Is the Road to Hell Paved with Good Intentions?

The Effect of U.S Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy on Human Rights

Rhonda L. Callaway B.A., M.A.

Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 11, 2001

APPROVED:

Dr. Steven C. Poe, Major Professor
Dr. David Leblang, Major Professor
Dr. R. Kenneth Godwin, Committee Member
Dr. James Meernik, Committee Member and Chair of Graduate Studies in Political Science
Dr. Harold D. Clarke, Committee Member and Chair of the Department/Division of Political Science
Dr. Warren W. Burggren, Dean of the College/School of Arts and Sciences
C. Neal Tate, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of Graduate Studies

Callaway, Rhonda L., Is the Road to Hell Paved with Good Intentions? The Effect of U.S. Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy on Human Rights. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), August 2001, 254 pp., 31 tables, 18 illustrations, 198 titles.

Theories in the international political economy literature, economic liberalism and dependency, are explored in order to test the effect of U.S. aid, trade, and investment on human rights conditions in recipient states. Two measures of human rights conditions serve as dependent variables: security rights and subsistence rights. The data cover approximately 140 countries from 1976-1996. Pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel corrected standard errors, is employed due to the temporal and spatial characteristics of the data.

The results indicate that foreign assistance and economic policy may not be the best approaches to altering poor human rights practices in the area of security rights. Economic and military aid is negatively associated with levels of security rights, supporting the traditional dependency perspective. While the results from trade and investment are generally in the positive direction, the lack of consistent statistical evidence suggests that increased trade and investment relationships do not dramatically improve security rights. We can conclude, however, that trade and investment fail to have the negative effect on security rights in less developed countries which critics of globalization suggest.

Economic aid has a statistically significant negative effect on subsistence rights, while military aid seems to benefit the human condition in recipient states. However, extreme negative effects on security rights accompany any benefit realized in the area of subsistence rights from military aid. Trade and investment have a positive and statistically significant effect on basic human needs providing support for the liberal perspective. It appears that American businesses and politicians can forge ahead with seemingly self-interested motivations and economic policies as American economic gain ironically serves to benefit the well being of citizens in other states. However, in spite of political rhetoric and even sincere intentions regarding foreign assistance policy, it appears that the road to human rights hell is paved with good intentions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank several people for their continued support during my graduate career. I am thankful for the unwavering support of my parents, as I returned to graduate school not once, but twice. This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and guidance of my dissertation advisors, Dr. Steven C. Poe and Dr. David Leblang. I would also like to thank Dr. Wesley T. Milner for his words of encouragement as well as for sharing much of his data on subsistence rights. Likewise, I would like to thank Dr. Poe and Dr. C Neal Tate for sharing their data on security rights.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The link between human rights and U.S. foreign policy has seldom been as evident as in the recent debate on Capitol Hill regarding the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China. The traditional attempt to tie economic and military assistance to human rights has given way to legislative debates regarding the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment. Proponents of granting China PNTR cite economic benefits to the United States, arguing that the action would advance America's high-tech industry and demonstrate that the United States was not reverting to protectionist policies that failed in the past (Armey 2000). In regards to human rights, the positive impact on China and the Chinese people is also cited: "As information technology spreads in China, it will help the Chinese learn about their government and, more importantly, the world beyond. It will encourage democratic reforms in China and help make China a more free and open society" (Armey 2000). Thus, conservatives in Congress advocate both a national interest, continued economic growth, and a foreign policy interest, that of improving human rights and the development of democratic norms.

Opponents of granting PNTR to China argue that although the U.S. government rhetorically supports the concept of worldwide democracy, the actions of the American business community, as well as of Congress, often contradict the sentiment. As evidence, opponents point to American companies favoring totalitarian countries such as China

over democratizing states for investment (Brown 2000). Additionally, opponents favor connecting trading privileges to human rights conditions. "Shame on us, shame on this Congress, if we give Permanent Most Favored Nation Status trading privileges to the People's Republic of China, a communist government that flies in the face of all human rights, that cares nothing about its workers, that exploits child labor, that uses slave labor, that persecutes Christians, and allows and encourages forced abortions" (Brown 2000). Thus, good foreign policy intentions on the part of critics include preventing trade until human rights conditions improve.

This political exchange echoes the legislative debates heard several decades earlier concerning the allocation and appropriation of foreign assistance. In the 1970s and 1980s, legislators argued whether the United States should consider a state's human rights practices when allocating economic and military aid. The debate resurfaced during the recent discussions regarding granting Colombia a $1.6 billion aid package. Supporters in Congress of the plan cite the domestic drug problem as the primary reason for the need of foreign assistance, however they often resort to human rights and democracy rhetoric for support.

> We have the obligation to at least assist them with some additional fire power with which to fight the druggies who have been using our dollars to buy weapons to fight the people there who are trying to preserve their democracy…Narco-guerrillas, funded by the illicit drug trade, now threaten the oldest democracy in Latin America. The Colombian government has the political will, but not the resources, to combat this threat. Failing to provide U.S. "Supplemental" aid will further weaken Colombia's democratic institutions, jeopardize its fragile economy and undermine its ability to negotiate peace (Souder 2000).

Congressman Souder's urging was accompanied by that of Congressman Ballenger who described a recent FARC attack on a village and argued that this "recent attack should present us with more clear evidence that any further delay…will result in more violence, more attacks, and could threaten the very existence of the Colombian government" (Ballenger 2000a).[1]

Opponents of Plan Colombia in Congress argue that supply side attacks in the war on drugs are and have been fruitless, and funding should be provided for domestic drug treatment programs (Ramstad 2000). In addition, opponents point to the impact of foreign assistance, and in this case military assistance in particular, on human rights. "We have just voted, with essentially no strings attached, to be involved in a military operation in Colombia with the money going for a military operation, to a military that does not lift a finger while these paramilitary death squads go in and massacre innocent people. I say to Senators, Democrats and Republicans, this is no longer Colombia's business. This is our business because we now have provided the money for just such a military, which is complicit, not only in human rights violations…but in the murder of innocent people, including small children" (Wellstone 2000).

With cuts to the foreign assistance program since the end of the Cold War and the ever increasing trends in globalization, this same argument has shifted from the allocation of public, or government, funds to the regulation of private funds, mainly trade and

[1] Congressman Ballenger offered an even more dramatic plea for passage of the Colombian aid package. "Mr. Speaker, in Shakespeare's play *Julius Caesar*, the soothsayer warned Caesar to 'beware of the Ides of March.' Caesar did not listen and Caesar perished. Today, on this Ides of March, I bring my colleagues fair warning. If we do not pass the Colombia aid package, our friends in Colombia could suffer the same fate as Caesar and our own children could be next" (2000b).

investment. This scenario begs the question, is there any merit to the arguments presented by proponents of granting China PNTR or to the arguments from those advocating the Colombian aid package? In other words, is there any empirical evidence to suggest that human rights conditions are improved by the infusion of international capital and goods, or even foreign assistance for that matter? Or, is the road to hell paved with good intentions?

While these questions appeal to those interested in human rights policy and U.S. foreign policy, these inquiries also address competing theories found in the field of international relations. First, the neo-liberal perspective suggests that all forms of international capital, whether it be aid, trade, or investment, are beneficial to all parties. The international economy is a positive sum game whereby all participants can experience improvements in wealth and development, both of which contribute to improvements in human rights conditions. Dependency theorists and critics of globalization, on the other hand, contend that the flow of international capital and goods, including foreign assistance, is self-serving to the donor regime at the expense of the recipient regime, particularly the underdeveloped Global South. Thus, aid, trade, and investment dollars from the United States are merely economic and political tools aimed at perpetuating the development and wealth gaps between developed and less developed states. Reliance on aid, trade, and investment inhibits both economic and political growth necessary for the improvements in human rights conditions.

While most academic research examines human rights as a determinant or factor in foreign and economic policy decisions, this research focuses on the consequences of foreign policy decisions. Specifically, this research investigates whether U.S. aid, trade,

or direct foreign investment affects human rights conditions. Additionally, this research addresses the results of the empirical findings in the context of the implications for U.S. foreign policy. For example, findings that foreign aid has a negative effect on human rights conditions would suggest that policy makers should consider this when making decisions such as the recent Colombian aid package, assuming human rights is a concern. Likewise, if the results indicate that trade and investment are related to improvements in human rights, then policies aimed at reducing these relationships due to poor human rights records may be misguided. These and other scenarios are explored in connection with the empirical results.

Significance of Study

The majority of the published research on human rights and foreign policy examines human rights conditions as a determinant in foreign policy decisions, particularly the allocation of foreign aid.[2] Very little research examines the impact of U.S. foreign policies, particularly those relating to the allocation of foreign assistance or economic factors of globalization, on human rights conditions (Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1998, 1999). This research will address this deficiency in the understanding of the consequences of U.S. policy making.

In addition, the present research will contribute to the existing research on the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and human rights in several ways. Focusing on the influence of the United States is significant because that country was the leader in the post-World War II era and advocated the liberal capitalist ideology necessary for the

[2] See Schoultz 1980; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquerello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Poe et al. 1994; Blanton 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995; Apodaca and Stohl 1999.

emerging globalization that took place. In addition, the United States was the major western country in the Cold War era that impacted the nature and degree of foreign assistance, particularly in the allocation of foreign aid to nations of the South.

Also, this research is the first to combine U.S. aid, trade and investment in one analysis. The relationship between aid and human rights is examined first, followed by an analysis of the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment. The last chapter offers an integrated model that includes economic aid, military aid, trade openness, direct foreign investment, and a variety of economic, political, and cultural/social control variables. In contrast with the aid and investment literature, a larger sample of countries is examined.[3]

Two different measures will be employed to capture the concept of human rights. The most prevalent research in human rights concentrates on the personal integrity of the person, or security rights (McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). However, the liberal perspective also suggests that increases in economic conditions will improve not only the personal integrity of the individual, but overall living conditions as well.[4] Thus, this research will examine the relationship between aid, trade, and investment from the United States and human rights conditions using two separate concepts of human rights: security rights and subsistence rights.

---

[3] This study includes approximately 140 countries from 1976 through 1996 compared to that of Regan's (1995) use of 32 developing countries in Latin America and Asia, Meyer's (1996, 1998) sample of approximately 50 Third World nations, and Smith et al.'s (1998, 1999) similar sample.

[4] Research addressing subsistence rights or basic human needs include Dixon (1984); Rosh (1986); Spalding (1986); Dixon and Moon (1987); London and Williams (1988); Moon and Dixon (1985, 1992); Moon (1991); Milner (1998); Milner, Poe, and Leblang (1999).

This study employs an improved research design, specifically the use of pooled cross-sectional time series. Regan (1995) does employ pooled cross-sectional analysis in his study of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, but the study is limited in the number of nations included. In addition, the models in the present study include key control variables identified by earlier studies (Poe and Tate 1994) that are omitted in the studies of Meyer (1996, 1998), Smith et al. (1998, 1999), and Regan (1995). This study also takes into account the end of the Cold War which has not been addressed in the human rights literature by previous research, with the exception of Milner (1998). Smith et al. (1998) acknowledge the changes in direct foreign investment due to the end of the Cold War and even call for expanding the time frame used by Meyer (1996).

In addition to the main-effects models of security and subsistence rights, this research investigates the nature of the relationship between each variable of interest and human rights. In other words, the assumption that aid, trade, and investment has a simple linear relationship with human rights is not made; rather, the analysis includes a discussion and an empirical test to determine whether there are, in fact, curvilinear relationships. This is a substantial improvement over the vast majority of the literature on the determinants of human rights, which assumes and tests for only linear relationships (Dixon 1984; Rosh 1986; Spalding 1986; Dixon and Moon 1987; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; London and Williams 1988; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1999; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Milner 1998; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Blanton 1999). A second analysis addresses, in a theoretical and empirical fashion, a

possible interaction effect that aid, trade, and investment each has with democracy and wealth, another possibility that is largely left unaddressed by previous research. Thus, several interaction terms are introduced into each model.

Lastly, this research addresses the foreign policy implications associated with each type of economic influence from the United States, that is, aid, trade, and investment. Accounting for the variables that explain human rights abuses or poor living conditions is just the start. Being able to explain how government actions affect human rights allows for better policy prescriptions on the part of academicians.

Organization of the Study

This research on the relationship between U.S. aid, trade, investment and human rights is divided into seven chapters. The next chapter reviews the literature on the determinants of human rights, the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, and the relationship between factors of globalization and human rights. The additional economic, political, and social factors contributing to the realization of both security and subsistence rights are also explored. Lastly, this section offers a critique of the literature, pointing out potential gaps in the literature.

Chapter Three delves into the theories explored in this study. First, the nature of human rights is explored, specifically, the development of security and subsistence rights. This section seeks to address whether there are trade-offs between these rights when it comes to foreign policy. Does the realization of certain types of rights necessarily negate or prevent the realization of other types of rights? Or are rights realized in a simultaneous fashion? In the context of this study, it is logical to assume that aid, trade, and investment are going to influence more than just one type, or subset, of rights. It is

naïve to believe that any country can direct aid or trade or investment to influence only security rights and not subsistence rights. The same money is flowing into the domestic state; it will undoubtedly influence more than one factor in that country.

Second, the nature of foreign assistance is examined within the context of neo-realism. The importance of donor interests in the allocation process of foreign assistance suggests that governments utilize aid programs in a classic *realpolitik* fashion. Are governments, in this case the United States, truly interested in improving conditions in recipient states, or is national security the priority? Are these competing or complementary interests? Ultimately, does the interest or purpose of the donor make a difference in terms of the effect on human rights? The inconsistency of the U.S.' human rights policy suggests that the promotion of human rights, the concerns for economic and social development in poorer nations, and ultimately peace within these regions, are often sacrificed for other concerns, mainly national security. Ruttan (1989), in addressing foreign assistance specifically, suggests that there is an inconsistency between policies based on self-interest and policies based on human needs which may lead to disturbing consequences. One such consequence is the danger that self-interest may be pursued in the name of foreign aid, regardless of the impact on the recipient nations. The question becomes, does this donor interest even matter? Regardless of intent of aid, the United States, or any other donor, has a moral responsibility to ensure that their gain is not at the expense of the recipient's pain, particularly in the area of human rights.

Third, the neo-liberal perspective on the positive effects of globalization, as well as the arguments posed by critics of globalization, are explored in Chapter Three. In practice, it is suggested that private industry, particularly multinational and transnational

corporations, is concerned with such factors as domestic and regional stability, the presence of labor unions, and the domestic infrastructure. It is often argued that MNCs and TNCs will not invest in a state unless certain conditions are met, conditions relating to the respect for political rights (Forsythe 1997; McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999). However, critics suggest that this fact entices host governments to engage in human rights violations in order to attract foreign investment.

The theoretical effects of trade and investment are found in two competing views on the effects of globalization. The opposing views are often interpreted in relation to the extent of the distribution of power, wealth, and development as well as the degree of political and economic struggles over resources (Klak 1998). It is argued, in a neo-liberal vein, that globalization provides for economic development and that all players benefit, in a positive sum game, even the underdeveloped nations of the South. The liberal capitalist ideology and policy from which globalization is derived "represents a country's ticket or passport to the globalizing economy" (Klak 1998, 3) Critics of globalization point to the increasing divide between rich and poor countries, economic inequality within nations, and the decreasing ability of states to develop and control domestic economic institutions (Klak 1988; Thomas and Wilkin 1997; 1999; Coker 1999; Galbraith 1999).

The implications of the effects of globalization on human rights can easily be drawn. Should globalization benefit nations domestically in terms of economic development and democratization, human rights conditions should improve as each of these variables or factors has been found to be important in the realization of human rights. However, if critics are correct, then globalization may have a deleterious effect on human rights in that countries associated with economic inequality, lower levels of

overall economic development, and those with autocratic governments tend to be less respectful of human rights. Critics argue that aspects of globalization, such as trade and investment, simply contribute to all these inequalities in developing states and lead to trade dependent and investment dependent relationships.

In Chapter Four, the two models of the realization of human rights are established. This process includes the development of a security rights and a subsistence rights model. Previous models concentrate primarily on domestic factors, with the exception of international war in the security rights model (Poe and Tate 1994) and the inclusion of trade by Moon (1991). However, research has begun to examine the interaction between international and domestic factors, particularly as they relate to the development of domestic institutions and norms of behavior (Rothgeb 1989, 1990, 1991, 1996; Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1999; Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton 1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Timberlake and Williams 1984; and Kowaleski 1989).

In addition, the derivation of the dependent variables is explained in this chapter. The variable for security rights is designed to capture the level of government abuse of the integrity of the person. Thus, this variable measures a government's propensity to torture, arbitrarily imprison, summarily execute its citizens for political reasons, as well as captures the level of extrajudicial killings and disappearances within a society. The second dependent variable, subsistence rights, is derived from an index measuring infant mortality, life expectancy, and basic literacy levels. It is commonly referred to as the Physical Quality of Life Index (Morris 1979, 1996). This measure is designed to capture the ability of a regime to meet the basic needs of its people.

The variables of interest, U.S. aid, trade, and investment, are defined and the mode of measurement is discussed in Chapter Four. Each variable is reported, in the original data source, in millions of dollars. Simply utilizing the variable in this form distorts the actual influence or relationship between the United States and the recipient state.[5] For example, if state A and state B both receive ten million dollars in aid for a particular year, it would be incorrect to assume an equal influence on each if state A is one of the more developed countries, such as Argentina, whose mean value of GDP is $128,896 million and state B is a smaller, poverty stricken country such as Haiti whose GDP is $1,678 million.[6] Thus, each variable of interest is converted into a percentage of GDP. Since this research is testing competing theories regarding the effect of these variables, the hypotheses regarding the relationship between each of these variables and human rights is presented as competing hypotheses. Summary statistics also are provided showing the differences between a sample of all countries, an OECD sample, and a sample of non-OECD states.

The remaining control variables are categorized as representing either economic, political, or social and cultural factors. The additional economic variables include measures for wealth and economic growth. The political variables in the security model include the level of democracy, the presence of a leftist or a military government, the presence of either a civil or international war, and a variable for the end of the Cold War.

[5] The term recipient is used in this study to refer to those states that receive aid, trade, or investment from the United States. This term is usually used in the context of foreign assistance, however, to avoid any confusion it will encompass trade and investment as well.

[6] A similar comparison can be made using per capita GDP where Argentineans have an average annual income of $4,040, while Haitians survive on approximately $275 per year.

In addition to these political variables, the subsistence model includes two additional variables: the level of military burden and the number of military personnel. The social and cultural variables in the security model include two measures for population, the level of population and population growth, as well as a variable indicating whether the state was colonialized by the British. The subsistence model adds two additional religion variables measuring the presence of Muslim or Buddhism as a state religion.

Lastly, Chapter Four explains the methodology utilized in the study. This study examines (1) the influence of aid, trade, and investment on the *level* of human rights, (2) whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship between these variables and human rights conditions and (3) whether the effect of aid, trade, and investment are moderated by levels of democracy and wealth. There are approximately 140 countries in the sample covering a twenty year time period, 1976-1996. In all three instances, I am interested in the relationship over time and across many nations. As such, pooled cross-sectional time series analysis is the most appropriate design (Stimson 1985; Sayrs 1989; Hicks 1994) and appropriate, sophisticated statistical methodologies will be used.

Chapter Five presents the results of the effects of U.S. foreign assistance on human rights conditions. First, the bivariate relationship between aid and human rights is addressed. Then, the results from the multivariate analyses are presented and discussed. Generally, foreign aid serves as a detriment to human rights. This finding lends support to the arguments presented by dependency theorists and critics of globalization who suggest that elites within the recipient state merely use U.S. dollars to perpetuate their power and terrorize the political opposition. Additional analyses are offered to first assess the nature of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights.

Second, the possibility of interaction effects between aid and democracy and between aid and wealth is pursued. Interaction terms are created and added to the main-effects model in order to empirically test whether the effect of foreign aid is conditioned upon the level of democracy and the level of wealth in recipient states.

Chapter Six presents the effects of economic globalization (i.e., trade and investment) on human rights conditions. As in the case with the foreign assistance chapter, bivariate relationships between these variables are examined, followed by a multivariate analysis. The bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that trade and investment positively and consistently affect subsistence rights, indicating that increases in the level of U.S. trade and investment relationships translate into increases in the level of basic human needs. The effects on security rights are not as consistent and an additional analysis is offered in order to investigate this result. Similar to the analysis in Chapter Five, curvilinear and interaction effects also are explored.

Chapter Seven offers an integrated model combining aid, trade, and investment, as well as the control variables, into one analysis. In addition, this chapter summarizes all of the results of the study and offers suggestions for further research. Implications for U.S. foreign policy are explored, given the empirical results. The combined results suggest that foreign assistance and economic policies are not the optimal means to attempt to alter (i.e., improve) a regime's behavior regarding security rights. Suggestions that foreign aid has the potential to do otherwise are not supported by any empirical results in this study. While the results from trade and investment generally suggest a positive relationship, the substantive results suggest that economic policies do not

drastically alter human rights conditions where the integrity of the individual is concerned.

The results from the subsistence rights model offer more hope for the relationship between economic policy and human rights conditions. While foreign assistance is still, in general, a negative influence, the prospect for trade and investment improving the level of basic human needs is promising. Thus, this research comes to the general conclusion that the U.S. foreign aid program has perpetuated and contributed to poor human rights conditions in recipient states and should not be used, rhetorically or in practice, as a tool to improve human rights. In addressing national security concerns, the United States needs to pursue alternative means of influence. While the allocation of foreign assistance may serve as a valuable national security tool, it does so at the expense of citizens elsewhere. Withholding foreign assistance on the grounds of poor human rights records, however, would be a positive step in the implementation of an U.S. foreign assistance program.

The results from the trade and investment variables are consistent in the analysis using both the entire sample and non-OECD states only. The consequence in this case, at least for subsistence rights, is a positive one. The human condition is improved by U.S. trade and investment. Additionally, trade and investment does not appear to contribute to a state's propensity to violate security rights. The intention of those engaged in trade and investment is that of economic gain and not necessarily improving human rights. American businesses, as well as politicians interested in continuing the pattern of American prosperity, can forge ahead with these seemingly self-interested motivations and economic policies as their economic gain, as Adam Smith and David Ricardo

predicted, serves to benefit living conditions for citizens in other states. On the other hand, in spite of political rhetoric and even sincere intentions on the part of policy makers regarding foreign assistance policy, it appears that the road to hell is paved not only with good intentions, but self-serving intentions as well.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The following chapter provides an overview and critique of the previous research conducted on security and subsistence rights. The first section examines the development of the dependent variable – human rights. Questions such as how researchers define human rights, how the data is gathered and measured, and whether the measurement of human rights reflects the definition are considered. The second section examines the empirical research on the determinants of security and subsistence rights, specifically the economic, political and cultural factors that the literature has identified to be significant in the realization of both security and subsistence rights. The literature examining the effect of foreign assistance, direct investment, and trade is discussed within this section. The last section focuses on the literature addressing the effects of U.S. aid, trade, and investment on human rights conditions.

Determinants of Security and Subsistence Rights

The research on human rights falls primarily into two categories: first, human rights as an independent variable explaining U.S. foreign policy decisions such as the allocation of aid, and, second, human rights as a dependent variable investigating the causes of human rights violations.[1] In the 1980s, researchers began to examine the

[1] For studies utilizing human rights as an independent variable to explain aid allocation see Schoultz 1980; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Poe et al. 1994; Blanton 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995, Apodaca and Stohl 1999.

conditions within nation-states that explained the latter category, that is, the variation in human rights conditions. Specifically, these early studies focused on what would become known as security rights, or those rights that guarantee the right to be free from government torture, imprisonment due to political views, and murder (see Stohl and Carleton 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Blanton 1999). At the same time, a second set of researchers began examining the factors that contribute to a citizen's standard of living, or basic human needs (Dixon 1984; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Dixon and Moon 1987; Moon 1991; Milner 1998). The following sections of Chapter Two examine the process of determining and defining human rights as a dependent variable and discuss the literature that employs such measures.

Human Rights as a Dependent Variable

The first issue facing researchers in the field of human rights has been the definition of the variable itself. Once the definition has been established, several additional issues are relevant, specifically the availability of data and reconciling the data available with a definition and measurement of human rights. Like all studies in political science, the question a researcher wishes to address will determine all other decisions in the research design, including the definition of the dependent variable. For example, if one wishes to ascertain whether wealth influences the level of voting and participation within a state, the researcher might define the dependent variable as political rights. Thus, in the case of human rights, researchers must decide if the question they are asking refers to civil and political rights, personal integrity rights, economic rights, social rights and so on.

These typologies have arisen, in part, from the *Universal Declaration of Rights* (1948), and other international human rights covenants such as the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Eight Protocols* (1950), *The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1951), the *United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights* (1966), the *United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* (1966), and *The Helsinki Agreement* (1975). These agreements outline a wide range of human rights that the international community strives to protect. The selection of which rights to focus on, again, depends on the question being posed in the research.[2]

"[E]ven when one has clearly delineated what is meant by human rights violations, reliable information is often hard to come by" (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 211). The researcher faces the following questions: Where does the data come from? Who gathers it? How reliable and valid are the data? Nations are usually not forthcoming with detailed information regarding any abuses that might occur. Additionally, the quantity and quality of available human rights data lacks consistency across nations and over time (Lopez and Stohl 1992).

The last issue involves reconciling the data and actual measurement with the concept or definition of human rights. In the case of security rights, there seems to be a

[2] There is a debate within the human rights literature regarding the "dichotomy" of civil and political rights on one hand and social and economic rights on the other (Donnelly 1989). Some researchers question whether the latter actually constitute human rights at all (Cranston 1964). This research follows the logic presented by Donnelly, specifically that these rights are related and social and economic rights (in this case a standard of life) are indeed human rights. In addition, this research assumes that there is at least a minimum level of human rights that is considered universal as evidenced by nation-state's signatures on the various international human rights documents and covenants.

consensus that this at least includes torture, false imprisonment, and extrajudicial disappearances and killings. The data available with this type of information come from Amnesty International, State Department Country Reports, as well as professional media sources. This has led to the development of two basic types of measurement: an events-based approach and a standards-based approach. An events-based human rights measure consists of a tabulation of the various categories of abuses over a given period of time. The information regarding the types of abuses is usually gleaned from newspaper sources. For example, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data set provides the number of conflictual and cooperative events for a given country each year. Other examples are the data set gathered by Taylor and Jodice (1983) and the PANDA data set (Bond and Bond 1995).

A standards-based data set, on the other hand, establishes a set of criteria for different levels or rankings for a country. Researchers examine annual reports on human rights conditions, such as Amnesty International and State Department country profiles, and assign a rating for each country given the set of criteria (see Gastil 1980; Carleton and Stohl 1985). As will be seen, a consensus on which method is best is not forthcoming. Adding to the confusion, security rights has appeared in studies as "integrity of the person," "political repression," and "negative sanctions."

Studies focusing on the realization of basic human needs rely primarily on demographic data. Initially, the measure employed by researchers interested in basic human rights needs has been one of wealth, specifically gross national or gross domestic product. The main reason for its use has been availability. Researchers hypothesized that the poorest in a society would eventually realize the benefits from increases in societal

wealth (Milner 1998). Moon (1991) presents several arguments regarding the inadequacies of wealth as a measure of basic human needs. He argues that wealth, in the form of GNP, fails to indicate individual income or consumption. This would be required in order to evaluate a citizen's basic human needs. Second, a measure of GNP fails to account for price fluctuations within and between countries. "In sum, the same income buys very different levels of basic needs fulfillment, even within a single country" (Moon 1991, 21). Third, a measure of GNP does not account for how the income is distributed within a society, particularly among women and children. Lastly, Moon argues that measures of wealth fail to account for the fact that crucial items necessary for basic human needs may simply not be available.

Additional demographic measures have been considered, including indicators of minimum health and nutrition standards, levels of education, adequate water and housing, and necessary sanitation. International organizations and agencies such as the United Nations Development Program, UNESCO, and AID routinely gather such indicators of basic human needs. Many researchers have created composite indices of these basic needs components (Drewnoski and Scott 1966; McGranahan et al. 1972; U.S. National Economic and Social Council). The most prominent and widely used index was developed by Morris (1979). This Physical Quality of Life Index is a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy.

Literature with Human Rights as a Dependent Variable

Security Rights

Research on the realization of either security or subsistence rights has utilized a variety of measures as the dependent variable. As stated above, the measure utilized is

based on the research question posed. For example, is the researcher interested primarily in why governments abuse citizens or why the government is unable to adequately provide for the basic welfare of the citizenry? The literature on human rights, thus far, has focused primarily on two categories of rights: personal integrity or security rights and basic human needs or subsistence rights.

Early studies focused on political and civil rights. One of the initial efforts to codify these types of human rights abuses was the Comparative Survey of Freedom by Gastil (1973). Beginning in 1978, Freedom House published an annual report, *Freedom in the World,* based upon Gastil's criteria. In these surveys, freedom is defined in terms of political rights "that allow people to participate freely and effectively in choosing their leaders or in voting directly on legislation and those civil liberties that guarantee freedoms such as speech, privacy and a fair trial" (Gastil 1980, 4). Each nation receives a rating based on a set of factors contributing to a citizen's civil and political rights. The result is a ranking from 1 to 7. The nations are then divided into three categories: countries with a rating of 1 or 2 are considered "free," a rating from 3 to 5 refers to a "partly free" country, and a 6 or 7 indicates a country that is "not free."

In addition, Gastil (1980) created a scale of political terror which captures "murder, torture, exile, passport restrictions, denial of vocation, ubiquitous presence of police controls, and threats against relatives" (Gastil 1980, 37). This scale provided a set of criteria that captures personal integrity or security rights. This political terror scale has five levels:

Level A — Countries on *Level A* live under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional (though police and prison brutality may occur). Political murders are extremely rare. There is no detention without trial, and laws protect individual and group rights.

Level B — On *Level B* there is a limited amount of imprisonment for non violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional, and psychiatric institutions are not used to silence political opponents. Political murder is rare, or, if present, characteristic of small terrorist organizations.

Level C — On *Level C* there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted. Incarceration in mental hospitals and the involuntary use of strong drugs may supplement imprisonment.

Level D — On *Level D* the practices of Level C are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life in some societies at this level. In others there is large-scale incarceration of ideological opponents in labor camps or reeducation centers. In still others the terror may stem primarily from the arbitrary and capricious manner in which opponents are punished. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Level E — On *Level E* the terrors of Level D have been extended to the whole population, and may result from religious, ethnic, or ideological fanaticism. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. The worst periods of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia characterize countries on Level E (Gastil 1980, 37).

It is with this political terror scale that Carleton and Stohl (1985) developed a one-dimensional ranking of countries. In their study, they employ three separate measures to capture the concept of human rights. One dependent variable is simply the Freedom House civil rights scale mentioned previously. The other two dependent variables are created using the Gastil five-level scale. The country information utilized came from two different sources: the State Department Country Reports and Amnesty International. This

study is significant in that it established the idea that human rights are a one-dimensional phenomenon. Second, it created a data set that was both cross-national and cross-temporal in that it included 59 countries for the years 1977 to 1983. This allowed for inferences to be made about dynamic changes across time. Lastly, this research demonstrated that utilizing different sources of data within the same study provides more robust and reliable findings. The five-level scale developed by Gastil (1980) would be the basis for several additional studies.

Wolpin (1986) creates his own categories for countries using Amnesty International and State Department Country Reports. Three categories are based on the level of violence within a nation: violent, institutional, and minimal. He compares his list with that of Sivard (1983) and any differences in the country list are then resolved by referring to the classification provided by Gastil (1980). This study is restricted to the 105 low-income countries for the years 1973 through 1980.

Park (1987)) uses three separate measures for the concept of human rights in a study of one hundred countries spanning the late 1970s and early 1980s. The exact years and the exact countries are unclear as the author states that not all of the variables of interest are available for each country for every year. The rationale for the broad concept and scope of human rights is to "encompass all three aspects: the political rights of the First World, the social rights of the Second World, and the basic economic rights of the Third World" (Park 1987, 406). Thus, he uses a composite of Gastil's Freedom House Civil and Political Indices, the GINI index, and the Physical Quality of Life Index (Morris 1979). This study is mainly a preliminary examination of the variables with very little theoretical discussions regarding the relationships between them and human rights.

These two studies demonstrate, once again, the use of multiple measures for the dependent variable, a pattern that would continue within the literature.

The literature up to this point utilized a one-dimensional measure for the concept of security rights. Mitchell and McCormick's (1988) dependent variable is actually two dependent variables designed to capture the level of "arbitrary imprisonment" on one hand and "the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners" on the other. "The conceptual justification for this dichotomy was based upon the view that, although arbitrary imprisonment was certainly reprehensible, resort to torture and killing was a distinct, and qualitatively worse, activity" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 484). In order to construct their two-dimensional dependent variable, the authors rely solely on Amnesty International reports from 1985. They cite bias in both the Freedom House and State Department reports as justification for their exclusion. Through correlation tests, they find that their measure of political imprisonment/torture is comparable to other measures of human rights violations. This study sparked a debate within the literature regarding the proper way to measure the various governmental actions that are collectively referred to as security rights.

Referring to disappearances, detention, torture, and political killings as political repression, Henderson (1991, 1993) utilized the Gastil (1980) method of measuring the dependent variable. Similar to Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Henderson relied on only one source of data – the State Department Country Reports. However, to ensure coding validity, the data were compared to Humana's (1986) survey and Amnesty International reports.

Poe and Tate (1994) prefer the one-dimensional approach arguing that "the two dimensions postulated by Mitchell and McCormick stem, in reality, from the one dimension that Stohl and his colleagues tap – that both torture/killing and imprisonment are rooted in a regime's willingness to repress its citizens when they are considered a threat" (Poe and Tate 1994, 855). The authors employ the now familiar five-level coding system using both Amnesty International and State Department Records for the years 1980 to 1987 for 153 countries. These data were expanded to 1994 in a subsequent article (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

Thus far, all of the studies under consideration employed a standard-based measure. Davenport (1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1999) opted for an events-based measure in studies on negative sanctions. This research employs the Taylor and Jodice (1983) measure that tabulates on an annual basis government censorship and restrictions. Davenport argues that this measure is preferable for three reasons. He suggests that these data are more reliable than data on violations of physical integrity rights such as torture, political executions, and false imprisonment. This holds across countries and over time. Second, Davenport argues that the events-based measure provides for more variance in the dependent variable. Lastly, "as the rate of government responsiveness is of interest and not the general amount of restrictiveness/permissiveness allowed by the political system, this measure is much more appropriate than some 'standard-based' measure such as Freedom House or Amnesty International Country reports" (Davenport 1996a, 389). Considering the question Davenport seeks to address is different than the determinants of human rights abuse, this choice of dependent variable may indeed be appropriate.

The latest innovation in measuring security rights is offered by Cingranelli and Richards (1999). Concentrating on physical integrity rights, the authors employ a version of Mokken Scaling Analysis to argue that security rights are a one-dimensional phenomenon. In addition, their analysis suggests that this one scale "provides information not only about the *level* of government respect for physical integrity rights, but also about the *pattern* and *sequence* of government respect for particular physical integrity rights" (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 408). Unfortunately, the data are only available for the years 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996 and for only seventy-nine countries.

Subsistence Rights

Thus far, the studies have focused on what the literature refers to generally as first generation rights. These rights are characterized as those protecting the political, civil, and physical integrity rights of the citizenry. Researchers also have focused on explaining the factors contributing to the basic needs of individuals. Shue (1980) argues that human rights consist of more than just security rights or personal integrity rights. He contends that there are also subsistence rights and the right to liberty. The primary variable employed here has been the Physical Quality of Life Index (hereafter PQLI) (Morris 1979, 1996). Researchers utilizing this variable include Dixon (1984), Moon and Dixon (1985, 1992), Spalding (1986), Rosh (1986), Moon (1991), and Milner (1999).

The use of different dependent variables to capture the concept of human rights suggests that there is not a consensus among researchers and that there are multiple dimensions of the term "human rights", to which no one measure does justice. The present research attempts to provide a more robust finding by employing two different

measures: one designed to capture the concept of the universal right to life and liberty and the second designed to capture those rights most closely identified as basic human needs.

Determinants of Human Rights

Security Rights

Wolpin (1986) offers a study utilizing 105 less-developed countries from 1973-1980. Using only a bivariate analysis, Wolpin (1986) finds that military rule and ethnic fragmentation have a negative impact on human rights. Of particular interest is the finding that military aid is also negatively related to human rights. This result supports arguments presented by dependency theorists and others (Meyer 1998) that foreign aid, especially military aid, serves as a detriment to human rights conditions. In addition, Wolpin (1986) finds that education and literacy have a positive impact on human rights conditions. The major drawback to this study is that it only shows bivariate relationships and offers no causal relationship. Basically, this study offers an exploratory examination of the possible variables that might influence the level of violence perpetuated by the state. It offers little theoretical reasoning for these relationships.

Park (1987) finds that there is a positive relationship between human rights and ethnic diversity, governmental expenditures on welfare, percent of the population that adheres to Christianity, and urbanization. On the other hand, the study found a negative relationship between human rights and governmental expenditures on education and the military and the percent of the population that is Muslim. The limitation of this study is the narrow scope and the simplistic methodology employed. This research is valuable,

however, in that it established various tendencies and correlations among explanatory variables and contributed to the development of human rights models.

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) also attempt to explain the causes of human rights violations by analyzing 123 countries in 1985. The authors look at the level of poverty, economic development, economic dependency including level of trade and investment, the colonial experience, and type of political regime. The authors actually use two dependent variables, one designed to capture the level of "arbitrary imprisonment" and one that measures "the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners." A five-point ordinal scale is then utilized to "provide greater sensitivity to these dimensions" (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 484). They posit three basic hypotheses: (1) that the relationship between wealth and abuse is linear based on the theory posited by Robert McNamara; (2) that the relationship between wealth and abuse is curvilinear based on the theory posited by Samuel Huntington; and (3) the Marxist theory indicates that there is a positive relationship between investment and government repression.

While the authors spend a great deal of time outlining the theoretical arguments regarding the economic variables, they spend little time actually empirically testing the hypotheses. In fact, they place more emphasis on the other variables of interest: British colonialism, age of the regime, and regime type. The control variables in the study include income, trade and population size. In addressing economic explanations for human rights violations, they find that, generally, the more wealthy the nation, the less likely the regime is to engage in either repression dimension, particularly torture and false imprisonment, thereby lending support to the McNamara proposition. However,

McCormick and Mitchell (1988) argue that there is a threshhold effect between wealth and both dimensions of abuse. Lastly, they find a positive relationship between trade and imprisonment.

In regards to the political explanation for abuse, they find that totalitarian regimes tend to imprison their citizens falsely, while authoritarian regimes engage in more violent forms of behavior, particularly murder. Lastly, they find that British colonialism tends to be associated with less imprisonment. While this study marks an improvement over the previous study, both theoretically and in the size of the sample, the authors still rely on a bivariate analysis at one particular period in time and they fail to follow up on the theoretical propositions the offer.

Henderson (1991, 1993) also focuses on political and socioeconomic variables to explain human rights conditions. Henderson utilizes both bivariate and multivariate analysis in his research. However, much like McCormick and Mitchell (1988), he only examines one point in time and thus fails to address or identify any possible dynamic trends in the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. He controls for the level of democracy, economic growth, economic inequality, economic development, investment, and his particular variables of interest, population levels and growth. His dependent variable is state repression derived from the State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights for 1985*.

In analyzing 152 countries for 1985, Henderson finds that there is a positive relationship between physical integrity rights and the level of democracy and economic growth. He finds a negative relationship between the dependent variable and economic inequality, however this finding is suspect at best considering the ten-year gap in the

measure for the dependent and independent variable. The two measures of population have opposite effects on human rights conditions. Population growth has a negative impact on human rights conditions, suggesting that sudden increases in population put a significant strain on resource allocation and the government's ability to provide basic needs.

Up to this point, the research on human rights conditions relied on a simple bivariate or cross-sectional analyses. Poe and Tate (1994) employ a statistical method that allows for both space and time. That is, they examined personal integrity abuse cross-nationally (153 countries) and across time (1980-1987). They first address the issue of the dependent variable. Arguing that State Department records can often be biased, they utilized two separate measures of personal integrity abuse, both based on a five-point ordinal scale: one based on the records of Amnesty International and the other based on the State Department's Country Profiles.

Their list of independent variables includes the level of democracy, economic development and growth, population level and growth, regime type, colonial history, and the involvement in civil or international war. Their results indicate that democracy and economic standing are negatively related to personal integrity abuse, while the size of the population and the involvement in civil and international wars increase the probability of personal integrity abuse. In addition, they identify lagged repression as the strongest indicator of human rights abuses. However, recent research (Achen 2000) suggests that the use of a lagged dependent variable serves to exaggerate or underestimate the coefficients for the variables of interest. Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) expanded the study through 1993. They find several new variables to be statistically significant in their

replication. Specifically, military regimes are positively related to personal integrity abuse, British colonial experience is negatively related to abuse, and leftist governments tend to be less repressive than non-leftist regimes.

A subsequent study focused primarily on the democracy variable, which is the strongest indicator of human rights (Poe and Tate 1996). Using a path model, this analysis enables the researcher to determine direct and indirect influences of the independent variables. The democracy variable is once again the strongest direct indicator of human rights conditions. The only variable that exhibits both direct and indirect influence on human rights is economic development. The size of the population and the existence of civil and international war have only a direct effect on abuse, while population growth, the presence of a military regime and leftist governments exhibit only an indirect influence. The results of this analysis support their earlier findings.

All of the studies, thus far, assume a linear relationship between democracy and human rights abuse. The findings suggest that as the level of democracy increases the level of abuse decreases. Fein (1995) hypothesizes, however, that there is actually a curvilinear relationship between the two variables, a thesis referred to as "more murder in the middle." As democratic rights, such as personal freedoms, spread to more and more individuals, the elites within the society have a greater motive for repression. "Divided elites, inequality, and violent challengers threatening the legitimacy of the current social order impel the governing elite to resort to repression or state terror" (Fein 1995, 173). She further suggests that more abuse occurs in regimes that are in the process of democratization, but still fall short of fully institutionalized democracy. This argument is parallel to the argument regarding economic development posited by Olson (1963) and

Gurr (1968) who assert that it is not the poorest of the poor that tend to revolt in developing societies, but those who have achieved a modicum of economic success. These results indicate that as democratic norms are realized, citizens begin to become more politically aware and active. Thus, citizen demands may increase a regime's tendency to engage in repressive behavior.

Subsistence Rights

Shue (1980) argues that human rights consists of more than just security rights or personal integrity rights. He contends that there are also subsistence rights and the right to liberty as well as security rights and that collectively they constitute "basic rights." Empirical research with subsistence rights, or basic human needs, as the dependent variable concentrates primarily on issues of economic growth and development (Chenery and Strout 1966; Dixon 1984; Dixon and Moon 1987; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Rosh 1986; Moon 1991; Milner 1998). Additional research on the connection between forms of monetary flow and basic human needs focuses on the concept of dependency and military assistance (Hartman and Walters 1985) and food assistance (Vengroff and Tsai 1982; Nortin, Ortiz, and Pardey 1992).

The primary dependent variable utilized in the study of subsistence rights is Morris' (1979, 1996) Physical Quality of Life Index. For example, Dixon (1984) examines the influence of economic growth and the concentration of trade on basic human needs by analyzing 72 countries over a twenty-year period, 1960 to 1980. His primary interest is determining the rate of improvement in this index, otherwise known as the Disparity Reduction Rate, a derivative of the PQLI calculated by taking the average

annual change in the PQLI. Dixon (1984) finds that trade concentration, as a measure of dependency, has little impact on the provision of basic human needs.

Similar to the literature on personal integrity abuse, Moon and Dixon (1985) add political variables to an economic model of basic human needs (Physical Quality of Life Index). These variables include the level of democracy, ideology of the elites, and a measure for state strength. Controlling for wealth, Moon and Dixon (1985) find that both democracy and leftist ideology have a positive influence on the provision of basic human needs, supporting the liberal position. State strength, as measured by government expenditures and elites adhering to rightist norms, however, have a deleterious effect on the provision of basic human needs. They conclude that the political attributes of a state matter when explaining the provision of basic human rights. This study is important in the development of basic needs models in that it recognizes that political factors, not just economic factors, contribute to the state's ability to provide subsistence needs.

Spalding (1986), again utilizing the Physical Quality of Life Index as the dependent variable for "well-being." includes measures designed to capture a regime's democratic structure, rights and liberties, health expenditures, energy consumption, degree of capitalism, industrial production, proportion of labor in industrial and service sectors, and wealth as independent variables. Spalding (1986) finds that wealth is the most powerful explanation for well-being, however capitalism has little, if any, explanatory power. Thus, private ownership of the means of production does not serve to improve human rights conditions in less-developed countries. In addition, rapid development was found to have a deleterious effect on well-being, lending support to the

thesis posited by Olson (1963). Lastly, similar to most other studies on human rights, Spalding (1986) finds democracy to be significantly and positively related to well-being.

Moon and Dixon (1985) build upon their previous research by examining military factors that influence the provision of basic human needs. After controlling for the economic and political variables used in their previous work, they add three variables designed to measure the defense burden on society, the extent of military participation in society, and whether the military controls the ruling regime. Military spending is found to inhibit a regime's ability to provide for basic human needs while m
ilitary participation, as measured by military manpower, has a positive influence. Military control of the government has no discernible impact on the ability of a regime to provide for basic human needs. However, Rosh (1986) finds contradictory evidence in a similar study examining the relationship between military expenditures and subsistence rights. He finds that the military burden on society and even the economic variable, per capita GNP, to have little effect on the provision of basic human needs.

Moon (1991) provides the most comprehensive study to date on subsistence rights. He develops a model that includes the previous economic and military variables and adds the following: percent of labor in agriculture, British colonial experience, dependency, socialist influence, years of independence, the level of mineral exports, Buddhism and Islam. He finds most of the variables to be statistically significant with the measure for agricultural labor, military expenditures, dependency, and the influence of Islam to be negatively related to subsistence rights. On the other hand, the degree of democratization, socialist influence, wealth, and the influence of the British and Buddhism to be positively related to basic human needs. This study established key

economic, political, and social variables that are important in the realization of basic human needs.

Foreign Assistance, Trade, Investment and Human Rights

Of interest to this particular study is the fact that researchers have begun to examine monetary factors and their relationship to human rights conditions. That is, research has begun to examine the effect of foreign aid (Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998, Smith et al. 1998, 1999), direct foreign investment (Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1998; Rothgeb 1990, 1991, 1996), and trade (Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton 1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Alfatooni and Allen 1991; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Timberlake and Williams 1984; Kowalewski 1989; Rothgeb 1989; Barbieri and Davenport 1997) on not only human rights abuse but on domestic conflict as well. Conflicting results from these studies suggest that further inquiry into the relationship between monetary flows and human rights conditions is warranted.

Regan (1995) addresses, in an empirical fashion, the impact of foreign aid on human rights practices. He explores the relationship between U.S. economic aid and human rights during the Carter and Reagan administrations. As his sample, Regan uses 32 countries in Latin America and Asia that received most of the foreign assistance granted by the U.S.. In addition, Regan includes nations that received little or no aid during the same time period as a control group. Controlling for population, democracy, economic development, and the number of military personnel, Regan finds that although the variable for economic aid is statistically significant, substantively the changes in repression due to changes in aid are negligible. He argues that aid is just one

> part of the signal that is sent to the recipients of U.S. assistance and that those searching for mechanisms with which to manipulate human rights practices should focus on the entire range of bilateral interactions… [F]oreign aid can be used to foster economic development, alleviate the suffering from national disasters, promote bilateral cooperation, and reward allies for previous compliant behavior. But the evidence… suggests that aid is not very effective at altering the repressive behavior of recipient states" (Regan 1995, 624).

He also finds that democracy and the level of population have no discernible impact on human rights practices, contrary to previous findings (Poe and Tate 1994, 1996; Henderson 1991, 1993). His study lacks a broad sample, choosing to concentrate on Latin America and Asia, thereby leaving out less-developed countries in Africa.

Meyer's (1996) primary interest is the relationship between human rights and multinational corporations, but he also includes U.S. economic aid in his model. His fully specified model, which he tests on five different measures of human rights (civil liberties, political rights, and the three components of the Physical Quality of Life Index) includes GNP, direct foreign investment, U.S. economic aid, and debt. He finds a positive relationship between investment (or the presence of MNCs) and civil and political rights in the Third World, thus lending support to the neoliberal perspective. He also finds a positive relationship between U.S. economic aid and first generation rights. These findings remain relatively constant over the various dependent variables. The drawback of this research is that it is limited in the number of countries, fifty less developed countries, and the lack of control variables found to be important in previous research in the realization of human rights.

In a response to Meyer (1996), Smith et al. (1998, 1999) argue that the Western emphasis on the importance of economic development as a cure-all for abusive regimes

has been overstated. They contend that transnational corporations are motivated by economic concerns, to the general exclusion of human rights. They criticize Meyer's (1986) analysis based on the measure of the dependent variable, the inclusion of only U.S. direct foreign investment, and the exclusion of the impact of the Cold War on human rights conditions. They attempt to replicate Meyer's (1996) analysis substituting the Poe and Tate (1994) measure of personal integrity abuse for Meyer's Freedom House measure and total world direct foreign investment for U.S. direct foreign investment. Smith et al. (1998, 1999) could not reproduce the results for either U.S. economic aid or direct foreign investment and ultimately argue that the neoliberal position falsely works to negate the need for international regulators and institutions to monitor human rights. Meyer's (1996, 1998) results on aid and investment support the liberal perspective, while Smith et al.'s (1998, 1999) results suggest that the liberal perspective is overstated and the reliance on economic factors to improve the human condition is unrealistic.

Additional studies in the international political economy literature have examined the effects of foreign investment, as well as international trade, on conflictual/cooperative relations between countries (Polachek 1980; Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; Gasiorowski 1986; Pollins 1989a, 1989b; Reuveny and Kang 1996, 1998; Sayrs 1990). Of more interest here, however, is that research has begun to examine the effect of international economic factors on domestic sources of violence, which in turn may lead to further state repression and abuse (Rothgeb 1990, 1991, 1996; Snyder 1978; Rogowski 1987; Zimmermann 1993). However, these studies fail to address human rights violations directly.

Nonetheless, the theories and arguments presented in this strand of literature easily lend themselves to human rights. The factors that influence political violence and state repression are undoubtedly closely related. Rothgeb (1991) argues that "all types of foreign investment tend to play a role as a missing factor of production in very poor societies, and the end product is less political protest and an inclination toward a respite from political turmoil" (Rothgeb 1991, 728).

The literature on the relationship between trade and human rights focuses primarily on measures of state repression, or negative sanctions, and are motivated by dependency and world systems theory. Timberlake and Williams (1984) utilize the Taylor and Jodice (1983) measure for negative sanctions as their dependent variable. They test the hypothesis from dependency/world systems theory that increases in foreign penetration of capital in peripheral nations lead to a decrease in nonelite participation and an increase in government repression. In an analysis of 72 countries, they find only weak support for the first part of the hypothesis, that increased investment leads to a decrease in political participation on the part of nonelites. They find no direct effects of dependence on repression, but some evidence of indirect effects through investments effect on political exclusion.

Ziegenhagen (1986) and Pion-Berlin (1989) find a positive relationship between trade dependency and state repression. The former uses the Taylor and Jodice (1983) measure for negative sanctions and measures trade dependency by the degree of trade concentration in various export categories. Pion-Berlin (1989) includes two sources of information for the dependent variable: first, the *New York Times* Index which is used to count individual incidences of state repression and Amnesty International reports of

abuse. As the independent variable, Pion-Berlin (1989) uses international trade agreements as a proxy for dependency, which is suspect and unconvincing as it is difficult to establish dependency based upon trade agreements alone. The actual amount of exports and imports, as well as the unevenness of the trade relationship is necessary to determine the extent of trade dependency.

Carleton (1989), examining only Latin American countries, finds similar results to Ziegenhagen (1986) and Pion-Berlin (1989) substituting Freedom House measures for the dependent variable and percentage of exports made of manufactured goods for trade dependency. Carleton (1989) is concerned with a new twist to the traditional international division of labor. He argues that a new division of labor is emerging, namely the laborers in the Third World engaged in the manufacturing portion of MNC production processes. Carleton (1989) theorizes that states will engage in repressive behavior to maintain a political and economic environment that is attractive to MNCs. He finds that increases in manufacturing investment and the pursuit of export-oriented industrialization are associated with higher levels of state repression.

Rothgeb (1989) conducts a cross-national study of 84 underdeveloped countries and tests whether foreign investment, as measured by stocks and flows of manufacturing and mining, is related to various forms of political conflict, including repression. He finds that higher levels of investment in manufacturing are associated, over time, with less repression. He concludes that foreign investment does not drain resources or stifle domestic growth as dependency theorists argue. In addition, he argues that international investment works to integrate the host nation into the international arena. "Such integration leads to greater awareness of international standards and creates a greater

desire for conformity so that a government's domestic behavior will not become a barrier to the expansion of international contacts and opportunities" (Rothgeb 1989, 119). This finding falls into line with the theories posited by neoliberal proponents of the positive consequences of international trade and investment.

Kowalewski (1989) analyzes state repression from a very different perspective, that of labor actions taken against transnational enterprises in underdeveloped Asian countries. From the dependency perspective, underdeveloped states will more likely favor and support the TNE over workers in labor disputes. Thus, Kowalewski (1989) measures state repression in terms of labor repression (firings, injuries, detentions, and coerced terminations). The results on the relationship are mixed. Some state officials do tend to side with the TNE, thus Kowalewski concludes that labor repression does occur.

Davenport (1995b, 1996) concentrates on negative sanctions (Taylor and Jodice 1983) and finds a positive relationship between trade dependency and state repression. His measure for trade dependency is similar to Ziegenhagen's (1986), trade concentration in export categories. However, Davenport's (1995b, 1996) studies include a much greater number of observations and more sophisticated methodology.

Conclusion

In summary, the research on personal integrity rights and subsistence rights has identified conditions within nations that collectively explain why regimes abuse its citizens. These conditions, or determinants, can be placed into three categories: economic, political, and social. The economic determinants of the realization of security and subsistence rights include domestic economic development, or wealth, (McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Spalding 1986; Mitchell and McCormick

1988; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and economic growth (Olson 1963; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

International economic factors, the subject of this research, provide far more mixed results. There is no consensus on the effects of foreign aid on recipient states (Regan 1985; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1999). The results of previous research on trade and investment are also inconclusive: several results support the dependency perspective which posits that repression is increased due to trade-dependency (Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton 1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Alfatooni and Allen 1991; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) while others find no relationship between trade-dependency and repression (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Kowalewski 1989; Rothgeb 1989; Henderson 1996).[3] Due to the conflicting results from this research, a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of trade on human rights conditions is warranted. At this juncture, there are no studies that examine, in a comprehensive fashion, the relationship between all three types of financial flows from the U.S. and human rights conditions in the recipient nation.

The political determinants of the realization of human rights include past levels of abuse (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 1996a), the level of democracy (Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the existence of a leftist government (Moon and Dixon 1986; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999), military burden (Moon 1991), religion (Moon 1991),

[3] Examining the relationship from a liberal perspective, Barbieri and Davenport (1997) find qualified support for both the liberal and dependency perspectives depending on the time period and on how the dependent variable is operationalized.

involvement in either civil or international wars (Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1998), and the impact of the Cold War (Smith et al. 1998, 1999; Milner 1999).

Lastly, several social variables are important in the realization of human rights. These include the level of population and population growth (Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), history of British colonialism (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999) and the presence of certain forms of state religion (Moon 1991).

CHAPTER THREE

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Introduction

This chapter examines the theoretical arguments regarding human rights and American foreign policy. The concept of human rights – its definition, scope, and nature – must first be established in order to proceed to the question of improving the realization of such rights. Of particular interest is the development and establishment of security and subsistence rights within the literature and within American foreign policy. The second section addresses the rationale for interest in human rights in the United States. This includes a discussion of the evolution of the United States as the hegemon following World War II and its reluctant leadership in the area of human rights. The relationship of human rights policy to other policies of national interest is discussed and examined, as the former has traditionally taken a back seat to the latter.

The third section examines the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and human rights. First, the positive and negative arguments for the justification of the allocation of aid are presented. The question of why regimes allocate foreign assistance may give an indication as to the expected results of that allocation. Then, the positive and negative arguments regarding the effects of such aid are offered. Competing theories grounded in neo-liberalism and dependency provide very different views on how recipient regimes are affected by the allocation of foreign assistance. The fourth section presents theories associated with economic globalization, specifically those arguments relating to the effects or consequences of international trade

and investment on domestic conditions. The last section of Chapter Three concludes the chapter.

The Nature of Human Rights

The human rights debate includes such questions as whether universal or basic human rights exist and whether cultural, collective, group, and environmental rights should be included in the formation of a standard definition of human rights (Cranston 1964, 1973; Shue 1980; Donnelly 1984, 1989, 1994; Howard 1983). While it is not the purpose of this research to debate the specific nature of human rights, it is important to understand how nation-states view human rights, particularly in light of their foreign policies. This research assumes that governments recognize that there are internationally accepted human rights. This assumption is based, in part, on the wording of the preamble of the U.N. Charter which calls for the organization to "achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" (U.N. Charter, Article 1, paragraph 3). In addition, the assumption is supported by the fact that this charter has been signed by nearly every country of the world.

There are at least three areas of debate, pertinent to this research, within the literature regarding the nature of human rights and the impact of human rights on American foreign policy. The first debate lies within the actual definition of rights. Cranston (1973, 7) suggests that human rights are something that pertains to all men at all times; "they are rights which belong to a man simply because he is a man". Donnelly (1989, 12) concurs, stating that "[h]uman rights are a special class of rights, the rights

that one has simply because one is a human being." Similarly, Vincent (1986, 13) contends that "human rights are the rights that everyone has, and everyone equally, by virtue of their very humanity. They are grounded in an appeal to our human nature." Yet, disagreement emerges when one is asked for specificity. For example, Cranston (1964, 40) posits that the traditional rights to life, liberty, and property are "universal, paramount, categorical rights." However, he continues stating that economic and social rights are emphatically not universal and in fact "belong to a different logical category" (Cranston 1964, 54). Donnelly (1989) disagrees and suggests that civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other are interdependent, that is, they are realized together and cannot easily be separated into categories of human rights and non-human rights.

When the United States refers to human rights in the context of foreign policy, what rights are they referring to? Perhaps the best source for how the United States actually defines human rights is found in a speech by Cyrus Vance, secretary of state during the Carter administration, on Law Day before the University of Georgia's Law School, April 30, 1977.[1] Vance states:

> Our human rights policy must be understood in order to be effective…Our concern for human rights is built upon ancient values. It looks with hope to a world in which liberty is not just a great cause, but the common condition. In the past, it may have seemed sufficient to put our name to international documents that spoke loftily of human rights. That is not enough. We will go to work, alongside other people and governments, to protect and enhance the dignity of the individual.
>
> Let me define what we mean by "human rights." First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or

[1] This speech is important as Carter's presidency ushered in a new era in U.S. human rights policy.

> punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair public trial, and invasion of the home.
>
> Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the state of a nation's economic development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a Government's action or inaction which diverts resources to an elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference to the plight of the poor.
>
> Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement both within and outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government.
>
> Our policy is to promote all these rights. They are all recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the United States helped to fashion and which the United Nations approved in 1948. There may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve. I believe that, with work, all of these rights can become complementary and mutually reinforcing (Vance 1977).

Interpreting these remarks, one might conclude that the United States places an emphasis, at least rhetorically and theoretically, on security rights, political and civil rights, as well as what Shue (1980) refers to as subsistence rights. However, the priority in American foreign policy has been on the first two, while there has been a lack of emphasis on subsistence rights.[2] Differences in countries' human rights priorities emerge as states attempt to clarify exactly what constitutes human rights. For example, certain non-Western religious and cultural practices such as female genital mutilation rituals in Africa

[2] The United States does engage in a variety of programs aimed at improving subsistence rights; however, in foreign policy diplomacy, which includes debates and negotiations regarding human rights, the emphasis is on civil and political rights, as well as security rights.

and "honor killings" in Islamic culture are deemed human rights violations in the West.[3] In addition, non-Western countries place an emphasis on collective and group rights while individual rights and liberties are emphasized in the West. This leads to the second debate regarding the nature of human rights.

The next debate relevant to this research is the one between cultural relativism and universalism. Specifically, do universal rights exist? The adoption of the U.N. Charter as well as the adoption of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights suggests that there is an internationally accepted minimal standard of human rights. While the passage of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights binds the states of the world together and seeks to address human rights under one umbrella, it does so only in a political and moral way. The legal weight that the declaration carries is not a heavy one (Cassese 1990). The Third World is quick to criticize the universality of human rights arguing that the Third World countries had little input into the drafting of the document due to the colonial status at the time of passage. In addition, the developing states contend that the rights outlined in the declaration are ethnocentric reflecting Western conceptions of human rights and omitting non-Western views on human rights.

Lastly, critics contend that too much emphasis is placed on the rights of the individual at the expense of the rights of groups and collectivities which are more predominant in the developing world (Baehr 1994). The United States has signaled,

[3] An "honor killing" refers to the murder of women in Islamic states for the crimes of adultery and other sexual offenses. According to a position paper sponsored by the Muslim Women's League, "women who bring dishonor to their families because of sexual indiscretions are forced to pay a terrible price at the hands of male family members. Attempted murder and other forms of corporal punishment have been reported. The most severe manifestations of punishment affect only a small percentage of women, even though the notion of family honor and shame is extremely important in most communities of the Muslim world." The position paper is available online at http://www.mwlusa.org/pub_hk.shtml.

through the passage of the *International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights* (1976), that the types of rights they deem as universal include civil and political rights and those rights referred to as security rights. The U.S. Senate has failed to support any other international human rights documents, including the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1976). This signals to the international community that the United States does not want to be held accountable or responsible for the provision of these types of rights. This last critique leads to the next debate within the human rights literature, that is, what types of rights are addressed in foreign policy decisions.

A third and final debate involves the role of human rights in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy, specifically, which rights governments focus on in the formulation of foreign policy. In the United States, the focus is on political, civil, and property rights of individual citizens. The origins of these rights as they apply to citizens within states, at least in the Western context, can be traced to the Virginia Bill of Rights (1776) that was incorporated into the U.S. Constitution in 1791 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 (Baehr 1994). Individual rights and liberties are laid out, primarily derived from the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. These include the right to life, liberty, and property as well as the right not to be tortured or falsely imprisoned by one's government. These have evolved into what are referred to as political, civil and security rights, or first generation rights. It is these rights on which U.S. statesmen, tend to focus their foreign policy. In addition, the violations of these types of rights also tend to be the focus of the media and NGOs.

In the international arena, human rights have been codified in a variety of treaties and resolutions. The protection of the so-called "first generation rights" is found in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1976), *The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1951), and *The Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (1975), among others. These documents attempt to protect the civil and political rights, as well as the physical integrity rights, of citizens throughout the world.

The international community also has recognized the need to go beyond these "first generation" rights and address additional types of "basic rights." These are codified in such documents as the *Helinski Agreement* (1975), the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* (1976), the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (1979), and the *United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development* (1986). These documents seek to address the economic, social, and cultural rights of citizens. These types of rights are seemingly more difficult to realize as they require fundamental structural changes within a society.

In attempting to use foreign policy tools to alter regime behavior (mostly Third World regime behavior), the American government has adopted a predominantly western view of human rights, specifically that certain security rights are "universal." Foreign policies based on these types of rights are quite straightforward and easily lend themselves to the carrot-and-stick approach to foreign policy. For example, the message may be, stop abusing the security and political rights of citizens and the United States

will commence trading relationships or conversely, the message might be if abuse continues the United States, and perhaps the rest of the international community, will impose economic sanctions.

In addition, the United States has placed an emphasis on the development of basic human needs as evident in declarations of Cyrus Vance as well as the formation of such aid programs as Food for Peace, the Improved Maternal and Newborn Survival Program, Child Survival Program, and the Achieving Broad-Based Economic Growth Program.[4] Foreign policies regarding these types of human rights conditions are not nearly as straightforward as security rights. Solving these types of problems requires long-term commitments, continued engagement and innovative prescriptions, in other words, foreign policies that don't fit neatly into the carrot-and-stick approach. However, the utilization of foreign assistance, trade, and investment as policy tools does signal the U.S' interest in promoting a wide range of human rights.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights

The United States has long advocated the neo-liberal position of social and political advancement through economic means, particularly regarding less-developed nations. Eberstadt (1988) argues that it is the United States' responsibility to use all of its power (including financial power) to maintain and encourage the liberal international economic order. The ultimate foreign policy goal, at least rhetorically, is the development of democratic nations, free of domestic violence and human rights abuses, and friendly to the United States.

[4] For additional lists of current U.S. Agency for International Development programs see their website at http://www.usaid.gov/

The United States' leadership role in international affairs is relatively new, emerging as the world's economic and political leader after World War II. This occurrence came after its unwillingness to assume hegemonic responsibility after World War I and the subsequent economic and political chaos of the interwar period. The economic, political, and social destruction caused by World War II and the expansionary motives of the USSR left the United States with no other perceived option than to shoulder most of the responsibility of postwar rebuilding. The U.S.' tool in attempting to achieve the goals of economic, political, and social development, it can be argued, was a monetary one. For example, rebuilding Europe was funded first with massive amounts of economic aid and later with American investments; fledgling democracies were bolstered with both economic and military aid; and the United States attempted to alleviate poor living conditions with varying forms of humanitarian aid. The United States initiated and managed the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, which was designed to help Europe recover economically. In fact, in 1947 the plan provided $497 million in reconstruction loans while, in 1952, the plan allocated over $13 billion dollars, 89% of which went to the European states. Non-European recipients were Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Turkey, for obvious geopolitical concerns (Brown 1953) .

At the same time, the Truman Doctrine formulated a national security policy of containment based partially on the allocation and distribution of military and economic aid to weak nations susceptible to Soviet aggression. Thus, foreign aid granted to Europe, and eventually Latin America and Asia, was primarily a strategic strategy aimed at containing communism and maintaining America's national security with little concern for human rights. "The Soviet Union's threat to the West's position of dominance in the

developing world led the United States for the first time to conclude that economic assistance to the South could be a powerful tool in the Cold War." (Spero and Hart 1997, 169). Thus, it is safe to suggest that foreign assistance served as a valuable "carrot" to attract client-states in the East-West geopolitical struggle. At the same time, the United States was dedicated to the development of democratic states and a free market economy, at least rhetorically, particularly in response to the spread of communism and the rise of demand economies.

The aftermath of World War II also left many nations destroyed socially. The human rights atrocities associated with the war led to a postwar emphasis on human rights, with the United States leading in the insistence that Nazi leaders should be punished for their crimes against humanity (Orentlicher 1992). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, with additional covenants regarding economic, political, and social rights following in 1976. Implementation of human rights policy, however, was another matter.

The U.S.' leadership in the formulation of a human rights regime, but its reluctance to "submit to the jurisdiction of international bodies that enforce or monitor human rights commitments" is tied to foreign policy (Orentlicher 1992, 341). This reluctance was justified by a fear of U.S. laws being superseded by international law, or the loss of sovereignty, as well as U.S. concern for national security. A recent example of such fear is the U.S. refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Fearful that the far-reaching jurisdiction of the ICC will eventually lead to the prosecution of American soldiers as well as infringe upon the sovereignty of the state, the United States finds itself as one of the most vocal opponents of the ICC (Scheffer 1996;

Tepperman 2000; Bosco 1998).[5] The combination of these factors hinders the U.S. commitment to human rights (Orentlicher 1992). Although the U.S. Senate did not ratify many of these documents, policy makers nonetheless became interested in improving the living conditions in the less-developed countries and began a commitment, at least rhetorically, to the improvement of human rights. These efforts are evident in congressional legislation passed tying foreign assistance to human rights practices, as well as passing legislation to fund programs under the direction of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Luard (1992) discusses several possible foreign policy constraints on human rights policy. One such constraint is the fact that governments critical of human rights practices believe they must maintain a working relationship with the abusive regime. The assertion is that increased criticism of a regime may cause resentment leading to a difficult diplomatic relationship. The current U.S.-China relationship is indicative of this type of argument. For example, shortly after the U.S. State Department issued its 2000 annual report on human rights, the Chinese foreign minister accused the United States of a double standard when it comes to human rights.[6] Strategic concerns may also be a foreign policy constraint on human rights policy. For example, foreign aid was often used as a policy tool to maintain political and economic control of Third World nations during the Cold War. In addition, governments are hesitant to criticize repressive

[5] Ironically, the failure of the United States to ratify the Rome Statutes implementing the ICC places it in the category of "rogue states" along with Libya, China, Algeria, Yemen, and Qatar (Bosco 1998; Tepperman 2000).
[6] See the news article at http://www.itn.co.uk/news/20010227/world/08china.shtml for details.

regimes that control precious resources (such as oil) or where sensitive negotiations are at stake (US/USSR SALT Treaty).

A third foreign policy constraint is the concept of sovereignty, one of the most heralded rules of diplomatic relations. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, state sovereignty and territorial integrity have served to allow states to control domestic conditions free of international intervention. The emergence of human rights concerns in the latter half of the twentieth century has been slow to penetrate this enduring tenet of international relations. Fourth, it is argued that criticizing a state's human rights practices is not a very effective tool in human rights diplomacy. Government leaders maintain that this constitutes a waste of energy because resources could be utilized elsewhere. Lastly, increased governmental criticism may alienate the repressive government, which only serves to decrease the influence of the United States.

The United States has been criticized for not accepting responsibility for advocating and leading in the efforts at establishing universal standards of acceptable human rights practices. Additionally , it is argued that the United States should take social and economic rights more seriously (Shue 1980; Donnelly 1989; Howard 1983; Forsythe 1990). According to Forsythe, the United States focuses on political and civil liberties and security rights to the exclusion of the basic needs for survival. He concludes that the

> human rights movement in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America demands rights that go beyond the American tradition. They demand entitlements to adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education. To argue that these demands on public authorities are not as essential to human dignity and welfare as demands for civil and political rights is to fail to understand and relate to less affluent, less individualistic societies (Forsythe 1990, 453).

Forsythe (1987) also concludes that Congress has been unable, if not unwilling, to implement policy in line with legislation regarding human rights. In terms of military assistance, Congress has chosen to defer to the president and the idea that "the public naming of a gross violator of internationally recognized human rights was not a good idea in U.S. foreign policy" (Forsythe 1987, 404). In doling out economic aid, Congress has preferred to focus on assisting those most in need, ignoring the abusive nature of the elite regime.

From a public opinion perspective, Forsythe (1995) posits that the American public demands a foreign policy based on their own self-image of "an exceptional people who stand for freedom around the world" (Forsythe 1995, 111). This sentiment of American "moral exceptionalism" and the demand and will of the American people is the basis of many arguments for U.S. involvement in promoting human rights around the world (Eberstadt 1988; Schifter 1992; Forsythe 1995; Ruttan 1996). Thus, foreign policy is tied to domestic politics in the sense that the general public has a sincere concern for people around the world and insists that the United States take this into account when formulating policy, particularly economic policy. This is especially true when citizens hear reports of abusive regimes and the denial of basic freedoms (Schifter 1992).

Donnelly (1984) advocates a new direction in foreign policy for the United States characterized by "positive nonintervention," and a "gradual phasing out of all relations with the human rights-violating regime" (Donnelly 1984; 1989). He concludes, in agreement with Forsythe, that the United States must take a more active and positive role in pursuing internationally accepted standards of human rights. Additionally, Donnelly

suggests that U.S. foreign policy should follow the guidelines of such standards instead of simply adhering to self-motivated interests. This research adds that the United States also should be cognizant of the consequences of their foreign policy decisions, particularly when it comes to human rights.

Foreign Assistance and Human Rights

Banfield (1963, 2-3) posed the following question almost forty years ago: "Why is aid so confidently proposed by policy makers and so readily supported, or at any rate tolerated, by the public?" That same question is relevant today in light of the recent Colombian aid package. Specifically, why does the executive branch and members of Congress so readily support this type of government intervention and why does the public go along? I contend that there are two possibilities. The first is that there is a self-interest (or donor-interest) motivation, mainly the domestic drug problem. Second, politicians and the public have no concept of the actual consequences of such action. It is further argued that regardless of the first possibility, the knowledge of the second is imperative given the U.S.' role in the international system.

The first concerted effort at addressing specific human rights violations with foreign assistance policy at the executive level was initiated by Jimmy Carter.[7] The

[7] The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1961 and served to separate the allocation of military and non-military aid to recipient states. The 1960s brought the focus of foreign assistance to developing nations with an emphasis on economic, political and human development. It relied heavily on the theory of economic development posited by Rostow. While the program addressed the human condition, it did not speak directly to human rights violations. This original piece of legislation contained little restrictions on how assistance was to be provided, and perhaps more importantly who was eligible for assistance (USAID). It was the Carter administration that first attempted to tie human rights practices to foreign policy.

Carter administration attempted, with little success, to make adherence to accepted human rights practices a key component in granting assistance to a recipient nation. The presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush witnessed the return of national security as the main factor in granting assistance. Of keen interest was the prevention of communist infiltration in Latin and Central America. As a result, the United States supported authoritarian, right-wing regimes in countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama in the name of "democracy". Interest in human rights was not exclusive to the executive branch. Congressional interest in the allocation of foreign aid was piqued during the early 1970s, primarily in response to the *realpolitik* policies of Nixon and Kissinger. In 1971, the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 signaling the first time that Congress vetoed a foreign assistance authorization since the Marshall Plan was enacted. Several reasons have been offered for this action including opposition to the Vietnam War, over emphasis on short-term military goals, and the idea that economic aid was not helpful in achieving any foreign policy goals (USAID).

The U.S. Congress concluded that human rights should be a consideration in determining whether the United States would grant foreign assistance. The 1982 Harken Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act mandated that

> No assistance may be provided…to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons or other flagrant denial to the right of life, liberty, and the security of person, *unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in the country* (U.S. Code, quoted in Claude and Weston 1992, 293. Italics added by this author).

Congress also addressed the allocation of military aid. Section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act dictates that military aid will not be continued or granted to countries that engage in gross human rights violations. However, just as there is a loophole with economic aid, military aid may be granted if the president indicates in writing "that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance" (Claude and Weston 1992, 293). An example of this caveat is President Clinton's decision to sell fighter jets to Indonesia in spite of that country's human rights records. According to the 1996 State Department Report, the Indonesian government

> Continued to commit serious human rights abuses…Reports of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture of those in custody by security forces increased. Reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions and the use of excessive violence (including deadly force) in dealing with suspected criminals or perceived troublemakers continued. Prison conditions remained harsh, and security forces regularly violated citizens' rights to privacy…The Indonesian people continue to lack the ability to change their government. The government continued to impose severe limitations on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association (*State Department Country Profile Reports, 1996)*.

The more recent waiver is that allowing approximately $1.6 billion of aid to Colombia. In signing the waiver, President Clinton in essence is "certifying that the war-torn nation has met minimum human rights requirements and waiving conditions it has yet to meet" (CNN.com 2000).[8] As a result of extenuating circumstances in the granting of foreign assistance, the United States continues to financially assist, either through economic or military aid, countries that are guilty of human rights violations. Thus, the United States engages in a conscious trade-off in the area of foreign assistance and human rights. The question becomes, is this trade-off beneficial or detrimental to human rights conditions?

Given the interests of politicians, the importance of basic human needs and the desire to alleviate security rights abuse on a normative level, the question arises, does the U.S. foreign assistance program attempt to address them? Morgenthau (1962) argues that there are actually six purposes for the allocation of U.S. foreign aid: to provide subsistence to recipients, for economic development, to serve humanitarian purposes, for military purposes, to bolster American prestige around the world, and to serve as a bribe in diplomacy. The first three purposes fit into what Ruttan (1989) calls "ethical considerations" and are congruent with the philosophy of neo-liberal political thought. This position is also consistent with the concept of American "exceptionalism" and moral responsibility.

On the other hand, Morgenthau's last three correspond to Ruttan's (1989) "donor self-interest" category and are consistent with the neo-realist or *realpolitik* perspective on international relations, specifically that aid is justified on the grounds that it will enhance U.S. national security (Cingranelli 1993). Taking this line of reasoning further, allocating foreign assistance on the basis of ethical considerations suggests a positive relationship between aid and respect for human rights. On the other hand, one might not expect improved respect for human rights from the allocation of foreign assistance on the basis of donor self-interest. It is this latter motivation that leads critics, particularly those from the Left, to argue that foreign assistance does more harm than good (Ruttan 1989).

Turning to the arguments regarding the consequences of foreign assistance, previous research has outlined the detrimental effects of aid in connection with human rights. The first argument focuses on the connection between foreign aid and repression,

[8] The complete CNN report is found at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/08/23/colombia.aid/.

specifically that security aid serves to increase repression in less-developed countries. Essentially this form of aid lands primarily in the hands of Third World elites, the military in particular (Clark 1991; Meyer 1998). Economic and food aid also ends up in the hands of elites. The centralization of food aid, for example, means that individuals in remote and rural locations face several obstacles in order to gain any benefit, namely the time and expense of travel and the opportunity cost associated with leaving their farms. Lastly, Meyer (1998) points out that international aid perpetuates the anti-democratic tendencies in Third World nations. "Chomsky and Herman charge that aid is used to marginalize 80 percent of the Third World's population, excluding them from the political process and denying them their legal and human rights" (Chomsky and Herman 1979, 54, quoted in Meyer 1998).

The second argument focuses on the negative impact associated with economic aid, specifically to the recipient's economic infrastructure. Development of the periphery is hampered by the restrictions and conditions placed on aid. Dos Santos (1970) contends that these limitations prevent recipient nations from utilizing aid as a substitute for economic surplus necessary for development. In addition, economic aid is used to introduce antiquated and ill-suited technology to the periphery and is used to finance foreign investment in industries that are considered a low priority for development or, even worse, aid is used merely to attract foreign investment that does little to create domestic industries (Dos Santos 1970, Frank 1969). Economic aid is often granted in the form of a loan that underdeveloped countries find difficult to repay. In addition, it is argued that foreign assistance in the form of loans inhibits a nation's propensity to save because any profits are used to repay the initial loan. Aid in the form of technology

transfers, critics contend, serves to disrupt the traditional production process leading to increases in unemployment and the "disintegration of stable communities and families" (Clark 1991, 288). Lastly, aid is often viewed by developing nations as a form of imperialism, in this case, yankee imperialism.

In contrast, there are a few arguments suggesting that aid actually has a positive impact on human rights. First, Meyer (1998) points out that one goal of the U.S. allocation of aid is the opening of future private investment opportunities. Foreign assistance, it is argued from the neo-liberal position, helps increase economic development, evidenced by high rates of growth in certain countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Spero and Hart 1997). Second, several studies have demonstrated that aid has benefited Third World nations, particularly in the areas of education and health (Zimmerman 1993). Spero and Hart (1997) point out that the quality of life of many countries would have suffered or would have been worse had it not been for distribution of poverty-alleviation and medical aid.

Given the concept of American "moral exceptionalism," the impact of foreign assistance on recipient regimes should be a concern for the United States. One concern is the danger that self-interest may be pursued in the name of foreign assistance, regardless of the impact on the recipient nation. "If the donor self-interest argument is used as a primary rationale for developing assistance, it imposes on donors some obligation to demonstrate that this assistance does no harm to the recipient" (Ruttan 1989, 414). As previously described, the political and strategic self-interest of the donor country is often masked in economic programs aimed at the recipient nation. "Political considerations in both donor and recipient countries have, however, often made it advisable to cloak the

objective of short-term political or strategic assistance with the rhetoric of economic assistance" (Ruttan 1989, 413). This lends credence to the idea that U.S. policy makers, in spite of rhetoric supporting the economic and political development of recipient nations, may primarily be interested in political objectives.

Thus, while there are divergent theories regarding the motivation of aid, from a normative position it is paramount that the donor acknowledge the consequences of its actions. In other words, the motivation of the aid is irrelevant to those that it impacts. Whether the aid is for donor or recipient interest does not negate the fact that U.S. dollars are flowing into the recipient state. This research seeks to address the nature of these consequences (is there a positive or negative effect of foreign aid on human rights?) And then make policy prescriptions regarding appropriate actions the U.S. government should take in response to the empirical results.

Globalization and Human Rights

> According to the International Monetary Fund, globalization
>
> > is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows...The term has come into common usage since the 1980s, reflecting technological advances that have made it easier and quicker to complete international transactions—both trade and financial flows. It refers to an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity—village markets, urban industries, or financial centers" (IMF 2001).[9]

In addition to economic factors, globalization also extends to include the increasing cultural, environmental and political exchange that occurs between states. The effect of

[9] For a complete discussion of the IMF's position on globalization see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II.

the economic aspects of globalization is of primary interest here and the effects that it has on domestic conditions, namely human rights conditions.

Foreign economic domination in the Third World began in the form of colonialism and imperialism in the late fifteenth century with the quest for empires on the part of European states. A second wave of European imperialism occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century leading up to World War I. Self-determination and issues of state sovereignty have not squelched foreign interest in overseas markets. The attraction of cheap labor and relatively inexpensive resources in developing countries provide incentives for multinational corporations to invest in these developing nations. In addition, as the global economy continues to expand, there is an increasing opportunity for trade between diverse regime types. The effects of foreign investment and trade can be viewed from two different perspectives.

The neo-liberal view suggests that international sources of capital have a positive impact on local conditions, specifically that "[t]hrough trade, international aid, and foreign investment, the less-developed economies acquire the export markets, capital, and technology required for economic development" (Gilpin 1987, 265). Trade and investment contribute to the transition from a traditional to a market economy by addressing certain deficiencies within the developing state. These deficiencies include the lack of an economic middle class, the presence of an agriculturally based economy, and the inefficient use of natural resources. Classical liberals defend the trade and investment practices against critics who suggest that such activity is harmful to domestic workers. The primary defense is that trade and investment lead to efficiency in employment that leads to higher wages, works to reduce inflation thereby providing

lower consumer prices, and contributes to overall peace given the increased level of interdependence among trading partners. Thus, the influx of foreign capital, whether through trade or investment, will make up for these deficient resources in the host country, thus improving both economic and social conditions (Clark 1991). This economic development, it is argued by neo-liberals, should also lead to improved human rights conditions as there is a "tenet of faith among politicians, financiers, and academicians" that "economic development enhances human rights conditions" (Pritchard 1989, 1).[10]

As Shue (1980) points out, these "human rights conditions" can be categorized as subsistence, security, and liberty rights. While there is disagreement as to the primacy of any one of these rights (Shue 1980; Donnelly 1989), there is consensus that economic development plays a key role in improving the human condition. Just as Lipset (1959) argues that economic development is a "requisite for democracy," it appears that economic development may also be a "requisite for human rights." It seems consistent, therefore, to expect that trade and investment dollars from the United States would improve human rights conditions in the recipient nations.

Critics of globalization argue that there are actually deleterious effects of globalization, particularly to the nations of the South (Coker 1999; Galbraith 1999; Thomas and Wilkin 1997, 1999; Klak 1998). The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the World Summit for Social Development Conference (1995) cautioned that as part of the phenomenon of globalization, "the rapid processes of

[10] The empirical research has revealed that there is indeed a positive relationship between economic standing or wealth and human rights (Spalding 1986, Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Dixon 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

change and adjustment have been accompanied by intensified poverty, unemployment, and social disintegration."[11] Along the same vein of dependency and world-systems theorists (Prebisch 1950; Frank 1966, 1969, 1979; Dos Santos 1970; Wallerstein 1974a, 1980), critics of globalization argue that the presence of Western capitalism, that is multinationals, the influx of foreign capital, as well as uneven trade relationships, places a greater emphasis on the function of the elite in developing societies, as well as, decreases state autonomy regarding economic policy. Baran (1967) argued that not only are Third World countries slow to develop, but their development is blocked by trade and investment from the industrialized states. This lack of economic development speaks directly to human rights conditions. In general, critics contend that less economically developed countries are more susceptible to a dependent trade and investment relationship with more developed nations, that, in turn, serves to perpetuate their economic stagnation (Myrdal 1956). In addition, they argue that the benefits of trade are enjoyed by the developed states, but actually tend to exacerbate the problems of developing states, specifically the problem of vast economic inequities within a society.

Critics also suggest that the effects of foreign investment, trade, and presumably aid benefits the local elite and works to marginalize the masses. This marginalization simply adds more power to the elite, creating a wider gulf between the rich and the poor. The emphasis on economic development, particularly the competitiveness associated with trade and investment, is believed to have negative consequences on vulnerable segments of the population, especially migrants and women workers, as well as indigenous peoples. "Globalization has been cited as a contributing factor in violations of the right

[11] Quote is from paragraph 14 of the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action.

to life, the right to protection of health, minority rights, freedom of association, the right to safe and healthy working conditions and the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being in many countries" (Leary 1998, 268). This schism in a developing society creates conditions that might lead to social unrest, domestic violence, and ultimately poor human rights conditions. The elite, hoping to retain their position as well as the financial rewards from the influx of American dollars, will engage in behavior that will maintain the status quo, perhaps even using repression and domestic violence to do so. "Foreign capitalists seek to secure their assets in Third World countries by forming political alliances with feudal landowners, resulting in authoritarian governments opposed to labor unions, civil rights, and democracy" (Clark 1991, 279).

These two arguments are discussed within the literature as the engine of development thesis and the Hymer thesis (Hymer 1979a, 1979b; Meyer 1996, 1998). The engines of development thesis implies that a positive relationship exists between investment and the respect for human rights by the recipient regime, or, stated conversely, that higher levels of investment decrease the likelihood that regimes will engage in abusive human rights practices. Proponents of the engine of development thesis argue that foreign investment increases the standard of living in the recipient nation by providing jobs, increasing the tax base, and generally improving the infrastructure (Spero and Hart 1997).

The Hymer thesis implies that a negative relationship exists between external financial flows and human rights conditions. While Hymer did not address human rights directly and refers to the behavior of MNCs, he concludes that as a MNC "crosses international boundaries, it pulls and tears at the social and political fabric and erodes the

cohesiveness of national states" (Hymer 1979b). Hymer argues that a hierarchy develops in the recipient nation benefiting the top one-third of the population, leaving the bottom two-thirds to suffer. This line of reasoning is consistent with that of critics of the effects of globalization. The effect of U.S. trade and direct foreign investment, along with foreign aid, will be examined to assess the consequences of globalization on human rights.

Conclusion

The arguments of the engines of development theory and the positive aspects of aid are analogous and basically represent the neo-liberal perspective regarding the effects of foreign assistance and globalization on human rights. That is, higher levels of aid, trade, and investment lead to improved human rights conditions in the recipient nations. Conversely, the Hymer thesis and the negative aspects of aid are analogous to one another and basically echo the critics' arguments regarding the negative effects of foreign assistance and globalization. Specifically, recipient nations are not the primary beneficiaries of aid, trade, investment, or development in general. Globalization, according to critics, is detrimental to the improvement of human rights conditions and serves to maintain the relatively weak position of the recipient nation.

The conflict between donor interests and recipient interests in the area of foreign assistance can be generalized to other foreign policy decisions in connection with investment and trade. If the U.S. objective is to promote peace and improve human rights conditions, then knowing if its policy decisions concerning foreign assistance, direct foreign investment, and trade run counter to these objectives is an important contribution to both the academic literature and to policy makers.

CHAPTER FOUR

HYPOTHESES, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the security and subsistence models of human rights developed for this study. The first section defines and develops the measurements of the two dependent variables. The justification for the use of security rights and subsistence rights is explained, as well as how the data for the two variables are gathered and coded. The second section concentrates on the variables of interest in this study: U.S. foreign assistance, trade, and investment. This section also details the theoretical foundations for the presence of curvilinear and interaction relationships. The third section of this chapter identifies the control variables. These are independent variables that have been identified as determinants of security and subsistence rights. They are divided into economic, political, and cultural variables. The third section concludes with a summary of the independent variables. The last section details the methodology adopted for the analyses.

Dependent Variables

As discussed in Chapter Two, measuring and defining human rights and subsequently human rights violations has been problematic with much disagreement among researchers in the field as to what constitutes the best measure. In addition, there is little consensus whether research should focus on security rights and civil and political rights (so-called first generation rights) or social and economic rights (so-called second generation rights). It could be argued that one reason for the division of rights is for political expediency. Foreign policy decisions regarding the violations of physical

integrity rights such as torture and extrajudicial executions seem far more cut and dry than decisions regarding how to alleviate societal and economic problems such as poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy.

In addition, the division of rights seems to be a convenient tool for political science researchers. "One way to avoid the problems caused by global measures of human rights is to concentrate on a small subset of core rights…which are usually defined as freedom from torture, freedom from imprisonment for the mere expression of beliefs and freedom from political execution" (McNitt 1986, 73). This research concentrates on two "subsets" of rights, the aforementioned security rights as well as a measure of basic human needs designed to capture one component of social and economic rights – a humane standard of living.

The two dependent variables reflect several principles contained within the various articles in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, the measure for security rights captures the "right to life, liberty, and the security of person" (Article 3), the right not to be "subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Article 5), and the right not to be "subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9). Article 25 of the Declaration states that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services…" Article 26 indicates that the signatories agree that everyone also has a right to education of the parent's choosing. This right to an adequate standard of living and education is best captured by the physical quality of life index. Many of these concepts are further

clarified and expanded in the *International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights* (1976) and the *International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1976).

Security Rights

In selecting the measure for security rights, researchers are faced with at least two dilemmas: first, whether to use a standard-based or an events-based measure and second, whether security rights are a uni- or multi-dimensional phenomenon. Two types of data dominate the field: events-based measures such as Taylor and Jodice's *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (1983) and Bond and Bond's PANDA data set (1995) and standard-based measures such as the political terror scales based on the standards first established by Gastil (1980). In general, events-based measures are data on specific individual violations within a certain time period, while standard-based data are measurements of human rights conditions at the national level based on a set criteria. Recent research (Lopez and Stohl 1992; Stohl et al. 1984; Poe and Tate 1994) indicates an inherent bias in events-based data measurement techniques. Specifically, Lopez and Stohl (1992) argue that events-based data fail to capture the "afterlife effect" of human rights violations. That is, the terror experienced by the victims at time t lingers into the future and this institutionalized abuse cannot be detected by an events-based measurement.[1]

[1] Empirical research that employs a standard-based measure for the dependent variable of personal integrity abuse includes Stohl and Carleton (1985), Carleton and Stohl (1987), Gibney and Stohl (1988), Henderson (1991, 1993), Poe (1992), Poe and Tate (1994); Gibney and Dalton (1997), Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) while other research utilizes an events-based measure (Davenport 1995a, 1995b; Barbieri and Davenport 1997). In addition, a new unidimensional measure developed by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) addresses not only the level and pattern, but also the sequence of government respect for human rights. See the literature review in Chapter Two of this study for a further discussion.

As a result, a standard-based political terror scale derived from Gastil's (1980) criteria is used in this study for the measure of security rights. Gastil (1980) established a five-level ranking of political terror based upon a set of criteria including the degree or extent of imprisonment due to political beliefs, torture, political murder, and politically motivated disappearances. Carleton and Stohl (1985) apply this set of criteria in coding raw data from two annual reports: the U.S. Department of State Country Reports and Amnesty International Reports. This initial effort yielded a data set of fifty-nine countries for the years 1977-1983. Poe and Tate (1994) further expanded and combined several data sets based on this set of criteria, specifically, the data set from Poe and Sirirangsi (1993, 1994) and data provided by Stohl and his colleagues (Stohl et al. n.d.). This data set consists of 153 countries for the years 1980-1987. Poe and Tate (1994, 1996) have updated the data set to include the years 1976-1996 and have made the data available.[2]

The method of deriving the standard-based measure involves coders reading the Amnesty International and State Department reports. One problem facing coders is that the two reports do not necessarily cover the same countries. For example, the State Department generally releases reports on more countries than Amnesty International. Citing the high correlation between the two measures, Poe and Tate (1994, 855) "chose to substitute the value coded for the State Department scale when profile information was unavailable on a country in the Amnesty International reports and vice versa…" Thus, two measures are actually created: one is based on State Department Reports supplemented by Amnesty International data when necessary and the other based on

[2] These data were obtained from Poe and Tate and their website at ttp://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.htm

Amnesty International Reports and supplemented by State Department data when necessary. The latter measurement is utilized in this present research.[3]

This variable is designed to capture the level of government abuse of physical integrity rights or security rights. The variable ranges from "1," representing the most abusive record, to "5," representing the greatest degree of the realization of security rights.[4] The variable is a one-dimensional measure, thus bringing us to the second dilemma for researchers interested in security rights – whether human rights is a one-dimensional or multi-dimensional phenomenon.

There is a significant amount of research using one-dimensional measures (Carleton and Stohl 1985; Poe and Tate 1994, 1996; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). However, McCormick and Mitchell (1988; 1997) suggest that this line of research is flawed because it fails to take into account their argument that security rights are multidimensional. They argue that the use of imprisonment is quite different than the use of torture and killing. "[W]e contend that human rights violations differ in type not just amount, such that they cannot be clearly represented in a single scale" (McCormick and Mitchell 1997, 573). In a substantive manner, they contend that the two types require different government activity, different uses of government resources, and, of course, the two types of abuse cause different consequences for the victims. On the normative side, they suggest that there is a great difference between a regime which resorts to

[3] Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) report differences in the two measures certainly resulting from the respective biases in the reporting from the two different organizations. The Amnesty International based measure is preferred for this study in order to avoid the U.S. bias in the dependent variable, particularly as this research aims at addressing U.S. foreign policy decisions.

[4] For the purposes of this study, the ordinal ranking of countries has been inverted from the original data set by Poe and Tate (1994) in order for both respect for human rights and subsistence rights to be in the same direction.

imprisonment and a regime that engages in torture and killing in order to maintain political order and control. Ultimately, McCormick and Mitchell (1997) conclude that torture/killing and imprisonment represent two distinct types of personal integrity abuse and should be analyzed separately.

Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999, 298) agree that in some instances such a separation or division might be useful. Citing the work of Most and Starr (1989), they contend that these types of abuses are, in essence, just several options open to abusive regimes. For example, killing the political or regime opponent simply negates the necessity to imprison them. "Thus statistical analysis focusing on one or the other of McCormick and Mitchell's imprisonment and torture/killing indices might produce misleading or meaningless results – if one desires to explain the propensities of governments to repress or abuse personal integrity rights" (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 298).

Several of McCormick and Mitchell's (1997) arguments are addressed in the measure by Cingranelli and Richards (1999), specifically those situations where rankings cannot accommodate regimes that have a "take no prisoners" philosophy. One of McCormick and Mitchell's major complaints is that there can conceivably be countries that have no political imprisonment (a ranking of 1), but torture and killing may be common (a ranking of 4). Cingranelli and Richards (1999) have derived a data set based on the level, pattern, and sequence of a government's respect for personal integrity rights based on Mokken coding techniques. As a result of their analysis, Cingranelli and Richards (1999) have demonstrated empirically that security rights are one-dimensional. However, due to the limited number of years (1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996 only) provided by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) and considering their convincing

argument of the uni-dimensionality of the nature of security rights, the data provided by Poe and Tate are utilized.[5] This data set is the most comprehensive measure of security rights available.

Subsistence Rights

The second dependent variable, subsistence rights, is measured by the physical quality of life index (Morris 1979, 1996). This measure is designed to capture the ability of a country to meet the basic needs of its people. The variable is a composite index of "infant mortality per thousand live births, life expectancy at age one, and basic literacy as the proportion of the population fifteen years and over who are literate" (Milner 1998, 74). Infant mortality and life expectancy together measure the overall health of a society. Infant mortality itself is tied more to water purity, maternal morbidity and the overall well-being and health of the home environment. Life expectancy at age one, however, addresses the available nutrition and health conditions outside the home. The literacy variable gives an indication of the general level of development within a society and specifically reveals whether social benefits actually extend to women and children (Morris 1979, Dixon 1985, Milner 1998). The variable potentially ranges from zero, indicating the lowest level of quality of life, to 100, representing the highest level of quality of life.

Morris' (1979) original computation of the index included the early 1970s, as well as, indices for males and females for the years 1950, 1964, and 1970 (Morris 1979). This

[5] A correlation test was conducted comparing the Cingranelli and Richards (1991) data set with the data from Poe and Tate. The two data sets are highly corrected (Ktau-b = 0.7073; Spearman = -.8107). The inverse relationship is due to Cingranelli and Richards' ranking based on respect for security rights, while Poe and Tate's measure is based on personal integrity abuse.

index was updated by Morris in 1996 and included the years 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990. Milner (1998) collected additional data and filled in many of the missing years to have a comprehensive cross-sectional time series data set. Thus, Milner (1998) was able to include the years 1980-1993 in his study of globalization and the realization of basic human needs.[6] In order to further update the data for this present study, I gathered additional years (1976-1979 and 1994-1996) of data.

The process for updating the index involved gathering data for (1) life expectancy at age one; (2) infant mortality; (3) and illiteracy rates for adults. The *World Development Indicator* data base was used to gather the initial data for the three separate measures. This source provided a comprehensive amount of data, particularly the rates of illiteracy. These data were compared to the Milner (1998) data set. In instances where data were missing, data from the Milner (1998) data set were added to the initial data from the *World Development Indicator* data. Additional sources of missing data were gleaned from the *World Development Report*, UNESCO, and UNICEF's *Children of the World Report*. Upon gathering as much missing data as possible, the three separate measures were converted to a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the worst performance and 100 representing the best performance. The three indexed measures are then combined into the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) using the formula created by Morris (1979, 1996).

The computation of PQLI includes a measure for infant mortality per thousand live births (IMR). According to Morris (1996, 3), "improvements in the infant mortality

[6] Wesley Milner generously provided his updated data for the years 1980-1993.

component reflect social improvements inside the home, particularly the well-being of women." This infant mortality rate uses 250 per 1,000 live births as the worst possible performance with 0 per thousand reflecting the best performance. Each country's performance is converted using the following formula:

$$250\text{-IMR}/2.50.$$

The measure for life expectancy at age one (LE^1) assumes that 38 years is the worst performance and 85 years is the best performance. The resulting index for each country is derived from the formula

$$LE^1 - 38/0.47.$$

However, the data available discloses infant mortality at birth (LE^0). Thus, the conversion formula to obtain the measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) is as follows:

$$LE^1 = LE^0 - 1 + Q^0(1\text{-}K^0)/1\text{-}Q^0$$

Where Q^0 is the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births; K^0 is the average survival period during the first year. This survival period is assumed to be .03 year; LE^0 is life expectancy at birth; and LE^1 is life expectancy at age one.

The original raw data on literacy rates was actually given as illiteracy rates. Thus, the data had to be converted simply by subtracting the raw data from 100. After each individual measure is converted to a scale from 0 to 100, the composite index is calculated by simply averaging the sum of the three components. Each component is thus weighted equally.[7]

---

[7] The information for the formulas and additional information regarding the derivation of the Physical Quality of Life Index is from Morris (1996).

Table 1 displays the mean values of the variables measuring security rights and subsistence rights. The first section of the table reveals the summary statistics for the

Table 1. Security Rights and Subsistence Rights – Summary Statistics

Total Sample:	**OBS**	**MEAN**	**STD. DEV**	**Min**	**Max**
Security Rights	3281	3.56	1.177	1	5
Subsistence Rights	2834	68.82	19.967	7.28	95.27
OECD Nations					
Security Rights	436	4.76	.441	3	5
Subsistence Rights	404	91.57	1.474	87.44	95.27
Non-OECD Nations					
Security Rights	2845	3.37	1.145	1	5
Subsistence Rights	2430	65.03	19.085	7.28	92.48

total sample for the two measures of security rights and subsistence rights. The next two sections of the table represent the summary statistics for OECD states and non-OECD states respectively. There is a great discrepancy between the levels of respect for human rights and whether the country is an OECD or non-OECD state. For example, the mean value of security rights in OECD states approaches the maximum value of "5," while the citizens enjoy a very high quality of life (91.57). However, the mean value of security rights for non-OECD states is approximately 1.5 points lower on the scale. In addition,

non-OECD states lag behind OECD states in the quality of life measure by approximately 25 points.[8]

Primary Variables of Interest: U.S. Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment

Foreign Aid

The first primary independent variable of interest is U.S. foreign assistance. Regardless of whether foreign aid is the dependent or independent variable, it has traditionally been conceptualized in three different ways: economic aid (Poe 1992; Carleton and Stohl 1987: Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Regan 1995; Smith et al. 1998, 1999), military aid (Poe 1991; Poe and Meernik 1995), and total aid (Stohl et al. 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Meyer 1998, 1999).[9] This study focuses on economic and military aid and their respective effects on human rights.

In keeping with convention, the data for the allocation of economic and military U.S. aid represents the total bilateral economic and military assistance packages, including grants and loans, that is allocated to each recipient state. The data is taken from *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Aid from International Organizations* published annually by the Agency for International Development (Poe and Meernik 1995).[10] The data are reported in the millions of dollars. Table 2 provides summary statistics for U.S. economic and military aid. Similar to Table 1, this table provides a breakdown

[8] The levels of respect for human rights for the different sub-samples are provided here for a comparison. The analysis will not include the sample of OECD states only, as there is little concern regarding their human rights practices.

[9] Additional studies have conceptualized aid by differentiating the different types of aid programs. For example, Hofrenning (1990) uses subsets of economic aid including AID development assistance and P.L. 480-Title I commodity credits.

[10] The data for economic and military aid were generously provided by Dr. Steven Poe and Dr. James Meernik. Additional and missing data were gathered from the original source.

Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance – Summary Statistics
(Millions of 1992 Dollars)

Total Sample:	**OBS**	**MEAN**	**STD. DEV**	**Min**	**Max**
Economic Aid	3121	42.658	155.499	0	2489.001
Military Aid	3121	31.801	186.122	0	2349.785
OECD Nations					
Economic Aid	417	1.256	6.841	0	75.384
Military Aid	417	8.132	57.186	0	556.346
Non-OECD Nations					
Economic Aid	2704	49.043	166.126	0	2489.001
Military Aid	2704	35.451	198.450	0	2349.785

of the summary statistics for the three measures of foreign aid into the total sample of countries, OECD states, and non-OECD states. The mean value of economic aid for the entire sample is 42.66. However, when considering OECD versus non-OECD states, there is a large discrepancy in the values, 1.26 and 49.04 respectively. Similar patterns are observed for military aid as well, with non-OECD states averaging almost four times as much military assistance from the United States. It also should be noted that there is a wide variance in the sample, particularly in the case of non-OECD states.

However, the raw dollar figures can be misleading. For example, Egypt receives a disproportionate amount in terms of economic ($1,227 million) and military ($1,312 million) aid compared to the mean values in the sample of $42.66 and $31.8 million respectively. While this is an extraordinary amount of aid allocated to Egypt, the total percentage of economic and military aid compared to overall GDP comes to roughly 4%

each. In 1984 both Gibraltar and Lesotho also had an economic to GDP ratio of approximately 4%, however their raw dollar allocation was only $6.74 million and $29.46 million respectively. Similarly, in 1988, Belize's aid to GDP relationship totaled 4.05%, however the total amount of economic aid allocated to Belize that year was $12.07 million. On the other hand, small amounts of U.S. aid can constitute larger percentages of GDP. In 1983, the United States allocated $24 million to Belize, an amount drastically smaller than the amounts for Egypt, however this $24 million constituted almost 16% of the country's GDP. In 1978, $53 million in economic aid was allocated to Guyana, which equaled 11.56% of their GDP. This larger percentage suggests a greater reliance, or dependency, on the United States for economic standing. In this vein, it is intuitive to expect that there is a bigger influence of U.S. dollars on the domestic conditions within the recipient state. As such, economic and military aid is measured as a percentage of GDP.

The summary statistics of the transformed variables of economic and military aid are presented in Table 3. The table is broken down, once again, into the total sample and OECD and non-OECD states. There is an obvious difference in the percentage of GDP that economic and military aid constitutes when comparing OECD and non-OECD states. In addition, economic aid has a much stronger presence in recipient states, almost nine times as much as military aid.

Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance – Summary Statistics
(As a percentage of GDP)

Total Sample:	**OBS**	**MEAN**	**STD. DEV**	**Min**	**Max**
Economic Aid	3065	.00852	.017868	0	.1983507
Military Aid	3065	.00156	.007671	0	.1519511
OECD Nations					
Economic Aid	417	.000021	.000203	0	.0033129
Military Aid	417	.000045	.000327	0	.0031067
Non-OECD Nations					
Economic Aid	2648	.009869	.018877	0	.1983507
Military Aid	2648	.001800	.008227	0	.1519511

Considering the time necessary to transfer foreign aid funds from the United States to a recipient nation and the actual implementation of aid, it is unlikely that aid granted at time t will have a contemporaneous impact on human rights violations at time t. A more realistic model assumes that there is a lagged effect of foreign aid on security rights. However, there is no sound theoretical argument suggesting a certain time lag over another. Regan's (1995) model includes a one-year lag, while Meyer (1996, 1998) uses a three-year lag. A three-year lag was chosen for two reasons. First, even one year seems too short a time period to conclude that any effect on security rights would have been realized. The coding of the variable is annual allocation of aid. There is no means of determining whether the aid was actually allocated in the early months of a year or in December. Second, results from a three-year lag will provide a chance for comparison to the Meyer model.

A neo-liberal view, as well as political rhetoric, suggests that higher levels of aid are more likely to result in improved human rights conditions, or increases in both the level of security rights and increases in the physical quality of life or subsistence rights. For example, Madeline Albright, U.S. secretary of state, argued that the Colombia aid package and President Andres Pastana "merits our support for his plan to fight drug trafficking, achieve peace, promote prosperity and improve governance throughout his country" (Albright 2000, 1).[11] This hypothesis is derived from arguments that foreign aid can bring peace; help governments meet educational and health goals; build schools and health clinics; train teachers, nurses, doctors, and other related health workers; provide medical supplies; provide improvements in access to food and nutrition through the PL 480 food programs; create new employment opportunities as aid contributes to the building of large infrastructure projects; connect rural and urban area through road projects; assist in developing food cooperatives; provide vocational training; and assist in developing labor organizations (Zimmerman 1993).

H1: The higher the level of economic aid and military aid, ceteris paribus, the more likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

On the other hand, arguments are just as plentiful that foreign aid contributes to poor human rights conditions, particularly in the case of military aid and repressive governments. Leaders in such regimes simply use the military assistance to maintain and perpetuate their power, including suppressing the rights of the political opposition. This is a concern expressed by opponents in Congress of granting the Colombian aid package. "We at least need to see a concerted effort by the Colombian Army to thwart the

[11] Albright cited from CNN at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/04/15/colombia.pastrana/ .

paramilitary groups, who are responsible for most of the atrocities against civilians, and a willingness by the Colombian Armed Forces to turn over to the civilian courts their own members who violate human rights" (Leahy 2000, quoted by the AP).[12] As for economic aid, the restrictions and conditions imposed on many types of aid prevent any assistance from actually improving domestic conditions (Dos Santos 1970). For example, antiquated techniques and materials often are introduced into the recipient state which then require them to seek further aid down the road. This seems to perpetuate the foreign assistance relationship between the United States and the recipient state. In addition, economic aid also is used by elites in recipient states to fund their own agendas and the benefit of this aid is not distributed to the masses.

H2: The higher the level of economic aid and military aid, ceteris paribus, the less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Trade and Investment

In the international political economy literature, studies have examined the effects of direct foreign investment and international trade on conflictual/cooperative relations between states (Polacheck 1978, 1980, 1992; Gasiorowski 1986; Pollins 1989a, 1989b; Reuveny and Heejoon 1996, 1998; Sayrs 1990). More of interest here, however, is that research has begun to examine the impact of international economic factors, such as trade and investment, on domestic sources of violence (Rothgeb 1991; Snyder 1978; Rogowski 1987; Zimmerman 1983). Previous research on the specific relationship between international economic factors and human rights has conceptualized trade in a variety of

[12] Senator Leahy's comments can be found at http://www.colombiasupport.net/200001/ap-farcresponse-0112.html.

ways including trade concentration of certain export categories (Ziegenhagen 1986; Davenport 1995, 1996), manufactured exports as a percentage of total exports (Carleton 1989; Henderson 1996), and international financial agreements regarding trade (Pion-Berlin 1989).

This current research is interested solely in the amount of bilateral trade between the United States and all other countries. Thus, U.S. trade figures are collected from the *International Monetary Fund's* Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook for the years included in the study. The total dollar value of U.S. exports to each state and imports to the United States from each state are added together, divided by GDP, and then multiplied by 100 to calculate a trade openness variable.[13] In studies interested in the effects of investment on domestic conditions, measures for investment have included both total world investment (Smith et al. 1999; Rothgeb 1987, 1989, 1991) as well as investment from one particular country (Meyer 1996, 1998). Again, considering this research is interested in the influence of U.S. investment, the data for U.S. direct foreign investment (hereafter USDFI) data is from the *U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis.* It is measured as a percentage of GDP, similar to the other independent variables measuring aid and trade. Both variables are measured at a lag of one year as there is no expectation that investment today will affect conditions today. There is a time lapse in order for trade and investment to penetrate the domestic economy. A longer time period is not used, as in the case of foreign assistance,

[13] Heston and Summers derived a trade openness variable be adding total imports and total exports and dividing by GDP. This measure is based on the same concept, however U.S. figures are substituted for world trade figures in the Heston and Summers measure.

considering there is, for the most part, a steady stream of trade and investment throughout the year.

Table 4 offers a preliminary view of the total dollar amounts of trade and investment that flow between the United States and recipient states. The first section of this table reflects the summary statistics for the entire sample. The subsequent sections reveal the summary statistics for OECD states and non-OECD states. The comparison between the mean levels of trade and investment between OECD and non-OECD states is

Table 4. U.S. Trade and Investment – Summary Statistics
(Millions of Dollars)

Total Sample:	**OBS**	**MEAN**	**STD. DEV**	**Min**	**Max**
Trade – U.S. Exports	3271	1907.016	7268.594	0	132,584
Trade – U.S. Imports	3298	2533.285	10,256.25	0	159,746
Investment	2453	3287.29	10,186.44	-8552	112,907
OECD Nations					
Trade – U.S. Exports	399	9548.378	17,458.4	35	132,584
Trade – U.S. Imports	399	12,446.72	25,156.85	125	159,746
Investment	417	15,040.6	20,465.4	.46	112,907
Non-OECD Nations					
Trade – U.S. Exports	2872	845.419	2946.10	0	56,761
Trade – U.S. Imports	2899	1168.862	4167.12	0	74,111
Investment	2036	880.056	2302.77	-8552	26,410

striking. In terms of trade, OECD states enjoy over ten times the amount of trade dollars than non-OECD states. The discrepancy in investment is even greater. The United States

invests over seventeen times the amount of money in OECD states than in non-OECD states.

Much like the figures from U.S. aid, these trade and investment figures can be misleading and fail to adequately describe the nature of the relationship between the United States and recipient states. Table 5 displays the measure for trade openness

Table 5. U.S. Trade and Investment – Summary Statistics
(As a percentage of GDP)

Total Sample:	**OBS**	**MEAN**	**STD. DEV**	**Min**	**Max**
Trade Openness	3179	.0869745	.1200461	0	1.042042
Investment	2403	.0555904	.1842852	-.4224	2.582443
OECD Nations					
Trade Openness	399	.0615194	.0710827	.0110922	.5129359
Investment	418	.0712977	.0818263	.0000641	.4402513
Non-OECD Nations					
Trade Openness	2780	.090628	.1251005	0	1.042042
Investment	1985	.0522828	.1991128	-.4224	2.582443

and investment, both as a percentage of GDP. Here it is evident that while in raw dollars the OECD nations receive greater amounts of trade and investment dollars, in terms of relation to GDP the discrepancy is greatly reduced. In fact, trade constitutes greater amounts of GDP in non-OECD (.09) states than in OECD (.06) states. What is more striking is the range of the respective variables. There is a greater likelihood that trade and investment comprises a larger percentage of GDP in non-OECD states. This

indicates a greater influence of U.S. trade and investment on the economies of non-OECD states.

The neo-liberal perspective, and again political rhetoric, posits that there is a positive relationship between globalization and the realization of human rights. Liberal thought suggests that "foreign trade serves to strengthen the merchant and manufacturing classes within the developing nations, thereby breaking the grip of traditional elites on the economy. Market forces also shift peasants out of subsistence farming and into factories where their productivity is enhanced and their standard of living can rise" (Clark 1991, 275). The benefits realized by the host state include increased economic resources and domestic economic stimulation that comes from multinational investment. These new economic resources provide the funding for new social programs in the host state, further improving human rights conditions (Rothgeb 1989). In addition, Gilpin (1975) argues that foreign investment provides technology to the host state, enabling a more efficient use of resources. Thus the neo-liberal perspective hypothesizes that investment and trade flow from the United States will have a positive impact on the physical quality of life and respect for security rights.

H3: The higher the level of trade and investment, ceteris paribus, the more likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Critics of globalization and dependency theorists, particularly the more radical branch, argue that dependent trade and investment relationships serve to weaken regime support and encourage class conflict. Rather than trade and investment serving to diffuse wealth from the developed world to the developing states, these two external economic influences stifle economic development and growth, conditions necessary for the

improvement of human rights. Specifically, core countries reap the benefit of raw materials and exploit labor found in periphery states. Thus, periphery states simply contribute to capitalism in the core states at the expense of their own domestic economic development. In addition, foreign trade and investment entities tend to form coalitions with elites in the periphery which often block potential reforms that endanger the existing regime, and perhaps more importantly, the regime's profits. The profits are often then diverted into the military as well as into "individual displays of wealth and status" (Clark 1991, 285). What ultimately occurs in the periphery state is "backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within its borders. The development that it produces benefits very narrow sectors, encounters unyielding domestic obstacles to its continued economic growth…and leads to the progressive accumulation of balance-of-payments deficits, which in turn generate more dependence and more superexploitation" (Dos Santos 1984, 103). Others argue that the technology advancements from trade and investment are often not useful to the domestic economic development needs.

H4: The higher the level of trade and direct foreign investment, ceteris paribus, the less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Threshold Effects

Research suggests that levels of democracy (Fein 1995) and wealth (Olson 1963; Gurr 1968) make a difference in the level of repression and political violence within states. At certain levels of each, more repression and political violence are going to occur, followed by a diminishing effect. Thus, while curvilinear relationships between an independent and dependent variable are not novel in the area of human rights, the idea that there is a threshold effect regarding human rights and foreign aid, trade, and

investment has yet to be explored. The theoretical arguments for this threshold effect are grounded in the two major competing theories' characteristics in the analysis of the linear relationship – dependency theory and neo-liberalism.

How might these potential curvilinear or threshold effects manifest themselves? First, one must consider that aid, trade, and investment have the potential to influence or affect not only the domestic economic structure but the domestic political structure as well. This is especially so in the case of foreign assistance. While foreign assistance consists of money that is introduced into the recipient's state, this type of intervention inherently involves politics. Foreign assistance often is used to influence both political and economic policies in the recipient state. For example, the United States often places "economic conditions on aid that shapes monetary and fiscal policy, investment policy, and international economic policy, such as exchange rate and nationalization policy" (Spero and Hart 1997, 185). In addition, aid is given to government officials. On the other hand, the money from trade and investment flows primarily into the recipient state's economy. While there might be government ownership of certain industries, the governments in recipient states receive this type of capital infusion primarily in an indirect fashion and, thus, have less influence on the allocation and spending of trade and investment dollars.

Second, given that aid, trade, and investment dollars are controlled differently once introduced into the recipient state, the question becomes do different levels of each make a difference? In the area of foreign assistance, low levels of economic and military aid may signal a minor interest on the part of the United States in the recipient state. For example, such an interest might be characterized by a minor client-state relationship, a

short-term relationship such as humanitarian relief, or the United States may not have any real and lasting engagement with that state. In these types of situations, human rights conditions may not be affected. However, as the level of aid begins to increase elites in charge of the government may simply use whatever aid is granted at their own discretion oftentimes ignoring the needs of the citizens. In addition, elites may resort to repression in order to remain in power. This scenario is supportive of the dependency perspective.

Higher levels of aid signal a greater U.S. interest in the recipient state and are indicative of a long-term client-state relationship, one with real or high levels of U.S. political engagement. For example, "[a]id contributed in important ways to growth in certain countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which received massive aid inflows" (Spero and Hart 1997, 184). Additional countries that received large amounts of aid and which can be characterized as having a long-term relationship with the United States are Egypt, Israel, and most of the Latin and Central American states. This scenario leads to two possible outcomes. First, due to heavy U.S. engagement and influence, elites must compromise and even relinquish some of their power to contending groups. Elites, or government, must make concessions, including altering human rights practices, to satisfy American concerns and interests. In addition, larger amounts of aid, particularly economic aid, suggest that education, health, and agricultural programs are receiving additional funding, ultimately contributing to better living conditions. This outcome most resembles a neo-liberal argument favoring foreign assistance allocation.

A second outcome mirrors the arguments presented by dependency theorists. Again, greater U.S. interest in the client-state leads to higher levels of foreign assistance, as well as higher levels of U.S. engagement and influence. The elites in the recipient

state resort to greater human rights abuse to silence political opposition, rather than compromise to satisfy American pressure and desire for a stable government, democratic or not. For example, Donnelly (1989) points out that the economic recovery miracle of South Korea was supported in large part by massive amounts of U.S. economic aid. "Twenty-five years ago South Korea was widely viewed as an economic disaster saved from complete collapse only be massive and seemingly endless infusions of American aid, which amounted to half the national budget" (Donnelly 1989, 170). However, improvements in the South Korean economy and subsequent improvements in subsistence rights as a result of foreign aid are offset by the fact that "its record on civil and political rights has been dismal. In addition to abrogating political freedoms and civil liberties, the military regimes that until very recently ruled Korea…regularly engaged in such practices as mysterious death, kidnapping, political imprisonment, and torture" (Donnelly 1989, 184).

As for trade and investment, there are again competing theories that suggest a curvilinear relationship exists between economic factors of globalization and human rights conditions. In one variant or another, one of the major arguments presented by dependency theorists is that Third World countries become too economically dependent on foreign countries and thus they fail to develop domestic industries and markets (Frank 1966, 1969, 1977; O'Donnell 1988; Cardosa 1979; Dos Santos 1970, 1973, 1984; Wallerstein1974a, 1974b, 1980).

> For the dependent countries these relations represent an export of profits and interest which carries off part of the surplus generated domestically and leads to a loss of control over their productive resources. In order to permit these disadvantageous relations, the dependent countries must generate large surpluses, not in such a way as to create higher levels of

> technology but rather creating superexploited manpower. The result is to limit the development of their internal market and their technical and cultural capacity, as well as the moral and physical health of their people (Dos Santos 1984, 96).

Dos Santos (1984) implies that not only is the economic structure affected, but the living conditions of the citizenry are affected by such dependent economic relationships.

This dependent relationship developed from the very beginning during the years of imperialism. Thus, even at initial or low levels of trade and investment with wealthier states, dependency theories indicate that domestic conditions suffer. Higher levels of U.S. economic penetration into recipient economies continue to cause domestic markets and conditions to suffer due to the propensity of less developed countries to become even more economically dependent on the core country. The higher the level of U.S. trade and investment, the more elites within Third World states will suppress the citizenry to provide and maintain a stable economic environment and to maintain the flow of trade and foreign investment. In addition, the relationship between businesses in the industrialized states and business elites in the periphery states serves to exclude infant and developing industries in the periphery and to prevent the diffusion of capital from the elites to the majority of the citizens.

On the other hand, it can be argued that lower levels of trade and investment signal little U.S. penetration into the recipient state. At these low levels there may be no changes in human rights conditions, particularly where subsistence rights are concerned as there is little additional income flow into the domestic economic system. Higher levels of trade and investment, on the other hand, indicate that U.S. firms have indeed penetrated domestic markets. As such, more and more money is introduced into

circulation contributing to the level of wealth within recipient states. An increase in wealth, in turn, contributes to improved human rights conditions (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Henderson 1991; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Milner 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This scenario illustrates the neo-liberal perspective that free trade and liberal investment conditions are integral parts of a positive sum game affecting not only the international economy and domestic economies, but human rights conditions as well. The increase in economic well-being and improved political and security rights occur somewhat simultaneously as suggested by theories in the field of human rights, specifically that political and economic rights are interdependent and interrelated (Howard 1983; Donnelly 1989). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that the realization of political and economic rights are related (Milner 1998; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999).

H5: The level of aid, trade, and/or investment has a conditional effect on human rights conditions.

Interaction Effects

A third analysis will consider the hypotheses that the relationships between human rights and the economic variables of aid, trade, and investment are moderated by the level of democracy and economic standing within the recipient state. What are the theoretical arguments in support of this hypothesis? At higher levels of democracy, states are characterized by increased "openness of political institutions" (Jaggers and Gurr 1996). That is, democratic states tend to have institutions and procedures whereby citizens can effectively participate in competitive elections of their leaders as well as adequately express their preferences regarding policy alternatives. In fact, most

definitions of democracy include aspects of regular, peaceful, and competitive elections (Dahl 1971; Sorenson 1993), citizen participation in policy making decisions (Cohen 1971; Dahl 1971, Sorenson 1993), as well as the protection of civil and political liberties which guarantee such citizen participation (Sorenson 1993). Ultimately, Dahl (1971) contends that the keys to democracy are competition and participation.

Citizens living in states with lower levels of democracy have less opportunity for participation in decisions regarding policy alternatives, particularly redistributive policies. Thus, at lower levels of democracy it is more likely that aid, trade, and investment will have negative effects on human rights as elites within society utilize the benefits from aid, trade, and investment to their own advantage. As states become more democratic, however, more citizens are included in this electoral process and the result is an increase in demands for redistributive policies. Given these conditions, neo-liberal theory suggests that in more democratic states, citizens are likely to have more say in the distribution of foreign aid dollars, as well as the ability to voice opinions regarding the policies directing trade and investment. At higher levels of democracy, the influx of aid, trade, and investment dollars is more likely to improve human rights conditions, due to citizen involvement and institutions based on democratic norms.

Dependency theorists would basically agree that at low levels of democracy, aid, trade, and investment are detrimental to human rights conditions. However, as states become more democratic, there is a higher likelihood of political unrest and violence due to increased opportunities for the political opposition to voice their demands. The influx of aid, trade, and investment dollars from the United States will only exacerbate the political unrest indicative of fragile democracies. For example, elites within society will

use foreign assistance and the economic benefits from trade and investment to fund their repressive activities, or at the very least fund their own agendas to the exclusion of the potential political opposition.

> In Third World societies…the masses have been granted access to the political arena when their economies are much more underdeveloped than was the case in the developed world. This means that the vast majority in these societies, in addition to having low incomes, have little or no access to very basic social and municipal services – schools, hospitals, potable water, a regular electricity supply and so forth – and yet have been encouraged to expect and demand these things by politicians during the phase of political mobilization…As a result the sheer volume of demands vastly exceeds the poorly endowed state's capacity to deliver the goods. The meager size of the national cake in underdeveloped states induces not the sedate competition of the western democracies but a frenetic scramble which can often be extremely vicious…Those powerful enough grab on a spectacular scale and have no compunction about using violence to achieve their goals. The use of hired thugs to intimidate and if necessary kill political opponents and their supporters is a normal feature of the political process in many Third World states (Randall and Theobald 1985, 190).

Thus, introducing foreign aid will only serve as an additional destabilizing factor in the democratization process as elites within the society will use this aid to maintain the status quo and suppress the rights of the masses.

Globalization critics also suggest that international trade and investment not only acts as disruptive economic forces, but as destabilizing political forces as well. In essence, multinational firms become bedfellows with "a political and social coalition of wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, and large landowners dedicated to the defense of existing feudal-mercantile order" (Baran 1957, 195). As such, local officials have little incentive to provide or initiate any social and political reforms. In fact, regimes may even resort to repressive action in order to maintain and attract multinational investments (Rothgeb 1989). Interactions terms will be used to determine

if aid, trade, and investment are intervening variables between the influence of democracy and human rights.

H6: The effect of aid, trade, and investment on human rights is moderated by the level of democracy.

Does the level of economic development matter? That is, will aid, trade, and investment affect human rights conditions differently at different levels of wealth? It seems intuitive that the introduction of aid, trade, and investment to the poorest countries will have a different impact than the introduction of such external economic factors on richer societies. In countries with the lowest levels of economic development, by definition the citizens are living in dire poverty with only immediate goals of subsistence. The introduction of external sources of income in the poorest of the poor countries, one could argue, doesn't seriously threaten the social position of those elites that do exist. In these poor societies, regimes have very little need to repress its citizens. Generally, the poor are busy being poor (Olson 1963, Gurr 1968). In such situations, providing subsistence in the form of aid, trade, and investment to the poorest in society may actually reduce the level of political protest and turmoil (Rothgeb 1991). Thus, while security rights may not improve, there is no expectation that security rights will worsen. As for subsistence rights, the introduction of economic resources may serve to improve the state's ability to provide for basic human needs following the neo-liberal argument that external sources of income are diffused throughout society.

As states become more wealthy, however, the presence of foreign investment "creates both anxiety about their social position for some groups and the promise of new opportunities for others" (Rothgeb 1991, 31). Alexis de Tocqueville, in his commentary

of the French Revolution, stated that, "…those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was most pronounced were the chief centers of the revolutionary movement." Even Marx argued that improvement in workers' economic conditions led to social unrest due to their increased inability to satisfy increasing wants. Thus, rather than "more murder in the middle", in this case there is more political unrest in the middle class. The government may resort to repression in order to maintain economic and political control of the state. Thus, security rights are more likely to be violated as friction between the emerging economic classes and the elites continues. Subsistence rights, on the other hand, may see improvement as the level of wealth increases as more and more aid, trade, and investment dollars are introduced into the recipient state's economy.

At the highest levels of economic wealth, the effects of the introduction of aid, trade, and investment on human rights may be negligible. First, at this level of economic development, aid is not likely a factor. Second, the influx of additional trade and investment in the wealthiest countries probably does not noticeably alter the level of per capita GDP. Last, countries at extreme high levels of wealth generally have good human rights records. In fact, wealth is a leading characteristic of states with good human rights records (Mitchell and McCormick1988; Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Henderson 1991; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Milner 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

H7: The effect of aid, trade, and investment on human rights is moderated by the level of economic wealth.

Independent Control Variables

Both models include several control variables identified by previous literature as

important determinants of both personal integrity rights and subsistence rights. They are divided into economic, political, and cultural variables. The following section offers a description of these variables, how the variables are measured and the data gathered for the analyses.

Economic Factors

Two variables measuring a country's economic condition are included as control variables.[14] Previous research in the field of human rights indicates that economic standing, or the wealth of a nation, is positively associated with respect for human rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994, Davenport 1995; Poe et al. 1997) and subsistence rights (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Milner 1998) These studies indicate that wealth is a strong predictor in the improvement of the human condition. Thus, it is expected that citizens in wealthier nations experience less abuse from the regime and better living conditions. On the other hand, human rights violations and substandard living conditions are expected in relatively poorer countries. "The poorest countries, with substantial social and political tensions created by economic scarcity, would be most unstable and thus most apt to use repression in order to maintain control" (Mitchell and McCormack 1988, 478). Following previous research, economic standing is measured by GNP per capita.

[14] A third economic variable is economic inequality. According to Gurr (1986), income inequality drives a wedge between the rich and poor resulting in conflict and political instability. As the gulf between the rich and the poor increases, the elite must resort to various forms of repression in order to maintain stability. Unfortunately, the restrictions on data availability reduce the number of observations severely. Thus, economic inequality is not included in the model. A regression was performed with the inclusion of this variable and it is significant in determining human rights conditions, however the limitation of observations renders other control variables, which have been shown to be significant, insignificant. Economic inequality is measured by the GINI index formulated by Deininger and Squire (1996).

The possible effect of economic growth, the second economic control variable, is less clear. On the one hand, economic growth implies greater resources and the state's increased ability to provide for at least the basic human needs. This might bode well for subsistence rights, but tells us very little about the effect of economic growth on security rights. Olson (1963) suggests that domestic political unrest is a by-product of rapid economic growth. Gurr (1968) also argues that domestic unrest may be due to the fact that expectations regarding the benefits of economic growth are not met, particularly the expectations of the non-elite.

Previous research yields conflicting results. Poe and Tate (1994) find that there is no link between economic growth and security rights in their 153-country study for the years 1980-1987. However, this result changes in their subsequent study (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 307) when additional years are added. In this study, they find that "economic growth exercises a negative impact on repression." In regards to subsistence rights, Milner (1998) finds no relationship between economic growth and a country's respect for basic human needs. However, when differentiating between OECD and non-OECD states, the results change. For OECD states, economic growth is influential and statistically significant, that is, increases in economic growth lead to a decrease in respect for subsistence rights. He finds no relationship when considering non-OECD states, although the coefficient is in the anticipated direction.

The conflicting theories and results lead to competing hypotheses regarding the link between economic growth and human rights. Thus, the variable is analyzed utilizing a two-tailed test. Economic growth is measured by calculating the percentage growth in GNP per capita.

Political Factors

The level of democracy in a regime is found in previous research to be positively associated with respect for security rights and with subsistence rights (Spalding 1986, Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994, 1996; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1999). That is, regimes that are more democratic are less abusive to citizens and are better able to provide for basic human needs. The influence of democracy is twofold: first, the representative nature of democratic regimes tends to inhibit a regime from committing widespread human rights abuses, and second, it causes the state to seek alternative means of conflict (Henderson 1991).

Poe and Tate (1994) argue that certain measures of democracy, specifically Freedom House, include a measure of personal integrity that would conflict with the dependent variable. The authors suggest that a tautological problem exists, as many measures of democracy contain elements that are necessarily captured in the measure of human rights. "If democracy is to function as an independent explanation for state terrorism and abuse of personal integrity, it must be defined in terms of procedures and rights that do not themselves preclude repression" (Poe and Tate 1994, 856). Thus, the Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1996) measure of democracy, which focuses on the institutional attributes of democracy rather than actions of the state, is employed in this study. Polity III measures democracy on a scale of "0," representing the least democratic, to "10," representing the most democratic. Thus, as the level of democracy increases, respect for both security rights and subsistence rights should increase.[15]

[15] A second measure for level of democracy is the political rights scale from Freedom House. The Freedom House scale and the Polity III measure are correlated at .92 suggesting that the two variables measure, in essence, the same phenomena.

The level of democracy is but one variable that captures the political characteristics of a regime. A second political variable is regime ideology, specifically the presence of a leftist regime. Regimes are considered leftist if they are "governed by a socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with nonsocialist opposition" (Poe and Tate 1994, 858). Poe and Tate (1994, 1999) include a measure for the presence of a leftist government based on the arguments of Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979) and the empirical findings of Mitchell and McCormick (1988). Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) argues that while right-wing autocracies sometimes evolve into democracies, this likelihood is practically nonexistent when considering revolutionary sociality or communist states. She suggests that leftist governments are more repressive and they "create refugees by the millions because they claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society," leading to a negative relationship with respect for security rights. In contrast, Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) suggests that traditional autocratic (right-wing) regimes have systemic differences when compared to socialists states, specifically that "traditional autocrats tolerate social inequalities, brutality, and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them." One can infer from this last statement that subsistence rights under a communist revolutionary regime would suffer right along with security rights.

However, Moon (1991) argues that socialism provides for a social environment where inequalities are thought to be smaller. "With a much lower percentage of income deriving from ownership of capital and land, inequality levels are likely to be much lower.…It is also evident that socialist states possess a much greater command over

social resources, with a considerably greater ability to extract, mobilize, and target the surplus on the problems of basic needs" (Moon 1991, 72).

What does the empirical analyses suggest? In regards to security rights, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) find limited support for the Kirkpatrick thesis that totalitarian (Marxist states) are more repressive. The caveat is that they are only more repressive on their imprisonment scale. On the torture dimension, the authors find no significant difference between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian (right-wing) regime. Poe and Tate (1994) find conflicting results depending on which dependent variable is used. In the model based primarily on State Department reports, the leftist government variable yields a strong, statistically significant coefficient in the anticipated direction. This is in contrast to the model based on Amnesty International Reports, which revealed an extremely weak coefficient with a negative sign. "These results are precisely what one would expect if indeed the State Department's profiles are biased against leftist governments (or, alternatively if Amnesty International ratings are biased in *favor* of leftist regimes and movements)" (Poe and Tate 1994, 864). In their follow-up article, Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) find that leftist countries are less repressive regardless of the source of the dependent variable. The authors suggest that perhaps a longer time span and a larger number of countries might be the cause for the change.

In his analysis of subsistence rights, Moon (1991, 74) finds that socialist states "possess a PQLI level more than 17 points higher than would be expected on the bases of GNP alone." This finding is a qualified one, however, due to the small sample size (11 socialist countries) and the fact that most of these are characterized by relatively high income levels (Moon 1991, 75). In addition, Cuba proves to be an outlier, primarily due

to their relatively high rate of literacy. There are conflicting theories regarding the potential effect of leftist regimes, as well as results, thus leading to a competing hypothesis. A variable for the presence of a leftist government is included in the model and posited with a two-tailed test. The variable is coded with a "1," representing a leftist government and a "0," otherwise.

Just as there is an expectation that leftist governments will have an impact on human rights conditions, it is hypothesized that regimes under military rule will abuse both security and subsistence rights (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Poe and Tate 1994; Moon 1991). Their method of obtaining power suggests that violence is their primary modus operandi. In addition, they "will face fewer barriers than other leaders if they choose to act repressively" (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Thus, it is hypothesized that the presence of a military regime will result in less respect for security and subsistence rights.

Two additional military variables, military burden and military personnel, will be included in the model of basic human needs based on Moon's (1991) results as well as conflicting research (Moon and Dixon 1985; Rosh 1986). Military burden is simply the percentage of military expenditures by the government. Previous studies present the argument that a heavy military burden contributes to a state's ability to provide for basic human needs. Benoit (1973) argues that military expenditures actually facilitate economic growth and contribute to economic benefits, particularly to countries in the Third World. For example, Benoit (1973) points to the benefits to society of manpower training, the fact that defense programs provide improvements in infrastructure (military-built roads are used by civilians as well), and defense expenditures may actually stimulate demand.

More recent research takes the opposite position, specifically that money allocated to the military represents lost opportunities to spend on the improvement of living conditions (Rosh 1986; Moon 1991; Felice 1998; Chan 1985). "Arms cannot be used to plow fields, immunize children, or prolong life. Large allocations of a country's resources to military expenditures, therefore, might provide for economic growth, but not for development from a basic needs perspective" (Rosh 1986, 133). Felice (1998) concurs with this argument and adds that military regimes forfeit economic rights in exchange for the right to self-determination, the latter requiring increases in military preparedness and spending. "[M]ilitarism represents a structural choice that accords military priorities and arms spending a higher priority than meeting basic human needs" (Felice 1998, 26). Felice points out that this trade-off between military spending and subsistence rights is not just detrimental to less developed countries, by citing that since the 1970s the United States has experienced a decline in the standard of living.[16]

The results from the research are mixed. Moon and Dixon (1985) find a negative relationship between military spending and basic human needs, but a positive relationship between military personnel and PQLI. Rosh's (1986) study conflicts with the findings of Moon and Dixon (1985), that is, the size of a country's military burden does not affect a country's provision of basic needs. Given the conflicting results, a two-tailed hypothesis is posited for both military personnel and military expenditures.

[16] Felice (1998) points to Census Bureau statistics which indicate that the percentage of workers with low earnings (defined as less than $12,195 per year in 1990 adjusted dollars) rose from 12.1 per cent by the end of the 1970's to 18 per cent by the end of the 1990s. In addition, Felice (1998) cites that the number of children living in poverty in the United States grew by more than one million in the 1980s. Felice (1998) attributes this to increases in military spending.

The remaining political variables focus on the occurrence of national and international war, as well as the effect of the Cold War. Previous research suggests that involvement in international conflict (Stohl 1975, 1976; Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and civil wars (Nieburg 1969, Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979, Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1998) negatively affects the realization of both security and subsistence rights. In times of war, a regime is more apt to abuse citizens in order to maintain power. International wars are apt to create a domestic environment of repression as the regime focuses on events beyond its borders. Maintaining civilian peace and obedience becomes paramount to the war effort. "Moreover, preparations for war earmark resources that could alleviate hunger and create jobs, and they make coercion and conscription a way of life much more often that not" (Claude and Weston 1992, 145). Thus, international wars appear to have a dampening effect on both security and subsistence rights.

Civil wars are just as likely to produce opportunities for a regime to commit human rights violations. Recent events in Cambodia, Nigeria and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) are a testament to the atrocities a regime is capable of committing. Human rights, in general, suffer in time of conflict. Thus, both international and civil wars are included in the model. An international or civil war is defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. Both variables are coded 0 if there is no current war, and 1 if there is. It is hypothesized that involvement in either case decreases the respect for security and subsistence rights in that particular regime.

Although it seems counterintuitive, it is hypothesized that regimes during the post-Cold War period are more likely to engage in security rights violations (Milner

1998). During the Cold War era, the threats and incentives from the United States and the USSR kept the behavior of satellite states in check. The demise of the bipolar global system characteristic of the Cold War has decreased the involvement and influence of the superpowers in many repressive regimes. The abandonment of this "stabilizing" influence, as well as the "revival of nationalism" may work to unleash the repressive nature of many regimes (Milner 1998). As for subsistence rights, the fall of the Iron Curtain has exposed the former communist states to larger and more diversified markets. As a result, increases in the level of trade and investment within these previously closed markets suggest that the quality of life will improve. On the other hand, the economic woes in Russia also indicate that the transition from a command to a market economy is not necessarily a smooth one and that at least in the short run, subsistence rights might suffer. The variable for the Cold War is coded as 1 for the years of the Cold War and 0 for subsequent years. It is hypothesized that the Cold War served to inhibit repressive regimes in terms of security rights, however the post-Cold War's influence on subsistence rights in unclear. As a result, it is posited as a two-tailed test in the subsistence rights models.

Cultural Factors

Previous research has found that the level of population and change in population influence human rights conditions (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). It is theorized that large populations increase the pressure on resource allocation. This in turn can lead to increases in opportunities for regimes to repress their citizens due to the increasing scarcity of resources. The population strain on resources

suggests that the regime will have a harder time in providing for basic human needs. In addition, rapid population growth adds to the problem of resource allocation.

Two population measures are utilized in this study. The first is a measure of the country's current population. It is logged to account for the disparity in the range of the variable in the present sample. The second variable for population measures the percent change in national population from year to year. It is hypothesized that both variables for population are negatively related to personal integrity rights and subsistence rights.

The colonial experience of a regime has been identified as an important determinant in the development of the political culture of a nation (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Countries that had been territories of Great Britain, it is hypothesized, will have greater respect for the security rights of the individual. This argument is based upon the idea that British influence led to the development of democracy and democratic ideals. "In this sense, the British role was one of protecting and guiding indigenous development" (Moon 1991, 240). In addition, the British model of colonialism, one of indirect rule, afforded the native population a greater role in governmental participation, ranging from self-government to the establishment of local institutions. As a result, the former colonies were better prepared for independence (Moon 1991).

Does this political training translate into an ability of the former British colonies to provide subsistence rights as well? Moon (1991) investigates the effects of British colonialism on subsistence rights. He argues that, along with British political influence, missionaries played a crucial role in the provision of basic human needs, concentrating on education, medical care, medical training, and training the natives in the area of

agricultural development. "The bulk of the arguments seem to suggest that the British approach would yield a postcolonial political atmosphere more conducive to the spread of citizen welfare" (Moon 1991, 244). The results indicate that the influence of British colonialism results in improvements in subsistence rights compared to other colonial experience. However, the results presented by Moon (1991) are a bit confusing. He reports a negative correlation between British colonial history with a simple *r* of -.13. However, when the variable is included as part of the model, it becomes a positive influence. It appears that it is a positive influence only if compared to other colonial experiences (French, Belgian and Portuguese), but there is no posited explanation of the switch of the sign in the two separate analyses. A dummy variable for the history of British colonialism is included in the model. It is hypothesized that this influence will have a positive effect on security rights. Given the ambiguous results regarding the relationship between British colonialism and subsistence rights, it is posited with a two-tailed test.

Previous studies have indicated that strong religious beliefs, particularly of the elite, influence the provision of basic human needs (Park 1987; Moon 1991). The most significant results are found in the negative influence of Islam and the positive influence of Buddhism on subsistence rights. Park (1987) finds that the greater the percentage of Christian population, as opposed to Islam, the better the PQLI. Unfortunately, Park offers no theoretical justification for either including the variable or a rationale for the result. Moon (1991) also includes an analysis of the effects of Buddhism and Islam in his model of basic human needs. He points to the fact that Buddhists place a high priority on

literacy and education as one possible factor for the relationship between Buddhism and higher PQLI figures.

Regarding Islam, Moon (1991, 249) suggests that "Islamic culture maintains an extraordinarily rigid division in the treatment of the sexes, which may impede basic needs fulfillment.…Any inequality – whether class, sectoral, geographic, or sexual – will lower basic needs relative to a society in which resources and therefore life chances are more evenly distributed." In addition, given the central role women play in development issues, such as infant mortality, health care, and nutrition, their treatment will have a definitive effect on the provision of basic human needs (Moon 1991). Thus, Islamic and Buddhist dummy variables will be included in the model for subsistence rights. It is hypothesized that the presence of Islam is detrimental to subsistence rights, whereas the presence of Buddhism as a predominant religion promotes the realization of basic human needs. The variable for each is simply a dummy variable with 1 denoting Islamic or Buddhist countries and zero denoting all other countries in the data set. All of the control variables for the two models are summarized in Table 6.

TABLE 6. VARIABLES USED TO EXPLAIN SECURITY AND SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS

VARIABLE	Security Rights	Subsistence Rights
Main Variables of Interest		
U.S. Foreign Assistance *(U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Aid from International Organizations)*	Two-Tailed Test	Two-Tailed Test
Economic Control Variables		
Economic Standing *(Per Capita GNP)*	Positive	Positive
Economic Growth *(Percent Increase in Per Capita GNP)*	Two-Tailed Test	Two-Tailed Test
Political Control Variables		
Democracy *(Gurr's Polity III; 0 = least & 10 = most)*	Positive	Positive
Leftist Government *(1=leftist & 0 = non-leftist)*	Two-Tailed Test	Two-Tailed Test
Military Government *(1=military & 0 = non-military)*	Negative	Negative
Civil War *(Singer and Small 1994; 1=yes & 0 = no)*	Negative	Negative
International War *(Singer and Small 1994; 1=yes & 0 = no)*	Negative	Negative
Post-Cold War *(0 = Cold War & 1 = Post-Cold War)*	Negative	Two-Tailed Test
Military Burden *(Military Expenditures as a % of GNP)*		Two-Tailed Test
Military Personnel *(Number of Military Personnel)*		Positive
Social/Cultural Control Variables		
Population *(Logged Population)*	Negative	Negative
Population Change *(Percent Yearly Population Change)*	Negative	Negative
British Influence *(1 = Former British Colonies)*	Positive	Two-Tailed Test
Buddhist *(0 = no & 1 = yes)*		Positive
Muslim *(0 = no & 1 = yes)*		Negative

The empirical equations for the security rights and subsistence rights model are provided below:

Security Rights = $\alpha + \beta_1$ U.S. $Aid_{t-3} + \beta_2$ U.S. $Investment_{t-1} + \beta_3$ U.S. $Trade_{t-1} + \beta_4$ Economic Standing $+ \beta_5$ Economic Growth $+ \beta_6$ Democracy $+ \beta_7$ Military Control $+ \beta_8$ Leftist Government $+ \beta_9$ Civil War $+ \beta_{10}$ International War $+ \beta_{11}$ Cold War $+ \beta_{10}$ Population Level $+ \beta_{11}$ Population Change $+ \beta_{12}$ British Cultural Influence $+ \varepsilon$

Subsistence Rights = $\alpha + \beta_1$ U.S. $Aid_{t-3} + \beta_2$ U.S. $Investment_{t-1} + \beta_3$ U.S. $Trade_{t-1} + \beta_4$ Economic Standing $+ \beta_5$ Economic Growth $+ \beta_6$ Democracy $+ \beta_7$ Military Control $+ \beta_8$ Military Expenditures $+ \beta_9$ Military Personnel $+ \beta_{10}$ Leftist Government $+ \beta_{11}$ Civil War $+ \beta_{12}$ International War $+ \beta_{13}$ Cold War $+ \beta_{14}$ Population Level $+ \beta_{15}$ Population Change $+ \beta_{16}$ British Cultural Influence $+ \beta_{17}$ Buddhism $+ \beta_{18}$ Muslim $+ \varepsilon$

Research Design and Methodology

In this study, I examine the influence of aid, trade, and investment on the level of human rights and whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship between aid, trade, investment and human rights conditions. In addition, I examine whether aid, trade, and investment actually serve as moderating effects on the relationship between democracy and/or wealth and human rights. In all three cases, I am interested in the relationships over time and across many nations. There are approximately 140 countries in the sample covering a twenty year time period, 1976 to 1996.

Linear and Non-Linear Analyses

In order to accomplish the first task, a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis is required for the analysis of the effects of aid, trade, and investment on both security and subsistence rights. Pooled cross-sectional time series, however, are susceptible to heteroskedastic error terms due to the cross-national nature of the data, and

autocorrelation due to the time series nature of the data (Hicks 1994, Beck and Katz 1995, 1996; Stimson 1985). Since the bias is associated with the error terms, or residuals, and not the coefficients, ordinary OLS is performed to estimate the variable coefficients. The problem of autocorrelation is addressed with the inclusion of an AR(1) panel specific correction term (Achen 2000), while the heteroskedasticity inherent in the data is corrected with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996).

An additional analysis will consider whether there is a non-linear relationship between aid, trade, investment and human rights. The process to determine whether there is such a relationship consists of several steps. First, a regression equation is formulated based on the linear model. In this case, the model assumes that aid (trade and investment) and human rights has a linear relationship:

$$Y = a + b_1 X_1 + e$$

Where Y represents security (subsistence) rights and X_1 represents values for aid (trade and investment). A second regression equation is formulated based on a non-linear model. This equation takes the form of a quadratic equation.

$$Y = a + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_1^2 + e$$

A hierarchical F test is then conducted to "determine if the incremental explained variance due to adding a quadratic term is statistically significant" (Jaccard et al. 1990, 52). The strength of the effect is also calculated by simply taking the difference between the squared multiple correlation of the quadratic regression and the simple linear regression.

Interaction Effects

In order to empirically ascertain whether an interaction effect exists, an interactive model must be investigated. The original additive model suggests the following form:

$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3\text{-}b_k$*(Remaining Control Variables)* $+ e$

where Y is human rights conditions, X_1 is foreign aid (trade or investment), and X_2 is either democracy or wealth. The interaction model, on the other hand, assumes the following form:

$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_1X_2 + b_4\text{-}b_k$*(Remaining Control Variables)* $+ e$

where X_1X_2 is the interactive, or multiplicative term. The derived slope, b_3, measures the interaction effect of aid (trade or investment) times democracy or aid (trade or investment) times wealth. While it is hypothesized that both aid (trade and investment) and democracy have an effect on the realization of human rights, here it is hypothesized that the effect of aid (trade or investment) on human rights is dependent on the level of democracy or the level of wealth. The analysis of an interaction model consists of explaining three issues: first, is it possible to infer from the sample that an interaction effect actually occurs in the population? Second, if so, what is the strength of that effect? And, third, what is the nature of the effect?

The first issue, ascertaining whether the interaction effect actually occurs, is addressed by conducting an F test on the interaction term. The appropriate formula for this test is:

$$F = \frac{R^2_2 - R^2_1)/(k_2 - k_1)}{(1 - R^2_2)/ (N - k_2 - 1)}$$

If significant, one can provisionally conclude that the interaction effect does occur in the population. If the *F* test is insignificant, one must conclude that an interaction effect does not occur in the population.

The second step is to ascertain the strength of the effect. This is determined by implementing a test for effect size, such as *eta squared* or r2. The formula for *eta squared* is as follows:

$$\text{Eta}^2 = \frac{\text{SS(AxB)}}{\text{SS(T)}}$$

A similar result can be obtained from simply taking the difference between the squared multiple correlation for the original additive equation and the squared multiple correlation from the interaction equation. This reflects the strength of the interaction effect in the sample data (Jaccard et al. 1990, 24).

The third challenge is the interpretation of the coefficient or determining the nature of the effect. Basically, this is achieved by examining *b*3, the coefficient of the multiplicative term. This coefficient indicates the number of units that the slope of *Y* on X_1 changes, given a one-unit change in X_2. The formal equation for calculating the slope of the predicted effect of X_3 on *Y* at any particular value of X_2 is

$$b_1 \text{ at } X_2 = b_1 + b_3X_2$$

"[M]ost investigators will want to gain an intuitive feel for the interaction by calculating the slope of *Y* on X_1 at a few different values of X_2" (Jaccard et al. 1990:27). Choosing the values of X_2 should be driven by theory or at least represent a plausible scenario. As

such, the analyses will provide a variety of scenarios examining the effect of aid (trade or investment), or X_1, at different values of democracy and wealth, or X_2.

Conclusion

This chapter has served to explain the measurement and choice of the dependent variables, security and subsistence rights. Likewise, the measurement and explanation of the primary independent variables, U.S. aid, trade, and investment was provided. In addition, the economic, political, and sociocultural variables were introduced, along with their measurement and expected relationship to human rights. Lastly, a discussion of the methodology that will be utilized was offered. The next chapter, Chapter Five analyzes the relationship between United State economic and military aid and both measures for human rights. Chapter Six focuses on the effect of trade and investment on human rights.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE LEGACY OF THE U.S.' FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Introduction

This chapter examines the empirical relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and human rights.[1] The first section examines the bivariate relationship between economic and military aid and both measures for human rights. The second section of this chapter discusses the results from the multivariate analysis. First, the analysis focuses on the effect of economic and military aid on the level of security rights. Then, attention is turned to the relationship between foreign assistance and the level of subsistence rights. The third section examines the nature of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, that is, whether the relationship is linear or curvilinear. Lastly, this chapter examines whether foreign assistance affects human rights differently at different levels of democracy and/or wealth.

Before proceeding to the results of the bivariate analysis, a repeat of the competing hypothesis is warranted. Recall from Chapter Four that the neo-liberal perspective suggests that foreign assistance will serve to positively affect human rights conditions by contributing to peace negotiations, providing health and nutrition and agricultural assistance, and contributing to the development of infrastructure within the state which is necessary for domestic economic development.

[1] This research has not tested for the effects of foreign assistance from other countries.

H1: The higher the level of economic aid and military aid, ceteris paribus, the more likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

The dependency perspective posits the opposite hypothesis, specifically that foreign aid is a tool that elites within the recipient regime use to further their own political and economic agendas. The result is twofold; first, oppression to fend off a political contender occurs and second, officials pocket or utilize foreign assistance to perpetuate their elite lifestyle while the masses continue to suffer in poverty.

H2: The higher the level of economic aid and military aid, ceteris paribus, the less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Bivariate Statistics

The bivariate relationships between economic and military aid and human rights are presented in Table 7. The table displays the relationship between both types of aid and human rights for the entire sample, OECD states, and non-OECD states.[2] These three different samples illustrate the vast differences in the amount of foreign assistance granted to the less developed countries in comparison to industrialized states.[3] When attention is turned to the multivariate analyses, only two samples are included: the total country sample and the sample of non-OECD states. An analysis of OECD states is not included because the United States does not attempt to address human rights concerns in those states and the number of OECD countries receiving aid is limited.

[2] The bivariate statistics in this chapter, as well as in Chapter Six, were conducted using contemporaneous variables for foreign aid and human rights. The purpose of the bivariate analysis is not to establish causality, rather to determine the nature of the relationship between the variables of interest.
[3] Four industrialized countries, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, received economic aid during the years in the sample and Austria, Finland, and Spain received military aid. The amounts for each year are presented in Appendix A.

Table 7. Bivariate Relationships: U.S. Foreign Assistance and Human Rights (Aid as a percentage of GDP)		
	Security Rights (AI)	**Subsistence Rights (PQLI)**
Economic Aid		
All Countries	**-.11***	**-.31***
OECD	.02	-.08
Non-OECD	**-.03****	**-.25***
Military Aid		
All Countries	**-.08***	-.03
OECD	**-.27***	**-.18***
Non-OECD	**-.05***	.01
Number of Observations		
All Countries	3032	2646
OECD	414	384
Non-OECD	2618	2262

* $p < .05$
** $p < .10$

AI = Amnesty International
PQLI = Physical Quality of Life

The first column in Table 7 represents the bivariate relationship between both types of aid, the three different country samples, and security rights variable based on Amnesty International Reports. The second column reveals the relationship between foreign aid and subsistence rights, based on the Physical Quality of Life Index. In general, the results indicate that there is an inverse, or negative, relationship between foreign assistance and human rights. In other words, higher levels of aid, relative to GDP, are associated with lower levels of security and subsistence rights. In the first column of correlations between foreign aid and security rights, this phenomenon holds except for the relationship between OECD states and economic aid, which indicates a positive relationship. However, this result is not statistically significant. In addition, there is little expectation that either the United States is granting significant amounts of

aid to OECD states or that the U.S.' intention with any such aid is to address human rights records in OECD states. A graphical representation sheds light on the negative relationship between foreign assistance and human rights. Figure 1 depicts the average amount of economic and military aid, in millions of dollars, allocated to non-OECD

Figure 1. Allocation of Foreign Assistance (Non-OECD States)



countries at each level of personal integrity abuse. A country rated a "1" is considered to have the worst human rights record, while a country rated a "5" is considered to have the best human rights record. Countries with the worst human rights records receive, on average, more aid from the United States. In spite of congressional legislation aimed at

prohibiting such action, the United States continuously allocates and appropriates economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records.

The distribution of economic and military aid, as a percentage of GDP, for security rights is presented in Figure 2. The gap between economic and military aid is

Figure 2. Allocation of Foreign Assistance as a Percentage of GDP (Non-OECD States)



	1	2	3	4	5
Economic Aid	1.14	0.86	1.06	1.07	0.7
Military Aid	0.17	0.19	0.27	0.17	0.04

more pronounced when both are measured as a percentage of GDP. Economic aid comprises approximately five times as much GDP than military aid. Except for the dip in the ratio for the countries with the best human rights records, there is a consistent economic aid to GDP percentage across the countries in the sample. The distribution of

military aid as a percentage of GDP falls off for those countries with the best human rights records (Level 5 countries).

The bivariate relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and subsistence rights indicates a similar relationship (Table 7). Both economic and military aid are associated with lower levels of subsistence rights. It is unclear from these results whether countries with low levels of subsistence rights attract greater amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, or whether greater amounts of foreign assistance contribute to lower levels of subsistence rights. One exception is the positive relationship between military aid and non-OECD states, however this relationship is not statistically significant.

Examining the relationship between subsistence rights and economic aid graphically, in millions of dollars, suggests that countries in the range of 40 to 70 on the Physical Quality of Life Index receive more economic aid from the United States (Figure 3). However, those suffering the most and presumably those that need economic assistance the most, those experiencing under 30 on the Physical Quality of Life Index, do not receive as much economic aid as the rest of the sample. The average amount of economic aid allocated for countries below 30, such as Gambia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Chad, Ethiopia, and Cambodia, is $22 million compared to the $42.66 million average for the entire sample. Military aid, as measured in millions of dollars, follows a similar pattern to economic aid, albeit at lower averages across the sample. Countries with less than 50 on the PQLI receive very little military aid. It is the countries in the middle range of subsistence that receive the most military aid.

Figure 3. Allocation of Foreign Assistance (Non-OECD States)



	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Economic Aid	0	13.23	24.02	33.04	72.6	73.71	64.42	37.48	41.89	42.16
Military Aid	0	0.09	1.6	2.24	20.1	52.24	49.77	26.21	45.96	43.76

When economic aid is compared to the GDP (Figure 4), it is evident that economic aid comprises a large percentage of GDP in the countries that have the worst living conditions. So, while in raw dollars it appeared that countries with the worst living conditions were not receiving comparable levels of aid, when compared to GDP these countries appear to have a heavy dependence on U.S. aid. Military aid, however, appears to be a greater percentage of GDP in countries in the middle range of subsistence; such countries include Turkey, Algeria, Kenya, and most of the Latin American states.

Figure 4. Allocation of Foreign Assistance as a Percentage of GDP (Non-OECD States)



	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Economic Aid	0	1.16	1.88	1.9	1.26	1.04	1.25	0.57	0.49	0.61
Military Aid	0	0.006	0.12	0.2	0.12	0.24	0.36	0.1	0.15	0.09

At this preliminary stage, the results indicate support for the second hypothesis, that is, support for the dependency perspective regarding the negative relationship between foreign assistance and domestic conditions, in this case, human rights conditions. While bivariate statistics are useful to establish relationships between variables, in most cases there are additional influences on the dependent variable that a study seeks to explain. As such, multivariate analysis is required in order to account for a relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, holding other important factors constant.

Level of Security and Subsistence Rights

Security Rights

The results from the multivariate analysis on the relationship between foreign aid and security rights are presented in Table 8. Models A and B represent the economic aid and military aid models respectively for all countries in the sample. The analysis is replicated using only non-OECD states in Models C and D.[4] In addition, the independent variables are separated into economic, political, and social/cultural factors. The variables of interest, economic and military aid, are reported as the first economic factors in the models. The chi-square statistic is used for the determination of the overall significance, or goodness of fit, of the regression. In other words, it indicates the chance that the model is any different than a random model. According to the results, the probability that these particular models occurred by chance is less than one in one hundred. Thus, the chi-squared results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the model as a whole is not significantly different than zero. In addition, the R^2 indicates how much of the dependent variable is explained by the variation in the independent variables. The R^2 statistics of 79% to 82% indicate that all the models perform well.[5]

[4] The statistical analyses for this study are conducted with Stata 6.0 (StataCorp) statistical software package. The use of a pooled cross-sectional timed series research design carries with it inherent problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. A Cook-Weisberg (1983) test was conducted for each model in the study and the results indicate that there is indeed the presence of heteroskedasticity. These two threats to inference are corrected by the inclusion of an AR(1) specification to address autocorrelation (Achen 2000) while panel corrected standard errors were utilized to address the heteroskedasticity in the models (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). It should be noted that all of the multivariate analyses in this study suffer from similar inherent threats to inference and are thus corrected in the manner just discussed.

[5] All subsequent models have similar chi-square and R^2 results. As a result, no additional comments will be made on these statistics, unless they are drastically different.

Table 8. Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Model
U.S. Economic and Military Aid
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

	All Countries		Non-OECD	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	6.73*	6.52*	7.65*	7.40
	(.25)	(.25)	(.31)	(.31)
ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.03*		-.04*	
	(.01)		(.01)	
Military Aid t-3		-.07*		-.07
		(02)		(.02)
Economic Standing	.04*	.05*	.01**	.02*
	(.005)	(.004)	(.01)	(.01)
Economic Growth[#]	-.04	-.04	.02	.01
	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.08*	.08*	.07*	.06*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Leftist Government[#]	.20*	.20*	.18**	.19**
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Military Government	-.08	-.09	-.10**	-.11**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Civil War	-.94*	-.97*	-.94*	-.96*
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
International War	-.23*	-.22*	-.30*	-.29*
	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)
Post-Cold War	-.28*	-.27*	-.26*	-.26*
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.23*	-.21*	-.28*	-.27*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Population Change	.002	.002	.001	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
British Influence	.25*	.26*	.25*	.25*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Number of Cases	2252	2252	1894	1894
R^2	.82	.82	.79	.79
Wald X^2	810.54	795.20	603.59	577.77
Probability > x^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

[#] two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10

The variables of interest, economic and military aid, are statistically significant and the results are supportive of the critics' view regarding the effect of foreign assistance.[6] The aid variables were lagged, as indicated in Chapter Four, for several reasons. One was to compare the results to previous research, mainly that of Meyer (1996, 1998) and Regan (1995). Second, the process of appropriation and allocation of U.S. aid is such that a contemporaneous effect is not expected. Lastly, lagging the aid variables speaks to the issue of causality, specifically that a dependent variable cannot be influenced by the occurrence of an independent variable years in advance. Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation that the level of human rights will influence allocation and distribution of aid three years prior.[7]

According to the results, at a lag of three years, higher levels of aid relative to GDP are associated with lower levels of security rights in all countries as well as in non-OECD countries. The results conflict with the findings of Meyer (1996, 1998) not only in the expected direction but also in the number of lags. These results are also in conflict

[6] Tests for outliers and influential data were conducted utilizing DFBETA and Cook's Distance tests. Unlike many other studies in U.S. foreign aid, Egypt and Israel did not present themselves as outliers, due to aid being calculated as a percentage of GDP rather than in raw dollars. Rather, India, Somalia, El Salvador, and Central African Republic presented themselves as possible outliers. The analysis was replicated with those countries removed and the substantive and statistically significant results were not altered. The countries were kept in the sample in the results presented in the text since there is no theoretical reason for their removal.

[7] To empirically examine the issue of causality, several tests are possible. Granger causality tests are one option, however, this type of analysis is problematic in panel data. Granger causality can be conducted country by country, however this does not tell us about the relationship between trade or investment and human rights overall. A test for weak exogeneity is a second option (Hausman 1978; Engle 1984; Charemza and Deadman 1992). Such a test includes estimating the original aid model, computing the residuals, and including the residuals in a model for foreign assistance. A model for aid allocation has not been developed for the purposes of this study; therefore, the residuals were regressed on aid in a bivariate regression. The residuals are not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected. Pinpointing the nature of the causal relationship is an important subject for future research. A similar test for weak exogeneity is also conducted in Chapter Six; therefore, a repeat of this explanation is not presented.

with the study by Regan (1995). This study found that greater levels of economic aid is statistically related to less repression. The substantive results, however, were not meaningful. Regan's analysis leads to his conclusion that foreign aid was simply an additional foreign policy tool available to diplomats rather than an effective tool in improving human rights. The results in the present analysis lend support to the conclusions by Smith et al. (1998, 1998) that reliance on economic aid is misplaced and the United States as well as the international community should focus on alternative means of addressing human rights. The analysis was replicated with a contemporaneous effect and at lags of one, two, four, and five years as well. The substantive results were not altered. Thus, aid from the United States has not only a contemporaneous effect but prior aid, over a five-year period, continues to influence human rights conditions.

The appropriation and allocation of economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records is done through an exception, or loophole, to congressional legislation prohibiting such practice. Administrations often invoke national security concerns or override foreign assistance legislation in the name of humanitarianism. This act is done, then, with an acknowledgment that aid is allocated in spite of poor human rights records. What is the effect of overlooking the human rights record of a potential recipient state? In other words, assuming that human rights is a priority, is the trade-off worth it? The results indicate that it is not. That is, countries receiving aid, in spite of congressional stipulations, seem to suffer in the area of human rights.[8] Contrary to the political rhetoric of the potential human rights benefit of aid, these results suggest that

[8] It should be noted that these results cannot speak to situations where national security concerns are a priority.

higher levels of U.S. government assistance are not effective in improving human rights conditions, in fact, it appears to exacerbate an already poor condition. Countries with poor security rights records receive U.S. economic and military aid which the elites in power simply use to maintain the status quo by silencing and even eliminating any potential political opposition.

The coefficients for economic (Model A) and military (Model B) aid indicate that a 1 percent increase of aid relative to GDP decreases .03 and .07 respectively the index of respect for security rights. In the models for non-OECD states (Model C and Model D), the results are comparable with military aid having the same effect and economic aid decreasing respect for security rights by .04. While the coefficients are statistically significant, of more importance are the substantive results. Even when the empirical analysis yields statistically significant results, substantively the results may not equate to any plausible scenario in reality. For example, Regan's (1995) analysis found that economic aid is statistically significant and positively related to improved levels of human rights. The substantive results, however, indicated that the amount of aid in theory necessary to make a difference did not actually exist in practice.

The conversion of the coefficients from Models C and D to meaningful results is displayed in Table 9. A sample of different example countries with mean values of economic and military aid, relative to GDP, is provided. The effect on security rights is

Table 9. Substantive Results of Aid on Security Rights

Country	Mean Values of Aid/GDP Economic	Military	Effect on Security Rights Economic (-.04)	Military (-.07)
Worst Records (1 & 2)	.94	.18	-.04	-.01
Country A (Client-State)	5.25	1.71	-.21	-.12
Country B (Allied State)	3.77	5.18	-.15	-.36
Country C (African State)	7.37	2.01	-.29	-.14
	Maximum Values		Effect	
Non-OECD States	19.84	15.20	-.79	-1.06
OECD States	.33	.31	-.01	-.02

then calculated and displayed in the last two columns. The coefficient for economic aid (-.04) and military aid (-.07) are multiplied by the mean values in order to examine the effect of foreign aid on security rights.

The countries with the worst security rights records, those with a ranking of "1" or "2," average .94 and .18 in economic aid to GDP and military aid to GDP respectively over the years in the study. This converts to an effect of -.04 from economic aid and -.01 from military aid on security rights over the period of the study. Turning to countries considered as client-states, Country A received a hypothetical annual economic aid to GDP average of 5.25 percent and a military aid to GDP ratio of 1.71 percent. The combined effect of this distribution of aid (-.21 and -.12) is detrimental to security rights on a level that exceeds the effect of the presence of an international war (-22) and the end

of the Cold War (-.28). Several countries in Latin America, such as El Salvador, received comparable amounts of foreign assistance from the United States.

Country B is representative of Third World states that are considered U.S. allies. In this hypothetical example, aid to GDP ratio averaged 3.77 for economic aid and 5.18 for military aid. The combined effect of U.S. aid for averages of this amount is a decrease in one half a level on the security rights scale. Thus, aid to U.S. allies in the Third World appears to contribute to poor human rights records. Country C represents a Third World African states. Many African states received a great deal of U.S. economic aid tied to humanitarian relief efforts. The mean values for this hypothetical equate to 7.37% and 2.01% for economic and military aid as a percentage of GDP respectively, resulting in the combined effect of a decrease of approximately .43 in the level of security rights. Somalia is an example of a Third World African state that received large amounts of economic aid from the United States. In 1980, economic aid to Somalia, relative to GDP, was approximately 18%. In the 1990s, the highest ratio of economic aid to GDP in Somalia reached over 10%. Over the years in the study, the average level of security rights in Somalia is 2.19. In spite of humanitarian aims, the results suggest that this level of economic aid only contributed to the suffering of many Somalians. In addition, the maximum values of both types of aid are provided for OECD and non-OECD states. At these maximum values, security rights are negatively affected by three quarters of one point in the economic aid model and over one point in the military aid model for non-OECD states.

According to the results, the allocation of military aid has a much greater negative influence on security rights than economic aid, in fact almost twice the effect of

economic aid. Fortunately, the mean values of military aid do not reach the levels of economic aid in relation to overall GDP for most countries in the sample. Given the empirical and substantive results, at this juncture we can conclude provisionally that there is support for the second hypothesis posited, specifically that foreign assistance from the United States has a deleterious effect on security rights.

Turning to the control variables in the models, the results from the economic variables are mixed. Wealth remains a statistically significant predictor of a regime's respect for security rights. This result is consistent with previous findings regarding the relationship between economic standing and security rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Economic growth, however, is not statistically significant in any of the models. In the sample for all countries, the relationship is in the direction that would support the theories posited by Gurr (1968) and Olson (1963), however there is no statistically significant evidence that rapid growth contributes to increases in a regime's propensity to violate security rights. This finding contradicts that of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) where they find that economic growth is negatively related to repression in the sample using State Department records. Their empirical results, using a two-tailed test, indicate that economic growth actually improves human rights conditions, as their variable is abuse and not the realization of human rights. However, the empirical results do not translate into significantly important substantive results considering that it requires a 10% rate of economic growth to decrease abuse by .04 units on the security rights scale.

The political variables all perform well in the model, save the presence of a military government, which is only statistically significant in the models of non-OECD

states. Similar to previous research, democracy remains a constant and positive effect on the realization of security rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Citizens in states that are more democratic experience higher respect of security rights. The coefficient for leftist government is in the positive direction and is statistically significant, lending support to the findings by Moon (1991). Contrary to arguments presented by Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1979), these results indicate that leftist governments are not more apt to abuse the security rights of its citizens but are in fact less apt to abuse them. These findings are consistent with those of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999). In fact, leftist governments have a comparable influence to that of British colonization on the level of security rights.

The strongest predictor within the political factors category of the violation of security rights is the presence of civil wars. Countries experiencing such a violent conflict, according to the model, should expect a decrease in respect for security rights by almost one full level. Involvement in an international conflict is also detrimental to the realization of security rights. The addition of the end of the Cold War as a control variable also performs well and supports the finding by Milner (1998). Ironically, the Cold War served as a pacifying influence, that is, during the Cold War, regimes were less likely to engage in human rights violations. After the Cold War, nationalism and ethnic conflict have been on the rise and have contributed to human rights atrocities.[9]

The remaining control variables are designed to capture the social and cultural factors that are theorized to have an influence on the realization of security rights. The variable measuring the level of population is statistically significant and in the

hypothesized direction, indicating that countries with larger populations experience lower levels of respect for security rights. However, an increase in population does not appear to be influential in the level of respect for human rights. This variable is neither statistically significant, nor in the hypothesized direction. A history of British influence has a positive effect on the provision of security rights, suggesting that British colonialism provided for the establishment of democratic norms. This supports the finding of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).

Regardless of political rhetoric or the original intent or purpose of foreign assistance, the above results indicate that both U.S. economic and military aid has detrimental effects on security rights of the citizens in recipient states. Does aid have the same effect on factors contributing to the overall standard of living in recipient states? Is it possible that a regime's target of human rights violations makes a difference? For example, economic and military aid appear to support the status quo regime and harm the political opposition, i.e., the target of security rights violations. Does foreign assistance have a comparable effect on the target of subsistence rights abuses, that is, the average citizen? The next section of this chapter addresses what effect aid has on the realization of basic human needs.

Subsistence Rights

The relationship between foreign assistance and subsistence rights is displayed in Table 10. Similar to Table 8, the results include models for economic and military aid for all countries and non-OECD countries. Model A and Model B are models for economic and military aid, incorporating all of the countries in the sample. Non-OECD

[9] Examples include the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda.

Table 10. Multivariate Analyses: Subsistence Rights and U.S. Economic and Military Aid (Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

	All Countries		Non-OECD	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	57.10	51.16*	54.32*	50.45*
	(5.68)	(6.18)	(8.40)	(7.70)
ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.48*		-.39*	
	(.14)		(.13)	
Military Aid t-3		1.28*		.62*
		(.19)		(.28)
Economic Standing	1.13*	1.19*	1.96*	1.96*
	(.10)	(.10)	(.13)	(.13)
Economic Growth#	-.25	-.53	-.56	-.84
	(1.37)	(1.38)	(1.41)	(1.40)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.86*	.82*	.78*	.79*
	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Leftist Government#	-2.40*	-1.70**	-1.17	-.32
	(1.17)	(1.01)	(1.11)	(1.02)
Military Government	-.4.26*	-4.77*	-4.12*	-4.61*
	(.96)	(.98)	(.86)	(.89)
Military Burden	.001	.03	.01	.01
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Military Personnel	.01*	.01*	.01*	.01*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Civil War	-2.28*	-2.59*	-1.81*	-1.85*
	(.74)	(.76)	(.71)	(.69)
International War	-.56	-.09	-.48	-.18
	(.70)	(.68)	(.93)	(.91)
Post-Cold War#	.85	1.00	1.44	1.53**
	(.74)	(.78)	(.93)	(.94)
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	.16	.55	.21	.49
	(.34)	(.39)	(.49)	(.45)
Population Change	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.03
	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
British Influence#	-2.39*	-4.16*	-3.42*	-4.63*
	(1.17)	(1.07)	(1.26)	(1.11)
Buddhist	-1.80	3.66	-.12	4.53**
	(3.65)	(2.40)	(3.22)	(2.18)
Muslim	-10.13*	-9.99*	-9.80*	-9.49*
	(1.30)	(1.37)	(1.15)	(1.24)
Number of Cases	1880	1880	1536	1536
R2	.91	.92	.91	.92
Wald X2	1200.68*	849.99*	959.83*	727.79*
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10

states are used in Model C and Model D. Economic aid remains a negative influence on human rights, in this case, subsistence rights. However, contrary to the relationship between military aid and security rights, military aid has a positive effect on subsistence rights.[10]

Given the prior empirical results with regard to security rights, there appear to be two separate effects of U.S. foreign assistance on human rights conditions. First, the results for economic aid suggest that this type of assistance lands in the hands of the leaders of these repressive regimes and the elites continue to abuse a certain segment of the population, primarily the political opposition. Second, it appears that military aid is detrimental to security rights as elites in charge use the weapons and materials against the political opposition. How can military aid benefit subsistence rights while at the same time be detrimental to security rights? One plausible explanation is that money originally earmarked for military expenses can be diverted by the recipient regime to welfare and infrastructure expenditures. In this sense, the repressive regime is providing, at least minimally, in terms of basic subsistence, for the vast majority of the population. The regime seems to keep them just happy enough as not to encourage wide-spread revolt and subsequent support for the political opposition.

The multivariate analysis yields statistically significant results, however, the substantive results will shed light on whether the statistical results are meaningful in the

[10] Diagnostics indicated that Egypt and Israel did not present themselves as outliers, due to aid being calculated as a percentage of GDP rather than in raw dollars. Rather, Mozambique, Haiti, El Salvador, and Somalia presented themselves as possible outliers. The analysis was replicated with those countries removed and the substantive and statistical results were not altered. Thus, the countries were kept in the sample because there is no theoretical reason for their removal.

realization of security and subsistence rights. The substantive results of the analysis are presented in Table 11. The results from Table 9 are replicated so that a comparison can be made to the results from the subsistence rights models. The first four columns of data

Table 11. Substantive Results of Aid on Security and Subsistence Rights

			Effect on:			
	Mean Values of Aid		Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Country	Economic	Military	Economic (-.04)	Military (-.07)	Economic (-.39)	Military (.62)
Worst Records (1 & 2)	.94	.18	-.04	-.01	-.37	.11
Country A (Client-State)	5.25	1.71	-.21	-.12	-2.05	1.06
Country B (Allied State)	3.77	5.18	-.15	-.36	-1.47	3.21
Country C (African State)	7.37	2.01	-.29	-.14	-2.87	1.25
	Maximum Values		Effect		Effect	
Non-OECD States	19.84	15.20	-.79	-1.06	-7.74	9.42
OECD States	.33	.31	-.01	-.02	-.13	.19

are the same as in Table 9. The last two columns represent the results from multiplying the mean values of economic and military aid for non-OECD states, relative to GDP, with the coefficients for economic aid (-.39) and military aid (.62) from Table 10. Economic aid has a negative effect on subsistence rights, similar to that of the effect of economic aid on security rights. Thus, economic aid not only serves as a negative influence on that segment of the population that poses a threat to the political status quo, but the average citizen suffers as well. It is important to recall that the scale of subsistence rights is from 0 to 100. Thus, while the results are statistically significant, it requires a relatively large amount of economic aid, relative to GDP, to substantively influence subsistence rights.

Nonetheless, the negative influence of economic aid cannot be discounted for two reasons. First, this same economic aid has a deleterious effect on security rights and second, it cannot be discounted in light of the political rhetoric that the U.S.' goal is the improvement of human rights. These results again provide support for the dependency hypothesis (*H2)* presented, at least in the case of economic aid.

The effect of military aid on subsistence rights is quite different than the effect of economic aid on the level of basic human needs. According to the results, military aid is positively related to the realization of subsistence rights. The empirical results from the relationship between military aid and subsistence rights, therefore, provides support for the first hypothesis presented. That is, there is support for the neo-liberal perspective that foreign assistance contributed to improvements in living conditions. This support, however, is a qualified one given the fact that military aid, as a percentage of GDP, is on average far less than economic aid and the amount of military aid necessary to affect any significant substantively important change simply doesn't exist. The amount of military aid has to be extremely large in order for states to receive any benefit in terms of subsistence rights. In addition, the trade-off between military aid being detrimental to security rights and beneficial to subsistence rights does not appear to be worth the cost, as an increase in military aid designed to help subsistence rights actually decreases the respect for security rights.

Turning to the other economic variables in the model, economic standing (i.e., the wealth of the citizenry) has a positive effect on subsistence rights. In fact, this is the strongest economic variable in the model, indicating that wealth remains a key indicator in providing for the basic needs of citizens as well as improving the level of security

rights. This result is consistent with previous research examining the relationship between wealth and basic human needs (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Milner 1998). Economic growth has a negative effect, although it is not statistically significant. At this juncture, we can conclude that there is no statistical evidence that economic growth negatively affects human rights conditions.

The political variables exhibit some interesting and unexpected results. As expected, democracy has a positive effect on the realization of basic human rights. This remains fairly consistent across the models as well as in previous research (Dixon and Moon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Milner1998). In addition, the presence of war has a deleterious influence on subsistence rights; however, only the presence of a civil war is statistically significant. Involvement in an international war has no statistically significant bearing on the state's ability to provide for the basic needs of its citizenry. These results conflict with Milner (1998) whose study found both international and civil wars are substantively important for security rights, but have no effect on subsistence rights. The Cold War variable does not perform as well in the model for subsistence rights, except for Model D. The end of the East-West ideological struggle has not had a significant influence on the provision of subsistence rights. However, the coefficients are in the opposite direction than in the security rights model suggesting that subsistence rights have improved since the end of the Cold War.

Contrary to the results in the model of security rights, the presence of a leftist government appears to have a deleterious effect on subsistence rights, although it is only statistically significant in Model A and Model B. This result suggests that socialist governments are not as competent at providing for the subsistence needs of their citizens

as their ideology would have us believe. Thus, while socialist states may not be more apt to abuse the security rights of their citizens, they are not as able to provide for basic human needs.

The strongest political variable is the presence of a military government. The results indicate that those nations with a military regime experience a decrease of over 4 points on the physical quality of life index. This finding is consistent with the effect of military regimes on security rights as well as previous research (McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This result suggests that a military regime not only abuses the security rights of its citizens, but it also fails to provide them basic human needs. Of the two other military variables, only the number of military personnel is statistically significant and in the expected direction, supporting the findings of Moon and Dixon (1985). However, the substantive results are minimal. For every one thousand increase in the number of military personnel, subsistence rights improve by only .01. The result from the military expenditures variable is not statistically significant and fails to support either hypothesis. There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that increases in military expenditures will benefit subsistence rights (Benoit 1973) or that increases will be detrimental to subsistence rights, as such expenditures take away from spending on welfare needs (Rosh 1986; Felice 1998).

The social and cultural variables also yielded some unexpected results. Size of the population and population growth do not appear to have a significant influence on the state's ability to provide for basic human needs. The strongest cultural predictors are the presence of a state religion. States characterized as Muslim have a strong negative effect on the provision of basic human needs. The presence of a Muslim government

consistently decreases the realization of subsistence rights by approximately 10 points. It is by far the most influential social/cultural factor in the model. The results support the findings of Park (1987) and Moon (1991). The results from the presence of a Buddhist dominated government are mixed. The variable measuring Buddhist influence is only statistically significant and in the predicted direction in the model for military aid and non-OECD states (Model D).

The variable capturing the legacy of the British is in the negative direction and is statistically significant. According to the results, states that were colonized by the British have less respect for basic human needs. This finding contradicts the results from the security rights model where a history of British rule led to improved human rights conditions where the personal integrity of the individual was concerned. One plausible explanation rests with the idea that the British were able to instill political norms, at least at the elite level, but did little to provide guidance in how to accommodate or ensure the realization of basic human needs for the masses. This result supports dependency theorists arguments that the core country benefits economically from imperialism at the expense of the periphery state.

These results indicate that, in general, foreign assistance is detrimental to both security and subsistence rights. Any benefit gained or realized in subsistence rights by the presence of military aid is far outweighed by the deleterious effect the military aid has on security rights. The decision by the United States to override or invoke the loopholes in legislation restricting aid due to poor human rights records appears to be a poor decision. In cases where aid has been granted for self-serving reasons (i.e., Cold War ideology, oil resources from the Middle East), it is important for the United States to

realize the consequences of such action. From a normative position, the United States still has a moral responsibility to ensure that its national interests are not realized at the expense of humanity. Even in the instances where the aid is ostensibly granted for humanitarian reasons, the results are the same. This suggests that the present form of aid needs to be reassessed. Unilateral aid from the United States, as dependency theorists suggest, is associated with poor human rights conditions.

Linear or Curvilinear Relationship

Neo-liberalism and dependency theory suggest two competing perspectives for the hypothesis that a curvilinear relationship exists between foreign aid and human rights. Recall from the discussion in Chapter Four that foreign aid is allocated and distributed to recipient regimes, specifically government officials or elites within that regime. At the lowest levels of foreign assistance, scenarios indicative of minor U.S.-client relationships, human rights conditions may not be significantly affected. As foreign aid begins to increase, elites and government officials in the recipient states, according to the dependency perspective, will use this assistance to further their own interests and agendas.

At higher levels of aid, the two theories project very different scenarios. The neo-liberal perspective suggests that elites within recipient states will compromise and make political and economic concessions in order to satisfy American pressure for reform, stability, and development. Dependency theory posits that in order to satisfy these American concerns, elites will simply resort to greater levels of human rights abuse to silence the political opposition and provide a perception of stability. In addition, the greater levels of aid will be used for elite consumption and the majority of the population

will not realize any improvements in basic human needs. This research puts forth the hypothesis that there is a non-linear relationship between foreign aid and human rights. The process to determine whether there is a curvilinear relationship between foreign aid and human rights necessitates the use of a quadratic equation.

The security rights and subsistence rights models for non-OECD states from Table 8 and Table 10 were replicated with the inclusion of a quadratic term for economic and military aid respectively. The results are presented in Table 12 with only the

Table 12. Curvilinear Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models U.S. Economic and Military Aid (Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Economic Aid t-3	-.07*		-1.12*	
	(.02)		(.30)	
Economic Aid Squared t-3	.003*		.06*	
	(.02)		(.02)	
Military Aid t-3		-.07*		1.28*
		(.02)		(.47)
Military Aid Squared t-3		.02*		-.09*
		(.01)		(.04)
Joint F Test (X^2)	20.49#	9.71#	14.44#	7.37#
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.78	.92	.92
Wald X2	604.66	573.44	1196.71	742.88
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* $p < .05$
# $X^2 < .05$

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10

variables of interest displayed.[11] While the coefficients are statistically significant in the model, what is of more importance is their joint significance. A joint *F* test for each model is also reported in the table. The combination of each foreign aid variable and its associated quadratic term is jointly significant. In other words, the null hypothesis can be rejected that taken together, foreign assistance and the square of foreign assistance have no effect on security and subsistence rights. For both types of aid and security rights and for economic aid and subsistence rights, the initial effect is negative as indicated by the coefficients for foreign aid. The quadratic term, on the other hand, is positive in Model A, Model B, and Model C, indicating a curvilinear relationship.

Figure 5 offers an illustration of the curvilinear relationship between economic aid and security rights.[12] The graph indicates a U-shaped relationship with increasing amounts of aid, relative to GDP, associated with lower levels of security rights. However, if a country's economic aid to GDP ratio reaches over 10%, human rights conditions appear to improve.[13]

The results from the curvilinear analysis indicate qualified support for the dependency perspective that low and moderate levels of foreign aid have deleterious effects on human rights. The neo-liberal perspective is supported, however, at higher levels of foreign assistance. In reality, however, this level of aid, relative to GDP, is

[11] The complete results are available in Appendix B.
[12] The pattern for economic aid and subsistence rights as well as the pattern for military aid and security rights mirrors the pattern exhibited in Figure 5, thus they are not shown. Rather, Figure 5 represents all three cases.
[13] In the case of military aid, the threshold is 15% of GDP.

Figure 5. Curvilinear Relationship Between Economic Aid and Security Rights (Non-OECD)



seldom reached. Recall that the average level of economic aid to Somalia was 7.37%, far less that the 10% of GDP necessary for any benefits to be realized. Thus, in order to effectively improve human rights and find substantial support for the neo-liberal perspective, the ratio of foreign aid to GDP must be an extreme amount. Not only does this type of ratio of aid to GDP signal an extreme dependence on the United States for foreign assistance, it is an unlikely scenario for the future due to the fact that the levels of aid have decreased since the end of the Cold War. The average annual aid to GDP ratio for non-OECD states during the Cold War was 1.15 and .24 for economic and military aid respectively. These amounts dropped to .77 for economic aid and .07 for military aid

in the post-Cold War era. Thus, the results provide more support for the dependency perspective.

The case of military aid and subsistence rights indicates a different relationship (Figure 6). In the original analysis (Table 10) and in the interaction analysis (Table 12), military aid has a positive effect on subsistence rights, however the results from the quadratic term are negative, indicating a curvilinear relationship. Should military aid exceed 6% of GDP, the effect of military aid becomes negative. In other words, there is a threshold to the benefit of military aid on subsistence rights. Thus, while military aid is detrimental to security rights (unless the military to GDP ratio reaches over 15%), the benefits to subsistence rights are lost if a regime becomes too dependent on the United States for military assistance. Again, the overall conclusion points to support for the

Figure 6. Curvilinear Relationship Between Military Aid and Subsistence Rights (Non-OECD)



dependency arguments regarding the negative effects associated with foreign assistance. While we will have to wait to see the actual effects of the present Colombian aid package, these results suggest that nothing but additional harm is going to come to not only the security rights of the citizens of Colombia but to their subsistence rights as well.

Interaction Effects

The relationship between aid and human rights may actually be more complicated than an additive, or main-effects, model allows. Previous studies have indicated that both democracy and wealth are statistically significant in predicting the realization of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Mitchell and McCormick 1988, McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Moon 1991). This analysis examines whether the stage of this economic and political development makes a difference or serves as a moderating effect on the relationship between human rights and aid, trade, and investment.

In addressing the level of democracy, the arguments for an interaction effect were outlined in Chapter Four. A brief review is warranted. In countries experiencing lower levels of democracy, citizen participation is limited to the extent they are able to effectively engage in elections and policymaking. In such countries, dependency theorists would argue that foreign assistance dollars and benefits from trade and investment are economic tools for elites to suppress the political opposition and maintain their authority and position with society. The neo-liberal position, on the other hand, suggests that the introduction of foreign aid will help alleviate poor living conditions and pave the way for future investments.

At higher levels of democracy, the neo-liberal position suggests that more and more citizens are engaged in the political process and thus have more voice in choosing the political leadership and the allocation of government funds, as well as more say in the overall direction of economic policy. Dependency theorists might argue that the democratization process is a fragile one and that increases in the level of democracy coincide with a higher likelihood of social and political unrest due to more and more diverse segments of the population making political and economic demands upon the government. Elites in such transitional states will utilize the economic windfalls from aid, trade, and investment to further suppress the rising political opposition and to continue reaping the economic benefits at the expense of the masses.

It is also hypothesized that aid, trade, and investment will have different effects on human rights conditions depending on the level of economic development. At the lowest levels of wealth, the vast majority of the citizenry is concerned with subsistence and pose little political threat to the elites. The introduction of aid, trade, and investment may improve levels of subsistence, but have little effect on security rights. As wealth increases, the emerging middle class begins to clamor for more political and economic rights. In response, government may resort to human rights abuses in order to suppress the growing political unrest. Subsistence rights may continue to improve, however, as the overall level of wealth increases due to the influx of American dollars into the recipient state's economy.

In order to empirically ascertain whether this type of relationship exists, an interactive model must be investigated. An interaction term, created by multiplying

economic aid/GDP times democracy, was added to the original main-effects model. Thus, the original equation for human rights has been changed from:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3\text{-}b_k(\textit{Remaining Control Variables}) + e$$

to

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_1X_2 + b_4\text{-}b_k(\textit{Remaining Control Variables}) + e$$

Where X_1 represent aid and b_1 is its coefficient, X_2 represents democracy and b_2 is its coefficient, and X_1X_2 represents the interaction term with b_3 as its coefficient.

Foreign Aid, Democracy and Human Rights

Table 13 displays the results of the interaction between foreign assistance and democracy and their combined effect on human rights. Only the variables of interest are presented, however the complete results can be found in Appendix C. In several cases, the original aid variable is no longer statistically significant (Models A, B, and D) due to the high level of collinearity between the aid variables and the interaction terms.[14] In Model C, the original aid variable is still statistically significant, however the interaction term is not. Due to this effect of multicollinearity, the results of the joint *F* test are of more importance.[15] In all four models, the joint *F* test is statistically significant, thereby allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis. The statistical significance of the *F* test indicates the presence of an interaction effect in all four models.

[14] The correlation between economic aid and the interaction between economic aid and democracy is .66, while the equivalent correlation for military aid is .64.

[15] The lack of statistical significance of the individual coefficients is irrelevant when interaction effects are included in a model. The joint *F* test provides for the test of statistical significance of the variables of interest

Table 13. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models U.S. Aid and Democracy
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Economic Aid t-3	-.02		-.53*	
	(.01)		(.17)	
Democracy	.07*		.72*	
	(.02)		(.14)	
Economic Aid x Democracy	-.004**		.03	
	(.002)		(.03)	
Military Aid t-3	.	-.04		.15
		(.02)		(.26)
Democracy		.07*		.76*
		(.01)		(.13)
Military Aid x Democracy		-.02*		.17*
		(.01)		(.07)
Joint F Test (X^2)	82.41#	66.49#	37.94#	46.28#
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.79	.91	.92
Wald X2	628.30	678.87	1046.97	705.56
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10
# X^2 < .05

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10

The strength of this interaction effect is computed by the difference in the R^2 of the main effects model and the interaction model. Using Model A as an example, the main effects model R^2 is .7921 while the interaction model's R^2 is .7942. The difference (.7942-.7921) equates to a .21% additional difference in the variance explained in security rights, a relatively small effect size. The remaining models exhibit a similar effect. However, given how well the independent variables explained the variance in the

dependent variable in the original models, adding an additional variable was unlikely to drastically change the amount of explained variance.[16] In addition, the relatively small effect does not diminish the fact that the addition of the interaction term is statistically significant, suggesting an appropriate functional form.

Of more interest are the substantive results of the interaction terms. The nature of the interaction term is determined with democracy (X_2) as the moderating variable. The value of the coefficient for the interaction term (b_3) indicates how the relationship between security rights and foreign aid (X_1) varies across different values of democracy. Various levels of democracy are offered to ascertain the varying effect on security rights. A value of two was chosen to represent countries with low levels of democracy. The mean value of democracy among the countries with the worst security rights in the sample is 2.40. A value of four was chosen as it is the mean value of democracy for the entire sample. Lastly, countries with high levels of democracy are represented with a value of ten. In the sample, the mean value of OECD countries is 9.87.

The respective coefficients (*b3)*, standard errors (*SE*), and *t* statistics for these different scenarios are presented in Table 14. In non-OECD states, the results support the dependency argument, specifically that as countries increase in the level of democracy, they are more negatively affected by the presence of economic aid. In other words, at higher levels of democracy, increases in the aid to GDP ratio are more detrimental than aid to countries at lower levels of democracy. All of the *t* scores are statistically

[16] For example, the variable measuring population adds only approximately 2% of the variance explained.

Table 14. Interaction Analyses:
Economic Aid, Democracy and Security Rights
(Non-OECD States)

Level of Democracy	*b3*	*SE*	*t*
Low (2)	-.028	.012	-2.33
Medium (4)	-.036	.012	-3.09
High (10)	-.06	.02	-3.00

significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero. At low levels of democracy (a 2 on the Polity III scale), a one percent increase in aid relative to GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .028 on security rights. From a dependency perspective, it is not surprising to find that aid allocated to regimes with little or no indication of democratic values would use foreign aid to perpetuate the current regime. At high levels of democracy, each one percent increase in aid/GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .06. From the lowest to the highest levels of democracy, the effect doubles. This effect is above and beyond the effect of aid and democracy alone. Figure 7 offers a graphical representation of this relationship. There is support for the notion that foreign intervention in the form of economic aid during the democratization process is detrimental to human rights as elites utilize aid to suppress the emerging political opposition.[17]

[17] The results from the interaction between economic aid and subsistence rights as well as military aid and security rights were comparable and thus only one explanation was provided.

Figure 7. The Effect of One Unit Change in Economic Aid on Security Rights, Conditioned upon Democracy



The relationship between military aid and subsistence rights for non-OECD states, as originally reported in Table 10, is positive (a coefficient of .62). The interaction between military aid and democracy was reported in Table 13 and remains positive (a coefficient of .17). These results indicate that not only does military aid contribute to improved subsistence rights directly, but countries at higher levels of democracy receive an additional boost, in terms of basic human needs, from the allocation of military aid. The substantive results from the interaction model are reported in Table 15 for varying levels of democracy. Again, each *t* score is statistically significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero. In this scenario, at higher levels of democracy, military aid is

Table 15. Interaction Analyses:
Military Aid, Democracy and Subsistence Rights
(Non-OECD States)

Level of Democracy	*b3*	*SE*	*t*
Low (2)	.493	.244	2.01
Medium (4)	.83	.318	2.61
High (10)	1.85	.717	2.58

more beneficial in the realization of subsistence rights. A graphical representation of this relationship is offered in Figure 8.

Figure 8. The Effect of One Unit Change in Military Aid on Subsistence Rights, Conditioned upon Democracy



There is a twofold explanation for these results. First, in states that are more democratic, as previously discussed, citizens may have more say in redistributive policies through the power of the vote and other opportunities to participate in the electoral process. Thus, citizens will demand redistributive policies favoring improvements in basic human needs such as health care, sanitation, and education. Second, in this particular scenario, it is military aid that is being considered and such aid may not have an economic distributive characteristic as much military aid comes in the form of equipment. Receiving such military equipment from an external source, however allows a regime to redirect money originally earmarked for defense into domestic welfare concerns, concerns which citizens in states that are more democratic are able to voice their position.

Overall, the results indicate that the relationship between foreign aid and human rights differ depending on the level of democracy, and the results are generally supportive of the dependency perspective. Only military aid and levels of democracy are in the positive direction in support of the neo-liberal position concerning the realization of basic human needs. Again, this support is a qualified one, given the previous finding that there is a threshold effect to the positive influence of military aid on subsistence rights. At the lowest levels of democracy, all types of foreign aid are detrimental to security rights and economic aid is negatively associated with the level of basic human needs. This effect, however, is relatively small compared to the results as the level of democracy increases. These results indicate that as states become more democratic, the effects of foreign aid only serve to disrupt the process, particularly the aspect of democracy that pertains to the realization of security rights.

The Interaction of Foreign Aid and Wealth

A second possible interaction exists between foreign assistance and wealth. Table 16 presents the four models for the interaction between economic and military aid and wealth and their effect on security rights (Model A and Model B) and subsistence rights (Model C and Model D). Again, only the variables of interest are presented, the complete

Table 16. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models U.S. Aid and Wealth
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Economic Aid t-3	-.02*		-.58*	
	(.01)		(.16)	
Wealth	.02*		1.93*	
	(.02)		(.13)	
Economic Aid x Wealth	-.01**		.18*	
	(.01)		(.03)	
Military Aid t-3		-.04		.85*
		(.03)		(.33)
Wealth		.02*		1.98*
		(.01)		(.13)
Military Aid x Wealth		-.01		-.14
		(.01)		(.10)
Joint F Test (X^2)	24.13#	15.56#	239.20#	222.52#
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.78	.92	.92
Wald X2	614.13	725.96	1031.45	719.36
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

$X^2 < .05$
* p < .05; ** p < .10

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10

table is available in Appendix D. All the aid variables remain statistically significant in the interaction models, except for military aid in Model B. The joint *F* test indicates the presence of an interaction effect in each model.

The strength of the interaction effect is calculated by taking the difference in the squared multiple correlations in the main-effects model and the subsequent interaction models. Using Model A as an example, the interaction R^2 is .7946, while the R^2 for the main-effects model is .7921. The difference (.7946-.7921) equals .0025, indicating that an additional .25% in the variance is explained by the addition of the interaction term. Similar to the effect size of the interaction between aid and democracy, the size of this effect is relatively small. However, this fails to negate the proper specification of the model or the statistical significance that aid's effect on human rights is moderated by a country's level of wealth.

The substantive results of the interaction of economic aid, wealth, and security rights are presented in Table 17 using Model A. The nature of the interaction term is determined with wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, as the moderating variable. The value of the coefficient of the interaction term, b_3, indicates how the relationship between foreign assistance and security rights varies across different values of wealth. Three different values of wealth were selected and are listed in the first column of Table 17. The low value of 2.14 represents the mean value of countries with the worst human rights records. The medium value of 3.85 represents the mean value of wealth for the entire sample. The high value of 15.25 represents the wealthier countries, as it is the mean

Table 17. Interaction Analyses:
Economic Aid, Wealth and Security Rights
(Non-OECD States)

Level of Wealth	*b3*	*SE*	*t*
Low (2.14)	-.054	.016	-3.44
Medium (3.85)	-.078	.028	-2.76
High (15.25)	-.238	.122	-1.95

value of OECD states.[18] The respective coefficients, standard errors, and *t* statistics for these different scenarios are also presented in Table 17 in columns two, three and four respectively.[19]

In non-OECD states, the results suggest that the wealthier a state becomes, the more detrimental the effect economic aid has on security rights. All of the *t* scores are statistically significant, although the high value is only significant at the .10 level. These results, once again, provide more support for the dependency perspective. The poorest countries, contrary to the arguments presented, are ill affected by economic aid in terms of security rights. Elites do appear to perceive a potential threat from the poverty stricken masses and are more likely to suppress political opposition, even in the poorest countries. As wealth increases, the extent of political suppression grows, possibly in response to growing unrest among the emerging middle class. Figure 9 provides a graphical representation of this negative relationship. Ultimately, the level of wealth does not have

[18] These values are stated in the thousands, thus the lowest value, 2.14, equals $2,140 per person while 15.25 equals $15,250 per person.

the same relevance as the level of democracy, as the only scenario that is of substantive importance is that of economic aid, economic development and security rights. The results indicate that the level of wealth is not significant in the relationship between foreign aid and subsistence rights.

Figure 9. The Effect of One Unit Change in Economic Aid on Security Rights, Conditioned upon Wealth



Conclusion

The analysis of the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and human rights revealed that the former is negatively associated with the latter. The bivariate and

[19] While all four models indicated the presence of an interaction effect, the different slopes in the remaining models were not statistically significant.

multivariate analyses consistently point to this negative relationship. The one exception is the positive effect of military aid on subsistence rights. However, subsequent analysis indicated that there is a threshold to this positive influence and the amount of aid necessary to be effective in improving subsistence rights is at the same time extremely detrimental to security rights. Foreign assistance is not the pacifying foreign policy tool that political rhetoric suggests. The U.S.' efforts at improving human rights records across the globe have been harmed by their foreign assistance program. The next chapter investigates whether the private sector, in the forms of trade and investment, influences human rights conditions. The results will inform U.S. policy makers as to the wisdom of either restricting or encouraging trade and investment in the name of human rights.

CHAPTER SIX

U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

IS THERE HOPE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between U.S. trade and investment and both security and subsistence rights.[1] The bivariate relationships between the two economic variables and human rights are examined in the first section. Second, the empirical results from the multivariate analysis are discussed. An investigation of the multivariate relationship between trade, investment, and security rights is examined. Then, attention is turned to the effect of trade and investment on subsistence rights. The third section examines whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship among the variables of interest. Similar to the analysis regarding the relationship between foreign aid and human rights, the fourth section will address whether the trade and investment variables' effect on human rights is conditioned by the level of democracy and/or wealth.

The hypothesis for the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment bears repeating before proceeding to the bivariate statistics.[2] The neo-liberal position argues that both trade and investment will be positively related to the realization of human rights. Trade and investment contributes to economic wealth providing for a better standard of living. Neo-liberals contend that the deficiencies in less developed economies, specifically the lack of capital, an oversupply of unskilled laborers, and

[1] This research does not test the effects of international trade and investment on human rights, only trade and investment from the United States.
[2] For a complete explication of the theorized relationships between human rights and U.S. trade and investment, see Chapter Four.

protectionist trade policies, all contribute to substandard living conditions and can be relieved through international trade and investment. As for security rights, neo-liberals suggest that with improvements in economic standing comes political reforms and the decline of repressive regimes.

H3: The higher the level of trade and investment, ceteris paribus, the more likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Dependency theory, on the other hand, posits that trade and investment relationships with the United States will have negative effects as elites within recipient states benefit at the expense of the vast majority of citizens. Trade and investment from the U.S. serve to suppress domestic economic growth as the less developed state tends to loss control over resources and policies governing land use and wage labor. The result is a substandard quality and standard of living. In addition, elites in the periphery, it is argued, are captured or coopted by the greater economic power and fail to develop policies favoring the recipient state. Repression may also increase in order to maintain a stable investment and trade environment and ensure continued elite economic dominance.

H4: The higher the level of trade and direct foreign investment, ceteris paribus, the less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.

Bivariate Statistics

Bivariate statistics are useful to establish the correlation between two variables. The results of the correlations between human rights and U.S. trade and investment are displayed in Table 18. The bivariate relationships are broken down into country

Table 18. Bivariate Relationships: U.S. Trade, Investment and Human Rights
(As a percentage of GDP)

	Security Rights (AI)		Subsistence Rights (PQLI)	
Trade				
All Countries	**.09***		**.15***	
OECD	**.22***		**.12***	
Non-OECD	**.13***		**.22***	
Investment				
All Countries	**.12***		**.13***	
OECD	**.10***		**-.17***	
Non-OECD	**.14***		**.16***	
Number of Observations	**Trade**	**Investment**	**Trade**	**Investment**
All Countries	3130	2371	2698	2091
OECD	397	414	368	383
Non-OECD	2712	1936	2312	1690

* $p < .05$

AI = Amnesty International
PQLI = Physical Quality of Life

categories (all countries, OECD countries, and non-OECD countries) and security and subsistence rights. Again, the three different samples are offered to illustrate the disparity in the levels of trade and investment by the U.S. to various types of countries. The first column reports the correlation between trade and investment, as a percentage of GDP, from the U.S. and the security rights variable based on Amnesty International Reports. The second column represents the bivariate relationship between subsistence rights, based on the Physical Quality of Life Index, and U.S. trade and investment. [3]

The results suggest that trade is positively related to both measures of human rights. In addition, all of these relationships are statistically significant. In other words,

[3] See footnote 1 in Chapter Five for the explanation of using contemporaneous variables in the tests for bivariate correlations.

higher levels of trade, as a percentage of GDP, are associated with higher levels of respect for security and subsistence rights. The bivariate relationship between U.S. investment and human rights reveals a similar relationship to that of human rights and trade. That is, higher levels of investment, relative to GDP, are associated with countries with better human rights records, except for the relationship between subsistence rights and OECD countries. At this point, however, it cannot be assumed that higher levels of either trade and investment from the U.S. actually contribute to higher levels of human rights conditions. One could just as easily conclude that higher levels of human rights conditions attract higher levels of trade and investment, particularly since many multinational and transnational corporations consider domestic conditions and global public opinion when making decisions about trade and investment.[4]

A graph provides a better appreciation of the relationships between trade, investment, and human rights. Figure 10 provides a view of the relationship between U.S. exports, imports, and investment (in millions of dollars) and security rights. A country rated "1" is considered to have the worst human rights record. Countries with the best human rights records are represented in the graph with a "5." When all countries are included, the disproportionate amount of trade with countries with the best human

[4] Human Rights Watch has an article at www.hrw.org/about/initiatives/corp.html outlining the connection between corporations and human rights violations. They cite that companies such as Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum Company, Nike, Heineken and several others "were placed on the defensive by damaging exposures of corporate complicity in human rights violations." The issue continued by stating that MNCs and TNCs were "stung again and again by charges that their companies had abused workers and propped up repressive governments. Accounts of child labor and sweatshop working conditions stunned public opinion to become human rights issues of broad popular concern."

Figure 10. Distribution of Trade and Investment (All Countries)



rights records is evident. The U.S. trades and invests overwhelmingly with and in countries with the best human rights records. It should be noted, however, that the majority of these countries with the best human rights records are OECD states. This might possibly explain the positive relationship between security rights and trade and investment reported in Table 18.

When only non-OECD countries are considered (Figure 11), the countries with the poorest security rights records received greater amounts of trade and investment dollars. This belies the correlation between trade, investment, and security rights in non-OECD countries reported in Table 18, where there is a positive relationship. When trade

and investment are measured in millions of dollars, rather than as a percentage of GDP, the correlation to security rights is negative. The correlation between U.S. exports, as measured in millions of dollars, and security rights is -.088, while the correlation between U.S. imports, measured in millions, and security rights is -.086. Both are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Figure 11. Distribution of Trade & Investment (Non-OECD States)



When trade and investment are taken as a percentage of GDP, the discrepancy between the non-OECD countries with the worst and best records presents a different trend (Figure 12). As previously mentioned, in raw dollar figures, non-OECD countries with the worst security rights records receive a disproportionate amount of trade and

investment from the U.S.. When calculated as a percentage of GDP, however, trade and investment comprises a larger percentage of wealth in non-OECD countries with better human rights records. This is, in part, a function of the fact that non-OECD countries with the best human rights records tend to be smaller countries with relatively small GDPs. This also accounts for the positive correlation between trade, investment, and non-OECD states in Table 18.

Figure 12: Distribution of Trade and Investment (Non-OECD States)



	1	2	3	4	5
Trade	6.43	8.29	7.92	9.25	10.79
Investment	2.54	3.00	3.11	2.66	5.27

Whether calculated as raw dollar figures or as a percentage of GDP, the trends in trade and investment in regard to subsistence rights tend to mirror each other. The U.S. consistently trades and invests in countries with higher levels of subsistence rights. In other words, the U.S. simply does not trade with and invest in countries with the poorest living conditions. Figures 13 and 14 graphically illustrate the

relationship between trade, investment and subsistence rights. Figure 13 provides trade and investment in millions of dollars, while Figure 14 presents the values of trade and investment as a percentage of GDP. The countries with the worst living conditions in

Figure 13. Distribution of Trade and Investment (Non-OECD States)



	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
US Exports	1	17.27	31.65	43.06	187.51	427.8	608.58	1428.96	1678.17	570.65
US Imports	0	31.54	61.31	182.91	353.09	850.89	777.63	2214.77	1958.14	854.23
US DFI	0	18.14	27.04	44.95	147.28	245.72	842.39	1576.48	1504.66	558.39

the sample have a subsistence rating, or Physical Quality of Life Index, closer to 0.[5]

[5] For example, the lowest PQLI rating in the sample is Cambodia in 1977 with a 7.27. In 1980, 1982, and 1992, Sierra Leone had a PQLI rating of 16.21, 16.03, and 16.67 respectively. The mean PQLI rating for Afghanistan for the entire sample is 26.11. The following countries had a PQLI rating below 30 at some point during the years in the sample: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Upper Volta, and North Yemen.

Countries experiencing the best living conditions have a subsistence level closer to 100.[6] In raw dollars, countries in the range of 70 to 90 on the Physical Quality of Life Index receive the greatest amount of trade and investment dollars from the U.S..

When converted to a percentage of GDP, there is a gradual increase in the level of trade and investment as the standard of living increases (Figure 14). This positive

Figure 14. Distribution of Trade and Investment (Non-OECD States)



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Trade	0.18	4.46	4.2	4.65	6.71	7.94	7.09	11.56	12.35	8.78
Investment	0	0.86	1.23	1.98	3.66	2.39	2.96	4.49	10.01	6.14

relationship is reflected in the bivariate statistics reported in Table 18.[7] Thus far, we can provisionally conclude that there is support for the neo-liberal position regarding the

[6] Non-OECD countries with a PQLI rating above 90 include Barbados, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel.

[7] Recall that the variable for trade is converted to a percentage of GDP by using the Heston and Summer variable for trade openness as a model. In this study, U.S. exports plus U.S. imports are divided by GDP for the variable for trade.

relationship between human rights and trade and investment. Neo-liberals contend that globalization, in this case international trade and investment, is positively related to improvements in the human condition. Bivariate statistics are limited, however, in that they can only suggest that a relationship exists between two variables. Multivariate analysis allows for a more sophisticated examination of the relationship between two variables as additional factors, or variables, are taken into consideration. Thus, the following section of Chapter Six investigates the multivariate relationship between trade and investment and security rights, followed by an analysis between these same two economic factors and subsistence rights.

Level of Security and Subsistence Rights - Multivariate Analysis

Security Rights

The results from the multivariate analyses on the relationship between security rights and U.S. trade and investment are displayed in Table 19. The first two models include the variable measuring the level of trade openness or trade measured as a percentage of GDP. Model A includes all states in the sample, while Model B restricts the analysis to non-OECD states. The analysis is replicated with U.S. investment in place of trade in Model C and Model D. Similar to the presentation of the aid models, the independent variables are separated into economic, political, and social/cultural variables.

Table 19 Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Model

	Trade		Investment	
	All Countries	Non-OECD	All Countries	Non-OECD
Independent Variable	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D
Constant	6.69*	7.48*	6.05*	7.17*
	(.26)	(.38)	(.22)	(.30)
ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Trade Openness t-1	-.003	-.002		
	(.002)	(.002)		
Investment t-1			.005*	.005**
			(.002)	(.001)
Economic Standing	.05*	.02*	.05*	.03*
	(.003)	(.01)	(.001)	(.001)
Economic Growth[#]	-.05	-.01	-.14	-.11
	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.10)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.08*	.07*	.08*	.05*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Leftist Government[#]	.09	.09	.32*	.31*
	(.08)	(.06)	(.09)	(.10)
Military Government	-.11*	-.12*	-.14*	-.14*
	(.04)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Civil War	-.84*	-.83*	-.89*	-.88*
	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)
International War	-.28*	-.34*	-.26*	-.35*
	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.10)
Post-Cold War	-.23*	-.20*	-.27*	-.24*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.22*	-.27*	-.19*	-.26*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)
Population Change	.002	.0004	-.001	-.005
	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
British Influence	.18*	.18*	.32*	.32*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Number of Cases	2552	2174	1999	1604
R^2	.79	.77	.82	.78
Wald 2	713.63	606.90	1025.93	913.08
Probability > x^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Two-tailed test

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .10$

The chi-square statistic is used for the determination of the overall significance, or goodness of fit, of the regression. In other words, it indicates the chance that the model is any different than a random model. According to the results in Table 19, the probability that these particular models occurred by chance is very slightly above zero in one hundred. Thus, the chi-squared results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the model as a whole is not significantly different than zero. The chi-square indicates that the models are statistically significant and the R^2 indicates that between 77% and 82% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independent variables.[8]

Recall that the trade and investment variables in the models for security and subsistence rates are lagged at one year. This is done for two reasons. First, there is no expectation that trade and investment will have a contemporaneous effect on human rights and second, lagging the variables of interest addresses the issue of causality. One might expect that better human rights records actually attract trade and investment. However, with the inclusion of a lagged trade and investment variable, the direction of causation is more clear. There can be no expectation that human rights records at time t influence trade or investment at t-1. In addition, an empirical test was conducted and found that trade was weakly exogenous.[9]

[8] Just as in the foreign assistance models, the two inherent and common problems with this particular type of analysis were corrected with the use of an AR(1) parameter (Achen 2000) to accommodate the autocorrelation in the model and panel-corrected standard errors to address the heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). All of the models in this chapter suffer from these two threats to inference and no additional remarks are made addressing this issue. In addition, the remaining models have comparable chi-square and R2 statistics and thus the explanation of these results is not repeated for each.

[9] See footnote 6 in Chapter Five for a complete explication of the issue of causality.

Although the direction of the trade variable would suggest support of the critics' view on the relationship between factors of globalization and human rights conditions, it is not statistically significant in either the model of all countries or the non-OECD country model.[10] However, given the positive bivariate relationship between trade openness and security rights reported in Table 18, the multivariate results are puzzling. Upon further analysis, it was determined that trade openness does have a positive relationship with security rights in a multivariate model until the variable for population is introduced to the model. A bivariate analysis between trade openness and population revealed a negative relationship (correlation of -.21, $p < .05$), suggesting that higher levels of trade openness are associated with countries characterized by smaller populations. Conversely, countries with larger populations are associated with lower levels of trade openness with the United States.

Further examination of the relationship between trade openness, population, and security rights revealed that there is, in fact, an interaction effect occurring between trade and population which influences security rights. Table 20 reveals the pertinent results from this analysis, while the entire results can be found in Appendix E. The joint *F* test is statistically significant, suggesting the presence of an interaction effect. However,

[10] Additional diagnostics on the trade models indicated that the Bahamas was an extreme outlier as the U.S. comprises over 400% of the Bahamas trade when compared to GDP. As a result, this country was removed from the sample. Additional countries were identified as outliers by using the dfbeta test. These included Angola, Singapore and several Latin American countries. The analysis was replicated with these countries excluded; however, the variable for trade in the security rights model is never statistically significant. Given the lack of any theoretical grounds for their removal, all the countries remained in the sample except for the Bahamas.

Table 20. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights Model
U.S. Trade and Population in Non-OECD
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)

Independent Variable	Security Rights Model A
Trade Openness t-1	.02
	(.02)
Population	-.28*
	(.02)
Trade x Population	-.001
	(.01)
Joint F Test (X^2)	191.31#
Number of Cases	2174
R2	.77
Wald X2	694.64
Probability > x2	0.00

$X^2 < .05$
* $p < .05$;

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19

examining the individual slopes as population size changes reveals that no slopes are different from zero. Additionally, the *t* statistics for each slope are not statistically significant. Thus, while the functional form of the model is well-specified, the substantive results indicate that different levels of population are not statistically significant in affecting the relationship between trade and security rights. At this juncture, we can only conclude that population appears to have a dampening effect on the relationship between trade and security rights.[11]

Turning to the other U.S. economic variable of interest, investment as a

[11] The precise relationship between trade and population is not known and is beyond the scope of this research.

percentage of GDP is statistically significant and supportive of the neo-liberal view at a lag of one year (Table 19).[12] According to the results in Model C and Model D, higher levels of investment lead to higher levels of respect for security rights. The findings here support those of Meyer (1998) and Rothgeb (1989) regarding the relationship between investment and human rights. Meyer (1998), using the presence of MNCs as a variable for investment, finds their presence is positively associated with civil and political rights as well as improvements in the quality of life. Rothgeb (1989) finds that foreign investment, as measured by the level of multinational manufacturing and mining, is positively related to improved human rights conditions. In addition, these results contradict previous studies that find a negative relationship between higher levels of trade dependency and repression (Ziegenhagen 1986; Pion-Berlin 1989; Carleton 1989).

The present results indicate that a one percent increase in the level of investment relative to GDP leads to a .005 increase in the level of security rights. At first glance, this .005 increase appears to be quite weak given that the scale of security rights ranges from 1 to 5. Thus, a substantive investigation of the results is necessary. Table 21 displays the conversion of the coefficient for investment (.005) and trade (.02) from Table 19 and Table 20 respectively.[13] A sample of different countries, with mean values of trade and

[12] In the investment model, the Bahamas is again an extreme outlier as it receives over 200% of its GDP investment from the United States. As a result, it is removed from the analysis. In addition, Panama received comparable amounts of investment from the United States and was also eliminated from the sample. Additional diagnostics indicated that Liberia was also an outlier. However after observing the data, the year 1976 indicated an investment to GDP ratio of over 90% in Liberia while the remaining years were in the low teens. This suggested a data entry error and that one year of data was removed from the sample. Bahrain, Singapore, and several Latin American countries also revealed themselves as potential outliers. However, excluding them from the sample failed to change the substantive results.

[13] The coefficient for trade was used from Table 20 because the joint *F* test indicated that it is statistically significant in conjunction with population and the interaction of population and trade. The positive relationship between trade and security is also supported by the bivariate statistics and in a regression analysis with the variable for population removed.

investment, is also provided in the second and third columns. The effect on security rights is then calculated by multiplying the mean values by the coefficients and reported in the last two columns. The first conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that trade potentially has a far greater effect on security rights than investment. This is due to

Table 21. Substantive Results of Trade and Investment Effect on Security Rights

Country	Mean Values of Trade	Mean Values of Investment	Effect on Security Rights Trade# (.02)	Effect on Security Rights Investment## (.005)
Worst Records [a]	7.65	2.78	.15	.01
Worst Living Conditions [b]	4.52	1.75	.09	.01
Country A (Client-State)	22.08	20.55	.44	.10
Country B (Trade Dominant)	38.89	2.17	.78	.01
Country C (Investment Dominant)	16.35	29.53	.33	.15
	Maximum Values		Effect	
Non-OECD States	96.26	98.58	1.93	.48
OECD States	6.1	7.14	.12	.04

[a] *Countries with a security ranking of 1 or 2*
[b] *Countries with lower than a 40 on the PQLI*
\# *coefficient from the trade/population interaction model in Table 19*
\## *coefficient from the investment variable in Table 18*

the fact that trade comprises a larger percentage of GDP than investment, as well as the stronger trade coefficient from the multivariate analysis.

The countries with the worst security rights records, those with a ranking of a "1" or a "2" received an average trade to GDP ratio of 7.65 and an investment to GDP ratio

of 2.78. These countries realize an improvement in security rights from trade (.15) and investment (.01), albeit a fairly mild improvement. However, this combined effect is comparable to the influence of British colonialism. Similarly, countries with the poorest living conditions (those with less than 40 on the PQLI) have mean values of trade and investment to GDP of 4.52 and 1.75 respectively. This translates into a combined improvement of .10 in the level of security rights (again, a fairly mild improvement). What may be more important is the fact that trade and investment do not appear to inflict any harm where security rights are concerned.

While the foreign assistance program has been detrimental to U.S. allies and client-states, the benefits to security rights from trade and investment can be seen in the Country A example. In this scenario, trade and investment comprises over 40% GDP. This translates into an improvement of over half a point on the security rights scale. Countries in Latin America receive, on average, comparable levels of trade and investment from the United States.

When trade volumes become a substantial portion of GDP, like in Country B which hypothetically received approximately 39% of their GDP from trade and 2% of their GDP from investment, more drastic improvements in security rights are possible, almost .80 of one point on the security rights scale. Country C illustrates that it takes almost twice as much investment to realize half of the benefit of trade. At this point, relying on investment alone to improve security rights is insufficient. However, these results suggest that there are real benefits of trade in the area of human rights. This is particularly true when observing the differences in the amount of trade from U.S. trade to non-OECD countries versus OECD states. An increase in the level of trade to non-

OECD states, according to the results, would have positive effects on human rights. The effect of trade and investment on the maximum values of non-OECD and OECD is also provided in Table 20.

The remaining economic variables in the models perform in a similar fashion to the foreign aid models. Wealth continues to be an important factor in the realization of security rights as previous studies have found (McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). For every one thousand dollar increase in wealth per capita, security rights are improved by .05 (Model A and Model C). The effect is not as strong in the non-OECD country models. Again, contrary to the theories posited by Olson (1963) and Gurr (1968), there is no statistical evidence that economic growth leads to increases in the abuse of security rights.

The political factors perform in a similar manner as they did in the models for foreign aid. The strongest predictor remains the presence of a civil war, which leads to a decrease of almost a full point on the five-point security rights scale. The presence of an international war reveals a similar pattern, but with less severity. A country's involvement in an international war equates to a decrease of between .26 and .35, depending on the model. This result supports previous research that wars in general are detrimental to human rights (McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Poe and Tate 1994; Milner 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The end of the Cold War has had a negative effect on security rights, similar to the models of foreign assistance and supportive of the results by Milner (1998).

Regime type, in all of the models, proves to be an important factor in the realization of security rights. Democracy is in the anticipated direction and is statistically

significant, while military regimes continue to be a detriment to security rights. The remaining political variable, leftist governments, continues to be in the positive direction, albeit statistically significant only in the models for investment. The results from the leftist regime variable suggest that democratization is not the only path to improved security rights. What is evident, however, is the fact that military regimes are disastrous where human rights are concerned.

The cultural variables in the model measure the effects of population, population growth, and the legacy of British colonialism on human rights conditions. While all the variables are in the anticipated direction, the variable measuring population growth is not statistically significant. Thus, there is no statistical evidence that rapid population growth is detrimental to human rights. The results from the other population variable indicate that countries with larger populations are less likely to respect security rights within their society, consistent with previous research (Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). A history of British colonialism remains an important factor in the development and realization of security rights.

These results indicate that the variables of interest, trade and investment, do influence security rights conditions, with trade potentially having a much larger effect in non-OECD states. However, the level of trade and investment must comprise a significant portion of the recipient state's GDP to be effective, particularly in the case of investment. The effects from the maximum values of trade and investment indicate the potential benefit to security rights from factors of globalization. While it is unrealistic to believe that states will maintain such a large reliance on the United States for trade and investment as the maximum values indicate, the results from the Latin American states

indicate that security rights can be realized through increased globalization in the form of trade and investment. These results suggest that political opposition within the regime is less likely to be a target of human rights violations with increases in trade and investment with the United States. The next section of this chapter investigates whether society at large also benefits from trade and investment.

Subsistence Rights

The relationship between trade, investment and subsistence rights is presented in Table 22. Similar to models of security rights, the results include models for trade and investment for all countries and non-OECD states. The first two columns are models for trade, while the last two columns include the variable for U.S. investment. In contrast to the model for security rights, the level of trade openness in the subsistence rights model is statistically significant and in the positive direction, lending support to the neo-liberal perspective. The analyses indicate that a one percent increase in trade openness results in an increase of .29 and .20 in subsistence rights in all countries and non-OECD countries respectively.[14] Investment remains in the positive direction and statistically significant, similar to the results from the security rights model. In this instance, a one percent increase in investment, relative to GDP, equates to a .07 increase in subsistence rights in

[14] As in the security rights model, the Bahamas were eliminated from the sample in the trade model for subsistence rights due to their overwhelming dependence on the U.S. for trade. However, additional countries also revealed themselves as possible outliers, specifically Angola, Singapore, Haiti, Honduras, and Mozambique. The analysis was repeated with these countries excluded. Since the results, both statistically and substantively, were not altered and given the lack of theoretical grounds for their elimination, these countries were kept in the sample presented in the text.

Table 22. Multivariate Analyses: Subsistence Rights Models

Independent Variable	All Countries Model A	Non-OECD Model B	All Countries Model C	Non-OECD Model D
Constant	41.72*	42.21*	53.14*	43.56*
	(7.65)	(7.19)	(8.43)	(9.82)
ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Trade Openness t-1	.29*	.20*		
	(4.42)	(4.41)		
Investment t-1			.07*	.07*
			(.03)	(.03)
Economic Standing	1.14*	2.06*	1.04*	1.99*
	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)	(.17)
Economic Growth[#]	-1.49	-1.74	-1.10	-1.27
	(1.17)	(1.15)	(.95)	(.96)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.71*	.73*	.83*	.70*
	(.16)	(.15)	(.10)	(.13)
Leftist Government[#]	-1.13	.38	-6.08*	-6.39*
	(1.17)	(.89)	(1.85)	(1.65)
Military Government	-6.20*	-6.13*	-4.62*	-3.99*
	(1.51)	(1.40)	(.91)	(.85)
Military Burden	.04	.05	.06	.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)
Military Personnel	.004*	.004*	.001	-.001*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Civil War	-.92	-.62	-1.08	-1.26
	(.77)	(.73)	(1.11)	(.99)
International War	-.68	-.70	-.28	-.03
	(.55)	(.74)	(.54)	(.79)
Cold War[#]	1.10	1.78	2.18*	2.85*
	(.93)	(1.10)	(.89)	(1.15)
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	1.08*	.99*	.58	1.06**
	(.36)	(.35)	(.54)	(.63)
Population Change	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.09**
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)
British Influence[#]	-3.28*	-3.95*	-6.03*	-7.25*
	(1.32)	(1.21)	(1.04)	(1.19)
Buddhist	5.59*	6.83*	13.81*	18.11**
	(2.50)	(2.28)	(2.45)	(2.92)
Muslim	-11.54*	-12.34*	-12.12*	-10.24*
	(1.38)	(1.43)	(2.79)	(2.27)
Number of Cases	2093	1733	1697	1322
R^2	.91	.92	.92	.92
Wald X^2	670.20*	2587.60*	238.57*	251.35*
Probability > X^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

[#] two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10

both Model C and Model D.[15] These results, combined with the positive statistically significant results from the relationship between investment and security rights, suggest that economic factors of globalization benefit the human condition.

Having statistically significant results only indicates an empirical relationship between variables. Converting the coefficients from Table 22 into substantive results provides a more concrete appreciation of the benefits of trade and investment, as well as indicates whether the statistical results have any tangible meaning. Table 23 replicates the substantive results from the security rights models and adds two additional columns for the effect of trade and investment on subsistence rights. The first four columns are the same as in Table 21. The last two columns represent the effect of trade and investment on subsistence rights by multiplying the mean values of trade and investment with the coefficients for trade (.20) and investment (.07).

The patterns established in the security rights models continue here; that is, there is much more significant influence on subsistence rights from trade than from investment. In the client-state example (Country A), where countries have approximately 40% of their GDP tied to U.S. trade and investment, subsistence rights can see an improvement of almost 6 points. In Country B, a 38.89 trade to GDP ratio translates to an improvement of 7.78 points on the subsistence rights scale. Diffusion of the economic benefits to trade are evident as the level of subsistence rights increases.

[15] The Bahamas and Panama were removed from the sample in the investment models. Both receive over 200% of their GDP from investments from the U.S.. Diagnostics on the investment models also indicated that Liberia, Guyana, Singapore, and Bahrain were potential outliers. Their removal from the analysis did not alter the results, thus they were left in the sample that is presented in the text.

Table 23. Substantive Results of Trade and Investment on Security and Subsistence Rights

Country	Mean Values of Trade	Mean Values of Investment	Effect on: Security Rights Trade (.02)	Security Rights Investment (.005)	Subsistence Rights Trade (.20)	Subsistence Rights Investment (.07)
Worst Records #	7.65	2.78	.15	.01	1.53	.19
Worst Living Conditions ##	4.52	1.75	.09	.01	.90	.12
Country A (Client-State)	22.08	20.55	.44	.10	4.41	1.44
Country B (Trade Dominant)	38.89	2.17	.78	.01	7.78	.15
Country C (Investment Dominant)	16.35	29.53	.33	.15	3.27	2.07
	Maximum Values		Effect		Effect	
Non-OECD States	96.26	98.58	1.93	.48	19.25	6.90
OECD States	6.1	7.14	.12	.04	1.22	.49

Countries with a security ranking of a 1 or 2
Countries with less than 40 on PQLI

Thus, one can conclude that trade and investment do serve to improve human rights conditions. The plight of countries with poor security rights and the worst living conditions, it would appear, can benefit from increases in trade and investment. These results suggest that preventing or restricting trade and investment would not be in the best interests of either security or subsistence rights. These results support, ironically, the

arguments presented by conservatives on Capitol Hill regarding the potential benefits that trade to China will bring in the area of human rights. The recent passage of PNTR should serve to increase the level of trade between the U.S. and China. Thus, given the results, one might expect to see an improvement in China, particularly in the area of subsistence rights, in the coming years.

Turning to the remaining independent variables in the subsistence rights models, the two other domestic economic variables perform in a similar fashion to all the previous models. The level of economic wealth in a country is positively related to the subsistence rights experienced within the state. These results are statistically significant across all the models and consistent with previous research (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Milner 1998). The variable measuring economic growth is not statistically significant. So, while there seems to be a suggestion that rapid growth is detrimental to domestic conditions, there is no empirical evidence supporting the theories posited by Gurr (1968) and Olson (1963).

Overall, the political variables fail to perform as well in the models for trade and investment, contrary to the findings of previous results and contrary to the theoretical arguments presented. Only the level of democracy, the presence of a military regime, the size of the military, the presence of leftist governments, and the end of the Cold War in the investment models are statistically significant and in the direction hypothesized. Surprisingly, involvement in either a civil or international war has no statistically significant affect on the realization or provision of basic human needs. In addition, expenditures on the military seem to have no bearing on the regime's ability to provide for subsistence rights. A finding of no statistical significance, in either direction,

conflicts with Benoit (1973), whose study finds a positive relationship and Rosh (1986), Moon (1991) and Felice (1998) who find a negative relationship between military expenditures and the realization of basic human needs.

The social and cultural variables, for the most part, do perform well in the model of subsistence rights when trade and investment are included. Contrary to the influence of population on security rights, larger populations appear to have a positive influence on the provision of subsistence rights. This in part can be explained by a greater number of people providing for the country's basic needs. Since the hypothesis was posited in the negative direction, we must conclude that this result is not statistically significant. The direction of the variable measuring population growth is in the direction hypothesized for all the models, but is only statistically significant in the investment models for non-OECD countries (Model D). According to the results, an increase of one unit in population in non-OECD countries relates to a decrease in .09 in the level of subsistence rights.

A legacy of British colonialism, once again, proves to have a deleterious effect on a regime's ability to provide for basic human needs, particularly in the investment models. Just as in the models for foreign assistance and subsistence rights, this variable indicates that the British failed to disseminate the ability for the state to provide an adequate level of subsistence although democratic norms appeared to have transferred to the elites. The findings here contradict those of Moon (1991) whose study found that the British influence resulted in improvements in subsistence rights. His study, however, compared the influence of the British to that of French and Portuguese colonial heritage. The remaining two social/cultural variables measure the presence of a state-dominated

religion. These two variables are both statistically significant and in the direction hypothesized. In addition, they are extremely influential in the provision or inability of a state to provide basic human needs. The presence of a Muslim-dominated government decreases the level of subsistence rights by at least 10%. The findings for the variables measuring the influence of religion are consistent with that of Park (1987) and Moon (1991).

The results from the multivariate analysis of both security and subsistence rights suggest that higher levels of trade and investment, relative to GDP, translate into improved human rights conditions, thus providing support for the neo-liberal hypothesis posited. The effect is more pronounced, or realized, in the area of subsistence rights. This suggests that larger trade and investment relationships with the United States benefits society at large. The quality of life of individuals in states with higher levels of trade and investment with the United States improves as a result of this relationship. The analysis also suggests that this benefit is only just beginning to be realized, as the United States tends to trade and invest in countries with better human rights records. Increasing the portion of GDP from trade and investment in states with poor security and subsistence rights records appears to be a policy worth pursuing.

Curvilinear Relationships

Just as in the case of foreign assistance, this research hypothesizes that there is not just a simple linear relationship between trade and human rights or investment and human rights, rather a curvilinear relationship exists between trade/investment and human rights. While a full explication of this relationship is found in Chapter Four, a brief review is offered here. Dependency and neo-liberal theory provide divergent arguments regarding

the consequences of such trade and investment. In countries where there is little U.S. economic penetration in terms of trade and investment, there is subsequently little additional capital flowing into the country. At such low levels, human rights conditions may not be affected. Dependency theory, however, suggests that elites within these types of countries will actually suppress political opposition in order to provide a stable environment designed to attract investment and international capital.

As U.S. firms become more entrenched in foreign markets, a dependent relationship develops which prevents Third World countries from developing domestic industries and markets, thus quality and standard of life suffers. Accordingly, both security and subsistence rights suffer from trade and investment relationships with the U.S.. Neo-liberals, on the other hand, would argue that the diffusion of capital will benefit all in society. As foreign capital and goods penetrate society, both the standard and quality of life improves. In other words, with economic prosperity comes improved political and civil rights. Ultimately, neo-liberals view globalization, including trade and investment, as a positive sum game where all citizens in the world can improve their economic standing.

The security rights and subsistence rights models for non-OECD states from Table 19 and Table 22 were replicated with the inclusion of a quadratic term for trade and investment respectively. The results are reported in Table 24.[16] While all the coefficients are statistically significant, save the investment variable in Model B, their

[16] The complete results of this analysis, including the control variables, is available in Appendix F.

Table 24. Curvilinear Analyses: U.S. Trade and Investment in Non-OECD States (As a Percentage of GDP)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Trade Openness t-1	-.008*		.337*	
	(.004)		(.08)	
Trade Openness Squared	.001*		-.003*	
	(.0001)		(.001)	
Investment t-1		-.002		.11*
		(.004)		(.04)
Investment Squared		.0001*		-.002*
		(.0001)		(.001)
Joint F Test (X^2)	5.79##	9.12#	24.33#	8.16#
Number of Cases	2174	1606	1733	1322
R2	.77	.78	.93	.92
Wald X2	619.05	976.09	1495.33	257.26
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

$X^2 < .05$; ## $X^2 < .10$
* p < .05; ** p < .10

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22

joint significance is more important. The results indicate that the joint *F* test also is statistically significant in all four models. The null hypotheses that taken together, trade, investment and the square of each, have no affect on security and subsistence rights can be rejected.

In the original model, investment had a positive effect on security rights, however the inclusion of the square of investment inverted the direction of the coefficient (Model B). The square of investment is in the positive direction, thus indicating a curvilinear relationship. The curvilinear relationship is better appreciated in Figure 15. What is most glaring is the effect of debt on human rights. There are numerous examples in the

Figure 15. Curvilinear Relationship Between U.S. Investment and Security Rights (Non-OECD States)



sample where the United States has either withdrawn its previous investment or where the host state has incurred investment debt.[17] This failed investment relationship has a detrimental effect on security rights, specifically the process of getting out of that debt. Perhaps in efforts to attract or maintain investment, host states engage in repressive behavior in order to present a stable investment environment. This, of course, supports dependency theorists' accusations that multinational investment serves as a detriment to human rights conditions. As countries resume a positive investment relationship with the U.S., however, an improvement in security rights is realized. The greater the ratio of

[17] For example, in 1977, investment in the amount of $8540 million was withdrawn for Saudi Arabia, $834 million in Iran in 1976, $454 million from Bahrain in 1977, and $242 million from Angola in 1977. In the sample, the average amount of investment lost equates to $265 million. This loss is the mean for 111 incidences of withdrawal of U.S. investment.

U.S. investment to GDP, the more rapid improvement in security rights. This supports the neo-liberal view regarding the relationship between globalization and human rights, specifically that increased levels of trade and investment leads to improvements in economic and social conditions, including improvements in human rights conditions.

The case of trade and subsistence rights indicates a different relationship (Figure 16). In this scenario, the coefficient for trade openness is positive while the squared term possesses a negative coefficient. Again, the presence of two different directions on the coefficient suggests a curvilinear relationship. The statistically significant joint *F* test indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected that taken together, trade openness and the square of trade openness have no effect on subsistence rights. The results indicate that a shift from zero to approximately 60 in the level of trade openness can improve subsistence rights by approximately 10 points. However, there is a threshold to the benefit of trade openness. Once past approximately 60 on the trade to GDP ratio, a country no longer realizes improvements in subsistence rights, in fact, subsistence rights begin to suffer as a country becomes extremely dependent on the United States for trade. Countries in the sample that have greater than 60% of GDP in U.S. trade include Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Honduras, Trinidad, Suriname, and North Yemen.

These results indicate that the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment is more complex than a linear model allows. Contrary to the arguments

Figure 16. Curvilinear Relationship Between U.S. Trade and Subsistence Rights (Non-OECD States)



presented by the dependency camp, in general, greater levels of investment are related to an improved level of security rights. This is offered with one caveat, the ill-effects of recovering from investment debt. Neo-liberal theories of globalization are further supported by the results indicating that greater levels of trade are related to greater levels of subsistence rights. Yet, there is a point of diminishing returns as too heavy a reliance on trade from the U.S. starts to inhibit the realization of basic human needs. One explanation is that the less developed countries' reliance on primary products for trade prevents the development of industries that allow for human development in terms of skilled labor and higher wages. The next section of this chapter investigates whether

trade and investment interacts with the level of democracy and the level of wealth in their relationship with human rights.

Interaction Effects

The hypothesis that the effect of trade and investment on human rights is moderated by either the level of democracy or wealth is addressed in this section of Chapter Six. Studies have indicated that democracy and wealth are significant factors in the realization of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Moon 1991). Thus, we are interested in determining whether there is a conditional relationship whereby trade and investment have different impacts depending on the level of democracy and wealth. While a complete discussion of the hypothesized relationships is offered in Chapter Four, a brief recap is warranted. Again, the level of democracy indicates the extent that citizens can effectively participate in electing their officials and voicing their position on policies. At lower levels of democracy, local officials and the established elite have little incentive to divert the economic benefits from trade and investment to those most in need. In addition, dependency theory suggests that these same elites will suppress opposition to reforms and policies that threaten their position. At higher levels of democracy, dependency critics suggest that this mode of behavior is only increased as elites perceive their position slipping and act to preserve their status. Neo-liberals on the other hand, suggest that with an increase in the level of democracy comes greater citizen participation in policy decisions, in this case economic policy.

The level of wealth is also hypothesized to make a difference in the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment. Subsistence needs preoccupy the

daily lives of those living in the poorest of poor countries. The introduction of trade and investment dollars may slightly improve the level of subsistence, but may not affect security rights as the elites fail to perceive those in poverty as viable political adversaries. As the level of wealth increases, however, dependency theory indicates that the emerging middle class serves as a threat to the leadership of the state and increased repression will ensue. The influx of trade and investment may actually improve subsistence rights due to the benefits associated with increases in capital within the state. Neo-liberals maintain their positive sum arguments regarding the realization of political and economic rights from the influx of foreign capital. Thus, countries with increasing levels of wealth will only benefit from trade and investment relationships with the U.S..

In order to determine whether this type of relationship is significant, an interaction model is offered with democracy as the moderating variable. Two different interaction terms are created for this analysis. The first interaction term considers the relationship between trade (and investment) and democracy. The second interaction term investigates the relationship between trade (and investment) and wealth. Thus, the original equation for human rights has been changed from:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3\text{-}b_k\textit{(Remaining Control Variables)} + e$$

to

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_1X_2 + b_4\text{-}b_k\textit{(Remaining Control Variables)} + e$$

where X_1 represents trade/investment and b_1 is its coefficient, X_2 represents democracy/wealth and b_2 is its coefficient, and X_1X_2 represents the interaction term with b_3 as its coefficient.

Trade, Investment, and the Level of Democracy

Table 25 displays the results of the interaction between the two factors of globalization and democracy and their combined effect on human rights. Once again, only the variables of interest are displayed, however the full results are available in Appendix F. In every case, except Model C, the original trade or investment coefficient is no longer statistically significant. The democracy variable remains statistically significant in each model, while the interaction term is only statistically significant in Model D, investment and subsistence rights. The lack of statistical significance on these coefficients is due, in part, to the high degree of multicollinearity between the variables.[18] This high degree of multicollinearity makes the results of the joint *F* test all that more important.[19] In all four models, the joint *F* test is statistically significant, suggesting the presence of an interaction effect in all four models.

The strength of the interaction effect is calculated by taking the difference of the square multiple correlations. Using the investment and security rights model (Model B) as an example, the R^2 for the main-effects model is .7710, while the R^2 for the interaction model is .7897. The difference (.7897-.7710) equates to a 1.87% increase in the variance explained in security rights. The remaining models exhibit a comparable size effect. Of

[18] The correlation between trade and the interaction between trade and democracy is .70, while the equivalent correlation for investment is .62.

[19] A reminder here that in the analyses of interaction effects, the statistical significance of the variables of interest is no longer the primary concern considering the effects of multicollinearity. The statistically significant joint *F* test indicates that the variables, taken together, are statistically significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. Thus, the coefficients are used in the explanation of the substantive results since the joint *F* test signals their statistical significance, not the p-value traditionally used.

Table 25. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade, Investment and Level of Democracy

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Trade Openness t-1	.000001		.12*	
	(.003)		(.06)	
Democracy	.07*		.67*	
	(.01)		(.16)	
Trade x Democracy	-.0003		.02	
	(.002)		(.01)	
Investment t-1	.	.005		-.05
		(.003)		(.04)
Democracy		.05*		.67*
		(.01)		(.15)
Investment x Democracy		-.00005		.04*
		(.001)		(.01)
Joint F Test (X^2)	61.73#	50.96#	43.29#	57.57#
Number of Cases	2174	1604	1733	1322
R2	.77	.79	.93	.92
Wald X2	693.01	951.19	1955.99	260.31
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

X^2 < .05
* p < .05; ** p < .10

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22

more interest, however, is the actual substantive results of the interaction terms. The nature of the interaction term is determined with democracy serving as the moderating variable.

Initially, we could conclude from Table 25 that while trade and democracy benefit security rights, their combined effect dampens or inhibits any gains for countries on the path to greater levels of democracy. However, the substantive impact is negligible in the investment example, as the change in security rights is measured at the thousandth

decimal point. In addition, the *t* scores for the individual slopes are not statistically significant at any level of democracy. Thus, while at first glance, the interaction of trade and democracy appeared to have a negative effect on security rights, the substantive evidence does not support any claim that human rights are being negatively affected by trade and investment, even at lower levels of democracy. Once again, this provides support for the neo-liberal perspective.

The interaction effect on subsistence rights, however, suggests a very different relationship. The interaction of both trade and investment with democracy has a positive effect on subsistence rights (Table 25, Model C and Model D). Various levels of democracy are used in order to determine the varying effect of trade and investment on security rights and subsistence rights. A value of two was chosen as it is representative of countries experiencing low levels of democracy. The mean level of democracy for countries experiencing the worst living conditions (less than 30 on the PQLI) is 2.48. A value of four was chosen as it is the mean value of democracy for the entire sample. Lastly, the value of ten was chosen to represent the countries with the highest level of democracy. The mean value of OECD states in the sample is 9.87.

The coefficients (*b3*), standard errors (*SE*), and *t* statistics for the relationship between trade, democracy, and subsistence rights for the three different scenarios are displayed in Table 26. In non-OECD states, the results suggests that the more democratic a state is, the more benefit it receives to subsistence rights from trade. At higher levels

Table 26. Interaction Analyses:
Trade, Democracy and Subsistence Rights
(Non-OECD States)

Level of Democracy	*b3*	*SE*	*t*
Low (2)	.16	.059	2.71
Medium (4)	.20	.049	4.08
High (10)	.32	.055	5.82

of democracy, increases in the trade to GDP ratio are more beneficial than trade is to countries at lower levels of democracy. All of the *t* statistics are statistically significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero. At the lowest level of democracy (2), each one percent increase in trade openness translates into an increase of an additional .16 on the subsistence rights scale. This benefit is in addition to the benefit from trade alone and the benefit from democracy. At high levels of democracy (10), each one percent increase in trade openness equates to an increase of an additional .32. The effect doubles as one moves from the lowest to the highest levels of democracy.

Figure 17 provides a graphical illustration of this positive relationship.[20] The statistical and substantive evidence is supportive of the neo-liberal position. In other words, the results suggest that as the level of democracy increases (those characteristics of democracy such as greater citizen participation and the realization on the part of democratically elected leaders that their power is in jeopardy if the majority of the population are not satisfied with the economic and political conditions within the state)

[20] The pattern for investment mirrors the pattern exhibited in Figure 19 and thus is not replicated.

Figure 17. The Effect of Trade on Subsistence Rights, Conditioned upon Democracy



this leads to an increased tendency for states to provide higher levels of basic human needs.

Trade, Investment and the Level of Domestic Wealth

The second interaction effect that is hypothesized in this study is the relationship between trade/investment and wealth and their combined effect on security and subsistence rights. Table 27 presents the four models with Model A and Model B reflecting the interaction relationship between security rights and either trade or investment and Model C and Model D representing the interaction between these two

Table 27. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models U.S. Trade, Investment, and Level of Wealth

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Trade Openness t-1	-.0036**		.35*	
	(.002)		(.05)	
Wealth	.008		2.53*	
	(.01)		(.17)	
Trade x Wealth	.001*		-.05*	
	(.002)		(.01)	
Investment t-1	.	.007**		.09*
		(.004)		(.04)
Wealth		.03*		1.99*
		(.01)		(.17)
Investment x Wealth		-.001		-.004
		(.001)		(.01)
Joint F Test (X^2)	11.12#	16.39#	235.77#	200.93#
Number of Cases	2174	1604	1733	1322
R2	.77	.78	.92	.92
Wald X2	648.91	877.55	3203.90	256.10
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

$X^2 < .05$

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22

economic variables and wealth and their effect on subsistence rights. Only the variables of interest are presented, however the complete results are available in Appendix G. All of the original trade and investment variables are statistically significant in the direction from the original main-effects models. The joint *F* test is statistically significant, indicating that there is indeed the presence of an interaction effect between trade and wealth as well as between investment and wealth.

Table 28 provides the substantive results of the analysis. The nature of the interaction term is determined by wealth as the moderating variable. Three different values of wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, were selected and are listed in the first column of Table 28. The three levels represent the mean value of wealth for countries with the worst human rights records, the mean value of wealth in the sample,

Table 28. Interaction Analyses:
Trade, Wealth and Subsistence Rights
(Non-OECD States)

Level of Wealth	*b3*	*SE*	*t*
Low (2.14)	.237	.044	5.39
Medium (3.85)	.145	.045	3.22
High (15.25)	-.471	.103	-4.57

and the average level of wealth in the industrialized states. The coefficients, standard errors and *t* statistics are presented for each scenario in columns two, three and four.

These results indicate that at higher rates of per capita GDP, increases in trade have a deleterious effect on subsistence rights in non-OECD countries. All of the *t* scores are statistically significant which indicates that all of the slopes are different from zero. This relationship becomes more evident from a graphical representation which is offered in Figure 18. These results are very different than the previous analysis where the relationship between trade and subsistence rights was enhanced at higher levels of democracy. In this case, it appears that the negative effect of the interaction term dampens the combined positive effect that trade and wealth have independently.

Figure 18. The Effect of Trade on Subsistence Rights, Conditioned upon Wealth



At first glance, these results are puzzling and seem to defy the neo-liberal position. The results are also puzzling in that overall trade, as well as investment, has demonstrated a positive relationship. How then, can the combination of trade and higher levels of wealth negatively affect subsistence rights? One plausible explanation is that countries with higher levels of wealth also have higher levels of economic inequality. One measure of such economic inequality is the GINI index (Deninger and Squire 1996). A correlation test reveals that there is a negative correlation between wealth and equality (-23. $p < .05$ for 448 observations). The GINI index was not included in the model, given the limited number of observations. Economic inequality, or gap between the rich and poor within a state, speaks directly to subsistence rights. Economic inequality implies a gap between health and nutrition, as well as education. Lastly, the wealthiest of the non-OECD

countries tend to be the oil producing states of the Middle East where the gap between the wealthy and poor is staggering. In addition, the differences in treatment of women in these states also directly affects subsistence rights.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter indicates that economic factors of globalization, on the whole, benefit the human condition. This is particularly the case in the area of subsistence rights. The results further suggest that trade is far more effective in accomplishing this goal than investment. However, investment is a far more consistent influence in that it is statistically significant in every model. In addition, there is a curvilinear relationship between factors of globalization and human rights. Lastly, this analysis demonstrates that both democracy and wealth serve as moderating factors influencing the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment. The following chapter offers an integrated model that incorporates all four types of U.S. economic influence: economic aid, military aid, trade, and investment. In tandem, do these variables exhibit the same influence on security and subsistence rights? Lastly, the policy implications are addressed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INTEGRATED MODELS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This final chapter provides an examination of the combined effect of U.S. foreign aid, trade, and investment on security and subsistence rights. All of the variables of interest, along with the control variables, are integrated into one model for each dependent variable. This analysis will shed light on how various types of economic relationships with the United States simultaneously affect human rights. Specifically, this analysis offers a comparison between the effect of government funds, that is foreign assistance, and private funds or trade and investment. In other words, is government intervention or the power of the free market better suited for addressing human rights conditions? Furthermore, this chapter offers a summation of all the previous analyses and places it within the context of American foreign policy. In other words, given the results, an examination of how U.S. foreign policy might proceed in the area of human rights is offered. The chapter closes with suggestions and directions for further research.

Multivariate Analysis

Security Rights

The results from the multivariate analysis on the relationship between security rights and aid, trade, and investment relationships with the United States are reported in Table 29. The first model, Model A, represents the analysis for all countries in the sample and Model B is the analysis for non-OECD countries. The chi-square statistic signifies that the probability that these particular models occurred by chance is zero in

Table 29 Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Integrated Model
Aid, Trade, and Investment

Independent Variable	All Countries Model A	Non-OECD Model B
Constant	6.32 (.22)*	7.42 (.27)*
U.S. FACTORS		
Economic Aid t-3	-.03 (.01)*	-.04 (.01)*
Military Aid t-3	-.05 (.02)*	-.03 (.03)
Trade Openness t-1	-.003 (.002)	-.0003 (.002)
Investment t-1	.006 (.003)**	.002 (.004)
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS		
Economic Standing	.05 (.005)*	.02 (.008)*
Economic Growth#	-.08 (.11)	-.06 (11)
POLITICAL FACTORS		
Democracy	.08 (.007)*	.06 (.007)*
Leftist Government#	.34 (.10)*	.34 (.11)*
Military Government	-.11 (.07)**	-.12 (.07)**
Civil War	-.98 (.12)*	-.96 (.12)*
International War	-.25 (.10)*	-.35 (.12)*
Post-Cold War	-.29 (.05)*	-.27 (.05)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS		
Population	-.20 (.014)*	-.27 (.02)*
Population Change	-.0002 (.003)	-.005 (.003)
British Influence	.35 (.05)*	.35 (.05)*
Number of Cases	1734	1396
R^2	.83	.80
Wald X^2	1057.79	886.33
Probability > X^2	0.00	0.00

two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10

one hundred. The R^2 indicates that 83% (Model A) and 80% (Model B) of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independent variables.[1]

[1] The countries of Panama and the Bahamas were removed due to their extreme reliance on the United States for trade and investment. Familiar countries presented themselves as outliers (Somalia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Bahrain, and Costa Rica), however removing them from the sample did not alter the statistical or substantive results.

The empirical results of the variables of interest are generally reflective of the earlier analyses in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. Economic and military aid are statistically significant and in the negative direction as previously reported, however military aid is not statistically significant in the model for non-OECD states. According to the findings in Table 29, higher percentages of aid relative to GDP are related to lower levels of security rights. In Model A, the analysis for the entire sample, a one percent increase in economic aid relative to GDP translates into a decrease of .03 index points in security rights, while the same increase in military aid equates to a decrease in .05 index points in security rights. These results support the critics and dependency perspective regarding the negative effects of governmental intervention in the form of foreign assistance. The negative arguments presented regarding the relationship between the allocation and distribution of foreign aid and the recipient state's domestic conditions are confirmed in this study.

Turning to the economic globalization variables, trade openness remains in the negative direction and is still not statistically significant, just as in previous models of security rights. Investment as a percentage of GDP is in the positive direction and is statistically significant, albeit at the .10 level. According to the empirical results, a 1 percent increase in investment, relative to GDP, translates into an increase of .01 in the level of security rights when all countries are considered. The correlation between trade openness and investment as a percentage of GDP in the sample is .5974. Considering this high level of correlation and the fact that in previous models investment was statistically significant, trade and investment were removed in succession from the analysis to determine if the multicollinearity between the two was affecting the results.

When trade openness was included rather than investment, both foreign aid variables remained statistically significant and maintained their same coefficients. Trade openness was not statistically significant, but remained in the negative direction. When only non-OECD countries were included in the analysis, military aid becomes statistically significant at the .10 level, however trade openness is still not statistically significant. The analysis was replicated with the inclusion of investment rather than trade. Again, the military aid variable becomes statistically significant, but the investment variable does not. This holds for both samples.[2] In Model B, the analysis for non-OECD states, the only variable of interest that is statistically significant is economic aid. Unlike the models in the previous chapter, when combined with foreign assistance, trade and investment do not significantly affect security rights.

All of the remaining control variables in both models are statistically significant except for economic growth and change in population. This, too, is consistent with the previous models where neither of these two variables is found to be an important factor in contributing to the realization of security rights. The wealth of the citizenry remains an important factor in the determination of security rights. All of the political variables perform well in the integrated model for security rights, with the presence of conflict, both civil and international, having a very strong effect. The variables measuring the end of the Cold War confirms the analysis by Milner (1998). The post-Cold War era has witnessed a decrease in the level of security rights. It appears that the wave of

[2] An additional analysis was conducted including an interaction term for the combined effect of trade and population given the results in Chapter 6. The trade variable becomes positive, but still statistically insignificant. However, the joint *F* test indicates the presence of an interaction term. These findings are consistent with the findings in the previous chapter.

democratization unleashed at the end of the Cold War led to increased political and ethnical tension which led elites, in turn, to use repressive measures to maintain power. Regime type remains a significant factor as well. Higher levels of democracy and leftist states are both positively related to higher levels of security rights. Military regimes, on the other hand, have a detrimental effect on the realization of security rights.

In summarizing the relationship between security rights and U.S. aid, trade, and investment, the combined results in Model B suggest that, overall, foreign assistance and economic policy may not be the best approaches to altering poor human rights practices in recipient states in the area of security rights. For example, if the objective is truly improving security rights conditions in non-OECD states, then appropriating and allocating foreign assistance is not a recommended policy as there is a negative correlation between the two. Likewise, aid due to donor or national security interests should be allocated with the knowledge of its deleterious effects. While the United States, as well as most states, must juggle national security interests with other types of "low politics," in the absence of the ideological battle characteristic of the Cold War era, there seems to be little justification for the former abusing the latter. Thus, we can confidently suggest that the road to hell, human rights hell, is paved with good intentions regarding foreign assistance. That is, in spite of political rhetoric and perhaps even sincere intentions on the part of policymakers, the use of foreign aid has been demonstrated to have deleterious effects on security rights. Suggestions that aid is being allocated for the improvement of human rights simply is not supported by any evidence in this study.

On the other hand, while the results from trade and investment are generally in the positive direction, the lack of consistent statistical evidence suggests that security rights are not dramatically improved by increased trade and investment relationships. We can conclude, however, that trade and investment fail to have the negative effect on security rights in less developed countries that critics of globalization suggest.[3] Thus, it appears that national economic policies can be pursued without bringing harm, in terms of security rights, to the citizens in the states that have significant trade and investment relationships with the United States.

Subsistence Rights

The relationship between subsistence rights and U.S. aid, trade, and investment is investigated and the results are displayed in Table 30. Similar to the previous table, the independent variables are separated into U.S. factors, domestic economic factors, political factors, and finally, social and/or cultural factors. Model A is the analysis for the entire sample, while Model B is the analysis when only non-OECD states are considered. The variation of the independent variables explain 94% and 95% of the variance in the dependent variable for each respective model. The chi-square statistic indicates that the probability that these models occurred by chance is slightly above zero in one hundred.[4]

[3] Although there is a negative coefficient regarding trade and security rights, the results were not statistically significant. In addition, the inclusion of the variable for level of population influences the direction of the trade variable. This relationship deserves additional research.

[4] Just as in the security rights model, Panama and the Bahamas were removed due to their high trade and investment to GDP ratio with the United States. The countries of Guyana, Mozambique, and Liberia were revealed as possible outliers utilizing a *Dfbeta* test. However, removing these countries did not alter the results and due to the lack of any theoretical grounds, these countries were kept in the sample.

Table 30. Multivariate Analysis: Subsistence Rights Integrated Models Aid, Trade, and Investment

Independent Variable	All Countries Model A		Non-OECD Model B	
Constant	56.60	(6.60)*	48.47	(6.60)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.65	(.15)*	-.45	(.13)*
Military Aid t-3	1.15	(.24)*	.62	(.24)*
Trade Openness t-1	.21	(.04)*	.21	(.04)*
Investment t-1	.11	(.04)*	.11	(.05)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	1.01	(.06)*	1.55	(.14)*
Economic Growth#	-1.47	(.79)**	-1.49	(.91)**
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	1.12	(.17)*	.97	(.16)*
Leftist Government#	-7.57	(1.51)*	-6.30	(1.18)*
Military Government	-5.60	(.98)*	-6.00	(.99)*
Military Expenditures	.02	(.05)	.01	(.04)
Military Personnel	.002	(.001)*	.00003	(.0001)
Civil War	-1.81	(.94)**	-1.62	(.96)**
International War	-.42	(.63)	-.50	(.92)
Post-Cold War#	1.24	(.65)**	2.197	(.92)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	.13	(.40)	.65	(.40)**
Population Change	-.04	(.03)	-.08	(.04)**
British Influence#	-1.44	(.67)*	-3.54	(.76)*
Muslim	-7.20	(1.88)*	-6.89	(1.59)*
Buddhist	16.89	(2.27)*	20.01	(2.09)*
Number of Cases	1491		1166	
R^2	.94		95	
Wald X^2	2306.19		16218.70	
Probability > X^2	0.00		0.00	

two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10

Turning to the variables of interest, foreign aid, trade, and investment are all statistically significant regardless of the country sample. The directions of the

coefficients are consistent with the results of the previous analyses on aid in Chapter Five and trade and investment in Chapter Six. Again, there is a dual affect of aid on subsistence rights. Economic aid, as previously found, is negatively associated with subsistence rights. Concentrating on the model of non-OECD states (Model B), a one percent increase in economic aid as a percentage of GDP translates into a decrease of .45 in the level of subsistence rights. The consistent negative performance of the economic aid variable suggests that there are seemingly no long-term human rights benefits to the allocation of economic aid.[5]

The results from the economic aid variable seem to be offset by the benefit of military aid, which indicates that the level of subsistence rights improves by .62 with each one percent higher level of military aid to GDP. However, one should keep in mind that, on average, the level of economic aid is much higher than the level of military aid, as percentages of GDP, and more importantly that any positive benefit realized in the area of subsistence rights from military aid is accompanied by extreme negative effects on security rights. Lastly, the analysis on military aid and subsistence rights in Chapter Six indicated that there was a threshold effect to the benefits of military aid. This curvilinear effect remains consistent in the integrated model.

The results from the trade and investment variables in Table 29 are consistent across the two models, indicating that a one percent increase in trade and investment, relative to GDP, translates into an increase in subsistence rights by .21 and .11 respectively. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, trade continues to maintain a

[5] This research cannot make a conclusion regarding emergency humanitarian aid for such natural disasters as earthquakes or flooding.

stronger influence on the realization of subsistence rights than investment, in this case almost twice the influence. Contrary to the prospect of U.S. government funding improving human rights conditions, the potential for improvements in basic human needs from trade and investment appear boundless, save any government intervention to obstruct such relationships. American businesses, as well as politicians interested in continuing the pattern of American prosperity, can forge ahead with these seemingly self-interested motivations as their economic gain also serves to benefit citizens in other states. The assertion by Pritchard (1989, 1) that there is a "tenet of faith among politicians, financiers, and academicians" that "economic development enhances human rights conditions" isn't simply a prayer or a leap of faith, but rather a substantiated reality.

The interaction analysis unveiled, however, an interesting caveat regarding the relationship between trade and subsistence rights depending on the level of wealth in the recipient state. The consequence of high levels of wealth, many argue, is not all good. Societies experiencing high levels of wealth, particularly non-OECD states, also experience a great deal of economic inequality. In such countries, higher levels of trade do not alleviate poor living conditions among the majority of the citizens. Overall, however, these results indicate that the relationship between external economic factors such as trade and investment is associated with enhanced human rights conditions. Thus, not only is domestic wealth or economic development important, but the international community, in its pursuit of economic prosperity, can generate a human rights by-product – improved standards of living or subsistence rights among non-OECD states.

In the integrated model for subsistence rights, the control variables also perform better than in the separate models of subsistence rights reported in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. For example, economic growth is statistically significant at the .10 level and in the direction posited by Olson (1963) and Gurr (1968). According to these results, greater rates of economic growth lead to lower levels of subsistence rights. Thus, all the economic variables in both models are important and statistically significant factors in the realization of subsistence rights.

As for the political factors, all of the variables are statistically significant except for the level of military expenditures and the presence of an international war. Regime type is extremely important in the provision of basic human needs with leftist and military governments proving to be incapable of providing citizens with adequate levels of subsistence. On the other hand, countries that are the most democratic (10 on the Polity III scale) realize an improvement of approximately 10 points on the physical quality of life index. Other political variables perform in the direction predicted. As expected, the presence of a civil war is detrimental to the state's ability to provide basic human needs. However, the end of the Cold War has led to an increase in the realization of subsistence rights.

The remaining variables reflect various social and cultural factors within a society. The variables measuring population and population growth are only statistically significant in Model B, the analysis for non-OECD states. In that model, countries characterized by larger populations are more likely to have higher levels of subsistence rights, contrary to the hypothesis. Population growth, on the other hand, is in the hypothesized direction indicating that greater rates of population growth are detrimental

to a state's ability to provide for basic human needs. The legacy of British colonialism remains a negative influence on the provision of subsistence rights. As previously mentioned, this may be due in part to the fact that while the British were able to instill democratic norms that are important in the realization of security rights, they were unable to transfer an ability to provide for the subsistence needs of the citizenry. The influence of a state-dominated religion is remarkable. Those states characterized as Muslim suffer approximately 7 points on the subsistence rights scale, while states that are predominantly Buddhist receive between almost 17 and 20 points on the scale.

In order to appreciate these results in a substantive manner, several examples used in previous chapters are replicated in Table 31.[6] U.S. governmental interference in the case of economic aid proves, statistically and substantively, to be detrimental to subsistence rights. For example, the countries with the worst security rights and those countries suffering the worst living conditions experience a decrease in the level of subsistence of .42 and .84 respectively. For countries with an even greater reliance on U.S. aid, such as Country C and Country D, the level of subsistence is decreased by 3.32 and 2.13 index points respectively. While military aid demonstrates a positive relationship with subsistence rights, one must recall that the effect on security rights is even more devastating and makes the trade-off between the effect on subsistence rights and the effect on security rights unacceptable. This is particularly the case when alternative means of improving subsistence rights are available – mainly the private marketplace.

[6] Given the lack of statistical results for the security rights model, except for the economic aid variable, the results were not transformed into any substantive examples.

Table 31. Substantive Results of Aid, Trade, and Investment on Subsistence Rights

Country	Mean Values				Effect on: Subsistence Rights			
	Economic Aid	Military Aid	Trade	DFI	Economic Aid (-.45)	Military Aid (.62)	Trade (.21)	DFI (.11)
Worst Records #	.94	.18	7.65	2.78	-.42	.11	1.61	.31
Worst Living Conditions ##	1.87	.17	4.52	1.75	-.84	.11	.95	.19
Country A (Client-States)	1.33	.12	22.08	20.55	-.59	.07	4.63	2.26
Country B (Allied State)	3.77	5.18	14.05	2.65	-1.70	3.21	2.96	.29
Country C (African State)	7.37	2.01	4.11	.36	-3.32	1.25	.86	.04
Country D (Investment Dominant)	4.74	.48	15.87	28.92	-2.13	.30	3.33	3.18

Countries with a security ranking of 1 and 2
Countries with a PQLI less than 40

The substantive effects of trade and investment on subsistence rights are presented in the last two columns of Table 31. These substantive results illustrate the statistical results, specifically that the path to improved subsistence rights is primarily through the private sector in the form of trade and investment. In this case, the self-motivated intentions of American businesses and firms, as well as the U.S. government, are positively associated with higher levels of subsistence rights. The example of the client-states, Country A, ealize a combined effect of almost 7 points on the physical quality of life index due to increased levels of globalization. At the same time, this

benefit is not undermined by any perceptible ill effects that trade and investment have on security rights. Thus, governmental interference in the marketplace would seem to indirectly inhibit or prevent the positive effects of trade and investment on subsistence rights, as well as security rights.

Summary of Results and the Effect on American Foreign Policy

This research set out to accomplish several objectives. The first objective was to embark on an investigation of a little studied phenomenon – the consequences of American foreign assistance and economic policy in relation to human rights. The empirical analyses in Chapter Five, Chapter Six, and in the present chapter have led to several basic conclusions regarding the relationship between human rights and varying levels of U.S. aid, trade, and investment in recipient states. First, the source, or type, of dollars flowing into non-OECD states seems to matter. The empirical results indicate that there are, indeed, dire as well as beneficial consequences of such policies. The dire consequences stem from the U.S. foreign assistance program. Over and over, the empirical results indicate that human rights conditions are negatively affected by economic and military aid from the United States. Although military aid is positively associated with the realization of basic human needs, the ill-effect on security rights negates military aid has a preferable means of improving the standard of living of citizens around the world.

The recent $1.6 billion foreign assistance program to Colombia, which most human rights activists oppose, would seem to be a bad human rights policy on the part of the United States. As a policy of national security, the likelihood for curbing the trafficking and supply of drugs into the United States is suspect. Congressman Ramstad

pointed out previous failures at attacking the domestic drug problem at its source: "over the last 10 years…the Federal Government has spent $150 million to combat the supply of illegal drugs. Yet the cocaine market is glutted, as always, and heroin is readily available at record high purities…Our drug eradication and interdiction efforts have also been costly failure" (Ramstad 2000).

The relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment, however, is more promising. Positive consequences, particularly in the case of subsistence rights, bode well for the future as the trend of economic globalization is not likely to reverse. While critics of globalization push for "fair trade" rather than free trade, the results suggest that the quality of life for those currently suffering in substandard living conditions can be improved by greater levels of trade and investment. The PNTR debates where China is concerned will undoubtedly continue as certain lawmakers strive to limit trade due to poor human rights records. These results, however, suggest that isolating human rights violators from participating in the international economy may not be the best approach to solving their human rights conditions. These results cannot speak directly to the effects of economic sanctions or other means of what Donnelly refers to as "positive non-intervention"; however, obstructing the flow of trade and investment into less developed countries seems to be a lost opportunity to improve the lot of the majority of the citizens within a state.

In summary, dollars in the form of U.S. foreign assistance have a very different relationship with human rights conditions than dollars in the form of U.S. trade and investment. According to this research, the most effective means of accomplishing improved human rights is through the private sector in the form of trade and investment.

Thus, the U.S. government should refrain from manipulating the market in the name of human rights, as this research has demonstrated that states with a healthy trade and investment relationship with the United States exhibit higher levels of human rights conditions, or at least these relationships fail to harm conditions.

Second, it was suggested that focusing on the United States was important and the evidence bears this out. Levels of U.S. aid, trade, and investment matter and the role of the United States in the increasing globalization of the international economy as well as its perceived political leadership, at least among democratic states, suggests that its power and influence in the international system will only continue. Third, the development of two separate models was fruitful in that the evidence indicates that U.S. influence on human rights is not one-dimensional. That is, the United States should broaden its focus beyond security rights to include on an equal footing economic or subsistence rights. While security rights violations capture the attention of governments, NGOs, IGOs, and especially the media, the plight of a larger number of the world's citizenry is affected by poor levels of subsistence rights.

Fourth, the inclusion of key independent variables provided a more complete picture of the various economic, political, and social factors relevant to the realization of human rights. Previous studies have not included the post-Cold War era, mainly due to the lack of data and the timing of the research. The results indicate that with democratization comes the potential for political unrest and subsequent repression. In terms of subsistence rights, however, the end of the Cold War has allowed for improvements in the provision of basic human needs. This may be a function of previous

socialist states opening up to international markets and the infusion of capital and goods which serve to improve levels of subsistence.

Additional variables were posited with competing hypotheses. For example, the models indicated, leftist (or socialist) regimes were incapable of providing basic human needs and their inward economic focus may be to blame. However, they were not as likely to abuse the security rights of its citizens contrary to the theory supplied by Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1979). Economic growth failed to be a factor in the majority of the models and leads to the conclusion that there is little, if any, empirical evidence that rapid economic growth has any affect on human rights conditions. Lastly, the legacy of British colonialism has led to two opposing outcomes. First, the results indicate that the former British colonies experience higher levels of respect for security rights. Second, the British failed to transfer the ability or knowledge of how to go about providing the basic needs for the majority of the citizens.

Lastly, the target of human rights abuse, or the type of human rights, makes a difference.

> U.S. foreign policy probably could not, and almost certainly should not, concern itself with the performance of other governments in honoring every one of these internationally recognized human rights. The policy must in practice assign priority to some rights over others. It is not entirely clear so far either which rights are receiving priority or which rights ought to receive primacy in U.S. foreign policy…. the so-called "economic rights," which I shall call subsistence rights, ought to be among those that receive priority" (Shue 1980, 5)

The evidence from this research confirms the position posited by Shue (1980). While the United States has traditionally focused on security rights in their linkage to foreign policy, the United States has a far better opportunity to improve the level of subsistence

rights in other states. In turn, the improvement of such basic human needs should factor into the improvement of security rights. In fact, security rights and subsistence rights are positively correlated with one another, indicating that higher levels of subsistence rights are associated with higher levels of security rights (Milner, Poe and Leblang 1999).[7] Further analysis will have to be undertaken in order to adequately investigate the nature of the relationship between the two, however, it seems quite intuitive that these two rights are interrelated, or what Donnelly (1989) refers to as "interdependent." Thus, improvement in one subset of rights should equate to improvements in the other.

Further Research and Conclusion

This study has addressed the relationship between human rights conditions and U.S. aid, trade, and investment. In doing so, paths for further research were uncovered. First, while focusing on the United States is important and was of primary interest for this research, future research needs to examine the role of other industrialized states and the influence of aid, trade, and investment from those states. In the area of foreign assistance, additional studies should examine the differences between bilateral and multilateral trade as the motives for bilateral foreign assistance appear to obfuscate the original purpose of the assistance.

In terms of globalization, future research should attempt to flush out the role of population size in the trade and human rights relationship. In addition, the role of finance capital, as another component of economic globalization, should be investigated to determine if decisions and/or loans from the IMF or World Bank contribute to human

[7] The correlation between security rights and subsistence rights in the entire sample is .37 ($p < .05$) and .21 ($p < .05$) for non-OECD states.

rights conditions. The role of other facets of globalization, increased communication and technology for example, are also bound to play a role in the realization of human rights and should be considered in future research on human rights.

In the area of foreign policy, there is a need for research on the role of strategic concerns, particularly as they apply to donor interest or donor intent. This type of investigation could address the exact nature of the trade-off between national security needs and human rights. Lastly, future research should continue to focus on the wide range of human rights as it relates to foreign policy. The United States funds many development programs, such as those through the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as food and health programs. The effect of this type of assistance needs to be investigated.

The question posed by this research sought to discover whether the intentions or rhetoric of policymakers were valid when it comes to human rights. Does the allocation of foreign assistance improve human rights conditions? Will the lives of citizens in Colombia improve as a result of the $1.6 billion foreign aid package? Does trade actually bring improvements to the quality and standard of life? Will trade with China bring democracy and improved levels of subsistence? The philosophy of Adam Smith, writing over 200 years ago, seems to be relevant to this study.

> The uniform, constant and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite, not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor (Smith, *The Wealth of Nations, Book II Chapter III*).

According to Smith, the market will provide, naturally, for improvement, even in the face of government forays into the economy. There is a great deal of irony in that government intervention for the purpose of human rights appears more harmful than the selfish motives of free enterprise and its subsequent influence on human rights conditions. It seems that it is more appropriate to say to hell with the good intentions of governments, the path to human rights heaven is paved with free trade and investment.

Appendix A. Economic and Military Aid Distributed to OECD States
(in 1992 dollars; in millions)

Country	Year	Economic Aid	Military Aid
Austria	1978		.237837
Austria	1984		.1321229
Austria	1986		.1245847
Austria	1987		.1205914
Austria	1988		.1161413
Austria	1991	.4106323	
Austria	1992	.2	
Austria	1993	.292062	
Finland	1978		.237837
Finland	1986		.1245847
Finland	1987		.1205914
Finland	1988		.1161413
Germany	1993	.5841241	
Ireland	1986	62.29236	
Ireland	1987	42.207	
Ireland	1988	40.64944	
Ireland	1992	39.8	
Italy	1976	1.891255	
Italy	1977	6.679471	
Italy	1978	46.9728	
Italy	1979	6.634288	
Italy	1980	5.070875	
Italy	1981	7.200543	
Italy	1982	75.38423	
Italy	1983	18.24539	
Italy	1984	13.21229	
Italy	1985	2.169787	
Italy	1987	.1205914	

Country	Year	Economic Aid	Military Aid
Spain	1978	14.03238	274.8206
Spain	1979	12.91317	302.334
Spain	1980	11.83204	212.8077
Spain	1981	11.18382	193.3423
Spain	1982	31.77113	183.4061
Spain	1983	16.58672	556.3461
Spain	1984	15.85474	532.4551
Spain	1985	15.31614	514.2394
Spain	1986	14.32724	479.9004
Spain	1987	6.029572	130.2387
Spain	1988	3.71652	2.78739
Spain	1989		2.33623
Spain	1990		2.025855
Spain	1991		1.539871
Spain	1992		.9
Spain	1993		.292062
Spain	1995		.0933633

Appendix B. Curvilinear Analyses:
Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models for U.S. Aid
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.73 (.32)*	7.39 (.31)*	58.11 (7.61)*	50.80 (7.64)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.07 (.02)*		-1.16 (.31)*	
Economic Aid Squared	.003 (.002)*		.06 (.02)*	
Military Aid t-3		-.09 (.05)*		1.28 (.47)*
Military Aid Squared		.003 (.004)		-.09 (.04)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)*	1.97 (.12)*	1.96 (.13)*
Economic Growth	.03 (.09)	.01 (.09)	-.51 (1.28)	-.84 (1.40)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.07 (.01)*	.06 (.01)*	.85 (.13)*	.79 (.13)*
Leftist Government	.16 (.10)	.19 (.10)**	-1.09 (1.01)	-.29 (1.02)
Military Government	-.10 (.06)**	-.11 (.06)**	-4.16 (.85)*	-4.64 (.88)*
Military Expenditures			.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Military Personnel			.01 (.001)*	.005 (.001)*
Civil War	-.95 (.12)*	-.96 (.11)*	-1.61 (.71)*	-1.88 (.69)*
International War	-.31 (.09)*	-.29 (.09)*	-.78 (.95)	-.14 (.91)
Post-Cold War	-.27 (.05)*	-.29 (.09)*	1.44 (.94)	1.57 (.94)**
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.28 (.02)*	.26 (.05)*	-.02 (.45)	.46 (.44)
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
British Influence	.27 (.04)*	.25 (.04)*	-2.83 (1.14)*	-4.64 (1.12)*
Buddhist			-2.77 (3.89)	4.62 (2.19)*
Muslim			-10.61 (1.16)*	-9.49 (1.24)*
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.79	.92	.92
Wald X2	604.66	573.44	1196.71	742.88
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix C. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Aid and Democracy
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.65 (.32)*	7.40 (.32)*	49.06 (8.75)*	50.22 (8.23)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.02 (.02)		-.53 (.17)*	
Democracy	.07 (.02)*		.72 (.14)*	
Economic Aid x Democracy	-.004 (.002)**		.03 (.03)	
Military Aid t-3		-.04 (.02)		.15 (.26)
Democracy		.07 (.02)*		.75 (.13)*
Military Aid x Democracy		-.02 (.01)*		.17 (.08)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	.01 (.01)**	.02 (.01)*	1.99 (.13)*	1.96 (.13)*
Economic Growth	.01 (.09)	.01 (.09)	-.51 (1.46)	-.86 (1.41)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Leftist Government	.19 (.10)**	.19 (.10)**	-.67 (1.10)	-.21 (1.05)
Military Government	-.11 (.06)*	-.11 (.06)**	-4.00 (.87)*	-4.52 (.89)*
Military Expenditures			.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Military Personnel			.01 (.001)*	.01 (.001)*
Civil War	-.94 (.11)*	-.95 (.10)*	-1.42 (.71)*	-2.07 (.69)*
International War	-.30 (.09)*	-.28 (.09)*	-.42 (.92)	-.21 (.90)
Post-Cold War	-.26 (.05)*	-.27 (.05)*	1.53 (.94)**	1.56 (.94)**
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.28 (.02)*	-.27 (.02)*	.53 (.51)	.49 (.48)
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
British Influence	.26 (.04)*	.25 (.04)*	-3.15 (1.14)*	-4.40 (1.20)*
Buddhist			-.70 (3.32)	4.37 (2.16)*
Muslim			-9.81 (1.08)*	-9.38 (1.22)*
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.79	.91	.92
Wald X2	603.59	678.87	1046.97	705.56
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix D. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Aid and Wealth
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.66 (.32)*	7.41 (.32)*	51.48 (8.06)*	52.05 (8.00)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Economic Aid t-3	-.02 (.01)*		-.58 (.16)*	
Wealth	.02 (.02)*		1.93 (.13)*	
Economic Aid x Wealth	-.01 (.01)**		.18 (.06)*	
Military Aid t-3		-.05 (.03)		.85 (.33)*
Wealth		.07 (.02)*		1.98 (.13)*
Military Aid x Wealth		-.01 (.01)		-.14 (.10)
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Growth	.02 (.09)	.01 (.09)	-.58 (1.41)	-.84 (1.39)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.07 (.01)*	.07 (.01)*	.79 (.13)*	.79 (.13)*
Leftist Government	.18 (.10)**	.19 (.10)**	-1.13 (1.15)	-.26 (1.02)
Military Government	-.10 (.06)**	-.11 (.06)**	-4.04 (.84)*	-4.60 (.89)*
Military Expenditures			.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Military Personnel			.01 (.001)*	.01 (.001)*
Civil War	-.94 (.11)*	-.96 (.11)*	-1.77 (.71)*	-1.80 (.69)*
International War	-.29 (.09)*	-.29 (.09)*	-.55 (.92)	-.23 (.91)
Post-Cold War	-.27 (.05)*	-.26 (.05)*	1.53 (.93)**	1.55 (.94)**
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.28 (.02)*	-.27 (.02)*	.39 (.47)	.39 (.47)
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
British Influence	.26 (.04)*	.25 (.04)*	-3.37 (1.17)*	-4.88 (1.13)*
Buddhist			-.98 (3.60)	4.51 (2.16)*
Muslim			-9.29 (1.10)*	-9.56 (1.26)*
Number of Cases	1894	1894	1536	1536
R2	.79	.79	.91	.92
Wald X2	614.13	725.96	1031.45	719.36
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix E. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights Model
U.S. Trade and Population
(Non-OECD States)

Independent Variable	Security Rights Model A
Constant	7.31 (.33)*
U.S. FACTORS	
Trade Openness t-1	.02 (.02)
Population	-.26 (.02)*
Trade x Population	-.002 (.01)
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS	
Economic Standing	.02 (.01)*
Economic Growth	-.01 (.08)
POLITICAL FACTORS	
Democracy	.06 (.01)*
Leftist Government	.09 (.09)
Military Government	-.12 (.06)*
Civil War	-.83 (.11)*
International War	-.34 (.08)*
Post-Cold War	-.20 (.05)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS	
Population Change	.001 (.002)
British Influence	.17 (.05)*
Number of Cases	2174
R2	.77
Wald X2	694.64
Probability > x2	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix F. Curvilinear Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade and Investment
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.51 (.31)*	7.11 (.30)*	37.86 (7.06)*	44.11 (9.62)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Trade Openness t-1	-.01 (.004)*		.34 (.08)*	
Trade Openness Squared	.0001 (.0001)*		-.003 (.001)*	
Investment t-1		-.002 (.004)		.11 (.04)*
Investment Squared		.0001 (.0001)*		-.002 (.001)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	.02 (.01)*	.03 (.01)*	2.13 (.14)*	1.97 (.16)*
Economic Growth	-.02 (.08)	-.12 (.10)	-1.76 (1.14)	-1.07 (.98)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.06 (.01)*	.06 (.01)*	.81 (.15)*	.70 (.13)*
Leftist Government	.08 (.09)	.31 (.10)*	.33 (.98)	-6.63 (1.66)*
Military Government	-.12 (.05)*	-.14 (.06)*	-6.00 (1.37)*	-4.05 (.85)*
Military Expenditure			.04 (.04)	.03 (.05)
Military Personnel			.004 (.001)*	-.001 (.001)
Civil War	-.84 (.11)*	-.88 (.12)*	-.68 (.73)	-1.24 (.99)
International War	-.34 (.09)*	-.35 (.10)*	-.76 (.75)	-.01 (.80)
Post-Cold War	-.21 (.05)*	-.24 (.05)*	1.92 (1.11)**	2.90 (1.16)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.27 (.02)*	-.25 (.02)*	1.23 (.34)*	1.04 (.62)**
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.01 (.003)	-.05 (.03)	-.09 (.05)**
British Influence	.18 (.04)*	.33 (.05)*	-4.65 (1.21)*	-7.62 (1.19)*
Buddhist			7.93 (2.19)*	18.48 (2.86)*
Muslim			-12.25 (1.39)*	-10.22 (2.23)*
Number of Cases	2174	1606	1733	1322
R2	.77	.78	.93	.92
Wald X2	619.05	976.09	1495.33	257.26
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix G. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade, Investment and Democracy
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.47 (.31)*	7.19 (.30)*	44.58 (7.65)*	46.67 (10.55)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Trade Openness t-1	.000001 (.003)		.12 (.06)*	
Democracy	.07 (.01)		.67 (.16)	
Trade x Democracy	-.0003 (.001)		.02 (.01)*	
Investment t-1		.005 (.003)		-.05 (.04)
Democracy		.05 (.01)		.67 (.15)
Investment x Democracy		-.0001 (.001)		.04 (.01)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	.02 (.01)*	.03 (.01)*	2.12 (.14)*	1.97 (.18)*
Economic Growth	-.02 (.08)	-.11 (.10)	-1.79 (1.11)	-1.19 (.97)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.07 (.01)*	.05 (.01)*	.67 (.16)*	.67 (.15)*
Leftist Government	.10 (.09)	.31 (.10)*	.12 (.93)	-6.56 (1.56)*
Military Government	-.12 (.06)*	-.14 (.06)*	-6.16 (1.39)*	-4.07 (.83)*
Military Expenditures			.04 (.04)	.02 (.05)
Military Personnel			.004 (.001)*	-.0004 (.001)
Civil War	-.84 (.11)*	-.88 (.12)*	-.69 (.73)	-1.35 (1.01)
International War	-.34 (.08)*	-.35 (.10)*	-.68 (.72)	-.05 (.79)
Post-Cold War	-.20 (.05)*	-.24 (.05)	1.78 (1.08)**	2.93 (1.16)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.27 (.02)*	-.26 (.02)*	.90 (.37)*	.89 (.68)
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.01 (.003)	-.04 (.03)	-.09 (.05)**
British Influence	.19 (.04)*	.32 (.05)*	-4.29 (1.31)*	-7.07 (1.20)*
Buddhist			6.34 (2.31)*	18.06 (2.88)*
Muslim			-12.73 (1.45)*	-10.46 (2.26)*
Number of Cases	2174	1604	1733	1322
R2	.77	.79	.93	.93
Wald X2	693.01	951.19	1955.99	260.31
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

Appendix H. Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade, Investment and Wealth
(Non-OECD States)

	Security Rights		Subsistence Rights	
Independent Variable	**Model A**	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**
Constant	7.55 (.31)*	7.15 (.31)*	37.88 (6.73)*	43.79 (9.83)*
U.S. FACTORS				
Trade Openness t-1	-.004 (.002)**		.35 (.05)*	
Wealth	.008 (.01)*		2.53 (.17)	
Trade x Wealth	.001 (.001)*		-.05 (.01)*	
Investment t-1		.01 (.004)**		.09 (.04)*
Wealth		.03 (.01)*		1.99 (.17)*
Investment x Wealth		-.001 (.001)		-.004 (.01)
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS				
Economic Standing	.01 (.01)	.03 (.01)*	2.53 (.17)*	2.00 (.17)*
Economic Growth	-.01 (.08)	-.10 (.10)	-1.85 (1.13)**	-1.22 (.94)
POLITICAL FACTORS				
Democracy	.07 (.01)*	.05 (.01)*	.70 (.16)*	.69 (.13)*
Leftist Government	.10 (.09)	.32 (.10)*	.59 (.83)	-6.37 (1.62)*
Military Government	-.13 (.06)*	-.14 (.06)*	-6.13 (1.39)*	-3.97 (.85)*
Military Expenditures			.03 (.04)	.03 (.05)
Military Personnel			.004 (.001)*	-.001 (.001)
Civil War	-.84 (.11)*	-.88 (.12)*	-.33 (.72)	-1.24 (.98)
International War	-.34 (.08)*	-.35 (.10)*	-.68 (.71)	.05 (.79)
Post-Cold War	-.21 (.05)*	-.24 (.05)*	1.70 (1.05)	2.87 (1.15)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS				
Population	-.27 (.02)*	-.26 (.02)*	1.18 (.34)*	1.05 (.63)**
Population Change	.001 (.002)	.01 (.003)	-.04 (.03)	-.09 (.05)**
British Influence	.18 (.04) *	.33 (.05)*	-3.39 (1.15)*	-7.27 (1.17)*
Buddhist			7.67 (2.28)*	18.04 (2.91)*
Muslim			-11.97 (1.40)*	-10.34 (2.28)*
Number of Cases	2174	1604	1733	1322
R2	.77	.78	.92	.92
Wald X2	648.91	877.55	3203.90	256.10
Probability > x2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

* p < .05; ** p < .10

REFERENCES

------ United National Economic and Social Council.

------1948. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. United Nations.

------1951. *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. United Nations.

------1975. *Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*. United Nations.

------1975. *Helsinki Agreement*. United Nations

------1976. *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. United Nations.

------1976. *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*. United Nations.

------1979. *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. United Nations.

------1986. *United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development.* United Nations.

Achen, Christopher. 2000. "Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables." Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodological Section of the American Political Science Association.

Alafatooni. Afra and Michael Allen. 1991. "Government Sanction and Collective Political Protest in Periphery and Semiperiphery States: A Time Series Analysis." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 19:29-45.

Apodaca, Clair and Michael Stohl. 1999. "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:185-98.

Army, Richard. 2000. Congressional Testimony on May 9, 2000. www.usinfo.state.gove/regional/ea/uschina/pntrdbte.htm

Baehr, Peter R. *The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Ballenger, Cass. 2000a. Congressional Testimony available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/~r106M7wGUq::

Ballenger, Cass. 2000a. Congressional Testimony available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/~r106Nye2Zo::

Banfield, Edward C. 1963. *American Foreign Aid Doctrine*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Baran, Paul. 1957. *The Political Economy of Growth.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Barbieri, Katherine and Christian Davenport. 1997. "Pacific Inducement or Terrorist Impulse: Investigating the Relationship between Trade-Dependency and the Violation of Human Rights." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, September 1997.

Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan Katz. 1995. "What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," *American Political Science Review* 89:634-47.

Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan Katz. 1996. "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series Cross-Section Models," *Political Analysis* 6:1-34.

Beetham, David. 1998. "Democracy and Human Rights: Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural." In *Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges*, ed. Janusz Symonides. Dartmouth: Ashgate Publishing.

Benoit, Emile. 1973. *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1994. "Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America." *International Interactions* 19:339-58.

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1999. "Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 36:233-44.

Bollen, Kenneth. 1983. "World System Position, Dependency, and Democracy." *American Sociological Review* 48:468-79.

Bollen, Kenneth A. and Robert W. Jackman. 1995. "Income Inequality and Democracy Revisited: Comment on Muller." *American Sociological Review* 60:983-89.

Bond, Doug and Joe Bond. 1995. *Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) Codebook for the P24 Data Set.*

Bosco, David. 1998. "Sovereign Myopia." *The American Prospect* 41:24-7.

Boswell, T. and William Dixon. 1990. "Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 55:540-57.

Bowen, Janine L. 1998. *Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.* Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Brenkert, George. 1992. "Can We Afford International Human Rights?" *Journal of Business Ethics* 1:515-21.

Brockett, Charles. 1992. "Measuring Political Violence and Land Inequality in Central America." *American Political Science Review* 86:169-76.

Brown, Sherrod. 2000. Congressional Testimony on May 9, 2000. www.usinfo.state.gove/regional/ea/uschina/pntrdbte.htm

Brown, William A. 1953. *American Foreign Assistance*. Washington: Brookings Institute.

Cardosa, Fernando Henrique. 1979. "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America." In *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,* ed. David Collier. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carleton, David. 1989. "The New International Division of Labor, Export-Oriented Growth, and State Repression in Latin America." In *Dependence, Development, and State Repression*, eds. George Lopez and Michael Stohl. New York: Greenwood Press.

Carleton, David and Michael Stohl. 1985. "The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 31:1002-18.

Cassesse, Antonio. 1999. "Are Human Rights Truly Universal?" In *The Politics of Human Rights*, ed. Obrad Savic. London & New York: Verso.

Charemza, Wojciech, and Derek F. Deadman. 1972. *New Directions in Econometric Practice : General to Specific Modelling, Cointegration, and Vector Autoregression.* Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Chenery, H.B. and A.M. Strout. 1966. "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development." *American Economic Review* 56:679-733.

Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman. 1979. *The Political Economy of Human Rights*. Boston, MA: Sound End.

Clark, Barry. 1991. *Political Economy: A Comparative Approach*. New York: Praeger.

Cingranelli, David L. and Thomas E. Pasquarello. 1985. "Human Rights Practices and the U.S. Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 29:539-63.

Cingranelli, David L. 1993. *Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:407-17.

Claude, Richard Pierre and Burns Weston, eds. 1992. *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Cohen, Carl. 1971. *Democracy*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Coker, Trudie O. 1999. "Globalization and State Capital Accumulation: Deteriorating Economic and Politics Rights in Venezuela." *Latin American Perspectives* 26:75-91.

Cranston, Maurice. 1973. *What are Human Rights.* London: Bodley Head.

Curry, Robert L. 1989. "The Basic Needs Strategy, the Congressional Mandate, and U.S. Foreign Aid Policy." *Journal of Economic Issues* 23:1085-96.

Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Democracy and Its Critics***.** New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davenport, Christian. 1995a. "Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 23:119-44.

Davenport, Christian. 1995b. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science*. 39:683-713.

Davenport, Christian. 1996. "The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression." *Political Research Quarterly* 49:377-403.

Davenport, Christian. 1999. "Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43:92-116.

De Vries, Michael S. 1990. "Interdependence, Cooperation, and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 27:429-44.

Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire. 1996. "Measuring Income Inequality: A New Database." World Bank:Typescript.

Dixon, William. 1984. "Trade Concentration, Economic Growth, and the Provision of Basic Human Needs." *Social Science Quarterly* 65:761-764.

Dixon, William and Bruce E. Moon. 1987. "The Military Burden and Basic Human Needs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30:660-684.

Donnelly, Jack. 1984. "Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns." *World Politics* 36:255-83.

Donnelly, Jack. 1989. *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Donnelly, Jack. 1994. "Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of International Human Rights." *Ethics and International Affairs* 8:97-113.

Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1970. "The Structure of Dependence." *American Economic Review* 60:231-36.

Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1973. "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem Of Dependence in Latin America." In *Underdevelopment And Development,* ed. H. Bernstein. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Drewnoski, Jan, and Wolf Scott. 1966. "The Level of Living Index." United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Report Number 4.

Eberstadt, Nicholas. 1988. *Foreign Aid and American Purpose*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Engle, R. F. 1984. "Wald, Likelihood Ratio, and Lagrange Multiplier Tests in Econometrics." In *Handbook of Econometrics*, volume II, eds. Griliches, Z. and Intriligator, M. D. pages 775-879. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987." *Human Rights Quarterly* 17:170-91.

Felice, William F. 1998. "Militarism and Human Rights." *International Affairs* 74:25-40.

Forsythe, David P. 1987. "Congress and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of General Legislation." *Human Rights Quarterly* 9:382-404.

Forsythe, David. P. 1990. "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect." *Political Science Quarterly* 105:435-54.

Forsythe, David P. 1995. "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Views." In *Politics and Human Rights*, ed. David Beetham Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1966. "The Development of Underdevelopment." *Monthly Review* 18:17-31.

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1969. *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1979. *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Galbraith, James K. 1999. "The Crisis of Globalization." *Dissent* 46:12-16.

Gasiorowski, Mark. 1986. "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence." *International Studies Quarterly* 30:23-38.

Gasiorowski, Mark and Solomon Polachek. 1982. "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26:709-29.

Gastil, Raymond. 1973, 1980. *Freedom in the World Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1980.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gibney, Mark and Matthew Dalton. 1996. "The Political Terror Scale." In *Human Rights and Developing Countries*, ed. David Cingranelli. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Gibney, Mark, and Michael Stohl. 1988. "Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy." In *Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues*, ed. Mark Gibney. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1975. *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation : The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment.* New York: Basic Books.

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goldstein, Joshua. 1985. "Basic Human Needs: The Plateau Curve." *World Development* 13:595-609.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1968. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." *American Political Science Review* 62:110-24.

Hartman, John and Pamela Barnhouse Walters. 1985. "Dependence, Military Assistance And Development: A Cross-National Study." *Politics and Society* 14:431-58.

Hausman, J. A. 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics." *Econometrica* 46: 1251-71.

Henderson, Conway. 1979. "Multinational Corporations and Human Rights in Developing States." *World Affairs* 14:17-30.

Henderson, Conway. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:120-142.

Henderson, Conway. 1993. "Population Pressures and Political Repression." *Social Science Quarterly* 74:322-33.

Heston, Alan and Robert Summers. 1994. The Penn World Table (Mark 5.6).

Hicks, Alexander M. 1994. "Introduction to Pooling," In *The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State,* eds. Alexander Hicks and Thomas Janoski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 189-217.

Hicks, Norman and Paul Streeten. 1979. "Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick." *World Development* 7:567-80.

Hicks, Norman. 1980. "Is There a Trade-Off Between Growth and Basic Needs?" *Finance and Development* 17:17-20.

Hofrenning, Daniel J. B. 1990. "Human Rights and Foreign Aid; A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations." *American Politics Quarterly* 18:514-26.

Howard, Rhoda. 1983. "The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa." *Human Rights Quarterly* 5:467-90.

Humana. 1986. World Human Rights Guide.

Hymer, Stephen. 1979a. *The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hymer, Stephen. 1979b. "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development." In *Transnational Corporations and World Order*, ed. George Modelski, pp.386-403. San Francisco, CA.: W. H. Freeman.

Jaccard, James. Robert Turrisi, and Choi K. Wan. 1990. *Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression*. London: Sage Publications.

Jackman, Robert. 1982. "Dependence of Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World." *World Politics* 34:175-96.

Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1996. POLITY III: Regime Change and Political Authority, 1800-1994. [computer file] (Study #6695). 2nd ICPSR version. Boulder, CO: Keith Jaggers/College Park, MD: Ted Robert Gurr [producers], 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1996.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. 1979. "Dictatorship and Double Standards." *Commentary* 68:34-45.

Klak, Thomas, ed. 1998. *Globalization and Neoliberalism: The Caribbean Context*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Kowalewski, David. 1989. "Asian State Repression and Strikes Against Transnationals." *In Dependence, Development, and State Repression*, eds. George Lopez and Michael Stohl. New York: Greenwood Press.

Leary, Virginia. 1998. "Globalization and Human Rights." In *Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges*, ed. Janusz Symonides. Dartmouth: Ashgate Publishing.

Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.

London, Bruce, and Bruce A. Williams. 1988. "Multinational Corporate Penetration, Protest, and Basic Needs Provisions in Non-Core Nations: A Cross-National Analysis." *Social Forces* 66:747-71.

Lopez, George A., and Michael Stohl. 1992. "Problems of Concept and Measurement in The Study of Human Rights." In *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight*, eds. Thomas Jabine and Richard Claude. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 216-234.

Luard, Evan. 1992. "Human Rights and Foreign Policy." In Claude, Richard Pierre and Burns H. Weston, *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action, 2nd* edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

McCormick, James M. and Neil Mitchell. 1988. "Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:231-39.

McCormick, James M. and Neil Mitchell. 1989. "Human Rights and Foreign Assistance: An Update." *Social Science Quarterly* 70: 969-79.

McCormick, James M. and Neil Mitchell. 1997. "Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis." *World Politics* 49:510-25.

McCorquodale, Robert and Richard Fairbrother. 1999. "Globalization and Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21:735-66.

McGrenahan, D.V., C. Richard-Proust, N.V. Sovani, and M. Subramanian. 1972. *Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development*. New York: Praeger.

McKinlay, R.D and A.S. Cohen. 1975. "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes." *Comparative Politics* 8:1-30.

McKinlay, R.D. and A.S. Cohen. 1976. "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 70:850-64.

McNitt, Andrew D. 1986. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems and Possibilities." *Policy Studies Journal* 15:71-83.

Meernik, James, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe. 1998. "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics* 60:63-85.

Meyer, William H. 1996. "Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18:368-97.

Meyer, William H. 1998. *Human Rights and International Political Economy in Third World Nations: Multinational Corporations, Foreign Aid, and Repression*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Milner, Wesley. 1998. Ph.D. Dissertation. "Progress or Decline? International Political Economy and Human Rights." Denton: University of North Texas.

Milner, Wesley, Steven C. Poe, and David Leblang. 1999. "Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21:403-43.

Mitchell, Neil J. and James M. McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations." *World Politics* 40:476-98.

Moon, Bruce and William Dixon. 1985. "Politics, the States, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 29:661-94.

Moon, Bruce and William Dixon. 1992. "Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-Offs." *International Studies Quarterly* 36:191-212.

Moon, Bruce. 1991. *The Political Economy of Basic Human Needs*. Ithaca. Cornell University Press.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1962. "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid." *American Political Science Review* 56: 301-09.

Morris, Morris David. 1979. *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index*. New York: Pergamon.

Morris, Morris David. 1996. "Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, 1960-1990." Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies Working Paper (#23/24).

Most, Ben, and Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Norton, George W., Jaimie Ortiz, and Philip G. Pardey. 1992. "The Impact of Foreign Assistance on Agricultural Growth." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40: 775-86.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1988. *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1963. "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force." *Journal of Economic History* 23:529-52.

Orentlicher, Diane F. 1992. "The United States Commitment to International Human Rights." In Claude, Richard Pierre and Burns H. Weston, *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action.* 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Park, Hans S. 1987. "Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies." *Human Rights Quarterly* 9:405-13.

Pion-Berlin, David. 1989. *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Poe, Steven C. 1990. "Human Rights and Foreign Aid: A Review of the Quantitative Research and Prescriptions for Future Research." *Human Rights Quarterly* 12:499-512.

Poe, Steven C. 1991. "Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 28:205-16.

Poe, Steven C. 1992. "Human Rights and Economic Aid under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter." *American Journal of Political Science* 36:147-67.

Poe, Steven C. and James Meernik. 1995. "U.S. Military Aid in the Eighties: A Global Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 32:399-412.

Poe, Steven C., Suzanne Pilatovsky, Brian Miller, and Ayo Ogundele. 1994. "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region." *Human Rights Quarterly* 16:539-58.

Poe, Steven C., and Rangsima Sirirangsi. 1993. "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to Africa." *International Interactions* 18:1-14.

Poe, Steven C., and Rangsima Sirirangsi. 1994. "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid During the Reagan Years." *Social Science Quarterly* 75:494-509.

Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88:853-72.

Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1996. "Democracy and the Human Right to Personal Integrity: A Causal Model." Unpublished Manuscript.

Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda Keith. 1999. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993" *International Studies Quarterly* 43:291-314.

Polachek, Solomon. 1980. "Conflict and Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24:55-78.

Pollins, Brian. 1989a. "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:737-61.

Pollins, Brian. 1989b. "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" *American Political Science Review* 83:465-80.

Prebisch, Raul. 1950. *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems.* New York: United Nations.

Pritchard, Kathleen. 1989. "Human Rights and Development: Theory and Data." In *Human Rights and Development*, ed. David P. Forsythe. New York: St. Martin's, 329-47.

Ramstad. Jim. 2000. Congressional Testimony on March 21, 2000 online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:17:./temp/~r106cjVklY::

Randall, Vicky, and Robin Theobald. 1985.. *Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Regan, Patrick M. 1995. "U.S. Economic and Political Repression: An Empirical Evaluation of U.S. Foreign Policy." *Political Research Quarterly* 48:613-28.

Reuveny, Rafeal and Heejoon Kang. 1996. "International Trade, Political Conflict/ Cooperation, and Granger Causality." *American Journal of Political Science* 40:943-70.

Reuveny, Rafeal and Heejoon Kang. 1998. "Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/ Cooperation: Do Goods Matter?" *Journal of Peace Research* 35:581-602.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81:1121-38.

Rosh, Robert. 1986. "The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human Needs." *Policy Studies Journal* 15:135-46.

Rothgeb, John. 1989. "Direct Foreign Investment, Repression, Reform, and Political Conflict in the Third World." In *Markets, Politics, and Change in the Global Economy*, eds. William Avery and David Rapkin. New York: Lynne Rienner.

Rothgeb, John. 1990. "Investment Dependence and Political Conflict in Third World Countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 37:255-72.

Rothgeb, John. 1991. "The Effects of Foreign Investment upon Political Protest and Violence in Underdeveloped Societies." *The Western Political Quarterly* 44:9-38.

Rothgeb, John. 1996. *Foreign Investment and Political Conflict in Developing Countries.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Ruttan, Vernon W. 1989. "Why Foreign Economic Assistance?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 37:411-24.

Ruttan, Vernon W. 1996. *United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sayrs, Lois. 1989. *Pooled Time Series Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.

Sayrs, Lois. 1990. "Expected Utility and Peace Science: An Assessment of Trade and Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 11:17-44.

Scheffer, David. 1996. "International Judicial Intervention." *Foreign Policy* 102:34-52.

Schifter, Richard. 1992. "America's Commitment to Human Rights in Foreign Policy." In *Morality and Expediency in International Corporate Relations*, ed. W. Lawson Taitte. Austin: The University of Texas Press.

Schoultz, Lars. 1980. "U.S. Foreign Policy to Human Rights in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Two Administrations." In *Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies*, eds. Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt, and George W. Shepherd. Boulder: Westview Press.

Shue, Henry. 1980. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1981, 1983. *World Military and Social Expenditures,* 1981 edition & 1983 Edition. Washington: World Priorities.

Smith, Adam. 1976 [1776] *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Eds. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Smith, Jackie, Melissa Bolyard, and Anna Ippolito. 1998. "Globalization and Human Rights: Friends or Foes?" Presented at the 1998 Hinman Symposium: Democratization and Human Rights. Binghamton University.

Smith, Jackie, Melissa Bolyard, and Anna Ippolito. 1999. "Human Rights and the Global Economy: A Response to Meyer." *Human Rights Quarterly* 21:207-19.

Snyder, David. 1978. "Collective Violence: A Research Agenda and Some Strategic Considerations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22:499-534.

Souder, Mark. 2000. Congressional Testimony on March 15, 2000 available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/~r106l1cC3m::

Spalding, Nancy L. 1986. "Providing for Economic Human Rights: The Case of the Third World." *Policy Studies Journal* 15:123-34.

Spero, Joan E. and Jeffrey A. Hart. 1997. *The Politics of International Economic Relations.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Time and Space: A Statistical Essay," *American Journal of Political Science* 29:914-47.

Stohl, Michael, David Carlton, and Steven E. Johnson. 1984. "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter." *Journal of Peace Research* 21:215-26.

Stohl, Michael and David Carleton. 1985. "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8:592-606.

Streeten, Paul. 1981. *First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David Jodice. 1983. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tepperman, Jonathan. 2000. "Contempt of Court." *Washington Monthly* 32:25-29.

Thomas, Caroline. 1998. "International Financial Institutions and Social and Economic Rights: An Exploration." In *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal*, ed. Tony Evans. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Thomas, Caroline and Peter Wilkin, eds. 1997. *Globalization and the South.* Great Britain: MacMillan Press.

Thomas, Caroline and Peter Wilkin, eds. 1999. *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Timberlake, Michael and Kirk Williams. 1984. "Dependence, Political Exclusion, and Government Repression: Some Cross-National Evidence." *American Sociological Review* 49:141-46.

Vengroff, Richard and Yung-Mei Tsai. 1982. "Food, Hunger, and Dependency: PL480 Aid to the Third World." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 17:250-65.

Vincent, R.J. *Human Rights and International Relations*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974a. *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974b. "The Rise and Future Demise of the Word Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16:387-415.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1980. *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750.* New York: Academic Press.

Wellstone, Paul. 2000. Senate Testimony available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/~r106RFpMMy:e9505:

Wolpin, Miles. 1986. "State Terrorism and Repression in the Third World: Parameters and Prospects." In *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, eds. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Ziegenhagen, Eduard. 1986. *The Regulation of Political Conflict.* New York: Praeger.

Zimmerman, Robert F. 1993 *Dollars, Diplomacy and Dependency: Dilemmas of U.S Economic Aid*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.