Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to Better Control DOD's Acquisition of Services Page: 8 of 23
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well-defined requirements and clearly understood objectives complicates
efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor acquisition
outcomes. Contracts, especially service contracts, often do not have
definitive or realistic requirements at the outset needed to control costs
and facilitate accountability. This situation is illustrated in the following
examples:
* In June 2004, we found that during Iraqi reconstruction efforts, when
requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract
arrangements that introduced risks. We reported that DOD often
authorized contractors to begin work before key terms and conditions,
such as the work to be performed and its projected costs, were fully
defined. In September 2006, we reported that, under this approach,
DOD contracting officials were less likely to remove costs questioned
by auditors if the contractor had incurred these costs before reaching
agreement on the work's scope and prices In one case, the Defense
Contract Audit Agency questioned $84 million in an audit of a task
order for an oil mission. In that case, the contractor did not submit a
proposal until a year after the work was authorized, and DOD and the
contractor did not negotiate the final terms of the contract until more
than a year after the contractor had completed the work. We will issue
a report later this year on DOD's use of undefinitized contract actions.
* In July 2004, we noted that personnel using the Army's Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in Iraq, including those
who may be called upon to write statements of work and prepare
independent government cost estimates, had not always received the
training needed to accomplish their missions.' We noted, for example,
the statement of work required the contractor to provide water for
units within 100 kilometers of designated points but did not indicate
how much water needed to be delivered to each unit or how many
units needed water. Without such information, the contractor may not
be able to determine how to meet the needs of the Army and may take
unnecessary steps to do so. Further, we have reported that contract
customers need to conduct periodic reviews of services provided under
6GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract Management
Challenges, GAO-06-1130T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006); and GAO, Iraq Contract
Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense Contract Audit Agency's Findings, GAO-06-1132
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2006).
7GAO, Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts
Requires Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004).GAO-07-832T
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United States. Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to Better Control DOD's Acquisition of Services, text, May 10, 2007; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc294731/m1/8/: accessed April 24, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.