Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition Environment Page: 2 of 21
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GAO
Accountability. Integrity. Reliability
IHighlights
Highlights of GAO-08-782T, a testimony
before the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the
Department of Defense's (DOD)
management of major weapon
system acquisitions a high risk
area. DOD has taken some action
to improve acquisition outcomes,
but its weapon programs continue
to take longer, cost more, and
deliver fewer capabilities than
originally planned. These persistent
problems-coupled with current
operational demands-have
impelled DOD to work outside of
its traditional acquisition process
to acquire equipment that meet
urgent warfighter needs.
Poor outcomes in DOD's weapon
system programs reverberate
across the entire federal
government. Over the next 5 years,
DOD plans to invest about
$900 billion to develop and procure
weapon systems-the highest level
of investment in two decades.
Every dollar wasted on acquiring
weapon systems is less money
available for other priorities.
This testimony describes DOD's
current weapon system investment
portfolio, the problems that
contribute to cost and schedule
increases, and the potential
impacts of recent legislative
initiatives and DOD actions aimed
at improving outcomes. It also
provides some observations about
what is needed for DOD to achieve
lasting reform. The testimony is
drawn from GAO's body of work on
DOD's acquisition, requirements,
and funding processes, as well as
its most recent annual assessment
of selected DOD weapon programs.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-08-782T.
For more information, contact Katherine V.
Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or
schinasik@gao.gov.DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require
Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes
in the Acquisition EnvironmentWhat GAO Found
DOD's portfolio of weapon system programs has grown at a pace that far
exceeds available resources. From 1992 to 2007, the estimated acquisition
costs remaining for major weapons programs increased almost 120 percent,
while the annual funding provided for these programs only increased 57
percent. Current programs are experiencing, on average, a 21-month delay in
delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter-often forcing DOD to spend
additional funds on maintaining legacy systems.
Systemic problems both at the strategic and at the program level underlie cost
growth and schedule delays. At the strategic level, DOD's processes for
identifying warfighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and
procuring weapon systems-which together define DOD's overall weapon
system investment strategy-are fragmented and broken. At the program
level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge
about system requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking such
knowledge, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic,
exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost
growth and schedule delays. At the same time, frequent turnover of program
managers and an increased reliance on contractors increases the
government's risk of losing accountability.
Recognizing the need for more discipline and accountability in the acquisition
process, Congress recently enacted legislation part of which requires decision-
makers to certify that programs meet specific criteria at key decision points
early in the acquisition process. Likewise, DOD has recently begun to develop
several initiatives that are based in part on congressional direction and GAO
recommendations. If adopted and implemented properly, these measures
could provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced investment
strategy, sound business cases for major weapon system acquisition
programs, and a better chance to spend resources wisely.
While legislation and policy revisions can help guide change, DOD must begin
making better choices that reflect joint capability needs and match
requirements with resources or the department will continue to
experience poor acquisition outcomes. DOD investment decisions continue
to be dictated by the services who propose programs that overpromise
capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start
and sustain development programs. The transitory nature of leadership
further undermines successful reform. To better ensure warfighter
capabilities are delivered when needed and as promised, incentives must
encourage a disciplined, knowledge-based approach, and a true partnership
with shared goals must be developed among the department, the military
services, the Congress, and the defense industry.United States Government Accountability Office
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United States. Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition Environment, text, June 3, 2008; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc292067/m1/2/: accessed April 19, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.