THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Muhamad S. Al-Olimat, B.A., M.S., Denton, Texas
December, 1995
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Al-Olimat, Muhamad S. *The State of Democracy in the Arab World*. Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), December, 1995, 22 tables, 2 figures, references, 196 titles.

This comparative study assesses the state of democracy and examines the process of democratization in the Arab World between the years 1980-1993. It addresses shortcomings in the mainstream democracy literature that excluded the Arab World from the global democratic revolution on political cultural grounds.

To fulfil the objectives of this study, I employ both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches to test a number of hypothesized relationships. I hypothesize that transition to democracy is negatively associated with economic development, militarism, U.S. foreign policy, the political economy of oil, and dependency. I contend that emerging civil society institutions so far have had no significant effect on democratization in the Arab World. Finally, I hypothesize that the level of democracy in the Arab World is influenced greatly by the issue of civil rights.

In order to investigate the hypothesized relationships, the following data sets have been used: Gastil's Freedom House Data set, "Repression and Freedom in the 1980s" data
set, and Vanhanen's 1990 data set.

The findings of this study support the aforementioned hypothesized relationships. I find that Arab countries, in general have made modest progress toward democracy, making the Arab World part of the global revolution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my parents (Salem and Eda) for their prayers. Thanks also goes to my brothers Ahmad and Hamoud for their financial support. I would also like to thank my brother Mahmoud, my sisters, my sisters-in-law, and all my family members for their support, encouragement, and prayers. I wish also to express my deep appreciation to my major advisor Professor Emile Sahliyeh for his time, and his support to me throughout the Ph.D. program years. Thanks also goes to my committee members for their help.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Research Problem

The post-World War II period has witnessed both a resurgent movement toward democracy as well as major setbacks to authoritarianism triggered by military takeovers. The developmental approach (the dominant paradigm in the field of comparative politics) was optimistic concerning the prospects of democracy and liberalism in the world; however, the short-term successes were reversed by an armed movement. That movement was represented by the emergence of authoritarian and totalitarian police states, and military dictatorships. Some such regimes still exist in the Arab world.

Since the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in the mid-1970s, there has been a new resurgence of democracy, sometimes taking place in the least expected regions of the world. Consequently, "over the past decade the paradigm of 'democratization' has come to dominate analysis of political change, reflecting the dramatic transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern and East Europe, Latin America, and East Asia" (Wickham 1921, 507).

As Kazancigil put it, "the 1980s drew to a close in an
atmosphere of euphoria induced by the end of the cold war and the wave of democratization which swept through East Europe and reached some countries of Asia and Africa, having earlier reshaped the political landscape of Latin America" (1991, 247). Indeed,

Democratization has been one of the most intensely studied topics of the 1980s. Students of comparative politics have explored the erosion of authoritarian rule, the conditions for democratic transition, the process of democratic regime change, the foundation and consolidation of new democracies, and the consequences of democratic transition for the future of democratic rule (Share 1987, 525).

Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Lipset, Vanhanen, Schumpeter, O'Donnell, Whitehead, Mitchell and others described such a movement toward democracy as a global revolution. To Diamond et al. (1988, xii),

the emergence during the last decade of pro-democracy movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, is part of a larger phenomenon that also involves the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the systemic crisis in the two communist countries of China and the Soviet Union. While the democratic revolution encompasses this global phenomenon, the term has a special meaning in relation to what is still somewhat anachronistically referred to as "the Third World."

This revolution, according to Diamond et al. (1988, xii), is occurring in societies in which "it was not so long ago that democracy was thought to be a system unsuited to countries outside the bloc of Western industrialized nations."

Furthermore, Diamond et al. (1988, xii) indicated that "the democratic revolution in the Third World has shown that the
yearning for democracy is universal and that a democratic system can take root in countries and cultures not traditionally thought of as part of the West."

During the 1980s and mid-1990s, the Arab World has also witnessed mass demands and genuine insurrections for democratization as well as suffered major setbacks to authoritarianism. The 1980s general sense of crises triggered by the economic difficulties, facilitated the popular quest for democracy, while the popular demands for openness and transition to democracy in the 1990s were motivated by a genuine quest for power sharing, and political participation as an outcome of the global resurgence toward democracy and the influence of the Gulf war.


In Jordan, the process of democratization was the result of a combination of economic crisis and societal demand for participation. As Roberts put it:

the recent downturn in the international economy drastically affected the Jordanian standards of living by resulting in a decrease in the flow of both remittances and oil-state financial support, while ultimately causing unrest and violence. Subsequent expansion of political participation, it is argued, resulted more from the top down than otherwise, and reflected the elite's desire to
quell the violence and appease the masses (1991, 119).

Roberts added that current transition goes beyond mere periodic eruption of societal outrage from the ruling elite. The implications of the riots were clear. In order to ensure stability and to create public support for austerity measures, the government had to respond to public concerns with regard to political participation.

Egypt has also resumed its long parliamentary tradition. The latest elections enabled the opposition movement to win parliamentary seats based on party contestation. Morocco expanded the bases of political participation including genuine opposition based on pluralism represented by political parties, clubs, associations, and the related freedoms.

Tunisia, has also made some progress toward liberalization of its political system. The 1987 constitutional coup against Bourguiba's rule, has shown signs of liberalization and a degree of political pluralism. Ben Ali's government has legalized some political parties, but denied other parties, such as the Islamic Renaissance (Nehda) party, the right to exist.

The United Yemen Republic embarked upon a genuine process of democratization, in its post unification era. In the 1990 elections, three major political parties (the Islah Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the Congress Party) have controlled the parliament. However, the Socialist-
Communist forces of the south and the forces of the north collided in a bloody civil war in 1994, which led to the defeat of the Southern forces that sought to dismantle the Yemeni unity. Currently, the defeat of the separatist forces of the south represents the best opportunity for the government of the united Yemen to establish a liberal democratic political system.

Lebanon also resumed its parliamentary democracy after sixteen years of devastating civil war, under which Lebanon lived under the absence of national government, anarchy, and the rule of the war lords. The 1991 Tai‘f agreement reemphasized the distribution of power between the warring ethnic groups in the country. It has shown its ability to restore the sovereignty and the authority of the state despite some opposition of some forces that rejected participation in the agreement.

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) which emerged as a result of the Oslo peace agreements has promised to establish a pluralistic democratic system in the areas under its jurisdiction. The Palestinian National Council, trade unions, Women’s organizations, and other civil society institutions have been part of Palestinian political life for so long, making the process of transition from national struggle to state-building an easier process.

With regard to the Arab Gulf states, Kuwait has always represented a distinctive case. Following its independence,
Kuwait held its first election in 1963. The Kuwaiti constitution guaranteed basic civil and political rights. Kuwait maintained a parliamentary experience which was interrupted when the emir dissolved the parliament in 1976 and 1986. However, following the Gulf war, the country held its first post-Gulf war free elections in 1992. The elections were contested by political clubs (parties) and independent candidates.

The other Arab-Gulf states also have somewhat opened up their political systems by establishing consultative parliaments. Saudi Arabia established its first consultative council in 1992 due to popular demands in the post-Gulf War. Oman has also established a consultative council with partial-indirect election for some of its members. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar pledged to follow suits of other gulf countries in their efforts to open up their political systems.

In North Africa, the declining legitimacy of the Algerian ruling elite, which has been exacerbated by an economic crisis compelled the Algerian president (Ben Jaded) to announce his intention to resign the presidency and to hold free elections in 1990. The result was a sweeping victory for the Algerian Islamic Movement, which was then denied the right to rule. In general elections of 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) won the majority of the popular vote. Such sweeping triumph brought about fear
regarding the commitment of the ISF to liberal democracy, and a fear from an Iranian model in North Africa. Consequently, the military took over, and the country has plunged into civil war.

The Arab World--Political Stagnation or Transition?

Despite such improvements and setbacks, what is striking about the literature on democratization and its advocates is its exclusion of the Arab World from the global revolution and struggle toward democracy. In assessing the state of the literature that deals with the prospects of democracy and democratization in the Arab world, I would classify such literature into three schools of thought: the mainstream "exceptionalist" school, the Middle Eastern area specialist school, and the Arab school of transition to democracy.

The Exceptionalist School

The "exceptionalist" or "exclusionary" school of thought encompasses mainstream Western scholars such as Huntington, Diamond, Linz, Lipset, Schumpeter, O'Donnell, Whitehead, and others. They argue that the Arab World is an exceptional case to the worldwide trend toward democracy because of the alleged incompatibility of the Arab-Islamic culture with the norms of democracy.

In their global survey of transition to democracy, Diamond et al. stated that,
less justifiable, perhaps, is the exclusion of most of the Islamic world from Morocco to Iran, in particular the Arab World. In part, this stemmed from the limits of our resources, which were stretched thin by the scope of the project. But it was a decision made also in response to theoretical priorities. With the exception perhaps of Egypt, Lebanon, and certainly Turkey (which appear in our Asia volume), the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition even to semidemocracy (1988, xx).

A more striking aspect of the exclusionary school of thought is Huntington's use of a theological approach to study the prospects of transition to democracy. Although it was not his only approach, he used it exclusively in the Arab World, ignoring the importance of the socioeconomic approach to the study of transition to democracy.

Huntington (1991, 73), stated that a strong correlation exists between Christianity and democracy. Modern democracy developed first and most vigorously in Christian countries. As of 1988, Catholicism and/or Protestantism were the dominant religions in thirty-nine democratic countries, which makes up 57 percent of a total of sixty-eight countries that were predominantly Western Christian. In contrast, only seven, or 12 percent of fifty-eight countries with other predominant religions were democratic. Democracy was especially scarce among countries that were predominantly Muslim, Buddhist, or Confucian.

Huntington (1991, 73) attributed respect to "the dignity of the individual and the separate spheres of church and state. In many countries, Protestant and Catholic church leaders have been central in the struggles against repressive countries." Furthermore, Huntington stated that "it seems plausible to hypothesize that the expansion of Christianity
encourages democratic development."

Huntington assumed that Christianity advocates respect for human dignity more than other religions, ignoring the common grounds it shares with Islam and Judaism which also strongly stress respect for human dignity and equality. Furthermore, Huntington, contrary to reality, ignored the existence of the Islamic liberation theology that requires resistance to tyranny.

It should be noted that while Protestantism in comparison to Catholicism was more revolutionary, it is not until recently that Catholicism developed a liberation theology against authoritarianism in Latin America, after centuries of close alliance with monarchies and authoritarianism. Catholicism had long been portrayed as the primary supporter of authoritarianism, aristocracy, stagnation, and backwardness of Latin America.

Huntington’s assumption concerning the expansion of Christianity encouraging democratic development lacks credibility even in the only case he cited—South Korea. South Korea developed a democratic norm due to radical socioeconomic changes that have shaken the Korean society since World War II. Huntington (1993, 22) stated that Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic and Buddhist and Confucian cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against human rights "imperialism" and a reaffirmation of
indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures.

Huntington's argument suffers from factual, methodological, and theoretical problems. He seems flatly to assume that Islamic, Buddhist, and Confucian countries are incompatible with democracy leaving one to question whether he considers the following democratic countries as parts of such exceptional cultures: Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Sri Lanka. Finally, Huntington's subjective judgmental/cultural assumptions, which are dismissed as irrelevant since the 1970s, lack empirical support and concrete data.

The Arab School of Transition to Democracy

This school encompasses a wide range of scholarly thinking—from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum. It encompasses Arab nationalists, Marxists, dependentistas, Western liberals, and the Islamic movement. It should be noted at the beginning that this school of thought rejects entirely the major thesis of the "exceptionalist" school of thought that advocates the absence of principles of liberal democracy in the Arab-Islamic tradition. Principles such as equality, regime accountability, civil liberties, and the right to resist tyranny including revolution are deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition.

This school denies the unfounded thesis that Arab-
Muslim political culture lacks knowledge of the concepts and the norms of democracy. In fact, "the term 'democracy' in its Greek context was" known at least to some Arab intellectuals in the early days of Islamic history, probably through translations of Greek political works into Arabic. The Arab philosopher, Alfarabi, for example, discussed the concept of democracy as early as the tenth century in his Al-siyasah Al-Madaniyyah (The Political Regime) (Abed 1993, 192).

However, the modern Arab awareness of democracy, as Dajani (1984, 120) put it, went through three stages. The pre-World War I period witnessed an emergence of Arab thinkers influenced by Western-European liberal democracy. Such thinkers, who studied in the West, preached Western liberalism as the best regime type.

The second phase, which covers the inter-world war period (the "Arab Independence Movement") was motivated by two factors, a quest toward liberalism and socialism. The third stage, the post-World War II period (the "Arab Constitutional Movement") was able to establish parliamentary governments in some Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, which unfortunately, soon were replaced by military dictatorships except in the case of Lebanon.

Another group of Arab scholars used the dependency approach to explain the status of democracy and
underdevelopment in the Arab World. For instance, Amin and Galun (1987, 102) indicated that the international system does not promote democracy due to its establishment on unequal exchange, unequal development, and unequal relations between the center nations and the peripheries. Accordingly, the lack of democratic governments in the Arab World stems from the absence of real Arab political independence. Foreign hegemony, economic dependency, and cultural dependency led to the spread and the continuity of authoritarian rule in that world.

A third group of scholars consists of the Islamic democratic tradition. They assumed that principles of Islam promote Shura (consultation), regime accountability, equality, and the right to revolution. Islamic views on democracy will be dealt with in a separate chapter.

The Area Specialists

A third group of scholars include Arab and non-Arab area specialists who belong to the developmental and the neo-developmental approach. Charles Issawi, an Arab developmentalist (1958, 33), was one of the very first specialists on Arab affairs to address the economic and social foundations of liberal democracy in the Middle East, before even Lipset’s most cited article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy" (1959).

Issawi draws attention to sociological factors to explain the absence of democracy in the Arab Middle East.
He finds that the necessary socioeconomic foundations of democracy are absent in the Arab World. He views certain thresholds of territorial size, population, economic development, wealth distribution, industrialization, and education as the primary requirements for a liberal democracy. Large size promotes regionalism in an absence of adequate communication means. Economically, democracy seems to flourish when industry and trade are the dominant activities. Industry and trade raise income, create a new middle class, and promote urbanization and the growth of cities. Education is critical to liberal democracy. It promotes cooperation, understanding, and national cohesion, which are all necessary for the prospects of a democratic system of government.

Issawi (1958, 49) concluded that what is needed in the Arab world is great economic and social transformations, which are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of a genuine democracy in the region. In fact, Issawi's approach to democracy in the Arab World reflects his authentic understanding of the complexity of the Arab society. As he put it, the issue of democracy is determined by socioeconomic transformations rather than by stereotypes which do not address the real problem.

Hudson (1977, 12) identified the problem of political legitimacy as the central problem facing the Arab World. "The shortage of this indispensable political resource
largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics, and the autocratic, unstable character of all present Arab governments."

However, in spite of these crises, area specialists dismissed the stagnation thesis of the "exceptionalist" approach. The Arab World is going through the same process of change that is sweeping the globe, but at a lower speed. Ahmad (1990, 6) denies the lack of democratic tradition in the region; "soon the Arab world will be incorporated within the global trend of liberal democracy as the influence of the global resurgence of democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Europe."

Hudson (1988, 162) suggested that there are three reasons for the possible prospects of democracy and the deterioration of authoritarianism in the Middle East.

First, democratization of one kind or another is "breaking out" in other parts of the world, and I think there may be a demonstration effect operating in the Middle East. Second, the civil society is emerging after a period of oil-induced stagnation. Third, the authoritarian state in the Middle East may be reaching the limits of its capabilities—technological, bureaucratic, and moral.

Indeed, another motivating factor for change has to do with the policy failures of Arab states, which have made it critical for regimes to seek political legitimacy, political support, and recognition through democratic norms. Furthermore, authoritarianism in its classical sense is collapsing, and there is an emerging "civil society." There
is "a considerable body of literature and data "that now
exists to demonstrate that public opinion does at least
exist, contrary to the orientalist stereotype of deeply
divided parochial "pulverized" societies in which a broader
consensus is impossible (Hudson 1988, 163).

Hudson (1991, 408) has questioned the efforts of the
mainstream theorists on democracy. "Has the orientalist
stereotyping of the Arabs, so evident in parts of American
academic life and the news media, blinded mainstream
analysts to the possibilities of more participatory politics
in this region?" As Hudson put it (1991, 408),

Prejudice and ignorance have played a part in this
curious neglect, but in fairness we should also
look to our paradigms and research agendas as
well. Given the predominance of authoritarianism,
political scientists working on the Middle East
understandably have concentrated on explaining the
absence of liberalism and democracy, to the
neglect of studying less prominent countervailing
tendencies. We have focused on society and
political culture, portraying them as lacking in
"civic" qualities, infused with patriarchal
values, divided vertically by "traditional" or
"primordial" loyalties and horizontally by social
inequalities and immobility.

Contrary to the "exceptionalists" Hudson (1991, 408) writes
"yet, notwithstanding all these apparent requisites of
authoritarianism, there have been some remarkable rumblings
of political liberalism and even democratization in the past
several years, and recently a small number of Middle East
specialists have begun to analyze them."

Esposito (1991, 434) has found that some Middle East
Arab-Muslim countries have developed a growing democratic
experience, namely Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, and other countries. Such experience is expected to develop in a well-established political democracy including political competition, political participation, civil rights, and political freedoms.

Esposito addressed the central controversial issue that Westerners take against the Arab World—that is, whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Accordingly, even if Islam appears to some that it does not promote democracy, history has shown that nations and religious traditions are capable of having multiple and major ideological interpretations or reinterpretations. The transformation of European principalities, whose rule was often justified in terms of divine right, into modern Western democratic states was accompanied by a process of reinterpretation or reform. The Judeo-Christian tradition, while once supportive of political absolutism, thus was reinterpreted to accommodate the democratic ideal. Islam also lends itself to variable interpretations; it has been used to support democracy and dictatorship, republicanism, and monarchy. The twentieth century has witnessed both tendencies.

Meanwhile, Abdulla (1992, 6) has stressed the importance of promoting human rights and civil liberties. "The practice of human rights cannot wait until all political systems have become democratic. Human rights in their vast range can be protected under nondemocratic
regimes and violated under democratic ones. Still, human rights and democracy, though not interchangeable, can form the most human relationship of all."

Norton (1993, 205) agrees with Hudson (1977-1991) that Arab governments face a persistent crisis of legitimacy. The second Gulf War of 1991 actually highlighted such dilemmas as well as reemphasized the inefficiency and the weaknesses of many Arab regimes. Such regimes have pursued a cautious approach and a cautious tone about the need to renovate Arab political systems. Indeed, regimes' objective for limited liberalism was to "spread the blame for failed economic policies, for spectacular rates of unemployment and underdevelopment, and for inadequate services" (Norton 1993, 207).

Norton has deemed the changes that are occurring in the Arab World as a kind of liberalization. Arabs refer to this process as "Ta'adudia," or pluralism. Accordingly, "the Arab political leaders have been willing to liberalize, but none have been willing to democratize comprehensively. Liberalization here refers to reformist measures to open up outlets for the free expression of opinion, to place limits on the arbitrary exercise of power, and to permit political association. In contrast, democratization--namely, freely contested elections, popular participation in political life, and, bluntly, the unchanging of the masses-- has not occurred" (Norton 1993, 207).
Democracy requires growth and the existence of civil society—widespread mobilization into interest groups. Norton found that such institutions are growing very fast in the Middle East. Business groups, women's associations, political parties, and trade unions, for example, are expected to enhance the process of transition to a democratic society.

Richards (1993, 217) dismissed the thesis of what he called the "neo-orientalists who assert that the absence of a tradition of civil society, the weakness of the middle-class, and Islamic conceptions of the state all doom any hope of the regions participating in the current world-wide upsurge of democratic politics."

Richards (1993, 218) is optimistic about the prospects of democracy in the Arab World, "simply because economic imperatives dictate heightened political participation in the region." The issue, to Richards, is not religion or political culture, but economic crises as well as opportunities that would compel Arab governments to liberalize their ruling. As Richards (1993, 220) put it, the argument here is far simpler: coping with the challenges of food, jobs, and investment will require greater integration into the international economy. Such economic changes imply enlarging the role of the private sector, widening the scope of the rule of law, and, more generally, restructuring the state's relations with its citizens. In short, expanded political participation will be a necessary tool in the struggle to forge a successful "Arab," "Iranian," or "Turkish" capitalism in the information age.

Ibrahim (1993, 232) found that the limited liberalization
process in the Arab world has been triggered by a series of legitimacy crises exploded by the Gulf war. The Arab ruling elites demonstrated their "incompetence at managing regional and inter-Arab conflicts as well as their ineptness at managing domestic societal affairs."

The societal response to this incompetence was reflected through a growing dissent movement in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The masses exercised "street politics" to express their dissatisfaction with regime performance and demanded radical change. This phenomenon occurred in most of the Arab World--Algeria (1988), Jordan (1989), Kuwait (1989), Egypt (1988), and Tunisia (1984,1988).

Limitations of Existing Literature

This brief review of existing literature should reveal a lack of communication between the three theoretical trends that address the prospects of democracy in the Arab World. Most of the native intellectuals' contributions are written in Arabic. Few or no translations or attempts to communicate has been made, which necessarily means a lack of knowledge about the contributions of other schools of thought.

On the other hand, the "exceptionalist" mainstream theorists articulated brief judgmental stereotypes reflecting a parochial approach to the study of the Arab World. Still, the area specialists are the closest to reality concerning the prospects of transition to democracy
in the Arab World. However, most of the existing literature is judgmental-ideological, and lacks a careful examination of the dynamic changes that are occurring currently in the Arab World.

A second crucial problem concerning current contributions on democracy in the Arab World is that they lack a unifying-organizing core (i.e., a conceptual framework) that identifies the research problem, states the impediments to the research problem, suggests a scientific approach to the study, states clear hypotheses and tests them whenever possible, to reach conclusions on the research problem.

Methodologically, existing literature is subjective in the sense of issuing judgments rather than relying on concrete data. There are few objective, neutral, or quantitative studies that examine the socioeconomic and political requirements of liberal democracy. There also is a lack of concrete data, studies of public opinion, studies of election turnouts, measuring the association between economic development and/or economic stagnation and democracy, empirical studies of indicators of modernization such as education and urbanization. This study will attempt to avoid the shortcomings of the existing literature by providing a thorough investigation of the state of democracy and the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World.
Purpose and Significance

The purpose and the significance of this study stems from the shortcomings of the mainstream theoretical contributions on democracy as I will explain later. The mainstream literature has ignored the improvements, and developments that are occurring in the Arab World regarding transition to liberal democracy. My purpose is to assess the state of democracy, as well as to examine the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World. Furthermore, this study has a policy relevance. It hopes to provide a model of transition and consolidation of democracy in the Arab World.

Finally, I will seek answers to the following questions: What are the prospects for the emergence of democratic regimes in the Arab World? Is there any sign of emerging practices of liberal democracy in the Arab World? If not, what are the reasons behind this phenomenon and why does the Arab World lag behind other parts of the world in developing such societal system of government? Is the Arab Islamic political culture compatible with democracy or not?

Concept Definition and Measurement of Democracy

The existing literature on the meaning of democracy, as it is discussed in the next chapter, indicates that providing a definition for democracy is not an easy task. In this study, and drawing on the mainstream scholars (Dahl, Vanhanen, Sorensen, Linz, Huntington, Diamond), by democracy
I mean a regime type that guarantees political participation, political competition, and political liberties. Political competition is defined in terms of governmental guarantees of the rights of individual and organizations to contest for public offices.

Political participation entails an inclusionary system of government that provides the opportunity and the necessary means for individuals and groups to take part in or attempt to influence the decision-making process.

Civil and political liberties require governmental recognition and respect for freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and a guarantee to the right to participate in public life through voting and other means necessary to ensure such rights.

Methodology

This is a comparative study that will employ both the qualitative and quantitative approaches of research. It is a descriptive, and empirical study that seeks to examine the state of democracy, and the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World between the years 1980-1993.

It is a descriptive in the sense that it seeks both to describe the state of democracy in the Arab World and to assess the process of transition to democracy. It is quantitative in the sense it relies on quantitative data in one of its chapters that seek to establish some associations whenever possible with some factors that might explain the
process of transition to democracy in the region of the study.

Data Description

In order to fulfill the objectives of this study, I will be using the following data sets. First, Gastil’s Freedom House Data Set will be used in order to examine the state of and the prospects of democratization in the Arab World. Gastil has compiled a data set that represents a comparative survey of freedom published by Freedom House since 1973.

The survey’s origins are reflected in the use of "freedom" rather than democracy as the criterion for rating system. Freedom has always been undersold primarily by comparison with modern political democracy. It was years before its author understood that the survey was essentially a survey of democracy (Gastil 1991, 22).

The survey’s formal methodology is extremely simple. The work began with the simplest of checklist for political rights and civil liberties; each country was evaluated against a reference book description.

Gastil’s (1991, 24) rating of political systems consists of a seven-point scale for political rights and a seven-point scale for civil liberties. Countries are classified on a scale that ranges from (1) the most free to (7) the least free. In terms of the status of freedom, Gastil constructed an index dividing countries into "free" and "not free," which has been used primarily as a means of summarizing the data for presentation as a map of freedom.
Gastil's index employs one dimension for competition and participation (called political rights) and one dimension for civil liberties. For each dimension, a seven-point scale is used, so that the highest-ranking countries (i.e., those with the highest degree of democracy) are one-ones (1-1’s) and the lowest are seven-seven’s (7-7’s). In other words, the index attempts to reflect the space of semi-democracy or semi-authoritarianism between outright authoritarian (7-7) and fully democratic (1-1) regimes (Sorensen 1993, 17).

However, despite the limitations of the Freedom House survey spelled out by Sorensen (1993, 17-20), it is still the most comprehensive data available. Sorensen pointed out two caveats are worth stressing in relation to the Freedom House survey. The Freedom House "first provides only a rough approximation of the possible presence and status of democracy in a country. They are incapable of revealing many of the features of political systems."

The second caveat that should be stressed with regard to the index is that the estimate of degrees of democracy concerns the "new" democracies. . . . These democracies are in the early stages of what might be a long process of transition from authoritarian toward democratic rule. In other words, the ratings these new democracies receive in the indexes are really only snapshots of regimes that are "on the move"--that is, in a process of transition from one form of regime toward another.

Second, "Repression and Freedom in the 1980s: A Global Analysis" by Poe and Tate (1993, 17) is used. They have
compiled a pooled cross-sectional time series data set to assess the state of freedom in the 1980s. This data set has been updated to the year 1993, which make it suitable for the purpose of this study.

Third, Vanhanen (1990, 24) has compiled a data set to study the process of democratization of 147 countries comparatively. His data set includes data on political participation, competition, and socioeconomic indicators.

In addition to the qualitative method, I will also use the multiple regression model to analyze relationships between the dependent variable (democracy), and the independent variables, which will be explained in a latter section.

Research Hypotheses

In order to account for the changes in the dependent variable (Vanhanen's Index of Democracy), and to establish association with the independent variables, the following model and related hypotheses will be tested.

\[ Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + e \]

Democratization = a + b_1GNP/Capita + b_2Oil Producing Country + b_3Military Aid + b_4Economic Aid + b_5Dependency + b_6Civil Rights + b_7Civil Society + b_8Military Expenditure + Sudan + e

H_0: Economic development has no effect on the emergence of liberal democratic societies in the Arab World.
$H_2$: Oil producing Arab countries tend to be less democratic than those do not produce oil.

$H_3$: The growth of civil society institutions will contribute to a greater degree of democracy in the Arab countries.

$H_4$: The level of civil rights will positively be correlated with the degree of democracy.

$H_5$: The higher levels of military aid a country receives, the less will be country's degree of democracy.

$H_6$: The more economic aid a country receives, the less likely that country will be democratic.

$H_7$: Higher levels of military expenditure will correlate negatively with democracy.

$H_8$: Dependency measured by Snyder and Kick's index will negatively correlate with democracy.

Operationalization

$H_1$: Economic development refers to the per capita GNP. As Vanhanen (1990, 104) put it, "GNP per capita is not the only important indicator of socioeconomic development, but it can be regarded as the most central indicator of socioeconomic development." Furthermore, Vanhanen (1990, 104) stated that "Per capita GNP measures the wealth of nations, but it can also indicate the level of socioeconomic development."

Scholars in the field of comparative politics (Lipset 1959, Coleman 1960, Cutright 1963, Muller 1985) have found a positive correlation between economic development and the level of democracy. In the case of the Arab World, I expect to find that the progress toward democracy has been
associated with low GNP per capita income rather than high rates, which would support my conviction that transition to democracy in the Arab World is associated with economic crises rather than economic development.

**H₃.** In an effort to test the relationship between the political economy of oil and the process of transition to democracy, I have collected data on oil to control the effect of oil production on the politics in the oil-producing countries.

**H₄.** I mean by civil society institutions the emergence of the following: political parties, women associations, student unions, and labor unions. This index is based on the Civil Society Project in The Middle East (1994). Thus, I will construct an index ranging from 1-4. Countries are ranked on the index according to the number of each institutions they have established out of four.

**H₅:** By dependency, I mean Arab reliance on outside world, as well as the hegemony of the World Capitalist System in the region. I will test the presence of dependency, and its impact on democracy through using the Kick-Snyder’s Index of Dependency and world system status. Their index was constructed from four variables: trade flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges, and conjoint treaty memberships (Arat 1991, 97).

**H₆:** The level of military expenditure measures the impact of military expenditures as a percentage of the GNP.
As I will explain shortly in the findings, high rates of military expenditures promote the emergence of autocratic rule. They create a militaristic society which devotes national resources for the sake of militarism, strength, aggression, instability, and war.

$H_6$ and $H_7$: Economic and military aid are compiled by the Poe-Tate data set. I will test the relationship between democracy and aid in order to examine the nature of United States's foreign policy in the Arab World, and the role of democracy as a principle guiding its foreign policy.

$H_5$: The likelihood for democracy to emerge is positively correlated with the existence of the level of the civil rights in a particular country at a time. Civil rights are measured by Gastil's Freedom House Civil Rights Index, which is composed by the Freedom House, providing a number of the level of the rights each country permits.

Scope and Limitations

The scope of this study is limited to the Arab countries (the Arab World). Currently, the Arab World consists of the following states: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

In this study, I will compare these Arab states with each other in terms of the improvements they are making toward democratic societies. Therefore, the unit of
analysis is the state. Similar to other studies, this study has certain limitations needs to be spelled out.

First, data are not available on some of the Arab countries. Thus, I will try to complement the available data sets with secondary data, which means this study is subject to limitations concerning secondary data.

Second, in conceptualizing democracy, it is difficult to apply Western understanding of democracy to the Arab culture. I will try to reconcile those two culture whenever possible, and provide substitute terms to those recognized by the democratic theory as fundamental aspects of democracy.

The third limitation concerns the sample size of this study. The number of cases (states) is twenty one with some missing cases, which makes it difficult to obtain accurate results concerning the state of democracy and the process of democratization in the Arab World.

Organization of the Study

This study is divided into three parts: conceptualization of democracy, regime typology, and analysis and conclusion. Part I, encompasses chapters 1, and 2. In chapter 1, I have outlined the research problem, the purpose, significance, scope, limitations, methodology, and research hypotheses. In chapter 2, I will review the existing literature on democracy, measurement of democracy, democratization, and the relevant literature of transition
to democracy.

Part II includes chapters 3, 4, and 5. These chapters deal with classifying Arab countries based on regime-type, as well as a sociopolitical overview. Chapter 3, will be devoted to the study of state formation and nation building. Chapter 4 is devoted to the study of the politics of monarchic regimes, while chapter 5, focuses on the study of the politics of the republican regimes in the Arab World.

Part III, which includes chapters 6, 7, and 8, deals with democracy from an Arab-Islamic perspective, data analysis and the conclusion. Chapter 6, is devoted to addressing the issues of the familiarity of Arab political culture with the norms of liberal democracy. The objective is to shed some light on the familiarity of such tradition with the values of liberal democracy, to examine the meaning of democracy from the Arab-Islamic cultural perspective, as well as examining specifically the question of Islam and democracy. Chapter 7, is devoted to data analysis, while chapter 8 concludes the findings of the study, and offer future scenarios of democracy in the Arab World.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF DEMOCRACY

This chapter survey literature on the conceptualization of democracy, its indicators, impediments and models of transition toward democratization. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the theories of development, underdevelopment, and democracy.

Theories of Development, Underdevelopment, and Democracy

The processes of change, growth, evolution, progress, and reversal have always intrigued philosophers and political scientists. The post-World War II witnessed the emergence of new nations that represented a challenge to existing insufficient methods of studying such processes. Accordingly, a variety scholarly works emerged to contribute to the understanding of such complicated processes in the Third World (Wiarda 1985, Almond 1978, Huntington 1963).

The developmental-modernizational approach was contributed mainly, as Gabriel Almond (1987) put it, by a new generation of American political scientists, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Scholars such as Almond, Huntington, David Apter, Leonard Binder, Henry Bienen, James
Coleman, Lucian Pye, Dankwart Rustow, Richard Sklar, Robert Ward, Crawford Young, Myron Weiner, Daniel Lerner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Karl Deutsch, Philips Cutright, Deane Neubauer, Walt W. Rostow, Alex Inkles, Joseph Lapalombara, and others led to a new approach. Generally speaking, the developmental approach, as Chilcote, and Edelstein (1986, 7) assert perceives underdevelopment as a condition that all nations have experienced at some time. They argue that while some nations have managed to develop, others have not.

Accordingly, modernization has been looked at as a process of change in which societies move from traditional life to modern life. Modernity has been defined as a Western style of life and models of development in every aspect of life. Thus, the Third World nations have been advised to pursue a Western model of development, including renunciation of their culture and traditions which are deemed by developmentalists as responsible for their backwardness. Furthermore, developmentalists dismissed the external factors role in underdevelopment; they looked at the process of development as a linear model in which societies move from extreme poverty and backwardness to extreme wealth and prosperity.

In fact, the efforts of development in the 1950s to 1960s have been frustrating and complete failures in most of the Third World. They have led to national disintegration, wars, indebtedness, dependency, and instability. Therefore,
developmentalism has been criticized as a new imperial, Western, ethnocentric model, and as part of the Cold War strategies, which led to the emergence of dependency and the world system schools of thought.

Dependency and the World System

Dissatisfaction with the developmental approach and the failure of developmental efforts in the Third World stimulated a new line of thinking that emerged mainly in Latin America. This approach focused more on the external aspect of development, dismissing the developmentalists' hypothesis that dependence was natural and that internal affairs are responsible for backwardness. Accordingly, "it asserts that the now developed countries were never underdeveloped and that contemporary underdevelopment was created" (Chilcote and Edelstein 1986, 20).

The approach encompasses a wide range of contributions along the political spectrum ranging from conservatism, to Marxism. Raul Prebisch, Osvaldo Sunkel, Pedro Paz, Theotonio Santos, and Helio Jagaribe, Ruy Mauro Marini, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Falletto, and Anibal Quijano. Furthermore, scholars from North America, Europe, and other Third World countries have contributed significantly to the dependency theory. Scholars such as Andrea Gunder Frank, Dale Johnson, and Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Emmanuel Wallerstein, Johan Galtung, and Samir Amin are among the leading scholars in the field (Booth 1993, 7).
These scholars have divided the world into four classes—the capitalist exploiting countries (the United States, Western Europe, Japan); the periphery of the center (Brazil, Mexico); the center of the periphery (the dependent bourgeoisie in Latin America, Africa, and other Third World countries); and the periphery of the periphery (peasants). Among and between these classes there are processes of unequal exchange, unequal development, exploitation, and dependence. The process of dependence has been created centuries ago, and maintained currently by instruments of the international political economy (e.g., World Bank, IMF, Paris Club, London Club). Thus the only way out of dependent relations is through national development, socialism, and revolution against the unjust distribution of international statuses, the capitalist political economy which creates and maintains exploitative relations that seeks to draw resources from the periphery to the center, and condemns the periphery to a state of underdevelopment or distorted development. The political economy approach has been criticized as being deterministic, theoretically imprecise, and difficult to verify empirically (Booth 1993, 15-18).

The Political Culture Approach

The political culture approach, "focuses on the basic values, beliefs, and psychological ways of behaving in different countries and culture areas. The argument is that
values and beliefs are important factors in telling us how people behave and their orientations toward the political system" (Wiarda 1985, 236). Diamond (1993, 1) deemed that Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture 1963 was the pathbreaking contribution that proved nations differ significantly in their political values, political attitudes, political beliefs, and political aspirations. These values are shaped according to the elements of political culture and by their life experiences, education, and social class. Almond and Verba (1963, 12-13) defined political culture as it "refers to the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." They identified different types of political culture: the parochial political culture where there is a lack of specialized political roles from religious and social orientations, lack of involvement in political life); the subject political culture (where there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward outputs, citizens' awareness of the political process, and political passiveness); and participant political culture (where active political participation is the rule).

A primary aspect of the political culture thesis is the emergence of a civic culture and whether or not cultural values resist change, as well as their compatibility with modern values of democracy. Cultural change, according to
Inglehart (1984, 22), is a necessary variable in the cultural argument. Furthermore, Inglehart asserted that high rates of political participation, political action, and institutionalization of representation, have been motivated by the growth of postmaterialist values. He defines postmaterialist values as a new political cultural trend emerging in Western countries characterized by less concern with economic security, and more emphasis on issues of social equality, and the environment (Inglehart 1979, 212).

Huntington (1991, 289) found that cultures vary "significantly in the extent to which their attitudes, values, beliefs, and reacted behavior patterns are conducive to the development of democracy. A profoundly antidemocratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny legitimacy to democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and effective functioning of those institutions." Huntington identified two cultures that do not promote democratic norms: Islam and Confucianism.

The New Comparative Political Economy: Toward a Class Theory of Democracy

Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, 1) provided a new theoretical-conceptual framework to analyze the emergence of democracy as a regime-type. Their main tool of analysis is class. Their work "examines the relationship between capitalism and democracy or, more precisely, between the
transformations of society that came with capitalist economic development and the long-term chances of democratic forms of rule." Their basic premise is that democracy is above all a matter of power. Thus, they identified three elements of power relations: class, state power, and transnational relations. Accordingly, they write that "It is central to our thesis of our theoretical framework that democratization was both resisted and pushed forward by class interest. It was the subordinate classes that fought for democracy. By contrast, the classes that benefited from the status quo nearly without exception resisted democracy. The bourgeoisie wrested its share of political participation from royal autocracy and aristocratic oligarchy, but it rarely fought for further extensions once its own place was secured." Their basic proposition denies the bourgeoisie that decisive role in the struggle for democracy which both Marxist and liberal historians have attributed to it (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 5).

The second element in their thesis is the international power variable and the process of democratization. War has been seen as the most dramatic manifestation of inter state power relations. A defeat in war would transfer political systems and ends the former ruling coalition. It would transform dramatically the internal balance of power, and would create structures rapidly to advance transition toward democracy. Japan and Germany are among the most prominent
examples where the defeat in World War II enabled the alliance to establish liberal political systems despite the alleged incompatibility with culture, especially in Japan.

The third element is the state structure and democracy. State power is an integral element in the struggle for democracy, given the fact the struggle for democracy is a struggle for power. Thus, a modern state is on its own a significant part of the overall landscape of power. "The state apparatus is furthermore of special relevance because it is always a major actor in that field in which democratic rule must prove itself as effective and real—the power to shape authoritative decisions, binding for all" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 63).

Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) perceive the state as having a potential autonomy, contrary to the Marxist notion which sees the state as an instrument in the hand of the dominant class. Autonomy from the interests of the bourgeoisie, or the landlord class, is a necessary condition for democracy. Furthermore, there is a need for autonomy of civil society institutions which is expected to be promoted by capitalism. Thus, high organizational density in society—among all classes but especially among the subordinate classes—is an important counterweight to the power of the state apparatus.

In this study, I will refer to these theories as well as testing some hypotheses related to these theories in the Arab World.
The Meaning and the Measurement of Democracy

In his pathbreaking work (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942, 250-296), Schumpeter distinguished between two models of democracy: the "classical doctrine of democracy," which defines democracy as "the will of the people (250), and his "modern model of democracy."

Schumpeter defined democracy as "the democratic method and that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will."

Lipset (1959, 27) defined democracy as "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office." Lipset's definition, as he stated, is abstracted from the works of Schumpeter and Weber. It implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a "political formula" or body of beliefs specifying which institutions--political parties, a free press, and so forth--are legitimate (accepted as proper by all); (2) one set of political leaders in office; and (3) one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office.

Lipset (1959, 28) identified three primary criteria for distinguishing between democracy and dictatorship. These principles are a stable institutional political system,
competition, and political participation. However, to him economic development and political legitimacy are the guarantors of a stable democracy. Legitimacy refers to "the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper." Lipset seems to agree with Weber, who suggested that "democracy in its clearest form can occur only under capitalist industrialization," given the fact that "most countries which lack an enduring" tradition of political democracy lie in the underdeveloped sections of the world. Such societies necessarily lack a legitimate authority as well as development to sustain a stable political system.

Mayo (1960, 60) deemed that "a political system is democratic to the extent that the decision-makers are under effective popular control." Mayo (1960, 61-67) identified four principles of a democratic political system. First, is "a popular control of policy-makers," that is choosing the policy-makers (representatives) at elections held at more or less regular intervals. "The second principle of democracy is that of political equality," which in turn is institutionalized as the equality of all adult citizens in voting. "The third principle may be stated either in terms of the effectiveness of popular control or in terms of political freedoms." "The fourth principle is that when the representatives are divided, the decision of the majority prevails."
Mayo (1960, 70) constructed a working definition of democracy from the above principles: "A democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of equality and under conditions of political freedom."

Cohen (1970, 7) defines democracy in terms of political participation and power sharing. "Democracy is that system of community government in which, by and large, the members of a community participate, or may participate, directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect them all."

Cohen (1970, 8-9) considers political participation as the essence and the primary foundation of the democratic theory. "Democracy is constituted by participation—the participation of community members affected by decisions in the making of those decisions." Furthermore, Cohen distinguished several dimensions of democracy: (1) the breadth of democracy; (2) the depth of democracy; and (3) the range of democracy.

Dahl (1971, 1-9) assumed that "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals." Furthermore, Dahl assumed that such responsiveness entails that citizens
must have unimpaired opportunities: (1) to formulate their preferences, (2) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, (3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.

These three opportunities are necessary but not sufficient conditions for political democracy. However, Dahl (1971, 3) presented eight institutional guarantees to liberal democracy:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations;
2. Freedom of expression;
3. Right to vote;
4. Eligibility for public office;
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support;
6. Alternative sources of information;
7. Free and full elections;
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Dahl noted the difficulty in meeting such conditions and guarantees perfectly, therefore, in Sorensen’s words (1993, 12), he prefers the term polyarchy for concrete systems and reserves the democracy label for the nonexistent ideal type. Consequently, Dahl (1971, 1-9) identified two dimensions of democratization: public contestation (political competition) and the right to participate (inclusiveness). Dahl used those two criteria in evaluating the progress that regimes are making toward "the ideal"
regime type—democracy. Thus, regimes that are characterized by a high degree of public contestation and participation—in Vanhanen's words (1990, 8), approach the ideals of democracy. Dahl calls these systems polyarchies. A polyarchy, then, may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, i.e., highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (Dahl 1971, 8).

Coulter (1975, 1) defines democracy "in terms of three separate but related continua of political competitiveness, mass political participation, and public liberties." To Coulter, democracy is "pluralistic with regard to competitiveness, inclusive with regard to participation, and libertarian with regard to liberties."

Pennock (1979, 6) distinguished between two types of definitions of democracy, ideal and procedural. As an ideal, democracy is "government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to the greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the utmost, by means including free and full discussion of common problems and interests."

However, Pennock (1979, 7) identified as well as adopted a procedural definition: "democracy is rule by the people where 'the people' includes all adult citizens." "'Rule' means that public policies are determined either
directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which each voter who chooses to vote counts equally ('one person, one vote') and in which a plurality is determinative."

In fact, Pennock's operational definition of democracies is in harmony with the quantitative approach, which measures democracy within the guidelines of the electoral process. Meanwhile, Pennock reemphasized the importance of equality and plurality.

Huntington (1991, 7), following Schumpeter and Dahl (1955, 1971), defined "a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections, in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."

Huntington's (1991, 7) definition drew upon Dahl's two dimensions of polyarchy--contestation and participation. Meanwhile, "it also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns."

Huntington's definition is in agreement with the latest contributions in the field, which emphasize the importance of free elections through the expansion of political
participation, which necessarily implies the universality of enfranchisement. Furthermore, it also stresses the vitality of competition and the existence of civil liberties and political rights. According to Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1989, xvi),

"democracy" denotes a system of government "that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties--freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations--sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

Diamond et al.'s definition of democracy is a comprehensive definition that goes beyond the electoral requirements of a pluralist system. It encompasses three primary elements besides procedural elements, which makes it difficult to classify nation-states within these criteria. Indeed, Diamond et al. recognized the problems of such comprehensive and broad definition to the concept of democracy.

Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1990, 83) found three essential, interdependent elements of democracy, as conceived in Western contemporary political cultures.

One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third, is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.
However, Gurr et al. identified other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, the principle of checks and balances, and freedom of the press as means and manifestations of these three general principles. Meanwhile, Gurr et al. articulated operational indicators of democracy derived from their coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.

Terry Lynn Karl (1990, 2) defined democracy as "a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision-makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of military prerogatives."

Vanhanen (1992, 11) emphasized three principles of democracy—competition, popular election, and regime accountability. Vanhanen stated that "by democracy I mean a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people."

Luis Albala-Bertrand (1992, 24) deemed democracy as a type of political system rather than a kind of society. To him,

a democratic system is distinguished and characterized by "republican-type" features, such as the rule of law and the separation of powers, as well as by elements that refer to the issues of
representation and participation: sovereignty of the people expressed in universal suffrage, alternating terms of office, political pluralism, the effective exercise of civil liberties and human rights on the whole.

Sorenson (1993, 12) adopted Dahl's (1971) definition and developed an even more condensed definition that summarizes the basic elements of political democracy. Dahl's eight conditions "cover three main dimensions of political democracy, namely, competition/participation, and civil and political liberties." Sorensen (1993, 13) formulated his operational definition based on Dahl's concept of polyarchy. To him, "Political democracy can be viewed as a system of government that meets the following conditions: meaningful and extensive competition, political participation, and a level of civil and political liberties."

Sorensen, by extensive competition means that all effective positions of government are open for individual and organized competition at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. Competition entails opportunities for the individuals to compete for public office and to employ their resources free from any regime harassment. Besides, all group-organized competition, political parties, trade unions, women's associations, and the like must be given full opportunities to reorganize, mobilize, and run for public offices.

Sorensen's second condition deals with political participation. Thus, a democratic system is an inclusive
system that includes the adult population to participate effectively without any exclusion to certain social groups. However, a democratic system maximizes the civil and political liberties of its citizens. Freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organizations are sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Sorensen 1993, 13).

Measurement of Democracy

Comparativists have developed several indices and indicators to measure democracy. Fitzgibbon (1951, 517-518), in his studies of the development of democracy in Latin America, selected ten specialists (experts) in Latin American government and politics. Fitzgibbon asked them to rate Latin American countries on 15 issues, giving their rating grades from A-E, representing performance ranges from a democracy to an insignificant achievement of democracy.

Fitzgibbon's indicators include political, social, and economic indicators. Politically, he was concerned about the substance of the political process, nation-building, national sovereignty, civil rights, political rights, independent judiciary system, and civilian supremacy over the military. Economically and socially, Fitzgibbon required a fairly adequate standard of living, internal unity, and social cohesion. Fitzgibbon's approach was criticized as a subjective approach, which lacked objectivity in the process
of rating the countries on his fifteen-point index.

Within the spirit of the developmental-dichotomous approach, Lipset (1959, 73) classified nations into four groups. He used different criteria to measure the level of democracy: stable democracies such as Australia, the United States, and Britain; unstable democracies and unstable dictatorships, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia; and stable dictatorships, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Cuba.

Lipset's main criteria in judging European democracies are "the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic 'rule of the regime.'" While in Latin America, Lipset used the fairness of election for most of the post-World War I period.

Phillips Cutright (1963, 256) broke away from the subjective approach of measuring democracy. He used the comparative method to study national political systems. His "time" period covered data from 1940 through 1960. Cutright (1963, 256) constructed an index of political development to measure the association between the development of the political system and the development of other social institutions in the nation. As he put it, "an index is constructed and correlated with several other indicators of national development of 77 independent nations." Cutright
found that the level of political development is highly correlated with the level of communications, economic development, education, and urbanization.

Cutright (1963, 256) scored nations on characteristics of their legislative and executive branches of government. His index ranges from 0-63, the higher the score, the more a country is developed politically. However, "his index seems unnecessarily complicated. Besides, it does not take the level of electoral participation into account" (Vanhanen 1990, 12).

Neubauer emphasized the importance of the electoral process as a defining factor of the existence or the absence of democracy. His indicators of democracy are: the percent of the adult population eligible to vote, which is a basic requirement of the concept of "democraticness"; of one man-one vote, which is also basic to the modern concept of democracy; information equality, which assumes that all individuals possess identical information about the alternatives; and competition, through the existence of political parties.

Based on Dahl's (1971) two criteria of democracy--public contestation and participation--Nolting and Williams (in Dahl 1971, 231) "display 114 countries classified according to the opportunity of adult citizens to vote in elections and ranked according to the opportunities available to political opposition to compete for popular
support and public office."

However, Dahl (1971, 243) expressed caution about the accuracy of such classifications. He stated that "one should remember that many of the variables" on which the ranking are based necessarily require decisions based on judgments rather than hard data."

Jackman (1975, 64) used four components to measure democratic performance--the number of adults voting expressed as a proportion of the voting age population, the competitiveness of the party-voting system, electoral irregularity, and measuring freedom of the press.

Diamond et al. (1988, xvi) identified three principles of a democratic political system: competition, political participation, and civil and political liberties. Consequently, they classified nations into democratic, semi-democratic, hegemonic party system, and authoritarian. Diamond et al.'s (1986, xviii) dependent variable is not only concerned with democracy, but also with political stability. They also extend their concern to political legitimacy, a controversial and difficult concept to be measured. To them, "A stable regime is one that is deeply institutionalized and consolidated, making it likely therefore to enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy."

Gastil began his comparative survey of freedom in the early 1970s, "as an attempt to give a more standardized and relativized picture of the situation of freedom in the world
than could be provided by essays of individuals from different backgrounds that had formed, and in part still form Freedom House's review of the condition of freedom in the world" (1982, 5).

Gastil (1973-1994) developed two dimensions in his surveys of freedom--political rights and civil liberties. "Political rights are rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy, this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and free elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties are rights to free expression, to organize or demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights" (1982, 7).

Gastil rated these political rights and civil liberties on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with "7" the least free or the least democratic, and "1" as the most free or the most democratic. Gastil's approach is a "comparative" one, in which countries are rated on his scale in comparison to other countries. He understood democracy as a process of institutionalizing freedom. As he put it (1989, 161), "Democracy is seen in the survey as the institutional form of freedom in the modern world, with 'freedom' defined essentially as internal political freedom and its necessary context." Gastil's index was criticized as being
ethnocentric—that reflects Western values, most of which are not recognized by non-Western nations. It is still one of the primary indices in the field that summarized the state of freedom in the world.

Vanhanen (1990, 17) "wanted to construct a measure of democratization based on a few quantitative indicators, which can be applied to all contemporary countries and which takes into account the most important dimensions of democracy." Vanhanen, following Dahl, identified two dimensions of democracy—competition and participation.

In order to measure democracy within those dimensions, Vanhanen turned to electoral data. He measured democracy through rates of elections participation and "the smaller party’s share of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections, or both; it was used to indicate the degree of competition." Finally, using different formulas (1990, 18), Vanhanen constructed an index of democracy that was employed in his study of 147 states between 1980-1988.

Coppedge and Reinicke (1990, 51) constructed a scale for democracy based also on Dahl’s conceptualization of polyarchy. The scale measures the degree to which national political systems meet the minimum requirements for political democracy, where real world "democracies" rather than abstract ideals are the standard. The polyarchy scale is constructed from indicators of freedom of expression, freedom of organization, media, pluralism, and the holding
of fair elections.

Furthermore, Coppedge and Reinicke (1990, 51) indicated that their scale is "(1) well grounded in democratic theory, (2) world-wide in scope, (3) demonstrably valid, (4) solves problems of weighting indicators, and (5) is easy to interpret and replicate."

Bollen (1990, 14) identified four major problems in the attempts to measure democracy: "(1) invalid indicators, (2) subjective indicators, (3) dichotomous or ordinal measures, and (4) the failure to test reliability or validity." In his work (1990, 14), Bollen used three indicators to measure political liberty. These indicators are: freedom of the press, the freedom of political parties to organize and oppose the government, and the extent of government sanctions imposed on individuals or groups. In terms of these indicators, political rights are: fairness of elections, an elected chief-executive, and the effectiveness of the national legislative body.

Bollen combined these six indicators into a single index of democracy that, as he put it (1990, 19), corresponds fairly closely to the liberty and rights facets of political democracy.

From Authoritarianism to Democracy and the Opposite, Why?

Another body of literature that is relevant to this research are the numerous studies that deal with the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democracy as
a system of governance is expected to be brought about by rational political people who seek to maximize their interests and minimize their losses. Actors, indeed, seek to protect their interests that either are secured or hindered by current arrangements. Therefore, the existing authoritarian forces are compelled to give some concessions in their quest to maintain some powers that might be in jeopardy due to a total loss to the democratic-challenging forces. Thus, one of the primary reasons that compels authoritarian regimes to open up is the loss of political legitimacy and the emergence of division within the existing regime.

Sorensen (1993, 29) argued that transitions to democracy are only very rarely based on the complete defeat of the elite who stood behind the previous authoritarian rule. In the vast majority of cases the transition to democracy is based on negotiations with the forces backing the authoritarian regime. The question then becomes: why should the forces behind authoritarian rule enter such negotiations?

At this point, it is necessary to say that the primary reason that compels the status quo forces of authoritarianism to open up the political system is fear of losing control due to coalition building from the challenging forces. This condition necessarily assumes that the authoritarian regime is going through major crises shaking its foundations. Crises such as loss of political legitimacy, economic crisis, and military defeat are among the most prominent crises that would force the status quo
forces to rethink their position within the new emerging political, as well as militarily challenging, forces.

Marvall (1982), and Sorensen (1993) hypothesized that a split within the authoritarian forces would occur. Thus, a division between the hard-liners and the soft-liners would further the range of political maneuvering to consider the democratic option by the soft-liners, which means the existence of a conflict situation between the two forces. Under conditions of both internal and external pressures, also due to normative commitments to liberal democracy, change would take place. Practically, democracy provides a solution to problems of political legitimacy to the existing social order. However, Sorensen also pointed out that other factors, such as promised foreign aid and loans, might encourage the ruling elite to open up the authoritarian regime. Accordingly, while the authoritarian forces are agreeing on the possibility of change, they also would make sure that democratic institutions would not hinder their interest. The democratization of South Europe, Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea, represent such regulated transition under which authoritarian forces secured their interests.

A second factor that accounts for a defeat to authoritarianism that is strongly related to the loss of legitimacy and internal division is internal and external pressures brought about by the failure of economic
development strategies. In some countries, especially in Latin America, the failure of economic developmental models created economic stagnation, inflation, unemployment, and international debts. Such developments mobilized societal groups to demand change by even military means.

Another important factor identified by scholars such as Sorensen, in the former Eastern Bloc, is "old elite’s loss of belief in its right to rule." The self-defeat brought about by societal collapse, mounting economic crises, and popular uprisings brought about sudden collapse to authoritarianism which lost belief in itself and its right to rule. The end of the Cold War and the democratization of the Eastern Bloc also has brought about a snowballing effect in Huntington’s words. That is, the collapse of the Communist Bloc compelled its clients in Africa, the Far East (Thailand, Vietnam), and in the Middle East (South Yemen, Syria) to consider the option of expanding their base of political support.

Dahl (1971, 65) and Lipset (1965, 31) contend that economic development is a primary factor compelling authoritarianism to allow change. Dahl stated that "the higher the socioeconomic level of a country, the more likely that its regime is an inclusive or near-polyarchy." Lipset also kept stressing the importance of economic development since his first contribution concerning democracy in the 1950s. He stated that "perhaps the most common
generalization linking political systems to other aspects of societies has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development.

Indeed, economic development which entails growth and distribution has always been deemed as the primary factor behind the process of transition to democracy. Economic development itself, in my point of view may compel regimes to change through the radical changes it imposes upon the societal structure. Economic development necessarily creates and enhances the following forces that favors democratization: economic development introduces changes in the standard of living of the people, increases social mobility, increases physical mobility, creates a middle class, increases urbanization, improves education, and creates a consumer society. Such factors are necessary conditions that can force authoritarianism to change.

The process of change itself is brought about by the influence of such shifts within the social structure, namely, the emergence of new classes with a gap between their economic power and political power. The emergence of new wealthy social groups that lack access to political power means that they will seek to bridge the gap between their economic and political powers. Failure to respond to such emerging forces could lead to mobilization of grievances and even violent political instability.

Regimes that responded to the impacts of modernization
(e.g., South Korea) developed inclusionary societies, while exclusionary regimes (e.g., Nigeria and Algeria) that rejected encompassing the emerging forces of modernization had to face national breakdowns and civil wars.

Diamond et al. (1989, 14) identified the emergence of a tolerant political culture as an important variable in the democratization process. Political culture is a set of "beliefs, ideas, attitudes, values, evaluations, and behavioral orientations." In addition, Diamond et al. (1989, 22) identified the emergence of civil society institutions as another crucial factor in the process of democratization. Such institutions represent a link between the state and the society.

Furthermore, authoritarian regimes are forced to introduce changes or to be a subject of the changing process through what Huntington (1991, 100) called the demonstration effect of snowballing or the domino-effect. A successful democratization occurs in one country and this encourages democratization in other countries, either because they seem to face similar problems or because successful democratization elsewhere suggests that democratization might be a cure for their problems whatever those problems are, or because the country that has democratized is powerful and/or viewed as a political and cultural model.

The snowballing demonstration effect, as Huntington, Inglehart, Higley and Barton, Reuschemeyer et al. put it, was facilitated in the 1980s by the communication revolution, television satellites, and transportation which created "by the mid-1980s the image of a worldwide
democratic revolution" undoubtedly becoming a reality in the minds of political and intellectual leaders in most countries of the Arab World."

O'Donnell et al. (1989) agree on the importance of the international context of the collapse of authoritarianism, especially in South Europe and Latin America.

Transition and Consolidation of Democracy: Toward Model-Building

Another body of literature that is also related to the topic of my dissertation is the issue of consolidation democracy and model-building. Since the early 1980s, transition to democratization from military dictatorships, authoritarian rule, and autocracies has become one of the most intensely studied topics in social sciences generally, and political science, in particular. As Share (1985, 525) put it, comparativists have explored aspects of erosion of authoritarian regimes, the conditions of transition to democracy, regime change, and the consolidation of democracies. Furthermore, developmentalists have also pursued strategies of model-building of transition to democracy since the late 1960s.

Rustow (1970, 337) identified three types of explanations of transition to democracy in recent writings of American sociologists and political scientists. "one of these proposed by Lipset, Cutright, and others, connects stable democracy with certain economic and social background
conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence." A second type of explanation dwells on the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among citizens. A third type of explanation looks at certain features of social and political structures. Rustow has criticized such studies that focused on "preconditions" for the transition to democracy, due to the fact that these studies usually tended to jump from the correlation between democracy and other factors to the conclusion that these factors were responsible for democracy. Furthermore, Rustow argued that they also tended to look for the causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors, but not political factors (Share 1987, 337).

Dahl (1971, 210) distinguished between three strategies of democratization. The first strategy deals with direct occupation of a country and installing a democratic government, as well as nurturing such government with economic support and security until it is able to rely on itself. The German and Japanese democracies were established by foreign powers that occupied both countries after their defeat in World War II. Currently, those two democracies are classified as among the most stable, and well developed democracies. Dahl identified another strategy of building a democracy, that is through supporting the existing liberal regime in order to
consolidate its democracy and prevent authoritarian forces from gaining the upper hand. A third strategy is to support revolutionary movements and provide them with the necessary funds and weapons in order to topple existing authoritarian regimes.

In fact, the transition to democracy in South Europe and Latin America has puzzled comparativists. In the case of Spain, Jose Maravall (1982, 5) pointed out that "transition towards democracy must be examined from the genetic point of view that focuses on the actual politics of collective actors, their strategies and their political conception." Maravall agrees with Dahl (1971) that the evidence simply does not sustain the hypothesis that a high level of socioeconomic development is either a necessary or sufficient condition for competitive politics, nor the converse hypothesis that competitive politics is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a high level of socioeconomic development. The issue has to be put within its political context. Dahl (1971, 71) concluded that the difference in regimes cannot be explained by appealing to the usual explanatory factors—the level of socioeconomic development, urbanization, education, size of the middle class, per capita income, and so on.

Maravall, in his study of transition to democracy in Spain, found that transition to democracy is such a complex process that encompasses both social pressures "from below"
and strategies of reform "from above." He identified different stages, among them the preparatory stage of transition. This stage a process of political struggle and mass mobilization of lower classes that is extremely important in order to exert pressures on the ruling elite. In a second stage the decision-making stage-- a decisive faction within the ruling elite leads to accepting pluralist democratic compromise in order to end the impasse and to avoid a civil conflict. Finally, in order to establish a pluralist framework and to organize a constitutional electoral process, the political organization of the democratic right become a necessity (Marvall 1982, 11).

Alfred Stepan (1986, 64-84) proposed eight particularly plausible and distinctive paths leading to the termination of the authoritarian regime and the process of re-democratization. These are: (1) internal restoration after external reconquest; (2) internal restoration reformulation; (3) externally monitored installation; (3) re-democratization initiated from within the authoritarian regime; (5) society-led regime termination; (6) party pact (within or without consociational element); and (7) organized violent revolt coordinated by democratic reformist parties, and Marxist-led revolutionary war.

Share (1987, 529) developed a typology of transition to democracy based on two classificatory questions. First is the democratic transition brought about with the
participation or consent of leaders of the authoritarian regime, or does it transpire without such participation or consent? After Sartori (1976, 275), Share termed transitions which enjoy the support of authoritarian rulers as consensual. This type entails that "continuous change amounts to self-change, to transformation resulting from and permitted by the inner constituent mechanisms of each political structure. This support for democratization can be manifest in two ways: authoritarian leaders may simply tolerate democratic political change, refraining from active stewardship over it, or they actively participate in the process of change hoping thereby either to control and limit such change, or to forestall more distasteful change" (Share (1987, 529).

Furthermore, consensual transition entails continuity in the sense that it preserves some of the traits of an authoritarian government. Consequently, "consensual transitions are able to foster simultaneously 'backward' and legitimation; democratic rule is established upon, not at the expense of authoritarianism. Thus consensual transitions usually avoid open confrontation between supporters of authoritarian and democratic rule, and may gain adherents from both camps. Logically, in such cases one would expect to detect democratic features within the preceding authoritarian regime, as well as nondemocratic vestiges in the succeeding democracy" (Share 1987, 529).
Share (1987, 529) identified another type of transition— the nonconsensual—in which the legitimacy of authoritarian and democratic rules are mutually exclusive. The support of either one cannot be reconciled with the other. Under such conditions of transition, an open confrontation occurs between the two camps. The triumph of the democratic camp would necessarily imply an exclusion of old guards of authoritarianism from participating in the construction of the new regime.

Share (1987, 531), concluded that "most modern democracies have resulted from transition through rupture." Within this category, Share identified four types of transition. Transition produced by the colonial powers of the preceding authoritarian regime, usually because of the defeat and occupation by a foreign power. Postwar Western European and Japan’s transition illustrate this type. A second type, extrication, which according to Share would occur when authoritarian regimes experience a sudden loss of legitimacy and abruptly hand power over to the democratic opposition, such as Argentina and Peru in the 1980s. A third type of transition through rupture may take the form of "coup s" in which the authoritarian regime is dislodged from power by an elite group within the military or police forces, such as Portuguese transition. Finally, transition through rupture may come about via mass mobilization or revolutions, of which the the Iranian, and the Nicaraguan revolutions serves
as a prototype.

Diamond et al. (1988, 1990) emphasized the importance of societal struggle for the sake of achieving democracy around the world. In their ambitious project of democracy in developing countries, they studied transition to democracy in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Despite their unjustifiable exclusion of some regions, their studies enriched the field of transition to democracy by providing different strategies of such transition in different parts of the world. In some countries, societal struggle was associated with elite willingness to accommodate the other side in the political process; however, leadership and global changes also have contributed to the process of transition to democracy.

Gayso (1991, 1) recognized the extraordinary changes that occurred since the mid 1980s, in which a series of events altered regime type around the globe, ranging from Latin America to East Europe, from Africa to Asia, where the will of the people is expressed in different ways. Such movement has resulted in many countries moving toward more open and participatory political and economic systems. These events reemphasize the fact that the birth of democracy can only be the result of decisions and actions taken by the people themselves.

Gayso (1991, 1) noted that the transition and the birth of democracy are painful processes. Democracies when young
and new, can be very fragile and perishable as they emerge from dictatorship, tyranny, or chaos. Democracies are not only difficult to build but also difficult to maintain. The long-term sustainability of the new experiments remain uncertain.

Huntington (1991, 210) identified three models of transition to democracy. The linear-incremental model, which entails the expansion of political suffrage and political participation, primarily reflects European experience. The British and the Swedish models of transition to democracy are the most visible examples. Indeed, Rustow (1970, 361) himself developed a model of transition to democracy based on the Swedish experience, which encompassed national unity, prolonged an inconclusive political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rule, and habituation to the working of those rules.

Huntington (1991, 210) identified a second model that is more relevant to the experience of the Third World than to the linear model that is the cyclical model. The cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy occurred in Latin America and is still repeating itself in the Third World. For instance, Sudan is the most visible example of this model in the Arab World where power and authority are rotated between the military and the civilian government. The features of this model are key elites' acceptance, at least superficially of the legitimacy of
democratic forms. In addition to holding elections from
time to time, but there is no succession of power occurring
through the electoral process.

A third model identified by Huntington (1991, 211) is
neither linear nor cyclical, but rather dialectical. "In
this case the development of a middle class leads to an
increased pressure on the existing authoritarian regimes for
expanded participation and contestation. Within the course
of governing an urban "breakthrough" occurs, leading to the
overthrow of the existing authoritarian regime and the
installation of a democratic one. Meanwhile, the newly
installed regime finds it difficult or impossible to govern
effectively. Consequently, it is usually replaced by a
"right wing" authoritarian rule. "In due course, however
this regime collapses and transition is made to a more
balanced and longer-lasting democratic system. This model
is roughly applicable to the history of a number of
countries, including Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, and
Spain.

Higley and Burton (1989, 17-18) emphasized the
importance of the elite as a pivotal factor in transition to
democracy. They argued that democratic transitions and
breakdowns can best be understood by studying basic
continuities and changes in the internal relations of
national elites. A disunited national elite, the most
common type, produces a series of unstable regimes that
tends to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. However, a consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy as in the cases of Sweden, Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit. They concluded that regime changes toward democratization, or regression to authoritarianism, have to be preceded or accompanied by elite transformations. Elite transformation from disunity to consensual unity would produce a democratic regime, while elite transformation from consensual unity to disunity would lead to the resurgence of authoritarianism.

In fact, the role of leadership and the elite in transition is crucial for the process of regime change from authoritarianism to democracy as well as to the consolidation of democracy. There are numerous examples in which elite willingness and acceptance of democratic arrangements have led to the consolidation of democracy, as in the cases of Spain, Greece, and Costa Rica, while elite disunity has led to catastrophic societal instability in Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, and the Philippines.

Vanhanen has indicated that, in his comparative studies (1984, 1990, 1992), he paid more attention to "the structural factors of democratization than to the political ones. The result of these studies provides a base for
estimating the significance of systematic structural factors and the scope of local, unique, and random factors, including conscious strategies of democratization used by political actors." However in his latest contribution, Vanhanen (1992, 5) stated that this book is an attempt to add something to the already rich heritage of comparative democratization studies by focusing on the relative significance of social constraints and conscious political strategies on the one hand, and on the nature of the strategies used in the struggle for democracy and the types of problems in particular centuries and regions on the other hand.

Karl and Schmitter (1991, 275) found that in the cases of transition to democracy in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe, most if not all of the impetus for change comes "from below" from actors in subordinate or excluded positions in the social, economic and political order of the ancien regime, and those in which elite actors "from above," i.e., from within the dominant institutions of authoritarian rule, social prestige, and/or economic exploitation, play the leading role in moving the system towards some form of democracy.

However, in the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, Peeler (1985, 40) emphasized the importance of elite accommodation in the consolidation of democracy through agreement on a set of political rules. He asserted that democratization in all three cases seems to have been built on a period of elite competition for political power, a competition sufficiently muted by accommodation to keep it within the bounds of civility most of the time. Democratization was in each case demanded by emerging mass-based
political movements which were able in due course to extract enough concessions from the dominant elites to establish a formally liberal democracy.

Rial Ju’an (1991, 289) has also emphasized the importance of mobilization from below, discrediting the military, political accommodation of all political players, the "ethicalization" of politics, and the role of the intelligentsia, as the primary factors behind transition to democracy in Latin America. However, Dix (1992, 488) stressed the importance of the institutionalization of the political parties in Latin America as an important step in the process of transition to democracy in the region, where political actors accommodated themselves within the political process. José Cazorla (1993, 78), and Hagopian (1990, 149) asserted that political pacts and agreements, in addition to the expansion of the middle class associated with societal mobilization for the cause of democracy were behind the transition to liberal democracy in South Europe and Latin America.

The aforementioned contributions are relevant to the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World. I will build a phased-transitional-dialectical model of democracy in the Arab World to be presented in the conclusion, that reconciles and utilizes elements of the above mentioned models and strategies.

From Democracy to Authoritarianism

Indeed, the argument stated above does not suggest a
linear model of the collapse of authoritarianism and the triumph of democracy. The post-World War II period has witnessed both democratization and regression to authoritarianism. Consequently, the relative success of the democratic forces does not mean a total defeat to authoritarianism; in some cases, it is a mere tactical-temporal withdrawal from running the show. The examples of reversal to military authoritarianism are quite numerous in the Arab World. Countries such as Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia, Argentina, the Philippines, Brazil, and Chile all have witnessed periods of their modern history in which authority was exchanged between the democratic forces and the forces of authoritarianism. But the question remains, why some countries that have embarked on the process of democratization have regressed to authoritarianism.

The primary reason for the return of authoritarianism to power has to do with the performance of the civilian government in terms of maintaining order, protecting the national integrity, and achieving economic development. Scholars such as Huntington (1968), Nordlinger (1977), McKinlay, and Cohan (1976), Jackman, O’kane, Johnson, McGwan, Slater (1986), and others have cited the performance of the civilian government as a primary factor motivating the military to overthrow the civilian government.

Nordlinger (1977, 19) found that "immediately after the
overthrow of a civilian government the officers issue a public statement to explain and justify their actions. Those communiqués include some common themes because they speak to the problems facing almost all praetorians in the coups’ immediate aftermath—the consolidation of their control and the legitimation of their actions. The praetorians themselves as responsible and patriotic officers, these public spirited qualities leaving them little choice but to protect the constitution and the nation from the unhappy consequences of continued civilian rule."

Praetorian usually justify their actions by “charging the former civilian incumbents with a shorter or longer list of performance failures. The soldiers almost invariably claim that constitutional principles have been flouted by the corrupt, arbitrary, or illegal actions of the civilian incumbents. They are commonly accused of having acted contrary to the national interest by allowing subversive groups to threaten the country’s internal security, by fomenting class and communal conflicts and thereby encouraging political disorder and violence, by adopting policies that resulted in low economic growth rates, widespread unemployment, and inflationary spirals, or by failing to undertake programs of socioeconomic modernization and reform” (Ibid., 20).

Another factor is lack of institutionalization of the political process, and the political disintegration mainly
in the Third World countries. Thus, the "military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military" (Huntington 1968, 194).

Another factor is the failure of the process of nation building and the escalation of ethnic cleavages in the society. Countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt are well known examples in this regard.

The failure to institutionalize the process of democratization--through the enhancement of the role of law, the civil society institution, and the lack of a democratic leadership--is an important variable contributing to the return to authoritarianism.

Finally, the reversal to authoritarianism is brought about by a societal failure to develop and, enhance the tolerant culture that brought about the collapse of authoritarianism at the beginning of the process of transition to democracy. Italy, Germany, Turkey, Nigeria,
Nicaragua, and other countries are examples of a cyclical switch of authority between the democratic forces and those forces of authoritarianism, due to a societal failure to install and nurture a democratic political culture. The aforementioned contributions will be employed to build a dialectical model of transition to democracy in the Arab World to be presented in the conclusion.
Part II REGIME TYPOLOGY

CHAPTER 3

NATION-BUILDING AND STATE FORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD, A SOCIOPOLITICAL OVERVIEW

The main objective of this chapter is to address the issue of nation-building and state formation in the Arab World, followed by an economic regime typology that would help in understanding the prospects of democratization in the region of study, in the coming chapters.

At the heart of Arab politics are the problems of nation-building and state formation. The essence of this process can be articulated through addressing three basic components: crisis of political legitimacy, authority, and identity (Hudson 1977). Two theoretical approaches will be presented concerning the process of nation-building in the Arab World; a developmental-modernizational and a dependency-world system perspective, followed by a class analysis and a classification to the Arab World into three classes (upper income, low-income, and middle income) of countries.

The notion of nation-state in itself is alien to the Arab-Islamic culture. Its origins can be traced back to the post-World War I settlements and compromises between the
colonial powers, rather than to a natural-historical evolution of a national awareness of distinctiveness of a people which encourages them to articulate such awareness in an entity called a nation-state. Accordingly, "In one respect, the nation-state in the Arab World has been a "compulsory" model at independence of former colonies and dependencies, partly for lack of any other respectable models of statehood" (Zubaida 1993, 121). Furthermore, the idea of nation-state is a new phenomenon in the sense that it has no historical antecedent in the political culture of Islam; nor has it become a familiar term in the political vocabulary of the region. The concept has remained without an adequate definition ever since its importation, among a host of political ideas, from Western Europe during the nineteenth century. In the European political tradition, the nation-state has been defined by three essential elements for its formation and survival. These are territory, people, and government. A fundamental prerequisite is to ensure the acceptance by the people of the authority of their state to regulate and conduct their affairs. Thus, the sovereignty of the state must be based on popular consent to that legitimacy. S. E. Finer encapsulates all these qualities when he characterizes the notion of the state as a territorial delimited population which has accepted a common form of government (Kelidar 1993, 316).

Bill and Springborg (1994, 39) define nation-building as "the process whereby a sense of shared national identity, patriotism, and loyalty to a homeland develops" while state-building is referred to as "the process of constructing governmental and political institutions." Hudson (1977, 2) considered the task of nation building and the related processes of legitimacy, identity, and authority
as central problems that have faced the Arab World since World War II. I agree strongly with Hudson, and I would go further to say that such problems go even deeper in history. Their roots can be traced historically to the transfer of the Caliphate from the Arabs to non-Arab Muslims. Specifically, the escalation of nationalism and nation-building occurred in the nineteenth century, at a time when the winds of nationalism struck the Ottoman Empire. Arabs called upon the establishment of an Arab rule in their homeland.

In exchange for Arab support in World War I, and their revolution against the Ottoman Empire in 1916, the European colonial powers had promised to unite them under the rule of the Hashimiat dynasty—the prophet’s family. However, the settlements of post-World War I were entirely different. There had been a secret agreement between the allies to divided the Arab World among themselves and to colonize the whole region. Thus, current borders are artificially created by the colonial powers with no natural borders to divide the Arab people.

In spite of the importance given to the problems of state-building, Arabs have been unsuccessful in agreeing on basic requirements related to nation and state-building, such as the establishment of a viable nation-state, and the agreement on issues of territory, people, identity, authority, ideology (Nationalism, Islam, Socialism),
culture, borders, citizenship, unity, solidarity, and peaceful settlement of inter-Arab disputes.

Scholars such as Bill and Springborg (1994), Hudson (1977), Issawi (1958), and others have approached the process of nation-building in the Arab World from a developmental-modernizational perspective. Bill and Springborg have made an analogy between the historical development of the European nation-state and the Middle East’s efforts of nation-building. They deemed the following aspects as basic for the establishment of a nation state: state ideology, authority, sources of political legitimacy, aspects of stability, and war. They asserted that "the Middle East today is wrestling with the same problems of state formation that have confronted Europe" (1994, 38). However, the difference between the two regions is that nation-building in Europe was an outcome of historical evolution of national awareness, while nation-building in the Middle East was an artificial creation by foreign powers. Thus, the more artificial the country is, the more difficult are the challenges of state formation and nation-building.

Countries of the Fertile Crescent, for example, were carved out of the Ottoman Empire in accordance with British and French desires. National aspirations and identities of residents were not coterminous with state boundaries. To some of these residents, the idea of nation referred to their specific ethnic or religious groups, many of which, as the result of new nation-states having been created, were fragmented, scattered among two or more countries
of the region" (Bill and Springborg 1994, 38).

While the developmental-modernizational approach deemed the struggle for state-building in the Arab World as a normal aspect that has been encountered by western nations, dependentistas, and world system analysts view it from a different perspective. Similar to underdevelopment, the creation of artificial states that lack foundations and the division of the Arab World was engineered and implemented by the colonial powers and the instruments of the international political economy in defense for their interests. The Arab World has been looked at as constituting "peripheral states" which are shaped by dependence on a world market, dominated by capital relations, and the capitalist powers of the "center." Accordingly, relationships between the center and peripheries are governed by unequal economic exchange relations and unequal development, which impedes genuine development in the peripheries. Dependentistas perceive unequal development as a primary catalyst that exacerbates poverty, inequality, regional imbalance of development, and distribution. These problems produce a combination of societal contradictions, civil wars, antagonism, international wars, and tremendous social crises which threaten the political authority and the very existence of states both locally and regionally. In response to such challenges, the peripheral states would pursue repressive strategies in order to secure themselves. In such efforts,
they only can do so through reliance on foreign powers in
the center, which would enhance their dependence and
backwardness (Zubaida 1993, 41). The aforementioned
problems of state formation and nation-building are
manifested in three crises that current Arab governments
face. These problems are a crisis of identity, legitimacy,
and authority.

The Crisis of Identity

The crisis of identity is related to multiplicity of
loyalties where the individual and the group are shuttered
by and between different types of loyalties—loyalty to Pan-
Islamism (Islamic Solidarity), Pan-Arabism (Arab
Nationalism), localism (territorial state), and religious-
sectarian loyalty. Such confusion complicates individual
and group existence from different perspectives. First of
all, under the conditions of fragmentation, "states struggle
hard to establish their ideological hegemony over
competitive calls for loyalty and identity from these
competing claims" (Bill and Springborg 1994, 46). Such
struggle is the major reason for regional wars, civil wars,
and the sense of instability that all states and people live
under. Fragmentation of identity and loyalty have
contributed to civil strife and has impeded the development
of a democratic experience in most of the Arab World.
Countries such as Lebanon were shattered by competing
loyalties that have led to devastating civil wars. In other
countries such as Iraq and Somalia, it has led to disintegration of the territorial state.

Scholars have identified some factors influence the articulation of nationality and national identity in the Arab World, among which is Islam. Islam as a universal message is not bound by natural borders, nor does it recognize artificial ones.

Unlike some other religions that are associated with a specific tribe or ethnic group, such as Judaism, or that are nonproselytizing, such as the heterodox Druze faith, Islam once it had spread beyond the confines of Arabia, no longer benefited from reinforcing tribal, ethnic, or other solidarities. The socioreligious identity that characterizes Muslims is that they are members of the Umma al-Islamiyya, the community of the believers. Unlike adherents to the "political religions" of secular European nationalism, who identify themselves with reference to a specific territory and state, members of the Islamic Umma do not constitute a state, nor is their faith associated with any specific land. Islamic doctrine, therefore, is strictly speaking, incompatible with nationalism, which refers to a specific people in a particular place. Nationalism from an Islamic perspective implies *Jahiliyyah* (pre-Islamic) tribal particularism (Bill and Springborg 1994, 46).

The spread of sectarianism is another argument related to religion that complicates the process of nation-building. In the Arab World, Sunnism, Shi’ism, Christianity, Judaism and their subgroups have contributed to the lack of consensus on national and religious identities. Their subgroups, such as the Alawi, Ibadi, Zidi, Wahabi, Suffi, Maronite, Catholics, Gospels, Arab Jews, non-Arab Jews, in addition to their affiliated political and military
movements, have made it extremely difficult for the territorial state to gain total or even considerable support necessary for maintenance of order and stability.

Another obstacle to the achievement of national identity, identified by Bill and Springborg (1994, 63), is economic development and the absence of a bourgeois class, which was responsible for the development of secular nationalism in Europe. Secular nationalism and the bourgeois class, which present favorable conditions for nation-building, have not been obtained by any Arab country where primordial loyalties have always overshadowed loyalty to the artificial states. The evolution of the bourgeoisie was aborted deliberately by the ruling elites in the 1950s and 1960s when elites in control utilized state power for the sake of such policy. Bill and Springborg (1994, 68) writes:

After reasonably strong states did emerge in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s, elites in control of them then used those states to inhibit the development of an independent bourgeoisie . . . which might have threatened political stability by demanding democratization of those polities and liberalization of their economies. Moreover, Middle Eastern economies have been insufficiently independent and developed to provide adequate foundations upon which indigenous merchants, financiers, and manufacturers might construct internationally competitive enterprises.

Batatu (1986, 63) followed the same line of thinking in comparing the successful efforts of nation-building and its related requirements in Europe, but not in the Arab World. He asserted that
It is not an accident that the "third estate" played an important role in the emergence of such European nation-states as France or England in the dawn of modern age; or that the process of German unification was impelled in the 1860s in part by the manufacturing classes of the Rhine region; or that shipping, manufacturing, and commercial interests in America's thirteen colonies were an important motivational force in the 1780s behind the trend toward a strong federal government. In the Arab countries the counterparts of these classes have never been strong in the modern era. International economic relationships have been strong in the modern era. International economic relationships have been so structured, the financial, organizational, and technical powers of the multinational corporations have been so overwhelming, and Arab private entrepreneurs have not been able to grow autonomously, or have been able to thrive only as appendages of either the multinational corporate system or of their own governments.

Political Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is a second problem facing Arab regimes. It "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset 1981, 64-65). A crisis of legitimacy, as Lipset put it, is a crisis of change. Therefore, its roots must be understood within the process of change in modern societies. In terms of Western Europe, Lipset (1981, 71) asserted that western nations have achieved institutional and democratic legitimacy through solving the major obstacles to nation building. These impediments are "the place of the Church, the admission of lower strata, particularly the workers, to full political and economic 'citizenship' through universal
suffrage and the right to bargain collectively; and the continuing struggle over the distribution of the national income." In contrast to the European nations, Arab regimes have exploited religion to legitimize their unpopular rule. By doing so, they even distorted the liberal-accommodative nature of the ideology. Furthermore, what is striking in the case of Arab regimes is that they resort to the use of coercive means to accomplish elusive legitimacy rather an institutional process similar to that of Western Europe. Thus, civil wars, international wars, ideological attacks, and the use of historical-religious and traditional claims are the primary strategies to accomplish political legitimacy.

Legitimacy can also be achieved through economic development and progress. Regimes elsewhere, such as in Europe and Asia, refer to their economic accomplishments to expand the support for their authority, while Arab regimes refer to empty ideological slogans, or those that connote ideological and personal attacks on domestic and external enemies.

Generally speaking, sources of legitimacy in the Arab World can be classified into domestic and external. Domestically, governmental authority has been legitimized through the offering of political and economic rewards to certain groups in the society. In addition, Arab regimes used personal legitimacy to enhance their rule. Finally,
they have built large security agencies to achieve legitimacy through coercive rule, imprisonment, human rights violations, elite hegemony, ideological attack on groups classified as "domestic enemies of the people", and reliance on religious-historical and tribal claims of rulership.

The external sources of legitimacy deal with the outside environment and the role of international clientelism in legitimizing rulers in the Third World. Thus, colonial powers that are responsible for the creation of modern Arab states are also responsible for their existence. In this regard, Western powers are committed to the survival of the ruling elite such as those in the Gulf region.

Furthermore, some Arab regimes (e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) have also invoked Arab nationalism as a transnational ideology to legitimize their rule. A final external aspect is a regime's exaggeration of the enmity of the outside environment, and the creation of a security dilemma. This strategy has been utilized by Libya, Iraq, and Syria to divert the attention of their people from domestic hardships. Under such conditions, regimes pursue conflictual foreign policy, and use all coercive means domestically in the name of national security and national survival, including imprisonment, torture, and expulsion to the "collaborators" with foreign enemies.
Crisis of Authority

Arab regimes have also suffered from a crisis of authority. According to Hudson (1977, 82), "few Arab regimes can count themselves as reasonably secure from attempted irregular changes of government through coups d'état, assassinations, rebellions, or armed uprisings."

State authority is challenged by the presence of two competing grounds for authority as identified by Hudson (1977, 83). On one hand, the Arab governments try to use modern grounds to gain authority, including parliaments and political parties, while on the other hand they continue to use various elements of traditional authority. This latter type of authority consists different types of competing elements; the patriarchal dimension, tribalism, Islam and the feudal dimension (Hudson 1977, 84). These dimensions have made it difficult for the state to establish its authority.

It is evident that state authority has been challenged seriously by the aforementioned forces. The state competes on loyalty, effectiveness of its policies, and attempts to find its way amongst these forces. Such moves have not been successful in many instances. States' authority has collided with tribal, familial, and religious authorities and has led to civil wars such as in the case of Lebanon, or national disintegration such as in the case of Somalia, or total alliance with tribalism against the emerging modern
urban political forces such as in the cases of the Gulf states. Some states, however, have capitalized upon this complex array of competing sources of authorities with some success in some cases, while it has been a total failure in others. Jordan is an example of a case where the monarch has used religious, tribal, familial, and neo-feudal elements to support his rule. Accordingly, the monarchy creates balances of power at certain times and shifts to another major tribes at other times to enhance its rule, thus, capitalizing on the creation of divisions between such traditional authorities. Such politics have shown how risky it is, under the conditions of total failure of the government in managing the economy, or under the conditions of an emerging leadership that is capable of unifying traditional-tribal support to topple the government. This process has been averted at the last moment in Jordan in 1989, where economic crisis mobilized tribal forces with urban political forces and led to the first serious challenge to the monarchy since the 1950s. Under such conditions, the monarch attempted to revive his traditional-tribal support through pledging support to their regions and appealed to the urban forces by pledging the resumption of the parliamentary experience.

To sum up the discussion, the Arab countries suffer from serious problems of nation-building and state formation. The essence of those processes, as Issawi (1958,
had put it is development in its three dimensions: the economic, the political, and the social. I agree strongly with Issawi who identified such dilemmas at the beginning of the development process in the 1950s. These dilemmas are currently debated by area specialists and politicians after decades of wasted efforts of unproductive development.

The essence of the problem is development. Had the Arab states been successful with development efforts, and the utilization of the tremendous oil wealth, the efforts of nation-building could have been more successful. The fact that Arab regimes resorted to utilizing kinship, tribal, religious, historical, and coercive instruments for support to their rule came as no surprise due to their failure to provide their people with basic necessities, to legitimize their rule, enhance national identity, or establishing an effective political authority.

The Political Economy of the Arab World

The political economy of the Arab regimes refers to the phenomena of development, dependence and inequality in the distribution of wealth, as well as the striking disparity in terms of wealth among Arab countries. The Arab World is divided into two major classes: the rich and the poor. This fact is an accurate generalization even in "oil monarchies" such as Saudi Arabia where people in the Eastern part of the country live in poverty and underdevelopment.

Area specialists like Bill and Springborg (1994, 122),
identified the social structure of the Arab World as consisting of seven classes: the upper (ruling) class, the bureaucratic middle class, the bourgeois middle class, the cleric middle class, the traditional working class, the peasant class, and the nomadic class. Their schema includes one upper class, three middle classes, and three lower classes. However, Bill and Springborg found that the upper ruling class, which is less than 2 percent, controls the Arab societies. The upper class has a monopoly of all instruments of power, authority, and wealth in society. Furthermore, to ensure its monopoly and control, the ruling class also controls the military and maintains large landholdings. Consequently, Bill and Springborg concluded that the three middle classes in the Arab World are weak in terms of their power and authority in comparison to a tiny minority that controls the land and who lives on it. Thus, as they put it (1994, 125) the bulk of the population belongs to the three poor classes.

Oweiss (1995, 2) has classified Arab countries into three groups based on GNP per capita income as a central indicator of development. These groups are: low-income, middle-income, and upper-income groups. Oweiss’ classification of countries is useful to the main themes of this chapter. I will employ his classification, and build on it a regime classification, in addition to a class analysis of the Arab World. The Arab World can be looked at
from an economic perspective as classified into three classes of countries:

First is the low-income class of countries. The primary criteria for categorizing countries is the GNP per capita income, in addition to some social indicators. The GNP has been used as an informing indicator of development by the United Nations as a summarizing figure of a nation's progress. The United Nations identified poor countries as that group of nations with a per capita income of less than $500 (UNDP 1994, 102). This category includes the following Arab countries: Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, and Somalia.

The low-income countries in the Arab World as Table (3.1) shows are characterized by high population growth rates ranging from (2.9) to (3.4). Poor countries are inhabited by a population of 51 million, representing 22 percent of the Arab people. Second, they are characterized by low per capita income. Countries such as Somalia have never exceeded $130 per capita. A third feature of these countries is low literacy rates; for example Djibouti has a literacy rate of 19 percent. Furthermore, these countries are characterized by low life expectancy rates (less than 50 years), high unemployment rates (ranges from 20-30 percent), agricultural economy (Somalia, Mauritania), high external debts (Sudan with $17 billion), high rates of military expenditures (Yemen 14 percent), weak governmental
structures, and the absence of governmental authority in the country and desert sides (Yemen, Somalia). Despite the economic difficulties that this group of countries is facing, there is no reason to conclude that these countries have no hope of making a transition to democracy. Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and Djibouti all had in their recent histories a tradition of elected governments. These countries have made some progress, despite their major setbacks represented by disintegration such as in the case of Somalia, and military takeover in the case of Sudan.

Table 3.1: Socioeconomic characteristics of the Low-Income Group of Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>POPG</th>
<th>LIEX</th>
<th>LITR</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>UNEMP</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>EXTD</th>
<th>MIL/GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>355M</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritian</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>2.227</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>1.900</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POP:** Population in millions (1994)
**POPG:** Annual population growth in (1994)
**LIEX:** Life expectancy at birth (years) 1992
**LITR:** Literacy in (1994)
**GNP:** GNP Per Capita in U.S. Dollars (1994)
**UNEMP:** Unemployment percentages Rates in 1994
**UNDP:** UN Human Development Index (1993)
**EXTD:** External debts in U.S. billion Dollars, except Djibouti(Millions), in (1994)

The Middle-Income Group of Countries

The United Nations (UNDP 1993, 103) identified the middle income as ranging from $640-$1750 per capita income. It encompasses the following countries: Syria, Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. This category is inhabited by a total population of 142.8 million Arabs, constituting 67 percent of the Arab people (Oweiss 1995, 2).

The middle-income class of countries as Table (3.2) shows are characterized by high indebtedness, in which the debts of this group of countries equals $200 Billion. Iraq tops the list with $80 billion, followed by Egypt with $32 billion to be also followed by Algeria with $26 billion making Arab countries among the highest indebted countries worldwide. Second, this group of countries is characterized by high population growth ranging from 1.9 percent in Tunisia, to 3.74 percent in Syria. These rates are associated with 0 percent economic growth rates for the period of 1980-1991 (Oweiss 1995, 2). Such combination would intensify the economic difficulties that this group of countries are facing. Another feature is high unemployment rates ranging from 7.5 percent in Syria up to 35 percent in Lebanon.

This class of countries, however, has better conditions than the low-income group of countries. They have high literacy rates (Jordan 82 percent), skilled labor force, and
a potential for the development of an industrial sector
(Egypt, Algeria, Iraq), if the necessary foundations were to
be provided. These features are extremely necessary for the
development of a liberal democratic society if the political
accommodation and the political will would be provided. In
support for this trend, Huntington (1991, 315) indicated
that "the overwhelming bulk of the countries where economic
conditions were supportive of democratization were emerging
in the Middle East and North Africa, namely in middle-income
and upper middle-income groups of countries." Therefore,
Huntington predicted that democratization in the 1990s would
be the dominant feature of Middle Eastern politics despite
his pessimism concerning the prospects of democratization in
the Islamic World based on cultural factors. Huntington
(1991, 315) maintained that "Middle Eastern economies and
societies were approaching the point where they would be too
wealthy and too complex for their various traditional,
military, and one-party systems of authoritarian rule."
Thus, the prospects of transition to democracy in this
category is encouraging as we will see in the coming
chapter.

Table 3.2: Socioeconomic Characteristics of the
Middle-Income Class of Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>POPG</th>
<th>LIEX</th>
<th>LITR</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>UNEM</th>
<th>EXTD</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>MIL/GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>54.82</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>POP</td>
<td>POPG</td>
<td>LIEX</td>
<td>LITR</td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>UNEM</td>
<td>EXTD</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>MIL/GDP</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.768</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23.524</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>14.88</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>66.46</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POP: Population in millions 1994
POPG: Annual population growth (1992)
LIEX: Life expectancy at birth (years) 1992
LITR: Literacy in (1994)
GNP: GNP Per Capita in U.S. Dollars 1994
UNEM: Unemployment in (1994)
EXTD: External debts in U.S. billion dollars 1994
UNDP: UN human development index 1993-1994


The Upper-Income Countries

This group includes the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely, (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman), and Libya. Their primary source of income is oil revenues, which comprises around 80 percent of their national income. They constitute 11 percent of the Arab population.

A major feature of this group of countries as Table (3.3) indicates is high immigration rates. The percentages of non-nationals ranges from 26 percent of the population in Oman to 70 percent of the population of the United Arab Emirates. This implies high reliance on foreign labor; the
foreign labor force has been estimated at around 7 million workers in the Gulf region.

Another feature of this category is high per capita income, as in the case of the UAE where GNP per capita income is estimated around $22,000. These countries are also marked by medium literacy rates, ranging from 62 percent in Saudi Arabia to 80 percent in Kuwait. However, Oman’s literacy rate is 47 percent, due to the fact that Oman’s entrance to the modern world did not begin until the 1970s.

Table 3.3: Some Economic and Social Indicators of Upper-Income Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>POPG</th>
<th>NON</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>LIEX</th>
<th>LIT</th>
<th>OIL</th>
<th>MEX</th>
<th>UNE</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>MEX</th>
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<tr>
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<td>5.24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18000</td>
<td>74.99</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>NEG</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POP: Population in millions 1994
NON: Percentage of non-national to the total population
GNP: GNP per capita in 1994
LIEX: Life expectancy in 1994
LIT: Literacy rates 1994
OIL: Oil percentage of the GNP in 1994
UNE: Unemployment in (1994)
UNDP: UN Human Development Index 1993-1994
MEX: Military expenditures as percentages of GDP in 1994

In terms of the prospects of transition to democracy in this category, as we will see in the coming chapters, due to the decline of oil prices and the Gulf War, the upper-income group of countries has been under tremendous pressure to open up its regimes for more participation.

Summary

Generally speaking, the efforts of nation and state-building in the Arab World have been unsuccessful. There have been many obstacles to such efforts, some of which stem from internal sources, while others are of external origins. Internally, it has been mentioned that the concept of nation-building and its components are alien elements to the Arab-Islamic culture, which does not recognize the territorial borders as real borders between Arabs, and Muslims. The creation of such borders was an external effort by imperial powers, not natural home grown awareness of the distinctiveness of people of a territory that would help in establishing a state. Arabs, regardless of their territorial states, share the same language, the same historical experience, and the same national ambitions. In fact, despite religious diversity, Arabs consider the contextual cultural framework of the Arab-Islamic culture as the essence of their existence. Thus, the efforts of separation during the past seven decades have not contributed to the establishment of strong, well-developed societies, nor has it achieved even minimum stability for
any Arab regime.

Arab regimes, without exception, have been subject to political instability, assassination, riots, and rebellions. They have experimented with all means of establishing political authority except a genuine democratic option. They have witnessed all regime types except that which is based on the choice of the people. According to such a system, Arabs may be able to establish viable nation-states and achieve what they could not through other regime types.
CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICS OF MONARCHIC REGIMES

In chapter 3, I have classified the Arab countries into three classes based on criteria that depends more on economic and social indicators. However, in this chapter, as well as the coming one, Arab countries are classified based on the political-regime type, as well more leniency on political indicators. Accordingly, Arab regimes are classified into the following categories: traditional monarchies, modernizing monarchies, personal dictatorships, modernizing-authoritarian regimes, and liberal democratic regimes.

The objective behind this classification is to assess the progress, the obstacles, and the characteristics of current regimes that might either facilitate transition to liberal democracy or impede such process. Accordingly, monarchies in the Arab World are classified as either traditional or modernizing monarchies.

Traditional Monarchies

The traditional monarchies--"regimes"--include members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), except for Kuwait, for reasons to be explained later. Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are
considered traditional monarchies. These monarchies are classified as traditional due to the nature of their political system and their reliance on traditional bases of rulership. Their political legitimacy, claims of authority, and sources of societal supports are tribal, religious, personal, historical, and external rather than popular-constitutional. Some of these monarchies, such as the United Arab Emirates, have liberal and highly advanced market economies.

Characteristics of Traditional Gulf Monarchies

Generally speaking, traditional monarchies of the Gulf are characterized by the following features: all are oil-producing countries, base their rule on traditional sources of political legitimacy, are highly integrated as peripheries in the international political economy, and are highly dependent on Western allies for their survival. Furthermore, they are characterized by high rates of human rights violations (Gastil 1982, 1989; Gause 1994); lack of political accommodation; weakness or lack of civil society institutions, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia; ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts; border disputes; and potential rebellions similar to the Iranian model.

Oil is an integral part of any study of the traditional monarchies, to the extent that the monarchies have been called the "Oil Monarchies" of the Gulf (Gause 1994). The importance of oil stems from its role in the political life
of these societies. The discovery of oil in the Gulf altered radically the relationship between the state and the people. The central characteristic of such a relation, as identified by (Gause 1994, 58), is that

It is a one way relation, that it is from the top down. Usually, governments can provide services to citizens only if citizens provide taxes to the government. In the Gulf, monarchies provide a vast array of services and benefits to citizens, at little or no cost. The only requirement for receiving them is keeping your political and social behavior within the limits set by the government.

Oil has increased the power of the state; it has made the state the final arbiter in the entire life of the people. The government grants all societal needs free of charge, except for loyalty and non-intervention in politics. In exchange, the state does not guarantee representation or expansion of the bases of its authority, given the fact that the principle of 'no taxation no representation' is the rule. Furthermore, the political economy of oil has created an alliance between the local ruling-traditional elite and the complex interests of the international political economy (IPE), which makes the preservation of the status quo the primary goal of the interaction between the two interests. Therefore, any demand for change in such societies is governed by the dynamics of the IPE, which necessarily has not been supportive of expanding the bases of rulership.

Another important argument related to the impact of oil on governmental authority is that it has increased the
ability of "Oil Monarchies"--rentier state--to contain opposition through financial bribes or oppression. In this regard, oil monarchies have pursued a "politics of containment" to opposition and have benefited from the cooperative political economy of the leading nations, which ignored human rights abuses by such regimes. Gause (1994, 80), put it successfully when he explained the basis for the absence of serious opposition to the rentier state:

The basis of the contention that rentier states are immune to serious public pressures for a role in the political process is the issue of taxes. In the dominant models for understanding political development in the West, the connection between rulers' needs to extract revenue from society through taxes and society's rights to constrain rulers through elections and legislative bodies is direct: "No taxation without representation."

The decline of oil prices since the mid-1980s, provides a chance for balancing state-society relations, in which the society would be forced to provide the government with financial revenues as a form of taxation; in return, the government would respond to societal needs of representation, power-sharing, and political participation. For instance the reduction of oil prices export revenues in a country like Saudi Arabia from $116.2 billion in 1981 to $20.5 billion in 1988 (Kanovsky 1990, 61) represents unprecedented GNP fluctuation in the world. Another factor contributing to the economic crises in the Gulf was the burden of the Gulf Wars. Oweiss (1995) estimated the financial burdens of the war to be around $308 billion.
Other factors that are expected to exacerbate the financial difficulties of the Gulf countries and force them to rely more on domestic revenue sources are Iraq’s eventual return to the export market and the probable turnaround in production from the former Soviet Union (Kanovsky 1994, 83). Such new developments are most likely to impose an alteration of state-society relations through the increasing of economic crises, and urgent governmental needs for cutting subsidies and increasing taxation, which necessarily means representation.

The mounting economic pressures, represented by huge budget deficits (Saudi Arabia) and growing external debts (GCC countries) have brought about modest political change. This limited change has presented itself through different initiatives to establish consultative-advisory councils in the Gulf.

The primary criterion for representation in these monarchic-appointed councils is tribalism. Representatives of tribes are appointed by the monarch to represent the interests of their people, as well as to share symbolically in an advisory entity called Majlis. In Saudi Arabia, King Fahad appointed an advisory council of 60 members in 1991. Similarly, Oman in 1992 had its appointed and indirect election to the advisory council. In Bahrain the emir appointed an advisory council of 30 members, while Qatar is still operating under its advisory council that was
appointed in 1972 in its post-independence year.

I called this type of accommodation "tribal representation," due to the fact that it was the dominant type of representation throughout the tribal history of the Arab people in which tribal leaders surround themselves with a council to assist them in deciding on matters of common concern to the tribe. However, such type of representation excludes the emerging modern elements in its nascent stages of establishing a middle class. Such an emerging class is leading the opposition to the monarchic rule in the Gulf.

The future of the opposition movement in traditional societies will be determined by governmental response. If the governments accommodate the emerging new interests and their new demands, this could lead to national reconciliation and a process of regime accommodation, which would enhance the prospects of liberal openings in these states. A lack of accommodation and reliance on coercive means would likely lead to an active mobilization process that would de-stabilize these regimes. Furthermore, the question of representation remains whether "tribal representation" is a sufficient arrangement to absorb the emerging complex social interest in these traditional polities. According to Huntington (1963, 1991, 315), the emergence of complex interests requires an emergence of an equivalent complex political arrangement to deal with the new demands and claims placed on the political regime. If
regimes fail to promote such growth of political arrangements, the result would be a revolution, defined as radical change and the collapse of old arrangements, and the emergence of new political system. In fact, despite the elementary changes alluded to above, political development in traditional societies has lagged far behind the economic side of development, which itself has been in recent retreat due to budget constraints. This situation necessarily means widening the gap between systems' response and the growing political power of the emerging classes. This imbalance, under conditions of non-accommodative polices, would breed discontent, mobilization, and revolution supported by the emerging and mobilization of the bourgeoisie, the poor, and the intelligentsia classes. Such alliance, with even minimum support from the military and non-external intervention, might lead to total overthrow of the existing governments in the Gulf.

Thus, the gap between governmental response, defined as political development (Almond and Powell 1978) and the spread of new, complex interests, such as political clubs, civil society institutions women's associations, student unions, and chambers of commerce would, likely increase societal mobilization against the government and could lead to radical change understood in terms of a revolution (Huntington 1963, 1991).

Any objective study of the Iranian Revolution would
find an analogy between current conditions in the
traditional monarchies and Iran under the Shah's rule. The
Shah relied heavily on his security forces, isolated himself
from the society, lived a lavish style of life, surrounded
himself with a corrupt elite, marginalized the Iranian
intelligentsia, pursued massive coercive human-rights-
violating measures, and heavily relied on external sources
of legitimacy. These forces widened the gap between the
state and the society and created societal demands for
change. Under conditions including the lack of governmental
response, which was below societal expectations, and more
oppressive measures against the populace, the people were
more and more inflamed against the government, which led to
a revolution and total overthrow of the ruling elite.

Some efforts of mobilization are already under way in
the Gulf region. There is an opposition movement,
manifested by the presence of political clubs, riots, and
protests (in Bahrain April 1995, Qatar June 1995),
petitioning the governments (of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE),
criticism of human rights violations, (Middle East Watch,
Gulf activists), and an open opposition to the ruling
families as in the Cases of Saudi Arabia (1990-1995) and
Bahrain (1995). In post-Gulf War Saudi Arabia, the "second
class uncontained Ulama" (clergy) opposed their country's
reliance on the West, the royal family's corruption, the
mismanagement of wealth, the imprisonment of dissidents, and
the spread of moral decadence.

At this point, it is necessary to note some of the major features of this category of monarchies, followed by a profile of each country. Table 4.1 shows some of the basic political characteristics of traditional regimes. As the table indicates, traditional monarchies are classified as not-free societies by the Freedom House ratings; they have high rates of human rights violations, as reported by Amnesty International and regional human rights organizations, in which these monarchies rank at the top of the index (7); their sources of authority are based on tribal-religious or historical claims rather than popular; there is an absence (Saudi Arabia) or weakness (Oman, Bahrain, Qatar) of civil society institutions, they are highly diverse ethnically (UAE), religiously (Oman, UAE), and linguistically (Oman). There is an absence of constitutions (Saudi Arabia) or national charters that would restrict the powers of the government. There are few limits on governmental powers, with no separation of powers, and there exists a governmental hegemony in all societal affairs.

Table 4.1: Political Indicators of Traditional Monarchies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>FRE</th>
<th>LEG</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>CSO/4</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>ETHN</th>
<th>RELSEC</th>
<th>LING</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>
Bahrain. Bahrain was a British protectorate from the mid-1880s until it received its independence in 1971. The country is the smallest in size in the Arab World, with 238 square miles and a population of less than half a million. Bahrain is highly divided across sectarian lines. Two-thirds of its people are Shi‘i Muslims, and one-third Sunni Muslims, with minorities from other Arab countries, Asian countries, and European countries. The ruling monarchy belongs to the Sunni sect. Gause (1994, 8) writes:

Bahrain was the first oil producer among the six monarchies, with production beginning in 1932, but its oil reserves are now almost exhausted. Its earlier oil wealth gave Bahrain a head start on its neighbors in developing educational and social institutions contributing to its status as the most socially liberal of the six Gulf monarchies.

In terms of political change, Bahrain has been struck by many Shi‘i revolutionary attempts, as well as Sunni
political activism. The first Shi'i attempt to overthrow the ruling family was in 1989, and another riot in April 1995 was inspired by Shi'i political movements. So far governmental response was typical; imprisoning rioters, and protesters.

The government also tried to vent some of the opposition by creating a consultative council, which was appointed by the emir in 1993. The council consisted of thirty members divided evenly between Shi'i and Sunni sects. However, the powers of the current council are less than those for the freely elected National Assembly, which was suspended in 1975. Its powers are limited only to the review of legislation sent to it by the council of ministers; but it cannot initiate legislation (Gause 1994, 115).

The Bahrain opposition is not satisfied with the appointed council arrangement and has demanded free elections and the restoration of constitutional arrangements in the Island. The latest riots (in April 1995) on the island show how unstable the regime is. It requires radical reform that has not been granted from above, nor does the emir recognize such a necessity. Such an attitude would certainly inflame the opposition that declared its willingness to sacrifice for the sake of establishing an open regime in the island.

Qatar. Qatar was also a British protectorate from 1916 until it received its independence in 1971. The population of Qatar (less than 500,000) is mainly Sunni, with a Shi'i minority. The country is rich with oil that it began producing under British rule in 1949, and its income
($20,206 in 1989) ranks among the highest in the world.

In terms of regime accommodation and openness, Qatar has not shown a willingness to expand the bases of rulership. Similar to Bahrain, historical-tribal claims of rulership, supported by foreign allies, represent the major claims of political legitimacy for the monarchy. After Qatar’s independence in 1972, the emir appointed a consultative council that still sits. Similar to the other Gulf monarchies, the Qatar opposition petitioned the emir for more openness, and free elections, but so far there has been no constructive response from the government. On the contrary, "opposition sources report that some of the signers of the Qatar petition to the emir have been harassed and detained by the authorities" (Gause 1994, 116).

In July 1995, the crown prince of Qatar conducted a coup against his father who was visiting Switzerland, and overthrow him. The new government has been recognized and promised major reforms.

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the largest country among the GCC. The Saudi population is largely Sunni (90 percent), with a Shi‘i oppressed minority of less than 10 percent in the eastern part of the country. Over the past seventy years, the ruling family of Ib‘n Saud has been successful in exterminating any opposition to its rule. Thus, with some exceptions such as the emerging post-Gulf War opposition, and the takeover of the Grand Mosque in 1981 by opponents of
the regime, the Saudi rule has experienced no serious opposition. In fact, the government, through its distributive system of financial rewards, has marginalized tribal opposition.

The Gulf War unveiled a wave of protest and criticism of the Saudi regime's despotism and its entire reliance on the West. The war has produced the most serious challenge to the royal family. One impact of the war is a growing opposition movement that has disturbed the government through its tape-cassette distribution of anti-government propaganda. This movement is led by what I call "uncontained class of Ulama" which in alliance with the intelligentsia have petitioned the king before, asking him to initiate a serious dialogue and reform in the kingdom's political system.

Furthermore, the Women's movement in the country has gained some boost from the presence of American women in the Gulf. Encouraged by such a presence, Saudi women mainly, university instructors, teachers, and workers in the bureaucracy, have demonstrated against government discrimination in banning women from driving and have demanded reform of the situation of the Saudi women.

King Fahad, in an attempt to contain the growing movement of opposition and the effects of the Gulf War, announced in September 1992 the establishment of a national consultative council of 60 members. The council, which was
appointed entirely by the king,

is to carry out all the activities usually performed by parliament elsewhere except the enactment of laws. In other words, the council may initiate debates, discussions, and deliberations on public matters; it may question members of the executive; and it may recommend new laws and policies to the cabinet which, in turn, would forward the recommendations to the king. It is the latter who are invested with the power of lawmaking within the bounds of Sharia (Ibrahim 1993, 298).

Shortly, the king dissolved the council on grounds that its deliberations exceeded its purpose. The council debated issues related to politics, the role of the royal family, and the administrative-financial corruption in the kingdom, issues that the monarch felt had to be stopped.

Though the impact of the Gulf War on the process of liberalization is still unfolding, the monarchic regime continues to resist the process of change. Indeed, the importance of the war stems from the fact that, it has opened the Gulf to the world as never before. It brought the world to the Gulf and opened the Gulf to the world, simultaneously. The war has stimulated a growing demand for liberalization and increased the confidence of the growing opposition in its ability to petition the king, distribute anti-government material, and lecture publicly against governmental policies.

The Gulf war also stimulated a serious debate concerning the monarch’s decision to invite the allies to fight a neighboring Muslim country and a brotheren nation. This mounting criticism compelled the king to secure the
help of the religious establishments in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the Ulama in both countries have issued religious decrees (Fatwas) supporting the actions of the monarch and declaring Iraq as a non-Muslim-aggressor country. The Ulama’s actions have also been brought under scrutiny. In addition to the debate about the role of the Ulama in legitimizing political and military action of the monarchy, there has been the questioning of the royal family’s financial corruption, administrative corruption, and gender relations. These endless questions and debates will most likely force the traditional monarchy to respond in one way or another.

A major factor that would force the government to respond is that, within the changing global environment that has witnessed such resurgence toward liberalism and the decline of governmental support when associated by the societal gains that Saudis have made in the past three decades in the areas of education, urbanization, acculturation, communications, and the changing nature of the military in the country, all are factors that generate pressures on the ruling elite. Indeed, Saudis have made progress in education, with a general literacy rate of 62 percent. However, the male literacy rate is 73 percent, with 48 percent for females. In terms of urbanization, 77 percent of the people live in urban cities. Both the exposure of the military to the latest technology through
the devotion of 16.0 percent of the GNP (Kanovsky 1994, 101) to the military and the military exchange programs with the Western countries could lead to a kind of change in the military's doctrines concerning its role in development and its relation with the ruling family.

The monarch's response, so far, fails to match the seriousness of the changes that are occurring in the country. This means that King Fahad has shown neither a serious intent to liberalize his rule nor a willingness to accommodate the growing demands of the Saudi opposition. There is no doubt that the country is going through a critical period, and the government must develop accommodative policies or risk ignoring the societal demands that are breeding grievances, and grievances are preludes to rebellions.

Oman. According to Gause (1994, 9), "the Sultanate of Oman has a rich history as a commercial empire, extending its sway in the seventeenth century to Zanzibar and the East African coast." The majority of Omani people (three-quarters) belong to the Ibadi sect of Islam, a branch of the Kharijite movement that rejected both Sunnism and Shism. Historically, the Ibadi movement in Oman established the most liberal elected system in the entire Islamic empire. The Ibadis are a revolutionary sect in nature in the sense that they rejected the dynastic regime type imposed by the Umayad and the Abbasid families. The Ibadis elected their
leaders democratically and freed themselves from those restrictions and requirements developed by both the Shi'i and Sunni movements. These include the descendence of rulers from the prophet's (Mohammed) family or the direct descendence of Imam Ali, as required by the Shi'i sect.

The modern history of Oman began in 1970 when Britain conspired to assassinate the father of the current ruler, Saeed Ben Taymour, and installed his son, Gabuss. Saeed Ben Taymour held Oman in backwardness. He rejected any contact with the outside world; refused any attempt to modernize the country and pursue oil discovery efforts; and failed in fighting the Omani Marxist movement in Duphar, which gained considerable success until its defeat by the new sultan and his Western alliance. Gabuss initiated a movement to modernize the country through employing oil revenues to the efforts of development. Within the past three decades, Oman has made significant improvements in education, health care, transportation, and communication.

The central, most important actions taken by Gabuss were the unification of Oman under the rule of a central government and the extermination of the Omani-Marxist movement in Duphar in the 1970s. In 1981, the Sultan of Oman appointed a consultative council, which was dominated by governmental officials and which used to meet infrequently. Following the Gulf War, Sultan Gabuss appointed a council through an innovative selection process
described by Gause (1994, 115). The sultan asked each one of the 51 governors of the provinces to recommend three potential representatives, with consultation with the notables of the province. He then chose one of them. In urban provinces, ballots were cast among attendees to determine the three nominees. Gause noted that this system of selection has its roots in the democratic theory. He further noted that what distinguish this council from past experiences is the sultan's insistence upon the independent nature of the council as a third independent branch of the government with full legislative powers. The new council as Gause (1994, 115), writes is:

Unlike its predecessor, which was a rubber stamp, this council has displayed a spirit of independence from the government. Its most notable activity was its questioning of ministers. In sessions televised to the entire country, members of the council subjected ministers from the "service" ministries to sharp questioning about their activities and, in the eyes of the members, their shortcomings. It was a new experience for the ministers, many of whom had spent two decades in government without ever having to answer in a public forum for their activities. By all accounts, Omanis liked the show.

In fact, it is fair to say that the interests of the Omani people are more represented in their government than those neighboring peoples of other monarchies. The tribal nature of the country and the relative willingness of the monarch to accommodate the growing urban interests that have just begun to see the light encourage me to say that, if the indirect system of representation is to be replaced by a
direct selection, it would constructively help the cause of transition to a more open system in Oman.

**United Arab Emirates.** The United Arab Emirates (UAE), similar to other Arab Gulf regions, was under British colonial rule from 1830 until it received its independence in 1971. The total area of the UAE is 75,581 square kilometers. The population is 2,791,141. The country is highly diverse ethnically, consisting of 19 percent national Emirians, 23% other Arabs, 50% South Asians, and 8 percent Westerners. The UAE nationals are fewer than 20 percent. Religiously, the UAE is made up of Islam (96%); Shi’i (16%); and Christians, Hindu, and other religions (4%). Linguistically, Arabic, Persian, English, Hindi, Urdu, Swahili, and other local languages are used (NTDP 1994).

In terms of political liberalization in the country, the UAE has lagged behind its economic gains and status as a financial economic center in the region. Gausse (1994, 116), asserted that:

In March 1993 the UAE Federal National Council resumed meetings after a two-year hiatus. Seventy percent of its members, appointed by the rulers of the seven emirates, are new, but rumors that they would be chosen by direct election and that the powers of that body to initiate legislation and oversee government ministries would be expanded proved to be groundless.

In his discussion of the Oil Monarchies, Gause (1994) concluded that there are no inherent cultural, religious, or tribal impediments to the process of liberalization in the
Gulf. Citizens could participate effectively whenever
governments permit representation and participation.
Traditional-tribal institutions have shown flexibility in
coexisting with modern civil society institutions. In the
Gulf, the gains of education in the past decades have
produced an able cadre of citizens to articulate societal
concerns beyond personal and individual appeals. In Gause's
view, the demand for change in the Gulf was not inspired by
the global trend toward democratization, but rather, from
domestic pressures. Finally, he concluded that it is a
mistake to perceive the efforts of the growing democratic
movement as a threat to stability. The Gulf opposition is a
loyal opposition that deserves accommodative governmental
policies. Such response will set the political agenda in
the Gulf for the next decade and perhaps beyond (Gause 1994,
118). Consequently, what we call traditional societies are
capable of introducing liberal reforms to their societies.
The issue is neither culture nor religion, but politics and
the willingness of the hegemonic ruling elite to accept
diversity and to expand political freedoms, competition,
and participation.

The Modernizing Monarchies

This category of countries includes the monarchies of
Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco. The primary distinction of
this type of monarchy is its relative openness and the
potentiality for the establishment of constitutional
monarchies. Generally speaking, modernizing monarchies (Table 4.2) are characterized by the following features: the existence of political parties and political clubs, an emerging civil society, a less violative attitude toward basic human rights, and parliaments. These monarchies share with traditional monarchies the religious, historical, and tribal aspects of political legitimacy. Accordingly, both the Hashimite ruling family in Jordan and the Hassan ruling family in Morocco have based their role on religious grounds, while the Subah family in Kuwait has based its rule on historical-tribal claims.

Table 4.2: Modernizing Monarchies’ Political Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>FRE</th>
<th>LEG</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>SO/4</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>ETH</th>
<th>REL</th>
<th>LANG</th>
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</table>

PR: Political rights in 1993 (freedom House)
CR: Civil Rights in 1993 (freedom House)
FRE: Freedom status (NA: not available, PF: partly free), Freedom House, 1993
LEG: Sources of political legitimacy (TR: Tribal, RL: Religious)
PP: Political parties (0: NO, 1: YES)
SO/4: Civil society institutions (political parties, labor unions, women associations, and student unions)
PAR: Parliaments (0: NO, 1: YES)
WAR: War in the last ten years
ETH: Number of ethnic groups
REL: Religions and religious sects
LANG: languages spoken by the people
CONST: Constitution (0: NO, 1: YES)

Kuwait

Kuwait was a British protectorate from 1899, until it received its independence in 1961. Upon the British departure, Iraq refused to recognize the independence of Kuwait and sought to annex Kuwait militarily. Historically, Kuwait was a small district part of the southern province of Al-Basra. However, the international alliance, led by Britain, also militarily supported the independence of Kuwait. Although there were no large-scale military operations between the two sides in the 1960s, Iraq never recognized the independence of Kuwait and repeatedly attempted to annex Kuwait, which in a later stage (1991) led to the Second Gulf War.

Kuwait's importance to the West stems from two factors: its huge oil reserves and its huge financial reserves that contribute to the health of the global economy. The majority of the Kuwait nationals (650,000) are mainly Sunni (two-thirds) and one-third Shi'ı, in addition, there are 850,000 non-nationals, who are migrant workers from around the world. Politically, Kuwait has a long parliamentary experience despite some interruptions. Its first direct election was held in 1963. Its democratic experience was interrupted when the emir dissolved the elected parliament in 1976 and again in 1986. However, its first and most important election occurred a year after from the Gulf War.

In 1992, following the Gulf War, the country held free
elections that were contested by political clubs and independent candidates. In fact, despite the differences among the ruling elite, the nationalists, the Kuwaiti Sunni Islamic Movement, and the Shi'i movement, there was a consensus on the necessity of putting Kuwait first, which means that the independence of Kuwait is more important than Arab-Islamic solidarity. About the election itself, as Ghabra (1993, 112) states:

[It] can be seen as an initial victory for the middle class, which demonstrated a unity that cut across geographic lines, and for political forces that were able to make inroads into the external areas and in races against tribal candidates, in addition to a nascent ability by some candidates in certain areas to transcend shia and Sunni division.

The characteristics of the Kuwaiti society, in terms of its population size (650,000), small area (17,820 square kilometer), education (73%), urban population (88%), income ($16,150), and communication (highly developed), represent an environment conducive to the establishment of a real democratic system if the monarch were to be genuine in establishing a constitutional monarchy.

Jordan

The establishment of Jordan in 1921 as an entity was part of post-World War I settlements, namely a British fulfillment of some of its promises to the Hashimite family. Since its creation, the Jordanians and the Arab resistance movement that moved to the country from other areas annexed
by the colonial powers attempted to establish a constitutional type of government. The country's early attempt to liberalize its ruling system led to the first national conference that was held in 1928. The conference produced the National Pact which outlined the principles upon which the new government was to operate. These principles include true representation, elections, and accountability. However, this movement toward democracy was reversed in 1957 represented by the enhancement of the authority of the king and the abolition of the democratic government and the freely elected national assembly. The young king (21 years old), consolidated his rule through refining the military from opponents, building a Central Intelligence Department, building a secret police department, establishing a military academy and later a university, strengthening his alliance with the West, and exiling the Jordanian opposition.

The primary reason for the reversal of the democratic process in Jordan in the late 1950 was a combination of many factors. First, the king feared the growing popular support for the elected government, which intended to shrink his power. A second serious factor was not only the fear of shrinking the authority of the monarch, but also the fear of overthrowing the monarchy and replacing it with a nationalist-socialist government, given the fact that the National Socialist Party won the parliamentary majority.
The National Socialists, therefore, not only won a mandate from the Jordanian people, but also the support of neighboring Arab countries, namely Syria, Egypt, and the Arab-democratic movement, which placed its activities in Lebanon.

In the 1987-88 economic crises, a soaring unemployment rate (25%), devaluation of the currency (Dinar, 40%); frustration with Jordanian/PLO relations, as represented by administrative disengagement with the West Bank; police repression; austerity measures; and price hikes, all undermined the support of the government. This led to riots, which erupted in the southern part of the country that had supported the monarchy since the early 1920s. The magnitude of the riots and the quick spread of anti-government activities compelled the government to deploy the military in cities and towns. The king, felt threatened after decades of an absolute absence of any serious opposition to his rule, was compelled to give concessions and to restore the parliament.

Valerie Yorke (1990, 28) explains that, through his actions, the king was seeking to satisfy the competing demands of his main social constituencies before they turned into "grievances" and grievances are preludes to rebellions. The process of democratization resumed after the election, freeing political prisoners, curbing the role of the Mukhabrat's (intelligence) repression, drafting the National
Charter in 1990, and recognizing political parties.

Ibrahim (1993, 298) notes that the process of democratization in Jordan is a continuing experiment that is based on rational calculation. The king of Jordan saw that the long-term survival of his family's rule requires an accommodation to the growing dissatisfaction with the performance of his government and the general hatred of the security agencies. Furthermore, the economic crises brought about by the decline of oil prices that led to stopping economic aid and remittances from the Gulf, in addition to a societal demand for change supported by a global trend toward liberalism and democracy, convinced the monarch that the road to a more open society was not an option but a necessity.

Garfinkle (1993, 85) perceives the efforts of liberalizing the system as a necessity for the survival of the monarchy in Jordan. He asserts that "Hashimite Jordan has managed to weather some very tough times since formal independence in 1946. But now the regime faces a systemic crisis unlike any it has faced in the past. The monarchy as it has existed, in its form of one-man rule, cannot continue beyond the reign of the present monarch, Hussain Ibn Talal".

Roberts (1991, 119) observes that the resumption of the democratization process in Jordan is motivated by a combination of economic crisis and societal demand for participation. He writes:
The recent downturn in the international economy drastically affected the Jordanian standards of living by resulting in a decrease in the flow of both remittances and oil-state financial support, while ultimately causing unrest and violence. Subsequent expansion of political participation, it is argued, resulted more from the top down than otherwise, and reflected the elite's desire to quell the violence and appease the masses.

In order to ensure stability and to create public support for austerity measures, the government had to respond to public concerns with regard to political participation. The king moved immediately to diffuse the situation by announcing his intention to restore the parliament and to conduct fair and honest elections. In fact, since the 1989 riots, Jordan has made significant progress in terms of openness. The 1989 parliamentary election, which was confirmed as clean from governmental fraud, marked the beginning of

A total transformation in which political parties took part in public, even before they secured their official permits, and could conduct their representatives to the Eleventh House of Deputies, which actually reflected the structure of the Jordanian society in all its political and intellectual shades (Tawalbah and Bettar 1994, 64).

In this election, the opposition won the majority, mainly the alliance of the Islamic movement in Jordan. Since then, the government of Jordan has made serious effort to liberalize the political system including legalizing the political parties, introducing a new National Charter, licensing more party newspapers, releasing political prisoners, licensing the branch of the Arab Organization for
Human Rights, and reforming the election law that gives each citizen an equal vote, that is, "one man one vote". In fact, these improvements need to be furthered in order to contribute to the stability of the country in the post-Hussain era. The central problem for Jordan is lack of political succession experience, which would escalate the crises that the country lives under because of economic hardships and the economic boycott from the Gulf. Thus, if the monarchy is ready to expand freedoms and to transform itself into a constitutional monarchy such as the monarchies of Europe, Jordan can be expected to enjoy social peace. But, if the political succession fails, and the monarchy and its external allies show little tolerance for the demands of constitutionalism, it is expected that the military would step in. In fact, currently, the succession battle has undergone a serious debate on both sides, the royal family, and the Jordanians. Furthermore, Jordan is witnessing a resurgence to the role of the security agencies, and the Mukhabrat (secret police). Lately, numerous attacks on civilians have been reported which only leads to more hatred, and mobilization to Jordanians against the government.

Morocco

The Moroccan royal family has based its rule on grounds similar to those of Jordan. The monarchy claims that it is a descendant of the prophet's (Mohammed) family. According
to Layachi and Haireche (1992, 82), King Hassan commands
great respect and support in the rural areas. In fact, King
Hassan has taken radical measures to consolidate his rule
through managing to avoid a threat from his military by
engaging it in the conflict over the Western Sahara.
Secondly, the king has allied himself with the traditional
elite and has established professional, loyal police and
security forces.

Morocco maintains 200,000 men in its armed forces,
well-equipped by American and French equipment.
In addition, there are 10,000 well-trained police
and a royal force of 2,000. There are a varying
number of desert tribesmen ready to fight for the
king (Sturgill 1994, 78).

Thirdly, the king receives support from his close friends
abroad, including the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf
states. In the 1980s, the king introduced liberal reforms
in Morocco. According to the Moroccan constitution (1972),
power is shared among the monarch, the government, and the
Assembly (parliament). Two-thirds of the Assembly are
elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term. The
Assembly initiates legislation, but the king has to agree to
any new law. Morocco has a multiparty system (12 parties),
civil society institutions, labor unions, women's
associations, and relative freedom of the press.

Based upon the preceding analysis, the following
generalizations can be made. The prospects for
democratization in the three modernizing—Kuwait, Jordan,
and Morocco—monarchies is encouraging should the process of
transition keep its momentum. So far, these monarchies have made progress in terms of improving their records of human rights, as table shows. Their recognition of political parties, political clubs, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and their promotion of social peace are all necessary factors that would consolidate these emerging democracies. Such steps of consolidation may enhance the hopes of their becoming constitutional monarchies similar to those in Europe. However, despite such optimistic conclusions, one cannot rule out the possibility that these regimes may regress into authoritarianism.
THE POLITICS OF REPUBLICAN REGIMES: MODERNIZATION, AUTHORITARIANISM, DISINTEGRATION, OR LIBERALISM

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate political development among the republican regimes in the Arab World. I will classify Arab republican regimes into four subcategories: modernizing-authoritarian republics, personal-dictatorships, disintegrating republics, and a liberal democratic-populist republic.

The Politics of Authoritarianism

Scholars in the field of comparative government have identified different types of authoritarian regimes. Sorensen (1993, 76-77) has classified three types of authoritarian regimes. His first classification is authoritarian developmental regime; its basic feature is its capability of promoting both growth and welfare. The government is reform oriented and enjoys a high degree of autonomy from vested elite interests. It controls a state apparatus with the bureaucratic, organizational capacity for promoting development and is run by a state elite that is ideologically committed toward boosting economic development in terms of growth as well as welfare.

The second type identified by Sorensen (1993, 77) is the authoritarian growth oriented regimes where an elite-
dominated government that promotes economic growth but not welfare. An example is Brazil during military rule, from 1964 until the present period of redemocratization. A third type of authoritarianism is the authoritarian state elite enrichment regime; a "regime promotes neither growth nor welfare; its main aim is rather the enrichment of the elite, which controls the state."

Other scholars such as Bill and Springborg (1994, 24-25), identified different types of models of regime strategies of political development in the Middle East. Those countries fall into four categories: the democratic-populist, the traditional-authoritarian, traditional-distributive, and authoritarian-distributive. "The democratic-populist path of development stresses liberal democratic political values and provides relatively open participation through such institutions as parties, parliaments, and elections." Such systems are relatively rare in the Arab World. Lebanon is the only real democracy in the Arab World. The traditional-authoritarian political system's "emphasis is placed on increasing the order-maintaining and economic-growth-facilitating capacities of the government. Rule of the most conservative traditional mode, and although dynamism is often present, the benefit tends to coagulate at the top. The monarchies of Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are examples of this kind of system." Bill identified security of the ruling house as
the overwhelming obsession of the political strategists who
direct these governments. Furthermore, political
participation is severely restricted and all important
decisions are monopolized by the central figure in the
ruling establishment.

A third type identified by Bill and Springborg is the
traditional distributive regimes. Its major feature is its
capacity to distribute its wealth through their respective
population. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar are examples of this
regime-type. The final type is authoritarian-distributive
regimes. Such regimes stress a very specific form of
political participation. People are mobilized in the
implementation of policies formulated by the ruling elite
but they do not participate in the making of such policies.
Syria, Iraq, and Labia are examples of this regime-type. I
will classify republican regimes in the Arab World according
to the following categories followed by justification of
categorization and country profile: personal dictatorships,
disintegrating republics, modernizing republics, and liberal
democratic republics.

Personal Dictatorships

The primary characteristic of the personal dictatorship
republics is the monopoly of power by a single military
leader, supported by a single party organization such as
Syria's Ba'ath party, and Libya's Popular Committees. The
military dictator makes decisions and runs the country based
on his own conviction with little power-sharing, and participation. In fact, what is striking about this dictatorship is the dictator's claim of popular legitimacy and public support for his regime. Most countries in this category have Mailises (National Assemblies, constitutions, and some civil society institutions), but they lack political accommodation and political parties, and they are actively involved in regional and international conflicts. In these regimes the dictator devotes national wealth for the efforts of military adventures. Dictators seek from their adventures to divert the attention of their people to the outside arena. All dictators are actively involved in military adventures. Asad of Syria has been involved in wars and intervention in Lebanon since 1976; Kadafi's military adventures in Africa (Chad) and elsewhere are well known. These regimes also are characterized by high rates of human rights violations, are classified as not free countries, and have highly diverse societies ethnically, religiously, and linguistically. Finally, dictatorships are characterized by political instability, which makes assassinations, military coups, and civil wars as the primary means of political succession. Without exception, all dictators came to power through the military, supported by a small sect of the population; an example is the Alawi sect in Syria, which devotes resources to both its narrow interests and its security and survival. Table (5.1) show
some of the major characteristics of this category.

Table 5.1: Political Indicators of Personal Dictatorships

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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PR: Political rights in 1993 (Freedom House)
CR: Civil rights in 1993 (Freedom House)
FREED: Freedom status as classified by Freedom House ratings, 1993
LEG: Source of legitimacy (MIL: military power)
PP: Political parties (0: No, 1: Yes)
CSO/4: Civil society institutions (Political parties, labor unions, women associations, student unions)
PARL: Parliament (1: Yes, 0: No)
WAR: Number of wars in the last ten years
ETH: Number of ethnic groups
RELG: Number of religions and religious sects
LING: Number of languages spoken by the people
CON: Constitution (1: Yes, 0: No)


As Table 5.1 indicates, dictatorial regimes in the Arab World are characterized by human rights violations measured by the Freedom House Index, which ranges from 1-7. Countries in this category tops the index, meaning high rates of human rights violations. Libya and Syria (7,7) are considered "not free" and highly violative of human rights. Their source of political legitimacy is the coercive-military force. Furthermore, these countries are
characterized by involvement in conflicts as in the cases of Syria (2) and Libya (1). These countries also, are highly divided among ethno-religious and linguistic lines. Libya has 8 ethnic minorities, Djibouti has 6, and Syria has 4 (NTDB 1994). This nature necessarily promotes instability and civil strife. Strikingly, these dictatorships, however, maintains some civil society institutions (Djibouti, 4/4). Countries in this category have labor unions, women's associations, student unions, and political parties organized by the state. Parliaments and constitutions also maintained in all countries in this category. The existence of these liberal elements have been utilized by dictators to claim societal support for their regimes as in the cases of Syria and Libya. Country profiles for personal-authoritarian regimes are discussed next.

Djibouti. Djibouti is a former French colony located in the Eastern part of Africa, with a population of 415,599. The country received its independence from France in 1977. Djibouti is a poor country in which the service sector is the dominant, with a weak industrial and agricultural infrastructure. According to Sturgill (1994 88) France maintains Djibouti's economy. In addition, the country receives aid from the Arab Gulf countries, from the European, and the international organizations.

Djibouti has been encompassed within this category because the country has no political succession experience
and because of the hegemony that President Hassan Aptidon and his prime minister Gourad Hamadou are exercising since the independence of the colony. President Aptidon is ruling the country since its independence in 1977, and his prime minister has been in office since 1978. Even though the country had elections in 1992, the results were total victory for the presidents' party, with no oppositional success worth mentioning.

In fact, the Djibouti people in 1992 went to the polls to vote on a national referendum to approve a new constitution. The new political arrangements sought to legalize political parties and expand political freedoms. The people of Djibouti had voted on their representatives to the Chamber of Deputies. The result of elections was a total victory for the president's party which won all seats of the Chamber of Djibouti (65). In 1993, the country held its first presidential elections. President Aptidon also emerged as victorious.

Syria. Like other Arab countries, Syria and its current borders emerged as a settlement between colonial powers. Great Syria was divided into four countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria. Since its emergence, Syria has always been troubled by an identity crisis.

The lack of consensus on the identity and status of the Syrian state has allowed its fortunes to fluctuate. Having rejected overtures for union from Iraq and Jordan, and seceded from one with Egypt, the country has languished at the mercy of
its rulers, who have resorted to extra-legal means for the attainment and retention of political power. Under these conditions, the pursuit as well as the exercise of power become arbitrary, violent and extremely unpredictable. The armed forces have emerged as the principal determinant of power and in whose favor it is to be wielded. Thus a symbiosis has evolved between leaders of sectional political interests whose political ambitions outpace their popular base of support and groups of army officers seeking the legitimation of power seizure (Kelidar 1993, 328).

In Syria a very small minority of Shi'i sect (Alawi) rules the majority Sunni since the 1970s. Hinnebusch (1993, 246), summarized neatly the process of Alawi's takeover, as well as the nature of the Syrian regime. He asserted that:

The fall of the ancien regime opened the way for the formation of the Baathist authoritarian-populist state. Its leadership, dominated by rural minorities, was determined to break the power of the urban Sunni establishment. Opposition parties and professional associations-political vehicles of upper and middle class rivals-were repressed or controlled. The mobilization of new pro-regime participants by the Ba'ath party apparatus gave the regime some societal roots. At the same time, nationalization destroyed the economic bases of bourgeoisie power. Land reform eliminated the landlords' role as gatekeepers between state and village and transformed a large part of the landless proletariat into a small-holding peasantry dependent upon the state. Education and increasing state employment broadened the state-employed middle class. The increased fluidity of the class structure and spawning of state-dependent social forces created the social terrain on which Asad constructed an autonomous "Bonapartist" state "above" classes. He used a combination of kin and sectarian solidarity, Leninist party loyalty, and bureaucratic command to concentrate power in a presidential monarchy, while a praetorian guard commanded by Alawi clansmen shielded him from challenges.

In order to guarantee the survival of his regime, and the
dominance of the Alawi sect, the regime has

Sharply reduced societal autonomy, and destroyed some social forces while creating and coopting others. The state victimized some of the most developed parts of civil society—the Sug (market), merchants, and industrialists. In deploying Alawi Asabiyya (Sectarian nationalism) in its primitive power accumulation, it stimulated primordial identities and de-legitimized itself in the eyes of many Sunni. Overlapping communal and class cleavages sharply bifurcated regime and opposition, allowing for little compromise or civility between them; opposition took violent forms while the regime was unrestrained by law in its repression (Hinnebusch, 1993: 246).

In terms of the prospects of democratization in Syria, area specialists (Ibrahim and Hinnebusch) deemed the departure of Asad as a necessary factor for the democratization process in Syria. This post-Asad regime should pursue an incremental liberalization process that is capable of accommodating the whole Syrian groups within the new political arrangements. Another important facto is stimulating the economic growth needed to consolidate political liberalization in the country. This will require concessions of further autonomy to the bourgeoisie and to the syndicates and unions. However, the Asad regime has proved ability to survive even the effects of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Ibrahim (1993, 302), writes that:

Having mended his fences with Egypt, the West, and the oil-rich Arab states during the crisis, Asad has been under no marked regional or international pressure to change his ways. With his Ba’ath rival in Iraq much weakened and isolated, his participation in the Middle East peace talks endearing him to Washington for the time being,
assistance from the Gulf, and Syria’s new oil discoveries filling his coffers, Asad has been able to present to the home front as strong a case as ever.

Such regime-regeneration of power is strange, given the fact that the overwhelming majority of regimes supported by the collapsed Soviet Union have gone through radical changes, ranging from total collapse to reform. However, Syria has managed to reconcile quickly with the West in a short period of time without any necessary efforts of reform, while South Yemen, Somalia, and other countries have disintegrated or collapsed entirely.

Libya. Libya was subjected to the Italian occupation, until it gained its independence in 1951. Post-independence Libya was ruled by the Sanousi Monarchy until 1969, when young officers inspired by Arab nationalism and promoted by Nasser of Egypt conducted a military coup. Since then, Moummer Kadafi ruled his Jamaheriah, authoritatively. International organizations reported massive human rights violations committed by the regime, which has led to a massive expulsion of Libyan political refugees around the globe. In fact, the National Liberation Front of Libya (NLFL), which was established in 1985 to mobilize the Libyan opposition in and outside the country, has been so far unsuccessful in its attempts to overthrow the Kadafi’s regime. The latest attempt was reported in April 1995. Kadafi, as usual, emerged victorious.
Though the prospect for democratization in Libya is slim under the leadership of Kadafi, from his perspective, the Jamaheriah, a title articulated by Kadafi carry a deeper meaning of democracy than even the term "republic". The Jamaheriah, means the extreme rule of the people, or the rule of the masses in the state of the masses, through popular committees. In this sense, Kadaffi is elected as president indirectly by the peoples' committees. In fact, Kadafi went further (in his book The Green Book), to claim that he articulated a new path of development that differs from communism and capitalism based on his philosophy of the role of the Jamaheer (masses), in the state of the masses.

Putting political rhetoric aside, Libya is considered an extreme military dictatorship. In Libya, political parties and clubs were banned decades ago. The role of Islam and the Islamic movement is severely restricted by the regime. The Islamic movement, similar to other opposition, was subjected to a near extermination inside Libya, in which the people's committees conducted public executions of those charged with political-Islam. Any other line of thinking considered by such committees as "enemies of the people" gives the committees all rights to implement the harshest type of penalty, mainly public execution.

The Disintegrating Authoritarian Regimes

This group of countries share similar characteristics with personal-authoritarian regimes in terms of human rights
violations, and lack of political accommodation. Its primary feature is societal disintegration and civil wars due to long periods of dictatorial rule. It encompasses Iraq and Somalia. Both countries in this category are in civil wars. Furthermore, in both countries, central governments’ power have shrunk dramatically, as well as the ability to provide services to the society. Iraq’s dictatorial rule of Hussain brought the country to its knees, through the war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait, as well as the civil war against the Kurdish minority in the North, and the Shi’i in the South. Such wars have impoverished the country and drained its resources.

Somalia is also in a tragic situation. The collapse of the dictatorship of Siad Barre led to the country’s disintegration where Somalis have lived without government for the last four years. Table (5.2) shows some of the basic indicators of countries in this category.

Table 5.2: Political Indicators of Disintegrating-Authoritarian Regimes

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PR: Political rights in 1993 (Freedom House)
CR: Civil rights in 1993 (Freedom House)
LEG: Source of legitimacy (MIL: military)
PP: Political parties (0: NO)
CSO/4: Civil society institutions (Political parties, labor unions, women’s associations, and student unions)
Parl: Parliaments (1: Yes, 0: NO)
Table 5.2 indicates that countries in this category are classified not free according to Freedom House' ratings. They are highly violative of human rights measured by Civil Rights and Political Rights in which both countries tops the index of 7. Their source of ruling is coercive and military power. Both countries are involved in civil wars. Furthermore, both countries are highly divided among ethnoreligious and linguistic lines, in which countries have more than 5 ethnic minorities, 2-4 religious sects, and 3-5 languages. They are also characterized by weak civil society (Iraq: 2), or the absence of such institutions (Somalia: 0). However, in the case of Iraq, there exists a written constitution.

These characteristics indicates instability, conflict, and lack of political accommodation. The existence of an unaccommodating ruling elite (Military), ethnoreligious-linguistic minorities, and lack of civil society institutions is inflammable formula for disintegration. Following are the country profiles.
Iraq. Iraq was set up in 1920 out of three former Ottoman provinces, namely Basra in the south, Mousel in the north, and Baghdad at the center. Though these provinces possessed a corporate sense of their separate existence, they did not profess a uniform political identity (Kelidar 1993, 323). Iraq is a rich country with its natural resources. In addition to oil, the country is rich in terms of agriculture and water resources, besides a growing industrial sector that was destroyed by the Gulf War. Iraq has a total area of 437,072 square kilometer, and a population of 19,889,666. The country is highly divided country among communal and ethnic divisions. Arabs comprise 75-80 percent; Kurdish 15-20 percent; Turkoman, Assyrian, and others comprise 5%. Religiously the country is comprised of Muslims 97 percent (Shia 60-65%, Sunni 32-37%), Christians and others percent (1994 NTDP).

The primary problem of Iraq is an outlet to the gulf that enables the country to export oil and to expand its trade relations. This problem has forced Iraq to pursue devastating wars against Iran, and two attempts to annex Kuwait.

The political system of Iraq is military-dictatorship that belongs to the Arab Ba’ath (resurrection) party. Iraq has been under the military rule since 1958, when the military overthrew the Hashimiat monarchy that was established as a compromise of the post-World War I period.
Iraq has a National Assembly to represent the population. The country had its parliamentary elections in 1989. Its parliament is comprised of Sunni Arabs 53 percent, Shi'i Arabs 30 percent, Kurds 15 percent, Christians 2 percent (NTDB 1994). This complex nature of the population of Iraq had made its artificial construction a questionable entity. Neither the people inhabited the region, nor neighboring countries were convinced that such a country was created to last. In fact, the people of Iraq had rebelled against this artificial political arrangement and the creation of the central government since its establishment in 1921 by Britain. The Shi'i in the southern part rebelled against imposing monarchical rule in the country; this was followed by Kurdish rebellions since the 1920s. Thus, the government of Iraq had the seeds of confrontation since its creation.

The territorial integrity of Iraq has as much been questioned by the surrounding states as its legitimacy to rule was challenged by the indigenous population. Neighboring countries have laid territorial claims, which have always been a primary catalyst for instability in the region. Iraq since its creation involved in wars with all its neighbors, as well as with all its citizens. Turkey, for instance, laid claim to the province of Mousel until that dispute was settled in Iraq's favor with the help of Britain. Iran has made a larger claim over some parts of the country on sectarian bases where the Shi'i majority
Given the situation that the Iraqi government had to confront its people and its neighboring countries, militarism became the primary character of the central government in Baghdad. The Iraqi government has devoted national wealth to build a strong military establishment and a powerful political-security organization (the Ba’ath party) to support the dictatorial rule of the central government in Baghdad, regardless of their impacts on the well-being and welfare of the Iraqi people. These efforts have been emphasized under Hussein, as never before:

Hussein’s regime bears the full responsibility of the impoverishment of the Iraqi people, the worsening of the economy and the draining of human financial resources of the Arab countries and Iran. Prior to the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq’s excess reserves were $34 billion according to official statistics of the Central Bank of Iraq. Those reserves were totally drained in the war years from 1980 to 1988. In addition, the reserves turned to a foreign debt of approximately $80 billion. To this worsening situation, one should add the foregone opportunity of the drop in agricultural production and other economic distortions during the Iraq-Iran war. It is estimated that an additional loss to the Iraqi economy in the neighborhood of $48 billion occurred. Other financial assistance to Iraq from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other countries even the United States was estimated to have been approximately equal to $18 billion. The total amount drained by Iraq between 1980-1988 was almost equal to $180 billion. In adjusted figures, according to published rates of inflation, the figure becomes $214 billion in 1992 prices (Oweiss 1995, 14).

In spite of the tragic effects of the Gulf War on both Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi regime sought to pursue another
devastating war, which cost Iraq hundreds of thousands of lives, destruction of its industrial infrastructure, and billions of dollars. According to Oweiss (1995, 15), the invasion of Kuwait, the war, and its aftermath lead to the following cost, Kuwait: $110 billion (adjusted after further information became available), Iraq: $120 billion, Saudi Arabia: $64 billion, United Arab Emirates: $4 billion, Egypt: $3.5 billion, Jordan: $2 billion, Yemen: $1.5 billion, Morocco: $1 billion, and others: $2 billion. The total of the estimated cost in 1992 prices was equal to $308 billion. In adding up the cost of the Iran-Iraq war to that of the Gulf War, the total turned out to be $522 billion in 1992 prices. This estimation of a loss of half a trillion U.S. dollars represents both a foregone economic opportunity to the Arab economies--which may never be repeated in history--and imposes future economic burdens which are yet to be assessed.

These billions of dollars could have been used to develop the whole Arab World. In terms of the prospects of democratization in Iraq, the only hope of the people and the country is through the departure of the Hussain dictatorship, and the initiation of a process of reconciliation among the people of Iraq and their neighbors. In fact, the complex nature of ethnic divisions in the country does not even encourage observers to conclude that the post-Hussein regime would be democratic, given the fact that each of the ethnic minorities of Iraq has historical claims and outside support that might hinder the national reconciliation process in the country. The prospects of an emerging liberal system in Iraq depends on the departure of the ruling dictatorial elite, lifting the international
economic embargo, a national reconciliation process, and a new political arrangement that would protect the rights of all minorities without the hegemony of one over the others.

**Somalia.** Somalia is an East African country, south of the Arabian peninsula with an area of 637,660 square kilometers, and a population of 6,666,873. Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974 (NTDB 1994). Somalia won its independence in 1960, and elected its first democratic government which ruled for nine years until Siad Barre conducted a military coup against the civilian government. He ruled the country dictatorially from 1969-1991, when the country plunged into civil war. However,

On January 27, 1991, a popular uprising and generalized breakdown in security drove Somali president Siad Barre from his bunker in the ruins of Mogadishu into a tank that eventually took him into exile. This departure marked the formal end of a difficult era but did not usher in a new one. The Somali state, always a fragile, artificial creation dependent on external resources and suspended above a decentralized and fractious society, had collapsed. Owing in large measure to Barre’s destructive, divisive policies, no broadly based political groups existed to succeed the old leader. Consequently, competing factions and anarchy filled the resulting vacuum. With the state collapsed, the Somali people suffered the horrible brutality of living in Hobbesian world without law or institutions to regulate relations among groups or to protect the most vulnerable from the most vicious. violence and looting prevented economic production or the distribution of food, creating widespread famine that killed hundreds of thousands (Leyons and Samatar 1995, 7).

Somalia has faced a serious problem since its independence, that is achieving national unity, state
formation, nation-building, and overcoming its colonial past. The Somalis were extremely eager to unite their country and to establish a central government that would articulate the Somali identity, and able enough to return its occupied land by Ethiopia. Despite the homogeneity of Somalia among the African countries, what is ironic is the failure of the Somalis to unite themselves into one country with a central national government. Somalis failed to overcome their narrow tribal localities, which had left devastating impacts on the country. Geshekter (1995, 1) pointed out that

It is bitterly ironic that Somalia, the only nation in Africa with one ethnic group, one culture, one language, and one religion should be the most deeply divided of the continent’s fifty-two fractious countries. The Somali nation has broken down into its tribes and there is little trust between them.

In terms of the prospects of democratization in Somalia, it can only be achieved through a process of nation-building, elite accommodation, professionalizing the military, and a process of national reconciliation after years, if not decades, of clan enmities. So far, the failure of the Somalis and even the International Community to accomplish peace among Somalis can only contribute to fragmentation and extend the civil war and suffering.

Authoritarian-Modernizing Regimes

This category encompasses a group of countries that can be considered as modernizing authoritarian regimes. They
are modernizing in the sense of their promotion of economic development and economic growth, and because they are more developed politically than personal authoritarian systems. In this category, there exists political parties, political clubs, relative freedom of the press, and improvement in respect of basic human rights. These regimes can still be considered as restrictive in terms of political freedoms, but potentially to develop to a more democratic-accommodative regimes. This category lies in between personalism and liberalism. It bears features of both; they are likely to either develop to more accommodative political arrangements or reverse to authoritarianism. Algeria is an example of a country that has made remarkable efforts to democratize in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, the country regressed back into authoritarianism and military rule. In fact, the country is in civil war, disintegration, and near economic collapse. On the other hand, a country like Egypt, has relatively resumed its democratic tradition, expanded some freedoms, and accepted political pluralism, recognition of political parties, and maintained its National Assembly's elections, which would support the efforts of total democratization to the system. Table (5.3) shows the basic characteristics of the modernizing-authoritarian regimes.
Table 5.3: Political Indicators of Modernizing-Authoritarian Regimes

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>FRE</th>
<th>LEG</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>CSO</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>ETH</th>
<th>RELG</th>
<th>LING</th>
<th>CON</th>
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PR: Political rights in 1993
CR: Civil rights in 1993
FRE: Freedom status measured by Freedom House' Index; PT: partly free, NF: not free, F: Free
PP: Political parties (1: Yes, 0: No)
LEG: Legitimacy base of government (MIL: military, POP: popular)
SCO: Civil society institutions (political parties, women's associations, labor unions, and student unions)
PAR: Parliaments (1: YES, 0: NO)
WAR: War in the past ten years
ETH: Number of ethnic minorities
RELG: Number of religious minorities
LING: Number of linguistic minorities
CON: Existence of constitutions (1: YES, 0: NO)


Table 5.3 shows that countries within this category have better conditions in comparison with the previous categories in terms of freedom status. Some of these countries are classified partly free. Furthermore, countries within this category have civil society institutions ranges from 3-4. However, these countries are involved in conflicts, ethnoreligious diversity, which implies instability and potential societal strife as in the
cases of Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia.

The prospects of democratization depend on regimes' willingness to expand the bases of political participation, freedoms, regime accommodation, and peaceful settlement to domestic and international disputes. The following section offers a country profiles for this category of states.

Algeria. Algeria is a large, rich country with a population of 27,895,068. The country's major source of wealth comes from its natural resources of oil, gas, agriculture, and a growing industrial sector. Since its independence from France, in 1960, the country was ruled by The National Liberation Front (FLN), until president Bendjedid was forced to resign in 1991 amongst popular riots against a corrupted FLN rule. Upon, the departure of Bendjedid, a multiparty system was established and elections were held in municipal levels, district levels, and parliamentary election in which the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) won the majority of the National Assembly seats in the first round. Out of the 599 contested seats, ISF won more than 300, compared to only 25 seats for the secular, Berber-based opposition Front of Socialist Forces, and 16 seats for the NFL (Layachi and Haireche 1992). The ISF was denied its victory, and the military took over. Since then, the country has been involved in civil war.

Currently, the central question that is debated about the prospects of democracy in Algeria is the role of Islam
in the democratization process. This is a theme that will be investigated further in the following chapter. In fact, Islam has never been an alien element in the struggle of the Algerian people. The Islamic Ulama led the struggle against France. According to Boutheina Cheriet (1992, 11), the Algerian Ulama (Islamic scholars), in the shade of the colonial system, provided educated Algerian administrative and economic elites with a philosophical and political culture that they could find neither in the colonial culture nor in traditional religious mysticism. The Ulama laid the foundations of a national ideology in Algeria by transforming puritan Islam into a modern value system.

Layachi and Haireche (1992, 72) write

Islam had given Algerians a sense of national identity when they were striving for independence from France. Islam is still an integral part of Algerian nationalism. It is not an orthodox observance of the faith, but rather a source of cultural identity and a basis of international differentiation. In this broad sense, Islam is a key to understanding not only culture and society but politics and economics as well.

Layachi and Haireche (1992, 71) identified two clusters of factors that led to the resurgence of Islam in the Arab countries of North Africa: domestic and international factors.

The domestic factors include economic crises throughout the Magreb resulting from shortfalls in export earnings and the failure of national development strategies, which promoted the disengagement of the state from the productive and distributive spheres. Also, adopting the restructuring guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stimulated a political crisis evolved around the partial rejection of Westernization and secularization of society that
accompanied modernization. Among the international factors, the Iranian Islamic revolution provided a model of a successful Islamist challenge to secularism. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe encouraged challenges to authoritarian regimes, and the more recent Gulf War unleashed the mobilizational potential of the Islamists.

Ghassan Salame (1993, 23) asserted that Islamists in essence espouse the nationalist’s program, translate it into religious terms, and promise to achieve it the moment they gain power. Islamists thus embody an ambiguous mixture of continuity in policy and radical shift in elite identity. Algerian Islamist leader Abassi Madani, himself a former militant of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which has ruled the country since independence, insists that the Islamic Salvation Front’s program is a return to the FLN’s “authentic” foundation during the war of liberation that ended 30 years ago.

However, “many Algerian observers interpreted the 1990 results more as a vote against the NFL than a vote for ISF or for “Islam.”

Currently, Algeria is passing through a critical period of its modern history, that is the ongoing civil war. The triumph of democratization through accommodation of the Islamic and non-Islamic political parties would enable Algeria to overcome its current dilemma.

Egypt. Egypt is a North African country with a total area of 1,001,450 square kilometers, and a population of 60,765,028 million citizens. The political regime of Egypt is civilianized military presidents since 1952. “Egypt has the longest parliamentary experience in the Arab World. Having been the first country to experience constitutional
monarchy, populist authoritarianism, and the "mixed" system of the present period, it has exerted important influence (sometimes directly, sometimes by example) on the other Arab states" (Hudson 1991, 411). "Egypt, is the one Arab country with some historical experience of political pluralism, as the 1920s and the 1930s demonstrated. With the failure of the Nasirist experience of mass "mobilization", the pluralism or ta'addudiyya is also strengthened." (Hudson 1991, 413).

Egypt's parliamentary heritage goes back to the thirteenth century when the Mamluk government established the Diwan (Parliament/Mailis) (Dajani 1984, 120), however; its modern political experience was influenced by Napoleon's invasion. In 1886 the Khedive (Monarch) created Egypt's first modern parliament. It was established Simply in emulation of European democratic practices, as his first speech from the throne indicated. It was more likely that the social and intellectual ferment created by half a century of secular education, profound economic change, and new class formations and class relations compelled Ismail to recognize the principle of representative government. Under Ismail it would still be difficult to speak of democracy, as the three Parliaments of his reign were duly elected by the rural squirearchy and the urban bourgeoisie. We are still within the "Shura" system, which made Ismail's Parliaments "consultative" bodies representing a merely moral weight in politics and legislation. They could enact laws touching minor domestic affairs but were de jure not empowered to discuss foreign policy or major acts of State Sovereignty (Awad 1984, 14).

Awad (1984, 14) deemed that the peaks of the struggle
for liberal democracy in Egypt were the Urabi Revolution of 1882 and the Zaghlul Revolution of 1919, intensified societal and mass support for liberalizing the Egyptian political system. The revolutionary struggle of Urabi, Zaghlul, the Free Officers, and the Muslim Brotherhood sought to break the monarchial-British domination of power in Egypt and establish a democratic society. What facilitated this effort, was the absence of confrontations between the nationalists and the Islamists. Thus, Urabi, Zaghlul, and the Free Officers were as much nationalist as they were Islamists.

In terms of the current liberalization efforts, Ibrahim (1993 301) noted that:

The Mubarak government has continued to muddle through with little, if any, marked change in further democratization of the system. The press continues to enjoy a margin of freedom, and three new parties have been established by court order since the Gulf crisis; of these, the most important is probably the Arab Democratic Nasirite Party established in April 1992. Not much also has happened to make the system truly more participatory. New bouts of violent confrontations with Islamist groups, meanwhile broke out in 1991 and 1992.

The central impediment to the democratization effort in Egypt is the economic crisis of Egypt which has always been a liability on the country's political independence as well as its status in the international community. For economic reasons, Nasirite Egypt sided with the Eastern bloc, then altered its loyalty to the West by Sadat. Finally, the Mubarak government has enhanced the dependency of Egypt on
the West as never before. The country is dependent on the West in its food necessities, security, and stability. The IMF has designed a structural adjustment program that has always been a catalyst for confrontations between the governments and the opposition. It should be noted that the adjustment plan is expected to turn the economy around and increase the role of the private sector in the economy. The new plan calls for such measures as reducing the budget, relaxing controls on prices of some agricultural and industrial products and energy, lifting trade barriers, and eliminating obstacles to private-sector growth. The program also includes restructuring of state-owned enterprises. The government will sell more than 2,000 public enterprises and divest its equity about 240 joint ventures (Merriam and Fluellen 1992, 59).

However, Oweiss (1995, 12) asserted that economic reform and the implementation of the IMF plan since 1991 has shown little progress. "Privatization in Egypt is only one way out of current economic difficulties. By no means is it the only course of action which can help Egypt economically. Privatization has to be accompanied by a host of structural reforms in agricultural, housing, industrial, and service sectors as well as the government's budget and the country's balance of payments."

Economic reform is extremely important for the process of democratization of Egypt. Poor economy, associated with high unemployment rates, high inflationary rates, high population growth rates, and governmental refusal to widen political participation, would only encourage civil strife.
guerilla wars, and instability. In Egypt, such efforts have been under effect for a long period of time. Guerrilla activities in the countryside, political assassinations, and communal conflicts hinder the stability of the country. Meanwhile, it is fair to say that Egypt has made some success in some aspects of the liberalization, while it has regresses in other aspects. But such efforts are not sufficient to secure societal consensus nor do they allow for the emergence of powerful political opposition, in fear of regime collapse.

The seriousness of the economic crises, the demands for societal sacrifices in the implementation of the IMF austerity programs, the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, all press hard for constructive and genuine regime response. So far the government has cautious effort to liberalize the system despite holding periodic elections and giving relative freedom to the press. In the latest Parliamentary election, major political parties have boycotted the election due to the regime’s refusal to guarantee clean elections.

Mauritania. Mauritania is a poor northern African country, with a population of 2,192,777 (NTDB 1994). The country received its independence from France in 1960. Since then, the country has been ruled either directly by the military or by a civilianized military president. The central problem facing Mauritania is its ethnic division between
Arabs and Africans, and the lack of accommodation to the interests of the non-white population in the country. Therefore, Arabs dominated the political scene in Mauritania and reemphasized the Arab heritage in the country, which inflamed the southern black region of Mauritania. "Racial tensions generated by the government's white Arab policy arose. The black half of the population in the south became restless. Black troops tried to take over in 1987 and were crushed. Racial tensions between the black government of Senegal and the white government of Mauritania remain at a fever pitch. Mass deportations of minorities began in both countries" (Sturgill 1994, 104).

In terms of the liberalization of the political system of Mauritania, the country has started its political liberalization process in 1991, when the people of Mauritania approved a new draft of a constitution, and elected their representatives on 12, July 1991. Accordingly, the government legalized the emerging political parties that are mainly based on tribal localities. The current president (Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya) led his party (The Social Republican Party--PRDS) to victory in which he won 61 percent of the popular vote (NTDB 1994). Mauritania's government recognition of ten political parties and at least 20 political clubs and associations is an encouraging trend; if it keeps its momentum, it would develop a democratic experience in the country.
Mauritania suffers from serious economic problems, ethnic cleavages, and conflicts between Arabs and Africans, in which Arabs are accused of monopoly of power. Border conflicts with Senegal, and Morocco over the Western Sahara contribute to the instability of the government.

Sudan. The Sudan is a multi-ethnic North African country. Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with a size of 2,505,810 square kilometer, and a population of 29,419,798 (NTDB 1994). The Sudani people are scattered across that wide expanse, derive from a complex mix of ethnic groups. Arabic culture and ethnicity predominate, even though a slight majority of the population belongs to such African peoples as Nubian, Fur, Nuba, Dinka, Shilluk, and numerous others in the far south. Moreover, more than seventy per cent of the citizens are Muslim by religion, including many non-Arab peoples. Traditional African religions predominate in the south, and perhaps six per cent are Christian. Of these, most converted to Christianity during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1956) (Lesch 1995, 1).

Sudan has suffered from continuous internal strife since gaining its independence in 1956 from the joint rule of Egypt and Britain. Indeed, the civil war in the south, which costs the government half a million dollars a day has been considered as the primary impediment to development in Sudan.

The modern political history of the Sudan has rotated between two types of governments--the civilian and the military. Following its independence, the Sudan had a democratic political system, followed by a short period of
military rule (1956) to be replaced by a civilian government that ruled until 1969. However, the military led by Numiri overthrew the civilian government and ruled dictatorially, from 1969-1985. In 1985, Numiri was also, overthrown by a moderate minister of defense in an alliance with the civilian forces. The military ruled one year, when General Sewar al-Dahab returned power to the elected government exactly on the first anniversary of the coup. The civilian government ruled from 1986-1989 to be overthrown by the military, which is still ruling. Currently, the leaders of the coup promised to prepare the country for civilian and national elections, including presidential elections.

**Tunisia.** Tunisia is a north African Arab country with a total area of 163,610 square kilometers, and a population of 8,726,562 (NTDB 1994). According to Layachi and Haireche (1992, 85),

> Tunisia has gone the farthest in modernization or Westernization under the rule of Bourguiba. It has the most liberal family and personal Status Law, and an educational system that seems copied from the West. It is also the most secular state where separation between state and Mosque was a personal concern of Bourguiba, along with feminism, democratism, and secularism.

Bourguiba ruled Tunisia from 1956-1987. In 1987, Bourguiba was removed constitutionally due to the deterioration of his health, by his closest ally, the minister of interior, the current president Ben Ali. Upon his takeover, Ben Ali pledged to expand freedoms and to liberalize the Tunisian
political system. However, the regime has engaged in unproductive dialogue with the opposition movement. The result of such dialogue was resumption of the authoritarian personal rule of Bourguiba's rule, and resumption of violation of human rights and political oppression. The most affected party of governmental oppression is the Renaissance Party--a very moderate Islamic political party that pledged continuously its commitment to coexist with secular parties, commitment to electoral-representative democracy, and freedom for women. But the response was to exile its leader and imprison its members. Other secular parties also were oppressed and freedom was restricted.

International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Middle East Watch, have criticized the regime's violation of basic human rights of the Tunisian people, especially followers of political parties. As Ibrahim (1993, 301) put it

The regime has not only ignored such criticism, but has also endeavored to curb the activities of the Tunisian League for Human Rights by making it illegal to hold memberships in that organization and a political party. By July 1992, the league found it impossible to operate and, therefore, dissolved itself. Its dissolution was not only a serious setback for the democratization process, but also for the evolution of civil society in Tunisia.

Yemen. Yemen is located in the Southern part of the Arab peninsula, with a total area of 527,970 square kilometers, and a population of 11,105,202 millions (NTDB 1994). The
divided Yemen has been ruled by a military-tribal alliance in the North, and a Marxist dictatorship in the South. The two countries decided in 1990 to merge, establishing the Republic of Yemen. Soon after the unification, the alliance of the Socialist North, and the Communist South declared their intention to liberalize the political life of the new republic. Forty-six political parties were legalized and freedom of the press was recognized. "Political participation in Yemen has been intense, and public, from the moment of unity and promulgation of the new constitution. Within two months of the unity proclamation, between 18 and 20 political parties were preparing to register as political parties" (Hudson 1993, 421).

The process of preparation for the election has produced three major political parties, and approximately twenty small parties. The three major parties are Northern Old Alliance (The General People’s Congress,) the (GPC) which was created as the party of North Yemen president Ali Abdullah Salih, and relied for its support on the army and a coalition of other forces backing Salih’s regime; the Southern Old Alliance supported by the socialist party, and the Islah (The Reform-Islamic party). The April 1993 Yemen elections were quite competitive. Some 21 parties fielded candidates, with 4,730 candidates standing for only 301 parliamentary seats. About 50 candidates were women. The two ruling parties enjoyed the advantages of patronage and state control of radio and television, while Islah enjoyed the power of the northern tribes and of the Islamist groups’ urban organizations. After
the votes were counted, the General People’s Congress, the former ruling party of North Yemen, had won 123 seats—by far the largest bloc, but not a majority. The Islah placed second, winning 62 seats, and the socialists third winning 56 (Dunn 1993, 25).

The Yemeni new experience has failed due to conflict between the traditional antagonistic forces of the North and the South, each of which had its own military, and territorial bases. In May 1994, the two forces collided in a civil war, which was preceded by the Southern forces’ call for dissolving the Yemeni unity. The North rejected entirely any option that would lead to the fragmentation of the unified Yemen, and allied itself with the Islah party and the traditional support in the North, and capitalized on the crises in the South. The result of the war was a defeat for the southern forces, despite the support of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Currently, the government in Sa’na is recovering from the four-month civil war, and addressing post-civil war reconciliation efforts including political development. The central problem facing Yemen is an economic crisis that began in 1991, when more than a million and a half Yemeni nationals were expelled from the Gulf. Their remittances and savings in the gulf were lost due to political reasons and the refusal of Yemen to support the allies in the Gulf War. Thus, the future success of the United Yemen Republic would depend on its consolidation efforts in the post-civil war, economic development, and reconciliation with its
neighbors.

Palestine (The Palestinian National Authority (PNA)). The creation of the PNA was a result of the Oslo peace negotiations that granted Palestinians self rule in Gaza Strip and Jericho, to be expanded in July 1995 to the West Bank.

The self-autonomy areas of the Gaza Strip and Jericho present an interesting case study of the prospects of nation-building. This process could be encompassed within two perspectives, the economic and the political. The economic side of nation-building entails economic growth measured by productivity and economic equity measured by equal distribution of the national wealth. Economic development also requires the establishment of the economic infrastructure, including a productive sector, service sector, marketing, distribution, financial accountability, and equity. With regard to the political aspect of nation-building, it entails the establishment of a legitimate political authority, a consensus identity, and citizenship with well defined territory.

The plans for such economic reconstruction have not been spelled out. In this context, George T. Abed (1994, 42) has indicated that there is no well thought out plan for the construction of a Palestinian national economy. Abed maintains that there is a lack of vision concerning building an autonomous economy in Gaza. Instead of planning toward
the establishment of a strong national economy, the PLO urges the unemployed Palestinian workers to seek employment inside Israel. Abed criticized the PLO’s plan to have a large portion of its labor force seek employment inside the Jewish state rather than to draw and implement a development program and create employment opportunities locally. Another serious problem in the path of economic development in the occupied territories, is financial accountability. The donors are afraid that the financial aid will not be used for developmental projects, but rather for bribing notables, and paying for political favors.

The PNA (PLO) is also lagging concerning the political development of the emerging political entity. The actions of the PNA shows lack of commitment to the democratic norms. This is represented by the closure of some newspapers, and insensitivity to the demands of the political opposition. In this connection, Arouri and Carroll (1994, 16) have pointed out that the new charter of the Palestinian authority "organizes the government around a powerful president, the chair of the PLO executive committee. "A vaguely defined legislative authority is entrusted to a "council of the National Authority" which is appointed by the PLO executive committee until replaced by a popularly elected Council. The president of the National Authority controls the legislative and administrative process as well as the internal security forces."
Arouri and Carroll (9194, 16) have also, questioned the effectiveness of the new constitution concerning the protection of the Palestinian people against autocratic rule. Furthermore, the charter does not guarantee a democratic system of government, even the right to vote, the right of assembly, a definition to citizenship, as well as the ambiguity concerning the right to establish political parties. The legalization of such political parties is subject to their objectives and activities.

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the Palestinian Authority is able to construct such a legitimate authority capable of maintaining order, plurality, equity, and development.

**Liberal Democracy**

Lebanon is the only country that can be considered as a liberal democratic society in the Arab World. Lebanon won its independence from France in 1943. Its size is 10,400 square kilometers and its population is 3,620,393 (NTDB 1994). Lebanon is highly divided among communal and ethnic lines. Ethnicity represents a primary variable in the power equation in Lebanon. The country consists of the following ethnic and religious groups: Arab 95 percent, Armenian 4 percent, other 1 percent, Religions; Islam 70 percent (5 legally recognized Islamic groups - Alawite or Musayri, Druze, Ismailite, Shia, Sunni), Christian 30 percent (11 legally recognized Christian groups - 4 Orthodox Christian,
6 Catholic, 1 Protestant), Jews (less than 1%) (NTDB 1994). Furthermore, the country is also divided linguistically: Arabic (official), French (official), Armenian, and English. Lebanon is a highly educated society the literacy rate comprises 80 percent. The literacy rate among the male population is 88 percent, and 73 percent of the female population, making Lebanon the first country in terms of education, in the Arab World followed by Jordan.

Lebanon has a long democratic experience in the Arab World. Due to the civil war that erupted in 1975, Lebanon was not able to hold elections since 1972. In accordance with the 1991 Ta’if agreement that ended the civil war, the country held its first post-civil war elections in 1992, despite the boycott of certain sects of the Lebanese society such as the Maronite Christians as a protest of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The elections produced a parliament that guaranteed sectarian parity in the country, which put Lebanon back on track in resuming its long experience of a liberal free society.

The new distribution of power between ethnic groups in Lebanon divided the political power between Muslims, and Christians. The president is a Christian; the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of the Parliament is a Muslim Shi‘i. According to Harik (1995, 12), the civil war in Lebanon was instigated by external factors; that is not to deny the importance of conflict over power
domestically.

Despite the conflictual nature of the sectarian interaction in Lebanon during the past fifteen years, Harik (1995,15) believes that 'communalism' and 'sectarianism', are not obstacles to cooperation among Lebanese. "Lebanon has a very long history of communal cooperation on a variety of levels, has possessed relative independence domestically, and enjoyed a comparatively high degree of individual and cultural freedoms for more than two hundred years". Harik has also identified another factor that defuses the fear of sectarianism, and contributes to the survival of the pluralist nature of the Lebanese state--its unobtrusiveness.

Government involvement in society has always been limited in Lebanon and its role quite circumscribed, leaving considerable room for individuals and groups. Since the government did not have considerable control over material and cultural resources, communities did not have to obtain or preserve their values through it. By the same token, there did not have to be intense competition for controlling the government. Any increase in the government control capabilities would undoubtedly increase the level of tension among the communities (1995, 15).

Finally, Harik (1995, 16) is optimistic about the future of resuming the Lebanese democratic tradition, despite the civil war. He found that Lebanese in all their communities continue to be strongly committed to the national and territorial integrity of Lebanon and continue to be committed to the communal democracy of the country. He suggests additional political reform, mainly to the presidency that is making the office of the president chosen
directly by the people. Such effort would contribute more to political legitimacy, stability and moderation, given the fact that to run for the presidency, a candidate would have to seek the support of voters from all the various communities and, therefore, moderate his views to form a common denominator. Table 5.4: shows some political indicators of Lebanon.

Table 5.4: Political Indicators of Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>FRE</th>
<th>LEG</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>CSO/4</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>ETH</th>
<th>RELG</th>
<th>LING</th>
<th>CONS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>POP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PR: Political rights in 1993
CR: Civil rights in 1993
FRE: Freedom status in 1993
LEG: Legitimacy base (POP: popular)
PP: Political parties (1: YES)
CSO/4: Civil society institutions (political parties, women associations, labor unions, student unions)
War: War in the last ten years
ETH: Number of ethnic minorities
RELG: Number of religions, and religious sects
LING: Number of languages spoken by the people
CONS: Constitution (1: YES)


Table 5.4 indicates the major characteristics of the Lebanese political system. Lebanon is classified as partly free (5,4) due to the conditions of the civil war. However, Lebanon is the only country that can be classified as democratic within the Western standards. It has civil society institutions (4/4), political parties, parliament, and constitutions which specifies the distribution of
powers, and the separation of powers in the country. Lebanon is highly divided among ethno-sectarian lines making it vulnerable to instability and civil war.

Summary

In this part, I have classified the Arab countries economically into three categories and politically into six categories: traditional monarchies, modernizing monarchies, personal dictatorships, disintegration authoritarian regimes, modernizing authoritarian regimes, and a liberal democratic regime (Lebanon). However, despite the differences between these categories there is a clear tendency toward expanding political freedoms and political participation. Such a move is represented by a trend in the traditional societies toward the establishment of consultative councils, while it is represented in the modernizing monarchies by legalizing political parties, civil society institutions, and expanding freedoms of the press, assembly, and expression. Even in the personal dictatorships and the modernizing authoritarian regimes, all governments have tried to present themselves as liberal democratic through conducting symbolic elections. Among the Arab countries, Lebanon is the only country that can be classified as a liberal democratic country. It is expected that the relative peace in the region would enable Lebanon to resume its historical role as a leading force toward liberalism in the Arab World.
Finally, the inquiry about such a trend has to do generally with the global trend toward democratization, and specifically in the wake of the economic crises that struck the Arab World following the sharp decline in oil prices. According to Brand (1995, 13), the region's "domestic politics have long been heavily influenced by developments outside their borders. There is no reason to expect this to change in the near future." Brand (1995, 13) concluded that the collapse of the oil prices has deprived the "rentier" state from the means of absolute control. The only way states would be able to extract resources and support of their people is through expanding the bases of political participation. This trend to democratization has also been motivated by different regime tactics. Ibrahim (1993, 302) asserted that "coercion has been stretched to the limits of diminishing returns. It has led already to the tragic disintegration of Iraq and Somalia and to a quasi-guerilla warfare in Algeria and parts of Egypt." A second factor identified by Ibrahim is "the outcome of the Gulf crisis was not only political mobilization of the urban masses, but also their diminishing fear vis-a-vis the coercive measures of the state. A final factor has to do with the regime's strategies of survival through symbolic power-sharing. This strategy according to Ibrahim (1993, 302) "offers the best hope for transition from autocratic to democratic rule with a minimum of instability and bloodshed."
CHAPTER 6

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

The resurgence of Islam since the mid-1970s has triggered a new discussion concerning the compatibility of religion with the norms of liberal democracy. The political culture approach leads the discussion, arguing that certain nations belong to cultures that are incompatible with modern norms of liberal democracy (Huntington 1991, 1993). This argument has been raised first and foremost in Latin America, i.e., whether Catholicism promotes the norms of liberal democracy. It has been argued that Latin American countries are not, and will not be, able to build liberal democratic systems due to their political culture that is governed by Catholicism, which only preaches passivist obedience and tyranny (Wiarda 1992, Dealy 1992).

The concomitant resurgence of Islam and the struggle for democratization in the Arab-Islamic World and those nations belonging to Confucianism, extended the argument beyond Catholicism and Latin America. In this connection, it is stated that countries belonging to Islam and Confucianism cannot build liberal democratic governments because of an alleged unfamiliarity and incompatibility of those cultures with modern norms of liberalism (Huntington
One of the primary objectives of this chapter is to assess the familiarity of Arab-Islamic political thought with the norms of liberal democracy. Another objective is to address the issue of the compatibility of the Arab political culture with the modern norms of democracy. To achieve these goals, I will first investigate the evolution of Islamic political thinking and practice of the Islamic polity on liberal questions. The chapter also will examine the struggle between four ideological trends (nationalism, democracy, socialism, and Islam) in the twentieth century. The chapter will conclude by addressing the debate between those who claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy and those who contend that there are many principles in Islam that are consistent with democratic norms.

Islam Between Theory and Practice

Islam is a central component of the Arab political culture and is

A fundamental element in the national identity of the Arabs. It is equally important in affecting political authority where its effects are multiple. In terms of doctrine, it has been interpreted to justify virtually absolute rule, but at the same time it insists on equality. In terms of historical practice, the Islamic polity exhibited despotism punctuated by rebellion and chronic succession crises. In terms of its own heterodox offshoots, it embodied the idea of radical dissent (Hudson 1977, 91).

Monshipouri and Kukla (1995, 37) asserted that the gap between Islamic values and the empirical-legal order and
institutions in place in some Muslim nations has contributed to the confusion surrounding Islam's stands on issues of human rights, women's rights, democracy, and the like.

Since the death of prophet Muhammad (PBUH), there have emerged contradicting views on matters of the state, authority, the role of religion, sectarianism, and rebellion. Among the most controversial elements of Islam are the nature of the state, the role of the Calif, and the rights and obligations of the people. There has been a lack of consensus on these matters as well as conflicting and contending views concerning each. Islam does not recognize the nation-state nor does it promote nationalism. The concept and the meaning of loyalty extend beyond the bonds of nationalism to encompass a wide array of nations, colors, languages, and ethnic minorities.

In terms of the role of Islam in state-building, it has been used throughout history to legitimate certain regime types that are in contradiction with the essence of Islam. It had been used to legitimize the dynastic rule shortly after the Arabs had returned back to pre-Islam, establishing absolutist rulership. The Q'uran (the constitution) itself has not specified the nature of political succession, leaving it to Muslims to decide on political matters. The absence of specificity on these fundamental aspects of state-building had opened a discussion over the past fourteen centuries and had led to bloody wars that have
divided Muslims into two major sects, and seventy-three political movements.

Politically speaking, two primary camps emerged. The first camp, the Islamic liberal school of thought, attempted to accommodate the scripture to the changes occurring overtime and place. The second, which has been called by Western scholars as the Fundamentalist school of thought. This school insisted on the literal interpretation of the scripture to justify their disbelief in accommodating change with the principles of Islam.

Islamic Thought and the Norms of Liberal Democracy

The principles of Islam encompass a line of liberal thinking that is entirely different from the actual practice of present-day Islamic states. Concerning the basic question of democracy, i.e., the people as the source of authority, Durg (in Dajani (1984, 181), stated that Islam's primary sources of thoughts the Q'uran, Hadith (prophet's sayings), and the practical implementations of Islam in the era of the righteous leaders -- deemed the "nation" as the source of sovereignty and authority. This principle is based on the doctrine of equality of all before the law, which is a primary principle of liberal democracy.

These primary sources of Islamic thought have not specified such measures of selection of leaders in order to give a margin of flexibility based on space and time. Thus, the Ummah (nation) chooses its leaders either directly or
indirectly. In this context, Durg in Dajani (1984, 181) asserted that Islamic thought emphasized two other major principles analogous to liberal thought: these are Ba'ya (contract) and Shura (consultation). The Ba'ya and Shura represent the foundations of electoral-representative government, although the Islamic tradition did not specify the number, the manner, or the institutions that should perform these functions because that gives Muslims a margin of flexibility in responding to needs of time.

Dajani (1984, 120-141) identified three stages in the development of the concept of democracy in Arab thought. I will adopt his stages and I will build on them. Accordingly, his first stage is the pre-World War I. This stage has witnessed the emergence of thinkers and jurists who busied themselves with the issues of Shura, as well as the introduction and the absorption of the term democracy. Philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Ib'n Taymya, Ib'n Khaldun, and Al-Mawrdi, as well as others, are among the most prominent jurists concerned with the necessity of consultation, the role of Ulama (jurists), ruler accountability, and the right of resisting tyranny.

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) provided a comprehensive analysis of the sociopolitical and social foundation of the best and most practical regime. He addressed in his Muqaddima (Introduction) issues ranging from local political arrangements to diplomacy and international relations, which
reflects the level of intellectual development of the Islamic civilization at that period of time. According to Weiss (1995, 29-31) most of the problems that Arabs in the modern age are struggling with have been addressed by Ibn Khaldun hundreds of years ago. Ibn Khaldun tackled the issues of political authority, economic development, labor, classes, class relations, urbanization, population, political stability, revolutions, rebellions, and international politics.

Among these scholars, Al-Farabi (878-950) is one of the most prominent contributors to the democratic thinking in Islam. Echoing the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Al-Farabi has addressed the democratic regime in his book *The Political Regimes*, he did not, however, deem democracy as the best regime, due to his conviction that democracy as a regime type does not promote the creation of a righteous citizen who lives in a righteous city (Madina Fadilla). He considered the democratic city as one of the ignorant cities, but it is "the most admirable and happy city" (Lerner and Mahdi 1963, 51-51). Alfarabi asserted that the principles upon which a democratic society could be constructed are equality, liberty, freedom, popular political legitimacy, the maximization of individual rights, respect for values of pluralism, and the elimination of societal conflicts through the representation of varied interests.
Meanwhile, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have witnessed the emergence of a new generation of Arab students of Western liberal thought, such as Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905), Al-Tunisi (1820-1889), Al-Afgani (1839-1897), Rashid Rida (1885-1935), as well as others. Safi (1994, 111) considered Al-Tahtawi, Al-Afgani, Muhammad Abduh, and Al-Kawakibi as the voices of reform in modern Arab-Islamic history. These scholars were among the most prominent Arab thinkers who planted the seeds of the idea of democracy in modern Arab thought. This new generation introduced classical liberal thought to the Islamic World, and attempted to reconcile Islamic thought with the values of Western liberalism in their quest to revive the Islamic World after decades of decadence. The Islamic World suffered from social, political, and economic backwardness represented by dismantling the role of initiative (Ijtihad), change (Tajdid), the triumph of tyranny (Tassuf), and corruption (Fasad). Al-Tahtawi advocated the role of the people in the political process and the necessity of comprehensive social and economic democracy similar to that of the European countries. He emphasized the importance of the reinstatement of the role of the people in political life. He further asserted that political apathy (La'Muballah) and tyranny (Tassuf), are alien to Islamic tradition (Dajani 1982, 121). The task of involving the people in political life is facilitated by the fact that
Muslims were very involved in the daily affairs of the Islamic state. Political, economic, and social affairs were the concern of normal Muslims. Therefore, advocating apathy, alienation, and marginalization of the role of the people are dangers needed to be confronted if Muslims are to resume their leading role among nations.

In a similar vein, Al-Tunisi emphasized the necessity of political reform in the Arab-Islamic world, and highlighted the need to borrow from the Western experience. In this regard, Al-Tunisi called for the reconciliation of the Islamic principles of Shura (consultation), justice, equality, and freedom with the Western institutional forms of government. He advocated the introduction of parliaments to the Islamic world. By doing so, he sought to overcome the institutional aspect that was left unspecified. In his opinion, parliaments and national assemblies are compatible with the Islamic tradition, which asserted the principle of Shura, which, in itself, can be institutionalized in a form of Majlis (Parliament) (Dajani 1984, 122). Similar ideas can also be found in the writings of Al-Afgani. Al-Afgani advocated the resistance of colonialism and the rule of tyranny. He emphasized the necessity of the embodiment of Shura in a parliamentary system of government as the best solution to the problems facing the Arab-Islamic world (Dajani 1984, 123). Other scholars (e.g., Aladdin Abdullah and Al-Kawakibi) examined the causes of Arab-Islamic demise
in comparison with Western renaissance. They asserted that political backwardness is a major force that led to the decadence and the decline of Arab-Islamic civilization. They advocated a parliamentary political system with separation of powers and regime accountability as central strategies for the renaissance movement (Dajani 1984, 124). Other scholars such as Abd Al-Raziq emphasized the flexible nature of the scripture in matters related to state-building and political authority. Abd al-Raziq went further to say that:

Islam did not determine a specific regime, nor did it impose on the Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organize the state in accordance with the intellectual, social and economic conditions in which we are found, taking into consideration our social development and the requirements of the times (Bindar 1988, 130).

Furthermore, Abd Al-Raziq asserted that:

The Caliphate is not a religious regime, that it is not required by Islam, and that, despite the pretensions of the caliphs, they could not possibly have been the successors or caliphs of the prophet because the prophet was never a King, and never tried to establish a government or a state; he was a messenger sent by Allah, and he was not a political leader (Bindar 1988, 130-131).

In response to the calls for reform, the Islamic world had witnessed a sort of "shuristic" political system, despite the general absence of permanent institutions. The efforts to expand the bases of political participation were introduced by the Ottoman sultan Solomon, "the man of Law" who initiated a political reform movement including
establishing a parliaments (Dewans). These Dewans were not a totally novel idea as they were known in an earlier period of time under the Mamluk rule in Egypt in the year 1692. The Dewan idea amazed the French Council in the Mamluk Court, who reported such type of institution to his government (Dajani 1984). Mohammed Ali and Napoleon in the eighteenth century reintroduced the parliamentary system of government to Egypt. Finally, in this period, While Arab-Muslim intellectuals were advocating Western values of parliamentary liberal government, the Western countries engaged in a conspiracy to destroy the Islamic Caliphate and colonize its territories. Such policies had a devastating effect on the growing democratic movement in the Arab-Islamic World.

Dajani (1984, 132) identified two other stages: the inter war period and post-World War II. The inter war period witnessed Arab subjugation to foreign colonialism, namely, the British and French. The European colonial powers divided the Arab World and denied promises made to them in the pre-World War I period. Arabs were promised an independent state, encompassing the twenty-one current Arab states, in exchange for their support in World War I by revolting against Ottoman rule.

The Search for an Ideological Political Formula

During the inter war period and after, the Arab World has witnessed the emergence of four political trends: the
liberal democratic, the nationalist, the socialist, and the Islamic. The triumph or failure of one or more has determined the destiny of the Arab World since then. In fact, the West has done great disservice for the cause of democracy in the Arab World as early as the dawn of this century. Thus, there had been a reversal from the move toward the nourishment and maintenance of the liberal values in the Arab World; that is, democracy and freedom have been sacrificed for the sake of national independence from the tyranny of the Western-democratic colonial powers. Arab intellectuals were in a great dilemma of how to justify to their people the advocacy and the devotion to the values of democratic colonial-exploitative-Western powers that jailed Arab leaders, and exiled, murdered, seized the property of, and displaced some of Arabs from their homeland forever. These polices destroyed Arab-Islamic unity and destroyed the Arabs’ last attempt to imitate the West.

The destruction of the newly established Arab Syrian Kingdom in 1920 by France was a major setback for the drive toward democracy in the Arab World. This kingdom was established on liberal-constitutional bases. The Westernization movement, which advocated becoming Europeans in everything, was defeated by the emerging nationalist-socialist trends that made the struggle against the colonial West and the liberation of the Arab World their primary goals. With these serious setbacks to the liberal cause,
socialism and communism were brought to the Arab World through direct contacts with the former Soviet Union. The USSR was sympathetic to the Arab demands of self-determination and national independence. In fact, the Russian Revolution of 1917 revealed the secret agreements between the European Colonial powers to divide the Arab World. The alliance of the socialist-nationalist and Islamic forces was successful in achieving independence in some parts of the Arab World. In opposition to the democracy of 'the colonial west,' Arab nationalists and socialists attempted to conceptualize a democratic form of government that is applicable to the Arab World, which necessarily takes into consideration its peculiar institutional and cultural conditions. Nationalist-socialist democracy (not Western style) and societal solidarity were among the main values promoted by the post-World War I period politicians.

Unfortunately, the new Arab constitutional governments that were established in Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt were replaced by military dictatorships. Syria was the primary stage of military coups, occurring approximately every four months. Dajani (1984, 139) identified the idea of a 'single organization' as one of the most important post-World War I developments within the socialist contributions, mainly in Syria and Egypt. The single-party idea was espoused by a new conceptualization to
socialist democracy, which necessarily divided citizens within single entities into two camps: members of the single organization (party) and enemies of the people. Similarly, the Arab World was divided into two camps: socialist-progressive-radical, revolutionary states and reactionist forces (i.e., monarchies) as enemies of the Arab people, and collaborators with the West. The United Arab Republic—the leading Arab country—adopted a socialist charter that presented a nationalist project to unite the working class, peasants, labor, intelligentsia, soldiers, and the national capitalists into a single organization. Those who are not encompassed within this project are deemed as the enemies of the people, as well as reactionists, collaborators, and agents to foreign enemies.

Such ideological diversities initiated an Arab Cold War, during the past four decades, that divided the Arab World as never before. In fact, nationalist and socialist movements have failed to achieve significant solidarity, unity, liberation to occupied Arab lands, economic development, and political development. Such grievances and the failure of the nationalists-socialists were preludes for the emergence of the Islamic movement.

The defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967, the disillusionment, the dissatisfaction of the performance of the nationalist state, Arab fragmentation, Arab mass alienation, the Arab Cold War, the Arab Civil Wars, the
failure to utilize oil wealth in the projects of development, the centralization of power, the creation of dictatorship and the personalization of authority (rule of Zai'm), corruption, mismanagement to national resources, and human rights violations inflamed Arab masses and forced them to search for an alternative to the existing status quo. To many, the alternative was Islam. In fact, the reasons for the emergence of Islam are those that led to the quest for democratization, as I will explain shortly. In the following section, I will examine the factors that led to Islamic resurgence.

Islamic Resurgence: Political Development or Fundamentalism?

The aforementioned developments have brought Arabs and Muslims to unprecedented disillusionment. Islam was sought by many as the only way out of such impasse. The resurgence of Islam has been manifested by the formation of cultural associations and study groups, by the growth of Muslim social institutions, including welfare societies and financial establishments, and by an increase in such public manifestations of religiosity as mosque attendance and veiling. According to surveys conducted in Tunisia, for example, the proportion of urban men and women who reported praying five times a day increased from 18 percent in 1967 to 61 percent in 1973. Similarly, the proportion who deemed it important that Muslims abstain from the consumption of alcohol increased from 46 percent to 73 percent (Tessler 1995, 8).

However, Faksh (1994, 184) has identified three periods of
Islamic revival over the past century. He asserted that these "three periods of Islamic revival were associated with the failure to deal with an accumulation of internal crises stemming from sociopolitical and economic decay and foreign hegemony." The first in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was championed by movements such as the Wahhabis of Arabia, the Mahdis in Sudan, the Sanusis of North Africa, and the Islamic reform movement in Egypt. Faksh identified two other periods, the second which reached its peak in the 1940s, in which the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World and the Muslim Society in the subcontinent of India emerged as the two most powerful organizations. The third and longest period began in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the War of 1967 and

Continued throughout the 1970s amid severe economic dislocation, class disparities, and authoritarian state structure. It became a formidable force after the Islamic revolution of 1978-79 in Iran, sweeping across the Muslim heartland from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. This is Islam as a political force, or political Islam, challenging established regimes, shaking Arab political life to its foundations, and calling for a revival of the early Islamic ethos of governance (Faksh 1994, 184).

Since the late 1960s, this Islamic revival has grown until it manifested itself politically in the mid-1980s and up to the mid-1990s as a central opposition and alternative force to the existing status quo. Wright (1991, 26) identified three factors behind the success of the Islamic movement in mobilizing public support: economic hardships,
political failure, and social turmoil. The reason behind the Islamic revival can be classified under several sub-cATEGORIES.

Political-Economic Factors

The ecopolitical factors that stimulated demands for liberalism and support for Islamic revivalism mainly have to do with regime performance in the past four decades. In the most extreme cases of Islamic resurgence, it has been asserted that in the cases of Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt, the overwhelming support of the Islamic movement is evidence for such trends of dissatisfaction with governmental policies. Economic deprivation, social exclusion, and political under-representation [have] encouraged the development of Islamist movements not only in Algeria but also in many other Muslim countries. The remarkable electoral success of the Islamist parties reflect votes against the governments and the status quo, as much as, or even more than, votes for the platform of Muslim political parties. For example, according to several analyses (Layachi and Haireche 1992, Ibrahim 1993, Tessler 1995) of the 1990 and 1991 Algerian elections, the people cast "rejection votes out of revenge" to the ruling establishment rather than to the Islamic Salvation Front. The same analogy and conclusions could also be drawn in terms of other cases such as Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Another related argument gave advantages for the Islamic
movement as being the absence of alternative opposition parties with a credible platform and governmental support to the Islamic movement in previous decades. The leftist parties have lost their credibility and ability in mobilizing opposition against regimes. In Egypt, for instance, the situation was summed up by a socialist leader who complained that while "Islam may not be able to solve the country's problems, Muslim groups at least have a credible slogan. They may be without a real solution, but we [Socialists] are without even a pretend solution" (Tessler 1995, 10). The poor performance of socialism and Arab nationalism was a primary catalyst for the resurgence of Islam due to the unfulfilled promises concerning critical issues, such as the liberation of Palestine, Arab solidarity, economic development, housing, jobs, education, and political participation. Such unfulfilled promises for the past five decades outraged Arab masses that expressed their rage in the 1980s through "street-politics," armed struggle with the ruling elites in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia; and overwhelming support for Islam as in the cases of Jordan and Algeria.

Arabs have viewed both nationalism and socialism as contributing to Arab-Islamic divisions and the maintenance of tiny states that lack basic foundations as well as strengthened dependency upon the East and West. Both capitalism and socialism have failed to address urgent needs
for social justice, equal distribution of wealth, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, and restoring lost Arab dignity and pride.

Other factors that have contributed to the resurgence of Islam pertain to the availability of the political space. This space was furnished by governmental tolerance, and the organizational aspect of the Islamic movement added to its involvement in providing social services. In fact, "in many nations, including Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan (and even in Israel's occupied territories), Islam was actually encouraged or cultivated by governments beginning in the 1970s to counter leftists, when political dikes were finally opened, the Islamists flooded the system" (Wright 1992, 27).

In terms of the organizational aspect, the Islamic movement enjoys an advantage over rival groups represented by access to religious establishments, which offered unmatched opportunities for recruitment unavailable to rival secular groups. Furthermore, governmental tolerance in previous decades for strategic domestic reasons provided the Islamic movement with the needed time to grow and organize.

The involvement of the Islamic movement in providing relief and social services to the poor masses in the Arab World has generated tremendous support to the movement. This explains why the Islamic movement provided community service programs that included health care, schooling, family care centers, and spiritual support. Such sectors
were either neglected by the government in some cases, like Egypt, or provided at an unaffordable price for the poor in countries such as Tunisia, Jordan, Somalia, Mauritania, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Through the social support network, in the Arab-Islamic World the Islamic movement was able to recruit loyal constituencies to defend and promote its agenda. This societal support gave the Islamic movement an advantage over other political groups that lacked such support. In fact, the leftist-nationalist movement was isolated from the poor. They have no developmental projects, no health care services to be provided, and even lack the will to address seriously such societal problems. The nationalist-leftist movement busied itself for the past seventy years with intellectual debates that do not help the poor to lift themselves out of poverty.

The effectiveness of the relief efforts of the Islamic movement in the aforementioned countries, especially in times of crises and natural disasters, was unmatched by even governments that felt their authority was threatened by a well-organized and highly dedicated movement to serve the people. In Egypt, where poverty is a central characteristic of the country, "the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic groups offer a wide array of services, ranging from inexpensive medical and educational facilities to soup kitchens." Indeed, in some areas, particularly in Upper Egypt and inner city slums, these groups "have become the
sole provider of social services" (Lalor and Karanasou 1993, 5, in Tessler 1995). In the case of Egypt, Islamist groups have distinct advantages:

They have access to mosques, operate charitable societies, and promote Islamic banks and investment companies. They run medical clinics and literacy programs, provide low cost clothes and books for students, and contribute food and even cash for the indigent. Given the deterioration in the quality of government services since the 1970s, the Islamic charities fulfill important needs. [At the same time], government restrictions on the formation of civic and political groups have disproportionately hampered liberal and left movements, thus leaving loopholes for the religious groups (Tessler 1995, 11).

The third factor that contributed to the revival of Islam was Western policies and the emergence of anti-Western sentiments in the Arab-Islamic World. Misguided Western policies, and lack of Western support to its values of human rights and freedoms, have mobilized Arabs and Muslims against the West.

The West has been charged with holding false images about Islam and Arabs. Nurturing stereotypes of fanaticism, terrorism, fundamentalism, exploiting Arab wealth, engaging in devastating national wars, and funding division and fragmentation within the Arab World all are arguments held by Arabs and Muslims against the West. Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Renaissance Islamic Party of Tunisia, put it neatly when he asserted:

look at the atrocities heaped on the Islamic movements at the hands of repressive regimes that continue to terrorize the people; and, in all
likelihood, their persistent presence is morally and financially perpetuated by a West that claims it is a global sanctuary for the message of democracy. . . . What happened to the principles of democracy and human rights? The West seems to be driven by greed, contempt, and self-interest; and these inequities require an ideological facade for justification (Bin Yousef and Abduljobain 1992, 36).

Ghannouchi further asserted

We neither harbor a craving for war nor do we brood on historical enmities; yet the West persists in preventing our rebirth, preserving our backwardness, hoarding our resources, and promoting our demoralization. Not finding that enough, it supports the dictatorial regimes that try to drain us of our will for revolution and reformation (Bin Yousef and Abduljobain 1992, 37).

Furthermore, the failure of Arabs and Muslims in establishing modern and well developed states was engineered by western colonialism, that

Reinforced a prevailing Muslim sense of inferiority, the product of centuries of European colonial dominance, which left a legacy of both admiration of Western power, science, and technology and resentment of Western dominance, penetration, and exploitation. The failures of the modern experience stood in sharp contrast to an Islamic ideal which linked the faithfulness of the Islamic community with worldly success, as witnessed by the memory of a past history in which Islam was a dominant world power and civilization (Esposito 1984, 17).

Consequently, I do agree with Tessler, Wright, Ibrahim, and others that the main reason behind the resurgence of Islam is to be found within the socioeconomic and political spheres, and not in spirituality. Such a conclusion would enable us to say that the dynamic of interaction between the contending forces in the Arab-Islamic World is not
fundamentalism, but an expression of grievances that have been oppressed for decades. The issue to me is not fundamentalism but dissatisfaction with the performance of an inefficient ruling elite. The issue is employment, housing, health care, education, social welfare, food, clothing, transportation, equality, participation, and, freedom of expression rather than fundamentalism. The issues are political development, economic development, and social development, which are concerns of Arabs in the 1990s as they were two hundred years ago. Finally, lack of progress and the rule of tyranny not only are leading to military confrontation, but I expect that the continuation of grievances would fuel mass revolutions.

The Compatibility of Islam and Democracy

Scholars in the field of Middle East affairs have drawn commonalities that underlie the Islamic resurgence and the concern for democracy in the present-day Arab World. In this connection, Tessler maintains that

Each trend has for the most part been driven forward by the same underlying stimulus, namely a deep dissatisfaction among ordinary citizens with established patterns of governance and prevailing political and economic relationships. Opposition to the political and economic status quo, and the attendant desire for better and more accountable government, is similarly at the root of popular support for Islamist movements (Tessler 1995, 10).

The resurgence of Islam and its concomitant quest for democratization in the Arab World has generated serious debate concerning the compatibility of Islam with the norms
of liberal democracy. The debate brought about two schools of thought; the first school denies the compatibility of Islam with democracy, and the second school dismissed the anti-compatibility thesis. The first school of thought consists of scholars who view the process of Islamic resurgence as fundamentalism, fanaticism, radicalism, new Islamic expansionism, replacement of Communism, and a threat to Western culture interests and stability, as well as incompatibility with modern norms of liberal democracy. Huntington (1984, 1991, 1993), Paris (1993), and Mirsky (1993), lead in advocating the anti-compatibility thesis, as well as the threat argument. Huntington contends that Islam is anti-democratic because

Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Buddhist and Confucian cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against human rights "imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures (Huntington 1993, 41).

In the opinion of such writers, democracy requires a civic culture that promotes diversity, ideological pluralism, independent judgment, dissent, bargaining, compromise, coalition-building, and freedom; these values are allegedly absent in Islam culture. According to this analysis, "the Muslim religion insists on social and intellectual conformity and on the uncritical acceptance of established
authority, whereas democracy demands a political culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise" (Tessler 1995, 12).

Islam is also held to be anti-democratic because it "prohibits the establishment of representative and parliamentary political systems, viewing these as man-made constructions that have no place in a polity where the revealed word of God is the only authoritative source of law and political authority" (Tessler 1995, 14).

Another argument raised against the compatibility of Islam with liberal democracy is political accountability. It has been argued that "Islam requires rulers to be obedient to God alone." As one scholar explains, "democracy ceases to exist in a situation where the ruler is accountable only to God, and where it is the ruler's responsibility to guarantee the continued harmonious integration of each individual and group into the community" (Anderson 1987, 221).

In brief, this school necessarily assumes the natural antagonism between Islam and democracy. Yet, the views of the pessimistic trend are not widely shared. Many observers--native and Western area specialists--as well as some politicians and intellectuals, have dismissed the contradiction between Islam and democracy, insisting that there is no evident contradiction between Islam and modern values of liberal democracy.
The advocates of the compatibility of Islam and democracy dismissed even the virtue in holding debates about whether Islam is compatible with democracy, holding that the same discussion might apply to Judaism or Christianity, and they have been debated for centuries (Fuller 1992, 23). Furthermore, they insist that the critics of Islam hold false conviction about the homogeneity of Islam and charged them of issuing judgmental generalization. In their opinion, it is not accurate to assume that all Islamist and Muslim countries are anti-democratic.

In fact, it is evident to me that the Islamic political discourse has absorbed the values and the terms of Western liberalism, that have been used to attack Western supported regimes, on the same grounds that Western constituencies would critique their governments. The grounds are more a call for respect to human rights, liberalism, women’s rights, political participation, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Rachid Ghannouchi described the misconceptions of the Islamic definition of democracy:

When the compatibility of Islam and democracy is in question, some Westerners and Islamists maintain, as do the diligent opponents of political Islam, that the two platforms follow divergent paths. Another delusory precept, especially on the part of Islamists, is based on an inadequate knowledge of the humanities and an indoctrination in superficial literature that define complex issues in simplistic terms. This is done by segregating Islamic government and democracy to mean "God’s rule" and "the people’s rule" respectively. The advent of "God’s law" was revolutionary in that it abolished monarchical claims on wealth, power, or legislation; it
negated the clergy's monopoly of affairs requiring the interpretation of God's will; and it nullified the authority of those clergymen who sought to speak in God's name. "God's rule" is revolutionary because it grants executive, but not legislative, power to governors. When we say "God's rule" we do not mean that God comes down and governs directly. Divine law, as applied by the Muslim state, is based upon constitutional statuses confirming to Islamic ethics. In addition, it disallows monarchies or oligarchies from controlling governmental affairs. Therefore, when earthquakes or prejudicial perspectives are overcome, it is clear that "God's rule" correlates to the rule of the people or their representatives. Islamically, these are ahl al-hall wal-ajd, an elective body of highly qualified and experienced scholarly individuals (Bin Yousef and Abuljobain 1992, 32).

Hassan Turabi, the leader of the Nationalist-Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan, has presented a similar conceptualization of Islam and the values of liberalism. Turabi advocates the establishment of political parties, free elections, leading roles of the Sudani women, dismissing entirely that segregation between gender is not from Islam, liberalizing the economy, and establishing a democratic society based on Shura and Ijmaa (consensus). Turabi emphasized the importance of the economic aspect of the state. He asserted that, in the case of Sudan, "the economy is being privatized. This is not inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but in fact is inspired by Islam. As a result, the complete withdrawal of subsidies and the floating of the pound have occurred" (Cantouri and Lowrie 1992, 54).

Many scholars contend that even if Islam appears to be
anti-democratic as Huntington (1991, 1993), Mirsky (1993, 567), and Paris (1993, 553) asserted, many other cultures that have been regarded as inhospitable to democracy by Huntington have undergone a successful transformation to democracy.

Democracy has been spreading and still is spreading in the Confucian world. One need think of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, which is one of the bulwark countries of the democratic world. And yet the skepticism akin to that heard today about the prospects for democracy in the Islamic world was expressed in very similar terms about the prospects for democracy in Japan before it became democratic (Mauravchik et al. 1993, 6).

Confucianism, for instance, has been declared as hospitable to economic liberalism but not to political development. The Confucian culture has shown tremendous success in the field of political development and democratization. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have made remarkable success in all aspects of life, including political and social development, i.e., they assimilated the values of liberal democracy.

Another argument that could be made against the advocates of the incompatibility argument is that Islam itself is not the primary explanation of political, social, and economic matters that are occurring in the Arab-Islamic World. Islam is not the primary source, nor is it the ultimate reference or context, in guiding the life of Muslims in the current world arena. As Bindar (1984, 81) put it:
The question is whether Islam is the primary explanation of any political matter at all, or whether it enters into the analytical picture only after we have understood the situation in terms which are not at all so parochial, or exotic, or culturally unique. Considerable questions may be raised regarding whether such general references to Islam as a holistic entity are an adequate statement of the political culture of any Middle Eastern country. I am certain that it is wholly misleading to equate Islam and culture in general in any Middle Eastern country, and not only in the most Westernized of them. Islam in its various forms, and categories, and applications, is only a part of Middle East culture, and by itself accounts for little. It is often far more accurate to see various Islamic symbols as instruments wielded by those who have power. Of course, this has nothing to do with what Muslims call "real Islam" but it has everything to do with the study of political development.

Indeed, the matter of compatibility is an interpretive matter. All religions as well as ideologies can be interpreted as against or for certain values. Islam is similar to Christianity and Judaism in this regard. Sisk (1992, 17) identified "two distinct sets of interpretations on the issue of Islamic teachings and democratic practice: the first can be considered a liberal tradition, and the second an Islamist one, which is often used as a less pejorative synonym for "Fundamentalism" perspective. "The former allows for broad interpretation of the holy scriptures, whereas the latter adopts a literal, or narrow and restrictive, interpretation. Sisk called the first school the Islamic Liberal school of thought. Sisk named Mohammed Abdu "the father of the Liberal-reformists." According to the Liberals, Islam does not prevent Muslims
from establishing governments on the basis of modern reasoning and the most solid aspects of what the experience of nations has shown to be the best regime-type. Sisk found another interpretation; he called it the "fundamentalists' interpretation."

This perspective is a relatively recent revival of a much earlier phenomenon, fueled by such circumstances of a latter twentieth century as defeat in war and humiliation associated therewith, the decline of Arab nationalism, and economic and social dislocation (1992, 17).

Indeed, the principles of liberal democracy are not alien at all to Islam. Islam addressed these principles fourteen hundred years ago. The principle of freedom (Huria) is exactly what is defined in Islam justice (Adl), rights (huqq), consultation (shura), parliament (Majlis, Dewan), and equality (Musawa). In terms of the alleged rigidity of Islam, Islam has provided the principle of Al-Masaleh al-Dunyawia and Massaleh al-Ummah (what is necessary for the nation) which gives the Ummah freedom and full independence in managing its worldly affairs, including establishing a political regime and a type of government based on popular demand. These principles necessarily advocate the interests of the Ummah as supreme. Thus, if such interest requires adopting political experience of other nations, let it be the case, and there is no harm in doing so. Thus, it is up to the Muslims to establish the ruling system that best serves their public good (al-masaleh al'amma), a system which may change over time and place. It
is not difficult to ascertain the high degree of compatibility between the criteria of democracy and Islam as interpreted by the Liberals—free and fair elections, universal suffrage, multi-party politics, minority rights, equality of citizens—all consistent with the thought of many Islamic liberals.

In examining the history of Islam we find that, contrary to the advocates of the incompatibility argument, I would say that Islam is not a monolithic religion, and neither does the Islamic movement. Furthermore, Islam as an ideology lend itself to interpretations by scholars within the variables of time and space.

In the case of civic values this means Islam is not, by its very nature, intolerant of diversity, hostile to dissent, and inhospitable to new or foreign ideas. On the contrary, these normative orientations are as much a part of Islam's cultural and political legacy as are whatever penchant for conformity, narrow-mindedness, and opposition to innovation may also be found among the traditions of the Muslim community (Tessler 1995, 14).

The history of Islam is a history of diversity, pluralism, and scholarly interpretations that in some cases led to wars and historical divisions. The source and the essence of the Sunni-Shi'i (the Great Division) was an interpretational dispute concerned with political, social, and economic matters. A careful study of Islamic history would reveal that under the Islamic rule there were four major religious schools (Mathaheb) of thought, and at least seventy-three political groups (Firag). Furthermore, Islam as a "religion
has been marked throughout its history by an intellectual trend that encouraged rational inquiry and speculated on the philosophical foundations of the world and humanity, as well as by an obscurantist trend that condemned philosophy, reduced ordinary citizens to intellectual apathy, and forced political challengers to resort to force. The central preoccupation of the former tradition is discussion, or kalam, defined as the exercise of reason and stimulated not only by the logical exposition of arguments but also by "new ideas" that poured into the souls and became a preoccupation of the masses" (Marsisni 1992, 36). Indeed, I do agree with Tessler, Esposito, and others that Islam is compatible with the norms of liberal democracy. The dilemma we have in judging Islam is a lack of examples that implement the real Islam. There is a huge gap between theory and practice, and between Islam and the current states. It seems to me the most appealing interpretation is the reconciliation of the principles of Shura (consultation), Musawat (equality), Adel (justice), Muhasaba (accountability), Huria (freedom), Ijtihad (innovative reasoning), Almassleh Al'amma (public interests) with the norms of liberal democracy.

In the following section I will test the compatibility of Islam and democracy through accounting for the principles of liberal democracy. I have accounted for the major values of liberal democratic theory, and assigned a score of 1 if Islam is compatible with the modern norms of liberalism, and
a score of 0 if Islam is incompatible. The main criteria used in determining the compatibility or the incompatibility is matching the Islamic principles with the principles of liberal democracy, i.e., reconciling the Arab-Islamic understanding with the modern principles and institutions of modern liberal thought. Table 6.1 summarizes the attempt to reconcile the principles of Islam with those of liberal democracy.

Table 6.1: The Compatibility of Islam with the Principles of Liberal Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Liberal Democracy</th>
<th>Islam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected executive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament/Majlis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism-Parties/Ta’budia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization/political power</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights (non-Muslims)/Muli system</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rule of Law (Saw’a, Swasia)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent judiciary (Kahda Mustaqel)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private enterprise</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rights (divorce, education, property)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation/compromise/bargaining</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting tyranny (Tasu’f)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of choice (religion)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first four Califs (executives) after Prophet Mohammed were elected among the elite. The prophet himself did not specify his successor, nor does the Qu’ran, in order to avoid a dynastic style of government. The Qu’ran says: "truly the best of men for thee to employ is the (man) who
is strong and trusty" (Qu’ran 28:26). According to AL-Anssary (1980, 12-13), the selection of the Calif is conducted through two stages. First he should be nominated by ah-al Shura (consultative council). In the second stage, the nominated Calif is elected publicly through popular support and Ba’ya (contract). The elected Calif enjoy wide authority, but he is restricted with the principles of rulership in Islam, the opinions of ahl-al Shura, and the views of the normal people. Thus, in accordance with the liberal school of thought alluded to above, Muslims were given the opportunity to elect their leaders directly and/or indirectly. Then Muslims give their popular consent (Bay’a) or contract to the elected leader.

The institutional aspect, within its Advisory Council, was known to Arabs even before Islam. However, after the advent of Islam, the Islamic polity had known numerous experiences of institutionalizing the Shuristic system. In the first era (Prophet, and his companions), the consultative council was known as an instrument of decision-making that aid the Calif in the process of rulership. In later stages, during the Mamluk, and the Ottoman eras there were Dewans and parliaments which encompassed representatives from different regions of the Islamic polity to represent the interests of their constituencies.

In terms of the conceptualization of the principle of institutionalizing the diverse institutions, the Qu’ran
instructed individuals, groups, and the rulers to adhere to the principle of Shura (consultation). As Deggan (1994, 127) noted, the principle of Shura can be institutionalized through the creation of an assembly, or a parliament. Degan found that "the best known of the political prescriptions contained in the Qu’ran is that Muslim community, "the Umma," should have recourse to "Shura," or consultation. In large states, Shura would take place in the form of a national assembly (Majlis al-Shura). The Qu’ran itself has a whole chapter (42) entitled Consultation. In one of its verses, the issue of faith has been tied to consultation. The Qu’ran says about the believers: "those who respond to their lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation" (Qu’ran 42:38). In another verse the Lord has instructed the Prophet to pass over the faults of his companions and to "consult them" (Qu’ran 3:159).

Diversity and plurality is the essence of the Islamic history. Spiritually speaking, there are four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence concerning matters of worship and non-worship affairs. Politically, the division between Muslims shortly after the death of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), was concerned first and foremost with political succession. Two schools of thought emerged at the beginning: the Shi’i school, which adopted the priority of the elected Imam (Ali) for the position of the fourth Calif, and the Sunni school,
which was not active in supporting Imam Ali and accepted the rule of his opponent (Moawya) who reintroduced the dynastic rule to the Muslim polity as a regime type. Furthermore, this division led to the emergence of at least seventy-three political movements in the first century of Islam, some of which still exist.

The Qu’ran has asserted that God intentionally created people different. It says we: "made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)" (Qu’ran 49:13). Similarly, the prophet accepted the diversity among his companions in matters related to worship, business, leadership, and related issues. Such bases would enable me to conclude that Islam is not against diversity nor does Islam stands as an obstacle to the institutionalization of such principle into institutions. Thus, political parties, interest groups, unions and associations that represents various societal interests are compatible with the Islamic theory of rulership.

During Islamic rule, decentralization of political power was a primary principle of ruling. Regions and nationalities were left alone to rule themselves. In the case of non-Muslims, the Mullah (non-Muslims in the Muslim polity) system asserted that non-Muslims are to be left
alone to live, in accordance with their own religions and laws. The prophet himself allowed the Jewish community, as well as the Christian-Arab tribes to live under their own laws. The Qu’ran says about the Jewish leaders in the Maddina (First Muslim Community) who came to the prophet asking him to rule in their disputes: "But why do they come to thee for decision, when they have (their own) Torah before them? - therein is the (plain) command of Allah". History has shown ultimate religious tolerance and harmony between nationalities and followers of the different religions in the Islamic polity.

The principles of justice (Adl), and Musawa (equality in the implementation of laws and the equal treatment of people) were central principles in Islam. The Qu’ran and the Sunna emphasized the importance of the equal treatment of people. Both asserted that people are equal; thus, they should be treated on equal bases. The Qu’ran (16:90) says: "Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and he forbids all indecent deeds, and evil". "Islam was more than a religious movement. It was also a socioeconomic revolution. Islam, through the holy Qu’ran, strongly protested against unjust social structures and structures of oppression prevalent in Mecca--in particular, and everywhere in the world, in general" (Engineer 1990, 50). The Qu’ran says: "be just: that is next to piety" (Qu’ran 5:8). Islam came as a revolution that protested and
condemned inequalities in the Arab societies. Islam liberated the slaves (Bilal, Yasser's family, Suhib (the Roman), Selmaan (the Persian), treated them equally, and promoted some to Calif status (Mamulk Dynasty).

The independence of the judiciary (Khada) has always been a central matter in the political life of the Islamic state. In many historical cases the authority of the Khadi (Mufti-supreme judicial authority) exceeded that of the executive branch, that is, powers of the political leader. In fact, the Khuda in the Mamluk era, namely Ib'n Taimya, undermined the authority of the political regime when its leaders attempted to violate the principles of law and equality.

Islam encouraged private initiative and encouraged economic activities. Prophet Mohammed himself worked in trade, and was married to a businesswoman, and his closest companions (and later Califs, like Ottoman) were businessmen too. However, the economy of the Islamic state was a mixture of both private ownership and public ownership. Prophet Mohammed says: "the people share three things: water, grass, and fire." In modern terms, people's necessities of energy, water resources, and food should be shared by all. The importance of this minimum requirement is to ensure that the poor class would have access to necessities, provided and protected by the state.

Furthermore, Islam recognized ownership and protected
property of individuals from governmental or unjust seizure by other individuals. The Qu’ran (2:188) says: "Do not devour one another’s wealth by false and illegal means."

Throughout the history of Islam, merchants and businesspeople had an important sociopolitical and spiritual status, given the fact that merchants and businessmen contributed to the spread of Islam in Africa, the Far East, and in Europe.

Islam encourages participation of Muslims in the daily life of their political community. The prophet used to involve men, women, and even young children in the daily life of the community through direct contacts following the five prayers. Prophet Mohammed in a leading incident, that is the first battle with the nonbelievers who expelled him from his homeland in Mecca, asked Muslims to participate in the decision to fight or to withdraw. Thus, an example was set that indicates the necessity of active participation to ensure the popular nature of the decision-making process in all aspects of life. The Qu’ran clearly instructed Muslims to compete in doing good deeds, which would contribute to their worldly and otherworldly life.

The prophet himself used to monitor contests between his companions on matters such as training, education, and promotion of social reform. The Qu’ran and the Sunna instructed Muslims to cooperate, compromise, and bargain. The Qu’ran (5:2) says: "Help ye one another in righteousness
and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour". In another verse, the Qu’ran (16:125) says: "Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious". The history of Islam has shown tremendous flexibility in even modifying religious articles to suit different nations and regions. For instance, Syria and its citizens had been granted an understanding of their habits that exaggerates celebrations to an extreme waste.

Islam respected women and expanded their rights as never before. Prior to Islam, women in Arab societies had no equal treatment, nor did they have the freedom or the will to act independently. Islam treated them equally and held them responsible for their actions spiritually, and thus, worldly actions. Women participated in public discussions and political matters. Mosques were shared by men, women, and children. The Qu’ran (2:228) says: "And women shall have rights similar to those against men in a just manner". In another verse the Qu’ran (33:35) says:

For Muslim men and Women—for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and women who fast for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah’s remembrance for them—has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward.

History has reported that, in a leading case when a woman stood up to Ommar (the second Calif) in the mosque during
public discussions shared by the whole community, she presented a different opinion that was better than Ommar's, who humbly declared publicly that "the woman is right and Ommar is mistaken." Women participated in wars, nursing, and preaching. However, currently we are witnessing certain types of treatment of women in some countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia) that is in clear contradiction with the essence of Islam. Prohibiting women from driving, or obtaining the right to divorce, or education are traditional, tribal, and pre-Islamic and have nothing to do with Islam.

Islam held the individual as responsible for his action, regardless of his gender, but Islam does not preach modern types of extreme individualism that isolate the individual from his familial or communal ties. Accordingly, in spiritual matters and those of responsibility, the individual is responsible for his deeds. But such individual responsibility also has a social and communal meaning that is active social involvement, social solidarity, and support for family and relatives. The Qu'ran (30:44) says: "Those who reject faith will suffer from that rejection: and those who work righteousness will make provision for themselves (in heaven)." In another verse, the Qu'ran (41:46) says: "Whoever works righteousness benefits his own soul; whoever works evil, it is against his own soul".

Islam emphasized the principle of freedom in all
aspects even in religion. The Qu’ran’s verses clearly state the freedom of the individual to believe or not to believe. It says: "There should be no compulsion in religion" (Qu’ran 2:256). In another verse (10:99), the Qu’ran says: "If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed,- all who are on earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe." As far as Islam advocates freedom in religion, it necessarily encompasses all other related aspects of freedom, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, the right to privacy, and all related types of freedom. The second Calif (Ommar) once said to the governor of Egypt, "since when have you enslaved the people, verily they were born free."

In terms of political freedom and resistance to despotism, the Islamic history of pluralism of political thinking, groups, and schools of thought has shown how much emphasis Islam places on the people’s right to live in a free society free from tyranny. The prophet once said, "There is no obedience in sin," and tyranny is the essence of sin in Islam, i.e., the rule of Tassuf (the rule of a tyranny). Islam does not promote obedience to tyranny; on the contrary, it clearly advocates resistance to tyrants. The Qu’ran has condemned oppression and oppressive rulers, describing them as "Mustakbirin (arrogant, drunk with power): and the ruled, or the masses of people as Mustad’fin
(weakened, oppressed). The messenger of God (Mohammed) naturally arise from amongst the weak and fight for their liberation from clutches of the oppressors". The Qu’ran as Engineer (1990, 73-74) put it

Clearly and unambiguously stands with the weak in their struggle against their oppressors. It also laments, even reprimands those who do not come to the rescue of those who are being persecuted. Reprimanding them the Qu’ran (4:75) says: "why should you not fight for the cause of Allah and the weak among men and of the women and the children who are saying: our Lord! bring us forth out of this town of which the people are oppressors! Oh give us from thy presence some protecting friend! Oh give us from thy presence some defender!"

The Qu’ran (22:37-38), guaranteed victory for the oppressed, and the exiled from their homeland unjustly by arrogant power-holders. It says: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;—and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid;—(39). They are those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, (for, no cause) except that they say, "our Lord Is Allah." Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, Synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid his (cause);—for verily Allah is full of strength, exalted in might, (able to enforce his will)."

In terms of the right to revolt, the Qu’ran (4:148) says: "Allah loveth not the shouting of evil words in
public speech, except by one who has been wronged, for Allah is he who heareth and knoweth all things." Thus oppressed people should take the matter of their oppression publicly and defend their rights on individual bases as well as on an organizational level. Individuals', political parties', union's protest are all from Islam until injustice be lifted.

Based on the aforementioned arguments concerning the familiarity of the Arab-Islamic political culture with the norms of liberal democracy, and the reconciliation attempt with modern institutions, I conclude that Islam is a liberal religion and its principles are compatible with modern norms of liberal democracy. However, "If Islamic states appear not to construct their political structures precisely this manner, this is not the fault of Islam and its ideals in much the same way that the limitations and shortcomings which may be found in some democratic states should not be attributed to democracy and its ideals" (Degan 1994,15).
CHAPTER 7

DATA ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I will present the empirical test of the hypotheses provided in Chapter 1. These hypotheses examine the relationship between democracy and several domestic and international factors that influence the state of democracy and the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World. These hypotheses are derived from the theories of development, underdevelopment, and democracy. Several of them have been debated and tested by comparativist scholars, especially in the fields of European and Latin American studies.

The nation-state is used as the unit of analysis. This design is a derivative of the Most Similar System Designs articulated by Przeworski and Teune (1970) and Lijphart (1971). The Most Similar System Designs have the advantage of drawing significant inferences and interpretations of events while distinguishing the outstanding effects, given the shared characteristics of the units of the study. This approach in general solves the problem of the limited cases in system analysis and the relative large number of exogenous variables.
Data Description

In Chapter 1, I described the data sets to be used in this research. First, Vanhanen (1990, 1992) has compiled a data set of a series of comparative studies, to assess the process of democratization in 147 countries. His data set includes information on political participation, competition, and socioeconomic indicators. I use Vanhanen's data and his index of democracy (ID), which ranges from 0-49, as a dependent variable to be explained by a variety of exogenous variables. The exogenous variables deal with both the domestic and external affairs that might influence the state and the process of democratization in the region of study.

The second data set is the Repression and Freedom in the 1980s: A Global Analysis data set. This data has been compiled by Poe and Tate (1993) in a pooled cross-sectional format, including 168 countries spanning from 1980 to 1987.

Third, I used Gastil's Freedom House Data Set to assess the relationship between a nation's record of civil rights and the improvements toward democratic society. Gastil's index of civil rights (Chapter 1) ranges from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free).

The complete data series are based on annual observations of key indicators related to the democratization process and the existence of democratic practice or the lack thereof in twenty-one Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti,
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (North and South until 1990) in the period from 1980 to 1990. These indicators, as employed in different models, include five ratio measurements and four ordinal or dichotomous indices. The following section gives a detailed description of the variables.

The Dependent Variable

Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID), a ratio series, is a measure of the level of democracy (1990, 1992). It is formulated by multiplying the percentage of votes that the largest (majority) party did not receive, by the percentage of voter turnout of the total population and then multiplied by 100. To formulate: Level of democracy = 100 - (Majority party vote %) X Voter turnout % X 100. According to Vanhanen, this formulation accounts for the level of political participation and the competitiveness (public contestation, Dahl 1971) of the political system. Both are important ingredients in the electoral process and represent the essence of democracy (Vanhanen 1990). Critics of measuring only the voter turnout and the minority party percentage votes point out, however, that these measures may not be adequate to reflect the nature of democracy. Though the contents of democracy are much broader (e.g., those found in Booth’s and Seligson’s [1989] works), it is
nonetheless a very helpful measure to conduct a comparative study. In fact, Vanhanen’s

Selection of the two basic political indicators is based on the assumption that in contemporary states the use of political power is constitutionally concentrated in the hands of governmental institutions. On the other hand, in modern constitutional systems, elections have become the standard procedure for selecting persons for institutions wielding political power. This is because in nearly all constitutions the highest state authority is said to be vested in the people, who exercise authority through elections. The people elect the highest power-holders, the members of parliaments, and sometimes also the president. For that reason, the legal competition for power is concentrated in parliamentary or presidential elections, or both (Vanhanen 1990, 18).

The effectiveness and the efficiency of Vanhanen’s democracy index is also defended in his Strategies of Democratization (1992).

In the Arab World, the lack of data at the present time makes Vanhanen’s ID the best measure available for regression analysis despite the problems of missing values, and lack of significant variation in some cases in particular years.

Statistical Description of the Dependent Variable

Democracy as conceptualized and measured by Vanhanen (1990, 1992) is used as a dependent variable. In the Arab World, this phenomenon in its pluralistic-Western standards is more an exception than a rule. It is reflected in the heavy bias toward 0 in the mean, and 0 variance in many countries. According to Vanhanen, this outcome represents the lack of either competitiveness or popular participation
in the political systems. Table 7.1 illustrates Vanhanen's Index of Democracy in the region of study. Among the units, it is obvious that Sudan ranks the highest especially in the years 1986-1987. The table shows that most of the Arab countries have no elections, represented by the dominance of the value of 0. Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, and Syria are the only countries that have values beyond 0 on the index. The level of democracy in the Arab countries ranges from the absence of elections (0) to 11.7 in the years 1986, 1987, and 1988.

Table 7.1: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy

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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Vanhanen's ID starts from 1980 and ends in 1987, as in the Poe-Tate data. In Vanhanen's 1992 study, he lists the extended data to 1990. By the same method of calculation, this table extends the data to 1993. However, to be conservative in regression analysis, only data given by Vanhanen is used, therefore restricting the time span in the analysis from 1980 to 1990.
Table 7.2 shows the degree of democracy as measured by Vanhanen’s ID ranges from 0-11.7 in the region.

Table 7.2: Summary Description of Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<td>Valid Cases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Dev</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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</table>

A more detailed description of each country, without the serial time considerations, is shown in table 7.3. The table illustrates the minimum and the maximum degree of Vanhanen’s ID in each country for the period from 1980-1990. It shows that Lebanon and Sudan rank the highest on the index, while most of the countries have a flat value of 0, which is an indicator of the absence of elections.

Table 7.4 indicates the ID in 13 years. It shows the maximum and the minimum degree of democracy. It ranges from 3.3 in 1992-1993 to 11.7 in the years 1986, 1987, and 1988. The table indicates a decline in the degree of democracy following the military coup in the Sudan in 1989. Since then, there is a gradual reversal to authoritarianism in most of the countries that embarked upon such process. Countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt have witnessed a reversal trend from democracy represented by the decline of degree of democracy in the
Table 7.3: Description of Vanhanen's Index of Democracy in Each Country, 1980-1993

<table>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<th>Maximum</th>
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Table 7.4: Annual Statistical Summary of Index of Democracy, 1980-1993

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.7190</td>
<td>2.1463</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.7550</td>
<td>2.1956</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.3769</td>
<td>0.9311</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.3909</td>
<td>1.0104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to other parts of the world, Table 7.5 shows that the Arab countries rank among the lowest countries of the World on Vanhanen’s ID. They rank lower than the Western European, Latin American, and some African and Asian countries. This fact makes the findings of this study tentative due to lack of variation in the values of the dependent variable. Democracy in the Arab World is in its nascent stages. As the data shows, this nascent movement might develop into a higher stage of democracy, or it might reverse into authoritarianism.

Table 7.5: A sample of Vanhanen ID for a Selected Group of Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ID80</th>
<th>ID82</th>
<th>ID84</th>
<th>ID86</th>
<th>ID88</th>
<th>ID90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Korea</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Independent Variables

The explanatory variables include ratio, interval,
ordinal, and dichotomous measures of pertinent features of
the twenty-one countries for the same period (1980-1993).
Their operationalization and their relations to the concepts
to be studied will be provided in the following sections.
The ratio measures are:

1. Per capita GNP. The per capita GNP figures for the
period 1980-1993 have been collected from Penn World Tables,
1994.

2. Military expenditure as percentages of GNP. The data
have been collected from the National Trade Data Bank, 1994.

3. Per capita economic aid. These data are already
compiled within the 1993 Poe and Tate data. It includes
mainly the United States and international aid to Arab
countries.

4. Per capita U.S. military aid. These data are
constructed by Poe-Tate 1993, to illustrate the U.S.
military aid to the Arab countries.
The ordinal and dichotomous measures are the indices of:

1. Civil society. This is an aggregate index of the
existence of civil society organizations. The construction
of this index of civil society, ranging from 1 to 4, is
determined by the existence of four types of organizations
which are supposed to contribute to democratic
participation: competing political parties, women's
associations, trade unions, and student unions. The
existence of each type of institution is counted as 1, its
absence is counted as 0.

2. Civil rights. This variable is composed by Gastil’s measure of civil rights. Gastil has compiled an index of civil rights ranging from 1-7. The higher the value, the less free is the country.

3. Dependency. This variable is examined by Kick and Snyder index of dependency which is defined in terms of four types of international networks: trade flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges and cojoint treaty membership. Kick-Snyder have classified countries into three groups--core, periphery, and semiperiphery. This variable is reported within the Poe-Tate data set of 1993.

4. Oil Producing Countries. This variable is designed to be a dichotmous measurement of the status of beong an oil producer (values=1). The oil producers are Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE.

The variables included in this study reflect regional economic development, oil production status, and foreign policy. The economic series are indexed by the annual per capita GNP.

Table 7.6 presents GNP/capita for all countries in the Arab World. Table 7.7 shows mainly the minimum ($120), and the maximum ($28,0340) GNP per capita in the Arab World.

Also related to the domestic-economic issue is the military expenditure. This series is compiled as the percentage of the military expenditure of the annual GNP.
Table 7.6: GNP/capita in 1000 U.S. Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2.091</td>
<td>2.176</td>
<td>2.266</td>
<td>2.330</td>
<td>2.428</td>
<td>2.576</td>
<td>2.654</td>
<td>2.482</td>
<td>2.580</td>
<td>2.525</td>
<td>2.350</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>1.840</td>
<td>2.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>1.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2.791</td>
<td>2.361</td>
<td>1.930</td>
<td>1.961</td>
<td>1.837</td>
<td>2.073</td>
<td>2.308</td>
<td>1.818</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.154</td>
<td>1.417</td>
<td>1.680</td>
<td>1.690</td>
<td>1.605</td>
<td>1.557</td>
<td>1.108</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>2.090</td>
<td>2.160</td>
<td>1.290</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>1.120</td>
<td>1.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2.068</td>
<td>2.224</td>
<td>1.971</td>
<td>1.765</td>
<td>1.622</td>
<td>1.515</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.479</td>
<td>1.630</td>
<td>7.200</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>6.912</td>
<td>miss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>1.581</td>
<td>1.680</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>1.652</td>
<td>1.735</td>
<td>1.816</td>
<td>2.115</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>1.326</td>
<td>1.350</td>
<td>1.285</td>
<td>1.258</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>1.121</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>1.280</td>
<td>1.440</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.720</td>
<td>1.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (N)</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (S)</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>miss</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7 shows mainly the minimum ($120), and the maximum ($28.0340) GNP per capita in the Arab World.

Table 7.7: Statistic Summery of GNP/Capita, 1980-1993 (measured by 1000s of 1987 U.S. Dollars)

| Valid Cases | 262 |
| Missing Cases | 32 |
| Mean | 5.1405 |
| Variance | 42.5532 |
| Std Dev | 6.5233 |
| Minimum | .1200 |
| Maximum | 28.0340 |
However, this is not a balanced pool because of the large number of missing values in the earlier years (1980-1983). Foreign aid measures include two series, per capita international economic assistance (mainly U.S.), and per capita United States military aid.

Civil society is an ordinal indicator of some major components correlated with the civility of societies. These institutions include political parties, women's associations, student unions, and labor unions. This index is built upon the major themes provided by the Civil Society Project in the Middle East, as well as other contributions in the field of civil society.

Research Hypotheses

In order to account for the changes in the dependent variable (Vanhanen's Index of Democracy), and to establish association with the independent variables, the following model and related hypotheses will be tested.

\[ Y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + b_5x_5 + b_6x_6 + b_7x_7 + b_8x_8 + \text{Dummy} + e \]

Democratization = a + b_1 GNP/Capita + b_2 Oil Producing Country + b_3 Military Aid + b_4 Economic Aid + b_5 Dependency + b_6 Civil Rights + b_7 Civil Society + b_8 Military Expenditure + Sudan + e

H_1: Economic development has no effect on the emergence of democratic societies in the Arab World.

H_2: Oil producing Arab countries tend to be less democratic than those do not produce oil.
H$_1$: The growth of civil society institutions will contribute to a greater degree of democracy in the Arab countries.

H$_4$: The level of civil rights will positively be correlated with the degree of democracy.

H$_5$: The higher levels of military aid a country receives, the less will be country's degree of democracy.

H$_6$: The more economic aid a country receives, the less likely that country will be democratic.

H$_7$: Higher levels of military expenditure will correlate negatively with democracy.

H$_8$: Dependency measured by Snyder and Kick's index will negatively correlate with democracy.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships.

Figure 7.1: A Model of Democracy in the Arab Countries
Operationalization

H₁. Economic development refers to the per capita GNP. As Vanhanen (1990, 104) put it, "GNP per capita is not the only important indicator of socioeconomic development, but it can be regarded as the most central indicator of socioeconomic development." Furthermore, Vanhanen (1990, 104) stated that "Per capita GNP measures the wealth of nations, but it can also indicate the level of socioeconomic development."

Scholars in the field of comparative politics (Lipset 1959, Coleman 1960, Cutright 1963, Muller 1985) have found a positive correlation between economic development and the level of democracy. In the case of the Arab World, I expect to find that the progress toward democracy has been associated with low rather than high GNP per capita. This would support my conviction that transition to democracy in the Arab World is associated with economic crises rather than economic development.

H₂. In an effort to test the relationship between the political economy of oil and the process of transition to democracy, I have collected data to control the effects of oil production on the politics in the oil producing countries.

H₃. I mean by civil society institutions the emergence of political parties, women's associations, student unions, and labor unions. This index is based on the Civil Society
Project in the Middle East (1994). Thus, I will construct an index ranging from 1-4. Countries are ranked on the index according to the number of institutions they have established out of a possible four.

H_1: By dependency, I mean Arab reliance on outside the world, as well as the hegemony of the World Capitalist System in the region. I will test the presence of dependency and its impact on democracy by using the Kick-Snyder Index of Dependency and world system status. Their index was constructed from four variables: trade flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges, and conjoint treaty memberships (Arat 1991, 97).

H_2: The level of military expenditure measures the impact of military expenditures as a percentage of the GNP. As I will explain shortly in the findings, high rates of military expenditures promote the emergence of autocratic rule. They create a militaristic society that devotes national resources for the sake of militarism, strength, aggression, instability, and war.

H_6 and H_7: Economic and military aid are drawn from the Poe-Tate data set. I will test the relationship between democracy and aid in order to examine the nature of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab World, and the role of democracy as a principle guiding its foreign policy.

H_8: The likelihood for democracy to emerge is positively correlated with the level of civil rights in a particular
country at a particular time. Civil rights are measured by Gastil's Civil Rights Index. The index provides a score corresponding to the level of civil rights each country permits.

Model Specification

According to the hypotheses, the regression analysis is to falsify the relations between democratic practices and the domestic economic conditions (GNP, and oil revenue), foreign influence (U.S. military aid and economic aid, dependency), domestic sociopolitical conditions (civil rights, civil society, and military expenditure/GNP). that is:

Democratization = a + b\text{GNP/Capita} + b\text{Oil Producing Country} + b\text{Military Aid} + b\text{Economic Aid} + b\text{Dependency} + b\text{Civil Rights} + b\text{Civil Society} + b\text{Military Expenditure} + Sudan + e, where n is the number of cross sections and t is the number of time points.

Handling Heteroscedasticity and the Unit Effect

Data with heteroscedasticity and autoregression can be treated with the weighted least square combined with the AR(1) (autoregressive) model. In such a case, the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), where the time-serial correlation and unit heteroscedasticity are ignored in the estimation, is not justified. To determine whether the data suffer from this particular variance irregularity, one
method is to run the regression with the OLS method and the diagnose the residuals. The assumption of data homoscedasticity is falsified by the following plot of residuals of the equation, with all the variables of interest included, against the dependent variable.

**Figure 7.2: Residual Plot**

To overcome these problems, several methods have been developed as appropriate responses. One is the time-serial Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model, also known as the GLS-ARMA model: Like the normal time-series case, it treats the pooled estimation problem by estimation and then specifying the time dependence process in the residuals. It also incorporates a conventional approach to (between-unit) heteroscedasticity by a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) procedure.
With the heteroscedasticity properly corrected, another statistical property concerned in this study is the cross-sectional unit effect that reveals the political culture of the 21 countries. This is assumed, first of all, for Vanhanen's data collection method. For each cross-sectional unit at a particular time, when there is no worthwhile election to be reported, Vanhanen's ID carries forward the value of the previous election. Second, many countries in the region had no elections for a number of years. Even for the ones that held elections, such as Lebanon, according to Vanhanen, they are marked by irregularity. However, the ID carries the value of the last successful election in the absence of a coup. Some contributing factors of the irregularity of ID are the lack of stable democracy, such as in Sudan. This country had a successful election in 1986; thus, until overthrown by the military, it carries two years of high (highest) ID value. To assume this temporary phenomenon as a stable feature is inaccurate in understanding the context of the regime changes. As demonstrated in the following passages, some unit dummies are required to capture these effects. Microcrunch is used to implement the GLS-ARMA model.

The Regression Results

Table 7.8 presents the regression results of the model. Table 7.9 shows the diagnostic information by cross-section, while Table 7.10 shows the diagnostic information by time.
Table 7.8: Regression Analysis of the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.1188</td>
<td>(13.0923)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>(1.5917)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil producing country</td>
<td>-0.3206</td>
<td>(-3.1444)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>(1.8103) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>(0.3313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>-0.1353</td>
<td>(-6.5250)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>-0.4254</td>
<td>(-11.2982)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Index</td>
<td>0.0270</td>
<td>(0.8905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>-0.0114</td>
<td>(-4.1724)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.8498</td>
<td>(1.1523)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 11 (years) × 21 (countries) = 231
R-Square                        | 0.379
Adjusted R-Square               | 0.354
* p<.05, one tail
**P<.00, one tail

The above pooled cross-sectional time series regression model, based on the GLS-ARMA (AR1) process, illustrates statistically significant findings of the following variables: the status of an oil producing country, civil rights, dependency, military expenditure and military aid.

The residuals (Table 7.10) demonstrate a tendency of a higher variance ratio over time. This is a significant finding. It confirms the hypothesis that there is a gradual democratization in the region starting from 1986. However, it also indicates a reversal trend toward authoritarianism represented by the decline of the values of the residuals in 1989 and 1990, following the military coup in the Sudan.
### Table 7.9: GLS Diagnostic Information by Cross-Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Residual Mean</th>
<th>Residual Var.</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.0286</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.6473</td>
<td>4.517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.4125</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.3736</td>
<td>11.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (N)</td>
<td>0.2247</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.1938</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.1625</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.0507</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.0180</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>-0.0339</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>-0.0546</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>-0.0769</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>-0.1909</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>-0.2745</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-0.3430</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-0.4570</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (S)</td>
<td>-0.5333</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-0.6424</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>-2.4250</td>
<td>2.306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.10: GLS Diagnostic Information by Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Residual Mean</th>
<th>Residual Var.</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-0.0526</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-0.1856</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-0.1779</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-0.2198</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-0.1153</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-0.1241</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.4408</td>
<td>1.836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.4296</td>
<td>1.849</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>3.301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.1243</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.0320</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cross-sectional residual mean (Table 7.9) demonstrates a variance of the nations in comparison. It indicates that the most democratic is Morocco (1.0286) and the least is Djibouti (-2.4250). The variance ratios are evenly distributed with a range except for the case of Sudan that had an ID value of 11.2 (the highest) from 1986 to 1989. The statistically abnormal variation causes the largest variance ratio (11.024) in the cross-section, even after the specification of a dummy to correct this effect.

Findings

The findings of this study are classified into two types: those variables that deal with domestic politics (e.g., the GNP per capita, civil rights, civil society institutions, military expenditures, and the political economy of oil). The variables that deal with the international environment include economic aid, military aid, and dependency.

Domestic Politics, Economic Development and Democratization in the Arab World

A mainstream theory of comparative politics asserted that a certain level of economic development is necessary for the evolution of a democratic political system (Huntington, Lipset). In this connection, poverty has been deemed as the principal obstacle to democratic development. Generally speaking, comparativists measure economic development by GNP per capita. Vanhanen (1990, 111-112)
writes that GNP per capita is not the only indicator of socioeconomic development, but it can be regarded as the most central indicator. However, it has also been identified as a poor indicator of democratization.

It does not take into account the differences in the distribution of wealth and other resources used as sources of power. The most important economic power resources are highly concentrated in the hands of the ruling group in socialist countries and in the Middle East oil countries. The concentration of power resources has prevented the emergence of democracy in these countries, despite their high level of GNP per capita (Vanhanen 1990, 111-112).

Lipset (1959, 75) stated that "perhaps the most common generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." Lipset found a positive correlation between indicators of economic development, wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education. He computed average means of these indicators and found that low per capita wealth precipitates discontent, which provides the social basis for political extremism. According to Vanhanen (1990, 41), this thesis of Lipset "has been the most extensively tested hypothesis on the conditions of democratic order." Needler (1968), Cutright (1963), Dahl (1971, 1990), Barsh (1992, 124), and Merriam and Flueelrn (1992) all have found a positive effect of economic development measured by GNP/per capita on democracy.
In the case of the Arab World, some Arab countries have made significant progress in the material aspect of modernization and economic development measured by GNP (Table 7.6), but political development has always lagged far behind. The improvements in GNP were associated with the increase of oil prices, which necessarily implies a lack of real development and diversification of the economy. Agriculture and industry remained underdeveloped in comparison with the huge amounts of wealth that fueled the Arab systems from oil.

In terms of effect of economic development on ID, has been found that GNP has no statistically significant effect (t ratio being 1.5917) on democracy measured by Vanhanen's ID. This result is in contrast with the mainstream literature, but consistent with my expectation that economic development would be associated with antidemocratic regime-types in the Arab World. I have mentioned before—in various parts of this research—that the quest for democratization in the region has been associated with economic crises rather than the economic boom. In fact, the economic boom which led to improvements in GNP per capita in the Arab World for the period 1973-1985, had been associated with massive human rights violations, lack of political accommodation or participation, and competition. There has been an absence of elections in most Arab countries, no political parties, civil society institutions were weak, and
there were no parliaments or national assemblies. However, economic crises have compelled the ruling elite in the Arab World to ease some of the pressures by accepting some kind of elections and pluralism. Thus, the findings of this study confirm the theoretical contribution of area specialists (Brand 1995, Tessler 1995, Hudson 1995, Ibrahim 1993), that associates democratization with economic crises.

The Political Economy of Oil and Democracy in the Arab World

The large amounts of wealth generated from oil for the last three decades also have generated a debate in the field of Middle East Studies and the Arab World concerning the impact of the political economy of oil on political development. Generally speaking, area specialists such as Korany (1994), Waterbury (1994), Hudson (1994, 1995), Tessler (1995), Brand (1995), and others have asserted that oil revenues have not contributed to democratization. On the contrary, they have increased the power of the authoritarian state at the expense of potential emerging civil society institutions. In the Arab World, states have used large portions of oil wealth for the expansion of bureaucracy, military expenditures, and the increase of the power of the secret police. The positive improvements toward democratization that occurred in the Arab World have been associated with the economic crises: the debt crisis and the decline of the oil wealth in the past decade. The period 1973-1985, the "Oil Boom" period, had been associated
with the growth of state power, human rights violations, and lack of political accommodation.

The thesis of the incompatibility of oil’s political economy with the modern values of liberal democracy has been termed in the literature as the "rentier" state theory. Accordingly, scholars within this line of thinking (Korany, Tessler, Norton, Hudson) have dismissed the political cultural thesis (Huntington 1991, 1993) of the incompatibility with democracy and focused more on the dynamics of oil relations on the distribution of power relations in the Arab World. The rentier state

Rests on the hypothesis that external sources of income resulting from the export of oil, in other words, oil revenue, is in fact a form of rent. Income is raised by the state, not through the more traditional route of domestic taxation and economic strategy, which are often seen to be associated with popular demands for political reform and legitimacy, but externally through the commodity of oil. In a sense, the economic development argument is turned on its head because although many Middle Eastern states are vastly wealthy in terms of gross national product which might present a prima facie case for political development, the nature of the wealth is not the result of industrialization and societal differentiation, factors once seen as necessary to political change, but simply the result of enormous oil revenues. As Luciani states: "the need to raise revenue is the basic reason why the state has an interest in the prosperity and economic well-being of its country. Without such an interest, it is inevitable that rentier states will display little tendency to evolve towards democratic institutions (Deegan 1994, 8)."

The prospects of democratization, as Waterbury (1994, 7) put it, currently are encouraging due to the decline in oil prices which should eventually weaken state’s authority.

In this study, I have attempted to examine the
relationship between the political economy of oil and democratization in the Arab World through two ways. The finding supports the hypothesis that the status of being an oil producing country is not favorable ($b=-0.3206$ at $p<.00$) to democracy in general in the Arab World.

The findings of this research that yielded a negative correlation between the political economy of oil and democracy confirm the theoretical contributions of the area specialists. Hudson, Korany, Tessler, Ibrahim, and Anderson hypothesized that the political economy of oil relations has contributed to authoritarianism rather than to democracy.

Civil Society Institutions

The success of transition and maintenance of democracy are dependent on state-society relations, and the existence of intermediating institutions between the state and the society. However, if the state is a hegemonic-dominant force (statism) it will impede the emergence of a democratic society. The state’s authority is usually exercised in an abusive manner, due to the lack of intermediating institutions between the state and the normal citizen. In the absence of such institutions, the state deals directly with citizens and inflicts penalties or sanctions on an individual and communal basis. This nature of treatment tends to promote tyranny. On the other hand, the existence of civil society institutions such as labor unions, women’s associations, youth associations, student unions, political
clubs, chambers of commerce, and political parties tend to prevent the emergence of tyrannical rule by preventing the state from dealing directly with the individual.

Arat (1991, 23) indicted that "the dominance of these central and highly centralized state institutions has precluded the development of strong and autonomous interest groups, village associations and political parties." In a similar vein, Elshtain (1995, 6) stressed the importance of these "mediating institutions" that lie between the individual and the government. Their importance is to sustain and support civic institutions. Touraine (1991, 261) deemed that citizens' subjugation to the public sphere as a primary impediment to political freedom and the establishment of a free society.

In this study, I have found the civil society index has yielded an insignificant relationship (t=0.8905) between the two variables. This finding refutes an emerging trend in the Arab World: the Civil Society Project hypothesized that the emerging civil society institutions will further the cause of democracy and contribute to full democratization in the Arab World. However, a counter trend has also emerged recently, led by Hudson (1995), that asserted that civil society institutions have not shown significant contributions to democratization in the Arab World. This enhances the thesis that current improvements are elusive and have not affected directly the hegemonic nature of the
state in the Arab World. The Arab state remains the final arbiter in societal matters, not civil society institutions.

This is not however, to dismiss entirely the future prospects of the role of the civil-society institutions. Thus, what explains the weakness of the civil society institutions in the Arab World is the hegemonic role of the state in the Arab World. This result makes it necessary for the state to refrain from intervention in the civil society institutions as well as the necessity of the civil society institutions themselves to articulate their independence for the sake of building democratic societies in the Arab World.

Civil Rights and Democracy in the Arab World

The expansions of freedoms (Gastil 1989, 1991)—from terror, from arbitrary imprisonment, freedom for religious institutions, and freedom of religion, freedom of the press, assembly, of political organizations, labor unions, peasant associations, women’s organizations, the rule of law, curbing the role of security agencies, respect for individual freedom of free enterprise and economic activity, and finally full recognition of opposition through political accommodation—all have been found as necessary conditions for the improvement toward a democratic society and contributing to democracy in the Arab World. These factors represent the essence of political development defined within the dimension of a regime’s response to societal demand for freedom and political accommodation.
Civil rights measured by Gastil's-Freedom House Index (a reverted indicator, i.e., the higher number denoting a less free society) (Gastil 1988, 1989, 1991) has revealed a negative relation \( b = -0.4254 \) at \( p < .00 \) with democracy. This finding implies that the more regimes recognize freedoms and civil rights, the more the society would make progress toward democracy. Furthermore, these findings confirm the importance of the politics of accommodation and the expansion of freedoms as necessary conditions for the emergence of democratic societies.

Military, Militarism, Conflict, and Democracy

The role of the military in political development and economic development has always been a controversial issue in comparative politics. Two schools of thought have been identified by Bill (1969, 41-24). The first school considers the military in the developing world as the central pillar buttressing the status quo. The army is viewed as a conserving force that steadfastly opposed any attempt to modernize to introduce significant change. The second school of thought views the military in less-developed areas as the champion of change. This school of thought portrayed the military as a dynamic force of change.

In the Arab World, the military is the central player in politics. The military either rules directly (as in the cases of Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Algeria), or rules through a civilian military leader (such as in Yemen, Syria,
Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia), or rules in alliance with the monarchic ruling elite, (such as in the cases of the Gulf monarchies, Jordan and Morocco). In some countries, the military establishment is an independent entity, as a form of a state (Iraq, Syria, Algeria) within a state. The military has its own housing complexes, its schools, universities, hospitals, and recruits from its own academies and schools. Its budget exceeds that designated for the rest of the country, and the efforts of national development.

The role of the military in the process of democratization could be tackled from different points. First, one may investigate whether the military has contributed to economic development in the Arab World. This question requires evaluation of military rule’s economic performance and its records. Given the difficulty in doing so, the international debts of military regimes are an important indictor in this regard. The militarily ruled countries are among the most indebted nations on earth. Iraq’s debts exceed $200 billion, Egypt $32 billion, Algeria $26 billion and Sudan $17 billion. Furthermore, the military rule in the Arab World is responsible for political backwardness. The military is responsible for the destruction of the emergent political pluralism in the 1950s. In countries like Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere, the military dismantled political parties, exiled their leaders,
and executed some. The military has restricted freedoms and created a security police society where the fear of the secret agent and the soldier is an image in every citizen's mind.

An important issue related to development is military expenditures, and the militarization of the civilian life in Arab countries. Arab countries rank among the highest spending countries worldwide in terms of purchasing military hardware (Bill and Springborg 1994). These huge amounts of financial resources, as Table 7.11 shows, are devoted to the military rather than to economic development. The military has transferred the "lives" of some Arab countries such as Libya, Iraq, and Syria into an arena of military operations where every single child, teenager, female, or male participates in military activities. Such exaggeration of the security dilemma is associated with extreme restrictions of freedoms.

Table 7.11: A Sample of Military Expenditures of some Arab Countries as Percentages of their GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In testing the relationship between militarism and democracy, I have found the following results: the level of military expenditure as a percentage of GNP is negatively related \((b=-0.0114 \text{ at } p<.00)\) to democracy.

This finding supports my hypothesis, as well as some of the theoretical contributions in the field. Consequently, the militarization of civilian life, military expenditures, and the exclusionary type of military (Remmer 1994) and its tyrannical rule are primary impediments to democracy in the Arab World. There is an urgent need for the military’s withdrawal from politics. Also, there is a need for the professionalization of the military, and the creation of a clear line between the military and politics. Furthermore, the military’s establishment has to be opened up to the society, and there is an urgent need for decreasing its budgets and devoting such resources to literacy, health care, social development, and economic development.

The International Environment and the Promotion of Democracy

The importance of the international environment in promoting democracy has always been a controversial aspect of the debate concerning prospects of democracy and foreign policy. Scholars such as Huntington (1984, 1991, 1993), Diamond (1992), O’Donnell et al. (1986), Lowenthal (1989), and others have raised numerous questions addressing the role of the international environment in the process of transition to democracy. Bahgat (1994, 39) writes that the
term global setting or external environment includes a variety of international actors such as foreign states, international organizations (e.g., the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank), nonprofit organizations (e.g., Amnesty International and Middle East Watch), intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Community [EC] and the international economic system. In this study, economic aid has statistical significant effect on democracy (t-ratio 0.3313). In terms of the impact of military aid on the ID, given the negligible size of the estimated parameter (0.0005) with a mean of (4.334), and a negligible average impact of (0.0022), I conclude that military aid has no significant impact on the ID.

These findings illustrate the nature of the U.S. foreign policy in the Arab World given the fact that, the U.S. is a primary provider of assistance to some Arab countries. However, the role of the United States in promoting democracy has been a major issue in foreign policy, namely concerning the U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and the Middle East. Scholars have reached various conclusions ranging from weak support to democracies, to an active support of the military authoritarian forces, and contributing to the collapse of democracies. The question remains whether the United States has made an effort to promote democracy, and whether it is in the interest of the United States to promote such values in the Arab World.
"Most analysts have concluded that, at best, there is no statistical relationship between human rights behavior and the amount of aid received and, at worst, that there is a significant negative relationship; that is, the more abusive a regime, the more aid received" (Chomsky 1978, Schoultz 1981; Falk 1981; Stohl, Carlton, and Johnson 1984; Carlton and Stohl 1985, 1986). "Meanwhile, others such as Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) in their study of 30 Latin American countries, and Poe in his studies of the Carter and Reagan administrations' aid policies, (1992, 1993) have found human rights represents an important variable in the decision of aid allocation.

In the case of the Arab World, it has almost been established that the United States can make no claim to a single case where it has supported democracy. Perry (1992, 6) asserted that "the post-World War (II) period witnessed Western steadfastness against the development of liberal democracy in the Arab world." Indeed, Arabs were serious in constructing an open, liberal, and participatory society. Such efforts were aborted by the Western powers namely, Britain, France, and the United States. Fuller and Green, and Kodami-Darwish (1994, 6-7) argued that "the U.S. had contradictory interests in the Middle East and that concern to sustain the peace might lead the United States to reinforce authoritarian states against the will of the people". Others, such as Arat (1991, 73), concluded that
"in sum, European or American, the Western foreign influence generally has been unfavorable to the advancement of democracy in developing countries." The U.S. commitment to democracy, as Whitehead (in O'Donnel 1986, 24) put it, "will be viewed by all concerned as a superficial commitment." Consequently, scholars have concluded that the absence of American support for democratization in the Arab World, as well as the absence of the principle of democracy in guiding U.S. foreign policy.

This conclusion supports the theoretical findings of the area specialists and confirms the assumptions that U.S. foreign policy in the Arab World has not been guided by the principle of promoting democracy. On the contrary, U.S. policy for the past five decades has shown systemic opposition to democracy, as well as unlimited support to authoritarianism and despotic monarchies. In defense, its national interests allegedly would be hindered by the triumph of democracy in the region.

The Political Economy of the World Capitalist System and Democracy

One of the primary features of modern world politics is the complex interdependence between nations, to the extent that any change in any part of the world would affect others in an equivalent magnitude. The essence of mainstream international relations theory (pluralism, dependency, and the international political economy) is the growth of
interdependence between nations. Accordingly, dependency deemed that the instruments of the international political economy engineered the ecopolitical underdevelopment, exploitation, and backwardness of the Third World.

Dependentistas (A. G. Frank, Peter Evans, Galtung, Wallerstein and O'Donnell) hold international domination as responsible for the emergence, existence, and maintenance of authoritarianism in the Third World, especially in Latin America. Similarly, dependentistas, nationalists, and Islamists in the Arab World (e.g., Samir Amin, Hanafi, Ganouchi, Turabi) deemed foreign hegemony in the Arab World as responsible for Arab political dependence and economic backwardness.

Arat (1991, 96) writes that "dependency has been identified as an important structural factor that prevents both development and democracy." Scholars such as Snyder and Kick have attempted to measure "the dependency level of countries by their world system status", which is operationally defined "according to four types of international networks: trade flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges and conjoint treaty memberships" (Arat 1991, 97). They have classified nations into core, periphery, and semi-periphery, and found that political development and democracy correlated negatively with high dependence rates. The reasoning behind these assumptions is that the capitalist system maintains
exploitation and an extractive process, that draw resources from the periphery to the center and condemning the periphery to a state of underdevelopment or distorted development (Bath and Dilmus 1976, 5).

I have tested the relationship between dependency and democratization in the Arab World by using Snyder-Kick’s index of dependency. A statistically significant finding is reported that dependency is negatively (b=-0.1353 at p<.00) related to democracy. This finding is consistent with the dependency-world system thesis, which hypothesized that dependency is correlated with authoritarianism and that the creation of despotic-clientele regimes guards the interests of the ruling elite and those of the capitalist systems. Furthermore, these findings are also consistent with those theoretical contributions of the area specialists.

Summary and Conclusion

In the past decade, there is a tendency toward democratization and a reversal to authoritarianism in the regimes that embarked upon a process of transition to democracy in earlier years. The time-variance (Table 7.10) indicates that 1986, 1987, and 1988 were the most democratic years, mainly due to the high turnout in a particular country (Sudan). However, as the table also shows, there is a reversal in the process of democratization in the region (1989 and 1990). The military coups in Sudan (1989) and Algeria (1991) affected directly the level of democracy in
the region. Indeed, area specialists have detected a serious reversal trend in the most ambitious cases of transition to democracy, namely in Jordan.
CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has sought to fulfill certain objectives. First, I attempted to account for the primary reasons for the nascent process of transition to democracy in the Arab World. As hypothesized and confirmed by the data analysis in this study, the beginning process of transition to democracy in the Arab World has been triggered by economic crisis rather than economic development. This conclusion differs one of the assumptions of the mainstream comparativists who hypothesized that a certain level of economic development (medium) is necessary for the evolution of a democratic system of government. Such level was measured by the improvements in the GNP per capita. In general, the Arab World has reached such status in the mid-1970s; however, there had been no noticeable liberalization. On the contrary, the economic boom in the Arab World was associated with military coups, authoritarianism, hegemonic monarch, and absolute rule of the security police (Mukhabrat) states. Furthermore, human rights violations, restrictions of freedoms of the press, thinking, travel, and assembly were severely restricted alongside of the economic boom. The oil boom enhanced the role of the state at the
expense of society, creating a powerful state that extended its authority in some countries like Saudi Arabia and Libya to the desert side. The oil-ruling elite gained financial resources that enabled them to purchase the latest technology of warfare, as well as to train its security apparatus in its quest to contain the opposition.

The Arab World, for the past three decades, has been classified as non-free World, except one country--Lebanon. However, the decline of oil revenues left tremendous impacts on both oil-producing and non-oil producing countries. As the data shows, high GNP per capita was associated with the oil boom, which itself was associated with lack of political development measured by human rights violations, wars, assassinations, and overall societal instability. Area specialists in the field of the Arab World and the Middle East studies have recognized the importance of the economic crises in influencing Arab politics. For instance, Brand (1995, 13) concluded that the collapse of the oil prices has deprived the "rentier" state from the means of absolute control. Such conclusion implies that the only means for extracting support of their people is through expanding the bases of political participation.

The relative transition to democracy has also been motivated by regimes' need for political survival. Ibrahim (1993, Hudson (1995), Korany (1994), and others have indicated that coercive measures in the Arab World have been
stretched to the limits of diminishing returns. Repression has led to national catastrophes ranging from territorial disintegration, as in the case of Iraq, to civil wars in Somalia, to guerilla warfare as in Algeria and Egypt. According to some area specialists (Ibrahim 1993, 302) a regime's strategies of survival through symbolic power-sharing offers the best hope for transition from autocratic to democratic rule with a minimum of instability and bloodshed.

Another factor that contributed to the relative transition to democracy in the Arab World through a wave of elections was the Gulf War. The war offered the Arab people an unprecedented opportunity to express themselves relatively free from governmental repression. It has led to a process of popular mobilization of all political forces, which articulated an agenda sought to rally Arabs against Western allies, as well as their clients in the region. The war has also contributed to overcoming the fear of regime repression. This triumph over self and group fear from the government was facilitated by societal opposition to the destruction of Iraq. Thus, for the first time since the wars of independence, Arab masses had the opportunity to oppose their regime's participation in the western coalition (Morocco, Egypt), as well as to praise their regime's opposition to the coalition as in the cases of Jordan, Yemen, and Sudan.
Empirical Contributions

In Chapter 7, I have presented the empirical findings of this study. The GNP per capita, and the civil society have insignificant effect on democracy in the region. The political economy of oil, military expenditures, the U.S. eco-military aid, and dependency have a negative effect on democracy. However, it has been found that civil rights, as measured by Gastil's index, have a positive effect on democracy in the Arab World. Furthermore, the relatively low $R^2$ indicates that there is still a large portion of variance unexplained. Such conclusion makes the findings of this study tentative due to the lack of significant variation in the index of democracy (the dependent variable). In Chapter 7, I have indicated that the dominance of the 0 value on the ID illustrates the absence of political participation and political competition in the Arab World. This problem has made the Arab countries rank the lowest on the index.

Contributions of this Study Toward Democratization

One of the main contributions of this study was to locate or incorporate the Arab World within the global trend toward democratization and liberalism. As this study has shown, regardless of regime-type or level of economic development, all Arab regimes have attempted to present
themselves to their peoples and to the world as democratic regimes. Country profiles have shown a trend toward political pluralism (Ta‘adudia); elections; recognition of political parties, clubs, women’s organizations, student unions, chambers of commerce, and labor unions; and a trend toward accommodation. Furthermore, the analysis of the residuals in Chapter 7, shows a trend of democratization in the Arab World. Table 7.10 illustrates that there has been a modest trend toward democracy in the region since 1986. However, there has also been a reversal trend toward authoritarianism in 1989, after the military coups in Sudan and Algeria.

Thus, excluding the Arab World on cultural-judgmental grounds, as suggested by the leading scholars of the mainstream school of democracy, is not a scientific judgment and lacks empirical support.

Political Culture and Democracy

A second objective of this study was to assess the familiarity of the Arab-Islamic political culture with the norms of liberal democracy. Islam has provided Arabs with a political system, which encompasses a theory of rulership based on what we consider in the modern world as a liberal principle. These principles are: principle of freedom (Huria), social justice (Adl), rights (huquq), consultation (shura), parliaments (Majlis-al Shura, Dewan), and equality (Musawa). Furthermore, Islam has provided the principle of
Al-Masaleh al-Dunyawia and Massaleh al-Ummah (what is necessary for the nation, and public necessities) which gives the Ummah freedom and full independence to manage its worldly affairs, including the establishment of a political regime, and a type of government based on popular demand. These principles necessarily advocate the interests of the Ummah as supreme.

Islam recognizes as well as promotes the principles of diversity, compromise, cooperation, free enterprise, parliamentarism, pluralism, decentralization of power, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of traveling. Finally, Islam promoted the values of societal equality, separation of powers, participation, competition, and women's rights.

Democracy from an Arab perspective

A third objective of this study was to examine the meaning of democracy in the Arab World, i.e., whether there is democracy by Western standards or not. I have found that what is currently occurring in the Arab World is a process of nascent movement toward democracy. To be more precise, there is a process of Ta‘adudia (pluralism) and liberalism, understood as a process of openness of political regimes, for more participation and power-sharing through the establishment of Parliaments, consultative councils, and civil society institutions such as political parties, trade unions, women's associations, and chambers of commerce.
Pluralism (Ta‘adudia) is a process, not a state of things. It might take decades until it develops to a higher stage of full liberal democracy or it might revert to authoritarianism. In being of such incremental nature, the region resembles Latin America, where the efforts of democratization were initiated in some countries in the mid-nineteenth century, but the process is still ongoing. Thus, in the Arab World there is no full democracy understood in terms of its Western meaning of full political participation, political competition, interest groups, or separation of powers. What exists is a pluralist process that might develop into an advanced stage of democracy, or it might turn back toward authoritarianism.

As was stated earlier, pluralism (Ta‘adudia) in the Arab World has been brought about by tactics of survival from above, and in some cases societal struggle from below. It is true that "street politics" did exercise some pressure on the ruling elite and compelled them to give manageable concessions, but the final say has always been in the hands of the ruling elites not Arab masses. The willingness of the ruling elite, to give tactical concessions, identified as limited change, was motivated by survival strategies that sought to abort the real popular quest for real democracy, and to extend the power of the ruling authoritarian elites in the region.

Such survival tactics have become the norm, not the
exception in the Arab World. These tactics have been used in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Syria in order to contain the opposition, either with military means or tactical concessions that seek to dismantle the organizations and the societal support for opposition, and their quest for real democracy. Regimes in Tunisia, Algeria, and Jordan employed such tactics to gain time to contain opposition. In Algeria, when the ruling elite of the military establishment saw that even tactics of survival and containment threaten its existence through their loss of power, as well as its failure to abort societal support for the opposition, the military took the matter into its own hands and enhanced its grip on power. The military jailed the elected parliament members, and the elected leader of the opposition who was expected to be inaugurated as a president. In Tunisia, the regime compromised with the opposition during the period of the peaceful coup, until it regained its momentum. Then it pursued a strategy that sought to dismantle the opposition, jailing them, and exiling the rest. Thus, contrary to the optimistic tendency advocated by Ibrahim (1993), and the Civil Society Project (Norton, Kazemi, Schwedler, and others 1994) who see the survival tactics as instruments to further the transition to a full democratic society, I believe that such measures under the condition of lack of elite-accommodation would only benefit the ruling elite in its
quest to gain time to contain the democratic forces and exterminate them.

Democratization in the Arab World

A fourth objective of this study is to examine the improvements that Arab countries have made toward democracy. First—as I have attempted to show through regime classifications—the current Arab World is not a monolithic World as it used to be decades ago. There is a great diversity among the Arab countries in both economic development and political development, which makes it difficult to generalize accurately. Economically, the Arab World is divided into three categories: the poor Arab countries, the middle income countries, and the high income countries. Politically, the Arab World is divided among at least five categories: traditional monarchies, modernizing monarchies, personal dictatorships, modernizing-authoritarian republics, and liberal democratic republics.

In terms of the prospects for democratization in the monarchic regimes, which have been classified into modernizing and traditional it has been found that modernizing monarchies (Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait) are making progress toward transition to democracy. The modernizing monarchies have made progress in terms of improving their records of human rights, recognizing political pluralism through licensing political parties (Jordan, Morocco) and political clubs (Kuwait--Diwania),
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and their promotion of social peace. These steps are crucial for the efforts of consolidating their emerging democracies, through the establishment of constitutional monarchies similar to those of the European style of rulership (Britain, Norway, and Sweden). However, despite such an optimistic conclusion, one cannot rule out the possibility that these regimes may revert to authoritarianism. In the case of Jordan, some scholars who were optimistic concerning Jordan's efforts at democratization such as Hudson (1995), have found that there is a reversal trend toward restricting freedoms. I agree with Hudson (1995), in the sense that the process of consolidation of democracy needs a genuine leadership that is willing to compromise and accommodate the emerging political interests in the political game. So far, what is happening is mere survival tactics which are not expected to further the cause of democracy. "Survivalism" is a regime tactic of containment of the opposition and time-gaining until circumstances become suitable for regime regrouping and resumption of authoritarianism.

In terms of the traditional "Oil Monarchies," I agree with scholars such as Gause (1994), who found no inherent cultural, religious, or tribal impediments to the process of liberalization in the Gulf. The people of these countries are willing to sacrifice for the sake of liberalism as well as to participate actively in mobilization efforts. The
gains of education in the past four decades have produced an able cadre of citizens to articulate societal concerns beyond personal interests.

Among traditional societies, the ruling monarch of Oman has shown genuine willingness to liberalize his regime more than Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Qatar. In these societies, there is a need for regime accommodation, perceiving the opposition as loyal opposition, and less reliance on external sources of legitimacy, which has shown its inability to secure elite survival when opposed by societal mobilization as in the case of Iran. Thus, the Gulf monarchies need to expand the bases of their rule, if not for the sake of building a liberal democratic society, at least for the sake of their survival. Otherwise, I would predict the emerging class of well-educated citizens, highly mobilized intelligentsia, a professional military, sectarian division, and the efforts of a non contained class of Ulama (Clergy), would topple the Gulf regimes in a similar fashion to the Iranian model.

In terms of republican regimes, which I have classified into personal dictatorships, disintegrating republics, modernizing republics, and a liberal democratic republic, there is also some progress toward democratization. Personalists-rulers in the region (Syria, Iraq, and Libya) govern dictatorially, supported by a single political organization and the military. However, all dictators in
the region claim the popular will is behind their regimes. All claim the symbolic elections legitimize their rule, and all had held elections since 1989.

The modernizing authoritarian regimes, which include Egypt, Tunisia, and Mauritania have their origins in the military. These regimes are characterized by more openness, holding periodic elections, although they still also are characterized by high rates of human rights violations and restrictions on freedom. But these countries are expected to develop into more modern democratic societies should the political will and economic development be present.

In terms of the disintegrating republics (Somalia, Algeria) their major traits are civil wars and instability. Lebanon is the only country that can be classified as a liberal democratic country. Lebanon's modern history shows that, among the Arab countries, Lebanon is the only country that has peaceful power succession. Although the country went into civil war it is recovering quickly, which encourages me to say that soon Lebanon may be able to resume its role as a model in the Arab World.

Finally, despite regime diversity, it has been found that the Arab Countries are beginning to make progress toward democracy. Table 7.10 demonstrates a modest tendency toward transition to democracy especially in 1986, 1987, and 1988. However, it also shows a reversal toward authoritarianism represented by the decline of the values of
the residuals in 1989 following the military coup in the Sudan and Algeria in 1991.

Toward a Model of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in the Arab World

A fifth objective of this study was to provide a procedural model for the transition and consolidation of democracy in the Arab World. These procedural steps are concerned with the question of how to organize the nascent improvement toward democracy in a non-monolithic growing world for the sake of accelerating the process of democratization. There are many steps that need to be taken into consideration, but first it has to be understood that democratization is not an easy task. It requires societal involvement, including both sides of the equation in the Arab World, the ruling elites and the masses. From above, it needs elite willingness to expand the bases of their rule through elite-accommodation. Within this line of thinking, I would apply the transition to democracy in Latin America, and South Europe as examples for such process. Transition to democracy in South Europe, and Latin America is an example for regime accommodation.

A second step involves the empowerment of the people and pressures from below. Scholars such as Sorensen (1993, 130) call this process 'conscientization'. Accordingly, democracy should be looked at as a home-grown creature that is nurtured and maintained on all societal levels, and that
ranges from family matters and localities, into national levels. The empowerment process must expand to the marginalized classes that are alienated from the mainstream life of society. In fact, in every society there is a class of people that is deliberately marginalized by the actions of the state and the ruling elite, marginalized people, who are alienated from the mainstream life of the society, either to deliberate actions of the ruling elite, or lack power resources that would enable them to affect the decision making process in their societies. In the Arab World, the marginalized people represent a large portion of societies, which not only includes the poor classes but the intelligentsia, and the emerging middle class of university instructors, lawyers, medical doctors, merchants, and entrepreneurs. These classes feel alienated and powerless in terms of influencing the nature of things in their societies. In order to build a democratic society, these classes have to be brought back into the mainstream of society through an empowerment process that seeks first to educate the individual and the groups about the social reality which they live, then design strategies of change of such reality. Paolo Freire, a Brazilian educator (in Sorensen 1993, 130), calls this process 'conscentization'.

Third is that mobilization and organization to alienated elements are necessary instruments for the process of democratization. The poor alienated classes, and the
powerless have to be organized and actively participate in the process of decision-making concerning issues matters to their lives. The essence of this process is to build confidence to those marginalized classes. Thus, local communities should be organized in a manner that would enable them to make decisions concerning their lives locally. Here come into play the role of decentralization of power and shrinking the power of the state. Thus, when localities experience the fruits of their involvement that produced local decisions to local problems, that would pull them back to the society as a whole and make them witness the power of their empowerment. The combination of local organizations from the entire country would necessarily bring about a new class that would be empowered and seek its share in the political process.

In terms of the awakening of the middle class, the empowerment process has to emphasize the need for total separation of the middle class from the state in the Arab World. Strikingly, in the Arab World the emerging middle class is contained by the state, which explains its failure to lead the democratization process or to crystallize its interests distinctively from those of the ruling authoritarian elites. Thus, there is an urgent need to strengthen the role of the middle class, to break its alliance with the military and from the sectarian-ruling establishments as in the cases of Syria, Iraq, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Egypt. This alliance between merchants, entrepreneurs, business people, lawyers, and doctors (middle class) and the state explains its weakness and lack of support to the democratization efforts. Thus, the separation is a necessary step in order to activate the historical rule of the middle class in the democratization process that is attributed to it by both capitalism and socialism.

A second related problem is the alliance between the Arab bourgeoisie and the state. The bourgeoisie in the Arab World either has been contained by deliberate strategies of the state, or by its own acceptance and promotion of such alliance for selfish-interests and tactical gains.

In fact, lately, there has emerged a new line of thinking that raised suspicions about the role of the bourgeoisie in the democratization process. This trend has been raised first by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). Accordingly, the bourgeoisie throughout history participated marginally in the process of democratization. It was the working class that sought liberal democracy, which simply would enhance the power of the working class. Thus, in the Arab World there is an alliance between the exploiting bourgeoisie and the ruling elite. Both share businesses, agricultural projects, real estate ownership, and joint investment adventures that would benefit both, but not the democratization process, nor does it help to improve the
conditions of the poor.

Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) asserted that the real democratic class is the working class, not the bourgeoisie. However, even the working class in the Arab World is still weak and unable to articulate itself as a political force, except in some minor cases in North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria). The working class suffers from regime-containment politics, lack of independence, and sectorial-fragmentation of workers among scattered sectors which lack coordination. Within the empowerment thinking there is a need for strengthening the role of the working class through a reorganization process of the labor movement and activating its role in the society as a political power.

A final aspect of the empowerment process is the role of the Arab intelligentsia. In other regions such as Latin America, East and South Asia, East Europe, and Africa, the intelligentsia class of writers, journalists, poets, scientists, ideologist, and the like led the struggle for democratization in their countries. Names such as Vaclav Havel in the former Czechoslovakia, Nelson Mandela, and others led the struggle of their peoples to a final triumph of democracy. In the Arab World, intellectuals share with the masses marginalization to their existence, and lack of initiative and leadership. They either live in the margin of their societies or they live in the West, far away from their societies.
A fourth step in the process of consolidation of democracy in the Arab World is the need to professionalize the military and to separate it from politics. The role of the military in the Arab World since the wars of independence has been characterized as humiliating, oppressive, and inefficient. The military has failed to return Arab occupied land or to secure Arabs in their homeland; it has failed to modernize its societies while in power; and it refused to give up power. The military has contributed the most to political backwardness of the Arabs through its deliberate dismantling of political parties, labor unions, and political clubs since the 1950s. The military has drained the national wealth, with its huge budgets, as well as exploited the society through its business dealings and the spread of corruption in the Arab World. Furthermore, the military in alliance with despotism has waged wars against civilian minorities through sectarian disputes such as those in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, and Mauritania.

Thus, professionalizing the military and returning it to the barracks is a necessity for the democratization process. There is an urgent need for the military's immediate withdrawal from politics, and a return to civilian rule. In fact, there was a period of time after World War II in which Arabs lived for a short period of time under civilian elected governments such as in the cases of Syria,
and Somalia. However, civilian rule was brutally exterminated by a wave of military repression that has been ruling for the past fifty years.

A fifth step in the process of transition and consolidation of democracy is social reconciliation. Since early in this century, different doctrines have competed for loyalty of the Arab citizen. Nationalism, and Pan-Arabism, Islamic-solidarity, regional loyalties, ethnic conflicts, and religious conflict shredded the solidarity of Arabs. Arabs belong to different religions and share the Arab World with minorities, such as the Kurds, the Sharcuss, Chechans, Armenians, and Druz. Religiously, Arabs belong to different religions and religious sects such as Sunni, Shi‘i (Alawi, Ibadi, Zaidi, Bahai‘i), Christian sector of Catholics, Copts (4 million in Egypt), Orthodox, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Gospels, and Jewish. Within these ethnoreligious groups there is a serious need for dialogue if democratization would occur. Ethnic and religious claims have to be settled for the sake of peaceful coexistence. Democratization cannot be accomplished in a society such as Iraq where the Kurds are persecuted, nor can it be successful in Saudi Arabia where Shi‘i Arabs are persecuted for their religious creed. Thus, inter-group and inter-ethnic religious dialogue has to be conducted to resume centuries of peace and coexistence between the people in that region.
An important step of social reconciliation that has been successful elsewhere is forming political pacts, national charters, and national constitutions. This strategy has been successful in Spain, Brazil, and in Latin America in general as Hagopian (1990, 150) pointed out. Political pacts between political forces would institutionalize the game and make it more predictable, which contributes to the survival of all political players and helps all to achieve their goals through adherence to the same rules of the game of fair competition.

A sixth step in the consolidation of democracy is an institutionalization of representation. In order to consolidate democracy, there is a need for a process of institutionalization of the emergent groups' interests and their representation. There is a need for parliaments, political parties, women's organizations, student unions, syndicates, chambers of commerce, consumer associations, lobbying, and interest groups. The importance of such process is the crystallization of the societal interests through a diversification process, which makes it difficult for a single group to control society. Pluralism and diversity in association with institutions would enhance compromise between the conflicting interests, cooperation, and coordination which are the essence of a democratic society.

A seventh step is socioeconomic equity. A striking
feature of the Arab World is the existence of the two extremes: the extreme poverty and the extreme wealth. Huge disparities exist in the Arab World. In some countries, like UAE and Qatar, the per capita income exceeds $30,000, whereas in some countries, like Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, it ranges from $130-$350. Within the territorial states, extreme poverty exists in the most wealthy societies, dividing such societies across social classes of rich and poor. For despite the Saudi wealth, the Eastern part of the country—Shi’i—lives in poverty due to governmental polices seeking to keep the Shi’i population in backwardness. In other countries that are either classified poor or middle income, the extremes live side by side. In Cairo, slums are only a few blocks from extremely wealthy neighborhoods. In Jordan, camps are less than a mile from the royal palaces. The same generalization applies to Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and elsewhere. This unequal distribution of national resources and the exploitation of the poor by the ruling elite’s alliance with the business class has to be broken down. If such grievances have no legitimate means to be expressed, they would easily find their way through street politics. In Saudi Arabia, the Shi’i grievances were expressed many times but they were repressed brutally and kept hidden from the outside world. In Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt, the mid 1980 to early 1990 uprisings sought an outlet for the problems of the poor, and
an end to the everlasting exploitation by the alliance of the ruling-elite and business.

External support is another necessary step for the success of democracy in the Arab World. The role of foreign nations, governmental organizations, and nongovernmental international organizations has always been debated in terms of its impact on the promotion of democracy. Although there is no consensus between comparativists on this point, it is necessary to say that external support to democracy in the Arab World is necessary given the heavy involvement of other nations in the internal affairs of the region. It has been found by scholars in the region that foreign nations such as the United States, Britain, and France have contributed significantly to the defeat of the democratic experience in the Arab World. Thus, if such nations are not willing to support the efforts of democratization, it is urgent that these nations at least refrain from opposing the efforts of democratization in the Arab World. The interests of the international political economy, which are primary impediments to liberalization in the Arab World, have to know that democratization does not mean necessarily anti-international trade or cooperation. In fact, the fear of the oil cartel, should be calmed and understood in terms of democratic forces' quest for an equal share of the national wealth for the efforts of development. Democratization serves the interests of both the native peoples of the
regions as well as the world's oil cartel interest given the fact that democracies are more stable and free-trade oriented regimes. Foreign governments are to stop their opposition to democratization, and the international financial organizations are to assist the democratic process through sustaining a process similar to that of Costa Rica, South Korea, Japan, and Germany for the sake of establishing a peaceful region.

The Future of Political Change in the Arab World:

Toward A Model Of Transition To Democracy

In Chapter 2, I have presented the mainstream contribution on model-building of transition to democracy. Based on these contributions, I propose a dialectical model of transition and consolidation of democracy. I predict that the future scenarios of political development in the Arab World will be a dialectical-confrontational process, under which the probabilities of rebellions, revolutions, and political instability are very high.

A careful study of the events/developments in the Arab World since the mid-1980s would reveal that there are portents of a radical change in the region. Political protests, direct confrontation with the ruling elites, the globalization of domestic and regional conflicts, the limited concessions provided by the ruling elites, civil wars in Algeria, Yemen, Sudan, guerrilla war in Egypt, the growth of civil society institutions, the growth of the
efforts of mobilization, the increasing confidence of the people in their power to change the course of things, the global resurgence of democracy, the collapse of the former Eastern Bloc, the economic crises, the decline of oil revenues, the social alienation, and the overall popular dissatisfaction of the governmental performance for the past five decades—all of these developments, if compared to the limited-ruling elite responses would only lead to a revolution. In fact, to me such change has already started: since 1989, there is no Arab country free from political incidents, whether protest (Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia), civil war (Yemen, Algeria, Sudan), guerrilla war (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon), assassinations, and assassination attempts of the rulers (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Jordan), military coups (Algeria, Sudan), constitutional coups (Tunisia, Qatar), internal elite-rebellion (Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia), and international wars (Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya). All of these confrontations are serious messages to the ruling elite concerning the necessity of change, or risking total overthrow.

The last few pages of my dissertation will be devoted to a discussion of the possible course of political change in the Arab World. The model-building contributions presented in Chapter 2, are very relevant to the process of transition to democracy in the Arab World. I present a
phased-transitional-dialectical model of democracy in the Arab World that encompasses, as well as reconciles and utilizes, the alluded to models and strategies. The model encompasses strategies of confrontation, societal conflict, instability, uprisings, rebellions, revolutions, regime accommodation, and consolidation of democracy as a regime type in the Arab World.

Phase 1: Confrontational phase--Challenge and Counter-Challenge to Authoritarianism

This stage assumes a failure of the process of nation-building in the Arab World, a situation reflected in Arab politics since the end of the colonial wars. Such failure has impeded the establishment of stable and democratic countries. Accordingly, Arabs have failed to agree upon necessary requirements of nation-building, such as questions of authority, identity, legitimacy, and shared national goals (Hudson 1977). The most violent expressions of such failures were and still are violent wars between the Arab people. Within the territorial state, I would assume the elements of change and crises that have been alluded to through the discussion--economic crises, human rights violation, global resurgence of democracy--would lead to an open confrontation between the challenging-democratic forces and the forces of status quo--the guardians of authoritarianism (O'Donnell et al. 1986, 1989; Diamond 1989, 1992; Booth and Walker 1993; Tilly 1978, 1973; Aya 1979).
In the Arab World, the challenging forces encompass the Arab nationalist movement, the Arab-Leftist movement, the Islamic movement, the labor movement, the Women's movement, the civil society organizations (business associations, chambers of commerce), and the intelligentsia. These forces engage in open clashes with the forces of the status quo. The status quo forces include the Arab-ruling elites, the monarchs, the military, the intelligence and security forces, personal dictatorships, and the foreign interest of the international political economy.

In order to mobilize popular support for the sake of political change, this model assumes the necessity of a host of intervening-accelerating variables (Tilly 1978, Booth and Walker 1993) that strengthen the position of the democratic forces. Factors such as a decline in oil prices (the Gulf region), financial crises such as the collapse of the national currency (Jordan, Algeria, and Sudan), economic hardships such as the sky-rocketing inflationary rates and the radical hikes of unemployment rates (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco), military defeat (Iraq, Syria), or civil disorder (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan), radicalize the society through the creation of new classes that are mobilized along class interests (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1978) and external pressures, such as the global resurgence of democracy (Stepan 1986, DeFronzo 1991, Huntington 1993).
The accelerating factors undermine the political legitimacy of the existing ruling elite (Tilly 1987, Aya 1979, Booth and Walker 1993) by enabling the challenging forces to gain some leverage in their struggle. This does not mean a fatal defeat to the status quo forces (Marvall 1982). Simultaneously, it does require an urgent immediate response from the ruling elite, which would take us to the second phase.

Phase 2: Regime Response and Opposition-Coalition Building

The mounting pressures created by the challenging forces and aided by the accelerating crises demand regime response (Booth and Walker 1993). In fact, such conditions usually create factionalism within the ruling elite (Marvall 1982) and strengthen the opposition through the creation of a unified front to lead the struggle against the authoritarian forces (Tilly 1987, Brinton 1965, Wolf 1969, Moshiri 1991, Walton 1984). Numerous scenarios may be identified within this phase. The first scenario, elite-accommodation and national reconciliation. This scenario (Marvall 1982, Tilly 1973, Booth and Walker 1993) assumes the occurrence of division within the ruling elite that would lead to the emergence of two wings: the hard-liners and the soft-liners. Generally speaking, a victory of the soft-liners is most likely due to the enormous amount of pressures on the system from both the society and the faction occurring within its camp. This would enhance the
reformers' wing. Such a scenario triumphed in Spain, although it was motivated by survival tactics (Marvall 1982).

Within these dynamics there are also different processes that might occur. The emerging reformist elements would promote regime accommodation (Booth and Walker 1993) in which the emerging challenging forces are recognized and accommodated within the political game through participation and power-sharing. Thus, the regime would initiate a national dialogue, introducing a national charter, constitution, elections, installment of a parliament, curbing the inflation, improving the economic conditions, releasing political prisoners, and relatively limiting the authority of the police and the security agencies, and returning the military to its barracks. The Jordanian mobilization and rebellion in 1989 represents a strong example under which the government was compelled to respond to societal demands for change. The economic crises, that was crystallized by collapse of the currency, soaring inflationary and unemployment rates, associated with a long-time mobilization process to the challenging forces for the past four decades, all were important factors. The only option for the monarch was either to respond positively or risk overthrow of the regime. Thus, within the survival tactics that might develop into stable (Booth and Walker 1993) and a genuine democratic society.
A second scenario is regime repression, lack of accommodation and the escalation of the societal conflict into a popular discontent (Booth and Walker 1993). The regime responds to societal demands by direct confrontations between the security and the civilians, direct military rule, martial laws, violations to basic human rights, arbitrary imprisonment, public execution, air raids, and an open civil war. The Syrian rebellion of 1982 and the ongoing civil war in Algeria are examples of such a scenario. Usually the outcome of such conflict is resolved through military means, in which either the challenging forces (Tilly 1987) gain societal support or the ruling elite exterminates the rebellion. In Syria, for instance, the brutality of the regime led to extermination of the opposition represented by an elimination of an entire city (Hamah) in 1982, which enhanced the authority of the authoritarian-ruling elite.

A third scenario within the second phase is deliberate denial of the existence of opposition (Booth and Walker 1993; Huntington 1991, 1963). This strategy entails ignoring the existence of opposition to the ruling elite, continuing human rights violations, basing claims to authority on religious-historical and traditional claims, and relying on foreign support for the maintenance of power. This strategy has been used by the Gulf monarchies. Consequently, the outcome of the accommodative politics is
relative stability (Booth and Walker 1993, Ibrahim 1993, Tessler 1995) with potential institutionalization of the democratic process as in the case of Jordan (1989-1995). The outcome of the confrontational scenario is frequent and periodic eruption of civil wars, as in the cases of Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. In the case of Algeria, it has led to national disintegration and civil war; in Egypt, it has led to guerrilla war; in Syria, it has led to the elimination of cities off the ground in the Sunni regions, thus contributing to national instability.

In terms of the third scenario of ignoring the existence of the opposition, based on Huntington’s (1963, 1984, 1991) reasoning, I expect revolutions similar to the Iranian model to occur in such rigid regimes. In fact, there is a revolution in the making in such societies (Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia), and the process of coalition-building is occurring right now in the GCC countries, despite regimes’ enjoyment of relative security provided by foreign allies. The April 1995 rebellion in Bahrain, the June 1995 coup in Qatar, and coalition-building in Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are preludes for revolutions in the Gulf. Indeed, the volcanic-Iranian (Davies, Feierabends, Gurr) revolutionary model is highly applicable to the Gulf region.
Phase 3. Accommodation, Revolution, and the Institutionalization of Democracy

Following up phase 2, an accommodative regime would encourage the emergence of a civil society institution (Ibrahim 1993, Norton, Muslih), and an institutionalization of democracy. The confrontational model means an all-out civil war (Booth and Walker 1993). Usually the civil war gives the military leverage over the civilian elite. The nature of the military itself, whether being "inclusionary or exclusionary" (Remmer 1991, 4), would determine the nature and the outcome of the confrontational struggle. An inclusionary military (Sudan 1985) would take over for a period of time, stabilize the country, and prepare it for civilian rule. However, the exclusionary praetorian (Algeria 1992-) would destroy the existing political institutions and escalate the confrontations with civilians until a civilian-led popular disobedience or armed guerrilla front topples the military's government (Booth and Walker 1993), which means a triumph of the democratic forces over the status quo.

The third scenario of the deliberate ignoring of the existence of opposition breeds a revolution in the making. Usually, the revolutionary leaders mobilize (Skocpol, Smelser, Booth and Walker 1993, Wolf, Brinton, Tilly, Moshiri 1991, Goldsone 1986) discontent into rebellion by appealing to corporate identity, to individuals' sense of
deprivation, identifying existing regimes with such deprivation, as well as appealing to the utilitarian value of the rebellion (Kim 1991, 22). Such strategies would strengthen the democratic forces, which would escalate the level of confrontation to a popular level. Under such conditions, the ruling elite and its military are not able to defend themselves. They are most likely to ask for help from their foreign allies (Egypt, 1923-1952). The foreign allies either engage in an open war with nationals or help in safe passage of their old allies and help in stabilizing the country. Usually, foreign forces assist the status quo forces against the popular demand, which means an open confrontation with a colonial power.

The struggle against colonialism will mobilize the people against both the status quo forces, and the foreign forces. The outcome necessarily means defeat to the status quo forces given the fact that colonial powers are not expected to provide long-range support for the unpopular ruling elite.

Phase 4: Consolidation, Containment, Survivalism, and Authoritarianism

The outcomes of phase 3 leads to the installment of a liberal democratic system. A few developments can be noted. First, the installment of a coalition government usually, called a "national-reconciliation" government (Sudan 1985, Jordan 1989, Yemen 1995). Such government would introduce
the principles of pluralism, freedom of the press, improvement in human rights, and would generate international support for such policies.

Second, stabilization of the political process would lead to the decline of the number of personal political parties and enable the widely led political parties with popular support to articulate long-range support. Thus, a handful of political parties will set up the rules of the political game, which would enhance the efforts of constructing a stable political system.

Third, the enhancement of a liberal political culture would lead to the emergence of civil society institutions, institutionalization of the norms of liberal democracy, economic development, political development, and a consolidated political authority that corresponds to the societal norms and aspirations.

Fourth, within this scenario, the ruling elite would pursue containment-survival tactics designed to manipulate the opposition and return to authoritarianism. Accordingly, the ruling elite might recognize temporarily the demands of the opposition, for the sake of absorbing the popular outrage and time-gaining, then exterminate the opposition. In fact, the politics of containment and the tactics of survival have become the norm in the Arab World. Tunisia is the most obvious example where the ruling elite compromised temporarily with the opposition under the conditions of a
transitional period after the coup of 1987, then pursued an aggressive politics designed to exterminate the opposition. Thus, the government returns to authoritarianism.

In conclusion, this model does not assume a linear one-time game between the democratic forces and the authoritarian forces, nor is it bounded by a certain period of time. This process may take many rounds for a long period of time. In fact, the experience of other countries, mainly in Latin America and South Europe, would show that the dialectical nature of interaction between the two camps took more than a hundred years. The Latin American democratization experience in some countries started in the mid-nineteenth century; meanwhile, the process of democratization is still going on. Thus, I would expect that the dialectics of democratization in the Arab World would occur over a long period of time.

Prospects for Future Research

The process of democratization in the Arab World still needs urgent exploration by comparativists in both the mainstream school of thought and area specialists. There is a need to explore the political, economic, and international aspects of the democratization process in the region. So far, existing contributions revolves around cultural-judgmental stereotypes that failed to incorporate the Arab World within the global trend toward democracy. Furthermore, most scholars have to account for the emerging
liberal arrangements in the region including political pluralism, elections, and the emergence of civil society institutions in the region. The essence of democracy, or the lack of it, lies within the socioeconomic and political structures of the Arab World, which have shown some uneasiness to the democratization process. However, the mounting pressures on political authorities have led to improvements toward democracy in the regions. In addition, there is a need to construct data sets about the Arab World, in terms of economic, political, and social indicators, that would enable researchers to employ the statistical techniques and methods employed in other regions such as Latin America and Europe in order to reach accurate results concerning democratization in the Arab World.
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APPENDIX B

POLITICAL MAP OF THE ARAB WORLD
BIBLIOGRAPHY


305


Wolf, Eric. 1969. *Peasant Revolts of the Twentieth*
