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responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel in the ANP training program; (2) the extent to
which DOD has assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring responsibilities for ANP
training from contractor to USG personnel; and (3) lessons learned from other DOD foreign
police training programs that directly relate to the advantages and disadvantages of using
USG personnel or contractors.
To describe the roles and responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel, we reviewed DOD
and State documents and prior GAO work, as well as USG audit reports by the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, the DOD Inspector General, and the State Inspector General. For the
purposes of this report, "USG personnel" refers to DOD military and civilian personnel
supporting the ANP training program, while "non-USG coalition personnel" refers to personnel
from other coalition countries supporting the ANP training program. We interviewed DOD and
State officials in Washington, D.C.; and Kabul, Khandahar, and Konduz, Afghanistan; and
DynCorp officials in Falls Church, Virginia; and Khandahar and Konduz, Afghanistan.6 We also
visited three ANP training sites in Afghanistan to further develop information found in
documents and provided via interviews. We obtained data on the numbers of USG and non-
USG coalition trainers and mentors, DOD contractor personnel operating under the December
2010 contract, and the location of USG and DOD contractor personnel at NATO ANP training
sites. While we assessed the data's reliability and determined they were sufficient for our
purposes, we did not independently verify this information.
To describe the extent to which DOD assessed (a) the advantages and disadvantages of
using USG or contractor personnel for ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring
responsibilities for ANP training from contractor personnel to USG personnel, we reviewed
relevant contract documents, including DOD's acquisition plan and strategy, statement of
work, and contract performance reports and obtained information from DOD officials in
Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, Afghanistan.
To describe the lessons learned from the execution and oversight of other DOD foreign police
training programs regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or
contractor personnel, we obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in
Afghanistan. We also interviewed two retired USG officials with expertise in U.S. foreign police
training efforts.' In addition, we reviewed several reports on recent U.S. foreign police training
efforts published by research organizations based in Washington, D.C., and by the Center for
Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to February 2012 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
6We also spoke with officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to obtain information on their
roles and responsibilities in the ANP training program. These departments provide mentoring and training in
counternarcotics, customs and border issues, weapons, procedures, crime scene protocols, investigations, crime
scene management, and financial crime.
7We contacted these individuals based on our prior police training work. We used their views to assess the
statements of current DOD officials. These officials may not be the only individuals with relevant information to offer.
GAO-12-293R Afghanistan Security
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