, the Western Allies (Great Britain and the United States) moderated their demands on Germany and approached the German defeat with a view more commensurate with the expected post-war power structure; but Allied occupation terms were harsh. The post-war execution of those terms became especially severe in the French and Russian Zones.

The unconditional surrender of the German forces on 7/8 May 1945 initiated the first of a series of repressive measures directed against the German people. The wartime

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32 Kennan, Memoirs, 95.


34 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 441.


agreements formed the basis for the occupation of Germany. Soviet policies toward the defeated enemy complicated and exacerbated the execution of these agreements and soon created a situation in which the Western Allies began to reconsider the wisdom of reducing West German industrial capacity and prohibiting West Germans from possessing any military capability.

These interrelated subjects became the objects of great concern and action in the years following the unconditional German surrender. West German economic recovery became a primary goal of the Western Allies, who readily supported that recovery. Whether to allow the rearmament of West Germany was not an easy decision because of objections and fears emanating from within and without the German territorial confines. At the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, charged that the West was not disarming Germany, but he refused to agree to an Allied inspection of the Soviet Zone for the existence of German units.37

Post-World War II Europe was a rubble heap, an open morgue.38 Following the surrender in 1945, there were millions of hungry people and displaced persons, whom SHAEF

37Clay, Decision, 126.
had to save from starvation and disease. The Germans were not only a defeated people, but Germany was devastated. The winter of 1945–1946 was exceptionally cold. With their means of production damaged and practically no crops from the 1945 harvest, the Germans depended on the victors for survival. Allied agreements provided for shipment of food from the Soviet Zone to the Western zones, but the Soviets refused to comply. The United States and the British bought food and other goods to send into West Germany while the Soviets were taking similar goods from East Germany and sending them to Russia. Even with Western assistance, the German people subsisted on reduced rations for months.

At the time of the surrender, Germany ceased to be a sovereign state. The economy was completely disrupted and

39 Murphy, Diplomat, 252.


41 Bohlen, Witness, 233.

42 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 427 (1946), col. 1573 (Bevin).

43 Clay, Decision, 120.

all communications were at a standstill.\textsuperscript{45} The people were bewildered and confused.\textsuperscript{46} Everything was rationed and controlled. Germany had no government, no army, and no industrial and financial structure.\textsuperscript{47} There was dismantling of industry; the Soviets stripped their zone of industrial equipment. Millions of refugees moved west.\textsuperscript{48} Displaced persons had an absolute priority over the German population for food, and there were frequent levies on the Germans of clothing for displaced persons.\textsuperscript{49}

The German people believed that all German army officers were Nazis; consequently, German officers suffered unemployment.\textsuperscript{50} In 1945 the Allies seized the property of all suspected Nazis.\textsuperscript{51} Many officers lost everything they had; they had no money, no jobs, no homes, no pensions, and

\textsuperscript{45}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 422 (1946), cols. 1352-1358 (Hynd); Zhukov, Memoirs, 633.

\textsuperscript{46}Brentano, Germany and Europe, 9.

\textsuperscript{47}MacMillan, Tides, xviii, 122.

\textsuperscript{48}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 414 (1945), cols. 2394-2399 (Horakin); Murphy, Diplomat, 252.

\textsuperscript{49}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 417 (1945), cols. 1525-1527 (Hynd).

\textsuperscript{50}Brentano, Germany and Europe, 28; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

\textsuperscript{51}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 422 (1946), cols. 1352-1358 (Hynd).
no means of supporting their families. The Allies instituted a five year ban on Nazis exercising their professions.

To govern conquered Germany, the victors signed an agreement on 5 June 1945 under which they assumed supreme authority over all Germany. In the areas the Soviets occupied, they formed the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) on 9 June 1945. On 10 June 1945 SMAD ordered the formation of parties and unions and five Länder.

When the Germans surrendered, the document JCS 1067 defined the United States' occupation. The Potsdam Agreements modified JCS 1067. There were many prohibitions in JCS 1067, the objectives of which were to show the Germans they could not escape the suffering they brought upon themselves. The Allies would be firm and aloof, discourage fraternization, prevent a German threat to

52 Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
54 Oppen, "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic," 5 June 1945, Documents on Germany, 29-35; Zhukov, Memoirs, 660-661.
55 Fischer, Verteidigung, 22.
56 Murphy, Diplomat, 283.
57 Clay, Decision, 72-73; Oppen, Documents on Germany, 13, Footnote.
the peace, eliminate militarism and Nazism, apprehend and
punish war criminals, control German war making capacity,
enforce reparations and restitution, return POWs, control
the German economy, and prepare for democratic government.58

When the Germans surrendered, United States forces were
in positions east of the prearranged dividing line between
the Soviet and United States' occupation zones. Churchill,
believing that a United States' presence in those positions
would give the Western Allies an advantage, attempted to
persuade President Harry S. Truman to delay withdrawal of
these units until after the Potsdam Conference. Truman
refused Churchill's request, and United States' and British
troops began moving back to the west on 1 July 1945.59
Within a few days the Soviet forces moved to the zonal
border.60

At Potsdam the primary agenda was Germany. Because of
Nazi atrocities, there was no tendency to be lenient with

58 Oppen, JCS 1067, April 1945, Documents on Germany,
13-27; U. S. Department of State, "Directive of the United
States Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military
Government of Germany", Bulletin 13 (21 October 1945): 596-
607; Clay, Decision, 10-11; Dean Acheson, Present at the
Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W.

59 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decision (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), 298-306;
Zhukov, Memoirs, 657.

60 Hastings Lionel Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord
the Germans. Soviet actions following the Yalta Conference motivated the Western Allies to change their goal to ultimate unification rather than dismemberment. Truman, adhering to the zonal agreements worked out by the Allied Control Council, wanted to salvage as much of the Yalta Agreements as possible, but the Soviets had already sealed their zone and refused to allow the Allied Control Council to operate there. The United States tried to reassert the Declaration on Liberated Europe signed at Yalta. There were sharp exchanges over the Balkans, and the Soviet Union did not fully honor its agreement on Hungary.61 Because there was no permanent French government, France was not invited to Potsdam, did not sign the Potsdam Agreements, and was not bound by those agreements.62

In July and August 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, the Big Three restated and expanded restrictions and prohibitions on Germany. As part of demilitarization, the Big

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61Bohlen, Witness, 229, 231-235; Declaration on Liberated Europe, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 971-973.

62Murphy, Diplomat, 286-287, 299.
Three agreed to prohibit all forms of military activity by the German people. In accordance with the Potsdam Agreements, the Allies would abolish all German military organizations including the officers' corps. At the time United States' officials expected to keep Germany demilitarized for an indefinite period. Yet, it was United States' policy for only the next five years while Germany was under military government.

At the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences the Allied leaders agreed upon the general terms of the occupation and post-war policy. Occupation zones, areas of influence, and reparations were subjects that would cause difficulty in the post-war years. The Soviet Union and the Western Allies, now including France, would later accuse each other of breaking those wartime agreements.

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64Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 422 (1945), col. 180 (Hynd).


66Murphy, Diplomat, 238.
The Allies established a legal basis for the occupation. Implementing the wartime agreements, they promulgated laws to govern Germany. Control Council Law Number 2, 10 October 1945, provided for the termination and liquidation of all Nazi organizations.67 Control Council Law Number 8, 30 November 1945, prohibited military teaching and training.68 Law Number 34, 20 August 1946, threatened prosecution and the death penalty for violations of occupation regulations and laws regarding demilitarization; it dissolved the Wehrmacht.69 To aid in controlling Germany, Truman offered the Allies a twenty-five year pact to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany. France and Britain accepted the offer, but the Soviet Union rejected it.70

There were problems with German POWs. Under the provisions of JCS 1067, German General Staff officers and NCOs were subject to apprehension and internment.71 The British, whose policy toward POWs was different from the United States' policy, did not initially dissolve German units, but maintained Kampfschlägerkostand, which were

67Oppen, "Control Council Law No. 2," Documents on Germany, 79.

68"Control Council Law No. 8," ibid., 90-91.

69"Control Council Law No. 34," ibid., 151-152.

70Bohlen, Witness, 274-275.

71Oppen, JCS 1067, Documents on Germany, 13-27; Clay, Decision, 17; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
complete German units under German command. It was Churchill's idea to have a German army in the event of an early war with the Soviet Union. Consequently, German POWs in the British Zone began to think of rearmament early, primarily in the sense of restoring existing units to combat readiness. Some of these Germans guarded key installations to relieve British soldiers. The Soviets accused the British of maintaining Wehrmacht units fully armed. According to the British, a shortage of personnel made it essential to retain German staffs to insure that the Germans obeyed British orders.

On the other hand, every time the West asked the Soviets for information, the West received insults, insinuations, or accusations. In 1945 the Soviets repeatedly accused the Western powers of breaking the Potsdam Agreements. The British dissolved their units in December 1945 after the Soviet protest and formed POWs into work units. France placed 1.75 million POWs in her labor force and recruited some for the French Foreign Legion.

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73 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 411 (1945), col. 1084 (Petherick).

74 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 417 (1945), cols. 216-217 (Hynd); Zhukov, Memoirs, 665, 672, 678-680.

75 MacMillan, Tides, 117.
There were POW work units in the French and United States' Zones. The Soviets declared their German POWs to be war criminals and sent most of them into Russia.

At Potsdam the participants more clearly defined the guiding principles on reparations. The Paris Agreement of 14 January 1946 specified how to divide reparations from the Western zones of Germany; the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency was to do this. The Allied Control Council in March 1946 decided on the level of German industry necessary to maintain living standards based on Germany as an economic unit. There would be a distribution of the surplus above this level.

In the Soviet Zone in early 1946, the Communists took political control by destroying the independence of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and changing its name to Socialist Unity Party (SED). Four parties applied for recognition: Communist, SPD, Free Liberal Party, and CDU. SMAD hampered all but the Communist, which had a clear policy but was weakest in number. Later in the year, the Communist merged into the SED, which was more socialist than communist, but the Communists received the key positions.

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76 Fischer, Verteidigung, 22, 26; Zhukov, Memoirs, 665, 672, 678-680.

77 Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

Eventually all parties were under central control, and in elections there was only one list of candidates. Parties other than the Communist-led SED either faded or gave up.79

In addition to economic recovery and security, one Western objective was to establish a German government. Accordingly, the Western Allies proceeded to grant progressive degrees of self-government to the Germans in their zones. As early as March 1946, United States' authorities allowed the Germans to take over the denazification program in their Zone.80

By May 1946 the Wehrmacht was disbanded in the Western zones. At this time the British employed 110,000 ex-Wehrmacht personnel in labor groups, which performed general labor, cleared land mines, and swept mines from the sea.81

In the early days of the occupation, France or the Soviet Union blocked every Allied measure of consequence.82 The French were seeking security, and they believed that a


80Clay, Decision, 442.

81Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 423 (1946), col. 116 (Fryde).

dismembered Germany was less dangerous than a united one, but the French had problems. French military and political leaders of the pre-1945 era were discredited. French moral wounds were not healed and France was dependent on the United States. After World War II, France wanted the Ruhr mines, but abandoned the idea in return for Anglo-United States approval to separate the Saar from Germany.

An early attempt to coordinate and improve German recovery was the United States' proposal to combine the Western Zones. Britain accepted this idea in principle on 30 June 1946, and it became the first phase of the political reconstruction of West Germany. The Soviets objected to this action as a violation of the Potsdam Agreements. On 22 October 1946 British Foreign Secretary Bevin told the House of Commons that the British were not prepared to fulfill the Potsdam Agreements unless they applied equally to all zones. He said there would be no reparations.

deliveries from current production so long as there was a
deficit in the balance of payments in any one zone.88

In a restatement of United States' policy on Germany, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in a speech at Stuttgart on 6 September 1946 expressed the United States' desire to return the German government to the people. The Germans should be given primary responsibility, under proper safeguards, for managing their own affairs. The West should permit the Germans to prepare for a democratic government by drafting a constitution and organizing a provisional government.89

Even though German morale in the British and United States' Zones was not yet restored in October 1946, the Allies reconstructed public administration from bottom to top in an approximation of United States' and British concepts of democracy. This process involved formation of Länder and Land governments and the first Landtag elections in November and December 1946.90 Officials were to take office on 1 January 1947, but as late as November 1946 it was difficult to get the Germans to manage their own

88Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 427 (1946), col. 1513 (Bevin).


90Fischer, Verteidigung, 19; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 428 (1946), cols. 233-254 (Paget, Millington, Gammans, Platt-Mills, Taylor, Freeman, Thomas).
affairs.\textsuperscript{91} The Germans, a defeated people, considered the occupation powers responsible for everything in Germany; why should the Germans do anything for themselves?

According to Franz Josef Strauss, communist strategy in Europe was to control Germany as a step toward control of Europe.\textsuperscript{92} In Germany the Soviets generated hostility toward France; in France they generated hostility toward Germany.\textsuperscript{93} In action and language they showed a disregard for the Yalta, Potsdam, and other agreements.\textsuperscript{94} It appeared that the Soviets wanted to collaborate only on their terms.\textsuperscript{95} In late 1946, the Soviets vigorously pushed disarmament in the UN, and as early as 15 November 1946 SED leaders announced a

\textsuperscript{91}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 430 (1946), col. 1705 (Prior-Palmer).


\textsuperscript{95}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 419 (1946), col. 1342 (Eden); Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 421 (1946), col. 2 (Written Answers); Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 427 (1946), col. 1591 (Pritt); Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in London, 4 October 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 282-284.
draft constitution for a German Democratic Republic (DDR) for East Germany. 96

There was an active movement for European unity. On 16 January 1947, Churchill announced the formation of a United Europe Committee and began the United Europe movement. 97 In accord with this idea, Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March 1947, the purpose of which was to form a permanent system of defense against revived German militarism and aggression. 98

The Soviets also feared Germany and pursued their own interests in their post-war goals. The primary Soviet goal is preservation of the Russian homeland and the communist revolution. Over the years invading armies have entered Russia from the west on several occasions, and the Soviets have sought means to prevent a recurrence of this threat. The victory over Germany gave the Soviet government legitimacy and world power status, and the Soviets have gained the traditional Russian objectives of a buffer zone

96 Millis, Forrestal, 216-217; Fischer, Verteidigung, 23.
in East Europe, a defense in depth, and the protection of Marxism. 99

George C. Marshall became Secretary of State in January 1947 just as the press accepted the term "Cold War." In the spring of 1947, hopes of continued Allied unity faded, early evidence of which was the lack of progress at the Moscow Conference in March-April 1947. 100 There the four powers agreed to complete the repatriation of German POWs no later than 31 December 1948. 101 The United States completed repatriation of its prisoners by 30 June 1947. The French and British also complied, but there was no information on POWs from the Soviet Union. 102

On 18 April 1947 in Moscow, Marshall and Bohlen visited Stalin, who perceived no urgency in settling the German question. 103 During this visit Marshall recognized that the Soviets would not collaborate with the West in solving European economic problems. 104 Moreover, Marshall's 5 June

99 MacMillan, Tides, 110; Bidault, Resistance, 145-146.
100 MacMillan, Tides, 110.
103 Bohlen, Witness, 262-263.
104 Kennan, Memoirs, 325.
1947 speech at Harvard aroused hope that the European Recovery Plan (ERP), or Marshall Plan, would include Germany. Acceptance of the ERP demonstrated that European nations would help themselves when given the opportunity; but, since the Soviets prohibited the East Bloc from participating in the ERP, the ERP divided Europe. On the other hand, the Germans were disappointed that Germany could participate only through the military governors.

German economic and social recovery was important to the economic life of the West. By 1947 most West European countries had made a remarkable economic recovery. In West Europe, however, the people feared that in the future when Germany recovered the Germans might be in a position to dominate Europe. Socially, in June 1947 the Germans displayed a resentment against the Allies

105Clay, Decision, 214-216; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 14-15.

106Clay, Decision, 224; Kennan, Memoirs, 335; MacMillan, Tides, 116; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 15-16.

107Clay, Decision, 215.


110MacMillan, Tides, 466; Kennan, Memoirs, 418.
for an "unjustifiable" attitude toward the German people and their problems.\textsuperscript{111} By 1 October 1948 German schools were in full operation, and the Allied reeducation program worked toward changing this point of view. Non-Nazi teachers were "democratizing" the German children, but the German attitude changed slowly.\textsuperscript{112}

Churchill said that the first step to European revival was a partnership between France and Germany.\textsuperscript{113} Accordingly, there was a need for a European organization to solve common military, political, and economic problems, but the British believed that their ties to the Commonwealth and worldwide economic activities would preclude their joining any such international organization.\textsuperscript{114} Even Germans recognized that Franco-German relations constituted a major problem of European politics. On the other hand, the Germans were upset at French action on the Saar.\textsuperscript{115} France achieved some success in 1947 when the Saar was detached

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\textsuperscript{112}William F. Russell, "Teaching Germans to Teach Themselves," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 27 (October 1948): 68-77.


\textsuperscript{114}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 491 (1951), col. 472 (Morrison).

\textsuperscript{115}Brentano, \textit{Germany and Europe}, 34-35, 74.
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from occupied Germany and included in the French economic system, leaving the final status of the Saar to be determined in the peace treaty with Germany.¹¹⁶

In the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, George Kennan published an article under the signature "Mr. X" expressing the idea of containment, which the press identified with United States' foreign policy. Kennan later wrote that he meant political containment of a political threat, not military containment, but at the time in the article Kennan advised that the United States' policy toward the Soviets be a long term, patient but firm and vigilant, containment of Soviet expansive tendencies and that the United States regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not as a partner.¹¹⁷ This policy became the attitude of the Western Allies toward the East Bloc during the period which spawned West German rearmament.¹¹⁸

By the end of 1947 the Western powers realized that they could not govern Germany successfully in collaboration with the Soviets.¹¹⁹ At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, 23 November 1947, after four weeks of argument, Marshall proposed an indefinite adjournment, an

¹¹⁶Eden, Full Circle, 4.

¹¹⁷"Mr. X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-582; Kennan, Memoires, 358.

¹¹⁸Kennan, Memoirs, 356, 364, 378.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 397, 419.
action which suspended the Potsdam Agreement that the powers hold meetings at least once every three months.\textsuperscript{120} This conference adjourned on 15 December 1947. Nevertheless, since 1946 the United States and Britain had been granting the West Germans more authority in managing their own affairs, and by late 1947 they were moving in the direction of establishing a West German political authority.\textsuperscript{121}

During the years 1945 to 1947 the West disarmed and most Western soldiers went home. Thus the absence of a German army to defend Germany was a critical weakness in the defense of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{122} Within one year after the war the United States reduced its forces in Europe from 3.1 million to 390,000. Britain reduced its forces from 1.3 million to 500,000. Canada removed all of its 300,000 men. Confronting this essentially disarmed West were about 4,720,000 Soviet troops in Europe in 1946.\textsuperscript{123} In 1948 after the Czechoslovakian coup the French government was afraid of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{124} The French were afraid the Soviet

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Murphy, Diplomat, 312.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Kennan, Memoirs, 397, 419.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Eden, Full Circle, 33; Ismay, Memoirs, 454; Nutting, \textit{Europe Will Not Wait}, 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Fischer, Verteidigung, 26-27.
\end{itemize}
Union would overrun France before help could arrive from Great Britain and the United States.125

The Soviet attitude was to keep Germany down. Soviet actions on reparations disturbed the Allies since the Soviets were stripping every area they occupied of all movable goods and calling those goods "war booty." They were also shooting and impressing Germans across the inter-zonal border in the United States' Zone.126 By January 1948, Soviet violations of the Potsdam Agreements had become so flagrant that the Western Allies no longer felt obliged to implement terms favorable to the Soviet Union.127

There was continued effort toward European unity. On 22 January 1948 before the House of Commons, Bevin proposed a "Western Union" of France, Britain, and the Benelux countries.128 On 17 March 1948 these countries signed the Brussels Pact.129 This pact included a security clause

125Policy Statement of the Department of State, 20 September 1948, ibid., 651-659.
126Millis, Forrestal, 79-80, 182-183.
127Kennan, Memoirs, 419.
128Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 446 (1948), cols. 392, 398-401 (Bevin).
against Germany, and through that clause members formed the Western European Union (WEU), which dissipated some of the fears of a revived Germany.130

While the West prepared to forge a West German government, the Soviets, in a note of 6 March 1948, objected that the London discussions on a German government contradicted the Potsdam Agreements and the agreement on control of Germany. The United States replied on 21 February 1948 that no agreement prohibited the Allies from discussing among themselves questions of common interest.131

The Soviets moved toward establishing an area of influence in East Europe. During 1947-1948 they tightened their grip on Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.132 The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 promoted insecurity and growing tension in Europe.133 On 10 March 1948 Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky, Chairman of the Allied Control Council for the month of March 1948, attacked the West for not recognizing the SED in the Western zones. The last meeting of the Allied Control Council was on 20


133Ibid.; Acheson, Present, 264.
March 1948. Sokolovsky, as chairman, was responsible for keeping it alive, but he walked out and never called another meeting. From that time in 1948 the Soviet Union carried out a systematic unilateral policy of its own in the Eastern Zone.

The most dramatic violation of good faith in the post-war years was the Berlin Blockade. In March 1948 the Soviets were alarmed at the Western move toward a separate West German government (the London Program). There was a need for currency reform in Germany, and the first step in the London Program was a separate West German currency in June 1948. The Soviet withdrawal from the Control Council terminated negotiations on currency reform, but the Western Allies decided to take action in their zones. Effective 21 June 1948, the old German currency was to be invalidated. Although the pretext for the Berlin Blockade was currency reform, the purpose was to force the

134Clay, Decision, 351, 355; Zhukov, Memoirs, 677.


136Kennan, Memoirs, 419.


West to abandon Berlin and the London Program.  

The blockade began on 31 March 1948 with a Soviet order to stop passenger trains to Berlin, and the Soviets ended the blockade on 12 May 1949.

National Security Council (NSC) Report 9 of 13 April 1948 assumed that the fear of Soviet aggression was strong enough to motivate free European nations to cooperate closely if the United States guaranteed support.

Although France needed Germany as a shield against the Soviet Union, a French note of 20 May 1948 expressed a fear that measures to rebuild German political organizations could cause a Soviet reaction. The Soviets did threaten abrogation of the 1944 Franco-Soviet treaty.

On the other hand, the French were still afraid that Germany, once recovered, would attack France. Accordingly, in 1948 France wanted a guarantee against a revival of a German

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139 Kennan, Memoirs, 420.
140 Clay, Decision, 343, 444, 358, 362; Acheson, Present, 274; Oppen, "Four Power Communiqué on Lifting the Berlin Blockade," Documents on Germany, 115.
141 Report by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council, 13 April 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: Western Europe, 85-88.
142 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948: Germany and Austria (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), 266, Footnote; The United States Political Advisor for Germany to the Secretary of State, 1 April 1948, ibid., 158-160.
143 Adenauer Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 255; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 17-18, 34.
The occupation troops provided security against Germany, but as it became apparent that the Soviets were creating a desert in their zone, the West began to suspect that the real enemy was not a revived Germany.\textsuperscript{145}

In mid-summer 1948 the West Germans prepared to elect a constituent assembly for the purpose of establishing a West German government. This Allied sponsored project was the London Program. During the winter of 1948-1949, West German leaders in a Parliamentary Council worked on a constitution, the Basic Law. Simultaneously, the Western Allies worked on a new Occupation Statute to go into effect when the West German government became operational.\textsuperscript{146} By the end of 1948, four-power rule in Germany had collapsed, and in the Western zones as a result of the ERP, economic revival had begun.\textsuperscript{147}

France in 1949 was afraid that the United States and Britain would form a relationship with Germany which would exclude France.\textsuperscript{148} Beyond that, French fears included revival of German power, a European war, and the problem of

\textsuperscript{144}Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 398-399.
\textsuperscript{145}Montgomery, \textit{Memoirs}, 356.
\textsuperscript{146}Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 418-419, 420-421, 427-428.
\textsuperscript{147}MacMillan, \textit{Tides}, 128.
\textsuperscript{148}Kennan, \textit{Memoirs}, 456.
her overseas empire.\textsuperscript{149} It was partly as an answer to those French fears that the United States, Britain, and France established in February 1949 the Military Security Board for the Western zones to insure the maintenance of disarmament and demilitarization.\textsuperscript{150}

Probably for the first time in history the Basic Law constituted a state with no means for self-defense and no legal provision for defense management. In 1948-1949 the idea that Germany might again build an armed force met opposition from the occupation powers and evoked mistrust in France, the Low Countries, and Germany. The Basic Law did not relinquish military sovereignty, the right of a state to have an armed military force, but it had no constitutional provision which could infer military sovereignty. It merely had a few stipulations on military legal matters.\textsuperscript{151}

Political unity continued to grow in Western Europe. The United States', British, and French foreign ministers on 8 April 1949 signed the "Agreement on Basic Principles for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Murphy, \textit{Diplomat}, 168-169; McCloy, \textit{Challenge}, 30.
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\end{footnotesize}
Trizonal Fusion," which merged the Western zones. The West also contributed to general Western European unity when on 5 May 1949 in London the foreign ministers of Denmark, France, the Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Britain plus a Belgian representative signed the agreement establishing the Council of Europe.

The Germans acted expeditiously on the Basic Law: approval by the Parliamentary Council on 8 May 1949, the military governors on 12 May 1949, and Land representatives on 23 May 1949. The FRG came into being and the Basic Law went into effect on 24 May 1949. The first nineteen articles enumerated are immutable basic rights. Article 4: "No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms...."


154 Ibid.; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 266, Editorial Note.


The Council of Europe had two organs: the Committee of Foreign Ministers and a consultative Assembly of Parliamentarians. The council was to reflect public opinion in member states, debate, and formulate a European opinion. The first meeting was in Strasbourg on 10 August 1949 at which time Churchill asked where the Germans were and pressed to have them admitted. The main purpose of West European organizations was protection from a perceived Soviet threat.

West Germany became a republic in 1949. On 15 September 1949 Konrad Adenauer became Federal Chancellor with a majority of 202 out of 402 votes. The Occupation Statute went into effect 21 September 1949, and it established the relation of the occupation powers to the FRG. The Allied High Commission replaced the Military Government. The first Allied High Commissioners, John J. McCloy of the United States, André François-Poncet of

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159 MacMillan Tides, 164, 168, 175-176, 184; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 24.

160 Kennan, Memoirs, 327-351.

France, and Sir Brian Robertson of Great Britain, held their first meeting in Bonn on 21 September 1949. On 1 October 1949, the Soviets protested that by creating a separate West German government, the West had violated the June 1949 Council of Foreign Ministers agreement in Paris to achieve political and economic unity in Germany. Thus, less than five years after suffering total defeat, West Germany was moving toward sovereignty.

As a result of World War II, it appeared that only the United States and the Soviet Union retained the resources and determination to solve world problems. The British, suffering from the loss of their empire, were almost bankrupt. The French, still agonizing over their collapse in 1940, were suffering from psychological, economic, and political problems as well as a dearth of effective leadership.

The years 1945 to 1949 constituted a period of critical transition for the world, for Europe, and especially for Germany. The nations had emerged from total war much different than when they entered the fray. The German countryside was devastated, the political and military
structure was destroyed, and German society was in a state of collapse, leaving a power vacuum into which the major nations of the East and West moved.

Allied wartime cooperation quickly degenerated into a struggle for the control of central Europe. There was a realignment of the balance of power, and former friends became enemies. One of the major problems was a general ignorance about the capabilities and intentions of each bloc. Each side was suspicious of the other, and misunderstandings degenerated into political feuds. A general mistrust on both sides motivated the West to adopt a policy to contain communism within its existing spheres of influence and prevent its expansion.

Closely associated with mutual mistrust was the quest for security. Although the fear of Germany did not vanish, there appeared a new, more pervasive fear of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, as the polarization became set and fears increased, there was a growing realization that Western Europe must be united and that West Germany must be part of Western unity.

Following the collapse, the German people had been subjected to an almost rabid demilitarization, but due to Western assistance, German economic recovery was rapid. West German political recovery responded quickly to Western encouragement, but in November 1949 Konrad Adenauer said that the German nation had been in a state of mental
instability for the past thirty-five years and that Germany had no interest in rearmament.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{164} Memorandum of Conversation with Adenauer, 13 November 1949, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria}, 308-311.
CHAPTER III

NATO, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND SECURITY (1949-1950)

Following World War II, the wartime alliances fell apart, cooperation degenerated into political competition, and mistrust and suspicion permeated Europe. Within this polarized political atmosphere, the Western Allies experienced problems with the Soviet Union. Based on the deteriorating situation in Europe from 1945 to 1950, the Western Allies perceived a threat from the East Bloc. Efforts to form international organizations for collective security produced several alliances, the most important of which were the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The WEU encompassed concepts of human rights and constitutional traditions; it also met the military threat.¹ Fears of the Soviet Union motivated the Western Allies to want the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in their defense system. Ironically, in 1945 the Allies disarmed Germany; four years later, they offered the Germans arms, which the Germans did not want.

On the other hand, the Germans could use the Allied

desire for rearmament to their advantage. Although the FRG could provide manpower, war material, and maneuvering room, the Allies were hesitant about bringing the FRG into the community of nations as a sovereign state. Beginning in 1946, the West Germans gained increasing degrees of sovereignty. By the spring of 1950, Konrad Adenauer was sufficiently confident of Western support to appoint a security advisor. He initially sought a security force in the guise of police similar to that of East Germany, but the Western Allies hesitated. In the meantime, he formed a security office, the Amt Schwerin (Schwerin Office), which began security planning.

There was cause for concern in the FRG. In August 1946 the East German police were under the "German Administration of the Interior" (DVdi). In November 1946 the first cadre of the "Barracks German Border Police" (KVP) was formed, and by the fall of 1947 it had reached a strength of 4000 men. Since the Soviets had a preponderance of conventional arms in Europe where the Allies had no effective defense system, the Soviets were dependent on those conventional arms, while the United States fell progressively behind in its military readiness objectives. Thus, the West European states

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depended on the United States' nuclear monopoly and military potential. In the event of war, Western Europe, almost undefended, would face an overwhelming Soviet army. In view of the situation in 1947, the West considered openly for the first time inclusion of FRG military potential in Western defense.4

In January 1948 the British Foreign Office projected the inclusion of Spain and Germany in a Western defense system when the situation permitted. This possibility was long discussed in the press in the spring of 1948. In France, Charles de Gaulle, an influential private citizen and national hero, considered the possibility of FRG participation in Western defense to be in the distant future; however, he assumed the existence of several German states.5

Under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, members have the right to act in self-defense, individually or in groups.6 The signatories of the Brussels Pact wanted the United States to associate with that group, but the United States' position was to support the pact without a


5Foerster, Anfänge, 327-328; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 163.

formal treaty. The international press advertised the military inferiority of Western Europe, including the exposed position of the FRG with the Rhine as first line of defense. The security responsibility of the Western occupation powers and the length of the occupation were uncertain, but because of Allied demilitarization rules the West Germans could do nothing for their own defense. In February 1948, the Soviets sponsored a coup in Czechoslovakia; soon after the signing of the Brussels Pact, they put pressure on Norway and began the Berlin Blockade. These events and Soviet rearmament motivated negotiations to create NATO. Yet, at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 20 May 1948 Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall said that the JCS would not make a commitment to any defense arrangement without knowledge of European requirements and participation, but would send observers to the WEU meeting in London in July 1948.

Being concerned about the vulnerability of the FRG to East German police forces, in June 1948 former General Hans Speidel, professor of history at the University of Tübingen, wrote a security memorandum Die Sicherheit Westeuropas

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7 Millis, Forrestal, 422-423, 434-435.
8 Foerster, Anfänge, 332.
9 Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, 206.
(Security of Western Europe), a proposal whereby the FRG could rearm in defense against the East Bloc.\(^{11}\)

At the London WEU talks on 16 July 1948, the WEU strategic concept was to fight as far to the east as possible. The WEU wanted the United States' help in the form of units and equipment and forecast that it would be three to five years before WEU forces would be prepared to fight.\(^{12}\) The object of WEU defense policy was to convince the Soviet Union that war would not be profitable.\(^{13}\)

In East Germany, a group of former Wehrmacht officers began military planning, which on 3 July 1948 produced the Kasernierten Bereitschaften (readiness groups in barracks) with a cadre of one thousand officers and NCOs from the Wehrmacht. By the end of 1948 the cadre had grown to eight thousand.\(^{14}\)

In September 1948 the Brussels Pact nations created a

\(^{11}\)Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 249-254, 468-475.


\(^{13}\)Memorandum, Bohlen to Secretary of State, 6 August 1948, ibid., 207; Considerations Affecting Conclusion of North Atlantic Security Pact, 24 November 1948, ibid., 285; Memorandum by JCS to the Secretary of Defense, 24 November 1948, ibid., 290.

\(^{14}\)Fischer, Verteidigung, 24; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 267.
WEU defense organization with headquarters in Fontainebleau.15 This organization was led by the WEU Defense Committee consisting of the five defense ministers; Field Marshal Montgomery was chairman.16 The WEU was the first legal move toward European unity.17

In 1948 United States officers visited WEU headquarters to consider plans for West European defense. Motivation for the visit was the perceived Soviet threat and the military weakness of Western Europe. The Soviets had thirty divisions in East Europe; in Western Europe, the United States had three and one-half divisions, the British two and one-half, the French six under-strength divisions, and the Benelux countries a total of six.18 Even though there was a disparity between Western and Soviet divisions in authorized strength, Soviet and East Bloc military manpower far exceeded that of the West.19 By December 1948 the Western Allies had agreed that there was a Soviet threat to Europe

15Montgomery, Memoirs, 455.


18Acheson, Present, 307-308.

19Fischer, Verteidigung, 28-29.
and that they must form an alliance to meet that threat. This alliance appeared in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty, submitted to the participating governments on 24 December 1948.

At the beginning of 1949 Montgomery expressed the view that without West Germany there could be no effective defense against the Soviet Union, but West European nations demanded security against Germany and were hesitant to accept German political and economic recovery until they received assurance of that security. According to George Kennan, the Soviets had no intention of attacking West Europe in the post-war years, but the West was uncertain about Soviet plans for the future. Even though the West believed in 1949 that West German security was inseparable from West European security, there were two immediate obstacles: mistrust of the German people and the ohne mich (count me out) attitude of the Germans.

NATO was organized to counter the Eastern threat. On the other side, the memoirs of Soviet marshals, including

20Millis, Forrestal, 506-508; Dulles, War or Peace, 95-96; Bohlen, Witness, 267-268; Clay, Decision, 153.


22Kennan, Memoirs, 138-142.

23Fischer, Verteidigung, 28-29.

24Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, 206.
Shtemenko, Meretskov, and Zhukov, state that in the late 1940s the Soviets believed that the United States used nuclear weapons against Japan to intimidate the Soviet Union and that the United States planned to use those weapons to dominate the world.\textsuperscript{25} Backing up East German units were the Soviet armed forces. In February 1949 the Soviet Union had four million men under arms and 75,000 first line aircraft. It could easily drive to the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf, and Suez. The Soviet Union, however, lacked modern weapons. It was also deficient in oil; it had oil, but not enough for an extended war.\textsuperscript{26}

In East Germany former Wehrmacht officers helped form the National People's Army (NVA).\textsuperscript{27} In 1949 the Soviet Union was rearming East Germany through the Bereitschaften.\textsuperscript{28} On 14 April 1949 the Kasernierten Bereitschaften came under the Top Administration for


\textsuperscript{26}General Catroux, "Tendances de la Politique étrangère Soviétique," Politique Étrangère 14 (Fevrier 1949): 23-32.

\textsuperscript{27}Times, 29 Apr. 1950, 6.

Training, which on 18 January 1956 became the DDR Ministry for National Defense.29

Meanwhile, the Western Allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D. C. At the time, NATO did not include Germany, but there was a provision whereby the treaty states by unanimous consent could invite non-members to join. NATO institutions included the North Atlantic Council (NAC) consisting of the foreign ministers, the Defense Committee composed of the defense ministers, and the Military Committee whose members were the chiefs of staff. The Standing Group (NATO SG) consisted of high level officers from the United States, Britain, and France.30

The North Atlantic Treaty did not restrict mutual defense efforts; moreover, it condoned simultaneous economic, social, and cultural effort in consonance with the UN Charter.31 There was a need, however, to separate the military from the rest of NATO, one reason being to obtain a

29Fischer, Verteidigung, 25.


West German association. Military effort was to be defensive and designed to discourage Soviet aggression. Article Five, "Mutual Defense Effort," states that an armed attack against one or more member states in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against all. An additional provision stipulates that an attack against the occupation troops in West Germany was considered an attack against a member state. European countries with overseas territories posed a special problem in that they could not assess a NATO commitment until they knew what was required to defend their non-NATO possessions.

On both sides, crucial factors in deterrence were a firm resolve and combat ready forces available for a counterattack. This readiness required integrated leadership and assigned organizations. Therefore, troops and support had to be designated and ready for action in the shortest time. Since the Soviet Union was superior to NATO in conventional forces, NATO sought agreements on placement of nuclear weapons and delivery means. Accordingly,


34. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 13 January 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 5-7.
anti-communist NATO was to provide a security net of military-political pacts encircling the Soviet Union. The strategy was deterrence; the risk of war to accomplish political objectives had to be certain and unacceptable.35

There were questions concerning West German industrial capacity. The State Department announced on 13 April 1949 that equipment from 159 plants previously scheduled for removal as reparations was to be retained in Germany.36 Moreover, Adenauer in 1949 maintained that West German industry had been destroyed and could not support rearmament, but West Germany could rearm if the United States supplied the weapons.37 On the other hand, in May 1949 Deputy Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett testified that the German economy and fear made it impossible to consider Germany a participant in Atlantic defense.38

Adenauer considered Soviet foreign policy after 1946 to be expansive, and he used this view as the point of departure for his security policy. The West corroborated his anxiety, and before his election as Federal Chancellor

35Fischer, Verteidigung, 47.


37Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 343.

in 1949, he determined his security policy: defense and security by the Allies and displacement of the Western defense line to the east, inclusion of the FRG in the Western defense system, readiness to share responsibility for European security, deterrence through Western military strength including FRG troops, and renunciation of a national armed force. He emphasized equality as the primary condition for FRG participation in European defense. There were three demands: sovereignty in return for rearmament, security against East Europe, and a European federation. The forward position of the FRG required the FRG to be strong against the East without appearing too strong militarily and politically to the West.

During the debate in the French National Assembly in July 1949 on ratification of NATO, Schuman considered it necessary to reassure Parliament and the French public. To him, it appeared inconceivable for the West to permit the FRG into NATO as a nation capable of self-defense. Moreover, the French ministerial council did not want to consider restoration of German military power. Conversely, there were individuals in France who favored FRG rearmament;

42 Fischer, Verteidigung, 29.
Georges Bidault confided in United States Ambassador to France David K. Bruce that he did not agree with perpetual German disarmament. 43

Since he had no military background, Adenauer formed much of his policy on the advice from former German military men, especially Hans Speidel. He also followed the political debate on rearmament. After his election as Federal Chancellor in 1949, Adenauer realized that the time for FRG rearmament had not come, but he considered it advisable to express his thoughts abroad and make it clear that the Germans would not shirk sharing responsibility for West European security. 44 The first successful Soviet atomic bomb test gave the debate strong impetus in the fall of 1949. 45

Under the Occupation Statute, the FRG Government and Länder received legal authority in accord with the Basic Law. Occupation authorities retained control over demilitarization, security of Allied forces, occupation issues, and changes to the Basic Law. 46 The FRG received permission

43 Foerster, Anfänge, 330-332.
44 Ibid., 334; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 341.
46 Occupation Statute, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 105-111.
to establish consular relations with other states, with a
Bureau of Consular Affairs under the Chancellor. In
addition, by September 1949 the British Foreign Office
perceived the FRG eventually in the WEU and NATO, but the
West wanted a quid pro quo for all concessions.

Formation of the FRG preceded a similar event in the
Soviet Zone. The Soviet sponsored Volksrat (People's
Council) announced on 7 October 1949 the establishment of
the German Democratic Republic (DDR), and from October 1949
East Berlin (Pankow) was the capital of the DDR. In the
fall of 1949 notes from both sides accused the other of
evading responsibility for promoting Germany as a
homogeneous entity and transforming it into a democratic
state.

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47 Acheson, Present, 339; Fischer, Verteidigung, 21-22;
Oppen, "Petersberg Protocol," Documents on Germany, 439-442.

48 Charge in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of
State, 1 September 1949, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and
Austria, 269-271.

49 U. S. Department of State, "Establishment of Soviet-
Sponsored East German Republic," Bulletin 21 (21 November
1949): 761-764; "Establishment in the Soviet Zone of the
Government of the German Democratic Republic: Allied High
Commission Press Release, 10 October 1949," Great Britain,
Foreign Office, Selected Documents on Germany and the
Question of Berlin, 1944-1961 (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1961), 125-126; "Statement by the United
States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, on the Illegal-
ity of the East German Government, 12 October 1949," ibid.,
126-127; Fischer, Verteidigung, 23.

50 Fischer, Verteidigung, 23.
Demanding the cessation of reparations on 27 October 1949 in Bonn, Adenauer said industrial dismantling was causing unrest and distrust among the Germans. At the Foreign Ministers Conference from 9 to 11 November 1949 in Paris, the West reaffirmed the policy of giving the Germans more responsibility and freedom to conduct their affairs. Accordingly, the Petersberg Agreement of 22 November 1949 provided for incorporation of the FRG into the European community. It was to promote FRG participation in all international organizations to which the Germans could contribute. In return, the FRG volunteered to maintain demilitarization and prevent recreation of armed forces. Thus, dismantling would stop in designated plants. The

51 The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 28 October 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 290-294.


55 The U. S. High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 22 November 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 343-348.

56 Times, 14 Mar. 1950, 5.
Petersberg Agreement also revised the Occupation Statute, which was attached to the Basic Law.57

In November 1949 Adenauer wanted to integrate the FRG into Western Europe, an objective having priority over reunification. As a condition he wanted Germans to be citizens of Europe.58 He expressed little interest in German rearmament, but wanted equal partnership in the economic field and closer relations with France.59 Adenauer's primary goal in 1949 was modification of the Occupation Statute and restoration and consolidation of West Germany.60

In November 1949 many of the French were apprehensive about FRG rearmament in spite of denials by Schuman and Acheson. The French were dissatisfied with British participation in West European affairs since France wanted Britain


60Adenauer, Erinerrungen, 1945-1953, 235-236.
to counterbalance any German threat.\textsuperscript{61} France also saw a political and economic threat from a united Germany.\textsuperscript{62}

Some Western generals favored FRG rearmament. In 1949 Montgomery approached Bevin on German rearmament and in November 1949 visited the United States where he told Truman and Eisenhower that the West needed German military forces.\textsuperscript{63} Clay questioned the advisability of leaving Germany defenseless and wondered if Germany should be expected to contribute to the common security.\textsuperscript{64} On 21 November 1949 a British Foreign Office spokesman indicated the occupation powers would change their Germany policy as the situation changed. Yet, in November and December 1949 the British government explained six times that it did not intend to revise its demilitarization policy.\textsuperscript{65}

Adenauer had two lines of thought. He knew the Germans were unsure about rearmament; he also believed the West

\textsuperscript{61} The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 21 November 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 342–343.


\textsuperscript{63} Montgomery, Memoirs, 458.

\textsuperscript{64} Clay, Decision, 342; New York Times, 21 Nov. 1949, sec. 1, 5; The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 21 November 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 340–342.

\textsuperscript{65} Foerster, Anfänge, 330–331.
feared the East Bloc and was anxious for the Germans to rearm. To obtain FRG sovereignty, he used both lines, but did so carefully so that he might avoid a domestic crisis as well as an international reaction.66 As quoted in the Cleveland Plain Dealer of 3 December 1949, Adenauer opposed an autonomous armed Germany, but said he would accept a German contingent in a European army.67 On 5 December 1949 he did not openly support West German remilitarization, but indicated that the FRG might be called upon to make a defense contribution. Should this happen, Adenauer proposed FRG units under a non-German command.68 On 9 December 1949 he demanded inclusion of FRG manpower in any West European strike force against the Soviet Union. The High Commissioners had warned him not to make statements like this, but he reasoned that most Germans opposed war; the DDR police were a regular army; the Western Allies had demilitarized Germany and were responsible for FRG security; and Germans must have equal rights.69 Yet, in 1949, the majority of FRG public still rejected a defense contribution.70

67 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 3 Dec. 1949.
70 Fischer, Verteidigung, 30.
In the DDR, the Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung (Main Administration for Training) was established in 1949 under Generalinspekteur Wilhelm Zaisser. In early 1950 this office became directly responsible to Generalmajor Petrakovsky, a member of the Soviet Control Commission.  

The DDR was training the Volkspolizei to be converted into a 360,000 man Volksarmee by April 1950. This army was to include six divisions, each with one tank and one artillery regiment and one grenadier battalion.

In his foreign policy strategy, Adenauer's ideas on security emanated not only from fear of Soviet expansion but from anxiety over the stability of the democratic social order in the FRG. Internally, German democracy needed stabilization anchored in a powerful united Europe. Externally, his goal was a guarantee of United States' deterrence and assistance within NATO. Accordingly, he sought to associate the FRG with the West. Evidence of this quest included accession to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in October 1949, ratification of the ERP in January 1950, accession to the Council of Europe.

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in July 1950 as an associate member, and collaboration in
the Schuman Plan beginning in May 1950.\textsuperscript{73}

The West was studying how to use West German industrial
capacity to improve NATO military capability without
violating security prohibitions.\textsuperscript{74} In consonance with this
effort, United States ambassadors, meeting in Rome in March
1950, agreed to consider the immediate use of German
industry to provide NATO materials and supplies.\textsuperscript{75}

On 14 April 1950, guidelines for United States' defense
and foreign policy for the next thirty years appeared in
National Security Directive 68 (NSC 68). Although not a
master plan, NSC 68 focused on the struggle between the
Soviet Union and the free world.\textsuperscript{76} Conclusions drawn in NSC
68 affected not only a military strengthening of NATO, but,
in the sense of containment, merged the goals of economic
strength and political stability. The sequel to NSC 68 was
a resolve to increase the land forces in Western Europe to

\textsuperscript{73}Foerster, Anfänge, 332-333; Adenauer, Erinnerungen,
1945-1953, 244-247.

\textsuperscript{74}Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom, 23 March 1950, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1950: Western Europe, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{75}Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 27
March 1950, ibid., 34.

\textsuperscript{76}A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary, 14 April 1950, Foreign Relations of The
United States, 1950: National Security Affairs; Foreign
Economic Policy (Washington: United States Government
thirty divisions. This increase appeared trifling in view of other commitments; therefore, there was added interest in including the FRG in the military and economic effort of NATO. In the spring of 1950 NATO was not yet confronted with this issue, but the FRG defense contribution entered a new phase in Western discussions because of the interchange of ideas between governments for the first time. 77

There was a noteworthy change of perspective in Paris in the spring of 1950. The French government admitted that FRG rearmament could not be prevented; however, the West was to control the FRG and its resources during the occupation with the help of the Coal and Steel Community. As part of its political strategy, the French government refused to discuss FRG rearmament. 78

The Western powers still lacked unity on rearming Germany. At the beginning of April 1950 Acheson and McCloy announced their opposition to FRG rearmament. 79 Nevertheless, in April 1950 the United States was considering some means whereby West Germany could contribute politically and economically to NATO. 80 Britain considered it too soon to

78 Ibid.
79 Foerster, Anfänge, 330-331.
rearm Germany.\textsuperscript{81} Belgian Premier Eyskins, on the contrary, felt that West Germany should be armed as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{82} French objections were more complex. Schuman and President Auriol declared themselves against FRG rearmament. French Premier Georges Bidault proposed a civilian general staff for NATO with one-half Europeans and one-half United States and Canadian.\textsuperscript{83} He pointed out that such an arrangement would integrate British interests more closely with NATO, but a close association of the FRG with NATO at that time was not desirable or politically possible because German rearmament would provoke the Soviet Union. Moreover, there were insufficient weapons, but some day the West might rearm the FRG.\textsuperscript{84} Bruce pointed out on 25 April 1950 that the West had two problems: how to tie British interests more closely to NATO and how to fit West Germany into Western Europe and NATO as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} Strauss, Grand Design, 94; The U. S. Delegation to the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State, 25 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 860-863.

\textsuperscript{82} The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 13 March 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 30.

\textsuperscript{83} The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 20 April 1950, ibid., 57-58; Foerster, Anfänge, 330-331.

\textsuperscript{84} The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 22 April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 60-62.

\textsuperscript{85} The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 25 April 1950, ibid., 63-65.
In the spring of 1950 the mood was cynical. A calm appeared over Europe following the Berlin Blockade and fading alarm over the Soviet atomic bomb test. Only political councils and military staffs appeared concerned.86 NATO concepts of an integrated defense led in April 1950 to the draft of a four-year plan for the step-by-step formation of "balanced collective forces." By mid-1950 NATO had at its disposal fourteen divisions and about 1000 aircraft, but there was no unity of command capable of meeting an enemy attack with an effective delaying action. On the other side, the Soviet Union had about 175 divisions.87

In 1950 in the FRG the unpopularity of the FRG's making a defense contribution was exacerbated by communist propaganda through radio and newspapers. The principal opponents of rearmament were opposition parties, pacifists, nationalist church groups, and former Wehrmacht groups who felt ignored. Likewise, communists opposed rearmament as did the SPD with the help of Martin Niemöller, who conducted a personal campaign against Adenauer and rearmament.88 The German Protestant Church was strongly pro-unification; hence, it was conciliatory toward the DDR government. Certain West German Industrialists, businessmen, and

86Foerster, Anfänge, 287.

87Fischer, Verteidigung, 45-46; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 136.

anticommunist professional soldiers also favored unification.\textsuperscript{89} These groups perceived rearmament as preempting reunification.\textsuperscript{90}

From December 1949 to the spring of 1950 Adenauer submitted numerous requests for an Allied security guarantee, indicating to the Allies that he perceived a serious threat.\textsuperscript{91} On 28 April 1950, he submitted a request to the High Commission for authorization to form a police force equivalent to that of the DDR.\textsuperscript{92} In May 1950 the three occupation powers said a security guarantee was not necessary because Allied occupation troops under the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty served as an existing, effective defense.\textsuperscript{93}

The United States' State Department moderated a JCS proposal to insert FRG divisions into NATO. The State


\textsuperscript{90}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

\textsuperscript{91}Foerster, Anfänge, 334-335; Paper Approved by the Foreign Ministers, 22 May 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 1085-1086.


\textsuperscript{93}Foerster, Anfänge, 334-335; Paper Approved by the Foreign Ministers, 22 May 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 1085-1086.
Department did not expect voluntary agreement by France and Britain and feared that pressure from Washington might create tension in NATO. There was a belief that no opposition existed in Britain, an idea which emanated from an informal meeting of the foreign ministers in May 1950 when British representatives talked bilaterally with Americans in support of FRG rearmament. Perceiving a threat from the East Bloc, the British considered the federal police proposed by Adenauer on 28 April 1950 an intermediate step to rearmament.94

By May 1950, the Soviets had violated at least five quadri- or tri-partite agreements, and rumors were rife exaggerating the size of the military force in the East Zone.95 The Western Allies concluded that there was no prospect for negotiating with the Soviet Union and that the correct course was a position of strength.96 In West Germany in 1950 there was a fear of the East German \_\_\_\-


95The United States Delegation to the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 915-918.

96Memorandum of the Tripartite Preliminary Meetings on Items 6 and 8, 9 May 1950, ibid., 1078-1081.
schaften. John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, claimed that there was a military threat from the Soviet Union, that the armament race was on, and that the key to success in dealing with the Soviets was power.

In May 1950 United States Ambassador Douglas in London reported that there was a need to study the admission of the FRG into NATO. Because of the disparity in manpower between the Soviet Union and the West, the United States believed more rapid progress was necessary in the build-up of Western defensive strength. Ironically, on 8 May 1950 the High Commission promulgated "The Defensive Law for the Prevention of German Rearmament," effective 1 June 1950, to simplify earlier agreements and to give more control to the Germans. In London prior to the foreign ministers conference in May 1950, Bevin and Acheson agreed to consider later acceptance of the FRG into NATO, but to keep their discussions secret in the interim. Simultaneously, with a hint of rejection against FRG rearmament, the British

97 Bohlen, Witness, 304; Times, 3 April 1950, 4.

98 Dulles, War or Peace, 2-3, 16.

99 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 81-83.

100 Paper Prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs as Background for the May Foreign Ministers and North Atlantic Council Meetings, 3 May 1950, ibid., 85-90.

101 Times, 9 May 1950, 4.
representative joined the French to consider FRG economic association with NATO.\(^{102}\)

At the conference of foreign ministers, 11 to 13 May 1950, the issues of FRG rearmament and accession to NATO were not considered seriously.\(^{103}\) The foreign ministers, however, did perceive the Soviet Union as a threat.\(^{104}\) At the time leading Western politicians and military leaders suggested FRG rearmament in the context of a supra-national European army; thus the FRG would become a partner in NATO.\(^{105}\) Acheson told Schuman the West should not contemplate a build-up of German military forces. Schuman replied that French policy was similar to that of the United States: gradual return of sovereignty to Germany under the occupation powers, integration of Germany into the West, and an occupation, the termination of which depended on the goodwill of the Germans. The occupation powers had to retain the initiative.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{102}\)Foerster, \textit{Anfänge}, 336-337.

\(^{103}\)Ibid.

\(^{104}\)The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 16 May 1950, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe}, 105-108.

\(^{105}\)Fischer, \textit{Verteidigung}, 30.

\(^{106}\)The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 9 May 1950, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe}, 1013-1018.
On the last day of the conference the three foreign ministers still did not agree. When they informed the Benelux ministers of the policy decisions on Germany, Netherlands Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker asked why the FRG received only rights but no duties. Stikker considered rearmament premature, but a majority of the Hague parliament agreed on early FRG rearmament. Bevin expressed the common judgment of the occupation powers that FRG rearmament was premature; however, this matter could be discussed when the FRG proved itself cooperative. Bonn already bore part of the Western defense burdens in the form of occupation costs.

There were several possible ways for the FRG to make a military contribution: an FRG contingent in a supra-national West European army, a "mercenary solution," and financial and economic contributions. Several months after the formation of NATO, the British Foreign Office considered the integration of the FRG into Western defense via NATO and the Brussels Pact. After the conference, Acheson rejected a proposal to put the plan for FRG rearmament before the NAC. Besides, the Schuman Plan appeared to be a suitable model.

107 Foerster, Anfänge, 337


109 Foerster, Anfänge, 337; Times, 4 April 1950, 4.
for European cooperation. Acheson reasoned that agreement on FRG rearmament at that time would undermine NATO.110

During a conversation at the Petersberg on 16 May 1950 Adenauer learned details of the foreign ministers conference in London. He learned that the Western powers agreed to incorporate the FRG into the political and economic system of the West as soon as possible if the FRG would begin internal security planning. This reported agreement was sufficient approval for Adenauer to act.111

Adenauer had been considering the appointment of a security advisor for some time.112 Reservations against rearmament, fear of militarism, the war crimes trials, fears of repeating the mistakes of the Weimar period, and the resulting militarism were reminders of what might happen should Adenauer be careless. Adenauer wanted a democracy-minded, politically inactive, military expert; these requirements reduced the number of candidates.113 Adenauer had been in contact with several former Wehrmacht generals. He had personal contact with Speidel since the winter of 1948-1949 and had read Speidel's memorandum of June 1948.114

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110 Foerster, Anfänge 329, 331-332, 337; Acheson, Patterns, 115-116.


112 Ibid.

113 Foerster, Anfänge, 459-460.

114 Ibid.; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 249-254, 468-476.
Speidel, acceptable to France and the United States, refused an appointment as security advisor. Adenauer also had close contact with General of Panzer Troops Hasso von Manteufel, but Manteufel was already too involved in politics. At the end of 1949 Adenauer had considered General of Panzer Troops Walther Wenck. Major General Reinhard Gehlen, intelligence specialist, had Adenauer's confidence but was too close to the United States to please Britain and France. General of Panzer Troops Leo Freiher Geyr Schweppenburg had good British connections but was a political risk.115

In 1949 British Major Michael Thomas, advisor to the British military government, was looking for a suitable security advisor among former Wehrmacht generals. He consulted journalist Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, who mentioned former General of Panzer Troops Gerhard Graf Schwerin. In the fall of 1949 Thomas got in contact with Schwerin. Lord Robertson, British High Commissioner, after thorough investigation, proposed Schwerin to Adenauer. It appears that Adenauer and Schwerin had not known each other. Although the British considered him worthy of confidence, high ranking United States officers considered Schwerin a second choice: they preferred Gehlen.116

115Foerster, Anfänge, 458-459.

116Ibid., 459-460; The Secretary of State to the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort, 21 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 689-699.
Adenauer accepted the British recommendation of Schwerin, who had read Speidel's security memorandum. Schwerin was briefed on the situation and discussed in writing the possibility of his appointment.\textsuperscript{117} At the time Schwerin was selling pharmaceutical products. On 24 May 1950 Adenauer invited Schwerin to a conversation and appointed him to be his advisor on military and security matters, thus establishing the Dienststelle Schwerin, or Amt Schwerin. Schwerin's instructions were to prepare the foundation for a future defense ministry.\textsuperscript{118}

In the meeting on 24 May 1950, Adenauer identified two problems: an internal danger from disintegration of public life and communist infiltration, and insufficient security in the event of an East-West confrontation. Schwerin accepted the oral commission to report on both problems to the Chancellor.\textsuperscript{119} He had planning responsibility for external and internal security.\textsuperscript{120}

External security was the defense of FRG territory against the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Occupation Statute, with which the FRG agreed, the occupation powers

\textsuperscript{117}Foerster, \textit{Anfänge}, 459-460.

\textsuperscript{118}Greiner, "Dienststelle Blank," \textit{Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen}, 99-124.

\textsuperscript{119}Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, \textit{Himmeloder Denkschrift}, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{120}Foerster, \textit{Anfänge}, 461-462.
were responsible for external security, since they had decreed the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, yet it was clear that the West could not defend the FRG. After futile attempts to obtain an Allied security guarantee or strengthening of occupation troops, Adenauer considered an FRG defense contribution to fill the void. The initiative, however, had to come from the West. He resolved to comply with an Allied wish for FRG participation only under conditions of far-reaching concessions.\textsuperscript{121}

Internal security pertained to defense against communist-directed agitation and propaganda as well as activities by nationalist and neo-Nazi groups. It required passive defense measures and preservation of public order in case of a confrontation with the East Bloc as well as border defense by police forces. In accordance with occupation law, these measures devolved upon FRG authorities.\textsuperscript{122}

In his conversation with Adenauer, Schwerin demanded as a condition for his work the complete support of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leadership. Adenauer agreed that it was a necessary element. During the first conversation between SPD leader Kurt Schumacher and Schwerin on 7 June 1950, they discussed questions of FRG security. Schumacher would not compromise with the Government security position.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 462.
\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., 463.
Since German workers were afraid of being misused for Allied goals, the SPD would reject any attempt by the Allies to establish a federal constabulary against the will of the Länder. Hence, the SPD continued to oppose Adenauer's security initiative.

As a consequence of the Korean War, which changed the world political situation and influenced domestic politics in the FRG, the Chancellor acquiesced in the necessity to consider anew the question of German security. On this basis and in mutual recognition of responsibility for security, Adenauer agreed to maintain close contact with Schumacher and to keep him informed on this issue. Adenauer recognized that SPD agreement was essential to a political settlement of the security problem.

Schumacher did not fundamentally reject an FRG defense contribution; he agreed with Adenauer that there was a threat from the East. His ideas, however, were of a strategic defense. In the event of a Soviet attack, he advocated an offensive to drive the aggressor east of the 1937 Reich boundary. Schumacher did not deny the duty of self-defense so long as it had the prospect of success; how-

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123Ibid., 472-474.
124 Ibid.
ever, he feared Soviet opposition at the first sign of mobilization. Rearmament would conjure up a danger of war, which would sacrifice an unarmed Germany.¹²⁶

Schwerin's title was Berater des Bundeskanzlers in Sicherheitsfragen (Advisor of the Federal Chancellor for Security Questions).¹²⁷ Schwerin asked Colonel Johan A. Graf Kielmansegg to serve as secretary for the Amt Schwerin. Major Achim Oster and Major Axel von dem Bussche also joined Schwerin at the beginning.¹²⁸ In the Chancellor's Office under Herbert Blankenhorn, Schwerin organized an office, the "Center for Home Service."¹²⁹

The appointment of a former high ranking professional officer rather than a police expert as security advisor suggests that Adenauer was considering a future military contribution to European defense. Inasmuch as Adenauer had stated publicly that the FRG could not ask the occupation powers to defend West Germany without offering a quid pro quo, plans were necessary should the Western Allies ask for a defense contribution. Adenauer perceived this request to

¹²⁷Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 268.
be imminent and therefore could not postpone associated domestic political and organizational tasks.¹³⁰

Complying with Adenauer's wish for him to report on internal and external security matters, in May 1950 Schwerin drafted the "Contribution of Ideas," in which he proposed the establishment of a mobile federal constabulary. In the event of a Soviet attack, Schwerin expected a penetration to the Rhine River within a few days, and he anticipated communist subversion to incite revolutionary actions. The assumed objective of an Eastern invasion was denial of West German industrial and manpower potential to the West.¹³¹

Schwerin expressed other ideas in "Outline of Practical Possibilities for the Formation of German Cadre Units in the Area of the United West European Armed Forces." He proposed on one hand an FRG contingent in a European army and on the other, police units similar to the Volkspolizei. Another possibility was conversion of Länder border police into a federal constabulary. Schwerin opposed the option of inserting German labor units into Allied formations since he considered them unreliable as soldiers. Although Schwerin's proposals varied considerably, Adenauer used his memoranda

¹³⁰Poerster, Anfänge, 457.
¹³¹Ibid., 475.
frequently to explain FRG security proposals to individual High Commissioners at the beginning of June 1950.\textsuperscript{132}

There was a continuous effort by the United States and Great Britain in early 1950 to integrate West Germany into Western Europe and to reduce the dependence of NATO military strength on the United States. The idea at that time was not to rearm West Germany, but to persuade the FRG to support NATO logistically.\textsuperscript{133} To assist in this effort, in June 1950 Truman designated Charles M. Spofford Deputy United States Representative to the NAC.\textsuperscript{134} Lord Robertson believed that FRG military preparedness had to develop step-by-step, perhaps through establishment of a German constabulary. This British idea conformed to Adenauer's policy with an interim solution to internal security being a step toward external security.\textsuperscript{135}

In early June 1950, among United States political leaders the official attitude toward FRG rearmament was still negative. At the beginning of June 1950 Acheson twice rejected FRG rearmament with United States' arms.\textsuperscript{136} On 16

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., 476-477.
\textsuperscript{133}Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 23 March 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 32-33.
\textsuperscript{134}The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 24 June 1950, ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{135}Foerster, Anfänge, 476-477.
\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., 337; Acheson, Patterns, 115-116.
June 1950 Truman considered FRG rearmament unrealistic. The High Commission considered FRG rearmament premature. At the beginning of June 1950 Adenauer considered ten to twelve divisions necessary and for the first time offered German soldiers. The interchange of ideas within the Federal Chancellor's Office early in June 1950 revealed the possibility of gradually forming defense forces under the cloak of federal police. Adenauer enunciated this idea in speculating that the FRG be accepted into NATO as a counterweight to DDR military formations. In June 1950 the State Department published data on East German forces. There were at least eleven officer training schools and a forty thousand to fifty thousand man military force of thirty-nine Bereitschaften armed with standard German infantry weapons and a few T-34 tanks. In June 1950 Adenauer explained to the Bundestag that Schwerin would

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137 Memorandum by the President of the United States, 16 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 688-689.

138 Poerster, Anfänge, 337-338.


140 Ibid.; "Note From the British Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister on the Remilitarization of East Germany, 23 May 1950," Great Britain, Selected Documents, 130-132; Memorandum of Conversation by Director of Policy Planning Staff, 5 October 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 360; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 267.
discuss an FRG defense contribution with the High Commission in negotiations on external security.\textsuperscript{141}

According to Adenauer, an FRG military contribution required adequate and timely military protection during the formative period, complete military and political equality, cessation of condemnation of the German soldier, and satisfactory settlement of war crimes sentences.\textsuperscript{142} West Germany was to purchase political sovereignty by sharing in Western defense.\textsuperscript{143}

For several years the United States Department of Defense maintained that European defense required willing and active participation of the FRG, but as late as 5 June 1950 United States’ policy required demilitarization. Conversely, on 6 June 1950 General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, said the defense of Europe would be strengthened by the addition of Germany. Bradley’s comment reinforced the views of Clay, Montgomery, and Adenauer, who in early 1950 perceived a need for the FRG in European defense. United States’ missions in London, Paris, and Bonn urged West German participation in European defense. To be sure,

\textsuperscript{141}Foerster, \textit{Anfänge}, 457, 461-462.

\textsuperscript{142}Adenauer, \textit{Erinnerungen, 1945-1953}, 385.

however, the Korean War caused a change in the official United States' position on FRG participation.\textsuperscript{144}

The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 accelerated the transition of the Amt Schwerin from the contemplative to the operational phase. Schwerin applied the idea of the Korean War being a trip wire to alert the West to communist intentions and the FRG security policy.\textsuperscript{145} The parallel between the ideological and political division of Korea and Germany was obvious.\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, the Korean War afforded welcome assistance to the Chancellor's security policy; it hastened, at government and diplomatic levels, deliberations and encouraged plans for inclusion of the FRG in Western defense.\textsuperscript{147}

Within an apparent peaceful atmosphere the outbreak of the Korean War was a shock. It appeared as a fundamental change in Soviet policy in that the Soviets would now employ military force in pursuit of political goals. The West believed that the Soviets were pursuing war by proxy in Korea and that the entire communist camp supported the

\textsuperscript{144} Acheson, Present, 435.
\textsuperscript{145} Foerster, Anfänge, 477; Times, 26 Jun. 1950, 4.
\textsuperscript{146} Times, 27 Jun. 1950, 5.
\textsuperscript{147} Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Danksschrift, 5.
Korean War. On 27 June 1950 Acheson said these circumstances would have a long term effect. He concluded that this war confirmed the central direction of communist imperialism to conquer independent states through armed aggression rather than through traditional communist means.

In the summer of 1950 Adenauer wrote that FRG security was a problem of the first order. In reality, the security problem was of second order after his foreign policy goals; the security problem served merely as a vehicle to hasten the return of full sovereignty. In this regard, Adenauer's instructions to Schwerin were to formulate several courses of action for FRG participation in Western security. Then, in harmony with gradual concessions by the occupation powers, Schwerin would develop the optimum plan for an FRG defense contribution.

The Korean War accentuated the problem of West European defense. NATO was new and the West had a relatively weak force in Europe, a condition which was exacerbated because

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148U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 3585.
149Foerster, Anfänge, 287.
150Ibid., 474-475.
the Soviets had broken the United States' nuclear monopoly.\textsuperscript{151} By 1950 there was a steady undercurrent of responsible opinion throughout Europe in favor of FRG participation in Western defense.\textsuperscript{152} Germany had to be integrated into the West before time expired, but the West did not want to risk a German national army. The events of 1950 reinforced the Western inclination to give the FRG more freedom. During the years 1946 to 1950 the West, especially the United States, had been granting the FRG greater latitude in conducting its own affairs. With the outbreak of the Korean War and the accompanying urgency, the Western Allies were convinced of the necessity to accelerate the FRG transition to complete sovereignty with accompanying rearmament.

\textsuperscript{151}Greiner, "Dienststelle," \textit{Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen}, 99-124.

\textsuperscript{152}McCloy, \textit{Challenge}, 28-30.
CHAPTER IV

THE Amt SCHWERIN (1950)

The North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 underlined Western fears of communism. Western leaders assumed the worst and sought measures to counter what they perceived to be a world-wide threat. There was fear in the FRG; Amt Schwerin activity became intense; Adenauer proposed FRG rearmament; and in September 1950, the Western foreign ministers approved FRG rearmament. Not to be caught unprepared, Adenauer directed the secret preparation of a master plan to guide FRG rearmament.

In 1945 the Soviets had separated their zone from the rest of Germany and systematically incorporated it into the East Bloc. Soviet policy operated with the slogan of German unity, ostensibly in consonance with German interests. The Soviets presented a compromising attitude to the FRG public where communist agitation linking reunification with Moscow won many Germans. The Soviet campaign to split the FRG from the West intensified after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, and the Soviet threat assumed a more

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ominous specter in late June 1950. In East Asia by 1950 the Soviets had trained the North Korean army, which was logistically dependent on the Soviet Union, and Soviet advisors were at every level. For any action, the North Korean army required authorization by the Soviet Union.

At 0400 hours, Sunday, 25 June 1950, North Korean armed forces launched an assault on the Republic of Korea. The West perceived this attack as the first step in world conquest, and in 1950 it had a momentous effect in Germany where West Germans viewed it as the precursor to a Soviet sponsored war for German unification. A wave of panic swept the FRG where the Germans hoarded food and prepared to flee. Immediately after the attack, Adenauer requested reinforcement of Allied troops and, again, permission to form a federal police force with strength and capabilities commensurate with the DDR Volkspolizei.

Following the events of 25 June 1950, Acheson changed his position to support FRG participation in European

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5Kennan, Memoirs, 91; Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, 238-239.

6Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, 238-241.
defense. In his view, the defense of Europe now required increases in Allied forces, United States' troops and military aid, the inclusion of German troops, and a unified command. The Allies especially needed FRG cooperation.

To the West, the North Korean attack revealed two facts: the United States' nuclear monopoly was no deterrent to communist aggression and the force ratio in Europe was unsatisfactory. Moreover, the West viewed the Korean War as proof of a Soviet political offensive and motivation for an FRG defense contribution. In the summer of 1950 West European nations felt unprotected and endangered; they demanded a European army under a European defense minister who answered to a European assembly.

Truman ordered United States' troops to Korea and called on the UN to participate in defense against communist aggression. The Soviets responded to Truman on 28 June 1950 with accusations that the United States had undertaken aggressive action against the Korean People's Republic and

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the People's Republic of China in violation of the UN Charter.11

Relative military strengths of the East and West and the United States' nuclear monopoly convinced Adenauer of Soviet dependence on conventional forces. To him, the imbalance between Soviet and Western ground forces appeared threatening. The twenty-two Soviet divisions in the DDR, on maneuvers in the summer of 1950 near the FRG-DDR border, were opposed by only twelve to thirteen Allied divisions and about one thousand aircraft in all of Western Europe. Only light occupation units were in the FRG. Because of Western military commitments outside Europe, this disparity continued. The Soviets had the capability of reinforcing several-fold their DDR-based forces by units from the Soviet Union without a general mobilization. In the event of a Soviet attack, the West could not hold Western Europe.12

In East Europe in 1950 there were more than the twenty-two Soviet divisions (nine motorized and thirteen armored divisions) with six thousand tanks and two thousand aircraft in the DDR; there were eight to nine divisions in Poland, Austria, and the Balkans.13 Intelligence reports indicated the existence of 175 to 200 Soviet divisions at peacetime.

12Foerster, Anfänge, 368.
13Fischer, Verteidigung, 31; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 7.
strength with forty thousand tanks, and during the summer of
1950 there was an increase of Soviet forces in the DDR where
runways were ready for long range jet bombers. The
militarized DDR Volkspolizei was at full strength with fifty
thousand to sixty thousand men.

In September 1950 Adenauer considered possible an
invasion by the Volkspolizei, but new information indicated
that an invasion in the fall of 1950 was not possible.
Western security experts considered an entry of the Volkspolizei
prior to a Soviet attack improbable, with 1952 being the earliest date for an invasion. Other than limited
actions against Berlin, Adenauer expected no immediate
attack by the Volkspolizei, and he considered it probable
that Soviet units in middle Europe would move west only in
consonance with Soviet attack plans after 1952. He assumed
the Soviets would allow the DDR to attack and seize West
Germany, avoiding a large war and damage to the FRG, but
would seize the initiative immediately should DDR aggression
fail. Adenauer increasingly based his security
considerations on a medium range threat, and his general

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14 The U. S. High Commissioner for Germany to the
Secretary of State, 18 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The
Soviet Union, 706-709.

15 Ibid.; Minutes of Private Conference of French,
British, and United States Foreign Ministers and Their High
Commissioners for Germany, 14 September 1950, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 293-301.
political view of security did not change during the Korean War. In view of Far Eastern events and the resulting psychological-political effects, the West supported Adenauer's security concept.16

His assessment urged Adenauer to activity. In the time remaining before 1952 the West had to build an FRG military force adequate for deterrence and defense. Therefore, Adenauer decided on a new defense initiative: strengthening of Allied troops and an FRG defense contribution, but no national army. Adenauer considered the presence of Allied troops as the best guarantee of FRG security and he wanted those troops to serve as a defensive screen against a preventive strike on Western rearmament by the Soviet army.17

Schwerin did not agree with Adenauer's analysis of the situation. The appearance of military and political dimensions in his planning was too much for Schwerin's small staff to handle. Hence, he requested the formation of a committee of German military experts to negotiate with the Western Allies for FRG participation in West European defense. Not having been a general staff officer, Schwerin did not comprehend the scope of the strategic operational responsibility involved in his task.18

16 Foerster, Anfänge, 368-370, 510-511.
17 Ibid., 370.
18 Ibid., 478.
For conversations with the High Commissioners, Schwerin formulated security fundamentals. In the foreground was the FRG policy for emergency measures in case of a catastrophe, and problems of internal security repeatedly pointed to the necessity for mobile federal police. The High Commission and the Germans discussed related questions of refugees, air defense, defense against subversion, and external security, all of which were politically explosive. In a memorandum prepared at the beginning of July 1950 Schwerin proposed a plan for an immediate paramilitary program to be followed by the formation of twelve motorized and armored divisions.\(^{19}\)

Schumacher, the leader of the SPD, accepted the turn of events with skepticism. Informed by Schwerin of the conversations with the High Commission, Schumacher rejected the majority of his proposals. The establishment of a "home defense" especially irritated Schumacher because he remembered the police of the Weimar period, and he demanded separation of police and military problems. Although Schumacher rejected the establishment of a federal constabulary as a hidden military cadre, he wanted to be informed about the mobile police force perceived by Schwerin. Schumacher considered the greatest handicap to FRG defense to be the defensive attitude of the Western powers, who opposed advancing beyond the Elbe and striking

\(^{19}\text{Ibid.}, 364, 478-479.$
the enemy on the Vistula.\textsuperscript{20} The SPD position was that Western defense had to be strengthened so that in case of war the federal region could not be occupied and the aggressor would be thrown back immediately to the east beyond the 1937 Reich boundaries.\textsuperscript{21}

Adenauer informed Schumacher of the results of the talks with the High Commissioners. There was agreement between Adenauer and Schumacher on the general situation, and they agreed to cultivate a close exchange of opinion on the security issue. Openly they expressed two possible paths to increase FRG security: strengthening of occupation units and establishment of an FRG police organization.\textsuperscript{22}

In view of the militarization of the Soviet Zone and events in the Far East, on 4 July 1950 Adenauer requested security guarantees from the Allies.\textsuperscript{23} He also requested that the United States support an FRG defense contribution. In expectation of United States' support, the Amt Schwerin was the first FRG agency officially charged with the task of planning a defense contribution.\textsuperscript{24} The United States

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 479-480.
\item \textsuperscript{22}Foerster, Anfänge, 354-365.
\item \textsuperscript{23}Le Monde, 5 Jul. 1950; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 347.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Fischer, Verteidigung, 31.
\end{itemize}
responded favorably to Adenauer's request. As a result of the Korean conflict, in July 1950 United States' objectives in Europe shifted to merging the WEU defense organization with the NATO West Regional Group, ameliorating deficiencies in the French General Staff, and the use of German military potential. The French problem had first priority.25

Adenauer was not happy with events in Korea, and in the second week of July 1950 he began a security memorandum. Accordingly, on 10 July 1950 Ministerial Director Herbert Blankenhorn, Schwerin, and Gehlin met with Deputy United States High Commissioner George P. Hays to discuss measures necessary in the event of a surprise Soviet attack. Adenauer discussed them also on 11 July 1950 with Ivone Kirkpatrick and stressed FRG readiness to fight in Allied units.26 Possible solutions to the manpower problem were the thousands of combat experienced Wehrmacht veterans, conscripts, German service personnel, and partisans.

Hays informed the Germans that the United States had changed its rigid course of demilitarization and now supported the FRG.27 In mid-July 1950 the Allied High Commissioners discussed the problem of how to bring the FRG


26Foerster, Anfänge, 363-364.

27Ibid., 364.
into West European defense. Kirkpatrick wanted federal or Land police; François-Poncet suggested the increase and training of German service troops; McCloy proposed the enlistment of Germans in the United States Army.28

By July 1950 there was fundamental agreement between the High Commission and the Federal Chancellor's Office on the use of German military personnel. With a view to the service groups, Adenauer had not yet considered German rearmament in the true sense, merely a strengthening of Allied troops. Since the occupation powers were accountable for the service groups, other measures could be taken, such as reorganization and arming of service groups in British and United States' occupation units.29

In July 1950 the European press reflected rapidly changing attitudes toward the FRG and Europe and compared Germany with Korea.30 The United States, Britain, and France agreed they must integrate the FRG with the West as soon as possible, but they wanted the Germans to choose to do so. The majority of West Germans did not desire rearmament, and there was a need to continue developing democracy in the FRG. The Western Allies also had to deal

28 The U. S. High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 14 July 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 696-698.

29 Foerster, Anfänge, 366-367.

with the effect of an abrupt reversal of policy on the FRG, the military use of FRG production, and the use of FRG manpower. On 12 July 1950 McCloy proposed contact between German military experts and Allied authorities, which later evolved into a German-Allied expert group to discuss the problem of common defense.

Since the spring of 1950 Adenauer had been convinced that an FRG contribution to West European defense was urgently required and politically worthwhile. He considered agreement of the Western powers, including France, to be only a matter of time. It was necessary to relate external and internal security and prepare external security measures under the guise of internal security. This goal was to set the course of Schwerin's activity, but it soon became complicated in the Federal Chancellor's Office and the Interior Ministry through planning and negotiating for federal police, a defense and escort command for the federal Government, and cadre for an FRG troop contingent. In a speech on 13 July 1950 Adenauer spoke of Schwerin's proposal for a working staff in external security matters. The division between internal and external security had been

31 Report to the NSC by the Secretary of State, 3 July 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 691-695.

32 Hautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 11.

33 Foerster, Anfänge, 463.
insignificant heretofore, and he viewed the two as components of the same problem to be solved politically.34 Simultaneously with these domestic security measures was FRG admission to the Council of Europe as an associate member on 13 July 1950, the same day the Saar attained that status.35

In mid-July 1950 Schwerin proposed to the High Commission "Aide Memoire Number One," a list of actions in case of a Soviet invasion. This memoire included the entire spectrum of urgent measures for establishment of regular FRG troops. The Amt Schwerin would consider direction, objective, and probable tempo of a Soviet attack, and would offer German assistance (evacuation, medical help, raw materials, control of refugees, air defense, prevention of sabotage, food). It appeared that most problems required a strong mobile federal constabulary, the establishment of which would require Allied approval. On the basis of this aide memoire, German-Allied political conversations on security issues began on 17 July 1950.36 Led by Hays with Blankenhorn and Schwerin participating, this group discussed the formation of an expert military committee, the creation of a German security organization for the Ruhr region, procurement of volunteers in case of invasion, insertion of

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34Ibid., 463-464; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 35-36.
36Foerster, Anfänge, 365-366.
German volunteers into Allied units, and employment of German service units with the occupation forces. The subject of federal police remained open.37

The Far East and France created problems. In a special message to Congress on 19 July 1950, Truman stated that in view of events in Korea NATO defense was urgent.38 In July 1950 Montgomery complained that French forces were inadequately trained. Jules Moch replied that France had problems with politics, materiel, manpower (Indochina was draining her manpower), and standard of living.39 In July 1950 the French wanted a defense as far east as possible and more United States' and British troops on the continent. French NAC delegate Hervé Alphand said that because Indochina was draining the life blood from France, the French needed external resources.40 Bruce in Paris reported in July 1950 that French generals did not want a common army, but proposed using Germans as troops. They considered

37Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 11.


39The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council to the Secretary of State, 26 July 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 143-144.

40The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1950, ibid., 148-150.
it impossible to rearm Germany or convert it to military production until the European people were convinced there was no danger from Germany. The French said there was more fear of Germans in a European army than in a broader based force.  

France had serious internal problems emanating from World War II. On 10 May 1940 France ceased to be a free agent in international affairs when French armies crossed the Belgian frontier to meet the Nazi attack. In the post-war period France had not yet regained a position of stability and power. Mental scars of the Nazi invasion were worse than the physical wounds, and France was almost effete in power politics, the determining factor in international relations.

Three wars in less than a century with their retinue of ruin, misery, atrocities, resentments, and antipathies left a psychological obstacle to reconciliation. The French had witnessed the slaughter of their fellow citizens, seen their cities burn, and observed the destruction of their crops and communications system. In the post-war years their primary concern was to do whatever necessary to

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41 The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1950, ibid., 151-159.


prevent another invasion. Accordingly, the French reaction to the prospect of a rearmed Germany was expected, and the United States found it necessary to accept delays.

Churchill, addressing the Movement for a United Europe in London on 22 July 1950, said that the battle in Korea was a battle for Europe. The Korean War, arming of the DDR, and increasing world tension could not be considered in isolation; they were parts of the same threat and signs of an intensification of the Cold War, which influenced Adenauer's security ideas. There was also a cautious Western approval developing in favor of FRG participation in European defense. Western post-war conferences stressed in part demands for German disarmament and in part the wishes for FRG participation in European defense. In view of world political developments after the Korean invasion, French opposition began to crumble and there were indications of a common Allied position on the inclusion of the FRG in Western defense. The High Commission, beginning in July 1950, made numerous gestures in that direction, which the international press picked up. Adenauer, therefore, counted on Western acceptance of his security initiative, and his

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security policy gained a greater likelihood of realization the more the West became convinced of a growing Soviet threat. By 31 July 1950 even Truman had become an advocate of FRG rearmament.

The Amt Schwerin, from 1 August 1950 under the cover name "Central for Home Service" (ZfH), was under considerable stress. Problems included budget, illegality of its work, organization, personnel, and Schwerin's personality. Since Adenauer considered Schwerin and his staff merely useful and temporary instruments for his political concepts, he wanted to appoint people who were more suitable for negotiations with the occupation powers. Most former officers so considered belonged to closed groups with specific personal and political positions. Schwerin, at first not aware of this situation, was cool and later hostile to the group around Speidel, which had extensive connections with the cabinet. Schwerin's error in judgment on this matter did not endear him to the Chancellor.

Reporting French opinion on 1 August 1950 Bruce wrote that Pleven said that in the past the French had been overwhelmed by German superiority in numbers and equipment

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47 Foerster, Anfänge, 511-512.

48 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 31 July 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 702-703.

49 Foerster, Anfänge, 470-471.
and the French people and government lacked confidence in
their ability to create an effective military establishment;
the French Defense Minister, Jules Moch, saw the only
solution as French acceptance of German participation in
NATO, but the French people remembered three wars and still
feared Germany.\textsuperscript{50}

On 1 August 1950 Acheson instructed Charles M.
Spofford, United States Deputy Representative to the NAC, to
discuss with individual NATO representatives the use of
German industrial capacity for non-combat items.\textsuperscript{51} He
instructed Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas in London to discuss
with the French and British the use of German industry for
NATO military supplies.\textsuperscript{52} On 2 August 1950, Douglas,
questioning the French will to fight, replied that an answer
to this question was mandatory before the United States
would make a commitment.\textsuperscript{53}

In early August 1950 the NAC considered the aug-

\textsuperscript{50}The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State,
1 August 1950, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950:
Western Europe}, 168-172.

\textsuperscript{51}The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 1
August 1950, ibid., 172-174.

\textsuperscript{52}The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the
United Kingdom, 1 August 1950, ibid., 174-175.

\textsuperscript{53}The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the
Secretary of State, 2 August 1950, ibid., 177-179.
mentation of combat units in Europe. The deputies were convinced that it was necessary to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic area immediately. Accordingly, the WEU ministers met secretly at La Haye to determine a practical approach to West European defense. On 3 August 1950 McCloy reported that the West must plan an effective defense against the Soviet Union. His report indicated the need for more than strengthening existing armies; there was evidence that France lacked the will and capacity to bear the brunt of such a defense and the West had to correct this problem. At the beginning of August 1950 the Allies approved the military expert committee, which was to discuss form and modality of an FRG defense contribution. For the Ruhr defense organization, 5000 men from the Zoll border defense were to be added to the Haun-Paderborn area under British command for defense against an invasion of the Ruhr.

54 The U. S. Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council to the Secretary of State, 4 August 1950, ibid., 186-188.


56 Le Monde, 1 Aug. 1950.

57 The U. S. High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 3 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 180-182.

58 Foerster, Anfänge, 366-367.
To assist Adenauer in solving the security problem, on 7 August 1950 generals Hermann Foertsch, Speidel, and Heusinger proposed "Ideas on External Security of the Federal Republic," the fundamental ideas of which pertained to the structure of a German army, assumptions for a defense contribution, and security. The three generals considered the FRG military situation seriously threatened and the Western powers not in a position to guarantee external security. They demanded equality of rights and security as irrevocable prerequisites for an FRG defense contribution. Western readiness to revise the Occupation Statute was paramount. The proposal included an FRG contingent armed with modern equipment, a German corps with tactical air force, and participation in high level NATO staffs. They also wanted a NATO security guarantee to protect FRG armed forces during the organizational phase. The United States had already lost its nuclear monopoly, and the possible loss of the United States' nuclear superiority by 1952 stressed the practicality of early establishment of an FRG armed force.59

The French government learned on 8 August 1950 of the order of magnitude in which the Federal Chancellor's Office was thinking, and they objected to using the FRG border police as the basis for a national army. Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber, Edouard

59Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 268-271, 477-496.
Bonnefous, called the FRG request a wish for a camouflaged army. Adenauer issued an immediate public denial.60

There were many voices supporting Adenauer's concern for security. United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Alan G. Kirk reported from Moscow on 9 August 1950 the doubt that FRG rearmament would incite a Soviet attack, but the West could not wait to find out. There appeared to be an immediate Soviet threat to Western Europe and the Allies could not leave the FRG defenseless.61 Adenauer received special impetus for his policy in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strassburg on 11 August 1950 when Churchill proposed establishment of a European armed force including an FRG contingent, but Churchill did not speak for the British government.62 The German SPD delegation abstained from voting on this issue in Strassburg, but accepted the resolution for FRG participation in West European defense.63

Speidel, in his memorandum on FRG participation in Western defense, stressed the necessity to revise the Western condemnation of the German soldier. To Speidel and

60Foerster, Anfänge, 370, 372.


63Foerster, Anfänge, 511-512.
other forward looking German officers, it was absurd to advocate spiritual demilitarization denigrating German military tradition and judging the German military past, while simultaneously demanding new military accomplishments from the same people. They asserted that one could not equate the Wehrmacht to the Nazi regime; the Wehrmacht was not accountable for Nazi crimes. In August 1950, as set forth in the Speidel memorandum, the FRG granted rehabilitation to the German soldier.

Since Adenauer did not expect an immediate attack by the Soviet Union, he took a vacation in Switzerland on 13 August 1950; a small staff kept him informed on the latest political developments. On the day after his return from vacation, Adenauer discussed Speidel's memorandum with Minister of Housing Eberhard Wildermuth, who on 14 August 1950 sent it to the cabinet; however, Adenauer did not tell the ministers about his security initiative. In the meantime, Schwerin gave a memorandum to the High Commission dealing with psychological assumptions for internal and external security.

At the 17 August 1950 session with the High Commission,

Adenauer again brought up the security issue. He pointed out the threatening Eastern deployment across the Elbe and stressed the need for a demonstrative increase in Western military power. He then proposed formation of an FRG defense force of volunteers with a strength of 150,000 men as a counter to DDR paramilitary units. Supported by McCloy, he also proposed an FRG contingent in a European army. To Adenauer, defense force meant defense police, the single immediate means for rearmament. The police solution to rearmament was the only one to which the British would agree. Inasmuch as Adenauer considered police formations a preliminary step to an FRG contingent in a European army, the Amt Schwerin considered including the border police as part of the FRG contingent.

In addition to his meeting with the High Commissioners on 17 August 1950, Adenauer also met the press. His comments on rearmament caused a stir in the FRG, but the

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67 United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 18 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 707-709.


average German responded with ohne mich. On the other hand, his interview with the New York Times recommending formation of an FRG defense force equal in size and armament to the DDR Volkspolizei produced a sensation.

The High Commission did not oppose a speedy and silent rearmament. Kirkpatrick supported the plan and informed Adenauer on 25 August 1950 that Bevin wanted to contact Acheson on the matter. McCloy considered practical but unnecessary the subterfuge of establishing police units and asked for an early completion of Adenauer's security memorandum, which he was to receive in draft as a request.

Adenauer's memorandum of 29 August 1950, his first action toward rearmament, was based on Speidel's paper regarding assumptions and requisites for FRG rearmament. By the time he submitted this memorandum, Adenauer had sufficient information on the communist adversary to make a current estimate of the situation. This analysis also motivated him to propose the inclusion of FRG soldiers in a common defense organization.

72Foerster, Anfänge, 372.
73Fischer, Verteidigung, 31; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 268-271.
74Foerster, Anfänge, 368.
memorandum was little more than he had already declared in various expressions during the second half of August 1950. The second part included the political assumptions and consequences of including the FRG in the European defense system.76

In his 29 August 1950 security memorandum, to allay foreign apprehensions, Adenauer expressly excluded a national army and declared his readiness to provide a German contingent to an international West European army. He suggested international control via a military security office for the requested border police. The memorandum gave no strength for the police formations; however, internally the Federal Chancellor's Office discussed 120,000 men.77

Adenauer added to the security memorandum a "Memorandum on the Question of the New Arrangement of the Relation of the FRG to the Occupation Powers," in which he again explained that an FRG defense contribution assumed equality of rights with the Western Allies. In an aide memoire to the United States High Commissioner, he demanded as a condition for FRG participation in West European defense the transfer of twelve Western armored divisions to the eastern FRG border until the FRG had its own defense force. He also

76Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 35-36.
demanded modern and effective armament of FRG units. The security memorandum and aide memoire demonstrated that Adenauer was ready to fulfill a defense obligation for an integrated army.78

On 29 August 1950 Adenauer sent his security memorandum to McCloy, who took it with him to New York the same day.79 Although this paper became the subject of deliberations at the foreign ministers conference in New York, it was known to the FRG parliament only in abstract up to 1952. The memorandum was read for the first time in the cabinet on 31 August 1950, but no one received the text.80

In a session at the Petersberg at the end of August 1950, Adenauer explained his security memorandum. Hays, in the name of McCloy, welcomed Adenauer's readiness to provide an FRG contingent to a West European army. Repeating his demand of 17 August 1950, Adenauer insisted the occupation powers give a formal security guarantee for the FRG and Berlin.81

The difference between internal and external security appeared in Schwerin's instructions and in Adenauer's

79Le Monde, 1 Sept. 1950; Times, 30 Aug. 1950, 3.
80Poerster, Anfänge, 516-517.
security memorandum of 29 August 1950. Yet, public and Government officials were ignorant of Schwerin's role in internal and external security, since Schwerin classified security issues as "secret state matters" and restricted them to a closed cabinet committee. It was also convenient for Adenauer to maintain the secret of his advisory office.

In spite of the lack of sovereignty in foreign affairs, from the beginning, Adenauer gathered to himself all administrative functions associated with foreign policy and established the necessary bureaucracy. The liaison office to the High Commission, led by Blankenhorn, played a central role in security policy. Since the federal Government could not be concerned officially with questions of Land defense nor establishment of a security department, Schwerin was elevated to a division in close proximity to the High Commission. This solution appeared practicable and necessary from the secrecy aspect because of expected negotiations for an FRG defense contribution. In this position, the Amt Schwerin could not avoid the immediate influence of the Chancellor's Office; consequently, Blankenhorn's office transmitted Adenauer's wishes and instructions to Schwerin. Schwerin and his department had

82Förster, Anfänge, 463-464; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 35-36.
83Förster, Anfänge, 464.
the character of an independent group which, on Adenauer's instructions, worked independently and frequently with insufficient time. As its activity increased and received public criticism, the Amt Schwerin moved more into the foreground. To be sure, there were other personalities involved in this association.84

Ministerial Director Hans Globke was important to the Amt Schwerin as minister without portfolio of internal affairs, budget, and personnel matters in the Federal Chancellor's Office. He made decisions on finances and the viability of "project Schwerin" and acquired managerial functions which Adenauer did not want. Globke set up the relationship between the Amt Schwerin and other offices. Globke was the Chancellor's confidant and in common with Blankenhorn was of great value for Schwerin's task. Proposals went from Schwerin through Blankenhorn and Globke to Adenauer.85

In anticipation of Western approval of his request for an augmentation of occupation forces, at the end of August 1950 Adenauer deputized Theodor Blank with "Leadership of the Negotiations with the Allied High Commission over the Accommodation of Additional Allied Troops and the Working Out of General Questions of the Security of the Federal

84Ibid., 465-466.
85Ibid., 466.
Republic." Blank was immediately subordinate to the Chancellor. In consonance with this appointment, Blank drove around the FRG inspecting Kasernes, which one day might house troops. Blank knew from this brief tour that his task would not be easy.

On 30 August 1950 Douglas in London reported the need for an agreement between NATO and the WEU to permit acceptance of FRG military contingents should the NAC invite FRG participation. Such a step would eliminate the need for a new organization and would satisfy German distaste for NATO, since the FRG was less associated with the North Atlantic than the other NATO members. In contrast to most of the other NATO members, the orientation of the FRG was purely European.

In early September 1950 the JCS recommended, and the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed, that the United States should augment its forces in Europe. In a private conversation Marshall told Moch that German participation was the condition under which Congress would appropriate the

88The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, 30 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 251-255.
89Truman, Statement by the President upon Approving an Increase in United States Forces in Western Europe, 9 September 1950, Public Papers, 1950, 626.
funds for this augmentation. Moch replied that the French parliament would never agree. On 2 September 1950 Acheson told Bruce that the European defense force needed a supreme commander with a combined staff. With adequate control, NATO could integrate FRG units without creating a German national army. On 8 September 1950 the Secretaries of State and Defense reported to Truman that the United States was ready to send additional forces to Europe. Furthermore, United States' policy supported a European defense force with German participation on a non-national basis, a supreme commander, and a combined staff. Initially there should be no authorization for German units larger than a division; however, there was no objection later to FRG units integrated at corps or higher level. To avoid impairment of morale and effectiveness, the European defense force should be generated and integrated nationally, supported by German industry under the political and strategic guidance of NATO. Accordingly, on 9 September 1950 Truman approved an increase in United States' troop strength in Europe. The United States and its NATO partners were to coordinate this

90The Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State, 23 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 343-344.

91The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 2 September 1950, ibid., 261-262.

92The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to the President, 8 September 1950, ibid., 273-278.
effort for increasing the effectiveness of collective defense.93

Adenauer's offer of German troops became a negotiating base for the positions which the United States and Britain took at the New York Conference in September 1950.94 The difference between the British proposal, based on Adenauer's demands, and the United States' concept diminished when the ministers learned of their content. On the other hand, the French government rejected both solutions prior to the conference.95

The NATO foreign ministers placed the question of a German contribution in proper perspective at their New York Conference in September 1950.96 From 12 to 18 September 1950, firm ideas on FRG rearmament surfaced.97 Acheson spoke of ten divisions as part of a sixty division armed force, but the French were hesitant.98 Adenauer had asked

93Truman, Statement by the President Upon Approving an Increase in United States Forces in Western Europe, 9 September 1950, Public Papers, 1950, 626.
95Foerster, Anfänge, 373.
96Greiner, "Dienststelle Blank," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 14.
98Fischer, Verteidigung, 32; Nutting, Europe Will not Wait, 36-37; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 46-47.
for FRG participation in a European army, but Schuman
demanded a European army before the French would accept
German participation because they would not accept German
rearmament before France was rearmed.99 When the NAC met
on 15 September 1950, the single issue was how to defend
NATO against a Korean type invasion. Accordingly, there was
complete agreement on defending as far east as possible, but
existing forces were inadequate. There was also agreement
on establishing an integrated force with a unified command
as soon as possible.100 The final communiqué stated that
creation of a national German army would serve the true
interest of neither Germany nor Europe.101

On 19 September 1950, meeting in New York, the NAC
decided that the FRG would contribute to and become part of
West European defense.102 Yet, Bevin did not want to give

99 Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Lucius D. Battle,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 12 September
1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western
Europe, 285-288; Minutes of Private Conference of French,
British, and United States Foreign Ministers and Their High
Commissioners for Germany, 14 September 1950, ibid., 293-
301; The Secretary of State to the President, 14 September

100 Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO: The First Five
Years (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), 32; Nutting,
Europe Will Not Wait, 36-37.

101 Fischer, Verteidigung, 32; Nutting, Europe Will Not
Wait, 36-37; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 46-47.

102 Times, 20 Sept. 1950, 4; U. S. Department of State,
"U. S., French, and U. K. Foreign Ministers Conclude
the FRG a bargaining position, and the French would not make a decision until Allied forces in Europe were strong enough to defend against a German army. One impediment to progress was the fact that France and Britain refused to discuss rearmament openly because their representatives were not authorized to do so.

The NAC agreed that Western defense required an integrated force under central command and control as soon as possible with full use of manpower and resources. Hence, the NAC approved establishment of a European defense force under a supreme commander, with a chief of staff and an international staff. The force was to consist of national units. The smaller NATO countries did not object to FRG participation so long as suitable guarantees against German militarism obtained.

103 Minutes of Private Conference of French, British, and United States Foreign Ministers and Their High Commissioners for Germany, 14 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 293-301; United States Minutes, Private Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, New York, 12 September 1950, ibid., 1198-1201; The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 15 September 1950, ibid., 1229-1231.

104 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 15 September 1950, ibid., 1229-1231.

105 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 September 1950, ibid., 350-352.

106 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 September 1950, ibid., 348-350.
In creating an FRG contribution, the West was starting from nothing. In West Germany there was no defense industry, no list of draft age men, no records, and no organization on which to build an army. All of these requisites would take time.\textsuperscript{107} The West also had the task of motivating the FRG to do something for its own defense; but it would require at least eighteen months before the FRG could arm the first man.\textsuperscript{108}

In 1950 the Soviets increased reunification agitation and sought to rupture the Western alliance by propaganda against German remilitarization and resurrection of German imperialism. The Soviets adopted slogans to demonstrate a Soviet love of peace and aggressive Western actions. Secret support and masking of police organizations in the East insured that there would be no official communication about the DDR armed forces. Communists proclaimed the horrors of a third world war in which German soldiers, forced into service as mercenaries, would become cannon fodder during the destruction of their homes. The Soviets identified

\textsuperscript{107}Minutes of Private Conference of French, British, and United States Foreign Ministers and Their High Commissioners for Germany, 14 September 1950, ibid., 293-301.

\textsuperscript{108}Memorandum of a Private Meeting with Mr. Bevin, by the Assistant to the Secretary of State, 15 September 1950, ibid., 305-308.
their course with German national interests and described
the Washington and Bonn policy as devisive.\textsuperscript{109}

In the fall of 1950 with the possibility of an FRG
defense contribution, the East Bloc reacted with appeals to
the West German people. An appeal from East Berlin on 26
and 27 September 1950 followed the Western announcements on
19 and 26 September 1950 of the proposal for an FRG military
contribution. The Soviets characterized the Potsdam
Agreements as the only legitimate basis for regulation of
internal German affairs, and alleged that since only the
Soviet Union followed the Potsdam Agreements, the DDR would
be a model for development of a peaceful democracy for the
entire German population.\textsuperscript{110} Therefore, the Soviets called
for a departure of occupation troops and a peace treaty with
Germany, both of which were to succeed when the DDR and the
FRG merged.\textsuperscript{111}

At the New York Conference the NATO defense ministers
agreed to recommend means whereby the FRG could best
contribute to West European defense. They were to make
their report by 28 October 1950.\textsuperscript{112} To achieve this task,
they required German ideas in a usable format. Adenauer

\textsuperscript{109} Wettig, \textit{Entmilitarisierung}, 506-508.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 493.
\textsuperscript{111} Fischer, \textit{Verteidigung}, 38.
\textsuperscript{112} Moch, \textit{Histoire du Réarmement}, 84.
preferred that the initiative for this information come from the West, but the West did not want to ask the Germans for assistance. Required information included German proposals for changes in the Basic Law, new ministries, safeguards, size and strength, restrictions of the FRG to a ground role, restrictions on officers, controls, and a defense ministry. In early October 1950 the main effort shifted to the question of what form FRG rearmament should take. To ascertain this information, under the cognizance of Schwerin, a conference of German military experts met from 3 to 6 October 1950.

Adenauer was interested in preparing plans for an FRG contribution and the early appointment of a planning staff. On his direction, experts met secretly and in three days composed a comprehensive rearmament document. That secret meeting in das Eifelkloster Himmerod (Himmerod Monastery) produced a document, Denkschrift über die Aufstellung eines Deutschen Kontingents im Rahmen einer übernationalen Streitmacht zur Verteidigung Westeuropas.

113 The Acting Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 30 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 354-356.

114 Fett, "Grundlagen," Militärgeschichte, 171-172; Fischer, Verteidigung, 32; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 272.

115 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 272; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 17-23.

(Memorandum on the Formation of a German Contingent in the Framework of an International Armed Force for the Defense of West Europe), or the Himmeroder Denkschrift, which later became known as the "Magna Charta" of German rearmament.\textsuperscript{117}

The three High Commissioners had communicated with Adenauer, and from August 1950 they conducted talks, not negotiations. It was clear that the question of FRG rearmament would sooner or later become the subject of these talks, and Adenauer wanted to have his own draft or at least his own policy. He told the High Commissioners that he intended to have a committee of former officers develop ideas on a possible FRG contribution. The High Commissioners agreed but did not know about the meeting. Schwerin brought the committee together; holding the meeting in the Himmerod Monastery was Adenauer's idea. Fifteen people, under the death penalty by the Occupation Law if caught, produced the Himmeroder Denkschrift.\textsuperscript{118}

The fifteen participants, ranging in rank from major to three star general, were unemployed or had obtained jobs only recently. Most had not seen each other for five years or longer, and some had never met.\textsuperscript{119} Colonel General

\textsuperscript{117} Speidel, \textit{Aus unserer Zeit}, 272; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, \textit{Himmeroder Denkschrift}, 17-23.

\textsuperscript{118} Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Speidel, \textit{Aus unserer Zeit}, 272.

\textsuperscript{119} Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
Heinrich Freiherr von Vietinghof-Scheel was president of the conference; Colonel Johan A. Graf Kielmansegg was secretary; generals Speidel and Heusinger were the most prominent experts.120

Instructions to the participants were to clarify Allied military and psychological assumptions under which the FRG defense contribution could be fulfilled, to suggest how the organizational and leadership establishment of the FRG contingent was to appear in the European army, and to plan how to achieve the FRG contingent. Fundamentals for the Himmerod concept came from the memorandum prepared by Speidel on instructions of Adenauer. Authors of the Himmeroder Denkschrift were Speidel, Heusinger, and Foertsch.121 They dictated it to Kielmansegg, who wrote it.122

The memorandum dealt first with military assumptions: the Soviet Union would be ready earlier than expected to renounce an aggressive policy and support peace if Western military strength in Europe grew and FRG military potential was ready to step into the breach. The theory was that the sooner the West grew strong, the earlier a Soviet


121Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 362; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 272-273.

renunciation would occur. This view appeared reasonable for the next two years because the United States still had an effective nuclear deterrent. It was essential that the period of FRG military reconstruction be protected from an Eastern military threat not only politically but by troops. This requirement could be met if the West considered the FRG region east of the Rhine a defensive zone and not a strategic perimeter. For FRG equality an effective air defense of the German population and the establishment of modern FRG units in corps strength with a tactical air force and coastal navy were essential. Psychologically, defamation of the German soldier was to cease. Political assumptions included repeal of the Allied control authority and Control Council Law and reestablishment of German sovereignty. The Denkschrift demanded operational defense as far east as possible and offensive-minded combat leadership. The German region was to be strengthened no greater than necessary to avoid excess destruction. German divisions with two corps staffs, supplementary corps troops, and reserve units appeared to be suitable organizations. Infantry and light and heavy artillery were to represent branches of the service. The FRG would form a contingent only under the condition of prompt issue of necessary modern weapons and equipment for maximum combat power and mobility. The estimated FRG contribution was twelve divisions with a
total strength of 250,000 men. Although a few passages were later revised, this document served as the blueprint for the planning phase up to 1955.

East Bloc foreign ministers, except the DDR, announced the Soviet program in the declaration of 21 October 1950 in Prague. In the Prague explanation East Bloc foreign ministers demanded creation of a common German constitutional council formed equally by representatives of East and West Germany into a provisional, democratic, peace-loving, united, sovereign German government. The Soviets demanded that following the unification of Germany it be demilitarized and neutralized. In consonance with these demands, in the fall of 1950 the Soviet Union demanded a four power conference regarding a German peace treaty, which would insure the departure of occupation troops from Germany. If that occurred, it would change the power relationship in Europe for the benefit of the Soviet Union.

A West European defense system was not possible without FRG territory and resources. Under Soviet terms, the Soviet armed forces needed to withdraw only behind the Oder-Neisse

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123 Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 36-57; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 273-274.


125 Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 15.
line or the Western Bug, while United States' military units would leave Europe completely because there was insufficient space to station them outside the FRG. Without a United States' presence on the European continent, West European defense was questionable. A departure of occupation troops from Germany offered the Soviet Union the prospect of extending Soviet hegemony over all Europe and the ability to destroy the emerging Western collective security system.  

Opposing the FRG by the end of 1950 were 70,000 men in the Kasernierten Bereitschaften. They included about 31,000 army, 5000 navy, 4000 air force, about 18,000 border police, 5000 motor police, and the staffs of five special schools. Weapons and equipment came from the Soviet Union, whose army was the model for DDR forces.  

Major events developed rapidly beginning in June 1950. In consonance with the changing attitude in the West toward FRG sovereignty and rearmament, Adenauer directed that the Amt Schwerin prepare plans for FRG security and rearmament. These plans received unexpected impetus in June 1950 when North Korea attacked South Korea. The Amt Schwerin was deeply involved in much of the ensuing activity. Memoranda,  

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126 Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 510-511.  
127 Fischer, Verteidigung, 25; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 267; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 7.
plans, and recommendations by this group plus advice from several former Wehrmacht generals gave Adenauer the information he needed to compose his security memorandum of 29 August 1950.

Adenauer's sense of urgency and requests were answered by the Western decision to augment Allied troops in Western Europe and the NATO ministers' approval of West German rearmament. To assist the Western Allies in implementing their decision, Adenauer directed the composition of the Himmeroder Denkschrift, which became the basis for FRG rearmament. During this period, Schwerin was instrumental in the implementation of Adenauer's policies; however, Schwerin's tenure as Adenauer's security advisor was to be curtailed.
Late in 1950 Adenauer's security initiative began to bear fruit. Realizing that FRG rearmament required SPD support, Adenauer early sought the cooperation of SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, and by 24 August 1950 they had held press conferences.¹ Both claimed the necessity for immediate reinforcement of Allied troops.² Schumacher said that the DDR police would not invade the FRG but the Soviet Union would invade the West; he wanted police for internal security but rejected partial FRG rearmament.³

To implement the New York decision to rearm Germany, the West needed a plan acceptable to Germany's traditional foes, but there was disagreement on how this should be done. In September 1950, the United States formulated a plan for FRG rearmament. The French, disagreeing with the United States' plan, formulated their own plan. Not waiting to be told what to do, the Germans composed the Himmeroder Denkschrift (Himmerod Memorandum) as a master plan. Amid the Allied disagreement, German participation in the planning

²Ibid.; Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 7 Nov. 1950, 4.
process suffered initially. In late October 1950, Adenauer replaced Schwerin and the Amt Schwerin with Theodor Blank and a new planning organization. Seeking an agreement on rearmament, the Western foreign ministers met in Brussels in December 1950.

Jules Moch, on his return from New York at the end of September 1950, learned that French Prime Minister René Pleven had a counterproposal to the United States' plan: a European armed force, an international general staff, and multi-national divisions with FRG troops in battalions. Moch, fearing that Pleven was proposing German rearmament, tried to dissuade him. Neither memory of the Nazis nor allusion to non-aggression by the Soviet Union could change Pleven's mind; he considered it impossible to delay very long the United States' demands for FRG military units. Pleven saw a French counterproposal as the only alternative to a resurrected German national army. Schuman supported Pleven, but did not consider early FRG rearmament possible.  

The FRG and France wanted the political issues settled before the establishment of an FRG contingent, but motives were different. The FRG wanted security prior to beginning rearmament with military and political equality for its armed forces. On the other hand, France wanted guarantees that German troops be incorporated permanently within a

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4Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 91-104, 103.
supra-national control apparatus. Under United States' pressure to rearm Germany, France sought a means to permit a controlled rearmament.5

A series of events strengthened SPD opposition to a federal police authority. At the beginning of October 1950 Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann, respected by the SPD, resigned claiming that Adenauer desired "remilitarization." The SPD was highly suspicious of Heinemann's successor, Robert Lehr, an earlier nationalist and political foe of the SPD, who the SPD feared wanted to build a military force as an instrument of civil police. In October 1950 in Trauenstein, Lehr recognized as experts two generals who in 1935 transferred the Prussian police to the Wehrmacht. This event, following closely the change in the Interior Ministry, created suspicion that the police were intended as cadre for a military force.6

To avoid remilitarization, the SPD wanted to base federal police authority on a constitutional change. For that reason and on the basis of the New York decision of 19 September 1950, the SPD opposed the request of the federal Government to increase the strength of the proposed police

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5 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 10 October 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 368; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 373-374, 397-398; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 103.

force to thirty thousand. Lehr, renouncing the need for a constitutional change, explained that he merely wanted an organization to protect leading political personalities and the federal Government.\textsuperscript{7}

Although there were no unified opposition groups in the FRG, there was anti-rearmament sentiment among the communists, opposition circles in the Protestant Church, and professors at certain universities.\textsuperscript{8} After Heinemann resigned on 9 October 1950, he and Martin Niemöller led a campaign against rearmament, which developed into a movement for neutralization.\textsuperscript{9} Niemöller's name was well-known outside Germany, but his effectiveness was not proportional to his popularity.\textsuperscript{10} In October 1950 Niemöller wanted the voters to decide on rearmament, and he wrote a virulent letter to Adenauer denying him the right to commit the German people to rearmament.\textsuperscript{11} Heinemann, a member of the National Synod of the Evangelical Church, opposed the Government position. This view was important because East

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; \textit{Times}, 29 Aug. 1950, 3; Adenauer, \textit{Erinnerungen}, 1945-1953, 386-387.
\item \textsuperscript{10}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; \textit{Times}, 30 Nov. 1950, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{11}\textit{Le Monde}, 7 Oct. 1950.
\end{itemize}
Germany was mostly protestant, and many protestants believed the Protestant Synod to be the last link between the two Germanies. Niemöller attacked Adenauer because Adenauer had discussed rearmament secretly with the Allies, but neither Niemöller nor Heinemann was a pacifist. They opposed rearmament because they believed it would stand in the way of reunification.12 Niemöller had denied continuously the legitimacy of the FRG and stated that Adenauer and DDR Minister President Otto Grotewohl should behave as equals.13

Based on the New York decision, Acheson announced the United States' plan for FRG rearmament.14 On 19 October 1950, Under-Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett gave French Ambassador Henri Bonnet a note explaining this plan. Operationally independent FRG divisions were to be incorporated in multi-national corps with assimilation of FRG officers in corps staffs and in the general staff of the international army. There would be no homogeneous German staffs above division level. A numerical limit, based on a percentage of total Allied strength, would prevent the resurrection of German military power. Above tactical and strategic levels, FRG defense administration was to have a civilian character,


14 Ismay, NATO, 32; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 36.
and an Allied mission would control recruiting and organization. There would be continued prohibition of certain industry and a limitation of FRG arms production to light weapons. The military establishment was to begin after formation of the NATO supreme command, but the French government was not ready to accept this proposal.\textsuperscript{15}

Success at the Himmerod conference appears to have given Schwerin unwarranted boldness. Late in October 1950 before a dozen journalists in Bonn, Schwerin gave his opinion of FRG rearmament. Following his advice, the Allies were to demand that the FRG provide ten divisions as a mobilization base for about 200,000 men vis-a-vis East German mobilization of 3,500,000. The army was to be completely armored and motorized to permit an offensive defense. The mission was to contain the first shock of an attack on the Elbe followed by an immediate counterattack to the east. Schwerin said that it was time to recruit cadre and form a general staff, but recruiting would not be difficult because of many unemployed old soldiers and officers.\textsuperscript{16} In this press conference Schwerin exceeded his

\textsuperscript{15}Moch, \textit{Histoire du Réarmement}, 145.

instructions. Bonn officially announced that Schwerin's views were hypothetical and unofficial.

Adenauer was displeased with Schwerin's press interview. Furthermore, Schwerin was premature in his remarks and had divulged secret information. Consequently, Adenauer dismissed Schwerin and would not select another general as security advisor. When at the end of October 1950 Schwerin learned about his dismissal, he recommended that his successor be a political personality. Hence, Adenauer sought a civilian with a liberal reputation who was ignorant of the profession of arms. CDU deputy Theodor Blank met Adenauer's requirements, and Adenauer appointed Blank with a long title. The press responded immediately by calling Blank a new Noske.

Security had been the dominant project of the Amt Schwerin. The principal concern with security was the large number of occupation troops which the Allies were sending to the FRG in response to Adenauer's appeal for a force augmentation, and it appeared likely that a security office

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17 Fischer, Verteidigung, 34.
19 Le Monde, 28 Oct. 1950; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 279.
20 Le Monde, 31 Oct. 1950; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 279.
21 Fischer, Verteidigung, 34.
might evolve from the Blank organization. In addition, with permission of the High Commissioners, Adenauer deputized Blank with the power to lead the German negotiations. On 23 October 1950 Adenauer named Blank Der Beauftragte des Bundeskanzlers für die mit Vemehrung der Allierten Truppen Zusammenhangenden Fragen (Plenipotentiary of the Federal Chancellor for Questions Connected with the Reinforcement of Allied Troops). The designation Amt Blank was not official, but it became a term of general usage in reference to Blank's responsibilities. At the time Blank began to carry out his duties, the cabinet had not yet approved his appointment; however, Adenauer had informed Schumacher of his intentions. The Bundestag did not participate in the establishment of the Amt Blank; Adenauer established this office within the organizational authority of the Federal Chancellor. Later, the Bundestag Budget Committee approved funding for personnel and organization.

Since Blank was not a member of the outspoken Adenauer circle within the CDU, his selection was a clever move to

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23 Basler Nachrichten, 1 Nov. 1950, 1.
24 Kielmansegg, interview 10 Aug. 1982; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 Nov. 1950, 4; Greiner, "Dienststelle," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124; Fischer, Verteidigung, 34.
influence the imminent foreign policy debate in parliament.26

Members of the Amt Schwerin were uncertain, and they sat in the Palais Chambourg waiting. At the end of October 1950 they learned about Blank's new office, but no one saw Blank. Only three former military men from the Amt Schwerin moved to the new office: Bussche, Oster, and Kielmansegg. The others went home.27

On 21 October 1950 the French cabinet discussed a European armed force with FRG participation.28  On 23 October 1950, the French Council of Ministers approved the Pleven Plan.29  On 24 October 1950 Pleven presented this proposal to the National Assembly, and on 25 October 1950 Schuman gave a copy to Acheson.30 The plan rejected formation of German divisions and an FRG defense ministry.31 A unified European army was to be organized in the spirit of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was bound to

26Basler Nachrichten, 1 Nov. 1950, 1.

27Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 34.

28Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 131-133.


the political institutions of a united Europe.32 The national unit was to be the smallest unit possible; the administrative leader was to be a European defense minister answering to a council of national ministers and responsible to a European assembly.33 A common budget was to be the financial basis for the European army.34 States already possessing troops could retain national organizations: a transition period would permit the introduction of units into the European army. The French government said the European armed force would be suitable for NATO commitment.35

The Pleven Plan included a series of questionable stipulations and there was doubt that it would facilitate accomplishment of the NATO program as the French government asserted. Experts believed that the extensive and political reorganization required by the Pleven Plan would necessitate delay. Furthermore, Pleven wanted to wait until the end of negotiations on the Coal and Steel Community before beginning talks on the European army and the FRG military contribution. Inasmuch as there were many controversial stipulations and there was doubt that it would facilitate accomplishment of the NATO program as the French government asserted. Experts believed that the extensive and political reorganization required by the Pleven Plan would necessitate delay. Furthermore, Pleven wanted to wait until the end of negotiations on the Coal and Steel Community before beginning talks on the European army and the FRG military contribution. Inasmuch as there were many controversial

34Ismay, NATO, 33.
points, both French and foreign observers viewed the Pleven Plan as an attempt to delay FRG rearmament. Although the purpose of small national units was to avoid creating tactically independent German units, differences in language, customs, and thinking would impede cooperation of nationally heterogeneous troop contingents within divisions. There would also be psychological problems emanating from national differences.36

The Pleven Plan had numerous discriminatory provisions for the FRG. Integration on the lowest level put the FRG at a disadvantage in the selection of higher echelon leaders. The FRG would be denied a national military force because it did not possess one. From the beginning, FRG troops had to serve under command of the European army; whereas, other states could introduce their contingents later. Only the FRG would not have a defense minister; German units would serve under a European defense minister.37 Truman observed that the Pleven Plan was not satisfactory, but it was progress.38

Harold MacMillan observed that the Pleven Plan would meet the United States' demand for FRG rearmament without the risk of revived German militarism. The plan had the


37 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 368-369.

38 Truman, Trial and Hope, 257.
purpose of alleviating French fears, but the force would have low morale and be of little military value. In 1950 French public opinion opposed a German force the French could not control, and British public opinion was apprehensive of revived German militarism. As Alphand and Bidault later explained, the Pleven Plan was designed to exclude the FRG from NATO and prevent political sovereignty. The FRG held that German participation in NATO decisions required equality; any deviation from this view was discrimination.39

Leading Western and French military men did not agree with the French explanation of 24 October 1950.40 At Fontainebleau, Montgomery, General de Lattre de Tassigny, and General Bethouart opposed integrated tactical units and demanded that the FRG contingent have a structure permitting tactically independent units.41 General Bradley judged the Pleven Plan unsuitable, and Secretary of Defense Marshall agreed with him. The Pentagon rejected the Pleven Plan because of the delay. Since it was essential that officers be of the same nationality as their troops, international military judgment dictated that divisions be operationally

39MacMillan Tides, 220-221; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 369.


41Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 280-281.
independent, national troop units. In general, the Pleven Plan appeared incompatible with the NATO structure.\textsuperscript{42}

In the United States and the FRG, there was varied political opinion on the Pleven Plan. Acheson viewed the European army as neither militarily effective nor desirable; to him, it was hopeless.\textsuperscript{43} State Department personnel viewed it as an attempt to sabotage the FRG military contribution through an impracticable solution. The United States High Commissioner's office had sympathy for the Pleven Plan, but McCloy rejected it as discriminatory. Subsequently, he viewed it as an eventuality if French conditions made other solutions impossible. Pleven and Schuman thought the High Commission would influence Marshall and Lovett to favor the Pleven Plan. In Paris, Bruce viewed a supra-national European army as a possibility for French support of an FRG military contribution and an important step toward European cooperation. According to Bruce, French leaders Schuman, Monnet, and Pleven were serious, but Moch was using the Pleven Plan as a tactical feint.\textsuperscript{44} FRG Deputy Heinrich von Brentano viewed the Pleven Plan as a valuable step toward European integration, but none of the

\textsuperscript{42}Wettig, \textit{Entmilitärisierung}, 369-370; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 14 November 1950, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe}, 452-453.

\textsuperscript{43}Acheson, \textit{Present}, 458-459.

\textsuperscript{44}Wettig, \textit{Entmilitärisierung}, 370-371.
Germans entirely approved it.\textsuperscript{45} The proposal caused much consternation in the United States.\textsuperscript{46}

On 27 October 1950 Douglas reported to Acheson that the Pleven Plan needed clarification, but above all there was a requirement for Franco-German rapprochement. It was not clear whether or not the European army was to be under NATO, and it was illogical to make the Pleven Plan contingent on the Schuman Plan.\textsuperscript{47}

At a press conference on 28 October 1950 Adenauer characterized the Pleven Plan as having many obscurities. He noted that a German contingent in the "American European army" would have complete equality, which was an unconditional requirement, and he opposed coupling the European army with the Coal and Steel Community. He did not openly oppose the Pleven Plan, but spoke of it as discriminatory. The Germans wanted FRG forces fully integrated into a European army. Adenauer chose to wait before acting because the United States and Britain had set the FRG NATO orientation at New York and he did not know

\textsuperscript{45}Brentano, Germany and Europe, 48.

\textsuperscript{46}Acheson, Present, 458-459.

\textsuperscript{47}The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, 27 October 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 412-415.
what role they wanted the FRG to play in the NATO defense system.48

Adenauer reported on 31 October 1950 to the FRG Ministerial Council on his conversation with French High Commissioner François-Poncet regarding the Pleven Plan. The FRG considered the Pleven Plan an important contribution to solving West European defense problems, but it needed revision. The FRG Government agreed that complete equality for the FRG had to be acknowledged in the area of European defense. Nevertheless, the FRG intended no campaign against the Pleven Plan or the French attitude.49

Although the Pleven Plan was not a functional solution, in the NATO Defense Committee meeting on 31 October 1950 Moch said that the West must accept the French plan or the French would not participate.50 Accordingly, Acheson instructed Bruce on 3 November 1950 to tell Pleven and Schuman that it was paramount to build an effective European defense, that NATO military experts considered the Pleven Plan unsound, and the plan was unacceptable to the majority of NATO members (United States, Britain, Norway, Denmark,

48 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 372.

49 Basler Nachrichten, 1 Nov. 1950, 1.

50 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 3 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 426-431.
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Italy). Yet, the United States would accept constructive French efforts and leadership. If the United States were to provide money for military assistance in Europe, the military plan must be realistic. The United States recognized the need for safeguards, but would not accept the French take it or leave it attitude. The burden of proof of French sincerity was on the French government.

The Pleven Plan needed modification to be practical. Adenauer accepted the Pleven Plan even though France protested the FRG demand for no discrimination, but the NATO states did not agree with the concept of integration at battalion level. Consequently, Spofford considered it necessary to compromise. Having considerable freedom of action, and after consulting United States' military men in early November 1950, Spofford concluded that a nationally homogeneous combat group would suffice. The prevention of friction between national units within the division required

51 Ibid.; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium, 9 November 1950, ibid., 439-440.

52 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 3 November 1950, ibid., 426-431.

53 Ibid.; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 17 October 1950, ibid., 384-385.

54 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 3 November 1950, ibid., 426-431.

55 Fischer, Verteidigung, 33.
tactically independent units larger than battalions; thus, he proposed a reinforced brigade of about one-third division strength. Divisions would remain the operational ground units, but he rejected German divisions without consulting State Department and Pentagon officials, who disagreed with him. On 4 November 1950 he presented his ideas to the NAC at which time he agreed to relinquish German divisions if France accepted combat groups or regimental combat teams (RCT) of five thousand to six thousand men and more armament. The French would talk of an RCT if the word regiment were used; however, Spofford's idea called for too much German armament and operational independence. If the combat group had the characteristics of the usual regiment incorporated into a division, the French might accept it; if the combat group could operate independently, the French would oppose it. Most of the NATO SG opposed the French plan and supported the idea of FRG divisions.56

The Germans became critical of the Pleven Plan. On 4 November 1950 in Stuttgart Adenauer criticized a series of discriminatory conditions and objected that the delay for realization of the Pleven Plan was unacceptable in view of the threat. In the SPD criticism on 8 November 1950, Schumacher told the Bundestag that the Pleven Plan brought to the German people dissimilarity of sacrifice, risk, and

56 Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 234-235; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 386-387.
chance. He later said that the Pleven Plan was intended to prevent a direct relation of the FRG to NATO and to place an integrated Western Europe under French control.57

On 8 November 1950 Adenauer gave the cabinet's views to the Bundestag. The FRG Government perceived the Pleven Plan as a worthwhile contribution to European integration, but did not expect expeditious acceptance. Therewith the Pleven Plan, approved in principle, was in reality rejected. Adenauer again stressed the condition that an FRG contribution must have equality. The FRG position, although sounding positive, contained significant reservations.58

In exchange for renunciation of FRG divisions, Spofford added the condition that France renounce the European defense ministry and a political organization for control of an FRG military contingent. French NAC delegate Hervé Alphand appeared sympathetic and was ready to present the combat group idea to the French government; however, on 13 November 1950 Pleven received a compromise proposal.59

The NAC discussed the FRG military contribution in London beginning 13 November 1950. Spofford agreed with

57 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 375-376.

58 Le Monde, 9 Nov. 1950; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 375; Die Neue Zeitung, 11 Nov. 1950, 4.

Alphand that a European army was a desirable objective, but for partial agreement of the Belgians, representatives of other countries did not agree. The British, skeptical about a European army, proposed a modified Brussels Pact.60

In November 1950, there were Landtag elections in Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria, and the campaigns exacerbated the FRG political situation. The SPD told the people to vote for the Government if they wanted war, but to vote for the SPD if they wanted peace. The SPD propagated the idea that the Western Allies did not care about the FRG but merely wanted to use German troops to protect themselves.61 Supporting the SPD position in November 1950, Protestant theologian Karl Barth wrote a letter to German pastors against rearmament in which he agreed with Heinemann and Niemöller.62 Moreover, Niemöller and Schumacher held a conference during the November 1950 elections which appeared as an attempt to undermine the Government.63 In Tübingen on 14 November 1950 Niemöller explained that the United States

60Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 386; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 Nov. 1950, 4.


63Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 Nov. 1950, 1; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 373-374.
and the FRG took Bolshevism too lightly. He said the twenty million Germans behind the Iron Curtain had no neighbors, except the West Germans, who felt responsible for them, and that Adenauer's action was irresponsible because it would not lead to the reunification of Germany. The combined tactics of Schumacher and Niemöller appeared to be exerting great influence in November 1950, but the Protestant Synod did not agree with them.

On 15 November 1950 Pleven, Schuman, and Moch agreed with the combat group principle but rejected the proposal as renouncing the supra-national European army. The issue was control in establishing FRG units. The United States objected that French demands meant lengthy negotiations and erection of complicated international authorities before recruiting and formation of FRG units, whereas the defense emergency dictated against delay.

The British considered a supra-national army impossible. On 15 November 1950 Defense Minister Emmanuel Shinwell expressed the British desire for early creation of

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64 Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 2 Nov. 1950, 1.
65 Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 15 Nov. 1950, 4.
66 The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 25 September 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 724-725; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 17 November 1950, ibid., 780-784; Times, 18 Nov. 1950, 5.
an integrated armed force under a central command. The European army was intended to conform to the decision at the New York Conference, not to the Pleven Plan. He saw the problem as a military one, but the Pleven Plan also raised a number of unnecessary, difficult political problems.\textsuperscript{68}

Continued discussions proved to be productive. On 16 November 1950 Spofford informed Acheson that the French might accept something similar to the United States' plan if they could save face.\textsuperscript{69} Accordingly, Spofford informed Acheson on 17 November 1950 of the political aspects of an FRG contribution. There was greater agreement, but the Germans were not participating in the discussions, and they had to agree to the solution.\textsuperscript{70} On 18 November 1950 Acheson notified Spofford that all discussion on FRG rearmament must be within the NATO forum and there could be no approval prior to discussions with the Germans.\textsuperscript{71} Toward the end of

\textsuperscript{68}Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 480 (1950), cols. 1729-1731 (Shinwell).

\textsuperscript{69}The United States Deputy Representative to the NAC to the Secretary of State, 16 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 457-460.

\textsuperscript{70}The United States Deputy Representative on the NAC to the Secretary of State, 17 November 1950, ibid., 468-470; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the United States Deputy Representative on the NAC, 20 November 1950, ibid., 472-474.

\textsuperscript{71}The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the NAC, at London, 18 November 1950, ibid., 470-471.
November 1950 Spofford urged acceptance of combat groups and a later determination of the setting for the FRG contribution. Bevin and Shinwell sought to persuade French leaders to accept the Spofford Plan, but Alphand had instructions from Paris to reject it. Finally, at the end of November 1950, the French agreed to RCTs. Remaining issues pertained to the type of FRG defense agency.

Amid the discussion over the Pleven Plan, the possibility that a world conflict could arise from the Korean War gained credence when the Chinese Communists intervened in Korea in November 1950. Truman, in his press conference on 30 November 1950 said that it was more urgent than ever to establish an integrated command in Europe under a supreme commander. He expressed his intent to submit a request for an increase in size and effectiveness of United States' forces and to intensify efforts to improve NATO defenses. Truman's statement reinforced the decision of September 1950 to augment Allied forces in the

72Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 234-235.

73The United States Deputy Representative on the NAC to the Secretary of State, 17 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 468-470; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the United States Deputy Representative on the NAC, 20 November 1950, ibid., 472-474.

74Foerster, Anfänge, 287.

FRG, an action with which Blank was involved as part of his responsibilities.

In accordance with Adenauer's policy of keeping the opposition informed on the rearmament process, Blank early established and maintained communications with the SPD.76 As a trade union man, Blank had very good relations with the SPD opposition. Kurt Schumacher was the SPD leader, and Carlo Schmid and Adolf Ehlers were two important SPD deputies regarding rearmament.77 Schumacher opposed establishment of the Amt Blank in November 1950 as one more political instrument in the Federal Chancellor's Office, but there followed a long period in which the SPD did not comment on the Amt Blank. This silence existed because Blank, Speidel, and Heusinger kept the SPD informed on the activity of the Amt Blank until Schumacher died in 1952.78

The SPD did not oppose rearmament; they opposed rearmament under existing conditions because they believed reunification was possible. Adenauer was also interested in reunification, but understood that it was not possible in his lifetime.79


77Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.


Schumacher was correct in saying that a German armed force or an FRG defense contribution would block reunification, but he also had a secondary argument that twelve divisions were insufficient. If the Germans were to rearm, they should have fifty to sixty divisions; anything less would be inadequate against the Soviet Union.80

It is difficult to define the position of Blank and the Amt Blank in the Government. Blank, the Chancellor, and the ministers were members of the Bundestag. As a Government deputy and a member of the Bundestag Blank could participate in Bundestag sessions and committees.81 In public and in the Bundestag he spoke as a Bundestag deputy; later he spoke as Deputy or Security Deputy for the Federal Chancellor. As Deputy to the Chancellor, Blank led his department and negotiated with the Allies. As chief negotiator, he was consecutively chief German delegate at the Petersberg talks and for the Plevan Plan conference in Paris for the EDC. As a department leader, he was directly under the Chancellor; as chief delegate, he negotiated under instructions from the Foreign Office.82

Blank was not a minister and not a member of the federal Government in the sense of Article 62 of the Basic

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
Law, nor did he have the status of a state secretary, either
of which would have required him to resign from the Bundes-
tag. His position later became that of a parliamentary
state secretary to assure cooperation of Bundestag members
and to improve his negotiating position. He received the
compensation of a state secretary until 1954 when
compensation became that of a federal minister. Blank's
title corresponded to the decision of the Allied foreign
ministers on 19 September 1950 for an augmentation of Allied
troops in the FRG.83

Parliamentary control of the Amt Blank was a formality
since the Amt Blank was part of the Chancellery and,
according to German law and the constitution, the
Chancellery was under parliament. Parliament controlled the
Amt Blank but not always through the Chancellor even though
he was the only person politically responsible. Later,
Parliament established the Committee for European Security
to control Amt Blank actions, and Blank and members of the
Amt Blank went to parliament periodically to report their
activities.84

Initially the main task of the Amt Blank was to prepare
for negotiations and talks, but at its inception it had no

83Ibid.
84Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
capabilities. In December 1950 Blank appointed Heusinger and Speidel as his advisors and began organization of the Amt Blank. Heusinger had been Chief of the Operations Division of the German High Command during World War II and was arrested following the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler. Speidel had been Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Rommel in occupied France. He, too, was arrested following the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler. Speidel, who held an earned doctorate in history, was to participate in military negotiations with the Western Allies.

Blank and the Amt Blank had a dual function, as stated in the official designation of the Amt Blank. Adenauer’s memorandum of 29 August 1950 to the Western Allies showed his readiness to consider an FRG defense contribution, but it also showed that the Allies must act. They had to reorganize West European defense and bring in more troops. One Amt Blank function was to prepare for this augmentation; the other was to plan the FRG defense contribution. Blank

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85Ibid.

86Rautenberg und Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift, 34.


assumed his new responsibilities, and nineteen co-workers began intensive planning in December 1950.\textsuperscript{89}

There were two categories of people in the \textit{Amt Blank}, army officers and civil servants, but up to November 1956 all \textit{Amt Blank} and Defense Ministry personnel were civilian; there were no military personnel on active duty. Many functions in the \textit{Amt Blank} and later in the defense ministry were done administratively, and administration permeated the \textit{Amt Blank} to the lowest levels. In the beginning the Beamten and the Angespäter (army officers) shared administration. The Beamter was a lifetime civil servant; the Angespäter was not. The Beamter had more freedom and could not be dismissed. The presence of Beamten and Angespäter implied civilian and political control of the \textit{Amt Blank}.\textsuperscript{90}

In Germany there were political and civil control; they were different. Most of the Beamten in the \textit{Amt Blank} had the attitude: "We Beamten control you military."\textsuperscript{91} The Beamten are servants of the state and servants of the state exercise control; on this idea there was a point of conflict. At first the Beamten were not willing to give military personnel any authority other than to bear arms, a situation which was a continuous source of conflict. The

\textsuperscript{89}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid.
conflict between the Beamten and the military was difficult, especially during the first five years, because the Amt Blank had to establish a foundation. Should the incorrect foundation be established, everything else would be incorrect, and incorrect foundations would require years to correct. During the early years there were two or three Beamten who were compatible people, but most were not.92

Adenauer's method for power in domestic politics depended on two things: control of the personal politics of the people within the apparatus and more knowledge than anyone else. When the Amt Blank opened, the chief administrator of the Chancellery was Hans Globke. Globke's primary assistants were Josef Rust and Karl Gumbel. To Adenauer these men constituted a troika of confidence. Later, when Blank became Defense Minister, Adenauer assigned him two people: Rust as State Secretary and Gumbel as Chief of Personnel. Hence, Adenauer's control was effected. Another Beamter, Ernst Wirmer, was in the Amt Blank from its inception.93

Wirmer was very important in the Amt Blank, and effective 1 December 1950, he was the head of the Beamten. As a personal aide to the Chancellor, he was Adenauer's means for close control over rearmament. Wirmer entered the

92Ibid.
93Ibid.
Amt Blank as a confidant of Adenauer to monitor events, specifically for control and information. In late December 1950, a political Beamter was assigned; later there were many.\textsuperscript{94} Wirmer had direct contact with the Chancellor and without his consent no one could be assigned or dismissed.\textsuperscript{95} Wirmer was the most influential civilian in the Amt Blank, a condition which continued until the Amt Blank became a ministry. In spite of the civilian-military dichotomy, people in the Amt Blank worked together much like any other structured group.\textsuperscript{96}

The Amt Schwerin had been in the Federal Chancellor's Office under Blankenhorn, but Blank became appended to the State Secretary in the Federal Chancellor's Office immediately subordinate to the Chancellor. The Chancellor's Office was designated "The Bonn Central Ministry" with divisions for foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, and the press. The organization, orders, reports, papers, size, and general activity of the Amt Blank made it the equivalent of a ministry, and with the coordination of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{94}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{95}Greiner, "Dienststelle, "Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124.
\item \textsuperscript{96}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
\end{itemize}
entire Government activity through the Chancellor's Office, the Amt Blank was finally treated as a ministry.  

Amt Blank activity consisted of military planning and numerous other functions. Even for the most simple planning the means for selecting, arranging, and setting objectives appears to have been an impediment. Firm, realistic dates for objectives were fixed initially but did not anticipate unforeseen changes in the international situation. Hence, the means for accomplishing objectives were often estimated with the understanding that the basis would probably change.

The West understood the military setback wrought by the Chinese Communists in Korea, and the shift in United States' military interest to East Asia appears to have been unpleasant to the British and French. On 2 December 1950 Pleven and Schuman held talks in London with Attlee and Bevin concerning the Far Eastern threat. Also in December 1950 Attlee visited Truman to emphasize the importance of West European security above victory in Korea and to demand guarantees of United States' strength on the European

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98 Ibid.

99 Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 238.
Attlee told the French his only hope for success was to offer something in exchange, early establishment of an FRG contingent for certain. On this basis Pleven and Schuman agreed to the Spofford Plan. The two Frenchmen promised to recommend approval of the Spofford Plan to the French cabinet, who considered it on 5 and 6 December 1950. Moch and Socialist General Secretary Guy Mollet opposed the Spofford Plan. Mollet would accept FRG troops but not in a setting other than a supra-national army.

A compromise came late on 6 December 1950. Although the French cabinet agreed to the Spofford Plan, they preferred the Pleven Plan and demanded guarantees that FRG combat groups would have neither autonomy nor heavy weapons. The French rejected having FRG combat groups in homogeneous FRG divisions. Total FRG troop strength was not to exceed one-fifth of the Western armed forces in Europe. The FRG was to have no defense minister or general staff. The NAC received these French conditions, and the NATO SG accepted them. The agreement provided for prompt establishment of German RCTs by Western forces in the FRG. The solution suited the United States since a recruiting

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100 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 388-389; Acheson, Present, 478-480.

101 Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 238-244.

102 Ibid.

103 Le Monde, 8 Dec. 1950.
organization in Western armies appeared to be the most expeditious way to proceed. Although RCTs promised no good military result in the long run, they were practical in the short term.104

The Military Committee agreed that a defense force was militarily acceptable but must not delay the FRG contribution. Committee objectives included: formation of small FRG units as soon as possible; acceptance of the division as the best size unit, with a brigade or RCT allowable; an FRG defensive air force; German industrial contribution to FRG military units. Working together, the occupying powers and FRG authorities would prepare detailed plans including emplacement of safeguards.105

The NAC considered the Spofford Plan concurrently with recruiting and production. It was essential to solve the French political problem and plan for progressive supercession of provisional arrangements. The occupying powers would control German manpower through FRG agencies during the transition, and the Military Committee would decide how to incorporate FRG military units into an integrated force. The European reaction to the United States' proposal was generally favorable, but France was still a problem. As yet

104Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 389-390; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 238-244.

105Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense by His Assistant, 5 December 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 517-521.
the FRG had no NATO proposal, and the inaction had a deleterious effect. As reported by planners in the NATO SG, the French would have the opportunity during formation of German RCTs to present to prospective member nations the French proposal for a supra-national European army. Should FRG units be formed, the NATO commander was to determine the point in time for conversion of FRG organizations to combat ready units. If the European army were found suitable, German RCTs would be included in multi-national divisions. Otherwise, FRG divisions were perceived as part of the NATO defense force, a contradiction of the French cabinet stipulation of 6 December 1950 on the prohibition of German divisions. The British reluctantly agreed to the Spofford Plan but did not agree on a European army.

As of 11 December 1950 Adenauer would not agree to a burdensome FRG defense contribution with discriminatory duties. He still demanded complete equality with other member states in weapons and command authority. He criticized the plan to incorporate German combat groups into the NATO army, but stressed his readiness for accommodation if the measure was valid for all nations.

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106 Ibid.
107 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 507-508; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 390.
Viewing apparent Allied progress, in early December 1950 European communists launched a major propaganda campaign against rearmament. Soviet scare tactics had an effect on the Brussels Pact countries. France feared war within three months; Belgian Prince Baudouin said war was coming; and Bevin cautioned the Allies to proceed slowly with German defense participation.

On 13 December 1950 Schumacher explained SPD objections: since the United States had promised the German people equality in NATO, the NAC proposal was a breach of faith. It was impossible to defend freedom if some soldiers were classified as first class and others as second class and the second class soldiers received the most dangerous tasks.

In mid-December 1950 the NATO Military Committee reported on a joint meeting of that group and the NAC. The need for German troops in Western Europe was based on defending as far east as possible, close to the Iron Curtain, and requiring active, willing German participation. A defense force should be established as soon as possible but would not be effective without adequate troops. Allied


110 Acheson, Present, 482-483, 487.

forces would remain on German soil and there would be no FRG national army or general staff.\textsuperscript{112}

Accordingly, the NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels on 18 and 19 December 1950 and approved recommendations for planning by the NATO SG in Washington and the NAC in London.\textsuperscript{113} On 19 December 1950, the foreign ministers considered three plans: the Spofford Plan, the Pleven Plan, and the creation of a staff for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).\textsuperscript{114} The defense ministers approved the Spofford Plan for FRG rearmament.\textsuperscript{115} France accepted the report of the NAC and the Military Committee with two reservations: the controls in Germany set forth in the Spofford Plan should not be relaxed until another system was in place, and German RCTs could be attached to Allied units, but not grouped together. The Brussels Conference gave the FRG the choice of the Pleven Plan with German troops in RCTs or a defense contribution to NATO, organized in divisions, lightly armed and numerically equal to one-fifth of all Western forces. A national structure for the German military contribution would be developed in


\textsuperscript{113}Moch, \textit{Histoire du Réarmement}, 246-247.

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Le Monde}, 20 Dec. 1950.

accordance with both plans: the FRG could choose only between the European army or NATO options, but in both cases would be militarily subordinate to the NATO staff without its own general staff.  

In accordance with NATO desires for a unified command, on 19 December 1950 Truman sent a message to Acheson designating General Eisenhower SACEUR. All NATO countries accepted this appointment. Simultaneously, foreign ministers Acheson, Schuman, and Bevin left the door open for a four power meeting with the Soviet Union.

On 19 December 1950, François-Poncet, Chairman of the High Commission, told Adenauer that negotiations would begin along two paths. One was the so-called Petersberg line, or the NATO solution. The other was the Pleven line, or the

116 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 583-584; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 391-392.


European army (EDC) solution. The two lines ran parallel, but the main emphasis from the United States and the FRG was the Petersberg line, or the NATO plan.120

The decision of the Brussels Conference meant that if the French EDC solution did not go into effect, at a time to be determined by the NATO command the NATO solution was to go into effect. The High Commission and German military experts were to work out technical details. Military aspects of the WEU were to be subordinated to and merged progressively with NATO. On 20 December 1950 Adenauer met with the High Commission, who agreed to appoint a committee to discuss the German role in West European defense. Talks were to begin on 8 January 1951. German representatives were Theodor Blank, Hans Speidel, and Adolf Heusinger.121

On 20 December 1950 at the Brussels Conference, the NATO ministers invited the occupying powers to discuss with the German delegates participation in West European defense. On 21 December 1950 the High Commission

120Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 284; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 398-399.

and Adenauer agreed to instruct the Deputy High Commissioners and Blank to study FRG requirements. The primary German concern was the size of units and safeguards. Specific areas of study for Blank were the type of units, size of divisions, administration, and heavy versus light formations.122

The FRG appeared officially satisfied that German representatives would be consulted, but warned that it expected speedy results and no discrimination. Schumacher criticized the Brussels Conference because the Western powers discussed the FRG as if "we must be punished for their political mistakes at Potsdam."123 He blamed the Allies for not having recognized the situation five years previously. He considered the number of Western divisions unimportant to the central question of whether the German people recognized their position as defensible. He, too, demanded equality before organizing German troops.124

On 21 December 1950 the High Commission informed Adenauer of the Brussels results. François-Poncet sent a note with no supporting documents and sought to conceal the alternatives offered the FRG Government. He wrote of German

122The Allied High Commissioners for Germany to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 20 December 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Western Europe, 1044-1047.

123Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 393.

124Ibid.
contingents to the armed force under Eisenhower, but avoided identifying this armed force as a NATO organ. His purpose was to represent NATO as having recommended the French project for a European army. His note avoided telling the FRG that its units would be under the NATO command should the EDC fail.

Beginning in 1950 in the FRG there was discussion between the Government and the opposition parties on the constitutionality of an armed force. Associated with this discussion was the question of whether or not the FRG possessed military sovereignty. The Government maintained that military sovereignty emanated from the authority of the state as the sole sovereign power within its geographical limits. Whether or not the Basic Law tacitly or expressly granted military sovereignty was irrelevant.

1950 was a momentous year. It began with a general feeling that the communist threat was declining; however, the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the subsequent Chinese Communist intervention stimulated an intense interest in West European defense. These events exacerbated East-West relations and enhanced the Western

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126 Ibid., 383-384; Fischer, Verteidigung, 52.
127 Fischer, Verteidigung, 46.
perception of an ominous communist conspiracy against the free world. For the FRG, it meant increased attention from the West, new leverage for gaining sovereignty, and the beginning of a planning organization for rearmament.

In 1950 Germany was the main center of industrial power outside the United States, and the West had to prevent it from falling to the Soviet Union. The West also felt an obligation to prevent Germany from becoming a threat. The West could meet both objectives by making the FRG a part of Western Europe. Leadership in this purpose had to come from France, the morale of which had been shattered during World War II. With proposals by Schuman for a Franco-German coal and steel pool and Pleven for a European defense community (EDC), the action that had to be taken to solve the leadership problem became more distinct. Reemergence of French statesmanship was one of the most encouraging signs of the postwar period; however, at the end of 1950 France was a major obstacle to FRG rearmament.128 In meeting French demands and allaying French fears, the FRG had to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate and renounce German militarism. In December 1950 the FRG was prepared to begin the long process involving talks and negotiations, the purpose of which was to solve Franco-German problems, contribute to Western defense, and restore FRG sovereignty.

The Amt Blank was the agency charged with this task, and Theodor Blank was the man responsible for the talks and negotiations.
Not being pleased with the United States' proposal for FRG rearmament, on 23 October 1950 the French countered with the Pleven Plan, an impractical proposal reflecting French interests, to which no one outside France agreed. To avoid an impasse, Charles Spofford, United States Deputy Representative to the NAC, proposed a compromise, which the French accepted with reservations in early December 1950.\(^1\)

The West wanted a rearmament plan to which NATO would agree. On 13 December 1950 a joint meeting of the NAC and the NATO Military Committee convened in Brussels and on 18 December 1950 announced agreement on FRG rearmament. The French, however, were not satisfied. The foreign ministers authorized the High Commission to discuss the New York communiqué of September 1950 with the Germans, and in early 1951 parallel discussions began in Bonn and Paris. The talks in Bonn from January to June 1951 were at the technical level.\(^2\) In January 1951 the French government called a meeting in Paris for February 1951 in which the FRG was

\(^1\)"The EDC," The World Today 3 (June 1952): 236-248.

\(^2\)Ibid.
invited to participate. This group met until 21 July 1951.3

The Petersberg talks, so-called because they met in the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, concerned how to rearm the FRG; the Paris negotiations dealt with the politics of a European army.4 The Brussels Conference limited the scope of the Petersberg talks and the authority of the High Commissioners but did not inform the Germans of the limitations. Furthermore, the Brussels Conference restricted the Petersberg delegates to an non-official status. On the other hand, the Paris negotiations were given an official status.

Considering the options of NATO or a European army, Adenauer chose NATO. Because of incomplete knowledge of the Pleven Plan and the non-official status of the Petersberg delegates, he perceived discrimination against the FRG. Thus, he treated the talks at the Petersberg as political negotiations and preparatory military consultations.5

Because of British, United States', and FRG desires, the High Commission appeared at the Petersberg face-to-face

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5Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 394-396, 402.
with the Germans. In November 1950, Adenauer had appointed Theodor Blank to lead the German delegation. Speidel and Heusinger, called into the Amt Blank in December 1950, participated as military experts. Kielmansegg functioned as executive secretary. Government Counsel Ostermann was also a member of this group. Through these appointments, Adenauer wanted to make it clear that he did not negotiate under restraint. In this sense he refused to present the FRG proposal before knowing whose acceptance was required.6 These activities proceeded amid the continuous buildup of DDR military units and harassment by the East Bloc.

The DDR was continuously and consistently forming military units. Regulations, tactics, and weapons were of Soviet origin, and in the winter of 1950-1951 KVP units went on maneuvers from Germany to Poland and Czechoslovakia. In January 1951 under a reorganization, the thirty-nine Bereitschaften units became twenty-four lightly armed units, "People's Police Centers" (VPD). VPD units had an authorized strength of twenty-four hundred.7 Similar to a Soviet mechanized regiment, they consisted of three infantry

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6Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 281-284, 287; Fischer, Verteidigung, 36; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 402-403; Times, 6 Jan. 1951, 5; Times, 10 Jan. 1951, 6.

commands, an artillery command, and special troops; however, their armament was inferior to that of the Soviet Army. In early 1951, the Soviet Union continued its propaganda campaign against the West. On 5 January 1951, the Soviets sent notes to Britain and France alledging that the efforts to rearm the FRG were violations of their treaties with the Soviet Union from 1942 and 1944.8

Talks began at the Petersberg on 9 January 1951.9 The Allies sent Deputy High Commissioners George Hays, Sir John Guthrie Ward, and Armand Bérard.10 The FRG delegation was dedicated to gaining NATO membership, receiving authority to create the position of defense minister, and getting clarification of the war criminal issue.11 When he welcomed the Germans, Hays said that a German contingent under SHAPE

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9Times, 10 Jan. 1951, 6.

10Fett, "Grundlagen," Militärgeschichte, 176; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 990-991.

11The Germans objected to former German soldiers being considered war criminals, in particular their condemnation at Nuremberg. Fett, "Grundlagen," Militärgeschichte, 176.
command, not a German army, was the goal. From the beginning the Germans insisted on equality.

Beginning in January 1951, Blank could decide on general details; during the Petersberg talks he received no further instructions. He strove for equal rights in organization, leadership, armament, and equipment; he wanted to fix this condition in detail. Only on this basis could the Chancellor, Bundestag, and German people concur in a military contribution. Although the Petersberg talks were intended to cover military subjects only, Blank expressed the FRG position that military measures could be realized only in the context of common political assumptions.

On 14 January 1951 in Bielefeld, Adenauer gave his perception of psychological restraints on the German people, which included defamation of the Wehrmacht, the unmet need for a clear plan for defense west of the Rhine, constant rumors that the FRG would receive only light weapons, Moch's desire to restrict the size of FRG units, and unrelieved French mistrust. Since equality was the main requisite for a military contribution, it was mandatory that the FRG

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12The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 990-991.

13Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 290.

14Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 404-405.

get assurances that Allied forces would secure the peace. The Germans wanted contractual rights as a replacement for the occupation authority, the transformation of the High Commission into an ambassadorial conference, and some relief for the German people's feeling that they were being mistreated. They also wanted a debiting of post-war FRG financial burdens to the national defense expenditure and financial aid. Based on Adenauer's views, Blank's demands at the Petersberg were mostly political and went beyond the competence of the High Commission.

The desire for equality meant acceptance of the FRG into NATO. From the first, Blank, Speidel, and Heusinger sought information about the Brussels agreement. Since the Germans wanted to avoid exposing their proposals before knowing the Allied views, they wanted details on the extent of the promised equality. On the other hand, the Deputy High Commissioners wanted to know the technical details of the FRG proposal and the possibility of an FRG industrial contribution. In mid-January 1951, Blank demanded that the West revise the general verdict of guilt for German

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16 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 405; The United States Deputy High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, 17 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 993-996.

17 The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1003-1005.
soldiers and clarify the issue of war guilt. Otherwise, the psychological prerequisites for an FRG contribution would not be met. He explained that psychological problems required simultaneous consideration of the West Germans and the French. Blank wanted to know the strength and organization which the Allies considered for the FRG contingent. This request was logical except that, in accordance with the Brussels agreement, the High Commission was not authorized to provide this information. The High Commission's task was to reach an agreement with the FRG on technical matters, and since there appeared to be an impasse, nothing remained but to request new proposals from the Germans. 18

The Soviets continued their propaganda campaign. On 21 January 1951, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyschinskiy denounced NATO and the New York Foreign Ministers' Conference of September 1950. 19 The Soviets portrayed General Eisenhower's visit to Western Europe, which he made upon his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, (SACEUR) in early 1951, as evidence of a United States'...
desire to turn Europe into an armed camp. Moreover, they denounced Truman and the United States for exploiting Western Europe.\textsuperscript{20}

While he was in the FRG, Eisenhower agreed that the issues affecting equality had to be settled before recruiting German troops.\textsuperscript{21} Blank insisted that the mass conviction of German soldiers at Nuremberg had to be set aside before the German people would agree to a military contribution. Eisenhower conferred on this subject with Adenauer, Blank, Heusinger, Speidel, and SPD representative Erich Ollenhauer, and on 23 January 1951 signed a statement in which he recognized that the German soldier had fought for his home bravely and respectably. Eisenhower also apologized for his previous view that the Wehrmacht, especially its officer corps, had been identical with Hitler and the Nazis.\textsuperscript{22}

To preempt acceptance of the Spofford Plan, on 24 January 1951 the French government invited the European NATO

\textsuperscript{20} Le Monde, 7/8 Jan. 1951; Pravda, 12 Jan. 1951; Truman, \textit{Years of Trial and Hope}, 258.

\textsuperscript{21} Speidel, \textit{Aus unserer Zeit}, 290.

states to a conference in Paris for 6 February 1951. The French asked the United States and Canada to send observers. On 26 January 1951 Bérard, in a press conference at Bad Godesberg, promised equality for the FRG, representation in all common institutions, and equal application of regulations, but he stressed that the FRG must not become a member of NATO.

The French government implied that the United States agreed with their proposal. In response on 27 January 1951, Acheson sent a note to Schuman describing the Pleven Plan as a step toward European cooperation; but, he added, the United States supported European integration, not the French-inspired plan for a European army. The United States, in the spirit of the Schuman Plan, would accept a form of FRG rearmament suitable to France if other concerned

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25Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 444-446.

26Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 410-411.
nations wanted it.\textsuperscript{27} Any apparent United States’ sympathy for the French project was a mere courtesy.\textsuperscript{28} Blank complained of not being informed about the Brussels agreement.\textsuperscript{29} Urgency at the Petersberg implied that Western views were contrary to those of the FRG. Hence, the FRG delegation decided to state comprehensively its views and sought to discuss the political aspects of the military issue fixed in Brussels. Thus, there began an exchange of political ideas over the form of the FRG contingent. This discussion not only placed the Brussels agreement in question, it threatened to delay the creation of FRG units. Accordingly, the Himmeroder Denkschrift became the basis for talks between the FRG and the West.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27}The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 27 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 759-760.

\textsuperscript{28}New York Times, 6 Feb. 1951, sec. 1, 5.

\textsuperscript{29}The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 10 February 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1013-1014.

the Deputy High Commissioners finally gave a hypothetical figure of 250,000 men. The problem was that the High Commissioners could not agree on how much of the Brussels agreement to show the Germans, but on 27 February 1951 they gave a partial list of thirty-nine points.31

Acting on available information, the Amt Blank composed requests for nationally homogeneous, independent, operational units: German divisions. The Germans argued that division commanders constituted a better basis than regimental commanders for FRG participation in international command and staffs. It was essential that commanders of operationally independent divisions and German staff officers come into contact early with the NATO leadership to coordinate the integration of FRG units into strategic plans. The Germans also wanted an FRG corps as command headquarters for their divisions and special troops.32

No one expected the FRG to agree to a European army in the absence of details, and the Germans showed little enthusiasm for the French view. Schumacher, showing skepticism at a press conference in Heidelberg on 28 January 1951, voiced no objection to the Paris conference because he did not consider the proceedings to be binding; however, the

31Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 399, 406-407.
32Ibid., 407.
Pleven Plan had to be surmounted before the SPD would agree to a defense contribution.33

In late January 1951 Pleven went to Washington where he found a friendly attitude toward France.34 Truman announced agreement in principle with the French European army project.35 In a joint communiqué of 31 January 1951 Truman expressed the hope that the European army conference in Paris would succeed.36 Both men expressed the view that an FRG contribution would enhance European security.37

After Pleven's departure from Washington on 31 January 1951, Eisenhower reported on his European trip to Truman and the following day to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. He said there must be political and military agreement on equality before incorporating FRG units into an army. As SACEUR he wanted no unwilling contingent and no mercenaries under his command. Eisenhower considered FRG troops essential to NATO defense and rejected

33Ibid., 416.


35Le Monde, 1 Feb. 1951.


the French project as militarily useless. He wanted West Europeans in a reasonable time to take over their own defense and make United States' troops in Europe unnecessary.38 Following closely Eisenhower's actions, the Soviets sent a note to the West on 5 February 1951 requesting a meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council on FRG rearmament.39 On 17 February 1951, Stalin claimed that the Soviet Union demobilized part of its forces three times after World War II, that the Western Allies wanted war, and that the war in Korea would end in defeat of their internationalism.40

The FRG was pleased that the United States recognized the necessity for equality, but feared that postponement would permit France to promote the Pleven Plan. The French misrepresented the United States' position as support for the Pleven Plan; the inflexible attitude of the High Commission at the Petersberg gave credence to this view. Thus, the Germans were relieved when United States State Department officials George Perkins and Henry Byroade told them that the United States considered the FRG contribution


39Le Monde, 8 Feb. 1951.

40Pravda, 17 Feb. 1951.

The French postponed the Paris Conference to 15 February 1951.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 3 Feb. 1951, sec. 1, 4.} Of the nations invited to participate, only the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg accepted. Other NATO states sent observers. The prospective EDC states were to work out specific proposals in Paris on the basis of the Pleven Plan.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 11 Feb. 1951, sec. 1, 20.} Progress was slower than expected, and the French proposal reached the Prime Minister on 13 February 1951. After revision, it was delivered to the conference delegates on 15 February 1951.\footnote{Moch, \textit{Histoire du Rèarmement}, 269.} Adenauer received the text of the Pleven Plan on 16 February 1951.\footnote{\textit{Times}, 17 Feb. 1951, 5.} Under this plan the European army was to fuse all human and material elements of European defense under central military and political authorities.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 15 Feb. 1951, sec. 1, 5; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 15 February 1951, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question}, Part 1, 767-768.} In opening the Paris negotiations, Schuman explained the European army as a step
toward a united Europe, but it was not to delay or limit NATO planning or command authority.47

In contrast to the Petersberg talks, delegates to the Paris Conference had official status. At Paris, the leader of the German delegation was State Secretary Walter Hallstein.48 The FRG delegation included Amt Blank Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich de Mazière, legal expert Professor C. F. Ophüls and Ministerial Counsellor Friedrich-Karl Vialon from the Finance Ministry. Ambassador Albrecht von Kessel established liaison with the FRG delegates in Paris.49 Ambassador Hervé Alphand, General Edgard de Larminat, General Paul Stehlin, and legal expert Lucien-Hubert represented France. Deputy Emilion Taviani led the Italian delegation with Minister Leonardo Viletti, Colonel Turrini, and Marquis Alberto Rossi Longhi from the Foreign Office. Ambassador Baron Hervé de Grubin and Major General Orphée-Louis Gierst represented Belgium. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Joseph Bech occasionally participated in the negotiations with Colonels Jacobi and Hommel.50 Non-participating NATO states (United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Portugal) sent their

47Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 269-270.
48Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 446.
49Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 290-291; Fischer, Verteidigung, 37; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 420-421.
50Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 292.
ambassadors as observers. Alphand was presiding officer.

With the French memorandum emanating from the Brussels decision as a basis for negotiations, the first business at Paris was the authorization and organization of primary institutions: a defense authority, a parliamentary assembly, and a court of justice in common with the Coal and Steel Community. A common budget would provide funds for defense. In an eighteen month transition phase differences would be negotiated until appropriate agreements fixed equal treatment for all national contingents. Restrictions would be placed on the FRG, which had no national troops. During the transition phase a European defense commissioner would control troops allotted to the European army. Since there was no FRG army, the immediate task in Germany would be recruitment and establishment of units. The French memorandum specified that FRG units were to be formed and armed by occupation forces within the FRG.


The Pleven plan proposed three phases. The Occupation Statute would be valid during the first phase, and it appeared that a Frenchman would be European defense commissioner. During the second phase, authority of the European high commission would extend over national contingents and assume recruitment, administration, establishment, maintenance, and inspection of troops. Basic national units would be combat groups of five thousand to six thousand men. The final phase would combine three combat groups from different nations into a multi-national division. Multi-national tactical air units would follow a similar procedure.54

In contrast to this plan, which was political, military opinion in all nations, including France, held that a division composed of combat groups of different nationalities was unsuitable. The political leadership of the other NATO states was not inclined to sacrifice military effectiveness to French security demands against the Germans. Accordingly, the French proposals found little support.55

The French memorandum contradicted FRG interests. Participants were to agree first on the political structure


and then on military measures. Should the FRG agree to the political structure, it thereby accepted the French proposal including the defense commissioner's authority. Once the mechanism for a European authority was in place, France could attain its goal of an FRG defense contribution under supra-national control without FRG consent. Consequently, before the FRG would comment on the French plan, it wanted clarification and details on the status of the FRG in the European organization.\textsuperscript{56}

In Paris the Germans reacted to the French attitude. Hallstein withdrew from the Paris Conference at the end of February 1951 and induced Adenauer to appoint Conrad Roediger to lead the FRG delegation. On 22 February 1951 the delegates formed a Steering Committee of the chief delegates, which meant that Roediger, and later Blank, was a member of that committee. This committee was responsible for the agenda of the technical committees. The success of the Paris Conference depended on agreement between France and the FRG. The Germans had little interest in the French plan, but they had instructions not to jeopardize the Petersberg talks by a controversy in Paris. Thus, the FRG could not refuse the French memorandum entirely.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56}Wettig, \textit{Entmilitärisierung}, 419-420.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 420-421; Adenauer, \textit{Erinnerungen}, 1945-1953, 454; Fischer, \textit{Verteidigung}, 37.
The Germans saw discrimination in the occupation status, the origin of which was the Four-Power declaration of 5 June 1945. Negotiations for revision of the Occupation Statute had been on-going since September 1950. Because of the Occupation Statute, the FRG could not conduct foreign policy. The first revision of the Occupation Statute on 6 March 1951 gave the FRG competence in foreign policy, and the FRG foreign office was created on 15 March 1951 with Adenauer as Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{58}

In Paris the French sought first to settle the political issue; they stood unconditionally for control of the FRG contingent during the transition phase. On 7 March 1951 the French delegation presented a draft agreement on the European defense organization. The Germans fought back, and on 8 March 1951 FRG delegates used German experience against Russia to illustrate the military weakness of the French plan: combat groups in nationally mixed divisions had no military effectiveness. Although the FRG wanted to cooperate, it could not participate in a defense

\textsuperscript{58}Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 458-459; Fischer, Verteidigung, 35; Acheson, Present, 552; Times, 7 Mar. 1951, 4; Oppen, "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic," Documents on Germany, 29-35.
organization, the military objectives of which were not defined.\textsuperscript{59}

The United States did not want negotiations at the Petersberg. It wanted concise talks in which the Germans answered "yes" or "no"; the NATO command would determine details later. On the contrary, the Germans wanted details. Bérard supported the United States' goals but wanted smaller FRG units. Blank insisted that organization, size of initial cadre, disposition and distribution of funds, and disposition of the armed forces had to be considered from the first planning stage to the final result. Otherwise, there would be delays and a qualitative degradation through changes. Blank asserted constantly that the Petersberg talks were about a German NATO contingent and not the French European army. The Deputy High Commissioners had explained previously that German units in NATO would not be difficult to train, and Blank made this point to Bérard.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59}The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 772-774; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1951, ibid., 774-778; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1951, ibid., 778-779; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 422-423.

\textsuperscript{60}The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 17 February 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1016-1020; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 412-413.
The Germans wanted an explanation of the combat group, combat team, or groupement de combat. A United States' Army officer permitted the Germans to use a United States' manual describing the regimental combat team (RCT). The French government, which sought to withhold such documents from the Germans, made a diplomatic protest to Washington. FRG organizational expert Kurt Fett learned that the United States' concept of a combat group was an operationally independent unit tailored for situations outside Europe. On the other hand, the French understood a combat group as a regiment capable of receiving reinforcements, and was a dependent, operational unit equivalent to about one-third of a division. The Germans accepted the United States' RCT, and the combat group which Speidel proposed to the Deputy High Commissioners in March 1951, in fact, was a reduced strength division. Speidel explained it as an operational unit with mixed weapons and tactical air support composed of troops from different nationalities, but it could not be efficient because of language and logistics differences.61

In Paris the French rejected the FRG view. Alphand said there was no object in further discussion and demanded

61 New York Times, 16 Mar. 1951, sec. 1, 5; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 413-414; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 27 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 996-1001; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 2 March 1951, ibid., 1022-1025.
FRG agreement with the French if negotiations were to continue. De Mazière conceded several points on integration at corps level with the division as the basic national unit, but the French wanted to consider the integration level as a political matter. The delegates avoided a breakdown of the conference and continued discussion of the subject. A subcommittee was formed for discussion of military units with de Larminat chairman and de Mazière and delegates from other states as observers. They met first on 16 March 1951.62

Roediger repeatedly opposed discrimination. The Germans pointed out that the transition phase would damage the principle of military equality, since only Germans could recruit Germans. The French delegation finally modified its proposal by giving the FRG administrative authority under the European defense commissioner to establish FRG contingents.63

Further work of the Paris Conference took place in subcommittees by deputies. The FRG delegates cooperated to prepare technical details for the defense organization. Other delegates found German experience against Russia valuable. In cases where the Germans deviated from the

62 The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 774-778; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1951, ibid., 778-779; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 423.

63 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 423-424.
French view, there was support from other nations for the FRG view. Progress in the spring of 1951 was due largely to German cooperation, which inspired confidence in the other delegates. After the signing of the European Coal and Steel Agreement in mid-April 1951, suspicion decreased and communications between German and French delegates improved.64

Blank's work at the Petersberg became the basis for the FRG position in Paris, and he had to organize the Amt Blank while performing his functional responsibilities. The Amt Blank initially occupied a red brick building in the Ermekeil Barracks on Argelander Strasse in Bonn. The organization changed dramatically during this time. When the Paris Conference began in February 1951, in addition to Speidel, Heusinger, and Kielmansegg, there were five former soldiers, two of whom served for information and defense. Bussche handled public relations and a fourth served as interpreter. Fett was the fifth under an advisory contract for planning the Bundeswehr. The slow increase in military personnel in 1951 was not due to an absence of planning positions; it was because initial concepts had to be

64Ibid., 424-425; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 273; Le Monde, 19 Apr. 1951.
Fig. 1—Amt Blank organization, April 1951
developed by small groups of planners before a large number of participants could engage in detailed planning.65

The Beamter Ernst Wirmer controlled the Central Administrative and Personnel Division during its entire existence (See Figure 1).66 In April 1951 Subdivision I, Planning, of the Military Division had three major sections: G-1 for Personnel, G-3 for Leadership, and G-4 for Supply, plus experts on the army, navy, and air force. Basic military plans pertained to the Paris Conference, Information and Communications, and Public Relations. Six experts made plans for an increase in personnel, processing, and guidance. Further planning included formation, organizational structure of the army, the armed forces component, leadership, standardization, assimilation into the Allied force structure, and innere Führung (spiritual structure). Finally, there were applications, reception, and enlistment regulations, replacements, transportation, and supply.67

From the foundation of the Amt Blank until May 1951, Kielmansegg was Blank's primary assistant, and in a sense


67Fischer, Verteidigung, 58-59.
Blank's chief of staff. He was involved with all matters concerning negotiations, initial planning, and presentations before parliament and the public. In his subdivision were three to five people during this period. There were two sections. One was for military matters, military political matters, guidance for the Paris delegation, talks with the Allied delegation in Bonn, information to parliament, and evaluation of political decisions. Fett led the second section initially and had a planning activity for Speidel in Paris where he went frequently. Kielmansegg was a member of the delegation and also went to Paris, but not as frequently as Fett. Kielmansegg was always present when Blank was in Paris, but Blank was in Paris only for the main sessions. These offices constituted the military components of the Amt Blank from 1951 until the conversion into the Defense Ministry in 1955, and they became larger with more people and more subdivisions. On 8 May 1951 Major Wolf Baudissin became state Referent in the Amt Blank. His primary area of interest was innere Führung.

The FRG delegation presented their proposal at the Petersberg from the end of January to mid-April 1951.

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69 Fischer, Verteidigung, 54.
70 Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 450-459; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 407-408.
There were three military and political points. The first was an FRG contingent in nationally homogeneous corps designated as "territorial command administrative authorities." To avoid friction, the Germans asserted that operational units with all weapons types must exist permanently, dedicated to mutual coordination in language, mentality, and customs. On the same basis the Germans demanded air defense, reserve, and logistics units and a tactical air force. These forces were to be subordinate to the national "territorial command administrative authority," which would comprise two divisions. The second point was armament, the basis of which was experience from the Russian campaign plus their current knowledge of the Soviet Army. Tank units would be the nucleus of the FRG force. Infantry, artillery, and a tactical air force would be attached to the main units. The third point was an FRG defense ministry to

71Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 287; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1039-1043.

72The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 2 March 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1022-1025.

73Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 287; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 407-408; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 27 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 996-1001.
control and administer the armed forces.\textsuperscript{74} Blank asserted that the democratic structure of the FRG would permit no other administrative head because only through a parliamentary responsible ministry could the Bundestag supervise defense matters.\textsuperscript{75} This argument met little opposition.

The FRG proposals contradicted the Brussels agreement on all three points. Since the Deputy High Commissioners were not authorized to approve the FRG program, no concrete conclusion of the Petersberg talks was possible, a situation the Germans did not understand. Although no immediate results appeared likely, the United States wanted to continue the talks because it was essential and politically useful to become acquainted with FRG views. At this time, the French delegates considered it necessary to show the Germans the Brussels agreement. The Germans, however, were not ready to relinquish their demands, especially equality, and they did not believe their demands would impede agreement.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74}The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 7 April 1951, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1}, 1032-1035.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.; The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 17 January 1951, ibid., 993-996.

\textsuperscript{76}The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 7 April 1951, ibid., 1032-1035; Wettig, \textit{Entmilitarisierung}, 408-409.
Inasmuch as the Germans sought to give the French proof of good will, they agreed to renounce, without being asked, all FRG weapons production as assurance that the FRG would not launch a war. These voluntary concessions did not change the French course, and from the end of January 1951 there were times when the talks made no satisfactory progress. Because the Germans did not recognize that their demands exceeded the competence granted the High Commission at the Brussels Conference, they believed the stagnation due to Western disagreement. Nevertheless, the FRG-Allied exchange of ideas at the Petersberg was continuous.77

At the end of April 1951 FRG delegates at the Petersberg restated their views on the modality of the defense contribution, but there were still problems: the Germans had neither learned which units the West wanted to employ in Europe nor received assurance on management of FRG units with regard to formation, rearmament, and leadership. The Germans wanted information on Western troop strength, NATO strategic planning, and military tasks assigned to the FRG.78

In the meantime, the FRG was gaining international acceptance. On 2 May 1951 the FRG became a full member of

77Ibid.
78Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 426.
the Council of Europe. Parallel to the Petersberg talks and Paris negotiations, on 10 May 1951 in Bonn the High Commission and the FRG began discussing the political status of the FRG, but inter-Allied differences limited deliberations to exploratory conversations. Hallstein was officially in charge of the FRG delegates, but he participated only in the opening session. Professor Wilhelm Grewe was actually leader of the FRG group. It was necessary to establish political objectives, and on FRG demand several changes ensued: a military contribution with specified rights for Allied troops on German soil, adjustment of German security costs, and transformation of the High Commission into an ambassadorial conference with the FRG receiving its sovereignty. The Allies argued that they governed by the 5 June 1945 Allied agreement, but Adenauer was more interested in Western rights vis-a-vis the Soviets. The Occupation Statute permitted the Western Allies to assume unlimited power in Germany any time they deemed necessary. The West appeared ready in an emergency to reduce this right, but conceded no formula that undermined basic Allied authority. They agreed that, in the event of war, control over key

79Le Monde, 3 May 1951; Times, 3 May 1951, 3.
military positions and civil order in the FRG were necessary to give Western armed forces freedom of action. 80

At the Petersberg the Germans encountered Western opposition to their three military conditions. In mid-May 1951 Blank learned that the Allies still opposed an FRG defense minister. The Allies wanted a loosely defined international control over FRG military authority. Blank would concur only if the other nations were also under this control. The Deputy High Commissioners renewed their veto of an FRG general staff, even though not demanded by the FRG. Therewith NATO strategic planning would be withheld from the FRG, but Blank made FRG agreement contingent upon representation in international staffs. The High Commission considered this condition but made no promise. 81

The Deputy High Commissioners sent a report to their governments on FRG staff participation, but did not tell the Germans. Blank was adamant that the Germans have the

80 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 291; Le Monde, 28/29 Oct. 1951; Le Monde, 3 Nov. 1951; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 443-444, 478-479; Oppen, "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic," 5 June 1945, Documents on Germany, 29-35.

81 The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1039-1043; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1951, ibid., 1037; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 426.
opportunity to express their opinion. Allied delegates replied that this was not a mutual FRG-Allied view requiring German agreement. Blank objected that agreement was necessary to support the Chancellor and High Commission in future negotiations. Since Blank insisted that he scrutinize the Allied report, there was finally agreement to work out an acceptable text on disputed points. To the Germans, the revised report appeared to reflect Bérard's ideas on the European army; combat groups, accepted by Blank on request of the Deputy High Commissioners, were no longer reduced divisions but were tactically dependent units. Politically accentuated transitions appeared: control over a dependent FRG military authority and omission of FRG equality in all detailed topics. The report gave a false impression of German readiness to cooperate. On 18 May 1951 Blank inquired about Allied control of FRG administration, stating that if it were the same as NATO control it would be acceptable. Blank also said that he, not his deputies, would review the report and make comments or changes.\(^2\)

To preserve German credibility, it was important to correct discrepancies in the Petersberg report, of which the Germans dealt with over one hundred. The FRG-Allied

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\(^2\)The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 1039-1043; Wettig, Ent-militarisierung, 426-427.
editorial review was complete on 4 June 1951. The Germans explained their views convincingly to United States' and British colleagues, and sub rosa United States' support of the FRG view irritated the French. Blank insisted that a German signature appear on the document to give the Petersberg talks a formal international character and thereby raise their value vis-a-vis the Paris negotiations. After long debate the delegates agreed that a German signature might appear on an appendix. To maintain rapport with the Western Allies, Adenauer and his advisors considered it appropriate to agree to the report in toto, but sign it as an interim report.83

The Petersberg memorandum explained the FRG proposal. The report stated that, based on the NATO directive from Brussels, the participants reached a dead point on which they could not agree; however, the High Commission made no recommendations. During the first half of June 1951 the report went to the three governments enroute to the NAC. Since the FRG demand for equality came from the NAC alternatives of a NATO contingent or a European army, only the NAC could consider an appropriate solution to the dilemma. Inasmuch as the FRG was not knowledgeable of the NATO decisions of late fall 1950, Adenauer and his advisors saw

83Fischer, Verteidigung, 36-37; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 427-428.
the Petersberg memorandum as a step toward a NATO military contribution with equality.  

Enroute to Washington in early June 1951 with the Petersberg memorandum, McCloy stopped in Paris to visit Eisenhower whom he asked to exchange ideas with Jean Monnet. Previously, French diplomats had tried to convince Eisenhower that a supra-national European army was the best solution, since this was the only form under which France would agree to an FRG military contribution without unacceptable restrictions on the FRG.

German confidence increased in the belief that the United States supported FRG proposals. Informal promises convinced the Germans that McCloy sanctioned FRG concepts and would recommend them to the United States government. While United States and British delegates found the FRG proposals reasonable or debatable, the French feared other states would agree with the FRG. On suggestion of David Bruce, the United States observer at the Paris negotiations and a proponent of the EDC, French diplomats became active at the Paris conference at the beginning of June 1951 to counteract such a development. Heretofore, the French were in no hurry to establish a European army, but now the French were intent on an early agreement. Alphand shifted the

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85 Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 433.
action from the sub-committee, which discussed details, to
the Steering Committee and the plenum which discussed
political issues. He suggested the Paris Conference make an
interim report on the French project with the goal of
opposing the Petersberg report. 86

The FRG delegation was inadequately informed on the
changing political situation. The Germans sought an under-
standing of the new situation, but without good information,
they could not recognize which path they were taking and
warned the FRG Government of the danger in delay. Following
the Petersberg success, the FRG considered the Paris con-
ference less important than previously and therefore paid
little regard to the French change of course. The French
desire to reach an early agreement appeared to the FRG as an
opportunity to induce concessions from the French. On this
basis the FRG delegates in Paris prepared an interim report
explaining the FRG position. 87

Since March 1951 it had been clear that no alternative
considered by the NAC in Brussels could succeed. FRG
proposals at the Petersberg contradicted the Brussels
decision of December 1950, and it appeared unlikely that the
French would agree to revision of the Brussels agreement.

86Ibid., 429-430; The United States High Commissioner
for Germany to the Secretary of State, 4 June 1951, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security
and the German Question, Part 1, 785-786.

87Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 430-431.
In Paris the French considered FRG demands for operationally independent units unacceptable, and the twelve German divisions proposed at the Petersberg appeared excessive since that number would presumably exceed one-fifth the common force figure of the Brussels agreement. Nevertheless, the FRG and the other three national delegates were not reconciled to a French revision.88

As chief of a coalition army in which coordination between nations caused constant difficulty, Eisenhower was satisfied with the merits of a supra-national armed force. Thus, Eisenhower supported the European army, and in mid-June 1951 he sent a telegram to Secretary of Defense Marshall recommending it as the only achievable, useful solution. United States' leaders believed that Eisenhower knew if the European army was militarily sensible; they also believed that he correctly assessed the political situation. Considering the successful implementation of the Schuman Plan one year previously, United States' leaders concurred with Eisenhower and at the end of June 1951 announced support of a supra-national European army. Accordingly,  

Alphand revised the French position at the Paris Conference. 89

The FRG delegates wanted differences to appear clearly; otherwise, French proposals could appear unconditionally accepted. Therefore, the Germans emphasized that FRG participation in a European army required recognition of FRG equality, cessation of discrimination, and a militarily effective organization. When a French representative submitted a draft claiming unity on many contested points, Roediger on 22 June 1951 pointed out that the German view had to be unquestionably clear in the report if the FRG delegation were to concur. An FRG counter-proposal, non-discriminating and assuming equality, followed the French draft. Alphand showed French willingness, if necessary, to renounce organizational discrimination against the FRG, and on 26 June 1951 the French delegation proposed another version incorporating the FRG views. 90

On 27 June 1951 the French cabinet again resolved to pursue a supra-national European army and to resist the NATO solution. On 29 June 1951 Alphand explained that European


90 Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 273-274; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 430-431, 435; The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 23 June 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 798-800.
defense would be achieved on the basis of a European army with military elements of each nation integrated at the lowest level compatible with military necessity. Since French policy opposed direct participation of the FRG in NATO, FRG participation would be in a denationalized European army under European authorities.91

The Germans were disappointed when on 2 July 1951 McCloy said that the United States wanted to combine the FRG proposal and the French project. Even so, on 3 July 1951 Alphand submitted an amended version containing the German ideas.92 On 4 July 1951 McCloy invited Blank, Heusinger, and Speidel to a reception at Bad Homberg, where he explained that because of French opposition, acceptance of the Petersberg solution was uncertain, and he advised the Germans to reach an agreement with the French on the basis of a European army.93 Blank, reacting vigorously, said the Pleven Plan was not open for discussion and the Germans would not participate on that basis.94


94 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 293.
McCloy informed Adenauer that the United States supported the European army and that United States' military men, skeptical of the French proposal, sought an effective military organization. Adenauer replied that in his view the West had to act quickly to prevent the attainment of a neutralized Germany, which would be a major Soviet success. 95 Accordingly, Adenauer designated the Petersberg proposal as the priority project since European troops were necessary should the United States withdraw from Europe. Adenauer had already proposed relinquishing FRG reservations on the Paris Conference, but expressed doubt that France would agree to the Petersberg proposal. He told McCloy that the Allies had to make greater concessions to German public opinion if they wanted an FRG military contribution. 96

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In view of the perceived Eastern threat, during the first half of 1951, the Western Allies and West Germans began searching for a solution to the problem of bringing the FRG into the Western alliance and incorporating German troops into Western defense. This was not easy because of national animosities, the East-West conflict, and postwar regulation of a defeated Germany. Nevertheless, the agreements reached by the West at New York in September 1950

95 Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 437-438.
and at Brussels in December 1950 began to form the basis for a solution in early 1951.

One of the major problems in rearming the Germans was the absence of agreement among the Western allies. Inasmuch as the Germans had to agree to the solution, it was essential that they participate in negotiating sessions on this subject. Accordingly, negotiations began on two parallel paths in early 1951. At the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, members of the Amt Blank met with the High Commission to resolve technical details. The Petersberg talks evolved into more than a discussion of technical matters; the result was the Petersberg memorandum which presented the German view of FRG rearmament. The French rejected the Petersberg solution.

Simultaneously with the Petersberg talks, the Paris negotiations on the Pleven Plan, or European army solution (EDC), began on the political level. Members of the Amt Blank participated in this conference as technical experts during the first half of 1951. German success at the Petersberg alarmed the French, who in June 1951 began to concentrate on convincing other delegates of the merits of the French plan. The French were handicapped in this endeavor because international military authorities viewed the Pleven Plan as unsatisfactory. In consideration of the French uncertainty in international affairs, the Pleven Plan and the Schuman Plan were major advances in post-war French
diplomacy; however, the French solution was designed to produce delay and keep the FRG in a subordinate position.

Talks at the Petersberg were complete in June 1951; however, the task at the Paris Conference was in its early stages. With the French placing increased emphasis on their effort in Paris, it was essential that the Germans do the same. Accordingly, in early July 1951, the German negotiating effort in Paris received increased emphasis and a new cast of participants.
Adenauer considered it necessary to place greater importance on the Paris Conference.\(^1\) Thus, on 6 July 1951, he appointed Blank to head the FRG delegation and sent him and Fett to Paris with instructions which remained constant in the negotiations on the interim report and insured that the demand for equality would continue in importance.\(^2\)

Since the appointment made Blank a member of the Steering Committee, United States' and FRG officials hoped Blank's presence would hasten the work on the EDC Treaty.\(^3\)

When Blank assumed leadership of the FRG delegation, the Allies did not agree on how to accomplish rearmament. Accordingly, they held several conferences during the period July 1951 to May 1952, the most significant of which were in Washington, Rome, Paris, and Lisbon. Based on Allied decisions at these conferences, Blank's efforts contributed

\(^{1}\)Fett, "Grundlagen," Militärgeschichte, 177-178; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 6 July 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 2, 1487-1489.

\(^{2}\)Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 293.

\(^{3}\)Le Monde, 10 Jul. 1951.
immeasurably to the EDC Treaty, which the principals signed in late May 1952.

Blank, Speidel, and Kielmansegg arrived with the FRG delegation at the Hotel d'Orsay in Paris, Monday, 9 July 1951. In the afternoon, delegates held a meeting at which Blank examined changes to the interim report. Alphand received Blank at 1800 hours. Blank's objective was integration of the Petersberg Plan with the Pleven Plan.

The continental countries expected British participation in the EDC, but Britain wanted no bond with a supra-national Europe. The Benelux countries, fearing that the large countries would ignore them, opposed the Pleven Plan and hoped the British would join the EDC when the supra-national element lost importance. The French wanted British participation to prevent a resurrection of German military power but would not relinquish supra-nationality. The speech by Churchill in August 1950 in Strassburg produced the erroneous belief that British conservatives supported a supra-national European army, and the French believed that the Pleven Plan derived from Churchill's initiative. Thus, French disappointment was great when at the end of November 1951 the British announced that they did not plan to participate in the EDC. At this point, the FRG

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could have let the project fail on French inflexibility; however, the Germans supported the EDC on the assumption of equality.6

In the negotiations on the interim report, begun on 9 July 1951 in the Steering Committee and on 10 July 1951 in the plenum, the Germans pursued two objectives: non-compromise of their goals and a guarantee of equality beginning in the transition phase. Blank recognized the second objective as the major point and concentrated his attack on the French formula "difference of facts," which expressed French opposition. The French quickly made concessions but resisted equality in the transition phase. Blank asserted that attainment of an FRG parliamentary majority supporting the EDC depended upon the military and political conditions. In Blank's view, it was legally impossible for the FRG to ratify an agreement when it was not a sovereign state.7

The FRG had support of and opposition to the interim report at Paris. Italian, Belgian, and Luxembourg delegates welcomed FRG demands for equality as a means of preventing French hegemony in a European army. The Dutch opposed a

6Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 455-456; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 37-40.

7The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 11 July 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 824-826; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 438-439.
European army from fear of both French leadership and German domination.® In Paris at the tenth plenary session, Blank again expressed FRG demands: a unified command at army level with national corps and a defense minister. The goal of this session was to compose the final draft of the interim report.⁹

The interim report of 24 July 1951 dealt with the integration of armed forces under a supra-national authority, non-discrimination, a defense budget, and European institutions.¹⁰ Participating nations would receive consideration which the original French proposal had reserved for states with existing armies; national organs would function during the transition phase. Hence, the FRG could establish a central administrative office, but there was no agreement on the EDC control agency. There was still

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controversy over the basic national unit: tactically dependent or independent combat groups.11

The main controversy was over the composition of the basic operational unit, the division. International military judgment supported national homogeneity, and the United States wanted a solution that would be both politically acceptable and militarily reasonable. In early July 1951 McCloy stated that the Petersberg Plan would be incorporated into the Pleven Plan, and he accepted FRG suggestions as a basis for discussion. The United States' observers sought to mediate opposing views and told the French they must not refuse a militarily suitable solution. At the time the interim report was completed, the United States showed a political interest in a European army, whereupon Eisenhower appointed General John Michaelis as his representative to the Paris Conference.12

The conference worked through the problem of the basic national unit. Even though the delegates did not work well together during deliberations on the interim report, they labored from 24 July 1951 to early fall 1951 during the official summer recess. Informal conversations revealed

that the French were no longer insistent on the combat group as the basic national unit. Apparently in August 1951 the parties agreed to discuss the question as a military matter and relinquish the decision to the NATO commander. Michaelis, whom Eisenhower deputized to study the problem, formulated the concept of a combat group structurally resembling a division and equal in strength to one-third of a United States' division, essentially conforming to the Petersberg Plan. The French accepted an integrated FRG division under European command in a supra-national army; their purpose was to avoid national FRG rearmament.13

Adenauer persisted in his goal of sovereignty. On 1 August 1951 he summoned some of his closest advisors (Hallstein, Blankenhorn, Rust, Grewe, Blank, Kielmansegg) to a conference at his vacation spot on the Bürgenstock. There they agreed to take as a basis for negotiations the concept of an FRG-Allied security contribution set forth initially by Adenauer in November 1950 and to establish the principle of voluntary, equal partnership between the FRG and the Western Allies. Adenauer informally informed the High Commissioners of these thoughts.14 Supporting FRG equality, on

13Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 441-443.

14Ibid., 445-446; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 294.
19 August 1951 Eisenhower told Heusinger and Speidel that he would tolerate no prejudice against the FRG contingent.15

After the French conceded on the division issue, they demanded from the Germans unequivocal acceptance of the European army (EDC). At the end of August 1951 Adenauer and his advisors resolved to accept the EDC, and after the most important FRG demands were met, Adenauer willingly carried out this change. A difficulty followed in that some NATO members, especially the United States, believed that the French might make the European army independent of NATO. At the time, this question did not appear important, and it was not discussed much in the summer of 1951. Although events since the summer of 1951 made the EDC option necessary, Adenauer and his advisors did not forget the goal of FRG membership in NATO, and on the basis of the Petersberg talks, made assumptions for NATO membership. In opposition, the SPD criticized the European army solution.16

On 8 September 1951 the group working on revision of the Occupation Statute reached an agreement: FRG independence, replacement of the High Commission with an ambassadorial council, and transition of occupation troops

15 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 294-295.

Fig. 2—Amt Blank organization, 15 September 1951
to defense forces. They agreed for the Germans to decide if the FRG could meet occupation costs.17

By September 1951, the Amt Blank consisted of two divisions with three subdivisions each (See Figure 2); civilians managed both divisions. Of the six subdivision leaders, only Kielmansegg and Fett were former soldiers.18 Colonel Bogislav von Bonin joined the Amt Blank in June 1952 as Chief of the Planning Staff in Bonn. He became the chief Bonn planner because Fett could not do the jobs in both Paris and Bonn, and he had decided to go to Paris.19

At Paris in the summer of 1951 the EDC delegates expanded the Military Committee to an Integrated Planning Group as the core for future military control. Left and right wing political circles in France opposed participation of German officers in this group even though Alphand agreed that the FRG should participate in EDC leadership from the beginning. The French argued that because German officers had performed no military service for over six years they could not judge the military requirements. Consequently, Blank delayed the scheduled 12 September 1951 departure of FRG delegates to Paris. The French offered a compromise under which the planning group would include the

17Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 445-446.
Germans but would meet inconspicuously in the outskirts of Paris or Brussels. Blank opposed this idea; it mattered to him that FRG equality be recognized publicly.²⁰ He also ordered de Maizière's liaison group in Paris to return to Bonn. In Paris with no FRG delegates, negotiations would stagnate, and the French were afraid that the Petersberg Plan would again become prominent should the FRG reject the European army and the United States and Britain adopt the German view. Finally, the French resolved to invite the Germans without reservation, and the FRG delegation arrived in Paris on 1 October 1951. The immediate goal in Paris was to prepare a plan for the NAC meeting in Rome in November 1951. French General de Larminat was chairman of the Integrated Planning Group and Fett was chairman of the Coordination Committee.²¹

The French emphasized the supra-national, integrated character of the FRG defense contribution.²² Officially, they considered the level of integration to be a technical matter with no political relevance, but they objected to the division as the basic national unit. Speidel, certain of


²²Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 301.
United States' support, declared the nationally homogeneous division to be the basis for negotiations. Since NATO Headquarters had decided that a division-like organization would be the basic element, it would be a combat group, or a division one-third smaller than a United States' division.23

After their conference in Washington, the three foreign ministers on 14 September 1951 issued a statement expressing the goal to integrate a democratic Germany into a European community and NATO.24 They praised the Schuman plan as a contribution to a European defense organization and favored replacing the Occupation Statute with a contractual relationship between the FRG and the Western Allies.25 An appended communiqué foretold negotiations between the High Commission and the FRG for a new agreement on FRG-Allied relations including FRG participation in Western defense. The military contribution was to be organized within the EDC and NATO with the FRG having political equality.26 The West would retain special rights on the stationing of troops as


24New York Times, 15 Sept. 1951, sec. 1, 1, 3; Fischer, Verteidigung, 35.


26Times, 15 Sept. 1951, 4.
well as on the Germany and Berlin issues. In the declaration of 14 September 1951, the foreign ministers supported the French plan for the European army, but only under pressure from the United States did the British offer their support of the European defense organization.

On 16 September 1951 Schumacher said German democracy would end if removal of the occupation regime were contingent on acceptance of the Coal and Steel Community and the Pleven Plan. In his view the Pleven Plan served only to place German potential under French control. He saw the core of FRG discrimination to be exclusion from NATO, which meant that the FRG had no voice in strategic planning or troop strength; in effect this condition meant no FRG influence on defense and contradicted the SPD demand for equal risk and equal sacrifice. Ironically, Schumacher rejected Adenauer’s offer of consultation on foreign policy.

In Paris, only a few military issues remained in dispute. Following discussions, the delegates agreed fundamentally that all national armed forces would enter the


29 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 448-449.
European army. Yet, France, with overseas territories, asserted its right to retain troops for their defense since the EDC protected only the European region. Accordingly, troops required overseas would be excluded from integration. French leaders claimed the right to withdraw part of the French contingent from the European army in case of military necessity. Other delegations opposed the French, demanding that European defense not be prejudiced by troop withdrawals. They agreed for the NATO commander to decide the extent to which a reduction in strength was acceptable. Units serving as body guards for chiefs of state were to retain a national character, an agreement which suited the monarchial Benelux states. The French wanted national troop elements and police forces under EDC control, thus obviating the resurrection of German armed power. The German delegates prevailed with the counter proposal that only the strength of national forces be limited.

A controversy developed over the relation of the European army to NATO. Wanting to protect its interests, the Netherlands, on 8 October 1951, decided to send a

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31Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 301-302.

32Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 452.

delegation to Paris.\textsuperscript{34} The Benelux countries wanted a tie so close to NATO that the EDC would lose its independence. Afraid of losing direct contact with the United States and Britain through an independent continental community, they wanted to subordinate troops of the European army in peacetime to NATO instead of a European executive authority.\textsuperscript{35} This fear was valid since Britain was outside the EDC and could not fill the void between Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{36} France, Italy, and the FRG wanted the European army to be subordinate to NATO only in an emergency; the Benelux countries finally agreed.\textsuperscript{37}

Considerable differences also appeared in the Steering Committee on EDC organization and finances. The delegates could not agree on whether the executive organ should be one


man or a council. An intense controversy arose over the common military budget demanded by France. Even as late as 22 November 1951, the foreign ministers could not agree on these matters.

Since approval of the European army concept at the Washington Foreign Ministers Conference in September 1951, Britain had opposed the EDC nations, although agreeing outwardly. Britain was at a disadvantage vis-a-vis this newly formed bloc and expressed its discontent to the United States. This problem appeared at the NAC meeting in Rome on 26 November 1951, where the foreign ministers could not agree on the EDC organization or budget. In Rome on 27 November 1951, Eisenhower told Eden that Britain was to remain outside the EDC and in concert with the United States offer continental Europe an Atlantic reserve.

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38 The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State, 9 November 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 915-916.

39 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 302.


42 Eden, Full Circle, 34-36.
believed that in the distant future both Britain and the United States could be in reserve, making the EDC self-sufficient except in special cases. Making no progress in Rome, the NAC failed to agree on the FRG contribution and reconciliation of defense requirements with the European economy and politics.\footnote{Acheson, Present, 589; New York Times, 28 Nov. 1951, sec. 1, 14; Paraphrase of Briefing by Ridgeway B. Knight on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Rome, November 24-28, 1951, 30 November 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 1, 751-754; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 459-460.}

Based upon an agreement with Eisenhower, the day following the Rome meeting Eden told the press that Britain would not participate in the European army but would have another association.\footnote{New York Times, 1 Dec. 1951, sec. 1, 4; Eden, Full Circle, 36; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 460; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 40-41.} Eden opposed direct British participation in a European political federation, but approved political support of the European army in concert with the United States. He knew the EDC could fail, but hoped it would not fail over differences about FRG rearmament. He was already considering replacing the EDC, if necessary, with a smaller alliance, retaining technical military arrangements but renouncing a political structure.\footnote{Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 40-41.}
The equality granted the FRG at the Paris Conference in the fall of 1951 was valid within the EDC, but not in NATO. In contrast to other Western nations the FRG would not belong to NATO where members could decide on security questions. Since the EDC would have no military staff, participation of European army and FRG officers in some NATO command positions would be acceptable, but the Germans would be excluded from the NAC, political panels, and the strategic planning group. The EDC states tried to resolve the controversy by negotiating at a higher level. On 11 December 1951 the EDC foreign ministers met in Strassburg where they decided to strengthen the ministerial council. They tried to determine whether decisions would be made by majority or unanimous vote, but there was no agreement on this issue or on the budget. Blank participated as a member of the FRG delegation in Strassburg, where the delegates from other states decided to transform the Amt Blank into a defense ministry; however, the FRG Government balked. Shortly thereafter, the Paris Conference decided that all participating states would have a national defense ministry. These proposals were in accord with the principle

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46 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 302; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 457-463.
of equality, but their implementation depended on the EDC Treaty becoming effective.\textsuperscript{47}

In Paris on 17 and 18 December 1951, Pleven, Schuman, Eden, and Churchill discussed the British relation to the EDC.\textsuperscript{48} In a communique the two Britons welcomed the EDC and expressed the desire for close British association in all phases of political and military development. Close relations with the central command were to obtain as soon as it became permanent. British troops on the continent were to cooperate with the EDC armed forces in training, logistics, and operations.\textsuperscript{49}

From 27 to 30 December 1951 the foreign ministers conferred in Paris where they came closer to agreement on the EDC control authority.\textsuperscript{50} Nevertheless, the pace was too slow for the United States, which told France in December 1951 to make progress on the EDC Treaty by mid-winter or risk the loss of the United States' support.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{47}Greiner, "Dienststelle," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124.

\textsuperscript{48}New York Times, 18 Dec. 1951, sec. 1, 1, 8.

\textsuperscript{49}New York Times, 19 Dec. 1951, sec. 1, 1, 24; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 460-461.


\textsuperscript{51}Acheson, Present, 611-612.
Amid the lack of agreement on the EDC, the Amt Blank continued its work. Although EDC negotiations were constantly delayed, the number of personnel insufficient, its activities secret, and financing unsure, the Amt Blank created the FRG planning basis for the EDC Treaty.52 Because of numerous complaints in West Germany about Amt Blank secrecy, on 1 January 1952 the Amt Blank began informing the German public about the EDC; yet, the SPD continued to oppose the defense contribution.53 Blank's duties were many and varied. On invitation of the Netherlands, he was in the Hague on 4 and 5 January 1952 where he discussed with Dutch officials differences in the European army concept, but there was still a question in Paris over the common defense budget.54

On 6 January 1952 the Western Allies gave the Amt Blank the task of planning the recruitment of German soldiers for a European army. The Amt Blank plan was to register about 1,250,000 men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one years for military service, of which about 250,000 would be selected. By this action the FRG renounced a volunteer army; it meant a conscript army established through general

52 Fischer, Verteidigung, 59.
military service, one purpose of which was to exclude undesirable elements from the armed forces. High ranking officers from the Weimar period, such as Heusinger and Speidel, were to monitor the new army for elimination of Nazi influence. There were about twenty-five thousand officers, including thirteen hundred generals, available for the new army, but only a small number would be selected with those chosen being picked on the bases of both ideology and military proficiency.55

On 8 January 1952 Blank reported to the cabinet on the Paris negotiations. He explained the problems and pointed out an erroneous Associated Press report of a call-up of 1.2 million Germans.56 He also reported on the proposed military organization of the European army, the tactical air force, and coastal defense.57 On the same day, for the first time, Blank gave a synopsis of the EDC negotiations to the Bundestag political parties.58

Blank had problems with the press. On 9 January 1952 the Amt Blank corrected the erroneous Associated Press news release. Although governments generally encourage military

55Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 7 Jan. 1952, 1.
58Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 10 Jan. 1952, 1; Times, 9 Jan. 1952, 5.
silence, the official news blackout in which the Amt Blank functioned was not the correct public information policy. Blank risked a Government collapse because the opposition advocated open information. The German public knew the milieu in which the American press functioned and had the impression that Adenauer wanted to attain his military objectives as a fait accompli. The public also knew details of the Petersberg talks and the Paris negotiations through the foreign press.\(^5^9\) Blank recognized the problem and increased his contacts with the press. The Amt Blank announced on 9 January 1952 the aggregate strengths of future divisions: the new army would consist of six motorized infantry divisions and six armored divisions. Specific strengths depended on weapons delivery dates. Hence, detailed information on size and composition was not yet available.\(^6^0\) On 10 January 1952 Blank announced that the executive organ of the EDC would probably consist of four men with presidential authorization.\(^6^1\) Continuing his public information activities, Blank addressed the executive committee of the CDU in Bonn on 12 January 1952 where he stressed the importance of a citizen army.\(^6^2\)

\(^5^9\) Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 9 Jan. 1952, 2.

\(^6^0\) Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 10 Jan. 1952, 1; Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 11 Jan. 1952, 3.

\(^6^1\) Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 10 Jan. 1952, 1.

\(^6^2\) Times, 14 Jan. 1952, 3.
The Bundestag felt threatened by the international negotiations on an FRG military force. Blank was in charge of the FRG delegation in those negotiations, and on 14 January 1952 he explained to the press that the Bundestag would approve the defense contribution when it ratified the EDC Treaty. Parliamentary fears appeared legitimate since an FRG armed force would not be under the purview of German courts but under the EDC commissioner acting on instructions of the EDC council of ministers.

Blank conscientiously followed Adenauer's policies. On 17 January 1952, the foreign press in Bonn complained that they were excluded from some press conferences and that Blank was not readily available. On 19 January 1952 in a radio broadcast, Blank reported on the Paris negotiations and the proposed army. The FRG had two choices: in weakness invite attack, or join the Western allies to uphold the peace. Blank assured the Germans that the United States and Britain would support the FRG. On 20 January 1952 Blank made another speech on rearmament. The European army would


have forty-three divisions, twelve of which would be West German, with a tactical air force and navy. National forces would exist through division level with equality for all nations in uniforms, weapons, and organization. The conscript forces would be augmented by volunteers, and there would be no Prussian system. The opposition denounced Blank for his attempts to prepare the German people psychologically for rearmament.68

The United States wanted to secure an agreement on the EDC. In Washington on 21 January 1952, Netherlands Prime Minister Willem Drees, discussing military expenditures with Truman and Acheson, said his country could not relinquish one third of its budget to foreign discretion. Accordingly, this group formulated a compromise whereby the contribution of EDC states was based on sums fixed by the NAC, prepared by the European authority, and approved unanimously by the ministerial council. This compromise made the military budget an EDC matter, secured a veto right for member states, and guaranteed the EDC relationship with NATO. The ministerial council would have greater authority and would be the deciding organ in financial matters.69 A similar


proposal appeared in Brussels. Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to compromise, and the foreign ministers reached an agreement at the EDC conference in Paris 26 to 27 January 1952. The crisis in the EDC negotiations ended.70

Blank also had to contend with domestic opposition. Reacting to Blank's radio address of 19 January 1952, on 24 January 1952, the Federal Union, a small opposition party, complained about the cautious press policy. The party challenged the Government on its information policy regarding the defense contribution and the EDC negotiations. Parliament wanted to know the armament and eventual disposition of FRG divisions in the European army. Blank's policy of sporadic and incomplete information created anxiety, and the SPD agreed with the criticism.71

In France, government supporters sought a majority in favor of the EDC and came to terms with the cabinet on restrictions: no FRG troops would exist before the treaty became effective, French armed forces would merge gradually into the European army, and nations with territorial claims (FRG) could not attain admission to NATO.72 Hence, the

French had to win Britain and other nations for the EDC. Meanwhile, the West prepared for the Lisbon Conference.

On 25 January 1952 Acheson told McCloy that the foreign ministers should meet with Adenauer before the Lisbon Conference to solve problems and agree to as many terms as possible, especially financial contributions and security safeguards. The United States and Britain were not pleased that the issue of FRG membership in NATO arose before agreement on military obligations and the EDC. They understood German consternation over exclusion from NATO, but feared that premature demands might endanger EDC ratification in France. While others were seeking solutions to the rearmament problems, France appointed Gilbert Grandval ambassador to the Saar on 25 January 1952, and the French government made it clear that questions on Germany had to be solved conclusively. This act broke the Franco-German jurisdiction over the Saar, which was not supposed to change until a peace treaty with Germany was signed. Franco-German cooperation was necessary for the EDC, and

French action in the Saar evoked an unpleasant reaction in the FRG.\textsuperscript{74}

During the visit of Eden and Churchill to Washington in January 1952, Acheson said he wanted to eliminate Benelux concern before it weakened United States-British support. Acheson said there was no reason to fear that the United States would lose interest in Europe after the EDC was formed. Accordingly, after their return to London, Eden and Churchill directed the Foreign Office to prepare a proposal for British association with the EDC. On 1 February 1952 Eden suggested to Schuman suitable British political and military relations with the EDC and close cooperation of British armed forces with the European army. Eden agreed that British troops were to remain on the continent as long as necessary to meet NATO obligations.\textsuperscript{75}

During February 1952 the FRG and French parliaments expressed their views on the negotiations.\textsuperscript{76} On 7 and 8 February 1952 the Bundestag debated the defense contribution.\textsuperscript{77} The coalition agreed to the proposed


\textsuperscript{75}Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 461.

\textsuperscript{76}"The EDC," The World Today 3 (June 1952): 236-248; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 283.

\textsuperscript{77}Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 520.
solution, but reservations by the FDP, CDU, and DP persisted: membership in NATO for the FRG, relaxation of the Occupation Statute, and six supplementary resolutions. Thereupon the Bundestag majority proposed a "united Europe in a confederation, uniting all free European people with equal rights and responsibilities" which had the goal "in cooperation with other people of the free world to defend the fundamental rights of freedom and democracy wherein the reunification of Germany would be obtained in peace and freedom." They also demanded that since the FRG was not a NATO member it would seek rights conforming to the EDC concept of a voluntary alliance of equal partners. Although the SPD rejected the EDC and Germany agreements, the Bundestag approved the FRG defense contribution on 8 February 1952.

In the fall of 1951, the Soviet Union appeared to have a reunification proposal, but deferred it because of the EDC negotiation crisis in the winter of 1951-1952. At the end of January 1952 when Western agreement on the EDC appeared imminent, the East Bloc prepared a new Germany initiative. On 13 February 1952, the DDR government, referring to the Potsdam Agreements, requested that the four occupation

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powers hasten completion of a peace treaty and permit the German people to establish their own unified democratic state. One implication was that a future German state would have no association with the West. On 20 February 1952, the Soviet government announced that it shared DDR concern and wanted to achieve a German peace treaty expeditiously.⁸⁰

NATO representatives discussed the FRG relation to NATO in London in mid-February 1952. The Netherlands' delegate demanded immediate admission of the FRG. Other delegates favored admission after formation of FRG units and establishment of the EDC. Alphand wanted the FRG to be represented in NATO only on the EDC ministerial council, and Schuman opposed FRG admission to NATO. At this point, Britain invited the three Western foreign ministers to London for a pre-Lisbon conference; Eden invited Adenauer. The foreign ministers discussed the issue, but Eden and Acheson did not share Schuman's view to exclude the FRG from NATO. Acheson, Eden, and Schuman met in the British Foreign Office at 1500 hours, 18 February 1952. At 1645 hours, Adenauer joined the group and accepted a proposal for

⁸⁰Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 497.
joint sessions of the NAC and the EDC ministerial council.

He again agreed not to produce prohibited items.81

Relations between France and the FRG worsened after 1 January 1952. At Lisbon in February 1952 the Germans tried to add new conditions for participation, and the French tried to impose more restrictions on FRG rearmament and arms production. Immediately before the Lisbon Conference, the French Assembly and the Bundestag gave detailed instructions to their respective delegates on what to demand. Consequently, there were two problems at Lisbon: French finances and German arms production.82

On 22 February 1952 the NAC met in Lisbon.83 On 24 February 1952 members of the Rapporteur Group, including Blank and the High Commission who had been negotiating in Bonn on the FRG financial contribution, went to Lisbon.84

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84United States Delegation Record, ibid., 159-160; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Department of State, 23 February 1952, ibid., 256-257.
Following introductions, participants considered the year 1954 as the time of greatest danger. This date was based on United States' study NSC-68, which had previously described the year 1952 as the time of greatest danger. In agreement with Adenauer's estimate, by 1954 the Soviet Union would accumulate large stocks of nuclear weapons, and the United States' nuclear deterrence would be questionable. The West was trying to overcome its deficit in conventional forces, but Soviet troop strength remained far greater.85

The NAC conference in Lisbon and the London pre-conference produced basic agreement on the political problems of EDC organization and FRG entry into NATO. The NAC found that the underlying principles of the EDC Treaty conformed to NATO interests, and they agreed to establish a European army including the FRG.86 The NAC also adopted military goals for 1952, 1953, and 1954.87 The NAC decided that the EDC would meet the following requirements of the Brussels decision: strengthen NATO defense, integrate EDC forces into NATO, promote closer association of Western


87Ismay, NATO, 47.
Europe and the FRG with the West, fulfill military effectiveness goals, and fulfill provisions for security safeguards. The NAC also created a permanent NATO Secretary General with Hastings Lionel Ismay, Lord Ismay, as Secretary.

NATO planners of 1949 and 1950 had considered about 100 divisions necessary for defense in middle Europe. In Lisbon the NAC agreed to this requirement and fixed the strength objectives for the end of 1954 at about ninety-seven divisions plus replacements and reserve units for corps and army commands. The EDC would provide thirty divisions and the United States and Britain would maintain their current six and two divisions respectively on the continent. The FRG would provide twelve divisions. France retained its numerical superiority authorized in December 1950. The EDC would have an effective sea and coastal defense and a five thousand plane tactical air force. Unknown to the FRG, the SHAPE defense line was still


89Ismay, Memoirs, 458; Le Monde, 14 Mar. 1952.
the Rhine river; however, FRG officers would participate in all operational NATO control groups.90

In late February 1952 after the Western states achieved agreement on integration of the FRG into their defense system, the Soviets agreed with DDR Minister-President Otto Grotewohl to hasten negotiation of a treaty with Germany.91 A Soviet note of 10 March 1952 to the West demanded early signing of a peace treaty and a reunited Germany.92 Simultaneously, KVP recruiting intensified, and the DDR prepared for pre-military and para-military training of all youth to be initiated by the Frei Deutsch Jugend (FDJ).93

With their note of 10 March 1952, the Soviets became more legalistic.94 The Soviets and the DDR wanted a united German council as a conditio sine qua non. In accordance with the Potsdam Agreements, Germany was to be a unified, autonomous, democratic, peace-loving nation, cleared of occupation troops one year after signing of the peace treaty. The note relinquished the Soviet demand for

93Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 490.
94Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 291.
unconditional West German demilitarization. They simultaneously used the Potsdam Agreements to make legitimate the Oder-Neisse Line and to represent French claims on the Saar as unwarranted.95

The armaments commission posed a problem for the EDC delegates. The Germans had always rejected the idea that FRG armament would be inferior to that of other nations. From the beginning Blank enunciated German readiness for voluntary reduction of weapons production. In the EDC the ministerial council would decide on military production, but as proof of good will, Adenauer was ready to accept a prohibition on weapons production. At the London foreign ministers conference in mid-February 1952, Adenauer appeared pressed to yield to French demands, and his acceptance ensued from the assumption that the FRG would receive from abroad weapons equal in quality to those of other states.96

On 15 April 1952 the British government announced that it was ready to agree for the EDC and NATO to meet their responsibilities in accordance with military force and other assistance. So long as NATO endured, the automatic


assistance of the Brussels Pact would apply to relations between Britain and the EDC.97

The Soviet change of course in early 1952 had an effect in the DDR. Public discussion of military issues became open; KVP recruiting no longer concealed the military nature of the KVP. On 1 May 1952 State President Wilhelm Pieck spoke in public of the necessity for the DDR to "organize the armed defense of our home."98 On 3 May 1952, Minister-President Walter Ulbricht explained "in view of the existence of aggressive, imperialistic forces in the world, a peace-loving Germany must defend itself."99 On 12 May 1952, Grotewohl said that it was necessary to organize an army for the defense of the country. Pravda put special importance on this statement.100

The Soviets wanted the national armed forces of a united Germany to originate in Soviet-formed and controlled DDR units. At the beginning of 1952 the KVP numbered 55,000 ground troops, 4000 to 5000 seamen, and about 3000 air force candidates. Paramilitary formations added 18,000 men from the border police and 5000 men in security service units in contrast to the FRG with 10,000 men in border guard units.

97Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 287; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 462.
98Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 500.
99Ibid.
100Pravda, 12 May 1952; Le Monde, 13 May 1952.
In the KVP, officers and officer candidates constituted a large (forty per cent) portion, with NCOs in a similar ratio; there was a small minority of ordinary soldiers. Hence, the KVP had the structure of a cadre for a mass army, the size of which was based on DDR manpower and economic potential and suggested that it was intended for the national armed forces of a united Germany.¹⁰¹

There was an early controversy over an FRG tactical air force and coastal navy. Only the size of tactical air force and coastal defense units for the first phase was determined, but there were no EDC naval units in the Baltic or North Seas with which FRG units could operate. The Netherlands insisted that their naval forces be subordinate to the NATO command outside the EDC. This issue was undecided when contractual agreements were ready for signature on 9 May 1952. Inasmuch as the FRG delegates threatened to boycott the signing, at the last moment the French yielded. Consequently, the FRG coastal defense was constituted nationally within the EDC.¹⁰²

Since the EDC budget was a source of controversy, the FRG urged member nations to assume definite financial obligations. With difficulty, the French agreed that every participant had to make a suitable contribution. The FRG

¹⁰¹Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 503-504.

¹⁰²Ibid., 473-474; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 309-310.
insisted on an uncompromising payment formula from the beginning. The financial responsibility was of concern because the FRG was to introduce all of its troops into the EDC, whereas, France was to incorporate only about one-half of its forces. FRG payments to NATO were to flow to the European army, while the French could divert an undetermined amount for their national forces overseas. Consequently, the FRG could get into the difficulty of financing a disproportionately large part of the European army.  

The FRG injected a problem into the EDC negotiations when the cabinet appointed Blank and Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer to act jointly in this matter. Schäffer in Paris and Blank in Bonn conducted confusing and unmanageable, dual negotiations on the same topics. Blank maintained that the Petersberg talks destroyed the basis for the Paris negotiations on the common budget. To complicate matters

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104 The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 20 December 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: European Security and the German Question, Part 2, 1691-1694; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 22 December 1951, ibid., 1699-1700.

105 The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 20 December 1951, ibid., 1691-1694; The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 22 December 1951, ibid., 1695-1699.

106 The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 20 December 1951, ibid., 1691-1694.
further, on 12 May 1952, Ulbricht threatened Adenauer and the FRG cabinet with "reprisals at the hands of the German people" if they signed the contractual agreements with the West.107

Blank had intended to set up the Federal Defense Council as a coordination agency for the defense organization on 12 May 1952 during a cabinet meeting; however, it was delayed. This agency was finally created on 21 October 1955.108 The delay contributed to the mistrust developing between the Amt Blank and the German public.

After prolonged negotiations, at the end of May 1952 concerned states were ready to sign the EDC Treaty.109 On 21 May 1952 the foreign policy committee of the French National Assembly delivered an unfavorable note on the agreements.110 On 23 May 1952 the French cabinet announced new conditions for the French signature: Britain and the United States must guarantee against an FRG withdrawal from the EDC, and the status of French troops in the FRG would be the same as in the Bonn troop statute for the United States.

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107 *Times*, 13 May 1952, 6.


and Britain.\textsuperscript{111} Schuman, who was in Bonn with the British and United States' foreign ministers for the signing of the Germany Treaty, received instructions to insist on the French demands.\textsuperscript{112} On 25 May 1952 the Soviets sent a note to the West charging that the FRG-Allied documents constituted a flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agreements; they again called for a four-power meeting to draft a German peace treaty.\textsuperscript{113}

The French demands in late May 1952 aroused displeasure among the other states. The British and United States foreign ministers told Schuman that they would not agree to a one-sided guarantee against the FRG. On Schuman's urging, they attempted to satisfy French security demands in a declaration: the United States and Britain assured the EDC states that if an act "by some side threatens the integrity" of the EDC, "they would consider this a threat to their own security."\textsuperscript{114} The French demand for the Bonn troop agreement to apply to French troops led to a controversy among the Western powers. Consequently, France received several concessions. For the case of delay in the EDC becoming effective, a conference of occupation powers and the FRG

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112}Adenauer, \textit{Erinnerungen}, 1945-1953, 530-532.
\item \textsuperscript{113}\textit{New York Times}, 25 May 1952, sec. 1, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{114}Adenauer, \textit{Erinnerungen}, 1945-1953, 532-533.
\end{itemize}
would consider the Bonn Agreements. Schuman finally agreed to the Western response.

The six EDC states signed the EDC Treaty in Bonn on 26 May 1952 and the following day repeated the ceremony in Paris. The Germany Treaty, signed in Bonn on 26 May 1952, was to end the occupation, restore FRG sovereignty, replace occupation costs with a defense contribution, and commit the Western nations contractually to FRG defense; it could become effective only after ratification of the EDC Treaty. Five documents received signatures on 27 May 1952. In addition to the EDC Treaty, there was a treaty to create the EDC and merge the armed forces in it, a treaty between the six EDC states and Britain whereby the British agreed to mutual military aid in the event Britain or any EDC state were attacked, a protocol by NATO extending to the FRG the guarantees of the NATO Pact, and an EDC protocol to

115 Ibid.


NATO as a guarantee of EDC cooperation. There was also a declaration by the United States and Britain by which they would regard any threat to the integrity of the EDC as a threat to their own security. On 27 May 1952 the DDR reacted to the Western action by imposing stricter controls over Western access to Berlin.

An additional protocol signed by the EDC foreign ministers provided that the delegations which participated in the Paris negotiations would continue to meet as an Interim Committee during the period between the signing of the EDC Treaty and the date when EDC institutions became functional. Hence, Blank's roles as chief FRG negotiator and security deputy continued.

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The period January 1951 through May 1952 was not only the formative period for the Amt Blank, it marked the most important achievements for Blank and the Amt Blank. During this time, guided by Adenauer's political and military policy, Blank and the FRG delegates successfully carried FRG objectives through the Petersberg talks with the Allied High

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Commission. The Petersberg effort reflected the FRG view and convinced Adenauer and the Western Allies that Blank was the man to represent the FRG at Paris. Accordingly, Blank became the chief FRG delegate at the EDC negotiations in Paris, replacing men whose forte was diplomacy. Blank's effort in Paris met more and greater obstacles than he encountered at the Petersberg; nevertheless, his firm, unyielding resolve held and FRG goals were recognized. In Paris, where it was necessary to comply with the decisions of the NAC and the Western foreign ministers, there was opposition from all sides, especially from the French, and discretionary compromise became essential on several points. Nevertheless, the EDC Treaty, signed on 27 May 1952, was a practical document with which the FRG intended to comply. The signing of the EDC Treaty marked a transition point which demanded adaptation, patience, and revision; however, French uncertainty forced the Amt Blank to make drastic changes in the plans it developed prior to May 1952.

CHAPTER VIII

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY I (1952-1953)

Following the signing of the EDC Treaty and the Bonn and Paris Agreements in May 1952, there was optimism that all EDC states would complete ratification in a short time. Four EDC states ratified the documents as expected; only Italy and France did not. There appeared to be no major problem with eventual ratification by Italy; however, in France EDC opponents aggressively sought its defeat. In France attempts to modify the EDC Treaty created excessive delay, upset the West, and damped the spirit of optimism.

From 1950 to 1952 the general mood in the FRG concerning rearmament was not calm. The population was undecided, but those favoring rearmament grew in number. How the "European soldier of the German nation" would behave was not yet determined. The "citizen in uniform" sounded good; however, Germany had traditionally produced good soldiers but not always good civilians.¹

Even though ratification did not make political progress in France or the FRG, preparations continued for establishment of the EDC.² In France the Gaullist attitude

¹Die Gegenwart, 22 Nov. 1952, 758-762.
exacerbated the situation for the Pinay government, which rested on the RPF. On the Radical Socialist Days of 23 and 24 May 1952, Edouard Daladier and Edouard Herriot opposed the EDC. Daladier called the reappearance of the German army a colossal danger; the objective of World War II had been the destruction of the Germany army, a century-old threat which had permitted France no freedom. He did not trust the voltface of the Germans, he feared a new Reich with a Drang nach Osten, and he recommended a return to the anti-German Brussels Pact and a four-power conference with the Soviet Union. Herriot, distressed over FRG rearmament, considered the Bonn and Paris Agreements non-binding. He hoped for a Franco-Soviet understanding, which he considered necessary to meet the common German threat. Only René Mayer defended the EDC. After the signing of the agreements in May 1952, EDC opponents joined the Socialists around Jules Moch. Even in the MRP of Robert Schuman, there was opposition.3

After the signing of the Bonn and Paris Agreements in May 1952, the DDR regime attempted to designate the KVP the "National Armed Forces" of the DDR. Pieck, demanding an armed force capable of defending the DDR and securing the peace, wanted the party to define what the people were to defend. As part of his program, the Freie Deutsche Jugend

3Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 527-529.
According to Pravda, the signing of the EDC Treaty aroused a deep alarm in France and other West European countries. The Soviets viewed the German people as having to take their destiny in their own hands since the EDC Treaty and the contractual agreements constituted a step toward war. In view of the "threatening danger" instigated by the Bonn and Paris Agreements, it was necessary to organize German youth for defense. On 1 June 1952 the fourth FDJ parliament accepted the program for the FDJ to train youth readiness squads. The FDJ would send its best members to the German people's police and become a feeder organization for the DDR military.

On 6 June 1952 Charles de Gaulle inaugurated a campaign against the Paris and Bonn Agreements, which he described as granting the FRG sovereignty and equality with nothing in return. In place of the EDC, he wanted a confederation with popular authority founded on a continental community. Gaullists contended that the EDC betrayed the French army and that an integrated armed force was a militarily

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5Pravda, 28 May 1952.
6Pravda, 29 May 1952.
7Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 491.
ineffective coalition; a military and economic community with no common political leadership was senseless. The Gaullist attitude influenced French military men, including the Chief of the French General Staff, Marshal Alphonse Juin.9

In the FRG, Blank promoted the EDC. Speaking on Radio Hamburg on 12 June 1952, he said it was difficult to predict how many or when FRG troops would be recruited; volunteer cadre would form at the beginning of 1953.10 On 13 June 1952, he addressed the Foreign Press Association and expressed confidence that rearmament would begin in January 1953. He was optimistic about early ratification of the EDC Treaty by all parties.11

The East Bloc announced on 13 June 1952 that, because the West rejected the Soviet proposal for national German armed forces in a unified Germany and resolved to form an aggressive army in the FRG, the DDR was compelled to form its own national armed forces for defense and preservation of the peace.12

Beginning in 1952 the Amt Blank urgently processed the Volunteer Law. According to Blank, this law was the basis

9Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 526-527.
12Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 501.
for soldiers' rights and was necessary to train cadre and establish German units. Blank emphasized the necessity for extensive, continuous citizenship instruction within troop units. He also discussed conscientious objection, with which there was no problem, but Parliament had to define the precise bases for conscientious refusal of military service. Blank explained the necessity for parliamentary control and the meaning of a close integration of the new army with the state and the people. The Volunteer Law was the first step.

In the DDR during the summer of 1952, the KVP improved considerably, and tanks, guns, and fighter planes arrived from the Soviet Union. On 5 July 1952 the DDR Ministerial Council, on instructions from the SED Central Committee, decided to dissolve the twenty-four KVP departments and establish four army groups. KVP army strength increased from 55,000 to 80,000. At the same time, the first aviation division was formed on airfields under Soviet control, and Soviet advisors appeared at all command levels in Army Group North. On 9 July 1952, Ulbricht announced that the new army

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13 Die Neue Zeitung, 10 Nov. 1952, 3; Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

14 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 312; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 491-492.
Fig. 3--Amt Blank organization, 9 July 1952
DDR national armed force would support a people's movement to overthrow the Adenauer Government in the FRG.  

To adapt to the changing situation, the Amt Blank reorganized (See Figure 3). Effective 9 July 1952 it had four divisions formed from the original two: Central Division for Personnel and Administration (I); Military Division (II); Law and Economy (III); Accommodation and Billets (IV). The Military Division had four subdivisions, three of which were considered part of a future defense ministry. The fourth, Military Planning, was the nucleus of the staff for the expected "German Authority of the German Integrated Armed Forces." The Military Planning subdivision had four sections: Joint Armed Forces, Land Armed Forces, Air Armed Forces-Luftwaffe, Navy. Total staff assistants were 708, of whom 120 were in Paris. Meir Werika was the first historian. Thus, a defense ministry had a beginning in organization and strength. Under the provisions of Paragraph 62 of Bundestag standing orders, a committee on the EDC Treaty was constituted on 10 July 1952. The SPD voted to instruct the Federal Government to report on Amt Blank activity in this committee.
From the summer of 1952 until the spring of 1955 there was an inverse relation between Soviet foreign policy activity and Western progress on the FRG defense contribution. In the DDR on 12 July 1952 the SED Party Conference received its resolutions, one passage of which dealt with military issues; however, the declaration to establish a national DDR armed force was absent. Soviet support did not materialize and party leaders revised the draft. Hence, the talk of DDR "national armed forces" appeared only in speeches by Ulbricht and Pieck.¹⁸

Strong opposition to the government in the summer of 1952 threatened the French cabinet and foreign ministry, a situation that could postpone EDC ratification. The division into EDC opponents and supporters cost the government its parliamentary base. In exploitation of this problem, there was contact between French EDC opponents and Soviet deputies in Geneva, who were seeking a militarily weak FRG by opposing an FRG military contribution. In the summer of 1952, EDC supporter General Mariè Bethouart suggested the French government seek treaty revision. He wanted to prevent disintegration of the French Union and the French army due to competition between EDC and overseas forces. He also wanted the European military organization combined with a political union under a supra-national

¹⁸Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 502, 621-622.
authority. To preserve French national integrity, Gaullists opposed a supra-national Europe, and Socialists rejected the EDC to keep the FRG from developing political power. EDC opponents wanted France to remain uncommitted but to place maximum commitments on the FRG. Consequently, every demand which won new support drove advocates away. The French government, although committed by signature, appeared ambivalent.19

Opposing Adenauer and Blank in the FRG, Martin Niemöller still advocated a neutralized, unarmed Germany. He argued that if both sides armed, both sides would use their arms.20 His activity had the effect of supporting the DDR.

Schumacher died 21 August 1952 and was succeeded by Erich Ollenhauer as leader of the SPD.21 Nevertheless, SPD opposition to rearmament continued within and without the Bundestag. The Bundestag Committee on the EDC Treaty held its first work session on 4 September 1952, but it had no control over the Amt Blank. Yet, Blank's appearance before this committee made a good impression on SPD members.22

19Ibid., 529, 534-535.
Member states were working out the details of the EDC Treaty. The Amt Blank had this duty for the FRG and supported working groups in Bonn and Paris. In contrast to members that had a defense ministry, the FRG was constrained to coordinate this planning, often in minute detail, in Bonn and Paris with the French and other members. The Amt Blank expended great effort in this planning, which they could not easily change.23

Beginning in January 1952 the Federal Government reported on the Amt Blank in six Bundestag committees and to the plenum. In addition to executive supervision, up to the summer of 1952 the Budget Committee and a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee supervised the Amt Blank. The Bundestag plenum controlled the Amt Blank through budget, military, and foreign policy committees. Prior to July 1952, the Budget Committee approved expansion of the Amt Blank, the activity of which was restricted to internal planning and preparation requiring the consent of the Bundestag. Except for the Budget Committee, there was little concern with the Amt Blank; however, after establishment of the EDC Committee and the standing Security Committee, the situation changed. Because the Amt Blank conducted its planning in secret, there were questions concerning its activity. Before the fall of 1952, there was

23Fischer, Verteidigung, 61.
no question about parliamentary control of the Amt Blank, but the press held the view that political-parliamentary control was less than would have applied to a ministry. Beginning in September 1952, the Federal Government reported on the Amt Blank to the EDC Committee, and in the fall of 1952 the committee attitude was favorable, although the question of innere Führung was not settled.24

The Himmerod conference produced recommendations on innere Führung for the spiritual regulation of the armed forces. Initial planning for innere Führung took place in discussions with the interested public and the Federal Youth Circle, whose ideas the Amt Blank sought. The procedure included a series of meetings in universities, church academies, and institutions with experience in law, education, politics, and psychology. Amt Blank members used the results to plan the spiritual structure of the armed force and its place in state and society.25

Work on innere Führung began 8 May 1951 with the appointment of Major a. D. Wolf Graf Baudissin, who defined the concept in 1952. This work involved the spiritual regulation of the armed forces which Speidel, Heusinger, Kielmansegg, and de Maizière formulated. The work group included civil and military members. Because Blank

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25Fischer, Verteidigung, 54.
supported this new goal and represented it politically with great emphasis, work on Innere Führung made uninterrupted progress.\(^{26}\) Innere Führung changed German military philosophy.

Advocates of Innere Führung were pledged to the Basic Law; the concept had to pass the practical test in the formation of the FRG armed forces. The Amt Blank determined the fundamentals, which could be realized incrementally in the units. With the establishment of the armed forces and the school of the Bundeswehr, Innere Führung would acquire the needed experience. From its inception, Innere Führung was the object of criticism and discussion in the Amt Blank, the Defense Ministry, the Defense Committee, parliament, and the public.\(^{27}\) To allay concern, Blank, speaking at Bochum-Hovel in the Ruhr on 5 October 1952, announced the early establishment of a defense ministry and stressed that there would be no militarism in the new army.\(^{28}\) Innere Führung would assure the Germans that there would be no militarism.

The East Bloc continued its military activity. In October 1952, Stalin argued that war between the capitalist

\(^{26}\)Ibid., 54, 57.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 54-57.

\(^{28}\)Times, 6 Oct. 1952, 4.
states was more probable than war between the capitalist and communist blocs. In the DDR on 6 October 1952 Soviet military rank and uniforms became part of the "German National Army." On 8 October 1952, Marshal Vasilevsky, in a speech in Moscow revealing new weapons and combat capability of the Soviet armed forces, predicted that the five year plan for 1951-1956 would yield greater improvements. In the fall of 1952 the DDR Länder had available about 51,500 men. On order of the Communist Party, about 36,500 served. In the second half of 1952, people's readiness police commands were formed in the fourteen district capitals and East Berlin with a strength of 14,000.

All was not serene in the Amt Blank where there was a struggle with Bonin over innere Führung. Bonin tried to get Baudissin and innere Führung under his control, but Kielmansegg refused. Bonin then gave directions which Amt Blank members viewed as detrimental to innere Führung. Konrad Kroske, a minor official in the Amt Blank, resigned over the alleged introduction of the old Prussian discipline. Kroske's complaint was over an eight-page

30Pravda, 10 Oct. 1952.
31Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 491-492, 625-626.
32Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
Grundsatzanweisung (fundamental order) on organization and training of new troops. Objections were that it ignored parliamentary control, advocated unified political, economic, and technical training like the Third Reich, and used Nazi language. Bonin signed this order. Major Axel von dem Bussche, head of the press section, resigned in October 1952. Kielmansegg also opposed the order but did not resign. With the resignation of Bussche, the press section vanished; after he left the Amt Blank, the information activity was under Kielmansegg. Bussche's successor was Konrad Ahlers.

Following the resignation of Kroske on 2 November 1952, Blank on 3 November 1952 denied there was a crisis in the Amt Blank and stated that the new army would be democratic under full control of parliament and civilians. The press reacted by warning Germans to be on guard against a return of the old Prussian system. To calm public apprehension over the Bonin incident, on 4 November 1952 Blank spoke over the radio to declare there would be no Prussianism in the new army.

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34 Newsweek, 17 Nov. 1952, 47-48.
36 Times, 4 Nov. 1952, 6.
Amr Blank difficulty with the press can be attributed to Blank, who hated reporters and handled them negatively. As a result, they became angry at him, and he found himself continuously defending the Amr Blank before the FRG public.38 In his radio speech on 4 November 1952 he assured the German people that regulations would require parliamentary approval and the cabinet would have a veto over officer selection.39 The new army would need 2000 to 3000 officers in the grade of colonel and higher. A committee of twelve to fifteen people chosen for their "democratic qualities" would make recommendations to the cabinet, who would appoint all officers in the rank of colonel and above.40 On 5 November 1952, Blank said there would be no new German general staff.41 To be sure, this information did not deter the press from attacking Blank and his office.

In France intensive recruiting for the EDC, which Deputy Prime Minister Henri Teitgen attempted in the fall and winter of 1952, isolated EDC opponents in the MRP. Only with effort could Schuman prevent his party associates from


40New York Times, 6 Nov. 1952, sec. 1, 4; Times, 6 Nov. 1952, 5.

making a four-power conference with the Soviets a condition for ratification.\(^4_2\) In fact, this demand for a conference supported East Bloc propaganda, which was intense, and on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, deputy Soviet Premier Mikhail G. Peruvkin warned the West not to forget the might of the Soviet army.\(^4_3\)

Continuing his campaign for the EDC in a radio address on 9 November 1952, Blank reassured the German people that the new army would be democratic; it would be no black Reichswehr.\(^4_4\) The next day, Die Neue Zeitung reported in detail what Blank said. Based on Amt Blank plans, the FRG would require 22,000 officers and about 80,000 long service troops and NCOs. Forty generals, 250 colonels, 900 lieutenant colonels, 2000 majors, 6300 captains, and 12,300 lieutenants were necessary. Blank emphasized that officers and troops had to accept the democratic form of government.\(^4_5\) He further explained that the Amt Blank was planning a 300,000 man armed force organized in twelve divisions, which would be civilian in character with military justice the same as civilian justice. After ratification of the EDC Treaty, there would be nine to

\(^4_2\)Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 528-529.
\(^4_3\)New York Times, 7 Nov. 1952, sec. 1, 5.
\(^4_4\)Times, 10 Nov. 1952, 6.
\(^4_5\)Die Neue Zeitung, 10 Nov. 1952, 3.
twelve months before the FRG contribution became reality. Blank intended his speech to allay French and German apprehension. The Amt Blank, an embryo defense ministry, in mid-November 1952 included about 200 former Wehrmacht officers; the head of the Military Division was Heusinger.

The press and the SPD criticized Blank. Since the SPD was not content with the Bundestag debate in February 1952 on rearmament and the EDC negotiations, on 18 November 1952 they tried to force a discussion in the plenum. They wanted to know the legal basis for the Amt Blank, why the press received information prior to parliament, and when the Bundestag would receive information about Amt Blank organization and activity. The Government was not providing as much information as journalists believed it should, but each time Blank spoke the public learned a little more.

The nation was very attentive to Blank's words about future German soldiers being civilians in uniform, but the secrecy of Amt Blank work for the Chancellor, permitted by the Bundestag, threw a shadow over the FRG; consequently, the press called for the removal of Blank before he "rendered inferior service to the state and army." On 22 November

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49 Die Gegenwart, 22 Nov. 1952, 758-762.
At the time Blank could still go through a Bonn press conference and receive applause, but because of the secrecy, much of the German public mistrusted the Amt Blank.50

While he was deputy from October 1950 to October 1955, Blank went before the Bundestag three times regarding Amt Blank business. He spoke once as deputy on 5 December 1952 regarding the EDC Treaty and twice in January and May 1955. Usually, Adenauer, one of his representatives, or the chairman of the EDC Committee represented the Amt Blank before the Bundestag. When Blank refused to answer questions regarding the Amt Blank, he gave the reason for his silence that a "de facto department chief" had little credibility and should not discuss the EDC negotiations. Blank was aware that the Bundestag would have the final word on Amt Blank work, and even though he knew that a favorable Bundestag attitude would result only from an unrestricted flow of information, he retained his silence.51

In an interview with U. S. News and World Report on 19 December 1952, Blank again presented his views on FRG rearmament. The new army would be a European army, not a German army. European military academies would train the leaders. The draft would require two classes, sixty percent of which

50Ibid.

should be available for eighteen months. Inasmuch as the German arms industry was dismantled in 1945, it would require from nine to twelve months before the FRG could manufacture small arms and three to five years before it could fabricate tanks and artillery. Accordingly, no soldiers would be recruited until arms were available. He also outlined a mobilization schedule beginning the date of EDC ratification, which projected a twelve month lead time prior to conscription.52 Blank reiterated most of this information in a radio interview on 31 December 1952.53

The year 1953 began with problems in both blocs. In Berlin on 1 January 1953, Pieck warned that the Paris and Bonn Agreements, if ratified, would make it necessary for the DDR to organize modern, well equipped national forces.54 By 1 January 1953 the French Pinay-Schuman government fell.55 Blank's prediction to begin rearmament by January 1953 went awry. On 1 January 1953 in a radio broadcast, he hoped for cadre formation no later than the end of 1953, and the press chided him for being behind.56

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54 Times, 2 Jan. 1953, 4.
55 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 312-313; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 300; Le Monde, 9 Jan. 1953.
56 Le Monde, 2 Jan. 1953.
On 6 January 1953 Radical Socialist René Mayer formed a cabinet with Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister.57 As Mayer formed his government, he accepted demands for contractual supplements to the EDC Treaty. Without supplements, it was unreasonable to attempt ratification in the National Assembly. In case of an overseas emergency, France wanted to withdraw its troops from the European army, which meant that the French departed from the Paris and Bonn Agreements they had signed and placed new demands on the EDC partners.58 On 7 January 1953 Adenauer acknowledged the possibility of supplementary protocols and agreed with Mayer that the treaty could be changed. The Germans understood that supplementary protocols were to complete, not revise, the agreements.59 Belgium and the Netherlands opposed the German view; the Benelux countries wanted France to ratify the signed agreements one time only with no delay. Italy told France and the FRG that she would not concur with a treaty change. Based on the French demand for revisions, the Bundestag postponed the third reading of the Bonn and Paris Agreements. It appeared that the French knew an EDC

57U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Session, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953, 11; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 531-532.

58Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 47-48; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 301-302; Le Monde, 8 Jan. 1953; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 535.

collapse would res resurrect an FRG defense contribution in another form. In view of French domestic politics, the United States considered an alternate solution in the event the EDC collapsed, and in the winter of 1952-1953 State Department planners secretly studied this possibility.60

French demands for revision evoked support for the EDC. Arguing the necessity of the EDC for European security on 9 January 1953 in Munich, Blank assured the Germans there would never be another Minister of Armament like Albert Speer.61 Eisenhower became president of the United States in January 1953, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, perceived the EDC as an urgent necessity.62 On 21 January 1953, the Amt Blank announced that changes demanded by France would not prevent ratification of the EDC Treaty.63 To monitor the EDC, on 21 January 1953 the Bundestag Committee on the EDC Treaty became the Standing Committee for European Security Issues. In sequence, committee chiefs were: Strauss (CDU), Richard Jäger (CSU), and Erler (SPD).64

60 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 313-314; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 531-532.
61 Le Monde, 10 Jan. 1953.
62 Eisenhower, Mandate, 107, 140.
64 Greiner, "Dienststelle," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124.
Since the Bundestag recognized that France was not strong enough to gain acceptance of the supplementary protocols, it decided in January 1953 to proceed with the second and third readings of the EDC Treaty. The FRG demonstrated its intent to cooperate in Western defense and made it difficult for the French government to change the treaty, a course of interest to the United States. Dulles, visiting Bonn and other European capitals, urged ratification, renounced special European demands, and sought parliamentary support for the treaties. The SPD had another view; it feared that ratification could give Blank complete authority to accept the French supplementary demands.65

The Mayer government tried to induce Britain to a closer tie with the EDC. The French ambassador in London, René Massigli, in January 1953 put pressure on Eden to favor this request. On 28 January 1953 Eden revealed in the House of Commons the British intent to maintain close political liaison with the EDC.66 The French wanted a fifty-year guarantee of military assistance in case of an attack against the EDC, a promise to station a specific number of British troops on the continent, and a British delegation to EDC agencies. The French wanted this guarantee both as a

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65Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 557; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 546.

66Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 510 (1953), col. 1003 (Eden); Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 548-549.
counterweight to FRG influence and to appease the Socialists.67

Dulles, on a trip to Europe in late January and early February 1953, repeatedly stressed that the United States considered the EDC to be the only formula for an FRG defense contribution and that a delay in ratification beyond April 1953 would affect the United States' foreign aid. French and FRG opposition perceived this view as an ultimatum.68 Yet Dulles' message did not reduce EDC opposition in France.69

At the beginning of February 1953, the EDC Interim Committee learned in outline the French protocols. The French demands shocked the Netherlands and Belgian diplomats, who, with the Italian delegation, sought to win FRG delegates for unqualified support of the treaty. They rejected objectional items as contrary to the agreements and feared that the FRG might be too obliging. The FRG delegation understood the French demands, especially

67 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 548-549.


discrimination against the FRG, and agreed to evaluate the French protocols as acceptable or unacceptable.70

The Mayer government tried to persuade Dulles on his 3 February 1953 visit to Paris that French policy toward the EDC promised success and would not change the treaty, but Dulles appeared skeptical. Immediately following Dulles' trip to Paris on 4 February 1953, the Foreign Policy and Defense Committees in the National Assembly elected two anti-EDC men as reporteurs on the EDC Treaty: Socialist Jules Moch and Gaullist General Pierre-Marié Koenig. Consequently, Socialists, Gaullists, and other EDC opponents united in voting.71

On 11 February 1953, Alphand submitted the supplementary protocols to the Steering Committee of the Interim Committee with the provision that their acceptance was necessary for French ratification. He contended that the protocols only interpreted the agreements and did not revise the treaty.72


The first protocol provided that the French government could interchange its military personnel between the EDC contingent and the national armed forces for overseas employment or international requirements. This clause made it possible for France, based on its overseas responsibilities, to hold a strong national army in Europe as an instrument of national policy.73

The second protocol demanded that France retain unrestricted, unsupervised, national arms production. France also wanted the unrestricted right to withdraw troops to overseas areas from Europe. Removal of considerable French armed forces from Europe could adversely affect the disposition of NATO; hence, the EDC Treaty permitted such action only with the consent of SHAPE.74

Another protocol provided for a limited transition phase and stated that the vote distribution in the ministerial council be changed only with unanimous support. Under this protocol France would decide on EDC matters even if its EDC forces dwindled to a symbolic contingent.75

The French demanded continuation of national military schools. This demand served the structural and personnel

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73Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 536-537; Le Monde, 14 Feb. 1953.

74New York Times, 12 Feb. 1953, sec. 1, 6; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 536-537.

75Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 536-538; Le Monde, 14 Feb. 1953.
unity for French forces and supported the establishment of French cadre at EDC expense. The French also wanted their armed forces to receive the same legal benefits which British and United States forces received in the FRG under the Bonn Agreements. The French wanted special privileges in the FRG not only on the EDC budget, but for the support of French troops. The final French demand was for new negotiations on foreign military aid to prevent hasty FRG rearmament with heavy, modern weapons. The costs of appeasing recalcitrant French parties devolved on the other EDC states.76

The motives behind the French demands were questionable. It was not clear whether Mayer and Bidault believed the other EDC states would accept French demands or expected the EDC to collapse when challenged. Personnel changes in the French delegation plus a degeneration of Franco-German rapport increased German mistrust of the French government. The new French Foreign Minister, Bidault, appeared as a hesitant EDC supporter or a disguised EDC opponent. Belgian and Dutch delegates in Paris considered the situation hopeless, and the Germans openly expected the EDC to collapse. In spite of the demands on the EDC states, Mayer and Bidault hinted that with supplementary protocols the French parliament would ratify the EDC

76Ibid.
Treaty, but the French government, to the displeasure of other member states, expended little effort publicizing the EDC. Subsequently, the other EDC states rejected every deviation from the original treaty.77

By 13 February 1953, Blank knew the content of the French protocols, but he had not seen them.78 Still supporting the EDC in an interview in Bonn, Blank expressed optimism for ratification of the EDC Treaty in the spring of 1953. Considering the purpose of the EDC, he added that the West knew much about the DDR armed forces from deserters.79

Until the spring of 1953 one Soviet objective in the DDR was an armed force. On 19 February 1953 the DDR Ministerial Council formed a State Secretariat for Domestic Affairs within the Ministry of the Interior, therewith concealing the internal military administration department. Total KVP strength was 100,000, not counting the paramilitary and police organizations in the DDR. Alert units of the State Security Service (SSD), Border Police, and Transportation Police were subordinate to the Ministry of State Security. SSD formations represented the beginning of a politically dependable, militarily trained elite unit on the Soviet model and were organized, billeted, and equipped

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79Le Monde, 14 Feb. 1953.
as infantry; their estimated strength was 5000. The Border Police, with a strength of 30,000, were paramilitary with special police functions. The mission of the Transportation Police was to protect road travel; equipment included light infantry weapons. The General People's Police with 85,000 men were under the Interior Ministry. In a meeting of chiefs of EDC delegations on 20 February 1953, Blank read a prepared statement that under no circumstances should acceptance of the French protocols become a condition for EDC Treaty ratification. EDC delegates in Paris balked at Alphand's explanation that the protocols changed nothing, and they rejected any deviation from principles accepted by France in May 1952. The protocols had not yet been published. In view of ratification difficulties in the National Assembly, the French believed foreign opposition would vanish.

On 20 and 21 February 1953 the Steering Committee studied the French demands, but the partner states refused to discuss them because they were counter to the treaty.

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Blank expressed concern that the demands were prejudicial to European integration. To improve the French domestic situation, Blank had already explained that he would consider the texts, comment on the obscurities, and close the gaps; however, all partners had to agree that neither ratification could be deferred nor the contents of the treaty changed. Benelux and Italian delegates agreed with Blank and did not consider interpretive protocols on the basis of the French draft. Denying the treaty-changing character of the draft, Alphand replied that a satisfactory settlement was a condition for French ratification.

On FRG demand, the question of supplementary protocols was submitted to the foreign ministers of the EDC states, who from 24 to 25 February 1953 were to meet in Rome. The Steering Committee went to Rome to participate in the ministerial discussions. The French tried unsuccessfully to gain concessions, and in view of unanimous opposition, Alphand admitted the necessity to rewrite the French protocols. As chairman of the Steering Committee, he presented the situation to the foreign ministers and the

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84 Le Monde, 24 Feb. 1953; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 541-542.

85 Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 313; Times, 25 Feb. 1953, 8.

other chiefs of delegation. Alcide de Gasperi and Johan Willem Bergen wanted to hasten ratification in their parliaments without waiting for negotiations which could modify the treaty. Bidault insisted that a satisfactory settlement was necessary to gain the concurrence of the French parliament, and he reiterated his statement that the French protocols were interpretations and supplements, not modifications.

The Rome Conference deputized the Steering Committee to formulate an interpretation of the EDC Treaty considering overseas responsibilities of EDC states, without delaying parliamentary procedures. In the Steering Committee, the delegates explained that the French drafts revealed treaty changes and required a new ratification process; consequently, the French should withdraw the protocols. The foreign ministers agreed on 25 February 1953 that the French protocols should be rewritten to conform to the spirit and substance of the EDC Treaty. At the final session in Rome, the foreign ministers decided unanimously to press for speedy ratification of the EDC Treaty and disassociate the protocols from the treaty. Instructions to the Steering Committee.

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87 New York Times, 1 Mar. 1953, sec. 1, 33; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 313.


89 Times, 26 Feb. 1953, 8; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 543-544.
Committee were to rewrite the protocols considering France's special problems in Indochina and North Africa.\textsuperscript{90}

To emphasize its position, the FRG Government published DDR military strengths as of 1 March 1953: 120,000 men under arms, 25,000 in para-military organizations, 400,000 young people in sports and training organizations.\textsuperscript{91}

Non-French EDC Interim Committee members encountered new obstacles in broader French demands which included a Saar agreement that would satisfy French claims. Bidault also wanted the French representative in the NATO SG to become a political director recognized as the EDC ambassador, the purpose of which was to establish France as spokesman in NATO for the EDC states. Adenauer opposed Bidault's representation of the supplementary protocols and referred to the Rome Communiqué which stated that all governments were committed to expedite the treaty through their parliaments. He asserted that Bidault's explanation was unsuitable if France could discharge the treaties only after agreement on the protocols. Adenauer pointed out that negotiations in the EDC Interim Committee might delay ratification. On 3 March 1953 Bidault again answered that the protocols were only interpretive and supplementary; in his view, the Interim Committee had to deal with the

\textsuperscript{90}New York Times, 26 Feb. 1953, sec. 1, 1.

\textsuperscript{91}Times, 17 April 1953, 7.
unchanged French text on the basis of the Rome instructions. The controversy over the Rome Agreement was prominent in the Steering Committee. In the session of 4 March 1953, Alphand insisted on the old draft, but the other chiefs of delegation refused to discuss it and the conversation died. Meanwhile the Steering Committee proposed that the Legal Committee analyze the French draft in its relation to the treaty text. The Legal Committee evaluated, point-for-point, French wishes on their compatibility with the EDC Treaty and caused the French demands to vanish.  

Following the Soviet propaganda line, the DDR council of ministers announced on 5 March 1953 that all men from the FRG and West Berlin who refused military service could receive DDR citizenship. The DDR soon changed this line because Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 changed Soviet policy. Following Stalin's death, communist propaganda promoted the easing of tension and a softening of the accusation that the West followed an aggressive policy. Nevertheless, the communists repeatedly opposed FRG rearmament. Post-Stalinist propaganda spread slogans

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appropriate to individual target nations appealing to and strengthening apprehension of FRG dependence on the West and the fear of resurrected German military power; the FRG and Adenauer were continuous targets. When tactically appropriate, there was no anti-Americanism. Objects of agitation were NATO and the stationing of United States' troops in the FRG, both of which were said to represent preparation for aggression and causes of international tension.95

By this time, Britain was ready to send strong representation to the EDC and appeared ready to commit itself for fifty years if the United States would do likewise. British commitment of troops to the continent caused differences and disagreement in the negotiations between France and Britain in the first half of March 1953. The French government sought bilateral talks with the British, but the British wanted to include the other EDC states. The British cabinet did not agree on French wishes. Eden interceded for an EDC association, but Churchill refused to help France at the cost of British freedom of action. The FRG supported inclusion of the British in the European army or a guarantee for stationing British troops on the continent. The British knew that a promise would facilitate Franco-FRG agreement, but Eden would not oppose Churchill. Hence, France alleged

95Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 620-621.
that Britain promised not to withdraw troops from the continent without previous consultation with the EDC states. Franco-British conversations continued during the remainder of 1953.96

At Stalin's funeral on 9 March 1953, Georgi Malenkov stressed the possibility of coexistence and peaceful competition between the communist and capitalist systems; shortly thereafter, the intense anti-Western polemic stopped. For the first time in several years the Soviets permitted Western diplomats private contact with Soviet citizens, and after two years of fruitless talks in Korea, the communists became cooperative.97

The French protocols were still a problem in the West. On 10 March 1953, Blank presented the German case to the EDC Interim Committee: there could be no fundamental change to the EDC Treaty.98 According to Blank on 13 March 1953, the signatory states to the EDC Treaty considered the French protocols as an interpretation of the treaty.99

96Ibid., 549-550; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945-1953, 562.


Negotiations became complicated through other circumstances. On 18 March 1953, Bidault mentioned the possibility of a plebescite on the EDC Treaty, and the MRP considered an appeal to the population against a recalcitrant National Assembly. The plebescite, supported by Schuman, Teitgen, and Pleven, was the object of an intense publicity campaign favoring the EDC.\textsuperscript{100}

In spite of French tergiversation, with the coalition vote the Bundestag approved the Bonn and Paris Agreements on 19 March 1953, and on 15 May 1953 the Bundesrat agreed.\textsuperscript{101}

In mid-March 1953, the French displayed growing impatience for an agreement in the EDC Interim Committee. The reason appeared to be Mayer's visit to Washington on 24 March 1953 to request United States' economic aid for France. The French ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, urged his government to compromise with the other EDC states. The French project appeared exposed to other pressure as Netherlands' Foreign Minister Beyen explained his government's support for FRG acceptance into NATO should the EDC collapse; Belgium and Luxembourg delegates concurred with Beyen. In the meantime, Mayer wanted to maintain

\textsuperscript{100}Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 545.

the United States' good will while awaiting treaty ratification. On 24 March 1953 immediately before Mayer's departure, there was agreement on the protocols: an interchange of personnel between national and European armed forces could take place but not an interchange of roles. Accordingly, a dissolution of the French army within the EDC was impossible.102

The amended protocols added nothing practical to the treaty. The delegates ignored demands for changes in voting weight of individual member states in the ministerial council. NATO did not support the French demand for freedom to withdraw EDC troops to overseas areas, but there was agreement to direct the commission to issue instructions on this matter. On request the treaty was to place at the disposal of a member state troops requested from its EDC contingent; however, the NATO commander could refuse consent if the withdrawal threatened EDC security. Discussions regarding the status of French troops in the FRG and United States' aid produced no results. Only the United States could decide the question of the United States' military aid. In Washington, Mayer expected to renew the French demand for settlement of the Saar problem as a prerequisite.

for EDC ratification, but leaders in the United States' refusal to guarantee French sovereignty over the Saar.103

In France and the FRG on 26 March 1953, opposite views were expressed. Marshall Juin told the Defense Committee of the French National Assembly that the treaties held many guarantees against the FRG, and he recommended a revision of the EDC Treaty suitable to French national requirements. Blank reported to Adenauer on the French protocols and stressed that they must not modify the EDC Treaty. He presented the EDC Interim Committee's findings to the Bundestag Security Committee on 27 March 1953.104

In reaction to the Bundestag vote on the EDC Treaty, on 31 March 1953 the Soviet press called Adenauer a liar and accused him of trying to enslave the German people.105 From the summer of 1952 until the end of 1954 communist agitation centered on West European security against Germany. The main point in the "restoration of national German unity on democratic and peace-loving fundamentals" in the spring of 1953 was the "vital interests of all neighbors of Germany."

103The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 26 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Western European Security, Part 1, 781-784; The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 8 April 1953, ibid., 786-788; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 547-548.


"strengthening of peace in Europe," and "national hopes of the German people in a united country." 106

On 19 April 1953 the New York Times reported that the Amt Blank was making steady progress in completion of plans for rearmament despite slowness in ratification of the EDC Treaty. 107 With regard to organization plans, the Amt Blank presented a cogent view on integration at corps level. Since divisions from five or six nations must work closely together during wartime, why not become accustomed to this system in peacetime? 108

After Bundesrat approval of the treaties on 15 May 1953, the FRG ratification procedure was complete, and in spite of political loyalties SPD readiness to cooperate on the military contribution became clearer than had been previously. The regular briefings which Blank, Heusinger, and Speidel gave SPD leaders were important in winning SPD support. 109

In his EDC campaign, Blank had problems with some youth. At a CDU party meeting on 7 June 1953 in Bielefeld,

106 Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 622-623.
109 New York Times, 16 May 1953, sec. 1, 1; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 559; Fischer, Verteidigung, 40; Moch, Histoire du Rermement, 304.
hecklers interrupted him during a speech in which he pled for Germans to arm in defense of the West. Police removed several hecklers, but heckling continued throughout his speech.\(^{110}\)

On 10 June 1953, General Matthew B. Ridgeway (SACEUR) gave East Bloc strengths: 5.5 million men under arms, of which 4.5 million were Soviet troops organized into 175 combat divisions. There were thirty Soviet divisions in Europe.\(^{111}\) These figures tended to substantiate the East Bloc threat. On 13 June 1953 Grotewohl declared that a united Germany was a DDR objective.\(^ {112}\)

Meanwhile in East Berlin on 17 June 1953, Soviet tanks and armored cars entered the city after twenty thousand to fifty thousand workers, protesting new work rules, rioted; the Soviets declared martial law.\(^ {113}\) Establishment of armed forces in the DDR before 17 June 1953 was slow; KVP recruiting was suspended and orders to conduct military instruction for the SED and FDJ were countermanded; only SSD formations were reliable in the 17 June 1953 rebellion. An extensive purge of the KVP removed at least ten thousand men, but these actions created no fear of KVP authorities.

\(^ {111}\)Le Monde, 10 Jun. 1953.
\(^ {112}\)Le Monde, 14/15 Jun. 1953.
\(^ {113}\)Times, 17 Jun. 1953, 6.
because KVP unpopularity prompted many members to seek discharge.114

With the delay in the EDC Treaty, Blank took advantage of the time to accept an invitation to visit the United States. In reaction, on 17 June 1953, the French Conseil Superieur des Forces Armée prepared a resolution: Blank's trip would increase the danger of an agreement between the United States and the FRG on a defense contribution, and it was necessary to act as soon as possible to prevent a bilateral solution with FRG participation outside the EDC.115

On 22 June 1953 Blank and his entourage left Cologne for Paris. With him were Heusinger and several staff officers enroute to Washington. Prior to his departure, a reporter tried unsuccessfully to interview Blank, but Blank answered no questions. His silence was warranted because the French were sensitive about his contacts in Washington.116 Others accompanying Blank were Fett, Deputy to the Chief Military Delegate in the EDC Interim Committee and Organizational Chief of the Amt Blank; Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Huckelheim, expert for weapons and material; Lieutenant Colonel Werner Panitzky, Air Force, Deputy Chief

114Fischer, Verteidigung, 44; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 625-626.
115Der Spiegel, 1 Jul. 1953, 5.
116Ibid.
Division I
Central Division

1. General and Non-military Staff

2. Administration
   Administrative Organization

Division II
Military Division

1. Military Defense Questions

2. Military Organization

3. Military Personnel

4. Planning (Bonn)

Division III
Law and Administration

1. Law

2. Administration

Division IV
Accommodations and Billeting

Division V
Procurement Authority

A. General

B. British

C. French

Fig. 4—Amt Blank organization, 15 March 1953
of the subdivision Luftwaffe; and First Lieutenant Konrad Ahlers, press officer in the Amt Blank.117 (See Figure 4).

Coincidentally with Blank’s departure, the United States and the FRG announced on 23 June 1953 that they would raise the status of their respective envoys to ambassador.118 The FRG delegation sailed on 24 June 1953 on the America and arrived in New York on 30 June 1953.119 They were in the United States fifteen days. During the visit Blank met with the foreign ministers of the three major Western Allies, who agreed that the settlement of the condemned war criminal problem should be made with a coup de grace.120 Blank also participated in these negotiations to include Germans on an Allied interzonal clemency board for war criminals, an accomplishment of great psychological importance for the FRG role in a European army.121

On 28 June 1953, Joseph Laniel formed a new French government with Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister and André Pleven as Defense Minister. The Laniel government

118 Ibid.
120 Der Spiegel, 22 Jul. 1953, 5-6.
held essentially the same view as its predecessor on FRG rearment.1

Amid the EDC Treaty ratification procedure, there was a continuation of the East-West polemic, Franco-German animosities, French domestic fears, and German political rivalry. All of these conflicts interacted and affected the proposed EDC. Delay, demands for revision, and uncertainty did not deter Blank and the Amt Blank. They continued to plan and coordinate an FRG defense contribution.

CHAPTER IX

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY II (1953-1954)

In spite of the French delaying action, little changed. In the FRG the Amt Blank continued to plan for rearmament, the Germans debated the EDC issue, and political parties continually criticized the Government. Internationally, the East Bloc waged a propaganda campaign reflecting a change in tactics after Stalin died, but at the same time, the Soviets continued to build the armed force of the DDR.

In a forum in Tübingen on 5 July 1953, Carlo Schmid explained that the SPD considered four-power talks on Germany necessary but wanted to continue the policy of Western integration. The SPD was not ready to accept neutralization of a reunited Germany, and he agreed with the Government that Western support was essential for a united German state. Schmid stressed that the SPD was not a pacifist party but valued the right and duty of defense. He agreed with Deputy Fritz Erler on a military contribution under the assumption that the FRG's interests would be defended within NATO and that the FRG would have equal rights regarding freedom of decision on rearmament.¹

During July 1953 there were several noteworthy events. On 6 July 1953 the Soviets protested an alleged slander campaign in the Anglo-American press with respect to the 17 June 1953 uprising in East Europe and charged specifically that certain United States Congressmen had provoked the rebellion. At the end of his visit to the United States on 15 July 1953 in Washington, Blank held a news conference in which he expressed confidence in early ratification of the EDC Treaty and formation of an FRG armed force. On 18 July 1953 the Soviets warned France that the FRG was preparing to resurrect militarism under the direction of the United States as an instrument of aggression in Europe.

Continuing its planning, the Amt Blank announced on 20 July 1953 that the FRG recruiting system would be similar to the United States' selective service system. This system had to be in accord with innere Führung. In the second phase of innere Führung, planning and discussion shifted to the Bundestag and the public. In the summer of 1953 Heusinger, Baudissin, and Kielmansegg explained the reform concept to the Bundestag Committee for Questions on European Security. These discourses terminated in late summer 1954.

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2Pravda, 6 Jul. 1953, 5.
4Pravda, 18 Jul. 1953.
5Times, 21 Jul. 1953, 5.
after the committee approved the concept of innere Führung. The Amt Blank, responsible for forming an army in cooperation with professional representatives on human, political, and ethical issues, educated the public on the necessity for innere Führung.\(^6\)

The Soviets continued to display outward cooperation. Thus, the combatants signed an armistice in Korea on 27 July 1953.\(^7\) The Soviet Union on 5 August 1953 accepted a Western proposal for a four-power foreign ministers conference on the German question.\(^8\) Ironically, the Korean truce and Soviet willingness to participate in such a conference dampened enthusiasm for European integration, especially the EDC.\(^9\)

On 16 August 1953 Blank continued his effort to shape public opinion through an interview with a representative of a German youth organization. He emphasized that the new army would stress youth and their rights. It was to be democratic, with soldiers having the right to vote in civil elections. In the army there would be religious freedom, and soldiers could express their opinions and petition

\(^6\)Fischer, Verteidigung, 55.

\(^7\)Times, 27 Jul. 1953, 6.


their superiors. Blank's effort became more serious on 20 August 1953 when the Soviets announced a successful detonation of an H-bomb. Yet, his air of secrecy toward the Bundestag plenum emanated from Adenauer's policy of respect for Allied security and weakening of parliament. Disadvantages of this policy appeared in parliament during deliberations on the Volunteer Law. By September 1953 the Amt Blank had received applications from 105,000 volunteers, whose acceptance required EDC Treaty ratification and the passage of the Volunteer Law authorizing their induction.

During his tenure as chief of the Amt Blank, Blank maintained his seat in the Bundestag, which meant that he conducted election campaigns near the end of his term. On 4 September 1953 while making a speech in Bocholt in his Ruhr constituency, he had a mild heart attack. Doctors ordered complete rest; however, he soon recovered and returned to work.

In an attempt to intimidate FRG voters, on 5 September 1953, the Soviets warned that if the EDC Treaty and the Bonn

12 Greiner, "Dienststelle, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124.
Agreements went into effect, reunification of Germany would be impossible. The Soviets lost credibility in the FRG where the revolt of 17 June 1953 in East Berlin and other German cities discredited the communists. This event and the ineffective SPD campaign against Adenauer convinced many undecided voters that Adenauer's policy was correct. Consequently, in the Bundestag election of 6 September 1953, the KPD sustained such a crushing defeat that it forfeited its Bundestag representation. The CDU/CSU gained an overwhelming victory giving the Government coalition more than two-thirds of all seats. Therewith, the SPD lost its political relevance and the Government majority was at liberty to accommodate the Basic Law to the requisites of the FRG defense policy. In Moscow the Soviets proclaimed that the West German elections took place under a reign of terror.


16Le Monde, 8 Sept. 1953; Times, 18 Jun. 1953, 8; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 559-560.


18Fischer, Verteidigung, 52.

19Pravda, 7 Sept. 1953.
Before the Bundestag election of September 1953, Blank was prepared to ask Adenauer for autonomy over his office. Following the election, Adenauer expressed his intent to nominate Blank Minister Without Portfolio since there were internal and external repercussions involved in making Blank defense minister. Because the FRG was still occupied, there was fear that it might delay the EDC Treaty. There was also a constitutional question. In addition, a rumor circulated that Blank would resign as chief of the Amt Blank and Franz Josef Strauss would replace him.

In September 1953, Blank led the Amt Blank and the Foreign Office in a study of Adenauer's concept for a European security system: a demilitarized zone on both sides of the Oder-Neisse line from the Elbe to the Vistula and from the Baltic Sea south across Europe to Trieste; Germany west of the Elbe would be garrisoned only by EDC troops; areas east of the Vistula, except Rumania, would be garrisoned only by satellite troops; Soviet troops were to withdraw to Russia. Yet as of 16 September 1953 the Amt Blank had submitted no plans.

22 Le Monde, 18/19 Oct. 1953.
In accordance with the growing importance of the FRG military contribution, in 1953 SHAPE redefined forward defense: when sufficient FRG troops were ready, the defense line would be the zonal border rather than the Rhine River. Simultaneously, interdiction of hostile reserves and nuclear weapons became part of the NATO plan. Until the EDC Treaty was ratified, however, the Germans were not to participate in the planning for that defense.

Coordination between the Foreign Office and the Amt Blank was not as close as it could have been. This policy may have been deliberate since the Foreign Office supervised the Paris negotiations. Only the Foreign Office, under whose auspices Blank negotiated, gave instructions to the delegation; however, instructions passed through an interministerial committee, a procedure which contributed to delay and reduced the time available for coordination.

In September 1953 in the DDR KVP recruiting resumed. After the 17 June 1953 riots the regime gave priority to political reliability. Masking of the KVP military nature, neglected since the spring of 1952, was renewed. The Soviets supplied weapons and heavy equipment, a military academy in Dresden trained staff officers, and all organization and weapons technology followed the Soviet

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24 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 558-559.

model. The KVP had infantry and mechanized divisions, but was smaller than planned.26

Although Blank supported the Bundestag committees and was present at the first twenty-four sessions, he had detractors. He gained SPD support for the Amt Blank in the fall and winter of 1953 through public information.27 In this endeavor Blank had competition from Franz Josef Strauss, his Bavarian rival, who prepared to attack Blank. Strauss' plan was to put himself in the cabinet, hold Blank out of the cabinet, and after ratification of the EDC Treaty make Blank the FRG member of the EDC commission in Paris. This maneuver would permit Strauss to become defense minister. Blank observed but said nothing. By 15 October 1953 it was apparent that Strauss would become minister without portfolio with the capability of watching the EDC and the Amt Blank. There was no action on Blank or the Amt Blank, but Adenauer gave Blank less information than previously. Blank sought no ministerial rank, only suitable autonomy and independence from the Chancellor's bureaucracy; he wanted to represent the Amt Blank before the Bundestag

26 Times, 23 Sept. 1953, 6; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 626-627.

and in the cabinet. Blank's method of obtaining Adenauer's attention was an abrupt tender of resignation.28

In a letter of 15 October 1953 to the Chancellor, Blank threatened to resign unless he received a seat and voice in the cabinet and representation of defense matters before the Bundestag.29 Prior to receipt of the letter, Adenauer in a special cabinet session announced that the defense sector was in good hands under Blank. The Chancellor assured the public that he would announce a defense ministry in a few months and that Blank would become the defense minister. Blank was to have a free hand in his work.30

On the morning of 16 October 1953 before Adenauer had Blank's letter, the CDU/CSU faction chairman met him in the Bundeshaus concerning Blank. Adenauer expressed confidence in Blank and promised a later appointment as defense minister. When he returned to the Palais Schaumburg, he found Blank's letter, which showed clearly that the problem was operational. The seven hundred man Amt Blank required special authority and independence; it was no longer permissible that the Amt Blank, whose preparations for the FRG defense contribution endured and whose representatives


Fig. 5—Amt Blank organization, 1 January 1954
negotiated with full plenipotentiary powers, sign correspondence under the letter head of the Federal Chancellor's Office.\textsuperscript{31} On 16 October 1953 Adenauer wanted to present two new cabinet members to the Bundestag. He had offered Heinrich von Brentano the position of Minister of European Affairs and acting Foreign Minister. This appointment was frustrated by opposition of Beamten in the Foreign Office, State Secretary Hallstein, and Ministerial Director Blankenhorn. Blank's tender of resignation and the Brentano problem upset Adenauer, who rejected the resignation and expressed confidence in Blank. Hence, Blank was to become independent of the Chancellor's Office in the second government.\textsuperscript{32}

In late 1953 there was a reorganization of the Amt Blank (See Figure 5), which became effective 1 January 1954. While waiting for ratification of the EDC Treaty, the Amt Blank made plans and drafts of fundamental laws: a Volunteer Law, disciplinary rights including laws and regulations, a military punishment ordinance, and terms of service. In the scientific area, formulas were devised for establishing armament programs and presenting requirements for industry and research. They also worked out the basic concept of the new FRG army, the main effort of which concerned personnel


\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid}. 
planning, military service, troop organization, and armament.33

In France, international issues became complex. In October 1953 Radio Moscow alleged that France was a party to a secret clause in the EDC Treaty.34 The less important the negotiations with the United States and Britain, the more the French government sought to improve its domestic political situation through success against the FRG. In late fall 1953 the French requested a guarantee from the United States to keep troops in the FRG indefinitely, but the United States would not act. As it became clear that France would not fulfill its troop obligations set at Lisbon, the French demanded that the FRG be limited to the same percentage as France. The French raised anew the demand that French armed forces in the FRG have the same status as British and United States' troops.35 Bidault, on 30 October 1953, stated that France could not ratify the EDC Treaty until there was a settlement of the Saar issue.36 The French wanted to annex the Saar and prevent its economic association with the FRG. On 9 November 1953 Adenauer refused to negotiate on this basis and added that there had

33Fischer, Verteidigung, 62.
35Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 549-550.
been no conversation on a link between the EDC Treaty and the Saar.\textsuperscript{37}

On 16 November 1953 General Alfred Gruenther, the SHAPE Commander, and High Commissioner Conant called on Adenauer. Present were Hallstein, Blank, Speidel, and Heusinger. Speidel expressed disappointment on the lack of progress in the Saar talks. Adenauer added his doubt on EDC ratification and talked to Gruenther about a United States-British-FRG agreement should the EDC collapse.\textsuperscript{38}

Dulles officially acknowledged the EDC as the only solution and instructed all United States' officials to refuse discussion of alternatives. He, as well as Eisenhower, considered a supra-national European alliance necessary to strengthen the free world. He also saw the overcoming of national animosity between the Germans and their neighbors and integration of the FRG with the West as politically and morally urgent objectives. Dulles' appearance of relying entirely on the EDC solution was a facade; he steered this course to exert pressure on France.


\textsuperscript{38}The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 16 November 1953, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Western European Security}, Part 1, 840-841.
He was convinced that France used the discussion of alternatives as a pretext to avoid a decision.39

There was never much sympathy for the EDC in Britain; the government supported the EDC to maintain good relations with the United States. To British leaders, French delay in ratification of the treaty caused doubt that the European army would materialize. Therefore, the Foreign Office devised a plan to bring the FRG into NATO and bind the FRG to the Brussels Pact of 1948. This proposal remained a close secret, and no foreign politician or diplomat appeared to know of it at the time. In 1953, British leaders more and more detected a French readiness to defeat the EDC, but concealed their displeasure at new French demands. The British believed that it would be best for the West to abandon the EDC and agree to an FRG military contribution within NATO.40

In an effort to prevent France from ratifying the EDC Treaty, on 7 December 1953, the DDR parliament sent a letter to the French National Assembly appealing for a union of France and peace-loving Germans to defeat FRG rearmament.41

After Adenauer's victory in September 1953, the Soviets

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40 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 554-555.

41 Times, 8 Dec. 1953, 6.
courted France, emphasizing the ninth anniversary of the Franco-Soviet friendship pact which occurred on 10 December 1953.\textsuperscript{42}

To motivate the French to act, Dulles emphasized the necessity for the EDC. At the winter meeting of the NAC in Paris on 14 December 1953, he expressed doubt that Europe could become secure if France and the FRG did not get together in the EDC. West Europe had to evolve soon into a political, economic, and military unit including both countries; otherwise, United States policy would submit to an "agonizing reappraisal." The French public viewed Dulles' statements indignantly.\textsuperscript{43}

In London on 21 December 1953, Blank stressed that the EDC would prevent rebirth of Prussian militarism, and he gave details on plans to safeguard against this condition.\textsuperscript{44} The Amt Blank dealt with this and other aspects of the defense contribution beginning with the Himmeroder Denkschrift and continuing through the EDC Treaty. Reaching its zenith during this period, the Amt Blank made plans and

\textsuperscript{42}Pravda, 10 Dec. 1953.


\textsuperscript{44}Le Monde, 22 Dec. 1953.
schedules. Although the main tasks concerned military and administrative technicalities, the Amt Blank prepared recommendations on basic issues such as health service, military administration, and employment of technicians. French EDC opposition tended to overshadow this work, and the reorganization of 1 January 1954 was characterized by inaction on the EDC. On 1 January 1954 the subdivision Innere Führung was reestablished in the Military Division, from which it had been detached in 1952. Thereafter, the spiritual structure received a higher priority.45

On 2 January 1954, Molotov declared that the Soviet people wanted peace.46 This declaration may have influenced France since the French government did not increase its efforts for EDC ratification. Laniel on 6 January 1954, after the public announcement of a forthcoming four-power Berlin conference on Germany, was optimistic about ratification of the EDC Treaty.47

In early 1954, the Soviets launched a peace drive to defeat the EDC and soften the Western attitude toward the Soviet Union.48 They used international negotiations to influence world opinion, especially the Berlin Conference

45Fischer, Verteidigung, 62-63.
46Pravda, 2 Jan. 1954.
from 25 January to 18 February 1954. To be sure, the United States and Britain expected the Berlin negotiations to clarify the Soviet position on a political settlement in middle-Europe, but no Soviet inclination toward concession was perceptible. Indeed, the Soviets used the Berlin Conference as a platform to attack the EDC and NATO. The Soviets gave the impression that they were prepared for diplomatic talks and in the ensuing months repeatedly used diplomatic contacts with the West to attain their goals.

For example, they appealed to the French to strengthen the Franco-Soviet mutual security pact. The Berlin negotiators exacerbated the situation in France when Bidault announced that the EDC Treaty would remain valid in the event of German reunification. On 3 February 1954, reiterating that France and the Soviet Union must act together for peace, Molotov proposed that France abandon the EDC and renew cooperation with the Soviet Union. He alleged mutual security interests of France and the Soviet Union vis-a-vis German militarism and opined that both

49Eisenhower, Mandate, 342.


52Bidault, Resistance, 190; Fischer, Verteidigung, 41; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 61-62.

nations had to press for firm Franco-Soviet relations. He again proposed the Soviet draft for the German peace treaty of 10 March 1952, which plan called for a neutralization of Germany. The peace treaty would prohibit Germany from entering an alliance directed against any nation that had been at war with Germany.

During the Berlin Conference the Soviets replaced the demand for a German peace treaty with the demand for a common European treaty based on collective security: all European states would be united in a regional security pact committed to the renunciation of threats and the assurance of mutual military support in case of aggression. For Germany, which the Soviets expected to remain temporarily divided, withdrawal of occupation troops except for reduced contingents would apply to the Soviet Union in the DDR and to the United States, Britain, and France in the FRG. Should there be a security threat in Germany, the Soviet Union and the Western states would have the right to military action in their respective zones. The mutual assistance pledge for the NATO region would make the Soviet


Union an ally. The purpose of this Soviet project was to foil the EDC and destroy NATO. Alliances not conforming to the goals of the pact were not permissible. The FRG would become more susceptible to Eastern influence than it had been since the United States would depart Europe militarily and politically, and, of course, the Soviets retained the right to return to Germany with troops. Security against the United States' war preparations and FRG remilitarization formed the basis of the Soviet argument.57

At the Berlin Conference French diplomats tried to learn if the Soviets would bargain for renunciation of the EDC, but Molotov would not respond. Soviet leaders did not want an agreement on European issues; they wanted to manipulate Western governments through diplomacy. Yet, on Molotov's initiative, the delegates agreed to a five-power conference concerning Asian issues, specifically Indochina. Molotov fulfilled his promise after Mendès-France announced an Indochina policy and set a course to revise the EDC. To the Soviets, who tended to interpret political events in black and white terms, Mendès-France's position may have

appeared as a total renunciation of the United States. On 5 March 1954, Molotov called on Europe to reject the EDC as the course to World War III. After Soviet leaders demonstrated that they sought no understanding on the German problem, EDC supporters in France believed it might be possible to put together a parliamentary majority for the EDC Treaty, but Gaullists in the government obstructed actions of EDC proponents.

The Soviets succeeded in the subversion of a few West Germans. On 27 March 1954 the Amt Blank announced the arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Heinz, former head of Amt Blank counter intelligence. Heinz and four other people employed by the Amt Blank had connections with the Soviet Union.

On 31 March 1954 the Soviets sent a note to the Western representatives to the Berlin Conference explaining that they would agree to include the United States in their thirty-two nation security pact if the Soviet Union could join NATO. Acceptance of this proposal could slightly diminish Soviet prerogatives and eliminate the United States militarily as a counter-weight to Soviet power in Europe.

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58Eden, Full Circle, 71-75; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 641.


since the voting power would be diluted and the East Bloc would probably wield veto power over decisions counter to its interests. In the meantime, the FRG would remain a military vacuum.  

In the UN disarmament negotiations, the Soviets sought to work diplomatically against the EDC, and from the spring of 1954 wooed British and French delegates. On 29 April 1954, relative military strengths of East and West appeared in the press. The Soviet Union was reported to have twenty-two combat ready divisions in the DDR and within thirty days the East Bloc could mobilize four hundred divisions. In contrast, NATO was shown to have the mobilization potential of one hundred divisions. In 1954 in the FRG there were 18,000 Bundesgrenzshutz (BGS), 10,000 readiness police and 55,000 police in the Länder, and 35,000 communal police. Added to that figure were 2350 Bavarian border police, 2800 traffic police, 850 federal passport control officials, and 11,800 customs officials. In spite of Soviet peace


63 Times, 30 Apr. 1954, 6.

overtures, in Moscow, Marshal Georgiy K. Zhukov on 9 May 1954 warned that the United States was "playing with dangerous fire."65

Internationally, Soviet policy demanded a German peace treaty. The Soviets, claiming the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements as the only legal basis for a German settlement, used the slogan "German self-determination" to exclude Western influence on German reunification to reach that goal through the DDR regime. Hence, the Soviets rejected common German elections as a subject for four-power negotiations. Molotov explained at the Berlin Conference that the German people could not be the object of decisions by other nations; the German problem was a matter exclusively for the Germans.66

In France the Laniel government fell at the beginning of June 1954; in spite of official loyalty to the EDC it had given little support.67 The majority in the National Assembly, as well as many other Frenchmen, was displeased with the Indochina war, especially after Dien Bien Phu fell.68 Radical-Socialist Pierre Mendès-France became Premier and kept his promise to end the Indochina conflict


66 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 638-639.


through negotiations, but there was doubt that the
government would support the EDC Treaty.69 Despite French
domestic problems, Blank, in a radio interview on 4 June
1954, said he expected the EDC Treaty to be effective in the
autumn.70

In his investiture speech on 18 June 1954, Mendès-
France said he wanted to reconcile the parties disputing
over the EDC and restore national unity.71 He announced a
new proposal and would submit precise changes to the
National Assembly before the summer vacation. His announce-
ment prompted several alternatives from French politicians
who wanted to convert the EDC into a coordinating agency
without a supra-national character and with a coalition
army.72

Since Mendès-France's behavior revealed a new struggle
for revision, Adenauer believed the moment had come to
publish FRG demands. He reminded the Western nations of
unredeemed promises given in May 1953 to recognize FRG
independence. At a CDU rally in Düsseldorf 20 June 1954 he
explained that the German people could not wait forever for

69New York Times, 15 Jun. 1954, sec. 1, 1; Nutting,
70Le Monde, 5 Jun. 1954.
71New York Times, 18 Jun. 1954, sec. 1, 1; Nutting,
Europe Will Not Wait, 65.
72Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 320.
restoration of sovereignty. If the EDC Treaty ratification process were to last a long time, the German people could no longer wait for the return of their freedom and sovereignty. FRG Ambassador Heinz Krekeler in Washington emphasized the speech to Dulles and expressed hope for early EDC ratification; otherwise, the FRG should receive its sovereignty. With that initiative the linkage between relaxation of the Occupation Statute and settlement of the FRG defense contribution became weak.73

Mendès-France's policy of internal French reconciliation indicated that the French government wanted to change the EDC Treaty unilaterally. He tried to remove this apprehension, and on 20 June 1954 assured Assistant Secretary of State Bedell Smith that he supported the EDC and wanted to ratify the treaties as soon as the Indochina problem was solved. He explained that his success at the Geneva Conference on Indochina would increase his personal prestige to influence the National Assembly for ratification of the EDC Treaty. He described the proposed changes as minor supplements to be submitted to the EDC states after ratification and said the changes were necessary as a condition for approval of the EDC Treaty in parliament.74

74Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 563.
In a speech by Ambassador Douglas Dillon on 29 June 1954, the United States warned against the French policy of deviating from the EDC. Dillon emphasized the political maturity demonstrated by the FRG and said that further defense of the FRG through NATO required a suitable FRG contribution. Dillon gave France two alternatives: FRG rearmament through the EDC or an independent FRG national army. Following conversations between Eisenhower and Churchill, a United States-British study group met in London to discuss alternatives in case France did not ratify the treaties. Should France not ratify the treaties by the end of August 1954, the date set by Mendès-France, the West considered a unilateral declaration granting sovereign rights to the FRG as provided in the Bonn treaties. The West sought French support of this position, but did not intend to preclude subsequent French ratification of the EDC Treaty.

In the United States, the House Mutual Security Bill of 30 June 1954 specified that all military aid for European projects be halted for nations refusing to ratify the EDC Treaty.

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Several days after Mendès-France's investiture, the Benelux states proposed a meeting in Brussels of the EDC foreign ministers. The goal was to force France to state a clear position on the EDC. Should France agree, she would practically relinquish her demands for treaty revision because there was insufficient time to achieve an agreement on changes. Mendès-France, refusing the proposal while welcoming the idea, explained that his involvement in the Indochina negotiations would not permit his participation at Brussels.78

Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak went to Paris to ascertain Mendès-France's intentions. Mendès-France assured Spaak that he would come to Brussels before the French parliament acted on the EDC Treaty, but insisted that the EDC Treaty be modified. Since the French tried to give the impression that the FRG opposed the French revision only to create delay, it appeared that they were trying to create disunity and thereby break the isolation into which France was falling. To strengthen this ploy, at the beginning of July 1954, Mendès-France announced that he would send an emissary to Bonn to discuss the subject.79

Adenauer opposed the view that he was ready to abandon the EDC. On 2 July 1954 he said that FRG sovereignty was overdue and EDC chances were doubtful. He disputed allegations that he was considering alternatives to the EDC, expressed confidence in early French ratification, and spoke against establishment of an FRG national army. He explained that he could not accept French demands for treaty modification. In his view it was unreasonable that EDC ratification completed in four EDC states should begin anew; he was not ready for a bilateral treaty with France. He pointed out the necessity for close FRG agreement with the Benelux countries, Britain, and the United States, and objected to a European policy without France or against France. The French press reacted with agitation, and Mendès-France cancelled the emissary's visit to Bonn.80

On 10 July 1954 during the Indochina conference, Mendès-France had a conversation with Molotov, who put no conditions on his offer of diplomatic assistance. Molotov assumed that Mendès-France would continue the anti-United States theme. Following the successful Indochina conference, they met on 21 July 1954 at which time Mendès-

80Le Monde, 6 Jul. 1954; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 568-570.
France unsuccessfully explored the possibility of settling the German issue.  

Advised that the Germans in Bonn had misjudged Mendès-France, Adenauer in mid-July 1954 sent a German acquaintance of Mendès-France to ascertain the possibility of a conversation. Mendès-France expressed displeasure with FRG mistrust and said the treaties in their present form had no chance of ratification. If the FRG did not accept his view, it could try for a settlement at the Brussels Conference; otherwise, it could expect the EDC to fail. Mendès-France was ready for a meeting with Adenauer and so informed him. At first Adenauer accepted the invitation, but later reconsidered, believing it better to avoid contact with Mendès-France. It appears that Adenauer believed it possible for the French parliament to ratify the treaties and that a meeting would weaken EDC support by implying an FRG advance to the Premier.  

The French government was irritated over Adenauer's attitude, but wanted to keep the negotiations alive. Mendès-France's principal concern was to bring the Indochina war to a conclusion, and Soviet cooperation helped him achieve this goal on 21 July 1954. Thereupon, EDC supporters within and without France demanded that he use

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82Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 570-571.
his prestige to force parliament to ratify the treaties. Thus, he decided to play the role of arbitrator between EDC supporters and opponents for a mediated formula as he had announced on 18 June 1954.83

By the end of July 1954 Mendès-France was convinced there would be no majority in the French National Assembly for the EDC Treaty.84 Being well informed, Otto Grotewohl on 5 August 1954 announced that the Bonn and Paris Agreements would prevent a German accord.85 After Mendès-France's accession to office the Soviets concentrated on France, represented at the disarmament talks by EDC opponent Jules Moch. Shortly after his arrival in Paris in August 1954, Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov talked to Moch and expressed Soviet readiness to relax international tension and work for disarmament. Moch told him the Soviet Union could support the Franco-British disarmament plan of 11 June 1954; however, to avoid the impression in France that it was an anti-EDC maneuver, there would be no immediate announcement. A week later Vinogradov told Moch the Soviets accepted the Franco-British plan.86

Immediately prior to the EDC debate in the French

83 Le Monde, 21 Jul. 1954; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 570.
84 Eden, Full Circle, 164-166.
National Assembly, Poland, appealing to traditional Franco-
Polish friendship against Germany, invited France to join an
assistance pact against the FRG to prevent a war for
hegemony over her lost territory.\textsuperscript{87}

Mendès-France persevered, and on 13 August 1954
proposed to his cabinet a "use protocol" which was a radical
revision of the EDC Treaty. It had thirteen changes and was
a conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union. This "use
protocol" was a step-by-step decentralized procedure for
fulfillment of the French demand for guarantees by the
United States and Britain, a renunciation of the supra-
national character of the EDC, economic preference for
France, and political and military discrimination against
the FRG. Experts from the participating states concluded
that every point would require a repetition of the
ratification procedure in those countries having already
accepted the treaties.\textsuperscript{88}

The French proposal was directed toward maintenance of
national sovereignty and retention of national authority.
Although only EDC states could make proposals, the protocol
contained numerous regulations for the United States and
Britain. Should guarantees be denied, each state would be
free to decide whether to continue its membership. Several


\textsuperscript{88}New York Times, 13 Aug. 1954, sec. 1, 1; Nutting,
Europe Will Not Wait, 66-67.
paragraphs pertained to special advantages for France.

France had returned to the memorandum of 15 February 1951, which had been rejected on 2 July 1951: the FRG would submit to control from which other states were exempt, integration of national units in a European armed force would be limited in ground and tactical air units, and all FRG organizations were to be under European command while other nations could introduce only part of their armies into the EDC. Other EDC delegates in Brussels, the United States observer, and French EDC supporters believed that the protocols were designed for rejection. Otherwise, it was impossible to explain why Mendès-France had systematically compiled all points unacceptable to the EDC states during the Paris Conference of 1951.89

The West withheld an offer of military sovereignty to the FRG as a provisional ploy to reduce the pressure in France against ratification. The United States and Britain convinced the Germans that in the event of an EDC collapse FRG admission to NATO would be the course of action. Should France veto FRG membership in NATO, there was a good prospect for a United States-British-FRG military alliance. Both nations announced their support of the EDC and would accept an alternative reluctantly. Mendès-France knew that

an FRG military contribution was inevitable in one form or another.90

Mendès-France's proposal risked the internal political danger of uniting EDC opponents and supporters in mutual rejection. Hence, his justification for revision was weak: the treaties, which commanded no majority, required amendment to overcome domestic political opposition and mobilize a majority for the EDC. Although his appeasement course of 18 June 1954 was wrecked, Mendès-France persisted in his proposal and insisted that it conformed to the will of a broad parliamentary majority.91

On 14 August 1954 Mendès-France presented his view to the French people on radio. His main objection to the EDC was that it affected French national sensibility. The choice was between an FRG rearmament which France could supervise and one which would remove all French control. His reference to the alternatives of a supervised and unsupervised FRG military force informed the French that they could not reject every solution. He argued for a positive decision because the United States and Britain intended to restore FRG sovereignty and withhold its military authority only temporarily. He defended his proposal as the best compromise that the EDC states and the

90Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 567.
French public could accept; however, he was prepared, if necessary, to consider other proposals. The other EDC states, the United States, and Britain promptly rejected the French demands.92

Most of the French cabinet agreed with Mendès-France, but three of the five Gaullist cabinet members (Koenig, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Maurice Lemaire) considered his proposals so serious that they withdrew on 16 August 1954. On the same day, the French sent the proposed revisions to the EDC states, the United States, and Britain. The Gaullist RPF would not support Mendès-France. French "Europeans" would not accept the proposed solution as a compromise, and on 20 August 1954 Schuman rejected the proposal.93

The Brussels Conference of EDC foreign ministers began on 19 August 1954. Blank and Adenauer arrived the previous day for talks with members of the French delegation.94 Before and during the conference Adenauer avoided the personal conversation with Mendès-France that he had


suggested in July 1954; he communicated with Mendès-France through Paul-Henri Spaak.95 At the first session, Mendès-France declared that the unamended treaties could not receive a majority in the French parliament. He represented his demands as the only means to prevent a NATO crisis, to avoid neutralization of Germany, and to reproach French EDC supporters for playing into Soviet hands by opposing the protocols. He alleged that the United States did not entirely oppose the protocols, which in his view contained no discrimination but merely a "difference of facts." Finally, Mendès-France included a request for solution of the Saar problem prior to FRG participation in the EDC.96

Conference delegates responded. Netherlands Foreign Minister Beyen declared himself ready for compromise if the spirit of the EDC would not be affected, but he rejected the French proposal since it did not conform to this assumption and would require new ratification.97 Attlio Piccioni, of the Italian Foreign Ministry, cited three conditions under which Italy would meet the French demands half-way: preservation of the supra-national principle, non-discrimination against partner states, and avoidance of


96Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 66; Fischer, Verteidigung, 41; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 581-582; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955, 279.

a new ratification procedure. Exercising self-restraint, Adenauer merely said the French protocols were unacceptable because they required a new agreement by the EDC states. Hence, he held fast to his goal of May 1952: political integration of Europe in a political community. Spaak favored a compromise dividing the French proposals into two categories not requiring ratification and which could not go into effect without parliamentary approval.

Prior to evaluating the French proposal, representatives of the other EDC states contacted Bruce, who confirmed that the United States supported the EDC. To avoid discrediting Mendès-France, he explained that Mendès-France was misinformed. The United States' position convinced the five foreign ministers that their view was correct. Experts conferred on the morning of 20 August 1954, but reached no substantive agreement. When the EDC states rejected the French proposal, the United States and Britain reacted. The British government, whose antipathy Mendès-France expected, informed him that it considered modification acceptable only so far as it required no new ratification. United States Ambassador in Brussels Frederick Alger on 20 August 1954 urged Mendès-France not to

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98 Ibid., 282.
99 Ibid., 278-279.
refuse a reasonable compromise. The United States and
Britain wanted Mendès-France to accept Spaak's mediation.
After midnight the conference participants departed with no
agreement. On the afternoon of 21 August 1954 in
conversations lasting until late night, Spaak sought a
solution acceptable to Mendès-France.101

The five other EDC states finally agreed on
concessions. They granted the right of secession should
NATO disintegrate, the United States and Britain reduce
their responsibilities, or a reunited Germany separate; they
agreed with decentralization. Even though the five states
met most French demands, Mendès-France was adamant on all
points: discrimination against the FRG, expanded veto of the
ministerial council, veto by member states against the
commission, and elimination of the law courts. The
conference adjourned on the night of 21-22 August 1954 with
no success. Mendès-France left Brussels with the
explanation that stubbornness of the other EDC states sealed
the fate of the EDC; with these insignificant changes, the
National Assembly would reject the treaties.102

101 Eisenhower, Mandate, 402; Wettig, Entmilitar-
isierung, 584-585.

102 New York Times, 22 Aug. 1954, sec. 1, 1; Nutting,
Europe Will Not Wait, 67-68; Wettig, Entmilitarisi-
ierung, 585-586; U. S. Department of State, "Text of
Mendès-France went from Brussels to Britain where Churchill and Eden welcomed him on 23 August 1954 in Chartwell. The British leaders refused to discuss alternatives to the EDC with Mendès-France and urged him to motivate the National Assembly to vote for the treaties including the Brussels concessions. They pointed out that France was already isolated and would be entirely alone should the French parliament reject the EDC Treaty. Even though Mendès-France was certain of a negative vote, on British urging he appeared to promise support for the EDC. They told him that if the EDC failed another solution would follow immediately, with or without France.

Mendès-France accepted the ideas of the British leaders and indicated that the FRG could be attached to NATO or a smaller group. Simultaneously, he declared himself in favor of an early return of FRG sovereignty. Churchill and Eden cautioned him about being too confident of new negotiations. Should the French parliament not agree, the FRG would enter NATO on the basis of equality.

Following the Brussels Conference there were several more attempts to reach an agreement with Mendès-France. Antoine Pinay, with support of EDC proponents, proposed to

103Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 67; Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 310.
104Eisenhower, Mandate, 402.
105Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 587.
put the EDC into effect for an eighteen month test period. On 25 August 1954 Spaak offered a broader concession whereby a commission decision contested by a member would be brought before the ministerial council. Mendès-France agreed to neither and set a course for rejection.106

On 28 August 1954 when Mendès-France submitted the EDC Treaty to the National Assembly, he presented advantages and disadvantages, but did not recommend ratification.107 He mentioned the relation of the FRG to the West and hinted that in the event of rejection an equivalent agreement would obtain shortly. He implied that the FRG would receive its sovereignty in either case, but sovereignty would not include military authority. He assured the deputies that a new agreement on FRG rearmament could not succeed without French participation. Many deputies, not realizing that FRG rearmament was inevitable, appeared to have been duped by the denial of FRG military sovereignty. After introduction of the EDC Treaty, the National Assembly began debate on 28 August 1954.108 Before both sides had completed their arguments, the oratory ended on 30 August 1954 with a motion


107 Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 67-68.

for adjournment *sine die*. The motion carried by a vote of 319 to 264 with forty-three abstaining. With that evasive action, the National Assembly rejected the treaties.

When the French parliament rejected the EDC Treaty on 30 August 1954, briefly there was uncertainty in the Amt Blank about conversion of the supra-national to a national contingent with a national command organization; however, the decision was for a national command organization with the provision that the defense contribution be within NATO. For the top command organization in the FRG contingent, the Amt Blank considered all modes, and the FRG selected the United States' model. The perception was of a defense ministry having divisions for Administration, Budget, Justice, Support and Accommodations, Defense Economics, Technology, and the Foreign Division. Military divisions were for armed forces, army, air force, and navy. This "Joint Armed Forces" concept avoided supreme commands and guaranteed uniformity in handling defense matters.

The Soviets, perceiving the demise of the EDC as a triumph of their policy, condemned the Western policy of

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111 Fischer, *Verteidigung*, 63.
"strength." The Soviet belief that Mendès-France had rejected the European army and NATO led them to assume that the FRG defense contribution was no longer important. Thus, the Soviet Union did not extend its 30 August 1954 "success" by political action, but on 10 September 1954 resubmitted the project for a security pact.¹²

The SPD insisted that rearmament required a constitutional change, but the Government wanted to avoid a change in Article 24 of the Basic Law. At the SPD party conference of 1954, Erich Ollenhauer and Adolf Arndt made proposals for a democratic structure and civil control of the defense apparatus: appointment of military deputies from parliament, laws for the parliamentary security committee, explanation of the responsibility of the defense minister versus parliament. Control was to be exercised by state secretaries in the defense ministry. Adenauer supported this system and offered a position to the SPD, but Ollenhauer refused the appointment to avoid an obligation to Adenauer's defense policy. Prior to 1954, the appointed CDU state secretary was to establish this position from the coalition parties, but he did not do it.¹³

¹²Pravda, 10 Sept. 1954.
Amt Blank. With the signing of the Bonn and Paris treaties on 26 and 27 May 1952, there was great optimism for early ratification with an accompanying realization of the EDC and FRG sovereignty. The belief persisted that early ratification required plans for early implementation. The anticipation of early ratification prompted the Amt Blank to work with delegates from the other EDC states for completion of details, time tables, and responsibilities associated with implementation. Accordingly, the Amt Blank was busy in Bonn and Paris drafting the myriad laws, regulations, and ordinances necessary to implement formation of the FRG contingent. In spite of Western hopes for success, all did not proceed as planned. External problems emanating from traditional French fears, internal political problems, and continuous harassment by the East Bloc delayed EDC ratification and wore thin the nerves of those charged with adjusting to the day-to-day uncertainty.

On 30 August 1954 when the French National Assembly removed the EDC Treaty from further consideration, a new era in the FRG rearmament program began. Although the previous Amt Blank work was worthwhile, Blank and his entourage were faced with a new set of problems and new challenges, all of which they met successfully. They adjusted and continued to plan for rearmament.
ACCESSION TO NATO (1954-1955)

The collapse of the EDC was a momentous event for both East and West. The Soviets perceived it as a breakdown of Anglo-American leadership and an opportunity to recover their influence in Europe. The West viewed the collapse as a challenge to bring the FRG into the Western defense system rapidly and completely. Quick reaction by Western leaders led to the proposal and acceptance of a new approach, and in spite of continued French opposition, the West responded favorably to the new initiative. The East Bloc lost its bid for leadership in Western Europe, and Western leadership became stronger. At all steps in this involved process, Blank and the Amt Blank played a vital role.

The East Bloc followed with interest and counter action the events in the West. A Soviet note of 24 July 1954 proposed to the United States, France, and Britain a conference to consider the creation of a collective security system in Europe; it was the same proposal the Soviets had offered at the Berlin Conference. On 4 August 1954, the Soviets proposed a foreign ministers’ conference to discuss

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the German problem. They introduced an "all-European treaty concerning collective security in Europe," in which security guarantees by France, Poland, Britain, and the Soviet Union were to create favorable conditions for German unity. Since the Soviets considered NATO an aggressive military grouping, French rejection of the EDC brought hopes for all-German elections and reunification of Germany. They used these ideas in attempts to foil the Brussels Pact (WEU).2

Without exception, Western reaction to the EDC failure was anti-French. The French, surprised at this bias, expected to continue negotiations on a French alternative to the EDC.3 Eisenhower spoke on 30 August 1954 of the "serious set-back."4 Dulles on 31 August 1954 called the French rejection a "sad event," which compelled the United States to "scrutinize" its foreign policy, especially with respect to Europe.5

Neither Dulles nor any other United States' official was certain, after the French vote, that the EDC or a similar project could succeed. Consequently, in Washington

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3Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 593-594.


there was renewed effort to solve the problem of the FRG defense contribution. Dulles received suggestions to use the Brussels Pact as an instrument for military integration of the FRG, but he hesitated. After unsuccessful United States' support for the EDC, the initiative for an alternative had to come from Europe.6

On 1 September 1954 the British cabinet agreed on FRG accession to NATO. One solution was a three-sided defense pact between the FRG, the United States, and Britain. Eden, therefore, sought restoration of FRG sovereignty, nondiscriminatory participation in Western defense, and a contractual settlement of the status of foreign troops in the FRG; France was not to participate in these talks.7

Initiative for a new solution emanated from the British when British High Commissioner Hoyer Millar on 2 September 1954 talked to Adenauer on FRG accession to NATO. Adenauer agreed fundamentally, but did not want to abandon hope for a European army. Placing great value on military and political equality, Adenauer wanted a guarantee that a new agreement would not fail on French action.8 The British ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, on 2 September 1954,

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6 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 591.
explained the British NATO proposal to Mendès-France, who wanted a European coalition including Britain.\textsuperscript{9}

Eisenhower and Dulles agreed to relinquish the initiative to the British. Meanwhile, Dulles went to Manila to negotiate the Southeast Asia Pact (SEATO); in his absence, Eisenhower considered three possible courses of action, a revised EDC, FRG accession to NATO, and a bilateral agreement with the FRG. On his return, Dulles rejected the first.\textsuperscript{10} For the bilateral agreement, Dulles considered it suitable to inform the French of United States’ intent. Churchill supported the United States’ proposal for FRG accession to NATO, and all NATO members but France concurred. Thus, the British planned a conference of the six EDC states, the United States, Britain, and Canada while the shock of EDC rejection could be used advantageously. They wanted the conference to convene before mid-September 1954, but the United States feared that an inadequately planned conference would fail.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{9}\textit{New York Times}, 4 Sept. 1954, sec. 1, 2


The United States and Britain warned Mendès-France that a separate military alliance with the FRG would follow should France block a compromise. The British acknowledged that an effective defense of Western Europe without France and the FRG was inconceivable, and France could veto FRG sovereignty and accession to NATO. Under these circumstances, Eden prepared to give the FRG a security guarantee under the Brussels Pact of 1948 and grant the FRG accession to NATO. With this agreement France could obtain guarantees without the FRG feeling subjected to unilateral control. Churchill agreed with Eden, and both agreed that Eden should investigate personally in West European capitals the possibility for negotiations.


14 Speidel, *Aus unserer Zeit*, 323.


Meanwhile, Mendès-France concocted a plan for the FRG to become a member of the Brussels Pact only.  

After the conversation on 2 September 1954 with Hoyer Millar, Adenauer announced a modified course in a radio speech on 4 September 1954, when he requested equality and return of sovereignty in exchange for FRG participation in Western defense. Adenauer refused to isolate or ignore France and expressed the belief that an agreement between the FRG and its Western neighbors was necessary. He explained that the FRG was ready to limit its armament voluntarily. The goals of his diplomacy were FRG sovereignty with military authority and equality within the Western security system. He rejected the four power conference on Germany demanded by the SPD because of Western disunity.

After France rejected the EDC, the diplomatic situation changed. Blank was no longer the negotiator; Adenauer was the negotiator and Blank his assistant; Speidel was the

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military observer in Paris. Mendès-France became the negotiator for the French and Eden for the British. As a member of the FRG delegation to the London Conference, Blank was with these diplomats during the negotiations.21

Eden's first visit was to Brussels where on 11 September 1954 he met the foreign ministers of the Benelux countries. Beyen, Spaak, and Bech agreed with the idea of a revised Brussels Pact, which partially countered their fear of the Germans.22

The FRG public had begun to doubt the correctness of Adenauer's policy, which was the object of SPD criticism. Also, the CDU suffered defeat in the Schleswig-Holstein elections on 12 September 1954. Consequently, Adenauer needed a speedy solution to regain public confidence and offer the prospect of an early end of the occupation.23 On 12 and 13 September 1954 Eden conferred with Adenauer, who was in a dejected mood because the EDC failure had caused a domestic political crisis.24

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21Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 323.


23Eden, Full Circle, 170-175; Times, 13 Sept. 1954, 6; Eisenhower, Mandate, 402-403.

Eden proposed a way out of Adenauer's dilemma. In accordance with Eden's proposal, the Brussels Pact was a suitable political association for the FRG, and it included Britain. Adenauer stressed continuing readiness for European integration but agreed that entry into NATO was the best solution. They also favored an FRG defense contribution based on an FRG-French understanding.25 On 13 September 1954, Italy accepted Eden's proposal, but on 14 September 1954 Eden encountered difficulty with Mendès-France. Although Eden emphasized that France was threatened with isolation, Mendès-France persisted in his internal political necessity and that the Brussels Pact must be independent of NATO. At the same time, Mendès-France demanded strong control over the FRG military force.26 He also made a Saar settlement a precondition for any French agreement on FRG sovereignty or rearmament.27

On 15 September 1954, Dulles began a fast trip to Bonn and London.28 Before he agreed to a nine-power conference,

25Eden, Full Circle, 170-175; Times, 13 Sept. 1954, 6; Eisenhower, Mandate, 402-403.


he wanted information. He expected nothing positive from Paris, but wanted to give moral support to Adenauer. Eden, surprised and apprehensive, feared that Dulles would disturb the consensus and give the French the impression of disunity. On his arrival 16 September 1954, Dulles talked to Adenauer on how to return sovereignty and bring the FRG into NATO. Adenauer was ready to agree on European unity, and both sought to settle the problem with the same supra-national feature as the EDC. Their joint communique expressed complete agreement on European integration and that the FRG would enter NATO directly. Adenauer, as well as Eden, expressed the desire for full sovereignty, and Dulles appeared to agree.

On 17 September 1954 in London, Dulles recommended the Brussels Pact and made it clear that he supported stronger supra-national regulation. Eden wanted to solve the problem quickly and emphasized his preference for the Brussels Pact.

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31Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 72.

Concomitantly, there was agreement by all participating states that the settlement be based on the Brussels Pact.33 Complicating matters, France wanted an international arms control organization within the Brussels Pact.34 The Brussels authority was not to have cognizance over a common army, but merely troops and weapons within the pact states. It would include FRG forces but exclude a large number of French units in France and all British units in the British Isles.35 In spite of its supra-national features, the French proposal would permit almost unimpaired continuation of French military policy. Allocation of United States' military aid was to be removed from the donor; France and other pact members were to control United States' supplies to the FRG. There were restrictions on FRG arms production. As in the EDC Treaty, specified heavy weapons were prohibited in the "strategically exposed zone" of the FRG.

33Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 598-600; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955, 313-319.

34Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, 72.

Hence, France would be able to expand its weapons production
and receive the predominant share of arms orders.36

There was much criticism of the French proposal. On 22
September 1954 United States High Commissioner James B.
Conant informed the State Department that FRG coalition
leaders, Foreign Office, and defense officials had examined
the French proposal. Blank, Strauss, Heinrich Krone, and
Thomas Dehler noted the absence of the FRG in NATO. Blank
and Heusinger criticized the fact that the FRG was the only
member whose entire armed forces would be subject to control
and limitation, whereas the others could declare that a
majority of their forces was required overseas. More
important was French veto power over the NAC. The Germans
insisted on agreement about the size of the FRG army before
a system of limitations became effective and criticized the
French proposal that the Brussels Council allocate arms aid
from the United States. Blank, Strauss, and Krone stressed
that the London meeting must produce French agreement on FRG
rearmament. Blank and Strauss insisted that if the London
attempt failed, the United States and Britain had to act
quickly to rearm the FRG; failure to do so would discredit

36Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the
National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954, 7
October 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Adenauer and United States-British German policy and lead to neutralization of Germany.37

The FRG now made a proposal by which it would receive sovereignty and acceptance into NATO. Relaxation of the occupation would follow from the Four-Power declaration by which the West assumed authority in Germany on 5 June 1945.38 The FRG was ready to accept the transition definitions from May 1952 so far as they still applied, but demanded omission of the emergency clause and a new treaty on the status of Western forces in the FRG. The FRG agreed to a maximum troop strength of twelve divisions and an amended Brussels Pact with simultaneous entry into NATO, provided there was no discrimination. The FRG proposal partially met French demands for a contractual reduction of the FRG defense burden. In contradistinction to the French concepts, control would be through NATO and not a special Brussels Pact agency.39


38Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1953-1955, 319-321; Oppen, "Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic," Documents on Germany, 29-35.

There was agreement with the FRG proposal. Indeed, the United States and Britain recognized FRG demands for sovereignty which surpassed the 1952 concessions. The Netherlands also agreed. Thence, the FRG would be restricted with regard to troop strength, production of certain heavy weapons, and storage of supplies. The FRG was ready to concede to these demands, which were to be in a voluntary pledge not determined or imposed from without. The Netherlands opposed the French proposal on arms reductions by a Brussels Pact agency, favored NATO being the overwatch agency, favored complete integration of FRG units into NATO, and rejected discrimination against the FRG. Accordingly, FRG membership in NATO appeared certain.\footnote{Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 604-605.}

Blank accompanied Adenauer to London on 27 September 1954 for the Nine-Power Conference on Germany, which was held from 28 September to 3 October 1954. The FRG delegation included Adenauer, Blank, Walter Hallstein (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), and Herbert Blankenhorn (Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).\footnote{Times, 23 Sept. 1954, 5; Oppen, "Documents Relating to the Revision and Extension of the Brussels Treaty," Documents on Germany, 192-207; Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Western European Security, Part 2, 1294-1297.}
On 28 September 1954 Eden opened the Nine-Power Conference as presiding officer. As a point of departure, he proposed acceptance of the FRG and Italy into the Brussels Pact and the FRG into NATO. During the conference break, the FRG and the occupation powers discussed FRG sovereignty. At the first plenary session, Mendès-France spoke for establishment of an arms control agency within the Brussels Pact, adding that containment and supervision of military forces in Western Europe must create a feeling of security and confidence. He wanted a military command parallel to NATO through institution of a European inspector. Again he demanded greater British guarantees and a Saar agreement linked to FRG sovereignty.\textsuperscript{42}

When Adenauer spoke, he advocated necessary military measures accomplished by NATO, opposed all discrimination against the FRG, and offered FRG guarantees. The FRG would agree to membership in NATO and the Brussels Pact, accept a maximum strength of twelve divisions, and prepare the FRG army for integration into a supra-national armed force. The FRG did not agree but expected that the three Western powers would retain their joint authority in Germany. The FRG was ready to renounce all claims to production of biological and chemical weapons, heavy war ships, long range missiles, and

strategic bombers. This renunciation was voluntary and did not encroach upon FRG sovereignty.\textsuperscript{43}

On 29 September 1954 the conference considered British and United States' promises. Dulles emphasized the United States' declaration of 16 April 1954 by which Eisenhower promised to maintain United States' troops in Europe, including the FRG, as necessary for common defense so long as a threat existed. This commitment was indefinite in contrast to the twenty year NATO pact. In the event of agreement, Eden promised to maintain British strength on the continent at four divisions and a tactical air force, or the equivalent. Britain agreed not to withdraw this force against the wishes of a majority of Brussels Pact states and SACEUR; but in the event of an acute overseas emergency, the British demanded that they not be bound by a majority decision.\textsuperscript{44}

Mendès-France insisted that the Brussels Pact retain a military-political function independent of NATO, since the French hoped to acquire a stronger position in the seven-nation Brussels Pact than in the fifteen-nation NATO. He wanted extensive prohibitions on FRG arms production; hence, he pursued the idea of the "strategically exposed zone."

\textsuperscript{43}Speidel, \textit{Aus unserer Zeit}, 324; Wettig, \textit{Entmilitarisierung}, 607; Nutting, \textit{Europe Will Not Wait}, 73-74.

The other eight nations rejected all French proposals since they did not desire to weaken NATO for the benefit of a special West European organization, establishment of an arms community, or production prohibitions in the interest of French industry.45

French concern centered on the issue of arms control by NATO or a special Brussels Pact agency. Although Mendès-France had no support, on Spaak's initiative, the other foreign ministers agreed to compromise. They agreed for the Brussels Pact to have one arms control authority and pledged close cooperation with NATO, which was to regulate all military matters within the Brussels Pact. The FRG, in contrast to other states, agreed to introduce all of its units into NATO and submit to restrictions. Control and limitation of the FRG contribution appeared acceptable to the Germans because they had no desire to exceed NATO limits. With support of the Netherlands and Italy, the FRG delegates opposed the French demands on one point only: the "strategically exposed zone" and production limits.46

As the Western foreign ministers discussed an alternative to the EDC, the Soviets sought a new course. Prior to the London Nine-Power Conference, the Soviets sent Moch a disarmament proposal agreeing with the main Western

45 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 609.
46 Ibid., 609-610.
exceptions to the Soviet note. On 30 September 1954 the Soviets submitted their plan to the UN General Assembly. Information indicated that this action was a counter-move to the Western attempt for an FRG military contribution. The effort was unsuccessful because the Soviets were too late to mobilize West European public opinion against the FRG military contribution. When the West agreed to FRG entry into the Brussels Pact (WEU) and NATO, the Soviets increased publicity favoring a European security pact.

When the conference threatened to fail, it appeared that the FRG could achieve unrestricted rearmament through the United States and Britain. On the evening of 30 September 1954, Mendès-France appeared to agree with Spaak, but on 1 October 1954 protested that French demands were not considered sufficiently. When he resubmitted his earlier proposal, the other foreign ministers became indignant. A small group, including Adenauer, Blank, Halstadt (State Secretary in the Foreign Office), and Kielmansegg met on 2 October 1954 to solve the problem. For the afternoon meeting, only Adenauer and Kielmansegg attended because Kielmansegg was the only expert. This decisive meeting was a difficult encounter, primarily between Eden and Mendès-France. Britain and the United States were

47 Moch, Histoire du Réarmement, 320.
48 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 643-644.
observers; Dulles was present. The urgency of the situation prompted Mendès-France to yield when he agreed to the Spaak compromise and obtained several minor changes. Britain yielded to Dulles' pressure that the Brussels Pact Council in certain cases decide by majority. The idea of the "strategically exposed zone" came to nought, and arms control applied to all continental industries. Except for Adenauer's voluntary renunciations, no general production restrictions obtained. The French arms pool was defunct. The Nine Power Conference ended 3 October 1954 when the agreements became final.

The FRG was prepared to arm quickly after the agreements in London on 3 October 1954, and the West expected German soldiers in uniform by the spring of 1955. In cooperation with the EDC Interim Committee, the Amt Blank had prepared detailed plans for this procedure and dealt first with creating cadre from volunteers. On 26 February 1954 the FRG parliament enacted a constitutional amendment permitting a vote on conscription. In compliance with this


amendment, the Amt Blank recommended draft boards similar to those in the United States.\textsuperscript{51}

The foreign ministers deputized technicians to plan details of another conference for the final settlement. On 5 October 1954 in Paris under the chairmanship of Sir Christopher Steel, NATO delegates established a Steering Committee. Two sub-committees, in which the nine London Conference nations represented the fourteen NATO states, were to clarify FRG membership in NATO and FRG and Italian membership in the Brussels Pact. In London a commission of Brussels Pact nations brought the FRG and Italy into the Pact. Representatives of the FRG and the High Commission discussed FRG sovereignty in Bonn.\textsuperscript{52}

On 12 October 1954 after the London Conference, Mendès-France requested that the French National Assembly sanction the agreement; he attained a positive vote of 350 versus 113 against with 152 abstaining.\textsuperscript{53}

The Saar issue presented a final difficulty, the settlement of which Mendès-France alleged was necessary for France to accept the agreements. Adenauer was ready to concede a politically autonomous Saar with economic ties to France, but demanded that the final solution remain for the


\textsuperscript{52}Wettig, \textit{Entmilitarisierung}, 612-613.

peace treaty. The French parliament had to agree before the FRG could enter NATO. Blank participated in the proceedings of 20 to 23 October 1954. On 22 October 1954 the NAC voted to accept the FRG into NATO, and on 23 October 1954 fifteen nations signed the agreements in Paris. Finally, on 23 October 1954, France and the FRG signed an agreement on the Saar.

The Paris Agreements in the fall of 1954 gave the FRG greater freedom of action than the treaties of May 1952. NATO membership meant legal equality with other Western states. The presence of German diplomats and officers in advisory groups, staffs, and NATO commands secured FRG participation in NATO decisions. In relation to its financial burdens, the FRG was under-represented; this disparity grew as other states observed their responsibilities less and less.

A Soviet note of 23 October 1954 requested a foreign ministers meeting of the four powers in November 1954, but


57 Wettig, *Entmilitärisierung*, 617.
there were no new proposals. To prevent ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Soviets on 13 November 1954 invited the United States and twenty-three European states to a conference for creation of a collective security system and to gain Soviet accession to NATO. The Western states refused. On 20 November 1954, the Soviets offered to postpone the proposed four-power conference provided the West delayed ratification of the Paris Agreements until after the conference.

For several months, the Soviets had been trying to win French support for East Bloc goals, and it appeared that they expected cooperation in return for their support in ending the Indochina War. On 22 November 1954 Mendès-France defended the Paris Agreements before the UN General Assembly, an act that was tantamount to repudiation of Franco-Soviet cooperation, but the Soviets continued to insist on a four-power conference. On 29 November 1954 the British replied that there would be no talks until after


60 New York Times, 14 Nov. 1954, sec. 1, 1; Fischer, Verteidigung, 43.


62 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 643-644.
the WEU was established.63 Because West European states would not participate, the Soviets held the conference with the East Bloc states from 29 November 1954 to 2 December 1954.64 On 2 December 1954 the East Bloc proposed a European security pact, which later became the Warsaw Pact.65

At the end of November 1954 Vinogradov had a discussion with de Gaulle, who on 4 December 1954 demanded that four-power negotiations clarify the Paris Agreements prior to ratification. De Gaulle explained that the new agreements were scarcely better than the EDC, but gave France the possibility of its own army, its own character, and its own foreign policy. In much the same sense that the demand for four-power negotiations was designed to prevent FRG rearmament, the Soviets offered the United States a disarmament agreement should the Paris Agreements not become effective.66

On 8 December 1954 the FRG Government considered ways to inspire public support for the new army since public opinion polls showed that seventy-nine percent of the

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64 Fischer, Verteidigung, 43; Pravda, 3 Dec. 1954.
66 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 618, 643-644.
population opposed military service. Among Blank's opponents were protestant ministers, the West German Trades Unions Federation, and the SPD. Youth were generally indifferent; they were willing to serve, but were not anxious to volunteer. In December 1954 the Amt Blank had only two hundred thousand volunteer applications out of the five hundred thousand required.

The East Bloc continued its opposition to FRG rearment. On 8 December 1954 DDR leaders announced that the KVP would become the nucleus of the DDR army. Pravda on 9 December 1954 said that ratification of the Paris Agreements would be a direct hindrance to application of the Franco-Russian treaty. The Soviet Union threatened to increase armaments because of renewed German militarism.

To allay fears that the new FRG army would be inferior to the Allied armies, in mid-December 1954 in a speech in Essen, Blank assured the German public that FRG soldiers would have adequate arms and equipment equal in quality to

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69 "West Germany," Time, 6 Dec. 1954, 33-34.
71 Pravda, 9 Dec. 1954.
72 MacMillan, Tides, 550.
that of other Western nations. The new army would not be a state within a state, but civil authority would prevail.73

In an attempt to intimidate the French public and parliament on the eve of the National Assembly debate on ratification, on 16 December 1954 the Soviets sent a note to France threatening to abrogate the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1944.74 Nevertheless, it was a great surprise within and without the French parliament when that body on 24 December 1954 in the first reading rejected the WEU treaty (Brussels Pact) by 280 to 259 votes with eighty-eight abstentions. The negative vote occurred because numerous deputies considered acceptance secure and believed they could shirk their responsibility to their political advantage.75 Immediately after the first parliamentary vote, Mendès-France sought a reversal of the decision.76 On 27 December 1954 the National Assembly approved the treaty in the second reading by 289 to 251 votes with eighty-six abstentions.77 On 30 December 1954 ratification


77Le Monde, 29 Dec. 1954.
carried with 287 to 260 votes and seventy-four abstentions. This vote constituted approval of four protocols: admission of the FRG to NATO, admission of the FRG to the Brussels Pact (WEU), granting of sovereignty to the FRG, and the granting of European status to the Saar.

In accordance with Western policy, plans for the FRG armed forces were the responsibility of Amt Blank specialists, whose work indicated that by 1958 the FRG would have the largest, best paid, and most powerful military machine in Western Europe. Originally, the Amt Blank visualized two years for creation of the new army; but, by 1955 three to four years appeared realistic. The problem was that rearmament had to begin from a zero base. Amt Blank officials were uneasy about the pressure on the FRG to create its armed forces within three years. They did not speak openly, but knew that the creation of a 500,000 man army in so short a time would ignore FRG political realities and incur unnecessary risks. A minimum of five years was required to establish a military organization that would

82*New York Times,* 12 Nov. 1954, sec. 1, 2;
satisfy political requirements. Militarily, it would take longer than three years to screen officer and NCO records to prevent the return of men with questionable records and political ideas. Furthermore, there was an absence of control (integration) at the lower levels, which the EDC would have provided. The first year plan projected the creation of a one hundred thousand man cadre, who required careful selection and education.

On 3 January 1955, the French government presented a new proposal containing familiar demands. In mid-January 1955 technicians from the seven powers met in Paris where it appeared that no one agreed with the new French proposal, but with the fall of Mendès-France’s government on 4 February the useless negotiations stopped.

Amt Blank activities were many and varied. Following his trip to Washington in 1953, Blank continued his effort to help German war criminals, and on 11 January 1955 spoke on that subject before an assembly of ex-POWs. The Amt Blank supported an appeal to the world conscience for release of Germans still in Western custody before establishment of the new armed forces. Public response to

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83 Ibid.; Der Spiegel, 30 Mar. 1955, 8-12.
85 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 616-617.
Blank was not always cordial. At a political rally in Freiburg on 15 February 1955, communist rioters threw tear gas and fire crackers at him as he spoke. In spite of such incidents, Amt Blank functions continued, and by February 1955 members had managed negotiations on troops, weapons, and maneuver areas with NATO general staff officers.

Following the October 1954 signing of the Paris Agreements and the subsequent French ratification, the Soviets launched a vigorous campaign for German reunification. A campaign began in the DDR on 24 February 1955 for a stronger armed force. Simultaneously, Soviet policy and slogans changed course.

Western states did not begin ratification of the Paris Agreements until after the final French vote. The Bundestag concurred with a large majority on 27 February 1955. The SPD rejected the agreements just as they rejected the treaties in May 1952, but with a weaker vote. Nevertheless, the SPD was ready to cooperate in creating a new armed force. The other states ratified the Paris Agreements

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90 New York Times, 6 Mar. 1955, sec. 4, 5; Wettig, Entmilitärisierung, 618-619; Fischer, Verteidigung, 43.
Fig. 6—Amt Blank organization, 1 November 1954
with no major difficulties. To voice their objections, on 18 March 1955, the Soviets repeated their threat to abrogate the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1944.

In March 1955, according to General Gruenther, SHAPE Commander, the Soviet Union had the largest land army in the World. After World War II it demobilized substantially, but even so, in 1955 it had an army of two and one-half million men. The Soviet air force had 20,000 operational planes; the Soviet navy had 350 submarines. In addition, the satellites had eighty divisions and a combined air force of 2000 to 3000 planes.

Throughout this period, the Amt Blank was planning and negotiating. Yet, in 1954-1955 within the Amt Blank there arose a difference in opinion over the defense concept of the Planning Subdivision leader, Bogislav von Bonin. (See Figure 6). In view of the superior strength of East Bloc forces and based on German experience on the eastern front during World War II, Bonin proposed to organize FRG forces in blocking positions. Special FRG units were to delay east of the Rhine, by-pass, and intercept an enemy attack on the Rhine. The plan, to be executed by a volunteer force of

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91 Eden, Full Circle, 191.
94 Fischer, Verteidigung, 50.
120,000 to 150,000 men, did not meet the equality demand at division level, and the FRG would have exceeded its twelve division limit by four additional brigades.95

The Bonin Plan consisted of a modern Maginot Line with a static defense, reinforced with numerous anti-tank guns, but it was impossible to develop because the weapons technology of the 1950s would allow a determined and strong attacker to punch through any static defense.96 Heusinger and Kielmansegg studied the plan.97 To Kielmansegg, it was not acceptable as a German or NATO plan.98 Although the Amt Blank evaluated and rejected this plan on political and military grounds, the Bonin Plan aroused public controversy.99

Bonin then made a serious mistake; he visited the most famous World War II generals, beginning with von Manstein, and told them he had the only realistic plan but his superiors disagreed with it.100 Ten years after the war these generals did not have current knowledge, but they told


99Fischer, Verteidigung, 50.

100Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982; Der Spiegel, 30 Mar. 1955, 8-12.
Bonin's idea was to obtain a paper from ten to twelve field marshals and generals to convince Blank of its value, but in early 1955 he took his story to a Frankfurt newspaper. As a consequence of that article, Blank dismissed Bonin from the Amt Blank on 22 March 1955.

Always seeking new information and advice, on 28 March 1955 Blank and nine assistants arrived in London for briefings and study of British military methods. Blank was concerned with parliamentary control, organization and functions of the defense ministry, service departments, and the ministry of supply.

Blank was also concerned with internal German problems. There were many complaints in parliament about Blank's "high handed secrecy," and many German editors supported the Bonin Plan. Consequently, on 30 March 1955 the Bundestag Security Committee began an investigation of the Amt Blank.

On 2 April 1955, the FRG announced that the first group of volunteer officers would receive training at Sonthofen in the Bavarian Alps within the next six months, but the Amt

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Blank had done little other than paper planning for creation of the new army. Work could not actually begin until parliament passed legislation authorizing conscription, the right of eminent domain, and a military penal code.\footnote{New York Times, 3 Apr. 1955, sec. 4, 6.}

On the basis of the Paris Agreements, FRG accession to NATO became effective at 1200 hours, on 5 May 1955, the same date the FRG became a sovereign state.\footnote{New York Times, 6 May 1955, sec. 1, 1; U. S. Department of State, "Federal Republic of Germany Gains Sovereignty, Accedes to North Atlantic Treaty," Bulletin 32 (16 May 1955): 791-795.} On 8 May 1955, an announcement in Paris revealed that Herbert Blankenhorn would be the permanent FRG delegate and ambassador to NATO.\footnote{New York Times, 9 May 1955, sec. 1, 4; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 May 1955, 1.} Speidel would lead the FRG military mission and planning team at SHAPE headquarters.\footnote{New York Times, 9 May 1955, sec. 1, 4; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 334.}

The Bundestag Standing Committee for Questions of European Security partially met the security requirements of the Amt Blank; however, the Amt Blank would not provide it information on strategy, tactics, organization, and armaments. In May 1955 Blank was growing nervous and irritated, and the committee was becoming burdensome to him. Several
CDU faction members complained to Brentano about the tone and style in which Blank answered questions.\textsuperscript{110}

The East Bloc signed the Warsaw Pact Treaty 14 May 1955. The Warsaw Pact, having the purpose of counteracting FRG membership in and disrupting NATO, changed little in political and military matters. The explanation that "democratic Europe" was forced into a defensive and offensive alliance through "provocative remilitarization of West Germany" was intended to conceal the reverse suffered by the Soviets from Western approval of the FRG defense contribution.\textsuperscript{111}

Meanwhile, Blank's problems increased. The Land Assembly of Bavarian Farmers (BBV) met 16 May 1955 in Munich to discuss the effects of rearmament on agriculture; the topics were land confiscation and military service for farmers' sons. The BBV wanted farmers' sons to be exempt from the eighteen month service in hardship cases and others to train only one month in winter.\textsuperscript{112} Blank was also involved with the military budget.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} Der Spiegel, 11 May 1955, 9; Greiner, "Dienststelle," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 99-124.

\textsuperscript{111} Pravda, 15 May 1955; Great Britain, "Warsaw Treaty, 14 May 1955," Selected Documents, 212-215; Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 644-645; MacMillan, Tides, 600, 602; Fischer, Verteidigung, 43.

\textsuperscript{112} Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 1955, 2.

\textsuperscript{113} Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/19 May 1955, 1.
rearmament in 1955 was nine billion DM. The FRG could cover the cost but would require assistance should speed be required. Costs included personnel, equipment, construction, maintenance, and miscellaneous items. Furthermore, it was necessary to determine military requirements and costs for Allied troops.\textsuperscript{114}

In contrast to other budget assessments, the Amt Blank prepared a special economic plan in cooperation with the Federal Finance Ministry. This plan was in the budget for the first time in 1955 and required agreement by the Budget Committee and the Committee on Questions of European Security, hence securing double parliamentary control. The sum of 170 million DM which the Amt Blank required for initial equipment was only part of the plan.\textsuperscript{115}

On 20 May 1955, Federal Finance Minister Schäffer sought to break Land opposition to the budget. Finance Ministry spokesman Vialon told the Bonn press that the Amt Blank had 5.2 billion DM in the 1955-1956 budget in addition to the nine billion DM defense budget to pay for Allied stationing costs and garrison damage. Of this 5.2 billion DM, 280 million DM was for construction and seventy million DM was for personnel expenses.\textsuperscript{116}


\textsuperscript{115}Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/19 May 1955, 1.

\textsuperscript{116}Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21/22 May 1955, 1.
To enter NATO, the FRG needed sixteen laws, among which were the Freiwilligengesetz (Volunteer Law), Wehrpflichtgesetz (Conscription Law), and the Wehrdienstverweigerungsge-setz (Conscientious Objection Law). In total, the Amt Blank prepared eighty-two laws and ordinances for establishing the army. The FRG Government tried to rush rearmament bills through parliament to block any neutralization movement. Adenauer conferred with Blank and Heusinger on 20 May 1955 at Buehlerhohe in the Black Forest on initial rearmament legislation. Blank and Heusinger, the principal planners, wanted to create the necessary cadre as soon as legislation would permit, then simultaneously form twelve divisions.

Just as Adenauer expected, Pravda on 22 May 1955 proposed neutralization of Germany. The FRG could expect no sudden change in Western policy since the West had at no time seriously considered neutralization of Germany.

The Bundesrat Security Committee began an examination of the Volunteer Law on 20 May 1955. This law, processed by the Amt Blank since 1952, came before the Bundesrat Security Committee.

118 Der Spiegel, 8 Jun. 1955, 7-8.
120 Pravda, 22 May 1955.
121 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 May 1955, 1.
Committee as the "Three Paragraph Blitz Law" on 28 May 1955. The Land representatives did not understand the proposal, but Blank, under the guise of secrecy, would provide no useful information. The Volunteer Law, authorizing the Government to recruit officers and enlisted men as soon as possible, was a provisional bill which would provide military status to Speidel, Heusinger, and the other FRG officers at SHAPE Headquarters. On 28 May 1955 the opposition voiced reservations about the military provisions of the Paris Agreements and alleged that the Volunteer Law would prejudice later military legislation. The SPD press called the Volunteer Law an enabling act and on 31 May 1955 criticized it as a "draft of ambiguities and rubber-stamp negotiations." The Volunteer Law, basing the armed forces on a 150,000 man cadre, reminded the SPD of the 100,000 man army of the Weimar era. The SPD knew that a personnel committee of reliable, educated, democratic personalities would select future officers. This fifteen member committee was to be appointed through cooperation between the Amt Blank and the Security Committee under the auspices of the Federal Chancellor.

124Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Jun. 1955, 2.
125Ibid.
The Amt Blank planned to train a cadre of 150,000 volunteers who would train the remainder of the 500,000 man force. On 31 May 1955 the Amt Blank announced the dispatch of 130,000 notices to soldiers and 40,000 to administrators. According to the Amt Blank, the number of non-prior service volunteers had increased. At the time, there were applications from 130,000 volunteers. Accordingly, to prepare for these troops, the FRG Government considered speed necessary in processing the Volunteer Law. Near the end of June 1955, the cabinet was to propose additional military laws: Qualification Test Law, Soldier’s Law, Disciplinary and Hardship Ordinance, and Pay Law. A second set of laws would include the Military Duty Law, the Federal Work Law, and the Defense Preparedness Law.

As of 2 June 1955, plans called for the Personnel Committee to select the first regimental and division commanders during the summer of 1955 and unite them in late fall for the first course at Sonthafen, provided the Volunteer Law passed before the parliamentary recess. The

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126 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 May 1955, 1-2; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4/5 June 1955, 3.
127 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Jun. 1955, 2.
129 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 May 1955, 1, 2; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 Jun. 1955, 1, 2.
Personnel Committee, consisting of seven former professional soldiers, seven civilians, and a chairman, was to become operational in June 1955.130

The Federal Cabinet on 2 June 1955 approved three laws: the Federal Work Law to force from private citizens and business a special emergency payment in kind or work; a Defense Preparedness Law to circumscribe rights of ownership to the earth and sea bottom for defense; and the Qualifications Exercise Law to protect volunteers from forfeiture of their jobs during their military duty.131

The passage of enabling legislation signaled the proximity of the Amt Blank transition to a Defense Ministry. In Bonn indications were that Blank would be the Federal Defense Minister when the Paris Agreements became effective; however, there was speculation that Adenauer would serve as defense minister until parliament passed the Military Law.132 In Paris on 10 May 1955, Adenauer told the press that he would relinquish the Foreign Ministry post to devote more time to domestic and political problems.133 He also said that he wanted to deal with problems associated with the new FRG armed forces. Even though Blank was the leading

130 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 Jun. 1955, 1, 2.
131 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 Jun. 1955, 1, 2.
candidate for the Defense Ministry post, he appeared to be in the background.134

On 2 June 1955 in Bonn, an announcement declared that Adenauer would appoint Blank to be the first FRG Defense Minister.135 On 6 June 1955 at 1100 hours, Federal President Heuss received the Chancellor, who submitted his resignation as Foreign Minister and nomination of CDU/CSU parliamentary chairman Brentano as his successor.136 Adenauer simultaneously nominated Theodor Blank to be Defense Minister.137 Blank received the Defense Ministry Charter on 7 June 1955, and he took the oath of office before Bundestag President Gerstenmaier on 8 June 1955.138 Adenauer resigned as Foreign Minister to devote his time to rearmament and reunification. An opponent of militarism, he perceived the creation of a democratic military establishment as one of the greatest challenges of his life, and Blank was his chief instrument of military policy. Blank, a strong advocate of the Chancellor's "European" policy, favored an FRG alliance with the West and opposed

134 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 May 1955, 1.
137 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 Jun. 1955, 1.
neutralization of Germany as the price of reunification.  

Not to be forgotten, in June 1955 First Secretary of the SED Walter Ulbricht proposed an interim solution to the German problem. Reunification was to obtain under provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and the UN Charter, and he wanted both German governments to participate in international negotiations.

In early June 1955, the Amt Blank still believed that secrecy would not inhibit volunteers. The Amt Blank also had confidence in the public relations brochure Vom Künftigen Deutschen Soldaten: Gedanken und Plannungen der Dienststelle Blank (The Future German Soldiers: Thoughts and Planning of the Amt Blank), prepared for distribution in mid-June 1955. It appeared that the authors wrote it in isolation because it assured soldiers of generous remuneration; however, Finance Minister Schäffer was doubtful about large salaries.

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After the French rejected the EDC Treaty, the Western

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140 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 Jun. 1955, 1.
Fig. 7—Defense Ministry, 7 June 1955
Allies moved rapidly to incorporate the FRG into Western defense via NATO and an expanded Brussels Pact (WEU). It appeared to the East Bloc that the EDC collapse was a great victory, which they sought to exploit. Increased propaganda, appeals to the Germans for unity, threats to the West, and attempts at alliance with the West were of no avail. In spite of East Bloc efforts and French opposition, the West ratified the Paris Agreements, and the FRG entered NATO and the WEU with sovereignty and authorization for an armed force. Blank and the Amt Blank responded to this rapid transition by coordination with NATO, drafting legislation, and changing plans to meet new requirements. Accompanying FRG sovereignty was the transition of the Amt Blank into the Federal Defense Ministry. (See Figure 7).

Blank obtained his release from the Amt Blank, but the SPD press service expressed great anxiety about his nomination as Defense Minister. Blank, who agreed that the preliminary Volunteer Law was the beginning of more extensive military legislation for the preservation and security of democracy, now had the opportunity to create cordial working relations and mutual confidence with the entire parliament necessary for further military legislation; however, press and parliamentary criticism became more serious after he became Defense Minister.

144 Fischer, Verteidigung, 64.
CHAPTER XI

DEFENSE MINISTRY (1955-1956)

Federal President Theodor Heuss gave the Defense Ministry Charter to Blank on 7 June 1955, but within the preceding year, Blank had little control over events. The ensuing unrest divided the office he managed. Although he had many loyal subordinates, in the course of the year he provoked annoyance and doubt. Harassed on all sides by parliamentarians, officers, and citizens, and at times criticized more than encouraged by Adenauer, Blank was fighting a war of nerves, which demanded an excess effort.  

By October 1956, Adenauer had achieved his objective of FRG sovereignty. As a consequence, the rearmament issue was no longer paramount, and he no longer needed Blank.

One of Adenauer's major projects was passage of the Volunteer Law, the purpose of which was to permit the enlistment of volunteers. This law, providing for about fifty colonels and twenty-two generals to command divisions, displeased the Länder because it said nothing about military composition and administration. The Länder suspected that,

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on the basis of this law, the federal Government would act secretly to establish a federal military administration in violation of the Basic Law. Rheinpfälzische Minister President Peter Altmeier in a letter to Adenauer stated the Land objections and requested an explanation. Adenauer replied on 3 June 1955 that the Volunteer Law prejudiced nothing, but the Länder watched closely as the Bundesrat received a proposal for financial support of the armed forces. Blank requested an advance of 82.3 million DM above the 1955-1956 defense budget for organization of subordinate authorities, military administration, the military allocation district, military and civil servants, and the military episcopate. He also wanted to purchase another 172 personal cars and twenty buses.

Federal Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer on 6 June 1955 addressed a letter to the chairman of the Bundestag Budget and Security Committees in which he specified how Blank should organize staff, cadre, and logistics. The next day, 7 June 1955, Adenauer sent a letter to rheinpfälzische Minister President Altmeier in which he asserted that the Volunteer Law would not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Länder. Adenauer's letter appeared to contradict the letter Schäffer had written one day earlier.


When Blank went before the Bundestag Security Committee on 7 June 1955, the deputies wanted to know about the forthcoming military legislation, but Blank answered few questions. Schäffer's proposal prejudiced everything because it included detailed requirements for establishment of the armed forces. The nebulous Government plan, aggravated by Blank's silence, caused the opposition in the Bundestag to propose that no money be allocated for troop dispositions.

The Land deputies felt deceived and regarded the Volunteer Law a breach of confidence. Adenauer sent a letter to the Bundesrat prior to its session on 10 June 1955: "It is my view that nothing will be deduced from the Federal Finance Minister's proposal." In the second Bundesrat committee session on the morning of 10 June 1955, members wanted to know the difference between the Schäffer proposal and Adenauer's letter. Blank felt the impact of this Government dual action that afternoon in the Bundesrat plenum. Arthur Sträter said the Volunteer Law called for disgraceful time pressure, expressed mistrust of the Security Committee, and contained absurdities. In spite of the Bundesrat denunciation, Blank would have the task the

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7Ibid.
following week of informing the Bundestag that the federal Government would submit the Volunteer Law to parliament unchanged. Fritz Erler warned that this law left essential matters unregulated. Blank was tense and appeared to be in poor health, trying to conceal his nervousness behind excessive amplifier volume. His apparent ineptness before the plenum prompted leading Christian Democrats and faction leader Heinrich Krone to request that the Chancellor solve the "Blank problem" as soon as possible. Indeed, Blank had appeared uneasy in public since receiving a blow on the head from a beer mug in Augsburg during the 1954 Bavarian election campaign.8

In the meantime, rearmament was proceeding slowly. On 11 June 1955 Blank announced that the FRG was to receive the same military equipment from the United States as other members of NATO and that the Defense Ministry was satisfied with the quality of these items.9

On 15 June 1955 Blank appeared before parliament for the first time as Defense Minister.10 The slow, dull budget debate revived when Erler spoke of the defense contribution and focused on public discussion of the armed forces. Erler asked Blank for an opinion on FRG military policy and

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criticized him for his poor press relations, especially his reluctance to make public announcements. Erler also referred to the working climate in the Amt Blank which favored former General Staff officers. He closed by requesting that Blank withdraw the Volunteer Law and start anew. Blank ignored Erler's proposal on the Volunteer Law because the Government was committed to fulfill the Paris Agreements. With respect to the other questions, Blank said that parliament should withhold legal control and change the members of the Personnel Committee. To the reproach about the press, he replied that he had held no press conferences. Carlo Schmid (SPD) requested that Blank answer a question, but Blank said "no." This reply left an adverse impression of Blank, who appeared nervous, overworked, and distraught.\textsuperscript{11}

The tragedy of the situation was that Blank had begun his ministerial career in defense of a law with which he did not agree and which originated with the Chancellor outside the Amt Blank. Because of his desire to satisfy foreign policy, Adenauer had his Staatsekretär Hans Globke draft the infamous twenty-eight line Volunteer Law, with which Blank was obligated to concur.\textsuperscript{12} On 20 June 1955, motivated by growing opposition and Bundesrat refusal to endorse it,

\textsuperscript{11}Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/17 Jun. 1955, 1.

\textsuperscript{12}Der Spiegel, 22 Jun. 1955, 7-9; Der Spiegel, 28 Sept. 1955, 10-11.
Adenauer postponed debate on the Volunteer Law, which would have given the Government authority to form an army without parliamentary control. The law would have set a dangerous precedent, but Adenauer regarded it urgent and wanted to enlist six thousand volunteers during 1955. Adenauer's impatience was motivated by his desire to comply with the Paris Agreements. There appears to be no evidence to indicate that he wanted to usurp the prerogatives of any Government agency.

On 21 June 1955 after the first reading, the Bundestag sent the Volunteer Law to committees with the demand for amendments. On 22 June 1955 in the Bundestag, Blank made no progress. Even the cabinet denounced the Volunteer Law. Blank's friends criticized him in public. A Fronde from all parties formed against the Volunteer Law in the parliament, and the opposition began asking constitutional and political questions. This law did not define the legal position of the soldier and could permit equipping the armed forces with inferior equipment.

The cabinet, working on other military legislation, sent the Soldier's Law to parliament on 22 June 1955. In contrast to the Volunteer Law, the Soldier's Law treated the

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legal position of the soldier and conformed to the Basic Law. The soldier was to be a citizen in uniform who accepted the will of the state; he could vote and be elected to office. In the criminal justice area, the Government directed that military penal law be in harmony with civilian penal law. Subsequent bills included an administrative organization law, a disciplinary ordinance, a military duty law, a new military penal handbook, a change of judicial organization law, and a change of the penal process ordinance. At the conclusion of the Government explanation, Blank again proclaimed the Volunteer Law an immediate necessity: before the first course of instruction could begin, it was necessary to call six thousand volunteers. To strengthen the Defense Ministry, it was also necessary to authorize FRG military officers to report to the international staff.\textsuperscript{16} Appearing before the Bundestag on 27 June 1955, Blank emphasized that, of the many laws required by the Paris Agreements, the Volunteer Law was needed first because the FRG was building its armed forces from a zero base.\textsuperscript{17} Supporting the FRG Government, the United States


signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAP) with the FRG in Bonn on 30 June 1955.\textsuperscript{18}

Regardless of MDAP, the Volunteer Law was the most pressing issue; hence, other issues were delayed. To be effective, the Volunteer Law had to be consistent with Personnel Committee procedures. On 4 July 1955 the committees (Security Committee, Civil Servant Legal Committee, Budget Committee) and the parliamentary parties began work on the Volunteer Law. It appeared that the coalition supported the Government and would pass the Volunteer Law prior to the parliamentary recess, but there was only one week for deliberations.\textsuperscript{19} Considering opposition to the bill, Adenauer agreed to rewrite the Volunteer Law in exchange for a new version clearing the Bundestag by 16 July 1955. He agreed that none of the six thousand men would go to tactical units.\textsuperscript{20} A Personnel Committee for selection of higher officers with regard to qualifications and experience was to be established by law. The Defense Ministry was not to induct any high ranking officers before the Personnel Committee examined them. Within imposed restraints, the Defense Ministry could select candidates and under the


\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}, 1 Jul. 1955, 1.

provisions of Paragraph Four, the six thousand volunteers would be under the Defense Ministry. Paragraph Five designated 31 March 1956 as the expiration date for the Volunteer Law.\(^{21}\)

On 5 July 1955 after two days of deliberations the coalition parties agreed on the wording of the revised Volunteer Law; the SPD appeared to cooperate. Yet, on 5 July 1955 when the SPD left the committees considering the Volunteer Law, the SPD spokesman said that the SPD had not agreed to cooperate. The FDP had its own proposals and the coalition parties were not united.\(^{22}\) As a consequence of SPD and FDP actions, coalition support for the Volunteer Law collapsed.

With regard to military service, on 6 July 1955 Blank explained that the Government was sympathetic to German youth. Since the Germans had witnessed the destruction of their country, it was understandable that youth were hesitant about military service, and the Government gave special attention to personnel selection. Senior armed forces positions could be filled only by men who accepted basic democratic principles with conviction. The Government knew of the distress of former soldiers and that the majority were respectable and fought courageously. Blank

\(^{21}\)Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 Jul. 1955, 1.

\(^{22}\)Ibid.
explained that considerable progress had been made to solve the war criminal problem. Soldiers with the duty of defending society had to carry their worth and dignity with respect. They had to be obedient and true not only to their military superiors but to civilian representatives of the state.23

On 10 July 1955 the Government agreed to parliamentary control of the armed forces, and the Bundestag Security Committee revised the Volunteer Law.24 On 13 July 1955 the Bundestag held the first reading of the bill establishing the Personnel Committee to screen officer candidates for colonel and higher rank.25 On 15 July 1955 the Bundestag passed two bills. The first established the Personnel Committee: the Government would nominate the committee, parliament would approve the nominees, and the President would appoint the members. The second bill was an authorization to recruit six thousand volunteers in 1955; it passed the second reading and adopted United States' officer grades.26

There were a myriad of problems associated with Western defense. In mid-July 1955 Blank made a speech in the

Bundestag in defense of NATO exercise Carte Blanche. SPD chairman Ollenhauer, referring to this air maneuver, alleged that the FRG defense contribution would provide no security for the German people. Deputy Millies asked the Defense Minister to explain this ambiguity. At the time, the maneuver was in progress and Blank could not answer the question. The object of the exercise was to test tactical air defense under conditions of nuclear warfare, and Blank explained that data from the exercise indicated that it was a success.27

In Bonn on 22 July 1955 the Bundesrat passed the Volunteer Law and the bill for the Personnel Committee.28 President Heuss signed the Volunteer Law on 23 July 1955; the Personnel Committee was to convene on 27 July 1955.29 All parties except the German Party supported the Personnel Committee in the Bundestag. Adenauer warned of the problems the committee would have because of human and democratic weakness since committee members were not bound by instructions. The committee included eight generals and admirals, six colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors, none of whom could serve on active duty again. Saving time was important to the Personnel Committee, but the CDU

faction wanted a review court and a condition that the committee reveal the basis for its decision on every rejected application. The committee maintained that under the provisions of the law, neither the Defense Ministry nor the applicant needed to know the basis for committee decisions.30

Internal problems were exacerbated by international events. Following several years of Cold War confrontation, in August 1955 the Soviets sought diplomatic relations with the FRG and recognition of the Pankow DDR government.31 Thus, by invitation of the Soviet Union, Adenauer visited Moscow on 8 September 1955. During this visit on 13 September 1955, the Soviets agreed to return about ten thousand German POWs and other Germans still being confined in the Soviet Union. The price was establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union.32 Adenauer also consented to negotiate a trade agreement.33

The East Bloc, by this time members of the Warsaw Pact of 14 May 1955, monitored Western events closely. As a reaction to FRG rearmament, in September 1955, the DDR

Volkskammer (parliament) amended the DDR constitution to provide for a national armed force. This action was a mere formality in that the one hundred thousand man militarized DDR police organization was already an armed force.34

Grotewohl portrayed this armed force to be necessary for the defense of the DDR and declared that the DDR would take all measures required to defend itself against the FRG militarists and neo-fascists. He added that the signing of the Austrian State Treaty of independence and neutrality on 15 May 1955, by the foreign ministers of the four Powers, had "shown the way to the solution of the German problem."35

In the FRG Defense Ministry, it was necessary for political reasons to give Blank a deputy, a Staatsekretär.36 Josef Rust, an Adenauer confidant, assumed this position on 8 October 1955.37 Blank also appeared apprehensive about the new Staatsekretär in the Federal Chancellor's Office, Hans Globke.38 Another of Adenauer's confidants, Karl

Gumbel, was assigned to the Defense Ministry as personnel chief.39

To make matters worse, one of Blank's rivals for the post of Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, had been attacking Blank for three years.40 Blank believed that his position vis-a-vis Strauss was secure, even though Strauss had wanted to be the leader in the defense area since 1950 and had served as chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag parliamentary party since 1952 and later as chairman of the EDC Security Committee.41

Amid these domestic German maneuvers, the United States signed an agreement 8 October 1955 on the sale of military equipment, materials, and services to the FRG.42 Yet, the Germans claimed they could not spend more than nine billion DM per year on defense without causing economic, financial, and military instability. On 12 October 1955 NATO rejected this position inasmuch as there was not yet one German recruit.43 When the Government revealed its budget at the


annual NATO review on 5 November 1955, the FRG rearmament program had a deficit coming from the cost of heavy arms and other equipment that could not be manufactured in the FRG. To offset the deficit, the FRG wanted the United States to give these items to the FRG.\footnote{New York Times, 11 Nov. 1955, sec. 1, 6.} Ironically, during the first half of 1955 the FRG attained the highest level of production ever in Germany, and there was no inflation.\footnote{New York Times, 18 Nov. 1955, sec. 1, 1.}\footnote{New York Times, 9 Dec. 1955, sec. 1, 10.}

In early December 1955 the Personnel Committee vetoed five military men whom Blank had nominated for reactivation. Two of these men, leading officials in the Defense Ministry, were Kurt Fett, head of the Military Planning Department, and Fritz Bergengruen, head of the Army Department.\footnote{Der Spiegel, 14 Dec. 1955, 17-21.} Since the committee would not tell Blank the reasons for their rejection, he was angry. Inasmuch as Fett was one of the few FRG military men who knew NATO secrets, the Personnel Committee's action caused uneasiness in NATO.\footnote{Ibid.; New York Times, 9 Dec. 1955, sec. 1, 10.} The Fett affair was the first case of tension between the Personnel Committee and the Defense Ministry.\footnote{Ibid.; New York Times, 9 Dec. 1955, sec. 1, 10.} The committee action contributed to Blank's growing unpopularity since critics
claimed that he vacillated between the old army and the new and failed to instill democratic ideas in older officers.49

By this time, there was widespread criticism of Blank. On 7 December 1955 Adenauer spent an hour in the Bundestag discussing the future of Defense Minister Blank. During the first week of December 1955 the CDU parliamentary deputies devised a cabinet revision in which Blank was to resign as Defense Minister. In spite of support for the project, Adenauer decided there would be no changes.50 Apparently he retained his confidence in Blank.

The FRG budget was in the foreground. In Bonn on 9 January 1956 the Government showed that it finished the year of 1955 with a surplus, since it spent little of the 1955 military budget. A surplus was logical because the FRG was receiving United States' equipment, and on 9 January 1956 four United States' officers and twenty-four NCOs arrived at Andernach Army Depot to train cadre in the use of that equipment. Similar United States' training groups reported to air force and navy training centers.51

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made the first equipment deliveries in January 1956. They included light weapons and equipment for basic training.

On 16 January 1956 Blank visited the naval training company in Ebkeriege Barracks at Wilhelmshaven. On the same day, the Defense Ministry announced that the navy would become operational in April 1956. The navy, with twelve destroyers on loan from the United States, had the mission of defending the Baltic and North Sea coasts and conducting anti-submarine warfare. In the event of war, it would be under SHAPE command. Because the FRG economy was good, on 17 January 1956 the United States informed the Germans that the United States would not donate more equipment for FRG rearmament.

The DDR did not appear to have the same support problems as the FRG. In its rearmament program, on 18 January 1956, the DDR Volkskammer approved creation of a defense ministry and a "people's army." The Kasernierte

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Volkspolizei (People's Police in Barracks) (KVP) were to be redesignated as an army. This force numbered about 95,000 in the ground forces and 15,000 in the air and sea forces, which had remained unchanged for the past three years. The DDR armed force officially became the "National People's Army" (NVA). On 20 January 1956, Willi Stoph became the DDR Defense Minister.

Accompanied by Blank, Heusinger, and Speidel, Adenauer inspected the first six training companies at Andernach on 20 January 1956. Blank spoke prior to Adenauer and thanked the state and municipal authorities for their cooperation in the rehabilitation of the Andernach Depot. There was criticism of Blank for his handling of this visit. Although the Defense Ministry claimed that Adenauer was on a private tour, foreign attachés were present.

On 31 January 1956 Finance Minister Schäffer renewed the FRG demand that the United States pay for part of the nine billion DM armament program; he claimed that the FRG could not do it alone. In Bonn on 4 February 1956 Schäffer put pressure on the United States, Britain, and

59 Ibid.; Times, 17 Jan 1956, 8; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 348.
60 Times, 19 Jan. 1956, 8.
France to end FRG payments supporting Allied troops in the FRG. These payments, made under the Paris Agreements, were to stop on 5 May 1956, but the Allies wanted them continued. In Bonn on 6 February 1956 the FRG said it would refuse further cash payments to support Allied troops; it wanted to use the money to build its own armed forces. Another reason the FRG wanted to stop these payments was that the Government, having promised the people that rearmament would not cost more than 9.26 billion DM per year, was afraid that to continue payment would make the people feel deceived. Most of the cabinet supported Schäffer. In response, the United States, Britain, and France requested early negotiations on the FRG defense contribution.

The FRG cabinet on 8 February 1956 approved a bill to make about ten million Germans liable for compulsory military service. Blank was behind schedule. The first two thousand volunteers were still in basic training, and Blank needed legislation to authorize the recruiting of more volunteers.

In the West, Allied defense circles considered the DDR army insignificant since it was not new; however, the West was highly conscious of the twenty-two Soviet divisions in the DDR in February 1956. There was some cause for concern. In February 1956, describing the evolution of Soviet policy in the mid-1950s, Khrushchev said: "We never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism." In a speech on 14 February 1956 he listed three principles of Soviet foreign policy: peaceful coexistence of the two systems, rejection of the inevitability of war, and approval of various forms for transition to socialism. On 15 February 1956 Pravda attributed the origins of all wars and all threats of war to the prolonged survival of capitalism. In the same issue, Khrushchev said that in capitalist countries transition to socialism would take place under conditions of sharp class struggle. On 17 February 1956, Pravda quoted Mikhail A. Suslov saying the balance of forces in the world had changed radically in favor of peace supporters, and mighty forces existed for preventing imperialists from unleashing war and

69 Philip E. Moseley, "Soviet Foreign Policy: New Goals or New Manners?", Foreign Affairs 34 (July 1956): 541-553.
70 Pravda, 15 Feb. 1956.
aggression. This issue of Pravda also said that the simultaneous existence of capitalist and socialist states was inevitable.71

On 20 February 1956 the FRG Defense Ministry announced that 199,848 Germans had volunteered, but the armed forces needed more men and began a recruiting campaign.72 Yet, in early 1956 the only military authorization law was the Volunteer Law, which was to expire on 31 March 1956.73 Still trying to direct more FRG funds into the new army, on 22 February 1956 Brentano informed the United States', British, and French embassies that the FRG was prepared to negotiate the defense contribution.74 The first authentic military bill, the Soldier's Law (Soldatengesetz), was submitted on 29 February 1956.75 The next day, 1 March 1956, representatives of seven NATO states began negotiations on FRG financial support of Allied troops in West Germany.76

The Bundestag on 6 March 1956 by a vote of 390 to twenty enacted fourteen constitutional amendments legalizing rearmament and establishing civilian and parliamentary

control over the armed forces. On 8 March 1956, Blank said that if the Bundestag passed the Soldiers's Law during March 1956, the FRG armed forces would number 95,500 by the end of 1956. The army was to have 64,000, the air force 12,500, and the navy 8000. Fifteen thousand frontier police were to be incorporated into the army. Meeting in West Berlin on 16 March 1956, the Bundesrat approved the fourteen constitutional amendments and the Soldier's Law, which the SPD supported. This law, which had to pass before the buildup could begin, was to become effective 1 April 1956. Blank expected this law to enable the FRG to be at eighty percent of its authorized strength in two armored divisions, three infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, and one mountain brigade by the end of 1956. The Bundesrat completed amendment of the Basic Law on 19 March 1956 to permit establishment of the Bundeswehr and to designate the Minister of Defense a cabinet position.

The Government wanted the conscription legislation to pass before the July 1956 recess.\textsuperscript{82} Creating doubt about reaching strength objectives, the first reading of the conscription bill in the \textit{Bundesrat} on 23 March 1956 reduced the term of service from eighteen to twelve months.\textsuperscript{83} In reply to NATO criticism that the FRG was behind schedule, on 27 March 1956 Blank denied any delay in the rearmament program. Blank told a group of American journalists: "We shall carry out our NATO obligations this year to the fullest extent."\textsuperscript{84}

On 2 April 1956 the United States Army activated thirteen assistance teams to aid FRG instructors, which brought the total to twenty-three teams of an expected seven hundred that would be in service by the end of 1956.\textsuperscript{85} Even so, as of 6 April 1956, the FRG still refused to pay 3.2 billion DM per year to support NATO forces in the FRG and wanted the United States to pay about 8.6 billion DM for rearmament.\textsuperscript{86}

In April 1956, the Soviet Union created great publicity over the departure of the 200th Air Assault Division from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{New York Times}, 17 May 1956, sec. 1, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{New York Times}, 24 Mar. 1956, sec. 1, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{New York Times}, 28 Mar. 1956, sec. 1, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{New York Times}, 3 Apr. 1956, sec. 1, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{New York Times}, 7 Apr. 1956, sec. 1, 3.
\end{itemize}
the DDR as part of a program for Soviet withdrawal of military forces from East Europe. Although the Soviets announced the reduction of its armed forces by 1.2 million men within the next year, Soviet forces remained at an estimated four million men. Even with the reduction, the Soviet Union could recall and equip a thoroughly trained reserve.

In the FRG, the conscription bill was submitted to parliament on 3 May 1956; it called for eighteen month service. A Government paper explained that conscription was better than a professional army, since a professional army was characteristic of autocracy and could lead again to a state within a state. Blank presented the case for the Government; he argued that modern weapons required a training period longer than twelve months. The conscription bill passed the first reading in the Bundestag on 4 May 1956 by a show of hands. The goal was to have the first draft in the winter of 1957 for men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. Although the FRG was legally bound by international agreement to contribute five hundred thousand

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men to NATO, the SPD attacked this commitment and the authority to conscript men and argued that conscription would provoke the DDR.90

Supporting these personnel laws, on 7 May 1956 the Bundestag committees approved 2.5 billion DM for the armed forces to buy cars and light tanks.91 Moreover, the first shipment of heavy equipment from the United States arrived at Bremerhaven on 15 May 1956 and included tanks, self-propelled artillery, and recovery vehicles. Heusinger called this arrival an historic event.92

The Soviet peace offensive continued. In addition to 640,000 men demobilized in 1955, in May 1956 the Soviets announced the closing of the Belgorod Artillery Academy.93 On 18 May 1956 the Soviet Union began withdrawal of troops from Berlin as the first of 30,000 scheduled for recall.94 On 29 May 1956 DDR Premier Otto Grotewohl issued an eight point program to ease tension in Germany, pledging against conscription and atomic weapons.95

The Personnel Committee created a problem for the *Amt Blank* on 29 May 1956 when they vetoed the appointment of eighteen generals and colonels.\(^96\) Under Schwerin and Blank, there was a reluctance to select officers older than the top ranking military men in the *Amt Blank*, regardless of experience. The manner of selection was to exclude all who may have threatened to advance beyond those already in the *Amt Blank*.\(^97\) Generally when seeking new talent, members of the *Amt Blank* recommended someone whom they had known previously.\(^98\) There were two arguments between the Personnel Committee and Blank. First, the committee charged the Defense Ministry with holding personnel actions. Second, the committee claimed the right not only to declare an individual "suitable" or "unsuitable," but to recommend his assignment. When Blank refused to accept the committee's recommendations, they resolved to deal more rigorously with his nominations. Blank could thank his personnel chief, Gumbel, that the committee had made only six rather than nine negative decisions. Gumbel had withdrawn three names which the committee had decided to reject. To circumvent adverse committee action, Blank


\(^{98}\) Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
resorted to the practice of employing these men in responsible positions as civilians.99

Saying that an army is a symptom, not a cause, of East-West problems, Adenauer rejected Soviet proposals of 6 June 1956 to match the Soviet reduction of armed forces.100 The next day, 7 June 1956, the FRG agreed to pay part of the cost to maintain United States' troops in the FRG for another year. The new fiscal year was to begin at the end of April 1957, and the FRG was to contribute about 3.6 billion DM to NATO forces in the FRG. Schäffer said the FRG could not afford to pay more.101

On 8 June 1956 a Defense Ministry spokesman said that the FRG would have 96,000 men under arms by the end of 1956 despite the financial burden of paying for the support of NATO forces in the FRG. The 20,000 men from the Bundesgrenzshutz (BGS) expected to transfer to the new army in the summer of 1956 would bring the total to 40,000 men, and Blank planned to recruit 45,000 more volunteers by the end of the year. About 1.5 billion DM for NATO troops was to come from the defense budget. It appeared that Blank would not spend the budget of nine billion DM during the fiscal

year since the FRG was still building cadre. According to Blank on 21 June 1956, the West German economy would have no difficulty absorbing the additional burdens of armament production. Hence, on 30 June 1956 the FRG agreed to pay France about 274 million DM to support French troops in the FRG for the year ending 6 May 1957.

In mid-1956 in the FRG there was a general public apathy emanating from the catastrophe of World War II; there was no defeatism and no fear of communism. There was, however, a belief that the FRG was not defensible in the nuclear age, and there was a cool, objective, non-hysterical attitude toward the Soviet Union. Many Germans wondered what twelve divisions could do against East Bloc forces. Growing numbers favored talks with the Soviet Union on reunification since the defeat of the EDC Treaty had been a severe blow to German confidence in the West. Preying on low morale in an election year, the opposition challenged Adenauer on the rearmament policy and reliance on the West for negotiation with the Soviets.

105 New York Times, 10 Jun. 1956, sec. 6, 12.
The East Bloc reinforced its peace offensive, and on 22 June 1956 the Soviets attacked Adenauer for misrepresenting their position on reunification. On 30 June 1956 the DDR announced its intent to reduce its armed forces by thirty thousand. This reduction would leave a ninety thousand man force and permit a series of reductions in other communist countries: Poland, 47,000; Czechoslovakia, 34,000; Hungary, 20,000; Romania, 40,000; Bulgaria, 18,000; Albania, 9,000.

When the Bundestag voted for the Conscription Bill in the second reading on 4 July 1956, the opposition deputies walked out. Yet, on 7 July 1956 when the Bundestag approved the conscription bill to draft five hundred thousand men, the vote was 276 to 174 with twenty-two abstentions. The SPD opposed this bill, claiming that mass armies were outmoded in the nuclear age and that conscription would impede disarmament negotiations and deepen the division of Germany. Besides, twelve divisions were insufficient.

In Munich on 11 July 1956, Erich Ollenhauer, SPD Chair-

man, called for an election to reverse Adenauer's policy of alliance with the West. He wanted to cancel universal military training, revise the FRG commitment to NATO, restore normal relations with the East Bloc, and make a trade agreement with the People's Republic of China. Yet, both the SPD and the Government agreed that the way to German reunification was by negotiations between the Big Four, not between the FRG and the DDR.

Attempting to divide the FRG, on 11 July 1956 the DDR government invited West German men to escape the draft by going East, where there was no draft. On 13 July 1956 the Communist Central Committee sent a message to the SPD in West Germany hailing the FRG labor movement and praising SPD anti-rearmament actions. Nevertheless, President Heuss approved military conscription when he signed the law after Bundesrat approval on 20 July 1956. Rearmament was making progress, and on 23 July 1956 the FRG agreed to contribute to the support of Belgian and Canadian troops in the FRG.

In the summer of 1956 there was an anti-United States bias in the FRG evident as a deterioration of relations between United States' troops and the Germans. On 30 July 1956 the FRG sent its ambassador to Dulles to express concern over a feared reduction of United States' forces in Europe. Heusinger went to the Pentagon with the same message. The alarm was caused by Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the JCS, who called for a reduction of United States' armed forces by eight hundred thousand before 1960. This proposal would reduce the number of the United States' divisions in Europe from five to less than one with defensive reliance placed on nuclear weapons. At the time, the Soviet Union and the East Bloc had sixty-three divisions in place; the Allies had fourteen. General Gruenther said the Allies needed thirty divisions to stop a communist offensive. Eisenhower sent Robert Murphy to


Adenauer with the message that the "Radford Plan" was officially non-existent. 122

Several international events of 1956 had a serious psychological impact on the West Germans. On 7 August 1956 the FRG accepted an invitation to attend a London conference on the Suez Canal. 123 Since about twelve percent of FRG overseas trade went through the Suez Canal, the FRG was a major user. The FRG delegation departed on 15 August 1956. Not wanting to get involved in the Middle East after Nasser nationalized the canal, the Germans rejected a British suggestion to join in economic sanctions against Egypt. Adenauer feared that a diversion of attention from Europe would reduce West Europe to a peripheral theater for the United States and would weaken NATO, the purpose of which was to defend Western Europe. 124

On 29 August 1956 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party charged the FRG with plotting war to reunite Germany by force. 125 This charge, however, accompanied growing opposition to military service in the FRG. On 1 September 1956 a poll showed an increase in opposition to universal military service between December 1955 and July

1956 when parliament passed the conscription law. This opposition was reflected in the inability of the Defense Ministry to obtain officer candidates for the volunteer force. At the time, the Defense Ministry had 47,000 volunteers on active duty, including 9,500 former BGS, of the 96,000 desired goal by the end of 1956.126

In Bonn on 8 September 1956 the FRG renewed its efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to reunify Germany on the basis of free elections. In a memorandum to the Soviet Foreign Minister, the FRG proposed a demilitarized zone in East Germany and sent copies of the plan to the United States, Britain, and France. The Soviets rejected this offer and accused the FRG of remilitarizing Germany.127 West Germans viewed this Government bid for unity with ambivalence. Critics claimed it to be an election trick; supporters praised it as an opening for talks with the Soviet Union.128 In the meantime, the FRG was rearming, and by mid-September 1956 the United States had delivered $476 million worth of equipment donated to the FRG armed forces.129

Amid growing world tension, Adenauer's political opponents were active. In spite of SPD and FDP opposition,
on 16 September 1956 the FRG announced that it would participate in a second conference on the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{130} In Bonn on 17 September 1956 it appeared that the cabinet would reduce the term of military service: twelve months for conscripts serving in the artillery, infantry, and engineers; eighteen months for those serving in the technical services. This act conformed to the ideas of Richard Jäger, Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag.\textsuperscript{131}

When parliament returned on 22 September 1956 after an eight week recess, the attitude reflected support for short term conscription and a slower pace on rearmament. These thoughts appeared to reflect the uncertainties of the average German. In view of the forthcoming 1957 elections, there was a cautious reaction by politicians, who tended to oppose eighteen month conscription. Strauss urged the FRG to slow the pace of rearmament even though the Defense Ministry said that military plans were current.\textsuperscript{132} On 26 September 1956 the CDU faction, with other opponents of eighteen month conscription, unanimously approved twelve month service, the shortest service period in NATO except

\textsuperscript{130}New York Times, 17 Sept. 1956, sec. 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{131}New York Times, 18 Sept. 1956, sec. 1, 5.
\textsuperscript{132}New York Times, 23 Sept. 1956, sec. 1, 22.
for Luxembourg.133 When the cabinet approved twelve month service on 27 September 1956, Blank protested that the FRG could not reach its goal of five hundred thousand men by 1959 on that basis, and the FRG would have to make the armed services more attractive for volunteers.134 The NAC also expressed doubts that the FRG could meet its manpower commitment with twelve month service.135

Internationally, the FRG was active in the fall of 1956. On 27 September 1956 the FRG decided to join the Suez Canal Users Association.136 On 29 September 1956 Adenauer and Mollet announced the Saar agreement, which France and the FRG promptly ratified.137

By 1956, Amt Blank rearmament plans were showing results. In late September 1956 the first flight of the new FRG air force was stationed at Fürstenfeldbrück. It consisted of three United States' manufactured jet planes having World War I markings of a black Iron Cross on a white background on the wings and fuselage with a black, red, gold rectangle on the rudder.138 All did not continue smoothly.

137 New York Times, 30 Sept. 1956, sec. 1, 1; Conant, Germany and Freedom, 88.
On 2 October 1956 Richard Jäger said the FRG had to reduce its purchase of United States' tanks. This reduction coincided with the change to twelve month service. On 3 October 1956 the FRG had 52,800 men under arms, but the new army would employ few, if any, draftees in 1957.

In the FRG there was a continuing clamor for Blank's removal, and in Bonn on 12 October 1956, Adenauer prepared a cabinet revision. There was speculation that Franz Joseph Strauss would replace Blank in the Defense Ministry. The press described Strauss as a "young, energetic Bavarian," and on 16 October 1956 Adenauer appointed him Defense Minister. Since Strauss had counseled a slow building of the armed forces, the replacement of Blank by Strauss marked a change in the rearmament program. It indicated that Adenauer wanted to decelerate military preparations. Accordingly, in Bonn on 17 October 1956 the FRG announced revised rearmament goals. The previous goals of 96,000 men

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144 Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.
by 31 December 1956 and 270,000 men by 31 December 1957 became questionable.  

In the meantime, there were ominous events in the East. On 20 October 1956 Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders returned to Moscow from a quick trip to Poland where dissidents were attacking socialism and the Soviet Union, advocating that the Polish economy retain more features of capitalism. On 20 October 1956 problems in Hungary became more evident. There was concern in Moscow that Poland might be moving too rapidly on the path opened by Tito toward "national communism." On 23 October 1956 there were reports of disturbances in Hungary. Under terms of the Yalta Agreements, Soviet troops were authorized in Hungary to hold a "corridor" to Austria only so long as Austria was occupied. After the Austrian treaty was ratified, the Soviet Union had no right to keep troops in Hungary, but on 24 October 1956 Soviet troops fired on a crowd in Budapest; more soviet troops entered Hungary.  

On 24 October 1956 Soviet armed forces appeared to have


149 Eden, *Full Circle*, 582-583.
quelled a bloody anti-Soviet riot in Budapest.\textsuperscript{150} In Hungary on 25 October 1956 a Soviet tank fired on civilians.\textsuperscript{151}

Farther south, on 27 October 1956 the Israeli Army mobilized against Egypt.\textsuperscript{152} With no hesitation, on 29 October 1956, Israeli troops entered Egyptian territory.\textsuperscript{153} On 30 October 1956 the Soviets issued a statement that a "black reaction and counter revolution" took advantage of the situation in Hungary, and the Hungarian government "requested" Soviet army units.\textsuperscript{154} On the same day, Adenauer instructed Strauss to notify the NAC that the FRG could not meet its 1957 manpower commitment; the revised FRG goal was two hundred thousand men under arms within fourteen months.\textsuperscript{155}

On 31 October 1956 the British cabinet decided that the CINC of the Allied forces be authorized to execute a


\textsuperscript{153}Eden, Full Circle, 582-589; Bohlen, Witness, 431.


\textsuperscript{155}New York Times, 18 Oct. 1956, sec. 1, 8.
previously approved plan at dusk by attacking the Egyptian air force. Accordingly, British and French forces moved into Suez that night. During the Suez crisis, Nikolai Bulganin threatened to destroy Paris and London with nuclear weapons if Britain and France did not cease operations in Egypt and withdraw.

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 moved faster and farther than the Soviets liked, and they were afraid it might spread to other satellites. When the Hungarian Army began to fraternize with demonstrators, on 1 November 1956 the Soviets moved in with tanks. In a letter to Bulganin on Sunday, 4 November 1956, Eisenhower urged the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Hungary. On the same day, the Soviets attacked Budapest. In the south on 5 November 1956, French and British parachutists made airborne landings in Egypt. Bulganin's reply of 5 November 1956 to Eisenhower said nothing about Hungary, but concentrated

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156 Eden, Full Circle, 594, 598.
158 Strauss, Grand Design, 49.
159 Eden, Full Circle, 608-609, 618.
161 Eden, Full Circle, 608-609, 618.
The incidents in Poland and Hungary emanated from the Soviet de-Stalinization policy, and the Soviets took advantage of the accidentally concurrent Egyptian situation to divert world attention from these problems.

Nothing since the fall of the Third Reich had stirred German emotions like events in Hungary and Egypt. Fear and an intense desire for security had fostered the creation of the FRG, and fear was suddenly alive again. Adenauer's declining reputation began to improve; events in Hungary appeared to justify Adenauer's premise that rearmament offered the best promise of military security. In October 1956 thirty-eight percent of the FRG public favored an army; in December 1956 fifty percent favored rearmament. The SPD began to cooperate, and Erich Ollenhauer supported the army that the SPD had been opposing. Strauss, as the new Defense Minister, had to deal with rearmament under these new conditions. Blank was out.

Blank's appointment as Defense Minister was accompanied by myriad problems between himself and various segments of the German population. Regardless of the problems, Blank continued to promote the Chancellor's rearmament program.


Although the Amt Blank rearmament schedule could not be met, the planning was sound and was producing results in 1956. By mid-1956 the German populace was becoming passive about rearmament; however, a change in the international situation in late 1956 stimulated a renewed interest in West German defense. By this time, however, Adenauer had decided to slow the pace of rearmament. Needless to say, East Bloc harassment continued; however, this pique was insignificant compared to the animosity generated by Blank's secrecy and evasion. In many respects, Blank's problems were due to his loyalty to Adenauer, whose firm control of rearmament inhibited Blank's functions in the Defense Ministry. Many proponents of rearmament refused to cooperate, and opponents of rearmament grasped Blank's problems as an opportunity to delay or prevent rearmament. Regardless of the reasons for Blank's problems and his success in planning rearmament, Adenauer succumbed to political pressure and removed him.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

The period 1945 to 1955 witnessed drastic changes in Western Europe, especially West Germany. Following World War II, Germany became the proving ground for East-West relations, into which poured competing forces to fill the void created by the destruction of the Third Reich. At the end of World War II, West Germany was defeated and prostrate; ten years later, it was the most prosperous West European country, a member of NATO, and a sovereign state with plans and approval to create its own armed force. The path from devastation to prosperity was not an easy one, and the West Germans had to overcome obstacles at every turn. Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank played important roles in this transition.

Good intentions, specified in Allied wartime agreements, turned into misunderstanding, non-cooperation, and a struggle for supremacy. West European states were caught on the horns of a dilemma; they had an inherent fear of Germany as well as a fear of the Soviet Union. France and the Benelux countries had experienced German invasions on several occasions, and the French and Germans had fought
many battles.\textsuperscript{1} Since Germany had a reputation for attacking its neighbors, France was hesitant to rearm the Germans while France, unarmed, continued to suffer from the occupation of World War II. On the other hand, Western Europe had experienced only one invasion by the Russians when Czarist troops drove to and occupied Paris at the end of the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, France and Russia had been friends since the end of the nineteenth century. Hence, West European nations, especially France, initially perceived the Germans to be the primary threat. The fear of Germany produced the Brussels Pact of 1948; the fear of the Soviet Union produced the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. A growing fear of the Soviet Union also motivated an early call for West German troops to help the Western allies meet a perceived threat from the East; yet, the lingering fear of the Germans caused the Western Allies to hesitate. Nevertheless, the West believed that the Germans deserved a degree of self-government, and together the Western Allies and the west Germans founded the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949. A similar political act followed in the Soviet Zone in October 1949 when the German Democratic Republic (DDR) appeared with a complete government.

Konrad Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the FRG in 1949, and one of his primary objectives was sovereignty. Perceiving a threat from the East, he was initially alarmed by the Korean War, but soon realized that there was no immediate danger to Germany. Perhaps by 1952, the East Bloc might attack, but in the meantime the threat could be used as leverage to pry sovereignty from the West.

Adenauer had been concerned with sovereignty and security since the early days of the occupation, and as early as 1949 considered the appointment of a security advisor to plan for internal and external security. This course followed sound logic; however, the Germans were restrained by the occupation regime and Allied agreements from World War II. This meant that the Western Allies had to perceive a threat before they would assent to any West German armed force. By the spring of 1950, the West sensed a threat, and from the foreign ministers conference in London in May 1950, Adenauer obtained tacit approval to begin security planning. Accordingly, on 24 May 1950 Adenauer appointed former General Gerhard Graf Schwerin to head the FRG planning activity. Among Schwerin's problems was the fact that he had not been a general staff officer, and as a consequence, he did not understand the magnitude of his task. He also had problems emanating from his personal qualities; he was no politician.
The detonation of the first Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949 encouraged the West to think more seriously about arming the West Germans and bringing them into the Western security system, but the alarm soon subsided and the West returned to its internal problems. Ironically, the West was jolted from its apathy on 25 June 1950 by the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Fear grew, and the West saw this event as a pattern for war in central Europe. Thence came assumptions for the defense of Western Europe: the Soviets would strive to spread communism throughout the world and dominate the world, and Soviet leaders would employ every expedient means to attain their goal, including war.² From that analysis came the initiative for the Western Allies to act immediately to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

By September 1950, the Western Allies had decided that they must act promptly to strengthen West European defense.³ Accordingly, at the New York Foreign Ministers Conference in September 1950, they approved the concept of West German rearmament. The United States formulated a plan whereby the Germans could form nationally homogeneous, operationally independent combat divisions. The French objected, the idea of German troops under German command horrified them.

³McCloy, Challenge, 28-29.
Hence, on 23 October 1950, the French countered with the Pleven Plan for a supra-national European army in a European Defense Community (EDC), the purpose of which was to prevent any form of German national army and to delay as long as possible the creation of any German military unit.

The Western Allies, as well as the Germans, considered the Pleven Plan to be militarily ridiculous; but, despite opposition from leading French generals, the French insisted that the Allies must accept the Pleven Plan or the French would not participate. After the United States and Britain informed the French that they would not tolerate an inflexible French attitude, there was hope for compromise. Accordingly, Charles Spofford proposed a compromise on which the French reluctantly agreed to negotiate.

Upon his appointment, Schwerin began security planning, but his major contribution was the arrangement of the Himmerod conference in October 1950 where fifteen former German officers formulated a plan for rearmament. Following this success, Schwerin committed a faux pas when in October 1950, without permission, he held a press conference which violated FRG security and embarrassed Adenauer. Thus, Adenauer dismissed Schwerin and sought a security deputy whose political and leadership aptitudes were more in line with his own.

Already having considered several generals, Adenauer looked for a civilian security deputy whose loyalty to the
Chancellor was unquestionable. Adenauer wanted a member of the CDU political party, a member of parliament, and a person who would follow instructions without proclaiming his disagreement with Government policy. Inasmuch as Adenauer considered sovereignty and security a personal challenge, he intended that his ideas be carried out; the security deputy had to recognize this fact and comply with Adenauer's demands. Adenauer found the qualities he sought in Theodor Blank. An adroit politician, but lacking experience in international negotiations, Blank had most of the qualities Adenauer sought. In time, he gained experience in international affairs.

Blank's duties were many and varied. As security deputy, he was responsible for planning the accommodations for the Allied troop augmentation approved in September 1950. He was also charged with planning the FRG defense contribution to include organization, recruitment, training, and equipment of the new armed forces. He was a diplomat, leading the FRG delegations at the Petersberg and in Paris on rearmament. Throughout the entire period, as a member of parliament, he maintained his seat in the Bundestag, where he supported Amt Blank plans. In organizing the Amt Blank, he surrounded himself with former General Staff officers.

As chief of the Amt Blank, Blank was responsible for everything his department did or did not do. The Amt Blank was the planning agency for FRG rearmament; it was also the
de facto defense ministry until June 1955 when it became the
de jure Defense Ministry with Blank as Defense Minister.
The Amt Blank maintained a large staff to support its members who participated in the Petersberg talks and the Paris negotiations.

In December 1950, the Western foreign ministers met in Brussels where they determined guidelines for negotiations on rearmament. There were two courses whereby the FRG could be rearmed: a German contribution to a supra-national European army and the EDC, or a German national army with the FRG a member of NATO. In January 1951, at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, the Allied High Commission began unofficial talks on the NATO plan with a group of Germans under the leadership of Theodor Blank. In February 1951 in Paris, official negotiations began on the Pleven Plan, or the European army. Talks at the Petersberg culminated in an interim report in the summer of 1951, which was the FRG proposal for rearmament. Because of Blank's success in the Petersberg talks, Adenauer appointed him to lead the FRG delegation to the Paris negotiations on the European army in July 1951.

The French, distressed at the success the Germans experienced at the Petersberg, increased their efforts in Paris to block the Petersberg Plan. Although the European army was a French idea, the French never accepted its full implications. Yet, in Paris, the Germans so completely
accepted the concept of the European army that they frightened the French. Although the other EDC states, the United States, and Britain opposed the French view, in early 1952 there was agreement on the EDC Treaty, which was signed on 26 May 1952 in Bonn and 27 May 1952 in Paris. The Western Allies and the FRG also signed other treaties and agreements supplementing and complementing the EDC Treaty. Until ratification was complete, delegates were to continue work on provisions for implementing the EDC. As chief of the FRG delegation and a member of the EDC Steering Committee, Blank continued to participate in these activities as well as in international conferences on rearmament.

The immediate political battle was ratification of the EDC Treaty. Although the EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952, the French were dissatisfied. France, burdened financially by the Indochina war, politically by fragmented leadership, and psychologically by a fear of Germany, was the major obstacle. The French did not want the FRG to be rearmed with a military organization which they could not control. Accordingly, by one device or another they delayed action on the EDC Treaty until August 1954. By this time, they had


5The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the President, 5 June 1953, ibid., 401-408.
changed the Pleven Plan so much that it was no longer the Pleven Plan. On 28 August 1954, the French parliament finally began action on the EDC Treaty; however, before they could complete their work, a motion for adjournment sine die carried, marking the defeat of the EDC on 30 August 1954.

The West viewed the EDC failure as Mendès-France's achievement. Following a twenty-seven month ratification process, the West accepted the EDC as the milieu for West German rearmament only to see the project introduced by France rejected by the French parliament. Reasons for the French action included a combination of fear and jealousy of the Germans, French problems with its overseas empire, especially North Africa and Indochina, slow recovery of the French economy, and the failure of French leadership. There was also a political reason: France wanted a strong Britain within the European framework. It was British policy, however, not to join Europe too closely. The French were also afraid an armed FRG would involve France in a war with the Soviet Union to recoup lost German territory.

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7 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung, 590; Eisenhower, Mandate, 402-403.


there is ample evidence to blame the EDC failure on the French, the Germans share some responsibility in that they could have been more cooperative.  

Primarily due to the initiative of Anthony Eden, the Western allies met in London in September 1954 where they decided to rearm the FRG by bringing it into the Brussels Pact (WEU) and NATO. Blank and Kielmansögg participated in this endeavor. The Allies signed the Paris Agreements in October 1954. Again, the French tried to bloc FRG entry into NATO, but Allied pressure was too great and the French ratified this course in December 1954. After French ratification, the other states ratified the Paris Agreements.

After the Paris Agreements were signed in October 1954, Adenauer's intervention in rearmament planning immediately increased and reached a climax in a disagreement with Blank over the three paragraph Volunteer Law in the Bundesrat in the summer of 1955. The publicity emanating from this fray was detrimental to Blank in the Bundesrat, Bundestag, and public.  

After the Allies ratified the Paris Agreements, there could be no automatic check on the possibility that a

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10U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Session, Part 2, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 529.

rereamed Germany might threaten Europe; this situation was a consequence of French refusal to support their own proposal, the European army and the EDC. In due course, the FRG became a sovereign state and entered NATO on 5 May 1955. On 7 June 1955, the Amt Blank became the Defense Ministry with Blank as Defense Minister.

As Defense Minister, Blank continued to press parliament for the passage of legislation implementing rearmament. By this time, Blank was having serious problems with the press, his parliamentary colleagues, and the public. As security deputy, Blank adapted well to the political world, especially on difficult issues, but when he became Defense Minister his position changed. He now took his directions from Adenauer. Consequently, Blank withdrew behind the Chancellor in political accountability to parliament and the public and became more distant than his ministerial position warranted. This change in Blank's initiative appeared to conform to Adenauer's intentions.

In his numerous appearances in the EDC and Security Committees, Blank's desire to represent the Amt Blank and his open, willing, face-to-face appearances before the

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Bundestag showed a desire to cooperate. Blank's reticence emanated from the strongly pronounced requirement for secrecy in military affairs, and it appears that Blank did not follow the Chancellor's information policy entirely voluntarily. Finally, owing to political pressure, in October 1956 Adenauer replaced Blank as Defense Minister with Franz Josef Strauss.

Blank's problems and Amt Blank problems were at times the same and at times different; at all times they were related. One of the major problems was the cloak of secrecy under which the Amt Blank operated. Blank and his department suffered from this policy. Blank, loyal to Adenauer, was carrying out the Chancellor's policy of support for the Allies as well as maintaining confidential protection for his domestic and diplomatic intentions. Had Adenauer's opponents known his thoughts, there would have been little if any hope for success. Blank, in concert with Adenauer and other CDU officials, conducted public relations campaigns to educate the populace and reduce opposition to rearmament; however, this activity achieved only limited success.

Blank and the Amt Blank had problems with the press and parliament emanating from the secrecy policy. In both

15Ibid.
16Ibid.
cases, Blank could probably have reduced the hostility had he employed more personal tact. He recognized the problem and tried, unsuccessfully, to solve it by holding frequent press conferences. His problems were primarily due to the nature of his responsibility, not his personality. Rearmament was an unpopular, difficult subject in the post-War years, and Blank bore the brunt of criticism from most sectors.\(^7\) He never did escape the press criticism, which continued to call for his dismissal.

The SPD promoted a continual flow of anti-rearmament propaganda and employed every available verbal assault on Adenauer's rearmament program. Although fundamentally agreeing with the Chancellor, the SPD opposed his program for political reasons.\(^8\) The SPD ideas were bolder than Adenauer preferred, but the SPD supported rearmament after it was approved. Although his bombast often appeared to support the East Bloc, SPD leader Kurt Schumacher was one of the most effective anti-communists in Germany.\(^9\) Blank and the Amt Blank escaped most SPD criticism because of the frequent briefings they gave to SPD leaders.

\(^7\)Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

\(^8\)The United States High Commissioner for Germany to the Secretary of State, 17 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: Central and Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, 780-784.

\(^9\)U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Session, Part 2, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, 529.
Throughout the period of FRG rearmament, the East Bloc observed and interfered where and when it felt that interference worked against the West. The FRG was caught in the middle of this East-West controversy. The Soviet Union tried to block every step the West took. Threats, propaganda, requests for four-power conferences, disarmament proposals, proposed security treaties, and intrigue were some of the techniques employed by the East Bloc to thwart FRG rearmament; however, none was ultimately successful. Collective action by the Western Allies reduced the effect of East Bloc attacks on the Amt Blank.

The major failing of Blank and the Amt Blank was the inability to meet the rearmament schedule set by the Western Allies and approved by Adenauer. In 1950-1951, West Germany had all of the trained, combat experienced soldiers that it needed. The main tasks were to bring them into an effective organization and give them weapons. The Amt Blank was to create the organization; the West was to provide the weapons. On this basis, rearmament could have become reality within two years. With the delay in ratification of the EDC Treaty, the combat experienced veterans grew older and their experience outdated. Consequently, by 1953-1954, it was doubtful that a new German army could be created in
three years, and the Amt Blank had to start from a zero base.20

That the time involved had to be amended was one of the main reasons Blank was forced to leave office as Defense Minister. The Allies, especially the United States, pressed for the FRG contribution as soon as possible because of an immediate Soviet threat. It was questionable, however, that Blank believed it possible to set up an effective army with all support units and French approval in two or three years. Three years from the start, the FRG required a myriad of preparations before the first soldier could be in uniform. The FRG needed special laws and knowledge of the size of the armed force, the draft, volunteers, and logistics. Military planning for quarters, training, and other essentials was difficult. The Germans planned for everything they would need before the first soldiers joined. The Amt Blank set a time of four and one-half years for rearmament. This figure was realistic, and the Amt Blank gave it to the Chancellor. As the only responsible person associated with military planning (there was as yet no defense minister), Adenauer said: "No."21 For political reasons he would not change the time from three to four and one-half years. Planners in the Amt Blank tried to reduce the time schedule by one and

21Ibid.
one-half year; they reduced it one year, but were very uneasy about it. The premature completion date was not Blank's mistake.\textsuperscript{22}

As far as the Allies were concerned, Blank was highly respected and successful, but he often suffered from a lack of information. Frequently the allies withheld information for the same reason Blank withheld information from the press; they were afraid of what he would do with it. The French not only withheld information, they attempted on several occasions to deceive the Germans about Allied intentions. This situation meant that the Germans had to work harder and longer to fill the void created by the lack of knowledge. Thus, Blank and his department worked around the problem. The French created a problem over the Saar, which was secondary to rearmament. There was no legitimate tie between the Saar and the Paris Agreements; however, the French created a political tie between the two by making French ratification contingent on a Saar agreement.\textsuperscript{23}

Adenauer personally handled the Saar problem. Blank's persistence and cooperative attitude at the Petersberg and in Paris held French opposition to a minimum. The fundamental problems with France were far beyond Blank's influence, and were dealt with effectively by Britain and

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.

the United States. While Blank had problems with parliament, the press, and the public, all accounts indicate that he established and maintained excellent rapport with Western representatives at the Petersberg, in Paris, and in other international meetings.

There appears to have been no personal conflict between Blank and Adenauer; Adenauer removed Blank as Defense Minister partially as a political sacrifice.\textsuperscript{24} Years later, Strauss, the man who succeeded Blank in the Defense Ministry, wrote that the post of Defense Minister was professional and political suicide. Everyone was against him: the press, the unions, the opposition. The position of Defense Minister had always been strenuous and dangerous, especially since World War I. Noske saved Weimar, but was discharged like a criminal. Gessler was relieved. Gröner reached a sad end. Schleicher had a tragic end. Blomberg was dismissed. Blank, a man of good will, was reduced to a state of collapse.\textsuperscript{25}

In late 1956 Adenauer adopted a more realistic time schedule for meeting rearmament goals; this change would have taken much pressure off Blank. Strauss, a proponent of slower rearmament, carried out the change. Although Strauss displaced Blank as Defense Minister in October 1956, Blank's

\textsuperscript{24}Kielmansegg, interview, 10 Aug. 1982.

\textsuperscript{25}Strauss, \textit{Grand Design}, 96.
work was important. By October 1956 the Amt Blank had become the Defense Ministry. The Defense Ministry adjusted its plans and continued to function. With the slower pace of rearmament, goals were met, even though later than originally planned. Based on the Himmeroder Denkschrift, the Amt Blank negotiated and planned the FRG armed force, the Bundeswehr. Blank was the chief negotiator and planner in this process. Although Konrad Adenauer was the driving force behind FRG rearmament, Theodor Blank was the instrument who pushed it through Allied negotiations and parliamentary acceptance.26

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