A READING OF SHAKESPEARE'S PROBLEM PLAYS INTO HISTORY: A NEW HISTORICIST INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL CRISIS AND SEXUAL POLITICS IN TROILUS AND CRESSIDA

and MEASURE FOR MEASURE

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

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This study is aimed to read Shakespeare’s problem
comedies, Troilus and Cressida and Measure for Measure into
the historical and cultural context of dynamically-changing
English Renaissance society at the turn of the sixteenth
century. In the historical context of emerging capitalism,
growing economic crisis, reformed theology, changing social
hierarchy, and increasing sexual control, this study
investigates the nature of complicated moral problems that
the plays consistently present. The primary argument is
that the serious and dark picture of human dilemma is
attributed not to Shakespeare’s private imagination, but to
social, political, economic, and religious crises in early
modern England.

The introduction argues that literature as a form of
cultural memory registers social traces and ideological
struggles. In that respect, this study attempts to
integrate the textual and the social in a network of
material practices. Another objective of this study is to
resituate cultural traces and social energies encoded in the
problem comedies in the postmodern theoretical context to understand the plays in a dialogic interaction between the original historical context of textual production and the modern reader.

In the reading of Troilus and Cressida, this study discusses linguistic confusion, value judgment, and commodification of female body in connection with the transition from feudal absolutism to capitalist relativism in early modern England. With emerging capitalist relativism, language loses its ontological referentiality, value is deprived of its intrinsic property, and the female body is subject to the market principle of exchange. In the analysis of Measure for Measure, this study examines human subjectivity and judicial sexual control from a perspective of Puritan asceticism and social reform. Sexual control is studied in connection with the spiritualization of the household and increasing illegitimacy rates in England at the turn of the sixteenth century.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: READING LITERATURE INTO HISTORY

Stephen Greenblatt confessed his yearning desire to "speak with the dead" and returned to history in his hopes to "re-create a conversation with them" in literary studies (1988, 1).¹ He claims that "the voice of the dead" can be retrieved from hidden textual traces since "even the most trivial or tedious" one contains cultural resonance and lost voice (1988, 1). The voice is not completely lost, but is buried in the text with fragments of the lost past and waits to be heard. As literature has "both the cultural meanings of art and the transcultural forms of art," the modern reader can communicate with the hidden voice of the past and simultaneously produce the meaning of a text through the medium of culture-specific determinants and transcultural elements (Bauerlein 24).² In this respect, literary meaning is produced only through the negotiation between the reader and the text, and the universal (transcultural and transhistorical) meaning of a literary text is an illusion.

Inspired by the desire to converse with the past, this paper situates Troilus and Cressida and Measure for Measure in their historical contexts to uncover the cultural, social, and economic traces suppressed and refigured in the
process of literary representation. This paper also examines ideological strategies and collective beliefs in the midst of the cultural and economic crises of the English early modern period. In Measure for Measure, unrestrained sexuality is examined as a major threat to social order, and the sexual politics of the state is studied in connection with the rising illegitimacy rates in the last years of the Elizabeth's reign. In Troilus and Cressida, emerging primitive capitalism and the mounting economic and social crises are discussed in the context of linguistic confusion, paradigm shift in value judgment, and commodification of female body.

Greenblatt's critical approach resists the reductive integration of historical and ideological moments of a text into a monologic and unified voice ("a single master discourse") in order to uncover hidden "textual traces" ("the signs of contingent social practices") of cultural and ideological transactions immersed in the literary representation (1988, 3, 5). Dissatisfied with formalist aesthetics that regard the text itself as the central locus of meaning, Greenblatt proposes "a poetics of culture" which takes literature as "a part of the system of signs that constitutes a given culture" and further reaches out beyond traditional aesthetic boundaries toward the moments of cultural "resonance" and inscription embodied in literature to recover "the complex, dynamic cultural forces from which
[literature] has emerged and for which as metaphor or more simply as metonymy it may be taken by a [reader] to stand" (1980, 4, 5; 1990, 170).4

His cultural poetics traces "how collective beliefs and experiences were shaped, moved from one medium to another, concentrated in manageable aesthetic form, offered for consumption" in a given cultural period. His poetics also simultaneously identifies the cultural changes, cognitive faultlines and ideological tensions in those collective beliefs and experiences to unveil how the circulation of "social energy" is inscribed in a work of literature which is a "sensitive register of the complex struggles and harmonies of culture" (1988, 5, 6; 1980, 5).5 In other words, cultural poetics primarily focuses on the collective beliefs and power strategies embedded in the cultural system. In addition, cultural poetics critically examines such beliefs from a perspective of cultural constructionism since literature is defined as materially embedded in "specific communities, life situations, [and] structures of power" (1980, 7).6 In short, the poetics of culture disagrees with the belief that sees literature as transcendent and autonomous artifacts.7 Cultural materialists envision a complex and multi-layered structure of culture in which individuals, artifacts, and social energies are produced and circulated, influencing one another in close interconnection.
In order to develop the theoretical framework for this paper, it is important to understand what such major concepts as culture, history, ideology, language, and subjectivity mean in a materialist perspective and how they interact. Since cultural poetics reaches beyond the formalist aspects of literature and attempts to integrate the textual and the social in a network of material practices, these concepts provide the fundamental theoretical grounds for materialist literary studies. In the sense that cultural poetics is designed to reread literature in order to reveal "the behavioral codes, logics, and motive forces controlling a whole society," it is a sociological approach to literature, and these sociological concepts (which have been neglected by structuralist literary studies) come to occupy the central significance in materialist literary studies (Veeser xi).

In contrast to the idealist view of man with transcendental free will, materialist critics believe that a human subject is fluid with no fixed identity and is constructed by social influences. As human consciousness depends on social motivation for its construction and activities, man is simply a biological entity if removed from his social and historical context, that is, from culture. Culture is the symbolic pattern of multi-layered meanings embodied in concrete social relations and practices, through which individuals communicate with each
other and share their experiences and beliefs. Cultural phenomena carry patterns of meaning in their symbolic forms in a given structured social context; as a result, materialist literary studies takes culture as the basis of literary production.

In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Clifford Geertz defines culture as a semiotic field: “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (4). Man as a social animal continues to produce meanings, values, and judgments in the social semiotic system of culture that constitutes and provides the cognitive and normative pattern of meanings to the members of a given society. Men are entrapped in the social webs of significance, and their consciousness, imagination, language, and artifacts are all symbolically and concretely situated in the cultural field.

Raymond Williams develops a similar perspective by defining culture as “the signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored” (1981, 13). As the web of social significance in which a whole social order and its energies circulate and negotiate, culture provides a concrete semiotic field for the
production of meaning in society. As part of the signifying practice in society, literature produces and negotiates its meanings only by being situated within the semiotic system of culture. If an artifact is displaced from its semiotic context, it is drained of its cultural and signifying power, and only its transcultural form and meaning survive symbolically.

Talcott Parsons also views culture as a "shared order of symbolic meaning," that is, "a symbolically mediated pattern of values or standards of appropriateness that permits the construction of a set of action-guiding, normative, conventional rules through which significant cultural objects are generated and used" (11; Schmid 90-91). In the sense that culture provides a field for the production and consumption of cultural objects through the internalization of social values and norms into aesthetics, cultural artifacts (inclusive of literature) obliquely reflect the semiotic and social order and can be interpreted as a medium of symbolic representation that expresses shared beliefs, cognitive patterns, ideologies, power strategies, and interests in a given society. Culture is the producer and product of the symbolic social order, and it also indirectly but actively regulates the social and ideological order through the production of cultural artifacts.⁹

The semiotic function of culture is illustrated by Geertz in the concept of "thick description" which is a kind
of inscription of cultural and historical traces in the densely textualized event.\textsuperscript{10} In that human action always has the meaning, there are two categories of description: first, physical description ("thin description") and second, cultural description ("thick description") (Geertz 7). As a cultural category, any human action is to be interpreted within the diverse conceptual structures of meaning in a given culture, and it loses all its semiotic value outside the concrete engagement with culture and history. Like ethnography that, "through a semiotic approach to culture," gains "access to the conceptual world in which [human] subjects live so that [ethnographers] can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them," cultural poetics attempts to draw meanings and to "sort out the structures of signification" from the "thick description" of literature (Geertz 7, 9, 24).\textsuperscript{11}

In Metahistory, Hayden White defines history as "a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse" with "a deep structural content which is generally poetic, and specifically linguistic, in nature, and which serves as the precritically accepted paradigm of what a distinctively 'historical' explanation should be" (ix).\textsuperscript{12} The poetic and linguistic nature itself seems to put history in a poststructuralist textual perspective, and the "accepted paradigm" suggests that history is merely an interpretation of historical facts from a particular perspective. He
suggests that history ("historiography" in an exact sense) is a narrative representation of the historical facts produced in "the interpretative exchanges between past and present" (Hamilton 133). As a linguistic representation, the historical meaning comes to be "deferred" in the sense of historical "differance," and the confidence in the return to the originary historical moments comes to be seriously doubted. In short, history is an ideological, cultural, and linguistic reconstruction of the past seen and negotiated through the present.

Another aspect of history is that "lived history" (social practices) is "culture"; therefore, the terms "cultural" and "historical" are interchangeable in the semiotic sense (Heller 1993, 156). In the sense that consciousness is determined by cultural and historical existence, man (as a being of the Heideggerian "Dasein") is thrown into history and culture at the same time to be produced as a subject. In the process of negotiating with social reality, human consciousness produces and is produced by historicity (historical meanings, norms, codes, and practices) that constitutes a semiotic web in a given culture. As interconnected indistinguishably, both culture and history provide a semiotic field within which man turns from a biological entity to a social being. Semiotically, history and culture function and exist inseparably in constant mutual interaction and influence, thus creating a
network of social signification in which humans become signifying animals.

From a perspective of cultural materialism, historicity constitutes the social unconscious through the control of material practices, and individual consciousness is formed under the constant influence of the social unconscious. Consciousness is produced in the negotiation of the base and superstructure in Marxist terms, that is, a fusion of concrete material reality and its historical and cultural representation. The mental and the material are not separate entities to be distinguished: humans have "the 'mentality' that corresponds to their 'material' acts" (Veyne 158). In that respect, cultural poetics aims to focus on both mental and material aspects of literature and foregrounds material traces embodied in its "thick" texture to grasp the historical unconscious.

In the development of cultural poetics, ideology offers a fundamental theoretical ground in connection with culture, history, subjectivity, and language. Ideology is diversely defined as "systems of thought or belief" in an abstract sense or "the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life" in a semiotic sense (Eagleton 1991, 1; Thompson 5). However, ideology can also be defined in terms of power and epistemology: first, it is seen as "the practice of replacing social relations of inequality within the sphere of signification and discourse"; second, it
refers to "the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure," and "social life is converted to a natural reality" (O'Sullivan 107; Eagleton 1991, 2).^{14}

The two aspects of power and epistemology are inseparably intertwined in the production of the human subject and his knowledge of the world in the sense that "to study ideology" is "to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination" (Thompson 4). Dominant power legitimates itself by naturalizing and universalizing dominant beliefs and values. It also simultaneously excludes challenging beliefs and judgments, obscures concrete social reality, and mystifies social conflicts and contradictions in its imaginary resolution (Eagleton 1991, 5-6). In that sense, to understand ideology is, to a large extent, to explicate the connection between the meaning produced by the symbolic forms of social representation and the relations of domination which the meaning serves to maintain, and cultural poetics largely focuses on this connection to explore the strategy of power and the construction of discursive practices.

In the process of forming human subjects or consciousness, ideology plays a key role by internalizing cognitive paradigms and structures of signification, through which man perceives and constructs outside reality.
Althusser claims that "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects," by the functioning of the category of the subject" (1971, 173, 176). In other words, social meanings, values, and beliefs are inscribed in consciousness only through ideology which is termed as "the form of an imaginary subjection" (Sarup 1996, 54). In short, an autonomous and unitary pre-given self is an illusion conferred by ideology, and consciousness is inescapably subject to and molded by ideological inscription.\(^\text{15}\)

In summarizing the Althusserian view of ideology, Jonathan Dollimore says that "ideology has a material existence—that is, the system of beliefs which constitutes ideology is built into cultural practices and social institutions" (1984, 18). In Althusser's view of social relations, ideology is concretely embodied in the material structures and institutions of society such as religion, education, political system, law, communications, culture, etc., thus producing and presenting the "imaginary" social relations to individual consciousness so as to perpetuate existing power relations and economic dominance: ideology is "an organic part of every social totality" and "a structure essential to the historical life of societies" (Althusser 1996, 232).\(^\text{16}\) In other words, ideology is not the abstract system of beliefs and values, but the "imaginary" representation of concrete relations of power and
signification inscribed in the social processes and institutions which, in turn, naturalize and mystify social relations in individual consciousness through "the interaction between the symbolic system (spoken language) and the social system (the framework in which speech takes place)" (Cormack 12).

In the sense that ideology is internalized in social institutions and discursive practices, ideology is "a process which links socio-economic reality to individual consciousness" and is "a fact of consciousness" (Cormack 13; Volosinov 11). In the perception of and negotiation with the world, consciousness is mediated by ideology into a specific cognitive and conceptual framework by which social relations are mystified into an imaginary reality. In that respect, self-consciousness and subjectivity are "an ideological effect," and human subjects are supposed to perform a dual function, being "held to be responsible, centres of initiative, through being subjected and tied to an imaginary identity" (Sarup 1996, 54).

Language is not only a means of communication, but also a producer of meaning because it refracts reality into a form of ideological representation: "Our language does not so much 'reflect' reality as 'signify' it, carve it into conceptual shape" (Eagleton 1991, 203). The intrinsic connectedness between the signifier and the signified is denied, and language is deprived of its illusionary function
to evoke reality in its conceptual reproduction of reality. In the process of converting actual reality into another conceptual reality (the sign or "the symbolic"), language becomes a powerful means of ideological reproduction (or distortion) of social relations and lived experiences, and the semantic continuity between language and reality is severed.

In *Language as Ideology*, Gunther Kress and Robert Hodge claim that there is "no 'pure' act of perception, no seeing without thinking. We all interpret the flux of experience through [the] interpretative schemata of [language]" (5). Language constructs a world that is "much more stable and coherent" than actual reality, and "it takes its place in our consciousness and becomes what we think we have seen" (Kress and Hodge 5-6). "As the practical consciousness of that society," language performs the constructive function of the "interpretative schemata" or the "categories of perception" structurally embodied in and produced by the social praxis (Kress and Hodge 5; Weimman 294).

As for the relations between individual consciousness and language, language is constitutive of and coextensive with the speaking consciousness: "Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse" (Volosinov 13). As an integral part of the ideological mediation between individual consciousness and the external world,
language fills consciousness with ideological and semiotic content in the process of social interaction; that is, the social enters into and forms consciousness through language (the sign): "thought conceptualises through language, and it is not a matter of one being the instrument of the other but of each engendering the other: language makes thought possible, thought makes language possible" (Coward and Ellis 79). In this respect, language is an intrinsic part of consciousness, and language, ideology, and consciousness are inextricably intertwined.

In the formation of individual subjects and social relations, ideology works through language, that is, the "representative power of the word as an ideological phenomenon": "Ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of sign," and "every ideological refraction of existence" comes with "ideological refraction in word" (Volosinov 14, 15, 21). As a sensitive register of social existence and tension, language is charged with diverse ideological interests and value judgments and simultaneously offers the social and ideological medium through which a subject meets, conceptualizes, and negotiates with the world: "Without sign there is no ideology" (Volosinov 9). Just as man is trapped in the prison of ideology, so his consciousness is confined to the prison of language. By their nature, the content of consciousness is the same as that of language as well as that of ideology, and they
function collectively in reality, mutually reinforcing one another.

In Lacanian terms, human subjectivity including the unconscious is constituted in the process of substituting a sign for a reality: "Reference to the self, to desire or to life can only be made through language, through the symbolic register and is never direct or immediate" (Lemaire 57). The human subject comes into a social and ideological being with his unconscious being inserted into the pre-existing order of language in which the lived experience is translated into the symbolic experience in the process of "the primal repression" that constitutes "the unconscious" (Lemaire 53). The Symbolic order is "a vast unconscious" that is religious, cultural, moral, ideological, and, first of all, linguistic (MacCannell 125). The Symbolic order which is "intersubjective and social" is defined as "the patriarchal ideological order" and "a moral order" at the same time (Bowie 93; MacCannell 128, 129). In view of the Lacanian psychic paradigm, a human acquires subjectivity only by being inserted into the Symbolic order, and he or she is "an effect of the signifier" rather than its originary cause and creator. A subject is socially constructed by cultural and linguistic symbolism in the process of ascension from the Imaginary order into the Symbolic order.

The philosophical legacy of Cartesian dualism
dehistoricizes the concept of human subject by displacing it from the cultural and historical praxis into transcendental autonomy: "I am therefore, to speak precisely, only a thinking being, that is to say, a mind, an understanding, or a reasoning being, which are terms whose meaning was previously unknown to me" (Descartes 84). In defining human nature, the Cartesian view of moral idealism always assumes an ascension from matter to essence and rejects the historicity of human existence in the lived praxis: "In effect, the individual is understood in terms of a pre-social essence, nature, or identity and on that basis s/he is invested with a quasi-spiritual autonomy. The individual becomes the origin and focus of meaning--an individuated essence which precedes and--in idealist philosophy--transcends history and society" (Dollimore 1984, 250).

At the other end of the spectrum, the empirical and materialist view of man negates spiritual idealism and advocates that a human is a subject of and is subjected to historical existence, and he individuates himself only in the social process: "Society does not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves" (Marx 77). As suggested in the materialist definition of culture, history, ideology, and language, human subjectivity is constructed, transformed, and positioned in response to and in constant interaction with the conditions of material and
social existence. In other words, the human subject is a socially constructed entity with no fixed essential identity.

In *Literacy Theory*, Terry Eagleton claims that "my own view is that it is most useful to see 'literature' as a name which people give from time to time for different reasons to certain kinds of writing within a whole field of what Michel Foucault has called 'discursive practices,' and that if anything is to be an object of study it is this whole field of practices rather than just those sometimes obscurely labelled 'literature'" (1983, 205). He raises two fundamental questions in literary criticism: one is the difficulty in defining the term "literature," and the other is the nature of literary representation as part of discursive practices concretely situated and structurally embedded in the historico-cultural context. In drawing the boundary of literary studies, Eagleton reaches out beyond the formalist definition of "literature" toward the "whole field of discursive practices." He proposes to orient literary criticism toward the study of the circulation, negotiation, and exchange of the dynamic cultural forces in which a literary work is produced and consumed. By situating literature in the moments of cultural resonance, literary studies can uncover various meanings and the cultural codes through which those meanings are internalized.
Literature is a poetic form of signifying practice, that is, a linguistic practice performed by an author with aesthetic and ideological designs. From the formalist perspective of New Criticism, a work of literature contains an autonomous form or structure which is irreplaceable and untranslatable in other forms. The form continuously resists its historical situatedness and cultural contingency; as a result, its meaning remains ahistorical and universal. In contrast to the previous paradigm of New Criticism, postmodern cultural studies is oriented toward culture, history, ideology, and power strategy from the materialist perspective.

Cultural materialists claims that literature inescapably contains and refracts (rather than reflects) individual and social consciousnesses, customs, legal systems, religion, education, etc., in other words, social formations and practices in Foucauldian terms. Regardless of the conscious intention of the author, the discursive formation and practice in a given society ("the social unconscious" in psychoanalytic sense) are deeply embodied in literature as long as language is utilized as the medium of literature: "the social presence to the world of the literary text and the social presence of the world in the literary text" (Greenblatt 1980, 5). In that respect, cultural poetics extends the limit of literary criticism beyond the transcendental autonomy of textuality toward the
social semiotic boundary. The traditional boundary of disciplines no longer exists as separate, but as integrated from the interdisciplinary perspectives. Literature is not an independent and closed system, whose meaning can be derived from isolated textuality, but an open system interacting synchronically and diachronically within society.

The physical object and abstract concept are converted into the sign in reality, and the sign acquires "the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change" in the process of conversion (Volosinov 19). In other words, the semiotic value of any linguistic representation is fulfilled and determined by its historicity, and the signifying practice ("parole" in praxis rather than "langue" in an abstract sense) negotiates and produces its meanings only in the concrete historical context of its use (its production and interpretation). Robert Hodge defines the "signifying practice" as "simiosic acts," the process of constructing (producing, interpreting) meaning" and further claims that "in each case, the text has a mimetic function, that is, it claims to represent part of reality," but, the text "signifies something of its semiotic context, i.e. the conditions under which it was produced; and that is an important part of its social meaning" (6). Material reality within which a work of literature is produced plays a key role in determining the meaning of an
expressive practice, not in the sense that reality is directly reflected or mirrored in literature, but in the sense that reality is mediated and refracted in semiotic acts by social pressures.

In his efforts to interpret and analyze the texts produced and circulated in the cultural and cognitive context of the past, Louis Montrose comes up with a new interpretative strategy by reading a text of literature from the perspective of "the historicity of texts and the textuality of history" (23). The first part of his chiasmic formulation ("the historicity of texts") emphasizes "the cultural specificity, the social embeddedness, of all modes of writing" and encourages the return of the reader to the originary historic context; in other words, the meaning of a text or discourse should be produced or constructed with reference to the originary "social networks and cultural codes" in which a text is produced (Montrose 20-21). As Fredric Jameson suggested in his definition of literature as "a socially symbolic act," literary texts cannot transcend the context of production (17). From a perspective of semiotics, all human activities and artifacts assume their functions and meanings in the complex network of material domain, and in addition to that, they produce, mediate, negotiate, and symbolically represent their social existence in a given historical period.

In The New Historicism, Aram Veeser says that "every
expressive act" is embedded in "a network of material practices," and "literary and non-literary 'texts' circulate inseparably" (xi). The focus is "to reveal through the analysis of tiny particulars the behavioral codes, logics, and motive forces controlling a whole society" and "to resolve 'lit' back into the historical complex" (Veeser xi). As long as literature exists and functions as "a socially symbolic act," it absorbs and represents the specific "semantic horizons" ("the political, the social and the historical"), the process of which was phrased by Clifford Geertz as "thick description" (Jameson 17, 75; Homer 43).

The second part of the formula ("the textuality of history") indicates that history is a mere textual representation. This poststructuralist attitude to history and text denies the "access to a full and authentic past, a lived material existence, unmediated by the surviving textual traces of the society in question" since the surviving textual traces are "at least partially consequent upon complex and subtle social processes of preservation and effacement" and are "subject to subsequent textual mediations" in the historical process (Montrose 20). In that sense, cultural critics approach history not as the collection of hard facts, but as the textual representation of symptomatic historical traces in a given cultural and ideological system. History is regarded as a representational construction produced in the complex
network of cultural, ideological, and textual mediations.

As part of textual practices, history is merely a symbolic act of linguistic representation. The traditional historical studies of which E. M. W. Tillyard's *The Elizabethan World Picture* is representative reduce the social and cultural history of the English Renaissance to a single master narrative by foregrounding dominant ideologies and discursive practices and simultaneously repressing social and ideological tensions deeply embedded in Renaissance culture. This kind of monologic historical consciousness ignores the concrete lived experiences and social tensions in Elizabethan society and perpetuates the legitimacy of the dominant ideologies of the society, thus drawing a "stable, coherent, and collective" picture of Renaissance society (Montrose 18).

The New Historicist principle of "the historicity of texts and the textuality of history" is fully charged with the tension between poststructuralist textualism and postmodernist culturalism, which Montrose argues provides the "model of a dynamic, unstable, and reciprocal relationship between the discursive and material domains" (23). His interpretative paradigm redraws the boundary between the textual and the social to problematize the structuralist aesthetics of textual autonomy. The tension which seems irreconcilably contradictory shows, in a sense, the dilemma of cultural poetics as well as its strength.
In the paradigm of Montrose's cultural poetics, the meaning of a text is not to be discovered, but to be constructed in the writerly reading by the reader, and the text is always open to constructive interpretation rather than closed. The meaning emerges from the negotiation between the text and the reader and between the textual past and the interpretative present. Just as a text is embedded in the context of its production, so is the critic a historical subject fashioned socially, culturally, and institutionally. In that sense, it is necessary for the critic to "historicize the present as well as the past, and to historicize the dialectic between them--those reciprocal historical pressures by which the past has shaped the present and the present reshapes the past" through the mediation between the past and present cultural experiences (Montrose 24). The poet and the critic both exist as historical subjects inescapably situated in their own material contexts; as a result, literary criticism inevitably reshapes itself in a constant dialectic negotiation between the two disparate entities of the text and the critic. Through this kind of critical encounter, literary critics can redraw the intellectual, ideological, and historical boundaries and communicate with the text.

As for the relations between literature and history in cultural poetics, critics are supposed to return to the originary context of the text through the relatively less
contaminated and less mediated aspects of history. The critic is supposed to grasp relatively pure (or less contaminated) historical moments (anecdotes, for example) that have gone through minimal social and ideological mediations with the maximum cultural resonance. Cultural poetics aims to situate the text in the "predictably recurrent" event of "representative historical significance" (Fineman 53). In the words of Joel Fineman, a text is given its own voice by the "peculiar and eventful narrative force" of its historical situatedness that has the "pointed, referential access to the real" (Fineman 56-57). In that sense, an event of representative cultural significance is used as a "historeme" ("the smallest minimal unit of the historiographic fact") that provides and constructs the basis of the meaning of a text (Fineman 57).

With reference to the relations between the text and society, Greenblatt says that the point is to trace "the circulation of social energy" and ask "how collective beliefs and experiences were shaped, moved from one medium to another, concentrated in manageable aesthetic form, offered for consumption" (1988, 5, 6). The "social energy" is defined by Greenblatt to be "manifested in the capacity of certain verbal, aural, and visual traces to produce, shape, and organize collective physical and mental experiences" with "a minimal predictability" and "a minimal range" (1988, 6-7).
Social energy is more of a rhetorical and semiotic power (which is social and historical) rather than a physical power, and it is produced in the field of social semiosis in which the concrete and abstract relations of signifying potentials such as artifacts, religion, ideology, morality, and institutions react, influence, and contradict one another to produce the collective, but fragmentary and conflictual fields of social signification. Due to their minimal adaptability and predictability, a work of literature can survive and continue to signify in changing social and historical circumstances, creating an illusion of permanent signifying potential (permanent essential meaning).

Greenblatt's comment on the circulation of social energy is significant in that sense: "For the circulation of social energy by and through the stage was not part of a single coherent, totalizing system. Rather it was partial, fragmentary, conflictual; elements were crossed, torn apart, recombined, set against each other; particular social practices were magnified by the stage, others diminished, exalted, evacuated" (1988, 19). In his negation of the ideal to recover the totality and coherence of Renaissance culture, Greenblatt encourages the critic to come up with the collective experiences and repetitive cognitive patterns of a historical period represented in a work of literature, but, at the same time, his cultural poetics claims that the
conflicts and tensions that have been suppressed in the monologic representation dynamically interact with the collective experiences in order to demonstrate ideological faultlines and power strategies, thus drawing a new picture of an age.

Shakespeare's plays show that "the subversive voices are produced by and within the affirmations of order"; in other words, a play is both a site of ideological appropriation and suppression and a site of ideological and institutional contestation at the same time (Greenblatt 1988, 52). Since the textual traces are "the signs of contingent social practices" at different levels of the signifying strata in a work, different ideologies and motives are negotiated and exchanged in a creative tension between collective and individual experience, defying a singular and totalizing system.

This kind of mediation represents society by distorting, amplifying, and suppressing social elements. A play carries social energy to the stage for collective experiences, and at the same time, it constitutes a new symbolic reality on the stage as a substitute of actual reality. But at a deeper stratum, the suppressed polyphonic voices emerges in the individual experiences of the audience and reader. In that respect, dramatic experience is collective and subjective at the same time. The collective experiences and beliefs are not singular, coherent, and
totalizing, but polyphonic, subversive, conflictual, and fragmentary.

Cultural poetics aims to understand the negotiations and exchanges through which social energy is represented and circulated in ideological amplification and suppression and is transfigured in the specific mode of aesthetic production in a specific textual and social context. In its signifying potential, a work of literature is given productive power and energy to construct (rather than imitate) reality in a newly negotiated and exchanged form, and it transfigures what it represents beyond recognition at the surface level, but it indirectly registers the social and historical rather than directly reflects those.

In *New Historicism*, Brook Thomas says that "Shakespearean plays have the power to speak to us, not because they contain an 'untranslatable essence,' but because 'social energy initially encoded in these works' enables a continual transformation and refashioning of them as they are circulated in the flow of social energy at various moments of negotiation and exchange that is necessitated and enabled by the synchronic production of difference" (184). A work of art is not only embedded in the past, but also reforges and refashions itself in the perpetual present through the negotiation of social energy at its reception and performance: a dramatic performance is "the renegotiation and refuguration between the historical
otherness of the text and the recirculation of social energy" (Brook Thomas 209). The meaning of a past text cannot be available without the active participation of the reader since the meaning always derives from the negotiation between the text and the reader, that is, between two different sets of social energy: one is the past, and the other is the present.

In literary representation, all representations are incomplete and misleading (biased ideologically), creating the illusion of reality, and literary experiences are always, to some extent, illusory. Despite the efforts to achieve thematic closure and unity, internal differences and fissures are registered and embedded in the text; in other words, the different strata of signification reveal cracks and gaps along the faultline, and the efforts to harmonize and hide internal conflicts are doomed to be defeated. The multiplicity of the signifying potential in the text rejects any attempt to frame the semantic closure of the textual meaning since the active reception of a text is often described as "writerly reading" (an active reading of rewriting or negotiating with a literary text in the reader's imagination). The diverse textual layers and traces of the signifying potential are embedded in the text to be appropriated ideologically and to be activated into semiotic negotiation and exchange by the reader. As for the process of this semantic mediation, Brook Thomas explains
that "interacting with one another, the play's multiplicity (not doubleness) of discourse threatens efforts of its half-visible ruler/reader to impose a hierarchal order" (213).

Literary critics call *Troilus and Cressida* and *Measure for Measure* "problem plays" because of their dark dramatic vision and persistent moral cynicism. The problematic vision has been mainly interpreted as stylistic and self-contained in the plays themselves. Traditional historicists have attempted to situate the plays in history, but the ideological, linguistic, and economic aspects of history have largely been ignored. The primary thesis of this paper is that the nihilistic vision of these plays is neither personal nor stylistic, but cultural, economic, and ideological. The plays are not only the "creation" of authorial imagination, but also the "product" of historicity, that is, the cultural and social situatedness of the author and the plays. This paper is written with the belief that cultural and economic history is a key to the understanding of the "problems" that the plays consistently present.
NOTES

1. Greenblatt argues that the desire is "a familiar, if unvoiced, motive in literary studies, a motive organized, professionalized, buried beneath thick layers of bureaucratic decorum" and further elaborates on his recreation of the conversation with the dead: "It was true that I could hear only my own voice, but my own voice was the voice of the dead, for the dead had contrived to leave textual traces of themselves, and those traces make themselves heard in the voices of the living. Many of the traces have little resonance, though every one, even the most trivial or tedious, contains some fragment of lost life; others seem uncannily full of the will to be heard" (1988, 1).

2. Bauerlein claims that cultural poetics studies "the works of art in cultural contexts, but also examines the work's elements that are not reducible to a single cultural context. This negotiation between an artwork's specific cultural determinants and its capacity to transcend 'those' determinants (not all determinants) requires of the critic a great deal of circumspection and balance" (24-25).

3. Greenblatt deconstructs the concepts of autonomous individuality, linguistic transparency, and ideological neutrality: "No individual, not even the most brilliant,
seemed complete unto himself--my own study of Renaissance self-fashioning had already persuaded me of this--and Elizabethan and Jacobean visions of hidden unity seemed like anxious rhetorical attempts to conceal cracks, conflict, and disarray" (1988, 2).

4. Literature is theorized to have three close-knit functions: "as a manifestation of the concrete behavior of its particular author, as itself the expression of the codes by which behavior is shaped, and as a reflection upon those codes" (1980, 4).

5. In Shakespearean Negotiations, Greenblatt defines social energy by its effect in society: "it is manifested in the capacity of certain verbal, aural, and visual traces to produce, shape, and organize collective physical and mental experiences. Hence it is associated with repeatable forms of pleasure and interest, with the capacity to arouse disquiet, pain, fear, the beating of the heart, pity, laughter, tension, relief, wonder. In its aesthetic modes, social energy must have a minimal predictability--enough to make simple repetitions possible--and a minimal range: enough to reach out beyond a single creator or consumer to some community, however constricted" (1988, 6).

6. As literary interpretation, cultural poetics acknowledges "the impossibility of fully reconstructing and reentering the culture of the sixteenth century," but Greenblatt compensates its theoretical deficiency by
"constantly returning to particular lives and particular situations, to the material necessities and social pressures that men and women daily confronted, and to a small number of resonant texts" (1980, 5).

7. Greenblatt proposes some fundamental principles of cultural poetics: first, "there can be no appeals to genius as the sole origin of the energies of great art"; second, "there can be no transcendent or timeless or unchanging representation"; third, "there can be no art without social energy"; forth, there can be no spontaneous generation of social energy; fifth, "mimesis is always accompanied by--indeed is always produced by--negotiation and exchange"; sixth, "the agent of exchange may appear to be individuals . . . but individuals are themselves the products of collective exchange" (1988, 12).

8. The descriptive view of culture is the pattern of beliefs, customs, and values embodied in material and mental practices including the material artifacts, social institutions, and concrete social relations.

9. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu compares culture with "a map" in that sense that just as an outsider finds his way around in an unknown landscape with the help of map, so historical practices, norms, and interpretation can be guided by culture (2).

10. When a person is rapidly contracting his right eyelid, the physical act may mean twitching, winking, fake-
winking, or communicating a message. Without understanding its proper meaning in the proper context, the simple description of physical act does not mean anything semiotically. In that sense, the "thick description" contains "a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another"; in other words, the "thick description" has "a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures" in terms of which diverse cultural meanings are "produced, perceived, and interpreted" and without which they would signify nothing (Geertz 7, 10).

11. Like the aim of cultural poetics, ethnographers do not attempt "to codify abstract regularities but to make thick description possible, not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them" (Geertz 26).

12. Hayden White says that historians perform "an essentially 'poetic' act, in which he 'prefigures' the historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain 'what was really happening in it" (x).

13. The concept of base is used not in its narrow sense of "the relations of production" or "the economic structure of society" in simple terms, but in a broad sense of the general material relations (economy and natural factors such as geography, race, climate, etc.) in close connection with human agency, and the concept of "superstructure" is used as
"the whole of social life apart from its 'real base,'" including the concrete forms of religious, political, legal, and ideological relations (Jakubowski 33, 37).

14. Terry Eagleton says that "the term ideology, in other words, would seem to make reference not only to belief systems, but to questions of power" in the process of "'legitimizing ' the power of a dominant social group or class" (1991, 5).

15. As for the construction of subjectivity, Madan Sarup summarizes Foucault's view: "Foucault believes that the production of the subject by the human sciences as an object of knowledge enabled a new form of political control. He thinks that the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the existence of power; the individual with his or her identity and characteristics is the product of a relation of powers exercised over bodies" (1996, 69).

16. Althusser says that "it is as if human societies could not survive without these 'specific formations,' these systems of representations (at various levels), their ideologics" (1996, 232).

17. In Language and Materialism, Coward and Ellis says that "thus, the function of ideology is to fix the individual in place as subject for a certain meaning. This is simultaneously to provide individuals with a subjectivity, and to subject them to the social structure with its existing contradictory relations and powers" (76).
18. Volosinov claims that "signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another. And the individual consciousness itself is filled with signs. Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction" (11). He further argues that "individual consciousness is not the architect of the ideological superstructure, but only a tenant lodging in the social edifice of ideological signs" (13).

19. Language has two different aspects: "langue" and "parole." Isolated and divorced from the concrete linguistic context, "langue" is neutral, but "parole" is concrete, social, and material, that is, ideological. The language in the social context ("parole") is the sign fully charged with social and ideological traces.

20. Language is neither neutral nor transparent, being highly contaminated by and charged with ideological and social values.

21. Sarup explains the function of language in the construction of the human subject as follows: "the human subject, as s/he acquires speech, is inserting her- or himself in a pre-existing Symbolic order and thereby submitting his or her desire to the systematic pressures of that order: in adopting language s/he allows his or her 'free' instinctual energies to be operated and organized"
Gurewich and Tort also claims that "the symbolic order is the order of language and culture, the synchronic structure in which the child is unknowingly inscribed. It is a constraining structure imposed on the child through the 'Law if the Name of the Father.' The repression that this law entails causes the formation of the unconscious" (Gurewich and Tort 33-34).

22. The discursive formation is defined as the linguistic practices and institutions that produce hegemonic truth and knowledge in society, and the discursive regime indicates the social procedures and apparatuses by which truth and knowledge are produced.

23. Volosinov contends: "The word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems. The word is the medium in which occur the slow quantitative accretions of those changes which have not yet achieved the status of a new ideological quantity, not yet produced a new and fully-fledged ideological form" (19).

24. Jameson defines literature as "a socially symbolic act" representing the multi-layered "semantic or interpretative horizons": within the political and historical horizons, the first phase is the text itself ("the individual literary work or utterance"), the second is
the "collective and class discourses of which a text is little more than an individual 'parole' or utterance," and the third is "human history as a whole" in which a text is interpreted in terms of "the ideology of form" which is "the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production" (75, 76). The first phase investigates "purely formal patterns as a symbolic enactment of the social within the formal and the aesthetic" by moving "beyond the purely formal properties of the work itself," and the second phase focuses on the study of "ideologeme" which is "the smallest intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic collective discourse of social classes" (Jameson 76, 77; Homer 43). The third phase provides "the all-embracing unity of a single code which [concrete semantic differences] must share and which thus characterizes the larger unity of the social system" as a way of reaching the "ideology of form" (Jameson 88).

25. Greenblatt defines the concept of social energy as follows: "What then is the social energy that is being circulated? Power, charisma, sexual excitement, collective dreams, wonder, desire, anxiety, religious awe, free-floating intensities of experience. . . ." (1988, 19).
CHAPTER II

COMMODOIFICATION AND PARADIGM SHIFT

IN TROILUS AND CRESSIDA

1. Historical Perspective

In Troilus and Cressida, the moral vision is decadent and “pessimistic almost to the point of nihilism,” and the play consistently presents “a world in pieces [with] all value and coherence gone” (Barton 443). Terry Eagleton also claims that the vision of the play is marred by the collapse of the fundamental moral fiber of society: the picture is “not an uncertain world in which humans are confused in establishing relations between them and the world, but a world in which the transcendental moral authority itself is shaken at the root, and humans experience a total disruption between the world and their perception of it” (1986, 60). Eagleton’s moral and social skepticism is clear in view of the disjunctive disparities in plot, character, language, and theme. Gayle Greene further inscribes the pessimistic vision in the historical context of dynamic social transition in early modern England: “Among the ironies involved in this piece of ‘monumental mock’ry’ is that Troilus and Cressida offers the quintessential expression of the Elizabethan idea of order, Ulysses’ degree speech,
amidst a context of chaos and at a time in history when it has all but ceased to apply” (1981, 271).

The nihilistic vision of the play represents the dynamic socio-historical processes in which the early modern English society experienced rapid structural changes and subsequent social conflicts rather than a pessimistic authorial imagination. In the context of a worsening economic and political situation such as repeated crop failures and dearth, high inflation, declining living standards, threatening sense of war, aging Elizabeth with no heir, and Essex rebellion, the fundamental changes in economic structure from manorial feudalism to primitive capitalism undermined the roots of the traditional moral and social structure of the Great Chain of Being, but had yet to establish a new order.

This chapter situates Troilus and Cressida in the context of the emergence of “merchant” capitalism (primitive market economy) that took place in the second half of the sixteenth century in an effort to trace the effects of economic changes that “forever” influenced and altered “the structure of English society” (Dobb 123; Bruster 12). The play is also analyzed in close connection with the social, political, and economic instability in England around the turn of the sixteenth century to trace the “silent” and “latent” historical aspects imbedded in the play, that is, “the unconscious of the work (not of the author)” (Macherey
86, 92). Despite the pessimistic vision apparent in the play, the concrete social and economic crises in the late Elizabethan period remain latent and irrecognizable until the play is situated in its historical context. As the "unconscious of the work," however, the socio-economic traces play the key role in constituting the meaning of the text.

Between the two historical perspectives, the play is primarily examined in conjunction with the larger perspective of the transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism: as the feudal social structure of the Great Chain of Being (that is based on the "degree" of social and economic rank and status) changed into a new socio-economic structure of primitive capitalism, the concepts of subjectivity, time, value, and language also experienced radical transitions. In Troilus and Cressida, the disjuncted social and cultural vision is derived from the tensions between the old order of feudal society and the new order of primitive capitalism.

In the transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism, the entire social and economic structure experienced drastic changes, and the foundation of social hierarchy was shaken. In the Shakespearean version of the Trojan war, the motif of chivalric honor (one of the exemplary feudal virtues) is frequently and anachronistically contrasted with the dominant imagery of
mercantilism, and both chivalry and commercialism are
depicted as negative: Cressida is repeatedly figured as a
desirable commodity traded by the self-appointed merchant
Troilus while Hector, the exemplary knight of chivalry,
constantly contradicts his chivalric principles in the play.
In the play, mercantile imagery works as "a coherent
leitmotif" of the play, and subjectivity, sexuality, and
language become chaotically relativized in the merchandising
exchange system of value (Stafford 36).

The change in the economic structure comes not only
with the transformation of the mode of production and the
distribution of wealth, but also with that of the "mental
habit" and behavior of the members of society. This paper
does not attempt to trace the economic transition as an
exclusive lineal development, but as a site of coexistence:
the social and economic structure of "residual" feudalism
still remained "dominant," but through the cracks of the
dominant ideology of feudalism, the "emergent" primitive
capitalist "habit of thought" persistently subverted and
undermined the old order (Raymond Williams 1977, 122-24;
Shuger 9). The cultural and historical process does not
develop in an autonomous, complete, and unified manner;
rather, it is marked by multiplicity, incompleteness, and
fragmentation. Raymond Williams claims that "no mode of
production and therefore no dominant social order and
therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or
exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention" (1977, 125). In Bakhtinian terms, the transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism provided a site for social hetroglossia in which a multiplicity of social voices and historical otherness interact dynamically.

In “Social Mobility in England, 1500-1700,” Lawrence Stone argues that “between 1540 and 1640 English society experienced a seismic upheaval of unprecedented magnitude”: it was the “period of disintegration” that accompanied “fundamental changes in politics, society, thought, and religion” (16; 1967, 1). The transition and the subsequent tension were already apparent in the second half of the sixteenth century, and the sense of crisis was increasingly mounting at the turn of the century. In the sixteenth century, the steady population growth brought an oversupply of work forces into labor markets so that unemployment increased while real wages declined by as much as 50 percent (Stone 1966, 26). In The Age of Elizabeth: England under the Later Tudors 1547-1603, D. M. Palliser says that “by the end of Elizabeth’s reign the population of England may have been as much as 35 percent higher than it was at the start” and further contends that the population rose sharply after 1570 (43). In combination with the relatively inflexible supply of foodstuffs and consecutive poor harvests, the population growth pushed up prices of agricultural products substantially, and the rising prices pushed down the living
standard of the labor classes in the second half of the sixteenth century.

This period also saw “a striking rise in the material comforts of all classes from the yeoman upward” (Stone 1966, 26). A segment of society that included land-holders and large tenants such as freeholders and tenant farmers substantially benefitted from rising agricultural prices, increased commercial activity, and increased demand for professional services” (Stone 1966, 26). The population growth and the subsequent polarization between the upper and lower classes triggered social mobility and disturbed traditional social hierarchy. The period between 1580 and 1630 was the epoch of “gathering crisis” accompanied by the population expansion, long-term inflation, and repeated crop failures (Wrightson 142).

In the Elizabethan period, the downward trend was fueled by catastrophic harvest failures in 1586 and 1594-1598 and the subsequent extreme inflation in which foodstuffs soared sixfold almost in a century (Wrightson 143). In *A Midsummer Night’s dream* written around 1597, Titania complains that “The ox hath therefore stretch’d his yoke in vain, / The ploughman lost his sweat, and the green corn / Hath rotted, ere his youth attain’d a beard” (II.i.93-95). In the last decades of the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth century, the price revolution resulted in land hunger, capitalist agriculture,
and increased capitalist consciousness. As a result, the gap of social polarization between the haves and have-nots widened substantially. To a certain extent, the last decades of the Elizabethan period can be characterized by the extremes of wealth and poverty. The poor had to be protected by the Poor Law while the wealthy land-owning class fell into the frenzy of house-building (Palliser 130).

Enclosure, rising rents, extinction of common rights, failure to renew tenancy, devastating inflation, and crop failures drove the poor into chronic debts and desperate poverty, causing the downward mobility of the landless labor classes as opposed to the upward mobility of the landed gentry and yeomanry. The social and economic crisis culminated in a series of legislation for the control and relief of the poor: the Poor Laws that were developed between 1531 and 1601. Before the Acts of 1576 and 1598, all vagrants were outlawed and punished severely, and for the third offence, they were punished by death (Smith 77). Only in the two acts and, mainly, in the 1598 Act, were the poor treated humanely, and Smith observes that "the date of that legislation is largely explained by the severe economic crisis which began in England in 1594" (Smith 78).

Behind the political and social instabilities that enveloped the last decade of the Elizabeth's reign, the worsening economy intensified the sense of anxiety and frustration especially in the minds of the lower half of
society. In combination with "not only high food prices but industrial depression and general economic contraction," the food shortages caused by the consecutive dearth between 1594-1598 pushed the laboring poor down to "the brink of subsistence" (Clark 1977, 235). The economic hardship of the marginal poor brought "as many as four times the number of villagers onto the poverty line," and the parish relief was neither effective nor sufficient (Clark 1977, 240-41).

In Kent, there were as many as eleven food riots and disturbances from about 1585 to 1603, which is by far the highest number in any comparable period between 1558-1640, and by the turn of the century, "refusals to pay local and county taxes were the most common offences, apart from felonies, indicted at county quarter sessions" (Clark 1977, 250-51). The high prices for foodstuffs, economic contraction, high taxation to support war and the poor, and increased conscription gradually raised the level of socio-economic discontent among the public, and the 1590's was a period of decline from the "culmination of the 'high Elizabethan period'" around 1585 (Smith 235).

David Cressy classifies the Renaissance population into six different groups: gentlemen; clergy and professionals; merchants, tradesmen, and craftsmen; yeoman; husbandmen; laborers and servants (35). This model differs from the traditional feudal social order in that the three groups of merchants, professionals, and laborers do not have a place
in feudal society. The feudal social order no longer corresponds with the changing economic reality of the Renaissance as Palliser says: "Church, law, commerce and government office gradually became separate hierarchies from that based on land" (86). Cressy also says that "a man's position in the community did not necessarily match his legal or traditional status" in the Renaissance (37).

Among the groups, the merchants belonged to the most "mobile group of transients," and the commercial elites---international traders and eminent merchants---were financially equal to the gentry (Stone 1966, 19; Cressy 37). Shakespeare himself makes a good example of "the peculiar fluidity" of Tudor social hierarchy: "the son of a tradesman in a small Midlands town [ends] up owning the largest house there, a coat of arms, and the appellation 'William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon, gentleman'" (E. W. Ives. Faction in Tudor England. Historical Association, 1979. P.4, quoted in Palliser 99). With accumulated capital and elevated power and status, the merchant and guild class was actively engaged in the emergence of primitive capitalism in the Renaissance. The cloth industry, in particular, dominated British foreign trade and expedited the emergence of the market economy by employing large numbers of unemployed laborers displaced by the agricultural revolution. In The Economy of England 1450-1750, Donald Coleman says that Tudor England was "pre-industrialized"
rather than "pre-industrial" (1).

In response to the rising prices of foodstuffs, the gentry class accumulated wealth by charging "higher entry fines and rents" and insisting on "shorter leases" (Wrightson 130). With this amassed wealth, gentry and yeomanry turned to the purchase of land, causing "land hunger." The yeomanry class also greatly benefitted from inflation and declining wages, and they achieved elevated social status in this economic crisis: "It was a common complaint that the yeomen were unsettling the social order by their upward mobility" (Cressy 39). Yeoman farmers are described by Wrightson as ambitious and aggressive "small capitalists" who were determined to maximize their profits and engaged in "market-oriented specialization and innovation" within the traditional agrarian framework (135). The substantial land-owning yeomen, that is, tenant farmers, specialized in foodstuffs that were in great demand in the market, and they also enclosed the common field for the large-scale production by squeezing out copyholders and smaller holders. As a result, the feudal subsistence economy was replaced by "capitalist agriculture" (Palliser 206). By contrast, this widening middle class meant "a period of insecurity and decline" for the lower landless classes (Wrightson 137).

In *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, Dobb argues that "merchant" capitalism and other primitive
capitalist stages were "already in process in England in the second half of the sixteenth century" (123). In *The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation*, Richard Halpern concurs with Dobb’s periodization: he takes the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century as "the historical period in which primitive accumulation played its first important role" (69). Halpern describes the primitive capitalist stage in England: "What does characterize this period is the development of various preconditions for capitalist production--the spread of markets, the development of merchant’s capital, the creation of a dispossessed class--within a complex conjuncture that combines both the late mutation and the partial dissolution of the feudal economy" (69).

In the second half of the sixteenth century, merchants and craftsmen began to enjoy "the great 'profit inflation'" through monopoly and increasing unemployment, and real wages made "a catastrophic fall" in England, causing the growth of an impoverished wage laborer class (Dobb 120). The index of purchasing power of agricultural wages dropped steadily: from 74 in 1570-79 to 55 in 1600-1609 with the standard of 100 in 1520-1529 (Lachmann 121). In other words, the purchasing power of the real wages in 1600-1609 was less than half what it had been at the start of the previous century, and the purchasing power of money-wages continued to deteriorate substantially through the end of the century.
(Lachmann 121). As a result, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the class of merchants and craftsmen enjoyed their rising social status and began to "invest their capital in the employment of other craftsmen and themselves to assume the role of merchant-employers" (Dobb 135).

Under the feudal system, the manor occupies the center of the social, political, and economic structure of the society by allocating the agrarian labor and production in society. In England, the social hierarchy was fixed through the manorial structure in 1540's: magnates, large landholders, and small landholders held the manors, and the land was divided for agricultural production among freeholders, copyholders, leaseholders, and cotters (Lachmann 28). However, as the feudalism began to give way to emerging primitive capitalism, the entire social structure was destined to change.

The number of landless peasants in England and Wales during the last sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries offers a good indicator of the development of agricultural capitalism. The percentage of peasants not tied to manor increased from 11-12% in 1540-1567 to 35% in 1600-1610: "Landless peasants were controlled by poor law and market structure created by the gentry in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (Lachmann 129). The proportion of English peasants employed as wage laborers almost exactly
coincides with these figures (Lachmann 17). The wage laborers severed from the traditional manorial economic system began to provide the labor force in the developing primitive and mainly agrarian capitalism. The wage laborer had “the freedom of mobility and the right to accept or reject employment offer[s]” (Lachmann 39).

Their “masterless” and “vagrant” state, however, was regarded as threatening to the feudal land-based social order (Lachmann 39). The “vagrant or sturdy vagabond” undoubtedly presented a threat to the stable social order of the “‘naturally' fixed hierarchical relations structured around local manorial centres” (Taylor 1). The legitimate social order sanctioned by the natural law of the Chain of Being was the ideological and epistemological ideal of Renaissance society. The land-based manorial social structure was likewise regarded as the earthly realization of that order. But, the stable social order came to be threatened by the social mobility of the landless and masterless poor. Vagrancy was a crime that challenged social hierarchy fundamentally; as a result, the state was obsessed to fix the unstable social identity of the poor by imposing their places in the social hierarchy and by confining them geographically within the limits of the parish.

The Renaissance manorial system was anchored in a hierarchical social order, and the social mobility
undermined the system at the very root. Especially, at a
time of rapid transition, vagrancy and social mobility
presented serious doubts about the natural and permanent
aspects of social order, human identity, value, and
hierarchy. Palliser portrays the "fluid" period from 1540
to 1640 as "the time of great stress upon order, degree, the
chain of being, genealogy and the cult of ancestry" (98).

In that sense, social and hierarchal mobility seems to
have been taken as the erosion of natural order rather than
a new social phenomenon derived from the changing social and
economic conditions. In *Vagrant Writing*, Barry Taylor
contends that the Renaissance social theorists were
disturbed by the energy of social mobilization that
"threaten[ed] to expose as imaginary both the immutable
Signified of the Word, and the order of Commonwealth which
it underwrites" (14). In the "degreed" structure of the
Chain of Being, socio-economic inequalities were justified
by a divinely appointed hierarchy that provided a
prescription for an ideal harmony in social relations"
(Wrightson 19). But, vagrancy and increased social mobility
could fundamentally change the general perception of the
stable and "naturalized" order of the society. M. C.
Bradbrook describes the emerging social skepticism in early
modern England: "The emblematic framework was never quite as
stable as critics like Tillyard tend to suggest, and
Ulysses' famous speech on degree is a lament for its
passing" (142).

In the last decade of the Queen Elizabeth’s reign, the disintegration of social order was expedited by a series of social crises. Anne Righter calls the growing sense of anxiety “a darkening in the temper of the age” (154). The skeptical disillusionment and the fragmentation of social and individual unity in the play reflect the social, economic, and political “uncertainties and anxieties which are so characteristic of the closing years of Elizabeth’s reign” as well as the transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism (Outhwaite 24).

The Essex rebellion is symptomatic of the crisis of the 1590’s and presents a focal point in illuminating the increasing sense of disorder and darkening social vision. First, the escalating factionalism and political rivalry between Essex and Cecil marred court politics during the last years of Elizabeth, and the fall from royal favor made Essex plot the rebellion. In his rebellion, he fundamentally undermined social order and stability as well as the royal authority of the Queen. Second, the aging queen with no heir posed a serious cause of political instability, and the rival political factions attempted to take advantage of the situation in their favor by aligning themselves with foreign royal power. Essex was allied with King James of Scotland, and Cecil was suspected to have a secret agreement with the Infanta. As part of the reasons
for his rebellion, Essex criticized the Cecils for plotting to sell the crown to the Infanta.

Third, the rebellion took place in the midst of a series of prolonged and unsuccessful overseas wars and expeditions. Under the worsening economic situation, the entire nation was required to support these wars through heavy taxation and recruitment, and public discontent was increasing rapidly. The expeditions were intended to bring financial returns to support the royal coffers and to finance the repeated wars (Kinney 318). Fourth, Essex expected to receive support from disgruntled London populace easily, but his assessment of public discontent was miscalculated: Peter Clark claims that “at certain times, as in London in 1595, it seemed as if the whole fabric of the urban community might be about to disintegrate. Yet what is also remarkable is that the urban crisis never careered out of control” (56). Fifth, Essex’s secret truce agreement with Tyron and dubbing of 79 knights before his departure from Ireland against the Queen’s express will are characteristic of the worsening predicament of England as well as the weakening royal authority at the turn of the century (Jenkins 309; Kinney 319).

In an effort to suppress the protracted rebellion of Tyrone, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, was sent to Ireland as “the Queen’s first Lord-Lieutenant and Governor-General” at the head of “her largest land army” in 1599 (Powell and
Cook 177; Kinney 318). To the dismay of himself and the Queen, his campaign failed completely, and the desperate Essex concluded a secret truce with Tyrone against the will of Elizabeth. At the news that his political rival Robert Cecil was named Master of the Wards which Essex wanted badly for political and financial reasons, Essex decided to return to London to regain his authority and reputation in his factional rivalry against the Cecils through an interview with the queen (Kinney 319; Hurstfield 188).

Essex returned with 200 men and six officers to London early in the morning of September 28, 1599, and, with his face and clothes covered with "splashes of mud," he rushed through the queen’s Presence and Privy chambers to the bedchamber to find the queen who just awaked with neither wig nor formal dress that was "part of the [artifact] of monarchy" (Jenkins 310; Levin 154). As soon as he found her, "he fell on his knees, seized her hands, and covered them with kisses" to plead for her mercy (Jenkins 310). In this incident, Essex’s impulsive heroism and emulous pride are apparent, and the queen later said that "that man is above me" (Kinney 320). After a brief period of confinement, Essex could visibly regain sympathy and power, and "rumors of treason were frequent" (Kinney 320). In 1600, the renewal of his monopoly on the import of sweet-wines was denied by the queen, and he was also angry at the rumors that the Spanish Infanta would be placed on the
Essex's remarks on the queen grew harsher and wilder: the queen, "being an old woman, was no less crooked and distorted in mind than she was in body" (Kinney 322). In his insubordinate recalcitrance, he tried to tear down "the total Elizabethan myth" by demonstrating that "the virgin goddess [Elizabeth] was no more than a frail woman" (Hurstfield 189, 190). Essex's factional followers raised rebellious plots and fanned his frustration and resentment at his political rivals, the Cecil family. Finally, Essex consented to the conspiracy to "surprise the court and the Queen's person" in an effort to remove Robert Cecil from the court, and the Lord Chamberlain's Men were hired to perform Richard II, "with the deposition scene included" at the globe the night before the treason (Jenkins 315, 316; Levin 155).

On February 8, 1601, he marched with about 200 of followers, urging the passers-by to take up arms to protect the queen under the threat of his factional enemies and to prevent England from being sold to the Infanta (Kinney 322; Jenkins 316). He succeeded neither in receiving support from his potential followers nor in raising the London populace to his side, and he retreated to his house. After posing brief resistance and destroying incriminating evidence, he finally surrendered and was executed on February 25, 1601 (Powell and Cook 162; Carole Levin 155,
The Essex treason represents "a frontal assault against the whole Elizabethan system" and simultaneously symbolizes the factional struggle to "seize the whole monopoly of power" in the context of intensifying court factionalism at the turn of the century (Hurstfield 189).

Essex's impulsive return and subsequent rebellion are symptomatic of Elizabethan social crises in many ways: fear of imminent Spanish invasion, ubiquitous Elizabethan court rivalry, protracted Irish rebellion, question of royal succession, and misguided and miscalculated confidence in raising the needy and desperate population of London to his political purpose. The Essex rebellion also presents a close parallel to the world of the play in which social disorder and pessimistic moral vision dominate, human activities are incessantly presented against the backdrop of meaningless war, and characters are obsessed with the vaunting and asocial pride and emulation, similar to those demonstrated by Essex. In addition, the factionalism ("emulous factions") in the Greek camp is highly indicative of the one between the Cecil family and Robert Devereux.

Eric Mallin contends that England was "a country besieged" around 1600: England was under "a pervasive fear of attack. Frequent skirmishes with Ireland and rumors of imminent Spanish invasion fostered a national preoccupation with war" (145). The law required the entire nation (every householder) to be armed and ready for the foreign invasion
as appointed by the commissioner (Mallin 145). After the defeat of the Armada, the sense of national glory and rejoice was high, but pride soon turned into distress and discontent: "From 1590, however, the news of endemic military incompetence abroad, the continuous demands for men, musters, weapons and taxes all brought rising disillusion" (Clark 1977, 249).

The conflict between Essex and the Cecils was "a central social drama in the last years of the reign," and the "proliferating factions seemed to manifest a pathological disunity of political structure and spirit, a contagious emulation of disorder" as shown similarly in the nihilistic social and moral vision in *Troilus and Cressida* (Mallin 146, 147). Even at the local level, the factional struggle was bitterly waged, causing governmental disintegration and public mistrust: "From 1598 Essex's power was in rapid decline, leaving his party in the county wide open to a takeover bid by his rivals" (Clark 1977, 225, 261).

2. Paradigm Change in Language: From Reference to Representation

In "the fractured universe" of *Troilus and Cressida*, language is notoriously slippery and opaque in "persistent tonal equivocations" and "ambiguity" as many critics have pointed out: "superfluous," "ineffective," "dissonant," and
Characters such as Ulysses, Hector, and Troilus fail to relate linguistically with the world in their solipsism. The play persistently portrays a world in which language (signifier) is detached from the referent (signified). Language remains a means of mere representation with no semantic assurance of transcendent reality.²⁵

As T. McAlindon suggests that the "imperfect speeches" are used as "an omen of personal and social disorder," the linguistic fragmentation in the play depicts the social disunity and moral deterioration: "a world gone wrong, a world where problems of language reflect a crisis of values which was actually occurring in the late Renaissance" (30; Greene 1981, 276). Social decorum based on degree cannot function, and harmonious social communication and hierarchy are disjunct in this shaken world. If Volosinov is correct to argue that "the word has the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change," then the linguistic destabilization in the play marks the social disorder in England at the turn of the sixteenth century (19).²⁶ Greene also argues that "the breakdown of hierarchical view of order [in the late sixteenth century] called into question the right relation of word to thing, effecting a division of language from reality which would culminate in the nominalism of the next century--in the
skepticism of language expressed by Hobbes, Locke, and the Royal Society" (1981, 272, 273). In the dissolution of social cohesion, the metaphysical discursive order gives way to "the social force of a disorderly semiotics," and communicative disruption inevitably rises from "a deliberate destabilisation of the order of 'lawful language'": the discursive practice itself becomes "vagrant" without being anchored in the metaphysical reality (Taylor 14, 22).

In the Foucauldian epistemic paradigm, meaning preexists language, and words are bound to "a given ontology" before the Renaissance (Waswo 285). But, in the Renaissance, the sign becomes ontologically separated from reality (nature) and comes to reside in "an ideal mental order" (Gutting 149). Foucault says that language loses its status of "a signature stamped upon things" and finally becomes a system of "man-made sign" (1970, 56, 62). As the epistemic resemblance between things and words comes to be denied, language is no longer intertwined with reality, and it ceased to correspond transparently with nature.

The lack of intermediary between the sign and the world made language represent rather than refer: the sign has "no content, no function, and no determination other than what it represents," and linguistic representation became opaque, arbitrary, and subjective in its nature (Foucault 1970, 64). As a result, linguistic representation became a mental construction of reality with no intrinsic ontological
properties; in other words, language shifted from referential to relational. Waswo calls the shift as "a definitive feature of the Renaissance" if this process was not complete (13).30

In the shift from referential to relational or representational semantics, language was no longer "cosmetic to meaning," but became "constitutive of it": "Shakespeare’s assertion of literary immortality assumes that words have meaning by creating something that would not exist without them" (Waswo 60).31 In this process of paradigm shift, the linguistic energies were released from monologic referentiality, and linguistic closure in producing meaning largely came to be relationally deferred.32

In the play, linguistic discontinuity dramatizes social anxiety and disintegration, and desiring subjects fail to communicate with one another in their solipsism. When irritated Diomedes demands that Cressida “let your mind be coupled with your words,” language is incessantly “deferred” and forsworn: it is the world of linguistic irony and “madness of discourse” (V.ii.15).33 As the play opens, the Prologue in armor begins a speech in an epic tone, but the pompous archaism, neologism, and elevated style are immediately disrupted by sardonic bathos, and colloquial triviality: “The ravish’d Helen, Menelaus’ queen / With wanton Paris sleeps--and that’s the quarrel” (9-10). All the epic heroes (“the princes orgulous” wearing “crownets
regal”) have “tickling skittish spirits” in expectation of war (2, 6, 20). The discordant tone unsparingly reduces Homeric heroism and epic struggle to a “war for a placket”: “Lechery, lechery, still war and lechery!” (II.iii.21; V.ii.193). Gordon Williams says that the scene is dominated by stylistic ironies such as “the spectral solemnity, the gradus epithets, the dictionary language, the decorum which avoids every contact with the senses and the soil” (99).

A typical linguistic disorder is depicted in III.i where Pandarus exchanges meaningless words with Paris’s servant:

Pand. Friend, you, pray you, a word: do you not follow the young Lord Paris?

Serv. Ay sir, when he goes before me.

Pand. You depend upon him, I mean.

Serv. Sir I do depend upon the Lord.

Pand. You depend upon a notable gentleman, I must needs praise him.

Serv. The Lord be praised! (III.i.1-8)

This conventional Shakespearean comic scene indicates the linguistic skepticism and arbitrariness that are so prevalent in the play. On the surface, the quoted dialogue is a typical comic scene with the intentional twisting of the meaning by a stock witty servant to fool an old courtier, but as the dialogue develops, the comic scene turns from cunning verbal twisting to linguistic confusion.
Pandarus uses the terms of feudal ideology such as "follow" and "Lord" in the dialogue, but the servant twists and drains the feudal meaning out of the words by substituting the meaning of the words with "go" and "God." Later, in response to the servant's question ("You are in a state of grace?"), Pandarus says that "Grace? Not so, friend: honour and lordship are / my titles" (III.ii.14-16). In his consciousness of feudal hierarchy, the word "grace" is taken as an appellation of Duke by Pandarus in contrast to its intended religious meaning of a state "free from mortal sin" (Palmer 184). The term "honour" also is used as a feudal title by Pandarus and as virtue by the servant. In the sense that consciousness takes shape and being in the concrete process of social interaction, failed communication is symptomatic of the social and moral crisis as well as disillusioned individual consciousness in such society (Volosinov 13). As language is constructed and deeply embedded in human interaction with other individual consciousness in society, linguistic disorder is a reflection of social disorder.

This comic linguistic confusion is viewed as intentional and class-oriented by Pandarus: "Friend, we understand not one another: "I am / too courtly, and thou art too cunning" (III.i.26-27). Pandarus takes this linguistic confusion as the breakdown of communication between a refined courtier and an uneducated cunning
servant. But when the servant describes Helen as "the Mortal Venus, the heart-blood of beauty," Pandarus mistakes her as Cressida: "No, sir, Helen: could not you find out that by her attributes?" (III.i.31, 34-35). This is not a deliberate verbal confusion, but an absence of the semantic standard that makes communication possible in society: "languages are dialogically implicated in each other and begin to exist for each other" (Bakhtin 1981, 400).

As the scene moves on, the linguistic ambiguity becomes clearer. Pandarus' repeated use of the word "fair" adds to the linguistic dilemma:

Fair be to you, my lord, and to all this fair company; fair desires in all fair measure fairly guide them--especially to you, fair queen: fair thoughts be your fair fellow. (III.i.42-45)

The word "fair" is drained of its concrete meaning in this context, and in its excessive and hollow usage, the semantic value is lost: the signifier clearly fails to anchor in the referent. He is merely "full of fair words," and real communication breaks down among characters as the meaning is reduced to hollow sound (III.i.46).

Pandarus also uses the term "sweet queen" eleven times within the span of about sixty lines. As a result, the term "sweet" begins to be used infectiously by both Helen and Paris: "Sweet queen, sweet queen, that's a sweet queen, / i'faith" (III.i.69-70). His courtly and chivalric language
“sink[s] back into mere sounds, conventional gibberish, and meaninglessness” as if to symbolize the decaying order of feudalism (Colie 333). As there is no unified cosmic authority in which to anchor value and identity in the historical transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism, language moves beyond centrifugal “multi-accentuality” into linguistic indeterminacy or chaos.35

In I.ii, Troilus complains about the irrational and meaningless war he has to fight in the name of honor. He indicates that it is a war of sexual immorality to justify the abduction of Helen who is lawfully wedded to Menelaus:

Fools on both sides, Helen must needs be fair
When with your blood you daily paint her thus.
I cannot fight upon this argument;
It is too starv'd a subject for my sword. (I.ii.90-93)

In this world of erotic and political game, unrestrained male desires have turned into an irrational war, and men are daily thrown into absurd bloody battles merely to sustain Paris’s lechery. In this senseless world, Troilus’s skeptical speech defines the nature of the war throughout the play. He, however, later switches his skeptical attitude toward the war for no particular reason and argues for the keeping of Helen in the Trojan debate scene: “She is a theme of honour and renown, / A spur to valiant and magnanimous deeds” (II.iii.200-1). As the hostage of all-devouring Time, humans change and retract their words with
neither proper motivation nor new awareness in this play as R. A. Yorder observes that "yet nowhere in Shakespeare is the official standard of conduct more at odds with the action and language of the play" (13).  

By contrast, Hector experiences a discontinuous subjectivity rather than a linguistically mediated unitary self in the same Trojan debate scene. Hector proposes to "let Helen go" rather than keep her since "no discourse of reason" can justify "a bad cause":

Nature craves
All dues be render'd to their owners: now
What nearer debt in all humanity
Than wife to the husband? (II.ii.113, 117-18, 174-77)
He insists that the "raging appetites" should be checked by "law of nature," and the "moral laws of nature and nations" would not extenuate "the soil of her fair rape" (II.ii.182, 177-78, 185-86, 149). In an ironical shift of position, however, Hector gives in and agrees to keep her since "'tis a cause that hath no mean dependence / Upon our joint and several dignities" (II.ii.193-94). More ironical is the fact that before his so appealing and persuasive argument for the principle of natural law, "a roisting challenge" was already sent to the Greeks (II.ii.209). There is a dual structure of reality in Hector's consciousness and in the play: one is a psychical reality formed individually, and the other is an ideological reality formed collectively.
Despite his awareness of the futility in keeping Helen and continuing the senseless war, the sense of chivalric honor and the politics of feudal ideology overwhelm Hector's immediate experience and rationality. Just like a floating signifier, he switches his positions without anchoring in reality. Language as a means of self-representation constitutes selfhood and, at the same time, erases it. In the sense that a human subject is a “verbally embodied self,” the linguistic disorder automatically leads to the eraser of stable selfhood as suggested by Michel Montaigne: “we are men and hold together, only by our word” (Kushner 54; I.9. p.23). From a Lacanian perspective, only the linguistic mediation (the Symbolic order) raises the self from the Imaginary confusion and brings about the illusionary sense of stable and whole subjectivity in consciousness.

Hector's individual perception of reality conflicts with his ideology. That is, his sense of chivalric honor overshadows the absurdity of war and carnage in his split consciousness. The law of nature and morality in Hector’s psychic reality founders in the ideological and political pragmatism of war. Throughout the play, Hector vacillates and contradicts himself mainly because of the inner division in his discontinuous subjectivity. In his vacillation, the divided self fails to anchor in reality morally and psychologically, and he alternately plays his divided roles
without the power to resist the decaying power of the world.

By extension, all the characters are trapped by the same dilemma and compelled to play momentary and split roles like Hector who is representative of the linguistic dilemma in the play: "the pattern of division which is so central to the play" (Vivian Thomas 82). The speaking subject in the play is inextricably immersed and arrested in "the moment of enunciation" with no correlation to material reality (Coward and Ellis 62, 67). As shown in case of Troilus and Hector, language merely exists with no ontological referentiality to action as prelinguistic reality. The speaking subject lives in the momentary illusion of linguistic reality and subjectivity conferred by representational language. As time passes, however, the illusionary reality of language disappears along with the linguistic self. When language becomes the arbitrary signifier chaotically dissociated from the signified, all human knowledge, desire, and perception are subject to "envious and calumniating Time" (III.iii.174).

In this world where there is no truth, especially no linguistic truth, Pandarus cannot be farther from the truth when he says that "I speak no more than truth" (I.i.64). It seems that only Cressida correctly understands the dilemma: "To say truth, true and not true" (I.ii.98). Unlike the male characters who desperately cling to the illusion of truth, honor, virtue, degree, justice, and eternal love, her
moral insight instinctively undermines their fictionality and relativizes those male values. It is Cressida alone who comes to understand the ephemerality of love, doubleness of self, and uncertainty of language. In this world of social disorder where truth and essence have lost their moral ground, her primary concern is not to fashion herself in terms of patriarchal values, but to protect herself from the exploitive power of patriarchy.

As the Greek council scene in which the degree speech is given by Ulysses opens, Agamemnon presents his highly inflated speech with "crammed latinity and labored syntax":

"As knots, by the conflux of meeting sap, / Infects the sound pine and diverts his grain / Tortive and errant from his course of growth" (Schwartz 308; I.iii.7-9). The thirty lines of his speech rely on elevated language and philosophical abstractions. Instead of admitting that the "seven years' siege" of Troy is a failure, he describes their experience as "the protracted trials of great Jove / To find persistive constancy in men" (I.iii.12, 20-21). The hardship the Greeks are faced with is a winnowing process to distinguish the worthy from the unworthy: at a time of fortune's frown, "Distinction, with a broad and powerful fan / Puffing at all, winnows the light away, / And what hath mass or matter by itself / Lies rich in virtue and unmingled" (I.iii.27-30).

Agamemnon's speech sounds stoic and noble, but in
actuality, he uses empty rhetoric to avoid taking responsibility: "The 'winnowing' plainly does not establish 'Distinction' (Thersites survives, Hector dies) and the very suggestion that it does is monstrously unfair to all those Greeks who have perished under [Agamemnon’s] incompetent leadership" (Bradshaw 149). In his carefully worded speech, Agamemnon intentionally omits the real cause of the war, that is, a mere revenge of Menelaus’s cuckoldry in the name of honor and subsequently fails to justify the validity of the daily carnage. The paralysis of the Greek camp that is caused by overweening pride and egotism among its top leaders is elevated as "a beneficial ordeal" to bring moral and hierarchical differentiation (Girard 160). In this context, Agamemnon’s language demonstrates that language does not reflect reality, but rather is manipulated to construct imaginary moral distinction and military honor in an effort to drive his subordinate generals to "the protracted trials" of meaningless carnage (I.iii.20).

In this generalized and intentionally abstract speech, Agamemnon seems to suggest that moral virtue lies not in essence, but in "the doing" itself, and the longer protracted the war is, the more virtue the Greeks can claim (I.iii.292; Green 28). The linguistic trust is persistently breached, and the moral authority of the Greeks is betrayed in the words of their leader despite his heroic and essential imagery. He seems to be more interested in
language itself rather than in communicating meaning and value through language: language is reified into an empty signifier.

When Aeneas enters the Greek council to convey Hector’s chivalric challenge to Agamemnon, his initial words are simultaneously sarcastic and deflationary in view of the degree speech given by Ulysses: “Degree being vizarded, / Th’unworthiest shows as fairly in the mask” (I.iii.55-56). In the broken Chain of Being, the worthy and the unworthy are indistinguishable, and king and his subordinates cannot be differentiated. Aeneas satirizes the degree speech and its epic heroism: “How may / A stranger to those most imperial looks / Know them from eyes of other mortals?” (I.iii.222-24). And then, a lengthy and ironic verbal exchange of about forty lines is wasted before Agamemnon finally identifies himself: “He tells thee so himself” (I.iii.255). In this ironic and deflationalory scene, the “high and mighty” Agamemnon, “god in office,” fails to distinguish himself from his subordinate generals as if to show his ineffective leadership and the subsequent havoc in military and moral order in the Greek camp (I.iii.230, 231). It is one of the prime examples of the persistent discrepancy between language and reality in the play.

As language is denied its anchorage in intrinsic reality, the representation of Agamemnon (“topless deputation,” and “great commander, nerves and bone of
Greece" in Ulysses' words) becomes a mere linguistic and ideological construction divorced from Agamemnon himself: "This discrepancy reveals the vacancy of the office, the arbitrariness of the signifiers, the contingency of 'degree,' and the failure of 'reputation' to anchor, secure, and--more important--to render visible an authorized identity" (I.iii.152, 55; Charnes 91). In this scene, the representational power of language falters and is laid bare. The degree so eloquently advocated by Ulysses ceases to preserve distinction and objective principles in language, selfhood, and political order. As the play develops two of its most dominant themes, degree and order, Agamemnon who is the epitome of power and honor fails to anchor his moral authority and language in reality, thus setting a nihilistic tone of the play early in the first act.

In contrast to the moral vision of the ordered universe, the degree speech ironically reveals the linguistic fictionality of the principle of the Chain of Being. The vision of divine order neither operates nor exists in this brutal world of carnage, lechery, and egotism, and the comic moral redemption is missing even at the end of the play. In this world of moral chaos, Ulysses desperately relies on language and its fictional reality, but the dilemma is that the prelinguistic reality cannot be substituted by them.

Ulysses begins his self-contradictory and equivocal
speech on degree by spending 16 lines in deference to Agamemnon and Nestor:

Agamemnon,
Thou great commander, nerves and bone of Greece,
Heart of our numbers, soul and only sprite,
In whom the tempers and the minds of all
Should be shut up, hear what Ulysses speaks.

(I.iii.54-58)

The balanced syntax and inflated rhetoric elevate the "slow-witted" and ineffective Agamemnon to the moral, political, and ideological center of the Greeks, thus intensifying the division between hyperbolic and verbose language and reality (Tillyard 1971, 57). In contrast to his imagined greatness, Agamemnon is simply an incompetent leader who has allowed his army to be paralyzed by factionalism and who has failed to demonstrate his regal authority to a foreign messenger. As shown in his pompous, but hollow speech, he drives his army to the battle field through linguistic manipulation. His royal authority is likewise constructed through the language of Ulysses which is emptied of its "signifying potential" (Colie 320).

In the speech of "the speciality of rule," Ulysses expresses the orthodox Elizabethan political ideology:

The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre
Observe degree, priority, and place,
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
Office, and custom, in all line of order.

But when the planets
In evil mixture to disorder wander,
What plagues and what portents, what mutiny,
What raging of the sea, shaking of earth,
Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors,
Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
The unity and married calm of states
Quite from their fixture! O, when degree is shak'd,
Which is the ladder of all high designs,
The enterprise is sick. (I.iii.85-88, 94-103)

In the metaphysical universe of the Chain of Being, "order provided perfect correspondence between all parts of the chain and perfect harmony between each level and between all the degrees within each level"; in short, nature desires order as God's design (Collins 16). In divine hierarchy, each individual is appointed to his particular degree ("authentic place"), and any private desires for the higher degree ("neglection of degree") throw the universe into chaotic anarchy ("mere oppugnancy") (I.iii.108, 111, 127). In his speech, Ulysses argues that cosmos and society slip into chaos when unrestrained individual desire and factional rivalry ("an envious fever / Of pale and bloodless emulation") engage in "vizard[ing]" degree in competition for the higher degree (I.iii.83) as shown in the case of the
Essex rebellion. The escalating factionalism in the court of Elizabeth seriously undermined the proper operation of the government in power struggles, and Essex's vaunting pride and desire for power fundamentally challenged a national political structure based on the concept of the Chain of Being.

The concept of the Chain of Being constituted the heart of Tudor political, social, and religious ideology. Tudor political and religious theorists believed that the Chain of Being was a divine and natural structure of the universe, on the basis of which society was hierarchically ordered. In that respect, degree was an imagined but powerful reality that regulated the psychic, moral, religious, and social structures of Elizabethan society.

On the other hand, the Chain of Being was a mere linguistic and ideological construction that supported the foundation of Elizabethan social and political structures by naturalizing and universalizing the man-made social and economic order into divine order. In other words, the ruling class ideologically legitimated social inequality and class hierarchy by constructing the imaginary relations between human society and divine cosmos and further by mystifying social conflicts as natural in the chain of being. By creating imaginary relations of universal order, that is, the Chain of Being, the dominant class justifies and perpetuates the concrete social relations of inequality.
In the context of the social and economic crisis in the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, the increased emphasis on “order and degree” (the Chain of Being) during this period indicates the rising anxiety of the ruling class over the worsening social conditions. In the same vein, the degree speech by Ulysses can also be taken as an alarm to the decayed moral vision of the play. In Althusserian terms, the concept of degree is internalized in the “ideological state apparatus” in the sanction of divine providence (Althusser 1971, 142).

In a Platonic sense, the earthly order is a copy of the heavenly order, but there is no such implication in the degree speech. In the political speech of “the speciality of rule,” however, divine providence does not sanction the degree: “the angelic end of the chain of being is omitted” (Tillyard 1971, 84). The idea of divine order is pauperized and reified into a mere simulacra (counterfeit), and the natural order loses its moral authority over the human order: “Ulysses’ anthropomorphic description of the cosmos reverses the logical sequence of origin and copy by implying that the heavens are an imitation of the social order” (Freund 29). In that sense, there is no divine providence in the political ideology of the Greeks despite the efforts to anchor their political ideology in transcendent reality.
The doctrine of order has been politically reified into an empty linguistic representation divorced from concrete historical reality. Moreover, Ulysses demonstrates his manipulative power by linguistically constructing nonexistent divine order in the Greek council. The doctrine of the ordered universe thus becomes a linguistic construction, a fiction. In other words, there is no transcendent order in the moral decadence of the play except in language; as a result, Ulysses’ speech is merely "a poetical oration," and what he preaches is "the unexamined platitudes of a doctrine of order which the play itself consistently subverts" (Stein 152; Colie 321). In that respect, the play is representative of the mounting moral, economic, and political crisis and subsequent anxiety in the last years of Elizabeth. Thomas Cartelli offers a similarly pessimistic view on the degree speech by claiming that in the formalization of the doctrine of degree, "the text begins to highlight its absences, expose its essential incompleteness, articulate the ghostly penumbra of absent signs that lurk within its pronouncements" (3). Ulysses’s speech was intended to stir up the Greeks from their paralysis, but Ulysses’s fictional doctrine of order, however eloquent, is ineffective in producing intended action as "truth" is "tir’d with iteration" (III.i.174).

After defining "the speciality of rule" and depicting the chaos that results when it is violated, Ulysses moves to
the cause of the Greek paralysis: unrestrained will and envious emulation. When the doctrine of degree is violated, justice will waver between the "endless jar" of "right and wrong," and degree will be a ladder for emulous factions to climb in "mimetic rivalry":

Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite,
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself. (I.iii.117, 119-24)

In such a state, man is trapped in the closed circuit of power, will, and desire: Ulysses contends that man aspires to an unconstrained power that would subsequently yield to egotistical self-will, and self-will would be, in turn, devoured by self-perpetuating and blind appetite.

In the feudal social structure where each individual is appointed its fixed degree by divine providence, objective value and distinction inhere not in individuals, but in assigned degree. Guided by reason, will and desire locate their proper values and meanings only in the ordered social structure. Man finds ontological and social meaning not in his individuated psyche, but in social harmony and concordance: "Tudor consciousness related to social reality by limiting [individual] possibilities" (Collins 24).

Within this fixed and immutable universe ordered by degree,
"continence and temperance" were praised as supreme virtues at the expense of will and appetite unrestrained by reason (Collins 25). As an unnatural and infectious social disease, excessive desire and unrestricted will posed a threat to social order and, by extension, to cosmic order.

With the emergence of capitalism and the increased mobility in social hierarchy, demographic topography, and economic system, however, the Tudor "world view" began to change or, more correctly, to collapse. As Tillyard influentially argued in Elizabethan World Picture, "the battle between Reason and Passion . . . was peculiarly vehement in the age of Elizabeth" (75). Ulysses thus argues that the predatory and egotistical appetite "suffocate[s]" and erases natural distinction (degree), and personal ambition spreads chaotic disorder like an infection (I.iii.125). Where degree once functioned as an ideological mechanism to maintain order, it instead now offers a metaphorical ladder with which to "climb" social hierarchy:

And this neglection of degree it is

That by a pace goes backward, with a purpose

It has to climb. The general's disdain'd

By him one step below, he by the next,

Th' next by him beneath . . . . (I.iii.127-31)

As the image of degree changes into a competitive "ladder" that goes retrogressively for madly inflated emulous desires (the "universal wolf"), the general is "disdain'd" by his
inferior "one step below" in the sickness of emulous fever (I.iii.102, 121, 129, 130). When the concept of degree is merely institutionalized in the form of political and military hierarchy, its reified mechanism is abused as a tool of power struggle and hierarchical subversion.

Despite the ceremonious language frequently employed in the play to naturalize the doctrine of order and distinction, Ulysses' speech unintentionally subverts the ideological doctrine represented by the chain of being. In doing so, he foregrounds growing social anxiety over the Elizabethan "cultural crisis" caused by the decaying social and political order: "a process constantly changing people, things and relationships, demanding as it develops the continual dissolution of all social preconditions and ideological conditions which would otherwise restrict its expansion" (Grady 26; Ryan 28). Ulysses expresses a similar sense of crisis when he says that "the unity and calm of states" are shaken from their "authentic place" in the Greek camp (I.iii.100, 108). Ulysses's poignant lamentation over alienation from the Chain of Being seems to be a nostalgic reaction to the passing of an old feudal order ("the 'natural' relationship between individual and community") into a new "fluid" "bourgeois" order with new elevated self-consciousness and individual desire (Heller 1981, 13).55

Although Ulysses advocates absolute hierarchy and
degree in his language, his words nevertheless implicitly
indict Agamemnon for his ineffective leadership.
Agamemnon's incompetence led the Greeks to fail "in the
promis'd largeness"; therefore, the foiled "enterprise" is
derived neither from "the protractive trials of great Jove"
nor from the "neglection of degree" (I.iii.5, 20, 127). The
disrespect for the degree in the Greek army is rather "a
consequence and not a cause" under the incompetent
leadership (Green 109). In that sense, the degree speech is
"a cunning piece of rhetorical generalization" in which the
real cause of the problem, Agamemnon's incompetent
leadership, is dismissed, and "the Great Chain of Being is
wheeled on to prop up the chain of command" (Tillyard 1971,
58; Bradshaw 150).

Ulysses' political pragmatism reifies the concept of
order into a mere external rule of military hierarchy and a
constraint on individual desires at the cost of its divine
moral values. As a manipulator of ruling class ideology,
Ulysses attempts to resuscitate the paralyzed Greek camp and
justify its incompetent leadership by deceptively ascribing
the responsibility to those who do not blindly follow
Agamemnon. In the logic of the degree speech, degree is
implicitly equated with military rank, and insubordination
is tantamount to violation of the universal moral order.

In the transitional social process of the Renaissance,
both belief and language (that were once regarded as natural
and divine) came to be alienated from prelinguistic reality. In the play, the intrinsic reality no longer exists except for in language. In the degree speech, language does not live up to action and fails to materialize in reality. The linguistic and conceptual unity is broken with the passing of the old paradigm of similitude. The play thus shows a cultural and political heteroglossia in the transition from the late feudal order to emerging primitive capitalism.

When Agamemnon asks Ulysses to cure the moral sickness that he diagnoses, he elaborates on the mimetic rivalry of Achilles without offering any concrete solution. He merely reiterates that factionalism (the “factious feasts” as Nestor terms it) is the cause and attributes all responsibilities to Achilles who “pageants” Greek leaders “like a strutting player” and “make[s] paradoxes” their “achievements, plots, orders, [and] preventions” (I.iii.151, 153, 181, 184). Ulysses’ obsession with language is manifest in this scene, and his empty rhetoric merely luxuriates his intellectual power and ideology. His language symptomatically shows his incessant and paradoxical endeavor to live and find meaning in language in the world of linguistic emptiness. In that sense, Ulysses is structurally entrapped in the ironic contradiction between his affirmation of the constancy of linguistic reality and his negation of it.

As the “dull and long-continu’d truce” is further
protracted, Hector challenges the Greeks to a chivalric duel that, "However it is spread in general name, / Relates in purpose only to Achilles" (I.iii.322-23). However, like a merchant who first shows "foul wares" in the hopes of selling them or presenting foils for the better one, Ulysses proposes to "make a lott’ry, / And by device let blockish Ajax draw / The sort to fight with Hector" (I.iii.359, 374-76). The commercial metaphors debase human relations down to commercial transactions by comparing a chivalric duel with a commercial deal. In the Chain of Being where each component has its authentic degree, a human cannot be equated with a commercial object. Ulysses violates the principle of degree that he advocates at the beginning of the scene. In view of Achilles’ "blown up" pride and Greek factionalism--"What glory our Achilles shares from Hector, / Were he not proud, we all should share with him; / But he already is too insolent"--Ulysses’ Machiavellian strategy seems somewhat defensible on the surface, but it again goes against his ardent speech of degree (I.iii.316, 367-69). Through deceitful manipulation, Ulysses elevates the "sodden-witted" Ajax to the rank of Achilles in honor and military valor (II.i.45). In the sense that they have different degrees in the Chain of Being, he voluntarily negates the moral doctrine of degree for political convenience in his pragmatism.

While Ulysses anxiously advocates hierarchy as a way of
keeping a man from turning into a self-annihilating monster, he himself adds to the cannibalistic rivalry of the Greeks. With Ulysses's ready abandonment of the idea of degree and order, the moral center of the play collapses into a chaos of mimetic and vainglorious desires, and the speech of degree declines into a mere political tautology devoid of essential meaning. Philip Brockbank defines the speech as "the game of class solidarity and mutual self-glorification" (38). With the loss of linguistic anchorage for the transcendent signified, the speech becomes a device for political and rhetorical disguise ("a ceremonial act of self-concealment") to advance opportunistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic display of power in the "madness of discourse" (V.ii.141; Cartelli 12). In _Troilus and Cressida_ where the signifier is disconnected from the signified, language is constantly frustrating and frustrated at the same time, and the linguistic disorder expands to the personal, social, political, moral, and cosmic disorder as illustrated in the instance of the degree speech and its violation by the advocator himself. Moral order exists only in empty language, and political expediency and manipulation dominate instead of the Chain of Being.

In the growing anxiety of a disordered and fractured metaphysical reality, human identity becomes destabilized. The lovers' desire for constancy and integrity in love is
only illusory: “I am as true as truth’s simplicity, / And simpler than the infancy of truth” (III.ii.167-68). Love has lost its anchorage in “a winnow’d purity” of passion and constancy. Troilus and Cressida, however, cling to untrustworthy language in the game of literary canonization: “As truth’s authentic author” to sanctify the future verse in eternal citation (III.ii.165, 179). Though betrayed eventually, the vows of the two lovers demonstrate their conscious and desperate desire to achieve stable selves and constant love in the futile universe of “Injurious Time” that “with a robber’s haste / Crams his rich thiev’ry up” (IV.iv.41-42). In linguistic narcissism, the lovers engage in “authoring” themselves as rhetorical subjects (“rhetoricized consciousness[es]”): “Creatures of their word, their speech mimes purpose and conviction, but their being is predicated on the rhetoricity of the word” (Freund 24, 25). In their desperate but paradoxical efforts to generate stable selves and love, they turn to language, but language cannot create transcendent reality in the moral world of the Chain of Being where essence and degree exist prelinguistically.

As the play opens, Troilus luxuriates his feelings of unrequited love in “hollow, formulaic, and hyperbolic” language: “But I am weaker than a woman’s tear, / Tamer than sleep, fonder than ignorance, / Less valiant than the virgin in the night, / And skilless as unpractis’d infancy” (I.i.9-
Troilus creates himself into a Petrarchan lover in “the dreadful artifice” of his linguistic solipsism and sensuality (Green 25). Trapped in the extreme artificiality of language, his language dissociates from his thoughts, and his rhetorical self collapses: “Patience herself, what goddess e’er she be, / Doth lesser blench at suff’rance than I do” (I.i.27-28). In this sphere of patriarchal desire, Troilus and Pandarus are obsessively preoccupied in creating the imaginary Cressida in language. Like a pimp, Pandarus “pours” Cressida’s sensuous images into “the open ulcer of [Troilus’] heart” to generate his erotic desire for Cressida: in comparison to her hand, “all whites are ink, / Writing their own reproach, to whose soft seizure / The cygnet’s down is harsh, and spirit of sense / Hard as the palm of ploughman” (I.i.53, 56-59). This kind of hollow and artificial indulgence in language is prevalent in the play and is symbolic of human efforts to create self and reality in language at a time when the social and linguistic disorder dominates in society.

Towards the end of the scene, Troilus turns himself into a merchant and Cressida into a pearl:

What Cressida is, what Pandar, and what we.
Her bed is India; there she lies, a pearl.

. . . . . . . . . .
Ourself the merchant, and this sailing Pandar
Our doubtful hope, our convey and bark.
In "the highly conventional, overfamiliar vocabulary of the petrarchistic sonneteer," Cressida is transformed from a Petrarchan goddess to sexual merchandise that Pandarus sells and Troilus buys, and his idealized love degrades into a sexual transaction (Colie 330). In his sensuality reified into erotic idealism, he is merely indulging in the linguistic creation of his and Cressida’s images that are "of far more interest to him than the realities" (Greene 1983, 137). He is more interested in his idealized poetic creation of her than in Cressida herself. Cressida is "the other" ("object a" as the "object of desire" and his "imaginary other") for Troilus in a Lacanian sense: woman is aught but as she is valued (Bjelland 173; Clarke 226).

Despite his professed idealism, Cressida is a reified object of idealized love and sensual gratification, and her identity is defined by the signifier of masculine desire. After the betrayal scene in V.ii, Troilus comes to realize the fictional emptiness of his linguistic reality. In deep disenchantment, he shows his newly-found mistrust in language: "Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart; / Th’effect doth operate another way" (V.iv.108-9).

In the orchard scene where the lovers are readied for a one-night "wartime liaison" by the pimping Pandarus, Cressida ("sluttish spoils of opportunity" and "daughter of the game" in Ulysses’s words) perilously reveals a divided
self to Troilus: "I have a kind of self resides with you, / But an unkind self, that itself will leave / To be another’s fool" (IV.v.62, 63; Berry 131; III.ii.146-48). To survive the cruelty of war as a daughter of a traitor, "a woman of quick sense" knows that she should "master" her language "at every joint and motive of her body" (IV.v.54, 57; III.ii.120). But in the passion of love, she wishes to have the "men’s privilege / Of speaking first" and speaks "the thing [she] shall surely repent" in rapture: "Why have I blabb’d? Who shall be true to us / When we are so unsecret to ourselves?" (III.ii.123-24, 127-28, 130). As she attempts to represent herself in language, her frustration grows, and she shows "little confidence in the stability of selfhood or in the ability of discourse to represent it": "In faith I lie-- / My thoughts were like unbridled children, grown / Too headstrong for their mother" (Freund 23; III.ii.120-22). Between lines 118 and 132, the words of enunciation are used at least nine times, which seem to show Cressida’s obsession with language at this particular moment: "confess," "lie," "blabb’d," "speak," "silence," and "mouth." Despite the impossibility of linguistic representation of herself, she still clings to a desperate hope of unifying her divided self into a true and constant lover ("a kind self") through language, but her effort to fashion a unified subject is futile and short-lived.

As she fails to integrate her divided self between true
passion and the "hold-off" policy, she declares to "take [a] leave" from "[her] own company," which the insensitive Troilus perceives as a mere coquettish craft: "Her desire is not to get away from Troilus, but to get away from herself in order to understand herself, or to sort out the two dominant selves she finds within her" (III.ii.138, 143; Adams 80). In her deep psyche, her divided selfhood is further separated, and she momentarily alternates between passionate love and anxiety of betrayal:

I have a kind of self resides with you,
But an unkind self, that itself will leave
To be another's fool. I would be gone:
Where is my wit? I know not what I speak.

(III.ii.146-49)

In her multi-layered psychic complexity ("such intermingling of craft and pathos"), Cressida struggles with the contradictory sense of truthful constancy ("love") and strategic infidelity ("craft"), and, at the same time, she purposefully plays her "unkind" role to "angle for [Troilus'] thoughts" (Freund 24; III.ii.151, 153).

Being divided and trapped between a self-protective and manipulative desire ("an unkind self") and an even stronger passion for Troilus (a kind self), Shakespeare's Cressida suffers a fragmentation of subjectivity in reality. She becomes a figure of pathos and tragedy rather than a one-dimensional betrayer of legendary infidelity. In her double
predicament as the female child of a traitor left behind in the cruel world of war and male desire, the discrepancy between inner self and marketable self is pathetic, but inevitable since there are "no intrinsic identities apart from our relationships" (Yoder 12). Cressida's precarious subjectivity is required to transform and perform her roles, depending on what masculine desire fashions her to be. The dilemma of uncertainty and division tragically dominates her unreliable self and language; as a result, her desire to escape self-division is doomed to fail in the domains of patriarchal power and desire.

In response to Cressida's speech on self-division, the sensuous Troilus turns to language and tries to create an illusion of stable self and love through linguistic representation. Full of illogical comparison, formulaic syntax, and cliche, his language is conventional and discordant, matching "a plot in which high sonnet-love cannot be accomplished" (Colie 330). In his ironic desire to canonize the eternity of his love and selfhood in a literary form, he resorts to literary convention:

   Yet, after all comparisons of truth,
   As truth's authentic author to be cited,
   'As true as Troilus' shall crown up the verse
   And sanctify the numbers. (III.ii.171-74, 178-181)

Troilus attempts to create in linguistic representation a love and truth that would be unavailable in the real world.
But without the referential unity of language, his effort is a mere reification of his illusionary desire into a hollow signifier, and his rhetorical construction of Cressida (the "imaginary other") is destined to betray him. The archaic genre and language themselves are emblematic of his misguided efforts to transcend the reality of his true self and love only in his imaginary indulgence. As Troilus loses control of language in extreme artificiality and conventionality, his linguistic self-fashioning of himself as an innocent and constant lover subverts and erases his newly-created subjectivity.

Encouraged by Troilus’s avowal, Cressida also expresses her new-found subjectivity of "true Cressida" in artificial style:

When they’ve said 'As false
As air, as water, wind, or sandy earth,
As fox to lamb, or wolf to heifer’s calf,
Pard to the hind, or stepdame to her son’--
Yea, let them say, to stick the heart of falsehood,
'As false as Cressida.’ (III.ii.189-194)

Her neurotic sense of inner division finally comes to a resolution of the divided self into 'a kind self' in the representational power of language. In contrast to Troilus’s vow that elevates him as "truth's authentic author," Cressida employs the imagery of mutation and falsity and cannot still escape the legendary epithet of
"false Cressida" (III.ii.179). It seems ironic that she could not be free from the legendary representation of her infidelity even at the moment of creating a new-found self of faithfulness and constancy. In the illusion of language, her new self is as empty and ephemeral as that of Troilus: the lovers “speak by the book; their fluency in its lovely cliches threatens love-language at its center, as they empty their utterance of the very meanings they strive to express” (Colie 325). The anticlimax of the avowal scene is the swearing of “amen” by all three participants of the pseudo-brothel match-making: “Go to, a bargain made: seal it, seal it, I will be the / witness” (III.ii.195-96, 205). This scene epitomizes futile human efforts to rely on the representational and constructive power of language in creating private realities in the world of referential disunity, but this kind of desperate hope for a linguistic reality is constantly subverted in the play.

When the Greeks decide to "buy" Cressida "in right great exchange" for Antenor, she once again becomes merchandise in the world of male politics and desire (III.iii.21, 28). At the news of the trade-off, Troilus's response is unbelievably short and unemotional ("Is it so concluded?"), and he hastily leaves the scene, making a hypocritical statement that "We met by chance: you did not find me here" (IV.ii.68, 73). His action in this scene implicitly negates his previous avowals and puts his
linguistic subjectivity of truthful lover in jeopardy. In the scene of the final separation of the lovers (IV.iv), Troilus’s indulgence in language is remarkably conspicuous in comparison to Cressida who mainly makes one-line statements with the exception of the opening nine line speech. Where Cressida realizes that her new linguistic identity produced in the repeated avowals cannot protect her from the politics of masculine desire, Troilus still indulges in creating his imaginary reality in language: “I love thee in so strain’d a purity / That the blest gods, as angry with my fancy, / More bright in zeal than the devotion which / Cold lips blow to their deities, take thee from me” (IV.iv.23-26). Troilus’s speech mystifies the cruelty of the trade-off and justifies his easy compliance through rhetoric such as illogical analogy (god’s anger with his love), artificial wording and syntax (“so strain’s a purity” and “more bright in zeal”), and impersonal and conventional verbiage (“the devotion which / Cold lips blow to their deities”). In her skeptical response, Cressida’s short question is piercing as if to negate his verbose language: “Is’t possible?” (IV.iv.31).

Troilus’s linguistic indulgence further moves on to “injury of chance” and “Injurious Time” to mystify their separation in the same artificiality of his linguistic delusion (IV.iv.32, 41). His impersonal and artificial language clearly contrasts with Cressida’s relative
reticence and shows his imprudent reliance on the representational power of hollow signifiers:

We two, that with so many thousand sighs
Did buy each other, must poorly sell ourselves
With the rude brevity and discharge of one.

As many farewells as be stars in heaven,
With distinct breath and consign'd kisses to them,

(IV.iv.38-40, 43-44)

As the moment of separation draws near, Troilus returns to his hackneyed theme of faithfulness as if to fashion and fixate their love and Cressida's selfhood in his language once again: "But 'Be thou true' say I to fashion in / My sequent protestation: be thou true, / And I will see thee" (IV.iv.54-56). However, just as Ulysses and Agamemnon contradict themselves in their speeches and fail to produce reality in language, so all his efforts are destined to fail in the absence of linguistic referentiality.

3. Conflict in Value Assessment: Intrinsic Value versus Contingent Value

As humans exist and conceptualize reality in the shared and pregiven symbolic forms of culture, "to imagine is to begin the process that transforms reality" (Hooks 9). When social and economic conditions change, the cognitive paradigms also change. In the process of the paradigm
shift, conflicts, subversions, and negotiations inevitably take place in the material and cultural domains. In addition, paradigm shifts transform human value, agency, meaning, and relationship to accommodate cultural and ideological negotiations between old and new paradigms. In that respect, the sense that "things fall apart" (the "bitter equilibrium of disillusionment") in Troilus and Cressida persistently represents the socio-economic conflicts and negotiations in the process of the historical crisis and subsequent changes in the cognitive paradigm (Ellis-Fermor 63; Grady 66).

Andrew Hiscock contends that the play draws "its dramatic energy from the remorseless study of cultural flux" in the context of the growing tensions between "old and obsolete values" and the emerging cultural order (164-165). In the feudal social structure, man was constantly encouraged to define his identity in terms of his socially, politically, and economically-appointed position. Since all creatures are ranked by degree into a coherent and unified scheme of perfection, any change in the order destroys universal harmony and leads to chaos. In this cosmic paradigm, time and history are static and cyclic rather than progressive and lineal, and individual experiences and desires are constantly reoriented to conform to the shared social psyche. As a dominant ideology, the doctrine of degree negates the inner experiences and desires of the
subject who had "no psychological conception of the self as an individual defined by and within itself" (Collins 21).

Despite the famous degree speech, *Troilus and Cressida* displays subjects such as Ulysses, Ajax, and Achilles who fail to be mediated by reason and degree, being obsessed with unbounded narcissism and predatory rivalry.

Christopher Caudwell defines the spirit of primitive accumulation as "intemperate will, 'bloody, bold and resolute,' without norm or measure": "The absolute individual will overriding all other wills is therefore the principle of life for the Elizabethan age" (92). In the nihilistic moral vision of the play, characters with unrestrained narcissism and infected desire actively engage in the "unfettered realization of human individualities" against the doctrine of degree (Caudwell 93). In the Chain of Being, the value of each individual intrinsically resides within the bounds of degree, but man with unrestrained will attempts to realize his value beyond the limit of his assigned degree. Among other characters, Achilles and Ajax are representative of this vaunting ambition in the play: "human will (as opposed to reason)" constitutes "a structuring force for the play" (Bradshaw 160). Unbounded desire endangers and fractures metaphysical order and self by disrupting the unity between self and degree, and it also degrades teleological time into an "envious and calumniating" destroyer (III.iii.174).
As a significant aspect of the play, unbounded individual will shows a "new bourgeois ethic" that emerged in the historical transition from the feudal order of the Chain of Being to primitive capitalism (Southhall 219). By reducing the fixed social relations of feudalism to the capitalist principles ("commodity relations") of universal exchange and mobility, emerging capitalism made the previously fixed relationship between individuals and society fluid and erased all social distinctions into chaotic "equivalency" (Bogue 88). Southhall argues that unbounded desire and individualism "touches the very quick of Shakespeare's conception of the spirit of capitalism as a force which reduces life to the mere satisfaction of the appetites" (227). With the gradual collapse of the "'natural' relationship" of feudalism, man began to be released from the fixed system of a priori truth, and human action became a conscious choice of the desiring subject (Heller 1981, 3). Once anchored in absolute transcendent reality, values and meanings came to be released from the master idea of the Chain of Being, and value judgment became relative: "The Renaissance no longer knew a single, unequivocal, universally valid scale of values" (Heller 1981, 280). In this relativistic world, man is left with no absolute moral standard by which to measure his actions and experiences: all the individual and communal relations became relativized in the system of exchange value.
degree is gone, intrinsic value no longer exists, and all values are temporal and contingent in the system of exchange.

As tension grows in the transition from feudal absolutism to capitalist relativism, the old feudal and new capitalist orders are both presented negatively, thus leaving the play with no moral center into asocial and anarchistic disorder. On the one hand, chivalry (once representative of the moral and military ideal in feudal society) becomes corrupt: chivalric honor and glory become a means of ruthless self-realization and personal interest. For example, the misguided sense of chivalric love and honor drives the Greeks and Trojans into ruthless carnage for the possession of Helen's body. Hector who is closest to the ideal of knightly virtue in the play agrees to keep Helen in the name of chivalric honor, and he violates the chivalric military code and is finally killed in his greed for sumptuous armor. The reified sense of honor instead dissolves feudal communal relations into self-devouring individual desire and will. The principle of chivalry becomes a hollow social institution, and chivalric virtue gives way to "appetitive" individual honor. Despite Shakespeare's repeated use of the term "chivalry," the true spirit of knightly honor and glory is found nowhere in the play. Chivalry exits only in language and in patriarchal ideology.
On the other hand, emerging capitalism objectifies women as "a commodity of the Trojan War market" and evaluates individual worth and relations in "the scales of the market place," negating all intrinsic values and natural order (Fischer 29; Stafford 39; Southall 223). In addition, emerging capitalism commodifies social relations as shown in the triangular relationship of Troilus (buyer), Pandarus (seller), and Cressida (an object of trade). In this moral context, individual interest focuses on the maximum realization of will and desire. In that respect, growing skepticism and anxiety over the emerging capitalist order is clear: "While Shakespeare depicts a dramatic world in which values are changing from medieval to mercantilist economic ethics, his sympathetic characters do not find the new system satisfying." (Fischer 29, 30).

The lengthy Trojan debate scene on value opens with the speech of Priam. In this speech, Priam appears as incompetent a leader as Agamemnon had been, suggesting a similar lack of moral and political authority in Troy. In response to Priam's question of whether or not to return Helen to finish the "hot digestion of this cormorant war," Hector proposes to "let Helen go" by saying that it is meaningless to sacrifice so many Trojan lives to "guard a thing not ours nor worth to us": "She is not worth what she doth cost the keeping" (II.ii.6, 17, 22, 52). Despite Hector's appeal to the moral authority of natural law, the
tone of the debate indicates that Helen is merely a stolen property in patriarchal society: her return is decided according to the male judgment of her value.

Hector argues that Helen was immorally and illegally abducted as a sexual object by Paris; therefore, there is neither merit nor intrinsic value to be justified by reason in keeping her. He further says that such abduction violates natural and human laws by debasing the inviolable bond of marriage and stealing other's property. Troilus, by contrast, rejects his "cramm'd reason" in favor of "manhood and honour" and proposes to keep her by saying that "what's aught but as 'tis valued?" (II.ii.47, 49)

In a world where commercial relativism replaces intrinsic value imposed by degree, value is decided by the subjective assessment of the beholder. Despite his description of himself as a chivalric knight, Troilus fails to show the true spirit of chivalry in his commercial relativism. As shown when he imposes his subjective will and idolatrous image upon Cressida in his naive idealization of his love, Troilus's chivalric idealism adamantly subjectivizes the value of Helen as a measure of Trojan valor and honor. This scene shows us that capitalist commodity relations begins to emerge, even individual identity loses its fixed value, and relativism dominates value judgment. The central question of the play is "what is the nature of value and has it or has it not an absolute existence?" (Ellis-Fermor 69)
In denying Troilus's relativistic and subjective judgment of value, Hector offers an absolute and essentialist view of value:

But value dwells not in particular will:
It holds his estimate and dignity
As well wherein 'tis precious itself
As in the prizer. 'Tis mad idolatry
To make the service greater than the god;
And the will dotes that is attributive
To what infectiously itself affects,

Without some image of th'affected merit. (II.ii.54-61)

Hector essentializes value by saying that it is not decided by mere subjective volition and intention ("particular will"), but by a thing itself because of its own merit given by providential degree. However, he neither rejects subjective value completely, nor subscribes solely to intrinsic value: value resides in "the prizer" as well as in degree. He combines the subjective and objective aspects of value, but if a desired object has no intrinsic value that a desiring will ("the prizer") projects, the desire itself deteriorates into "mad idolatry." He is an essentialist and objectivist at the same time: "Hector wants a fusion of intrinsic and assigned values, so that he can use the 'given' qualities of things as a norm for assessing other people's value-judgment[s]" (Eagleton 1986, 59). This scene self-consciously analyzes the moral predicament of a new
epistemological order: "if there are no objective values, what follows?" (Bradshaw 143). Though his own principle fails to hold "under the test of experience" when he agrees to keep Helen at the end of the scene, Hector advocates intrinsic values in opposition to subjective values imposed by infected will (Helton 115).

Defending his moral relativism, Troilus responds in a speech that consists of abstract and illogical analogy, circular logic, and improper comparison. The first analogy is concerned with marriage:

I take today a wife, and my election
Is led on in the conduct of my will:
My will enkindled by mine eyes and ears,
Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous shores
Of will and judgement--how may I avoid,
Although my will distaste what it elected,
The wife I choose?" (II.ii.62-68)

The logical mistake in this analogy is that to justify the violation of marriage, Troilus ironically employs the logic of the permanence of marriage. Helen’s abduction ("her fair rape" in Paris’s words) is not, by any stretch of the imagination, legitimate marriage. Troilus, however, ironically desires to protect the concept of chivalric honor by falsely elevating the act of abduction and rape to the legitimacy of marriage.

Deprived of the divinely sanctioned degree, Troilus is
required to create his system of value on the basis of sensual perception and desire: "will" ("eyes and ears") over "judgement" (reason). For Troilus, value judgment aspires to the full realization of illimitable individual will and appetite as shown in "the underlying nature of the new value system" at the close of the sixteenth century: the play shows "Shakespeare's conception of the spirit of capitalism as a force which reduces life to the mere satisfaction of the appetite" (Vivian Thomas 131). Bruster also views this as "a cultural distillation of historical pressures" pervasive in "the literary imagination of the English Renaissance" (12). It is clear that Troilus's subjectivity is simultaneously split between the "reified" feudal ideology of chivalry and the emergent intemperate "bourgeois will" under the social pressure of emerging capitalist imagination (Caudwell 93).

Troilus next turns to silk and food imagery, representing the Trojans as buyers of Helen and the Greeks as her seller:

We turn not the silks upon the merchant
When we have soil'd them, nor the remainder viands
We do not throw in unrespective sieve
Because we now are full. (II.ii.70-73)

Troilus's previous idealistic image of marriage is here undercut by his merchandising and food analogy: the most significant aspect of the economic metaphor in Renaissance
drama is “the application of economic value to the appraisal of individual human worth” (Fischer 27). In the moral structure of the Chain of Being, individual worth is intrinsic to his or her authentic degree, but with the emergence of capitalism, human worth comes to be evaluated in a comparative and relative sense. In other words, the powerful mechanism of market economy begins to dominate individual linguistic and cognitive habits in the Renaissance: all social and moral distinctions were reduced to a single standard of relative exchange. In Troilus’s mercantile mentality, courtly love and epic heroism are reified and deflated into a mere commercial enterprise to maximize subjective will and desire. In the reifying power of capitalism, the spiritual value of courtly and epic traditions has declined into social institution and practice.

The commercial mentality of the all-equalizing market economy incessantly commodifies human relations and obliterates the intrinsic values of Helen into a marketable merchandise permanently dissociated from her position in the degree of natural law. To satisfy an acquisitive and appetite desire for Helen, Pandarus and the self-proclaimed merchant “Troilus” manipulates her image into a commodity in this scene: “the processes of commodification, reification, and fetishization” prove to be “society’s ruling principles in the wake of a perceived collapse of a
no-longer-viable theocentrism" (Grady 93). Just as unbounded will turns into a self-devouring monster in Ulysses's degree speech, so the acquisitive and equalizing spirit of capitalism becomes a monster that erases all social and moral distinctions into commercial enterprises in the debate of value. The food imagery itself is emblematic of the appetitive spirit and power of capitalism that "[at] last eat[s] up himself" (I.iii.124). Though Troilus uses sensuous idealism to mask himself, his predatory spirit of appetitive acquisition is constantly latent in his language and selfish love of Cressida throughout the play. The spirit of acquisitive capitalism equalizes the essential difference of degree into "what's aught but as 'tis valued" in the system of exchange (II.ii.53).

Troilus illogically drags in the myth of Hesione to support his weak position: "Why keep we her?--The Grecians keep our aunt" (II.ii.81). Helen and Hesione are not comparable cases. First, Hesione was not married in contrast to Helen who was married to Menelaus. Second, the Trojans wanted to sacrifice her to a sea monster which Apollo and Neptune sent because her father, Laomedon, violated the promise he made with the gods when they built the walls of Troy (Clarke 215). And then, he quickly turns to another commercial analogy: "Is she worth keeping?--Why, she is a pearl / Whose price hath launch'd above a thousand ships, / And turn'd crown'd kings to merchants" (II.ii.82-
84). In this imagery, the unresolved moral dilemma is self-evident in Troilus’s language that alternates between commercial imagery and chivalric heroism. The Homeric war is literally turned into a mercantile adventure, and the spirit of capitalism becomes “the central preoccupation of the play” (Southhall 226; Stafford 42).

Masculine possessive desire transforms Helen’s rare beauty into an exquisite commodity (“a pearl”), whose high “price” turns the honorary efforts of chivalric war into an oceanic commercial expedition just as Troilus’ previous imagery of commercial adventure in which he is a desiring merchant, Cressida is “a pearl in India,” and Pandarus is a sailing ship (I.ii.100-4). Despite his eloquence, Troilus fails to present the reasons for keeping Helen and continuing the war at such tremendous costs of “honour, loss of time, travail, expense, / Wounds, friends” (II.ii.4-5). All he can offer is the degrading and inessential commercial imagery and the illogical analogy of marriage.

In contrast to the superficiality of the arguments by Troilus and Paris, Hector finally appeals to natural law and contends that an abducted wife should be duly returned to her legitimate husband:

If this law

Of nature be corrupted through affection,

And that great minds, of partial indulgence

To their benumbed wills, resist the same,
There is a law in each well-order’d nation
To curb those raging appetites that are
Most disobedient and refractory. (II.ii.177-83)

As the moral authority of Trojan chivalry, Hector condemns indulgent desire and appetitive urge as an unnatural idolatry that needs to be curbed by law and reason. In advocating natural law of which degree is an element, he implicitly indicts the acquisitive spirit of emerging capitalism. However, he abandons his moral authority in the span of less than 10 lines by arguing to keep Helen as if to suggest that the residual order of decayed and reified feudalism gradually gives way to the emerging acquisitive order. 

Despite the linguistic profusion in his arguments, the debate is truncated in the middle, and the moral dilemma is left unanswered between the residual feudal order and the emergent capitalistic order. Stephen Mead succinctly summarizes the moral dilemma: “Viewed from a perspective of economic history and theory, Troilus and Cressida reflects the impending chaos of a world in which people continue to rely upon a system of references even after their own betrayals of coded meaning have rendered such a system arbitrary and ruthless” (237).

This scene symbolically depicts the passing of a decayed feudal world whose moral foundation has been shaken by the acquisitive and appetitive spirit of capitalism. Eric Mallin calls the negative depiction of the characters
Hector and Troilus as the "cultural referentiality" of the play to "debased and warped" chivalry (165). Hector's objective rationalism and natural law helplessly succumb to Troilus's irrational subjectivism and reified sense of honor, thus causing the moral defeat of Hector who is closest to the ideal of chivalry. Cassandra's "high strain of divination," the only consistent moral voice in the scene, is also rejected as the product of "brain-sick raptures," and her prophetic voice fails to change the doomed fate of Troy (II.ii.114-15, 123). There is no room for her voice in this patriarchal world of demoralized chivalry, and it is only Hector who feels "touches of remorse" at her words: "Our firebrand brother Paris burns us all. / Cry, Trojans, cry! A Helen and a woe: / Cry, cry! Troy burns, or else let Helen go" (II.ii.111-13, 116). It is only her brief appearance that sets the moral tone throughout the entire play, and the play does not offer any more voice of moral authority in the decayed world of chivalry. "No discourse of reason" prevails in this transitional period with no new moral authority yet established (II.ii.117).

The Greek moral ethos is sarcastically summarized in Thersites's universal raillery as well as in the general moral vision of the play:

Here is such patchery, such juggling, and such, knavery! All the argument is a whore and a
cuckold: a good quarrel to draw emulous factions, and bleed to death upon. Now the dry serpigo on the subject, and war and lechery confound all!

(II.iii.73-77)

In his repeated tautology, Thersites reduces Homeric heroism, chivalry, and courtly love to negative qualities such as clownage, cheating, envious competition, and lechery. His persistent perception of the play is "the satiric, comic, cynic, demotic or material view" distinguished from the "courtly or idealist views" (Brockbank 35). These negative qualities symbolize human inadequacy and lack of moral vision in this decayed world, but at the same time, they are characteristic of the appetitive and self-aggrandizing spirit of predatory capitalism.

In the chaotic realm of desire that Thersites depicts, man is infected with egotistic self-will and emulous competition, and the "feudal love ethic" and the concept of chivalric honor gave their place to lechery and war of cuckoldry (Southhall 219). In his "choral" vision in which "all is relative and nothing absolute," all positive values such as passion, love, honor, and degree are negated and debased (Grady 70; Ellis-Fermor 68). In the imagination of Thersites, those values ultimately change into disease ("a botchy core" and "a red murrain"), animal ("Cerberus" and "ass"), and lechery ("a whore and a cuckold") (II.i.6, 19,
All intrinsic qualities are relativized and parodied into "folly and ignorance" in his "revolting" but "true" choric vision (II.iii.29; Schwartz 317). Ellis-Fermor contends that "in the world [Thersites] offers us there is no stability in character, ideals, institutions, judgment, nor in imagination itself" (68). He is the very spirit of capitalism itself in that his relativizing and equalizing power of imagination resembles that of appetitive capitalism.

Thersites's imagination constantly points to the asocial individualism that obliterates and equalizes the moral and political hierarchy through self-will and envious pride:

Agamemnon is a fool to offer to command
Achilles, Achilles is a fool to be commanded of
Agamemnon, Thersites is a fool to serve such a fool, and this Patroclus is a fool positive.

(II.iii.64-67)

In his chaotic imagination of universal equivalency, egotistic self-idolatry replaces degree and order as the guiding principle of human action and dissolves all human endeavors into futile and illusionary subjectivism. "As an integral part of the play's form and matter," Thersites's destructive imagination embodies the moral and political corruption of the society marred by the "amoral mechanism" of the decayed chivalric world and the emerging capitalist
spirit: "A new complex of unified separates" reigned over the Renaissance age (Ellis-Fermor 68; Grady 30). As the play develops, the appetitive spirit of capitalism symptomatically becomes asocial and solipsistic individualism characterized by overweening pride and narcissistic mimetic desire. Being "lion-sick" of his "self-assumption greater / Than in the note of judgement," Achilles "inveigle[s] his fool from him," and his factional interest leads the Greek camp to political anarchy (II.iii.89, 94, 126-27). Even Patroclus refuses to pay proper respect to Agamemnon, and Achilles arrogantly declines Agamemnon's request for audience: "His legs are legs for necessity, not for flexure" (II.iii.108). In this moral and political anarchy, Agamemnon himself cannot be free from the appetitive spirit of capitalism in his language: "if he overhold his price so much / We'll none of him" (II.iii.135-36). When intrinsic and objective values are replaced by subjective solipsism, a man merely becomes a victim of self-overestimation, thus falling into a self-mockery of "what he thinks he is" (II.iii.145).

As jealous Ajax joins the Greek leaders in condemning Achilles for his gigantic pride, his statement that "I know not what pride is" bitingly turns the whole play into "a picture of human folly on a grand scale" (II.iii.154; Vivian Thomas 124). In this sarcastic and self-defeating manipulation of the blockhead Ajax, the Greek leaders all
abandon moral and political authority to engage in their amoral scheming of political expediency. They become thus figures of the predatory power of capitalism. In the sense that “instrumental reason” transforms reality to actualize egotistic human desires and wills, the manipulative scheme is another form of the self-aggrandizement and narcissistic individualism that are so harshly indicted by the Greek leaders themselves. Ulysses’s words “the raven chides blackness” apply not only to Ajax, but to all of the Greek generals including himself.

Ulysses’s abnormal indulgence in manipulation is typical of “instrumental reason” in that he “manipulates because manipulation itself is proof of the fineness of his soul” (Green 29). He unconsciously maximizes his “imagin’d worth” in his narcissism and reveals his competitive spirit against Achilles who disdains his war-planning skills (II.iii.173). Ulysses (“the personification of conscienceless craft”) is compulsively addicted to his “manipulative, self-advancing cynicism” (Bradshaw 154).

In “enlard[ing] [Ajax’s] fat-already pride and add[ing] more coals to Cancer,” Ulysses unconsciously projects his own self-devouring “wolf” into Ajax and Achilles. Despite his conscious denial of his real self, Ulysses’s egotistic obsession with self-display makes his pride “his own glass, his own trumpet, his own / chronicle” (II.iii.157-58). This scene shows that the ego of each character is inflated and
bloated to the extent that man instrumentally uses man as a mere object of operation in endless manipulation to satisfy an indulgent sense of "spacious and dilated" pride and desires (II.iii.250). In that respect, the repeated imagery of inflation mimics the organizing theme of the play: "the self-consuming nature of individual will and appetite" (Kaufmann 142).82

In III.iii when the egos of Achilles and Ulysses clash, asocial individualism reaches its climax. The moral dilemma for the characters is that the feudal moral code of degree requires individuals to stay in the chain of social and political hierarchy. By contrast, the growing bourgeois ethics of capitalism made "an appetitive universal wolf" (emulous rivalry and egotism) a key element in the human psyche. In the transition from the residual feudal moral code of communal harmony to the emergent competitive bourgeois ethics, the dominant moral code of degree lost its moral authority, but, at the same time, there was no new moral paradigm to replace the old one.83

When Ulysses manipulates Achilles into action, he employs the rule of the "honor" market economy to deflate Achilles's value. In other words, he borrows Cressida's "hold-off" strategy as a buyer to depreciate the inflated price of Achilles' honor (Girard 144). As the manipulator of the market of honor and glory, he offers "foul wares" (Ajax) first in the hope of selling them or raising the
value of the better ones, but as a buyer this time, he adopts a "hold-off" policy--indifference ("strangeness") (I.iii.359; III.iii.45). In a market economy controlled by supply and demand, increased demand only leads to price inflation: "supple knees / Feed arrogance, and are the proud man's fees" (III.iii.48-49). Politeness only increases the arrogance of the proud man, and a proud man demands more humbleness ("fees") for his imagined self-importance. As a shrewd merchant of honor, Ulysses rigs the market to reduce the demand for Achilles's honor as a way of lowering its price. The entire Greek leaders are deployed to tarnish "the luster of the better" (Achilles), and even the poorest buyer, Menelaus, shows contempt for the "great Thetis' son": "What, does the cuckold scorn me?" (I.iii.361; III.iii.64, 94). As commodity value replaces intrinsic value, human identity and honor become relative, dependent on the negotiation between buyer and seller in the current market supply and demand.

When Hector's challenge was first delivered to the Greeks, Achilles was fully aware who it was intended. His initial reaction is simply a manifestation of his overweening pride in his own intrinsic and absolute value: "He [Hector] knew his man" (II.ii.130). But, with the decline of the demand for his military prowess, the confused Achilles loses his faith in the richness of his value and honor: "What am I poor of late?" (III.iii.74). Suddenly, he
realizes that his imagined value is no longer objective and absolute, and it can fluctuate with supply and demand. In his new awareness of the nature of human value, he understands that honor and greatness derive from such external distinctions as "place, riches, and favour" ("slippery standers") that man as prey to the wheel of fortune shall "read" his greatness and misfortune only "in the eyes of others" (III.iii.77, 82, 84).

Despite his new awareness that all values and distinctions depend on the ungrateful time and fortune that devour all previous performances, however, his pride still insists on the permanence of his absolute values:

But 'tis not so with me:

Fortune and I are friends; I do enjoy
At ample point all that I did posses,

Save these men's looks. (III.iii.87-90)

In his mind, Achilles still denies objective standards ("these men's [other Greek generals'] looks") in assessing his self-knowledge and identity. Despite his extreme desire to be recognized and emulated by others, he paradoxically refuses to accept the evaluative gaze of others in his asocial individualism.

Pretending to read a letter from an unknown man, Ulysses begins the second stage of his honor market strategy. After reducing the demand for Achilles, Ulysses speaks of the emptiness of subjective honor whose value has
not been negotiated and estimated objectively. Man can neither feel nor enjoy his honor and greatness except by "reflection": "when his virtue shining upon others / Heat them, and they retort that heat again / To the first giver" (III.iii.99-102). Ulysses employs Neoplatonic imagery of reflection to challenge Achilles to reexamine his essentialist view of himself. In other words, he implicitly insists that Achilles' greatness be properly evaluated for its use value in free competition with that of Ajax. It is ironical that Ulysses "instrumentalizes" absolutism to promote pragmatic relativism.

Achilles quickly gives in to the "instrumental" logic of Ulysses by saying that "For speculation turns not to itself / Till it hath travell'd and is mirro'd there / Where it may see itself" (III.iii.99-111). This statement merely shows that he readily accepts the imagery of reflection in the hopes that others will recognize his intrinsic excellence, but he is not ready to abandon his solipsistic narcissism. In the pursuit of individual identity, man is always already concerned with "the desire-for-reflection" as a way of gaining "self-knowledge" and constructing selfhood (Butler 1987, 7). In that sense, man ("a reflective structure") is a subject who constantly desires the recognition of others, and his action and identity are born of this desire: desire is human only when "[man] wants to be 'desired,' or 'loved,' or, rather, 'recognized' in his human
value, in his reality as human individual" (Butler 1987, 8; Kojeve 6). In fashioning himself into a hero, Achilles constantly desires his heroic qualities to be recognized by others, but his narcissistic solipsism contradictorily denies his true value to be judged objectively by others. In other words, Achilles needs the gaze of the "other" (the recognition of the other) to construct his self, but his solipsism refuses to be mediated by the other.

As "an unreal emptiness (the presence of the absence of a reality)," desire exists beyond "need" and represents a powerful energy of metonymic displacement that "disintegrates structures of reason, self, morality, convention, all attempts to contain and fix reality" (Kojeve 5; Goodheart 2). Since desire is simultaneously a negative and positive energy, its amplification endangers and fractures both the social order and the self by disrupting the unity between self and others. Therefore, desires must be restrained and mediated by others; otherwise, society becomes an all-out struggle against one another for narcissistic recognition that can be seen in the paralysis of the Greek camp in the play. The dilemma that Achilles is faced with is that he constantly desires the "other" for his solipsistic self, but his unrestrained will refuses social mediation in the gaze of the "other."

Ulysses once again turns to the imagery of reflection to express his relativism: "no man is the lord of anything,
Though in and of him there be much consisting, / Till he communicate his parts to others" (III.iii.115-17). He suggests that real honor lies not in essence, but in the gaze of others ("the applause" in recognition) in stark contrast to his previous degree speech (III.iii.119). Ulysses is correct in that self must be objectified dialogically in communication with others, but man becomes "a mere effect of the Other" in its extreme case and permanently trapped in the schizophrenic division between his real self and his public image (Eagleton 1986, 61).

Ulysses then moves to incite rivalry between Achilles and Ajax:

Nature, what things there are
Most abject in regard and dear in use!
What things again most dear in the esteem
And poor in worth!"  (III.iii.127-30)

His argument is that man is judged on either pragmatic value or essential value, but in the Greek camp where the logic of instrumental reason prevails, only the pragmatic value dominates in the evaluation of man's quality. Ulysses implies that if Achilles further refuses to fight the Trojans, his honor and prowess would lose the pragmatic value, and he could be replaced by Ajax. Glory is nothing but an empty image on the basis of the momentary pragmatic value (use value), and it is under the constant threat of jealous rivalry." In this world of the market dynamics,
honor does not reside in one man but incessantly circulates like a commodity in honor "economy" until it is momentarily taken by an emulous rival. All moral values simply reside in the public perception and the doing itself: life is a struggle of the moment against "skittish Fortune" (III.iii.134).

When all values are deprived of essence and estimated by pragmatic and instrumental standards, truth is a mere product of transient time:

Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back
Wherein he puts alms for oblivion,
A great-siz'd monster of ingratiations.
Those scraps are good deeds past, which are devour'd
As fast as they are made, forgot as soon
As done. (III.iii.145-150)

In this dramatic context, time is not the unfolding process of divine providence in eternal repetition, but the amoral process in which change destroys all values and human efforts. Such words as "oblivion, ingratitude, devour, and fast" indicate that time is discontinuous, "irreversible," and dynamic (Sommerville 33). In contrast, the concept of time is continuous, repetitive, and static in the Chain of Being. In the play, time is merely "a point" in the dynamic process of change and flux, and the concept of "seizing the time" dominates the human psyche (Heller 1981, 173, 179). Value and self begin to have their meaning only in the new
dynamics of time, and time as the force of mutation can "outrun" the fixed and codified system of old human values, morals, and relations: "Striving to know the 'time,' rather than understanding the old authorities or traditions, is the way to truth and to a correct praxis" (Heller 1981, 175, 180, 186).

Like an ungrateful monster, the dynamic power of time obliterates and equalizes all human excellence and honor into oblivion, and human action and performance have only transient value. Just as the emergent bourgeois ethic weakens and replaces the traditional values of chivalry and courtly love, so the destructive force of time obliterates the concept of inherent honor. For a moral relativist like Ulysses, "perseverance" offers the only way to "keep honour bright" because "to have done is to hang / Quite out of fashion" (III.iii.150, 151-152). But if Ulysses's advice stands true, his efforts to put Achilles in action are futile and self-defeating. In an amoral and transient world where a man of honor is to be "o'er-run and trampled on" like "a gallant horse" fallen as the "pavement for the abject rear," honor and glory are a "monumental mockery" hanging on the wall to be forgotten and destroyed by envious time. Contrary to his conscious efforts to restore order and action among the Greeks, he is merely preaching "a black picture of human effort" marred by folly and futility (Campbell 228).
Ulysses further develops his concept of time by using the imagery of anarchistic competition:

For honour travels in a strait so narrow
Where one but goes abreast. Keep then the path;
For emulation hath a thousand sons
That one by one pursue." (III.iii.154-57)

Honor is a monopolistic commodity to be taken momentarily in cruel and ceaseless competition by the son of capricious fortune. It is a theater of asocial individualism and self-devouring competition under the constant threat of outrunning and appetitive time. All human endeavors such as honor, love, war, and death are time's fool, and time is "a fashionable host" who deceptively encourages "the selfish passions of a mob of uncontrolled individuals" to the "futile strife" (Campbell 228).

In the image of "Injurious Time" that hastily "crams his rich thiev'ry up," man is thrown into a precarious world where infected will and predatory competition devour permanent value and order that the degree speech advocates so eloquently (IV.iv.41-42). In the bleak moral vision of the play, man becomes a puppet of time, and the single operational principle of the universe is not the doctrine of degree, but the destructive power of time, "old common arbitrator" in euphemistic terms: "What's past and what's to come is strew'd with husks / And formless ruin of oblivion" (IV.v.224; IV.v.165-66). In short, all values become
transient and ephemeral, and the soul of action lies in the
doing: "The present eye praises the present object"
(III.iii.180).

The destructive and appetitive power of time is
symbolic of "the powers of personal and social corruption
inherent in the appetitive spirit of capitalism" (Southhall
231). Honor becomes a commodity in the market, whose value
is determined by the commercial mechanism of timing and
demand: "like fair fruit in an unwholesome dish," honor and
virtue are "like to rot untasted" (II.iii.122-23). In the
play where the spirit of the emerging bourgeois ethic
relativizes all values including love and war in terms of
pragmatic utility, time symbolizes the aggressive and
corruptive spirit of the new bourgeois ethic and also
betrays all intrinsic and absolute values sanctioned by the
old feudal moral codes.

In a world where time destroys all values, man
"instrumentalizes" humans and moral ideals into the objects
of his appetitive desire for pragmatic purposes. In IV.v
and V.viii where Achilles first meets the visiting Hector in
the Greek camp and later slaughters Hector savagely in
violation of the code of chivalry, Achilles embodies the
amoral and asocial power of the instrumental mentality. In
his sensuous and appetitive mentality, Hector is reified
into a mere object of destruction: "Now, Hector, I have fed
mine eyes on thee; / I have with exact view perus’d thee,
Hector, / And quoted joint and joint" (IV.v.230-32).

Achilles examines Hector as if he were a beast, and he further intensifies his line of imagery by saying that "I will the second time, / As I would buy thee, view thee limb by limb" (IV.v.236-37). His speech clearly implies that he becomes a contemptuous merchant of butchery contemplating how to cut up the choice quarry.

In Achilles's degrading and despicable imagery, the war turns into mere butchery, and the epic hero who is closest to the chivalric ideal declines into a beast. Achilles's self-serving rationality reifies human ideals and heroism ("honour and renown") into an instrument to maximize his individual honor and power; in other words, his lust for power and glory (a version of "bourgeois will") transforms all human ideals into pragmatic utility (II.iii.200; Caudwell 93). In this bourgeois mentality, even heaven loses its power of divine arbitration and becomes part of the amoral mechanism of instrumental rationality: "Tell me, you heavens, in which part of his body / Shall I destroy him--whether there, or there, or there-- / That I may give the local wound a name" (IV.v.241-43). As shown in Thersites's sarcastic description of the disillusioned Homeric world ("how the poor world is pestered / with such water-flies, diminutives of nature!"), chivalric heroism and its ideals become buffoonery of subhuman beasts and insects (V.i.32-33).
The death of the unarmed Hector symbolically represents the decline of the feudal value system and chivalry that occurs with the rise of the primitive bourgeois ethic. Despite the plea of Andromache and Cassandra to stay away from the battlefield ("The gods are deaf to hot and peevish vows, / They are polluted offerings"), Hector insists on keeping his vows to gods made "i’th’vein of chivalry": "Mine honour keeps the weather of my fate: / Life every man holds dear, but the dear man / Holds honour far more precious-dear than life" (V.iii.16-17, 26-28, 32). In his coded and reified sense of chivalry, Hector’s vows and "faith of valour" take precedence over divine prophecies revealed in dream and vision. Real chivalric honor does not, however, reside in the blind fulfilment of imprudent and reckless vows, but in the true spirit of faith and charity (V.iii.69). Contrary to his insistence on chivalric honor, Hector’s selfish sense of honor is only "a matter of whim" (Gordon Williams 114).

In the context of Christian chivalric virtues such as "mercy, pity, faithfulness, and truth," Hector’s selfish and obsessive sense of honor indicates that chivalry begins to decay into an empty ideological institution and mere codified rhetoric, losing its true spirit in the process of instrumental reification (Schofield 5)." No character in the play, including Hector himself, embodies its true spirit and virtue despite frequent avowals in terms of the ethical
and social meaning of chivalry. In that sense, the decline of the spirit of chivalry is emblematic of the passing of traditional feudal social values, and, at the same time, the corrupted practice of the chivalric code symptomatically refers to the Elizabethan social anxieties over the rapidly collapsing social system and cataclysmic socio-economic changes.

In the first battle scene between Hector and Achilles, Hector shows honorable knightly courtesy by saying "Pause, if thou wilt" when Achilles is at disadvantage (V.vi.14). But when Hector comes across a Greek soldier in sumptuous armor about 20 lines later, his possessive (rapacious) desire drives him to chase for the armor in contrast to his previous generous courtesy to Achilles. The meaningless cruelty and greed shown in killing the Greek soldier attest to the hypocritical nature of a chivalry that is corrupted by materialist desire. Moreover, the dual nature of the war spoils ("most putrefied core, so fair without") is symbolic of the hollowness of chivalric ideals (V.viii.1).

Spotting the unarmed Hector, Achilles orders Greek soldiers to slaughter Hector in his burning revenge:

Strike, fellows, strike: Come, Troy, sink down!
So, Ilion, fall thou next! Come, Troy, sink down!
Here lies thy heart, thy sinews, and thy bone.
On, Myrmidons, and cry you all amain
'Achilles hath the mighty Hector slain.' (V.viii.10-14)
This "sheer aimless cruelty" is morally and aesthetically "revolting" especially in view of Hector's final cries ("I am unarm'd: forego this vantage, Greek") (Campbell 228; Girard 232; V.viii.9). In the sense that the "collective murder" of Hector is a Shakespearean invention, Achilles's brutality and narcissistic arrogance emphasize the nihilistic vision of the play (Girard 232). To cover up this despicable collective slaughter, Achilles behaves as if he killed Hector alone and drags his dead body around.

The slaughter scene is consistent with the thematic and structural development of the play in that the old reified feudal order (Hector) is gradually replaced by the exploitative and amoral spirit of the emergent capitalist order (Achilles) under the threat of the rapidly changing socio-economic circumstances in the Elizabethan age. Despite the chivalric idealism of Hector, his sense of honor and justice gives in to the greed for sumptuous armor that finally leads to the loss of his life. Symbolically, Hector's death represents the passing of chivalry and its feudal social order in the rapacious spirit of the newly emerging bourgeois order: Hector's ruthless death implicitly demonstrates that "the medieval-toned world of Troy is supplanted by the decentered, late Renaissance world of 'Realpolitik" (Bradshaw 161). The egotistic rapacity of Achilles mercilessly destroys Hector in violation of the chivalric code of charity and honor; in other words, the
lawless and amoral individualism of the new capitalistic order makes the anachronistic feudal social vision obsolete and dysfunctional.

In *Troilus and Cressida*, social and moral disorder consistently dominate the thematic and structural development to the end, and characters are trapped in the nihilistic vision. Towards the end of the play, Agamemnon enthusiastically expresses the hope of ending the long-drawn-out war: “If in [Hector’s] death the gods have us befriended, / Great Troy is ours, and our sharp wars are ended” (V.x.9-10). However, there is neither textual evidence to support his enthusiasm, nor moral redemption in any character. The Greek camp is still divided by factionalism and unrestrained individual will, and Agamemnon remains incompetent in his leadership. Characters such as Troilus, Achilles, Ajax, and Ulysses are morally confused and fail to live up to their epic status. This dark picture, however, is not personal, but social and historical; in other words, it represents the crisis of moral values in society. In that sense, the play presents a close parallel to the economic and cultural crisis at the last decade of the Elizabeth’s reign. The growing social tension and anxiety are inscribed in the apocalyptic vision of the play.

4. Sexual Politics and Commerce of Desire:

Commodification of Female Body
Patriarchy inscribes not only gender hierarchy, but also gender epistemology in discourse and social practice to naturalize and perpetuate its dominance. In other words, gender ideology is embodied in material practices and social institutions as part of "the habit of thought" in a concrete historical context, and gender is constructed as "the effect of historically specific power relations" (McNay 1992, 3).

In the patriarchal social order of the Chain of Being, females are assigned in the lower degree of the divine order, and gender itself is used to maintain patriarchy and social control. In the reified social practices of degree and order, gender becomes "a regulatory practice" and simultaneously functions as the "productive power" that constitutes and controls docile female subjects (Butler 1993, 1).

In Troilus and Cressida, female bodies such as those of Helen and Cressida are appropriated in the forms of war spoils, commodities, and objects of male sexual desire. They are thus deprived of their active agency to negotiate with gendered reality. As the locus of power relations, the female body becomes a point of ceaseless socio-cultural contestation between male dominance and female resistance as shown in the cases of Helen and Cressida. Helen and Cressida are allowed only to play a passive role of sexual and material object in negotiating her social status and value in the cruel world of war.
Unlike other Renaissance plays in which the female body is portrayed as a dangerous terrain to be controlled and tamed through marriage, no efforts are made to contain female sexuality in marriage in Troilus and Cressida. As the object of narcissistic male desire, woman loses the status of a marriage partner. The female body is reduced to an object of commercial transaction and a chivalric pawn. The female subject is ideologically reified as mere property in the economy of male desire; that is, female body is a passive and tradeable commodity, and man is an active merchant.

In the logic of early modern capitalism, the instrumentalized economic mechanism structures the psyche of society and its members, and human relations including love are reduced to commodity fetishism. The subplots of war and love converge in the theme of male desire for the bodies of Helen and Cressida, and the underlying structure of the play develops on the triangular scheme of commodity exchange: possessor (male), possession (female), and male competition for the female body (Helen and Cressida). With emerging capitalism, the traditional gender paradigm of possessor and possessed is transformed into a commercial paradigm of merchant and commodity, that is, a relation of female exchangeability.

As "a normalizing and regulatory function," gender exerts dominance and control, but the politics of power
operate not in a homogeneous and unopposed field, but in a dynamic and resistant interaction: "there are no relations of power without resistance; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised" (McNay 1992, 25; Foucault 1980, 142). In feminist terms, power always produces resistant counterforces and strategies (with "less visibility" than power itself) to destabilize the fictionality of patriarchy: "the sexed body is to be understood not only as the primary target of techniques of disciplinary power, but also as the point where these techniques are resisted and thwarted" (Huspek 99; McNay 1992, 39).

In the body politics of exploitive male desire in which her body is commodified and exchanged, Cressida gives up her romantic idealism and accepts the market principle of supply and demand to maximize her exchange value and to survive "in a jungle of erotic strategy" (Girard 125). To thwart the monopoly of male power in assessing the value of her erotic body, she changes into a false trader. She thus plays a game of sexual politics by holding off the satisfaction of male desire and also switching her sexual fidelity from one man to the other in a manner consistent with commodity exchange. Cressida consciously internalizes the mechanism of market economy to raise her value in the market of masculine desire. In her fear and instinct, she quickly
realizes that nobody will protect traitor’s daughter left behind in the enemy territory when her commodity value declines. She is forced to fashion her protean subjectivity in her imposed role of commodity since the demand for her body would disappear at the moment she quits holding off, and male desire is satisfied.

The thematic motif of the female body as a commodity sets the tone of the love plot in the opening scene of the play. Pandarus is a procurer who solicits Troilus for Cressida’s body by generating possessive desires in Troilus: “Well, she looked yesternight fairer than ever I / saw her look, or any woman else” (I.i.32-33). To sell Cressida’s body at the right time and price, Pandarus advertises her body parts one by one and manipulates Troilus’s “mimetic desire” for Cressida: “thou answer’st, ‘She is fair’: / Pour’st in the open ulcer of my heart / Her eyes, her hair, her cheek, her gait, her voice” (I.i.52-54; Girard 152). As “the midwife and engineer of desire,” Pandarus switches his strategy from advertising to Cressida’s defection to the Greeks to intensify Troilus’s anxiety over the loss of her body: “She is a fool / to stay behind her father; let her to the Greeks, / and so I’ll tell her the next time I see her” (Girard 123; I.i.80-82).

In this scene, the commodification of the female body culminates in the imagery of the overseas mercantile venture. As for the imagery, love, one of the most private
human relations, turns into "a commercial transaction," and Cressida becomes "a prize for this merchant-venturer" in the debased commercial psyche of Troilus (Southhall 221; Gordon Williams 109). Stafford claims that "the female is the object of value which the lover, depicted as a merchant, seeks across a literal or figurative sea" (37). Despite the depiction of Troilus as "the prince of chivalry" by Pandarus, he is "in contact with the remnants of a chivalrous world" as its corrupter rather than its believer, symbolically demonstrating the passing of feudal order (I.ii.232; Southhall 228).

Fully aware of Pandarus' function as "a bawd" and the masculine exchange system, Cressida plays the role of a coquette who takes love as a combat for self-protection:

Upon my back, to defend my belly; upon my wit, to defend my wiles; upon my secrecy, to defend mine honesty; my mask, to defend my beauty; and you, to defend all these; and at all these wards I lie, at thousand watches. (I.ii.265-69)

Contrary to her sense of self-protection, this speech merely shows her vulnerability and lack of defenses: her only defense is sexuality. In the patriarchal love game of possession rather than devotion, her strategy is to "lie at every ward" to defend her sexual vulnerability against male desire. But when she runs out of defenses, she would "lie" to defend her belly as the last defense. As a self-
protective stratagem, she is required to wear the "mask" and "secrecy" to hide her real self in the market where woman is but as she is valued by the male gaze. In response to the market principles of male desire, she readily takes and plays multiple roles that the situation dictates in order to defend her sexed body marginalized by her father's defection to the Greeks.

She confides that only her sexuality (virginity) guarantees her status as the object of desire, and she has to turn to shrewd wiles to protect her virginity:

If I cannot ward what I would not have hit, I can watch you for telling how I took the blow, unless it swell past hiding, and then it's past watching. (I.ii.272-75)

As a daughter of a traitor, her instinct tells that she has to fashion herself as a "daughter of the game" and "the spoils of opportunity" to survive in the hostile world of war (IV.v.62, 63). She passively attempts to play the game of desire that is dictated by the patriarchal norm of her society for survival, but the stigma of strumpet is imposed on her by the hypocritical moral standard of the single-sex society for her counteractive playing of the male game. She has no alternative but to engage in protean self-fashioning to resist brutal patriarchal power.

From the start of the play, Cressida shows a split subjectivity between true love and stratagem as she sees
"thousand-fold" more in Troilus "than in the glass of Pandar's praise" (I.iii.289, 290). But as "a woman of quick sense," she decides to assume strategic coyness:

Yet hold I off. Women are angels, wooing:
Things won are done; joy's soul lies in the doing.
That she belov'd knows naught that knows not this:
Men prize the thing ungain'd more than it is.
That she was never yet that ever knew
Love got so sweet as when desire did sue.

(I.iii.291-96)

She has no alternative but to adopt the value- assessing system of the market: she abandons her true self and intrinsic value by acting coyly to raise her market price. Cressida thus "identifies herself as a 'thing'" that draws its value not from "any intrinsic merit," but from "its market value, determined by its scarcity" (Adelman 1985, 122). She fully understands that once her virginity is lost, male desire diminishes, and her price declines. Because the emerging bourgeois ethics reified love as a form of possessive desire, she resists tyrannical male domination and commodifying mentality by holding off the pleasure of her body from male appetite. If she is a woman of duplicity and opportunity, she is compelled to play such a role by the male exchange system and the political expediency of war. Her primary concern is to achieve control over male desire in order to survive in this hostile world of single sex.
Amplifying masculine anxiety over female body and unruly female desire, she decides to be illegible, unpredictable, and unmanageable. She has quickly realized that the moment her true self is exposed to the male gaze, she would be harshly evaluated by the scrutinizing eyes of male anxiety. Ulysses reads Cressida like a book: "There's language in her eye, her cheek, her lip-- / Nay, her foot speaks; her wanton spirits look out / At every joint and motives of her body" (IV.v.55-57). In a sense, her entire psyche and moral dilemma lie in one sentence: "Achievement is command; ungain'd, beseech" (I.iii.298).

Despite her enormous market value--she can launch a thousand ships and turn crowned kings into merchants--Helen is conspicuously silent in the play. She appears only in one scene (III.i), and what she says is mainly a meaningless conversation with the procurer Pandarus. Symbolic of the ideological structure of the play, Helen does not exist as a human in this world, but as a reified object of beauty for whose body men are senselessly slaughtered. That is, as an object of male honor and sexual desire, she is deprived of her own voice. She is depicted as a woman of worthlessness and triviality who counts hair on the cloven chin of Troilus and listens to Pandarus's bawdy love songs. She is also presented as a personification of invisible destructive power pervasive in the entire play, but her true voice is missing. Helen exists only in patriarchal representation,
that is, the voice of the other. In the sense that heroes are engaged in the epic war for the body of such a woman in the name of chivalric honor, the patriarchal ideology and its moral authority self-deconstruct in the play.

To enforce the image of "placket," the "brothel mood" is introduced before Helen’s appearance (II.i.iii.21; Gordon Williams 107). At the cue of the word "seethes" by Pandarus, the servant of Paris says that "Sodden business: there’s a stewed phrase" (III.i.39, 40). The words “seethe,” “sodden,” and “stewed" implicitly express sexual connotation in close association with the brothel: "the brothel scene of ‘stew’ is often overtoned with that of syphilitic scalding" (Gordon Williams 107). Later in the scene, Pandarus sings a song at Helen’s request:

For O love’s bow
Shoots buck and doe;
The shaft confounds
Not that it wounds,
But tickles still the sore.
These lovers cry O ho, they die! (III.i.111-16)
This bawdy song further develops the prevailing mood of the brothel and reinforces the image of Helen as the strumpet of war.

When Diomedes arrives at the Greek camp to exchange Cressida for Antenor (IV.i), Helen’s "whorish" image becomes clear in his conversation with Paris. Diomedes says that
Menelaus:

like a puling cuckold, would drink up
The lees and dregs of a flat tamed piece;
You, like a lecher, out of whorish loins
Are pleas’d to breed out your inheritors. (IV.i.62-65)

Helen is depicted as the symbol of unruly sexual desire, that is, as the transgressor of the normative patriarchal system rather than a victim. Despite such negative characterization, there is no evidence to support this view in Helen’s action or words. The ideological structure of the play (the textual ideology) represses her true voice into silence and debases her body into a “contaminated carrion weight”; in other words, she exists only in the male signifier (IV.i.72). Paris then turns to mercantile imagery by comparing Diomedes to the chapmen who “dispraise the thing that they desire to buy” (IV.i.77). She is a thing of high exchange value in the market of honor, that is, an object that all males desire to buy as a symbol of honor.

As the orchard scene (III.ii) opens, a strong sexual overtone again dominates. Troilus asks the procurer Pandarus (“Charon”) to transport him to “those fields /
Where I may wallow in the lily beds” (III.ii.9, 10-11). His delicate idealism of female sexual body (“lily beds”) contrasts with the image of an animal rolling in mud, in which his misguided idealism cracks open to show his aggressive male power and desire to pollute Cressida’s body.
He expresses his heightened sensual appetite: "I am giddy: expectation whirls me round. / Th'imaginary relish is so sweet / That it enchants my sense: what will it be / When that the wat'ry palate tastes indeed / Love's thrice-repured nectar?" (III.ii.16-20). On the one hand, the speech reveals his "ideal and tremulous anticipations" in his sexual union with Cressida; on the other hand, his bodily appetitive desire carries his sensual view of female body (Ellis-Fermor 61). As Marilyn French defines that love is "either a purchase of sensation, or power struggle" in the play, his speech epitomizes the contradictory and even self-defeating sense of love (164).

The brothel mood becomes apparent as the body broker Pandarus enters to introduce the two lovers each other: "So, so; rub on and kiss the mistress. How now, a kiss in feefarm!" (III.ii.48-50) In his language, sexual connotation continues, and love becomes a legal contract: "'In witness whereof the parties interchangeably--'" (III.ii.58). Towards the end of the scene, Pandarus transfigures Cressida into a commodity to be traded from his hands to those of Troilus: "Go to, a bargain made: seal it, seal it" (III.ii.195). The prevailing imagery in the scene suggests that this love relationship is more of a one-night "wartime liaison" rather than the true love of mutual devotion, and the marital implication is completely missing (Berry 130, 131). In the context of the marriage speech
made in the Trojan council by Troilus, the lack of talk of marriage seems to show Troilus's double standard for Cressida.

In the first meeting of the lovers, Cressida’s initial reaction is a strong sense of fear in contrast to Troilus’s sensuous idealism: “Blind fear, that seeing reason leads, finds safer footing than blind reason stumbling without fear. To fear the worst oft cures the worse” (III.ii.69-71). This speech shows that Cressida is desperate in her sense of sexual and political vulnerability in this single-sex society. Her “seeing reason” (self-defensive instinct) cautions her not to yield to her romantic emotion for fear that the “bargain” of her body would further endanger her precarious status. In a sense, her psyche is paralyzed by a sense of fear over male sexuality before giving up her body.

Cressida again expresses her fear of male betrayal: “all lovers swear more performance” than they could, but they “reserve an ability that they never perform” (III.ii.83-85). On the surface, her statement complains about the discrepancy between the speech and action of the lovers as Troilus puts it in metaphysical terms: “This is the monstruosity in love, lady: that the will is infinite, and the execution confined: that the desire is boundless, and the act a slave to limit” (III.ii.79-82). Troilus’ speech displays the psychological reality and dilemma of the lovers in abstract terms and is in line with the theme of
unbounded desire pervasive in the entire play.

Below the surface, however, Troilus misses the
desperate fear of Cressida in his sensuality, and the lovers
fail to communicate in a real sense. She fears that her
body can be traded as a sexual commodity and a political
bargaining chip at the convenience of men. The fear of
betrayal fundamentally dominates her psyche including her
sense of love, identity, and reality. As a shrewd daughter
of the game, she understands that male betrayal can
transfigure her body into a commodity and a political
bargaining chip at any moment, and later in the play, she
voluntarily adopts the tactics of betrayal: she decides to
lie on her back to defend her belly. Troilus mistakes her
uncertainty as the typical wavering of a female lover and
says that “You know now your hostages: your uncle’s word,
and my firm faith” (III. ii.106-7). But in this world of
linguistic disruption, she knows that words do not “stick
where they are thrown” contrary to her uncle’s insistence
(III. ii.111).

Cressida continues to express her fear of betrayal and
powerlessness and gradually reveals her divided
consciousness to Troilus:

If I confess much you will play the tyrant.
I love you now, but till now not so much
But I might master it. In faith I lie--
My thoughts were like unbridled children, grown
Too headstrong for their mother. (III.ii.118-22)

She withdraws her defensive cover and shows her split self between true love and hold-off stratagem. This wavering between confession and self-denial lies in her deep misgivings on self-revelation in the male market system of value judgment. Her dilemma lies in the fact that she cannot represent her true self in language: "Who shall be true to us / When we are so unsecret to ourselves?" (III.ii.123-24) Freund says that "unlike Troilus, she has little confidence in the stable identity of selfhood or in the ability of discourse to represent it" (23). In a world where female self-expression is deemed dangerous and transgressive, she knows that she is supposed to "hold [her] tongue" in silence, but she can hardly restrain her desire to express her true love to Troilus in the "rapture" of love (III.ii.128, 129).

In a sense, "men's privilege of speaking first" resides at the center of the "ideological formation" of this fictional society in which a female is only given the passive power of coyness to control the supply of her body in the commerce of male desires (III.ii.127-28). The danger of female self-expression follows immediately. When she says that "stop my mouth" in the fear of self-revelation, Troilus mistakes it as a request for a kiss: "'Twas not my purpose thus to beg a kiss" (III.ii.136). Troilus interprets her fear and linguistic frustration only in
sexual terms since she exists merely as an object of sexual desire in his psyche. The mental agony that she displays in this speech is mistaken as a coquettish gesture to disguise her sexual embarrassment. In the process of the reification of female body into the commodified object of male desire, female language is also reified into the sexualized signifier. The scene is symbolic of the communicative breakdown between the lovers and simultaneously overshadows the tragic fate of their love in the end. The love is doomed at the beginning by Troilus’s narcissistic desire and Cressida’s inability to communicate her fear of betrayal.

In her desperate frustration, Cressida decides to leave her “own company” (the divided self between a pathetic lover and a coy mistress). From a Lacanian perspective, her “symbolic” self can no longer hold itself in the schizophrenic split and constantly vacillates between “a kind self” and “an unkind self” (III.ii.146-47). "Such intermingling of craft and pathos in the verbal presentation" reveals her “dilemma of uncertainty” on her marginalized subjectivity (Freund 24). At the same time, the subconscious fear of betrayal is inversely reflected in her self-protective “unkind self” of betrayal. Being "partial, unreliable, and not her own," she is deprived of the integrity of self only to fashion uncertain selves against her will (Greene 1983, 136). Her elusive and divided self is representative of her powerlessness and
defenselessness as well as of the profoundly fragmented world of no moral center in which Cressida is required to survive. In this speech of two selves which Adelman calls "Cressida's perilous revelation of self," her love is stronger than her craft with which to "angle" for the truth and depth of Troilus' love (1985, 124; III.ii.153).

In contrast to his commodification of Cressida's body, Troilus now ironically elevates Cressida as a courtly love object in his narcissistic idealism in III.ii. Complaining of his unrequited love, Troilus ("a true knight" in Ulysses' words and "the prince of chivalry" in Pandarus's words) compares himself to a vassal and Cressida to a sovereign: "all my powers do their bestowing lose, / Like vassalage at unawares encount'ring / The eye of majesty" (IV.v.96; I.ii.232; III.ii.36-38). In Troilus's reifying psyche, Cressida is transformed from a sexual object into a spiritual ideal to satisfy his egotistic narcissism.

The "libidinal economy of courtly love" spiritualizes the lady into a "sublime object" who becomes "an abstract Ideal" ("the Other") devoid of true human substance (Zizek 1994, 89). Zizek claims that "the ideology of courtly love" deprives the lady of real human qualities and makes the lady function "as a mirror on to which the [male] subject projects his narcissistic ideal" (Zizek 1994, 90). Not much different from the logic of female commodification, the sexual economy of courtly love reifies and mortifies the
female body into an object of male narcissism. In other words, the idealization of Cressida as the lady of courtly love is another form of narcissistic reification that turns her body into a thing of high value in the male libidinal system.

In the elevation of female body into his narcissistic ideal, Troilus also identifies himself as a Petrarchan lover whose "integrity and truth" would be matched with "such a winnow'd purity in love" (III.ii.65). He reifies his narcissistic self into the personification of truth; in other words, he lives into his "imaginary" Petrarchan self of truth reflected and produced in his own signifier: "I am as true as truth's simplicity, / And simpler than the infancy of truth" (III.ii.167-68). In the illusion of his stable "imaginary" selfhood, Troilus idealizes himself as "an unwavering and self-identical source of fidelity," but he is merely indulging in his self-adulation of his linguistic self (Freund 25). Troilus cannot be true to himself and to Cressida who is merely an imaginary fiction of his sensuous idealism. As for "the infancy of truth," Adelman argues that "Troilus' desire for Cressida is invested with the power of a nostalgic longing for union with an overpowering maternal figure; from the first, he associates his love with his own infantilization" (1985, 130).

In his linguistic self-adulation, Troilus ("truth's
authentic author") again assumes the role of a pastoral lover: "True swains in love shall, in the world to come, / Approve their truth by Troilus" (III.ii.171-72, 179). Unlike Cressida who can play only passive roles as the object of male desire, Troilus constantly switches his roles from a merchant to a knight of courtly love, a Petrarchan lover, and finally to "truth's authentic author" (III.ii.179). As Troilus changes his roles, Cressida passively turns into various objects of his desires. In other words, female identity is only relational to male definition in this patriarchal social formation: as "a constitutive element of social relationships," gender is "a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (Scott 42). As relational commodity value replaced absolute intrinsic value in early modern England, female self lost her stable identity in gender politics and became susceptible to arbitrary male definition.

Encouraged by Troilus's avowal of truth and faithfulness, Cressida overcomes her divided self and fear of betrayal and accepts the role of "courtly lady" (Asp 411). In response to "all comparisons of truth," she promises that "if I be false, or swerve a hair from truth," "let memory, / From false to false, among false maids in love, / Upbraid my falsehood" (III.ii.178, 182, 187-89). Howard Adams says that "she comes to a resolution of her divided self, opting decisively to achieve for that side of
her which would be true, and finding the strength to achieve this in the mirror of Troilus's strong avowal of the goodness of fidelity" (82). Even in her avowal of truth, she cannot escape from the legendary stigma of infidelity, repeating the word "false" in contrast with the term "true" used by Troilus. The word "false" is symbolic of her deep anxiety over and mistrust in the arbitrary power of male desire (reified in the form of love) and simultaneously predestines the tragic fate of her future betrayal in her psyche. Even in the overwhelming power of love, she cannot be free from the ominous sense of fear as a powerless object of exchange in the Homeric gender ideology. At the end of the scene, the brothel mood is again introduced by Pandarus: "Whereupon I will show you a chamber / with bed, which bed, because it shall not speak of / your pretty encounters, press it to death" (III.ii.206-8). The brothel imagery constantly returns to characterize her in sexual terms as part of the patriarchal structure dominant in the play.

In the morning-after scene, the nature of Troilus's sensuous love is revealed through his elevated rhetoric: "To bed, to bed! Sleep kill those pretty eyes, / And give as soft attachment to thy senses / As infants empty of all thought" (IV.ii.4-6). In simple terms, he wants to leave as quickly as possible after the night of consummation, but he is merely luxuriating in his sensuous language to hide from himself and Cressida his urgent desire to leave. After a
night of romance, he does not seem to have any urgent reason to leave quickly, but he hastens his departure in fear of the public revelation of his affair as well as for his diminished desire for Cressida. Troilus’s hasty departure revives and amplifies Cressida’s sense of insecurity and fear: “You men will never tarry. / O foolish Cressida, I might have still held off, / And then you would have tarried” (IV.ii.16-18). Freud’s view of male sexuality is insightful in this respect: “the psychical value of erotic needs” diminishes “as soon as [male] satisfaction becomes easy. An obstacle is required in order to heighten libido; and where natural resistance to satisfaction has not been sufficient men have at all times erected conventional ones so as to be able to enjoy love” (187).

From Freud’s perspective, an obstacle should be erected to maintain male erotic desire, but Cressida’s overwhelming love has taken her short; in other words, Troilus’s “mimetic desire” for Cressida is already gone after consummation: “On that fateful morning ‘original’ desire is completely dead, its death prophesied by the intelligent Cressida” (Girard 128). She becomes not so much “a crafty coquette” as “a loving fool” who ignores the fundamental principles of female body politics (Adelman 1985, 124). In that sense, this morning-after scene is the starting point of their real separation in the development of the plot. Though she has internalized the politics of erotic desire in this male-
dominated value system, she fails to calculate and persist with her sexual politics and finally surrenders her body only to depreciate its value. She takes his early departure as a kind of betrayal, the realization of her persistent fear in her deep psyche, and this new relationship makes her more vulnerable and less valuable in the politics of male desire: "she is second to military honor in her lover's faith" (Adams 83). Psychologically, Cressida's unfaithfulness (unkind self) maintains his mimetic desire as it is external to him: achievement kills pleasure as suggested by the Freudian principle of male erotic desire. As Pandarus appears, Cressida again becomes a sexual object in his jeering jokes and market imagery: "How now, how now, how go maidenheads?" (IV.ii.23). In Pandarus's jokes, maidenhead is a commodity to be traded in the marketplace.

Upon hearing the news of the trade-off of Cressida, Troilus calmly accepts the deal and agrees to hand her over to the Greeks as a political bargaining chip in his typical philosophizing. In his initial response, he attempts neither to reverse the deal nor to express emotional disturbance. Adelman raises a question of whether he would agree to trade her to the Greeks if she had held off in the previous night (1985, 125). In his possessive desire, she is won, and pleasure is gone; that is, she is one of his achievements and can be traded. In a Freudian sense, the resistance to his desire is intentionally raised in his
unconscious by passively letting her go to the Greeks in order to increase his sexual satisfaction. In the parting scene, he repeatedly promises that he would go to the Greek camp to see her, risking all danger.

In the most degraded statement that "truth's authentic author" makes in the play, the true nature of his love is revealed: "We met by chance: you did not find me here" (III.ii.179; IV.ii.73). At this fateful moment, he is more concerned with his reputation rather than with Cressida to be exchanged to the enemy camp, and he leaves instead of returning to break the news himself and to comfort her: "There is a curious tradition of blindness to Troilus's disgraceful behavior on that early morning" (Girard 128).

Long before Cressida's physical infidelity, Troilus first betrays her psychologically in his duplicity; that is, the legendary paradigm of truthful Troilus and unfaithful Cressida is ironically reversed in Shakespeare's version of the story: "Though Cressida is false, her inconstancy is qualified by the world of the play; and though Troilus is loyal, his truth is similarly disqualified by context" (Greene 1983, 141). In view of Troilus' love as the longing for union with the maternal figure as suggested by Adelman, the consummation itself is symbolic of a kind of incestuous desire (1985, 137). The trade-off of Cressida frees him from the predicament of incest; in that respect, his betrayal is already inscribed in his unconscious if the act
of betrayal is to be performed by Cressida trapped in the patriarchal textual ideology.

In stark contrast to Troilus, Cressida responds hysterically and desperately to the news as if to show her pervasive sense of fear and vulnerability:

Time, force, and death,
Do to this body what extremes you can;
But the strong base and building of my love
Is as the very center of the earth,
Drawing all things to it. (IV.ii.104-8)

In grief and desperation, she idealizes her love as the center of metaphysical order in an effort to achieve her stable self out of her precarious status. She believed that she finally achieved a secure self in love, but her new self (a mere rhetorical construction of Troilus) shatters in the reality of political expediency and male exchange system:

"This is a cry of a woman with a satisfying, new-found identity as a woman of truth and faithfulness" (Adams 85).

In the parting scene of the lovers (IV.iv), the psychological mechanism of gender politics becomes clear in the opposite responses of the two lovers to the fateful separation. In contrast to his disgraceful behavior at the news of the trade, the loss of Cressida’s body suddenly revives Troilus’s possessive desire for her. Absence itself raises the value of her body, and, all of a sudden, he portrays himself as a faithful lover: "the constancy of a
lover is inversely proportional to his mistress's willingness to satisfy his desire" (Girard 127).

Troilus switches from the brief response of "is it so concluded?" back to his usual linguistic luxuriation (IV.ii.68). In contrast, Cressida switches from pathetic lament to passive acceptance: "And is it true that I must go from Troy?" (IV.iv.29). Cressida quickly realizes the gravity of the situation in which her sexed body turns into a bargaining chip for political expediency. She now sees through the hypocrisy of her chivalric lover and feels a sense of betrayal. Troilus again turns to the commercial imagery: "We two, that with so many thousand sighs / Did buy each other, must poorly sell ourselves / With the rude brevity and discharge of one" (IV.iv.38-40). For Troilus, love again becomes a commercial and political transaction in which Cressida is traded as a payment to buy Antenor. In combination with his artificial rhetoric, this mercantile imagery cheapens the pathetic scene of parting to a deal of the marketplace.

In the absence of Cressida's sexed body, the power of gender hegemony is reversed. Troilus's revived desire turns into jealousy and fear of betrayal: the "metamorphosis of Troilus" into "mimetic desire" is "the turning point of the whole episode" (Girard 130). He repeatedly requests her to be true in his anxious jealousy for fear that her body will be up for grab in the erotic competition with the Greeks:
"Hear me, my love: be thou but true of heart---" and "The Grecian youths are full of quality, / Their loving well compose'd, with gift of nature flowing, / And swelling o'er with arts and exercise" (IV.iv.57, 75-77).

Cressida is surprised at his sudden change ("I, true? How now, what wicked deem is this?"), but she soon realizes that his love is a disguise for his sensual desire ("O heavens, you love me not!") (IV.iv.58, 81). Despite his repeated avowal of faith, she now sees "a still and dumb-discoursive devil" in his elevated rhetoric, and the double nature of his love intensifies her sense of insecurity and helplessness (IV.iv.89). In protest, Troilus defends himself with his usual rhetorical eloquence:

While others fish with craft for great opinion,
I with great truth catch mere simplicity;
Whilst some with cunning gild their copper crowns,
With truth and plainness I do wear mine bare.

(IV.iv.101-4)

In view of the fact that he is the one who speaks in the most artificial language in the play, this linguistic self-delusion simply self-deconstructs. He is not able to be true to his linguistic simplicity and true desire. He mistakes his desires for Cressida as absolute, intrinsic, and autonomous, but they are multiple, external and relational in reality, mutating in the mechanism of mimetic jealousy and anxiety.
As Diomedes appears in the parting scene to take
Cressida from Troilus, he intensifies the jealousy and fear
of Troilus by praising her beauty in chivalric terms: "The
lustre in your eye, heaven in your cheek, / Pleads your fair
usage; and to Diomed / You shall be mistress, and command
him wholly" (IV.iv.116-18). While the quarrel between
Troilus and Diomedes continues over her, her sense of being
an object of male sexual competition dominates her
consciousness. Helpless, she keeps complete silence as if
she has "no voice of her own" in this male exchange order
(Adelman 1985, 127). Despite her desperate efforts to
establish a stable self in love, she is destined to be
carried off to the enemy military camp as a political
bargaining chip.

Cressida's new fate is symbolically defined in
Diomedes' brief sentence: "to her own worth / She shall be
priz'd" (IV.iv.131-32). As a commodity, she is again thrown
into the market of body politics, and she silently decides
to switch from a passive victim to a daughter of the game:
"Here she is suddenly afforded the opportunity to decide
once again what her own worth actually is--by finding a new
mirror in which to try to discern it" (Adams 87). In a
world where intrinsic merit is replaced by relational market
value, the female body fluctuates in its value according to
the standard of male sexual demand; that is, Cressida is
again required to place her body in the market for value
judgment and to play the game of coquettishness to raise her market value.

Cressida’s movement from Troy (the home market) to the Greek military camp (the foreign market) epitomizes the victimization of female body in the male exchange system. Gordon Williams indicates that the Trojans make Cressida "a whore in the war game," and the Greeks make her "a whore in the love game" in the exchange (112). In the "naked display of [patriarchal] power," Ulysses proposes that Cressida be "kiss’d in general" upon her arrival (Bjelland 182; IV.v.21). As a helpless object of male desire placed back into a new market, she has no choice but to accept male sexual aggression passively and to internalize its mechanism to survive. The kissing in general is "akin to the stylized rape" ("gang rape") of a female body plundered as war spoils (Gordon Williams 112; Traub 81). Quickly realizing her precarious position as "the projected site of exchange of the desires," Cressida switches into the male-imposed role of wantonness and allows herself to be kissed in general in order to take control of her commodity status (Traub 82).

In that sense, this is a critical scene for the awareness of her new identity and her subsequent betrayal towards the end of the play. For her, to survive in this hostility is to adapt actively to the transactional circulation of male desires.

As she kisses from man to man in a symbolically sexual
manner, bantering with Greek generals who are previously described by Troilus as merchant venturers, her body turns into a sexual commodity acquired in foreign trade: "From here [the kissing in general], it is but a short distance to complying with the opinion of Diomedes, who values her so little that he wastes few words on her, prizing her, simply, 'To her own worth'" (Greene 1983, 143). At his turn, Ulysses refuses to kiss her: "Why then, for Venus' sake, give me a kiss / When Helen is a maid again, and his" (IV.v.49-50). It is a cruel psychological torture for Cressida and is simultaneously a contemptuous scorn for her strategy to negotiate her sexual value in a new hostile environment: he shakes "her confidence in herself even as an object of sensual desire" (Asp 413). After this experience, she has no alternative but to become a daughter of the game in order to find a guardian to protect her; in that respect, her betrayal is an inevitable next step in the course of her action in her shaken psyche.

This scene also indicates deep misogyny in the underlying gender ideology of the play. The misogynistic anxiety of the Renaissance gender ideology is clearly represented in Ulysses’ depiction of Cressida’s quick-witted glibness:

O, these encounterers, so glib of tongue,
That give accosting welcome ere it comes,
And wide unclasp the tables of their thoughts
To every ticklish reader: set them down
For sluttish spoils of opportunity
And daughters of the game. (IV.v.58-63)

In the context where language is separated from the
metaphysical reality of the Chain of Being, female language
is taken as a sign of moral disorder and social crisis. As
opposed to the glibness of Troilus and Ulysses that is a
sign of intellectual power, female glibness is equated with
sexual wantonness. In the binary paradigm of the
Renaissance gender ideology, female silence is symbolic of
chastity, and female verbosity is emblematic of sexual
llicitousness and subversive power dangerous to the
patriarchal authority and social order. Karen Newman
claims that "Talk in women then is dangerous because it is
perceived as a usurpation of multiple forms of authority, a
threat to order and male sovereignty, to masculine control
of commodity exchange, to a desired hegemonic male
sexuality" (134). She is driven into accommodating the
rules of the brutal male sexual game in which language is
frequently employed to hide the duplicity of male desire,
but the patriarchal double standard stigmatizes her
linguistic participation in the game as a sign of sluttish
wantonness. As she is traded from the Trojans to the
Greeks, she is degraded from a sexual object to a strumpet.

In V.ii, Cressida performs her legendary role of an
unfaithful betrayer in reality, but the double structure of
the tragic love story exonerates her from the eternal ignominy of "as false as Cressida" (III.ii.194). As for the betrayal, Grady contends that "it is a mistake to seek for a 'realistic' motive in her sudden change," but his statement only has partial truth (78). He is correct in that the betrayal lies in the misogynistic structure of the legendary story in which she unrealistically changes her heart like an abstract Morality figure within less than 24 hours after the trade-off, but, at the same time, his argument is off the mark in that she has been consistently driven to this betrayal by Troilus's disgraceful acts and her sense of fear and insecurity. Girard observes that the betrayal is a kind of "retaliation" against Troilus' spiritual betrayal that "occurs first and is totally unprovoked" (138).^{193}

In "what is perhaps the most loveless encounter between lovers in Shakespeare" (V.ii), Cressida falls for her guardian, Diomedes, not because of lechery, but mainly because of fear in a new military environment (Greene 1983 144). After experiencing "the 'spiritual' infidelity" of Troilus, she is left with no choice but to practice her defense of coquettish wiles on her new "sweet guardian" to take control of her fate in this male exchange system (Girard 138; V.ii.7). But her defensive strategy does not work with the realist Diomedes who insists on her "mind" to be "coupled with [her] words": "No, no, good night; I'll be your fool no more" (V.ii.15, 32). He knows that she is
already "forsworn" and has lost her honor; that is, she has simply declined into a sexual object and has no power even to negotiate her value in a new market.

This scene shows that the politics of power and the politics of sexuality intersect and operate in the same sphere where Cressida is required to surrender either her body or protection. In such power relations, Diomedes has absolute control of Cressida who has been reduced to a mere plaything of exploitative male desire: he angrily and disdainfully threatens to leave her five times at her wavering, and she calls him a guardian twice and begs him to stay in fear of losing him. This is not a typical Shakespearean love scene, but a representation of exploitative male power. She attempts to negotiate her psychological and physical security "with reluctant, factitious wiles, not falling under Diomedes' erotic spell, perhaps for the good reason that there was no spell," but after the failure to create her new value and sexual status in a new military environment, the next step she can take is simply to swap her body for protection (Brockbank 49).

In desperation, Cressida returns to the theme of split self (the kind and unkind selves) before her final exit from the play into complete silence:

Troilus, farewell! One eye yet looks on thee,
But with my heart the other eye doth see.
Ah, poor our sex! This fault in us I find:
The error of our eye directs our mind.
What error leads must err; 0, then conclude,
Minds sway'd by eyes are full of turpitude.

(V.ii.106-111)

The speech of two selves in III.ii is partially intended to "angle" for the truth and depth of Troilus' love in her sense of fear, but this soliloquy represents the final crisis of her selfhood, a wavering in growing fear and insecurity between her potential selves: one is Troilus' faithful Cressida, and the other is "Diomed's soiled one" (Adelman 1992, 52). Her identity is a mutable and relational construct (an image of male desire), a function of power relations. Sensing the double nature of Troilus' faith and her precarious position, she decides to use her sexuality as a defense by becoming the calculating and elusive daughter of the game for survival, that is, the "victim of a strategy that costs no less than herself" (Greene 1983, 145).

Cressida ascribes her sexual depravity to female frailty in general, but, in reality, her fault lies only in her playing of the socially imposed role of sexual object. In this speech, she merely repeats the traditional male problematization of unruly female sexuality; in other words, even at a moment when she experiences such mental anguish, she is deprived of the independent emotional capacity to express her true feelings in the process of internalizing
the male representation of unmanageable female desire: "But by the time of Cressida’s capitulation to Diomed, so utterly has she been schooled, coerced by the law of the father, that when she delivers her indictment of the gaze, she speaks not for her ‘unkind’ female self, but mimes in high irony the edit of the homologous" (Hooker 927).

There is an unbridgeable gap in her consciousness between a victimized self and a betraying self, and her psyche is paralyzed by the guilt of betrayal in this self-defeating trap of split selves. Cressida views her betrayal less as an inevitable course of action in this brutal male exchange system than as female sexual weakness as if to suggest that women are such unreliable creatures as to be led into lechery by sensuous optical illusions. From the perspective of her gendered subjectivity, she is divided into private and public selves, which are eternally unbalanced in patriarchal gender politics. In the misogynist gender ideology of the play, her private self is repressed and denied as the dangerous, unmanageable, and opaque other, and her constructed public self is naturalized in the logic of gender politics. As an “ephemeral creature of the present with no intensity of attachment to the present,” she defines herself and women in general as a subversive power to the male order of immutable permanance, and her infidelity fulfils the patriarchal anxiety over female transgressive desires, that is, the “male nightmare
of unmerited betrayal” (Stein 157; Fiedler 148).

In this voyeuristic scene in which the male gaze (Troilus, Ulysses, and Thersites) secretly observes Cressida’s betrayal, her inner psychic struggle is dismissed as mere coquettishness, and the misogynist structure of the play is reinforced in the depiction of Cressida as lecherous: “She will sing any man at first sight” (Ulysses) and “Now she sharpens: well said, whetstone” (Thersites) (V.ii.9, 75). The multiple perspectives of the male spectators fail to come up with the dialogic vision of gender relations, being misogynist as summarized in Thersites’ raillery: “Lechery, lechery, still wars and lechery!” (V.ii.193).

In this scene, patriarchal power relations are inscribed on female body through the gazing eyes of male spectators, and the female sexed body is passively defined and represented as a threat: “In the governing economy of the play,” the masculine gaze asserts “the privileged power of the male to determine the terms of discourse, the value and specificity of all items of all exchange” (Hooker 909). The dramatic experience of the audience is consistently guided towards the characterization of the unfaithful and lecherous Cressida by the intervening commentaries of the male spectators, and the true nature of Cressida is enveloped into silence by their misogynist language and gaze: “Basing her identity on male desires and definitions,
Cressida is the sum total of 'opinions' of men whose opinions are in themselves societally determined, and she is thus only representative of her world" (Greene 1983, 145).

The betrayal and the subsequent rage of Troilus is symbolic of the defeat of his possessive narcissism as well as the chaotic moral vision pervasive in the play:

If there be rule in unity itself,
This is not she. 0 madness of discourse,
That cause sets up with and against itself!
Bifold authority! Where reason can revolt
Without perdition, and loss assume all reason
Without revolt. This is, and is not, Cressida.

(V.ii.140-45)

In the outright denial of the betrayal, Troilus abruptly switches from merchant of love to an idealistic and metaphysical lover who bases his love on the immutability of cosmic order in his deep narcissistic solipsism. At the sudden and unexpected transformation of Cressida, he experiences an ontological crisis in the dissolving coherence of moral certainty: the unfaithful Cressida is not his if "sanctimony be the gods' delight" (V.ii.139). In the cosmic vision of his idealized love, Cressida's infidelity embodies an unimaginable revolt against divine reason unless "the bonds of heaven" are dissolved (V.ii.155). In his desperate fixation on the solipsistic vision of cosmic unity and sexual fantasy, he ironically and illogically imagines
two separate Cressidas in contradiction to his own fragile rule of unity.\textsuperscript{106}

To maintain his narcissistic desire for the union with Cressida, he denies his optical and auditory "attest" as if "those organs [eyes and ears] had deceptious functions, / Created only to calumniate" (V.ii.121, 122-23). His narcissistic delusion does not allow him to accept the real Cressida as she is, and he further negates her betrayal that just took place in his observation: "This she?--No, this is Diomed's Cressida" (V.ii.136). This is his Cressida, neither an optical illusion nor Diomed's Cressida, and their "vows" are devoid of guiding "souls" and divine "sanctimony"; in other words, Troilus "suffers without gaining insight" in his deluded solipsism (V.ii.137, 138). In his imagination, Cressida is deprived of her true self as an erotic construct of his eternally possessive desire; that is, she is merely an object to be divided between him and Diomedes when his solipsistic vision of universal certainty collapses. He is deceived by his own desire into believing that there is part of Cressida that would remain in his possession forever. In his idealized vision of cosmic unity, there is no place for division, but he readily switches to the "bifold authority" to negate the soiled Cressida in the hopes of retaining the pure and constant Cressida in his narcissistic pleasure: "Cressida is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven" (V.ii.153). In his psychic
torment, the logic of language is marred by inconsistency and disjunction, the madness of his own discourse, which Hooker calls "a moment of nonsense wherein a dual logic resides" and "a hole appears in [his] homological cosmology" (928).

As his sexual union with Cressida is threatened in reality, Troilus desperately turns to the cosmic imagery such as the bond of heaven and divine unity in an effort to generalize his libidinal anxiety into impersonal cosmic anxiety. In this solipsistic logic of psychological transference, the blame and responsibility for the failure of the legendary love move from Troilus to the faulty cosmic order and Cressida, the violator of cosmic law. His solipsistic and monologic fantasy has produced and maintained Cressida as his idealized sexual object in his possessive desire, and his contorted reasoning operates to save the integrity of his sexual fantasy by dividing Cressida into kind and unkind selves.

In his narcissistic denial of separation from the object of desire, Troilus adheres to the vision of fragmentation that is a pervasive motif of the play: "This is, and is not, Cressida" (V.ii.145). On the one hand, this paradoxical consciousness keeps him from falling into the psychic paralysis of ontological and cognitive uncertainty by defining Cressida as the protean "other" that defies the cosmic rules of unity and divine sanctimony. On the other
hand, this double consciousness can only redeem his masculine pride and solipsistic idealism under the delusion of his moral victimization. Cressida becomes an unknowable and opaque object that threatens the cosmic principle of unitary truth, but the irony is that Troilus is also divided into dual selves: a metaphysical Petrarchan lover and a merchant of desire who does not believe in and is not true to his moral principles he advocates in his solipsistic illusion.

Cressida is "a thing inseparable" that "divides more wider than the sky and earth," but this spacious division "admits no orifex for a [subtle] point" (V.ii.147-150). The illusion of a dual Cressida disintegrates as Troilus finally comes to acknowledge that Diomedes' Cressida is the self-same Cressida of his own in his paradoxical perception that "orifex" is "no orifex." At this moment, the traumatic experience of undeniable betrayal leaves him with "the image of a soiled Cressida and the fragmentation of the universe": "Instance, O instance! Strong as heaven itself: / Cressida is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven" (Adelman 1992 55; V.ii.152-53). In the profound ontological paranoia of his failed love, he abandons himself and love to the vision of fragmentation and spoiled food: "The fractions of her faith, orts of her love, / The fragments, scraps, the bits, and greasy relics / Of her o’er-eaten faith are given to Diomed" (V.ii.157-59). In this fragmented world of appetitive
desire, Cressida is transformed from the object of male desire ("love's thrice-repurged nectar") into the sexual leftover as her body is transferred from Troilus to Diomedes (III.ii.20).

The betrayal of the "false" Cressida is rather the "defeat [of Troilus] in a war of pseudonarcissism" than that of his faithful love, and he never grows in his moral wisdom as a romantic hero to the end (Girard 138). In his solipsistic illusion of faithful lover, he furiously condemns Cressida for playing the game of desire in the male exchange economy to take control of her fate: "O Cressida! O false Cressida! False, false, false! / Let all untruths stand by thy stained name, / And they'll seem glorious" (V.ii.177-79). This speech demonstrates a profound anxiety over the rebellious power of feminine desire embedded in the misogynist gender ideology of the text. Charnes observes that "there is only desire 'as' social production, and nothing else" in the play, but as opposed to the male desire that is socially legitimised to acquire and work on its object (female body), female desire is repressed and marginalized as the dangerous other (97). Troilus is the signifier, author, and performer; on the contrary, Cressida is the signified, text, and performed. In the economy of libidinal transaction, male desire reifies and commodifies the female body as a site of repression and exploitation, and the female body is transferred by the power apparatus of
gender politics from one male desire to another like a commodity in the market of male desire.
NOTES

1. In Shakespeare, Ryan argues that the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean society constitutes "an exceptional, fleeting phase in English history." It was a "hybrid, transitional formation which . . . is neither feudal nor bourgeois, but rather early capitalist society rapidly coalescing within the accelerating dissolution of late feudalism." (31). In that sense, Shakespeare’s drama is "an eclectic medium for the compound articulation of the entire social ensemble": the "crucial mediation between drama and society" (31).

2. In Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare, Douglas Bruster succinctly summarizes the emerging aspects of the British market economy: "Figuring prominently among such influences were a continually high level of inflation; the extension and intensification of merchant adventurism and other speculative financial activity (including the increase in ‘projects’ and ‘projectors’); the material implications of international trade expansion; the rapid growth of London’s population and the subsequent complications of urban pressure; and, perhaps most important, the progressive, structural institutionalization of the market economy" (12).
3. In *A Theory of Literary Production*, Macherey says that a literary work is always incomplete and insufficient; therefore, a critic must "move outside the work" and situate it "in the 'relation' between the implicit and explicit" to reach the "unconscious of the work" (85-92).

4. In *Renaissance Man*, Agnes Heller makes an insightful comment on the cultural tension: "the Renaissance was the first wave of the protracted process of transition from feudalism to capitalism. . . . In that process of transformation a whole social and economic structure, an entire system of values and way of life were shaken. Everything became fluid; social upheavals succeeded one another with unbelievable speed, individuals situated 'higher' and 'lower' in the social hierarchy changed places rapidly" (2).

5. In analyzing the play, the transition from feudalism to primitive capitalism is discussed not from the perspective of the mode of production or the economic structural changes, but from the "totality of those aspects as represented in the 'geist' or 'spirit' that has inspired the life of a whole epoch" (Dobb 5).

6. The new social and historical developments create new perspectives and values in the cultural process, and the resultant culture comes to "represent areas of human experience, aspiration, and achievement which the dominant culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, represses, or even
cannot recognize" (Raymond Williams 1977, 124).

7. In 1565, wool, woolfells, and textiles accounted for over 90 percent of the foreign exports. The textile industry took precedence over religion and politics in dictating foreign policy until 1570's (Palliser 324).

8. Despite the lack of reliable data, certain historians assume that "Tudor craftsmen and labourers spent four-fifths of their income on food and drink, one-eighth on clothing and the rest on light and fuel" (Palliser 133).

9. Vagrancy or "subsistence migration" became "an overwhelming demographic phenomenon of the last years of the [Elizabeth's] reign," and it substantially "aggravated local unemployment and exacerbated pressure for food and housing" (Clark 1977, 235-36). As a result of the economic hardship, there were noticeable changes in birth and burial rates between 1591 and 1600: in comparison to the previous decade, burial rates were extremely high in certain parts. Burials were 60 percent higher, at Bexley, and the number of births recorded in the parish register declined by about one fifth at Wickhambreaux (Clark 1977, 242).

10. As for the periodization (the second half of the sixteenth century), Paul Sweezy contends that it "would not be seriously disputed by anyone," and further summarizes that "western European feudalism entered a period of acute crisis in the fourteenth century and thereafter disintegrated, more or less rapidly in different regions."
On the other hand, we cannot speak of the beginning of the capitalist period until the second half of the sixteenth century at the earliest” (46). He also says that the intervening period poses a problem of definition and needs to be defined within a new paradigm (46). Merchant capitalism means the commercial activities that transport "the goods produced by the guilds or the peasants, in order to gain from price differences between different productive areas" (Dobb 123).

11. Halpern argues that Dobb’s view is a kind of "reductive [Marxist] historicism" and further claims that "the concept [suggested by Dobb] therefore has a preliminary value in defining the meaning of the transition to capitalism as it applies to the Tudor and Stuart periods" (69).

12. A series of Tudor legislative efforts to control the poor--the Poor Laws--were a reflection of this economic polarization, through which the accumulation of capital and the growth of the labor class were possible as the basis of the development of the capitalist system. In other words, "all employers and owners of capital were abnormally enriched at the expense of the standard of life of the labouring class" (Dobb 236).

13. Righter summarizes the darkening of the age: "the Essex plot, the aging of the Queen and the uncertainties of the succession, a general sense that society was corrupt and
life itself running down, losing its energy and freshness: all of these things contributed to a new atmosphere of pessimism, a loss of faith in the world and in human abilities" (154).

14. Since the defeat of the Armada in 1588, heavy taxation was imposed, and men were levied every year: Portugal expedition in 1589, expeditions to the Azores in 1589-97, expedition to the West Indies in 1595, and expedition to Cadiz in 1596. The number of levies in England and Wales for service abroad is as follows: 2,490 in 1592 (France), 3,025 in 1593 (France), 4,800 in 1594 (France and Netherlands), 1,806 in 1595 (Ireland), 8,940 in 1596 (Cadiz and Ireland), 8,835 in 1597 (Ireland and the Azores), 9,164 in 1598 (Ireland and Netherlands), 5,250 in 1599 (Ireland), 4,885 in 1600 (Ireland), 12,620 in 1901 (Ireland), and 3,300 in 1602 (Netherlands) (Powell and Cook 156).

15. Kinney claims that "Essex had by then lost 12,000 men and spent 130,000 [pounds] and in utter frustration and despair, he now agreed to a private conference and truce with Tyrone, the details of which were kept secret between them" (319). Elizabeth Jenkins says that Essex reached a secret agreement which amounted to the "Home Rule for Ireland" after the loss of 12,000 men and 300,000 pounds (309).
16. Before his return against the queen’s command not to depart Ireland, Essex “disobeyed her further—some called it treason—by dubbing [fifty-nine] knights against her express wishes” (Kinney 319; Levin 154). Elizabeth later threatened to “degrade those knights whom Essex dubbed in Ireland, but even Robert Cecil advised against such a brutal withdrawal of political specie” (Clark 1977, 258). Essex tried to appoint his followers in key posts and wanted to win the mastership of the Court of Wards for himself, but when all his hopes were denied by the queen, he volunteered for the service in Ireland, “an act of political suicide” (Hurstfield 188).

17. Jenkins says that the queen was taken by surprise in this incident “at the disadvantage of not being dressed [properly] and not knowing whether he had come with an army at his back or who there might be outside her bedroom door” (310).

18. The monopoly was withheld by the queen, who said that “an unruly beast must be stopped of his provender” and returned it to the queen herself (Jenkins 314). Essex took the decision as final, and “for Essex this meant ruin” (Levin 154). As for the question of royal succession, Cecil and his faction supported the Infanta against James, and James’ claim to the throne seemed to depend on “the mediation of Essex” (Jenkins 315).
19. Kinney says that Essex made the statement to Sir John Harrington who was so embarrassed by it that he left Essex's presence quickly (322).

20. In his letter to Lord Keeper Egerton, Essex denied the divine authority of monarchy and challenged the Elizabethan cult: "What! Cannot princes err? . . . Is an earthly power or authority infinite? Pardon me! Pardon me! my good Lord. I can never subscribe to these principles!" (Hurstfield 189-90).

21. A considerable body of discontented men "with deep anti-Court feelings" gathered around Essex and urged him to revolt in frustration: "the politically second-rate, the bankrupt, the disappointed, as well as a section of the literary coterie of late Elizabethan London" (Levin 154-55; Hurstfield 189).

22. Bacon said that "there was not, in so populous a city where he thought himself so dear, one man from the chiefest citizen to the meanest artificer or prentice that armed with him" (quoted in Jenkins in 316).

23. After the Spanish Armada in 1588, which consisted of 130 ships and 27,000 men, Spain further attempted to invade England in 1596 and 1597. In 1596, the Spanish navy invaded with over 100 ships and 16,000 men, but the fleet was dispersed by a storm, and in 1597, another fleet of 136 ships and 9,000 men again failed to conquer England by a storm (Powell and Cook 164). As for the factional rivalry
in the Elizabethan court, Mallin describes that "the protracted struggle with Spain and Ireland magnified tensions within the upper levels of government, the nobles dividing along anti- and prowar lines. The Cecil family . . . led the faction that promoted peace with Spain and Ireland. The opposing, militant faction followed Robert Devereux, the second earl of Essex" (146).

24. In "Troilus and Cressida: The Disjunctive Imagination," Arnold Stein says that "no significant action" develops from language; in that sense, characters and their discordant language are relevant to the theme of "division and rupture," and all speeches are not transparent (153, 158).

25. The "dialogic disposition" of the Shakespeare's plays presents "stubborn resistence to the entrenchment of any unifying language or code of representation" (Bristol 122-23).

26. Volosinov elaborates on the linguistic registering of social changes: language is "the most sensitive 'index of social changes,' and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still with definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems. The word is the medium in which occur the slow quantitative accretions of those changes which have not yet achieved the status of a new ideological quality, not yet produced a new and fully-fledged ideological form"
(19).

27. Greene further says in the same article that "whereas the earlier Renaissance saw similitude . . . as a reflection of the world's shape and nature, of correspondences which were thought to exist, to the seventeenth century, similitude was a lie and a source of confusion, and language, no longer guaranteed by a transcendent reality, was as likely to obscure truth as represent it" (1981, 273).

28. The term "lawful language" is used in the sense that the Lacanian Symbolic order, linguistic order, raises humans from the confusion of the Imaginary order and enables them to enter society through language. In his theory, language performs an organizing and censoring function of the psyche; in other words, it play a role of principle and law in constructing subjectivity.

29. Foucault claims that "up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture," and language was a "certain and transparent sign for things" in the hidden network of resemblance (1970, 17, 36). In that sense, language as "a thing inscribed in the fabric of the world" worked in incomplete probabilities.

30. Waswo views that "the first major relocation [in the linguistic process] occurs when late medieval nominalists replace universals with particulars as the
objects that confer meaning" (33). He further says that  
"the direct correspondence of word to thing assured by God 
becomes the indirect correspondence of word to thing via the 
memory-image of sensation. . . ." (35).

31. The shift in the linguistic paradigm was not a 
unitary and lineal development, but a conflictive 
coexistence: "a shared set of tensions and problems that 
arise from the competition between the cosmetic and 
constitutive views of the language/meaning relation" (Waswo 
63).

32. It is anachronistic and absurd to read the 
poststructuralist "linguistic turn" in this context, but it 
is reasonable at the same time to trace and compare some 
similar elements and energies released by the constitutive 
view of language in the Renaissance paradigm shift.

33. In V.ii, Cressida constantly retracts her language 
and wavers in her relationship with Diomedes. She agrees to 
the romantic liaison with Diomedes and promises to "bestow" 
on him the sleeve given to her by Troilus as a symbol of 
their eternal love, but she declines to honor her words: "I 
prithee, do not hold me to mine oath," and "I will not keep 
my words" (V.ii.25, 26, 98). Just as social disorder is 
reflected in linguistic confusion, so her mental instability 
divorces her words from her action.

34. Volosinov claims that "the forms of signs are 
conditioned above all by the social organization of the
participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction" (21). He clearly establishes a triangle of individuals, society, and language, in which they are inextricably intertwined and mutually interact, influencing each other.

35. In close relation to the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia, multi-accentuality means the linguistic capacity to elicit various social and ideological tones in specific historical situation. In that sense, multi-accentuality points toward the dialogic and polyphonic discourse in the specific social and historical context.

36. In William Shakespeare, Eagleton explains the paradox between action and word in terms of the linguistic binarism between "parole" and "langue." Since language is a historical "event" whose meaning cannot be "read off from the formal structures which generates it," the "parole" is in conflict with the "langue," and its embeddedness into history constantly transgresses the general structure of "langue" (35-36).

37. In another context, Montaign again develops his view of linguistic selfhood: "In modeling this figure upon myself, I have had to fashion and compose myself so often to bring myself out, that the model itself has to some extent grown firm and taken shape. . . . I have no more made my book than my book has made me" (II.18. 504).
38. In *Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World*, Madan Sarup says that through the entry into language, a subject becomes "conscious or aware of oneself as a distinct entity," and language conceals the split of selfhood from "the conscious subject, who is supposed to feel whole and certain" of his identity (34). Since language is a sensitive register of the social and ideological, "the social enters into the formation of the unconscious" through language that presents an illusion of the "unitary subject" (34). In *The Subject of Tragedy*, Belsey further develops the concept of subjectivity conferred by language: "To be a subject is to have access to signifying practice, to identify with the 'I' of utterance and the 'I' who speaks" (5).

39. As for Hector, Grady says that there is "no synthesis of the 'aporia'" (74). The term "aporia" is used in the sense that a character is situated between the irresolvable but valid polarities. It is a site of linguistic and ideological negotiation at a time when the dominant system loses its logical validity.

40. Janet Adelman describes *Troilus and Cressida* as "the play of division" in her essay (1985, 119). Stein also argues that "disunity infects not only persons and society but themes and symbols, as if the dramatic imagination were trying to oppose itself at every turn." (164).
41. McAlindon says that Agamemnon’s prolixity is “inseparable from his failure to communicate with those below him and with his lack of perception into the cause of military stalemate” (35).

42. In *Shakespeare’s Scepticism*, Bradshaw contends that pompous rhetoric turns out counter-productive and trivial in the play, and Agamemnon’s speech is characterized by “deflating juxtapositions, echoes and internal contrasts” (128, 151).

43. In “An Exhortation, concerning Good Order and Obedience, Rulers and Magistrates,” the concept of degree is explained: “Almightye God hath created and appoynted all things, in heaven, earth and waters, in a mooste excellente and perfecte order. In heaven, he hath appoynted distincte or severall orders and states of Archaungelies and Aungelles. In earth he hath assigned and appoynted kynges, prynces, with other governoures under them, all in good and necessarye order” (Kinney 60).

44. Collins maintains that each has “a determined part to play” and be satisfied with his degree to preserve social order: “There was no place for private desires or occupations. . . . Although order was natural, and man, naturally, was thus inclined to order, he had to help order reveal itself. For this reason civil law, custom, and various ceremonies resulted from the ‘ayd and dylygence of man.’ Without such aid, nature ‘wyl soone be oppressyd and
45. In distinction from the "repressive state apparatuses" based on the physical forms of power and violence, the "ideological state apparatuses" actively involve in the production of social and economic relations as well as human subjectivities by ideology. The ideological state apparatuses include school, church, family, economic and political systems, mass media, and literature (Althusser 1971, 142-43, 148-58).

46. Ulysses' instrumental reason reified the doctrine of degree into an ideology to perpetuate the power system: "In short, Ulysses' high rhetoric is revealed as ideology in the service of reified power, or of what Foucault called the technology of power, leading in turn to a process of domination and autonomous self-perpetuation by reified systems of instrumental thought" (Grady 67).

47. In his explanation of the Baudrillardian theory of simulacra, Madan Sarup outlines the process of simulation: "In the feudal era, there was a fixed social order which established a hierarchy of signs of class, rank and social position. Signs at this stage were fixed, restricted, perfectly clear and transparent. . . . From the Renaissance to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the unmediated real was replaced by the 'counterfeit'" (1996, 112).
48. Charnes persuasively maintains that "no other Shakespeare play so explicitly conjures 'telos' only to dismantle it," and the play moves towards "a preordained end, but this end itself delivers neither a moral nor a providential ethos" (75). In this world, degree itself is an ideological contingency, "a myth of the absolute," that is devoid of transcendent meaning and value in the relativistic cultural flux and disintegration (80).

49. Grady says that Ulysses' manipulation "abstracts [conservative] values from the traditions and cultures which created their meaning and then transports these evacuated signifiers into a matrix of value-free logical operations through which they can be manipulated as desired by the instrumentalizing subjects" (67).

50. Girard defines "mimetic desire" as the desire whose pleasure is delayed and revived only by envy (147). In this mechanism of pleasure, once a thing is achieved, the pleasure is gone. The phrase "mimetic rivalry" is from Girard (163).

51. In a sense, Ulysses' closed circuit imagery is misleading since power, will, and appetite seem to be different names for the same mechanism of misdirected energies of desire ("appetite, an Elizabethan commonplace for desire") in the play (Traub 85). In Deleuze and Guattari, Bogue defines Nietzsche's will to power as desire that is "an unbound, free-floating energy which Freud called
libido" (89). In Lacanian terms, language produces desire, and desire comes into being as the metonymic and perpetual displacement of the signified. Therefore, desire is a lack or absence ("a revealed nothingness, an unreal emptiness") that has no referentiality to the real and eternally defers its satisfaction in reality (Kojeve 5). In the world of linguistic chaos, the gap between desire and its object makes desire farther removed from the real and more solipsistic; as a result, desire turns into a blind predatory monster that eventually devours itself.

52. "Tudor social psychology was superego oriented" to appropriate “right reason” (Collins 25).

53. Ronand Bogue views that capitalism sets adrift individuals, things, words and beliefs by decoding (deterritorializing) traditional social domains (88).

54. Ryan claims that the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean society was "an exceptional, fleeting phase in English history." It was a "hybrid, transitional formation which . . . is neither feudal nor bourgeois, but rather early capitalist society rapidly coalescing within the accelerating dissolution of late feudalism." In that sense, Shakespeare’s drama is "an eclectic medium for the compound articulation of the entire social ensemble": the “crucial mediation between drama and society" (31).

55. In Renaissance Man, Heller observes that the emerging capitalism “dissolved the ‘natural’ bonds linking
man to his family, his social estate, and his 'ready-made' place in society, and shook all hierarchy and stability, turning social relations fluid, the arrangement of classes and social strata as well as the placement of individuals within them” (3-4). The author further says that the feudal ideology made man’s identity correspondent with his “defined existence,” but the “bourgeois ideology” of the Renaissance denied “a static concept of man”: “feudal one-sidedness” versus “capitalist many-sidedness” (1, 4, 10, 13).

56. The speech is a “psychologically strategic escape into ideology” (Cartelli 13). Stein also depicts the degree speech negatively: “But if the speech on degree is a central statement, why does it fall so flat as a dramatic issue, an episode of noble eloquence left high and dry, the action of talk?” (151)

57. W. R. Elton views Ulysses as a “supreme pragmatist rather than [a] pious traditionalist,” who invokes the doctrine of degree (“the speciality of rule”) not as a “high moral doctrine,” but as “a practical military device” (99). On the other hand, Theodore Spencer calls him “the voice of common sense and practical reason” (112).

58. Vivian Thomas calls Ulysses as “loquacious and at worst a windbag” in the degree speech (135). McAlindon says that the speech is characteristic of unnecessary exhaustiveness, repetition, and inability to offer the solution despite the sagacious diagnosis (36).
59. Tillyard expresses his skeptical view on the degree speech in detail: "The style throughout is quite deliberate and not in the least 'abandoned'; and yet Shakespeare was not writing in the full passion of earnestness, was not quite sunk in what he did, but (to alter the metaphor) had his tongue at least part way in his cheek. He does in fact continue his method of inflation and deflation; only here, in addition to the anticipatory deflation of the previous scene, the inflated style contains, through its excess, its own deflationary self-criticism" (1971, 55).

60. Stein argues that the degree speech "exhibits Ulysses' power and even more, it exhibits itself" (152). Charnes also says that the speech merely expresses Ulysses' ideology (90).

61. Petrarchan commercial imagery elevates the female lover into an object of high value to which male desire is projected. In the sense that the female body turns into a commercial object in male imagination, Petrarchan imagery shows the egotistic mechanism of patriarchal gender politics, but it is not reified. In contrast, Troilus's commercial imagery is used with the strong implication of "pimping." Cressida's body is a commercial and sexual object to be traded between Pandar (supplier) and Troilus (consumer) in this context. Her body becomes reified in the form of sexual object.
62. French says that Troilus is far more interested in his own feeling and mind than in Cressida, and "in a 'masculine' world in which ends are devalued, love is either a purchase of sensation, or power struggle--or both" (164). In the same context, Greene also claims that "throughout, Troilus shows more interest in the style and idea of love than in Cressida herself, and it is this which accounts for his failure to know her" (1981, 278).

63. Colie views that Troilus is "not in control of his language": "In his poet-role, as in his lover-role, Troilus is just undertaking his apprenticeship; he seizes upon his art too headlong and impetuously, just as he seizes upon his beloved. He cannot stop to realize what language, or what a woman, can mean to a man" (331).

64. Caudwell views the emergence of capitalism and bourgeois will as the key to the paradigm change in the Renaissance as well as to the development of Renaissance drama: "Shakespeare could not have achieved the stature he did if he had not exposed, at the dawn of bourgeois development, the whole movement of the capitalist contradiction, from its tremendous achievement to its mean decline. His position, his feudal 'perspective,' enabled him to comprehend in one era all the trends which in later eras were to separate out and so be beyond the compass of one treatment." (95).
65. Tillyard claims that disorder and chaos are the "product of sin" that is "perpetually striving to come again," and the Renaissance cosmology as the dominant ideological axis fostered static values and psychology and encouraged the passive acceptance of the existing reality (1963, 20). In Faerie Queene, Nature argues in response to Mutability: "... all things stedfastnes doe hate / And changed be; yet, being rightly wayd / They are not changed from their first estate; / But by their change their being doe dilate: / And turning to themselves at length againe, / Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate: / Then over them Change doth not rule and raigne; / But they raigne over change, and doe their states maintaine" (VII.vii.58).

66. As the official ideology of Tudor and Jacobean England, the doctrine of divine order came to dominate human behavior such as psychology, self-consciousness, subjectivity, and epistemology; in other words, individual emotion, motivation, and desire were compromised and restricted by the symbolic structure of cosmic order.

67. Heller says that the growing individualism is also reflected in painting: "The search for the real proportions between the world and man also found expression in painting in the way 'perspective' and the representation of perspective became a central problem." Painting began to "demonstrate that man was no longer in contact with a transcendent world, but with a very human one, cut to the
measure of man” (1981, 172).

68. Gellner defines relativism as “a doctrine in the theory of knowledge: it asserts that there is no unique truth, no unique objective reality. What we naively suppose to be such is but the product—exclusively, or in some proportion, which varies with the particular form the relativism takes—of the cognitive apparatus of the individual, community, age or whatever” (183). This paper does not argue that the traditional value system was completely relativized in the Renaissance, but that relativism began to grow gradually with the emergence of the early primitive capitalism as shown in Troilus’ speech: “What’s aught but as ‘tis valued?” (II.ii.53).

69. Zoltan Tar states that “[capitalist] society is dominated by contradictions, law of exchange, and an increasing instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitat). Human being are mere agents of the commodity exchange principle behind which is the domination of man by man” (160). It is anachronistic to apply this statement to the Renaissance period, but it is still valid to measure the “commodity exchange principle” expressed in the play.

70. Kaufmann says that chivalry in the play becomes “a form of ideological or social illness, and inertial adherence to it is a morally fatal addiction” (151).

71. Tillyard says that Cressida’s betrayal lies in the moral dilemma of Troilus’ subjectivism: “The irony of
Troilus arguing that value rests in the valuer and not in the thing valued is terrible when we apply his argument to his own fate at the hands of Cressida, and looks forward to the play's emotional climax" (1971, 68).

72. Southhall views Troilus to be "in contact with the remnants of a chivalrous world, but he is in contact with them as an agent of corruption" (228). In that sense, he is only "an abstract of the corruptive spirit" with his "mercenary-mindedness and appetitiveness" (228).

73. Vivian Thomas also expresses a similar opinion: "There can be little doubt that Shakespeare was very conscious of the social and economic changes taking place in his society and that these developments find expression in the play" (134).

74. The concept of reification was originally theorized by Lukacs. Grady summarizes the concept of reification: "the tendency within capitalist societies for the unconscious construction of social structures--primarily the economy and state bureaucracy--to confront individual subjects as oppressive, controlling but out-of-reach, 'given' conditions for social life" (34). But the term "reification" is used in this paper to indicate a cultural tendency to replace the intrinsic spirit and essence of a certain concept with pragmatic purposes and exploitive will. In this process of reification, a concept completely loses its intrinsic value and meaning and comes to be replaced by
its self-serving instrumentality of pragmatism. For example, the true spirit of chivalry is lost in the process of reification, and only the self-serving and self-perpetuating mechanism of patriarchal ideology dominates the concept of chivalry. The reified concept of chivalry transforms reality and structures "the unconscious of society and its members" in order to naturalize the artificiality of its constructed values. In short, reification makes man switch from spirit to material and from essence to pragmatic instrumentalization. In Troilus and Cressida, human desire is reified in sexuality and power in the amoral mechanism of reified chivalry and capitalist economy.

75. Greene says that "the corruptive spirit of a society" that "reduces people to terms of appetite and trade" presents "a powerful indictment of the mercantilism of the age, and Cressida reminds us of the effects of capitalism on woman" (1983, 137).

76. Tillyard describes the split consciousness or ideology of Hector by saying that "Hector, for all his nobility, stands for a double ineffectiveness: personally for a mind divided between reasonable, realistically moral, action and unreasoning point of honour; symbolically, for the anachronistic continuance of the chivalric code into a world which has abandoned it" (1971, 66-67).
77. Tillyard does not agree with the critics who view Thersites as a choric voice: "To make Thersites into a chorus, the authentic commentator on the play's action, is ridiculous. His function is that of a Fool, to give a twist to every action and every motive" (1971, 60).

78. Grady says that Thersites's universal raillery is both "choric and deficient, deflating love and chivalry," but it is emblematic of the plot structure. The "consciousness of the play" is "self-deconstructing" in the sense that the reified structures of chivalric feudalism and values "self-deconstruct" in the text (85).

79. Grady defines "instrumental reason" as "a method of thinking, closely but complexly linked to modernity, science, and capitalism, in which all values are suspended in a totalizing quest for techniques, means, and instruments to transform reality according to any human desires or purposes whatsoever. . . . such a mode of thinking becomes self-perpetuating and self-serving: autotelic and carrying a hidden value of control and domination underneath the (not revealed as ideology) neutrality. . . ." (52). Instrumental reason is part of the reification process that enables the signifying system of culture to conceptualize and ideologize the socio-economic systems and to give the meaning to the world (54).

80. Zoltan Tar says that "subjective reason is instrumental reason; its worth is determined by the
operational value for the domination of men and nature”; on the other hand, “objective reason emphasizes ends and harmony as a principle inherent in reality” (84, 85).

81. Grady defines instrumental reason as “a method of thinking, closely but complexly linked to modernity, science, and capitalism, in which all values are suspended in a totalizing quest for techniques, means, and instruments to transform reality according to any human desires or purposes whatsoever. As value-free thinking, it has been conceptualized as technical [and] neutral,” but “such a mode of thinking becomes self-perpetuating and self-serving: autotelic and carrying a hidden value of control and domination underneath the (now revealed as ideology) neutrality” (52). This instrumental reason constitutes a kind of “reified system” that enables the signifying system of culture to conceptualize and ideologize the socio-economic systems (Grady 53).

82. As for the frequent use of images such as magnification, inflation, swelling, dilation, and turgidity, Patricia Parker says that: “The inflation or bloating that affects both bodies and words” works as a primary motif in the play, representing the split between signifier and referent: epic heroism, chivalric honor, linguistic essentialism, love and faith all dissolve into accidental chances and inflated individual desires (224).
83. This kind of moral dilemma is clearly presented in the play as Clarke claimed that the play is "an allegory of the conflict between late feudal aristocracy and the rising bourgeois that played so great a part in [Shakespeare's] own time" (209).

84. Desire is permanently deferred in its fulfilment in the realm of human experience and transgresses the principle of reality in its illimitable lack: "Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition and insatiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched" (Durkheim, Suicide as quoted in Goodheart p.8).

85. In this paper, the use value is determined in relation to human needs, and the exchange value is decided in relation to other commodities.

86. Caudwell calls "bourgeois will" as the "principle of life for the Elizabethan age" and further defines it as the desire for "intemperate self-expression": the desire "to be the thing he is, to realize himself to the last drop, to give out in its purist and most exquisite form of aroma of self" (92).

87. A fifteenth-century manuscript folio entitled "How Knyghtis of the Bath Shulde Be Made" (ed. Harold Arthur and Viscount Dillon. P.68) includes the oath the aspirants were supposed to take: "ye schall love above all thinge and be
stedfaste in the feythe and sustene the chirch and ye schall
be trewe un to yowre sovereyne lorde and trewe of yowre
worde and promys & sekirtee in that oughte to be kepte.
Also ye schall sustene wydowes in ther right at every tyme
they wol requere yow and maydenys in ther virginite and
helpe hem & sucoure hem with yowre good for that for lak of
good they be not mysgovernyd. Also ye schall sitte i[n] noo
plase where that eny iugement schulde be gevyn wrongefully
ayens eny body to yowre knowleche. Also ye schall not
suffir noo murderis nor extorcioners of the kyngis pepill
with in the Contre there ye dwelle but with yowre power ye
schall lete doo take them and put them in to the handis of
Justice and that they be punysshid as the kyngis lawe woll”
(as quoted in Rovang p.52-53).

88. Girard maintains that “the theme of a disarmed
Hector” is not exclusively Shakespeare’s invention, but the
“collective murder of Hector” is purely Shakespearean
despite the text of Lydgate in which Hector is first
surrounded and attacked by the Myrmidons and is finally
killed by Achilles (232).

89. The term “fetishism” is rather used from the
Marxist perspective than from the Freudian. The term is
employed in this context to present a concept that the
process of commodification abstractly conceals and erases
the concrete and intrinsic relations between man and
commodity.
90. Michael Huspek views Foucauldian "resistence" to have "less visibility" than power: "As subjugated knowledge, predicated on "countertruths" and carried often by oppositional discourses (e.g., antilanguages), [resistence] may hide itself within power's reign of 'truth,' or if it does emerge to express its own 'truth,' it may be immediately disqualified, delegitimated, made unstable and insecure, if not altogether silenced" (99).

91. In view of the widening foreign trade and growing commercial practices in the late Elizabethan reign, the growing bourgeois ethic of the new commercial value structure in society is reflected in this imagery and the commodification of the female body.

92. As for the prevailing theme of precarious and relational identity, Freund says that: "The elusiveness of identity permeates the play and confers a peculiar dimension of doubleness and doubtfulness on the casual requests for identification scattered throughout the play" (32).

93. In The Metastases of Enjoyment, Slavoj Zizek says that "The knight's relationship to the Lady is thus the relationship of the subject-bondsman, vassal, to his feudal Master-Sovereign who subjects him to senseless, outrageous, impossible, arbitrary, capricious ordeals" (90).

94. Grady contends that Troilus' exaggerated idealization of female lover is a combination of "Petrarchan subjectivity" and "a heightened sexual appetite" (83).
95. The Lacanian "mirror stage" is explained by Easthope from a social perspective of psychoanalysis: "Looking in a mirror I see that image reflected there as myself (‘it’s me’) when it is never more than my likeness, and so misrecognise my identity in it. Similarly, since I must be somewhere, I live into--and live out--the social roles, identities and likeness offered by the ideological state apparatus (family, education, culture). Thus I am constructed to live as a free agent, produced to act as if unproduced. Ideology now comes to be defined effectively as the whole of my lived experience and cultural identity, all that I am beyond what is biologically given, the body" (40).

96. Adams puts Troilus’ narcissistic language in the negative perspective: "the flaw in T’s vow of faithfulness" is that it was given to "his own subjective idea of womanhood" (82).

97. As for the linguistic self-adulation of Troilus, Freund says: "But the strenuous embodiment of this consciousness in language destroys the subject; the very act of his authoring himself gives him away and splits the identity of author and word" (25).

98. Kaufmann sees the divided and multiple self as a conspicuous aspect of the play: characters "each possess a number of potential selves, and they decide to keep one of these alive, while avoiding the kind of conscious choice which will negate all other possibilities. . . ." (141).
99. Palmer says that "how go" means that "what is the state of the market in" (229). After consummation, Troilus and Pandarus jeeringly jokes about the romantic liaison previous night, and Troilus is "more allied with Pandarus than with Cressida" in this scene (Adelman 1985, 126).

100. Gordon Williams observes that the transfer of Cressida to the Greek camp by Diomedes is "his small-scale re-enactment of Helen's rape" (107).

101. Grady views the kissing scene as a kind of "sexual harassment" and further says that the interpretation of the scene ranges from "terrified victimization to courtly bantering to lusty and shocking sexual pleasure" (80).

102. Newman argues that "rhetoric and public speaking" were regarded as "anathema to women," and "the extent of this perceived threat may be gauged by the strict delegation of the talking women to the carefully defined and delimited spheres of private and domestic life in which the husband was exhorted to rule" (134).

103. As for the betrayal of Cressida against Troilus, Girard argues: "After his night with her, he thought that she would be forever at his mercy, but she caught him in a trap from which, this time, he cannot extricate himself" (138).

104. As for the elusive and dual nature of identity, the play persistently deals with the discrepancy "between the pure and constant identity of desire and the despoiled
and complex fragmentation of identity in reality” (Lyons 233).

105. Burns says that this play is “the ugliest of all Shakespeare’s plays in its language about women overall” (111).

106. Adelman says that Troilus tries to maintain “[his union with Cressida] by invoking even ‘the rule of unity’ against itself: here that rule—the guarantor of individual identity insofar as it postulates that a thing must be itself and not something else—guarantees not Cressida’s identity but her separation from herself, in the service of a larger unity” (1992 54).

107. Charnes revised the famous definition of desire in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* by Deleuze and Felix: “We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production. ‘There is only desire and the social, and nothing else’” (29).
CHAPTER III

SOCIAL ORDER AND SEXUAL CONTROL
IN MEASURE FOR MEASURE

1. Theoretical and Historical Perspectives

Measure for Measure provides a challenging and problematic study of human sexuality in which sexual desire and its legal control consistently dominate the structural, moral, and thematic development of the play to the end. The play problematizes the nature of sexual desire and its social meanings by suggesting that human sexuality is not only private and biological, but also social, cultural, and judicial. Sexual norms and their practices in society symbolically register and reflect the socio-historical context in which they are produced and performed. This study situates the drama in its specific historical context to trace the cultural meanings and moments that are inscribed in the text. Sexuality and its social control are also examined in connection with the Puritan theology of the household to trace social, economic, and moral crises at the turn of the sixteenth century.

In Measure for Measure, sexual desire provides the fundamental ground for human action, and human subjects neither move beyond the boundary of libidinal desire nor
perform their social functions as moral agents in this dark world. Humans are obsessed with sexual desire, and state power is mobilized to police the sexuality of its members. The governing authority of Vienna is linked to the world of prostitution through the legal control of sexuality, and the religious authority actively cooperates with the law in controlling sexual activities through the disguised Duke-friar, Vincentio. In Vienna, which reflects various social and historical aspects of London in the early modern period, personal sexual desire is brought into the social and public space to be controlled and tamed by state power and social control mechanisms.

In the case of Claudio and Juliet, sexual desire has to be controlled through the institution of marriage; otherwise, sexual desire remains dangerous and subversive to social order. In the play in which "its language, people, and plot are all saturated with sexuality," human libidinal energy is classified, repressed, prohibited, punished, and legitimized only through social and legal mediation (Berry 136). The nature of desire is judged by the legal authority of the state: moral versus immoral, legal versus illegal, adulterous versus legitimate. In The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault says that sex is "not only a secular concern but a concern of the state as well; to be more exact, sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals, to place themselves
under surveillance" (116).² The Viennese court carefully monitors and regulates the circulation of sexual energies in society under the authority of Angelo, whose sexuality, in turn, is placed under the constant watch by higher authority, the Duke.

As for the nature of sexuality, Foucault defines it as a cultural construct that is formed in close interaction with social and discursive practices, knowledge, and power in the semiotic field of culture:

Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries to gradually uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct . . . a great surface network in which . . . the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power. (1990 A, 105-6)

It becomes obvious in Measure for Measure that sexuality is codified in the public and social space, and it is placed under the control of state and religious power. Because of its subversive potential to social, moral, and economic stability, sexuality becomes an object of moral experience and social anxiety especially when the mounting crisis threatens social stability. In the play, no one is able to
fulfil his or her own private sexual desire without the legal and religious mediation of the state. In the process of social mediation whereby an extradiscursive domain (biological desire) is transfigured into a discursive formation (sexuality as a cultural construct), human body and sexual energy metamorphose into discourse and knowledge, and truth is finally produced as a discursive product (sexual norms and values). In this process, power and ideology produce, legitimize, and control human sexuality by means of moral discourse, theology, and the family system. In short, sexuality provides one of the most contested domains of social control and resistance.

For the fulfilment of hidden erotic desire, Angelo splits and struggles against himself, whose morality and psyche are the product of the dominant discourse in society. Until he realizes his hidden desire, human body and erotic energies remain as a mere object of repression and legal enforcement. For Isabella, sexual desire verges on the demarcation of spiritual damnation and salvation. For Claudio and Juliet, sexuality is the "prompture of blood," which is morally equated with "ratsbane" and a "thirsty evil" (II.iv.177; I.ii.12-13). Erotic desire is a social construct, whose meaning is always mediated and appropriated in the specific historical context as Valerie Traub says that sexuality has "no inherent meaning. We have no unmediated access to our bodies; our bodies, our
subjectivities, our desires, and anxieties are constituted in relation to social processes" (6-7).

Once human sexual drive and procreative power become socialized, hegemonic discourse imposes responsibility upon desiring subjects since sexuality, uncontrolled and uncensored, creates a fundamental and subversive challenge to the established social order and hierarchy. Marriage as one of the most effective control mechanisms of erotic and procreative power classifies, codifies, and normalizes human eroticism. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault theorizes the concept of the "deployment of alliance" as a way of illustrating the control mechanism embedded in the system of marriage: "It will be granted no doubt that relations of sex gave rise, in every society, to a 'deployment of alliance': a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of names and possessions" (106). With "the mechanisms of constraint," the institution of marriage is "built around a system of rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit," and its primary objective is to "produce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that governs them" (Foucault 1990 A, 106).

In Foucault's concept of sexuality, desire, marriage, and social order are conflated inseparably only to reproduce the established order and to perpetuate hegemonic discourse. In other words, sexuality is always politicized and
contested in a historical context to privilege the dominant ideology and its reified material structure. As a cross-section of economy, religion, authority, pedagogy, ideology and sexual desire, family—a concrete space of marriage—constitutes the basic unit of the social order, and for that very reason, sexuality and marriage need to be placed and examined in the socio-political domain where erotic desire and desiring subject become the main target of social control.

In *The World We Have Lost*, Peter Laslett says that “marriage was an act of profound importance to the social structure” in the sense that it creates a “new economic unit,” allows the “full membership of a community,” and adds a “cell to a village society” (94). The entire social structure was dependent on the family, the most basic unit of economy, politics, and religion in early modern England. In *The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641*, Stone gives a detailed picture of the early modern family system:

... the institution of the family was held together by law, custom, and convenience rather than by ties of sentiment or affection. The Tudor family was an institution for the passing on of life, name, and property, and it was not until the seventeenth century that it began to be regarded as an instrument of religion and moral instruction. (271)

He contends that the family was a social institution through
which the legal, pedagogical, religious, and moral norms are reinforced and perpetuated in early modern England. In his view, the family functioned as an institution of social normalization that internalized legal, economic, and religious norms in individual subjects.

In Puritan theology, the family was elevated to the level of "church and commonwealth in microcosm," and marriage functioned as "the origin and fountaine of all private and publike government" (Todd 1980, 23). As the center of religious education and social discipline, the family was supposed to play a primary role in establishing the kingdom of God in England: "let us consider that the family is the Seminary of the Church and Common-wealth; and as a private schoole, wherein children and servants are fitted for the public assemblies, as it were the Universities, to perform, when they meete together, all religious duties of Gods worship and service" (Downame as quoted in John Morgan 143). As implied in the words of "church" and "commonwealth," the family functioned as a center of religious and ideological indoctrination, and, by extension, the head of the household exercised his absolute authority over the family members as the religious and moral leader.

In that sense, at the bottom of the social control mechanism came the family that maintained, reproduced, and perpetuated the established hierarchical order of early
modern England. "Elizabethan and early Stuart Puritans" stressed the function of the household as "the fundamental spiritual unit of society" that was actively engaged in the production of docile human subjects:

It was in the family that the child learned basic social skills such as duty, humility, sobriety, and self-denial. The first necessity, in a highly stratified society, was obedience, and here the child could learn not only from its own experiences, but also from observing the inferior status of its mother.

(Todd 1980, 18; John Morgan 143)

As the primary unit of godly instruction, the Puritan family stressed self-denial and obedience in the fear of God and focused on producing faithful Puritan subjects who would be the reformers of the church and commonwealth. With the emphasis on religious education and discipline, Puritanism provided an effective social mechanism through which individuals were fashioned into docile religious subjects.

Another significant aspect of the Puritan spiritualization of the household and marriage came from the humanist social theory in the sixteenth century: not only English Calvinism but also Christian humanism laid the foundation for the spiritual and social elevation of marriage: "Later in the [sixteenth] century, [the] humanist concept of the household as the seminary of church and commonwealth became an important basis for the Puritan
stress on household education" (Todd 1980, 22-23). Todd argues that Puritans combined the humanist concept of "marriage as a state of intellectual and spiritual companionship" with "the Biblical doctrine that marriage was created by God and that woman is part of the human race, possessed of a reasonable soul and redeemed by Christ" (1980, 20). Erasmus said that "Dame nature her selfe hathe enacted marriage" and "commended marriage on the biblical basis of Christ’s presence at the wedding at Cana" (Todd 1980, 20). Deeply embedded in the religious and intellectual tradition of England in the sixteenth century, the Puritan ideology of marriage is not only a theological doctrine, but also a social theory.

The Puritan moral ideals of conscience and self-knowledge encourage the individual soul to examine its inner psyche and outer behavior in line with the Puritan spiritual paradigm of faith, glory of God, grace, self-justification and depravity. The Puritan self constantly tries to fit his or her psychic experiences in with the Puritan spiritual paradigm which is ideologically one of the most strict and effective control mechanisms. Man becomes a divine instrument to represent the glory of God and to achieve the kingdom of God on the earth, but at the same time, the concepts of depravity and self-justification inevitably lead to self-examination, self-denial and spiritual anxiety: the dualism of the soul in a state of grace and the flesh in a
state of depravity. On the Puritan premise that all humans are equally and completely sinful and corrupt in the alienation from God, man is in a constant struggle against himself to prove his spiritual justification by denouncing the fleshly and secular. This auto-didacticism (created most effectively in the patriarchal Puritan family) contributes to strict and effective social control in society.

At the turn of the sixteenth century in England, Puritanism was a neither uniform nor organized religion, but rather "an ethos which pervaded society and touched most people, except the Roman Catholics and the Queen" (Graves and Silcock 248). Despite such Puritan doctrines as predestination, justification, negation of reason, and biblicalism, "the Puritans of the Elizabethan age" remained members of the Anglican Church and attempted to reform it and society from within: "It was not until Charles I's policies in the late 1620s and 1630s that [Puritans] began to secede from the Church" (McGrath 33; Graves and Silcock 249). Even at the beginning of King James's reign, the doctrinal differences were not fundamental and essential except for the hard-line Puritans, and Puritanism was "part of the spiritual, intellectual and moral climate of the age" (Graves and Silcock 246).

From a perspective of religious and political struggle, McGrath says that "Puritan resistance" came to rise first
between 1558 and 1570 among those who were "very uneasy in their consciences about whether they could accept so imperfect a church as that established by law" (73-74). With the influence of Calvinism, Puritanism began to embrace discontented Protestants especially in Parliament, universities, and the London Protestant congregations, and Thomas Cartwright delivered in Cambridge "a series of lectures concerning the government of the early Christian church which were a fundamental challenge to the church established by law in 1559" (McGrath 80-81, 99).

With the rise of English Presbyterianism, Puritanism grew in power and intensity between 1570 and mid 1580's: "Elizabeth had by now a Parliament largely Puritan, and though Parliament was not yet anything like so powerful as it was to become, its wishes were having increasing weight" (McGrath 125; Maynard 217). During this period, a Presbyterian network was established within the Anglican Church, and Puritanism transformed into "an organised, disciplined movement" (Fulbrook 107, 110). Parliamentary campaigns continued to achieve reform with the help of some members of the Queen's Council such as Leicester, Walsingham, and Burghley who sympathized with the Puritan cause (Neale 323). J. E. Neale argues that when the Parliament met in 1584, "the Puritans had ready a flood of petitions from ministers, town corporations, Justices of the Peace, and the gentry of whole counties" (322).
At the same time, reform measures were introduced at the local level: "Ministers organised 'classis' [district conference] and conferences, meeting in small groups in their local area and coming together occasionally on a wider, regional basis" (Fulbrook 107; Neale 323). Puritans became involved with "local political struggles" for the places such as Justices of Peace, muster commissioners, and judges, and the Puritan alliance with common lawyers strengthened the reformist group in posing "local opposition to prerogative rule": "Puritanism was becoming firmly embedded as the religious orientation of sects of English society in a wider manner than the early campaigns for reform of ceremonial had implied" (Fulbrook 111).

With the appointment of archbishop John Whitgift to Canterbury in 1583, the Puritan movement met an obstacle and began to "crumble within": "In the late 1580s and '90s, through the efforts of Whitgift and Bancroft, the Puritan movement in the narrower sense was effectively extinguished" (McGrath 213; Fulbrook 112). Through sermons, tracts, and laws, he intensified his campaign for uniformity with the help of the queen, and, with the loss of its powerful support at court such as Leicester, Walsingham, and Burghley, Puritanism experienced serious setbacks in the face of the growing Anglican repression. In 1589 and 1590, the investigation into the Marprelate tracts discovered the covert presbyterian order and the Book of Discipline,
numerous Puritan preachers were imprisoned and sent for trial (Neale 327; McGrath 229-232; Fulbrook 112). The Puritans in the Parliament were "on the defensive," and the reform movement were weakening: "A generation of great Puritan patrons and parliamentarians were coming to an end" (Fulbrook 112). McGrath calls the repression in 1580's and 1590's "the Puritan onslaught" which led to the death of the Elizabethan Puritan movement in a political sense (205).

Despite its political defeat in London, Puritan "classes" survived in numerous regions, and "the evangelical impulse" was still "flourishing" with the help of "the local governors" who actively patronized or sympathized with Puritanism: "Nevertheless, Puritanism in the wider sense was too firmly entrenched in civil society to be engulfed by a more self-confident establishment or to succumb to concerted attacks from the centre" (Fulbrook 113; Guy 307). At the local level, the Anglican drive against Puritanism backfired "all over southern England": "In counties like Suffolk it sparked the puritan-politicization of the country gentry, who in their various roles as deputy lieutenants, muster commissioners, JPs, and assistants to the assize judges wielded local power" (Guy 307-8).

Between 1604 and 1608, Fulbrook says that the ejected preachers enjoyed "considerable freedom to continue preaching" in Nottinghamshire, and some clergymen were allowed to use the pulpit to advocate separatism by the
churchwardens (115). Not as a political power, but as a spiritual discipline and conscience, Puritan pietism continued to have its influence at the local level despite its political defeat. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Puritanism was mainly "an inward-turning struggle, concerned with conscience and spirit rather than politics and structure" (Fulbrook 116). It seems that the Puritan religious ideal of "godly life" still had profound influence on lay believers in the Church of England, and the Puritan religious tenet of biblicalism and conscience was not hampered by the so-called "triumph of conservatism" (Graves and Silcock iii).

In the face of the rapidly changing social, economic, and religious ethos in early modern England, the moral vision of the Chain of Being was seriously threatened as the governing principle of the state along with the social and political stability. In this social context, the governing class---religious and political power groups at the state and local levels---began to control sexuality as a way of maintaining social stability. With the ardent aspirations for social and political order, early modern England demonstrated a strong desire for the control of sexuality and the family structure.

As explained in the historical introduction to *Troilus and Cressida*, rapidly changing economic factors such as commercialism, massive production for the expanding domestic
and foreign markets, inflation, population increase, and polarization in the distribution of wealth radically undermined the social order and hierarchy of early modern English society and have also "turned sons and daughters of poor families into vagabonds and beggars--the masterless men and women that clogged the roads during the late Elizabethan period" (Appleby 27). Serious social and political efforts were made to contain the "disordering population growth" and to replant the roving band of vagabonds in their proper economic, hierarchical, and geographical spheres (Appleby 29). In addition to the moral and religious efforts to maintain social order, the government was also engaged in the legal control of the displaced poor: "The social order reflected in these statutes [the Statute of Artificers and the Poor Laws] is the traditional one where each person's status and location is prescribed, duties and responsibilities are fixed, purposes clear, and commitments arranged hierarchically: to God, to king, to overload, to one's superiors, to one's dependents" (Appleby 29-30). In these circumstances, the family was the most basic unit of social control, and any uncontrolled sexual desire posed anxiety and danger to the family-based social structure. Illegitimate pregnancy was thought to undermine the family structure as well as social order, and, at the same time, illegitimate children became a financial burden to the local government and parish.
Around 1604 when Measure for Measure was written and performed, the parish baptism registers shows that the reported bastardy ratio marked its highest peak. In the north and west of England, Ashton-under-Lyne records show that the illegitimacy ratio for the period between 1594 and 1604 was 6.8 percent, and in 1594, it reached 16.6 percent. It was almost 10 percent in the last decade of the sixteenth century at Rochdale and about 16 percent in Prestbury and Cheshire between 1571 and 1599 (Laslett 143). Because of the diverse geographic variations, the data cannot be trusted with the highest degree of accuracy, but they indicate the general attitude toward sexual practice and illegitimacy in early modern English society.

Judging from the statistics, it seems reasonable to assume that premarital pregnancy was unusually high when Measure for Measure was written and performed around 1604. As a sensitive register of social practices and changes, the play reflects the prevalent social anxiety over the weakening social order and the family structure under the threat of rising illegitimate pregnancy. Premarital pregnancy was taken as a major threat to the family structure (the most basic unit of society) and as a cause of the financial burden to the shrinking budget of the local government. In Shakespeare of London, Marchette Chute says that Shakespeare’s eldest daughter was conceived premaritally by citing her baptism record (49-50, 53).
addition, as Leah Marcus argues, the city of London made tremendous efforts to curb sexual transgressions and prostitution in this period: "Notorious brothel owners and employees from the suburbs were ostentatiously carted and whipped about London, then thrown into Newgate Prison, where they could form a reconstituted 'house' like the one Pompey discovers in the Viennese jail, teeming with all his old customers" (Marcus 163).

In early modern England, the attitude towards individual sexuality and marriage procedures differed from place to place, but it is clear that there was a tremendous gap between the religious and legal control mechanism of erotic desire and the plebeian practice of sexuality. Sexual irregularities were openly denounced as a disgrace, but public opinion did not take them as serious crimes. The gap was, to a large extent, derived from the ambiguous and often confusing nature of legitimate marriage, and even the ecclesiastical authorities failed to make a clear distinction between "two different types of marriage contracts" (Quaife 44). As for marriage, there were two legal traditions--civil law and canon law--that made marriage legitimate publically and officially. From the perspective of the civil law, there were two types of marriage contracts: "'Spousals de futuro' were contracts to marry and could be repudiated under reasonable circumstances by either party, and 'Spousals de presenti' were contracts
of marriage” (Quaife 45). In many cases, spousals de futuro (the “private promise of marriage between the two parties themselves”) were regarded as spousals de presenti (the “public contract” of marriage) when cohabitation and pregnancy occurred (Marcus 172). Spousals de presenti were also considered as legal and valid matrimones even if they were secret and done without ecclesiastical rituals: “Even the Church, after several centuries of endeavour, failed to have solemnisation accepted as the essential element in the marriage act” (Quaife 45).

The Church acknowledged that as long as both parties consented, a contractual marriage became valid and legal without a priest, witness, or any written deposition. At the same time, however, the canon law based on the Catholic and Anglican tradition insisted that “though valid and binding, such secret marriages were sinful and forbidden, and that, if they took place, the offenders were to be punished and forced to solemnize their marriage in ‘facie ecclesiae’” (Schanzer 76). Due to the discrepancy in the view of the legitimacy of matrimony between civil law and canon law, the practice and attitude towards marriage marked a wide difference, depending upon social class, economic status and locality (Laslett 150). And even in the Christian tradition, non-conformists differed from the Anglican Church: “For the nonconformists marriage consisted simply of a promise followed by consummation: church
ceremony was irrelevant" (Laslett 152).

Since Protestant theologians such as Richard Hooker elevated human beings to "voluntary agents," whose wills are free, "counselled by the promptings of conscience," and whose actions are derived from the "freely determinate choices," the reformed church, in principle rather than in practice, considered marriage as a matter of individual conscience rather than of legal and religious control (Wilks 23). Combined with the civil law tradition of contractual marriage, the attitude of the reformed church added to the moral and legal confusion concerning marriage. The two paradigms of matrimonial legality conflicted in principle, if not in reality, and at the same time, the friction continued to undermine the control mechanism of social order as well as sexuality.

Along with the definition of marital legitimacy, the view of premarital sexual activities became confusing and misleading; that is, dependent on the state of marital legitimacy, sexual contacts became classified as legitimate consummation or illegal fornication. Human sexual desire, in turn, came under strict and constant control. Despite the strenuous prohibitive efforts of the state and church, pre-nuptial fornication was widely prevalent. After analyzing the proceedings in the Registry of the Archdeaconry at Leister and especially a case dating from July, 1598, Laslett concludes:
. . . sexual intercourse did not have to await the conclusion of the church marriage; it was expected to take place directly after the contract was definitely concluded. Brides in Leister at this time must normally have gone to their weddings in the early, and sometimes in the late, stages of pregnancy. (150) Quaife also says that apart, perhaps, from the yeomanry and gentry, "sexual amorality is the dominant value among the peasantry," and "the pre-nuptial pregnancy before the church wedding was quite acceptable to the community if he did marry the girl later" (Quaife 245). It is notable that there was a great discrepancy in the attitudes towards illicit sexual activities between the governing legal authority and low peasantry as clearly shown in the case of the opposed attitudes to the consummation of marriage in Measure for Measure.

As for the rise of the illegitimate birth rate, historians do not seem to agree on the exact cause of the rising pattern. What is clear is, however, that there was a strong control mechanism of sexuality, and the parish-based community in general (including villages and small towns where 90 percent of the population lived) placed a constant and suspicious watch upon their members, especially young unmarried couples. For example, village people kept a close eye on single females, and any girl suspected of incontinence was immediately accused and put to the test:
"the sight of a village lass sitting peacefully under a hedge with a [disreputable] soldier made one respectable citizen so furious that he stabbed her severely with his sword" (Quaife 49, 89). Some similar incidents that illustrate the close monitoring of individual sexuality and illicit relationships by community and neighbors are not difficult to find in sixteenth and seventeenth century England (Quaife 48-56). Moreover, in London of 1604, the penalties for sexual offences were exceptionally strict, and the royal court and church were "exerting their own competing effort to surmount the crazy quilt of local jurisdictions with one overarching standard governing marriage and sexuality" (Marcus 175).

As for the legal and religious control of the sexuality, the archdeacon’s court, which was the lowest of the ecclesiastical courts and often referred to by people as the "bawdy court," had jurisdiction over sexual irregularities and was "willing to act on rumour" (Quaife 48; Laslett 151). In addition to the court’s function of enforcing church attendance and religious conformity, its jurisdiction over sexuality indicated "one aspect of the wider desire by the state to regulate the lives of those it ruled" (Sharpe, 85). Above all, the control of sexual desire by the ecclesiastical court clearly indicates anxiety over the changing moral values and further demonstrates the aspiration of the reformist ruling class for the maintenance
of social order: "Certainly the desire to suppress ungodly
behaviour in general, and sexual immorality in particular,
makes sense if we accept that there was a divergence in
‘mores’ between the established village notables and the
marginal poor," and "again the impression is one of
regulative laws being imposed upon the poorer members of
village society by the richer" (Sharpe 86).

In the sense that the social control of sexuality has
historical continuity in the second half of the sixteenth
and the first half of the seventeenth century, it is
meaningful to trace the development of the penal system in
controlling sexual offences. The jurisdiction moved from
the church court to the secular court in the first half of
the seventeenth century, and in the wording of the law, the
punishment became severe: "London, unlike Shakespeare’s
Vienna, did not punish sexual incontinence with death, but
there were numerous ‘precise’ and vocal Londoners who
argued, like Angelo, that it should" (Marcus 163). The
punishment ranged from whipping, fine, public penance,
imprisonment to possible death in 1650 (Quaife 197; Laslett
137, 140-41). In 1650, fornication temporarily became a
capital punishment as dramatically depicted in Measure for
Measure, but there is no record for the application of the
law to any actual cases (Quaife 197; Marcus 174).

Around 1550, historians detected “evidence of a wider
growth of ‘law and order consciousness’” and the
"intensification of concern over law and order":
  After the Reformation, the rulers of England were continually confronted by the grim spectre of religious, ideological, and social unrest. . . . It is impossible not to interpret the growing severity in criminal statutes as further evidence of a fundamental concern about social order. (Sharpe 16-17)

In the context of the growing specter of instabilities in social hierarchy and political order, the increasing severity of punishment for sexual offences shows the anxiety and desire to regulate the community by the state. In this context, the Renaissance rage for order turns out to be a radical and anxious reaction to the transition of society, and, as part of this wider picture of social regulation, the increased sexual control offers a significant key to the interpretation of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure.

In Measure for Measure, the inseparable coexistence of sin and crime, the church and the secular court, and religion and society still remains indistinguishable to Claudio and other characters, including Isabella, but the emerging attitude of differentiation on the part of Angelo ruptures him into a split subject. For him, the Christian humanist ideal of natural law no longer remains compatible with social order and civil law, and only power, that is, law offers the basis of social order. The vision of the morally-ordered universe is not compatible with Angelo’s
legalism. His extreme disillusion with the human body and sexual desire shows his puritanical obsession with spirit over body and makes him an adversary against himself.

2. Puritan Subjectivity

In Measure for Measure, sexual desire is dramatized as dangerous and subversive to the social order of Viennese society. Unrestrained sexuality is presented as the chaotic and wicked power that needs to be tamed, controlled, and allocated into the proper social space, that is, the institution of marriage. Desire itself is deprived of its proper representation in the pathologically dark picture of the play: sexuality is either a target of stoic abstinence and repression on the part of the state power or mere licentiousness in the underworld of prostitution. Sexuality is deprived of its natural power of procreation and mutual love in “the extremes of suppression and licence” (L. C. Knight 223).

At the opening of the play, judicial authority moves from the Duke to Angelo for the purpose of enforcing the law of sexual control, which has not been enforced for the past nineteen years. The Viennese court has “strict statutes and most biting laws” that have been let slip “like an o’er-grown lion in a cave / That goes not out to prey” (I.iii.19, 22-23). As a result, the law and the authority of the court have become “more mock’d than fear’d,” and moral disorder
and liberty came to tease "Justice by the nose,/ The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart/ Goes all decorum" (I.iii.27, 29-31). The social order and hierarchy have been turned upside down, and reason and decorum have lost their regulative power by allowing people "scope" and "permissive pass" rather than imposing "punishment" (I.iii.35, 38-39).

To test Angelo's integrity and simultaneously to establish social order and control, the Duke uses Angelo by investing him with the authority and terror to pronounce "mortality and mercy" in Vienna (I.i.44). The Viennese court and the Duke turn to the law to cope with the permissive and failing moral milieu, and as a puppet, Angelo is given the judicial power to maintain the social and ideological order of Viennese society. In the context of ascending tension between sexual liberty and the moral order, Angelo paralyzes his psyche by imposing "upon his sexual self the psychic equivalent of castration," an attribute "internalized in the moral force of Angelo's superego" (Wheeler 115). As a "motion ungenerative," the deputy is chosen to control and de-sexualize the threatening libidinal energy in society and, at the same time, to maneuver untamed libidinal forces into the institutionalized space of marriage (III.ii.108). Despite the incomparable praise by the Duke--"Our city's institutions, and the terms / For common justice, y'are as pregnant in / As art and practice hath enriched any,"--Angelo is a socially-
constructed puppet, a kind of "repressed desire in the form of debased sexuality" (I.i.10-12; Wheeler 139). Until his repressed and demonized sexual desire returns and polarizes his psychic unity immediately after meeting Isabella, Angelo remains obsessed with his puritanical self, negating his sexual libido repressed in the body.

From a Lacanian perspective, man acquires individual subjectivity by being inserted into the Symbolic order: "it is the symbolic order which is determinant of subjectivity, and the imaginary realm of images and appearances are merely effects of the symbolic" (Evans 203). In other words, a subject, multiple and divided, ascends from the confusion of the Imaginary order into the Symbolic order of law, language, religion, ideology, and culture, which MacCannell calls "a vast unconscious" (132). The multiple self is socially mediated into a Symbolic self: "Behind the Symbolic lies the notion of mediated (unconscious) desire" (MacCannell 132). Sarup says that as the human subject acquires language, he or she is inserting the self into "a pre-existing Symbolic order and thereby submitting his or her desire to the systematic pressures of that order" for "instinctual energies to be operated upon and organised" (1992, 105-6). In that sense, the subject-constituting process alienates the self from the real, and culture and ideology actively produce false consciousness and desire to bridge the gap between reality and consciousness.
Individuality acquired in the Symbolic stage seems unified and solid on the surface, but it is an illusory and fragile identity (illusion of individual autonomy) divorced from the real world (lived experience and actual relationship) as shown in the immediate breakdown of Angelo’s Puritanical subjectivity after his fateful meeting of Isabella. A subject cannot escape a rupture between self and world ("the other") as well as within its psychic continuity. In the Symbolic stage, the natural became de-natured, represented, and interpreted into the Symbolic order of law. In other words, the natural power of sexual libido is repressed into abstinence in the process of constructing Angelo’s puritanical subjectivity. In that sense, human psyche (including the unconscious) is constituted in the social and cultural field, and human sexuality becomes an ideological construct. The ego and the Cartesian self which traditional psychology regarded as the originary and transcendent source of human psyche need to be decentered as an illusion and can no longer uphold their autonomy free from the socio-historical pressure and subject-constituting power.24

As for Angelo, the lack of self-knowledge and the misguided sense of moral perfection derive from the illusion of his Symbolic selfhood that is constituted by puritanical moral exactitude:

O fie, fie, fie
What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?

. . . . . . . . . . .

What is’t I dream on?

O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,

With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous

Is that temptation that doth goad us on

To sin in loving virtue. Never could the strumpet

With all her double vigor, art and nature,

Once stir my temper: but this virtuous maid

Subdues me quite. Even till now

When men were fond, I smil’d, and wonder’d how.

(II.i.172-73, 179-83)

Suddenly, the illusion of his idealized, fixed and stable self collapses and splits into an unimaginable monster. The ego and identity that he firmly trusted betray his reason, and he can only marvel at his monstrous protean self. Once a rupture takes place in his psychomachia, his moral vision becomes disrupted and inverted: reality and dream lose distinction, saint is equated with strumpet, and virtue is confused with vice. As Lucio correctly and insightfully describes him as “a motion ungenerative,” Angelo is a socially constructed puppet, whose psyche is repressed in the puritanical moral ethos (III.ii.108). To Angelo, his consciousness and desires are transparent and controllable all the time, but the vast space and power of the unconscious (socially constructed and psychologically
uncontrollable) remain outside his moral and psychological
domains. In the unconscious, his repressed desires escape
repression and then immediately intensify enough to plot a
rape, which is unthinkable to him before the collapse of the
fictional equilibrium of the rational subject: "the social
reality is then nothing but a fragile, symbolic cobweb that
can at any moment be torn aside by an intrusion of the real"

In Deleuze and Guattari, Ronald Bogue says that "group
subjectivity constitutes the 'absolute preliminary' for the
emergence of all individual subjectivity"; in other words,
human psyche (consciousness and unconscious) is social and
historical to a large extent (83, 93-94). Humans feel the
gap between the Real and the experienced reality, and the
gap is bridged by the "imaginary identification" imposed by
society and its dominant ideological system (Lemaire 72).
In the sense of Foucault’s epistemology and Boudieu’s
"habitus" ("structured structures predisposed to function as
structuring structures"), a human transforms into a social
subject as part of the group subjectivity; that is, human
body and psyche cannot escape being the target of ideology
and politics (72).

Angelo’s puritanical individuality is not uniquely his
own since his sense of selfhood and psyche is part of the
group subjectivity and is the product of the historical
"habitus." Angelo’s sense of selfhood and moral certainty
is clear and self-confident if illusionary:

'Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus,
Another thing to fall"; "rather tell me,
When I that censure him do so offend,
Let mine own judgement pattern out my death,
And nothing come in partial." (II.i.17-18; 28-31).

The Duke also portrays him in a clear, but highly sarcastic manner: "Lord Angelo is precise; / Stand at a guard with
Envy; Scarce confesses / Not his blood flows; or that his
appetite / Is more to bread than stone" (I.i.50-53). Fully
charged with inner tension, Angelo's psyche is
characteristic of Christian asceticism. In The Use of
Pleasure, Foucault says that "Christianity associated the
sexual act with sin, evil, the Fall, and death," and as a
result, the dissociation of flesh and soul valorized the
concepts of abstinence, chastity and virginity (14). In
Christian ascetic culture, sexuality has become
problematic and morally devalued, and sexual behavior came
to be conceived as "a domain of moral experience" (Foucault
1990 B, 24).

Asceticism, one aspect of Puritan self-examination, is
"a systematic self-discipline in feeling, interaction, and
action" against the spontaneous and impulsive response to
life (Leites 1982, 395). Especially for Puritanism, the
ascetic concepts of self-control, self-knowledge, self-
examination, and conscience restrict the experience of the
Puritan self and induce disciplined obedience to God as God's spiritual instrument. In *The Puritan Experience*, Owen Watkins argues that the Puritan self is required to measure his experiences against divine standards and to fit his experiences into Puritan spiritual norms in search of the self-justification and the glory of God: the "zealous effort to make all experiences fit" (228). In a sense, Puritan subjectivity assumes a fictitious identity of humiliated and depraved, but zealous selfhood. The Puritan zeal and anxiety to fashion religious subjectivity is significant: "'a Christian anatomizeth himself; he searcheth what is flesh, and what is spirit; what is sin, and what grace.' The inner landscape had already been mapped by experts. A man knew what he ought to find, because everyone was alike" (Thomas Watson, *Heaven Taken by Storm* 56 quoted in Watkins 231).

The Puritan paradigm of stoic ethical and religious subjectivity "interpellates" all individuals into the "Symbolic order" of Puritan selfhood in the Althusserian and Lacanian sense, and the Puritan conscience which continues to foreground depraved reason, spiritual insecurity, and skeptical view of self legitimizes absolute obedience and coercive control. By elevating individual conscience and self-knowledge, Puritanism seems to have contributed to the creation of modern subjectivity, but in actuality, it greatly reduced individual initiatives through religious
"interpellation" in Althusserian terms. The Puritan conscience and self-knowledge resided in individual psyche as the control mechanism in the production of docile and subordinate souls; as a result, the Puritan psyche was in deep and perpetual tension, alternating between spiritual security and insecurity. The constant strife between the self-fashioned Puritan ego and the return of repressed desires deep at heart seems to characterize the split psyche of the Puritans. In short, the split between body and soul characterizes Puritan mentality.

In the Puritan mind-set, a human is under constant pressure to turn himself or herself into an ethical and religious subject. A subject is not allowed to moderate its bodily desires but is required to achieve absolute self-mastery to fit all of its experiences as God’s divine instrument. Puritans were encouraged to subordinate this attitude of stoic self-denial to their social experiences thereby consciously participating in the production of their own docile subjects. In that sense, Puritans constantly experienced the internal alienation of soul and body in their daily lives, and, by extension, Puritan zeal for social reform is inseparably intertwined with private self-mastery.

Many critics argue that Angelo’s lack of self-knowledge is the source of the play’s primary moral dilemma, this lack of self-knowledge is, seen in historical context,
characteristic of Puritan subjectivity. Marc Shell argues that Angelo’s fault is “not hypocrisy but lack of self-knowledge” (86). Angelo’s first reaction to his encounter with the emergence of repressed sexual desire was a stark surprise: “what are thou, Angelo?” (II.ii.173). This stable Puritan self is shattering down as a mere fictional construction of Puritan subjectivity: “From thee: even from thy virtue! What’s this? What’s this? Is this her fault, or mine?” (II.ii.162-64). The moment he realizes his desire for Isabella, he is at a loss, not knowing how to cope with and tame his rebellious instinct. As part of God’s image and spiritual instrument on the earth, Angelo’s conscience (an idealized moral subject) demonstrates a dichotomy between good and evil as shown in his imagery of sexuality and psychic disintegration. In his idealized Puritan psyche, sexual desire equals the “carrion” that corrupts, “lying by the violet in the sun,” and he again portrays his sexuality as the destructive instinct “to raze the sanctuary/ And pitch our evils there” (II.ii.166-67, 171-72).

For Angelo, who Shell argues suffers the “internal castration of the mind,” the return of sexual desire repressed in his unconscious proves the most horrific and even traumatic awareness of the dual nature of his identity (85). In Angelo’s psyche, fleshly desire has no place and function other than as the object of repression and control.
for the purpose of self-examination and self-justification. Once his Puritan subject encounters the unexpected and unimaginable challenges of sexual appeal in Isabella's saintly beauty, Angelo's self-righteous moral vision and sovereign conscience simply crumple in his psyche. His Puritan self, that seems to have been in perfect harmony with his religious principle of self-denial, has finally ruptured, and then Angelo goes through a keen awareness of the discrepancy between the symbolic and the real in the Lacanian sense.

The fundamental psychic process for the constitution of Puritan morality depends upon self-examination and self-discipline on the basis of the divinely-informed individual conscience. But as seen in Angelo's emphasis on self-discipline over the self-examination of true inner psyche and experience, Puritan ideology prioritizes the disciplining and mastering of desires by subordinating self-examination as another form of self-control: "To know oneself was paradoxically the way to self-renunciation" (Foucault 1988, 22). Foucault further elaborates on Christian asceticism: "In Christianity asceticism always refers to a certain renunciation of the self and of reality because most of the time your self is a part of that reality you have to renounce in order to get access to another level of reality" (1988, 35). Puritan morality prescribes self-renunciation as the prerequisite to spiritual salvation; as a result, a Puritan psyche is required to discover and
suppress the inner self that is fallen and depraved.

Isabella challenges Angelo's self-righteousness by asking him to question his own psychic and legal certainty:

Go to your bosom,

Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know
That's like my brother's fault. If it confess
A natural guiltiness, such as is his,
Let it not sound a thought upon your tongue
Against my brother's life. (II.ii.137-142)

Despite the theological ideals of sovereign conscience and direct individual access to God, Angelo's Puritan psyche lacks in self-examination that would reveal human frailties in himself. Isabella says that to be aware of one's "natural guiltiness" through self-examination is the first step to mercy, and she advocates the law of nature rather than that of man. By contrast, Angelo is obsessed with his moral righteousness and ready to pass judgment in the name of justice, but, in actuality, he has neither gone to his heart deeply enough nor knocked his heart sincerely enough. Being "dress'd in a little brief authority," Angelo is "most ignorant of what he's most assur'd" and plays "such fantastic tricks" like "an angry ape" (II.ii.119-22). "A natural guiltiness" in himself has never been properly examined and tested in his consciousness, or, to be exact, it has not been even examined since it has been repressed in his unconscious from the start.

Angelo, a Puritan subject, is obsessed with renouncing
his sexual desire as a sign of rebellious and fallen nature:

A man whose blood

Is very snow-broth; one who never feels

The wanton stings and motions of the sense;

But doth rebate and blunt his natural edge

With profits of the mind, study and fast. (I.iv.57-61)

Angelo renounces his "natural edge" as his psychic enemy and then naturalizes his defective Puritan ego (I.iv.60). The religious and social ideals have been inscribed in his nature and psyche; that is, what he believes to be his natural self turns out to be a social, religious, and ethical construct. His seemingly natural and autonomous selfhood emerges as a mere "figure" "stamp'd" upon his "metal" in Angelo's own imagery, and the illusionary self simply collapses under the weight of reality (I.i.47-49).

Angelo's psychological realism sharply penetrates into and shakes his Puritan subjectivity: "she speaks, and 'tis such sense / That my sense breeds with it" (II.ii.143-43). Isabella's words make sense with such revelation and persuasive power that his sensuality abruptly emerges into his consciousness from the repression of the unconscious. The images of chastity and rationality ironically stir up his sexuality and emotional tribulation by subverting the dichotomy of body and soul. The moment Angelo realizes the ironic truth that sensuality "breeds" with chastity and rationality, his disrupted self suddenly becomes susceptible to all temptations. Thus, Angelo responds to Isabella's
offer of true prayers: “Hark, how I’ll bribe you: my good lord, turn back. / How! Bribe me?” (II.ii.146-47)

Once Angelo discovers the deeply repressed subversive self in his psyche, his responses are first to question the validity and durability of his social self and then to deny his new awareness by demonizing the newly-found subversive self:

What’s this? What’s this? Is this her fault, or mine?  
The tempter, or the tempted, who sins most, ha?  
Not she; nor doth she tempt; but it is I  
That, lying by the violet in the sun,  
Do as the carrion does, not as the flower,  
Corrupt with virtuous season” (II.ii.163-68).

He is deeply confounded at his multiple selves that he first encounters in his psyche, and then he turns to his religious paradigm of sin and temptation as if to deny his split subjectivity. But he quickly realizes that there was no temptation, and it is only he who lusts for Isabella’s chastity. He is thrown into moral confusion and then denies his sexual desires as external to himself by describing them with imagery of putridness. In stark contrast to the brilliant visual imagery of the “violet in the sun” and the “flower,” the imagery of the corrupting carrion is unmistakably indicative of his sudden moral dislocation and self-abhorrence. For puritanical Angelo, sexuality is no other than the “unfortunate evidence of the sinfulness of man” as Stone said in *The Family, Sex and Marriage* (523).
His self-image of "razing the sanctuary" further shatters his complacent selfhood and leaves him in deep moral skepticism.

In a short moment of moral revelation, he realizes the absurdity and fragility of his religious and moral idealism: "O, let her brother live! / Thieves for their robbery have authority, / When judges steal themselves" (II.ii.175-77). Angelo, however, fails to acknowledge the fragility of human nature as well as of his psychic reality under the burden of puritanical moral stricture. If the short moment of self-awareness were truly revealing, he would have neither committed the rape nor ordered the execution of Claudio later in the play. Angelo's vision of the moral and legal orders has been shaken and shattered at its very foundation, and he is left in moral confusion rather than in a new moral vision: "What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?" (II.ii.173). The paralyzing psychic contradiction is, to a large extent, symptomatic of the dilemma of a puritanical split subjectivity.

In the first appearance of Isabella, she shows the same subjectivity of Puritan self-discipline as Angelo. She desires stricter control of the body: "I speak not as desiring more, / But rather wishing a more stricter restraint / Upon the sisters stood, the votarists of Saint Clare" (I.iv.3-5). In her self-righteous conscience, she is another ideological puppet rather than a true human being. Fornication does not differ from any other condemned crime.
to her:

There is a vice that most I do abhor,
And most desire should meet the blow of justice;
For which I would not plead, but that I must;
For which I must not plead. . . . (II.ii.29-33)

And immediately after the speech, she quits pleading
with Angelo for her brother and leaves, saying that “O just
but severe law! / I had a brother, then: heaven keep your
honor” (II.ii.41-42). Her sense of moral righteousness is
too strict and strong to accommodate human fault and fallen
human nature, and her main concern revolves around self-
justification and divine law, failing to “experience the
full guilt of [her] sin in the light of God’s love, to
mediate on the power and love of Christ, and to implore the
aid of the Spirit for all [her] infirmities” (Watkins 15-
16). The concept of self-examination was, to a large
extent, misinterpreted and eventually misused as a mechanism
of social control. 28 Though Isabella speaks of mercy,
grace, and divine justice, she is as “precise” as Angelo,
and she is obsessed with godly discipline.

But Isabella immediately turns into a human of blood
and emotion when she asks Angelo to spare her brother’s life
and questions him: “Who is it that hath died for this
offence? / There’s many have committed it” (II.ii.89-90).
Isabella’s puritanical nature, nevertheless, still remains
indelibly deep in her soul, and she responds harshly to her
brother’s suggestion that she give up her body to Angelo to
save his life: "Better it were a brother died at once, / Than that a sister, by redeeming him, / Should die forever" (II.ii.106-108). In Puritan theology, individual conscience not only constitutes the ultimate human potential to achieve an enlightened understanding of divine law and grace, but also offers a site of moral struggle to assure a faithful believer of his spiritual redemption. At the cost of any sacrifice including the life of her brother, Isabella believes that her conscience should not be stained and degraded in sin for her spiritual redemption.

It is not for mere self-righteousness and selfishness, but out of an abhorrence of spiritual damnation that Isabella refuses to yield her body to "such abhorr’d pollution" with strong vehemence:

As much for my poor brother as myself;  
That is, were I under the terms of death,  
Th’impression of keen whips I’d wear as rubies,  
And strip myself to death as to a bed  
That longing have been sick for, ere I’d yield  
My body up to shame.

Then, Isabella live chaste, and brother, die:  
More than our brother is our chastity.

(II.iv.99-104, 182-84)

She is not so much concerned with her bodily chastity and life as with her unblemished conscience and soul since the individual soul makes a direct contact and communion with
God and is the ultimate standard of redemption.

In terms of the autonomous individual soul imagined by Puritans, Foucault contends that an individual subject is "the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him into existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (1977, 30). Foucault’s statement can be recontextualized to suggest that Puritan theology constructs a human soul into an ideological subject whose sense of self-mastery and self-examination, in turn, control his body and spirit by disciplining individual conscience. In that sense, Puritanism strongly advocates and encourages the "culture of discipline" with religious zeal and an ascetic conviction (Todd 1987, 7). When Isabella says that "more than our brother is our chastity," she makes it clear that "chaste constancy" is not "her possession, but an element in a larger whole," and the "idealization of chaste constancy" indirectly reinforces the control of sexuality in the Jacobean society by demonizing "unceremonialized sex" as a "greater evil than murder" (French 191, 197). In the play, human sexuality is portrayed as "evil, filthy, disgusting, [and] disease," and "only marriage can purify it" through control for the social and religious order (French 197). In combination with Puritan conscience, the elevation of family as the basic unit of religious practice and education
greatly contributed to the control of unwedded sexual activities as well as to the maintenance of social order in general.\textsuperscript{29} In the world of \textit{Measure for Measure}, sexuality is no longer individual and private, but collective, social, and public, and by extension, sexuality is one of the major domains Puritan reformists focused on to achieve a new social order based on individual conscience.

3. Judicial Control of Sexuality

For Puritans who aspired to eternal salvation through ascetic self-control, excessive and unregulated sexual desire was rejected as an archenemy and a sign of spiritual depravation.\textsuperscript{10} Samuel Danforth says that sexual uncleanness “blines the Mind, darkens the Understanding, extinguishes the Light of Nature, and of Common Grace, and makes a man a fool,” and he further argues that “Let thy lustful Body be everlasting Fuel for the unquenchable fire; Let thy lascivious Soul be eternal Food for the never-dying Worm . . . Hell from beneath is moved to meet thee, and is ready to entertain thee” ("The Cry of Sodom Enquired Into" 6, 14 as quoted in Verduin 222, 227).\textsuperscript{11} This perspective might be too radical and reductive to be a standard Puritan response to sexuality, but the Puritan concern over sexual excess seems to have been clearly illustrated. For the Puritans who were anxious to achieve spiritual salvation and divine grace, sexuality was sinful concupiscence even within marriage if it is not for the elevation of divine glory.
(Weber 158, 263). In the Puritan paradigm that the soul is the self imprisoned in the fallen and rebellious body, the flesh becomes the target of repression and active self-discipline, and sexuality is finally reduced to the enemy of the Puritan conscience.

Once conscience comes to dwell at the center of the Puritan self with its unique sovereignty, sexuality (the "idolatory of the flesh") moves into the realm of active and systematic discipline and regulation by conscience (Leites 1986, 99). The "censoring powers of conscience" define and constitute a new form of sexuality; in other words, a new control mechanism of sexual desire is created in response to "the power of conscience": "the causal link between the new conscience and the new sexuality" (Leites 1986, 144).

Leites further claims that "it is because of the new conscience that a new sense of sex's mysterious place in the human psyche comes about. Far from simply repressing sex, conscience also creates it" (1986, 144). Like Foucault's concept of power that produces rather than suppresses, the Puritan conscience devises and produces a new socially and religiously stable form of sexuality--marriage.

In "The Puritans and Adultery," Keith Thomas describes Puritan efforts to control sexuality:

If any single measure epitomises the triumph of Puritanism in England, it must surely be the Commonwealth's act of 10 May 1650 "for suppressing the detestable sins of incest, adultery and fornication."
This was an attempt, unique in English society, to put the full machinery of the state behind the enforcement of sexual morality. (257)

Keith Thomas argues that the 1650 law was not only the result of the Puritan revolution, but also “the culmination of more than a century’s legislative pressure” (281). In conjunction with other socio-economic factors, the state began to repress sexuality. Sexuality was defined as a spiritual sin and the root of all vice as shown in Measure for Measure. In addition to controlling and channeling sexual energies through the ascetic regulation of conscience, the household as a little commonwealth laid a ground for sexual control. Uncontrolled sexual desire disrupts marriage, family, church, community and nation: “For the state, Passive Obedience to the husband and father in the home was the model for and guarantee of Passive Obedience to the king in the nation” (Stone 1979, 410).

Christian reformists believed that the Christian commonwealth could be achieved only by the rightly educated souls in the spirit of Christian piety and social responsibility. In other words, as social and religious evils are rooted in human frailties, they believed that social and religious justice could be achieved only by reforming individual conscience in the spirit of the Scriptures. The Protestant reform focused on a new depraved, but spiritually autonomous subjectivity armed with a sovereign conscience and just soul.
In the context of Protestant social reform and spiritual education, matrimony has a special meaning and function. Socially, Protestant theologians attributed three major functions to marriage: the "avoidance of fornication," "the procreation of legitimate children," and "the public interest in law and order" (Stone 1979, 101-2).

Religiously, the family served as a unit of "spiritual intimacy" and education:

Attendance at service in church remained a formal Sunday obligation, but devotional piety shifted to the daily attendance at family prayers; moral control by the priest was partially replaced by moral direction by the head of the household; and Church catechisms were partially replaced by catechisms for the household, about a hundred of which were published between 1550 and 1600 alone. (Stone 1979, 101, 104)

The household took the place of the church, and the father served as spiritual leader in the small church of the family. By emphasizing the "doctrine of the priesthood of all believers" for the spiritualization of the household, Protestant ideology succeeded in bring "order, discipline, and obedience to the family, as well as to society as a whole" (Stone 1979, 111).

As a way of maintaining social order through the family, sexuality should be controlled by legal and religious authorities. Marriage was primarily intended to control sexual desire in society—legitimate procreation and
avoidance of fornication. Without due religious and legal control of sexuality, traditional social order and matrimonial system can neither function nor exist. Unrestrained desire continues to endanger and destabilize the matrimonial structure and poses a major threat to social order.

As a sign of social threat, sexual desire is frequently compared with venereal disease and evil in the body of the state: "a French velvet," "a French Crown," "Sciatica" and "a thirsty evil" (I.ii.33, 48, 55, 122). In response to Lucio's question of why he was arrested, Claudio answers:

> From too much liberty, my Lucio. Liberty,  
> As surfeit, is the father of much fast;  
> So every scope by the immoderate use  
> Turns to restraint. Our natures do pursue,  
> Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,  
> A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.  

(I.ii.117-22)

Liberty, unrestrained and licentious gratification of desire, eventually leads to the "fast" of imprisonment and punishment, and the unguided release of desire poisons both individuals and society like ratsbane.

For the purity of spiritual conscience, the sovereign principle of self-examination and self-denial translates "the flesh into the root of all evil" (Foucault 1990 A, 19). In the context of the soul and body dualism, the body as the negative "other" of the soul is demonized in the
form of moral depravity. If a self is to achieve spiritual salvation, the body must be disciplined, controlled, and demarcated as the alien part of the self. In the paradigm of Puritan spiritualism, murder and lechery are of the same moral value in that one brings physical death, and the other spiritual. In this sense, Claudio’s sexual imagery of death is characteristic of the Puritan obsession with spiritual purity and asceticism.

At the center of the Puritan moral vision lies steady conscience that is to be achieved only in “a steadiness in God’s will” (Leites 1986, 30). Without constancy in God, sexual desire is merely impulsive, carnal, and concupiscent as shown in Claudio’s self-incriminating speech in I.ii. His words such as “too much liberty,” “surfeit,” and “immoderate use” all indicate excessive sexual desire that is intrinsically opposed to Puritan steady conscience. Despite his sexual transgression and protest against arbitrary indictment (“she is fast my wife”), the imagery in his answer shows that Claudio’s view of sexuality is heavily influenced by the Puritan moral norm--ascetic and steady conscience (I.ii.136).

Ironically, Lucio again asks if the crime is murder or lechery in response to Claudio’s repentant speech that “too much liberty” is like ratsbane. This question implies that murder and pregnancy have the same weight by the Viennese legal standards. Lechery is such a serious crime that it is punishable by death in contrast to the common sense of
society. His next question raises a doubt about the validity of the death sentence imposed upon Claudio: "Is lechery so look'd after?" (I.i.133). From the perspective of the Viennese law, lechery is as dangerous to social order as murder is, and, at the same time, lechery is as detrimental to spiritual salvation as murder is from a Puritan perspective.

Furthermore, Angelo indicates that individual sexuality and state governance are not clearly demarcated as separate entities to him: "Their saucy sweetness that do coin heaven's image / In stamps that are forbid" (II.iv.45-46). In his legal view, procreation without divine sanction is analogous to illegal coinage that is prohibited by the law of the state. In that sense, the imagery implies that individual sexuality and procreation are under the control of the state power like coinage. This imagery also shows the legal dilemma of the Viennese court: the conflict is between human law and divine law. Coinage is controlled by state law, and procreation is sanctioned by divine law. However, there is no legal hierarchy indicated in the imagery: the two different legal perspectives are treated with the same moral value and legitimacy. In this moral and legal indeterminacy, the Machiavellian deputy can insist on the full severity of state law, negating the moral basis of divine law.

In Measure for Measure, sexuality is not set aside as private, but always remains in the realm of the public--
judicial, economic, and political:

Thus stand it with me: upon a true contract
I got possession of Julietta's bed.
You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
Save that we do the denunciation lack
Of outward order. (I.ii.134-38)

"The stealth of [the] most mutual entertainment" must be preceded by "a true contract" and the "outward order," without which the desiring subject is merely tinkering with ratsbane and a thirsty vice (I.ii.134-38). As shown in the delay of the marriage for the "propagation of a dower" despite the legal matrimonial contract, marriage intersects with a complex spectrum of sexuality, economy, law, religion, and politics in the play (I.ii.139). The matrimonial contract between Angelo and Mariana also parallels that of Claudio and Juliet. In both cases, the dowry plays a decisive role in solemnizing their marital contracts, and Claudio and Angelo both legally commit fornication according to the law of Vienna and possibly Jacobean England. Despite his outward moral perfection, the "well-seeming Angelo" cunningly "swallowed his vows whole pretending in her discoveries of dishonour" when Mariana's dowry could not be delivered as promised (III.i.223, 226-27).

Claudio's matrimonial contract is valid and legal from a perspective of civil law whether it is the spousal de futuro or the spousal de presenti. But, in actuality, the
ecclesiastical court harshly regulated and controlled unrestrained sexual energies in society to establish a new moral norm of sexuality: "In an adult life span of thirty years, an Elizabethan inhabitant of Essex . . . had more than a one-in-four chance of being accused of fornication, adultery, buggery, incest, bestiality, or bigamy" (Stone 1979. 324).

In Vienna, the "outward order" of ecclesiastical marriage distinguishes legitimate desire from lechery, and marital sexual union from fornication. As a way of staving off political crisis and restoring social order, the political apparatus of the state nullifies the illusion of marriage based on love and desire, which are highly cherished in Shakespeare’s romantic comedies. Sexual desire is defined as a site in which the relations of power continue to be negotiated between private desire and public control. State power problematizes, controls, and institutionalizes individual desire in the process of collective normalization. Despite the full efforts of the state to normalize sexuality, however, the play shows the apparent faultline in the moral experiences of its members as illustrated in the constant challenges of the comic world of inversion to the dominant political authority.

Despite a political scheme to contain the destabilizing nature of sexuality, the audience cannot help feeling that the social anxieties and crises resulted from the defective law itself and legal practices sanctioned by the monarch and
his government. By criminalizing and demonizing sexuality, however, the Viennese court ascribes social and moral disorder (caused by misrule and defective law) to its subjects. Psychologically, the Viennese legal system excessively represses the pleasure principle in favor of the reality principle in that “it is a Freudian axiom that the essence of man consists, not, as Descarte maintained, in thinking, but in desiring” (Norman Brown 7). The Viennese court contradicts basic human instincts, and it rules the state, not based on human nature, but on political expediency. In this social context, a human is constantly required to fashion himself into a subject of moral and spiritual conscience: “I have spirit to do / anything that appears not foul in the truth of my / spirit” (III.ii.205-7). In that sense, the structure of the play is dialectical in negotiating meaning between the aristocratic court of Vienna and the plebeian cosmic world: “The confusion in the narrative meaning is created because it offers equal dramatic power to mutually exclusive positions” of the comic underworld and the court, and each side is morally inadequate (McLuskie 93).

Brief as it may be, the prison scene (II.iii) in which the disguised Duke-Friar gives Juliet confessional instruction is representative of “the thematic opposition of social power and erotic desire” (Tennenhouse 1982, 147). In this scene, Duke Vincentio has a dual identity because he embodies political and religious power at the same time. A
pattern of thematic development in the play is established: the tyrannical power of the state (the neglect of the legal enforcement by the Duke and the revival of the defective law to the full severity by Angelo) is exercised for the restoration of social and moral order, but the naked and rigorous legalism leads only to the state of sexual, judicial, and moral corruption. As the next step, the religious principle of mercy and forgiveness is introduced to challenge the strict legalism and to bring the harmonious moral vision and reconciliation at the end. In the whole process of moral and social redemption, Duke Vincentio remains ubiquitous and all-powerful with his panoptic power, manipulating people, government affairs, and even religion. He simultaneously demonstrates that the monarch is the only authority capable of restoring the state to order.37

The Duke is more Machiavellian than Angelo in that his political strategy exploits religion and deploys the meticulous process of confession and penitence. The Duke can access and manipulate his subjects through religious confession, which otherwise would not have been available to the political leader. He visits "afflicted spirits" and "minister[s] to them" according to the nature of their transgressions (III.ii.4, 7-8). In combining religious and political power, the Duke-Friar manipulates individual conscience:

*Duke*: Repent you, fair one, of the sin you carry?

*Juliet*: I do; and bear the same most patiently.
Duke: I'll teach you how you shall arraign your conscience
And try your penitence, if it be sound,
Or hollowly put on. (II.iii.19-23)

In his confessional discourse, he stigmatizes the unborn child as a sin and advises Juliet to examine ("arraign") her guilty conscience. The Duke reinforces the legal order of the state by controlling and correcting the consciences of his subjects by means of a sense of religious guilt (humiliation and shame) without tyrannically imposing the long-neglected law. She confesses or is psychologically forced to confess and repent her sin: "I do repent me as it is an evil, / And take the shame with joy" (II.iii.35-36).

This confessional scene is typical of the Foucauldian "self-formation as an 'ethical subject,'" a process that "requires [the subject] to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself" (1990 B, 28). By concentrating on individual conscience, this process of subject formation individuates actions and values and finally internalizes dominant ideologies in the conscience of each subject. William Dodd claims that "Vincentio is thus shown exploiting religious techniques of mortification normally associated with the induction of penitence to bring about political subjection" (226).

In the Duke’s long contemptus mundi speech that begins with "Be absolute for death" (III.i), he gives Claudio a severely morbid and un-Christian consolation. This speech
is designed to prepare Claudio to accept death in the absolute negation of the self and world rather than in the Christian vision of “an eternal tranquility with God” (Carolyn Brown 151). The Friar is a kind of “trickster” whose speech “goes further toward cynical disparagement of life than either a stoic philosopher or a Christian theologian would permit” (Hammond 504). In the name of confession, he induces a sense of “mortification” and “penitence” into Claudio in an un-Christian manner for reasons of political expediency. He exaggerates the pain, helplessness, and transitoriness of life:

A breath thou art,
Servile to all the skyey influences
That dost this habitation where thou keep’st
Hourly afflict. Merely, thou art Death’s fool;

(III.i.8-11)

Contrary to the Christian vision of the eternal life after death, death itself is an escape from the pain of life. Despite the eloquence of his speech, the Duke’s consolation is too artificial, theatrical, and manipulative to be truthful. Ironically, Claudio’s response is Christian, and he accepts death: “To sue to live, I find I seek to die, / And seeking death, find life. Let it come on” (III.i.42-43).

Just as the Duke induces a new form of guilt in Juliet through the examination of conscience in the process of subject formation, so he attempts to create an ascetic and skeptical form of consciousness in Claudio. Por Claudio,
this scene of confession is only significant in showing how the Duke manipulates his conscience through the theatrical exercise of religious and political power. Claudio is forced to fashion himself into an ethical subject by stoically giving up his desire and will to life. He momentarily gives in to the strategy of creating a docile and obedient conscience.

Once Duke Vincentio unjustly delegates his ducal authority and disguises himself as Friar Lodowick, the entire fabric of the Viennese society is exposed to the gaze or surveillance of the ruler. His surveillant gaze is symbolic of the all-encompassing mechanism of power in which all subjects are subjected to state control. There is an unusually pervasive intrusion of state control into the lives of individuals, especially into sexuality in Measure for Measure. The play is “set largely in a series of places of confinement and retreat” as if to suggest a dark tone of state surveillance and control (Black 78). The dramatic actions mostly take place in prison, friar’s cell, and grange along with the places of power such as courtroom and palace. The underlying tone of the play is overshadowed by the repressive power of the law, and at the center of the state power stands the Duke with his panoptic surveillance.

As Dreyfus and Rabinow have said that “the control of bodies depends on an optics of power,” and to place individuals under observation is one of the most effective mechanisms of normalization (156). Constant visibility
leads individuals to self-examination, and if this disciplinary observation permeates society, surveillance itself effectively produces normalized subjects: "The panoptic idea of permanent visibility also encompasses a notion of constant assessment or judgment: control through normalization" (McNay 1994, 94). As the ruler of a state, Duke Vincentio undoubtedly has the greatest visibility with his every action exposed to his subjects as suggested in his complaint: "I'll privily away. I love the people. / But do not like to stage me to their eyes" (I.i.67-68). He reverses this mechanism of observation between him and his subjects and achieves absolute power of surveillance by delegating his authority and hiding under the cloak of friar. Through this move, he is able to have access to the deep recesses of Viennese society including the underworld of prostitution, and he can even have direct access to his criticism made by the unsuspecting Lucio.

As he disappears from visibility, the Duke becomes an omnipotent ruler--duke, friar, trickster, stage director, and bed-trick plotter all combined in one body. By delegating his power, the Duke can exercise even more power: his power can be "exercised" in practice rather than "possessed" in the sense of the "micro-physics of power" (Foucault 1977, 26). In Angelo's confession of his sexual and legal transgressions, Vincentio's power is clearly demonstrated:

O my dread lord,
By the delegation of "all the organs of [the Duke's] own power," Angelo comes to possess the supreme authority of the government, but he loses the Duke's visibility (I.i.20-21). Angelo unknowingly trades Duke's visibility for the power of deputation; in other words, his every move comes to be placed under the Duke's surveillance as suggested by words "perceive" and "look." In exchanging his visibility with that of Vincentio, Angelo comes under the permanent surveillance of the Duke who becomes "power divine" in his invisibility. Duke Vincentio diffuses his power to maximize his surveillant gaze to discipline and normalize the consciousness, conduct and sexuality of his subjects. In Power on Display, Tennenhouse says that "the disguised monarch's power derives from his ability . . . to 'Look into the hearts and bowels of [the] dukedom'" (155). In Measure for Measure like other absent monarch plays, Duke Vincentio comes into the center of the state power, and the monarch's diffused authority is fully concentrated and displayed in public at the end of the play to affirm the newly established order and the returned monarch.

Controlling Vienna in his absence through surveillance and manipulation, Duke Vincentio waits for his opportunity to return to his power with the dramatic public staging of
his power: "Another basic theme of Measure for Measure is the sense of government as drama that creates and justifies the friar-Duke's dissimulation, so puzzling to critics evaluating this 'good' ruler" (Holland 19). His actions are carefully contrived to display his power by writing letters and giving verbal instructions as if a stage director designs the final act. He waits for political and moral disorder in his absence from the seat of power since the chaotic situation and social crisis reaffirm his political leadership and authority. In that sense, the last act of the Duke's ceremonial return is a carefully orchestrated drama of Machiavellian politics in which the Duke's leadership is reaffirmed as inevitable for the maintenance of social order, and the social crisis and destabilizing elements are contained and regulated in the traditional values such as marriage, mercy, justice, and patriarchal monarchy. In this drama of Machiavellian politics, the entire state and its members are placed under the close surveillance and manipulation of a monarch, and nobody suspects it except for Lucio. Only the absolute monarch can restore social order: Tennenhouse sees the final display of power as "an argument for political absolutism" (1986, 156). Despite his moral depravity, Lucio is the only one who can size up the Duke's Machiavellian side: "the old fantastical duke of dark corners" (IV.iii.156).

In Measure for Measure where the terms such as "common justice" and "the properties of government" dominate the
thematic development from the start, the law plays a central function as part of social control apparatuses in Vienna (I.i.3, 11). The fundamental dilemma in the play grows out of diverse concepts of law—civic, natural, and ecclesiastical—closely interrelated with the Christian doctrine of mercy and justification. In the hierarchy of law, divine providence constitutes the prime cause of the universe, and, at the same time, the lower laws such as natural and civic laws must comply with divine providence. Any law in conflict with divine will should not prevail and should be nullified as the deviant human construction. In the paradigm of the Chain of Being, divine providence stands at the top of the legal hierarchy as the ultimate source of the legal and moral authority, and natural law serves as the mediator between eternal (divine) law and human law.

In the play, the word "law" is used twenty-five times in various contexts without any clearly defined meaning of the term. Each character demands legal justice, depending on the different individual understanding of the law. Isabella demands justice and equity on the basis of natural reason and conscience; on the other hand, Angelo imposes justice based on the power of the recorded law. Even Pompey demands legal justice, arguing that his prostitution business is legal since there has been no law in practice against prostitution for the last fourteen years. In that sense, the legal dilemma in the play derives not only from Angelo, but also from a Viennese legal system itself that
has failed to define and establish a legitimate standard for the members of society. In the punishment of legal and moral transgressions, there is an unmistakable conflict between natural law and civil law in the dramatic world of Vienna as is the case between common law and canon law in early modern England: "It is remarkable how close [Angelo's] reduced notions of justice and reason are to the prevailing sentiment of English commonlawyers at the beginning of the XVIIth century" (Skulsky 148). In both cases, conscience and reason become a key factor in human action and its judgment. Dependent on whether reason and conscience are natural and universal or artificial and limited, the legal perspectives can vary widely and take opposite ways in administering justice.

At one end of the legal spectrum of the city of Vienna, Isabella and Escalus advocate natural law, which is defined as "an unwritten and intuitive basis for all law" (R. S. White 6). In the Elizabethan doctrine of natural law, man intuitively and universally realizes natural law through "reason and conscience" inscribed in every heart, which were given by God as a compensation for the fallenness of human nature (R. S. White 183). The legal frame of natural law is universal, eternal, and transcendent, but in practice, however, natural law like natural philosophy points to the principle of "probability" based on experience and practicality.42

In The Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas differentiates
reason into two parts: speculative reason and practical reason (II, Q.94, Art.4, 47). Speculative reason is concerned with universal principles and truths that apply to all men; therefore, natural law is constant and valid eternally. On the other hand, practical reason descends to particular human actions and contingent matters. As a result, actual judgment in natural law tends to be situational and contingent on the moral basis of the general precepts of the law (speculative reason).

Equitable justice is spatially and temporally constant in natural law, but the moral generalization by speculative reason is tempered with and mediated by the practical reason that takes into account particular actions and concrete experiences in reality in the judgment of moral and legal actions.

Against Angelo's strict legalism, Isabella challenges him to "Go to your bosom, / Knock there and ask your heart what it doth know / That's like my brother's fault" (II.ii.137-39). In judging human actions, practical experience including human weakness and ignorance needs to be considered to reach probable justice in careful consideration of individual conscience and reason. In the practical application of natural law, legal judgment must be made in careful consideration of human frailties and predicaments in lived experience as Isabella argues. Thus, it must account for the unrestrained, but instinctual desires of Angelo and Lucio as well as of Claudio and
On the other end of the spectrum, the rigorous civil law legalist Angelo denies the universal sovereignty of reason and conscience (equitable justice) by adhering to "recorded law": "It is the law, not I, condemn your brother" (II. iv. 61; II. ii. 80). Positive law assumes that logic and pragmatic reason rather than natural reason and conscience must be the standard of legal judgment. Skulsky summarizes the nature of civic law that Angelo supports: first, "a sentence is to be justified solely by appeal to law as the ultimate authority and definition of justice," and second, "the one 'rational' requirement for a fair punishment" is "uniformity and accuracy in carrying out the law" (147). In Renaissance England, common law jurists challenged the judicial certitude of individual conscience and reason by arguing that diverse men had diverse conscience and reason as shown in the conflicts between common law judges and the Court of Chancery (the "keeper of the King's Conscience") (R. S. White 46-49).

For Angelo and other positive jurists who believe that "What's open made to justice, / That justice seizes. What knows the laws / That thieves do pass on theives?" the only fair legal justice is to apply the positive law to each case with utmost accuracy and impartiality (II. i. 21-23). In many cases, however, the wholesale application of the law is not justice, but merely a means of controlling social order. As shown in the restoration of the dormant law and its mortal
punishment in Vienna, the legitimate law can deviate from moral and legal justice and corrupt into "the manacles / Of the all-binding law" (II.iv.93-94). In terms of the Thomist differentiation of "venial" and "mortal" sins, a rigorous civil law jurist like Angelo is capable of neither dispensing "lawful mercy" nor distinguishing sins committed through "malice" or "weakness or ignorance": the sins "irremissible" or "remissible" (II.iv.112; Aquinas II. Q.88 A. 1-6 477-491). Contrary to the seeming impartiality of the positive law, Angelo's "angry law" (written law) can be arbitrary irrespective of concrete human experiences and predicaments (III.i.201). Positive law is legislated on the social and political necessity, and in practice, its application may be deductive in contrast with natural law whose judicial principles are mediated by reason and actual experiences in reality.

The title "Measure for Measure" originated in the Bible: "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again" (Matthew 7.2). The message of this biblical sermon is more clearly stated in Matthew 6.14-15: "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." Darryl Gless explains the spirit of the sermon as mercy and forgiveness: "Charity based on the simultaneous recognition of divine perfection and of one's inevitable offenses (the beams in one's eyes) is the New Law to be observed toward
all men at all times, 'for this is the law and prophets'" (48). The sermon warns men against their moral self-righteousness; that is, it advises men to assess their inner selves and to examine their frailties objectively before judging others. For Shakespeare’s contemporaries to whom the word “law” referred “as readily to invisible or revealed divine laws as to statutory or common ones,” the essence of the law is the love of God and neighbors, in other words, mercy and forgiveness: “a charity in sin” (Gless 42; II.iv.63). In that sense, self-examination will eventually lead men to realize that mercy is the spiritual mandate of divine and natural laws, and the final judgment is up to God: “How would you be/ If He, which is the top of judgement, should/ But judge you as you are?” (II.ii.75-77)

In stark contrast with the Protestant doctrine of sola fide (fideism) that frees individual conscience from the external laws and nullifies all deviant human laws at variance with the justice of the law of God, Angelo’s view of law is fundamentally irreconcilable with providential essentialism. The civil law does not claim providential authority as its moral basis:

I not deny

The jury passing on the prisoner’s life
May in the sworn twelve have a thief, or two,
Guiltier than him they try. What’s open made to justice,

That justice seizes. What knows the laws
That thieves do pass on thieves? 'Tis very pregnant,
The jewel that we find, we stoop and take 't,
Because we see it; but what we do not see,
We tread upon, and never think of it.
You may not so extenuate his offence
For I have had such faults; but rather tell me,
When I that censure him do so offend,
Let mine own judgement pattern out my death,
And nothing come in partial. Sir, he must die.

(II.i.18-31)

The legal mechanism that operates in Angelo’s world of Machiavellian politics demystifies Christian metaphysics by defining law as a mere penal system and statecraft. Angelo regards justice, not as the application of equity, but as a political instrument for maintaining social order and civic discipline. For him, justice is not a quest for “equitable justice” in God, but for political expediency. In universal law, the agent of legal enforcement is given moral authority by the sanction of divine law, but for an anti-essentialist jurist like Angelo, the divine moral sanction is irrelevant. Charity is supreme justice when man is aware of his moral weaknesses and ignorance, but once the legal action fails to achieve the sanction of divine authority, legal exactitude becomes the standard for justice. For a legalist of positive law like Angelo who takes the law as a mere political apparatus to achieve social control, the legal exactitude of the written law is the only way to establish...
justice in society.

Since there is no established legal and moral authority in Vienna, the legal interpretation of legitimate sexuality wavers, dependent on the political necessity of the state. The fundamental legal dilemma of the play is that Juliet’s pregnancy and her relationship with Claudio are open to two diametrically opposed legal interpretations:

Thus stands it with me: upon a true contract
I got possession of Julietta’s bed.
You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
Save that we do the denunciation lack
Of outward order. (I.ii.134-38)

From a perspective of civil law, Juliet is Claudio’s legal wife on the true contract of marriage in Renaissance England. Ecclesiastical law, however, does not acknowledge the contract until it is solemnized in the church: “Because of the relevance of the contemporary debate, Shakespeare’s play immediately acquires a great deal of social significance. Claudio’s plight is not merely a requirement of the plot but a situation which could become a social reality for Shakespeare’s audience” (Vivian Thomas 174).

Though the geographic and historical backdrop of the play is Vienna and the plot is from the stories of Giraldi Cinthio and George Whetstone, the play depicts Shakespeare’s Jacobean London and social conditions as indicated by various topical references in the play.” By extension, the legal and moral dilemma in the play is representative of the
late Elizabethan and early Jacobean period, which experienced radical and dynamic social changes and subsequent irreconcilable ideological tensions: "This news is old / enough, yet it is every day's news" (III.ii.223-24). As for the marital status of Claudio and Juliet, it is difficult to pass any judgment because of the moral and legal confusion of the period. Common people were generally expected to consummate the marriage contract before the official ceremony, but depending on the different legal principles, their sexual contacts were vulnerable to the state control and were discriminated as fornication or legitimate consummation.

In the play, there is no justice and equity in enforcing the law. The Duke admits his fault and tyranny in governing Vienna:

Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope,
'T would be my tyranny to strike and gall them
For what I bid them do: for we bid this be done,
When evil deeds have their permissive pass,
And not the punishment. Therefore indeed, my father,
I have on Angelo impos'd the office;
Who may in th'ambush of my name strike home,
And yet my nature never in the fight
To do in slander. (I.ii.35-43)

It is the Duke himself who brought moral dislocation and disrupted decorum in society by not properly enforcing "strict statues and most biting laws" for such a long time:
"The Duke, in his triple role as friar-confessor, deputizer of Angelo as judge, and disguised ruler, unites the institutions of the church, the law, and the state and reveals the failures of each to regulate the sexuality it constructs" (I.iii.19; Neely 227). His legalism is characterized by absolute arbitrariness and political expediency. His legal attitude shows that justice is not based on moral and spiritual standards, but on the will of the ruler and political necessity. In his language, the law is figured as a punitive and repressive instrument such as “an o’er-grown lion in a cave,” “the threatening twigs of birch,” “the rod” and “the needful bits and curbs to headstrong jades” (I.iii.20, 22, 24, 26). The neglected law and the “tied-up justice” must be compensated in the true spirit of the law, but the Duke bypasses the course of justice for fear that his tyranny and neglect might tarnish his reputation. Like Angelo, he is not a providential legalist, but a Machiavellian jurist, who is manipulative, scheming, and political.

Norman Holland compares the Duke to a Machiavellian monarch: “Shakespeare’s Duke is on Machiavelli’s side—at least insofar as he accepts the necessity for dissimulation in government” (20). As a Machiavellian ruler who embodies the political, legal and religious power of the state, he deputizes Angelo to enforce “strict statutes and most biting laws” and disguises himself in the habit of a friar to maximize his surveillance and control of Vienna (I.iii.19).
Instead of enforcing the law himself, the Duke turns to religion and dispenses mercy and forgiveness. Machiavelli sarcastically demystifies the metaphysical and religious foundation of the law and social control: "Nor in fact was there ever a legislator who, in introducing extraordinary laws to a people, did not have recourse to God, for otherwise they would not have been accepted, since many benefits of which a prudent man is aware, are not so evident to reason that he can convince others of them. Hence wise man, in order to escape this difficulty, have recourse to God" (I.i.4 241-42). Religion is not only an institution for spiritual redemption, but also "a political device to facilitate stable rule by encouraging civic virtue and obedience" (Raab 258). Despite the fact that the name "Machiavelli" was a term of political scheming and anti-spiritualism in the Renaissance, the prevalence of the Machiavellian villains in Renaissance drama demonstrates the surge of psychological and moral realism in the general public who came to realize the rupture between the divine moral order and the actual events of the political and economic world.

In his confession to Friar Thomas, the Duke makes it clear that his legal philosophy bases its moral ground, not on the transcendent reality of divine ordinance, but on the reality of Machiavellian politics. In his Machiavellian eyes, a human subject is a protean being without a fixed identity: "Hence shall we see / If power change purpose,
what our seemers be" (I.ii.53-54). In the world of political expediency, the moral vision of divine order is a faded illusion that constantly idealizes and naturalizes political and legal institutions. In an attempt to control sexual energies, the ruling ideology in Vienna becomes faced with its inner contradictions and begins to lose its moral grounds in the face of the growing social, political, economic and psychic realism: Altieri views Vienna as "a fragmented society" in which "a disparate mass of people" remain unable to achieve "a final unity," and "one can see this as a movement toward realism, if one likes--Shakespeare representing Renaissance society as it actually was" (16).

The social and moral crises seem to have come rather from the misrule of the state by the Duke than from the particular failure in regulating sexuality (prostitution and lechery). As implied in the disguised Duke's skeptical speech ("Liberty plucks Justice by the nose, / The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart / Goes all decorum"), Viennese society is experiencing the dissolution of all moral values and social standards, and its scope is too wide to be ascribed to a single cause (I.iii.29-31). Dollimore claims that "the demonizing of sexuality" is "an ideological conspiracy" in the sense that "through a process of displacement an imaginary--and punitive--resolution of real social tension and conflict is attempted" ("Transgression" 74). The crises do not seem to be limited to any single sector of society, but they seem to be rooted in the
collapse of the fundamental moral fabric of society:
"Novelty is / only in request, and it is as dangerous to be
aged in / any kind of course as it is virtuous to be
constant in / any undertaking. There is scarce truth enough
alive / to make societies secure; security enough to / make
fellowships accurst" (III.ii.217-22). Constancy comes to be
replaced by newfangledness, and the implied economic images
of "security" ("the pledges demanded in return for advances
of capital") and "fellowships" (corporations formed for
trading ventures") indicates the social and economic
instability caused by the rapid transformation of society
(Measure for Measure footnote 92). Despite his awareness
of the nature of the crises, the Duke and his court ascribe
the social instability to unregulated sexuality. In a
sense, the Duke as a ruler has been looking for a scapegoat
for his failure in governing the state. The mounting
anxiety over the breakdown of social structures in Vienna
stigmatizes unregulated desires as politically dangerous,
ungovernable, and destructive as a way of coping with
destabilizing social pressures and establishing social
control.

As a conventional ending of comedy, the Duke dispenses
wholesale mercy and multiple marriages to establish a comic
vision at the end of the play. Unlike other Shakespearean
comedies, however, the moral tensions and legal discords
still remain unresolved with no real sense of festivity, and
"a total scepticism and abandonment of values" continue to
overshadow a chance of moral redemption as if to indicate "the spiritual exhaustion of the Jacobean age" (Lever lvi). Wylie Sypher claims that "the laws still stand forfeit," and "the counterpoise of mercy and mortality remains precarious" at the end of the play (329). Mercy is dispensed at the expense of justice, and marriages are forced upon his subjects not as celebration, but as punishment to justify the Duke's "comic policy of misrule" (Sypher 329). The biblical spirit of "measure for measure" is lost in his unjustifiable delegation of power, multiple lies, and inept tricks, and Lucio is not fully pardoned for the slanders he made for the Duke as Lucio says that "Marrying a punk, my lord, is pressing to death, / Whipping, and hanging" (V.i.520-21).

As the moral and political authority, the Duke is obligated to balance mercy and justice in order to establish social and moral order in the state where corruption and sexual desire "boil and bubble / Till it o'errun the stew," and "the strong statues / Stand like the forfeits in a barber's shop" (V.i.316-19). The arbitrary shift from legal justice to divine mercy at the end, however, fails to establish a firm and legitimate moral center despite the conventional comic ending: "Measure for Measure in effect produces a happy ending, legitimate marriages, and an ordered state, but by exposing the mechanisms whereby these are produced, the play unsettles responses to them" (Neely 228). The Duke clearly expresses his intention to enforce
the law that has been neglected for 14 years like "an o'er-grown lion in a cave," but he contradicts his intention by scheming the bed trick for Mariana (I.iii.22). Isabella and Claudio consummate their marriage on a "true contract" and are severely punished by the law. The Duke, however, deceives Angelo into a bed trick on a broken pre-contract, the legal validity of which is quite questionable as a true contract of marriage (I.ii.134). It is reasonable to question the Duke's sincerity to restore the moral and social order of Viennese society: "He is your husband on a pre-contract: / To bring you thus together 'tis no sin, / Sith that the justice of your title to him / Doth flourish the deceit" (IV.i.72-75).

The Duke problematizes a key legal issue here: what is the legal ground for the punishment of Claudio and Isabella if the marriage contract legally validates the pre-marital sexual union? The moral tone of the play is highly casuistic, but unlike typical Renaissance casuistry, the moral center continues to digress as Sypher explains:

In this sense Measure for Measure is casuistical because of its adjusting immediate legalism to ultimate indeterminations. The Viennese do play with evil. What looks like forgiveness is not; what looks like sin is not; what looks like lechery is not; what looks like brutality is not; what looks like chicanery is not; and so on--an infinite regression, an illusion of settlement and resolution and comedy. And all the
while there are really lust and grossness, and, possibly, even love. All is in equipoise, yet all is in question and unsettlement. (333)

In that casuistry is "the process of applying fundamental moral principles to the activities of daily living," the play is highly casuistical, but its final moral vision falls apart and fails to provide any concrete answer to the legal dilemma that early Jacobean society was faced with (Slights 3). The casuistical aspect of the moral and legal dilemma in the play may be "a response to the crisis of conscience and authority that was fundamental to the religious and political experience of the period" (Slights 4).

The same moral dilemma is again found in Isabella's ready consent to the suggestion of the bed trick in surprising contrast to her initial condemnation of her brother's sexual transgression: "The image of it gives me content already, and I / trust it will grow to a most prosperous perfection"; "There is a vice that most I do abhor, / And most desire should meet the blow of justice" (III.i.260-61; II.ii.29-30). The play is a kind of casuistical debate on the moral and legal nature of sexuality, but the debate ends with more questions than with answers. The legal standards constantly regress into the skepticism of moral indeterminacy, and marriage becomes a political mechanism to control sexuality in society. Illegitimate sexual desire is politically appropriated to "enforce legitimate marriage, erasing the distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate, chaste and unchaste, wife and punk, which the institutions and the Duke (and the play) wish to construct” (Neely 228). The universal moral foundation already began to collapse, and essentialism came to be displaced by the moral and legal relativism that subverted the metaphysical cosmic vision of the Chain of Being. The Duke voices his choric statement in deep moral frustration: “None, but that there is so great a fever on goodness that the dissolution of it must cure it” (III.ii.216-17).

Critical assessment of the Duke Vincentio ranges over a wide spectrum from Christian providence and justice (Christian interpreters such as G. Wilson Knight, Roy Battenhouse, Noville Coghill) to “a sinister, all-too-human manipulator” in Wheeler’s terms and a psychologically inconsistent, but “convenient stage machine” in Shanzer’s terms (including critics such as W. W. Lawrence, E. M. Tillyard and Rossiter who focus on the inconsistencies and ruptures in the play) (Wheeler 122; Shanzer 113). These widely opposed perspectives do not seem to suggest an artistic failure, but to reflect the social and moral conflicts of the Renaissance period inscribed in the characterization of the Duke. As Ascalus skeptically questions the validity of the moral and legal standards that he is obligated to defend and enforce—“which is the wiser here, Justice or Iniquity?”—the unified moral vision of the play simply collapses under the weight of its social and
ideological contradictions (II.i.169-70). The play itself continues to waver between the opposite poles in theme, language, tone, plot, and characterization as the play develops. The comic characters in the subplot underworld undermine the monologic social vision of the Viennese ruling class, and the dramatic vision continues to regress and defer into moral indeterminacy. In the same vein, Dollimore observes that the marginalized and subordinate are given a voice which “may confront authority directly but which more often speaks of and partially reveals the strategies of power which summon it into visibility” (“Transgression” 84).

Angelo’s legalism is bitterly parodied by the episode of Justice Elbow whose name implies a “witless” fool. His malapropism and long tenure satirically undermine the Viennese judicial system. In contrast to the authority of the law that the Viennese government is upholding, the constableship became a burden for people of “any wit” to avoid and to relegate to people of less wit like Elbow: “As they / are chosen, they are glad to choose me for them; I / do it for some piece of money, and go through with / all” (II.i.165-68). The justice has served his job for seven and a half years simply because nobody was willing to sacrifice his time and energy for the job; that is, at the expense of some financial burden, people of “any wit” gladly relegate the empty honor of justiceship to others. The authority of the “deputed sword” is clearly overshadowed and humiliated in Vienna by the growing materialism in the Renaissance.
As part of discursive practice, the law transcribes social ideal and order into linguistic discourse, and legal justice is served through proper linguistic communication. Elbow's linguistic confusion, however, represents the legal and moral crisis in his constant use of malapropisms such as "benefactors," "detest" and "respected" for "malefactors," "protest" and "suspected" (II.i.50, 68, 160). Marcus says that "he, a constable and therefore an agent of city law and order, is an 'elbow' indeed, incessantly turning the law and language back upon themselves until all possibility for stable meaning is lost" (176). The farcical episode of malapropism demonstrates the degraded status of the judicial system as well as the fundamental dilemma of the law in Viennese society.

The dramatic world is characterized by a dark vision of instability, disruption, incoherence, inconsistency, and subversion, and the dramatic tensions constantly reveals faultlines between essentialism and relativism, idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism, nature and ideology, providence and human desire, and order and disorder. Lever points out the tension and disjunction deeply embedded in the play: "Measure for Measure is made up of contrasts and antinomies juxtaposed and resolved, and the process is incorporated in its dramatic form. The characters evince too many human inconsistencies, the themes too many contradictory aspects, for allegorical drama" (lix). The paradoxical world of the play repeatedly subverts the
unified dramatic vision and simultaneously shows "every ideal as fragile and unrealistic" (Westlund 157). The monologic vision and experience of the play constantly encounter the multiple voices and consciousnesses that transgress and negotiate with the dominant ideological structure in the context of cultural dissolution.

4. Dialogic Vision

In Bakhtinian terms, the comic underworld in Measure for Measure presents a polyphonic world of carnival, which inscribes the play with new historical consciousnesses and dialogic tensions. For Mikhail Bakhtin, the carnival offers a site in which the potentiality of otherness and epistemological pluralism is created and contested in a dynamic field of unmerged voices and unrestrained consciousnesses. In that respect, the comic subplot is the Bakhtinian carnivalesque world that unveils and dialogically constructs the potentiality of otherness. In polyphonic discursive practice, "generic heterogeneity" refuses to be subordinated to any discursive and historical totalization of thematic and authorial monologism and points towards vast congeries of unrestrained voices and ideological stances (Bakhtin 1981, 85). In the world of heteroglossia (the polyphonic situation of diverse "social and discursive forces") where the center and the other continue to interact dialogically, human experiences diversify and interact in the otherness of various contradictory ideologies and
cultural energies to subvert and parody the established and
official center of monologic moral and social order
(Holquist 69).

Bakhtinian dialogism refuses the monologic stasis of
eternal stability and transcendence and simultaneously
defines the subject and society as events that constantly
interact with each other for the production of other
meanings, other possibilities, and other relationships, that
is, otherness. In Bakhtinian dialogism, the binary
opposition of self and other is replaced by the concept of a
series of "unending events" in which the self and world are
everlasting unfinished in dialogic relations. The world and
self are in a state of eternal "becoming," and the self is
dialogic even with himself. As juxtaposed with the
repressive Viennese court in which the state stifles the
natural energies of sexuality and procreation, the comic
underworld provides the "other" and enables the dialogic
interaction between the official and the private, the center
and the margin, and the ruler and the ruled.

In the polyphonic world of Measure for Measure, the
domain of prostitution and unregulated sexuality plays a key
role as the other of the official Viennese court; without
this plot, the moral vision and theme of the play would be
monologic, static, and allegorical. In striking contrast to
the patriarchal moral order of repressed sexuality in
Viennese society, the comic subplot of the underworld
releases unrestrained sexual energies, creating and
amplifying tension in the play: “Nature dispenses with the deed so far / That it becomes a virtue” (II.ii.140; III.i.134-35). Unlike Claudio’s “thirsty evil” and Angelo’s “filthy vices,” Lucio views human sexual desire positively as procreative power in the abundance of nature:

You brother and his lover have embrac’d;
As those that feed grow full, as blossoming time
That from the seedness the bare fallow brings
To teeming foison, even so her plenteous womb
Expresseth his full tilth and husbandry.

(I.ii.122; II.iv.42; I.iv.40-44)

To Lucio’s positive description of Juliet’s pregnancy in the play, Isabella’s initial reaction seems spontaneous and morally untroubled: “O, let him marry her!” (I.iv.49)

In the initial meeting of Isabella and Lucio, sexuality is a far cry from Angelo’s complete abstinence of “snow-broth” (I.iv.58). Gless gives a persuasive interpretation of the scene:

This view of sexuality is new to the play, and its refreshing effect is heightened by contrast with the oppressive atmosphere of the convent. Sexuality and human procreation becomes, in Lucio’s poetry, functions of natural plenitude, powers that are part of nature’s beauty and, like all other powers of nature and of man, descend from God. (104)

In Lucio’s imagination, human sexuality is associated with agricultural images of procreative energy bestowed by the
god of nature; that is, unlike the images of sin and death used by Claudio, sexual energy is the natural, organic, and legitimate power that leads to the abundance of life. In that sense, the play is dialogically balanced in its moral vision and is saved from falling apart thematically and structurally by the comic subplot. The play develops as an event constantly creating tensions and subverting the allegorical interpretation of centripetal closure (mercy versus justification) with the help of the disorderly underworld of the comic subplot. The diverse interpretations of the play are mainly caused by the polyphonic structure and vision of the play, which saves the play from falling into allegory.

In *Measure for Measure*, under the thematic opposition of mercy versus justice, there lies a unique dramatic tension "between the unidimensional quality of the fable and the multidimensional nature of the social and psychological conflicts" according to Vivian Thomas (173). The paradigm of mercy versus justice is mainly derived from Christian moral teaching, which largely resembles the didactic simplicity of biblical fable. At the same time, however, the deep structure of the play carries more complex tensions and conflicts at the social, economical, political, psychological, and moral dimensions: the play dramatizes the social control of sexuality, Puritan asceticism, declining moral vision, increasing social skepticism, worsening economic situation, anxiety over the continuing war with
Spain, the proclamation for pulling down the brothels and gaming houses in 1603, and allusions to James I in early modern England (Lever xxxi-xxxv). On the surface, the moral vision of the play points towards mercy and social harmony in the Christian universal order, but, below the surface, the faultline is clear, and moral vision is dark.

In allegorical readings of the play suggested by such scholars as Battenhouse and Leavis, the Christian virtues of self-examination, mercy, and equity are initially challenged and thwarted by legal tyranny and rampant sexuality, but the Christian prince finally restores moral and social order to society. This line of reading focuses on the thematic development of the play with a monologic moral and social vision and draws universal interpretations from the play such as Christian atonement, justice, and mercy with no respect to historical tensions and changes. On the other end of the interpretative spectrum, such allegorical moral vision is negated from the perspective of Renaissance socio-historical contradictions deeply embedded in the play by such scholars as Dollimore, Tennenhouse, and Altieri, who suggest that there is neither a unified allegorical moral vision nor a final unity in style, belief, and characterization. The historical reading of the play traces the dialogical interpretations that connects the play with the specific cultural context such as the spiritual exhaustion of the Jacobean age and the ideological strategies of the state. Moreover, characters are involved
in moral and psychological struggles in the dynamic interaction of diverse social and discursive forces, and the polyphonic vision of the play is established.

The allegorical reading fails to draw the dialogical vision that is presented by the ideological and moral faultlines throughout the play. One example is that at the end of the play, moral and social order is reestablished by means of wholesale forgiveness and marriage which, if a traditional comic ending, demonstrate psychological inconsistencies and raise moral skepticism. The Duke fails to provide legal, moral, and psychological grounds for his sudden forgiveness, and Isabella’s continued silence to the Duke’s marriage proposal undermines the final vision of moral redemption through mercy and justice. The vision of providential moral order is subverted and reestablished repeatedly in the play, but the final vision is clearly and awkwardly distorted to achieve the transcendent values of order, harmony, and stability in the moral universe.

The official and legitimate ideology is placed under the threat of chaos by the subversive power of sexual desire, which is explained by Dollimore in *Political Shakespeare* as follows: "In the Vienna of *Measure for Measure* unrestrained sexuality is ostensibly subverting social order; anarchy threatens to engulf the state unless sexuality is subjected to renewed and severe regulation" (72). The comic world, however, is not restrained and contained by the dominant class in the play, but presents an
untamed and natural vision of procreation and life forces as illustrated in Lucio's agricultural imagery of Juliet's pregnancy: "seedness," "teeming foison," and "plenteous womb" (I.iv.42-43). In contrast with the incremental imagery of agriculture, images of sexual control such as "snow-broth" and "blunt[ing] his natural edge" look morally inferior and unnatural (I.iv.58, 60).

In the heteroglossal world of the play, the religious and political ideology of the state is undermined and subverted by the unmerged consciousnesses of marginalized characters. The comic characters in the subplot such as rakes, pimps, prostitutes and parasites attempt, at least, to give the play a new definition of sexual desires if the attempt is finally contained in the legal punishment and forgiveness of the state. Structurally, sexuality is supposed to be denied and tamed by the official power of the state, but, at least, the forces of sexuality retain their polyphonic voices and consciousnesses in the inversion of the official sexual order. Just as the text itself shows the stylistic division at III.i.152 as suggested by Rossiter in *Angel with Horns*, so the ideological structure is not unified and coherent, but heterogeneous and polyphonic (164).

In *Measure for Measure*, two different worlds are negotiating and compromising in close interaction to produce a polyphonic vision: one is the comic world of inversion, and the other is the legal and political world of the
Viennese court. The official world of the Viennese court (the site of law and morality) renounces and represses sexual desires as the source of social and moral disorder. On the other hand, the comic world of moral inversion as the "ideological Other" of the court advocates sexuality and subverts the order of the public domain that controls sexual energy in society (Mullaney 1988, 57). Just like the outskirts of London where "dissolute and idle" people frequented "numerous brothels and gaming houses," it occupies the space of "difference" and subversion, challenging the monologic vision of legal justice and religious morals and raising the multi-consciousness of the play (Lever xxxiii). The dominant center of the providentialist ideology (a world in which politics and religion exist together as shown in the case of Duke Vincentino who is a political leader and friar simultaneously) attempts to marginalize and silence the private space of individual experiences and desires, but the marginalized world of sexuality constantly interrogates the validity of the dominant ideology of the court. The comic characters such as Lucio, Elbow, and Pompey display more sympathy, spontaneity, and liveliness than the political leaders of the Viennese court such as the Duke and Angelo who are morally deficient and manipulative to suppress the natural power of sexuality for their political purposes.

The sphere of sexuality and prostitution was staged side by side with that of law and power as if to translate
the legal paranoia and sexual anxiety into the structure of the play. In a sense, the interaction between the center and the margin, that is, conflict, negotiation and compromise between them constitutes a key factor in the thematic development of the play. As a result, a coherent and unified thematic center gives way to the disrupted, subversive, skeptical and fundamentally unstable vision of the play. Altieri contends that the play defies a unified vision through the satiric and realistic depiction of the Jacobean society in which social unity was seriously challenged by diverse social pressures (16). It is clear that moral vision is not monologically unified, but dialogically multiple and satiric.

Just as the Jacobean theaters (situated in the marginal outskirts of the power center of London and localized in the same place as houses of prostitution) challenged the moral and political authority of England, so the marginal realm of prostitution and sexuality directly and indirectly interrogated and undermined the moral, judicial and religious legitimacy of the political establishment in Vienna. In that sense, the thematic and structural development in Measure for Measure traces a pattern of dialogical negotiation between the two opposed domains of the private and the public, which polyphonically fosters such a problematic but psychologically realistic and fertile dramatic vision.

It would be rewarding to draw a comparison between the
locality of the "houses of resort in the suburbs" of Vienna and that of the theaters in the Jacobean period (I.ii.93). The theaters were located in the Liberties which stood as a "transitional zone between the city and the country," free from the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor and the manorial rule (Mullaney 1991, 21). As the "translation of physical topography into a cultural topography," the Liberties provided the space for the illegitimate and anomalous that cannot be allowed in the official realm of the city such as brothel, taverns, and theaters: "the margin of the city" functioned "as a more ambivalent staging ground, as a place where the contradictions of the community--its inconsistent hopes, fears, and desires--were prominently and dramatically set on stage. Between city and country stood 'an uncertain and somewhat irregular territory'" (Mullaney 1991, 18, 21). All the social elements that threatened the health and order of the body politics were excluded and marginalized into the Liberties to maintain the political and moral order in early modern England. The repressed and silenced social territories, however, refused total silence and constantly attempted to negotiate with the dominant ideological apparatuses.

Just like the brothels in the outskirts of Vienna, the theaters in the Liberties were undoubtedly characterized by their social, judicial, and economic marginality; that is, they vividly demarcated the domain of the ideological "other" opposed to the Renaissance metaphysical center. The
unstable and subversive energies of the theatrical performance circulated in society, thus producing cultural, political, and social dialogic interaction: “For the sixteenth century, the Elizabethan playhouse and its productions were supreme manifestations of ‘incontinent rule,’ token for all that stood in a certain sense outside its own age, for everything—from residues of past cultures to emerging forms of the strange and the new—that lodged on or just beyond the ideological horizon” (Mullaney 1988, 55). The public playhouses not only caused a serious irritation to the city, but also presented “a threat to the political well-being and stability of the city” (Mullaney 1988, 53).

In the play, the comic world of the subplot represents a site of political, legal, and religious contradictions and subversions that the Viennese court seeks to suppress and contain, but the repressed desires, social practices, interests, experiences, and resistance participate in the social transactions with the ideological and political establishment of the Viennese court by destabilizing the overdetermined, coherent and monologic vision of society.” In the process of cultural dialogism, the marginal world of the subplot dislocates the monologic imagination of the established class with cultural faultlines and moral dissonance. Just as the Liberties and public theaters severed as the “other” of the official ideological center and created productive tension and subsequent cultural
dialogism in early modern England, so the comic world of the subplot was actively engaged in the constant negotiation and contention with the Machiavellian state power mechanism of Vienna.

In *Measure for Measure*, the first two scenes symbolically contrast the center and the margin as shown in the cultural topography of London. In I.i, the Viennese court functions as the center of legal and political legitimacy as suggested by terms such as "the properties of government," "justice," "power" and "law" (3, 11, 21, 65). In contrast to the opening scene where ducal authority is transferred to establish order in society through sexual control, the next scene is peopled with the sex offenders, who mainly belong to the margin of Viennese society. The second scene shows how the actual experience of the ordinary people goes against the "common justice" of the court and questions its fairness and validity (I.i.11).

The comic subplot is the Bakhtinian carnivalesque world that unveils and dialogically constructs the potentiality of otherness. Pompey and Lucio prove to be delightful figures, more spontaneous and natural than any other characters in the play. They develop into two major negotiators in the circulation of sexual energy in Viennese society. In response to the monologic sexual control of the Viennese court, Pompey resolves to "follow it as the flesh and fortune / shall better determine" (II.i.250-51). Despite his serious moral defects, his resolve to follow human
nature and fortune sounds fresh against the background of ascetic legalism in Vienna and shows moral superiority in comparison with Angelo who is a "motion ungenerative" (III.ii.108).

Lucio may be a morally degenerate bawd, a liar, and a slanderer like Pompey, but at the same time, he is also a natural, insightful, and likable character: "Lucio is an entirely human being: if very low, he is also very funny. And though he 'stands for' sex intellectualized as witty smuttness, stripped of emotion and therefore debased, he is a mingled yarn; for there are touches in him of good sense in a 'low' mind which is denied to his better" (Rossiter 155). In the moral darkness of Viennese society, he is "the liveliest figure and the one who does most to keep the play from quite falling apart" and to challenge the moral and legal tyranny of the state power (Tillyard 1971, 129).

Lucio is not only a comic device, but also an insightful voice: "It was a mad, fantastical trick of him to steal from / the state and usurp the beggary he was never born to. / Lord Angelo dukes it well in his absence; he puts / transgression to't" (III.ii.89-92). This short statement seems to summarize the dislocated moral vision of the play effectively and to reveal the injustice and arbitrariness of the Viennese legal system. In the play, nobody shows better insight in perceiving the hypocrisy of the politicians, Angelo and the disguised Duke, than Lucio, who is frequently dismissed as immoral and anti-social in a comic vein, but it
is obvious that he is one of the major characters, not to be underestimated and effaced. Ironically, Lucio tells some truth in his description of Duke Vincentio in his lies: "A very superficial, ignorant, unweighing fellow" (III.ii.136). It is probably Lucio alone who consciously and unconsciously detects the "fantastical trick" of the Duke. Lucio's comic but penetrating remarks present a keen psychological realism not found in any other characters: "Friar, thou knowest not the Duke so well as I do" (IV.iii.160-61). Lucio is a kind of gadfly who constantly irritates the disguised Duke, debunking him and his political schemes.

Though a bawd and social degenerate, Lucio does not lose moral ground in the face of the disguised Duke, who believes that sexual liberty is "too general a vice" to be cured only by severe punishment: "Why, what a ruthless thing is it in him, for the / rebellion of a codpiece to take away the life of a / man!" (III.ii.96, 110-12). Lucio seems to see through the hypocrisy of the Viennese court and offers Duke Vincentio advice: "A little more lenity to lechery would do no harm in / him. . . . Yes, in good sooth, the vice is of a great kindred; / it is well allied; but it is impossible to extirp it quite, / friar, till eating and drinking be put down" (III.ii.94-95, 97-99). As for the Duke's scheme to cope with the moral and social crises in which "Liberty plucks Justice by the nose" through the regulation of erotic desires, Lucio's speech unmasks the intended politicization of the body and further debunks what
he orchestrated to achieve without being slandered of tyranny (I.iii.29).

In the play, Lucio constantly subverts and problematizes the politicization of the erotic as the Viennese court attempts to "catch individual desire within the web of the body politic". "The complexity of the relationship of Measure for Measure . . . lies in the fact that the Duke, who professes complete power and control, is not in fact all-powerful. Lucio’s accusations have force; the Duke’s plots cause us discomfort and strain our credulity, too" (Goldberg 234, 235). Of the two thematic and structural centers in the play, Lucio as the "other" of the official state power represents the marginalized one and is actively engaged in the dialogic interaction to balance the dramatic vision in the Viennese social heteroglossia.

In the specific historical context of a proclamation (dated September 16, 1603) that required the demolition of brothels and gaming houses on the outskirts of London as is the case in Vienna ("What proclamation, man? / All houses in the suburbs of Vienna must be plucked / down"), Lucio’s voice is uniquely disruptive of the official ideological center: "For that which, if myself might be his judge, / He should receive his punishment in thanks: / He hath got his friend with child" (I.ii.87-89, I.iv.27-29). Even if Lucio is an untruthful rake and habitual liar, his words should not be disregarded as merely opportunistic and self-serving. In a sense, he indirectly uncovers repressed human
sexual and procreative energies, and he also approaches human sexuality not as a threat to social order, but as the productive energy of procreation and abundance. For Lucio, sexuality implies increase, life, abundance, and fertility:

Your brother and his lover have embraced;  
As those that feed grow full, as blossoming time  
That from the seedness the bare fallow brings  
To teeming foison, even so her plenteous womb  
Expresseth his full tilth and husbandry. (I.iv.40-44)

In contrast to the moral and imaginary poverty of the Viennese court and the legal system, his poetic imagery is fresh, natural, and liberating. Lucio’s poetic description of Juliet’s pregnancy psychologically and morally undermines the political and religious asceticism of the Viennese court and moves beyond the moral hypocrisy of the Viennese ruling class.

The polyphonic and subversive vision of the subplot becomes more evident with Pompey, servant to Mistress Overdone. Contrary to the view of the Viennese court that sexual energies—mere lust for them—pose a serious threat to divine order and social stability, Pompey presents an empirical and naturalist view of human sexuality and human nature. Sexual desire is “a human fundamental” for him (Rossiter 154). In his response to Escalus’s charge that he is a bawd, Pompey simply answers that “Truly, sir, I am a poor fellow that would live” (II.i.220). In the Viennese world of moral inversion, Pompey’s empirical morality is
simply to survive, and the lawful trade for him is what the law would allow. The artificial moral values in the Viennese court fail to establish legal standards on the basis of human nature and instinct. As a result, the audience sympathizes with the rakes, pimps, and other sexual transgressors who resist the law of Vienna.

The lawful trade is not what natural law sanctions, but what the legislated law allows in Vienna; therefore, fornication suddenly becomes a capital crime 14 years after legislation. In that sense, Pompey’s question that “Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the / youth of the city?” is poignantly realistic and naturalistic as “a commentary on the difficulty of applying ‘law’ (a reasoned thing) to matters of ‘instinct’” (II.i.227-28; Rossiter 155). Pompey says that it is impossible to control sexuality with the power of law without castrating all the youth in the city: “Truly sir, in my opinion, they will to’t then” (II.i.230). As for the social control of human sexuality, Pompey’s commentary is psychologically realistic and prophetic: “if this law holds in / Vienna ten years, I’ll rent the fairest house in it / after three pence a day. If you live to see this come / to pass, say Pompey told you so” (II.i.237-40).

The law must be grounded on the moral authority sanctioned in reality; otherwise, rigorous legalism is mere tyranny. The unnatural control of sexuality criminalizes and physically restrains human subjects to institutionalize and
homogenize moral values as well as sexual desires: "I am as well acquainted here as I was in our house / of profession: one would think it were Mistress / Overdone's own house, for here be many of her old / customers" (IV.iii.1-4). Just as Marcus argues that brothel owners and employees around London were arrested, carted, whipped, and thrown into Newgate Prison where sex offenders and brothel customers were housed together with them, so the tyrannical control of sexuality in Vienna persecutes sexual misconduct as the primary threat to social order and even criminalizes the natural instinct of sexual desire among the youth by prohibiting fornication as a criminal act of capital punishment (163). In his words, Pompey implies a sharp indictment of the legal tyranny that indiscriminately makes part of society a group of sex offenders.

Pompey advises Escalus not to fear sexual desires as if he saw through the political strategy of the Viennese government: "If your worship will take order for the drabs and the / knaves, you need not to fear the bawds" (II.i.231-32). In contrast to the stilted view of law, the tapster's stubbornness to obey "flesh and fortune" looks natural and human. For him, human nature and fortune, in other words, his empirical experience, natural desire, and basic instinct take precedence over the official monologic legal doctrines and dogma. This kind of tension between the official and the private and between the legal and the instinctual is too obvious for a single vision to dominate the play. The shaky
moral ground of the official ideology in the play offers a site for the polyphonic ideological contention between social control and psychic realism.

The farcical comic world in the play privileges sexual desire as the power of natural procreation and plenitude at the expense of the social and political order. The subplot of "natural guiltiness" undeniably satirizes and depicts the law and justice system in Vienna negatively. In Shakespeare's Reparative Comedies, Joseph Westlund views the subplot as "vivid and full of life":

Dr. Johnson, stern and apparently relentless moralist though he seems to be, remarks that "the light or comick part is very natural and pleasing," unlike the "grave scenes" which were written with "more labour than elegance."

He faults the major characters on moral grounds, yet lets the disreputable ones off scot-free. I think that many people share his emotional relief. The bawdy characters do not implicate us in their situations; instead they neutralize our tendency to idealize or debase. (216; 169)

Despite the lack of moral identification with the comic characters in the subplot, the moral demarcation between the institution of the law and the world of prostitution becomes blurred and demystified in the audience. The comprehensive vision of the play can be achieved only through the
interaction of the two worlds in the play. In the judicial paradigm of the Viennese court, Christian moral and spiritual virtues are translated into the codified law as a way of establishing divine truth in social order, but in the world of Measure for Measure, such vision of truth and moral conviction is lost. The moral insight (given in the play) dialogically challenges the codified moral experience by valorizing individual desires and differences.

Given historic and judicial pressures to enforce sexual morality, sexual impropriety and its proper control must have been a major social concern in early modern England. Measure for Measure is mainly characterized by the ideological clash between the state and its subjects as well as the conflict between law and human instinct (unregulated sexual desires), and these conflicts lead to major splits in style, plot, theme, and dramatic moral vision. As Rossiter suggests, the "doubleness of vision" in the play constantly resists ideological and thematic closure, creating uncertainty, incoherence and moral frustration (166). In that sense, the vision of the play is constantly reconstituted and deferred in the Bakhtinian dialogic interaction of the historical elements in the British early modern period. In such a world of moral deferral and inversion, the legal system does not have moral superiority to the criminal: the executioner and the bawd "weigh equally: a feather will turn the / scale" (IV.ii.28-29).

Measure for Measure concludes conventionally with the
celebration of multiple pardons and marriages, but unlike other comedies, marriages are imposed upon individuals by the monarch against their will. Marriage neither resolves conflicts psychologically and morally nor presents a celebratory and happy ending. The ending is problematic in many ways: first, it lacks moral order and psychological harmony among characters; second, as symbol of universal accord and unity, marriage comes as the ultimate resolution of human conflicts in other comedies, but in Measure for Measure, it is imposed by the political power as compensation or punishment; third, the tragic intensity still remains in the end, and Angelo and Lucio fail to achieve moral redemption and repentance; fourth, along with the artificial resolution imposed by the deus ex machina (the Duke), the excessive theatricality still continues to be dominant.

In the play, sexual desire is represented as sinful, repellant, and hideous from the beginning. It is the major threat to social stability: "Indeed, it is not just authority (justice) which is tried in the play: it is sexuality itself that is on trial" (French 185). French further argues that "again chastity is pitted against a form of legitimacy, but instead of social prerogative and invulnerability, it is the legitimacy of political authority, justice"; in other words, she seems to suggest that the thematic development is dependent on man's
degenerate and unbridled sexuality in conflict with the political authority under the backdrop of sexual stench and corruption (185). Towards the end of the play, the marriage sanctioned legally and religiously can legitimize and purify the sinfulness of sexuality into a form of normalized desire, on the basis of which the elementary unit of social order, family, is established and reproduced. For the perpetuation and reproduction of social hierarchy and monarchy in Vienna and early modern England, marriage must be legally codified and imposed upon individual subjects even in the form of punishment as shown in the case of Lucio at the end of the play.

The political strategy of controlling sexual energies is double-faceted in the play: first, social and political imposition of marriage, and second, construction of the ethical subject as "an entity opposing, resisting, and subduing libidinal energies" (Foucault Use of Pleasure 66). This kind of social strategy is clearly displayed in Isabella's response to Angelo's seduction: "Then, Isabella lives chaste, and brother die: / More than our brother is our chastity" (II.ii.183-84). Isabella, a Puritan subject, denies illegitimate sexual desire as a fundamental threat to her conscience and spirituality as well as to social order. Constant chastity (complete lack of sexuality) is the utmost virtue for Isabella--"a thing enskied and sainted" and "an immortal spirit" (I.iv.34, 35). Sexuality
is part of fallen nature ("infected will"), which is to be repressed or limited within the boundaries of matrimony as it is a major threat to the fundamental principles of early modern society. Early modern subjectivity and psyche are required to exist in the profound paradox of the "erected wit" (Godly aspiration and reason) and the "infected will" (desires and fallen nature), and Puritanism constantly molds and pressures subjects to transcend fallen nature in aspiration of the spiritual perfection of asceticism. As a "means of establishing social purity through bodily purity," the absolute negation of the flesh became a primary objective of the dominant ideological apparatus (Stallybrass 125). In that sense, sexuality is a historical fiction: "Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a thing one administered. It was in the nature of a public potential; it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytic discourses" (Foucault 1990 A, 24). The body and fleshly desires are supervised, criminalized, tried and contained through the procedure of coercive individuation in the dramatic city of Vienna.

By inference, only marriage saves individuals from the illicit sexual transactions in the play, and there is no space for legitimate sexual desire outside matrimony, which relocates the dangerous potential of sexuality back into the domain of social, religious and patriarchal hierarchy. In *Suffocating Mothers*, Janet Adelman views the multiple
marriages at the end of the play in negative terms, claiming that "even the marriages that traditionally end in festivity have here become the punishment for sexual sin" and "fail to satisfy the desires of either the characters or the audience" (79, 87). From the opening of the play to the end, erotic desires are problematized and delegitimized, and an individual is required to "fashion himself into a subject of ethical conduct" (Foucault 1990 B, 251). In such a paradigm, the state apparatus such as religion, monarchy, and education can easily produce an ethical subject by making him engage in the inner spiritual combat between body and soul for the purpose of reproducing and perpetuating social, moral, and political order.
NOTES

1. In Puzzling Shakespeare, Marcus says that “Vienna is not actually Vienna; it is London, or at least a place which can easily be taken for London” (162). Other topical and historical elements have been pointed out to connect Vienna with London (162-77). In his introduction to the play, Lever also gives a detailed comparison between the fictional Vienna and London (xxxii-xxxv).

2. Foucault says that the new control mechanism of sexuality analyzed in the text took place at the end of the eighteenth century, but he further contends that such control mechanism was “a rich, refined technique which began to take shape in the sixteenth century and went through a long series of theoretical elaborations” until the end of eighteenth century (1990 A, 116). He also views that “the advent of the age of repression” coincides with the emergence of the bourgeois society in the seventeenth century (5, 17).

3. In this paper, the term “discourse” is used not as just language, but as a practice or mechanism that produces the utterance of certain social meanings and further constructs an institutional field for the operation of those meanings. The term “discursive formation” means the linguistic practices and institutions that produces
knowledge and truth. Through discursive practices, social norms, values, and distinctions are produced as "the discursive product."


5. The second quotation is originally from The Christian mans Closet written by Bartholomew Batty and translated by William Lowth (London, 1581). Due to the unavailability of the text, the quotation is borrowed from "Humanists, Puritans and the Spiritualized Household" by Margo Todd (1980, 22). As for the definition of the Puritans, John Stachniewski says that "Puritans, for my purpose, were people whose minds appear to have been captured by the questions whether or not they were members of the elect, and how the life of an elect (and elect community), in contradistinction to that of a reprobate, should be ordered. In principle they took a literalist view of the Bible and were either vociferous and vigorous in their attempts to purify the Church of England of perceived accretions to the practices of the primitive church or split off into sects which they thought conformed to these more closely. Such preoccupations ramify into political attitudes, even political theory. . . ." (11)

6. The quotation is originally from Guide to Godliness by John Downame, but due to the unavailability of the text,
this paper indirectly quoted Downname from Godly Learning by John Morgan (143).

7. Margo Todd maintains that "Christian humanism, not English Calvinism, laid the foundations of the [Puritan] spiritualized household," but his argument seems somewhat reductive and simplistic (1980, 34). Despite its overemphasis on Christian humanism, however, this article clearly shows that the Puritan concept of the spiritual household was greatly influenced by the humanist social theory.

8. The first quotation is originally from Erasmus's Praye of matrymony. Trans. Richard Taverner (n.d.), sigs. Aiii. This paper quoted Erasmus from Todd's "Humanists, Puritans and the Spiritualized Household."

9. Graves and Silcock argue that it is difficult to draw the line between Puritanism and the Anglican church despite some doctrinal differences: "The important point to remember is that the Anglican Church was a broad-spectrum Church which embraced Puritanism. From its very inception, it encompassed a wide range of opinions and, Presbyterians and Separist apart, differences were not fundamental, but rather a matter of degree. There was a general acceptance of predestination, and no one denied the importance of the Bible, although there was some disagreement as to how important it was. To the ardent Puritans of the Anglican left it was the 'only' authority: 'The Bible only is the
10. As for the difficulty in defining Puritanism and the Anglican Church, Patrick McGrath raises a series of fundamental critical questions: "Was a Puritan a member of the Church of England? Were there major differences in theology, in religious practices and in views about church government between Puritans and non-Puritans within the Church, and if so, what were they? Did all those who were labeled 'Puritans' share a common set of beliefs, and were they all agreed about what they wanted done? Is 'Puritanism' solely or primarily a term with a religious significance, or can it legitimately be used in a much wider sense to include 'political Puritanism' and that large group of people who had grievances against the established church for reasons which were not mainly religious?" (32).

11. Graves and Silcock contend that "Elizabethan, Jacobean and even Caroline activist Puritans were Anglican reformers and very different creatures from the Puritan revolutionaries of the 1640s. In such a short time, between 1629 and 1640, the politico-religious geography of England was redrawn" (150).

12. McGrath briefly summarizes the "violent and bewildering changes in Tudor religious policy" in less than thirty years: "After the break with the papacy in the 1530's, [Englishmen] were legally bound to accept the peculiarly national but mainly Catholic church of which
Henry VIII was Supreme Head. During Edward VI's reign the state church became increasingly Protestant. Mary restored Roman Catholicism for a few years, but Elizabeth I replaced it by a Church of England of which she was the Supreme Governor" (1).

13. In his article titled "Parliament," G. R. Elton says that it is misleading to exaggerate the power of the Puritan group in the Elizabethan Parliament which was "dominated by the Queen-in-Council, who guided business in both Houses and only rarely lost control" (83, 100).

14. Fulbrook gives a detailed account of the growth of Puritanism in 1980's: "It was the concerted opposition of the Queen and the Archbishop of Canterbury, aided by certain members of an increasingly conservative bench of bishops, which served to transform Puritanism in the 1580s into an organised, disciplined movement, with distinctive forms of political activity and a network of contacts united in the service of a cause rather than a personal faction" (111).

15. Neale further says that "the House was shaken, as also were councillors. Even Elizabeth was perturbed, but she stood firm for conformity, vowing that she would call some of the Commons to account, who had spoken disrespectfully of the bishops and meddled with matters that were above their capacity and outside their province" (322).

16. The Marprelate tract first appeared in October, 1588 and shocked the nation because of its "witty" and
"scurrilous" nature (Neale 326). Written by "one who calls himself Martin Marprelate" and printed by the secret press, the "rollicking satire" continued to "trounce bishops and their assistants" with three more tracts (Neale 326-27). As for the Book of Discipline, it began to be prepared around 1585 by Travers with the help of Thomas Cartwright to "erect discipline" in the church; in other words, they wished to "set up presbyterian church government secretly, within the Church of England" (McGrath 230-31).

17. In 24 English parishes between 1581 and 1660, the ratios of illegitimacy go as follows: 1581-90 3.7%, 1591-1600 4.5%, 1601-10 4.3%, 1611-20 3.6%, 1621-30 3.7%, 1631-40 2.4%, 1641-50 2.1%, and 1651-60 0.5% (Laslett, The World We Have Lost 142).

18. In some other areas, the ratios are significantly lower, but even if the reason for the increase in the illegitimacy rates is not quite clear--whether it was caused by social dislocation and demoralization or not,--it is safe to say that the illegitimacy rates reached its peak in the first decade of the seventeenth century.

19. Despite the fact that the prenuptial sexual union was prevalent and dominated the low marginalized classes such as peasantry in the early seventeenth century, the archdeacon's court actively spied on illicit sex and prosecuted fornicators with the help of village neighbors.
20. In many cases, sexual offenders were required to be "placed on a bond, but if they were unable to provide sureties to go bond, they found themselves in jail: "Basically secular punishment for illicit sex, other than bastardy, consisted of a bond, goal if sureties were not found, and indictment to the Assizes, and possible death for capital offences" (Quaife 197).

21. It is confusing how long the law has been left unenforced like "unscour'd armour" (I.ii.156). The Duke said it was 14 years in I.iii.21, but Claudio said it was 19 years in I.ii.157 ("nineteen zodiacs").

22. In *Figuring Lacan*, MacCannell defines the Symbolic as "the patriarchal ideological order" or "a moral order" that constitutes "a vast unconscious" and human subjectivity (125, 128-29).

23. MacCannell claims that the Symbolic order "stands in the role of the mediator: as the law, it restricts desire; as the mediator who must also assure procreation, it also--selectively--accommodates desire to the law which denies it" (128).

24. In *Jacques Lacan*, Jonathan Lee argues that the illusion of the Cartesian subject-centered self is "essentially a unified, autonomous subject, fully present to its own consciousness--indeed, essentially identical with this consciousness--a belief that all human knowledge can be grounded in the clear self-knowledge of this unified
subject" (22).

25. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu defines "habitus" as "systems of durable, transposable 'dispositions,' structured structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules . . ." (72). He also views the "habitus" as "history turned into nature" "in and through the production of practice," and in the same context, the unconscious is defined as "the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus . . ." (78-79).

26. According to Foucault, Christian stoicism constructs man as "an entity opposing, resisting, and subduing libidinal energies to tame the forces of desire"; that is, Christian ideology compels man to deny his sexuality and other desires and to struggle against himself for self-control (1990 B, 66).

27. Althusser uses the concept of "interpellation" to explain the ideological process of constructing human subjects: ideology "interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject" (1971, 173). Further detailed explanation is given in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" especially in pages 170 to 177.
28. In *The Persecutory Imagination*, Stachniewski says that Calvinist obsessive theology "did not confine themselves to the puritan strongholds . . . but infiltrated the mental life of the nation. Most simply one can say that Calvinist theology was orthodoxy; the call for immediate and large-scale reform of ecclesiastical and political structures was not. Often puritans identified themselves by promoting the second along with the first" (12-13). The Foucauldian concept of subjectification is neither limited to religion, nor politics, but it "points to the collaboration of internal with external agencies of control through the medium of discourse . . ." (6).

29. As for the Puritan spiritualization of the household, Margo Todd says that "Puritans are seen as the creators of an exalted notion of the family as the fundamental spiritual unit of society. The family as a 'little commonwealth' is set against traditional forms of order and relationship; as a 'little church,' it challenges the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The concomitants of the doctrine--an exaltation of the marriage relationship, a demand for household religious education and discipline, and a slight but noteworthy elevation of the position of women within the household--are clearly attributed to protestant theology in the hands of zealous English practitioners" (Todd 1987, 5).
30. The new Puritan zeal was to produce ethical and pious subjects by allowing conscience absolute moral and spiritual autonomy: "the sovereignty of conscience over social and ecclesiastical superiors" (Todd 1987, 177). However, the principle of transparent and unified autonomy of conscience is a fiction. Without the rigorous self-examination and self-denial, conscience is always vulnerable to the full spiritual warfare between spirit and flesh:

I sing my SELF; my Ciuil-Warrs within;
The Victories I howrely lose and win;
The dayly Duel, the continuall Strife,
The Warr that ends not, till I end my life.
And yet, not Mine alone, not onely Mine,
But every-One’s that under th’honor’d Signe
Of Christ his Standard, shal his Name enroule,

In the severe and endless struggle between body and spirit, conscience was constantly cultivated to make a denial of the body in the struggle against itself.

31. As for the Puritan attitude to sexuality and sexual excess, Edmund Morgan and Edmund Leites repudiate the Puritan asceticism of absolute self-denial suggested by Max Weber, Kathleen Verduin and other scholars. The former
scholars maintain that the Puritans were theologically not hostile to sexuality and even acknowledged it as "a steady and active force in the self" (Leites 1986, 20). Morgan claims that the dark and negative portrait of the Puritans was incorrect, and they showed no "blind zeal or narrow-minded bigotry" in matters of sex ("The Puritans and Sex" 607). For the favorable view of Puritan sexuality, see The Puritan Family and "The Puritans and Sex" by Edmund S. Morgan, in which he says that the Puritans were neither kill-joys nor ascetics and knew how to enjoy their lives in their divine devotion and glorification.

32. For Protestant and Puritan reformers, matrimony was instituted by God as the fundamental social and spiritual unit of the commonwealth, and it was sanctified as holy and superior to virginity. Puritans were especially eager to spiritualize the household (Todd 1987, 100).

33. "Daniel Rogers believed marriage to be 'the seminary of the commonwealth, seed-plot of the church, pillar (under God) of the world . . . supporter of laws, states, orders, offices, gifts and services . . . the foundation of countries, cities, universities, succession of families, crowns, and kingdoms" (Matrimoniall Honour (1642) 7 as quoted in Todd 1987, 100).

34. Ingram explains the function of the family in further detail: the socio-economic crises of the period stimulated a rage for social and religious order and led to
"greater stress on the role of the family household as the nursery of religion" (126).

35. In reaction to the Puritan spiritualization of the family, the social and religious pressures were systematically applied to impose a new psychological, spiritual and hierarchical cohesion upon the new ideology of family and matrimony: "This cohesion was stimulated by a flood of propaganda from the pulpit and printing press, making the household responsible for, and the symbol of, the whole social system, which was thought to be based on the God-given principles of hierarchy, deference and obedience" (Stone 1979, 409).

36. The quotation was used by Foucault to illuminate the confessional control mechanism of sexuality in the Counter Reformation, but there seems to have been a great similarity in control mechanism between Catholic confessional penance and Reformation self-incriminatory conscience. In that respect, Leites disapproves of Foucault's efforts to single out the confessional tradition as the origin of the sexual control (1986, 142). Leites, however, seems to miss Foucault's point to some extent. Foucault does not distinguish the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in terms of sexuality: he does not "rule out a certain parallelism in the Catholic and Protestant methods of examination of conscience and pastoral direction: procedures of analyzing "concupiscence" and transforming it
into discourse were established in both instances” (1986, 116). Mahon also says that the Reformation and Counter-Reformation were deeply concerned of “the question of how the individual is to be governed in order to attain eternal salvation” (175).

37. In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault delineates the concept of Bentham’s “Panopticon” (an architectural design of the prison) in which each inmate is inserted in an enclosed and segmented cell for the full observation from the tower (195-228). Foucault says that the Panopticon was designed to “induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (201).

38. Foucauld claims that the micro-physics of power “presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to ‘appropriation,’ but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess . . .” (1977, 26).

39. The civic (civil)law points toward political and social legalism, that serves to maintain and reinforce the socio-economic order and hierarchy in a given society on the basis of the public good and the benefits of the law-making groups. The civic law tradition tends to be judicial,
punitive, prohibitive and historically contingent based on the authority of political power. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical law is derived from God's providence, which is "a transcendent reality grounded in the ultimate pattern of cosmic ordinance" (Gless 37). In close connection with ecclesiastical law, natural law stands as the true manifestation of divine reason. Natural law is the "voice of nature that admonishes, orders, and teaches, together with the reason that scans nature and our own hearts" (Fuchs 9). If man is not blinded by "sin or passion," he is capable of understanding the natural law inscribed in his heart by reason; therefore, reason itself is natural law (Fuchs 7). Theoretically, there is a distinction between natural law (which was rationally presented by the creator and can exist "independently of any positive historical intervention by God") and divine law (which divine providence decreed as positive law) (Fuchs 10). Natural law can exist by itself without Christianity and the Bible; on the other hand, divine law is ultimately supernatural, dependent on the authority of God. However, both laws are divine in actuality in the sense that nature was created by God. From the perspective of the divine law, since man is rationally illuminated by God to understand the truth encoded in nature, there is no contradiction between the civic law and the divine law. But as the social secularization and realism intensify, the ideal of
teleological harmony disintegrates into moral skepticism.

40. For further detailed usage of the term "law," see The Harvard Concordance to Shakespeare (689) by Marvin Spevack.

41. As for the legal conflict between common, canon and natural laws in Renaissance England, see R. S. White (44-50), Skulsky (147-53) and Dickens (279).

42. Shapiro maintains that the term "probability" is a defining concept in the development of natural philosophy as opposed to the traditional metaphysics that draws certainty from transcendent authority: "Observation and experience could lead to a useful but less than perfect knowledge of phenomenon. Natural knowledge was thus probable knowledge, not science" (39). For further reference on natural philosophy and the concept of probability, see Shapiro (15-73) and Grant (1-18).

43. Natural law is geared toward "probable justice" and "equitable punishment" that derive from the particular and immediate experiences of "concrete human predicaments": "'Tis set down so in heaven, but not in earth" (Skulsky 150, 153, 154; II.iv.50).

44. From an epistemological perspective, speculative reason derives from the analogical moral frame of the divine universe, but practical reason allows rational beings to differentiate concrete matters inductively according to conscience to arrive at probable justice. Probable justice
is based on a "satisfied conscience" rather than on the truth of positive law, and justice should be built on conscientious "moral assurances" (Shapiro 189-90). Just like natural philosophy whose interest in the second cause of nature replaced that of the first cause (God) without rejecting the frame of the first cause (transcendent metaphysics), natural law moves from analogy to difference in passing judgment within the frame of the moral universe (Grant 11-12). In that sense, there is a unique epistemological similarity between natural law and natural philosophy in early modern England.

45. Gless gives a more detailed observation: "For all the warnings, commandments, exhortations, promises, and threatenings, which the law itself and the prophets and apostles do everywhere use, are directed to nothing else, but to the end of this law [charity and mercy], as it were to a mark" (A Catechism 138 as quoted in Gless 42).

46. In his introduction to Measure for Measure, Lever compares Vienna depicted in the play and Shakespeare's London in detail: "the continuance of the war with Spain; the plague in London; the treason trial and executions at Winchester in connection with the plots of Raleigh and others; the slackness of trade in the deserted capital" (xxxii).

47. This interpretation goes against a significant number of critics (G. Wilson Knight, R. W. Chambers, Roy
Battenhouse, F. R. Leavis, David Stevenson, Francis Fergusson and others) who regard the play as a parable for divine providence or as a tribute to James I. This paper interprets Measure for Measure as more than "a didactic morality which demonstrates the fair and proper meting out of justice and mercy by the ruler" (Weil 64). Weil raises some serious questions concerning the symbolization of the Duke as divine providence or James I: why does he make multiple lies and unjustly delegates his power? Why does he repeatedly praise himself in such a awkward manner? Why does he use such clumsy tricks to manipulate plot and characters? In addition to these questions, his proposal to Isabella and unforgiving attitude toward Lucio at the end also raise questions.

48. J. W. Lever explicates the lines 220-22 that "[the] corporations are 'accurst' by the high security they must offer to have their ventures financed" (92 footnote).

49. In his introduction to the play, Lever says that sponsalia per verba de futuro, a sworn declaration of intention to marry in the future, was not thus absolutely binding. Failure of certain conditions to materialize, notably failure to furnish the agreed dowry, justified a unilateral breach" (liv). It is not quite clear whether Angelo and Marina had a full contract or a pre-contract, but Lever views the contract between them as de futuro spousal (liv).
50. The casuists advocated "the supremacy of the individual conscience" as "the rational means by which man relates moral law to his own actions" (Slights 10-11). Being faced with and exposed with problematical moral dilemmas in daily life, the conscience as a divine nature or the image of God in man was supposed to bring the harmony between individual action and divine law (Slights 10-34). In *Medusa’s Gaze*, Gallagher views casuistry as "the central, if controversial, instrument for drawing order out of a chaotic landscape of conflicting moral, political, and social hierarchies" and further claims that it was "a central instrument in the social construction of reality, a mediating channel between products and consumers of the normative text of social order: it taught one how to read the book of the world with a nuanced eye but always under the gaze of received truths; it promoted a taste for empirical investigation in the context of an anticipated telos" (3-4). But at the same time, casuistry ("the discourse of conscience") initially acted as "a method of enforcing the hegemony of a single prescribed text, a logos, as the pattern for the narrative of a Christian life," but later began to be exposed to the deconstructive plurality of the meaning: "a context of ideological and interpretive instability that might be beyond [the] power to contain" (7-18).
51. In the footnote to the play, Lever says that "out at elbow" means "without the wit to reply" (30).

52. Bakhtin says that carnival "discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order, another way of life. It leads men out of the confines of the apparent (false) unity, of the indisputable and stable" (Rabelais 48). In that sense, the carnivalesque culture offers a site of heteroglossia for social dialogism, "[opposing] the protective, timeless stability, the unchanging established order and ideology, and [stressing] the element of change and renewal": carnival as "a means for displaying otherness" (Rabelais 81; Holquist 89). The deconstructive impulse of carnival that is parodic and centrifugal is a primary impetus for social heteroglossia and dialogism in Bakhtinian historical poetics.

53. Heteroglossia is a locus in which diverse social, ideological and historical forces collide and negotiate to achieve "a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships (always more or less dialogized)" (Bakhtin 1981, 263). Holquist also defines "heteroglossia" as "the situation of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she might make at any particular point, but any one of which must be framed in a specific discourse selected from the teeming thousands available" (69). As a vast field of multiple ideology, epistemology and consciousness, heteroglossia represents "the co-
existence of socio-ideological contradictions” and functions as a basic condition for the signification of a text or event in the spatial and temporal context (1981, 291).

54. Dialogism is a Bakhtinian linguistic and philosophical principle in the world dominated by “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices” (Dostoevsky 6). A plurality of interacting and unmerged consciousnesses is to be achieved by the subjects who are not arrested in the monologic unity, but in constant interaction with others to produce meaning and value in historical situatedness. In Dialogism, Holquist claims: “In dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness. This otherness is not merely a dialectical alienation on its way to a sublation that will endow it with a unifying identity in higher consciousness. On the contrary: in dialogism consciousness is otherness. More accurately, it is the differential relation between a center and all that is not that center” (18). Epistemologically, dialogism assumes that meaning is not perceived, but experienced and constituted from the position where a subject is situated.

55. In the play, it is noted that there is a clear division in language, characterization, dramatic intensity and moral vision: "It is to me quite evident that the texture of the writing--the tenseness of image and evocative
quality--undergoes an abrupt change when the Duke begins talking prose in III.i.; and that this change applies to more or less to all the 'serious' matter thereafter" (Rossiter 164). L. C. Knight also argues that "the last two acts, showing obvious signs of haste, are little more than a drawing out and resolution of the plot" (232).

56. As for the interaction of the center and margin in the play, a proper balancing is suggested by Josephin Bennet: "This low-life material has been variously and curiously treated; on the one hand its prominence in the play has been enormously exaggerated, and on the other its function in the plot has been largely ignored" (6).

57. Altieri says that "No longer are we given a group of people unified in their basic aims and beliefs . . . . Instead, we have a disparate mass of people, its titulary head the one cut off from the rest so that they all remain incapable of achieving --or being whipped into--a final unity. One can see this as a movement toward realism, if one likes--Shakespeare representing Renaissance society as it actually was; or one can interpret it instead as a formal difference from the romantic comedies: the play is not a comedy, embodying a harmonic vision, and tending to select its materials in terms of their potentialities for social congruence, but rather a satire, which forces selection along other lines altogether" (16).
58. In *The Place of the Stage*, Mullaney clams: "It was to the Liberties . . . that citizens retired to pursue pastimes and pleasures that had no proper place in the community. Their place of retreat was a heterogeneous one: alongside gaming houses, taverns, bear-baiting arenas, marketplaces, and brothels, stood monasteries, lazar-houses, and scaffold of execution. Whatever could not be contained within the strict bounds of the community found its place here, making the Liberties the preserve of the anomalous, the unclean, the polluted, and the sacred" (22).

59. In 1576, James Burbage built the Theatre, and "in 1577, the Theatre was joined by the Curtain; the Rose appeared on the Bankside in 1587, followed by the Swan in 1595 and the Globe, refashioned from timbers of the original Theatre in 1599" (Mullaney 1988, 27). At the turn of the century, the city was surrounded by "playhouses posted strategically just outside its jurisdiction" (27).

60. In Jamesonian terms, the cultural dialogism radically contests and subverts the "collective fantasies about history and reality," created by "the allegorical master narrative" (34). In *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt also shows an interest in the "circulation of social energy" to demonstrate the social mechanisms that "shape, and organize collective physical and mental experiences" (6).
61. On the proclamation for the demolition of the brothels in London, Lever gives a detailed information in his introduction to the play (xxxii-xxxiii).

62. Isabella’s ready response to the suggestion of the bed trick clearly indicates that she was keenly conscious of the legal aspect of the prenuptial contract. It is still highly questionable whether the contract is valid or not from the perspective of the ecclesiastical and civil law.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study has been to read Shakespeare's problem plays, *Troilus and Cressida* and *Measure for Measure*, into the historical and cultural context of dynamically-changing English Renaissance society to investigate the nature of the moral problems that these comedies present. In contrast to other Shakespeare's plays, the moral problems in the plays "probe the complicated interrelations of character and action in a situation admitting of different ethical interpretations" (W. W. Lawrence 21). The perplexing complexities in human life undermine the moral vision and divide moral bearings of the audience, thus presenting "an art of inversion, deflation and paradox" (Rossiter 117). The primary argument of this study has been that this serious and dark picture of human dilemma is attributed not to Shakespeare's private imagination, but to social, political, economic, and religious crises in early modern England.

In the sense that human consciousness is constituted by and negotiates with historical pressure in the social semiotic structure, authorial imagination and literature register various social changes and ideological struggles in a given historical period. As "a medium of cultural memory"
whose meaning is negotiated and concretized only through its socio-historical situatedness, Shakespeare’s problem comedies, *Troilus and Cressida* and *Measure for Measure*, have been examined in connection with the changing historical context such as emerging capitalism, reformed theology, growing economic crisis, changing social hierarchy, and increasing sense of sexual and social control in England at the turn of the sixteenth century (Assmann 123). In short, this study has aimed to communicate with the past through Shakespeare’s problem comedies that present “a thick cultural description” of early modern English society. This study has tried to trace the changing linguistic patterns, value system, subject formation, and sexual politics in early modern England through the symptomatic reading of the problem comedies and other historical references.

Another objective of this study has been to resituate cultural traces and social energies encoded in the problem comedies in the postmodern theoretical context to interpret the plays in a dialogic interaction between the original historical context of textual production and the modern reader. As history “transcodes” textual meaning “from one network of signs to another,” the ideological and cultural position of the reader is essential to the reading of the problem comedies that seem to display specific cultural symptoms of the early modern period more than any other Shakespeare’s plays (Martines 4). By historicizing the
present (the reader) and the past (the text), this study has been intended to be a cultural dialogism where the present negotiates with the past for a new understanding of the problem comedies.

In the reading of *Troilus and Cressida*, this study first focused on the world of linguistic confusion where the signifier is detached from the signified as the sign of social disorder and moral deterioration in the late Renaissance. The breakdown of social and moral order in the late sixteenth century led to a division of language from reality that culminated in the nominalism in the next century. As a mental construction of reality, linguistic representation came to lose its intrinsic ontological properties with a shift from referential to representational semantics. In the "madness of discourse," all characters, especially Troilus, Hector, and Ulysses, fail to "couple" their "mind[s]" with their "words" (V.ii.15). With the "symbolic order" of language in disarray, linguistic skepticism and arbitrariness dominate the play, and language becomes a tool for political and sexual manipulation. Characters fail to relate linguistically with reality in their narcissistic illusion, and their desperate efforts to establish stable linguistic reality are doomed to fail in social and moral disintegration.

In the next chapter, this study has dealt with the paradigm shift in value assessment: a change from intrinsic
value to contingent value. This topic was examined in the context of the growing tension between the transcendental reality of feudal absolutism and the emergent bourgeois ethic of capitalist relativism. The principle of all-equalizing market economy relativizes human relations and values and consequently commodifies Helen and Cressida as marketable merchandise: what is aught but as it is valued? In the Trojan debate, Hector abandons his moral principle of natural law and turns to the political expediency of instrumental relativism in the name of chivalric honor. In the Greek debate scene, Ulysses also instrumentalizes his principles of natural degree to maximize his egotistic and amoral power of political manipulation. In a world where unbound individual will and desire reify the intrinsic values of honor, virtue, and charity to empty words, the feudal moral foundation is replaced by the acquisitive and appetitive spirit of capitalism.

In the last analysis of *Troilus and Cressida*, sexual politics and the commodification of female body were discussed to trace how patriarchy inscribes power relations in social practices, naturalizes gender ideology, and perpetuates its dominance. Deprived of their active agency to resist patriarchal tyranny, Cressida and Helen are reduced to objects of commercial transaction and narcissistic male desire. The play develops on the triangular imagery of commodity exchange: male merchant,
female commodity, and commercial competition for the possession of female body. Combined with the logic of emergent capitalism, patriarchy reifies the female body in commodity fetishism. Helen is depicted not as a human, but as a reified object of male desire for which crowned kings turn into merchants, and thousand ships are launched for commercial venture. Troilus calls himself a merchant venturer and Cressida a jewel in India; in other words, she is a prize for his commercial venture. In her body politics, Cressida passively accepts the market principle and tries to thwart the monopoly of male power by holding off male desire and switching her sexual fidelity.

In the reading of Measure for Measure, this study first examined the nature of Puritan subjectivity and the Puritan attitude towards sexuality. A human ideologically transforms into a social subject through the imaginary identification with his ego-ideal. In the process, an individual develops his subjectivity on the basis of the group subjectivity imposed by society. In that respect, the "precise" Angelo is not a creation of authorial imagination, but is representative of the Puritan group subjectivity that constantly encourages man to subordinate himself to stoic self-denial and self-discipline for spiritual redemption. For the Puritan Angelo who believes that the soul is imprisoned in the fallen and rebellious body, unrestrained sexuality is sinful concupiscence, an archenemy of spiritual
salvation. After the first meeting with Isabella, however, his repressed sexual desire returns, and his Puritan subject collapses into a protean monster that plots a rape. He is a socially-constructed puppet who falsely believes in the transparency of his selfhood and finally becomes torn apart by the return of desire.

The next chapter focused on the judicial control of sexuality in connection with the spiritualization of the household and increasing illegitimacy rates at the turn of the sixteenth century. For Protestant social reformers who aspired to bring godly discipline, order, and justice to society, the family served as a basic unit of religious instruction and social discipline. As a basic social control mechanism that maintained, reproduced, and perpetuated social and religious order, the family came to have a special place in early modern England. This historical context provides a new perspective for the interpretation of the play. Duke Vincentio ascribes social and moral disorder to sexual misconduct and criminalizes extramarital sexuality as the threat to social order and the source of all evil. The Viennese court rules the state not based on human nature, but on political expediency. The play shows that sexuality is not private, but is always public; in other words, erotic desire is a social construct and an object of moral experience, whose meaning is always mediated and appropriated by society.
In the last chapter, this study discussed the dialogic vision of the play where the comic underworld of inversion interacts with the public world of the Viennese court to produce polyponic voices and consciousnesses. In contrast to the Viennese court whose voice is official and monologic, the underworld presents the polyponic voices of carnival that offer otherness and plurality. The comic subplot refuses to be contained by the dominant power of the state and continues to present an untamed natural vision of human instinct and procreative forces. The comic characters such as Lucio, Elbow, and Pompey display sympathy, spontaneity, and liveliness in contrast to the Duke and Angelo whose moral deficiency continues to darken the vision of the play. Historically, the world of the subplot in the outskirts of Vienna is compared with the Jacobean theaters that stood in the Liberties (outskirts of London). Just like the comic underworld in Vienna, the Liberties were demarcated as the domain of the ideological "other" as opposed to the official center of London and provided the space for illegitimate and anomalous voices.
NOTES

1. In *Shakespeare's Problem Comedies*, W. W. Lawrence summarizes the fundamental features of problem plays:
   The essential characteristic of a problem play . . . is that a perplexing and distressing complication in human life is presented in a spirit of high seriousness.
   This special treatment distinguishes such a play from other kinds of drama, in that the theme is handled so as to arouse not merely interest or excitement, or pity or amusement, but to probe the complicated interrelations of character and action, in a situation admitting of different ethical interpretations. (21)

2. Evans defines the ego-ideal as "an internalised plan of law, the guide governing the subject's position in the symbolic order" (52). On the other hand, the ideal ego "originates in the specular image of the mirror stage; it is a promise of future synthesis towards which the ego tends, the illusion of unity on which ego is built" (52).
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