A POLITICAL AND MACROECONOMIC EXPLANATION OF
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Sean D. Carey, B.A.
Denton, Texas
August 1997
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This study develops a model of macroeconomic and political determinants of public support for European integration. The research is conducted on pooled cross-sectional time-series data from five European Union member states between 1978 and 1994. The method used in this analysis is a Generalized Least Squares – Autoregressive Moving Average approach. The factors hypothesized to determine a macroeconomic explanation of public support for integration are inflation, unemployment, and economic growth. The effect of the major economic reform in the 1980s, the Single European Act, is hypothesized to act as a positive permanent intervention. The other determinants of public support are the temporary interventions of European Parliament elections and the permanent intervention of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. These are hypothesized to exert a negative effect. In a fully specified model all variables except economic growth and European Parliament elections demonstrate statistical significance at the 0.10 level or better.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent years studies of European integration have been prolific in both comparative politics and international relations, however, the role of public support the integration process has received minimal attention. One of the reasons for this is the traditional idea of a ‘permissive consensus’ amongst the European citizenry towards the integration process (see Inglehart 1970; Lindberg & Scheingold 1970, 1971; Stavridis 1992). The idea of the ‘permissive consensus’ was that decisions regarding European integration and European policy were conducted by national elites, and the passive support of the public was taken for granted. The lack of serious investigation into public support for integration through the European Union (EU) and its predecessors has stemmed from the assumption that EU policy is essentially foreign policy, which is traditionally elite driven. More recent developments have shown that this is, in fact, not the case. The opposition to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), in particular the defeat of the referendum in Denmark and the close margin of acceptance in France, shows that the

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1 The European Union took this name in 1992. The Union essentially began life as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, from which it later became the European Economic Community (EEC) and then the European Community (EC). To avoid confusion and create consistency throughout this study, I will use the term European Union (EU) when perhaps EEC or EC would be, technically, the correct term to use.
European mass publics are not as compliant with elite-driven integration as had.an
previously been suspected. Perhaps even more demonstrable of the emerging influence
of the public in the integration process, was the rejection of EU membership by the
Norwegian electorate in a referendum in 1994, which their elites had negotiated. This
study aims not only to investigate support for the process of integration amongst the mass
publics of Western Europe, but also attempts to explain the circumstances that create
variation in this support.

It is generally accepted that European integration is initiated and pushed forward
by elites, but it cannot progress without public support. It is a necessary, if not a
sufficient condition for the integration project to proceed (Anderson and Reichart, 1996;
Reif, 1993). Elites whose citizens are not enthusiastic about the process for integration or
a particular EU policy are unlikely to be enthusiastic themselves in pushing for further
integration. Although public opinion may not be the driving force behind the integration
process, it can affect its direction, speed and continuity and elites’ calculations about the
potential gains and costs of integration must take public opinion into account at all times
(Anderson and Kalthethaler, 1996, 178). Investigation of the major steps of integration
suggests that domestic support is required for the implementation of these changes.
Therefore, understanding the factors that affect public support for European integration is
imperative to identifying the integration process. For these reasons this research should
be of interest to others, as well as increasing understanding of an institution which has
played such a major part in changing the nature of study in the sub-fields of both
comparative politics and international relations.
This research may contribute to this field in a number of ways. For one, it may help explain the great leaps forward that the members of the EU took with the Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of European Union (1992, usually called the Maastricht Treaty, adopting the name of the Dutch town where it was signed). Furthermore, this research could be of use in ascertaining the future direction of European integration. With accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta beginning in 1997, and the assertion by the European Council that any of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) may do likewise when they satisfy the conditions of the acquis communautaire, expansion is now very high on the EU agenda. This is often counterbalanced with arguments calling instead for greater integration of the existing membership. This debate between those who favor a ‘broadening’ of the Union and those who favor a further ‘deepening’ of the Union is one of the main issues in the study of contemporary regional integration study.

Regional integration has been a popular area of research in the post-war era, and the practice of regional integration has been far more expansive in Western Europe than anywhere else. In the past decade the European Union (EU) has taken major strides towards increased integration. There has been greater ‘deepening’ of the integration process with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. There has also been a ‘broadening’ of the EU with the

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² The acquis communautaire is a set of rights and obligations attached to membership of the European Union and its institutional framework. This includes the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties, such as those in the Maastricht Treaty.
Iberian expansion (Spain & Portugal) in 1986 and the EFTA expansion (Sweden, Finland & Austria) in 1995\textsuperscript{3}. Since the Union began as a coal and steel trading bloc it has expanded to include nine new members; all of which joined for predominantly economic reasons.

There are a number of reasons why research in the area of European integration and public support for it is particularly applicable at this time. Firstly, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty is proving to be politically sensitive, even in the traditionally more dynamically pro-integration states, notably France and Germany. Goals such as Economic Monetary Union (EMU) or a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are a long way from being attained. Secondly, after a period of relatively smooth agreement on the future direction of the Union there now appears to be diverse opinions among members. Thirdly, the 1996 intergovernmental conference (IGC) will come to a conclusion in 1997. The results of this ongoing conference are likely to have significant consequences for the short-term and medium-term future of the European Union, especially with regard to agreements over expansion, defence policy and the timing of the next steps towards monetary union. The outcome of the IGC is likely to generate crucial referenda within some of the member countries (Rees, 1996a). Furthermore, as the 'Cold War' becomes an ever more distant aspect of international relations, there is less pressure on the countries of Western Europe to integrate. One

\textsuperscript{3} One could also include the incorporation of the German Democratic Republic into a unified Federal Republic of Germany in 1991.
could argue that this has lead to a decrease in the passive acquiescence of mass publics with regard to integration decisions, making public opinion more significant in matters of European integration.

One of the perceived problems of the European Community, and one that remains with the European Union, is the problem of the 'democratic deficit'. The 'democratic deficit' is the term generally applied to the lack of direct public influence on the policies of the European Union's institutions. This 'democratic deficit' problem has also lead to a concentration of studies at the national and systemic level, with more emphasis on elites than individuals. Most of the institutions, such as the Commission, the European Council and the Council of Ministers, consist of personnel appointed by the national governments of the member states. The only directly elected institution is the European Parliament (EP), which is, at this time, relatively powerless in comparison with the Commission, European Council and Council of Ministers. Franklin and Wlezian (1997) find that European institutions and the policies they generate are generally of low salience for Europeans.

Furthermore, the issue of European policy, historically, rarely swings national elections. But with the increase in the use of referenda to achieve approval for EU policies, and the increase of party political division towards European policy, research into public support is becoming ever more valid. Moreover, in a number of national elections that are taking place during 1997 (UK on May 1st, France on June 1st and France on June 1st and

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4 The influence on elections at the elite level has gone even deeper in the UK. The
Ireland on June 6th and 1998 (Germany) the issue of Europe is expected to be more influential than ever before (Rees 1996b, 8). At the time of writing it is too early for serious analysis of these elections. However, concentrated media coverage of European issues in the campaigns, and defeat for incumbent governments with seemingly unpopular European policies, were prominent in both the UK and France. This suggests that governments need to place more importance in public evaluations of their European policy if they wish to be re-elected. This increase in the electoral importance of European integration issues demonstrates that investigation into factors that generate favorable views towards the EU is more relevant at the moment than ever before.

This study aims to establish that amongst the mass publics of the European Union member countries it is possible to determine the conditions that account for the variations in support for the process of European integration. This study emphasizes the strong effects of economic variables on the public’s evaluations of the European Union. One way that this will be shown is to demonstrate that when the economic situation of a country is good, citizens look upon the European Union more favorably. Another way to emphasize the importance of economics is to measure the public approval for the major Conservative Party, which had governed for eighteen years, suffered a landslide defeat in this election after much internal strife over its European policy. In the subsequent leadership election in June, the issue once again demonstrated the deep divisions between the parliamentary party. Eventually electing the ‘anti-European’ candidate, William Hague, despite the fact that the ‘pro-European’ candidate, Kenneth Clarke, topped all Conservative Party polls at the grassroots level and party activist level. Moreover, in 1990, Lady Thatcher’s resistance to European integration became a domestic political liability and contributed to her downfall (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 525).
economic integration progressions of the EU, such as the creation of the Single European Market. The positive affect on EU support from an improved economic situation can also be contrasted with opposite views towards political integration. Although there are extremely high levels of support for economic integration, they are accompanied by more tentative levels of support for political integration, which manifest themselves as negative attitudes towards increased political integration of the European Union.

There is a limited amount of literature in this field at the present time. In chapter two this previous research will be evaluated and built upon. Also, a brief discussion of the principal approaches to studying European integration will be incorporated into this chapter. Chapter three will set out the theory to be tested in this research, and operationalize the variables to enable an empirical testing of this theory. The main arguments of the theory will emphasize the affect of macroeconomics on public support for European integration, the significant positive affect of the Single European Act in the 1980s, and the negative affect of the political interventions of Maastricht in the 1990's and the European elections throughout the period. The research will move on to formulate a model in chapter four, which can be empirically tested using regression techniques on a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set. The results of the model are then interpreted and analyzed. Chapter five concludes the thesis, identifying both the positive and negative findings of the work, and discussing the implications it may have with a view to future studies in this field.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been a plethora of literature regarding European integration since, and even during, the Second World War. Most has been concentrated on the theoretical motivations for this integration and its continued progress, mostly at the level of governments and European institutions. Far less numerous are investigations concerning public opinion in the dynamics of integration. More recently, there has emerged several empirical studies dealing with public support for integration in Europe. In this section I will briefly review some of the more important theoretical works of European integration, then take a more detailed and analytical look at the empirical work dealing with public support for European integration.

Traditional Views of European Integration

The traditional theoretical approaches to understanding European integration concentrate, almost exclusively, on the elite driven integration that is synonymous with the origins of the post-war integration of Western Europe. At the same time that post-war realism was gaining pre-eminence in the study of international relations, functionalism, a theory of regional integration, was also being developed. Functionalism deviated widely from the realist assumption that competition and conflict between states, the main actors,
would be the primary features of international relations. The work of David Mitrany (1943, 1966, 1975) is central to functionalist theories. Mitrany believed that when faced with their inability to solve problems states would pool a limited amount of their sovereignty with one another into various international organisations. Mitrany was not interested in functional integration of European nations per se, but in the creation of international organisations to fulfil certain specific needs (Wood and Yesilda, 1996, 18). Collaboration over more technical matters would lead to an increased level of co-operation between states. As this co-operation increases there would be an incremental move towards integration. Mitrany's work did not recognise the importance of gaining public support for incremental integration as such. The expansion of integration would, according to Mitrany, occur with the gradual leadership of elites, in particular co-operation over technical matters.

Critics charge that there is a lack of evidence that technology has produced functional integration in Western Europe (Pentland, 1973) and that integration needs the deliberate action of political leaders to bring about advances. After the initial successes of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a more scientifically testable theory emerged: neofunctionalism. A revision of functionalism, neofunctionalism, was developed by Ernst Haas (1958, 1964, 1975). Haas argued that functional integration would be more likely to be achieved through the attainment of economic goals through political means. Pressure would need to be exerted on political leaders from opinion leaders and interest groups, in particular economic interests. The original research of Haas concentrated on the formative years of the European Coal and Steel Community. Haas
formulated two key concepts for integration, ‘spillover’ and ‘supranationalism’ (Haas, 1958, chapters 8 & 13). Joseph Nye clarifies ‘spillover’ as “functional interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks which press political actors to redefine their common tasks” (Nye, 1971, 65). For integration to occur it must come from the expansion of tasks already being performed. The process would begin with technical matters, and be followed by integration in the realm of ‘low politics’, such as economics and trade, then spillover to ‘high politics’ such as a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The concept of ‘supranationalism’ requires that cross-national networks be established to find unanimously acceptable solutions to mutual problems (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970).

Haas played down the role of public opinion influencing the integration process, finding it impracticable to have any recourse to general public opinion in the development of integration (Haas, 1958, 17).

Neofunctionalism has received much criticism, especially due to the stagnant period of European Community development in the 1970s. Stephen George criticises the idea that a process which, once begun, was self-sustaining (George, 199, 21). Keohane and Hoffman emphasise that if neofunctionalism were to occur it would have produced something similar to the Single European Act in the 1970s (Keohane & Hoffman, 1991, 19). Andrew Moravcik, among others, highlights the dynamic role taken by national governments of the leading states (Britain, Germany & France) in formulating the Single European Act rather than any neofunctionalist processes (Keohane & Hoffman, 1991, 41-84). Haas himself later observed that ‘global turbulence’ was destroying the coherence of regional economic organisations (Haas, 1975, 208). Neo-functionalist theories dominated
the studies of European integration in the 1960s and 70s. Even in the 1980s there were
signs that integration may be following this approach. However, after the democratic
elections to the European Union and the public influence and pressure that followed the
two major EU legislations of 1986 and 1992 it became clear that any theory of European
integration must also incorporate the support of the people it integrates.

Another theoretical body of work centers around the ideas of national identity.
This work is important because it stresses the importance of the mass publics in the
integration process. Wallace and Smith (1995) identify many of those who studied the
European Community EC in the 1950s and 1960s hoped that Europe would succeed in
moving beyond the nation-state. Nationalism and nation-states were, for the authors of
neofunctionalist approaches to integration, part of the baggage of an ideological age that
was coming to an end (Wallace and Smith, 1995, 145). Of the recent works on the
importance of national identity in the realm of European Integration, Brigid Laffan’s
(1996) work concentrates on the importance and prevalence of national identity in the
integrationist process. She argues that nationalism has embraced and accommodated the
‘European project’ in many states and there has been a resurgence of such because of the
growing salience of immigration. How states define themselves culturally, politically and
economically is important to the dynamics of integration, and Laffan sees the prospects
for further integration rests on the EU’s ability to create a European identity (Laffan,
1996, 82-83).

Deflam and Pampel (1996) argue that in the present conditions of globalisation,
states have, to some extent, given up a degree of sovereignty to institutions such as the
EU and the United Nations. But on the other hand, the process has also strengthened the role of states as the primary actors in the world political system. This persistence of the nation-state coincides with a persistence of national identity, to the extent that this national identity will dominate a citizen’s perception of any supranational body on their perceived worth they have for their own country. Even those people who increasingly identify with ‘post-national’ issues, such as human rights and self-determination, have to frame these issues within nation-states to become effective (Deflam and Pampel, 1996, 121).

Richard Münch (1996) finds that European identity is forming itself at the expense of national identities, but these national differences will intensify in the process of European standardization, which he sees as the future direction of European integration (Münch, 1996, 398). Anthony Smith (1992) explains why national identity is so important for interpreting public approval for integration. Smith sees that, for political leaders, national identifications possess distinct advantages over a more unified European identity. They are vividly accessible, well established, long popularized and still widely believed, therefore frequently played upon. For Smith, national identities still constitute the basis for the political community (Smith, 1992, 55).

Andrew Gamble (1995) also emphasizes the influence that national identities play in the integration process, but through the actions of political elites. Gamble sees the EU as the project of national elites, therefore it is often perceived as having trans-national differences because there are trans-national differences between the elites of the EU member states. A trust developed between electorates and their governments with regard
to European level institution building; therefore the development of the EU has been overwhelmingly elite-driven. And while accountability is indirect, this will probably continue and public opinion will play little role in the direction of integration.

One of the most popular analyses of the motivations of support for integration amongst mass publics is characterized by the work of Ronald Inglehart (1967, 1970, 1971, 1977). His theory rests around his identification of the concepts of post-materialism and cognitive mobilization as being important individual level determinants of support for European integration. Inglehart asserts that after the Second World War the countries of Western Europe experienced great economic and social improvements that gave way to a new political dimension that crossed the traditional left-right cleavages. As citizens satisfied their materialistic needs they made ‘post-materialist’ choices. According to Inglehart, as political value orientations become more ‘post-materialist’ support for the European Union will increase (Inglehart, 1977, 12).

Furthermore, his theory of cognitive mobilization asserts that as increases in education and access to information occur, citizens develop a greater cosmopolitan outlook, of which support for European integration benefits (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978, 86).

Discussion of the impact of post-materialism is necessary for this research because specific questions in the Eurobarometer, the biannual large-scale public opinion survey within the EU countries and the data source for the dependent variables, are geared towards measuring the effects of post-materialism. According to Inglehart, there are a number of policy areas where post-materialism is found to be particularly significant in understanding the motivations behind political choices; one of these policy areas is the
issue of support for European integration. Furthermore, Inglehart was one of the first students of European integration to stress the importance of public opinion in the integration process, and not regard it as an exclusively elite-driven process.

Not a great deal of critical empirical research has been conducted on post-materialist effects on European integration. One of the more convincing is that of Janssen (1991) who operationalizes Inglehart’s theory of Silent Revolution (1977) at three levels of aggregation: individual, cohort and macro (445-6). Janssen finds that "post-materialism appears to be unrelated to attitudes towards European integration, while the concept of cognitive mobilization makes sense only at the individual level" (443). Janssen concludes that Inglehart’s theory is of almost no use in explaining either public attitudes towards integration or the cross-national differences in support (467-8).

Other work investigating post-materialist effects on European integration also finds there to be little correlation. Dobratz (1993) and Gabel and Whitten (1997) even find that there is a negative relationship between post-materialism and EU support.

Higher support for the EU from materialists is not altogether surprising when one conceptualizes the EU as an economic institution geared to the mutual increase in wealth of all its members. Further research by Anderson and Reichart (1996) finds that there is strong inconsistency of the post-materialist affect on support for European integration. Anderson and Reichart (1996) find that post-materialism is also negatively correlated with EU support at the aggregated level. But when broken down into original six member states and the six states that joined in the 1970s and ‘80s there is a significant difference, with a positive correlation for the former and negative for the latter, offering
strong evidence for a revision of Inglehart’s theory (Anderson and Reichart, 1996, 241-4).

When a post-materialist variable was incorporated into the model developed in the following chapter, the same conclusion was found, with post-materialism insignificant in all variations tried.

Empirical Studies of Public Support for European Integration

There have been several empirical studies that have investigated public support for European Integration in recent years. One of the best analyses is the work of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993). They refute the traditional idea that evaluating the opinions of European mass publics has little relevance to the process of European integration. They argue that if the ‘permissive consensus’, characterized in the work of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), did ever actually exist, the development of the Union and policy-making on EU issues is far more dependent on public influence today.

Eichenberg and Dalton cite a number of examples where the influence of the public on European integration can be seen; one obvious example being the power of the people to elect representatives to the European parliament after 1979. Also, the Maastricht-approving referenda in Ireland, France and Denmark in 1992; the referenda in Ireland and Denmark in 1972 to approve joining and in 1986 and 1987 to approve the Single European Act; and the referendum in the UK in 1975 to approve continuation of membership (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 507-508).

Eichenberg & Dalton use two levels of analysis to conceptualize the sources of public support for the EU: National - using inflation, GDP, unemployment, EC referenda
and national trends; International - using EC budget ratio, intra-EC export ratio, European Parliament elections and East-West conflict. They cite the work of Michael Lewis-Beck (1988) as representing the body of literature from where they derive their economic hypotheses. Lewis-Beck identifies the relationship between economic conditions and the evaluations of national governments, which Eichenberg and Dalton argue transfers to support for the EU. Although they do recognize that the public's knowledge of EU affairs may be limited, the major impact that the EU has on economic welfare should be a fact recognized by the European public (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 512).

Eichenberg and Dalton find that attitudes to the EU were more favorable when: inflation was low, the EU's share of a country's trade was high, when EU elections and referenda brought attention to the Community and when East-West relations were peaceful (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 527). They find, contrary to their theoretical expectations, that net return from the EU budget and unemployment has virtually no impact on citizen support for the Community (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 512). They also find that the impact of European Parliament elections, which they hypothesized would stimulate positive reactions towards integration, stretched only to the first EP election in 1979. The novelty had worn off by 1984 and the variable did not warrant inclusion in their model. The time period for their research only enables Eichenberg and Dalton to include two instances of European elections for their research, whereas the data that is used in this study includes four. The reason for the time period ending in 1988 is that no further data was available, or relevant, to the East/West relations variable. Not only does this exclude the Maastricht factor that Eichenberg and Dalton discuss in their
theoretical justification for their research, but also the full implementation of the 1986 Single European Act, which finally came to fruition in 1992.

Similar to the research design of this thesis, Eichenberg and Dalton use Eurobarometer survey research and OECD data from 1973 to 1988 for their pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. However, they use the biannual Eurobarometer results and quarterly data, which omits six months of economic data and is susceptible to seasonal distortions. For this project I will also use the data from both Eurobarometer surveys per year, but aggregate them together and use the yearly macro-economic statistics. This does reduce the number of cases, but includes all the data available and enough cases remain for solid analysis.

A further flaw of Eichenberg and Dalton’s operationalization of their variables is that they use net support for European unification as the dependent variable. This excludes the majority of respondents with weak disposition, both for and against, from their analysis. From the Eurobarometer question which asks whether the respondent thinks EU membership is good, bad or neither, Eichenberg & Dalton subtract the respondents answering ‘bad’ from those answering ‘good’ (1993, 518). Not only do they omit the ‘neither’ respondents, but their results would be the same, for example, for a country with 20% of respondents choosing ‘good’ and 10% ‘bad’ as that of a country where 50% choose good and 40% choose ‘bad’. This measurement of support for the European Union could very well yield misleading results.

Eichenberg and Dalton’s work can be criticized on a number of levels, but it is an interesting basis from which to base further research. As they point out:
In methodological terms, this research represents one of the first applications of pooled cross-sectional and time-series analyses to the cross-national study of public opinion in comparative and international politics (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 509).

Although the citizens of different countries support European integration at different levels, they find variation around each baseline, which is caused by a similar economic and political dynamic (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 530).

Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) attempt to explain the variation in mass support for integration across time and across countries, which they claim can be explained by domestic economic conditions, timing and circumstances of a country’s entry into the Union and length of membership in it. Their results indicate that length of membership in the EU is somewhat more important than economic performance (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, 175).

In their work, which is similar to that of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) justify using macro-level economic performance for determining public opinion because one of the main ‘selling points’ of European integration has been economic improvement. Therefore, most citizens will weigh the benefits of the integration process on the performance of their own economy (1996, 176-7). The length of membership hypothesis states that the longer a country is a member of the EU, the greater the awareness and understanding of benefits received by its citizens (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, 177).

The most interesting aspect of Anderson and Kaltenthaler’s (1996) article is their third hypothesis that the timing and circumstances is a strong predictor of attitudes to
integration. They argue that the publics of the countries that joined the Union as founding members in the 1950s would be more supportive of integration than other members. In contrast, those joining in the 1970s have publics that are negatively disposed to integration, and these attitudes constrained the elites from joining the Union earlier. Those joining in the 1980s are different still: their membership was not constrained from lack of support from their mass publics, but by political motives from the existing members (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, 177). The variable operationalized for this hypothesis is a coding of original members with values of three, the members that joined in 1973 with one and the late joiners with two. This seems to be flawed because it is inconsistent with the length of membership hypothesis. There also seems to be no theoretical possibility of including the countries that joined in 1995, which occurred before their article came to publication, but interestingly, is not referred to.

Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) use Generalized Least Squares estimations of a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set from 1973 to 1993, with three different dependent variables for public support of European integration. In complete contrast with the findings of Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) they find that the effects from unemployment are the strongest economic variable on public support for integration. They explain this by criticizing Eichenberg & Dalton's dependent variable for omitting those respondents with no strong feelings for integration, either good or bad. However, Anderson and Kaltenthaler's dependent variables seem no more efficient as they only utilize positive responses, omitting more data than Eichenberg & Dalton. Their other two hypotheses of timing of entry and length of entry are both significant with all three dependent variables,
more so than the economic variables. This brings them to the conclusion that, although
economic circumstances are important, the length and timing of membership are more
affective determinants of public support for European integration (Anderson and

Anderson and Reichart (1996) use three *Eurobarometer* polls to investigate how
direct and indirect economic benefits associated with EU membership affect support for
integration. Anderson and Reichart identify a number of areas where they see previous
research has faltered, in particular that of Eichenberg & Dalton (1993). They argue that
cross-temporal and pooled cross-national research is flawed because of the variance in the
time parameter, as well as the assumption that benefits of membership have similar
effects across all countries. They also argue that the EU cannot be compared with the EC
or EEC because what integration meant in 1975 and what it means in 1995 are completely
different; also, countries that joined at different times will not react similarly to economic
costs and benefits from membership. Anderson and Reichart do not try to explain
differences in support over time, but concentrate on explaining the differences across
countries and between individuals of the EU. One of the reasons that they cite for
conducting their research at the national level is that EU membership is not necessarily a
'zero-sum game'; instead it involves both winners and losers, with the winners of
integration policies more favorable to EU membership (Anderson and Reichart, 1996,
233).

Using OLS regression, Anderson and Reichart find that trade and budget returns
are significant in two of the years, and that length of membership is positive in all three
The only individual level economic variable that is consistent with estimations with and without controlling for length of membership is personal income. Although other variables that they have operationalized as personal economic benefit variables: high education, age, gender, and occupation as farmer are occasionally, but not consistently, correlated. It must be noted that operationalization of the 'winners' of European integration is neither clear nor easy. In fact, the assertion that individual skills are more valuable or more transferable within an integrated market reflects Inglehart's cognitive mobilization theory discussed above. They also find that post-materialism has little effect on support for European integration, and is actually slightly negatively correlated. This supports the theory that approval for European integration has a higher correlation with materialists than post-materialists (see Janssen, 1991. For theories of post-materialism and European integration: Inglehart, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1977; Inglehart and Rabier, 1978).

Anderson and Reichart's (1996) paper is interesting in its theoretical design, but fails to deliver any convincing results. A country's length of membership appears to be a significant factor in determining a European citizen's approval for European integration. However, the assumption that the reason for this is the familiarity of the EU institutions or time to appreciate benefits of membership is a weak one. When comparing the average level of support in the UK or Denmark who joined in 1973 with that of Portugal or Sweden who joined much later, support is much lower in the countries that joined earlier. The big difference is between the original six members and the rest of the Union, the reasons for this are not adequately explained.
Much of the empirical literature on support for European integration investigates the suitability of using national economic variables to explain the variation of this support. There is no consensus on the effectiveness of the economic model of support; Gabel and Palmer's (1995) analysis finds that there is more evidence for their 'policy appraisal' model than the economic voting model of Dalton and Eichenberg (1993) (Gabel and Palmer, 1995, 12). They describe national economic evaluations as 'noisy' (indirect) measures of EC policy implication, thus weakly correlated with support for the EU (Gabel and Palmer, 1995, 5). Their 'policy appraisal' hypothesis is based, not on general economic circumstances, but on the trade balance with other EU countries, which implies that the support of mass publics fluctuates with their estimation of the comparative advantage between theirs and the other EU states, and between individuals of the same country. This, they allege, can be controlled for by identifying the higher support among the 'winners' of European integration, determined by income, occupation, education, and distance from foreign borders. This suggests a high level of political sophistication on the part of the European citizenry, which Gabel and Palmer justify by citing recent work that finds the American public forms consistent opinions on US foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Russett, 1990; Wittkopf 1990). This appears to be a somewhat weak justification of their hypothesis; Is American public opinion towards its country's foreign policy really the same as European attitudes to the European Union?

Using OLS regression on an aggregated data set from the Fall Eurobarometer surveys between 1984 and 1989, Gabel and Palmer (1995) find that the national benefit of membership variable is more efficient in explaining EU support than Dalton and
Eichenberg's economic hypothesis. However, Dalton and Eichenberg use objective macro-economic variables (GDP, inflation and unemployment) to determine national economic situation, whereas Gabel and Palmer use a subjective Eurobarometer question which asks the respondent to evaluate the improvement of the economic situation over the previous year (1995, 14-15). I propose that a more suitable comparison would be to replicate the data used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993).

A further model looks at security concerns, which is measured by World War II deaths per capita as a proxy for the importance of European integration as an instrument of peace, and the occurrence of EP elections for increasing support in years which they occur. Both are found to be significant, along with the 'policy appraisal' hypothesis using an additional OLS regression of aggregated data from the Eurobarometer surveys of 1973 to 1989. Although the limits of the data mean that the dependent variable for Eurobarometers 5 to 9 (Spring 1976 to Spring 1978) differs from all the rest: curiously replacing evaluation of membership as 'good' or 'bad' with evaluation of the speed of the movements towards unification. This question was dropped after 1978 when it became apparent that it meant different things in different countries. To increase the number of cases in their research Gabel and Palmer (1995) merge together the responses to two Eurobarometer questions relating to integration, which they see as measuring the same phenomenon. A theory supported by Gabel and Whitten (1997, 86) and Deflem and Pampel (1996, 139), but Anderson and Reichart (1996) argue that they measure different attitudes: one affective and one utilitarian (238-9). This timing of the analysis is interesting, especially in view of the security hypothesis, which would invariably be less
significant, if at all, with the inclusion of more data for the Iberian and 1995 EFTA expansions.

Gabel and Whitten (1997) recognize the difference between objective and subjective measures of economic performance. They examine the effects of both subjective evaluations of national and personal economic fortunes and objective regional and national economic conditions on support for integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997, 82). They find that it is the 'subjective' economy, rather than the 'objective' economy, which really influences support for integration, and because of this EU policy matters very little for changes in public support for integration (92). They justify the use of regional data by highlighting the major disparities of economic conditions within countries, giving the regional variation of the unemployment rate in the UK as an example (Gabel and Whitten, 1997,84).

One of the most interesting aspects of Gabel and Whitten's research is their hypotheses that increases in inflation and unemployment will lead to a similar increase in individual-level support for integration. They theorize that closer integration will lead to a greater control over macroeconomics, which has been lost with global market trends (see: George, 1992, who argues that worsening economic conditions promote support for integration). This also assumes that individuals share the perspective of elites (Gabel and Whitten, 1997, 85). In their analysis, using OLS regression on an aggregated data set, Gabel and Whitten (1997) find that all three macroeconomic indicators that they test, inflation, unemployment and GDP, are insignificant at the national level. However, at the regional level they find that regional unemployment is a statistically significant, and
positive, predictor of support for integration (Gabel and Whitten, 1997, 90-1). They also find that an individual's subjective economic assessment is significant, but this significance is greater for an individual's perception of the national economy than of their personal economic situation. With the inclusion of a great number of control variables the predictive power of their model is weak, with an $R^2$ of 0.15 (Gabel and Whitten, 1997, 90). There is a very large possibility that variables such as education, income and occupation are highly correlated with each other.

Most of the literature that discusses the macro-economic affects on support for European integration, without identifying the obvious theoretical drawback that the EU is not responsible for macro-economic policies. Duch and Taylor (1997), however, do make this connection, and their research concludes that there is very little evidence to suggest that macro-economic fluctuations affect support for the EU. They find that unemployment is not significant in influencing support for integration, but inflation is. They argue that this is merely coincidental because all through the 1980s inflation declined as a response to policy responses to the inflationary post-oil crisis. To demonstrate this Duch and Taylor incorporate a lagged dependent variable into their Panel Corrected Standard Error (PSCE) estimation, after which the coefficient for inflation becomes insignificant (1997, 75-7). The findings of previous research, such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), that finds a relationship between EU, support and macro-economics is spurious according to Duch and Taylor (1997, 77). As the European Union is merely a peripheral player in the control of monetary and fiscal policy, Duch and Taylor argue that macro-economic fluctuations do not directly affect evaluations of the
EU (1997, 78). However, this theory depends upon a degree of sophistication among mass publics to make this distinction. Moreover, they end their analysis in 1989 and fail to extend their research into the 'Maastricht era', which, one suspects, would not support their analysis as convincingly.

Duch and Taylor (1997) forward the idea that evaluations of national incumbents will shape mass attitudes towards the European Union (68). Their analysis does not bear this out, and only Britain shows significance, but that is understandable because the date of the data matches the premiership of Euroskeptic Margaret Thatcher. Duch and Taylor also find that targeted spending in less developed regions does not affect the level of support in these regions in comparison with regions that over-contribute. Although, individuals that gain from the comparative advantage of integration, determined by education, wealth, occupation and region, are found to be more supportive of the integrative process, but at a decreasing level over time (Duch and Taylor, 1997, 77-8).

Summary

It is clear from the review of the literature, that there is very little agreement about what actually motivates public support for European integration. There is a great deal of concentration on economic motivations, but at different levels of analyses, and with very different results. No research has seriously attempted to measure the impact of changes in the economic or political framework of the European Union, such as the impacts of the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty. There is no work that has convincingly concluded what influences the attitudes of European mass publics towards the Union.
In the next section I will formulate a theory that attempts to address this gap in the literature. Whilst building upon the existing body of knowledge, I will attempt to improve this research with regard to economic motivations, and formulate an improved theory that incorporates the effects of major changes in the European Union, such as the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORY AND OPERATIONALISATION

The previous chapter discussed the developments of the research on public support for European integration. There are numerous reasons why investigating the variations in public opinion regarding the European Union is important, even more so at this current time. With the hectic schedule of changes due in the short and medium-term future of the Union, such as a possible eastward expansion, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, or Monetary Union; gauging the timing of maximum public approval is imperative. The saliency of 'European issues' is also having more domestic electoral impact than ever before. The issue of Europe was of key importance in recent elections in France, Ireland and the United Kingdom. There was even further influence of the 'EU effect' in the post-election leadership contest of the British Conservative Party after their landslide defeat in the May election, which ended eighteen years of continuous government. This chapter attempts to expand on the previous research and formulate a viable theory, which can be empirically tested.

Theory

The origins of the European Union are the origins of an economic institution. Although many of the elites that were involved in its establishment had more political aims for the institution's development (such as Jean Monnet), the European Union was
fundamentally set up as an instrument of economic integration. Its first two names are
testaments to that: European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic
Community. Although there are obvious signs of additions to this original purpose, the
Union remains strongly intertwined with economics. Dalton and Eichenberg (1993)
assert that “if the EU has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member
states’ national economic welfare” (510). Anderson and Reichart (1996) emphasize that:

> The EU is, first and foremost, an economic union and trade organization that was
designed to facilitate trade among its member states as well as integrate those
sectors of West European economies vital to a country’s industrial survival. (232)

Therefore, any theory of public support for the European Union has to take into account
the importance of economics.

From the existing literature we can see that there is no clear consensus of which
economic factors are important. Some find that economic factors are important at the
individual level (Anderson and Reichart, 1996; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and
Whitten 1997; Duch and Taylor 1997), and others at the national level (Eichenberg and
Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler, 1996). However, the significance of
individual level data is frequently less than convincing. Although there is a tendency for
support for European integration to be higher among certain occupations, incomes and
educational level, it rarely variates enough to provide an adequate explanation of what
guides people’s perception of the EU (see Deflam and Pampel, 1996).

As discussed above, there is a significant body of work that exists which stresses
the importance of macro-economic variables in shaping public opinion towards political
choices, especially voting (see Lewis Beck 1988). Probably the most important
measurements of a country's macro-economic performance are inflation, unemployment and gross domestic product (GDP). Although there is no absolute consensus in the literature, I expect that an improved economic performance will lead to more favorable attitudes to integration. Because of the economic nature of the Union in the perception of its citizens, the presence of favorable economic circumstances will be accompanied by a favorable disposition to the Union. Poor economic performance usually stimulates protestation against those accountable for the economic situation. Therefore, the European Union will experience less support, as will an incumbent national government, when economic times are hard. To this end, any increase in GDP, or decrease in inflation or unemployment, will lead to increases in public support for European integration.

These three measures are the most comparable economic factors across countries. Although other economic measures may have some relevance for particular nations or circumstances, inflation, unemployment and GDP are the most consistent across time and between countries.

The economic nature of the European Union also suggests that level of investment might be a useful determinant of economic performance. However, further investigation shows that the variable for investment is highly correlated with that of growth in real GDP. A cross-correlation matrix for the remaining three continuous economic variables can be seen in Table 1. This initial research shows that inflation, unemployment and economic growth are not significantly correlated with each other.
Table 1 – Correlation Matrix of Macroeconomic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>RGDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGDP</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other research has attempted to demonstrate correlations between budget returns and support for integration, or percentage of EU trade dependence and support as more direct measures of economic evaluations. These measures, however, are flawed. Increased support for higher budget returns simply hypothesizes that the poorer the country, the greater the support. This would result in the richer countries having the least amount of support for integration. If that was the case it seems very unlikely that the Union would have lasted so long as an economic institution. Although research, such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), shows that EU budget returns have virtually no influence on public support for the Union. They attribute this conclusion to the lack of awareness of these gains, or because the perceived benefits of integration are intangible benefits that cannot be measured by budgetary statistics (524). EU trade dependence assumes a high degree of sophistication from the public that they can identify levels of trade increasing within the Union. This theory would also hypothesize that an increase in wealth from increased trading with the United States, Japan or post-communist republics of Eastern Europe, for example, would cause a decrease in support for the European Union.

Unemployment and inflation are sometimes merged to form a more complete variable, often called a ‘hardship’ variable. However, for influencing possible support
for European integration they may measure slightly different phenomena. Moreover, as stressed by Lewis-Beck (1988, 11), these variables may differ in influence between countries, such as greater sensitivity to inflation in Germany or unemployment in France. Therefore, the variables will be measured separately. Gross domestic product is a more positive measurement of national economic wealth, and is the best measure of overall living standards. All three economic variables are hypothesized to influence support for European integration as followed:

\[ H^1 \text{ Increases in the rate of inflation over time will create a decrease in public support for the European Union.} \]

\[ H^2 \text{ Increases in the rate of unemployment over time will create a decrease in public support for the European Union.} \]

\[ H^3 \text{ Increases in economic growth over time will create an increase in public support for the European Union.} \]

These three hypotheses account for variation of support for the European Union with fluctuations of national economic performance. A more direct measure of the affects of economics on support for the Union can be observed by looking at the changes in the Union itself. During the period of this research (1978 to 1994) the European Union went through two major changes in its structure: In 1986, the members approved the Single European Act (SEA), and in 1992 the Treaty of European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty). Both pieces of legislation covered many areas, both economic and political. Possibly of greater significance: both treaties received widespread media attention, therefore, reaction to EU policy in these two instances does not require a high
level of political sophistication. The SEA was predominantly the final step towards a complete common market, Maastricht, as I will argue later, was mainly seen as a step towards political integration. The SEA and the '1992 project' stressed the further liberalization of trade and a completion of the single market with free movement of labour, capital and goods. The European mass publics perceived this change as a movement towards greater economic integration, which it was. Therefore, I expect the European mass publics to increase their support for the Union in response to the Union improving its economic structure.

$H^4$ The passing of the Single European Act created an increase in public support for the European Union.

The theoretical approaches that dominated the early years of post-war European integration, functionalism and neo-functionalism, stressed the importance of incremental economic integration leading to greater political integration. In some respects this has been the case. From the early years of the Common Market has emerged a more politically centered Union. The European Union now operates above the level of economics and trade. The European Court of Justice, for example, has a responsibility to enforce law, and making what is, in effect, judicial law that supercedes the authority of national courts (Nugent, 1994, 220). Another institution that is obviously politically centered is the European Parliament. Elected every five years, it is the principal democratic demonstration of support by the European mass publics. Although most evidence of voting motivations and campaign platforms concludes that elections are
fought along regular party political lines. "They are fought by national political parties and politicians, mainly over national problems, concerns and issues" (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996, 287).

On the whole, the political integration of Europe is not viewed as fondly amongst the European public as economic integration. This can be seen by the Maastricht-approving referenda in Denmark and France, where the issues of national sovereignty were at the forefront of the campaigns. In France, for example, many people were appalled to discover that the Treaty would allow other European citizens to vote in French local elections (New York Times, 9 July 1992, quoted in Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994, 459). Franklin, Marsh and McLaren see Maastricht as "uncorking the bottle of popular opposition to European unification" (1994, 455). They identify the Treaty as an intention to capitalize on the triumph of the Single European Market by opening the way to a political union that would compliment the economic union achieved by the SEA. Although the Maastricht Treaty did contain elements of economic integration the main changes to the Union were perceived as being increased political integration. An example of this occurred when British Prime Minister, John Major, fearing an unpopular backlash from both the British people and his Conservative party,

5 Although some members are elected on a purely 'anti-European stance'. One example of this is MEP Sir James Goldsmith, the leader of the Referendum Party in the UK, who was elected (in France) with no other policy than dismantling of the EU.

6 As Franklin, Marsh and McLaren emphasize: completion of the Single European Market required a single currency, which required a single central bank, which required a single monetary policy, which required coherent policy-making in many areas, including foreign and defense policy (1994, 455-6).
succeeded in negotiating an opt-out from one of the main facets of the Treaty: the Social Charter. I expect that the change negotiated at Maastricht will have the opposite affect to that of the SEA.

\( H^5 \) The passing of the Treaty on European Union created an increase in public support for the European Union.

A further example of the political nature of the European Union is the direct elections of members of the European Parliament. These elections occur at five-year intervals and on these occasions the issue of European integration is more salient, and the political nature of the Union emphasized. I expect that the attention that these elections generate creates negative attitudes to European integration in the years the elections take place. Generally, the public holds negative views towards the politicization of the European Union. The increased media coverage, and the opportunity to vote, creates a temporary saliency of the European Union as a political institution, which manifests itself as an abrupt temporary decrease in support for the integration process. This is the opposite affect expected from democratizing the institution; one of the motivations for introducing direct elections was to mobilize support for the Union. The view of Gabel and Palmer (1995), that the barrages of positive information associated with EP elections is not a plausible one. European elections are rarely exercises in the dissemination of European Union propaganda, but are fought along regular political lines. Frequently these elections are the principal occasions when politicians with negative views of the
European Union can express these opinions; domestic issues such as education, health or defense, for example, are far more salient during a general election than European issues.

\[ H^0 \text{ European election years create a temporary decrease in public support for the European Union.} \]

Operationalization

Differences between public support for the process of European integration occur principally at the national level. This can be seen by the wide disparity of support between countries in figures 1 through 5, although I will argue later that trends around different baselines demonstrate that there is a transnational tendency for public support to fluctuate in similar directions at the same time. Despite the integrated nature of the European market, the performance of this market is still measured at the national level, certainly with regard to the salient economic factors such as inflation, unemployment and national income (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 510). Moreover, there are no adequate measures of systemic-level economic performance for the European Union; therefore this analysis will be conducted at the aggregate national level.

Operationalizing Support for European Integration

One of the main discussions in the literature is the operationalization of the dependent variable: support for European integration, or support for the European Union. An advantage of focusing on public opinion research in the countries of Western Europe is the existence of *Eurobarometer* surveys that have been conducted at regular intervals
since 1970. Since the mid-1970s these surveys have been conducted biannually in the spring and the autumn. For the purpose of this study I have merged the surveys for each year together. This gives a large 'N' for each time point (years), and avoids the distortions of seasonality that some research reflects. For example, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) use each survey as a separate unit and utilize quarterly data to match the timing of the survey. Not only does this method omit six months of data each year, but it is also subject to the seasonal distortions that exist in economic performance.

There are a number of questions in the Eurobarometer surveys dealing implicitly with the issue of European integration. One of these questions asks whether the respondent considers the movement towards European unification should be speeded up, continue as present or slowed down. This question was asked in the early Eurobarometers, but only intermittently since 1979. One of the reasons for this is the unreliable responses between countries. The question was found to measure different concepts between countries. Therefore this variable is inappropriate for this research project, which strives for a consistent time-series data set.

The other two questions asked in the Eurobarometer surveys have been asked in every survey since autumn 1978. I have merged together the responses from each of the biannual surveys from 1979 to 1994 into one yearly total. The data for 1978 is taken just from the autumn survey, but with a substantial 'N' of almost 7000 for the five countries eventually selected for the research. The two questions are worded as follows:

Question A: In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?
Question B: Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership in the European Union is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

The responses for question A are good, bad or neither good nor bad. The responses for question B are strongly for, to some extent for, to some extent against and very much against. Both of these questions have been asked in every survey since the autumn 1978 Eurobarometer. One of the aims of this research was to establish a large and consistent data set for the period of interest. For this reason only countries that were members for the entire seventeen-year period were considered, which means that late joiners Greece, Spain and Portugal were not considered. Also, the data used is weighted using the European weight variable that adjusts each national sample in proportion to its share of total EU population. Only countries with a reliably large number of respondents in each year, after weighting, were used. This discounts Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark and Belgium. The five members with the largest populations remain, which (at 85 cases) is more than adequate for a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. The Eurobarometer research within the United Kingdom is conducted separately for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Obviously, it is desirable to include responses for all the regions of a country, so the data for Britain and Northern Ireland are merged together.

There are a number of ways of constructing a dependent variable from these two variables, and I have chosen to demonstrate my model using more than one. For question A responses have been coded as; favor EU strongly = 4, favor EU to some extent = 3, against EU to some extent = 2, against EU strongly = 1. From these responses an
aggregated mean score has been calculated, the country trends can be seen in figure 6. This variable includes all the data available, not just variations of high support, and is the most complete variable used. However, other variables can be constructed that show support for integration, but differ significantly from the mean variable. One way is to use all the strongly favorable responses, which reflects the high levels of support for the EU in each of the countries. The trends for strongly favorable responses, as well as all favorable responses can be seen for each country in figures 1 through 5. From question B three alternative variables can be utilized: ‘good’ responses to reflect support for membership of the Union, ‘bad’ responses to show opposition for the EU, and see the model work in the obverse. These trends are also mapped in figures 1 through 5. Another variable, as used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), is to show the net support for membership, i.e. ‘bad’ responses subtracted from ‘good’ responses. The net responses for each country can be seen in figure 7.

Some existing research argues that the two questions measure different responses: question B measures utilitarian support for integration because it asks for an appraisal of EU membership, question A measures affective support because it asks for the extent of attachment to European integration (see Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, or Anderson and Reichert, 1996). However, when these differences are empirically analyzed the two variables appear to tap the same phenomena. This can be seen by a strong correlation between the responses to the questions in each Eurobarometer survey (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). A factor analysis by Deflam and Pampel (1996) finds that the two questions
essentially measure one underlying factor, at least in their years of investigation; 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1992 (139).

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in which all the European Union countries are members, provides data on a wide range of macro-economic variables. The inflation variable can be established from the consumer price index (CPI) recorded each year. This figure is calculated as the year to year percentage change of the CPI in each country. Unemployment is calculated as the percentage of the total labour force unemployed. This figure is standardized to account for the different definitions of unemployment in each country. The measurement of economic growth is taken from the real gross domestic product (RGDP) data, which measures national income/wealth. The variable used is percentage change from year to year, and can be, and occasionally is, negative. Although the mean percentage change from year to year in the five countries is a positive 2.1%. All the economic variables are yearly performance variables. Any monthly, quarterly, or biannual economic data would be distorted by a degree of seasonality.

The variable that reflects the effect of the Single European Act (SEA) is constructed as a dummy variable, coded with values of 0 up to the year of the

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7 An example of the need for having this variable standardized can be seen by the adjustment of the UK government's definition of unemployment during this period, which changed 30 times, 29 of which caused the published rate of unemployment to fall (The Economist, 1995, cited in Duch and Taylor, 1997, 79).
intervention, and a value of 1 for the proceeding years. Although the Act was actually formerly signed in 1986, it received maximum exposure around, and after, its signing. Therefore, the effect is not picked up by the biannual Eurobarometer surveys until 1987. I expect that the effect of the SEA is not short-lived, but continues for a number of years due to the enactment of the Treaty and the much publicized ‘1992 project’ that symbolized the conclusion of its purpose. The SEA significantly changed the nature of the Union, and thus the public’s perception towards the EU. Therefore I have modeled the impact as being an abrupt, in 1987, permanent affect. The variable for the effect of the Maastricht Treaty is also constructed as a dummy variable, coded as 1 for the year 1992. The Maastricht Treaty received much greater exposure prior to its signing, and reaction to its effect can be seen immediately. The data series ends in 1994, two years after the Treaty is signed. Because of the subsequent high profile media coverage of the referenda for the Treaty’s ratification, and the implications of the ratification, the Maastricht Treaty is modeled as a permanent intervention. Thus the Maastricht variable is coded with values of 0 until 1992, then values of 1 thereafter. If the data were available, one may also expect that its effect remains significant today.

The effect of the European elections is also constructed as a dummy variable. All years that elections to the European parliament occurred (1979, 1984, 1989 and 1994) are coded as 1, other years as 0. Because of the differences between cross-sections (countries) that can be seen in figures 1 through 7, country dummies are also incorporated into the model. The reasons for these differences arise from their different national identities, cultures, histories, experiences, length of EU membership and circumstances of
joining. There are also other reasons for the creation of these country variables, which are stipulated by the methodology used for analysis that will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

To analyze the hypotheses detailed in the previous chapter I will use a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set, which uses regression techniques across both space and time. There are a number of advantages to this approach. One advantage is that the multiplying of cases over time with the number of units (countries) increases the sample size and enables the researcher to conduct analyses in an area that may be difficult within a single unit. However, pooled cross-sectional time-series produces two main threats to inference: one, autocorrelation of the error terms, and two, the problem of heteroskedasticity, when there is unequal distribution of the error term. For these reasons Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is no longer an appropriate estimation technique because the coefficients produced are no longer unbiased.

There are a number of works that identify the problems of a pooled cross-sectional design (Stimson, 1985; Sayrs, 1989; Beck and Katz, 1995). James Stimson (1985) suggests four methods for dealing with these problems: one is to ignore it; two, is to use least squared dummy variables (LSDV) which will account for heteroskedasticity, but not the autocorrelation; three, is to work with the error components model (GLSE approach), which is useful for unit dominant data, but not as effective at dealing with time-series difficulties. A fourth method is the GLS-ARMA (General Least Squares -
The General Least squares approach estimates any first order autocorrelation (AR1) bias in the data. If autocorrelation exists it provides an estimate of its strength, rho, and takes this into account. The GLS-ARMA method utilizes dummy variables to correct for cross-sectional differences in the level of the dependent variable. Also, after conducting diagnostic tests for first order autocorrelation of the residuals, the model can be re-estimated with autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) parameters. James Stimson co-authored the 'Microcrunch' statistical program, which incorporates all of these methods for encountering the problems of pooled cross-sectional time series data. All procedures for this paper have used the 'Microcrunch' statistical program.

From the theory discussed in the previous chapter a model can be developed to empirically test the hypotheses. The model, incorporating the dummy variables, is as follows:

\[ EU_{ij} = a + \beta_1 \text{Inflation}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{Unemployment}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{RGDP}_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{SEA}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{Maastricht}_{ij} + \beta_6 \text{Elections}_{ij} + \delta_i \text{Country} + \theta(Bi)/\phi(Bi)\epsilon_t \]

Where:

- \( EU_{ij} \) = mean responses of attitudes towards European unification
- \( a \) = constant
- \( \beta_1 \text{Inflation}_{ij} \) = inflation (CPI) rate at time \( t \) in country \( j \)
- \( \beta_2 \text{Unemployment}_{ij} \) = percentage of total workforce unemployed at time \( t \) in country \( j \)
- \( \beta_3 \text{RGDP}_{ij} \) = percentage change in real GDP at time \( t \) in country \( j \)
$\beta_{4}\text{SEA}_j = \text{permanent intervention of the Single European Act}$

$\beta_{5}\text{Maastricht}_j = \text{permanent intervention of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union)}$

$\beta_{6}\text{EP elections}_j = \text{occurrence, or non-occurrence, of European election at time } t \text{ in country } j$

$\delta_i = \text{regression parameter for unit dummy variables}$

Country = country dummy variable

$\theta = \text{moving average parameter}$

$B_i = \text{backshift operator}$

$\phi = \text{autoregressive parameter}$

$\epsilon_t = \text{error term}$

Clarke (1993) finds that the initial specification of his pooled cross-sectional time-series GLS-ARMA model is straightforward but for one exception. After including all the covariates (variables $\beta_1$-$\beta_3$) and the dummy variables for the three interventions (variables $\beta_4$-$\beta_6$), the question is which country dummies to include (Clarke, 1993, p9).

Inspection of the dependent variable (see figure 7) shows that levels of public support for European integration varies greatly across the five countries. Because of the variation of the levels of support between countries, and because of the need to control for national differences, four countries are incorporated into the model; one being suppressed as a baseline.
Original analysis of the OLS version of the model, which uses the mean score values as the dependent variable, shows that the pooled Durbin-Watson (D), which should be close to 2.0, is 1.31 and the R-squared is a very high 0.84. This strongly suggests that there is first order correlations of the residuals and that the general least squares approach is indeed necessary. The model is then repeated using the GLS-ARMA approach; the results can be seen in Table 2. The R-squared for the model using GLS-ARMA estimates is 0.72, a significantly high percentage of variance explained. As can be seen in Table 2, two of the three macro-economic variables are significant: inflation and unemployment. RGDP is not significant, but the coefficient is in the expected direction.

Table 2 – GLS-ARMA Estimates of Support for European Integration

Dependent Variable: Mean scores of Attitudes to European Unification in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard Errors</th>
<th>T Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.14***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGDP</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Elections</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 0.10 level for one-tailed test
** Significant at the 0.05 level for one-tailed test
*** Significant at the 0.01 level for one-tailed test/two-tailed test
The most impressive results are found for the two intervention variables for the major treaties of the period. As expected, the Single European Act, modeled as a delayed permanent intervention, is significantly correlated with increases in support for European integration. Along with the macro-economic variables, this strongly enforces the concept of higher support for European integration when there is economic improvement. The Maastricht Treaty, which was modeled as an abrupt permanent intervention, is also highly significantly correlated with decreases in support for European integration as hypothesized. Although the other political variable, the dummy variable of EP elections, is not significant, it is negatively correlated as expected. Other research has found that the initial EP election in 1979 was positively correlated with support for the European Union because of the novelty of exercising a democratic influence (Handley, 1981; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Allowing for this, and the lower saliency of the elections compared to the major treaties, this result is not entirely unexpected.

Table 3 – GLS Diagnostic Information by Cross Section for Regression in Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-section</th>
<th>Residual Mean</th>
<th>Residual Variance Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.0030</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>1.749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated from the ocular inspection of the time-series trends in Figure 7, all of the country variables are significant. Another diagnostic of the cross-sections, the
residual means and residual variance ratio, suggests that national variations are not so
great as to significantly bias results. However, the residual variance ratio is somewhat
high for United Kingdom. Further investigation finds this residual variance ratio to be
even higher for the UK when using alternative measurements for the dependent variable:
1.804 with percentage of respondents who favor unification, and 3.842 when net support
of respondents' evaluation of their country's membership is used. This leads us to
suspect that an analysis of members other than the UK, traditionally an outsider within
the European Community, may demonstrate even more convincing results.

There are a number of reasons why the United Kingdom can be considered
significantly different to the other four countries in the research. Firstly, they joined at a
different time, and in different circumstances than the other countries. Secondly, Britain
has a more insular foreign policy tradition in relation to Continental Europe, and a
"special relationship" with the United States (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 526).
Thirdly, the lack of diffuse support in that country for the European ideal, assumed for
most other members, has resulted in a continuing political debate with regard the
commitment to the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 526-7). As can be seen in Table 4,
there is evidence that the hypotheses are indeed strengthened when the model is run
without the United Kingdom. All the economic and political variables previously
significant have similar or slightly higher coefficients. The coefficients for both RGDP
and EP elections are considerably higher, and almost significant at the 0.5 level, and are

---

8 The principal reason for French President, Charles de Gaulle, vetoing Britain's first
formal application to join the Union in 1966.
once again in the expected direction. Although the R-squared for this analysis is smaller than the analysis for all five countries, it still remains respectably high at 0.63.

Table 4 – GLS-ARMA Estimates of Support for European Integration

Dependent Variable: Mean scores of Attitudes to European Unification in France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard Errors</th>
<th>T Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.61***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGDP</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Elections</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-4.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 0.10 level for one-tailed test
** Significant at the 0.05 level for one-tailed test
*** Significant at the 0.01 level for one-tailed test/two-tailed test

When the same model is run using other variations of the dependent variable, similar results are found, although with less variance explained. The R-squared for the variations of the evaluation of membership of the EU as the dependent variable are (using all five countries): percentage of 'good' respondents, $R^2 = 0.56$; percentage of 'bad' respondents, $R^2 = 0.35$; net percentage of support, $R^2 = 0.44$. One interesting aspect of using these dependent variables for the model is that the variable for economic growth, RGDP, is significant at the 0.01 level or higher in each of the three dependent variable measurements.
A further concern of pooled models of cross-national time-series data is the potential methodological problems attributable to fixed effects for particular years. For this reason the residual means for each year were checked. This diagnostic revealed that the residual means for each year are low, mostly close to zero. The highest residual mean is that for 1988 of 0.0826 for the model in Table 2 using all five countries, and 0.0672 for the model in Table 4. Other research, such as that of Gabel and Whitten (1997), incorporates dummy years to control for these effects, but the diagnostic information suggests that this is not necessary for this analysis.

It has been suggested that, because of the elite-driven nature of public opinion, support for European integration is subject to a lag effect (Duch and Taylor, 1997, 71-74). A lagged version of the dependent variable decreases the influence of short-term shocks. Duch and Taylor (1997) find that when they incorporate a lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of their model the economic variables for inflation and unemployment are no longer significant in the hypothesized direction, whilst the lagged dependent variable is. Moreover, their coefficients for unemployment suggest that higher levels of unemployment lead to increases in support for integration (Duch and Taylor, 1997, 73). Their findings, which were from data collected between 1975 and 1989, suggest that running the model incorporating a lagged dependent variable may account for some of these high correlations. The results of the model, including a lagged endogenous variable, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on all five countries, are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 – OLS Estimates of Support for European Integration with Lagged Endogenous Variable

Dependent Variable: Mean scores of Attitudes to European Unification in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard Errors</th>
<th>T Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.17***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged EU support</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGDP</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Elections</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 0.10 level for one-tailed test
** Significant at the 0.05 level for one-tailed test
*** Significant at the 0.01 level for one-tailed test/two-tailed test

Contrary to Duch and Taylor's (1997) results, Table 5 suggests that a lagged dependent variable is not significant. There is very little change in the values or significance of inflation and unemployment, with the significance of both variables actually increasing in the hypothesized direction. Although the most weakly correlated of the independent variables, RGDP and EP elections, do become more insignificant.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This research sought to explain the factors that create variation in support for European integration in the publics of Western Europe. As the primary instrument of European integration, the European Union is used as the obvious expression of a citizen’s view on the process of European integration. There are persuasive results to suggest that variation in public support is subject to changes in both the economic situation, and the economic and political changes in the Union during the last two decades.

The review of the literature revealed that there is a large body of work at the theoretical and institutional level of European integration, but that analysis of public opinion and European integration is not nearly as popular. There has been a tendency to concentrate the investigation of integration at the elite level. In recent years a limited number of empirical works have tried to test the factors that influence public support for European integration using quantitative methods. However, none of these works has managed to determine convincingly which factors are the most sufficient determinants of this support. I have attempted to build on these works by improving the methods for the operationalization of the economic theories of explanation. Furthermore, I have advanced the concept of the influence of institutional change, both economic and political with the incorporation of the intervention affects of the Single European Act and Treaty of
European Union. Expecting, and finding in the subsequent results, that economic change has a positive affect for support for integration, and political change a negative one.

The theoretical background to changes in European integration, such as the neofunctionalist theories, has been almost exclusively concentrated at the elite level. Work that has emphasized the importance of public opinion, such as that of Inglehart, has concentrated on the individual-level determinants of support for integration. There is clearly a need for more convincing theories of European integration that incorporate the advances in the integration process in recent years, as well as the emerging consensus regarding the importance of public opinion. This research has attempted to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the determinants of support for integration by positing a number of theoretical concepts, which can be rigorously tested by quantitative methods.

The quantitative analysis revealed that there is strong evidence to support the theories of macro-economic factors influencing public support for integration, such as those advanced by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993). Moreover, the results are more convincing than previous findings for a number of reasons, such as the improvements in the operationalization of the concept of support for integration and the length of the time-series data set analyzed. While support for integration is consistently positively correlated with measurements of the national income (growth in real GDP), there are not highly significant results for this variable. However, the more highly visible economic indicators, inflation and unemployment, are significantly correlated with public support for European integration. The results show that as the 'misery' variables of inflation and unemployment increase there is a significant negative correlation with support for
European integration. This demonstrates that when times are good mass publics are more supportive of the European Union, but when times are hard they blame the Union for not having the desired effect of improving ones economic circumstances. Despite the fact that the Union has little direct impact on macro-economic policies, it does seem to be held accountable by the citizens of its members.

These economic determinants of support for integration are also found in the effects of change in the economic structure of the integration process, which has been demonstrated by modeling the intervention of the Single European Act. The SEA of 1986, which created the most radical economic changes in the Community since its inception, was found to have significant effects on public opinion. The intervention of the SEA was found to be highly significant as a delayed abrupt affect. Moreover, as the policies of the SEA came into place, with the so-called '92 project', the effects of the SEA are even more significant. Thus, the intervention is modeled as a permanent effect, the significance of which is high.

The Maastricht Treaty, as one may expect from the observance of media coverage and the political recriminations of referenda and elections, had a major impact on public opinion. The Treaty on European Union was found to be highly correlated with support for European integration. Modeled as a permanent intervention (in a data set that runs to 1994) it was found to have significant negative affects on the integration process. Leading one to conclude that the political integration, so much at the forefront of the agenda of the Treaty, was a hugely unpopular change in the minds of the European mass publics. This negative attitude towards political integration is also enforced by negative
correlations of the European Parliament elections with support for integration. Although not highly significant, this intervention variable is consistently found to have negative affects on public support.

This study offers a number of potential implications for the future study and research of European integration, and could even influence the future practice of politics, with regard to highlighting favorable circumstances of change within the Union. The research adds to the body of knowledge on what determines the opinions of mass publics towards approval of the integrationary process in Europe. But the research does not challenge any universally believed concepts, but improves some of the existing concepts of public opinion towards the European Union discussed in the review of the literature. Moreover, the research offers a relatively new approach to how institutional changes, as with the SEA and Maastricht, have helped determine public attitudes towards Europe. Even if not revolutionary this research combines the ideas and theories of a number of scholars together to create a more substantial, coherent and parsimonious explanation of the subject.

This research may also have uses in the real world, and there are a number of likely areas where this may occur. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the public perception of the EU has moved away from the economic to the political. The Union is no longer simply a common market, but a political entity. Its more explicitly political concerns have included its move into the world of foreign and defense policy, as demonstrated by the actions of the Western European Union (WEU) in the former Yugoslavia, and the role played in both the transformation to democracy and to market
capitalism in the formerly communist Central and Eastern European states. Also, since 1979, direct elections have been added to one of the EU institutions, the European Parliament. Such steps have helped reduce the democracy deficit within the EU and bring many of the European issues to the forefront of party politics within EU member states. Referenda in certain countries have also helped to reduce this deficit. As the Union moves towards being more political in nature, it becomes a more salient issue to the mass publics. Therefore, politicians and the institutions within the EU have to act in a more accountable manner. Knowing what characteristics and situations promote positive (or even negative) attitudes towards European integration can help with the formulating of policies, or even dictate electoral campaigns.

A solid and testable theory of what factors generate approval for the integration process in Europe is a desirable addition to political science. This is not only for promoting integration among the fifteen current European Union member states, but also for the expansion towards the Central and Eastern European states and for providing a more fruitful model for the study of regional organizations around the globe. While international relations are going through such an unstable time and disintegration is more common than integration, greater knowledge on why the EU has been so successful should have utility for practical politics.
APPENDIX

FIGURES
Figure 1 - Support for the European Union in France

Figure 2 - Support for the European Union in the Netherlands
Figure 3 - Support for the European Union in Germany

Figure 4 - Support for the European Union in Italy
Figure 5 - Support for the European Union in the UK

- Favor EU strongly
- Favor EU in total
- EU a good thing
- EU a bad thing
Figure 6 - Public Support for the European Union (mean score of responses to Eurobarometer question: "Are you for or against membership of the EU?")
Figure 8 - Macro-economic Variables for France 1978-94

Figure 9 - Macro-economic Variables for the Netherlands 1978-94
Figure 12 - Macro-economic Variables for the United Kingdom 1978-94

- Inflation
- Unemployment
- RGDP
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