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POLITICAL CULTURE IN WEST AND EAST GERMANY
AT THE TIME OF REUNIFICATION:
REVISITING THE CIVIC CULTURE

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Steffen Baumann, Vordiplom

Denton, Texas

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Studies of political culture have often focused on the impact of political institutions on political culture in a society. The scientific community has accepted the position that institutions shape beliefs and attitudes among the citizens towards the system they live in. This study tests this hypothesis by using survey data collected during the fall of 1990 in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, West, and East Germany.

The quantitative analysis consists of three methods. The frequency of certain variables is compared cross-nationally, the same variables are used to form summary measures in order to measure central tendencies in the countries' population. The regression analyses trace differences among the citizens and different social groups. The overall findings show that institutions have some impact on the expectations from the government where social spending and government's role in the economy are concerned. Protest potential develops independently from the institutional frame, as the similar distribution of this variable in East and West Germany indicates. Social characteristics such as age education and gender that were often suspected to shape political culture play a minor role as the findings herein suggest.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW

I.A. Introduction

Former German chancellor and Noble Peace Prize awarded Willy Brandt commented when the Iron Curtain fell in the fall of 1989 that "Now joins together what belongs together". Willy Brandt and many other representatives of the first generation of political leaders in West Germany were convinced that the two Germanies belonged together. As this thesis will show, they took that point of view based upon their personal experience and the country's history prior to the end of World War II, Germany in the borders of 1937. They probably were not convinced that it was joint present political culture that united the four sectors of Germany in its borders of 1989.

The main topic of the research herein is to investigate whether the fundamental change in political culture in West Germany is a function of the democratic institutions that were installed by the Allied Forces. Now, it is possible to assess whether political culture in East Germany is fundamentally different since citizens were ruled by totalitarian governments for an uninterrupted period of 57 years. Or are cultural changes due to factors other than the governing institutions? Are East and West Germans quite similar or very different? The possible finding that East and West German political cultures are distinctly different would have an important impact on expectations concerning how long it will take until the two parts merge. It required two or three generations before West

Germany developed a political culture comparable to those found in Britain and the United States. Considering the differences in political culture among East and West Germans, one can predict a long and painful process of adaptation to the new system in the East.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: The rest of Section I places the study of political culture into the context of the study of comparative politics in general, and analyzes some of the relevant literature in the subfield. Section II covers the design of the study, the data that are used, the variables that appeared to be most important, the summary variables that have been created in order to allow more general statements than can be provided about responses to questions about single issues, and the methods that are employed. Sections III and IV summarize the findings of the bivariate analyses. Section III considers attitudes on single issues, and section IV focuses on broader summary measures in order to detect differences and similarities in political culture. Variables are constructed in a way that allows one to measure attitudes towards civic protest and the role of government both in the sphere of the economy and in the realm of the government as a welfare state. Section V discusses the multivariate findings yielded by several multivariate regression analyses. The conclusion, Section VI, summarizes the empirical findings and places them in a theoretical framework.

I.B. Literature Review

"Political culture refers essentially to the orientations that members of a society have about politics and the political system. It encompasses everything from beliefs about the legitimacy of the system itself to beliefs about the adequacy and appropriateness of political input structures, governmental policies, and the role provided for the individual in the political process." (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981, 22). The study of political culture is an important sub-field in comparative politics. Muller and Seligson (1994) point out the main grounds for disagreement among scholars who are studying political culture: whether political culture shapes the institutions of a political system or whether the political institutions determine a society's political culture. For example, the mature "old" democracies in Great Britain and the United States are said to have produced a climate in society that is beneficial to the survival of democracy. In that case institutions have developed the emergence of a particular political culture.

One of the reasons for the peaceful revolution in East Germany during the fall of 1989 may be that East German citizens had developed a political culture that was no longer compatible with the political institutions in the country. The structural functionalist argument (Huntington 1968 ; Puttnam, 1994; Muller and Seligson, 1994) suggests that a certain political culture is necessary in order to maintain institutions and that a political system's task is to react flexibly to a society's political culture and its changes. If the political system does not fulfill this requirement, it will be replaced by a system that is more responsive to the society's political culture.

Ronald Inglehart (1977) introduced a new component to the definition of political

culture: the materialist/post-materialist construct. His theory is based upon two assumptions, one regarding human nature in general and the other involving the political socialization process. Inglehart asserts, in what has become known as the *scarcity* hypothesis, that mankind desires most those goods that are in short supply. Second, he argues that the social, economic, and political conditions that were prevailing during one's formative years and during the preadult phase shape the individual value scheme that one carries throughout his or her entire life.

Children who grow up in an environment that is characterized by relative wealth and material security can spend more time and energy on social and self-actualizing activities, as Maslow (1954) has labeled activities that are designed to satisfy needs higher on the pyramid of needs. These activities help to form their values and beliefs for the rest of their lives. These individuals are labeled "postmaterialist". In contrast, children who grow up in an environment within which they experience scarcity of material things focus their attention on the satisfaction of basic material needs and the provision of physiological security throughout their lives. Accordingly, this type of person is labeled "materialist".

Inglehart identifies rise in postmaterialism over time. The number of citizens that experienced economic misery in their youth during World War II and the economic devastation that followed the War is decreasing within the population. Instead a new generation grew up in a time of greater material security. That cohort represents the largest population group today. Thus, the number of postmaterialists increases with the number of this new generation.

Inglehart constructed a survey instrument that was designed to distinguish

materialists from postmaterialists. In the survey, respondents were asked to rank the priority they assert to specific public policy issues. They are offered four items. Two of them are said to represent issues that are salient to materialists, the other two are of postmaterialist nature. One of the items offered to respondents is the suggestion for government action in order to fight rising prices. As Clarke and Dutt (1991) have shown, this item is sensitive to *current* inflation rates. Respondents select the item as an important task that the government is supposed to perform in times of high inflation rates. In times of lower inflation, the item loses its saliency regardless of the respondents being materialists or post-materialists. Clarke and Dutt (1991) argue that Inglehart has not demonstrated the existence of post-materialism among respondents with his instrument. Instead, when the item is replaced by another item that taps unemployment in the place of inflation there is no such thing as post materialism. Unemployment is the major economic worry to most citizens of the Western European nations who were subjects to Inglehart's original studies.

Dalton (1996) suggests a way out of this dilemma. Testing Inglehart's theory, Dalton uses data from the World Values Survey that were generated through a more detailed battery of items that were considered materialist or postmaterialist. Using these data, Dalton still finds a certain shift toward postmaterialist attitudes among the populations of the advanced Western societies. The number of postmaterialists per society is much smaller, however.

Another major challenge to Inglehart's works stems from Duch and Taylor (1994). They find that the whole concept of postmaterialism needs to be tested in a

methodologically more sophisticated form than the one Inglehart employs. They also challenge the significance of Inglehart's findings. For them, the best tool to test his theory is a multivariate model rather than Inglehart's bivariate testing.

Inglehart and Abramson (1994) respond to Dalton's critique. They refuse to accept that their findings were flawed. Instead, they claim that their conclusions in their original works had been confirmed with data from the world values survey. This procedure allows them to investigate the phenomenon in a larger set of countries. Inglehart and Abramson claim that Duch and Taylor's challenging findings are based upon the erroneous exclusion of birth cohorts that experienced deprivation during their formative years and, thus, now should be materialists. Second, Abramson and Inglehart specify the difference between high levels of growth and high levels of economic wealth in general and the importance of this difference. The first will yield higher numbers of postmaterialists in the future, whereas the latter already has had an impact on the value schemes of the average citizen. Thus, the number of postmaterialists is higher in this latter type of society.

Other scholars (Swank 1996; Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang 1996; Jackman and Miller 1996) have investigated the impact that political culture has on economic performance and growth in a country. Building upon Weber's ([1905] 1985) notion of the Protestant Ethic, Granato and his colleagues (1996) employ an index of political culture that is composed of responses to questions concerning, mutual trust in others, life satisfaction, and protest potential. They find that a political culture that encourages hard work is crucial to economic growth.

Jackman and Miller (1996), in contrast, do not find such a direct and close relationship between political culture and economic performance and growth. They question whether or not it is possible to measure political culture by the use of surveys. After all, it is problematic to generalize from individual attitudes to aggregate societal characteristics. The authors do not solely focus on economic performance but follow Putnam (1993) in analyzing institutional performance in a polity.

Putnam measures institutional performance by an index that consists of 12 single items that yield four subgroups: policy process, policy decision content, policy implementation, and bureaucratic responsiveness. Putnam finds that culture does not necessarily arise from a society's governing institutions. Instead, the cultural context in which democratic institutions are installed is crucial to the institutions' performance and survival. Even within one nation, Italy, the impact that institutions have on the development of political culture varies largely between different regions. Generally, institutions are said to shape political culture and eventually similar institutions shall produce similar outcomes. In Italy, however, the same institutions were instituted in all 15 regions of the country in 1970. *"The social, economic and cultural contexts into which the new institutions were implanted differed dramatically."* (Putnam 1993, 6). The rich North and the poor "Mezzogiorno" in the South are as different in the degree of development in many ways as are the North American neighbors, the United States and Mexico. The success and failure of democratic institutions is distributed similarly-- professionally working institutions in the North and less developed ones in the South.

Jackman and Miller (1996) replicate Putnam's analysis of the Italian regions'

democratic and institutional stability. Jackman and Miller measure political culture as an index of the following seven items: Levels of overall life satisfaction; levels of interpersonal trust; support for revolutionary change; support for the current social order; levels of political discussion; levels of postmaterialist values (a concept and data introduced by Inglehart 1990); and proportion of the population that is Protestant. With this measure of political culture, they do not find any support for the hypothesis that cultural factors influence political or economic outcomes.

Almond and Verba conducted the first comprehensive crossnational research on the phenomenon of political culture, or as the authors label it "civic" culture in 1957. This effort resulted in their book "The Civic Culture" (1963). Almond and Verba studied the political culture in five countries that differed in many features, including political culture, at the time when the research was carried out. The countries were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Mexico, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In their interviews, they tried to measure such diffuse concepts as citizen and subject competence, interpersonal trust, and feelings towards the government, government in this case represented by the police and bureaucracy officials. These three variables, among others, were hypothesized to be crucial to a political system's stability and chances of survival. Almond and Verba (1963, 13) define political culture as *"the particular distribution of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation"*. A society's political culture falls into one of the three categories defined by the authors. The categories are "parochial", "subject", and "participant". The more mature a society is and the longer its citizens are exposed to democratic norms and institutions, the more likely it

becomes that the country's political culture moves along the continuum from parochial toward a mature participant political culture. The American and British cultures are described as participant political cultures, whereas the other nations that Almond and Verba study had not yet reached that mature stage of development.

In their study Almond and Verba find that Germans, Britons, and Americans had developed high levels of trust in their governments. However, Germans were not at all proud of the symbols of their democracy and its institutions, even though Germans were the best informed respondents about politics. Britons and Americans shared high levels of pride in their systems. Britons and Americans trusted their government officials the most and were convinced that they treat all members of society equally. Germans were a bit more skeptical, and only 50% of the Italians and 37% among the Mexicans had an optimistic view of their respective governments' officials. The same ranking applied to general interest in politics. The Anglo-Saxon citizens discussed politics almost twice as often as their counterparts on the European continent and in Mexico. A last of their findings that needs to be mentioned in here is the degree of interpersonal trust. On this variable, too, Americans and Britons scored much higher than the respondents in the other countries that Almond and Verba study.

From these findings, Almond and Verba suggest that *"a balanced commitment to politics seems to be related to the existence of more basic social values"* (Almond and Verba 1963, 240). They are by and large skeptical about the development toward democracy in Mexico and both the "young" democracies in Europe: they conclude that the US and the UK will remain stable democracies, since the existing underlying social values

have shaped a political culture that is beneficial to democracy.

In 1980, the authors edited a volume that revisited their original work (Almond and Verba, 1980). Scholars from the five countries under consideration traced the development of political culture in their countries over the two decades since the original work was published. They detect methodological flaws and misconceptions in the original work but also show evidence for a change in political culture in the countries they were studying. These differences are especially striking for the case of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Kavanagh (1980) isolates a number of possible reasons for a change in political culture in Great Britain over the previous decades. First, the population profile in demographic terms in Britain has changed dramatically. For example 600,000 new non-Caucasian immigrants have had an impact as well as the aging of the population in general together with a rise in the number of the young. The median and mean voter are still of the same age. However, now the distribution is almost bimodal with relatively many young and old citizens. Second, Kavanagh adopts Inglehart's theory when he points out that the median voter at the time of the "Civic Culture" was born during World War I and what implication this has on the political socialization. *"He spent his formative years during a period of mass unemployment and threats of war"* (Kavanagh 1980, 136). The British median voter at the time of the "Civic Culture Revisited", on the other hand, was born in the early 1930s, has experienced World War II, but also economic benefits from the first labor government, and a relatively safe economic environment during his or her formative years.

The degree of mass political participation and trust decreased over time. For example, only 27% of the Britons were convinced they could not do anything to influence the government in the Almond-Verba survey. This number had increased to 40% by 1974. This development is typical of most of the variables under consideration in the context of political culture: Kavanagh (1980, 170) summarizes this pessimistic view: "The evidence suggests that there is no great popular confidence in the political institutions...The dissatisfaction remains more pronounced on the 'output affect' rather than the 'system affect'".

Abramowitz (1980) contributes through his analysis of culture change in the United States to the revisited volume of the "Civic Culture". He does not detect an entire shift in political culture in the United States. Citizens' attitudes towards the government are more cynical, and trust is eroded. Abramowitz suggests that situational variables play a key role in the development of these attitudes. The Vietnam War and the Watergate affaire were important landmarks in the political socialization of most Americans that have eroded American citizens' trust in their government officials. On the other hand, the general public appears to be more interested in politics and better informed at the time of the follow up study than at the time of the original investigation. *"Increasing geographical mobility, greater availability of leisure time, the growth of higher education...contributed to a gradual secularization and homogenization of American Culture"* (Abramowitz 1980, 206). However, Abramowitz is less optimistic about the future of American political culture than were Almond and Verba 20 years earlier. He repeatedly stresses the importance of situational variables. He warns of the threat that a prolonged economic

crisis, or an unstable international environment, might pose to the American political culture. On the other hand, he also considers the possibility that a period of greater stability might restore trust in democracy, its institutions and interpersonal trust among the citizens.

Among the five countries under consideration in the present study, Italy is the most difficult nation to draw a coherent picture of its political culture. As the analysis of Putnam's (1993) work has indicated, it is not possible to speak about one Italy. Among the different geographical regions, people's attitudes, socialization, and socioeconomic levels of development vary largely. Sani (1980) has revisited the findings of the "Civic Culture". He views his country even in 1980 still in a process of transition from totalitarian to democratic culture. As in the case of the United Kingdom, generational change has taken place both among the electorate as well as among the officials. *"Approximately half of the 1976 electors have come into political life since the Civic Culture study."* (Sani 1980, 317). Sani questions whether or not the differences in political culture among the younger and elder cohort are due to a real generational change in attitudes and beliefs or if it could simply be traced back to life cycle phenomena.

Just as in the United States, the general public in Italy during the early 1980s is better educated, socially and geographically more mobile, and the society as a whole is more secularized than in the past. This development has caused the emergence of more liberal attitudes in general and a rise of the political parties on the left. Levels of interpersonal trust are still low, and identification with the democratic institutions and trust in them varies widely among the regions.

Germany is the country whose political culture has probably undergone the most profound change during the years following the original "Civic Culture" survey. In the "Civic Culture" Almond and Verba were very skeptical about the chances of survival of democratic norms and institutions in Germany. Even though Germans were well informed about politics, they did not talk politics as much compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries. Germans possessed particularly low levels of interpersonal trust and took no pride in their country's democratic institutions and symbols.

This has changed considerably over time as the findings by Conradt (1980), Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981), and the findings in this study will show. Between 1959 and 1978, pride in the political and social system has risen by a factor of three.¹ By 1972, 90 percent of the German population were convinced that the federal republic represents the best possible form of government. Their trust in government and officials was almost twice as high as in the United Kingdom at the same time. The percentage of people who are interested in politics has risen over time. In 1952, only 27 percent stated that they were generally speaking interested in politics. By 1977, 50 percent of the respondents stated they were interested in politics. By 1979, 79 percent of the respondents stated they discussed politics sometimes or frequently. And, finally, the level of interpersonal trust that was so strikingly low in the "Civic Culture" study has risen five fold over the three decades since the end of the War.

Generational factors can explain changes in political culture in all the countries under consideration. When Conradt's study was published (1980), those respondents who

¹Data in this paragraph stems from Conradt (1980).

had witnessed Hitler's election as Chancellor when they were at least 21 years of age were now 69 years old. Those who were born after World War II were at age 35. And, the younger half of the German population in 1980 had experienced their socialization mainly in a democracy.

This younger generation has witnessed denazification, the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle), the emancipation movement during the 1960s, the new politics of social movements, and the new foreign politics toward the East. In short, by 1980, the general German political culture that used to be labeled "parochial" had developed into a mature, informed participatory citizenship. Unfortunately, no survey data for the East Germans prior to the ones that are employed in this study are available for comparison.

I.C. Theory and Main Hypotheses

I theorize that it is not the institutions that shape a country's political culture. Instead, citizens develop a certain political culture, and it is then the government's task to react to the culture. An institutionally flexible polity has a sense for changing demands within its constituency. This sense allows the government to survive and stay in power. If the institutions are not able to respond this flexible way they will lose their legitimacy and will eventually be replaced. In short, every citizenry has the form of government it deserves according to its political culture. East Germany experienced the peaceful revolution of 1989 because the political culture in that country had developed in a direction where the established institutions could no more respond to the citizens' demands.

From this theoretical framework I derive the following hypothesis:

- Hr:** East German political culture is very similar to West German political culture and the political culture in the other Western countries in this study.
- Ho:** East German political culture is distinctly different from western political culture.

SECTION II

METHODS AND MEASURES

II.A. Most Different v. Most Similar Systems Design

Przeworski and Teune (1970) introduce the concept of "most different and most similar system [MDS and MSS, respectively] design". MDS designs attempt to explain similarities in one or more than one variables across countries or political systems that appear to be different. MSS designs examine similar countries as subject to scientific inquiry and explains variance on one variable or a set of variables within these countries. Przeworski and Teune (1970) claim that this method allows for truly comparative research in the field. They criticized studies that were of a mainly theoretical nature or had chosen a case-study approach.

Almond and Verba's (1963) "Civic Culture" study was published seven years before Przeworski and Teune wrote their monograph. However, Almond and Verba considered carefully which countries to choose for their cross-national inquiry. The five countries in their "Civic Culture" study were more or less developed western industrialized or industrializing countries. All the countries in their study could have been labeled democracies, even though the Mexican democracy was of another, less democratic type than the other political systems that were analyzed, and Germany and Italy were just beginning the democratization process after emerging from the catastrophe of fascism and World War II. The five countries in the study were allied with each other through several

economic, political, and defense treaties. The United States and Great Britain were even responsible for the German political system since they functioned as occupying powers (and continued Germany's status as an occupied country until 1989).

Given these similarities and alliances, one may be tempted to label the Almond and Verba study a "most similar systems" design. It is not, however, the study's results show how variant the countries' political cultures were, but Almond and Verba chose them because of their presumably different political cultures. The Mexican culture was said to be characterized by Catholicism, authoritarianism, corporatism and economic backwardness. The Anglo-Saxon countries did function as the base model for all desirable qualities that democracies have developed, a mature political culture among its citizens. The continental European countries, Germany and Italy could function as the two poles on the landscape of political culture in the West European context. They differ in economic structure and development, ethnicity, religion, and general demographic variables, to name just a few. In short, we have to label the civic culture study a "most different systems" design.

The present study returns to the same countries as the Almond and Verba study with one important change. Mexico is no longer in the study, instead I replace it with East Germany in this design. Yet, the design herein has changed fundamentally in terms of MDS and MSS. I hypothesize that the four western countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany have developed a common political culture since the time when the "Civic Culture" was published originally. I attempt to measure variables similar to those that Almond and Verba were measuring. The most striking

findings in 1990, however, are not the differences among the countries, but the similarities. During the life-span of only two generations residents of countries that were previously so different have become very much alike in their attitudes and beliefs towards government, their roles in their societies, and the political action they are willing to support or take. East Germany now is an outlier in the "most similar systems" design. If the functionalist argument held, uninterrupted autocracy there for almost sixty years should have provided a distinct political culture that is strikingly different from the political culture in the Western countries. Germans in the East and West are bound together by a common history and culture that preexisted to 1948. Their political culture, however, differs substantially in some respects.

II.B. The Survey and Questions.

In 1990, the "Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung Koeln, Germany", one of the four important survey institutes in the country,² conducted a large scale survey in eight western countries and two former communist countries, Hungary and the former German Democratic Republic. The study is entitled "Role of Government". In all countries in which the survey was conducted a total of 14,897 respondents were asked questions that were designed to determine whether or not there were country-specific patterns of political culture. The questionnaire consists of 90 attitudinal questions and 50 demographic questions. This yields a dataset of 140 variables for approximately 7,000 data points from the five countries under consideration herein.

²The other institutes are: the "Zentrum fuer Umfragen und Meinungsanalysen (ZUMA)", the "Forschungsgruppe Wahlen", both Mannheim, and the "Institut fuer Demoskopie", Allensbach, Bodensee.

The period of time for this study coincides with a great “real world” experiment in political science. The iron curtain had fallen in the autumn of 1989 and Germany was to unify October 3rd, 1990. The two Germanies did not yet have the time or opportunity to influence each others' views and attitudes. Hence, they should have had different political cultures, if political culture indeed was a function of the governing institutions. This hypothesis is tested by conducting the same survey at the same time (autumn 1990) in both Eastern and Western Germany.

II.C. Variables

The questions in the survey generally tap single issues, such as the role of government in protecting infant industries or dying ones, attitudes towards government as a provider of social services and welfare, and attitudes towards different forms of political participation that range from public meetings to damaging government buildings. Section three of this thesis explores the attitudinal distribution across the countries on a number of these single issues. Three summary measures are created, as just noted, a number of questions tap attitudes dealing with fiscal spending, social spending and the protest potential. The summary measures are constructed as additive indices of answers to individual questions. Results and distributions are presented in section IV. Section V uses the summary indices as dependent variables in regression analyses.

II.D. Methods

In the data analysis section, three methods are employed. The bivariate analyses in sections three and four consist of frequency counts and cross tabulations of the data performed on a country-by-country-basis. Single-issue attitudes and the summary measures are

compared cross-nationally. In addition, the analysis controls for age, education, and gender. The age variable is divided into four groups: first, those respondents who were at the time of the survey, 1990, 63 years of age or older. These respondents had been at least 21 years old at the time of the foundation of the G.D.R.. Their political socialization and preadult phase took place in a non-communist environment. The second age group consists of respondents who were older than 43 at the time of the survey. These respondents had experienced the emancipation movement in the West, the rebellion and its violent suppression in Prague, Czechoslovakia, when they were at least 21 years of age. The third group consists of those respondents who experienced their entire socialization as citizens of the G.D.R. The fourth and youngest group consists of respondents under the age of 21. This generation can be expected to develop their own political culture at least partially in the unified Germany of 1990.

The education variable is dichotomized into a group of better and less well educated respondents. Education here is measured by the number of years that the respondent spent in school. The reason for the construction of this measure is that the educational systems in the five countries under consideration vary largely. Formal degrees, as the American High School diploma, the British O-Levels, and the German Abitur can not be standardized given the limited information in the surveys.

In section five of this thesis, involving the multivariate analysis, a third type of methodology is employed: a multivariate regression. Dummy variables for each country, comparing to West Germany, the three social characteristics, age, education, and gender, and the three summary measures on political culture are the independent variables. The

dependent variable is, in turn, the three summary measures (protest potential, government in the economy, and welfare state) in three regressions. In addition, a multiple regression analysis is performed for each country individually.

SECTION III:

BIVARIATE FINDINGS I

III.A. Attitudes Toward Self

III.A.1. Interest in Politics

As Figure I in Appendix B indicates, the degree of interest in politics is high in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in the Germanies. In East Germany, 80 percent of the respondents and 79 percent of the respondents in West Germany answered that they discuss politics often or very often. These scores may have been unusually high during the time of the survey. In the fall of 1990, the most important topic for Germans in the East and West was the unification, a political issue. Every German was aware that his or her life was about to undergo what might be major changes. Thus, it is little wonder that politics was discussed with a high frequency. This granted, the results still indicate a large shift towards active citizenship. In the Almond and Verba (1963) study only 35% of the respondents characterized the act of voting as satisfying. The same question was not asked in the 1990 survey. Yet, it is reasonable that the respondents who discuss politics with a high frequency are more interested in politics than were the respondents one or two generations earlier.

Respondents from the Anglo-Saxon countries traditionally score high on the variable that taps interest in politics. These findings indicate an interesting paradox in American political culture: 76 percent of the population refer to themselves as to be

interested in politics. However, it remains a question as to why voter turnout remains below the 50 percent mark. Italians were not interested in politics in the original study and still are not interested in 1990. Unfortunately, there is no data available on the level of trust that Italians have for their government. The Italian political system has experienced a long series of scandals that involved high-ranking government officials. The frequent revelation of corruption and involvement in organized crime are likely to erode the citizens' trust in government, one might conclude. Furthermore, it is likely that a citizenry that feels alienated from the corrupt, distant central government in Rome grows weary of politics in general.

III.A.2. Protest Potential

The single most striking difference in political culture in this study as compared to the earlier study's findings as well as compared cross-nationally is the different distribution of the citizens' protest potential. Figure II in Appendix B indicates the attitudes toward rather conventional forms of public protest. In both the Germanies and the Anglo-Saxon countries, respondents are convinced that public protest in general and mass demonstrations should be allowed. Americans are somewhat less likely to protest than their European counterparts. However, even in the US, 71 percent state that demonstrations ought to be allowed. More striking is the distribution of answers to the question as to whether respondents obey the law without exception or whether they would follow their conscience in case of a conflict between law and their own conscience. In the Germanies a majority of three fourths would follow their conscience, as opposed to only 56 and 57 percent in the United Kingdom and the United States.

As to the findings from earlier questions, two plausible rival explanations can be advanced. In Germany, the high confidence in individually developed standards of what is good and what is bad need not surprise us for two reasons. First, no other country in Europe has undergone as many experiences with unjust regimes during the twentieth century as has Germany. A common belief is that one of the reasons that allowed a fascist dictatorship to come to power was the citizens' passivity. One can assume that from these experiences, the citizens may have learned the importance of caution toward dictatorship and unjust laws in any form. Second, East Germans had, at the time of the survey, just realized that it was possible to overthrow an unjust regime by disobeying its laws and following their consciences. Americans and Britons, on the other hand, have lived in democracies for very lengthy periods of time. About half of them are used to obeying the law without violating deeply-held beliefs. Anglo-Saxon respondents do not perceive that consciences and laws could ever conflict.

A rival explanation is that Britons, and especially Americans, live in societies that are thought to be as individualistic on first glance, but actually are mass societies that allow little room for deviating, individual standards and anti-authoritarian patterns of behavior. Indicators for this mass phenomenon are the success of mass events in sports and entertainment, and the high degree of organization in religious groups.

Figure III in Appendix B displays the responses to questions designed to tap attitudes towards more unconventional forms of protest against the government. Respondents were asked whether a general strike that shuts down all business and offices in the country should be allowed and whether one should be allowed to occupy or even

damage government offices and buildings.

Slightly worrisome is the low but still significant portion of the respondents in the United States and West Germany that did not exclude physical violence against the government from the list of protest options. Four percent in the United States and three percent in West Germany view such action as an appropriate form of protest against the government. The percentage may appear to be a relatively small number; however the absolute number of potential terrorists in the United States exceeds 10 million people.

The Respondents' attitudes toward mass strikes are somewhat similarly distributed to these attitudes towards more moderate forms of protest. Again, one is tempted to conclude that East Germans in the aftermath of the peaceful revolution in 1989 prefer such means of protest as a general strike than their counterparts offshore the continent and on the other side of the Atlantic. Twice as many East Germans as Britons and two and a half times as many East Germans as Americans view a general strike as a lawful form of protest. Not surprisingly, West Germans have followed the events in East Germany more closely than citizens in any other country. Their exposure to the success of mass protest against the government has probably shaped their attitudes. As the results displayed in Figures I through III have shown, the protest potential in Germany is much higher than it is in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The political culture in East and West Germany is surprisingly similar to one another, given the diametrically different institutional environment in which political culture developed.

III.B. Attitudes Towards the Government

III.B.1. The Government and the Economy

As section III.A. has shown, political culture in the two Germanies is relatively similar with regard to protest potential and general interest in politics and significantly different from the attitudes and opinions that are observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This pattern changes when we examine the expectations that citizens have regarding government. Figures IV through VI in Appendix B tap the respondents' attitudes about what role the government should play in the economy.

Not surprisingly, Americans, citizens of the purest capitalist country in the study, are on every single item the least likely to approve of government intervention in the economy. Also, East Germans are the most likely to opt for government intervention in the economy. A planned central economy is the type that most of the East Germans have experienced for most of their lives. This socialist attitude is quite similar to the political culture manifested in attitudes found in Italy and the United Kingdom.

East and West Germans' attitudes with regard to public protest, are as different as they are similar with regard to the government's role in the economy. As Figure IV in Appendix B indicates, Italians and East Germans largely support government action that includes price and wage controls, and that attempts to reduce income differences. East Germans, who have been socialized in a communist political system can be expected to hold this point of view. The Italian case can be explained by the galloping inflation and the enormous regional differences in income and standard of living within that nation. West Germans and Britons agree that the main purpose of the government in the economy is to

redistribute wealth and income. A majority of Americans opts against any government intervention on these three issues. Americans are, just as their fellows in Europe, the most disapproving of government attempts to control wages. Respondents in all countries that did not experience communism appear to believe in the power of the free market where wage bargaining is concerned.

According to the findings reported in Figure V in Appendix B, Americans seem to like to work and want the government to support their industries in both cases, be it in either declining or rising industries. The cross-national picture of attitudes on government industrial support appears rather homogenous. Perhaps harder to understand are respondents' attitudes towards the desirable length of the work week. A majority of Italians, Britons, West Germans and amazing 92 percent of East Germans want to reduce the length of the work week. In sharp contrast, a large majority of 63 percent among American respondents support the current work week length or even wish to work longer hours. This finding is relevant to the debate about the notion of materialism-postmaterialism. Materialists could be distinguished from postmaterialists by the answers to this question. One would no more need to rely on the weakly developed concept of attitudes towards inflation rates. The item "reduce the length of the work week" should be included in the World Values Survey in order to make further inferences to the Inglehart concept.

Responses to questions that tap attitudes towards public ownership of large scale industries (such as banking, steel manufacturing, and electricity generating), follow nearly the same pattern in East Germany and Italy as Figure IV displays. As expected, Americans

are the most critical about public industries. For example, only 38 percent of the American respondents think it is wise to allow the government to control, or own, the steel industry. Germans are very much like Americans in their attitudes towards these issues, even though they are less opposed to governmental control of these key industries than are Americans. Britons want their government to take control, especially over the electricity industry. A majority of 80 percent of the respondents in Great Britain opted for control or public ownership of this industry.

To summarize the findings in the field of governmental intervention in the economy, one can say that East Germans' and Italians' opinions are similar. In both countries people want a strong government that controls key industries, prices, and wages. Britons tend to support intervention to a lesser degree than their continental European counterparts. The capitalist market economy in the United States parallels the respondents' attitudes in that country. A majority of Americans desire to limit governmental intervention in the economy; however, the government is welcome to support and protect infant and declining industries. West Germans' attitudes on the government's role in the economy differ substantially from East Germans', as well as from British and Italians' attitudes. Where attitudes on the government's role in the economy are concerned, German political culture is most similar to the American political culture, but in a more moderate, less capitalistic manner. This can be speculated to be a result of German corporatism and the principal of the "social market economy" as it was designed by Erhardt and Schiller during the early days of the Federal Republic.

III.B.2. The Government as a Provider of Welfare Benefits

This section focuses on the role of government in the social realm. Six variables were selected in order to determine differences and similarities in terms of political culture and expectations from the government as a provider of social welfare. Where the three classical pillars of social security, as they were introduced by Bismarck in 1869, are concerned, the political cultures of the five countries are very similar (see Figure VII). In all countries, large majorities are convinced that it is the government's duty to provide health insurance and retirement insurance.

The third governmental responsibility, to provide unemployment insurance, lags behind in terms of public support by an average of 20%. Nevertheless, we find high levels of support for governmental unemployment insurance in the European countries. The US citizens are with regard to this issue, just as with other issues where governmental responsibility is involved, more skeptical. For example, ten percent fewer Americans, as compared with their European counterparts, view the provision of public health insurance a governmental duty. A similar pattern applies to retirement insurance. The greatest difference, however, is in the area of unemployment insurance. Only 53 percent of the American respondents view unemployment insurance as a governmental responsibility as compared to 94 percent in the former GDR. Thus, the United States is the outlier where the issues of social security are concerned. European respondents are quite homogenous in their attitudes with those of the West Germans tending somewhat more towards American attitudes than those of the other countries.

As Figure VIII in Appendix B demonstrates, a similar pattern is observed for the

other three variables in the study that involve governmental welfare spending. In Europe, respondents are by a large majority convinced that government is supposed to assist students in their financial needs, to provide decent housing for everyone, and to create jobs for everyone. Here again Americans' support lags behind 15 percent where housing and student loans are the issues and to provide jobs for everyone is not even a majority position in the United States. Fifty-six percent of the American respondents do not view full employment as the government's responsibility. United Kingdom respondents support that view to a lesser extent (only 63 percent opt for the government's attempts to create jobs for everyone). The other Europeans are convinced that full employment should be a governmental policy goal.

To summarize the findings in this section on the government as a provider of welfare benefits, one can conclude the following: expectations towards the government are surprisingly similar in all the European countries considered in this research. In this respect, the political culture in the United States differs substantially from the ones in Europe. Americans do not view to the same extent as their European counterparts do the republic as the *res publica* (common thing) in the original Latin meaning of the word. Yet, they agree to some extent on solidarity as a governmental virtue (solidarity, meaning here that citizens support each other in formal health, retirement, and unemployment insurance). Among the European nations West Germans provide the greatest support for a free market economy which Americans are also inclined to advocate. No significant differences between the attitudes of East Germans and respondents in the other European countries are found.

SECTION IV

BIVARIATE FINDINGS II: SUMMARY MEASURES ON PROTEST POTENTIAL, WELFARE STATE, AND GOVERNMENTAL INTERACTION IN THE ECONOMY

IV.A. Summary Measures

In this section, summary measures for the key of political culture variables are discussed. The summary measures have been constructed by incorporating the single variables discussed above into additive indexes. In the case of the "PROTEST" index, six variables have been used. Respondents could agree strongly (scored 2), agree (scored 1), disagree (scored -1), or disagree strongly (scored -2) with the various items tapping the same notion³. This yields a scale from -12 to 12 on the variable "PROTEST". The summary measure of governmental intervention in the economy, "GOVEECON", consists of ten single items with the same battery of answers from which the respondents were asked to choose. This yields an index with a scale from -20 to 20. "GOVESOC", the index that taps respondents' attitudes towards government as provider of welfare services and social security is constructed in the same way. For this variable the scale ranges from -18 to 18. Figures IX through XI in Appendix B display the mean score for each country in this study as a measure of central tendency. The findings are statistically highly significant with

³See Appendix A, for detailed information on question wording and distribution of answers.

eta-values ranging from .14 to .40.

IV.B. The Summary Indices Compared

IV.B.1 Protest Potential

Figure IX reports the mean scores for protest potential for West and East Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data for Italy were not available for this variable. The mean score for the entire population in this study is .08. The two Germanies score significantly higher on protest potential (.58 West Germany and .72 East Germany). As to the possible reasons for this high protest potential, most noticeably in East Germany, we speculated in section III that East Germans had experienced just a year before the survey was conducted that displaying civil protest could actually force an unjust regime to resign. This experience probably fostered the citizens' belief in the efficiency of public protest. Also do Germans in the East and West share a history of totalitarian governments that were put into power or put themselves into power without having faced public protest. Thus, Germans learned to protest soon after the government begins to threaten them.

This theory accounts for the low scores for protest potential in the Anglo-Saxon countries, too. Great Britain scores -0.117 and the United States even lower at -1.3837. The explanation that is discussed with respect to East and West Germany applies here, too, in its reverse. Britons, as well as Americans, were never exposed to totalitarian governments. Protest potential, in the sense that it is used here, necessarily needs to be directed towards someone or something, in this case the government. Since the respondents from the Anglo-Saxon countries in this study did never feel threatened in their civil liberties by their governmental institutions there was no reason for high levels of

protest potential to develop.

IV.B.2 Government's Role in the Economy

The same pattern of political culture and attitudes towards the government's role in the economy that was revealed by the analysis of the single variables also is characteristic of the corresponding summary measure. On a scale from -20 to 20, the mean score among the overall population in the study is 11.50. Average American respondents score three units, that is fifteen percentage points, lower than the average respondent in the study. A commonly shared capitalist viewpoint in the United States colors respondents' attitudes towards governmental involvement in the economy. Americans reject more strongly such efforts than respondents from any other country in the study. Respondents from the United Kingdom and West Germany are quite similar to each other in terms of their views on governmental interaction in the economy. Both countries' mean attitudes score slightly below the mean score for this variable in the entire population. West Germany's score is 11.11, as opposed to 10.64 for Great Britain.

Just as in the single item analysis, we find that East German and Italian respondents' scores on the question about governmental regulations and intervention in the economy. Both countries' respondents score well above average (East Germany: 14.82; Italy: 13.53). A possible reason for the high expectation of the governmental involvement in the economy might be that East Germans were simply accustomed to this situation. In East Germany, it had been the government's task for 40 years to organize and to plan the economy and, compared to other East European countries, it was enormously successful. East Germans had the highest standard of living among the satellites of the

Soviet Union; East Germany had, at least officially, zero percent unemployment, and a comparatively good supply of goods of all kinds. Italy follows this socialist attitude. The Communist Party in Italy traditionally gained the highest percentage of votes among all West-European countries. So it is not surprising that Italian respondents are most likely to expect the most assistance from their government. Communism and a strong Communist Party seem to influence political culture in terms of expectations from the government.

IV.B.3. The Government as Welfare Provider

We find the same pattern of results, that we found for the government's role in the economy, towards the government as a provider of welfare benefits (See Figure XI). The mean score for this index is 10.86. Again, it is the United States' respondents (Mean score: 6.55) who believe most strongly that it is the individual's task to care for himself or herself and that it is not the government's responsibility to provide such benefits. West Germans score well below average (9.39) on this variable and, thus, lean the most towards the American point of view on this question. The difference between East German (14.47) and Italian (13.92) respondents on this issue is negligible. In both countries people expect the government to provide a high level of social security for their respective citizens. The British respondents are more moderate in their attitudes towards the question what the government's responsibility is in the field of welfare provision. Nevertheless, they lean significantly towards more socialist attitudes that are found among Italian and East German respondents.

Overall then, Germans are significantly more likely to support citizens' rights to protest. American respondents' attitudes generally are skeptical of governmental

interference with individual aspects of life and business; whereas people in East Germany and Italy expect much more from their governments. In these two countries, government is expected to lead the economy and provide high levels of welfare benefits.

SECTION V:

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

This section discusses the findings of multiple regression analyses that control for three variables -- age, gender, and education. The dependent variables are: protest potential (PROTEST), the government's role in the economy (GOVECON), and the government's role as a provider of welfare benefits (GOVESOC). Finally, I discuss the findings of the overall regression. In this analysis, the countries, scored as dummy variables with West Germany as a reference category, and the social characteristics (age, education and gender) are regressed on PROTEST, GOVECON, and GOVESOC in turn.

V.A.1. Protest Potential III

Table I in Appendix C displays the results of the regression analyses for protest potential in West and East Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data on Italy for the protest variables were not available. One pattern that is common to all the four countries in this study is that young, well-educated, male respondents are the most likely to favor public protest against the government.

However, the degree to which the above-mentioned social characteristics influence protest potential varies across countries. The respondent's age is the single most powerful predictor for protest potential among West Germans and Britons. As Table I displays, the b-values for the younger age groups, as opposed to the eldest group, averages around 3.1. Age matters in the United States and East Germany, to a lesser extent. However, the b-

values for the age variable in these two countries averages only 2.4.

In all the four countries in the study, we find that men are more likely to protest or state that public protest ought to be allowed than women do. Also, this pattern does not apply equally to all the countries in the study. For Germans from the East and West and American respondents, gender is a weaker predictor than for respondents from Great Britain. The b-value for British women's protest potential of -1.76 is three times as high as that for respondents in the United States and more than twice as high as the results for the two Germanies.

Better educated respondents are more likely to protest than are those who are less well educated. This applies most strongly to American respondents (b-value: 2.34). Scores for respondents from the Germanies lie in between those for the two Anglo-Saxon countries where the impact of education on protest potential is concerned. In the case of British respondents, education is a less powerful predictor for protest potential. With 0.84, the b-value for education in Great Britain is the lowest in the study. This finding might be due to the traditionally politicized British working class, which is manifested in the frequency of strikes in Britain and the high degree of organization in labor unions in that country.

V.A.2. Government as Provider of Welfare Benefits III

When a respondent's attitude towards the government as provider of welfare benefits is the dependent variable and the social characteristics are the independent variables in regression analyses, we again find patterns that apply across all the five countries in this study. Less educated, older women want the most from the government in terms of

welfare spending and social security. This finding is not all that surprising considering this particular social group probably is on average the one that is facing the most difficult social situation. Again, however, there is some significant variance across the countries. Table II displays the results for this regression analysis.

For Italy, the amount of education has the least impact on attitudes towards the welfare system. The better educated respondents are only slightly more likely to be opposed to a welfare state (b-value of -0.75) than are the less well educated. On the contrary, education is a strong predictor for these attitudes among Americans. The b-value for respondents from that country is almost four times as high as among Italian respondents. For British respondents, the same pattern applies as it does to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts west of the Atlantic. British respondents with higher education are more likely to be opposed to a welfare system (b-value: 2.13). As the bivariate findings have shown, Germans in general favor their welfare system. Nevertheless, in East as well as in West Germany, the better educated favor slightly less the idea that government should be a provider of social services. With respect to similarities in terms of political culture, it is striking that no significant differences can be observed between the impact of education on attitudes towards welfare between the two Germanies. Following the theory that institutions shape political culture, one might expect that the governmental welfare system in communist Germany had colored respondents' attitudes differently from the West German respondents' attitudes.

The general pattern that the eldest cohort is the one that is most in favor of welfare and social security applies to almost all the countries in this study, however, West

Germany is an outlier. In that country, the younger generation, respondents less than 42 years of age tend to favor an extensive public social security system (b-value: 0.97); this applies even more to the youngest cohort, respondents age 21 or younger (b-value 1.58). I conclude that this finding reflects the growing fear among younger Germans that they will not be able to find a job and a certain degree of material security in times of a persistent unemployment rate of twelve percent.

In Italy and the Germanies, women expect slightly more from the government than do men; this is a pattern that is observed to be stronger among respondents from the Anglo-Saxon countries than from non-Anglo-Saxon countries. As the findings above indicate, American and British women are significantly less likely to protest against the government than are their continental European counterparts than are men. At the same time, these women are more likely to expect more from the government in the social sector than men.

V.A.3. Government and the Economy III

Findings on this third summary dependent variable again follow a discernible pattern. As Table III displays, young, well educated men want to minimize the degree of governmental intervention in the economy; whereas elder, less educated women are more likely to favor governmental direction in the economy. Variance on this finding across countries is minimal. The strong and advantaged of a system (young, well educated men) do not see any need for the government to be involved in the economy. The underprivileged, on the other hand, who might feel that they do not have the resources to help themselves, want the government to take a strong position in the economy, too.

V.B. Multiple Regression with Country Dummies.

This section discusses the findings from three multiple regressions. In turn, the three main variables on political culture in this study (protest potential, welfare state, and governmental interaction with the economy) are the dependent variables. The independent variables are the three social characteristics (age, education and gender), plus dummy variables for the countries with West Germany as the reference category. Age group variables are entered into the regression such that the oldest age cohort is the reference category.

V.B.1 Protest Potential IV

The multivariate findings in this section confirm what the bivariate analysis in section III and IV have indicated previously. British and American respondents are by far less likely to protest or even consider political protest in the form of demonstration, strike, and occupation of government.

Furthermore, East and West German political culture is similar in terms of protest potential. The t-statistic of 0.64 for the East German summary dummy variable indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the attitudes of East and West German respondents on public protest. That allows to conclude that, controlling for age, education, and gender East and West German political culture is not significantly different with respect to public protest. Figure XI also reveals that the protest potential among the younger age cohorts is much higher than among the eldest respondents in the study. And it is confirmed that higher degrees of education are associated with higher levels of protest potential. The more years of education that a respondent has completed, the more likely

she or he is to favor political protest in its various forms.

V.B.2. The Government in the Economy IV

Table IV in Appendix C displays the results of the multiple regression on respondents' attitudes towards the role of government in the economy. Age and gender are not good predictors of a respondent's opinion on this issue. The low t-statistics between 0.13 and 0.70 on these variables indicate that respondents from all age groups and both genders do not vary in their attitudes towards the issue significantly. The degree of education, on the other hand, is a good predictor of attitudes towards governmental intervention in the economy. Higher levels of education, typically related to higher income and more prestigious professions, make a respondent more likely to be opposed to a strong role of the government in the economy.

Comparing the five nations yields the following picture. Italian and, even more so, East German respondents are much more likely to prefer a strong governmental influence in the economy than are West German respondents. Just as the bivariate analysis above revealed, British respondents are, with respect to their attitudes on the governmental role in the economy, very similar to West Germans, but leaning slightly towards a more pure market economy view (b-value of -0.57). American respondents want to limit the government's efforts the most. The b-value of -2.26 indicates that American respondents do favor a free market economy more enthusiastically than do their West German counterparts.

V.B.3. Welfare State IV

Table IV also displays the results for the regression in which the dependent variable is the summary index of views of government as a provider of social security and public welfare. Higher socio-economic status, as measured by higher levels of education, makes a respondent more likely to oppose an extensive public welfare system. Respondents from the youngest birth cohort are more apt to favor such a system than are persons in the eldest cohort. The other social characteristic, gender, predicts attitudes towards the welfare state, too. The b-value of .99 indicates that women are more likely than men to favor an extensive social security system.

The cross-national findings again confirm the results from the bivariate analysis. Americans are by far more skeptical towards public welfare than are the other countries' respondents. Italian and East German respondents go equally far in their support for the government in the field of public welfare. British respondents, too, have higher expectations from the government than do Germans. However, Britons tend more towards the West German view than do East Germans.

V.C. Summary of the Multivariate Findings

The findings in this section have by and large confirmed the results that are revealed in the bivariate sections. Gender, age and education generally have the same impact on attitudes towards protest and the government's role in the economy and as a provider of welfare benefits in all the countries in the study. Female respondents feel differently about the issues when compared internationally. The gender difference in attitudes within a country, on the other hand, follows the same pattern in the five countries.

Cross-nationally, the study shows that protest potential in both Germanies is far higher than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In this respect, East and West German political culture is very similar. On the issue of governmental welfare spending and provision, Italians, East Germans, and Britons expect considerably more from their governments than do West Germans, who, in turn, have higher expectations than Americans. Attitudes regarding the role of the government in the economy follows the same pattern, with the exception that Germany and Great Britain have changed in the sequence. Americans are most opposed to governmental interaction with the economy; East Germans and Italians expect the most from their governments.

Note, however, that the regression analyses that employ the three summary indexes as dependent variable explain very little variance. The scientific community has largely concluded that social characteristics such as gender, age and socio economic stratification, measured in education are powerful predictors for political culture and especially for individual protest potential. As the findings in the multivariate section herein reveal, this is not so. The most powerful explanans' are the country dummies. Cross-national variation exists in terms of political culture. A respondent's nationality, not his or her education, gender, or age determine the respondent's attitudes.

SECTION VI

CONCLUSION

This study explores political culture in West and East Germany at the time of reunification in 1990. The main hypothesis advanced in this work states that political culture develops independently from the country's institutional framework. If the hypothesis were provisionally confirmed, we would have found the same political culture patterns in East Germany as we find them in West Germany.

Indeed, West and East German political cultures are very similar in some respects. As this study shows, East and West Germans both score high on an index of protest potential. Thus, when we focus on a definition of political culture as citizens' attitudes towards their role in politics, political culture in East and West Germany appears very similar. Apparently, 60 years of dictatorship and 40 years of Communist institutions in East Germany did not influence political culture with regard to citizens' propensity to engage in unconventional forms of political participation. This finding is consistent with this study's major research hypothesis. Data from the two Germanies indicate that some aspects of political culture can develop and change independently from the governing institutions existing in a country. The institutional systems in East and West Germany were purposely designed in sharp contrast to each other. Yet, several decades later, aspects of their political culture were very similar.

However, we can not reject the null hypothesis that was advanced in section II of

this study. Attitudes among citizens of East and West Germany for the other two concepts of which political culture is said to consist, the role of government in the economy and the role of government as a provider of welfare benefits, vary significantly. Living in a country whose government was responsible for every area of economic and social life shaped East Germans' expectations of government's responsibilities as a provider of welfare benefits. Compared to persons in West Germany and the other three countries in this research, East Germans tend most to favor an extensive social security system. Two factors may be adduced to explain this preference. First, East Germans simply are familiar with a government that fights or hides unemployment, that provides a highly-developed, free health system, and that guarantees a living standard for the elderly that does not differ from the one the working population enjoys. Second, East Germans' high expectations for government action in the realm of social security reflects fears concerning what their standard of living may be in the future. East Germans are aware of the inefficiency of their large-scale industry and the unavoidable disindustrialization that occurs in the process of restructuring the economy.

East and West German attitudes also differ significantly towards the government as a provider of welfare benefits. West Germans favor an extensive welfare state by a substantial margin. Yet, they score lower than their East German counterparts on every single item tapping those preferences. The gap between the two political cultures is most clearly manifested in attitudes towards unemployment insurance and whether government has responsibility to create jobs for the entire population. East Germans tend to favor such policies more than West Germans by a margin of 30 percent points.

Attitudes regarding government's role in the economy differ substantially between East and West Germans as well. For example 80% of East Germans state that they want government to control wages. The corresponding figure for West Germans is less than 40%. The same explanation that applied to attitudes towards government as a provider of welfare benefits applies here, too. East Germans are accustomed to government controlling wages and, consequently, larger income differences in the population are avoided. East Germans wish to inject this Communist heritage into the new Federal Republic. Moreover, East Germans view themselves as disadvantaged in the wage bargaining process when they compare themselves to the more experienced West Germans. Therefore, they want the government to step in to assist them in that process.

Overall, then, we can not reject the null hypothesis; the evidence suggests that institutions do matter in Huntington's (1968) sense. Institutions shape important components of the political culture in a country. It is not only the case that institutions respond flexibly to changes in political culture, as I conjectured at the beginning of this study. Instead, institutions also can shape the population's response to governmental action. This explanation can help to account for the value change that is observed in West Germany. Denazification, federalism, integration in Western economic and national security alliances, and the political institutions that were installed by the allied forces after World War II are responsible for changes in political culture in West Germany that occurred between the Civic Culture study conducted in the early 1960s and the present investigation. Recall that Almond and Verba (1963) labeled Germans "parochial." Thirty years later, many German citizens are well-informed, active, proud members of the concert

of advanced Western societies. However, it required institutions more than a generation to shape West German political culture in a form similar to how Anglo-Saxon political culture has developed over a very lengthy period. If that was the standard period of time that is required to change political culture in a society that experienced dictatorship, it would mean that East and West Germans may live in one Germany but their political cultures will remain different from each other, at least for the next 25 years.

The findings in this study can serve as a basis for broader reflections on the sources of change in political culture. This research has focused primarily on institutions as the driving force behind development and change in political culture. As the evidence has shown institutions alone can not account for the changes in the G.D.R. East German citizens seem to have been content with the institutional goals that were set in their country. Their high protest potential has made institutional change possible, even though the West German institutions respond less adequately to East Germans' political culture.

Other plausible explanations of political culture change could focus on the personality of political leaders as level of analysis when trying to account for the relationship between political culture and institutional stability. Charismatic leaders such as Fidel Castro and Margaret Thatcher remained in power for lengthy time periods even though some might object that they were ruining their countries' economies. One might argue that leaders such as Thatcher and Castro had the ability to shape or reshape citizens' political attitudes and beliefs. Similarly, one might speculate that even Helmut Kohl had some of these qualities. East Germans, when they eventually were faced with the choice between Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl, trusted Kohl's leadership qualities and political

vision more than Honecker's.

Relevant also is Ronald Inglehart's (1967) theory of value change. Recall that his theory regarding a value shift from materialism to postmaterialism is based on two core hypotheses. The scarcity hypothesis states that human nature desires those goods through life the most that were in short supply during one's childhood and adolescence. The second hypothesis states that once a personal value hierarchy is established it will be maintained for the rest of an individual's life.

This theory might help to explain differences between East and West German political culture. East Germans grew up in a society that was strictly opposed to western consumption patterns. Even though the overall supply of basic goods that satisfy the physiological needs was relatively good in East Germany compared to the supply in other Soviet satellite countries, luxury goods were in short supply and out of reach for the average East German citizen's budget. Thus, according to the scarcity hypothesis, East Germans were conditioned to desire western consumption goods the most. In sharp contrast their brothers (and later their cousins) in West Germany enjoyed an abundant supply of material goods as a result of the Federal Republic's "economic miracle." Consequently, according to Inglehart's theory, it should not surprise one that East Germans eventually attempted the overthrow of their political system in order to satisfy their deeply held needs. They acted in accordance with Inglehart's economically deterministic theory and can be labeled materialists.

Inglehart's theory also states that a generation's political culture is stable over time. Thus, once the citizens have experienced shelter and security provided by

government they will not be willing to give up these expectations about the responsibilities of governing institutions even if these institutions have undergone dramatic changes as they did in Germany at the time of reunification. East Germans accustomed to an encompassing social security system hold these expectations in the Unified Germany, too.

Thus, East Germans' collective political culture profile contains a postmaterialist side, too. It is manifested, for example, in the high ranking of the leisure time in the individual hierarchy of values. This yields a unique phenomenon in the debate about materialism and postmaterialism. Typically, a country's political culture is labeled materialist, postmaterialist, or somewhere on the continuum between these two poles. The East German case is especially interesting since East Germans value postmaterialist values such as leisure time higher than respondents from any other country in this study, on the other hand materialist values, the desire to possess western consumption goods led East Germans to overthrow their government during the peaceful revolution of 1989.

All the above stated theories seem intuitively reasonable. Yet, as the large scale quantitative analysis in this study has revealed, there is no one single theory that can account for the determinants of development and change in political culture. It remains to be seen over the course of time whether political culture in East and West Germany will eventually merge.

For future research on the topic I suggest the following. First the analysis herein ought to be replicated in regular intervals. It might be possible to trace shifts in political culture over time. Also, it seems to be important to incorporate economic variables in the analysis. As I have speculated, the high unemployment rate and the fear among young

Germans as to whether they will enjoy a secure life in the future, might determine the attitudes. So, an incorporation of variables that tap that notion might mean an interesting improvement over the research that has been carried out and yielded this Master's thesis.

APPENDIX A:

WORDING AND DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES

1. Variables Measuring Attitudes Towards Self

V58 Interest in Politics

Q.: "How interested would you say you personally are in politics?"

1. Very interested
2. Fairly interested
3. Somewhat interested
4. Not very interested
5. Not at all interested

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	15.3	16.2	9.6	12.7	3.7
2	24.1	24.6	31.0	28.4	28.3
3	41.3	39.1	26.0	35.1	17.5
4	15.8	13.8	25.5	17.2	31.8
5	5.3	6.3	7.9	6.6	18.7
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V4 Obey the Law Without Exception

Q.: "In general, would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their conscience even if it means breaking the law?"

1. Obey the law without exception
2. Follow conscience on occasions

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	25.3	27.5	44.4	42.9
2	74.7	72.5	55.6	57.1
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

V5 Public Protest

Q.: "There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strictly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. Forms of protest: Organising public meetings to protest against the government."

1. Definitely allowed
2. Probably allowed
3. Probably not allowed
4. Definitely not allowed

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	49.3	55.8	64.3	48.4
2	38.8	35.0	27.2	27.8
3	7.8	5.9	4.9	14.2
4	4.1	3.3	3.6	9.6
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

V7 Protest Demonstration

Q.: "There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strictly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. Forms of protest: Organising protest marches and demonstrations."

1. Definitely allowed
2. Probably allowed
3. Probably not allowed
4. Definitely not allowed

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	41.2	47.1	40.5	38.0
2	41.6	40.0	32.0	33.4
3	17.3	8.6	14.4	17.0
4	4.4	4.3	13.1	11.6
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

V10 National Anti-Government Strike

Q.: "There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strictly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. Forms of protest: Organising a nationwide strike of all workers against the government."

1. Definitely allowed
2. Probably allowed
3. Probably not allowed
4. Definitely not allowed

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	15.6	20.6	12.3	9.5
2	31.2	42.5	20.2	16.6
3	22.3	17.5	21.2	20.4
4	31.0	19.5	46.4	53.6
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

V8 Occupation of Government Office

Q.: "There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strictly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. Forms of protest: Occupying a government office and stopping work there for several days."

1. Definitely allowed
2. Probably allowed
3. Probably not allowed
4. Definitely not allowed

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	3.7	2.4	3.6	3.9
2	13.6	8.6	7.5	8.8
3	38.8	35.1	27.9	29.4
4	43.9	53.8	61.1	57.9
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

V9 Damage Government Buildings

Q.: "There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strictly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. Forms of protest: Seriously damaging government buildings."

1. Definitely allowed
2. Probably allowed
3. Probably not allowed
4. Definitely not allowed

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>
1	1.2	.7	.8	2.0
2	2.0	.3	.5	2.1
3	8.7	4.4	4.4	7.2
4	88.1	94.5	94.3	88.6
N	2812	1028	1197	1217

2. Variables Measuring Attitudes Towards the Government in the Economy

V55 Reduce Income differences

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and poor?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	22.0	48.3	42.2	16.9	38.2
2	41.6	36.0	31.6	27.6	40.0
3	28.4	12.9	15.9	29.9	15.2
4	8.0	2.8	10.3	25.7	6.6
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V25 Government Control Wages

Q.: "Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Government action for the economy: Control of wages by law."

1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of
3. Neither in favor of nor against
4. Against
5. Strongly against

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	8.6	49.6	6.9	7.1	21.2
2	22.7	29.1	19.0	17.7	51.0
3	22.5	8.9	16.5	24.9	12.1
4	22.8	7.6	45.4	34.4	12.8
5	23.5	4.9	12.3	15.8	2.9
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V26 Government Control Prices

Q.: "Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Government action for the economy: Control of prices by law."

1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of
3. Neither in favor of nor against
4. Against
5. Strongly against

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	20.1	61.6	15.8	9.3	40.3
2	30.9	26.2	39.6	26.9	47.5
3	16.9	4.8	14.4	26.2	5.4
4	17.3	5.1	24.5	25.9	5.0
5	14.8	2.4	6.2	11.8	1.7
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V30 Government Support New Technology

Q.: "Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Government action for the economy: Support for industry to develop new products and technology."

1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of
3. Neither in favor of nor against
4. Against
5. Strongly against

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	27.5	53.5	34.6	25.8	21.4
2	42.3	31.2	54.7	47.4	53.6
3	19.6	10.2	9.1	20.3	14.4
4	8.5	3.5	1.3	5.0	7.5
5	2.1	1.6	.3	1.5	3.1
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V31 Government Support Declining Industry

Q.: "Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Government action for the economy: Support for declining industry to protect jobs."

1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of
3. Neither in favor of nor against
4. Against
5. Strongly against

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	26.2	50.7	18.5	14.9	29.2
2	36.1	24.0	41.0	36.8	47.2
3	18.7	11.5	19.8	28.8	12.6
4	14.5	8.9	18.2	15.9	8.5
5	4.6	4.9	2.5	3.7	2.5
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V32 Reduce Length of Work Week

Q.: "Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. Government action for the economy: Reducing the working week to creat more jobs."

1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of
3. Neither in favor of nor against
4. Against
5. Strongly against

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	23.1	46.9	10.7	7.8	21.7
2	30.0	35.1	31.1	16.0	34.5
3	22.1	11.1	28.7	35.2	34.5
4	15.6	4.2	25.7	18.8	18.1
5	19.2	2.7	3.8	16.8	5.5
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V46 Government Role: Electric Power

Q.: "What do you think the government's role in each of these industries and services should be? Electricity."

1. Own it
2. Control prices and profits but not own it
3. Neither own it nor control its prices

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	16.4	30.2	30.0	6.0	27.7
2	56.8	65.5	49.6	59.0	63.9
3	26.8	4.3	20.4	35.0	8.4
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V46 Government Role: Steel Industry

Q.: "What do you think the government's role in each of these industries and services should be? The Steel industry."

1. Own it
2. Control prices and profits but not own it
3. Neither own it nor control its prices

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	6.4	12.5	14.3	2.1	18.2
2	44.6	68.1	43.4	36.1	65.8
3	49.0	19.4	42.3	61.8	16.0
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V46 Government Role: Banking and Insurance

Q.: "What do you think the government's role in each of these industries and services should be? Banking and insurance."

1. Own it
2. Control prices and profits but not own it
3. Neither own it nor control its prices

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	7.2	19.5	6.7	4.3	21.3
2	51.3	68.8	44.4	52.3	62.6
3	41.5	13.7	48.9	43.4	16.0
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

3. Variables Measuring Attitudes towards the Government as Provider of Welfare

Benefits

V51 Health Care for the Sick

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide health care for the sick?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	56.8	82.3	85.0	40.3	87.9
2	38.6	16.6	14.5	48.8	11.4
3	3.7	1.0	.4	8.0	.3
4	.8	.1	.1	2.9	.3
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V52 Provide for Elderly

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the old?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	54.1	84.7	78.8	40.1	81.5
2	40.6	14.5	20.2	47.5	17.6
3	4.8	.6	.8	10.4	.7
4	.5	.2	.2	2.1	.2
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V54 Provide for Unemployed

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	19.1	52.0	32.0	13.9	32.4
2	59.2	42.2	48.0	39.0	45.4
3	17.1	4.6	15.1	34.1	16.5
4	4.6	1.2	4.8	13.1	5.7
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V49 Provide Jobs for All

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	29.6	62.7	23.8	15.9	38.4
2	44.6	32.2	39.5	27.9	46.5
3	21.4	4.6	22.1	33.5	9.5
4	4.4	.5	14.6	22.8	5.5
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V56 Financial Help for Students

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to give financial help to university students from low-income families?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	31.1	58.7	49.0	30.8	52.7
2	54.8	37.3	43.6	56.7	40.1
3	11.3	3.1	5.1	9.5	5.3
4	2.8	.9	2.3	3.0	1.9
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

V57 Provide Decent Housing

Q.: "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide decent housing for those who can't afford it?"

1. Definitely should be
2. Probably should be
3. Probably should not be
4. Definitely should not be

Percentage Distribution by Country

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Italy</u>
1	24.3	49.0	46.5	21.1	45.0
2	55.6	44.6	46.3	52.5	45.7
3	16.3	4.9	5.6	20.6	6.4
4	3.9	1.5	1.6	5.9	2.9
N	2812	1028	1197	1217	983

APPENDIX B

FIGURES I THROUGH XI

Figure I

Interest in Politics




Figure II
Protest Potential




Figure III
Protest Potential, unconventional




Figure IV
Government and Economy I




Figure V
Government and Economy II




Figure VI
Public Ownership




Figure VII

Welfare State I




Figure VIII
Welfare State II




Figure IX
Protest Potential




Figure X

Government Intervention in the Economy





Figure XI

Welfare State



 Summary Measure for the Government as a Provider of Welfare Benefits

APPENDIX C

TABLES I THROUGH IV

Table I:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis

Protest Potential

Countries:

	<u>WG</u>	<u>EG</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>US</u>
	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>
Education	1.42 a	1.52 a	0.84 b	2.34 a
Age 18-20	3.17 a	2.44 b	2.90 a	2.14 c
Age 21-42	3.82 a	2.25 a	3.25 a	2.63 a
Age 43-62	1.90 a	1.44 a	2.03 a	2.46 a
Gender	0.97 a	-0.73 b	-1.76 a	-0.52 d
Constant	-2.29	-1.75	-0.60	-6.00
F	66.00	11.96	28.40	28.39
R	0.34	0.24	0.33	0.29
R2	0.12	0.06	0.11	0.09

a - $p \leq .001$

b - $p \leq .01$

c - $p \leq .05$

d - $p \leq .10$

Table II:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis

Welfare State

Countries:

WGEGUKUSItaly

	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>
Education	-0.94 b	-0.94 b	-2.13 a	-2.96 a	-0.75 c
Age 18-20	1.58 d	0.70	-0.68	4.36 a	-0.41
Age 21-42	0.98 b	-0.67 d	-0.48	0.68	-0.65
Age 43-62	0.39	-0.54	-0.76 c	0.87	-0.94 c
Gender	0.63 b	1.04 a	1.28 a	1.80 a	0.87 b
Constant	9.17	14.58	0.75	7.41	14.37
F	3.29	4.47	10.14	11.97	3.08
R	0.08	0.15	0.20	0.21	0.13
R2		0.02	0.04	0.05	0.02

a - $p \leq .001$ b - $p \leq .01$ c - $p \leq .05$ d - $p \leq .10$

Table III:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis

Government in the Economy

Countries:

WGEGUKUSItaly

	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>
Education	-0.64 a	-0.97 a	-1.03 a	-0.73 b	-1.16 a
Age 18-20	0.83 c	-0.08	-1.48 b	0.23	0.14
Age 21-42	0.51 b	-0.28	-1.30 a	0.42 d	0.31
Age 43-62	0.28	0.40	-0.86 b	0.25	0.39
Gender	-0.14	0.27	0.14	0.28	0.06
Constant	11.92	15.64	12.63	9.19	14.96
F	2.66	3.82	7.84	2.14	4.02
R	0.07	0.14	0.18	0.09	0.14
R2		0.02	0.03		0.02

a - $p \leq .001$ b - $p \leq .01$ c - $p \leq .05$ d - $p \leq .10$

Table IV:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis

Social Characteristics and Country Dummies

Dependent Variable:

1) Protest 2) Government 3) Government
 Potential in Economy and Welfare

	b	b	b
Education	1.60 a	-0.81 a	-1.49 a
Age 18-20	2.75 a	0.04	1.45 a
Age 21-42	3.18 a	0.04	0.29 d
Age 43-62	1.96 a	0.10	-0.01
Gender	-1.01 a	0.05	1.00 a
E Germany	0.12	3.58 a	4.92 a
UK	-0.50 b	-0.57 a	3.31 a
US	-2.13 a	-2.27 a	-2.77 a
Italy	x	2.55 a	4.69 a
Constant	-2.17	12.13	9.77
F	92.19	161.53	137.25
R	0.33	0.42	0.39
R2	0.11	0.18	0.15

a - $p \leq .001$ b - $p \leq .01$ c - $p \leq .05$ d - $p \leq .10$

x - data not available

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