SIKH TERRORISM IN INDIA 1984-1990

A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Karandeep Singh M.A., M.Phil.
Denton, Texas
August, 1991
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By a quantitative case study of the Sikhs of Punjab this dissertation attempts to understand the social, historical and political processes that lead to group terrorism. It is argued that group terrorism is a response, primarily of the weak, to structural injustice and structural violence. Regime attempts to address such grievances, coupled with modest amounts of repression, leads to a decline in the incidence of terrorism. The latter point has greater validity in the initial stage of terrorist movements, when conflicting political attitudes have not hardened beyond a point of no return.

Terrorism is best regarded "as politics pursued by other means," and terrorist groups bring to their actions their own sense of purpose and legitimacy. The latter is more than often masked by their gruesome deeds, thereby preventing layman and scholar alike from a proper appreciation of the basic factors underlying this phenomenon. By highlighting the drama associated with terrorist events, the media have their own contribution to
make towards this process.

In recent times, religion has become a powerful force in giving legitimacy to terrorist actions. The present work considers this highly salient fact, as well as stresses the necessity to consider the historical and social contexts and group power resources in any meaningful analysis of violent protest movements. Quantitative rigor is combined with a sensitivity to context.

Terrorism is operationalized by taking a time-based count of terrorist killings of innocent people. Regime acts of omission and commission are coded as time series interventions. The analysis also includes a continuous variable measuring the incidence of economic distress in Punjab. A case is also made for the superiority of Box-Jenkins time series techniques for the quantitative analysis of problems of this nature.
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I am grateful to Profs. Clarke and Booth for their encouragement and help. My father, Balwant Singh Kumar, contributed towards the completion of this project in more ways than I can even think of. Hardev Singh Chauhan helped with data collection. And finally my wife, Balraj, by her patience and help made it all possible. To all these individuals I express my sincere gratitude.

Karandeep Singh
Blood and destruction shall be so in use,
And dreadful objects so familiar,
That mothers shall but smile when they behold
Their infants quartered with the hand of war,
All pity chok'd with custom of fell deeds;

William Shakespeare,
*Julius Caesar* Act III, Sc I
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Systematic and rigorous study of the phenomenon of terrorism, though not terrorism itself, is of relatively recent origin and only over the last two decades or so have efforts been made to demarcate terrorism from other forms of political violence and conflict, as for instance riots, civil wars, rebellions, revolutions etc, and to treat it as some form of an interdisciplinary sub-field all by itself (Alexander and Gleason 1981:xix; Miller 1988:63). The culmination of such efforts has been the founding, in 1977, of an inter-disciplinary journal devoted exclusively to the subject - Terrorism: An International Journal.

Terrorism has existed for ages, though the present times with rapid developments in public information access through the media, and the technological revolution which enables a large number of people to be affected by terrorism, have given a "heightened salience" to it (Norton and Greenberg 1980:2, Clark 1980). Hacker and Rubin elaborate upon the views of Norton and Greenberg. For the former (Hacker 1976:IX), the fact that modern weapons have become more
destructive, easier to conceal and obtain, has given tremendous leverage to terrorist groups. Rubin (1970:108) stresses that modern means of communication and transport enable terrorists to have a high degree of coordination of their activities. The mass media also have their own contribution to make. By their extensive coverage of terrorist events\(^1\), they ensure that terrorist actions are made known to the entire world. In so far as terrorism wants to inspire a wider audience with fear as a result of its actions, the media therefore are perhaps unwittingly playing into the hands of the terrorists (Alexander 1984:135-50, Podhoretz 1981, Cohen 1983, Bell 1978, Cooper 1977:140-56). Summing it all up, Alexander, Carlton and Wilkinson (1979:X) write:

It is also possible that in the future, terrorist groups will have access to biological, chemical, and nuclear instruments that have the potential to kill large numbers of people. An entire city's water supply can be poisoned with lethal chemicals. Nerve agents can cause hundred of thousands of fatalities. A single incident involving biological agents, both toxins and living organisms, or nuclear bombs would obviously produce many casualties and mass destruction. Thus, the advances of science and technology are slowly turning the entire modern society into a potential victim of terrorism; there is no immunity for the noncombatant segment of the world population or for those nations and peoples who have no direct connection to particular conflicts or to specific grievances that motivate acts of violence.

\(^{1}\)Done at least in part because the sensation and drama associated with terrorist incidents attracts the attention of people and hence "sells."
While the revolution in communications and transport give the terrorist the aforementioned advantage in the contemporary era, by the same token he also has a disadvantage in that his gruesome deeds against political innocents can be well publicized by the regime whose structural injustice or structural violence he opposes. This in turn serves to deflect mass opinion away from the grievances that have led to terrorism in the first place. Thus an attack at the root of the problem may not be possible, especially if the regime in question is in no mood to relent. In short, the terrorist by his actions is not only losing support amongst some sections of the regime that he is opposing, but is perhaps also helping the regime solidify its domestic support for the political line it is adopting vis-a-vis their demands. This argument finds support in the works of Weimann (1983), Kelly and Thomas (1981) and Martin (1985). Also, Schmid and Graaf (1982) suggest that since in the main the view of a news story is colored by its source, and because most of the time the major source for the media on such matters is the government, the dice thus is already loaded against the cause of the terrorists.

The advancement in technology and its contribution to the growth in terrorism is by no means accepted by all scholars pursuing this line of research. Thus for Rapoport, terrorism in the past had been equally destructive as today,
had international connections and in organizational terms was not inferior to present terrorist groups. A study of terrorist activities of the ancient past hence "can provide materials for useful comparisons" (Rapoport 1984:659). In a detailed analysis of three ancient terrorist groups, the Thugs, Assassins and the Zealots-Sicarii, Rapoport writes:

The cases are inherently interesting and peculiarly instructive. Each group was much more durable and much more destructive than any modern one has been; operating on an international stage, they had great social effects too. Yet the noose, the dagger, and the sword were the principal means they employed, travel was by horse or foot, and the most effective means of communication was by word of mouth. Although a relatively simple and common technology prevailed, each example displayed strikingly different characteristics. The critical variable, therefore, cannot be technology: rather, the purpose and organization of particular groups and the vulnerabilities of particular societies to them are decisive factors. Although the point may be more easily seen in these cases, it must be relevant, I shall argue, in our world too (Rapoport 1984:659).

The importance of the study of terrorism cannot be over-emphasized. In his introduction to the theme issue on the world wide chronology of terrorism for the year 1981 of Terrorism: An International Journal, Ray S. Cline remarks, "It is clear that the 1980s is likely to be an age of deliberate employment of violence and threats of violence for political ends on an unprecedented scale. The trend can only be altered by greater awareness of what we are seeing and of what is at stake" (Cline 1982:xi). The gravity of the problem has by no means declined as we enter the nineties and is further illustrated by the title given to one of the articles in the 1988 issue of this journal -
"Fighting World War III: A Suggested Strategy" (Cauley and Sandler 1988:181). The present developments in Iraq, with the level of precautions that are being taken by the allies in their own countries and with regard to their citizens and institutions abroad, anticipating terrorist backlash from Iraqi and Islamic fundamentalist groups, illustrates very well the modern day problem of terrorism. Contemporary terrorism hence undoubtedly poses a grave threat to the welfare of mankind, and it is with us to stay at least for a reasonably predictable future, and this, more than anything else, calls for urgent efforts to understand and study it.

Compared to the importance of the subject, what is the state of academic and scientific advance in the field of terrorism? Rather pathetic! One scholar (Bell 1977) argues that most of the scholarly work on terrorism is unsystematic, lacks coordination, and is not grounded in empirical reality. In another piece Bell states that "Terrorism has as a by product produced a vast cottage industry of self-declared analysts and specialists, who with not very visible qualifications have yet to produce a common wisdom" (Bell 1980:201). Indeed these seem to be the observations of a predominant majority of scholars engaged in the study of terrorism (Miller 1988:85-87; Evans 1981:302; Saper 1988:13). The best statement of the problem is indeed made by the editor of "Terrorism: An International Journal." Reviewing the progress made after
nearly a decade of the founding of the journal, Yonah
Alexander writes, "In the Fall of 1977 we published the
first issue of Terrorism: An International Journal. Now,
ten years later, there is still no consensus on the
questions we had posed then: 'What acts constitute
terrorism? What are the underlying causes of the phenomenon?
How can and should we deal with it?'" (Alexander 1987:i).
Alexander goes on to mention the urgent need for a greater
understanding of the problem of terrorism in the interest of
the very survival of our society.

Defining Terrorism: The "Politics" of Terrorism

Any embarrassment over definitional wrangles should be
short lived, however, especially in the social sciences. It
often is the case that the definition of concepts
fundamental to research and theory is endlessly disputed,
but this does not seem to impede continuing research or even
the development of theory" (Greene 1974:7)

For it was a witty and a truthful rejoinder which was
given by a captured pirate to Alexander the Great. The King
asked the fellow, "What is your idea, in infesting the sea?"
And the pirate answered, with uninhibited insolence, "The
same as yours, in infesting the earth! But because I do it
with a tiny craft, I'm called a pirate: because you have a
mighty navy, you're called an Emperor" (St. Augustine, City
of God, Book IV, Chapter 5).

Terrorism, like more conventional warfare, can be
understood as politics pursued by other means (Maranto
1987:11).

In social science literature, any scholarly attempt to
define a concept, begins, in a ritual fashion, by asserting
its value laden nature, and the consequent difficulties of definition (Jenkins 1981; Fattah 1981). The concept of "modernization" is a good example. What is modernization to a vast majority of allegedly value neutral scholarship is capitalist growth to another group of scholars. The concept thereby serves to hide, it is argued by this group, the essence of class relations and class exploitation, and hence has a value bias. As social scientists we have to live with this problem. In fact recent debates have focused on the possibility and even the desirability of definitions that are allegedly value neutral. Provizer clearly is in the latter category when he states, "the debate over definition (of terrorism) is less significant than the debate over the propriety of the action, that is its morality. Opponents and defenders of pornography do not really disagree over what constitutes the phenomenon. Instead, the debate really centers on its acceptability under given sets of circumstances" (Provizer 1987:8). Jenkins stresses that the term "terrorism" is not only "politically loaded," but that it is also "slippery," "fast moving," and "is a loose label applied to political extremists, common criminals, and authentic lunatics" (Jenkins 1981:10). White likewise states that "terrorism is difficult to study objectively, because it evokes deep-seated political emotions (White 1991:xi).
The term terrorism has had different meanings depending on the times. It came into vogue in the 18th century to refer primarily "to violent acts of governments designed to ensure popular submission" (Chomsky 1986:1-2). Over a period of time it was understood as referring exclusively to individual or group acts of violence directed against state authorities. The definition adopted at the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937 is a good illustration of the latter usage of the term. It defined terrorism as "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public" (Fattah 1981:12).

Any serious study of terrorism has to bear in mind that the above two sources of terrorism are analytically distinct, though often related. For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the term 'regime terrorism' or 'state terrorism' to refer to state actions that are designed to terrorize minorities and/or other people and groups residing within state boundaries, and 'insurgent terrorism' or 'group terrorism' to label terrorist actions by groups that are protesting state policies. However, when the context is clear, these distinctions may not be made.

Much of the contemporary literature on domestic terrorism considers only the phenomenon of insurgent
terrorism. Vetter and Perlstein suggest that the dramatic events associated with insurgent terrorism make this form of terrorism more "newsworthy." The disparity in media coverage prompts more scholars to concentrate their efforts only on group terrorism. In their words:

The disparity in media coverage of the two categories of politically motivated violence has produced a popular and professional literature on terrorism that is top-heavy with material on what one author designated as agitational terrorism, at the expense of detailed descriptions of enforcement terrorism (Vetter and Perlstein 1991:4).

In so far as the primary focus by scholarship on the study of insurgent terrorism implies its study without considering the integral connection of insurgent terrorism and state policies, this seems to be a false start toward any comprehensive understanding of the overall phenomenon of terrorism. Group terrorism ought to be understood as a response to state policy, and if applicable to the situation, also as a response to state terrorism. It is a weapon of the weak, whether at the domestic or the international level (Hamilton 1981:229; Gleason 1981:243; Norton and Greenberg 1980:2). The latter aspects of terrorism are as important today as the former. For our purposes, in this dissertation, insurgent terrorism as evidenced internally within a state is considered in its relationship to domestic policy. With regard to the League of Nations definition, Fattah rightly states:

It defines as terrorist "all criminal acts directed against a state" but leaves out violent and repressive actions of
"duly constituted" governments. As it stands, it does not apply to atrocities committed by certain political regimes in violation of the Geneva Convention, such as the killing of civilians or the torture of prisoners. Nor does it apply to the orchestrated efforts of some governments aimed at intimidating and subjugating minority groups, the members of a particular political party or religious faith, the inhabitants of occupied territories, etc. Even acts of genocide would hardly qualify as terrorist acts under this definition.

More often than not, studies of insurgent terrorism not only consider terrorism independently of state policies, but also ignore the conditions and circumstances that have generated it. Many a time, and in a large measure, these are created by those very regimes that are plagued by terrorism. It is a major purpose of this dissertation to address these deficiencies in the study of terrorism by looking at manifestations of terrorism in their context and in their integral connection with state policy.

It needs therefore to be understood that insurgent terrorism, despite all the abhorrence attached to its name, is nevertheless guided by a sense of legitimacy and perceived injustice, and like any other form of collective political action is a form of protest\(^2\). As a scholar

\(^2\) It need be mentioned that our concerns as political scientists are with the terrorism of the seriously and structurally aggrieved groups and not with the terrorism of the mentally unstable, though it must also be borne in mind that a lot of literature, especially that on the psychology of terrorism, categorizes political terrorists also as mentally deranged. Thus Hacker (1976) suggests three kinds of terrorists - crusaders, criminals and crazies. He goes on to mention that these are not mutually exclusive categories, and in fact there is a considerable overlap among these categories. Rubenstein disagrees however: "I have maintained --- that most terrorists
states: "every person who engages in violent activity must ultimately be able to justify that violence. This is applicable to police officers and soldiers as well as terrorists" (White 1991:117). The government in this scenario is an actor like any of the other groups in the society that are seeking relief from it. The fact that government may or may not have the majority of the people behind it does not imply that it does not play the game of power in a ruthless fashion or that its actions, at various points in time, have greater sanctity than the groups protesting its policies. In short it takes two or more players to play a game. Terrorism needs to be understood as a dialectic of struggle between power contenders, the existing government being one of them. Undoubtedly the innocent are the victims of terrorism (both in its state and group manifestations), but these victims communicate a message from one participant to the other, and to wider intended audiences.

Much of the contemporary literature on terrorism, as the following literature review will show, does not take this dual nature of the phenomenon into consideration, and talks mainly of group terrorism directed against the power holders (McCamant 1984:11). This is a little surprising for

are not insane fanatics, career criminals, or government hirelings, but normal people driven to extremes by their situation and by mistaken political conceptions (Rubenstein 1987:228).
according to one scholar, though "terrorism is sometimes a tool for revolutionaries and nationalists, ... [it] is most frequently used by government to maintain power" (White 1991:x). The sole focus on group terrorism in the definition of terrorism, by its bias, objectively helps the power holders in their political struggle, and therefore lacks value neutrality. As Slann writes

various social sciences have sought to identify and characterize the psychology, ideology, and goals of political movements using terrorist activities. Usually, those activities seek to undermine and discredit a society's governing process by making millions of individuals aware that, even as political innocents, they are vulnerable to violence. What is often unclear or overlooked is that the government itself may be utilizing violence, at least partially to achieve its goals (Slann 1987:39).

A good illustration is provided by Saper (1988:24): "A distinction is made here between the terrorism of the revolutionary or rebellious directed upward against an institutionalized authority or stronger adversary and the terrorism of political regimes whose governance is directed downward against its people. I deal chiefly with the former type of terrorism, although governments frequently sponsor

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Some scholars (Hacker 1976) define "terror" as fear inspired by the state and "terrorism" as fear emanating from the actions of the weak. A typical example of modern day usage of the eighteenth century meaning of the term terror is provided by Arendt. She writes, "terror is not the same as violence; it is rather, the form of government that comes into being when violence having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control" (Norton and Greenberg 1980:2).
and train terrorist bands" (Saper 1988:24). It is submitted that the one type of terrorism cannot be understood or analyzed without taking the other into consideration. Moreover, the scant literature which does take into consideration aspects of power struggle between power holders and contenders for power lacks empirical backing (Fromkin 1975; Pierre 1976; Hacker 1976; Thornton 1974).

Friedlander illustrates well the problems associated with the sole focus by scholars on group terrorism; he calls terrorism "the slaughter of the innocent" and wants it to be branded as a criminal activity. He further goes on to say that "To say that randomized terror-violence utilized as a politico-legal strategy for ostensible revolutionary ends can be condoned and even encouraged, simply because there is no peaceful or legitimate remedy for redress, is to replace the rule of law with the ancient credo of might makes right" (Norton and Greenberg 1980:18-19). Friedlander takes a one-sided and moralistic approach that seems to overlook that there exist situations characterized by structural violence and structural injustice, and under certain historical and cultural circumstances, the violence of terrorism may be both a natural response to such situations and an effective and necessary tactic against such injustice.

Without getting into too much conceptual hair splitting, I define terrorism, following Mickolus and Heyman, as "the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extra-normal
violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims" (Mickolus and Heyman 1981:153).

The fact that a wider audience is being inspired with fear via the involvement of political innocents is a conceptual demarcation point of terrorism from political violence, and the "heightened salience" of terrorism in the contemporary epoch, mentioned earlier, is precisely because modern day scientific developments, such as air travel and nuclear plants, enable much wider "target groups" to be affected by terrorist actions.

It may well be that state policies generate group terrorism and the latter in turn lead to state terrorism or vice versa. The point is that the two should not be studied independently of each other. Anti-regime group terrorism voices some political demands against power holders. How can this form of terrorism be studied without understanding the dynamic of policy making and the power interests of the power holders? As a scholar puts it "An adequate definition of terrorism .. should apply to the actions of the governors as well as those of the governed, to the crimes of the rulers as well as those of the ruled" (Fattah 1981: 13).
A Framework for Analysis

In terms of Skocpol's generic classification of four families of social scientific theories of revolution and political violence, my approach can be categorized as a political-conflict model, identified by her, in a representative fashion, with the work of Charles Tilly (Skocpol 1977:9), and which stresses that the "conflict among governments and various organized groups contending for power must be placed at the center of attention to explain collective violence and revolutions" (Skocpol 1977:9). I employ a specifically "political model" to comprehend the problem of Sikh resurgence and terrorism in Punjab, based on the works of Aya (1979), Tilly and Tilly (1981), and Moore (1966,1978). In doing so, an attempt is made to correct a perceived gap in the available literature on the subject - religious resurgence and violence, so far, has not been analyzed keeping in mind the centrality of power and power conflicts in society.

Religious resurgence movements are one of the many "repertoires of collective action" available to groups to protest against grievances that they perceive to be justified. Collective action here is defined as action "when sets of people commit pooled resources, including their own, to common ends" (Tilly and Tilly, 1981:17). Such movements are one of the many forms of political
conflicts in society over resources and public policy. And in the case of religious terrorism for instance, howsoever gruesome and abhorrent some of the acts of the aggrieved groups in the drama might appear to the ordinary person, they are nevertheless guided by a sense of legitimacy and perceived injustice.

One must begin with the birth of grievances of specific groups and classes, for little analytical advantage accrues from a study of generalized frustration. This, however, is not enough. In the absence of political action of whatever sort, a mere catalogue of grievances may not be of any interest to the social scientist, indeed, may not even draw his attention (Kriesberg 1982:66-106). One must also focus on the "pathways from arousal to action" (Aya, 1979:75). In the case of the protestors, for example, the analyst must go beyond their grievances to the amount of power resources that the aggrieved groups may have. Power resources can include ideology, economic and social status, culture, and organizational strength.

Socialization levels which these variables measure indicate the level at which perceived injustice is reacted to, and also determine the nature and form of this reaction. Careful observation often reveals that it may not be the

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4In this therefore the present dissertation owes to the work of Moore and other scholars in that line of thinking (Tilly, 1981:15).
really deserving that are able to fight and win or lose political battles but those who already have a significant status in society (Wolf, 1969:289-91). One must also consider the space in the political structure that is available for the protest movement. A state structure weakened by serious internal conflict within the ruling class or by international military or economic pressure (Skocpol, 1977:19-24) can provide significant political space to the aggrieved groups and classes to make their voices heard in an effective manner.

The response of power holders to political protest is another factor very often neglected in social research (Skocpol 1977, Walton 1984). On this point, the Tillys mention that many of the forms of collective action by protesting groups are determined by the response of power holders to protest movements; that such movements learn, and in fact often themselves practice the methods used on them by the state (Tilly, 1981:21). As the subsequent chapters reveal, this point is very pertinent in the context of contemporary Sikh terrorism.

This theoretical perspective can help analyze the complex problem of the resurgence of religion among the Sikhs of Punjab, where every day terrorism and violence are taking their toll of human lives. Group terrorism emerges after demands that are perceived as legitimate by the aggrieved groups are denied for a prolonged period by the
power holders and/or after repressive measures are unleashed. Such denial of redress and repression may produce among some sections of the aggrieved populace, especially the youth, a total lack of faith in the political process and hatred and contempt for the state. Under such situations group terrorism may develop as the response of the weak, the young and the proud to structural violence and perceived injustice (Hamilton, 1981:229, Gleason, 1981:243). Culture and history, in addition to state violence, as mentioned above, have also a role to play in the selection by groups of this form of protest. In the case of the Sikhs, for instance, one can find significant instances in Sikh history of terrorist acts against oppressive and bigoted state officials who had been persecuting the Sikhs and destroying Sikh religious places and shrines. Such cultural-religious legacies serve as templates or models of behavior among contemporary victims of repression or abuse.

Government violence and repression are inherent to our analysis for in their absence the essence of politics is left aside. As Chomsky says, terrorism refers "to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends), whether it is the wholesale terrorism of the Emperor or the retail terrorism of the thief" (Chomsky, 1986:2). Indeed it is very often the case that the wholesale terrorism of the "Emperor" precedes the retail
terrorism of the "thief." In fact, most often the wholesale determines, originates and conditions the retail.

This analysis differs sharply from a vast body of literature that does not consider governmental violence in its definition of political violence, the idea being perhaps that since the latter is a legitimate use of force, it should hence be excluded. Apart from the fact that many governments in the third world are "illegitimately" constructed, there is the additional problem that "legitimate" governments often also employ illegitimate force. Thus many "terrorists" today are being killed in India under the garb of false "encounters" with the security forces (Facts On File, 1988:650). Therefore to exclude governmental violence from the concept of political violence involves two fundamental problems. First, it reveals the ethnocentric bias of Western scholarship. Second, it is also an analytical framework inadequate to encompass what by their own proper standards constitute numerous human rights violations and illegal acts by so called legitimate governments.

The foregoing may also suggest that religion is a mere handmaiden of politics, but the relationship is much more complex then that. Religious values and politics interact, and this calls for an analysis keeping in mind their dialectical inter-connectedness. Religion provides one element of "the nexus of established rights and obligations
in which groups of ordinary people are embedded and which, once violated, make for grievances." (Aya, 1979:79) In addition it is a powerful mobilizing force with a generally strong organizational network. But above all, in certain contexts and in specific cases, it enables a mass political movement to circumvent the problem of "free ridership" (Olson:1971). The belief in individual salvation via martyrdom in certain religions, Islam and Sikhism for example, needs to be explored from this perspective also. The possibility of salvation through martyrdom constitutes a powerful individual "non-collective" benefit available to religious-based mass protests. It can motivate participants to accept risks not otherwise justifiable in pursuit of a collective good like justice.

Justification for A Case Study

The field of comparative politics ... is in a state of crisis. Few scholars are now able to define the field's parameters precisely, its methodology has been subjected to searching criticism, there is no longer a single integrating set of theories on which scholars in the field can agree, students are put off by the lack of a clear focus, and the field itself has become fragmented and disjointed (Wiarda 1985:xi).

The vigor of the behavioral revolution with its strong insistence on making political science a nomothetic discipline capable of making general theoretical statements not limited by spatio-temporal or cultural limitations
(Przeworski and Teune 1970; Bill and Hardgrave 1981) appears to have toned down and scholars in the field of comparative politics are trying to re-assess the directions in which comparative politics is moving and ought to move (Wiarda 1985; Verba 1985). An important methodological criticism of cross-national comparative analysis has come from scholars who think that facts pulled out of context for purposes of comparison do not yield fruitful social analysis (Winch 1970).

The above criticism poses a dilemma for comparative analysts for, on the one hand, studies of particular areas and cases do not contribute much to the overall purpose of developing scientific generalizations while, on the other hand, "more general works that deal with data across a large number of nations often seem to be superficial and inadequate in their treatment of individual nations or actors - or worse than inadequate, sometimes they are outright distorted" (Verba 1985:36). To remedy such kinds of problems, Wiarda has called for an "islands of theory" approach - meaning the development of generalizations specific to culture areas and subsequent attempts to build bridges between such "islands" (Wiarda 1985). On the other hand, Verba (1985:36) favors "a better blend and overlapping of theoretically interesting case studies and broader comparative ones" (1985:36).
Modern comparative politics is thus characterized by a step back from the cross-national studies of past and is exhibiting greater sensitivity to context. Yet at the same time the positive features of behavioralism - rigor of explanation (possibly with reliance on statistical methods) and explanation within the context of overall generalizations has been retained. The work of scholars like Welch (1980), Moore (1966), Wolf (1969), Skocpol (1977) and Dunn (1972) is a good example of research characterized by sensitivity to historical context yet with a view to "understanding the generalizable logic at work in the entire set" (Skocpol 1977:6).

The preceding analytical framework serves as a guide to the complex problem of the contemporary resurgence of religion and terrorism among the Sikhs of the Indian state of Punjab. After a review of the literature on terrorism and religious resurgence and violence, I propose to consider the Sikh problem from the above delineated analytical framework. Finally, an attempt based on quantitative data on incidents of terrorism in Punjab is made to relate the variance in terrorism to policy choices by the government and to the factor of economic distress, as for example unemployment.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Given the relatively recent focus by the academic community on the subject of terrorism, few systematic attempts have been made to review comprehensively the literature in the field. One recent attempt mentions that, "the overflow of commentary on this topic, publicly available, seems to have escaped formal categorization and order, imposing some difficulties in research and analysis" (Miller 1988:63). Two annotated bibliographies were published in 1980 are by Norton and Greenberg (1980) and Mickolus (1980). Any attempt at classifying the prevalent literature in any field is bound to lack neatness and clear cut boundaries. Nevertheless, such classifications are necessary for a better organization of research. Generally speaking, and in the context of the above, Miller's (1988) thematic and methodological classification of the literature of terrorism appears satisfactory.

Taking as his point of departure the behavioral revolution in social science methodology, Miller divides the literature on terrorism into traditional and behavioral
approaches. Within the former he categorizes historical and judicial/legal studies of terrorism and in the behavioral approach are included psychological, socio-economic and policy studies. The major concern of behavioral literature is with theoretically oriented and empirically verifiable knowledge, while the more traditional approaches, while exhibiting theoretical concerns at times, are, generally speaking, less self conscious of methodological aspects and place less stress on empirical rigor. In behavioral literature, empirical rigor, more often than not, takes the form of statistical analysis.

Traditional Approaches

Historical Studies

Historical studies focus on the background of terrorist movements, their ideology and organization; terrorist leaderships; biographies of terrorist personalities; and terrorist tactics. Typically, they are skeptical of the possibility of a general theory of terrorism and study isolated or a small number of cases of terrorist activity by non-quantitative methods. Representative works among others are Laqueur (1977), Hyams (1975) and Dobson (1974), Mcknight (1974), Smith (1976), Hart (1985), Kiernan (1985) and Dobson and Payne (1979).

Laqueur (1977) offers the view that terrorism is not
something new and talks of cycles of terrorism. Modern terrorism, according to him, has a marked lack of restraint, among other things, compared to its older version. Furthermore, Laqueur is skeptical about the possibility of a general theory or a general definition of terrorism, stressing the need to consider it on a case by case basis, and favors a hard policy towards the terrorists. In the long run this policy will succeed and, moreover, the populace instead of becoming alienated by the repressive measures of the government will side with it realizing full well the necessity for such action. The absence of consistent repressive counter-measures, according to Laqueur, would mean the constant threat of blackmail from minority groups. As regards the effectiveness of consistent repression in curbing the menace of terrorism, Laqueur's views find support in the work of Livingstone (1983).

Hyams (1975) looks at terrorism as an effective instrument of social and political change. He argues that terrorism is "self-reducing" in that it is born out of intolerable conditions, induces the government to initiate moderate reform and thereby brings about the conditions of its own demise. Hyams is also concerned with outlining the various theories of terrorism, discusses organizations like the IRA and PLO, and has a historical discussion of terrorism as it evolved in the nineteenth century. Mcknight (1974) gives an account of interviews with various terrorist
leaderships and organizations all across the world. While the book lacks a theoretical focus, it is an important source of raw data for the more theoretically oriented researchers.

While Smith (1976) gives a biography of Carlos, based on interviews and eye witness accounts, the subject of studies by Hart (1985) and Kiernan (1985) is Yasir Arafat. Dobson and Payne (1979) in the context of an overview of terrorism, cover major international terrorist groups, classify them on a regional basis, and give some kind of a 'who's who' of the various terrorist organizations and leaderships currently in existence. Also studied is the response of democratic governments to terrorism.

While exhibiting sensitivity to context, in general, historical studies tend to lack rigor of analysis, are not based on hard empirical data, and are relatively less conscious of method. For theoretically guided research they serve the purpose of generating hypotheses to be tested empirically, and are a valuable source of descriptive information. Also, much empirical work in the social sciences exhibits disdain for the context. One can profitably correct this problem by appreciating the significance of studies conducted within the historical method.
Judicial-Legal Studies

Legal aspects of terrorism are the subject of the judicial/legal studies within the traditional oriented approach to the study of terrorism (Bassiouni 1975, Green 1974, Gal-Or 1985, Murphy 1985, Fattah 1981, Lillich 1982). The focus here is mainly on international terrorism and the need for ensuring the safety of diplomats and other officials engaged in duties necessitated by increasing international interdependence. Also of concern are the effectiveness of existing legal methods in international law to counter terrorism, and the problem of defining terrorism in terms of international law. International conduct is judged on the basis of a normative framework on which international relationships should be based, and solutions are sought within international law. Typically, studies in this area are concerned with attempts by the international community to come out with international legal standards, possibly formulated in international law or conventions, to cope and contend with the phenomenon of terrorism. One need not be reminded of the fact that such concerns have been exhibited since the days of the League of Nations. Legal studies give a useful account of these failed efforts.

Green (1974) proposes U.N. initiatives, creation of international criminal courts, and an international anti-terrorism convention as probable solutions to the problem of terrorism in the world. The appendices in the work by
Bassiouni (1975) provide texts of the various UN documents, draft codes and treaties that deal with the efforts by the international community to curb and contend with terrorism.

A focus on the legality of terrorism is more than likely to hide the politics surrounding terrorism. It is very often true and oft mentioned in the literature that "one nation's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." This makes it obvious that an international consensus on the definition of international terrorism can be at best vague and hence of little utility. In many respects law reflects the existing international relationships and it is only rarely that it circumvents them. A political consensus among the members of the international community is a prior necessity before effective international procedures are evolved to cope with international terrorism.

Behavioral Approaches

Psychological Studies

Conscious theory building efforts, model testing and stress on quantitative methods are the hallmark of the behavioral approach. Much behavioral work in the field of terrorism comprises psychological studies of individual and group terrorist activities, though a variety of new, interdisciplinary studies is also emerging. A more recent
one (Miller 1987) employs an inter-disciplinary perspective comprising content and propaganda analysis, psycholinguistics, structural linguistics and political and socio-biographic analysis of major event-related statements issued by the West German Red Army Faction.

A recent study on the psychology of terrorism attempts to complement other analyses of the root cause of terrorism by stressing that "principles of human learning, particularly those of cognitive-behavioral conditioning, can provide a useful and significant component" to the extant explanations on the subject (Saper 1988:13). Kampf (1980) links extremism with peer pressure and Post (1984) stresses marginalization and troubled family backgrounds. According to him,

there is a tendency for marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled family backgrounds to be attracted to the path of terrorism, so that for many belonging to the terrorist group is the first time they truly belonged, and the group comes to represent the family. This creates powerful pressures to conform within the group, for to disagree is to be seen as disloyal and to risk losing the group. Organized against society, the group is seen as all good, and the outside society as all bad, this being the rationale for committing violent anti-society acts (Post 1984:241).

Freedman (1983) states that contemporary terrorism carries on the "ancient messianic and prophetic tradition of horror." This is based on a fanatic belief in the need to punish man for his violation of certain absolute and sacrosanct values and beliefs. Hassel (1977) finds that
terrorism has strong appeals for the younger middle class elements of the population. Like Post he believes that doubts and lack of social moorings resulting from modern day developments contribute to the growth of terrorism, in addition to factors like sadism and masochism.

In general, psychological studies of terrorism remain at either the individual or group level of analysis and, in accordance with the chief concerns of that discipline, do not directly take into account the politics and the political aspects of terrorism. This is a major weakness in any understanding of terrorism, and especially that which occurs as a result of the political process. No wonder that the psychologists have come up with hypotheses that are in stark contradiction with each other and miss, what in my opinion, is the crux of the matter, namely the feeling of structural injustice on the part of the terrorists at the hands of the regime.

**Socio-Economic Studies**

In the second subgroup of behavioral studies of terrorism we find the work mainly of quantitatively oriented social scientists who examine social structural variables to seek explanations of terrorism and other manifestations of political violence. Here terrorism is considered a subset of political violence in general. Generally cross-national and comparative case studies are undertaken. The concern of
this body of literature is with the overall phenomenon of political violence in society. Only recently have studies appeared that treat the subject of terrorism exclusively. Netanyahu (1986) argues, for instance, that modern terrorism is a byproduct of the political ambitions of expansionist states, mainly the Communist and Islamic. Both these groups of countries have provided ideological and material support to the terrorists to carry on their activities which are mainly directed against the Western democracies and Israel. Parry (1976) shares in general the beliefs of Netanyahu though he singles out Marxism and the Soviet Union to blame for much of the terrorism existing in the world. Rubenstein (1987) believes that such arguments are misleading in the extreme and that terrorism is generated "not only by grievances, but by the political weakness of militant intellectuals unable either to organize mass violence or to attract reliable allies to their cause." He finds in the "disconnection" of the intelligentsia "a primary internal cause of terrorism, dictating to a large degree its philosophy, tactics, and consequences" (Rubenstein 1987:xvii-xviii). Regarding the stress on external causes of terrorism emphasized by Parry and Netanyahu above, Rubenstein writes:

to conceive of terrorism as the mere product of outside manipulation, created by the machinations of this government or that, makes it impossible to understand either its causes or consequences ... Terrorism is not mass violence, and foreign powers have long tried to use it for their own ends. But a terrorist movement with staying power, a movement
capable of serving a destabilizing function, is not just a stage play produced by foreign intelligence agencies. It has historical antecedents, roots in a certain social milieu, relationships with other local organizations; it has its own sense of grievance and philosophy of remediation, its own modus operandi and contradictions. The surest way to misunderstand a terrorist organization, even if one considers it illegitimate, is to deny its local authenticity (Rubenstein 1987:xix).

One may disagree with Rubenstein on the question of the "disconnection" of the intelligentsia as a motive force for the generation of terrorism, but his criticism of the opinions of scholars like Netanyahu and Parry is absolutely valid. External sponsorship of terrorists does occur, of course, but it seems more likely to be a source of resources than a primary cause of terrorism. Stress needs to placed also on the fact that grievances of groups indulging in terrorism have to be pretty serious, in other words structural, for them to indulge in such drastic actions as the killing of innocent civilians and/or the bombing of civilian targets etc. It may also be the case that other "normal" political participatory techniques have been tried and exhausted by such groups and the regime has perhaps not only refused to address their demands, but has come out with strong measures of repression.

Prominent studies, among others, which deal with political violence in general and which can provide insights into the study of terrorism are Gurr (1971), Olson (1971), Russett (1971), Huntington (1968) Johnson (1966) and Welch
(1980). "Civil strife" for Gurr (1971) is a resultant of "relative deprivation" - actors perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Regime coercive potential, institutionalization, strife facilitation and legitimacy are mediating variables. On the basis of a cross-sectional multiple regression analysis of 114 polities across the world, Gurr claims to explain two-thirds of the variance in civil strife by variables based on relative deprivation. The major problem with Gurr's work is a lack of direct measurement of the collective psychological phenomenon of relative deprivation. As Taylor points out, relative deprivation and other such psychological theories of violence are characterized by "the absence of any direct evidence concerning the relationship between perceptions, psychological processes, and political violence among individuals" (Taylor 1984:84). Also in Gurr's work we find the level of analysis problem. While his major independent variable is at the individual level of analysis, his measurement of it is exclusively social.

In a work on domestic terrorism in the United States (1988), Gurr attempted to classify terrorism into vigilante, insurgent, transnational, and state terrorism. The vigilante form was attributed by Gurr to the rise of new right wing groups like the Klan and the resurgence of old ones. Terrorism of this form defends the status quo or
attempts to return to the circumstances of an earlier period. Insurgent terrorism seeks to change the status quo and is hence diametrically opposed to vigilante terrorism. It seeks to change government policies by direct threats or direct action. Gurr places Black militants, Puerto Rican nationalists and white revolutionaries in this category. Since the American political context was not marked by the presence of state terror, Gurr chose not to go into detail about this typology of terrorism.

Huntington (1968) stresses the growth of political participation due to modernization and the failure of political institutions to keep pace with it as an important variable in the onset of revolution and political violence. Johnson (1966) believes that system disequilibrium caused by the introduction of new ideas, technology and new forms of economic organization, challenges the dominant values, and given an "intransigent elite," unable to handle these unsettling systemic forces, individuals who have lost their social moorings tend to identify themselves with proponents of alternative value systems, who are often revolutionaries.

Olson's (1971) basic argument is that rapid economic change produces social dislocation and this in turn leads to political violence. Individuals who have weak social ties have more potential for political violence. In situations of rapid economic growth or decline, the society's network of social inter-relationships becomes dislocated and thus
increases the number of declassed individuals who have a potential for violent action. Economic growth changes the place and nature of work. Often, for instance, people lose their socially secure environment in the village. Additionally, rapid economic growth also increases the number of the poor in absolute terms. To sustain high rates of growth, the people have to save to a considerable extent. This leads to, at least in the short run, a decline in the standard of living. Moreover, economic growth leads to a rise in the expectations of people. In the absence of mediating factors like religion, charisma, ideology or repression, political discontent mounts and very often erupts in violence. Olson believes, the solution to political instability and violence lies in determining an optimum level of economic change that produces minimum social dislocation.

Russett (1971) explores the relationship between land inequality and political stability on the basis of a sample of 47 countries. Using multiple regression analysis he advances the cautious conclusion that rural land inequality leads to political violence. His examination of the relationship of equality to the stability of democratic regimes suggests that land equality may provide "the soil to nourish free institutions but the seed must be first planted." In a more recent cross-national study on this subject, Muller and Seligson (1987) have challenged some of
the conclusions of Russet's work. Distinguishing between
nation-wide income inequality and land inequality, they
suggest that the former is more conducive to political
violence than the latter. Rural land inequality does
heighten the level of political violence in a society in
addition to factors like the repressiveness and coerciveness
of a regime, but it is not the main variable to be studied
when considering levels of political violence in society.
As they say, "Agrarian inequality is relevant only to the
extent that it is associated with inequality in the nation-
wide distribution of income" (Muller and Seligson 1987:443).
Nation-wide income inequality, it is argued, is more than
likely to make some urban groups discontented. Urbanization
facilitates a better organization while the peasantry, which
may be unhappy at rural land inequality, can do little about
it because rural areas are difficult to mobilize and
moreover, peasants need an urban vanguard to lead their
protest. More than likely, the discontent generated by
nation-wide income inequality would involve urban groups in
a struggle with the regime and these in turn would build up
peasant alliances thus raising levels of violence in
society. Based on a multiple regression analysis of about
60 nations, Muller and Seligson indeed find support for
their hypotheses.

By a "combination of case studies and broader
theorizing," Welch (1980) examines the causes and
consequences of four rural rebellions. He looks for long
term causes like the nature of political elites, the bases
of rebel organization, the extent of geographic marginality
as well as "immediate precipiants" like the use of
repression and a "quickened sense of deprivation."
Rebellion for him is a political act requiring a political
explanation and not some crude economic determinism or a
mechanical calculus based on frustrations and aspirations as
explanations.

In general the scholarly studies in this category do
not single out terrorism as an independent phenomenon for
explanation. Most of them can be categorized under the
general rubric of political violence studies. They do
however offer valuable insights and ideas on the subject of
terrorism. Methodologically they are, generally speaking,
characterized by rigor of explanation and stress reliance on
empirical testing of propositions. In any analysis of
terrorism it is appropriate to consider them for they are
the ancestors to a specialized study of political violence,
which terrorism has developed into over the last two
decades. The important aspect distinguishing terrorism from
violence, as Rapoport points out, is that

Violence may well be a universal phenomenon, as inseparable
from the human condition as is the sense of frustration and
anxiety which produces that violence. To justify violence
we usually argue that the persons we want to hurt either
deserve punishment for misdeeds or that they deserve it
because they can hurt us and intend to do so. A very
different kind of logic is required to justify terror. The
victims do not manifestly threaten us; they are innocent by
conventional moral standards or by the evidence of our senses (Rapoport and Alexander 1989:xiii).

The use of repression and its impact on political violence have been the focus of some studies on political violence. From learning theory two hypotheses are derived which treat repression as a deterrent, as well as an instigator. The former predicts a linear negative relationship with increasing levels of repression, while the latter a positive correlation. With respect to the latter relationship, Gurr remarks, "psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation of aggression" (Gurr 1968:1105). Some studies have also found a curvilinear relationship, which has been interpreted to mean that insufficient or excessive use of repression instigates violence. Empirical research in the field of general political violence has no clear cut hypotheses to offer on the relationship between repression and political violence. Linear relationships have been found out in studies by Markus and Nesvold (1972), Feierabend and Feierabend (1972), and Jacobson (1973). Curvilinear relationships have been pointed out by Bwy (1968) and Gurr (1968). In a study of central American unrest and rebellion, Booth and Walker (1989) and Booth (1991) suggest that repression carried out in the absence of ameliorative regime policies serves as an
instigator for more violence and mobilization. According to Booth:

differing regime responses to organization and protest determined whether national revolts (or revolution in the case of Nicaragua) would occur. Where regimes responded to demands with policies designed to reduce inequalities of wealth and to permit recovery of real wages and with low or modest levels of repression, popular mobilization and protests subsided. But where regimes did not pursue ameliorative policies and sharply escalated repression by public security forces, protests and opposition organization increased and national revolts ensued (Booth 1991:36).

Policy Studies

Policy studies consist of "public policy literature composed of government documents on policies and decisions pertaining to means and methods adopted to control, combat, and abolish terrorism," (Miller 1988:65). According to Miller, public policy literature is "guided by the following question: What kind of national policies appear to be most effective in thwarting or reducing acts of international terrorism?" (Miller 1988:65). This body of literature also includes scholarly works that study government responses and their impact on international terrorism.

Quantitative studies of nations' responses and their impact on international terrorism have begun to emerge since the last decade or so. Much controversy has arisen over whether a hard line stance or a conciliatory government policy deters terrorism. Hacker (1976) Evans (1977) Stohl (1983) and Jenkins et al. (1977) have argued that a no concessions policy is not an effective deterrent against
international terrorism. Recently the findings of Steven Poe (1988) not only substantiate the findings of the above mentioned scholars, but also lend credence to the belief that "tough" government policies not only do not deter terrorist actions, but also are more likely to lead to greater loss of human life.

Most of the studies in the field of international terrorism just cited do not focus on the major causes behind the social phenomenon (whether hostage taking, or for example, hijacking) they are studying. They look at the symptoms and the response of governments to them without considering the underlying structural grievances that motivate terrorism. An attempt (if ever) on the part of governments to redress these structural grievances and the impact of these moves on terrorism have not yet been considered subjects worthy of attention. Moreover in the extant studies, there is a tendency to pull too many facts out of context, which make the generalizations developed more meaningless than meaningful in application to specific cases.

Little empirical and quantitative work is available on the politics of terrorism, more especially that on the politics of domestic terrorism. A 1980 study (Gleason 1980) applying the Poisson Model to study incidents of International Terrorism in the United States was bold enough to state that "This study is a first attempt at a
quantitative analysis of Terrorism" (Gleason 1980:263).
Interestingly that study found little justification for the
widely held belief that there had been an alarming increase
in the incidence of terrorism in the past decade. Gleason
further went on to point the need for testing the theories
of the historical and qualitatively oriented researchers as
the agenda for further research in the field of terrorism.
Sharing the views of Gleason, Hopple (1982) states
Systematic, quantitative work on terrorism per se has begun
to accrue. The results, of course, have not been uniformly
successful or invariably dramatic. However, both
quantitative research on terrorist phenomena and the track
record of causal modeling in the domains of domestic and
international conflict suggest that appropriate analytical
techniques offer a promising route to acquiring knowledge
about terrorism (Hopple 1982:74).

Jenkins et al. (1977) have studied 77 international
hostage episodes and have concluded that terrorist
kidnapping does not involve a great degree of peril for the
kidnapper. Their study reveals that there is an 80 percent
chance that the kidnapper will escape death and capture and
a 50 percent possibility that some, if not all, of his
demands will be met. The ITERATE (International Terrorism :
Attributes of Terrorist Events) project data (Mickolus 1977)
is another significant data base for those who are
interested in a quantitative study of international
terrorism.
Ted Gurr (1979) has analyzed domestic terrorism from 1961 to 1970 in 87 countries. His findings reveal that terrorist campaigns were short lived, did not seriously threaten society and hostility to specific government policies were main motives to terrorist action, and in this they did not differ from any other group(s) using different means. Using path and factor analysis, Hamilton (1980) tests Laqueur's (1977) and Hyams (1975) propositions on the relationship between "insurgent violence" and state repression, and concludes that the immediate effect of insurgent violence is to increase repression, while the immediate effect of repression is to increase insurgent violence. However the long term effect of repression is to decrease violence. Hamilton admits that his method does not take into account the dynamic of terrorism and suggests time series analysis. A fundamental flaw with the work is his inability to single out empirical indicators of terrorism per se and the fact that states generally follow a mixture of repressive and concessionary policies. His support for statistical case studies rooted in history is well taken, however (Hamilton 1980:236).

White, based on an examination of IRA and ETA terrorism, concludes that repressive measures are of at best questionable utility, "in both cases the repression of local nationalist population was successfully used as a recruiting device by terrorist organizations" (White 1991: 246).
Hewitt (1984) in an empirical study of the use of repressive measures by British army in Cyprus in the 1950s concluded that in the short run repression did bring about a decline in the incidence of terrorism. However in the long run, such measures had a diminishing utility in containing terrorism. Changing government policies to provide some concession to terrorist demands, in the short run, increases terrorism. This is because terrorists perceive that the government is doing so out of a position of weakness. However, according to Hewitt, in the long run such measures on the part of government are likely to produce a decline in the incidence of terrorism. Hewitt's views find support in case studies and other general works by some scholars. They also stress that the opening of political channels of expression for regime dissidents and understanding and attacking the fundamental causes that motivate terrorism by regimes are effective ways to fight terrorism (Rubenstein 1987, Lee 1983, Corrado and Evans 1988).

The Phenomenon of Religious Resurgence and Violence

Miller's survey of the literature of terrorism is woefully inadequate in treating the substantial amount of terrorism and violence linked to religion and religious resurgence in the modern era. Only a short while ago, the leader of an allegedly secular Iraq tried to capitalize on
this phenomenon when he asked Muslims all over the world to side with him in his fight against the "satanic" forces led by the United States. The literature that considers religious resurgence and of the connections between resurgent religions and violence is hardly mentioned in the review of the literature on terrorism by Miller. Contrary to the expectations of the theorists of modernization of the period of 1960s and the 1970s, religion has not only shown resilience to technological development, but has, in some respects also assumed a greater hold on the human mind as a result of social development. Quite often, a high level of politicization, violence and even terrorism has accompanied such movements of religious resurgence. A number of interesting works seek to explain these developments in the contemporary era.

Sahliyeh (1990) argues that the phenomenon of religious resurgence is a complex one and no single theory or concept is adequate to explain it in its entirety. He contends that religious resurgence can be fruitfully approached from the perspective of crisis theory and resource mobilization (Sahliyeh 1990:4).

In terms of crisis theory, religious resurgence is evidenced in the contemporary world because religion provides people with a "sense of refuge, guidance, comfort, and a sense of discipline to cope with the complexities of life" (Sahliyeh 1990:7). Carrying this idea further,
Hertzke in a study of the rise of Christian fundamentalism in America writes, "The revival of religious fundamentalism around the globe whether in Christian, Jewish, or Islamic forms, appears to be a profound and militant reaction against the cultural sweep of modernity - the shattering of traditional moorings that tie a people to its past" (Hertzke 1990:78). The growth of a permissive culture in the West, the abandonment of traditional roles and institutions, as for example the family and the church, abortion, and homosexuality, would constitute some of the elements of this break with tradition that the crisis theory refers to. In a somewhat similar vein, Shupe says, "a massive resacralization of basic human issues in various cultures is underway, perhaps emerging in protest against secularization, but certainly arising in moral vacuums often created by it. Religion has become a rallying point for political activism worldwide because of its nonrelativistic nature" (Shupe 1990:26). Barnhart calls man an "incurably religious animal." He contends that the social forces which gave birth to early forms of religion and magic continue to exist today. Science and the demands for religion will continue to coexist since the former, "will continue to create new gaps both in knowledge and in the moral life, gaps that theology will temporarily fill in with promises and grandiose proclamations --- The human being is indeed the rational animal. It is also the magical animal,"
intensely conscious of its own incurable finitude, but always trying to either deny or transcend its finitude" (Barnhart 1990: 31-32).

Donald. E. Smith takes a somewhat different line from the above group of scholars. On the basis of a study of the religions of Catholicism, Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism in the third world, he states "there is no unique generalized religious resurgence sweeping the Third World; rather, a survey of the last sixty years shows that Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Catholicism have all experienced periods of intense political activity followed by periods of quiescence. The present situation must be seen as part of the same pattern. Religious resurgence is a cyclical phenomenon. What has changed in the present situation, perhaps, is mainly the growing awareness of these events by the Western world, and the perception that they might be related to our interests" (Smith 1990:34).

The study of religious resurgence from the perspective of resource mobilization stresses the presence of opportunities, resources and incentives to religious groups, that enable them, at times, forcefully to intervene in the political process. The presence of opportunities more often than not consists of the secular ruling elite aligning with religious groups for political gain and legitimacy. Such a phenomenon is evidenced for example, in the United States, with the cooptation of the conservative Protestants by the
Republican party (Wald:1990), the support given to the Sikh fundamentalist leader Bhindranwale by the rule of Mrs. Gandhi so as to embarrass her Akali rivals in Punjab (Singh:1990), and the political alliance and support given by Anwar Sadat in Egypt to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain support from the Egyptian masses (Cantori:1990).

The presence of resources and incentives are two further elements in the resource mobilization model that can build a religious revivalist movement. Resources would in this context consist of organizational strength such as the presence of churches and temples, access to communication networks and the financial contribution of members. Among the incentives to participate in a political movement, the most interesting aspect is of the idea of redemption through martyrdom as evidenced for example in Islam, Sikhism, and Christianity.

Ayoub (1987) in a study of the traditions of martyrdom in Islam and Christianity writes, "the martyrs - 'those who are slain in the way of God' - the Quran tells us 'are not to be reckoned as dead; rather, they are alive with their Lord sustained,'" and that the "true martyr for God retains his desire for martyrdom even in Paradise" (Ayoub 1987:72). The Shia sect of the Muslims, according to the same scholar, "have made the ethos of martyrdom and suffering a basic principle of their faith and piety" (Ayoub 1987:72-73). With regard to divergence in the traditions of the two
religions, Christianity and Islam, redemption in the former is based on stoic suffering and in the latter on an activist striving in this world. Among the similarities, both the religions "are in agreement regarding the exalted station of the martyr with God and the belief that the martyr will carry the marks of his sacrifice with him to be displayed even in heaven" (Ayoub 1987:75). Necessarily, the divergent religious traditions would lead to different forms of political participation by the concerned religious groups. Having said that, one must also stress that religious tradition has a dialectic with the environment and thus also responds to changes in the latter (Antoun and Hegeland 1987:238-239). The rise of Christian "liberation theology" can be cited as a good illustration.

Dodson in this respect states that the traditional links in Latin America of the Catholic church and the state and the landed elite, led to the increasing isolation of the Church in the wake of demands by the masses for an end to poverty and exploitation and "provoked a radical rethinking of religious faith in Latin America" which ultimately resulted "in a radical reordering of priorities within the church that sharply altered church-state relations." The creation of grass roots Christian base communities in the context of reorganized pastoral work and in an environment of state repression and poverty "proved to be exceptionally fertile for the spread of a prophetic perspective and
conducive to a vigorous growth of religious activism. Thus, led by a grass-roots element that had traditionally been passive and subordinate, the church became the principal critic of political authoritarianism and societal injustice" (Dodson 1990:176). The political fallout in Nicaragua of this process was the support of the church of a rebellion to overthrow the brutal dictatorship of Somoza in Nicaragua and in Brazil it helped curb the excesses of military rule. As a whole, these developments increased popular participation and encouraged the growth of democratic forces in Latin America.

Central America has witnessed developments conditioned by the above, though not necessarily identical. O'Shaughnessy mentions of the split between the conservative and the progressive Protestants. The latter do "not want their faith to be an appendage of either a mother church or of U.S. foreign policy decisions, have formed their alliances with progressive Catholics" (O'Shaughnessy 1990:100-101). The progressive Protestants have demarcated themselves from the conservative ones (the latter go primarily by the name of evangelicals in Central America) on the interpretation of the scripture and the resultant political action required of the devout. As O'Shaughnessy states:

Theologically, progressive Christians believed that economic and political structures, not individual characteristics, are major (but not exclusive) causes of the widening gap between rich and poor on their continent. They
believed that sin has both individual and organizational dimensions and that material poverty and the biblical "poverty of spirit" must not be confused. Most importantly, the former cannot be spiritualized but must be addressed and redressed. The Bible for these Christians has a social as well as a transcendentental context. This view of faith and how one acts on a social and political level are deeply related. These Protestants frequently make reference to the prophetic tradition of the Bible and argue that they work for social change and social justice. Unlike their conservative counterparts they are not afraid of Marxism as a rival ideology that will destroy Christianity (O'Shaughnessy 1990:101).

The conservative Protestant groups, in the context of poverty and repression in the region, are often now supported by the state since a belief in salvation in the next life "encourages earthly passivity and therefore is not a challenge to the state." These groups in turn have supported authoritarian and repressive regimes in Central America because they have been left alone by such regimes and also because these regimes "frequently supported by the United States who these groups view favorably" (O'Shaughnessy 1990:103). O'Shaugnessy further mentions the tremendous rise in influence of the evangelical groups in Latin America over the preceding few years. According to her they have doubled in number from six years ago to fifty million today. These developments have a significant potential as far as politics in the region is concerned. "We are witnessing a play in which religious beliefs and political choices share center-stage together. How the drama unfolds over the next decade will, in part, determine the future of Central America" (O'Shaugnessy 1990:105).
Pottenger (1989) states that the various strains of liberation theology in Latin America have attempted to link in their analysis of society and social relations the "ethical implications of Christianity" and modern social analysis as for example Marxism. This has generated a commitment to act on behalf of the exploited and the poor. The Bible has been interpreted or re-interpreted in the light of the necessity for this form of political action. Pottenger discusses those liberation theologians who justify violence and concludes with respect to terrorism, that it is the most difficult form of violence to incorporate in liberation theology, the reason being, as Rapoport succinctly puts it, "because the terrorist must regard victims as objects and nothing could be more antithetical to the Christian injunction to demonstrate love for one's enemies" (Rapoport 1989: 8).

Coming back to the concept of religious martyrdom and its link with incentives to participate in political and revolutionary movements on the part of the masses, scholars have sought to explain such actions in terms of Olsonian collective action theory (Olson 1971).

Essentially the resolution of the problem of collective action involves a solution to the problem of free ridership. In other words, assuming that actors are rational and self-interested, they will not put significant effort into the realization of a public good (which is characterized by
nature by jointness of supply and non-excludability), if the collective action of others produces that good. Olson argues that the latter is only possible by coercion or by providing excludable private goods incidental to the provision of a collective good. Samuel Popkin has suggested that the problem of free ridership can in addition be tackled "(1) because persons contribute for reasons of ethics, conscience, or altruism; (2) because it pays to contribute on a pure cost-benefit basis; (3) because of selective incentives (excludable benefits), which can be either positive or negative; or (4) because it pays to contribute, given that the contributions of others are contingent on one's own contribution" (Popkin 1979:254).

In the context of our discussion of religion and politics, among the contributions mentioned by Popkin, the kind of contribution which is based on grounds of conscience is significant. Analyzing the role of religious culture and its contribution to the onset of revolution, particularly the beliefs of Shia Islam, Gregory Rose (1987) states, "the special incentive provided by the religious opposition (to the Shah) was, simply put, salvation" (Rose 1987:76). In the context of the general role which culture can play in helping the process of protest mobilization, Rose states:

structural analysis of the causes of revolution fail to explain the Iranian case because of their economic-determinist assumptions about collective action. The Iranian case, certainly, does not suggest that extra-
economic phenomena lie at the root of all revolutionary mobilization; rather, it underscores the importance of the problem of collective action and while, economic special incentives may be present in some cases, the cultural environment can, and in the case of Iran does, provide equally compelling special incentives (Rose 1987: 78-79).

Arjomand (1988) in his analysis of the Iranian Revolution also stresses the role of Shia Islam though his work is dominated less by an approach dominated by the theory of collective action. He is highly critical of stereotypical attempts to understand revolution. Such would include seeing revolutions as involving the liberation of man from tyranny, as the march of progress, as involving struggle and the eventual victory of the proletariat, and as wars of anti-imperialism and national liberation. Arjomand advises scholarship seeking to understand the Islamic revolution to "discard the conventional wisdom and dispassionately discount the modern political myth of revolution." The Iranian revolution is best appreciated "in the context of the relationship between Shiaism and political order in the history of Iran, and by comparing it to other revolutions" (Arjomand 1988:4). Social change, for Arjomand, results in "social dislocation and normative disturbances" thus necessitating the need for the reintegration of the dislocated groups in "societal community" and inclusion in the polity. Often modern states fail in this respect and the rival movements that succeed in doing so often lead successful revolutions. "In
Iran, the most effective of these movements drew its inspiration from Shiaite Islam and was led by Shiaite men of religion" (Arjomand 1988:5).

Antoun and Hegeland (1987) examine religious resurgence from a comparative anthropological perspective. They are essentially concerned with investigating if religious resurgence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam has evidenced a similar process. Religious resurgence according to these scholars is both a "cause and effect of change." In all three religions, religious resurgence has exhibited a belief in activism, in other words, that redemption lies in making efforts to improve the existing environment; it is related to a strong assertion of identity; and finally, such movements invariably involve participation by the enabled groups in society rather than the disabled. On the latter point they discuss coincidences between resurgence and the rise to power of an economic group and state that "religion has become a unifying ideology for emerging classes struggling to exert political pressure on unresponsive governments" (Antoun and Hegeland 1987:235). In a somewhat similar tone Caplan writes that religious fundamentalism is "frequently deeply involved in contemporary political processes and so cannot be divorced from the operation and implications of power" (Caplan 1987: 5).

One need not be carried too far on the latter point and consider all religious and cultural phenomena as merely
being determined by the economic base of society. Indeed, it seems that this was not true even of earlier Marxian historical materialism (Gilbert 1979). Nevertheless, it was Weber who gave a very subtle relationship between the social formation and the ideas, culture and religion prevalent in society. While criticizing the crude materialist explanation that stressed the ideological superstructure as a mere epiphenomenon of the economic base, he did not suggest that the economic base did not at all condition social ideas and beliefs. In other words he did not espouse crude idealism either. As Bocock and Thompson state, Weber "wanted to arrive at a formulation which would do justice to material circumstances and interests and also to the channelling effects of ideas in determining people's actions." In Weber's own words:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 'From what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world (Weber quoted in Bocock and Thompson 1985:2)

One can find in these lines clues that could explain how religious resurgence movements, associated perhaps with rising economic groups, would resort to violence and terrorism for the attainment of their political objectives.
The stress by Rapoport (Rapoport and Alexander 1989) on the relevance of the study of history and tradition to understand terrorism also perhaps assumes significance in the above context. As he states, "the fact is that we do know very little about how deeply rooted the terrorist phenomena is in our traditions, and we know less about how much of a tradition terrorists themselves share. Until these things are understood better, can we even appreciate the meaning of the information gathered about terrorists today?" The volume of which he is a joint editor attempts to "provide both historical and moral perspectives for terrorist activities" (Rapoport and Alexander 1989:IX). For these scholars thus, "doctrine, not technology, is the ultimate source for terrorism and the French not the Industrial Revolution should preoccupy those interested in modern terror because it provided conceptions that made justifications of the phenomena credible" (Rapoport and Alexander 1989: xiii). Perhaps the political environment and doctrine are treated synonymously by Rapoport for, in another piece, lamenting the excessive focus placed on technological developments in the analysis of modern terrorism, he states, "the technological, not the political, environment is normally seen as the decisive determining condition for terrorist activity" (Rapoport 1984:658). On the basis of a comparative study of terrorism in the traditions of Hinduism, Islam and Judaism, Rapoport suggests
that in the analysis of terrorism, "the critical variable, therefore, cannot be technology: rather, the purpose and organization of particular groups and the vulnerabilities of particular societies to them are decisive factors" (Rapoport 1984:659).

Martin in a survey of the "scholarly approaches to the question of whether and how religion and violence are actually linked," concludes that "the study of religion and violence in the social sciences and humanities is not yet well coordinated or very conclusive. We have not responded very effectively to what has been perceived as a resurgence of traditional religion especially where this has involved violent outbreaks" (Martin 1989:368). To understand the links between religion and violence and its concrete manifestations he emphasizes scholarly focus on "the social and hermeneutical processes by which religious groups interpret scriptures and traditional world views as demanding violent action in certain circumstances and are able to persuade others of their interpretations" (Martin 1989:351). In other words, "a considerable amount of focused historical and textual research will have to be done," for the "ultimate issue is the nature of human society itself" (Martin 1989:368). In his own contribution he applies this approach to study the significance of the "interpretive processes" by which the al-Jihad group of fundamentalist Muslims in Egypt has concluded on the need
for violence to restore the fundamental tenets of Islam in the modern world.

The subtlety in Weber's approach to the question of the role which ideas play in social transformation highlighted above, seems to have been missed by Martin, who in reviewing the existing literature on the subject of the relationship between religion and violence in the social sciences mentions of "two starkly different approaches" - historical materialism and cultural idealism. In the latter approach he includes Durkheim, Weber, Geertz, Lewy and Rapoport. The hallmark of this approach in general is that "social behavior is driven by ideas, doctrines, institutions, or culture more generally" (Martin 1989:353). While more traditional idealists stress the integrative and stabilizing potential of religion vis-a-vis the polity, Lewy (1974) stresses the function of religion as a causal variable in revolutionary movements in world history at various points in time. For Rapoport also, as seen earlier, the stress is less on the integrative potential of religion. As Martin points out, Rapoport attempts to find in religious tradition ideas that legitimize rebellion and terror. In contradistinction to the classical idealists, hence, Rapoport and Lewy both lay stress on the role religious tradition plays in mobilizing religion based groups for terroristic or violent political purposes.

The classical materialist view, according to Martin, is
that religion serves to blunt class consciousness thereby focusing the attention of the oppressed on rewards in the other world. It has thus served the interests of the ruling classes. Later Engels and Mannheim pointed out that it could also serve as a mobilizing force on the side of the oppressed and exploited. The most concrete manifestation of this is found in Lincoln who seeks to show that "religion is an important ingredient in rebellion and revolution, albeit as an extreme form of ideology, but that 'one cannot conclude that religion and ideology are the tools of one party only, the ruling class'" (Martin 1989:361).

The above was a survey of the pertinent literature on violence and terrorism in general as well as of violence that is avowedly associated with religious goals. In the context of the analytical framework outlined in the introduction and this review of the pertinent literature on the subject, we are now in a position to analyze the dynamic of religious resurgence and terrorism among the Sikhs of the Indian state of Punjab. The following chapter gives a background and analysis of the subject in the context of geo-politics, history, culture and political economy. Subsequently, Box-Jenkins Time Series analysis is used to evaluate many of the hypotheses drawn from the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE AND RELIGIOUS TERRORISM: THE CASE OF THE SIKHS OF INDIA

At the heart of every terrorist action, there is a cause, a political goal, a perceived injustice or denial of liberty. This is as concrete to the activist as any prime minister's notion of justice or freedom. No political rhetoric can disguise this fact. No opponent of terrorism should forget this.

(Stephen Segallier, "Invisible Armies" quoted in India Today, July 31, 1987:8)

Little rigorous effort has been expended so far by social scientists towards the understanding of the rise of Sikh religious resurgence and the factors leading to the rise of Sikh terrorism in the Indian state of Punjab. Needless to add, this is an important case in the contemporary world scene, marked as it is by the reassertion of religious identities all over the world. In the present chapter, in the context of the analytical framework laid out in the introduction, I propose to analyze these phenomena. It would be advisable for the reader to bear in mind the chronology laid out in the appendix to better understand the following analysis. Rather than following a strict
historical and a chronologically oriented approach, I have concentrated more on highlighting the crucial events in the context of the analytical framework laid down earlier.

A recent survey (Singh 1987) of the prevalent explanations of what the author calls the "Sikh problem," attempts to classify them into five categories - Sikh nationalism; conspiracy theories; primacy of regional factors; primacy of national factors; and Marxist interpretations.

The proponents of the Sikh nationalism explanation (Brass 1974) see contemporary Sikh "national revival" as being sustained by a perception among the Sikhs of being discriminated against by the country on constitutional, religious, economic, and social grounds. As far as the economic aspect of the matter is concerned, there is certainly some basis. The share of the farm sector in the gross state domestic product remained above 50% during 1984-85 and 1985-86. The share of manufacturing during the same years was 11% and 10.5% respectively. Looking at the figures for the country as a whole, the share of agriculture in the total gross domestic product has progressively declined from 37.5% to 34.5 percent over the years 1984-85 to 1985-86. In the same period, the share of the manufacturing sector increased from 15.3% to 15.8%. Thus the character of the economy of the state is rather lopsided, and though an agriculturally prosperous region,
Punjab is an industrially backward state. Over the years, the central government has refused to invest in a significant manner in the state, perhaps because Punjab is on the border of the country. Wallace mentions that out, "of total central investment in all states in nondepartmental undertakings as of March 1979, Punjab's share was only 2.2%" (Wallace 1986:372). Many believe that it is unrealistic to expect agriculture to sustain the advance of the state, as in the past, for surely there are limits to technological advance in that sector. It is argued therefore, by the proponents of this explanation, that due to the above and as a result of certain political developments over time, the consciousness of being a discriminated minority in India has today crystallized into the consciousness of being a separate nation that needs its own independent statehood.

The Government of India (1984) and Hindu ideologues like Balraj Madhok (1985) argue that the developments in Punjab marked as they are by Sikh terrorism and violence are the "handiwork of those conspiring to dismember India by external aggression and internal extremism through the use of terror" (Singh 1987:1270). While the Government does not back up its assertions of external role, Madhok finds the "Muslim connection" in the conspiracy to split the country. The hub of this so called connection lies in Pakistan. Jeffrey (1986) and Leaf (1985) focus on the developments in
the state of Punjab to identify certain generalities that could be related to the current crisis. Jeffrey's is the familiar modernization-instability explanation. He believes that the development of agrarian technology in Punjab in the 1960's, popularly called the Green Revolution, set the stage for the current developments. He contends, in the words of Singh, that modernization accelerated the emergence of mass society: face to face village communities disintegrated; urbanization, consumerism, and mass literacy inflated expectations; ethnic identities became firmer emblems of occupational competition; rootlessness, alienation, and graduated unemployment nurtured messianic tendencies, especially fundamentalism; and, above all, a revolution took place in communication, particularly political communication. Social change outpaced familiar political practices and the ability of institutions to regulate them (Singh 1987:1271).

One is indeed reminded of the ideas of Samuel Huntington for whom the "primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change" (Huntington 1968:5).

Leaf argues that the crisis in Punjab has resulted from a conflict over divergent patterns of economic and political development favored by the Akali Dal and the Congress respectively. While the former favors some sort of pluralism in the form of decentralization of economic and political relations between the federal government and the states, the latter is more inclined towards a Soviet model, with industrial domination of agriculture, a near
monopolistic party control of the government apparatus and rigid centralization.

Singh divides the national factors centered explanations into those that focus on the nature of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi's leadership and those that base themselves on the modernization-instability thesis (this time applied to the all India level). As far as the former is concerned, it is argued that the Punjab crisis was a deliberate creation of Mrs. Gandhi to further her electoral ambitions. The crisis was created to bolster Hindu vote for her party. In doing so, she reversed her earlier strategy of relying more on block minority and lower caste votes (Kothari and Deshingkar 1985, Gupta 1985, Sathyamurthy 1986).

Marxist interpretations (Gill and Singhal 1984, Surjeet 1985, Bains 1985) consider the relationship between economic policies and the emergence of social classes, the class character of the Indian state, and the process of nationality formation that is associated with the development of capitalism in the country. As Singh states: All Marxists highlight the rapid increase in rural capital formation that began with the Green Revolution and coincided with the formation of a Punjabi Suba. The introduction of modern agricultural practices, they argue, led to peasant differentiation and the emergence of a class of "capitalist" farmers. This development, it is further asserted, sharpened contradictions between the capitalist farmers and the poor peasantry and agricultural laborers, and between the capitalist farmers and the all-India industrial bourgeoisie. Furthermore, in Punjab, these contradictions are said to have reinforced two other social cleavages - caste, in which Sikh Jats (capitalist farmers) intensified the exploitation of Mazbis and Ramadasis (agricultural laborers); and the urban-rural divide, in which the
traditional ascendancy of Hindu mercantile capital, established during the colonial period, was contested by capitalist farmers (Singh 1987:1275).

Citing a lack of clearcut definitions, insufficient empirical evidence, and inadequate attention to the question of level of analysis, Singh concludes by suggesting that "the 'Punjab problem' still stands in need of a rigorous analysis" (Singh, 1987:1277). As he writes:

Overall, the recent publications on the "Punjab problem" share several common shortcomings. There is a profusion of unclear definitions, assumptions and ambiguities. Few attempts have been made to demarcate the relevant analytical levels of the issue. And almost all the studies mentioned are flawed by the lack of sufficient empirical data - from the conspiracy theories to the Marxist class alignments, from the Sikh nationalist interpretations to the regional problems of the Akali Dal, and from the structural changes in the Indian political system to factional infighting in Punjab. Although many of the works examined filled an immediate need to explain dramatic events, their general contribution to an understanding of the subject remains limited. The "Punjab problem" still stands in need of a rigorous analysis (Singh 1987:1277).

The present analysis traces events from the middle and late seventies to the eighties, including the onset of the Akali agitation in mid 1982; the rise of the fundamentalist leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale; the attack by the Indian army on the Golden Temple, the holiest of the Sikh shrines, in June 1984, and the consequent assassination of Mrs. Gandhi six months later followed by the anti-Sikh riots organized mostly by the Congress party and the government (Appendix G; India Today Nov. 30, 1984); the signing of an
accord with moderate elements in the Akali Dal by Rajiv Gandhi, son of the former prime minister who succeeded her to office in July 1985; the government reneging on many of the crucial terms of this agreement, thereby weakening and discrediting moderate Akalis; the defeat of the Rajiv Gandhi's Congress in the parliamentary elections of November 1989 and the acts of omission and commission of the two governments that succeeded the regime of Rajiv Gandhi. Presently the country is once again in a politically uncertain climate. The prime minister, Chandra Shekhar, has resigned calling for parliamentary elections in May of 1991.

The attack on the Golden Temple, the holiest of Sikh shrines, in June 1984, its consequent desecration and the killing of the leader of the resurgence movement Bhindranwale and his lieutenants, gave religious fundamentalism and terrorism a very powerful impulse. This event was the single most important factor in the rise of religious terrorism in the state of Punjab. It not only inflamed the general mass of the Sikhs, who until this period were not very sympathetic to the terrorists, but gave an increasing legitimacy to terrorist actions and pronouncements. Bhindranwale had repeatedly stated that he would die rather than have the holiest of Sikh shrines desecrated by the entrance of the army or the police. By living up to his word, he heightened the credibility of his pronouncements and ensured a legacy marked by assassinations
and heightened terrorism. To compound matters, the army attack was timed to coincide with the celebration by the Sikhs of the 378th anniversary of martyrdom of one of their gurus, Guru Arjan Dev. The latter had also built the Golden Temple. At the time of the attack therefore, many thousand pilgrims were staying in the Golden Temple complex. Hundreds of these, including many women and children, as an eye witness account of the operation (Appendix F) mentions, were killed in the army action.

The subsequent army occupation of Punjab and repression of the Sikhs, especially the youth in rural areas, did not help matters. Singh and Nayar write:

The most galling aspect of the army occupation of the Punjab was the reign of terror let loose in the countryside. As the police accompanied by army jawans combed village after village looking for arms and terrorists, they subjected every young Sikh (never a Hindu) to third degree methods to extort confessions. Some were let-off after a beating; others locked up in police stations and prisons for further questioning. There they continued to rot because it was virtually impossible to find out where they had been taken to (Singh and Nayar 1984:124).

The anti-Sikh pogrom organized under government auspices (PUDR and PUCL, 1984) after the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi (a direct result of Blue Star operation - the army term for the attack on the Golden Temple) was another crucial event in this process. Unofficial estimates reported that nearly 40,000 Sikhs had moved to Punjab in search for more security in the wake of these riots (India Today Jan.15, 1985:1). These riots were a major blow to the national and state-
level forces of secularism in the country. According to the government's own estimate, 2,897 people were killed in these riots, the worst in post independence Indian history. Most of those killed were Sikhs (Facts on File, 1985:310). This is not to mention the thousands rendered homeless and fear stricken by the brutality of the violence. Not only were the riots following Mrs. Gandhi's death inspired by the government, but subsequently, and till today, no major effort has been made to punish those guilty of promoting them. This has vindicated Sikh claims of government sponsorship of these riots.

After months of procrastination, the government appointed the Misra Commission to investigate the matter. Subsequently its terms were amended so that the report could not be made public (Helweg, 1987:146); in August 1987, the report was released and it basically evaded its job by asking for two more committees to finish the task it began (India Today, Aug.31, 1987:39). Indeed, many of those identified as the perpetrators of these riots by independent civil rights bodies have been elevated to ministerial positions (PUDR and PUCL, 1984:Annexure iv). Blue Star, the subsequent repression in the Punjab countryside, and this government inspired pogrom were major factors that heightened the perception of structural injustice among the Sikhs (already there in part due to lack of economic investment by the center in Punjab). The hanging of the two
persons accused of killing Mrs. Gandhi, in January 1989, further inflamed Sikh passions.

As we shall see below, many scholars have made the argument that at least in part the Punjab problem was allowed to be dragged on by Mrs. Gandhi in order to make political gains in what are called the Hindi belt states of the northern part of the country. After a brief flirtation with moderate Akalis, Mrs. Gandhi's son and successor, it appears, continued with that essential political line. This strategy did not garner the dividends expected by the leaders of the Congress, with that party losing significantly in the northern belt in the parliamentary elections of Nov. 1989. The two succeeding prime ministers, despite promising starts, have proven incapable of resolving the Punjab crisis, which in the meanwhile has grown worse as days have gone by. Presently the hard core element, it appears, would not be satisfied short of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan. Increasingly, the distinction between the moderates and the extremists has been allowed to be blurred. All this of course means greater and greater uncertainty of life and security for the millions of Hindus living in Punjab (a state with a predominant Sikh majority) and equally the tens of thousands of Sikhs living outside
the Punjab in predominantly Hindu dominated regions of India\(^1\).

As mentioned in the Introduction, the above developments are best appreciated in the context of the culture, religion and tradition of the Sikhs, especially the Jat Sikhs; the input of elite conflict and elite choices; the impact of advancement of agrarian technology in Punjab, popularly called the Green revolution; and to some extent also the role of external actors like the state of Pakistan, with which the Indian state has had a political rivalry bordering most of the time on political enmity. It is to these factors that we now turn.

Geopolitics and the Culture of the Caste

Punjab lies on the main invasion route to the Indian subcontinent and has played an important role in the history and politics of the region. The intermittent breakdown of central rule and frequent plunder and invasion from the northwest helped to create a situation of uncertainty and chaos that shaped the distribution of land in the region.

\(^1\)The 1981 Census Report did not give a religious breakup of the state unlike the 1971 Report. According to the latter report, the total population of the state was 13,551,060. Among this the Sikhs numbered 8,160,400 (60.2%), Hindus were 5,087,000 (37.6%), Muslims 114,000 (0.8%) and the Christians 162,000 (0.2%) respectively. As a consequence of the events of the last decade the Sikh population has risen by several percentage points, though concrete estimates are unavailable.
The necessary political stability to possess large estates simply did not exist. In addition, the tenacity to resist invasion depends to a significant extent on an all pervasive sense of personal involvement and injury which is largely absent in a social situation characterized by a predominance of exceptionally large landholdings. This legacy still predominates in Punjab, with the bulk of the agrarian population being of middle and rich peasant status.

One estimate adopting the two fold criteria of a) ownership and non-ownership of land and other farm and non farm assets as well as the amount of such ownership and b) the manner in which the land is utilized, i.e., whether it is cultivated with family and/or hired labor or leased out, concludes, that the rich and the middle peasants comprise 23.36% of the total peasant households in the state and control 64.97% of the total cultivated area in the state; the small peasants comprise 20% of the total peasant households and farm 20% of the total cultivated area in the state; and the landless agricultural laborers, mainly belonging to the untouchable castes, Sikh, Hindu, Muslim or Christian, comprise 27% of the rural population in the state. The study also points out that the ranks of the poor peasants, those with operational holdings below 5 acres per household and who operate their farms mainly with family labor, increased three fold during the first phase of the Green Revolution i.e. the period 1961-71 (Dhami, 1981:295-
The amount of land and wealth in peasant hands, particularly the rich and middle peasants, constitute key power resources for a protest movement to be launched (Wolf, 1969:289-91; Alavi, 1965:274-75).

From the social angle, the bulk of the agrarian population in Punjab comprised of the Jats, an agricultural caste, generally accepted to be of Aryan stock (Singh, 1963:14-15). The Jats were "mainly small proprietors and tenants, and a few were landowners" (Pettigrew, 1975:25-26). Being on the main invasion route, they developed private armies and bands for protection. Not only that, political circumstances - the frequent changes of political rule in which an individual could create his power, make the utmost use of, or augment the power he had, fostered a particular cultural tradition among the Jats: they did not regard themselves as subordinate to any other person (Pettigrew, 1975:57).

In this context, the eminent historian of the Sikhs, Khuswant Singh, states:

The Jat was born the worker and the warrior. He tilled his land with his sword girded round his waist. He fought more battles for the defence of his homestead than the Kshatriya, for unlike the martial Kshatriya the Jat seldom fled from his village when the invaders came. And if the Jat was maltreated or if his women were molested by the conqueror on his way to Hindustan, he settled his score by looting the invaders' caravan on their return journey and freeing the women he was taking back. The Punjabi Jat developed an attitude of indifference to worldly possessions and an instinct for gambling with his life against odds. At the same time he became conscious of his role in the defence of Hindustan. His brand of patriotism was at once hostile towards the foreigner and benign, even contemptuous, towards his own countrymen whose fate depended so much on his courage and fortitude (Singh, 1963:15-16).
The word "Punjabi Jat" needs to be stressed in the above quote, for the characteristics referred to cut across the prevailing religions of the period. The subsequent conversion of some of these sections of Jats, a distinct identity with its own history, to Sikhism gave the converts a higher degree of militancy relative to the unconverted Jats. A perusal of historical evidence (Singh, 1963, 1966), reveals that the Jat caste has a sense of pride and a propensity to react to perceived injustice quickly and rather vigorously. Moreover the threshold at which such reaction occurs tends to be rather low.

Caste and Religion

When it was founded in the early part of the sixteenth century, Sikhism was an eclectic, simple religion based on monotheism and social equality. It opposed idol worship and ritual and was peace loving. "Sikhism was born out of a wedlock between Hinduism and Islam after they had known each other for a period of nearly nine hundred years. But once it had taken birth, it began to develop a personality of its own and in due course grew into a faith which had some semblance to Hinduism, some to Islam, and yet had features which bore no resemblance to either" (Singh 1963: 17). Sikh religion developed its "aggressive credo" from the influx of Jats to its fold (Singh, 1963:96). In this
connection Pettigrew (1975:25) mentions that even the present day symbols of the Sikh faith evolved with this influx.

This process began at the time of the sixth Guru of the Sikhs, Guru Hargobind, and reached its culmination with the founding of the Khalsa (the Pure) by the tenth and the last Guru, Gobind Singh, in 1699. Guru Hargobind (1595-1644) fused the temporal and the spiritual for the community, an important task. He constructed the Akal Takht (seat of the Immortal) opposite the Harimandir Sahib in the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Harimandir Sahib represents the seat of spiritual authority for the Sikhs, and to this was added the Akal Takht, the center to guide the Sikhs in their temporal affairs. The Golden Temple, the most sacred shrine for the Sikhs, carries within its precincts the twin centers of Sikh spiritualism and temporalism. Overall, under Hargobind there occurred a "change of emphasis from a peaceful propagation of the faith to the forthright declaration of the right to defend that faith by force of arms" (Singh 1963:66).

Guru Gobind Singh baptized the Sikhs and made the carrying of weapons obligatory. It was also stressed that the use of violence for a sacred and a righteous cause was justified, when all other methods had failed. Khushwant Singh, the eminent Sikh historian, writes, that as Guru Gobind "grew into manhood, he was able to disentangle one strand which ran through the confusion of ideas: that
although love and forgiveness are stronger than hate and revenge, once a person was convinced that the adversary meant to destroy him, it was his duty to resist the enemy with all the means at his disposal, for then it was a battle of the survival, not only of life, but of ideals. It became the dharma yudh (the battle for the sake of righteousness)" (Singh 1963:77). In the Guru's own words,

O Lord, these boons of Thee I ask,
Let me never shun a righteous task,
Let me be fearless when I go to battle,
Give me faith that victory will be mine,
And when comes the time to end my life,
Let me fall in mighty strife (Singh, 1963:96).

The influx of the Jat social identity gave a degree of militancy to the Sikh religion and the latter, in turn, strengthened this militancy by evolving the concept of martyrdom. Two of the ten Sikh Gurus became martyrs in the eyes of the members of their faith. These developments also led to a change of leadership among the Sikhs from the non-militant and urban Khatri caste to the militant Jat. "The rise of militant Sikhism became the rise of Jat power in the Punjab" (Singh 1963:89). Sikhism also became a vehicle for the expression of peasant grievances against the Muslim rulers of the day and also helped in the fight against invaders (Pettigrew, 1975:26). How much of the resistance comprised peasant grievances and how much religious persecution, need not detain us here. Indeed, the thesis of exclusive religious persecution has not been free from
challenge (Pettigrew, 1975:242). For our purposes, it is sufficient to state that the Sikh ethos reflects a belief that the Sikhs were the subject of brutal persecution at the hands of the Mughal rulers and that their ancestors did not let the prestige and glory of their religion suffer. They were prepared to, and did, sacrifice even their lives towards this end. In fact the daily "ardas" (the prayer of the Sikhs) recounts the heroic deeds of their martyred ancestors who suffered torture and brutality but did not give up their faith. Any situation today that might expose Sikhs to perceived religious and political persecution would in all likelihood meet stiff resistance from the community, especially from the Jats.

"Gurudwaras" (places of worship) were built to commemorate such occasions and are places of pilgrimage for the devout. In modern Punjab these gurudwaras number approximately 20,000 and provide a well established organizational setup for the Sikh community to mobilize itself in times of need (India Today, Feb. 28, 1987:10). They serve as a constant reminder to the community of the sacrifices of the Sikh ancestors. In contemporary Punjab, the terrorists who have been killed by the security forces are considered martyrs of the Sikh faith. It has been reported that the entire stretch of border villages in Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Ferozepur districts of Punjab is dotted with memorials to slain terrorists (India Today, Jan
Many of them were shot by the security forces in false "encounters" - i.e. it was reported to the public by the security forces that terrorist(s) of the following name(s) were killed while trying to escape from custody or while they attacked the security forces. Amnesty International, in its recent report on India, has charged the Indian government with illegal killing of scores of Sikh militants since 1987 (Facts on File, 1988:650). The four member Bains committee appointed by Akali chief minister Barnala, after the Akalis came to power in Punjab in September 1985, in a unanimous recommendation accused the "law enforcement agencies in Punjab, including the para-military forces, of having been indulging in terrorism and lawlessness --- In its final report, the committee made a sample study of 35 'encounters' claimed by the police and stated that almost all of them were 'fake'" (Indian Express, February 25, 1986:1).

The Sikh "gurudwaras" are not simply places of worship. They are also places where members of the community as well as others can rest and stay. They represent the ideal of salvation via service to the community. In fact the Sikh slogan of "Degh, Tegh, Fateh" represents the above in a nutshell. Degh is the cauldron in which the community food is cooked, Tegh is sword, and Fateh means victory (Pettigrew, 1975:80).
Commenting on the Sikh tradition in Punjab, Pettigrew goes on to say that the Sikhs had fought and died for their community. The Sikh heritage was a past of 400 years of Muslim persecution: and these 400 years were packed with legends of brave actions. Sikh mythology --- consisted of accounts and tales of ancestors and heroes who in a very recent past fought and died for "community" (Pettigrew, 1975:80).

With this went a strong legitimation for violence in the culture.

But for men, young and old, death was excitement, drama, a proof of their daring, their bravery, as true sons of the Khalsa. The legitimation of killing and violence was historical and cultural. Courage, the willingness to take risks, the absence in the ideology of any concept of defeat and submission and the capacity to impose one self on others, were major values of the culture. (Pettigrew, 1975:59).

Over the period of their history, their have been many instances when Sikhs have been avenging the desecration of their shrines and the killing of their leaders, sympathizers and/or their families. In his time, Guru Gobind Singh himself summoned an ascetic, Lachman Das (renamed Banda Bahadur) and "charged him with the duty of punishing the men who had persecuted the Sikhs and murdered his (i.e. the Guru's) sons" (Singh 1963:101). Pir Buddhu Shah, a resident of Sadhoura, had been hanged by the ruler of Sadhoura, Sardar Usman Khan, for helping Guru Gobind in one of his battles with the Mughals. Banda Bahadur captured Sadhoura in 1709 and hanged Usman Khan for hanging the Pir (Singh 1981:882). Banda avenged the killing of the infant sons of
the Guru by sacking Sirhind and killing the Mughal governor, Nawab Wazir Khan, who had been responsible for the deed (Singh 1981:164). Similarly in 1748, Lakhpat Rai, a minister of the governor of Lahore, was killed for committing atrocities on the Sikhs (Singh 1981:1055). The most famous of these instances was the beheading of the Mughal governor, Massa Rangar, by two Sikhs. Rangar had been guilty in Sikh eyes of committing innumerable atrocities against the Sikhs.

This tradition, in some fashion, was also in evidence during the movement for the freedom of the country from British rule. Patriotic Sikhs like Bhagat Singh and Udham Singh killed British officials who had been responsible for brutalities meted against protestors. Bhagat Singh and his colleagues shot dead a British police officer, Saunders, who it was believed, had assaulted and injured, during a demonstration, Lala Lajpat Rai, a freedom fighter. Udham Singh killed in England Sir Michael O'Dwyer, in March 1940, to avenge what is popularly known in Indian history as Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. Both Bhagat Singh and Udham Singh were subsequently hanged. During the movement for Gurudwara reform spearheaded by the Akali Dal in the early 1920's, while the bulk of the Akali party was committed to non-violence, police atrocities on peaceful Akali demonstrators led a group of Akalis, known as Babbar
Akalis, to organize an underground terrorist movement for a short span of time (Singh 1963:205).

More recently in the late sixties and early seventies, in the wake of what is known as the (Maoist inspired) Naxalite movement in some parts of the country, some mainly rural Sikh youth in Punjab resorted to terrorist actions against police officers and landlords. Thus, both in avowedly secular movements, as the last one to be mentioned, as well as in Sikh wars against their opponents in the 18th century, one witnesses a fairly substantial amount of violence by Sikhs and the frequent incidence of revenge. In their armed struggles against stronger powers in the 18th century, the Sikhs also became famous for their tactics of "hit, run, and turn back to hit again" (Singh 1963:108).

Culture and religion may not by themselves help to bring about a situation marked by political violence. But both have the tendency to heighten the impact, and even condition the response of groups who have perceptions of injustice. There is a dialectical relationship between the various elements of a social situation and it may be very difficult, and perhaps impossible at times, to analyze them separately. The slicing of reality into segments, done for the purpose of analysis, does, of necessity, injustice to its holistic and dialectical nature. Keeping this in mind, it is worthwhile to consider now the long term changes in the
social structure of Punjab in the context of new agrarian technology introduced in the mid-1960s.

The Politics of the Green Revolution

In India, the kulak (if we may use that word) has marched boldly through the door of politics and is very much a force to be reckoned with in Indian polity (Byres, 1981:445).

The national level Congress party and the regional and the Jat Sikh dominated Akali Dal are the two main contenders for political power in the state of Punjab. The Akali Dal came into existence in the early part of this century in the context of a protest movement against British rule for the reform of Sikh religious places. It has had an anti-imperialist tradition and after independence it was the main force which initiated, and eventually won in 1967, the creation of a state of Punjab based on linguistic considerations. In its struggles, the Akali Dal has had not only to contend with the Congress but also the Punjabi Hindu dominated Jana Sangh (today called the Bharatiya Janata Party). The latter party though sharing a common language and culture nevertheless took little initiative to side with the Akali Dal for fear of domination by the Sikhs in a state where the Sikhs would be in a majority. The history of this relationship is rather intricate and need not detain us here, but it has generally been the case that the Akali
party has had to launch agitations, basically non-violent political protest movements, for demands that a number of enlightened Hindus and even the Indian Left thought were in the interests of the state of Punjab.

During Congress rule in the state (1972-77), the Akali Dal voiced demands that related to control by the Sikhs of Sikh religious places all over the country; the return to Punjab of some Punjabi speaking areas from the neighboring states of Haryana and Rajasthan, originally left out when the state was formed in 1967; decentralization of power in center-state relations; better terms of trade for agriculture; and the recognition by the Center of Punjab's rights as the sole riparian state over the waters of the rivers Ravi and Beas. In 1976, during the emergency, Mrs. Gandhi as prime minister had decided, in an award, the share of water of the respective states from these rivers. The Anandpur Sahib resolution (1973) is a formal document embodying the Akali demands (Appendix E).

When the Congress was replaced by the Akali-Janata coalition (the Punjabi Hindu dominated Jan Sangh was the main component of the Janata Party in Punjab) in 1977, the Akali government did little to press for these demands apart from filing a case on the river waters dispute in the Supreme Court in 1978. When the Congress regained power nationally and in the state in 1980, Mrs. Gandhi persuaded, after a slight revision of her 1976 award, the Congress
chief minister, Darbara Singh, to withdraw the river waters case filed by the erstwhile Badal government from the Supreme Court. At this point the Akalis initiated an agitation for the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution. The developments following this agitation have led to the present crisis of terrorism and violence in the state. After all, their numbers have increased and the landless have also suffered in terms of wages. The central government under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi had its own axe to grind, and there was the rise of fundamentalism, bolstered in part by Akali and Congress factionalism and in part by the ruling party at the center.

The initial agitation of the Akalis is best appreciated in the context of the Green Revolution and its impact on regional and national politics. The Green Revolution was introduced in some regions of India in the mid-1960s, including the Punjab, and it led to the introduction of high yielding varieties of seeds, better farm management techniques and other inputs required for a vibrant agriculture. It had significant impact on the prosperity of the agricultural sector in general, and more particularly on those who owned larger units of land. According to one estimate, the widespread prevalence of irrigation across all sizes of landholdings - a distinctive feature of the Punjab agrarian economy - enabled the Green revolution to bring all-round general prosperity to the peasantry. The gains,
however, came in proportion to the initial land holdings; in other words, those with initially larger landholdings got more out of this revolution than those with smaller landholdings. This resulted in a significant rise of inequality in the agricultural sector in the state (Bhalla and Chadha, 1982:87).

The Jats amongst the Sikhs, who are primarily an agricultural caste and enjoy a high social status in the state, were the main beneficiaries of this revolution. There is disagreement among scholars as to the exact proportion of Jats among the Sikhs. According to one estimate (Puri, 1983:117), the Jat Sikhs are approximately 20% of the Sikh population and they own 60% of the agricultural land in the state. Another estimate points out that 35% to 66% is the proportion of the Jat Sikhs to the total Sikh population in the different districts of Punjab (Kumar, 1984:50). The 1931 census mentioned that 50% of the total Sikh population were Jats (Pettigrew, 1975:35). Wallace (1986:363) gives an estimate of 33%.

The number and proportion of landless has increased in the state due to the impact of the transformation in agrarian technology. In the years 1961-1981, the landless nearly doubled in number from approximately 17% of the total agricultural work force in 1961 to 38% in 1981 (Helweg, 1987:151). In terms of wage increases this segment of the rural population has not benefited very much. "Inspection
of the figures show that in the Punjab as a whole, in the period 1966-77, for all operations, the index of real wages reached a peak in 1970 and showed a downward trend thereafter, although output has proceeded ever upwards. In all cases the 1977 figure is below the 1970 one, and for the seven years after 1970 in ploughing, sowing, seeding and harvesting real wages fell in five of the years" (Byres, 1981:439).

In the absence of a specifically "political" model, one should expect from the aforementioned, that the landless and the poor peasants should be the spearhead of unrest in the state. Indeed, some have heralded the Green Revolution as a "prelude" to a red one (Sharma, 1973:77). Given our model, however, this should not be the case. As Eric Wolf argues "But, ultimately, the decisive factor in making a peasant rebellion possible lies in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it. A rebellion cannot start from a situation of complete impotence; the powerless are easy victims" (Wolf, 1969:289-91).

Most of the landless in the state are the Sikh untouchables (an anomaly for a religion that believes in a casteless society and whose sacred book, the Guru Granth Sahib, includes hymns written by some of the untouchable saints of the times) who hardly have had any sympathy for the Jat-Sikh dominated Akali Dal, which was the spearhead of the initial movement for the implementation of the Anandpur
Sahib resolution. The Sikh lower and even the upper urban castes have been more or less opposed to the Akali Dal and have voted either for the Communists or the Congress Party. This was well established till recently, when the desecration of the Golden Temple by Mrs. Gandhi in June 1984 swung these sections to vote for the Akali party in 1985.

The poor peasantry has in the past aligned itself politically with the upper Jat castes, and therefore the Akali party, because it shares a similar social status with them despite its economic inferiority to its allies. Besides, in some respects the Green Revolution has benefited the poor peasantry also, though far less than it has the upper classes in the agrarian sector of Punjab, as already seen above. Thus, reasons embedded in the history and the caste structure of the region account for a "mystification" of rural class consciousness and thereby the spearheading of rural unrest in the state by the landless laborers and the poor peasants.

Structural changes in the agricultural proletariat also have contributed to this mystification (Byres, 1981:434). This has occurred because of the increased demand for permanent labor by the rich households because of the time bound operations that are required by the new technology. It appears that many of the local landless have gotten better wages, longer contracts, and advance payments because of this development. The demand for casual labor is mainly
fulfilled by migration from the neighboring states that are more impoverished, like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The inflow of migrant labor in the state on a significant scale started around the mid-seventies. The sharp rise in wheat production and the short time gap between harvesting and sowing necessitated a large labor force. Mechanization in the form of combine harvesters could not cope with this tremendous labor requirement. Thus the migrant laborers came in handy. Almost all of them non-Sikh, they are also a cause of concern for those who would like to alter the religious composition of the state. While the dominant sections of the predominant Jat peasantry in the state need them, they also threaten Sikh numbers in the state. At one point in time, Akali leader Tohra voiced the demand that they should not be allowed to vote in Punjab. Extremist groups in Punjab have resorted to terrorist actions against these laborers also, but as the Indian Express reported in 1985, "the economic compulsions of the farming community have, however, checked this trend as in the absence of alternative measures, it was the farmer who stood to suffer from inadequate migrant laborers" (Indian Express, May 2, 1985:5). It needs also be mentioned, that only those rural households who employ significant outside labor in their farm operations stood to suffer, in other words, the richer sections among the Jat Sikh peasantry.
An intense conflict of interest between the migrant workers and the indigenous landless has perhaps not emerged because of the fact that the local landless got better deals as mentioned above. In the absence of this structural change in the agrarian proletariat, migration would certainly have brought down the wages of the landless overall. But nevertheless, a recent survey (Kumar, 1984:84) documented the hostility of the local labor to the migratory workers and the positive attitude towards the migratory trend of the rich and middle peasants. Bhushan Kapoor (1987) also demonstrates in an empirical manner the discrimination faced by the migratory labor in Punjab.

The distribution among castes of ministers in the Punjab state government from 1952 to 1980 is a good indicator of the rising clout of the Jat Sikhs in Punjab with the coming of the Green Revolution. In the period 1952-56, Jat Sikhs constituted 25% of the total ministers in the state, in 1957-66, they were 29.2% and in the period 1967-80, they constituted 48.7%. The latter period is the one that felt the effect of the Green Revolution (Kumar, 1984:48).

Not only in Punjab, but in the entire country, a new elite has emerged from the agrarian areas where the impact of the Green Revolution was felt, and has come into a clash with the industrial interests insofar as it demands cheaper agricultural inputs and higher prices for agricultural products (Ray, 1988:159-63; Satyamurthy, 1986:49).
According to Ray, the efforts of this new elite to alter policy towards its interests have not been successful at the center "because the industrial interests, with their money power and better rapport with civil servants in New Delhi, have generally out-maneuvered them. As a result, the rural rich have come to believe that unless the unitary-centralist direction of India's development planning and administration is reversed and a substantial measure of autonomy is secured for the states, their interests will continue to be neglected by the national government" (Ray 1988:162).

It must be borne in mind that to demand a better deal for the farm sector, it is not necessary to have experienced a decline in terms of trade. Even in the absence of a shift in terms of trade, protests can emanate from the rural elite. All that is required is a discrepancy between perceived needs and perceived want satisfaction. Generally want satisfaction and income increase does generate the appetite for more. On this point, De Tocqueville very pertinently states that,

patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. For the mere fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others and they now appear more galling; people may suffer less, but their sensibility is exacerbated (De Tocqueville in Davies ed. 1971:96).
It is this basic idea that has subsequently evolved into theories of relative deprivation, J-curve, and the like (Aya, 1979:53-60). The absence of a decline in the terms of trade to the detriment of the rural sector is hence not a necessary condition for rural protest to emerge. The rural elite, primarily because of its rise of expectations and given the power resources at its command, could have indulged in protests for a still better deal. But here, in this concrete instance, we witness a combination of a rise of expectations and deteriorating terms of trade for agricultural products. As Ray mentions,

Since 1975-76, the price index of agricultural products has lagged behind that of manufactured products. Under pressures from urban industrial and professional interests, the national government has disturbed parity between the prices of agricultural and industrial products by attempting to siphon surpluses from agriculture to industry (Ray, 1988:162).

The situation hence has a double edged character to it.

It was in the above context that the Jat Sikh dominated Akali Dal launched an agitation for the implementation of the Anandpur Resolution soon after they lost power in the state in 1980. In 1981 the Akali Dal came out with a comprehensive list of demands that included economic, religious, territorial and political issues (Appendix D). These were a compromise between the demands of the various Akali factions. The seat of the agitation was also shifted to the holy city of Amritsar in the August of 1982 and the
agitation was renamed the Dharamyudh Morcha - the battle for righteousness, in consonance with Sikh wars of the past.
In view of the above analysis, we can now better appreciate the inputs from the elite power groups into the Punjab situation.

Elite Input

Analysts of the Indian scene have discerned a process of change in the culture of Indian elite since the mid-1960s. Amal Ray (1988:148) mentions the "tradition of elite accommodation" prior to the struggle for the office of prime ministership between Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress rival Morarji Desai. For the "first time in free India, the tradition of elite accommodation and consensus in the Congress party suffered a serious fracture" (Ray, 1988:150). This was again made very obvious in 1974, when Mrs. Gandhi broke the rules of the political game and imposed internal emergency in the country and put much of the opposition behind bars. Another dynamic in the rise of religious resurgence and religious terrorism in Punjab came from various elite factions and political party rivalries both at the local and national level.

In an interesting study, Pettigrew (1975:26) points out that the faction is a traditional form of organization for the Jat Sikhs and has represented "a relatively persistent
and typical mode of organization." With factionalism among the Jats, who are primarily in the Akali Party, went the rivalry at the party level between the two main contenders for political power in the state, the Akali Dal and the Congress Party, and also the rivalry between various Congress factions. All the above led to a significant boost to fundamentalism in the state embodied in the rise of the fundamentalist leader Bhindranwale.

After losing the 1977 national elections, Mrs. Gandhi initiated a change in her electoral strategy - a greater reliance on majority i.e. Hindu communalism - to win power (Satyamurthy, 1986:47-48). In Punjab, the Congress sought to implement the new strategy by boosting Sikh fundamentalism in order to embarrass their moderate and non-fundamentalist Akali rivals (who mobilized their constituencies on religious appeals). At the same time the Congress also sought to stoke Hindu communal fears of Sikh domination in Punjab (Tully 1985:57-58, Helweg 1987:142-143). This effort found fertile demographic and economic soil in the state because Hindus live primarily in the urban areas and are occupied mainly with trade, while the Sikhs live predominantly in the rural areas and work mainly in agriculture (D'Souza, 1982:792). The growing nexus between trade and agriculture as a result of the Green Revolution had already sharpened the conflict between the two
communities, to which now were added the machinations of the Congress.

Mrs. Gandhi was hardly interested in a negotiated settlement with the Akali Dal consequent to the agitation launched by the latter party in the middle of 1982. Indeed it was alleged many a time, and not by supporters of the Akali Dal only, that the government was simply not interested in talking and resolving the issue, but had a vested interest in letting this agitation go on. India Today in its critique of the White Paper (issued by the Government of India) that described the sequence of events that led to the attack on the Golden Temple (It called it "Operation Whitewash") wrote, "What it does not say, on the other hand, is why did the talks suddenly break down on November 17, 1982 when the two sides had come closest to settlement and a draft agreement had, in fact, been written out. The Akalis have been alleging that this happened because Mrs. Gandhi "resiled". In the absence of any explanation in the White Paper, it seems, this is another inconvenient point the Government decided to evade" (India Today, July 31, 1984:38). Singh and Nayar (1984:120) also corroborate this. As an editorial in the Economic and Political Weekly stated, "A negotiated settlement in Punjab would raise the credibility of the Dal and this is clearly an unwelcome prospect for the Congress(I). With the partisan interests of the Congress(I) guiding the policies
of the central government, it became expedient to continue to act in an ad hoc manner with scant regard for the long-term consequences of such an action" (Feb. 18, 1984:265). This also explains perhaps the willingness of Mrs. Gandhi to accept the religious demands of the Akali Dal with relatively less opposition compared to the territorial and secular. It was calculated that this would also boost fundamentalism in the state.

Moreover, during Mrs. Gandhi's rule a process of centralization and personalization of political authority took place that did not favor the assertion of regional demands and identities. She was reluctant to allow non-Congress governments to remain in power in the states and repeatedly dismissed them on one pretext or the other. These "structural changes in the national government, along with the political behavior of the Congress(I) party leaders, placed further limits on the system's capacity to deal effectively with the demands of regional and ethnic elites, as well evidenced in its dealings with the Akali agitation in Punjab" (Malik 1986:361). Coupled with all this was the tendency of the Akali Dal to resort to agitational methods when out of power in an effort to reverse "electoral defeat by resorting to street politics" (Malik 1986:352).

The clash between the Akalis and Nirankaris (a heterodox Sikh sect, according to many Sikhs) in April 1978 was used
by the Congress, then in opposition in the country and in the state, to whip up Sikh fundamentalism in Punjab (Tully, 1985:58-59) and to embarrass the moderate Akali government that was in power. In the March 1979 Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC- an elected body of the Sikhs that manages the Sikh Gurudwaras) elections the Congress supported the fundamentalist Bhindranwale against the Akali Dal (Puri, 1983:116). After its accession to power in 1980 at the center and the state, the Congress kept on building Bhindranwale up, for example, in the way he was arrested for the murder of the journalist Lala Jagat Narain and then released (Helweg, 1987:143; Tully, 1985:52-73). In consonance with its policy of boosting majority communalism in the state, in the 1980 Assembly elections, the Congress leadership drastically changed the religious composition of the Congress Legislature party to the detriment of the Sikhs (Puri, 1983:117).

In the course of events, however, Bhindranwale fell out with the Congress but "by surrendering justice to petty political gains the government itself created the ogre who was to dominate the last years of Mrs. Gandhi and to shadow her until her death" (Tully, 1985:71). Not to be left behind in its political rivalry with the Congress, the moderate Akali Dal now started wooing the fundamentalist Sant Bhindranwale to side with them with regard to the demands with which they had launched the agitation (Tully,
1985:72). Soon there was a joint agitation of the fundamentalist and the moderate sections of the Akalis for a mixture of religious, economic, and political demands.

The various moderate Akali factions, in their rivalry, also adopted fundamentalist postures depending on the circumstances. Thus, to embarrass the Akali chief minister, Badal, his rival Akalis blew up a clash with the heterodox sect of the Nirankaris in April 1978 (Gandhi, 1981:59). This was a major boost to fundamentalism in the state from within the moderate Akali ranks apart from the Congress party as seen earlier. This process also ultimately resulted in Bhindranwale taking refuge in the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, the Golden Temple, with the connivance and perhaps the encouragement of Tohra, one of the faction leaders and the head of the SGPC, the elected Sikh body which controlled the Sikh shrines. This dynamic is still being witnessed after so much tragedy that has occurred in the state and with the Sikhs in particular. In November 1986, Tohra, who "had allowed militant groups to use the shrines as headquarters," got reelected to this body, "and upon his re-election he set about dismantling the safeguards intended to keep extremists from seizing the sites" (Facts on File, 1986:926).

Akali factionalism has very frequently also involved the Akal Takht (the seat of the Immortal), which is located in the Golden Temple, and which is the seat of the supreme
religious authority for the Sikhs. The authority of the Takht is exercised by Sikh head priests who are appointees of the SGPC. Very often the faction that controls the SGPC can embarrass its opponent Akali factions in control of the state legislature via the edicts of the Akal Takht. Thus S. S. Barnala, an Akali chief minister, was punished for allowing the police and para-military forces to invade the Golden Temple during his chief ministership in April 1986. Later he was even excommunicated from the Sikh religion for indulging in activities harmful to the Sikh religion. These edicts of the Akal Takht have also been applied to Sikh members of the Congress party. Thus the Home Minister of India, Buta Singh, was also excommunicated for allowing the army to desecrate the Golden Temple.

The rivalry within leaders of the Congress in Punjab is another factor worth noting. This was mainly between two arch rivals - state Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, and the then Union Home Minister, Giani Zail Singh. On returning to power Mrs. Gandhi had appointed both knowing full well that they were political enemies. "It was just because Mrs Gandhi did not want politicians to be able to command any independent influence that she did her best to prevent any of her colleagues from becoming too powerful in their home states" (Tully, 1985:63). While the Chief Minister wanted a hard line on Bhindranwale and the fundamentalists, the Home Minister, to embarrass him, undermined his efforts. In fact
Giani Zail Singh and Mrs. Gandhi's son originally drew the plan of boosting up fundamentalism to embarrass their Akali rivals. Darbara Singh was known to be secular minded (Tully, 1985:63-66). The scenario of an administration at odds with itself, one wing supporting and the other opposing fundamentalism, the moderate Akalis vying with each other, and the political rivalry between the two leading contenders for power in the state, Akali Dal and Congress, provided the necessary space in the political structure for fundamentalism to gain strength.

In the wake of the above, fundamentalism grew and ultimately Mrs. Gandhi, pursuing her strategy of majority communalism, sent in the army to the Golden Temple in June of 1984, killing Bhindranwale and many of his lieutenants. This incensed the vast Sikh masses, the bulk of whom still were not yet sympathetic to extremist and fundamentalist slogans. Given the ethos and culture of the community outlined above, it was not surprising that Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated a short while after this attack on the holiest of the Sikh shrines. Sikh grievances mounted still further when under the nose of the Congress administration and with its encouragement, Sikhs were brutally massacred in various parts of India (Appendix G; India Today Nov. 30, 1984).
The state of Punjab has a 553 kilometer border with Pakistan that is marked by ravines and elephant grass. It is thus relatively easy to cross the border for smuggling and other such activities. Pakistan is a country with which India has fought three wars and, from the security standpoint, Indo-Pakistan relationship has been a predominant concern for the Indian government. Without naming anyone but in an obvious reference to Pakistan's support of Sikh terrorists, a White Paper released by the Indian government in July of 1984 mentioned "active support from certain foreign sources with deep rooted interest in the disintegration of India" (Facts on File, 1984:588-89). In August 1986, legislation was passed to create a five km. militarized zone on the Indian side of the border with Pakistan (Facts on File, 1986:798), and in January 1987 the Indian army and air force were placed on maximum alert because of tensions between the two countries arising out from border maneuvers. At this time the army also sealed the Punjab border with Pakistan (Facts on File, 1987:45).

The international dimension is another power resource with the fundamentalists and terrorists today. India has witnessed a number of hijackings of their aircraft to Pakistan and many arrested terrorists have also confessed to being trained in Pakistan. India Today (Feb. 15, 1987:52-
55) describes in detail the various terrorist training camps set up in Pakistan.

While the resurgence of Sikh fundamentalism in Punjab can be attributed primarily to internal factors in the country, the international dimension came to play a part after fundamentalism and subsequently terrorism had grown significantly and become a problem for the leadership. Once nurtured by the factors mentioned previously, Sikh fundamentalism and terrorism have been supported and encouraged by India's traditional enemy. Interestingly and paradoxically, Sikh ethos and history, as mentioned earlier, have been built on a past that consists of Muslim persecution and the brave resistance to it of Sikh ancestors. Politics indeed makes strange bedfellows for the state of Pakistan does indeed glorify that period in Indian history that the Sikhs and Hindus both condemn as bigoted and sectarian. This said, all the same, the geo-political dimension of the situation, Punjab being a border state and the historical animosity of the two neighbors, India and Pakistan, should not be overlooked in an analysis that seeks to explain the politics of Sikh resurgence and terrorism in the contemporary epoch.
Conclusion

In recent years several specifically politico-economic and contextual factors have boosted Sikh religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the Punjab province of India: the history, culture and social structure of the region; the characteristics of the Sikh religion and the Jat Sikh caste; long term changes in the agrarian social structure; elite and governmental inputs; and the machinations of political parties, factions and politicians to win and maintain power. There are some similarities evidenced with the contemporary resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism (Antoun and Hegland, 1987:248-50). In the Sikh case too, we see the characteristics of activism, identity assertion, and participation by the relatively well off.

While not denying the role of factors like anomie and the social dislocation and psychological vacuum caused by modernization, I believe that these factors need to be treated as hypotheses that are complementary and not rival to my analysis. This is one point of departure from analysts like Hegland who stress that anomie and the motivating factors behind the involvement of religious resurgence movements in politics (as for example the emergence to power of an economic group) are competing

In addition to anomie and other psychological causes, religious fundamentalism can also develop a mass base because of its efforts in the area of social reform. In rural Punjab for example, the appeal of fundamentalism on women in the context of high consumption of liquor by the male members of society cannot be under-estimated. Surely, only a naive analysis will overlook these support factors. Bhindranwale in Punjab, for example, threatened to burn those who drank liquor.

In the context of social reform and the rise of Bhindranwale to popularity in Punjab two incidents cited by Singh and Nayar (1984:27-28) are worth mentioning. One was of a Hindu married woman who was being pestered by her in-laws to get money from her parents, a pretty common occurrence in India.

One day a young girl came to see Bhindranwale who held court on the roof of the Akal Takht. She clutched his feet and sobbed out her story of how she was maltreated by her husband's family for failing to extract more money from her parents and of her husband's unwillingness to take her side. Bhindranwale asked her name and where she lived. "So you are a daughter of the Hindus," he said. "Are you willing to become the daughter of a Sikh?" She nodded. Bhindranwale sent a couple of his armed guards to fetch the girl's family. An hour later a very frightened trio consisting of the girl's husband and his parents were brought to his presence. "Is this girl a daughter of your household?" he demanded. They admitted she was. "She tells me that you want money from her father. I am her father." He placed a tray full of currency notes before them and told them, "take whatever you want." The three fell at his feet and craved forgiveness. "This time I will let you off. But the next
time this girl comes to me with any complaint you know what I will do to you!"

The other incident concerned villagers who complained of being forced to pay bribes to some policemen of their area. Bhindranwale likewise summoned these policemen to his court and got them to return the bribe back to the villagers. Later on however, the authors allege, that Bhindranwale started offering such services for money.

Nevertheless, the failure of society to address widely prevalent social evils, and the efforts of religious fundamentalism to address such issues was also responsible for the spread of fundamentalism. A study of such causal factors and their link with the rise of fundamentalism is the task of the respective disciplines that deal with these subjects. Therefore, contrary to the opinion of Hegland cited above, my stress is on the adjacency of psychological and social factors to the rise of fundamentalism to the politico-economic motivations, and not their rivalry. These two explanations are not mutually exclusive but are a part of an integral explanation of the rise of religious fundamentalism.

The prevailing political economy determines, to a significant extent, the social color of a situation. Thus today in the Sikh religion, little emphasis is given to Sikhism's strong traditional belief in social equality, opposition to the caste system, and belief in a ritual free
and simple life. Indeed, the holy book of the Sikhs, as mentioned before, is adorned with verses from saints who belonged to the untouchable castes. The overwhelming stress, on the other hand, is today placed on struggle and sacrifice for a righteous cause. The historian Khuswant Singh mentions that the evils associated with caste entered Sikhism at the time of Ranjit Singh (Singh, 1963:289). The above is explained better in the context of the political economy outlined above, though it needs also to be mentioned that even today the virulence of caste is relatively less in Sikhism as compared to orthodox Brahmanical Hinduism, for example.

The government of Rajiv Gandhi continued to place political gain above principle and essentially relied on repressive measures for a solution that required political acumen and willingness to take risks. In July 1985 Gandhi signed an agreement with the Akali Dal which led to a withdrawal by the Akali Dal of its agitation for the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution and a considerable decrease in terrorism. Subsequently, step by step, the government backed out of its own agreement. In May 1987, the central government dismissed the popularly elected, Akali Dal-led Barnala state government, ostensibly for its failure to bring peace and communal harmony to the state, but actually to win political gains in the forthcoming state election in the neighboring state of
Haryana. Terrorism witnessed an increase once again in the state. The Akali moderates have a no less enviable record. When in power, all of their legislators were accommodated in powerful ministerial and/or high official positions (India Today, Feb. 28, 1987:14). None of the legislators wanted to be left behind in the race for power and the Chief Minister in order to keep every one happy gave every legislator some important position or the other. One is reminded of Pettigrew's remark:

Throughout history the [Sikh] community has been broken into various political coalitions and never represented by any single political allegiance or alliance. Unwittingly, the effect of this pattern has always been that it has been pregnant with the possibilities of guarding the community on all fronts or of betraying it on all fronts (Pettigrew, 1975:33).

The defeat of the Gandhi government in the November 1989 general elections raised high hopes. One of the first things that the new prime minister, V.P. Singh, did was to convene an all-Party meeting to solve the Punjab crisis. Not surprisingly, among the directives to the government handed down by the meeting were withdrawal of repressive legislation and punishing those guilty of the November 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The Congress party opposed this resolution and was isolated.

Internal factionalism, a perennial problem of the Indian opposition, brought down the V.P. Singh government. It would, however, be wrong to state that Singh had made more
than a promising start. His government was not willing to hold elections in the state, perhaps due to the fear of seeing a government come to power that had very close links with separatists. In doing so Singh lost the support of the Akali Dal (M) faction, lead by S. S. Mann, considered close to the militants. Commenting on this, India Today wrote that "by eschewing elections, V.P. Singh has shown lack of political will, and has squandered one more chance of a solution." It pointed out the dangers of continued President's rule in the state in that it would "make the moderate Akalis increasingly vulnerable to militant rhetoric" (India Today Oct. 15, 1990:45-48). In its August 15th issue, the journal wrote,

No government could have asked for a better beginning on an issue as contentious as Punjab. And yet it would require special talent to undo all the initial gains as this government has done. Rajiv Gandhi's departure itself had opened up new possibilities of rapprochement. Then V.P. Singh made his historic open-jeep, no-flak-jacket odyssey to Amritsar. There was also the great hope in S.S. Mann. Today, after changing two governors, the government is back to square one. Killings have reached unprecedented levels -- The government's chance was to make a bold initiative in the very beginning. But now it has pushed itself into a corner where it has no option but to perpetuate the old Congress(I) policy (India Today Aug. 15, 1990:26).

Indeed after the accord between Rajiv Gandhi and the moderate Akali leader, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal in July 1985, this was the second chance to address the structural grievances of the Sikhs, and it was squandered through incompetence, countervailing pressures, and lack of boldness on the part of the central leadership.
V.P. Singh was replaced by Chandra Shekhar, a party rival. Chandra Shekhar was elected prime minister because of the support given to him from the outside by the Congress Party of Rajiv Gandhi. Chandra Shekhar was one of the few opposition politicians who had opposed Mrs. Gandhi's Punjab policies and Blue Star. Within a couple of months he also resigned thus setting the stage for general elections in May of 1991. As to what will happen in the future, it only remains to be seen. If the people elect the Congress, chances for a solution are very bleak. In the absence of a Congress victory also, the prospects for the future are not very good. While historical, cultural and economic factors give the Sikhs sizable political clout, it should not be forgotten that they remain a tiny minority in India - only 2% of the total Indian population. At times it may be rather difficult for majorities to accept the viewpoint of such tiny minorities. With all this there is a hard core Sikh element that has lost its faith in the political structure, legitimacy of government, the various parties including the Akali moderates, and is demanding an independent state of Khalistan. One source has listed eight Sikh extremist organizations (Kumar, 1984:78-79). The Telegraph (Jan 7, 1990) mentioned four prominent terrorist groups - Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), Bhindranwale Tiger Force (BTF) and the Babbars. These groups indulge in terrorist activities
like killing innocent Hindu bus passengers in the state and outside, planting bombs at public places, and also killing those who oppose them and their families. Additionally they also kill police officers and prominent politicians. Basically the terrorists want to promote a Hindu backlash on the Sikhs outside Punjab, thereby facilitating Sikh migration into Punjab, and an emigration of the Hindus from Punjab to other parts of India. In this way they hope to drastically alter the population composition of the state. This is viewed as a critical step towards the founding of an independent Sikh state. The Indian government in the anti-Sikh riots following Mrs. Gandhi's death did play into the hands of the terrorists when it sought to hold the entire Sikhs responsible for the deed. Such acts have a tendency to forge even stronger links between the terrorists and the masses whose interests they claim to represent. Rubenstein lamenting the fact that even the so called terrorism experts fall into this trap writes:

What the terrorism experts should understand - but apparently do not wish to acknowledge - is that retaliation based on the principle of collective responsibility for terrorist actions follows precisely the adversary's script. When President Ronald Reagan sent a U.S. task force across the "line of death" in March 1986 to confront the Libyans in the Gulf of Sidra, Abu Nidal smiled. And when American bombers based in England attacked Tripoli in April, killing some forty Libyans, including Khaddafy's adoptive infant daughter, in retaliation for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque frequented by American GI's, he rejoiced. Indeed, if Reagan did not exit, it would be necessary for Abu Nidal to create him (Rubenstein 1987:xvi).
The border status of the state is another crucial element to be considered in the demand of the terrorists for an independent state.

Regarding the killings by terrorists, it may also be mentioned that Sikhs, who are members of the state's police forces or who oppose terrorist activities, are as much victims of terrorist activities as Hindus. Thus according to one estimate in 1988, out of the 1949 people who fell victim to terrorist bullets, 1044 were Sikhs. Similarly the figures for 1989 are 742 Sikhs out of a total of 1168, and for 1990 (till August 31st), 999 out of 1437 (India Today, October 15, 1990:49). Having said this, it needs also to be pointed out that the terrorist's venom is only poured on those Sikhs who politically oppose them -- in the press, politics, academic institutions. The ordinary Sikh does not, relatively speaking, fear for his life at terrorist hands. He, on the other hand, apprehends, particularly if he lives in the rural areas of districts most affected by terrorism, that he may lose his life to state terrorism. Thus the Hindu fears for his life in Punjab, the Sikh within Punjab is afraid of the central law enforcement authorities and outside Punjab he fears a revisitation of what happened to Sikhs after Mrs. Gandhi's death. The picture is hardly encouraging for the masses living in Punjab and for the Sikhs outside Punjab.
The repressive measures of government, rather than serving to crush the terrorists, give them stronger grounds for the beliefs that they already possess. The various government(s) in this respect do not even take minimal steps to woo these elements back into the mainstream such as by implementing Rajiv Gandhi's accord of July 1985 with the Sikh moderates and thereby providing a somewhat conducive atmosphere in the state to the process of political normalization. This can only be a halting step for in the meanwhile, attitudes have hardened and much blood has been spilt on both sides of the divide. Any government in New Delhi, seeking to root out terrorism in the state only by means of law and order, has to recognize the implications of the legend of the region at the time of the brutal persecution of the Sikhs by the Mughal governor of Punjab, Mir Mannu:

Mir Mannu is our sickle,
We the fodder for him to mow,
The more he reaps, the more we grow

(Singh, 1963:140).
In doing time series studies of single countries, it should be feasible to keep the statistical analysis firmly grounded in historical reality. One is essentially doing a statistical case study. In the past, cross-national analyses have occasionally shown a tendency to become detached from history; this is fatal for any study intended to be taken seriously by non-statisticians (Hamilton 1981:236).

It is my contention that insurgent terrorism is a gruesome political weapon that arises in response to state policies under certain historical, cultural, and politico-economic circumstances. In this respect Hyams' (1975) assertion that it is born out of "intolerable conditions" is valid. The only point that needs to be stressed is that socialization and resource levels of a community determine the threshold when conditions become "intolerable."

Rubenstein's (1987) assertion that insurgent terrorism is generated by grievances does not adequately stress that the adoption of this method by groups, with legitimization of actions rather hard to find, suggests that the grievances are of a structured nature and that perhaps other methods
have been tried and exhausted. One must also consider that terrorism could simply be an expression of anger by the young and the proud against continued regime injustice. Thus, for example, the Blue Star operation in Punjab was followed by anti-Sikh riots. Regime actions that generate structural grievances may occur, among other reasons, because the regime perceives a political advantage in them, miscalculates, or out of a simple lack of political sagacity on the part of the power holders. In light of the above, scholars like Laqueur (1977) and Livingstone (1983), who suggest that consistent repression is the way to solve the problem of terrorism, are perhaps mistaken. So are Netanyahu (1986) and Parry (1976), who assert that terrorism arises in the main due to support by external actors like the Communist and Islamic countries.

A proper study of insurgent terrorism is only possible if the historical, cultural and politico-economic context is taken into account, and also if regime acts of omission and commission (especially the impact of state terrorism), are considered. Quantitative studies of this nature hardly exist in the social science literature. Almost none of the "policy studies" referred to by Miller (1988:65) study terrorist incidents in proper perspective, i.e., in the context of group perceptions of regime structural injustice, oppression and/or violence. Almost none explain the variance in terrorism by examining regime attempts to either
address or not to address these structural grievances. In light of the historical and politico-economic context and the background of events in Punjab, I now test in a quantitative manner some of the hypotheses relating to Sikh terrorism, in an effort to lend more rigor and precision to the analysis.

Hypotheses

Regarding Sikh terrorism, the following hypotheses need to be considered:

1. The most significant factor in the rise of Sikh terrorism in India was the attack by the Indian army in June 1984 on the holiest Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple. The fact that this attack coincided with the anniversary of martyrdom of one of the Sikh Gurus resulting in the death of a number of innocent pilgrims, including women and children, and that many of the arrested militants were simply shot dead by the security forces (Appendix F), further exacerbated matters. Looting and pillaging by the army and the destruction of holy and sacred historical documents stored in the temple precincts also enraged many Sikhs (Singh and Nayar 1984). Feelings of structural injustice among Sikhs were reinforced and solidified. I expect a massive permanent rise in terrorism as a result of this event. However a rather long
lag before the increase occurs is expected because of:

a) the state of intense shock among the Sikhs over this invasion; it took time for the anger to gain momentum and find organizational expression.

b) the brutal repression by the army and other law enforcement agencies in the state (especially in the countryside) for months after this invasion. In this respect the following comments of Singh and Nayar deserve to be reiterated:

The most galling aspect of the army occupation of the Punjab was the reign of terror let loose in the countryside. As the police accompanied by army jawans combed village after village looking for arms and terrorists, they subjected every young Sikh (never a Hindu) to third degree methods to extort confessions. Some were let-off after a beating; others locked up in police stations and prisons for further questioning. There they continued to rot because it was virtually impossible to find out where they had been taken to (Singh and Nayar 1984:124).

Additionally, the promulgation in July 1984 of a presidential decree called the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, which was replaced by a law in August of the same year, gave a free hand to the security forces in the state. It also impaired the impartial administration of justice in the state (See Appendix C). In the words of retired Supreme Court Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, by these acts, "a scared government has tried to meet extremist terror with legal terror which has few parallels in history" (India Today, Feb. 28, 1985:28).
c) the killing of scores of militant leaders in the wake of Blue Star, especially the unquestioned leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. It would take a long time for a new leadership to emerge from the second ranks, organize itself and subsequently engage in activities of revenge and terrorism. Also, terrorist actions are not spontaneous, but demand a high level of coordination and planning, something extremely difficult in an atmosphere of extreme repression and a vacuum in leadership.

d) the morale of the law and order forces in the state was rather high at this point in time. Terrorist actions of revenge against police officers and their families had not assumed the proportion which they subsequently did.

2. The anti-Sikh riots of Nov. 1984, sponsored primarily by the government, in the wake of the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi by her two Sikh body guards, served to solidify Sikh feelings, of regime structural injustice and violence, that had been intensified by Operation Blue Star. Separatist tendencies, nurtured by economic discrimination by the central government, intensified by Blue Star, were further strengthened by these riots. Again, it needs to be borne in mind that the reaction of terrorism is expected to occur with a significant lag, precisely because of the reasons mentioned earlier. The effect of these riots therefore is expected to be permanent with a lag of several months.
3. The accord signed by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sikh moderate leader Harchand Singh Longowal on July 25, 1985, addressed some of the major demands of the Akali Dal and created conditions for the decline of terrorism in the state. By strengthening the moderate ranks, the central government took a wise step to isolate extremism in the state. The killing of Longowal shortly thereafter by the extremists generated a massive wave of sympathy for moderate Sikhs and moderation in the state. This was clearly evidenced in the subsequent state elections which were peaceful despite terrorists threats of violence, and which for the first time gave an absolute majority in the state legislature to the Akali party. The gains in countering terrorism were rather short lived -- soon, because of its own political compulsions, the government of Rajiv Gandhi backtracked on the accord, thereby weakening moderate ranks and hardening attitudes in the state. I therefore expect the accord to generate a temporary decline of terrorism in the state.

4. Scholars (Rubenstein 1987, Lee 1983, Corrado and Evans 1988, Hewitt 1984, Booth 1987, Booth and Walker 1989) have stressed that the opening of political channels of expression for regime dissidents in conjunction with policies designed to address, in some fashion, their demands
are effective ways to fight terrorism and political unrest. The installation of popular rule in the state of Punjab following the Rajiv-Longowal accord did provide a channel to express political grievances. While it is true that the more militant and extremist sections of the Sikhs were not happy either with the accord or with the consequent installation of popular rule by the moderate Akalis in the state, nevertheless, it is argued that some means of popular political expression are better than none at all. Consequently, throughout the period of popular rule in the state, it is hypothesized that a decline in the incidence of terrorism should be evident.

5. By the same token, the denial of means of political expression to Sikhs (especially when insurgent grievances have not been significantly addressed), evidenced when direct central rule was imposed on Punjab following the dismissal of the popular Barnala government in May 1987, should have contributed to a rise in terrorism. The period of central rule also was associated with a large rise in the killings of terrorists by the security forces, primarily in "encounters" with them. Thus, during the first 16 months of central rule in the state which followed the dismissal of the popularly elected Barnala government, 496 terrorists were killed. During the entire Barnala rule, which lasted for about 18 months, only 118 terrorists were killed. The
number of encounters reported during central rule, in the same period, was 580 against 172 during the entire period of Barnala rule (India Today Oct 15, 1988:254). We can therefore test if repressive measures are effective in such situations. It is hypothesized that given the culture and history of the Sikhs, such means would be counterproductive. In other words, the period of central rule would contribute to an increase in terrorism in the state.

6. The hanging of Mrs. Gandhi's assassins, one of whom was by many press reports not directly involved, given the context, increased terrorism in the state. For the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs they were martyrs who had successfully avenged the destruction of their holiest shrine. Their hanging was additional evidence suggesting that the Indian government was their primary enemy, was not secular as it claimed to be, and the only hope for Sikhs was to have independent statehood. The migration therefore of Hindus from Punjab and of the Sikhs into Punjab from other parts of the country needed to be accelerated.

7. In November 1989, the general elections in India led to the electoral defeat of Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress party. They witnessed the electoral victory in Punjab, with one of the highest margin in the entire country, of S.S. Mann, who was accused of conspiring to kill Mrs. Gandhi, and
considered close to the militants. Subsequently, he was also released from prison. The new prime minister showed daring and initiative and visited Amritsar in an open jeep. The reception that he received was overwhelming. The Hindu (Dec. 16, 1989:1) reported, "Since 1962 when Jawaharlal Nehru visited the city, no leader had received such an overwhelming response from the people, who have now clearly demonstrated that they want peace." Here was another golden opportunity to address some of the pressing problems of the Sikhs and the state of Punjab. As time proved, however, nothing more than a promising start was undertaken. The people guilty of the anti-Sikh riots remained unpunished, the crucial water issue was not settled, the territorial redistribution demanded by the moderates was not implemented, and, the government soon faced severe internal crises. Therefore, it is hypothesized that only a temporary decline in the incidence of terrorism occurred as a result of these elections.

8. It has often been hypothesized that factors of economic distress also cause protest and violence. While the groundwork for the aforementioned political developments was laid down by the politico-economic compulsions of the primarily rich peasantry and other upper rural strata in the state of Punjab, one also needs to incorporate in the fully developed model a variable measuring the direct influence of
economic distress on the variance in terrorism. Therefore, it is hypothesized that increasing levels of rural unemployment (primarily because terrorism is basically a rural phenomenon indulged in the main by rural youth in the state), contribute to rise in levels of terrorism. One can hypothesize that the direct effect of this economic variable was relatively small in comparison to the gross political acts of regime injustice like Blue Star and the anti-Sikh riots.

Data Collection And Measures

My dependent variable, group terrorism, is operationalized by taking a time-based count of the number of civilians killed by terrorists. Initially it was thought that the count of the injured would also be used in the analysis, but very soon it was discovered that the discrepancy in the reporting of the number of injured by the press was rather high. This is understandable as it is difficult to estimate accurately the number of the injured in such situations. More generally, it should be noted that reliable violence data are very difficult to gather. In the case of Punjab it is even more difficult, for given the culture of the region, the level of violence, even prior to the onset of terrorism, was substantial. The importance of
this consideration is heightened when it is realized that, given a political climate, the media, the police or the party in opposition or in power, may have a vested interest in exaggerating the incidence of terrorism.

Keeping these factors in mind, the data on killings were gathered from the regional newspaper - The Indian Express. The newspaper was scanned daily for reports on killings by terrorists in the state of Punjab as well as outside the state. It was decided to aggregate the data on a monthly basis. A major reason for this decision was the fact that the indicator for unemployment in the state was monthly, and had some other unit of aggregation been used for terrorist killings, it would have been difficult to employ time-based economic variables in the model.

The Office of the Director of Employment, Punjab, maintains a monthly record of the total number of persons registered in the unemployment exchanges in the state. The unemployed are categorized into rural and urban unemployed. Percentage figures for male rural unemployed were calculated by dividing the total number of rural unemployed by the total rural male population in the state between the ages of 20 and 39. These data are available in the Statistical Abstracts of Punjab published by the state government. While the office of Employment did not provide the number of unemployed classified by sex, based on my personal knowledge of rural Punjab and the most frequent age of the people who
register at these employment exchanges, I assumed that most of the rural unemployed would be males between the ages of 20 and 39. Patriarchal and traditional values are more strongly grounded in rural areas. Thus, it is highly unlikely that rural women will seek jobs. The case would have been different if I had been interested in getting data concerning urban unemployed. In this case it would introduce a significant error of measurement because relatively more females register at the urban unemployment exchanges. For present purposes, however, the aim was to tap the incidence of economic distress in the target rural youth population as effectively as possible. In the absence of other relevant monthly economic indices (as for example prices) maintained by the state, this was the best that could be done to tap the contribution of economic distress among the rural youth in Punjab towards the incidence of terrorism in the state.

Box-Jenkins Time Series Analysis

The nature of the analysis calls for a time series design. Box-Jenkins procedures are well suited for this purpose. The essential features of this technique are described below. For details the reader may refer to Box-Tiao (1975), Box-Jenkins (1976) and, for a non-specialist treatment, McCleary and Hay (1980).
Time series data often are characterized by what are called time series dependencies ("the tendency of time-related observations to be correlated such that the value of a series at one time is dependent, at least partly, upon one or more earlier values of the same series" (Clarke et al 1990:72)). These dependencies need to be modelled in order to obtain valid estimates. In the terminology of Box-Jenkins this process involves building a "noise model" which in turn implies the specification of appropriate auto-regressive (AR) and moving average (MA) parameters. An AR process is one in which a random shock has an exponentially diminishing impact over time. By contrast, an MA process is characterized by the finite persistence of a random shock.

These AR and MA parameters need to be modelled appropriately for accurate results. Box-Jenkins methods provide us with superior techniques for modelling AR and MA parameters compared to ordinary least regression (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) regression methods. Typically such methods may not be able to detect or model time series dependencies beyond the first order. Such dependencies often are more complex than that and hence inadequate noise model parameters could bias or distort the results. Box-Jenkins procedures employ two diagnostic tools - the auto correlation function (ACF) and the partial auto-correlation function (PACF) to diagnose and model AR and MA parameters appropriately. The absence of significant
correlations ("spikes") in the ACF of model residuals at appropriate lags combined with an insignificant Ljung-Box Q (LBQ) (Ljung and Box 1978) statistic indicates that the model residuals are "white noise" i.e. that significant correlation is absent. The LBQ statistic provides an overall test of whether there is any significant information in the model's residual ACF over a certain specified number of lags. Once the noise process has been satisfactorily modelled, the variables of interest, be they dichotomous or continuous, can be introduced in the model and then once again the model residuals checked to ensure that a white noise process is present. If necessary, the noise model is modified to produce such a process.

In the social sciences we frequently measure impacts that are dichotomous in nature, i.e., the presence or the absence of an event. In this dissertation examples include the presence or absence of the accord, central or popular rule, anti-Sikh riots, and the national level elections that defeated the Congress party led by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. These "interventions" can be specified as binary variables in the Box-Jenkins model. They are coded 0 when the event is absent and 1 when present. We can also consider dynamic impacts using adjustment (delta) parameters. For example, I have hypothesized that the impact of the accord on terrorism was of a temporary duration and declined over time. Delta parameters in Box-
Jenkins enable us to measure the rate of decay in such
lagged effects.

Box-Jenkins analysis also provides a superior technique
to determine the lag time when the effect of an impact
occurs. Although it is desirable that lags should be
theoretically specified, given the absence of strong theory,
the cross correlation function (CCF) is a diagnostic tool
which can help specify the appropriate time lag. In order
to obtain the requisite CCF, noise models are built for the
continuous independent variable series, applied to the
dependent series, and the CCF of these residuals and the
residuals of the noise model of the independent series is
calculated. By noting the "spikes" (significant
correlations) in the CCF, a judgment is made regarding the
appropriate lag to be modelled. Although this is a somewhat
atheoretical way of model building, in exploratory studies
or studies in areas characterized by weak theory, such model
building methods are justifiable and easily implemented by
Box-Jenkins techniques. In sum, the relatively effective
noise model building strategy, the utilization of binary
variables or "interventions," and the CCF function that
helps specify lags in the case of continuous independent
variable series are important reasons justifying the
selection of the Box-Jenkins approach to time series
modeling. A number of software packages are available to
model time series using Box-Jenkins techniques. BMDP 2T
(Dixon 1988) is employed for the present analysis. Before the appropriate noise parameters are added to the model, it is of utmost impotance that the series be stationary both in its mean and variance. Mean stationarity is attained by differencing the series (usually single differencing works), and variance stationarity typically is obtained by taking the natural log of the series of interest. The latter transformation helps to stabilize the variance of the series, but makes interpretation of the parameters less straightforward. Visual inspection of a plot of the series is usually sufficient to reveal variance non-stationarity. If still in doubt, the analyst can do analysis of variance tests. The process of model building is iterative and continues until a satisfactory model is generated.

To summarize, in the Box-Jenkins procedure:

1. First, on the basis of visual inspection or appropriate statistical tests, the series is made stationary both in mean and variance. Next the analyst builds univariate or noise models for the dependent and independent series of interest with the help of the ACF and the PACF. This is an iterative process and ends only when the residuals of the model are white noise, i.e., they are not significantly correlated. For this purpose the ACF of the model residuals and the LBQ for this series is considered.

2. The "noise models for the independent variables are used,
in turn, to filter or 'pre-whiten' the output series so that its residuals can be cross-correlated separately with the residuals of each independent variable noise model. This ensures that the bivariate cross-correlations between dependent and independent variables are uncontaminated by autocorrelation common to the two series, and permits the lag structures and reciprocal relationships between the series to be explored empirically" (Clarke et al. 1990:73).

3. The interventions in the model and their lags are specified as well as the lags of the independent continuous variable series. The model is then estimated through an iterative process. Insignificant parameters may have to be dropped to obtain the best model and/or additional or different noise parameters (AR and MA) may need to be added to make the model residuals white noise. At each stage the model residuals are examined. The process ends when the ACF of the residuals and the LBQ statistic are insignificant.

Having specified the reasons for selecting Box-Jenkins analysis and described model selection procedures and the steps in model estimation, I now describe the model identification process undertaken to develop a model of Sikh terrorism in India.

Univariate Model Building

Even a cursory look at the plot of raw series of
terrorism (Figure 4.1) suggests a strong evidence of variance non-stationarity. Hence the dependent variable was natural log transformed. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the ACF and PACF of the logged series. The patterns in the ACF and the PACF (see McCleary and Hay 1980:66-91) suggest that the outcome series needs to be differenced to render it stationary. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the ACF and PACF of the logged and differenced series. McCleary and Hay (1980:87-89) advise that in Box-Jenkins analysis, it is dangerous to overlook seasonal parameters. When in doubt, one ought to include them in a model and later, given indications to the contrary, seasonal parameters may be abandoned. On the basis of the spikes in ACF(1) and ACF(12), the noise model tentatively was identified as (011)(001)_12 (McCleary and Hay 1980:29-136, Liou 1988:435). What this implies is that the series has been differenced once and that random shocks at lags 1 and 12 i.e. the MA parameters, are operating on the time series.

The univariate model thus estimated is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST. ERR.</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6438</td>
<td>0.0853</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.3784</td>
<td>0.0919</td>
<td>-4.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the parameters are highly significant and are well within the bounds of invertibility (McCleary and Hay 1980:86). The plot of ACF of the model residuals is shown
in Figure 4.6. The ACF indicates that the process is white noise since all correlations are insignificant. Also, the LBQ statistic at 20 lags is 23 which is statistically insignificant ($p > .05$). Thus the noise model for the dependent series is tentatively accepted as $(011)(001)_12$.

Univariate Model For The Rural Unemployment Series

The plot of the rural unemployment series (Figure 4.7) does not indicate the presence of variance non-stationarity. Hence the unemployment series is not log transformed. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the ACF and PACF of the undifferenced series. It is apparent that the series needs to be differenced to attain mean stationarity. The plots of the ACF and the PACF of the differenced rural unemployment series are shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. The spikes in ACF(1) help identify the tentative noise model for the unemployment series as ARIMA $(011)$. For this model, the following results were obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST. ERR.</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4653</td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plot of the ACF of the residuals is displayed in Figure 4.12. The LBQ at 20 lags was 15 and hence is statistically
insignificant. The (011) noise model for the unemployment series is hence acceptable.

The CCF of the residuals of this model applied to the dependent variable series, and the residuals of the univariate model for the rural unemployment series is as shown in Figure 4.13. The CCF does not give us any obvious indication that economic distress affected the incidence of terrorism (McCleary and Hay 1980:229-36, Liou 1988:462). In the absence of these signals we have to rely on intelligent guesses and/or prior theory regarding the time lag before economic distress influenced levels of terrorism.

Thus far I have built noise models for the two continuous variable series, terrorism and unemployment. It now remains to incorporate the other binary interventions in the model and to test the significance of their impacts.

Building a Multivariate Model of Sikh Terrorism

The variable definition in the multivariate model was as follows:

GOLD=0.
IF(MONTH GE 8406) THEN GOLD=1.
RIOTS=0.
IF (MONTH GE 8411) THEN RIOTS=1.
ACCORD=0.
IF(MONTH EQ 8507) THEN ACCORD=1.
PRULE=0.
IF(MONTH GE 8510 AND MONTH LE 8705) THEN PRULE=1.
HANG=0.
IF (MONTH EQ 8901) THEN HANG=1.
ELECTION=0.
IF (MONTH EQ 8911) THEN ELECTION=1.
CRULE = 0.
IF (MONTH GE 8706) THEN CRULE = 1.

Operation Blue Star (GOLD) and the anti-Sikh riots (RIOTS) are coded such that permanent effects could be measured, while the Rajiv Longowal accord (ACCORD), the general elections (ELECTION) in November 1989, and the hanging of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi (HANG) are coded to measure temporary effects. PRULE and CRULE are the periods of popular and central rule in the state. It was mentioned earlier that the lagged effect of RIOTS and GOLD would be rather long. The precise time lag was specified by examining the plot of the raw series. In May and June 1985, terrorist killings jumped after many months of quiescence. Thus, the lag time after GOLD and RIOTS was set at 11 and 7 months respectively. Rural unemployment was modeled with a lag of 2 months with a delta parameter to capture decaying effects at longer lags. All independent variables were differenced since the dependent variable had been differenced (Liou 1988:470). The BMDP output is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST.ERR.</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5294</td>
<td>0.1203</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.4910E-01</td>
<td>0.1245</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 GOLD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.152</td>
<td>0.5094</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 RIOTS</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.286</td>
<td>0.5629</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 HANG</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.6106E-01</td>
<td>0.4488</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 ELECTION</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.2005</td>
<td>0.4470</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ACCORD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.382</td>
<td>0.5216</td>
<td>-10.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 ACCORD</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7686</td>
<td>0.0515</td>
<td>14.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 PRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.121</td>
<td>0.3595</td>
<td>-3.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The seasonal parameter is not significant ($t = -0.39$)
and thus is deleted from the model. A number of other
independent variables also are not significant but first we
need to make our noise model non-seasonal before we consider
the possibility of dropping them. The following is the
output with the seasonal parameter removed from the multi-
variate model.

**Model 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST. ERR</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.9123</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
<td>-23.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 GOLD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.882</td>
<td>0.3963</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 RIOTS</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9320</td>
<td>0.4233</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 HANG</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.2182</td>
<td>0.2011</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ELECTION</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.5532</td>
<td>0.2284</td>
<td>-2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 ACCORD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.243</td>
<td>0.4071</td>
<td>-12.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ACCORD</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5720</td>
<td>0.0713</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 PRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.402</td>
<td>0.2522</td>
<td>-5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 CRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>0.3324</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 UNEMP</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1664</td>
<td>0.0274</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 UNEMP</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6889</td>
<td>0.0967</td>
<td>7.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES $= 7.853928$
DEGREES OF FREEDOM $= 56$
RESIDUAL MEAN SQUARE $= 0.140249$

Observe that there has been a drastic improvement in the
significance of the other independent variables and that the
RMS$^1$ has declined indicating that this model has a better fit compared with the previous one. With only one exception, the signs of the estimated coefficients for the several independent variables are also as expected. Only the variable HANG is still insignificant. Moreover, its sign is not as expected, i.e., the negative sign indicates that the hanging of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi contributed to a temporary decline in the incidence of terrorism. The results when this variable was omitted from the model are as follows:

Model 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST ERR</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.9081</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
<td>-22.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GOLD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.870</td>
<td>0.4029</td>
<td>7.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RIOTS</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.4301</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ELECTION</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.6414</td>
<td>0.2205</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.253</td>
<td>0.4135</td>
<td>-12.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5772</td>
<td>0.0723</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.389</td>
<td>0.2566</td>
<td>-5.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The residual mean square (RMS) is calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the residual sum of squares for the series and multiplying the result by $1/N$ where $N$ is the number of observations.

$$RMS = \frac{1}{N} \left( \sum_{t=1}^{N} a_t^2 \right)^{1/2}$$

By tradition this statistic is more frequently employed as a goodness-of-fit criterion than $R^2$ which is computed by the formula

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\text{residual sum of squares}}{\text{total sum of squares}} = 1 - \sum_{t=1}^{N} \frac{a_t^2}{Y_t^2}$$

The $R^2$ has the additional problem in time series analysis, i.e., that the greatest portion of the variance explained by it is accounted for by $\bar{Y}$, which is the mean of the differenced series. See McCleary and Hay (1980:100-101).
In this specification (Model 3) all variables are significant at the .05 level and their signs are as anticipated\(^2\). However, the very high value of the noise parameter (-0.91) suggests that all may not be well with the model residuals. This is confirmed by the model residuals (Figure 4.14). The LBQ at 20 lags is 33. Now the marginal spike in ACF(1) of the model residuals can be ignored. The LBQ is also only marginally significant. It ought to be less than 30 at 20 lags. At this point the analyst can give the estimates of this "best" model. However, I suspected that the culprit here was the election variable which was very close to the end of the series and hence could be responsible for the marginally significant correlation in

\(^2\)The correlation matrix of the parameter estimates of this model does not show any significant correlation as the following table shows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 \\
1 & 1.000 & & & & & & & & \\
2 & -0.038 & 1.000 & & & & & & & \\
3 & 0.004 & 0.013 & 1.000 & & & & & & \\
4 & 0.296 & -0.012 & 0.020 & 1.000 & & & & & \\
5 & -0.004 & -0.015 & 0.037 & -0.011 & 1.000 & & & & \\
6 & -0.002 & 0.015 & -0.045 & -0.005 & -0.350 & 1.000 & & & \\
7 & 0.034 & -0.069 & 0.350 & -0.005 & 0.124 & -0.095 & 1.000 & & \\
8 & 0.035 & 0.048 & 0.036 & 0.087 & -0.423 & 0.106 & -0.134 & 1.000 & \\
9 & -0.203 & 0.165 & -0.026 & -0.196 & 0.022 & 0.003 & -0.146 & -0.152 & 1.000 \\
10 & 0.060 & 0.089 & 0.118 & 0.189 & -0.036 & 0.108 & -0.183 & 0.446 & -0.363 \\
\end{array}
\]
the model residuals at lag 1. The output without the
election variable is as shown below.

Model 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>ORDER</th>
<th>ESTIMATE</th>
<th>ST ERR</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CIKILL</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.6283</td>
<td>0.0816</td>
<td>-7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GOLD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.870</td>
<td>0.4495</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RIOTS</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9887</td>
<td>0.4592</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.285</td>
<td>0.4395</td>
<td>-12.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5728</td>
<td>0.0812</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.271</td>
<td>0.3098</td>
<td>-4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CRULE</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.095</td>
<td>0.4070</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1300</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UNEMP</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7208</td>
<td>0.1337</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES = 11.496923
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 58
RESIDUAL MEAN SQUARE = 0.198223

The value of the noise parameter has declined significantly,
which could be an indication that residual correlation is
absent\(^3\). The ACF of model residuals is as shown in Figure
4.15. The LBQ statistic is not significant also, i.e., at
20 lags it equals 23. The autocorrelation at lag 8 is not a
big problem. First, it is only marginally significant,
second it could be there purely by chance, and third it is

\(^3\)No high correlation also exists amongst the model variables
as is evident from the correlation matrix below:

**CORRELATION MATRIX OF PARAMETER ESTIMATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>-0.279</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</table>
not at earlier lags, which normally are considered crucial. In terms of residual auto-correlation and the LBQ statistic, I have a greater confidence in Model 4 than Model 3.

However, a point worth highlighting is that the RMS of Model 4 (.198) is much higher than that of Model 3 (.145). Thus, in terms of a better fit, Model 3, though with minor residual correlation problems, has an advantage. It also includes the Election variable, the results of which are as hypothesized. At this point it becomes a question of judgement - whether to accept Model 4 or Model 3. Both agree with our hypotheses. While the one with the Election variable has better explanatory power, the residuals are less well behaved. The model without the Election variable has clean residuals but its explanatory power as measured by the RMS statistic has deteriorated somewhat. The marginality of the spike in the model with the Election variable (Model 3) and its better explanatory power led me to accept that as the model of Sikh terrorism in India. In the following section its parameters are interpreted.

Parameter Interpretation

The interpretation of the parameters of the model selected above is based on McCleary and Hay (1980:141-203) and Gujarati (1988:147-150). The percent change in the expected value of the lagged dependent variable as a result
of an intervention is \((e^{w_0} - 1)100\). In the case of interventions involving \(\delta\) parameters (which are rate parameters), the total effect of the change in the independent variable on the dependent is \(w/(1-\delta)\). When the \(\delta\) values are large, this means that the rate at which the series is attaining a new equilibrium (in the case of a permanent effect) is slow, and with smaller \(\delta\) values, given a similar hypothesized effect, the rate is fast (McCleary and Hay 1980:158).

When modelling temporary effects, a high \(\delta\) value indicates that the return to the original level of the series is very slow. In the case of very low values, the indication is that the going back to the original level is nearly instantaneous. In fact it is advisable not to model \(\delta\) parameters when the calculations in this case show that this measure is very low (close to 0) or very high in magnitude (close to 1). In the latter case a permanent impact without a \(\delta\) parameter is suggested and in the former, a pulse effect, that is a short spurt in the dependent variable followed by an immediate return to the pre-intervention level, with appropriate lag, needs to be modelled (McCleary and Hay 1980:167).

As expected, the results of the analysis show that Operation Blue Star led to a massive permanent increase in the incidence of terrorism in the state, of the order of nearly 1664 percent. The later anti-Sikh riots likewise
caused a permanent increase of 152 percent in the pre-intervention levels of terrorism. Both these interventions caused an increase after long lags, eleven months in the case of the attack on the Golden Temple and seven months after the riots. The reasons for these long lags have been explained earlier.

For the entire period of popular moderate Akali rule in the state, the incidence of terrorism declined by nearly 75 percent. On the contrary, when popular rule was set aside by the central government, allegedly on grounds of its inability and lack of political will to fight terrorism in a determined fashion, and when more repressive measures were unleashed as a result of central rule, terrorism increased by nearly 190 percent. Thus, repressive measures in the absence of some kind of an response by the rulers to grievances, given the culture and history of Sikhs, did little to remedy the situation.

The accord signed between the Akali moderate leader, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, and prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in July 1985, eventually led to the afore-mentioned popular Barnala rule in the state for the next 18 months. The subsequent assassination of Longowal by extremists for his alleged "sell out," created an atmosphere in the state that was hardly conducive to the spread of terrorism. In many respects, the accord was an attempt to settle many long standing Sikh grievances. As expected, the impact of this
agreement was shortlived, for as time went by the government reneged on many of its promises and the militants and the moderate Akalis both concluded that the central government was not sincere in its intentions. As this realization dawned, terrorism returned to pre-intervention levels. The effect of the agreement may be displayed as follows (McCleary and Hay 1980:167-168):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Decline in pre-Accord Level of Terrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

Thus, in a period of about nine months the pre-accord levels of terrorism began to be witnessed once again in the state. Figure 4.16 depicts this graphically.

With respect to rural male unemployment, the model is a "log-lin" model Gujarati (1988:147-50), i.e. the dependent variable has been logged but the independent variable (rural unemployment) is expressed in its natural metric. Both the dependent and the independent variables have been differenced. The elasticity of unemployment evaluated at the mean is $\omega(\bar{X})$ which comes to $0.16(18.56) = 2.97$. Thus, a
percent increase in unemployment led to about a 3 percent increase in terrorism after a lag of two months. As expected, the initial impact of economic distress on the incidence of terrorism was far less profound compared to the several interventions discussed above. The $\delta$ value captures the decaying effects of unemployment on terrorism at lags that are longer than two months. Thus, the total impact of a percentage rise in unemployment is \( \frac{2.97}{1-0.68} \), which comes to a 9 percent increase in the incidence of terrorism.

The results of the Box-Jenkins analysis therefore support most of my hypotheses. They indicate that terrorism is indeed a reaction by resourceful groups to perceived structural injustice and violence. In the absence of a serious effort by regimes to address their grievances, or to at least work with the moderate elements within protest movements, repressive measures alone are less likely to bear fruit. The results also suggest that, as hypothesized, political rather than economic conditions had the strongest direct effects on the incidence of terrorism.
Figure 4.1
PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR TERRORISM

-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

LAG CORR. +------------------------------------------+

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<tr>
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<td>I+</td>
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Figure 4.2
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR TERRORISM

-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

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Figure 4.3
PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR TERRORISM (DIFFERENCED)

-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

LAG CORR. +------------------------------------------+

1  -0.303   XX+XXXXX+I   +
2   -0.217    +XXXXXI   +
3    0.131    + IXXX   +
4  -0.088     + XXIX   +
5  -0.052     + XI   +
6  -0.044     + XI   +
7   0.207     + IXXXX+I   +
8  -0.192    + XXXXI   +
9   0.160     + IXXXX   +
10  -0.097    + XXI   +
11  -0.237    +XXXXXXI   +
12  0.313     + IXXXXX+X
13  0.070     + IXX   +
14  -0.182    + XXXXI   +
15   0.015    + I   +
16   0.190    + IXXXX   +
17  -0.231    + XXXXI   +
18  0.016     + I   +
19  0.127     + XXX   +
20  -0.129    + XXXI   +
21  -0.036    + XI   +
22   0.070    + IXX   +
23  -0.022    + XI   +
24  -0.041    + XI   +
25   0.135    + IXXX   +
26   0.029    + IX   +
27  -0.079    + XXI   +
28   0.043    + IX   +
29   0.005    + I   +
30  -0.140    + XXXI   +
31   0.054    + IX   +
32   0.033    + IX   +
33  -0.043    + XI   +
34   0.060    + IX   +
35   0.012    + I   +
36  -0.031    + XI   +

Figure 4.4
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR TERRORISM
(DIFFERENCED)

-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

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Figure 4.5
PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS OF MODEL RESIDUALS
(TERRORISM)

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Figure 4.6
Figure 4.7
### PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

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**Figure 4.8**
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

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3  0.076   + IX+
4  0.151   + IXXX+
5 -0.061   + XI+
6 -0.043   + X+
7 -0.124   + XXX+
8 -0.017   + I+
9 -0.058   + XI+
10 -0.100  + XXI+
11 -0.073  + XXI+
12 -0.119  + XXXI+
13  0.059   + IX+
14 -0.160  + XXXXI+
15  0.063   + IXX+
16 -0.071  + XXI+
17  0.057   + IX+
18  0.057   + IX+
19  0.069   + IXX+
20  0.128   + IXXX+
21  0.041   + IX+
22  0.081   + IXX+
23 -0.114  + XXXI+
24 -0.167  + XXXXI+
25 -0.114  + XXXI+
26 -0.034  + XI+
27  0.033   + IX+
28  0.054   + IX+
29 -0.044  + XI+
30 -0.041  + XI+
31  0.051   + IX+
32 -0.174  + XXXXI+
33  0.053   + IX+
34 -0.103  + XXXI+
35  0.013   + I+
36  0.065   + IXX+

Figure 4.9
PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
(DIFFERENCED)

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Figure 4.10
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
(DIFFERENCED)

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Figure 4.11
Figure 4.12
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Figure 4.13
### PLOT OF RESIDUAL AUTOCORRELATIONS

OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL

(ELECTION VARIABLE INCLUDED)

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**Figure 4.14**
PLOT OF RESIDUAL AUTOCORRELATIONS
OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL
(ELECTION VARIABLE EXCLUDED)

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LAG  CORR. +-------------------------------------------------+
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     3  0.049  + IX +
     4 -0.100  + XXI +
     5 -0.066  + XXI +
     6 -0.086  + I +
     7  0.008  + I +
     8 -0.274  +XXXXXI +
     9  0.180  + IXXXX +
    10  0.192  + IXXXX +
    11 -0.128  + XXXI +
    12 -0.190  + XXXXI +
    13  0.015  + I +
    14  0.018  + I +
    15  0.055  + IX +
    16  0.087  + IX +
    17 -0.062  + XXI +
    18 -0.060  + XI +
    19  0.085  + IXX +
    20 -0.012  + I +
    21 -0.101  + XXXI +
    22 -0.054  + XI +
    23  0.095  + IXX +
    24  0.197  + IXXXX +
    25  0.051  + IX +
    26  0.023  + IX +
    27 -0.120  + XXXI +
    28 -0.036  + XI +
    29  0.019  + I +
    30 -0.133  + XXXI +
    31  0.025  + IX +
    32 -0.016  + I +
    33 -0.084  + XXI +
    34  0.235  + IXXXXX +
    35 -0.096  + XXI +

Figure 4.15
Figure 4.16

Terrorism and the Accord
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Movements of violent protest and rebellion are a product of grievances. Theories of political violence and revolution suggest the need to study the manner in which these grievances originate (Kriesberg 1982:29; Aya 1979). Grievances, it is argued, can be caused by "relative deprivation" (Gurr 1971); economic and/or class exploitation associated with capitalism (Walton 1984:161-62); the failure of political institutions to keep pace with rapid socio-economic development (a characteristic associated especially with modernizing societies) (Huntington 1968); inappropriate rates of economic development, in other words, rates that have socially de-stabilizing effects in terms of breaking individual social moorings and/or generating expectations that are hard to meet (Olson 1971); and structural factors as for example patterns of land inequality (Russett 1971).

Theoretical research in the area of political violence not only stresses a study of the origin of grievances of protesting groups, but also emphasizes the need to analyze the processes by which groups with grievances develop a
self-consciousness, identify targets, and initiate protests - in other words, "the pathways from arousal to action" (Aya 1979:75). Often, the really deserving or the deeply aggrieved are incapable of launching protest movements because of inadequate economic and organizational resources (Alavi 1965; Wolf 1969). Resources of land, peripheral location from the center of the regime, organization, cadres, and ideology are some of the variables that research in the area of violence and revolution has emphasized. These are some of the factors that help the process of mobilization of grievances suggested by prior theory.

Skocpol (1979) has drawn the attention of theorists to external military pressures on regimes and the internal elite conflicts within, factors that afford the necessary space in the political structure for groups with grievances to make their presence felt. Another dynamic in the entire process is the response of power holders to protest movements (Skocpol 1979; Tilly and Tilly 1981; Walton 1984). Often, as the Tillys mention, the protest movement learns and practices the methods used on it by the state.

In recent times theoretical focus has also centered on the question of religion and violence (Rose 1987, Arjomand 1988, Martin 1989). For various reasons discussed earlier, the force of religion has failed to diminish in its impact on society. Contrary to the hypotheses of early modernization theorists, religion has gained strength in
response to social and technological development.

In so far as human action is guided by a sense of legitimacy (Moore 1978), religion provides a powerful legitimizing force for protest movements. It also has a well established organizational network, a more or less regular following, and considerable financial resources. But above all, and in certain contexts, the idea of martyrdom associated with some religions, can help launch a highly potent protest movement. This aspect of the relationship between religion and violent protest has only been highlighted by scholarship recently. Thus the belief that martyrdom for a righteous cause would guarantee salvation for the martyr is a powerful incentive that facilitates mobilization of the aggrieved. The role of the concept of martyrdom in circumventing Olsonian "free ridership" has been highlighted by Rose (1987) and Singh (1990) in the case of Shia Islam and Sikhism respectively.

The relationship between religious ideology and the dynamic of society is rather complex and intricate. While Idealism stresses a largely independent role of religious ideas in determining social processes, Materialism, in its cruder version, considers the economic base of the society as significantly conditioning, if not determining, everything else (i.e. the "superstructure"). Here it was noted that Weber represented a subtlety that refused to entertain the above dichotomy between ideas and material
forces. For him,

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 'From what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world (Weber quoted in Bocock and Thompson 1985:2)

Coming to the theoretical literature on terrorism, the state of this sub-field is, I have argued, rather pathetic. Little well established, rigorous, empirically based literature is available (Bell 1980:201; Alexander 1987:i; Miller 1988:85-87; Evans 1981:302; Saper 1988:13). Terrorism is a term surcharged with emotion and consequently difficult to define. Scholars and laymen alike find it very difficult to remain objective. The gruesome behavior exhibited by terrorists, prevents not only the ordinary person, but also many analysts from a true appreciation of the underlying causes of terrorism. Thus scholars like Friedlander (cited in Norton and Greenberg 1980:18-19) who stress the immorality of terrorism are exhibiting more of a moral outrage against terrorism than helping to analyze it from a critical perspective. The media hardly play a constructive role, for they are in the main interested only in the drama that is associated with terrorist events, something that "sells," rather than an analysis of the deep seated causes of the phenomenon.

Moore's ideas about the legitimacy of human action have
been applied by some scholars to the study of terrorism (Segallier 1987, Martin 1989, Rapoport 1984). Rapoport (1984) analyzes justifications for terrorism in religious traditions, the purposes and organization of terrorist groups and the vulnerabilities of societies to terrorism. He believes that a study of terrorism as it existed in the past can provide fruitful comparisons with contemporary terrorism. Rapoport does not attach significance to the fact that modern technological developments have made terrorism more potent. In the context of legitimization by religions of violent actions, Martin places emphasis on the need to focus on "the social and hermeneutical processes by which religious groups interpret scriptures and traditional world views as demanding violent action in certain circumstances" (Martin 1989). Netanyahu (1986) and Parry (1976) argue that terrorism exists in the main due to the support it gets from foreign sources. Rubenstein (1987) provides a useful corrective to such arguments, and like Hyams (1975) points out that terrorism has more to do with internal than external causes, as for example group disaffection.

By a quantitative case study of the Sikhs of Punjab this dissertation has attempted to understand the social and political processes that lead to group terrorism. Group terrorism is considered a response, primarily of the weak, to structural injustice and structural violence (Norton and
Greenberg 1980:2; Hamilton 1981:229; Gleason 1981:243). In studying Sikh terrorism, I have focused on the central issue of power and power conflicts in society. As Skocpol writes, "conflict among governments and various organized groups contending for power must be placed at the center of attention to explain collective violence and revolutions" (Skocpol 1977:9).

Terrorism is best regarded "as politics pursued by other means," in other words, as a form of unconventional political participation (Maranto 1987; Fromkin 1975; Pierre 1976; Hacker 1976; Thornton 1974). In my analysis, I have argued that in the context of a heightened feeling among the Sikhs of Punjab of economic discrimination by the central government, the attack on the Golden Temple and the anti-Sikh riots following Mrs. Gandhi's death, crystallized Sikh feelings of structural injustice. Until the present date no serious attempt has been made to punish those who were responsible for these riots. This situation has led a section of the Sikhs to demand an independent state of Khalistan where, it is argued, the Sikhs would be able to live with dignity and a measure of security. In order to attain this goal, the terrorists kill members of the Hindu community who live in Punjab. The idea is to drive them away from the state. They would also welcome a backlash of the Hindus on the Sikhs outside the state, so that they would be driven into Punjab. Additionally, politicians,
members and families of law and order personnel, and Sikhs who oppose terrorist goals are also killed. The border status of Punjab and the near perennial rivalry of India and Pakistan are other factors that were highlighted in my analysis. They are also resources that terrorists use very effectively. Thus a number of hijackings of Indian planes have taken place to Pakistan and allegations of terrorist training camps just across the border in Pakistan are very common.

All acts of structural violence and injustice do not result in terrorism or other forms of political protest. History, culture and political economy play a crucial role in determining the threshold at which protest ensues, the forms that such protest may take, and the legitimizing notions that go along with it. In my dissertation I have stressed the influence of Sikh history, the impact of Green Revolution on the agrarian regions of the state, the machinations of politicians of the two major parties in Punjab, the geopolitics of Punjab, the land resources of the overwhelming Jat Sikh peasantry in the state, and the concept of martyrdom that is integral to the Sikh religion. All these factors have helped mobilize Sikh resistance against the central government.

I have argued that since terrorism is best understood as a political weapon for the attainment of certain ends, regime policy initiatives are integral to the study of group
terrorism. Whenever, in the course of events, it appeared that the central government was making a serious effort to redress these structural grievances of the Sikhs, levels of group terrorism came down in Punjab. This dissertation examined empirically the impact upon group terrorism of the accord signed between the government and the moderate Akali leader Sant Harchand Singh Longowal in July 1985, the initiation of popular rule in the state in September of that year, the hanging of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi, and the effect of measures of repression on the incidence of terrorism. Also considered was the impact on terrorism of the general election which saw the national defeat of the Congress party.

Group terrorism was operationalized by taking a time based count of the number of people killed by terrorists. Box-Jenkins techniques were used to study the impact of regime policy initiatives and the factor of economic distress on levels of terrorism. Regime policy interventions, some of them constituting state terror, and national elections were coded as binary variables.

The results of the analysis verified most of the hypotheses of the study. Thus as hypothesized, when a popular government facilitated the popular expression of grievances, levels of terrorism came down. By the same token periods of denial of popular expression led to an increase of the incidence of terrorism. The consequence of
Operation Blue Star and the anti-Sikh riots, engineered in the main by the government and the ruling party, were truly catastrophic. Levels of terrorism jumped manifold after Blue Star. The presence of economic distress was also shown to statistically correlate with a higher incidence of terrorism, though the impact of this variable was not as high as regime acts of political injustice. Electoral results that gave a feeling that the new regime was more sympathetic than the one that had lost power also brought down the incidence of terrorism temporarily. Thus in the context of the culture, history and the political economy of the Sikhs, more especially the Jat Sikhs, most of my hypotheses were tested successfully.

A point worth noting in conclusion concerns the relationship between case studies and attempts at theory building in political science. At one time, the initial impetus of the behavioral revolution had led scholars to completely ignore context and focus on attempts to develop generalizations across historical and temporal boundaries. Over the years this tendency has moderated somewhat and scholars are now voicing criticism of the earlier a-contextual and a-historical methods (Verba 1985; Wiarda 1985). These days greater sensitivity is being exhibited to context and history, though the methodological rigor associated with behavioralism has been retained. The future path of political research ought to focus on a "better blend
and overlapping of theoretically interesting case studies and broader comparative ones" (Verba 1985:36), undertaken with rigor and precision. This perspective has guided this dissertation and it is hoped that future research on the subject of terrorism will strive to maintain context sensitivity and rigor of analysis. It may not be useful for social science scholarship to emulate, at least in the near future, the generalizing techniques of the hard sciences because of the context sensitive nature of the subject they handle. The development of more sophisticated tools of analysis in the future could perhaps change this research agenda.

In analyzing incidents of terrorism in other times and contexts, analysts ought to consider the rise and development of forms of injustice and violence, and their impact on the origin and development of terrorism. The process of social analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism ought to look at the justifications that terrorists bring to their actions, in other words, their perceptions of injustice and oppression. Scholarship on terrorism needs to realize that the concepts of state and group terrorism are distinct though highly inter-related. Hence, it is naive to study terrorism bereft of a consideration of state policies. Scholars, as for instance Saper (1988:24), who ignore this or who are conscious of state policies and/or state terrorism, and yet do not consider it worthwhile to study
them are off the mark. The phenomenon of terrorism is best approached as an attempt by groups to achieve political goals. Regime policy decisions and/or repression cannot be overlooked in any meaningful study of terrorism.
APPENDIX A

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<td></td>
<td>Percentage to total</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Density</td>
<td>Per Sq. Km.</td>
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<td>Literacy</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Education (30-9-1988)</td>
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<td>Arts, Commerce and Science Colleges</td>
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<tr>
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<td>High/Senior Secondary Schools</td>
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<td>Primary Schools</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seats in Punjab Vidhan Sabha</td>
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Lok Sabha Seats in Punjab  No. 13

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1972-76

Giani Zail Singh of the Congress Party rules Punjab as its chief minister. Mrs. Gandhi is the prime minister of India. The period 1975-1977 witnesses the imposition of internal emergency in India. Most of the country's political opposition is put behind bars.

March 16-20, 1977

Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) elections are held in India. The electorate rejects the emergency rule of Mrs. Gandhi and elects the opposition to office nationally. The voter turnout in Punjab is approximately 70%. Morarji Desai is chosen to lead the country. The new government dismisses a number of state governments on April 30 on grounds that they are unrepresentative. Punjab is one of them. Elections are held in these states in June 1977. Given the wave against the Congress, not surprisingly, non-Congress governments are formed in most states. Punjab is led by the Akali leader, Parkash Singh Badal.

1980

A split occurs in the ruling party at the Center because of internal party differences. The ruling party loses majority and elections to the Lok Sabha are held prematurely in the first week of January. Nearly 63% of the electorate cast their vote in Punjab. Mrs. Gandhi regains power with a
sweeping victory. Like the previous government, she too
dismisses nine state governments in February of that year on
grounds that they no longer reflect popular will. Parkash
Singh Badal is removed as Chief Minister. Subsequently,
elections are held in Punjab along with other dismissed
state governments on May 28 and 31. In June 1980, Darbara
Singh leader of Mrs. Gandhi's Congress(I) assumes office as
Chief Minister of Punjab.

The Akalis begin an agitation for the implementation of the
Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR). A memorandum listing their
45 demands is submitted to the Prime Minister. This
memorandum is ignored. Between August 1980 and September
1981, the Akalis lead seven major political agitations in
Punjab. They involve demonstrations and daily courting of
arrests. In the course of these agitations, nearly 25,000
party workers court arrest.

September 1981

Lala Jagat Narain, a prominent Hindu journalist of Punjab,
is murdered. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had frequently
voiced criticism of the murdered journalist. Subsequently,
the Sant is arrested on charges of conspiracy to murder
Narain. His arrest triggers off unrest and shootings in
Punjab. Nine people are killed in the rioting. Before his
arrest, the Sant negotiates with the authorities the terms
of his surrender. Later in the month, 5 Sikhs hijack an Indian Airlines jet to Pakistan. The hijackers are seized by the Pakistani authorities. They claim to be members of the Dal Khalsa, a separatist Sikh organization. Among their demands are the release of Bhindranwale and compensation to the victims of those killed in the riots following Bhindranwale's arrest. Some time later, on the instructions of the prime minister, Bhindranwale is released.

October 1981
Mrs. Gandhi meets a high level delegation of Akali leaders. Subsequently, Mrs. Gandhi summons the Congress(I) Chief Ministers of the affected states (Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan) to discuss the crucial water issue. She amends her water distribution award of 1976 and decides to give a little more water from the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to Punjab. Darbara Singh, the Congress chief minister of Punjab, is forced to withdraw the case filed in the Supreme Court by the erstwhile Akali government of Parkash Singh Badal. This case had challenged the prime minister's distribution of the river waters between the affected states.

1982
The Akalis after a period of quiescence of nearly six months, meet the Prime Minister in April, go home without
much hope and resume their agitation. In May, Mrs. Gandhi lays the foundation of the Sutlej-Yamuna link canal that would implement the agreement on water sharing between states. On 2nd May, the government bans the Dal Khalsa and the National Council of Khalistan, two separatist Sikh organizations. In August, the Akali agitation shifts to Amritsar, changes its name to Dharamyudha Morcha (Fight for the sake of Righteousness). The Akali agitation is intensified. Daily arrests are courted. In 88 days of protests, according to Amnesty International Report (1983), 36,737 Akalis are arrested. Akali demands have become more comprehensive now and are divided into four major categories:

1. **Political**: Reorientation of Center-State relations as originally laid out in the ASR of 1973. The central government would look after only defense, foreign affairs, communications, railways and currency. Recognition of Sikhs as a separate nation (Kaum).

2. **Economic**: Redistribution of the waters of the rivers Ravi and Beas between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. The earlier distribution had been made by Mrs. Gandhi in 1976, when most of the opposition in the country, including the Akalis, was behind bars as a result of the declaration of internal emergency. The Akalis felt that the interests of Punjab had
not been adequately represented at that time and hence called now for a reopening of the award made by the prime minister. The Akali protests prior to 1982 had centered mainly on the water distribution issue and more autonomy for states.

3. **Territorial**: Transfer of neighboring Punjabi speaking territories to Punjab, and the declaration of Chandigarh as the sole capital of the state. When the state of Punjab was created in 1966 on linguistic grounds, certain Punjabi speaking areas, primarily in the neighboring state of Haryana (which was partitioned from united Punjab in 1966) had been left out. It was the demand of the Akalis to include these in the state of Punjab. Also, the Akalis demanded the inclusion of Chandigarh, a modern and a well built city, which was serving as the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana ever since 1966, into Punjab.

4. **Religious**: Creation of an All India Gurudwara Act that would enable the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committee (SGPC) (a body that manages Sikh Gurudwaras) to manage all Sikh religious places throughout India; declaration of Amritsar as a holy city; broadcasting of Sikh religious hymns over the government controlled All India Radio, the only network in the country; and the restoration of Sikhs' fair share in the armed forces. On the latter question, the
Sikhs already enjoyed disproportionate strength in the country's armed forces. In the recent period, it was contended by the Akalis, that the government had been consciously trying to reduce Sikh influence. Later on, during the course of agitation, the demand for the enactment of a Sikh personal law and amendment to the constitution to define Sikhs as a separate religious category (and not as a sect of Hinduism) were added.

Two domestic Indian Airlines flights were hijacked to Amritsar in August. In the latter hijacking, the demand was raised to transfer power in Punjab to the Akali Dal and the release of Sikh extremists arrested by the government in connection with the various disturbances in the state. In October the Akalis protested outside the Indian Parliament. The protest subsequently turned violent. The police had to resort to firing resulting in the death of four agitators.

1983
Attempts to mediate the dispute are made by Swaran Singh, an erstwhile union minister. Not much comes out of these efforts. In February, talks are again held between the Akalis, central government, and the representatives of other affected states. They remain inconclusive. Soon afterwards, on Feb 13, Mrs. Gandhi announces the acceptance of three major religious demands of the Akalis - Gurbani
(religious discourse) is to be broadcast from All India Radio, the All India Gurudwara Act is to be passed, and the walled city of Amritsar is to receive the status of a holy city. The Akalis are dissatisfied and term these concessions a fraud and continue with their agitation. On March 26, Mrs. Gandhi announces the appointment of a commission under Justice Sarkaria to review center-state relations. Akalis welcome this development, since one of their major demands is for the states to have more powers. They nevertheless continue their agitation. In early October, following a massacre of Hindus by the terrorists, the government of Darbara Singh is dismissed by Mrs. Gandhi and central rule is imposed on the state. Following this, the government enacts three pieces of legislation - Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, Chandigarh Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act. On October 7, in accordance with the provisions of these acts, Punjab and Chandigarh are declared disturbed areas. Amnesty International, referring to the enactment of these laws for Punjab and other states, in its 1984 report "expressed concern (to the Indian Government) that laws which conferred broadly defined powers to shoot to kill appeared to facilitate the illegal and arbitrary killing of political opponents in a number of states."
The Akalis add another demand to their earlier list of demands. Article 25 of the Indian constitution had classified the Sikh religion as a sect of Hinduism. The Akalis want an amendment of the constitution to recognize Sikhism as a separate religion. Since late February, they have been burning the Indian constitution as a form of protest. More than 200 Akali workers are under detention for burning the constitution. On the 31st of March, the Home Minister announces that the government would amend the constitution to recognize Sikhism as a separate religion.

March 4
The districts of Amritsar, Kapurthala and Gurdaspur are declared "disturbed areas" by the government. Police are given powers to "shoot to kill" law breakers and to make arrests without warrants in these districts.

March 20
The AISSF (All India Sikh Student Federation), a youth organization very close to Bhindranwale, is banned by the government. At least 100 activists are arrested in the two days following this ban.
April 5
The central government imposes further stringent measures on the state. The National Security Act (1980) is amended allowing individuals in Punjab and Chandigarh to be detained without trial for up to 2 years for acts alleged to be prejudicial to the defense or security of the state. During this time they can be held for up to six months without their detention being reviewed by the Advisory Board established under the National Security Act.

April 15
30 rural railway stations are set on fire in nine out of the twelve districts of Punjab, allegedly by militant Sikhs.

June 2
The entire state of Punjab is declared a "restricted area," off limits to all foreigners and journalists. The army is called into the state and takes over the security of the state. The police and other para-military forces are placed under the direct control of the army.

June 4-5
Operation Blue Star is conducted. The army in simultaneous action in major gurudwaras in the state liberates them from
extremist/terrorist control. The worst fighting takes place in the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The eve of the attack coincides with the Sikh celebration of the martyrdom of one of their gurus. Hundreds of these pilgrims, including women and children, are killed in this attack. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and some of his major lieutenants are also killed. The Golden Temple is damaged. Hundreds of historical documents, some of them bearing the signature of Sikh gurus, are destroyed in what are allegedly acts of vandalism by the army. Sikhs all over the country are offended by this invasion of their holiest shrine. The incident also provokes mutiny and/or desertion of some 2500 Sikhs in the army (India Today, May 15, 1990:1). According to the Indian Express (June 15, 1984) 492 extremists were killed in Operation Blue Star along with 84 army troops. According to Facts on File, the "government's assault on the temple was widely applauded by Indian opposition parties." The Associated Press journalist, Chellaney, reports seeing bodies shot with their hands tied behind them. He is charged with sedition by the authorities and warrants are issued for his arrest.

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1The passing of the Golden Temple and other religious places in the state into extremist hands was a gradual process, not a single event, but had largely been completed by this time.
July 5

Another hijacking takes place of an Indian jet to Pakistan. Among the demands are the release of all Sikh extremists; $25 million reparations for damage to the Golden Temple during Blue Star; and the withdrawal of Indian army from Punjab. The next day, the hijackers surrender to Pakistani authorities. Pakistan rejects a demand to extradite the hijackers to India on grounds of the lack of an extradition treaty with India.

July 10

The Government's White Paper explaining the factors that lead to Blue Star invasion is issued. It mentions that in this operation 493 civilians and alleged terrorists and 93 army personnel were killed. Indirect references to a foreign conspiracy to destabilize the country are also made. On 27th October, official sources quoted in the press put the number of dead, including soldiers, at 1000 (Amnesty International Report 1985). Other estimates mention about 4000 casualties. *India Today* calls the White Paper a whitewash operation.

July 14

The promulgation of a presidential decree called the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance. In August this was replaced by an act of the same name. "The Act permitted special courts to try people on charges of
'waging war': it was mandatory for special courts to sit in camera, courts could sit in jails and the identity of witnesses could be kept secret. The burden of proof was transferred from the prosecution to the defense, if the accused was in an area where firearms or explosives were used, or where security forces were attacked or resisted. Appeals could be lodged only within 30 days of sentence" (Amnesty International Report 1987). By the terms of this Act the government of Punjab was granted special powers to declare areas "terrorist affected" for up to 6 months and to establish special courts to try terrorist crimes. In early August these Special Courts begin their work of trying alleged extremists. By the end of 1984 several thousand people are awaiting trial before three special courts in Punjab. In March 1985, the Home Minister announces that as of March 22, 1,785 cases had been conducted before special courts in Punjab and a further 3,264 cases were pending. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer states, "A scared government has tried to meet extremist terror with legal terror which has few parallels in history" (India Today, Feb. 28, 1985:28). Aug. 24

Sikhs hijack a plane to Dubai.
Sept. 21

The government announces that 431 Sikh extremists captured in Blue Star are to be tried for waging war against the state. Many could receive the death sentence.

October 31

Mrs. Gandhi is assassinated by two of her Sikh body guards. Anti-Sikh riots, mostly organized by the government, take place in most cities of northern India. Mrs. Gandhi's son, Rajiv Gandhi, is nominated prime minister by the president Giani Zail Singh. Gandhi announces that elections to the Parliament would be held on December 24 and December 27. The electoral process would be excluded from the trouble torn states of Assam and Punjab. In these elections, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party sweeps the polls. Her son Rajiv Gandhi retains his prime ministership. It is very obvious that the victory has been made possible by the wave of sympathy flowing in the country following the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi.

January 1985

The Home Minister announces in Parliament that the death toll from the anti-Sikh riots was 2987 (Facts on File:310).

February 2

Curbs on entry of foreigners to Punjab are extended.
March 11

Eight moderate Akali leaders who had been arrested in the wake of operation Blue Star are released. Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, a moderate and the "morcha (agitation) dictator" is one of them.

April 11

The government announces that a Supreme Court judge would be appointed to hold a judicial inquiry into the anti-Sikh riots; the ban on AISSF, the militant student wing and a pro-Bhindranwale organization, would be lifted; and some Sikhs detained in the wake of Blue Star would be released.

The Akali Dal announces a postponement of its planned agitation until June 1 to give the government more time to meet its other demands which include dissolution of special courts to try purported terrorists; end of court martial for Sikh deserters from the army; withdrawal of the army from Punjab; and release of all detainees held without charges.

May 10-11

Bomb blasts hidden in transistor radios rock the capital and several northern states of the country. Nearly 80 people are killed. This appears to be the first coordinated reaction of terrorism to Blue Star.
May 13

The FBI foils a plot by 7 Sikhs to assassinate prime minister Rajiv Gandhi during his forthcoming visit to the United States in June. Director Webster also stated that "the Sikhs also had been plotting to bomb strategic locations in India, including a nuclear power plant, bridges and government buildings" (Facts on File: 363).

May 18

Government introduces the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Bill 1985. Under the provisions of this Bill, death penalty is made mandatory for "terrorist" acts which result in death. It was to be applicable throughout India for 2 years. "Disruptive activities" were made punishable from 3 years to life imprisonment and were broadly defined as "any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media, which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Advocating or inciting such activities was also made similarly punishable" (Amnesty International Report 1986:220). The Bill became a law on May 29. The same month, the border was sealed with Pakistan.
June 1-7
Sikhs observe Ghallughara (Genocide) Week, the first anniversary of Blue Star.

June 23
An air crash of an Air India Boeing 747 off the coast of Ireland kills 329 people. Sikh terrorist groups claim responsibility.

June 24-29
The government announces that it would release some 150 Sikh youth detained in connection with trouble in state and against whom no serious charges exist. Sant Harchand Singh Longowal welcomes this announcement.

July 24
The prime minister signs an accord with the Akali leader, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. The main provisions are transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab on January 26; the appointment of an autonomous commission to settle the territorial claims of Punjab and Haryana, its report was to be submitted by December 31, 1985 with its recommendations to be binding on both the states and the final territorial exchanges between the two states were to take place on Jan 26, 1986; a tribunal presided over by a Supreme Court judge
was to make an allocation of river waters between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan; the ASR, which demanded a restructuring of federal relations, was to be referred to the Sarkaria commission which was already looking into the proposed changes to be made to the nature of Indian federalism; financial payments to innocent individuals killed in agitation or any action after Aug. 1, 1982; merit rather than communal or regional criteria for recruitment to the military; an expanded inquiry in the anti-Sikh riots; employment to be provided to Sikhs discharged from the army as deserters; and the central government would take steps to promote the Punjabi language. On 24 July, the Punjab Government announced the immediate withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1983 (which had widened army powers of arrest), declared that the state was no longer a "terrorist affected area" and restricted the mandate of special courts established under the 1984 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act. However, those accused of "waging war" and "hijacking" would still face trial before special courts under procedures which shifted the burden of proof and permitted trial in camera (Amnesty International Report 1986:222). Thus the special courts were not abolished. Not all circles within the Akali Dal were happy with this accord with the central government. The AISSF, the Joginder Singh (father of Bhindranwale) faction of Akali Dal, and Badal and Tohra, two moderate Akali leaders, voice
opposition to the accord. They wanted the government to apologize to the Sikhs for Blue Star; exonerate, not rehabilitate the Sikh army deserters; and drop all cases against Sikhs and release them immediately.

August 18
The Defense Ministry announced the reinstatement of 900 of the 2733 Sikh army deserters. Some 237 others were to be given employment in the para-military forces (Facts on File:617).

August 21
Sant Harchand Singh Longowal is shot dead by extremists. A massive wave of sympathy is shown for the killed leader in Punjab.

Sept 6
The Government decides not to prosecute the Associated Press reporter, Chellaney. Earlier he had been charged with inflammatory reporting of Operation Blue Star.

Sept 15
The Government bans a report by the Citizens For Democracy (CFD) group that had exposed its role in the anti-Sikh riots. A co-author and printer are charged with sedition.
Elections are held for the 117 member state legislative assembly and 13 parliamentary seats in Punjab. Some extremist groups, who had opposed the accord, threaten violence. The Akali faction of Joginder Singh calls for a boycott. Surprisingly, little violence takes place. This election sees a voter turnout of nearly 68%. This is considered an outright rejection of terrorism by the people of the state and a victory for the Akali moderates. For the first time in its history, the Akali Dal wins an absolute majority in the state assembly (more than 70 seats). Surjit Singh Barnala, a close ally of Sant Longowal becomes chief minister of Punjab on Sept. 29. "The new government announced the release of 224 further detainees held under the NSA and established a committee to review the cases of an estimated 2,400 people still detained after arrest during the previous three years. By the end of 1985 the committee was reported to have recommended the release of more than 2,000 detainees and the withdrawal of cases against 450 people arrested during or after violent events at the Golden Temple in June 1984. The central government subsequently said that 377 of them charged with waging war and awaiting trial in Jodhpur jail would not be released" (Amnesty International Report 1986:221-222). Some wanted youths also surrender in this period. On Sept 26 the state government announced the dissolution of Special Courts.
October

Four Sikhs are arrested in the United Kingdom in connection with a conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi during his forthcoming visit to that country.

Jan 1986

Protests ensue in the neighboring state of Haryana. The demonstrators are protesting the transfer of the joint capital, Chandigarh, to Punjab. Sikh militants and extremist groups again assume control of the Golden Temple.

Jan 22, 1986

Death sentence pronounced for the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi. They can still appeal, however.

February

"An official four-member committee, headed by a former judge, studied 35 "encounters" (of terrorists and the security forces) in the state and reported this month that almost all such cases in the Punjab were "fake encounters."

(Amnesty International Report 1987:231)

March 21

Sikh militants storm the Punjab assembly. Four are killed and 25 wounded in the ensuing clash with the police.
April 30

Following the proclamation of Khalistan, an independent Sikh state, on April 29 from within the Golden Temple by some groups, the Golden Temple is raided again on April 30 by police and paramilitary forces. There is minimal resistance this time. It is once again freed from extremist control.

May 8

The ruling Akali Dal is split, with some members protesting the attack on the Golden Temple. Twenty seven members under the leadership of Badal and Tohra, who were among those who had opposed the Longowal-Gandhi accord, break away. The Barnala rule now gets support from the Congress and other opposition parties and stays on in power.

June 1-7

The second anniversary of Blue Star is celebrated by the Sikhs as Genocide Week.

June 21

Second postponement of the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab.

June 25

A magisterial inquiry finds that the Border Security Force had been guilty of deliberate killings of militants and recommends that charges of murder be brought against those responsible" (Amnesty International Report 1987:231).
Oct. 2
The prime minister escapes an assassination attempt. From all accounts, it appears to be a crude and an unorganized effort.

August 10
General Vaidya, the army chief during Blue Star, now retired, is shot dead by Sikh extremists. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) claims responsibility.

Jan 18, 1987
The Golden Temple is raided for the second time in nine months by police and para-military forces, one of the periodic cleanups of militants who assume control over it periodically.

Feb 11
Chief Minister Surjit Singh Barnala is excommunicated from the Sikh religion by the five Sikh Head priests for allowing, as the head of the administration, to allow the police and para-military forces to invade the sanctity of the Golden Temple.

Feb 23
The Misra Report is made public. This panel under a retired Supreme Court judge had been appointed in early 1985 to
inquire into the anti-Sikh riots. But soon after, the
government had taken steps that raised suspicion among the
Akalis and other Sikhs about the government's true
intentions. A little while after the commission's
appointment, the government directed that its inquiry should
proceed in secret. Later the government came out with a law
that allowed reports by any such commissions to be kept
secret permanently. While the report had been submitted in
August 1986, it was only made public now. The report
indicted the Delhi police for "total passivity, callousness
and indifference" in the wake of the riots, as well as some
low level workers of the Congress party for participation.
One of the major participants, according to many independent
inquiries by civil rights groups, H.K. L. Bhagat, a top
Congress leader, was exonerated though the commission noted
that hundreds of affidavits had been filed accusing him of
participation in the anti-Sikh riots. It further said that
the Congress did not organize the riots which were more or
less "spontaneous," while also mentioning that in some
respects the violence was systematic. The government
followed the release of this report by appointing two
further commissions to prosecute the people linked with
these riots.
March 7
The third raid on Golden Temple in 11 months takes place. The objective of the security personnel was once again to seize extremists hidden in the shrine.

April
Terrorists seek to impose morality by the force of gun. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), threatens to "burn alive" those who smoked, drank or ate meat. Numerous liquor stores are burnt. The meat trade in the holy city of Amritsar comes to a standstill. People are also asked to have simple marriages.

May 11
Central rule is imposed on Punjab with the popular Barnala government being dismissed on grounds of lack of political will to fight terrorism. Opponents contend that this was done with a view to win the state elections in the neighboring state of Haryana to be held in June. Within weeks of this declaration more than 1,000 people were detained in Punjab under TADA. The Governor of Punjab, Sidhartha Shankar Ray, is asked by the central government to speed up the construction of the Sutlej-Yamuna link canal. This would implement the disputed water sharing agreement, and thereby benefit Haryana. The central government also chooses at this time to release the Eradi Water Tribunal
report, though it had been submitted in January, 1987. In accordance with the recommendations of this report, the share of Haryana in the disputed waters was increased.

June 18
The Congress party is routed in state elections in Haryana.

June 25
Golden Temple is raided again. This is the second time in 1987 and the fourth in 14 months. No significant resistance is offered to the security forces.

August
The National Security Act (NSA) which permitted the authorities to detain people without charge or trial for security reasons, was amended to make its provisions even more harsh. Later, the government also strengthened the provisions of TADA. "It created special courts whose proceedings would be conducted entirely in camera. A confession to a senior police officer could be admitted as evidence if the police had 'reason to believe' that it was 'made voluntarily,' even though the Indian Evidence Act has long required confessions to be recorded before a magistrate as a safeguard against abuse. The burden of proof was shifted onto the accused. Bail was also made more difficult
to obtain. Sikhs were particularly unlikely to be released on bail" (Amnesty International Report 1988:158).

March 4, 1988

In what was called the "most significant move since the accord" by India Today, the militant Sikh high priests were released; forty of the approximately 365 Jodhpur detainees were also released. They had been arrested in the Golden Temple at the time of the Blue Star operation. To this date, no charges had been filed against them. One of the demands of the Akali Dal had been for their unconditional release. The state assembly was also dissolved.

March 23

The government passed the fifty-ninth constitutional amendment. It provided for a state of emergency to be proclaimed in Punjab on the broadly defined grounds of "internal disturbance" if the integrity of India was threatened. Under the amendment the right to life, as guaranteed in the Constitution, could be suspended and security forces empowered to shoot people at will. Central rule in the state was extended for a further period.

May 9-18
A siege of the Golden Temple takes place. Forty-one militants die. Some of them commit suicide by consuming poison. The siege takes place in full view of the media.

August 3
The highest court of the land upholds the death sentence for two of the three accused in Mrs. Gandhi's assassination.

August 10
A report by the Amnesty International (Facts on File 1987:650) states that dozens of Sikh prisoners throughout India had died during the previous 18 months after being tortured by the police, and scores had been killed in fake or staged encounters with the security forces. While stating that many of the victims were involved in killing civilians and security personnel, the report nevertheless mentioned that the 'government action taken against them has transgressed international human rights standards.'

September 21
Rajiv Gandhi visits Punjab. He announces the further release of 138 more of the 365 Jodhpur detainees, stepped up economic investment in Punjab, jobs for youth in border districts, the proposed holding of village elections in the state, and the calling of an all-Party conference to solve the Punjab problem.
Jan 6, 1989

The execution of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi occurs. Press reports indicate widespread doubts of the guilt of one of the two, Kehar Singh.

March 3

Conciliatory moves are made by the government. Among them are the release of all the Jodhpur detenues, cases against them are also withdrawn; withdrawal of some draconian laws; curbs on police powers; lifting of ban on travel by foreigners throughout Punjab; and the withdrawal of special amendments to the NSA.

April 7

Charges of conspiring to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi and of waging war against the government are filed against five Sikhs. One of them, S. S. Mann, is a leader of an Akali faction considered close to the militants. The death penalty is the maximum possible.

May

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), which provided for special courts to try people in camera and suspended important legal safeguards against arbitrary detention was extended for another two years.
November 22-24

Parliamentary elections are held in India. Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress lose and sit in opposition. The Congress' losses are mainly in the North, but it sweeps the South. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a party enjoying the support mainly of the Hindus, makes commendable electoral gains. V.P. Singh, an erstwhile cabinet member of Rajiv Gandhi who had resigned in the wake of corruption in the government, assumes the prime ministership of the country on December 2. Among the victorious in Punjab are S. S. Mann, the widow of one of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi, as well as the assassin's father. S.S Mann wins his parliamentary seat with the second highest vote margin in the entire country, a good indication of the alienation of the Sikhs from the national mainstream.

December 7

The new prime minister pays a visit to the Sikh holy city of Amritsar in an open jeep and is welcomed by thousands. In contrast the erstwhile prime minister, if ever he visited the state, was accompanied by an entourage of nearly 6000 security personnel and addressed rallies from behind bullet proof shields. The Hindu (December 16:1) reports, "Since 1962 when Jawaharlal Nehru visited the city, no leader had received such an overwhelming response from the people, who have now clearly demonstrated that they want peace."
December 17

The new prime minister convenes an All Party Conference to find a solution to the Punjab crisis. Among the policy directives handed down to the Union Government are a) the scrapping of the fifty-ninth amendment to the constitution that allowed the government to do away with civil liberties in Punjab, and b) punishment of those guilty of the November 1984 anti-Sikh riots. Among the major national parties, the party of the erstwhile prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, the Congress(I), does not endorse the consensus document. Akali Dal factions led by Mann and Badal do not attend.

December 29

Parliament repeals the 59th constitutional amendment (1988) which permitted the suspension of the right to life in Punjab.

March 29, 1990

When the central government proposes extension of central rule in the state, in the face of its publicly declared electoral promise to hold popular elections in Punjab, the Akali Dal (Mann) withdraws support from the national government. Mann also calls for Nuremberg type trials of those guilty of the anti-Sikh riots of November 1984.
April 10
President's rule is further extended in Punjab for a period of six months by the passage of the 64th amendment.

July-August
A serious internal crisis develops in the ruling party at the center.

October 5
By the 76th amendment, President's rule is extended in Punjab for another six months.

October 12
S.S. Mann, a semi-moderate, considered considerably close to the militants, and on whom many had put hopes for a negotiated settlement of the problem, resigns his seat from the national parliament.

November 7
The government of prime minister V. P. Singh falls in the wake of a Hindu-Muslim temple dispute that had intensified factionalism in the ruling coalition. The Hindu dominated Bharatiya Janata Party withdraws support to the government thereby forcing Singh to resign. These developments are unrelated to the Punjab crisis.
November 10

Chandra Shekhar, one of the contenders for the post of prime minister earlier, assumes prime ministership of the country with the support from outside of the erstwhile prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress(I). Earlier, Chandrashekhar's had been the lone voice among the opposition that had opposed the late Mrs. Gandhi's policies on Punjab. He had been a critic of the Blue Star operation of June 1984. Clearly, he enjoyed some amount of goodwill in Punjab.

December 28

The prime minister and S. S. Mann hold private talks. Mann stresses the right to self-determination for Sikhs and the involvement of Sikh militants in any negotiations with the government. The prime minister agrees to consider talks with the militants.

Jan 12, 1991

The three major Akali factions, Akali Dal(M), Akali Dal(B) and Akali Dal(L) decide to unite under the leadership of S.S. Mann, leader of the Akali Dal(M) faction. Mann once again calls for self-determination for Sikhs.

Feb 1991

Alleging excessive interference by Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister resigns, calling for general elections in May.
Source: India Today, The Indian Express, Facts on File, Amnesty International Reports, and The Hindu.
APPENDIX D

CHARTER OF AKALI GRIEVANCES 1981
A. Religious

1. Interference in religious affairs of Sikhs. 2. No endeavors by the government for Sikh control over the management of gurudwaras in Pakistan; 3. Apathy towards safety of life and property of Sikhs settled abroad and in other states of India; 4. Forcible occupation of Delhi Gurudwaras in 1971; 5. Applying Land Ceiling Act to gurudwaras in Haryana; 6. Failure to name any train as Golden Temple Express while 15 trains have been named after other religious places; 7. Delay in awarding holy city status to Amritsar; 8. Not permitting installation of a transmitter in Golden Temple; 9. Non enacting the All India Gurudwara Act; 10. Usurping the SGPC's authority in the field of sending pilgrims to Pakistan; 11. Interfering in the Sikh tenets and violating the sanctity of Sikh traditions; 12. Illegal and forcible occupation of Delhi Gurudwaras with the help of the police; 13. Restrictions on carrying of 'kirpans' (swords) by Sikhs in the national airline;

B. Political

1. Violation of the assurance given to Sikhs for an autonomous region and instead declaring Sikhs as criminal; 2. Ban of 'Punjabi Suba' slogan; 3. Keeping Chandigarh and
other Punjabi-speaking areas out of Punjab and taking away control of water head works and river water distribution; 4. Denial of internal autonomy of the state; 5. Topping of Akali governments through illegal corrupt practice; 6. Denial of second language status to Punjabi in neighboring states; 7. Expressing lack of confidence in Punjabis and disarming them by withdrawing licensed arms; 8. Rejecting the Anandpur Sahib resolution and following a policy of divide and rule by inciting communal tensions.

C. Economic

Failure to safeguard the rights of Harijans and other weaker sections; 16. Non-payment of compensation to the victims of Indo-Pakistan wars in Punjab; 17. Non-payment of unemployment allowance; 18 Linking of production to the price index; 19. Denial of facilities to farmers and workers under the Employment Insurance Scheme; 20. Forcible acquisition of urban agricultural land at cheap rates; 21. Ban on the sale of rural land within the 5 km. radius of the corporation limits.

D. Social

1. Non-recognition of the Sikh Personal Law; 2. projecting Sikhs in improper way in films and TV etc., encouraging anti-Sikh literature and not giving sufficient time for coverage of Sikh literature on radio/TV.

APPENDIX E

ANANDPUR SAHIB RESOLUTION (ASR)
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution as endorsed by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal on 23 October 1982


(A) Principles

(1) The Shiromani Akali Dal is the supreme body of the Sikh Panth and as such is fully authorized to represent and lead them. The basis of this organization depends on mutual relations, aspirations of man and his relations with the creator.

(2) These principles are embodied in the doctrines of Guru Nanak Dev, viz, Nam Japo (God Worship), Kirat Karo (Do hard labor) and Wand Chhako (Share your hard earnings with others).

(B) Aims

The Shiromani Akali Dal shall strive for the fulfillment of following aims:

(1) Propagation of Religion and Sikh tenets and condemnation of atheism;
(2) Maintaining the realization of Panth's independent entity and creation of such an environment where Sikh sentiment can find its full expression;

(3) Eradication of poverty and hunger through an equitable economic structure-increase in wealth and end of all exploitation;

(4) Removal of illiteracy, untouchability and casteism as laid down in Sikh scriptures;

(5) Ending ill-health and sickness, and the condemnation of intoxicants.

PART -1

The Shiromani Akali Dal considers it a primary task to inculcate a sense of Divinity among the Sikhs so that they are proud of being the same. In order to accomplish the same, the Akali Dal will initiate the following programme:

(a) Preaching the one-ness of God, worship, belief in the Ten Gurus and the Holy Granth, and information about the doctrines explained by them for implementation by the Sikh;

(b) For the successful preaching of Sikh Divinity, philosophy, tenets and kirtan etc. production of good preachers, singers, dhadis and poets from Sikh Missionary Colleges so that preachers are able to propagate freely in India and abroad, villages and cities, schools and colleges etc.
(c) the work of Amrit Parchar (Baptism) to be undertaken at a larger scale, particularly among the schools and colleges. Study circles of college professors and students to be organized for this purpose;
(d) Revival of Daswandh (donation of 1/10th of income) among the Sikhs;
(e) Respect and honor the Sikh historians, intellectuals, writers, Parcharaks, Granthis etc. and provide facilities to raise the standard of their life, training and work;
(f) In order to streamline the Gurudwara administration, arrangements to be made for the training of employees, maintenance of Gurudwara buildings and issuing of necessary directives to the SGPC members in this behalf;
(g) Correct printing of scriptures, research of old and new Sikh History, translation of scriptures and preparation of clean literature of Sikh principles.
(h) Strive for the enactment of new All India Gurudwara Act under which all Gurudwaras in the country are managed efficiently and endeavour that old institutions of the Sikhs like Asis, Nirmala etc. become an integral part of the Sikh society;
(i) The Managers of all Gurudwaras in the world to be woven in a single chain in order to have effective benefits of the common means of religious propaganda;
(j) To secure 'Open Darshan' of Sri Nankana Sahib and other Gurudwaras which have been snatched away from the Panth.
PART-II

Political

The panthic political aim is definitely based on the directives of the Tenth Guru, which is engraved on the pages of Sikh History and is in the mind of the Khalsa Panth - Its aim is, KHALSA JI KA BOL BALA.

To this end in view, the Shiromani Akali Dal will strive and wage struggles for the following:

1) (a) The areas which have been taken away from Punjab or have been intentionally kept apart e.g. Dalhousie from district Gurdaspur; Chandigarh; Pinjor; Kalka and Ambala City in district Ambala; whole Una Tehsil of Hoshiarpur district; 'Desh' ilaqa of Nalagarh; Shahabad block of District Hissar and Sirsa Tehsil; 6 Tehsils of district Ganganagar of Rajasthan and the contiguous Punjabi speaking Sikh-populated areas, should be immediately merged, with Punjab under one administrative unit;  b) In this new Punjab, and other states the Central intervention should be restricted to Defence, Foreign Affairs Post and Telegraphs, Currency and Railways. The rest of the departments should be under the direct control of Punjab;

c) Effective arrangements should be made to safeguard the interest of the minority Sikh community living outside
Punjab, so that they do not fall a prey to any
discrimination;

2) The Shiromani Akali Dal will also try that the
Indian Constitution becomes Federal in the real sense and
all states are equally represented at the Center.

3) The Shiromani Akali Dal feels that the foreign
policy of the Congress Government is useless and harmful for
the country and the nation as a whole. It will strive for
good relations with all neighboring countries, particularly
where the Sikhs reside or where their religious shrines are
found. Our foreign policy should not be tagged along with
any other country:

4) To ensure justice for Sikh employees at the Center
and States and to raise effective voice against injustice,
meted out to them, is an important part of the Shiromani
Akali Dal's programme. Particularly in Defence Services,
efforts will be made to maintain the conventions of the
Sikhs and the demands of Sikh soldiers would be constantly
kept in view. Shiromani Akali Dal will also try that the
'Kirpan' (sword) becomes an integral part of the Sikh
soldiers' uniform;

5) Creation of favorable atmosphere for the
rehabilitation of ex-servicemen, revision of necessary
concessions and safeguards for their rights so that they
live a life of self-respect;
6) The Shiromani Akali Dal feels that every man or woman, who has not been sentenced by a Court of law, should be allowed to keep a fire-arm without licence;

7) The Shiromani Akali Dal favors a policy of prohibition and a ban on smoking at public places.

APPENDIX F

AN EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT BY BRAHMA CHELLANEY
CORRESPONDENT, ASSOCIATED PRESS
OF AMERICA
On the sweltering afternoon of 4 June, I left New Delhi for Amritsar by car after hearing unconfirmed reports that the government was calling out the army to flush out Sikh terrorists from the Golden Temple and other shrines. Little did I realize what was in store for me. By the time we reached the industrial town of Phagwara, the government announced over radio that a 36-hour statewide curfew was being clamped and all road, rail and air traffic suspended from 9 p.m. My driver, a Sikh who did not sport the traditional turban and beard, said, 'Let's cancel the trip to Amritsar and stay in Jalandhar. I didn't want to take the risk of driving during curfew.'

It was about 7 p.m. and we were still three hours away from the Sikh holy city. During the one-hour drive to Jalandhar I tried to reassure the driver that it was safe to travel to Amritsar because we were from the press. However, all this pep talk went in vain when at Jalandhar a paramilitary police superintendent told us, 'Shoot-on-sight orders have been issued. Army troops are everywhere, and you will be taking considerable risk if you travel to Amritsar.' The driver drove the car straight to Jalandhar's Skylark Hotel and said firmly that he would not move from there until curfew was lifted.

I tried to persuade and cajole him into taking me to Amritsar, but he remained unmoved. I begged him, told him it was the greatest story of the year, offered him a fat bonus,
but he said adamantly, 'I don't want to be shot.' The hotel manager and a couple of other people also tried to persuade him, telling him that the troops would never fire at a press car. But there was no way to make him change his mind. Angry and frustrated, I stayed overnight at the hotel. Early in the morning, I went to driver's room and again urged him to take me to Amritsar. After much persuasion, he agreed reluctantly. The 85-kilometer drive to Amritsar took more than three hours because our car was stopped almost every five kilometers on the highway by rifle-toting troops who would frisk us and search the vehicle.

At least at one checkpoint, the soldiers made us stand by the side of the road with our arms up until their officer came and checked my credentials. With baited breath we reached Amritsar at about 11 a.m., but not before we were almost turned back to Jalandhar by a troop commander at the city border checkpost.

As we drove towards the Golden Temple, we heard mortar explosions and machine-gun fire. The battle between the Sikh militants and the army had started. The streets were deserted except for armed policemen and soldiers, patrolling by jeep and on foot. Just near the Temple, we were stopped by a police patrol and taken to the city's B-Division police station. There we were told sternly that we should go to a hotel and stay indoors. 'Anybody on the street is liable to be shot, including you,' said inspector Surinder Pal Singh.
While driving towards a city guest house, we saw a large group of foreign and Indian journalists at the kotwali or the main police station. We stopped, and were told by one newsman that police had rounded up all visiting journalists - foreign and Indian - from city hotels and brought them to the kotwali where they were told by police superintendent Sital Das to pack up and be ready to leave Amritsar in about an hour in a military convoy. We drove away, not wanting to get involved in that affair, and went to the office of the United News of India (UNA), one of the country's two major news agencies.

Later, when we visited Ritz Hotel we found all the journalists had been placed under house arrest. Hours later, the entire group - except for two newsmen working for Indian Press - were driven out of Punjab in an army convoy while I was asleep in my room at the Ritz. As I had arrived that very day and checked into the hotel very late, my name was not in the list of journalists in town the police had prepared, and so I escaped detection. I sent my first story with the two AP photo stringers who left with the others in the car in which I came.

The next morning I visited the kotwali where the officials were friendly and willing to talk endlessly on the military operation. They accused the military of ordering the illegal rounding up of all journalists and turning the police force into a 'social welfare corps'. Realizing that
the domestic press was under government restrictions and that I was the only journalist of a foreign news organization in town, the officials - Sikh and Hindus alike - were very helpful, providing interesting details in the raging gun battle. "We want the world to know the truth. So it is our duty to provide you all the information," said one police superintendent.

That night the army exchanged heavy machine-gun fire with the militants entrenched in the Golden Temple and sent 25-member batches of commandos inside the shrine. I slept the night in the house of a UNI correspondent, Jaspal Singh Sidhu. Earlier that day, I spoke to Sikh fundamentalist leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who was inside the Temple, by walkie talkie from an old, decrepit building near the sprawling shrine complex. "We will not surrender. We will fight to the last man," said the 37-year-old Bhindranwale in what was apparently his last interview with a journalist. "No might in the world can make us bow our head."

On the afternoon of 6 June, I met a Hindu air force officer who soon became a good friend and an invaluable source of inside information. He invited me to stay at his house, and I readily accepted the offer because the city hotels had closed down the previous day. That same day, he took me to residences of two of his army friends. One of them, who was commanding a unit in the night of 5 June
described graphically how the commandos were cut down by Sikh militants firing from inside underground tunnels. The military operation had to be temporarily suspended because of that disaster.

At about 9 p.m. on 6 June, the entire city of 700,000 was plunged into darkness by a power outage. Half an hour later Amritsar was shaken by powerful shelling, mortar explosions and machine-gun fire. The big battle had begun. Half the city was up on rooftops watching the battle. Tracer bullets and flares lit up the crescent moon sky. The explosions at the Golden Temple rattled doors and windows miles away. While the battle was raging, the state-run radio claimed the city was "calm". Between 10.30 p.m. and midnight, we heard slogans from city outskirts of villagers trying to march to the Golden Temple from three different directions. The slogans - "Long live the Sikh religion' and 'Bhindranwale is our leader" - were heard briefly on each occasion and were followed by rapid army machine gun fire and screams.

Few residents slept that night. The battle ended more than twelve hours later at about 10.00 a.m. By then the curfew had been extended indefinitely and main streets were being heavily patrolled by gun-wielding troops. I walked four kilometers toward Golden Temple that afternoon but was turned back by soldiers. At the main police station, I heard reports of heavy casualties from policemen who had helped
remove bodies from the shrine. My air force friend, a police superintendent and another police official reported that at least 800 Sikh militants and 200 army men had been killed in the storming of the temple according to a preliminary official count. Among the dead were Bhindranwale and two former Indian army generals who were leading the Sikh militants.

It was an incredibly frustrating experience. While the world was unaware of the capture of Golden Temple and the heavy casualties, I was sitting in the rich information that I had collected, unable to file it. All telephone, telex and teleprinter lines were cut and postal services suspended on 3 June, and I was a virtual prisoner in Amritsar, unable to leave the city because of the air, road and rail blockade.

On 8 June, despite the military capture of the 17th-century temple, troops still battled pockets of resistance inside the complex and the intermittent sound of mortar and machine-gun fire continued to be heard all over the town. Using binoculars from a nearby building, I saw a destroyed tank outside the shrine and an armored personnel carrier smoldering on the marble pathway inside the temple complex. The stench of death pervaded the temple neighborhood, and residents complained it was suffocatingly difficult to live. Authorities had cut power and water supply to the Golden Temple and its neighborhood before the siege began. We have been without power and water in temperatures of 104
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degrees Fahrenheit,' said Gurbaksh Singh, one resident living near the Golden Temple. 'To add to our misery, the heavy gunfire, shelling and mortar and grenade explosions inside the temple brought chemical fumes to our homes.'

I twice visited the main city crematory on 9 and 10 June to check the fatality toll in the Golden Temple assault. Strangely, while there were troops everywhere in the city, there were none at the crematory. 'The army probably think that the ghosts would take care of intruders,' said the man on duty at the crematorium. He and police officials, who were given charge of removing the dead from the temple complex, said bodies were being brought in municipal garbage truck round-the-clock since early 6 June. 'We have been really busy. To add to our woes, we don't have enough wool to burn the dead, and so we are cremating them in heaps of twenty or more,' said the crematory official.

Near the Golden Temple, I saw an estimated 50 corpses in a large rubbish lorry that had sewage still smeared on its outer body. From the back of the grey truck, at least two masculine legs were sticking out and from the left side one could see hanging the forehead and the long flowing hair of an apparently unturbanned Sikh. As I peeped into the truck from the back, I could see dead bodies of at least two women and a child. That night it was difficult to sleep; I kept thinking of the dead bodies.
On 10 June, a UNI reporter and I saw the dehydrated body of a petty shopkeeper, who apparently had died of starvation and thirst, being pulled out from a wayside stall by troops about two kilometers from the Golden Temple. Later, the district police chief admitted in confidence that six people and more than 1,000 buffaloes had died of starvation because of the strictly-enforced curfew. In Amritsar's Green Avenue district, where I stayed with the air force officer, babies had no milk to drink and residents were mostly eating lentils and homemade bread. A village milkman who tried to bring milk to the area in violation of the curfew was shot dead by soldiers. From my three military sources, I gathered that 106 people had been killed between 4 and 10 June by army firing on crowds of Sikh villagers trying to march to the Golden Temple.

On the evening of 10 June, I had a hair-raising experience. While taking a picture of a column of tanks rolling down a city road, I noticed a tank turning its gun towards me. I ran to the left to a dingy by lane, leaving my new notebook behind. About 2.5 kilometers ahead, at a city intersection at twilight, I heard a shot fired behind my back. I turned back and saw a man - a non-Sikh - fall to the ground and a group of Sikh soldiers pointing their rifles at him. I almost froze, and thought that was the end of me and virtually stood motionless on the ground. Half a minute
later, I glanced back again and saw the jeep heading in the opposite direction.

That night, while relating these two incidents to my friend and his neighbor, I learned that the telephone line of a state legislator living in that district was restored earlier that day. I rushed to the nearby UNI office and discovered to my utter surprise that the phone there too had a dial tone. Panting in excitement, I frantically tried the number of AP, Delhi, UNI office in Jalandhar and Chandigarh. I got through to Jalandhar first and told the UNI office to message AP to call me urgently. Half an hour later, I got through to UNI, Chandigarh, and was dictating my story for relay to AP when the line got cut. It took another forty five minutes of continuous dialing to get AP. I had collected so much information that I didn't know what to file immediately. I gave the death toll (800 Sikh militants and 200 army men) in the Temple assault, reported the starvation deaths, the three abortive attempts by Bhindranwale's men to kill the top Sikh political leader, Harchand Singh Longowal, while the battle was raging, and the arrest of 6,000 suspected Sikh terrorists.

The next morning I had another unnerving experience after visiting the crematory again. (The toll, meantime, had increased to about 1,220). While taking some shots of gun-toting troops patrolling by jeep and truck, my camera was seized by a group of soldiers and I was taken to the command
post of the artillery unit, located near a large government school which had been turned into a prison and where 27 Sikh detainees were shot and killed the previous day while allegedly attempting to escape. For some time, I feared I was a prisoner too and would be locked up at the school.

However, after a telephone call to the military high command I was assured by Major A. Shukla that I was free and offered tea and biscuits.

As I sat in the room of another major, I found that the soldiers were getting their letters vetted and signed by the official before mailing them. (Postal and telegraph services for the civilian population had still not been restored). Each soldier who brought his letter in was asked by the major, "I hope you have not written anything about our operations here." Although each of the four soldiers said "no", the major still read the letters before signing above the mailing address. "We don't want our troops and their relatives living outside to feel demoralized by accounts of the battle here," the official said, alluding to the heavy army toll.

An hour later, colonel Adarsh Sharma, director of military intelligence in Amritsar, arrived. "I have received instructions that I should confiscate your film, return your camera and escort you out of the cantonment area," he said. He drove me back in his jeep to the place from where I had been picked up and said in parting, "I advise you to stay
indoors wherever you are staying. The situation is not going to improve in the next few days, and I don't want you to get into trouble again.'

As I made my way through the city, I saw a crowded bus at the inter-city bus station. I was told it was a bus taking people stranded at the station for the past eight days to Jalandhar. Although the bus had a 56-seat capacity; about 120 people, some perched on the roof, had packed it. Realizing it was a great opportunity for me to end my imprisonment in Amritsar, I made my way into the bus with great difficulty and sat next to the driver on the hood, where four other people were already sitting. The drive was the most tortuous one I have ever undertaken. Apart from the crush of other passengers the bus was stopped at least thirty times on the highway by army troops. One each occasion all passengers were ordered to get off the bus and line up on the road. The soldiers searched all bags and frisked passengers thoroughly in sweltering heat before letting the bus proceed. There were tanks stationed on the highway and many armored personnel carriers as well.

Chastened by the morning's earlier experience, I did not dare take out my camera and take those good pictures that went begging. The bus took five-and-a-half hours to cover the eighty kilometers to Jalandhar. I arrived there sweaty, thirsty and hungry, and discovered that there was no other bus leaving Jalandhar, towards New Delhi or any other
point, that evening. The curfew had just been relaxed briefly in Jalandhar, and I took a scooter cab to the office of the top district civilian official to take his help in hiring a taxi to New Delhi. The 35-year-old Sikh officer virtually became in instant friend.

He asked inquisitively about what was happening in Amritsar, suggested I stay overnight in Jalandhar to meet a doctor arriving from Amritsar, and then arranged my accommodation in a nice government guest house. That night over dinner at his residence, the city district magistrate who had been accompanying the troops in the countryside searches, provided details of how the military conducted the combing operations. The next morning I met the doctor who had arrived from Amritsar. An eye surgeon of Jalandhar, the Sikh was rounded up along with some other local doctors and taken to the Sikh holy city to conduct postmortem examination of civilians killed inside Golden Temple.

The doctor corroborated what I had been told by a deputy police superintendent in Amritsar that several of the slain Sikh militants were shot at by troops with their hands tied at the backs. The doctor, whose team examined four hundred corpses, including a hundred women and fifteen to twenty children, said he conducted postmortems of several Sikhs whose hands were tied at the back with their turban cloth. Later that day, the civilian official arranged my departure by a car for the neighboring state of Himachal Pradesh. On
the way, we were again stopped and searched innumerable times by troops. Once I crossed the Punjab border, I heaved a sigh of relief. I was free again.

APPENDIX G

EXTRACTS FROM "WHO ARE THE GUILTY?"
(REPORT OF A JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND IMPACT OF THE RIOTS IN DELHI FROM 31 OCTOBER TO 10 NOVEMBER)
PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
A fact-finding team jointly organized by the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the course of investigations from November 1 to November 10, has come to the conclusion that the attacks on members of the Sikh community in Delhi and its suburbs during the period, far from being a spontaneous expression of "madness" and of popular "grief and anger" at Mrs. Gandhi's assassination as made out to be by the authorities, were the outcome of a well-organized plan marked by acts of both deliberate commissions and omissions by important politicians of the Congress (I) at the top and by authorities in the administration. Although there was indeed popular shock, grief and anger, the violence that followed was the handiwork of a determined group which was inspired by different sentiments altogether.

Experiences of individual members of the team as well as their extensive interviews with (i) victims of the riots; (ii) police officers who were expected to suppress the riots; (iii) neighbors of the victims who tried to protect them; (iv) army personnel; and (v) political leaders, suggest that the attacks on the Sikhs followed a common pattern, whether they took place in Munirka in the South, or Mangolpuri in the West, or Trilokpuri in the East. The uniformity in the sequence of events at every spot in such far-flung places proves beyond doubt that the attacks were master-minded by some powerful organized groups. As a senior
army officer deployed in Delhi during the recent riots said: "This arson is the work of an expert". Newspaper reports suggest that this pattern is similar in all Congress (I) ruled states.

There was also a definite pattern discernible in the choice of the victims made by the assailants. According to the 1971 census figures Sikh males in the age group 20-50 number approximately, 100,000. The Sikhs who were killed in the recent riots largely belonged to this group. The official estimate of only 325 killed (including 46 Hindus) till November 7 (HINDUSTAN TIMES, NOVEMBER 11) sounds ridiculously low compared to the magnitude of arson, lynching and burning alive of people in the resettlement colonies alone. On the basis of information gathered from various sources, including eye-witnesses, survivors and relatives of the dead, the team estimates that the number of those killed is more than a thousand.

From our talks with the victims and their neighbors in almost every riot hit spot, we could reconstruct the sequence of events, which followed a stereo-typed pattern every where. The first phase was marked by the floating of a set of rumors on the evening of October 31, following the announcement of sweets and lighting lamps to celebrate Mrs. Gandhi's death. (Later during our investigations when we asked the residents of the affected localities whether anyone from among them had actually seen such things, almost
everyone admitted that they had not personally witnessed it, but had heard from someone else. We did however come across a few people who while expressing revulsion at the incidents of assaults on the Sikhs, added that they had seen in some places some Sikhs expressing their glee at Mrs. Gandhi's death by demonstrative gestures. We have reports that some isolated groups of Sikhs also exhibited similar behavior. From the information that we have gathered from various sources, our impression is that such cases were few and isolated. The second rumor was that train-loads of hundreds of Hindu dead bodies had arrived at Old Delhi Station from Punjab. Third, water was poisoned by the Sikhs. As for the two latter rumors, we came across evidence of policemen in vans touring certain localities and announcing through loudspeakers the arrival of the train and the poisoning of water. In certain areas we heard that police officials had rung up residents advising them not to drink water. These rumors (the last two were officially repudiated later) contributed to the shaping of a public mind that acquiesced in the attacks and murders that took place soon after.

The second phase began with the arrival of groups of armed young people in tempo vans, scooters, motorcycles or trucks from the night of October 31 and morning of November 1 at various places like Munirka, Saket, South Extension, Lajpat Nagar, Bhogal, Jangpura and Ashram in the south and south-east; the Connaught Circus shopping area in the
center and later the trans-Jamuna colonies and resettlement colonies in other areas in the north. With cans of petrol they went round the localities and systematically set fire to Sikh houses, shops and Gurudwaras. We were told by the local eye-witnesses in all the areas we visited, that well known Congress (I) leaders and workers (their names are to be found in Annexure-1) led and directed the arsonists and that local cadres of the Congress (I) identified the Sikh houses and shops. A senior police official who for understandable reasons does not want to be named, pointed out: "The shop signs are either in Hindi or English. How do you expect the illiterate arsonists to know whether these shops belonged to Hindus or Sikhs, unless they were identified to them by some one, who is either educated or a local person?) In some areas, like Trilokpuri, Mangolpuri and trans-Jamuna colonies, the arsonists consisted of Gujjar or Jat farmers from neighboring villages, and were accompanied by local residents, some of whom again were Congress (I) activists. In these areas, we were told Congress (I) followers of the Bhangi caste (belonging to the scheduled caste community) took part in the looting. In South Delhi, buses of the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) were used by the miscreants to move from place to place in their murderous journey. How could the DTC allows its buses to be used by criminals.
Attacks in the resettlement colonies (e.g. Trilokpuri in the trans-Jamuna area and Mangolpuri in the west, where the maximum number of murders took place, again displayed the same pattern. The targets were primarily young Sikhs. They were dragged out, beaten-up and then burnt alive. While old men and women and children were generally allowed to escape, their houses were set on fire after looting of valuables. Documents pertaining to their legal possession of the houses were also burnt. In some areas of Mangolpuri we heard from the survivors that even children were not spared. We also came across reports of gang-rape of women. The orgy of destruction embraced a variety of property ranging from shops, factories, houses to Gurdwaras and schools belonging to the Sikhs. In all the affected spots, a calculated attempt to terrorize the people was evident in the common tendency among the assailants to burn alive the Sikhs on public roads. Even five days after the incidents, on November 6, in the course of one of our regular visits to Mangolpuri we found that although the ashes had been cleared, the pavement in front of the Congress (I) office was still blotched with burnt patches, which the local people had earlier pointed out to us as spots where four Sikhs were burnt alive.

Note: These organizations are comparable to the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States. The publisher of this report is an eminent Indian political scientist by the name of Rajni Kothari.
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