SHARED NORMS, HIERARCHICAL MAINTENANCE, AND

INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHY

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The dissertation studies two aspects of international hierarchy. The world of
international politics is not one of completely sovereign states competing in anarchy. Patterns of
hierarchy, where a dominant state has legitimate control over some actions of a subordinate state,
color the globe. First, I look at shared norms and hierarchy. Most studies concerning hierarchy
focus on material maximization as an explanation for hierarchy--if hierarchy increases the wealth
and security of two states, then hierarchy is more likely. I argue that shared norms held by two
states facilitate hierarchy. Shared norms produce a common in-group community, generate
common interests, create common ways of doing business, and give rise to common values that
increase subordinate states' ability to persuade the dominant state. These factors ease the
creation and maintenance of international hierarchical relationships. Second, I study interstate
behaviors that can be explained as actions of maintenance by dominant states over subordinates
to preserve or increase a level of hierarchy. I theorize that sticks and carrots from a dominant
state (like economic sanctions, military interventions, and foreign aid) help sustain a dominant
state's rule by convincing subordinate states to follow the dominant state's commands and
expectations. Using data on U.S. hierarchies from 1950 to 2010, I utilize multivariate
regressions to test hypotheses drawn from these theories. I find that shared norms associate with
hierarchy, and maintenance actions uncommonly associate with compliance.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation attempts to build directly off of David Lake's work on international

hierarchy (Lake 1996; 1999; 2009a). Lake argues that although much of international relations

scholarship assumes that states operate as completely sovereign actors in an environment of

anarchy, much of international relations is structured by patterns of hierarchy (Lake 2009a).

Lake contends that hierarchy matters because it influences states to behave in ways not predicted

by theories based on anarchy. States sometimes accept the leadership of dominant powers rather

than perform balancing actions. This acceptance gives dominant states the authority to command

other states. Subordinate states comply with the expectations of dominant states not simply as

the result of coercion, but as the result of viewing the dominant state's ability to command as

legitimate. Dominant states do not attempt to gain all possible benefits from their coercive

power, and instead limit their actions in order to maintain legitimacy (Lake 2009a). A goal of

this dissertation is to expand upon two areas of Lake's work-- hierarchy as the dependent

variable, and hierarchical maintenance.

First, I look into the creation of hierarchy by asking whether hierarchies are created

simply to maximize the wealth and security of the states involved, or if shared norms play a role

in states entering into, and strengthening, hierarchical relationships. Lake's theory predicting

hierarchy focuses on material maximization as an explanation of hierarchy (Lake 1996, 1999).

Material maximization ideas argue that if more hierarchy raises the wealth or security of states,

then the likelihood of those states strengthening or creating a hierarchical relationship increases.

Material maximization plays an important role in states' decisions about international hierarchy,

but this is only a partial explanation. It seems likely that states care about the norms and values of other states to which they grant a degree of authority over their actions.

In chapter 2, I argue that shared normative beliefs and values facilitate hierarchical relationships between states because shared norms give rise to common identities that increase the perceived interest in, and appropriateness of, hierarchical relationships; create common goals that incentivize cooperation; ease cooperation due to similar ways of doing business; and give the subordinate state a greater likelihood of influencing the dominant state through persuasion. Normative values studied in this dissertation include type of government, type of economic system, religion, governing ideology, and culture. If these factors play an important role in determining whether dominant states acquire sovereignty from other states, this research will better illuminate the complex nature of international hierarchical relationships.

A relationship between shared norms and hierarchy has important implications for many areas of international relations. Such a relationship implies that state behaviors are influenced by more than simply the desire for power and/or security, as described in neorealist theory (Waltz 1979). Thus, shared norms may influence states to act in ways not expected by balance of power and bandwagoning theories (Wright 1942; Waltz 1979). The role of shared norms may explain spheres of influence and hegemonic stability beyond the impact of agreements negotiated between major powers or the economic benefits a hegemon provides (as is the focus in: Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981) by weaker countries sharing the same values as a powerful state. And, this implies that soft power may play an important role in major power foreign policy (Nye 1990). If shared norms affect hierarchical relationships, then norms described in democratic and capitalist peace theories may not only predict peace between democratic-capitalist states, but explain the hierarchical structure of regional and world orders led by

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powerful democratic, capitalist states (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen 1997; Mousseau 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001). Scholars will better understand great power transitions if we appreciate the importance of shared norms in facilitating rising states accepting the international status quo maintained by the current leader -- current literature on power transitions does not focus on this aspect (Organski & Kugler 1980). Additionally, norms are constructed values, so evidence of a relationship between shared norms and hierarchy would help show how socially constructed factors influence international relations.

Second, I study interstate behaviors that can be explained as actions of maintenance by dominant states over subordinates to preserve or increase a level of hierarchy. Scholars tend to view international actions, such as economic sanctions, foreign aid, and war, as interactions between sovereign states in anarchy. Lake argues that when assuming state of anarchy, scholars cannot fully understand such acts between states because motivations behind these behaviors depend on whether states are in hierarchy or anarchy. Lake explains that many state behaviors result from a dominant state wanting to display the reach of its authority by punishing a subordinate for defying a dominant state's rule or expectation (Lake 2009a). Such actions are similar to a domestic state punishing a citizen, and are done not just to punish, but to maintain order. Viewing certain powerful state acts toward weaker states as hierarchical maintenance helps us understand why these actions are performed by explaining the context in which these behaviors take place. Furthermore, studying hierarchical maintenance helps explain states' responses to powerful state actions.

I expand upon Lake's work by further theorizing why disciplining actions increase compliance to dominant state expectations, and I also focus on maintenance actions that benefit or reward subordinates to comply. Furthermore, I execute statistical tests for evidence of

hierarchical maintenance. In expanding maintenance theory I describe why maintenance actions are necessary at all. If states enter a hierarchical relationship because they expect such a relationship to benefit both of them, why would a dominant state ever need to use coercion to enforce hierarchical compliance? Questions like this require further explanation.

In chapter 3, I theorize that sticks and carrots from a dominant state (like economic sanctions, military interventions, and foreign aid) help to sustain a dominant state's rule by convincing subordinate states to follow the dominant state's commands and expectations. I argue that punishing actions by a dominant state maintain hierarchy and facilitate compliance by increasing the dominant state's reputation for punishing, socializing subordinate states to the dominant state's norms, increasing hierarchical clarity and respect, and changing a subordinate's leader to one that is more friendly. I also contend that beneficial maintenance actions by a dominant state facilitate compliance and hierarchy by effectively buying compliance with assistance and aid, socializing subordinate states to dominant state norms, and preserving the dependence and weakness of a subordinate state. Furthermore, I argue that subordinate state defiance elicits dominant state discipline.

I test these hypotheses using historic data on U.S.-country dyads from 1950 to 2010. I employ multivariate regression to analyze the data, control for confounding variables, and determine if the statistical findings support the hypotheses. From the analysis on shared norms in Chapter 2, I find evidence that shared norms positively associate with U.S. hierarchy. Shared Christianity and shared capitalism were the most influential common norms. Christianity's effect on norms was most powerful during the Cold War. This finding implies that shared norms have their greatest influence when there is a clear and threatening out-group that does not value the same norms. The existence of an out-group strengthens the importance of shared norms in the

perceptions of in-group members, and increases the incentives to cooperate in order to better compete and defend against the out-group state.

In chapter 4, regression analyses reveal that dominant state maintenance only uncommonly increases compliance among subordinate states. Maintenance works not simply as a tool to coerce the target state, but also uncommonly increases compliance among subordinates in a region. Finally, chapter 5 finds more weak evidence supporting the influence of hierarchy in state behaviors. The results suggest that dominant states have limited ability to enforce their hierarchy with maintenance.

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 includes both the theory and empirical tests about shared norms and hierarchy. Chapter 3 provides a general theory about the role of maintenance in hierarchy. Chapter 4 and 5 test maintenance hypotheses derived from the theory in chapter 3. Finally, I conclude and draw together the main themes of the theories and statistical evidence in chapter 6.

CHAPTER 2

SHARED NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHY

2.1   Introduction

Many international relations theories assume that the international world is anarchic and hierarchy only exists in domestic situations. However, David Lake points out that the world appears to be filled with state to state relationships that have elements of hierarchy (2009a). Rather than global politics being a world of anarchy where completely independent and sovereign states struggle to survive and/or increase their wealth, a world with hierarchy contains some states that have an extent of legitimate control over the actions of other states. This is similar to the domestic hierarchy of a government over its people because in both cases subordinate actors accept the rule of the ruler as rightful and expect to benefit from this rule. Lake argues that hierarchical relationships come into existence as a result of actors' cost-benefit analyses of material interests. If an increase in hierarchy gives a net benefit to the actors involved, then an increase in hierarchy is more likely. If there is no net benefit from an increase in hierarchy, then an increase is less likely (Lake 1996). For example, the United States benefits from hierarchy over Caribbean states because foreign powers cannot use the Caribbean to threaten the U.S. and the hierarchy is relatively cheap. Focusing only on material factors means only taking into account how a level of hierarchy will maximize actors' wealth and security. This material based explanation adds to our understanding of hierarchy, but it is incomplete. It seems unlikely that actors giving up control of some of their actions would not care about the character and nature of the actor dominating these actions. Sharing certain norms may facilitate hierarchical relationships, and ignoring this misses an important explanation of international hierarchy.

In contrast with the material focused explanation of hierarchy, I argue that actors considering entering into hierarchical relationships do care about normative values, and that the effects of norms will produce a different pattern of international hierarchy than the effects of material interests alone. Having certain norms in common can promote hierarchy because shared norms give rise to common interests and identities that facilitate the development of relationships, ease cooperation due to similar ways of doing business, and give the subordinate state a greater likelihood of influencing the dominant state through persuasion. Normative values that may affect hierarchy include a common type of government, type of economic system, religion, civilizational culture, and governing ideology.

The goals of this chapter are to explain how normative values can affect the likelihood of two states having a hierarchical relationship with one another and then to quantitatively test for this proposed association. The general hypothesis to be tested is that: *Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another when they have key normative characteristics in common.* I look at U.S.-country dyads from 1950 to 2010 and assess whether normative values and institutions including political system, economic system, religion, governing ideology, and culture (e.g., democracy, capitalism, Christianity, right wing ideology, and Western culture) affect the level of hierarchy. I expect that sharing these values with the U.S. will be positively related to the level of U.S. hierarchy. I utilize multivariate regression models to test my hypotheses.

Finding that hierarchy is related to shared norms will have important implications for many areas of international relations. This may indicate that states often do not balance against one another simply to maintain the balance of power and secure their survival (unlike the account in Waltz 1979); that states do not necessarily bandwagon with whichever power best

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secures their survival (as they do in Wright 1942; Waltz 1979); that spheres of influence will be determined partially based on spheres of similar norms; that hegemonic stability will be partially based on weaker countries sharing the same values as the hegemon rather than just the economic benefits the hegemon provides (as is the focus in Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981); and that U.S. foreign policy makers give more weight to the importance of norms and soft power in maintaining U.S. hegemony than would be expected if norms did not associate with hierarchy (Nye 1990). Such findings suggest that normative mechanisms described in democratic and capitalist peace theories to explain the peace and cooperation among democratic-capitalist states may also explain capitalist and democratic world and regional orders led by powerful democratic, capitalist states (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen 1997; Mousseau 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001). Such findings may also lead to insights into power transition theory. Whether power transition between the top two states in the system leads to a great power war or not may be dependent on the extent that the transitioning states share common norms that will facilitate the rising power accepting the status quo favored by the old power (Organski & Kugler 1980). Furthermore, because norms are constructed values, successful findings in this chapter will provide more evidence for the importance of socially constructed factors in international relations.

For the rest of this chapter, I first define hierarchy and explore some sources of hierarchical legitimacy. Next, I discuss material interest maximization versus normative ideas in explaining hierarchy. Then, I explain how holding normative values in common can affect hierarchy, and I explain the hypotheses derived from the theory. The research design is explained, and finally, I discuss the results from statistical tests of these hypotheses.

2.2   Previous Literature

2.2.1   Hierarchy

Taking into account the concept of hierarchy introduces an element that is underplayed in many IR theories. Hierarchy is the extent of legitimate control that one unit has over the actions of another (Lake 2009a). Legitimate control means the control is viewed as acceptable and appropriate by the actors being controlled (Lake 2009a). This conception of hierarchy breaks with the clear distinction made between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy because the hierarchy of one international actor over another is similar to the hierarchy of a government over its people. In both cases, the subordinate units are controlled by a mixture of coercion and legitimacy, and in both cases the subordinates expect to benefit from the control by the order that the ruler provides. International hierarchy differs from interstate influence under anarchy because anarchy has little conception of one international actor having the legitimate right to rule over another.

Interstate hierarchy consists of at least two states: a dominant and a subordinate. The dominant state takes control of some of the actions of the subordinate in one or both of two general spheres: economic policy and security policy. In security hierarchy the dominant state is involved in the military protection of the subordinate and has a level of control over the military and diplomatic policies of the subordinate. Also, any additional policies of the subordinate that affect their security may be regulated by the dominant state (Lake 2009a). Economic hierarchy is the extent of control over "all actions that affect the accumulation and allocation of resources" (Lake 2009a, 56), which may include the dominant's control over the subordinate's exchange rate, tariffs, finances, infrastructure policies, prices, regulation, and rules of private property (Lake 2009a).

2.2.2   Legitimacy

The concept of hierarchy advanced in Lake's work, and in this project, includes an element of legitimacy. Without legitimacy, influence is based purely on coercion, and even if the influence is a regular occurrence, influence based on coercion alone can occur between two independent states in anarchy. The legitimacy of the control makes the control of one unit over another fundamentally different because the relationship between the two units is that of a dominant over a subordinate in hierarchy, rather than two equals in anarchy with one able to regularly coerce the other. Lake calls the legitimate control that defines this concept of hierarchy, "authority" (Lake 2009a). When an actor has authority, its actions are followed based on its right to rule, rather than simply due to coercion. When authoritative actors use coercion, the coercion also has an element of legitimacy. An acceptance of a ruler's right to rule supports the right of a dominant actor to punish (Lake 2009a).

Legitimacy can come in varying degrees. A subordinate state's government and populace may fully support a dominant state's rule. Or, a small elite in charge of a subordinate state may accept hierarchy to support their narrow or idiocentric interests while most of the populace passionately disagrees with the hierarchy. As long as there is a level of acceptance from the subordinate state of another state's authority over certain actions, then there is a level of legitimacy. If a dominant state has control over some areas of a subordinate state's behavior in a way not fully enforced by coercion or threat of coercion, then an element of legitimacy exists.

Dominant states may initiate some hierarchies by force. However, once the hierarchical structure forms and a subordinate follows some dominant state rules based on authority, then an extent of legitimacy exists. It is conceivable for a dominant state to entirely maintain a hierarchical structure by coercion. Because such an interstate relationship would not involve any

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legitimacy, it would not fall into this paper's concept of hierarchy, which is defined as legitimate control, or authority. Instead, I would describe this as an interstate relationship where a powerful state regularly coerces a weaker state on certain issues. Dominant states will face difficulty maintaining consistent, hierarchy-like, influence over a state based on coercion alone. And, once a dominant state begins to regularly coerce in order to force compliance, some elements in the subordinate state will likely begin to tepidly accept the dominant state's authority, even if they do not like it. Thus, such situations will often transition into hierarchy if an extent of legitimacy arises, or it will remain regular interstate coercion.

Legitimacy can come from a variety of sources. International relations scholarship tends to focus on legitimate control stemming from official rules and laws (Lake 2009a, 25-28). The Waltzian and neorealist depiction of domestic hierarchy versus international anarchy takes this approach. Domestic hierarchy is recognized because it is based on official rules and laws derived from formal institutions like states; a king or president has the legitimate right to rule because the rules of the state decree that is the role of the office they hold. International hierarchy on the other hand, is not recognized because it is not supported by such rules (Waltz 1979). Many scholars from liberal and constructivist schools of thought also treat international politics as a state of anarchy and underplay the levels of hierarchy between international actors because it is not based on official rules and laws (Oye 1985; Stein 1990; Wendt 1992, 1999; Reus-Smit 1999; Lake 2009a). These scholars tend not to focus on control that may result from informal control of one polity over another. Informal hierarchy is the extent of legitimate control one unit has over the actions of another when this legitimacy comes from an exchange or bargain rather than official rules, and informal hierarchy is a prevalent form of hierarchy in international relations (Weber 2000; Cooley 2005; Hobson & Sharman 2005; Donnelly 2006; Lake 2009a).

Legitimacy is not a norm in itself, but it draws on the substance of norms (Clark 2005). The notion of legitimacy is always contested because it is determined by how actors feel about what is right (Franck 1988). Because legitimacy is dynamic and is determined by a process of historical change, it does not have an eternal logic based on insecurity, so traditional theories that assume an eternal logic to the workings of international relations will leave the effects of legitimacy unexplained (Hurrell 2005).

Much of the previous literature on legitimacy in international relations focuses on the legitimacy of the rules of the international system and the legitimization of hegemons (Kissinger 1977; Clark 2005), rather than on what legitimates a hierarchical relationship between two states. This literature emphasizes that legitimacy comes from an agreement of major powers; often during treaty making processes occurring after major power wars (Kissinger 1977; Clark 2005). While great power-determined legitimacy will certainly affect the extent to which a powerful state's hierarchy over a weak state is legitimate, factors between the two countries may also matter in determining the legitimacy of that hierarchy.

2.2.3   Examples

Two examples of hierarchy that illustrate the nature of these relationships pertain to the U.S. relationships with the Dominican Republic and Japan. The U.S. gained and maintained hierarchy over the Dominican Republic through state to state agreements, threats, and military interventions and occupations. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that intervening in Latin American countries may be necessary in order to fulfill the Monroe Doctrine and to correct poor governance. This justified the U.S. intervening in the Dominican Republic. In 1905, the two countries signed a protocol granting authority to the U.S. over a number of

Dominican governmental responsibilities. At a high point of U.S. hierarchy from 1916 to 1924, the U.S. navy governed the Dominican Republic.

During the history of the hierarchy, the Dominican Republic agreed to give up varying degrees of control to the U.S. over some of its actions including allowing the U.S. to manage its customhouses, agreeing to not lower or increase taxes without U.S. consent, making the U.S. its only foreign creditor, placing its military under U.S. command, and limiting its foreign financial and security sources to the U.S.. Both states benefited from the hierarchy in that the Dominicans were more secure from internal and external financial and security threats, had improved customs revenues, and had improved economic infrastructure and material conditions. The Americans gained a subordinate that supported U.S. foreign policy and a nearby country that could not be used by its enemies to threaten it (LaFeber 1994; Smith 1996; Lake 2009a).

After World War Two, Japan subordinated itself in a hierarchical relationship with the United States by becoming a U.S. protectorate. U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan helped increase U.S. security by preventing a return to militarism in Japan and by allowing the U.S. to have more bases in East Asia to defend against other threats in the region. Japan benefited by receiving U.S. protection from the USSR and by being able to spend less money on defense (Lake 2007). In both of these cases the United States had some control over the other state's potential actions, this control was accepted by the other state as legitimate, and the other state maintained officially its independence as a state. These two cases are not unusual and neither is the mutually beneficial nature of the relationships.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the strength and longevity of these hierarchical relationships result from norms that these countries share with the United States. Since the end of World War Two, Japan has been a strong democracy whose quality of life has

benefited tremendously from the capitalist system. Seeing the United States as the champion and defender of the norms that support democracy and capitalism may facilitate a level of hierarchy into the future. The Dominican Republic is also succeeding at developing a democratic, capitalist country, and these cultural similarities, along with a common Christianity, may ease the continuance of a hierarchical relationship between the U.S. and the Dominican Republic.

2.2.4   Problems with Bargaining

These examples reveal problems with idealizing international hierarchies as resulting from bargains. In trying to create general theory for how hierarchies work, simplifications are a necessary cost. This results in examples that are a rough fit to the generalized theory. The initiations of hierarchy in both Japan and the Dominican Republic involved military force, and this seems different than a peaceful bargain between two states entering into a mutually beneficial relationship. Despite the imperfect fit between examples and theory, I believe the hierarchical relationships between these two countries can appropriately be described as bargains. I argue that first, even in cases of military force, one-sided leverage, or surrenders, an agreement still results from bargaining. Second, even if a hierarchical bargain is initiated by force, the continued acceptance of the hierarchical arrangements shows a level of acceptance. And third, international and domestic hierarchies often involve coercion.

States using military force as part of interstate bargaining is well studied in the literature (Schelling 1960, 1966; Clausewitz 1976; Fearon 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1997; Filson and Werner 2002; Reiter 2003). Bargaining between states does not stop at the start of hostilities, and states go to war in order to achieve political objectives (Schelling 1960; Clausewitz 1976). Conflicts help reveal the true nature of each side's leverage. Once conflict

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clarifies the true balance of states' capabilities, states can more easily agree to a deal. Some such deals result in hierarchy. In the historical case of Japan, convincing Japan to surrender required heavy costs, and by the end of the war they had limited bargaining leverage. Still, this case resembles the theoretical idea of bargaining in war.

Kecskemeti argues that no surrender is literally unconditional because all surrenders involve some bargaining and mutual concessions. When the outcome of a war becomes clear, both states are willing to agree to a surrender rather than pointlessly add costs to the war. Defeated states have residual forces still able to deal costs to the victors. The losing state uses this little leverage to receive some concessions in the surrender. Kecskemeti studies the end of World War Two and concludes that the Germans were the closest to an unconditional surrender, but even they got some political compensation. He sees Japan as an example of successfully utilizing residual forces as bargaining leverage. The U.S. had bombed Japan and over run their pacific island territories, but Japan's mainland army was still capable of putting up resistance. The decision to surrender in Japan was not even unanimous. Elements of the military wanted to fight on. Therefore, Japan could have continued to fight. The U.S. wanted to avoid a costly invasion of the Japanese mainland. Thus, they agreed to maintain the Japanese monarchy (Kecskemeti 1958). By surrendering, Japan was agreeing to accept U.S. hierarchy.

U.S. leverage over Caribbean states is huge. Resisting U.S. demands will likely have large negative consequences. An idealized version of bargaining where both actors have many good choices is not the case in this relationship. However, the Dominican Republic could have resisted more. Cuba and Nicaragua have shown that somewhat successful defiance of U.S. hierarchy in the region is possible. And, motivated populaces could make U.S. military interventions costly with guerrilla tactics.

Any subordinate state can try to defy a dominant state and throw off hierarchy if it wants to. By not rebelling against U.S. hierarchy, states are accepting the hierarchy to a degree, even if the level of legitimacy is low. Japan has accepted a hierarchical relationship with the United States for almost 70 years. Japan is not the same country it was at the end of World War Two. It is an advanced democracy that for a time was the second largest economy in the world. Domestic leaders in Japan choose to maintain the hierarchical bargain with the U.S. because its leaders think it benefits them. If Japan decided to drastically limit the hierarchical relationship with the U.S., it seems unlikely that the U.S. would use heavy coercion to maintain this hierarchy. The American public would probably not accept U.S. casualties to maintain hierarchy over a democratic state choosing to end a hierarchical relationship. Japan could likely reject U.S. hierarchy, but chooses not to because its leaders believe it is in their interest to continue agreeing to the hierarchy.

Hierarchy and authority regularly involve coercion. Thus, heavy use of coercion does not mean a hierarchy is not legitimate, nor that bargaining did not occur. However, It is possible that initially some hierarchies were simply coercion in anarchy, and later the coercion became legitimate. Domestic hierarchies also have also used coercion to create and strengthen hierarchy. The United States exercised its domestic authority to coerce with military force in the Whisky Rebellion and to maintain hierarchy over southern states in the American Civil War. The American rebels who were killed during these U.S. domestic military interventions likely did not find that use of force legitimate. However, in both areas of the U.S. today, the authority of the U.S. government is generally considered legitimate. In both cases, the local populaces could have continued to fight on; especially in the American Civil War. The south however, did not

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choose to fight on; they chose to surrender. The south's surrender did not represent an inability to resist at all, but an agreement to lay down arms and accept U.S. hierarchy.

Despite their disadvantages compared to the United States, both the Dominican Republic and Japan could have further resisted U.S. hierarchy. Thus, they could have chosen an option other than hierarchy and were agreeing to U.S. hierarchy by not further resisting it. Fighting to the death is not an appealing option to the loser. However, the option is also costly to the victor, and therefore the defeated can use it as a bargaining chip. These cases do not meet an idealized case where the weaker state has many options and it strongly embraces hierarchy in full legitimacy. However, an element of legitimacy was given to the U.S.. A bargain made with little leverage, is still a bargain. Therefore, these cases show that international hierarchy often involves coercion and difficult bargains.

2.2.5   Material Maximization or/and Norms?

Literature on hierarchy can be split into two camps based on which factors researchers emphasize to explain hierarchy--those who focus on normative values and those who emphasize material maximization. Material factors are costs and benefits that directly increase or decrease an actor's wealth or security. Material maximizing explanations focus on the amount of wealth and security between the two actors as most determinative of the level of hierarchy. This means that if a state decides subordinating itself to a dominant state will increase its economic growth or help protect it from foreign threats, then it is more likely to join such a hierarchy than if it did not. A normative explanation on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of norms, beliefs, or values held by actors (Spruyt 2000; Hobson & Sharman 2005; Keene 2007; Sharman 2012).

Material maximization and normative theories have different assumptions regarding the source of hierarchical legitimacy. For material maximization theories, legitimacy comes solely from the agreement to enter hierarchy, and this agreement is based on material factors. For normative theories, legitimacy comes from a variety of normative factors and these normative factors facilitate the agreement to enter hierarchy. Rapkin and Braaten (2009) contend that legitimacy has three dimensions: a base of shared values, a process of decision making in the use of power, and the success of outcomes. The first—a base of shared values—is the focus of the normative theories. Shared values can facilitate the legitimacy of hierarchy. The third dimension—the success of outcomes—refers to material success as a source of legitimacy, and this is what the material maximizers focus on. The second dimension—a process to determine the use of power—is discussed by normative and material theories with a different state motivation for caring about the process. Normative theories focus on the value of a process that has been internalized so that the process has legitimizing value in and of itself. Material theories focus on how different processes protect a states' material interest. The point here is the difference between material maximizing and normative explanations of hierarchy can be viewed as different focuses to explain the source of hierarchical legitimacy.

2.2.5.1   Material Maximization

Many theories involve material maximization logic as an explanation or/and motivation for hierarchy, even though the authors are not attempting to explain hierarchy as broadly defined in this project. Such theories include theories on hegemony, spheres of influence, and power transitions. Lake's theory explains international hierarchy more directly by material maximization logic (Lake 1996).

Hegemony is a form of hierarchy, and the literature on hegemony discusses the material benefits of economic stability and growth that come from hegemony (Kindleberger 1973; Wallerstein 1974; Gilpin 1975, 1981; Keohane 1984). For example, Kindleberger argues that the immense depth and length of the Great Depression was due to the absence of a hegemon to maintain a relatively open market for distress goods; provide counter-cyclical long-term lending; and ensure low interest rates in crises. He concludes that one authority is needed in the future to avoid another great depression (Kindleberger 1973).

The term, "sphere of influence," is often used to describe areas of hierarchy in diplomacy, foreign affairs analysis, and IR theory. A sphere of influence is an area that a foreign country has considerably more military, cultural, or economic influence in than any other country. Europeans split up imperial holdings in Africa and China as spheres of influence. Eastern European countries during the Cold War were said to belong to Russia's sphere of influence. Because the term usually describes a major power having control over some of the actions of other states that the major power would not have control over if the other states were completely sovereign, the term is describing international hierarchy. In IR theory the term often refers to an informal recognition between powers of certain states' legitimate right to control certain areas. However, the term usually describes respect for a state's zone of foreign control among great powers rather than an agreement between a great power and its subordinates (Bull 1977), so literature on the concept is underdeveloped in its description of the complicated relationship between dominant and subordinate states. Descriptions of state motivations for creating spheres of influence are generally focused on great powers' concern for maximizing their power (Bull 1977; Gilpin 1981). For example, one motivation for a sphere of influence is to create defensive buffer states. However, the value of spheres of influence also can be affected

by normative beliefs like nationalism, so literature on the term has taken into account materialist and normative factors.

Power transition theory involves hierarchy in that the powerful state creates the rules of the system and these rules are followed by the weaker states (Organski 1958; Organski & Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke 1996). The top power in the system sets up the rules in its favor, so material maximization is the dominant state's main motivation in this theory. However, normative factors can also be taken into account under the theory's concept of satisfaction with the status quo. The theory expects great power war to be more likely when the number two state in the system is approaching the number one state in power, unless the number two state is satisfied with the rules set up by the dominant state. In the latter case, power is likely to transition peacefully because the transitioning powers do not disagree enough over the rules of the system to have a great power war (Organski 1958; Organski & Kugler 1980; Kugler & Lemke 1996). Lemke and Werner apply power transition theory to regional hierarchies and argue that the international system is composed of multiple, overlapping systems (Lemke & Werner 1996). This is similar to theory specifically about international hierarchies that also proposes multiple hierarchies existing in the world (Lake 2009a).

Ideas about status quo rules contained in power transition theory are related to this chapter in that satisfaction with those rules may be determined by the norms of a country. For example, if two countries have norms that support innovative capitalism so that they can compete with minimal trade barriers, then both countries will support status quo rules enforcing freer trade across the system, and they should be less likely to go to war over such rules. Similar normative mechanisms may also support a dominant state's hierarchy. Both a weak state and a transitioning challenger will be more likely to accept the legitimacy of the dominant state's rules

when they agree with these rules as a result of shared norms. Because power transition theorists are focused on explaining major power war, their explanation of the status quo rules of the system supported by the dominant state is underdeveloped and limiting. Are status quo rules only contested between system or regional leaders and their challengers? What variety of status quo rules do leading states impose on subordinates? Are these rules limited to system/region-wide rules? Studying hierarchy can explore the gaps in power transition theory's explanation of hierarchy by explaining the variety of hierarchical relationships and rules that any dominant state may have with any subordinate state.

Lake's 1996 theory directly pertains to hierarchy as defined in this chapter. The theory is a material maximization theory because its general argument is that the level of hierarchy we are most likely to see is the level that maximizes the actors' material interests. The theory describes a decision states must make about the level of hierarchy between two states. Two key factors that determine the overall benefits or costs of a relationship are opportunism and governance costs.

Opportunism occurs when one actor creates costs for another by changing the terms of a deal after the dominant state has already made an investment. When two international actors work together, one state may make an investment into the relationship. For this investment of resources to produce benefits, the deal or relationship between the two actors must continue. In a deal between two completely independent actors, the non-investing actor has an incentive to act opportunistically once the investing actor invests. The non-investing actor knows the investing actor prefers absorbing some costs due to opportunism rather than losing the investment. Hence, the non-investing actor can change the terms of the deal in order to better itself. This change is costly to the investing actor because they have to give more to the other actor. To prevent this,

the investing actor has the incentive to create hierarchy whereby it controls the other actor and does not let it act opportunistically (Williamson 1975, 1985; Lake 1996; 2009b). Lake gives an example,

> the forward-based defense strategy desired by the United States in Western Europe and the Western Pacific after World War II required large deployments of U.S. troops and equipment that could not occur without a measure of hierarchy in both regions. The fortuitous circumstances created by the occupation of Germany and Japan, as well as the creation of strategic trust territories in the South Pacific, permitted the necessary protectorates. Absent some form of   hierarchy, the subordinate states might defect to the Soviet side during the Cold War, fail to live up to their responsibilities in the division of labor, or simply demand a larger share of the gains from cooperation, all of which would reduce the returns to the United States. Only by exerting a degree of authority over their foreign policies could Washington limit the potential for opportunism inherent in these relationships. (Lake 2009b, 275)

While Lake identifies limiting the costs of opportunism as an upside of international hierarchy, the costs of governing are a major downside. Governing costs are the increased costs to the dominant actor that come with having more control in a hierarchical relationship. Such as monitoring the subordinate's actions, providing safeguards to the subordinate state to ensure it the dominant state will not take advantage of its position, and coercing the subordinate to stay in compliance. While greater potential for opportunism in a relationship, increases the likelihood of hierarchy, greater governance costs make hierarchy less likely. Thus, the expected level of hierarchy occurs where the combination of saving from preventing opportunism in partners and the costs of governing maximize the security and/or wealth from the relationship (Lake 1996).

2.2.5.2   Norms

Much of the literature on norms and hierarchy focuses on colonization and relationships between states and pre-state societies (Watson 1992; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Spruyt 2000; Sharman 2012). Sharman adds evidence to the idea that hierarchy is not just based on material

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benefits, but is also based on a social logic. He does this by arguing that three modern hierarchical states (Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand) maintain certain dependencies not because they benefit materially, but because they value the norms of development assistance and self-determination (Sharman 2012). While Sharman focused on changing norms in the dominant state, Spruyt argued that changing norms in colonies led to decolonization. As evidence he examines Dutch and French decolonization processes where he finds that once local elites from the periphery were exposed to the ideals of democratic equality, state building, and national self-determination, they used these ideals to help gain their independence. The speed and pervasiveness of decolonization that affected both weak and strong European powers indicates that norms played a role in decolonization and not just material factors (Spruyt 2000). Goertz and Diehl find that a global decolonization norm, measured by the extent that previously dependent territories gained their freedom and the proportion of those that gained independence through military conflict, decreased the chance that military conflict was involved in dependent territories' transitions to independence (1992).

Keene describes international norms and ideologies that indicate which societies are civilized, and he argues that powerful states have used these beliefs as justifications for hierarchy. When another society is considered uncivilized, powerful states create hierarchy to bring good order and civilization to these peoples. Throughout history the ideas of race, ideology, and human rights have been used to justify hierarchy (Keene 2002). Keene looks at a series of treaties the British made in order to abolish the slave trade and finds that treaty partners were treated differently based on the socially constructed notions of civilized nations and barbarians. Treaties with the peoples considered barbarians were much more restrictive on how they had to act to end the slave trade compared to treaties with civilized peoples (Keene 2007).

Hobson and Sharman trace history, giving many examples, to conclude that constructed ideas have been a key part in many international hierarchies and that the creation of hierarchy is not explained by material factors alone (2005).

International and regional norms regarding what is acceptable can affect the level of hierarchy. Lake argues that the United States formed protectorates after World War Two rather than empire because of developing norms against foreign rule (Lake 2009a). Kang describes how the Confucian Far East states of Vietnam and Korea recognized China as the superior Middle Kingdom. This belief in the superiority of the Middle Kingdom facilitated Chinese hierarchy (Kang 2010). Watson describes how differences in beliefs between Greeks living on the Greek peninsula and Greeks living in Anatolia led to the Greeks on Anatolia accepting Persian rule and peninsula Greeks resisting it fiercely, despite the economic advantages that would benefit both Greeks by living under the Persian Empire (Watson 1992).

2.2.6   Literature Discussion

This section discusses a few topics. First, I emphasize that the hierarchy perspective should not be viewed as a paradigm competing with other major schools of IR theory. Second, I explain how adding norms to hierarchy theory will further distinguish it from other theories. Finally, I argue that this chapter fillS in current holes in the hierarchy literature.

The hierarchy perspective adds knowledge to the literature, but is not a direct challenge to knowledge already gained by IR's major schools of thought. For example, the hierarchy perspective relaxes the simplifying assumptions of neo-realism, but does not necessarily invalidate the general conclusions. Neo-realism simplifies the world by assuming that the world is anarchic and each state is completely sovereign, and it concludes that states balance against

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one another and resort to self-help (Waltz 1979). The anarchy and sovereignty assumptions are not made to create complete, accurate descriptions of international relations. They are made because they are generally true, and some general knowledge can be gained by making such assumptions. However, these simplifying assumptions ignore the reality that states are not always fully sovereign and the world is not completely anarchic. Thus, phenomenon affected by hierarchy and shared sovereignty are ignored because of these simplifying assumptions. For example, war coalition joining and state military spending are variables that can be further explored by relaxing the simplifying assumptions (Lake 2009a). However, the conclusions that great powers have pressure to balance against one another and to resort to self-help still stand as generally true even as a hierarchy perspective finds new knowledge about how hierarchy affects interstate behavior. Conclusions from both perspectives do not have to contradict each other. For example, it is plausible for hierarchy between two states to increase bilateral trade flows and for great powers to tend to balance against one another. Because more of international relations is understood by accepting the general conclusions from both perspectives, viewing the hierarchy perspective as a competing paradigm with neo-realist theory(or any other IR school of thought) is not useful.

One important reason for researching the effects of norms on hierarchy is that normative effects will further distinguish the advances of hierarchy theory from realist schools of thought. The expectations of hierarchy theory and of realist theory differ less when hierarchy theory is focused on material interests as the determining factor of hierarchy. Realist theory already predicts weak state bandwagoning when subordinating is the best way for a weak state to secure its survival, so normative explanations would add to the security explanation in bandwagoning theory (Wright 1942; Waltz 1979). If hierarchy is fully determined by material interests, then

hierarchy may not have much of an effect on our understanding of international behavior because hierarchies fully explained by material interests should grow and shrink as soon as those material interests change. When there is an incentive for two states to form hierarchy, hierarchy forms, and when the material incentives change, the hierarchy is dissolved. This means hierarchy could be merely a spurious variable with no independent impact on the world because material interest is the key variable that affects both hierarchy and the variables we may expect hierarchy to affect, such as coalition joining. One could just study the material interests of states, while ignoring hierarchy, and equally well explain state behaviors. If hierarchy also has a normative basis though, levels of hierarchy will have more independence from material interests and will have the ability to impact state behavior separate from the material interests that partially cause the hierarchy.

Current normative theory on hierarchy does not directly add onto the material maximization literature because the normative literature: is not focused on the hierarchical bargain between two states, focuses on pre-state societies, and does not produce general empirical results. While material maximization literature emphasizes material factors that incentivize a bargain between two states, much of the normative literature focuses on the normative traits of either the powerful state, weaker states, or system-wide norms. I want to more directly apply norms to the idea of hierarchy as a social contract by looking at what normative characteristics between two states makes a hierarchy agreement more likely. The normative literature focuses on case studies rather than finding general empirical evidence for the effects of norms, and a lot of the literature's focus on pre-state polities limits its usefulness to understanding the modern world. What is needed is a theory and test that clearly applies to the modern state system and explains how shared norms may facilitate hierarchy between states.

This paper will attempt to do this and will add onto material maximizing theory by considering the general effects of norms on state hierarchical relationships.

2.3   Theory

I argue that hierarchy is facilitated by having certain norms in common, and that norms facilitate hierarchy through four non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: creating a common identity for the two states, creating common interests, easing cooperation due to similar ways of doing business, and giving the subordinate state a better chance of influencing the dominant state through persuasion.

2.3.1   Common Identity

The first mechanism by which common norms affect hierarchy involves the many ways that holding a common identity facilitates cooperation and hierarchy. The concept of identity is defined and explained in previous literature (McCall and Simmons 1978; Wendt 1994; Fearon 1999), and scholars argue that states holding a shared identity are more likely to cooperate (Wendt 1994). I extend this argument by suggesting that if two or more states are more likely to cooperate because they have a common identity, then hierarchy will also be more likely if hierarchy is an efficient way to cooperate. Common identity facilitates hierarchical relationships between states for three reasons. First, an in-group affinity makes hierarchy seem more appropriate. Second, when states see each other as in-group members, the other state is seen as less threatening because states with a shared identity see their security interests in a joint manner. And finally, a common identity among two states may strengthen the negative perception of a

third state as a state with a different identity, thereby increasing the incentive to cooperate against that third state.

The concept of identity has been well discussed and defined in the literature. When two states hold norms that they value, they may identify themselves and others by those norms, and this can lead to two states seeing each other as a common in-group rather than seeing each other as an "other" (Sumner 1906; Wendt 1994). Wendt defines social identity as, "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object" (McCall and Simmons 1978; Wendt 1994, 385). Fearon summarizes one usage of the word identity as, "a social category, defined by membership rules and allegedly characteristic attributes or expected behaviors," (Fearon 1999, 36). I am essentially using the same concept as Fearon and Wendt and have defined a common identity as beliefs among two or more actors that they share characteristics signifying them as belonging to a constructed category of actors.

Both constructivist and normative liberal theories have used the concept of identity to explain cooperation among states (Moravcsik 1997; Wendt 1994; Owen 2002). Wendt argues that while realism and neoliberalism assume that states only identify with themselves, constructivists look at the extent to which states may identify with other states as a common community whereby they care about the interests of the entire community and not just a state's individual interests (Wendt 1992). Ideas-focused liberalism expects conflict to be likely when states differ on what they view as their identities and boundaries in incompatible ways. If two states' identities and ideologies are not compatible, conflict is more likely, while if they are compatible, cooperation is facilitated (Moravcsik 1997; Owen 2002).

There are many characteristics by which societies and individuals may identify themselves—identities that matter are those salient in people's minds. More salient identities are

those that are more important to an actor in its self-definition. Take a hypothetical example, countries with red, white, and blue in their flag will assign patriotic meaning to those colors and use those colors as a symbol of themselves. Other countries may use the same colors and people from one country may feel a minor affection toward a country that shares a similar colored flag. However, this affection will be small compared to the affection felt toward a state that shares a salient identity that more deeply identifies a state. A state's status as a democracy will be a key part of how its people and leaders view the state. Unlike the flag colors, democracy is not just a symbol of the country, it is viewed as an important characteristic of it. While the plight of a state with a similarly colored flag may not invoke much impetus for foreign aid or protection, the plight of a state who shares important values and characteristics likely will.

The first reason why common identities facilitate hierarchical relationships is that a strong state and weak state sharing a common, salient identity have a general in-group affinity toward each other. Seeing another state as a common member of a salient group naturally produces a kinship with that state. Such a kinship facilitates cooperation by making hierarchy under the dominant state seem more appropriate to the subordinate state and by inducing the dominant state to see it as its responsibility to protect an in-group member. For example, imperial Russia felt a level of affinity toward Eastern Christian states and peoples due to their common Slav ethnicity and common Orthodox religion, and this facilitated Russian attempts to gain and maintain hierarchical control over these regions; including taking actions leading to the Crimean War that Welch argues cannot be explained from realist factors alone (Welch 1993).

The second reason norms affect hierarchy through identity is that when states see each other as in-group members, the other state is seen as less threatening. States with shared identity see their security interests in a joint manner. This lessens the security dilemma between the two

states (Kahl 1998). A state has fewer reasons to be concerned about another state's aggressive intentions when the other state is viewed as a member of a common community. As Wendt explains, anarchy does not necessarily lead to self-help and the expectation of another state's attack. Interaction among states can reveal to each other what type of actor each state is (Wendt 1992). Through repeated interactions two states can identify each other as a common type of actor based on salient characteristics revealed by the states' behaviors. This commonality leads the states to see each other as being a part of a common community that works together peacefully rather than threatens each others' survival. With the security dilemma mitigated, the two states are more likely to see their relations in a perspective of relative gains rather than zero sum, and this will facilitate cooperation. If a state is more confident that a fellow in-group state will not take advantage of some sovereignty given to it in hierarchy, then the likelihood of that state agreeing to hierarchy increases.

Cooperation will be further facilitated when the in-group states identify their group as an identity that is peaceful. Identifying another state as a certain type may help a state predict the other state's behavior, and if the behavior predicted is non-predatorial, then a state will expect less risk when cooperating. States that share a non-predatorial identity expect good intentions from each other, so less risk from cooperation is expected. States do not simply judge other states on their ability to harm them, but on their intent (Owen 2002), and states will act differently depending on whether they have recognized a state as a predator or non-predator (Wendt 1992). Weaker states may fear that a dominant state will take advantage of the privileges given to it under hierarchy, so an identity-based expectation that that state is a non-predator will facilitate hierarchy. Owen argues that liberal states believe other liberal states will not act predatorily toward them because liberal governments respect the rights of others and will

behave responsibly (1997, 2002). Therefore, liberal states will be more willing to cooperate in more ways, including entering into a hierarchical relationship, because they identify each other as non-predator cooperators.

The third reason norms affect hierarchy through identity is that a common identity among two states may create, or strengthen, a negative perception of a third state as a state with a different identity. Once two states identify with one another, the boundaries of who "we" are must be compared to who we are not. An identity category can only be understood by comparing it to who the identity does not include. This works similarly to the development of nationalism. By purposely excluding some, in-group loyalty and cohesion become stronger (Marx 2002). Two states with a shared identity can work in a manner similar to the behavior shown in social psychology studies where friendships among individuals formed in early stages of field studies diminished by assigning the friends to different groups (Sherif 1966). Such studies show that simply perceiving two social groups is sufficient to create intergroup discrimination (Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Tajfel & billig 1974; Doise et al. 1972; Turner 1975). When two states have a shared identity, a third out-group state will become the "other" to the in-group states. This can increase suspicions of the third state's intentions, which will increase the first two states' fear of the third state and increase the incentives for the first two states to cooperate on security in order to secure themselves against the out-group state. Viewing the other state with extra suspicion increases the chances of miscalculations that can lead to war and to states developing an identity partially based on conflictual opposition to the negatively viewed out-group (Mitzen 2006). The increased chance of conflict due to these factors increases states' need to focus on security.

Owen points out that insecurity arising from a third state is heightened during times of transnational ideological struggles because during these times ideological leaders favor close relations with great powers who follow the same ideology. Also, during ideological great power tensions, great powers will be more concerned about increasing their power by bringing smaller states into their sphere of influence. One strategy for doing this is by promoting its ideology in lesser states (Owen 2002).

If the most efficient way for two states to secure themselves is to enter into a hierarchical relationship, then the increased fear of the out-group state will increase the likelihood of hierarchy. Working together to counter the perceived security threat of the out-group state can be done in the form of an alliance among equals, or by hierarchy. Hierarchy will be more efficient when one state is more powerful and has to invest more in their security because this state will seek hierarchical control to ensure its investments pay off (Lake 1996). Another factor that will make hierarchy more efficient is the strategic value of a weaker state's land. When the weaker state's land is of important strategic value, the powerful state will have greater incentives to use that land with its own forces to maximize its strategic utility. For example, Japan and Taiwan are critical locations for U.S. naval and air bases to extend U.S. military power. The U.S. has substantial incentives to create hierarchy so it can use some of these countries' sovereign territory for military bases. The Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the value of Caribbean islands to the defense of the U.S. because attacks can be launched from the islands. Therefore, the U.S. has the incentive to have a measure of hierarchy over Caribbean islands to prevent rivals from using an island as a launching pad for attack. Also, hierarchy offers the advantage of a more top-down structure that makes a defense more cohesive and increases the likelihood that the states will

have alliance similarity because the dominant state may have more influence over the subordinate's foreign policy.

2.3.2   Common Interests

The second mechanism by which common norms lead to an increased chance of hierarchy is that common norms lead to common interests, and if these common interests are best achieved by hierarchy, then hierarchy becomes more likely. Norms can lead to common interests in two ways. First, normative ideas can lead to common normative interests when the states share a goal that they value even though it does not materially benefit them. If two states value spreading Christianity, then this normative belief of valuing the expansion of Christianity creates a common interest in increasing the influence of this religion. If two states value preserving endangered species, then they are more likely to work together to protect such organisms, and if there is an incentive to cheat on an endangered species policy, then hierarchy may be beneficial so the dominant state can punish cheaters.

Second, norms can lead to common material interests that create incentives for cooperation and hierarchy in a variety of ways. The value of particular material gains are determined by the perspective of individuals, so which material gains hold value is not axiomatically true or universal. Therefore, shared normative beliefs that determine the value of material gains can give two states common material interests that they can cooperate to achieve (Owen 1997). Furthermore, if behaviors determined by norms make certain strategies for obtaining material interests beneficial, then states with those similar norms may have an incentive to work together at implementing those strategies. For example, free market societies with an innovative citizenry will favor freer trade so that their citizens can maximize the gains

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from their innovations by exploiting them across other states. Also, common norms regarding which domestic political institutions are legitimate can create common interests and facilitate cooperation. Throughout history states have had conflictual relationships due to differing norms of legitimate domestic order. During the Peloponnesian War, oligarchies and democracies fought each other. In the 19th century monarchies in Europe battled against revolutionary states (Nolt 1990; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Moravcsik 1997). Communists and liberals fought fascists in World War Two, and later liberals and Communists aligned against each other during the Cold War (Moravcsik 1997). In these examples, states cooperated and competed with each other depending on the similarity of the other state's domestic legitimacy norms, so dissimilar domestic legitimacy norms created differing interests that made cooperation less likely. And, when states with opposing ideologies did cooperate extensively, they required a common overriding interest to temporarily produce cooperation (e.g. liberals and communists in World War Two).

2.3.3   Ease of Cooperation

States with common norms are more likely to operate in ways more similar to each other, which increases the efficiency and cost effectiveness of cooperation. When states share certain assumptions, communication and interaction is likely clearer and easier (Kahl 1998). Further integration of policies is easier when two states already have similar policies and values (Moravcsik 1997). The deeper a hierarchy, the more the states may have to integrate their policies and work together. This process will produce costs due to confusion, and the states will need to make adjustments based on their different modes of operation. Communication confusion can lead to misunderstandings at all levels of government and society that may cause

difficulties. Different routines and policies for how to accomplish tasks can create inefficiencies when two states try to work to solve a task together. Furthermore, changing to a new process for completing a task produces costs as the government and/or society overcome a learning curve for employing the new process. Thus, minimizing changes due to previously similar policies lowers learning curve costs.

One example of norms easing cooperation concerns norms on legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution. Even capitalist countries disagree on the proper rules for immigration, social welfare, taxation, religious freedom, health and safety, environmental and consumer protection, cultural promotion, and public goods distributions (Moravcsik 1997). Scholars have found that deeper EC/EU cooperation is often preceded by a convergence of values relevant to the deeper integration (Burley 1992; Ruggie 1995; Moravcsik 1997). Therefore, common norms regarding appropriate regulations likely facilitate hierarchical cooperation.

Two cases where differing norms made hierarchy more difficult for the United States are U.S. hierarchies with Islamic states and U.S. hierarchies with dictatorships. U.S. hierarchies with Islamic states have produced costs due to different norms in these states. After the September 11th attacks the United states began a global war on terror involving increased hierarchical relationships with some Muslim countries. President George W. Bush referred to the war on terror as a "crusade", which in a Christian context is a very positive term. However, in an Islamic context the term is viewed negatively and its use made U.S. hierarchy more difficult with Muslim countries. The discrepancy over the term between Christian and Islamic cultures led to its ill-advised use, so the difference in meanings of a word made hierarchy more difficult. U.S. hierarchies with dictatorships have also been more costly due to differing norms.

Such hierarchies require dictators to be cooperating with, and giving some of their sovereignty to, a country rhetorically opposed to the dictators' form of government. The United States' rhetoric about spreading freedom across the globe facilitates criticism and propaganda against U.S. hierarchies with dictatorships. Due to this rhetoric, the difference in governing values hinders the legitimacy of cooperation and of the dictator's regime. When two countries share the same cultural terminology and have the same governing values, such impediments to hierarchy and cooperation are less likely to arise.

2.3.4   Subordinate Persuasion

The final mechanism by which common norms increase the likelihood of hierarchy is that by two states holding certain norms in common, the subordinate state can use the values in these norms that they both share to persuade the dominant state. For example, in the 2011 intervention in Libya, France and the United Kingdom appealed to the United States on the basis of the shared values of human rights and freedom from oppression. France and Britain's probability of persuading the U.S. was greater because of their common values. A country whose government does not share these same values, such as Russia or China, will be less likely to be persuaded on the grounds of freedom from government oppression. One particular set of norms that can give a subordinate state more influence are norms that the subordinate state should be consulted and accommodated. In this case, a norm would directly give a subordinate state influence, and this norm will have its strongest impact when institutionalized in formal agreements between the dominant and subordinate states (Risse Kappen 1995). One such example are the institutionalized consultation norms in NATO between the U.S. and Western Europe. (Risse Kappen 1995). This allowed the Europeans more opportunities to persuade the dominant United

States and increase their influence over the hierarchy. The future strength of the United States'

Western European hierarchy may be in danger partially due to diverging norms. For example,

the extent of Germany's rejection of the U.S. led 2003 Iraq war was partially due to the Bush

administration's failure to consult with the Germans over the war (Rudolf 2005). The breaking

of a consultation norm both offended the Germans and made U.S. hierarchy less favorable to

them because of a lack of influence over U.S. decisions. If a subordinate state believes in a

higher likelihood of influence in a hierarchical relationship, then it will be more likely to support

a hierarchy. This leads to my general hypothesis.

2.3.5   Hypotheses

> General hypothesis: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical
> relationship with one another when they have key normative characteristics in common.

> To actually test the theory, I derive more specific hypotheses that identify particular

norms that make hierarchy more likely. Although the theory is meant to be universal, due to data

limitations, the empirical tests and the following testable hypotheses will just refer to

international hierarchy led by the United States. The normative characteristics identified are

particular to the United States, but I would expect such relationships to exist in other hierarchies.

> Hypothesis 1: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with
> one another the more that they share democracy in common.

> Hierarchy with a co-democratic state will be viewed as more acceptable because its

democracy gives the dominant state more legitimacy. Democratic states and societies tend to see

the democratic form of government as the most legitimate kind (Diamond 1999; Welzel and

Inglehart 2006). Democratic states respect the democratic process and consider foreign

governments more legitimate when they operate on democratic principles. Because a democratic dominant state is seen as more legitimate, democratic subordinate states may be more willing to give up some control of their actions under hierarchy. While any loss of sovereignty may be viewed negatively, a subordinate state will tend to view the surrender of some sovereignty more favorably when the dominant power's government is considered legitimate. One important democratic value that gives democracy legitimacy is that contests over power and policy should be settled institutionally rather than violently.

Two democratic states sharing peaceful settlement values will facilitate trust, cooperation, and hierarchy among those states. Scholars argue that these values play an important role in creating the democratic peace observed between democracies (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001), and if they can decrease the likelihood of war between two states, they may also increase the likelihood that two states trust one-another enough to enter into a hierarchical relationship. States expect the other state to not take military advantage of hierarchy due to the states' believing conflict is not the appropriate way to solve disagreements. If the democratic form of government does produce peaceful settlement norms, and these norms are externalized to relationships with foreign countries, then democracies may prefer a world order controlled by countries that share this peaceful norm. A democratic world order would not only be normatively satisfying for democratic states, but would increase states' security because the world is run by states with peaceful, democratic norms. Democracies may view subordinating themselves as a fair trade for maintaining a democratic world order.

National role conceptions (Holsti 1970) of the United States may play a part in motivating the U.S. to create hierarchy over other states. A national role conception is what a

state's leaders believe the state's identity and function is in international politics. To some extent the U.S. sees itself as the defender of democracy and a supporter of people fighting for liberation over dictators. These national role conceptions can help motivate the U.S. to create hierarchy over democratic states because doing so supports the country's self conception of what it should do on the international stage. Subordinate states may also accept the U.S.'s role as a defender of democracy and be more likely to accept hierarchy in order to respect and facilitate that role. A subordinate state's own national role conception may fall into Holsti's category of a faithful ally (1970). A country that views itself as a faithful ally does not just have an alliance with another country, but commits itself to support the policies of another country (Holsti 1970). One reason a state may accept the U.S. as a faithful ally is because of the normative bond they share based on democracy. A state seeing itself as a faithful ally of the U.S., which is seen as a defender of democracy, is more likely to view hierarchy under the U.S. as more acceptable than a country who does not view its role in such a way.

Finally, a shared democratic culture may cause states to see each other as a common in-group that would produce more affinity toward each other (Wendt 1994; Owen 1997; Weart 1998; Moravcsik 1997), and this affinity may facilitate a hierarchical relationship. Once states identify collectively because of their shared domestic system, cooperation and hierarchy become more likely because of general in-group affinity among democracies, the mitigation of the security dilemma, and the shared perceived security threats from out-group states.

Hypothesis 2: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share capitalism in common.

While working and living under capitalist systems, people grow to believe in certain capitalist values (MacPherson 1962; Harris 1979; Mintz 1985; Sider 1986; Murphy & Margolis

1995; Mousseau 2000). These values, shared among states, should produce a common identity and common interests - each of which facilitates hierarchy.

Capitalist norms can be internalized and prized for their intrinsic value and become the basis of a common identity that facilitates hierarchy. Regularized capitalist behavior leads people to expect contracts to be honored. Capitalism involves individuals trying to profit in a free market, and for this to work, the rule of law and exchange-based cooperation must be in place. This implies a fair amount of freedom for individuals to search for a profit and a limited government to not disrupt or put into jeopardy individuals' enterprises. Living in a society based on contracts between actors that are upheld by the rule of law can facilitate people perceiving each other as equal and seeing negotiation and compromise as the proper way of doing business. These values can be spread to how government leaders should be chosen. Thus, capitalism can foster democratic values of negotiation and compromise in deciding government leaders and policies (Mousseau 2000). The values of freedom, exchange-based cooperation, the legitimacy of profit as a motive for action, and limited government arise from capitalism. These values held in common among two states will likely produce a common identity that will facilitate a stronger relationship through the in-group mechanisms. Grunberg finds evidence of a link between pro-capitalist norms and support for the U.S.. In survey data, respondents who give anti-capitalist answers were more likely to be anti-American than respondents who did not give anti-capitalist answers (Grunberg 2005).

Capitalist states share a common interest in promoting free trade and peace. The norms and customary behaviors of people living in capitalist states lead them to be generally more innovative, efficient, and opportunistic. Free trade will maximize wealth for a state with such citizens because the citizenry can best utilize world resources and markets to make profit.

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Therefore, states with shared capitalist values have an incentive to create and maintain a high level of free exchange of goods, services, and capital. Capitalist states have disincentives for violent conflict because the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits of commerce (Gartzke 2007).

Hierarchy is likely between capitalist states because the goals of security and economic stability are often best produced through hierarchy. Hierarchy helps produce security because subordinate states are too weak to defend themselves against powerful threats. A dominant state will have the legitimate leadership to form joint security communities in order to contain and prevent war with non-capitalist states. Hierarchy can help achieve economic goals because a state or IGO can enforce agreed upon rules and take action in an economic crisis (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981).

Hypothesis 3: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share Christianity in common.

Coreligion states may identify with each other so that they see themselves as belonging to a common community, and this can reduce costs in hierarchy that would be produced if a subordinate state saw itself as being ruled by a dominant state of an "other" religion (Deutsch et al. 1957; Wendt 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Adler & Barnett 1998). For states and peoples who have a salient religious identity, rule by a state with a different religion often creates costly resistance. For example, the U.S. hierarchies involved in the war on terror have been made more difficult by Muslim resistance to the hierarchy of the Christian and secular United States. Another example is Muslim resistance to the incorporation of Islamic populations into the Russian Federation. On the other hand, states that share a religion may view each other as members of a common community and find the intrusion of hierarchy more acceptable. Lai and Reiter found that a common religion increases the likelihood of an alliance and the length of that

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alliance (Lai and Reiter 2000). If the in-group out-group mechanism increases the probability and strength of an alliance, then it will likely increase hierarchy as well.

Citizens of a state may believe that all people of a common religion should be ruled by one ruler, and leaders who desire more hierarchy may be able to justify hierarchy based on such beliefs. Because two states of a common religion could contain actors who hold this belief, two states of the same religion are more likely to have a hierarchical relationship than states of a different religion. For such a belief to facilitate hierarchy, it should be more than the belief that a religion should all follow one man or state's moral leadership, but that hierarchical control from one state or leader of the religion is appropriate. Islamic empires have often justified empire on the belief that all Muslims should be ruled by one Islamic Caliphate. The Byzantium Empire and Russia have attempted to create more hierarchy partially based on the belief that Orthodox Christians should be ruled by one ruler.

Religion has evolved in such a way to help people accept hierarchical institutions and larger in-groups, and this evolutionary purpose of religion also can be used to support international hierarchies. Biologists, anthropologists, and psychologists have argued that religion has evolved biologically and culturally to help societies survive (Sober & Wilson 1998; Sosis 2000; Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Atran & Henrich 2010; Haidt 2012). A group's survival was increased by having religion because it binds people to a community and incentivizes them to cooperate beyond kin groups without cheating (Sosis 2000; Sosis and Alcorta 2003; Atran & Henrich 2010). Religion creates a moral community that believes in the wrongness of socially unhelpful acts and believes in gods that are always watching. The power of a belief in gods was enhanced when it was believed that gods delivered collective punishments such as droughts or hurricanes (Atran & Henrich 2010). Religion's incentivization of pro-group behavior helped

increase cooperation among non-kin groups and gave an incentive to follow rules from society's hierarchical institutions. Even when a particular religion does not incentivize pro-group behavior through morals or fear of divine wrath, the forming of a moral community helps expand the in-group and facilitates cooperation through shared identity mechanisms.

Religious beliefs that helped large communities work together over tens of thousands of years, may also help states work together and make hierarchy more efficient. When there is a moral community based on religious beliefs, people are more likely to obey pro-group rules without coercion and inspection. This facilitates cooperation among larger groups by making such cooperation more efficient. Just as religion facilitated efficient cooperation among individuals, a common religion can incentivize the same among states. When states, and domestic actors within states, cooperate more efficiently due to moral and religious rules, then a hierarchy becomes more efficient because the dominant state can spend less resources monitoring and coercing the subordinate to follow the dominant state's commands.

Hypothesis 4: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share governing ideology in common.

Literature on ideology and cooperation with the United States generally supports the notion that OECD right wing governments cooperate more with the United States than OECD left wing governments. Isernia uses European survey data during the Cold War to find that European voters are more likely to be anti-American when they are left wing (2007). Potrafke finds in a sample of OECD countries that governments controlled by left-wing decision makers are less likely to vote with the U.S. in United Nations General Assembly voting than right-wing governments (2009). This effect holds among votes considered important and unimportant to the United States. Thus, shared domestic ideology plays a role in international alignment (Potrafke

2009). Schneider and Urpelainen find that international cooperation is less likely when states hold different partisan ideologies. This is the case even when states share an incentive to cooperate. States' partisan ideologies give them different views on the best strategies and priorities in international cooperation. These differences mean more costly compromise is necessary for cooperation; making cooperation more costly and less likely to occur (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). The literature finds that cooperation is more likely between governments with similar domestic ideologies, and I propose that cooperation in the form of hierarchy will also be more likely.

Ideological similarity with the United States makes hierarchy more likely for the same reasons holding other norms in common facilitates hierarchy. In OECD countries, right of center parties usually have governing ideologies that are more similar to those of the United States than left of center parties. Most of the developed world has a larger leftist influence than the United States, so left of center parties tend to be more radical than the American Democratic or Republican parties. Ideology is a set of normative beliefs held in a country about the role of government, and shared ideology should facilitate hierarchy in a similar fashion as other shared norms. States with similar ideology are more likely to have similar foreign and domestic goals, so this produces similar interests to cooperate on. When the dominant state believes in the same ideological assumptions as the subordinate, the subordinate should expect more influence in a hierarchical relationship because it can persuade the dominant state using ideological arguments. States with similar governing ideologies are more likely to have similar ways of doing business and similar policies, and this will make the close cooperation done in some hierarchies less costly. Finally, governments often identify by their governing ideology and may enforce this identity by running for election on the basis of their ideology, so two states with the same

ideologies are likely to see each other as a common in-group and as a result view hierarchical cooperation as more appropriate. For example, President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's ideological affinity facilitated cooperation between the two governments and gave Thatcher greater influence over Reagan's policy decisions (Smith 1990).

Hypothesis 5: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another when they belong to a common civilization.

Samuel Huntington (1996) proposed that the current and future world will be divided upon civilizational lines. Rather than conflict occurring primarily between states or ideologies, conflict will be focused on the largest cultural grouping, civilizations. Civilizations are the broadest culture-based identity where people share a common way of life and outlook on the world. Huntington discusses the effects of a common in-group affinity among co-civilization states and how it facilitates cooperation. He sees regional organizations as evidence of this because the most integrated regional organizations belong to a common civilization. For example, NATO and the European Union belong to the Western civilization and are deeply integrated, while ASEAN states have had more trouble integrating due to cultural differences (Huntington 1996).

Huntington discusses the importance of civilizational core states. Core states are states viewed as a center of their civilization's culture and are the most powerful states of a civilization. There may be more than one core state. Other states that belong to a civilization are member states. Core states provide leadership for their civilization. Huntington predicted that after the Cold War, civilizational core states will be the center of state alignment, rather than the two ideological super powers. Civilizational member states are likely to band wagon with their civilization's core state and belong to its sphere of influence. The cultural commonality between

core and member states will legitimate the order-imposing role of the core state for the member states. Huntington describes how Germany-France and Russia extended their spheres of influence to surrounding countries that share their civilizational culture -- Western Christianity and Orthodox. Civilizations that lack core states will have trouble implementing civilizational order (Huntington 1996).

What Huntington is describing here is norm-based hierarchy. The common norms are the many norms that are included in a civilization's culture. The culture of a civilization consists of beliefs just like any other norm, and the processes that create within civilization cooperation approximate those of other shared norms. Huntington mostly focuses on the identity mechanisms as to why civilizational in-group states are likely to accept hierarchy from their core civilizational state. However, the general normative mechanisms described in this paper's theory also apply to civilizations. Common culture leads to similar assumptions of how business is done and makes communicating and working together proceed more smoothly. Common cultural worldviews allow the civilizational subordinates to persuade the dominant state based on cultural beliefs and arguments And, common cultures may lead to common material interests.

Studies that attempt to test Huntington's clash of civilizations theory by searching for a relationship between intercivilization dyads and conflict do not provide a compelling test of Huntington's theory. These studies find no evidence for the theory, and some even find that intercivilization conflict is less likely than intracivilization conflict (Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett and Oneal 2001; Chiozza 2002). However, these studies only focus on one part of the theory and do not convincingly test that part. The theory is not focused on the prediction that the average dyad between civilizations will be more conflict prone than within-civilization dyads. The theory predicts the general shape of international relations. It is not necessarily the case that

when states are aligned by civilizations they will have more conflict with each other. Huntington's discussion of core states makes it clear that if the core states properly create order over their civilization, they may be able to control their subordinates and prevent conflict with other civilizations. And, states belonging to civilizations without core states will have trouble working together, so they are likely to fight amongst themselves and even become shatterbelt regions, which are regions of many weak states that strong states vie for influence in (Unstead 1923; Hensel and Diehl 1994). For example, the Islamic civilization does not have core states to create Islamic hierarchy, so they have trouble working together. And instead, the Middle East has become a region that is fought over. Similarly, Africa does not have core states, so China and the West compete for economic influence in the region. Because civilizations without core states are not united, more conflict within civilizations is compatible with the clash of civilizations theory. Furthermore, when testing dyads, the severity and importance to the systemic or regional balance of power of the dyadic conflicts is not taken into account. The theory is less focused on predicting smaller conflicts that have less importance on the world balance of power, and more focused on the "most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts" that occur between civilizations (Huntington 1996, 28).

What the clash of civilizations theory more clearly predicts is hierarchy of core civilizational states over civilizational member states. This prediction can be derived from the general hypothesis of my paper. I will test the prediction in an attempt to find evidence for one aspect of Huntington's theory and for one sub-hypothesis of this paper's theory[1].

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[1] The Western Civilization and Christianity hypotheses are testing similar concepts. Indeed, a key component of Western Civilization is Christianity. However, I test them separately because they are different concepts. Religion is a key part of civilizational culture, but it is not civilizational culture itself. As I argue in the religion hypothesis section, religion has played an important role in shaping societies and structuring people's world views. Plausibly, a religion may have great influence on state's actions involving hierarchy, while the larger concept civilization does not. Furthermore, Western Civilization is not defined by Christianity. There is ample variation between Western Civilization and Christianity. Western Civilization only includes Western Europe, North America, and Australia.

2.4   Research Design

The data consists of U.S.-country-year dyads from 1950 to 2010. U.S.-country-year

dyads consist of the United States paired with each country in the world for every year from

1950 to 2010. The focus will be on the United States because of data availability. Also, the

United States is of particular interest due to its strong use of normative rhetoric in foreign policy.

Because hierarchy is based partially on a state's international legitimacy, studying the predictors

of U.S. hierarchy can also lead to insights on the sources of the United States' hegemonic

legitimacy. During the Cold War, U.S. legitimacy was more easily explained by joint security

concerns about the Soviet threat (Kagan 2004), but after the Cold War, foreign policy scholars

debated whether U.S. legitimacy will be more based on domestic democratic-capitalist norms or

international multilateral process norms, such as consulting with allies and getting approval from

an international body before major military interventions (Kagan 2004, 2005; Tucker &

Hendrickson 2004, 2005). Studying the empirical record of the United States and hierarchy can

shed light on this debate by looking for evidence of specific domestic norms as a source of U.S.

legitimacy.

2.4.1   Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is the level of international hierarchy the United States has over

another country in a particular year. The main operationalization of this variable is Lake's

measurement of U.S. security and economic hierarchy over other countries (2009a). Data for

these variables from 1950 to 2000 has been collected by Lake, and I will extend the data to 2010

in order to create more overlap with the independent variables (Lake 2009a).

While, large Christian populations dominate in these areas as well as Latin America, Eastern Europe, Russia, and
some African countries. There are also substantive Christian populations in other parts of Asia.

2.4.1.1   Security Hierarchy

Security hierarchy refers to U.S. control over security issues and is measured by an index of two factors: U.S. troop deployments in other countries relative to other countries' populations (DoD), and the extent that other countries' alliance patterns are similar to U.S. alliance patterns (Bennett & Stam 2000). A subordinate state allowing a dominant to deploy troops on the subordinate's sovereign territory signifies a recognition of the dominant state's authority over some of the subordinate's sovereignty. The stationed troops tend to give the dominant state some control over the subordinate's security policy because the dominant can embroil the subordinate in wars by launching attacks from its territory, and the dominant's troops can increase control by making the subordinate dependent on the dominant for military defense (Lake 2009a). The fewer alliances a subordinate has with countries with which the dominant does not have an alliance, the more dependent the subordinate is on the dominant state for security aid. A subordinate will be aware of this and may diversify its alliance partners to prevent this dependency. Failing to do so indicates an amount of acceptance of the dependency and influence that comes with it. A weaker state having more alliances with states not allied with the dominant state indicates greater foreign policy autonomy and weaker hierarchy (Lake 2009a).

The military personnel component is constructed by taking the total number of active duty military personnel stationed in each country divided by the host country's total population. And, this value is normalized to one for the highest country value in 1995[2]. Military personnel are from the Department of Defense and population is from Gleditsch (DoD; Gleditsch 2002; Lake 2009a). This component has a mean of .084, a standard deviation of .570, a minimum

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[2] The choice of 1995 was arbitrary. I chose 1995 to maintain consistency with these measurements in the literature (Lake 2009a).

value of 0, and a maximum value of 11.538. The component's values mostly fall between zero

and one; only 1.8% of observations are greater than one.

The EUGene software generated the alliance similarity component. If a country was

allied with the U.S. in a year than its score is 1 divided by the number of alliances with countries

that the U.S. is not allied with. If the country is not allied with the U.S., then it is coded a 0

(Bennett & Stam 2000; Lake 2009a). The alliance similarity component ranges from 0 to 1, has

a mean of .304, and has a standard deviation of .456[3].

The security hierarchy variable is computed by adding the alliance similarity and military

personnel components, and then normalizing the sum to one for the highest country value in

1995 (Lake 2009a). The mean is .201, the standard deviation: .397, the min: 0, and the max:

5.913. Less than 2 percent of observations are above one. Hence, with the exception of a few

outliers, the variable mostly ranges from zero to one. There are a few variables above one

because the variables are normalized to one for the highest value in 1995, but in other years the

highest values are greater than the highest value in 1995.

2.4.1.2   Economic Hierarchy

Economic hierarchy refers to U.S. control over economic issues, and is measured by an

index of two factors: an ordinal measure of the extent to which the other country's exchange rate

regime is dependent on the U.S. dollar (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Ilzetzki et al. 2011), and a

continuous measure of the other country's relative trade dependence on the U.S. (Gleditsch 2002;

World Bank; Barbieri & Keshk 2012; Heston et al. 2012). Monetary policy is an important part

of a state's economic policy. Thus, the more a state links its currency to the U.S. dollar, the more

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[3] COW Alliance Data has recently been updated. However, EUGene has not yet been updated to include the new
alliance data. Thus, currently the security hierarchy variables extend only to year 2000.

it is giving control of part of its economic policy to the United States (Lake 2009a). If a country is highly trade dependent on another, it will be vulnerable to the other's influence. The failure of a state to diversify its trading partners indicates a level of acceptance of the influence. The acceptance of the influence is similar to the acceptance of hierarchical control, so trade dependence proxies for hierarchy (Lake 2009a).

The exchange rate regime component is derived from Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and Ilzetzki et al. (2011). If a country's currency is not anchored to the U.S. dollar at all in a year, then it is coded a 0. If a country's currency is anchored to the U.S. dollar in a year, then it is coded a value of 1 to 3 depending on the extent of the anchoring as determined by Ilzetzki et al. (2008). These values are normalized to one for the highest value in 1995. This component ranges from 0 to 1, has a mean of .236, and a standard deviation of .378.

Relative trade dependence on the U.S. is measured by taking a state's total trade flows with the U.S. in a year, and dividing that by the state's GDP. Then, subtracting from this number the sum of: total trade flows with Russia divided by GDP, total trade flows with China divided by GDP, total trade flows with the United Kingdom divided by GDP, and total trade flows with France divided by GDP. This value is then normalized to one for the highest value in 1995. This variable ranges from 0 to 4.206, has a mean of .064, and a standard deviation of .170. Data on trade flows is from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri & Keshk 2012). GDP data is from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2012). The construction calculations are from Lake (2009a)[4].

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[4] Flows with the U.S. relative to GDP capture the amount of economic leverage the U.S. has on a country. However, if states are also highly dependent on other great powers economically, then this will weaken U.S. leverage because the influence of the other power(s) may conflict with U.S. preferences. Thus, I subtract the dependence on other great powers to capture this dynamic.

My economic hierarchy index is constructed the same as the economic hierarchy index in Lake (2009a). However, due to data availability, I use different sources for my measurement of its constructs. These include GDP (Heston et al. 2012), trade flows (Barbieri & Keshk 2012), and exchange rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al. 2011). These data sources measure the same variables, except the data extend for a longer period of time. My measure correlates with Lake's at .96. The economic hierarchy index is the sum of its two components normalized from 0 to 1 for the highest value in 1995. The variable ranges from 0 to 3.58, although only one percent of the observations are above one. The mean is .21 with a standard deviation of .31.

FIGURE 2.1. Average U.S. Hierarchy

Source: Lake 2009a; DoD; Bennett & Stam 2000; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Ilzetzki et al. 2011; Gleditsch 2002; World Bank; Barbieri & Keshk 2012; Heston et al. 2012.

Figure 2.1 shows the average U.S. economic and security hierarchy per year. U.S. economic hierarchy has declined throughout the Cold War, and then increases during the 90s and

00s. U.S. security hierarchy has decreased since the 1950s. Figure 2.2 shows the security hierarchy index capturing the drop in U.S. security hierarchy over Cuba after Communists took over the country.

FIGURE 2.2. Cuba's U.S. Security Hierarchy

Source: Lake 2009a; DoD; Bennett & Stam 2000.

As an alternative measure of hierarchy, I will use the similarity between the U.S. and the other state on key votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 1983 to 2008 (Gartzke 1998; Dreher and Sturm 2012). Since 1983 the U.S. Department of State has published reports on which UNGA votes are important enough to U.S. interests that the U.S. heavily lobbies other states over those votes. The more hierarchy the U.S. has, the more influence it should have over a state's vote. Thus, the extent that states vote with the U.S. on key votes proxies for hierarchy. The U.N. similarity variable ranges from 0 to 1, has a mean of .47, and a standard deviation of .22.

FIGURE 2.3. Average U.S. Hierarchy, 3 Measures

Source: Lake 2009a; DoD; Bennett & Stam 2000; Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Ilzetzki et al. 2011; Gleditsch 2002; World Bank; Barbieri & Keshk 2012; Heston et al. 2012; Dreher and Sturm 2012.

Figure 2.3 shows the average levels of U.N. voting similarity to the U.S. on key votes compared to economic and security hierarchy. Voting similarity was volatile during the 80s, relatively high during the 90s, and relatively low during the 00s.

Security hierarchy correlates with economic hierarchy at a value of .23 and with U.N. voting similarity with a value of .30. Economic hierarchy correlates with U.N. voting similarity at -.12. These correlations are statistically significant. The lack of strong correlations among the measures indicates that they each capture a different aspect of hierarchy. Security hierarchy captures U.S. control over security affairs. Economic hierarchy captures U.S. control over economic issues. And U.N. voting similarity captures U.S. control over symbolic international action.

2.4.2   Key Independent Variables

The independent variables are measured using data from the non-U.S. country because the U.S. holds the characteristics of these variables throughout the time period studied. The goal is to measure the extent that the other country is also high on these factors. Democracy is measured by Polity IV data using the polity2 variable (Marshall & Jaggers 2002). In 2010, the polity2 mean was 3.82. Some countries around this mean in 2010 were Russia(4), Thailand(4), and Nigeria(4). In the same year, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were at the minimum value of -10, and Norway, Canada, and Japan were at the maximum value of 10.

Capitalism is measured by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom measure from 1970 to 2009 (Gwartney et al. 2011). The index consists of forty two data points from five broad categories: the size of government including expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to trade internationally; and regulation of credit, labor, and business. This continuous index has the maximum potential value of 10 and minimum potential value of 0. In 2009, the average capitalism score was 6.27. Countries who scored around this average score are Bolivia, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Countries with the highest scores are Hong Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand; who had the scores of 9.01, 8.68, and 8.20 respectively. While the least capitalist countries are Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Venezuela; with scores of 4.08, 4.16, and 4.28, respectively (Gwartney et al. 2011).

Christianity is measured by a percentage of the population that is Christian (Barrett et al. 2001). In 2010, the mean was 56.86%. Countries around the mean in 2010 were Cameroon(56.58%), Ethiopia(56.64%), and Cuba(59.22%). In 2010, the countries with the least amount of Christians were Somalia(0.05%), Morocco(0.10%), and Afghanistan(.10%). For the

same year, the most Christian countries were Samoa(98.79%), Romania(98.49%), and Malta(97.98%).

I measure ideology by using a party orientation of the executive variable from the Database of Political Institutions. The variable is ordinal, ranges from 1 to 3, and covers 1975 to 2010. A three indicates a chief executive whose party orientation is conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. A 1 indicates a communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing party controls the chief executive. And a 2 indicates the chief executive is controlled by a centrist party (Keefer 2010). In 2010, examples of countries ruled by a left executive were Chile, Portugal, and Austria. Countries with center executives were Kazakhstan, Finland, and Ireland. And countries with right executives were Denmark, New Zealand, and Mexico. For robustness, I will also run models with a dichotomous ideological variable. This variable will score a "0" for country-years with a center or left government, and a "1" for country-years with a right government.

Western civilization will be identified by a dummy variable. The variable will receive a one if the country is a Western state, and a zero otherwise. The categorization is based on Huntington's clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). In 2010, 47 of 192 countries were coded as Western. Examples of Western countries are Switzerland, Finland, Lithuania, and Canada.

TABLE 2.1. Independent Variables

Measure	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Democracy	-10 to 10	.25	7.49
Capitalism	2.11 to 9.21	6.02	1.17
Christianity	0 to .998	.54	.39
Executive Ideology	1 to 3	1.818	.927
Western Civilization	0 to 1	.23	.42

Sources: Marshall & Jaggers 2002; Gwartney et al. 2011; Barrett et al. 2001; Keefer 2010; Huntington 1996.

FIGURE 2.4. Independent Variables' Averages

Note: Averages are in the scale of each variable.Sources: Marshall & Jaggers 2002; Gwartney et al. 2011; Barrett et al. 2001; Keefer 2010; Huntington 1996.

Figure 2.4 shows the average worldwide values for the five key independent variables. Average democracy decreased since the end of the 50s until the end of the 70s where it started increasing. It increased greatly during the 90s, and continued to grow through the 00s. Despite the increases, the average level of democracy remains under a Polity score of 6, meaning the average level of world democracy is still undemocratic. Average capitalism decreased during the 70s and has been slowly increasing since the mid-80s. The average executive ideology appears fairly consistent over time. Countries' religion and civilizations do not change much, so the average values on those variables have remained mostly constant.

2.4.3   Control Variables

Reasonable candidates for omitted variable bias are included as controls. Valuable natural resources may relate to the dependent variable, hierarchy, because the resources provide an incentive for the dominant state to create hierarchy. Also, scholars have shown that natural resources often create a resource curse that links natural resources to weaker liberal institutions (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Isham et al. 2005; Morrison 2009; Vicente 2010). This is measured as the amount of crude oil proven reserves. Oil data is available from 1980 to 2010 from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). As an alternative measure for natural resources, I will also use total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to 2010 (World Bank).

State capabilities will be controlled for. Liberal states tend to be more powerful than illiberal states, and states with high capabilities both have less of a need for aid from a dominant state and are better able to resist unwanted hierarchy. I will measure state capabilities using the COW capability scores[5] (Singer et al. 1972).

Governing mountainous terrain is costly, so mountainous terrain should make hierarchy less likely. Such terrain also may be positively related to democracy because it makes defense easier and a secure defense facilitates democracy (Gibler 2007). Mountainous terrain is measured by the percentage of terrain that is mountainous (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

States with more coastline are more easily taken advantage of by the United States because of easy access by sea, and coasts may increase the likelihood of capitalism and democracy due to the protection and trade advantages of the sea. Therefore, coasts will be

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[5] COW capability scores, also known as the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), are estimates of a state's material capabilities. They are calculated from total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members (Singer et al. 1972).

controlled for and measured by the percentage of population within 100 kilometers of ice-free coasts (Gallup et al. 2001).

Economic development is related to capitalist institutions and democracy (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1988; Huntington 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix & Stokes 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004), and it decreases the level of dependency on a dominant state. Economic development is measured as GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002; World Bank).

I also include proximity. Proximity to the U.S. makes hierarchy more likely due to lower logistical costs. Proximity is likely related to religion, capitalism, and democracy due to cultural diffusion. Proximity is measured as the minimum distance between two states' capitals (Gleditsch & Ward 2001).

Shared domestic liberal norms like democracy or capitalism may not facilitate hierarchy. Instead, liberal norms expanded to the international realm as institutions that bound a dominant state to institutional rules may play a greater role in facilitating hierarchy. By forming NATO, the United States agreed to limit the use of its power and consult with its NATO allies before using force (Ikenberry 2011). These agreements may be more powerful than shared domestic norms and will be controlled for with a NATO dummy variable.

I will also control for the extent that two countries have common interests. There is not a clear way to interpret the results while controlling for common interests because common interests may both act as a spurious variable and as an intermediate variable. As a spurious variable, common interests may lead to the creation of common norms that develop in order to justify pursuing those common interests. And common interests may facilitate hierarchy. This means not controlling for common interests could create omitted variable bias. However, norms may affect hierarchy through common interests as an intermediate variable, so controlling for

common interests will also cancel out one important mechanism by which norms work.

Therefore, if results from models controlling for common interests do not show a significant

relationship between norms and hierarchy, it may be because common interest is the key

intermediate variable in the casual chain of norms affecting hierarchy. Common interests will be

measured using an affinity score. This score is measured from 1950 to 2008 as UNGA voting

similarity to the U.S. (Gartzke 1998; Strezhnev & Voeten 2012)[6].

Table 2.2 shows the correlations among the independent variables. Although some correlations

among variables are strong, none are above .7. Thus, multicollinearity should not be a problem.

2.4.4   Method

I will test the hypotheses using a series of multivariate regressions, and the results will

support the hypotheses when key independent variables significantly relate to hierarchy in the

expected direction.   I will run different combinations of models for each of the three

measurements of the dependent variable, and will use separate regressions for every combination

of the regressors because some variables reduce the time span of the data.

I will focus on results from panel corrected standard error models. Panel corrected

standard errors are advantageous because they adjust for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous

correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). Pooled regressions with clustered standard errors

problematically do not take into account contemporaneous correlation (Hoechle).

Panel corrected standard error models do not control for omitted variable bias resulting

from unobserved unit heterogeneity. A fixed effects model can control for this;

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[6] This control variable is the affinity score for all UN votes, while the dependent variable discussed earlier is the affinity score for only UN votes specified as key by the U.S. government. The U.S. government began identifying key UN votes in 1983. Thus, the key votes variable has a more limited time frame.

TABLE 2.2. Independent Variables' Correlations

	Democracy	Capitalism	Christianity	West	NATO	Ideology	Resources	Mountains	Coasts	Proximity	Affinity	GDP	Capabilities
Democracy	1												
Capitalism	.4813 (.0000)	1											
Christianity	.4132 (.0000)	.1689 (.0000)	1										
West	.4494 (.0000)	.4646 (.0000)	.4682 (.0000)	1									
NATO	.3822 (.0000)	.3324 (.0000)	.2340 (.0000)	.4486 (.0000)	1								
Ideology	.1078 (.0008)	-.1300 (.0001)	.1355 (.0000)	.1177 (.0001)	.0230 (.4551)	1							
Resources	-.3494 (.0000)	-.1878 (.0000)	-.2389 (.0000)	-.1942 (.0000)	-.1525 (.0000)	.0227 (.5071)	1						
Mountains	-.0207 (.1053)	-.0503 (.0098)	.0268 (.0369)	-.1317 (.0000)	-.0455 (.0003)	.0498 (.1708)	-.0676 (.0000)	1					
Coasts	.2630 (.0000)	.2841 (.0000)	.1081 (.0000)	.1098 (.0000)	.1511 (.0000)	.0437 (.1611)	-.0528 (.0001)	-.2228 (.0000)	1				
Proximity	-.1900 (.0000)	-.0705 (.0000)	-.4741 (.0000)	-.1237 (.0000)	-.2249 (.0000)	.0579 (.0596)	.1492 (.0000)	.0891 (.0000)	-.1997 (.0000)	1			
Affinity	.2037 (.0000)	.2306 (.0000)	.2624 (.0000)	.3383 (.0000)	.3449 (.0000)	-.1712 (.0000)	-.2115 (.0000)	.0140 (.2922)	.1821 (.0000)	-.1677 (.0000)	1		
GDP per cap	.3445 (.0000)	.6347 (.0000)	.1693 (.0000)	.4394 (.0000)	.4080 (.0000)	.0517 (.0946)	.0829 (.0000)	-.0943 (.0000)	.2827 (.0000)	-.1301 (.0000)	.1174 (.0000)	1	
Capabilities	.0180 (.1192)	.0291 (.0744)	-.0977 (.0000)	.0226 (.0382)	.0939 (.0000)	-.1517 (.0000)	-.0408 (.0020)	.0002 (.9847)	-.0771 (.0000)	.0334 (.0023)	.0564 (.0000)	.0455 (.0001)	1

Note: p-values in parentheses.

however, the disadvantages of a fixed effects model outweighs the benefits of controlling for unobserved unit heterogeneity.One problem with a fixed effects model concerns my theoretical expectations. I expect key independent variables to vary with hierarchy between states more than within states because norms change slowly. For example, among NATO countries, only Portugal, Greece, and Turkey have a more than 2 point change in their Polity2 democracy scores. Therefore, countries most expected to have high hierarchy due to norms have little variation on the independent variables. For the Christianity and West variables, there is little variation within any state. Fixed effects models only take into account within state variation and ignore all associations between states, so their results will not estimate most of the theoretically expected variation. Also, fixed effects models may suffer from omitted variable bias because geography control variables, which do not vary within states, will be dropped. In addition, fixed effects models are generally inefficient (Plumper and Troeger 2011).

Panel corrected standard errors have trouble running some models with my data because a number of states have short periods of observations and there is not a common time period where every state exists in the same year. The pairwise estimation option is used when necessary to overcome this problem.

2.5   Analysis

In this section I first discuss the extent that the regression results support the hypotheses. Then, I discuss the comparative strength of the variables. Next, I explore my findings' implications for international relations theory. After that, I cover Cold War results and implications. Then, I analyze the predictive capability of my models. Finally, I discuss the weaknesses of my research design.

TABLE 2.3. Multivariate Regressions

	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy	UNGA Voting Similarity
Democracy	0.0013***	-0.0006	0.0013***
	(0.0002)	(0.0008)	(0.0003)
Capitalism	0.0119**	0.0986***	0.0141
	(0.0038)	(0.0063)	(0.0091)
Christianity	0.2692***	0.0622***	0.0444***
	(0.0262)	(0.0117)	(0.0079)
Ideology[t#]	0.0313***	0.0031	0.0225***
	(0.0041)	(0.0068)	(0.0060)
Western	-0.1165***	-0.1862***	-0.0120
	(0.0222)	(0.0170)	(0.0182)
Resources	-0.0000	0.0033***	0.0000
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Mountainous	0.0017***	0.0013***	0.0005***
	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0000)
Coasts	0.2052***	0.0469***	0.0348***
	(0.0177)	(0.0107)	(0.0078)
Proximity	-0.0000***	-0.0000***	-0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Affinity	0.0075**	0.1776***	0.3764***
	(0.0028)	(0.0195)	(0.0346)
GDP per cap	0.0138	-0.0491***	-0.0063
	(0.0135)	(0.0036)	(0.0088)
Capabilities	2.2748***	1.4187***	-0.8316***
	(0.5586)	(0.2441)	(0.1921)
NATO	0.0593***	-0.0964***	-0.0096
	(0.0068)	(0.0102)	(0.0072)
Observations	2318	1985	1496
Groups	106	98	100
Ar(1)Controlled	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients reported from multivariate regression with panel-corrected standard errors. The executive ideology coefficient is from a separate regression that includes this variable. The other variables are run separately because the executive ideology variable reduces the number of observations. The regressions including the ideology variable do not control for a ar(1) due to better model fit. *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$. Regressions also ran using the log of economic and security hierarchy with substantially the same results. #Regressions also ran with a dichotomous version of executive ideology have similar results for security and economic hierarchy. However, the dichotomous ideology variable was not significantly related to UNGA voting.

Hypothesis 1: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share democracy in common.

The regression results reveal that democracy is positively related to security hierarchy and UNGA voting similarity, but not economic hierarchy. Democracy is robustly related to security hierarchy because in all specifications the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The effect of democracy is weak however. Increasing democracy from its minimum to maximum value increases the mostly 0 to 1 security hierarchy variable by .026. Democracy's relation to UNGA voting is significant and positive in all specifications. Thus, the results reveal a connection between democracy and UNGA key voting similarity. The strength of the relation is weak. On average, if a state moves from the lowest democracy score to the highest, then that state's 0-1 voting similarity score will increase by .026. Overall, hypothesis 1 finds some support because democracy is positively and significantly related to security hierarchy and hierarchy measured as UNGA key voting similarity.

The lack of relationship between democracy and economic hierarchy may result from states tending to choose what they believe are the best economic policies for their country regardless of their level of democracy. UN voting and security hierarchy are choices more focused on international relationships, while the components of economic hierarchy are also business decisions. Thus, choices about the former two take into account shared democratic norms, while choices related to economic hierarchy focus on what policies maximize the wealth of a state. A state's democratic institutions do not make it more likely to benefit financially from economic hierarchy. Therefore, democracy does not facilitate economic hierarchy.

Hypothesis 2: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share capitalism in common.

Capitalism is related to economic and security hierarchy, and capitalism is not

significantly related to similar voting patterns to the U.S. on important UNGA votes. The

capitalism coefficient is positive and significant when economic hierarchy is the dependent

variable. The strength of the coefficient is very strong. On average, if the capitalism variable is

moved from its minimum possible value to its maximum, the mostly 0 to 1 economic hierarchy

index increases by .986. This means, on average and while controlling for other factors, a great

increase in capitalism is associated with a change from no economic hierarchy to very high

economic hierarchy. The relationship between security hierarchy and capitalism is vulnerable to

specification changes. Overall, the regression results support a link between capitalism and

security hierarchy. In the fully specified model, capitalism is positively and significantly

associated with security hierarchy. The relationship is moderately strong. On average and

controlling for other factors, an increase of capitalism from its lowest value to its highest will

increase the mostly 0 to 1 security hierarchy index by .238. In other words, a great increase in

capitalism increases the security hierarchy index by over 2/10 its normal range. This increase is

the same as an increase of the 1999 U.S. security hierarchy over Iran(0) to that of France (.250)

or Bosnia & Herzegovina (.287). In sum, hypothesis 2 receives support from the data indicating

that capitalism has a positive relationship with security and economic hierarchy. However, there

is not a significant relationship with hierarchy measured as UNGA key voting similarity.

The lack of significance on UNGA voting may result from UN voting similarity not

facilitating trade and economic growth among capitalist states as much as economic and security

hierarchy. Capitalist states have an incentive to allow a dominant state to enforce trade rules and

maintain stability so they can grow and prosper. Economic and security hierarchy represent

these two roles of a dominant state. UN voting does not as clearly support those goals. Thus,

capitalism may fail to relate to UN voting similarity because voting with a dominant state does not increase a capitalist subordinate's wealth.

Hypothesis 3: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share Christianity in common.

Christianity is associated with security hierarchy, economic hierarchy, and hierarchy measured with UNGA key votes. In most models, Christianity coefficients are positive and significant, supporting the hypothesis. The effect of Christianity on security hierarchy is moderately strong. On average and while controlling for other factors, a country's population that is all Christian compared to a country that has no Christians, is expected to have .269 more security hierarchy. This is an increase of over 2/10 of the mostly 0 to 1 security hierarchy scale. This is the same as the difference between the U.S. hierarchy level with Iran(0) and North Korea(0) in 1999, and that with France(.25) or Bosnia & Herzegovina(.29) in 1999. Christianity's influence on economic hierarchy is more moderate. A 100% Christian nation, compared to a 0% Christian nation, is expected to have .062 more economic hierarchy. This increase is like increasing U.S. economic hierarchy from the 2009 level of U.S. economic hierarchy with Norway(0) and Japan(0) to the 2009 levels of Afghanistan(.053) and Israel (.067). Similarly, a 100% Christian nation, compared to a 0% Christian nation, is expected to have a .044 higher UN similarity score. This is the same as the difference between the 2008 UN similarity score with North Korea(.077) and that with Indonesia(.115). Hypothesis 3 is supported.

Hypothesis 4: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another the more that they share governing ideology in common.

Government ideology has a positive and significant relationship with security hierarchy

and hierarchy measured as UN key voting similarity. However, there is not a significant relationship with economic hierarchy. Overall, hypothesis 4 is supported by the evidence. On average and controlling for other factors, the more ideologically to the right an executive is, the more security hierarchy and UNGA voting similarity there is. A country with a right leaning executive is expected to have .09 more security hierarchy than a country with a left leaning executive. .09 more security hierarchy is like increasing the amount of U.S security over North Korea(0) and the Congo(0) in 1999 to the amount of U.S. security hierarchy over the UAE (.07), Macedonia (.09), and South Korea (.13). A country with a right leaning executive is expected to have .07. more UNGA voting similarity than a country with a left leaning executive. This difference is the distance between the U.S.'s UNGA voting similarity in 2008 with Cuba(.038) and with Tunisia(.12).

> Hypothesis 5: Two states are more likely to have a stronger hierarchical relationship with one another when they belong to a common civilization.

The evidence does not support the idea that states sharing a civilizational culture are more likely to have a hierarchical relationship. Controlling for other factors, a Western state is significantly less likely to have U.S. security and economic hierarchy. On average, a Western state has .117 lower security hierarchy and .186 lower economic hierarchy. Western states are not significantly related to UN key voting similarity to the U.S.. Many of the important tenets of Western civilization are the other key independent variables. To make sure controlling for these norms was not gutting the effect of the West, I ran the models again without the other key normative variables. The results were substantively the same.

2.5.2   NATO

Another variable of interest is the effect of NATO. NATO has a positive and significant

relationship with security hierarchy, a negative and significant relationship with economic

hierarchy, and a negative and insignificant relationship with UN key voting similarity to the

U.S.. Controlling for other factors, NATO membership increases security hierarchy by .059.

This relationship is moderately weak, however, when autocorrelation is not controlled for, the

strength increases considerably to .223. NATO's negative association with economic hierarchy

is moderate. Controlling for other variables, NATO states score .096 less on the economic

index.

2.5.3   Comparative Strength of Normative Variables

TABLE 2.4. Strength of Normative Variables

Variable	Security Hierarchy		Economic Hierarchy	
	Min to Max Effect	p-value*	Min to Max Effect	p-value*
Democracy	.026	.000	-0.012	.500
Capitalism	.238	.002	.986	.000
Christianity	.269	.000	.062	.000
West	-0.117	.000	-0.186	.000
NATO	.059	.000	-0.0964	.000

*p-values are the p-values for the regression coefficients.

UNGA Voting Similarity		
Variable	Min to Max Effect	p-value*
Democracy	.026	.000
Capitalism	.282	.121
Christianity	.044	.000
West	-.012	.508
NATO	-.010	.183

*p-values are the p-values for the regression coefficients.

All the normative variables have a significant relationship with security hierarchy. However, Christianity has the strongest relationship with security hierarchy, and the relationship is significantly larger than that of other norms' min to max effect. The West and capitalism have the next strongest relationships. NATO and Democracy have relatively weak relationships. Thus, controlling for other factors, Christianity has the strongest effect on U.S. security hierarchy.

Only democracy is not significantly related to economic hierarchy. Capitalism has by far the strongest association with economic hierarchy, and the difference in the strength of its min to max association is statistically significant. Thus, controlling for other factors, capitalism is the most important norm for U.S. economic hierarchy.

Democracy and Christianity are significantly related to UNGA voting similarity, but the substantive size of these relationships is not strong. Christianity's min to max association is not significantly larger than democracy's min to max association. Capitalism, the West, and NATO are not related to UNGA voting similarity.

2.6   Implications

2.6.1   Christianity and Security Hierarchy

Christianity is the most influential norm in U.S. security hierarchy. The result builds upon Lai and Reiter's finding that a common religion increases the likelihood and length of an alliance (Lai and Reiter 2000). The combination of these findings bring into question the lack of attention religion has received form IR scholars. The results indicate that religion is a key factor facilitating state cooperation on security matters. This implies that states in need of security cooperation should first try cooperating with states that share a common religion. Such

cooperation will, on average, be easier and less costly due to the states viewing each other as belonging to a common religious community.

Is the Christianity relationship primarily an effect of the rejection of U.S. hierarchy by Islamic populations? To test for this, I ran the same model with an Islamic control variable measured by the percentage of a state's population that is Muslim (Barrett et al. 2001). In this model, the positive and significant effect of Christianity is stronger. The coefficient is .344 and the p-value .000. Thus, the relationship between Christianity and security hierarchy is not caused by Muslim states rejecting U.S. security hierarchy. The Muslim variable is positive and significant with a coefficient of .030 and a p-value of .012. This suggests that Muslim states are more likely to have hierarchy with the U.S. than non-Muslim states, but not as likely as Christian states.

2.6.2   Capitalism and Economic Hierarchy

The strong association between capitalism and economic hierarchy supports the literature focused on economic hegemony (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981). States with a common economic interest will let a dominant state set the rules of the game so that all states can benefit from a stable system. States with free economies are those best able to take advantage of the stability and openness provided by an economic hegemon, so these states are most likely to accept the hegemon's hierarchy. This result alone does not clearly determine whether economic hierarchy is facilitated directly or indirectly by norms. Does the association exist because capitalist states have a common affinity toward each other, or do they cooperate because their capitalist nature gives them common material interests? Because other norms have much weaker associations with hierarchy, it seems more plausible that the common interests generated by

common capitalist norms and institutions is the key mechanism. Most of the norms discussed in this paper should produce a common in-group affinity, but capitalism particularly creates a common material interest. The implication for dominant states which seek an increase in hierarchy is to focus on convincing states that hegemony is in their interest because they can successfully compete in areas where their economy is most efficient.

The capitalist variable also has relatively strong effects on security hierarchy and UNGA voting similarity. Hence, Capitalism was generally an important variable. The strength of capitalism in these findings comports with studies arguing that capitalism is the key to the peace observed among democracies (Gartzke 2007). If shared capitalist values and institutions facilitate peace and cooperation among states, then the spread of capitalism will be more important than the spread of other norms and institutions for world peace.

2.6.3   International Institutions or Liberal Norms?

The results contain insight on the debate concerning the basis of U.S. hegemonic legitimacy. Is more legitimacy generated by international institution norms or liberal democratic and capitalist norms (Kagan 2004, 2005; Tucker & Hendrickson 2004, 2005)? Both NATO and Democracy are not significantly related to all measures of hierarchy, and when they are related, their influence is weak. NATO is only positively related to security hierarchy because its relationship to economic hierarchy is significant but negative[7]. Capitalism on the other hand, is positively related to all measures of hierarchy at the .1 level and its influence is stronger. Therefore, the statistical evidence reviewed above supports the notion that capitalist norms are

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[7] I believe NATO is negatively related to economic hierarchy because throughout the Cold War NATO consisted of many Western European countries. Western Europe contains developed countries whose realm of economic hierarchy is relied upon instead of the U.S.. This includes the EC/EU. Indeed, when a Western Europe control variable is included, NATO loses statistical significance, and Western Europe is significant and negative.

more important than institutional norms in gaining legitimacy for U.S. hierarchy. However, democratic norms are also not very influential, and no more so than institutional norms. Thus, leaders cannot rely on international institutions or shared democracy to facilitate hierarchical cooperation. Instead, a common belief in capitalist principles may legitimate hierarchy.

2.6.4 Geography

Geographical control variables (proximity, coasts, and mountains) are robustly and consistently related to all measurements of hierarchy. Proximity is negatively and significantly related to hierarchy. The closer a country is to the United States, the more likely it is to fall under U.S. hierarchy. Coasts, measured as the percentage of a state's population within 100 kilometers to a coastline, are positively and significantly related to U.S. hierarchy. States with large segments of their populations close to coastlines are more likely to have U.S. hierarchy. The results of these two variables show that hierarchy is facilitated when geography increases the ease and convenience of hierarchy for a dominant state. Proximity to the United States and easy access to coastal populations lower logistical costs.

Mountainous terrain has a surprising positive relationship with hierarchy. Mountainous terrain was expected to have a negative relationship because mountains should make hierarchy more difficult and costly. This variable does not comport with the evidence from the other two geography variables because lower costs from flatter land does not seem to facilitate hierarchy. The value of mountainous terrain as defensive territory may have caused this result.

2.7   Cold War Effects

The Cold War was a major system-wide rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and U.S. and subordinate state decisions related to hierarchy may have been affected by the Cold War. To test for this, I will run panel corrected standard error regressions including variables that interact the post cold war era, identified as a dummy variable, and the normative variables. Doing so will provide a test of Kagan (2004)'s proposition that during the Cold War the United States' legitimacy was more supported by mutual security concerns among the U.S. and subordinate states, but after the Cold War, the United States' legitimacy was more based on economic and democratic norms. If this idea is correct, then the new interactive variables will be positive and significant and the constituent normative variables will be either insignificant or weaker. Below are two tables. The first is the regression table. Interpretation of interactive effects is difficult with regression output alone, so the second table presents the interactive margins that can be used to analyze the results (Brambor et al. 2006).

2.7.1   Democracy

Democracy has a positive and significant relationship with all three hierarchy measures after the Cold War, but is only positive and significant with one measure during the Cold War. Thus, the evidence supports an interactive effect between democracy and the Cold War where democracy more strongly associates with U.S. hierarchy after the Cold War than during the Cold War.

2.7.2 Capitalism

Capitalism relates positively and significantly with two measures of hierarchy during the Cold War, and two measures of hierarchy after the Cold War. Therefore, the results do not show evidence of a clear interactive effect. Capitalism positively associated with hierarchy during and after the Cold War.

2.7.3 Christianity

Christianity is positively and significantly related to all three measures of hierarchy during the Cold War, while Christianity only relates positively and significantly during the Cold War with security hierarchy. Christianity more strongly associated with security hierarchy during the Cold War. Hence, the evidence suggests an interactive effect whereby Christianity more strongly associated with hierarchy during the Cold War than after.

TABLE 2.5. Cold War Effects Regressions

Variables	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy	Unga Voting Similarity
Ideology*PostCW[t#]	-0.0182*	0.0151	-0.0265**
	(0.0083)	(0.0113)	(0.0084)
Ideology[t#]	0.0376***	-0.0046	0.0319***
	(0.0052)	(0.0101)	(0.0068)
Democracy*PostCW	0.0040***	0.0039*	-0.0011
	(0.0010)	(0.0018)	(0.0012)
Democracy	0.0004	0.0002	0.0027*
	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0011)
Capitalism*PostCW	0.0002	0.0189*	-0.0192
	(0.0044)	(0.0075)	(0.0155)
Capitalism	0.0393***	0.1044***	0.0446***
	(0.0034)	(0.0087)	(0.0104)
Western*PostCW	0.0059	0.0031	0.0967*
	(0.0272)	(0.0355)	(0.0451)
Western	-0.2693***	-0.1985***	-0.1170***
	(0.0128)	(0.0276)	(0.0334)
Christianity*PostCW	-0.0692***	-0.0980**	-0.0377+
	(0.0110)	(0.0349)	(0.0194)

Table 2.5 (continued).

Variables	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy	Unga Voting Similarity
Christianity	0.3371***	0.0832***	0.0589***
	(0.0083)	(0.0154)	(0.0145)
NATO*PostCW	0.0576*	-0.0372+	-0.0119
	(0.0270)	(0.0202)	(0.0190)
NATO	0.2020***	-0.0886***	-0.0314+
	(0.0079)	(0.0142)	(0.0177)
Post-CW Dummy	-0.0338	-0.1220**	0.0139
	(0.0244)	(0.0414)	(0.0928)
Resources	-0.0015***	0.0038***	0.0008
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Mountainous	0.0014***	0.0012***	0.0003*
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0001)
Coasts	0.1868***	0.0276*	0.0137
	(0.0201)	(0.0117)	(0.0102)
Proximity	-0.0000***	-0.0000***	-0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Affinity	0.0133	0.1769***	0.5386***
	(0.0091)	(0.0164)	(0.0643)
GDP per cap	0.0182***	-0.0545***	-0.0217*
	(0.0039)	(0.0040)	(0.0088)
Capabilities	2.4103***	1.1483***	-0.6324***
	(0.2116)	(0.2791)	(0.1350)

Notes: *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$. Coefficients reported from multivariate regression with panel-corrected standard errors. The executive ideology coefficient is from a separate regression that includes this variable. The other variables are run separately because the executive ideology variable reduces the number of observations. Regressions also ran using the log of economic and security hierarchy with substantially the same results. #Regressions also ran with a dichotomous version of executive ideology have similar results for security hierarchy and UNGA voting. For economic hierarchy, the dichotomous version's coefficient is not significantly different than the ordinal version. However, it does achieve significance with a p-value of .047.

TABLE 2.6. Cold War Interactions' Margins

VARIABLES	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy	UNGA Voting Similarity
Ideology*PostCW	.0164**	.0128*	.0069
	(.0058)	(.0062)	(.0065)
Ideology	.0408***	.0049	.0275***
	(.0053)	(.0117)	(.0071)
Democracy*PostCW	.0044***	.0041*	.0016*
	(.0008)	(.0018)	(.0008)
Democracy	.0004	.0002	.0027*
	(.0010)	(.0009)	(.0011)

Table 2.6 (continued).

VARIABLES	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy	UNGA Voting Similarity
Capitalism*PostCW	.0395*** (.0028)	.1233*** (.0041)	.0254 (.0238)
Capitalism	.0393*** (.0034)	.1044*** (.0087)	.0446*** (.0104)
Western*PostCW	-.2634*** (.0222)	-.1953*** (.0146)	-.0203 (.0290)
Western	-.2693*** (.0128)	-.1985*** (.0276)	-.1170*** (.0334)
Christianity*PostCW	.2679*** (.0132)	-.0148 (.0271)	.0211 (.0128)
Christianity	.3371*** (.0083)	.0832*** (.0154)	.0589*** (.0145)
NATO*PostCW	.2596*** (.0254)	-.1259*** (.0134)	-.0434** (.0149)
NATO	.2020*** (.0079)	-.0886*** (.0142)	-.0314 (.0177)

Notes: *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

2.7.4   Government Ideology

Right governments were positively and significantly related to security hierarchy and UN voting during the Cold War, but were positively and significantly related to security hierarchy and economic hierarchy after the Cold War. Thus, the results do not clearly show an interactive effect.

2.7.5   West

Western states were significantly less likely to have hierarchy according to all three hierarchy indicators during the Cold War. After the Cold War, Western states were less likely to have higher economic and security hierarchy. Thus, with the exception of UNGA voting similarity, the West consistently has a negative relationship with hierarchy measures.

2.7.6 NATO

During the Cold War, NATO was positively related to security hierarchy and negatively related to economic hierarchy. After the Cold War, NATO is positively related to security hierarchy and negatively related to economic hierarchy and UN voting. These results do not strongly support an interactive effect.

TABLE 2.7. Strength of Normative Variables

Variable	Min to Max Effect	
	Security Hierarchy	Economic Hierarchy
Democracy*PostCW	.088***	.082*
Democracy	.008	.004
Capitalism*PostCW	.395***	1.233***
Capitalism	.393***	1.044***
Christianity*PostCW	.268***	-.015
Christianity	.337***	.083***
West*PostCW	-.263***	-.199***
West	-.269***	-.199***
NATO*PostCW	.260***	-.1259***
NATO	.202***	-.089***

* Significances are based on the p-values for the interactions' margins.

UNGA Voting Similarity	
Variable	Min to Max Effect
Democracy*PostCW	.032*
Democracy	.054*
Capitalism*PostCW	.254
Capitalism	.892***
Christianity*PostCW	.021
Christianity	.059***
West*PostCW	-.020
West	-.117***
NATO*PostCW	-.043**
NATO	-.031

* Significances are based on the p-values for the interactions' margins.

The comparative strength of the normative variables are roughly the same in the Cold War regressions as in the regressions without Cold War interactions[8]. Capitalism tended to have the strongest impacts, especially in economic hierarchy. Christianity often had the second strongest impact; with a particularly strong influence on security hierarchy. When significant, democracy's influence on hierarchy was relatively weak. Democracy's min to max influence scores less than .1 with all forms of hierarchy. This means the influence of a completely autocratic country compared to a fully democratic country increases hierarchy by less than 1/10 its normal range with other variables controlled. In comparison, a country that has no Christians compared to a country that has only Christians during the Cold War increases U.S. security hierarchy by over 3/10 its normal range. And, the minimum to maximum effect of capitalism increases economic hierarchy by its entire normal range.

2.8   Cold War Implications: A Cold War Interactive Effect?

Ideology, capitalism, Western Civilization, and NATO did not have clear interactive effects, while democracy and Christianity did. Democracy and Christianity were influenced by the Cold War differently. Democracy related positively to hierarchy after the Cold War, and Christianity related positively to hierarchy during the Cold War. Hence, some evidence of Cold War effects were found, but it was not consistent. Therefore, the Cold War does not have a clear interactive effect on the relationship between norms and hierarchy in general. However, the Cold War's influence on the relationship of hierarchy with democracy and Christianity gives us insights on how hierarchy works.

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[8] I calculated these by taking interactions' margin coefficients and multiplying them by the number of possible changes to obtain the minimum to maximum effect each variable had on the dependent variable, controlling for other factors.

2.8.1   Cold War and Non-Democratic Subordinates

Kagan (2004) argues that during the Cold War U.S. legitimacy was less based on norms, and after the Cold War it will be democratic and capitalist norms that are important. The statistical results above support this idea among democratic norms, but not capitalist norms. Democracy significantly relates to economic and security hierarchy only after the Cold War. Capitalism relates to hierarchy about equally after and during the Cold War. Thus, Kagan's argument is weakly supported. This implies that during the Cold War the U.S. was more concerned about containing the Soviet Union than cooperating with liberal democracies. Thus, the U.S. would cooperate with any type of governments as long as the cooperation helped limit Soviet influence in the world. After the Cold War, the U.S.'s normative dislike of non-democracies influenced U.S. policy to cooperate in a hierarchical relationship with less non-democracies. This finding shows that normative affinities have less influence on hierarchy when a dominant state views cooperating with states who do not share certain norms as useful to maximizing relative power and influence versus a rival.

2.8.2   Cold War Christian Crusade

Christianity more strongly and robustly relates to hierarchy during the Cold War than after. This may have resulted from Christian states viewing the Soviet Union as a threatening out-group state. Christianity may have generally been a powerful force because it was used to unite states against the Soviet Union. Historian Dianne Kirby argues that Christianity was intentionally used by leaders in this way.

> In the rhetoric of the Cold War, Christianity became a means of distinguishing between socialism and communism, of dramatizing and publicizing the Soviet regime as an evil power and the Cold War as a Manichaean conflict and of consolidating the western alliance, the 'special relationship' in particular. The success of Christian Democratic

parties throughout western Europe in the postwar period is testimony to the effectiveness of this strategy, which contributed significantly to the intensification of the Cold War, as well as to the transformation of Christian leaders into Cold War warriors and the transmogrification of Christianity into a politicized doctrine (Kirby 2000, 412) Christianity may work as an effective tool for rhetorically rallying support because

religion is a deep part of many people's beliefs. Religion can provide a solid foundation for one's belief system, and appealing to these core beliefs can effectively focus people's attention on the value of their religious in-group and the threat of an out-group (Kinnvall 2004). If Christianity primarily works by identifying out-group threats to an important in-group, then Christianity should have its greatest influence when there is a believable out-group to fear. The Soviet Union's power and universal and atheist ideology legitimized them as a threat. In the post-Cold War, a state-level anti-Christian threat has not emerged. Thus, the data do not show as strong and robust a relationship between hierarchy and Christianity after the Cold War. However, if such a threat were to emerge in the beliefs of Christian nations and/or leaders, Christianity may facilitate hierarchical cooperation again.

2.8.3   Clash of Civilizations?

The West variable was negatively related to all three measures of hierarchy. The end of the Cold War did not produce positive and significant relationships between the West and any hierarchy measures. Overall, I did not find support for Huntington's clash of civilizations in this data. Even when I remove all other normative variables from the model, the West still does not associate positively and significantly with hierarchy. I conclude that general civilizational culture norms have not played a major role in U.S. hierarchy.

2.9   Models' Predictive Capability

Comparing the actual levels of hierarchy compared to the predicted levels reveals that the models fairly accurately predict small countries close to the United States. However, more developed countries with high hierarchy are under predicted. These under predictions are likely the result of historical factors that created high hierarchy among certain developed countries. For example, the highest levels of security hierarchy are with Japan and Germany. These two countries are greatly under predicted because the model does not take into account World War Two and the ongoing occupations of those countries after U.S. victory in the war. In economic hierarchy, Canada is greatly under predicted. Democracy, capitalism, Christianity, Western values, and NATO membership were not enough to accurately take into account the deep trade and cultural ties between the United States and Canada.

TABLE 2.8. U.S. Security Hierarchy; top 25 in 1999

Actual Security Hierarchy		Predicted Security Hierarchy	
Germany	.6359248	Costa Rica	.5836497
Japan	.5542083	Dominican Republic	.574783
United Kingdom	.5343007	El Salvador	.557143
Italy	.5340516	Honduras	.5538823
Belgium	.527464	Guatemala	.5491517
Portugal	.5174507	Haiti	.5450384
Honduras	.513955	Panama	.5386676
Greece	.5105377	Jamaica	.5346733
Spain	.5091383	Greece	.5291903
Netherlands	.5072476	Venezuela	.494387
Turkey	.5059802	Mexico	.4768049
Denmark	.5051513	Nicaragua	.4708365
Norway	.5036247	Ecuador	.4628024
Australia	.5029038	Norway	.4587971
Hungary	.5014713	Trinidad & Tobago	.4557528
Haiti	.5013135	Peru	.4518423
Panama	.5011507	United Kingdom	.4311579

Table 2.8 (continued).

Actual Security Hierarchy		Predicted Security Hierarchy	
Canada	.5008374	Denmark	.4260826
El Salvador	.50083	Colombia	.4204545
Trinidad & Tobago	.5007902	Spain	.4124544
Jamaica	.5006573	Portugal	.4109541
Bolivia	.5006067	Italy	.402238
Uruguay	.5005653	Canada	.3982634
Nicaragua	.5005169	Ireland	.3981197
Paraguay	.500413	Chile	.3979324

Sources: Lake 2009a; DoD; Bennett & Stam 2000.

TABLE 2.9. U.S. Economic Hierarchy; top 25 in 1999

Actual Economic Hierarchy		Predicted Economic Hierarchy	
Canada	.9803433	El Salvador	.4473037
Panama	.8583066	Honduras	.4383823
Malaysia	.8544745	Haiti	.4369272
Honduras	.8228316	Costa Rica	.4333332
Argentina	.7064284	Guatemala	.4206101
Lithuania	.6871082	Panama	.4170993
El Salvador	.6417832	Peru	.402457
Dominican Republic	.584645	Nicaragua	.3840774
Costa Rica	.510559	Trinidad & Tobago	.3837158
Trinidad & Tobago	.5011107	Chile	.3831629
Venezuela	.472201	Jamaica	.3828384
Egypt	.4580721	Dominican Republic	.3760974
Jordan	.4580721	Bolivia	.3547866
Nicaragua	.4569978	Mexico	.3375449
Mexico	.4513257	Argentina	.3325229
Jamaica	.382423	Ecuador	.3240744
Guatemala	.3774089	Guyana	.308978
Israel	.3503191	China	.3055555
Guyana	.3302122	Japan	.298657
Bolivia	.2999527	Venezuela	.281655
Peru	.2906612	Morocco	.2812886
Kuwait	.268526	Albania	.2809476

Table 2.9 (continued).

Actual Economic Hierarchy		Predicted Economic Hierarchy	
Paraguay	.2662412	Israel	.2786511
Sri Lanka	.2448272	Ireland	.258083
Bangladesh	.2336264	Canada	.2564275

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff 2004; Ilzetzki et al. 2011; Gleditsch 2002; World Bank; Barbieri & Keshk 2012; Heston et al. 2012.

TABLE 2.10. UNGA Voting Similarity on Key Votes; top 25 in 1999

Actual Voting Similarity		Predicted Voting Similarity	
Israel	.846154	Israel	.9294472
Estonia	.769231	Denmark	.7754425
Poland	.730769	Albania	.773205
El Salvador	.730769	Netherlands	.7719387
Norway	.730769	Norway	.77189
Romania	.730769	Portugal	.7652091
Hungary	.730769	Ireland	.762585
Lithuania	.692308	Belgium	.761345
Slovak Republic	.692308	Greece	.7611657
Czech Republic	.692308	Estonia	.7578242
Denmark	.692308	Finland	.7575758
Greece	.692308	Spain	.7527409
Slovenia	.692308	Slovenia	.7441955
Portugal	.692308	Austria	.7436743
Spain	.692308	Slovenia	.7428507
Albania	.692308	Sweden	.7373479
Australia	.692308	Hungary	.7333667
Belgium	.692308	Bulgaria	.73017
Latvia	.692308	Latvia	.7299743
Netherlands	.692308	Lithuania	.7296182
Finland	.692308	Romania	.723335
Bulgaria	.692308	Poland	.7148488
Turkey	.653846	New Zealand	.7081741
Brazil	.653846	Czech Republic	.7007825
Guatemala	.653846	Cyprus	.7000791

Dreher and Sturm 2012.

The modeled predictions for UNGA voting similarity are more accurate than the predictions for security and economic hierarchy. Developed countries that were under predicted in the previous tables are predicted more accurately here. Notably, Israel's actual, and predicted, values of voting similarity are far higher than the rest of the countries.

2.10   Weaknesses

The findings of this study will not give the final word on the hypotheses because of several weaknesses. One, the theory applies to the hierarchies of any dominant state over any subordinate. However, the empirical tests are limited to the United States. A problem with generalizing these results is that the U.S. may operate differently than other dominant states. The U.S. could act as a particularly normative country, and thus, norms play a greater role in its hierarchy. However, I suspect similar relationships to hold for other dominant states because the four mechanisms by which shared norms facilitate hierarchy theoretically apply to any potential hierarchical relationship. A stronger concern about generalization is the particular norms that played a role with the U.S. may differ with other dominant states. Norms develop through a historical process, and which norms are important might vary from hierarchy to hierarchy. Hence, the findings on specific norms in this chapter are best applied to the United States, and the finding that norms matter suggests that shared norms can facilitate hierarchical relationships in general.

Second, because fixed effects is not appropriate for this study, unobserved heterogeneity was not controlled for and could bias the estimates. Third, the most accurate relationship may be an interactive effect between a common normative bond and a material interest in hierarchy. Because factors that can create material interests are so diverse, creating a general variable

measuring the level of material value in a hierarchy is difficult. Maybe future work will think of a creative solution. Fourth, many of the norms are not measured directly. For democracy and capitalism, institutions were measured rather than actual norms. Because domestic institutions may have independent effects, these measures are problematic and may conflate institutions and norms. However, institutions and norms tend evolve together. Thus, measuring norms as institutions may well reflect the concept of a society-wide norm. Fifth, a lack of overlap in available data in both space and time limited the number of observations in the statistical tests. Finally, this study does not separate the simultaneity between hierarchy and norms. U.S. hierarchy over many countries began before the time frame of this study, and the dominance of U.S. hierarchy may have created norms similar to the U.S. in subordinate states; rather than norms facilitating U.S. hierarchy. However, U.S. hierarchy probably had minimal influence on Christianity, and Christianity was one of the most influential variables. Thus, Christianity supports the notion that shared norms facilitate hierarchy, rather than just hierarchy facilitating like-norms. Furthermore, this weakness is mitigated by the difficulty of externally imposing norms and institutions. Indeed, Enterline and Greig show that externally imposed democracies tend to only survive and produce stability under special circumstances, and if the imposed democracy only achieves partial democratization, the imposition will produce more war, less democratization, and less prosperity (2005, 2008a, 2008b). Despite the mitigations, reverse causality remains a limitation in this study. However, the findings show that the expected correlation exists and this helps support the theory because such a correlation is a necessary first step to provide convincing evidence for the theory. I expect that causation goes in both directions. Future work may provide illustrative, rich case studies that show that the casual

directions goes in the direction I propose in some instances. Thus, at least part of the associations I found would be explained by norms influencing hierarchy.

2.11   Conclusion

Most studies on hierarchy, hegemony, and spheres of influence focus on the importance of material factors in motivating hierarchy (Kindleberger 1973; Wallerstein 1974; Gilpin 1975, 1981; Bull 1977; Keohane 1984; Lake 1996). This perspective argues that if a hierarchical relationship increases two states' wealth and/or security, then a hierarchical relationship is more likely. Material based explanations increase our understanding of what factors create and maintain hierarchical relationships, but their explanation is incomplete. A state relinquishing an amount of sovereignty to another state in a hierarchical relationship is likely to create an intangible loss for the subordinate state. Such an intangible loss may be mitigated by intangible values held in common with the dominant state. This chapter sought to give insights on the question of whether shared norms play a role in international hierarchy. Previous literature on norms and hierarchy focused on pre-state relationships, the norms of only one of the two countries, and narrow case studies. This chapter developed a general theory explaining the role shared norms play in facilitating hierarchy, and this chapter empirically tested the general hypothesis resulting from the theory.

Multivariate regressions used to analyze U.S. hierarchy over the states of the world from up to 1950 to 2010 found evidence that shared norms are positively associated with U.S. hierarchy. Shared Christianity and shared capitalism were the most important common norms. Holding these norms in common creates the perception that two states are members of a common community. States belonging to a common community have an affinity toward each other and a

common way of doing business that facilitates hierarchical cooperation. Furthermore, shared norms allow subordinate states to influence the dominant state through persuasion by utilizing their mutual values. Capitalism is especially important because shared capitalist norms facilitate states having a common interest in low barriers to flows of trade and capital so their citizens can use their individual initiative and innovation to take advantage of world-wide economic opportunities. The Cold War did not have a consistent influence on the relationship between shared norms and hierarchy. Evidence of Christianity's positive relationship with hierarchy was much stronger during the Cold War. This implies that shared norms can have their greatest influence when there is a clear and threatening out-group that does not value the same norms. The existence of an out-group strengthens the importance of shared norms in the perceptions of in-group members, and increases the incentives to cooperate in order to better compete and defend against the out-group state. However, democracy more strongly influenced hierarchy after the Cold War. This suggests that while shared norms can increase hierarchy due to a normative-out group interactive effect, states may value normative affinities that do not strengthen an in-group bond when threatened less when a dominant state and its rival are in a power struggle.

Future work should buttress the results of this chapter. I tested a variety of norms on different types of hierarchy, and some norms were related to certain types of hierarchy, but not others. Studying specifically why particular norms facilitate particular types of hierarchy is an area for future study. Future work should study the interaction of a threatening out-group and cooperation among in-group states. The Cold War may only scratch the surface of this phenomenon. Future studies should find ways to measure the hierarchies of non-U.S. dominant states. Expanding the empirics to all dominant states is necessary to validate the theory

empirically on more general terms. Also, expanding measures of hierarchy to before 1950 will help determine the extent that hierarchy spreads norms rather than norms facilitate hierarchy.

More accurately viewing the international world as a pattern of hierarchies, rather than as states operating in complete anarchy, may offer new insights to international relations. Understanding that the relationship between dominant and subordinate states is similar to the relationship of a domestic state over its citizens is important for understanding world politics. Similar to domestic hierarchies, international hierarchies are facilitated and maintained partially by norms that legitimate rulers. Discovering how, and which, norms facilitate the hierarchy of one state over another is necessary to understand the patterns of control and influence across the globe. Major powers do not operate in the world alone. Gaining more subordinates increases a state's prestige and power. Thus, appreciating the role norms play in gaining subordinates will give scholars a better understanding of the competition among great powers and the strength of the world order those powers create.

CHAPTER 3

HIERARCHICAL MAINTENANCE: THEORY

3.1   Introduction

Dominant and subordinate states enter into a hierarchical relationship because they both calculate that such a relationship is beneficial. If such a relationship is mutually beneficial and voluntarily entered into by both parties, then why should the dominant state use coercion to enforce hierarchical compliance? Do dominant states use coercion to influence compliance? If so, are coercive acts successful? Which kinds of coercive acts are successful and on which compliance issues?

Scholars have not answered such questions partially because of the simplifying anarchy assumption. Scholars view international actions such as economic sanctions, foreign aid, and war as interactions between sovereign states. If two states are not completely sovereign and in anarchy, then scholars cannot fully understand actions between the states when assuming anarchy. Hegemony theorists point out important factors that facilitate a hegemon's order, but they do not focus on the specific actions a dominant state takes to enforce hegemonic rules. U.S. foreign policy debates consist of the pros and cons of the use of U.S. coercive power, but how have U.S. actions benefited U.S. foreign policy goals in the historical record?

I develop a theory that explains why dominant state actions to reward or punish other states can increase compliance to the dominant state's expectations, and I test the implications of the theory utilizing multivariate regression and the historical record of U.S.-other-country dyads from 1950 to 2010. I argue that dominant states punish and reward subordinate states through maintenance actions (e.g. military interventions, foreign aid, and economic sanctions) to both adjust the cost-benefit calculation of states in favor of compliance and/or accepting a hierarchical

relationship, and to clarify the strength and boundaries of a dominant state's authority. More specifically, punishing actions by a dominant state maintain hierarchy and facilitate compliance by increasing the dominant state's reputation for punishing, socializing subordinate states to the dominant state's norms, increasing hierarchical clarity and respect, and changing a subordinate's leader to one that is more friendly. And, beneficial maintenance actions by a dominant state facilitate compliance and hierarchy by effectively buying compliance with assistance and aid, socializing subordinate states to dominant state norms, and preserving the dependence and weakness of a subordinate state. I also argue that subordinate state defiance elicits dominant state discipline. And, I explain why very costly and failed maintenance attempts may decrease compliance. In this chapter I discuss the theory. In the next chapter I explain the research design and statistical analysis of hypotheses concerning the effects of U.S. maintenance on compliance. And lastly, I test the extent that defiance elicits costly maintenance actions.

This chapter continues as follows. I first describe the general theory and definitions. Second, I explain the mechanisms by which costly maintenance, called discipline (Lake 2009), decreases subordinate state defiance. Third, I explore how poorly executed disciplining actions by dominant states can increase defiance. Fourth, I describe how beneficial maintenance can promote subordinate compliance. And finally, I draw hypotheses on the notion that subordinate state defiance might elicit dominant state discipline.

3.2   General Theory and Definitions

In this section I explain how maintenance actions can preserve international hierarchy. First, I describe why dominant states sometimes need to maintain their hierarchies. Second, I discuss why hierarchical maintenance is important to international relations theory and

international hierarchy. Finally, I discuss the concepts of compliance, defiance, general incentives, and targeted incentives.

3.2.1   The Need for Maintenance

I define hierarchical maintenance as the processes by which a dominant state clarifies the hierarchical agreement and produces incentives for subordinate states to accept a hierarchical relationship and comply with a dominant state's expectations. If hierarchical relationships form due to mutual interest in such a relationship, why is maintenance needed at all? Maintenance may be needed to solve two general impediments to hierarchy. One concerns when subordinate states calculate that the general benefits of a hierarchical relationship fall short of making hierarchy in their interest. In cases where general benefits are not satisfactory for a state, or where a hierarchical relationship does not provide sufficient general benefits, the dominant state can provide targeted incentives to make hierarchy worthwhile. Or, the dominant state can use maintenance to change subordinates' perspectives on what they consider beneficial. Maintenance can be used to facilitate the initiation of hierarchy, or to preserve or increase a hierarchy that has already been initiated. Maintenance to preserve a current level of hierarchy may be necessary due to changes in the environment, or due to internal changes in a subordinate state, that leads the subordinate to believe that the current level of hierarchy is less valuable.

The other impediment to hierarchy mitigated by maintenance is that the expectations and boundaries of proper subordinate behavior are not always clear. There are a plethora of international behaviors that a dominant state may or may not consider acceptable, and the international world is always changing. Thus, the content of the hierarchical agreement may often be in question or disputed. Maintenance actions can show the subordinates what the

dominant state will not tolerate. If the action succeeds, it will reinforce the strength of the

hierarchy. I elaborate on these problems and their mitigation later in the paper where I discuss

the mechanisms by which maintenance actions help maintain hierarchy.

3.2.2   The Importance of Hierarchical Maintenance

Scholars will not have a full explanation of many state behaviors without understanding

that some state actions are done in the process of a dominant state maintaining its international

hierarchy. Such behaviors include military interventions, intelligence agencies' interventions,

sanctions, and foreign aid. The motivations behind such behaviors in anarchy are different than

in hierarchy. For example, viewing military interventions as simply interstate conflict might lead

to a gap in understanding the cause of some conflicts. Some conflicts are not explained well by

territorial disputes, miscalculations, rivalry, conflicting identities, opposing systems of

government, a lack of shared economic connections, or other common conflict explanations in

the IR conflict literature (Waltz 1964; Wendt 1994; Hensel 1999; Morrow 1999; Gartzke et al.

2001; Russet & Oneal 2001; Hensel et al. 2008). I argue that some conflicts, and other state

behaviors, result from a dominant state wanting to display the reach of its authority by punishing

a subordinate for defying a dominant state's rule or expectation. Such actions are similar to a

domestic state punishing a citizen, and are done not just to punish, but to maintain order.

Therefore, the context of hierarchy plays a key role in the dominant state's behavior, and such

behaviors cannot be as completely understood by IR theories that assume anarchy. Thus,

explaining interstate actions in the context of hierarchy gives us a deeper comprehension of

international behavior than using the simplistic anarchy assumption.

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A focus on hierarchical maintenance not only improves the explanation of state behavior beyond general IR theories that assume anarchy, other areas of research can benefit from such a focus as well. I will discuss three other areas. First, hierarchical maintenance is important for understanding international hierarchy because maintenance actions might play a key role in the growth and continuation of hierarchies. Second, hegemony and Marxist theories have already explored forms of economic hierarchy, but have not explored actions of hierarchical maintenance. And finally, considering hierarchy may advance future work in foreign policy analysis.

3.2.2.1   Hierarchy

Understanding maintenance is also important for understanding international hierarchies because I contend that dominant states use punishment and reward to help create and preserve these hierarchies. While powerful and weak states with common interests and a common identity may have the capacity to cooperate in a hierarchical relationship with few maintenance actions from the dominant state, many subordinate and dominant states will likely have differences that produce tensions in their hierarchical relationship. Weaker states in different situations, or with different ideologies, might believe in a different strategy to obtain wealth and security than what the dominant state offers. Understanding maintenance will allow scholars to better understand how dominant states enforce subordination among states with many conflicting interests. Furthermore, even among dominant and subordinate states mutually satisfied with their hierarchical relationship, the dominant state might make demands that are not in the subordinate's interest. Will subordinates comply for the sake of their obligation to their hierarchical ruler? Or do subordinates often require extra incentives for some demands?

Understanding the role of dominant state maintenance in convincing subordinates to comply with particular demands will help answer these questions and further explain the strength of dominant state authority.

3.2.2.2   Economic Hegemony

Even in economic hegemonies involving countries with common economic and/or ideological interests, states will not agree on all issues and in some situations states will have incentives to cheat. The extent that subordinate states alter their behavior to fall in line with the interests of an economic hegemony is not determined by common interests alone, and states may not agree on the best rules under which to cooperate. Why will a dominant state's vision of economic cooperation prevail? Are the benefits of economic cooperation obvious so that a bargain is struck as to how to cooperate among states? Or does a hegemon impose its ideological vision of proper economic cooperation upon its subordinates? Studying hierarchical maintenance allows us to explore what threats and actions dominant states use to deepen economic harmony in the way they prefer.

Scholars discussing hegemony have theorized about the important variables that help a hegemon maintain a hegemonic order (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990a). For example, Gilpin suggests that moral leadership, prestige, and military and economic supremacy are important for hegemons to maintain order (1981). Marxist theories emphasize an international class alliance that maintains power through the use of an ideology to support the current world economic system and order (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1981, 1987). Such theories add ideology as a key factor in Gilpin's list of variables. These variables may be important, but, their identification does not tell us about the process of how specific acts by a dominant state help

maintain international hierarchy. Do hegemons use military force or foreign aid to maintain their hegemony? If so, when is it successful, and how does it work? Scholars have begun answering these questions by discussing specific aspects of hegemonic maintenance, but do not summarize all the processes of dominant state maintenance in one theory (Alt et al. 1988; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). I expect the process of hegemonic maintenance to involve many mechanisms. Thus, a hole exists in the literature to combine the disparate mechanisms explored by scholars, and to create a general theory to explain the processes of hegemonic and hierarchical maintenance. This is one goal of this chapter.

3.2.2.3   U.S. Foreign Policy

Scholars have explored the disadvantages of using coercive U.S. power; especially unilateral coercive power. Some scholars argue that coercive actions taken by the United States that are not supported by U.S. subordinates and allies decrease the legitimacy of U.S. hierarchy (Tucker & Henderson 2004; Walt 2005; Lake 2006). Coercive actions decrease hierarchy among subordinates who did not support such actions and make future compliance from these states more difficult to obtain. Ikenberry (2001) argues that one explanation for the post-WWII success of U.S. hierarchy was the U.S. commitment to restrain its actions and consult with allies (Ikenberry 2001). Subordinates accepted a level of U.S. hierarchy because they believed the U.S. would not take advantage of its dominant position. If subordinates no longer feel safe from U.S. dominance, then they are more likely to balance against the U.S.(Walt 2005; Thompson 2009). A traditional military balancing coalition is less likely than balancing in the form of disrupting U.S. goals and acts of defiance (Jervis 2003; Bobrow 2008; Doran 2009). Such lack

of cooperation decreases U.S. hierarchy and increases the costs, or the possibility, of achieving U.S. foreign policy goals (Jervis 2003; Lake 2006).

I theorize how dominant state maintenance can increase compliance and hierarchy, rather than reduce it. My statistical analyses may find evidence supporting concerns about the coercive use of U.S. power, or the results may support my contention that maintenance, including coercive maintenance, increases compliance by strengthening the authority of the dominant state. I theorize about different types of maintenance on different types of subordinate states. And I test the effectiveness of a variety of U.S. maintenance actions. Such theorizing and statistical analysis will not provide the final word on the above concern, but will help scholars better understand what types of U.S. maintenance have increased or decreased compliance in the past. For example, I test whether future defiance to the U.S. increases or decreases after the U.S. uses coercive forms of maintenance. I run the same tests for sanctions, military interventions, CIA interventions, and foreign aid. The tests should reveal which types of maintenance produce better or worse compliance from subordinates. Perhaps defiance against the U.S. increases synergistically when a U.S. maintenance attempt is particularly costly to the U.S.. I test how maintenance failure and costs to the U.S. affect subordinate defiance.

3.2.2.4   Compliance and Defiance

Part of a hierarchical relationship includes the expectation that subordinate states will comply with demands or rules set forth by the dominant state. IR scholars have used the term "compliance" to describe two similar concepts. In one version that I label compellence-compliance, compliance refers to one state giving into the demands of another state (Schelling 1960, 1966; Baldwin 1971, 1979; Powell 1990; Pape 1996). Studies using this definition discuss

how compellence and deterrence from one state can alter the behavior of another state. Threats of war and economic sanctions are examples of policy options used to obtain this type of compliance. In another version that I label agreement-compliance, compliance concerns the extent to which states follow through with their interstate agreements (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002; Franck 1990; Keohane 1997). Such accords range from statements of common principle to formal written agreements containing specific actions states promise to execute (Chayes & Chayes 1993), and they include both bilateral agreements and rules set forth by intergovernmental organizations like the WTO.

An important difference between these versions of compliance is the level of focus on international agreements. When discussing compellence-compliance, there are two sovereign states, and one wants the other one to act in a certain way. How previous international agreements affect a demand is of minimal importance compared to the calculation of the costs and benefits of the demanded action, and the rewards or punishments offered by the demanding state. Agreement-compliance concerns more than the interaction of one state manipulating another state through coercion. Scholars studying Agreement-compliance explore the extent to which compliance is affected by a previous agreement (Chayes & Chayes 1993; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002; Franck 1990; Keohane 1997). A previous agreement might increase compliance by increasing the legitimacy of an expectation; or by altering the interests of the states. While in the Agreement-compliance noncompliance can be referred to as rule breaking, in compellence-compliance, there are no rules to break. Lake (2009) uses compliance in the context of hierarchy to describe subordinates obeying a dominant state's commands.

The concept of compliance I use is a combination of the two varieties in the literature. Dominant states expect subordinates to comply as part of the mutually understood hierarchical

arrangement, and/or dominant states use compellence and deterrence policy tools to obtain compliance. Hierarchical arrangements do not usually explicitly state all of the dominant state's expectations, and what is expected of a subordinate state is continually negotiated. When clarifying and negotiating the reach of a dominant state's authority, compliance will seem more like compellence-compliance because this is a process of creating the rules. On the other hand, when a dominant state expectation has previously been accepted, the compliance expected resembles agreement-compliance because compliance concerns adhering to a previous, if informal, agreement. The process of compliance can involve either a powerful state attempting to create a hierarchy by convincing a subordinate state to comply, or two states already in a hierarchical relationship negotiating whether a subordinate will comply with a particular expectation.

Both versions of compliance refer to a state following an expectation of an international force (e.g. a state or an international agreement). When that force is a hierarchical agreement or a dominant state, the potential compliance is the compliance of interest in this chapter. I define compliance as an act of a (potential) subordinate state that follows a dominant state's rules or demands. The definition includes potential subordinate states because a dominant state might use compellence and deterrence policies in order to create hierarchy in the first place. Thus, compliance marking the beginning of a hierarchical relationship are relevant to this chapter's theory.

Compliance is a necessary part of hierarchy. Hierarchy can be defined as a relationship between states consisting of regular legitimate compliance of a subordinate state to a dominant state. Subordinates living under the order of a dominant state should act differently than they would in anarchy. In hierarchy, the reason a subordinate complies with a dominant state is not

solely due to coercion or common interests, but due to an obligation to comply with a ruler's authority (Lake 2009). This is similar to how a citizen in a domestic state might obey a law he disagrees with out of respect for law and order. Without any compliance, a hierarchical relationship cannot exist. Hierarchy implies some level of compliance to dominant state expectations. However, during a hierarchy, many compliance and defiance events may take place. No one event of defiance removes a subordinate from a hierarchy, and one example of compliance does not mean two states have a hierarchical relationship. However, in total, a hierarchical relationship will consist of some level of legitimate compliance by a subordinate state to the expectations of a dominant state. And, the more compliance a dominant state can create in comparison to a situation of no hierarchy, the stronger the dominant state's hierarchy.

When states fail to comply with an interstate expectation, they are defying that expectation. Defiance is an act of a subordinate state that disobeys a dominant state's rules or demands. This includes bold acts of defiance such as a subordinate allowing the dominant state's enemy to use its territory for military purposes, as well as lesser actions like refusing to lend nominal support to a dominant state's proposal in the U.N.. Compliance also comprises a variety of actions including: preserving a preferred type of government, allowing dominant control over certain domestic policies, and supporting the dominant state in foreign policy.

3.2.2.5   General and Targeted Incentives

For a subordinate state to enter and stay in a hierarchy, incentives for hierarchy must exist. Incentives for hierarchy can be split into two categories: general incentives and targeted incentives. General incentives are common benefits that all states within the hierarchy, or some sub-group, receive by subordinating themselves in a hierarchy; these are the general benefits that

Lake argues gives subordinates a reason to enter a hierarchy (Lake 1996; Lake 2009). Two examples of general incentives are: the economic benefits maintaining common economic systems, and regional security. For example, British and American hierarchies promoted open markets. The dominant state of a hierarchy can use its leadership to produce more open markets for all under its authority, and ideally this provides pareto improving benefits for all within the hierarchy due to an expanding economy. Regional security provided by the dominant state benefits the subordinate states by the peace that it induces and because the subordinate states can spend less money on their militaries.

Dominant states cannot easily take away general incentives from subordinates without damaging the strength of the hierarchy. For example, if the United States tried to punish a country by no longer using its influence to promote open markets across the globe, the U.S. would harm a key component of U.S. hierarchy--providing open markets. Another example: if, during the Cold War, the United States tried to punish West Germany by renouncing its obligation to defend West Germany from the Soviet Union, this might produce instability due to the higher threat of Soviet encroachment and devalue U.S. hierarchy as a force for stability and defense. Hence, general incentives are difficult to target against a specific state because of their general nature. If the general incentive is taken away from one state, this lessens or eliminates the general incentive for another state. Thus, if a dominant state wishes to actively maintain hierarchy, it likely will use targeted incentives.

Targeted incentives (and disincentives) are costs or benefits applied to a subordinate state by a dominant state in order to induce subordinate state compliance and clarify the rules of the hierarchical arrangement. These tools can be split into two categories-- benefits and discipline. Benefits are dominant state actions that give positive incentives to subordinates to comply and

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accept hierarchy. Benefits include, inter alia, foreign aid, market access, and military bases in a subordinate's country. Discipline refers to dominant state action to maintain hierarchy that exacts costs on a subordinate state (Lake 2009). Discipline includes economic sanctions, military interventions, and supporting domestic opposition. Subordinates will have the incentive to comply in order to avoid these costs. Lake (2009) coined the term discipline in the context of hierarchy. He points out that in an order, the ruler must have the ability to enforce its rules, and dominant states use discipline to keep their subordinates in line (Lake 2009).

3.3   Discipline

Discipline works to preserve or increase hierarchy though four mechanisms: reputation, normative socialization, hierarchical clarity and respect, and leader change. Acts of discipline will increase the chance of future compliance through one, some, or all of these mechanisms. Thus, some acts of discipline may primarily work though one mechanism, while others rely on more. These mechanisms are rough categories of discipline processes identified in the literature, and are not mutually exclusive. I now discuss these mechanisms one by one.

3.3.1   Reputation

Discipline can help a dominant state maintain hierarchy by increasing the dominant state's credibility through the process of strengthening its reputation for toughness, honesty, and resolve. Credibility is the combination of a state's perceived capability to carry out a threat or promise, a state's perceived interest to carry out a threat or promise, and a state's reputation for resolve to carry out threats or promises(Tang 2005). A dominant state's credibility consists of other actors' perception of these factors. Each factor is necessary for a state's threat to have

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credibility (Tang 2005). Resolve is a state's private commitment to follow through on its threats and promises, even at the risk of war. Reputation is the perception of a state's general resolve to take costly action in certain types of situations (Tang 2005). Maintaining a reputation for disciplining when certain rules are broken is necessary for a dominant state to have credibility when it threatens such action. The belief that a dominant state is tough or honest in its threats are components of the perception of a dominant's resolve to take costly action in certain situations.

The credibility of a dominant's discipline is important to influence subordinate behavior and limit costs to the dominant state. Influencing subordinates with threats of discipline requires that subordinates believe the dominant state will accept the costs and follow through with punishing action. A dominant state has limited resources, and cannot usually punish every potential defector. Thus, a credible threat of discipline should keep many potential defectors in compliance and limit the costs from defections; which include both the costs from defections themselves and the cost of disciplining those defections. For examples, literature on interstate conflict and sanctions argues for reputation as a motivation for these actions (Schelling 1960, 1966; Lindsay 1986; Peterson 2012).

Scholars have applied reputation logic to interstate conflict since the seminal work of Schelling (1960, 1966), and I apply similar logic to hierarchies. Past discipline provides a signal subordinates can utilize to determine whether they find a dominant's threat to punish credible. Subordinates can never be sure if a dominant will punish, but they can reasonably think that if a dominant state has punished a state in the past, it will do so in the future. States concerned about reputation may enter a costly conflict when the costs and benefits from that particular conflict do not seem worth it. However, the expected long-term benefits from reputation make the decision for conflict rational. For example, Schelling (1967) argues that the Korean War was only worth

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its costs to the U.S. because it signaled to the world the U.S.'s willingness to take heavy costs to stop the spread of Communism.

Crescenzi argues on the other hand, that state B's reputation for conflict increases the likelihood of conflict with state A because state A observes and learns from state B's previous behavior that state B tends to fail to solve crises peacefully. State A may then suspect that if B could not avoid violence previously, it is less likely to in a current situation. This can make compromising and trusting state B difficult, leading to an increased chance of conflict (Crescenzi 2007). Schelling's reputation story has more relevance for dominant-subordinate state relationships because Crescenzi's story involves navigating interstate crises, while I am concerned about dominant states enforcing their hierarchical expectations. Subordinates should always want to avoid conflict with a more powerful dominant state, and subordinates have concerns about whether or not they can defy a dominant state without being punished. Therefore, the primary concern for subordinates is not the dominant state's ability to compromise, but simply whether the dominant state tends to punish subordinates. If the dominant state has often punished subordinates in the past, then subordinates likely will not respond by considering the dominant state a generally hostile state who must be met with force. The subordinate will likely respond by learning that the dominant state enforces its hierarchical expectations with force, so the subordinate should not defy in order to avoid discipline.

States sometimes use sanctions to demonstrate their resolve rather than to affect compliance in the target state (Lindsay 1986). For example, Jimmy Carter embargoed Soviet grain for this purpose (Lindsay 1986). Lindsay (1986) finds that sanctions are more successful at achieving international symbolism (e.g. signaling one's resolve) than compliance. Peterson (2012) argues that the target of sanction threats takes into account the sender's reputation for

following through on sanction threats when deciding to acquiesce or not. And he finds evidence

that states' responses to U.S. sanction threats are related to recent U.S. sanctioning behavior

(Peterson 2012). Thus, due to reputation, states may sanction one state for the purpose of

achieving compliance in other states.

U.S. behavior appears to support the notion that dominant states care about reputation.

Meernik (2011) points out that since World War Two, U.S. presidents were very concerned

about U.S. credibility. Truman's containment strategy prioritized concerns about image,

prestige, and credibility. Eisenhower advocated domino theory-- if the U.S. did not quickly

respond to Soviet aggression, U.S. promises of aid to other states would not be trusted. Part of

the reason Kennedy and Johnson committed to the war in Vietnam was to maintain U.S.

credibility as a guarantor of security. Reagan claimed that interventions were necessary in

Central America to uphold U.S. credibility (Meernik 2011). Meernik finds that the U.S. is more

likely to have conflict with states it has previously had conflict with. One explanation for this

concerns a reputation for toughness. Once one conflict occurs, other states observe the U.S.

behavior. The U.S. has signaled its commitment by deploying forces, and as a result, the U.S.

then has its reputation at stake in a particular conflict theatre and must achieve a positive

outcome to maintain its reputation (Meernik 2011).

3.3.1.1   Weaknesses of the Reputation Explanation

Despite the expansive literature on the role of reputation in international conflict, the

theoretical explanations receive only mixed empirical support (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Huth

1997; Danilovic 2002). Some scholars argue that the power of reputations is a myth. Ward

(1987) argues that leaders often play chicken because they believe a reputation for toughness will

be advantageous in future crises and negotiations. However, states also refuse to cooperate in the future to maintain their reputation. Thus, states acting to maintain a strong reputation often find that their efforts lead to less cooperation. This limits many important public goods like international peace and protection of the environment (Ward 1987). Tang (2005) argues that a reputation for resolve cannot form in anarchy. In anarchy, states always assume the worst and assume that states are resolute, even if they did not stand strong in a previous crisis. Thus, leaders' beliefs in the advantages of having a strong reputation are misplaced (Tang 2005).

These scholars argue that state leaders believe in reputation, but reputation does not actually benefit them. Therefore, they should expect defiance to affect discipline, but discipline will not affect future defiance. These arguments do not clearly apply to reputation in hierarchy. In anarchy, reputation may have little effect because states generally assume the worst of other states and cannot take any chances of losing security. However, in relationships with a dominant state, a weaker state is unlikely to guarantee its security through self-help because of the power differential. And in a hierarchical relationship, an element of trust may build so that the two states feel they are bargaining over the level of expected duties to each other, rather than survival. In these situations, a reputation for toughness may convince subordinates to comply with the dominant state because subordinates will not assume the worst about the dominant state's intentions, and a level of trust may mitigate the need for the two actors to play chicken. Furthermore, even if reputation has no effects, I would expect discipline to decrease defiance due to the other three discipline mechanisms discussed below.

3.3.2   Normative Socialization

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) identify normative socialization as another mechanism by

which maintenance can increase compliance. Dominant states can use maintenance to alter the norms of another state, and then compliance is achieved because subordinate state leaders believe the complying policies are appropriate. They identify two processes by which a dominant state can use discipline or benefits to alter the norms of another state—external inducement and internal reconstruction (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

3.3.2.1   External Inducement

In external inducement, the dominant state uses material incentives (benefits and discipline) to convince subordinates to comply on policy. After subordinates have complied with the dominant state, over time the subordinate internalizes the legitimacy of the complying policies and supports them for normative reasons. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) identify three reasons why this happens.

First, subordinate elites may receive domestic costs from publics and challenging elites in the opposition because elites subordinating their state to a dominant state may be unpopular. To counter these costs, the elites may justify the complying policies on normative grounds. For example, after World War Two the United States supported a new political and economic order supported by the ideas of liberal multilateralism. In Europe, forces on the left and the right resisted this. The right wanted to maintain nationalism and empires. The left feared liberal economics would take away a country's ability to plan economically and secure the welfare of its people. The Marshall plan induced European leaders to accept American norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Rather than European leaders simply justifying U.S. preferred polices based on the incentives provided by the U.S., leaders could justify the policies based on the advantages of liberal economics and politics. Also, challenging elites may use pro-compliance norms to point

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out a contradiction in traditional norms still held by elites in power and their compliance policies. Thus, elites may accept norms supporting compliance for rational domestic reasons. Second, elites' complying policies may not logically follow from their internal normative beliefs as morally correct policies. The discrepancy between what elites' believe to be moral and their policies might cause mental anguish known as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1954). To end the cognitive dissonance, elites may change their internal normative beliefs rather than change their policies. Once this change occurs, elites now support the complying policies because they believe them to be right, rather than due to rewards or punishments. Third, by repeatedly interacting with institutions created by the dominant state, elites are frequently exposed to the dominant's norms and may grow to accept these norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

3.3.2.2   Internal Reconstruction

Maintenance can also socialize subordinate elites' norms through internal reconstruction. Internal reconstruction involves the dominant state coercively changing the subordinate's domestic political institutions. The institutions implanted will embody many of the dominant state's norms. As elites become accustomed to these institutions and accept them as legitimate, they will also accept the norms involved in the institutions as legitimate (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). For example, before British colonization of India, Indian elites did not have democratic values. However, after Indians were forced to use Western political institutions, even after the Indians rejected British rule, Indian elites supported democratic norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) studied U.S. diplomacy after both World Wars and the British in India and Egypt. They found that the socialization of the subordinate primarily works

through the socialization of elites rather than the masses. Their case studies also suggest that dominant to subordinate norm socialization requires material maintenance, and is not successful by the use of persuasion alone (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). This evidence implies that if dominant states want to increase hierarchy and compliance, one strategy for doing so is by taking maintenance actions that alter the norms of subordinate elites. Once norms are altered so that subordinate elites agree with dominant state policies, subordinates will comply without need for much material incentives by the dominant state. Having more norms in common may then facilitate greater hierarchical authority for the dominant state as described in the previous chapter.

3.3.3   Hierarchical Clarity and Respect

Lake explains how coercion by the dominant state is sometimes necessary in order to maintain its hierarchy because the legitimate right of the dominant state to create rules may unravel if rule breakers go unpunished. Lake argues that dominant states punish defiance not just to protect their reputation. Letting defiance stand weakens and threatens the agreement between dominant and subordinates about the authority of the dominant and the duties of the subordinates (Lake 2009). These concerns can be split into two related factors--maintaining a general respect for the dominant's rule, and clarifying rules and expectations agreed to in the hierarchical bargain.

The hierarchical agreement has power to influence subordinates. Subordinates agreed to the hierarchy and have pressure to stick to their duties for as long as they respect the agreement. However, the extent of a dominant state's hierarchy is continuously contested. And, as external environments change, the hierarchy agreement may become more questioned because the actors

involved will have uncertainty concerning whether the changes in environment have changed the hierarchical arrangement (Lake 2009). The uncertainty may lead to a lack of respect for the dominant state's authority because if the hierarchical arrangement is no longer valid, neither is the authority of the dominant state to punish. The power of a ruler is never eternal and subordinates may begin to question whether the dominant's order still exists.

The term respect refers to deference for the dominant state's authority. This is similar to a citizen's respect for the authority of a police officer. Respecting an officer's authority includes a mixture of fear for consequences and legitimacy. Most citizens consider an officer's right to use force to impose the law legitimate, and also fear the officer's use of force. Therefore, when an officer is fulfilling his/her duty, most citizens will obey an officer's commands because they believe in the officer's authoritative role in society, and because they fear his/her ability to punish. Similarly, when subordinate states have respect for a dominant state's authority, they are more likely to comply out of a mixture of fear and legitimacy, which I have labeled respect. If a police officer has no ability to enforce the law with punishments, then many citizens may not obey the officer. Likewise, if a vigilante attempts to enforce the law with the power of a sword, citizens are less likely to comply than if the vigilante had legitimate authority to use force. With less respect for a hierarchical agreement, subordinates will likely try to cheat for material gain. Discipline from the dominant state, that other subordinates accept as legitimate, will clarify that the agreement still stands and that cheating is not acceptable. Once this is clarified, other subordinates will understand the current state of the agreement, and the authority it bestows upon the dominant state, and will be pressured to not defy.

Clarity not only reinvigorates respect for the hierarchical agreement, it facilitates an understanding of the extent of the dominant's authority that the initial agreement did not make

clear. Subordinates may be tempted to defy not because they lose respect for the agreement, but because they did not know that their action would be considered defiance. Discipline clarifies the line of the dominant's authority and allows subordinates to know what is and is not acceptable.

The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as an example. Russia's hierarchy in Eastern Europe collapsed partially because Soviet Bloc states that rejected Russia's hierarchy went unpunished. The lack of discipline decreased the amount of respect for Russia's right to rule, and defections increased (Lake 2009).

3.3.4   Leader Change

Leader change is a disciplining action where the dominant state punishes defiance by influencing a leader change in the subordinate state. Leader change can be influenced by military invasion or by giving financial, material, or other types of support to domestic opposition movements. Leader change clearly has overlap with other forms of discipline. For examples, if the leader change also involves institutional and policy change, then normative socialization mechanisms will also apply. Furthermore, a dominant state showing the willingness to overthrow a subordinate state's leadership signals the dominant state's tough reputation and what kind of behavior the dominant views as breaking the rules of hierarchy.

I identify leader change as a separate discipline mechanism because the changing of a leader produces compliance in a state in ways different from the other discipline mechanisms identified in this chapter. Even without socialization and without fear of future discipline, the installed leader is likely to comply more with the dominant state than the previous leader for two reasons. First, the dominant state is likely to put in place a leader that believes further

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compliance with the dominant is the best option for his/her country. Second, the new leader may feel a measure of loyalty toward the dominant for the support in gaining power.

Two examples of U.S. influenced leader change over its Caribbean hierarchy are the invasions of Grenada and Panama. In Panama, two justifications for the invasion were the U.S. exercise of its right to protect the Canal in Panamanian territory and to bring a foreign leader, Noriega, to justice. In Grenada, the U.S. invaded to secure a cooperative and stable government that would not ally with Cuba. In both these countries, U.S. relations have been cooperative and hierarchical since the invasions. Therefore, maintenance by leader change appears to have succeeded.

3.3.5   Discipline Hypotheses

The theory above applies to all subordinates and potential subordinates. However, states that have no interest in U.S. hierarchy may not be affected in the same way as states already in U.S. hierarchy or states that are potential subordinates - states who have enough interest in hierarchy to be close to preferring hierarchy but are not currently subordinates. Maintenance may only work on hierarchical subordinates and those that have some potential of subordinating. Thus, I will direct my hypotheses specifically to subordinate states even though I also expect maintenance to produce compliance among some non-subordinates. The four mechanisms described above lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Subordinate states are less likely to defy when they have recently received discipline.

Both the increase of a dominant's reputation for disciplining, and the greater respect and clarity of the hierarchy that discipline can produce, lead to the expectation that dominant state discipline on one state will decrease defiance from other states. I expect that maintenance will

have the greatest influence on states in the same region as the target state for two reasons. First, subordinates may expect dominant state behavior in their region to better predict the dominant's regional behavior than behavior outside the region, and therefore respond to maintenance in their region more than maintenance outside the region. Subordinates should expect this dominant state behavior because of regional diffusion and hierarchical subsets. Diffusion of defiance will likely take place regionally due to the easy visibility of defiance in a state's region, and due to trade and cultural connections that may transmit sentiment and ideas supporting defiance. Furthermore, dominant states may view subordinates in the same region as a subset of their hierarchy and treat them differently than another subset. Dominant states may create subsets because regional subordinates tend to share similarities compared to subordinates from another region. For example, Caribbean subordinates are all weak, close to the United States, and share a moderate amount of norms with the U.S., while European subordinates are further away, stronger, and share more norms and institutions in common. Thus, the U.S. is likely to view Europe and the Caribbean as different subsets of U.S. hierarchy and treat them accordingly. The second reason within region maintenance has greater influence is that the disciplining of a regional state is more visible due to proximity and cultural and language similarities. Subordinates will think more thoroughly about how a dominant's maintenance on another state may affect them if the maintenance is more strongly brought to their attention.

> Hypothesis 2: Subordinate states are less likely to defy the more the dominant state has recently disciplined in a region.

3.3.6   Where Discipline Fails

Alt et al. (1988) discuss hegemon-subordinate bargaining over the benefits of a hierarchy. However, they do not focus on bargaining done to determine whether there is hierarchy in the

first place. They point out that subordinates under hegemony sometimes have incentives for defection to gain information about what the dominant state will tolerate. They also argue that a dominant state should not always punish defiance, particularly in three situations. First, in some cases it will be common knowledge that the hegemon cannot punish many cases of defiance, so even if the hegemon punishes one state, others will still have an incentive to defy. Second, in other cases subordinates gain such a small benefit from defiance that other subordinates will not defy even if an act of defiance goes unpunished. And finally, in some cases, punishing is too costly for the dominant state, so the benefits of discipline for a dominant state are not worth its costs of punishing (Alt et al. 1988). Thus, the expectation that more discipline leads to less defiance only applies to situations that do not fall into the above cases.

Sometimes, discipline can backfire, especially with military interventions. As Tang (2005) points out, credibility not only consists of reputation, but also the perception of capability and interest in a disciplining action. Attempts to use military discipline that fail, or prove more costly than expected, may increase the likelihood of future defiance because the discipline attempt revealed a dominant state's inability to discipline in such away, or its lack of interest in doing so due to the heavy costs of disciplining. Weaker states have incomplete information about the private information of a dominant state's true capabilities. Both failed attempts, and surprisingly costly attempts, at military maintenance will inform weaker states about the heavy costs to, and/or incapability of, the dominant state to perform a similar military maintenance again. And this emboldens states to defy. Furthermore, a botched maintenance attempt may be so costly that it erodes the dominant state's capability to intervene in the same way again. In addition, if the dominant state's domestic politics oppose certain maintenance actions due to a costly attempt, subordinates will doubt that the dominant will punish in the same way again.

Snyder (2003) argues that empires often believe certain myths that lead them to expect preventative strikes against rebellious frontiers will deter other frontier areas from defying. However, this strategy often produces more defiance. He suggests that empires can often pull back and husband their power in order to extend the duration of their empires (Snyder 2003).

Discipline can also backfire when subordinates, and other states, find it illegitimate. Lake explains that U.S. military actions are more likely perceived as legitimate when they are done through multilateral institutions. He argues that George W. Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy greatly damaged U.S. authority by not showing the restraint that traditional U.S. subordinates expected of the U.S.. Without agreed upon limits on the use of the dominant state's power, subordinates will not find the benefits of hierarchy worth the risk of a dominant state abusing its power (Lake 2010a). Lake describes examples of the U.S. limiting its actions for the purpose of legitimacy in its Caribbean hierarchy. In the Dominican intervention of 1965, the U.S. replaced its troops with an Inter-American Peace Force approved by the Organization of American States. Before the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, it achieved a request for intervention from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The United States gained such approval to maintain the legitimacy of its discipline and hierarchy (Lake 2010b).

I expect an interaction effect between dominant state costs from disciplining and an act of discipline. The more costs a dominant state experiences, the more likely discipline will produce defiance, rather than compliance.

> Hypothesis 3: When a dominant state recently has disciplined a subordinate, the higher the dominant state costs, the more likely that subordinate is to defy.

> Hypothesis 4: When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate, the higher the dominant state's costs, the more likely subordinates in the same region as the targeted subordinate are to defy.

One problem with the costs hypotheses is that high costs may also show the dominant

state's resolve for discipline. Another similar expectation concerns the success or failure of an

act of discipline. If a discipline attempt is successful at achieving its immediate goal, the

strength of a hierarchy should increase. However, if a dominant state fails, then subordinates

will doubt the dominant state's ability and willingness to discipline again, and the respect for the

hierarchy may diminish at the sight of a dominant state's failed attempt to discipline a

subordinate.

>Hypothesis 5: When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate and fails to achieve its immediate goal, the subordinate state is more likely to defy.

>Hypothesis 6: When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate and fails to achieve its immediate goal, subordinate states in the same region as the targeted state are more likely to defy.

3.4   Benefits

The other general category of maintenance is benefits. While discipline involves

exacting costs on subordinates, benefits are positive incentives that facilitate subordinates

accepting hierarchy. Foreign aid, market access, technology, beneficial dominant state military

bases, or anything a dominant can give to a subordinate is a benefit. I have identified three

mechanisms by which benefits decrease defiance-- buying compliance, normative socialization,

and preserving dependence and weakness.

3.4.1   Buying Compliance

If subordinates do not consider the general benefits resulting from a hierarchy valuable

enough to overcome the loss of sovereignty in hierarchy, then dominant states can add extra

benefits to make hierarchy in the subordinate's interest. Buying compliance works in two ways.

First, sometimes a subordinate has the capabilities to comply, but simply does not consider complying to be in its interest. This is the straight forward case where benefits adjust the subordinate's cost-benefit analysis to make hierarchy worthwhile. Second, sometimes compliance is not worthwhile because the costs of developing the capabilities to comply are too high for the subordinate. In these cases, the dominant's aid makes hierarchy worthwhile not simply by bribing the subordinate, but by making the act of compliance drastically cheaper. For example, the U.S. may expect relatively weak states to control terrorist or drug activity in its territory that the U.S. considers injurious to itself. However, a weak state may not have the special forces necessary to achieve the task. The U.S. can provide money, technology, and training to make compliance more reasonable for the subordinate state. Literature has found evidence of foreign aid buying compliance on the issue of combating terrorism. Empirical evidence shows that foreign aid has reduced terrorism and donors give aid for this purpose (Azam & Thelen 2008; Azam & Thelen 2010).

Sechser theorizes that compellent threats against weaker states may fail because the weaker states are unwilling to take the reputation costs from appeasing the stronger state. Weaker states may even fight hopeless wars in order to maintain their reputation for cost tolerance. The stronger state can overcome this with side payments. However, the costs of the side payments may be steep (Sechser 2008). Thus, one reason beneficial maintenance may be effective is because it counterbalances the subordinate state's reputational costs for complying.

3.4.2 Normative Socialization

Above, I discussed how Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) argue that benefits and discipline act as external inducement to convince or force subordinates to comply, and later subordinate

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elites internalize norms supporting these policies. Then, elites support the complying policies due to the norms, rather than just inducement. This mechanism applies to both discipline and benefits.

3.4.3   Maintaining Dependence and Weakness

Maintaining the dependence and weakness of subordinates relative to the dominant power facilitates the strength of a hierarchy. The more power a dominant state has relative to its subordinates, the more easily it can discipline and benefit its subordinates. When disciplining is easier, the threat of discipline is more credible. This makes defiance less likely, which decreases the cost of hierarchical maintenance, and increases the relative power of the dominant state. Thus, stronger relative power for the dominant state creates a virtuous cycle for hierarchy, and efforts to prolong the power differential are likely worthwhile. Furthermore, when subordinates are dependent, the services and goods provided by the dominant state are more valuable; making hierarchy more valuable. For example, if a subordinate does not have the military capacity to defend itself, hierarchy is more attractive than if the subordinate had stronger defensive capabilities.

When a dominant state provides security, or an essential economic need, subordinates are less likely to independently develop these capabilities. Thus, providing essential needs keeps subordinates weaker and more dependent on the dominant state. Rosen argues that maintaining an empire requires keeping the initial advantage in the ability to create military power. U.S. efforts to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles can be seen as attempts to keep a monopoly of military force over potential subordinates. The U.S. uses a similar strategy as the British used in India. U.S. provision of security to subordinates helps

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maintain the U.S. military superiority within its hierarchies because subordinates do not need strong militaries for defense. Offering advanced technology also helps achieve this goal by decreasing the need for the subordinates to develop their own advanced military technology (Rosen 2003).

Discipline, as opposed to benefits, can also help maintain superiority over subordinates by punishing subordinates who develop capabilities threatening to the dominant state. However, such disciplining actions are likely seen as illegitimate, so benefits are more likely used to keep subordinates weaker in a hierarchy. For example, the United States attacked Saddam Hussein partially to prevent him from gaining nuclear weapons. And the United States threatens Iran for the same reason. However, Iraq and Iran are not U.S. subordinates, so these are threats between independent states. Most subordinates would not agree to a hierarchy where the dominant has such power. For example, a U.S. attack on France for developing nuclear weapons would not be considered legitimate by France or other European subordinates. Thus, the U.S. must offer benefits to subordinates instead. The United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among its subordinates by offering to defend them under its own nuclear umbrella. U.S. defense commitments to Germany, Italy, and Japan played an important role in these states staying non-nuclear (Bunn & Timerbaev 1993).

When the hierarchy has a high security component to it, and the subordinate's own resources can play a key role in providing security, the dominant state may actually prefer more subordinate strength. Especially in a situation where even if a subordinate devotes a high amount of resources to security, it will still need the dominant state's help. The more overburdened a dominant state is with defense responsibilities, the better chance it will forgo the weakness strategy because it values the advantages of defense burden sharing over the

advantages of keeping a subordinate weak. A dominant state may prefer that a subordinate help

share the burden in certain areas of security, but maintain weakness in other areas. For example,

the U.S. may want many of its allies to increase defense spending, but to maintain dependency

on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence and advance military technologies or capabilities. If a

dominant state decides maintaining weakness is not worth the extra burden of providing security,

then it will have to rely on other disciplining and benefiting mechanisms to maintain hierarchy.

3.4.4 Benefits Hypotheses

The three benefits mechanisms lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 7: The greater the level of dominant state benefits recently given to a
subordinate state the less likely that state will defy.

Benefits may only produce compliance bilaterally. However, if a dominant state gains a

reputation for giving benefits to compliers, then there may be an effect on states other than the

state receiving benefits.

Hypothesis 8: The greater the level of dominant state benefits recently given to a
subordinate state the less likely subordinate states in the region will defy.

3.5 Defiance Elicits Discipline

Because dominant states prefer compliance over defiance, acts of defiance must cost a

dominant state in some way. To prevent a subordinate from defying again in the future, a

dominant state may respond with discipline.

Hypothesis 9: Dominant states are more likely to discipline states who have recently
defied more dominant state expectations than states that have defied less.

3.5.1   Audience Size and Obedience

The literature on reputation argues that the greater the expected reputational benefits from an action, the more likely such an action will take place (Walter 2006; Clare & Danilovic 2010). The number of actors whose future behavior may cost a dominant state has an important impact on the level of reputational benefits from discipline. If more actors have an opportunity to defy the dominant state, then the dominant state is more likely to take costly action in order to deter defiance with a tough reputation. Furthermore, the more actors that defy the dominant state, the greater incentive the dominant state has to discipline.

Walter (2006) explains that reputation matters for states fending off domestic rebellions. States calculate the value of a reputation for toughness based on the expected future challenges to its rule. If many challenges are expected, then a reputation for toughness is very valuable and a state will need to bear the cost of a fight. Walter finds that governments are significantly more likely to fight a particular separatist group if the expected costs from dealing with more future challengers are high. This variable had a greater impact than variables dealing with current factors of a dispute (Walter 2006). Thus, Walter's findings support the notion that the likelihood of a dominant state disciplining a subordinate is more likely when there is more expected defiance from other subordinates in the future.

Lake's focus is on hierarchical clarity and respect, rather than reputation, but he predicts the same relationship in international hierarchy. Lake expects discipline to be less likely in regions with obedient subordinates and in regions with few subordinates. A region with few subordinates has few countries for defiance to spread to regionally. He expects the most discipline in Latin America and the Caribbean because there are many subordinates with the incentive to defect there. Europe is less likely to receive discipline due to similar policy

preferences with the U.S., so European states have little incentive to defect. The U.S. has few subordinates in Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia, so Lake does not expect these regions to need maintenance. A cursory review of U.S. military interventions supports his expectations because interventions are more likely in the Caribbean and Latin America (Lake 2009).

Examining strategic rivalries from 1816 to 1999, Clare and Danilovic (2010) find an interaction effect between states having a weak reputation and the number of potential future opponents on dispute initiation and escalation. They argue that when states have poor outcomes in disputes, they can benefit from investing in reputation by behaving more aggressively. And, this benefit only matters when states have many potential future opponents (Clare & Danilovic 2010). Applying this to hierarchy; when a dominant state experiences substantial defiance, and when multiple potential subordinates may defy, the dominant state should be more likely to punish in order to build its reputation for discipline. Tang (2005) argues that a lone superpower will have a greater concern for reputation than a major power during other levels of polarity. Under unipolarity, the entire world is a potential challenger, so the benefits of a strong reputation are highest under unipolarity. Therefore, a lone superpower should involve itself more in world affairs than one in a multi-, or bi-, polar world because it believes its reputation will prevent more costs (Tang 2005). Concurring with Tang, Meernik also notes that the U.S. especially cares about credibility because of its vast hegemonic commitments (Meernik 2011).

The above literature supports the notion that the more states that may defy, the stronger the incentive to discipline. I contend that the actual level of general defiance should also incentivize discipline. One state defying does not necessarily indicate that many others will as well. However, multiple states defying will clarify to a dominant state the benefits of disciplining. The dominant state will view the costs from multiple defiance actions and may

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expect the trend to continue with an even greater increase in defiance. Thus, a high general

level of defiance incentivizes discipline to lower the already elevated defiance and to prevent

defiance from spreading.

> Hypothesis 10: The greater the level of average regional state defiance, the stronger the positive relationship between state defiance and discipline.

3.6   Conclusion

In this chapter I have developed a theory that explains why dominant state actions to

reward or punish other states can increase compliance to the dominant state's expectations. I

argued that dominant states punish and reward subordinate states using maintenance actions that

both clarify the reach of a dominant state's authority, and alter the cost-benefit analysis of states

towards accepting a hierarchical relationship and/or complying to dominant state expectations.

Punishing actions, called discipline, help maintain hierarchy and facilitate compliance by

increasing the dominant state's reputation for punishing, socializing subordinate states to the

dominant state's norms, increasing hierarchical clarity and respect, and changing a subordinate's

leader to one that is more friendly. And, beneficial maintenance actions facilitate compliance

and hierarchy by effectively buying compliance with assistance and aid, socializing subordinate

states to dominant state norms, and preserving the dependence and weakness of a subordinate

state. In addition, I have explained why very costly and failed maintenance attempts may

decrease compliance, and I proposed that subordinate state defiance elicits dominant state

discipline.

In the next two chapters I test hypotheses drawn from the theory utilizing multivariable

regression and the historical record of U.S.-other-country dyads from up to 1950 to 2010.

Chapter 4 analyzes results for hypotheses expecting maintenance to increase compliance, and in

chapter 5 I test hypotheses proposing that dominant states respond to subordinate state defiance with discipline.

CHAPTER 4

HIERARCHICAL MAINTENANCE: DISCIPLINE AND BENEFITS EMPIRICS

4.1   Introduction

In this chapter I test hypotheses expecting that maintenance actions by a dominant state increase compliance. I find that maintenance actions only rarely associate with more compliance among subordinates. Therefore, the primary hypothesis that maintenance increases compliance finds only weak support. The unrobust findings suggest that authority in international relations to take coercive actions is weak. However, other dominant states may more effectively maintain than the U.S. because they are not limited by liberal politics and norms. I first explain the research design. Then, I discuss the results. Finally, I explore implications from the evidence.

4.2   Research Design

Hypotheses 1-2 expect acts of negative maintenance (discipline) to decrease defiance. Hypotheses 3-6 represent the idea that failed and costly attempts at discipline may facilitate more defiance, rather than less. Hypotheses 7-8 predict that acts of positive maintenance (benefits) associate with more compliance. The unit of analysis is the U.S.-other dyad. A U.S.-other dyad consists of the relationship between the United States and another state for a particular year. The range of the data is the U.S. paired with every country of the world from 1940 to 2010, although missing data for some variables in particular years will limit the time frame. Although I have developed a general theory, due to data availability I limit the research design to the United States as a dominant state. The full data set includes 14,384 U.S.-other dyad-year observations.

4.2.1   Key Dependent Variables: Defiance and Compliance

Defiance and compliance come in many forms, and I do not have one general measure to capture all compliance/defiance . Instead, I use a variety of measures that capture different forms of compliance or defiance to U.S. hierarchy.

4.2.1.1   Human Rights

At times, the U.S. advocates respect for human rights[9]. Thus, states violating human rights are in defiance of a U.S. human rights expectation. To measure human rights, I utilize the Physical Integrity Rights Index from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli & Richards 2010). The Physical Integrity Rights Index ranges from 0 to 8 and measures the extent that governments do not use: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances to achieve political goals. The mean and standard deviation are 4.82 and 2.34, respectively.

4.2.1.2   Democracy and Capitalism

The United States tends to promote democracy and liberal economic policies across the world[10]. Therefore, maintaining democratic institutions and free market policies are forms of complying with U.S. expectations. I capture democracy with Polity2 scores[11] (Marshall & Jaggers 2002). These have a .25 mean and 7.49 standard deviation. For capitalism I utilize the

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[9] The U.S. has not always prioritized human rights in its foreign policy. However, the U.S. often prefers that other countries' improve human rights and pressures them to do so. Thus, generally, an improvement on human rights is an example of meeting U.S. expectations, even though the U.S. is not always consistent on this preference.

[10] The U.S. has not always prioritized promoting democracy and capitalism in its foreign policy. However, the U.S. often prefers that other countries' liberalize their policies and institutions and pressures them to do so. Thus, generally, an improvement on democracy or capitalism is an example of meeting U.S. expectations, even though the U.S. is not always consistent on this preference.

[11] Polity2 downloaded from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom measure from 1970 to 2009[12] (Gwartney et al. 2011). The index consists of forty two data points from five broad categories: the size of government including expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to trade internationally; and regulation of credit, labor, and business. This continuous index has the maximum potential value of 10, a minimum potential value of 0, a 6.02 mean, and a 1.17 standard deviation.

4.2.1.3   UNGA Voting Similarity

Starting in 1983, the Department of State has published reports on which United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) votes are important enough to U.S. interests that the U.S. heavily lobbies other states over those votes. States refusing to vote with the U.S. on votes it labels key are in defiance of the U.S.'s expectations. Therefore, I use similarity scores from 1983 to 2008 to capture states' level of compliance on key UN votes (Gartzke 1998; Dreher and Sturm 2012). The variables ranges from 0 to 1, has a .47 mean, and a standard deviation of .22.

4.2.1.4   Alliance Similarity

Alliance similarity scores capture the extent that a country in a particular year has the same alliances as the United States[13] (Bennett & Stam 2000). The U.S. would generally prefer a state to ally with its friends and to not ally with its enemies, so a state having more similar alliance patterns as the U.S. is an example of compliance. The range is 0 to 1, the mean is .30, and the standard deviation is .46.

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[12] Economic Freedom Index downloaded from <http://www.freetheworld.com/>

[13] Alliance similarity data downloaded from Lake 2009 replication data at <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/data.html>

4.2.2   Key Independent Variables

4.2.2.1   Key Independent Variables Interaction

My hypotheses pertain to states already in hierarchy, however, I also expect maintenance to have an effect on states outside of hierarchy. I want to view the relationship between discipline and compliance among both these categories of states. Thus, using interactive variables as my key independent variables is appropriate. All key independent variables, described below, will be interacted with a dichotomous variable that is a one if a state is under U.S. hierarchy and a zero otherwise. Because I am using a dichotomous measure of hierarchy, the key interactive term will effectively tell us the relationship between discipline and compliance among subordinates. While the constituent discipline term will tell us the relationship between discipline and compliance among states that are not currently under U.S. hierarchy. This allows me to ascertain the relationship among states who are under U.S. hierarchy, and among those who are not.

States coded "1" on the *UShierarchy* variable are those with an economic hierarchy index or security hierarchy index score greater than .2. This threshold is chosen for a few reasons. One, the mean of the security and economic hierarchy indexes are about .2 -- .201 and .208, respectively. Thus, this barrier includes country years that have above average U.S. security or economic hierarchy. Second, the .2 barrier includes countries that generally would be expected to fall under U.S. hierarchy. For example, if the barrier is above .5, South Korea would not be included for any year, even though South Korea is generally viewed as a U.S. subordinate. Finally, a low barrier is used to capture a larger N and more variability on variables within the interaction term. For example, if the barrier is very high, the data consist of mostly central American and Caribbean countries. Furthermore, my theory applies to states under any amount

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of U.S. hierarchy, not just states under high levels of U.S. hierarchy. Out of the 14,384

observations in the dataset, 3, 558 are observations of states under U.S. hierarchy. The

UShierarchy constituent term is included in all models as a control.

4.2.2.2   Key Independent Variables (Hypotheses 1-2)

The key independent variable is dominant state discipline. A dominant state can use a

variety of methods to discipline a state. I use a few key types of discipline to operationalize the

concept. Discipline is measured by military interventions against a government, CIA

installations of new governments, and sanctions. I first discuss each variable. Then, I discuss

how they are operationalized.

U.S. military interventions against a government are examples of discipline. *Military

Against* indicates when a U.S. military intervention takes place against a state's government.

Data comes from two sources, and the sources will be used separately as robustness checks. The

International Military Intervention(IMI) dataset ranges from 1946 to 2005[14] (Pearson and

Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008). The Military Intervention by Powerful States

dataset ranges from 1946 to 2003[15] (Sullivan and Koch 2009). Between 1946 and 2005 the U.S.

has intervened against governments 18 times. A list of military interventions is shown in table

29 in the appendix.

CIA influence to overthrow a government (e.g. CIA organized coups or CIA funded

political opponents) are examples of U.S. discipline. I create *CIA Install* to represent the event

of the U.S. successfully using the CIA to install a new government in a country. Data on CIA

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[14] The International Military Intervention(IMI) dataset downloaded from < http://www.k-
state.edu/polsci/intervention/index.html>

[15] Military Intervention by Powerful States dataset downloaded from < http://tsulli.myweb.uga.edu/data.html >

interventions are available from 1947 to 1989[16] (Berger et al. 2012). Berger et al. (2012) create

this dataset based on historical studies of the Cold War that often base their work on declassified

documents (Yergin 1991; Blum 2004; Westad 2005; Weiner 2007; Library of Congress). The

data are limited to the Cold War period because CIA documents younger than 25 years cannot be

obtained by the Freedom of Information Act and because most documents from the Cold War are

available and have been studied by historians[17] (Berger et al. 2012). The data include 26

observations of CIA influenced government installations. A list of CIA interventions is shown in

table 30 in the appendix.

Sanctions are economic costs exacted upon another country, so sanctions by a dominant

state are examples of discipline. Sanctions data include the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions

(TIES) Data available from 1971 to 2000[18] (Morgan et al. 2006), and the Sanctions Use Dataset

available from 1949 to 1978[19] (Drury 2000). To maximize the time range of the sanctions data,

I will combine these two datasets to create a *Sanctions* variable that indicates when a sanction is

currently imposed by the U.S.. As an alternative measure for sanctions, I will also run models

with a sanctions variable that is only coded "1" when there is a sanction and the sanction has had

an economic impact on the target country. A sanction has had an economic impact if it at least

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[16] CIA data downloaded from < http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/data_nunn >

[17] It cannot be known how many CIA interventions have occurred but are still classified. Thus, there may be a missing data problem where CIA events occurred, but are in the data as not occurring. The declassified actions include CIA involvement in countries that are allies and enemies from across six continents, so there is no apparent bias in the declassification. The data may be biased by the apparent heinousness of the CIA actions or by the extent that the CIA strategies are still used today, rather than in such a way that biases my analyses. If there is a relevant bias, it is likely biased against my expected correlations. I expect defiance and CIA interventions to correlate. The missing CIA interventions may have not been declassified because states who were defiant in the past are still defiant today, and releasing the CIA actions could create even more defiance when the government or people of that country are upset. Thus, it is likely that there are acts of defiance that correlate with CIA interventions, but because these CIA interventions are still classified, in my data I will not detect that correlation. Therefore, the potential missing CIA data biases the results against my hypotheses. So if a statistically significant result is found, it will be in spite of the potential missing data problem, not because of it.

[18] Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data downloaded from < http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm >

[19] Sanctions Use Dataset downloaded from <http://web.missouri.edu/~drurya/data.html>

resulted in significant macroeconomic difficulties. Evidence for this includes atypical changes in inflation or unemployment, or great drops in trade relationships (Morgan et al. 2006).

4.2.2.3   Key Independent Variables (Hypotheses 3-6)

Data capturing the failure and costliness of acts of dominant state discipline are available for military interventions. I measure failure and costliness of an intervention separately. I use the number of dominant state military casualties during an intervention against a subordinate state to measure the costliness of an intervention. Data are available from 1946-2005 (Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008). For the squared version of this variable I simply square the original variable. Intervention failure is a dichotomous variable receiving a 1 to indicate if the primary political objective of an intervention was not attained and maintained for at least 30 days. If the primary political objective was attained, the variable is a zero. These data are available from 1946-2003 (Sullivan and Koch 2009). There are few occurrences of intervention failure, so I will also alternatively test the effects of intervention success. This variable is coded "1" for success and "0" otherwise. All the above variables are coded "0" on years that there was no military intervention[20].

4.2.2.4   Key Independent Variables (Hypotheses 7-8)

The key independent variable for these hypotheses is dominant state maintenance in the form of benefits. A dominant state can use different methods to benefit a state. I use a few key types of benefits to operationalize the concept. Benefits are measured by military intervention

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[20] Thus, for variables: military intervention, military intervention failure, and military intervention success, a "1" indicates that the event occurred (an intervention, an intervention failure, or an intervention success, respectively), and a "0" indicates that the event has not occurred. Consequently, a "0" for the intervention failure variable represents both an intervention success and no intervention occurring at all; the vast majority of the "0s" will represent no intervention occurring.

on the side of a government, CIA support of a government, and foreign aid. Next, I discuss each

variable. CIA support and military intervention on the side of the government are

operationalized and decayed the same way as their discipline counterparts described above.

U.S. military interventions on the side of a government are benefits. *Military Support*

indicates when a U.S. military intervention is fought in support of a state's government. Data

come from the same sources as the *Military Against* variable described in the Discipline section

(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008). A list of military interventions is

shown in table 29 in the appendix. CIA influence to support a government (e.g. counter-

insurgency activity and providing supplies) are examples of U.S. benefits. I create *CIA Support*

to measure when the U.S. uses the CIA to support a government that it did not previously install.

The data include 638 observations of the U.S. supporting a government that it did not previously

install, and are from the same source as *CIA Install* discussed earlier (Berger et al. 2012). A list

of CIA interventions is shown in table 30 in the appendix.

The U.S. utilizes foreign aid as a benefit to convince, and/or help, states comply. I

measure foreign aid as the combined military and economic U.S. foreign aid given to a country

in a year in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Data are collected by the U.S. government from 1946 to

2010 and measured in constant 2010 dollars (Greenbook 2012)[21]. In this time period, the U.S.

gave foreign aid in 9,646 out of 14,376 country-year observations. The average amount of

foreign aid given to those that received any aid is 224 million.

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[21] Foreign aid data downloaded from < http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>.

4.2.2.5   Key Independent Variables' Decay and Average

All of the above independent variables are manipulated in the same way. From each of the described variables I create two separate variables. One measures whether or not the maintenance action took place in the country year, and the other captures the average regional level of the maintenance action. First, I describe the direct maintenance variables. Maintenance acts should produce an expectation of maintenance and respect for hierarchy, and then wither away over time as the environment changes and subordinates begin to question again the strength of the hierarchy. Because of this, I do not want to measure these acts of maintenance just as a "1" during the act, and "0" otherwise. I want to capture the act itself, and the time passed since the act. To do this, these measures will receive a "1" for years during the act, and a "1" on the following year. Then, they will decay to zero over ten years. Due to the deterioration, these variables are not dichotomous, and range from 0 to 1^{22}.

The average regional maintenance variable takes the above maintenance score and averages for all states in a potential target state's region. If a state leaves the dataset and would still have a decaying maintenance score above zero, this score will be calculated into the average because a country leaving the system does not cancel out the effect of the U.S. intervention in that country on the perceptions of other states. I base the identification of regions on: traditional classification of regions, geography, and culture. The regions are: North America, the Caribbean and Central America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Atlantic Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, Indian Ocean, Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian islands, and Pacific Islands. All key independent variables are lagged by one year.

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[22] The foreign aid variable is taken in real levels rather than decayed because unlike the other variables, a non-zero level of foreign aid is consistent over time.

4.2.3   Control Variables

Variables that are reasonable candidates for omitted variable bias are included as controls. Controls for research designs used to test other hypotheses in other sections are the same as the controls below because the key variables for all hypotheses are similar and constitute similar threats to omitted variable bias. Maintenance on a country is more likely when maintenance is less costly and when the dominant state's incentives for hierarchy are higher. In other words, when maintenance is difficult, and when controlling the subordinate does not offer the dominant much reward, maintenance is unlikely. Factors that facilitate maintenance will also likely facilitate compliance because potential target states will realize that maintenance is easy and comply to benefit from beneficial maintenance or/and to avoid discipline. This creates the potential for omitted variable bias, so factors that increase the incentive for maintenance are controlled for. Such factors include: proximity to the U.S., coastline, mountainous terrain, natural resources, economic development, and subordinate military capabilities.

Each of these factors are likely related to maintenance. Proximity to the U.S. will likely lower maintenance logistic costs due to the shorter distance. States with coastlines make logistics easier and facilitate maintenance in the form of military intervention. Mountainous terrains might increase logistics costs and increase the difficulty of a military intervention. Natural resources on a subordinate's territory create a higher incentive for hierarchy, and therefore maintenance actions to preserve or increase hierarchy are more likely worth their costs. Economically developed countries have more resources with which to defend against an intervention, and more economic damage through sanctions or benefits through aid are necessary to influence the state. Therefore, economic development facilitates resisting dominant state maintenance actions, and it can increase the costs of maintenance actions on the dominant state.

Less subordinate state military capabilities will likely ease the costs of maintenance for a dominant state due to its overwhelming power and leverage.

Natural resources are measured as the total natural resource profits as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to 2010 (World Bank). Mountainous terrain is measured by the percentage of terrain that is mountainous (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Coastline is measured by the percentage of population within 100 kilometers of ice-free coasts (Gallup et al. 2001). Proximity is measured as the minimum distance between two states' capitals (Gleditsch & Ward 2001). Economic development is measured as GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002; World Bank). Capabilities are measured by COW capabilities data (Singer et al. 1972 V. 3.02).

During the Cold War, the United States may have been more likely to receive compliance from subordinates because they were united by the threat of the Soviet Union. Also, the U.S. may have felt greater urgency to maintain subordinates in order to counter Soviet influence. Because of these possibilities, the Cold War is a reasonable candidate for omitted variable bias and included as a control variable. Observations receive a 1 from 1947 to 1991, and a 0 otherwise.

4.2.4   Method

I estimate the models using panel corrected standard errors. Panel corrected standard errors adjust for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). My continuous dependent variables are: UN vote similarity, alliance similarity, and capitalism. The Physical Integrity Rights Index and Polity2 can be viewed as ordinal variables. However, because of the large number of categories, it is appropriate to estimate them like continuous variables. Torra recommends also estimating such variables using ordinal techniques to check

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for distortions (Torra et al. 2006). I will estimate such models as if they are continuous and as if they are ordinal. Therefore, I will estimate them using panel corrected standard errors, and ologit with standard errors clustered by country[23]. I will focus on panel corrected standard errors models[24]. I will run the panel corrected standard error models with an autoregressive process (1) in order to control for time dependence (Beck 2001).

I will run models including all of the control variables described previously, and models not including the resources and mountainous terrain variables because these variables greatly limit the time period of the data. I run many models for each hypothesis because the methods literature does not provide a consensus on the most appropriate model. However, I will focus on the fully specified models using the best models noted above to analyze the results. To determine whether the hypothesis is supported I look at the coefficient and p-value of the marginal effects. When key variables in the models result in statistically significant marginal effects in the expected direction, I will have found evidence for the hypothesis. Because my key independent variables require interactions with a dichotomous independent variable, I will calculate the margin's value, standard error, and statistical significance and present these values in a margin's table. I will use these values to determine whether hypotheses are supported or not (Brambor et al. 2006). The research design is summarized in the following tables.

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[23] In these models, ologit rarely has different results than panel corrected standard errors.

[24] I will also run fixed effects models for all dependent variables, but will not focus on these results. Fixed effects models have the advantage of controlling for unit heterogeneity. However, with fixed effects I lose the ability to compare variation across countries. Also, I lose a lot of data because many of the key variables are rare occurrences and have not occurred for many countries; all of these countries are dropped under fixed effects. Furthermore, fixed effects models may suffer from omitted variable bias because geography control variables, which do not vary within states, are dropped. In addition, fixed effects models are generally inefficient (Plumper and Troeger 2011). Because fixed effects has several problems that other models do not have, I will focus on results from other models to analyze the results.

TABLE 4.1. Discipline Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Description
Hypothesis 1	Subordinate states are less likely to defy when they have recently received discipline.
Hypothesis 2	Subordinate states are less likely to defy the more the dominant state has recently disciplined in a region.
Hypothesis 3	When a dominant state recently has disciplined a subordinate, the higher the dominant state costs, the more likely that subordinate is to defy.
Hypothesis 4	When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate, the higher the dominant state's costs, the more likely subordinates in the same region as the targeted subordinate are to defy.
Hypothesis 5	When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate and fails to achieve its immediate goal, the subordinate state is more likely to defy.
Hypothesis 6	When a dominant state has recently disciplined a subordinate and fails to achieve its immediate goal, subordinate states in the same region as the targeted state are more likely to defy.
Hypothesis 7	The greater the level of dominant state benefits recently given to a subordinate state the less likely that state will defy.
Hypothesis 8	The greater the level of dominant state benefits recently given to a subordinate state the less likely subordinate states in the region will defy.

TABLE 4.2. Dependent Variable: Levels or Acts of Defiance/Compliance

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Human Rights	Physical Integrity rights Index (Cingranelli & Richards 2010)	0-8	4.88	2.39
Democracy	Polity2 (Marshall & Jaggers 2002)	-10-10	.25	7.49
Capitalism	Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al. 2011)	0-10	6.02	1.17
UNGA Voting Similarity	(Dreher and Sturm 2012)	0-1	.473	.224
Alliance Similarity	(Bennett & Stam 2000)	0-1	.304	.456

TABLE 4.3. Hypothesis 1 Independent Variable: Act of Discipline by Dominant State (10 Year Decay)

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Military intervention against subordinate	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-1	.010	.088
CIA installation of a government	(Berger et al. 2012)	0-1	.030	.148
U.S. Sanctions currently imposed	(Drury 2000 ; Morgan et al. 2006)	0-1	.175	.371
Military casualties from intervention	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0- 23,385	14.523	551.869
Military intervention failure	(Sullivan and Koch 2009)	0-1	.002	.043
Military intervention Success	(Sullivan and Koch 2009)	0-1	.002	.040
Military intervention in support of subordinate	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-1	.022	.135
CIA support of government it did not install	(Berger et al. 2012)	0-1	.085	.274
Foreign aid	(Greenbook 2012)	$0-1.26 billion	8.84e+8	4.37e+8

Notes: Above data are from the variable with a 10 year decay to zero. Above data are from the interactive variables: Maintenance X U.S. hierarchy

TABLE 4.4. Hypothesis 2 Independent Variable: Average Regional Discipline by the Dominant State (10 Year Decay)

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Military intervention against subordinate	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-.333	.010	.029
CIA installation of a government	(Berger et al. 2012)	0-.409	.023	.051
U.S. Sanctions currently imposed	(Drury 2000 ; Morgan et al. 2006)	0-1	.173	.213
Military casualties from intervention	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-1,169.25	14.451	123.133

Table 4.4 (continued).

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Military intervention failure	(Sullivan and Koch 2009)	0-.143	.002	.011
Military intervention Success	(Sullivan and Koch 2009)	0-167	.002	.011
Military intervention in support of subordinate	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-1	.015	.047
CIA support of government it did not install	(Berger et al. 2012)	0-1	.056	.131
Foreign aid	(Greenbook 2012)	$0-3.65e+9	6.67e+7	2.20e+8

Notes: Above data are from the variable with a 10 year decay to zero. Above data are from the interactive variables: Maintenance X U.S. hierarchy

4.3   Analysis

4.3.1   Introduction

In this section I analyze the results of the statistical models. First, I discuss the

relationship between direct maintenance and Compliance. Next I cover results concerning

regional maintenance and compliance. Then, I explain the results concerning the influences of

military intervention casualties, failures, and successes. Finally, I discuss several implications

from these results.

TABLE 4.5. Direct Maintenance-Compliance Relationships (Hypotheses 1 and 7)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Military Intervention X Hierarchy	0.087 (0.13)	0.044 (0.03)	-0.048 (0.24)	5.016*** (1.35)	7.711* (3.12)
Military Intervention	-0.062 (0.10)	-0.036 (0.03)	0.010 (0.20)	-4.343*** (0.98)	-2.975 (2.26)

Table 4.4 (continued)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Sanctions X Hierarchy	0.094*** (0.02)	0.014 (0.01)	0.007 (0.03)	0.271 (0.23)	-0.319 (0.42)
Sanctions	-0.133*** (0.03)	0.001 (0.01)	0.012 (0.03)	-1.211*** (0.25)	0.398 (0.34)
CIA Installation X Hierarchy	-0.292** (0.09)	-0.020 (0.04)	-0.125 (0.17)	3.598+ (2.14)	-2.299 (1.68)
CIA Installation#	0.311*** (0.09)	0.023 (0.02)	0.111 (0.17)	-3.499+ (1.86)	0.597 (1.36)
Military Intervention Support X Hierarchy	-0.051 (0.07)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.013 (0.10)	-0.018 (0.68)	0.715 (0.73)
Military Intervention Support	0.036 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.07)	-0.501 (0.56)	-1.203* (0.58)
Foreign aid X Hierarchy	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)
Foreign aid	0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
CIA Support X Hierarchy#	0.037 (0.06)	0.003 (0.03)	-0.164 (0.15)	-0.048 (0.50)	-1.439 (1.16)
CIA Support#	-0.018 (0.05)	0.027 (0.02)	0.210+ (0.12)	-0.520 (0.41)	-2.455** (0.78)
Resources	-0.001* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.003+ (0.00)	-0.031*** (0.01)	-0.021* (0.01)
Mountains	-0.000 (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	0.011 (0.01)
Coasts	-0.005 (0.02)	0.319*** (0.05)	0.300* (0.15)	-0.436+ (0.23)	2.522** (0.91)
Proximity to U.S.	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)	0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)
GDP per capita	0.043*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.506*** (0.05)	1.027*** (0.06)	1.788*** (0.28)
Capabilities	-0.281 (0.38)	1.548*** (0.36)	-1.640 (1.60)	-15.384** (4.77)	3.299 (11.40)
U.S. Hierarchy	0.040* (0.02)	0.051** (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)	-0.356* (0.18)	0.937*** (0.28)
Observations	2,040	3,455	2,413	2,287	3,438
R-squared	0.124	0.287	0.803	0.265	0.048

Notes: Results are from regressions with key independent variables decaying to zero over 10 years. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 #Coefficients and standard errors for CIA variables are from a different model that included the CIA variables with less observations.

TABLE 4.6. Direct Maintenance-Compliance Relationships Interactions' Margins

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Military Intervention X Hierarchy	.024 (.055)	.007 (.013)	-.039 (.118)	.673 (.871)	4.736* (2.134)
Military Intervention	-0.062 (0.10)	-0.036 (0.03)	0.010 (0.20)	-4.343*** (0.98)	-2.975 (2.26)
Sanctions X Hierarchy	-.039* (.024)	.015 (.009)	.018 (.030)	-.939*** (.185)	.078 (.318)
Sanctions	-0.133*** (0.03)	0.001 (0.01)	0.012 (0.03)	-1.211*** (0.25)	0.398 (0.34)
CIA Installation X Hierarchy	.0190 (.086)	.003 (.030)	-.014 (.116)	.099 (3.89)	-1.702 (1.474)
CIA Installation[#]	0.311*** (0.09)	0.023 (0.02)	0.111 (0.17)	-3.499+ (1.86)	0.597 (1.36)
Military Intervention Support X Hierarchy	-.0148 (.0358)	-.004 (.023)	-.017 (.067)	-.520 (.443)	-.488 (.694)
Military Intervention Support	0.036 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.07)	-0.501 (0.56)	-1.203* (0.58)
Foreign aid X Hierarchy	4.690e-11*** (9.04e-12)	-1.56e-11** (6.192e-12)	-1.288e-11 (1.529e-11)	-6.490e-10*** (1.366e-10)	-1.896e-10 (1.514e-10)
Foreign aid	0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
CIA Support X Hierarchy[#]	.019 (.034)	.030 (.029)	.046 (.133)	-.568* (.285)	-3.894*** (1.166)
CIA Support[#]	-0.018 (0.05)	0.027 (0.02)	0.210+ (0.12)	-0.520 (0.41)	-2.455** (0.78)

Notes *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Variable failed to run.

4.3.2   Hypothesis 1, Direct Discipline

4.3.2.1   Hypothesis 1, Direct Discipline Summary

Hypothesis 1 is very weakly supported by military interventions data, and not supported

by CIA intervention and sanctions data. The evidence shows that within hierarchy states that

have recently been the target of U.S. military interventions tend to have more democracy than states that have not.

4.3.2.2 Direct Military Interventions Hypothesis 1

Among subordinates, 1 out of 5 compliance indicators associate positively and significantly with a previous military intervention. Therefore, when looking at military interventions, hypothesis 1 receives very weak support. This suggests that on democracy, military interventions successfully influence target states to comply, but not on other issues. Among subordinates and on average controlling for other factors, a state recently targeted by a military intervention has almost 5 more points on the -10 to 10 Polity index. This difference is the same as the margin between an anocracy with a Polity score of "1" and a democracy with a score of "6". Thus, military interventions have a substantive influence on democracy. Military interventions on states not under U.S. hierarchy significantly associate with more defiance rather than compliance on 1 of 5 compliance issues. This implies that military interventions against states that do not accept U.S. hierarchy are counterproductive in producing human rights, but have no effect on other issues.

4.3.2.3 Direct CIA Installations Hypothesis

For direct CIA interventions, no forms of compliance have a significant relationship with recent CIA interventions within U.S. hierarchy. Outside of U.S. hierarchy, CIA installations associate positively and significantly with 1 of 5 compliance indicators. Thus, the CIA data does not support hypothesis 1, and U.S. CIA installations of new leaders has not had a positive impact on target state compliance. These outcomes likely result from the U.S. using the CIA to install

leaders that do not comply on many U.S. expectations in order to achieve specific foreign policy goals not captured by my compliance indicators.

4.3.2.4   Direct Sanctions Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the sanctions data. Among subordinates and non-subordinates, 2 of 5 compliance indicators associate negatively and significantly with recent direct U.S. sanctions, but none have a significantly positive relationship. The results suggest that sanctions produce less compliance in states whether they are U.S. subordinates or not[25].

4.3.2.5   Direct Discipline, Hypothesis 1 Conclusion

The results suggest that direct military discipline can increase compliance among subordinates on the issue of democracy only, but CIA interventions and sanctions do not facilitate compliance. Hypothesis 1 finds very weak support only with military interventions. Thus, the evidence does not find much support for the effectiveness of U.S. discipline on increasing compliance from the target of the discipline.

4.3.3   Hypothesis 6, Direct Benefits

4.3.3.1   Direct Benefits, Hypothesis 6 Summary

Benefits given by the United States tend to associate with less human rights and democracy in target states, and rarely associate significantly with more compliance. Thus, I do not find evidence that U.S. benefits helps influence states to comply, and hypothesis 6 does not find support. However, it may be that benefits are given to obtain narrow goals not captured by

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[25] Results from an alternative sanctions variable counting only sanctions that had an impact on the target state has similar results.

these compliance indicators. The U.S. may accept the human rights and democracy flaws of

target states who help them with specific problems--possibly, fighting terrorist or Communist

groups within the target state.

4.3.3.2   Direct Military Intervention Support, Hypothesis 6

Among subordinates, no indicators associate significantly with military interventions in

support of a government. Thus, I do not find evidence that military interventions in support of a

government influences more compliance from that government. Therefore, I do not find

evidence for hypothesis 6. Among non-subordinates, military interventions in support of a

government relates negatively and significantly with democracy, but not any other compliance

issues. The U.S. has often militarily intervened in support of a government in order to stop the

spread of Communism or to fight non-state actors such as terrorist groups and drug cartels.

Thus, these finding may result from the above mentioned priorities taking precedence over the

forms of compliance measured in the models.

4.3.3.3   Direct Cia Support, Hypothesis 6

Within hierarchy, CIA interventions in support of a government associate significantly

with more defiance from the target state on 2 of 5 compliance indicators. Thus, among

subordinates, CIA support of a government tends to associate with more defiance and hypothesis

6 is not supported. CIA interventions in support of governments tends to lead to less democracy

and human rights in those governments. On average, subordinates who recently had a CIA

intervention had an almost 4 point lower Polity score and .5 less in the 0 to 8 human rights index.

Thus, CIA interventions' effect on democracy is greater than its effect on human rights. Direct

CIA and military interventions have similar results likely for similar reasons. Direct beneficial CIA interventions may be ineffective at influencing a state, but I think they probably increase compliance only on narrow issues not captured in these models. Human rights and democracy are likely decreased because the U.S. has often intervened to fight terrorism and Communism, and the U.S. considers the human rights and democracy record of the regime it supports less important than its help in fighting Communism or terrorism. U.S. CIA interventions in support of non-subordinate governments have similar results except they only associate negatively and significantly with democracy.

4.3.3.4 Direct Foreign Aid, Hypothesis 6

Within hierarchy, foreign aid associates with more compliance in 1 out of 5 compliance indicators, and foreign aid relates significantly to more defiance in 2 of 5 indicators. These findings do not show clear evidence that foreign aid helps increase compliance. Thus, hypothesis 6 is not supported. The negative association is consistent with other forms of maintenance decreasing human rights. This suggests the U.S. does not often take maintenance actions in order to increase human rights. Among non-subordinates, foreign aid associates with more compliance on one indicator and more defiance on another.

4.3.3.5 Direct Benefits, Hypothesis 6 Conclusion

The lack of a positive link between benefits and compliance suggests that benefits given to a subordinate state by a dominant state do not convince a subordinate state to comply. However, these direct benefits could plausibly influence subordinate state compliance on narrow issues not captured by my general compliance indicators.

4.3.4 Hypothesis 2, Regional Discipline

4.3.4.1 Hypothesis 2, Regional Discipline Summary

In general, I have only found very weak evidence that U.S. discipline influences compliance among states in the same region as the state targeted. These findings suggest that neither subordinates nor non-subordinates accept the legitimacy of U.S. aggressive actions in their region. Thus, the U.S. hierarchical social contract does not include the right to interfere abrasively in the affairs of other states. If subordinates accepted stronger U.S. authority, they should comply more in respond to U.S. regional discipline.

TABLE 4.7. Regional Maintenance-Compliance Relationships (Hypothesis 8)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Military Intervention X Hierarchy	1.351 (0.95)	-0.107 (0.21)	-0.596 (1.21)	9.604+ (5.77)	-6.852 (6.47)
Military Intervention	-1.534+ (0.82)	-0.048 (0.15)	0.279 (0.88)	-5.911 (3.64)	-2.466 (4.23)
Sanctions X Hierarchy	0.011 (0.07)	0.026 (0.04)	-0.119 (0.07)	-0.456 (0.52)	-0.004 (0.91)
Sanctions	-0.139+ (0.07)	0.040 (0.03)	0.503** (0.15)	-0.573 (0.44)	2.063* (1.02)
CIA Installation X Hierarchy	3.480 (2.39)	0.619 (0.50)	-0.824 (1.14)	2.472 (9.44)	11.139 (11.09)
CIA Installation#	-2.021 (2.80)	0.189 (0.40)	0.259 (1.18)	-7.562 (8.85)	-8.033 (10.57)
Military Intervention Support X Hierarchy	0.745 (0.54)	0.112 (0.20)	0.186 (0.62)	-0.707 (2.83)	7.998 (4.97)
Military Intervention Support	-0.894+ (0.50)	-0.059 (0.14)	-0.044 (0.43)	-3.658+ (2.18)	-4.842 (4.30)
Foreign aid X Hierarchy	-0.000* (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Foreign aid	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
CIA Support X Hierarchy#	0.406 (0.25)	0.136 (0.11)	-0.229 (0.22)	-2.702 (1.69)	-3.326 (2.61)
CIA Support#	-0.402 (0.26)	-0.045 (0.09)	-1.746*** (0.31)	1.308 (1.56)	-11.148*** (2.57)

Table 4.7 (continued)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Resources	-0.001+ (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.004* (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.024* (0.01)
Mountains	0.000 (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	0.009 (0.01)
Coasts	0.043* (0.02)	0.311*** (0.05)	0.243* (0.12)	-0.240 (0.26)	2.519** (0.91)
Proximity to U.S.	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)
GDP per capita	0.042*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.509*** (0.04)	1.007*** (0.05)	1.747*** (0.28)
Capabilities	-0.581 (0.39)	1.527*** (0.34)	-2.789+ (1.53)	-23.583*** (4.71)	0.038 (11.03)
U.S. Hierarchy	0.065* (0.03)	0.060** (0.02)	0.038 (0.03)	-0.278 (0.23)	0.638+ (0.33)
Observations	2,040	3,455	2,413	2,287	3,438
Countries	140	147	109	144	147
R-squared	0.118	0.316	0.826	0.255	0.050

Notes: Results are from regressions with key independent variables decaying to zero over 10 years.   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   #Coefficients and standard errors for CIA variables are from a different model that included the CIA variables with less

TABLE 4.8. Regional Maintenance-Compliance Relationships Interactions' Margins

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Military Intervention X Hierarchy	-.184 (.601)	-.156 (.171)	-.317 (.981)	3.692 (3.717)	-9.318 (5.779)
Military Intervention	-1.534+ (0.82)	-0.048 (0.15)	0.279 (0.88)	-5.911 (3.64)	-2.466 (4.23)
Sanctions X Hierarchy	-.128 (.082)	.065 (.040)	.384** (.152)	-1.029** (.382)	2.059** (.857)
Sanctions	-0.139 (0.07)	0.040 (0.03)	0.503** (0.15)	-0.573 (0.44)	2.063* (1.02)
CIA Installation X Hierarchy[#]	1.459 (.829)	.808** (.308)	-.565 (.730)	-5.089 (4.533)	3.106 (5.563)

Table 4.8 (continued).

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
CIA Installation[#]	-2.021 (2.80)	0.189 (0.40)	0.259 (1.18)	-7.562 (8.85)	-8.033 (10.57)
Military Intervention Support X Hierarchy	-.150 (.364)	.053 (.168)	.143 (.552)	-4.365* (1.996)	3.156 (3.746)
Military Intervention Support	-0.894 (0.50)	-0.059 (0.14)	-0.044 (0.43)	-3.658 (2.18)	-4.842 (4.30)
Foreign aid X Hierarchy	-1.10e-10 (7.44e-11)	-3.79e-11* (2.18e-11)	-6.99e-11 (5.26e-11)	-3.77e-09*** (7.50e-10)	-6.14e-10 (1.03e-09)
Foreign aid	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
CIA Support X Hierarchy[#]	.004 (.270)	.091 (.093)	-1.975*** (.321)	-1.393 (.844)	-14.474*** (2.325)
CIA Support[#]	-0.402 (0.26)	-0.045 (0.09)	-1.746*** (0.31)	1.308 (1.56)	-11.148*** (2.57)

Notes *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. [#]Coefficients and standard errors for CIA variables are from a different model that included the CIA variables with less observations.

4.3.4.2   Regional Military Interventions Hypothesis 2

The average level of regional military interventions against states has no significant associations with any compliance measures. Consequently, hypothesis 2 is not supported by military intervention data. The evidence suggests that subordinates and non-subordinates do not accept U.S. authority to use violent and overt military action on other states in their region. Thus, states do not comply in response to U.S. military interventions in their region.

4.3.4.3   Regional CIA Installations Hypothesis 2

One of 5 compliance indicators positively and significantly associate with regional CIA

regime installation levels within U.S. hierarchy and no compliance indicators significantly associate with regional interventions among non-subordinates. Thus, I found very weak evidence in support of hypothesis 2. These results suggest that both subordinate and non-subordinate states do not accept the U.S.'s right to overthrow regional governments with the CIA and thus do not comply in response on any compliance issues except alliance similarity. The effect on alliance similarity is moderately weak. A region with 1/10 of the states recently having leaders changed by the CIA compared to a region with no leaders recently changed would have almost .1 more alliance similarity. This means this increase would increase alliance similarity by almost 10% the indicator's range.

4.3.4.4   Regional Sanctions Hypothesis 2

Two of 5 compliance indicators associate positively and significantly with regional sanctions among subordinates and non-subordinates. And among subordinates, one indicator also associates significantly negatively. Hence, I have found very weak evidence for hypothesis 2. States appear to respond with more compliance on issues of capitalism and democracy when the U.S. sanctions states in their region. This suggests that the U.S. can sanction one state to influence other states in the region. However, among subordinates, sanctions in a states region associates with less human rights. Sanctions' has a substantively weak relationship with capitalism , stronger with democracy, and strongest with human rights, but all of these relationships are weak.

4.3.4.5   Regional Discipline, Hypothesis 2 Conclusion

These results suggest that disciplining subordinates is not a very effective tool for

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producing regional compliance. I found no evidence that military interventions against a government associates with more compliance. And, I only found very weak evidence that CIA interventions and sanctions associate with more regional compliance. I suspect that although states accept a level of U.S. hierarchy, their hierarchy agreement with the U.S. does not include the legitimate right for the U.S. to use force in a state's region. Thus, such actions by the U.S. are not viewed as appropriate and states do not respond positively.

4.3.5   Regional Benefits, Hypothesis 8 Summary

Regional average levels of U.S. military interventions, CIA interventions, and disbursement of foreign aid in support of governments either have no association with compliance indicators or they associate negatively. Therefore, hypothesis 8 is not supported. These results may be skewed by the U.S. supporting governments in regions that are trending toward more defiance. In such regions, the U.S. gives more benefits to maintain a hold in the region or in an attempt to turn the tide of unwanted behaviors.

4.3.5.1   Regional Military Intervention Support, Hypothesis 8

With no compliance indicators does the likelihood of compliance significantly increases when regional average levels of supportive U.S. military interventions are higher, and in 1 compliance indicator the relationship is significantly negative. Therefore, hypothesis 8 finds no support. The results suggest that when the U.S. military intervenes to aid a state, other states in the region do not respond with more compliance. I suspect this results partially because the U.S. does not make a promise to intervene on behalf of other regional states who comply. Thus, the U.S. does not provide an incentive for regional states to comply when it intervenes in a state.

4.3.5.2   Regional CIA Support, Hypothesis 8

Among subordinates and non-subordinates, 2 of 5 compliance indicators associate negatively and significantly with regional CIA support. Thus, hypothesis 8 receives no support, and the evidence suggests that states tend to respond to CIA interventions in support of governments in the region with defiance. The U.S. may use the CIA to intervene in regions that are trending toward non-compliance. Hence, CIA interventions associate with more regional defiance. The negative associations among subordinates are moderately weak. A region with 1/5 of its states supported by the CIA compared to a region with no states supported by the CIA on average and controlling for other factors has almost 3 less Polity points and almost .4 less capitalism index points on its 1 to 11 scale.

4.3.5.3   Regional Foreign Aid, Hypothesis 8

Among subordinates, 2 of 5 compliance indicators associate negatively and significantly with U.S. foreign aid in a region. Thus, hypothesis 8 is not supported by the foreign aid data. The evidence suggests that subordinates do not view foreign aid benefits in their region as a strong enough action to increase the authority of a dominant state. The negative relationship may result from the regions that the U.S. tends to give foreign aid to. Military aid likely goes to volatile regions where the U.S. is focused on specific security goals not measured by my compliance indicators. And, humanitarian aid is likely given to needy populations despite the compliance levels of the states.

4.3.5.4   Regional Benefits, Hypothesis 8 Conclusion

The results do not find evidence that beneficial maintenance helps increase compliance in

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a region. Indeed, increased beneficial maintenance in the form of CIA support, military

interventions in support of a government, and foreign aid associate with more regional defiance;

rather than compliance. This may result from the U.S. giving benefits to states in regions that

tend to defy U.S. preferences.

4.3.6   Hypotheses 3-6, Costs, failure, and Success of Military Interventions

TABLE 4.9. Direct Military Interventions' Costs and Failures (Hypotheses 3 and 5)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Casualties X Hierarchy	0.115 (0.16)	0.017 (0.02)	2.595+ (1.39)	2.175 (1.62)	15.571*** (2.48)
Casualties	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.238+ (0.13)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Goal not attained X Hierarchy	–	0.293* (0.13)	–	–	1.296 (10.83)
Goal not attained	0.050 (0.19)	-0.160 (0.10)	–	-1.400 (1.93)	-5.887+ (3.36)
Goal attained X Hierarchy	0.101 (0.15)	0.020 (0.03)	2.753+ (1.51)	5.987*** (1.50)	1.687 (5.28)
Goal attained	–	–	–	–	–
U.S. Hierarchy	0.070*** (0.02)	0.045** (0.01)	0.018 (0.02)	-0.311* (0.15)	0.748** (0.25)
Military Intervention	-0.084 (0.13)	-0.009 (0.01)	-2.835+ (1.51)	-2.828** (0.99)	-1.276 (2.07)
Sanctions	-0.075*** (0.02)	0.010 (0.01)	0.015 (0.03)	-1.090*** (0.19)	0.204 (0.25)
Resources	-0.002* (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.031*** (0.01)	-0.019+ (0.01)
Mountains	-0.000 (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	0.010 (0.01)
Coasts	0.007 (0.02)	0.320*** (0.05)	0.326+ (0.18)	-0.585* (0.24)	2.489** (0.94)
Proximity to U.S.	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000+ (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)
GDP per capita	0.041*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.487*** (0.05)	1.036*** (0.06)	1.770*** (0.29)

Table 4.9 (continued)

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Capabilities	-0.440 (0.34)	1.489*** (0.37)	-1.793 (1.81)	-15.935** (4.93)	1.581 (11.57)
Constant	0.242** (0.08)	0.132 (0.08)	1.307** (0.51)	-2.666*** (0.53)	-13.721*** (3.15)
Observations	2,040	3,455	2,413	2,287	3,438
Countries	140	147	109	144	147
R-squared	0.104	0.275	0.776	0.256	0.055

Notes: Results are from regressions with key independent variables decaying to zero over 10 years. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1. –Variable failed to run.

TABLE 4.10. Direct Military Interventions' Costs and Failures Interactions' Margins

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Casualties X Hierarchy	.114 (.158)	.017 (.025)	2.833* (1.514)	2.174 (1.619)	15.567*** (2.481)
Casualties	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.238+ (0.13)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Goal not attained X Hierarchy	–	.133 (.085)	–	–	-4.591 (10.273)
Goal not attained	0.050 (0.19)	-0.160 (0.10)	–	-1.400 (1.93)	-5.887+ (3.36)
Goal attained X Hierarchy	0.101 (0.15)	0.020 (0.03)	2.753+ (1.51)	5.987*** (1.50)	1.687 (5.28)
Goal attained	–	–	–	–	–

Notes *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   –Variable failed to run.

4.3.6.1   Casualties, Hypotheses 3-4

4.3.6.1.1 Casualties Summary

The findings for direct military interventions indicate some evidence for a positive linear relationship between casualties and target state compliance. I do not find clear evidence of a relationship between regional levels of U.S. military intervention casualties and compliance. Thus, the costs of a dominant state military intervention do not often affect third party states' actions about compliance. However, states targeted by a dominant state military intervention appear to view more casualties as a sign of resolve and comply in response.

TABLE 4.11. Regional Military Interventions' Costs and Failures (Hypotheses 4 and 6)

	UNGA Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Casualties X Hierarchy	0.014*** (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	0.024 (0.06)	0.002 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.05)
Casualties	-0.009* (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	-0.026 (0.06)	-0.010 (0.04)	-0.010 (0.04)
Goal not attained X Hierarchy	0.526 (0.75)	-0.809+ (0.44)	-0.625 (1.47)	-2.113 (7.41)	-10.695 (12.05)
Goal not attained	-1.446 (1.16)	-0.315 (0.48)	-1.529 (1.66)	-14.064+ (7.82)	-13.052 (14.07)
Goal attained X Hierarchy	8.275*** (1.87)	2.222 (1.74)	-0.729 (2.41)	43.575** (16.85)	38.656 (23.98)
Goal attained	-7.777*** (2.08)	-1.703 (1.39)	–	-29.131 (17.92)	-23.766 (20.81)
U.S. Hierarchy	0.049** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.026 (0.02)	-0.469** (0.16)	0.847** (0.27)
Military Intervention	-0.692 (0.58)	-0.107 (0.11)	1.053 (1.10)	-6.541* (3.23)	-3.445 (3.88)
Sanctions	-0.115+ (0.07)	0.061* (0.03)	0.400** (0.15)	-0.789* (0.33)	2.152** (0.81)
Resources	-0.001+ (0.00)	-0.000+ (0.00)	-0.003* (0.00)	-0.027*** (0.01)	-0.025* (0.01)
Mountains	0.000 (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	0.008 (0.01)
Coasts	0.038	0.308***	0.250+	-0.442+	2.352**

	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.87)
Proximity to U.S.	-0.000+	-0.000***	0.000*	0.000+	-0.000*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP per capita	0.044***	0.053***	0.505***	1.007***	1.808***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.27)
Capabilities	-0.712*	1.502***	-2.634+	-22.945***	-0.218
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(1.56)	(4.87)	(10.65)
Constant	0.230**	0.100	1.041*	-2.494***	-14.469***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.43)	(0.49)	(3.00)

Table 4.11 (continued).

	UNGA Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Observations	2,040	3,455	2,413	2,287	3,438
Countries	140	147	109	144	147
R-squared	0.127	0.321	0.820	0.241	0.056

Notes: Results are from regressions with key independent variables decaying to zero over 10 years. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1. –Variable failed to run.

TABLE 4.12. Regional Military Interventions' Costs and Failures Interactions' Margins

	UNGA Voting Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Alliance Similarity (PCSE AR1)	Capitalism (PCSE AR1)	Physical Integrity Index (PCSE AR1)	Democracy (PCSE AR1)
Casualties X Hierarchy	.006*	.000	-.002	-.008***	-.016
	(.003)	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)	(.038)
Casualties	-0.009*	0.001***	-0.026	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Goal not attained X Hierarchy	-.920	-1.125*	-2.155	-16.177*	-23.747
	(1.114)	(.581)	(1.904)	(9.604)	(19.425)
Goal not attained	-1.446	-0.315	-1.529	-14.064+	-13.052
	(1.16)	(0.48)	(1.66)	(7.82)	(14.07)
Goal attained X Hierarchy	.498	.519	-.729	14.443*	14.889
	(1.195)	(.374)	(2.406)	(6.161)	(11.214)
Goal attained	-7.777***	-1.703	–	-29.131	-23.766
	(2.08)	(1.39)		(17.92)	(20.81)

Notes. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. –Variable failed to run.

4.3.6.1.2 Direct Casualties Hypothesis 3

The more casualties the U.S. takes in a military intervention, the more likely the target state complies in 2 of 5 compliance indicators. This is the opposite direction of the relationship expected in hypothesis 3. Instead of subordinates viewing costly interventions as a sign of dominant state weakness, subordinates appear to view increased casualties as a sign of dominant state resolve. No compliance indicators were significant among non-subordinates. This suggests that non-subordinates are not as swayed by U.S. resolve as subordinates. Subordinates may give in more easily once resolve is shown due to perceiving U.S. interventions as relatively more legitimate.

4.3.6.1.3 Regional Casualties Hypothesis 4

Regional average levels of U.S. casualties from military interventions against governments are not clearly related in one direction to compliance indicators. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported, and more U.S. casualties in military interventions appears not to consistently influence regional states' compliance decisions.

4.3.6.1.4 Casualties, Hypothesis 4 Conclusion

I do not find much evidence that third party states respond to increasing dominant state casualties from military interventions in other states. Thus, casualties do not signal dominant state weakness or resolve to other states in hierarchy. However, some of the evidence suggests that the states targeted by a military intervention view increasing dominant state casualties as a sign of resolve, and comply in response. This supports the notion that international relations and war are usefully understood in the context of bargaining. Military interventions reveal to the

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parties information on their true bargaining leverage. Increasing dominant state casualties show

dominant state resolve and thus convinces targeted subordinates to comply on some issues.

4.3.6.2 Failed Military Intervention Goal Attainment, Hypotheses 5-6

4.3.6.2.1 Failed Attainment Hypotheses 5-6 Summary

In this section, I am studying the effects of failed U.S. military interventions on state

compliance. Among subordinates, failed U.S. regional interventions in the same region

associates with less compliance. Thus, the evidence suggests that states alter their levels of

compliance in response to military intervention failures in their region. Military failures reveal

the dominant state's inability to enforce authority and/or weaker bargaining leverage.

Consequently, states defy.

4.3.6.2.2 Direct Failed Attainment Hypothesis 5

The number of failed attainments in the data are very small, so the models had trouble

running without dropping variables. For hypothesis 5, only 4 of 5 compliance indicators were

able to run, and only two of these had both terms of the interaction run. Therefore, hypothesis 5

is not satisfactorily tested. I found no evidence of significant relationships.

4.3.6.2.3 Regional Failed Attainment Hypothesis 6

Within hierarchy, 2 of 5 compliance indicators are negatively and significantly associated

with regional levels of failed U.S. military interventions. Thus, some support for hypothesis 6 is

found. Consequently, failed interventions in a subordinate's region impact subordinate's

perceptions. Subordinates see failure in their region as an indication that the dominant state is unable to punish defiers, and therefore, increase defiance. Subordinates increase their defiance moderately. In a region with 1/5 states recently experiencing a failed military intervention compared to a region where no states experienced a failed military intervention, the subordinates on average and controlling for other factors had over 20% of the alliance similarity index less alliance similarity and over 3 points less of the 9 point human rights scale. Among non-subordinates on the other hand, the coefficients fail to reach significance. This means U.S. military failure in their regions has less influence over the actions of non-subordinates. Non-subordinates may have less compliance to decrease because they do not have a hierarchical relationship with the U.S.

4.3.6.2.4 Failed Military Intervention Goal Attainment, Hypotheses 5 and 6 Conclusion

The results here show that the act of a military intervention alone does not increase compliance among regional subordinates. Indeed, failed military interventions appear to decrease compliance, rather than increase it. Thus, failed attempts at discipline are counterproductive because they lead subordinates to doubt the dominant state's ability and willingness to discipline again, and they diminish subordinates' respect for hierarchy.

4.3.6.3   Military Intervention Successful Goal Attainment

4.3.6.3.1 Attainment Summary

If military intervention failure may facilitate defiance, then success may facilitate compliance. I examine the other side of hypotheses 5-6 by analyzing the results of military intervention goal attainment, instead of failure. I find very weak evidence that target states are

more likely to comply after a successful U.S. military intervention[26]. The evidence suggests that the influence of successful U.S. military interventions is limited. The liberal hegemony of the U.S. may weaken its ability to force and pressure compliance by military interventions. Thus, forceful dominant states may maintain more effectively.

4.3.6.3.2 Attainment, Direct Intervention

For the direct military intervention models, all of the outside of hierarchy goal attainment variables dropped. Thus, the remaining within hierarchy variables actually measure the overall relationship with goal attainment in and outside of hierarchy. 1 out of 5 compliance indicators positively and significantly associates with direct military intervention success. Thus, even successful military interventions do not often produce compliance in the target state. Only human rights was significant. The impact of successful interventions on the target state's human rights index is strong. A state with a recent successful U.S. military intervention has on average and controlling for other factors an almost 6 point increase in the 9 point human rights index. This is a difference the size of 2/3s of the human rights scale. The finding may result from the U.S. occasionally taking action to stop human rights abuses.

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[26] The statement that targets states are more likely to comply after a successful military intervention is not tautological because not all forms of compliance are forced upon a target state by the U.S. military during a successful military intervention. U.S. military objectives are usually more limited. Therefore, the association represents targets states complying in response to the U.S. military intervention rather than a successful U.S. military intervention simply defined as the U.S. military successfully forcing a target state to comply to each compliance issue I measure. Furthermore, the dependent variable decays for 10 years, thus the correlation represents target states continuing to comply after a recent U.S. intervention.

4.3.6.3.3 Attainment, Regional Levels

Within hierarchy, average regional levels of successful military interventions associate positively and significantly with 1 of 4 compliance indicators. Thus, on the issue of human rights within hierarchy, higher levels of compliance are more likely when the U.S. has recently conducted a successful military intervention in the region. On average and controlling for other factors, if 1/5 of regional states have recently had a successful U.S. military intervention compared to no states having the same action taken, a state's human rights score is one-third of the way higher on the human rights scale. Thus, the strength of the relationship is moderate. The evidence very weakly supports the idea that military interventions not only affect policies of the state targeted, but of states in the region who calculate that if the dominant state successfully intervened in a neighbor, it may intervene in one's own state. Outside of U.S. hierarchy, 1 out of 4 compliance indicators associates negatively and significantly with successful military interventions. Therefore, on the issue of UNGA voting outside of hierarchy, higher levels of compliance are less likely when the U.S. has recently conducted a successful military intervention in the region. Overall, successful military interventions did not have a strong enough impact on states to obtain many statistically significant results. This implies that the regional impact of successful military interventions on compliance is weak.

4.3.6.3.4 Successful Military Intervention Goal Attainment, Conclusion

I find only very weak evidence that successful U.S. military interventions influence compliance directly or indirectly. However, within hierarchy, military goal attainment was positively related to 4 of 4 compliance indicators; just only one significantly. This suggests that U.S. successful maintenance may influence compliance, just very weakly. I suspect that

dominant states that were more willing and able to use violent force would have more effective military enforcement of compliance.

4.4   Implications

4.4.1   Maintenance Can Work, but Not Often

The results reveal that maintenance often fails to produce compliance, and only rarely does maintenance associate with compliance. Thus, maintenance can work, but not consistently. My general hypothesis that maintenance should associate with more compliance only finds weak support from the evidence examined above. The unrobust findings reveal two major implications--the weakness of authority in international relations, and the weakness of U.S. hierarchy.

4.4.2   Lack of Authority in International Relations?

If dominant states have authority, then their maintenance actions should produce compliance among subordinates. Subordinates should comply out of the expectations of reward or punishment, and out of acceptance of dominant state authority. Although I found some evidence of states complying in response to maintenance, the finding was uncommon. This suggests that authority in international relations is weak. The results show that the international world is fairly anarchic compared to hierarchical. However, the evidence does not suggest that the pure anarchy assumed by many international relations theory is correct.

The results of this chapter find evidence of weak authority and hierarchy in international relations. First, dominant state maintenance did influence states to comply some of the time. Thus, maintenance does have an impact on states' compliance levels; albeit a weak one. Second,

subordinates tended to more often significantly respond to dominant state regional maintenance than non-subordinates. This suggests a difference in relationship between subordinates and non-subordinates. Subordinates have a hierarchical relationship with a dominant state, and therefore respond more to dominant state's regional actions. The smallness of this difference reveals the weakness of hierarchy of international relations, but its existence supports international hierarchy's influence. Finally, the U.S. Hierarchy variable shows stronger support for the influence of hierarchy in international relations.

The U.S. hierarchy constituent variable has interesting implications. The variable represents the relationship of compliance with U.S. hierarchy when there is no maintenance. In other words, the variable represents the non-coercive influence of U.S. hierarchy on compliance. U.S. hierarchy often positively and significantly associates with 3 of 5 compliance variables[27]. However, U.S. hierarchy relates significantly negatively with human rights. This indicates that the U.S. either cares more about the other forms of compliance, or has more power to influence them. The broader theoretical implication of the evidence is that dominant state hierarchy influences compliance to some dominant state expectations without the use of discipline. Thus, hierarchical compliance is enforced through a mixture of coercion and non-coerced agreement. Furthermore, this finding supports the notion that dominant states have the right to command, and subordinate states follow their expectations. However, the finding may simply result from states who already prefer to follow a dominant state's expectation having a greater likelihood of joining hierarchy.

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[27] Alliance similarity is a component of the U.S. hierarchy variable, so this relationship may result from that.

4.4.3 Subordinate Resistance

Overall, subordinates are quite resistant to U.S. maintenance. Subordinates only uncommonly comply in response to U.S. maintenance actions. This shows the weakness of U.S. hierarchy. Subordinates do not respect U.S. maintenance. Indeed, the evidence suggests that subordinates sometimes do not even consider U.S. maintenance actions appropriate because subordinates at times respond to maintenance acts with more defiance, rather than compliance. Thus, the U.S. hierarchical arrangement does not strongly include the U.S. right to use force.

This finding is difficult to generalize to other hierarchies. The U.S. has a particularly liberal hierarchy. The U.S. is a democracy at home, and advocates freedom and democracy abroad. The U.S. is less repressive toward its subordinates than the Soviet Union was. Thus, I expect that dominant states that are more willing to use force against its subordinates would have more effective maintenance. Many subordinates may have only tepid fears of U.S. maintenance because the U.S. has difficulty taking abrasive actions abroad. I also expect hierarchies heavily maintained by their dominant state to weaken substantively if credible maintenance weakened. Indeed, when the Soviet Union revealed that it was no longer willing to use force in Eastern Europe, its hierarchy crumbled. Future work needs to confirm the differences between U.S. liberal hierarchy and more controlling hierarchies.

4.5   Weaknesses

One important weakness is that the hierarchy measures can also be viewed as measures of U.S. leverage over the other state. Thus, states identified as being in a hierarchical relationship with the U.S. may be more responsive to regional discipline because they are more vulnerable to U.S. discipline than other states. The U.S. leverage over states identified as subordinates may be

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so great that the states have no choice but to comply. However, the hierarchy measures are not based on factors completely outside of the subordinate's control. The four components of the hierarchy measure can all be reduced if a subordinate decides to reject U.S. hierarchy. States can choose another currency, or basket of currencies, to rely on other than the U.S. dollar. States can actively diversify their trading partners to become less dependent on the U.S.. States can diversify their alliance portfolio to become more of a neutral country rather than a U.S. aligned country. And finally, most states can expel U.S. troops from their territory if their governments are determined to do so. A failure to do these things indicates a level of acceptance of U.S. hierarchy. Furthermore, GDP per capita, capability scores, proximity to the U.S., mountainous terrain, and amount of shoreline are included as control variables, and these should control for the subordinate's ability to resist U.S. influence. Therefore, the threat of this hierarchy measure actually capturing U.S. leverage is minimal.

4.6   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have run a series of multivariate regressions on data of U.S.-other-state dyads from up to 1950 to 2010 to test hypotheses expecting positive associations between U.S. maintenance actions[28] and compliance to U.S. expectations among subordinate states. I find evidence that U.S. maintenance uncommonly increases compliance from subordinate states targeted by maintenance and subordinate states in the region of a state targeted with maintenance. In general, most forms of maintenance either have little effect on compliance or increase defiance.

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[28] e.g. military interventions, CIA influence, sanctions, and foreign aid.

The findings reveal both the weakness and influence of hierarchy and hierarchical maintenance in international relations. Dominant state maintenance can effectively increase compliance among subordinate states, but only rarely. Maintenance works not simply as a tool to coerce the target state, but also can increase compliance among subordinates in a region; however, regional maintenance also only rarely associates significantly with compliance. International relations scholars are correct to assume that international relations is more anarchic than domestic relations. A ruler of a state has a greater ability and authority to coerce its subjects into compliance than does a dominant state in international relations. However, the evidence in this chapter suggests that dominant states do have some, albeit weak, authority and power to influence compliance to their expectations with the use of maintenance.

CHAPTER 5

MAINTENANCE: DEFIANCE EMPIRICS

5.1   Introduction

In this chapter I test hypotheses expecting that recent acts of defiance will associate with more discipline by the dominant state. I only found very weak evidence that defiance elicits discipline. Regional levels of defiance more consistently relate to discipline than state defiance. I conclude that dominant states have greater concern for regional defiance than state defiance because their discipline acts aim to prevent regional discipline more than simply to punish a target state. And, the evidence suggests that dominant states do not regularly use coercive methods to control the types of defiance measured in this chapter. For the rest of this chapter I first explain the research design. Then, I discuss the regression results. And finally, I close with general conclusions.

5.2   Research Design

5.2.1   Dependent Variables: Discipline Onset

Hypothesis 9 expects more defiance to create more discipline. The dependent variable is the onset of U.S. discipline upon another state. While in the previous research design I wanted to capture the onset and decay of a disciplinary action, here, I want to predict just the onset of discipline. Thus, I do not decay the variable. I create three dependent variables for different kinds of discipline. I code *Military intervention* as "1" if the U.S. intervened militarily against the government of a state in a particular year, and "0" otherwise. The military intervention data range from 1947 to 2005 (Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008). I code *CIA Onset* as "1" on years that a CIA intervention helped overthrow a government, and

otherwise "0". The CIA data are available from 1947 to 1989 (Berger et al. 2012). I code

Sanctions a "1" for years the U.S. initiated sanctions. The sanctions data range from 1966 to

2000 (Drury 2000; Morgan et al. 2006).

5.2.2   Key Independent Variables: Defiance

I create ordinal acts of defiance indexes. I produce different types of defiance variables

(all ordinal indexes) required for different hypotheses. These variables include: *state defiance,*

average regional defiance, and interactions. I describe the construction of the defiance variables

next.

State defiance captures how many types of defiance acts occurred recently. The *state*

defiance index ranges from 0 to 6. The variable consists of defiance on the following 6

categories of defiance issues weighted equally: capitalism, democracy, human rights,

expropriations, key UNGA voting similarity, and alliance similarity. Each of these categories

adds 0 to 1 to the index. If a defiance act of a category occurred in the last three years, then that

category adds a "1" to the index, otherwise a zero. While the capitalism, democracy, key UNGA

voting, and alliance categories are unitary variables not made up of smaller constituent measures,

the human rights and expropriation categories consist of constituent measures. The human rights

category consists of three human rights indexes[29]. And, the expropriation category is made up of

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[29] To measure human rights, I utilize three variables--two from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project and the
Political Terror Scale(PTS) derived from Amnesty International's yearly country reports (Cingranelli & Richards
2010; Gibney et al. 2012; Amnesty International). The PTS is a five point index that measures the level of
repression by the government (Gibney et al. 2012; Amnesty International). It has a 2.73 mean and a 1.10 standard
deviation for all countries and all years. The first measure I use from CIRI is the Physical Integrity Rights Index
that ranges from 0 to 8 and measures the extent that governments do not use: torture, extrajudicial killing, political
imprisonment, and disappearances to achieve political goals. The mean and standard deviation are 4.82 and 2.34,
respectively. As another human rights measurement, I use CIRI's New Empowerment Rights Index that ranges from
0 to 14 and measures the extent that a government allows: freedom of movement, freedom of speech, worker's
rights, political participation, and freedom of religion (Cingranelli & Richards 2010). It has a mean of 8.39 and a
standard deviation of 4.26.

expropriations and oil nationalizations(Kobrin 1984; Minor 1994; Hajzler 2007; Guriev et al. 2009; Tomz & Wright 2010)[30]. The human rights and expropriations categories add a "1" to the index if any one or more of their constituent parts have recorded a defiance in the last three years. I use a three year window because the occurrences of defiance are fairly rare, and the U.S. may not respond immediately. There are 9 components of the index. Each of the components' data sources have been described previously, and I explain the creation of the components next.

Now, I describe how I determine if an act of defiance occurred for each component. The expropriations and nationalizations data simply indicate whether one of these acts occurred or not, so no additional procedure is necessary to determine whether an act of defiance occurred. For the rest of the components, I indicate an event of defiance occurring when the yearly change in their value decreases by a substantial amount. The U.S. tends to promote each of these factors, so the U.S. would likely consider a sudden decrease a violation of its expectations. For each component I determine what amount of decrease is substantial based on the coding of the variable and what theoretically makes sense as an important enough decrease to be considered a defiance by the United States. The goal of this procedure is to capture substantive negative change as defiance.

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[30] The United States generally opposes the expropriation of foreign property because of its advocacy for liberal economics and its citizens' interests in their foreign assets. Thus, the expropriation and nationalization of properties is a defiance of the American liberal hierarchy. To capture such events I use two measures. The first is expropriation . The data cover 1929-2004. The variable is coded "1" if an expropriation took place in a country-year; otherwise a "0" (Kobrin 1984; Minor 1994; Hajzler 2007; Tomz & Wright 2010). Expropriation includes any of the following four events described by Toms and Wright:

(1) nationalization, defined as action by a government to take ownership of a foreign firm; (2) coerced sale, in which the government threatens or takes actions that induce foreigners to sell part or all of their direct investments to the government or to domestic citizens; (3) intervention or requisition, in which the government takes control of foreign direct investments without proclaiming itself the rightful owner; or (4) renegotiation, in which the government compels direct investors to accept substantial changes in a contract or a concession (Tomz & Wright 2010).

The oil nationalization data covers 1960 to 2006 and was collected by Guriev et al. (2009). The data was coded from tables in the previously cited article. The variable receives a 1 if the government took formal ownership of foreign oil extraction assets in a country-year, and otherwise a zero. Out of 7,319 observations, 285(3.89%) expropriations occurred. In 9,304 observations, 97(1.04%) oil nationalizations took place.

The amount of decrease in the measures that indicates an act of defiance are as follows: PTS: 1 or more; New Empowerment Rights Index: 2 or more; Physical Integrity Rights Index: 2 or more; Polity2: 1 or more; Fraser Economic Freedom Index: more than .5; key UN similarity: more than .15; and alliance pattern: more than .099. These amounts of decrease are enough to indicate a noticeable change. This means a dominant state who observes states' levels on these issues, will be unlikely to not notice the change in behavior of the state. If the barrier to indicate a defiance is too low, then the indicator may capture changes that are hardly noticeable. If the barrier is too high, then the indicator will only capture rare, massive changes. The goal of the above barriers was to capture a decrease in compliance that has a substantive impact on the policies of the state making the change so that a dominant state would clearly notice the change.

A *State defiance* score above zero indicates a recent act of defiance. With a mean of .620 and a standard deviation of .799, a *State defiance* score above 1 is a high score, and a score above 2 is very high. The year Hugo Chavez took over in Venezuela, 1999, the country had a score of 3. In 1989, the year of the U.S. invasion, Panama had a score of 2. When the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, Grenada had a score of 2. Japan, Canada, and Western Europe have never had a defiance score above 1.

I create the *average regional defiance* variable to capture the general level of defiance to U.S. hierarchy in a region. I construct the components by first taking every incidence of state defiance and assigning both the year of defiance and the year afterwards a "1". Then, I linearly decay the data to zero over 10 years. Next, I average all states in a state's region for average regional components. I do this for each component of defiance separately. Then, I index the regional defiance components by averaging the different scores for the six component categories to create the *Average Regional Defiance* variable. I first average the constituents to the human

rights and expropriations components amongst themselves before averaging their category

averages into the index. I create *Average Regional X State Defiance* as interaction variables.

They are created by the product of *state defiance* and *average regional defiance*.

5.2.3   Key Independent Variables, U.S. Hierarchy Interaction

My hypotheses pertain to states already in hierarchy, however, I also expect acts of

defiance from states outside hierarchy to have a similar relationship with dominant state

discipline. I want to view this relationship among both these categories of states. Thus, I

interact my key independent variables with the dichotomous *U.S. hierarchy* variable coded a "1"

if a state is under U.S. hierarchy and a "0" otherwise. Because I am using a dichotomous

measure of hierarchy, the key interactive term will effectively tell us the relationship between

acts of defiance and discipline among subordinates. While the constituent discipline term

provides information on the same relationship among states that are not currently under U.S.

hierarchy. This allows me to ascertain the relationship among states that have a hierarchical

relationship with the U.S., and among those who do not. Specifics on the coding of the *U.S.

Hierarchy* variable are described in the previous chapter.

5.3   Method

The controls are the same as they were in hypotheses 1-8. To estimate my regressions I

use a Cox proportional hazard model with clustered standard errors (Cox 1972). I chose this

model due to the dichotomous nature of my dependent variables and to control for time

dependence. Hypotheses 9 and 10 will find support if their key independent variables are

positive and significant.

TABLE 5.1. Hypothesis 9 and 10

Hypothesis	Description
Hypothesis 9	Dominant states are more likely to discipline states who have recently defied more dominant state expectations than states that have defied less.
Hypothesis 10	The greater the level of average regional state defiance, the stronger the positive relationship between state defiance and discipline.

TABLE 5.2. Hypothesis 9 Dependent Variable: Acts of Discipline

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Military intervention against subordinate	(Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008)	0-1	.002	.039
CIA installation of a government	(Berger et al. 2012)	0-1	.005	.069
U.S. Sanctions initiated	(Drury 2000; Morgan et al. 2006)	0-1	.036	.185

Note: Above data are from the variable with a 10 year decay to zero.

TABLE 5.3. Hypothesis 9 Independent Variable: Acts of Defiance

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Acts of Defiance	Below.	0-5	.620	.799
Expropriation of foreign property (Component Indicator)	(Kobrin 1984; Minor 1994; Hajzler 2007; Tomz & Wright 2010)	0-1	.067	.249
Oil nationalizations (Component Indicator)	(Guriev et al. 2009)	0-1	.023	.151
Human Rights (Component Indicator)	Political terror scale (Gibney et al. 2012; Amnesty International)	0-1	.203	.402
	Physical Integrity rights Index (Cingranelli & Richards 2010)	0-1	.120	.325
	New Empowerment Rights Index (Cingranelli & Richards 2010)	0-1	.149	.357
Democracy (Component Indicator)	Polity2 (Marshall & Jaggers 2002)	0-1	.086	.280
Capitalism (Component Indicator)	Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al. 2011)	0-1	.086	.280

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
UNGA Voting Similarity (Component Indicator)	(Dreher and Sturm 2012)	0-1	.157	.364
Alliance Similarity (Component Indicator)	(Bennett & Stam 2000)	0-1	.004	.066

Note: Above data are from the variable where the defiance variable remains a "1" for 3 years after its occurrence.

TABLE 5.4. Hypothesis 9 Independent Variable: Average Regional Level of Acts of Defiance

Indicator	Source	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Acts of Defiance	Below.	0-.5	.130	.099
Expropriation of foreign property (Component Indicator)	(Kobrin 1984; Minor 1994; Hajzler 2007; Tomz & Wright 2010)	0-1	.111	.180
Oil nationalizations (Component Indicator)	(Guriev et al. 2009)	0-.65	.039	.089
Human Rights (Component Indicator)	Political terror scale (Gibney et al. 2012; Amnesty International)	0-1	.566	.199
	Physical Integrity rights Index (Cingranelli & Richards 2010)	0-1	.407	.217
	New Empowerment Rights Index (Cingranelli & Richards 2010)	0-1	.457	.228
Democracy (Component Indicator)	Polity2 (Marshall & Jaggers 2002)	0-1	.179	.165
Capitalism (Component Indicator)	Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al. 2011)	0-.5	.008	.034
UNGA Voting Similarity (Component Indicator)	(Dreher and Sturm 2012)	0-1	.526	.242
Alliance Similarity (Component Indicator)	(Bennett & Stam 2000)	0-.263	.010	.031

Notes: Above data are from the variable with a 10 year decay to zero. Above indicator in its region-wide form is interacted with its dyadic levels and the U.S. hierarchy variable to form the key independent variable.

TABLE 5.5. Hypothesis 9 Methods

Hypothesis	Dependent Variable	Method
Hypothesis 9 and 19	Dominant State Discipline	Cox Hazard with clustered standard

		errors

5.4   Analysis

TABLE 5.6. Defiance (Hypotheses 9 and 10)

Variables	Military Intervention (Cox Haz. Ratio)	CIA Intervention (Cox Haz. Ratio)	Sanctions Initiation (Cox Haz. Ratio)
Regional Defiance	219355.8 (1955521)	3190.524 (23036.11)	67.895+ (162.766)
State Defiance	1.646+ (.453)	.202*** (.066)	.882 (.147)
Resources	1.001 (.043)	.907 (.066)	.987 (.014)
Mountains	.997 (.021)	1.014 (.021)	1.006 (.004)
Coasts	1.535 (2.800)	1.725 (2.403)	1.199 (.397)
Proximity	1.000 (.000)	1.000+ (.000)	1.000+ (.000)
GDP per capita	1.000 (.000)	1.000* (.000)	1.000+ (.000)
Capabilities	.228 (5.579)	.000 (.000)	2.40e+10*** (9.71e+10)
U.S. Hierarchy	2.868 (4.115)	4.122+ (3.341)	2.216** (.549)
Observations	3,455	3,455	3,455
Countries	147	130	147

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

5.4.1 Hypothesis 9, State Defiance

5.4.1.1 State Defiance Summary

I find weak evidence for a positive relationship between defiance and military interventions, but not CIA interventions and economic sanctions. Therefore, hypothesis 9 only receives minor support. The U.S. apparently does not regularly respond to a state's defiance with discipline. This surprising result implies that the U.S. realizes the weakness of its maintenance ability and often does not use it. However, the result may come from the U.S. having higher priorities than the defiance indicators measured in this study. Perhaps the U.S. focuses more on combating terrorism and Communism at the expense of preferences like Capitalism, democracy, and human rights.

5.4.1.2 State Defiance Military Interventions

The U.S. is over 60% more likely to intervene in states that have recently defied than states that have not. If the defiance index moves from its minimal possible value to its highest, meaning that a state moves from no defiance to a large variety of defiance, the U.S. has a 323% greater chance to intervene in that state than a state that has not recently defied at all. This relationship is only statistically significant at the .1 level. Thus, I found some evidence that defiance leads to military interventions on the defying state. This supports hypothesis 9.

5.4.1.3 State Defiance CIA Interventions

State defiance significantly relates to a lower chance of a CIA intervention. Hence, CIA interventions data do not support hypothesis 9. A state that has defied on one issue compared to one that has not defied at all has an 80% decreased chance of being targeted by a U.S. military

intervention. And, a state that has very heavy defiance compared to no defiance is 399% less

likely to suffer a CIA intervention overthrowing their leader.

5.4.1.4   State Defiance Sanctions Initiation

I do not find evidence that state defiance relates to the initiation of sanctions because the

relationship has a -pvalue of 0.450. Thus, state defiance does not appear to increase the chance

of sanctions against that state from the dominant state.

5.4.1.5   State Defiance Conclusion

While military interventions find minor support for the hypothesis that defiance elicits

discipline, I do not find evidence that defiance induced CIA interventions or sanctions. I suspect

other U.S. priorities that are difficult to control for may create this finding. For example, the

U.S. may prioritize fighting communists or terrorists, and this process may often associate with

less compliance on some of my compliance measures. When dealing with a state fighting groups

that the U.S. does not like, the U.S. is less likely to discipline such a state and more likely to turn

a blind eye to defiance on less security based issues like human rights, democracy, and

capitalism. Thus, there is potential for omitted variable bias that creates the negative relationship

with CIA interventions and a lack of relationship with sanctions.

5.4.2   Regional Defiance

Regional defiance increases the likelihood of all three types of discipline. However, none

of the relationships achieve significance at the .05 level, and only the association with sanctions

has a p-value below .1. Thus, I have only found weak support for hypothesis 10. The great

variability of the data makes interpretation of the hazard ratios dubious. However, all of the

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hazard ratios are consistently very large. An increase in a region's defiance from no defiance, to a region where half of the states defied recently on one issue, increases the likelihood of a military intervention, CIA intervention, or economic sanction by the U.S. in the region by 10,967,790%, 159,526%, and 3,394.76%, respectively.

I suspect that with more data these hazard ratios and their standard errors would shrink. Overall, I have found stronger support for the U.S. responding to regional compliance than state defiance because the regional defiance variables generally were closer to having significantly positive relationships, and state defiance was actually significantly associated a lower chance of a CIA intervention. Thus, the evidence weakly suggests that the U.S. responds more to regional defiance than state defiance. This implies that the U.S. has greater concern about deterring regional defiance and/or increasing respect for its hierarchical authority in a region, than concern for punishing a particular state that defies.

5.5   Conclusion

The results in this chapter did not strongly support my hypotheses. The results weakly suggest that dominant states care more about keeping regional defiance low than punishing a particular state for defying. Hence, focusing on dyads when explaining disciplining behaviors is a mistake. The evidence in this chapter does not make clear whether dominant states respond to regional defiance in order to deter in anarchy, or whether dominant state actions intend to maintain hierarchy. Either way, if the weak results hold in future studies, scholars studying states' behaviors need to focus on regional motivations rather than dyadic motivations for military interventions, covert interventions, and economic sanctions.

Generally, I conclude that dominant states only uncommonly use discipline to maintain their hierarchies. In international relations, subordinate states only give dominant states a very limited amount of authority to take coercive actions. Consequently, hierarchies in international politics are weak. While most citizens accept a domestic state's right to arrest their neighbor who has committed a crime, in most situations subordinate states do not accept the dominant state's right to coerce their neighbor. Thus, dominant states do not often respond to defiance with discipline. However, the weak evidence for a relationship between defiance and discipline also may result from that the U.S. is not a very coercive dominant state. The U.S.'s lack of discipline in response to defiance may result from the nature of U.S. hierarchy.

International hierarchical relationships not only give a level of authority to dominant states, but also may include rules and expectations of how dominant states use their authority. The social contract between a dominant and subordinate state incorporates what subordinates expect of the dominant state. Social contracts in international relations, like social contracts in the domestic situation, are usually unwritten and vary. No two social contracts are exactly the same, and thus, no two hierarchical relationships are exactly the same. Therefore, the United States may have a stronger inhibition to disciplining subordinates than other dominant states. It seems that in the Soviet Union and the Roman Empire, violent discipline in response to defiance was expected and feared. However, U.S. hierarchy has a less imperial nature to it and subordinates expect some defiance to not be punished harshly.

The evidence from this chapter is consistent with the idea that in U.S. hierarchy subordinates often consider the disciplining of subordinates inappropriate. U.S. rhetoric as the defender of the free world and a defender against belligerent states would not comport with frequent acts of discipline by the U.S.. Part of subordinates' motivations for accepting U.S.

hierarchy is an expectation that the U.S. will not use costly coercion to force compliance (Ikenberry 2001). I undervalued the extent that the U.S.'s informal hierarchical agreement includes an expectation against U.S. coercion. This is a plausible reason why defiance did clearly associate with U.S. discipline. I think the extreme weakness of the support in this chapter for defiance eliciting discipline results from both the particular liberal nature of U.S. hierarchy and international hierarchies generally having limited legitimacy and ability to influence subordinates with coercion.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1   Introduction

In this dissertation I have theorized about the creation, strengthening, and maintenance of international hierarchy. Importantly, I quantitatively tested hypotheses drawn from the theories. Through the course of analyzing the processes of international hierarchy and examining data related to it, this dissertation has increased our understanding of international hierarchy and international relations. By developing a theory on why shared norms may facilitate international hierarchy and finding statistical evidence in support of the theory, we can have more confidence in the role shared norms play in creating and strengthening hierarchical relationships between states. Similarly, theorizing about, and testing, how states react to powerful states' actions, and what elicits dominant state actions, advances our understanding of the role hierarchy plays in inter-state behavior.

The findings and theories of this dissertation advance our understanding of international relations through three general themes. First, the dichotomous distinction between hierarchy and anarchy ignores the relationships of authority in international relations that approximate authority relationships in domestic states. And, exploring these hierarchical relationships explains some differences in state behaviors. Second, this dissertation has explained and demonstrated some aspects of the importance of norms in international relations. Third, states do not simply view each other as potential allies or enemies based on their geopolitical material factors. How states behave toward one another depends on how they identify each other.

This chapter continues as follows. First, I discuss each of the above themes one by one. Then, I discuss the extent to which the results reveal a liberal U.S. hierarchy are generalizable to

other dominant states. Next, I discuss the weaknesses of this work and where future work on this topic should proceed. And finally, I conclude by explaining a major impact this dissertation has on international relations theory, and what it suggests about U.S. foreign policy.

6.2   Hierarchical Authority in International Relations

In this section, I first point out two areas of international relations literature where integrating international hierarchy expands our understanding of the topic or makes important distinctions. Advancements are made by considering how authority influences the structure of the international system and state behaviors. Second, I explain how the theory and key examples support the importance of hierarchical authority. Finally, I discuss the weak statistical evidence in support of the maintenance theory.

6.2.1   Hierarchical Authority Underplayed in International Relations Literature

6.2.1.1   Anarchy in International Relations

Major paradigms of international relations scholarship (neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism) mostly assume that the international world is anarchic with little role for authoritative hierarchical relationships (Waltz 1979; Oye 1985; Stein 1990; Wendt 1992, 1999; Reus-Smit 1999; Lake 2009a). This stems from these scholars' focus on authority coming from official rules and laws derived from formal institutions like states. A monarch or president has authority because the rules of the state decree that is the role of the office they hold (Lake 2009a, 25-28). Scholars tend not to focus on authority that may result from informal control of one polity over another. International hierarchy is less formal in that it involves the extent of authority one state has over the actions of another when the authoritative legitimacy comes from

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an exchange or bargain rather than official rules. This dissertation provides argumentation and evidence for the influence of informal hierarchy in international relations.

6.2.1.2   State Behaviors in International Relations

Scholars study many state behaviors without focusing on the influence of hierarchy. Motivations behind state actions (actions such as: military interventions, intelligence agencies' interventions, sanctions, foreign aid, and compliance to the demands or expectations of powerful states) may differ depending on whether states exist in a hierarchical relationship or an anarchical one. Thus, scholars will not have a complete explanation of many state behaviors without understanding that some states take some actions in the context of hierarchy.

For example, viewing military interventions as simply interstate conflict might lead to a gap in understanding the cause of many conflicts. Some conflicts are not explained well by territorial disputes, miscalculations, rivalry, conflicting identities, opposing systems of government, a lack of shared economic connections, or other common conflict explanations in the IR conflict literature (Waltz 1964; Wendt 1994; Hensel 1999; Morrow 1999; Gartzke et al. 2001; Russet & Oneal 2001; Hensel et al. 2008). I argue that a number of conflicts, and other state behaviors, result from a dominant state wanting to display the reach of its authority by punishing a subordinate for defying a dominant state's rule or expectation.

For instance, the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989 to punish a defying subordinate. U.S. hierarchy over the country of Panama began at Panama's independence in 1903 when the U.S. utilized its navy and marines to support Panama's separation from Colombia. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty made Panama a U.S. protectorate and gave the U.S. the right to intervene militarily and build the Panama Canal (Chambers 1999). General Noriega, who became ruler of

Panama in the early 80s, cooperated with the CIA from the late 60s to the early 80s primarily against Communist influence in the region. However, relations worsened in the 80s and Noriega began defying on several issues. The 1989 invasion successfully corrected Panamanian defiance, and U.S. relations have been cooperative and hierarchical since the invasion.

The literature's explanations of the conflict do not offer a full understanding of why the invasion of Panama occurred. This conflict was not produced by a security dilemma between the two countries, and there was not a territorial dispute. Panama and the U.S. had strong economic connections, were not rivals, and conflicting identities did not appear to facilitate the conflict. Panama's lack of democracy eased the American decision to invade, but is not a complete explanation. The history of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship and of the incident itself describe a cooperative hierarchical relationship that went sour when the subordinate increased its defiance of the dominant state. Then, the dominant state exercised what it perceived as its right to invade and change the leader of the weaker state to maintain its subordination.

Authority in International Relations

I theorize about that rather than the international world consisting simply of many states competing in anarchy, realms of authoritative hierarchical power exist and influence international relations (Lake 2009). Dominant states have the authority to regulate certain subordinate state potential actions in a way that is at least as similar to the way a domestic state regulates the actions of its citizens as it is to the way a state influences another state's behavior in international anarchy. Domestic states do not simply pressure and negotiate with its citizens to behave in certain ways. Citizens recognize a level of legitimacy in the state's expectations that influences people's behavior in addition to the state's ability to punish and reward. When a government begins enforcing a law more strictly than it has before, it effectively expands its

level of authority over its citizens' behavior. Citizens may further comply with such a government partially because it has established a reputation for punishing or rewarding, but reputation is not the only mechanism convincing citizens to comply. Similarly, when states accept a hierarchical relationship with a dominant state, their decision to comply or defy takes into account the right of the dominant state to expect compliance on certain issues.

After the U.S. invasion of Panama, countries in the region and around the world had different reactions. Consistent with the statistical associations, regional countries that reject U.S. hierarchy reacted with more defiance and attempts at forms of balancing. Nicaragua and Cuba presented a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the U.S. for the invasion in an attempt at soft balancing. The resolution passed with 75 yes votes, 20 no votes, and 40 abstentions. While about as many subordinate states voted to condemn the U.S. as to not condemn the U.S., non-subordinates were much more likely to condemn the U.S. than not condemn the U.S.(United Nations). This suggests that subordinates were more likely to accept the U.S. invasion of Panama as more appropriate because they grant the U.S. a level of international authority. Furthermore, the defiant reaction of Nicaragua and Cuba shows that invading Panama did not encourage compliance through the mechanism of reputation.

The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada stands as another example of military conflict best explained as U.S. maintenance of its Caribbean hierarchy. In 1979, a relatively moderate socialist leader, Maurice Bishop, took power. Bishop failed to hold free elections, repressed political opponents, supported Soviet policy internationally, and cooperated with Cuba. These behaviors created tensions with both the Carter and Reagan administrations. The United States responded by punishing Grenada via refusing to cooperate on several issues. In 1983, Bishop was overthrown and killed by more extreme Marxist-Leninists. The United States responded

with invasion, and afterwards Grenada complied with the U.S. on issues of economic and foreign policies (Zunes 2003).

The international reaction to the invasion supports my theory. Caribbean subordinates tended to comply with U.S. anti-Soviet policy by hunting down potential left-wing threats in their countries and more closely following U.S. foreign policy. For example, Suriname ejected Cuban diplomats and closed the Cuban embassy the day following the invasion (Zunes 2003). Therefore, the invasion successfully induced compliant policy among regional subordinates. Overall, world reaction to the invasion was negative. The United Nations General Assembly condemned the invasion with a vote of 108 to 9; with 27 abstentions (United Nations). The states who chose to not condemn the U.S. invasion were more likely U.S. subordinates than states who voted for the anti-invasion resolution. Thus, subordinates generally responded less negatively than non-subordinates.

Cases of U.S. interstate conflict resulting from its role as a dominant hierarchical state exercising its authority to maintain order are not limited to the Cold War. From 1898 to 1934, the U.S. military intervened more than 30 times in the Caribbean (Smith 1996, 52-53; Lake 2006). At least some U.S. leaders clearly understood the U.S. authoritative role in hierarchy. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt declared,

> Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a generally loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power… (LaFeber 1994,247; Lake 2006)

Furthermore, the U.S. continues to take actions of maintenance in the Caribbean region after the Cold War. For example, the U.S. invaded Haiti in 1994 to over throw a military regime, and the U.S. has supported a coup against Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela (Lake 2006). The

differences in reactions between Saudi Arabia and Iran to the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq provide

another example. Both countries did not support the war. However, while Iran actively

supported elements in Iraq that attacked U.S. forces, Saudi Arabia allowed the U.S. to use

military bases to direct planes and observe war actions (Al Rasheed 2006). Iran saw the invasion

as a direct threat and wanted to discourage the U.S. from future action in its region, while Saudi

Arabia had an extent of a hierarchical relationship with the U.S. and did not fear for its security

from the U.S. as much as Iran did.

Cuba serves as an example of increased defiance in one state leading to increased U.S.

maintenance actions in other states. The U.S. feared losing another Caribbean subordinate after

Cuba became a Communist country, and this facilitated the U.S. taking aggressive measures to

ensure other states remained subordinated and free of Soviet influence. The U.S. used the CIA,

military, and economic sanctions to this end. For example, When the Dominican Republic

president, Rafael Leonidas Trujilloy Molina, opened relations with the Soviet Union in 1961, the

CIA helped assassinate him. And, when the U.S. feared left-wing leaders might take over the

country, the U.S. invaded (Lake 2010b). Lake (2010b) argues that the U.S. embargoed Cuba in

order to deter other regional states from similarly defying. Furthermore, the invasion of Grenada

was partially motivated to prevent another Cuba from emerging. Hence, the successful defiance

of Cuba led to increased maintenance aimed at influencing the behaviors of other states in the

region. Collectively, these examples suggest that one important role hierarchy plays in affecting

state behaviors in international relations is through the influence of authority.

6.2.2   Lack of Statistical Evidence for Maintenance Authority

Despite the handful of examples that seem to support the theory, the statistical results

reveal that examples like Panama are not a usual occurrence. I only found weak evidence supporting that states respond positively to U.S. maintenance and that the U.S. disciplines in response to defiance. Thus, although hierarchical authority plays a key role in some dominant state actions, the evidences shows that this is uncommon; at least for the United States.

This implies that although the U.S. may have a strong hierarchy in the Caribbean, it generally does not have the authority to take maintenance actions. If the U.S. had such authority, the statistics should show stronger relationships between U.S. maintenance and compliance. States instead have low respect U.S. authority and fail to often comply in response to U.S. maintenance actions.

Thus, dominant states have quite weak authority, and international relations has much weaker hierarchy than a domestic state. Therefore, the influence of hierarchy on state behavior appears to only occur in limited circumstances. This mitigates the influence of hierarchy in international relations. However, the weak evidence and specific examples suggest that hierarchy does exist and can influence behaviors in international relations. Thus, although hierarchy has weak effects in international relations, the effects still have some explanation power and add to our understanding of international relations and state behaviors.

6.3   Norms Matter

Another theme of this dissertation has been the importance of norms in how hierarchy works. Norms influence both the level of hierarchy between states and the behavior of states in hierarchy. I present in Chapter 2 a theory of why shared norms facilitate hierarchy and find statistical evidence of an association between shared norms and hierarchy. In chapters 4 and 5 I find only a weak connection between maintenance and compliance. This suggests that the

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United States' informal hierarchical agreement with its subordinates includes the expectation that the U.S. will not often discipline subordinates when they defy. The idea that a dominant state does not have the right to often punish its subordinates is a norm. I expect that hierarchies with a weaker norm against dominant state punishment would experience more actions of discipline by the dominant state. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the idea that a norm in U.S. hierarchies limits the amount of U.S. discipline.

The United States shows its concern of gaining normative support for its maintenance actions. In the Dominican intervention of 1965, the U.S. replaced its troops with an Inter-American Peace Force approved by the Organization of American States, and before the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, it achieved a request for intervention from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The United States took these actions in an effort to show to its subordinates that it was not abusing its power (Lake 2010b). Ikenberry (1999) and (Lake 2010a) argue that the strength and endurance of the post World War Two liberal order with the U.S. as the dominant state results from the U.S. restraining itself by the rules of institutions and multilateralism. Furthermore, as the Soviet Union fell, the U.S. tried to expand its hierarchical reach farther across the globe, and its strategy for gaining legitimacy was called, "assertive multilateralism" by Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Both the Clinton and H.W. Bush administrations created legitimacy for their international actions by gaining approval of international organizations (Lake 2006). Thus, the U.S. has often followed consultation and consent norms because such actions are expected by its subordinates. One concern with the 2003 Iraq war is that the invasion weakened U.S. hierarchy because expected restraints on U.S. power were broken.

The previously mentioned findings imply that norms play an important role in hierarchy. Indeed, the idea that one state has the legitimate right to control another is itself a normative belief. A discussion of hierarchy without including norms is missing a crucial factor in the creation and workings of hierarchy. Thus, when combined with Lake's (1996) material maximization theory of international hierarchy, the norms chapter creates a more complete picture of international hierarchy that takes into account both ideational and material predictors of hierarchical relationships. The variety of norms looked at in this study show the great diversity of hierarchical arrangements and processes that can exist based on what norms are held by the states in a relationship. Which norms matter, and when, will depend on the salience of the norms held in particular situations. Although the U.S. informal hierarchical agreements with its subordinates appears to include a strong expectation that the U.S. should not often use coercive discipline against its subordinates, I suspect many other hierarchies in history have had less of such norms. On the creation of hierarchy, I found that a variety of norms are associated with hierarchy. Shared democracy, capitalism, Christianity, and governing ideology all associate with some forms of hierarchy. However, Christianity and capitalism have particularly strong associations with hierarchy. I suspect different norms have facilitated hierarchy with other dominant states. For example, shared capitalism and Christianity clearly did not unite the Soviet Union. However, older Russian hierarchies likely were facilitated by Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Slav identity. Therefore, the findings that norms seem to play an important role in multiple facets of hierarchy implies that scholars should not undervalue norms.

The findings of Christianity's significant role in U.S. hierarchy comport with the importance of religion in historical empires. Religion tends to play such a role because religion provides a solid foundation for people's belief systems (Kinnvall 2004). Hence, religion is

salient in societies' identities and worldviews, and can affect behavior and political opinions. Religious beliefs and identities facilitate hierarchy through a number of mechanisms. Many leaders based their legitimacy on religion. For examples: Orthodox Christianity was used to justify the Byzantine Empire's and imperial Russia's authority over the Balkans; Islamic empires were supported by the idea that all Muslims should be ruled by one Islamic Caliphate; and Persian and European monarchs derived their legitimate power from gods. Religion also can create a moral community that helps expand the in-group as well as provide pro-group rules that believers have pressure to follow. Obedience to such rules can lower the costs of hierarchy. Furthermore, Sharing a common identity with people of the same religion facilitates hierarchy through the in-group mechanisms that ease hierarchy among any salient in-groups. Christianity may have especially facilitated U.S. hierarchy due to the threat from an avidly Atheist out-group -- the Soviet Union.

6.4   State Identification

Theory and evidence from this dissertation strongly support the constructivist idea that states act differently toward each other depending on how they identify one another (Wendt 1992; 1994). States do not simply make calculations based only on power and security as realists contend (Waltz 1979). States decide what type of state they are interacting with, what their relationship with that state is, and use the results of these decisions to choose how to behave toward another state and its actions. This dissertation has looked at several aspects of identification that I review below. Theory and empirical results from this dissertation support the influence normative identification has on the creation and strengthening of hierarchy. Normative values can help states classify other states. Once this identity forms, the states with

shared norms identify each other as an in-group. The in-group will also define an out-group, and normative and in-group-out-group identifications influence the level of hierarchy between states, and therefore, influence whether the states identify each other as a dominant or subordinate in hierarchy, or another state in anarchy. Furthermore, how states identify a dominant state influences the level of authority the dominant state has to take maintenance actions.

Wendt's (1992) description of two actors encountering each other for the first time applies to the development of hierarchy. When the two actors first meet, they do not automatically assume the other actor intends to threaten their survival. The actors may realize this possibility, but it does not follow from an anarchical situation to automatically assume it. How the actor's initially react to each other's first moves will help them attribute probabilistically the other's intentions and the other's nature. If their first series of interactions leads them to view each other as threats, then a zero-sum competitive situation may arise. However, if they view each other as non-threatening, or even friendly cooperators, then the actors will have less pressure to take defensive actions and may even work together for relative gains.

Now, alter Wendt's (1992) hypothetical so that one actor is more powerful than the other. We should not assume that the powerful actor will automatically use its power to coerce the weaker. The stronger actor may have a material incentive to, but the weaker actor can hope that the stronger does not have this intention. By the stronger actor's initial actions, the weaker actor can make a judgment of its intentions and character. Similar to the original story, if a series of interactions leads to the actors identifying each other as non-threatening or cooperators, a friendly relationship might develop whereby the pressures of anarchy are lessoned. Having one actor act as a leader may maximize gains from cooperation, and its leadership position will give it the authority to command some of the other actor's behaviors. Although conceivably either

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actor could become the leader, most likely the powerful actor will lead because it can use its strength to back up its authority. The two actors will continually negotiate the extent of the stronger actor's authority through regular interactions. In this story, actors' social interactions over time develop hierarchy out of anarchy through interactions. If the interactions are consistent enough, the dominant position of one actor in a hierarchical arrangement may become a fact of their social world. At this point, the actors can easily identify their relationship and act based on that relationship. This situation contrasts a world of constant anarchy because the actors have no formal hierarchical leader. This outcome of interactions between a stronger and weaker actor is only one possible outcome. Based on how those interactions play out, and on the actors' intentions, the stronger actor may destroy the weaker, may enslave the weaker, may bully the weaker, or they may simply stand off from one another. Whatever the outcome that the series of interactions lead to, the outcome will influence their future relationship and their behavior toward one another.

For the rest of this section I discuss this dissertation's support for the importance of identification in international relations and hierarchy in three areas. First I discuss identification in the creation of hierarchy. Then, I cover evidence for the role state's identifying each other plays in the nature of hierarchical relationships.

6.4.1 Identification and the Creation of Hierarchy

When states try to judge the character of another state and attempt to predict its actions and intentions, salient norms are one factor they can look at. If states observe norms and values perceived as useful for cooperation, this can facilitate cooperation. Thus, by identifying the norms of another state, states may act less cautiously and more cooperatively because they

identify a state with attractive norms. If states identify each other as states with common norms, they may see each other as similar actors with similar interests, and may see each other as belonging to an in-group, which further facilitates cooperation (Wendt 1994). Additionally, the existence of an in-group can facilitate identifying another state as an out-group, which then both incentivizes cooperation among in-groups and hinders cooperation with out-groups (Sherif 1966; Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Tajfel & billig 1974; Doise et al. 1972; Turner 1975; Marx 2002). My theory in Chapter 2 further describes why shared norms and a shared identity may facilitate cooperation and hierarchy. As well, the empirical results finding an association between shared norms and hierarchy are consistent with the idea that state cooperation in the form of hierarchy partially depends on how states identify each other based on norms. The Cold War interaction effect found with religion supports the notion that the presence of an out-group facilitates cooperation among in-groups. These arguments and this evidence suggest that constructivist ideas about shared identity and state identification apply to hierarchical cooperation.

Western Europeans and the United states identifying each other as Christian nations compared to the atheist Soviet Union may have facilitated U.S. hierarchy. Historian Diane Kirby describes the use of Christianity during the beginning of the Cold War:

> In the rhetoric of the Cold War, Christianity became a means of distinguishing between socialism and communism, of dramatizing and publicizing the Soviet regime as an evil power and the Cold   War as a Manichaean conflict and of consolidating the western alliance, the 'special relationship' in particular. The success of Christian Democratic parties throughout Western Europe in the postwar period is testimony to the effectiveness of this strategy, which contributed significantly to the intensification of the Cold War, as well as to the transformation of Christian leaders into Cold War warriors and the transmogrification of Christianity into a politicized doctrine (Kirby 2000, 412)

The availability of Christianity as a common bond among Americans and Europeans, and as a contrasting worldview compared to the Soviets, facilitated cooperation and hierarchy between the U.S. and Western Europe.

6.4.2 Identification and the Nature of Hierarchy

The Wendt (1992) story of two encountering actors explains how a series of interactions leads to two actors identifying each other's character, and not only can this facilitate a hierarchical relationship, it influences the level of coercion expected and used in such a relationship. Just as the outcome of two actors encountering each other in anarchy is not guaranteed by the anarchy, the nature of the hierarchy depends on the series of interactions between the actors. The findings in the defiance chapter suggesting that U.S. subordinates expect low rates of costly U.S. punishment implies that states' identification of each other plays a role in the nature of hierarchical relationships. Subordinates identify the U.S. as a less intrusive state and therefore accept hierarchy and expect less intrusive punishment. The arguments and evidence summarized above support the idea that how state's identify each other plays an important role in how state's behave toward one another.

6.5 Liberal U.S. Hierarchy and Generalization

The evidence suggests that U.S. hierarchy has a liberal character to it. Both shared democracy and capitalism appear to facilitate the creation and strengthening of U.S. hierarchy. And, the U.S. does not tend to respond to state defiance with discipline. Furthermore, the lack of state response to U.S. maintenance actions suggests that subordinates states do not accept the U.S. hierarchical right to enforce its hierarchy coercively. The history of the U.S. at times

leading the world in support of democracy, capitalism, and freedom would not comport well with a dominant state forcibly enforcing its expectations. States appear to join U.S. hierarchy out of a mixture of expectations of benefits from the order and stability that the U.S. provides, and out of respect and comfort in the norms that the U.S. believes in. Although there are plenty of antidotal examples of the U.S. enforcing its will upon countries by force, the statistical evidence suggests that the U.S. does not normally maintain its hierarchy in this way, and that such actions have minimal effectiveness. Subordinates accept a degree of U.S. hierarchy, but not U.S. authority to coerce often. These conclusions expand our understanding of U.S. hierarchy. However, if U.S. hierarchy has a special liberal character to it, how well can we generalize the empirics of this dissertation to other hierarchies by less liberal dominant states? Although the findings about any specific norm are not generalizable, the general finding about norms and the evidence for the weakness of maintenance have universal implications. I will first explain why we can generalize the norms findings, and then the maintenance findings.

The norms findings are generalizable for two reasons. First, previous literature focused on material factors generally explaining hierarchy (Lake 1996, 1999), and evidence of norms facilitating hierarchy suggests that in international relations shared norms also influence the creation and strength of hierarchy. Scholars have not shown or deeply theorized about this before. Thus, the explanations and evidence in this dissertation reveal an impactful type of variable in international relations. If shared norms matter for international relations in one situation, it seems reasonable that shared norms can facilitate hierarchy in other situations. The second reason why the norms findings are generalizable concerns the normative nature of other hierarchies.

While the combination of liberal democracy and capitalism may be unique norms that aid in support of U.S. hierarchy, many dominant states justified their dominance of other people on some normative account. The Soviet Union did not maintain its hierarchy by force alone. The Soviet Union claimed to represent a union of states who believed in the norms of socialism. Elements of Russia's subordinate states and their populations believed in creating equal socialist societies, and in the evilness of capitalism. Imperial Russia appealed to the Slavic identity and Orthodox Religion that Russians shared with their neighbors in the Balkans. In Middle-Ages China, Korean and Vietnamese leaders accepted and respected the superior Confucian culture of the Middle Kingdom, and this facilitated hierarchy there. Modern China tries to appeal to their culture again by building Confucian schools in South East Asia.

Some dominant states' appeals to shared norms will more effectively influence potential subordinate states than others. However, most make such appeals. The less shared norms a dominant state shares with a potential subordinate, the more unshared norms will justify dominance rather than shared norms. European colonial empires argued that they should help less civilized peoples, and Romans believed their superior culture justified their empire.

Thus, while a shared belief in Christianity, capitalism, and democracy may facilitate hierarchy with the U.S.. Shared beliefs in socialism, Orthodox Christianity, and Slav identity have influenced Russian hierarchy, and shared Confucianism have influence Chinese hierarchy. Therefore, I find it plausible that the empirics for the U.S. will hold true for other dominant states. However, the generalizability of maintenance may be more conditional based on the nature of the hierarchical norms.

The weakness of maintenance actions comports with the theoretical description of international relations as more anarchic than the domestic situation. Because of this

correspondence, it seems likely that any dominant state will have trouble maintaining hierarchy with force because states consider coercive maintenance less legitimate than citizens do in hierarchy. Hence, I think there is a level of generalizability from the maintenance findings. However, this generalizability is limited by the nature of U.S. hierarchy, and I expect maintenance to have relatively stronger effects in hierarchies led by a more aggressive dominant state.

U.S. subordinates expect the U.S. to uncommonly coerce, and when the U.S. does coerce they at most tepidly consider it legitimate. Other dominant states on the other hand, more aggressively coerce and although subordinates may not consider the use of power more legitimate, subordinates expect it as part of the nature of the hierarchy they belong to. Soviet and Roman subordinates knew and accepted that defiance would be met with strong coercion. Therefore, when the Soviet and Roman empires reminded its subordinates of its ability and willingness to use force, the likelihood of subordinates responding with compliance was greater than when the U.S. maintains.

Still, the U.S. does take maintenance actions to maintain its hierarchy, and the very weak findings for maintenance are surprising. The more forceful maintenance of other dominant states is not so much greater that scholars should ignore these very weak findings. I suspect the maintenance of other dominant states also has fairy weak effects, although probably stronger than the U.S.. And, the more unshared norms a dominant state uses versus shared norms to justify its hierarchy, the more I expect the dominant state to use maintenance.

Applying the findings to the newly rising power of Brazil shows this dissertation's implications for other states. The maintenance findings imply that maintenance actions to increase or continue hierarchy will only be effective at times. Thus, Brazil should only

cautiously use maintenance actions and be wary of possible negative reactions. However, Brazil has had success before. In 1996, Brazil and Argentina helped prevent a coup in Paraguay with threats of economic sanctions. This action coincided with cooperation from neighbors and a normative fight against the undemocratic coup in Paraguay. Therefore, this action was aided by regional agreement on the crisis based on shared norms.

Brazil has opportunities and hurdles due to norms. Brazil advocates democracy and may appeal to other states with democratic norms, similar to how the U.S. does. Latin American countries tend to split on relatively socialist government ideology and free market ideologies. Brazil seems to play to both. If Brazil can convince regional states that they have ideologically similar norms and goals, then other states may consider Brazilian hegemony more appropriate. Identity norms can also help or hurt Brazil. Brazil is a Portuguese speaking country surrounded by Spanish speaking populations. If language/cultural differences based on Portuguese versus Spanish become more salient, this will make advancing Brazilian hierarchy more difficult. However, Brazil has the common identity with its neighbors as a Latin American country. Brazil already uses shared Latin Americaness to create a sense of common identity. Brazil also seems to use the normative out-group interactive effect by resisting the un-Latin American influence of the United States. Brazil can and does also appeal to states using its identity as a south, or newly developing, country. Brazil has lots of opportunities to utilize shared norms to its advantage and to weaken its potential hierarchy with unshared norms.

6.6   Future Work/Weaknesses

Scholars have ample room to build upon this work and further explain and understand the role of dominant state maintenance in the creation and level of international hierarchy. I will

first discuss empirical short-comings, and then I will cover more general future areas of work on hierarchy.

I have made general arguments. However, my empirics only cover hierarchy of the United States since the end of World War Two. Future work will need to think of creative ways to code the hierarchies of all major powers. Without this accomplished, empirical evidence cannot strongly support general hypotheses. However, comparisons of multiple hierarchies will create complications because every hierarchy may have important differences. Scholars should use proper methods to control for differences between hierarchies.

Although I used many measures of compliance/defiance to U.S. hierarchy, their range limits the conclusions of this study. The U.S. has many types of expectations, and a few key ones are missing from this analysis. A variable representing the level of security interest the U.S. has in a particular state-year would help control for the potential of omitted variable bias resulting from the U.S. prioritizing security interests over other compliance issues. The higher security interest the U.S. has in a state may decrease the likelihood of U.S. discipline because the U.S. is satisfied as long as the other-state complies on key security issues. And, the likelihood of a defiance on compliance issues such as human rights and democracy may increase when the U.S. has a key security interest at stake in a country because the state may use U.S. resources to repress and the U.S. may support repression if the actors repressed are viewed as a threat by the U.S.. Communist and international terrorist non-state actors should be included in future work.

I have found evidence of general associations consistent with some explanations of international hierarchy. However, scholars will have more confidence that these explanations are accurate if they are supported by rich case studies illustrating propositions in this study. Case studies will help solve the problem of casual directions. I expect norms, hierarchy, maintenance,

and compliance all to have casual effects toward one another. Advanced statistical techniques may help, but detailed case studies can make clear the plausibility, and give clear examples, of causality directed in the way the hypotheses expect.

For a narrow focus and parsimony, this dissertation studies state to state hierarchy. However, the concept of hierarchy applies to the legitimate control of any actor over another. Our understanding about the hierarchical authority of non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations over states and individuals is still underdeveloped. Nongovernmental organizations in failed states and powerful intergovernmental organizations appear to have a level of sovereignty over subordinate actors that is not explained in most theories of how international relations works.

Along these lines, dominant state hierarchies are not limited to state to state hierarchy. Rather than a dominant state simply having legitimate control over the institutions of a state, it can control individuals, territory, or other assets traditionally thought to fall under the sovereignty of another state without any control over the actions of that state. The state only refers to the institutions of government. Thus, authority over people on a state's land, or of a state's territory, are not the same as authority over the state itself. The state to state focus of this study creates tension between my definition of hierarchy and what I claim falls under hierarchy. I defined hierarchy as legitimate control of the actions of another state. However, I count U.S. personnel on another states territory as examples of hierarchy. This example, and measurement, does not necessarily refer to control of one state over another, but control of territory within another state. A slightly broader focus of hierarchy may change its definition to the legitimate control of one state over the actions or sovereignty of another; whereby sovereignty refers to assets and actors traditionally controlled by a territorial state. Another example of the

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complications of hierarchy is South Ossetia. South Ossetians claim independence, Georgia claims sovereignty over South Ossetians, and Russia grants Russian citizenship and passports to South Ossetians. This case complicates the simple view of state to state hierarchy for two reasons. One, by Russia issuing citizenship and passports to South Ossetians, Russia is creating state to individual hierarchy over citizens of another state. And two, Russia is creating hierarchy not over Georgia in general, or over an issue area of Georgia policy, but over a particular territorial area that Georgia claims is theirs. U.S. military bases around the world create a similar problem. Control over another state's territory does not necessarily imply control over another state. The parsimonious state to state focus used in this dissertation does not take into account either of these complications.

Another area for future work includes studying the competition of great powers for subordinates. What strategies do dominant states use to persuade potential subordinates to cooperate with them over another power? To what extent can subordinates play dominant states off against one another? Can coercive maintenance actions be deterred by threat of subordinates defecting to another dominant state? I suspect that the more dominant states that are available for a subordinate to choose from: the greater a subordinate's bargaining power, the less dominant states will discipline, and the more benefits subordinates will receive.

Finally, this dissertation focuses on actual hierarchy, as compared to official hierarchy. Actual hierarchy is the de facto extent of legitimate control one actor has over another. While official hierarchy is the formally recognized extent of legitimate control one actor has over another. For example, all states are formally sovereign. But as studies on international hierarchy show, sovereignty is divisible and shared. How do the differences between official and actual hierarchies affect the level and maintenance of hierarchy? And how do these differences relate

with either shared norms or norms about the proper level of hierarchy? Very little theoretical and empirical work has been completed on this subject, and understanding the interplay between official and actual hierarchy may be important for understanding the structure of international relations.

6.7   Conclusion

I conclude by emphasizing major changes in how scholars and policy makers should think about international relations and U.S. foreign policy due to insights from this dissertation. First, I discuss how norms shared among two actors influence the very structure of the international system by facilitating hierarchy, and then consequently, also affect state behavior. Second, I discuss how the results and viewing international relations differently should influence U.S. foreign policy.

6.7.1   International Relations

The great importance of Lake's (1996, 2009) concept of hierarchy for how we understand the international system is that rather than the international system consisting of independent actors competing in an anarchical world, patterns of hierarchy exist across the globe. For the sake of parsimony, realists, liberals, and constructivists have assumed anarchy to add to our knowledge of international relations. However, this assumption has left our understanding of international relations incomplete. A more accurate description of world politics will not treat hierarchy as a dichotomy between international relations and domestic states. Dominant states' level of control over subordinate states is more accurately described as somewhere on a continuous hierarchy scale, rather than as a 0 on a hierarchy dichotomous scale. The

phenomenon of an international actor having an extent of authority over other international actors belongs to the same general category of phenomena as other types of hierarchies(or authority, or legitimate control). There are common mechanisms at work when a state has authority over its citizens, when a tribal leader has authority over his people, when a father has authority over his son, when a powerful state has authority over other states, when an intergovernmental organization has authority over a group of states, and when an NGO has a level of authority over people in failed states. Taking realms of international authority into account changes our understanding of the international system and expands the areas of it that we can explain. The goal of this dissertation has been to build upon this understanding.

IR scholarship has a burgeoning international norms literature (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Checkel 1997). These scholars study the creation and effects of international norms. Some works have also looked at how domestic norms affect international relations (Dixon 1994; Mousseau 2000). What about shared norms? What influences do norms held by more than one state at the same time have? I have argued, and found evidence, that shared norms facilitate international hierarchy. This means that beliefs, values, and inclinations held in common in the minds of people and leaders from different countries plays a role in shaping the structure of the international system. The constructed nature of the system goes beyond the intersubjective structures created by the interactions of international actors. Norms held at below the state level produce higher level incentives to form relationships that change the order of international society.

How this works can be described with a variant of the boxes within boxes approach (Lake & Powell 1999). People in the same society have similar experiences and socialization processes. Therefore, they tend to hold similar beliefs, desires, inclinations, and values. Thus,

they have norms, and collectively norms affect a society's behavior. Norms exercise influence on a nation's state through several mechanisms. One such influence described in this dissertation is that states are more likely to have stronger hierarchical relationships with other states sharing similar norms. These relationships then form the structure and order of the international system by creating patterns of hierarchy. Then, these patterns direct influence back down to states because states sometimes act differently toward each other depending on the level of authority in their relationship. Powerful state's international behaviors often are not actions used to negotiate or influence other actors in anarchy, but are dominant state acts of rewarding and disciplining for the purpose of maintaining hierarchical authority and subordinate state compliance. And, how weaker states view and respond to a powerful state's actions differ depending on whether the actions are viewed as authoritative or purely coercive. Thus, scholars will have a fuller explanation of both the organization of the international system and state behaviors by understanding the influence of lower level normative factors on the structure of international society.

6.7.2 U.S. Foreign Policy

In this dissertation I have made general arguments and utilized statistical tools to produce fairly general results. Applying these results and theories to the more narrow issues of foreign policies should be done with care and taking into account the peculiar variables of a particular situation. This dissertation offers general advice to U.S. foreign policy decision makers based on how norms influence hierarchy and how U.S. hierarchy has worked in the past.

The finding that norms facilitate U.S. hierarchy suggests that states can employ soft power to obtain and maintain U.S. influence in the world (Nye 1990). U.S. attempts at

persuasion should harness shared norms that the U.S. has with other countries. In particular, shared capitalist norms and Christianity may provide the greatest basis for persuasion. Shared democratic values and governing ideology may also be effective tools, but the evidence suggest they will generally have less influence. Utilizing shared Western civilization will likely have no effect. In the formative years of the Cold War, 1945-1948, the perceived socialist policies of the United Kingdom created a challenge to gaining a strong U.S. commitment to Britain and Europe. Thus, a lack of perceived shared capitalism acted as an obstacle to closer relations. However, shared Christianity and the Soviet threat were used to rally U.S. support for commitment to Europe (Kirby 2000), which led to U.S. hierarchy.

Norms in common that have a particularly strong correlation with U.S. hierarchy are those that correspond with creating an in-group to counter a threatening out-group. During the Cold War, the atheist, Communist Soviet Union created an out-group that facilitated the influence of capitalism and Christianity in strengthening U.S. hierarchy. Thus, U.S. policy should focus on utilizing shared norms that mark major differences with out-groups. The relatively weak association between democracy and hierarchy may have resulted from the Soviet Union more strongly representing atheism and Communism than dictatorship. Indeed, during the Cold War the U.S. regularly cooperated with normatively horrible dictators to counter perceived Communist influence.

If shared norms facilitate hierarchy, then this suggests that efforts to spread U.S. norms may promote future U.S. influence. U.S. rhetoric often focuses on spreading democracy, however, my results suggest that this is a mistake. Indeed, the work of Enterline and Greig show the difficulty of obtaining positive results from foreign imposed democracies (2005, 2008, 2008b). The successful examples of Japan and Germany required great effort and resources by

the imposing state, and they had the very fortunate circumstances of ethnic homogeneity, high economic development, and the successful prevention of early political violence (Enterline & Greig 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, Enterline and Greig find that while fully democratic externally imposed polities associate with less war and more prosperity in a state's region, imposed polities that only achieve weak democracy associate with more war, less democratization, and less prosperity in a region (2005). Instead, the U.S. should focus on spreading capitalist values and Christianity. The U.S. government explicitly preaching a religion probably contains downsides, but less overt methods like indirect support of missionary groups may work. The U.S. may spread shared norms with soft power or hard power. Future work should study the relative effectiveness of different policies for disseminating norms.

The power of capitalism likely resulted from it combining capitalist values and the great material incentives that capitalist states have in cooperating. Thus, the U.S. should focus on exploiting shared norms that also produce a shared material interest to increase its influence. According to the statistical evidence, other shared norms did not as strongly and robustly associate with U.S. hierarchy, and domestic and foreign actors may not view spreading a religion as appropriate. Therefore, capitalism provides the best opportunity for the U.S. to expand its ability to use soft power to increase its influence or authority.

This dissertation has shown the influence of norms and the weakness of dominant state maintenance. Both scholars and foreign policy advisers should take away that shared norms can facilitate hierarchical relationships, and states in international relations have limited authority to induce compliance with acts of maintenance.

APPENDIX

MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS

TABLE A.1. U.S. Military Interventions against States U.S. Military Interventions in Support of States

Country	Year	Country	Year
Afghanistan	1998	Bahamas	1985
Afghanistan	2001	Bolivia	1986
Cambodia	1975	Chad	1983
China	1955	China	1998
Cuba	1959	Cuba	1958
Dominican Republic	1961	Dominican Republic	1965
Grenada	1983	Egypt	1984
Haiti	1963	El Salvador	1983
Haiti	1994	Guatemala	1987
Haiti	2004	Guyana	1978
Iran	1980	Honduras	1986
Iraq	1991	Honduras	1988
Iraq	2003	India	1962
Libya	1986	Indonesia	2004
North Korea	1950	Kuwait	1990
Panama	1988	Kuwait	1994
Sudan	1998	Kuwait	1996
Vietnam	1964	Laos	1961
		Laos	1964

Liberia	1947
Pakistan	2005
Panama	1959
Panama	1989
Papua New Guinea	1998
Philippines	1951
Philippines	1989
Republic of Vietnam	1961
Republic of Vietnam	1965
Saudi Arabia	1963
Saudi Arabia	1984
Saudi Arabia	1990
South Korea	1950
Sri Lanka	2005
Taiwan	1955
Taiwan	1958
Thailand	1966
Thailand	2004
Turkey	1957
Zaire	1964
Zaire	1967
Zaire	1978

TABLE A.2. U.S. CIA Interventions Against and In Support of States
U.S. CIA Interventions Against States   U.S. CIA Interventions In Support of States

Country	Year
Bolivia	1964
Brazil	1964
Chad	1982
Chile	1964
Chile	1973
Ecuador	1963
Ghana	1966
Greece	1967
Grenada	1983
Guatemala	1954
Guyana	1966
Indonesia	1965
Iran	1953
Iraq	1963
Italy	1948
Japan	1952
Laos	1958
Lebanon	1957
Nepal	1959
Panama	1981

		Country	Years
Panama	1989		
Philippines	1947		
Republic of Vietnam	1955	Argentina	1977-1984
Syria	1949	Bahrain	1972-1990
Thailand	1969	Cambodia	1971-1972
Zaire	1960	Cambodia	1976-1977
		Colombia	1963-1964
		Cuba	1953-1960
		Dominican Republic	1948-1980
		Egypt	1954
		Egypt	1973-1990
		El Salvador	1948-1990
		Ethiopia	1948-1976
		Greece	1948-1966
		Haiti	1951-1988
		Honduras	1965-1990
		Iraq	1956-1957
		Jordan	1958-1959
		Kuwait	1962-1990
		Laos	1955 - 1959
		Liberia	1948-1990
		Nicaragua	1948-1981
		Oman	1972-1990

Panama	1948-1970
Paraguay	1955-1990
Peru	1966-1967
Qatar	1972-1990
Saudi Arabia	1948-1990
Somalia	1978-1990
South Africa	1963-1964
South Korea	1950-1990
Taiwan	1950-1990
Thailand	1954-1955
Thailand	1958-1970
United Arab Emirates	1972-1990
Uruguay	1965-1985
Zambia	1978-1979

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