DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change Page: 2 of 15
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GAO
HiAccountabity IntegrityReliability
Highlights
Highlights of GAO-06-257T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD)
is shepherding a portfolio of major
weapon systems valued at about
$1.3 trillion. How DOD is managing
this investment has been a matter
of concern for some time. Since
1990, GAO has designated DOD's
weapon system acquisitions as a
high-risk area for fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. DOD
has experienced cost overruns,
missed deadlines, performance
shortfalls, and persistent
management problems. In light of
the serious budget pressures facing
the nation, such problems are
especially troubling. GAO has
issued hundreds of reports
addressing broad-based issues,
such as best practices, as well as
reports focusing on individual
acquisitions. These reports have
included many recommendations.
The subcommittee asked GAO to
testify on possible problems with
and improvements to defense
acquisition policy. In doing so, we
highlight the risks of conducting
business as usual and identify some
of the solutions we have found in
successful acquisition programs
and organizations.DOD ACQUISITION OUTCOMES
A Case for ChangeWhat GAO Found
DOD is facing a cascading number of problems in managing its acquisitions.
Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon systems mean DOD
cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended nor can it be relied
on to deliver to the warfighter when promised. Military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming a large share of DOD resources and
causing the department to invest more money sooner than expected to
replace or fix existing weapons. Meanwhile, DOD is intent on transforming
military operations and has its eye on multiple megasystems that are
expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. These costly
conditions are running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal path.
DOD knows what to do to achieve more successful outcomes but finds it
difficult to apply the necessary discipline and controls or assign much-
needed accountability. DOD has written into policy an approach that
emphasizes attaining a certain level of knowledge at critical junctures before
managers agree to invest more money in the next phase of weapon system
development. This knowledge-based approach results in evolutionary-that
is, incremental, manageable, predictable-development and inserts several
controls to help managers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and
performance goals. But DOD is not employing the knowledge-based
approach, discipline is lacking, and business cases are weak.
Persistent practices show a decided lack of restraint. DOD's requirements
process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can
support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly
complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are
approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because
programs are funded annually and departmentwide, cross-portfolio priorities
have not been established, competition for funding continues over time,
forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding
increment rather than delivering capabilities when and as promised.
Improving this condition requires discipline in the requirements and
budgetary processes. Determining who should be held accountable for
deviations and what penalties are needed is crucial. If DOD cannot discipline
itself now to execute programs within fiscal realities, then draconian,
budget-driven decisions may have to be made later.www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-257T.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Katherine V.
Schinasi, 202-512-4841.United States Government Accountability Office
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United States. Government Accountability Office. DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, text, November 15, 2005; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc295117/m1/2/: accessed April 2, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.