Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain Uncertain Page: 2 of 24
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SGAO
aAccountabiity Integrity-Reliability
Highlights
Highlights of GAO-06-548T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study
The Army considers its modular
force transformation the most
extensive restructuring it has
undertaken since World War II.
Restructuring the Army from a
division-based force to a modular
brigade-based force will require
extensive investments in
equipment and retraining of
personnel. The foundation of the
modular force is the creation of
standardized modular combat
brigades designed to be stand-
alone, self-sufficient units that are
more rapidly deployable and better
able to conduct joint operations
than their larger division-based
predecessors.
GAO was asked to testify on the
status of the Army's modularity
effort. This testimony addresses
(1) the Army's cost estimate for
restructuring to a modular force,
(2) progress and plans for
equipping modular combat
brigades, (3) progress made and
challenges to meeting personnel
requirements, and (4) the extent to
which the Army has developed an
approach for assessing modularity
results and the need for further
adjusting designs or
implementation plans.
This testimony is based on
previous and ongoing GAO work
examining Army modularity plans
and cost. GAO's work has been
primarily focused on the Army's
active forces. GAO has suggested
that Congress consider requiring
the Secretary of Defense to provide
a plan for overseeing spending of
funds for modularity.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-548T.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Janet St.
Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
stlaurentj @gao.gov.FORCE STRUCTURE
Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular
Force Remain UncertainWhat GAO Found
Although the Army is making progress creating modular units, it faces
significant challenges in managing costs and meeting equipment and
personnel requirements associated with modular restructuring in the active
component and National Guard. Moreover, the Army has not provided
sufficient information for the Department of Defense and congressional
decision makers to assess the capabilities, costs, affordability, and risks of
the Army's modular force implementation plans. The Army's cost estimate
for completing modular force restructuring by 2011 has grown from an initial
rough order of magnitude of $28 billion in 2004 to $52.5 billion currently.
Although the Army's most recent estimate addresses some shortcomings of
its earlier estimate, it is not clear to what extent the Army can achieve
expected capabilities within its cost estimate and planned time frames for
completing unit conversions. Moreover, according to senior Army officials,
the Army may request additional funds for modularity beyond 2011.
Although modular conversions are under way, the Army is not meeting its
near-term equipping goals for its active modular combat brigades, and units
are likely to have shortfalls of some key equipment until at least 2012. The
Army plans to mitigate risk in the near term by providing priority for
equipping deploying units and maintaining other units at lower equipping
levels. However, it has not yet defined specific equipping plans for units in
various phases of its force rotation model. As a result, it is unclear what level
of equipment units will have and how well units with low priority for
equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises.
In addition, the Army faces significant challenges in implementing its plan to
reduce overall active component end strength from 512,400 to 482,400
soldiers by fiscal year 2011 while increasing the size of its modular combat
force from 315,000 to 355,000. This will require the Army to eliminate or
realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some
progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions through
military civilian conversions and other initiatives, but some of its goals for
these initiatives may be difficult to meet and could lead to difficult trade-
offs. Already the Army does not fully plan to fill some key intelligence
positions required by its new modular force structure.
Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach
to measure progress against stated modularity objectives and assess the
need for further changes to modular designs. The Army has not established
outcome-related metrics linked to many of its modularity objectives.
Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and
training events, the Army does not have a long-term, comprehensive plan for
further analysis and testing of the designs and fielded capabilities. Without
performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the
Secretary of Defense nor congressional leaders will have full visibility into
the capabilities of the modular force as it is currently organized, staffed, and
equipped.
United States Government Accountability Office
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United States. Government Accountability Office. Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain Uncertain, text, April 4, 2006; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc290393/m1/2/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.