Nuclear Nonproliferation: Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials Page: 12 of 28

                                
regarding the physical security of U.S.-transferred material as the United
States' other nuclear cooperation agreement partner countries.
We also found that physical security concerns are not confined to
countries that have limited infrastructure and resources. The potential
vulnerability of nuclear material at certain facilities in high-income
countries was raised to us by NSC officials. 13 Specifically, we reported
that there may be security vulnerabilities in certain high-income countries,
including three specific high-income countries. For sites in these
countries, GTRI officials told us the U.S. government's strategy is to work
bilaterally with the countries, provide recommendations to improve
physical protection, and follow up as needed.
In our September 2011 report, we found that DOE has taken steps to
improve security at a number of facilities overseas that hold U.S. nuclear
material but faces constraints. DOE's GTRI program removes U.S.
material from vulnerable facilities but can only repatriate materials that
have an approved disposition pathway and meet the program's eligibility
criteria. GTRI officials told us that of the approximately 17,500 kilograms
of HEU exported from the United States, 12,400 kilograms are currently
not eligible for return to the United States. The vast majority of this
amount-about 10,000 kilograms-is currently not eligible for return
because the material does not have an acceptable disposition pathway,
such as permanent disposal or potential reuse. Another 2,000 kilograms
of material is located primarily in the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) member countries and is in use or adequately protected,
according to GTRI officials. 14
As a result, we made several suggestions and recommendations to
improve oversight and accountability. For example, we suggested that
Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of
U.S. weapon-usable nuclear materials overseas. As a separate matter,
we also suggested that Congress consider amending the Atomic Energy
Act if State, working with other U.S. agencies, does not include enhanced
measures regarding physical protection access rights in future and
renewed agreements, so that U.S. interagency physical protection teams
may obtain access when necessary to verify that U.S. nuclear materials
13GAO-11-227.
14EURATOM is composed of the 27 countries of the European Union.

GAO-12-512T

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