AN EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF KEY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORISTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION

DISSERTATION

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By

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The problem of the investigation was to ascertain the contributions of various sociological theorists to a sociology of emotions. Emphasis was to be placed on the symbolic interactionist school. The method employed was that of a literature review, with an evaluative analysis of each of a number of writers as each contributed to a sociology of emotions. The study had the purpose of remedying the long-standing neglect of emotions by sociologists. This purpose was accomplished by indicating the distinctive contributions of each theorist and areas of convergence among theorists.

The investigation was organized according to groups of theorists. Each theorist was examined for conceptions of human nature and of the relationship between the individual and society. Chapter I discussed the problem in general; the remaining chapters analyzed the theorists. Chapter II discussed the classical theorists Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Talcott Parsons. Chapter III presented the views of the symbolic interactionists George

The findings showed that emotion has been neglected by the classical theorists. Preoccupied with rationality and with demonstrating the overall influence of society on the individual, this group acknowledges emotions but fails to treat them systematically. The symbolic interactionists, more concerned with how persons and society are linked, pay more attention to emotion while stressing cognitive mechanisms. Although some still neglect emotion, their frame of reference implies its treatment. Contemporary theorists address emotion explicitly, providing a set of basic questions and delineating a sociology of emotion.

It was concluded that the sociology of emotion has some important precursors. The classical theorists provided some important clues while symbolic interactionists provided a general framework. Contemporary theorists extend this framework to establish parameters for a sociological analysis of emotion.
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## V. CONCLUSION

A Sociology of Emotion Implied in Early Works
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Specific and Explicit Attention Toward Developing a Theoretical Approach to a Sociology of Emotion by Recent Sociologists
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem and Its Purposes

In this study the nature of an emergent area of interest in sociology will be examined, the sociology of emotions. Although Hochschild (17, 18), Denzin (6), and others (8, 21, 22, 29, 34) have elaborated the need for a sociology of emotion and although beginnings toward the development of such a field have been made from several different perspectives, as yet there is no clearly articulated sociological theory of feelings and emotions (17, p. 280).

This study will consist of bringing together, analyzing, and synthesizing the central thoughts and ideas which relate to the development of a sociology of emotions. It will focus on selected parts of the works of such major sociologists as Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Parsons, as these works bear upon the nature and social molding of emotional expression and the inhibition of such expression. Although a variety of orientations will be explored, the major emphasis of the present study will be on the symbolic interactionist tradition as it relates to the development of a sociology of emotions.
The Importance of Emotion

Emotions play an important role in structuring the social arena in which the person interacts with others. They are pervasive in human affairs. An understanding of their place in social life is important for an inclusive sociological perspective, and such a perspective can add knowledge to psychological and physiological theories of emotion.

A social psychology which claims to study the subjective side of social life can no longer afford to ignore the affective, emotional and mood-shaping components of this process. . . . In everyday life, the mood that one establishes can be as basic to the organization of one's joint actions as are one's claims to power, status, and social influence. . . . Moods and feelings are attached to these ritualized self-ideas, making mood and affect central to the study of self in social interaction (6, p. 9).

Sociologists are aware, in a common-sense way, of the importance of mood and emotion, but are not in the habit of making clear and explicit the way individuals "understand" much of their social experience through the emotions. How the individual feels becomes closely aligned with what the individual sees and thinks, but the literature of sociology tends to stress the cognitive sphere to the exclusion of emotions.

In presenting a sociological theory of certain aspects of emotional experience, Susan Shott provides support for two arguments for the sociological relevance of emotion:

Many affective phenomena require investigation from a sociological perspective in order to be fully
understood; and secondly, some aspects of social life cannot be fully explicated without considering emotion. The necessity of a sociological perspective for the explanation of some elements of feeling is indicated by my analysis of affect socialization and construction and the nature of role taking emotions.

The cultural shaping of affective experience is an area clearly relevant to most sociological perspectives. This analysis attests to the clearly sociological character of feelings. The sociological investigation of emotion must surely increase our understanding of both emotion and social life (34, pp. 1330-1331).

Neglect of Emotion

Even symbolic interactionism, which often focuses on subjective experience, has tended to neglect emotional subjectivity as a social phenomenon. The powerful influence of Mead's emphasis on the cognitive as the key element in man's evolution may have had an influential role in turning the symbolic interaction approach away from adequate consideration of emotion (26). This neglect of affect and emotion is at least partly a result of the high value placed on rationalistic and technological orientations in industrial society. In this context, encouragement of affective experiences may be viewed as antithetical to rational conduct.

Related to this is the felt need of the social sciences to emulate the so-called hard sciences in terms of objectively measurable dimensions. Therefore, behavior and overt indices of cognition have been seen as more suitable
for measurement than subjective emotional and thought processes.

Definition of Emotion

There is a large and diffuse body of literature on emotion in the areas of physiology, biology, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. Rorty (32, pp. 537-543) has compiled an extensive bibliography of works on emotion in these areas of study. There are many definitions of emotion in this literature. A definition by Strongman provides a useful starting point.

Emotion is feeling, it is a bodily state involving physical structures, it is gross or fine-grained behavior, and it occurs in particular situations. When we use the term we mean any or all of these possibilities, each of which may show a wide range of variation (36, p. 1).

Emotion is thus a multifaceted phenomenon, as was made clear by Izard, who specified that a complete definition of emotion must take into account all three of these aspects or components:
(a) the experience or conscious feeling of emotion,
(b) the processes that occur in the brain and nervous system, and
(c) the observable expressive patterns of emotion, particularly those on the face (19, p. 4).

The parallels between Strongman's and Izard's definitions are clear—each specifying organismic, experiential, and social components. This convergence in the overall conception of emotion serves as a point of departure, however: these definitions illustrate the difficulty in studies about emotion, different theorists dealing with different
parts of the broad meaning that the term emotion carries with it.

One reason for this diversity of approaches to the study of emotion is that a number of disciplines have contributed to the present understanding of emotion. These disciplines have included social psychology, counseling, personality theory and research, clinical psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, ethology, neurology and neurophysiology, and biochemistry (19, pp. 13-17).

Some basic issues serve to divide the field of emotion studies. One issue already noted centers on ways of defining emotion, with different writers stressing different components. Another issue focuses on ways of accounting for the occurrence of emotions. As Izard wrote:

. . . scientists do not agree on precisely how an emotion comes about. Some maintain that emotion is a joint function of a physiologically arousing situation and the person's evaluation or appraisal of the situation. This explanation of the causal process comes from a cognitive theory of emotion. . . . Some cognitive theorists . . . describe appraisal as a rather elaborate set of cognitive processes (consisting of primary, secondary, and tertiary appraisal), while Arnold describes appraisal as essentially an intuitive automatic process (19, p. 4).

Another issue is whether emotions are transient or stable phenomena. In other words, are they emotion states or emotion traits? "To what extent are emotions determined by the situations and conditions of the moment and to what extent are they stable characteristics of the individual?" (19, p. 5). This question indicates one way in which the
sociology of emotion is dependent on the psychology of emotion: the basic conception of human nature, and specifically of emotion, has a bearing on how the social order is seen to articulate with the individual. Sociology has either option open to it. For example, Parsons (30, 31) stresses more enduring aspects of social structure and would therefore, presumably, be more receptive to a trait conception of emotion; Goffman (14, 15, 16), on the other hand, is more situational and would therefore be more receptive to a state conception.

Another issue in emotion study, as in psychology in general, is whether emotions are innate or learned. One can offer no simple answer to this question. While there is some evidence for the innateness of emotions, no sharp boundary divides the innate and the learned:

Almost anyone can learn to inhibit or modify the innate emotion expressions. While the innate expression of anger involves baring of the teeth as in preparation for biting, many people clinch their teeth and compress their lips as though to soften or disguise the expression. People of different social backgrounds and different cultures may learn quite different facial movements for modifying innate expressions. In addition to learning modifications of emotion expressions, sociocultural influences and individual experiences play an important role in determining what will trigger an emotion and what a person will do as a result of emotion . . . (19, p. 6).

There is thus no absolute dichotomy between the innate and the learned as regards emotions.
Finally, Izard has noted that the distinction between positive and negative emotions is not as simple as it appears. Negative affect is not always synonymous with negative adaptiveness:

Emotions such as anger, fear, and shame cannot be considered categorically negative or bad. Anger is sometimes positively correlated with survival, and more often with the defense and maintenance of personal integrity and the correction of social injustice. Fear is also correlated with survival and, together with shame, helps with the regulation of destructive aggression and the maintenance of social order. Unwarranted or overdetermined anger or fear usually has negative organismic and social consequences, but so may the emotion of joy if it is associated with derisive laughter or is combined with excitement and ulterior motives and becomes what Lorenz . . . called "militant enthusiasm" (19, p. 8).

Since these controversies about emotion are endemic to psychology in general, it is not surprising that social psychology in particular is not unified in its approach to the study of emotion. There are thus two major approaches to emotion and feeling in social psychology: the organismic account and the interactive account. The interactive account appears to have greater utility than an organismic account for a sociological study of emotion. But, in getting to the interactive approach, the nature of the organismic account will be briefly explored.

Examples of this approach are found in Darwin, Freud, W. McDougall, and S. S. Tomkins (5, 11, 28, 37). Such works focus on the relation of emotion to drive or instinct.
According to the organismic view, the paramount questions concern the relation of emotion to biologically given "instinct" or "impulse." In large part, biological factors account for the questions the organismic theorists pose (18).

This position is specified by McDougall, who built his social psychology on the emotions. According to McDougall, emotional excitement . . . is the only part of the total instinctive process that retains its specific character and remains common to all individuals and all situations in which the instinct is excited (27, p. 29).

Social factors do not, and perhaps cannot, play a very large part in this perspective on emotion.

If emotions are essentially based in biological givens, then cultural norms and social interaction do not basically affect emotions. In contrast, the interactive account emphasizes that self-labeling and management are key parts of the emotion process. This difference is one of degree because the organismic view has tended to treat cultural differences in emotion as superficial surface differences imposed on the more basic biological elements.

Although the doctrine of instinct has gone out of vogue, the organismic account holds that . . . there is some "core" aspect of emotional behavior, identifiable in terms of neurological circuits and/or subjective experience, which is biologically given and hence pan-cultural. By contrast, a basic assumption of the present emphasis is that there are no core aspects of emotion which are not intrinsically and essentially influenced by socio-cultural factors. But an adequate analysis of emotion must avoid the Sycilla of cultural relativism as well as the Charybdis of nativism. The course between the two lies in the recognition that emotions come
into being only through the interaction of biological and sociocultural systems (2, p. 58).

Examples of the interactive approach are found in the works of Gerth and Mills, Goffman, Kemper, Schachter, Shott, and Turner (13, 15, 21, 22, 33, 34, 38).

In the interactive account, social influences permeate emotion more insistently, more effectively, and at more theoretically posited junctions. In large part, sociological factors account for the questions the interactive theorist poses (18).

Schachter's definition of emotion is a specific instance of an interactive definition of emotion. His view of emotion does include acknowledgment of physiological arousal in emotion and the labeling of that arousal; both are necessary parts of a person's experience of emotion. For Schachter, emotion is a state of physiological arousal defined by the actor as emotionally induced (33, pp. 23-24). "Just as there are pressures to establish the 'correctness' of an opinion and the 'goodness' of an ability, there are pressures to establish the 'appropriateness' of an emotion or bodily state" (33, p. 128).

Among the various theories of emotion, cognitive-type theories have become particularly influential in recent years. A number of theories are included in this group, from Freud (11) to Schachter (33), Arnold, Lazarus, Simonov, Kagan, and Izard (19). While Freud has generally been linked to an instinctual view of emotions, he is also known for a cognitive conception:
Although Freud's conception of instinctual drives as the wellspring of motivation has been severely criticized or rejected by some contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers, his seminal notion that motivational phenomena (including "wish impulses") are represented by bonds between ideas and affects still thrives in various forms and contexts (19, p. 40).

Just what these "bonds" are vary from theorist to theorist. Arnold saw emotion as springing from drive, on the one hand, and action impulse plus cognition on the other. Schachter, as noted, viewed emotion as a resultant of undifferentiated arousal and cognition. Lazarus perceived emotion as a response of either a cognitive, expressive, or instrumental nature. Simonov conceived of emotion as an interaction between need and the probability of achieving a goal. Kagan "defines a motive as a cognitive representation of a desired goal that may or may not be associated with particular behaviors... a representation of a future event that will enable the person to feel better" (19, p. 41). Izard saw emotions as "affective-cognitive structures," as the basis for all motivation (p. 45).

An interactive approach to emotion tends to take certain sides on the issues in a psychology of emotion. For one thing, it tends to account for the occurrence of emotion not through simple physiological arousal, but through a combination of arousal and cognitive appraisal. Secondly, it tends to see emotion as a transient phenomenon, as a state more than as a trait. Thirdly, it tends to
stress the learned aspects of emotion rather more than the innate aspects. On the final issue, however, one finds no clear indication of whether the interactive approach views positive and negative emotions in terms of a single dimension or more than one.

The cognitive emphasis in an interactive approach to emotion allows specifically for the influence of situations upon emotion: each situation is viewed as inviting an appraisal which, combined with arousal, constitutes the particular emotional response to that situation. An organismic approach, by contrast, blurs the distinctions among situations and the appraisals that accompany them. The emphasis on emotion states as opposed to traits also articulates the individual with particular situations, as already noted. Enduring emotions, on the other hand, play down situational vicissitudes and are consistent with an organismic approach. Finally, the interactive approach stresses how the individual can learn to modify his expression of emotion.

In this study, the focus will be on an interactive approach to the sociology of emotion; emotion will be broadly defined to include a wide range of affective phenomena. The terms feeling, temperament, mood, emotion, and sentiment have all been used in the literature on affect. This study will include all of these terms as part of the subject matter of the sociology of emotion, because they
have been used by different writers as they attempted to handle affective phenomena.

For example, Cooley (4), Durkheim (10), and Turner (38), used the term sentiments in their work. Turner defined sentiment as

a socially defined complex of feeling that indicates a characteristic relationship to a social object and is accompanied by tendencies to behave in the socially appropriate manner. It incorporates emotion but does not correspond exactly to any emotion (38, p. 22).

It is the interactional aspect of emotion that makes it of interest from a sociological perspective. This is clearly a part of a sentiment as conceptualized by Turner and also a part of emotion as defined by Schachter above. Therefore, a broad interactive account of emotion as described in this section defines the field of emotion for this study of the emerging sociology of emotion.

Relationship Between Sociology and Psychology

Traditionally, the study of emotion has been a psychological subject. Therefore, a brief examination of the overlap or interface between sociology and psychology can provide perspective for the present study. In general, the discipline of social psychology covers the overlap between the two disciplines.

This study will not explore in depth the theoretical issues underlying the various approaches to social
psychology, but it will take note of certain of these issues which have pointed relevance for the present study.

   Social psychology has been defined by Lindesmith as concerning itself
   ... with the phases of social experience that derive from individuals' participation in the on-going world of social groups, with their interactions with other people, and with the effects upon them of what is broadly designated as the cultural environment (25, p. 4).

Lindesmith applies the symbolic interaction approach to the study of group life and contends that it is the most sociological of all social psychologies.

   Social psychology from the psychological perspective has been characterized as a highly experimental approach to its subject matter. Elliot Aronson's recent social psychology textbook, The Social Animal (1), illustrates such an emphasis. Aronson relies very heavily upon experimental evidence from laboratory studies and attempts to apply this body of controlled empirical observations to larger social issues of human relations.

   Critics find this approach very limited. Kreilkamp, for example, is highly critical.

   Nearly all Aronson's chapters are pervaded by a similar pattern. He starts with interesting questions, then moves to experimental evidence (usually not directly pertinent to answering the interesting questions he begins with) and then he sometimes ends with interesting speculations, worded to imply that the preceding experimental evidence bears on his final speculation (23, p. 19).
In his attempt to attain a broader conceptual framework for social psychology, Kreilkamp makes extensive use of the work of such social writers as Herbert Marcuse, Ronald Laing, Erving Goffman, Carl Rogers, Kenneth Burke, and Thomas Schelling. And yet he ignores much of the symbolic interaction perspective in social psychology which draws on the sociological tradition. He does mention the Mead-Cooley corpus in his analysis of Goffman, but none of the later works of Blumer (3) and a number of other writers who have attempted to create a conceptual framework for social psychology and who have been influential among sociologists.

Kurt Lewin's field-theoretical approach to social psychology attempted to create experimental simulations of "real" life. He wrote:

If the views of the field-theoretical approach are correct, there is a good prospect of approaching experimentally a great number of problems which previously seemed out of reach. . . . the experimenter . . . does not need to be afraid of creating "artificial," "unlifelike" situations. Experiments become artificial if merely one or another factor is realized, but not the essential pattern (24, p. 234).

But even Lewin and his students have been accused of stressing the rational and the cognitive over the irrational. Marie Jahoda writes:

As a result, mainstream social psychology is often no longer social. It treats people like objects rather than persons and where it does not, limits its concern to the cognitively rational and consistent . . . (20, p. 215).
Jahoda stresses the need for a more "social" psychology. She criticizes the heavy use of rationality in theoretical approaches and says:

... in our daily transactions we are all inclined to be guided by established patterns of behaviour and gut feelings, rather than by our minds. Even the best trained in formal logical reasoning use intuitively, a different, inductive "real-world-reasoning" when put on the spot in actual decision making (20, p. 216).

It is quite possible that a controlled reference to emotions in the theory and research of sociology will add to the conceptual base of sociological social psychology. This should also enhance productive interchange between psychology and sociology.

Organization of the Dissertation

In Chapter II, the classical sources in sociology are examined to explore their contribution to a sociology of emotion and to look for the beginnings of continuities with later sociological writers on emotion. The task is to discover what the major theorists contributed to a framework for a sociological perspective on emotion.

Pertinent parts of the writing of Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Parsons are examined in Chapter II (9, 10, 39, 40, 35, 30, 31). The focus will be on selected "keys" in their work which are related to the place of emotion in social interaction.
Durkheim, for example, in his different works handled the question of affect from at least two different directions. In the *Division of Labor* (9, pp. 349-350), he emphasizes how sentiments are generated by human interaction; in the *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (10, pp. 443-448) he holds that emotions are a part of social facts which are shaped by external cultural constraints.

Chapters III and IV examine in a more specific way the interaction theory tradition. George H. Mead's work is a classic treatment of the development of the self through social interaction. He emphasized the role of others in the formation of the self. Mead constructed a middle ground between extreme social construction and individual psychology which provides a foundation for a sociology of emotion (26). Mead's view of the self and society as two aspects of the same thing allows for a sociological analysis of emotion as a product of social interaction. However, Mead's approach, in that it is essentially cognitive, is incomplete as a framework for a sociology of emotion (26).

Charles Horton Cooley's work, although preceding Mead's in time, adds another dimension to Mead's cognitive approach. While Cooley also focused on a social self formed through interaction—the "looking-glass self"—he added a realm of intuitive self-feeling which exists separate from others. This realm of intuitive self-feeling
moves to the individual level and the phenomenology (subjective self) experience of emotion (4, pp. 117-190).

Douglas has defined the interactionist perspective as "the sociology of everyday life" (8).

The sociology of everyday life is a sociological orientation concerned with the experiencing, observing, understanding, describing, analyzing, and communicating about people interacting in concrete situations (8, p. 1).

The emphasis is on observing natural situations in order to learn what humans feel and think prior to doing any observations of a controlled nature. The stipulation concerning "concrete situations" calls for observing members of society engaged in face-to-face interaction rather than collecting self-screened accounts with the use of questionnaire surveys. A third emphasis of the sociologies of everyday life is to seek out the "feelings, perceptions, emotions, moods, thoughts, ideas, beliefs, values, and morals of the members of society" (8, p. 2).

Chapters III and IV examine characteristic treatments of emotion in the Symbolic Interaction approach of Herbert Blumer.

The emphasis on ongoing aspects of interaction in the Symbolic Interaction approach makes it especially appropriate for studying emotions as they arise from and are contained in interaction situations. Emotions are emergent as a key part of meanings intertwined with cognitive elements.
The ethnomethodology of Garfinkel and existential sociology are examined briefly in Chapter IV (12, 8).

Finally, the present study will examine several prominent current attempts to grapple specifically with the creation of a sociology of emotion. Kemper (22, p. 20) has constructed a power-status model of social relationships to explain repetitive aspects of guilt, shame, anxiety, and depression as experienced by the individual. His model attempts to explain a great range of emotions in terms of their organization at physiological, psychological, and sociological levels. This approach offers a cogent means of identifying a place for the social analysis of emotion in a context that does not ignore biological and psychological considerations.

One final foreshadowing of the analysis to follow should be noted. Hochschild has introduced an emotional-management perspective to study the self, interaction settings, and social structure. This perspective probes the ways that emotions may be subject to acts of both personal and social management. She draws heavily on Goffman's "situationism," focusing on the immediate social situation and its influence on participants' psychological states. Goffman's work is used in broad context "as the critical set of conceptual connecting tissues by which structure and personality, real in their own right, are more precisely joined" (18, p. 557). Hochschild attempts to account for an actor who can feel,
assess, and manage feelings by establishing a framework for analyzing, reflecting, and managing deeper inner feelings.

"In sum, the emotion-management perspective fosters attention to how people try to feel, not, as for Goffman, how people try to appear to feel" (18, p. 560).

The two different approaches identified in the work of Durkheim can be found in current work on emotion. Kemper (21, 22) emphasizes the importance of immediate social interaction in the production of emotion. In contrast, Hochschild (17, 18) stresses that cultural prescriptions and social norms, created in the past and drawn by actors into the present situation, are the most important determinants of emotion.

The concluding chapter (Chapter V) summarizes the development of a sociology of emotion, including key ideas from the "founding fathers" of sociology: Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel. Here an effort will be made to realize a "for the time being" closure in fulfilling the purpose of this dissertation—to meet the need for a coherent statement of the current position of the sociology of emotion and to show how this position has developed. There is an implicit treatment of emotion in much of the early sociology becoming more explicit in recent years. In this chapter, the focus is on the connections in the development of various approaches to a sociology of emotion, with greatest attention directed to the various branches of the
interaction tradition. The trend from implicit reference to explicit placement of emotion in the sociological tradition will be examined.
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CHAPTER II
THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN THE THEORIES OF
DURKHEIM, PARSONS, SIMMEL, AND WEBER

The present chapter focuses on the major theoretical perspectives of four writers, each of whom has made significant contributions to a sociology of emotion. The chapter is also designed as an analysis of specific commentaries by the four as these pertain to a sociology of emotion. The four are Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), Georg Simmel (1858-1918), and Max Weber (1864-1920). They have been selected because their works have had extraordinary influence in sociology and these works have indeed been seminal for the sociology of emotion.

Each writer is first examined in terms of his manner of conceptualizing the relation between the individual and society. A more specific examination of how each deals with affective elements is then undertaken. Discussion includes specific emotions and specific social contexts related to emotions.

The Treatment of Emotions in Sociology in the Developing Period

None of the four writers wrote extensively on the subject of emotions. None excluded emotion entirely, but what does not appear is a systematic treatment of the subject.
The relative neglect of emotion exemplified by their work can be traced, among other things, to a climate of opinion that valued rationality. Thus Durkheim attributed the presence of logical concepts in the individual mind to the collective conscience (29, p. 163); he was also confident of the utility of such concepts for understanding society (42, p. 200). Weber, on the other hand, saw a progressive growth of rationality in Western society, even as he experienced in himself and observed in society a growing despair over such rationalization (13, p. 24ff). Parsons (38) incorporated these two writers into his goal-directed action schema, greatly modifying the positivistic organicism in Durkheim's thought (27). Simmel, while he recognized emotions, tended to treat them in their more overt aspects accompanying interaction, and then in their more abstract forms and types (52).

Yet all four thinkers saw limits to rationality. Weber's despair centered on the fact that rationality produced new social conditions that imprisoned man in new ways even as it failed to produce a beneficent march of progress—much less perfection—in all realms of human existence (13, p. 23). Weber nonetheless opted for the study of the rational in his analyses. His reason was methodological: it was more relevant to the development of the viewpoint he was creating to construct ideal types from the manifestations of rational action. Parsons, by
contrast, envisioned the actor as nonrationally—that is, subject to cultural pressures—pursuing ultimate values (15, p. 205). A ruthlessly analytical strain appears in Parsons' thought, however, and his fourfold tables offer another version of ideal types.

Durkheim

Durkheim's sociology addressed both cognition and emotion. Because he was fundamentally concerned with a sociology of knowledge, he developed a sociology of religion as well, believing the two to be intimately linked (23, p. 506, n. 48). In his conception of the collective conscience, he saw both collective thoughts and collective sentiments as transmitted and impressed upon the individual mind.

Individual thought is excited into a "state of effervescence" by an intensification of social life, which occurs primarily in religion, and it is under these altered circumstances the individual mind is transformed into collective mind. Thus, Durkheim's theory of knowledge depends upon a theory of the sentiments, common in the French sociological tradition, which sees group activity as productive of radical alterations of subjective states (29, p. 165).

For Durkheim, writing in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, collective sentiments and the collective conscience generally arise through "a synthesis sui generis of particular consciousnesses." This "has the effect of disengaging a whole world of sentiments, ideas, and images which, once born, obey laws all their own" (10, p. 471).
Durkheim took the position that the collective conscience is created through human interaction, over time—a strongly held, specific, and widely agreed-on set of beliefs (9, pp. 75-80). Thus he wrote, "It is not sufficient, then, that the sentiments be strong; they must be precise." Individual sentiments, by contrast, are less precise: "On the contrary, sentiments such as filial love or charity are vague aspirations towards very general objects" (9, p. 79).

In effect, collective sentiments are norms that act as external social constraints on the individual, partly through internalization. "Each of them is relative to a very definite practice" (9, p. 79). Durkheim asserted the existence of sentiments as social facts, as opposed to psychological facts. This was essential to the development of a new level of analysis and of an appropriate method of investigation (11). This level of analysis was to be kept separate from the individual:

On the pretext of giving the science a more solid foundation by establishing it upon the psychological constitution of the individual, it is thus robbed of the only object proper to it. It is not realized that there can be no sociology unless societies exist, and that societies cannot exist if there are only individuals (12, p. 38) (emphasis in original).
Durkheim described society as "a new fact sui generis, with its own unity, individuality, and consequently its own nature—a nature, furthermore, dominantly social" (12, p. 46). This "new fact" is felt emphatically by the individual, who "is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely collective reality" (12, p. 38).

Durkheim wanted also to establish a social psychology to supplement his structuralism. For one thing, he acknowledged behavioral variations among individuals, asserting that the stability of demographic data resulted from a force external to the individual. He added that "such a force does not determine one individual rather than another" (12, p. 32). The social force or social facts applies in a general way to all individuals in a given society and this gives stability to demographic data that he found in his study of suicide between areas. Different individuals then react to the external force in varying ways. The seed of this social psychology lay in his distinction between individual and collective consciences:

There are in us two consciences: one contains states which are personal to each of us and which characterize us, while the states which comprehend the other are common to all society. The first represents only our individual personality and constitute it; the second represents the collective type and, consequently, society, without which it would not exist (9, pp. 105-106).
This dualism pervades Durkheim's thought. "Man feels himself to be double," he wrote; "he actually is double. There are in him two classes of states of conscienteness that differ from each other in origin and nature . . ." (2, p. 161). The one class contains "The sensations and the sensory appetites," the other "the intellectual and moral life"; further, "it is evident that passions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activity—whether theoretical or practical—is dependent on social causes" (2, p. 162).

Durkheim cited the ever-growing influence of the social side on the organismic side:

Therefore, since the role of the social being in our single selves will grow ever more important as history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there will ever be an era in which man is required to resist himself to a lesser degree, an era in which he can live a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization (2, p. 163).

Thus the conflict between the organismic and social sides of the individual is ever-growing. Indeed, individualism, for Durkheim, was basically a social phenomenon; it reflected a shift from social homogeneity to differentiation and social heterogeneity, from mechanical to organic solidarity (31, p. 124).
What Durkheim most forcefully argues is that much of our repertoire of emotional responses has arisen in a shaping process from our social environment. In elaborating this point of view, Durkheim conceived of two types of personality corresponding to two types of morality: one personality had intellectual faculties that are much better developed than the emotional faculties, remaining committed to social obligations. The other type had an opposite combination of emotional and intellectual faculties and low regard for social obligations (31, p. 117).

The two personality types reflect two types of morality in human history—persisting, universal types—and both, personality and moral types are illustrated successively in the various ages of the history of culture. There are the classic ages, such as those of Augustus and of Louis XIV, in which general love of form, rule, and standard brings to the fore discipline and restraint as sovereign values. At such times, the first personality type flourishes. There are, on the other hand, ages—and Durkheim characterizes his own as one—in which standards, rules, and forms become attenuated and flux reigns. In such ages the second personality type becomes more expressive, when there is search for objectives to which men can commit themselves (31, pp. 117-118).

This typology anticipates a contemporary typology of the institutional versus the impulsive individual proposed by Ralph Turner (45). The institutional believes in high standards, self-achievement, revelation while in control, hypocrisy as failure to live up to standards, perfection in role performance, future orientation, and individualism as resisting mediocrity; the impulsive does something because he wants to, believes in self-discovery, revelation during lowered
inhibitions, hypocrisy as living up to standards one doesn't believe in, performance that stresses frailties, present time orientation, and individualism as abiding by one's impulses. Thus emotionality to Durkheim varies among persons not only in an individual way, but in a way dictated by the prevailing social structure.

Sentiments, Collective Conscience, and Mechanical Solidarity

Although "sentiment" and collective conscience" represented key concepts in Durkheim's work, sentiment remained a primitive notion; he did not even define it specifically. One becomes aware of its importance, however, from his use of examples, as in the reference to crime in the Division of Labor: "Thus, the reality of the fact that we have just established is not contestable: that is, that crime shocks sentiments which, for a given social system, are found in all healthy consciences" (9, p. 73). One common denominator of sentiments, then, was that it includes a significant emotional component.

Durkheim recognized the great variety of sentiments:

It is not possible otherwise to determine the nature of these sentiments, to define them in terms of the function of their particular objects, for these objects have infinitely varied and can still vary. Today there are altruistic sentiments which present this character most markedly; but there was a time, not far distant from ours, when religious, domestic, and a thousand other traditional sentiments had exactly the same effects (9, pp. 73-74).
In this context Durkheim spoke of collective sentiment as the critical binding force of society, but of a society characterized by mechanical solidarity. In this type of society, the collective conscience is sufficient by itself to ensure conformity; shared sentiments provide the bases for strongly held rules. Sentiments thus underlie criminal law, which is very stable and changes only slowly:

This fixity of penal law evinces the resistive force of the collective sentiments to which it corresponds. Inversely, the very great plasticity of purely moral rules and the relative rapidity of their evolution show the smaller force of the sentiments at their base; either they have been more recently acquired and have not yet had time to penetrate deeply into conscience, or they are in process of losing strength and moving from depth to surface (9, p. 78).

Moral rules, in contrast to penal laws, "are generally somewhat nebulous" (9, p. 79), lacking the laws' neatness and precision. In either case, perpetration of crime shocks the collective sentiments and the very reality of a behavioral definition of crime is manifested in the public response to its occurrence (9, p. 81).

Using crime as a case in point, Durkheim develops an initial conceptualization of collective sentiments as pervasive, specific, and intense. "They are strong because they are uncontested. What adds the peculiar respect of which they are the object is that they are universally respected" (9, p. 103). Yet the existence of crime also shows that they are not universally respected. Durkheim evolved his concept of the collective conscience and its constituent sentiments
from one of exterior restraints to which most individuals had a feeling of respect and obligation. Eventually, the individual so endowed had a feeling of the desirability of obedience: "... Durkheim now holds that a moral rule is not truly moral unless obedience to it is held to be desirable as well as a matter of duty—that is, the individual's happiness and self-fulfillment are inextricably intertwined with such obedience" (18, p. 109).

**Religious Activities and Sentiments**

For Durkheim, religion evoked emotion in two ways: in engendering a feeling of respect for society and in arousing specific emotions in ritual situations. These two aspects of emotional evocation are mutually reinforcing. "The essence of religion is the sacred community of believers, the indispensable feeling of collective oneness in worship and faith" (30, p. 247).

*Elementary Forms* amplified Durkheim's earlier analysis of collective sentiments as set forth in *Division of Labor*. The generalized sentiment of respect for society is manifested as religious sentiment: God is society. Durkheim noted that the concepts supplied by the collective conscience provided bridges for the individual to the unobserved or unknown: "Very frequently a term expresses things which we have never perceived or experiences which we have never had or of which we have never been the witness" (10, p. 483).
Society supplies not only the concepts but the terms—or more generally the symbols.

Symbols function as proxies for the referents of sentiments. Durkheim noted: "This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely united in our minds; the result is that the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously to the other" (10, p. 251). Symbols serve thus as one means by which society provides for evocation of religious sentiments and, by implication, sentiments in general. An emblem, as a concrete symbol, functions to reinforce social cohesion:

By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this more obvious to all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread quickly when once thought of. But more than that, this idea should spontaneously arise out of the conditions of common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiment society has of itself: it also serves to create this sentiment; it is one of its constituent elements (10, p. 262).

Symbols, whether verbal or emblematic, incorporate both thought and sentiment in varying mixtures. Durkheim did not specifically state that the two lay on a continuum, but indicated a general causal connection between the two: that thought is at the bottom of feeling. "This is what that pseudo-delirium consists in, which we find at the bottom of so many collective representations: it is only a form of this essential idealism" (10, p. 260).
Rituals evoke specific emotions. Positive rituals deal with and evoke positive emotions, negative rituals, negative emotions. Men celebrate the former "with confidence, joyfully anticipating the happy event which they prepare and announce" (10, p. 434). The latter, the so-called piacular rites, deal with "every misfortune, everything of evil omen, everything that inspires sentiments of sorrow or fear . . ." (10, p. 435). Ritual thus provides a way of managing emotions that occur in the lives of individuals.

Ritual also supplies its own set of emotions; these sometimes come into conflict with personal feeling of the moment. Here, piacular rites became strategically important to Durkheim's analysis. Durkheim illustrated with the case of mourning:

One initial fact is constant: mourning is not the spontaneous expression of individual emotions. If the relations weep, lament, mutilate themselves, it is not because they feel themselves personally affected by the death of their kinsman. Of course, it may be that in certain particular cases, the chagrin expressed is really felt. But it is more generally the case that there is no connection between the sentiments felt and the gestures made by the actors in the rite. If, at the very moment when the weepers seem the most overcome by their grief, some one speaks to them of some temporal interest, it frequently happens that they change their features and tone at once, take on a laughing air and converse in the gayest fashion imaginable. Mourning is not a natural movement of private feelings wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty imposed by the group. One weeps, not simply because he is sad, but because he is forced to weep. It is a ritual attitude which . . . is, in a large measure, independent of his affective state (10, pp. 442-443).
In short, society supplies rules for the timely expression of appropriate emotions. More precisely, these rules specify what emotions can be displayed, leaving room for private emotions that may be at variance. But society attends to private emotions as well, at least in terms of emotional management, such as the expiation of guilt (8, p. 104). The mourning situation may provide outlets for feeling and the expression of other emotions that soften the sense of loss.

But this change of the affective state can only be a temporary one, for while the ceremonies of mourning result from it, they also put an end to it. Little by little, they neutralize the very causes which have given rise to them. The foundation of mourning is the impression of a loss which the group feels when it loses one of its members. But this very impression results in bringing individuals together, in putting them into closer relations with one another, in associating them all in the same mental state, and therefore in disengaging a sensation of comfort which compensates the original loss. Since they weep together, they hold to one another and the group is not weakened, in spite of the blow which has fallen upon it (10, pp. 447-448).

Certainly, a major thrust in Durkheim's thought was that society functions to buoy up the individual. As a result of religious participation, man "feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him" (10, p. 469).
Suicide and Sentiments

While most interpretations of Durkheim see individual behavior as a consequence of the impact of the collectivity on the person, as we have seen, there was room for a social psychology in his work. This was developed by Durkheim and his student, Mauss; the latter's analysis, for example, of gift exchange, provided a detailed explanation of how individuals through interaction could evoke the sentiment or sense of prestige (43, p. 252). In functional terms, Durkheim was not solely concerned with how individuals functioned to preserve society; he was also concerned with how society functioned or failed to function in preserving the individual. Suicide explicitly carried out this analysis.

Durkheim's typology of suicides includes egoistic, altruistic, and anomic:

Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis for existence appears to man situated beyond life itself. The third sort of suicide . . . results from man's activity's lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings (12, p. 258).

Egoistic suicide springs from a socially structured individualism. This was illustrated in a negative sense by a lack of family ties (12, p. 274), and in a more positively structured sense by the higher suicide rates among Protestants than among Catholics (12, pp. 152ff). One religion, Protestantism, stressed individualism more than the other.
As a result, Durkheim argued, the individual was not insulated against those passions that lead to suicide. In altruistic suicide, socially dictated sentiments actually lead to suicide—for example, the soldier's self-sacrifice to preserve his comrades or the flag.

In contrast to altruistic suicide, Durkheim categorized the other two types together in some important respects:

Certainly, this anomic suicide and egoistic suicide have kindred ties. Both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence is not the same in both cases. In egoistic suicide it is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depriving the latter of object and meaning. In anomic suicide, society's influence is lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein (12, p. 258).

Durkheim thus imputes to the individual an inability to regulate his desires and emotions without the restraining influence of social norms.

Anomie, or normlessness, appeared first as a state of society and secondly as a state of the individual—the latter proceeding from the former. Merton saw only the former aspect in Durkheim: "... this concept referred to a property of the social and cultural structure, not to a property of individuals confronting that structure" (28, p. 161). Nisbet, on the other hand, saw a cluster of emotions:
... what he (Durkheim) does see all around him—in confutation of the hopes of the Enlightenment and its utilitarian successors—is release from community and tradition that results in despair and insupportable aloneness. Not self-discovery but self-fear, not confident optimism but excessive melancholy and anxiety: these, for Durkheim, are the consequences of the modern history of individualism (30, p. 300).

Thus Durkheim goes full circle, from stressing the impress of society upon the individual's emotions to admitting society's occasional failure to regulate the individual's emotions. Durkheim's views are summarized at the end of this chapter.

Weber

Weber's thought was dominated by the concept of rationality, or the notion of the increasing domination of society by rationality—rationalization. And yet rationality occupied an ambiguous position in Weber's sociology—sometimes as an aspect of his methods, sometimes as an attribute of society itself (16, p. 16). Confounding this was the ambiguous relation between the rational and the irrational, for Weber spoke of the passion of the scientist:

And whoever lacks the capacity to put on blinders... will never have what one might call the "personal experience" of science. Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider; without this passion... you have not calling for science and you should do something else (12, p. 135).
As for his concept of action, Weber has been accused of confusing emotion with irrationality, seeing both as mere deviation from rational conduct (17).

Part of the problem of irrationality is that actions have unintended or unforeseeable consequences (13, p. 31). As Weber attempted to demonstrate, because of the Protestant ethic "the Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so" (50, p. 181) (emphasis added). What was an emergent goal at one point in social history becomes an imposed, institutionalized reality in another. In his methodology, Weber endeavored to remain free of values (49), even the value of rationality; contrary to Parsons (38), interpretation Verstehen was not perceived as an extension of idealist philosophy but merely the method historians had always used (19, p. 10). Weber's taxonomies of action, relationships, authority, institutions, and social structures stem from an impressively broad base of scholarship.

Human Nature and the Relation between the Individual and Society

Freund contrasted Weber's approach to the individual with that of Durkheim by conceiving the individual, not society, as the basic unit of analysis of social action:

The originality of Weber's contribution lies in the fact that he did not sever social structures and institutions from the multifarious activities of man,
who both builds them up and endows them with significance. Central to his sociology, therefore, is the concept of social action; he was concerned ... with achieving the most objective understanding possible of how men evaluate and appraise, use, create and destroy their various social relationships. He thus sought to understand actual man living in society (13, p. 88).

Weber constructed a pyramid of carefully defined concepts, beginning with the most basic—behavior and social behavior. Behavior, according to Weber,

will be called human "behavior" only insofar as the person or persons involved engage in some subjectively meaningful action. Such behavior may be mental or external; it may consist in action or omission to act. The term "social behavior" will be reserved for activities whose intent is related by the individuals involved to the conduct of others and is oriented accordingly (46, p. 29).

Weber also clarified the reasons for his emphasis on the individual as the basic unit:

Action, in the sense of a subjectively understandable orientation of behavior, exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human beings. For other cognitive purposes it may be convenient or necessary to consider the individual, for instance, as a collection of cells, as a complex of biochemical reactions, or to conceive his "psychic" life as made up of a variety of different elements, however these may be defined. Undoubtedly such procedures yield valuable knowledge of causal relationships. But the behavior of these elements, as expressed in such uniformities, is not subjectively understandable (51, p. 102).

Only individuals have consciousness; in consequence, terms such as "collective conscience" constituted mysticism for Weber. This does not mean that there was, for Weber, no collective reality but rather that a subjective understanding of that reality can be ascertained only by knowing the
thoughts and feelings of those who participate in the reality. Weber did not recognize two classes of feelings --collective and individual, in the manner of Durkheim-- but only those belonging to the individual.

**Types of Social Action**

Weber used rationality as a polarity in constructing a set of ideal types of action. One type lay closest to the rational pole; another type was antipodal, while still other types fell in between. The types included (1) the instrumentally or formally rational (zweckrational), (2) the value or substantively rational (wertrational), (3) the affectual, and (4) the traditional. Weber described them as follows:

(1) **instrumentally rational** (zweckrational), that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends;

(2) **value-rational** (wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success;

(3) **affectual** (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor's specific affects and feeling states;

(4) **traditional**, that is, determined by ingrained habituation (47, pp. 24-25).

Weber presented this taxonomy with several provisos. Importantly, he noted that precisely because they constitute idealizations one type may shade over into another.
At an analytical level, two types may possess some common attributes. At a concrete level, a given behavior may have the attributes of more than one type. For example, traditional behavior constitutes the bulk of everyday behavior; but to the extent that it is upheld by self-consciousness, it is value-rational. Similarly, Weber notes, when affect is sublimated, it is "in the form of conscious release of emotional tension" and therefore "well on the road to rationalization in one or the other or both of the above senses" (47, p. 25). At the same time, value-rational and affective action forms share the common attributes of being performed for their own sakes (47, p. 25).

A lesson for a sociology of emotion may be isolated: one cannot interpret emotion narrowly as consisting solely of affective action. This is a very important point. Not only is affective action analytically related to other types; a continuum connects them where types differ. Moreover, Weber provided examples of other types of action that conform to our understanding of the terms "emotion" and "sentiment." Thus acts of a purely value-rational nature are based on convictions "required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it consists" (47, p. 25). Weber's taxonomy in effect reveals that emotion can be either irrational or rational; the critics who accused him of categorically equating emotion with irrationality (17) may be unfair.
Martindale gives an example of how affect may be combined with the purest rationality, even dictating its ends:

So far as the actions of a young man and girl in love are determined by the presence of powerful emotion they are, in Weber's terminology, affective. When the stirrings of adolescence send the young boys of America into the trees in the girl's front yard to behave in ways leading sager minds to think that perhaps Darwin had a point, such irrationalities are not atypical of affectively determined actions. By contrast, the same girl's elder sisters may employ every artifice with a deliberately calculated rationality. Thus rational social actions may appear even in areas where the most powerful emotions normally appear, such as erotic spheres (26, p. 371).

This typology is not only useful in its own right for understanding behavior, but is used systematically by Weber as a basis for constructing other taxonomies—for example, for relationships and patterns of legitimation of authority. The latter can be seen as concrete manifestations of types of action. Otherwise stated, Weber conceived of emotion as embedded in both individual action and social structure.

**Sentiments and Relationships**

Weber distinguished between two types of relationship: communal and associative. A communal relationship "is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together" (47, p. 40). An associative relationship, by contrast, is based on a "rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency" (47, p. 41). Weber compares this dichotomy to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft...
distinction of Tonnies. It may also be compared roughly to the mechanical and organic solidarities of Durkheim.

Weber's analysis is unique in that it can be used to study relationships whether they are on a continuum between communal and associative types or combined aspects of the two types. While the family typifies the communal relationship, "the great majority of social relationships has this characteristic to some degree," for the reason that relationships that last for some period "involve emotional values which transcend its utilitarian significance" (47, p. 41). It is not sufficient that there be a common "feeling" about a situation; only a feeling that "leads to a mutual orientation of their behavior to each other"—such as feelings of belonging together—will suffice (47, p. 42). By deduction, church attendance is communal if it stresses solidarity—a "we feeling"—and associative if it stresses the attainment of common values—salvation through proper behavior or faith (3, p. 288).

Sentiments and Charismatic Leadership

Corresponding to his typology of action, Weber classified the bases of legitimacy as

(a) tradition: valid is that which has always been;
(b) affectual: especially emotional, faith: valid is that which is newly revealed or exemplary;
(c) value-rational faith: valid is that which has been deduced as an absolute;
(d) positive enactment which is believed to be legal. Such legality may be treated as legitimate because:
(1) it derives from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties;
(2) it is imposed by an authority which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets with compliance (47, p. 36).

In this treatment of the affectual, Weber seems to stress the importance of faith as a basis of legitimacy. One way of interpreting this is to say that faith is an emotionally based belief, and that such belief lends legitimacy to a social object.

Pentecostal workship activity provides an example of faith as a basis of legitimacy. A high level of emotional activity is generated and people tend to go into altered states of consciousness, with some speaking in tongues or ecstatic speech. This activity gives legitimacy to the spiritual and moral messages communicated by this religion.

Traditional legitimacy is the oldest, more persistent form; it survives partly because "the fear of magical evils reinforces general psychological inhibitions against any sort of change" (47, p. 37). Legitimacy is closely related to sentiment in that it is always based on beliefs that carry some emotional component. Fear of change, for example, was given by Weber as important for the legitimacy of tradition. In addition:

Conscious departures from tradition in the establishment of a new order were originally almost entirely due to prophetic oracles or at least pronouncements which were sanctioned as prophetic and thus were considered sacred (47, p. 37).
Weber collapsed this fourfold typology into a three-fold classification of authority as legal, traditional, and charismatic. Legal authority had its base in rational grounds; those in authority held power by virtue of the legality of the norms. Those in traditional authority relied on the perceived sanctity of traditions. The person with charismatic authority relied "on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him" (51, p. 328).

The first two types were based directly in the social order, the charismatic type solely in the individual:

In radical contrast to bureaucratic organization, charisma knows no formal and regulated appointment or dismissal, no career, advancement or salary, no supervisory or appeals body, no local or purely technical jurisdiction, and no permanent institutions in the manner of bureaucratic agencies, which are independent of the incumbents and their personal charisma. Charisma is self-determined and sets its own limits (48, p. 1112).

As charisma is not based on the social order, it "lives in, not off, this world" (p. 1113); "charisma is by nature not a continuous institution, but in its pure type the very opposite" (p. 1113).

In charismatic authority, definite feelings are involved. The one who holds such authority "feels he has been sent" on a mission (14, p. 246), or a matter of duty (51, p. 359). For the followers, it is a matter of
devotion—"complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (p. 359). The charismatic is the exception, the direct antithesis of the everyday control of the other two types (p. 361). Relationships vary accordingly: "The corporate group which is subject to charismatic authority is based on an emotional form of communal relationship" (p. 360). Thus the principle of affective action, for Weber, was manifested on several levels simultaneously: the level of action generally, the level of relationships, and the level of authority.

One sentiment similar to the sentiments involved in charisma is that of status honor, bestowed by actors or groups of actors on themselves or one another. At the organizational level, social esteem is bestowed on the leader by his followers because the rules require it.

Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes. Behind the functional purposes, of course, "ideas of culture-values" usually stand. These are ersatz for the earthly or supra-mundane personal master: ideas such as "state," "church," "community," "party," or "enterprise" are thought of as being realized in a community; they provide an ideological halo for the master (14, p. 199).

At the societal level, status groups constitute one basis of social stratification.

In its characteristic form, stratification by "status groups" on the basis of conventional styles of life evolves at the present time in the United States out of the traditional democracy. For example, only the resident of a certain street ("the street")
is considered belonging to "society," is qualified for social intercourse, and is visited and invited (14, p. 188).

Bureaucratization and Suppression of Emotions

Weber saw bureaucracy as the embodiment of rational action generally and of rational-legal authority in particular. Moreover, he saw the growth of rationality in both senses as inevitable and irreversible, although he was not propounding a one-factor theory of history. A correlate of this rationalization is an ever-growing suppression of emotion—what Weber called the "iron cage" in the context of bureaucracy. The bureaucratic state is thus depersonalized (14, p. 334). "Rationality, in this context, is seen as adverse to personal freedom. Accordingly, Weber is a nostalgic liberal, feeling himself on the defensive" (14, p. 50).

But if rationalization has suppressed feeling in one way, it has elicited feeling in another way, as a general negative climate. It has disenchanted the world. With the progress of science and technology, man has stopped believing in magic powers, in spirits and demons; he has lost his sense of prophecy and, above all, his sense of the sacred. Reality has become dreary, flat and utilitarian, leaving a great void in the souls of men which they seek to fill by furious activity and through various devices and substitutes. A prey to precarious relativism, to uncertainty and tedious scepticism, they attempt to furnish their souls with the bric-a-brac of religiosity, estheticism, moralism or scientism—in brief, with a sort of pluralist philosophy which extends an indiscriminate welcome to the most heterogeneous maxims from every part of the world.
Mysticism becomes mystification, community becomes communitarianism, and life is reduced to a series of unrelated experiences (13, pp. 23-24).

In short, where feeling is inhibited and no longer legitimated in its traditional forms, it finds new expressions and new legitimations.

Simmel

For Simmel, the distinctiveness of the sociological level of analysis lies in the nature of interaction: in the fact that interaction is reciprocal. "The action of one can only be analyzed by reference to the action of others, since the two are part of a system of interaction that constrains both" (7, p. 185). While each actor makes his own contribution, emotional or otherwise, to that interaction, the interaction itself takes on an almost independent existence (24, p. 67). There is a certain strain between individuals in interaction, on the one hand, and between the individual and his interactional context, on the other.

Simmel saw the individual and society in a constant dialectic. This is illustrated in the case of emotions:

If one arranges psychological manifestations in a genetic and systematic hierarchy, one will certainly place, at its basis, feeling (though naturally not all feelings), rather than the intellect. Pleasure and pain, as well as certain instinctive feelings that serve the preservation of individual and species, have developed prior to all operation with concepts, judgments, and conclusions. Thus, the development of the intellect, more than anything else, reveals the
lag of the social behind the individual level, whereas the realm of feeling may show the opposite (52, pp. 34-35).

Where Durkheim struggles rather obliquely with the duality between the individual and the social, Simmel confronted it directly. "According to Simmel, the socialized individual always remains in a dual relation with society; he is incorporated within it and yet stands against it. The individual is, at the same time, within society and outside it . . ." (7, p. 184). Interaction always involves opposing tendencies, which in the aggregate comprise a unity: "harmony and conflict, attraction and repulsion, love and hatred" (p. 184). Love relationships thus "strike us as woven together of love and respect, or disrespect . . . of love and an urge to dominate or the need for dependence" (44, pp. 22-23).

Social Forms, Social Types, and Sentiments

Simmel used what amounts to ideal-typical constructs in his analysis. As these constructs are not systematically interlocking, his analyses amount to what are now called "middle range theories" (28), and some would argue that the scope of their significance is even narrower, more microsociological, then the term "middle range" implies. Emotions are analyzed in terms of the interactional situation, which provides the form or structure for behavior, and the actor's role, which specifies the type of behavior.
Dyads and triads.---Simmel attached fundamental significance to numbers in social life. Between the dyad and the triad lay a broad psychological and social chasm. In the former, interaction and sentiment are governed predominantly by the actors; in the latter, group life takes on an emergent quality: "the dyad does not attain that super-personal life which, in all other groups, creates among its members a sense of constraint. Yet the very lack of super-personal structure also entails intense absorption of the participants in their dyadic relationship" (7, p. 186). While "any large group can be immortal," creating "a very specific sociological feeling," a dyad dies with the loss of one member, creating "sentimentalism and elegiac problems" (52, p. 124). Thus the feeling tone differs basically from dyads to other groups.

Sociability.---Relationships often commence for specific purposes, but come to sustain themselves by taking on their own lives; i.e., they become ends in themselves. In such terms Simmel saw, for example, the evolution of courtly etiquette (20, p. 91). While the forms of sociability are superficial, "the deep spring which feeds this realm and its play does not lie in these forms, but exclusively in the vitality of concrete individuals, with all their feelings and attractions, convictions and impulses" (20, p. 91). The person has room to put his own
stamp on these forms. For a sociology of emotion, Simmel could be interpreted as arguing that social rules govern the establishment of interaction patterns, but once these are initiated, emotional currents are created that enliven their social forms, ones that can themselves have lives of their own.

The stranger.—This social type remains outside the group, yet of the group, and is a product of particular social conditions. Not being committed, he is free to act in group situations with a greater degree of objectivity. Not being a long-standing member, and therefore bearing layer on layer of experience with the group's concerns, his emotional involvement is relatively shallow. He is thus "the ideal intermediary in the traffic of goods as well as in the traffic of emotions" (7, p. 182).

Conflict.—To Simmel, conflict is part of the natural state of human affairs, coexisting with harmony. Conflict is part of the dynamic that sometimes holds groups together and sometimes drives them apart. Simmel's analysis of conflict was based in part on emotion.

Dissociating factors—hate, envy, need, desire—are the causes of conflict: it breaks out because of them. Conflict is thus designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties (44, p. 13).

Conflict may in fact be positively functional for a relationship or group, providing a "safety valve" for
emotions and making further interaction possible. Simmel provides examples of conflict as serving functions for the group or society: for instance, conflict within and between castes serves to preserve the boundaries in the Hindu caste system.

Thus, the Hindi social system rests not only on the hierarchy, but also directly on mutual repulsion, of the castes. Hostilities not only prevent boundaries within the group from gradually disappearing, so that these hostilities are often consciously cultivated to guarantee existing conditions. Beyond this, they also are of direct sociological fertility: often they provide classes and individuals with reciprocal positions which they would not find, or not find in the same way, if the causes of hostility were not accompanied by the feeling and the expression of hostility—even if the same objective causes of hostility were in operation (44, p. 18).

Simmel saw conflict as a relationship of mutual involvement and reciprocity. Thus he considered conflict to be a creative force because it can strengthen existing social bonds or establish new ones (7, p. 185). Simmel's analysis of conflict interactions and emotions provides a beginning for a fruitful area of research.

The secret society.—This kind of group stands isolated from the rest of society even though its members may participate in the great range of other community affairs. "The separateness of the secret society expresses a value: people separate from others because they do not want to make common cause with them, because they wish to let them feel their superiority" (52, p. 364). The secret society
typifies the tendency to cliquishness that Simmel notes can be observed in a variety of contexts. Thus, "even in school classes, it can be observed how small, closely integrated cliques of classmates think of themselves as the elite over against the others who are not organized . . . who . . . through their hostility and envy, involuntarily acknowledge this higher value" (p. 365). In this passage, Simmel illustrates how the formation of sentiments both within and outside a group may serve as a motive for group formation.

A secret society has further characteristics that provide insights into a sociology of emotion. It is typically centralized and authoritarian, demanding blind obedience from its members. In this respect it is a de-individualizing influence. Collective sentiments, as distinguished from private ones, to use Durkheim's categories, predominate in these groups even more than they normally do. This feature stands in contrast to the separateness of the secret society which expresses the desire to not be part of the larger group (52, p. 373). However, as is often the case in Simmel's work, we are left stranded, feeling a need for more information and insight into the reasons for and function of secret societies in the community. Simmel was a hit-and-run sociologist.
The metropolis.—Urban life is characterized by the norms of punctuality, precision, calculativeness, and impersonality. The result is a blase outlook and a reserve in social relationships. An emotional trade-off takes place: personal freedom is gained but greater loneliness or isolation from collective sentiments, is the price that is exacted. The metropolis has, in fact, become central to the crisis of modern existence (20, pp. 35-36), a phenomenon about which Simmel was quite ambivalent (6, p. 18). We see here signs of congruity with Weber's interest in rationalization, with similar implications for a sociology of emotions.

Specific Sentiments

In addition to his treatment of sentiments in the contexts of forms and types, Simmel also discussed specific sentiments. As catalogued, the sentiments include: hatred of the "enemy of the group," jealousy, envy, begrudging, confidence, honor, faithfulness, and love (22, pp. 100-101). Three of these sentiments are dealt with next as illustrative.

Jealousy.—By comparison with envy, this sentiment has strong sociological significance. "It is characteristic of the jealous individual to have a rightful claim to possession, whereas envy refers to the desirability of what is denied it, not to the legitimacy of any claim" (44, p. 50).
Simmel clarified the distinction further as follows: "The feeling of the envious individual turns more around possession, that of the jealous person more around the possessor" (p. 51). Once again we are left wondering what the more general social principles at work may be. In this case, the larger patterns and sentiments related to distributive justice are not subjected to analysis.

Faithfulness.--Continuing the same line of thinking, Simmel contrasted faithfulness with such feelings as love, friendship, patriotism, and the sense of social duty. He noted that "in spite of their extraordinary sociological significance, these feelings remain, above all, subjective states" (52, p. 384). Faithfulness, on the other hand, may be viewed as the affective factor that is oriented specifically to "the preservation of social units" (p. 381). However the relationship begins, the emotion of faithfulness comes into being to preserve it; another term for this emotion is "legitimation" (p. 382), used by Simmel is a rather singular way. Faithfulness, in this line of reasoning, becomes a kind of emotional undertone linking the individual to the group, combined at a more conscious level with a set of cognitive references and rationalization for this membership. Membership in the group is thus sustained by a web of both cognitive and emotional bonds (and we might also assume the existence of alternative
membership possibilities each sustaining its own set of reasons or feelings to explain why the person is not faithful to that particular group). In triads, the group to which members are faithful takes on a life of its own. With the advent of this dynamic, the collective sentiment of faithfulness becomes a property that is generated at least in part by the group's very existence.

Gratitude.—This emotion develops in a manner similar to that of faithfulness. It provides "one of the most powerful means of social cohesion" (52, p. 389). Gratitude refers to more than another person's deed, because that supplies only the seed for gratitude: "We are grateful to him . . . because he exists, because we experience him" (p. 389). Gratitude may be exchanged, as after an exchange of gifts or deeds, where reciprocal acts foster mutual appreciation. Yet it goes beyond the utilitarian nature of economic exchange; gratitude tends to blossom into a sentiment oriented to the other person for his own sake, sustained by the interweaving of sentiments between the persons who supply rewards to one another. A set of discrete acts becomes the bases for a continuing "collective" sentiment holding the person in a web of me-them relationships.
Parsons attempted to synthesize the theories of Durkheim, Weber, and other sociologists on the one hand and Freudian psychoanalysis on the other (38). (Let it be noted that there is much controversy over just what Parsons was up to, but the present analysis is well within the parameters of conventional Parsonian analysis.) The result was an elaborate theoretical model, or conceptual scheme, that purported to do at least two things: (1) it integrated personality and social and cultural systems under an umbrella theory of action; (2) it gave an ideal-typical classification of the basic dimensions of social interaction, forming various combinations that comprised a comprehensive taxonomy. Emotion was employed systematically as one of the three basic aspects of all three action systems: the cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative aspects.

Human Nature and the Relation Between the Individual and Society

Parsons' first synthesis of social action theory defined action in such a way as to make it nonrational (38). His subsequent systematic elaboration, utilizing aspects of Freudian theory, gave further emphasis to an "irrationalist" conception of human nature. The emotional aspect of behavior played a fundamental part in this conception (35, 39, 40, 41).
Personality, culture, and social system are three facets of the general pattern, the action system. As such, they have some common attributes: the cognitive, cathetic, and evaluative aspects of action. Each system also has attributes of its own. In important ways, the personality system is linked with the cultural and social systems—through role-expectations. These are internalized by the individual and become his need-dispositions (41, p. 19). Role expectations can thus be used to describe variations in both the personality and the social system; the latter variations are called pattern variables.

For Parsons, the personality-society linkage is even closer than for Durkheim. Durkheim at best implied a dialectic between the individual and society, and at worst conceived of society as forcing its will on a resisting organism. In Parsons' view, personality is hardly more than a mirror image of society (39, p. 72). This constitutes what some critics call an "oversocialized view of man" (53, p. 190).

The net contribution . . . has been the peculiar view of man as the social, malleable, and plastic animal who swallows society in order to buy the acceptance of his fellows . . . If man has urges, they are rechanneled and restrained: if he deviates, there are sanctions or he is referred to some form of institutionalized deviation. The feedback of his behavior into the system is generally conceived of as being functional; social conduct is equated with social process (29, p. 79).
The development of personality involves internalization of objects; no place is left for primitive drives (39, p. 54). Parsons uses the term "object" as a general reference to key elements with which the developing personality interacts. Mother is a prototype of a class of "social objects" to which the personality becomes attached. Internalization of this social object would mean that the pattern of the relationship of mother-child becomes a part of the ego system of the child (39, p. 43). Parsons held that

... the primary structure of the human personality as a system of action is organized about the internalization of systems of social objects which originated as the role units of the successive series of social systems in which the individual has come to be integrated in the course of his life history. His personality structure is thus in some sense a kind of "mirror-image of the social structures he has experienced" (39, p. 54).

Parsons' effort to bring Freud within the framework of contemporary sociology underplayed the dynamism of psychoanalytic theory (29, p. 78). Parsons stressed the importance of the superego as a "bridge" to the id and ego (34, p. 31), but in effect left the latter two elements out of his later formulations of personality.

The Voluntaristic Theory of Social Action

Parsons' first synthesis of social action theory was based on the unit act, which involved these elements: goals or ends toward which the actor strives and means or
conditions over which he has control, encompassing Weber's idea of zweckrational; norms or conditions beyond his control, imposed from outside by society, following Durkheim; ultimate ends or values that guide selection of more immediate ends in Weber's sense of wertrational (38, p. 43ff).

Parsons came to see sociological theory and psychoanalytic theory as belonging "to the same basic conceptual scheme or frame of reference which it is convenient to call the theory of action" (33, p. 336). This led to a differentiation among the three types of action systems. Early in his career he saw a discrepancy between the personality and the institutional structure (p. 337)—a view that he apparently renounced later. Incorporating the Freudian term of "cathexis"—or pleasurable attachment to objects—into his lexicon, he conceived of the cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative orientations to action. The first two he saw as intimately connected: "Cathectic-cognitive orientation toward the object world, in any system of behavior extending through time, always entails expectations concerning gratifications or deprivations receivable or attainable from certain objects and classes of objects" (41, p. 11).

The above trichotomy then became further differentiated. It was subclassified according to the particular system or systems under immediate concern. First, action
was broken down into motivational and value orientations; the trichotomy for the latter was cognitive, appreciative, and moral. Culture patterns were classified as belief systems, systems of expressive symbolism, and systems of value-orientation standards. The categories become more complex, involving cross-classifications of the basic trichotomy (35, pp. 57-58). All three systems of action thus operate according to the same guiding principles, even as they are mutually differentiated.

**Parsons' Treatment of Affect**

Affect was a basic part of human action in Parsons' scheme. Indeed, the formation and growth of the personality "requires that social and cultural learning be strongly motivated through the engagement of the pleasure mechanism of the organism" (36, p. 12). Parsons used both the terms "sentiment" and "need-disposition" to refer to affect in the individual. He distinguished need-dispositions from drives as two types of motivation, with the difference "depending on the stage of development of the personality involved, and the type of action being discussed" (41, p. 111). Sentiments are "attachments to common values"—with the connotation that they may gratify need-dispositions and retain a "moral" or conformity relationship to the social system (35, p. 41). The sentiment of love, for example, is selfish and self-oriented, but it
also implies a certain altruism and evokes tender feelings for another person (1, p. 159).

The pattern variables represent dilemmas or choices that each social system must make in establishing its own orientation and the role expectations of its members. Where Weber would have allowed for variation and interpretation between these idealized polarities, Parsons tends to phrase the issue in either/or terms. The pattern variables include: affectivity v. affective neutrality; self-orientation v. collectivity orientation; universalism v. particularism; ascription v. achievement (or qualities v. performance); and (functional) diffuseness v. specificity (25, pp. 58ff; 41, pp. 80-84). Regarding the first dilemma, Parsons stated:

In motivational terms it may be presumed that the "ultimate" interest of any actor is in the optimization of gratification. The most direct path to gratification in an organized action system is through expressive orientations; hence relative to the expressive, both the instrumental and the moral codes of orientation impose renunciations or discipline. The social object is always actually and potentially to some degree an object of cathexis. Hence in patterning the orientation to that object it is always a problem whether, in certain relevant respects, expressive orientation in terms of relatively immediate gratification interests is permissible, or is to be renounced in favor of instrumental or moral, that is certain types of evaluative interests. The first alternative may be defined as that of "affectivity," the second of "affective neutrality" (35, pp. 59-60).

Parsons refined further his conception of pattern variables, distinguishing between the relationship of actor and object, on the one hand, and the meaning of object to
actor on the other. Affectivity-affective neutrality belongs to the first category (37, p. 194). Parsons' attention was directed primarily to love and related emotions. He cross-classified affectivity-neutrality with other pattern variables, most notably with specificity-diffuseness. Here he derived a typology of what he called attitudes: affectivity-specificity results in a receptiveness attitude; neutrality-specificity results in an approval attitude; affectivity-diffuseness results in a love attitude; and neutrality-diffuseness results in an esteem attitude (35, p. 108). It is clear that neutrality does not imply lack of emotion.

Parsons did not deal systematically with other emotions. For example, he referred to pleasure as functionally diffuse (32, p. 420). That classifies pleasure with love, but Parsons did not provide a dimension by which those two emotions could then be differentiated. Anxiety is seen as a need-disposition (41); alienation is likewise (35, p. 254). His theory does not deal with such emotions as hostility or possessiveness at all (1, p. 181). Thus, Parsons, despite extraordinary efforts toward systematization, did not produce a systematic approach to emotions, at least not in the sense that one can locate and explain the full range of emotions within Parsons' complex social structure categories. He supplies a "feel" for the place of emotions within his system, and gives some examples.
But he merely asserts their reconciliation to his system. He does not in fact prove this point, nor does he describe precisely how all of the emotions fit into the system.

Summary

The writers discussed in this chapter represent a starting point in the development of a sociology of emotions. Rather than speaking explicitly and systematically about emotions from a sociological perspective, these writers either talked about it implicitly, or gave somewhat explicit attention to it, or gave brief analyses of specific emotions. Still, a number of postulations about emotion as a sociological phenomenon can be gleaned from these four theorists. It then becomes apparent that the sociology of emotions has an intellectual debt to the four theorists.

For Durkheim, the major emphasis is on the concept of collective sentiments. This refers to the emotional aspects of the collective conscience. Collective sentiments arise from the individual's sentiments, but emerge as social facts *sui generis*. Collective sentiments thus have an objective reality quite apart from individuals. They also differ in quality from individual sentiments in being stronger and more precise. Collective sentiments function as norms—acting as external social constraints on the individual.
While Durkheim emphasizes social facts, he also addresses the link between the individual and society. He conceives of this linkage as a duality of consciousness that resides within each individual: one part the organismic, the other part the social—the two ever in conflict. As society develops historically, the social side assumes an ever more prominent role in the individual, intensifying the conflict with the organismic side. This duality also gives rise in Durkheim's thought to a corresponding dichotomy of personality types and of moralities—anticipating a contemporary analysis by Turner.

Durkheim sees sentiment as the principal binding force for at least some types of society—those characterized by mechanical solidarity. Here, the norms are essentially the collective sentiments. Sentiments vary in their depth, intensity, and duration. An act of deviance, such as a crime, may so shock the sentiments as to move the populace to take action. The fact that crime exists, however, demonstrates that those sentiments do not succeed universally as constraints on individuals.

Collective sentiments are the embodiment of society. This is exemplified by the religious sentiments. Religion also evokes other emotions, positive and negative. Thus Durkheim notes the importance of rituals as a means of manipulating emotion. Society also provides means of representing emotions or the referents to emotions:
symbols. In rituals, society also supplies rules as to what emotions are appropriate—anticipating Hochschild in Chapter IV; sometimes these include rules for handling unwanted, but naturally occurring, emotions such as grief at funerals. In addition to handling surface emotions, society provides ways of handling private emotions, such as the expiation of guilt.

Emotions also function as a barometer of the state of health of a society and of its link with the individual. The suicide rate is an index of how well and the style by which society protects the individual from his own emotions. Egoistic suicide springs from a socially fostered individualism, altruistic suicide from norms that actually prescribe suicide in certain situations, and anomic suicide from an absence of self-sustaining norms. As in egoistic suicide, in anomic suicide the individual's link to society is attenuated. Thus while society generally exerts control over the individual's emotions, it occasionally fails to do so.

Weber, in contrast to Durkheim, sees emotion solely as an individual phenomenon, even where whole collections of individuals happen to share the same emotion. It may be some aspect of social structure that conditions or dictates the presence or absence of emotions, but it is individual action out of which relationships and various
features of social structure spring. It is only the individual who has consciousness.

Weber posits a four-fold typology of action: instrumentally rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional. As in much of his work, these are ideal types. Therefore actual instances of action may combine features of more than one type. Moreover, at the analytical level, two types may possess common features. Emotion may thus lie in value-rational, affectual or traditional action. Emotions can be characterized in different ways, e.g. rational or irrational, but Weber does not analyze such characterizations systematically.

The Weberian typology of action is applied to relationships. Communal relationships are based on affectual or traditional action. Associative relationships are based on one of the two rational types of action. Most relationships tend to lie toward the communal polarity, and thus contain emotionality. Still Weber's ideal-typical analysis is oriented to rationality as an ideal, from which emotion is treated as a deviation, despite his acknowledgment that much of social life is pervaded by emotion.

Weber extends his action typology into the varieties of legitimation. Affectual legitimation is based on faith, or an emotional belief in the validity of a social object. The one who is accorded that validity is said to have charismatic authority. The idea of legitimacy itself seems
to be based in emotion, as in an attitude of deference or reverence, regardless of the types of legitimacy. Charismatic authority lies primarily in the individual, legal and traditional authority in the social structure. This reiterates Weber's difference from Durkheim, who sees all legitimacy as a manifestation of collective sentiment. Like charisma, status honor is bestowed upon individuals or groups of individuals and not social structure.

Just as Durkheim sees mis-emotion or perhaps maladaptive emotion, as springing from excessive individualism, Weber sees it as springing from excessive rationality. In the "iron cage," emotion is suppressed by the overvaluation of rationality, resulting in negative emotion. The result is a flatness and disenchantment from which there appears to be no escape. Paradoxically, the pursuit—the passionate pursuit—of rationality in some roles, such as that of the scientist, seems to elicit joy, while its ruthless pursuit in other sectors of society, such as bureaucracy, is a harbinger of despair.

Unlike Durkheim and Weber, who focus on the historical and macro-social, Simmel's emphasis is on the micro-social world of interaction. He employs a style of theorizing that deals with more delimited situations, rather than attempting a systematic analysis; Simmel is content to build up a picture of social life from his snapshots of social forms and types. These are ideal-typical constructs which
do not interlock in the manner that Weber's or Parsons' constructs do.

Like Durkheim, Simmel sees a dialectic both within the individual and between the individual and society. But Simmel is more specific by asserting that the individual is both within and against society. Conflict for Simmel is a basic ingredient of social life, serving as both a binding and alienating force.

Simmel analyzes a number of social forms and types, including group size. An immense social gulf lies between dyads and triads: dyads are more psychologically dominated while triads contain a specific "sociological feeling." In the case of sociability, the psychological and social contribute jointly, but the social is subordinated to the individual who supplies the energy and his unique stamp. This resembles Weber's emphasis on individual action as basic, and hence on individual emotion.

In the stranger, Simmel sees a special role uniquely suited to handling the emotions of others. Fashion allows the individual to be different in a larger context of similarity and belonging, while honor gives a common stamp to group members and sustains a sense of worthiness that would otherwise be lacking. Conflict serves as a safety valve for emotions while allowing groups and social structures to persist. In the secret society, people band together to create a feeling of exclusiveness among
themselves and envy among others. The metropolis engenders both a sense of freedom and loneliness; this is Simmel's counterpart to Durkheim's and Weber's analyses of the crisis of modern man and his emotions.

These analyses of forms and types illustrate different situations that engender different types of emotions and different ways of handling emotions that are provided by roles and types of interactions. Simmel also analyzes specific emotions, which vary in sociological significance. Jealousy is sociological because it entails perception of a rightful claim to possession, where envy involves merely a desire to possess. Many sentiments have social objects but are accorded less sociological significance by Simmel, e.g. love, friendship, patriotism. Faithfulness, by contrast, is more than a mere "subjective state" because it seeks preservation of a social unit. Gratitude may be similarly described; it can be exchanged as a resource, but it also includes an intrinsic regard by the person for the other.

Parsons provides a link between the classical theorists described above and the structural-functional and systems-oriented theories of contemporary sociology to which he has contributed heavily. His analysis of social reality is based, on the one hand, on a conception of social action akin to that of Weber with Durkheimian modification, and on the other on a multiple systems approach
to explaining human action. His thought represents a shift in fact from the former perspective to the latter.

Parsons posits four levels of action, or systems: cultural, social, personality, and organismic. His most complete analyses are for the first three; each of these three contain three components—cognitive, cathetic or emotional, and evaluative. Emotion is thus in principle given a systematic place in Parsons' theory.

Parsons sees the link between the individual and society as close. Through socialization, specifically internalization, the individual comes to acquire need-dispositions (motivation) that correspond to the role expectations in the social system. This view nullifies, or moves a long way in that direction, any conflict between individual and society; similarly, his functionalism ignores conflict at a social level. Parsonian theory then becomes an orderly scheme containing the possible permutations within each system.

Parsons approaches emotion in different ways in each of his systems. In his social system, role expectations are summarized as pattern variables (and their combinations), according to which whole societies can be classified. The most notable is affectivity-affective neutrality, which he cross-classifies with specificity-diffuseness; this results in what he calls the attitudes of receptiveness, approval, love and esteem. Since other attitudes
may also fall into one or another of these combinations, his scheme, while systematic, is not systematic enough to give full satisfaction to someone desiring theoretical closure. Within the personality system, he tends to see some emotion as a need-disposition, but he does not develop this systematically.

Parsons thus consigns emotion either to the social system or to the personality system in the pattern variables and need-dispositions, respectively. Implicitly the need-dispositions are inevitable outcomes of pattern variables, which amount to settings for the rules for emotion. But some need-dispositions, such as anxiety, appear to develop on their own.


CHAPTER III

THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN THE THEORIES

OF THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISTS

This chapter analyzes the contributions of the symbolic interactionist school to a sociological understanding of the emotions. Included in this discussion are the writings of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931); Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929); Herbert Blumer, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1916-1962); and Erving Goffman. Symbolic interactionism is by no means limited to these authorities; the chapter refers, thus, to such other writers in the field as Lindesmith, Strauss, Rose and Shibutani.

The chapter begins with a discussion of Mead who for the most part excludes emotion from his analysis, and then turns to the other theorists. As will be seen, while Mead deemphasizes emotion, his theoretical framework permits its inclusion, and thus creates a legacy for succeeding writers. As in the previous chapter, the present discussion focuses first on how each theorist deals with the problem of human nature and the relationship between the individual and society and, secondly, on how each conceives of a sociological perspective for addressing the question of emotion.
Symbolic Interactionism and Its Implications for the Study of Emotion

In an important sense, symbolic interactionism starts at the point where the theorists analyzed in the previous chapter leave off. The writers discussed earlier assumed that society has an important impact on the individual—and sometimes that the individual may also affect society. But these authorities left unanswered the question of how the individual comes to be transformed from a neonate into a socialized member of society. Mead (29) provided the plausible mechanisms of role playing and games as the means of socialization.

More fundamentally, an integral part of Mead's legacy focuses on his dual focus as implied in the term "symbolic interactionism": symbols and interaction. The first word suggests this school's "accent on attitude and meaning" (28, p. 339). The second word suggests this school's focus on interaction as the starting point for observation—as with Simmel. Mead ends up trying to account for overt interaction by the covert process of symbolizing; the latter becomes the major focus. Thus more recent writers of this school, such as Rose (35) and Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin (26), contend that man "lives in a symbolic environment" (1, p. 9). Typical of this approach is Goffman, who starts from the outside, "following the Chicago Cooley-Mead sociological tradition" (24, pp. 125-126); the split
between the outer and the inner becomes most clearly enunciated for Mead (24).

No one should misinterpret the emphasis on subjective meaning in this school. Merton ascribed central importance to sociology as a whole according to Thomas's theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (30, p. 421). Contrary to behaviorist psychology, man does not respond directly to stimuli, but indirectly through cognitive filters:

Clearly, Mead's model of man is cognitive, picturing as he does a being who actively organizes his perceptions of the world, and acts on the basis of the meanings of the objects and events encountered. . . . it involves such phenomena as responding to the inferred future intentions of others (1, p. 10).

As noted, Mead's cognitive emphasis excluded emotion, but such exclusion is not an ironclad requirement for symbolic interactionism. For one thing, "emotion terms are symbols. The theoretical stance of symbolic interactionism is clearly relevant" (1, p. 117). For another, as modern cognitive psychology has made clear, cognitions, whatever their referents, can have emotional consequences (1, p. 27).

Mead

Symbols constituted, for Mead, a level of communication unique to man, distinct from gestures, and used by infrahuman species as well. The gesture is at once the "transitional link to language from action" and the basis
for "the continuities of human and infrahuman social life" (28, p. 355). That is, the gesture is a common element in both overt action and covert ideation. Verbal gestures are a category of actions that can serve as common signs to both maker and perceiver; these are significant symbols. Language makes possible in society behavior integration, precision, and differentiation—and at the same time plasticity and variation (28, p. 356).

Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse . . . in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed. . . . Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking—which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of gestures—take place (29, p. 47).

In contemporary terms, concepts or categories are made possible by language. One particular concept, the self, is therefore possible only through language.

Human Nature and the Relation Between the Individual and Society

Language, the product of society, makes the self possible. The self exists only insofar as others exist "since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also" (29, p. 164). The structure of the individual self depends on the group's behavior. The self develops in two stages. In the first, by
imaginatively taking the role of others in play, the child learns to experience himself as others see him. In the second, these individual others become fused into a "generalized other"--or the community. Thinking becomes possible only when this second stage is attained; only when the generalized other is incorporated does the self commence its existence (29, p. 175).

Mead delineated the nature of the self. For example, he held that it is not the physiological organism, but is dependent upon it (29, p. 139f). The self has two aspects: the "I" and the "me." The I is the spontaneous, proactive aspect; the me constitutes the distillate of the introjected generalized other, which acts as a check on the I. The I not only observes the me but becomes successively incorporated into the me. The I and me have been likened to Freud's id and superego, respectively (33, p. 97); but that interpretation is not universally held (25, p. 273). The relation between I and me is more that of a cybernetic mechanism enabling a person to become an object to himself: input, output, feedback (1, p. 120).

Like Durkheim, for Mead "the individual and society are twin-born" (33, p. 93). Still, the individual is swallowed up in society in a highly socialized conception--like that of Parsons--which has more recently been termed "oversocialized" (44). Mead was, however, vague in his conceptualization of social organization and tautological
in the "precise points of articulation between society and the individual" (43, p. 156). Such a "point of articulation," the role, was for Mead a cognitive concept rather than a social structural concept (1, p. 12f). His conception of the mutual influence of self and society emerged as "simple but profound . . . , but one that needed supplementation" (43, p. 157). For example, he did not account for human uniqueness (32, p. 50), admitting uniqueness but not explaining how it comes about (p. 55). Mead's emphasis implies too great a homogeneity and does not take into account the great divisions and subcultures of modern society. Contrary to Mead, moral and intellectual standards are based on more than just significant others. For example, there are the influences of school, movies, television and the print media.

Mead's Treatment of Emotion

For Mead, "the essence of the self . . . is cognitive; it lies in the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking, or in terms of which thought and reflection proceeds" (29, p. 173). And so, "the core and primary structure of the self . . . is thus essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon" (p. 173).

Mead denied the connection between the self and the organism, on the one hand, and emotions on the other. As regards the former, the self is contrasted as a
self-reflective entity, as opposed to the organism, which involves more "sensuous experience" and "habitual reactions" (29, p. 136). As for the latter, Mead maintained that none of the processes essential to the self involved emotion:

The individual need not take the attitudes of others toward himself in these experiences (affective), since these experiences merely in themselves do not necessitate his doing so, and unless he does so, he cannot develop a self; and he will not do so in these experiences unless his self has already originated otherwise (p. 173).

The self, like other categories including society itself, had an emergent epistemological status separate from that of the physical world. The self cannot develop without the existence of others; there can be no self without a me, with all the appropriate connotations. On this abstract, epistemological level, seemingly, Mead encountered difficulty in denying systematic importance to emotion. It is not clear what the connection is between the self and the organism even though Mead asserted the existence of a connection. As Pfeutze notes, Mead certainly did not deny such self-regarding emotions as self-approval and self-condemnation (33, p. 81); nor does he deny interpersonal conflict or, for that matter, kindliness (29, p. 258).

Still, some maintain that Mead implied a symbolic interactionist conception of emotion. The necessary mechanisms for such a conception are contained in his analyses:
inputs, behavioral and physiological outputs, and feedback (1, p. 120). Cooley's work, which preceded Mead's, makes more explicit the division between self and society on both cognitive and emotional levels.

Cooley

Cooley was most explicit about man living in a symbolic environment when he referred to society as a mental phenomenon (28, p. 344): "The personality of a friend, as it lives in my mind . . . is simply a group or system of thoughts associated with the symbols that stand for him" (8, p. 81). At the same time, Cooley represented a filling in of some of the deficits in Mead's thinking, with respect to both the self and the role of feelings. As Numerof stated:

Cooley's concept of self-feeling provides us an opportunity for considering individual uniqueness. Cooley's argument conceptually supplements a weakness in the interactional model [of Mead] in several respects. His superiority is not simply that he does justice to psychology and sociology but that within the model of interaction he finds a conceptual place for non-interaction as well (32, p. 62).

Cooley's "justice to psychology and sociology" entailed a closer scrutiny of the noncognitive aspects of subjective meaning, on the one hand, and of the nature of the social organization with which the self articulates, on the other.
Cooley represented a point of departure from Mead that is both more explicit and more flexible; while "he does not recognize the existence of a self which is not social, neither do his writings preclude its existence, a point which Mead would not accept" (32, p. 61). Cooley's conception of self can thus be analyzed in terms of two aspects, the self-feeling and the "looking-glass self."

The self-feeling is the core of the self, and as such, is instinctive, that is, it appears at birth in the structure of the organism as a quality which will necessarily develop. It is elaborated into a social self in the course of interaction through the operation of imagination and habit (28, p. 344). Cooley defined self-feeling as "my-feeling," or a sense of appropriation, and as a special kind of feeling toward which ideals may be associated" (8, p. 137). Self-feeling is understandable in both social and nonsocial aspects of an individual, occurring "within the context of a 'general life'" (8, p. 149). Unlike Mead's conception of the self, it includes mental, emotional, and physical experience:

It [the emotion or feeling of self] seems to exist in a vague though vigorous form at the birth of each individual, and, like other instinctive ideas or germs of ideas, to be defined and developed by experience, becoming associated, or rather incorporated, with muscular, visual and other sensations; with perceptions, apperceptions and conceptions of every
degree of complexity and of infinite variety of content; and especially with personal ideas (8, pp. 139-140).

Self-feeling takes many forms, appearing distinctly as grief, anger, or fear, or merging with other experiences and feelings (8, pp. 150-151).

As noted, imagination contributes to the elaboration of self-feeling into a social self; the looking-glass self is an equivalent term for imagination. Cooley defined the looking-glass self in terms of three elements: "(1) the imagination of our appearance to the other person; (2) the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; (3) self-feeling" (8, p. 152f). The second element affects crucially how we come to feel about ourselves; but it represents also a function of the degree of importance we attach to the particular other person—a variation that Mead had not even conceived.

Cooley's view of the self is not properly interpreted as the oversocialized conception that it has often been called. Basically, he saw the individual as proactive. Hence, the three-step process of the looking glass outlined above becomes double-edged: it can be used either to incorporate the attitudes of others toward self or to influence the attitudes—and actions—of others. As one recent review of Cooley says:

While stressing that self consciousness and an understanding of self are products of social interaction, Cooley presents a picture of an active individual
influencing the perceptions of others in the process of being influenced by their perceptions. The reciprocal relation between individual and others is vital to an understanding of Cooley's social self, and this reciprocity has not received attention commensurate with its significance (37, p. 637).

This notion is very contemporary, in that it anticipates Goffman's notion of impression management, discussed later in the present chapter. It also has bearing on the expression of feeling, discussed below.

Cooley stressed the importance and uniqueness of particular individuals throughout the life cycle. "Primary groups" provided the milieu facilitating such unique relationships while also helping to socialize the individual. Such groups are characterized by: (1) face-to-face association, (2) unspecified nature of associations, (3) relative permanency, (4) the small number of persons involved, and (5) the relative intimacy of participants (28, p. 345). "Primary ideals" are fostered, which are universal across cultures: loyalty, decency, fair play, and sincerity (40, p. 392).

Human nature for Cooley is a trait of primary groups and is inseparable from them.

What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups? Surely not an attribute of the separate individual--supposing there were any such thing--since its typical characteristics, such as affection, ambition, vanity, and resentment, are inconceivable apart from society.

Here as everywhere in the study of society we must learn to see mankind in psychical wholes, rather
than in artificial separation. We must see and feel the communal life of family and local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations of something else (10, pp. 30-31).

Cooley's Treatment of Emotion

The notion of self-feeling has already been discussed. Cooley went further, however. In fact, the attention paid by Cooley to sentiments, ignored by social scientists for decades, has been likened to "cries in the wilderness" (40, p. 224). Cooley defined sentiment as follows:

By sentiment I mean socialized feeling, feeling which has been raised by thought and intercourse . . . and become properly human. It implies imagination, and the medium in which it chiefly lives is sympathetic contact with the minds of others. Thus love is a sentiment, while lust is not; resentment is, but not rage; the fear of disgrace or ridicule, but not animal terror, and so on. Sentiment is the chief motive-power of life, and as a rule lies deeper in our minds and is less subject to essential change than thought, from which, however, it is not to be too sharply separated (10, p. 177).

Cooley thus not only posited fundamental importance to sentiments, but indicated their connection--however vaguely specified--to cognitions.

Sentiments grow from self-feelings (10, p. 190). Moreover, they become more diversified, with "many new varieties and shades . . ." (10, p. 178). Finally, they undergo a "trend toward humanism . . ." (p. 178). Thus, once they are nurtured in the primary group, they are directed toward the wider society: "The kinds of meanings that are formed in our intimate associations, the
sentiments, are subsequently displaced upon other objects" (40, p. 592). The primary ideals described above are thus sentiments that often have a stronger influence on social behavior than do our formal roles.

Of all the primary group sentiments, love is the most important. According to Rieff, Cooley equated love with altruism, terming the sentiment "the ascetic one of sacrificial action" (34, p. xix). Cooley saw this sentiment as assuming major importance in the future in assuring social cohesion. It was Cooley's "sociological version of the truth that societies cannot live without love" (34, p. xviii). Cooley develops this view in terms of the sentiment of brotherhood in and out of primary groups in Chapter XVII of Social Organization (10).

The sentiment of mutual kindness or brotherhood is a simple and widespread thing, belonging not only to man in every state of his development, but extending, in a crude form, over a great part of animal life. . . .

This sentiment flourishes most in primary groups, where, as we have seen, it contributes to an ideal of moral unity of which kindness is a main part. Under its influence the I-feeling becomes a we-feeling, which seeks no good that is not also the good of the group. And the humanism of our time strives with renewed energy to make the we-feeling prevail also in the larger phases of life (10, pp. 189-190).

Cooley was clearly hopeful and somewhat optimistic about the effect of brotherhood and kindness for building social cohesion in a democratic country. Such optimism is
harder to support in 1982, but such sentiments continue to exist and have their impact.

If room existed for social interest in Cooley's notion of sentiments, he also left room for self-interest. He described the sentiment of pride as the "form social self-approval takes in the more rigid and self-sufficient sort of minds; the person who feels it is assured that he stands well with others whose opinion he cares for" (9, p. 232). Vanity, unlike pride, is unstable and transient, occurring when one's self-image is unsure of when one is insecure about the approval of others; the vain person thus depends more on others for his self-esteem (p. 234). Thus arises the notion of a continuum of dependence on others. As has already been noted about the looking-glass self, one can present the self in ways that influence others. This includes specifically the presentation of sentiments. Cooley thus observed that even little children manipulated their families in order to receive attention and self-regard (37, p. 636).

Cooley has made a contribution to the sociology of emotions merely by acknowledging their social significance. He went further, however, in showing the contrast between social and nonsocial origins of emotions, the forms of social organization shaping sentiments, the variety of sentiments, or at least the beginnings of an analysis of
this variety, and the social uses of sentiments by the individual in his own interest or that of others.

Cooley's distinction between social and nonsocial origins is made in the context of his discussion of the self. Thus, self-feeling originates non-socially and is modified in the developing individual through social interaction into various sentiments. Sentiments are the more diversified ramifications of the innate self-feelings. Sentiments emerge in the form of social organization referred to by Cooley as primary groups, characterized by intimacy and face-to-face association. One set of sentiments known as primary group ideals exert a strong influence on the individual's behavior within the primary group as well as outside of it. Cooley showed how the looking-glass self may be used both to incorporate social expectations and to manipulate other persons. From this discussion, it can be seen that Cooley has anticipated contemporary analyses of self-sentiments (41) and self-presentation (20), as will be elaborated in more detail in this and the next chapters.

Blumer

Blumer represents a culmination, in some respects, in the development of symbolic interactionism. Not only did he coin the name of this sociological school (36, p. 24), he has also been described as "the most persistent of [the]
codifiers of the Meadian legacy" (43, p. 177n). Blumer thus represents one of the two so-called mainstreams of symbolic interactionism: "the more symbolic constructionist . . . tradition" versus "the behavioristic form of the Iowa (Kuhn) tradition . . ." (14, p. 293). Like Durkheim, Blumer's vision of sociology was that of processes or "currents"; unlike Durkheim, Blumer urged sociologists to study those processes directly (11, 12), at what we have come to call the microsociological level. The success of Blumer and other symbolic interactionists in carrying out such a program has been debated (12).

As was noted by Schwartz and Jacobs, Blumer codified the basic assumptions of symbolic interactionism:

1. Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings the things have for them.
2. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction one has with others.
3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters (36, p. 24, from 5, p. 2).

For Blumer, then, social reality is constructed from these meanings assigned to the situation by actors; the situation becomes the basis for their actions (36, p. 25). Social reality is constantly in the process of being created and re-created. Adopting a perspective similar to Simmel's, Blumer saw interaction as an independent and emergent process, but one that not only can but is likely to be re-shaped by the actor over time.
Needless to say, aggregate "social meanings" tend to change rather slowly over time. To say that social reality is constantly being recreated does not mean that we start over each day, but rather that the process of maintaining and changing meanings never stops.

The individual does not simply respond directly to stimuli, but rather to the meanings he attaches to these stimuli. The individual's disposition to act shapes the stimulus into a meaningful object (3). Interaction with others also has a shaping influence on the object. But the individual not only interacts with others; he interacts with himself because he is by nature a reflexive being. This subjective process is therefore anything but automatic; it can be moved in a variety of directions (5). Blumer posited this process of interpretation as an intervening variable. The situation was the independent variable and the response the dependent variable (4).

Mead's legacy can be described as having split into two traditions: role theory and symbolic interactionism (43, p. 177). The former emphasized more "objective" aspects of social structure; hence a typical definition of role as a "pattern of behavior associated with a distinctive social position" (6, p. 18). For symbolic interactionists, the term "role" has come to refer to "a cluster of related meanings and values that guide and direct an individual's behavior in a given social setting" (35,
p. 10). This conception of role differs from Mead's and Cooley's, which emphasized taking the role (or "outlook") of another person; here role is part of social structure. In Blumer's view, role, like all of social structure, is subject to reconstruction, individually or collectively. Even in the absence of social structure, e.g., in collective behavior, there is an "interstimulation" by which interpretations of different actors can be mutually modified, sometimes in rapid fashion (2, p. 170). Likewise, in reference group behavior, actors may assign themselves attractive, threatening, or imaginary roles in the absence of any corresponding objective role (30, 39).

Compared to Cooley's postulates, Blumer's treatment of emotion can be described as at best vestigial. He takes emotion out of the spotlight. Like Mead, however, Blumer's perspective leaves room for emotion. For example, in situations where social structure is attenuated—as in mobs—Blumer notes impulsive activity, loss of personal identity and critical ability, and possibly engagement in violence (2, pp. 174-185). This suggests, unfortunately, that emotion and cognition are inversely related. Even in poorly structured situations, however, cognition has its role to play in shaping emotion.

Blumer also acknowledged that emotions themselves can be objects of the self-reflexive process: one can be "... aware that he has a given feeling, conscious that
he dislikes eating with someone he despises . . ." (3, p. 179). Blumer's treatment of emotion agreed with what appears to be rather common psychological thinking on the matter: that cognition is at least one component of emotion and may help to explain its diversity. Cannon pointed out that visceral responses are more uniform than the corresponding labeled emotions (7); new evidence may weaken Cannon's position somewhat (1, p. 107) but does not destroy it. Mandler saw physiological arousal as necessary but not sufficient: what is needed to round it out is the belief that some emotion adequately accounts for the state of arousal (27). This belief is what Blumer referred to when he spoke of emotion as objects of the self-reflexive process.

Gerth and Mills

The difficulty that symbolic interactionists have faced in going beyond the tautological proclamation that "society is symbolic interaction" has been noted (12). The work of Gerth and Mills, some assert, is a point of departure, with an attempt to develop generic concepts that address "the range of variation in the definitional-interpretative process . . ." (43, p. 199). Their monograph constitutes an "early classic" in symbolic interactionism that has not received the attention it deserves.
Gerth and Mills undertook a project that avowedly attempted to meld the thinking of Mead and Freud. "Mead's concept of the generalized other, and Freud's super ego--their closest point of contact--enable us to link the private and the public, the innermost acts of the individual with the widest kinds of socio-historical phenomena" (15, p. xvi). Their assessment of the two writers' shortcomings is worth noting, however:

... they feel that Mead had neither an adequate theory of emotions and motives nor a dynamic theory of the affective life of man; on the other hand, Freud's notion of the personality tends, they think, to be socially inflexible (28, p. 370).

Gerth and Mills developed concepts of character, of social structure, and of the linkages between the two. Those linkages consist of role and institution. They define role as follows:

More technically, the concept "role" refers to (1) units of conduct which by their recurrence stand out as regularities and (2) which are oriented to the conduct of other actors. These recurrent interactions form patterns of mutually oriented conduct (15, p. 10).

This definition has symbolic interactionist flavor. An institution, then, is defined as

an organization of roles, which means that the roles carry different degrees of authority, so that one of the roles--we may call it the "head" role--is understood and accepted by the members of the other roles as guaranteeing the relative permanence of the total conduct pattern (15, p. 13).

Roles are the constituent parts of both individuals and society--individuals in their performance of roles and in
the effects of those roles, and society in the combinations of roles that make up social structure.

The Gerth-Mills notion of character is important because it incorporates a notion of emotion. Character takes the form of a psychic structure, an integration of perception, emotion, and purpose made out of the basic givens of sensation, feeling, and impulse, respectively. One can deal with perception and purpose first.

For sensation (the physical and organic event, for example, of light waves impinging in a certain way upon a certain kind of eye) to become perception (the seeing of the object as a red light) certain meanings must be added. . . . Sensations are organized into perceptions, and this organization goes on in close unity with the social organization of the person as an actor of roles (15, p. 20).

The transition from impulse to purpose undergoes a similar sociological accounting:

For impulse (the undefined and generalized urge to movement) to become purpose (the more or less controlled striving toward a specific object) the objects so specified and defined must be learned. Impulses are specified and directed in terms of the expectations of others; they are socially defined, linked with socially available goals and thus sustain the person in enactment of his roles, and in turn, the institutions of which these roles are a going part (15, pp. 20-31).

Finally, the genesis of emotion appears:

In order for inner feelings to become emotions, these feelings must be linked with socially recognizable gestures, and the person must become aware of them as related to his self. The same physical environment and the same physiology, for all we know, may be present, but in one case these conditions may lead to fear and flight, and in another, to rage and attack. The difference between the two experiences and behaviors cannot be adequately explained
physically or organically. The social definition of
the occasion, the meaning it comes to have for certain
types of persons, provides the clue to which emotion
and which conduct will arise (15, p. 20).

To phrase it another way, an organism is characterized by
impulse, impression, and feeling; a person is characterized
by purpose, perception, and emotion (15, p. 43).

In their work Gerth and Mills make several statements
regarding feeling and emotion. When we observe certain
gestures and physiological changes in another, they note,
we impute certain feelings to him, although not always un-
erringly (p. 50). Feeling states can be classified in terms
of being diffused or localized, or variously intense in-
tense in pleasure or pain (pp. 50-51).

Gerth and Mills view behavior homeostatically, with
emotion occurring within such a context. Thus, as long as
"action proceeds smoothly," with no interruptions or frus-
trations occurring, "no gestures, no feelings, and no
physiological changes need occur" (15, p. 51). Emotion may
be an "outburst" that occurs when the organism is dis-
organized and blocked from responding to a situation. The
expression of emotional gestures, Gerth and Mills maintain,
can reduce the urgency of feelings.

The authors emphasize that this purely physiological
account cannot account for the variety of emotions or for
its occurrence in social contexts. They note:

Both fear and rage may involve similar glandular se-
cretions, similar facial distortions, and even
awareness of similar feelings. Different emotions are identified in terms of the situations in which gestures are expressed. The vocabularies which are used as a response of others to our gestures define and give meaning to our emotion (15, p. 52).

By attaching meaning to emotion, emotion is incorporated into our character structures; and similarly, emotion is incorporated into our social structure. Thus, "if we can organize appropriate roles or rituals, and thus integrate and socially steer our emotions, our psychic structures will be less likely to take over the character structure as a whole and thus dominate our conduct" (15, p. 52). The addition of a cognitive component to emotion therefore serves as a mechanism of social control for emotions: emotion is experienced and expressed within a web of socially created meaning.

Gestures "may become the basis for feelings" (15, p. 55). When the gestures are vague and inchoate, the reactions of others can help to shape our emotions. Again, it is the meaning that is attached that helps to "complete" the emotion. It is not always possible to interpret gestures accurately, however. "The vocabulary of emotions the person acquires is usually limited to the more common emotions experienced by all members of a language group in a similar enough manner to have been given common names" (15, p. 56). Because of this inaccuracy, individuals may emit either genuine or spurious emotional gestures. Examples of spurious gestures are found in the professional actor...
and the insincere lover. Even spurious gestures, however, can become internalized and so become genuine.

Gerth and Mills indicate that there are vocabularies for both gestures and feelings, but that the two are usually combined (15, p. 57). Emotional vocabularies change over historical time and vary from one grouping to another—for example, social strata. While these vocabularies can serve as a mechanism of social control, the feelings and gestures underlying them can also.

Emotional vocabularies of patriotism may be imposed upon populations who are thus denied the public "expression" of their own sentiments. Nationalist prospects may be sentimentalized as "Missions," and nationalist history becomes the hallowed memories of heroes and martyrs. In such cases, some persons may experience the imposed sentiments as spurious, although they may make the conventional gestures that express no emotion; others may withdraw even from the gestures, and some may even actively criticize and resist both the inner meaning and the outer expression (15, p. 58).

The authors thus allow the individual much latitude in his acceptance of the social definition of the situation or of the socially prescribed emotions and gestures. Emotions are seen as masks which "may be said to have a 'tighter' or a 'looser' fit for the social actor" (15, p. 59). A professional actor may wear his emotional mask loosely, keeping a "self-conscious distance" from the part played (15, p. 59).

Gestures can serve functions for both society and the individual. They may be dictated by certain situations;
their performance then helps a group or institution to function in that situation. The individual may manipulate a gesture to gain an objective. Society may conventionalize gestures to hide inner feelings; Durkheim's example of piacular rites comes to mind, wherein the individual is helped to function in a social situation while he is undergoing emotional turmoil. Gestures may be subjected to fad or fashion; in the mass media, "differing prestige values" (15, p. 61) may be attached to gestures, providing an incentive to internalize them.

Gerth and Mills thus indicate how meaning, particularly socially attached meaning, provides a means of stabilizing emotion, and therefore controlling the individual's behavior. Recall, again, Durkheim's continuing interest in the function of society to sustain the individual emotionally and cognitively, as well as in material ways. Social control operates at the cognitive level by providing meaning and emotionally and behaviorally by prescribing certain feelings and gestures and by adding immeasurably to their substantive excitement. Society sometimes does provide the individual latitude in using emotions, of course, and the individual does indeed sometimes take advantage of this latitude.
Goffman

Goffman recognized a split between the individual's inner and outer worlds. Where role theory and symbolic interactionism are seen as opposite polarities—projecting the image of "theater" and of "game," respectively—Goffman showed a tension-filled merger between the two polarities. On the one hand, there is a preoccupation with ritual: "... even the seemingly trivial daily interactions are ceremonial" (24, p. 122). On the other hand, the spontaneity of games goes hand in hand with an unpredictability. In his view, consequently, management of this tension is ever present and "much of social life seems to be dedicated to avoiding open conflict over the issue of how to define reality" (p. 119). Like Simmel, he analyzed specimens of social interaction; from these middle-range analyses (as distinguished from the broad study of social systems), he attempted to discover generic sociological principles.

Like any symbolic interactionist, he conceived of interaction and the definition of the situation as intertwined. People "read" one another by messages transmitted wittingly or unwittingly: "... any message that an individual sends is likely to be qualified and modified by much additional information that others glean from him simultaneously, often unbeknownst to him . . ." (16, p. 15). Further, every situation has its rules, whether
the situation is formal or informal, focused or unfocused (18, part 1). The messages conveyed thus serve to convey the rules and the degree to which they are being followed.

A person presents himself in such a way as to conform to the rules, thereby embodying the values of society. This is done in role performance, for example, in the official show of piousness in a religious leader (20, p. 27). This impression management can be used to conceal one's true thoughts, intentions, or feelings from another, thus necessitating reference to "front regions" and "back regions" (p. 106). The discrepancy between inner and outer can also be managed by "role distancing," which can take the form of public display of the person's impatience with the role or situational demands being made upon him (18).

For Goffman, emotion was present in all social situations, and rules, however implicit, governed them. One kind of emotion emerges when the rules are violated, as for example the alarm of a housewife when her doorbell rings at an inappropriate time (21, p. 300f). Emotions are either euphoric or dysphoric, and the situations instituting a "routine" themselves can be structured in a way that encourages the one or the other kind. Thus, much of the ritual of daily life may be "designed to forestall a sense of embarrassment, to prevent one's losing face" (24, p. 133).
Embarrassment is thus one of the principal emotions analyzed by Goffman. "Whatever else, embarrassment has to do with the figure the individual cuts. . . . The crucial concern is the impression one makes on others" (17, p. 98). The emotion arises when that self-conception is "discredited," violating expectations about oneself. Others are embarrassed also, not out of empathy (although that may be involved), but because the encounter as a whole becomes chaotic, the routine is upset. Goffman defined "poise" as "the capacity to maintain one's own composure" even in a potentially embarrassing situation (17, p. 103). "Tact" or "graciousness," on the other hand, could be viewed as "the capacity to avoid causing oneself or others embarrassment" (p. 103). Gross and Stone added that this discrediting, which is at the heart of embarrassment, is both unexpected and has far-reaching impact. They classified, from content analyses, three areas of embarrassment; inappropriate identity, loss of poise, and disturbance of the assumptions people made about one another in social transactions (22).

Hochschild criticized Goffman's analysis of self-presentation on the ground that he does not adequately connect the range of surface emotions with the deeper feelings which the person experiences (23). One way that Goffman handles this is to acknowledge that each of us undergoes changes in emotion that are more variegated than
most social situations can handle (24, p. 123). Self-presentation therefore deceives the other, and so prevents disruption and embarrassment. This also involves a split in the self, in which one stands apart from the self; the potential for self-deception is therefore also very real (p. 129). Hochschild's criticism on this point is to be explored in greater depth in Chapter IV.

Summary

This chapter examined a group of theorists who placed greater emphasis on interaction and the creation and maintenance through this interaction of rules governing emotional behavior than the theorists reviewed in the preceding chapter. Mead and Blumer treated emotion in an implicit manner, Mead in particular generating a framework within which to understand the development of the self. Blumer systematized Mead's position. Cooley endowed the self with the capacity to act proactively as well as to reflect the emotional definition of both self and the external world that serve as the socializing elements in the construction of this self in the first place.

Symbolic interactionism provided a framework for understanding emotion as a social phenomenon. By positing mechanisms of socialization, it made more explicit the link between the individual and society. This link was embodied in the concept of role, whether as a cognitive concept or
a social structural concept. By positing that man lives in a symbolic environment, symbolic interactionism indicated that the meaning that is attached to a situation provides a key element in emotion.

Mead provided the general framework that symbolic interactionists have followed. His conception of "self" focused on the internalization of the generalized other to form the me, and the spontaneous and observing I. "Role" was a cognitive concept, representing the psychological states of other individuals rather than units of social structure. Mead's theory emphasized only cognition in a systematic way, although he acknowledged various emotions. Despite this cognitive emphasis, his view of the interacting self provided a basis for the analysis of emotions.

Cooley was more explicit and systematic about treating emotions. His notion of self was both cognitive and emotional. The self-sentiment was an innate and unfolding aspect of the self; through interaction with the social environment, the self-sentiment becomes transformed into various specific sentiments. This occurs in a particular form of social organization, the primary group. The sentiments formed in the primary group are diffused into all aspects of the individual's social life, and hence into various parts of the social structure. Love was his master sentiment. The looking-glass self was the mechanism posited by Cooley by which the individual became
socialized; it was also a means by which the individual could cope with, even manipulate others. Applied to sentiments, this means that the looking-glass self transforms the self-sentiment into various sentiments.

Blumer's thought was a culmination and systematization of symbolic interactionist thought. He maintained that individuals created meaning, and that this meaning created social structure. Thus the definition of the situation, being real, has real consequences. Blumer, in this manner, transformed the concept of role from a cognitive concept to a social structural concept. Like Mead, Blumer did not deal very explicitly with emotion. Similarly, however, his framework provided a means by which emotion could be accounted for in a social context: the meaning attached to a situation could be applied to emotions as well.

Gerth and Mills defined the link between the individual and social structure through the concepts of role and institution. They attempted a synthesis of Freud and Mead, while noting the limitations of each. They defined emotion as feeling, supplied by the organism, combined with meaning, supplied by the individual or society; an organism becomes a person when feeling becomes emotion. Meaning is a way of controlling emotion, and thus a means of society to control the individual. A vocabulary is provided for feelings and gestures, transforming them into emotions. Feelings and gestures, along with vocabulary, can be
controlled by society. Because vocabularies are incomplete, individuals can emit spurious emotions or gestures; these, however, can be internalized and become real. Social structure thus provides the individual with some latitude in experiencing and expressing emotion, and the individual may exploit that latitude for his own ends.

Goffman was a typical symbolic interactionist inasmuch as he attempted to explain overt interactions through the subjective interpretations people make in the course of their experiences in situations. Goffman addressed how individuals attempted to control the interpretations by other individuals, and what happened when that control went awry. Each situation has its rules, and the individual wants to appear to conform to those rules, even though he may be trying to deviate from them. His identity is based on his demonstrated competence at conforming. Embarrassment ensues when such competence is discredited. One can claim poise, however, by being able to control one's emotions in potentially embarrassing situations.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN THE THEORIES OF
SELECTED CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGISTS

The present chapter addresses sociological theories of recent origin. With the advent of these theories, it can be said that a sociology of emotions has become a field of legitimate and systematic concern. Indeed it is only with these theories that a sociology of emotion is a field at all within the larger domain of sociology. Broadly conceived, this area of focused interest is concerned with how emotions are distributed throughout a society, how the person's loci and interactions within a social structure affect his experience and expression of different emotions, and how this experience and expression in turn affect his interactions and place in the social structure.

Four different theorists are discussed. Each is found to have a different emphasis. Arlie Hochschild attempts to delineate the field as a whole, while stressing the cultural rules of experiencing and expression. Susan Shott is not as comprehensive, presenting her notions on what she calls role-playing emotions. Norman Denzin is concerned primarily with the mutual influences of interaction and the experiencing of emotion. Theodore Kemper focuses on
features of the social structure, specifically the dimensions of status and power, and how they elicit specific emotions. Each theorist has his own conception of emotion. Likewise, each has a different theoretical orientation. Shott and Denzin are symbolic interactionists, with Denzin adding aspects of phenomenology, existentialism and ethnomethodology. Kemper's emphasis is positivistic, complementing the "social constructionist" approach of the above two writers. Hochschild attempts to fuse the symbolic interactionist and psychoanalytic approaches into a model of the "sentient actor." Each of these writers is discussed in detail below. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ethnomethodology and existential sociology as they contrast with the symbolic interactionist position on emotion.

Hochschild

Hochschild calls for the establishment of a sociology of emotions. She notes various reasons why such a substantive specialty has remained unorganized within sociology for so long: the value emphasis on rationality and the intellect in Western societies, and the associated tendency to regard emotion as a primitive response; domination of sociology by males, who are culturally less emotional than females (an argument that she throws out but does not trouble to defend at length); the confusion between emotion and irrationality and reinforcing the first point made
above, and the greater importance attributed to rationality by prominent theorists, notably Weber (13, pp. 280-281).

Hochschild conceives of different ways of analyzing emotion. At the more general level, she distinguishes between the organismic account of emotion and the interactive account of emotion. In the former, "the paramount questions concern the relation of emotion to biologically given 'instinct' or 'impulse'" (12, p. 553). This view denies the role of conscious volition, thinking and adaptation—particularly the person's role as manager of his own emotions. The interactive account, on the other hand, takes into account the actor's performance as emotion manager, at both conscious and unconscious, overt and covert, levels. Hochschild's image of this "sentient actor" falls within the general range of emotion theorists discussed in this chapter, and is crucial to the contemporary dialogue on the sociology of emotions.

Hochschild presents her conception of what the contours of a sociology of emotion should be. Using the image of the sentient actor as a starting point, she posits as the basic question for this field "why the various emotions, such as joy or depression, are differentially distributed" (13, p. 283). Having raised this basic question, she indicates three routes by which the question may be answered for at least most emotions or occurrences of emotions; these are three dimensions of "sociohistorical
contexts" (p. 288): the normative, the expressive, and the political. Briefly, the normative concerns what she calls "feeling rules"--rules which affirm when certain emotions are appropriate or inappropriate. The expressive dimension concerns the act of emotional communication, that is, how the communicator shapes the emotional message and how the receiver interprets or "decodes" it. The political dimension concerns how one's location in power hierarchies affects the experiencing and expression of emotion--anticipating Kemper's emphasis. The normative, expressive and political dimensions are interdependent, in that they can be viewed as operating simultaneously in the same situation, and will be discussed more fully later.

Human Nature and the Relation between the Individual and Society

Hochschild makes very clear her notion of the nature of the individual and of human nature. As stated above, she sees the behavioral sciences, particularly social psychology, as divided between two accounts: the organismic and the interactional. The organismic stresses the pancultural similarities or uniformities in emotions; it is therefore unsuitable for her purposes because she seeks explanations for variations between and within particular societies.

This leaves the interactive account. Within that general approach, she discerns three distinct but
overlapping images of the individual:

In the first approach (associated with the image of the conscious, cognitive actor), the social context and thinking about emotion are linked, but conscious feeling tends to be neglected. In the second approach (associated with the image of the unconscious actor), unconscious emotional phenomena and social structure are linked, but again conscious feeling is omitted. In the third approach, the relation between sentience and its labels is analyzed, but the social context is often neglected (13, p. 285).

Her own preference is to establish the third approach, which emphasizes the area of conscious feeling, as the starting point, then to move out from there and incorporate whatever is useful from the other two approaches. The other two are exemplified by the writings of Goffman and Freud, respectively (12). She is concerned with the limitations of each. Goffman, insofar as he does deal with emotion, deals with it in a surface manner, ignoring the deeper emotions; Hochschild, by contrast, is equally concerned with surface acting and "deep acting." Here the influence of Freud is apparent. Goffman's writing is instructive, however, in that he shows how situations act as constraints on how we express feelings in the "front stage;" Hochschild would extend that notion of constraint to the feeling of deeper emotions. Hochschild is critical of Goffman's situationism, which ignores "the links between immediate social situations and macrostructure on the one hand, and individual personality on the other" (12, p. 556). To the extent that an individual has an identity, it is a
situational identity; likewise, emotions spring solely from situational encounters and are not embedded within more enduring structures of personality and society.

Freud, for his part, addressed these more enduring structures. For Hochschild, Freud's limitation lay in his subordination of emotion to motivation, and in his notion of emotion management as mainly unconscious: emotion is a derivative of instincts, while unconscious defenses ward off unpleasant affects. For Hochschild, emotion management or "emotion work" is mainly a conscious process. Her conceptual starting point is that the person feels and attempts to feel according to some sort of rule; the normative dimension seems to be pervasive. Her position is akin to that of Blum and McHugh (3), who see motivation and the ascription of motivation as guided by rules; where they use the word "motivation," Hochschild would use the word "emotion." To rephrase one of their assertions in these terms (3, p. 108): "Emotion is a sociological procedure for describing how organisms show themselves as persons."

To Hochschild, then, human nature is pervaded by emotions of both conscious and unconscious sorts. The individual responds to these feelings, particularly when they are the kind that he does not want--either because they are unpleasant or not in accord with emotion rules. This emotional dissonance prompts emotion work; sometimes society provides ways of reworking emotions, sometimes the
individual. The individual operates in a social context, both within immediate situations and more enduring "socio-historical" aspects of society—cultural rules of feeling and expression and structural aspects such as power hierarchies. That there are discrepancies between actual and rule-prescribed emotions attests to the imperfect fit between the individual and society. Society itself may generate emotions that conflict. Emotion work is one way that the individual can "patch up" these lacunae left by society. For Hochschild, the majority of emotions have a social genesis; these, in turn, are generated through emotion rules, for the most part but not exclusively. Here Hochschild leaves a theoretical gap that remains unfilled.

Hochschild's Treatment of Emotion

The above discussion gives some indication of how Hochschild is concerned, more or less equally, with both surface and deeper emotions. There is some ambiguity, however, in the meaning of "deep" emotions. On the one hand, it may refer to unconscious emotions; on the other, it may mean emotions that are conscious but withheld from the expressive realm. It is clear that Hochschild proposes to deal with all emotions, whatever their variety. But her focus of emotion-management and emotion work is on "conscious and deliberate efforts to shape feeling" (12, p. 559).
Deep acting consists of management of feelings from which emotional expression can follow. This is analogous to the Stanislavsky school of acting where an actor "might guide his memories and feelings in such a way to elicit the corresponding expression" (12, p. 558). In comparison, surface acting (typified by the English school of acting) would focus on the direct shaping of behavioral expression. The concept of deep acting is important because it emphasizes that social influences go beyond the surface presentation or outer appearance of the individual and influence the emotion work that goes on internally.

Whether acting on the stage or in real life, Hochschild seems to say, one is doing so consciously, in an attempt to portray a role. One makes a conscious effort to match surface expression and deep feelings, or to separate the two when that is appropriate.

The impression that Hochschild stresses conscious emotion is strengthened by her treatment of emotion work. She notes that where society does not provide means for alleviating or eliminating emotional dissonance, the individual often has his own means. These latter means involve conscious effort, as she notes:

There are various techniques of emotion work. One is cognitive: the attempt to change images, ideas, or thoughts in the service of changing the feelings associated with them. A second is bodily: the attempt to change somatic or other physical symptoms of emotion (e.g., trying to breathe slower, trying not to shake). Third, there is expressive
emotion work: trying to change expressive gestures in the service of changing inner feeling (e.g., trying to smile, or to cry). This differs from simple display in that it is directed toward change in feeling. It differs from bodily emotion work in that the individual tries to alter or shape one or another of the classic public channels for the expression of feeling (12, p. 562).

As already noted, Hochschild's work leaves open a gap in the social explanation of emotion, when she finds some emotions occurring—in a sense, mysteriously—despite emotion rules that may proscribe them. Similarly, she ignores a possibly important clue to the genesis of emotion in the above passage. The argument is as follows: If an individual can use conscious mechanisms to change emotions, he may use some of these mechanisms unconsciously, automatically, habitually to generate emotions in the first place. Thus, for example, cognitive mechanisms (as distinct from conscious techniques), such as calling up images, may generate particular emotions in a situation or over time. For example, one could recall a specific childhood experience (i.e. death of a pet) through memory imagery and evoke a specific emotion. This "definition of the situation" is directed to the situation leading to the emotion, and not merely a label for the emotion. Further, the situation may be unconsciously defined, but lead to conscious emotion. This suggests a re-examination of the whole conceptual range of conscious, unconscious, surface and deep emotions.
The dimensions of socio-historical contexts within which emotions occur take up the remainder of Hochschild's analysis. The normative dimension concerns feeling rules. Emotions are deemed appropriate or inappropriate by actors in situations, and thus may generate a dissonance with actually felt emotion. Such rules are part of society's overall normative structure, and thus provide in a general way "one means of control" of the individual in society (13, p. 289). This control extends beyond the temporary "presentations of self" in particular situations to the deeper levels of feeling. Thus, Hochschild argues, the individual learns to control his private feelings, and thereby brings private realms of his being under control. This anticipates Shott's assertion that self-control is a form of social control. The implication is that "worked over" emotions recede into unconsciousness, where they remain reworked and operate on a more automatic basis. For example, two common social behaviors tend to be automatically executed without conscious thought: (1) the requirement of comfortable and safe physical distance between people in social settings and (2) the routine but vague greetings which often occur upon first greeting another individual.

Appropriateness of emotion is judged in three overlapping ways: clinical, moral, and socio-situational.
(a) Clinical appropriateness refers to what is ex-
pectable for normal, healthy actors (e.g., the actor
may think her/his fury healthy; despite its moral
inappropriateness). (b) Moral appropriateness refers
to what is morally legitimate (e.g., the actor may
get furious at a helpless child, but this may be
morally inappropriate). (c) Social-situational ap-
propriateness refers to what is called for by the norms
specific to the situation (e.g., to feel effervescent
at a party). These three types correspond to the
actor's roles in everyday life as respectively, a
"folk" clinician, minister, and etiquette expert
(13, p. 291).

That norms of appropriateness can change is illustra-
ted by the woman's movement. As a result of this movement,
it became appropriate for women to experience and express
anger. Correlative to this change in the woman's role has
been a change in the man's role. Thus it is now appropri-
ate for men to feel and express emotions in ways that were
formerly proscribed, e.g., fear and tears. Because feeling
rules are part of the larger set of norms, Hochschild has
termed emotions the underside of ideology (12, p. 566).
It is clear that social movements provide one source of
conflict between feeling rules.

Just as feelings are differentially distributed,
feeling rules are also. In fact, skills for handling
feelings are distributed, Hochschild maintains, along class
lines: middle class children are socialized to work on
emotions, working class children to work on behavior (12,
p. 571). Because of feeling rules, certain emotions have a
social exchange value, and can be used as a resource in
situations. In industrial society, the ability to project
certain feelings as a resource may be functional for some parts of society. For example, the stewardess who can smile and convey a feeling of security is functional for the airline's business, but this behavior may not be healthy for her inner well-being (12, p. 570).

Hochschild's other major emphasis is on the political dimension. This is brought out in a general way through her analysis of senior citizens in relation to their offspring. She notes a differential distribution of power between these two generations, particularly in the case of seniors who reside in institutional settings and whose power vis-a-vis offspring is now greatly reduced. One result of such inequality is the generation of envy. But envious parents are unacceptable from society's point of view because of their potential disruptiveness. For this reason, emotion work occurs; here Hochschild indicates that the presumably unconscious mechanism of altruistic surrender is employed, whereby the underdog individual in this case the parent, identifies with the dominant other:

To maintain social cohesion it is probably important to contain envy between generations and between males and females--two strata of human beings that have to get along together if society is to survive. We seldom think of envy as a "problem" precisely because these strata usually do get along; divisions are more typically within these strata than between them, divorce and the generation gap notwithstanding. For example, the family is held together by love between husband and wife and parents and children. However, if we inspect various loves we find that they differ in the element of identification. This identification if often "one-way." That is, the woman often lives
through the man, partaking of his public life and success in a way that the man does not live through the woman in return (14, p. 104).

Hochschild is thus concerned with how the individual's emotions are related to the functional requirements of society. This interlocking, in her analyses, takes place on at least two levels: through the functional generation of feeling rules and through a set of mechanisms by which the individual adapts his feelings more or less appropriately to the situation.

Hochschild has mapped out what appear to be major aspects of a sociology of emotion. She has attempted to integrate what she perceives to be the most useful aspects of sociological and psychological thinking into a model of the actor. Her concerns are equally microsocial and macrosocial, focusing on feeling rules and personal management of emotion at a deep level. She has illustrated her more general ideas with analyses of specific situations and problems. In so doing, she has underlined both the utility of her framework and specific gaps that need to be filled.

Shott

In contrast to Hochschild, who attempted a comprehensive conception of the sociology of emotion, Shott's effort is a partial and selective view. For one thing, she is concerned with explaining only certain aspects of emotion from a sociological perspective. For another, she
approaches the problem solely from a symbolic interactionist viewpoint. Hochschild adopts a more open viewpoint, incorporating not only symbolic interactionism, but psychoanalysis, ethnomethodology, structural-functionalism, and exchange theory. Shott acknowledges a more modest claim for her theoretical perspective, attempting only to explain some aspects of emotion.

Human Nature and the Relation between the Individual and Society

Shott's concerns are with the socialization of the individual and with role taking as these processes bear on the emotions. Under the general banner of symbolic interaction, she uses four guiding propositions adapted from this perspective. The first asserts that a "study of the actor's definitions and interpretations is essential for an understanding of human conduct" (24, p. 1321). She cites Manis and Meltzer (20, p. 8), who stress the emergent, constructed character of much of human behavior. The second states that "human behavior is emergent, continually constructed during its execution" (24, p. 1321). Springing from Blumer (2, p. 82), this proposition stresses the notion that conduct is actively improvised through interpretation, and therefore can be transformed by the same means.

The third proposition states that "the actions of individuals are influenced by their internal states and
impulses in addition to external events and stimuli, for actors' perceptions and interpretations are shaped by the former as well as the latter" (24, p. 1321). Derived from Hewitt (4, p. 47), this statement presents the notion that physiological or psychological impulses do not determine, but are an important part of, the individual's acts. The fourth proposition states that "social structures and normative regulation are the framework of human action rather than its determinant, shaping behavior without dictating it" (24, p. 1321). Thus social structure provides a setting which influences, rather than determines in an ironclad manner, the behavior of individuals.

**Shott's Treatment of Emotion**

From the above propositions, it becomes clear that Shott's overall view of an explanation of emotion is interdisciplinary, taking into consideration physiological, psychological and social elements. Within this context, she is concerned to see what contribution the symbolic interactionist framework can make to such a total explanation. She talks about emotion in two ways: as a result of socialization, and as one type of emotion she terms role-playing emotions.

Her treatment of emotional socialization is very much in accord with Hochschild's analysis of feeling rules. She amplifies on Hochschild's notion of normative pressures by
finding examples primarily from the anthropological literature to illustrate variations in cultural systems, primarily in vocabularies of emotion. She concludes that "how one interprets one's emotions and, to some extent, what one feels are guided (though not determined) by one's culture and its feeling rules" (24, p. 1320).

Shott's most distinctive contribution to a sociology of emotion lies in her analysis of role-taking emotion and its function in social control. As noted, Hochschild anticipated this treatment in her notion of emotion work as a way of conforming to feeling rules; Cooley's better known aspect of the looking-glass self also anticipates this. Essentially a role-taking emotion is an emotion that occurs when one has placed himself in another's role. There are two sorts of role-taking emotion:

reflexive role-taking emotions, which are directed toward oneself and comprise guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, and vanity; and empathic role-taking emotions, which are evoked by mentally placing oneself in another's position and feeling what the other feels or what one would feel in such a position (24, p. 1324).

Her analysis of the reflexive role-taking emotions is provocative. Guilt, embarrassment and shame occur when an individual perceives that he has failed to perform as expected by himself or others, vanity and pride when he has succeeded in his performance. Guilt occurs relative to a moral standard, while shame occurs relative to a group, when one sees "that others do not accept an idealized self-image that one has built up" (24, p. 1325). Embarrassment is more
specifically situational, springing "from awareness that others (or the generalized other) view one's presentation of self as inept" (24, p. 1325). In a word, shame is a failure in general identity, embarrassment a failure in situational identity. She further contrasts the three emotions: "embarrassment seems to be the most closely linked with the actual presence of others, shame seems less connected to the presence of others, and guilt least tied to it" (24, p. 1326). Her analysis of vanity and pride recalls Cooley: vanity is unstable, occurring "when one is not sure of one's self-image or the approval of others" (24, p. 1326).

The role-taking emotions have functional significance for preserving social units. If guilt occurs because one's self-image has been marred, then that self-image can be restored by performing restorative acts. She cites evidence that actors do indeed engage in restorative behavior after evoking guilt feelings in themselves in consequence of their own behavior. Such acts are performed when one does not have to interact with the party one has injured; Shott sees this response tendency as making "little sense from the standpoint of equitable restitution but a great deal of sense from the standpoint of repairing a self-conception" (24, p. 1327). Embarrassment functions in a similar manner, motivating people to clear their situational identities.
Empathy is also a motivator of altruistic behavior, but for different reasons. Shott defines empathy as "the arousal in oneself of the emotion one observes in another or the emotion one would feel in another's situation" (24, p. 1328). To Shott, empathy is an emotion rather than a cognition. Shott argues that empathy shows that we have privately taken into ourselves a concern for the welfare of others. To the extent that this is so, it illustrates her assertion that "self-regulation must be the basis of much social control" (24, p. 1329).

Shott presents a social psychological theory of emotion that is conceived as interlocking with other levels of explanation. Kemper's criticism (18) that her theory ignores the role of physiology seems to be misplaced. Shott (25) correctly points out that she never intended to exclude this element, that there is evidence to support both a physiological explanation and a social constructionist explanation. Her position is akin to the multiple systems approach of Parsons as proposed by Averill (1); in this approach, a given emotional response is simultaneously involved in various systems of action: cultural, social, personality, and organismic.

Denzin

Denzin's central thesis is that "the emotions lie at the core of the intersection of mind, culture, and society"
A symbolic interactionist, he conceives an intellectual kinship between this orientation and ethnomethodology, and draws upon various phenomenological and existential thinkers, such as James, Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Schutz, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Like Hochschild, he is concerned with the historical neglect of emotion by sociology and by symbolic interactionists in particular, and attempts to redress that neglect.

**Human Nature and the Relation between the Individual and Society**

Denzin draws upon the Meadian tradition in his account of the socialization process. Fundamental to his conception of the development of the self is the development of language skills. These skills are crucial to acquiring the concept entailed in the words "I" or "me." He sees a convergence among Mead, Cooley and Piaget on these points: affective and cognitive processes in self-development; qualitative differences among developmental stages; the importance of interaction; and the ability of the organism to stimulate its own conduct.

Adulthood is thus qualitatively different from childhood. While Denzin stresses the importance of emotion in childhood, it is the adult who serves as the basis for his theory of emotion. He has a specific conception of the adult in relation to other persons which underlies the theory of emotion. This conception calls attention to a
set of assumptions that the individual carries around inside him:

Everyday life is organized around a body or taken-for-granted assumptions concerning primary human nature, by which . . . is meant those human sentiments that reference, for instance, fear, hope, love, envy, pride, humility, shame, awe, love, and hate. These assumptions will be termed the actor's primary interpretative framework. This framework embodies the person's conception of a normal, everyday interactant, including himself . . . it is also assumed that they have been schooled on such matters as affect, mood control, tact, ritual, the sacred, and the civil . . . Actors assume that when they approach other actors that those persons will be in some "mood-state" or emotional frame and that the "mood-state" will complement or disrupt the ongoing cognitive tone of their interaction (6, p. 254).

Once engaged in interaction with another, the individual is engaged in two streams that interpenetrate one another: a phenomenological stream and an interaction stream. The phenomenological stream has as its object the ongoing interaction. "It involves person A taking his own attitude in the situation, taking B's attitude and putting those two attitudes together into a flowing phenomenological definition of the situation" (6, p. 255). This private self "intrudes into the public life of the joint act through the giving off of information concerning one's mood and one's emotional reaction to the actions of the other as well as one's reactions to his own activity" (6, p. 255). This analysis is situational in Goffman's sense, but stresses the emotions where Goffman did not; there is nothing to suggest that deeper emotions are excluded. The
self is something that endures from interaction to interaction, with a conception of each other person's ongoing history as well.

**Denzin's Treatment of Emotion**

For Denzin, emotions are ubiquitous in social interaction. He defines emotions as "thoughts about feelings" (6, p. 253), further characterizing them as "embodied experiences" (p. 253), i.e. as occurring within the context of a person's total consciousness. Since the phenomenological and interaction streams are interdependent, emotions are by definition social as well as psychological.

Emotion is communicated by one actor to another. One way this is done is to give one's emotional reaction to the other person's actions. Another way is for the person to "establish a mood or emotional definition about themselves (nervous, tense, at ease) which, in turn, influences the mood of the other" (6, p. 256). As a result, each interactive situation has an affective tone. "Mood and emotion are felt, sensed, expressed, distorted, exaggerated, faked and fabricated" (6, p. 256). Not only may one misperceive the other's mood, but one's own as well, especially if one intellectualizes one's own mood.

Moods may be defined as "legal" or "illegal." This point recalls Hochschild's notion of feeling rules. In contrast with Hochschild, Denzin defines legality in
symbolic interactionist terms: "Actors attach a sense of moral worth to their emotional feelings, believing that their real or true selves reside in particular emotional experiences" (6, p. 259). Thus it is actors, not the culture, that establish the legality of their moods. Based on those moods one establishes "the organization of one's joint actions" as well as "one's claims to power, status, and social influence" (6, p. 259).

Kemper

Kemper's theory of emotion attempts to bridge the positivist and social constructionist approaches. In so doing, however, he is critical of the constructionist approach. His argument is that that approach ignores important physiological evidence regarding the origin and nature of emotion, evidence which he sees as supporting the proposition that there are specific physiological responses for each emotion (16). Nonetheless, Kemper maintains that "if humans acted largely according to genetic instructions, sociology would merely be a descriptive embellishment on biology" (15, p. 27). Kemper is critical of symbolic interactionist approaches for failing to recognize that certain patterns in human relationships seem to evoke certain emotional responses the world over, and do not lend themselves to the range of rule construction and meaning variability characteristically suggested by the "social
construction of reality" school of thought. He sees his technical-relational model as a useful tool for the symbolic interactionist researcher: "Technical activity and/or power and status are what actors are doing and what they see other actors doing in reference to themselves" (15, p. 370).

**Human Nature and the Relation between the Individual and Society**

The social constructionist, asserts Kemper, ignores important physiological evidence on the nature of emotion. The so-called Funkenstein hypothesis, that specific physiological responses underlie specific emotions, is supported by the evidence he reports. Constructionists ignore this evidence and its implications, Kemper states. On this basis, he sees a need to forge new links between this approach and the positivist approach. His design is, if anything, rather more positivist than constructionist. In this approach, social structure, or relationships, are much more important than norms or feeling rules.

Kemper believes that "the most important events are the ongoing or changing patterns of social relations between actors" (15, p. 26). He states two postulates about these relations: first, "that human relationships generally occur within a context of interdependence and division of labor between actors" (15, p. 27); second, "that when the division of labor becomes complex . . .
there arises a need for a new function, namely, one that will attend to coordination, scheduling and sequencing, deciding priorities . . ." (15, p. 28). Action between two actors is either coerced or voluntary; when coercion predominates, power relation provides the key, and when voluntarism is the mode, status provides the key. In this power-status model, the nature of individuals is ignored; the nature of their standing in relationships based on relative power and status, is everything.

Kemper's criticism that constructionists ignore physiological evidence should be accepted with extreme caution. As noted earlier, Shott's theory of emotion is situated within a framework that includes such variables. Kemper heuristically focuses upon structural variables, just as Shott heuristically focuses on a different set of variables. But Kemper is very forceful on this central point: that when certain kinds of relationships prevail between actors in a situation, such as a situation in which actor A exerts power over actor B, certain kinds of emotion will characterize the reactions of the actors involved. Actor B, for example, will experience emotion associated with subordination and he will not experience the emotions experienced by the dominant actor B. There may be a range of variability in the possible roles for emotional expression in this situation, to be constructed historically by
the actors of the society to which actors A and B belong, but this range cannot reverse the more general transcultural nature of dominant-subordinate relationships.

**Kemper's Treatment of Emotion**

In Kemper's theory, specific emotional—and physiological—responses ensue from specific constellations of power and status relationships within which the individual is situated and from the changes that occur in those constellations. He hypothesizes that "a very large class of emotions results from real, imagined, or anticipated outcomes in social relationships" (15, p. 43). He defines emotion as "a relatively short-term evaluative response essentially positive or negative in nature involving distinct somatic (and often cognitive) components" (15, p. 47). Emotions are classified as structural, anticipatory, and consequent emotions. Structural emotions result from enduring aspects of relationships; anticipatory emotions result from anticipated outcomes of encounters; consequent emotions result from the actual outcomes (15, p. 49).

Kemper's theory of emotion is thus based on the individual's present, future and past ties to the power and status aspects of his relationships. Structural emotions are the predominant emotions in his theory. These are rooted in a person's objective situation, which in turn
determines how he defines the situation; from that Kemper predicts what emotion will occur.

Kemper uses a three-dimensional matrix for classifying relationships. The first distinction involved is power versus status; the second is whether the self or the other is the perceived agent; the third is whether a felt excess or felt deficit is involved. Combinations of these dichotomous alternatives predict emotions and classes of emotions. Thus power relationships in general involve guilt, status relationships, shame. Kemper attempts rather specific predictions and explanations for emotional reactions in actors in a variety of prototypical situations. For example, an actor with an excess of power in a situation who misuses that power will feel "guilt." Guilt here is a prototype emotion. Its specific form and its social label, if there is one, may vary from one society to another, where rules for the expression of feeling may vary, but in all cases the feeling will fall within the parameters of the universal category of guilt.

Myers (21) used Kemper's power-status model to study a group of supervisors and subordinates in a business situation. He found a positive relationship between the degree of coerciveness and punitiveness of supervisors and the prevalence of emotional elements of fear-anxiety, anger and depression of subordinates. This study provides an example of how Kemper's sociology of emotions can be used in
organizational studies. Kemper's theory and its predictions fall under what Hochschild called the political dimension of socio-historical contexts. It was Hochschild (11) who asserted that those living on the bottom of the political experience the world as a hostile place, while those living at the top experience it as a benign place (11, p. 296). What Kemper does is to refine further these power-and status-relationships, so that a variety of emotions can be predicted, and not just the hostile-benign polarities.

For all his apparent differences from the symbolic interactionists, Kemper's approach bears a resemblance to particular treatments of emotion by these latter theorists. For example, his linking of emotion to the perceived status or power of self has parallels in Cooley's assertion and discussion of the fact that sentiments grow from self-feelings. Another parallel to Cooley is found in the latter's notion that pride is rooted in the persons assurance that he is approved by significant others—an idea also found in Shott's role-playing emotion of pride; this corresponds to Kemper's self-perceived possession of status. Goffman's discredited self-concept is seen again in Kemper's self-perceived lack or loss of status. Denzin's conception of emotion as an "embodied experience" is parallel to Kemper's concern for the physiological response which accompanies emotion.
Ethnomethodology and Existential Sociology

In the past two chapters, symbolic interactionism has been the predominant perspective shared by most of the theorists under discussion. Like this perspective, ethnomethodology and existential sociology, each in its own way, places stress on the subjective meaning that individuals attach to a situation. That similarity is a point of departure for these two approaches, however.

Ethnomethodology does not see the nature of a definition of a situation as important, but rather the manner in which that definition was achieved. Like symbolic interactionism in its earlier form, ethnomethodology is cognitive in emphasis. But cognition for ethnomethodology cannot be reduced to "an idea" as an achieved fact, but is concerned with the process by which an idea, or ideas, are found. This has implications: where symbolic interactionism tends to see a high degree of order and shared values, "feeling rules," ethnomethodology is prone to see a more brittle, unpredictable, and problematic world in its theoretical lens.

Consistent with this view of social reality, Garfinkel deals with such emotions as anger and embarrassment. These are most likely to emerge at disjunctive moments in the flow of interaction (9, p. 38). Such moments are by no means rare and, moreover, carry consequences of greater
long-term import than the more "unemotional" routines of social interaction.

The ethnomethodologist sees emotion flowing from the struggle to define a situation more than from the situation already defined. Because the individual is the creator of meaning, in this view—the occasion is only an arena in which he does his work—a process is undertaken among individuals to arrive at consensus. Once achieved, that consensus is legitimated: only then perceptions are established as "facts." Merely to contradict the truth value of such facts is to elicit emotion from participants.

Existential sociology also sees the individual as the creator of meaning. In this instance, however, feeling has a more central role in meaning: feeling is nothing less than one way of knowing the world. Existential theorists choose to focus on "perceptions and feelings (anxiety, dread, love, hate and envy) as the ultimate goals and well-springs of social meaning and action" (8, p. 18). This specific focus on emotion as a way of "knowing" reality through empirical experience affords a unique contribution to the more general sociology of emotion.

The existential sociologist tends to see meaning solely in feeling terms. In this way, he is as partial as the sociologist who sees meaning solely in cognitive terms. Some sociologists, notably Cooley, have attempted to keep both aspects in their accounts of social life. The
existential sociologist, like the ethnomethodologist, sees social living as problematic rather than as smoothly structured. Consequently, the emotions that are analyzed tend to be the more "uncomfortable" emotions. This also happens to occur with a structural theorist like Kemper. Again, however, a more balanced sociology of emotions would include the full range of emotions, as well as both the problematic and non-problematic social conditions that foster them.

Summary

The four theorists discussed in this chapter provide ample materials for the establishment of a sociology of emotions. Hochschild assembles theoretical materials for an interactive account of emotion, focusing on the image of the sentient actor. Based on this account, she delineates three dimensions or contexts for analyzing emotion: normative, expressive and political. Feeling rules specify when particular emotions are appropriate, and "emotion work" is done on feelings that are inappropriate or proscribed.

Shott recognizes the interplay of physiological, psychological and social variables, but explores a symbolic interactionist approach in explaining one class of feelings, which she calls role-playing emotions. These serve to ratify or discredit either a situational or more enduring identity, but they also have an important role to
play in the service of the larger social system, thereby taking the form of what Shott identifies as "altruistic behavior."

Denzin formulates a situational theory of emotion. An embodied experience, emotion occurs within the context of phenomenological and interactional streams. A person reveals his definition of the situation by the mood he presents. This mood affects the mood of other actors and hence the overall situation. Some moods are in accord with social expectations and some are not, thus exerting great influence on the course of interaction in the encounter.

Kemper sees emotion as physiologically based, with a frequent cognitive component. Emotion is a specific response to power and status aspects of relationships, in particular, to excesses and deficits of these attributes in self and other. Although Kemper rejects the constructionist approach, specific aspects of his theory parallels certain aspects of that approach.

Each theorist emphasizes leads that are foreshadowed by the perspective he or she has adopted. Hochschild emphasizes cultural and structural determination of the stream of emotions generated both in situations and in the macrosociological life of the community; Kemper stresses physiological and structural determinants; Shott turns to cultural and interactional determinants; and Denzin, to psychological, interactional and physiological determinants.
In fact, these theorists complement one another more often than they conflict, a position to be amplified in the final chapter. A brief section has been included at the end of this chapter which calls attention to two schools of thought—ethnomethodology and existential sociology—that diverge rather sharply from the main stream of recent developments in the sociology of emotions. It seems unlikely that these two schools will greatly influence future developments, but that remains a possibility nonetheless.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The present chapter traces the development of a sociology of emotion as reflected in the writings of the various theorists analyzed in the preceding chapters. The study has been organized not only to show how theoretical perspectives have developed but to identify significant continuities and divergencies. Thus, in Chapter II, the early theorists were depicted as providing, almost unwittingly because their attentions were directed elsewhere, a rudimentary sociology of emotion, one that can be abstracted from their more general writings. Chapter III showed how symbolic interactionism has brought emotions into sharper focus. It provided the framework of "the self and social interaction," through which the mechanisms of emotion could be highlighted—even though some of this school's proponents made no effort to deal with emotion to any significant degree. Finally, in Chapter IV, further developments in symbolic interactionism and other sociologies which can be linked to that tradition have been shown to deal increasingly with a sociology of emotion.

In tracing the contributions of these various writers, the present discussion summarizes both the positive
contributions and the deficits of the particular theorists with respect to the problem of emotions. No attempt is made to judge the general stature of each theorist or of clusters of theorists who compose particular schools. The assessment is made in general terms that can be applied broadly to our understanding of the development of a sociology of emotions rather than in the special terms used to evaluate intellectual performances of individuals. Exceptions are made where such evaluations seem particularly important for general understanding.

A Sociology of Emotion Implied in Early Works

Emotion was not totally ignored by the early theorists, yet it did not receive sustained attention. This deficiency was manifested in various ways. For example, emotion was not treated systematically, with the result that one cannot find an enunciation of principles dealing with the ways in which emotion occurs in social life. There is an absence of classifications of such emotions, nor is an effort made to articulate relationships among emotions and other aspects of human and social action. Where hints at a correction of these lacunae occur, they are left in an undeveloped state.

Quite typically of these theorists as a group, emotion was often implied, or at best casually mentioned from time to time. Lack of systematic treatment is relevant here:
when emotion is mentioned in one context, one has to assume that it is operating in another context in which it is not mentioned. Where emotion is mentioned repeatedly, it remains undefined, a primitive concept: Durkheim's works may be cited here. Emotion is indeed dealt with in a general way, as a general mode of action; but the principles that might be isolated and described are not sufficiently developed to meet the requirements of even lower levels of generality. Weber does little better. Simmel also failed to articulate different levels of generality, but in an opposite direction: his analyses of emotions in delimited contexts are not universalized to form more generic concepts and principles. Parsons moves the discussion a little further in the direction of "principled theory," but in fact enters a realm of rather cloudy abstraction.

Except for Simmel, the earlier writers in sociology most often dealt with emotion in macrocosm. Similarly, emotion was seen overwhelmingly as a rather static "social fact" rather than an ongoing process of life. Viewed as products rather than processes, emotions can be most easily placed in macro-social aggregates. Again, Simmel stands apart as an exception because he used interaction as his perspective.

The relationship between the individual and society provides an important departure point for a sociology of
emotion. Again, for the most part the early theorists specify that relationship in a general way, with the exact mechanisms excluded. As in Durkheim, the relationship between emotional and nonemotional elements is often implicit or poorly spelled out. The relationship between emotion and irrationality is specified in a rather imprecise or contradictory way; Weber, for example, sees both rational and irrational emotion, but fails to use that distinction consistently. Finally, partly because of this long-range, out-of-focus perception of emotion, a much stronger emphasis on rationality has contributed in a reflexive way to the underemphasis on emotion itself. The early theorists are examined individually below.

Durkheim

For all their shortcomings, none of the important early writers came up empty-handed on the topic of emotion. Thus, even with his limitations Durkheim can be shown to have made an important contribution in this regard. He perceived individuals to have emotions that can spring either from their own natures or from societal influences. He posited a connection between emotion and cognition, and showed that emotions can operate as a means of social control. He saw in the key social sentiments not only a deep sense of respect for society but also a more instrumental factor: that this respect and the conformity it entails
contributes to one's happiness and well-being, if not to
the sustenance of life itself. In Durkheim's view, society
regulates the individual's emotional life, but this regu-
lation is variable. Social regulation of emotions can
contribute to emotional well-being or what might be called
a positive emotional tone.

Society, for Durkheim, provides rules for the manage-
ment of public emotion, with specific techniques, or
rituals, of management. Society also provides methods and
rules for the release of private emotion. The case of
mourning shows how both public and private emotions are
managed, to the benefit of the individual. Finally, he
wrote of the effects of macro-social and historical trends
on emotional tone; the example of individualism is illus-
trative of the genesis of increased rates of egoistic
suicide.

Despite his remarkable outline of a general sociology,
by no means ignoring "sentiments," his contribution to a
sociology of emotion must be assessed as limited. For one
thing, he used sentiment as a primitive concept. He failed
to specify the mechanisms that make possible the relation-
ship between the individual and society. He frequently
implied the existence of emotion in a particular context;
and where he was more explicit, he was typically imprecise
as to how it functioned in that context.
Durkheim implied a connection between emotion and cognition, but did not attempt to specify the nature of that connection. In one context, cognition appears to underlie emotion; in another, the opposite relationship is implicit; in still a third, the two are mixed in varying ratios, as in behavioral responses to symbols. As a result, one cannot be certain what Durkheim's intent is, if in fact he has a more specific, though tacit, intent. He is also vague in specifying the difference and relationship between individual and collective sentiments. He is particularly vague in his conception of collective sentiments—except that he notes that they are pervasive, specific, and intense—and of how individual sentiments are transformed into them, or vice versa.

Durkheim saw the individual as individual in emotional terms, and the individual in his social aspect in more rational or intellectual terms: an untenable dichotomy, particularly because the author also viewed personality types and moral orders in a corresponding division. He viewed emotion as a social "fact," precluding at least in his own work an examination of emotion as social or personal process. Asserting that collective sentiments are differentially involved in different types of social control, he fails to specify why, or to specify the types of sentiments involved in each case.
Durkheim simply did not deal with emotion in an interactional context. Like Simmel, he used analyses of specific contexts but failed to generalize on emotion to broader principles; unlike Simmel, he generalized, and brilliantly, but *not* about emotion. Durkheim spoke about kinds of sentiments only in very general terms, such as the sacred, giving no clues as to how sentiments might be typed or at least ordered. Finally, Durkheim made much of his contention that society regulates the individual's emotions—and for the latter's good—but begged the question of why society also fails to regulate those emotions. In effect, he espoused a tautologous view of man and society that anticipates the views of Parsons half a century later.

*Weber*

Weber observed rationalization as a trend in modern society. He explicitly acknowledged emotion as a possible component in all action, and explicitly recognized a locus of emotion in individuals, regardless of how that emotion is used socially; this is distinct from the vaguer notion of social sentiment used by Durkheim. Weber provided a typology of action in which emotion shades into other types besides affective action. Further, he specified at least some of the criteria by which to differentiate a range of emotions that does not fall within the ideal type of the affective.
Weber endowed social structure with the meaning that the individual gives it through action. Since emotion is one of the principles on which action can rest, man finds meaning in part through feeling, and likewise vests meaning in social structures through feeling. Thus, relationships, authority, and other social structures can have unique and heightened meaning through feeling, such as charismatic authority. Finally, Weber distinguished between rational and irrational emotion.

On the deficit side, Weber did not come to terms with the limits of rationality. Trapped in a conceptual cage of his own creation, he proposed emotion as a general principle but failed to pursue it systematically. Thus charisma becomes the equivalent of an oasis in a desert of rationality; correctly, he saw that desert as a trend in social reality, but incorrectly he overemphasized it. Noting the predominance of emotion-laden traditional action in everyday life, he still chose to emphasize rational action in his ideal types.

Weber failed also to confront the question why suppression of emotion leads to the misemotion of despair. The unanswered question remains: whether the fault lies in (1) suppression of emotion by society as an inappropriate mechanism or (2) the inability of individuals to compensate for suppression. As for the latter, it would appear that
masses of people do indeed find more than disenchantment in contemporary bureaucratic careers.

Simmel

Making his modest contributions to a sociology of emotion, Simmel showed how special roles can be created and used for the handling of emotions; one case is that of the stranger. Simmel's clever examples of how one's grasp of the situation shapes emotion include the state of what later became known as relative deprivation. Some types of social organization mold emotion because of their formal properties, he held, among them group size and the metropolis. He asserted that both individuals and the interaction process contribute to emotion.

For Simmel, different emotions have differing degrees of sociological significance. For example, he contrasted envy with jealousy and faithfulness with gratitude. He analyzed a number of different emotions and showed how emotions can be used to serve certain goals— for example to set one apart, to achieve superiority or enhance self-esteem, or to establish similarity. An emotion can be the goal of some actions, as where persons nurture secrets to establish a sense of superiority. In Simmel's view, too, negative emotions can be functional for individuals or groups. Most importantly, he observed how emotions occur
"up close" in social interaction, taking major strides in the direction of microsociology.

On the deficit side, Simmel lacked a basic conception of emotion. Even though he analyzed examples of emotion, the concept of emotion itself remained a primitive, undefined concept. The results of analyses of particular emotions did not coalesce into a general sociological theory of emotions, nor did the author follow his analyses of special roles and types, including that of the stranger, to develop a general conception of emotion management.

Parsons

Parsons, like Weber, included emotion as one of the bases of action. But Parsons saw the cathetic, along with the cognitive and evaluative, as basic to the personality, social, and cultural action systems. A linkage connected emotion and cognition in the expectations that an individual has of himself or of others. Parsons also maintained that emotional gratification was an important part of the socialization process; he distinguished between emotions that are self-oriented (need-dispositions) and those that are other and socially oriented (sentiments); he viewed society as providing rules for emotion management through the pattern variable affectivity-neutrality—or gratification vs. delay; and made a start toward
classifying the emotions in the context of his pattern variables and need-dispositions.

On the deficit side, Parsons had an oversocialized conception of the individual. This amounted to a tautology since, like Durkheim, Parsons begged the question of how the individual comes to have such a close correspondence to society's expectations. The emotion of alienation, a need-disposition, became an emergency explanation for non-conformity; the predominant view of the individual became a conformist view. While Parsons considered socialization as important, he was vague about the nature of the socialization process, or internalization. This is all the more significant, since he considered emotional gratification to be an important part of the process.

Parsons appears for all his magnificent effort to systematize, to be unsystematic in his treatment of emotions. His cross-classification of pattern variables fails to provide enough "cells" with which to sort out different emotions that are identical in some respects—for example, love and pleasure as affective-diffuse emotions. Clearly, there are not enough criteria with which to pull off this differentiation in either an inductive or deductive way. One reason may be that the pattern variable affectivity-neutrality is likely an oversimplified view of emotion management rules. Finally, Parson's view of the link between emotion and cognition is not sufficiently explicit;
for two elements to be so "intimately" linked as Parsons maintains, closer scrutiny would be more appropriate.

Parsons' general action system puts the emphasis on analysis of social action in terms of the four systems perspectives of organism, personality, society, and culture. One use of Parsons' action system approach in the analysis of emotions has been suggested by Averill (1), rather than by Parsons himself. In this approach, it is proposed that a given action by an actor--individual or collectivity--involves some aspect of Parsons' four systems. For example, in the experiencing and expression of an emotion, the organism is involved in physiological arousal, the personality in feelings experienced, the social system in the outward expression and responses from others it elicits, and the cultural system in the norms for feeling and expression. This in no way implies, as Parsons does, that the physiological or psychological response must match the dictates of the social or cultural systems, only that elements are operating on the four levels. This looks like a useful extension of Parsons' analysis for a sociology of emotion.

More Explicit Attention to Emotion in Symbolic Interactionism

The four theorists discussed in Chapter II made contributions to a sociology of emotion even though emotion was far from being their primary preoccupation. Among
those contributions were an improved understanding and interest in particular emotions, a view of emotion as a basic ingredient in human action, some methods of emotion management, some notions of social control through emotion, some criteria by which emotions can be classified socio-logically and otherwise, and some commentary about macro-social and historical trends associated with certain emotions.

The writings of these theorists leave gaps, however, including these: (1) failure to define emotion generically, (2) failure to classify various emotions systematically, (3) failure to specify adequately the linkage between emotion and other components of action—notably cognition, (4) failure to specify systematically the rules for emotion management or to identify very clearly this general area of concern, (5) failure to specify systematically the roles involved in emotion management, (6) failure to examine the micro-social aspects of emotion (Simmel excepted), and (7) failure to examine those processes within the individual or the interactional encounters by which he develops emotional responses to social situations.

Symbolic interactionism has provided some answers to some of these unanswered questions. Concerned with the micro-social and intrapsychic aspects of social life, this sociological school has focused on the subjective aspects
of interaction. Beginning with Mead, and continuing with Blumer, symbolic interactionism's treatment of emotion at first struck an inauspicious note. The framework provided by these two authors, however, did offer a framework for the sociological study of emotion: emotion as a function of the definition of the situation. Writers like Cooley supplied very explicit treatment of sentiment as an innate attribute of individuals, with further shaping by the social context of interaction. Gerth and Mills formulated a number of propositions on the management of surface and deeper emotions, as did Goffman. Turner provided an alternative perspective on rules of emotion management.

With Mead's concepts of role-taking and the generalized other, symbolic interactionism found the tools for understanding the interactive and developmental link between the individual and society. Like Weber and Durkheim, Mead and Blumer saw the importance of the symbolic environment: that man, in defining his situations, does not respond in a simple stimulus-response manner; his symbolic interpretation becomes an intervening variable that is indispensable. Being reflexive, man is depicted as evaluating the feedback on his own responses; that evaluation has an implicitly hedonic quality; and emotion therefore becomes an implicit aspect of symbolic interactionism. Again within this framework, emotion terms are themselves symbols; hence there is much room for the development of
emotions and of emotions about emotions. In the end one can develop a vocabulary of emotions (Gerth and Mills) and address it within a symbolic interactionist framework.

Unlike the early theorists, who stressed the more enduring aspects of personality and culture, the symbolic interactionists stressed the self in social interaction. This approach accounts for their inclusion within the grouping of "everyday life" sociologies. To the extent that symbolic interactionism deals with emotion, this everyday approach forced theory to view emotion in a different light. Emotion became something more than a product of the cumulative socialization of the individual; it emerged as an ever-changing aspect of an ever-changing interchange between the self and the social environment.

Symbolic interactionism, as codified by Blumer, conceptualized the individual as being subject to the definitions or expectations of others or of the social structure, but equally capable of bringing his influence to bear on the situation: he is molded by and molds the situation. While Blumer did not emphasize emotion, this assumption about the individual left ample room for other symbolic interactionists to fill the vacuum. Gerth and Mills offered a number of propositions, including the attribution of feelings to others, genuine and spurious gestures to influence others, and stage actors distancing themselves from their roles. Goffman dealt extensively with how
individuals present surface emotions to influence others; this seems consistent with a little-appreciated aspect of Cooley's looking-glass self. The insight that emotion is a resource that can be used to shape a situation was recognized by Turner; his conception of the impulsive orientation shows how individuals develop their own definitions from myriad cues of how emotion should be handled.

With this situationist perspective, symbolic interactionism provides a new ontology that may unleash a new epistemology for examining emotion. By examining emotion "up close" rather than in the abstract, it becomes possible to grasp the kaleidoscopic nature of emotional interaction.

Some theoretical developments have been particularly fruitful. The insistence on definitions of the situation is consistent with the findings of psychology on cognitions and emotions. Language has been stressed by this school as few previous theorists have stressed it. The proactive nature of Mead's "I" and Cooley's "self" anticipated later writers who discussed how the person uses his emotions both to incorporate and to influence others.

Cooley's emphasis on sentiment and self-feeling amounts to an almost anomalous exception to sociology's early neglect of emotion. He provides a generic definition of emotion, as do Gerth and Mills. All three authors are in agreement that there are two classes of emotion--innate and socialized emotions--and that the latter develop from
the former through the reflexive process of socialization; the latter include the former as part of their referents.

The nature of social organization assumes increasing importance in the symbolic interactionist framework. Mead's conception of role--basically cognitive in nature--becomes a structural conception as well in the sociological eye of Blumer. Thus, Gerth and Mills provide definitions of role and institution that permit the use of emotion as a mechanism for articulating the individual and society. Cooley's conception of the primary group not only provides dimensions for analyzing social structure, but issues propositions about the genesis and displacement of a certain class of sentiments, the so-called primary ideals. Cooley thus locates the genesis of important emotions in certain sectors of the social structure.

More than their predecessors, symbolic interactionists analyzed specific emotions. For Cooley, love became the most important emotion sociologically; he saw its functional significance as increasing historically, an idea that has been developed by subsequent writers. He contrasted the emotions of pride and vanity--the latter being unstable, implying a continuum of dependence on others that is never explored systematically. Goffman analyzed embarrassment as well as the qualities of poise and tact, the latter two being means of handling the former. Even
so, this group of theorists analyzed relatively few specific emotions, and made no attempt to classify them.

The creation and popularization of the concept of "definition of the situation" set the stage for a more pointed study of rules for emotion management. Blumer's view of the individual gives root to the idea of influencing others' expectations of one's own emotions. Gerth and Mills maintained that most emotional gestures are determined by the social structure, and that role influences physiology. They pointed to two important aspects of emotion, but gave a rather one-sided view of its genesis. Goffman, on the other hand, indicated that the individual can insulate private emotions from those presented publicly. This he does because every situation has its rules. However, Goffman allowed not only for this internal rebellion, or separate life, through dichotomizing, but for a more external rebellion through role distancing. In general, most situations are acted out in such a way as to avoid the emotion of embarrassment.

Symbolic interactionism has, in general, made contributions to a sociology of emotion that complements the contributions of the earlier theorists. Some of the later theorists were simply more explicit about the subject of emotion. Still, one can note deficiencies in this approach. For one thing, the cognitive emphasis of Mead and Blumer has hampered the sociological analysis of
emotion even as it has implicitly sanctioned it. The ambiguities of Mead's concepts of I and me impair the vision of how emotion is formed and transformed in the self. The me feels in a physiological sense, and the I knows it but the I seems at least potentially, to be remarkably capable of distance from this somatic activity. Surface emotions are stressed, to the neglect of the more general deeper emotions. Mead's concept of role tends to emphasize cognitive more than the structural considerations.

For all the potential connections between emotion and cognition, these connections remain vague for the symbolic interactionists. This group, like its forerunners, did not adequately classify the emotions. Inadequacy also characterized the study of the process aspects of emotion in interaction—a flaw whose correction seems to have been promised in the more general theory. Finally, regarding the relationship between social and private emotion, one could hope that much more will be discovered as new understanding of emotion management emerge.

Specific and Explicit Attention Toward Developing a Theoretical Approach to a Sociology of Emotion by Recent Sociologists

In the past decade, a few writers have addressed themselves to a sociology of emotion in a more explicit way. These include most notably Hochschild, Shott, Denzin and Kemper.
Hochschild attempted to map out the field of sociology of emotion as such (4). In doing this, she laid the foundations in two ways: she attempted to delineate a model of the actor that would be most conducive, in her mind, to a productive analysis of emotion; and she specified at least three principal dimensions of social contexts within which emotion can be observed. Her emphasis is primarily macro-social, but she also tries to include a micro-social perspective of interaction situations. An effort to enlarge an essentially symbolic interactionist approach to the study of emotions to a micro level is itself an important development.

The model of the actor focuses on conscious feeling as a third position between the unconscious actor of Freud and the conscious thinking interacter of Goffman. This sentient actor is both conscious and feeling; a position which does not deny the world of unconscious affect or the area of conscious thinking. The actor is capable of doing conscious emotion management that can lead to a shaping of emotion and expression in terms of feeling rules, providing a connection between the sentient actor with the macro level of feeling rules and social structure. The virtue of her model of the actor is that it allows her to pursue the problem of emotions in an eclectic fashion. This virtue cannot be stressed too much, in a field that is surely still in its infancy and can therefore use whatever
theoretical inspiration it can find. It is noteworthy, therefore, that a cornerstone of her model comes from the symbolic interactionist Goffman.

Hochschild continues her attempt at a heuristic depiction of the study of emotions in laying down the dimensions of socio-historical and situational contexts within which emotions are observed to occur. These dimensions are the normative, expressive, and political dimensions. The first refers to the rules for feeling and managing emotions, the second to interpretation of emotions as they are expressed voluntarily or involuntarily, and the third to the use of emotion in relationship to others having greater or lesser power than oneself.

Hochschild makes no claim that these three dimensions are exhaustive as guides for the theoretical "excavation" of emotions in social life. Nor are they mutually exclusive. For example, the expression of emotion in a power hierarchy may very well involve normative elements as well. Thus, a conflict theorist would say that power-holders have control over the norms governing emotions. The point is that Hochschild has taken theoretical statements from earlier sociologists—notably Durkheim's observations about the rules for emotions in rituals--and generalized them to a higher level applicable to a sociology of emotion generally. In similar fashion, she has taken from the symbolic interactionist perspective the notion of labeling
emotions and made of it a more general dimension of the expressive and interpretive. Each of the three dimensions can be traced to concepts or dimensions of higher levels of abstraction in sociological theories: norms, power, definitions of the situation.

Since Hochschild's three dimensions are not exhaustive, one wonders whether other dimensions might be inferred from existing sociological theories. One strategy might be to look at specific theories to see if additions to Hochschild's dimensions are needed, and what they would be. It has already been suggested that Parsons' four-system scheme might serve as a heuristic model for emotions (1). Here Hochschild's normative dimension fits into or corresponds with Parsons' cultural system; her political dimension with the social system; and her expressive dimension with Parsons' cultural and personality system. Each of Parsons' dimensions might conceivably require additional components; for instance, emotion rules for status and power relationships as formulated by Kemper add specificity to Hochschild's general outline of the normative dimension. Another theoretical possibility is to pursue actions rather than action systems. Weber's distinctions among action, relationships, and various aspects of social structure may conceivably serve to delineate different ways in which emotion operates sociologically in each of these contexts. All of this is by way of pointing
up some plausible possibilities for the extension of Hochschild's dimensional analysis.

Hochschild's eclecticism has led to more equal stress upon flexible situationism and stable structurism within society and the personality, just as it stresses surface and deeper emotions equally. This both squares with and enhances thinking in the sociological mainstream, and it calls attention to an important benefit of any more systematic sociology of emotion: the development of a useful sociology of emotion should not only throw light on human emotional life as it is molded by social interaction, but also on the more general process of social interaction itself.

Shott's approach to a sociology of emotion is less comprehensive than Hochschild's. Shott's thinking falls within a specific social-psychological niche, that of the personality and social system in Parsons' action system scheme. She clearly acknowledges the delimitations of her analysis.

Her stand centers around the sociological significance of specific emotions. A key point is that certain emotions, the "role-playing emotions," function as means of social control. Emotions such as guilt, shame and embarrassment serve in the cause of self-control, and she finds their effectiveness powerful in this regard. Her's may seem like an analysis of minor scope, but its
implications are important: detailed analysis of a major mechanism of social control may prove to be no less than a strategic research site for examination of the Hobbesian problem of order. Moreover, like Hochschild, her analysis encompasses several situation-linked emotions—such as embarrassment—to be contrasted with several more enduring ones—such as guilt.

Denzin attempted to develop a constructionist theory of emotions. Zeroing-in on secondary emotive experience—thoughts about feelings—he places emotion into the reflexive framework of symbolic interactionism. His approach envisions a dialectic process between two systems, the personality and social systems; specifically there is a phenomenological inner stream and an interactional overt stream, each influencing the other. Depending upon one's subjective attitude, one interacts either "with" or "at" the other actors. Subjective states of individuals thus mold objective states of inter-actors and these latter establish emotional tones that have a somewhat independent life, feeding back into the original subjective states. Cooley might have guessed as much, but he did not create the complete conceptual apparatus to make this insight explicit.

Denzin might be construed as conceiving of emotion as solely a function of subjective interpretation. However, the steady interplay with the interactional stream
indicates that both subjective and objective factors play a role, that the objective can influence the subjective as well as the subjective operating on its own.

By contrast with this view, Kemper sees objective conditions, very specifically in the form of status and power dimensions of social structure, as exerting the major influence on the stream of emotions in the person's daily life. In the language of systems, Kemper emphasizes both social and organismic dimensions. The result is a theory that claims to predict specific emotions on the basis of specific social structural constellations of power and status. Situational emotional responses are determined by these objective constellations. Insofar as norms operate to establish status and power relationships, or designate the rights and obligations of power and status, or assign status values to objects and situations, such norms may vary from culture to culture. But once status and power dimensions are clarified, the emotional responses of actors in interaction will occur according to the universal "positivistic" principles that Kemper outlines. Thus, certain psychological and cultural elements are excluded as critical factors in accounting for emotions. If a person has limited power in a situation, for example, and is at the mercy of another person who may wield his power in an unpredictable manner, the probabilities are that the subordinate person will feel certain rather specific emotions,
feelings that are pancultural and transhistorical in nature. They involve body reactions whose labels may vary, but whose underlying patterns are universal.

A Sociology of Emotions: Present Status and Prospects

Just as Comte is credited with founding sociology not only by giving the field a name and delineating its role among the other sciences, a sociology of emotion now exists not only because it has a name but because its responsibilities have been delineated in at least an initial manner, and one not without promise. For this, primary credit must be given to Hochschild. Having designated at least some of the social dimensions within which emotion can occur and offering compelling examples, sociologists can proceed with "the excavation." Data from diverse sources must be gleaned from small groups as well as large organizations, with an idea to historical continuities.

Obtaining data pertaining to sociological dimensions of emotion is just one of the tasks of a sociology of emotion. Another task is the continuing examination of the properties of these dimensions, as mentioned in the reprise on Hochschild above. A third task is the continuing inquiry into propositions about emotion developed by earlier and contemporary theorists—particularly those formulated by the former and neither acknowledged nor explored by the latter. For example, Durkheim's assertion that collective
sentiments vary from deep, powerful and long-lasting ones to shallow and relatively weak ones does not seem to have been followed up by contemporary writers.

Other tasks remain. One is the relative importance of the psychological and the social in the generation of emotions. Durkheim's distinction between individual and social sentiments may be an important one because it allows for varying causal routes. Both Durkheim and Simmel acknowledged the dialectic relationship between the individual and society, that individual emotions exist in their own right. This viewpoint tends to get lost in mainstream sociological thinking as it did in the work of Parsons. If nothing else, the ethnomethodologist and existential sociologist may exert a corrective influence here, in their stress on the individual as creator of both emotional and cognitive meaning. One perspective that takes the individual into account as both originator and internalizer of society's dictates is supplied by Berger and Luckmann (2), who envision a cycle starting with externalization of individual creation, societal legitimation, and internalization by others. Related to this issue is the idea that emotions vary in the degree to which they are sociologically significant, a point stressed by Simmel. Just what he meant by this assertion gains clarity only for specific emotions, however, not for groups of emotions or emotions in general. It remains necessary to tease out underlying
characteristics and pursue their logical implications in a taxonomy of emotions.

One area that a sociology of emotions has ignored so far is what might be called the sociology of mis-emotions. The classical theorists--Durkheim, Weber and Simmel--each had a master theory for at least one mis-emotion, such as despair or the subjective counterpart of anomie. Mis-emotion generally is relegated to a sociology of mental illness, or to a residual category linked to social disorganization, which somehow one senses does not "belong" to "normal" sociology. But as Durkheim pointed out, deviance can be as useful in illustrating the workings of society as conformity. It is not without its functioning. A comprehensive sociology of emotion must therefore have an account of all emotions, whoever experiences them. The mis-emotions of the mentally ill, the alienated, the anomic, and the disenchanted are not to be prejudged as less sociological than anybody else's emotions.

A sociology of emotions, so informed as to the workings of the entire range of emotions, can also be a valuable clinical tool in serving individual and collective clients. A clinical sociologist so equipped should be able to assess the influence of a variety of influences in generating a problem emotion or emotions, as well as to prescribe an intervention tailored to the needs of the particular client (3). Such sociology of emotion can thus
become not only a body of detached theory, but also a body of applied and "applicable" knowledge.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


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