SPANISH RELATIONS WITH THE APACHE NATIONS
EAST OF THE RIO GRANDE

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This dissertation is a study of the Eastern Apache nations and their struggle to survive with their culture intact against numerous enemies intent on destroying them. It is a synthesis of published secondary and primary materials, supported with archival materials, primarily from the Béxar Archives. The Apaches living on the plains have suffered from a lack of a good comprehensive study, even though they played an important role in hindering Spanish expansion in the American Southwest.

When the Spanish first encountered the Apaches they were living peacefully on the plains, although they occasionally raided nearby tribes. When the Spanish began settling in the Southwest they changed the dynamics of the region by introducing horses. The Apaches quickly adopted the animals into their culture and used them to dominate their neighbors.

Apache power declined in the eighteenth century when their Caddoan enemies acquired guns from the French, and the powerful Comanches gained access to horses and began invading northern Apache territory. Surrounded by enemies, the Apaches increasingly turned to the Spanish for aid and protection rather than trade.
The Spanish-Apache peace was fraught with problems. The Spaniards tended to lump all Apaches into one group even though, in reality, each band operated independently. Thus, when one Apache band raided a Spanish outpost, the Spanish considered the peace broken. On the other hand, since Apaches considered each Spanish settlement a distinct "band" they saw nothing wrong in making peace at one Spanish location while continuing to raid another. Eventually the Spanish encouraged other Indians tribes to launch a campaign of unrelenting war against the Apaches.

Despite devastating attacks from their enemies, the Apaches were able to survive. When the Mexican Revolution removed the Spanish from the area, the Apaches remained and still occupied portions of the plains as late as the 1870s. Despite the pressures brought to bear upon them the Apaches prevailed, retaining their freedoms longer than almost any other tribe.
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CHAPTER I

THE APACHE PEOPLE

The following description of Apache culture is by no means complete. Rather, it is an attempt to give more understanding to a people who have long been misunderstood. Compared to European culture or American culture, the Apache culture is vastly different. It is not necessarily better or worse, it is not more or less civilized, it is simply different. Therefore it is important to be aware of these differences when telling the history of these people. Many historians fall into the trap of trying to interpret a foreign culture by judging it by the standards of their own—usually seeing the foreign culture as inferior and therefore despicable. Other historians take a self-loathing attitude, seeing their own culture as objectionable, while trying to make the foreign ethnic group the perfect interpretation of life. Both of these approaches fail to recognize the fact that there is no perfect society. Every society has its strengths and weaknesses, and each one has its successes and failures. This work is an attempt to give a fair interpretation to a people who have for the most part been not only feared and hated throughout most of their history but also admired for their resistance in the face of
overwhelming odds. If, by reading this chapter, the reader is given pause to reconsider his/her original opinion of the Apaches, then the writer has accomplished his task.

The Apaches are perhaps the most recognizable tribe of Native American Indians. John R. Swanton suggests that this is because of (1) their warlike character; (2) their constant depredations along the Spanish, Mexican, and American frontiers; and (3) the difficulty of forcing them to give up their life style and accept reservation life.¹ In any case their notoriety has attracted the attention of scholars and non-scholars alike. Multitudes of works have been written concerning the Apaches, but the vast majority focuses on the American period, especially the exploits of such great Apache leaders as Victorio, Cochise, and Geronimo. These works also concentrate on the western Apache at the expense of slighting those to the east.

On the other hand, the eastern Apaches of the prairies and plains have been virtually ignored by comparison. This neglect is strange considering the importance of these natives on the history of the Southwest. The Apaches of the plains are one of the major reasons that the Spanish Empire, and later the Mexican Empire, did not extend farther than they did. Still later their alliance with the Anglo-Americans moving into Texas proved to be invaluable in the Texan's struggle for independence and later statehood. It seems,
that despite their importance, only one book deals exclusively with the so-called plains Apaches, and it leaves much to be desired.²

The present work is an attempt to rectify that neglect. The term "plains Apaches" is perhaps a misnomer, for none of the Apaches lived a true plains Indian life style, with the possible exception of the Kiowa-Apaches. The Apaches are members of the Athapaskan linguistic group, which is one of the larger language groups with speakers residing from Alaska and Canada in the north to the southwestern United States and northern Mexico to the south. The Apaches, along with the Navajos, who are almost always considered a distinct tribe, make up the southern division of the Athapaskan family.

The Apache proper consists of six divisions: the Western (San Carlos) Apaches, the Chiricahua Apaches, the Mescalero Apaches, the Jicarilla Apaches, the Lipan Apaches, and the Kiowa Apaches. Harry Hoijer divides the southern Athapaskans into eastern and western groups based upon linguistic differences. The western group consists of the Navajos and the San Carlos-Chiricahua-Mescalero, while the Eastern Group consists of the Jicarilla-Lipan and Kiowa Apache—with the Jicarillas and Lipans having more in common with each other than with the Kiowa Apaches.³ Most other
scholars have accepted this division on linguistic as well as cultural differences.

This study will concentrate on the Apaches of the plains and its periphery. In this context, the term plains Apaches refers to those Indians who spent at least part of their annual migratory pattern on the plains. Therefore, the Lipans, Jicarillas, and Mescaleros will play major roles. The Kiowa Apaches will be excluded because of their remoteness from other Apache groups, as will the Western Apaches and the Chiricahuas, who had virtually no contact with the plains. During the height of their expansion the plains Apaches inhabited the plains regions including parts of eastern New Mexico and Colorado, western Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.

In historic times the Lipan Apaches roamed the area from the upper Nueces and Medina Rivers to the upper Red and Colorado Rivers. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, they had been forced south by their nemesis, the Comanches, and were ranging on both sides of the Rio Grande. At this time they had to be satisfied with marginal lands along the Great River and extended southward into Coahuila and Chihuahua, although portions of the tribe continued to camp in the vicinity of the Nueces and Guadalupe Rivers.¹

The Jicarillas occupied the mountainous region of southern Colorado and northeast New Mexico. They ranged into
the plains of western Kansas and Oklahoma and into northwest Texas.\(^5\) They generally camped between modern Albuquerque, Chama, and Colorado Springs on the west to western Texas and Oklahoma in the east. According to their legends, the Creator gave them the lands bounded by their sacred Rivers: the Arkansas, the Canadian, the Rio Grande, and the Pecos.\(^6\)

The Mescaleros operated in an area bounded by the Hondo River in the east, to Santa Fe in the north, to the Rio Grande in the west, and to Coahuila and Chihuahua in the south. Their favorite haunts were the Sacramento, Guadalupe, and San Andreas Mountain ranges. They also inhabited the Sierra Blanca and Davis Mountains. They, like all Apaches, were mountain people who were never completely comfortable on the plains. They usually wintered on the Rio Grande or further south and traveled out to the buffalo plains in the summer, sometimes as far as the Texas Panhandle.\(^7\)

A major problem in dealing with the Apache Indians is the confusion of names given them. These Indians, of course, had no written language and so almost all information that concerns them was related by Europeans or Americans, who were more often than not their enemies. Even the name "Apache" was not their own. In fact, the French used the word to apply to the worst of robbers and assassins.\(^8\)

The name "Apache" was first used by Juan de Oñate, colonizer of New Mexico, in 1598. Frederick Hodge suggests
that the term originated from "ápachu," the Zuñi word for "enemy." This is the most commonly accepted interpretation—perhaps for no other reason than that it seems to be most fitting, for throughout the historic period, the Apaches seemed to have been surrounded by enemies. Another widely accepted theory is that the term came from the Yuman-speaking Yavapais word, "e-patch," meaning "men that fight" or "fighting men." The Yavapais also supply several other potential sources. Their word for "people" is variously written as "Apátieh," "Axwáatca," and "Apádje."

There are several problems, however, with each of these theories. When Oñate first used the word, he had not yet encountered the Zuñi or the Yavapais. In addition, the accent on the Zuñi word is different. Of course, if the Zuñi "ápachu" were the origin, the Spanish might have corrupted it to conform to their own pattern. Several scholars have suggested that "Awá'tche," the Ute name for Apache, might be a more likely source. While the Spanish had probably not yet encountered the Ute either, the Pueblos living in the area undoubtedly had. They might well have transferred the name to the Spanish.

In any case, the Apache called themselves N'de, or "the people." James L. Haley suggests that Tin-ne-áh is more generically correct. Other versions include Diné, Tinde,
The variance is due mostly to Spanish and other recorders, as well as modern linguists making different interpretations of the name, but also to slight variances of the name within different Apache groups.

Of the numerous names bestowed upon various Apache groups, only Jicarilla, Lipan, and Mescalero for Apaches treated in this work have survived to the present. John Upton Terrell identifies twenty-two names for plains Apache groups. Almost all of the names were given to them by the Spanish and are either corruptions of Athapaskan words, Spanish idioms, or reflections of some Apache characteristic or custom. Spanish documents are also notorious for containing inconsistent spellings, adding to the difficulty in identifying Apache tribes.

The Jicarillas, Lipans, and Mescaleros had little contact with each other but recognized each other as members of the same greater family. They were not always friendly toward each other but rarely had lasting enmity. Most of their struggles were localized and concerned hunting rights or other territorial disputes. It is vitally important to remember that there was no overall chief of the Apaches. Indeed, there was not even an overall leader for any of the separate tribes.

Each of the tribes was nominally divided into bands, which in turn were divided into the most important unit
among the Apache Indians, the local group. A local group consisted of a chief and his followers. The group's membership was fluid. Members could join or desert at will, resulting in a continual but gradual redistribution of the population.\textsuperscript{16}

In general, chiefs were chosen for their wisdom and courage. Depending on the size of the group, there might be several lesser chiefs. The Lipans often had a war chief and a civil chief, with the latter having the greater power.\textsuperscript{17} Chiefs settled disputes, directed hunting, farming, raiding, warfare, medicine dances, and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this wide range of duties and the respect and importance imparted upon the chief, his role was that of an esteemed advisor rather than one who exercised arbitrary authority. In fact, the chief had no coercive power at all. His continued leadership depended upon the success of his policies and his ability to persuade others. In fact, one of the most important functions of the chief was to reconcile differences of opinion and bring all divergent elements of the group in line with the most popular view. Unresolved disputes weakened his position as chief and endangered the survival of the group. Those who strongly opposed the consensus might split from the group, choose a new leader, and form their own local group, thus leaving both parties in a weakened position.\textsuperscript{19}
The office of chief was not hereditary, but a worthy son might have an advantage over other aspirants simply because he had an excellent model before him, had the advantage of superior training, and might have had access to important inside information. Contact with Europeans and their emphasis on hereditary succession tended to strengthen family descent to the office. Europeans naturally came to look upon the son of a deceased chief as the new leader, regardless of his actual qualifications for the position, or his support within the tribe. Europeans also inflated the importance of the office by holding the chief responsible for the actions of his group and demanding that he deliver accused tribesmen for trial under white laws. Furthermore, Europeans bestowed financial and symbolic favors on chiefs who best conformed to the desires of the white man and thereby artificially increased a chosen leader's influence and prestige within his tribe.20

It is imperative to note that the difference between Apache and European government was a major source of conflict between the two groups. When Europeans negotiated an agreement with a chief, they expected it to be binding on all natives of the leader's tribe. From the native's point of view, the agreement had no effect on Apaches outside the chief's local group and even within the group it only bound those individuals who agreed with and supported the chief's
decision. Dissenters were discouraged from raiding the Europeans but the chief had no authority to stop them.

On the other hand, after making an agreement, the Indians considered it to apply to the European "local group" as it did in their system. Therefore, Apache local groups who established a peace with the Spanish at one settlement would have no problem in raiding or attacking Spaniards elsewhere, considering them beyond the range of the treaty. The Spanish would retaliate, sometimes from the locale where the treaty had originated, and cause the Apaches to claim that the Spanish had broken the peace, never realizing that the latter considered it broken when the Indians attacked their outpost. Both sides claimed to be the victim and accused the other of perfidity, when in actuality it was a simple misunderstanding of each other's governmental system.

Local groups varied in size from 40 to 250 individuals. Size was determined by the popularity of the leader of the group, as well as by the ability of the group to live off the resources of their territory. If the group grew too large, they would deplete the resources of their range and be unable to survive. Smaller groups, however, might not be able to defend themselves effectively. When threatened or planning a buffalo hunt, several groups would gather and usually choose a temporary principal chief from their combined leadership pool.21
Each local group was made up of a number of families. An Apache family can be described as a matrilocal extended family consisting of parents, unmarried sons, married daughters and their husbands and children. This entire unit did not live in the same structure. Each nuclear family generally had its own dwelling but lived in a cluster near each other. When a man and woman married, the male went to live with his wife's family. From this point on he was expected to provide for his wife's extended family.

Children were greatly prized among the Apaches. Pregnant women, likewise, received special treatment but were not pampered. They were expected to continue with their chores. However, they were not required to perform strenuous activities. At the time of birth, the husband would leave camp so that the woman's mother might attend her daughter. Other female relatives or friends might also assist. A skilled midwife likewise attended.

After the birth, the midwife washed the baby with lukewarm water. Sometimes the midwife would rub the baby with a mixture of red ochre and grease before wrapping it in a soft blanket. The baby was then held up to the four cardinal directions and shown the sun. Among the Jicarilla, the baby was washed in water from at least two of their sacred rivers. A few days later the father would name the infant after some natural object. Twins were considered a
sign of spiritual disharmony and one was usually killed instantly. If both a boy and a girl were born, the male was spared.\textsuperscript{23}

Babies were taught at an early age to be silent, because of the danger their crying might pose to the camp when an enemy was near. If a baby sought attention by crying, it was taken from the camp, strung from a bush in its cradleboard and ignored until it became quiet. On some occasions, Apaches were known to kill crying babies or even those known to be prone to tantrums when the safety of the band was at risk.\textsuperscript{24}

At six or seven months the baby was allowed to wander through camp on its own. All adults would help keep the child from harmful items such as fires, scorpions, or snakes. Disobedient children were doused with water but rarely struck. Alonso de Benavides, religious custodian of New Mexico, noted that the Apache taught and chastised their children, unlike the other natives he had contacted. Perhaps as a result of this, he noted that the children had great respect for and were obedient to their elders. The children were encouraged to roll naked in the snow, expose themselves to the sun and certain other dangers in order to make them hardy.\textsuperscript{25}

As the children matured they would be taught the various skills necessary to performing the tasks of their
respective sex. Boys were taught to hunt and the skills essential to becoming a successful warrior. Girls were taught to set up dwellings, prepare meals, and tan skins. They were considered fit for marriage after reaching puberty. Boys were considered marriageable after returning from a successful raid or war party, usually at the age of eighteen.

The Apaches had a universal fear of death and the dead. When a person died, their ghost was released and could do great harm to the living unless it immediately departed to the afterworld and stayed there. Most Apache burial customs were meant to encourage the ghost to accept its fate and leave the land of the living. The name of the deceased was never mentioned aloud and the camp where the death had occurred was moved. This relocation was generally more symbolic than substantial.  

If the death occurred away from camp or on the warpath, the body was generally left in a cave, thicket, or hole in the ground. The fear of the dead extended beyond members of a particular tribe. After a battle in enemy territory, Apaches often desired to purify the region. Each man in the war party would burn some of the hairs from the head of a slain enemy. They believed that this action would drive the spirits of the slain away from the area. If the Apaches failed to secure a scalp after killing an enemy in Comanche
lands, they often refused to return to the area for fear of vengeful Comanche ghosts.\(^27\)

The physical appearance of the Apaches varied. Sometimes they were described as tall, straight, and robust, while other scholars have said they were seldom large or heavy, being slightly shorter than the average white man. Ales Hrdlicka, a late nineteenth-century researcher, took measurements of reservation Apaches and determined that Apache men averaged 5' 6" and women averaged 5'. Despite the differences regarding the size of the Apaches, almost all agree that they were hardy, robust and athletic, with good lung capacity, as well as wiry, evenly proportioned limbs that were strong but not musclebound. Francisco Coronado, in a letter to the king, said that the Apache had "the best physique of any I have seen in the Indies." They had broad, round, rather flat faces with dark eyes and a complexion that ran from light tan to rich chocolate.\(^28\)

In summer men wore only a breechclout wrapped around the waist, dropping as low as the knees in front and falling to the ankles in back. The Jicarillas were particularly fond of antelope skin chamois, which they fit around their bodies, leaving their arms free. The men sometimes wore buckskin leggings, and moccasins rounded out the outfit. Apache moccasins were actually more like boots, reaching nearly to the knees. They were made of dressed buckskin,
which had several folds that could be brought up to protect the thigh. When folded down, the folds could be used to hold small implements and trinkets. The soles were made of thick undressed hide with the fur side out. The Comanche often called the Apache "Tá-ashi," meaning "turned up," referring to the toes of their moccasins.²⁹

In cooler weather Apache men wore a long-sleeved deerskin shirt or jacket. Jackets had a heavy fringe of buckskin strings around the shoulders, longer sleeves, and neck hole decorated with elaborate beading. In cold weather, a bison or mountain lion skin was draped about the body like a robe. In later times, a wool blanket replaced animal skins.³⁰

Women wore a two-piece outfit made of deer, elk, or antelope skin. A short skirt was tied at the waist and left loose at the knees. A shirt or jumper was worn over the head. It was made of a full-grown doe skin, dressed until it was as pliant as cloth, with the hair left on the tail and the dew claws on the legs. The women cut a hole in the center for their head and wore it with the tail behind. In later times women beaded their dresses elaborately, and they sometimes had a fringe of tin jingles on it.³¹

A division of labor existed among the Apache along sexual lines but was not rigidly drawn. In general, both men and women shared in garnering food and maintaining the
family. Women generally gathered the wild foods that were available and preserved and stored surplus food. They fleshed, tanned, and sewed skins into clothes or other items. Women were responsible for setting up the dwelling, gathering firewood and water, preparing meals, and making any household utensils they might require.

Men spent much of their time hunting. They were also responsible for protecting the camp, which might mean long hours of keeping vigil, especially when an enemy was believed to be near. They protected and cared for the horses and raided for more animals when necessary. If the group suffered casualties at the hands of the enemy, it was the man's responsibility to initiate or join a war party to exact revenge. Like the women, men were responsible for making any tools or instruments needed in pursuit of their duties. They made arrows, bows, flint knives, and rope from braided strands of rawhide, twisted buffalo hair, or horsehair.

The Lipans, Mescaleros, and Jicarillas all hunted buffalo and used it as a major source of food and materials. Early Spanish explorers noted the almost total dependence of the early Apaches of the plains, the Querechos and Vaqueros in particular, on the buffalo.

In truth, buffalo did supply the natives with a wealth of material. The skin provided a covering for their shelter,
as well as material for clothing, bedding, capes, and blankets. The meat, liver, tongue, and other edibles supplied a food source. The stomach, bladder, and other internal organs were cleaned out and acted as containers. For example, a buffalo stomach, cleaned out, filled with water, and tied off on both ends made a serviceable canteen. The intestines were used in the fashion of sausage skins. Cleaned, the native stuffed it with buffalo meat and some herbs and made pemmican, which could be easily carried by travelers.

Apaches also utilized other parts of the animal. Hooves could be ground into powder to make glue. Buffalo blood was often drunk when the kill was fresh, but some of it was collected and stored. When it dried and became powdery it could by ground and moistened to create a paint-like substance. The brains of the animal were used as a lubricant in the tanning process. Sinew and tendons were used for sewing and making bow strings. Bones served as tools, ranging from clubs, axes, and picks, to needles and eating utensils. Buffalo teeth were often strung into necklaces or other decorative items. Finally, with no wood on the plains, dry buffalo dung made an effective fuel. For the plains Apaches, the buffalo was a galloping department store that could supply virtually all of their needs.
In pre-horse days, the Apache would follow the buffalo herds, camping among them but away from the feeding animals, causing little commotion. Hunters would approach bison watering holes and smear their faces and bodies with mud. They would then hide, stretched out in the deep trails made by the bison or in brush shelters they constructed. The natives shot the animals with arrows as they passed. As the herd moved off, the hunters would try to wound one or more of the animals in the rear, without alarming the rest of the herd. If the herd stampeded, they would try to gather any dead or crippled animals left behind.\textsuperscript{32}

The surround was another common method of hunting buffalo. A band of natives would encircle a small bunch and approach from all sides while yelling savagely, killing as many of the confused animals as possible with arrows and lances. If the grass was dry, the Apache might set fire to it in a circle around the buffalo to hinder their escape. Unfortunately, this method often resulted in singeing the buffalo hides, thereby rendering them useless for conversion into robes, but it left the meat intact.\textsuperscript{33}

Once the Apaches acquired horses, hunting buffalo became much simpler. It also became more widespread. The Lipans who had always lived on the plains had easy access to buffalo herds. The Jicarillas and Mescaleros, however, who lived on the edge of the plains and in the mountains
bordering the plains, had more difficulty in gaining access to the animals. Once these tribes acquired the horse, however, they could easily reach herds for the annual buffalo hunt.

Other large game animal included deer, elk, antelope, and, in the mountainous regions, mountain sheep. The deer and antelope were sought more for their skins than for food. Apaches also hunted smaller animals such as beaver, rabbit, squirrel, chipmunk, porcupine, prairie dog, ringtail, opossum, wood rat, and peccary. Horses, mules, burros, and wild steer became food sources in post-European times.34

The Apaches differed on the consumption of fowl. The Jicarillas ate turkeys, doves, grouse, quail, and snow-birds. Some Mescaleros ate turkey, quail, and dove, but others disdained them; the Lipans ate wild turkey but refrained from consuming most other birds, especially water fowl.35

While men were primarily responsible for hunting, women were relied upon for gathering wild berries, fruits, and edible plants. Agave (mescal) was plentiful within the territory of the Mescalero and was such an important article in their culture that the term "Mescalero" came to mean "gatherer (or eater) of mescal." Sotol had smaller crowns than Mescal but was also collected. In a special process, mescal and sotol could be baked into thin sheets to make
"bread." The sheets were pulverized in wooden bowls or depressions in rocks, water was then added to make dough, and the mixture was then cooked in the ashes around a fire. Sometimes the mescal and sotol were stored in parfleches for later use, or placed in caves or caches for emergencies or times of scarcity.36

Almost all of the Apaches farmed to some degree. The Jicarillas cultivated a variety of crops, sometimes using irrigation to aid in growing squash, beans, pumpkins, cantaloupes, peas, wheat, tobacco, and maize. The most extensive agriculture occurred on the upper Arkansas and its tributaries. Corn, the most important crop, was stacked in rows and dried, and then a sufficient supply for winter food and spring seed corn was buried before the Jicarillas set out for the plains to hunt buffalo and other plains animals.37

The Mescaleros and Lipans had little interest in farming and it was completely subordinated to hunting and gathering. Minimal care was given to the crops. The worst of the weeds might be removed and thorny bushes might be laid around the periphery to keep out animals. An irrigation ditch might be dug if it could be done with minimal effort. Often, the natives would break camp after planting and return when they suspected the crop was near maturity to harvest any that survived.38
When the Spanish first encountered southern Athapaskans, they noted no farming. They did observe substantial trade between Apaches and Pueblos. The Apaches brought buffalo, deer, and antelope skins as their main trade articles. Meat, fat, and tallow, were also brought to trade, and the Jicarillas manufactured ollas, a species of crude potteryware, and jicaras, a round basket, to trade. In later times, captives from other tribes, horses, and mules became trade commodities. In exchange, the Pueblos supplied corn, squash, cotton cloth, and blankets. After the arrival of the Spanish, European items assumed a prominent part of the trade as the Apaches bartered for knives, hoes, wedges, picks, bridles, hats, beads, and other trifles. The Apaches also discovered that the Spanish would trade for native captives the Apaches had taken from other tribes, which undoubtedly increased the aggressiveness of the Apaches.\textsuperscript{39}

As long as the Apaches traded with the Pueblos, they had little need to grow their own crops. With the arrival of the Spanish, who used much of the excess crops grown by the Pueblos, and at times, captured visiting Apaches and sold them into slavery, the Apaches seem to have become more interested in agriculture. In addition, as the Comanches pressured the Lipans and Mescaleros southward, away from easy access to the Pueblos, it seems logical that they would have more interest in planting, although, as seen above,
agriculture was always expendable, and the crops might be left behind with little sorrow.

The acquisition of horses apparently strengthened the use of agriculture among the Apaches. Because they were among the first tribes to obtain the horse, they quickly became dominant on the plains. This dominance gave them the security to combine agriculture and hunting into an annual cycle. Once the Comanches began to pressure the Apaches from the north, however, the agricultural portion of the cycle became a danger to the Apaches. Because of the seasonal and sedentary nature of agriculture, the Comanche knew where to attack the Apaches at their rancherías and then escape into the plains. As the Apaches began losing control of the plains, their attachment to farming, limited as it was, provided a weakness to be exploited by the Comanches and other enemies.\textsuperscript{40}

There is much debate among historians concerning, where, how, and when, the American Indians first acquired the horse. Generally, it is agreed that the Apache were among the first to acquire the animal. It is unlikely that strays from Coronado or De Soto's expeditions supplied the first horses, as many early historians argued.\textsuperscript{41} It is also unlikely that the natives possessed horses prior to 1600, at least not in numbers large enough to have had any effect. Only after the Spanish established themselves in New Mexico,
at Santa Fe in particular, did the natives in the area have easy access to horses. They could also observe the use and advantages offered by the horse, and eventually learn to control the animal. At some point between 1600 and 1650, the Apaches adopted the horse into their culture. By 1650 they were using the horse in raids. Donald E. Worcester estimates that the Apaches were using the horse no later than 1620 or 1630.\textsuperscript{42} By this time, the Spanish were no longer able to keep these animals from the natives. Large herds of wild horses, known as "cimarrones," roamed the vast area of northern Mexico.\textsuperscript{43}

When the Apaches first encountered horses, they were most likely seen as simply another food source. Their next logical use would have been to use horses as beasts of burden, replacing dogs. Horses would have allowed the nomads to accumulate more wealth, by allowing them to carry more baggage when they moved. Finally, the natives would learn to ride their new horses and eventually use them to their advantage in raids and warfare.

Because they were among the first natives to acquire the horse, the Apaches quickly dominated their neighbors. The horse dramatically increased their ability to acquire wealth. The natives continued to subsist primarily off buffalo, but with horses, they were able to make larger kills and travel greater distances in search of them. Horses
allowed the natives to transport a greater amount of the kill to camp. In addition, mounted Apaches could attack the sedentary Pueblos quickly and more efficiently than they had on foot. The horse likewise allowed them to carry off more plunder and escape into the plains before the Pueblos could mount an effective resistance.

The horse not only became one of the main targets of raids but eventually became an important trade item. The advantage of stealing horses was that they could be driven off by the raiders. The Apache in New Mexico quickly discovered that they could steal horses from the Spanish and then return later to trade the horses for corn, metal goods, and other items that were more difficult to steal in a raid.44

The Apaches lost their dominance across the southern plains when horses spread beyond their control and other tribes acquired them. A major reason for this turnaround was the fact that the Apaches never completely became horse Indians. First, and probably most important, the Apaches never learned, or at least never took the time, to breed horses. Because of their proximity to an almost endless source of horses, they preferred to steal them, trade for them, or capture wild horses rather than raising their own. One French explorer noted in 1724 that the mares had
miscarriages, because the Apaches rode them constantly on raids or when hunting.\textsuperscript{45}

A second reason for the decline of Apache power was the fact that for the most part they were always more comfortable on foot than on horseback. After all, as mentioned earlier, the Apaches were essentially a mountain people. When hard pressed by a determined foe in battle, the Apaches often released their stock and fled to the mountains or to rugged terrain to continue the fight. Normally, plains Indians afoot were virtually helpless. The Apaches, on the other hand, often became more effective.\textsuperscript{46} The Jicarillas and Mescaleros both had strongholds in their home range. The Lipans, who were more completely adapted to plains lifestyle, were less apt to go afoot, but in later times, when driven from the plains to the hilly country around San Antonio and later to the Rio Grande, they too often avoided pursuit by striking out on foot in rough terrain.

Finally, unlike most other plains Indians, the Apache often consumed horses. Many plains tribes consumed horses out of necessity, but few ate it as a part of their regular diet. The Apache seem to have been the chief horse eaters. A Spanish missionary noted in 1744 that the Apaches raided the Rio Grande frontier for horses, not only for riding, but for eating. The horseflesh was apparently considered one of the "greatest dainties."\textsuperscript{47} The Lipans, who became more plains
oriented than other Apache groups, were less likely to eat horses because they were essential to the bison hunt, and for carrying tepee poles and covers. Many other plains Indians abhorred the idea of eating horseflesh, and as a result held the horse-eating Apaches in contempt.

In any case, horses played an important role in Apache raiding and warfare. The Apaches made a sharp distinction between "raiding" and "warfare." A raid had as its main goal the acquisition of horses or plunder. The members of a raiding party generally attempted to avoid contact with the enemy. Ceremonies concerning raiding were aimed at enhancing concealment and avoiding pursuit. Raids could be called for by anyone who needed horses or felt that the camp resources needed to be replenished. A warrior would announce his intentions of staging a raid, usually after seeking the approval of the band leader, and a dance would be held. During the dance, those who wanted to participate in the raid would join in. Raiding parties usually consisted of from eight to twelve individuals who volunteered to follow a chosen leader. An extremely popular or successful leader might have many more followers.

Because of its very nature, the raid often resulted in warfare. A war party generally was formed to avenge Apache casualties. An Apache who had lost a family member usually called for a war party to punish those responsible for a
loved one's loss, and family and friends of the deceased played a large role in this activity. In some cases the band leader would send runners to other nearby bands to recruit warriors for the endeavor. War parties might consist of as many as two hundred men and almost always included a shaman, or medicine man, who would encourage proper behavior, interpret signs and omens, and make predictions of the upcoming battle. Women often accompanied the war party as well, especially wives of chiefs. The women drove stolen stock, acted as sentinels, and even fought on occasion. Once the war party had been proposed, all who planned to participate would gather for a series of dances and speeches designed to set the mood for the event. Surprisingly, there were fewer restrictions placed on the members of a war party than on a raiding party.51

Before setting out on a major campaign, or when an invasion or attack seemed imminent, the Apaches chose a safe haven for their families and non-combatants. The Jicarillas and Mescaleros generally chose some interior mountain range with a water supply and available wild fruit. A small defensive party would stay behind to defend the families. In later times, the Jicarillas often left their families under the protection of the Spanish around Santa Fe. If little warning was received, the men might mount their horses and
plan a defense, while the women and children fled into the
hills, mountains, or rugged terrain for protection.\(^5\)

War parties armed themselves with bows and arrows,
lances, war clubs, leather shields, iron darts (known as
chuzas), and sometimes leather body armor for both rider and
mount. The primary weapon of the Apaches was the bow and
arrow. Even after the introduction of the gun, most Apaches
still preferred the bow and arrow because of the ease of
access and the rapidity of fire. In fact, in the 1780s the
Spanish began trading guns to the Apaches in the hopes that
they would discard the bow and arrow and lose their
proficiency with the weapon. Viceroy Gálvez, who advocated
the policy suggested that the guns sold to the Indians be
long barreled to make them awkward to use on horseback and
that the quality of metal, stocks, and bolts be inferior. It
was hoped that with time the Apache guns would break and
become useless. Thereafter, when the natives once again were
forced to use bows and arrows they would be much less
experienced in manipulating them.\(^5\) The policy backfired,
however, because the Apaches did not give up the bow, but
instead used them to cover their musketeers so that they
could load and fire in security.\(^5\)

Single curved bows, three to four feet in length
predominated. Bow strings were made of buffalo or deer
sinew, worked, soaked in water, and peeled into strands.
Three or four strands were then twisted together to make one long string. Bows functioned well in dry weather but in wet weather the string absorbed moisture and became useless. Warriors carried their bows unstrung, tying the bowstring to one end of the bow and tying a loop in the other end that could be slipped over the free end. Spare strings were carried in case of breakage. Mescal fibers could be used as a substitute string in an emergency. An Indian could present and string his bow, and shoot an arrow almost as quickly as a man could shoot a musket. A dozen arrows could be fired in the time it took to reload it.\(^{55}\)

Each warrior produced his own arrows, using hard, well-seasoned wood with four longitudinal flutings. The arrows were two to two and a half feet long and had three feathers for fletching attached to the nock end. Apaches did not chip flint arrowheads. Instead they whittled the tips of wooden arrows to a point and hardened them in fire. They did utilize arrowheads found in ancient campsites. Stones with points or sharp edges might be used if they could do so with minimal work. Sometimes Apaches would break stones on the chance that the pieces might serve as arrowheads. After European contact, the Apaches began to acquire metal arrowheads made from barrel hoops.

Shafts were tested by passing them through their teeth and biting down to straighten them. Apaches customarily
stained their arrows red with animal blood and sometimes dipped them in the sap of *Yucca angustifolia*, a non-poisonous plant deemed to have "mystic power." Some Apache poisoned their arrows by dipping the tips in snake or spider venom or in an extract of a deer's gal bladder that had been rotted by a rattlesnake bite, but such action was rare.

Medicine men who specialized in weaponry usually made lances. Sotol stalk, heated, straightened, and smoothed was a popular material for lances. Young spruce was also used. A lance measured between seven and twelve feet long. Like arrows, early lances had a fire-hardened point. In later times the Apache used knives, bayonets, cutlasses, and lance tips to arm their lances. The lance shafts were one and a half inches in diameter with a blade attached with sinew or, in later times with a brass ferrule. Mescaleros customarily set a tripod of lances at the opening to their dwellings and hung their shields, quivers, or other apparel on it.\(^{56}\)

The Apache war club was actually more of a mace. A fist-sized rock was wrapped in rawhide and then attached to a wooden handle by a short length of flexible rawhide. The connecting tab, two or three inches in length between the handle and the head of the club, prevented the club head from breaking off when it struck its target. The one and a half foot handle had a loop that passed through the handle to slip the wrist through.\(^{57}\)
Crude, hiltless, single-edged, pointed scrapers made of flint or chert were the standard knives among the Apaches. Early Apaches sharpened their knives with their teeth. The knives were placed in rawhide sheathes and usually simply tucked under their belts. The Mescaleros often cut a belt loop in the sheath while the Jicarillas carried theirs dangling from loops attached to their belts.\textsuperscript{58}

For defense the Apaches used shields and body armor. Dried and hardened buffalo bull hides were used to construct shields. A buckskin cover was stretched over the shield, overlapping the edges by about six inches. Small holes were punched in the edge of the buckskin and a drawstring was run through these, drawn up tightly, and then tied to create a smooth, tight cover. In battle the native wore the shield by placing his left arm through both of the buckskin loops and holding it between himself and his enemy. When using his bow he was unprotected but after firing he quickly recovered. Shields made in this manner were tough enough to deflect bullets unless hit dead on.\textsuperscript{59}

Apaches sometimes made armor of folded hides. Successive layers were glued together to increase the effectiveness of the armor. A protective coat of gravel or sand was glued to the outer surface to help deflect arrows and bullets. Quilted cotton armor became more popular after contact with the Spanish. The armor also became thicker,
presumably to make it more effective against bullets, and longer. A slit was added in the front and back to allow for mounting a horse. Similar hardened hides, cut into circles and made to overlap like fish scales, were used to protect the breasts and sides of horses.60

The Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans all lived in tepees, at least while on the plains, but all three tribes also had supplementary dwellings for other regions. Early Spanish explorers were impressed by the size and quality of the tents of the Querechos on the plains. Vicente de Zaldivar, in 1598 noted bright red and white bell shaped tents among the Querechos, built as skillfully as those in Italy and large enough to accommodate four mattresses or beds. The covering hide was tanned so well that no matter how much it rained, they would not leak or stiffen and upon drying remained soft and pliable. Zaldivar was so impressed he bartered for one to bring to camp and was further impressed to discover that it weighed less than two arrobas(approximately fifty pounds).61

Besides the tepee they sometimes built huts or wickiups. A circle of poles or saplings were bent over and tied at the center. Spaces between were thatched with local growth; yucca leaves or scrub in the desert regions, grass in the transition zone, tree bark or hides in the mountains, and reeds or branches in the river bottoms. A skin or
blanket might be draped over the exterior to minimize drafts and improve insulation. When the camp relocated, the brush huts were simply abandoned but the tepees were dismantled and transported by horses and mules, or dogs in the pre-horse days. The heavier poles served as a travois or pole-drag to transport possessions.

In addition to tepees and wickiups, the Mescalero also built brush *ramadas*. The *ramada* was a pole framework with a brush roof and open sides. Its purpose was to provide a comfortable, shady work area. In certain areas caves were used as temporary shelter, especially when on the move, so that time would not have to be taken to set up and take down tepees or other dwellings. In certain seasons Apaches apparently lived in the open without even a lean-to for shelter.  

The above summary of Apache culture is by no means complete. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the characteristics that would most influence their relations with Europeans. First, it is necessary to understand the home range of the various elements of the Apache tribes, their migration patterns, and regions they deemed especially important. Second, Native American government and social structure differed greatly from the European concept and as such lay at the root of many of the conflicts between
Apaches and Europeans. Third, the horse revolutionized Apache life style but did not dramatically change their culture. Instead, the horse simply increased what they already had, their range of occupation, their aggressiveness, and their accumulation of wealth. Fourth, the Apache concept of warfare and their weaponry differed drastically from that of Europeans. Apaches, like most Native Americans practiced a limited form of warfare primarily aimed at taking plunder. Finally, the nomadic life style of the Apaches made it difficult for the Spanish and other enemies to subdue them. Their tepees and other material culture allowed them to relocate with minimal loss or disruption to avoid enemies. All of these elements combined to make the Apache a distinct people whose struggle to maintain control of their homelands spanned centuries and survived the attempted conquest by the Spanish.
NOTES


12. Ibid.

13. The same argument could be made for the Zuñi and Yavapais terms as the Pueblos encountered by Oñate most surely had had contact with those two tribes as well. For other theories on the origin of the term Apache, see Dolores A. Gunnerson, *The Jicarilla Apaches: A Study in Survival*


Frank Secoy, *Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains (17th Century through Early 19th Century)* (Locust Valley, New York: J.J. Augustin Publisher, 1953), 25, suggests that the Apaches developed the practice of having one supreme war chief. Opler, however, says that it was "most unusual" for the followers of any leader to defer to the commands or directions of another without sanction or good reason. See Opler, "Lipan and Mescalero Apache in Texas," 209. There was never, in recorded history, a single chief of the Lipan and such power as Secoy describes seems unlikely except on a very temporary basis. See Sjoberg, "Lipan Apache Culture," 93-94.


Apache," 38.


43. Terrell, Plains Apaches, 97.

44. Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 24.

45. Stan Hoig, Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains


49. Morris Opler gives an excellent description of the intricate practices that were to be followed by warriors on a raid as well as the restrictions placed upon their wives and other family members and friends in "A Summary of Jicarilla Apache Culture," 209-210.


CHAPTER 2

FIRST CONTACT:

APACHE INDIANS FROM THEIR FIRST ARRIVAL IN THE SOUTHWEST TO THE SETTLEMENT OF NEW MEXICO BY THE SPANISH

The first contact between the Apache Indians and the Spaniards occurred when Francisco Vázquez de Coronado encountered a roving band of Querechos on the plains. His meeting and all subsequent meetings until the beginning of the seventeenth century, with one exception, were cordial. Much of the damage attributed to Apaches by historians was in fact caused by inter-Pueblo warfare, with possible assistance by allied bands of Apaches. Most of these Apaches, however, were not eastern Apaches, or Apaches living on the plains, but Navajos or western Apaches from Arizona and western New Mexico. To repeat, the Apaches who lived on the plains for the most part kept the peace with the Spaniards.

In order to understand the relationship between the eastern and western Apaches, one must first understand their arrival in the American Southwest. The Athapaskan linguistic family, like other Native Americans, migrated to the Americas from Asia across the Bering strait. They were one of the last groups to make the passage. The Athapaskans
currently known as the Apaches broke away from the greater Athapaskan stock that occupied the interior of Alaska and northwestern Canada and traveled to the south. They ended up in the American Southwest sometime between 700 A.D. and 1525.

The route is in as much dispute as the arrival date. Three possible routes have been suggested. The first suggestion carries the Apaches along the high plains east of the Rocky Mountains. A second possible route has the Apaches traveling through the Rocky Mountains. The third proposed route traverses the plateau or Great Basin west of the Rockies.

The most widely accepted route is the plains route. Supporters of this route argue that the Apacheans wandered south along the buffalo-rich high plains east of the Rockies over succeeding generations. When they reached the area of present-day eastern New Mexico and Texas, where the Rockies taper off, they swung to the west, where the agricultural Pueblos made tempting targets. Enemy tribes might also have assisted in pushing them to the west. Later migrations of the Apachean tribes would have followed but were prevented from making the final swing to the west by the presence of their earlier arriving kinsmen and so filtered instead across the southern plains. In this scenario, the earlier
migrants became the Western Apache and the later arrivals became the Eastern Apache.¹

The Rocky Mountain route, however, is the most unlikely. While Indians afoot would as likely traverse mountain ranges and rough territory as an open corridor, presence of food, water, and other tribes would have a greater effect on the route chosen. Game would be more abundant on the plains to the east or in the basin to the west, and either of these two routes would more likely be followed by the roving migrants.

The intermontane route also has a significant amount of support. There are a number of potential routes through the Great Basin and the connecting Columbia and Colorado Plateaus. In this scenario, the Eastern Apache led the migration, swinging east at the southern end of the Rockies to move out onto the plains. The Western Apache then followed and settled the area of present-day Arizona and western New Mexico.²

It seems likely that both the plains and intermontane routes might be correct, depending on the tribe. The Eastern Apache most likely arrived in the southwest via the High Plains east of the Rockies, while the Western Apache and Navajo likely traveled via the Great Basin route. Part of the evidence for this assumption is the fact that when the Spanish under Francisco Vázquez de Coronado traveled through
the Southwest, they found no evidence of any "wild tribes" in the area around Zuñi, Hopiland, Acoma, Taos, and Jémez, although they were there for two years and specifically asked about the country and its inhabitants.³

Adolf Bandelier and John P. Harrington both suggest that the Apaches were present but "cleverly hiding."⁴ This seems unlikely, considering that the Apaches rarely hid from the Spaniards. Even when the natives tried to avoid the Europeans, the Spaniards recorded glimpses of them or at least smoke signals.⁵ For Coronado and his men to have seen no sign of natives in the area seems conclusive proof that none lived there.

Since Coronado did encounter Apaches (Querechos) on the plains and later explorers found the Navajo firmly entrenched in the West, it is unlikely that the Western Apaches would have migrated across the Pueblo country to establish themselves in Arizona in such a relatively brief period of time. Since later explorers noted sparse Apache presence in the Rio Grande valley, it seems that they were stragglers rather than the advance guard of migration. In any event, the Pueblos would certainly have informed the Spanish of a great migration through the area.

In addition, the fact that some Pueblo languages had separate terms for Eastern and Western Apaches while others had a generic term for all Apaches bolsters the idea of the
two-route theory. Those tribes who had contact with only Eastern or only Western Apaches would obviously have but one name for Apaches. On the other hand, those tribes who lived in a more central location and had sporadic contact with both groups would probably develop different names to distinguish between the two groups. If, as Dolores Gunnerson suggests, both Eastern and Western Apaches migrated from the plains, there would have been no reason for the Pueblo tribes to distinguish between the two groups, other than to distinguish individual bands. This would have resulted in many more than two names.\textsuperscript{6}

The other major debate concerning the Apaches is the date of their arrival in the Southwest. Many scholars place their arrival at approximately 700-800 C.E. The evidence for this early date is the destruction of numerous pueblos in western New Mexico that began during this time period. Harold Gladwin argues that Apache tribes ruled the upper Gila and Mimbres by 1150. He describes the Apaches as virile, aggressive nomads, practicing hit and run tactics with no fixed settlements that could be destroyed. The Pueblos, on the other hand, were tied down by the necessity of protecting their families, homes, and possessions. These natives became vulnerable when they left their protected villages to draw water, obtain meat, or sow, tend, and harvest their crops.\textsuperscript{7}
Jack Forbes posits that the Apaches were the original, or earlier, settlers of the Southwest and were pushed out by the Pueblos in the 1300s. This theory seems unlikely given the aggressiveness of the Apaches in historic times. While it is apparent that much of the Pueblo destruction was indeed caused by inter-Pueblo fighting, it is likely that the Pueblos used various local Apache groups as allies in their wars. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Pueblos could have driven the Apaches from the region if they had already been there.

More recently, some historians have challenged the idea that the Apaches were responsible for the destruction of the Pueblos prior to the 1400s. Dolores Gunnerson suggests that most of the destruction previously blamed on the Apaches was actually caused by wars among the Pueblos themselves. She notes that the Spanish recorded marked hostility between the Pueblos, but no nomads living in the area. The Teyas and Querechos of the plains, rather than being hostile toward the Pueblos, had established a peaceful and mutually profitable trade with them by 1540.

Perhaps the best argument against Apaches being responsible for Pueblo destruction prior to 1540 is the former's motive for warfare. Apaches generally attacked for plunder or revenge. The destruction of a pueblo gained them nothing. First, the Pueblos did not generally launch attacks
against Apaches. Secondly, the Pueblos did not usually hunt buffalo or otherwise intrude into Apachería. Thirdly, the Apaches had no desire to occupy the abandoned pueblos. Finally, the Apache had little desire to farm abandoned Pueblo lands. In fact, destroying pueblos was detrimental to the Apaches because it removed a source of plunder. As long as a pueblo remained productive it was a source of trade and plunder, but once destroyed it served no benefit to the Apaches.

Pueblo to Pueblo aggression, however, had a motivating factor. The destruction of a pueblo by another benefitted the survivor by removing a rival for trade with other natives as well as a possible source of attack. In addition, destruction of neighboring Pueblos opened up new lands for farming and destroyed a potential haven for enemy Apaches.

This is not to suggest that Apaches never raided Pueblos, at times to the point of forcing their abandonment, but such intensive attacks usually occurred during times of duress, when there was a drought, or after the arrival of the Spanish, when the Europeans started recruiting Pueblos as auxiliary troops for raids against Apaches. Also, as the Spanish began to confiscate a greater amount of Pueblo production, the Apache raids became a greater burden on the remaining grain stores, often causing the abandonment of a pueblo.
In any case, the first encounter between Apaches and European came with Francisco Vázquez de Coronado's expedition in 1540. In the vicinity of the Texas Panhandle, Coronado's entrada encountered the Querechos, and further east the Teyas. Almost all scholars agree that the Querechos were Apaches, but there has been much debate over the Teyas.\textsuperscript{10} The Teyas have been identified variously as Apaches, Jumanos, and Caddoans.\textsuperscript{11} The strongest arguments can be made for identifying them as Apaches or Jumanos.

There are compelling arguments favoring an Apache identification. Both the Querechos and Teyas used dog nomadism, which was not attributed to any other group. Both names are Pueblo names and equivalents for both names are found among Pueblo languages.\textsuperscript{12} Adolph Bandelier recorded, while working at Cochiti, that a plains tribe called by the Queres "Kiruash" (Querecho?) had invaded the Río Grande Valley in pre-Coronado times. Coronado's chronicler, Pedro de Castañeda, recorded a similar incident involving the Teyas. It is possible, therefore, that both the Querechos and Teyas were involved in the attack and were simply different bands of Apaches.\textsuperscript{13}

Further, arguments generally used to dispute an Apache identification for the Teyas can be easily refuted. The enmity between the two tribes could have simply been an intra-tribal dispute and does not necessarily indicate that
the two tribes were of different nations. The fact that Teyas painted themselves while Querechos did not is a moot point since some Apache tribes used paint while others did not. The fact that the Teyas were more sedentary and practiced farming also does not eliminate the possibility that the Teyas were Apaches. The Jicarillas of later times, for example, were sedentary and practiced agriculture. Finally, the fact that the Teyas dressed similarly to the Quivirans simply shows that they were adaptable. The Jicarilla, who lived in the vicinity of the Pueblos adopted many elements of Pueblo culture and dress.\textsuperscript{14} It is not possible therefore to eliminate the possibility that the Teyas were Apaches.

There are equally strong, or perhaps stronger arguments linking the Teyas to the Jumanos. Some scholars argue that Teya was a version of the Caddo word Texia, meaning friend or ally, and the source for Tejas, associated with the Hasinai, or Caddoan, of east Texas. The term might have been used to indicate partners in a widespread trade network throughout the area of Texas and New Mexico. In the seventeenth century the Jumanos were a part of this network. The Apaches, on the other hand, had never been associated with the trade. The Tanoan Indians who accompanied Coronado simply identified the Teyas as trading partners or allies.\textsuperscript{15}
Arguing that the Teyas were Jumanos, Nancy Hickerson points to the geographical location of the Teyas, the cultural similarities with later Jumanos, and the enmity between the Querechos and Teyas. The location of the largest ranchería of the Teyas was in Palo Duro canyon, the general area where Jumanos were found later. The Teyas also showed a great amount of knowledge of the geography of the region especially to the south. In fact, an elderly Teya remembered encountering Cabeza de Vaca's party years earlier. Those who escorted part of Coronado's army back to the Pecos River informed the Spanish when they reached the river that it ran south to join the Tiguex (Rio Grande) twenty days to the south and then turned east. The Spanish (and possibly the Teyas) thought it probably flowed into the Mississippi.¹⁶

Culturally, the description of Teyas facial painting and clothing styles fit with Jumano culture. The Querecho (Apache) enmity with the Teyas is consistent with the long-recorded power struggle between the Apaches and the Jumanos for control of the plains. The Apaches eventually won the struggle, which might account for later Spanish records reporting Jumanos in widely separated areas. If the Apaches won control of the Plains area, they would have driven a wedge forcing the Jumanos to divide into two groups.

Whether the Teyas were Apaches or Jumanos cannot be determined with certainty. Neither possibility can be ruled
out completely, and since the Teyas do not appear in later records, the problem of identification is even more difficult. For the purposes of this paper, the Teyas will be considered Jumanos, since strong evidence supports this identification.

In any case, when Coronado's entrada first encountered the Querechos, the natives were not in the least agitated. Instead, they came out of their tents to scrutinize the newcomers and asked the vanguard what the army was. The Querechos communicated with sign language in such a manner that Pedro de Castañeda noted that "they made themselves understood so well that there was no need of an interpreter." The Querechos expressed an extensive amount of knowledge concerning the territory to the east, describing a great river that may well have been the Mississippi. Obviously, the Querechos traveled the plains and the surrounding country extensively.

The Spanish were generally pleasantly impressed by the Plains Indians, recording that they were better warriors and more feared than other nations the Spanish had encountered. Castañeda noted that they were "a kind people and not cruel," and were "faithful friends." Obviously the first meeting between the Spanish and the Apaches was quite cordial. The Apaches were cooperative and peaceful. Indeed,
other than curiosity, the Querechos took little note of Spaniards passing among them.

After Coronado returned to Mexico, the Pueblos perhaps encouraged the Querechos to settle nearby as allies against a possible Spanish return. Later explorers did find "Querechos" in the mountains around both Acoma and the Hopi Pueblos, but they were most likely Western Apaches arriving from the west rather than Eastern Apaches migrating from the plains. Juan de Oñate, colonizer of New Mexico, reported hostility between Querechos and Pueblos, but also noted a vibrant trade between the two. The Pueblos apparently used the Querechos as allies or mercenaries to attack and plunder enemy Pueblos.¹⁹

The next historical encounter with the Querechos came from Francisco Ibarra's expedition in the summer of 1565. Ibarra and sixty soldiers marched north from San Juan in Sinaloa, across the Rio Mayo to the Yaqui river valley and then apparently northwest to the pueblo Paquimé, most likely Casas Grandes in northern Chihuahua.²⁰ The principal chronicler of the Ibarra expedition, Baltasar de Obregón, used the term "Querecho" to refer to several tribes met on the expedition.

The first encounter with a "plains" Indian was with a "comely young man, handsome and well attired," who fled upon seeing the Spaniards. Two horsemen pursued him and after he
stoutly resisted until his strength and arrows gave out, his captors brought him before Ibarra. The governor reassured the trembling native with kind and soothing words and gave him clothes, beads and other gifts to win his favor. The Querecho was then released and encouraged to tell his people of the presents and kindly treatment by the Spanish in order to encourage them to visit the Spanish.\textsuperscript{21}

Later, three hundred Querechos arrived in the Spanish camp, having been brought in by the earlier native. They were lively, noble, friendly, brave, and able bodied. The women and children were attractive and the whole group arrived dancing, singing, and making strange faces toward the sun, which was all part of their ceremonial sun worship. The Spanish treated the natives kindly and gave them gifts and iron trifles.

The Querechos stated that they were three days from Cibola and four days south of the cattle. They claimed to live on slopes and in sheltered places during the summer and were enemies of the Querechos of the plains.\textsuperscript{22}

There are several points to consider concerning Obregón's Querechos. First of all, there is a possibility that these Querechos were not Apaches at all. Obregón could have been using the term to indicate generically any unknown nomadic tribe. The Ibarra expedition was far west of any location that Coronado's expedition had reported seeing
Querechos. If Obregón's Querechos were indeed Apaches, it is likely that they were Western Apaches, which would account for their location and the fact that they were "enemies" of the plains Querechos.

Obregón, in several instances, distinguishes between Querechos met by Ibarra's expedition and those of the plains. He noted the warlike characteristics of the natives, commenting that it was only natural since they bordered with the fierce plains Querechos. His statements indicate that he believed he was much closer to the plains than he actually was, and increases the probability that his Querechos were not plains Apaches but were either Western Apaches or some other non-related nomadic tribe.\textsuperscript{23}

The next encounter with Apaches on the plains occurred in 1581 with the Chamuscado-Rodríguez expedition. Fray Augustín Rodríguez organized the expedition to spread the Gospel to the natives to the north of Nueva Vizcaya. The expedition consisted of three friars, nine soldiers led by Francisco Sánchez Chamuscado, nineteen Indian servants, six hundred head of cattle and ninety horses. The little expedition left Santa Bárbara in June 1581, following the course of the Conchos to La Junta de los Ríos where the Conchos enters the Río Grande. They then followed the latter river upstream as far as the vicinity of Taos, encountering numerous tribes along the entire journey.\textsuperscript{24}
In the vicinity of the Galisteo River, the expedition headed east for the plains. When the Spaniards reached the Pecos River, they noticed a column of smoke and headed for it. They encountered a ranchería of five hundred huts and tents and were met by four hundred men armed with bows and arrows. The natives inquired by sign the purpose of the entrada. The Spanish replied that they had come as friends, but both sides remained wary and the natives seemed intent on firing arrows at the Spaniards. Rather than provoke a conflict, the Spanish withdrew to await further developments.

The Spanish tried to attract the natives with friendly actions but were determined to subdue them by force if necessary. Father Rodríguez made the sign of the cross as a sign of peace and upon seeing it the natives returned the sign and welcomed the Spaniards into their camp. Father Rodríguez dismounted and gave the natives a cross to kiss and soon the natives were rejoicing and offered the Spaniards everything that they had.

There were approximately two thousand natives at the rancheria. At the request of the natives, the Spanish camped nearby while the natives marveled at the new arrivals. The Spanish called the attention of the Indians and fired a arquebus among them at which the terrified natives fell to the ground as if stunned. The Spanish were pleased with the
reaction, but the natives asked the Spanish to refrain from further discharges because it frightened them, their wives and children, and "stunned their senses." 

These natives were very similar to Coronado's Querechos. They wore only buffalo hides and deerskins. They lived off the buffalo during the summer and fall, but during the rainy season went in search of prickly pears and yucca. They used dogs as pack animals, loading them with fifty to seventy-five pounds each and tying them together like a pack train with maguey ropes. Normally, they would travel three to four leagues per day.

After a brief stay at the ranchería, the Spanish expressed interest in the buffalo herds. The natives informed them that the herds were two days to the west, but none of them would accompany the expedition there. The Spanish decided to attempt the journey on their own. However, after two days of wandering over the plains and finding no cattle, they returned to the ranchería for a guide.

Again, the natives refused to supply a guide, so the Spaniards kidnapped a native, bound him, and brought him before Chamuscado to resume their journey in search of buffalo. The Indians became notably angry at this forced abduction, but the Spaniards maintained a careful vigil and no fighting broke out. The following day, with their captive
in tow, the expedition once again set out in search for the buffalo herds. Three days later they found some water holes frequented by the natives and used hoes to open them sufficiently to water their stock. Here, they killed their first buffalo. They questioned their captive concerning the buffalo and were assured that they would find the herds the following day at another water hole.

As promised, the following day they reached some lagoons of brackish water, near the headwaters of the Canadian River, and found large herds of buffalo. They killed forty with their arquebuses. The native explained that the water and the valley extended to a river that flowed where the bulk of the animals lived. The Spanish opted not to travel any further because of a shortage of supplies. They packed up the buffalo meat they had gathered and returned toward the ranchería.

The Spanish sent their native guide ahead, well laden with meat and content with having witnessed the success of the Spanish buffalo hunt. When the Spanish arrived at the ranchería, the natives welcomed their return, the guide having told his people of the fabulous hunt, and the natives were apparently impressed enough to forgive the kidnapping. In fact, the Apaches expressed interest in taking the Spaniards to where there would be many cattle. The Spanish rejected the offer and gave gifts of buffalo meat to those
who seemed to be tribal leaders, but promised to return soon. The natives indicated that they would await their return. Although the natives appeared to be mollified by the safe return of their tribesmen and the gifts, the Spanish still kept up their guard lest the Apaches try to avenge the kidnapping under the pretext of peace and friendship.  

The Chamuscado-Rodríguez expedition establishes the Apaches as living in approximately the same region they had been in at the time of the Coronado expedition. These Indians showed themselves to be quite amiable as well. After preparing to meet the Spaniard's approach with force, they quickly welcomed them as friends and despite the kidnapping of one of their tribesmen, they apparently parted on good terms. No doubt a part of this cordial departure resulted from the successful Spanish buffalo hunt. The killing of forty buffalo in such a short time must have impressed the horseless natives, as indicated in their interest in taking the Spanish to where the greatest number of buffalo grazed. Finally, their guide once again expressed an extensive knowledge of the region, indicating that these natives roamed extensively across the plains.

The next expedition to the north, that of Antonio de Espejo did not encounter the plains Apaches. It did, however, note the presence of mountain Querechos in the vicinity of Acoma and the Hopi pueblos. Groups of Querechos
seemed to have alliances with some Pueblos and to be enemies of others. In any case, it is most likely that these Querechos were either Navajos or Western Apaches who had settled in the area from the west. The Espejo expedition found no Querechos, or other potential Apaches, in the area east of the Rio Grande.\textsuperscript{29} This again supports the idea of an early split migration of Eastern and Western Apaches.

The Rodríguez-Chamuscado and Espejo expeditions set off a struggle in Mexico to acquire permission to colonize this promising region. Before permission was finally bestowed upon Juan de Oñate, however, two unsanctioned expeditions would attempt to claim the right. The first of these expeditions was led by Gaspar Castaño de Sosa, lieutenant governor of Nuevo León.

Castaño de Sosa marched up the Pecos River encountering many recently built but abandoned rancherías. He came upon a lone Indian, most likely an Apache, but none of the interpreters could understand him. Castaño gave the native some corn and told him he should tell his people to come out and not be afraid. Four days later, after traveling through an older abandoned rancheria, the vanguard saw a group of Indians and approached them. The Indians fled into a swamp. The Spaniards managed to capture two men, two women, and one of the pack dogs.
They took the captives back to camp to bring them before Castaño, but the lieutenant governor was absent, having gone to recover some horses. The captors thereupon released the women with all their possessions but kept the men and a pack dog, which always fascinated the Spaniards. When Castaño returned he was pleased to find the captives, but he had no interpreter. Castaño released the natives and their pack dog, giving them meat and corn and telling them, by signs, that they should not be afraid.\(^{30}\)

A few days later Castaño's expedition had the first known battle with the plains Apaches. The vanguard spotted a group of natives while attempting to cross a river. The Spanish unsuccessfully tried to communicate but eventually withdrew. One of the Spanish Indian guides lagged behind and when the group of natives saw him alone, they seized him, stole some rope, threw him into the river, and then shot him with arrows.

The following day a large number of natives appeared near the Spanish camp, but Castaño could not induce them to enter. Instead, the Indians attempted to run off some of the Spanish cattle. Castaño sent a patrol out to drive them away and the Indians fired arrows at them. The Spaniards fired back and killed several in self defense. Four of the Indians were captured and brought before the Spanish leader for punishment. Castaño ordered that one be hanged while the
other three, mere youths, were spared and kept as interpreters. In order to hasten the language learning process, each of the three youths was assigned to an individual Spaniard. Despite the efforts of the Spanish, all three escaped, taking an ox with them.\textsuperscript{31}

Later, at one of the northerly pueblos, probably either Picurís or San Juan, Castaño's party saw a group of natives encamped in some huts, about the distance of a long arquebus shot from the pueblo. The natives had come to the pueblo for refuge during the winter but began to leave as the Spanish approached them. Castaño sent word that they should return and the Spaniards spent a peaceful night in the huts of these Indians. The expedition soon came to an ignominious end when Captain Juan Morlete arrived with orders from the viceroy to arrest Castaño and bring him and his followers back to Mexico.\textsuperscript{32}

In retrospect, Castaño encountered at least two groups of plains Apaches. The first group, met at the southern fringe of the plains, were hostile, wanting little to do with the Spanish, except to steal their animals. This was caused by the fact that these Indians had most likely been in contact with Spanish slavers and were therefore suspicious of the motives of any Europeans in their territory. Their attack on the Indian guide at the river
might also be attributed to their resentment toward a native
guide of potential slavers.

The second group of Apaches were those encamped near
the Pueblo. As seen earlier, Apache tribes often wintered
near Pueblos. They, having much less contact with the
Spanish, reacted in a neutral manner. At first, they
attempted to leave but later apparently welcomed the Spanish
into their camp.

The second illegal expedition was that of Francisco de
Leyva Bonilla, whom the governor of Nueva Vizcaya sent in
1593 to punish some Indians who had been stealing from
frontier ranches. Bonilla took it upon himself to carry his
expedition into New Mexico and established his headquarters
at San Ildefonso, approximately twenty miles northwest of
Santa Fe. For approximately a year he and his followers
searched among the Pueblos for treasure, finally marching
across the plains toward Quivira. Along the way Bonilla
argued with Antonio Gutiérrez Humaña who eventually murdered
him and assumed command of the expedition. Humaña and his
followers later met their death, probably at the hands of
the Quivirans. Five Mexican Indians escaped. One of them,
Jusepe, was captured by the Apaches and lived with them for
a year before making his way to the Spanish settlements that
had been established in New Mexico by Oñate.33
Here again, the Apaches encountered by the expedition, based on the scant information available, appear to have been amicable. Bonilla and Humaña managed to pass unmolested through the plains. Surely had they encountered hostility among the Apaches, the Indian informant would have related such an occurrence to Oñate. The surviving Mexican Indian, whether captured or rescued, was treated well and had no difficulty leaving the Apaches to join the Spanish in New Mexico.

Meanwhile, in Mexico, there was a struggle to gain the right to colonize New Mexico. The winner of the struggle was don Juan de Oñate. After over two years of preparations and delays, Oñate finally reached the Pueblo of San Juan on the upper Rio Grande, approximately twenty-five miles north of Santa Fe, in July 1598 and established his headquarters. A short time later, he relocated to another Pueblo which he called San Gabriel at the juncture of the Chama and the Rio Grande. After exploring the immediate and outlying areas Oñate set up mission fields for the Franciscan friars that included the Apache Indians.

Francisco de San Miguel was assigned the province of Pecos, including the Vaqueros of that region to the Sierra Nevada and the pueblos of the "gran salina" behind the pueblo of Puaray. Francisco de Zamora received the province of Picurís with all Apaches in that area, along with the
province of Taos and the upper Rio Grande valley. Friar Alonzo de Lugo worked the province of Jémez and the Apaches and Cocoyes of that region.34

Father San Miguel had accompanied the expedition of Vicente de Zaldívar, one of Oñate's officers, to the buffalo plains. Fray San Miguel had remained at the Pecos pueblo while Zaldívar and his men continued east. Approximately eleven leagues east of Pecos, four Indian herdsmen (Vaqueros) approached the expedition. The Spanish gave them food and presents, whereupon one of the natives arose and called in a loud voice to many other natives that had been hidden. The natives entered the Spanish camp and were also given gifts. Zaldívar asked for a guide to the land of cattle and they willingly furnished one.35

The following day the Spaniards met three more natives who came down from a ridge. Zaldívar inquired concerning the location of their ranchería and was told that it was a league away but was also told that the natives were disturbed by the presence of the Spaniards. In order to calm and reassure the natives, Zaldívar visited the ranchería with a single companion, telling the three natives to go and forewarn their camp of his approach. Three-quarters of a league away from the Spanish camp small groups of natives began to approach Zaldívar asking him for friendship.36
Zaldívar distributed gifts among the natives and they implored him to visit their camp. Although it was dusk, Zaldívar decided that he must visit the camp lest he appear afraid. He was received with great friendship and did not return to the Spanish camp until late at night. At dawn the following morning, groups of natives arrived at the Spanish camp with gifts of pinole, a drink made from ground toasted corn mixed with water. Zaldívar distributed additional gifts and informed the natives that he had been sent by don Juan de Oñate in order that they might know that he could protect those natives loyal to the crown and punish those who were not.

Upon hearing this, the Vaqueros were well pleased and asked for assistance against their enemies, the Jumanos. Zaldívar promised that he would endeavor to insure peace among all the tribes. The Spanish departed on good terms and continued their search for the buffalo. A few days later they encountered a group of Vaqueros returning from trading with the Picuris and Taos pueblos. The Vaqueros had traded meat, hides, tallow, suet, and salt for cotton blankets, pottery, maize, and some small green stones (turquoise).

The following day the Spaniards found a ranchería of fifty tents made of tanned hides. The tents were bright red and white in color, bell shaped with flaps and openings, and were large enough to accommodate four mattresses without
difficulty. Zaldívar was so impressed with the tents that he bartered for one and brought it with him to the Spanish camp. After one final unsuccessful attempt to capture some buffalo, Zaldívar and his men headed back to New Mexico.

Less than two years later, Oñate himself led an expedition across the plains to visit Quivira. With seventy men and more than seven hundred horses and mules Oñate set off in June 1601, guided by the Indian Jusepe, the survivor of the Humaña expedition, and Zaldívar's guide during his trip to the plains.³⁷

Along the Canadian River, Oñate's expedition encountered Apaches who welcomed the Spaniards with demonstrations of peace. The Spaniards responded with generosity so that within a short period of time Apache men, women, and children flocked to the camp, raising their hands to the sun, their sign of friendship. The natives brought some small black and yellow fruit that grew in abundance along the river, and the Spanish ate large quantities of them without ill effects. The Apaches also brought fat and tallow to the Spaniards who gave the Apaches in exchange hard tack, tobacco, and some trifles.³⁸

The Spanish continued on, encountering several rancherías occupied by Apaches "who are masters of the plains." They had no permanent settlements but wandered with the buffalo. Despite the fact that the Spaniards were
intruding upon the Apache's territory, the natives made no attempt to harm the Europeans and none "became impertinent." 39

Traveling on toward Quivira, the Spaniards discovered a large ranchería with five to six thousand inhabitants, called by the Spanish "Escanjaques." There is much controversy concerning the identity of the Escanjaques. They shared many traits with the Apaches: they did not farm but lived solely off the buffalo, they used the same sign of peace and friendship as the Apaches, and some lived in buffalo hide covered structures.

On the other hand, most of their living structures were made of branches. They were dirty, dark, and of ugly complexion as compared to the Apaches, and they apparently did not use dog-pole drags. The most telling difference, however, was the fact that the Spanish distinguished between the Escanjaques and the Apaches and they apparently spoke different languages. There were some Apaches living among the Escanjaques. Oñate's Indian interpreter Jusepe could not communicate directly with the Escanjaques but had to talk to the Apaches, who then translated to the Escanjaques. The Escanjaques were apparently either Kansa or Osage, or more likely a Tonkawan group.40 In any case, they were not Apaches.
The Escanjaques eventually turned on the Spanish when the Spanish returned from Quivira. The Apaches, however, appear to have maintained their peaceful stance. Thus, during Oñate's governorship in New Mexico, the plains Apaches continued their peaceful attitude toward the Spaniards. They were wary of the Spanish presence in their territory, as well they should have been. Such an expedition as Zaldívar's or Oñate's were threatening to the Apaches for several reasons. First, since their motive was unknown to the Apaches, they posed a military threat if they proved to be hostile. Second, the Apaches had no doubt heard of slave raids to the south and might well have feared that this was the purpose of the expedition. Finally, an expedition of such size would have negative effects on the buffalo herds. Zaldívar noted that the buffalo herds had moved off upon the approach of the Apaches returning from their trading expedition to New Mexico. Large Spanish expeditions could disrupt the migratory patterns of the buffalo, and this augured ill for the horseless Apaches. Accordingly, it was reasonable that the Apaches showed concern for the approach of the Spanish into their territory.

During Oñate's governorship, the Spanish became aware of numerous "wild tribes" in the region surrounding the Pueblos. Until 1600 the Apaches and Vaqueros were mentioned as separate peoples. "Apache" was usually used in reference
to the Navaho, western Apache tribes and those living in the vicinity of Taos and Pecos. "Vaquero" was used to refer to those natives living among the buffalo. By 1601, the Vaqueros were also being called Apaches. This transition can be seen clearly in the expeditions of Zaldívar and Oñate. Zaldívar called plains tribes "Vaqueros" while Oñate, just two years later, called the same natives "Apaches."

At this time, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between different Apache groups. Spanish sources often used the term Apache to describe a group of natives with no further specifics. At other times, sources are overly specific, giving a name, usually of an Apache chief or some other equally temporary condition. That particular name might never appear again or the same tribe might be referred to by a different name when a new chief assumed leadership with nothing to connect the tribe to its former name. Because it took years for names to become attached to a specific tribe, the early volatility of nomenclature makes it impossible in many cases to determine with certainty an affiliation with an existing tribe.

The Spanish had several clashes with Apaches during Oñate's term, but it seems that most if not all of these were with western Apaches or Navahos. In 1599 for example, Apaches helped to defend Acoma against Oñate's forces. These
Apaches were most likely Chiricahua, Western Apaches, or Navahos.\(^{41}\)

Both Zaldívar and Oñate appear to have promoted good relations with the plains Apaches. In fact, after Zaldívar's journey, a Vaquero chief with more than two hundred warriors visited Zaldívar at San Marcos. The chief expressed great joy at the encounter and gave the Spaniard a piece of buffalo meat and other gifts. He informed Zaldívar that he and his people were friends of the Spanish. The Spaniard's trip also seems to have improved relations between the plains Apaches and at least some of the Pueblos.\(^{42}\)

Shortly after Oñate's return from the plains in 1601, the Quivirans sent an ambassador "of high standing and seriousness" with 600 servants with bows and arrows to New Mexico. He invited the Spanish in friendship to return with him to fight together against their enemies, the Ayjaos, apparently the Escanjaques. Both sides conversed in Apache, a mutually understandable language. The ambassador also informed Oñate that they had traveled to Quivira by a roundabout route and that if they had traveled due north they would have arrived more quickly. The Quiviran was apparently suggesting a route by way of Taos.\(^{43}\)

When Oñate refused the ambassador's request, the Quiviran asked for a dozen soldiers, with which he would be content. Oñate again refused, partially because of a mass
desertion of settlers that had occurred while he was in Quivira. The Quiviran made a final plea for six soldiers, so that he would have at least something to show his king when he returned. Oñate finally relented and picked six soldiers, ordering them to make ready. The ambassador left, leaving behind two guides to direct them by the more direct route. Later, Oñate changed his mind and the soldiers never made the trip.44

Oñate missed a golden opportunity to establish firm relations with the Quivirans, with great ramifications for the Spanish in the future. His lack of manpower, however, made honoring the Quivirans request too risky. His refusal to make the journey or send his soldiers means that he lost an opportunity to learn more about the Apaches living in the vicinity of Taos. Apparently they were at peace with the Quivirans since the ambassador was confident that six soldiers and two guides could traverse their territory safely.

It might also have solved the question of Apaches that Oñate had learned of who lived in Pueblos, one less than fifty miles from San Gabriel that contained fifteen plazas. The "Pueblo" was probably Taos, where the Apaches often camped while trading.45 Oñate, in the same letter, describes the pueblo of the herdsmen as "nine continuous leagues in length and two in width, with streets and houses consisting
of huts. It is situated in the midst of the multitude of buffalo." If this is the ranchería visited by Zaldívar, the use of terminology such as streets and houses seems a bit extravagant. Perhaps Oñate was exaggerating for effect.

Oñate also describes his efforts concerning the Apaches. He claimed to have compelled them to render obedience to the king, but not, he added, by means of legal instruments used in the rest of the provinces. His effort had caused him much labor, diligence, care, long journeys with armed forces, in addition to being constantly alert to danger. Despite his efforts, internal dissension caused Oñate to offer his resignation in 1607, and by 1609 he had been replaced as governor of New Mexico.

For the first half century of contact, relations between the Spanish and the Apaches were relatively cordial. Other than Castaño de Sosa's clash with Apaches on the plains, there was no other recorded hostility between the plains Apaches and the Spaniards. To the contrary, the relationship seems to be one of trust, respect, and friendship with Apaches coming to visit Spanish leaders and to trade with the Pueblos.

The hostility with Apache tribes was primarily with the Navajos or western Apaches. The Acoma rebellion, where Apaches aided the Pueblos, was the most obvious hostility.
Acoma would be much more accessible by western Apaches than by eastern Apaches who would have had to travel through a relatively dense population area to reach it.

The other area of potential Apache conflict came from the north of Spanish settlements. A long period of drought between 1560-1593 increased tensions among the Indians living in the New Mexico area by lessening the food supply. This drought could have affected the plains Apaches and caused them to move into the mountains bordering on the Pueblos, but it is more likely that the Indians moving into the mountains were western Apaches who were seeking closer proximity to the Pueblos.

The Apaches living on the plains would have been less affected by a drought because of the buffalo, from which they obtained almost everything that they needed. Any surplus could be traded to the Pueblos. Apaches living in the mountains or west of the Rio Grande would be competing with Pueblos for game in the area and though many of them farmed to some extent, their crops would be adversely affected by the lack of rain. Lack of horses would also limit the ability of the Apaches to overcome Pueblos by themselves, but with assistance of friendly Pueblos to provide a base of operations and additional weapons, men, and supplies, Apache raiders might successfully attack a Pueblo.
In any case, it appears that any conflict between Apaches and Spaniards, or Apaches and Pueblos was limited to the Western Apaches and that the Apaches of the plains remained peaceful and friendly.
NOTES
2. Ibid., 523-524.
5. Hammond and Rey, Rediscovery, 260.
10. Sonnichsen, Mescalero Apaches, 31, states that Querecho was a Pueblo word meaning "Buffalo Eaters."
    Herbert Eugene Bolton, in Coronado: Knight of Pueblos and Plains (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1964), 246, states that the name possibly came from their trade with the Queres or Keres pueblos of New Mexico.
12. There is some dispute over the origin of the name "Querecho." Bolton, *Coronado*, 246, argues that it was a name given them by the Pueblo dwellers of Tiguex, and was possibly derived from their trade with the Queres or Keres pueblos of New Mexico. Sonnichsen, *Mescalero Apaches*, 31, on the other hand, states that it is a Pueblo word meaning "Buffalo Eaters."

13. Gunnerson, *Jicarilla Apaches*, 18-23, and Adolph F. Bandelier and Edgar L. Hewett, *Indians of the Rio Grande Valley* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1937), 184. Gunnerson suggests that the Querechos were Western Apaches and the Teyas were Eastern Apaches. Several historians had noted that the name Teya is currently used by Pueblos to identify Lipan Apaches. See Hyde, *Indians of the High Plains*, 7, and Terrell, *Plains Apache*, 20. Also see Carroll L. Riley, "The Teya Indians of the Southwestern Plains," in *The Coronado Expedition to Tierra Nueva: The 1540-1542 Route Across the Southwest*, ed. by Richard and Shirley Cushing Flint (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997), 325-326, 333. Riley argues that the Pueblo language connection of Teya to Apache is a "weak phonological fit and certainly a slim basis on which to rest a linguistic affiliation." He suggests instead that the Teya were linguistically related to the southernmost Pueblos and were Jumanos.


18. Ibid., 362-63.


21. Ibid., 198.

22. Ibid., 201-203.

23. Carl Sauer, in The Road to Cibola (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932), 38-39, suggests that these "Querechos" were Sumas.

25. Hammond and Rey, *Rediscovery* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966), 89-90, say there were fifty huts. This is apparently a misprint since with four hundred warriors, this would mean eight warriors per dwelling. With five hundred, that would mean less than a warrior per dwelling, which seems plausible, since not every dwelling would have a warrior and many warriors might have been absent hunting or performing other duties. Hammond and Rey repeat the mistake in their *The Gallegos Relation of the Rodriguez Expedition to New Mexico* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: El Palacio Press, 1927), 32-33.

26. Hammond and Rey, *Gallegos Relation*, 32-33, Hammond and Rey, *Obregon's History*, 304. Obregon also notes that the natives would not even approach a horse in a group because of their fear of the animal.


uncertain. It seems likely, however, that they were the same Indians earlier explorers referred to as Querechos rather than Jumanos who are also mentioned by early explorers as living more to the south of Castaño's location at this point. The Jumanos were never mentioned as having pack dogs or dog travois. Only Querechos and plains Apaches were known to use that method of transport. In addition, the Indian interpreters brought by Castaño would probably be familiar with the Jumano language, since they were relatively nearby, but might be unfamiliar with the Athapaskan of the plains Indians.


35.Accounts of Zaldívar's expedition may be found in Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542-1706* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), 223-232 and in Hammond and Rey, *Juan de Oñate*, 398-401. See also
Juan de Montoya, *New Mexico in 1602: Juan de Montoya's Relation of the Discovery of New Mexico* (Albuquerque: The Quivira Society, 1938), 50-53. The following account of the expedition is a summary of these sources.

36. Their sign for peace was to extend the palm of their right hand toward the sun and then bring it down on the person whose friendship they desired.

37. Hammond and Rey, *Don Juan de Oñate*, 746.


40. Hammond and Rey, *Don Juan de Oñate*, 751-52, 841, 854, 865. The arguments supporting an Apache identification for the Escanjaques are weak at best. Terrell, *Plains Apache*, 103-104, argues that the fact that Jusepe could not understand the Escanjaques was not remarkable at all, in fact, Terrell claims that Jusepe would have had to have been a linguist of exceptional talent to have been fluent in the Apache language. He also notes that languages have various dialects, phrases, and pronunciations. Then he compares the Athapaskan language of Alaska with that of Arizona, saying that they would have difficulty understanding each other. That is quite different from two tribes living in constant contact with each other, as was the case with the Apaches
and Escanjaques. There would have been little difference in the latter case and Jusepe should have been able to understand the Escanjaques with little problem, especially after living with the Apaches for several years and acting as an interpreter for the Spanish for a couple of years as well.

Hyde, Indians of the High Plains, 12, argues that the Escanjaques were most likely the Lipan, known as Cantsi by Caddoans. Hyde argues that "es" is the Spanish article and that the name might be "(Es) Cantsi (que)" written Escansaque. This ignores the fact that Oñate and other Spaniards claimed that the name originated from the Indians themselves. It was a word spoken by them when they made the sign of peace.


42. Hammond and Rey, *Juan de Oñate*, 827.


44. Ibid, 63.


47. Ibid., 218.
CHAPTER 3
THE ASCENDANCY OF THE APACHES, 1607-1691

During the seventeenth century, the Apaches began their march toward a dominant position on the plains and in the area east of the Rio Grande. They had inhabited the area for years but shared it with numerous other tribes. Overall, Apaches were a relatively mild-mannered people who traded with nearby pueblos and only on occasion warred with their neighbors.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the Apaches began to assert their dominance. Advantaged by their geographic position, the Apaches were able to trade with the Spanish, or raid them with impunity. Their proximity to the main source of horses allowed them to control the distribution of this vitally important animal and monopolize its use. With the advantage of access to Spanish material and horses, the Apaches quickly assumed dominance of the plains and began subduing and isolating their enemies. By the end of the century, the Apaches had become lords of the southern plains.

After Juan de Oñate's resignation in 1607, there were several years of confusion during which the Spanish crown
debated the fate of New Mexico. No great wealth had been discovered, and since the natives were hostile, the conversion of them was unpromising. The deciding factor proved to be the uncertain fate of the few converted natives should the Spanish withdraw. The Council of the Indies felt it was unjust to desert the recent converts, but also felt that relocation of them would be too disruptive to their lives. In 1609 Fray Francisco de Velasco, arguing in favor of a continued Spanish presence in New Mexico, underscored the Council's position. He claimed that the Picurís, Taos, Pecos, Apaches, and Vaqueros had formed a league among themselves to exterminate the Spanish-friendly pueblos.\(^1\)

Interestingly, Father Velasco included the Vaqueros in this pact. Whether such a plan actually existed or not is certainly debatable. As seen previously, bands of Apaches often worked with individual pueblos toward common goals and for plunder, but it is unlikely that these natives had an organized alliance aimed at exterminating the pro-Spanish pueblos. It is even less likely that the Vaqueros, or Apaches from the buffalo plains, would be so directly involved in such a plot. Most likely, Father Velasco portrayed the worst possible scenario in order to increase support for a continued Spanish presence in New Mexico.
Once Santa Fe was founded in 1609-1610, the Spanish in New Mexico began to have increased contact with the natives of the region, including the various Apache groups. One of the first groups to be given a specific name was the Quinia Apaches, named after the chief of the tribe. The Quinia Apaches lived ten leagues north of Taos, and it is possible that these natives were the ancestors of the Jicarilla Apaches.\(^2\)

From 1621 to 1626, Fray Pedro de Ortega, the missionary at Taos, had contact with the Quinia Apaches. Chief Quinia was favorably disposed toward the Spanish. In fact, his friendly attitude toward the Spanish caused him to be shot with an arrow by one of his own people. Fray Ortega and another friar skilled in surgery traveled ten leagues in order to administer to Quinia, and when the chief recovered he decided to convert to Christianity. He was baptized by Fray Ortega in 1628.\(^3\)

Chief Quinia visited Santa Fe in 1629 to guide Fray Bartolomé Romero to his tribe. Romero had been appointed to convert Quinia's tribe by Fray Alonso de Benavides, custodian of the New Mexican missions. Quinia brought his son and a famed native warrior that he had captured in battle with him. Both of these natives accepted baptism and the Spanish governor, Francisco de Silva Nieto, acted as godfather to Quinia's son. When Quinia and the missionary
departed, the governor and fifty soldiers escorted the friar to the ranchería.  

The escort proved to be unnecessary because the Quinia Apaches did not resist the Spaniards, but rather welcomed them and sought baptism. In fact, in one day the group built a log church. The governor and Father Romero helped carry the logs, and the soldiers and Indians pitched in to assemble the building. After getting the missionary settled, the governor returned to Santa Fe. Father Romero continued to teach the natives, but Quinia soon rebelled and at one point attempted to murder Romero. Having failed, Quinia took his tribe to a new location away from the missionary's influence. A single native remained faithful to father Romero and protected him several times when the Apaches returned and attempted to kill him. Eventually, Romero abandoned his post and returned to Santa Fe.  

The Spanish also showed interest in Christianizing the Vaquero Apaches. The first conversions from this tribe occurred through contact with friars at pueblos where the Vaqueros came to trade dressed buffalo hides. During one of their visits, the Vaqueros learned that the Spanish had a sculptured image of Mary, the mother of Jesus, at a chapel in Santa Fe. They went to see it and were impressed--first seeing it at night when it was surrounded by many lighted candles with music playing in the background. Several
principal chiefs visited, worshipped, and converted at this site.\textsuperscript{6}

This promising beginning was frustrated when Governor Felipe Sotelo sent a Pueblo Indian captain to raid nearby tribes and bring back captives for slaves. The captain raided the camp of the Vaquero chief who had been most vocal in his support of Catholic conversion. The chief had a rosary given him by Father Benavides, and when the Pueblos attacked, he held it before him and begged for his life. It was to no avail. The Vaquero leader was killed along with a number of his followers. Others were taken captive and brought back to the governor. The attack on the peaceful Vaquero camp created an uproar among the religious community. The governor was displeased by the protest of the clergy but accepted the captives regardless. He later released them because of the clamor that surrounded the attack.\textsuperscript{7}

As a result of this incident, Benavides remarked that the Vaqueros revolted throughout the province. However, when Benavides departed in 1629, he expressed his belief that the Spanish were reclaiming control over the area. In his revised Memorial of 1634, Benavides was even more positive. He proudly remarked that through the work of the Franciscans, the Vaquero Apaches were at peace once more and many had been Christianized. Otherwise, he continued, they
would have already killed all of the Christians upon whom they had warred.⁸

Benavides also mentions a tribe known as the Apaches of Perillo. The tribe's name, which means "little dog," originated from a spring in the Jornado del Muerto, north of El Paso. A small dog had discovered the water hole five to six miles west of the road, accessible only through a narrow canyon. The Perillo Apaches lived in the vicinity of the spring. Despite being "very warlike," Benavides asserted, "they are more to be trusted than the forgoing nations and we pass by way of them with less anxiety."⁹ There is a general consensus that the Apaches of Perillo made up a part of the natives eventually known as the Mescalero Apaches.¹⁰

Concerning the Apache nation as a whole, Benavides noted that "without exaggeration, it alone has more people than all the Nations of New Spain [put] together, even including the Mexican [nation]." He further claimed that armies of more than 30,000 had been seen on their way to war with each other.¹¹ Obviously this is an exaggeration, especially the latter statement concerning Apache armies. Part of Benavides's motivation was to encourage further missionary activity in New Mexico by enlarging the number of potential converts in the region.¹²

Serious trouble began brewing between civil and religious leaders of the province of New Mexico in the
1620s. This struggle would be an important factor in dealing with the Apaches. Both civil and religious authorities blamed each other for lost opportunities and for creating problems that eventually led to a breakdown of relations between the Spanish and the Apaches. Governor Sotelo's raid, mentioned above, set the stage.

The conflict between the clergy and civil authorities exploded during the governorship of Luis de Rosas, who arrived in New Mexico in 1637. Rosas took the struggle directly to the Vaquero Apaches on the plains. Being disappointed by a lack of trade with the Vaqueros at Pecos, Rosas apparently blamed the priest stationed at Pecos for the lack of activity and forcefully dragged him back to Santa Fe. The governor later sent an expedition toward Quivira that killed a number of Vaqueros and captured even more to be brought back to Santa Fe, where they could be sold as slaves in Nueva Vizcaya. The Pecos Indians vigorously protested these activities, because they relied upon trade with peaceful Vaquero Apaches for many of their goods.13

Rosas's raids increased the hostility of Apaches on the plains. Supporters of Rosas claimed that his raids helped to force the Apaches to reduce their activities, but evidence indicates that the Vaqueros were relatively peaceful toward the Spanish at the time. In the midst of this power
struggle, the Taos Indians revolted and fled to the plains to establish a new pueblo at El Cuartelejo, apparently in present-day Scott County in western Kansas.\textsuperscript{14}

The Taos natives lived among the Apaches for approximately two years before Juan de Archuleta led twenty Spaniards and Indian auxiliaries to bring them back to Taos.\textsuperscript{15} Obviously, despite the Spanish raids and the use of Pueblo auxiliaries, the Plains Indians continued to have relatively peaceful relations with the Pueblos. The Taos natives chose to abandon their homes and flee to the plains for life among the Apaches, rather than face potential problems and the burdens of tribute placed upon them by the Spaniards. A number of other Pueblo groups followed that same pattern and Apaches sometimes fought to help defend these runaways when Spaniards came looking for them.\textsuperscript{16}

During the 1650s, slave raids on the Apaches increased. Governor Juan Manso de Contreras (1656-1659) managed to convince some Picurís to join the Spanish on slave raids. This was a departure from the generally friendly relations that these Pueblos had with the Apaches. Contreras's successor, Bernardo López de Mendizábal, increased the hostility toward the Apaches by provoking hostility at every possible opportunity in order to "legitimize" the taking of captives. According to Spanish law, only captives acquired
in wars of reprisal were legitimate candidates for enslavement.\textsuperscript{17}

Mendizábal drew up more than ninety decrees to justify the taking of captives, and he claimed to have owned ninety Apache slaves during his term. They were employed in sweatshops (obrajes), along with unemployed Pueblos and Spaniards, to produce goods for export. These workers washed hides, tanned leather, painted leather door hangings, and manufactured shoes and leather doublets. Earlier, Governor Rosas had similarly used Ute and Apache captives to enrich himself.\textsuperscript{18}

At one point, Governor Mendizábal organized a slave-raiding expedition of forty colonists and eight hundred Pueblos and sent them to the plains. They brought back seventy captives, but in their absence, Apaches from other areas raided the weakened settlements, killing villagers, stealing livestock, and taking captives of their own.\textsuperscript{19}

Perhaps as a result of increased Spanish raids, the Apaches of the plains stopped bringing their dog trains, women, and children into the Río Grande Valley. Instead, they limited their trade with the border pueblos, especially Pecos and Las Humañas, or allowed Spanish traders to seek them out on the plains. Despite the lessened contact, the Spanish continued to take captives. They seized captives who came to the border settlements to trade, provoked trouble
when they visited the rancherías to trade, or hired Indian allies to capture Apaches for them.\textsuperscript{20}

Not every expedition to the plains was with such malicious intent, however. In 1660 Captain Diego Romero led a party of soldiers out to the plains to trade with the Apaches. The Indians welcomed the Spanish party. They informed Romero that his father had visited them years earlier and had fathered a son with one of the Apache women. They indicated that Romero should do the same. Romero complied, apparently undergoing a native marriage ceremony before sleeping with one of the Apache women. Various other ceremonies were performed during his stay in which the Apaches made him a captain, awarding him with two bundles of skins and a tent.\textsuperscript{21}

Whether these types of ceremonies improved the relationship between the Spanish and the Apaches of the plains is unclear. The Apaches did not take such ceremonies lightly, but they had honored several other Spaniards, including Romero's father, with the title of captain. The Apaches perhaps hoped that by offering such titles to Spanish leaders they could escape the slave raids. The success of such a ploy seems tenuous at best, since the slave raids continued and plains Apaches were at times the victims.
Apache raids seem to have increased along the southern Río Grande, especially at the pueblo of Las Humañas. In 1650 the Spanish in New Mexico had traveled to the upper branch of the Colorado River in Texas where they discovered some pearls and established trade with the Jumanos in the area. For the next several years, the Spanish exchanged New Mexican articles for buffalo hides. The plains Apaches, probably in an attempt to prevent this trade, increased their attacks on Las Humañas, the most logical base for exchange.22

In 1652 Apache raiders plundered Las Humañas and profaned the church, carrying off twenty-seven women and children as captives. The Spanish responded with an expedition to the Sierra Blanca Mountains that left the Apaches "well punished."23 It is unclear who the raiding Apaches were. They apparently came from the Sierra Blanca mountains to the east, and they might have been the forerunners of the Mescalero. It is likely that these eastern Apaches attacked the pueblo to disrupt its trade with the Jumanos, enemies of the plains Apaches.

By 1660 Las Humañas was still an important trading center, but the Jumanos from the region beyond the Pecos were replaced with Apache traders. The visits were not always peaceful, but they increased in frequency.24 It is apparent from the activities around Las Humañas that the
Apaches were extending their influence further south, forcing the Jumanos, their rivals in the area, to retreat.

In 1659 a severe famine caused Apaches to come to the northern pueblos to trade their captives, and, in some cases, their own children for food. The Franciscan missionaries took advantage of the situation to purchase many of the Apache children and convert them. The governor of New Mexico also took advantage of the situation to seize and enslave many of the Apaches who peacefully came to trade.  

This event proved to be an important turning point for the Apache Indians. The insatiable desire of the Spanish for slaves, and perhaps the success and profitability in selling their captives, caused the Apaches to become slave traders themselves. By supplying slaves, the Apaches also lessened Spanish raids on their own rancherías, so, in effect, they began dealing in slaves for self preservation.

Prior to 1659, the Apaches had traded mainly hides, meat, and salt, with a few slaves bartered or given as gifts from time to time. After 1659, however, slaves became such a major part of the trade that the seasonal trade fairs in New Mexico came to be called "ransomings." Most of the slaves appear to have been Caddoan stock taken in raids toward Quivira.
Thus, by 1660, the Apaches of the plains were becoming more aggressive toward their neighbors. This forced the Jumanos of the plains further south out of contact with the Spanish and Pueblos near Las Humañas, allowing the Apaches to dominate contact and trade in that area themselves. They raided the Quivirans and other Caddoans to the east to supply slaves for the insatiable Spanish market. They maintained a relatively peaceful coexistence with the Spanish in New Mexico, withdrawing from direct contact to reduce friction and relying upon the Pecos pueblo as their primary trade outlet.

The decade of the 1660s saw drought, famine, and pestilence weaken the Pueblos and Europeans. It most likely affected the plains Apaches as well. When there was adequate rainfall for Pueblos to produce surplus crops and for plains Indians to hunt a surplus of game, peace generally prevailed. When drought caused a reduction of crops available for trade or game became scarce, the Apaches often turned to raids to acquire corn and other goods from the Pueblos, sometimes overrunning their smaller settlements. When the drought ended, peace generally returned.27

The crisis hit first in the southern Pueblos. In 1661 at Las Humañas, a crop shortage caused both natives and Europeans to consume crops before they were ripe. Between 1667 and 1669 no crops were harvested and the inhabitants
were reduced to eating cow hides, toasting them to make them more edible. In the midst of this crisis, an epidemic, possibly small pox, ravaged the Indian towns. Four hundred and fifty natives starved to death at Las Humañas alone.\textsuperscript{28}

With hundreds dying, the southern Pueblos planned to rise up, with aid from the Apaches, and overthrow the oppressive Spaniards. Several plots were discovered and the leaders hanged, but the Piros and Tompiros did revolt with the assistance of Apaches, only to be crushed by the Spanish. The natives were then impressed into service to aid the Spanish against their former Apache allies. Once the Apaches were faced with these attacks, they responded by changing their tactics from small-scale raids to full-scale attacks aimed at destruction of the Pueblos.\textsuperscript{29}

During the winter of 1668-1669, Governor Juan Rodríguez de Medrano summoned the New Mexico encomenderos to Santa Fe to organize a campaign against eastern Apaches who had been harassing the Saline Pueblos.\textsuperscript{30} The encomendero of Las Humanas had died and when his son refused the summons, the governor transferred the encomienda to Juan Domínguez de Mendoza for three generations in reward for his valuable services in leading many campaigns against the Apaches.\textsuperscript{31}

Domínguez de Mendoza showed his worth when, in 1670, the Apaches from the Seven Rivers district (lower Pecos) swept through Las Humañas, sacking the church, smashing and
breaking sacred images and ornaments. The Apaches killed eleven inhabitants and carried off thirty captives. Mendoza promptly responded by gathering thirty Spaniards and three hundred Pueblos to pursue the raiders. The expedition managed to kill thirteen Apache warriors and recovered six Christian captives.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite Domínguez de Mendoza's vigorous activities, he could not save the pueblo from destruction. In 1672 the Apaches launched another massive attack on Las Humañas. This time after robbing and sacking their way through the pueblo, they plundered the cattle and sheep herds that had previously been very productive. After the raiders withdrew, they prevented the Pueblos from working in the fields or hunting. They repeatedly crept to the pueblo at night and ambushed citizens. Under this constant harassment, the inhabitants, consisting of approximately five hundred families, eventually packed up and evacuated the settlement.\textsuperscript{33}

The Saline pueblos followed shortly thereafter. Within a five-to six-year period, over twelve hundred families from six pueblos were driven from their homes. The refugees fled to pueblos along the Río Grande. Some settled in Socorro and Senecú. Others fled all the way to the El Paso region. Still others fled to the Isleta and Albuquerque regions. The
Apache raiders, however, did not relent and pursued the fleeing natives to their new residences.\(^{34}\)

In January 1675, the Apaches surprised Senecú, killing the missionary and most of the inhabitants. Survivors fled to neighboring Socorro or El Paso. During the following year, Apache raids destroyed several other pueblos and churches and killed many Spaniards and converted natives. Spaniards retaliated by hanging captive Apaches or selling them into slavery.\(^{35}\)

While the Saline pueblos were being ravaged in the south, the northern pueblos, especially Pecos, escaped virtually unscathed. Most of the Apache raiders were from western New Mexico, either Navaho or Western Apaches, and they could not easily reach Pecos because of the intervening settlements along the Río Grande. Other raiders came from the mountains to the south or southeast of the Saline pueblos. The Apaches from the plains appear to have been relatively docile during this period. In fact, the plains Apaches continued to attend annual trade fairs at Pecos even as the pueblos to the south were suffering from destructive raids.\(^{36}\)

The Spanish, with increasing unrest among the Pueblo Indians and escalating hostility among many of the Apache groups surrounding New Mexico, were no doubt gratified by the relative peacefulness of the plains Apaches. The
Vaqueros, for their part, needed a place to trade their hides and Quiviran slaves and therefore were reluctant to cause trouble at Pecos. The Spanish were also interested in news from Quivira. They incessantly questioned Apaches visiting Pecos concerning the potential wealth of the Quivirans, asking the natives if, in their raids on that eastern tribe, they had noticed any golden bands or other signs of riches. While the negative answers of the Apaches left many Spanish disappointed, others still held dreams of discovering the fabled cities of gold from the days of Coronado.37

One of the most important factors leading to the increased aggressiveness of Apaches during the middle of the seventeenth century was their acquisition of the horse. Afoot, the Apaches were at a disadvantage when attacking pueblos or Spanish settlements. They could not escape quickly, especially when laden with plunder. Therefore, trade was a more profitable means of securing the items that they desired. Once they obtained the horse, however, it became a much simpler process to raid. Apaches could approach settlements quickly, then without warning attack, plunder, and escape, almost before the inhabitants could respond and defend themselves. If horses were the targets, then the process was further simplified by the fact that the plunder "carried" itself.
The Apaches began using horses for purposes other than food at some point between 1620 and 1630. By the 1650s horses were being used in raids against Spanish and Pueblo settlements, and by the 1670s Spanish horse herds had been reduced dramatically. The Río Grande valley was virtually depleted of horses by raiding Apaches. The Santa Fe presidio cavalry was essentially horseless with no means to pursue and punish marauders. In 1677 Father Francisco de Ayeta, the Franciscan superior of the New Mexico missions, brought a wagon train of supplies to Santa Fe, including one thousand horses for the troops. He later returned to Mexico to bring more. On his return to New Mexico in 1680, with wagons of supplies, horses, and fifty soldiers recruited from Mexico City, he encountered Spanish refugees fleeing from the Pueblo Revolt on the Río Grande. 38

It is unclear how large a role the Apaches played in the Pueblo Revolt. Apaches certainly had no love for the Spanish and had, in fact, many grievances against them, most relating to slave raids. Still, the only Apaches positively identified as having directly participated in the revolt were a group called the Achos, who lived near Taos. These Indians are usually identified as a band of Jicarillas. In any case, they apparently assisted the Taos and Picurís in massacring and expelling Spaniards from the vicinity. Either the Achos or other Apache groups also gave practical support
to the rebelling Pueblos by rounding up and tending all of the horses they could find, thus denying their use to the Spaniards and freeing the Pueblos to focus on the sheep and cattle herds.\textsuperscript{39}

It will be remembered that the Pueblos and Apaches in this northern area had an unusually close relationship. The Picurís had fled Spanish rule to live among the Apaches of El Curatelejo in the 1630s. Many of the refugees had been forced to return to Picurís shortly thereafter, but at least a few stayed among the Apaches for several more years. No doubt there was at least some intermarriage between the two tribes, which would have strengthened the bond. If the Achos were indeed from El Cuartelejo, this would account for their participation in killing Spaniards during the revolt.

Other Apache tribes also had involvement with Pueblos who were planning revolts. The Spanish in El Paso believed that they had thwarted an earlier uprising of the Pueblos that would have included Apache support. In 1653 Captain Francisco de Ortega pursued a group of raiding Apaches who had stolen a herd of mares from the Río Abajo area. Ortega's party caught the raiders in a surprise attack at night and killed them all while recovering the herd. From signs, knife marks, and other things discovered in the camp, they discovered how the Apaches had been in communication with some of the Christianized Indians. A large confederation was
uncovered and the guilty Indians punished. As a result, the Apaches in the area became more peaceful and friendly.⁴⁰

There are numerous other examples of cooperation or at least suspected cooperation between Apaches and Pueblos. Governor Antonio de Otermín (1677-1683), who was governor during the rebellion, held the Apaches personally responsible. He believed that they had long urged the Pueblos to rebel, and their constant attacks had served to weaken Spanish power. Spanish refugees of the Great Pueblo Revolt were shadowed by Apaches along their entire retreat to El Paso, and fear that they might attack was a major factor in influencing the complete withdrawal of the Europeans.⁴¹

Earlier, when the rebellious Pueblos had surrounded Otermín and his followers at Santa Fe, one of the Pueblo leaders met with the governor and asked for the release of all captives held by the Spanish, including the Indian leader's wife and children. The Pueblo chief claimed that Apache Indians among the rebels had asked about their people and that if Otermín refused to meet their demands the attackers would declare war immediately. The native leader also informed the Spanish governor that the rebels were expecting reinforcements from the Taos, Picurís, and Teguas nations.
Otermín rejected these demands. He believed that no Apaches were present, because they were then at war with the Pueblos and would not, therefore, be cooperating with them.⁴²

In fact, there were at least a few Apaches among the Pueblos, and they would have been interested in the release of family members being held by the Spanish. Otermín was correct, however, in his assumption that the Pueblo leader made the Apache presence seem more ominous than it was. In fact, a few days later, after the siege of Santa Fe began in earnest, the Pueblos informed the Spanish that, having received the expected pueblo reinforcements, none of the Spanish could escape because aid from the Apaches had been summoned and was expected at any moment.⁴³

As mentioned, a few Apaches participated in the attack on Santa Fe. When the Spanish finally pushed the rebels out of the villa, killing three hundred and taking forty-seven captives, the captives informed the Spaniards that all of the Pueblo tribes and Apaches had allied to push the Spanish from New Mexico. Shortly after the battle, a Spanish friar noted the bodies of various Pueblo tribes and Apaches among the scattered dead, apparently validating the Indian claim.⁴⁴ The Pueblos no doubt hoped to increase the desperation of the Spanish by exaggerating the extent of the
forces organized against them, but the presence of at least a few Apaches cannot be denied.

Still, the Apache do not seem to have participated in the rebellion in large numbers. They were, however, a constant threat. The Spanish were wary of their nearby presence, and almost all accounts express fear of potential Apache attacks.

From the Apaches' point of view, the Pueblo revolt would have predominantly positive effects. Most important, it would remove the presence of Spanish slavers and result in more Pueblo products being available for the Apaches. Negatively, it would remove the major source of horses and European goods. Whether the Apaches were major participants in the revolt or not, they definitely had an interest in the outcome. They were also doubtlessly looking for any opportunity to snatch more horses or plunder from the beleaguered Spanish, although such activity seems not to have occurred.

Raiding Apaches were not always detrimental to the Spaniards. In fact, shortly after the Pueblo Revolt, a body of Tiwa and Piros traveled toward El Paso, intent on assaulting the ranches in the area. Instead, they encountered a band of Faraone Apaches who killed five of the Pueblos and forced them to turn back. The Faraones, a name derived from the Spanish word for "Pharaoh," were an Apache
group that resided generally between the Río Pecos and Río Grande. The name first appeared in 1675, but by the early nineteenth century was replaced by the term Mescalero.\textsuperscript{46}

Once the Spanish retreated to El Paso, the Apache began raids on them in that locale. The first major attack occurred in January 1682. Apache raiders carried off two hundred horses. Raids on El Paso increased significantly after Spanish refugees from Santa Fe relocated there. Increased activity may be explained by a greater population and thus greater wealth in the area. Additionally, Apaches who had raided Santa Fe and the northern settlements for horses had to find a new source, and El Paso served nicely.\textsuperscript{47}

Governor Otermín planned an immediate campaign to reestablish Spanish rule over the New Mexican pueblos. Unfortunately, lack of manpower and supplies, combined with constant threats from Apaches and other nearby tribes delayed any action. The Mansos, Sumas, and Janos, tribes native to the El Paso region, became increasingly restless as the sudden increase in population in the area disrupted their normal economic patterns.\textsuperscript{48}

By November 1681, the region surrounding El Paso had been sufficiently pacified and Otermín was ready to attempt reconquest. Spaniards, numbering 146, and 112 Indian allies headed north on November 6. Along the way they saw many
signs of Apaches, both mounted and afoot. When the army reached Senecú, the Spanish found the pueblo deserted. They also found, as Otermín put it, "many signs of the apostates having deserted the place from fear, being oppressed by the heathen Apaches."  

After burning the deserted pueblo, the Spaniards continued northward, seeing more signs of Apaches. They saw indications that Apaches had driven herds from the interior pueblos to their homelands. The Spanish found an abandoned Apache camp in a canyon where the Apaches had apparently been camped in ambush. Otermín assumed that Apaches from this camp had sacked a nearby pueblo.

Otermín and other Spaniards thought the reconquest would be relatively easy. They believed that the Apaches would ravage the Pueblos without Spanish protection and that many Pueblos would welcome the Spanish back. They were quite mistaken in these assumptions. In fact, Fray Francisco de Ayeta, who accompanied Otermín's attempted reconquest, noted that the Pueblos had in many cases asked the Apaches for assistance and received it. In addition, continued Ayeta, the Apaches had not destroyed a single pueblo or even damaged one severely.

The Apaches had even parleyed with the Pueblos, spending months at dances, fiestas, and other entertainments. In the end, however, the Apache refused to
commit to peaceful relations and departed still at war. Despite hostilities, the Pueblos had maintained themselves successfully without Spanish aid.\textsuperscript{52}

Several interesting points emerge from Otermín's unsuccessful campaign. First of all, Otermín automatically assumed that the abandoned pueblos he encountered resulted from Apache raids. There is at least an equal chance that the pueblos were abandoned to avoid the return of the Spanish. The damage done by the Apaches could well have occurred after the inhabitants had deserted.

The fact that Apache signs indicated the presence of women and children demonstrates that these Apaches were not a war party. Likewise, the Apache camp situated in the canyon was most likely not there for an ambush. The Indians had simply picked a safe, hidden refuge to encamp. If they had families with them, the secure camp makes more sense.

Otermín's campaign convinced him that reconquering New Mexico could not be easily accomplished. As he admitted in a letter to the viceroy, the damage caused by raiding Apaches was less than he had expected or hoped. Accordingly, the Pueblo Indians appeared determined to retain their independence. Otermín recommended that the Spanish exiles and loyal Pueblos be settled in the vicinity of El Paso as a bulwark to protect Nueva Vizcaya. However, during his
absence, the Apaches had raided El Paso and driven off two hundred animals. This loss combined with those lost on the campaign placed the Spanish in a difficult position.\footnote{53}

In 1682 Apaches from the plains were reportedly raiding the frontiers of Sonora in conjunction with the more westerly Apaches. These Apaches had normally been peaceful when trading with the Spaniards at New Mexico, but, apparently lacking this outlet for trade, joined their Gila Apache kin to raid the Sonoran frontier for horses. The Apaches coming from the plains were in great need of horses, since they did not breed the animals themselves but relied on the Spanish for their supply.\footnote{54}

In August 1683, a group of Jumanos visited El Paso in an effort to reestablish contact and trade with the Spanish. They also requested aid against their Apache enemies. The Jumanos and their allies even offered to donate supplies if the Spaniards would assist them in a campaign against the Apaches. Unfortunately, Otermín's term was about to expire and he did not feel that the situation in El Paso was stable enough to risk an expedition.\footnote{55}

When Domingo Jironza Petris de Cruzate arrived at El Paso to assume the governorship, he wrote to the viceroy that the Apaches were so active in their raids that the few horses that remained in the settlement had to be tied to the doors of the settler's huts at night in order to prevent
them from being stolen. He later claimed to have subdued the Apaches by leading a campaign to a ranchería, killing many and taking twenty-two captives. The Apaches, he continued, had been less troublesome since the campaign.  

The Jumanos soon returned, again seeking aid from the Spaniards. In addition to requesting assistance and asking for missionaries, the Jumanos also mentioned the presence of other "Spaniards" to the east, undoubtedly French. The threat of French moving into Spanish territory and the opportunity to create an alliance with Quivira and Tejas convinced Jironza to organize an expedition of twenty volunteers led by Captain Juan Domínguez de Mendoza.  

Domínguez de Mendoza led his expedition to the junction of the Pecos and Teyah Creek, where Juan Sabeata, the Jumano leader, and a number of chiefs from other tribes held a conference with him. The Indians begged the Spanish for help against the Apaches. Domínguez de Mendoza reluctantly agreed to wage war on the enemy tribe. A few days later, the Spanish, accompanied by Jumanos and other allies, set off for the plains.  

On numerous occasions, scouts reported that Apaches were in the vicinity. Finally, the scouts reported sighting an Apache ranchería. The Spanish leader sent additional scouts to verify the location, but it turned out to be a false alarm, although the scouts did find old tracks in the
area. A short time later, Domínguez de Mendoza became suspicious of Sabeata and dismissed him and his followers. The commander felt that Sabeata had continuously delayed and misled the Spanish. He later wrote that he believed that Sabeata had plotted with other Indian nations to kill the Spaniards. \(^5^9\)

During the journey, the Apaches made three raids on the expedition, stealing horses in each case and wounding a Spaniard on the third attack. Domínguez de Mendoza believed that he lacked sufficient manpower and munitions to pursue the raiders or to wage a large-scale war. Accordingly, he decided to return to El Paso. Suspicions concerning the loyalty of the Indian allies might also have contributed to the Spanish commander's decision. The Spaniards did, however, manage to kill more than four thousand buffaloes during their trip and returned to El Paso with wagonloads of pelts. \(^6^0\)

Domínguez de Mendoza's expedition was a success economically, but a failure as far as Indian relations were concerned. He alienated Sabeata and the Jumanos. He might even have increased the enmity of the plains Apaches toward the Spanish. The Apaches who raided the expedition for horses were not specifically identified, but the location of the expedition indicates a group residing on the plains.
In 1685 the viceroy appointed Fray Alonso de Posada to write a report on New Mexico. Posada had gone to the province for the first time in 1651 and assumed the position of custodian of the New Mexican missions in 1660. Although he had not been in New Mexico for nearly twenty years, Posada's report gives a good indication of the situation as the Spanish perceived it. As such, it is appropriate to quote sections at length.  

Reporting on the Apaches, Posada wrote that

...there is a nation which they call the Apacha which possesses and is owner of all the plains of Cibola. The Indians of this nation are so arrogant, haughty and such boastful warriors that they are the common enemy of all nations who live below the northern region. They hold these others as cowards. They have destroyed, ruined or driven most of them from their lands. This nation occupies and has its own lands and as such they defend them, four hundred leagues from west to east; from north to south, two hundred leagues, and in some places more.

Their central dwelling place is the plains of Cibola bounded on the east by the Quivera with whom they have always had war, and have it now; with the nation of the Texas who bound them on the same side, with whom they also have always had war. Although these two nations are extensive and populous, the Apacha nation, which stretches along the frontiers of the land within for two hundred leagues, as has been noted, have always not only held them within their own boundaries but on many different occasions have invaded their lands....

To the south, continued Posada, the Apaches had pushed resident Indians, including the Jumanos, to the Río Grande and beyond. The Apaches were at war with all of the tribes in the vicinity of El Paso, even extending their raids to
Sonora. For a distance of one hundred leagues to the west of El Paso, the Apache had driven out or subdued the Indian nations. In addition, a large number of Apaches lived in the fertile pastures and meadows extending some fifty leagues north of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa.

Posada located the Yutas (Utes) seventy leagues to the north along the Colorado River. These natives were friendly toward the Spanish and they alone, of all the nations bordering the Apache, were "equal in manliness to the Apacha with whom they war." From the Ute country to the east, the Apache nation continued until once again encountering the Quivirans.

Posada concluded that

all the sierras that are within and those which surround the province of New Mexico the Apacha nation claims as its own. It has fought so much with the Spaniards that they ordinarily go about with their arms in hands. They have made many attacks from prepared ambushes on Indian pueblos, killing atrociously the warriors, carrying off the women and children alive, considering them as legitimate captives, laying waste usually the irrigated fields of maize, running off day and night horseherds of the Spaniards and inflicting all the rest of the injuries which the force of their fierce arrogance imposes. With special care all of the Indians of this nation who live on the eastern side of the provinces of New Mexico have always maintained peace with the Spaniards to trade and exchange their hides and chamois, but protect on the other hand the very Indians who live in the mountains surrounding New Mexico and who war on the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{62}
From Posada's report it becomes apparent that the Apaches were the dominant tribe of New Mexico. It is also clear that, from Posada's perspective, they were expanding their control at the expense of neighboring tribes. Only the Ute (Yutas) seem to have been able to meet the ferocity of the Apaches and to maintain their position and territory. Finally, Posada reminds the reader that the Apaches living to the east of New Mexico, out on the plains, had maintained a continuous peace with the Spanish, if only to have a place to trade.

Posada recommended that a presidio be established on the Río de las Nueces, where plenty of pasturage and farmland was available. One hundred soldiers and settlers could easily maintain such a post, and Posada supported relying on the Jumanos for support. They, he believed, would willingly settle in the area, since it had once been theirs before the Apaches had forced them out. The desire for vengeance and the Jumano inclination toward Christianity would compel them to remain loyal. As it turned out, Posada's recommendation was never acted upon, partly because the reconquest of New Mexico was considered a higher priority.

The reconquest would not occur, however, until the appointment of Diego de Vargas who arrived in El Paso in 1691. A step toward repairing relations with the Apaches had
occurred in September 1689 when the Apaches made peace with the Spaniards at El Paso. The previously hostile natives peacefully visited many of the neighboring pueblos. Father Francisco de Vargas, custodian of the New Mexico missions, encouraged missionaries to take advantage of the situation to win the souls of the Apaches. The Apaches of the Organ Mountains, thirty leagues north of El Paso, summoned Fray Vargas to visit them and he stayed among them for two days. Despite the fact that he was unprotected among numerous Indians, they did him no harm.  

Near Parral, a group of Apaches captured some missionaries. They later set them free without harming them, having fed them from their own food stores. This cordial peace was short lived, but it gave the Spanish hope that a more permanent peace might be achieved. It also stabilized the situation in the vicinity of El Paso at least temporarily allowed the Spanish to strengthen their position there. When Diego de Vargas finally arrived in El Paso in February 1691, he was able to concentrate on the reconquest of New Mexico, rather than subduing the natives around El Paso.

Between 1609 and 1691, the Spanish went from attempting to strengthen their hold in New Mexico to trying to keep a foothold at El Paso. The Apaches went from being relatively
peaceful and weak to being the most formidable natives in the area. The Apaches of the plains most clearly made this transition. The acquisition of the horse was a large part of this conversion. With the horse the Apaches were able to increase their range of their raids and trading expeditions. It also increased their success in hunting. Spanish slave raids forced the plains Apaches to raid their neighbors for captives to supply the insatiable demands of the Spanish for slaves. If the Apaches had not brought slaves to the Spanish, the Europeans would surely have raided Apache rancherías for captives.

When the Pueblos rebelled in 1680 and forced the Spanish from New Mexico, the Apaches played only a peripheral role. They were mainly concerned with plunder. The plains Apaches in particular had no real stake in the fortunes of the Spanish. In fact, the absence of Spaniards in New Mexico was actually detrimental to these Apaches, because it removed their primary source of horses and European goods. Since the Apaches did not breed horses, they had to find a new source once the Spanish retreated from New Mexico. El Paso served as the new source.

The Apaches on the plains increased their dominance during this period. Slowly they began to force competitors from the plains and intimidated their neighbors through raids. For example, their biggest rivals, the Jumanos, were
effectively pushed out during this period. First, the Apaches drove a wedge between the pueblos near Las Humañas and the Jumanos, eventually destroying the pueblos themselves as Spanish and Pueblo forces began staging campaigns against the Apaches from there.

When the Spanish retreated to El Paso, the Jumanos tried to reestablish trade relations and sought Spanish aid against the Apaches. The Apaches were able to cut off the Jumano-Spanish contact by forcing their way between the two groups again and by raiding both. Once the Apaches had removed their competitors from the El Paso region, they became more interested in peace with the Spaniards.
NOTES
1. George P. Hammond, Don Juan de Oñate and the Founding of New Mexico (Santa Fe: El Palacio Press, 1927), 172-177; Hammond and Rey, Don Juan de Oñate, 1093-1094.

2. Gunnerson, Jicarilla Apaches, 70-71, notes that the Mescalero called Jicarilla "kinya-inde" (inde being the equivalent of "people"). Kinya broken down in Navaho forms "kin" or "khin" meaning house and "ya" meaning high, possibly referring to houses at a high location or a multi-story house. Therefore, over time, the name Quinia could have been corrupted to Kinya (Jicarilla).


6. Hodge, Hammond, and Rey, Benavides' Revised Memorial, 91-92; Peter P. Forrestal, trans., Benavides' Memorial of 1630 (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan
History, 1954), 55.


8. Forrestal, Benavides' Memorial, 56; Hodge, Hammond, and Rey, Benavides' Revised Memorial, 92. John Upton Terrill, Plains Apache, 114, argues that the Apache captives who were released left their dead and goods behind and fled to the plains. Before the year was over, they had issued a formal declaration of war, sending word throughout the southwest that they would wage continual offensive against the Spanish in New Mexico. For the next century, he argues, there would be short periods of relative quiet, but for the most part, the plains Apaches remained hostile toward New Mexico. There is little evidence to support this statement. Apache hostility for the rest of the seventeenth century can usually be attributed to western Apaches or Navahos. Gunnerson, Jicarilla Apaches, 82, states that there is no indication that the Vaquero Apaches ever retaliated for the raid.


11. Ayer, Memorial of Benavides, 39; Hodge, Hammond, and Rey, Benavides' Revised Memorial, 81.

12. Hyde, Indians of the High Plains, 9, gives a bit more credence to Benavides's statement, believing that the Apaches controlled the entire plains at the time from Texas to Wyoming.


14. Ibid., 133, 137.


16. Ibid., 89-90.

17. Ibid., 92-93.


21. France V. Scholes, "Troublous Times," 12:396-397,


30. The five Piro pueblos, Tabiri, Quarai, Abó, Taxique, and Chilili, just to the north of Las Humañas, were known as
the Saline Pueblos because of nearby salt lakes.


37. S. Lyman Tyler and M. Darrel Taylor, "The Report of
Fray Alonso Posada in Relation to Quivira and Teguayo," New Mexico Historical Review 33 (October 1958): 301.


17, 69, 74.

43. Ibid., 1:102.
44. Ibid., 1:17, 59.
49. Ibid., 187; Hackett, *Revolt of the Pueblo Indians*, 2: 202-204.
51. Ibid., 2: 305-308.
52. Ibid., 2: 308.
58. Ibid., 134-137.
63. Ibid., 56-57.
64. Vargas, *By Force of Arms*, 227-228.
65. Ibid., 228.
A decade after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, the Apaches had become the dominant tribe on the southern plains. As a result of the revolt, the Apache acquired large herds of horses that had been abandoned as the Spaniards fled southward to El Paso. These animals served to strengthen Apache control over a vast region that stretched north into Nebraska, east to Quivira and the Caddo nations, south to the Río Grande, and west to the area controlled by their kinsmen—the Faraones.

Apache dominance was so pervasive that they had made enemies of all their neighbors. Lacking trade outlets, the plains Apaches welcomed the initial return of the Spaniards to Santa Fe in 1692. The Apaches to the west of the Río Grande were less happy with the Spaniards’ return. For them, the Spanish presence provided a haven for their Pueblo enemies, while making it more difficult for the western Apaches to reach the plains.

The architect of the reconquest was a new governor and captain general of New Mexico with the formidable name of Diego José de Vargas Zapata y Luján Ponce de León y...
Contreras. His appointment as governor and captain-general of New Mexico in 1688 was the culmination of a career in New Spain that spanned nearly two decades. Upon his arrival at El Paso in February 1691, the intrepid new governor intended to carry out an immediate campaign that would restore crown control of New Mexico, but he was unprepared for the dismal state in which he found Spanish forces.

An immediate muster revealed that a majority of the soldiers did not even possess leather jackets, helmets, or swords. Counting Indian allies, there were only about three hundred men capable of bearing arms. In the entire region that bordered El Paso, Vargas reported fewer than two hundred horses and mules to transport an army into New Mexico.

Despite his lack of manpower and provisions, as well as his desire to begin the reconquest as soon as possible, Vargas first turned his attention to renewed hostilities by the Apaches. The peace that had been established in 1689 seems to have crumbled by the time Vargas assumed the governorship. In early September 1691, he carried out a short campaign near El Paso, capturing 130 and killing more than 40 Apaches. The large numbers of captives indicates that he must have caught the Indians off guard. The Indians almost certainly were eastern Apaches.
This minor campaign with rather major results came in the midst of the preparations for a more extended campaign against the western Apaches. Juan Fernández de la Fuente, captain of the presidio of San Felipe and Santiago de Janos, had reported the hostility of Apaches in the Janos and El Paso regions, and he wrote the viceroy requesting aid in subduing them. The viceroy honored Fernández's request and ordered Vargas to assist him in a joint campaign. Although disappointed by having to delay the reconquest of New Mexico, Vargas obediently led his contingent in the campaign. He covered nearly five hundred leagues and by November Indian hostility along the frontier had quieted. This allowed Vargas once again to concentrate on the reconquest.4

Despite the apparent success of Vargas's campaign, Fernández had to launch another attack on the Apaches. He defeated them in a battle in February 1692. Afterward, the Apaches sued for peace. Fernández gave them gifts of clothing, provided supplies for their captains and other native leaders, and left them after exacting an agreement that they would visit the Janos presidio. Fernández soon heard rumors that the Apaches had formed a pact with all the people of their nation, as well as with the Janos, Jocomas, and Sumas. The intent of this alliance was to destroy El Paso and all of its pueblos and then do the same to Janos.
Upon gathering this intelligence, Fernández mobilized fifty well-armed soldiers and an unspecified number of Indian allies and sent them, under the command of his alférez (ensign) to investigate the rumors. Fernández's suspicions were further aroused when, twenty days after the peace was declared, no Apaches had shown up at Janos. The alférez met with the Apaches, and they agreed to accompany him to the presidio. On the morning they were to begin the trip, however, the Apaches emerged from the hills in two flanks and attacked one of the Spaniards drinking from a water hole. The attackers then raised their war cry, whereupon the soldiers struck back, killing several natives and forcing them to retreat back into the mountains.5

Obviously, there was still significant unrest among the Apaches. In fact, in March 1692 Vargas led an expedition across the Hueco mountains to the east of El Paso in search of salt licks and watering places of Apaches who had continuously harassed the El Paso district. Vargas traveled halfway to the Salado River during this successful campaign. He later pursued and defeated Apaches in the Sierra de los Organos, the Sierra Florida, and the Sierra Nevada to the north and west of El Paso.6

In August 1692, Vargas finally set off for New Mexico, not even waiting for fifty reinforcements to arrive from Mexico. His force of less than two hundred, including Indian allies, arrived at Santa Fe in mid September. After a few
days of negotiations, the native inhabitants surrendered without a fight. Vargas attempted the same process at Pecos, but was unable to achieve its submission. The Pecos natives had fled their pueblo and sent only a messenger to parley with the Spaniards. Vargas returned to Santa Fe and then headed toward the northern pueblos, accepting each pueblo's submission as he passed through. He reached Taos in early October, and, after accepting their surrender returned to Santa Fe.  

Before he left the northern pueblos, however, Luis Picurí, leader of Picurís pueblo as well as the Tewa and Tanos, made a proposal to Vargas. Picurí suggested that since the Pecos and Taos nations were friendly with the Faraone Apaches, who frequently raided Picurís, the Spaniards should assist him in making the two pueblos his allies. If the negotiations failed, Picurí offered to assist Vargas in defeating the two pueblos.  

On October 15, Vargas was able to report to the viceroy that all the pueblos within a thirty-six league radius of Santa Fe had given their submission. Two days later, Pecos, impressed by Vargas's benevolence but also wary of his growing alliances, sent its allegiance to Vargas, and over the next few days many of the other holdouts surrendered. In late October, the Spanish governor set out to subdue Acoma and Zuñí. After convincing the natives at Acoma to submit, Vargas and his army traveled toward Zuñí. On the way, a
group of Apaches stole sixteen head of cattle during a stormy night. Because of the poor condition of his horses, the weather, and the risk of failure, Vargas did not attempt to retaliate.⁹

Vargas was successful in negotiating the surrender of Zuñí. While there a Salinero Apache captain and eight to ten supporters approached Vargas and informed the Spaniard that his tribe was at peace with the Zuñí and desired peace with the Spanish as well. Vargas replied that he would welcome their friendship. As proof of their loyalty, the Salineros should seek out and kill the Apaches who had stolen horses from the Spaniards earlier. Vargas then continued on to Hopi country, receiving the submission of most of the pueblos in that vicinity as well.¹⁰

On his return to Zuñí, Vargas received distressing news that Apaches near the location of his supplies were becoming troublesome. He immediately secured his supplies and marched his entire army toward El Paso. Nonetheless, Apaches harassed Spanish forces throughout the entire journey. In fact, the Zuñís had warned Vargas of the hostility of the Apaches, and the day after he departed a runner came into the Spanish camp to warn him that Apaches were following his route. Upon hearing the news, Vargas ordered his men to be on guard with arms in readiness and horses saddled. Despite these precautions, a few days later and under the cover of
darkness, Apaches drove off fourteen horses and mortally wounded another.\textsuperscript{11}

As the entrada approached El Paso, it encountered a party of Apaches who immediately scattered upon seeing the armed Spaniards. Two of the Apaches were afoot. After fierce resistance, one of the natives was killed and the other captured. The captive Apache admitted that he and his companions had entered El Paso and stolen two horses. After a brief ceremony of baptism, the Apache was summarily executed.\textsuperscript{12}

Vargas learned that during his absence El Paso had been raided twice by Apaches. The attackers carried off twenty head of horses and cattle, which Vargas considered to be light losses.\textsuperscript{13} During his successful reoccupation of New Mexico, the only bloodshed resulted from Apache raids on his return from Zuñi. The hostile Apaches were generally referred to as Faraone Apaches.\textsuperscript{14}

The Faraones are generally considered to be Mescalero Apaches. However, until 1720 the term applied to most of the hostile Apaches living in the region between the Pecos Indians on the east to the area south of the Zuñis on the west. After the 1720s the term came to be more restrictive. It was used for those Apache bands living between the Pecos River and the Río Grande, and from Santa Fe in the north to the Conchos River in the south.\textsuperscript{15}
In all likelihood, the term Faraone was generically applied to any hostile Apache group that was not otherwise specifically identified. As the Spanish became more familiar with the area, many groups, especially those to the west of the Río Grande became known by other names--the Salineros encountered by Vargas being an example. Therefore, the Faraone Apaches who attacked and harassed Vargas west of the Río Grande were most likely western Apaches. The Apaches who raided El Paso, on the other hand, might well have been Mescalero Apaches.

Almost all of the hostility blamed on Apaches up to this time seems to have been the responsibility of the western Apaches. Eastern Apaches may have been involved in a few instances, especially those mentioned as living east of the Hueco mountains, but plains Apaches do not seem to have been involved at all. The Gila Apaches or other Western groups seem to be the most aggressively hostile of the Apaches living in the vicinity of El Paso during this time. Many modern historians make the mistake of lumping all "Apaches" together and considering them all guilty or innocent as the case may be.

It must be remembered that the Apaches were a widespread and diverse people. Each tribe, indeed, each band, often acted independently. Therefore, to claim that all Apaches were hostile because "some" Apaches raided El Paso or some other location is faulty reasoning. The Spanish
tendency to use generic terms, like Faraone, which later became more specific adds to the confusion. It is likely that the hostile Faraones during Vargas's times had little or no connection to the Faraones who later became identified as the Mescaleros. It seems clear, therefore, that most Apache aggression originated with tribes living west of the Río Grande, and that those Apaches living to the east of the river and on the plains were relatively peaceful by comparison.

Having reconnoitered New Mexico, Vargas offered his recommendations to the viceroy. He suggested that one hundred settlers be located at Taos, the most distant of the New Mexico pueblos and an entrance route for Apache raids. The area was favorable for settlement, because of its broad valleys and the many arroyos, woods, and fertile pastures that were ideal for farming or ranching. Vargas reasoned that one hundred settlers backed by a presidio would make it impossible for Apaches to sweep through the area. A second settlement of fifty families should be located on the Apache frontier at Pecos. That area was surrounded by mountains and subject to Apache ambushes, but sufficient Spanish presence there would deny Apaches easy entry to Pueblo settlements.

Another fifty families at Santa Ana would not only block an additional entrance by Apaches but also help protect the missionaries who ministered to the Keres and Jémez tribes. One hundred more families should be settled at
the abandoned pueblo of Jémez, still another Apache entrance. Senecú, on the other hand, should not be settled because floods had damaged the land, and it was on a frontier invested with Apache.\textsuperscript{16}

Vargas also noted that an additional fifty soldiers at El Paso would help keep the various Apache tribes in order. He remarked that Apaches had robbed and killed in New Mexico when that province had been at its peak strength, and now the Apaches had both fortifications and artillery.\textsuperscript{17} Despite the apparent strength of the Apaches, Vargas determined to reduce them, not through military action, but by persuasion.\textsuperscript{18}

A short time later, Vargas seems to have changed his mind. He remarked that even with fifty soldiers, he, or anyone, would be at great risk traveling the 130 leagues from El Paso to Santa Fe. The enemy could appear from any direction and quickly surround unwary travelers. Besides the Apaches, Vargas added, travelers had to be on guard against rebel Pueblos who posed an additional threat.\textsuperscript{19}

Vargas's recommendations were in accord with reality, except perhaps his comment concerning Apache artillery. Placing troops or settlers at Taos, Pecos, Santa Ana, and Jémez would form a defensive cordon against Apaches who surrounded Santa Fe. Senecú was obviously too isolated to be easily incorporated into a defensive ring and was too distant from Santa Fe or El Paso to be easily protected. As
Vargas indicated, the whole area between El Paso and Santa Fe was filled with roaming, hostile Apaches.

Once Vargas had accomplished the submission of most Pueblos in New Mexico, the next step was to settle the reconquered areas. In October 1693 Vargas set out from El Paso at the head of an entraña of eight hundred people, including one hundred soldiers, seventy families, seventeen friars, and a large number of Indian allies. On the journey north, Vargas learned that many of the Pueblos who had previously offered submission were in fact allied with several groups of Apaches in order to resist Spanish reoccupation. An exception was Juan de Ye, the Pecos governor appointed by Vargas on the previous campaign, who arrived in the Spanish camp and offered the services of his warriors. The Pecos governor professed his support for the Spanish but warned Vargas that the pueblos in the Santa Fe area intended to betray the Europeans.

Ye made good on his statement by gathering 140 warriors to join the Spanish as they secured the Santa Fe area. Vargas repaid this support by sending his second-in-command with thirty men to Pecos when Ye reported a potential threat from a large force of Tewas, Tanos, Picurís, and Apaches. The threat never materialized, but the cooperation between the Spanish and Pecos strengthened their bond.

In April 1694, Juan de Ye arrived in Santa Fe accompanied by three plains Apaches. The Apaches claimed to
have been former friends of the Spaniards and sought to renew the relationship now that the Europeans had returned. Hoping to reestablish the profitable trade of the past, the Apaches requested that Vargas send a company of Spaniards to Pecos so that their people might be convinced of the sincerity of the Spaniards. Vargas complied by sending a small party of soldiers and colonists to Pecos where they bought buffalo meat and chamois skins. The well-pleased Apaches departed, promising to return for more trade by October.23

A month later, however, the Apache captain of the rancherías on the plains visited Santa Fe with eight other Indians escorted by Juan de Ye. The Apache leader brought a gift of three buffalo hides and a light tent for Vargas as a show of good faith. The native captain reported that his rancherías were fourteen days distant from Santa Fe, that the buffalo herds were but ten days distant, and that Quivira, which the Apaches were at war with, was twenty-five to thirty days beyond the Apache rancherías.24

Vargas interrogated the Apache leader concerning the presence of silver in the area. Pointing to a silver dish, Vargas asked the native if he knew of the existence of such material in his land. The Apache chief replied that within a day's travel was a range of mountains. At the base of the mountain range were some rocks of the same material. The rocks were so heavy and hard that the Apaches had no way to
bring a piece of them for Vargas to examine. The native asked for an iron ax to break off some of the "white iron" and promised to bring Vargas a sample on his next visit. Both the Apache leader and Juan de Ye then excused themselves, pointing out that they must return home to plant their corn fields. Vargas reminded the Apache to return to Pecos when the corn was ready to harvest in order to trade.  

During the interrogation, the Apache leader showed interest in baptism. In fact, he informed Vargas that if the Spanish would destroy the rebellious Pueblos, the Apaches would settle in the abandoned pueblos and become Christians. Vargas was favorably impressed with the demeanor of the Apache captain and felt that his actions and deeds were already that of a Christian. The Apache also showed extensive knowledge of a large geographic area. He was aware of the location of the Tejas, seven days from his ranchería. He also had knowledge of the presence of Spaniards in Texas, but admitted that he did not know if they were still there. This was an obvious reference to Spanish expeditions sent in search of La Salle's colony, or perhaps a reference to La Salle's expedition itself, since the Apaches often referred to the French as "Spaniards."  

The mention of the silver rocks seems specious, however. If the source had been so near to Santa Fe, Vargas would no doubt have sent an expedition to investigate, but
apparently he did not do so. Furthermore, the Apaches did not bring samples or even mention it during their return visit in October. The promise to settle in pueblos and become Christians also seems far-fetched. It was probably nothing more than an Apache tactic designed to win Spanish support and to encourage Spanish-Pueblo hostility. It is also worthy of mention that the Apache captain remarked on his need to return home to plant maize. Obviously, these plains Apaches were involved in at least minimal farming.

By June 1694, provisions at Santa Fe were running low, and Vargas resolved to lead an expedition against the rebellious pueblos to the north and raid them for supplies. The Spanish force eventually moved north of Taos but found the area abandoned. It did encounter a group of Apaches from the plains who had been trading with the Pueblos. These Apaches greeted the Spaniards with friendly handshakes and informed them that the Taos Indians had fled upon seeing the Europeans approach. The Apache captain then picked up a large cross brought by the Spanish, held it up in sight of the entrance to a wooded canyon where the Taos natives had fled. He shouted to their governor that he could safely come and confer with him and the Spanish. The Apaches then accompanied Vargas to confer with the governor. The meeting, however, was not cordial. Nevertheless, Juan de Ye, who considered the Taos governor a friend, offered to accompany him to his pueblo on behalf of the Spaniards. The governor
accepted, but the Spaniards never again heard from Ye. In all likelihood, their Indian emissary was killed at Taos.²⁹

In this encounter, the plains Apaches by acting as intermediaries between the Spanish and the Pueblos, once again proved themselves to be friendly. Although rumors abounded concerning conspiracies involving the Apaches, they proved to be false. Later, when the Taos natives refused to produce their governor or Juan de Ye, Vargas sacked the pueblo before returning to Santa Fe.³⁰

In late August 1694, Pecos messengers reported to Vargas at Santa Fe that the plains Apaches had once again arrived at their pueblo. Vargas quickly sent a group of Spaniards to trade with the Apaches. The trade venture was no doubt successful as the Apaches promised to return at the end of the rainy season. The Europeans were impressed by the Apaches from the plains, remarking that they were better behaved, more trusting as friends, and made better trading partners than did converted Pueblo natives.³¹

Although the plains Apaches had reached some accommodation with the Spaniards during the 1690s, they continued to assert their dominance over other Indians. They ranged as far north as the Loup River in present-day Nebraska and they raided both Quivira and the Tejas to the east. In 1692 the plains Apaches made a major assault on a Wichita village, killing many men, burning their village, and taking the captives to New Mexico to trade. Two years
later, when Apaches brought a large group of captives to New Mexico, the Spanish refused to buy them. The Apaches then proceeded to behead the children before the eyes of horrified Spaniards.  

The sources refer to these Apaches as "Navaho." A trip to the plains would have been a long journey for the Navaho from Arizona, but there are several records from the 1690s and earlier testifying to their presence. In addition, the beheading of unpurchased children seems uncharacteristic of plains Apaches, but not of Navajos, whom the Spaniards often portrayed unfavorably. The Navajo forays to the plains were no doubt welcomed by the plains Apaches, who probably joined and guided their western kinsmen in raids against their enemies.

At this juncture, most hostilities blamed on Apache nations were attributed to those residing west of the Río Grande. The plains Apaches, on the other hand, maintained amicable relations with the Spanish, keeping alive a vigorous trade and sometimes acting as middlemen between the Spanish and still rebellious Pueblos. In 1695, however, an event occurred that would have resounding effects on the Apaches of the plains for years to come. Apaches de los Chipaynes, who arrived from the east to trade at Picurís, a few miles south of Taos, reported that some light-haired white men had defeated a large nation of Conejeros Apaches
who lived even further to the east. The Spanish immediately assumed that these white men were French.\textsuperscript{33}

In September 1695, Apaches visiting Picurís reported large numbers of Frenchmen approaching the plains of Cíbola. The French were attacking the Apaches and forcing them to retreat before the onslaught. Upon hearing these disturbing reports, Vargas ordered that the Apaches be closely interrogated. He wanted to know if the Apaches had actually seen the Frenchmen themselves, how far away they were, how long it would take for them to travel to the pueblos, whether they seemed to be establishing a permanent presence in the area where they were sighted, and various other pieces of pertinent information.\textsuperscript{34}

Upon being questioned, the Apaches admitted that they themselves had not seen the "white Spaniards." News of the French came to them from people seven nations beyond their home, a great distance from New Mexico. Those nations reported that the Frenchmen made intermittent raids on the nation of Quivira and others in that region. Finally, the Apaches remarked that they had obtained this information through natives who were enemies and slaves of the Apaches.\textsuperscript{35} This intelligence, which seemed to downplay the French threat to New Mexico, did not comfort Vargas. He immediately sent a request to the viceroy for additional weapons and supplies.\textsuperscript{36}
Renewed Pueblo unrest, which culminated in a sizable revolt in 1696, diverted attention from the French threat, at least temporarily. After campaigns to subdue various rebellious pueblos, Vargas headed north to Taos and Picurís. Upon attaining the submission of Taos, the entrada continued to Picurís, only to find that the natives there had fled to the buffalo plains, accompanied by Apaches, Tewas, and Tanos. The Spanish pursued the fugitives and came across a deserted Apache camp of thirty-one lodges. The site had been abandoned in such haste that the trail of fleeing natives was strewn with debris. Overtaking the escapees, the Spanish managed to capture eighty men, women, and children. The rest of the Picurís continued their flight eastward with the Apaches, where they became slaves of the Cuartelejo Apaches.37

While Vargas was busy subduing the rebellious pueblos, other Spaniards had been marching across the Texas wilderness in search of the French colony of Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle. La Salle's short-lived colony on the Gulf Coast of Texas caused the Spaniards to take new interest in Texas. Starting in 1686, five sea and six land expeditions set out to locate La Salle's seemingly elusive colony. Three years later, the remnants of it were discovered. As a result of these endeavors, the Spanish focused their attention on the Tejas Indians of East Texas.38
In 1690 Alonso de León led an expedition to establish Mission San Francisco de los Tejas among the Tejas Indians. Father Damián Massanet, who had recommended the founding of the missions in East Texas, noted that the Indians had two trade routes that would ease access to the area. He also observed, however, that one road was subject to Apache raids. The Apaches did not raid the more easterly, lower route because of its distance and the thick woods surrounding it. Massanet claimed that the Apaches who lived in an east-to-west running mountain range were at war with all other nations except the Salineros. Another missionary, Father Casañas de Jesús María, noted that the Sadammos were enemies of the Hasinai. This large nation, "known to others as the Apaches," lived in the territory to the west of the Yojuanes, a Tonkawan tribe, "far to the west of Texas." The missionary's description of the Sadammos fits with what is known of the Apaches. He also noted that these natives had a great abundance of iron among them and were enemies of all nations friendly to the Hasinai.

Father Francisco Hidalgo recorded that in August 1692 Spanish soldiers accompanied the Tejas in an expedition against the Apaches. The party traveled west until they reached the enemy's territory. There, they were ambushed one night and only Spanish firearms prevented the total annihilation of the defenders. This failed campaign was
followed by a more successful venture. The latter operation resulted in the deaths of 136 Apaches.\textsuperscript{41}

The statements of Massanet and Jesús María are good indicators of the level of knowledge possessed by the Spanish in Texas concerning the Apaches. Most of the information recorded by the missionaries was no doubt based on information gleaned from the Tejas and Hasinai, combined with their own limited knowledge of the natives. Both of their descriptions show a lack of perception concerning the actual state of the Apache nations at the time. Furthermore, Massanet also links the plains Apaches, who raided the Tejas but were peaceful toward the Spanish in New Mexico, with the Faraone Apaches, who were at war with the Spanish in New Mexico, lived in the mountains and probably had no contact at this time with the Tejas. The two Apache groups were independent of each other, but Massanet, like many other Spaniards, tended to vilify all Apaches.

When Alonso de León found no French settlements and Spanish missionaries soon encountered hostility from the Hasinai, the priests withdrew and abandoned the Texas missions in 1693. One of the soldiers, José de Urrutia was injured and chose to remain among the Indians. During his seven-year stay with the natives, Urrutia became their "capitán grande" and led large parties of allied Indians in raids against the Apaches. He later rejoined his countrymen in 1700.\textsuperscript{42} Urrutia's activities, along with the campaigns
recorded by Father Hidalgo, did not bode well for future Spanish-Apache relations in Texas.

Meanwhile, in New Mexico Pedro Rodríguez Cubero assumed the governorship from 1697 to 1703. During Cubero's administration, the situation in New Mexico improved despite Cubero's apparent lack of activity. More soldiers and settlers arrived, strengthening the colony. The Pueblos became more submissive, primarily because of the increased hostility of the Apaches. Faced with belligerent raiding Apaches, many Pueblos were forced to seek the protection of Spanish arms.43

Vargas blamed increased Apache attacks on the inactivity of Governor Cubero. In a letter to his son-in-law, Vargas claimed that at various times the Apaches had stolen more than 460 horses and mules. They had also caused many injuries and deaths among the Spanish. In spite of this, the governor had not sent out soldiers to punish them.44

Vargas's claim was a bit exaggerated, for in fact, Cubero planned several expeditions in 1701. Unfortunately for the hapless governor, an expedition against the Hopi was a failure, a second campaign against the Navajo was cut short, and a third expedition planned against the Faraones was canceled. To compound Cubero's problems, constant rumors filtered into New Mexico of Frenchmen approaching from the plains.45
In 1697 French and Pawnee severely defeated a "Navaho" party on the plains. The "Navahos" retaliated in the following year by destroying three Pawnee rancherías and a fortified village. In 1699 "Navahos" arrived in Pecos with Pawnee slaves, as well as French carbines, cannon, swordbelts, jewels, waistcoats, shoes, and brass kettles to trade. An Apache from the plains reported in 1700 that a French force had destroyed a pueblo of Jumanos.⁴⁶

Obviously the French were emerging as a new force on the plains, and the Apaches were going to have to adjust to their presence. The Navajo raids onto the plains were coming to an end along with the seventeenth century. Increased Spanish settlement along the Río Grande made it more difficult for Navajo raiding parties to traverse the pathway to the plains. In addition, in the early eighteenth century, both Utes and Comanches began making inroads into Navajo territory. The Spanish also began to make increasing numbers of campaigns against the Navajos in the first two decades of the new century. Later, the Navajos were convinced that Spanish peace and protection were more valuable than warfare and raiding. The Navajo capitulation had a negative effect on the plains Apaches. The absence of Navajo treks to the plains left the Apaches alone to face the growing menace of French hostility and musket-armed enemies who were seeking vengeance for previous transgressions. The decline of the Apaches was at hand.
In 1703 Vargas reassumed the governorship. He arrived in Santa Fe in November 1703 and took stock of the situation. After criticizing the work of his predecessor, Vargas turned his attention to improving the situation. Settlers from the Río Abajo region asked him to lead a punitive expedition against the Faraone Apaches who had been crossing the Sandia and Manzanos Mountains to raid them and steal livestock. In March 1704 Vargas himself led fifty officers and men from Santa Fe. They were met at Bernalillo by a detachment of Indian allies. Vargas's scouts reported that the Faraones had been sighted near Taxique. The governor sped to intercept the enemy east of the Manzanos mountains. The campaign, however, ended at this point. Vargas became ill and returned to Bernalillo where he died a few days later on April 8, 1704.  

The death of Vargas concludes a chapter in Apache history. To this point, the Apaches had been the dominant tribe on the southern plains, and indeed in the Southwest. With easy access to horses through raid or trade, and with some access to European tools, the Apache quickly asserted their power. They raided and terrified their neighbors, dragging captives back to New Mexico to sell or trade as slaves to the insatiable Spanish. The horse gave them superior maneuverability, range, and power, compared to their enemies.
Western Apaches proved to be hostile toward the Spaniards, especially because they lacked other tribes to raid. These Apaches had few easily accessible targets except the Pueblos, who generally appealed to the Spanish for assistance or protection. That dependency spawned trouble between the western Apaches and the Spanish. At times, western Apaches and Navajos made the long journey to the plains to raid more vulnerable targets. There, they were often joined by their eastern kinsmen, who no doubt welcomed the extra manpower in battles against their enemies.

With or without their western kin, the Apaches living east of the Río Grande and on the plains asserted their authority over their non-Apache neighbors. They were known and feared by almost all of the tribes living along the periphery of the southern plains. With the Spanish, however, the plains Apaches maintained a cordial relationship. They needed a convenient place to dispose of their spoils and captives.

By 1700 the cooperative raids of eastern and western Apaches were coming to a close, at least in northern New Mexico. In southern New Mexico, the Faraones continued to straddle the Río Grande and kept the avenue to the plains open. The lack of extensive settlement between El Paso and Albuquerque (1706) allowed the Faraones to dominate the area. They were able to attack passing caravans from their mountain haunts, raid nearby pueblos and loosely guarded
livestock herds, and travel to the plains to hunt the buffalo or plunder enemy tribes.

Thus, the eastern Apaches had reached the peak of their power during the 1690s and early 1700s. That power would be short-lived, however. The presence of French traders among the traditional enemies of the Apaches and the loss of contact with their western kinsmen spelled disaster. The French, unlike the Spanish, sold or traded guns to their native customers. As a consequence, the eastern Apaches found their enemies better armed than themselves. They also found themselves virtually isolated. Having made enemies of all their neighbors, these Apaches were surrounded by hostile forces. Their relationship with the Pueblos and Spanish became strained when they were unable to continue their previous supply of slaves and trade goods. Unable to trade for or buy the supplies they desperately needed, the eastern Apaches sought alternative methods of obtaining them. In addition, Comanches, a new tribe from the north would soon challenge Apache dominance on the plains.
must have been seen as a completely unrelated activity. If the Indians killed and captured in September had been western Apaches, Vargas probably would have considered it a prelude or precursor to his more extended campaign and would have given some acknowledgment of the event in his reports.


9. Ibid., 382-384; J. Manuel Espinosa, trans., First Expedition of Vargas into New Mexico, 1692 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 199-200.


12. Ibid., 249-250.

14. Opler, "The Apache Culture Pattern and Its Origins," 390. The term Faraone derived from the Spanish word for Pharaoh because, according to Fray Juan de Torquemada, an early Spanish historian, the Faraones had no knowledge or respect for God, much like the other Pharaoh.

15. Ibid.


17. Whether Vargas actually believed that the Apaches had artillery or not is open to question. He probably knew that the Spanish had abandoned pieces of artillery in their headlong flight from New Mexico in 1680, and might have assumed that it had fallen into Apache hands. There is no record of natives using artillery against Spaniards without European assistance, especially at this early date. Later, when the French joined with natives to attack Spanish forces, artillery would come into play, but the natives never used it on their own. Most likely Vargas was simply being dramatic to increase the magnitude of his victory once it was achieved.


NOTES

1. For Diego de Vargas's background see John L. Kessell, ed., Remote Beyond Compare: Letters of don Diego de Vargas to His Family from New Spain and New Mexico, 1675-1706 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989) 3-93. The same information in a slightly condensed, and perhaps more readily available form can be found in John L. Kessell, Rick Handricks, and Meredith D. Dodge, eds., Letters from the New World: Selected Correspondence of don Diego de Vargas to his family, 1675-1706 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 3-83.


3. Kessell, Remote Beyond Compare, 153, 155, 165. The Apaches must have been residing near El Paso, because Vargas makes no mentions of any preparations for the campaign. The campaign was also relatively short, probably no longer than a week. Since Vargas makes no mention of this short but successful campaign in his reports for the later campaign against the western (Gila) Apaches, the September campaign

22. Ibid., 260-262.


26. Ibid.

27. The source is unclear, but it is possible that the Apache meant that the silver rocks were one days' travel from his rancherías on the plains rather than from Santa Fe. This may account for Vargas not sending an expedition to investigate reports of silver ore.

28. Sources use both "Apaches from the plains" and "Faraones" when talking about the Apaches meeting with Vargas. From the context, it is impossible to tell whether the terms were being used interchangeably or there were two groups of Apaches present. If the terms were being used interchangeably, i.e., the Spanish referred to the Apaches from the plains as Faraones, this bolsters the argument that the term "Faraone" was used to apply to many Apache groups throughout the vicinity of New Mexico. However, since Faraone was usually reserved for hostile Apache groups and the plains Apaches were potential allies or at least
valuable trading partners, there well could have been two Apache groups present--the Apaches from the plains, and the Faraones from a more local area.


32. Stan Hoig, *Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 53. These Apaches were referred to as Navajo, but as George E. Hyde notes, it is unlikely that Navaho would be involved in such long range raids. See Hyde, *Indians of the High Plains*, 22.


34. F. W. Hodge, "French Intrusion Toward New Mexico in 1695," *New Mexico Historical Review* 4 (January 1929): 73-75.

35. Ibid., 76.


38. For a brief look at the search for La Salle and its results, see Donald E. Chipman, Spanish Texas, 1519-1821 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 77-85.


40. Charles W. Hackett, ed., Pichardo's Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas (4 vols.; Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1931-1946), 2:147, 175; Tyler,
Although there is some question as to the identity of the Sadammos, Jesús María's comment concerning the abundance of iron among the Sadammos would identify them as either Faraones of plains Apaches, both of whom would have had easy access to iron implements through trade with or raids on the Spanish in New Mexico. His description of their location also corresponds with known Apache haunts in West Texas.


43. Espinosa, Crusaders of the Río Grande, 341.

44. Kessell, Remote beyond Compare, 197.


46. Hoig, Tribal Wars, 54; Hyde, Indians of the High Plains, 22; Espinosa, Crusaders of the Río Grande, 350. The Apaches involved in these attacks were identified as "Navahos" but most likely they were a combination of Navajos and plains Apaches. Since the Spanish rarely distinguished between different bands of Apaches, a combined force of several bands would be identified by its most prominent element, in this case, Navajos. See also, J. Lee Correll, Through White Men's Eyes: A Contribution to Navajo History,
A Chronological Record of the Navajo People from Earliest Times to the Treaty of June 1, 1868 (6 vols.; Window Rock, Arizona: Navajo Heritage Center, 1979), 1:46.

CHAPTER 5

TURNING THE TIDE: THE DECLINE OF THE NORTHERN
PLAINS APACHES, 1704-1727

The Apaches living to the north of Santa Fe were at one time the most powerful tribe on the southern plains, if not the entire plains. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, new forces were developing that would break their power and cause their downfall in the short span of a quarter of a century. To the northwest, the powerful Comanche nation, allied with their cousins the Utes began to make inroads into land traditionally held by the Apaches. To the east, traditional enemies of the Apaches gained access to guns through trade with the French. Firearms helped offset the horse, which had given the Apaches a military advantage. To the southwest, the Faraones, themselves an Apache group, harassed the more northerly Apache tribes. Finally, to the south, the growing Spanish presence along the Río Grande eventually split the plains Apaches from their kinsmen and intermittent allies, isolating them still further. The downfall began with the death of Diego de Vargas.

Before he died, Diego de Vargas designated his lieutenant, Juan Páez Hurtado, as interim governor of New
Mexico. Hurtado spent most of his tenure as acting governor investigating a rumored alliance between the Navajos, Utes, and several Apache bands. Although testimony of several Pueblos indicated a conspiracy, no coordinated attacks occurred. The Faraone Apaches, however, continued to cause problems. In July 1704, just a few months after Vargas's death, Hurtado sent a force of 44 soldiers and 110 Indian auxiliaries into the Sandía Mountains to finish the campaign begun by Vargas.¹

The newly appointed governor, Francisco Cuervo y Valdés, arrived to assume his post in early 1705, and he immediately turned his attention to the Indian problems. He initiated several campaigns against the western Apaches and Navajos and had some success in quelling their hostility.² More important for this study, however, was the expedition he dispatched in 1706 to recover the Picurís who had fled to the plains in 1696.

For several years the fugitive Picurís had been requesting aid from the Spanish, explaining that they had become slaves of the Apaches to whom they had fled. The latest request came from three emissaries who had arrived in Taos in the company of ten tents of Apache traders. Earlier, constant harassment by Apaches in the vicinity of Santa Fe had prevented sending assistance to the Picurís, but having temporarily silenced the western Apaches and Navajo, Cuervo
thought such an expedition might be useful in restoring the natives to their homes.³

Command of the expedition fell upon Juan de Ulibarri. Ulibarri's expedition substantially increased the Spaniards' knowledge of Apaches living to the northeast of Santa Fe immensely.⁴ He departed Santa Fe in July 1706 with twenty soldiers, twelve militia, and one hundred Indian allies recruited from various pueblos. When the Spaniards arrived at Picurís, the grateful natives loaded the Spaniards with supplies, woolen blankets, and horses to be used by their kinsmen on the return journey. At Taos on the following day, Ulibarri heard rumors that the Utes and Comanches, were planning an attack. This is the first recorded mention of the latter tribe, which would soon play such an important role in Apache and Spanish history. Ulibarri delayed departure several days, but when no assault materialized, he continued on his way.

After crossing (and naming) numerous ridges, valleys, and rivers, Ulibarri's company encountered the first Apache rancherías about forty miles east northeast of Taos. Ulibarri mentions three groups; the Conejeros, the Achos, and the Río Colorados.⁵ These Apaches, some of whom the Spanish had encountered trading at Taos, informed the Spanish commander, as they had at Taos, that they were happy to have the Spanish visit their territory and would not
injure them. They then warned that other Apache nations to the east, the Penxayes, Flechas de Palo, Lemitas, and Trementinaxes might not be so friendly. They were, the friendly natives reported, "very bad thieves" and had done damage even to them. Ulibarri thanked the natives for their information and advice and rewarded them with gifts.

Armed with this knowledge, Ulibarri altered his course to a more northerly route. Two days and sixteen leagues later, the Spanish encountered a second group of Apaches. Small parties of these Indians of "La Xicarilla, Flechas de Palo, and Carlanas tribes" came down from the Sierra Blanca under individual chiefs. They all deferred, however, to a lame man, their head chief, whom they called Ysdalnisdael. Spaniards later called this man El Cojo, or the Lame one.

These natives demonstrated great friendship toward the Spanish. They stated that in the name of all of their tribe and Chief Ucase they had come to express their pleasure that white men entered their land without causing them harm. They told Ulibarri that upon his return he would find them gathered in the rancherías of the Jicarillas, and they also promised that if he would visit them there they would give him raisins, which they reserved for their most worthy guests. The natives emphasized that they had not stolen anything and were good people who kept busy sowing and harvesting their crops of corn, beans, and pumpkins.
Ulibarrí took advantage of the Indians' good nature by dropping off some worn-out horses with them that he intended to pick up on his return. Before he left the natives, he distributed gifts among them.

Continuing on, the expedition next encountered a river bank planted by the Penxayes. These natives approached the Spaniards fearfully, but once Ulibarrí convinced them that they were not endangered and ordered that no harm be done to the native fields, the Penxayes welcomed the Europeans. The entrada next encountered Penxaye stragglers who informed the Spanish that they were gathering to defend themselves from an expected Ute-Comanche attack.

From this point, near present-day Pueblo, Colorado, the party curved toward the east. The next few days were spent traveling across the dry plains of eastern Colorado. Even the Pueblo guides became lost on the vast expanse of flat grassland. It was mainly by accident that the scouts from the expedition wandered into the first of the rancherías of El Cuartelejo, called Tachichichi. After visiting a short while, the leader of the scouting party returned to the main party, accompanied by the Apache chief and several natives. The other scouts stayed at the ranchería where they were treated to entertainments and feasts. Ulibarrí welcomed the Apache chief and his entourage similarly at the main camp.
From these natives, Ulibarri learned that four days earlier they had killed a white man and his female companion whom they now assumed to be French. The Indians had taken a gun, some powder, a kettle, and a red-lined cap from the man, which they promised to show the Spanish when they arrived at the main Apache ranchería. On the following day, the main body of Spaniards marched into Tachichichi where the Apaches came out to meet them with buffalo meat, corn, and great jubilation. There, the Spanish received a delegation of Apaches and three Picurís from the main ranchería of El Cuartelejo. The Picurís assured the Spaniards that both they and the Apaches were pleased with Ulibarri's presence and that the Spaniards would be welcomed when they arrived at the main encampment.

The rest of the day was spent discussing the Apaches' enmity toward the Pawnees and Jumanos. Ulibarri no doubt guided the discussions along these lines to avoid the uncomfortable discussion of the Spaniards' mission to rescue the Picurís, which the Apaches might not concede willingly. By emphasizing the enemy threat to the Cuartelejo Apaches, Ulibarri could hint that it would be in the Apaches' best interest to maintain peaceful, friendly relations with the Spanish.

The next day the Spanish set out for the main settlements of El Cuartelejo. They were met outside the
villages by many Apache chiefs. These native leaders welcomed the Spanish unarmed and with merriment. They presented the entrada with more buffalo meat, corn, tamales, plums, and other foods. The chiefs then led the Spanish to a hill where the Apaches had erected a large cross. After a brief ceremony, the Spaniards took up the cross and carried it into the Indian settlements where they were greeted by many of the fugitive Picurís they had come to rescue. After taking official possession of the "new province of San Luís and the great settlement of Santa [sic] Domingo of El Cuartelejo," Ulibarrí distributed gifts and assured the natives of the good intentions of the Spaniards. He then explained that their purpose was the return of the fugitive Picurís to their home in New Mexico. The Spanish captain then chastised the Apaches for having badly used the Picurís, enslaving them when they had sought protection. He followed with a warning to the Apaches that any resistance to their goal would result in punishment.

The Apaches announced a willingness to return all of the Pueblos, not just those present but also those scattered throughout the rest of the rancherias. The plainsmen then suggested that Spaniards join them in attacking their Pawnee enemies as a show of good faith. Ulibarrí offered a series of excuses to avoid the proposed campaign but promised that
he or other Spaniards would return to assist the natives at a later date.

The Apaches then presented the gun they had taken from the suspected Frenchman to the Spaniards, who inspected it with great interest. When a Frenchman among Ulibarri's force stated that he recognized the gun and that it belonged to his kinsmen, the Apaches became wary. They immediately changed their story and informed the Spaniards that the gunbearer was not a "Spaniard," but a well-known Pawnee chief. It is apparent that the Apaches could not distinguish between Spaniard and Frenchman, especially within the Spanish ranks. They probably were confused by the Frenchman's remarks and interpreted them to mean that Ulibarri's men claimed their victim was a Spaniard. Hence, they were quick to alter their story to prevent any revenge the Spanish might seek for the murder of one of their people.

Ulibarri next set about gathering the scattered Picurís by sending out three groups to collect them. One of the rancherías was forty leagues distant indicating that the Cuartelejo Apaches controlled a vast expanse of the plains.

There has been much debate concerning the location of El Cuartelejo. Discussion centers on two possible locations; Otero or Kiowa county in eastern Colorado, or Scott county in western Kansas. Since Ulibarri noted that the rancherías
of El Cuartelejo were scattered over an area of at least forty leagues (just over one hundred miles) both locations could have been home to Cuartelejo Apaches.  

When the three groups returned with their fugitives, Ulibarrí could claim to have rescued sixty-two Picurís from the slavery and "barbarity of the Apaches." He gave the staff of command and the title "Captain-Major of all of Apachería" to a "young Indian of fine body and countenance," called Yndatiyuhe, and charged him with the care of a cross erected in the plaza of the ranchería. The Spanish expedition then took its leave and began the return trip to Santa Fe.

On the march, the party stopped at the ranchería of El Cojo to pick up their horses. The Apaches celebrated the return of the Spaniards and returned the beasts. They then informed Ulibarrí that in his absence the Utes and Comanches had attacked two Apache rancherías, one of the Carlanas and Sierra Blanca tribe and the other of the Penxayes. The Spanish continued on their way, and after observing another celebration at Picurís, during which the natives rejoiced over the return of their kinsmen, reached Santa Fe.

Ulibarrí's expedition is significant for a number of reasons. First, the multitude of Apache tribal names is indicative of the problem of identifying specific Apache groups. In his diary, Ulibarrí mentions no less than nine
"tribes." Some, such as the Achos and Conejeros were names familiar to the Spanish. Others, such as the Penxayes, Lemitas, and Flechas de Palo, were new names appearing for the first time in Ulibarrí's diary. Many of the names, which might have had some significance for Ulibarrí and his contemporaries are now simply tantalizing or confusing. In fact, almost all of them would eventually disappear and be replaced by names such as Jicarillas, Mescaleros, or Lipans. Unfortunately, there is often no direct link between the older names and the currently existing nomenclature.

Second, the expedition shows that most Apaches living to the northeast of Santa Fe were on friendly terms with the Spanish. Many tribes emphasized that they were honest and friendly, but added that their Apache neighbors were less so. These statements lead to two possible conclusions: that the Apaches were actually involved in raids on Spanish settlements but wanted to cast any Spanish suspicions on their neighbors and hence away from themselves; or, that the Apaches were truly innocent but knew from past experience that the Spanish were always looking for an excuse to attack and take slaves. Therefore, the Apaches wanted it known up front that they were guiltless and if some outrage had occurred, it must have been by someone else.

Regardless, the Apaches were genuinely pleased by Spanish presence because of the protection it offered
against enemy attacks. By assisting the Spanish, the Apaches no doubt hoped to win their aid against the Comanche-Ute or the French-Pawnee alliances that were just beginning to threaten their position on the plains.

Third, the campaign reveals that, at least in 1706, the Apaches occupied a large area of the southern plains. They controlled the plains from as far north as eastern Colorado and western Kansas, as well as the plains of Texas in the south. The Apache tribes encountered by Ulibarrí were also extensively involved in agriculture, growing a variety of crops.

Finally, Ulibarrí noted that the Apaches of El Cuartelejo appeared favorably disposed toward Christianity. During his visit, he had noticed numerous crosses, medallions, and rosaries. When Ulibarrí asked about them, the Apaches replied that when they were in battle and became fatigued, the ornaments reminded them of the "great Captain of the Spaniards who is in the heaven," and they become refreshed. In religious ceremonies held during the Europeans' stay at El Cuartelejo, the Apaches acted reverently and even mimicked the actions of Spaniards. Overall, the governor of New Mexico was favorably impressed by Ulibarrí's report and held high hopes of extending Spanish influence to the region. 9
Ulibarri's promise to return and aid the Cuartelejos against their enemies was delayed by renewed Indian problems in New Mexico. The Utes and Comanches, although not openly hostile toward the Spanish, were seen as a potential threat because of their increased attacks upon the Apaches with whom the Spanish were trying to forge a peace. More directly threatening, however, was renewed warfare with the Navajos. The Faraones also increased their activities in the years immediately following Ulibarri's return. These Indians, located in the Sandía Mountains, proved most troublesome. The Pecos natives, who were generally on friendly terms with the Faraones, referred to those living in the Sandías as "thieving Indian pirates."\(^{10}\)

When Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón arrived in 1712, he ordered that trade with non-Christian Indians be stopped. The governor believed that trade with the Utes, Comanches, and Apaches encouraged their depredations. His order included the Apaches of La Jicarilla and El Cuartelejo. Flores Mogollón felt that hostile natives used the pretext of trade to enter the fringes of settled areas, then used their proximity to steal as they departed. He desired to keep the raiders as far from the settlements as possible.\(^{11}\)

The policy was a failure, especially among the Faraones, who, in many cases, already resided close enough
to stage raids on the Spanish. In the summer of 1714, an expedition attacked Faraones in the Sandía Mountains. As a result these natives sued for peace at both Pecos and Isleta.\(^{12}\)

The peace was short-lived, however. Within a few months, the Faraones under the pretense of peace were entering Isleta and committing depredations. To address the problem, Flores Mogollón held a council in the summer of 1715. In order to identify the guilty parties and discuss the habits of the Faraones, Flores Mogollón invited don Gerónimo Ylo, the lieutenant-governor of Taos, and don Lorenzo, the lieutenant-governor of Picurís, to attend, because both pueblos had been victimized by Faraone Apaches for years.\(^{13}\)

Don Gerónimo identified the raiders as the Chipaynes or Lemitas, both of whom were known to the Spaniards as Faraones. He noted that these troublemakers often mingled with peaceful plains Apaches at the trade fairs and then committed depredations upon their departure. The Indian leader further suggested that the Pecos and Queres be prohibited from joining Spanish campaigns because of their close relationship with the Faraones. He suggested that Jicarillas, who had been victimized by the Faraones and had offered their assistance, be used instead. Finally, don Gerónimo suggested that the campaign be scheduled to arrive
at the Faraone rancherías at mid August, a time when they would be engrossed in harvesting their crops.\textsuperscript{14}

Don Lorenzo, on the other hand, identified the raiders as Trementinas or Lemitas. He reported that it was ten days march from Picurís to their first ranchería, composed of "thirty houses of wood entirely smeared with clay outside." Based on information gathered from the Pueblo leaders and other sources, Governor Flores Mogollón ordered Juan Páez Hurtado to gather a force in Picurís to chastise the Faraones.\textsuperscript{15}

Because of various delays, the expedition did not depart until August 30, 1715, almost a month later than the Pueblo leaders had suggested. Along the way, thirty Jicarillas and one Cuartelejo Apache apparently joined the expedition.\textsuperscript{16} The expedition itself, however, proved a failure. It discovered numerous tracks of Apaches and their horses but no live natives. They had already left for the buffalo plains. Rather than accept blame for missing the Faraones because the expedition was a month late, Hurtado and the Spaniards blamed the Pecos, arguing that they must have alerted the Faraones when the latter came to Pecos to trade.\textsuperscript{17}

Hurtado's expedition established that the Lemitas, Trementinas, and Chipaynes were the same or at least closely related bands of Apaches. They were included in the hodge-
podge conglomerate that the Spanish called the Faraones, and they were hostile toward the Jicarilla Apaches living to the northeast of Santa Fe. It is also noteworthy that the Jicarillas, through don Gerónimo, offered to give their assistance in the campaign. However, it seems that the Indian leader overstated the case when he claimed that "all" of the Jicarilla, "who are many," would be willing to join the expedition.\(^{18}\) Thirty seems to be a poor showing at best.

For the next several years, the Utes and Comanches far overshadowed the Faraones in their depredations on New Mexico. Hostilities began in 1716 after a Spanish force, led by Cristóbal de la Serna, attacked a Comanche and Ute camp about one hundred miles northwest of Santa Fe. During the next three years, the Comanches and Utes increased their attacks on pueblos and Spanish settlements in northern New Mexico. Apaches living north of Santa Fe and out on the plains, however, were their main targets.\(^{19}\)

The increased intensity of attacks on New Mexico led Governor Antonio Valverde Cosío to order a war council to discuss the matter. Coming out of the council was a decision to launch an immediate campaign against the Comanche and Ute nations. Most members of the council agreed. A month later, on September 15, 1719, the expedition, under the direct command of Governor Valverde set out to punish the Comanches and Utes.\(^{20}\)
Before he departed, Valverde received a dispatch from Viceroy Marqués de Valero, directing him to "employ with the greatest efficiency all his care to allure and entertain" the Apaches. Valero hoped that the Jicarillas would become a barrier to French designs in the area. He had been encouraged in this opinion by a missionary stationed at Taos. Fray Juan de la Cruz had written the viceroy informing him that the Jicarillas, or at least a portion of them, had come to him to request baptism. Having investigated their requests, the friar concluded that they earnestly desired conversion.\textsuperscript{21}

Valverde left Santa Fe with sixty presidial soldiers and marched to Taos. There he picked up an additional 45 settlers and 465 native allies. The expanded expedition departed Taos on the twentieth and marched east. Two days later, it encountered the Jicarilla Apaches. The first of the Jicarillas welcomed the Spanish and complained bitterly of Ute and Comanche assaults they had suffered. However, the Apaches were greatly pleased when Valverde announced to them the purpose of the expedition.\textsuperscript{22}

Numerous groups of Apaches approached the Spaniards over the next several days as the expedition slowly progressed through their rancherías. Chief Carlana of the Sierra Blanca arrived to report that he and half of his tribe had come to request the help of the Jicarilla Apaches
against the Comanches and Utes. The rest of his tribe had traveled to the land of Chief Flaco for safety. No other information is known concerning this latter chief, but he and his people obviously lived further out into the plains, safe from Comanche inroads. Importantly, Carlana offered the services of his people to act as guides for the Spanish.  

The Spanish next traveled through the rancherías of El Cojo, which Ulibarrí had encountered in 1706. El Cojo was absent having traveled to the Navajo province where he no doubt sought their aid against Comanche and Ute invaders. The chief's two sons informed Valverde that a year earlier the Comanches and their Ute allies had killed sixty Jicarilla, carried off sixty-four women and children as captives, destroyed a tower, and eradicated their corn supply. 

Valverde spent about a week traveling slowly through the Jicarilla rancherías, listening to grievances, and offering encouragement. When he departed to continue his expedition, nearly one hundred Jicarillas, including Captain Carlana, accompanied him. For almost a month the party followed their Jicarilla trackers, encountering large abandoned camps of Comanches and remnants of plundered Apache rancherías, but never overtook the enemy. With winter closing in, Valverde held a war council. He, as governor, was willing to continue on to El Cuartelejo, approximately
four or five days distant, but he would leave the decision up to the members of the expedition. The rank and file decided unanimously to return to avoid losing horses in the upcoming snows. Valverde accepted the decision but ordered a buffalo hunt to replenish their provisions before returning to New Mexico.

On the night that the council was held, ten Apaches from El Cuartelejo entered the Spanish camp to inform the governor that their people were coming to visit him. Valverde decided to delay his departure and await the Cuartelejos's arrival. A week later, more than one thousand Cuartelejos, Palomas, and Calchufines arrived with two hundred tents. Among the new arrivals was a Paloma chief recovering from a gunshot wound. Valverde learned that the native had received the wound in a battle with the French, Pawnees, and Jumanos, east of El Cuartelejo. The Paloma continued that the French had established "two large pueblos, each of which is as large as that of Taos," where they were arming and training the Pawnees and Jumanos and each day advancing more into the Apache lands. Having gained as much information as possible from the Cuartelejos, Valverde distributed gifts and returned to Santa Fe.

Several important pieces of information are gained from Valverde's expedition of 1719. It shows that the Apaches to the north of Santa Fe were on good terms with the Spanish.
The Jicarilla Apaches were involved in extensive, irrigated agriculture. All of the Apaches, from the Jicarillas to the Cuartelejos and Palomas were suffering increasing assaults from the Utes and Comanches and/or the French and Pawnees. As a result of these attacks, the Apaches were retreating on almost all fronts, many of them moving into the area of La Jicarilla. Finally, the Jicarilla Apaches seemed religiously oriented. They venerated the holy cross and appeared receptive to conversion.

Valverde quickly sent a report of his expedition and its results to viceroy Valero. He concluded that the French settlements were approximately two hundred leagues from Santa Fe, but that the French appeared to be advancing. The governor also indicated that he would continue explorations until contact was made with the French. Finally, he noted the lack of munitions and manpower in New Mexico to counter any emergency that might occur.  

Valero also received a letter from the auditor of war, Juan Manuel de Oliván Rebolledo. Oliván, having seen Valverde's reports, recommended that a presidio of twenty to twenty-five soldiers be established at El Cuartelejo. Two or three missionaries should also be stationed there to "instruct the Apaches and establish a perpetual alliance with those who are in their nation very numerous." These Apaches should be encouraged congregate and farm at the
presidio and farm. Their large numbers would provide sufficient auxiliary forces to counter the French advance.

To strengthen the Spanish position further, Oliván suggested that peace should be made with the Apaches in Texas to create a solid defensive cordon against the French.28

The viceroy agreed with Oliván's suggestion, but Valverde vehemently protested. The New Mexican governor felt that El Cuartelejo was too isolated for a presidio. There were numerous Indian tribes in that area and not all of them were friendly toward the Spanish. In addition, the Cuartelejo Apaches did not reside there year round. They gathered there to plant and harvest their crops and then scattered over the surrounding plains. In addition, the area had insufficient water and wood for a permanent settlement. Finally, Valverde argued, El Cuartelejo was too far from Santa Fe to be supported, should that be necessary. Instead, he recommended that a presidio should be established at La Jicarilla.29

A war council called by Valverde confirmed his conclusions. Several members of the council noted that fifty, not twenty-five soldiers, would increase the success of a presidio at La Jicarilla. The extra soldiers were necessary because of the attacks of the Utes and Comanches, as well as the Faraones from the east. The extra soldiers
would allow for sallies and reconnaissances to be made against hostile natives.30

While Governor Valverde was arguing to position the proposed presidio at La Jicarilla, he was also organizing an expedition to seek out the French to the east. This expedition would be led by his lieutenant-governor, Pedro de Villasur. Villasur's experience was questionable, but he would be accompanied two seasoned scouts. One was José Naranjo, an able scout and interpreter who had served under Diego de Vargas and accompanied both Ulibarri's and Valverde's campaigns to El Cuartelejo. The other was a Frenchman, Jean L'Archevêque, a survivor of the La Salle expedition (and one of La Salle's assassins) who had been captured in Texas, taken to Mexico for interrogation, imprisoned in Spain, and eventually returned to New Spain as a Spanish subject. He had joined Diego de Vargas in the reconquest of New Mexico, settled and married in Santa Fe, and participated in the Ulibarri and Valverde expeditions.31

Forty-two soldiers, sixty Pueblos, three civilians and a priest made up Villasur's army. The little army was well provisioned with maize, short swords, knives, sombreros, and tobacco for use in persuading Apaches to join the expedition. L'Archevêque contributed ten horses and six pack mules for the occasion.32
Villasur followed the same basic route that Valverde had followed the previous year. He traveled through La Jicarilla where he picked up at least a few Carlanas as guides and distributed the gifts he had brought. The Carlana guides rafted the Spanish and their provisions across a river in their country, but it is uncertain if any Apaches accompanied the expedition farther than El Cuartelejo.33

After two months of travel, Villasur reached the junction of the South Platte and the North Platte Rivers. Near there the party was nearly wiped out by Pawnee Indians with alleged French assistance. Only a dozen Spaniards survived, most seriously wounded, and among the dead were the much-traveled Jean L'Archevêque and José Naranjo. Fortunately, the survivors reached the camps of friendly Apaches at El Cuartelejo. The Apaches grieved over the defeat with the Spanish and kept them in their care for two days sharing their meager provisions with them and promising to help the Spaniards avenge their dead. The survivors straggled back to Santa Fe a few weeks later.34

The Villasur massacre had dire results for the Apaches living to the north of New Mexico. Those living in the vicinity of El Cuartelejo were left with little support against the growing threat of the Comanches, Utes, Pawnees, and French. They would have a brief opportunity to salvage their situation when the French entered their area and
offered peace, but events would prevent the Apaches from taking advantage of the proposal.

The Apaches at La Jicarilla suffered as well. The proposed construction of a presidio there never occurred. The viceroy, upon hearing of the Villasur disaster, ordered that the presidio be constructed immediately.\textsuperscript{35} Valverde, however, balked at the suggestion.

Valverde rushed his response to Valero back to Mexico City. With the loss of Villasur's company, almost one-third of the Santa Fe garrison had perished. It would be impossible to spare twenty-five soldiers for a presidio at La Jicarilla. Besides that, he continued, before sending them to "that desert," a strong house should be constructed for them to shelter their families, offer them refuge, and store their supplies. Keeping the new presidio supplied would also be problematic. There were twenty leagues of mountainous terrain between Santa Fe and La Jicarilla and for five months out of the year, snows made the roads impassable. This would leave the garrison at the mercy of a great multitude of untrustworthy Apaches. If they should rebel, the Apaches could easily muster a force of two to three thousand warriors in a week destroy the presidio, and endanger the remainder of New Mexico.\textsuperscript{36}

Several interesting facts come to light in Valverde's message: La Jicarilla had become a "desert;" the Apaches
had become "untrustworthy;" and the area had become an isolated death trap for five months of the year. Obviously, Valverde was afraid to weaken his faltering hold on Santa Fe any more than necessary, and he felt that spreading troops too thinly would prove disastrous. As far as the untrustworthiness of the Apaches, which Valverde stated he had personally experienced, he must have been referring to the Faraones. Almost every statement he had made up to this point concerning the Apaches to the north of Santa Fe had been glowing with praise.

Valverde's protests won him some concessions. Oliván suggested increasing the size of the proposed garrison at La Jicarilla and sending married men with a trade in order to assure the independence and success of the venture. A commander should be chosen from Mexico, since Valverde had stated the lack of qualified leaders in New Mexico. A war council in Mexico unanimously agreed to increase the proposed garrison to fifty men, recruited from wherever Valverde saw fit. It also agreed to the construction of a strong house for the men and their families, a place for their horses, and the stockpiling of provisions to assure their survival through the winter.  

These concessions, however, were not satisfactory for Valverde, since he had neither the manpower nor the supplies to carry out the orders. Fortunately for him, but
unfortunately for the Jicarilla Apaches, Mexico soon cooled to the idea of a presidio. Spain signed a treaty with France in the summer of 1721, and peace with its European rival lessened the perceived threat to Spanish holdings on the frontier, making an Apache barrier less urgent.\textsuperscript{38}

Although the Spanish cooled interest in establishing a presidio among the Jicarillas, the Apaches did not. Continued Comanche and Ute raids encouraged Captain Carlana and a delegation of Apaches to visit Santa Fe in November 1723. The emissaries met with the governor, Juan Domingo de Bustamante, and informed him that they had recently suffered a devastating attack from the Comanches. It was clear to the delegates that their only chance for survival was to throw themselves on the mercy of the Spaniards. As a consequence, the Apaches expressed willingness to settle peacefully in pueblos like the Christian Indians, seek holy baptism for themselves and their people, and accept priests to instruct them as well as an alcalde mayor to govern them. All this they agreed to in exchange for the protection of Spanish arms. The Apaches then asked Bustamante to accompany them to the valley of La Jicarilla, survey the situation, and choose the most advantageous sites for them to locate their pueblos. They were especially anxious to relocate as quickly as possible so that they might begin planting crops.\textsuperscript{39}
Bustamante was in the midst of organizing a campaign against the troublesome Faraones, but decided to convene a council of war to discuss this tempting proposal of the Apaches. The council members unanimously agreed to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them. It was hoped that the conversion and settlement of the Jicarilla Apaches might have a favorable impact on the more widely scattered bands of Apaches and convince them of the advantages of settlement and conversion. Additionally, the valley of Jicarilla was an important entrance into Santa Fe and a settlement of peaceful Apaches there would serve as a bulwark against French invasion (and although they did not say it, Comanche invasion as well). The council recommended that Bustamante cancel the campaign against the Faraones and instead lead fifty soldiers to La Jicarilla, gather the natives together, and determine the validity of the delegation's proposal. If all seemed in accord, Bustamante should begin assigning locations for their pueblos.40

Wasting no time, Bustamante assembled a presidial force of fifty soldiers and a week later departed for La Jicarilla. He visited the rancherias of three prominent chiefs. First, he traveled to that of Captain Carlana, who met him accompanied by six other captains and fifty warriors. After being escorted to their camp and then assured that all the Apaches welcomed the Spaniards and
conversion to their faith, the governor continued on to the ranchería of Captain Churlique. There he received a similar reception. Finally, he visited the ranchería of Captain Cojo where he was similarly assured of the fealty of these natives. The Apaches impressed on the governor that more of their people from widely scattered rancherías would join them in the spring. Bustamante took formal possession of the valley for Spain and placed it and all of its rancherías under royal protection.  

After returning to Santa Fe, Bustamante informed the viceroy of his actions. He recommended that a presidio of fifty soldiers be constructed at La Jicarilla, as had been suggested earlier under Valverde's term. Such a fortification would lend security to the Jicarillas, as well as to the missionaries stationed among them, and hasten their settlement and conversion.  

The immediate response concerning Bustamante's suggestions appeared favorable. Oliván wrote to the new viceroy, the Marqués de Casafuerte, in July, outlining in some detail the background of the proposed presidio and how it might be manned. The viceroy, however, hesitated to approve the plan.  

While officials in Mexico debated the issue, the Comanches once again swooped through the rancherías of La Jicarilla. In early 1724, Comanches forced the Jicarillas to
"give up half their women and children, and then they burned several villages, killing all but sixty-nine men, two women, and three boys." Bustamante authorized Juan Páez Hurtado to lead one hundred men in an effort to chastise the Comanches. Either Hurtado's campaign or a later one led by Bustamante, managed to recover sixty-four of the Jicarilla and return them to their homes.⁴⁴

Despite Bustamante's success in recovering some of their people, the Jicarillas told him that since they could not be protected in their own land, they were going to join the Navajos. The fiscal (legal adviser) in Mexico City advised that the Jicarilla not be allowed to "escape" to the Navajos, but instead they be relocated to a place closer to the Christianized pueblos. He even suggested using funds from the royal treasury for the first year or two to maintain them.⁴⁵

Still Casafuerte delayed, eventually gathering all pertinent information and delivering it to Pedro de Rivera who was about to begin his inspection tour of the frontier posts of New Spain. Rivera did not reach Santa Fe until June 1726 and his assessment of the situation was sent to Casafuerte from El Paso in September 1726. The inspector argued against the establishment of a presidio at La Jicarilla. If, he stated, the main goal of the presidio was to aid in the conversion of the Apaches, then they could as
easily be converted at Taos. If the main goal of a presidio was to expand the empire, then it was pointless to establish it. There were many places behind the frontier that were at least as fertile as La Jicarilla, and they were yet to be settled. Why then should the government foot the expenses of building and manning a presidio at La Jicarilla when travelers could not safely pass from El Paso to Santa Fe without an armed escort? Funds would be much more efficiently used to settle or protect areas already nominally under Spanish control than using them to overextend the frontiers. Thus, no presidio should be constructed for the Jicarilla. They should instead be relocated at Taos.46

The fiscal, Oliván, and the viceroy all agreed with Rivera's recommendation. In April 1727 the viceroy closed the file on the issue of a presidio at La Jicarilla. Bustamante was ordered to carry out Rivera's suggestion of relocating the Jicarilla to the vicinity of Taos.47 Spain's failure to establish a presidio at La Jicarilla ended the chance for the Jicarilla Apaches to withstand the onslaught of the Comanches and retain possession of their homelands.

There still remained one possibility, however slight, for the Apaches north of Santa Fe to salvage their position—an alliance with the French. In December 1718 Jean-Baptiste
Bénard de La Harpe departed New Orleans to travel up the Red River to establish a trading post among the Nassonites near present Texarkana. After founding a small trading post there and establishing sporadic contact with the Spanish missions in East Texas, La Harpe received news that Spain and France were again at war. Having lost, at least temporarily his chance to establish trade with the Spanish, La Harpe decided to extend French influence to the west and explore farther up the Red River.  

La Harpe's lieutenant, Sieur Du Rivage, encountered a large party of mixed tribes who reported to the French that they had just returned from a battle with the "Cancy." The friendly natives explained that the Cancy composed a very populous village on the banks of the Red River some sixty leagues from their present location. They also enticed the French by stating that the Spanish were established at the Cancy village and were working at "taking very heavy material from the earth." 

The friendly natives were a conglomerate of Caddoan tribes and Tonkawas. The Cancy were Apaches, most likely Lipans. While these Apaches no doubt had contact and trade with the Spaniards, there is no indication of a Spanish outpost located at the described location. The French also learned that the Cancy fought with bows and arrows, because the Spanish forbade trading firearms. They possessed,
however, swords, suits, hats, and some woven materials. Most importantly, however, was the fact that the Cancy had horses and controlled their distribution. Other nations could only obtain the animal through the Apaches.\textsuperscript{50}

La Harpe also recorded another important piece of information. He learned of a numerous nation known as the Padoucas who resided far to the north and northwest of the Arkansas. The Spanish were allies with some, but not all of these Indians. The Padoucas were frequently attacked by the Pawnees and were also enemies of the Caddoan tribes, with whom La Harpe was meeting.\textsuperscript{51}

There has been significant debate concerning the identity of the Padoucas. Many scholars insist that they were Comanches, while others insist that they were Apaches. In all likelihood, Frank R. Secoy is correct in his theory that prior to 1750, Padoucas referred to Apaches, while after 1750 the term related to Comanches who had moved into the area formerly occupied by Apaches.\textsuperscript{52}

There is little doubt that the Padoucas of La Harpe's time were El Cuartelejo Apaches. The area they lived in was identical to that described by Ulibarri in 1706, and they lived in widely scattered villages. Some of the villages had substantial structures apparently modeled after pueblo architecture. These structures were leftover influence from the Pueblos who had once lived among the Apaches. Their
material culture was almost exactly identical to that of the Apaches, and they farmed. Their war with the Pawnees was well documented by Spanish sources, and a statement that they were not all known by the Spaniards also fits data concerning El Cuartelejo. It will be remembered that Valverde, in his expedition to the Cuartelejos, met with only a portion of them and then departed before the bulk of the natives could meet with him to express any allegiance.53

A final note of interest concerning La Harpe's journey is that the Frenchman recorded that the Indians with whom he was meeting rarely traveled to the headwaters of the Arkansas River, because the Cancy passed that way to battle with the Padoucas. This statement of inter-Apache warfare at first seems to cast doubt on the identity of the Padoucas as Apaches. Since Apache-Comanche warfare was well under way by this time, perhaps one could argue that the Padoucas were Comanches. But, most likely, the warfare between the Cancy (Lipans) and the Padoucas (Cuartelejos) was an offshoot of the clash between the Jicarillas (allies of the Cuartelejos) and the Faraones (close relatives of the Lipans).

Noting the seeming power of the Padoucas, La Harpe observed that whoever controlled trade with them would control the central plains. Shortly after La Harpe's expedition, the French learned, through their Indian allies, of Villasur's defeat. Pierre Dugué de Boisbriant, the French
commandant in Illinois, recorded news from the western frontier. He was informed by natives in November 1720 that a large force of Spanish and Padoucas had entered their country to establish a post on the Missouri. A force of 60 Spaniards and 150 Padoucas had approached to within fifteen leagues of the Otoptatas who met with the Spanish pretending to be Pani-mahas. The Padoucas fled during the night, and the Otoptatas performed a dance for the Spanish. In the midst of the ceremony, the Otoptatas attacked the Spanish and all but two of the Spaniards were killed.\textsuperscript{54}

While not the most accurate account of the Villasur massacre, the native rendition did frighten the French into activity. They feared the loss of potential trade on the central plains and they also realized that peace must be made between their Indian allies and the Padoucas. In order to achieve this, French authorities called noted Indian authority and trader Etienne Véniard de Bourgmont out of retirement in Paris.\textsuperscript{55}

On his trip to the Padoucas, Bourgmont first stopped at the main village of the Kansas. Here he parleyed with the natives and sent messages to other tribes of his intentions to reach the Padoucas. When he departed, the Kansas and other tribes accompanied him with a sizable entourage of 300 warriors, 2 head chiefs, 14 war chiefs, 300 women, 500 children, and more than 300 dogs dragging freight on
travois. The sheer bulk of the expedition and the fact that most of the natives were afoot slowed progress to a crawl. In addition, a few days after departing the Kansa village, Bourgmont became too ill to continue.\textsuperscript{56}

Rather than delay or cancel the expedition, Bourgmont sent a French civilian named François Gaillard along with two freed Apache slaves and a pair of Kansa Indians to the Padouca. Gaillard was to travel ahead to the Padouca, distribute a few gifts among them, explain Bourgmont's peaceful mission, and try to convince some of the Padouca chiefs to accompany him back to a meeting with Bourgmont. A few weeks later, Gaillard's party encountered a Padouca hunting party. After a few tense moments between the Kansas and Apaches who were traditional enemies, the former Apache slaves explained Gaillard's mission and the tensions eased. The small party was taken to the Padouca village and received warmly. Gaillard quickly set about paving the way for Bourgmont. He led a small party of Apaches to meet with a Kansa hunting party, and then led a party of Kansas to meet with the Apaches. Both groups of traditional enemies treated each other cordially. Gaillard convinced the Kansas to return home so that they could inform Bourgmont of his progress. He stayed behind to visit other Padouca villages.\textsuperscript{57}
Upon hearing this news, Bourgmont decided to relaunch his campaign even though he was not fully recovered. He arrived at the Kansa village a few days ahead of Gaillard, who was bringing six hundred warriors and their families from eight Apache villages. After ceremonial greetings and speeches, Bourgmont spent the next several days gathering representatives from the French allies. When the council was held, Missouris, Otos, Kansas, Iowas, Osages, and Pawnees attended along with the French and Padoucas. Once the attendees had assembled, Bourgmont gave a speech announcing his intention to establish peaceful relations between all the attendant tribes. The French allies stood up and shouted their approval of the proposal, and afterward the Apache chief invited the attendees to visit his people.  

Less than a week later, Bourgmont led a column of seventeen Frenchmen and nineteen Indians from the Kansa, Missouri, Oto and Iowa tribes. The troop marched some 250 miles to the southwest. Somewhere in central Kansas, in the vicinity of Ellsworth, the French party reached a large Padouca encampment. The next several days were spent exchanging gifts, speaking, and feasting. The French expressed their desire to establish peaceful relations between themselves and the attending nations. The Padouca accepted Bourgmont's peace overtures and promised to maintain the peace not only with the French but with their
former enemies as well. The Padouca chief invited the French to accompany them to visit the Spanish who were only twelve days distant from their village, but the French begged off because of the lateness of the season.  

During their visit to the Padouca, the French recorded several interesting facts. The Padouca ranged over an area of 200 leagues (more than 500 miles). They had numerous villages and engaged in agriculture. At the camp where Bourgmont met them, there were 140 structures housing 800 warriors, 1500 women, and 2000 children. This was obviously not a permanent population. The number of inhabitants was greatly expanded because of the importance of the occasion. The head chief who addressed the French claimed that he controlled twelve villages and could muster 2000 warriors.  

Finally, the Padouca noted their relationship with the Spanish. Some of the Padouca villages were near to the Spanish, and the Spanish visited them each spring to trade—bringing horses, awls, knives, and axes. All of the items, they claimed, were of inferior quality to those brought by the French, indicating that the Padouca were more impressed by the quality and variety of goods offered by the French. Some Padouca villages were more remote from the Spanish and still used flint knives. They would no doubt be extremely
interested in developing a trade relationship with the French.\textsuperscript{62}

The promising beginning started by Bourgmont did not last long. The Apaches almost immediately tried to use their new-found allies against the Comanches. They and a few French traders surprised a Comanche hunting camp and scored a small victory, but for the next three years the Comanche were relentless in their attacks on Apache rancherías. In 1726 the Comanches even chased a band of Palomas and Calchufines into Santa Fe.\textsuperscript{63}

Political events eventually cut off French contact with the Apaches. Bourgmont returned to France in 1725, and his work did not survive long in his absence. The trading post he had established was abandoned in 1729 and replaced by a new post near the Kansa villages. French traders increased the supply of guns to the Pawnees and Kansas in order to encourage the taking of Apache captives to trade with the French. In addition, French traders who made trips to visit the Padoucas quickly realized that they were being eclipsed by the Comanches and thus began to shift their attention toward making peace with them.\textsuperscript{64}

The Spanish in New Mexico began receiving sporadic news of the French at El Cuartelejo. Governor Bustamante wrote to the viceroy in April 1727 to inform him that Jicarillas at Taos had reported that Frenchmen were aiding the Cuartelejos.
against the Comanches. When Apaches brought Comanche prisoners to Santa Fe, the Comanches were interrogated and informed the Spanish that there had been white men among the Apaches who had captured them. The description of the white men convinced the Spaniards that they were French.\textsuperscript{65}

In 1726 the French were reportedly three days march from La Jicarilla. They were leading a great force of Palomas, Cuartelejos and Sierra Blancas against the Comanches, trying to drive them from the area.\textsuperscript{66} The reports of French among the Cuartelejos obviously refers to the traders visiting the area as a result of Bourgmont's journey. The viceroy, upon receiving these reports took little action, apparently having come to the conclusion that the French were more interested in trade than in conquest. In addition, reports that they were attacking the Comanche might have been viewed with favor by the Spaniards in New Mexico. In any case Casafuerte requested that Bustamante keep him updated on new developments.\textsuperscript{67}

The break between the French and the Apaches in approximately 1727 brings another period of Apache history to a close. From this point on, the Apaches north of Santa Fe were more or less left in a defensive state, trying desperately to save their crumbling society. More and more they became dependent on the Spanish to protect them, and
increasingly they assisted the Spaniards in an effort to regain their former status.

The Apaches living to the east and south of Santa Fe had a slower decline because of their insulated position. They were protected from the Comanche onslaught by their more northerly kinsmen, and the Caddoans who bordered them on the east were less interested in expanding out onto the plains. But, eventually they too faced the pressures that had overwhelmed their cousins and they too would eventually be forced to seek protection and aid from the Spanish.
NOTES


4. Ulibarrí's campaign diary, where the following summary has been taken, is translated in Alfred Barnaby Thomas, trans. and ed., After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), 59-77.

5. Conejeros means "rabbit eaters" or "rabbit hunters." The Achos, who were first mentioned in connection with their supposed assistance to the Pueblos during the revolt of 1680, is a name of unknown origin. The Río Colorados lived along the Canadian River, which was known to the Spanish at this time as the Río Colorados. These natives should not be confused with natives of a similar name living southwest of Acoma who were probably Gila Apaches. See Opler, "Apachean Culture Pattern," 390-391.

6. Alfred B. Thomas, "Spanish Exploration of Oklahoma, 203
1599-1792, *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 6 (1928): 12-13, suggests that the friendly Apaches were Jicarillas, or their ancestors, and the hostile Apaches were Faraones. The origin of the names Penxayes and Lemitas is unknown. Flechas de Palo translates as "wooden arrows." These Indians possibly had some distinct characteristic concerning their arrows. Trementina means "turpentine," but the significance of the terminology has been lost over time. See Opler, "Apachean Culture Pattern," 391.

7. This is the first mention of the Jicarilla, although in the context of the diary it is not clear whether "La Xicarilla" refers to a tribe or a location. There is much controversy surrounding the origin of the term Jicarilla. Traditionally it has been believed that it was Spanish for "little basket." The Carlanas were named for one of their prominent chiefs. See Opler, "Apachean Culture Patterns," 389.


11. Frederic J. Athearn, *A Forgotten Kingdom: The Spanish Frontier in Colorado and New Mexico, 1540-1821*

15. Ibid., 82, 86-87.

16. This is a point of contention. Hurtado's diary makes no mention of Jicarillas or other friendly Apaches joining the expedition. Alfred B. Thomas, the editor of the diary, makes the statement in his introduction, (Thomas, *After Coronado*, 25) but has no citation and none of the documents that he translates mentions Apache allies. Most secondary works use Thomas's statement, citing him as the source. The specificity of the numbers (thirty Jicarilla and one Cuartelejo) leads one to believe that Thomas must have gotten the information from another source, which he chose not to cite. Gunnerson, *Jicarilla Apaches*, 182, on the other hand, says bluntly, "the Spanish did not use the Jicarillas as auxiliaries against the Faraons[sic] in 1715."

18. Ibid., 81.

20. A translation of the war council is in Thomas, *After
Coronado, 100-110. From the testimony, it is clear that the Utes have just recently become hostile, having previously had generally peaceful relations with the Spanish. It is therefore possible that the Comanches were having some negative impact on their kinsmen and might have been the real instigators of the raids, dragging their Ute cousins in reluctantly.

21. Thomas, After Coronado, 137-139.
22. Ibid., 110-112.
23. Ibid., 113-114.
24. Ibid., 115.
25. The "Jumanos" in this case were most likely Wichitas rather than the Jumanos who lived near the Pecos in the 1600-1700s.
26. Ibid., 127-133, quotation on 132.
27. Ibid., 141-145.
28. Ibid., 148-151.
29. Ibid., 154-156.
30. Ibid., 156-162.
32. Thomas, After Coronado, 36-37, 182; A. F. Bandelier, "The Expedition of Pedro de Villazur[sic], From Santa Fé, New Mexico, to the Banks of the Platte River, in Search of
the French and the Pawnees, in the Year 1720," in Hemenway Southwestern Archeological Expedition: Contributions to the History of the Southwestern Portion of the United States (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1890), 194. While most of the goods were destined for distribution as gifts to gain Apache guides and auxiliaries, it is unclear whether L'Archevêque intended to contribute his goods to the cause or whether he intended to trade the goods with Apaches, Pawnees, or possibly Frenchmen for profit.

33. Thomas, After Coronado, 250, 255; Gunnerson, Jicarilla Apaches, 195. Terrell, Plains Apaches, 168, says the Apaches deserted shortly after the party reached El Cuartelejo and well before the battle. Bandelier, "The Expedition of Villazur," 197-201, argued that Apaches were present and primarily to blame for the massacre of the Spanish, because they did not keep proper watch, or perhaps because of treachery on their part.

34. John, Storms Brewed, 249; Thomas, After Coronado, 165-166.

35. Thomas, After Coronado, 167-169.


38. John, Storms Brewed, 250.
40. Ibid., 195-197.
41. Ibid., 197-201.
42. Ibid., 201-203.
43. Ibid., 203-208.
44. Ibid., 208; Athearn, *Forgotten Kingdom*, 40.
46. Ibid., 209-217.
47. Ibid., 217-219; Gunnerson, *Jicarilla Apaches*, 201.
53. For evidence of the Padoucas being Apaches rather than Comanches, see G. B. Grinnell, "Who were the Padouca?" *American Anthropologist*, n.s. 22 (1920): 248-260; Hyde,
Indians of the High Plains, 86-87; Gunnerson, Jicarilla Apaches, 223; and Kavanagh, Comanche Political History, 66.


57. Ibid., 59-61, 138-142.

58. Ibid., 62-65, 142-144.


60. Norall, Bourgmont, 75, 159.

61. Ibid., 74-75, 155-156.

62. Ibid., 77, 159.

63. Hyde, Indians of the High Plains, 89-90; Francis Haines, Plains Indians, 82.

64. Haines, Plains Indians, 82-83; Folmer, Franco-Spanish Rivalry, 288; Terrell, Plains Apaches, 183-184.

65. Thomas, After Coronado, 256-257.
66. Ibid., 257-258.
CHAPTER 6

TURNING THE TIDE: THE DECLINE OF THE
SOUTHERN PLAINS APACHES, 1711-1749

While the Apaches north of New Mexico were suffering increased attacks on all sides, those living to the south suffered less oppression. The Faraones straddled the Río Grande between Santa Fe and El Paso and continuously harassed caravans and travelers passing along the trails. Farther to the east, in the vicinity of San Antonio, were Apaches who would eventually become known as the Lipans.¹ In the 1600s and early 1700s, the Spanish made no real distinction between the Faraones and Lipans, or other bands living in the area of the southern plains. Instead, they referred to all groups as simply Apaches.

In 1711 Faraone Apaches identified as Chipaynes arrived in Pecos to trade. After they had departed, it was discovered that many of the captives sold by the Faraones were Christianized natives from the Río Grande missions of Coahuila rather than heathen plains natives.² Obviously these Indians controlled a large expanse of the southern plains and West Texas.

In 1713 soldiers from Santa Fe were attacked while escorting travelers to El Paso. The governor of New Mexico
feared a larger uprising that might isolate Santa Fe, but the soldiers assured him that the raiders were a small party operating out of the Sandía Mountains. The governor responded in the following year by mounting an expedition of thirty-six soldiers, eleven residents from Albuquerque, and 321 Pueblo allies to punish the Faraones, but the force failed to make contact.³

Farther to the east, the French began making inroads into Texas. Several early expeditions from Louisiana into East Texas were carried out by the intrepid French trader, Louis Juchereau de St. Denis. St. Denis, after failing to locate Spaniards among the Tejas Indians, decided to push on toward the Río Grande and Presidio San Juan Bautista. Twenty-six Tejas Indians and three Frenchmen accompanied St. Denis. On the Colorado River the party was attacked by two hundred Apaches. After a battle of several hours, the attackers were driven off with only slight losses to the traders. The Tejas assured St. Denis that they would suffer no more attacks from the Apaches, and all but four returned to East Texas. True to their prediction, St. Denis reached San Juan Bautista without incident in July 1714.⁴

At the Spanish presidio, St. Denis was arrested. He spent almost two years explaining his presence to various Spanish officials ending with the viceroy himself. He eventually managed to convince the Spanish that he could be
useful to them, and they employed him as commissary officer on the entrada to reestablish a Spanish presence among the Tejas. The expedition, under the leadership of Domingo Ramón, departed San Juan Bautista in April 1716 and arrived safely among the Tejas two months later.\(^5\)

St. Denis acted as interpreter and helped smooth relations between Spanish and Tejas. The Frenchman soon departed for Louisiana to take care of personal business, leaving Ramón to supervise the building of the missions. By the end of 1716, St. Denis was back in East Texas having gathered merchandise for a second trip to the Río Grande.\(^6\)

St. Denis and Ramón left East Texas in early 1717 with a caravan and an escort of soldiers. Shortly after crossing the Colorado River, the party was assaulted by sixty to seventy mounted Apaches. The soldiers managed to drive off the attackers, but not before they made off with fifteen loaded mules, twenty-seven other animals, and a female mulatto driver who had been bringing up the rear.\(^7\)

It is obvious that Apaches constantly raided the trade routes between East Texas and the Río Grande. St. Denis, a contemporary expert on Indian relations, commented on the belligerency of the Apaches once he reached San Juan Bautista. Most Texas Indians, he remarked, could be pacified by a person knowledgeable of their language and conversant
with them. The Apaches, however, were a different case. It would be more costly to reduce them.\footnote{8}

While St. Denis was assisting the Spanish in their reoccupation of East Texas, Father Antonio de San Buenaventura y Olivares worked feverishly in an attempt to gain permission to establish a mission on the San Antonio River. Because the proposed site bordered on Apachería, Olivares requested ten soldiers to accompany the mission. A council in Mexico agreed with the friar's recommendations and Martín de Alarcón was appointed governor of Texas and given the responsibility of establishing the mission.\footnote{9}

Alarcón began gathering troops and supplies for the San Antonio venture, but it would be 1718 before he was ready to depart. In April he set out from San Juan Bautista with seventy-two persons, seven droves of pack mules, and large herds of cattle, goats, and horses. A few weeks later, the party arrived at their destination and founded a mission, a presidio, and a villa over the next several weeks.\footnote{10} San Antonio would quickly become the focal point of Spanish-Apache relations in Texas.

Alarcón's instructions ordered him to be wary of the Apaches and organize local Indians in a defensive alliance against them.\footnote{11} Although mindful of the hostility of certain Apaches, namely the Faraones, the Spanish were also aware
that other Apaches could be dealt with peacably—for example, the Jicarilla and Cuartelejo Apaches in New Mexico.

In attempting to address the Apaches on the northern frontier, Viceroy Baltisar de Zúñiga y Guzmán, Marqués de Valero, noted that they were a numerous and warlike tribe with a territory that stretched from the headwaters of the Missouri and Red Rivers to the north, to the mountains of New Mexico on the west, and to the frontier of Gran Quivira to the east. An alliance with them would create a defense cordon along the northern outposts of New Spain.¹²

Juan Oliván de Rebolledo, a member of the Junat General in Mexico City, suggested that friendly Apaches in New Mexico be told of Spanish settlements at San Antonio and along the Río Grande, lest they confuse them for French outposts. He further suggested that Apaches be informed of a simple way to distinguish between the Spanish and French. The former carried rosaries; the latter did not. He further recommended giving the peaceful Apaches rosaries to wear so that the Spanish might identify them as allies.¹³

At least in the early stages, therefore, the Spanish in Texas hoped to convert the Apaches into allies. This failed, perhaps because the Spanish had befriended the Tejas who were enemies of the Apaches, or perhaps because the Apaches confused the Spanish in Texas for Frenchmen who had been arming their enemies to the east. In any event, Apaches in

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Texas never developed the cordial relations with Spaniards that their more northerly kinsmen achieved in New Mexico.

Meanwhile, the French continued their activities to the east. St. Denis had been arrested yet again upon his arrival at San Juan Bautista, and transported to Mexico City. He eventually managed to escape from the capital and returned to Louisiana in 1719. Having failed to establish a profitable trade with the Spanish along the Río Grande, the French turned their attention toward New Mexico. As noted in the previous chapter, Benard de La Harpe encountered Apaches, probably Lipans along the Red River. These natives are no doubt the same ones who raided the area around San Antonio.

La Harpe's explorations combined with the seizure of Los Adaes by a small French force in 1719, caused the Spanish to reinforce the garrison at San Antonio with eighty-four soldiers. Alarcón was replaced as governor by the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo, who began making preparations for a vigorous campaign through Texas and into Louisiana. France and Spain negotiated a truce, however, even before the new governor crossed the Río Grande. Aguayo's planned campaign of conquest rapidly changed to one of reoccupation and fortification. The expedition resulted in the establishment of a presidio at Matagorda Bay, the site of La Salle's colony, and the reoccupation of the East...
Texas missions. Additionally two presidios were constructed in East Texas to strengthen Spanish presence there.\textsuperscript{15}

When Aguayo returned to San Antonio, he realized how exposed that settlement was to Apache raids. Although he himself had not encountered Apaches, San Antonio had suffered depredations. Prior to Aguayo's arrival in San Antonio en route to East Texas, Apaches had attacked supply trains traveling from Coahuila to San Antonio. In fact, one train had been attacked just two days before he reached Béxar. The Apaches signaled their hostile intent by tying red cloth onto arrows stuck in the ground near San Antonio. Armed with this information, Aguayo drafted plans and ordered the construction of a new fortress with four bastions, proportioned for a garrison of fifty-four men. He also sent several detachments of soldiers to patrol the vicinity of the presidio and missions in an effort to capture some Apaches and convince them through kind treatment that the Spanish wanted peace.\textsuperscript{16}

Shortly after Aguayo returned to Coahuila in 1722, Nicolás Flores was given command of the presidio at San Antonio. For more than a year after Flores assumed command, no horses were stolen from Béxar. Missionaries used this time by attempting to Christianize the Apaches. Their work was unsuccessful, however, and in 1723 the Apaches raided the presidio's horse herd and carried off eighty animals.
Flores immediately set out in pursuit, but after twelve hours returned to San Antonio to organize a concerted campaign against the thieves.\textsuperscript{17}

Two days after the theft, Flores departed San Antonio at the head of thirty soldiers and thirty mission Indians. After traveling a distance of 130 leagues, the Spaniards encountered a ranchería of two hundred Apaches. The Apaches rode out to meet the Spaniards, and a six-hour battle ensued. Thirty-four Apaches, including their chief were killed, twenty women and children were captured, and 120 horses and mules were recovered. A quantity of saddles, bridles, knives, spears, and other items stolen from the Spanish was also recovered. The triumphant Spaniards then marched back to San Antonio with their captives.\textsuperscript{18}

Flores's victory was soon tainted by controversy that surrounded the entrada. Fray Joseph González, a friar at Mission Valero, claimed that Flores had attacked an innocent band of Apaches. Indians from the mission had been supplied as allies in an effort to bring in Apaches for conversion. Instead, Flores's victims were potential neophytes who had been killed or captured while trying to escape. This conflict between the military and the missionaries was a problem that would hamper Spaniard's relations with Apaches in Texas for many years.\textsuperscript{19}
Regardless of his motives for the attack, Flores used the opportunity to interrogate the captives. From them he learned that five Apache captains had been involved in the raid. Each had sent a dozen of his men to raid the horse herd. They then brought the plunder back to the main Apache camp where it was distributed before the camp broke up. The captives claimed that they planted corn and beans near where the Spaniards lived and that they were all subjects of a "great captain." Without his permission, no one could do anything. When asked about their hostility toward the Spanish at San Antonio, one informant replied that the Apaches stole horses and other items in order to trade with "other Spaniards" to the north.²⁰

The Spanish immediately assumed that the "other Spaniards" were the dreaded French, then making inroads across the northern plains. But in fact, the "other Spaniards" were the Spanish in New Mexico. Flores traveled for more than three hundred miles before he reached the Apache ranchería. Because he took an indirect route, he was probably slightly more than two hundred miles from San Antonio. It is apparent, therefore, that their home was still further to the north. The fact that they lived near the Spaniards and planted crops suggested that they were Apaches known as Jicarillas or Faraones to the New Mexicans. As noted earlier, Faraones often brought slaves captured
from Coahuila to trade at Pecos. San Antonio would have been an even closer source of plunder.

The captives also informed Flores that the Apaches were interested in negotiating a peace with the Spanish. The captain, not willing to miss the opportunity, agreed to send a forty-year-old female captive, one of the main informants, as an ambassador to her people. Flores promised that if the chiefs would come in and make peace, he would release the captives. He then freed the woman, giving her a horse and loading her with gifts.

The woman returned three weeks later with a chief, his wife, and three other Apaches. According to Flores, he rode out to meet the natives and the chief handed him a gold-tipped baton, saying "Dios! Dios!" The chief informed the Spaniards that when the woman had arrived at his camp with word that the Spanish desired peace, couriers had been sent out to the other chiefs. The Indian leaders met and decided that he should go and see if the woman had told the truth and to discern the veracity of the peace offering. If he deemed that it was acceptable, he was to return and inform the other chiefs so that they might all travel to San Antonio to make peace. After three days of dining, entertaining, and discussion, the Apaches departed, promising that the five chiefs would return to make peace.²¹
This promising beginning, however, had little direct result, and further inspection indicates that Flores might have overstated his case. Other sources state that a lack of interpreter limited the exchange of information. The Apache chief's possession of a baton, as well as his religious greeting, suggests that he had had previous contact with Spaniards. Father González also examined the visitors and no doubt gave them conflicting promises.

In any case, shortly after the visitors departed, rumors began to flow through San Antonio concerning the motives of the Apaches. According to these reports, Flores's campaign had so aroused the Apache that they were gathering a massive force to attack the Spanish. When they received Flores's peace offering, they decided to wait until their people could be rescued before attacking. The promise of peace had been nothing more than a ruse to acquire the release of the captives.²²

It was two months before the Apaches returned. A party of thirty arrived in San Antonio in late December 1723, and it was welcomed by Father González. The friar invited them into the mission and proposed returning the captives to them as a show of good faith. But Flores, perhaps wary of the rumors that had been floating around the settlement, refused to turn them over until all five chiefs came in and made peace. This disagreement embroiled the commander and the
priest in an argument. In the midst of this, the Apaches, apparently uncomfortable, departed, leaving behind a young girl as an additional hostage. Before they rode off, they promised that when the weather warmed, four of the five chiefs would return to make peace, but that the fifth chief had no interest in befriending the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{23}

The controversy between seculars and clergy eventually cost Flores his position. He was removed at the urging of Father González but returned a year later. During his absence, the missionary suggested that he personally lead an expedition of seventy men into Apachería. Through kind treatment and the return of their families, González argued, peace could be achieved. He apparently never got a chance to test his theory. Within a year, Flores had vindicated himself and was reappointed to San Antonio. Father González was then recalled to the college at Querétaro. Ironically, he was killed by Indians near the Río Grande in 1728.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite González's apparent defeat in his feud with Flores, the missionary's peaceful viewpoint won over the viceroy. Although the Apaches had not been pacified in the vicinity of San Antonio and continued to cause depredations throughout 1724 and 1725, the viceroy urged Governor Fernando Pérez de Almazán to secure an alliance with the Apaches through gentle persuasion. The viceroy, encouraged by the peaceful alliance of Apaches with New Mexico, saw no
reason that a similar alliance could not be constructed in Texas. The Marqués de Aguayo, then regarded as the resident expert on Texas, agreed that peace overtures should take precedence over punitive expeditions. In the end, the viceroy forbade any campaign against the Apaches unless duly authorized by him.\textsuperscript{25}

The policy appeared to be justified when Apache hostility in the San Antonio area virtually disappeared over the next five years.\textsuperscript{26} No doubt the Apaches were drawn northward to meet the increasing threat of the Comanche invasion. Around 1724, the Comanches and Apaches reportedly fought a nine-day battle at El Gran Cierra del Fierro, somewhere in northwest Texas, possibly near the Wichita River. This battle was the beginning of the decline for the Apaches on the plains. Accordingly, Apaches near San Antonio were no doubt distracted from their usual raids on Spanish settlements by vicious Comanche attacks on their northern kin, the Jicarillas and Cuartelejos. It is well to remember that Apaches north of New Mexico were seeking aid from each other, as well as the Spanish, to meet this onslaught, and they no doubt sought aid from Texas Apaches as well.

While Apache activity lessened down near San Antonio, the Indians nonetheless continued to harass San Juan Bautista. In 1728 a band of Apaches stole the entire horse herd from Mission San Juan Bautista.\textsuperscript{27} These Apaches were
probably the Faroones living on the southern Río Grande, who had not yet felt the pressure of the Comanche incursions, and were too far south to provide aid to their kinsmen.

During this interim of Apache quiescence, Pedro de Rivera arrived in Texas to conduct his inspection. His recommendations included reducing the San Antonio garrison from fifty-three to forty-three soldiers. The resulting Regulation of 1729, based largely on Rivera's recommendations, forbade governors or commanders from waging war on or disturbing peaceful or indifferent tribes. These officials could launch forays to pursue enemy Indians, but could not fight against "any nation of gentile Indians who had been friendly, even though they may give cause for it."

Finally, the Spaniards were instructed to grant peace to any Indians who asked for it and to treat them with kindness—all with an eye toward influencing others to follow suit.²⁸

When enacted, Rivera's recommendations caused enormous problems along the frontier, and they illustrate a major problem in Spanish-Apache relations. Because of the Apache band structure, one might seek peace while others continued raiding. The Spanish, who rarely made distinctions between independent bands would assume that the Apaches as a whole had broken the peace and retaliate. If that action was against a peaceful band, its members would assume that the Spaniards' promises of peace were worthless and declare war.
On the other hand, when an Apache band negotiated peace with the Spanish, they believed that settlement, such as with Spaniards at San Antonio pertained only pertained to that location. In other words, if Apaches agreed to peace with the Spanish at any location, they did not perceive that accord applied to the Spanish settlements elsewhere. Apaches saw Spanish settlements as independent "bands," much in the manner that their system was organized. Thus, when the Apaches raided other locations, they did not feel they had broken their agreement. The Spanish, of course, saw matters differently.

Rivera's sweeping recommendations resulted in a flurry of protests from missionaries and settlers along the frontier of Apachería. They feared that once the Apaches learned of the weakened condition of the presidio at Béxar, they would begin raiding again. And Spaniards had good reason to fear the renewal of Apache raids. Between 1718 and 1731, twenty-two percent of all recorded deaths of Spaniards were attributable to Apaches.29 These fears were once again realized with increased Apache activity starting in 1731. With the removal of three East Texas missions to San Antonio, traffic in supplies between the Río Grande and Béxar increased. Apaches took advantage of lightly guarded travelers, attacking them, and often driving off their horses and personal baggage. As a result of these attacks,
Rivera, who had become private counselor to the viceroy in all matters concerning the frontier outposts, advised that all missionaries and other travelers be escorted by eight soldiers and a corporal from the presidios of San Antonio de Béxar or San Juan Bautista. He also recommended that the captain of Béxar be given permission to punish Apaches who continuously harassed the settlements.  

Renewed Apache raids in 1731 climaxed with an attack on the presidio horse herd. In September a party of Apaches stole sixty horses. Governor Pérez de Almazán, then captain of the presidio, sent out five soldiers in immediate pursuit while he organized a larger party to follow. At a league's distance from the presidio, the advance party encountered forty warriors and engaged them. Almazán's relief party arrived in time to rescue the beleaguered men, but the Spaniards, numbering twenty-five men, soon found themselves surrounded by five hundred well-armed and mounted Apaches. For two hours the Spaniards defended themselves, suffering two men killed and thirteen wounded. With most of their horses disabled, the Europeans gathered around a tree and set up a hastily organized defensive position. Just as it appeared that the detachment would be overwhelmed by sheer numbers, the Apaches broke off the attack and departed. The governor was totally amazed that the Spaniards had survived the encounter.
In fact, however, the Apache retreat was typical of their warfare patterns. To Apaches, their lives were precious. The cost of killing the Spaniards in their defensive perimeter would have been more costly than any gain the Indians might achieve. The natives had already acquired as much plunder as they were likely to get, and further delay might have allowed reinforcements from the presidio to arrive resulting in the loss of captured animals. Additionally, Apaches rarely fought to exterminate their enemy, because their main goal in warfare was plunder. Exterminating the enemy, or crippling them to the point where they were less productive or might even be convinced to abandon San Antonio, would be counter to the Apaches' best interest. These Indians, whether the Spanish realized it or not, needed the presence of Europeans at San Antonio in order to have access to horses, weapons, and, in times of peace, trade items.

An investigation following the battle revealed that three distinct tribes had participated in the attack: Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes. The Jumanes were the same natives previously known as Jumanos. They at one time challenged the Apaches for control of the plains but had been split by Apache incursions. Those Jumanos who had traveled to the north became allies with the Caddoan tribes and remained enemies of the Apaches. The Jumanos who were
driven south, found no help from the Spaniards and no friendly tribes as allies. Given their endangered situation, they eventually befriended the Apaches. This new relationship with their old competitors eventually caused the Spaniards to identify them as Jumano Apaches.

As for the "Pelones" which in Spanish means "bald" or "hairless one," this appears to have been a generic term used in several instances to identify a number of tribes. In all probability, the Pelones who raided San Antonio in conjunction with the Apaches and Jumanes were later known as Lipans. They lived at this time in the area between San Juan Bautista and San Antonio, and their territory extended fifty leagues upriver from the former.32

Joseph de Urrutia, who had lived in Texas since the 1690s, was amazed that the three tribes were fighting together. He had known the Jumanos and Pelones as enemies of the Apaches.33 The fact that the tribes were now fighting as a united force illustrates an important part of Apache culture and strategy. Again, these Indians rarely fought to exterminate enemies, rather they fought to subjugate them. Once an enemy tribe had been sufficiently weakened, Apaches often welcomed them as allies, eventually absorbing them into the greater Apache culture. This adaptability is one of the major reasons that the Apaches survived as long as they did, despite the fact that many powerful enemies, such as
Spaniards, Comanches, and Caddoan groups tried their best to exterminate them.

The September raid and battle convinced even the tendentious Rivera to alter his approach to Indian relations in Texas and admit that it was time to launch a full-scale campaign against the troublesome Apaches. With typical parsimony, however, he believed that one hundred and fifty soldiers, raised from San Antonio, Los Adaes, La Bahía, and San Juan Bautista, would be enough to assure victory. He also recommended that Presidio La Bahía be relocated to the Medina River, just south of San Antonio, which had been the site of numerous Apache depredations. In January 1732 the viceroy approved Rivera's suggestions with the exception of relocating La Bahía.34

Although Captain Almazán received orders to prepare a campaign, the new governor, Juan Antonio Bustillo y Ceballos, assumed command. Because of a heated debate that emerged from the power struggle between the two men, the expedition did not depart until October 1732. Bustillo eventually departed San Antonio with 157 Spaniards, 60 Indian allies, 140 pack animals, and a herd of 900 horses and mules. He hoped to be reinforced by a party of Tejas but none was forthcoming.35

After a week of waiting for Tejas reinforcements, which never arrived, Bustillo departed for Apachería. Progress was
cautious in order that the Apaches not become aware of the army's presence. After six weeks of travel the expedition was only seventy leagues from San Antonio in the vicinity of the San Saba River. There, Bustillo's spies reported the presence of a large number of Apaches in their rancherias. The governor led a contingent of one hundred men to attack the enemy's camp that consisted of four distinct rancherias, with four hundred tents spread out over half a league. He estimated that the encampment contained more than seven hundred warriors.

After contact, fighting broke out almost immediately. For five hours the struggle continued, the Apaches drawing fire from the Spaniards, then closing to hand-to-hand combat before the soldiers could reload. The natives fought bravely until a prominent chief fell in battle, causing a disruption within their ranks. The chief had in his possession a silver-headed baton, indicating that he had at one time been at peace with the Spaniards, most likely those in New Mexico. Shortly afterwards, the Apaches withdrew. Bustillo estimated that two hundred Apaches had been killed, but because the natives recovered their killed and wounded comrades from the battlefield, it was impossible to make an accurate determination. Only thirty women and children were taken prisoner, but seven hundred horses were recovered and
one hundred mule-loads of pelts and other plunder were acquired.

Despite his victory, Bustillo worried about an Apache counterattack and resolved to retire to the main camp. As he suspected, Apaches harassed the Spaniards' retreat, shadowing them all the way back to San Antonio, and stealing horses whenever the opportunity arose. Upon his arrival at Béxar, Bustillo was informed that during his absence other Apache raiders had stolen stock from the settlements. It had been determined during Bustillo's campaign that four tribes had been involved in the battle: Apaches, Ypandis (usually identified as Lipans), Ysandis, and Chentis. The latter two tribes were apparently recent allies of the Apaches and had just made contact with San Antonio. After releasing his troops, Bustillo faced a swarm of petitions requesting that he use the captives as leverage to assure peace with the Apaches. Citizens and missionaries alike urged the governor to send one or two of the captive females as ambassadors to their tribes. This failing, they suggested that a second, larger campaign be made against the natives to force their submission. Bustillo accepted the suggestion, and in January 1733 released a man and a woman, escorting them as far as the Guadalupe River.

Father Gabriel de Vergara, president of the missions of San Antonio, wrote the viceroy in January 1733 requesting
that missions be established for the Apaches. Having talked with the prisoners taken by Bustillo, Fray Vergara was convinced of the good nature and truthfulness of the natives. He reported that if the Apaches could be converted they would create a most prosperous mission. They were a numerous people, he recorded, and their submission would bring a vast amount of territory under Spanish control.\textsuperscript{38}

During this time, one of the female ambassadors returned to San Antonio, accompanied by three warriors who came to check out the woman's statements. They informed Bustillo that their head chief was assembling Apaches to discuss peace with the Spaniards. They also informed the Spaniard that there were thirty-seven bands of Apaches along the road to New Mexico. Bustillo detained the native entourage for three days, feasting and regaling them, perhaps to reinforce in their minds the Spanish desire for peace. When the natives departed, they promised that four chiefs with many of their people would return before two moons had passed.\textsuperscript{39}

The promised delegation never arrived, but small groups of Apaches trickled into San Antonio to trade and barter. Their peaceful demeanor encouraged the belief that peace had been negotiated. Unfortunately, in less than two months the prospects for peace were shattered. Three warriors and a woman entered the presidio to trade. Upon accomplishing
their task they were escorted out of the settlement as was the usual custom. Two of the soldiers accompanied the natives to a hill situated about a league and a half from the settlement. There, two dozen Apaches approached the smaller party who awaited without fear because of the assumed peace. The lieutenant of the presidio witnessed the incident and reported that the approaching natives advanced with hostile intent in two wings. The two escorts discerned their malice, but it was too late. The two soldiers fell from their horses and their bodies were surrounded by the Indians. When Spaniards recovered the bodies, they had been horribly mutilated and flayed. 

This incident, which is told from the Spaniards' point of view and appears on the surface to be a clear act of unprovoked violence, set off a wave of fear and dismay throughout San Antonio. To the Spaniards, it was a clear indication that the Apaches' promises of peace could not be believed. On the other hand, it is appropriate to consider the incident, as best we can, from the Apaches' point of view. First, it should be recalled that at this point the Apaches had not officially agreed to peace with the Spaniards. There is no mention of the Apache chiefs having come to the town to formalize an agreement. Therefore, to the Apache mind, there was no guarantee of peace.
Apaches would generally not kill even a potential enemy who visited their camp. Once outside the encampment, however, all bets were off. In this case, the Apaches probably felt safe while trading, but might not have felt secure once away from the Spanish settlement. A war party to meet them a couple of leagues from the settlements could easily have been prearranged.

Additionally, the "perceived" hostile intent of the two dozen approaching natives can be questioned. Plains Apaches, as well as other plains natives often greeted allies with sham charges that broke off at the last moment. Could this incident have been a mock charge, misinterpreted by the Spaniards? If so, the two Spanish escorts might have drawn their weapons or even fired at the charging natives, resulting in their immediate and violent murder by the Apaches. To the Apaches, the Spaniards appeared to have treacherously broken the existing peace. To the Spanish witness, the Apaches seemed to have killed the escorts in cold blood. Unfortunately, since the Apaches did not keep written records, their side of the incident will never be known, but it is important to remember that the information available on this and almost all confrontations involving Europeans and natives is told from the European point of view.
Whether the incident was a purposeful murder of two Spanish soldiers or a misunderstanding between to vastly different cultures, it resulted in several more years of fighting and distrust. It also caused a flurry of letters to be rushed to the viceroy requesting reinforcements. Even Father Vergara stressed the threat of the Apaches and supported reinforcements. In response to the letters, José Urrutia was appointed captain of the presidio in July 1733.\(^4^1\)

Urrutia himself almost immediately requested reinforcements. The garrison of forty-three soldiers at San Antonio was insufficient for the task at hand. Twenty-five soldiers should be reassigned from La Bahía, or if this was not feasible he suggested that fifteen soldiers be reassigned from La Bahía and ten be taken form Los Adaes. With the additional troops, combined with native allies, Urrutia felt confident that he could force the Apaches to submit.\(^4^2\)

Many of the depredations committed by the Apaches over the next several years seem to have been the work of a band led by a chief the Spanish called Cabellos Colorados, or Red Hair.\(^4^3\) The rebellious Apache chieftain led a trading party to San Antonio in 1734. Upon departing, the Apaches encountered two settlers out looking for lost cattle, tied them up and carried them off. A company of soldiers pursued
the natives but were unable to overtake them. The Spanish prisoners were carried to Apachería and eventually killed.\textsuperscript{44} Cabellos Colorados discontinued his visits to San Antonio shortly after the incident, apparently to avoid punishment at the hands of the Spaniards. He instead shifted his attention southward to harass settlements along the Río Grande. In December 1735, seventy Apaches attacked the mission Indians of Dulce Nombre de Jesús de Peyotes, eight leagues from San Juan Bautista. In the following year, Apaches attacked pack animals traveling from San Antonio to the Río Grande but were unable to overcome the ten-man escort. For a year following the above incident, the Apaches discontinued their visits to San Antonio and concentrated on stealing horses and killing Spaniards as well as mission Indians who wandered too far from the settlement's protection. A raid on the mission of San Francisco de la Espada netted the Apaches forty horses. Pursuing soldiers discovered a single worn-out horse that had been left behind by the attackers and recognized it as a mount that had been purchased earlier from the Alférez Juan Galván by Cabellos Colorados. Thus, the old antagonist was implicated in the raid.\textsuperscript{45}

Apache raids continued, culminating in an attack on the presidio horse herd, in which the natives drove off fifty-eight animals. A few days after the raid, the wife of
Cabellos Colorados with three other women and a warrior brought buffalo meat to trade for tobacco. Captain Urrutia received them cordially, gave them presents, but warned them that the Spanish would only remain friendly if the Apaches stopped their raids. The Apaches departed peacefully, but two months later they raided the presidio's horse herd yet again, stampeding the animals at night and then rounding up as many as possible in the ensuing confusion. Almost three hundred horses were captured in this raid. As a result, the Spanish moved the horse herd closer to the presidio for better protection and to allow quicker response to Apache raiders.46

These serious attacks on Béxar were the final straw for the Spaniards. Ten days after the last raid, the Spanish captured an Apache among the horses. He informed his captors that Cabellos Colorados and a fifteen of his people were on their way to the presidio to discover the location of the horse herd while feigning interest in securing peace with the Spaniards. Governor Prudencio de Orobio y Basterra immediately dispatched lieutenant Juan Galván with twenty-eight soldiers to capture and confine the rogue chief and his band. Eight leagues from the presidio, the soldiers arrested the Apaches, bound them together, and brought them to the presidio. Basterra informed the captives that they
were guilty of breaking the peace with the Spaniards and therefore were to be imprisoned.47

Cabellos Colorados convinced the governor to release one of the female captives so that the head chief of the Apaches might be informed of their incarceration and return the horses stolen in the last raid thereby securing the prisoners' release. Basterra agreed and set the woman free. For the next nine months, the Apache woman and several other Apache visitors tried to secure the release of the captives. They brought in a few horses at a time, claiming difficulty in gathering the entire stolen herd, and promised to return the rest of the stolen animals if the Spanish would release their prisoners. Basterra refused to budge until the Apaches proved their good faith by returning all the stolen animals.48

At one point the Apaches brought a large number of horses within sight of the presidio, enticing the Spaniards to recover them. Urrutia, suspicious of the Apaches' motives, sent spies to investigate. The spies reported the presence of a thousand well-armed Apaches in the vicinity, positioned to ambush any soldiers who ventured to recover the herd. Urrutia refused to take the bait, and the Apaches departed peacefully. For the ten months that Cabellos Colorados remained a captive, the Apaches committed no
depredations near San Antonio. Accordingly, Spaniards interpreted this lull as proof of the chief's guilt.\textsuperscript{49}

Whether Cabellos Colorados was responsible for the attacks on San Antonio or the Apaches called off their attacks in hopes of securing his release, the peace was shattered in October 1738 when the Apaches resumed their raids. Upon hearing of the renewed hostilities, Basterra ordered that Cabellos Colorados and the other captives, including the chief's two-year-old daughter, be shipped to Mexico City, where they disappear from Spanish records.\textsuperscript{50}

The renewed hostilities must have been more intense than earlier Apache attacks, because whereas five years earlier Urrutia had asked for twenty-five additional soldiers to quell Apache hostility, he now requested fifty soldiers from surrounding presidios and urged that citizens of Coahuila and Nuevo León be encouraged to enlist. This, he stated, would give him access to two hundred Spaniards and, combined with allies from the Tejas nation with whom he had considerable sway, would allow him to defeat the Apache hordes. Urrutia intended to pay for the campaign through the sale of captives, and to encourage enlistments, announced that all participants would share in the plunder.\textsuperscript{51}

Urrutia set out in late 1739 and encountered the Apaches in the San Saba River region. He captured a large number of captives and claimed to have discovered the pass
through the mountains to the northwest that the Lipans used to reach San Antonio. Despite the apparent success of his campaign, Apache raids did not diminish. Urrutia then requested an increase of ten soldiers for the garrison and suggested that a presidio constructed on the upper Guadalupe would guard against Apache incursions.\textsuperscript{52}

The failure of Urrutia's expedition to halt Apache attacks caused the missionaries to complain that the campaign had been nothing more than a thinly disguised slave raid. When José de Urrutia died in 1740, his son, Toribio de Urrutia, succeeded him as commander of the presidio. The younger Urrutia immediately began agitating for another campaign against the Apaches. However, several former Texas officials joined the San Antonio missionaries in opposing his plan. Opponents argued that further campaigns would simply anger the Apaches and cause more retaliatory raids and their opposition seems to have been vindicated when missionaries reported in 1744 that Apache hostility had decreased significantly.\textsuperscript{53}

In March 1743 Father Benito Fernández de Santa Ana, president of the San Antonio missions, had urged the viceroy to take immediate steps to convert the Apaches. Santa Ana believed that a presidio and mission constructed in the San Saba region, the heart of Apachería, would free San Antonio from depredations. He spent a great amount of time
communicating with Apaches who visited Mission Concepción, as well as the Apache captives at San Antonio. From them he learned of the increasing pressure that Comanches were placing upon them. As a result, Apaches themselves who came to the missions often asked for missions to be established for them and sometimes allowed priests to baptize their children.\textsuperscript{54}

While officials in Mexico debated which course to follow in Texas, an expedition was launched against the Apaches from Coahuila. The governor there led a force of two hundred men in 1743. But Apaches ambushed the Spaniards, gravely wounding the governor, killing more than half of his men, and capturing almost all of their horses and equipment.\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps this disaster convinced Spanish officials to order retribution from San Antonio.

In 1745 Urrutia finally received permission to campaign against the Apaches. Fray Santa Ana accompanied the expedition, along with fifty Spaniards and native allies. Eighty leagues from San Antonio, north of the Colorado River, Urrutia’s army encountered a widely scattered ranchería of Lipan and Natagé Apaches. Many of the natives were absent from the ranchería at the time, which allowed Urrutia to round up a significant number of captives and return to San Antonio. Santa Ana once again complained about the manner in which the campaign was carried out.\textsuperscript{56}
The Apache response was immediate. Four of their women arrived in San Antonio to announce that since the Spaniards obviously did not want peace, war would be declared. For the next several weeks, Apaches harassed the settlement, avoiding only Mission Concepción, which was under the charge of Fray Santa Ana who had always treated the Apaches kindly. The Apache attack climaxed in June 1745 with an organized assault on the presidio itself. Three hundred and fifty Lipans and Natagés made a concerted attack on the garrison with plans to burn it. A boy discovered the marauders, raised the alarm, and roused the citizens to its defense. The Apaches were slowed but continued progress toward their goal. Fortunately for the Spanish, one hundred mission Indians arrived and counterattacked, eventually driving off the Apaches.⁵⁷

Strangely enough, out of the battle emerged an opportunity for peace. During the confusion, an Apache held at Mission Concepción escaped to his people. The native informed a Lipan chief that the prisoners had been kindly treated and that the Spaniards truly desired peace. One of the natives held at the mission was the chief's daughter. Upon hearing the news, the Lipan chief ordered his followers to cease hostilities. The Natagé chief vehemently opposed the order but was finally convinced to call off his people as well. After two months of peace, an Apache woman bearing
a cross and a boy arrived in San Antonio bearing gifts for Urrutia and an announcement that the Apaches wanted peace.  

Nevertheless, while the Apaches were negotiating peace with the Spanish at San Antonio, they continued their raids elsewhere. It should have become clear to the Spanish that the Apache nation consisted of several bands with different goals and motives as reflected in the division between the Natagés and Lipan leadership. But, even as the Spanish began recording additional names for different bands, they still attempted to negotiate with the Apaches as a whole. The Río Grande valley suffered numerous raids from San Juan Bautista to the Junta de los Ríos. In response, campaigns against the Apaches were made from San Juan Bautista in 1747, 1748, and 1750. In one campaign, ninety-five captives were taken.  

Further south, however, some Apaches were active allies of the Spanish. By 1746, over four hundred Apache warriors normally camped seventy-five miles from the presidio of San Francisco de los Conchos. Captain José de Berroterán, a capable frontiersman with thirty-five years of experience, had befriended them, giving gifts paid for out of his pockets. In 1741 the Apaches had assisted Berroterán against hostile natives in the vicinity of Parras and Saltillo.  

In short, despite the friendliness of certain Apaches, others continued to raid and pillage frontier settlements. Berroterán recognized that "thousands of Apaches" from north
of the Big Bend area had easy access to the settlements in Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya. The lack of suitable fortifications on the Río Grande between El Paso and San Juan Bautista left the Apaches free access to much of the terrain of northern Mexico.\textsuperscript{61}

Fermín de Vidaurri was dispatched to reconnoiter the area for potential locations of future presidios. Vidaurri encountered an Apache ranchería of 250 natives east of the Big Bend. The natives were led by an eighty-year-old chief named El Ligero. In a cordial meeting the Spanish distributed gifts of flour, meat, and tobacco, and El Ligero supplied two Apache guides to conduct the Spanish to La Junta de los Ríos. The elderly chief stated that his people often traded there. Vidaurri also learned that El Ligero's Apaches were at war with the Natagés.\textsuperscript{62}

As Vidaurri's party approached La Junta, they encountered another elderly Apache chief named Pascual. Pascual and his family had been baptized, and he possessed a baton to indicate his authority. He was on friendly terms with Berroterán and claimed to control five rancherías of thirty families.\textsuperscript{63}

As Apaches to the southwest of San Antonio were either allying themselves with the Spaniards or fighting against them, Apaches to the northeast also created a quandary. Since Father Santa Ana had been requesting a mission and
presidio for the Apaches, other missionaries began working
toward the establishment of a mission for a number of native
groups to the northeast of San Antonio. Because of a
perceived trustworthiness of the Apaches, the northeastern
tribes won out. In 1746 construction began on the San Xavier
mission on the San Gabriel mission. Unfortunately, its
locations was just below a pass through which the Apaches
frequently passed on their trips to the buffalo on the
prairies, and the natives gathered there were traditional
enemies of the Apaches.\textsuperscript{64}

The Spanish had hopes that the location would help
guard against Apache activity in the area and prevent the
natives from communicating with the French. Trouble started
almost immediately. Temporary buildings were established in
1746, but orders from Mexico to establish a garrison there
were delayed for two months on the Rio Grande because of
Apache hostility. When the orders eventually arrived in San
Antonio, Urrutia delayed the detachment further because of
increased Apache hostility in the Béxar vicinity. There were
also rumors that a large number of Apaches had encamped near
the San Xavier mission site.\textsuperscript{65}

In the spring of 1747, a dozen prospective neophytes
arrived in San Antonio, apparently to protest the delay of
the mission's establishment. Fray Mariano Francisco de los
Dolores y Viana, the leading proponent of the venture, sent
some Indians from Mission San Antonio de Valero along with a Spaniard to begin planting crops as a diversion. Upon their arrival at San Xavier, a number of potential converts gathered and set to work planting crops. In the midst of their labor, however, Apaches attacked and disrupted the effort. One of the tribes departed in fear, claiming that the Spanish had betrayed them. Their leader promised to return if the Spanish could prove their good intentions.  

The formal founding of mission San Francisco Xavier occurred in early 1748. Within a few months, however, sixty Apaches descended on the mission, ransacked the buildings, and attempted to stampede the horse herd. Mission inhabitants managed to drive off the attackers but the Apaches shouted promises to return soon with a larger force to destroy the mission. The Apaches did indeed return shortly and ran off the mission's horse herd. A total of four raids were made on the mission in 1748, each resulting in the loss of horses and a total loss of life at the mission of three soldiers and four native converts.  

In early 1749, the Spanish decided to try a new tactic against the Apaches. Father Santa Ana had long contended that bloody campaigns against the Apaches increased the ferocity of their raids. Instead, campaigns should concentrate on taking captives, not for sale as slaves as had been previously done, but to be held as hostages and
treated humanely to convince the natives that the Spaniards truly desired peace. With this new concept in force, Urrutia set out in February to punish the Apaches. With two hundred men, mostly converted natives, Urrutia attacked a small ranchería, taking eight women and children captives.68

Upon his return, Urrutia discovered that Apaches had stolen cattle from Mission Concepción. He gathered three hundred men to pursue the raiders. On the Guadalupe River, twenty leagues from San Antonio, the army encountered a ranchería of four hundred Apaches. Most of the natives were absent hunting buffalo, and the Spanish quickly overran the encampment capturing thirty men, ninety women, and forty-seven children. The captives were transported back to San Antonio where the men were imprisoned. The women and children were distributed among citizens and missionaries with orders to treat them with kindness but not allow them to escape.69

Urrutia and Santa Ana now cooperated to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the campaign. Two Apache women and a warrior were selected to act as ambassadors to their people. Urrutia informed them that if the Apaches would live thereafter in peace and friendship with the Spaniards, the prisoners captured on the Guadalupe would be released, along with the captives taken in earlier campaigns. The three delegates departed San Antonio in April. In early August the
three native returned and informed the Spanish that four of their chiefs, with one hundred followers each, were encamped on the Guadalupe, waiting for permission to enter the settlement to establish peaceful relations.\(^70\)

On August 16, 1749, the Apaches arrived and were greeted two leagues from San Antonio by Urrutia, his troops, the missionaries, and citizens of the settlement. After extending greetings, the Apaches were treated to a feast in a specially built structure. Following two days of celebration, the captives were released, and on the nineteenth, an elaborate peace ceremony took place. A great hole was dug and a live horse, a hatchet, a lance, and six arrows were placed in it. After the participants danced around the hole in unison, the ceremony was completed when, at a signal, everyone raced to the hole and buried the horse and their instruments of war, bringing an official end to the conflict.\(^71\)

Thus, after thirty years of almost constant warfare, the Apaches and Spaniards concluded a peace lasting more than fifteen years. The Comanches, who were beginning to reach further into Texas were a large factor in convincing Apaches that in order to survive they must seek allies. Since they needed access to horses and guns, the Spaniards seemed the most tempting. Only four Apache chiefs negotiated
the treaty at San Antonio, but they must have been influential and have convinced most of their kinsmen to honor the agreement, at least around San Antonio. The peace ushered in a new phase of peaceful relations between the Apaches and Spanish which centered on the mission.
NOTES

1. The name Lipan apparently derived from "Ipa-n-de," the first part of the word believed to be a personal name, probably a prominent leader, and the second part meaning "people." Terrell, Plains Apaches, 19. The Lipans called themselves "Naizhan," meaning "ours" or "our kind." Frederick C. Chabot, Indians and Missions (San Antonio: Naylor Printing Company, 1930), 10-11.


6. Ibid., 208-209.

7. Charmion Clair Shelby, "St. Denis's Second Expedition to the Río Grande, 1716-1719," Southwestern Historical...
Quarterly 27 (January 1924): 200; William C. Foster, Spanish Expeditions into Texas, 1689-1768 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 122; Juan Oliván de Rebolledo to the King (April 28, 1718), Béxar Archives Translations, (hereafter referred to as BAT), Reel 1.


10. Ibid., 144-149.


12. Marquis de Valero, (June 3, 1719), BAT, Reel 1.

13. Oliván to Marqués de Valero, (December 24, 1717), BAT, Reel 1.


Historical Quarterly 49 (October 1945): 210; Morfi, History of Texas, 1:199.

18. Ibid., 207; Hoig, Tribal Wars, 83; John, Storms Brewed, 259.
20. Ibid., 209; Hackett, Pichardo's Treatise, 2:463.
22. Dunn, "Apache Relations," 211.
23. Ibid., 211-212; John, Storms Brewed, 261.
26. Most historians note the lull in hostility but offer no explanation. See Dunn, "Apache Relations," 223; John, Storms Brewed, 261; Chipman, Spanish Texas, 134.
27. Weddle, San Juan Bautista, 188.
29. Mardith K. Schuetz, "The People of San Antonio, Part


32. Weddle, San Juan Bautista, 81, 200; Opler, "Apachean Culture Pattern," 391; Tyler, New Handbook of Texas, 132.

Ulibarri had heard of a tribe of Pelones near El Cuartelejo in 1706. At the same time other Pelones had been harassing Presidio San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande. For a view of the Pelones as non-Apaches with more southerly origins, see Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 112-113.

33. Dunn, "Apache Relations," 228, 268.

34. Ibid., 229-230.

35. Ibid., 230. The Tejas Indians were apparently discouraged from participating in the campaign by one of their chiefs who had French leanings. The chief told his people that the Spanish planned to lure the participants away from their homes, kill them, and then kidnap their women and children.

36. Ibid., 231-234; Antonio Bonilla, "A Brief Compendium
of the Events Which Have Occurred in the Province of Texas from its Conquest, or Reduction, to the Present Date," Texas State Historical Association Quarterly 8 (July 1904): 41-42; Hoig, Tribal Wars, 84; Investigation of the guilt of Cabellos Colorados, Questionaire (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2.

38. Ibid., 235-236.
39. Ibid., 236.
40. Ibid., 237; Investigation of the guilt of Cabellos Colorados, Testimony of Don Bizente Albarez Trauiesso (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2.
41. Dunn, Apache Relations," 237-239.
42. Oliván to [Antonio de Aviles?] (July 18, 1733), BAT, Reel 1.
43. Although most scholars consider Cabellos Colorados to be a Lipan chief, both Haley, Apaches, 31, and Sonnichsen, Mescalero Apaches, 45, consider him a Mescalero. Cabellos Colorados might have been the recalcitrant fifth chief who earlier wanted no peace with the Spaniards.
44. Dunn, Apache Relations," 240-241; Investigation of the guilt of Cabellos Colorados, Questionaire (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Investigation, Testimony of Juan Cortina (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Investigation, (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2.
45. Dunn, "Apache Relations," 240-242; Investigation, Testimony of Alférez Juan Galbán (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Investigation, Questionaire (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Weddle, San Juan Bautista, 206; John, Storms Brewed, 271-273.

46. Investigation, Questionaire (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Investigation, Juan Galván's testimony (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Dunn, "Apache Relations," 243-244. Dunn says more than 100 horses were taken in the first raid.

47. Investigation, Questionaire, (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Dunn, "Apache Relations," 244-245.

48. Investigation, Questionaire (June 28, 1738), BAT, Reel 2; Dunn, "Apache Relations," 245-246.


54. William Edward Dunn, "Missionary Activities among
the Eastern Apaches Previous to the Founding of the San Saba
Mission," *Texas Historical Association Quarterly* 15 (January

56. Ibid., 251.
57. Ibid., 252; John, *Storms Brewed*, 275-276. John says
only 250 Apaches were involved in the attack.
60. James Manly Daniel, "The Advance of the Spanish
Frontier and the Despoblado" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Texas at Austin, 1955), 183.
63. Ibid., 200-201.
65. Herbert E. Bolton, "The Founding of the Missions on
the San Gabriel River, 1745-1749," *Southwestern Historical
Quarterly* 17 (April 1914): 340, 356-357.
69. Ibid., 260.
70. Ibid., 260-261.
71. Ibid., 260-262.
When the Comanches began their invasion of the plains in the early eighteenth century, the Apaches who lived there found themselves in a precarious position. Having made enemies of most of their neighbors, they had no allies. Between the turn of the century and the 1740s almost all plains Apaches groups, with the exception of a few isolated bands, began seeking peace with the Spaniards. Northern Apaches were the first, but by the 1740s even the plains Apaches in Texas and northern Mexico reluctantly looked to the Spanish for protection. The latter hoped to use the Apaches as a bulwark against Comanche hostility, but bureaucratic delays, insistence that the Apaches convert to Christianity and become "civilized" farmers, along with other requirements, caused the eventual failure of a lasting peace.

As mentioned, the northern plains Apaches first sought an alliance with the Spanish, actively asking for missionaries and the attendant protection that would accompany them. However, by 1725 these Apaches had been
dispersed by the Comanches. The vast region of El Cuarte-lejo, which once stretched from Nebraska in the north to Kansas or possibly Oklahoma in the south, and from eastern Colorado in the west to central Kansas in the east, was rather quickly invaded and dominated by Comanches pouring out of the Rocky Mountains.

The Apaches living in that region scattered. By 1725 the most northern Apaches groups were abandoning their semi-permanent rancherías and moving south, or were cut off by advancing Comanches. These unfortunates were eventually wiped out or weakened to the point that they lost their identity and were absorbed by stronger tribes. Only a few of the remnants might have consolidated and kept their Athapaskan identity as Kiowa Apaches.\(^1\)

The promising beginning with the French quickly fell apart. Once Bourgmont returned to France, the French in Louisiana began dismantling his peace with the Padoucas. The desire for slaves caused them to encourage the Kansas and Pawnees to resume raids on Apache tribes by 1730. When the French finally returned to the central plains and made their way to New Mexico, the Apaches had been almost completely displaced by the Comanches. Aside from those who fled southward, some congregated in the vicinity of La Jicarilla to the north of Taos, others joined together around Pecos
pueblo, and still others merged with the Lipan and Mescalero bands in Texas.²

Many of the Apaches who settled in the vicinity of La Jicarilla, fled into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains for safety. It will be remembered that the Spanish lost interest in constructing a presidio at La Jicarilla once the French threat had disappeared, but the Spanish finally established a mission for the Jicarillas in 1733. It was located on the Trampas River about a dozen miles from Taos. One hundred and thirty natives were at the mission the following year but these natives raised the ire of many missionaries by flaunting the strict rules of worship that had been imposed upon them.³

The mission had difficulties from the beginning. Although the governor of New Mexico, Gervasio Cruzat y Góngora, at first endorsed the project, even outlawing the sale of captive Apaches to Pueblos with severe punishment for violators, he later sent soldiers to the mission to drive away the neophytes. Despite the Apaches' fear of returning to the mission, many continued to seek out missionaries individually. Another blow to the success of the mission came when the governor restricted trade with all heathen natives, destroying the Apaches' economy by cutting off their trade in hides.⁴
Father Juan Mirabel, in charge of the mission, argued that the Jicarillas, as Christians, could be used as allies in wars against the Comanches. Cruzate's order of May 20, 1735, however, forbade the sale of arms to recently converted gentiles, with hefty fines enforced on Spanish violators as well as 100 lashes and 50 days in prison for Indian transgressors. While the law was no doubt aimed at preventing weapons from falling into the hands of Comanches and other hostile tribes, it also hampered the effectiveness of friendly Apaches about whom, the governor still had doubts. The mission continued to exist into the 1740s but by 1748 it had been all but abandoned by the Jicarillas.5

Because the mission did not offer the security they desired, some of the Apaches fled to live with the Navajos. Others found relief among the Utes and Comanches, apparently choosing to join their enemies rather than to be exterminated by them. The bulk of the Carlanas, Cuartelejos, and Palomas, along with some Sierra Blancas and Calchufines, fled to Pecos, where they established themselves on the Galinas River. There they supported themselves by killing buffalo on the southern plains and by using Pecos as a defensive backdrop when attacked. From their new location, the Jicarillas opened trade with the Faraones and obtained horses from them. The Faraones, who had always been enemies of the Spanish, repeatedly stole horses from the Europeans.
When these mounts began showing up among the displaced Jicarillas, the Spanish suspected them of aiding and abetting the Faraones, or perhaps carrying out raids themselves.⁶

In July 1739 a party of French traders led by Pierre and Paul Mallet arrived in Santa Fe. Although they had few, if any, trade items, having lost seven horses laden with merchandise while crossing a river, their successful completion of a trip from French Louisiana to Santa Fe began a series of trade expeditions between the two localities. Significantly, the French traders encountered no Apaches on the plains between the Platte River and Santa Fe. They returned by a more southerly route, following the South Canadian River. Along the way, they encountered two men and three women from the Padouca tribe who greeted them with handshakes. Soon afterwards, however, the Padoucas became frightened, abandoned the meat they had been carrying, and fled. The French could not induce them to return and eventually continued their journey to New Orleans.⁷

The Mallet expedition presents conclusive evidence that Padouca power had been destroyed. The small remnant encountered by the traders seemed more interested in avoiding discovery by the Comanches than anything else. In addition, the expedition encountered numerous bands of Comanches on both legs of their journey, demonstrating the
extent to which they controlled the plains. Some Jicarillas and Carlanas, however, maintained access to the plains. In 1741 a French expedition encountered a Jicarilla party some thirty leagues east of Pecos and were escorted to that pueblo to trade.  

More importantly, however, the expeditions gave the French an opportunity to negotiate peace with the Comanches, who then dominated the region between the French and Spanish colonies. By 1747 the French were trading rifles and ammunition to the Comanches and other allied tribes north of New Mexico. The Spanish in New Mexico hungered for trade with the French, despite knowing that Spanish mercantile policy prohibited it. However, when French traders escorted by heavily armed Comanches arrived at Taos in 1748, the Spanish began to fear French motives.  

A few months earlier, in January 1748, the Comanches had launched an organized assault on Pecos. An urgent message arrived in Santa Fe informing the governor that a large force of Comanches were encamped two and a half leagues from Pecos and appeared to be organizing for an attack. Governor Joaquín Codallos y Rabal quickly organized a relief expedition of twenty-five individuals and marched through the snow at night to reach the beleaguered pueblo at two in the morning. Seventy young men, some of them Jicarillas, were rounded up at Pecos to help meet the
assault. More than three hundred mounted Comanches, armed with shields, lances, bows and arrows, as well as some with swords and warclubs, participated in the attack, but they were beaten back by the Spaniards and their Pueblo and Jicarilla allies. The Spaniards lost a dozen native allies in the battle. Although Comanche casualties are unknown, they were heavy enough to force the Indians withdrawal.\textsuperscript{10}

Thus, when a small party of Comanches from a camp of one hundred lodges in the Jicarilla valley entered Taos and informed the Spanish that thirty French traders had been among them trading a large quantity of muskets and ammunition, the Spanish became concerned. Had those Comanches who attacked Pecos been armed with muskets rather than bows and arrows, the outcome of the battle might have been much different. As a result of this disturbing information, Governor Codallos recommended that a presidio be constructed north of Taos to halt French intrusions from that direction.\textsuperscript{11}

Unfortunately for the Spanish, the Jicarilla who might have supplied a support base for such a presidio no longer resided in the valley of La Jicarilla or in the pass through which the Comanches entered New Mexico. In 1749 the Comanches, having successfully weakened the Apaches and gained permanent access to the plains, turned on their former allies, the Utes. The Utes immediately sought aid
from the Spanish and made alliances with scattered bands of Apaches in northern New Mexico. The alliance helped the Apaches maintain their position longer than they might have otherwise, but even with the Utes and Spanish, the Apaches were no match for the French-armed Comanches. In fact, Comanches who arrived in Taos to trade were better armed than the Spanish. The Indians had new French muskets, two pounds of powder, and a pouch of musket balls.\(^{12}\)

Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupin (1749-1754) managed to stabilize relations with the Indians during his term of office. In September 1752 he reported that the Faraones living east of Albuquerque were causing little trouble in the area. In fact, he continued, they had twice refused to join the Gila Apaches in attacks in the vicinity of El Paso. Once, the Faraones repulsed an attack and quickly reported the incident to Vélez. Despite their apparent friendship, the governor discouraged any association between the Carlanas/Jicarillas and the Faraones, perhaps fearing that a combination of the two groups might turn against the Spanish.\(^{13}\)

When Vélez left office he had drafted detailed instructions to his successor regarding Indian policy. Of prime concern was the maintenance of friendly relations with the plains Apaches, especially the Carlanas. Those natives would prove most valuable in case of war with the Comanches.
They should be discouraged from contact with the Faraones and Natages who were currently at peace in New Mexico. These latter tribes, however, supplied horses to the Carlanas in exchange for buffalo meat. Since the Faraones and Natages obtained their horses from raids on Nueva Vizcaya and other north Mexican provinces, limiting contact with the plains Indians would reduce the necessity of the raids.\textsuperscript{14}

Vélez further recommended that his successor personally attend the trade fairs at Taos. The new governor should adorn his uniform with much splendor and be surrounded by a suitable guard to emphasize his station. Providing guards for the native rancherías and horse herds should be a high priority. Above all, however, the governor must prevent any hostile incidents among between the Comanches, Utes, and Apaches in attendance, thereby preserving the peaceful interlude.\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, Vélez suggested that if the peace with the Utes, Comanches, and Apaches looked stable for the future, the new governor should campaign against the Faraones. Even though those natives had been peaceful toward New Mexico during most of Vélez's term, their raids on Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora were intolerable and needed to be punished. Officials in New Mexico, he noted, were in a much better position to punish the transgressors than were those in Nueva Vizcaya.\textsuperscript{16}
Nonetheless, Vélez's successor was unable to maintain the peaceful balance. Comanche raids resumed and the Apaches, pressured from the north, began raiding farther south. During the 1740s, Apache raids in northern Coahuila had intensified. After the peace treaty between the Lipans and the Spanish at San Antonio in 1749, Apache raids shifted farther to the south and west. Between 1749 and 1763 Apache attacks on Chihuahua and settlements within a two-hundred-mile radius of the villa had resulted in more than eight hundred deaths and destroyed 4,000,000 pesos worth of property.\(^{17}\)

In contrast, San Antonio enjoyed a respite from Apache depredations after the treaty of 1749. Following the peace treaty, Spanish missionaries began working toward the complete conversion of the Apaches. Several plans were proposed as the Apaches began congregating in the vicinity of San Antonio to await their own mission. A few Apaches had been taken into Mission Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion de Acuña but with little success in converting them. The existing missions were unable to handle the new influx of natives, and many missionaries feared the detrimental effects of having the Apaches so near the mission neophytes.\(^{18}\)

Father Benito Fernández de Santa Ana proposed founding a mission for the Apaches in a mountainous region near the
Pedernales River. He wanted the presidio at San Antonio and its entire garrison moved to the new location, so that a new settlement might be created, as well as a mission for the Apaches. If the Apaches could be converted, asserted Santa Ana, San Antonio would be free to develop her resources and the whole region would prosper.\textsuperscript{19}

When Father Santa Ana retired because of illness, Father Mariano de los Dolores became the leading proponent of a mission for the Apaches. Dolores proposed that it be established on the Guadalupe River. This location would be close enough that no presidio would be required, yet distant enough to prevent the Apaches from having detrimental effects on the mission Indians of San Antonio. Dolores hoped to establish one or two missions until such time as it could be determined how many Apaches would gather. Unfortunately for the missionary, Spanish officials rejected his plan because of expense, lack of information, and competing plans.\textsuperscript{20}

Confusion created by lack of a unified plan delayed fulfillment of any concerted action. The first formal mission for the Apaches, therefore, was established not by San Antonio missionaries, but in the jurisdiction of San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande. In February 1752, Father Alonso Giraldo de Terreros received appointment to succeed Father Dolores as president of the Texas missions. Terreros,
however, never traveled to San Antonio, but instead became minister at the mission of San Juan Bautista where he began working toward the conversion of the Apaches with as much, if not more, fervor as Dolores and Santa Ana had demonstrated in San Antonio.\textsuperscript{21}

In June 1754, Pedro de Rábago y Terán, the governor of Coahuila, wrote the viceroy that peace treaties had been negotiated with the Apaches. As a result, more than nine hundred natives were camped on the Río Grande in the vicinity of the newly settled villa of San Fernando de Austria. The bulk of the Apaches were Natagés, who had frequented San Juan Bautista in the past, alternately to trade or commit depredations. Apaches called Cíbolas and Tucubantes were also noted as being present. The combined Apaches were led by three chiefs who were interested in missions. Spanish officials were cautious in their response and ordered an investigation to locate a favorable site for the mission.\textsuperscript{22}

In Rábago y Terán's absence, lieutenant governor Juan Antonio Bustillo y Ceballos and Father Terreros led an expedition to find a suitable location for the mission. Although the Apaches expressed a preference for a mission on the San Rodrigo river, a more favorable site was located at San Ildefonso, eighteen leagues west of San Juan Bautista and two leagues from San Fernando de Austria. Bustillo y
Ceballos and Terreros then held council with headmen of the Apaches then numbering two thousand. After explaining mission life to the Apaches and accepting their approval of the site, the lieutenant governor established the mission of San Lorenzo in December 1754.23

Father Terreros took charge of the mission, and by early March fifty-two Apaches had congregated there. At the end of the month, eighty-three native inhabited the mission. Buildings were constructed, and an irrigation ditch was dug to assist in growing crops. Father Terreros, after getting the outpost off to a good start, retired from its management to work on the larger-scale project of a mission in the San Saba region. Several months after his departure, the Apaches grew restless. Despite the efforts of the missionaries, in October 1755 they sacked and burned the buildings and permanently deserted the mission.24

The destruction of San Lorenzo convinced some Spaniards of the inconstancy of the Apaches and their unwillingness to settle in missions. Missionaries, on the other hand, became convinced that the failure had been caused by the reluctance of the Apaches to settle so far from their homeland. Accordingly, the religious were more determined than ever to place a mission in the heart of Apachería.25

Between 1753 and 1755, three expeditions penetrated the San Saba region locate possible sites for a mission.
Lieutenant Juan Galván of the San Antonio presidio led the first of these entradas. Scouting along the Pedernales, Llano, and San Saba Rivers, Galván found two suitable locations on the last stream. The expedition encountered a large party of Apaches on the river who, when they learned the purpose of the Spaniard's presence, welcomed them with expressions of great joy. The Spanish distributed gifts and held a worship service before departing.⁴⁶

In 1756 Pedro Rábago y Terán led a second expedition was led by Pedro Rábago y Terán. He retraced Galván's route and came to the same conclusion that the San Saba site had the best potential. This expedition encountered two groups of Apaches who promised to enter the mission when it was founded. Upon returning to San Antonio, Rábago found surprising support among its settlers for the proposed Apache mission. The Apaches had been peaceful for five years and Bexareños saw a mission as the best way to assure a continuance of the peace. Captain Urrutia added his support, estimating that there were four thousand Apaches to be converted.⁴⁷

A final expedition was launched before approval of the venture. This expedition was led by Bernardo de Miranda, the lieutenant governor of Texas, but it was more interested in discovering valuable mineral deposits than a site for an Apache mission. Accordingly, Miranda spent most of his time
exploring the vicinity of the Llano River and taking samples from a hill of red hematite. He also encountered Apaches who informed him of rich silver deposits, described as a mountain of pure silver, just six days journey above the Llano in Comanche country. Miranda returned to San Antonio with glowing reports of the potential wealth of what would be called the Cerro del Almagre mines.\textsuperscript{28}

Armed with the information gained from the expeditions, a junta in Mexico City considered the situation. It proposed to relocate the presidio of San Xavier, whose missions had become nearly useless, to the San Saba River, to increase the garrison's size to one hundred soldiers, and to establish three missions. Fray Alonso Giraldo de Terreros was to oversee the project, primarily because of the influence of his wealthy cousin, Pedro Romero de Terreros. Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla was to command the San Sabá presidial forces.\textsuperscript{29}

By September 1756 Ortiz Parilla and Fray Terreros were in Mexico City organizing their expedition. On their return trip to San Antonio, the party encountered a group of Apaches in Coahuila. Presents were distributed and the Apaches, upon seeing the great wealth of supplies destined for the mission, promised to assemble on the San Saba without fail. The two Spaniards and their retinue arrived in San Antonio in December 1756.\textsuperscript{30}
For three months the party stayed at San Antonio and continued preparations for the presidio and mission. Soon after they arrived, messengers were sent to contact Apaches in the San Saba area. Two Lipan chiefs and some of their people arrived at Mission Valero bearing apologies for the absence of the other tribes: the Natagés, Mescaleros, Pelones, Come Nopales (prickly pear eaters), and Come Caballos (horse eaters). They expressed their willingness to be congregated in the new mission. Over the next three months, bands of two to three hundred Apaches visited the town and received gifts from the. Father Terreros stated that the Indians were eager to please the Spaniards and were peaceful. Contrariwise, Colonel Ortiz Parilla caustically noted that the Apaches seemed more interested in the gifts than in conversion. In a letter to the viceroy, the colonel stated that the Apaches were as treacherous as ever and he feared the outcome of the venture.31

When warm weather returned in April, Ortiz Parilla decided to begin the march to the San Saba River. After scouting possible sites for the mission and exploring the river to its source, the colonel called a council to discuss the situation. Since no Apaches had been encountered, the commander urged abandoning the project. The missionaries, however, were determined to found the missions. They were confident that, given time, the Apaches would arrive.
Despite his reservations, Ortiz Parilla agreed to begin construction of the necessary structures. As the missionaries began building on the first of two planned missions on the south bank of the river, Ortiz Parilla began constructing the military installation some three miles upstream on the north bank. The missionaries hoped that the distance from the presidio would prevent the soldiers from having a negative influence on the neophytes.\textsuperscript{32}

As the buildings were being completed, one of the missionaries, Benito Varela, who was knowledgeable of the Apache language went out in search of the elusive natives. Arriving at the San Marcos River, he learned from a woman that the Apaches had suffered a devastating defeat on the Colorado River and had been forced to flee. At about the same time, a Lipan chief, El Chico (Chiquito), arrived in San Antonio. There, Father Dolores chastised him for failing to keep his word and ordered him to go to San Sabá at once.\textsuperscript{33}

The missionaries at San Sabá were heartened when in May 1757 Apaches began arriving. By June, three thousand natives had appeared. Unfortunately for the friars, only a small portion of the Indians were inclined to enter the mission. Chiquito, who led people in thirty-two tents, or about three hundred people, seemed interested in mission life. But another chief, Casablanca, who governed three hundred tents
made it clear that the Apaches were on their way to hunt buffalo and campaign against their northern enemies. Casablanca's brother had been killed in a Norteño raid on the Apache camp on the Colorado. With an emotional plea, the powerful leader convinced Chiquito not to desert his kinsmen in their time of need. Soon afterward, the entire Apache camp departed, leaving behind only a couple of sick natives in the care of the disappointed and disgruntled missionaries.\textsuperscript{15}

Chiquito was identified as a Lipan Chief while Casablanca was denoted as a Natagé leader. The Lipans, as identified by the Spanish, generally tended to be more positively perceived by the Spanish than their Natagé kin. It is therefore likely that Chiquito was in earnest with his desire to enter the mission and in his promises to return. Tribal pressure, however, forced him to accompany his kinsmen on a revengeful raid. Although it is unlikely that Chiquito and his people had any intentions of adopting Christianity and a completely settled life-style, he might very well have agreed to use the mission as a rancheria-type settlement where the Apaches would plant their crops and live until harvest time. As Casablanca pointed out, the primary sustenance for his people was the buffalo, not agricultural goods.
When the Apaches returned from hunting and raiding, burdened as they were with buffalo meat, they again resisted entering the mission. Throughout the fall of 1757, small groups of Apaches stopped by the mission to visit, but they never stayed more than a few days before hurrying southward. The Apaches no doubt feared a retaliatory raid from their northern enemies and wanted to distance themselves from it. In doing so, they also led their enemies into the lap of the Spaniards. If this resulted in a Spanish defeat of the Comanches, it would prove the worth of an Apache alliance with the Spaniards and no doubt speed up the conversion process. Also, the Apaches would be more willing to settle in the missions once they were assured of protection. Until that happened, they were not willing to take up residence in such an exposed locale. The Spanish, of course, were completely unaware of the Apaches' motives.

Further hindering Apache settlement in the missions was a deadly epidemic that swept through the Apache camps in late 1757, which discouraged close contact with the Europeans. In any case, the Spaniards were soon to learn firsthand the wrath of the Comanches and their allies.

After a raid on the presidial horse herd and an attack on the supply train from San Antonio, the northern tribes swept down on San Sabá in March 1758. Two thousand warriors, many of them armed with French guns, surrounded the mission.
They claimed to be searching for Apaches. After wrangling their way into the mission, the Norteños began their bloody work of ransacking the place. They killed Father Terreros and seven others, burned the mission, and then turned their attention to the distant presidio. Ortiz Parilla was helpless to defend the mission and its personnel from two thousand warriors, and he wisely kept his people within the walls of the presidio. The Norteños, unwilling to launch a direct assault on the garrison, eventually retired to the north to celebrate their victory and divide their plunder.\(^{37}\)

The massacre at the San Sabá mission sent a wave of hysteria throughout the Texas frontier. In San Antonio, Toribio de Urrutia, commander of the presidio, feared that San Antonio itself might be the attackers' next target. He begged for reinforcements from the viceroy and from all the principal settlements of Texas and Coahuila. At San Sabá, Ortiz Parilla used the disaster to recommend once again that the project be abandoned, or at least be relocated to a more favorable locale. But, he also proposed mounting a campaign against the Norteños to avenge the massacre.\(^{38}\)

Officials in Mexico City refused to relocate the presidio fearing that such action would be interpreted by the natives as a retreat, but they did support Colonel Ortiz Parilla's suggestion of organizing a punitive campaign. While Ortiz Parilla was awaiting a decision at San Sabá, the
Apaches continued to suffer attacks from the Comanches--some of them coming almost within sight of the presidio. Chiquito's Lipan band was attacked and nearly wiped out while hunting buffalo. In all, more than fifty Apaches were killed. In December 1758 Comanches surprised a group of thirty-four Apaches camped near the presidio. Only thirteen escaped with their lives.\textsuperscript{39}

With the loss of their people virtually under the noses of soldiers at the San Sabá garrison, it is little wonder that the Apaches were reluctant to settle nearby. In fact, an Apache chief informed Ortiz Parilla as he was preparing for his expedition against the Norteños that the Apaches were also in the process of undertaking a campaign against their enemies. Because of this, they had chosen to have no fixed habitation in order to avoid surprise attacks. After the campaign, assuming it was successful, the Apaches would be ready to congregate at missions.\textsuperscript{40}

In June 1759 Ortiz Parilla traveled to San Antonio to organize his campaign against the Norteños. By August the expedition, consisting of 139 presidial soldiers, 241 militia, 120 Indian allies, and two priests, departed San Antonio. One hundred and thirty four Apaches joined the expedition. The Spanish commander was doubtful of the loyalty of the Lipans but could do little to prevent their
joining. As it turned out, they proved to be a useful addition.\textsuperscript{41}

The Ortiz Parilla campaign achieved an early victory by surprising a Tonkawa camp, killing 55 Indians and capturing another 149. Within the camp were items taken from San Sabá, confirming the natives' guilt. Rather than be satisfied with the quick, cheap victory, Ortiz Parilla pressed northward, anxious to further avenge the attack on the mission. The Tonkawas encouraged the colonel's decision by freely offering information about the location of a Wichita village.

On the banks of the Red River near present-day Spanish Fort, the Spanish encountered a well-fortified village surrounded by a stockade and a moat. The natives launched a coordinated attack against the Spanish, repulsed several Spanish counter assaults, and eventually forced the Spanish themselves to retreat, abandoning two cannons as they withdrew. In the shelter of some trees, Parilla took stock of the situation and decided to order a full retreat. The natives harassed the Spanish army all the way back to San Sabá but did little damage to it.\textsuperscript{42}

The role of Apaches in Parilla's campaign is rather confused. Many historians state that the Apaches deserted at the first sign of trouble and hint that much of the blame for the failure of the campaign was their fault.\textsuperscript{43} Even
Ortiz Parilla gave the Apache allies mixed reviews. He stated at one point that some of the Lipans retreated "impetuously," taking not only their own horses but some of the Spaniards' as well.\textsuperscript{44}

Later, however, the Spanish commander admitted that the Apaches had been valuable allies. Although they were not as reliable as trained soldiers, they comported themselves well throughout the campaign, even during its critical moments. He admitted that having the Indians protect the flanks had been a mistake, because the Apaches did not fight in European style. Instead, they separated to fight in their manner of combat. This scattering could have easily been misinterpreted by the militia as a mass desertion of the Apaches, and it might have caused the militia themselves to break ranks and retreat.

There were still Apaches acting as scouts when Ortiz Parilla held his council to decide whether to retreat or not, and at least one historian gives the Apaches credit for saving the colonel's army from annihilation by acting as a rearguard. In addition, the Spanish commander must have considered the Apaches' contribution significant, for they received ninety-seven of the Tonkawa captives, which they preceded to trade to the Spanish for merchandise.\textsuperscript{45}

Additionally, Ortiz Parilla placed no blame on the Apaches for their unwillingness to settle in Missions at San
Sabá. He blamed, at least partially, the failure of the Spanish to prove that they could protect the Apaches. Until such assurance could be guaranteed, the commander had little faith that the Apaches would settle at fixed locations, although he urged that the Spanish continue their alliance with them. Otherwise, Ortiz Parilla warned, the Apaches would seek other alliances against the Spanish.  

Despite the lack of a clear decisive victory, the Lipans returned to their families to celebrate. The families of the participating Lipans had been left among the Natagés, Mescaleros, and Faraones farther to the southwest and thus were relatively safe from Comanche incursions. Although the Lipans celebrated the campaign as a victory in their camps, they were well aware that it was by no means decisive. The Norteños had not been crippled, or even badly injured. It would only be a matter of time before they once again began to take a toll on the Apache population. Realizing the isolation of San Sabá, the Apaches began requesting a mission further to the south, somewhere between the two outposts that had already proven to be failures.

Colonel Ortiz Parilla, meanwhile, was replaced by Felipe de Rábago y Terán who had been instrumental in causing the failure of the San Xavier missions and had created a great deal of friction with the missionaries in the San Antonio area. Upon his arrival at San Sabá, Rábago
set about earnestly improving the condition of the presidio, making sure the men were properly clothed, fed, and armed. He then replaced the presidio's wooden stockade with one of stone surrounded by a moat.⁴⁹

Perhaps because of Rábago's activities, the Lipans began to visit the presidio frequently. The new commander plied visiting natives with presents and furnished escorts to protect them from Comanches while they hunted buffalo. In October 1761, Cabezón, one of the most influential of the Apache chiefs, informed Rábago that he and his three thousand followers were prepared to settle at missions. Rábago immediately sent word to Father Diego Jiménez, president of the Río Grande missions who arrived at San Sabá in November.⁵⁰

Cabezón, Rábago, and Jiménez held a meeting in November to discuss matters. Cabezón stated that there were ten rancherías subject to two chiefs that were interested in missions. A short time later, these chiefs returned with Cabezón and agreed to recognize the Lipan leader as their spokesman. The chief then requested that the new mission be located on the upper Nueces, an area technically outside Rábago's jurisdiction; but, desperate to make progress, Rábago conceded.⁵¹

Even so, Rábago was forced to make other concessions to ensure Lipan settlement at the new mission. First, the
Apaches asked that more soldiers than ever before be supplied for a large buffalo hunt. Both Spaniards agreed that a successful hunt would help the success of the mission by supplying large amounts of food for the Apaches, thereby avoiding the necessary expense of having to supply them from Spanish reserves. Second, Cabezón demanded that the daughter of a leading Natagé chief, then being held in Nuevo León, be returned to her people. In exchange, the Natagé chief promised to use his influence to restrain the Mescaleros from raiding into Coahuila. Should those natives continue their raids, the Natagé captain promised to recover the horses and bring them to Rábago so that he could return them to their owners. The presidial commander refused a third Lipan demand—a combined campaign against the Comanches.52

While Rábago and Jiménez worked out the final details for establishing the new mission, actions were under way to close the inroads of Apaches into Coahuila. Captain Alonso Rubín de Calis of the El Paso presidio traveled in June 1759 to the junction of the Río Conchos and Río Grande. He was accompanied by fifteen soldiers and two missionaries. The mission Indians there welcomed the soldiers enthusiastically. During the Spanish sojourn, two Apache captains with their people visited the missions. The native warriors carried short shotguns, pistols, and swords; and they wore leather jackets. On arrival, they discharged their
guns, dismounted without a word, and entered the trading post to exchange mules and hides for horses. The Indians attempted to secure powder and musket balls, but the Spanish commander had forbidden his soldiers and Christianized Indians from selling these items on pain of death.\(^5^3\)

Four days later, another band of Apaches arrived armed with only bows and arrows. They brought buffalo meat and nuts to trade for mission products.\(^5^4\) This difference in armament reflects a sharp division growing between various Apache groups. By this time, the Faraones, or Mescaleros as they were more commonly being called, were well armed and arrogant. They traded with certain Spaniards while simultaneously raiding others. Accordingly, they were the cause of much consternation among the Spaniards. Contrariwise, the Lipans were armed with bows and arrows, had few fire arms, and arrived meekly to trade the few products they could wrest from the country where they had safe access. These Lipans were most likely the same natives who had requested missions from the Spanish.

The differences in Apache groups is further clarified by an expedition sent from New Mexico in 1763. Tomás Veléz Cachupín had reassumed the governorship of New Mexico, and he sent a pair of natives from the Pecos mission to find a route to San Sabá. Two hundred miles downstream from Pecos, the party reached a Lipan village. Comanches attacked the
ivillage while the visitors were there but caused only minor damage. Traveling another three days downstream, the small exploring party found a Mescalero camp among some sand dunes. The Mescaleros welcomed the visitors until some wounded Mescaleros entered the camp claiming that Spaniards had attacked them. The Apaches angrily planned to avenge themselves upon the visitors but they escaped during the night.

Five miles farther down the Pecos the fugitives encountered a camp of friendly Lipans. The Lipans promised to supply guides to take them to San Sabá. Ten days of travel later, the explorers and their guide entered another Lipan camp. There they encountered a Spanish force from the presidio of la Junta de Los Ríos. The Spanish commander informed them that he had been sent to punish the Apaches who were responsible for raiding the Río Grande settlements. The two New Mexican natives accompanied the Spanish back to la Junta de los Ríos, and from there returned to New Mexico, having abandoned their attempt to reach San Sabá.55

The small expedition also reveals some interesting facts about the Apaches at this time. Comanche raids were reaching hundreds of miles south of Pecos, but there were still significant numbers of Apaches in the region. Both Mescaleros and Lipans lived in close proximity to one another, but while the Lipans seemed to be invariably
friendly toward the Spanish, the Mescaleros were less faithful and had apparently committed recent raids on the Río Grande settlements. The proximity of the two Apache groups no doubt cast suspicion on both when raids occurred, and many Spaniards responded by wanting to punish any "Apaches" that they found. In the case above, however, the Spanish commander from La Junat de los Ríos appears to have been a rarity on the Spanish frontier, a man who attempted to establish guilt before administering punishment, or at least one who distinguished between Lipans and Mescaleros.

Back at San Sabá, Cabezón's band returned from their buffalo hunt in December 1761 and expressed their intentions to settle in missions. Rábago wrote a hasty note to Father Jiménez urging him to meet the Indians on the upper Nueces. He then appointed thirty soldiers and a lieutenant to accompany himself and the Apaches to the mission site. Seven days and one hundred miles later, the party arrived at a spring in a region known as El Cañon. Father Jiménez arrived a week later with an additional missionary, several wagons of supplies, and a few Christian natives to help build irrigation ditches.\(^5\)

On January 23, 1762, Mission San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz was formally established near present day Camp Wood. A small hut with a bell served as the church. More than three hundred natives congregated in response to the bell and
attended the founding ceremony. After the ceremony, Rábago appointed Cabezón war captain of the newly established village of Santa Cruz, deferring the appointment of other officials until they had received his instructions.57

Father Jiménez was quick to note a key difficulty in converting the Apaches. Unlike the Coahuiltecs of the Río Grande missions, who were poor and easily satisfied with the meager offerings of the missions, the Apaches were an active, wealthy, and proud people. They were accustomed to living well off the buffalo, had large numbers of horses, and even planted their own corn, melons, squash, and tobacco. Many had accumulated European goods such as brass utensils, articles of clothing, and a few firearms. As a result, the missions had little to offer the Lipans. In order to keep the Apaches satisfied, considerable expenditures would be required, but Jiménez believed that in the long-run the results would be worth the cost. If the Lipans could be converted, they would have a positive effect on their kinsmen, and peace would eventually spread across the entire frontier.58

Rábago left a garrison of twenty men at San Lorenzo when he returned to San Sabá. There he was met by a Lipan chief named El Turnio who claimed leadership of 114 warriors and as many as 400 band members. El Turnio insisted on a mission for his people, and Rábago, although reluctant
because of a lack of sufficient soldiers to garrison it, acquiesced. Thus, ten miles below San Lorenzo, near present-day Montell, Rábago established Mission Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria on February 6, 1762.59

Within a week, four hundred Apaches had gathered at each mission. Many more passed through the area to visit, causing much confusion. Construction of more permanent mission buildings was begun, and fields were cleared for planting. In the spring, twelve bushels of corn were planted in the hope of lessening dependence on the San Juan missions, which were strained to the breaking point. The corn made a good start but visiting bands of Apaches would ransack the fields, gathering the ripening corn before it was ready and leaving almost nothing behind for the mission.60

Still other problems soon emerged. Comanches began probing the vicinity. Between March and July, the Comanches launched three attacks on nearby Apache rancherías, killing more than fifty Lipans. The few Spaniards stationed at the mission were too few and too poorly informed to launch a retaliatory strike. They were, however, apparently able to discourage the Comanches from a direct assault on the mission itself. Rábago wanted to place fifty soldiers at the mission to assure its protection and aid the conversion process but lacked the manpower.61
In addition, the Lipans had to leave the mission to hunt buffalo, because there was not enough food. Once away from the missions, the Lipans fell under the sway of pagan influences. Many Lipans worried that their wives and children would not be safe in the care of the missionaries and often hurried back from the hunt to check on them. One chief believed that the missionaries planned to gather the Apaches in one place in order to kill them, and he encouraged his companions to rise up and slaughter the Spaniards before they themselves were killed. The chief was unsuccessful in his ploy and soon departed.\(^{62}\)

Some success was achieved however. The chiefs sought permission before leaving the mission to go on hunts and returned faithfully when they promised. In mid 1762 Jiménez reported to the Lipans that the Comanches had told the Spaniards in San Antonio that they would not attack the Lipans at the Nueces missions, although both he and the Lipans were skeptical of the promise.

At the new missions, Spaniards became familiar with eight Lipan leaders: Cabezón, El Turnio, Teja, Boruca, Panocha, Bordado, El Lumen, and El Cojo. The first two, known as the "founding chiefs" were the most influential. Bands led by other chiefs often visited briefly, and some made vague promises to settle when more Spanish soldiers arrived to assure protection. They never stayed long,
however, and the missionaries, already overburdened, did not encourage them to do so.\textsuperscript{63}

Eventually, twelve bands were associated with the missions of El Cañon. There were, however, numerous small groups of Apaches who remained enemies of the Spaniards and continued to commit depredations.\textsuperscript{64} It must be remembered that Apache chiefs did not have absolute authoritative power over their people. They ruled by power of persuasion. Therefore, while Cabezón might have earnestly wished to live peacefully in the mission, only those of his people who agreed with his decision would follow his example. There would undoubtedly be a few of his band who had no desire to live at the mission and would refuse to enter. In the Apache system, this was perfectly acceptable, and Cabezón would have no power over the dissenters. From this point on, they would select a new leader and act as an independent entity. However, because of the former connection, they would probably still have sporadic contact with their former band and even be assisted by them in times of crisis.

This system, of course, was unacceptable to the Spanish. They could not deal with Apaches who recognized no authoritative leader, nor could they readily understand such a system. Therefore, when a former member of Cabezón's or any other leader's band committed depredations, the Spaniards suspected treachery and sometimes punished the
innocent. This led the Apaches to distrust the seemingly haphazard actions of the Europeans.

By 1764, Father Jiménez was hopeful about the success of the missions. Great strides had been made. Jiménez reported with pride that while the missions of San Juan Bautista had been in decline for the last couple of years, the missions of El Cañon each had more than four hundred Lipans. Still, the friar remarked, many of the neophytes were warlike and treacherous, and none was well taught. This was because the viceroy had not seen fit to supply a garrison to protect the missions. Despite the lack of funds, stout adobe structures had been built. A church, sacristy, and quarters for the priests had been constructed, as had a storehouse for corn. The Lipans had been much impressed with the latter. They told Jiménez that if enemies came, they could hide in the structure. They then requested that the priest build similar houses for them to live in.65

In addition, the Lipans, who had previously resisted Christian instruction, had begun to listen. They even asked questions, allowing the missionaries to clarify some of their misconceptions. Some Lipan parents brought their children to be baptized and took the missionaries to visit and baptize their sick and elderly. In twenty-two months, Jiménez reported sixty-three baptisms. The Lipans never left the missions without first asking permission and often left
their women, children, and elderly at the missions when they went on raids against their Comanche enemies. This last practice served to doom the missions.

The first crisis came in the form of a small pox epidemic. In late 1764, the priests at San Lorenzo baptized forty children and twenty-seven adults. Those at Candelaria baptized two adults and five children. The majority of those baptized, however, died. As early as 1762, the Comanches had begun raiding the vicinity of San Sabá. In 1764 they launched a particularly severe attack on the presidio. From that point on, the presidio was virtually under siege by the marauding Comanches.

The increased Comanche raids resulted from Lipan forays into Comanche lands. On these occasions, the Lipans would take European articles with them and scatter them about the site of the raid in order to implicate Spaniards in the raid. Likewise the Lipans would leave Comanche articles near Spanish locales after they themselves had committed depredations in order to mislead the Spanish into thinking that the northern nations had committed these offenses.

This practice warrants attention. The events are accepted as fact by almost all historians, but a closer inspection reveals some problems. First of all, the Apaches, if indeed they committed these acts, slit their own throats. By bringing the wrath of the Comanches down upon their only
allies, the Spanish, the Apaches weakened their defensive bulwark. Obviously, having the Comanches retaliate against the Spanish would be better than having them revenge themselves upon the Lipans, but in the end the Lipans would also suffer. There is no likelihood that the Comanches would believe that only the Spanish were involved and the Comanches would eventually attack the Lipans. Therefore, the Lipans had no motive for committing such action, unless they truly believed that the Spanish were powerful enough to defeat the Comanches and therefore prevent the northern natives from reaching them. After witnessing the fiasco of the Ortiz Parilla campaign, there would be little reason for the Apaches to hold such a belief.

So, if the Lipans would not benefit from such actions, then who would? Perhaps the Comanches themselves. If the Comanches claimed that the Lipans had taken such action and informed the Spanish of them it would serve two important purposes. First, it would allow the Comanches to justify their attacks on the Spanish. They could claim that they "thought" that the Spanish had been actively assisting the Lipans in their raids. Thus the Comanches could talk peace with the Spanish but also justify their raids against them because of the perceived participation in campaigns against them.
In addition, by informing the Spanish of the Lipans’ "actions," the Comanche could sow the seeds of mistrust between the two allies. If the Spanish believed that the Lipans were betraying them, which they obviously did, they would likely terminate their alliance, which they also did. While this is all speculation, if indeed a Comanche plot to divide the Spanish and Apaches existed it worked better than even they probably expected.

Between 1751 and 1765, the Apaches had been relatively peaceful in the area to the south and east of the Junta de los Ríos. In 1765, however, that peace was shattered as Apaches furiously attacked Spanish posts in Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander. The outbreak was attributed to the unjust murder of three Apaches by horse herders of the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo. Many Spaniards noted, however, that the Apaches were deposed to fight and were looking for the pretext to go to war.69

On the other hand, the Apaches had rarely been peaceful in the El Paso region. Mescaleros living in the Organ Mountains would negotiate peace with the Spaniards and then violate it on their way home. In January 1765 two Apache leaders arrived in El Paso carrying a Holy Cross as a symbol of peace. They professed to be seeking peace for themselves and four other chiefs. The Spaniards gave them a cordial
reception but refused to negotiate a peace unless the leaders came in person.\textsuperscript{70}

Over the next several months, small groups of Apaches drifted into El Paso seeking peace. The Spanish refused, insisting that the chiefs come in person to negotiate. Finally, Pedro José de la Fuente, the captain of the presidio suggested that the Apache bring in a number of boys from three to seven years of age to act as hostages to ensure good behavior on the part of the adults. If the natives would agree to that, they would be welcomed into Spanish land, and, in fact, would be given lands to cultivate. The Apaches of course refused the offer.\textsuperscript{71}

Fuente eventually sent a campaign against the Apaches to discourage their depredations. The Spaniards and auxiliary natives marched into the Sacramento Mountains and attacked a small rancheria of ten huts. The natives fled upon the Spaniards’ approach, but the Europeans pursued, killing six and capturing seventeen. The victory had little effect on discouraging raids that lasted until the 1770s.\textsuperscript{72}

In October 1766 the Comanches finally raided the mission of San Lorenzo. By this time El Turnio and his band had abandoned the Candelaria mission. Within a year of the Comanche attack on San Lorenzo, the Apaches abandoned that site.\textsuperscript{73}
It was about this time that the Marqués de Rubí arrived on the scene. Appointed in 1766, Rubí arrived in Mexico with orders to inspect the entire frontier of New Spain and to report the status of each presidio from California to East Texas. Rubí arrived at the Nueces missions in mid 1767 to find Candelaria abandoned and San Lorenzo occupied by two missionaries, thirty soldiers and no Indians. Rubí's party then continued on to Presidio San Sabá. Rubí described the presidio as "without doubt the worst in the entire kingdom." It served no useful purpose, he declared, and if the Comanches discovered the true condition of the presidio, they might easily exterminate it. As a result, they would become so emboldened that they might then endanger San Antonio.  

Rubí completed his inspection of the frontier, and upon his return to Mexico drafted his recommendations. He suggested that the Comanches and other northern tribes only attacked the Spaniards because of the latter's connection with the Lipan Apaches. The inspector was assured that friendship could be cultivated with the northern tribes and that with their help the Apaches could be exterminated or at least sufficiently reduced. In addition, the presidio at San Sabá should be removed and part of its garrison used to strengthen San Antonio.
Rubí's recommendations were eventually sent to Spain where they were transformed into the Reglamento, or New Regulations of 1772. Even before they became official, however, many Spanish officials took Rubí's suggestions to heart and began their own campaigns bent upon crushing the Apaches. Thus, Rubí's inspection ushers in the last phase of Apache-Spanish relations, an unrelenting campaign to destroy the power of an entire people.
NOTES


5. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 242n.37; John, Storms Brewed, 256; Gunnerson, Jicarilla Apaches, 212, 216-222. See also Rupert Norval Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement: A Century and a half of
Savage Resistance to the Advancing White Frontier (Glendale, CA.: Arthur H. Clark, 1933), 55-56.


Spanish-Mexican Period, 1601-1849," in American Indian Ethnohistory: Indians of the Southwest: Apache Indians, VIII (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 61, mistakenly claims that the Comanches were armed with muskets. None of the sources supports such a claim and, in fact, omits muskets when describing the armament of the attackers.


15. Ibid., 133-137.

16. Ibid., 138-139.


20. Ibid., 189-191.
21. Ibid., 196-197; Weddle, San Juan Bautista, 242, 246.
29. Bolton, Texas, 83-85. For the problems resulting in the relocation of the San Xavier Missions and presidio see Gary B. Starnes, The San Gabriel Missions, 1746-1756 (Madrid: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1969), 32-45. For Pedro Romero de Terreros's contributions, see Weddle, San
Sabá Mission, 40-41.


34. The Norteños, or northern nations, were a group of allied tribes including the Comanches, Wichitas, Caddos, and Tonkawas.


38.Nathan and Simpson, San Sabá Papers, 8-12, 131-140, 144-151; Bolton, Texas, 87-88.


48. For a look at Rábago y Terán's exploits prior to his appointment at San Sabá, see Donald E. Chipman and Harriett Denise Joseph, *Notable Men and Women of Spanish Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 103-118.

49. Ibid., 118-119.


University of Texas, Austin, 1936), 15.


Richards, "Establishment," 16.


54. Ibid., 156.


57. Ibid., 166, Richards, "Establishment," 18-19.


Rábago estimated 300 natives of all sexes at San Lorenzo and 100 "vagabond" natives without families residing at Candelaria. See Richards, "Establishment," 35.


71. Ibid., 265-274.


CHAPTER 8

THE PATH OF SURVIVAL: THE PLAINS APACHES, 1768-1821

The frontier inspection of the Marqués de Rubí, 1766-1767, had a profound impact on the Apache Indians. On the first leg of his journey from Chihuahua to El Paso, Rubí noted extensive evidence of destruction caused by Apache raids. Indeed, his own party was attacked by Apaches north of El Paso. At Santa Fe Rubí suggested that a presidio be established between there and El Paso to better assure safe passage between the two outposts. The new presidio, however, was never constructed.¹

The second leg of Rubí's journey took him westward where he saw additional havoc wreaked by Apache raiders. Returning eastward, Rubí entered Texas in July 1767, by using a canoe borrowed from a ranchería of Lipans to cross the Río Grande. The party reached the abandoned mission of Candelaria where it found a small chapel and a large hut built by the Lipans. Lipans had visited from time to time but never stayed long. According to Nicolás de Lafora, Rubí's chief of engineers and assistant, the Lipans "laughed at the zeal and credulity of the friars" in their futile attempts to convert them.²
The situation at San Lorenzo was not much better. There the inspector's party found thirty soldiers and two "useless" missionaries. Rubí continued north to visit San Sabá. The inspector was shocked by conditions at the presidio, describing it as the worst in the entire kingdom. As far as he was concerned, it served no useful purpose, and if the Comanches were to discover the true condition of the presidio, they might easily exterminate it and thus be emboldened to endanger San Antonio.  

Rubí continued his trip through San Antonio to East Texas, and upon returning to Mexico wrote out his recommendations. He suggested that the Comanches and other northern tribes only attacked Spanish outposts because of his countrymen's alliance with the Lipans. Rubí was sure that friendship could be cultivated with the northern tribes and that with their help the Apaches' strength could be broken or at least significantly reduced. Once their power had been crushed, they should be dissolved as a nation and survivors should be shipped to the interior of Mexico. In addition, he suggested that the San Sabá presidio be moved to the Río Grande and that part of its garrison be used to strengthen San Antonio.  

Rubí's suggestions, which later became the basis for the "Royal Regulations of 1772," are a good indicator of one of the major problems concerning Spanish-Apache relations.
Rubí, like most Spanish officials in New Spain, lumped all Apaches together. Sometimes specific names might be assigned to certain Apaches, such as Mescaleros, Faroones, Lipans, or Natagés, but in the end, they were all simply "Apaches." Therefore, when "Apaches" committed depredations, most Spaniards did not care which band or group was responsible. As far as they were concerned, all Apaches were evil, untrustworthy, and should be exterminated.

This attitude is clearly illustrated by Rubí. Early into his inspection, he was exposed to Apache depredations in the vicinity of Chihuahua, which served to convince him that Apaches were the scourge of the earth. Matters were not helped by the outright attack on his party between El Paso and Santa Fe. Rubí's conviction was no doubt strengthened as he traveled to the west and witnessed the massive destruction caused by the Gila Apaches and their western kinsmen. By the time he reached Texas, there is no doubt that Rubí regarded the Apaches as little more that wild beasts whose very existence threatened the survival of the Spanish on the frontier.

The inspector's contact with Lipans was cordial but limited. He noted that they were settled farmers who helped him cross the Río Grande. This brief contact, however, was not enough to persuade Rubí that the Lipans were any better than their kin. The fact that they had not settled at the
missions of El Cañón seemed to confirm his conviction. He made no mention of the fact that the Lipans had been relatively peaceful since 1749 and that San Antonio had been virtually free of depredations since then. Instead, he mentioned the Lipans specifically in his recommendations as targets for reduction and removal.

Not all Spaniards were as narrow-minded as Rubí. Both Rábago and Father Jiménez, who had intimate contact with the Lipans, had implored the viceroy to recognize distinctions between the Apache groups. In fact, noted Jiménez, twice during his work among Lipans at the missions, the Mescaleros had asked the Lipans to join them in raids against the Spanish, and both times the Lipans had refused. On other occasions, he noted that the Mescaleros had stolen horses from the Lipans.5

It is well to remember that peace with the Lipans applied only to San Antonio and its environs. La Bahía, for example, remained a legitimate target as far as the Lipans were concerned. Fray Pedro Ramírez noted that before the Apaches were "pacified," his mission had had four thousand head of cattle, plenty to feed the mission Indians without fear of depleting the herd. By 1762, however, the mission had only four hundred head, owing to Apache depredations. The mission had to subsist on half rations for fear of wiping out the depleted herd. On two occasions, the raiders
overran the presidio of La Bahía itself, killing fifty cattle in the two raids. Obviously, La Bahía was outside the realm of peace negotiated by the Apaches.

In early 1768 Apaches began harassing Presidio de Santa Rosa to the southwest of San Juan Bautista. In response to the increased hostility of the Apaches, the viceroy ordered a joint campaign of forces from Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya to punish the natives. The expedition encountered few hostile natives. In fact, Manuel Rodríguez, who commanded the Coahuilan force, had traveled without incident from San Juan Bautista to El Paso by way of La Junta de los Ríos. He observed that trade between the two posts could be easily maintained by supplying an escort for caravans.

By the following spring, however, Rodríguez reported that the hostility of the Lipans and some of the mission Indians had made this same passage impossible. Only if the presidios recommended by the Marqués de Rubí were established could safe passage through the so-called despoblado be guaranteed. Several presidios constructed on the Río Grande between San Juan Bautista and El Paso would not only facilitate trade between those two posts but would also act as a cordon to help defend Coahuila and other provinces of northern Mexico.

Apache raids into the region had greatly intensified by the late 1760s. In March 1771, the Spanish launched an
expedition against the Apaches to curb their forays. The Apaches, however, had observed the expedition from their mountain strongholds and countered with a series of lightning-quick strikes against it. The raiders killed twenty-three Spaniards and stole all of their horses. The survivors dragged into Chihuahua in May, and the confident Apaches intensified their raids.⁹

Hugo Oconor, a talented Irish-born administrator who had arrived in New Spain in 1765, reported in November 1771 that Apaches had killed 140 residents of Chihuahua, stolen seven thousand horses and mules, and killed uncounted animals in a single year. He continued that since 1748 Nueva Vizcaya had four thousand persons killed and 120 million pesos of property had been destroyed or damaged. Ranches between Chihuahua and El Paso had been reduced from forty-six thousand head of cattle to eight thousand, and Apache raiders had begun raiding as far south as Durango.¹⁰

In April 1772 an Apache raid near Chihuahua resulted in the loss of four hundred horses. No pursuit was made because of the small numbers of troops, their lack of equipment, and their poor mounts. In the following month more than three hundred Lipans attacked several ranches near Nadadores, fifteen miles northwest of Monclova. In less than two hours the invaders killed twenty-three people, captured twenty-two, and stole almost one thousand head of livestock. The
Lipan raiders were reported to be well armed with pistols and other firearms in addition to their bows and arrows.\textsuperscript{11}

In the midst of these events, the Royal Regulations of 1772 arrived. These directives called for the establishment of a defensive line of presidios and vigorous warfare against hostile Indians. Through incessant attacks on hostile natives in their own villages and lands, and the good treatment of captives taken in such campaigns, the king hoped to achieve peace. It was forbidden, however, to grant peace to the Apaches who could not be trusted. Hugo Oconor was appointed commandant inspector of the Internal Provinces and ordered to put the new regulations into effect.\textsuperscript{12}

Viceroy Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursúa recognized the difficulty of Oconor’s assignment. Five presidios had to be relocated to the Río Grande, a general campaign had to be organized, presidial garrisons had to have the ability to fight outside their fortresses, and governor’s of surrounding provinces had to be convinced of the necessity of uniting their forces to fight the natives. The viceroy also noted the urgent need to coordinate policy on the frontier. For example, he pointed out that Indians who had just assaulted one fortress or settlement should not be peacefully admitted at another. Likewise Bucareli complained that governors, missionaries, presidio captains, and private citizens flooded him with conflicting suggestions and
information, making it all but impossible to make competent decisions on frontier matters.¹³

Bucareli instructed Oconor to dislodge a group of Mescaleros who were raiding out of the Bolsón de Mapimí and to review and relocate presidios across the frontier. Because of the magnitude of the endeavor, the governors of Texas and New Mexico would handle their respective portions. Juan María, Barón de Ripperdá, governor of Texas, saw to the Spanish abandonment of East Texas, the strengthening of the San Antonio and La Bahía presidios, and the settlement of a military detachment at Arroyo de Cíbolo, located halfway between the two existing fortifications.¹⁴

Oconor, at the head of three hundred troops, departed San Juan Bautista in April 1773 to establish the new Río Grande presidios. One day out of San Juan Bautista, the Spaniards encountered a group of Lipans who inquired about the purpose of the expedition. Oconor explained that they were there to establish presidios along the Río Grande, and he informed the Apaches that they must now stay north of the river.

The following day, five Lipan chiefs entered the Spanish camp to question Oconor about the location of the new presidios and accused the Spaniards of attempting to take their land. Oconor brazenly stated that the Spaniards were going to take not only the Apaches' land but that of

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the Comanches as well. He warned that any native who opposed the Spanish would be killed. Upon hearing this, the Lipans hastily assured Oconor that they were friends of the Spaniards and would gladly assist them against the Comanches.¹⁵

Sixty miles from San Juan Bautista, Oconor selected the site of the first presidio and left a detachment behind to begin construction. Traveling onward, the Spanish entrada encountered several other Lipan chiefs, each professing their friendship. One group turned over a Tarahumara woman to the Spanish as proof of their peaceful intent. Oconor left another detachment of soldiers at a site on the Arroyo de Agua Verde, twenty miles south of modern Del Rio, to construct the new Santa Rosa presidio.

The commandant inspector obtained the services of Lipan guides to take his party to the junction of the Pecos and the Río Grande. The next location selected for a presidio was in the Big Bend region. There he planned to relocate the San Sabá presidio near a ford frequented by the natives. This location, however, left one hundred miles of rugged terrain between the two presidios, causing Oconór to recommend the establishment of an additional presidio at La Babía, even though it was south of the frontier line if defense.
Having selected a new site for Presidio San Sabá, Oconor continued up the Río Grande. He launched two excursions into the Chisos Mountains to attack any lurking Indians. Those forces killed only one Indian but recovered more than one hundred branded horses. The natives, probably Mescaleros, later raided the rearguard, wounding a soldier. At La Junta de Los Ríos, Oconor made arrangements to move the garrison at Julimes back to its original site at La Junta. As he continued up the Río Grande, he launched several other forays against the Apaches, at one time encountering and defeating a force of six hundred natives. Oconor then selected sites for El Principe and San Elizario before returning to Chihuahua.\(^{16}\)

By early 1773 the Spanish were reaping benefits from their new line of presidios. For example, in May Mescaleros killed eight travelers and took six captives near San Fernando de Austria. Fifty-three soldiers from San Sabá, accompanied by reinforcements from San Juan Bautista, set out in pursuit. The Spanish encountered seven rancherías near present-day Pandale and launched a surprise attack. They captured sixteen Apaches, secured the release of three captives, and recovered two hundred horses and mules.\(^{17}\)

By October 1773 Bucareli boasted of a new peace on the frontier. The inhabitants of San Bartolomé, Nueva Vizcaya, claimed to have had the best harvest in twenty years because
of the lack of hostile Indians. Friendly Tarahumaras and
presidio captains were taking the initiative to launch small
offensives against hostile Apaches. By the end of the year,
Nueva Vizcaya had not lost a single life or a single head of
livestock from Apache raids over a period of four months.18

Some Lipans, finding themselves at odds with the
Spaniards, sought other alliances. Several bands living on
the Nueces and León Rivers made peace with the Bidais.
Through their new allies, the Lipans gained access to guns.
Some Tejas families even moved to live among the Lipans.
With a more powerful position, a group of Lipans offered to
serve Coahuilán governor, Jacobo de Ugarte y Loyola as
scouts against hostile Mescaleros.19

Both Ugarte and Oconor saw the usefulness of Lipans as
scouts and auxiliaries against the Mescaleros. Oconor,
especially, believed that the Comanches and Norteños were a
larger threat to the Spanish frontier than the Lipans.
Unfortunately for the Lipans, the governor of Texas
disagreed.

Governor Ripperdá refused peace offerings from all
Apaches. He and his French-born Indian agent, Athanase de
Mézières, regarded the Lipans as incurable thieves and
troublemakers. They managed to break the alliance between
the Bidais and the Lipans when they learned that four Lipan
chiefs and a large number of their people were traveling to

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East Texas to ratify a treaty with their new-found allies. Mézières reminded the Bidais of their commitment to the Spanish and urged them to prove their loyalty. As a result of the Frenchman's threats, a Bidais chief attacked and killed three of the seven Lipans who had entered his house to propose peace. 20

In fall 1775 Oconór was ready to launch a concerted attack against the Mescaleros. Mustering more than 2,200 troops and militia from Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, Sonora, Texas, and New Mexico, Oconor planned to defeat the Apaches with converging columns. The Spanish forces defeated the Apaches in fifteen separate engagements, killing 128 warriors, capturing 104 natives, and recovering almost 2,000 animals. 21

In a follow-up campaign, Spanish forces killed sixty-six Apaches, captured sixty-four, and recovered more than one hundred horses and mules. The Indians were forced from their homes, however, and retreated to the Sacramento Mountains and then beyond to the Pecos and Colorado Rivers. There the Comanches attacked them and wiped out three hundred Apache families. Halfway through the campaign, Oconor fell ill and soon resigned his position. 22

Oconor's retirement coincided with the formation of the Interior Provinces into a separately governed unit, largely independent of the viceroy of New Spain. Teodoro de Croix
received appointment as commandant general over the new administration, which included Texas, Coahuila, Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Sinaloa, New Mexico, and the Californias. He spent the first several months of his new position in Mexico City, mulling over archives to familiarize himself with the details of his new command."

Despite the apparent success of Oconor's campaigns, or perhaps because of them, Croix found the frontier in shambles. Reports from Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya indicated increased Apache hostility. Governor Felipe Barrí of Nueva Vizcaya informed Croix that between 1771 and 1776 some 1,674 persons had been killed, 154 captured, 116 haciendas had been abandoned, and 68,256 head of livestock had been stolen. These figures, he continued, did not include military losses or unspecified others. Governor Ugarte of Coahuila was so exasperated by the renewed hostility of the Lipans that he suggested the rounding up all the Lipans and the deportation of them overseas as the only viable solution."

In December 1777 Croix held the first of three war councils to determine his plan concerning the Apaches and the frontier. At Monclova, the council, attended by the governors of New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya, as well as presidial captains of the two provinces, concluded that war should be made against the Apaches. At the same time, the
Spanish should cultivate friendship with the Nations of the North. In addition, efforts should be made to encourage hostility between the various Apache tribes.\textsuperscript{25}

A second council was held at San Antonio a month later. At this council, Governor Ripperdá confirmed that the Lipans could not be trusted to keep the peace, although they were less hostile in Texas than in Coahuila because of the nearness of their enemies, the Comanches. He also noted that some progress had been made through the efforts of Athanase de Mézières in arranging peace with the Norteños. To this point, although many had considered these treaties to be deceitfully signed by the natives, all the signatories except the Comanches had scrupulously kept them. The Comanches, in the opinion of Ripperdá, would come to terms once the Lipans had been subdued. Finally, the council concluded that an alliance with the Nations of the North should be secretly encouraged, while no change should be made concerning dealings with the Lipans. This was because it would take time to gather the necessary troops and launch a decisive campaign.\textsuperscript{26}

The final council, held in Chihuahua, was the most significant. Since the Mescaleros and Lipans were the main concerns of the Eastern Internal Provinces, efforts to split them should first involve war against the Lipans while simultaneously encouraging peace with the Mescaleros. The

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council also recommended an increase of 1,800 soldiers assigned to the frontier. Until the forces could be secured, Comanches and Lipans should be prevented from visiting San Antonio simultaneously. This would allow the Spanish to treat each cordially, while encouraging hostility between the two tribes. In Coahuila, peace should be maintained with both Mescaleros and Lipans until reinforcements could arrive. Finally, the council recommended increased coordination and cooperation between the forces of neighboring provinces.\textsuperscript{27}

Croix's plans were disrupted by events outside New Spain. In early 1779 he received instructions to adopt a policy of peace concerning the enemy natives. Instead of launching a major campaign to pacify the Apaches, they should be won over through gifts and urged to settle near the missions and presidios. Later in that same year, Spain's declaration of war against England virtually killed Croix's hope for any significant reinforcements.\textsuperscript{28}

Despite these drawbacks, Croix still managed to increase the size of the frontier garrisons by 580 men. Each presidio received 19 reinforcements except for Santa Fe which received 35, San Antonio, which added 34, and Sonora, which, in the midst of a revolt of Seris, received 120.\textsuperscript{29} While not enough to carry out his intended offensive, the
additional troops allowed the presidios to be more effective in their defense of the frontier.

Croix's plans were further hampered by the untimely death in November 1779 of De Mézières, who had been working ceaselessly to promote an alliance with the northern nations and Comanches against the Lipans and their Apache kin. De Mézières's death was preceded by the arrival at San Antonio of Domingo Cabello y Robles to assume the governorship of Texas. Cabello's term of office (1778-1786) would do justice to a novel. It was full of intrigue, betrayal, battles, and diplomacy as Cabello tried to deal with various tribes, keeping them friendly to the Spanish while trying to encourage distrust and hostility between them.

In March 1779 eighty Lipans under the leadership of El Joyoso and several other chiefs camped outside of San Antonio and paid a visit to Cabello. Joyoso informed the governor that they had been attacked by Indians of the adentro (interior) and had lost more than three hundred killed and captured. They also knew that the Tonkawas had been involved and were on their way to avenge the attack. Accordingly, the Indians wanted Cabello and his soldiers to assist them. Cabello excused himself by proclaiming illness and stating that the Tonkawas had done nothing against the Spaniards and were therefore friends. So, the Lipans carried out their campaign without Spanish aid.
In spring 1779 rumors filtered into San Antonio of a meeting at Presidio Aguaverde between the governor of Coahuila and all the presidial commanders of that province in order to make peace with the Mescaleros and use them against the Lipans. Cabello was horrified by the rumors and worked to squelch them. He reported to Croix that despite the injuries caused by the Lipans, many people in San Antonio had befriended them and had general affection for them. He feared that the Lipans might be warned of the campaign, causing them to unite and exact revenge against San Antonio for the perceived betrayal.  

The Spanish in Coahuila had been cultivating hostilities between the two Apache groups for years. Although the Lipans were deemed more worthy of peace, they were chosen to be the first targets of destruction, despite the Mescaleros being seen as "more perfidious, cruel, and barbarous than the Lipan" and "not worthy of our honorable alliance." Nonetheless, Mescaleros were chosen over Lipans as Spanish allies. The rationale was that Lipans could more easily be subdued, living as they did in known lands and surrounded by enemies. Mescaleros, on the other hand, lived in a larger expanse with rugged, mountainous terrain, which would make them almost impossible to conquer.  

In spring 1779, Mescaleros attacked a Lipan encampment, killing a number of the Lipans and stealing six hundred
horses. The Lipans intended to avenge themselves upon the presidios of Coahuila, but Governor Juan de Ugalde appeased them while managing to keep their animosity towards the Mescaleros alive. Cabello was much relieved when the defeated Lipans arrived at San Antonio, not to destroy it, but to ask for peace. He took advantage of the opportunity to warn the Apaches that he would offer them sanctuary, but if they caused the least amount of harm he would personally gather all forces at his disposal and kill as many Lipans as he could find.35

In August a party of Tejas Indians arrived in San Antonio to discuss making war on the Lipans. In the midst of the discussions, Cabello received word that a group of Lipans were approaching to befriend the Spanish. Cabello informed the Tejas of the approaching Lipan party, telling them that the Apaches had heard of their presence and wanted to fight them. Cabello offered to escort the Tejas from San Antonio, urging them to spread word of the Apaches' presence. He slyly offered to protect them if they chose to stay, but the Tejas, convinced of Cabello's good will, chose to depart. Cabello loaded them with gifts and provided an escort to see them safely from the area, once again urging them to tell their people and their allies of the good treatment they had received. In such manner, Cabello hoped to find allies who would make war on the Lipans.36
That evening, six hundred Lipans arrived, camping outside San Antonio while five of their chiefs visited Cabello. First, they presented sixteen previously stolen mules as a sign of their good will. They expressed disappointment at not finding any Tejas at the presidio, informing Cabello that the wanted peace with that tribe. That, of course, was the last thing Cabello wanted, but he informed the Lipans that a small group of Tejas had been there (lest they discover the truth and catch him in a lie) and noted that they were at peace with the Spaniards. Almost as an after thought he told the Lipans that he suspected the Tejas peace was deceitful, thereby keeping the Lipans on cordial relations and sowing distrust between the two tribes."

Over the next several months, Cabello tried to hustle various visiting tribes in and out of San Antonio and avoid conflict or contact between the Lipans and the eastern tribes. Often times the Lipans cooperated by camping several leagues away and waiting for the other natives to leave. When the Lipans visited to request aid from the Spanish, their supposed ally, Cabello would lay down impossible requirements. For example, in one case he told the Lipans that before he could assist them they must travel to Chihuahua and convince Teodoro de Croix of their earnestness. The Lipans were astounded by the demand,
replying that such a trip would be impossible without facing severe danger from their enemies.\textsuperscript{38}

In addition, because of the difficulty in dealing with multiple chiefs, Cabello insisted that the Lipans choose a single chief and designate him as their supreme chief. The Lipans seemed inclined to accept the demand and returned to their camp to discuss the idea with their people. The next day they returned and announced their intention to follow any chief appointed by Cabello. The Texas governor, of course, refused and replied that they must designate their own leader and that the choice must be made by all the Lipans, not just those currently present. The Lipans agreed, despite the impossibility of the task, and departed to gather with the rest of their people.\textsuperscript{39} Without question, Cabello knew that such requests were impossible and was using them to keep the pretense of Spanish cooperation and friendship alive until Spanish forces could be mustered to crush the Lipans completely.

The system of intrigue nearly broke down in August 1780. Cabello was entertaining a small party of Tejas when a group of twenty Lipans arrived. Cabello hastily moved the Tejas to their rooms and ordered them not to come out. The Lipans quickly located the rooms and began begging through the doors for the Tejas to come and visit them in their villages. They offered to give the Tejas horses, weapons,
and even women if they would consent to a visit. Cabello arrived on the scene and drove the Lipans away, ordering them to leave the presidio immediately. After the Lipans departed, the governor apologized for the incident and warned the Tejas that the Lipans had planned to lure them to their homes in order to kill them. The Tejas assured Cabello that they believed him and departed after receiving the customary gifts.  

The preceding incidents demonstrate the extent to which the Lipans had been subdued by 1780. They desperately wanted peace with the eastern natives, but were unwilling to loose the wrath of Cabello to get it. They even conceded to most of his demands. Despite the apparent unreasonableness of Cabello, the Lipans, cowed by their weak position, meekly accepted what was offered.

To add to their problems, in October 1780, approximately 170 militia attacked a Lipan ranchería on the Nueces River in the mistaken belief that its inhabitants had committed a raid on their settlements. In fact, the attack had been carried out by the Comanches. The troop killed three Lipans and drove off more than 500 horses and mules. The Lipans swore vengeance upon their assailants, but before they could retaliate they were struck by a small pox epidemic. Over the next couple of months, more than four hundred Lipans died from the dread disease.
Meanwhile, the Mescaleros were also suffering severe setbacks. Having apparently succeeded in breaking the power of the Lipans, the Spanish now turned their attention to their former allies, the Mescaleros. Between 1779 and 1783, Juan de Ugalde launched a series of campaigns against these natives. He was able to force Lipans to join him on his final campaign, thus preventing the two oppressed groups from allying. The campaigns were of limited success and their overall failure contributed to Ugalde's removal from office.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the questionable success of Ugalde's campaigns, they did have significant results. Because the governor's campaigns penetrated the deepest recesses of Mescalero hideouts, the natives began asking for peace or fleeing toward Nueva Vizcaya. One infamous chief rode into El Paso in July 1782 to surrender. Croix agreed to peace only if the Apaches principally responsible for the raids on Coahuila surrendered as well. As a result, Apaches numbering 137, which included three principal chiefs, surrendered and Croix had them deported under guard to the interior. Other Mescaleros settled peacefully in the vicinity of El Paso and were used as auxiliaries in campaigns against the Gila Apaches to the northwest.\textsuperscript{13}

Croix's policies lessened the threat of Apache attacks but did not eliminate them completely. Their raids in Nueva
Vizcaya decreased dramatically after the deportation of some of the more hostile Mescaleros, but by 1787 attacks on Chihuahua and its environs picked up again. In three months, Mescalero attacks resulted in twenty-nine deaths and the loss of more than five hundred animals. One of the attacks was carried out by Mescaleros who had been maintained and supported by royal funds at the presidio of El Norte."

During this time, the Mescaleros apparently negotiated a peace with their Lipan and Natagé kin. In Texas Governor Cabello noted increased depredations by Lipans that started in 1784. He also recorded a number of engagements between the Comanches and Lipans, both of whom also preyed on San Antonio from time to time."

In 1785 Cabello finally accomplished what he had been attempting since he first arrived in Texas--peace with the Comanches. In October a visiting delegation of Comanches at San Antonio committed themselves to a peace agreement that included a war of extermination against the Lipans and also war against the Mescaleros. In addition, the Comanches agreed to inform Cabello whenever they intended to approach Coahuila in search of Apache enemies so that he might warn the governor of that province to avoid incidents."

As the Comanches were preparing to depart Béxar, Cabello learned of a nearby Lipan ranchería and feared that those natives might ambush the Comanches. He supplied a
substantial escort for the delegates and avoided trouble, although a party of Lipans did approach the Comanches to hurl insults and threats at them. The Lipans warned the Comanches that Cabello was insane for negotiating such an agreement with them. Angered, the Lipans soon packed up and withdrew to the Nueces River, some thirty leagues from Spanish settlements."

In rapid fashion the Lipans were shunned by the Spanish and other previously friendly natives. Spaniards in Coahuila refused the assistance of Lipans in campaigns lest the Comanches witness the cooperation and believe themselves betrayed. Likewise, East Texas natives were warned against selling arms to the Lipans in exchange for desperately desired horses. Cabello advised the commander of La Bahía to detain any Indians suspected of carrying arms to the Lipans."

In early 1786, the Lipans suffered a number of attacks from the Nations of the North and Comanches. Perhaps in retaliation for what they perceived as betrayal on the part of the Spaniards, the Lipans increased their depredations near San Antonio. They stole forty horses in less than a week. In retaliation, Cabello ordered out several scouting patrols with orders to kill any Lipans in possession of stolen livestock and to inform the Lipan chiefs of his directive."
Finding themselves more and more isolated, the desperate Lipans sent one of their most prominent chiefs, Zapato Sas, to visit Cabello. The Lipan leader indicated that he had the greatest reputation among the Lipans and that if Cabello would consent to appoint him Great Chief of his nation and supply the Lipans with protection and traders, they would relocate wherever the governor desired. He promised to prevent the theft of livestock, punish anyone guilty of such crimes, and return stolen animals to their owners.

Cabello, knowing the offer to be an act of desperation, refused. He replied that he must have proof that the Lipans would accept Zapato Sas as their single leader, that all branded cattle currently in Lipan possession be returned, and that all agreements must be approved by the commandant general. Until the Lipans could meet such requirements, Cabello ordered Zapato Sas to take his people away from the vicinity of San Antonio, La Bahía, and San Juan Bautista. The Texas governor suggested that they relocate to the vicinity of the abandoned San Sabá mission above the headwaters of the Río Frío, and the Lipans reluctantly acquiesced.

Having forced the Lipans to relocate, Cabello encouraged any potential allies who visited San Antonio to launch an attack against the beleaguered Lipans. The
proposed attack, however, never materialized. Despite setbacks, the Lipans were far from helpless. On a buffalo hunt, three hundred of them encountered fifty Comanche warriors. The Lipans attacked, killing almost half of the warriors, including a prominent chief, before they could escape. Another group of Lipans, camped six to eight leagues from San Antonio, began stealing horses from the Spanish settlement. When twenty-two Comanches arrived to inform Cabello of the results of a campaign against Apaches, he wanted to encourage them to also attack the nearby Lipans. He thought better of it, however, because of the disparity in numbers, although he did chastise the Comanches for not being more vigorous enough in their campaigns.\footnote{1}

Three months after his first visit, Zapato Sas returned to San Antonio to check on the progress of his earlier request. Cabello informed the chief that Lipans were guilty of stealing a number of horses from the presidio and noted that two hundred Lipans located in a ranchería ten leagues away were constantly slaughtering Spanish cattle. Without proof of Zapato Sas's loyalty and power to control his tribe, Cabello would not grant him his request. The Lipan chief retorted that because Cabello had not designated him as high chief of the Lipans, he was unable to prevent such excesses. The Lipan leader departed after requesting permission to hunt buffalo in the vicinity of San Sabá.
Cabello consented and gave the visiting delegation some trifling gifts, at the same time assuring them of the Spaniards' friendship.53

At this juncture, Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez issued orders concerning governance of the Interior Provinces. His directives called for waging constant warfare against the Apaches. War carried into their rancherías was viewed as the only way to force Lipan submission. Once they asked for peace, it should be granted immediately but only under definite rules and points of capitulation. A bad peace with all the tribes who sought it, he asserted, was better than the gains resulting from a successful war. The key to ultimate victory over the Apaches, Gálvez continued, was to get the natives to destroy themselves.54

Gálvez argued that trade should be encouraged with the Apaches. The desire for horses and other Spanish items was the primary motive for their raids. If the Spanish could satisfy the desire of the natives for European goods, it would, in the long run, be cheaper than equipping the troops engaged in constant campaigns. The Apaches should be encouraged to trade for alcohol and, in a break with traditional Spanish policy, guns.54

Gálvez held the opinion that the bows and arrows were more effective in the hands of natives than guns. Arrows, he argued, could be discharged without interruption. Twenty
arrows could be launched in the time it took to reload a Spanish musket. In addition, the Apaches could supply themselves with all the bows and arrows they needed. Guns, on the other hand, required constant maintenance to keep them in working order. By supplying the Indians with long-barreled guns of inferior craftsmanship, as well as with an abundance of powder, the natives would soon lose their proficiency with the bow. The guns would be useful to the natives in hunting and warring against each other, but their bulk and constant need for repair would make them almost useless in campaigns against the Spanish.\textsuperscript{55}

The policy, however, was ineffective. Félix Calleja, who performed an inspection of the province of Nuevo Santander, noted that implementation of it allowed the Apaches to seek peace whenever they were in a weakened position, and then use the respite to recover their strength. Whenever they were caught performing a raid, they would immediately flee to another area and seek peace, using the new location as an asylum from punishment. Gifts had become necessities. If they were not presented to the Apaches upon demand, the Indians would become threatening and often steal what they wanted. Finally, the Indians learned to identify inferior-quality guns that were offered to them and demanded more accurate rifles, or they brought those guns to the Spanish and demanded that they be improved.
and refurbished. Rather than discontinuing the use of the bow and arrow, the Apaches had learned to use them in conjunction with the gun. Their strategy was to have bowmen cover the gunmen, which allowed the latter to reload and fire.  

Between 1783 and 1786, Mescaleros took advantage of the relaxed state of military affairs and increased their raids. In July 1786, they raided into the heart of New Spain, penetrating as far as the outskirts of Mexico City and Guadalajara, in the process wiping out several settlements. As a result of these raids, Juan de Ugalde, who, as mentioned, had been removed from office in Coahuila by Croix in 1783 was appointed commandant of the eastern division of the Internal Provinces by Gálvez. With Gálvez's approval, Ugalde began organizing a campaign to punish the Mescaleros. The campaign would not be carried out until after the death of Gálvez in 1786, and, in effect, it would reveal one of the major flaws in the viceroy's policy.  

Ugalde arrived on the Río Grande in September 1786 to organize his campaign, only to find to his dismay that the governor of Coahuila was occupied in carrying out a campaign that resulted in the destruction of a Mescalero ranchería. This sortie delayed Ugalde's larger scale campaign, and, in the commandant general's opinion, led to its failure. Ugalde asserted that the surviving Mescaleros fled westward,
informing their people that "the great captain of Coahuila" (Ugalde) was back and planned to annihilate them. Perhaps for this reason, a few Mescalero bands began seeking peace at El Paso in January 1787.58

In Ugalde's first encounter with Mescaleros, he captured a chief, Zapato Tuerto, who informed him that his people had been granted peace at El Paso. While Ugalde reorganized his troops to continue the campaign, word advising him to end his campaign against the Mescaleros arrived from Presidio del Norte. Ugalde haughtily replied that as commandant of the four eastern provinces he and only he was responsible for their defense, implying that he would not recognize a peace unless he negotiated it. He did resolve, however, to spare any Mescaleros camped in the vicinity of the presidio.59

After another encounter with Mescaleros in which the majority of them escaped while leaving their possessions behind, Ugalde was approached by Juan Bautista Elguézabal, the commander of the Presidio del Norte, and 42 soldiers. Elguézabal reminded Ugalde that the Mescaleros were protected by treaties granted in Nueva Vizcaya and demanded to know his intentions. Ugalde promptly replied that he would continue to make war on all Apaches he encountered north of the river. After a tense discussion, Elguézabal departed, and Ugalde continued his campaign. He fought a few
minor skirmishes and discovered that Comanches had beat him to one camp, virtually wiping it out. Having apparently rid the Big Bend area of Mescaleros, Ugalde turned his attention northward where he had heard rumors of a powerful band of Apaches living at the headwaters of the Colorado. 60

Before reaching the camp of the great Apache chief, Picax-ande Ins-tinsle, Ugalde was met by his delegates. The Apache leader denied having ever raised forces against the Spaniards, claiming the Comanches were his only enemies. Ugalde and Picax-ande held a council in which the Apache suggested that the Spanish and Apaches combine against the Comanches. Ugalde, of course, refused the offer and instead suggested that Picax-ande relocate his people near the presidio of Santa Rosa. There they would place themselves under the protection of the Spanish and live in peace, free from Comanche harassment. The Apache chief reluctantly agreed. Several months later his people, as well as several other bands of Apaches, held a council with Ugalde to confirm the peace. 61

Ugalde's campaign received much criticism, and it did little to stabilize the Spanish-Mescalero relationship. Within a year, Ugalde would be on the campaign trail again, this time in pursuit of his former ally, Picax-ande Ins-tinsle.
While Ugalde campaigned against Mescaleros in the Big Bend country, in Texas, Governor Domingo Cabello y Robles was reassigned and left Texas to his successor, Rafael Martínez Pacheco. Martínez Pacheco, who had had a controversial career as a presidial commander in Texas, had a governorship no less fraught with controversy. The new governor's first order of business was to work out a peace agreement with several rancherías of Lipans by urging them to settle peacefully at the San Antonio missions. This action did not sit well with the missionaries or Jacobo Ugarte, who, in the absence of Juan de Ugalde, was serving temporarily as commandant general of the Interior Provinces.  

The missionaries begged Martínez Pacheco not to allow the Lipans to settle in the missions. To do so would lead to their destruction, because these religious outposts were already stretched to the breaking point. The Lipans would not accept the mission neophytes and they, in turn, would not accept the Lipans. The Apaches should instead be settled in a new mission created specifically for them. The governor boasted that he was accomplishing what no one before had--the settling of Lipans in missions. He argued that the main reason for the deplorable state of the missions was Lipan raiding. With the Lipans settled peacefully in them, the religious settlements would in fact prosper.  

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Ugarte's greatest fear was that the presence of Lipans at San Antonio might anger the Comanches to the point that they would break the fragile peace established by Cabello. He argued that if the Lipans were earnest in their desire for peace, they should be sent to Coahuila where the Comanches rarely traveled, and where they could be afforded the same amenities as they would receive at San Antonio."

The governor defended his actions, pointing out that he had thirty years experience in dealing with the Lipans and fifteen years of experience with the Comanches. Earlier in his career he had befriended a Lipan chief whose son was now a prominent chief among his people. While serving as presidial commander, he had been invited to a Lipan camp but then governor Ripperdá had refused to grant him permission to make the journey. Had he made that trip, he asserted, the Lipans would not have made war on the Spaniards."

Martínez Pacheco began distributing gifts to Lipans who visited the presidio. When Ugalde returned from his campaign in the Big Bend region in the summer of 1787, he was appalled at the governor's actions. Martínez Pacheco's attempt to reconcile Lipan and Comanche animosity was, he wrote, an "ill-considered and contrary policy." His gift distribution policy went "beyond generosity," because it made the presents seem worthless in the eyes of the Lipan chiefs, primarily because they were so freely given.
Changing the policy, however, was now almost impossible, since it would no doubt anger the natives. In addition, the buying of peace through gifts would be seen as a sign of weakness, or worse, an indication of desperation by the Lipans. Ugalde concluded his diatribe with a scathing reminder that Martínez Pacheco was only an interim governor of Texas. As such, he should consider himself a success if he turned the province over to his successor in the same condition in which he received it."

Martínez Pacheco agreed that removing the Lipans to Coahuila would be a good idea but noted that it must be done at the proper time and with Lipan consent. Otherwise, the natives would simply revert to thievery. In addition, he noted that the Comanches were continuing their attacks on the Lipans. He also reported that a band of Norteños had finally located and attacked the camp of Zapato Sas, capturing more than six hundred horses."

In April 1788, Apaches settled at Santa Rosa by Ugalde rebelled, killed several soldiers who tried to restrain them, looted several ranches in the area, and then raided settlements in Coahuila before fleeing into the mountains. The revolt at Santa Rosa convinced Ugalde of the perfidiousness of the Apaches. He began preparing for an extensive campaign against them by calling on his friend Picax-Ande Ins-Tinsle to assist him. The chief agreed to
support Ugalde, but the Spaniard became suspicious when it was discovered that there were Mescaleros and stolen Spanish goods in the chief's camp."

When the rebellious chiefs began to send emissaries to request peace from Ugalde, he professed pleasure and invited the chiefs and their people to come to a conference. After the five chiefs and seventy-one of their followers arrived to discuss the terms of the peace, Ugalde had them arrested and shipped to Mexico City under heavy guard. Ugalde then prepared a campaign against the remaining Mescaleros and Lipans, setting out in August 1789."

A Spanish force of twenty soldiers from San Juan Bautista was wiped out by the Lipans, but Ugalde gained revenge in January 1790. At the Arroyo de la Soledad, Ugarte, assisted by sixty three men from San Antonio and two hundred Comanches and Nortefios, attacked a large Apache encampment. Fifty-nine Apaches were killed, including two chiefs, and eight hundred horses were recovered. Ugalde stayed on the trail for seven more months, attacking several more rancherías before he returned home only to be removed command because of his "treachery" in dealing with the Mescaleros who had sought peace."

During Ugalde's campaign, a crisis occurred at San Antonio. A party of Lipans arrived, followed in quick succession over the next several days by a group of Bidais,
Orcoquizas, and Tawakonis—all enemies of the Lipans. The last group was there to join Ugalde's campaign against the Apaches. The Lipans took note of the cordiality of their enemies toward the Spanish, and although Martínez Pacheco attempted to appease them with gifts, the Lipans left unconvinced of his friendship.\footnote{4}

On December 29, 1789, six Lipan warriors stealthily entered the governor's residence unannounced and found him in his bedroom. Surprised but calm, Martínez Pacheco explained that he was ill and offered them some tobacco as he slowly dressed. He suggested that they join him for a meal and led them into the kitchen, where he casually signaled a soldier outside to call the guard and send twelve men to the rear. The suspicious natives began moving toward the patio, but the governor urged them to stay. When the armed guards burst into the room and the governor ordered that the uninvited guests be bound, the Lipans drew knives that had been concealed beneath their clothing and attempted to fight their way to freedom. Five of the natives were killed in the struggle. The sixth was overpowered, removed to the patio, and executed.\footnote{5}

Martínez Pacheco assured the viceroy that the Indians had come to assassinate him and spy on the Spanish. He had killed them all to prevent them from warning their kinsmen. In doing so, he assured that Ugalde's campaign would take
the enemy by surprise." This incident led to the removal of Martínez Pacheco from the governorship and cast doubt upon the veracity of his claims. Ostensibly, Viceroy Revilla Gigedo removed him for killing five "friendly" Lipans in his own home."

Martínez Pacheco's own version casts doubts on the true motives of the Lipans. If they planned to assassinate the governor why would they have allowed him to get dressed and leave his bedroom? The "concealed" knives, which appear so sinister in Martínez Pacheco's version, were a normal part of native armament. The fact that one of the natives grabbed the governor during the struggle is explainable as human instinct. Finally, it is extremely suspicious that even though one of the natives survived the fight and was overpowered and helpless, he was dispatched without interrogation. Accordingly, there is much that is suspicious about this "assassination" attempt.

In any case, Martínez Pacheco was replaced during the following summer by an aging veteran, Manuel Muñoz. Muñoz, because of age and illness, was virtually unable to deal with the Indian situation. He introduced a thirty-seven point policy dealing with the Apaches, but during his term of office depredations increased virtually unchecked, although no wars occurred. Yet, an overall peace existed between the Lipans and the Spaniards at San Antonio.
In an interesting case, a pair of cowboys were publicly punished for jeopardizing the peace. The two men had assisted Tonkawas to steal forty horses from the Lipans. The Lipans caught the men and took them before Muñoz, demanding that they be punished. To make an example of the men, the governor sentenced each of them to receive one hundred lashes on the plaza. This permitted the greatest number of Lipans to view the punishment. The fact that the two men were not murdered by the Lipans demonstrates the peaceful atmosphere at this time.\(^5\)

On the other hand, just as the change of governor was taking place, a band of Lipans raided Laredo. They managed to capture the powder house and magazine, leaving the defenders short of ammunition. The Apaches eventually ransacked several ranches in the area and terrorized the town itself before departing with as much livestock as they could round up.\(^6\)

There had been some hope at this juncture that the Lipans might be enticed to enter the missions. Although some missionaries blamed Lipan raids for the rapidly failing missions, others thought that the Lipans, tiring of war, would happily accept settled life. In fact, a handful of Lipans did settle at Mission San Antonio de Valero. When it was time to suppress the mission and relocate the Lipans, Chief Mariano refused, claiming that he had always lived at
the mission and that many of his relatives were buried there. Seventeen of his followers echoed the chief's sentiments."

By 1795 the Lipans were still a force to be reckoned with. There were an estimated 520 well-armed, well-mounted warriors living along the Nueces River and margins of the Colorado. From this and other strongholds they alternately raided or assisted the Spanish. Early in that year, a band of Lipans chased down six Comanches who had stolen horses from a mission on the Río Grande. They surprised the raiders, recovered the horses, and returned them to their owners.

Between 1796 and 1804, three major reports were written concerning the Apache Indians. Combined, they give a good indication of the state of the Apache nation at the turn of the century. The Lipans were considered the largest of the Apache bands and, in general terms, the most peaceful. They, during this time, were considered to be acting in good faith toward the Spanish. The Mescaleros occupied the region of the mountains near the Pecos River. Although they had been at peace with the Spanish, they rarely kept at it long and used the Bolsón de Mapimí as a gateway for their raids into Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya. They could only muster approximately three hundred warriors, having suffered heavy
losses from Comanche attacks and from numerous Spanish campaigns launched against them.

The Llaneros occupied the plains between the Pecos and the Colorado Rivers. They are made up of three divisions—the Natagés, the Lipiyanes, and the Llaneros proper. They held the Comanches in check and only infrequently attacked Spanish settlements, usually in the company of Mescaleros or Faraones. As of 1804, the Faraones were still quite numerous and inhabited the mountains between the Río Grande and the Pecos. They, like the Mescaleros, had sought and been granted peace numerous times, only to treacherously break it. Their raids centered on New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya. A handful of Faraone rancherías had faithfully kept the peace and were allowed to settle at Presidio San Eleazarío, approximately sixty miles south of El Paso.\textsuperscript{79}

During the early nineteenth century, European matters and internal turmoil took precedence over Indian policy. As a result, the Lipans and other Apaches had substantial freedom to raid, free from Spanish interference. One notable change in policy did, however, occur during this time. In a substantial reversal, Governor Antonio Cordero y Bustamante believed that all natives in the province could be useful if peace could be established. He worked toward the one thing the Spaniards had dreaded for a century, a Lipan-Comanche accord.\textsuperscript{80}
In 1807 Governor Cordero held a council in San Antonio and invited Lipans, Comanches, and Tawakonis. Each tribe acknowledged the hostility of the past and promised to work together to keep the peace. Each agreed to an allotment of land to confine their horse herds and to hunt buffalo, thus eliminating competition, which had been the root of most of the warfare. The peace lasted only two years before competition for horses caused bitter rivalries to reemerge. In 1816 the Comanches and Lipans reestablished their cooperative relationship to raid jointly Spanish settlements.81

In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1810), the Lipans played small but sometimes pivotal roles. The first Anglo-Americans who arrived in Texas, usually accompanying filibusters, found the Lipans friendly and cooperative. One Anglo-American described the Lipans as "shrewd," "remarkably honest," and "warmly attached to the Americans." During the Gutiérrez-Magee revolt, the Lipans supplied the rebels with buckskins, moccasins, provisions, and even offered their services. On the march to San Antonio, the rebels recruited an unspecified number of Lipans who performed well in the battle of Rosillo.82

Governor Antonio María Martínez, the last Spanish governor of Texas, noted numerous depredations during his term in office. In 1817 a party of sixteen Spaniards were
attacked by Lipans while trying to round up mustangs. In July of that year, two soldiers were murdered while carrying the mail between San Antonio and La Bahía. The governor complained that he had inadequate troops to make the frequent sallies necessary to subdue the natives. In 1819 bold Lipans attacked the horseherd at the capital, killing five soldiers in the process."

In 1820 the Ayuntamiento of San Fernando de Béxar met to discuss the Indian problem. It would be one of the last actions taken under the Spanish regime. The councilmen recommended waging a well-organized campaign against both the Lipans and Comanches. It should be followed by other military outings until the Indians were forced to "an enviable and lasting peace." If possible, the expedition should be entrusted "to officials hardened to an active life, familiar with the country, and experienced in the methods of making war against this kind of enemy.""

This period ended as it began, with a policy of potential extermination aimed at the Lipans. The new approach would fare no better than the original. In fact, the Mexican government would abandon it for a policy of negotiated peace, which was also unsuccessful. Texas and the United States would finally try to subdue the wily Apaches, but there would still be Apaches riding freely across the plains until the 1870s. Above all other things, the Apaches
were survivors. They adapted readily to changing situations, seeking peace when that was the most convenient path, but waging unrelenting war when that seemed the best policy. At times the Apaches had to give up their freedom temporarily in order to survive, but as soon as they had recovered their strength, they threw off the shackles of a settled life to return to the nomadic life to which they were so notably suited.
NOTES


6. Fray Pedro Ramírez to Manuel de la Piscina (June 6, 1762) BATM, Reel 5.


350
14. Ibid., 139-140.
17. Ibid., 243.
18. Bobb, Viceregency, 140-141.


31.For a biographical sketch of Cabello, see Chipman and Joseph, *Notable Men and Women*, 202-225.

32.Cabello to Croix (March 18, 1779), BAT, Reel 10.

33.Cabello to Croix (May 14, 1779), BAT Reel 10.


35.Croix to Cabello (August 16, 1779) BAT, Reel 11; Cabello to Croix (August 19, 1779) BAT, Reel 11.

36.Cabello to Croix (September 3, 1779) BAT, reel 11.
37. Ibid.

38. Cabello to Croix (October 19, 1779), BAT, Reel 11; Cabello to Croix (November 2, 1779) BAT, Reel 11.

39. Cabello to Croix (November 2, 1779) BAT, Reel 11.

40. Cabello to Croix (August 17, 1780) BAT, reel 12.

41. Cabello to Croix (October 20, 1780) BAT, Reel 12; Cabello to Croix (November 20, 1780) BAT, Reel 13; Cabello to Croix (December 6, 1780) BAT, Reel 13.


45. "Strength Report and Daily occurrences at San Antonio de Béxar," (April 1783) BAT, Reel 14; "Strength Report," (February 1784) BAT, Reel 14; "Strength Report," (January 1784) BAT, Reel 14; Cabello to Philipe de Neve (August 16, 1784) BAT, Reel 15.

47. Cabello to Rengel (November 25, 1785) BAT, Reel 16.

48. Rengel to Tueros (October 11, 1785) BAT, Reel 15; Cabello to Rengel (September 19, 1785) BAT, Reel 15.

49. Cabello to Rengel (April 18, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (June 12, 1786) BAT, Reel 16.

50. "Report" (June 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (July 2, 1786) BAT, Reel 16.

51. Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (July 3, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Ugarte y Loyola to Cabello (July 20, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (August 28, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (July 30, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (September 11, 1786) BAT, Reel 16; Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (September 25, 1786) BAT, Reel 16.

52. Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola (September 25, 1786) BAT, Reel 16.


54. Ibid., 40-47.

55. Ibid., 47-49. See also Elizabeth A. H. John, "A


58. Nelson, "Campaigning," 202-203; Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 206-210. Moorhead discounts Ugalde's claim that the Mescaleros were seeking peace to avoid his wrath, arguing that they did not know of his presence until after they began seeking peace. He does not take into account, however, the possible influence of the earlier campaign by the governor of Coahuila.


60. Ibid., 216-227.


62. Ugarte y Loyola to Martínez Pacheco (February 1, 1787) BAT, Reel 17.

63. Oliva to Martínez Pacheco (February 11, 1787) BAT, Reel 17; Pacheco to Oliva (February 14, 1787) BAT, Reel 17.

64. Ugarte y Loyola to Martínez Pacheco (February 1, 1787) BAT, Reel 17.
65. Martínez Pacheco to Ugarte y Loyola (March 10, 1787) BAT, Reel 17.

66. Ugalde to Martínez Pacheco (August 23, 1787) BAT, Reel 17.

67. Martínez Pacheco to Ugarte y Loyola (October 12, 1787) BAT, Reel 17; Martínez Pacheco to Ugalde (December 24, 1787) BAT, Reel 17; Martínez Pacheco to Ugalde (February 3, 1788) BAT, Reel 18.

68. Starnes, "Juan de Ugalde," 91-94.

69. Ibid., 94-95.

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CONCLUSIONS

The Apaches are among the best known yet least understood American Indians. The so-called Plains Apaches, those who inhabited the Great Plains and its periphery have suffered from a notable lack of scholarly studies. Most works on the Apaches deal with the Western Apaches and their last days of glory under such notable leaders as Victorio, Cochise, and Geronimo. Much less known are the Apaches who survived almost as long on the plains and deserts of Texas, eastern New Mexico, and northern Mexico. These plains Apaches were, more than anything else, survivors. They adapted to changes in their environment to retain their freedom longer than their kinsmen, despite the fact that they suffered more organized effort against them.

The Apaches attempted a number of adaptations during the Spanish period. From the time of their first contact with Spaniards of Coronado's expedition until the first Spanish settlements in New Mexico in 1609-1610, the Apaches were a peaceful nomadic tribe. Like all Native Americans, they alternated between raiding their neighbors and trading with them. Warfare was very limited, usually carried out to gain status (successful warriors were honored among the Apaches), to avenge deaths caused by enemy tribes (once the
status quo was achieved, wars usually terminated), or to gain items unavailable through trade (since all tribes were at the same technological level, such raids usually coincided with shortages, such as during times of drought, when tribes who usually had a surplus of corn to trade refused to trade in order to supply their own needs).

The settlement of the Spanish in New Mexico upset the natural balance of things. These Europeans brought with them new technologies and trade items: guns, steel knives, iron arrowheads, pots and pans, etc., and, perhaps most importantly, the horse. The natives could not produce or supply these items and so became dependent on outside sources. The Apaches found themselves to be in an ideal position to control access to these new luxuries. Santa Fe was founded almost in the center of the Apache homeland. Thus, with easier access to European goods and horses, the Apache could and did use their new-found power to dominate their neighbors.

From 1609 to 1692, the Apaches emerged as the dominant nation in the Southwest. Western Apaches generally raided the Spanish and Pueblos for desired items, although at times they would travel onto the plains. They were unable to establish a profitable trade relationship with the Spanish/Pueblo society, because they had no goods to barter except their meager items acquired on the plains. The
eastern, plains Apaches, on the other hand, had easy access to buffalo, which alone contributed numerous trade items such as meat, hides, and tallow. Shortly after the Spanish arrived, the Apaches had their first experience with slave raids. They quickly learned that to avoid such attacks they must supply the Spanish with alternative sources of slaves. With the acquisition of the horse, the Apaches on the plains were able to raid their neighbors, defeat them, and bring in large numbers of captives for a profitable trade. The horse also brought them into contact with natives from more distant tribes.

The Pueblo Revolt of 1680 increased the number of horses available to the Apaches, further strengthening their position. When the Spanish returned to New Mexico in 1692 and began to expand their control of the area by establishing garrisons and settlement, the plains Apaches welcomed them as new sources of trade. The period of 1692-1704 was the height of eastern Apache power. During this period, the plains Apaches controlled an area encompassing Nebraska to the north, eastern Kansas and Oklahoma to the east, southern Texas to the south, and the Río Grande in the west. The Apaches truly were "Lords of the Southern Plains."

Western Apaches, on the other hand, observed the return of the Spanish to New Mexico with dread and foreboding. To them an increased Spanish presence meant a lessening of
opportunity to reach the plains. Without items to trade or a source of slaves, the western Apaches had to depend upon raiding Spanish settlements to get the products they desired.

The period from 1704-1727 was a turning point for the eastern Apaches. New forces appeared on their borders with increasing frequency. To the east, the French supplied guns to tribes who were enemies of the Apaches. These musket-armed natives quickly turned the tide of Apache expansion. Instead, large numbers of Apache prisoners were soon on their way to be sold as slaves to the French. To the north, the Comanches and Utes began their unstoppable march onto the plains, shoving the Apaches southward or into mountains west of the plains.

The growing presence of the Spanish in New Mexico drove a wedge between eastern and western Apaches and kept the plains Apaches from accessing a much-needed supply of manpower. The inability of the plains Apaches to provide adequate numbers of slaves to the Spanish increased tensions between the two peoples. Seeing power slowly slipping from their grasp, the more northern plains Apaches increasingly sought protection rather than trade from the Spanish.

Only the Faroones were able to maintain a travel corridor across the Río Grande between El Paso and Albuquerque. These Apaches, along with the Lipans,
Mescaleros, Natagés, and the later Llaneros, were able to maintain their dominance for a longer period, because of their more insulated position. The southern plains Apaches were separated from the French and their musket-armed native allies by the Spanish in Texas. The Comanches were blocked, at least temporarily, by the more northern Apache tribes.

The southern Apaches did not have the cordial relationship with the Spaniards in Texas that their northern kin had with the Spanish in New Mexico. This was partly because the first meetings between Spaniards and Apaches in Texas involved friction over Spanish aid to the Tejas Indians, who were bitter enemies of the Apaches. When San Antonio was established, the Apaches raided it, because they did not need a trade outlet there, since goods were available at Pecos.

By 1749, however, even the Lipans were feeling the pressure from the Comanches and were ready to seek peace. The Apache peace with San Antonio lasted, almost without break, until 1768. The peace did not, however, extend to other Apache groups or to other Spanish settlements. The Mescaleros and Natagés continued to cause problems in the vicinity of El Paso and into the provinces of northern Mexico. Likewise, Lipans committed depredations at La Bahía and San Juan Bautista, which they considered separate entities from San Antonio and therefore fair game. The
Lipans generally did not harass San Sabá or the El Cañón areas because of their direct link to San Antonio.

By the time of the Marqués de Rubí's inspection of 1767-1768, peace at San Antonio was being strained. Most Spaniards did not distinguish between elements of the Apache tribes, rather they considered all Apaches the same. Accordingly, when Mescalero Apaches raided San Juan Bautista, the Spanish demanded that "Apaches" be punished. If the victims of the punishment happened to be Lipans or some other innocent group, the distinction was lost on the Spaniards.

Thus, when Rubí noted the large amount of damage caused by Apaches during his trip, he, like most officials, failed to distinguish the perpetrators from the more peaceful Lipans. Instead, Rubí recommended a policy aimed at crushing all Apaches' capacity to wage war. That objective remained the goal of Spanish Apache Indian policy throughout the remaining years of their empire in North America.

During this final period, Spanish-Apache relations were confused by a number of factors. Changing internal arrangements of the Internal Provinces caused crises of leadership for the Spanish. Often times governors, presidial captains, commandant generals, and viceroy's had different solutions to the Apache problem, and often times enacted them without proper authority. This led the Apaches to view
the Spanish policy as vacillating and caused them to become reluctant to make any agreements. As the Mexican Revolution for independence approached, the Spanish had even less time to deal with Indian problems. As a result, the Apaches were able to gain a respite and were even able, with at least some Spanish help, to establish a temporary alliance with their hated enemies, the Comanches.

Through it all, the Apaches were able to adapt to new situations to keep themselves alive, sometimes temporarily sacrificing their freedoms to do so. But no other tribe than the Apaches can claim to have suffered a longer, more determined effort to crush them into submission. Again, despite it all, the eastern Apaches were survivors.
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