Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain Page: 2 of 35
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GAO
HiAccountabity Integrity*Reliability
Highlights
Highlights of GAO-07-360, a report to
congressional committeesWhy GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program-a multinational
acquisition program for the Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and
eight cooperative international
partners-is the Department of
Defense's (DOD) most expensive
aircraft acquisition program. DOD
currently estimates it will spend
$623 billion to develop, procure,
and operate and support the JSF
fleet. The JSF aircraft, which
includes a variant design for each
of the services, represents 90
percent of the remaining planned
investment for DOD's major
tactical aircraft programs. In fiscal
year 2004, the JSF program was
rebaselined to address technical
challenges, cost increases, and
schedule overruns.
This report-the third mandated by
Congess-describes the program's
progress in meeting cost, schedule,
and performance goals since
rebaselining and identifies various
challenges the program will likely
face in meeting these goals in the
future.
GAO is recommending that DOD
limit annual production quantities
to no more than 24 aircraft per year
until each variant's basic flying
qualities have been demonstrated
in flight testing now scheduled in
the 2010 time frame. DOD non-
concurred, believing its current
strategy provides a balance of
technical risk, financial constraints,
and operational needs.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-360.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Michael J.
Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm @ gao.gov.JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Progress Made and Challenges RemainWhat GAO Found
The JSF program has delivered and flown the first development aircraft.
However, cost and schedule goals established in the fiscal year 2004
rebaselined program have not been met. Total JSF program acquisition costs
(through 2027) have increased by $31.6 billion and now DOD will pay 12
percent more per aircraft than expected in 2004. The program has also
experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight test
program, delivery of the first production representative development
aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. Delays in the delivery of
initial development aircraft were driven by incomplete engineering drawings,
changes in design, manufacturing inefficiencies, and parts shortages. Despite
these delays, the program still plans to complete development in 2013,
compressing the amount of time available for flight testing and development
activities. Also, the program projects it will meet all but one key
performance requirement-line of sight communications-that is currently
dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program.
Accurately predicting JSF costs and schedule and ensuring sufficient funding
will likely be key challenges facing the program in the future. JSF continues
to pursue a risky acquisition strategy that concurrently develops and
produces aircraft. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently
transition from development to production, the degree of overlap is
significant on this program. Any changes in design and manufacturing that
require modifications to delivered aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing
processes would result in increased costs and delays in getting capabilities
to the warfighter. Low-rate initial production will begin this year with almost
the entire 7-year flight test program remaining to confirm the aircraft design.
Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within
cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as
expected. The JSF program also faces funding uncertainties as it will
demand unprecedented funding over the next 2 decades-more than $12.6
billion a year on average through 2027.
Overlap of Production Investments and Testing
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cumulative production
investment (in billions of dollars) $0.9 $3.7 $7.4 $13.5 $20.4 $31.0 $41.9
Cumulative aircraft 2 14 30 60 103 185 275Percentage of
flight test program 1%
completed13%
Increasing confidence in investment
35% 56% 77% 98%
More knowledge
gained from flight tests
outcomesSource: DOD data, as of February 2007; GAO analysis and presentation.
United States Government Accountability Office
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United States. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, report, March 15, 2007; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc300971/m1/2/: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.