EVOLUTION, NOT REVOLUTION: THE EFFECT OF NEW DEAL LEGISLATION ON INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND UNION DEVELOPMENT IN DALLAS, TEXAS

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The New Deal legislation of the 1930s would threaten Dallas' peaceful industrial appearance. In fact, New Deal programs and legislation did have an effect on the city, albeit an unbalanced mixture of positive and negative outcomes characterized by frustrated workers and industrial intimidation. To summarize, the New Deal did not bring a revolution, but it did continue an evolutionary change for reform.

This dissertation investigated several issues pertaining to the development of the textile industry, cement industry, and the Ford automobile factory in Dallas and its labor history before, during, and after the New Deal. New Deal legislation not only created an avenue for industrial workers to achieve better representation but also improved their working conditions.

Specifically focusing on the textile, cement, and automobile industries illustrates that the development of union representation is a spectrum, with one end being the passive but successful cement industry experience and the other end being the automobile industry union efforts, which were characterized by violence and intimidation. These case studies illustrate the changing relationship between Dallas labor and the federal government as well as their local management. Challenges to the open shop movement in Dallas occurred before the creation of the New Deal, but it was New Deal legislation that encouraged union developers to recruit workers actively in Dallas. Workers' demands, New Deal industrial regulations, and union activism created a more urban, modern Dallas that would be solidified through the industrial demands for World War II.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL	American Federation of Labor
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
FLSA	Fair Labor Standards Act
ILGWU	International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
NIRA	National Industrial Recovery Act
NLB	National Labor Board
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
NRA	National Recovery Administration
NWLB	National War Labor Board
TLRB	Texas Labor Relations Board
TWOC	Textile Workers Organizing Committee
TWUA	Textile Workers Union of America
UAW	United Automobile Workers
UTWU	United Textile Workers Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

By 1900 Texas had gone through a period of economic development that yielded three cities that were among the fastest growing in industry and population in the nation. These cities were Houston, San Antonio, and Dallas. Many studies of the urbanization and industrial development of Houston and San Antonio have been conducted, but only recently has Dallas attracted attention. According to historians Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, Dallas ranked eleventh among the twenty-five largest American cities in 1900. It ranked seventh in 1920 and fourth by 1940. They maintain in their book, *The City in Southern History: The Growth of Urban Civilization in the South*, that the South, Dallas included, became more attractive to eastern markets and industry during the beginning of the twentieth century for the relocation of their businesses because of the South's restored railroad systems, cheap labor, and expanded hydroelectric power.[1]

These factors definitely made Dallas attractive to northern business investors, but as in other southern communities it was only the creation of New Deal legislation that aided industrial workers in Dallas to challenge the open shop mentality that was established and shift some support toward industrial union development and representation. It is the argument of this dissertation that in Dallas, Texas, unions were established in the textile, automobile, and cement industry because activities of both workers and union organizers were encouraged by New Deal legislations and organizers, and that the New Deal legislation had both a positive and negative impact on the working life and union representation of industrial workers in Dallas. These case studies will illustrate the complexity of the relationship between workers, management, and

[1]Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, *The City in Southern History: The Growth of Urban Civilization in the South* (Port Washington, NY: National University Publications, 1977), 22.

owners in industrial Dallas, as well as the changing perspectives and expectations of workers toward the federal government's responsibility in their working lives.

C. Vann Woodward asserted that southern industrial development had a slow start, but when northern interest peaked it brought economic prosperity and social conflict. In *The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945,* historian George Tindall details the changes that occurred throughout the South in the 1920s and 1930s and maintains that the southern people reacted in defensive ways to these new and unfamiliar racial, social, and economic changes in their cities. Most southerners desired to maintain their traditional principles while taking advantage of the growth of a diversified economy. Tindall claims that this struggle for balance dominated local leadership in most southern communities. Historian and author Roger Biles agrees with Tindall in his article entitled "The Urban South in the Great Depression." Biles illustrates that under the leadership of Robert L. Thornton and his Dallas Citizens' Council, coupled with the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, city leaders dominated local politics and controlled the community's reaction to the New Deal. According to Biles, these organizations continued to have a tight control on the city well into the 1960s.[2]

With the new industrialization came conflicts and problems within the infrastructure of southern cities. In 1911 George Waverly Briggs, a statistician from the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, conducted a study of housing among laborers in Texas that included Dallas. Briggs examined

[2]C. Vann Woodward *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), passim; George Brown Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), passim; Roger Biles, "The Urban South in the Great Depression," *The Journal of Southern History* 56 (February 1990): 71-100. Another classic work that speaks to the interpretation that the New Deal threatened to upset the status quo and alter some cherished institutions that southerners fervently believed to be the very bedrock of Southern civilization can be found in Frank Freidel, *FDR and the South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1965), passim.

> approximately 7,000 homes for working-class families of modest means, and observed that nearly forty percent of the city's population lived in "shotgun" design [homes and that] . . . Dallas . . . possessed an inadequate sewerage system. The economic plight of Negroes and organized white factory workers in Dallas frequently forced them to take boarders into their poorly ventilated "shotgun" houses. [He] found 'many three to five room houses in Dallas lodging from seven to twelve persons.[3]

As workers became more concerned about such conditions created by the industrialization of their communities, national unions became interested in establishing local chapters. In turn, manufacturers in Texas became suspicious of outside organizers and sought a solution to this growing problem. This sentiment was illustrated in the *Southern Textile Bulletin* warning that "the trouble with labor . . . was that working people possessed a 'spirit of self-expression' that was out of place amid the 'whirr of the spindles and the rattle of the looms."[4]

The New Deal did not bring immediate solutions to the many problems and conflicts of industrialization. Historian Paul Mertz details in his work, *New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty*, how New Deal programs both affected and ignored the chronic condition of southern poverty. A central theme to Mertz's argument was that southern society was characterized by "widespread poverty[, which] has been one of the distinguishing features of the South's historical experience, setting the region apart in a nation which has usually enjoyed material adequacy." Mertz suggests, through his discussion of southern poverty, that it was unlike the condition of poverty in other states, which made it a unique challenge for New Deal reformers.[5]

In terms of industrial development, Mertz argued that the southern cotton textile unions failed in establishing a strong presence in the South even though there were several strikes and

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[3]James C. Maroney, "Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Houston, 1975), 6.

[4] Broadus Mitchell, *The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South* (New York: DaCapo Press, 1921) , passim; Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, *Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 136 (quotation); "Welfare Work," *Southern Textile Bulletin*, April 6, 1916, p. 4.

[5]Paul Mertz, *New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), xi.

attempts to organize textile workers throughout the South. He claims that federal New Deal administrators sought to combat the southern poverty problem in two ways. First, Mertz asserts that they desired to raise southern incomes, which would provide the southern worker with more local purchasing power. Second, they tried to help the South provide needed incentives to eastern industrial investors so that they would be willing to bring industries to the South.[6]

Mertz maintains that there was a lack of unity and agreement in Washington as to the correct method of combating the southern poverty issue. He describes three very different viewpoints when it came to the chronic problem of poverty. Mertz claims that "some saw parity prices as the region's principal need. Others, more cognizant of chronic poverty, advanced plans for rehabilitation of the poor . . . Others envisioned a general economic development of the South, which would create an overall prosperity." Ultimately, he concludes that "none of these approaches proved fully adequate."[7]

In 1986, James A. Hodges published *New Deal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1941*, in which he argues that the programs and policies created by New Deal legislation had little or no real impact on the daily lives of the southern textile workers. Hodges asserts that the economic despair that existed in the South during the Great Depression was not reversed, due to the fact that the New Deal policies and leadership did not have the commitment or political force to bring about real change. This author's argument was that the southern cotton textile unionists failed to recruit a majority of southerners to organize textile workers throughout the South, and so there was no substantive change.[8]

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[6] Ibid., passim.

[7] Ibid, 256.

[8] James A. Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1941* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), passim. An excellent discussion of the failure of the Knights of Labor in the nineteenth-century South, due to the conservatism of southern leadership and financial instability can be found in Melton A. McLaurin, *The Knights of Labor in the South* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), passim.

At the heart of Hodges' thesis is his analysis of the failure of southern unionization. He claims that this failure not only weakened the national textile industry's unionization, but more specifically intensified the southern anti-union sentiment to the degree that the national unions became more interested in creating a stronger membership base in northern states. He asserts that the failure was not due to the workers' desire to create a local union, but instead failed because of the conservative leadership of union officials and southern business owners' fear of a shifting power structure. Hodges claims that since the Civil War, workers had been seeking ways to enhance their relationship with management, and so at its core the New Deal was not revolutionary. He asserts that

> for more than nine in ten southern cotton textile workers [their achievements] remained painfully basic – the eight-hour day, the forty-hour week, and the minimum wage . . . The threat of unionism, at best, hastened the change from the older and weaker imperatives of cotton mills paternalisms to modern management techniques, a change which here and there improved the lot of workers.[9]

Because New Deal changes were not revolutionary, little progress was made in replacing old conservative management attitudes with more progressive ideals.

This dissertation agrees with Hodge's assertion about conservatism, which is clearly illustrated by the open shop condition of Dallas. During the 1920s, Dallas business and political leaders had established a strong open shop city in the city. They publicized to the nation that Dallas was perfect for investment because it was almost free of union interference. The New Deal legislation of the 1930s would threaten Dallas' peaceful industrial appearance. Overall, this dissertation also agrees with Biles that change did come slowly, and thus it will disagree with Hodges that the New Deal had little or no real impact on the lives of workers. In fact, New Deal programs and legislation did have an effect on the city, albeit an unbalanced mixture of positive

[9] Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1941*, 6.

and negative outcomes characterized by frustrated workers and industrial intimidation.[10] To summarize, the New Deal did not bring a revolution, but it did continue an evolutionary change for reform.

It is the opinion of this researcher that the effects of economic regulation are often not immediately felt. Time is required in order to reverse tradition and paternalism, and the "basic" changes Hodges refers to are important evolutionary steps toward lasting change. New Deal historians have long chronicled the negative and positive impact that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), specifically Section 7(a), had on the relationship between labor and management in the Northeast and the Upper South. Hodges claims that the effect that the National Recovery Administration (NRA) had on the southern workers through all southern states lacked the immediate impact that workers desired. Ultimately, Hodges maintains that "the New Deal did not provide a model for all seasons, and the failure of cotton textile unionism marked one of the important limits of reform that bounded the possibilities of change that could be achieved through the New Deal." Southern workers wanted the national government to support them in their pursuit of collective bargaining, but instead the promise of Section 7 (a) was not the reality that they inherited. This dissertation will show that the goals of the NRA were often unfulfilled and incongruent for many workers, but these growing pains were a necessary step that laid a foundation for lasting change by the 1940s.[11]

Some blame the workers for the failure of New Deal legislation. Historian Christopher

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[10]Roger Biles, *The South and the New Deal* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), passim;

Roger Biles, "New Deal in Dallas," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 95 (July 1991): 19. James C. Cobb, in *Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877-1984* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1984), assert that industrial growth in the South had only a limited impact on modernizing the region and that New Deal programs solidified the modernization of the early twentieth century. This theme is repeated in James C. Cobb and Michael V. Namorato, eds., *The New Deal and the South* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1984), passim.

[11]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 198; Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 6 (quotation).

Tomlins states in his chapter for the book *The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives* that

> some [workers] resisted the mechanization of the production process or sought to compete with machinery by lowering their piece or wage rates. Others tried to control the introduction of machinery and to widen their jurisdiction to include craftsmen working on the same or related production processes, thus preserving their influence by building one union of all the strategic workers in one industry or group of industries.[12]

Others, such as Hodges, argue that by the mid-1930s textile workers as well as those in other industries were willing, in theory, to participate in and work with New Deal legislation. They were motivated by their desire to escape the effects of the Great Depression and to reverse the constant "competitive pressures on costs, in the absence of any effective regulation [that] led to a never-ceasing search for lower costs per unit to meet or surpass the costs of rivals." This would almost always result in lowering wages for workers and increasing the number of machines for which a worker was responsible.[13] This appears to be true for Dallas, which further illustrates how an evolution in ideas laid the groundwork for even more sweeping changes in the 1940s.

At the same time, Dallas industrial owners were not immune from joining in the New Deal fervor, but as soon as the demands and restrictions began to take their toll, these same businessmen, especially in the automobile and textile industries, began to violate many of the NRA regulations. Douglas Smith argues in his 1988 work, *The New Deal in the Urban South,* that in his investigation of four specific southern cities he found that the policies and programs created by the New Deal formed a new urban South in which traditional social and economic

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[12]Melvyn Dubofsky, ed., *The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), 149 (quotation).

[13]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 20. Many important works challenge the perception of a culture of docility among southern mill workers, including Melton A. McLaurin, *Paternalism and Protest* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971); David L. Carlton, *Mill and Town in South Carolina* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Bryant Simon, *A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); and Allen Tullis, *Habits of Industry: White Culture and the Transformation of the Carolina Piedmont* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

structures were openly challenged. Focusing his analysis on Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee; Atlanta, Georgia; and New Orleans, Louisiana; because they were urban southern areas that were similar in industrial development, racial pressures, and agricultural productivity, Smith asserts that the Great Depression affected local attitudes and created a disconnect between their local community and Washington D.C. Research indicates that the same disconnect and discontent materialized among industrial workers in Dallas, Texas. Smith claims that the creation of the New Deal relief agencies paved a way for social welfare agencies to develop in these same geographic areas. Dallas was a growing urbanized area by the 1930s. The industrial worker, just as in other southern urban cities, had by the time of the New Deal become ready to challenge the political traditions and open shop policy of the city.[14]

Smith shows that with the creation of the NIRA and the subsequent labor codes, southern workers had an avenue toward achieving better working conditions and higher wages. This researcher would agree with Smith's interpretations. But he admits that even though these codes were established, industrial noncompliance was rampant throughout the South. Smith asserts that "manufacturers in the scattered company towns rarely adhered to the codes, and even in the larger urban areas, the textile statue was defunct in almost all plants by 1935." Nonetheless, Smith's analysis of the four urban cities led him to assert that the relationship between the federal government and southern urban cities would be greatly altered due to their dependence on federal intervention and relief assistance, and thus a solid foundation was laid for ongoing reform.[15]

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[14]Douglas Smith, *The New Deal in the Urban South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 51; David Goldfield, *Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), passim. Goldfield would disagree with Smith in that Goldfield claims that progress was a euphemism for tradition and that the South had no real cities because rural values were still the prevailing attitudes among city leaders.

[15]Smith, *The New Deal in the Urban South*, 51.

In terms of the success of the southern labor movement, Smith claims that the experience of black southerners was problematic due to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan's anti-union sentiment intensified the atmosphere in which black southerners found it more difficult, if not close to impossible, to establish and maintain economic success. Smith details that through the New Deal employment programs, low paying jobs that were formerly classified as black jobs were redefined during the Depression as open to southern whites. Smith claims that the New Deal programs gave preferential treatment to southern whites so they could receive most of the employment and direct relief. Smith illustrates this argument by stating that the

> developments within the black communities mirrored what transpired in general throughout the major southern cities during the depression period. There were few immediate, fundamental changes; public service facilities and opportunities remained truly separate and unequal. Although many jobless individuals and their families benefited from the New Deal programs, the overall status of black life improved very little, if at all.[16]

So if there was evolutionary progress, it was shaped by persistent biases, such as racism.

The above description pertains to Dallas as well as other southern cities, due to the fact that many New Deal programs limited the employment of persons of color. Other published works that are important to this research project and pertain to Texas and southern race relations include Michael Phillips's book, *White Metropolis: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in Dallas, 1841-2001*. Phillips concludes that white business leaders systematically excluded Mexican Americans, Jews, and African Americans from the internal political systems and economic success that the city's industrialization brought to the established few. Phillips asserts that local

[16]Smith, *The New Deal in the Urban South*, 256 (quotation). Daniel Letwin, *The Challenge of Interracial Unionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), and Robert Korstad, *Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), are excellent resources on the frustration that African American unionists felt toward the unwillingness of the majority of white workers to join a biracial union. When biracial unions were achieved, it was usually in mining communities where the absence of white womanhood made social equality possible. Korstad argues that unions represented the best hope for achieving the New Deal vision of economy democracy and social justice.

white leaders created a "whiteness identity" that blended Southern traditions with a Southwestern regional identity. Phillips's research is useful to this study in that his analysis about how white power affected the working conditions and opportunities of Mexicans, Jews, and African Americans will provide excellent context concerning the working conditions of Dallas cement workers throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.[17]

Historian Walter L. Buenger's *The Path to a Modern South: Northeast Texas Between Reconstruction and the Great Depression* further investigates the connections between southern culture and the western elements of the Texan culture. Buenger focuses his analysis on eleven counties in the extreme northeastern section of the state between 1887 and 1930. He does allude to the effect of the New Deal and World War II but does not concentrate his study on these two important events. Buenger concludes that the changes the New Deal and World War II brought to northeast Texas intensified the economic stability and industrial development that was already occurring in this region. He asserts that the New Deal did not cause the shift from an agrarian to an industrially dominated region, but that this modernization was encouraged by the New Deal programs and legislation. According to Buenger, the foundations of economic, social, and political change had been established by the time of the Great Depression, so northeastern Texans were more willing to accept relief and aid through the New Deal programs. Buenger maintains that because of this positive attitude toward the federal government, Texas became less southern and more American. The research contained in this dissertation illustrates how the

[17]Michael Phillips, *White Metropolis: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in Dallas, 1841-2001* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), passim. Additional scholarship focused on the relationship between race, the collapsing agricultural system, and the promise of the New Deal can be found in Howard Rabinowitz, *Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), and Robert H. Zieger, ed., *Organized Labor in the Twentieth Century South* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1991). It should be noted that Foley's work focuses on Mexican agricultural workers and not the Mexican industrial workforce.

industrial workers of Dallas challenged southern paternalism in a similar way and began to participate in and support union development in their respective industries. Therefore industrial workers in Dallas began to identify their labor struggle with communities and workers outside Texas.[18]

Historian Lionel Patenaude's book, *Texans, Politics, and the New Deal*, began as a dissertation focused on the Texas politicians that were influential in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. Even though the New Deal is mentioned in the title of this work, the dominant analysis is centered on the elected federal officials of the Lone Star State that had the seniority to chair nine high ranking congressional committees. Patenaude specifically focuses on the influence of Vice President John Nance Garner, Representatives Maury Maverick and Hatton W. Sumners, and Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, concluding that these men were central to the successes and failures of New Deal programs and policies. Unfortunately, Patenaude does not detail the impact of these policies on local Texas cities or communities, but his data are very useful for background information about the influence of Texans in the Roosevelt administration, whose decisions directly affected Dallas.[19]

In terms of labor relations, Patenaude maintains that these Texans supported the social changes that were included within the New Deal legislation, but they were primarily concerned with economic recovery and not social reform. Therefore, the Texans in Washington did support the Agricultural Adjustment Act, National Industrial Recovery Act, and emergency employment relief. Ultimately, the legislation of the Second New Deal made these Texans realize that a change had taken place among the New Deal elements of the Democratic Party. Patenaude

[18]Walter L. Buenger, *The Path to a Modern South: Northeast Texas Between Reconstruction and the Great Depression* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), passim.

[19]Lionel V. Patenaude, *Texans, Politics, and the New Deal* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983), 59-70.

contends that "financial reform was something that Texans could understand, but . . . [they] found little sympathy . . . for some of the other objectives of the New Deal. Reform that benefited labor was a good example: most of the Texas delegation were against the Black-Connery Wages – Hours Bill of 1937 and several voted against the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938."[20] Regardless of their motives, these men made decisions that reshaped Dallas.

The conservatism of Texas' elected officials in Washington, who supported New Deal legislation primarily for economic recovery, was even stronger on the local level. According to Anthony J. Badger, in "How Did the New Deal Change the South?," unionization and other such labor reforms in the South were greatly restricted by voting laws that created a very small group of voters.[21] In Texas, requirements for paying poll taxes excluded poor people and people of color, creating a white electorate with property that was most likely to elect leaders who would support conservative ideas. Politicians in Texas, as elsewhere in the South, tended to join with manufacturers in opposing union organizers and other trouble-makers, and these same leaders opposed efforts by workers to raise wages and otherwise reduce the attractiveness of the South for industrial investors. Laborers either could not vote or, in failing to organize, did not vote in a unified fashion, leaving political leadership at the local, as well as the national, level in conservative hands. This further slowed the evolutionary impact of the New Deal, though as will be seen, it did not eliminate change entirely.

The following works concentrate more specifically on the implementation and effect of the New Deal programs on Texas. Author Jay Littman Todes in his dissertation, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas, 1900-1930," centers his argument on the anti-union

[20]Patenaude, *Texans, Politics, and the New Deal*, 72.

[21]Anthony J. Badger, "How Did the New Deal Change the South?," in *New Deal/New South: An Anthony J. Badger Reader*, ed. Anthony J. Badger (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2007), 40-44.

sentiment that strengthened through the beginning of the twentieth century. Todes claims that Texas employers openly supported the development of and even participated in open shop associations in order to discourage national union development. The author focuses on the Texas cities of San Antonio, Beaumont, El Paso, Houston, and Dallas. This work is dated but does place Texas in the national narrative of labor history. Even though this dissertation was written in 1949 and was based on limited resources, Todes provides an excellent discussion of the use of employer's tactics, as well as detailing the workers early pursuit of collective bargaining and use of the strike in order to achieve their agenda.[22]

In *The South and the New Deal,* historian Roger Biles investigates the impact of New Deal policies on the Old South and its traditions. Throughout his discussion, Biles does include Texas, Dallas in particular, in his analysis of the changing field of southern politics and labor conflicts that occurred during the 1930s. He concludes that the New Deal brought economic recovery and innovation to the southern states, but not without challenging the societal and traditional norms based in southern culture. This dissertation seeks to research more deeply these assertions for specific industries in Dallas.[23]

According to Biles, changes came grudgingly, in part because "the New Deal marked the beginning of the end of southern exceptionalism." After Reconstruction, southern politicians feared that the federal government would limit their individual rights and challenge their local social and political structures. The Great Depression created an unfortunate situation for most southern states in that federal government intervention was the only way to stabilize their economies. Biles concentrates primarily on the Lower South, but he does mention that because

[22]Jay Littman Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas, 1900-1930" (M.A. Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1949), passim.

[23]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 25-27.

of the oil industry Texas was more fortunate than other states and had a similar reaction to the New Deal programs as other southern states. Biles claims that the New Deal program prepared the South for the industrial productivity that the Second World War demanded of every state. This dissertation seeks to confirm this assertion.[24]

Biles provides more specific details in an article entitled "The New Deal in Dallas," in which he claims that the New Deal programs in Dallas had a minimal impact on the city and its social structures due to the power that local government had in maintaining the status quo. Specifically, Biles states that "resistance to change resulted from the influence of powerful elites, unvarnished fealty to long-standing values and institutions, the political powerlessness of the have-nots, and the New Deal's admittedly modest reform agenda." Biles asserts in this work that the main concern for Dallas leaders during the 1930s was the rising unemployment in the city. He states that in Dallas in 1931 "18,500 jobless men and women applied for relief . . . Employers discharged married female employees and retail stores cut back to a five –day work week." As for black residents of Dallas, Bile's claims that they survived the Great Depression due to the federal aid and relief agencies created by the New Deal, but these government administrators did not focus on challenging Jim Crow traditions of employment and hiring practices for southern blacks.[25]

Biles disagrees with historian Lionel Patenaude, who wrote in his article "The New Deal: Its Effect on the Social Fabric of Texas Society, 1933-1938," that the New Deal did change the physical landscape of Dallas. Patenaude describes how Roosevelt's alphabet programs provided

[24]Ibid, 157.

[25]Biles, "New Deal in Dallas," 19 (first quotation), 7 (second quotation). Another good city-level case studies of union successes and failures can be found in Alan Draper, "The New Southern Labor History Revisited: The Success of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union in Birmingham, 1934-1938," *Journal of Southern History* 62 (February 1996): 87-108.

new housing for racial minorities, created jobs for many residents through the Works Progress Administration and the National Youth Administration, and changed labor codes for many local industrial workers. Patenaude concludes his argument by asserting that even though Dallas workers were generally positive about the New Deal programs, local business owners became increasingly resistant to the later legislation, specifically the Wagner Act in 1935 and the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) in 1938. Opponents of the New Deal, especially local business owners affected by the FLSA, claimed that President Roosevelt had lost touch with the needs of the business community and was creating legislation that was radical. Patenaude maintains that business owners held the belief that through these pieces of legislation that

> [the United States] was headed toward socialism, communism, and interestingly enough even fascism. . . Thus, big government became un-American. While the business establishment was not reluctant to take handouts, it never was willing to submit to the encroachment of big government and the welfare state on its prerogatives.[26]

This dissertation supports Patenaude's assertion that New Deal legislation brought fundamental changes to both the industrial workforce of Dallas as well as molding Dallas into a more modern city.

Useful to the research pertaining to company town paternalism in an urbanized setting is the *History of Apparel Manufacturing in Texas, 1897-1981*. In this, historian Dorothy DeMoss investigates industrial development from the perspective of the Texas garment industry's owners and managers. Focusing on twenty-one Texas firms, DeMoss asserts that unionism failed in the state. This failure, according to DeMoss, was not because of bad management or sweat shop conditions, but because the workers had an affectionate and personal relationship with the factory owners. This relationship led to the gradual improvements in the living standards and working conditions of workers. DeMoss claims that the owners held festivals, parties, picnics,

[26] Lionel Patenaude, "The New Deal: Its Effect on the Social Fabric of Texas Society, 1933-1938," *The Social Science Journal* 14 (1977): 56.

and ball games because of their paternalistic concerns for their workers and not because owners were willing to create any programs to pacify their workers in order to maintain an open shop. She maintains that "it is not surprising that garment industry unions found great difficulty in recruiting members in Texas."[27]

Other scholars strongly disagree with DeMoss. Historian Isaias James McCaffery's dissertation, entitled "Organizing las Costureras: Life, Labor and Unionization Among Mexicana Garment Workers in Two Borderlands Cities," disagrees with DeMoss' assertion and claims that the parties and balls thrown by Texas manufacturers "show . . . that many of the manufacturers were earning fat profits and entered into a high 91 percent, excess profits tax brackets . . . Wealthy owners needed tax deductions and could claim promotional parties as legitimate business expenses." James C. Maroney's 1975 dissertation, entitled "Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929," investigates the relationship between Dallas business owners and their workers. He agrees with McCaffrey that this relationship was difficult, dangerous, and frustrating for Texas workers due to the fact that the industrial mangers held all of the power and influence. Other theses and dissertations that support this argument include the following: Travis H. Polk's "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas" (1966); Vance Davidson Sumner's "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas" (1942); Jack Rivers Strauss' "Organized Labor in Dallas County" (1948); and James Lee Forsythe's "The Effect of Federal Labor Legislation on Organizing Southern Labor During the New Deal Period" (1962).[28]

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[27]Dorothy DeMoss, *The History of Apparel Manufacturing in Texas, 1897-1981* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989), 144.

[28]Isaias James McCaffery, "Organizing las Costureras: Life, Labor and Unionization among Mexicana Garment Workers in Two Borderlands Cities – Los Angeles and San Antonio, 1933-1941" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Kansas, 1999), 45-56.; James C. Maroney, "Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Houston, 1975), passim; Patricia Evridge Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas* (Austin: University of Texas

Historians Sidney Fine, Allan Nevins, and Frank Ernest Hill have analyzed the changes that occurred between labor and management from the business owner's viewpoint. They conclude, that especially in the automobile industry, the New Deal promoted significant changes, but that businessmen like Henry Ford resisted these changes so dramatically that the result of New Deal legislation was often violence first and social reform later. This resistance to unionization and subsequent violence would not only occur in Detroit plants but also in the Dallas plant.[29]

The most recent scholarship on the development of Dallas, entitled *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas* was published in 1996 by Patricia Evridge Hill. Even though she discusses the labor conflicts through the 1920s and 1930s, her research focuses on the growth of the city's internal structures, changing politics, and the relationship between the city's industry and their community. Therefore there is a need for further analysis of the labor conflicts and compromises that occurred during the 1930s in Dallas.[30]

General histories pertaining to the effect of the New Deal on the South provide an excellent backdrop for analyzing its effect on Texas. There have been numerous studies conducted on the Deep and Upper South about various industries and the NRA, but New Deal

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Press, 1996), xiv-xxix; Travis H. Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas" (M.A. Thesis, North Texas State University, 1966); Vance Davidson Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas" (M.S. Thesis, North Texas State Teachers College, 1942); Jack Rivers Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County" (M.A. Thesis, Southern Methodist University, 1948); James Lee Forsythe, "The Effect of Federal Labor Legislation on Organizing Southern Labor During the New Deal Period" (M.A. Thesis, North Texas State College, 1962.

[29] Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962* (3 vols., New York: Scribner's Press, 1963), III, 47, 52-53, 132-33, 167; Sidney Fine, *The Automobile under the Blue Eagle: Labor, Management, and the Automobile Manufacturing Code* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 202; David Brody, "The Emergence of Mass- Production Unionism," *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century*, ed. David Brody (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 221-262.

[30]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, xiv-xxix. For a similar study of another Texas city, see Harold L. Platt, *City Building in the New South: The Growth of Public Services in Houston, Texas, 1830-1915* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982).

and labor historians have either left Texas out of their discussion or have given the state a passing mention. Overall, the scholarship on Texas's industrial development is varied and the scholarship of the effect of the New Deal programs on Texas is shallow. Specifically, the historiography on the industrial development and the impact of unionization efforts during the early twentieth century in Dallas is brief. Ultimately, historian Carl Degler claims that the New Deal was "a revolutionary response to a revolutionary situation." This researcher agrees with Degler's interpretation that the philosophies and intent of the New Deal were revolutionary, but it must also be noted that its results were tempered by the humanity of its subject, making the changes more evolutionary than revolutionary. To show this, this dissertation seeks to add to the scholarship by focusing on the development of industry and unionization in Dallas, as well as an analysis of the effect of the open shop movement and New Deal legislation on this urban area.[31]

This dissertation will investigate several issues pertaining to the development of the textile industry, cement industry, and the Ford automobile factory in Dallas and its labor history before, during, and after the New Deal. The specific questions that this research project seeks to investigate are as follows:

- Why and how did the textile manufacturing industry, cement manufacturing, and a Ford automobile plant develop in Dallas County?
- Who were the owners? Who were the workers?
- What were the attitudes and activities of these Dallas owners toward any union activity among their workers before, during, and after the New Deal period?
- If conflicts arose between management and labor on the subject of unionization, how were they solved? And, if so, what was the outcome?

[31]Patenaude, "The New Deal," 57; Carl N. Degler, *Out of Our Past: The Forces That Shaped Modern America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 416.

- What effect did the National Industrial Recovery Act, Wagner Act, and Fair Labor Standards Act have on the above selected industries and their workers in Dallas?
- How did race affect the above mentioned questions?
- And finally, how did World War II change the local atmosphere toward unionization and the working conditions of Dallas textile, cement, and automobile workers?

Therefore in tracing the effect of the New Deal legislation and World War II on the development of certain industries and labor unionization in Dallas, this study asserts that while these pieces of legislation were not revolutionary, they had an evolutionary effect on the city and a deeper and lasting influence than previous historians have claimed. New Deal legislation not only created an avenue for industrial workers to achieve better representation but also improved their working conditions. Reformers recognized that industrial labor not only needed a change in their economic power but that poor and dangerous working conditions needed to be addressed. New Deal legislation thus began a conversation among government officials, who responded to the basic needs of America's many industrial workers. This dissertation will also examine the development and presence of company town characteristics among these Dallas industrial workers and the southern paternalism that existed in this urban area. The legislation produced from the New Deal provided an opportunity and encouragement to industrial workers in Dallas seeking to challenge this paternalism and establish union representation for themselves similar to the activities of industrial workers around the United States.

Specifically focusing on the textile, cement, and automobile industries will illustrate that the development of union representation is a spectrum, with one end being the passive but

successful cement industry experience and the other end being the automobile industry union efforts, which were characterized by violence and intimidation. These case studies will illustrate the changing relationship between Dallas labor and the federal government as well as their local management. The Dallas textile workers lay in the middle, with both violent actions and limited success in union recognition and representation. It is the intent of this dissertation to assert that the worker's experience and union development and activity in the1930s was similar to that not only of industrial workers elsewhere in the South but also in the automobile plants of Michigan. Challenges to the open shop movement in Dallas occurred before the creation of the New Deal, but it was New Deal legislation that encouraged union developers to recruit workers actively in Dallas. Workers' demands, New Deal industrial regulations, and union activism created a more urban, modern Dallas that would be solidified through the industrial demands for World War II.

CHAPTER 2

THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT: A LOCAL AND NATIONAL EXAMINATION

New Deal historians have long chronicled the negative and positive impact that New Deal legislation, specifically Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), had on the relationship between labor and management in the Northeast and the Upper South. But historians have examined only briefly the impact that New Deal legislation had on areas west of the Mississippi, specifically Texas. In Dallas, the promise of Section 7(a) was strongly felt and greatly affected the relationship between labor and management. The ideals of unionization were strong among Texas industrial workers, even though Dallas business leaders wanted to maintain the open shop system at all costs. Many of these industrial workers were not passive but active supporters of the growth of unionization through the use of protests and strikes. Dallas industrial workers, like those elsewhere in the United States, were further encouraged by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or Wagner Act, in 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938. Workers would interpret these pieces of legislation as the federal government's second attempt to focus on furthering economic recovery but a change in the importance and influence of worker's rights.

Since the Civil War, workers had been seeking ways to improve their treatment by management. In 1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was established to represent skilled laborers in their quest for better working conditions and higher wages. Labor historian Christopher L. Tomlins claims that at the turn of the century new mechanization created conflicts for the growing unions. Machines could now replace some workers, thereby strengthening the power that management had over labor. It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century

that a growing class of socially concerned Progressives began to study the workplace and lives of common workers in order to bring more attention and interest to their issues. Throughout the Progressive Era, unions fought for both recognition and reform. By the end of the nineteenth century, especially for the AFL, the ideal of collective bargaining for American workers became the focus and cornerstone of their public policy. Even though the AFL's numbers grew to four million by 1920, the lack of success in achieving their labor goals led to a decline in membership during the next decade that reduced the AFL's strength by half.[32]

Throughout the history of American industrial labor, there was re-occurring evidence that the accepted management style was one of paternalism and opposition to unions. This would soon be challenged. Under the terms of the NIRA, which was itself a response to the economic devastation brought by the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established on June 20, 1933, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and named Hugh Johnson as its first administrator. Johnson encouraged participation through his public relations campaign, "We Do Our Part." Some of the most enthusiastic recruits to the program were southern textile workers. Thousands of their letters flooded the White House, addressed to either Johnson or Roosevelt, expressing their deep gratitude for helping the "laboring classes of people." Johnson had previously worked for the War Industries Board during World War I and had experience in business and management. By August 5, 1933, Roosevelt created the National Labor Board (NLB) to settle any disputes that might arise between managers and their workers. Johnson turned to New Yorker Robert W. Bruere, an economist, editor, and arbitrator, to run the board. He had such presence that it eventually became known as the Bruere Board. Historian Janet

[32]Julie Novkov, *Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and New Deal Years* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 36; Tomlins, "AFL Unions in the 1930s," 157-170; Barbara S. Griffith, *The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988), 6.

Irons states that "the Bruere Board was created just in time. Its charge was broad: to guarantee a peaceful settlement of all disputes . . . [and] to serve as a model for all industries attempting to develop their own processes for peaceful resolution of disputes." Unfortunately, the president did not define the Board's authority in regulating and monitoring industry's compliance. Roosevelt "simply stated that the Board would consider, adjust, and settle differences and controversies among disputing parties." With is jurisdiction unclear, and its authority uncertain, the Board proved powerless in the face of determined opposition to unions from industrial leaders.[33]

On February 1, 1934, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6580, which finally allowed the Bruere Board to hold elections for representatives who would "represent all of the employees eligible to participate . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining." Because of this executive action, there was rapid growth in both local chapters of national unions and employer-created company unions. Membership in national unions increased from 3,144,300 in 1932 to 4,200,000 in 1935, while the number of workers enrolled in company unions swelled from 1,263,194 employees in 1932 to 2,500,000 in 1935. The greatest increase in national union membership could be attributed to growth in the United Mine Workers, United Textile Workers Union (UTWU), International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), and Amalgamated Clothing Workers, which were all under the umbrella of the AFL. Collectively, their growth accounted for 700,000 new members. According to historian Mark Starr, the ILGWU, which was particularly active in Dallas, "doubled and tripled and finally quadrupled in size until in 1937 its membership totaled 250,000. These new members were promptly christened 'NRA

[33] Janet Irons, *Testing the New Deal: the General Textile Strike of 1934 in the American South* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 63 (quotations), 77; Charles J. Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 25.

Babies' and greatly changed the character of the membership."[34]

The NRA's ultimate purpose was to promote an element of self-rule in industry under federal supervision in order to control overproduction, to raise wages, and control the hours of labor which would ultimately stabilize and then raise prices. Roosevelt believed that all this could be accomplished by creating a set of codes that industry would have to follow. Each individual code would have to be approved by the President and together would form a set of standards for fair competition for industrial workers. There were three NRA advisory boards that were responsible for the overwhelming task of writing codes for all United States industrial work. The Industrial Advisory Board, created from national business leaders, advised the President on all matters of industrial policy. The other two agencies were the Consumers' Advisory Board and the Labor Advisory Board. The Consumers' Advisory Board's intent was to represent the interest and viewpoints of consumers and to provide advice on how provisions of codes affected prices and standards of quality to consumers. The Labor Advisory Board was comprised of organized labor leaders who were sympathetic with the needs of organized labor and advised Washington on labor questions.[35]

By the spring of 1933, the Industrial Advisory Board, the Consumer's Advisory Board, and the Labor Advisory Board collectively "produced 546 codes for fair competition and 185 supplemental codes, covering some twenty-two million workers and filling thirteen thousand pages in eighteen volumes." The representatives of these boards felt that the first step to fair competition was the right of employees to organize and collectively bargain. Along with this

[34]Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work*, 34; Rhonda F. Levine, *Class Struggle and the New Deal: Industrial Labor, Industrial Capital, and the State* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1988), 56; Mark Starr, "Why Union Education?: Aims, History, and Philosophy of the Educational Work of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 92 (July 19, 1948): 197 (quotations).

[35]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 43; Levine, *Class Struggle and the New Deal*, 34.

right, the code set a ten dollar a week wage for the South and an eleven dollar a week wage for the North, as well as a forty-hour work week for production workers and a forty-two hour week for plant workers. The codes that were created differed and changed with the industry in which they were to be applied. The language of Section 7(a) of the NIRA dictates that local or minority unions would have the right to engage in collective bargaining with a representative "of their own choosing." Furthermore, any such organizations

> shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

Labor code investigator Thomas McMahon expressed in an official report his expectations for the New Deal, especially Section 7(a), declaring "I look forward with hope to the better day now dawning for our textile workers that all will hail and bless the day on which President Roosevelt had the courage, vision, and ability to present such a program for the rehabilitation of industry in our nation."[36]

In order to develop the labor portion of the NRA, President Roosevelt had turned to Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York. Wagner maintained that the partnership between industry and labor had to be an "indispensable complement to political democracy and such democratic self-government in industry would require the active participation of workers." Along with the right of collective bargaining, Wagner added two provisions to the final version of Section 7(a), which are as follows:

> (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his choosing; and (3) that employees shall comply with

[36]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 45 (first quotation), 60 (third quotation); Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work*, 18 (second quotation).

> the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other condition of employment, approved or prescribed by the President.[37]

These additions are important because industrial workers interpreted the NIRA as giving them the power to choose to participate in their industry's union development or to refrain from participation. In turn, they believed that Section 7(a) would guarantee government support if they did choose to join a union. And lastly, employees were to comply with the conditions of their employment in terms of what was approved by President Roosevelt, with the underlying assumption that their industries would not require of them anything outside of what the president stated were acceptable conditions.

Not only did the NRA promise reform for adult workers, but it also seemed to address the national demand for more regulation of child labor. In the early 1920s Texas Governor Pat Neff considered Texas businesses to be progressive if they favored the protection of women and children in industry, but he ultimately asserted that their complete protection would result from management maintaining the authority in labor relations.[38] By 1933 fourteen states, Texas included, passed a child labor amendment, though it was not until 1939 that a total of nineteen states would adopt laws that were "modeled along the Norris-La Guardia anti-injunction act of 1932 . . . [which provided] for minimum wages for women and children." According to historian James T. Patterson, one of the major problems with the success of the New Deal legislation on the state level was an issue of timing. Key New Deal laws such as the NIRA and Social Security were passed, but most of the states were not willing to incorporate these changes locally until after the Supreme Court finally ruled in favor of the constitutionality of these laws. Even then, in light of the Court's invalidation of the NIRA in 1935, there was hesitation. Patterson explains

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[37] Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work*, 23 (first quotation), 24 (second quotation).

[38] Randolph B. Campbell, *Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 369.

that "while several states managed to accomplish much in 1935 or 1937, the great majority needed more time."[39]

While industrial workers embraced unions as a key to collective bargaining and better working conditions, industry owners tried to retain control. Francis Gorman, who was president of the UTWU, maintained that the southern cotton textile employers only paid lip service to new codes and that most industrial leaders looked for way to get around the law. A study conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1935 concluded that eighty-nine percent of company unions were formed because of one of three main factors. These factors were "(1) defensive responses to trade-union headway in the plant or locality, (2) the influence of the NIRA, and (3) strikes, either current or recent." According to Hodges, much of the increase in union activity, and in the creation of company unions, took place in the South. There Wagner's argument that the fight for collective bargaining by American workers was "at the heart of the struggle for the preservation of political as well as economic democracy in America" apparently fell on deaf ears.[40]

According to historian Sidney Fine, there was no other company that would compare to the Ford Automobile Company, which received much attention and publicity between 1933 and 1935 concerning their failure and refusal to comply with the original NIRA codes. Even though the NIRA guaranteed workers the right of collective bargaining, basing that right on the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Henry Ford would never accept that this action was a right of his workers. In 1919 Ford had bought out his minority stockholders. Therefore, by the time that the Great Depression hit the country, Ford had for a decade made company policies indistinguishable from

[39]James T. Patterson, "The New Deal and the States," *The American Historical Review* 73 (October 1967): 71 (first quotation, 79 (second quotation).

[40] Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work*, 54 (first quotation); Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 61-62; Josiah Bartlett Lambert, *If the Workers Took a Notion: The Right to Strike and American Political Development* (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2005), 98 (second quotation).

his own. Fine states that Ford "did not believe that organized labor should play any part in the shaping of [company] policy. In his view, labor unions were simply 'predatory' organizations and were 'part of the exploitation scheme." The importance of the automobile code contained in the NIRA was that it referred to "the manufacturing and assembling . . . of motor vehicles and bodies therefore, and of component and repair parts and accessories by manufacturers and assemblers of motor vehicles." Even though only 25 percent of the workers in this industry fell under this specific code, the Dallas Ford plant employees were among this percentage.[41]

The National Labor Board (NLB), created in 1933, made several key decisions on how to manage and regulate the growing discomfort between management and labor on the subject of union membership. The NLB maintained that employers had to "bargain in good faith, [on the subjects of] wages, hours, and working conditions, as well as grievances; employers had to rehire any worker discharged because of union membership; employees had to negotiate before calling a strike; and a majority of employees constituted a legal bargaining unit."[42] The key to the success of New Deal labor legislation was an acknowledgement and cooperation on the part of the employer that his employees had the rights defined by the NRA and that he was willing to negotiate on these terms. In the beginning, employers were willing to participate in the New Deal because they believed that it would aid them in their long term goal of "[eliminating] cutthroat competition through nationwide price and production standards." However, despite nationwide sympathy for workers fed by concern over high unemployment, industry compliance with NRA regulations declined rapidly. The NRA regional office in Dallas produced reports

[41] Sidney Fine, "The Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.," *The Business History Review* 32 (Winter 1958): 353-385; Sidney Fine, "The Origins of the United Automobile Workers, 1933-1935," *The Journal of Economic History* 18 (September 1958): 253 (quotation).

[42] Lambert, *If the Workers Took a Notion*, 63.

Table 1: Statistical Report of Complaints for Dallas County – March 30, 1935

Received Since 1933	5847
Docketed Since 1933	4463
Adjusted Since 1933	2666
Rejected Since 1933	1111
Referred to Compliance Division	121
Blue Eagle Removed	13
Referred to District Attorney	3
Referred to Code Authority	259
PRA complaints received	264
Primary rejects and transfers	665
Number of adjustments involving restitution	1529
Amount of restitution collected since 1933	$149,924.64
Number of employees affected	4324

Source: Dallas Complaints Activity Records (File 1, Box 3, Record Group 9, National Recovery Administration, National Archives Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX).

about the number of complaints in the area and sent these to Washington every two weeks. The above chart reveals the regional numbers for Dallas County through March 1935. Historian James Hodges asserts that many employers believed that if they made efforts without direct interference to keep their workers out of unions, it would not be a violation of Section 7(a). Essentially most of the confusion occurred because "Section 7(a) did not specially designate what management tactics for persuading workers to keep clear of unions constituted unfair labor practices." Hodges adds, "[Ultimately the act could be characterized as] vague and ambiguous, [but as Francis] Perkins said many years later [this was] a 'problem in semantics."[43]

In order to investigate any grievances properly, the NRA Code Authority would hire two or three investigators to look into the charges to see if they were valid and if the involved parties could come to some agreement or compromise. Their reports were often rerouted several times to several internal committees, which created a great deal of red tape. While these reports dealt

[43]Irons, *Testing the New Deal*, 49 (first quotation); Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 46 (second quotation).

with a broad variety of problems, many confirmed that workloads had greatly increased during the Depression, while most indicated that legal wages were not being paid. Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall explains that management began to require workers to do the same amount of work in eight hours that they had been required to do in twelve hours. In letters written to Roosevelt and the Code Authority, workers referred to this as "code chiseling." According to Charlotte Graham, who was a garment worker at the Justin-McCarty manufacturing factory in Dallas, owners were able to get around both the wage and hour codes. She maintained that under the garment industry code, "workers were to receive $9 per week during a training period lasting a certain number of weeks, and $12 per week thereafter. . . [unfortunately] workers at Justin-McCarthy were fired just before the end of the training period and then rehired as apprentices. They were never paid $12 per week." In order to circumvent the thirty-six hour work week, which was established by the NRA garment industry code, owners would force their workers to punch out at 5:00 p.m. and leave through the back door and then return through the front door and work until 11:00 p.m. The owners would not allow workers to clock back in, eliminating any record of a longer work week, as well as the possibility of promised overtime pay.[44]

Ultimately by 1934 many national union representatives claimed that the NRA Code Authority favored the employers and that the claims investigators conducted sham inquiries and only surface investigations of the workers' concerns. According to historian Landon R. Storrs, the NRA codes failed because the federal government chose to recruit businessmen to enforce the codes, thus creating a situation in which the codes were not enforced fairly because they often sided with management instead of labor. Motivations aside, the statistics do bring into question the thoroughness of their investigations because of the following:

[44]Lambert, *If the Workers Took a Notion*, 72; Melissa Hield, "Union-Minded": Women in the Texas ILGWU, 1933-1950," *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 4 (Summer 1979): 62 (quotation); Hall, *Like a Family*, 76.

> from 8 August 1933 to 8 August 1934, [the Code Authority] received and submitted 3,920 complaints alleging violations of the cotton code . . . 1,724 concerned the wage and hour provision of the code, 438 the 'labor provision' and 984 the stretch out, while 774 were classified as miscellaneous. The Code Authority made only 96 investigations of violations of wage-hour provisions and found only one case to be a valid complaint.[45]

Hall reveals that the impact of such lax tactics was that "spurred on by rising labor costs, mills of all kinds climbed aboard the rationalization bandwagon, cutting out weaker workers and tightening the workday by methods that seemed cold-blooded and crude." Work schedules were often erratic at best. It was not unusual for managers to send workers home for a day or two and then call them back to work around the clock when orders were received.[46]

The scandals brought angry reactions. Storrs maintains that "employers' sweeping disregard of Section 7(a), especially in the South, [prompted several prominent progressives to draft] a searching critique of the early New Deal." As the "Consumer's League," they presented their proposals in person to Roosevelt in April 1934, then published an open letter in *The Nation*, *Survey Graphic*, and *The New Republic*. There were more than 200 signatures to this letter that called for government to put more teeth into Section 7(a) in order to better support the workers. According to historian Rhonda Levine, official disregard, compounded by growing frustration among the nation's workers, brought more strikes throughout the country. Levine disagrees with Perkins about the level of strike activity, pointing out that

> strike activity was greater in 1934 than in 1933; it involved 1,470,000 workers in 1,856 strikes. A total of 2,014 work stoppages occurred in 1935, involving 1,170,000 workers. The major cause of the pre-1934 strikes had been the desire for higher wages and better hours, but the main issue in the majority of the strikes in 1934/35 was the desire for union recognition.[47]

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[45]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 92 (quotation); Landon R. Storrs, *Civilizing Capitalism: The National Consumers' League, Women's Activism, and Labor Standards in the New Deal Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 56.

[46] Hall, *Like a Family*, 295.

[47]Storrs, *Civilizing Capitalism*, 119 (first quotation), 120; Levine, *Class Struggle and the New Deal*, 114 (second quotation).

Hodges describes the impact of Section 7(a) on cotton textile workers as having been invited "to a fancy ball they were [too] poor to attend." They resented this, and on August 30, 1934, the UTWU announced that on September 1, 1934, a nationwide strike would go into effect. The true work stoppage occurred on September 4th due to the Labor Day holiday. A summer strike had almost erupted because NRA chief Johnson on May 22, 1934, had "ordered a sixty to ninety day period of reduction in the hours of production of textiles with no corresponding increase in hourly wage." In the fall of 1934, when he denounced textile strikers and unions in general, Lucy Mason, who headed the Consumer's League, wrote to him, "It is tragic that General Johnson should use his position and prestige to arouse public opinion against workers who are exercising a right specifically given them by the organization he heads."[48]

The UTWU had contacted the NRA Code Authority in the summer of 1934 requesting that their wages be increased due to the loss in weekly hours. Their wages did not increase, but some concessions were made by the Code Authority, including

> (1) the right to strike for further demands was not to be prejudiced; (2) a cotton textile board representative was to be appointed to the NRA Labor Authority Board, the Cotton Textile Code Authority, and the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board; (3) the NRA Division of Planning and Research was to study wage rates and differentials ad productivity in the cotton mills; (4) labor representative acknowledge the seasonal character of the industry and the need for reductions in output.[49]

But these concessions were not enough to hold off a national strike among the nation's textile workers. Gorman, as UTWU president, planned the strike to encompass all textile workers and mills from Alabama to Maine. Gorman referred to his "secret orders" to the press in order to create the allusion that this strike was completely organized and under control. Hodges refers to

[48]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 95.

[49]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 95; Forsythe, "The Effect of Federal Labor Legislation," 119-120 (quotation).

Gorman during this period as the "Wizard of Oz" in Washington due to the fact that "in reality [the 1934 strikes were] a series of spasmodic, uncontrolled local strikes and walkouts, and it should be seen as a series of events rather than as one cohesive event comparable to later strikes by national unions against integrated national companies or industries."[50]

In areas where mills were not geographically close, Gorman used the tactic of the "flying squadron." Flying squadron's strikers "ranged in number from a hundred people or so to one massive column of a thousand." They would travel from mill to mill in a caravan of trucks and cars, flying the American flag, and invading each mill while calling for its workers to stop work and join the strike. They were very successful either because of their intimidation or the desire of the workers to join in the strike. Historian G. C. Waldrep maintains that "the squadron's purpose . . . was dual. On the one hand, it amounted to an invitation – a forceful one, to be sure, but from the point of view from the participants a joyful one – to become part of the strike movement." The use of this tactic created animosity and fear among southern employers, and in several cases it forced "southern governors to bring out the National Guard to ring the mills with bayonets to protect the property and rights of non-strikers to cross the picket-line."[51]

According to the *Dallas Morning News*, textile workers in the cities of Waco, Dallas, and McKinney did not participate in the General Strike of 1934. The article claimed that they went so far as to ask to work on Labor Day to prove their loyalty to the factories in which they worked. In the same article Clarence R. Miller, manager of the Texas Textile Mills, was quoted as saying that

> workers in our mills are of a type entirely different from those involved in the strike. Most of them are high school graduates. They are convinced there is no need of a strike

[50]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 106.

[51]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 105 (first quotation), 106 (third quotation); G. C. Waldrep, *Southern Workers and the Search for Community* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 62 (second quotation).

> as we have promised them that any concessions or advantages which workers gain by the strike will be granted them here.[52]

Miller in a previous interview with the *Dallas Morning News* had stated that Dallas "workers are not organized and have no affiliation with those in Eastern mills, many of who are foreigners."[53] Miller's public statement makes it clear that he was very short-sighted about the effect that the General Strike had on workers in Texas. The labor activities of September 1934 encouraged Texas workers, who shared national concerns about wages and working conditions, to think about the possibilities that could be gained through unionization.

Miller's claim about textile workers in Texas reflects the confidence of many industry leaders in the South. Historian Storrs explains that organizing for labor reform in the South was quite different from organizing in the North, "and not because southerners lacked 'northern energy.'" Southern politicians generally supported the efforts of industrial leaders to oppose wage increases, while regional biases forced union organizers to recruit southern-born workers to lead membership drives to combat a perception that "Communist Yankees" were infiltrating the mills.[54] At a national level, southern legislators supported New Deal relief and social insurance proposals only after they had amended those proposals to ensure local administrative discretion in labor and management disagreements. But southern factories paid at least forty percent lower than eastern factories, and so the southern industry posed a threat to the tentative stability that eastern unions had just briefly achieved. AFL President William Green in 1930 called for a "Southern Organizing Campaign" that would appeal directly to employers. Since 1929 the AFL had been gaining strength in southern craft unions, therefore the executive leadership of the AFL decided to commit to a big southern campaign. Green [felt that] the "refining influence that the

[52]"Textile Workers Ask Work on Labor Day Instead of Strike," *Dallas Morning News,* September 2, 1934.

[53]"Cotton Factories Safe From Strike," *Dallas Morning News,* August 18, 1934.

[54]Forsythe, "The Effect of Federal Labor Legislation," 123.

AFL brand of unionism could bring to both the factory and its community . . . [would] prevent such strikes as are now harassing the South." Therefore in the face of the growing dissatisfaction among southern workers, industrial leaders in the South seemed to have the support of political and even union leadership in their quest to protect the status quo.[55]

The UTWU ended the General Strike of 1934 on September 22, though there was "no commitment from employers regarding the workers returning to work without discrimination." The question now became if the NRA and the federal government wanted workers to organize and use collective bargaining, and if so, were they going to receive support. Unfortunately, Lloyd K. Garrison, who was the first chairman of the NLRB, wrote that "Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act can never be thoroughly enforced with even-handed justice under the existing administrative authority." He added, "The powers of the Board . . . are quite inadequate for the proper discharge of its responsibilities."[56] This became quite clear. Martha Gelhorn, who was an informal reporter and Code Authority investigator, reported "widespread discrimination against union workers. They live in terror of being penalized for joining unions; and the employers live in a mingled rage and fear against the imported monstrosity: organized labor." Historian Storrs maintains that even though the NRA officially promised workers the right to organize, by 1935 less than ten percent of them had joined a union. The Textile Labor Relations Board (TLRB) by May 1935 received "4,374 complaints from thirty-five states, involving 1,407 mills and 128,806 individuals." Of these, it claimed to have "adjusted 127 strikes, 38 in cotton, and conducted 135

[55]Storrs, *Civilizing Capitalism,* 126.; George Sinclair Mitchell, *Textile Unionism and the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930), 50-76; Irons, *Testing the New Deal,* 42 (quotation).

[56]Forsythe, "The Effect of Federal Labor Legislation," 121 (first quotation); Stanley Vittoz, *New Deal Labor Policy and the American Industrial Economy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 145 (second quotation).

separate hearings." Unfortunately, also by May 1935 the NIRA was declared unconstitutional; therefore the TLRB was left with no legal status to conduct more investigations or hearings.[57]

Some of the complaints received from industrial workers in Dallas were resolved in wage restitution. According to a report issued in January 1935, Region Eight, which included Dallas, had 4,509 complaints to investigate. These involved 3,251 workers and their requests for wage restitutions of $97,061.83. Of these complaints, 932 were rejected for lack of evidence of any violation of an NRA code. In comparison, Houston during the same time period from December 22, 1934 to the first week of January 1935 had 4,707 complaints, of which 953 were rejected. The Houston complaints involved 4,988 industrial workers and resulted in wage restitutions of $129, 140.87. The Labor Compliance Officer for Dallas was E. E. Hale, who was often accused of being overly sympathetic to workers but not necessarily to union tactics. At the time of his appointment, Hale was forty years old, married, with no children. He was born and raised in Texas and completed his undergraduate work at the University of Texas. He began as the Labor Compliance Officer for northern Texas in February 1934, which is about the same time that his boss, Edwin A. Elliott, was named as the Labor Compliance Officer for all of Texas. Hale hoped to resolve conflicts without the use of strikes. One of his successes in 1934 was convincing M.K. Hurst, president of Regina Manufacturing Company in Dallas to make a restitution of $400 to his employees. The employees of Regina Manufacturing Company, which produced novelty curtains, draperies, and bedspreads, had charged the company with violating the wage provision of the Code of Fair Competition within the NRA codes.[58]

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[57]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 123 (first quotation), 125 (second quotation); Storrs, *Civilizing Capitalism*, 99.

[58] Form B3: Summary, Wage Restitution, by Regions, (Box 1, Record Group 9, National Recovery Administration. NASR); Summary – Complaint Activities Texas Offices (Box 1, Record Group 9, National Recovery Administration, NASR); Letter from Javits & Javits to E. E. Hale, February 21, 1934 (Box 1, Record

For better or worse, Hale apparently had a kindred soul in Eliott. Upon his appointment, Elliott was forty-three years old and married with two children. Like Hale, he was also born and raised in Texas and graduated from Texas Christian University, after which he spent a year at the University of California, and then earned a doctoral degree at the University of Texas. In a supportive letter to the NLRB, Professor H. A. Millis wrote:

> [Elliott] has real enthusiasm and zeal; he is sympathetic toward labor but still has the confidence of business men; he has made a splendid record as labor compliance officer, and I am satisfied would work out exceptionally well as regional director for Texas and Oklahoma. I liked particularly the fact that he looks upon the maintenance of industrial peace as a real contribution and something worth striving toward.

Within the same August 1934 letter, Professor Millis provided the NLRB with his analysis of the differences between Ft. Worth and Dallas:

> As to the relative merits of Fort Worth and Dallas as a location for the office of regional director, I am inclined to favor Fort Worth. First, it seems to be conceded that the people of Ft. Worth are more liberal in their views than are people in Dallas; Second, it is a known fact that Dallas is an open shop town, whereas Fort Worth employers, in the main, deal with unions. I think that a director located in Dallas might be handicapped in his dealings with labor.[59]

Regardless of his office location, Ellis obviously had a lot of work to do in Dallas.

Early in 1935 the United States Supreme Court heard the case *of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corps et al. v. the United States.* In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the delegation power made by the NIRA was unconditional. Brooklyn poulterers Joseph Martin and Alex and Aaron Schechter had been indicted for disobeying the "live poultry code", which was one of the codes of fair competition, and failing to observe minimum wage and hour provisions. The brothers appealed their conviction and took their case to the Supreme Court. Ultimately

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Group 9, National Recovery Administration, National Archives Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX [hereinafter cited as NASR]).

[59]Prof. H. A. Milllis to National Labor Relations Board, August 23, 1934 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board, NASR).

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote the opinion of the Court, which declared that only Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce, not the president, and that Congress could not delegate legislative power to the president. Therefore, the NIRA was deemed to be unconstitutional because it exceeded the commerce power that had been given to Congress by the Constitution. Historian Paul Conkin aptly describes the sentiment of most mill and factory owners: "after an ailing NRA was declared unconstitutional . . . many business men gladly went back to clandestine collusion, happy to be rid of legal cooperation under the glare of unfavorable publicity and with an ever present threat of unhelpful government interference." Sadly, as Hodges explains, Section 7(a) of the NIRA had sparked a flurry of labor organizing that it ultimately could not support or protect.[60]

Due to the Supreme Court decision and confusion over local jurisdiction and the length that Labor Compliance Officers could take to aid workers, Elliott wrote to the NLB executive secretary, Benedict Wolf, for clarification. Elliott asked in a letter dated October 3, 1934, that if "an employee becomes[s] active in the matter of organization of a union and actually induce[s] many others to become members, yet is discharged from employment before he himself becomes a dues-paying member . . . can we consider this a violation of Section 7(a) and require the employer to reinstate the employee?" Wolf answered Elliott on October 8, claiming that "the discharge of men who express sympathy with unionization, although he is not a member of the union himself, will probably have the effect of restraining other employees from union activity and self-organization. We believe you can consider both examples you set forth as within the purview of Section 7 (a)." Even if the compliance officers had their directions, confusion still reigned among local business owners. Elliott found a general indisposition on the part of Dallas

[60] Vittoz, *New Deal Labor Policy*,90; Levine, *Class Struggle and the New Deal*, 83; Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 140 (quotation).

employers to make written agreements with employees. He commented in his December 1934 report that "both the laborers and industrialists are [still] anxious for a clarification of 7a, one of course hoping that it will be strengthened and the other hoping it will [be] weakened."[61]

Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall declares that the legacy of the General Strike of 1934 was that workers seized the opportunity for their voices to be heard through the collective action and political participation that the New Deal laws seemed to offer them. Even though workers were left feeling disillusioned by the lack of governmental support and growing blacklisting of union members in some southern communities, they would not abandon their efforts to have the intent of Section 7(a) realized in their communities and factories. Waldrep maintains that "in southern textiles, the union movement was able to build upon a preexisting and highly developed sense of mutuality, one based on living together, working together, and, for better or worse, shared poverty."[62] This was certainly true among the textile workers in Dallas.

The principles laid out by the NIRA became the foundation for developing and writing its successor, the NLRA, or Wagner Act. The NLRA was signed into effect on July 5, 1935, and established a legally enforceable right for America's industrial workers to unionize. This act made all company-run unions illegal, protected every union member's right to use collective bargaining, and allowed strikes to be used as strategic instruments to achieve union goals. The Wagner Act represented the New Deal's open break with the support of anti-union policies that dominated the country during the 1920s. One of the main highlights of the Wagner Act was that all labor disputes were to be submitted to compulsory arbitration. Even though this legislation detailed the federal sanctions that would occur toward any industry that attempted to derail union

[61]Edwin Elliott to Benedict Wolf, Oct. 3, 1934, Wolf to Elliott, Oct. 8, 1934 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board, NASR); Regional Labor Board Monthly Report, Dec. 31, 1934 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board, NASR).

[62] Hall, *Like a Family*, 353; Waldrep, *Southern Workers and the Search for Community*, 113 (quotation).

activity in their factories or plants, it did not specifically indicate any reciprocal requirements of labor unions toward industrial management.[63]

Ultimately the Wagner Act created a legal avenue for industrial workers to break away from company-run unions and establish an elected representative council that was independent of employer domination. The national law would not only inspire northern industrial workers to seek new strategies to solve their labor disputes, but would also filter down to southern workers. Historian Theda Skocpol claims that the "NLRA's sponsors believed that industrial peace could come only after the rights of independent labor unions were strengthened, a process that they realized might entail bitter conflicts with business." The hope was that this law would curb the violence that was simmering between labor and management. According to Labor Secretary Francis Perkins, the strike volume did decrease in 1935. This decline was qualified by stating that the number of idle work days was less in 1935 than in 1934, even though the number of actual strikes was more in 1935, specifically 1,856 strikes in 1934 and 2,014 strikes in 1935. This tentative peace did not last because, especially in the South, management was not willing to accept the changes that this law brought. Because the Wagner Act did not really provide for effective restraint of anti-union activities while it encouraged union organizers to redouble their efforts, the stage was set for further conflict.[64]

In Texas, the parts of the labor codes that industrial workers were most interested in was the establishment of a minimum wage and the right to bargain collectively. Even though unions were collectively never strong in Texas and did not grow rapidly, their development was greatly encouraged by the passage of the NLRA in 1935 and the establishment of the new Congress of

[63] Lambert, *If the Workers Took a Notion,* 63; Theda Skocpol, "Explaining New Deal Labor Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 84 (December 1990): 1,297.

[64]Skocpol, "Explaining New Deal Labor Policy,"1,298 (first quotation), 1,301.

Industrial Organizations (CIO) that same year. Unfortunately, Texas politicians serving in the national government did not share the interest of their state's workers in industrial unions. For example, Vice President Garner viewed "sit-down strikes" that would occur in various industries as a violation of property rights and was often angry with President Roosevelt for not taking some action to stop workers from using this tactic. In 1938, East Texas Congressman Martin Dies would garner national support for creating the House Un-American Activities Committee by asserting that union organizers were advocates of communism and treason, and he spent the next six years targeting, in very highly publicized attacks, the members and unions that were connected to the CIO.[65]

As an extension of the new labor legislation, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama first introduced the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in May 1937. The FLSA was passed in July 1937 after considerable debate in the Senate, but it was not until May 6, 1938 that the wages and hours bill received the 218 signatures for its discharge out of committee. The result was another compromise on wages and hours that created an advisory committee to review any violations of the standards. Specifically, the FLSA "provided minimum wages of twenty-five cents an hour for the first year, thirty cents an hour for the second year , and forty cents an hour for the third year; gave some companies up to five years to reach the forty cent an hour level . . . [and] dropped [the hourly demand] from forty-four to forty." Remarkably, editorials the following spring in the majority of urban and rural Texas newspapers opposed the FSLA, claiming that President Roosevelt was attempting to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling and create another interpretation of the NRA. This shift of approval among many Texans against the New Deal

[65]Campbell, *Gone to Texas*, 389.

programs was similar to that in other regions of the country because these attempted to solve complex urban and labor problems that had been the focus of decades of debate.[66]

Hesitation about the accelerating pace of New Deal reforms would not last long. Even though Texas textile workers did not participate in the General Strike of 1934, the event was extensively covered by local newspaper and influenced Texas workers in their future dealings with factory management. The textile workers knew firsthand that "the textile industry best exemplified noncompliance in the cities and throughout the South, where "Manufacturers . . . rarely adhered to the codes." The national consequence of this noncompliance usually only resulted in the manufacturer losing their blue eagle status, but locally it caused a great deal of unrest and disillusionment among workers. During late 1934 and throughout 1935, a series of strikes and walkouts spread through fifteen Dallas factories that were owned by members of the Texas Dress Manufacturer's Association. New Deal laws also emboldened Dallas industrial workers in the automobile and cement industries, bringing them into the national conversation about the conditions of labor and wages. In Dallas, all industrial workers took their cue from the promises made by the NRA codes, and the conflict between management and labor would only intensify. Workers began to appeal to federal agencies for aid, but the aid was often unbalanced in terms of the federal government's support of union development and regulating management. Throughout the next several chapters, efforts to secure union representation, and through that the many benefits of New Deal labor reform, will be examined in the textile, cement, and automobile industries in Dallas, Texas.[67]

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[66] Steven A. Sellers, "The Editorial Reaction of Texas Daily Newspapers to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1938" (M. A. Thesis, North Texas State University, 1977), 144.

[67] Smith, *The New Deal in the Urban South*, 51.

CHAPTER 3

THE OPEN SHOP MOVEMENT IN DALLAS, TEXAS, 1900-1930

As the New Deal began to take shape under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dallas was well-established as an open-shop city, where unions were not welcome. This contradicted the pro-union spirit that characterized the early industrial movement in Texas just one generation earlier. An act approved by the Texas legislature in May 1899 had made it legal for "any and all persons engaged in any kind of work to associate themselves together and form trade associations and other organizations for the purpose of protecting themselves in their personal work . . . in their respective pursuits and employment." Eight years earlier, according to the November 15, 1891, minutes of the Dallas Branch of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), members voted to pay union delegates for their specific trade representation. These minutes reveal that they "inserted a clause that all those who labor for the city [Dallas] shall not receive less than two dollars per day for any work performed on any public street, factory, or building." Workers throughout Texas at the turn of the twentieth century were quietly attempting to join unions in the hope of creating a better relationship with management. But while these actions marked the beginning of the push by Texas workers for union representation, this quest continued through the 1920s without much success. In fact, unions failed in Dallas, where open-shop policies excluded them.[68]

Not only did the Dallas branch of the AFL establish a standard wage, but at their meeting on February 7, 1892, they created a Grievance Committee and appointed a representative to hear workers' complaints. There is no evidence that any complaints were filed or ever heard. This

[68]H. P. N. Gammel, *The Laws of Texas, Volume 11: 1897-1902* (Austin: Gammel Book Company, 1902), 262 (first quotation); Dallas AFL-CIO Council Records, 1891-1970 [November 15, 1891 (second quotation)] (Folder 2, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington [hereinafter cited as UTA]).

early effort was just a demonstrative move toward supporting workers' concerns in Dallas. Most employers desired to avoid workers' organizations at all costs because they viewed unions as an "interference with the personal liberty of the employer and employee." Manufacturers believed that a closed shop, where only union members could work, shifted the labor power structure in favor of labor unions, and thus such organizations could continuously make more and more demands. According to Father Jerome Toner, an internationally recognized labor scholar and activist from Saint Martin's University, "the main characteristic of the closed shop principle consists of a 'spirit of exclusion," by which a person usually is barred from participation or employment in a given field unless or until he is, becomes, or promises to become a member in good standing of a given society, club, or union." Toner had been nicknamed "The Labor Priest" because of his persistent fight for worker's rights as a member of President Harry S Truman's International Labor Organization in Switzerland.[69] But on the matter of closed shops, his words reflect the conservatism of the owners, not the workers, and the former prevailed in early debates on the subject.

The early trade unions in Dallas gained much credibility through their campaign for an eight-hour day. Eight-Hour Leagues were established in Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, and Austin. Due to their political pressure, the eight-hour ordinance was passed and went into effect on May 1, 1890. Unfortunately, even though the legislation was passed, "many Dallas employers ostensibly responded to organized labor's calls for an eight-hour workday but paid their employees so poorly that most had little choice but to work longer."[70]

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[69]Dallas AFL-CIO Council Records, February 7, 1892 (Folder 2, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, UTA); Jerome L. Toner, *The Closed Shop* (Washington DC: The American Council on Public Affairs, 1954), 78 (first quotation), 16 (second quotation).

[70]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 66.

Gathering widespread support for unionization proved tougher than getting votes for restrictions on hours, in part because early union organizers allied with groups that many Texans distrusted. Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, Dallas trade unionists collaborated with local socialists in order to achieve union goals, improve working conditions, and challenge the traditional business policies of Dallas industrialists. Even though the Dallas Trades Assembly, the local chapter of the AFL, and Socialist Local No. 36 remained officially unaffiliated, they worked together to support socialist candidates for Dallas city government between 1904 and 1915. In Dallas, union advocates such as George Clifton Edwards began to combat the anti-union sentiment in the area through the publication of the *Laborer*. Starting in 1904, Edwards sought to support the Dallas Trades Assembly in their various pursuits for their workers. The Dallas Trades Assembly consisted of thirty-three different unions that covered both skilled and unskilled workers. Edwards made it clear that he felt that socialism would be an excellent tool with which local workers could shift the power of capitalism from management to a balance between the owners and employees. The purpose of the *Laborer* became to provide a review of national and international labor trends and to expose Dallas workers to the principles of the socialist party. In order to create a grassroots effort, Edwards kept "the *Laborer's* price . . . very low – making it accessible to almost all workers. A single issue cost a nickel and yearly subscriptions to the weekly sold for one dollar." With financial support from union officials in the Dallas Trade Assembly and Dallas socialists from Local No. 36, the weekly was able to survive, and Edwards even created the Laborer Publishing Company. This firm was responsible for the production of the first socialist pamphlet written and published in Dallas, entitled "*Shall We Work or BE Worked*?"[71]

[71]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 44-46, 72.

By 1911 the Socialist Party in Dallas had grown to approximately 1,000 members, but only 400 of those members were eligible to vote. Even though the party had some support in Dallas, it had very limited political power due to the fact that the majority of their members were women or males who, because they had not paid their poll tax, could not vote in local or national elections. In 1911, Edwards distributed over 11,000 copies of the *Laborer* in an attempt to raise more political support. Unfortunately for him, this public relations strategy was not successful. Even though he also lost a bid for mayor in 1913 against the incumbent candidate, William M. Holland, the Dallas Socialist Party did have some success in illuminating and changing the lives of workers. Edwards, along with other socialists such as Dean Stuck and George Hinsdale, fought for the abolishment of child labor. Edwards chose to live in South Dallas among the cotton mills, and he witnessed the impact of the working conditions on the family:

> children as young as six worked off the payroll. Fifteen-hour days were not uncommon during peak periods. The operatives lived in squalid shotgun houses and suffered high rates of tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases caused by the fine cotton lint they inhaled at the mill. The practice of working young children severely limited the educational opportunities of mill employees.

With the help of state senator Alexander W. Terrell, Edwards and his colleagues drafted a basic bill that established minimum working age limits as well as the hours that a child could work. Unfortunately the health of Edwards and his family would not be spared. Before they left South Dallas, both he and his wife had contracted tuberculosis and their two infant daughters had died from the disease.[72]

Just as Edwards was actively working toward improving the working conditions of Dallas mill employees, a young Carl Brannin moved to Dallas and accepted an apprenticeship at a local cotton mill. Brannin's experience at the mill enabled him to become a powerful union advocate

[72]Ibid., 48-49.

for Dallas workers. His surprise at the long hours, low pay, and the condition of children at the mill prompted him to become connected to the Dallas socialist movement. Sixty years after he first went to work at a cotton mill in Dallas, Brannin recalled "that [in 1909] women received seventy-five cents a day, unskilled men received one dollar, and skilled weavers on piecework rarely earned more than two dollars [and that] . . . the eight-to-ten- year-old doffer boys already hump-shouldered from pulling bobbins of yarn off spinning machines." Even though he did not officially join the Socialist Party for three years, he sought to ease the transition of rural and immigrant people to the demands of the urban Dallas environment. Brannin worked tirelessly to expand the educational and financial opportunities for Dallas' industrial workers.[73]

Ultimately the effect of Dallas radicals during the beginning of the twentieth century was to draw attention to the working conditions for industrial workers and to try to empower them to seek a better working environment from their employers. In addition, due to the urban expansion that came after World War I, they encouraged city officials to create improved public services for the forgotten sections of industrial Dallas. But more important, in Dallas, as throughout the South, the common response to the influx of labor organizers like Brannin was the creation of, or in some communities the resurrection of, the open shop system. An open shop is defined as an industrial workplace in which management, in theory, does not make a distinction between union and non-union workers. According to author Jack Strauss, "employer interpretation of the open shop may vary all the way from this theoretical position, through employer discouragement of trade union membership, to cases in which any worker possessing a union card or found attending a union meeting is immediately dropped from the payroll."[74] More often than not, an open shop was one in which union membership was either discouraged or banned.

[73]Ibid., 50.

[74]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 64.

In 1895 at a meeting of Cincinnati businessmen, Thomas H. Martin, the editor of an Atlanta southern industrial journal entitled *The Dixie Manufacturer,* first suggested that there should be created a national organization to protect the interests of American manufacturers. By 1903 the newly created National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) issued their Declaration of Principles, which consisted of ten by-laws establishing their policies on boycotts, strikes, blacklisting, etc. Ultimately the spirit of their declaration was that manufacturers should be able to control and run their factories unmolested by either labor unions or the federal government. In the same year, NAM publicly declared at their convention in New Orleans, Louisiana, that they were an enemy of the closed shop system. They encouraged their membership to promote an open shop system. Specifically, their philosophy can be best summarized by stating that an open shop "meant that the employer was to be free to conduct his business affairs, to make decisions, and to determine – unencumbered by outside pressures."[75]

Throughout the 1920s, NAM intensified its opposition to the closed shop by creating their "American Plan." This movement reached its greatest strength in the South between 1920 and 1923. Within this system, manufacturers would acknowledge local trade unions and would allow these organizations to engage in collective bargaining through local representatives, who had been selected by the factory owners. Ultimately, "'the 'American Plan' purported to abolish the 'un-American' closed shop, but as in other open shop crusades, the destruction of unionism was the real objective, and neither effort nor money was spared in this crusade." Workers desired unionization because their perception was that it brought greater job security and would weaken the employers' temptation to fire high-priced union workers in order to replace them with cheap non-union labor. But according to NAM, the major objective of the unions was to attack and

[75]Allen M. Wakstein, "The National Association of Manufacturers and Labor Relations in the 1920s," *Labor History* 10 (1969): 165.

ultimately destroy "the American principles of laissez-faire, free competition, and the right to private property." NAM argued that a closed shop would develop slothful workers and weaken the American economy. John E. Edgerton, who was a paternalistic textile manufacturer from Tennessee and the president of NAM from 1921 to 1931, remained firm against critics of the open shop movement, maintaining that the NAM position was not an attack against workers' right to organize, but that these views were a misinterpretation of the movement. Other organizations such as the American Anti-Boycott Association and Citizen's Industrial Associations targeted specific geographic areas in which the AFL had achieved some success. On December 18, 1931, Robert L. Lund took control of NAM. Lund "was a member of the 'Brass Hats,' a group of industrialists who were not content to see 'radicals' and 'demagogues' supplant them and their colleagues as the leaders of the nation." Lund made his position very clear:

> the public does not understand industry, largely because industry itself has made no real effort to tell its story; to show the people of this country that our high living standards have risen almost altogether from the civilization which industrial activity has set up. On the other hand, selfish groups, including labor, the socialistic-minded and the radical, have constantly and continuously misrepresented industry to the people, with the result that there is a general misinformation of our industrial economy, which is highly destructive in its effect.[76]

Such declarations did not bode well for organizational efforts by workers in Dallas.

In November 1919, three to four hundred business leaders met on the rooftop of the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas to discuss whether they should establish an open shop association. Of that number present, only ten leaders went on record to oppose the organization. This minority

[76]Toner, *Closed Shop*, 16 (second quotation), 79 (third quotation); Wakstein, "The National Association of Manufacturers and Labor Relations in the 1920s," 165 (fourth quotation); David Brian Robertson, "Voluntarism Against the Open Shop: Labor and Business Strategies in the Battle for American Labor Markets," *Studies in American Political Development* 13 (1999): 146-185; Richard W. Gable, "Birth of an Employers' Association," *The Business History Review* 33 (Winter 1959), 535-545; Richard S. Tedlow, "The National Association of Manufacturers and Public Relations during the New Deal," *The Business History Review* 50 (Spring 1976): 29 (fifth quotation), 31 (sixth quotation).

group of Dallas business leaders heeded the warning of Tom Bell, a representative from the Texas Bureau of Labor Statistics, who stated at this meeting that "declaring Dallas an 'open shop town' [just as it had in San Antonio, Beaumont and Austin] would aggravate the very condition it sought to palliate." Historians such as Patricia Evridge Hill have agreed with Bell, suggesting that the militancy that developed among the city's building trades in the late 1920s and 1930s was a direct result of Dallas employers organizing their own open shop association.[77]

The majority of factory owners in Dallas followed a national trend to resurrect an open shop movement. This was in response to the growth of union activity among Dallas workers. Historian James C. Maroney explains that as soon as the "open shop associations appeared in Beaumont, San Antonio, Dallas, Sherman and other Texas cities; groups of employers sponsored the early organizations in Beaumont and San Antonio, but the Dallas venture, godchild of the local chamber of commerce, became a department in that body." The majority sentiment was that they did not want to attract "foreign elements" to Dallas. The keynote address at this first meeting was given by Dallas businessman Gilbert H. Irish, who stated:

> We are not opposed to the principle of organized labor . . . We believe, however, that through the wrongful influence of walking delegates the induction into the ranks of labor of countless half-baked foreign agitators and innumerable illiterates, unable to comprehend the genius of American institutions, or to even lisp a syllable of the English language, the contamination of I W. W.'s and Bolshevist elements, coupled with an absolutely erroneous belief resulting from governmental concessions, during the war, that organized labor can enforce any demand, however unreasonable, have led organized labor into a political and economic swamp where the miasma of radicalism and un-Americanism seems to have enveloped it.[78]

In order to combat the growing unionization and in response to the increasing militancy of the Dallas building trades, the Dallas Open Shop Association "guaranteed the solvency of all its

[77]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 59, 83.

[78]Maroney, "Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929," 209 (first quotation); "Businessmen Favor Open Shop Policy," *Dallas Morning News*, November 19, 1919; Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 69 (second quotation).

members in case of work-stopping strikes through the use of its rumored two- to- three million dollars reserve fund. Further, it subjected any business member who knowingly hired union workers to a three-thousand dollar fine." The members of the Dallas Open Shop Association included board members of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, as well as local manufacturers and owners of steel, textile, and automobile factories. According to Strauss, some who were responsible for the original creation of the Dallas Open Shop Association also were members of the Industrial Relations Committee, which included many prominent Dallas businessmen and community leaders.[79]

W. S. Mosher, owner of Mosher Manufacturing, a textile plant in Dallas, and a member of the Industrial Relations Committee, was elected as the Dallas Open Shop Association's first president. Mosher was infamous for his anti-union opinions. Within weeks of its November 1919 meeting, the Dallas Open Shop Association quickly organized as an extension of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce. Mosher set up the Association's offices in the Chamber of Commerce building and with the aid of Dallas business owner T. P. Roberts, who was named as the general manager, quickly recruited "250 business and 3,000 individual members." They had a board of directors consisting of eighteen members. Of these eighteen, six were elected by employers, six were elected by employees, and the remaining six were appointed by the Chamber of Commerce. Workers' representatives were therefore always in the minority. Subsequently, Hill maintains that "Roberts designed the Open Shop publicity campaign with the aim of replacing Dallas

[79]Biles, "The Urban South in the Great Depression," 94; Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 67; Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 65. The Industrial Relations Committee members included John V. Hughes, Rhodes S. Baker, Harry L. Seay, W. S. Mosher, S. S. Perkins, Fred Schoellkopf, Harry A. Olmstead, Gilbert H. Irish, S. N. English, Homer R. Mitchell, M. N. Baker, T. E. Jackson, and Bishop Harry T. Moore.

residents' situationally dependent support for labor with hostility toward all union activity."[80]

The Dallas Open Shop Association, supported by the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, influenced local attitudes about union activity for the next two decades. Within a year of the establishment of the Association, they reported in the *Dallas Forward*, the official publication of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, that the Association "had an income of $30,000" and retained its "250 firm members, and 3,000 employees and citizen members." According to labor historian Roger Biles, even though there was a rise in worker discontent in Dallas through the 1920s, local management was able to keep this discontent from boiling over. Biles writes that "in Dallas . . . local officials boasted that 95 percent of laborers in the city worked in open shops and that no factory lost a single day because of a strike during the entire decade."[81]

The efforts of open shop advocates in Dallas were complicated by a major development in the local political scene, the reemergence of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) through the registration of Dallas Klavern #66, which was the largest klavern in the state of Texas. Historian Norman Brown recounts its growth in Dallas through the words of a local member, explaining that "the Klan grew so rapidly in that city [because] Dallas is a strong Masonic city. . . So many Masons joined the Klan that in some communities the Masonic lodge became simply an adjunct of the local Klan chapter." In March 1921 local Klan members expressed their power by kidnapping, flogging, and branding a black man. By May they had recruited so many members that they held a march down Main Street in Dallas that consisted of eight hundred men. According to 1924 official Klan membership rolls housed in the Dallas Historical Society, the local Imperial Wizard was Dr. Hiram W. Evans, a Dallas dentist, and the Grand Dragon was Z. E. Marvin, who was the

[80]Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 79 (first quotation); Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 83 (second quotation).

[81]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 68 (first quotation); Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 14 (second quotation).

owner of the 29-story Magnolia Building. According to Hill, "by 1923, the Klan controlled both city and county governments . . . executive officers and proprietors [who] later became fixtures of the Dallas Establishment, appeared on a Klan membership roster distributed in the mid-1920s as 'KKK Business Firms 100%'."[82]

The revival of the Klan in Dallas after World War I established a membership that was close to 13,000 and devoted to white elitism. This growth was seen by some local industrialists as a threat to Dallas' emerging prosperity, civic order, and their public relations campaign that was attempting to depict the city as a "forward thinking, cosmopolitan city – ripe for eastern investment capital." This fear was reinforced by the flogging of sixty-eight people by the Klan in Dallas in 1921. In order to respond to the financial and physical threat that the Klan brought to the citizens of Dallas, twenty-five businessmen formed the Dallas County Citizens League for the primary purpose of opposing the Klan. This organization, led by Martin M. Crane, former state attorney general, was hampered by persistent beliefs that business leaders either supported or had joined the Klan. For example, Dallas attorney and local socialist activist George Clifton Edwards wrote an editorial in *The Nation* asserting that the Dallas Klan chapter was dominated by the local business interests:

> At the great Dallas Ku Klux parade the electric company kindly cut off all the downtown lights and let the masked men march in their desired darkness . . . The campaign manager of the Klan in Dallas was the law partner of the ex-mayor of Dallas who is the president of the Dallas street railway company. This union of fanaticism and fiancé has swept Dallas and the State.[83]

Historians estimate that at its height in the 1920s the Dallas Klan had a total of 75,000 members.

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[82]Norman D. Brown. *Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas Politics, 1921-1928* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1984), 53; Patricia Evridge Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Texas at Dallas, 1990), 257 (second quotation).

[83]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 101 (first quotation); George Clifton Edwards, "Texas: The Big Southwestern Specimen," *The Nation* 116 (March 21, 1923): 337. (second quotation).

The Citizens League did have some success after the violence of 1921. Due to their pressure, the Dallas police chief resigned from the Klan and prominent Dallas citizens and business moguls, such as George B. Dealy and Julius Schepps, committed themselves to privately and publicly combat the Klan's presence in Dallas. Dealy used his *Dallas Morning News* to change public opinion and discourage acceptance of the Klan while, according to historian Hill, "Schepps paid membership fees for almost fifty of his bakery employees and encouraged them to infiltrate the Klan and inform on its activities." The 1924 election marked a defeat for the Klan in Dallas. Dealy used the *Dallas Morning News* to help elect Dan Moody and Miriam Ferguson, who were intensely anti-Klan, as state attorney general and governor respectively. Their elections, coupled with a national scandal for the Klan, would lead the Texas Democratic Party to end their open relationship with the Klan.[84]

In his article, "The New Deal in Dallas," Biles claims that the Chamber of Commerce's Open Shop Association remained active in local politics and supported anti-union candidates in the 1920s. Its success in establishing an open shop policy in Dallas, which was supported by local businesses owners, resulted in the Dallas Chamber of Commerce being able a decade later to prevent the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) from campaigning effectively among Dallas workers and the greater community. The power of the Association, and a key to its success, can be seen in its threat to use the National Guard. Chamber of Commerce President, T. E. Jackson, who was also the president of the Manufacturers Association, declared in the *Dallas Morning News*, "It is hardly necessary to emphasize the importance of having a strong military body in this city the size of Dallas. Conditions might arise at any time which would make the

[84] Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 102.

presence here of such a unit highly desirable."[85]

Historian Leo Troy maintains that the experience of unions in Texas in the early 1920s followed the national trend. At the core of the employer's opposition to union development in the South remained their opposition to the use of collective bargaining among their workers. An editorial announcing the creation of the Dallas Open Shop Association in the *Dallas Morning News* illustrated their fear. The author wrote that "the right to quit work is indeed inherent and inalienable. But it is an individual right. It is not a collective right, and the strike in a collective action. It is essentially a conspiracy . . . which can seldom if ever be brought about without coercive methods." On a more positive note, J. F. Strickland, a member of the Dallas Open Shop Association, stated in an article several weeks later that "the operation of the association in this city has conclusively demonstrated that it was practical to obtain all the skilled workmen who were needed without having to employ union men." Just to make sure, the Association was ready to employ extreme measures, such as establishing a "free employment service to replace strikers" and even once bringing "1,500 scabs to Dallas – some from as far away as California and New England."[86]

After the initial efforts of the Dallas Open Shop Association, their movement began to wane in intensity. Through an analysis of the editorials and stories published in *Dallas Forward*, historian James C. Maroney shows that "one indication of the waning intensity of the movement is the amount of space that Texas labor press devoted to its presence: virtually every issue of

[85]Biles, "The New Deal in Dallas," 12; Biles, "The Urban South in the Great Depression," *The Journal of Southern History* 56 (February 1990): 71-100; "Open Shop Indorsed by Master Plumbers," *Dallas Morning News*, June 19, 1920, as quoted in Leo Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 1939-1953," *Southern Economic Journal* 24 (April 1958), 408.

[86]Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South," 412-413; "Southwestern Open Shop Association is Formed Here," *Dallas Morning News*, February 14, 1920 (first quotation). "Open Shop Credited with Success Here," *Dallas Morning News*, March 24, 1920 (second quotation); Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 83 (third quotation).

most labor papers in 1921-1922 carried at least one article on the so-called 'American Plan,' but such articles became less frequent by 1924." The initial response to the open shop movement in Dallas had been what author Strauss called "a near emergency situation [that created support for the] formation of a league of union men for opposition to the open shop here." Ultimately, local union representatives greatly underestimated the power that the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Open Shop Association could wield against them. Labor leaders failed to counter the power of the Association, and so they abandoned most efforts at unionization. The number of strikes in Dallas actually declined from 1922 to 1936, reflecting the triumph of the Association and its open-shop policy. It would take federal intervention through the New Deal during the 1930s to revive widespread support for unions by encouraging workers to believe that they could finally achieve the goals first discussed in Texas in the 1890s.[87]

The triumph of the Dallas Open Shop Association was fully understood by all who lived in that city. W.R. Brooks, a representative for the United Garment Workers Union, remarked when asked about the Dallas labor movement that the movement "could be what it is elsewhere if it had not been controlled by the Chamber of Commerce, by the Open Shop Association and other organizations unfavorable to labor." Manufacturer Clarence Miller was quoted in a *Dallas Morning News* article that the Dallas labor disputes had become a bitter fight that the managers were sure to win. Miller added, "I'll die before they unionize my employees . . . The Dallas Chamber of Commerce has made Dallas the dirtiest open shop town in the nation." In 1926, the Dallas Open Shop Association hosted the national American Plan Open Shop Conference. And even though the Association became relatively quiet by the late 1920s, "[one of] the activities

[87]Maroney, "Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929," 223 (first quotation); Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 84 (second quotation); Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South,"415; Strauss. "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 67; *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s.v. "Union Regulation," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html (accessed June 11, 2007).

that it continued longest was the publication of a 'fair list' of open shop employers." As a final sign of its transcendence, by 1929 even the publication of this list had ceased.[88] After all, there were apparently no significant Dallas employers by that time who did not maintain an open shop.

The Great Depression would create the context for a re-evaluation of open-shop policies. Texas initially did not suffer to the degree that was felt elsewhere because it applied stringent economic measures, cut state legislature appropriations by 21 percent, and benefited from the impact of the oil industry. Texas was also not as severely affected by the collapse of the cotton market because Texas farmers had diversified their crops. But according to historian Theresa Wolfson, the Great Depression had an extreme impact on the national textile industry. Overproduction of textiles throughout the early twentieth century had glutted markets and driven demand and prices downward. This enhanced the economic catastrophe that southern states experienced in the Depression. Wolfson reports that "the number of firms engaged in the production of women's clothing declined by 43.7 percent from 1929 to 1933, while the total number of manufacturing establishments in the United States fell by 32.4 percent." This problem motivated the textile management in Dallas and all of Texas to be open to participation in the New Deal's formula for recovery through federally regulated cooperation. In this spirit, mill owners were to provide a forty-hour work week and reasonable minimum wage, eliminate child labor, and engage in collective bargaining with their workers.[89]

During the early years of the New Deal, the business community of Dallas greeted the proposals for reform with great anticipation and enthusiasm, so much so that by mid 1933 the

[88]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 75 (first quotation); Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 73 (second quotation).

[89]Theresa Wolfson, "Role of the ILGWU in Stabilizing the Women's Garment Industry." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 4 (October 1950): 38 (quotation); Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 59; Lionel Patenaude, "The New Deal: Its Effect on the Social Fabric of Texas Society, 1933-1938," *The Social Science Journal* 14 (October 1977): 51-60.

"Dallas Chamber of Commerce [had] responded so quickly and energetically that [National Recovery Administration] chief Hugh Johnson singled out the organization for commendation." The Dallas Chamber boasted that the city's work force had a vast resource of "native, intelligent labor, easily trained, loyal, and efficient." By the fall of 1933 this enthusiastic spirit weakened significantly. This change of heart centered on the apparent support among Dallas workers for securing their goals by abandoning the established open shop system and actively participating in organized labor activities. Historian Hill claims the spark that revived the Dallas movement was the "militancy of the Dallas dressworkers" during their ten month strike to "challenge the elite's commitment to low wages," but in fact it appears that this fire soon spread to other industries as well, such as the plants that produced cement and automobile parts in Dallas.[90]

During the Great Depression, if unionization was to succeed in the South, the national organizations had to distance themselves from earlier radical politics and revise their traditional rhetoric of empowerment. Labor leaders during the 1920s had appealed to younger workers by emphasizing the respectability, credibility, and stability that union representation would bring to their work environment. Union organizations in the 1930s employed similar tactics in an effort to eliminate open-shop policies. While this proved to be too weak to establish strong unions quickly in Dallas, it represents an important philosophical change among union leaders in that they did not speak in terms of empowerment any longer but "emphasized the need to restore credibility and stability to their organization through non-partisan politics and low risk factors." Anti-union sentiment among Dallas industry owners and the power that the Dallas Chamber of Commerce had in the maintenance of open shops created an atmosphere in which unions were initially unsuccessful. According to historian John A. Salmond, this was true elsewhere in the

[90]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 60, (first quotation), 94. (second quotation.); Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 130 (third quotation).

South, as managers and owners of industry in the region viewed union organizers as personal enemies and thought that unions would seize control of both workers and production plants. Indeed, they viewed any "union activity" as "not only unnecessary but 'unsouthern.'" These views were deeply rooted in the paternalism of Southern culture, which had had in its own way given rise to open-shop policies. Just as labor organizers shifted their focus to cooperation, the New Deal would most effectively undermine the open-shop mentality by changing Southern culture itself while also promoting economic recovery and reform. But that would take time, and Dallas leaders would stubbornly resist abandoning their open-shop policies through much of the 1930s.[91]

[91]Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 86 (first quotation); David B. Robertson, "Voluntarism Against the Open Shop: Labor and Business Strategies in the Battle for American Labor Markets," *Studies in American Political Development* 13 (Spring 1999): 146-185; John A. Salmond, *Miss Lucy of the CIO: The Life and Times of Lucy Randolph Mason, 1882-1959* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 75 (second and third quotations).

CHAPTER 4

A PROFILE OF THE TEXTILE, CEMENT, AND AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRIES IN DALLAS, TEXAS, 1900-1930

Historian Roger Biles asserts in his book *The South and the New Deal* that "Dallas, home of the world's largest spot cotton market, suffered as the market slackened; in 1926 the Dallas Cotton Exchange handled 3,141,997 bales, but by 1929-30, only 1,527,489 bales." In June of 1931 Dallas declared a "'cotton week,' and major downtown stores exhibited cotton bales to stimulate the purchase of the product." Reasons for this decrease centered on the fact that during the 1920s the cotton market became increasingly unstable due to foreign competition and the shift to producing new synthetic products such as rayon. The fluctuating cotton market and postwar increase in southern laborers allowed the growth of the "stretch-out" system that, according to historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "filled every pore in the working day, and robbed them of control over the pace and method of production." The stretch-out system consisted of requiring workers to tend to multiple machines in order to produce as many textile products in an eight- hour work day as had been required in a ten- or twelve-hour work day.[92] Similar conditions prevailed in the cement and automobile industries in Dallas as the Great Depression deepened. In order to understand more fully the impact of such events, and how they occurred, it is necessary to take a closer look at the development of the industrial sector of Dallas.

The southern cotton textile industry was comprised of several different levels of workers involved in the various stages of production. The basic textile manufacturing process consisted of a four-part process, in which the spinning and weaving of cotton was the first stage to be completed. These tasks required the most basic of skills and were often conducted by the

[92]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 30 (first quotation); Hall, *Like a Family* , 211 (second quotation); Patenaude, "The New Deal: Its Effect on the Social Fabric of Texas Society," 51-60; Keith Volanto, "Ordered Liberty: The AAA Cotton Programs in Texas, 1933-1940" (Ph.D. Diss., Texas A & M University, 1998).

youngest of employees. The other three stages were finishing, distribution, and cutting. Much of the last three stages of the industry were done by firms in the Northeast, while the trend for southern textile industry was to provide only the basic stage of spinning and weaving. By the 1930's there were some southern mills involved in the finishing, distributing, and cutting trades in the industry, but these were still in the minority.[93] Nevertheless, a broad variety of people were employed for the basic stages of textile production in southern mills, including those in Dallas.

The garment industry in Texas grew during the early twentieth century because eastern manufacturers were seeking cheap labor and hoping to flee the influence of union activity. The South was an obvious choice for relocation. In a series of 1914 *Dallas Morning News* articles, J. B. Bagley, a Texas A&M professor of textile engineering, encouraged eastern investors to build cotton mills in Texas. Bagley wrote that "mills in Texas have quite an advantage over the New England mills in that they are so much nearer to the market. These markets have been moved to our very doors by the completion of the Panama Canal and the Houston ship channel." Coupled with other economic reasons for eastern investors to be interested in Texas, Bagley asserted that they would find a great resource of skilled labor. He insisted that "thousands of the laboring class [will] leave the war-stricken countries and come to this country. Already there have been movements started to induce great numbers of these to come to Texas." In this same article, Bagley attempted to persuade Texans that northern investment and growth of mills and factories in their towns would bring them stable wages, an abundance of work, and a better education for their children through the building of mill schools. A result of the United States entering World War I was that approximately five to six million men left the work force, which briefly created

[93]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 6.

an advantage of bargaining power among the workers that remained. This advantage sparked a collective interest in unionization throughout the South, which alarmed some potential investors. When World War I ended, so did the worker's bargaining advantage over management because labor was no longer scarce, and interest in southern investments resurged.[94]

Historian Edwin L. Caldwell asserts that not only was cheap labor attractive, but that new southern mills could easily install the innovative "Northrop loom, [which] was introduced as a superior machine," while the more established northern mills were slower to replace existing equipment. He adds, "Those developments helped to initiate the march of the textile mills into the Southeast, and to some extent into Texas." Historian Mary Oates reveals that another factor contributing to the South's industrial development was the introduction of "cheap hydroelectric power, which was available almost everywhere in the region." As far as Texas was concerned, the 1931 *Texas Almanac* admitted that the "development of the electric light and power industry within the state has been a major underlying factor in the extensive industrial growth."[95]

Incorporated in 1912, the Texas Power and Light Company was the largest distributor of electrical energy in Texas. According to the *Dallas Morning News,* "the transmission system comprises 211 miles of 60,000 volt steel tower lines and 785 miles of wood pole lines." Texas Power and Light began with 8,900 customers in 1912, and by 1923 their customer base had grown to 58,000. The *Dallas Morning News* article discussed the close relationship between the electric company and new industry in Texas. Specifically, John B. Carpenter, president of Texas Power and Light, stated that "one of the outstanding spheres of activity of the Texas Power and

[94]"Texas Desirous of More Cotton Mills," *Dallas Morning News,* December 20, 1914 (first and second quotations); Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 125-140.

[95]Edwin L. Caldwell, "Highlights of the Development of Manufacturing in Texas, 1900-1960," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 68 (April 1965), 409; Mary J. Oates, "The Role of the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Development of the American Southeast: 1900-1940," *The Journal of Economic History* 31 (March 1971): 282; *The Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide: The Encyclopedia of Texas* (A. H. Belo Corporation, 1931), 185.

Light Company . . . has been the development of industrial plants in Texas. . . [Focusing on] mills, manufacturing plants and other industrial enterprises . . . it has entered largely during the last few years into the movement to develop the textile industry in the State."[96]

The 1931 *Texas Almanac* reported that the electrical dominance in Texas industry was in line with that of the nation's dependence on electricity. The *Almanac* reported that there were 800 gins in 1931 and that many of the state's "cotton oil mills, textile mills . . . now [operate] by power transmitted over high-voltage lines." Carpenter declared that he intended to devote all of his energy to speeding up the development of cloth production among all the cotton mills in Texas. In the November 1925 edition of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce magazine, *Dallas Forward*, he continued to promote industrial development in Texas. He was quoted as stating that "there is an abundance of good labor in Texas and it is free of the radical tendencies which have jeopardized the textile industry in the Northeast . . . there is a trade territory surrounding Texas that could absorb millions of dollars' worth of cotton textiles each year." His efforts were successful because in 1931 the *Texas Almanac* reported that

> the magnitude of . . . industrial growth is both demonstrated and reflected by measurements with the yardstick of electrical output. In 1923, Texas stood thirteenth among the States in total electrical current generated and sold. In 1929, as a result of a 310 percent increase in the seven years, it had moved up into eighth place.

The commitment to industry was not just among ambitious businessmen such as Carpenter. W. T. M. Dickson of Millford, Texas, in a *Dallas Morning News* editorial, called to farmers:

> let us rise to the height of our great opportunity, that we may prove ourselves worthy sons of noble sires. Let [each of] us go home from this congress and organizing himself into a missionary committee of one, preach cotton mills, cotton mills, until our whole state wears the golden crown of industrial victory. Let us not let up in this campaign of agitation, education, organization and co-operation until from every hill top in our cotton

[96]"Power Company is Building Industries," *Dallas Morning News*, October 14, 1923 (first and second quotations).

> fields the echoing whistle from the cotton mill shall be answered back from every valley in all our broad state.[97]

Certainly Texas appeared to embrace the promise of prosperity offered by industry fueled with electricity.

The opportunity to build more modern plants and the speed with which the South accepted and promoted the use of electricity prompted a manufacturer census report that found the Southern states had moved "from three percent of all mills reporting power sources in 1900 to 75 percent in 1940." The acceptance of technological advancement created an opportunity for factory owners to build their mills and plants in new, often remote, locations where the workers were unskilled and could be hired for very low wages. Oates claims that for economic reasons most factory owners sought remote locations, far away from the skilled workers in established manufacturing districts. Therefore, the owners who either founded or relocated their plants to Dallas between 1900 and 1930 were making decisions within the normal industrial trend.[98]

Having lured investors to build manufacturing plants in Dallas, the city had to deliver on its promise not only of power, but labor. According to the 1900 manufacturer's census, Dallas had just four textile manufacturing plants, which employed seventy-six women. Seventy-two of these 76 employees were above the age of 16, so there were few young workers. The total wages earned by all of these workers in 1900 was $18,600, of which $18,000 was paid to the employees above the age of 16 and $600 was paid to the 4 employees under the age of 16. The annual wage for each group of employees was thus $250 and $150 respectively. While the 1904 *Texas Almanac* claimed that "according to the 1900 census, Dallas ranked first of Texas cities in

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[97]*Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide* [1931], 185 (first and third quotations); "See Big Future," *Dallas Forward, Official Publication of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce* 4.8 (August 1925), 41 (second quotation); "Cotton Mills, in Connection with Cotton Production," *Dallas Morning News,* August 16, 1900 (fourth quotation).

[98]Oates, "Role of the Cotton Textile Industry," 282.

manufacturing and since that time the industries have multiplied and increased," in fact by 1910 the number of Dallas textile factories had dropped to three. Conversely, the number of employees had risen from 76 to 261. There were 14 males and 247 females, which indicates that the dominance of women among employees continued, just as it did in the textile industry throughout the greater South.[99]

The rapid expansion of Texas' investment in textile manufacturing, and the growth in its population, continued through the next two decades.

Table 2: Population by Sex and Race, Dallas, Texas, 1920-1940

Classification	1920	1930	1940
Total Population	158,976	260,475	294,754
Male	79,506	126,071	139,759
Female	79,470	134,404	154,975
Native White	126,158	212,230	236,891
Male	62,532	102,687	112,457
Female	63,626	109,543	124,434
Foreign-born white	8,730	9,391	7,355
Male	5,097	5,215	3,993
Female	3,633	4,176	3,362
Black	24,023	38,742	50,407
Male	11,828	18,101	23,254
Female	12,195	20,641	27,156

Source: Bureau of Business Research, College of Business Administration, *An Economic Survey of Dallas County* (Austin: University of Texas, June 1949), 69.

A census of Texas cotton production and milling by Burt C. Blanton, industrial manager of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, revealed that the number of active spindles in Texas showed a

[99]*The Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide: The Encyclopedia of Texas* (Galveston: Galveston Dallas News, 1904), 248; United States Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census, 1900, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County] (Record Group 29, National Archives, Washington, DC); United States Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, 1910, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County] (Record Group 29, National Archives, Washington, DC); United States Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County] (Record Group 29, National Archives, Washington, DC); "Textile Industry of Texas Shows Great Development During the Last Eleven Years," *Dallas Morning News,* February 11, 1926.

99.8 percent increase between 1915 and 1925. By 1926 Texas ranked third among the southern states for the average number of active spindles. At the same time, according to Blanton, cotton consumption by Texas mills in 1925 rose from 8,525 bales in January to 9,855 bales in December. The Texas mills' profits reflected their rapidly rising consumption of cotton. In 1914 the Texas mills reported a collective profit of $3,754,785; by 1925 these same mills reported a profit of $25,892,540. Of course, this growth was supported by a tremendous increase in the population of Dallas. According to the United States Census Bureau, the population of Dallas, Texas, in 1900 was 42,638; it grew to 260,475 by 1930.[100]

Table 3: Number of Manufacturers, Number of Production Workers, and Average Number of Production Workers, Texas, 1919-1947

Year	Number of Manufacturers	Number of Production Workers	Average Number of Production Workers
1919	492	8,708	17.7
1921	361	7,442	20.6
1923	469	9,343	19.9
1925	405	10,612	26.2
1927	519	11,490	22.1
1929	572	13,853	24.1
1931	582	11,109	19.1
1933	506	10,202	20.2
1935	551	13,599	24.7
1937	611	16,433	26.9
1939	698	16,267	23.3
1947	1,068	30,695	28.7

Source: Bureau of Business Research, College of Business Administration, *An Economic Survey of Dallas County* (Austin: University of Texas, June 1949), 43-45.

The labor demands of the mills led to some interesting changes in the characteristics of Texas labor. In 1914, 16.5 percent of Texas workers were "in the group of 48 [years of age] and

[100]*Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide* [1904], 248; Twelfth Census, 1900, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County]; Thirteenth Census, 1910, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County]; Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County]; "Textile Industry of Texas Shows Great Development During the Last Eleven Years," *Dallas Morning News*, February 11, 1926.

under," but this proportion had swelled to 43.2 percent by 1919. During the same time period, the percentage of workers who were 60 years of age and older decreased from 55.3 percent in 1914 to 29 percent in 1919. In 1919 Texas had 492 total manufacturing plants that employed 8,708 workers, or an average of 17.7 production workers per company. Ten years later, the recruitment of eastern investors and industry had created 572 manufacturing factories in Texas that employed 13,853 workers, with an average of 24.1 production workers per plant. While the number of manufacturers in Texas increased substantially in ten years (16.3 percent), what is more significant is that their plants increased in total employment (59.3 percent) and average number of employees (35.9 percent). In 1930, Texas manufacturers paid $15,516,789.80 in wages, thus the average salary of manufacturing workers in 1930 in Texas had increased to $1,120.10. This meant that Texas labor remained considerably cheaper than that in the eastern states. When Texas was compared to eastern industries, it was found that eastern laborers were paid two to three times more.

Table 4: Number of Workers, Total Wages, and Average Wages for Texas, 1929-1947

Year	Number of Workers	Total Wages	Average Wage
1929	12,048	$13,630,181	$1,313
1931	9,701	$9,557,019	$985
1933	8,963	$6,851,012	$764
1935	12,126	$11,078,681	$914
1937	14,654	$14,210,497	$970
1939	13,647	$12,927,204	$947
1947	26,965	$58,193,000	$2,158

Source: Bureau of Business Research, College of Business Administration, *An Economic Survey of Dallas County* (Austin: University of Texas, June 1949), 49.

As far as a more personal description of the workers, Historian Dorothy DeMoss asserts that "in the thirties and early forties needle operators in Dallas and Fort Worth predominantly were

white, middle aged, married women who had received their training as seamstresses in other parts of the country or had native ability."[101]

In order to more fully describe Dallas textile workers, a sample group was taken from the list of names on the 1938 Dallas Cotton Mill factory timesheet. Data from the 1930 United States population census provides a sample of 110 textile workers from the Dallas Cotton Mill plant. All of the 110 workers identified were white, thirty-four were female, and seventy-six were male, reflecting a shift in the workforce that predated the Great Depression. Statistically, between 1900 and 1930 the female proportion of the southern industrial labor force decreased, from.17.5 percent in 1900 to 11 percent in 1930. Therefore the majority of industrial workers in the South were white males, although women still tended to dominate the textile industry. This demographic shift indicates that some southern industries had improved their wages to a level that an entire family did not have to work in order to survive. Too, southern Progressives had worked tirelessly to eliminate child labor by encouraging the expansion of employment for males. As a result, the number of male industrial workers increased.[102]

Of the 110 workers identified, none owned a home in 1930, and all of them rented rooms for $4 to $25 per month. Thirty-four workers paid rents of $10 or less, and seventy-six workers had rents that ranged from $11 to $25. Economically, textile workers were at a disadvantage in their purchasing power. Only four of them had a radio, whereas thirty-three Dallas Ford workers owned a radio. The average age of the textile workers was 37.5 years old. Male workers were an average of 39 years old, and female workers averaged 33.7 years old. Only two of the men

[101]United States Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census, 1920, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County] (Record Group 29, National Archives, Washington, DC); Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County];" DeMoss, *The History of Apparel Manufacturing in Texas, 1897-1981*, 167 (quotation) . Eleven plants in Dallas in 1919 produced textiles.

[102]Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 20; Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Dallas Cotton Mill Time Book (Texas Labor Archives, UTA). Between 1900 and 1930 workers between the ages of sixteen and nineteen in the southern industrial labor force also decreased, by 25 percent.

indicated that they were veterans. Only 44 percent of Dallas textile workers were from Texas, while the city's cement and Ford workers were 49 percent and 78 percent native Texans, respectively. It is interesting to note that the textile workers were almost all from other southern states, many of which had textile planes. Also of interest is the fact that fifteen of these workers, twelve men and three women, were illiterate. This illiteracy rate is similar to other southern communities with textile operations, but it is higher than that of white workers in the Dallas cement and automobile industries that are profiled later. Of the 110 workers, 82 indicated that they would be considered a cotton mill laborer. Other titles they claimed were chief engineer, machinist, weaver, spoolers, feeders, stub weavers, card room representative, repairer, dolpher, stitcher, spinner, and carpenter.[103] Perhaps a few wanted to elevate themselves above the lowly title of "laborer."

Textile mills and related industries dominated Texas manufactures, so a closer look at the principal Dallas owners seems to be in order. In 1917, Texas had 78 clothing factories; by 1933, the industry had grown to 103 factories. The oldest and longest surviving cotton mill in the Lone Star State was established in 1888 by Joel T. Howard and was located in Dallas on the corner of Lamar and Corinth Streets. It was simply named the Dallas Cotton Mills. Howard was born in 1869 and by 1910 was reported to be living in Dallas Ward 7; ten years later, he and his wife Katherine and daughter Margaret had moved to Dallas Precinct 22. By 1925 his Dallas Cotton Mills had been incorporated for $500,000; two years later, it was reportedly the largest cotton mill in Texas, with 16,328 spindles and 334 looms. The 1930 census recorded that the Dallas Cotton Mills provided enough revenue for Howard to purchase a home for his family that was

[103] Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population), [Dallas County]; Dallas Cotton Mill Time Book (Texas Labor Archives, UTA). The renters resided on the following streets in Dallas: Gould, Corinth, Wall, Hemingway, Parker, Lamar, Cockrell, Lanicia, Mongermy, Tasta, and Suitefee. The other states and countries that were represented among the nativities of textile workers are as follows: Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Canada, and Scotland.

valued at $60,000. The mill's president, Walter Hogg, also earned enough in 1930 to provide a home for his family in University Park that was valued at $60,000. Hogg had emigrated from England in 1888 and according to the 1930 census had not become a naturalized citizen.[104]

Another one of the first textile manufacturing plants established in Dallas was Lorch Manufacturing, founded in 1909. Its founder, August Lorch, a German immigrant born in 1863, developed a strong business by producing inexpensive cotton dresses called wash dresses. He immigrated to the United States in 1891 and by 1900 was employed as a dry goods merchant. The 1910 census for Dallas listed his occupation as a manufacturer of ladies wear. By 1920, Lorch was married to Flora and had three children, Magdalena, Elsa, and Lester. This census also reveals that in August 1894, Lorch had completed the naturalization process to become a United States citizen. By 1924 his son Lester Lorch had taken control of the plant and expanded production to include children's clothes and menswear. The 1930 census indicated that Lester Lorch and his wife Julia rented a home for eighty-five dollars a month, and that their household also included an African American live-in maid named Levy Pinkart.[105]

The Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Plant was founded by Leo Aronson, who was a Polish immigrant, in 1923. He had been born Schlome Leib Aronowicz in 1887 in Razionz, Poland, and immigrated to the United States in 1907. By 1920, he became a naturalized citizen as Leo Aronson, married Ethel Friend, and then moved to Dallas. According to the 1930 census, they rented a home for one hundred dollars a month and had two daughters, Mildred and Ruth. The

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[104]*The Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide: The Encyclopedia of Texas* (Dallas: A. H. Belo Corporation, 1927) ; Thirteenth Census, 1910, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County, TX]; Fourteenth Census, 1920, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County, TX]; Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County, TX]; *Dallas Forward* (4.8), 32. The second largest textile mill in Dallas in 1927 was the C. R. Miller Manufacturing Company, which had 15,056 spindles and 384 looms.

[105]Twelfth Census, 1900, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Thirteenth Census, 1910, Schedule 1 (Population) and Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County] ;Fourteenth Census, 1920, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County] ; Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County].

1930 city directory listed Aronson as the president of the Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Plant and claimed that this plant was the first manufacturer of ladies' ready-to-wear in the city of Dallas. Aronson had two business partners, Arthur Rose and Mason Yowell, and even though Dallas was his adopted city, he became a powerful influence in business and the community. According to his obituary, he was a member of Temple Emanu-El, a thirty-second degree Mason, a member of the Dallas Masonic Lodge 760 AF&AM, and a Shriner from the Hella Temple Shrine.[106]

Dallas manufacturer and owner of the Miller Manufacturing Plants, Clarence R. Miller, was born in 1885. By 1930, he was married to Esther and had two sons, Connell, age twelve, and Giles, age nine. Also living with the family was his aunt, Mattea Bell, aged seventy-one. The Miller residence included three black servants: Earl Govier, aged thirty-two, Rosina Govier, aged twenty-six, and Anni Jones, aged twenty-seven. Even though Miller's original factory was founded in 1909, the 1920s would prove to be an era of great expansion and wealth for both the Dallas textile industry and Miller. In 1923 Dallas, specifically Love Field, became the site for a new million-dollar textile mill. This operation was financed by investors L. W. Roberts, Jr. of Atlanta, Georgia, and M. L. Cannon of Breckenridge, Colorado. These investors were persuaded to locate in Dallas by John W. Carpenter. According to a *Dallas Morning News* article dated February 25, 1923, the final "announcement [of the million dollar mill] . . . came only after repeated conferences between the Chamber of Commerce committees."[107]

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[106]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Fourteenth Census, 1920, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County] ; *Dallas City Directory* (Dallas: Worley, 1930); *Dallas Morning News*, October 28, 1974, sect. D, p.5, col. 7. Schlome Leib Aronowicz arrived at Ellis Island as a 20-year-old tailor on January 16, 1907, aboard the *Pretoria*, which had sailed from Hamburg, Germany. The new arrival's passage was paid by his cousin, and Aronowicz declared that he was joining his cousin in Brooklyn. See http://www.ellisisland.org/. About 1935 Aronson's plant relocated from Commerce Street to the seventh floor of a business building located at 708-20 Jackson Street.

[107]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; "Million Dollar Textile Mill Will Be Built Here," *Dallas Morning News*, February 25, 1923 (quotation).

In 1925, Miller was elected president of Texas Textile Owners and became responsible for representing the management of twenty-five mills that existed in Texas. Part of Miller's agenda was to have "Dallas . . . make a strong bid for the 1926 convention of the American Cotton Manufacturers' Association . . . The Texas organization voted to have Dallas represent the State in bidding for the meeting of operators of Southern textile mills." Also in 1925, the "greatest cotton mill consolidation in the history of the Southwest" occurred when the C. R. Miller Manufacturing Company purchased the Dallas Textile Mills at Love Field and the Texas Cotton Mills at McKinney for a total investment of $3,750,000. This gave Miller control of 31,200 spindles. In the Dallas Chamber of Commerce's magazine *Dallas Forward*, it was reported that

> capitalization of the C. R. Miller Manufacturing Company is to be increased at once from $3,500,000 to $6,000,000 and [the] headquarters will be at Dallas. The company was established in 1902 as an overall manufacturing concern with a capital of $3,500. Since that time the company has increased its net worth some 588 times the original invested capital, and during the 22 years has paid dividends aggregating $1,381,250.[108]

By 1927 Miller presided over a reorganized C. R. Miller Manufacturing Company located at Love Field. His company consisted of three plants. One was the million dollar plant that was built in 1923. Miller also expanded his ownership of cotton mills in 1925 with the purchase of the Sand Springs Cotton Mills at Sand Springs, Oklahoma, for $2,030,000. He ran his Dallas plants twenty-four hours a day because he had more orders than he could fill by maintaining only two shifts, like most of the other Dallas factories. But other Dallas factories had similar product demands. For example, the Maltex Handkerchief Manufacturing Company located on Commerce

[108]"Elected President of Texas Textile Owners," *Dallas Morning News*, May 13, 1925 (first quotation); "Big Consolidation of Cotton Mills," *Dallas Forward* (4.8), 24 (second quotation).

Street was owned and operated by William Shaffer and W. Malowitz and produced from 600 to 700 handkerchiefs daily.[109]

Another cotton textile manufacturer, Justin McCarty, founded a plant in the mid-1920s that bore his name. In 1930 he was living with his mother, Lucy, in University Park. His plant became notorious among Dallas workers for having difficult working conditions. This was documented in a 1930 notation made in a factory inspector notebook which stated that "Justin McCarty had manager Clem Gilbert to remove all the cushions from the girls chairs and told them that they didn't need cushions." The Justin McCarty Manufacturing plant contained fifty machines to produce the extremely popular wash dress. Specifically, "their Mary Lou frocks at a sale at a local department store . . . outsold five leading competing nationally known brands of wash frocks in an elimination contest from a field of twenty-seven famous lines."[110]

Among these owners of Dallas textile factories, many were immigrants but all had been drawn to Texas to start their business because of the excellent public relations and availability of cheap labor that existed in the area. These manufacturers illustrate the wealth that existed in the industry, as well as the vast difference in backgrounds among the textile plant owners. They did produce an interesting variety of products. According to E. L. Blanchard's 1920 manufacturer's report on the Dallas textile industry, the mills made every manner of clothing, including the wash dress, which was a type of house coat dress that remained very popular through the first half of the twentieth century. Blanchard explained that in Texas

> there are twenty-two wash dress factories in operation employing several thousand workmen . . . Seven factories do nothing except manufacture uniforms of every

[109]"Miller Company Purchases Another Cotton Mill," *Dallas Forward* (4.8), 13; "Dallas Textile Mills Swamped with Orders," *Dallas Morning News*, September 11, 1927; "Dallas a Handkerchief Center," *Dallas Morning News*, October 7, 1928.

[110]Factory Inspectors Notebook (Folder 6, Dallas AFL-CIO Council Records, Texas Labor Archives, UTA), p. 30 (first quotation); "Wash Dresses Big Item in Manufacturers," *Dallas Morning News*, October 7, 1928 (second quotation). The Justin McCarty Manufacturing plant was located at 208 South Lamar.

> description, fourteen plants turn out working clothing and fifty-five make hosiery, neckwear, men's and women's hats, caps, dress shirts, children's silk dresses and coats.[111]

Among the most successful producers of wash dresses were, of course, Lorch and McCarty of Dallas. All of these owners and company presidents desired to continue their prosperity, even if it meant combating unionization in Dallas. Specifically, the plant owners would work with the Dallas Chamber of Commerce to establish and maintain an open shop policy.

Ninety-nine percent of Dallas textile manufacturers were white, but there was briefly an exception to this rule. At the 1901 summer exposition of the Colored Fair and Tri-Centennial Exposition in Dallas, Joseph E. Wiley, a black realtor in Dallas, began to pursue the creation of a cotton mill that would be completely black-owned and operated. Wiley claimed that "we believe that the production and manufacture of cotton offers the opportunity sought by the race for its deliverance from being looked upon as a foreign and often undesirable element of the country's population and for its advancement along the paths of civilization." At the Exposition, Wiley appealed to the black Dallas elite to not only support this venture in principle but also through financial means. Wiley asserted that even though black urban and rural workers were different, the cotton mill would provide black youths a secure avenue of future employment. Wiley also courted local white liberals in order to achieve his goals. On July 7, 1901, the New Century Cotton Mill Company was chartered. Wiley had achieved his financial agenda with the support of forty-four Dallas businessmen and companies. Three businessmen were African-Americans. He was surprised by the local white support of the cotton mill; in fact, "Arnold B. Sanford, president of the American Cotton Exchange . . . [raised] $30,000 . . . [and] Dallas citizens

[111]"Styles Made to Suit Southwest And Delivered to Wearer Faster Through Many Dallas Factories," *Dallas Morning News*, March 24, 1920 (second quotation).

[raised] another $10,000. This $40,000 was enough to get the mill in operation."[112]

Unfortunately, after the cornerstone was laid, the board of directors was named, and speeches were given, financial problems plagued the New Century Cotton Mill. The most serious money matter began in the summer of 1902, when the cotton mill deeded in trust to the Texas Savings and Trust Company its land, building, and machinery at an interest of six percent. In 1907, the Trust Company began legal proceedings to recover their investment due to lack of payments. On May 1, "after thirty days for creditors to bring forth their claims, the cotton mill was ordered sold at public auction. . . The New Century did not last long; the experiment failed after only five years." Thereafter, blacks generally remained in the workforce and not in the ranks of management. In Dallas this was not the only unsuccessful experiment that would affect the landscape of labor relations, and local workers would continue to be interested in how unions could better their daily working conditions.[113]

While Dallas textile mill owners varied in their backgrounds, working conditions in their plants were consistent with those that concerned workers throughout the country. Typically, the average number of full time employees that a manufacturing plant employed was thirty workers. This number increased during the busy season or would decrease by sending work out to laborers to complete at home. These two practices, which historian Theresa Wolfson refers to as the "evils of homework and sweatshop," led to concerns, which encouraged the development of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). In 1900, when the ILGWU was founded, their leaders sought to create not only a better working environment, but through their education programs on economics, history, literature, and philosophy they hoped to build better

[112]Michael V. Hazel, ed., *Dallas Reconsidered: Essays in Local History* (Dallas: Three Forks Press, 1995), 145 (first quotation), 152 (second quotation).

[113]Ibid, 155.

educated and stronger trade unions. The ILGWU instituted these programs in such cities as Knoxville, Tennessee; St. Louis, Missouri; and Dallas. Historian Mark Starr describes how the ILGWU created "English classes . . . for those garment workers who required such instructions, [while] the Workers University was enlarged and the class and lecture program was widened." The ILGWU in 1937 issued its *Handbook of Trade Unions Methods*, and the previous year it presented a musical revue entitled *Pins and Needles*, which ran on Broadway for two years.[114]

Of course, textiles were not the only industry in Dallas by 1930. The sharp increase in the city's population during the first three decades of the twentieth century, which included a substantial increase in the black population, supported the growth of many other industries. According to a guide to the city produced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1936, Dallas manufacturing was more diversified than that in any other Texas community. The WPA writers maintained that excellent railroad connections combined with geographic location made Dallas a logical site for all manner of manufacturing. They reported the following:

> The 1935 Federal manufacturing report for Dallas showed 12,126 persons employed in 508 manufacturing plants. Wages were $11,078, 681 and the value of products was $112,255,891. In 1937 there were 562 manufacturing plants listed in the city employing 14,654 persons with aggregate payrolls of $14,210,497. The value of manufacturing articles in the latter year (1937) was $140,626,858, approaching the 1929 peak year total of $142,512,320.[115]

Whether a growing population brought industry or vice versa, by the onset of the New Deal, Dallas supported a broad variety of manufacturing operations.

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[114]Theresa Wolfson, "Role of the ILGWU in Stabilizing the Women's Garment Industry," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 4 (October 1950): 36 (first quotation); Mark Starr, "Why Union Education," 197 (second quotation); *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s. v. "Union Organization," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html (accessed September 14, 2007).

[115] Maxine Holmes and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., *The WPA Dallas Guide and History* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1992), 134 (first quotation); Bureau of Business Research, *Economic Survey of Dallas County*, 4.0601- 4.0604. The increase of white inhabitants in Dallas was greater than the increase in the black population, but the number of African Americans in Dallas did grow. For example, between 1920 and 1930 the black population in Dallas increased from 24,023 to 38,742 residents.

Cement production was a major factor in the industrialization of Dallas. At the end of the nineteenth century, there were only two cement factories operating in Texas. But between 1909 and 1925 Texas cement manufacturing increased 185 percent, and by the end of the 1920s Texas ranked twelfth in national cement production. At its peak in 1929, the nine Texas cement plants collectively produced 7,369,000 barrels a year. During the Great Depression this production fell dramatically, and in 1933 barrel production reached 2,973,000. This decrease in production resulted from a decline in demand for construction cement and the overall increase in industrial unemployment. In 1931, Lewis R. Ferguson, vice-president of The Lone Star Cement Company of Dallas, announced:

> The depression has seriously affected the cement industry, causing many companies to close their mills indefinitely. . . We recognize however, that under existing conditions such action would cause hardship to the men laid off, and consequently our company has decided to try the experiment of operating the plant on a curtailed basis. This will enable us to give immediate employment to a considerable number of our workmen.[116]

The production scale soon changed. By 1935 the Bureau of Business Research at the University of Texas in Austin reported that thirteen industries, including cement plants, showed substantial increases in employment. Specifically, this report stated there had been on average a 7.1 percent rise in employment and that the figures for Dallas indicated that the employment and pay rolls were above this increase. The Bureau in 1937 noted that Texas cement production had again increased by 18.5 percent, creating a total production for that year of 6,918,000 barrels. Such news may have been bittersweet for those employed in Texas cement plants. Those nine firms in 1929 employed 1,484 workers, who collectively earned $1,369,175 that year. Their average was therefore $922.62 a year, far less than the average annual wage of $1,712.24 for a southern male

[116]Bureau of Business Research, *Economic Survey of Dallas County*, 63; Rose Marie Rumbley, *A Century of Class, Public Education in Dallas, 1884-1984* (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1984), 235; "Cement Mill Open on Curtailed Plan," *Dallas Morning News*, January 7, 1931(quotation).

industrial worker. While cement production may have recovered, and layoffs ended, there is no indication of any substantial improvement in wages for Texas workers.[117]

Cement production in Dallas began in 1900 when a group of investors, led by James T. Taylor from Galveston, established the Texas Portland Cement & Lime Company. This was the first cement facility in all of North Texas. By 1908, Jens Moller, an immigrant from Skagen, Denmark, and one of the original Galveston investors, led in the acquisition of the Iola Portland Cement Company from its owner, John Duncan. Moller and his partners wanted to expand their territory and industrial dominance. On January 21, 1908, twenty-two investors petitioned the Dallas City Council to have the plant's outlying areas incorporated as Cement City, Texas. By February 25, 1908, Dallas county judge Hiram F. Lively granted their request, and on April 28, 1908, Cement City was officially incorporated. The city limits, according to the incorporation papers, indicated that its boundaries were three miles west of the Dallas County Courthouse and reached the Texas and Pacific Railroad line in West Dallas. In 1910, The Trinity Portland Cement plant stood on Eagle Ford Road. This plant was named after the Trinity River and was financed by the LaFarge Corporation, whose headquarters were located in Washington D.C. Charles E. Ulrickson served as vice-president and general manager of this plant. At the end of Commerce Street in Cement City, the national Portland Cement Company built another plant that was referred to as The Lone Star Cement Company. This plant was the largest cement plant in

[117]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 3 (Manufactures) [Dallas County]; *The Handbook of Texas Online*, s.v "Union Organization," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html (accessed on January 20, 2008); "Texas Production of Cement Above Preceding Year," *Dallas Morning News*, January 27, 1938; "Texas Pay Rolls Above Year Ago," *The Dallas Morning News*, February 5, 1935; Bureau of Business Research, *Economic Survey of Dallas County*, 54; Scott Derks, *Working Americans 1880-1999: Volume I, The Working Class* (Lakeville, CT: Grey House Publishing, Inc., 2000), 225-228.

the region and had the capacity to employ 200 men and produce 4,000 barrels of cement a day.[118]

Data from the 1930 United States census provides a representative sample of 177 workers from Cement City. This census was conducted in the unincorporated Justice Precinct #7. The census recorder was unfortunately inconsistent in his reporting, which reduces the value of the data. For example, he listed street names and house numbers for some workers and then only geographical identifiers that excluded house numbers for others. Many Cement City residents continually complained to their city officials that a proper census was never correctly completed for their community. Therefore, some of the names of workers obtained through the Dallas city directory could not be identified in the 1930 census. Luckily, the recorder was more consistent in indicating whether workers were white, African American, or Mexican. Of the 177 workers identified, all were male, 92 were white, 43 were African Americans, and 42 were Mexican. Such numbers reveal that the Dallas cement industry employed many people of color, unlike the textile mills and the Ford automobile plant.[119]

A survey of the education levels of the 177 workers in the sample reveals that only four of the black cement workers were illiterate, whereas all of the white workers were literate. In fact, 97 percent of Anglo and African American cement workers could read and write English. These statistics illustrate that even though the workers might not have a high level of education, they consistently had a high rate of literacy. In comparison, a survey of the education levels of the identified Mexican workers reveals that only three of the forty-two workers were literate and

[118] City of Cement Incorporation Papers, 1908, and Annexation of Cement City Independent School District Papers, 1928 (Folder 1, Box 1, Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library, Special Collections, Dallas, TX); "Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 57," *Dallas Morning News*, December 27, 1931; "Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 59," *Dallas Morning News*, December 29, 1931; *Dallas City Directory* (1930); Sidney A. Davidson, Jr., *General Portland Inc.: The Dallas Plant Story* (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1987), 18, 24.

[119] Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County].

only eleven could speak English. Overall, the Mexican population in Dallas from 1900 to 1920 experienced a significant decrease in the proportion that could speak English, from 67 percent to 20 percent. This was a simple reflection of the fact that many Mexicans had fled their country as it was torn apart by a revolution. In Dallas, as elsewhere in the United States, they faced a great disadvantage. Due to the limited ability these workers had to communicate with management and coupled with the racial tensions that dominated this era, Mexican cement workers in Dallas were limited in their advancement within the industry and in their opportunities for effective union organization.[120]

Table 5: Mexican American Population for Dallas, Texas, 1900-1920

Mexicans in Dallas	1900	1910	1920
Total Population of Dallas	42,638 persons	92,104 persons	158,976 persons
Total Population of Mexicans in Dallas	60 persons (.01%) of total population	330 persons (.04%) of total population	4,130 persons (.03%) of total population
Men average age	41 years	29 years	25.2 years
Women Average Age	19 years	22.5 years	21.2 years
Average age of total population	28.7 years	26.9 years	24.4 years
Average year of immigration	1885	1899	1914
% of population that were naturalized	20% had gone through the process by 1900 census	30% had gone through the process by 1910 census	Only 41 persons of 4,130 (.009%) had been naturalized
Illiterate (writing)	48% could / 35% could not write in Spanish	45% could/ 53% could not write in Spanish	41% could/ 41% could not write in Spanish
Illiterate (reading)	50% could/ 33% could not read Spanish	49% could / 49% could not read Spanish	41% could / 40% could not read Spanish
Could speak English	67%	51%	20%
Could not speak English	17%	49%	61%

Source: Bianca Mercado, "With Their Hearts in their Hands: Forging a Mexican Community in Dallas, 1900-1925" (M.A. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008), 20-100.

[120]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Mercado, "With Their Hearts in Their Hands," 20-100; Document 2000-43 (File 14, Box 1,Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library); Memories of Ramon Acosta (Typescript, n.d., Texas Labor Archives, UTA), n.p.

In terms of the Dallas Mexican population's pursuit of naturalization, data indicates that the percentage was 20 percent in 1900; 30 percent in 1910; and less than 1 percent in 1920. Of the Cement City sample population in 1930, none had completed naturalization. The census reveals that of the identified workers, sixty- six percent immigrated between 1910 and 1920, 17 percent 1921 and 1927, and the remaining 17 percent between 1898 and 1907. This indicates clearly that within the sample population, a majority immigrated to Texas during the Mexican Revolution. Documents in the Cement City collection at the University of Texas at Arlington provide some insight about their path to Dallas. Between 1917 and 1925 the majority of the Mexican cement workers at the Trinity Portland Cement Plant came primarily from the state of Guanajuato, specifically the city of San Felipe. According to these records, Mexicans from San Felipe could walk across the bridge in Laredo, Texas, after paying five cents to enter the United States.[121]

Overall, of the 177 workers, 150 rented their homes at an average cost between five and thirty dollars, and twenty-seven owned their residences. Racial disparities characterize the living arrangements. Fifteen black cement workers owned houses valued from $300 to $4,500, and twelve white cement workers had homes valued from $2,000 to $5,000, but all of the Mexican families rented their residences, which cost between five and fifteen dollars per month. When the cement plant was built, the company erected thirty homes for their laborers to rent for two dollars a month, but obviously those quarters could not hold all of the new arrivals. While the Mexicans paid lower rents than blacks or whites, the fact that no Mexican worker owned a radio indicates that lower rents may have been a necessity rather than a choice. The housing furnished by the company for the supervisors, who were usually white, was segregated from the Mexican

[121]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Mercado, "With Their Hearts in Their Hands, " 20-100; Document 2000-43 (File 14, Box 1, Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library); Memories of Acosta, n.p.

village. All of the workers received very low wages; Historian Sidney A. Davidson Jr. reports that "the lowest rate of pay was in 1925-1926, [which was] $0.15 an hour for laborers, $0.16 for operators and $0.18 an hour for the foremen."



Figure 1: Housing in Cement City. Source: Cement City Collection (Folder 10, Box 1, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington. Reproduced with permission from Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington.

This provided a laborer who worked twelve hours a day for 365 days with a little more than $655.00 in wages. To assist workers, Trinity Portland Cement Company furnished a doctor for

minor complaints, opened a storefront that was operated by the company, and issued company food stamps to the families when plant production declined and working hours were curtailed.[122]

Among the cement workers, the average age of the heads of household was 35.7 years for Anglos, 33.9 years for African Americans, and 38.4 years for Mexicans. Nine were veterans of an American war, two from the Spanish American War and seven from World War I. Eighty-six cement workers (49 percent) of those identified were originally from Texas. The others came from thirteen other and five foreign countries, including Mexico. Cement work was often characterized by family members working together at the same plant. In fact, at the Trinity Portland Plant there were some families with as many as eight or nine family members working at the plant at the same time. Notable among these were the Bramhall, McDowell, Summers, Davidson, Hight, Caraway, Martinez, Gama, Soto, Garcia, and Areledo families, with two to four members each.[123] It is obvious from the surnames that working in family groups crossed ethnic lines.

Families defined the character of Cement City as its population grew to 503 by 1910 and then to 878 by 1920. During the early development, the residents, due to the plants' remoteness from Dallas, established their own post office, drug and general stores, schools, two dairies, two cemeteries, and a governing council. The dairies were located on Davis Street and were each operated by two local families, the Santerres and Chenowiths. The Santerre dairy was later sold

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[122]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Davidson, *General Portland*, 26 (quotation); Document 2000-43 (File 14, Box 1, Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library); Memories of Acosta, n.p. The identified cement workers located in the 1930 census lived on the following streets: Mount Clair, Fort Worth Ave, Stafford, Ormsby, Pollard, Willfornt, Thomas, Williams, Scott, Edgefield, and Menisley Typically cement factory employees worked seven days a week with shifts consisting of eleven to thirteen hours a day.

[123]Fifteenth Census, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; *Industrial Dallas Manufacturing Directory 1930* (Dallas: Dallas Chamber of Commerce, 1930); *Directory of Dallas City Manufacturing Plants 1930* (Dallas: Dallas Chamber of Commerce, 1930); *Dallas City Directory* (1930); Davidson, *General Portland*, 25. The other states and countries that were represented, apart from Mexico, included Illinois, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Louisiana, Georgia, Oklahoma, Alabama, North Carolina, Indiana, Ohio, Mississippi, Kentucky, Germany, Sweden, England, and New Zealand.

to the Teagues, who built and operated an ice cream parlor on the property. Specific businesses along Eagle Ford Road included S. M. Whittington's barber shop, M. F. Millikan's meat market, and J. B. Moreland's general merchandise store. These businesses were patronized by the local residents and created a community identity for Cement City. The surrounding community of Eagle Ford, which was notorious among other Dallas residents for its "fine bars, its great girls, and outlaws," was so large that it had its own weekly newspaper, *The Weekly Eaglet*, run by W. W. Basaye.[124]

The Cement City post office remained in independent operation until 1915, while the Cement City Independent School District remained unannexed until November 15, 1928. The schools that were then annexed into the Dallas system were West Dallas High School, Cement City High School, Eagle Ford Elementary, and Cedar Valley Elementary. Each of these had served a distinct constituency. Even though social events sponsored by the cement factories mixed races, the Cement City educational system did not. Eagle Ford Elementary and West Dallas High School were for white students, whereas Cedar Valley Elementary School and Cement City High School were for Mexican students. Blacks went to Fred Douglas Elementary School. During the 1930s the population of Cement City stabilized at 609 inhabitants, served by fourteen businesses. After World War II the residential area of the town declined and with it the small business district.[125]

As the cement industry intensified in Dallas, so did community spirit in Cement City. Living close to the plant benefited workers who lacked the transportation to their jobs and

[124]Folder 1, Box 1, Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library; "Cement City – Lanier Dads' Club Planned," *Dallas Morning News*, July 18, 1938; "Schools for Mexicans To Be Consolidated," *Dallas Morning News*, August 10, 1938.

[125]Folder 1, Box 1, Cement City Collection, Dallas Public Library; "Jens Moller, Founder of Cement Industry in Dallas County, Dies," *Dallas Morning News*, February 23, 1930.

created a social atmosphere that fostered connection between the workers. Commonly, workers created residential communities in the same geographic areas located around the factory or plant in which they worked. This developed into a social community within their working world that was supported and supervised by the paternalistic system imposed by their industry's managers. According to historian Toby Harper Moore, the rise of community schools, businesses, churches, and sports teams among industrial workers helped blur any divisions that existed between work life and home life. Harper states that the "schools in mill villages operated almost as a parallel educational system in the industrializing South, one with some striking similarities to the separate schools provided for blacks." These features were certainly present in the Cement City community.[126]

Was Cement City in fact a company town? According to historian Jennings J. Rhyne, a company town can be easily identified. He asserts that they typically were incorporated, had an average of two mills or factories, and housed approximately 500 residential inhabitants. They also were sub-communities separated from the dominant urban community. In terms of social interaction, Rhyne maintains that company towns consisted of three main units that included modern homes, a school, and a church. He specified that for a home to be considered modern in the early twentieth century, it had to be equipped with electric lights, running water, and inside toilets. Schools and church buildings would be financed by the local government and controlled by the incorporated town. Historian Jacquelyn Dowd Hall agrees with the geographic elements of a company town, and adds that because of the powerful industrial paternalism that resulted from these communities, the workers had limited options for change or advancement. In fact, Hall asserts, when workers began to challenge the owner's power and control, they suffered

[126]Harper, "The Unmaking of a Cotton Mill World," 80.

retaliatory action from their industry's management. Because southern industrial workers were poorly paid and lowly regarded, they could not avoid nor win such conflicts. Their helplessness was enhanced by the fact that they only had an average of eight years of formal education. On the other hand, while southern workers in a mill village were usually economically insecure and socially isolated, those in company towns, often located in or near an urbanized area, usually received wages that created much more economic stability.[127] By these standards, Cement City definitely had many of the identifying traits of a company town.

Henry Ford's Dallas operation more closely resembled a company town. In contrast to the low pay of the cement factories, Ford launched his five-dollar-a-day program on January 5, 1914. This program increased the minimum daily pay of workers in his automobile plants from $2.34 to $5.00 a day and decreased the working day from nine hours to eight hours. These changes attracted hundreds of workers to Ford plants from across the nation. Unfortunately, workers did not realize until later that they had to qualify for the five-dollar day and that this wage was not gained only by working for the company. There were three main qualifications for eligibility. First, the promise of the five-dollar day was applicable for the most part only to men over the age of twenty-two. Second, plant workers had to work for the company for six months or more to be considered committed to the industry and thereby eligible. And last, a worker would be considered for this wage only if the company was satisfied that the worker would not use this extra money for any deviant actions, specifically the purchase and use of alcohol. Common to all Ford plants was the sociology department that monitored the behavior of their workers. Ford agents would speak to relatives, visit workers' homes, oversee their living conditions and habits, and offer suggestions on how the workers' wages should be spent.

[127]Rhyne, *Some Southern Cotton Mill Workers*, 60, 62-64.; Hall, *Like a Family*, 104; Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 215.

According to Ford company policies, women who were employed with the company were excluded from the opportunity to earn five dollars per day due to the fact that "they are not, as a rule, the heads of families." The controlling paternalism that resulted from this wage increase would only intensify over the following decades.[128]

According to historian Sidney Fine, there was no other company comparable to the Ford Automobile Company that received so much attention and publicity between 1933 and 1935 concerning their failure and refusal to comply to the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Even though the NIRA guaranteed workers the right of collective bargaining, basing that on the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Ford would never accept that this action was a right of his workers. In 1919 Ford had bought out his minority stockholders. Therefore, by the time that the Great Depression hit the country, Ford had for a decade made his company's polices indistinguishable from his own. Fine stated that Ford "did not believe that organized labor should play any part in the shaping of [company] policy. In his view, labor unions were 'predatory' organizations and were 'part of the exploitation scheme." The importance of the automobile code contained in the NIRA was that it referred to "the manufacturing and assembling . . . of motor vehicles and bodies therefore, and of component and repair parts and accessories by manufacturers and assemblers of motor vehicles." Even though only 25 percent of the workers in this industry fell under this specific code, the Dallas Ford plant would be among this percentage.[129]

In 1924 Ford Motor Company built an assembly factory at 5200 East Grand Avenue and Henderson Street in East Dallas, Texas. The original permit was approved for $1,000,000, or

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[128] Daniel M. G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers, "Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 5 (October 1987): S69.

[129]Sidney Fine, "The Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.," *The Business History Review* 32 (Winter 1958): 353-385; Sidney Fine, "The Origins of the United Automobile Workers, 1933-1935," *The Journal of Economic History* 18 (September 1958): 253 (quotation).

almost ten percent of the total of $12,000,000 in construction approved for Dallas in 1924. The local architect and construction supervisor was S. F. Byler. He designed this plant to consist of three fire-proof brick and concrete units.



Figure 2: Ford Motor Company plant in Dallas, Texas. Source: "Seeing Dallas from the Air, No 51," *Dallas Morning News*, December 21, 1931.

The actual construction, which in fact cost $1,200,000, was undertaken by the Inge Construction Company of Detroit, Michigan. This project inspired improvements in the surrounding residential area. The purpose of the plant was to assemble automobiles from parts furnished by the company's Detroit factory. The Dallas plant employed an average of 2,500 workers and built 400 automobiles a day. It was responsible for distributing the finished automobiles and parts not

only to areas in Texas, but also to Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Colorado.[130]

During the 1920s the automobile industry enjoyed high profits, and the Ford Company translated these profits into a higher wage for their workers. Statistically, "by 1928, the average hourly wage of an automobile worker had risen to 75 cents as compared to 56.2 cents for production workers in manufacturing as a whole." By August 1924, Dallas construction permits were issued to build twelve new homes on Brook Street and thirty-eight new homes on Caldwell Street, both of which were near the Ford plant. The Dallas building inspector reported that the aggregate cost of this construction was $34,200. Each of these homes consisted of five rooms equipped with electricity and indoor plumbing, with a mortgage totaling $2,500 each. B. H. Dickerson, originally from Ft. Worth, Texas, received the Ford contract to build these homes. After receiving his permits from the Dallas Power Investment Company, his construction company broke ground in August 1924.[131]

There were six approved models for building Ford homes. Just as the assembly line system revolutionized automobile production, Ford required his builders to use the same methods. The floor plans of the model were all different but all included a living room, dining room, and kitchen on the first floor and a bathroom and three bedrooms on the second floors. Buyers purchased Ford homes directly from the Dearborn Realty and Construction Company. Even though there were no banks involved in the process, by 1921 the company required a ten percent down payment. The buyer paid monthly installments that over five years had to equal

[130]"Seeing Dallas from the Air, No 51," *Dallas Morning News,* December 21, 1931; "Ford Plant Building Permit Boosts Year's Total to $12,400,000," *Dallas Morning News,* May 5, 1924; "Homes To Be Built Near Ford Plant," *The Dallas Morning News,* August 24, 1924.

[131] "Ford Plant Building Permit Boosts Year's Total to $12,400,000," *Dallas Morning News,* May 5, 1924; "Homes To Be Built Near Ford Plant," *Dallas Morning News,* August 24, 1924.

one half of the cost of the house after the down payment was made. Ford employees who purchased these homes dealt directly with their employer for their weekly paycheck and mortgage. This established a level of economic control that extended beyond the workplace. Included in the home mortgage was a strict provision that once the house was purchased it could not be sold by the purchaser for a minimum of seven years. Ultimately, the Ford Company retained the right to repurchase the home within this seven-year time frame if the resident was deemed disruptive or undesirable to the Ford community. These homes were easily affordable for the Ford employees because in 1930 the company increased the workers wage to $7.00 a day. On the average, throughout the 1930s, a Ford factory worker earned $6.91 a day and worked for 245 days a year. Typically, plant foremen's wages were 25 percent higher than the wages of the men that they supervised. Their paychecks were more predictable thereby creating a purchasing power that allowed these Ford employees to acquire homes and maintain a standard of living that could be considered lower middle class. For example, Dallas plant foremen Allen L. Crouch and F. E. Kinnard owned homes that according to the 1930 census were valued at $3,000 and $2,700 respectively.[132]

Data from the 1930 United States population census provided a representative sample of 105 Dallas Ford Automobile plant workers. Of the 105 workers identified, all were white, 104 were male, and 1 was female. Unlike the cement industry, none of the Ford workers identified were African Americans or Mexican Americans. Thus an assertion can be made that it was hard for a person of color to obtain employment with Ford. The one female located in the census was Gene More, who was the company's secretary. More was a twenty-eight year old widow in 1930

[132]"Ford Plant Building Permit Boosts Year's Total to $12,400,000," *Dallas Morning News,* May 5, 1924; "Homes To Be Built Near Ford Plant," *The Dallas Morning News,* August 24, 1924; Derks, *Working Americans* , 225-228.; Reynold Wik, *Henry Ford and Grass-roots America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), passim.

and was listed as the head of her household. According to company policy, she was eligible for the dramatic wage increases. She owned her home, which the census recorded as having a value of $4,500. Due to the economic statistics collected from the 1930 census, most of these workers could be classified in the lower middle class and were more financially stable than Dallas cement workers. This is illustrated by the fact that twenty-eight workers (27 percent) owned their own homes, which ranged in value from $16,000 to $2,700. Seventy- seven workers (73.3 percent) rented their residences. Their rents ranged from $10 to $200, with the majority of them renting property for more than $25 a month. Collectively, this was a higher rent that Ford workers could maintain and Dallas cement workers could not. But the Ford employees either rented or owned homes on streets that were located close to the Ford plant on East Grand Avenue, staying within the community of Ford workers so that management would be able to closely monitor them. An additional economic indicator that is different from the Dallas cement workers is that thirty-three Ford plant workers owned radios, whereas, among the Mexican cement workers none owned a radio. A striking similarity between these two groups was that nine Ford employees reported that they were veterans, the same as the number of cement workers who claimed veteran status.[133]

The education levels of these workers revealed that all of the Ford workers were literate; like the white Dallas cement workers, they had a higher rate of literacy than textile workers in Dallas. The average age of the heads of household was thirty-seven years old and the median age was twenty-five years old. This age statistic corresponds to the data collected about southern workers by historian Sidney Fine, who reports that auto workers were typically young men between the ages of twenty and thirty-four years old. Eighty-two Dallas Ford workers (78

[133]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; *Dallas City Directory* (1930).

percent) that were identified were originally from Texas. Dallas residents must have recognized that while working for Ford had some negatives, in terms of management control, the economic stability they gained was a trade-off they were willing, in the beginning, to accept. According to Fine, the image of the Ford worker on the assembly line changed. Fine claims that during the 1930s and later, less than twenty percent of workers nationwide were engaged in assembly line operations. The Dallas plant was not among this twenty percent because 46 percent of the identified workers classified their jobs as assembly men. Other jobs listed by the identified workers were stock keeper, stock clerk, upholsterer, body builder, electrician, mechanic, painter, inspector, sander, bookkeeper, checker, and carpenter. Two of the most unique titles were held by Joseph Burne, who worked as the first aid man for the plant, and Leman Goode, whose title was Butler for the Ford management.[134]

The growth of industry in Dallas was the result of several factors that greatly influenced the lives of the workers inside and outside of the plants. These factors included the deliberate recruitment of eastern investors by local leaders who promised cheap labor and the accessibility of electricity in Texas cities. Both industrialization and population growth proceeded rapidly in Dallas, providing employment opportunities for many and chances at great prosperity for a few. Faced with the conflicts within their growing and diverse workforce, owners and managers of the textile, cement, and automobile plants either ignored problems, as in the textile industry, offered a few services, as in Cement City, or maintained strict control, as in the district near the Ford facility. All of these industrial leaders responded to the possibility of unionization among their

[134]Fifteenth Census, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]. For further individual information about the workers please refer to the charts and maps included at the end of the paper. The identified Ford workers located in the 1930 census lived on the following streets: South Street, Mary Street, May Street, Terry, Ashlone, Fisthugh, Garland Ave, Lindsley, Parry, Gurley, Phillips, East Grand, Ash Lane, Santa Fe Ave., and Henderson. Fine, *Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937,* 54. The other states and countries that were represented among the Ford workers were Kentucky, Illinois, Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Mexico and Italy.

workers by promoting an open shop atmosphere, which in their opinion would continue to protect their industrial development and prosperity. The New Deal would raise some serious challenges to this status quo in Dallas.

CHAPTER 5

"NEVER GIVE IN!" THE EFFECT OF THE NEW DEAL ON TEXTILE WORKERS IN DALLAS, TEXAS

Many southern states suffered economic catastrophes during the Great Depression, but because of stringent economic measures, such as cutting state government appropriations by 21 percent, and the impact of the oil industry, Texas did not suffer to the degree that was experienced elsewhere. The garment industry in Texas actually grew during the 1930s. In fact, historian Melissa Heild writes that "Texas showed a 40 percent increase in the number of clothing manufacturing firms from 1930-36." This occurred because eastern manufacturers sought cheap labor and hoped to flee the influence of unions. For these reasons, the South had become an obvious choice to relocate. But during the New Deal, Dallas textile workers, mostly women, overcame many obstacles to pose serious challenges to the established, paternalistic open-shop system.[135]

Membership in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union was divided into male and female lists. This union endorsed lower wages for female industrial workers and only provided token recognition for women among their national office holders. Even though by the end of the 1930s, 80,000 women had been organized into various unions and three out of four International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) members were women, local chapters still argued for labor contracts that included agreements for a wage disparity among the genders. Gender issues were so intense that some unions accepted labor contracts for their female members that allowed industries to "assign [female employees] to separate seniority lists so that they could not interfere

[135]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 30; Hield, "Union-Minded," 61.

with the accumulated privileges of male workers." Thus "women were still thought of primarily as transients in the labor force."[136]

Historian Dolores Janiewski confirms that gender issues were not the only concern among female workers. Race was another major factor. Specifically, just as in the social atmosphere of the South, in industrial work much anti-union sentiment was rooted in the theory of white superiority, which to survive needed to keep black workers in a lower status. As more southern white workers became interested in developing unions in their respective industries, black workers were also curious, but they were overwhelmingly distrustful of any movement in which whites participated in mass. Therefore northern union recruiters often discovered that increasing black membership in interracial unions in the South was challenging and difficult to achieve.[137]

The labor force in the garment industry in Texas, according to a study conducted by the Women's Bureau of the federal Department of Labor in 1932, included 15,343 women, of whom 52.4 percent worked an average of fifty-four hours per week in textile factories. This study is important due to the fact that the researchers also analyzed Hispanic and black women. The data indicates that only 31 percent of Hispanic women and 20 percent of black women surveyed had as many weekly working hours as whites in Texas textile factories. Author Stephen Amberg explains that Texan industrialists were different than northern industrialists in that "employers were able to use state power to block the extension of collective bargaining and slow the civil equality of the Mexican American and black communities . . . business leaders chose to do so in

[136]William Henry Chafe, *The American Women: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972): 86.

[137]Dolores E. Janiewski, *Sisterhood Denied: Race, Gender, and Class in a New South Community* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 149.

ways that preserved and enhanced their authority and wealth and limited improvements in the status of labor."[138]

Improving working conditions and wages in Texas factories was always a concern for workers. Charlotte Graham, who was a worker in the Justin-McCarty shop in Dallas, recounted that the factory was "a hot and dirty place with no fans, where the lint and dust hung from the ceiling. The workers wore old dresses, or rugs, as she called them, because they perspired so much. The machines were in long rows on one floor of the shop. Workers were not allowed to leave their seats, and bundle girls brought the work when a worker called for it." Graham went on to say in her interview with Hield that "management cares more for the machines than the workers . . . once when [she] ran a needle through her finger, breaking it off inside, with thread hanging out either side, she waited an hour and a half to see a doctor." Heild noted that Graham "was not given time off or compensation for the accident."[139]

Overproduction of textiles throughout the beginning of the twentieth century had over time glutted the market and in turn had driven the demand and price downward. This problem motivated the textile management in Dallas and all of Texas to be open to participation in the National Recovery Administration's formula for industrial cooperation. In the spirit of this cooperation, factory owners were to reduce the "standard hours for industry workers down from fifty or fifty-five to forty, set minimum weekly wages of twelve dollars . . . [eliminate] child labor in the mills, [prohibit] plant operations for more than eighty hours per week, and adopt the

[138]Hield. "Union-Minded," 59-70; Stephen Amberg, "Varieties of Capitalist Development: Worker-Manager Relations in the Texas Apparel Industry, 1935-1975," *Social Science History* 30 (Summer 2006): 235.

[139]Hield. "Union-Minded," 62.

[National Industrial Recovery Act's] section 7(a), which guaranteed labor the right of collective bargaining."[140]

In the beginning, the business community of Dallas, greeted the National Recovery Administration (NRA) with great anticipation and enthusiasm, so much so that by mid-1933 the "Dallas Chamber of Commerce [had] responded so quickly and energetically that NRA chief Hugh Johnson singled out the organization for commendation." The Dallas Chamber of Commerce boasted that the city's work force had a vast resource of "native, intelligent labor, easily trained, loyal, and efficient." According to a *Dallas Morning News* article entitled "Crowds Cheer Re-employed During Parade" Dallas was "100 percent NRA and the blue eagle . . . flew . . . [in the] Fair Park Stadium at night in a tremendous patriotic celebration." Through a proclamation by Mayor Charles E. Turner, September 9, 1933, was declared a holiday, "NRA Victory Jubilee Day," in Dallas. This celebration attracted representatives from fifty Texas cities. By mid-September 1933, Dallas had 64,221 employees working under the blue eagle banners, while 8,100 different businesses had signed agreements with the NRA. But by the late fall of 1933, this enthusiastic spirit weakened significantly. This weakening centered on the growing shift from an open-shop emphasis to workers participating in organized labor activities. By 1934 the local Dallas textile manufacturers actively challenged the scope and authority of the National Dress Board of the NRA. The federal government wanted the local producers to adhere to the Cotton Garment Code, but enforcement created tremendous resentment among the Dallas manufacturers.[141]

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[140]"Crowds Cheer Re-employed During Parade," *Dallas Morning News.* September 10, 1933; "Dallas Leading Texas in Number if Workers Under Eagle's Wings," *Dallas Morning News.* September 2, 1933; Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 59.

[141]Ibid., 60 (first quotation), 94 (second quotation).

In order to combat the threat of unionization, the Dallas Open Shop Association, which was founded in 1919, "guaranteed the solvency of all its members in case of work-stopping strikes through the use of its rumored two- to three- million-dollars reserve fund. Further, it subjected any member who knowingly hired union workers to a three-thousand dollar fine." According to historian Roger Biles, even though there was a rise in worker discontent in Dallas throughout the 1920s, management had been able to impose an open-shop policy. Biles asserts that "in Dallas . . . local officials boasted that 95 percent of laborers in the city worked in open shops and that no factory lost a single day because of a strike during the entire decade." While local officials were not entirely correct in their boast—there were in fact some major strikes by Dallas textile workers starting in 1927—their determination to keep an open-shop policy in Dallas was very clear.[142]

The growing disdain for the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and Section 7(a) did not just affect Dallas industry. It could also be found among other business and political leaders elsewhere in Dallas as well as across Texas. Biles maintains that the "*Dallas Morning News* consistently took a hostile position toward labor unions, opposing section 7(a) and the [National Labor Recovery Act (NLRA)]." He adds that the newspaper company "flaunted [its] noncompliance with New Deal laws, [by] refusing to pay its employees time-and-a-half for overtime work." In short, "the paper continued to treat its workers in the frankly paternalistic way it always had." Historian Randolph B. Campbell maintains that unions were never greatly encouraged by either the local or national political representatives of Texas. He declares that "Many leading Texans, such as Vice President Garner viewed the 'sit-down-strikes' as violations

[142]Ibid, 94 (first quotation), 14 (second quotation); *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s.v. "Union Regulation," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html (accessed June 11, 2007).

of property rights and were angry with President Roosevelt for not taking action to stop or prevent them."[143]

The federal government chose to work through Dallas city hall in order to fulfill the policies of the New Deal. This institution was part of the problem due to the fact that the power over corporate Dallas lay with the Citizens' Council. This organization should not be confused with the White Citizen's Council that was formed in the 1950s. The Dallas Citizens' Council was the invention of Robert Lee Thornton, who was a business maverick, failed farmer, and successful banker. Biles explains that "Thornton . . . insisted, for instance, that membership be limited to chief executive officers of major corporations – no doctors, lawyers, clergymen, educators, or intellectuals who might temporize when prompt action was needed." The purpose of the Citizen's Council was to clean up politics in Dallas and reverse the growing ineffectiveness of local government, but it had become a political force that Roosevelt neither opposed nor supported.[144]

During the 1930s the right to strike was defined in New Deal legislation as a commercial right and not a constitutional one, thereby hoping to "manage the conflict between the state's interest in fostering economic recovery and constitutional, institutional, and social restrictions on state activism." Historian Melissa Hield conducted a series of interviews with eight women who had participated in the ILGWU strikes in Texas. One of these women, "Olivia Rawlston, former Dallas ILG local president, [stated that] union mindedness was strong in Texas, a state known for its indifference and even hostility to organized labor." In other words, the conservatism of

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[143]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 95; Campbell, *Gone to Texas*, 389-390.

[144]Biles, *The South and the New Deal*, 136; Biles, "The New Deal in Dallas," 1-19; *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s.v. "Union Regulation" (first quotation), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html (accessed May 23, 2007). The members of the Citizens Council included Julius Schepps, Karl St. John Hobitzelle, Algur Hurtle Meadows, Edward Musgrove Dealy, and Robert Brooks Cullum, just to name a few.

management and New Deal legislation did not eliminate the desire of women textile workers in Dallas to unionize. Historian Lionel Patenaude illustrates the hope that unionization would help workers through the words of "E. E. Hales, [the] Labor Compliance Officer of the Dallas N.R.A. office, [who] said, 'Never before in history has labor had to this degree the active cooperative of government in extending and perfecting its organization. It is [a] great opportunity. All that remains for labor is to grasp it." But having the right to organize without employer interference was a new experience for Texans, and many Texan employers, such as those in the Dallas Citizens Council, argued that unionization was an activity that was un-American and radical.[145]

The *Dallas Morning News* reported in an article on August 3, 1933, that "Ernest Tutt, district manager of the Department of Commerce, reported a total of 9,968 pledges received . . . from Texas employers joining the NRA . . . A total of 3,280 agreements have been received from Dallas." Hopes were high. By August 9, 1933, just six days later, Dallas had 6,196 agreements to enforce and support the NRA codes. In an interview with the *Dallas Morning News,* William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), gave this foreshadowing advice to the industry of Dallas: "when employers of labor discharge workers because they organize into trade union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor they are, by said act, provoking industrial unrest and fomenting strikes . . . Industrial peace can be promoted and advanced through organization, co-operation and understanding on the part of those associated with industry." Later that month, Dallas faced its first conflict with NRA codes when garment workers threatened to strike over the maximum hour and minimum wage provisions.[146]

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[145]Hield. "Union-Minded," 60; Lambert, *If the Workers Took a Notion*, 85; Patenaude, "The New Deal," 55.

[146]"Buying Drive Soon, Johnson Promises, to Speed up NRA." *Dallas Morning News,* August 3, 1933; "More Wage Earners Put Under NRA as New Codes Offered." *Dallas Morning News,* August 9, 1933; *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s.v. "Union Regulation," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html.(accessed May 23, 2007).

Historian Patricia Evridge Hill declares that textile unionization in Dallas started in 1935, "[when] 100 Dallas dressmakers joined a grassroots 'sewing club' shortly after the Supreme Court declared [the] National Industrial Recovery Act codes stipulating minimum wages and maximum hours unconstitutional." When the NRA codes went into effect in 1933, skilled textile workers, such as silk dress cutters, who earned $35 to $50 a week in some other parts of the country, made only $10 to $15 in Dallas factories. Typically, Dallas garment workers who worked on cotton clothing were paid an average of $9.50 a week. The women of the "sewing club," alarmed at the loss of the promises offered by the invalidated NIRA, sought advice from Larry Taylor, who was the President of the Dallas Central Labor Council. He in turn requested advice from the ILGWU representative, Meyer Perlstein, to aid in this problem.[147]

In 1934 Perlstein had been sent from the St. Louis ILGWU office to recruit members. Perlstein, a Russian immigrant, has often been described as a rough, crude, and colorful character who proved himself as an excellent union organizer. His reputation had been made in Cleveland, "where he rescued the garment unions from oblivion before World War I." He had created the "Cleveland plan," which he began to implement throughout his assigned territory that included Texas. This strategy, which originated with the ILGWU and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) in Cleveland, Ohio in 1920, was a combination of the use of strikes, collective bargaining, and the participation of women. This method became controversial in the southern states. In fact, Lester Lorch criticized Perlstein's unorthodox and often violent methods, stating that "Perlstein was completely ignorant of the real conditions of the fledging Dallas garment industry . . . Perlstein seemed convinced that strong arm methods . . . were necessary to accomplish his ends." Perlstein had worked with David Dubinsky, leading a very successful

[147]Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas," 297.

union drive throughout the East and the Midwest, but he had a special interest in Texas, and Dallas in particular, because it had become the home of a sizable garment center. Within four months of his arrival he recruited four hundred of the one thousand dressmakers in Dallas and organized a Dallas chapter of the ILGWU. Local manufacturers responded to the ILGWU pressure by intimidating workers, firing the union's most active members, and communicating with the ILGWU solely through the Texas Dress Manufacturers' Association.[148]

Perlstein had previous recruiting and organizing success in 1933-1934 in San Antonio, Texas, where he helped to establish Garment Workers Local No. 421, so the national leaders of the ILGWU were convinced that he would have the same success in Dallas. But lasting reform would not come without several more years of strikes and negotiations in San Antonio, and the same would be true for Dallas.[149] In January 1935 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) received complaints from the workers of the Darling Dress Company in Dallas, and investigators began taking depositions. Those taken from Annie Thomas, Alto Blackburn, and Lillian Yurcho revealed the discriminating activities of their management. Specifically, Yurcho who worked as floorlady, was required by management to find out who were the union members on her floor. Yurcho claimed that "I, as floorlady, feel that the union girls have been discriminated against." Thomas agreed with Yurcho's assessment and added that she had worked for the Darling Dress Company as an operator for years and had always been reemployed after a slow season, but

> on Tuesday, Jan. 8, 1935, the factory was closed and everyone was laid off, until Thursday, Jan. 10, 1935, when the plant was reopened. Other girls who are non union

[148]George N. Green, "ILGWU in Texas, 1930-1970," *Journal of Mexican American History* 1 (Spring 1971): 145 (first quotation); DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing* , 149 (second quotation); Patricia Evridge Hill, "Real Women and True Womanhood: Grassroots Organizing Among Dallas Dressmakers in 1935," *Labor's Heritage* 5 (1994): 4-17; Robert R. Ebert and Shea L. Monschein, "Paternalism, Industrial Democracy, and Unionization in the Cleveland Garment Industry: 1900-1935: The Case of the Printz-Biederman and Joseph and Feiss Companies," *Journal of Research and Creative Studies* 2 (Fall 2009): 18-34.

[149]Julia Kirk Blackwelder, *Women of the Depression: Caste and Culture in San Antonio, 1929-1939* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1984), 138.

> girls have been reemployed; and the new girls have been employed in the place of the union girls who were laid off on Jan 8th. On Monday, before the plant was closed down on Tuesday, Mr. Toblowsky, owner, asked the floorlady if I was a union member. I have not as yet been called back to work . . . I feel that it is due to my being a union member that I have not been reemployed at this time.[150]

Blackburn made similar comments.

In February 1935 conflicts between labor and management came to a head in Dallas. A union election had been held and the membership of the ILGWU had voted 383 to 8 in favor of a general strike against the thirteen Dallas garment shops. This vote represented forty percent of the total garment workers in Dallas. Motivated by the recent firings of unionized workers, the strike began on February 7, 1935, when 150 women walked out of the various local shops in order to picket for the enforcement of labor codes in the Dallas factories. These 150 workers represented only 10 percent of garment company employees. Hield describes how "management threatened [the strikers] with the specter of the blacklist, and told mothers with sick children that they would not even be able to buy medicine in Dallas." Trying to undermine the union leaders, "they labeled the organizers 'foreigners' whose sole purpose was to make money by collecting dues." According to Hill, the *Dallas Morning News*

> refused to take female strikers seriously. One the first day of the walkout, dressmakers were described 'chatting good-naturally as if they were on an outing.' Noting less tension than was usually present among crowds that gather after an auto wreck, the *Morning News* concluded that Dallas dressmakers exhibited no tendencies toward violence and instead provided an example of 'how even tempered Texans can stage a strike without getting excessively 'riled up' about it.[151]

This assumed "even-temperedness" would soon be challenged because tension between police, management, and strikers grew quickly. The *Dallas Morning* News reported on February 13, 1935, that violence had erupted at the Donovan Manufacturing Company Plant, after a five-day

[150]Depositions of Annie Thomas, Alta Blackburn, and Lillian Yurcho on January 11, 1935 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Relations Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region).

[151]Hield. "Union-Minded," 65 (first quotation); Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas," 297 (second quotation).

strike by female garment workers, who were protesting the firing of four ILGWU members. The report noted that "One striker and three policemen were injured," specifically, "Policeman E. L. Warnack was bitten on the neck and wrist and kicked and beaten during the outbreak . . . Sergt. J. B. Burns was bitten on the wrist and Policemen O. P. Wright was slightly bruised."[152]

Once the strike breakers arrived at the Donovan plant they had to dodge both the picket line and the police in order to get into the factory. Charlotte Graham recounted a similar day in which "the strikers stopped some scabs, but others [scabs] retaliated by dumping hairset lotion, boxes of pins, or trash on the strikers. When the strikers tried to get even, arrests for picketing or disturbing the peace followed." Graham knew first-hand what she was recounting; as a striker, she was arrested fifty-four times. During to the growing tension and the violent outbreaks, Lorch began to carry a gun because of the continuous threats made against him and his family. Dallas strikers showed their frustration through threats and intimidation, targeting other factory owners. The glass windows of the office of John B. Donovan were destroyed by strikers throwing bricks, and Donovan was beaten on the Dallas streets by four union women. In covering this incident, the *Dallas Morning News* stated that he suffered from a gashed head and split trousers. Ernest Wadel, president of the Marcy Lee Manufacturing Company, believed that he also could be a target. He "persuaded a young woman employee to give him a knife which she was carrying in case she should be attacked by strikers." Newspaper coverage of these events created sympathy for the Dallas business owners among the local law enforcement and judges and confused the Dallas public on the subject of supporting local union organizing.[153]

Because of the growing volatile situation between management and labor, Dallas Mayor Charles E. Turner gave specific instructions for the police to "maintain an impartial attitude

[152]"Garment Workers' Pickets and Cops Clash at Factory," *Dallas Morning News*, February 13, 1935.

[153]Hield, "Union-Minded,", 65; DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing* , 151.

while keeping order between strikers and workers" because complaints had been filed with the mayor's office that the police were taking management's side. It did not reflect well on local leaders that, during a clash, "a law officer tore a union songsheet from a striker's hands and threw her to the pavement with such force that she was hospitalized with a hip injury." While the *Dallas Morning News* "excused his actions, explaining that the police mistook the songsheet for a court-ordered injunction," this hardly excused the officer's actions. After the dust cleared, at least eighty-six women would be arrested under various charges from misconduct to assault.[154]

Management of the Donovan Manufacturing Company Plant requested from Perlstein the names of all of the union members in order to identify any further troublemakers. Strikers were not receiving their wages, therefore in order to encourage workers to continue the strike, the ILGWU paid each striker $6 a week for their efforts. Owners were so concerned about the growing conflict that at least four larger dress manufacturers discussed "moving their factories from Dallas to smaller cities in North Texas in case of a long strike." To complicate the situation even further, the Dallas Central Labor Council and the State Federation of Labor put garments made in Dallas on the "We Don't Patronize List," which was featured on the strikers' posters that read "The Fight of the Southern Women Against the Sweatshop."[155]

While some of the women joined the strikers, others sought legal compensation for their losses. One specific example is "Carmen Jackson, garment worker [who] filed suit for $25,000 alleged damages against the Aronson- Rose Manufacturing Company. She alleged that she had been fired for "her union activities, and in violation of Section 7a of the national recovery act."

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[154]"Police Instructed To Be Careful in Handling Strikers," *Dallas Morning News,* March 14, 1935; Hill, "Real Women and True Womanhood," 10.

[155]"Garment Workers Form Committee for Strike Vote," *Dallas Morning News,* February 14, 1935; "Garment Workers Ballot to Strike by 383 to 8 Vote," *Dallas Morning News,* February 19, 1935; Hield, "Union-Minded," 65.

The Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Company was a major supplier of textiles for the state of Texas. From "January 1, 1934, to December 31, 1934, it sold better than one hundred fifty thousand ($150,000) dollars worth of dresses that it manufactured. That [was] approximately eighty per cent (80%) of such dresses [that] were sold in the state of Texas." Jackson had been discharged on December 14, 1934, and she filed her complaint with the NLRB in early 1935. During her hearing, Jackson testified that she had been both an operator and floor manager at the company until 1931, when she had followed her husband to St. Louis, Missouri. In 1934, the Jacksons returned to Dallas, and she was soon reemployed as an operator at the manufacturing company. As an operator, she made the original pattern for a garment that served as a blueprint for all the other workers to copy. This was one of the most important and skilled positions in the textile industry, and so while some workers would not have consistent work, operators such as Jackson were promised work all year long. The NLRB found that the company had violated Section 7(a) and ordered the company to re-employ Jackson immediately.[156]

The testimony provided on behalf of Jackson made it clear that her involvement with the ILGWU led to her dismissal. She testified that she joined the union on November 1, 1934, and served as the secretary/ treasurer and a recruiter for the union. One of the employees, Mrs. Ragsdale, provided important evidence for her claim of discrimination. Ragsdale testified that

> "[Mr. Aronson] took us to his private office and he had something he wanted to the girls to sign. He didn't give it to me to read. I didn't read it. But [he] knew I was a union girl and I was the last one of the girls he sent for to come into the office. He said that he had a statement there that he wanted me to sign that Mrs. Jackson was a trouble-maker; and I said 'I don't know that, Mr. Aronson.'"[157]

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[156]"Garment Worker Sues for Damages," *Dallas Morning News*, March 2, 1935; *ILGWU* v. *Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Company*, Dallas, Texas, 1935: 1-2, 35 (Folder 1, Box 1, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Collection, 1934-1970, Texas Labor Archives, UTA).

[157]*ILGWU* v. *Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Company*, Dallas, Texas, 1935: 1-2, 35 (Folder 1, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Collection, 1934-1970, UTA).

Leo Aronson claimed that Jackson was spreading rumors that he was "code-chiseling when in reality Jackson was putting pressure on Aronson to raise the wages above the NRA minimum." For this action and her union recruiting at the Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Company, Jackson was blacklisted and became unemployable in Dallas. According to a *Dallas Morning News* article published on March 2, 1935, Aronson-Rose Manufacturing Company had not yet re-employed Jackson, who was quoted in saying that "she has been unable to find other work" because of her union membership.[158]

Aronson was not alone in his vindictive tactics toward union members. Hill asserts that Lorch encouraged the Dress Manufacturer Association to blacklist any women whose names appeared in *Dallas Morning News* articles and court records pertaining to strikes and labor organizing. She details how the

> Dress Manufacturer Association set up a fund to pay for full page advertisements in local newspapers and hired investigators to find out one thing or another relative to the strike that we thought we should know about. Soon after the manufacturers established their strike fund, incidents of police brutality increased and special guards augmented the local police. As many as 100 private guards wore uniforms like those of the Dallas police and carried pistols during the strike. The Dress Manufacturers' Association paid $2,256.11 to "detectives" and spent over $100 taking pictures of strikers. Ironically, factory owners who claimed they could not afford to pay skilled dressmakers more than $12 per week paid private guards a weekly wage of $25 to stand at the factory doors.[159]

Dallas textile manufacturers were determined not to give up their open-shop policies without a fight.

In March, violence erupted again. This time strikers created a free-for-all battle at the Sheba Ann Dress Manufacturing plant, which was located on Commerce Street in Dallas. This conflict was sparked by a court order issued by Judge Towne Young of the state district court. He forbade picketing and the carrying of strike signs in front of five plants in Dallas, which

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[158]"Garment Worker Sues for Damages," *Dallas Morning News.* March 2, 1935.

[159]Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas," 306.

included the Sheba Ann Dress Manufacturing facility. According to his court order, two or more persons assembled gathered in order to picket would be considered an unlawful act.

Figure 3: ILGWU strikers pose for a group photograph in 1935. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 7, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

Eighteen women were arrested and were charged with disturbing the peace and interfering with a police officer. According to a *Dallas Morning News* article published on March 26, 1935, once the strikers and arresting officers arrived at the city jail,

> attempts to harass police when the patrol wagons were unloaded at the city jail proved a boomerang to a number of the arrested women. Falling to the ground as they stepped out

> of the wagon, they discovered to their dismay that the graveled driveway had been heavily oiled. All soon regained their feet, sadly contemplating greasy, almost ruined dresses.[160]

Obviously the mayor's plea for decorum was falling on deaf ears.

Union members would not adhere to Young's court order, and twenty-four more garment workers were arrested and jailed for contempt of court because they refused to sign a pledge not to violate the injunction. The *Dallas Morning News* reported that "the twenty-four who refused to sign Judge Young's pledge marched stiffly past the bench as their names were called, several of them tossing their heads determinedly as they passed. The same article recounts the dramatic story of Jessie Lee Ansley's signing of her pledge card, describing her as an

> attractive blonde [who] while the names were being called . . . conferred hurriedly with her mother, who sat in the courtroom. When her name was called she went to the table, wept silently as she signed and then ran to her mother. She grasped her mother by the arm and then started for the door. As she neared the exit she covered her face with her hands and started sobbing loudly.

The *Dallas Morning News* also listed the names of twenty-five women, all ILGWU members, who also refused to sign the pledge and were ultimately sent to jail until they could make the $1000 bond. Even though none of the women ever signed the pledge, they made the bond by April 1, 1935, and were all released on the promise of August W. Schulz, the executive secretary of the Dallas Central Labor Council, that they "would refrain from violating terms of orders refraining them from unlawfully picketing local garment manufacturing concerns." In order to calm the situation in Dallas, Fred E. Nichols, the State Labor Commissioner, was called in to monitor negotiations between labor and management at several factories. In early April 1935, representatives from both sides met in a round table discussion about their differences to see if

[160]"Eighteen Women Jailed following Strike Battle," *Dallas Morning News*, March 26, 1935.

they could come up with an agreement that both parties would accept. [161]

Figure 4: ILGWU strikers waiting to be processed into the Dallas city jail. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 7, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

Unfortunately, owners maintained that they would not deal with their workers collectively through an outside union representative but only individually through the factory management. This failed arbitration soured Nichols on ever reaching an agreement between

[161]"24 Garment Plant Strikers Sent to Jail for Contempt," *Dallas Morning News*, March 29, 1935; "Garment Workers Freed on Pledge of Official," *Dallas Morning News*, April 1, 1935.

workers and owners in Dallas, so he resigned his position. The announcement of Nichols' resignation and that the roundtable came to no agreement sparked violence once again between Dallas strikers and the local police. According to the *Dallas Morning News*, "trouble started at the Marcy Lee plant about 5:30 p.m., police said, when a 200-pound woman slipped up behind a young woman worker leaving the plant and with one quick snatch practically yanked off her dress." After the dust settled, twenty-eight women were jailed and were charged with picketing and disturbing the peace.

Figure 5: ILGWU strikers in the Dallas County jail. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 7, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

In June 1935, Labor Compliance Director Edwin Elliott commented on the condition of labor in Dallas. He stated in his monthly reported dated June 16, 1935, that after he returned from the AFL state convention in Waco, on May 13-16, 1935, that Texas had very determined leaders who were very sincere and quite determined to gain organized labor its rights but overall at times had made some serious tactical errors. Specifically he stated that "organized labor [in Texas] was greatly interested, of course, in the passage of the Wagner Bill, and seemed to have confidence in the NIRB and very appreciative of the work which had been done in behalf of organized labor. I anticipate with the passage of the Wagner Bill there will be much for this office to do."[162]

Finally, the strike in Dallas reached a breaking point when Lorch, who was both the owner of the Lorch Manufacturing plant and the head of the Texas Dress Manufacturers' Association, agreed to negotiate with Perlstein if Perlstein would agree to call off the pickets during Market Week in Dallas. Perlstein agreed, but after Market Week was over Perlstein attempted to meet with Lorch and Lorch refused to see him. Feeling that they had been betrayed by Lorch, the next day strikers converged on his shop. Hill writes that "on the morning of August 7 strikers entered the Morten-Davis and Lorch Manufacturing companies and stripped the clothing from ten female employees. Hundreds of spectators crowded the downtown streets and hung out of nearby office windows to witness the spectacle. The *Dallas Morning News* described the scene in an article entitled "Strippers Spread Work:"

> After several weeks of peaceful picketing, trouble first flared up again at 7:30 p.m. . . . when a large group of women strikers appeared at the Morten-Davis Company plant, Jackson and Austin, and started to molest arriving employees. The major victim of a scratching, kicking, and cursing assault was Mrs. Lucille Tyree, a worker in the plant, who was roughly seized and promptly stripped of her clothing . . . Arrival of the police

[162]"28 Women Jailed after Strike Fight; Worker Beaten; Commissioner Quits," *Dallas Morning News*, April 3, 1935; Region 8 Labor Board Monthly Report, June 16, 1935 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Relations Labor Board, NASR).

> sent the strikers scurrying to the Lorch Manufacturing plant, Lamar and Commerce, where nine more workers were either completely or partially disrobed before the gaping eyes of hundreds of persons in the streets . . . The fighting here was fierce before police gained the upper hand. For a time a small crew of policemen were almost helpless as the strikers grabbed employees one by one and beat and attempted to disrobe them.[163]

According to historian Dorothy DeMoss, the disrobed strikers were given white nurse uniforms to wear. These uniforms were produced by the Lorch factory.[164]

Figure 6: A cartoon illustration of the August 7, 1935, "strike-stripping" event in Dallas. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 7, Box 1,Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

[163]"Strikers Strip Ten Women on Dallas Streets," *Dallas Morning News,* August 8, 1935.

[164] Ibid. (first quotation); Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas," 303 (second quotation); DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing,* 154.

Figure 7: Dallas strikers in jail for stripping the clothes off of the scab replacements. From left to right: Charlotte Graham, Jessie Burgett and her 14-month-old son Roy, and Mae Senley. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 7, Box 1, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

The Dallas police reported that they had to use nine squad cars, eight motorcycle officers, all the detectives they had, and twenty officers from the afternoon detail to arrest and process the twenty-eight strikers. The charges ranged from disturbing the peace to inciting a riot. Each of the arrested strikers was released on a $200 bond. One of these strikers was Bessie Havens, who had worked for Morten-Davis Manufacturing Plant for five years and never made more than $12 a week, even though her employer promised $18 a week. This unfulfilled promise motivated her to join a union and strike. Later she told NRA investigators that she "joined the ILGWU because her work was undervalued and she thought a union could improve her condition." Havens was unfortunately injured during this strike and required medical attention. After being released from

the hospital emergency room, Havens was taken to jail where, according to her, she was "put in with street walkers and everybody else, but [this] did not lessen her commitment to the union." The "strike stripping" in Dallas attracted international attention. An Italian artist's sketch of the August melee appeared in *La Tribuna Illustrata* of Rome.[165]

Figure 8: Depiction of "strike stripping" from *La Tribuna Illustrata* of Rome, Italy. Source: "Italian Publication's Sketch of Stripping in Dress Strike, *Dallas Morning News*, September 10, 1935.

[165]"Strikers Strip Ten Women on Dallas Streets," *Dallas Morning News,* August 8, 1935 (first and third quotations); Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas," 303-304 (second quotation); DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing,* 154; *The Handbook of Texas Online*. s.v. "Union Regulation," http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/UU/oju1.html(accessed May 23, 2007); Michael V. Hazel, ed., *Dallas Reconsidered: Essays in Local History* (Dallas: Three Forks Press, 1995). In Dallas there was a substantial Italian population that had a local paper entitled *La Tribuna Italiana.* The Dallas paper was first produced by Carlo "Charley" Saverio Papa on June 20, 1913, and by 1920 had a circulation of seven thousand homes.

Strikers were arrested, fined $25, and sentenced to three days in jail. Meyer Perlstein was also sentenced to three days in jail and fined $100 for contempt of court since Judge Young alleged that he incited the strike that resulted in the stripping incident. Perlstein attempted again to reach a settlement between the ILGWU and the owners of the Dallas garment factories, but no agreement was ever reached. Lorch was quoted in the *Dallas Morning News* as saying that "no women who have participated in these fights, especially Wednesday's disgraceful riot in which several of our workers were stripped, shamed, and humiliated in public, will ever be permitted to work in any of our plants of this association."[166]


Supreme Court Refuses Habeas Writ

Meyer Perlstein, representative of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Tuesday was serving the second day of his three-day jail sentence for contempt of court for his participation in the disorders some weeks ago in connection with the local garment workers' strike. Before Perlstein can be released from jail he must also pay a fine of $100.

The picture shows the union representative behind the bars of his cell door just before he learned that the Supreme Court had refused to permit his release on a writ of habeas corpus.

Figure 9: Meyer Perlstein in the Dallas city jail. Source: Charlotte Graham Papers, 1935-1985 (Scrapbook, Folder 9, Box 1, Folder 9, Texas Labor Archives, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington). Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

[166]"Women Strippers to be Objects of Contempt Action," *Dallas Morning News,* August 9, 1935.

The textile strike in Dallas was very expensive to maintain. It is reported that between the payments to strikers, court costs, and lawyer fees, the cost for the local ILGWU was thirty thousand dollars. ILGWU's expenses included not only the $6 - $7 provided per week to each striker, but also they covered the cost of the strikers' car fare, meals, attorney's fees, bonding costs, and executive salaries. Manufacturers also suffered some expenses in that they had "the same attorney costs; have employed scores of private guards for several periods during the strike; have hired fleets of taxis to deliver non-striking workers home." Ultimately, the workers that took part in these strikes and union activities paid the greatest cost because they were blacklisted and could not find work. According to Hield, "the ILGWU helped many with bus fares to cities like New York, Los Angeles, or Kansas City and assured them jobs in union shops." The ten-month Dallas strike finally ended in November 1935 and succeeded in creating representation for five dress factories. Historian DeMoss maintains that even though Dallas remained "completely unorganized by the ILUGW and 'open shop' sentiments continued to predominate among the city's citizens," by 1937 through the local worker's continued belief in New Deal support and a strike against the Sheba Ann Frocks Manufacturing Company, the ILGWU was able to establish local union chapters 121 and 204 in Dallas. Even though the strikes in Dallas did not achieve many successes, the most enduring legacy is that for the first time, because of the influence of Section 7(a) and the General Strike of 1934, the textile workers in Texas gained an identity and political voice through union representation that enabled them to make their grievances public.[167]

In 1937 the ILGWU focused on the workers of the Sheba Ann Frocks Manufacturing Company. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or Wagner Act, which replaced the

[167] "Cost of Garment Workers' Strike Placed at $30,000," *Dallas Morning News,* April 21, 1935; Hield, "Union-Minded," 65; DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing in Texas,* 154.

invalidated NIRA, union organizers promoted a strike against this company. On February 11, the largely unorganized company workers struck for higher wages and the right to maintain membership in a union. Violence once more erupted between Dallas police and the strikers. Specifically, "striking women rushed police lines four times during the afternoon to reach non-strikers emerging after their day's work. [They] were unsuccessful, [but their actions] resulted in one arrest, several slapped faces, and numerous torn garments." Lorch, as the president of the Manufacturers Association, again "furnished Sheba Ann non-strikers with money for taxis" in order to get safely to work and past the picket line. In the end, after many hearings about the working conditions and absence of collective bargaining at the Sheba Ann Frocks Manufacturing Company, the federal board ruled that the firm had violated the NLRA and recommended that:

> 1. Sheba Ann desist from interfering with its employees right of self-organization to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
>
> 2. Sheba Ann desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the international as the exclusive representative of its employees.
>
> 3. Sheba Ann desist from discouraging membership in any labor organization by discrimination with regard to hire and tenure of employment.
>
> 4. Sheba Ann, in order to effectuate the policies of the Wagner Act, reinstate employees named in the report to the positions they held when the strike started February 11, 1937, with all rights and privileges of the positions, pay them an amount equal to what they would have earned normally less any amount they earned during the strike.[168]

Ultimately, new local chapters 121 and 204 of the ILGWU became the representatives that negotiated with Sheba Ann's president, Jack Ginsberg.

Overall, working conditions and wages in Dallas factories improved because of early New Deal legislation and union activism, which made some inroads on entrenched open-shop policies. The impact of these New Deal laws specifically improved the working conditions for

[168]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 102-103; DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing*, 154.

employees of J. M. Haggar and Ernest Wadel in that by the early 1940s these owners installed fans and improved lighting on the factory floor in order to increase the safety of their workers. But women employees still received lower wages than male employees. With the passage in 1938 of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), which set a minimum wage and a maximum hour level, industrial workers were provided a level below which their wages could not fall. This did benefit female workers, even if they continued to receive less pay than their male counterparts. Initially, according to historian James Hodges, the FLSA was opposed by southern employers, who feared that such requirements would harm smaller operations, but "its impact on southern cotton textile worker's lives . . . was slight."[169] This federal statute, however, by mandating a minimum wage, "inaugurated a potentially revolutionary course of government intervention in the economy." The impact of World War II would bring further changes for female workers in Dallas, specifically improved wages and even job mobility as two million women worked for war-related industries. Clothing manufacturers even began to hire black women. Of course, unions followed the ladies into the workplace, with the support of the federal government.[170] It was the final completion of a process begun under the New Deal, when women textile workers in Dallas overcame many obstacles to push for better working conditions and the right to organize.

[169]Hodges, *New Deal Labor Policy*, 190.

[170]Chafe, *American Woman*, 81; Heild, "Union-Minded," 61; DeMoss, *History of Apparel Manufacturing*, 157, 162.

CHAPTER 6

CIVILITY IN A COMPANY TOWN: THE DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND UNIONIZATION OF CEMENT CITY, TEXAS

By focusing on the industrial workers in Dallas who worked in the cement plants of Cement City, it is the intent of this chapter to identify and describe the development, influence, and characteristics of a company town and investigate their conflicts with management and their efforts to unionize under the National Recovery Administration (NRA) provisions. The Dallas cement plants consisted of the Texas Portland Cement, Trinity Portland Cement, and Lone Star Cement companies. The world of these industrial workers was similar to that of the industrial workers throughout the South, which allows useful insights on the influence of a company town on workers, the latter's struggle with the anti-union sentiment that existed in the South, and the impact of New Deal reforms.

Dallas cement workers research data reveal some distinct differences between them and other Southern industrial laborers in terms of the weaker economic status of cement workers and the lack of violence that attended their efforts to unionize. Even though Dallas cement workers fit into the southern model of industrial workers in a company town, there were qualities that made the cement workers in Dallas unique. The uniqueness manifests itself in the calm development of union representation among the cement workers, whereas in comparison the information presented about Dallas textile and automobile workers, for example, reveals an antagonistic relationship with management that complicated union involvement and limited the success of union development in their respective plants and factories. By expanding the profile of the Dallas workers involved in cement production, this inquiry will provide further insights on the question of whether Cement City can be considered a traditional company town.

Because Mexican-born workers comprised a substantial proportion of the laborers in Cement City (23.7 percent), comparing their experiences to that of Anglo and African American workers from the same plants will provide a strong context for understanding Cement City. Due to the economic impact of the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent depression that occurred between 1925 and 1932, Mexican industrial workers immigrated to the United States in search of employment. The widespread development of union representation in Mexico through the Casa del Obrero Mundial and the Confederación Regional de Obrero Mundial (CROM) led Mexican industrial workers to expect union participation and representation more than their American counterparts. The common expectation of membership in government-sponsored unions was reinforced by the Mexicans' experiences within their new working environment. Therefore, this chapter will examine Mexican industrial workers' unionization efforts in Mexico, their motives for coming to the United States, and their experiences north of the border. Overall, it appears that Mexicans in Cement City experienced both inclusiveness and exclusiveness in a company town environment in terms of their financial stability, community membership, and even labor representation.

Mexican labor history and its historiography commonly examines the relationship between industrial interests and the government, but several historians in the last thirty years have provided valuable scholarship on the workers' relationship with their management and government. Historians such as John M. Hart, Jorge Basurto, Ciro F. S. Cardoso, W. Dirk Raat, and David Walker have examined the Mexican labor force during the Porfirian and revolutionary periods and concluded that Mexican industrial workers were political pawns who were fueled by radical ideologies and often manipulated and controlled by their central government. In terms of radical ideology, these historians maintain that the most influential theory was associated with

the anarchist movement that emerged during the Mexican Revolution. Many historians of the Porfirian period agree that the Mexican Revolution destroyed the economic order of the country, which created financial distress and unemployment for many Mexican workers. Ultimately the destruction of the economic status quo created a situation that made new growth possible, but it also spawned a large number of unemployed workers ready to embrace more radical ideologies.[171]

Historian Stephen H. Haber theorizes that the failure of Mexico's first wave of industrialization was not produced by a single cause but resulted from a combination of expensive imported technology, the lack of skilled workers, and dependence on European capital. Haber maintains that these factors had a deeper impact than the Mexican Revolution on the stagnation of Mexico's efforts to modernize. He describes how, throughout this industrial development, Mexico's business interests, foreign and native-born, used numerous strategies to maintain control of markets, the labor force, and distribution networks, thereby creating a monopolistic stranglehold on the country's economic growth. Due to the fact that Mexico's political leadership wanted European investment to continue, "Mexico's monopolies and oligopolies never competed with other domestic firms. They dominated the market at their inception." In the end, Haber concludes that the modernization of Mexico was dominated by

[171]John M. Hart, *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class, 1860-1931* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Jorge Basurto, *El Desarrollo del Proletario Industrial* (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1975); Ciro F. S. Cardoso et al., *El Proletariado Industrial en México (*Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico, 1975); W. Dirk Raat., *Revoltosos: Mexico's Rebels in the United States* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981); David Walker, "Porfirian Labor Politics: Working Class Organizations in Mexico City and Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1902," *The Americas* 37 (January 1981): 257-287; Thomas Benjamin and Marcia Ocasio-Melendez, "Organizing the Memory of Modern Mexico: Historiography in Perspective, 1880s-1980s," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 64 (May 1984): 360-364.

foreign investors, who created an economic oligopoly that was endorsed and encouraged by the country's political leaders.[172]

Even though the Mexican Revolution created turmoil and upheaval, Haber demonstrates through numerous statistical data that the majority of the nation's industrial facilities were not destroyed by the revolutionaries. Instead, the leadership of the Revolution recognized that this economic base would be needed during and after the Revolution in order to stabilize the country. Haber claims that it was the withdrawal of foreign capital during the 1920s, which resulted from shaken investor confidence stemming from the turbulence of the Revolution, that caused great disinvestment in Mexico's industrialization. Therefore, it is Haber's assertion that it was not the Mexican Revolution itself that derailed Mexico's first wave of industrialization, but that this was done within a vacuum of entrepreneurial spirit and capita in the aftermath of the Revolution. Regardless of why, ultimately hundreds of thousands of Mexican laborers, during and after the Revolution, immigrated to the United States to find employment, only to encounter conflicts within their new country's mills and factories.[173]

Mexican workers who immigrated to the United States brought with them some skills and experiences in navigating within a government-controlled union system. According to historian John M. Hart, the 1912 creation of "the Casa del Obrero Mundial [in Mexico] was a product of revolutionary turmoil, economic crisis, political instability and a long tradition of urban lower-class unrest." The Casa emerged from the turmoil as a workers organization that would promote education, union representation, and direct action. From its inception, the Casa was dominated by anarchist ideals, which led to conflict between members of different political viewpoints.

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[172]Stephen H. Haber, *Industry and Underdevelopment: The Industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 102 (quotation).

[173] Ibid., 122-190.

Throughout the early years of the Mexican Revolution, the Casa encouraged its membership to use direct action when labor found itself in disputes with employers. The use of strikes, sit-ins, and public demonstrations became popular and successful. By the end of 1913, the Casa presented a clear agenda for its members. They organized themselves into subgroups that were consistent with specific types of labor, thereby creating connections within different industries, along with the expectation that fellow laborers would coordinate and support any direct action to improve salaries and working conditions. Unfortunately for the majority of Mexican workers, Hart maintains that even though in 1914-1915 there was a rapid growth in unionization,

> the continuing turmoil and instability of the Revolution, extreme inflation, and high urban unemployment rates led to serious strikes in major cities. . . Hundreds of small shops and businesses closed while larger concerns reduced their production and work forces. Thousands of workers were reduced to poverty and charity. Beggars were omnipresent.

Therefore Mexican workers began to seek employment in the United States with the various industrial corporations and agricultural labor, and they brought their activist ideals with them.[174]

In order to address the financial crisis and attempt to keep its native workforce, Mexico's central government handpicked Luis N. Morones to negotiate with the various Casa syndicates and stabilize the labor-management relationship. Through Morones, order was restored to the extent that nineteen Mexican states agreed to join the government-sponsored CROM. According to historians Raul Trejo Delarbe and Aníbal Yañez, the pact that the labor movement made with Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist government greatly undermined the limited level of solidarity the movement had accomplished. Through CROM, the Mexican government used a

[174]John M. Hart, "The Urban Working Class and the Mexican Revolution: The Case of the Casa del Obrero Mundial." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58 (February 1978): 2 (first quotation), 11-14 (second quotation); Raul Trejo Delarbe and Aníbal Yañez, "The Mexican Labor Movement: 1917-1975," *Latin American Perspectives* 3 (Winter 1976): 134; Michael J. Gonzales. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 146-147.

combination of repression and concession to maintain control, depending on whether laborers' discontent needed to be contained or satisfied for the good of the state.[175]

By May 1916, violent conflict between the Constitutionalist government and the urban working class boiled over and paralyzed Mexico City. Thousands of members of the Federation of Federal District Syndicates marched through Alameda plaza with a specific list of demands. These angry demands included the replacement of company script with government currency, protection of workers from retaliatory dismissals, and compensation for time lost while the strike was active. The government agreed that they would examine the worker's demands and their complaints about the arrests of certain labor leaders. Unfortunately, within three months of the concessions made by the Mexican government, the workers' economic status had not changed. For example, "the paper currency pesos guaranteed the workers . . . had been devalued by the banking houses of Mexico City . . . The industrialists and businesses still issued script money to the workers and petitions to the government, and strike threats against employers did nothing to rectify the situation."[176]

On July 31, 1916, a Casa endorsed walk-out began. In response, secret police were brought into Mexico City and systematically raided and closed the Casa headquarters, arrested its leaders, and by governmental order declared the Casa was a subversive, destructive, and illegal organization in Mexico. Realizing that the future of the Casa was bleak, many labor leaders and general membership cast their lot with the newly formed and government-sponsored CROM. Historian Hart concludes that due to the failure of the general strike in the summer of 1916, the power of the Casa was destroyed and capitalist interests prevailed. He claims that "the idealistic

[175]Delarbe and Yates, "The Mexican Labor Movement: 1917-1975," 134-135.

[176]Hart, "The Urban Working Class and the Mexican Revolution," 19 (first quotation); Leslie Bethell, ed., *Mexico Since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 125-150.

and democratic nature of anarchist methods and organization weakened an already vulnerable Mexican urban worker's movement and its confrontation with a new political elite and resurgent upper class." Mexico's government-sponsored union system represented an interesting contrast to the United States' open-shop movement of the early twentieth century.[177]

From its origins, CROM was closely tied to the central government. Even though the state limited CROM's activities to the economic sphere, it in principle sought to address all of the needs of workers. In contrast, American laborers often found themselves at odds with industrial management and local and national governments concerning union representation. During the 1920s the open-shop movement was the dominant strategy in dealing with American labor, and union membership grew unevenly. Throughout the South, the response to the influx of northern labor organizers was the creation and, in some communities, the resurrection of the open-shop system. While an open shop was often defined as an industrial workplace in which management did not make a distinction between union and non-union workers, according to author Jack Strauss, interpretations varied "all the way from this theoretical position, through . . . discouragement of trade union membership, to cases in which any worker possessing a union card or found attending a union meeting [was] immediately dropped from the payroll."[178]

In the United States, unionism was considered un-American and the independent worker or strikebreaker was often depicted as a hero. Conversely, in Mexico, between 1920 and 1924, membership in CROM grew rapidly from 100,000 to one million members. In an August 1925 declaration, the leadership of CROM claimed that "the union would play the role of maintaining a truce between labor and capital . . . workers must not become systematic enemies of capitalism . . . [but] that rights be respected – rights which they recognize are intimately tied to reciprocal

[177]Hart, "The Urban Working Class and the Mexican Revolution," 20.

[178]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 64.

obligations." Ultimately, President Lazaro Cárdenas wanted the Mexican labor force to be a partner with the government and to reinterpret themselves as an organized, disciplined class. Historian Alan Knight maintains that the workers' acceptance of CROM represented a willing acceptance of corporate capitalism, and in turn the creation of an avenue within the state to achieve worker's demands. Specifically, Knight asserts that this "conquest of a foothold in the state . . . [was] for workers in many other societies a distant dream. Thus labor leaders who emerged out of the . . . revolution . . . traded independence and ideological fidelity for access to power."[179]

Even though Mexican workers enjoyed a level of union representation, the economic crisis, violence, and population dislocation created by the Mexican Revolution caused a large number of them to immigrate. This did not offset a post-Revolution decrease in the population's mortality rate, which resulted in an increase in the total population from a little over nine million to fifteen million by 1930 and created an even larger pool of workers and more drastic demands to provide for this population. According to historian Carey McWilliams, Mexicans from the states of Durango, Zacatecas, Chihuahua, and Sonora became the most common immigrants to the United States because of the rail lines built in northern Mexico. [180] To further understand the scale of the immigration from Mexico during the first half of the twentieth century, refer to the chart below.

[179]Delarbe and Yañez, "The Mexican Labor Movement: 1917-1975," 136-137 (first quotation); Alan Knight, "The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution: 1900-1920," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16 (May 1984): 79 (second quotation).

[180]Douglas Monroy, Rebirth*: Mexican Los Angeles from the Great Migration to the Great Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 78; Carey McWilliams, ed., *The Mexicans in America* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), 9. Consult the maps in the appendix for the states and railroad system.

Table 6: Immigration from Mexico to the United States, 1901-1950

YEARS	NUMBERS
1901-1910	49,642 persons
1911-1920	219,004 persons
1921-1930	459,287 persons
1931-1940	22,319 persons
1941-1950	60,589 persons

Source: Lamar Babington Jones, "Mexican-American Labor Problems in Texas" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1965), 3.

Historian Mark Reisler theorizes that between 1900 and 1930 the United States actually acquired as many as one and a half million people from Mexico. His estimate represents as much as 10 percent of Mexico's total population during this time period. Specifically, Reisler focuses on 1924 when he states that "after World War I . . . Mexican immigration became more visible as the number of legal entrants increased dramatically to a peak of about 90,000 during the fiscal year 1924." Fueled by the stereotypes and racial myths pertaining to various immigrant groups, the 1921 Immigration Act and the 1924 National Origins Act were passed and marked a victory for immigration restrictionists. These pieces of legislation placed a quantitative limit on European immigrants, but due to omissions in the language of the legislation, immigrants from Western Hemisphere countries faced no quantitative limit. Therefore, throughout the 1920s even though restrictionists wanted to slow immigration, their effort did not affect the flow of workers from Mexico. In response to the American immigration restrictions, historian Douglas Monroy explains that the 1926 Mexican Congress passed laws to discourage Mexican nationals from immigrating to the United States. Specifically, these laws "forbade workers to emigrate unless

they had a written contract, validated by a local government authority, guaranteeing their wages, hours, and housing." These conditions often went unfulfilled.[181]

The increasing flood of Mexican immigration was immediately noticed north of the border. Specifically, "during the first decade of the century Mexican immigration comprised only 0.6 percent of the total number of legal immigrants. Between 1911 and 1920 the percentage rose to 3.8 percent." For American workers the fear was that Mexican immigrants would work for any wage and accept any working conditions, therefore allowing American industrialists, if the stream of immigrant labor persisted, to ignore American workers' demands. For American industrialists, the fear was that this same workforce could transplant the strategies and tactics of their native union organizations, thereby bringing an element of chaos and anarchy to industrial America. Nonetheless, when the United States entered World War I, which accentuated the country's labor shortages, thousands of Mexican immigrants sought employment in the farms and factories of the Southwest, especially Texas. Even though an act passed in February 1917 forbade the entry of immigrants into the United States who could not read their native language or English, the "secretary of labor suspended these bars to Mexican immigration because of the labor shortage of the war emergency." According to the United States census, by 1930 the Texas population had changed noticeably. As reported in the *Dallas Morning News*, the population of Texas was "approximately 73.5 percent white, 14.3 percent black, and 11.7 Mexican."[182]

As Mexican workers continued to immigrate, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) became a major supporter of immigration restrictions. Their leaders wanted to subject Mexico to

[181]Mark Reisler, "Always a Laborer, Never a Citizen: Anglo Perceptions of the Mexican Immigrant during the 1920s," *The Pacific Historical Review* 45 (May 1976): 232 (first quotation); McWilliams, *Mexicans in America*, 9; Monroy, *Rebirth*, 94 (second quotation).

[182]Mark Reisler, "Always a Laborer, Never a Citizen," 241 (first quotation); George C. and Martha W. Kiser, *Mexican Workers in the United States: Historical and Political Perspectives* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), 17; Monroy, *Rebirth*, 98 (second quotation); "Changing Population," *Dallas Morning News*, August 8, 1931 (third quotation).

quotas similar to those that had been established for the European nations. Founded in 1881, the AFL and its affiliates created a large federation of white-only craft unions that by 1920 reported 3 million members. According to historian Juan Gómez-Quiñones, Mexican workers attempting to participate in AFL unions were consistently unsuccessful. Specifically, "the period between 1900 and 1936 was the apex of craft unionism, which all too often excluded Mexican skilled as well as unskilled workers . . . [therefore the general Anglo prejudices led to] A.F. of L.'s failure to organize Mexican workers and its resistance to their participation in the Anglo-dominated craft-labor movement." Not all union organizations desired to curtail Mexican immigration. For example, in 1919, the Texas State Federation of Labor (TSFL) actively recruited Mexican workers to immigrate to Texas. Representatives from TSFL argued against quotas because they believed that if they passed, the international relationship between the two governments would break down. Ultimately, when the AFL applied political pressure on the TSFL to end their recruitment efforts, the TSFL generally consented but maintained that they would continue to welcome those who were already naturalized citizens. As more Mexican workers immigrated north, aid societies were established to address the various social and political needs of their communities. Due to the growth of the Mexican population in Dallas during the 1920s, an aid society entitled the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos en North América operated as a surrogate union for Mexican labor.[183]

Labor leaders from CROM, during the 1920s, became interested in gaining concessions from the AFL because they were concerned about the discrimination that Mexican workers received at the hands of AFL unions. At the same time, American industrialists during the wave of anarchist bombings in 1919 and 1920 became apprehensive about Mexican immigration.

[183]Juan Gomez-Quinines, *Mexican American Labor, 1790-1990* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 67 (quotation); John Mason Hart. ed., *Border Crossings: Mexican and Mexican-American Workers* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1998), 141.

According to historian Gregg Andrews, the American labor force and business leaders during Warren G. Harding's administration were under the impression that the continued flood of Mexican immigrants would create a wave of socialist opinion that would sweep throughout the United States, ultimately threatening the stability of the federal government. But even though industrial America was anti-Bolshevistic and fearful of foreign socialists, the desire for cheap labor did motivate the AFL to make a few concessions. American government officials that supported the open-shop movement protested that the leaders of the AFL, specifically Samuel Gompers, were being misled by radical forces within CROM and that the Mexican government was using the AFL to hoodwink the labor interests in the United States. Nonetheless, through several negotiations in 1927 the AFL-CROM agreement was created. This agreement stated that

> CROM promised to make every effort to dissuade workers from emigrating to the United States and Canada. When they did emigrate, CROM was to encourage them to join the relevant American unions, warning them that failure to do so would result in the loss of their Mexican union card. In return, the AFL agreed to make every effort to ensure Mexicans in the United States free access to and equal membership in its affiliated unions.

In the end, though, American organized labor did little to assist the assimilation of the Mexican immigrants into the American workforce or unions. Scrutinizing the influence of the AFL on the federal government in the early 1920s, Andrews states that "the Yankee socialists were too weak to confront their own government or respond effectively to the repression of workers and radicals in the United States."[184]

The first permanent Mexican settlement in Dallas arrived around the turn of the twentieth century. According to historian Michael Phillips, the first dramatic wave of Mexican immigrants into Dallas County occurred during the 1920s as a response to the violence and poverty caused

[184]Harvey A. Levenstein, "The AFL and Mexican Immigration in the 1920s: An Experiment in Labor Diplomacy," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48 (May 1968): 217; Hart, *Border Crossings*, 155, 158 (first quotation); Gregg Andrews. *Shoulder to Shoulder? The American Federation of Labor, The United States, and The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1924* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 119 (second quotation), 193.

by the Mexican Revolution. He adds that "by 1930 approximately 6,000 native Mexicans and Mexican Americans settled in Dallas. Mexican Americans comprised 2.3 percent of the city's population." Most of these Mexicans settled along McKinney Avenue in Little Mexico, but several of these Mexican immigrants also established their residences in Cement City, along Eagle Ford Road. Even though the majority of Mexican workers immigrated to find that the only jobs available to them were as farm laborers, there were exceptions. The Trinity Portland Cement and Lone Star Cement plants in Dallas employed not only Mexican labor but African Americans. Historian Emilio Zamora notes that even though such general employment could be obtained, manufacturing companies would often reclassify the skilled jobs as unskilled, thereby keeping wages low for their Mexican laborers.[185]

Poor working conditions and accidents characterized the work-a-day life of the cement worker. Local newspaper articles illustrated these precarious situations. For example, the *Dallas Morning News* reported in an article on June 13, 191l, that a thirty-year-old Mexican national, Daniel Ferrin, who worked for the Texas Portland Cement plant in Cement City, was killed when he was "caught on a line-shaft and whirled through space until his head was crushed by striking the floor." Dr. F. E. Ormsby wrote in his report for the company that witnesses recalled that Ferrin attempted to step over the line shaft instead of walking around it. His body was caught by the metal shaft which "[crushed] the base of his skull and [broke his] right hand." Five months later, R. Tarolar, a Mexican cement worker allegedly from Laredo who worked for the Texas Portland Cement Company, was killed at work. It was his responsibility to push a steady stream of rock and gravel through the chute so that the process of pulverizing this material into cement powder would not be hindered. An eyewitness reported that at 9 p.m. on November 24th, Tarolar

[185]Phillips, *White Metropolis*, 69 (quotation); Hart, *Border Crossings*, 141.

missed his footing, fell into the chute, and became part of the crushed rock. His body remained in the bin for approximately one-and-a-half to two hours. Ormsby, the doctor who attended to Tarolar's body after its extraction, concluded that the cause of death was suffocation as a result of the continual pressure of rock. In 1923, the Trinity Portland Cement plant was in the focus of a *Dallas Morning News* article about how a thirty-five year old Mexican named Emilio Grimaldo was "ground to death beneath the wheels of a switch engine . . . [that] was being used to haul material from the company quarries." Work in the cement industry was sought after among both immigrant and American workers, but it continued to be very dangerous.[186]

Cement plant managers tried to maintain a sense of community and often encouraged social occasions to celebrate a holiday or an accident-free safety record. For example, in 1930 the Lone Star Cement factory sponsored a Fourth of July celebration that was attended by more than 400 employees and their families. The celebration was hosted on the lawn of the plant in West Dallas. According to the *Dallas Morning News:*

> The entertainment began with a barbeque dinner and ended with dancing on the tennis courts. There was a display of fireworks following the dinner. Sports included horseshoe pitching and various handicap foot races. The Lone Star Band under the direction of G. Campbell gave a concert program and the Hot Clinkers String Band directed by Owen Carter played for dancing.[187]

Residents of Cement City also celebrated the achievements of local children and participated in sports activities together. The plant management supported and sponsored other recreational activities as well in Cement City. Among the recreational facilities for residents was a baseball diamond complete with a grandstand, a golf course, and a driving range. Even though all of the

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[186]"Caught by Shaft: Skull is Crushed," *Dallas Morning News*, June 13, 1911 (first and second quotations); Laborer Suffocates Under Pile of Rock," *Dallas Morning News*, November 25, 1911; "Laborer Killed When Engine Runs over Him," *Dallas Morning News,* August 7, 1923 (third quotation); Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 20.

[187]"Employees' Picnic Attended by 400," *Dallas Morning News*, July 5, 1930 (quotation).

residential areas and educational facilities were segregated, the baseball field in Cement City was not. During the 1920s and early 1930s both Mexican Americans and African Americans played on the Trinity Portland Cement Company team together. One of the most celebrated players was their pitcher, Rafael Peña, who was originally from San Luis Potosí, Mexico. The grandstand became a popular place for families to picnic and enjoy watching their plants' teams compete. Throughout the 1930s, the Trinity Portland Cement Company maintained a baseball team that played other factory teams and had an affiliation with the Greater Dallas League. Other events that were sponsored by the plant were "regularly held wrestling matches with professional talent from Dallas [that] were furnished courtesy of the plant management and an employee, Cecil Perry . . . other sources of sports and entertainment included a lighted tennis court and a well stocked lake for fishing by the plant's employee only." These few examples demonstrate that management was not only present in the Cement City residents' work life, but also played an active role in their social life.[188]

Through the companies' efforts, even though cement worker had a less stable economic status, one could argue that their workers developed a more stable and secure community, which created a trust among the cement workers that did not apparently exist among the workers in the Dallas Ford plant. On May 28, 1930, seven Cement City High School seniors graduated. The commencement ceremony was typical of a small tight-knit company town. The *Dallas Morning News* reported that "The auditorium was filled, barefoot kids crowding in the doors hardly able to conceal their emotions as their big brothers and sisters terminated an important period in scholastic careers." These few examples demonstrate that management was not only present in the Cement City residents' work life, but also provided for their children's education. Another

[188]"Seven Are Graduated in Cement City Class," *Dallas Morning News,* May 29, 1930; "Blue Diamond Defeats Trinity Portland," *Dallas Morning News*, March 21, 1938.

indication of the paternalism that existed in the Cement City factories was

> that the plant's management felt a great responsibility for its employees' health and welfare was the fact that a Dallas doctor, E. J. Brooks . . had an office in the plant's office building and saw patients there daily at a minimal monthly cost to the employee. Only major illnesses or operations were the financial responsibility of the employee. Dr. Brooks was one of the first in the area to own an automobile and he was always on call when needed.[189]

Disease was always a concern in a crowded urban area.

An alarming health concern in Cement City among all of its inhabitants was reported by *The Dallas Morning News* in 1917. An article published in January revealed that Ormsby was assisting federal investigators in a special study of Cement City and West Dallas. The doctor revealed that "that [in Cement City] 25 percent of the school children were found to have had malaria parasites in their blood during last fall, and that 22 percent of the men and women examined in that district had malaria parasites in their blood." The commission concluded that this was a result of the extreme poverty of the residents, but there is no evidence that company owners acted upon this information. Such protective and negative elements of paternalism were well within the frame of reference of the Mexican community. According to historian Alan Knight, Mexican industries borrowed a paternalistic style from the labor-management dynamic of the haciendas. Specifically, Knight asserts that industrial management in Mexico provided similar services, but they also "instituted close supervision of the factory, [compiled] complex regulations, [imposed] fines, [docked] wages, [and kept] dossiers of supported trouble-makers, hiring and firing at will."[190] Mexican cement workers in Dallas perhaps discovered that their lives had not changed so much, while their Anglo and African-American neighbors also saw

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[189]"Seven Are Graduated in Cement City Class," *Dallas Morning News*, May 29, 1930; "Blue Diamond Defeats Trinity Portland," *Dallas Morning News*, March 21, 1938; Davidson, *General Portland*, 18 (first quotation).

[190]"Inspect Heath Conditions," *The Dallas Morning News*, January 18, 1917 (first quotation); Knight, "The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution," 59 (second quotation); Cement City Collection 2000-43 (File 14, Box 1, UTA).

much that was familiar in Cement City.

Ormsby served as the official physician of record for births, deaths, and illnesses in Cement City and Eagle Ford. When a death occurred, he apparently consulted with Jesus Ojeda, who was the most commonly used undertaker in Cement City. White workers were usually buried at the Horton Cemetery or the Oak Cliff Cemetery on 8th Street in Dallas, whereas black workers were buried on the east side of the Horton Cemetery at the Crestview Memorial Park. Unfortunately, if Mexican workers or residents died either of illness or an industrial accident, there was not a local cemetery that would accommodate the family. Realizing this problem, in 1912 Trinity Portland Cement plant donated 2.6 acres in Cement City for a Mexican cemetery. In 1918 the same company donated an extra parcel of land to its Mexican community in order to create a cemetery for those loved ones that died of the devastating influenza epidemic that spread through the United States. Commonly referred to as El Camposanto de Cemente Grande, the cemetery accepted its last burial in 1946. World War II veteran Eladio Martinez, who was born in Cement City in 1921 and received the Purple Heart after being killed in the Philippines, was reinterred alongside his brother and fellow veteran Jesus Martinez. By the 1980s this area had fallen into disrepair and many headstones had been vandalized. Remarkably it was not until May 21, 1987, that a representative from the company, specifically Barney C. Jones, went to the Dallas records building and officially listed this area as a historic cemetery. In 1998, Dr. Laura Gonzalez, an anthropologist from the University of Guanajuato, and her graduate students found evidence that some of the workers buried there had come originally from the state of Guanajuato. This discovery led to a celebratory mass being held at the cemetery, sponsored by the Ledbetter Neighborhood Association and Gonzalez in August 1998.[191]

[191]Davidson, *General Portland*, 23, 28; Cement City Collection 2000-43 (Box 3, File 7, UTA); "Mass Honors Those Buried at Tiny Hispanic Cemetery," *Dallas Morning News,* August 17, 1998.

In response to the development of the New Deal and the shift away from the open shop mentality, and apparently already familiar with unions in Mexico, Cement City workers wanted to organize. In order to assist them with this, the AFL sent labor organizer W. R. Williams to Dallas in the spring of 1934 to conduct negotiations with the companies. Conflict arose when, after a few meetings between Williams and C. R. Caron, Portland's General Superintendent, Caron declared that Williams did not have the credentials to speak for the AFL. Nevertheless, during May 1934 an election was held under the supervision of the regional Labor Board. The number of eligible workers that could vote was based on the payroll dated previous to April 15, 1934, which indicated that there were 227 employees eligible.[192]

According to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hearing brief dated November 11, 1934, investigators found that "the notice of the time and place of election was received by the company on May 9, the election having been called for May 10. At the election, 152 votes were cast on the question of representation for collective bargaining purposes, resulting in a ballot of 150 in favor of the union as such agent and 2 against." Trinity's management filed a complaint that they were not given the same opportunity and time to organize their opposition to the vote for a union. NLRB investigators found that the election was fair and that Trinity had to negotiate with the union representatives. Company management countered this finding with an interpretation that they did not have to recognize the union as an agency for all. Yet another election was held at the Lone Star Cement Company in Dallas on December 19, 1934, which resulted in a tie.

[192] Brief of *Portland Cement Workers #19310 v. Trinity Portland Cement Company, Dallas* (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board , NASR); Weekly Report of the Fort Worth Regional Labor Board, Thirteenth District (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board , NASR).



Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 57 - - **Trinity Portland Cement Company**

Located on the Eagle Ford road, about seven miles west of the downtown district, the plant of the Trinity Portland Cement Company is one of the major industries of the city. Its capacity is 4,500 barrels of cement a day, and normally the number of men employed is about 250. It is one of three modern plants operated by this company in the State, others being in Fort Worth and Houston. The Dallas plant is the largest in the group. Charles E. Ulrickson is vice president and general manager of the company, which established its first plant here in 1910.

Tomorrow.—Procter & Gamble plant.



Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 59 - - - - - - - - - **Lone Star Cement Co.**

Located in what is known as Cement City, at the end of Commerce street in the West Dallas industrial district, the plant of the Lone Star Cement Company is one of the largest industries in that section. The plant was taken over by the present ownership in 1917 and was practically rebuilt during the last two years, with installation of new and more modern equipment. It has a capacity of 4,000 barrels of Portland Cement each day and employs 200 men, most of whom live in the vicinity of the plant.

Tomorrow: North Dallas High School.

—Photo Fairchild Aerial Surveys, Inc.

Figure 10: Cement production facilities in Cement City, 1931. Sources: "Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 57," *Dallas Morning News.* December 27, 1931; "Seeing Dallas From the Air, No. 59," *Dallas Morning News,* December 29, 1931.

After the votes were counted, eighty votes were cast for a company committee and eighty votes were cast for a union committee, with one vote that was voided by the company management. Stalemated, negotiators decided to hold another election, although the company managers did not press for an exact date.[193]

In November 1935, workers of the Trinity Portland Cement Company voted 122 to 70 to seek permanent union representation through the Portland Cement Workers Union, an affiliate of the AFL. Earlier that same year the United States Supreme Court had heard the case of *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corps et al. v. the United States* and in a unanimous decision held that the delegation power made by the National Industrial Recovery Act, under which the NLRB had operated, was unconstitutional. In a letter from Regional Director Edwin Elliot to Edwin Smith dated June 8, 1935, Elliott recounted the condition of labor in Dallas from Williams' report:

> Between 20% to 25% of the business concerns admit a change in policy since the decision. Most of these changes have to do with lengthening of hours. In the case of women, they pushed the work week up to 54 hours, which is the limit for women in the state, and the men are working 60 hours and beyond. . . Both labor and industry in this area, so far as Section 7(a) is concerned, are waiting to see what will happen to the Wagner bill. Labor is exceedingly hopeful, wants the bill passed, and needs it. Industry, while in disagreement with the principle of majority rule, does desire to the enactment of a measure establishing permanently an agency in the interest of industrial peace.[194]

Congress, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, answered the Supreme Court decision in 1935 by passing the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, which continued the NLRB and made clear its mission to protect workers' rights to organize unions, engage in collective bargaining, and participate in strikes.

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[193]Brief of *Portland Cement Workers No #19310 v. Trinity Portland Cement Company, Dallas* (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board , NASR); Weekly Report of the Fort Worth Regional Labor Board, Thirteenth District (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board , NASR). The National Labor Relations Board replaced the National Labor Board by executive order in June 1934.

[194]Edwin A. Elliott to Edwin Smith, June 8, 1935 (Box 1, Record Group 25, National Labor Relations Board, NASR).

Encouraged by the Wagner Act, Dallas cement workers sought union support because they felt that managers were not fully or fairly dealing with workers' demands. It was not until January 1939 that the workers from the Trinity Portland Cement plant voted to actively begin enrolling in the United Cement Workers Union, an affiliate of the AFL. The agreement that the plant managers made with union representatives was handled amicably through a three-day negotiation session at the Hotel Adolphus between workers, management, and union officials. No records indicate that Mexican cement workers were excluded from membership in this new labor organization. William Schoenberg was the AFL representative whom the cement workers felt was responsible for defusing potential violence pertaining to union presence in the plants. He argued that an increase in wages was not the central argument; instead, workers were most concerned with vacation time, seniority and promotion. According to the *Dallas Morning News*, by 1939 there were 600 workers enrolled "with the union having a 100 percent membership in Ft. Worth, 95 percent . . . in Dallas, and 90 percent in Houston." Schoenberg later was elected as president of the United Cement Workers Union. The ease of acceptance for union representation for Dallas cement workers was not the norm for the South. Furthermore, even though Dallas cement workers continued to be paid less than the average southern worker, the successful and peaceful development of union representation resulted in a quality working environment that was not present in other factories.[195]

In conclusion, due to the atmosphere of economic strain and civil disorder that the Mexican Revolution created it pushed a large percentage of its population to immigrate to the United States. Texas, and Dallas in particular, received much of this population. As previously discussed, government support of unions in Mexico created expectations and concerns among

[195]"Cement Workers Vote to Join Union Labor," *Dallas Morning News*, November 5, 1935; "Cement Union, Dallas Plant Sign Contract," *Dallas Morning News*, January 8, 1939 (quotation).

these Mexican immigrants that were problematic for American employers and industries in the United States. These workers sought inclusion in American unions, but were often rejected due to the political and social fears of both the American business owners and workers. As a result, Mexican cement workers were similar to their counterparts elsewhere in the South in their creation of a paternalistic community located around their plant. The social and educational activities of Cement City reflect the characteristics of a typical company town. However, while the Mexican workers in Cement City developed a high level of social cohesion, it was heavily tempered with educational and possibly union segregation and financial disparity. In the end, the industrial landscape of Dallas was enriched by the influence and activities of the Mexican community, even if it grew within the confines of a paternalistic company town that was only reshaped by federal intervention through New Deal reform.

CHAPTER 7

FORD WORKERS UNITE! (SORT OF): THE PURSUIT OF UNION REPRESENTATION AMONG THE DALLAS AUTOMOBILE WORKERS

Historian Toby Moore Harper asserts that during the 1930s southern industrialism began to shift toward a "Fordist labor regulation." He maintains that this type of "Fordism" could be characterized by the promotion of good citizenry through creating higher wages and attempting to balance union activity and corporate strength. The southern reality was that there were only minimal wage increases because the regional union's power was weak. Even though the management of the Ford Company had a distaste for unions, it did provide much higher wages that turned their workers into consumers. These higher wages also allowed their employees to be included in a larger class of working home owners. These workers were afraid to pursue any involvement with union activity that would threaten their newly achieved economic stability.[196] All of these factors made life as a Ford worker in Dallas much different than that for those who worked in the textile and cement industries, but it was not a better life and unionization became a goal for many Ford workers.

The Ford Motor Company was quite different from other industries in that it paid hourly wages instead of wages by the piece. The Ford factory held to an eight-hour day, although the worker was expected to get to work fifteen to twenty minutes early in order to set up his tools, as well as, stay later at the end of the day to restock the equipment. The worker was not paid for this time and was only allowed a fifteen minute lunch break. The most common complaint that existed among Ford workers was the industry's practice of the speed-up. By 1929 the Ford Motor Company had converted from the Model T to the Model A and reported a profit of $90 million annually. Rex Young, a Dallas Ford worker, stated in 1936 that workers often toiled in

[196] Harper, "The Unmaking of a Cotton Mill World," 80 (first quotation), 246 (second quotation).

the factory for twelve to fifteen hours but would only be paid for eight hours. Young explained that this was accomplished through the implementation of certain company policies. For example:

> a plant rule stating that when the line was stopped for five minutes the men had to punch their time card out for at least an hour. Many times a foreman shut the line down for five minutes, the men punched out, the foreman then restarted the line, forcing the workers to go right back to work on their own time. Many a time we gave Ford 55 minutes of free labor that way.[197]

Work grievances began to mount for Ford workers in Dallas. These grievances included, but were not limited to, the following:

> 1. No seniority system, therefore, the workers were at the mercy of the foreman.
>
> 2. No avenue to settle workers' concerns other than going to the foreman or supervisor.
>
> 3. No overtime pay for Saturday, Sunday, or holidays, and the seven-day job was scheduled so that no one worked more than 40 hours a week.
>
> 4. Wages were often based not on skill but favoritism of the local Ford management.
>
> 5. Workers had no control over the speed of operations – it was common for the foreman to hold a stop watch over the worker urging more speed and encouraging the employee to increase his output, thereby creating a speed-up.
>
> 6. Workers felt that the Ford company enforced discipline through terror, intimidation, and physical assaults.

In comparison, the cement worker's concern dealt with acquiring more advantages as workers, whereas the Ford employee demands consisted of combating the violations and abuses of New Deal regulations by their management. This difference illustrates the lack of intimidation in the

[197]Fine, *The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle* , 8(first quotation); Nelson Lichtenstein and Stephen Meyer, eds., *On the Line: Essays in the History of Auto Work* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 154, 157-160; Fifteenth Census,, 1930, Schedule 1 (Population) [Dallas County]; Brochure published by United Automobile Workers Local 870 of the Dallas Ford Plant (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection, 1937-1971, UTA) (second quotation); *Dallas Chamber of Commerce: Industrial Dallas Manufacturing Directory 1930*; *Directory of Dallas City Manufacturing Plants 1930*; *Dallas City Directory* (1930).

cement industry and the abundance found at the Ford plant in Dallas.[198]

Even though Henry Ford favored some New Deal programs, he strongly disagreed with Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). He did not support the right of workers to be able to use collective bargaining against their employers. Ford's attitude toward labor unions would be best summarized by his statement that "Labor unions are backed by war-seeking financiers and take away a man's independence. They are the worst things that ever struck the earth. The financiers want to kill competition so as to reduce the income of workers and eventually bring on war." He thought that this tactic was another term for labor racketeering and, in his opinion, could be classified as a criminal action by workers intent upon disrupting capitalism. For this reason, and because of his resistance to ending the open-shop policy, Ford refused to sign the National Recovery Administration (NRA) automobile code. NRA chief Hugh Johnson attempted to force Ford to sign by encouraging the federal government not to purchase Ford products and to discontinue any governmental contracts with the company. Ford was not shaken because as long as his company complied with the code in terms of wages and work hours, the federal government had no basis to force his signature, and his profits remained high. A Ford defender laughingly composed a mocking ditty:

> NRA me down to sleep
> I pray Johnson my code to keep;
> If I should bust before I wake
> AF of L my plant to take.

While the federal government did not purchase Ford cars or trucks, civilian purchases of Ford products did not waver. In 1934 the Ford Motor company made a profit of $21,362,118 after taxes and increased its percentage of new car and truck registrations to 28.8 percent. [199]

[198]Automobile Unionism Remarks by R.J. Thomas,, President, United Automobile Workers of America, CIO meeting in Buffalo, NY, August 4, 1941 (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA); Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes (UTA); Fine, *Sit-Down*, 54-99.

Nationally, Ford workers had several grievances that were not being dealt with at the company level. These workers took confidence from the NIRA and NRA and began a series of sit-down and slow-down protests. This protest was a type of strike in which a worker would remain at their stations and would deliberately slow down or sit out their operation in order to not only affect the production process but to also to prevent management from bringing in scabs to replace them. Just as in other locations, the workers of the Dallas assembly plant complained about forced speed-ups, the lack of seniority and security in their employment, and above all that "safety and health conditions in the automobile plants were deplorable." The management of the Dallas plant followed the Ford policy of union resistance under the leadership of Warren Worley, who was sent from Detroit to help organize the inside and outside squads. Too, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had a complicated task of convincing Ford workers to join the union during a time of seasonal layoffs and heavy unemployment. These workers had to balance their desire for union representation with the continual threat from their employers of loss in pay and position. According to historian Travis Polk:

> Ford employees actually worked only five months out of the year, which was the time required to produce a sufficient number of automobiles to fulfill all orders for that production year. Employees spent the other seven months at odd jobs waiting for production to begin on the new models. In the months they did work for Ford, they never could be certain how long they would work when they reported to the plant.

Not only was this happening in the Northeast but was the reality for Dallas workers.

Another issue that the AFL had to address, especially in the South, was their direct and indirect connection to the Communist Party. Communists could certainly be found among the members and leadership of the United Auto Workers (UAW), an affiliate of the AFL. Even though their numbers were few, their influence was strong. Some automobile manufacturers, in

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[199] Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 13; Fine, *The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle*, 79, 83.

order to stop the influence and development of AFL unions and Communists in their factories, created company unions. Historian Sidney Fine notes that company unions were not established by any automobile makers before the passage of the NIRA codes but were actively promoted by 1934. He adds that "Section 7(a) [of the NIRA] persuaded virtually all auto employers except Ford to establish employee representation plans in their plants to stave off the threat of auto unionism."[200]

Starting in Dallas in the summer of 1937, there was a series of violent acts by the Ford Company's inside and outside squads. Ford was notoriously anti-union. So beginning in 1915, under the direction of Harry Bennett, he organized spy networks in his various facilities. The LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee report issued in 1937 revealed that Ford Motor Company spent $994,855 on private detectives between January 1, 1934 and July 31, 1936. The detectives collected information about workers who might be considered subversive or disruptive. Under Henry Ford and his son Edsel's leadership, the company employed spies, created blacklists, and salaried disciplinary squads in order to halt any union activity that might begin to germinate in their factory. Soon after the Dallas outside squad was created in 1936, Stanley C. "Fats" Perry became its unofficial leader. Using his more than 200 pound frame, Perry openly pressured and intimidated workers to reject any union activity or organizer that came to the Ford plant. The purpose of Ford's outside squad was to investigate workers who were suspected of being union organizers and sympathizers as well as to prevent the plant from becoming organized. These activities were done through extreme and often violent methods. Ford employees referred to the outside squad as "Abbott's $5.00 thugs." The squad's nickname referred to the Dallas plant supervisor, W. A. Abbott. In order to ensure the squad members' loyalty, they were assembled

[200]Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 10; Sidney Fine, "The Origins of the United Automobile Workers, 1933-1935," *The Journal of Economic History* 18 (September 1958): 251, 259.

in the office of Rudolph Rutland, production manager at the Dallas plant, and told "that if the union [was] successful, Ford would move the plant to another location, costing them their jobs." One of their first assignments was to station themselves at the Greyhound bus terminal to look for any known union organizers and to monitor the picket lines at the local Dallas garment factories.[201]

The outside squad members at Ford's Dallas facility followed careful instructions at all times. They were instructed not to wear their identification badges and to keep in constant contact with the plant management. To do this, the members were to call a designated phone kept in the employment office. This phone was only to be used and monitored by the squad members. To keep order in the factory, each production department was divided into groups of five to fifteen men monitored by a captain. Addresses and telephone numbers were exchanged so that a group could be warned if a union organizer or sympathizer was on the plant floor or even near the factory.[202]

In mid-July 1937, Rutland ordered the wiretapping of W.J. Houston's home and office home. Houston was a Dallas attorney for the UAW. Ford employees Jack George and Fleet Hall were assigned to tap the telephone lines and to monitor the calls for twelve hours a day. According to the testimonies of Jack George, Fleet Hall, and Claud Dill—three members of the outside squad--during investigative hearings in 1940, the wire tapping lasted three weeks and only consisted of personal calls between Houston and his wife. The listening ended by August

[201]Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 25-29, 24 (quotation); Clipping of "The Case Against the Ford's" (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA); Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes (UTA); Stephen Norwood, "Ford's Brass Knuckles: Harry Bennett, The cult of Muscularity, and Anti-Labor Terror, 1920-1945," *Labor History* 37 (Summer 1996): 365-391. The following are identified members of the inside and outside squads: S. C. "Fat" or "Fats" Perry, Warren A. Worley, Claud Dill, "Sailor" Barton Hill, James Longley, Bob Johnson, Earl Johnson, Tommy Lewis, Buster Roberts, "Red" Brown, "Red" Cooper, Ray Martin, Perry O'Brien, Buster Bevill, Frankie Graham, O. B. Daniels, Jack George, Fleet Hall, and "Curly" Dukes.

[202]Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 28.

18, 1937, when "the telephone company sent a check for $8.35 as the refund balance from the original $15 deposit made out on August 19, 1937, to R. L. Lancaster."[203]

Under Perry's direction, the outside squad also used their muscle to intimidate the workers. In order to supply the squad with more of an advantage, Perry directed the Dallas plant's maintenance department to manufacture company issued blackjacks. By the end of 1937 the Dallas maintenance department was also supplying whips and lengths of rubber hoses for the squad. The assortment of firearms supplied to the outside squad was kept in the desk of John Mosley, who was the head of the service department. According to historian Travis H. Polk, the persistent violence that occurred in the Dallas plant against the development of unionization was much more dramatic than in any other Ford factory. Rumor and suspicion could cause a worker to lose his job. For example, Dallas Ford worker Joe Sable was not a union member but played on a baseball team sponsored by a local union. This activity was brought to the attention of a member of Ford's inside squad, "Sailor" Barto Hill. The next day at the plant Sable brushed against Hill and by the end of the day Sable was fired for causing a disturbance on the plant floor.[204]

The purpose of Ford's inside squad was to prevent any secret organization from forming within the plant. Even though there were specific enforcers assigned to the inside squad, the expectation was that all Ford employees were to become unofficial members of the inside squad. Official leadership for the inside squad later fell to Dill, who was notorious for his overbearing presence and the pressure he inflicted on the Dallas workers. His reputation would follow him to other jobs after his service at the Ford plant. In 1943 Dill was working as a foreman at the North

[203]Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 51-52.

[204]Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 14; Norwood, "Ford's Brass Knuckles," 365.

American Aviation Corporation in Grand Prairie, Texas, where thirty-three workers filed a grievance against him. The plant's Director of Industrial Relations, Nate Molinarro, investigated these complaints and concluded that their concerns were unfounded and they could either work for Dill or terminate their employment. The official wording of this grievance stated that:

> On Sunday, July 18, 1943, employees of Department 41 which is the electrical department went to the personnel office to terminate. They stated they could not and would not work any longer under the foreman, Claud Dill. These employees claimed that Dill was and is an ex-convict, is a labor baiter, insults women and is abusive toward men and is generally incompetent.[205]

Subsequently, all thirty-three workers quit their jobs because they would not work for Dill.

The violence during the summer of 1937 was concentrated not only against union workers but also against union organizers. On August 8, 1937, George M. Lambert and Herbert Harris arrived in Dallas and began working on behalf of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee. They brought with them a labor organizing propaganda film entitled "Millions of Us." The film, which portrayed black and white union members marching arm and arm, was scheduled to be shown at the open air venue of Fretz Park in Dallas. When Rutland heard about this showing he instructed Perry and Dill to find out if the event was sponsored by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). If so, he wanted them to disrupt the event. In reality the film was sponsored by the Socialist Party of Tennessee and was made available to any union activists to use. After heckling the speaker before the film was scheduled to start, Perry, Hill, and Dill charged through the crowd, smashed the projector, stole some sound recordings, and attacked the projectionist, Herbert Harris. According to the *Dallas Morning News*:

> Four of the twenty men gagged Harris, 41, self-styled Socialist party worker. They took him outside the city and covered him from shoulder to feet with tar, crude oil and

[205]Clipping of "The Case Against the Ford's**"** (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA);Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes (UTA).; Strike Notice File 1943, War Labor Board Records, File 8-D-5 (Box 1104, University of North Texas Archives, Denton, Texas) (quotation) ; Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 148-161.

> feathers. They dumped him out almost nude, in the street between Commerce and Jackson on Austin. George Lamberth, 23 of 5946 Richmond, also a Socialist party worker, was treated for cuts on his scalp received when the fight ensued . . . At Parkland Hospital doctors used the entire supply of commercial ether to remove the sticky substance from Harris' body . . . Harris' condition is uncomfortable, but not serious.[206]

The battered projectionist, who had been found unconscious and covered in tar and feathers, was probably lucky to be alive.

Figure 11: Herbert Harris holds a bundle made from his torn clothes. Source: File 89-1-4, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, University of Texas at Arlington, Special Collections, Arlington, Texas. Courtesy, Charlotte Graham Duncan Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington Library, Arlington, Texas.

[206]Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 69; Norwood, "Ford's Brass Knuckles, 365-366.

A picture of Harris with an attached article appeared not only in the *Dallas Morning News* but gained interest from other city newspapers, specifically the *Southern News Almanac* of Birmingham, Alabama. During the testimony given during the 1940 Dallas NRA hearing about the squad activities, witnesses revealed "that the tar came from the Ford plant, that the feathers had been given by a Ford official, and that the brush with which the tar had been applied had come from the Ford tool crib." Other facts that emerged from the testimony were that the squad members had planned to leave Harris in front of the Adolphus Hotel and had informed reporter Truman Pouncey of the *Dallas Morning News* where he would be located. Perry decided at the last minute not to drop Harris there because he was unsure if the Ford Motor Company would approve of any pictures being taken; instead, Harris was dropped by the newspaper's office and they notified Pouncey of the change of location and that they had changed their mind about the photograph being taken.[207]

Squad attention was specifically directed toward any union official that came to Dallas from Kansas City, where the UAW had gained a foothold among the plant workers. Union organizers and former Ford employees Leonard Guempelein, Richard Sowers, and Harold M. Bowen came to Dallas in the summer of 1937 from Kansas City and were quickly singled out for intimidation. All three became the victims of severe beatings; the most extensive being the kidnapping and mugging of Harold Bowen. He was shoved out of a car near White Rock Lake with several fractured ribs, a badly beaten face, and countless number of abrasions.[208]

Another example of the violence that erupted during the summer was the attack on Hat, Cap, and Millinery Workers Union organizer George Baer. The Hat, Cap, and Millinery

[207]Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 46.

[208]Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 21-45; Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 148-161.

Worker's Union was an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). According to an article in the *Dallas Morning News,* published in August of 1937, while

> standing on the corner of Commerce and Poydras Streets on the afternoon of August 9, [George] Baer was engaged in a fist fight, by unknown assailants, [was] knocked out by a blackjack, and put into and carried away by a car driven by a third one. He was thrown out on a road south of Oak Cliff after an hour, dazed, and taken to Parkland Hospital for emergency treatment.

Later that week the president of the national union, Max Zaritsky, came to Dallas to investigate Baer's beating and kidnapping. As a result of his investigation, Zaritsky discovered the tarring and feathering of Harris, the local socialist. Apparently these two incidents occurred on the same day. Harris identified one of his attackers as Dill, described as one of the "Ford Thugs," but there is no record that Dill was arrested. Upon the conclusion of Zaritsky's investigation, he told Dallas police that he had evidence that led him to the conclusion that two "Ford deputies" kidnapped and beat Baer. Brothers Earl and R. J. Johnson were subsequently arrested for the assault on Baer.[209]

The threats ended once Baer was released from the hospital, but while he was there, because of continuous threatening anonymous telephone calls, the Dallas police department assigned him a special policeman as a bodyguard. The protection of union officials in Dallas came also when the "Governor James V. Allfred . . . assigned twenty-five State Department of Public Safety men to Dallas because this business of beating and kidnapping has to stop . . . and if the twenty-five officers I am asking for cannot handle the situation, I will move in more who can." Many Dallas residents sent letters to the *Dallas Morning News* voicing their protest about the Texas Rangers' expanding authority in their city. The newspaper published these letters and excerpts from forty letters congratulating the governor on his action. One is as follows:

[209] Biles, *The South and the New Deal,* 157; Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 94.

> We the undersigned taxpaying citizens of Dallas congratulate you on your action in sending rangers here to protect our citizens from thugs whom we believe to be hired and imported from Northern cities in an effort to intimidate labor leaders. When local authorities fail to see and apprehend thugs who commit crimes on our downtown streets in broad daylight, it is high time for you to act as you did.[210]

By August 25, 1937, Baer had moved his family from Dallas to St. Louis. He was hospitalized for complications from his injuries. Later that month specialists operated on his left eye in an attempt to save its sight and structure. Sadly, the structure was saved but Baer's sight was dramatically impaired. By 1937, historian Douglas Smith claimed that "police forces in all southern cities organized 'red squads' responsible for protecting strikebreakers, guarding company property, and intimidating labor organizers." But at the same time, he added, the same officers periodically raided local bookstores to confiscate "dangerous literature" such as *The Nation*, *New Republic*, and even *Redbook Magazine.*[211]

Several of Ford's inside and outside squad members were arrested for criminal activity, but by the end of the summer of 1937 most Ford workers were still scared to support any union, much less name their attackers. The Ford squads' drive against union sympathizers had crippled thirty-five men, blinded one, killed one, and mutilated scores of others. The Ford lawyers that represented the various squad members explained that the Ford men "were protecting their lunch baskets and they did not want to be molested in their happy conditions. . . [the violence was] nothing more than fights between the boys." Legal expenses were becoming costly to the Ford budget so the Dallas plant management creatively raised money for bail bonds, legal fees, fines, and court costs through the use of the pickle jar. Beginning in the early fall of 1937, Rutland ordered Perry to place a pickle jar by the time clocks with a sign that stated "In Case." Each

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[210]Strauss, "Organized Labor in Dallas County," 96 (first quotation); Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 47 (second quotation).

[211]Smith, *The New Deal in the Urban South* , 197 (second quotation); Norwood, in "Ford's Brass Knuckles," makes it clear that security precautions to protect union organizers may have been a very good idea.

employee had to pass by the jar, watched by Perry and Dill, when leaving the plant. The duo strongly encouraged each employee to contribute to the jar. According to the workers that mentioned this jar in later investigations of the Ford Motor Company, no one was ever given an official explanation for the use of the money. At the end of each day, the money was counted and delivered to plant supervisor Abbott's office. Leon Armstrong, Abbott's business secretary, opened an account at the Grand Avenue State Bank of Dallas to deposit the money. According to existing records, the original deposit was $122.42 and by September 1937 there had been five other deposits that collectively totaled $412.57.[212]

Not only were Ford employees expected to avoid any union connection, so were their spouses and families. William A. Humphries was first employed by the Dallas Ford plant as a guard to an exhibit sponsored by the Ford Motor Company and located on the local fair grounds. By March 1937 Humphries had obtained a permanent job in the service department as a relief watchman. Unfortunately, his wife had become a member of the Dallas Millinery Workers Union. When this became known to the Ford management, Humphries asserted in his complaint to the NRA, he was pushed out of his new job. Humphries said that when he arrived at work on August 17, 1937, his time card was missing from the rack, and he was informed that because the company was reducing staff he was laid off. Humphries continued to come back to the factory in order to be reemployed. Finally, believing that he was not getting employment because of his wife's union membership, he asked her to destroy her membership card and stop her affiliation with the organization. She complied with his wishes and wrote a letter of denouncement on November 11, 1937, to Arvil Inge, who was the Dallas representative of the Millinery Workers Union, Local # 57. Humphries then took a copy of the letter to Abbott at the Ford plant, but he

[212]Clipping of "The Case Against the Ford's" (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA); Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes [quotation] (UTA); Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 61-85.

was told that he was discharged because of his work and not his wife's affiliation. Humphries appealed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and on his complaint more hearings were conducted in Dallas about the intimidation and threats at the local Ford plant. Another Dallas Ford employee that was forced out of his job because of union affiliation was H.C. McGarity. McGarity was forced from the plant by Dill due to McGarity's membership in the Electrical Mechanics Union. Along with Humphries, McGarity in October 1939 "presented his case before the Regional Office of the NLRB at Ft. Worth, Texas and investigators from that office began to check on the general situation in Dallas."[213]

Not only did the *Dallas Morning News* report on the hearings in Dallas surrounding the violence and intimidation against the Ford employees and union organizers, but *The New York Times* sent a reporter named Louis Stark to cover the event. Since the managers and owners of the *Dallas Morning News* did not favor of union or government intervention the Dallas NLRB hearings were not covered very intently by the local reporters The Dallas hearings lasted from February 26 to March 28, 1940, but Stark only remained for the first week of the investigations. Even though he stayed a very short time, *The New York Times* ran stories that consisted of 132 column inches of space about the activities in Dallas. The local *Dallas Morning News* provided its readers, including the headline spacing, only 112 column inches on the topic. According to the hearing records, there were over one million words of testimony, in which the witnesses told some truly spectacular details about their activities.[214]

On March 4, 1940, Carl Brannin issued a report for the Federated Press on the testimony given at the Dallas NLRB hearings. Brannin wrote that:

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[213]"Sumner, The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 56-59; Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 70.

[214]Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 75, 85, 86.

> Houston, now a U. S. government employee in Seattle, showed the direct connection between the Ford company and an attack on him in July 1937 when he related the conversation between himself and two of his attackers. "Fats" Perry and Earl Johnson, who were in the gang which knocked Houston down and kicked and beat him on a downtown corner in broad daylight, said; "It's our job" when Houston remonstrated with them afterward at the police station . . . Other witnesses, both present and former Ford employees, have testified to meetings held during 1937 on company time in the "dark room" at the plant. Instructions were given by foremen and heads of departments to a selected group to watch out for union organizers and CIO sympathizers and report to a certain man in the plant over a special phone.[215]

C.F. Nooncaster, president of the Dallas UAW, local union #870, worked tirelessly to protect Ford employees and negotiate an agreement pertaining to the workers' demands. By August 9, 1940, through a decision by the NLRB, the Dallas Ford plant was ordered to cease the pickle jar collections. It had been three years in operation and obviously forced employee contributions to an anti-union fund. Also, the plant was ordered to remove any weapons and discontinue the use of squad activity against its employees. Ford management had to publicly inform its employees that the inside and outside squads were no longer in existence and would not be revived. As well as these requirements:

> the board ordered the reinstatement with back pay of William A. Humphries, factory service employee, and H. C. McGarity, electrician. The board's action was based upon the findings that Humphries was dismissed because of his wife's activities on behalf of the Millinery Workers Union Local No. 57 of Dallas (A.F.of L.), and that McGarity was run out of the plant by one of the company's inside squads because of his membership in Electrical Mechanics Union, Local No. 1 (unaffiliated).[216]

Trial Examiner Robert N. Denham stated at the 1940 Dallas hearing that "never in the history of the board had he known of a case in which an employer had deliberately planned and carried into execution a program of brutal beatings, whippings, and other manifestations of

[215]Carl Brannin, "Wire-Tapping and Flogging Revealed as Ford Tactics," (File 89-1-3, Box 1, Ford Motor Company Records, UTA).

[216]Thomas, Automobile Unionism Remarks to the Convention of UAW convened in Buffalo, NY, August 4, 1941 (File 1, Box 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA); Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes (UTA).

physical violence." In terms of union representation, it took some time for the workers to decide which union the majority favored. It was not until June 20, 1941, that Ford workers received an agreement stating the company would acknowledge that its workers could became members of the UAW, as well as recognize that among workers' rights was the tool of collective bargaining. The initiation fee for this union was $2, and the membership fee was $1 a month. If a member was out of work, then he would be carried for three months; after that time his membership would be suspended. Once re-employed, the member could be reinstated without having to pay back dues. Therefore a year's dues would total $12. This was a price that most Ford employees could afford, and so they could enjoy the satisfaction of the union privileges and representation that were inconceivable prior to the NRA and NLRB.[217]

The unique situation that this research revealed was that the Dallas Ford workers had a stronger purchasing power than the majority of southern industrial workers due to their higher wages, thereby creating a more stable economic status. But they paid a price for that with vehement anti-organized labor control by industry "squads." Overall, Dallas workers in the textile, cement, and automobile industries experienced similar paternalism, which slowed the establishment of union representation. While the cement workers were successful in achieving local union representation without violence or any extreme measures by their management to oppose its development, this was an oddity. The more common southern anti-union sentiment was most vividly illustrated through the activities in the Dallas Ford automobile, where order was imposed by inside and outside squads that terrorized Ford employees. Not even the Dallas textile workers previously mentioned faced such violence (although perhaps this was because

[217]Thomas, Automobile Unionism Remarks, August 4, 1941 (Box 1, File 1, Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas Collection 1937-1971, UTA); Vertical File on 1937 Dallas Strikes (UTA); Polk, "The Ford Motor Company's Resistance to the Labor Movement in Dallas, Texas," 16; Work Stoppage Report Strike Notice 1943 (File 8-D-5, Box 1104, War Labor Board Records, University of North Texas Archives); Sumner, "The Labor Policy of the Ford Motor Company at Dallas, Texas," 87-106; Hill, *The Making of a Modern City: Dallas*, 148-160.

many of them were women). Overall, most industrial workers in Dallas had to accept trade-offs in order to maintain their employment. The conflict between labor and management in Dallas was indicative not only of a nationwide struggle but also of the intensity of southern opposition to unionization and the extreme conservatism that characterized an industrial Dallas. In the end, it required federal intervention through New Deal legislation to break the pattern of paternalism. Change did not come immediately, but it did come, in part because of the overwhelming impact of World War II.

CHAPTER 8

THE EFFECT OF WORLD WAR II ON DALLAS LABOR RELATIONS

As soon as the Japanese bombers pounded the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor, the relationship between labor and management in the American South changed forever. Once a declaration of war was approved by Congress, the nation's industrial production needs became overwhelming. The progress of in establishing and maintaining union representation and collective bargaining techniques that occurred during the 1930s was about to be tested. During wartime all labor, including southern labor, was essential to successful war production. Southern workers were now in an advantageous position to seek more governmental protection of their collective bargaining rights and work place demands. The Roosevelt administration strongly encouraged management to meet these demands in order to avoid work stoppages that would halt or hinder wartime production. In order to assist with this new balance of power, the federal government created the National War Labor Board (NWLB) on January 12, 1942, through Executive Order 9017, which was followed by the passage of the Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act on June 25, 1943. Historian Charles Chamberlain maintains that during the first year of World War II the majority of the southern industrial workforce continued to suffer from lower wages and a segregated labor market. At the same time, because of the creation of the NWLB and its role as arbitrator in industrial labor disputes, Chamberlain asserts that it was a

> time of unparalleled labor organizing throughout the United States. . . In the American South, this phenomenon enabled labor unions to continue organizing industries such as textiles, oil, steel, shipyards, automobile, and aircraft . . . Hence the war years brought the greatest era of labor organizing and workplace activism in the history of the nation and the American south. As a result of the labor shortage, workers . . . felt emboldened in their ability to protest workplace grievances.[218]

[218] Charles D. Chamberlain. *Victory at Home: Manpower and Race in the American South during World War II* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 130.

World War II, with its demands for accelerated productivity, provided a chance to complete the New Deal reform agenda for labor.

The framework for wartime labor agencies was based on the previous operations of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, or Wagner Act). The original functions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was created by the NLRA, were to ensure order, to procure the settlement of labor disputes, and to promote the observance of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. After the NLRA was constitutionally overturned the passage of the Wagner Act contained and continued the spirit of Section 7(a). Roosevelt's administration authorized the NWLB representatives to conduct union elections in order to maintain the consistency of the union and their representation for their various employees and to sustain the various collective bargaining agreements. According to historian James Atleson, the NWLB's "wartime polices were focused upon the need to insure increased and continuous production, to encourage the stability of labor relations as well as, to control rank-and-file militancy." President Roosevelt did not want the turbulent strikes and work stoppages of the 1930s to be characteristic of labor in the war years. The new NWLB was composed of twelve members, of whom four members each represented the sides of labor, management, and the general public welfare. Labor disputes that threatened war production would be addressed by direct negotiation and arbitration through investigations by the locally assigned districts. After the investigation was completed, then the NWLB was responsible for enforcing business compliance of the final settlement of these labor disputes. Between 1942 and 1945, the NWLB arbitrated fourteen thousand cases of worker disputes, of which twenty-five agreements ended

with the federal government having to seize and control the business in order to enforce compliance.[219]

The NWLB members thus inherited the responsibility from the NLRB, for the duration of the war, for investigating and arbitrating various controversies and conflicts that arose between labor and management, with the express purpose of maintaining war production at all costs. At the beginning of the war, industrial unions did not formally surrender the right to strike, but as the war progressed even the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), William Green, realized that it would be a necessity. Green stated that "the fate of our labor movement is bound up with the fate of our democracy." He accepted that the "no-strike" policy would be applied to all industries that produced goods directly or indirectly related to the military. He and others had to trust the NWLB to protect the right of employees to organize and designate representation for collecting bargaining, determine appropriate bargaining units, conduct representation elections, and enforce prohibitions against specified unfair labor practices. In sum, the federal government desired that management's role would be to direct the rate and maintenance of production and that unions, with the support of the NWLB, would police the compliance of businesses with the agreements that had been negotiated between labor and management.[220]

Thanks to the NWLB, war production was positively maintained:

> [Production] quadrupled in 1942 and surpassed the combined manufacturing output of the Axis powers. A significant share of production occurred in Texas where manufacturing recorded major growth, with its added value increasing from $453,105,423 in 1939 to $1.9 billion in 1944. Increased production allowed Texas to pass its pre-war position as an industrially underdeveloped state and join the rest of the nation with its modernizing regional economy.

[219] James B. Atleson, *Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and Law During World War II* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 1 (quotation), 44-46.

[220] Ibid, 21.

Due to wartime demands, American workers experienced unprecedented support from the federal government in hearing and responding to their collective workplace demands. This was in stark contrast to the government's original response to the implementation of Section 7(a) of the NIRA. Despite the government's earlier lack of balanced enforcement of Section 7(a), many historians and economists agree that it had an important symbolic effect on industrial workers in both northern and southern states toward expanding worker's rights, improving work conditions, and increasing economic stability. Understandably, managers wanted government contracts and responded to war production demands on the basis of a mixture of economic reward and patriotic fervor, but management was also concerned about the possibility of a permanent shift in the balance of power between labor and management, in favor of labor. But managers discovered that fighting the demands of the NWLB could place their businesses in economic peril.[221]

Defense related production finally reversed the economic depression and elevated unemployment of the 1930s, but even through these patriotic times workers still sought workplace advances from their respective industries and received some benefits. For example, "between April of 1940 and Pearl Harbor . . . non-farm employment grew from thirty-five million to more than forty-one million and wage rates increased nearly 20 percent." World War II also provided industries with an opportunity to use patriotism as an excuse to remind their workers that their participation in unions was an un-American and undemocratic activity that would lead to a slowdown in production, thereby endangering the United States success in the war. This tactic was successful on some level, for in 1941 there were only 4,288 disputes involving two million workers, which represented 8.4 percent of the industrial population. These

[221]Emilio Zamora, *Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas: Mexican Workers and Job Politics During World War II* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2009), 24.

numbers had diminished from 1940, when the number of disputes totaled over 17,000.[222]

Texas was included in the Eighth Region of the NWLB and experienced disputes on a regular basis. Due to the fact that Dallas was dominated by more garment plants than any other industry, cases involving such operations were numerous. In 1943, the NWLB heard a dispute between employees of the Dallas Pant Manufacturing Company and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America Local Union #302. The plant was located at 6113 Lemmon Avenue in Dallas, and the company's president was J. M. Haggar. It produced male cotton work pants and had a government contract to produce khaki pants for the Army. Production averaged 319 dozen khaki pants a week and 879 dozen commercial pants a week. In 1944, Haggar had 356 total employees, 297 females and 59 males. All of the plant workers were female and all of the male employees were in management. As was so often the case, a dispute arose when the managers sought to reduce the hourly wages of nineteen skilled cutting room employees, all female, from fifty-seven and a half cents to fifty-five cents:[223]

After a review by the NWLB Eighth Region, a federal directive on August 25, 1944, recommended from its investigation that the range of wage rates for the classification of cutter should run between eighty-five to ninety-five cents per hour, but the fifty-seven and a half cents was accepted to the NWLB. Also the directive established a hiring rate for inexperienced sewing machine operators at fifty cents an hour and not the forty cents an hour that had been overturned by the NWLB. Investigators for the NWLB had found that the "Union has established that the Company's practice of hiring inexperienced employees and advancing them in a very short time

[222]Atleson, *Labor and the Wartime State*, 20.

[223]Directive Order, August 25, 1944, Clifford Potter to J. M. Haggar, November 10, 1944, Haggar to Potter, November 13, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region). The complainants were Marie Davison , Mrs. J. H. Rawlings, Adeline Miller, Alda Mae Cornusud, Hassie Spears, Jean Mitchell, Eva Swartz, Vera Cuttery, Tressie Sanders, Marie Odom, Lizzie May, Mary Starleigh, Johnnie D. Bell, Corine Bedair, Mrs. T.W. Everett, Mrs. Fannie Nelson, Madie Allen, Ada Lee Greie, and Fannie Morgan.

to fifty cents an hour substantiates the Union's contention that a hiring rate of fifty cents an hour is justified." Further evidence indicated that according to the company's own records there was a loss of several hundred employees within a six-month period of time because of the lack of a fifty cent an hour wage. Because the company had not deviated from this wage policy since the beginning of the war, the NWLB feared that a hostile environment could lead to a production stoppage. In a letter on November 10, 1944, to President Haggar, Clifford Potter, the Director of the Disputes Division, requested an explanation as to why the company had failed to follow an order issued on October 2, 1944, mandating a retroactive wage increase. Haggar responded in a letter dated November 13 "that he had no intention of paying any retroactive pay on an hourly rate increase basis, even though such retroactive pay is provided for in the [previous order] and though he had previously agreed to pay such retroactive wages."[224]

The NWLB found that this wage rate increase was essential for the work force in Dallas since there had been such increases in food, housing, and clothing from the beginning of the war. A report from the University of California's Heller Committee indicated that a minimum budget of $50.00 a week was required to maintain a decent standard of living for a family of four during the war period. It was estimated that persons in the lower income brackets were obliged to spend at least 40 percent of their income on food alone, and thus the increase in food costs affected them with much greater severity than persons in upper income brackets. Union representatives contended that certainly in Dallas the wages of workers did not permit the maintenance of proper living standards and health conditions. Therefore, on April 27, 1943, the NWLB for the Eighth

[224]Directive Order, August 25, 1944, Potter to Haggar, November 10, 1944, Haggar to Potter, November 13, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region).

Table 7: Increase in Food Costs in Dallas, Texas – January 1941-January 1944

Food Stuffs	Units	January 1941	January 1944	Percent Increase
Bread	1 pound	5 cents	10 cents	100%
Fresh milk	1 quart	10 cents	16 cents	60%
Fresh Tomato	1 pound	6 cents	23 cents	283 %
Fresh Apples	1 pound	5 cents	12 cents	140%
Eggs	1 dozen	27 cents	47 cents	74%

Source: Directive Order, August 25, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX).

Table 8: Increase in Rents in Dallas, Texas – January 1941- January 1944

Type of Rental	January 1941	January 1944
Unfurnished 5 room cottage	$35.00-45.00	$55.00-85.00
Unfurnished 4 room cottage	$22.50	$42.50
Furnished 4 room apartment	$27.50-37.50	$50.00
Furnished 3 rooms, bills paid	$6.50	$37.50
Furnished 2 rooms, bills paid	$5.00	$20.00
Furnished single room	$3.00	$5.00-$10.00
Average percentage of	Increase – 178%	

Source: Directive Order, August 25, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX).

Table 9: Increase in Clothing in Dallas, Texas – January 1941-January 1944

Women's Clothing	January 1941	January 1944
Blouses	$1.00-5.00	$1.95-14.95
Gloves	$1.80-3.00	$2.95-$10.00
Shoes	$3.00-10.95	$5.98-14.95
Men's Clothing		
Wool Suit	$25.00-40.00	$40.00-95.00
Shoes	$7.85	$10,95
Average Percentage of	Increase – 105%	

Source: Directive Order, August 25, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, National Archives Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX).

Region had adopted a resolution setting a fifty cent an hour wage as the minimum standard rate of pay for industrial workers in the Dallas area. In their case brief, the union used management's tactics by qualifying their demands in patriotic terms, specifically stating that "it is difficult, indeed, for workers to make a full contribution toward the winning of the war, unless they are able to obtain a wage that permits the maintenance of living standards and health conditions."[225]

The Dallas Pant Manufacturing Company responded to the NWLB directive order by claiming that the previous decisions in the 1943 National Cotton Garment cases (111-1641-D, 111-1862-D, and 111-1546-D), in which the NWLB directed a forty-cent hiring rate for this industry with advancement after three months of employment to forty-five cents and after six months of employment to fifty cents per hour, was the only wage compliance instructions that the Dallas Pant Manufacturing Company had to obey. Thus the company claimed that the Eighth

[225] Directive Order, August 25, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, NASR).

Regional NWLB's action of establishing a fifty-cent hourly wage for all employees contradicted the established policy of the NWLB. Dallas Pant Manufacturing Company insisted that if it complied with the October 1944 directive order, the company's financial stability would suffer. Management stated that for the fiscal year of 1943 gross receipts from sales was $737, 209.26 and labor expenses was $745, 737.48, creating an operating loss of $8,528.22. Expert witness testimony in the arbitration had claimed that the company spent approximately three hundred dollars to properly train a cotton garment engineer. Therefore to recoup some of the cost, the forty-cents-an-hour wage structure was financially necessary. Testimony was also consistent in revealing that after operators were trained, there was an extensive turnover rate among them when their wages did not increase. The company's management vigorously maintained in their brief that it was not an established policy of their corporation to maintain a "substandard wage," but that there were established levels for an inexperienced, learner, and apprenticed worker. The NWLB countered this argument by stating:

> At 57 and a half cents, employees on a nine hour day would earn $5.46, including one hour of overtime compensation. Using a standard of production now considered fair and proper of 100 dozen per nine-hour day, there would be no incentive to increase production or to maintain a production of 100 dozen per day where a practically equivalent amount of pay may be received from the Company for a smaller amount of work performed.[226]

The NWLB thus held firm to its demand for a fifty-seven and a half cent wage for skilled cutters and various machine operators.

The panel members of the Eighth Division of the NWLB heard other textile disputes as well. One prominent case that pertained to the Dallas industrial community was between Texas Textile Mills and the Textile Workers Union of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) local # 617 and 618. Local # 618 represented the workers of the Love Field mill of Texas

[226] Ibid.

Textile Mills, owned and operated by C. R. Miller. According to the company's brief there were 243 employees in the Dallas plant and about 200 of them were involved in the collective bargaining unit. There were approximately equal numbers of male and female employees. There were 270 employees in the McKinney plant, and of that number about 230 were involved in the collective bargaining unit. Approximately sixty-five percent of the McKinney employees were women and thirty-five percent were men. The NLWB case brief indicated that "ninety percent of the output from the Dallas output and ninety-seven percent of the McKinney output go into the channels of war, lend lease, and essential civilian commodities. The plants have no direct Government contracts, but the looms are under [NWLB] control." The workers' issues included: union security, holidays, sick leave, minimum weekly hours, military service bonus, night shift bonus, insurance program, and wages. According to the NWLB case papers, the history of the union organization in the C. R. Miller mills had been tempestuous and marked by the common place dismissal of employees for union activities. Some employees had been reemployed with back pay after their cases were brought before the NLRB. The case brief (111-8486-D) flatly stated that

> Mr. C. R. Miller, president of the Textile Mills . . . has been one of the worst labor haters. During his campaign for Governor in 1938, he had published an advertisement in local papers which carried the most vicious anti-labor diatribe ever printed . . . In July 1939, at the Textile Committee Hearing in Atlanta, Georgia, Mr. Miller appeared and stated that his workers . . . did not want to be represented by professional labor racketeers.[227]

Obviously this was a big case, involving deep-seated conflicts.

The NWLB found that strikes in the organized portion of the national textile industry had been unheard of since Pearl Harbor, but in the case of the Texas Textile Mills there was concern

[227]Case Brief #111-8468-D (first quotation on page 1, second quotation on page 6) (Record Group 202, Nation War Labor Board, NASR).

that the workers would strike due to the management's constant conflict with its employees. Historian Timothy Minchin claims that the war years brought positive changes for southern workers, but the rapid economic growth also had a negative side. Minchin states that "despite receiving better wages, workers had to cope with heavy workloads and long hours. In many southern communities, dramatic economic expansion created housing shortages that were felt most acutely by working people."[228] The Miller mills provide an excellent example of this.

The workers of the Miller mills wanted a forty-hour week with a one-hour lunch break, five holidays a year, fifteen days of sick leave, wages of sixty cents an hour, health insurance, and a military service bonus of two weeks' pay for a male employee who volunteered or was drafted. Miller wanted to keep his employees' hourly rate at fifty cents because, he asserted, the company could not absorb this increased labor cost. He claimed in the company brief that

> the company is prepared to show by independent audit that it has lost money for many months and is now losing money and is actually on the verge of closing down its mills due to the fact that the stockholders will not permit it to continue to produce goods at a loss . . . the company has cooperated thus far to its utmost with the Government by attempting to comply with all Government regulations and output directive for the production of vitally needed war textiles, but it cannot continue to do so unless price relief is granted by the OPA or the War Production Board alters its output directive so that the Company may produce other material at a profit.[229]

During the NWLB investigation of this case, the panel found that the workers' demands were justified, especially for sick leave and insurance. In their report, the panel rebuked Miller in support of the military service bonus:

> It would seem that at this time when our boys are giving their lives on the battlefields of the world, no management, no matter how hard-hearted, would even question this provision. When we read the letters that service men are supposed to have sent home condemning that less that 1% of our working army who have involved in stoppages, we

[228] Timothy J. Minchin, *Fighting Against the Odds: A History of Southern Labor Since World War II.* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 8; Case Brief #111-8486-D (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, NASR).

[229] Case Brief #111-8468-D (quotation on page 11) (Record Group 202, Nation War Labor Board, NASR).

> wonder what letters would be sent if these boys knew that managements were attempting to deny them an accumulation of seniority while they are in service. We wonder, too, with what feeling they regard the growing profits of management in light of management's appreciation for the fact that they are over there bleeding and dying to save management while the same management is making these large profits. Certainly this Board cannot in all justice refuse to grant to those boys who will go into the service, a two weeks bonus. Most of them would have had that coming in vacation pay if they had stayed here. And certainly this Board cannot but order that a boy who has gone from his mill to the service has a right to accumulate seniority at the place of his last employment while hi is in the service. . . Certainly no employer can argue rationally that such a provision would constitute a financial burden worthy of mention. So, we ask the Board to grant to those boys who are to be taken from our mills to give their lives, if necessary, the relatively unimportant concessions contained in the provision stated above.[230]

They also learned that a variety of chronic health concerns such as respiratory, neurologic, and rheumatic afflictions occurred among the workers due to dampness, heat, defective illuminations, dust, repeated pressure, and sudden changes in temperature.

The *Dallas Morning News* ran editorials about how the wage war between the workers of the Texas Textile Mills and its management greatly confused most of the other textile workers in the state. Textile workers elsewhere in Texas believed that the ten-cent-an-hour increase ordered for these three mills represented an increase over the substandard wage of fifty cents an hour and not the actual pay of forty cents an hour. Therefore, textile workers from around the state began filing their own wage disputes with the NWLB. Other issues involved in this arbitration centered around the establishment of vacation and sick leave pay. The NWLB agreed with the company that in order to establish the validity of an illness, each ailing employee had to provide a doctor's certificate and be seen by the company's nurse. In the event of the death of a family member, which through this agreement would include only immediate family members, the worker's time

[230]Ibid.

off would reduce their vacation pay, and the employee had to "return to work with reasonable promptness immediately after the funeral."[231]

Even though in these two case studies management attempted to resist the demands of the local unions and to renegotiate a better wage structure for the company, in the end these firms had to follow the directives issued by the NWLB in order to maintain their involvement in war production. During the war years, the cement industry in Dallas was not as involved in military production as the textile industry, but the NWLB also heard disputes from these local unions. In April 1945, the Eighth Region NWLB arbitrated a dispute between the Trinity Portland Cement Company of Dallas and the United Cement, Lime, & Gypsum Workers International Union, Locals # 68, 121, and 124 (AFL). There were approximately 590 employees in the three plants of the company: 315 employees in Dallas plant, 135 employees in the Ft. Worth plant, and 140 employees in the Houston plant. Of these, 437 employees, 407 females and 30 males, took part in the complaint. This industry was not an official war industry, but the company brief provides documentation that the Trinity Portland Cement Company of Dallas did supply some cement for the war effort.[232]

Originally filed in the summer of 1944, the only issue involved was the workers' request for a two-cent wage increase that would be retroactive for all employees that had been employed with Trinity since June 1, 1944. The NWLB directive issued on September 20, 1944, granted a wage increase of seven cents in order to stabilize the national wage standard for the industry. According to the company brief, C. E. Caron, the general superintendent of the Trinity Portland Cement Company, asserted that the new rate increase would cost the company approximately

[231]Case Brief #111-6145-D, Statement Submitted for Company (Record Group 202, Nation War Labor Board, NASR);"Wage Hike Misunderstood By Workers," *Dallas Morning News,* July 20, 1945.

[232]Case Brief #8-D-269, Directive Order, September 20, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, NASR).

$15,000 a year, which would cause the company to lose money and force the plant to reduce its employees by two-thirds. Caron further explained that this could affect war production and create worker dissatisfaction. He claimed that since January 1941, the plants had run a forty-eight hour week and thus the take-home pay of their workers was sixty percent more than in 1940. Depending on the job classification, the new hourly wage ranged from sixty-six cents to ninety-nine cents. Of the twenty-seven classifications, welders, powerhouse repairmen, and plumbers received the largest wage increases. Since the NWLB found that this increase needed to be retroactive for all former employees from the date of the order, the panel required that "any employee who has either quit or been discharged since said date shall receive the amount of the increase for his classification up to the date on which employment with the company terminated. The company and the union shall promptly send a joint letter to each such employee at his last known address, advising him of his rights under this provision." In order to avoid even stronger governmental intervention, management of the Trinity Portland Cement Corporation chose not to fight the wage increase for most of its employees, but did put the Dallas plant on limited hours until after the war. After the war, the Dallas plant officially closed down.[233]

In 1942 the United Automobile Workers (UAW) of the CIO filed a national case with the NWLB because of the Ford Motor Company's rejection of a one-dollar-a-day wage increase. This collective case represented all 115,000 of their workforce. The union contended that an increase was necessary because of the ever-growing cost of living that their workers faced. The NWLB found in favor of the Ford Motor Company, stating that there was no real justification for this increase due to the fact that Ford workers were generally paid higher that other industrial workers and were receiving 28 percent more money in 1942 than they received in 1941 because

[233]Case Brief #8-D-269, Directive Order, September 20, 1944 (Record Group 202, National War Labor Board, NASR).

of the governmental war contracts. Nationally in 1943, Ford Motor Company and the UAW came to an agreement that barred work stoppages through walk-outs or strikes. Harry Shulman, a Yale law school professor, worked as the arbitrator between Ford and UAW for the war years and was able to maintain a peaceful labor-management relationship. Shulman often referred to pre-war labor-management relations as jungle warfare. He constantly reminded the participants on both sides that they were now "joint participants in the production effort." In 1945 this industrial peace came to an end for Dallas Ford workers. Three hundred and eighty-five Dallas workers threatened a work stoppage if the NWLB did not satisfy their demands concerning vacations, pay for union committee members, and preferential seniority for the bargaining committee. Unfortunately for these workers, World War II ended in Europe just as these disputes were to be heard, which greatly reduced the company's incentive to negotiate. [234]

According to historian Barbara Griffith, after World War II there was a crisis for American labor, especially southern labor. Therefore the CIO purposely established a program entitled "Operative Dixie." Between 1946 and 1953, CIO organizers participating in "Operation Dixie" created recruitment campaigns through twelve southern states, Texas included, in order to encourage the continuation of the progress made during the New Deal and war years. The CIO's North Texas Director, A. E. Hardesty, claimed that in 1946 "North Texas [in 1946] will either move forward to high wages and prosperity and industrial peace or slip again into the backward area of low wages, industrial stagnation and strife." Dallas war plants had not lost a single day to strikes or work stoppages and had amassed a substantial financial reserve. Thereafter, according

[234]"Ford Workers Denied Plea For Pay Hike: WLB Declares Scale Higher Than That of Others in Industry," *Dallas Morning News*, October 14, 1942; Atleson, *Labor and the Wartime State*, 67; "WLB Panel to Hear UAW Worker Dispute," *Dallas Morning News*, June 10, 1945.

to Hardesty and the CIO, these same employers had forgotten their patriotic spirit and were now attempting to return to the sweatshop mentality.[235]

As federal government intervention faded, industrial strife again flared up and boiled over in 1946. During the first two months of 1946, seven strikes costing 2,263 industrial workers approximately $141,840 of income slowed the overall Dallas' industrial production by 162,470 man hours. Four of these strikes lasted well into the late spring and would eventually cost 2,563 industrial workers close to $400,000 in income. By 1947, according to a *Dallas Morning News* survey conducted with labor and management, it appeared that relations had greatly improved. Specifically mentioned in the survey was the fact that the AFL's International Ladies Garment Workers Union introduced clauses in their contracts with management that allowed workers to request a pay increase without the need for union arbitration if the cost of living continued to rise. Of course, Congress in 1947 passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which greatly restricted union tactics in labor disputes and may have forced an air of civility on both sides.[236]

By the 1940s, the CIO had become a major force in American labor, with 1.8 million members paying dues. Unfortunately, by 1949 the CIO pulled all of their recruiters out of Texas and redoubled their efforts in other southern states. Overall, "Operation Dixie" failed due to the combination of ruthless employer opposition, weakening federal presence and enforcement, and the intense fear among Americans, southerners included, of any "un-American" connection. In a 1946 *Dallas Morning News* article entitled "Danger to Labor is Communist Muscling-In," author Samuel Pettengill discussed these concerns. About the reemergence of labor using strikes as weapons in Dallas, Pettengill wrote that the "Communists are promoting [strikes, and] not to

[235]"Labor Plans Showdown Against Dallas Open Shop," *Dallas Morning News,* December 30, 1945.

[236]"Dallas Area Strike-Free: Year Ends in Peace for Labor, Industry," *Dallas Morning News,* December 30, 1946.

promote the position of the workers but to seize power over government and workers.“ Thus, she added, “We have an enemy to deal with. Americans will not knowingly [vote] for Communistic [ideals]. Nothing would hurt labor more than for it to get smeared with the Communist line.”[237]

In the end, the post-war clashes between southern labor and management reversed much of the advance made through the 1930s and war years. The wartime government regulations and requirements had an adverse effect on employees in the post-war years due to the stored up anti-union sentiment of managers and their resentment for being forced to deal with organized labor and union representatives. The dissatisfaction of southern management set them on a collision course with southern labor for the better part of the twentieth century. At the same time, the “un-Americanism” stereotype reestablished itself by 1947 among many southern workers, so much so that by 1950, 40 percent of American workers held union cards but only 17 percent of all southern workers had a union membership. This led many historians to agree that there is a distinctiveness about southern labor that directly relates to the persistent weakness of union development through this region.

The legacy of the NLRB and the NWLB were that they positively affected the strength of post-war collective bargaining even in the South. They greatly enhanced, for a limited time, the strength of the union in industrial workplaces. This strength was accomplished through “the pressures from the government, the possible denial or withdrawal of contractual benefits, and the constant threat of hostile legislation surely strengthened the resolve of union officials.” Aside from the very real economic gains made by southern workers during the war, the most important change seemed to be structural, for the presence of organized labor had gained a permanent institutional place in their daily life, even in Dallas. After World War II Dallas workers clung to

[237]“Danger to Labor is Communist Muscling-In,” *Dallas Morning News*, February 4, 1946.

the promise of a better workplace through unionization even though the governmental support began to wane. Not until the 1947 passage of the Taft- Hartley Act did industrial workers feel a renewed enforcement by the federal government's prohibition of unfair labor practices through prohibited actions, such as outlawing the closed shop, maintaining the union security shop, and allowing workplace strikes giving management a 60 day notice. The passage of this act will further encourage industrial workers to continue to use their political voice and seek governmentally involved resolution to their workplace grievances. [238]

In conclusion, this dissertation asserts that throughout the growth of industry in Dallas and the subsequent union development, both worker and management styles evolved. Industrial management in Dallas was initially characterized by the negative paternalism of the open shop. Because of internal and external pressure by the development of unions and the New Deal legislation, the workforce became more educated and vocal. The three case studies detailed in this dissertation provide a snapshot comparison of southern labor from 1900 to the 1940s that had been lacking in current scholarship. Investigating the relationships between the textile, cement, and automobile workers and management in Dallas illuminates the spectrum along which workers participated in and were denied union membership. Southern labor was distinctive and suffered from a failed post-war union presence, and many Dallas industrial workers had the same experiences with both benevolent and negative paternalism, violence, intimidation, and success in their pursuit of union representation as the textile workers of the Piedmont region and automobile workers in Detroit, Michigan.

According to Burt Blanton, an industrial engineer and business economist, during "the life-span of every city there is a period when development seems to level off for a few years then

[238] Atleson, *Labor and the Wartime State,* 284.

forges ahead. When a city has passed through its dormant period it may be accepted as a well-balanced economic community." Dallas suffered economically just as the rest of the country suffered during the years of the Great Depression, but its industrial draws remained a constant which allowed the city and its workers to endure, recover, and prosper. In 1939 Dallas had 716 manufacturing establishments. By early 1943 this number had increased to 1,589 and it was predicted that by 1950 there would be two thousand manufacturing plants operating within the city limits of Dallas. Worker demands, New Deal regulations, and union activism created an evolutionary and lasting effect on Dallas, breaking down the anti-union attitudes shared by most industrial management and creating a workforce that could recognize their economic power, inequities, and dangerous conditions that needed to be addressed. They were able to employ strategies in order to achieve these goals. Overall, due to the production for World War II and the government's intervention, Dallas was finally solidified into a much more modern, urban, industrial city.[239]

[239]"Dallas' Big-City Attitude Pays Off: It's Big City Now," *Dallas Morning News*, March 14, 1949.

APPENDIX A

SELECTIONS FROM THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Rights of Employees

Sec. 7 (a). Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or to assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer

(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7(a).

(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, that subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to Section 6 (a), an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time and pay.

(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided: that nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time to time or in any code or agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an

unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided by Section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.

(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.

(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees, subject to the provision of Section 9 (a).

Representative and Elections

Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided: that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

Sec. 13. Nothing in this Act shall be constructed so an to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.

Source: *United States Statues at Large,* XLIX, Part I, 449 (1935).

APPENDIX B

DOCUMENTS OF THE OPEN SHOP ASSOCIATION

The Open Shop (Square Deal) Association of Dallas, Texas

(APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP)

The undersigned hereby applies for membership in The Open Shop (Square Deal) Association of Dallas, Texas, and subscribes to the Constitution and By - Laws of the Association. If this application is accepted and approved, the undersigned pledges to aid by lawful means in the furtherance of the purposes and objects of the Association, and refrain from doing anything contrary thereto, either directly or indirectly. Liability is acknowledged to pay per annum membership fees or dues (in case this application is approved) according to a schedule prescribed by the Directors, as shown on the reverse side hereof, payable in quarterly installments on demand, same being ($.....)

..... Dollars.

Signature ..... Date .....

Address ..... Phone .....

Business .....Number of Employees.....

Where signed by Employer, number of Employees must be stated.

Schedule of Membership Fees or Dues

As Fixed by the Board of Directors

The membership of this Association is for convenience, classified in three groups:

First: The Employee, meaning thereby persons actually engaged upon a wage basis.

Second: The Employer, meaning thereby those who engage persons upon a wage basis. Those who employ others as defined in Class 1 hereof.

Third: The Public, meaning thereby all persons not within the class of Employee or Employer.

The amount of fees or dues of Class 1, as above defined, is fixed at $2.00 per annum, payable semi-annually in advance, on January 1st and July 1st of each year.

The amount of fees or dues of Class 2 as above defined, shall be upon the basis of $1.00 per annum for each employee, provided, however, the minimum amount is fixed at $20.00 per annum, and the maximum at $2000 per annum. This is payable quarterly in advance, using the calendar year.

The amount of fees or dues of Class 3, as above defined,, is fixed at such an amount as the individual may subscribe, the minimum to be not less than $12.00 per annum, payable quarterly in advance, using the calendar year.

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE OPEN SHOP
(SQUARE DEAL) ASSOCIATION OF DALLAS, TEXAS,
January 13, 1920

PRINCIPLES

1. To promote and safeguard the interests of our citizenship, including the employees and employers, and their families, by insuring through the principles of the open shop, and by other means, equal opportunity to all, and by preventing all unjust discriminations, whether against employees, employers, or the general public. It is not the purpose of the association to prevent the formation of labor unions; but rather to protect personal liberty and property rights by seeing that non-union workers have an equal chance in Dallas with workers who belong to unions.

2. To strive for an increase in the margin between wages and living costs, both through a reduction in the cost of living, and through an increase in wages secured by increased labor efficiency and production. Within reasonable limits, the pay, and the tenure of positions for all workers, should be determined by their own proven ability.

3. To prevent industrial disturbances . . . . .

4. To help workers secure the kind of positions they are best fitted for by inclination, natural ability or training.

5. To insist on the invincibility of business contracts and full compliance with the law and to prevent the use of force in the settlement of industrial disputes.

BY-LAWS

ARTICLE I.

Name. The name of this incorporation is The Open Shop (Square Deal) Association of Dallas, Texas, duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Texas, with its principal office in Dallas, Texas, said corporation being without capital stock, and organized for educational purposes.

ARTICLE II.

Corporate Powers. Section 1. The corporate powers of this corporation shall be vested in a Board of Directors consisting of 18 members who shall be elected at an annual meeting, one-third of whom will serve for one year; one third of whom will serve for two years: and one third for three years.

Section 2. The directors shall be divided into three equal groups, representing the public, the laboring men and the employers respectively. This same relative group representation shall be maintained at each election.

Section 3. The Directors representing the public shall be appointed by the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers Association of Dallas, Texas.

Section 4. The Directors representing the laboring men shall be elected by the laboring men who are members of this association, chosen from the laboring members and they shall be personally and actually engaged in productive labor.

Section 5. The Directors representing the employers shall be elected by the employers who are members of this association, chosen from the employers members and they shall be personally, directly engaged in the employment and management of labor.

ARTICLE III.

Membership. Same as San Antonio Association.

Section 6. A quorum of members shall consist of ten members from each of the three groups of membership, and shall be entitled to one vote in person, no member being allowed to be represented by proxy.

ARTICLE VII.

Employment Bureau. Section 1. The furtherance of the aims of the Association, as listed under item four: namely, "To help workers secure the kind of positions they are best fitted for by inclination, natural ability or training," an employment bureau will be maintained at headquarters which shall be available without charge other than the Association membership fees, to all members of the Association.

Charter Granted, January 13, 1920.

Source: Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 54, 135-136.

APPENDIX C

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9370: ENFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD DIRECTIVES

Issued August 16, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statues of the United States, it is hereby ordered:

In order to effectuate compliance with directive orders of the National War Labor Board in cases in which the Board reports to the Director of Economic Stabilization that its order have not been complied with, the Director is authorized and directed, in furtherance of the effective prosecution of the war, to issue such directives as he may deem necessary:

(a) To other departments or agencies of the Government directing the taking of appropriate action relating to withholding or withdrawing from a non-complying employer any priorities, benefits, or privileges extended, or contracts entered into , by executive action of the Government, until the National War Labor Board has reported that compliance has been effectuated:

(b) To any Government agency operating a plant, mine, facility, possession of which has been taken by the President under Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act, directing such agency to apply to the National War Labor Board, under Section 5 of said Act, for an order withholding or withdrawing from a non-complying labor union any benefits, privileged or rights accruing to it under the terms and conditions of employment in effect (whether by agreement between the parties or by order of the National War Labor Board, or both) when possession was taken, until such time as the non complying labor union has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the National

War Labor Board its willingness and capacity to comply; but , when the check-off is denied, dues received for the check-off shall be held in escrow for the benefit of the union to be delivered to it upon compliance by it.

(c) To the War Manpower Commission, in the case of non-complying individuals, directing the entry of appropriate orders relating to the modification or cancellation of draft deferments or employment privileges, or both.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, August 16, 1943

Source: Todes, "Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas," 280.

APPENDIX D

PROMOTION MATERIAL ON TEXAS INDUSTRY



Source: *Dallas, Official Publication of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce* 4.8 (August 1925), 41.

APPENDIX E

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON TEXTILE, CEMENT, AND AUTOMOBILE WORKERS DRAWN FROM THE UNITED STATES CENSUS OF 1930

The census categories and codes are as follows:

Name

R/W = Can read and write

M/F = Male or Female

Race

Age

POB = Place of Birth

R/O = Rent or Owns his Residence

Residence

Occupation

Veteran = Statement of Veteran Status

Cotton Textile Workers taken from the 1930 Census s - Dallas, Texas									
Source: 1930 U. S. Federal Census									
Name	Literate	Sex	Race	Age	Place of Birth	Rent or Own	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Allen, C.E.	no	Male	White	32	Mississippi	R/12.50	2127 Gould	Textile Worker/CM	No
Allen, Edith	yes	Female	White	31	Texas	R/5.00	304 Corinth	Weaver	No
Allen,Dalton	yes	Male	White	38	Mississippi	R/13.00	2113 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Anderson, G.T.	no	Male	White	59	Tennessee	R/11.50	817 Hemingway	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Armitage, Lula	yes	Female	White	48	Texas	R/12.50	2122 Wall	Weaver	No
Armitage, Ray *	yes	Male	White	24	Texas	R/12.50	2122 Wall	Dallas Mill Labor	No
Armstrong, Lucy	yes	Female	White	62	Tennessee	[sic]	2121 Gould	Spooler	No
Armstrong, W.	yes	Male	White	36	Alabama	[sic]	2121 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Aughtene, Rara	no	Female	White	34	Texas	R/6.00	1124 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Bartman, Claudy	yes	Female	White	35	Texas	R/18.00	2116 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Beatty, Effie	yes	Female	White	31	Texas	R/12.50	2111 Wall	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Brooks, G. W.	yes	Male	White	44	Canada	R/5.50	2201 Wall	Labor "D Cotton Mill"	No
Buttler, Claud	yes	Male	White	35	Georgia	R/8.00	2132 Ward	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Burris, W. R.	yes	Male	White	57	Tennessee	R/12.00	2116 Cockrell	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Callie, Ray	yes	Female	White	44	Tennessee	R/12.50	1725 Lamar	[sic]	No
Catching, Ornie	yes	Male	White	31	Texas	R/8.50	2132 Gould	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Chapman, C. H.	yes	Male	White	37	Tennessee	R/25.00	2710 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Chapman, J. H.	yes	Male	White	61	Kentucky	R/14.00	2205 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Chappell, E.A.	yes	Male	White	23	Missouri	R/12.00	1306 Corinth	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Chappell, Pearl	yes	Female	White	34	Alabama	R/12.00	1306 Corinth	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Clover, [sic]	no	Male	White	41	Alabama	R/12.00	2109 Wall	Feeder	Yes - WWI
Cole, L. S.	yes	Male	White	42	Alabama	R/13.00	2209 Wall	Stubbweaver	No
Collins, Alex C.	yes	Male	White	38	Georgia	R/12.00	2203 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Elrod, Col. L.	yes	Male	White	41	Georgia	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Fleming, Austin	yes	Male	White	21	Mississippi	R/12.50	2109 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Fleming, Benji	yes	Female	White	22	Texas	[sic]	2109 Gould	Weaver	No
Fogarty, J.A.	yes	Male	White	53	Texas	R/7.00	2214 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Ford, Barabara	yes	Female	White	38	Georgia	R/12.00	2124 Gould St.	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Ford, Ben S.	yes	Male	White	33	Texas	R/7.00	2128 Wall	Cotton mill worker	No
Grant, Effie	yes	Female	White	36	Texas	R/16.00	2121 Wall	Weaver	No
Grant, W.W.	yes	Male	White	37	Tennessee	R/ 5.50	2203 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Grindale, C.	yes	Male	White	40	Georgia	R/16.00	2125 Wall	Cotton Mill Worker	No

Cotton Textile Workers taken from the 1930 Census s - Dallas, Texas									
Source: 1930 U. S. Federal Census									
Name	Literate	Sex	Race	Age	Place of Birth	Rent or Own	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Grendale, Buford	yes	Male	White	38	Alabama	R/4.00	1106 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Grendles, Bell	yes	Female	White	26	Texas	[sic]	2118 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Grendles, Joe	yes	Male	White	29	Texas	R/7.50	2118 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Grindles, C.	yes	Male	White	40	Georgia	R/16.00	2125 Wall	Textile Worker/CM	No
Hall, Earnest	yes	Male	White	19	Texas	[sic]	2134 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Hall, Gero.	yes	Male	White	59	Arkansas	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Hargrove, E.G.	yes	Male	White	45	Texas	R/7.00	2120 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Hassen, D.	yes	Male	White	30	Texas	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Hargraves, Lillie	yes	Female	White	36	Texas	R/12.00	1306 Parker	Weaver	No
Hayman, Lula	yes	Female	White	18	Texas	R/12.50	2122 Wall	Weaver	No
Heart, O.F.	yes	Male	White	39	Texas	R/6.00	2216 Lanicia	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Henderson, Colly	no	Male	White	42	Texas	R/12.50	2203 Gould	Card Room	No
Hensley, Thomas	yes	Male	White	38	Texas	R/12.50	2117 Gould	Machinist Cotton Mill	No
Hovar, George	no	Male	White	35	Alabama	R/17.50	1412 Corinth	Labor Cotton Mill	Yes- WWI
Jackson, Lee	yes	Male	White	22	Texas	R/6.00	1112 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Johnson, Andy	no	Male	White	54	Georgia	R/12.50	810 Mongermy	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Jones, Geo. Clay	yes	Male	White	30	Texas	R/11.50	821 Mongermy	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Lacey, John	yes	Male	White	40	Texas	R/20.00	2122 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Lentz, Sidney	yes	Male	White	30	North Carolina	Lodger	1721 Browder	Textile Worker/CM	No
Lewellerw, Callie	no	Female	White	75	Mississippi	[sic]	2216 Lanicia	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Lewllen, Frank R.	yes	Male	White	42	Mississippi	R/8.00	2200 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Littleton, Ola	yes	Female	White	38	Mississippi	[sic]	2204 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Matthews, Inez	yes	Female	White	39	Mississippi	R/6.00	1118 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
McNeely, Samuel O.	yes	Male	White	26	Louisiana	R/12.50	2207 Gould	Textile Worker/CM	No
Medlice, Bud	yes	Male	White	15	Louisiana	Roomer	2116 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Medlice, Jess	yes	Male	White	27	Louisiana	Roomer	2116 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Mitchell, Thomas H.	yes	Male	White	30	Texas	R/20.00	2116 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Myers, Tom	no	Male	White	49	South Carolina	R/8.00	1113 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Padgett, Willie Mae	yes	Female	White	22	Texas	R/12.00	814 Mongermy	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Parr, Frank	no	Male	White	36	Texas	R/7.00	2212 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Parrott, Sam	yes	Male	White	45	Mississippi	R/7.50	2210 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No

Cotton Textile Workers taken from the 1930 Census	s - Dallas, Texas								
Source: 1930 U. S. Federal Census									
Name	Literate	Sex	Race	Age	Place of Birth	Rent or Own	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Pylan, Jimmie L.	yes	Male	White	25	Texas	R/12.00	1701 Lamar	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Reaves, Fred	yes	Male	White	35	Arkansas	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Labor	No
Redd, J. E. or J.C.	yes	Male	White	46	Georgia	R/12.00	2109 Gould	Reparer - Cotton Mill	No
Reyonds, G. E.	yes	Male	White	33	Georgia	R/6.00	1108 Parker	Labor	No
Roberts, C.B.	yes	Male	White	19	Tennessee	R/8.00	2122 Wall	Weaver	No
Robertson, Clara B.	yes	Female	White	22	Texas	R/5.50	2127 Wall	Spinner Cotton Mill	No
Robinson, Stonewall	yes	Male	White	39	Mississippi	R.8.00	2136 Parker	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Robbins, Debbie	yes	Female	White	21	Oklahoma	Roomer	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Robbins, Ida	yes	Female	White	17	Oklahoma	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Robbins, Lla	yes	Female	White	17	Oklahoma	Roomer	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Robbins, Otis	yes	Male	White	28	Oklahoma	roomer	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Robbins, Reddie	yes	Female	White	21	Oklahoma	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Rubins, Manuel	yes	Male	White	24	Texas	R/6.00	1114 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Sherrell, Bula	yes	Female	White	18	Texas	R/12.00	2122 Wall	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Sherell, Laman	yes	Male	White	22	Texas	R/12.50	2125 Wall St.	Weaver Cotton Mill	No
Sherrill, Beatrice	yes	Female	White	24	Missouri	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Simons, John	no	Male	White	37	Tennessee	R/7.50	2125 Gould	Dolpher - Cotton Mill	No
Smith, Ada	yes	Female	White	47	Texas	R/4.00	1301 Tasta	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Smith, Allen	yes	Male	White	55	Texas	Boarder	2216 Gould	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Smith, H.A.	yes	Male	White	41	Texas	R/11.00	2135 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Smith, L	yes	Male	White	24	Texas	Roomer	2127 Gould	Textile Worker/CM	No
Smith, R. P.	yes	Male	White	78	Mississippi	R/12.50	2113 Gould	Helper - Cotton mill	No
Stanley, A.C.	yes	Male	White	49	Texas	R/5.00	2216 Lanicia	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Steel, Burrus	no	Male	White	37	South Carolina	R/5.00	2205 Suitefee	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Steel, R. G.	yes	Male	White	63	South Carolina	R/5.00	2205 Suitefee	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Steele, Henry R.	yes	Male	White	43	Texas	R/13.00	1109 Parker	Weaver Textile Mill	No
Sington, Cloe	[sic]	Female	White	26	Texas	[sic]	2125 Gould	Weaver	No
Sington, John	yes	Male	White	54	Texas	R/7.00	2125 Gould	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Todd, H.	no	Male	White	47	Tennessee	R/18.00	1117 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Togett, Froney	yes	Female	White	45	Texas	R/12.00	2111 Wall	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Toney, Earnest	yes	Male	White	25	Mississippi	R/20.00	2122 Cockrell	Cotton Mill Worker	No
Toney, Ivie	yes	Male	White	21	Mississippi	R/20.00	2122 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Toney, Pink	yes	Male	White	30	Mississippi	R/6.00	1120 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No

Cotton Textile Workers taken from the 1930 Census				s - Dallas, Texas					
Source: 1930 U. S. Federal Census									
						Rent or			
Name	Literate	Sex	Race	Age	Place of Birth	Own	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Toney, G. W.	no	Male	White	64	Arkansas	R/20.00	2122 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Toney, William	yes	Male	White	23	Mississippi	R/20.00	2122 Cockrell	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Trammell, Effie	yes	Female	White	29	Louisiana	R/5.50	2127 Wall	Weaver	No
Walker, Lela	no	Female	White	48	Texas	R/12.00	2122 Wall	Weaver	No
Wert, Noley	yes	Female	White	46	North Carolina	R/10.00	2105 Gould	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Wert, R.C.	yes	Male	White	52	South Carolina	R/10.00	2101 Gould	Textile Worker/CM	No
Williams, C.B.	yes	Male	White	50	Texas	R/6.00	1122 Parker	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Williams, Myrtle	yes	Female	White	36	Texas	R/10.50	1302 Corinth	Spinner Cotton Mill	No
Wilke, J.S.	yes	Male	White	64	Scotland	R/22.00	1412 Parker	Carpenter - Cotton Mill	No
Winn, H	yes	Male	White	41	Texas	R/5.00	2129 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Winn, J. H.	yes	Male	White	38	Texas	R/11.00	2117 Wall	Stitcher Cotton Mill	No
Winn, Kate	yes	Female	White	36	Texas	R/5.00	2129 Wall	Labor Cotton Mill	No
Winn, Louise	yes	Female	White	26	Oklahoma	[sic]	2117 Wall	Cotton Mill Labor	No
Woolbright, J. W.	yes	Male	White	51	Texas	R/20.00	2112 Cockrell	Cotton Mill Chief Engineer	No
Only J.H. Winn, J.W. Woolbright, Frank Lewllen, and Henry Steele owned a radio.									

ANGLO CEMENT WORKERS -from the 1930 U.S. Census - Dallas, Texas							SA = Spanish American War; WWI = World War I		
NAME	**R/W**	**M/F**	**Race**	**AGE**	**POB**	**R/O**	**Residence**	**Occupation**	**Veteran**
Adams, Walter K.	yes	male	white	35	North Carolina	R=$15.00	Cement Row	carpenter/cement company	**No**
Allen, Benny	yes	male	white	19	Alabama	stepson	1639 Mount Clair	laborer/cement factory	No
Allen, Earl	yes	male	white	21	Alabama	stepson	1639 Mount Clair	laborer/cement factory	No
Allen, J.B.	yes	male	white	54	Arkansas	R = $15	1639 Mount Clair	laborer/cement factory	No
Allen, Robert	yes	male	white	26	Alabama	stepson	1639 Mount Clair	laborer/cement factory	No
Anderson, Victor	yes	male	white	51	Sweden	O=$5,000	319 North Katherine	laborer/cement factory	No
Ballard, A.	yes	male	white	20	Texas	R=$12.00	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Barton, Lehl	yes	male	white	21	Texas	O = $2,000	Forth Worth Ave.	laborer/cement factory	No
Barrett, Doyd	yes	male	white	17	Texas	Renter	1 Belt Line Road	servant/cement factory	No
Bartholomew, O.V.	yes	male	white	56	Indiana	[sic]	Cement Row	superintendent cement co	No
Bartholomew. Robert	yes	male	white	27	Indiana	[sic]	Cement Row	Chief Engineer cement co	No
Burrogies, James	yes	male	white	53	Missouri	[sic]	1222 Stafford	laborer/cement factory	No
Bramhall, Eugene	yes	male	white	32	Texas	R=$12.00	Acadia/Eagle Ford	Machinist/cement factory	No
Bramhall, J. R.	yes	male	white	68	Missouri	R=$12.00	Acadia/Eagle Ford	rods dryer/cement factory	No
Bretendorff, Ernest	yes	male	white	24	Texas	O = $4,000	903 Ormsby	laborer/cement factory	No
Brown, John	yes	male	white	63	Illinois	O = $2,000	1014 Francis	yard foreman/cement plant	No
Burnett, Fred	yes	male	white	36	Texas	boarder	Cement Row	engineer, cement company	No
Carr, C.E.	yes	male	white	28	Texas	[sic]	Cement Row	carpenter/cement company	No
Carr, H.W.	yes	male	white	48	Missouri	R=$12.00	Cement Row	foreman/cement company	No
Cash, Tracy	yes	male	white	26	Texas	R = $15	2306 Ormsby	labor/Portland cement co.	No
Dalton, James	yes	male	white	26	Oklahoma	R = $12	1201 Stafford	laborer/concrete company	No
Dalton, Lasetter	yes	male	white	21	Texas	son-in-law	833 [sic]	repair man/cement co.	No
Davidson, S.A.	yes	male	white	41	Texas	R=$18.00	Cement Row	foreman/cement company	No
Day, D. N.	yes	male	white	43	Ohio	R=$18.00	Cement Row	secretary/cement company	No
Dennis, Flex	yes	male	white	22	Texas	boarder	814 Pollard	labor/cement company	No
Denton, Jerry M.	yes	male	white	54	Tennessee	R=$15.00	Cement Row	engineer, cement company	No
Dillard, S. O.	yes	male	white	22	Texas	R = $10	1425 Fort Worth Ave.	labor/cement company	No
Doyle, J. W.	yes	male	white	56	Texas	R = $20	2106 Willffont St.	night watchman/cement co.	No
Doyle, Sam	yes	male	white	37	Texas	R=$15.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	Yes-WWI
Duncan, M.E.	yes	male	white	27	Texas	R=$15.00	Cement Row	Electrician cement company	No
Edison, F. M.	yes	male	white	42	Georgia	R = $15	1223 Stafford	foreman/cement company	No
Evans, Earnest C.	yes	male	white	24	Texas	R =$12	1105 [sic]	labor/cement company	No
Evans, G. C.	yes	male	white	45	Tennessee	R = $2	741 Forth Worth Ave.	labor/cement company	No
Farrell, J. W.	yes	male	white	27	Texas	renter	113 North Katherine	carpenter/cement company	Yes- WWI

ANGLO CEMENT WORKERS - from the 1930 U.S. Census - Dallas, Texas							SA = Spanish American War; WWI = World War I		
NAME	**R/W**	**M/F**	**Race**	**AGE**	**POB**	**R/O**	**Residence**	**Occupation**	**Veteran**
Farley, B. T.	yes	male	white	40	Arkansas	O=$2,000	Acadia/Eagle Ford	shipping/cement factory	No
Fincher, V.K.	yes	male	white	36	Missouri	R=$12.00	Cement Row	Chemist cement company	No
Frank, Carl	yes	male	white	42	Germany	O = $4,000	1219 Stafford	engineer, cement company	No
Ganger, Jas	yes	male	white	45	Missouri	[sic]	Cement Row	assistant superintendent	No
Gattis, G.N.	yes	male	white	32	Tennessee	R=$12.00	Cement Row	Electrician cement company	No
Gaugh, O. W.	yes	male	white	20	Texas	R = $10	[sic] Mount Clair	labor/cement company	No
Gibson, Wallace K.	yes	male	white	34	Montana	R=$17.00	Cement Row	Chemist cement company	No
Guess, Jim	yes	male	white	34	Oklahoma	R = $7	[sic] Fort Worth Ave.	labor/cement company	No
Gust, Bob	yes	male	white	52	Texas	R = $10	[sic] Fort Worth Ave.	labor/cement company	No
Hanton, J. R.	yes	male	white	40	England	O=$2,000	1 Belt Line Road	labor/cement company	No
Hodgins, William H.	yes	male	white	44	Missouri	R = $15	1013 Fort Worth Ave	labor/cement company	No
James, V. K.	yes	male	white	32	Mississippi	R =$12	[sic] Fort Worth Ave.	labor/cement company	No
Jewett, J. W.	yes	male	white	39	Texas	R=$12.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Jones, J.R.T.	yes	male	white	47	Kentucky	R= $10.00	Center Street	Butcher cement company	No
King, D. J.	yes	male	white	37	Texas	R = $10	1027 [sic]	labor/cement company	No
Lalkington, Leslie	yes	male	white	22	Texas	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Machinist cement company	No
Lates, J. L.	yes	male	white	39	Texas	roomer	1205 Williams	laborer/cement factory	No
Lawker, J. A.	yes	male	white	34	Texas	R=$15.00	301 North Lillian Ave.	labor/cement company	Yes- WWI
Littleton, E.C.	yes	male	white	40	Texas	boarder	[sic]	laborer/cement factory	Yes -SA
Love, Marcus M.	yes	male	white	43	Louisiana	R = $16	2116 Gavel	contractor/cement co.	No
Martin, Grady	yes	male	white	33	Texas	R = $12	[sic] Scott	labor/cement company	No
McDowell, Clint W.	yes	male	white	40	Texas	R=$15.00	Forth Worth Ave.	laborer/cement factory	No
McDowell, Louis	yes	male	white	20	Texas	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Chemist cement company	No
McDowell, Ike	yes	male	white	16	Texas	boarder	Cement Row	Chemist cement company	No
Milton, K. L.	yes	male	white	21	Georgia	O = $3,000	[sic] Edgefield	truck driver/cement company	No
Moore, Dennis	yes	male	white	27	Texas	son of W.D.	Irvine and Dallas Pike	laborer/cement factory	No
Moore, H. D.	yes	male	white	42	Tennessee	R = $10	[sic] Fort Worth Ave.	laborer/cement factory	No
Pamdector, J.V.	yes	male	white	27	Texas	R=$12.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Pierce, C.R.	yes	male	white	30	Texas	[sic]	Cement Row	oiler/cement factory	No
Ralph, W.M. S.	yes	male	white	25	Texas	R=$10.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Reagan, Walter A.	yes	male	white	26	Texas	boarder	Center Street	carpenter/cement company	No
Robinson, Virigil	yes	male	white	41	Texas	[sic]	2918 Fairmont	mechanic cement co.	No
Ross, Jimmie	yes	male	white	25	Texas	son of W.T.	Acadia/Eagle Ford	carpenter	No
Ross, M. T. Jr.	yes	male	white	22	Texas	R = $15	1314 Menisley	electrical dept./cement co.	No

ANGLO CEMENT WORKERS - from the 1930 U.S. Census - Dallas, Texas							SA = Spanish American War; WWI = World War I		
NAME	**R/W**	**M/F**	**Race**	**AGE**	**POB**	**R/O**	**Residence**	**Occupation**	**Veteran**
Ross, Willie	yes	male	white	23	Texas	son of W.T.	Acadia/Eagle Ford	electrical dept./cement co.	No
Ross, W.T.	yes	male	white	52	Mississippi	O=$4,000	Acadia/Eagle Ford	carpenter	Yes - SA
Sample, John	yes	male	white	44	Texas	R = $ 15	[sic]	laborer/cement factory	No
Sandifer, Harold	yes	male	white	18	Texas	R = $13	[sic] Fort Worth Ave.	laborer/cement factory	No
Scarborougn, Arnie	yes	male	white	24	Texas	R = $25	2112 Fairmont	laborer/cement factory	No
Shelly, David	yes	male	white	57	Arkansas	R = $30	2602 Fairmont	construction cement co.	No
Smith, Frank	yes	male	white	44	Arkansas	O = $3,500	1304 Menisley	stone engineer/cement co.	No
Smith, Winfred W.	yes	male	white	46	Texas	R=$12.00	Cement Row	fireman cement company	No
Spain, John T.	yes	male	white	43	Texas	R=$18.00	Cement Row	stationary foreman - cement	No
Spams, A.S.	yes	male	white	36	Texas	R=$15.00	Cement Row	carpenter/cement company	No
Stuart, W. O.	yes	male	white	44	New Zealand	R= $22.00	Cement Row	electrical dept./cement co.	No
Stone, Austin	yes	male	white	26	Texas	R = $20	[sic]	labor/cement company	No
Stubbs, Fred	yes	male	white	19	Missouri	R = $40	2915 Firmont	laborer/cement factory	No
Sutherland, Carl	yes	male	white	46	Sweden	R=$17.00	Cement Row	Machinist cement company	No
Summers, J.D.	yes	male	white	43	Texas	R=$19.00	Cement Row	Chief Engineer cement co	No
Taggart, John	yes	male	white	38	Texas	boarder	Cement Row	engineer, cement company	No
Taggart, J.W.	yes	male	white	38	Texas	boarder	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Taylor, Jim	yes	male	white	23	Texas	boarder	Ft. Worth pike	carpenter/cement company	No
Thompson, Otto	yes	male	white	37	Texas	R=$15	Cement Row	mill wright/cement company	Yes-WWI
Wade, Cleople	yes	male	white	21	Georgia	O = $3,000	1223 Stafford	labor/cement company	No
Wells, M.R.	yes	male	white	28	Texas	R=$12.00	Cement Row	electrical dept./cement co.	No
Williams, C. J.	yes	male	white	33	North Carolina	R=$15.00	Cement Row	electrical dept./cement co.	No
Williams, Josh	yes	male	white	59	Texas	R=$15.00	Cement Row	overseer/cement company	No
Wilson, Jack	yes	male	white	20	Texas	R = $12	1117 Sylvan	labor/cement company	No
17 of the 135 cement workers owned radios									

BLACK DALLAS CEMENT WORKERS -from the 1930 U. S. Census - Dallas, Texas

NAME	R/W	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Anderson, Henry	yes	male	black	44	Texas	R=$10.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Baylor, Willert	yes	male	black	27	Louisiana	O=$2,500	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Broskins, Clyde	yes	male	black	29	Texas	R=$8.00	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Carroway, Urban	yes	male	black	23	Texas	R=$8.00	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Cook, Earlie	yes	male	black	15	Texas	stepson	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Cook, Ruben	yes	male	black	50	Texas	O=$4,000	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Coleman, Jessie	no	male	black	39	Texas	R = $10	2207 Sautiffe	concrete mixer	Yes- WWI
Cramp, Ed	yes	male	black	47	Texas	O=$400	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Duncan, James	yes	male	black	44	Louisiana	O=$1,500	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Floyd, Pink	yes	male	black	30	Texas	R=$8.00	Center Street	labor/cement company	Yes- WWI
Gillispi, Allen	yes	male	black	55	Texas	boarder	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Griffin, Vinnie B.	yes	male	black	[sic]	Texas	O=$200	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Harris, Monroe	yes	male	black	36	Texas	R = $12	2321 Sautifee	concrete mixer	No
Height, Joe	yes	male	black	44	Texas	O=$2,000	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Hight, Chas	no	male	black	50	Texas	O=$3,500	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Hight, Frank	yes	male	black	[sic]	Texas	O=$4,000	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Hight, Jafe	yes	male	black	46	Texas	O=$3,000	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Hight, Lonnie	yes	male	black	23	Texas	boarder	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Hight, W. E.	yes	male	black	16	Texas	boarder	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Houston, Larry	yes	male	black	33	Texas	R=$8.00	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Jackson, Marion	yes	male	black	21	Texas	Renter	2327 Thomas	labor/cement company	No
Jeffries, Jordan	yes	male	black	57	Texas	boarder	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Johes, Peter	no	male	black	47	Texas	R = $10	[sic] rarberrie	labor/cement company	No
Johnson, Jim	yes	male	black	60	Texas	R=$2.00	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Lee, Abbott	yes	male	black	21	Texas	R = $10	2326 Thomas	labor/cement company	No
McCoy, Lee R.	yes	male	black	37	Texas	O=$50	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
McCoy, M. J.	yes	male	black	19	Texas	O=$300	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Moore, W. M.	yes	male	black	59	Texas	O=$4,500	Irvine and Dallas Pike	laborer/cement factory	No
Morton, Lefl	yes	male	black	30	Texas	roomer	2327 Thomas	laborer/cement factory	No
Morton, Lewis	yes	male	black	60	Texas	roomer	2327 Thomas	laborer/cement factory	No
Polk, Jim	yes	male	black	50	Texas	O=$2,500	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Polk, John	yes	male	black	40	Texas	O=$1000	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Powell, Albert	yes	male	black	36	Louisiana	R=$8.00	Center Street	labor/cement company	Yes-WWI
Randle, Char	no	male	black	55	Louisiana	O=$3,500	Center Street	labor/cement company	No

BLACK DALLAS CEMENT WORKERS -from the 1930 U. S. Census - Dallas, Texas

NAME	R/W	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Robinson, Tom	yes	male	black	43	Texas	R=$10.00	Cement Row	laborer/cement factory	No
Rogers, Nathaniel	yes	male	black	26	Texas	renter	Acadia/Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Sanders, John R.	yes	male	black	28	Texas	R=$5.00	Mexican Quarters	laborer/cement factory	No
Sheppard, Dave	yes	male	black	28	Texas	O=$4,000	Irvine and Dallas Pike	laborer/cement factory	No
Staumer, Buck	yes	male	black	37	Texas	O=$500	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Staumer, Buck	yes	male	black	37	Texas	O=$500	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Strickland, Elijah	yes	male	black	38	Texas	R=$9.00	Eagle Ford	labor/cement company	No
Washington, George	yes	male	black	37	Texas	R=$8.00	Cement Row	labor/cement company	No
Wooten, Clint	yes	male	black	23	Texas	R=$10	Center Street	labor/cement company	No
Wooten, Cubis	yes	male	black	27	Texas	R=$10	Center Street	labor/cement company	No

MEXICAN CEMENT WORKERS - from the 1930 U.S. Census - Dallas, Texas

All address locations indicated Cement Row in Unincorporated Justice Precinct #7 - Eagle Ford

NAME	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Literate	Speaks English	Year of Immigration
Areledo, Elaris	Male	Mexican	41	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1917
Areledo, Tarigenanio	Male	Mexican	24	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1911
Arens, Jesus	Male	Mexican	50	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1916
Arias, Petronlilo	Male	Mexican	31	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1915
Baccas, L.	Male	Mexican	46	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1913
Barbarosa, Anabaurio	Male	Mexican	45	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1912
Barintas, Roquis	Male	Mexican	42	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1911
Barrera, Ricardo	Male	Mexican	35	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1918
Bries, Felipe	Male	Mexican	28	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1917
Cahillo, Sacareas	Male	Mexican	40	Mexico	R=$6.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1912
Caira, Jesus	Male	Mexican	37	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1926
Campo, Apolamaz	Male	Mexican	22	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1924
Carmado, Jose	Male	Mexican	39	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1913
Ermandez, Panfilo	Male	Mexican	38	Mexico	[sic]	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1910
Escobar, Miguel	Male	Mexican	49	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1902
Gama, Federico (father)	Male	Mexican	60	Mexico	R=$9.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1917
Gama, Pedro (son)	Male	Mexican	29	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1917
Gama, Rofugio (son)	Male	Mexican	25	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1917
Garcia, Francisco (father)	Male	Mexican	52	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1913
Garcia, Daniel (son)	Male	Mexican	20	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1913
Garcia, Guadlupe (son)	Male	Mexican	23	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1913
Garcia, Jesus (son)	Male	Mexican	29	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1913
Garcia, Pedro	Male	Mexican	30	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1923
Gonzales, Guinbelo	Male	Mexican	36	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1914
Gonzales, Roberto	Male	Mexican	18	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1927
Mageneniz, Juan	Male	Mexican	38	Mexico	R=$15.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1915
Martinez, Camfilo	Male	Mexican	22	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1924
Martinez, Jose	Male	Mexican	36	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1920
Martinez, Silberio	Male	Mexican	25	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1924
Pena, Francisco	Male	Mexican	39	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1908
Pena, Sotro	Male	Mexican	37	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1908
Peres, Ernesto	Male	Mexican	50	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1907

MEXICAN CEMENT WORKERS - from the 1930 U.S. Census - Dallas, Texas

All address locations indicated Cement Row in Unincorporated Justice Precinct #7 - Eagle Ford

NAME	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Literate	Speaks English	Year of Immigration
Perez, Ferdinado	Male	Mexican	26	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1918
Perez, Juan	Male	Mexican	35	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	Yes	1918
Pina, Rafael	Male	Mexican	30	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	Yes	Yes	1910
Pinter, Fiesl	Male	Mexican	29	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1923
Ramirez, Jenaro	Male	Mexican	33	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1915
Rotiez, P.	Male	Mexican	22	Mexico	R=$9.00	Cement Row	Laborer	Yes	Yes	1915
Sanchez, Luis	Male	Mexican	24	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1917
Siniair, Fiburnio	Male	Mexican	42	Mexico	R=$10.00	Cement Row	Laborer	Yes	Yes	1900
Soto, Benito (brother)	Male	Mexican	40	Mexico	R=$5.00	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1898
Soto, Lasquo (brother)	Male	Mexican	41	Mexico	boarder	Cement Row	Laborer	No	No	1898

Of the 42 listed Mexican cement workers none owned radios or were veterans of any American war.
Of the 42 Listed Mexican cement workers none were classifed in the census as naturalized citizen.

DALLAS FORD PLANT WORKERS TAKEN FROM THE 1930 CENSUS									
NAME	**R/W**	**M/F**	**Race**	**AGE**	**POB**	**R/O**	**Residence**	**Occupation**	**Veteran**
Alexander, Dillert	yes	male	White	28	Texas	R = $10	914 Henderson	assembler	No
Alexander, Everette	yes	male	White	24	Texas	R = $18	1014 St. Mary	assembler	No
Arie, Nic	yes	male	White	47	Illinois	R = $ 25	[sic]	assembler	No
Baggett, Rocky E.	yes	male	White	37	Texas	R = $37.33	4835 Garland	stock keeper	Yes
Basshorn, Kenneth	yes	male	White	33	Texas	R = $35	4926 S. Gurley	stock clerk	Yes
Bell, Alvin	yes	male	White	24	Texas	R =$25	4925 Garland	assembler	No
Bennett Otho H.	yes	male	White	44	Kentucky	R = $ 22	5205 Phillips	assembler	Yes
Bradberry, William	yes	male	White	23	Texas	R = $45	4926 Garland	assembler	No
Bridges, Gover P.	yes	male	White	32	Alabama	R = $35	5211 Gurley	assembler	No
Brown, Brashers	yes	male	White	[sic]	Texas	R = $40	259 Mary Street	assembler	No
Brooks, Claude	yes	male	White	22	Texas	R =$37	1112 Mary Street	assembler	No
Bryant, Bert A.	yes	male	White	23	Texas	R = $30	5019 Gurley	upholster	No
Buddrick, Ralph	yes	male	White	33	Illinois	[sic]	4808 Phillips	laborer	No
Bullock, Holbert L.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	R = $22	5006 Phillips	body builder	No
Burch, L. L.	yes	male	White	43	Arkansas	O = $3000	5349 Gurley	assembler	No
Burne, Joseph	yes	male	White	33	Texas	O = $4,500	5010 Garland	First aid man	Yes
Carly, Oras	yes	male	White	45	Mississippi	O = $5,000	5014 Gurley	Stock checker	No
Carney, Marion G.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	boarder	May Street	laborer	No
Catina, Barney	yes	male	White	40	Texas	R = $30	4935 Ashlone	assembler	No
Claeary, Charlie W.	yes	male	White	27	Texas	[sic]	4835 Garland	stock keeper	No
Cox, James E.	yes	male	White	20	Texas	boarder	4807 E. Grand	assembler	No
Crouch, Allen L.	yes	male	White	31	Texas	O = $3,000	5022 Parry	foreman	No
Darnell, Frank	yes	male	White	33	Texas	R = $22	4839 Terry	assembler	No
Davis, Joe D.	yes	male	White	32	Texas	R = $ 25	4909 Ashlone	electrican	No
Davis, Owen S.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	boarder	[sic] may street	laborer	No
Dawson, Leon W.	yes	male	White	24	Texas	O = $4,000	5207 Gurley	assembler	No
Dawson, Lural E.	yes	male	White	29	Texas	R = $200	[sic]	assembler	No
Day, Vaughn	yes	male	White	23	Mississippi	R = $25	4923 Phillips	assembler	No
Dill, Claud	yes	male	White	32	Texas	R = $40	259 South Street	foreman	No
Dlreey, Fred L.	yes	male	White	74	Texas	O = $16,000	4807 E. Grand	assembler	No
Edling, Manuel J.	yes	male	White	41	Kansas	O = $5,500	[sic] gurley	mechanic	No
Elkins, Walter L.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	boarder	[sic] may street	laborer	No
Ely, Fred W.	yes	male	White	49	Texas	O = $5,500	[sic] gurley	electrican	No
Eubank, Charles	yes	male	White	21	Texas	R = $20	[sic]	assembler	No

DALLAS FORD PLANT WORKERS TAKEN FROM THE 1930 CENSUS

NAME	R/W	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Eubank, Ollie E.	yes	male	White	25	Tennessee	R =$18	4822 Parry	assembler	No
Estes, Leonard	yes	male	White	29	Texas	O = $4,000	5202 Ashlone	assembler	No
Farrer, Major F.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	R = $30	5023 Gurley	painter	No
Fangury, Sanders	yes	male	White	25	Louisiana	R = $30	410 St. Mary	assembler	No
Foreman, J. M.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	O = $16,000	4807 E. Grand	assembler	No
Gilbert, Bill C.	yes	male	White	28	Texas	R = $40	4815 Parry	inspector	No
Good, Leb L.	yes	male	White	25	Texas	R = $25	5315 Ashlone	assembler	No
Goode, Leman	yes	male	White	28	Texas	R = $20	1406 Parry	Butler	No
Green, Frank	yes	male	White	40	Texas	O = $4,000	5114 Garland	upholster	No
Green, Harold H.	yes	male	White	29	Tennessee	R =$30	5339 Henderson	assembler	No
Hawkins, Linsley B.	yes	male	White	30	Texas	O = $4,500	5114 Gurley	bookkeeper	No
Fugate, William A.	yes	male	White	35	Texas	R = $35	5200 Lindsley	body builder	No
Hall, Charles	yes	male	White	29	Texas	R =$25	5102 Ashlone	painter	No
Hammond, Sidney H.	yes	male	White	36	Texas	R = $25	2840 Phillips	assembler	Yes
Harrison, Aubry	yes	male	White	25	Texas	R = $32	4811 Gurley	assembler	No
Harrison, Clyde L.	yes	male	White	20	Texas	R =$25	5118 Terry	painter	No
Harper, Thomas	yes	male	White	39	Texas	R = $25	4837 Phillips	checker	Yes
Hughes, Coy H.	yes	male	White	23	Texas	R = $28	4829 Ashlone	assembler	No
Holloway, George S.	yes	male	White	40	Texas	R = $25	[sic] Phillips	assembler	Yes
Johnson, William D.	yes	male	White	34	Ohio	R = $35	4806 Parry	assembler	Yes
Jones, Nobly C.	yes	male	White	27	Texas	R = $25	5015 Garland	Polisher	No
Kilcoyer, Tommy G. N.	yes	male	White	28	Texas	R = $15	5322 Sante Fe Ave	assembler	No
King, Emery M.	yes	male	White	25	Texas	R = $20	[sic]	upholster	No
Kinnard, F. E.	yes	male	White	34	Missouri	O = $2,700	[sic] Phillips	foreman	Yes
Kucher, Edward	yes	male	White	35	Texas	O = $1,800	5010 Ashlone	painter	No
Laprcato, Tony	yes	male	White	40	Italy	O = $4,000	5115 Lindsley	painter	No
Laws, C. Graves	yes	male	White	44	Tennessee	O = $3,000	5312 Ashlone	upholster	No
Lee, Leland G.	yes	male	White	40	Missouri	R = $27	5217 Phillips	laborer	Yes
Martines, Frank	yes	male	White	39	Texas	O =$4,000	5314 Gurley	assembler	Yes
McCaleb, Mason E.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	R = $35	[sic] mary street	laborerman	No
McCollons, Roy A.	yes	male	White	34	Texas	R = $20	5310 Santa Fe Ave	painter	No
McConley, Andrew K.	yes	male	White	34	Texas	R = $15	5308 Ashlone	assembler	No
McCutcheon, Paul	yes	male	White	26	Texas	R = $12	5214 Parry	assembler	No
McGrew, Louis E.	yes	male	White	21	Texas	O = $5,000	4939 Ashlone	assembler	No

DALLAS FORD PLANT WORKERS TAKEN FROM THE 1930 CENSUS

NAME	R/W	M/F	Race	AGE	POB	R/O	Residence	Occupation	Veteran
Minor, Richard W.	yes	male	White	21	Texas	R = $15	5305 Terry	painter	No
More, Gene	yes	female	White	28	Texas	O = $4,500	5110 Gurley	secretary	No
Morris, Everett	yes	male	White	26	Texas	R = $25	5232 Lindsley	body builder	No
Moore, Curtis J.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	[sic]	4920 Garland Ave.	assembler	No
Nibber Joe B.	yes	male	White	21	Texas	boarder	1111 St. Mary	assembler	No
Oliver, James D.	yes	male	White	57	Texas	O = $3,500	5019 Garland	carpenter	No
Noah, George G.	yes	male	White	33	Texas	O = $2,700	[sic] Phillips	inspector	No
Pollard, Elbert K.	yes	male	White	29	Alabama	R = $30	4810 Parry	foreman	No
Porter, Charles C.	yes	male	White	38	US	R = $30	4839 Phillips	assembler	No
Raykendall, Charles	yes	male	White	32	Texas	R = $25	4811 E. Grand	assembler	No
Redding, Norris D.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	R = $25	4944 Ashlone	painter	No
Richey, Ben F.	yes	male	White	25	Texas	O = $4,500	5227 Lindsley	foreman	No
Ridout, Lemmel N.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	R = $40	5015 Garland	accountant	No
Riley, Clyde L.	yes	male	White	23	Texas	boarder	1111 St. Mary	stock clerk	No
Rogers, Hollie B.	yes	male	White	26	Texas	O = $2,700	[sic] Phillips	assembler	No
Rope, George H.	yes	male	White	27	Texas	R = $20	611 Fisthugh	assembler	No
Sachre, Roy C.	yes	male	White	22	Texas	R = $30	4836 Lindsley	stockman	No
Sain, Luther E.	yes	male	White	28	North Carolina	R = $37.50	259 Mary Street	electrican	No
Schansetk, Bennie F.	yes	male	White	43	Texas	R = $25	1012 Henderson	assembler	Yes
Scoggins, William A.	yes	male	White	23	Texas	O = $5,000	4939 Ashlone	assembler	No
Scott, G.	yes	male	White	20	Texas	O =$4,500	5227 Lindsley	upholster	No
Sherman, Drury	yes	male	White	27	Mississippi	R = $37.50	1112 Mary Street	body builder	No
Slanrel, Roy	yes	male	White	29	Texas	R = $20	4940 Ashlone	painter	No
Smith, Dewey W.	yes	male	White	28	Texas	R = $27.50	[sic] Lindsley	foreman	No
Smith, James W.	yes	male	White	37	Texas	R = $35	5110 Lindsley	laborer	No
Speck, Elmer C.	yes	male	White	[sic]	Texas	R = $32.50	5232 Terry	assembler	No
Steele, Earl S.	yes	male	White	30	Texas	R = $30	1112 Mary Street	assembler	No
Taylor, Lonnie	yes	male	White	30	Louisiana	R = $25	5211 Phillips	body maker	No
Tucker, Richard	yes	male	White	22	Texas	R = $27.50	5102 Ashlone	upholster	No
Walker, L. N.	yes	male	White	31	Texas	R = $18	1014 St. Mary	assembler	No
Washburn, George	yes	male	White	36	Texas	O = $4,250	4830 Gurley	assembler	No
Wiley, Cecil L.	yes	male	White	30	Texas	R = $32	5232 Terry	assistant foreman	No
Williams, Carl	yes	male	White	22	Texas	O =$4,000	5119 Phillips	assembler	No
Williams, Gilmer M.	yes	male	White	23	Texas	R = $22.50	4804 Terry	assembler	No

APPENDIX F

DALLAS, TEXAS, IN 1936



Source: 1936 Centennial Map, Historic Maps of Dallas Collection, Dallas Historical Society, Dallas, TX.

APPENDIX G

INDUSTRIAL MAPS OF DALLAS, TEXAS, 1930



Source: 1930s Collection of Dallas Industrial Maps, Dallas Historical Society, Dallas, TX.

APPENDIX H

MAP OF CEMENT CITY AND EAGLE FORD ROAD, 1940



Source: Maxine Holmes and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., *The WPA Dallas Guide and History* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1992), 334.

APPENDIX I

CEMETERY LAYOUT FOR THE TRINITY PORTLAND CEMETERY, CEMENT CITY, TEXAS

Hispanics Buried in El Camposanto de Cemente Grande de la Compania / Trinity Portland Cemetery



Source: Henry Martinez. *Beginnings and Evolution of the Mexican American Hispanic Communities in Dallas County: People, Places, and Folklore* (Ledbetter Neighborhood Association: Alexander M. Troup and Associates, 1998), 67; Document 2000-43 (File 14, Box 2, Cement City Collection, Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington).

APPENDIX J

MAPS OF MEXICO

Map 1: *The Mexican States*



Map 2: *Railroads*



Source: Gonzales, Michael J. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2002), 4 (Map 1), 25 (Map 2).

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Cement City Collection

Texas Labor Archives

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Dallas AFL-CIO Council Records, 1891-1970

Dallas Cotton Mills Time Book

Ford Motor Company, Dallas, Texas, 1937-1971

International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 1934-1970

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