MODELING STATE REPRESSION IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE:
A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Advisory Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

John C. King, B.A., M.A.
Denton, Texas
December, 1993
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Until recently, scholars have not directed much attention toward isolating the phenomenon of state repression and determining how to measure and analyze it in an empirical, comparative fashion. This study is an attempt to contribute to the emerging theoretical literature on state repression. A time-series model was developed to test the hypothesis that state violence in Argentina and Chile is largely a function of four internal political factors and their interactions: 1) the inertial influence of past restrictive policies on the formulation of current policies, 2) the annual incidence of political protest demonstrations, 3) the perceived effectiveness of repressive measures on unrest, and the institutionalization of military rule.

The years 1940 to 1982 were studied in the case of Argentina, and 1948 to 1991 for Chile. The *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators: 1948-82* was the primary source of data for the study for most of the years. Original data were collected and merged with the handbook data for the years outside of its time frame.
Comparative multiple regression analyses showed that the model works well for Argentina, but not as well for Chile. Only one component of the model, political protest demonstrations, is strong across both countries. Since the results from the analyses do not support cross-national generalizations, specific adjustments to the model and alternative measures of some of the variables are suggested. In these ways, the study contributes to the construction of a general theory of repression.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches to the Study of Repression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of This Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY: THE CASES OF</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARGENTINA AND CHILE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1940 - 1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 1948 - 1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematical Specification of the Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Subhypotheses, Independent Variables, and Their Operationalizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory Tests of the Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological Assumptions and Tests for Autocorrelation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Methodological Assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests for Autocorrelation in the Project Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification for Using Ordinary Least Square Indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. STATISTICAL FINDINGS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT</strong></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1940 - 1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 1948 - 1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 114

Lessons Learned
Recommendations for Further Research

REFERENCE WORKS ........................................... 128
LIST OF TABLES

Table

1. Multiple Regression Estimates for State Repression in Argentina For The Years 1940 to 1982 .......................... 89

2. Predicted Values and Differences for the Model for Argentina .................................................. 93

3. Multiple Regression Estimates for State Repression in Chile for the Years 1948 to 1991 ......................... 104

4. Predicted Values and Differences for the Model for Chile .................................................. 110
LIST OF FIGURES

Figures

1. Overlay Plot of Predicted and Actual Incidents of State Repression in Argentina With Year ........................................ 84

2. Overlay Plot of Predicted and Actual Incidents of State Repression in Chile With Year ........................................ 101
In a report not long ago, Amnesty International (AI) estimated that close to twenty thousand people perished in Argentina during the decade of the 1970s as victims of official governmental violence and repression. The "disappeared," as they are officially called, were often innocent citizens who were either identified as or were vaguely suspected of being subversives by the military government and, therefore, were considered a threat to Argentina's security. The pattern of governmental arrest, torture, and murder of these people was documented by AI and by the country's judicial authorities as the courts attempted to sort out what happened and to determine who or what was responsible (Pion-Berlin 1984, 99; Elon 1986, 74-85).

As more information has become available, it is clear that the violence was more than a "limited response" by an authoritarian government to civil strife. Perhaps a better description is that it was a case of "state terrorism" reminiscent of Hitler's Germany in which the rule of law was arbitrarily suspended, the activities of a
secret police were intensified, and ordinary citizens chose not to acknowledge fully what was going on as long as they were not directly touched by it (Sloan 1984, 87-8; Elon 1986, 74-85). It is also clear that the military government had defeated its "subversive" opponents by the mid 1970s, yet the violence continued unabated into the late 1970s, seemingly without a clear reason.

The problems that Argentina has had with internal state violence are not unique. In fact, many of the Latin American countries have had problems with repression and state violence throughout their modern histories (Guatemala, Cuba, Haiti, and Paraguay, for example). How can such tragedies be explained, particularly in a country like Argentina which is considered one of the most, if not the most, modern in Latin America? What are the causes of and conditions under which internal governmental violence takes place, and why does it often persist for many years beyond the event or events that may have precipitated it? These questions form the basis of the problem to be studied here.

From a humanitarian perspective, it is important for us to gain a better understanding of these issues so that we as citizens of and policy makers in the world can learn how to prevent or mitigate such patterns of tragic political behavior. From a methodological perspective,
there is a need for theorists to view the problem of state repression as a discrete political phenomenon. Only then can we examine the problem objectively and hope to gain some clear insight into it. The project developed here is intended to help fill this gap in the political violence literature (described in the next section) by isolating state repression in the regression model used.

This study is a comparative time-series analysis of variance in state violence and repression in Argentina between the years 1940 and 1982, and Chile between 1948 and 1991. Argentina's tragic use of state repression and terror prompted me to try to find a way or ways to explain the problem in a clear and systematic fashion. For comparative purposes, Chile has been selected because it too is a modern, developing country with a recent history of governmental repression and violence. The years under study capture the modern political histories of both countries and covers the most recent period for which data are available. The time series for each of the two countries includes approximately forty points of measurement (measured annually) for each variable in the model. Furthermore, the political events data utilized in this project are available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) for
most of the designated time span and for the variables
specified in the model, described below in Chapter IV.

Chapter II summarizes the current literature on state
repression. Points of tangency between this study and
other works are noted, as well as a brief description of
what this work contributes. The modern political context
of Argentine and Chilean politics is established in
Chapter III. The chapter summarizes historical events
over the past century and focuses on political trends that
help to explain regime instability and political violence
in both countries since the 1940s. Chapter IV provides a
detailed description of the analytical model developed for
the study. It includes the specification of the
mathematical formula, descriptions of the variables,
subhypotheses to be tested, and sources for and
aggregations of the data. Also included is a discussion
of and test for the problem of autocorrelation in the
project data and a justification for using Ordinary Least
Square indicators.

Results from the regression and other data are
analyzed in Chapter V and are linked to the historical
information provided in Chapter III. The final chapter
discusses the theoretical and practical implications of
the study and proffers recommendations for further study.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter summarizes the theoretical literature on state-sponsored violence. One of the central concerns of analysts in the field is the separation, for analytical reasons, of the phenomenon of state violence from larger conceptualizations such as authoritarian regimes. This review highlights the concern and shows how some scholars are approaching the study of repression as a discrete political phenomenon. Included in the chapter is a brief description of how this study relates to and distinguishes itself from the literature.

Approaches to the Study of Repression

Refinements over the last twenty-five years in theory development on modernization, authoritarian regimes, and political violence provide rich sources to draw from in attempting to explain the causes and persistence of state repression in regions such as Latin America, that have had so many problems with modernization and violence. Yet throughout most of these years there has been a curious lack of attention to the development of a general theory
of state repression and violence. This omission has resulted from essentially two related trends among scholars. First, those interested in the problems of political violence have traditionally focused on explaining the causes of insurgent violence and the relationship between those causes and the process of modernization (Among the best examples are Davies 1962, 5-19 and 1971; Olsen 1963, 529-58; Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr 1972; Huntington, 1968; Gurr 1970 and 1974, 1482-1504; Bwy 1968, 17-66; Russett 1971, 206-13; Tilly and Tilly 1981; Walton 1984; Skocpol 1986, 68-87.) Second, official governmental violence has been systematically thought of as simply a factor in a larger context such as totalitarian, authoritarian, and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. (Examples include Arendt 1966; Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Huntington and Moore 1970; Perlmutter 1981; O'Donnell 1973; and Collier 1979). In fact, the labels used most often to refer to state-directed violence in these contexts - counter terrorism and counter insurgency - actually imply the problem of a lack of theoretical integrity in conceptualizing state violence as a separate analytical category (Stohl and Lopez 1984, 3; examples are Stepan 1976, 244-60; Barber and Ronning 1966; and Francis 1964, 389-401). Thus, the typical conclusion reached by most
theorists of political violence and modernization, however tenuously held, is that state repression is most often committed by modernizing, authoritarian governments as a consequence of and official response to popular political violence and unrest. The unrest, in turn, is possibly caused by a complex interaction of many factors related to the socioeconomic environment, political development, and change.

The problem with this perspective is that it is conceptually limiting. It implicitly promotes the construction of research designs which in effect preclude analysts from fully examining the problem of state repression as a discrete political phenomenon - its causes, its impact on the polity, the reasons why it persists, and a host of other questions. By contrast, this same research limitation does not limit the literature on other state-centric political problems such as war. John McCamant suggests that the limitation is based in Western social science's unconscious "antiseptic" view of governmental aggression. He asserts that until new analytical models are developed, Western scholars will continue to view governmental aggression against its own citizens as a peripheral problem (Duff and McCamant 1984, 83-98). Current political violence and modernization theory, in this significant way, falls short of providing
a theoretical framework for the systematic analysis of state repression.

Analysts of political terrorism, as a related but separate focus, have also failed to devise constructs which may be useful in investigating problems with state repression. The essential criticisms of the literature are that it is inadequate in both scope and depth of coverage and lacks systematized concepts, definitions, and research questions (Mickolus 1980; Wardlaw 1982). The consequence, according to Bowyer Bell in perhaps slightly overstated tones, is that "[t]errorism has as a by-product a vast cottage industry of self-declared analysts and specialists, who with not very visible qualifications have yet to produce a common wisdom" (Bell 1980, 201, cited in Singh 1991, 5).

Although no consensus has evolved on how best to develop a theory of state repression, a few scholars have explored new ways to frame and analyze the problem. For example, the first taxonomy, focused on domestic governmental violence appeared only in 1984 (López 1984, 59-98). Some of the latest and most interesting works are contained in the same volume.

Ernest Duff and John McCamant contributed a similar pathfinder volume earlier in 1976 when they published their Violence and Repression in Latin America: A
Quantitative and Historical Analysis. The principal task was twofold: 1) to identify possible indicators of repression and violence that could contribute to the construction of meaningful analytical models and theory; and, 2) to provide a historical survey of the problem of state repression and violence throughout the Latin American states. It was an early contribution to the literature, and remains an important volume.

Political violence scholars, as mentioned above, focused most of their attention throughout the 1970s and 1980s on developing theories of insurgent violence (e.g., relative deprivation and its variants, and social mobilization), and, as noted, no empirically based theoretical work appeared on the subject of state repression until 1984. Although the recent (1984) analysts may lack the historical perspective of the earlier (1976) ones, they demonstrate a greater application of scientific methodology and rigor in their analyses. The result is a growing, scientifically based body of literature focused on the analysis of repression per se.

One of the new ways of thinking about repression is to link it to external actors, ideas, or circumstances. David Pion-Berlin's work is particularly illustrative of this trend. His research question is: Could the
particular economic orientation of Argentine policy makers and their alliances with international creditors help to explain the causes and persistence of repression in the state between the years 1955 and 1980? His findings suggest that Argentine policy makers had "become more willing to use force to guarantee the longevity of programs most favored by their international creditors . . . and orthodox stabilization measures usually topped the 'most favored list'" (Pion-Berlin 1984, 119).

His study provides empirical support for the hypotheses that international alliances and the political elite's perceptions of economic doctrine may have helped determine the use of repression in Argentina, and perhaps could do so elsewhere. This is clearly a contribution to the repression literature, particularly the measurement and analysis of the relationship between elite perceptions of economic doctrine and the formulation of repressive policies. The overall contributions are the precision he brings to the analysis and his focus on repression as a discrete variable.

John Sloan's work with political culture and its implications for state repression, by contrast, while interesting and intuitively appealing, has not been as successful in contributing to a new analytical model. He
suggests that cycles of governmental violence in Latin America can be explained best as a function of the region's "fragmented political culture." Fragmentation in Latin American political culture, he maintains, has resulted from the Iberian style of governing in which all power was in the hands of a few elites, popular political participation was excluded, and a high stakes "political game" was established (Sloan, 1984:83-98). Sloan's generalizations are difficult to substantiate because they are based on the vague concept of political culture, and thus, on an unclear level of analysis.

Jim Zwick's analysis of repression in the Philippines is conceptually close to Pion-Berlin's work. He examines the security relationship between Ferdinand Marcos and U.S. policy makers and argues that the alliance between them promoted internal militarization: an expanded role of the military in the developmental process, a centralization of power, and extensive military expenditures that directed money away from needed social programs. His thesis is that the security and military relationship between Marcos and U.S. policy makers helped to set internal trends that, in effect, evolved into a political climate where it became easy and, at times, necessary (from Marcos' point of view) to implement repressive policies. Essential to the evolution in the
political climate were Marcos's predilection, tacitly supported by U.S. policy makers, toward the pronounced role of the Philippine military in the creation of a "New Society" (Zwick 1984, 123-44).

Zwick's analysis supports the notion that state violence is partially a component of regime type, but he goes further than other theorists. His contributions are found in his explicit linkage of external military influences (from the U.S.) to the causes of internal state repression in the Philippines, his explanation of the dynamics of the alliance, and the identification of all of the actors.

Michael Stohl offers a slightly different model. With Pion-Berlin and Zwick, he asks whether internal acts of state repression and violence are connected in some way to external events or circumstances. His model, however, focuses on measuring the influence of other, more general phenomena such as wars and the realist international political environment. His conclusion is that such external events and circumstances are indeed factors as they help to shape a given policy maker's perceptions about the use of force to solve political conflicts internationally as well as domestically (Stohl 1976 and 1984, 11-42).
Karandeep Singh focuses on the reciprocal impact of regime repression and political terrorism in India from 1984 to 1990 (Singh 1991). He utilizes sophisticated methodology to show empirical linkages between the violent behavior of a state (India in this case) and its opponents (Sikh terrorists) over time. In short, he shows that the behavior between the two is often reciprocal, and in so doing, Singh influences the study of state-directed internal violence.

Contribution of This Study

This study is related to the literature described above in several ways. Perhaps most significantly, it also brings the study of governmental repression to the forefront as a discrete, measurable political phenomenon. Taking cues from the literature, it incorporates new but as yet untested indicators, such as the perceptions of policy makers over time (Pion-Berlin 1986, 49-56). It also helps to extend the literature to include better, more precise applications of regression procedures framed in longitudinal time-series analyses.

The study departs from the literature in two notable ways, however. First, borrowing from decision theory, the analytical model tests (among other things) whether changes in governmental violence at any given time is
essentially a function of making incremental adjustments to established policies or practices. No other analyst identified in the literature has attempted to apply this notion to the study of repression, yet its inclusion seems completely practical as almost all human behavior is partially a function of past behavior.

Second, this project focuses exclusively on the analysis of two kinds of domestic political data: (1) annual levels of popular political protests and (2) annual incidents of governmental repression. As discussed above, most recent studies link variance in state repression to external influences or events. By contrast, this study will show that annual incidence of political protests, acts of repression, and their interactions over time, plus an indicator of regime type, can adequately account for much of the variation in the repression behaviors by the governments in Argentina and Chile between the years 1940 and 1991. In this way, the study illustrates a new and complementary approach to the study of state violence.
CHAPTER III

MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA AND CHILE

This chapter describes the major problems, trends, and politics in the modern political histories of Argentina and Chile that help place the analyses that follow into historical context. The discussion includes developments both prior to and during the years 1940 to 1991. The time frame is slightly different for each case, however.

Argentina, 1940 - 1982

Argentina is one of the most modern of the Latin American countries. It is highly urbanized, has a large middle class, and rivals many of the developed countries on many standard indicators of economic growth and modernization. Yet it has also been one of the more violent and troubled of the Latin American states throughout much of its recent history. Between the mid 1950s and the early 1980s in particular, the country had pervasive and almost continuous problems with political
repression, violence, and regime instability. Duff and McCamant attribute this apparent contradiction — modernized, yet unstable and repressive — to the interaction of three factors: 1) the failure of the middle class to find a lasting political consensus among the major contending groups in Argentine society, 2) the movement of thousands of European immigrants to Argentine urban centers during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and 3) the influence and legacy of Peronism (Duff and McCamant 1976, 236-41).

These factors, although helpful in explaining the Argentine paradox, are not exhaustive. Another factor that must be included is the distinctive attitude shared among traditional Argentine economic and military elites, and indicative throughout most other Latin America countries since the early part of the nineteenth century, that liberal politics and politicians are the twin evils of economic failure and political chaos. It is this assumption that over time provided military elites in Argentina and in other countries, such as Chile, with their rationale for periodic intervention, their intolerance of opposition, and the enlargement of their self-assigned role in the development process (Loveman and Davies 1989, 1-30).
As in other Latin American countries, a conservative oligarchy dominated Argentine political and economic life during the greater part of the nineteenth century. Financial success, particularly from the exportation of agricultural products to Europe and other parts of the world, gave the elite the resources to control the political and economic structure and direction of the country in ways that reflected its own interests. In effect, Argentina became a state based on the principles and practices of an autocratic republic. Centralized presidential power prevailed and was considered "flexible" in the event that extralegal measures were needed, order was maintained, opposition was not tolerated, and society was composed of hierarchical class relationships with power and privilege concentrated in the upper stratum.

The elite's dominance did not go unchallenged, however, particularly during the latter part of the century. Argentina had an economic boom during the 1880s which enriched not only the oligarchs but also a growing middle class that had up to that time been excluded from any meaningful political participation. When the middle sectors prospered along with the wealthy, they became discontented with the status quo and began to demand a greater role in the political process. By 1892 the middle
sectors joined forces and organized their own political party - the Radical Party (the Unión Cívica Radical or UCR)- in which Hipólito Yrigoyen became the dominant figure. Then came the Mexican Revolution and the political turmoil in Russia "which contributed to a general questioning of traditional [authoritarian] values and governmental systems and to the emergence of new concepts about societal relationships. Civilization came to mean democracy, and Latin American elites wanted to be included in the civilized world" (Loveman and Davies 1989, 7).

In 1912, after a decade of intense conflict between the ruling oligarchs and the Radical Party, the Conservative regime of Roque Sáenz Peña sponsored and passed through the Argentine congress fundamental electoral reforms that quickly changed Argentine political life. The reforms provided for universal male suffrage, secret balloting, and compulsory voting. The practical consequence was an immediate expansion of the electorate and political competition that led to a relatively quick transfer of power from the oligarchs to the Radicals. Yrigoyen became president in 1916 and within a few years the Radicals dominated both houses of Congress.

But Yrigoyen and the Radicals ultimately failed to provide the leadership that would alter the economic and
political structure or lessen the influence of the elite that ran it. Because of an unwillingness or inability to provide the reforms and practices necessary to sustain a fundamental political consensus, conflict began to pull the polity apart as the former ruling economic and military elites and a growing urban proletariat found their interests increasingly threatened by the Yrigoyen administration. These conditions and the 1929 depression confirmed the assumption long shared by the elites that liberal politics led to class conflict, political instability, and economic deterioration, and in so doing, frustrated national development (Duff and McCamant 1976, 237; Potash 1989, 93-105; Loveman 1989, 3).

In 1930 the military intervened without incident to "cleanse" the state of the mess the Radical politicians had made and return the country to an older order. Within two years political power was restored to the traditional oligarchy which ruled in coalition with the military for the next thirteen years and harsh austerity measures were imposed over the Argentine economy to cope with the depression.

Argentine politics had changed significantly since the 1920s, however, and the tactics that had worked for the agro-economic elite in the past, namely exclusionary politics and rigid controls over an economy focused on
foreign trade, now alienated the newly assertive middle sectors and a rapidly growing working class, and they provoked Argentine nationalists who resented the country's growing dependence on foreign investors (Wynia 1990, 148-50). By the early 1940s, the Conservatives' solutions to the country's problems were discredited and they were removed from power by another military coup in 1943.

As one of the original, but relatively minor, members of the 1943 coup, Juan Perón began his rise to power at this time. Quickly positioning himself by way of first the War Ministry and then the Labor Ministry, he built a powerful populist-based coalition among nationalists and industrialists within the Radical Party, pro-Axis factions within the military, and the alienated and disillusioned urban working class. His attacks on the traditional Argentine oligarchy and its supporters galvanized his popularity and won him the presidency in 1946 and again in 1951. Like the Conservatives and the Radicals before him, Perón's rise to power meant a rearrangement of the prevailing power structure to benefit the interests of his coalition.

Broadly conceived, Peronism was supposed to bring economic independence and prosperity to Argentina through an accelerated industrialization plan and through a redistribution of income from the upper to the lower
classes. In addition, workers were to be given "social justice" (Justicialismo) which, as Duff and McCamant explain, "never really amounted to more than Argentine populism with its promises to the forgotten Argentine" (Duff and McCamant 1976, 238).

Perón was in power for nine years before being ousted by yet another military coup in September 1955. His removal was triggered in large part by his failure to stabilize Argentina's deteriorating economic conditions. Between 1950 and 1955, the per capita gross domestic product declined to an annual average rate of 0.2 percent and real per capita income fell to 0.5 percent, down from an average of 2.8 percent and 3.7 percent from 1945 to 1950 respectively. By the mid 1950s it was clear that the Peronista development plan failed to provide economic independence and prosperity for Argentina. Instead, it had led to economic stagnation and political demoralization (Wynia 1990, 156).

The political climate was destabilized further by Perón's increasingly autocratic and arbitrary policy decisions during the 1950s. These included his expropriation of the leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and other acts of repression leveled against his opponents; his creation of an official Peronist Party in 1952; his obvious attempts to expand his power over the
military; and, finally, his challenge to the authority of the Catholic Church in 1954 over such issues as divorce and education all contributed to a sharp division between the Peronistas and others and resulted in undermining the support and cooperation from economic sectors that he needed to carry forth his programs (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 91-4; Wynia 1990, 156-7).

Anti-Perón factions within the military tried to move against him several times from June to August 1955, but failed. Then in September 1955 coup plotters succeeded and exiled Perón to Paraguay, where he stayed for the next 14 years. By forcing Perón out, the more traditional military elites once again asserted their disdain for politicians and for politics in general. The issue was a familiar one: what was the role of politics in Argentina's national development? The anti-peronistas, composed of conservatives and certain sectors of the military (the colorados), perceived "the Peronists as an unmitigated evil, and . . . wanted a return to some sort of society controlled by the landed elite and in which labor [and all opposition] was kept in its place" (Duff and McCamant 1976, 238). The peronistas, by contrast, "wanted to eradicate the last vestiges of the landed elite, . . . saw the army as their sworn enemies, and . . . wanted an Argentine state run more or less on the populist lines put
forth by the official doctrine of Peronism" (Duff and McCamant 1976, 238). In between were the Radicals who by this time were politically ineffectual.

Following the 1955 coup, the obvious question for the Argentine generals was how much, if any, political participation was to be given to the peronistas. General Eduardo Leonardi, the original leader of the coup, lasted in office only fifty-five days before being replaced by General Pedro Aramburu, who took a much harder line against the peronistas than had Leonardi. Considering the antipolitical ideology that characterized the military elites' attitudes toward national development, Aramburu's goal was to eliminate Perón's influence, but at this he failed.

Immediately after the removal of Perón, peronistas across the entire country demonstrated their anger with a series of protests and clashes with the military. In 1956 they carried out an organized revolt against the Aramburu regime that was finally stopped when the regime conducted an air bombardment on Peronist positions around Buenos Aires. In 1957, massive protests occurred in the streets of La Plata and Buenos Aires. In 1958, new elections were allowed but the peronistas were completely excluded from participation (Duff and McCamant 1976, 239). Prior to the elections, the Radical Party split into two halves over
the peronista issue, further weakening its political base. On one side, the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI) wing of the Radicals, led by Arturo Frondizi, favored finding ways to accommodate and co-opt the interests of the peronistas. The Unión Cívica Radical Popular (UCRP), on the other side, wanted nothing to do with them.

Frondizi's promises to the Peronists ultimately did help him win the election, but he failed to resolve the problem of their political alienation. In fact, within a short time the Peronists rejected his government as empty and illegitimate, and he lost whatever support he had from them. Simultaneously, Frondizi's political maneuvering had seriously provoked the anti-peronistas. There was a coup attempt against him in 1960, which failed. In the same year the peronistas attempted a rebellion in the port city of Rosario, and the pro-Perón General Confederation of Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores - CGT) called a series of massive strikes. In sum, violence between the peronistas and anti-peronistas reached new, higher levels during these years. For these reasons and for the fact that the Peronists won numerous victories in the 1962 congressional and provincial elections in which they had been allowed to participate (one of Frondizi's promises), the military removed Frondizi in 1962, temporarily restored order, and installed José María
Guido, the President of the Senate, to preside on the military's behalf for the remainder of Frondizi's term (Duff and McCamant 1976, 239-40).

New elections were held in July 1963 and another civilian, Arturo Illia, was elected president. This time the peronistas were excluded at all electoral levels once again. Illia failed to resolve the domestic turmoil and growing economic problems. Consequently, in 1966, after only three years he was removed by yet another military coup.

General Juan Carlos Onganía's takeover in 1966 signaled a fundamentally new approach to Argentine politics. His intention was to completely transform the old system into a new one in which all executive decisions and policies would be developed and implemented by a coalition of military modernizers, technocrats in the bureaucracy, and foreign capitalist investors. This new arrangement - a bureaucratic authoritarian regime - explicitly excluded all professional politicians and other political actors, such as labor leaders, from the policy process. As such, it illustrated a maturation of the "ideology of antipolitics" held by Argentine military elites (Loveman and Davies 1989, 3). As implied earlier, the assumption of antipolitics holds that politics and politicians, competing over "ideologized formulas and the
spoils of rule, submerged most of the Latin American countries in bloody civil strife", and that only the military, trained to be depoliticized protectors of the national interest and thus supposedly above politics, could solve problems inherent in a country's development process efficiently and effectively. In contrast to past interventions, the military was determined and prepared to stay in power indefinitely to transform Argentina into a developed country.

The Onganía regime asserted itself forcefully as it moved to gain control of its political environment and to start the transformation process. Congress was shut down and the politicians dismissed, political parties dissolved, basic legal protections were suspended, and hundreds of Peronists and members of other leftist and labor groups were arrested (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 101). As the logic of antipolitics meant that no opposition to the government's authority, policies, or programs would be tolerated, the regime's solutions depended on coercion, particularly of the Perón-inspired labor movement.

Although there were initial decreases in the violence and turmoil, the politics of antipolitics backfired in the long run because it added to the already pronounced polarization of the country, raised questions about the political legitimacy of the military's rule, and,
ultimately, contributed to a dedicated leftist revolutionary faction bent on destroying the government through assassinations, kidnappings, and armed attacks (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 101). In short, the tactics used by Onganía increased the political alienation and anger of the *peronistas* and set in motion the conditions for the beginning of the "dirty little war" between the military government and its opponents that reached its tragic conclusion in the late 1970s. As Skidmore and Smith describe it, the Onganía regime, like those before it, failed to "create a broad-based political coalition which could give continuity to policy and make possible genuine planning for the future" (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 103). Instead, authoritarian politics prevailed.

Onganía was replaced by General Roberto Livingston in 1970 only to be replaced by the original leader of the faction against Onganía, General Alexjandro Lanusse in 1971. Lanusse's principal objective was clear – to put an end to the violence and turmoil that had pervaded Argentine politics for fifteen years. He chose a different, perhaps more enlightened, approach than his predecessors. He decided to recognize the *peronistas* officially and gave them a stake in the political process by allowing them full participation once more. Thus, the Peronist Party was given legal status again, the country's
electoral procedures were reformed to expand the electorate, and most significant, Perón was invited to return to Argentina from his exile in Paraguay. While the overall level of conflict between the peronistas and the anti-peronistas decreased markedly, these efforts at building cohesion were to fail (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 103-4).

New elections were announced for March 1973 and Perón returned briefly in late 1972 to rally support for his proxy, Hector Cámpora. Cámpora won the election with 49 percent of the vote and the country returned to civilian rule. In deference to Perón, Cámpora resigned and new elections were scheduled for September 1973 at which time Perón became president once again and his wife Isabel became vice-president.

Violence from leftist terrorists continued throughout these months, in spite of the promise of a new era in Argentine life and, more concretely, real efforts to terminate repressive policies. Although sympathetic to Perón while in exile, the revolutionary left now rejected him and his coalition government as counter-revolutionary. As a result, terrorist attacks increased as the far left attempted to create the political and economic chaos that presumably would lead to a revolution.
One of the first actions Perón took on gaining office in late 1973 was to ban the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the most visible and revolutionary of the groups, and he initiated other repressive measures against the far left (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 104). In July 1974 Perón died and his wife Isabel Perón became president. Unable to stop the growing violence, terrorist acts, and deterioration of the economy, her presidency saw the rapid demise of the coalition that Juan Perón had put together. In March 1976, the military seized power once again and decided to turn the clock back by recreating its antipolitical bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. The new military government, under General Jorge Rafael Videla, stepped up the war against the leftist guerrillas with repressive tactics that took the form of state terrorism against the entire populace. His rule in some ways replicated that following the 1966 coup, but was more pervasive— institutions were seized, major centers of power taken over, and real and suspected subversives were arrested by the thousands. In short order, as many as 15,000 to 20,000 individuals fell victim to repression; they became the desaparecidos, or "disappeared." By the end of the 1970s, the military regime had brutally eliminated its leftist opposition, but at the important price of widespread intimidation of its citizens and of
international condemnation (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 107-8).

Argentina remained under military dictatorship until its generals led the country to defeat by the British in the Malvinas War in 1982. This disaster contributed to the demise of the military government, but it was not the only factor. The military government also had failed to solve Argentina's problems with economic stagnation and inflation and had left the country with a massive foreign debt that eroded the Argentine quality of life and threatened its future. In 1983, the Radical Party leader Raúl Alfonsín was elected to the presidency and Argentina restored constitutional rule.

Alfonsín had based his campaign on promises to institutionalize liberal democratic practices to prevent future authoritarian, military rule. Institutionalizing democratic reforms might not be enough to sustain democracy in the country, however. Argentina's economic and political problems are structurally based and formidable. Authoritarian governments have failed to solve them in the past and there is little reason to believe that democratically-oriented governments can do better in the future without skillful leadership and an extraordinary political commitment from the Argentines.

Chile, 1948 - 1990

Chile is also one of the most urban, modern, and economically successful countries in Latin America. And, like Argentina, its most recent past is marked by a military coup in which the regime - in this case General Augusto Pinochet - terrorized its citizens as it attempted to transform the society into a design of its own. Despite these general similarities, however, Chile has not experienced the persistent regime instability that so clearly defines Argentina over the past eight decades. In fact, Chile was distinguished among Latin American countries for its political cohesion, in obvious contrast to some of its neighbors, until its breakdown in the early 1970s (Duff and McCamant 1976, 189-200). Then after some sixteen years of repressive and arbitrary rule by Pinochet, the country finally returned to a civilian democratic government. One of the keys to this change was a Chilean restoration of the will and ability to find consensus among contending groups, expressed this time as an unequivocal rejection of Pinochet and military rule.

After achieving independence from Spain in 1817 and after going through a civil war in 1859, enlightened
Chilean elites established a parliamentary constitution and government based on liberal democratic institutions and processes. Although the interests of the agricultural and military elite tended to prevail, the system effectively absorbed other, more centrist and leftist views. The payoff was many years of political stability. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, Chile suffered two major "blemishes" that were to affect its stability in different ways (Duff and McCamant 1976, 191; Drake and Jaksic, 1991, 1-2).

The first was a major conflict between Chilean President José Balmaceda (1886-91) and the Congress over the issue of institutional authority, specifically the extent of presidential authority to design and carry out modernization policies. The conflict was compounded by the increasing institutional autonomy of the military, an outgrowth of German training missions. (As in other Latin American countries at this time, military elites in Chile looked to European military specialists to help them modernize and professionalize. By the 1890s in Chile, the military had achieved substantial institutional strength and a role as caretaker of the country's national interest (Nunn, 1989, 67-75; Nunn 1983, 70-99; Goldwert 1989, 43-6). In 1891, when many of the younger, newly professionalized military officers decided to support the
Congress, the conflict widened into a bloody civil war. Approximately 10,000 people were killed before the Balmacedas forces were finally defeated.

As traumatic to Chilean society as the conflict was at the time, its long range impact helped to strengthen Chilean political life by strengthening the parliamentary system itself. After the war the number of political parties expanded and parties took a more active role in channeling contentious political interests. By 1900 there were five different competitive political parties in Chile representing interests from the far left to the far right (Skidmore and Smith 1986, 121).

By contrast, the second major blemish - bitter conflicts between the traditional oligarchy and an emerging labor movement at the turn of the century - created divisions in Chilean political life that ultimately became "the basis for the polarization of Chilean society, which finally broke it apart in 1973" and opened the door for military rule (Duff and McCamant 1976, 191).

Unhappy about economic and working conditions, workers in the nitrate mines in the northern parts of Chile began a series of strikes and protests in 1905 that escalated into violent confrontations with armed members of the owners of the companies, members of the oligarchy.
One particular strike ended in the infamous Iquique Massacre of 1907 in which a large number of workers were killed. In each conflict, the state backed the companies, thus, contributing by 1910 to the development of a very militant labor movement, organized by radical anarcho-syndicalists.

Although many members of the oligarchy as well as the middle sectors were concerned about the militancy and strength of the labor movement, labor did not pose the threat to the political system that it did in Argentina. Over time, Chilean elites began to address many of the demands from the left and thereby defuse much of labor's militancy. For example, workmen's compensation laws were created in 1916, employer's liability laws in 1917, and a retirement plan for railroad workers in 1919. By 1917, while the government still did not legally recognize labor unions, it decreed the Yáñez edict, making itself the mediator between workers and owners in stalemated conflicts. The government actually used the edict often in 1918 and 1919 to benefit workers (Skidmore and Smith 1986, 122-3).

Such initiatives only partially mollified the labor movement, and relations between labor and the economic elite continued to deteriorate. As in Argentina an antipolitical ideology provided Chilean military officers
with the rationalization to intervene briefly in 1924 to restore order and to reform the political structure in ways that might resolve the differences. An official labor code and other measures were created explicitly to address the interests of labor and civilian rule was restored. By the early 1930s, however, Chilean society was seriously polarized over the issue of the political role of labor, but contending social forces continued to channel their demands through the political parties. In short, the political parties successfully found ways to create new coalitions and compromises among themselves which tended to bring most people toward the political center and to ensure stability, and the military stayed out of politics.

The Popular Front government of 1938 is the classic example of the Chilean commitment to parliamentary politics. Composed of a complex coalition of Radicals, Socialists, Communists and workers, the Front brought centrist Radical leader Pedro Aquirre Cerda (1938-46) to power with no violent reactions from rightist groups (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 126 and Duff and McCamant 1976, 191-2).

Cerda's victory was significant in that it illustrated, on the one hand, the cohesiveness of the Chilean system. On the other hand, it marked the
beginning of trends that eventually broke down that cohesion. The Radicals, the least ideological of the groups, had tipped the balance between the rightists and leftists by supporting leftist views on labor in the election. While rightists continued to keep control of the Congress, popular support of the left began to increase, centrist leaders became more important in the coalition process, and the right began to feel increasingly threatened by the left (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 126).

This fragile political balance unraveled during the tenure of the next president, Gabriel González Videla, also a Radical. Elected in 1946, his government included three seats for Communists in exchange for their support during his campaign. His accommodating attitude, however, was tested within the first few months of his term. In 1946 there were a series of violent strikes in the northern mining areas that rapidly spread to other parts of the country. Popular calls for national protests brought violent reactions from the Videla regime, which in turn provoked a number of urban riots. In the Latin American tradition of "flexible" presidential power, Videla resorted to a state of siege and suspended civil liberties as a means to restore order.
He increased the level of repression after attending the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in Rio de Janeiro in 1947. There he had apparently been pressured by the United States government to launch a counter-offensive campaign against Communist groups in Chile. Upon his return, he purged the three Communists from his cabinet and then, as Duff and McCamant explain,

he denounced the Communists for disrupting those extractive industries essential for the defense of the United States . . . [and] mobilized the army to take over the coal mines being struck by the Communists labor unions. He placed the northern provinces under military control . . . [and] proceeded to arrest hundreds of Communist labor leaders, all the members of the Central Committee . . . and the editor of the Communist daily El Siglo. Military tribunals were hastily set up to try these political prisoners, who were then sent to concentration camps in remote parts of the country (Duff and McCamant 1976, 192).

He further formalized his policies in September 1948 when the conservative Congress passed his "Law for the Defense of Democracy" outlawing the Communist Party, closing its
offices, and prohibiting members from running for and holding office (Duff and McCamant 1976, 192).

Videla's repressive policies showed that centrist Radicals were prepared to join with rightist groups to use "legal" means to exclude their adversaries from the political process. The impact was twofold: first, it did not decrease the overall level of conflict between the government and its leftist opposition; second, and related, it intensified the polarization that was beginning to consume Chilean politics.

In 1952 Carlos Ibáñez del Campo won the presidential election with 47 percent of the vote, economic conditions deteriorated, and labor conflicts intensified. He continued the reactionary repressive policies of his predecessor against Communists and other leftist organizations. In May 1954, a general protest was organized to demand the removal of the "Law for the Defense of Democracy" and to seek amnesty for all political prisoners, both of which were denied. In July 1955, a massive protest against repressive actions and the regime's economic policies disrupted the entire country. In 1956 the Central Union of Workers (CUT) organized a strike against wage and price freezes. In response to the growing turmoil, Ibáñez declared another state of siege in 1956, sent some 30,000 troops into Santiago, and arrested
250 to 300 labor activists. Urban riots sparked by student demonstrations erupted in Santiago early in 1957 and quickly spread to other cities. At least twenty people were killed and hundreds others were wounded by gunfire from soldiers. Ibáñez declared martial law and imposed curfews and censorship (Duff and McCamant 1976, 192-93).

Conditions improved dramatically with the election of Jorge Alessandri to the presidency in 1958. Although he considered himself a political independent, he campaigned as a leader of the right (combining the Conservative and Liberal ticket) and won with a slim margin of 31.6 percent of the vote over Salvador Allende with 28.9 percent (who had put together a broad coalition of leftist parties called the Frente de Acción Popular - FRAP), and Eduardo Frei with 20.7 percent (a new leader of a relatively new centrist party - the Christian Democrats - PDC).

Several factors contributed to a relative decrease in political conflict and violence during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The fact that Alessandri was a firm believer in liberal political processes and institutions may have contributed to it. The "Law for the Defense of Democracy" was finally rescinded in 1958, and by the early 1960s, Alessandri's economic austerity programs seemed to be working, at least in part. Annual per capita growth rates
increased at an average of 2.9 percent. Simultaneously, social mobilization in Chile increased at one of the fastest rates in Latin America (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 129-30 and Duff and McCamant 1976, 193). Translated into practical politics, this meant that, with growth, competition among groups to protect their economic status decreased during these years.

Just as significantly, changes in the voting laws in the late 1950s provided for greater popular participation - participation that was absorbed quickly by political parties. Hence, although Chileans had largely avoided the exclusionary politics that provoked military interventions and that undermined Argentina's stability, greater popular participation channeled through the parties heated up competition among and within the parties when economic conditions deteriorated again in the late 1960s. But in 1964, centrist Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei won the presidency with help from rightist Liberal and Conservative parties. The final vote tally was 56 percent for Frei, to 39 percent for Allende and the FRAP, and 5 percent for the Radicals.

Frei was a reformist. His plans, summarized by the slogan "Revolution in Liberty," generated high expectations, at least at the beginning of his presidency. Promising to work within the democratic structure, he
planned to a) use governmental resources to ensure agrarian reform, b) increase funding for socio-economic programs such as education and public housing, and c) gain greater industrial control by a "Chileanization" (limited nationalization) of foreign-owned copper mines. But by 1966 events escaped his control. The agrarian reforms proceeded too slowly to be effective in satisfying potential recipients. Deteriorating economic conditions precluded bold socio-economic changes, and his Chileanization policy did not translate into expanded production and benefits for Chile (see Wynia 1990, 174-79 for a more detailed description of Frei's "Revolution in Liberty"). In addition, the annual rate of growth dropped to 0.4 percent per capita and remained there throughout the latter 1960s. The upshot was that popular frustration rose quickly, and both the left and right began to regroup in anticipation of victory in the 1970 presidential election, while the Christian Democratic Party, now discredited, broke apart over the failure of the reforms. On the far left, a small group of radicals organized the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria - MIR), and dedicated themselves to the use of force as a means for change. Other, less radical leftists organized themselves under the banner of Popular Unity (Unidad Popular - UP). The right organized
the gremio (guild) movement, dedicated to obstructing leftist economic and political solutions, and the far right openly advocated the use of force against communists.

Salvador Allende, socialist leader of the UP, won the presidential election in 1970 with the narrow margin of 36.6 percent of the vote, two points lower than his showing in the 1964 election. But since he had received less than the majority of the popular vote, his inauguration required confirmation by a majority in Congress, as specified in the Chilean constitution. This meant that the UP had to find support from another political group or groups, since it did not hold a majority of the seats in Congress. Reacting against efforts by the Conservatives and the US to provoke military intervention to keep Allende from power, enough Christian Democrats in the Congress decided to vote for Allende that he was confirmed as president (Wynia 1990, 180).

Despite this weak mandate, Allende immediately set his regime’s principal objective in motion - the radical transformation of Chile into a socialist country through legal means, his Via Chilena. This meant, in Allende’s view, relying on Chile’s democratic institutions and
processes to create the laws necessary to make a transition to socialism.

For the right and many in the center, Allende's Via Chilena posed a direct threat to democracy, private property, and market economics. The right and center forces began a campaign to sabotage the administration by any means they could, including blocking all leftist initiatives in Congress, organizing strikes and protests, disrupting the economy, and assassination. Allende's path was further blocked by the composition of his loose coalition of leftist parties. The majority refused to make the practical political compromises necessary to win over enough of the centrists to make congressional victories, and other, more radical leftists wanted nothing to do with the "bourgeois" institutions. They demanded that Allende dissolve Congress and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. In short, as soon as Allende took office, Chilean politics degenerated into a hostile polarization between leftists and rightists manifested by a rigid institutional stalemate between the executive and legislative branches and by pervasive political violence (Duff and McCamant 1976, 197).

By 1972, the economy too had degenerated. In 1970, Allende decreed increases in wages and freezes in prices as part a redistribution of wealth plan designed to
benefit workers. While the policy quickly expanded the purchasing power of workers and controlled inflation in the short term, supply could not keep up with new demand so that runaway inflation resulted. The problem was exacerbated by sabotage by producers and merchants who wanted the Via Chilena to fail or hoped to make large profits from it, or both. For example, many shopkeepers evaded price controls by simply removing goods from their shelves and selling them for large profits on a new and thriving black market. By 1972 the rate of inflation exceeded 150 percent and by the next year it was 500 percent, and wages and salaries could not keep up. Balance of payment problems also developed when the regime failed to anticipate dramatic decreases in world-wide copper prices, caused by U.S. dumping from strategic stockpiles. The resulting deficits threatened Chile's creditworthiness with other states, as well as its domestic employment level. Widespread nationalizations left the private sector demoralized and adrift (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 137-38; Drake and Jaksic 1991, 3-4).

Political and economic unhappiness escalated into a virtual unarmed civil war between rightist and leftist groups from October 1972 to September 1973. In October 1972, a series of anti-Allende protests erupted across the country including serious disruptions of nation-wide
shipments by independent truck owners and protests by small business owners, farmers, and pilots. Simultaneously, the left took over numerous factories and organized large and numerous pro-Allende counter demonstrations (Skidmore and Smith, 1984, 139).

The turmoil was temporarily ameliorated by a declaration of a state of siege, by the appointment of military officers to the cabinet (demanded by the anti-Allende protesters), and by preparations for the March 1973 congressional elections. When the right failed to secure enough seats in the elections to impeach Allende, violence and conflict escalated once again, and the military officers refused to participate any longer in the leftist government (Wynia 1990, 188; Duff and McCamant 1976, 198).

In April 1973 labor unions disrupted the El Teniente copper mines with a series of strikes. The military responded with a coup attempt in late June, which failed. In July anti-Allende independent truck owners once again disrupted the shipment of goods, spearheading a new round of large anti- and pro-Allende demonstrations throughout August, with middle class organizations joining the anti-Allende ranks. Simultaneously, terrorist activities from both sides increased. The country seemed to be exploding from its political divisions and the extant institutions
were ineffectual in stopping it. Allende finally sought a resolution with Frei and the Christian Democrats to decrease the conflict, but the two sides failed to resolve their differences, and conditions deteriorated further (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 140). Chile's former ability to find cohesion in political crisis finally collapsed, and on September 11, 1973 General Augusto Pinochet led the military to seize control of the country and to restore order.

The coup was the most rapid and brutal military intervention in Chilean history, the first one in over thirty years. Like the generals in Argentina in 1966, Pinochet had two basic goals: The first was to end the political turmoil blamed on the politicians by any means necessary. The second was to rearrange fundamentally Chilean political and economic institutions and processes. From the military's view, both required the destruction of the existing system and the imposition of a new bureaucratic-authoritarian system in which military modernizers, just as in Argentina, would be the predominant authority and decision makers. Although many Chileans from all classes and economic strata seemed tacitly to welcome the military's new role and the promise of a new era free of political turmoil, few seemed to have
clear notions of the extent of the repression that was to follow.

One day after the coup a state of siege was declared and Decree Law number 5 was issued stating that it should be interpreted as a state of war (Valenzuela 1991, 63). Other antipolitical decrees followed quickly. The constitution was rescinded, Congress dissolved, all political activities and parties banned indefinitely, universities closed, the media severely restricted, and labor unions were suppressed and dismantled (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 142-44; Barrera and Valenzuela 1986, 236-6; Drake and Jaksic 1991, 4-5). In addition, a secret police was created - the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (DINA) - to continue the war against "any militant [or non-militant] opposition to the regime that had survived the initial arrests, deportations, voluntary exile, and executions after the coup" (Valenzuela 1991, 447). As in Argentina, no opposition was to be tolerated, and particularly none from the left.

An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 citizens were killed in the first wave of violence, including President Allende and numerous members of his government. Approximately 95,000 people, identified as actual or potential opponents, were arrested and many were tortured systematically over the next eighteen months. Some 2,000
more people later "disappeared." Another 10,000 or so fled and remained in political exile (Remmer 1979, 444; Harff and Gurr 1989, 26-7; Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick 1977, 238-43).

Four months after the coup began, General Pinochet announced that the military would stay in power for no less than five years; it stayed for sixteen. By 1983, Pinochet had successfully consolidated his power through constitutional amendments, state-controlled plebiscites, and bureaucratic manipulation so that he had transformed the institutionalized military regime into a "personalist" government in which he held supreme authority (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 143).

As described by Drake and Jaksic, "once the military had demobilized the polity and society, the regime began implementing its vision of a new order. It set out to replace not only democratic with authoritarian politics, but also statist with market-driven economics. A new cadre of technocrats - dubbed the 'Chicago Boys' because so many were trained at the University of Chicago - designed those laissez-faire economic policies" (Drake and Jaksic 1991, 5). Between 1977 and 1981 their efforts seemed to pay off in several significant ways: inflation dropped to 10 percent, the growth rate averaged around 7
percent in the late 1970s, and foreign reserves were restored (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 143).

From the beginning, however, Pinochet's economic policies were detrimental to workers and the urban poor, eroding their state entitlements and their economic well-being, as well as by excluding them from the political process. By 1980, unemployment among workers grew to 30 percent nation-wide (40 percent in the capital Santiago), and wealth was becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively few elites (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 143). When a severe economic crisis developed in 1982, workers and other urban poor were hurt the most. Marginalized from the political process, mobilized by economic hardships, and overcoming their fear of repression, they protested their unhappiness in the streets with loud demonstrations for a return to democracy. Several urban riots followed.

Although initially contained by violent repression from Pinochet, the protesters' actions sparked a redemocratization movement that grew in momentum and challenged the regime when students, unionists, and newly invigorated party activists also began protesting (Garretón 1986, 163-77). By the mid 1980s, a small number of the economic elite along with some high-ranking officers in the navy, the air force, and the national
police (but not the army) also began to raise questions about the direction the regime was taking. Pinochet allowed a national "yes or no" plebiscite on whether he should remain in office until 1995 and, thereby, continue his policies. The military promised an open and fair vote on October 5, 1988. To demonstrate its resolve, the military lifted its "State of Exception" rule, allowing all exiles to return to Chile to vote (Drake and Jaksic 1991,12). The simplicity of the plebiscite and careful intergroup politicking allowed Chile to recapture some of the political cohesion it had lost in the 1970s, and Pinochet and the politics of antipolitics were defeated. In December 1989 Chile began its return to democracy with the election of centrist Christian Democrat Patricio Alywin to the presidency and with a newly restored Congress.
Considering the problems that both Argentina and Chile have had with political instability and violence, military intervention, and patterns of repression (particularly in Argentina) over the past four decades, it seems appropriate to include these factors in any analytical model designed to help explain the causes of state violence. This model tests the hypothesis that variance in state repression in Argentina and Chile is largely a function of three internal political factors and their interactions over time: a) annual incidence of political protest demonstrations, b) the institutionalization of military rule, and c) the inertial influence of past restrictive policies upon the formulation of current policies. These are indicators for unrest, military intervention, and patterns of repression.

Framed as a time-series multiple regression analysis, the model provides the opportunity to make statistically-based observations on the mix of these particular factors.
over a relatively long historical period in both countries. A full explication of the model follows.

Mathematical Specification of the Model

The mathematical formulation is as follows:

\[ Y_t = a + B_1 Y_{t-1} + B_2 X + B_3 Z_1 + B_4 Z_2 \]

where

- \( Y_t \) is the number of government restrictions per year predicted by the model;
- \( Y_{t-1} \) is the lag (by one year) of the number of government restrictions per year;
- \( X \) is the number of annual protest demonstrations;
- \( Z_1 \) is the interaction between the lag of restrictions \( (Y_{t-1}) \) and the lag (by one year) of the number of protest demonstrations aggregated annually; and, \( Z_2 \) is the interaction between institutionalized military rule and the number of protest demonstrations aggregated annually.

The Dependent Variable and Its Operationalization

The dependent variable is state repression. There is general agreement among analysts as to what kind of governmental behavior constitutes repression. Although
some prefer to make subtle distinctions between the general concept of repression and the specific acts of governmental coercion or enforcement terror, most often they make little or no distinction between the terms (see Stohl and López 1984, 7-9 and Sloan 1984, 83-98 for example).

The terms state repression, governmental restrictions, sanctions and state-directed political violence are used synonymously in this study to refer to official actions taken "... to neutralize, to suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself" (Taylor and Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III, 1948-1982, 1985, 15).

The variable is operationalized with data made available from the ICPSR, compiled by Taylor and Jodice and defined in their World Handbook. Taylor and Jodice construct the variable from daily counts of the following types of activities initiated by a government: restricting citizens' rights of movement, assembly, and speech; closing universities; putting opposition leaders under house arrest or executing them; and temporarily dissolving legislative bodies. Sanctions against criminal behavior that has no political relevance were excluded from the operationalization (Taylor and Jodice 1985, 15-16). The
data are available in daily, monthly, and annual aggregations across approximately thirty or more sequential years. (See the subsections below for a more thorough discussion of the data.)

It is important to note that the decision rule for the dependent variable excludes murders of citizens by their governments and counts of the desaparecidos (disappeared people), despite my preference for including them. An accurate count of both is almost impossible to obtain, particularly across so many years as varying estimates would suggest (compare Harff and Gurr 1989, 23-41, Remmer 1979, 444 and Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick 1977. 238-43 for example). Although Taylor and Jodice provide an indicator titled "deaths from domestic violence" in their database, it was not used in this study for two reasons. First, it is not clear what is measured, for Taylor and Jodice make no attempt to separate deaths that resulted from a repressive government from deaths that may have resulted from other sources, such as from political terrorists or from the clash of competing political groups. Second, Charles Brockett argues convincingly that the indicator grossly underestimates deaths from political violence in Central America, and by implication, in other Latin American states (Brockett
Subhypothesis 1: Variance in governmental repression for any given year can be explained partially as a consequence of past repressive policies (or perhaps delayed responses to perceived threats), all other conditions in the model being equal. Decision making theory suggests that, within the context of any large bureaucracy, the decision making-process is predominantly one of making incremental adjustments to the inertia or momentum of established policy, despite the efforts of executives to make radical shifts.

In accordance with the notion that governmental policies or behavior at any given time are inextricably bound to past policies or behavior, a count of past acts of repression is used to predict that of current acts of repression. The operational measure to test this hypothesis is the lag (by one year) of the average number of governmental restrictions, that is, the lag of the dependent variable ($Y_{t-1}$) described above. It is expected that this variable will explain much of what is going on in the model when applied to Argentina because of that
country's relatively high incidence of military intervention over the years. Thus, in this case, the coefficient is expected to be positive and relatively large in comparison to the other coefficients.

**Subhypothesis 2:** Variance in governmental repression can be explained partially as a function of the number of political protest demonstrations carried out annually against a government, all other conditions in the model being equal.

A protest demonstration is operationally defined by Taylor and Jodice as a "non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting a regime, a government, or one of its leaders, its ideology, policy, or intended policy, or its previous action or intended action [including] demonstrations for or against a foreign government, its leaders, or its visiting representatives when such demonstrations are reported to indicate opposition to the demonstrator's own government" (Code book for Taylor and Jodice 1985, 6-7). Normal holiday celebrations, election/political meetings, rallies, and parades were excluded.

As with the political repression variable described above, the political protest demonstrations variable is operationalized from data provided by Taylor and Jodice, made available from the ICPSR. Acts of political protest
demonstrations are counted on a daily basis and aggregated annually across approximately thirty sequential years or more on a daily, monthly, and annual basis for Argentina and Chile.

The logic for including this variable in the model is that protest demonstrations may be perceived by a government as having the potential to escalate into more serious political unrest and disruption. A given government may believe that taking preventive action in the form of repression is in its best interest. Thus, we would expect the number of governmental restrictions to be high when the number of protest demonstrations is also high.

Subhypothesis 2: Governments (or policy makers) attempt to adjust current repressive policies based on their perceptions of the effectiveness of past policies, all other conditions in the model being equal.

This Subhypothesis will be measured by an interaction term composed of two variables: 1) the lag (by one year) of annual governmental restrictions, and 2) the lag (by one year) of annual political protest demonstrations. (The term is designated as "Z₁" in the model.) The operational definitions and criteria for both governmental restrictions and protest demonstrations have been described above.
Z₁, the interaction term, represents a mitigating factor in the model. The logic of expectation is as follows: if "protests" or "restrictions" or both are high in the previous year, a regime may have a tendency to relax restrictions a little, if it believes that its authority will not be threatened. Including the variable in the model is both logical and intuitively appealing - we expect governments to have memories, to consider what did and did not work in the past, and to try to adjust current policy accordingly.

Subhypothesis 4: Variance in governmental repression for any given year can be explained partially as a consequence of the interaction between institutionalized military rule and annual protest demonstrations, all other conditions in the model being equal.

This Subhypothesis will be tested also by an interaction term composed of two indicators: 1) a dummy variable to indicate the presence or absence of institutionalized military rule, and 2) numbers of political protest demonstrations, aggregated annually. The interaction term is identified as "Z₂" in the model.

Taylor and Jodice provide no indicator for institutionalized military rule, in contrast to the other variables in the model. I will operationalize institutionalized military rule using the criteria
suggested by scholars of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. A good example of such criteria is the distinction made by David Collier in his description of the 1966 coup in Argentina:

Argentina [was] ruled by the military as an institution, rather than exclusively by individual military rulers. In addition, the military appeared to adopt a technocratic, bureaucratic approach to policy making (as opposed to a more "political" approach through which policies are shaped by economic and political demands from different sectors of society, expressed through such channels as elections, legislatures, political parties, and labor unions). This approach to policy making has led scholars to join the adjective "bureaucratic" with the term "authoritarian" and to call such regimes "bureaucratic-authoritarian" (Collier 1979, 4).

For Argentina and Chile, any given year from 1940 to 1990 will be coded "1" if it can be shown that for that year the military ruled as an institution, rather than by an individual ruler. All other years will be coded as "0". The operationalization of political protest demonstrations, the other half of the interaction term labeled "Z2", has already been described above.
The logic of expectation for the interaction between institutionalized military rule and protest demonstrations is as follows: Protest demonstrations are expected to have a positive linear relationship with government restrictions in the absence of institutionalized military rule. This is a reasonable assumption, as ordinary people will presumably articulate discontent with increasing official restrictions, if they think they can escape punishment. The opposite is expected during periods of institutionalized military rule. Protest demonstrations are expected to have an inverse linear relationship with restrictions during periods of institutionalized military rule, for it is presumed that the public would be less willing to protest for fear of severe retaliation.

Exploratory Tests of the Model

Over the course of developing the model, I collected data for and experimented with a variety of socioeconomic indicators including gross domestic product per capita, consumer price index, public health and social services expenditures, growth in population, and percentage change in real industrial wages. Ultimately, no statistical combinations were found that contributed anything of consequence to the model. Hence, I made a decision to exclude the socioeconomic variables from the equation and
to work strictly with indicators for repression, protest demonstrations, and type of regime instead.

The rationale for the model was not based solely on my experimentation, however. As with all research, this project was driven by theory. My logic was as follows: It is reasonable to assume that the relationship among socioeconomic conditions, protest demonstrations, and repression might be characterized as an indirect linkage. That is, protest demonstrations may have been in part reactions to changes in socioeconomic conditions over time, and in this way precipitators of repression. If so, including one or more socioeconomic indicators in the equation would add little to the statistical results or theory, since any socioeconomic changes which might correlate positively with protests would be, in effect, encapsulated by the variable for protest demonstrations itself. Thus, there was no compelling theoretical reason to include socioeconomic indicators in the final specification of the model.

Sources of Data

One of the barriers to implementing comparative analyses of state repression and violence is the problem of collecting reliable data. When and how officially sanctioned violence is used against political opponents,
members of labor unions, or ordinary citizens is not the kind of information that a state gladly records or routinely provides to the public. In fact, the more successful the regime is with its repression, the more unlikely it is to gain reliable primary information.

Despite such difficulties, information on state violence has been and continues to be gathered and compiled into systematic and usable data sets (See Harff and Gurr, 1989:39, for example). The most commonly used sources are the following:

1) Amnesty International (AI). Although AI is one of the most frequently cited sources by journalists and scholars, it is one of the weakest for the purposes of systematic, empirical analysis. Its principal purpose has been to publish annual reports on human rights abuses and political prisoners for every country in the world since 1974. For scholars interested in longitudinal analyses, this is a very limited time frame. However, this problem is minor in respect to the coding and making use of AI data. The reporting periods vary not only for each country but from one volume to the next, creating problems of data overlap and unreliability (See López and Stohl 1984, 193 for a discussion of these problems.) For these reasons, data from AI will not be used in this project, except in secondary, descriptive ways. However, as Lopez
and Stohl assert, "It is clear to virtually all analysts of state terror that without the services of Amnesty International we would not have the level of documentation necessary for a comprehensive and cross-national perspective on this phenomenon" (López and Stohl 1984, 186).

2) Freedom House, a private institution, publishes information on the status of political rights and liberties throughout the world, which is similar to AI, but much more limited in scope. Operating since 1978, it provides annual descriptive surveys to the public. As López and Stohl point out, "The 1979 edition . . . includes a terrorism scale that is admirably suitable for comparative analysis of state behavior. The Freedom House material is quite useful but it . . . does not present enough material for the construction of a data set" (López and Stohl 1984, 193-94). Hence, this source is not used.

3) In 1961 the Department of State was given the responsibility to provide public information concerning problems with human rights throughout the world. Its Country Reports present descriptive information and data aggregated on an annual basis. This source can be useful for the systematic analysis of repression, but it has serious limitations. For example, the editions for the years 1976-82 do not distinguish between threats of
political violence and acts of violence, obviously a necessary distinction for meaningful analysis. Also, one cannot dismiss the possibility that political partisanship may affect the reliability of the data (López and Stohl 1984, 194).

4) The principal source for empirical data for this project is the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948-82* (ICPSR #7761). The decision to use this particular data set is justified by the following considerations: First, it is a reputable source readily available to scholars through the ICPSR. Second, the data from this source are essential to the construction of the model; have been collected in a consistent, systematic fashion for the two countries included in this study (as well as for 153 other countries); and are available in daily, quarterly, and annual aggregations across the years 1948 to 1982. Third, the source provides an opportunity to construct a scientifically based research design focused on the analysis of state repression as a discrete variable and its interaction, in complex ways, with other factors. In short, the data provide an opportunity to model and explain state-directed political violence in ways not attempted by others before, thus contributing to a growing theoretical literature on the subject.
Despite these advantages, there are some potential weaknesses in the data collection process that must be acknowledged. For example, Taylor and Jodice rely almost exclusively on the New York Times for their information. One of the obvious problems with that tactic is the possibility of collecting inaccurate data as a result of incomplete, uneven, or biased coverage. The New York Times does not station permanent correspondents throughout every region in every country that it reports on. It relies, in part, on a combination of the reporting skills of a relatively few correspondents (most assuredly located in the urban areas), on their contacts, and on national media which could be and most likely is censored by a repressive government. The concern here is that the New York Times, despite its reputation for accuracy, may unwittingly focus its attention on the urban areas and under report news in the rural areas. Stated succinctly, "remote rural disappearances are harder to tabulate than assassinations in city streets" (Brockett 1992, 170). This suspicion raises some obvious questions about the accuracy of the Taylor and Jodice data.

An ideal alternative would have been for Taylor and Jodice to do content analyses of the leading regional and national newspapers from the countries on which they collected data. But as they acknowledge, collecting data
in this way would have been prohibitively expensive, considering all of the variables in the database for each of the 153 countries across each of the years from 1948 to 1982. Instead, they rely on another alternative: they supplement their work on Latin America with *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. However, even with this additional source there may be significant inaccuracies in the data, especially the data on mass violence in Central America (see Brockett's critique 1992, 170-71).

The Taylor and Jodice database is a good source for this project, however, for the data collected on the specific indicators of interest here are likely to be highly accurate. For example, such acts of repression as the temporary suspension of a congress, a declaration of a state of siege, the closure of a university, or the enforced restrictions of civil rights and liberties, become public knowledge quickly and will be most probably announced in the national news. In fact, it may be that the sooner such an announcement is made, the better it would serve the purposes of a repressive government. In this way, the indicator is based on reliable, collectable data that can be used with the confidence that important aspects of repression are being measured.

Turning to the other variable of interest from the Taylor and Jodice database, the indicator for protest
demonstrations, it is reasonable to suspect it may be one of the problematic, controversial variables. But the fact that a protest demonstration is an open public display of political unrest and unhappiness, witnessed by others, tends to generate its own news and to become public knowledge whether a government likes it or not. The operationalization of the protest demonstration variable in the Taylor and Jodice database and for this project is based strictly on the fact that a demonstration took place. Controversial issues such as how many people participated in a demonstration, who they were, or how many were killed or injured by the government, while important contextual considerations, were excluded from the measurement of the phenomenon. From this perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the Taylor and Jodice data are accurate on this indicator as well.

Aggregations

Aggregations of the data. The data from the World Handbook are aggregated in daily, quarterly, and annual units across the years 1948 to 1982. It is well known among specialists in time-series analysis that the more measurements taken on one's variables across a long series, the more meaningful, reliable, and valid the analysis is likely to be. Hence, time-series analysts
modeling political or any other type of phenomena will want to measure across as many points in time as possible.

Ideally, this project has the potential to use information gathered across a large number of data points (the number of political protests per day, across thirty two years, for example). In practical terms, however, the daily events data from the Taylor and Jodice database cannot be used because of inconsistencies in their data collection process. The problem is that although all of the data for each year between 1948 and 1967 is available, they cannot be disaggregated into daily nor monthly units because the collection procedures did not include linking an event to the day that it occurred. But beginning in 1968, the data are available in daily, quarterly, and annual aggregations. For this reason, annual aggregations across the entire time frame are used in this study, although daily or quarterly aggregations would have been preferable.

While the time frame specified for this project is from 1940 to 1991, the Taylor and Jodice database has data available only for the years 1948 through 1982. To expand the database back in time to include the years 1940 to 1947, the author in an earlier work on Argentina compiled original data for each of the variables in the model for the years 1940 to 1947. The data were then merged with
the Taylor and Jodice database to create a uniform set that spans from 1940 to 1982. A brief description of this procedure follows.

The same primary sources, methods, and procedures used by Taylor and Jodice were followed. For example, an index of specific events to be coded was created, following exactly Taylor and Jodice's operational definitions for "political protests" and "governmental repression." No specific event was weighted more than others. The New York Times was scanned for every day for the years 1940 to 1947, and the occurrence of each "event" was recorded onto the index.

After collection, the data were aggregated from the indexes into single numerical totals for each year for each of the variables. This small database was then merged with the larger one, resulting in a consistent collection of data for every year from 1940 to 1982.

For this study, the same collection and assembly procedures were used to expand the data set for Chile from 1982 to 1991. I wished to cover the Pinochet years, for they were critical in examining state repression.
Methodological Assumptions and Tests for Autocorrelation

This part focuses first on a discussion of the methodological assumptions underlying the model developed for this project. Included in this section is a description of the most common problem facing time-series analysts, that of autocorrelation in the error terms. Identifying and solving this problem in the data, if present, is a necessary first step before one can have confidence in any analysis and interpretation of the data. The second part consists of a step-by-step application of the Durbin's h test for autocorrelation to the Argentine and Chilean data.

The Durbin's h test, illustrated by Charles Ostrom in his *Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques* (Ostrom 1978, 51-3), is a viable alternative test for autocorrelation on models that use a lag of the dependent variable as one of the independent variables, as this model does. For such models, the most conventional test for autocorrelation in regression models, the Durbin-Watson d statistic based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is not valid for several reasons discussed later in this chapter.
The Methodological Assumptions

The model developed for this project is an example of the classic linear regression model, written statistically as

\[ Y_t = a + BX_t + e_t \]

where \( Y_t \) is the dependent variable, \( X_t \) the independent variable, \( a \) and \( B \) are the unknown parameters, and \( e_t \) are the random errors. The subscript "\( t \)" indicates that \( Y \) and \( X \) are a series of observations through time (Ostrom 1978, 18). The assumptions underlying time-series linear regression model are as follows:

1) the relationship between \( Y \) and \( X \) is linear
2) there is no correlation between the error term and the predictor variable(s) (non stochastic \( X \): \( E[e_tX_t] = 0 \))
3) the error term has a mean of zero (\( E[e_t] = 0 \))
4) the error term has a constant variance over all observations (\( E[e_t^2] = \sigma_e^2 \))
5) the error terms corresponding to different points in time are not correlated (nonautoregression: \( E[e_t e_{t-m}] = 0 \) \( (m \neq 0) \)) (Ostrom 1978, 12 and 18)

All five assumptions are necessary for doing sound, systematic regression analysis. Because of the serial character of the data in such designs, the assumptions pertaining to the error term (3, 4, and 5) are of special significance when designing, implementing, and
interpreting time-series analyses. For example, assumptions 3 and 5 taken together, as Ostrom explains, "imply that the covariance of any two disturbance terms is equal to zero . . . [which] means that we are assuming that disturbances at one point in time are not correlated with any other disturbances" (Ostrom 1978, 20). When the assumption is violated, there is said to be autocorrelation in the error process, that is, the errors at one observation of the designated variables (or of unknown variables) are correlated significantly with the errors of the same variables at a preceding and/or a following observation. The consequence of autocorrelation is that to the unsuspecting analyst the regression line will appear to fit the data better than it actually does, and since the statistical indicators are no longer reliable and valid, the analyst will unwittingly over- or underestimate the impact of a given explanatory variable in the model, depending on whether the autocorrelation is positive or negative.

As mentioned above, one typical test used for detecting autocorrelation in a set of serial data is the Durbin-Watson d statistic. Based on the distribution of the predicted errors from one observation to the next, it is relatively easy to calculate by hand using the formula below.
\[
\sum_t (\hat{e}_t - \hat{e}_{t-1})^2 \\
d = \frac{\sum_t \hat{e}_t^2}{\sum_t (\hat{e}_t - \hat{e}_{t-1})^2}
\]

where the \( \hat{e}_t \)s are the OLS regression residuals (See Ostrom 1978, 32).

Most often, time-series regression analysts have the Durbin-Watson \( d \) statistic calculated automatically along with other OLS indicators when they use statistical software such as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Interpretation of the statistic requires simply comparing it to a standard table created by Durbin and Watson in which upper and lower bounds are specified for the statistic at different levels of statistical significance. If the statistic falls at or beyond the designated upper or lower limits at the .05 significance level, for example, it can be assumed that the data have a problem with autocorrelation, and any OLS regression indicators generated from it will be unreliable. But if the statistic falls within the indeterminate range - between the two bounds - the analyst can assume that the data are relatively free of autocorrelation, and that the OLS indicators can be interpreted with confidence. (See Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, 164-65 for a more complete technical discussion.)
There are essentially two strategies the analyst can take when the Durbin-Watson \( d \) statistic indicates that there is a problem with autocorrelation in the residuals. First, one can obviously try to use alternative data that are free from the correlation problem. That approach may be impractical in many cases, particularly when a lot of expense, effort, and time has gone into collecting original data. Second, and more typically, the analyst can use an alternative method of estimation; one that is derived from the problem data themselves. Ostrom recommends, generating what he calls "pseudo-Generalized Least Squares" (GLS) estimates from the original OLS estimates (See Ostrom 1978, 35-44). This approach clearly has some advantages: 1) the new GLS estimates are relatively easy to calculate from the original OLS indicators using fairly straightforward algebraic formulas; 2) no special statistical computer program is needed, and most importantly, 3) problems with autocorrelation can be successfully controlled for, and analyses of the data can be made with confidence in the integrity of the indicators.

Although not stated explicitly, the paragraphs above focus on ways to test for and solve autocorrelation in regression models that do not use a lag of the dependent variable as one or more of the independent variables. By
contrast, in models where a lag of the dependent variable is used as an explanatory variable, the Durbin-Watson $d$ statistic breaks down and is no longer an appropriate test for autocorrelation. The reason has to do with the likelihood of violating the assumption of no stochasticity in the independent variables (assumption number 2 above), that is, the likelihood of violating the assumption of no correlation between one or more of the independent variables and the error term. As Ostrom explains, "[the correlation often] occurs because $Y_t$ directly depends on $e_t$, $Y_{t-1}$ on $e_{t-1}$, and so on. Therefore, since $e_t$ and $e_{t-1}$ are directly related . . . $Y_{t-1}$ is related to $e_t$" (Ostrom 1978, 48). The condition can ultimately bias the OLS coefficient of the lagged indicator, and therefore make it very difficult to calculate a reliable Durbin-Watson $d$ statistic because that statistic, as discussed above, is based exclusively on the integrity of the OLS residuals. When a lag of the dependent variable is used as an independent variable "the OLS residuals [can] no longer provide an accurate reflection of the true underlying disturbances" (Ostrom 1978, 50). Thus, an alternative test for autocorrelation must be applied to models in which a lag of the dependent variable is used as one of the independent variables.
The so-called "Durbin's h test", developed by J. Durbin in 1970, provides such an alternative (See Durbin 1970, 410-21). Ostrom provides a step-by-step illustration of how to use the Durbin's h test in two different applications: a) with data samples greater than 30, and, b) with models in which the calculation of the test statistic involves the square root of a negative number (Ostrom 1978, 51-3). Although the mathematical details are not shown here, the project model meets the criterion established for option b—solving for the square root of a negative number. Hence, option b is the appropriate test for autocorrelation in this case.

In addition to being an alternative to the Durbin-Watson d statistic, there are other advantages to the Durbin h test. For example, like the d statistic, it is based completely on OLS estimates, which can be computed from any conventional regression software program. Plus, the algebraic formulas involved are straightforward. In fact, the test, as illustrated by Ostrom, consists simply of following a series of steps that involve computing OLS estimates from a given model, substituting those coefficients into a regression formula, and solving for particular values (See Ostrom 1978, 52). The steps are as follows:
1) Estimate the statistical relationship with OLS indicators.

2) Compute the predicted error term (\( \hat{e}_t \)) and the lag of the predicted error term (\( \hat{e}_{t-1} \)).

3) Regress \( \hat{e}_t \) on the lag of the dependent variable (\( Y_{t-1} \)), the other independent variable or variables (\( X_t \)), and \( \hat{e}_{t-1} \); in short, regress \( \hat{e}_t \) on all of the variables on the right hand side of the original equation, plus \( \hat{e}_{t-1} \).

4) Test the statistical significance of the coefficient for \( \hat{e}_{t-1} \) resulting from the regression procedure completed in step 3.

The decision rule for step 4 is this: if the coefficient for \( \hat{e}_{t-1} \) is statistically significant at a typical level (.01 to .05, for example), it can be assumed that there is indeed significant autocorrelation in the residuals, and an alternative estimation procedure must be used instead, such as pseudo-GLS estimates (Ostrom 1978, 52).

Tests for Autocorrelation in the Project Data

With the SPSS/PC package, the procedures outlined above were followed to test the data assembled for this project for problems with autocorrelation. A step-by-step illustration is provided below of the Durbin's h test as
it was applied first to the Argentine data and then to the Chilean data.

Test of the Argentine Data

1) The statistical relationships were estimated with OLS indicators, and the following coefficients were calculated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAGRST</td>
<td>.879094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTEST</td>
<td>6.063884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT1</td>
<td>-.032309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT2</td>
<td>-4.533988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>-11.534510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) \( \hat{e}_t \) and \( \hat{e}_{t-1} \) were computed. The formula for a simple regression equation is

\[
Y_t = a + bX_t + \hat{e}_t
\]

Using algebra to solve for \( \hat{e}_t \), the formula becomes

\[
\hat{e}_t = Y_t - a - bX_t
\]

Substituting the values of all of coefficients listed above in the appropriate places, the computation for \( \hat{e}_t \) is

\[
\hat{e}_t = \text{RESTRICT} + 11.534510 - (.879094 \times \text{LAGRST}) - (6.063884 \times \text{PROTEST}) + (.032309 \times \text{INTERACT1}) + (4.533988 \times \text{INTERACT2})
\]
The lag of $\hat{e}_t$ ($\hat{e}_{t-1}$) was computed after solving for $\hat{e}_t$.

3) As instructed, $\hat{e}_t$ was then regressed on all of the independent variables, including on the lag of $\hat{e}_t$.

4) The statistical significance of the OLS coefficient for $\hat{e}_{t-1}$ was tested. The coefficient was not statistically significant at the .05 level or better. Hence, following the decision rule, the hypothesis can be accepted that the data are free from any significant problems with autocorrelation in the residuals, and thus, regular OLS estimates can be used in the analysis of the Argentine data.

**Test of the Chilean Data**

1) The statistical relationships were estimated with OLS indicators, and the following coefficients were calculated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAGRST</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTS</td>
<td>.901542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT1</td>
<td>.025639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT2</td>
<td>-.472415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT</td>
<td>4.816252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) $\hat{e}_t$ and $\hat{e}_{t-1}$ were computed. Using the same OLS regression formulas already described previously in Step 2 above, the computation for $e_t$ with the Chilean data is the following:

$$\hat{e}_t = \text{RESTRCT} - 4.816252 - (0.002989 \times \text{LAGRST}) - (0.901542 \times \text{PROTESTS}) - (0.026539 \times \text{INTERACT1}) + (0.472415 \times \text{INTERACT2})$$

The lag of $\hat{e}_t$ ($\hat{e}_{t-1}$) was also computed, as instructed.

3) As in Step 3 above, $\hat{e}_t$ was then regressed on all of the independent variables, including $\hat{e}_{t-1}$.

4) The statistical significance of the coefficient for $\hat{e}_{t-1}$ was tested.

The coefficient was not statistically significant at the .05 or higher level or better. Thus, following the decision rule, the Durbin h test suggests that the Chilean data, like the Argentine data, is also free from problems with autocorrelation in the residuals, and that OLS estimates can be interpreted with the confidence that they are reliable and unbiased.

Justification for Using Ordinary Least Square Indicators

As discussed above, one of the most significant technical issues in time-series analyses is the resolution of any problems with autocorrelation in the data, which,
if not detected and resolved, will bias the regression coefficients. Other considerations plus this issue led me to choose Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) indicators for this project instead of others. First, although I have had experience with other analytical techniques such as Box and Jenkins, I am most familiar with the OLS technology. For example, numerous preliminary OLS models were developed for the project until one was found that was both theoretically appropriate and appeared free from technical problems. Second, having mastered and applied to the project data the OLS procedures to test for autocorrelation, a judgment was made that the indicators generated by the model are relatively valid and that nothing substantive would be gained by changing to another type of indicator or technology. Third, as mentioned earlier, OLS indicators can be interpreted in a relatively straight-forward manner, in contrast to Generalized Least Square or Autocorrelation Function (ACF) indicators which may make interpretations difficult or, at the minimum, require a greater specialized knowledge to understand (see McCleary and Hay 1980 for descriptions of alternative modeling techniques).

Overall, the OLS indicators were selected because they model the project data satisfactorily and allow for relatively uncomplicated interpretations. OLS results
from the model applied to the Argentine and Chilean data are interpreted in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

STATISTICAL FINDINGS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This chapter focuses on an analysis of the results of the regression model applied to the Argentine and Chilean data. It shows that the model predicts the actual data for both countries fairly well. That finding is mitigated, however, by the fact that the regression coefficients indicate that the model works better with the Argentine than with the Chilean data. This raises some theoretical and measurement concerns that are explored in the latter part of the chapter.

Argentina, 1940 - 1982

The overlay plot in Figure 1 illustrates the unqualified relationship between the predicted and actual values for governmental repression for each year. Each peak and valley in the data is fairly well predicted across all of the years, including 1955, the year Juan Perón was removed from power and state violence peaked at an all-time high. The plot clearly suggests that the model is a good
Figure 1: Overlay Plot of Predicted and Actual Incidents of State Repression in Argentina by Year.
predictor of variance in repression in Argentina over the entire time frame.

The more detailed statistical results presented in Table 1 confirm the suggestion. Sixty percent \( (R^2 = .60) \) of the variance in repression can be explained by the model. This relatively high predictive power is cross-checked by two other statistics. First, as demonstrated in Chapter IV, calculations for the Durbin's h test for autocorrelation showed no significant problems with correlation in the error terms. Thus, the OLS estimates can be accepted with confidence that they are reasonably accurate, and do not require any complex statistical transformations that might make interpretations difficult. Second, the Adjusted \( R^2 \) was calculated at .55. This statistic indicates that the model accounts for more than 50 percent of the variance in repression after statistical adjustments have been made for the number of variables used in the regression equation. In short, these statistical procedures provide clear, relatively robust evidence that the model predicts the data on Argentina very well and that the OLS indicators are not misleading. Other strengths of the model are that the signs of all of the coefficients are in the expected direction and all of the variables are statistically significant at .01 or higher. An interpretation of each of the coefficients for each of the variables in the model follows.
Table 1: Multiple Regression Estimates for State Repression in Argentina for the Years 1940 to 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>BETA</th>
<th>SE BETA</th>
<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAGRST</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTESTS</td>
<td>6.064</td>
<td>.695</td>
<td>1.067</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT1</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.668</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACT2</td>
<td>-4.534</td>
<td>-.414</td>
<td>1.405</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant = -11.535

R² = .60

Adjusted R² = .55

Definitions for the Abbreviations of the Variables Above

* LAGRST = Lag of Government Restrictions (Yₜ₋₁)
* PROTESTS = Protest Demonstrations (X)
* INTERACT1 = Interaction Between Lag of Restrictions and Lag of Protest Demonstrations (Z₁)
* INTERACT2 = Interaction Between Institutional Military Rule and Protest Demonstrations (Z₂)
1. LAGRST - the lag of governmental restrictions.

Recall that this variable was included in the model to test the subhypothesis that governmental repression for any given year can be explained partially as a consequence of past repressive policies, all other conditions in the model being equal. It is a lag by one year of the dependent variable itself. The idea is to test the notion that the policy making process was predominantly one of making incremental adjustments to the inertia or momentum of established policy.

The B coefficient for LAGRST would be a perfect 1.0 if the absolute number of current restrictions were exactly the same as the number of past restrictions, that is, if current restrictive policies for any given year were exactly the same as past policies. The fact that both the B coefficient and the standardized BETA coefficient for LAGRST are close to 1.0 (both at .88) is very informative. Specifically, the coefficients indicate: a) that nearly ninety percent of past restrictions will continue for a given year into the next year, if all other conditions remain equal; and, b) that this variable plays a very important role in the model, relative to the other variables. Statistically, the LAGRST variable alone explains much of what is going on in the model.
This finding makes a lot of sense when placed in historical context. Recall that Argentina’s recent political history is most easily defined as a relatively modern state lacking the basic political tools to resolve its conflicts, and that pervasive regime instability resulted. LAGRST indicates that repression was one of the political constants in the country, whether military officers or civilians were in power, and that upward or downward adjustments to its frequency were largely incremental. Thus, while the targets of state repression changed over time as one group, such as the Peronists, captured power and attempted to exclude its opposition, the overall reliance on force tended to be carried over from one regime to the next. This is a significant finding, and as stated above, helps to explain in a common sense empirical way the persistence of state violence in Argentina over the years.

2. PROTESTS - protest demonstrations. Recall that this variable was included in the model to test Subhypothesis 2 that governmental repression in Argentina can be explained partially as a function of the number of political protest demonstrations carried out against the government during any given year. The behavior of the opposition, such as a massive protest in the streets of Buenos Aires, is assumed to influence the behavior of the
state, that is, to cause it to take repressive action. Since an indicator of the obverse -- the impact of state violence on the behavior of the opposition -- was not included in the study design, PROTESTS does not precisely test for the notion that the state and its opponents mutually influence each other's behavior over time. In short, PROTESTS is limited to the more narrow assumption that popular unrest provokes regime repression, but not vice-versa. As the following analysis shows, however, there are strong impressions that a reciprocal relationship existed between repression and unrest, particularly during the state's anti-peronista campaigns in the late 1950s and 1960s.

The level of statistical significance at .000 and the BETA coefficient at .70 indicate that PROTESTS is an important component in the model. More precise information, however, is indicated by the B coefficient. It tells us that, on average, the government responded with six additional restrictions (6.06) for every protest demonstration against it across the years 1940 to 1982, when other conditions in the model are held constant.

Given the country's problems with social cohesion, we might expect a given Argentine government to be relatively easy to threaten, and to react to anti-government demonstrations with force as it sought ways to exclude its
opponents. In addition, inertia in repression policies gave threatened officials plenty of precedents to follow in isolating their opposition and an established policy framework. Thus, it is not surprising to find empirical affirmation of this variable. What is more of a surprise, at least to the author, is the absolute ratio of acts of repression to acts of protest. An average ratio of six-to-one, respectively, seems like a relatively harsh amount of repression in any country, and particularly in one that is considered well developed in most ways. The politics of Juan Perón's rise to power in the 1940s and its legacy lasting into the 1970s helps to explain in part the significance of these numbers.

Perón's rise in 1946 signaled a change in Argentine politics toward a more leftist direction in that he championed the interests of blue-collar workers, trade unions, and the urban poor. As discussed in more detail earlier, his removal from power in 1955 marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the military and succeeding regimes to exclude the peronistas and other leftists from the political process. The ensuing political struggle between the peronistas and the anti-peronistas over the next fifteen years intensified popular political alienation and discontent, political fractionalization, regime insecurity, and state violence (see O'Donnell 1979, 129-63 and Wynia
1990, 249-74). In this context, an average of six acts of repression for every protest demonstration carried out against the government throughout the entire time frame is empirical evidence that the Argentine government meant to keep as tight a reign as it could on the peronistas (at least until General Lanusse made peace with them in 1972) and on the political system in general. The attitude was demonstrated again in the late 1970s when the military terrorized the entire populace with its violent campaigns to eliminate the radical left.

3. INTERACT1 - tests for Subhypothesis 3: governments attempt to adjust current repressive policies based on their perceptions of the effectiveness of past repressive policies. The variable is an indicator that measures the interaction between the lag of restrictions (by one year) and the lag of protests demonstrations (by one year). It represents a mitigating factor in the model. The variable is based on the assumption that a rational government will look back and consider the degree to which its past restrictive policies were or were not effective in resolving political unrest as it adjusts its current policy or creates a new one altogether. In this regard, it may be interpreted as an indicator of governmental perceptions.

Results from the regression show that INTERACT1 is statistically significant and has a BETA coefficient of
As with the two preceding variables, these numbers show that INTERACT1 is important both to the construction of the model and to explaining variance in state repression in Argentina. Table 2 presents statistics that facilitate a more specific interpretation of the role of this variable in the model. It shows, respectively, columns of predicted values by year for the model with INTERACT1 in the equation (Yhat1) and with INTERACT1 out of the equation (Yhat2), as well as columns for the calculated differences between the two equations and the actual data for "PROTESTS" and "LAGRST." The following observations are based on the table.

Notice that the calculated differences between Yhat1 and Yhat2 are negative for almost every year, with the few exceptions when the differences are zero or near zero (1942, 1949, 1968, 1972, and 1979-81). This shows that more restrictions can be accounted for each year by including INTERACT1 in the equation than by excluding it. In 1951, for example, the calculations show that including INTERACT1 in the equation helps the model account for almost six more restrictions (5.48) than excluding INTERACT1 from the equation (85.66 - 91.14 = -5.48). More clearly, since the predicted value for Yhat1 is relatively much closer to the actual value for LAGRST at almost every
Table 2: Predicted Values and Differences for the Model for Argentina

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
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year than is the predicted value for Yhat2, it can be concluded with confidence that INTERACT1 makes a significant contribution to the model, and using the simple arithmetic procedure, we can see precisely what that contribution is by year in empirical terms.

As mentioned above, INTERACT1 represents a mitigating factor in the model. The logic of analysis is the following: we expect that if protests or restrictions or both are high in the previous year, a regime will have a tendency to relax restrictions for the next year. Observe in Table 2 that for the years 1955, 1962, 1966, 1969, and 1973 the levels for both protests and restrictions were relatively high. The level of repression declines substantially the subsequent year in every case. The same trend is evident for those years in which protest demonstrations only were relatively high (1965, 1957, 1969, and 1973). By contrast, there is no discernible trend in the data for the years when the level of restrictions only are relatively high.

These observations suggest that at times the Argentine government had a memory, that it seemed to look back at the effectiveness of its policies, particularly during the years of intense conflict between it and its opponents, and adjusted its current restrictive policies accordingly. For example, as noted earlier, the level of political conflict
rose dramatically following Perón's forced departure. Immediately after the coup, General Leonardi, the new president, apparently reflecting on the intensification of conflict generated by the coup, attempted to defuse the situation by taking a relatively moderate approach to enforcing the restrictions against the peronistas. Recall that he was replaced quickly by General Aramburu who immediately re-escalated the struggle between the peronistas and the anti-peronistas by outlawing the party, firing functionaries, and issuing restrictions designed explicitly to reverse Perón's influence. Clashes between the two groups throughout 1956 and 1957 resulted in the deaths of some forty Perón supporters, the creation of a "Board for the Defense of Democracy," and continued suppression of Peronism (see Chapter III and Skidmore and Smith 1984, 95-6).

Perhaps the clearest example of looking back at the effectiveness of past policies, is General Lanusse's decision after the 1969 coup to resolve the peronista problem once and for all. Most assuredly he was acutely aware of the divisiveness and turmoil the military's policies toward the Peronists had caused. It is reasonable to assume that his decision to allow them access and participation in the political system demonstrates a rational reflection on the bankruptcy of the regime's past
policies and a determination to alter them accordingly. The impact was an immediate decrease in political conflict in the state and the promise of a new era in Argentine politics. Conflict stayed relatively low until it grew, first, between Perón and the radical left, and, then, between the new military government in 1976 and the radical left (see "PROTESTS" and "LAGRST" in Table 2).

To recap, if the level of conflict was high in the past and the government considered that the restrictions that had been imposed were ineffectual or eliminated the threat altogether, then it tended to add fewer sanctions or even to relax some of them in the following year or years. It can be argued similarly that if protests were high in a previous year, but the level of conflict relatively low (that is, there were relatively few sanctions), then the state may have considered its opponent's grievances and decided to relax some of its restrictions as a result.

Another interesting but very different observation drawn from Table 2 is that at times the government looked back on its past policies and determined that it was safe in adding new restrictions. For example, during the Perón years, 1946 to 1955, the levels of protest demonstrations remained very low as Perón's Justicialismo captured the imagination and devotion of the majority of alienated workers. Protest demonstrations averaged less during these
years than any other comparable grouping of years. However, the rate of repressive acts increased over the same years, peaking in 1950, before it declined slightly; and then it stayed relatively high throughout the rest of Perón's presidency. By contrast, the number of protest demonstrations averaged less than two a year throughout all of these years.

In short, the data suggest that Perón may have reflected on his restrictive policies, carefully perceived what did and did not work from one year to the next, and consistently chosen to add new restrictions, particularly as the level of conflict intensified between him and his opponents during the early to mid 1950s.

4. INTERACT2 - the interaction between institutionalized military rule and annual protest demonstrations. This variable tests for Subhypothesis 4: Variance in governmental repression can be explained for any given year partially as a consequence of the interaction between institutionalized military rule and protest demonstrations, all other conditions in the model being equal.

The sign for the B coefficient and other statistics for INTERACT2 presented in Table 1 clearly support the hypothesis. The key to interpreting the coefficient for this variable is to examine its relationship to the B
coefficient for "PROTESTS." That relationship shows that the rate of restrictions imposed by military officials slowed to an average of about two (1.5) restrictions for every anti-government protest during the years of institutionalized military rule (Table 1). This number was calculated in the following way: the model estimates that the government imposed over six (6.06) restrictions for every protest demonstration during any given year, without controlling for the years of institutionalized military rule, and over four (-4.53) when the effects of the military rule are added to the equation. The difference is calculated by subtracting the B coefficient for "INTERACT2" (-4.53) from "PROTESTS" (6.06). The difference is 1.53 restrictions during times of institutionalized military rule.

The notion that the absolute number of repressive acts would decrease during times of institutionalized military rule makes a lot of practical sense, particularly when it comes to explaining events such as the 1966 military coup and the military's subsequent controlled bureaucratic-authoritarian revolution. As noted in Chapter III, the military was determined that this intervention was going to be different from earlier ones in that it was interested in a lot more than temporary, limited rule. To begin the transition, the junta dismissed the President and the judges
on the Supreme Court, dissolved the Parliament, and enacted the *Estatutos Revolucionarios*. The statutes gave the junta broad-based powers to ban indefinitely all political activities and parties, to close universities, to restrict labor unions, and to introduce economic austerity programs (see Chapter III).

A reasonable assumption is that once its power and policies became institutionalized and pervasive, the military government gained control over its political environment and its need to initiate other, new restrictions at the same rate began to diminish. In 1966, forty different official sanctions were imposed by the government (Table 2). With the exception of 1969, the absolute number of restrictions dropped dramatically within a few years, to between four and nine per year. In sum, the statistics and data show that although the government continued to impose restrictions during periods of military institutionalization, the number of restrictions declined substantially.

Overall, this analysis shows that the particular mix of factors included in the model provide a relatively good explanatory tool for the origination and persistence of state violence in Argentina.
Chile, 1948 - 1991

As with Figure 1, the overlay plot in Figure 2 illustrates the unqualified relationship between the predicted and actual values for governmental repression in Chile across the years 1948 to 1991. Similar to the fit of the model to the Argentine data, each peak and valley in the actual Chilean data is fairly well predicted across all of the years. In this most general of empirical terms, the plot suggests that the model is a reasonably good predictor of the data and, therefore, of variance in state repression in Chile across all of the years under observation.

A comparison of the plots - Figure 1 and Figure 2 - provide some intriguing observations about the use of repression in both Argentina and Chile throughout the last four decades. It is an interesting note, for example, that governmental violence rose dramatically at one particular moment in each nation. In Argentina, the peak was in 1955 with some 266 separate acts of repression, the year of Perón's political demise (Figure 1). In the case of Chile, the peak was in 1984, with 44 acts of repression (Figure 2). That was the year after General Augusto Pinochet completed his unofficial transformation of the institutionalized military regime, in place since late 1973, into a de facto personalist one in which he exercised greater autonomous
Figure 2: Overlay Plot of Predicted and Actual Incidents of State Repression in Chile by Year
authority than he had before (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 144; Valenzuela 1991, 30-50). This development, coupled with the death in 1982 of Eduardo Frei, one of the few remaining opposition figures to Pinochet, made it easier than ever for Pinochet to use repression. Thus, when popular political and economic discontent intensified in late 1983 over the issues of economic reform and redemocratization of the country, and many people began to demonstrate their displeasure in the streets of Santiago and elsewhere, Pinochet reacted quickly and with more single acts of repression than he had before, as Figure 2 shows (Barrera and Valenzuela, 260-62; Bethell 1984, 373-82).

Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate that the overall use of governmental violence was considerably more pervasive in Argentina than in Chile throughout comparable years. The peak of 266 separate acts in Argentina in 1955, for example, is six times greater than the comparable peak in Chile in 1984 at 44. More revealing is that the average number of repressive acts per year was 30 in Argentina over the time frame, whereas it was 9 in Chile. Although these numbers tell us nothing about the severity of any of the specific acts and the damage done to the citizenry or the political system, they suggest --overall -- that the governments in Argentina since 1940 have been considerably more active in using the sorts of violence and repression
measured here than their counterparts in Chile, which might be expected given Argentina's historical problems with political stability.

Turning to the more summary statistical results presented in Table 3, the claim made above that the model predicts the Chilean data well is confirmed by some of the statistical computations, although the fit between predicted and actual data is slightly less robust than with the Argentine data. The model accounts for 51 percent ($R^2 = .51$) of the variance in state repression in Chile between 1948 and 1991. As with the Argentine data, this relatively high predictive power is cross-checked by the use of two other procedures. First, the Durbin's $h$ test for autocorrelation showed no significant problems with correlation in the error terms (see Chapter IV). Second, the Adjusted $R^2$ shows that more than forty-five percent of the variance in repression can be accounted for by the model after statistical adjustments have been made for the number of independent variables in the equation. In sum, these procedures suggest that the model on the whole predicts the data on Chile well and that the OLS indicators are not misleading. Other strengths are that the signs for all of the regression coefficients are in the expected directions and that the PROTESTS variable is statistically significant. However, analysis of the
Table 3: Multiple Regression Estimates for State Repression in Chile for the Years 1948 to 1991

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Constant 4.816
R² .51
Adjusted R² .46

Definitions for the Abbreviations of the Variables Above

* LAGRST = Lag of Government Restrictions (Y_{t-1})
* PROTESTS = Protest Demonstrations (X)
* INTERACT1 = Interaction Between Lag of Restrictions and Lag of Protest Demonstrations (Z1)
* INTERACT2 = Interaction Between Institutional Military Rule and Protest Demonstrations (Z2)
coefficients indicates that the remaining three variables in the model are not significant for Chile.

1. LAGRST - the lag of governmental restrictions by one year. As described in the case of Argentina, this variable was designed to test the subhypothesis that governmental repression for any given year can be explained partially as a function of past acts of repression. The idea is to test the notion that state repression was predominately a decision process of making incremental adjustments to an inertia in established policy. Recall that the coefficient for the variable would be 1.0 if past policies perfectly predicted current policies, since LAGRST is a lag by one year of the dependent variable itself.

In marked contrast to the Argentine data, the B coefficient for LAGRST in the case of Chile shows that less than 1 percent (.003) of past restrictive policies were transferred into current policies. Also, the standardized BETA coefficient for the variable shows that it accounts for very little in the model, relative to the other variables in the equation. While these values taken together indicate some statistical support for the subhypothesis, they suggest that state repression in Chile cannot be explained predominantly as a function of policy inertia. In fact, they suggest the opposite -- repressive
policies were formulated, on average, mostly in a capricious, *ad hoc* manner, probably initiated in reaction to a perceived threat or to meet a short-term political need or goal. The extra-legal measures taken by Allende to enforce his *Via Chilena* between 1970 and 1973 fit this pattern.

More compelling, the finding for LAGRST makes sense in light of Chile's historical ability to maintain broad political consensus among its contending groups, and with the Chilean military's long-standing tradition of nonintervention into domestic politics. As discussed in Chapter III, the nation experienced a long period of regime stability prior to 1973, and the military stayed out of politics for some forty years (North 1976, 168-9). These conditions precluded a habit of relying on repression to reach desired political and economic goals and/or to resolve conflict, at least until the Pinochet years. Hence, the slight effects of policy inertia detected by the model perhaps thread essentially through the years 1973 to 1989. Finally, the statistics for LAGRST actually complement the other coefficients, particularly the coefficient for PROTESTS, as the following discussion shows.

2. PROTESTS - protest demonstrations. This variable was included in the model to test Subhypothesis 2, that
governmental repression in Chile can be explained partially as a function of the number of political protest demonstrations carried out against the government during any given year. As described above, the behavior of the opposition is assumed to influence the repressive behavior of the state.

The BETA coefficient for PROTESTS at .462 and its level of statistical significance at .002 indicate that this variable is the strongest component in the model (see Table 3). More specifically, the B coefficient indicates that, on average, the state imposed one act of repression (.902) for every act of political protest against it from 1948 to 1991. Clearly, this is an empirical suggestion of a reciprocal relationship between protesters and governmental officials over time, each probably influencing the behavior of the other. Although, as mentioned earlier, there is not enough information in the model to determine exactly who influenced whom when, the historical account presented in Chapter III provides several examples of reactionary governmental behavior following an eruption of popular unrest which in turn seemed to ignite further demonstrations. Videla's anti-Communist campaigns during the latter 1940s are good examples, particularly after passage of his "Law for the Defense of Democracy" in 1948. Other examples include
Ibáñez's violent responses to leftist unrest in the early 1950s, which culminated in a state of siege, urban riots, and military occupation of Santiago, and, of course, the 1973 coup and the eventual restoration of democracy. From this perspective, the findings for PROTEST are very important. First, they explain most of what is going on in the model; second, and perhaps more significantly, they help provide clear empirical linkages for political relationships that seem obvious, but are most often inferred from historical description, namely that unrest sometimes provokes regime aggression which in turn often provokes more unrest.

3. INTERACT1 - this variable tests for Subhypothesis 3: governments attempt to adjust current repressive policies based on their perceptions of the effectiveness of past repressive policies. It is an indicator that measures the interaction between the lag of restrictions (by one year) and the lag of protest demonstrations (by one year).

Results from the regression show that INTERACT1 is close to statistical significance and that it has a BETA coefficient of .367. These findings indicate that although the variable is second in statistical strength to "PROTESTS", it fails to meet the commonly accepted criterion of statistical significance and the BETA coefficient is too weak to be emphatic about.
A table was constructed to explore the impact of this variable in the model in a little more empirical detail, however. Table 4 follows the same format as Table 2, discussed earlier for Argentina. It contains columns of predicted values (by year) for the model with INTERACT1 in the equation (Yhat1) and with INTERACT1 out of the equation (Yhat2), as well as columns for the calculated differences between the two equations and the actual data for "PROTESTS" and "LAGRST."

The most obvious trend in the data is that there is little difference between the calculated values for Yhat1 and Yhat2 across nearly all of the years as shown in the "DIFF" column. Most of the values are zero or near zero. This fact demonstrates more specifically what the summary regression statistics suggest, namely, that when all other conditions are held constant, including INTERACT1 in the equation does not make much of a difference for most of the years, although it may have for several, and these can be identified easily.

This variable is designed as a mitigating factor. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the predicted values for Yhat1 (controlling for the effects of INTERACT1) are closer to the actual values for restrictions (LAGRST) than Yhat2 is for the years 1984 to 1987. All things being
Table 4: Predicted Values and Differences for the Model for Chile

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equal, this is an empirical suggestion (albeit weak) that the Pinochet regime may have reflected somewhat on its past policies during these years as it continued to try to manage and change Chilean society. These were crisis years for the regime, when the redemocratization movement began and questions about the direction in which Pinochet was taking the country began to surface both domestically and internationally (Drake and Jaksic 1991, 11-13). In this context, the regime relaxed some of its restrictions - lifting its censorship of books, guaranteeing an honest plebiscite, and allowing exiles to return. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that rationality may have been one of the factors driving the regime's decision process toward its latter years. If so, that behavior is illustrated here in the data.

4. INTERACT2 - the interaction between institutionalized military rule and annual protest demonstrations. This variable tests for Subhypothesis 4: Variance in state repression can be explained for any given year partially as a consequence of the interaction between institutionalized military rule and protest demonstrations, when other conditions are held constant.

Notice from Table 3 that although the sign of the B coefficient for INTERACT2 is in the expected direction (negative) and the BETA coefficient indicates that the
variable contributes to the overall construction of the model, the contribution is very modest at best. Another shortcoming is that the variable is not statistically significant. This indicates that the subhypothesis is not clearly supported. Thus, while it is well known that the Pinochet regime was successful in eliminating its opposition in the first few months after the 1973 coup, and it is clear that the absolute number of repressive acts declined as a result (see data for "PROTESTS" and "LAGRST" in Table 4), the statistics do not allow for a confident prediction of the average annual rate of decline in repression during the years 1973 to 1983 when the institutionalized military regime was most active. The essential contribution of INTERACT2, then, at least in the case of Chile, is its statistical controlling effects on the other variables in the equation.

Summary

These analyses show that the model works particularly well for Argentina, but not for Chile. In fact, only one component in the model, the protest demonstration variable, is strong across both cases, while the other three variables fail to attain significant betas for Chile. The obvious conclusion is that no definitive theoretical generalizations can be drawn at this time. Put into proper prospective,
however, the project is a beginning and is limited to only two cases. The addition of more cases to the study could show entirely different, perhaps more consistent results. The fact that it captures some of the important determinants of repression for at least one of the countries and demonstrates an alternative approach to the study of repression is very suggestive for further study. These issues and others are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The first part of this chapter summarizes some of the lessons learned from the study. The value of the model in general and some of its components in particular are discussed in the contexts of building a theory of repression and of applying the model's lessons to address practical concerns. The second part consists of recommendations for further research.

Lessons Learned

Presenting state repression as the dependent variable is the first step toward building a general theory of repression. As noted earlier, until relatively recently scholars have not invested much time and effort into sorting out the specific phenomenon of state repression and trying to figure out ways to measure and analyze it in an empirical, comparative fashion. Clearly, one of the lessons suggested by this study is that state violence can be conceptually isolated and measured as a discrete phenomenon, and that factors can be systematically linked together to help explain its origination and persistence,
at least in some countries. In this most general of ways, the model contributes theoretically based notions about how to proceed with the analysis of state repression, notions that have both practical and scholarly implications.

Selection and construction of meaningful independent variables is the next step toward building a theory of repression. The model developed and tested for this project identifies some of the causes of state repression in Argentina and Chile as the inter-relationship among these four factors over time: 1) the impact of inertia in policy, 2) levels of popular unrest, 3) policy makers' perceptions of the effectiveness of past policies, and 4) regime type. These factors were chosen in part from suggestions made in the theoretical literature and in part on the basis of their practical, commonsense value.

The indicator used to measure policy inertia (the LAGRST variable) is a lag by one year of the dependent variable itself. In this way, LAGRST conveys information about the influence of past acts of repression on present acts of repression for any given year in the model, all conditions being equal and when proper statistical procedures are followed to insure its reliability as an indicator. That its regression coefficient is easy to interpret (the closer to 1.0, the more influence from past
policies) is another methodological advantage. In addition, LAGRST seems intuitively valid, since it concurs with the truism that all human behavior is partially a function of past behavior. Overall, since state violence in any country may be partially a matter of making incremental adjustments to long-standing practices, the LAGRST indicator contributes a new way to conceptualize, measure, and analyze state repression, and thus may be a contribution to the literature. In terms of practical application, if policy makers can be made aware that repression may have its own inertia, they can work consciously toward reversing destructive or counterproductive trends.

Including an indicator in the model that tests the assumption that governments have memories and that they formulate new policies partially on the basis of rational or intuitive assessments of the effectiveness of their past actions (INTERACTI in the model; the third cause in the list above), seems like a reasonable choice for an indicator, but it has been ignored in the repression literature. We expect behavior to be driven in part by perceptions of what was successful. Isolation and measurement of this pattern in human behavior is useful to the study of state violence because it is the perceptions
of policy makers that underlie their decisions to use repression.

To help meet the challenge of measuring this perception, the INTERACT1 variable was developed. The variable is constructed from the interaction between acts of protest demonstrations and acts of repression. Both were lagged by one year to capture the delayed effects of the interaction on the use of repression. The variable's construction is methodologically innovative, and its use has demonstrated to be statistically significant, at least in the case of Argentina. An additional advantage is that the analytical techniques developed to assess the findings for INTERACT1 may help political analysts, historians, or activists explain in fairly precise empirical terms events such as Perón's increased use of repression during a period of relative political calm. Such findings may help indicate to human rights' organizations how they can direct their efforts in attempts to change policy makers' perceptions.

A similar argument can be made for the overall usefulness of the other interaction term (INTERACT2) in the model which indicates regime type, military institutionalization in this case. More specifically, it predicts variance in repression based on the temporal interaction between institutionalized military rule and
protest demonstrations. Although the findings were weak in the case of Chile, they were meaningful in the case of Argentina. They showed decline in state violence in Argentina during years of institutionalized military rule, as would be expected after a military regime has stabilized its political environment. In addition, the findings confirm an intuitive insight: that people are less willing to articulate their political discontent during periods of institutionalized military rule, presumably from fear of severe retaliation. As with INTERACT1, the construction of INTERACT2 and the methodology and techniques used to analyze it provide new ways to explain the relationship among state violence, regime type, and unrest in fairly precise empirical terms. Such information can be useful, for example, to populations that may want to work toward minimizing the power and influence of the military in their states.

The likelihood of being able to translate the statistical findings into practical policy suggestions is potentially worthwhile. It seems reasonable that any nation struggling to achieve internal peace and justice and any organization working to alleviate repression would be interested in the findings. To determine how such nations and organizations can utilize these findings may be an avenue for future research. The research could
focus on how they can gather information, how they can identify problem countries, and how they can inform and direct their own clients.

Recommendations for Further Research

It should be noted that the particular spatiotemporal character of the research design provided me with substantial information with which to link otherwise abstract statistics to historical trends and events in ways that give meaning to the statistics. This is an important consideration for several reasons, but particularly in light of complaints by many scholars that applied quantitative analysis is often too abstract and irrelevant.

While it is important to find summary statistical evidence that repression in Chile, for example, is predicted significantly by incidence of protest demonstrations, everything else being equal, such a finding does not convey enough meaningful information by itself to explain much. A reading of Chilean history informs us that acts of repression and protests did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they took place in the context of a breakdown in a long-standing tradition of political cohesion, the rise of a labor movement, a devastating coup, and the emergence of a redemocratization movement:
events which took place over some fifty years. Similarly, the historical details surrounding the political struggle between the peronistas and the anti-peronistas help place the abstract findings for Argentina into a concrete contextual perspective.

From this point of view, time-series analyses can contribute significantly to the understanding of specified empirical cause and effect relationships because they afford an analytical blend between empirical findings and historical description. It is another indication that the model tested for this project and the methodology used is practical and accessible to scholars, policy makers, and activists.

A comment is in order, however, about one of the principal limitations with a time-series design. Despite the advantage of being able to enrich abstract statistical findings with historical detail, time-series analyses are case studies. Making broad, cross-national generalizations from the findings for Argentina and Chile would violate the method of comparative inquiry, and thus, would be invalid (see Przeworski and Teune 1970). Yet, the findings for Argentina in particular suggest that further comparisons might be interesting both in practical terms and for theoretical reasons.
One strategy is to test the model against more countries, using the same approach illustrated here; the more countries the better. For obvious reasons that would be a very time-consuming task. A more efficient strategy would be to use a cross-sectional time-series design, a relatively new method. As the label implies, it combines strengths from two different approaches: observations on a set of variables are gathered and analyzed across many countries (or sets of countries grouped by explicit criteria) across many years or some other unit of time. Assuming that methodological problems such as autocorrelation can be successfully resolved, analysis of spatiotemporal relationships could be evaluated efficiently in a cross-national fashion and the findings generalized broadly.

While adding more cases to the study may show a greater consistency in the findings across countries, the likelihood is doubtful in light of the results found for Chile. Given that Argentina and Chile are unique cases with different histories prior to the period studied, the model needs to be respecified in ways that might better capture common determinants of repression for both countries and, by implication, across many countries.

One possible refinement is to include an indicator for political cohesion. As the historical description in
Chapter III indicates, Argentina has had more pervasive problems with political cohesion than Chile has. This difference may account for some of the differences in the predictive power of the model for the two countries. If political cohesion were quantified and included in the model, the model might work in more cases and consequently contribute more toward an understanding of causes of repression. A few strategies of how polarization, or the absence of political cohesion, might be measured include: 1) carefully constructed content analyses of opposition communications such as speeches, trade or professional newspapers, 2) actual counts of rapid changes in party coalitions or rapid changeovers in governments, 3) analyses of voting patterns, including the use of "blank" votes such as many peronistas cast after Perón was forced from office, or 4) the construction of a dichotomous variable to indicate the forced demise or restriction on activities of any political party or competing political group.

Another possible refinement would involve devising a more complete measure for reciprocal actions between a state and its opposition. As noted in the text, the idea of a reciprocal impact between acts of repression and unrest is not formally tested by the model, although the PROTESTS variable measures one half of the equation, the
influence of protest demonstrations on repression. A supplementary model for reciprocity, such as a temporal correlation between repression and protest demonstrations with repression as the independent variable, might strengthen the study by calculating the other half of the equation - the degree to which the state influences unrest over time.

Measuring reciprocity between popular protests and state repression is intuitively appealing and has theoretical implications. The measurement might explain the political demise of Pinochet as a function of his own acts of repression. The rationale might be as follows: his extensive use of repression alienated most of the population, a condition which contributed to an escalation of unrest that eventually found a voice manifested in the redemocratization movement in the early 1980s. Pinochet's initial response to the unrest was to use more repression, which strengthened rather than eliminated the resolve of the protesters. It was this resolve that finally removed Pinochet from office in the late 1980s. Likewise, the Argentine military's long-term combat with the radical left might be explained best as a reciprocal relationship, each side contributing to an escalation in the violent behavior of the other. Such an indicator could perhaps not only provide a better comparison between Argentina and
Chile, but also provide comparisons among them with other countries.

Another consideration might be to incorporate an external influence variable into the model. Pion-Berlin suggests that persistence of repression in Argentina may be partially explained by influences from external actors -- especially vested U.S. economic interests in this case. Regarding Chile, there is substantial evidence of the U.S. government's role in provoking and supporting anti-Allende political and economic turmoil during the early 1970s (Wynia 1990, 186-88). Also, the record suggests that one of the contributing factors to Pinochet's downfall was a weakening in international political and economic support for the regime because of Pinochet's continuance of human rights violations (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 136-44). It seems likely that adding an external influence variable to the model would increase its predictive power by increasing its generalizability across many cases.

The model might also be strengthened by redesigning the measures for some of the variables. For example, the operationalization of the protest demonstration variable was limited to peaceful popular demonstrations. It could be expanded to include other forms of participation such as armed attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings by organized groups against governmental or other opposition
leaders. The reason the variable was not constructed this way originally is that while the Taylor and Jodice database contained an indicator for armed conflicts, it did not separate insurgent attacks from governmental or military attacks. In addition, it is not clear whether Taylor and Jodice included deaths from armed attacks as part of the indicator itself, rather than simply coding the fact that an armed attack took place (see Taylor and Jodice codebook, 6). As noted elsewhere, tabulating exact numbers of deaths caused by governmental violence is a controversial issue. These problems made the indicator unusable for this study. New data were not collected because early runs of the model showed that protest demonstrations, as operationalized, was an important theoretical determinant of repression in both countries. A reconfiguration of the protest variable to include insurgent attacks might capture even more of the effects of unrest and make the model more applicable to cross-national comparisons.

Reconfiguring the indicator for regime type might also strengthen the model. As operationalized here, regime type is indicated by long-term institutionalized military rule, in contrast to personalist dictatorships and short-term military interventions that are defined narrowly (for example to force a restoration of order or
to implement austerity programs or reforms). Considering the pervasiveness of military elites' antipolitical attitudes and behavior throughout Latin America since the nineteenth century, expanding the criteria of the regime-type measure to include short-term as well as long-term military interventions might make a better theoretical basis for cross-national comparisons in Latin America as well as across other regions.

Finally, there may be alternative measures for the variable that was designed in this study to capture effects from policy makers' perceptions on repression. The original measure (INTERACT1) is composed of one-year lags on both repression and protests, the logic being that a governmental official would look back at the effectiveness of this interaction as a guide to formulating new policies of repression. Results from the statistical analysis show that it did not work well for Chile, although it did for Argentina. An alternative measure for the variable should include calculations of the similarity (or dissimilarity) of a given regime's reactions to equivalent events over time. Specifically, differences between current and past reactions could be calculated, indexed, and then used as a quantifier to perhaps better capture effects of the perceptions of policymakers on their use of repression.
Overall, the model used in this study makes a contribution to the understanding of state repression. Expanding and embellishing the model in the ways suggested here, and perhaps in other ways not yet conceived, could well strengthen the study and lend greater insight into the problem of states committing acts of violence against their own citizens. With improved understanding about the causes of the problem, we can hope to realize more effective solutions.
REFERENCE WORKS


