COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC POLICING PRACTICES

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It is assumed that democratic policing will help to improve the respect of human rights and democracy in a given country. Using secondary data, this study explores cross-nationally the interrelation between democratic policing practices (e.g., community policing) and democracy and human rights.

The results show significant positive correlation between the practice of democratic policing and indicators of democracy and respect for human rights. The analysis strongly implies that scholars have underestimated the power of policing institutions in democratic societies.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Forthcoming Chapters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF POLICING</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is Democracy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of Democracy and Human Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratizing Police for Better Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition in Policing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Conceptualization of Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement of Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability and Validity of Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Conceptualization of Democratic Policing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement of Democratic Policing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability and Validity of Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Tabulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Conceptualization of Human Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability and Validity of Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalizability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Definitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Democratic Policing Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Ratings in Selected Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratings of Democratic Policing Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and Discussion of Cross Tabulations of Variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS……………………………………77

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………86
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1. Beetham’s Democracy Pyramid</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2. Correlation Between Democracy and Democratic Policing</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Centralization)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3. Correlation Between Democracy and Democratic Policing</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Decentralization)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Title                                                                 Page

Tables

Table 1. Comparative Measures of Freedom (Inverted).................................62

Table 2. The Content Analysis of the Democratic Policing
Practices of 15 Countries.................................................................64

Table 3. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to
Centralization and Decentralization of Police Organization..................68

Table 4. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to
Community Policing and P-OP.........................................................69

Table 5. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Presence of Ombudsman and Legislative, Executive, or
Judicial Oversight...............................................................70

Table 6. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Presence of Civilian Complaint Boards and Civilian Oversight
by NGOs..........................................................71

Table 7. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Presence of Internal Police Control and Effective
Disciplinary Structure............................................................72

Table 8. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Advanced Technology Use for Investigations of Crime.........................72

Table 9. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Presence of the Trade Unions in the Police Organization......................73

Table 10. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Presence of the Use of Force and Human Rights Training
In the Police Organization...................................................75

Table 11. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the
Transparency of Police Operations to the Media................................76
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In policing, there are several dilemmas that arise from allowing certain individuals the absolute power to enforce the law. The most common dilemma arises from the need to respect the individual arrestee’s rights while ensuring the safety of the greater community (Sherman, 1974 & 1978). It is the peace officer’s duty to follow the rules while enforcing the law. The police are trying to discover ways to maintain an appropriate balance between governing others and controlling themselves (Skolnick, 1966; Harrison, 1999). When police are confronted with the crime, they must think rationally, carefully balancing the individual rights of the offender against the peace of the community (Bayley, 1985).

Democratic policing is an important initiative in recent decades to transform police organizations to better balance governing and self-control. Democratic policing refers “the police respect due process rights, do not discriminate unjustifiably in law enforcement practices, and follow priorities which are in the line with popular sentiment where this is clear, or which discreetly balance contending priorities in a divided community” (Reiner, 1992 in Marenin 2000; Kratcoski, 2000; Waddington, 1999).

However, transforming police into better and more self-controlled governors many require more than mere organizational tinkering. Democratic policing is no panacea for the ills of police in society. Of course, there is little that reform of the police can accomplish on its own to bring about democracy, unless a regime is dedicated to become
democratic. Bayley (1977, 1997, & 2001) explained it that the police can weaken democracy or they can strengthen it, but they cannot create it. Most scholars agree with Berkley’s (1969) argument that a police system could not be changed unless the society it serves was changed as well. Consequently, initiatives to change the police are limited by the capacity of the society served.

Analyses of democracy have given little attention to police and policing organization (Marenin, 2000). The reports or data sets on cross national level prepared by both international non-governmental organizations like the Freedom House, Transparency International, and the World Bank as well as governmental agencies like the U.S. State Department, European Commission, and European Parliament are usually compiled using information provided by journalists and the media, reputable scholars, academics, surveys, parliamentary discussions, independent reporters, human rights activists, and so on. They not only focus on the actions of government or parliament, rather they intend to reflect the reality of daily life. It is obvious that these reports and data sets incorporate the daily actions of police, but don’t isolate the role of police in democratic society. However, the political scientists analyzing democracies and relying on those data, as Marenin (2001) indicated, give little attention to police and policing organizations within democracy. In fact, even the wider scholarly groups of human rights theorists have not analyzed the most important and obvious coercive power of state and, consequently, the police, in their discussions of the violations of human rights and dignity (Marenin, 2000; Council of Europe Status Report, 2000).
According to Marenin (2000), this is because the literature has misconceptualized policing and police actions. The impact of policing can be observed by analyzing the nature of the state and its relations with civil society. However, most of the political assistance recommendations that are handed down advocate increased police accountability and a reorganization of the role of police in society. The United Nations Multi Unit Task Force in Bosnia, the European Commission’s Police and Human Rights Program, mainly launched in Eastern European Countries, research program of Vera Institute of Justice, with support from the Ford Foundation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and the United States, and the research on the increase the accountability of police and military in Latin America funded by Macarthur Foundation are the examples of those kind of policies (Sheptycki, 2000; Crawshaw et al., 1998; Bayley, 2001) In addition, the Vera Institute of Justice has been engaged in a survey of police accountability structures and public safety initiatives in several countries that are struggling to consolidate democracy (Stone & Ward, 2000). Also, the European Commission’s Police and Human Rights Program mainly was launched in Eastern European Countries in 1997 for the purpose of reevaluating the role of police in society (Sheptycki, 2000).

Police affect daily life both directly and indirectly in several ways. Police affect life directly by arresting and detaining individual citizens, they also protect certain freedoms of individuals, such as the right to vote and the right to speak freely. Police forces also protect elected officials from violence. Police can also directly influence the
making of public policy by participating in councils of government or by threatening to give or withhold support to the government (Bayley, 1997 & 2001).

Police indirectly affect daily life by socializing the public. Their existence reinforces the legitimacy of the government and its ability to use force to protect the rights of citizens; the police can also serve as an example to society. A police department that operates with fairness and respect for all its employees may encourage its citizens to do the same (Bayley, 1977, 1985, & 1997).

Is democracy compatible with policing? Police are given absolute power to enforce the law. How is this power democratic? It is the duty of police to protect human rights, to ensure the efficacy of certain legal policies and organizations, and to protect certain offices.

Accordingly, this study attempts to analyze the interaction between the police and society within the framework of democracy. Democratic policing is rooted in the theory of democracy (Bayley, 1976 & 1997). Consequently, in order to fully understand the concept of democratic policing, theory, practice and process of democracy have to be known and common areas of democracy must be fully understood, and the commonalities between policing and democracy must be clarified (Das, 2000; Kratcoski, 2000).

Comparative studies of democratic theory clearly indicate that in functioning democracies, the police, political norms, and society are congruent. If disagreements occur, they are resolved by legitimate and established legal and political procedures. But, in transition democracies, where both politics and policing are shifting, there must be resolution without the benefit of established legal and political procedures (Marenin,
It is necessary, then, to study the concepts of democracy and democratization of policing separately. These concepts can then be combined to provide the organizational requisites for democratic policing.

The concept of “democratic policing” recently became used to describe a specific model of policing. Democratic policing is intended to achieve low crime rates, diminished bribery, corruption, brutality, and maximum community satisfaction via problem and community oriented policing. Scholars who advocate democratic policing have identified several tenets that are fundamental to democratic policing, such as the rule of law, accountability to the public, open decision making, minimal use of force, involvement of public in policing, maximum respect for human rights, and internal democracy in the organization (Das, 2000). In order to implement these tenets, many policies have been formulated throughout the course of time. Civilian oversight, unionism, centralization or decentralization, problem oriented and community policing, ombudsman and civilian complaint boards, to use of advanced technology to investigate crime, and increased representation are just a few of the initiatives adopted in the name of democratic policing. However, the practicability of these initiatives in different countries has not yet been argued.

The necessity of these applications in certain democracies has not yet been researched. The implementation of applications such as community policing requires funding beyond the means of many countries. The change to community policing also requires time, which a few police organizations can afford. Other agencies must fundamentally change their organizational structure by moving from centralization to
decentralization. In some cases, a radical change of this nature must be passed through legislation.

Are the massive changes needed to enact democratic policing worth it? For an answer to this question, two other questions must be addressed. First, do democratic policing initiatives help further democratic values? And second, which democratic policing initiative comes closest to reaching the goals of democratic policing?

This study proposes the hypothesis that the level of democratization of a given country’s police force is positively correlated to the level of democracy in a given country. Conversely, a country without democratic institutions is not likely to use democratic policing. However, if democratic institutions are established and stable one can say that by protecting and defending these institutions, police practicing democratic policing will help to continue and stabilize democracy. Beyond these hypotheses, the primary purpose of the thesis is to examine the research that has been done on the effects of democratic policing practices on democracy and policing. More specifically, which applications are the more desirable and applicable, that is, which applications encourage a respect for human rights.

The study was based on a gloss of comparative field studies, the comparative analysis of different types of regimes and their policing structures, previous research findings, secondary data analyses, and the reports of non-governmental organizations, with the assumption that “police could not be more democratic than the society they came from” (Berkley 1969). Furthermore, this study proposes that the police organization itself is not the only organization that will be affected by democratic policing. It is also
expected that other organizations and professions will be affected by the presence of democratic policing.

Many scholars and research organizations agree that there is a positive correlation between democracy and democratic policing. However, little if any research has been done precisely measure this correlation and define the best-suited and most promising applications in general.

**Overview of the Forthcoming Chapters**

This thesis is comprised of five chapters, including this chapter. This chapter has served to introduce the basic concepts of democracy and democratic policing as well as their possible relationship to one another. It has also served to outline the overall purpose of this thesis and the importance of this study.

Chapter II will include a literature review of democratic theory and the concept and variables of democratic policing. Furthermore, it will cover the effects of democracy and democratic policing. Finally, the variables, however immeasurable, that promote democratic policing and democracy will be discussed.

Chapter III will discuss the methodology used for this research. The concept and the data of measuring “democracy” and “democratic policing” in comparative policing organizational structures will be discussed, and the overall methodology that is used for this research was analyzed. Chapter III will also include definitions and discussions of key terms.
Chapter IV is devoted to the analyses of the democratization of societies and democratization of policing. These two analyses will then be combined together, and the quantitative results will be cross-tabulated.

The final chapter will be a discussion of conclusions and recommendations. I will discuss how the results presented in chapter IV can be converted into sound policy and intelligent implementations to promote better policing.
CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF POLICING

What is Democracy?

The minimalist definition of democracy can be found in the worlds of Herodotus. He defined democracy from the Greek meaning of the word, stating that democracy is the rule of the people, and a process of selecting governments (Herodotus in Hornblower, 1992). This view, articulated by scholars ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville to Joseph Schumpeter to Robert Dahl, is widely used by social scientists. In this sense, in order to call a country democratic, it must hold competitive, multiparty elections. When public participation in politics is increased, the country is seen as more democratic.

Of course, elections must be open and fair. This openness requires that the freedoms of speech and assembly are protected. However, governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interest, or incapable of adopting policies that benefit the public good (Huntington, 1993). Those governments can still be called democratic, but they are not desirable. It is more desirable for a democratic country to guarantee a comprehensive list of social, political, economic and religious rights. It is then that democracy is fully realized.

An individual’s autonomy, dignity and freedom from coercion has to be protected. This protection can only be achieved through constitutional liberalism, which is designed to defend the individual’s right to life, property, and freedom of religion and speech. To secure these rights, the constitution must provide checks on the power of each
branch of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and the separation of religion and state (Dunn, 1992; Donnelly, 1998). Starting with Thomas Hobbes, and moving forward to John Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson, constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural inalienable rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, which secure them (Zakaria, 1997). From this meaning, de Tocqueville (2000) warned that “the tyranny of the majority” (the absolute sovereignty and power of majority) provided by democracy has to be supported by constitutional liberalism in order to make the democracy desirable. Otherwise, democracies may facilitate the abuse of human rights, contrary to the basic principles of democracy. This is the case with too many of democracies in the world today (Diamond, 1992).

On the one hand, what we expect democracy to be is broadly defined by Joseph Schumpeter (1947). He simply characterized democracy as a political method, a mechanism for choosing political leadership (Schumpeter, 1947). People choose politicians from a pool of competitive political leaders who compete for their votes. Then, until the next elections, decisions are made by those chosen people. At the next election, if people are not satisfied, they can choose to replace those officials.

On the other hand, Beetham (1999) explained democracy more narrowly. He combined the insights of the liberal and Marxist traditions in order to arrive at a definition of democracy that supports the basic principle of autonomy. His definition has three parts. First, he foresees substantial participation in local community institutions as well as the self-management of cooperatively owned enterprises. Second, he calls for a
bill of rights that goes beyond the right to vote, providing equal opportunity for participation. The third part provides for social and economic rights to ensure adequate resources for democratic autonomy. Thus, democracy, by this definition, requires both a high degree of accountability from the state as well as a democratic reordering of civil society.

A consideration of these narrow and broad definitions makes it abundantly clear that democracy is a political system. Beyond this, however democracy is also a specific social and economic system. In the first part of this study, democracy will be looked at experimentally. The primary concern here is government and governmental institutions. However, while explaining democratic policing in the second part, both the narrow and broad definitions of democracy must be used. It is better to discuss the broad definition first, expanding upon it while explaining democratic policing.

The best definition in this sense comes from Robert Dahl (1971). More than a definition of democracy, he outlines the tenets that are vital for democracy. He emphasizes the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, who are characterized as political equals. Citizens must have the opportunity to;

- Formulate their preferences;
- Show their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action;
- Have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government (Dahl in Sorensen, 1998).
Sorensen indicated that these three opportunities couldn’t be guaranteed automatically. They depend on certain institutional guarantees. Those guarantees shape the democracy of a society and they all must exist for a government to be classified as democracy (Sorensen, 1998).

Dahl outlines eight institutions, which are necessary to guarantee these opportunities:

1. Elected Officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

2. Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

3. Inclusive suffrage. Practically, all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

4. Right to run for office. Practically, all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for suffrage.

5. Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.

6. Alternative sources of information. Citizens have a right to seek out the alternative sources of information that exist and they are protected by laws.
7. Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1971).

8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Sorensen, 1998).

Most political scientists put these eight requisites for democracy into three main categories: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. Competition describes the popular election of the parliament or legislature and the head of government. The extent of popular control can be divided into many sub-categories to explain and to argue its meaning. For instance, popular control may be characterized by the degree of fairness between parties; independence from the current government; inclusiveness with no formal or informal exception in terms of any parties, candidates or voters (Dahl, 1971; Sorensen, 1998).

Participation describes an open and accountable government. Accountability is also multidimensional, and can be broken down to political, legal and financial accountability; accountability directly to the electorate, through the public justification for its policies; or indirectly to agents acting on behalf of the people. Accountability depends upon public knowledge of what the government is doing from sources that are independent of its own public relations organizations (Sorensen, 1998). Along these lines, an independent and democratic oversight body is needed to assess the power and independence, both legal and actual, of different governmental bodies. In addition all those accountability issue, “openness” refers to the governments responsiveness to public
opinion through a systematic process of consultation with relevant interest groups and organized citizen groups (Dahl, 1971; Beetham, 1999; Sorensen, 1998).

The third category covers all civil and political liberties (Sorensen, 1998, Dahl, 1971). Those describe guaranteed civil and political rights and liberties such as freedom of speech, association, assembly and movement, the rights to due legal process, et cetera. Without those, one cannot mention popular control over government. These rights and liberties are necessary if citizens are to communicate and associate with one another independently of government, and if they are to express dissent from government or to influence it on an ongoing basis (Beetham, 1999). Essentially, if all requisites indicated above are present at a meaningful level, civil and political liberties will be protected.

Competition, participation, and civil and political liberties are the essential categories that characterize democracy. Many social and political scientists agree that it is necessary to have a society that responds to all three. It would then be a “civil society”, a nexus of associations through which people organize independently to manage their own affairs. This nexus could also act as a channel of influence upon government, and a check on its powers. This would be society that believes democracy is its fundamental tenet (Diamond, 1992; Lipset, 1959 & 1960; Dunn, 1992; Beetham, 1999). All disagreements, all requests, all demands occur in society or come from society or are directed to society. All theories of social science that intend to explain democracy, can only explain it using civil society as a reference, including theories of culture, education, tolerance of diversity, religion, media, and so forth.
Beetham explains democracy with a pyramid (Figure 1) to emphasize the requisites needed to form democratic society. From his point of view, the presence of these segments individually is not enough. Political equality in each area is needed in order for a democratic system to exist. Beetham (1999) says that in elections, the equality of each vote and the equality of opportunity to stand for public office, regardless of which section of society a person comes from, are essential. To reiterate, in order to have a fully democratic government, according to the principle of accountability, no individuals or groups should be systematically excluded from their right to participate in the government and no one should be above the law. Furthermore, all people should be secure in their civil and political rights and liberties. An equal opportunity for self-organization, the right to use the media, and a remedy from powerful co-operations are the essential components that complete democratic societies (Beetham, 1999).

Figure 1:
Beetham’s Democracy Pyramid


Concepts of Democracy and Human Rights

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, democracy is not defined simply by its definite prerequisites. Governments that passed the test of democracy in terms of the
guidelines indicated above cannot necessarily be classified as democratic (Vanhanen, 1997). Other additional requirements are absolutely needed. Consequently, measurements of democracy basically count on those requirements. For example, development theory, defines democracy in material terms, noting economic well-being, education, food, and health service. In addition it explains democracy by nonmaterial terms, such as human freedom and dignity, identity, and security (Sorensen, 1998; Arat, 1991; Marx, 1998). Sorensen (1998), like Marx (1999 & 2000), believes that the latter falls under the category of human rights, especially civil and political rights that include prohibitions against torture, the right a fair trail, and freedom of thought, speech, religion, movement and residence.

Literature clearly shows that the relationship between democracy and human rights is basically based on the fact that democracies promote human rights. However, many political scientists like did not agree with this conclusion (Huntington, 1993). The reports of Amnesty International disagree with it as well. Countries like Germany, the U.S., and Denmark have been targeted by Amnesty International for their violations of human rights even though they received the highest scores in all of the democracy indexes. Literature explains that situation with reasons that range from the weakness of leading authority to economic shortcomings caused by the negative effects of democratic transition. However, none of these countries specifically emphasize policing practices that depart from any known theory. The reports prepared both Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department indicate that law enforcement is responsible for a higher proportion of human rights violations in the States, an intensive and specific focus is
evidently needed on law enforcement, on its administration, on its operations and on its control.

At this point, the Freedom House Index, which basically relies on human rights will be useful to help guard against misdetections and will elucidate the connection between democracy and policing.

**Democratizing Police for Better Democracy**

Even though democracy and policing are seen as conflicting terms, in reality they have to be each other’s component. As mentioned in the first chapter, people have more freedom if they are secure in their lives. That is why “social contract” theorists like Rousseau and Locke argued that individuals must agree, as equals, to contract together for their mutual benefit. In return for security and protection they must sacrifice some degree of their freedom (Rousseau, 2000; Locke, 2000). Dahl (1971) accepted this argument and added that this system only works properly in a society in consensus. Maintaining the society in consensus, basically, is the purpose of the legislatures, courts and administrators as they pass laws, make decisions, and implement policies. However, in reality, they are not enough to keep the society in consensus. There are many other institutions that must be established to assist those main powers. One of these supporting institutions the most important one, is the law enforcement system, the agency that is primarily in charge of enforcing the law. Law enforcement authorities act within the framework of the laws made by legislators, the policies implemented by administrators, and the decisions taken by the courts. Accordingly, they are in the middle of this triad, serving each master to keep society in agreement. Once society is in agreement, then
there is true democracy and the preservation of human rights. At its heart, democratic policing attempts to function in this way.

Crawshaw (1998), Das (2000), and Marenin (2000), then, all agree that in democracy, effective policies are those, which can be developed and implemented in a manner that is acceptable to the people affected by the policies. In order for this to happen there needs to be an informed debate within the community. Police contributions to such debates need to be tempered by an awareness of the tendency of some politicians to exploit public concern about “law and order” and criminal justice issues for narrow party political ends. When this occurs, the possibilities for informed debate are diminished and the likelihood of the formulation bad law and ineffective policies correspondingly increased. By making objective, rational and reasonable contributions to the public debate on policing matters, the police promote democratic principles and contribute to effective policy making. (Crawshaw et al., 1998)

Informed public debate is also dependent upon individuals and groups exercising rights essential to the democratic political process. The essential rights include the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to peaceful assembly and association (Crawshaw et al., 1998).

It is a function of police to enable democratic political debate and democratic political activity in accordance with the requirements of representative and accountable government. It is a function of police to play a part in ensuring that the processes of social or political change are constitutional, legal and peaceful. All of this means that when a community, or a part of a community, articulates demands on the political
system, police are to facilitate the transmission of those demands and not to suppress them. When the means or the ends of the government are at odds the rule of law, police are not to serve those means or ends. In this sense police can act as a “conscience of constitutionality” (Crawshaw et al., 1998; Das, 2000; Marenin, 2000)

**Transition in Policing**

On December 17, 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. General Assembly resolution 34/169 by which the Code of Conduct was adopted includes the rule “That, like all agencies of the criminal justice system, every law enforcement agency should be representative of and accountable to the community as a whole.”

On December 23, 1994, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution no. 49/184, which proclaimed the years 1995-2004 as the Decade for Human Rights Education. This proclamation was intended to pave the way for a universal culture of human rights, essentially, educational and training programs on human rights. A large portion of the resolution focused on the training of law enforcement personnel on human rights.

In April 1997, the Council of Europe, Directorate General of Human Rights launched a program entitled “Police and Human Rights 1997-2000.” The goal of the program was for all police officers in forty-one member States of the Council of Europe to acquire a sound knowledge of human rights standards. In particular, the program was intended to teach the human rights principles outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for the prevention of Torture and Inhumane
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Police would be thought skills that would enable them to apply these principles in their daily working practice. The European Council has also recently launched another similar program called “Police and Human Rights-Beyond 2000.”

All of these programs concentrated on human rights issues in policing. Consequently, they were also concerned with the organizational and operational reformations necessary for democratic policing. In fact, all of them also provide grants to police forces that take positive steps toward establishing high universal human rights standards. The programs are generally designed based on the belief among scholars that education and training increase police democratization. Because these programs focus on the importance of education and training, the curriculums of police training schools are carefully evaluated and extreme parts are taken to make sure that teaching procedures are standardized. The programs particularly attempt to ensure proper training on the use of force, firearms, and the decision-making process, as well as training that specially discusses human rights abuses. The scholars who look to maintain human rights in policing are keenly interested in recruitment procedures and police education and training. Even the training of middle and high-ranking police administrators shapes current policing policies in the field (Skolnick & Woodworth, 1967; Goldsmith, 1999 & 2000).

Actions that preserve universally accepted human rights are possible only in a democracy, and they can only be realized through the democratic behaviors of police (Berkley, 1969; Das, 2000; Marenin, 2000; Goldstein, 1977 & 1990). As indicated in the
previous chapter, international organizations, political scientists, and criminal justice scholars are all agree on this point. At the “Theme of Challenges of Policing Democracies” symposium held at the Institute of the Sociology of Law in Spain, without exception, criminal justice scholars and diplomatic representatives from many countries agreed on certain basic criteria that promote democracy in policing. Das collected these criteria into seven categories, namely the rule of law, accountability to the public, the transparency of decision making, popular participation in policing, the minimum use of force, creating an organization that facilitates learning of human rights, and internal democracy in the organization (Das, 2000). After this classification, research has shown that many other social and political scientists supported those criteria by using the same arguments, sometimes supporting their findings with them, and sometimes undertaking further research to support those criteria. All of authors mentioned above were used the same arguments in detail. In fact, the researches conducted by the Vera Institute in 2001 also ran in the same vein (Stone & Ward, 2000).

A look at the literature reveals that the democratic principles inherent in democratic policing, are preserved through controls placed on law enforcement. These controls may take three different forms. First, laws and regulations place controls on police. Secondly, the police administration may place internal control on itself. Lastly, external control may be placed on the police by community. Control, then, plays a vital role in democratization of the police (Skolnick, 1966; Bayley, 1985; Crawshaw et al., 1998).
The primary control system must lay within the police force itself. The police agency exhibits the desire to follow democratic norms in their policies and practices (Berkley, 1969). Police forces must police themselves because they are the only ones who can discharge this task effectively (Berkley, 1969; Goldstein, 1977; Bayley, 1985). Furthermore the internal capacity of police investigatory units has to reflect numerically the size of the problem and the seize of the organization (Goldstein 1977). According to Berkley (1969), the internal control systems of democratic police forces should present three basic qualities:

Impartial and efficient work that deals with infractions promptly and rigorously. Punishments should be fair and proportionate while safeguarding the rights of the accused,

Openness to the society both at the level of filling complaint and in the process of investigation,

Transparency of the investigation with maximum visibility of the operations.

According to Lewis (2000) and Finn (2001), in regards to the internal controls system, an ombudsman’s service must be supported as a key component of the police administration. Ombudsman can foster openness and transparency in the organization. Others, however, argue that ombudsman should act as agents of civilian public, and by extension, agents of external control (Goldstein, 1977; Walker et al., 2000)

External control, because of its basic construction, it is also called “the civilian oversight of policing.” Civilian oversight can fully ensure that the guidelines set fourth by the UN will be respected, and that representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability
will be preserved. Due to the comprehensive effectiveness of civilian oversight, democratic policing scholars tend to emphasize it above the other requisites of democratic policing.

A review of literature on civilian oversight indicates that in various jurisdictions around the globe, the civilian oversight of policing has promoted several kinds of expectations. Naturally, civilian oversight systems are slightly different in different societies, different regimes, and different police administrations. However, the overall functions of civilian oversight stay the same. They all advocate democratic policing. They also agree on what the basic tenets of democratic policing should be. Democratic policing requires accountability, responsiveness, and representativeness. Police have to be accountable to the people they serve, to international and national law, and to the political bodies (Finn, 2001; Walker & Luna, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Goldsmith, 1999; Mendes, 1999). Police have to be responsive to the community they serve and to the political authority that represents the community. Police have to represent the community, from which they are chosen.

Authors disagree, however, on how oversight systems should work. Terrill (1996) indicated that for oversight to be effective, common law practices and the decentralization of both political authority and judicial authority are musts. However, he is not optimistic about oversight practices in antidemocratic countries. He insists that only democratic countries with democratic laws and organs can practice democratic policing via civilian oversight. He makes his point that new democracies, or transitional
democracies, need a system of civilian oversight that is completely separated from the police.

Goldsmith (2000) does not agree with Terrill entirely. He states that the countries in transition to democracy can make changes that speed up the change process via civilian oversight. He also admits that the power of civilian oversight depends on the willingness of the politicians and administrators to comply. Many problems, such as impunity in the criminal justice system cannot be corrected by civilian oversight alone. He emphasizes that civilian oversight needs political, judicial and economic support. He also warns that the oversight process can place a heavy bureaucratic burden on the system that may hinder the efforts of democratic policing systems to adhere to humanitarian values (Goldsmith, 2000; Prenzler, 2001).

South African scholars Mokotedi and Koitsioe (1997), focus on the correlation between the political history of the country and necessity of civilian oversight in South Africa. They found that civilian oversight is not only a sure way to prevent and punish abuse, it also helps ensure democratic policing values are present throughout the policing organization. The authors also support Terrill (1996) who advocates the decentralization of policing as a means to effective civilian oversight. In this context, they find support for a clear distinction between the police and the oversight mechanism. They have also concluded that the civilian oversight of policing plays a central role in the overall development of justice, and in particular, it helps more policing towards the adaptation of democratization.
Lewis, as a very careful critic of civilian oversight for democratic policing, emphasizes that for civilian oversight to be effective, oversight committees must be overseen themselves. Otherwise, civilian oversight simply advocates regulations with no power to rule. His main concern, then, is focused on the necessity of a civilian oversight system that is supported by politicians, administrators and judges. He also added that for oversight to reach its maximum level of effectiveness, it must get its power from parliamentary democracy. Consequently, he proposed that in centralized or decentralized governments, civilian oversight bodies should be directed, governed or monitored by multi-partisan parliamentary subcommittees (Lewis, 2000).

Walker and Luna (2000) identify four different types of civilian oversight bodies. Even though, they do not specify whether oversight bodies work best in certain judicial systems, political regimes, or historical contexts, they concluded that the results of the civilian oversight are mixed. They say that an oversight agency with an independent power of administration is perhaps the most promising. However, they add that the measurement of this variable is not very significant. Like Lewis, they found very significant results in the positive correlation between the effectiveness of civilian oversight of policing and the elements of democracy.

According to a report of the U.S. Department of Justice, monetary ties are the initial indicators of the effectiveness of the civilian body. Financial comfort and independence make the system work efficiently (Finn, 2001). Walker and Luna (2000), Lewis (2000), Brereton (2000), and Goldsmith (2000) also support this finding. The U.S. Report also supports the idea of establishing a political body that oversees civilian
oversight (Lewis, 2000, Walker & Luna, 2000). The personality, dedication, and talents of the administrators of the oversight body will positively affect the outcome of the system (Goldsmith, 2000; Prenzler, 2001; Lewis & Prenzler, 1999). Finn (2001) also emphasizes that the subpoena power of oversight bodies can have an enormous impact on their effectiveness. He also concludes that civilian oversight can positively influence other community programs, such as community policing by increasing the accountability of police to the law and the community, increasing their responsiveness to the community’s needs and increasing the representativeness of police by building a bridge between the police and community. Civilian oversight effectively puts forth policy recommendations that lead to better policing services, promoting the accountability, responsiveness and representativeness of police (Brereton, 2000). The civilian oversight of policing, then, is not only a system that promotes democratic policing; it is also a mechanism that improves the ties between the community and police, effectively decreasing the crime rate (Finn, 2001).

Prenzler (2000) found that weak administration of the oversight body has a negative effect on the results of civilian oversight proceedings. He also admits that a passive strategy, an excessively legalistic or bureau pathological organizational culture, and insufficient quality control can cause problems rather then foster better policing. He also added that an effective oversight mechanism has to be very proactive and able to respond the changing situations and newly developed administrative policies. He gave a great deal of credit to the subpoena power in terms of the effectiveness of an oversight
system. Walker and Luna (2000) and Goldsmith (2000) also implied the same conclusion in their researches.

The idea of applying civilian oversight to policing first developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s to counter police corruption and brutality. By the mid-1980’s, civilian oversight was largely abandoned in favor of better control policies. However, new literature on the civilian oversight of policing is an effective way to control police wrongdoings and promote democratic policing in a democratic society. An independent body of civilian oversight that is powered by political will, independent financial resources, and talented, flexible administrators can very effectively promote better policing practices (Gissiner, 2001). Naturally, a democratic environment would be most effective for civilian oversight and accordingly, civilian oversight is conducive towards democratic policing.

The development of civilian oversight in transitional countries is encouraging. However, there is no indication that civilian oversight will be effective in anti-democratic regimes. It is often emphasize that these agencies must have the requisite powers to subpoena relevant documents and examine all relevant witnesses. In turn, they must themselves be fully accountable and transparent to the public. They should be open to the monitoring and scrutiny of the public, including the police. When necessary they should defend themselves to maintain public confidence in the process (Goldstein, 1977; Crawshaw et al, 1998).

They should also function as an ombudsman, identifying and solving systemic problems and situations that invite police wrongdoing and the abuse of power. This
function is essential if the public’s confidence in the police and police confidence in the accountability systems are to be maintained.

There are many other controversial ideas regarding the nature of civilian oversight. Many believe that oversight committees must be completely independent. Others advocate the importance of a police presence so that the community can understand nature of police work. On the other hand, there is a large gap in the literature that leaves unexplained the process of the oversight system, specifically leaving out its judicial and administrative dimensions. Walker and Kreisel (2001), as well as Finn (2001) have tried to explain the process, however their findings are limited.

Another issue that must be addressed is the situation of civilian oversight agencies in countries that are characterized by internal disorder or militaristic policing that often displaces simple democratic traditions of policing. Fighting against terrorist, separatists, guerrillas, and drug traffickers generally justifies a greater degree of latitude in police action, especially in relation to the use of force. Literature on this particular matter has remained unanswered and untouched. Most literature suggests, however, that war against crime can only be waged with the support of the community (Lewis, 2000). Consequently, accountability must come first in any kind of criminal justice policy. An inventory should be taken of the range of forces opposing the state, and of the difficulties that can arise in the preservation of law and order under such circumstances (Barber, 2001).

In a turbulent society, then, the relationship between police and community cannot proceed simply by appealing to the concerns of the citizens. It must also deal fully
and fairly with police interests and concerns. Consequently, any institutional mechanism, including civilian oversight, which is put in place to ensure police accountability, must attempt to deal fairly and fully with all parties (Mokotedi & Koitsioe, 1997).

Societies fractured by violence and fear of crime require effective, responsive policing as a matter of necessity. Despite the vast challenges faced in some countries, the non-police intermediary or police-specific nature of civilian oversight offers many possibilities for improvement (Goldsmith, 1999). As the report of the U.S. Justice Department indicates, the civilian oversight of policing is not only a system to promote democratic policing, it is also a mechanism that improves relations between the community and police. It can even help to decrease the crime rate (Finn, 2001).

The use of excessive force and human rights violations committed by police are the two primary problems of policing. Force is a resource of almost all police systems. Force is used to protect the police themselves as well as the community they serve. While promoting the safety of the community, police generally may legitimately use force in reasonable, limited and careful ways to protect themselves and others (Berkley, 1969; Bailey, 2000; Berman, 1987). The unreasonable, unlimited and reckless use of force by police is of great concern to the organization, the society, and even the country itself. Most of the policy ramifications of policing are focused on the issue of the use of force. Even new policing applications, like community policing which is designed to increase the accountability and responsiveness of police, are concerned with the use of force and human rights issues (Sheptycki, 2000; Crawshaw et al, 1998; Sammonds, 2001). Maybe more importantly, the use of force and violation of human rights is also reflected in the
attention the media gives to possible instances of police abuse. An accumulation of alleged abuse of force incidents, widely reported in the media, encourages over-generalization by giving the impression that the police are out of control throughout the police state (Uildriks & Reenen, 2001). Based on their investigation in a country, the Human Rights Watch Organization described the frequency of police brutality, indicating that police officers engaged in unjustified shootings, severe beatings, and the unnecessarily rough physical treatment of individuals throughout the country, while the police supervisors, city officials, and Ministries responsible for the police failed to act determinedly to control or punish such acts, or even to record the problem (Bracey, 2002).

Attempting to find a solution to that endemic problem, Trever (1996) indicated that many formal aspects of police organizations, including recruit training, in-service programs, disciplinary mechanisms, internal control and civilian oversight mechanisms, are related to levels of officer misconduct. However, research on this particular matter does not offer a clear and definite solution (Neil, 2001). On the other hand, it is very clear that a small proportion of officers are disproportionately involved in use of force and human rights violations. Consequently, use of force training including training in firearms, hand-to-hand tactics and decision-making, is frequently used as a mechanism to reduce human rights to violations, regardless, further research is still needed (National Institute Of Justice Report, 1997; the Council of Europe Status Report, 2000).

Community policing and problem oriented policing are two, frequently used approaches not only to crime problems but also to the democratization of police. They
both are the product of a modern society that demands more personal attention from
police and greater control over police activities in their neighborhoods. Both programs
cover many policing initiatives, ranging from close police-community relations to
community control over police activities (Stone & Ward, 2000; Trever, 1996). They both
also are community-based crime prevention techniques under governmental auspices.
They require the police, who are bound by law, to lead communities in informal
surveillance, analysis, and treatment. Especially community policing is a license for
police to intervene in the private life of individuals. It controls the coercive power of the
state to social amelioration (Bayley, 1985). They each presuppose that a sound public
relations program can encourage and improve police democratization. He added that the
relationship between police and the public encourages democracy in two ways: by
increasing accountability to local communities, and by providing fast and reliable
information on crime by breaking the wall of secrecy (Berkley, 1969; Bayley, 1976;
Goldstein, 1977). Community policing and problem-oriented policing function as
accountability mechanisms because they provide opportunities for community members
to set their own safety priorities and hold the police accountable for addressing those
priorities. Also, community feedback may function as a fast and reliable legal
information source, preventing police from even touching constitutional rights (Stone &

According to Windlesham (1998), community policing is a political strategy as
well as an organizational strategy. It increases public awareness of the overall crime
problem and expects their close assistance. By using this populist strategy, governments
can feasibly increase the accountability of the police and the accountability of the
government itself to the public, particularly in crime matters (Windlesham, 1998; Glensor

Research conducted up to this point has not clearly shown whether community
policing and problem-oriented policing contribute to crime reduction. Many sources do
agree, however, that community policing and problem-oriented policing encourage
democratic policing practices in a democracy (Bayley, 1985; Goldstein, 1990; Glensor &

Centralization or decentralization? This is one of the most argued points in
democratic policing. Even most of the authors who support civilian oversight totally
agree with the practice of decentralizing police administrations to improve oversight
practices (Goldsmith, 1999; Lewis, 2000; Walker & Luna 2000; Finn, 2001).

None, however, advocates oversight as the only thing that promotes democratic
policing. Looking at their overall views, Lewis (2000), Walker at al. (2000), Goldsmith
(1999), Uildriks and Reenen (2001) admittedly favor centralization at some point as a
means to cope with corruption. In addition to those, as a strong supporter of
centralization, Berkley (1969) specifically stated that a centralized police force, far from
posing a threat to democracy, might actually serve as its safeguard. His research in
several countries led him to the conclusion that centralized police forces can work
effectively to maintain and extend a democratic government. He also remembered that
democratic movements in the United States, such as the Civil Rights Movement, were
made possible by federal intervention in local matters. Perhaps it is possible to benefit
from both local and national contributions. Berkley also declared that there was a growing trend toward police centralization in democracies as well as totalitarian states. Denmark, Belgium, and Israel have long had national police forces. Sweden nationalized its police force in 1965, and France in 1966. The three Germanic states, which still have municipal police forces, are gradually abolishing them. England is consolidating its police forces into fifty large units, through a compulsory amalgamation scheme ordered by the Home Office (Berkley, 1969).

Berkley (1969) added that the trend towards centralization in Germanic States and the British is due in large part to the inability of municipal police forces to be independent of undue pressures exerted by local persons of influence. Also, the larger the organization, the more it tends to standardize and formalize its methods and procedures. Therefore, centralized police forces compel their members to treat both colleagues and clients in a more impersonal manner, thus reducing favoritism and discrimination (Goldstein, 1977).

Centralization also increases the likelihood of job mobility. Police officers in a larger force who find themselves in an undesirable position have more opportunities to make a change. This increased job mobility also gives organization members greater contact with fellow employees of different backgrounds and viewpoints. From his point of view, centralization may also faster democratic values because police affiliation with trade unions is made possible. In addition, citizen control of the police is more assured on a national level, where the force is placed under the democratic control of elected representatives (Berkley, 1969).
On the other hand, as an obvious example, the United States has always had a decentralized system. Even at the local level, policing is fragmented among neighboring jurisdictions, and divided into country municipal, and even smaller jurisdictional zones. These local departments employ eighty percent of all police officers, with the remainder are allocated to state, and national agencies (Kratcoski, 2000). However Windlesham (1998) reasserted that this fragmentation of the American criminal justice system and the lack of coordination between it’s the individual components are the principal factors that foster its inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

In his study, Kratcoski (2000) examined the merits of three distinct models of democratic police systems: the United States as an example of a fragmented system, Finland as an example of a centralized system, and Great Britain as a model of a coordinated system of policing. He concluded that the fragmented model of policing, dominated by autonomous local governments, is extremely democratic but also inefficient having a high potential for corruption. Many democratic nations find this model unacceptable because it sacrifices crime control for an excessive consideration of civil liberties. The national government dominates the centralized model of policing, which is more orderly and efficient but less democratic. Many democratic nations regard this model as unacceptable because it gives too little consideration to civil liberties in order to provide more effective crime control. The coordinated model of policing is viewed as a compromise by a number of police scholars. It is more efficient than the fragmented model and more democratic than the centralized model. It also has less
potential than the other two models for the abuse of police authority and systemic corruption (Kratcoski, 2000).

While observing the police in Japan, Miyazawa (1992) and Nakayama (1987) noted that the centralization of police operations, particularly among the security police where covert tactics are most likely, means that high-ranking officials will probably be involved in abuses of power. Control of such abuses will have to rely on prosecutors. However, investigating prosecutors exist only in Tokyo and Osaka, and there are only 50 of them to monitor 220,000 police officers. Moreover, prosecutors are fearful of the consequences of a confrontation with police. Thus, centralization, which contributes to the improvement of police services, makes control of organizational police crimes more difficult.

Mei Ko Wang (1982) in his comparative research of ten criminal justice administrations, namely Australia, Great Britain, the Republic of China, Communist China, Denmark, France, India, Japan, Thailand and the United States concluded that the most prominent trend is the centralization of police organizations.

Another important application of democratic policing is police unionism. Unions give individual officers the change to join and participate in an organization. They accordingly promote democracy within the organization by allowing individual officers to take a direct part in elections of officers and the approval or disapproval of major decisions.

According to Berkley (1969), unionism tends to make the policeman think of himself as a trade unionist, thereby identifying with what is usually a pro-democratic and
somewhat left of center ideology. He believed this pull to take left is important because police often experience a pull to the right. Even though, unions are seen as natural enemies of change bent on protecting hard earned gains, in reality, they are a new and dynamic force for positive change, especially as they press for a more democratic police organization (Goldsmith, 1977; Wilson, 1967).

Unions being democratic by nature can express themselves and attempt to exert their influence when the community starts to define police objectives, to modify or expand the police function, or to create alternatives to the criminal justice system (Goldsmith, 1977; Gleizal et al., 2000). Goldsmith (1977) also states that unions are bound to become involved when police agencies attempt to regulate the discretion of their personnel. Directives that address the amount of force an officer may use, the conditions under which a specific law should be enforced, the criteria for making an arrest as opposed to issuing a citation, or the manner in which demonstrations are to be handled, are all subject to union response.

Goldsmith (1997) and Wilson (1967) asserted that unions play an active role in creating more effective ways to direct, review, and control police conduct. Goldsmith argued also that policies encouraged by unions can raise the standards for police recruitment, advocating, for example, the increased recruitment of minorities. Unions can also promote democratic education and training practices, as well as democratic applications throughout the organization.

In addition, Marx (1998) indicates that the increasingly extensive use of crime analysis techniques, global positioning systems, video surveillance, computer dossiers,
and various other forms of biological and electronic monitoring and behavioral and environmental manipulations may make police more efficient and more democratic. Powerful computer databases that analyze crime patterns may help solve crimes and locate perpetrators. New forms of identification involving DNA or computerized fingerprinting may help convict the guilty and protect the innocent. New technologies may also help to control police (Coleman, 2001). For example police accountability might be enhanced by the videotaping of all police encounters with citizens.

In their research, Stone and Ward (2000) have found that computerized programs in policing like New York City’s Compstat program (McDonald, 2002), which stands for “computer comparison statistics,” help to improve democratic policing practices by increasing the accountability of police to the community.

Shapiro (1999), in his book The Control Revolution, explained both the advantages and disadvantages of using advanced technology in policing. In particular, he was concerned with the protection of privacy in a highly technological, information-based society. Like Marx, he did not clearly-distinguish whether he believes the use of technology promotes democratic values (Shapiro, 1999; Marx, 1998 & 2000).

The last topic that deserves much attention in democratic policing is the representativeness of the police agency. When considering the overall evaluation of any democratic application, its acceptance as a democratic policing application depends on three main criteria: accountability, responsiveness and representativeness, as indicated earlier. In particular, one of these qualities alone can indicate the presence of democratic policing. This quality is representativeness. The racial, ethnic, religious, gender and
political profiles of a police force must represent the general population of the area that it serves (Berkley, 1969; Crawshaw et al., 2001; Trever, 1996). The proportions of these groups present in police organizations must be equal to the general population. Otherwise, the main component of democracy is forgotten (Marx, 1998). The representation of women in the force is the first step towards representativeness. In many countries, minorities, immigrants and their second, third and in fact fourth generation children cannot become citizen in those countries and cannot participate in police organizations. Those minorities or ethnic groups may reach over ten percent of the entire population, giving them the right to sovereignty in the countries that have such laws and regulations (Crawshaw et al., 1998; Finn, 2001; Stone & Ward, 2000). Representativeness is one of the main elements of democracy indicated by political science scholars. It is consequently, also one of the main elements of democratic policing. Police organizations must be composed of the same racial, ethnic, religious, and gender profiles of the population of the community that they serve in order to be democratic.

The above-mentioned applications, derived from current literature, are accepted by most social scientists as democratic policing practices. They have been implemented and used to preserve, assist, or encourage democracy in different countries. Other applications are also available, such as the multiple funding of policing, real time analysis of crime statistics, victimization surveys or programs, civil litigation, the exclusionary rule of evidence, laws mandating arrest in domestic violence cases, and so on. There also promote the basic tenets of democracy. They are arguable or hard to implement or they
present some constraints on the process (Marenin, 2000; Das, 2000; Kratcoski, 2000; Stone & Ward, 2000).

However, this is not to say that the applications indicated above and used as variables of democratic policing are totally acceptable or inarguable. They, too, have their limitations. For example, in regards to the centralization / decentralization issue, if the regime character and police structure are kept conceptually distinct, then decentralization can become compatible with repressive rule. Furthermore local governments are not necessarily less authoritarian than centralized governments. Bayley argued outright that police structures should not be read as a symptom of governmental character. Identical command structures can accommodate regimes of vastly different types. Nevertheless, the structures of policing, such as centralization, and internal and external control systems do affect the character of the regime (Bayley, 1985; Skolnick, 1966; Stone & Ward, 2000; Bracey, 2002). Accordingly, it is assumed that a positive correlation, in fact an inter-correlation, exists between a country’s level of democracy and its police structure.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This research seeks to explore two different research questions. First, to what degree are democratic policing practices correlated with democracy in a given country? Second, which specific policing applications are most likely to be correlated to high levels of democracy, especially with respect to human rights?

In order to obtain answers to these research questions, this study will be divided into three parts. Measurement will be based on a mixture of secondary data analysis, content analysis and a literature review. To answer the first question, three steps will be followed. In the first step, the data on democratic countries will be collected from Freedom House, The Survey of Freedom (2001 & 2002). In the second step, data on democratic policing practices will be complied into a literature review, and a data set based on cross-national comparative research, field studies, and so forth will be designed by using simple content analysis techniques. Finally, in the third step, data on democracy and data on democratic policing will be compared in a scatter plot diagram.

In order to answer the second research question, data sets on democratic policing will be cross-tabulated with data imported from The Political Terror Scale of Purdue University (Gibney & Dalton, 1996).
Data and Conceptualization of Democracy

According to Sorensen (1998), the degree to which a country is democratic can be determined based on the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. Political equality is therefore a key characteristic of democracy. However, a great number of physical manifestation or institutions can be observed within a country to measure its level of democracy. Sorensen borrows Dahl’s definition of democracy, who refers to democracy as “polyarchy,” and outlines seven institutions that comprise polyarchy. He includes elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, eligibility for public office, freedom to form and join organizations, alternative sources of information, and freedom for expression. In addition to those, Sorensen added that the institutions that make government policies depend on votes, and that other expressions of preference are also vitally needed.

Sorensen asserted that these eight institutions or conditions are physical manifestations of three different ideological characteristics of democracies: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties as human rights. The concept of human rights includes civil and political rights, as well as, according to Western thought, economic, social and cultural rights.

In order to measure democracy, Sorensen believed that given the framework of the criteria listed above, the best instrument to measure democracy today lies in the Freedom House Index. He added that this index is very useful because it uses one dimension to measure competition and participation, and one dimension for civil
liberties. Consequently it addresses all three of ideological characteristics of democracy (Sorensen, 1998).

On the other hand, since the purpose of this research is to discover whether a correlation exists between democratic policing and democracy, the Freedom House Index is best used to represent the reality of daily life. That daily life includes an interaction between police, and the community, for it is the police who protect and defend the civil and political rights of the people.

Measurement of Democracy

The Freedom House Index is a product of The Survey of Freedom designed by Freedom House, a non-governmental international organization. Since 1955, Freedom House has monitor the progress and decline of the political rights and liberties of 192 nations and several major related and disputed territories. The Survey of Freedom evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world, and reviews a country’s freedom by examining its record in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. The survey is based on the principle that a country grants its citizens political rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant portion of the range of voter choice, and when the leaders of those parties can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power of government. The survey is also based on the principle that a country upholds its citizens civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights. These also include gender and family rights, personal reforms, and freedoms of the press, of belief and of association (Freedom in the World 2001-2002, p. 10).
The survey rates each country on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties. One on the scale represents a high degree of freedom, and seven a low degree of freedom, these scores are combined to form three more general categories. “Free” countries are those, which receive a rating of less than three. “Partly Free” countries are rated from three to just less than five. “Not Free” countries have a rating of five or more.

The Freedom House Index utilizes a seven-point scale to represent the level of democracy a country has achieved. The findings of Freedom House will be used in this study. However, for the purpose of this study, the Freedom House scale will be inverted so that "7," the highest number on the scale, corresponds to the highest level of democracy a country can achieve. The lowest level of democracy a country can achieve would therefore be represented as "1." By recoding the freedom house scale, the author hopes to make visually meaningful and readily understood comparisons between the Freedom House Index and other measures of democracy. Hereafter, this index will be presented as the "Inverted Freedom House Index." When the author states, for example, that the United States "has a rating of 7 on the Inverted Freedom House Index," let it be understood that this indicates that the United States has the highest degree of democracy possible according to the information produced by Freedom House.

Reliability and Validity of Data

According to the Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2001-2002” report, these ratings are not only reviews of the conduct of governments, but they are also intended to reflect the reality of life. It is also said that by compiling these ratings, a
country with a benign government that faces violent forces that oppose open society will be graded on the basis of the actual on-the-ground conditions that indicate whether the population is able to exercise its freedoms. It is also asserted that this survey enables scholars and policy makers both to assess the direction of global change annually, and to examine trends in freedom over time. Scholars can also make comparisons across regions with varying political systems (Freedom in the World 2001-2002, p. 10).

The Survey project is a yearlong effort produced by their regional experts, consultants, and human rights specialists. The Survey receives its information from a wide range of sources, including human rights activists, journalists, editors, and political figures around the world who provide information about the human rights situation in their respective countries. The Survey is also reviewed by the Survey of Freedom Advisory Board, consisting of very well known political scientists.

In the present study, only fifteen countries will be selected among the 192 countries included in the Freedom House Index. Originally, this researcher planned to randomly select twenty countries, including ten “free” countries, five “partly free” countries, and five “not free” countries. This selection would have included four countries each from five geographic regimes of the world, namely Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Far East and Oceania, the Americas, and the collective Middle East and Africa. However, careful screening regarding the data available on democratic policing and its operational variables, several countries are rejected due to unavailability, insufficiency, and untrustworthiness of their data. As a result fifteen countries were selected for this study: three from the Americas (Brazil, Colombia and the United States),
three from Eastern Europe (Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary), four from Western Europe
(the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Sweden and France), two from Africa and the
Middle East (South Africa and Saudi Arabia), and three from the Far East and Oceania
(Australia, China, and Japan), were selected as good candidates for this study. Ten of
these are classified as “free” countries, three of them are as “partly free” countries, and
two of them are “not free” countries.

Data and Conceptualization of Democratic Policing

Data on policing and democratic practices in policing will be collected from cross
national field studies that focus on democratic police practices in each respective country
as well as comparative studies on major criminal justice systems, policing, law
enforcement, and social control. Case studies on civilian oversight systems will also be
used in addition to a European Survey of Selected Police Organizations (Becker, 1980),
and the available annual country reports of Amnesty International (Amnesty International

For the purpose of this study, democratic policing will be characterized by the
institutionalization of the rule of law; accountability to the public (accountability);
transparency of decision making (responsiveness); popular participation in policing
(representativeness); minimum use of force; creating an organization that facilitates the
learning of human rights (responsiveness); and internal democracy of the organization
(Heymann, 1997). These concepts are outlined by Das (2000) in his article that evaluated
the findings of the symposium on the “Theme of Challenges of Policing Democracies”
held at the Institute of Sociology of Law in Spain on May 17-20, 1995. In this
symposium, officials from the field and scholars from thirteen countries participated in discussions on the definition and conceptualization of democratic policing. Das conceptualization of democratic policing agrees with other literature in the field and is consistent with assertions found in the 2001 report of the Vera Institute of Justice (Stone & Ward, 2000).

These concepts of democratic policing can be operationalized, according to a review of the literature. In Sum, a total of twenty-four democratic policing practices have been identified. However, while collecting data on those operational variables from the sources indicated above, it was determined out that data regarding half of those variables was either not available for the countries selected for this research or was insufficient to evaluate. Consequently, those variables were eliminated and, as a result, fourteen variables will be examined.

Those variables are;

- Centralization / Decentralization,
- Representativeness,
- Community policing,
- Problem oriented policing,
- Ombudsman,
- Oversight performed by legislatures, elected officials or the courts,
- Civilian oversight by non-governmental organizations,
- Civilian complaint boards,
- Internal police control,
• Effective disciplinary structure,
• Use of advanced technology for the investigation of crime,
• Unionism,
• Use of force training, and
• Human rights training.

In addition to those, media-police relations will be evaluated separately to understand the degree to which the inner workings of police are visible to the public. This assessment will be based in a general analysis of the tendency of police organizations to give detailed information about general operations (namely those that do not involve intelligence work) to the media. The degree to which the police respond to media feedback in general will also be evaluated.

Responsiveness to the public is another democratic policing variable quoted by most of the scholars. At the beginning, this study intended to add this variable and measure it with availability of 911 or similar emergency telephone systems, however, after the initial screening it was realized that every police agency has such systems but their effectiveness were not argued enough. Therefore, it was omitted.

Measurement of Democratic Policing

The operational variables of democratic policing were applied to a simple content analysis process defined by Zito who established a system to tally, or “count up,” how many variables are present in a given policing system (Zito, 1974). These variables are defined later in this chapter. Suffice it to say that the absence of a particular variable will result in a count of “0.” A “1” will be given if it is present, While analyzing the variables
for the purposes of this research, it was idealized that the presence of each variable would be verified using at least three different sources. However, very obvious and easy to identify variables will be counted based on one source. These include centralization/decentralization, unionism, internal police control and the presence of ombudsman. On the other hand, in two countries, data sources were inconsistent regarding one of the variables. In these cases, majority reports will be assumed as final.

In terms of the meaning and the scope of these operational variables, the most commonly accepted definitions of each variable are enclosed at the end of this chapter.

Reliability and Validity of Data

Multiple sources will be used to conduct this analysis. In addition, as indicated above, a previously established analyzing procedure will be used, and whenever necessary, information will be verified using three different sources on the same variable.

Coding and scoring will be controlled and corrected by the thesis committee chair who will personally match the data sources for greater inter-rater reliability.

Cross-Tabulations

In order to address the second phase, a cross-tabulation will be arranged between the data sets, comparing the democratic policing of the individual countries and the human rights applications of those countries.

As indicated in the first chapter, like measurement of democracy, human rights measurements are based on the reports of non-governmental organizations like Freedom House, Transparency International, and World Bank, as well as governmental agencies like the U.S. State Department, European Commission, and European Parliament. These
sources have been proven by many researchers to be relatively unbiased in their reports (Poe et al., 2001). In terms of human rights issues, the research conducted by Poe et al. showed that “The Political Terror Scale” was the most reliable scale available. This scale was prepared by evaluating the report of not only Amnesty International, but also the U.S. State Department (Poe et al., 2001).

**Data and Conceptualization Of Human Rights**

Based on the Political Terror Scale, countries are coded on a scale of 1-5 according to the level of certain variables in the previous year according to the analysis of these countries provided in Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Reports. In “Level 1” countries, there is a secure rule of law, no political imprisonment, and torture is extremely rare. In “Level 2” countries, there exist a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity, torture is unusual, and political murder is rare. “Level 3” countries have widespread political imprisonment; torture and brutality may be common, and unlimited detention with or without trial for political views is accepted. “Level 4” countries experience murders, disappearances, and torture as a common way of life. In “Level 5” countries, there is an extended level of violence among all populations. The leaders place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they will pursue personal or ideological goals (Gibney & Dalton, 1996).

**Reliability and Validity of the Data**

In the coding process of the Political Terror Scale (PTS), Gibney and Dalton indicate that coders were instructed to ignore their own biases, give countries the benefit of the doubt, consider the size of the country being coded, and view the various levels as
Part of a Continuum. It was also said that the weakest point of PTS was in differentiating between countries at the highest level. The countries that received Level 5 ratings exhibit a wide range in the number of violations as another Level 5. However, as the authors state, in either case, the situation in a country that receives a score of 5 is very undesirable. Inter-coder reliability was ensured by using two different coders for the same report. If conflict arouse, another coder reviewed that report and code it. Overall, the reliability percentage was about 70-90 percent (Gibney & Dalton, 1996).

However, there are some problems in the scale. For example, several countries, including the United States, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Australia, were not added to the scale. The explanation for their exclusion was that reports regarding these countries did not reveal any violation large enough to code. Consequently, they were assumed to have a score of 1.

Incidentally, there was no other data set available that contained information regarding all of these countries that was helpful for this study.

**Generalizability**

The cross-nationality of the study ensures the generalizability of the findings. Field studies, case analyses, and comparative studies used in this study were prepared by the experts in the field or scholars who are considered to be reputable social and political scientists. Their findings have been tested several times, and in many cases the policies that have resulted from their findings have produced fabulous results in practice. This research will not take into account the historical, economical, socio-cultural or other effects. This may affect the internal validity of the study. However, the cross-nationality
of the study should compensate for the omission. Overall, this study can be classified as valid and reliable.

Limitations

This research is intended to draw a roadmap between democracy and the democratization of policing. In this map, the definition of democracy is limited to the definition provided by Dahl (1971). Obviously, this definition does not cover every aspect of democracy in depth. However, many political scientists add or remove various concepts from democracy. For instance, Daniel Lerner (1968) and Seymour M. Lipset (1959 & 1960), connect democratization to economic growth and modernization. Larry Diamond (1992) was generally supportive of the work of Lerner and Lipset, but emphasized the Human Development Index (HDI) as having a stronger correlation with the combined index of political freedom than economic growth. The HDI is an expansion of the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) constructed by Morris D. Morris (1979), which takes into account national rates of literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy at age one.

Robert Dahl (1971) emphasized causal factors, including the historical, social, external, political-cultural and political leadership of a country in addition to its economic development. Like Dahl, Samuel Huntington (1993) saw multiple preconditions for democratization, with no single condition being sufficient enough to cause democratic development. However, Huntington does assert that a central prerequisite appears to be that the elites see their interests served by the introduction of democratic institutions.
Mancur Olson (1993) argues that democracy will most likely emerge when those who lead in the overthrow of an autocracy are incapable of establishing another autocratic system. In contrast, Raymond Gastil (1985) argues that democratization might depend on the diffusion of democratic ideas more than socio-economic factors. However, Arat (1991) argues, “As long as social and economic inequalities persist, developing countries that go through a process of democratization today are doomed to return to some form of authoritarianism.” Accordingly, this study will not give attention to those arguments and will remain limited to Sorensen’s (1998) definition of democracy. His standard approach operationalized a complex concept of democracy within the borders of common law and civil law.

In terms of democratic policing, the operationalized variables used for this research may not ensure that police accountability, responsiveness and representativeness by themselves to promote democratic policing. Caution is needed when applying policies. Also, the effectiveness of any kind of policy that adopts the assumptions presented in this study basically depends on the personal characteristics, perceptions, principles and fairness of the individuals, who work in the organization. The police subculture is not the main issue of this study.

Most Important in operationalizing the variables of democratic policing are the limitations of coding “1” and “0” for the presence and absence of each. This limitation means that the extent and quality of the presence of democratic policing reforms is not reflected in this analysis. Further research should include in-depth field research on this more qualitative aspect of the nature of democratic policing reforms.
Because of the existence of controversial terminology on democratic policing applications, the operationalized variables that will be discussed in this study are defined at the end of this chapter. The analysis that will be done in this study is absolutely based on those definitions and limited to them.

Since secondary information is an inexpensive data source that facilitates the research process in several ways, it is also useful for generating hypotheses for further research. It is useful to compare the findings from different studies and to examine trends. On the other hand, secondary data is not designed specifically for such a study. Due to the fact that no secondary observations or interpretations will be imported into this study, and secondary data will be used solely to help general arguments and to shed light upon commonly accepted international perspectives, this study will be much affected by the nature of secondary data. However, the inherent bias due to the structure of certain data sets will unavoidably be brought to this study along with the data. In particular, the Political Terror Index of Purdue University is arguably biased because it did not even evaluate some countries based on commonly held views of their inherited democratic tradition. In short, the overall findings of this study are limited by the nature of those secondary data sets.

In addition to the above limitations, let it be said at the outset that this research does not attempt to produce a perfect model that meets all expectations in all communities. The author does not claim that this model will lead to democratic policing through the exchange and importation of certain methods or procedures. No police organization can be transformed from top to bottom unless the society it serves is
transformed as well (Goldsmith, 1999). This research simply intends to shed light on the various policing characteristics that correlate to democratic societies.

Definitions

The following concepts will be used in this study;

**Democratic Policing:** Based on the afore indicated approaches, democratic policing can be briefly be identified as a system in which the police operate in accordance with the principles of democracy. This means, in an operational context, that the police ought to be trained in the law. They should understand international standards of human rights, and should act in accordance with the criminal code. Police operations themselves should be governed by written policies that are available to the public. In other words, from top to bottom the management, execution and articulation of every police activity should reflect a commitment to the rule of law (Skolnick, 1966; Trever, 1996; Das, 2000).

Given the importance of policing to the advancement of democracy, it is incumbent upon all practitioners, researchers, policy makers, and police professional to promote a strong international debate about the principles of democratic policing and the relationship between the development of democratic policing and the movement toward greater democracy (Shearing, 1997, Marenin, 2000).

**Police Accountability:** In policing, accountability has two different, competing meanings. The first of these has to do with having control over the police. Police actions are closely monitored and consequences are dealt out accordingly this type of
accountability has been dubbed the ‘subordinate and obedient’ type, and looks to establish political or democratic control over policing.

The ‘explanatory and co-operative’ type of accountability deals with the need for decision makers to provide explanations for their actions or information about their decisions without any commitment or consequences being returned. Police are expected to simply “give an account” of their activities (Chan, 1999; Miller et al., 1997; and Chevigny, 1999).

Organizational (Administrative) structure: Due in large part to their historical background, police organizations, with the exception of the extraordinary decentralization among the agencies of the U.S. are highly centralized and otherwise very similar in design and structure as Weber, Taylor and other classicist organizational theorists formulated them. (Swanson et al., 2000; Russell, 1997). The question is whether these organizational structures are able to solve the problems, of law enforcement, in particular police corruption, or whether their structure produces such problems (Russell, 1997).

Organizational Culture: “Culture” refers to a set of shared attitudes, values, goals and practices that characterize an organization as well as the expectations and norms that guide employees’ behavior (Merriam-Webster College Dictionary). Organizations derive this culture from their history, officer experiences, organizational structure, leadership style, and past methods of handling change (Glensor & Peak, 1996).

Sub-culture, police culture: A sub-culture is defined as an ethnic, regional, economic, or social group exhibiting characteristic patterns of behavior sufficient to
distinguish it from others within an embracing culture or society (Merriam-Webster College Dictionary). The definition in this document regarding the police sub-culture is based on exactly the same principal. However, instead of saying “police sub-culture,” “police culture” is preferred.

**Responsiveness:** A police force is democratic when it responds to the needs of individuals and private groups as well as the needs of government (Crawshaw et al., 1998)

**Definitions of the Democratic Policing Operational Variables**

**Centralization / Decentralization:** In the centralized model, a central government establishes a police force that is imposed on the population, as is the case in France, Japan, the former Soviet Union and Finland. The decentralized model is separated into two types. They are generally referred to as the coordinated and fragmented models. The coordinated model involves a considerable sharing of power between the central government and local authorities. England and Wales, Australia and Canada, all operate as coordinated models. In the fragmented model, also known as federalist model, the centralized government is responsible for the enforcement of the laws that have national application, the state has the responsibility to enforcement the laws specific to that state, and the local government formulates laws that are applicable in that jurisdiction. The U.S. is an example of a federalist or fragmented model. For the purpose of this study, police organizations will simply be classified as centralized or decentralized (Berkley, 1969; Bayley, 1985; Wang, 1982).
**Community Policing:** Community policing is characterized by ongoing attempts to promote greater community involvement in police activities. Community policing applications partly or totally cover five areas: a dedication to crime prevention, public inspection of the police, accountability of police actions, customized police action, and community organization (Swanson et al., 2001; Silva, 1999; Jordan & Zager, 2001).

**Problem-Oriented Policing:** P-OP is a program espouses that the police can accomplish much when working to prevent problems rather than simply responding to incidents. The collection and subsequent analysis of data provides the basis of problem identification and response strategies. It is not limited to simple police action. Rather, it advocates a community-police collaborative effort that takes a proactive approach to the problematic areas of the community (Goldstein, 1990).

In the case of both community policing and problem-oriented policing, it is assumed that the accountability of police to the public is increased by providing opportunities for local community members to set their own safety priorities. Especially using a problem-oriented policing approach, when elected officials are invited to participate, political and accordingly democratic control over police becomes stronger (Goldstein, 1990; Glensor, 2000).

**Ombudsman:** An ombudsman is a representative assigned by the police organization or the government to investigate citizen complaints and suggest solutions. In addition to his responsibility to receive and investigate complaints, the ombudsman serves as an independent and impartial arbiter who recommends what may be done to satisfy the complainant or in explains why no action is necessary (Walker et al., 2000).
Oversight Performed by Legislatures, Elected Officials or the Courts: First and foremost, the police are accountable to the legislature, to elected officials, or to the officials appointed by the elected officials. Those officials are sometimes the individuals responsible for policing actions by creating law, through central administrative directives or decisions, or perhaps by setting the particular budget. Besides these individuals, prosecutors are also responsible for policing practices, and accordingly they have a direct or indirect control over the police. In addition, in some countries, the courts have the power to take control of police agencies if those agencies are not accountable to the rule of law (Goldsmith, 1999).

Civilian Complaint Board: A Civilian Complaint Board or commission reviews how well Internal Affairs Divisions or other internal investigation bodies investigate complaints. A Civilian Review Board determines whether situations are handled appropriately, and states whether it agrees or disagrees with the IA findings.

A civilian Review Board may also be in some cases a commissioned agency, which investigates complaints, makes findings, and based on them, makes recommendations to the law enforcement administration regarding discipline and/or policy. It may recommend further investigation and may make policy recommendations. The establishments of the boards vary. Members of the community, independents auditors, members of the police organization, and academicians of the local community can be the members of the board. Some Civilian Review Boards do not accept members of a police organization; some only accept retired police officers. This research did not
deeply probe the member selection of the boards (Walker & Luna, 2000; Walker & Kreisel, 2001).

**Civilian Oversight by NGOs:** International and national non-governmental organizations can independently investigate police wrongdoings and publish their findings. Some police agencies have systems to officially accept the findings of those agencies and initiate further internal investigations based on those findings. Others are either arbitrarily interested in those findings or do not either accept or acknowledge them to start an internal investigation. However, the reports of both national and international NGOs are considered important by all scientists and organizations for their research and for their final decisions regarding the individual police organization or, more broadly, the country (Walker & Luna, 2000; Walker & Kreisel, 2001).

**Internal Police Control and Effective Disciplinary Structure:** Any kind of internal investigation on police wrongdoings can be seen as an internal central mechanism, internal controls can be issued by a central authority or federal body, or by local police department. The body exerting the internal control must have an established investigation procedure designed by the law, and punishment must be definite. Also, if the findings go beyond simple administrative wrongdoings, the system has to be responsible enough to hand over the file to the courts (Stone & Ward, 2000).

**Human Rights Training:** Human rights training covers both the basic training to teach recruits, and on-going, in-service training to refresh their knowledge in the line of duty. Both types of training are intended to teach recruits and line officers basic constitutional and international human rights standards. The police must conduct their
activities with respect for human dignity and basic human rights. This training teaches them how to observe these rights while they are policing, as well as how best to swerve the community in light of these standards. These kinds of training programs also include interrogation techniques, the use of firearms, applications of criminal procedure laws, ethics, decision-making techniques, crisis management, and more. The United Nations program called the “Decade for Human Rights Education” was adapted to the law enforcement training programs in most countries. In addition, due to pressure from civil community organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other political entities, human rights training in law enforcement has, for the most part, become widespread (Hazenberg, 2001).

**Use of Force Training:** The police must have as their highest priority the protection of life. This principle has particular applications for the police use of force. Specifically, the use of deadly force should be seen as appropriate only to save a life. Accordingly, very similar to human right training, use of force training includes teaching good investigation and legitimate interrogation techniques to reduce the tendency to use force to coerce confessions. It is also used to instruct police on the proper of use of firearms to improve decision-making when officers apply their gun. In addition, use of force training encourages officers to use technologically advanced non-lethal weapons and verbal techniques instead of forces (Mollen 1998; Weber, 2001).

**Representativeness:** Do the racial, ethnic, religious, gender and political profiles of the police force represent the general population of the area served? This is the question of representativeness. In order for a police force to be representative of the
public, its demographic make-up must be equal to the general population. Otherwise, the main component of democracy has been forgotten. The representation of women in the force is the first step in this issue. In many countries, minorities, immigrants and their second, third and in fact fourth generation children cannot become citizens in those countries and cannot participate in a police organization, even though those minorities, or ethnic groups reach over 10% of the entire population. The right of the countries to have such laws and regulations has been accepted as a right of sovereignty (Crawshaw et al., 1998; Mendes 1999; Goldsmith, 1999).

Police Unionism: Unions give individual officers the chance to join and participate in an organization. Unions promote democracy within the organization by taking a direct part in the election of officers and the approval or disapproval of major decisions. According to Berkley, unionism tends to make the policeman think of himself as a trade unionist, and thereby to identify with what is usually a pro-democratic and somewhat left of center of democratic society. Berkley asserted that this pull leftwards was important because police often experience a pull to the right (Berkley, 1969).

Advance Technology Use for Investigations of Crime: Intensive use of crime analysis techniques, global positioning systems, video surveillance, computer dossiers, and various forms of biological and electronic monitoring and behavioral and environmental manipulations may make police more efficient and accordingly more respectful of democratic tradition (Marx, 1998 & 2000; Coleman, 2001).
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Democracy Ratings in Selected Countries

Freedom House has assembled The Freedom House Index Classification of Free Countries, one of the most respected data sets that measures democracy. Using that data set, the fifteen countries selected for this study are classified in Table 1 by measures of freedom.

Table 1. Comparative Measures of Freedom (Inverted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Freedom Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partly Free 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not Free 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partly Free 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partly Free 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not Free 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United-Kingdom</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Free 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Table 1, four of the countries, namely Australia, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, are classified as democratic countries with an average
rating of 7. Six countries including France, Hungary, Japan, Slovenia, South Africa and the United Kingdom, are classified as democratic countries with an average rating of 6.5. One country, Brazil, is classified as partly democratic with an average rating of 5. Columbia is classified as partly democratic with an average rating of 4. Russia is classified as partly democratic with an average rating of 3. China is classified as not democratic, and has average rating of 1.5. Saudi Arabia is also classified as not democratic, with an average rating of 1.

**Ratings of Democratic Policing Variables**

Next, what the rating of each country from the content analysis of democratic policing variables in the literature is shown in Table 2. It shows a detailed explanation of the scores each country received in terms for each of the democratic policing variables that were defined earlier in the literature. The data for democratic policing variables were collected from an intensive and careful literature review as summarized in Chapter II of this study. Those variables are: centralization/decentralization, representativeness, community policing, problem-oriented policing, the presence of ombudsmen, legislative, executive, or judicial oversight, civilian complaint boards, civilian oversight by non-governmental organizations, internal police control, effective disciplinary structure, advanced use of technology for the investigations of crimes, unionism, and use of force and human rights training. In addition to those, the transparency of the police administration to the media is added for both combined and separate evaluation.
Table 2. The Content Analysis of the Democratic Policing Practices of 15 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries/Variables</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>United-Kingdom</th>
<th>United States</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>POP*2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>CO-NGO*5</td>
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CP*1= Community Policing  POP*2=Problem Oriented Policing  L/E/JO*3=Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Oversight. CCB*4= Civilian Complaint Board  CO-NGO*5=Civilian Oversight by Non-Governmental Organizations. IPC*6= Internal Police Control HRT*10= Human Rights Training  TM*11=Transparency to the Media.

Of course as indicated earlier and explained while reviewing literature, there is no clear consensus in the literature regarding the promotion of centralization or decentralization of policing as a democratic policing practices. While some scientists argue that centralization is essential to democratic policing, others, no doubt, accept decentralization as a key concept of democratic policing. Consequently, the correlation between democratic policing and democracy was explored considering both centralization and decentralization.
Centralized police departments exist in countries of every level of democracy (Figure 2). For example, France, Hungary and Sweden are highly democratic countries with centralized police organizations. Brazil, Columbia and Russia are partly democratic countries with that type of structure, and both China and Saudi Arabia, non-democratic countries, have centralized police organizations. Contrary to that, decentralized police departments are found only in highly democratic countries such as Australia, Japan, The Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States (Figure 3).

According to Bayley (1985), centralized police departments usually have often been the tools of authoritarian, repressive and totalitarian regimes. He explains that some
countries, such as Japan, Finland, and France, were exceptions to that rule, and added that their centralized police forces were the heritage of their rich organizational background.

On the other hand, Berkley (1969) claimed that countries like Sweden returned to centralized systems after experimenting with decentralized systems in order to allow the public a more powerful, strict control of the police. He admitted that just like Sweden and Finland, Japan and Spain, these countries were very successful with their centralized organizations at controlling and bettering police practices.

Many countries with highly centralized police organizations did have upheld democratic values for many years. Variables other than centralization/decentralization,
such as the existence of an effective disciplinary structure and the ombudsmen in those countries could be the reason.

After a careful inspection, the links between democracy and democratic policing reforms show a positive correlation. Some deviations occurred in analysis of the countries of Hungary, Slovenia and Saudi Arabia (Figure 3). In the cases of Hungary and Slovenia, their previous domination by communist regimes is the likely reason.

Terrill (1996) indicated that eastern, formerly iron curtain countries were transformed to full democracies very quickly without time to adopt their laws and organizations parallel to democratic laws and organizational culture. In such situations, transition to democratic application from authoritarian traditions requires greater time and is still necessary and helpful to build a stabile democratic police organization. Otherwise, the transition to a democratic police organization could cause unexpected and unfixable damage in their society such as lost of trust and fear of crime.

However our hypothesis proves invalid in the case of Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia implements most of the democratic policing applications, yet the lowest score in democracy of the countries analyzed. Perhaps, this dilemma may be explained by the efficacy and efficiency by which democratic policing reforms are rigidly controlled by the country’s political regime, and its religious traditional civil culture, and traditional organizational culture and so forth. However, we are limited by the data in our measurement of this efficacy and efficiency.

In addition there is a slight deviation from hypothesized correlation in the case of South Africa. As Mokotedi and Koitsioe (1997) indicated in their research, this disparity
was the result of the historical fear of violence between whites and blacks. This fear results in the need for a strict and fast-moving police organizations to prevent possible future violence during this time of transition from apartheid to democracy.

**Evaluation and Discussion of Cross Tabulations of Variables:**

As discussed earlier and depicted below in Table 3, decentralization seems more preferable model of police organization in democratic countries. Accordingly, it may be said that the decentralization of police agencies is more consistent with democratic values and actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralization</th>
<th>PTS</th>
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<th>Decentralization</th>
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</table>

At this point, it is necessary to explain the unique situation of South Africa. Even though, South Africa was evaluated as a democratic country in the Freedom House Index, the Purdue Political Terror Scale, which is prepared using data from the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International, focuses on human rights issues in the country. According to the Purdue Political Terror Scale, South Africa is classified as a level four country, which indicates that it has murders, disappearances, and torture as a common part of life. Even though new, global policing practices have been adapted to the South African Police Organization in order to combat outgoing high crime problems throughout
the country, the results do not yet reflect a high level of improvement. However, the future of country looks promising (Lever & Van der Spuy, 2000; Gordon, 2001).

In terms of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing practices, there are two different findings. As seen in Table 4, community policing became widespread in democratic world. However, countries like France have not adopted any policy called “community policing.” Nevertheless, their overall historical policing practices are centered around community relations (Gleizal, 2000). In addition, Hungary and Slovenia still have not adopted a specific policy called community policing. However, feasibility studies are currently underway (Videtic, 2000).

On the other hand, problem oriented policing does not find widespread support among democratic countries. This is due in part to its complicated nature. Goldstein (1990) indicated that problem-oriented policing requires more resources, very well educated personnel and, long and difficult training that many countries cannot afford. It is very difficult to find the desired level of personnel to adhere to this complicated policy. In addition, the resources used in this study did not expose enough data on this particular policy application.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Policing</th>
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<th>Problem Oriented Policing</th>
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</table>
The use of ombudsmen and oversight by legislatures, elected officials, or the courts are widespread in all levels of democracies. However their efficacy and efficiency are questionable based on the character of the individual regime (Table 5).

Table 5. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of Ombudsman and Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Oversight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ombudsman</th>
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<tr>
<th>Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Oversight</th>
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According to Mendes (1999), conversion democracies and non-democratic countries are using such policies as security valves to get rid of mass protests around the country. Since this study did not evaluate the efficacy or efficiency of these policies, the apparent availability of those applications is assumed and accepted as enough. On the other hand, the nature of those kinds of applications tends to change in time in the midst of a democracy, and they are, in reality the product of democracy regardless (Walker & Kreisel, 2001).

Civilian complaint boards and oversight by Non-governmental Organizations receive almost the same rating on the Political Terror Scale, they operate in basically the same way and stem from the same legislations. Those two applications exert control over the police and are the most recently applied methods in democratic countries. As indicated in previous chapters, civilian oversight in general mirrors the growing movement of all countries towards a better democracy, not only by helping to better
policing practices, but also by developing policies and procedures that help police do their job (Table 6).

Table 6. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of Civilian Complaint Boards and Civilian Oversight by NGOs.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PTS</th>
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<table>
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</table>

According to the individual reports of each country and several independent sources, even conversion democracies and non-democratic countries tend to adopt democratic applications in response to the pressures placed on them by the international community. Certain political, trade, and security agreements depend on the existence of democratic programs (Kratcoski, 2000; Szikinger, 2000; Da Silva, 1999; Gleizal, 2000; Terrill, 1996).

Internal police controls and effective disciplinary procedures that are established by law and implemented by ordinances or rules are generally considered to be the primary in police agencies in every type of regime or country. As indicated by Bayley (1985) and Berkley (1969), the organizational structures of police organizations have these mechanisms to hold police accountable not only to the community they serve, but also to the stakeholders of the governments (Table 7).
Modern and advanced scientific policing techniques are highly desired and recommended by scientists as well as governments (Table 8). However, due to the rapidly changing nature of today’s technology, its considerable expense, and the need for highly trained personnel to use it, the level of technology used in each country varies along a huge flabellum. Most of the countries use at least some level of technology and some degree of advanced scientific policing techniques in their police organizations.

On the other hand, some scientists including Marx (1998 & 2000), the leading figure to support technological methods as a way to better democratic policing, have also indicated that high levels of caution must be exercised when police work and science are combined. Technology can be used by police to invade individual privacy, and privacy is a central element of democracy (Coleman, 2001).

Table 7. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of Internal Police Control and Effective Disciplinary Structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Police Controls</th>
<th>PTS 1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tr>
<th>Effective Disciplinary Structure</th>
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Table 8. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of the Advanced Technology Use for Investigations of Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advanced Technology Use for Investigations of Crime</th>
<th>PTS 1</th>
<th>2</th>
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</table>
Police trade unions are seen as a catalyst within the police organizations. They foster the democratization of the organization in principal (Berkley, 1969; and Skolnick, 1966). Police trade unions in Russia serve as an example of such theory. According to Gilinskiy, even the inefficient structure of police trade unions in Russia helped on some level to democratize policing in the country (Gilinskiy, 2000).

Table 9 Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of the Trade Unions in the Police Organizations.

<table>
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<th>PTS</th>
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Gleizal (2000) in France, and Morgan and Newborn (1997) in England, state that police trade unions like any other trade union in a democratic society, not only encourage and promote the democratization of the police organization, they also help with the overall democratic stabilization of the country itself.

“Use of force training” was indented for the purposes of this study, to be measured in this study was beyond the to be a variable that indicated whether intensive training takes place within a country that helps officers to understand when the use of force is appropriate and respectful of individual human rights. However, the term “use of force training” is also used to describe simple “how to” classes. These classes are used to simply teach recruits and/or officers how to operate weapons and how to physically overcome and combat a presumed criminal. It was, in some cases, difficult to tell how to term “use of force training” was being applied. For this reason, extreme caution should be exercised when evaluating “use of force training.” Because use of force training is
classified as one of the necessary requisites of basic police training, all countries have such training at some level (Table 10).

Human rights training, however, is another matter. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights designs the standards of human rights training programs to be consistent with the UN Decade for Human Rights Education Program. In addition, the European Council Directorate General of Human Rights designs parallel requisites in its report on “Police and Human Rights 1997-2000.” Both international organizations have established access to check the situations in each country and publish reports regarding the situation in each country at the moment. The results below reflect real numbers on the existence of human rights training programs (Table 10).

As seen in Table 10, direct human rights training is not considered necessary by democratic countries, even though the programs of international agenda require and insist upon such implementations. There could be two reasons for this refusal to comply. The first one is explained by Trautman, that human rights training could be infused into other, different training programs, such as criminal procedure, the use of force and firearms, decision making, armed conflicts, police administration, police investigation techniques trainings, and police liability training sessions. Furthermore, most training programs disperse human rights training activities throughout without any specific human rights training (Trautman, 2000). The second possible reason for a lack human rights training is explained by Das (2000). He notes that most of the countries interpret separate human rights training to be embarrassing in its current adaptation, or find it repressive to their current, so called very democratic and successful systems.
Table 10 Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Presence of the Use of Force and Human Rights Training in Police Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Force Training</th>
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<th>Human Rights Training</th>
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On the other hand, some other countries have adopted human rights training policies easily and promptly, expecting to get financial help from the UN, or perhaps the European Council (Bayley, 2001; Weber, 2001). A proper conclusion is impossible in these cases.

In addition to the variables explored above, several social scientists state that the media does a great deal to control the police by bringing public attention to their anti-democratic wrongdoings (Goldstein, 1990; Goldsmith, 1999; Marx, 2000, Lewis, 2000; Neyroud & Beckley, 2001.) Many police agency administrators have adopted new policies like keeping the society informed as soon as possible and making their operations transparent in order to increase their reliability and accountability. Consequently, policies have been adopted to establish transparency to the media in their regular and routine operations. Table 11, shows that most of the democratic countries have these types of policies in order to help increase their level of accountability. The media is a powerful tool that can be used to combat crime. In order for police to successfully wield this tool, their operations must be open to the media (Windlesham, 1998; LaFree, 1998).
Table 11. Number of Countries with given terror rating according to the Transparency of Police Operations to the Media

<table>
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<th>Transparency to Media</th>
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On the other hand, according to the Vera Institute’s 2001 Report, particularly in countries where community based or non-governmental structures do not have open relationships with police, the media can give voice to society’s concerns about crime or police responsiveness. Accordingly, the media also plays a role in exposing police misconduct and pressuring police to reform (Stone & Ward, 2000).
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The police in democratic society are required to maintain order and to do so under the rule of law. As functionaries charged with maintaining order, they are part of a democratic bureaucracy. The ideology of a democratic bureaucracy emphasizes individual discretion rather than disciplined adherence to rules and regulations. In contrast, the rule of law emphasizes the rights of individual citizens and constraints upon the initiative of legal officials. This tension between the operational consequences of the ideas of order, efficiency and personal initiative on the one hand, and legality on the other, constitutes the principle problem faced by police as a democratic legal organization (Skolnick, 1966). In the last two decades, stakeholders, policy makers and scholars have looked for policies that combine the police discretionary power with accountability to the people. They created many policies, including community policing and problem-oriented policing. In addition, they tried to adopt old policies to new expectations by supplementing them with new control mechanisms, such as civilian oversight, ombudsmen, and so forth. In so doing, they have created new policies that promote both effective and efficient crime combating policies and more democratic police organizations that emphasizes the rights of individual citizens.

More than that, new policing policies are designed to develop democracy by creating certain democratic mechanisms, as explained in the second chapter of this study.
(Bayley, 2001). The democratization of police is as important as the democratization of the country. New world order encourages all countries to adopt a more democratic stance by solving their problems using democratic means. Democratic policing, in this sense, is the main prerequisite for the solutions of community-based disruptions. One of the most prolific and widely cited social analysts, Francis Fukuyama (1999), gives most of the credit to policing practices for redefining the social order.

Many scholars agree that police organizations can help democratize a country. However they also agree that this help is limited. Bayley (1997), as one of these scholars, indicated that unless the regime is dedicated to becoming democratic, there is little that the reform of police can accomplish on its own to bring about a democracy. Alternatively, others, like Marenin (2000), research the same conclusion from a different perspective, insisting that policing can be depoliticized and therefore can be removed from partisan and particularistic control through its subservience to the law, organizational regulations, professional norms and democratic culture. He also added that the relationship between police and democracy has to be mutual. Policing supports democracy, but democracy, in turn, must keep the police in cheek. The people must make sure that the police do not overstep their autonomy, and that they avoid the corruption, and misuse of force that may result from exceeding their bounds.

This study has shown that democracy and democratic policing are interrelated and that there is a significant positive correlation between them. Most of the policing applications that are classified as democratic policing practices are designed to promote democracy in any state with any level of democracy. Democracies, in turn, tend to
promote policing practices that maintain, consolidate, or stabilize the democracy of the country. Even though the efficiency, efficacy, accessibility or other unseen or unstated qualities of the variables analyzed are questionable, the simple presence of those variables indicates that a country is more likely to be democratic.

Decentralized police organizations were more likely than centralized police organization to promote democracy. All types of oversight have received significant support, together with “internal control,” “effective disciplinary structure,” “unionism” and “the use of advanced technology to investigate crime.” “Community policing” and “problem-oriented policing” are both new approaches to policing that change the nature of policing in terms of crime fighting, organizational structure, and proactive and reactive approaches, and so on. While “community policing” has received significant support despite its expensive and radical nature, “problem-oriented policing” has not found the same support with its complicated and vague character.

It should be noted that most of the democratic policing variables that focused on police operations, such as community policing and problem-oriented policing, and some of the variables that focused on organizational structures, such as civilian oversight by NGOs, and police trade unions, were consistent only with a decentralized police organizational structure. In fact, it would not be incorrect to announce that decentralized police organizations are more dynamic and adoptive. They are open to newly developed techniques and are very quick to adopt these new techniques and abandon old ones.

Applications like unionism, civilian complaint boards, and civilian oversight by NGOs, were only chosen by democratic countries. Unionism and civilian control boards
were never chosen by transition democracies or antidemocratic countries. New democracies such as Hungary, Slovenia, and in some sense South Africa have adopted at least one of these three vital applications. Rapid steps towards the improvement of democracy in such countries, even in the presence of democratic laws and regulations, allow police to act arbitrarily and in a repressive way. This shows that police can affect human rights and democracy by not obeying normative behavior, instead showing more concern for democracy, in fact, encourage the public to call for it.

The variable “Human Rights Training” by itself did not showed any positive correlation to the levels of democracy in the countries, but was present in all of the European democracies. There could be two different reasons for this. First of all, many democratic countries believe that human rights training by itself does little to make a difference in overall human rights violations. According to some scholars and researchers in the field, revising overall police training curriculums to teach a respect for human rights is more likely to change police behavior (Shearing, 1997; Hazenberg, 2001; Sheptycki, 2000; Bayley, 2001). Second, even though many democratic countries will attest to this conclusion, they have adopted specific human rights training courses due to European Union Regulations (Andersen et al., 1995).

In democracies, governmental agencies must represent the community they serve by race, ethnic background, religion, gender and political profiles. The analysis of this study has confirmed that belief. All established democracies have representative police organizations. Research has shown that some nation-states like Japan still did not meet this requisite. Even though, the member countries of the European Union presented in
this study have representative organizations, in Europe, before the regulations were adopted and required by the European Union, the situation was the same. The countries, then, are forced to change their national laws to establish more representative police organizations. However, that change covers only the citizens of member states. In fact, some counties, like Germany, decided not to adopt such policies (Andersen et al., 1995). On the other hand, the nationality laws of those countries are still in conflict with the European Union regulations. This conflict is not likely to be resolved in the near future. Since those laws are in force, it seems illogical to expect countries to be representative not only in Europe, but in any part of the world.

In this analysis, internal police control mechanisms and effective disciplinary structures received the same level of support from all levels of democratic countries. Because the literature emphasizes that internal police controls and an effective disciplinary structure promote democratic policing, it was obviously intended that these controls and the system, laws, and regulations were arranged and forced within democratic beliefs. Namely, if the laws and regulations were not designed within democratic structures, the meaning of these two variables was just imposition of a coercive and antidemocratic government. In order to avoid such confusion, in this study, it is better to look at those variables together, either considering civilian oversight or transparency to the media in addition to control and discipline. The combination, then, can show the intended purpose. The situation is exactly same for the variable “Legislative, executive, and judicial oversight.” If one cannot assume an overall democracy in a country, this variable means nothing at all and can be manipulated by the
governments in question. Consequently, extreme caution is needed when analyzing such variables and forming a conclusion. On the other hand, since there were many other variables used herein that are not consistent with any kind of coercive power or anti-democratic behavior, the combination of all the variables together can offer a reliable conclusion.

Many scholars believe that technology use in policing will diminish the anti-democratic, suppressive and discriminating behaviors of police (Marx, 1999; Coleman, 2001; Broderick, 1987; Neyroud & Beckley, 2001). However, many also agree that the uncontrolled use of technological improvements will also increase the suppressive power of the police by diminishing individual privacy (Shapiro, 1999). In this analysis, it is observed that all countries use technology in policing. However, some countries like Colombia, Brazil and South Africa did not have enough resources to use technology in policing. In this analysis, especially, the availability and usage of AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) and criminalistics laboratories (with DNA analysis capability for example) have been examined and accordingly evaluated. In the end, it was found that there is no clear correlation between democracy and the use of advanced technology to investigate crime and democracy.

An additional variable, transparency to the media, showed that there is a strong correlation between police-media relations and democracy. Accordingly, in democracies, police operations are transparent to the media. Thus, society can establish strict control over police. Without any exception, this conclusion was verified by the analysis of this research.
All of the policies that were chosen here have to do primarily with crime reduction. Beyond that, they are operational, organizational, administrative applications. By democratizing policing, the purpose is still the same: to lower crime rates. Democratic policing is designed to achieve this goal using democratic means. Some people claim that such policies tie the hands of police while not effectively combating crime. Administrators from transition democracies in particular seem to feel that initiatives such as civilian oversight and transparency to the media place too much pressure on police. As a result, police avoid confronting these types of systems, and do not perform their primary duty, namely, going after criminal (Das 2001). On the one hand, this is partly true. On at least some level, police officers think about the future of their career. They are afraid of putting themselves in controversial situations. Consequently, they play it safe, not pursuing complicated situations even when they could legally go further.

On the other hand, this statement is not entirely true. These systems do not obstruct police operations. Quite the contrary, they encourage and assist the police. In fact, they protect police officers from the accusations that are leveled against them (Walker & Luna, 2000; Lewis, 2000). The opposition to these systems stems mostly from a lack of officer training regarding the application and effectiveness of these policies (Marenin, 2000; Neyroud & Beckley, 2001; Bayley & Shearing, 2001).

In terms of certain operational policies such as, for example, community policing, there is no research that clearly shows that these policies do decrease overall crime rates. However, because their main purpose is to stop crime before it is committed, there is enough evidence to indicate that policies such as community policing are more effective
in certain neighborhoods and in certain types of crimes (Goldstein, 1990). Also, as Windlesham (1999) indicates, the benefits of these policies are long term. They are accompanied by radical positive changes in the attitudes of the community towards the police.

In addition, as Sherman (1978) and Trautman (2000) indicate, when effective controls are placed on the police, corruption and brutality will diminish. Consequently, the police will become more effective, and, more specifically, more able to prevent crime. Controls lead to a better organization, and, accordingly, better policing (Knapp et al., 1972; Mollen, 1998; McClurg, 1999).

Other studies also indicated that several of the methods used in democratic policing agencies effectively reduce crime. In addition, democratic policing methods encourage police agencies to respect human rights, act within the scope of the law, be accountable to the public, be representative of the community, and be responsive to the community. All of these by-products of democratic policing promote democracy in the society at large.

It is highly likely that the world can perhaps expect more from democratic policing than even these results. However, further research is needed to clarify the relationship between democratic policing and crime rates.

In closing, it should be noted that in today’s global civilization, most economic and social policies are shaped by the research conducted by social and political scientists (Lipset, 1959; Diamond, 1992). These scientists gather their data from various sources, as indicated earlier. Accordingly, the representation of a country in their reports directly
influences the policies that are implemented and therefore shapes the country’s economic and social future. With this in mind, the power of policing in the international arena should never be underestimated.
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