EDMUND SPENSER AS PROTESTANT THINKER AND POET:

A STUDY OF PROTESTANTISM AND CULTURE

IN THE FAERIE QUEENE

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Hoyoung Kim, B.A., M.A.
Denton, Texas
August, 1993
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The study inquires into the dynamic relationship between Protestantism and culture in The Faerie Queene. The American Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr makes penetrating analyses of the relationship between man's cultural potentials and the insights of Protestant Christianity which greatly illuminate how Spenser searches for a comprehensive religious, ethical, political, and social vision for the Christian community of Protestant England. But Spenser maintains the tension between culture and Christianity to the end, refusing to offer a merely coherent system of principles based on the doctrine of Christianity.

Chapter I introduces Niebuhr's dynamic understanding of the Renaissance and the Reformation and defines Spenser's attitude toward the potentials and limits of culture and of his art. Chapter II examines how Spenser views the complex relation of Christianity to religious and secular culture in the Legende of Holinesse, which envisions not a static but a dynamic relationship between them that includes both enduring tension and a strong need for integration. In the
Legend of Temperance, the subject of Chapter III, Spenser explores the full interaction between man's ethical potential and the insights of Christianity to find a feasible moral vision that transcends both classical ethics and antinomianism. Chapter IV studies Spenser's search for an ever-higher principle of justice in the Legend of Justice that can meet both the urgent need to restore order in the community and the more fundamental need to realize the spirit of brotherhood, which is ultimately possible only in God's mercy. Chapter V argues that, in the Legend of Courtesie, Spenser not only provides an ideal vision of the Christian community but shows the inevitable limit of Christian culture. In the Mutability cantos, however, Spenser overcomes the pessimism of the Legend of Courtesie and offers a balanced view of history from the Christian eschatological perspective. The Faerie Queene amply shows that its author is a highly disciplined and creative thinker as well as a poet of inexhaustible imagination.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF PROTESTANTISM AND CULTURE

The aim of this dissertation is to inquire into the complex relationship between Protestantism and culture in *The Faerie Queene*. The necessary task of defining the theological background of the poem has been begun already by such competent scholars as Virgil K. Whitaker in *The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought*, Andrew Price Woolley in "God of Law, God of Grace," and Debra Brown-Shneider in "Holiness in Spenser's Faerie Queene, Book I." This dissertation is not primarily concerned with how *The Faerie Queene* reflects the theological issues of the English Reformation, for example, the doctrines of justification by faith and predestination. Spenser was not a professional theologian; but, being a creative Protestant thinker and poet, he admirably tackles the pressing moral and social issues of his time with the flexible and imaginative tool of his poetic medium. Indeed, the intense interaction between Spenser's Protestant understanding of man and his understanding of man's cultural potentials embodied in the heroes' virtues best exemplifies Spenser's dynamic mode of thinking that constantly searches for feasible moral and social visions in the context of sin and Grace. *The Faerie*
Queene is deeply concerned with the religious, ethical, political, and social implications of the English Reformation.

Before proceeding to the main concern of this chapter, it will be appropriate to define the terms "Protestantism" and "culture," however tentative their definitions may be for now. Protestantism is examined for its typical views on man, the Gospel, and Christian life in history, which are reflected in such doctrines as original sin, justification by faith, salvation by Grace alone, and the Bible as the principal medium of revelation (Douglass 284-293); Protestantism is also considered for its peculiar attitudes toward Roman Catholic doctrines and practices including papal claims, the mass, and the veneration of the saints. Culture can be broadly defined as "the artificial, secondary environment which man superimposes on the natural" (Richard Niebuhr 30). More specifically, culture signifies the realm of human achievement; thus such forms of culture as speech, art, education, tradition, philosophy, government, and beliefs are all man-made, exist only for man, and are inevitably stamped with temporality and relativity (Richard Niebuhr 29-30). The relationship between Protestantism and culture is complicated by the fact that even when Protestantism harshly judges the pretensions of culture, it cannot do so without resorting to culture; indeed,
Protestantism, being a form of culture, cannot escape God's judgment.

The problem this chapter especially deals with is Spenser's apparent religious syncretism usually called Christian humanism. Every reader when first encountering the Letter to Raleigh, Spenser's preface to The Faerie Queene, is struck by his diverse allusions to Christian, classical, and medieval sources; St. Paul's Ephesians is cited along with references to classical philosophy, history, literature, and mythology—not to mention the medieval Arthur and Merlin. The question inevitably arises: does Spenser believe that the claims of Christianity and culture influenced by the classical and medieval secular tradition are essentially reconcilable with no tension?

The term "Christian humanism" has been conveniently used especially to cover the diverse syncretic tendencies of the Renaissance, as if such markedly different thinkers as Pico della Mirandola, Thomas More, and John Milton shared the same attitude toward man's cultural aspirations. It is because of my dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the term that this chapter is devoted to defining how Spenser views the complex relationship between the claims of the Gospel and of culture. The chapter first introduces Reinhold Niebuhr's insightful analysis of the development and breakdown of the medieval Thomistic synthesis of Christianity and culture, not so much to provide Spenser's
intellectual milieu as to illuminate the kind of synthesis of Protestantism and culture Spenser seeks in his masterpiece. Next, the question of the relationship between the English Reformation and Elizabethan culture offers a concrete testing ground for whether Niebuhr's suggestion can be validly applied to Spenser's case. The third section of the chapter criticizes three types of Christian humanism frequently employed by Spenserians as intellectual frames of reference in studying The Faerie Queene. These closely related discussions are devoted to clarifying the nature of Protestant-culture dynamics in the poem. Finally, Spenser's persistent concern about the possibilities and limits of his role as poet and of his poetry, being closely related to the larger issue of Protestantism and culture, will be discussed in the concluding section of the chapter.

The modern theological movement called "Neo-Orthodoxy" is an unexpectedly fruitful source of insight into Spenser's The Faerie Queene. Begun as a severe criticism against nineteenth-century liberal theology after the carnage of the First World War, the theological movement strongly questioned liberal theology's confidence in accommodating the Gospel to the demands of Western civilization. Karl Barth, perhaps the most prominent theologian of the neo-orthodox movement, sharply distinguishes the claims of the Gospel from the cultural life of mankind: "Religion is not the sure ground upon which human culture safely rests; it is
the place where civilization and its partner, barbarism, are rendered fundamentally questionable" (258). Behind this harsh judgment lies a radical theological redirection toward the crucial insights of the Reformation concerning man and his destiny: man remains a sinner through and through (simul justus et peccator); history always remains under God's judgment, being never free from its sinful tendencies (Gilkey 257).

Niebuhr, an American Protestant theologian sympathetic to the neo-orthodox movement, appreciates the insights of the Reformation. But, unlike Barth, Niebuhr tries to understand not only the errors but also the positive insights of the Renaissance; moreover, he does not hesitate to criticize the cultural defeatism and obscurantism as seen in Lutheranism and Calvinism respectively (Nature 2: 157-212). Niebuhr's critically balanced view of the significance of the Renaissance and the Reformation forms one of the main arguments of his theological masterpiece, The Nature and Destiny of Man, which greatly illuminates the dynamics of Protestantism and culture in Spenser's The Faerie Queene.

After explaining the development and destruction of the Catholic synthesis of classical culture and Christianity, Niebuhr explores how Protestantism can relate its understanding of the meaning of the Gospel to culture
without going back to the medieval synthesis that tends to obscure the inherent tension between its components.

The key to Niebuhr's inquiry into the medieval synthesis is his Biblical-Protestant understanding of sin and grace. He defines sin not as man's finite existence, as Hellenistic theology tends to view it, but as the wrong use of his essential freedom as *Imago Dei* to deny his creaturely nature (*Nature* 1: 16). As for grace or God's power, which is the sole answer to man's sin, Niebuhr insists that God's power over man (justification) should be in simultaneous and dynamic relation to God's power in man (sanctification). God's grace as justifying power forgives man's sins and establishes a righteous relationship with man; God's grace as sanctifying power enables him to become what he truly ought to be (*Nature* 2: 98-99). The implication is that man remains sinful but has also the obligation to be holy at the same time. Niebuhr finds in Christian theology from the Apostolic age to Augustine a tendency toward interpreting the Biblical pattern of sin vs. grace in terms of the Hellenistic pattern of the temporal vs. the eternal; St Augustine's seriousness with the Biblical doctrine of original sin makes the chief exception in the Hellenizing trend (*Nature* 2: 134). Another theological tendency of the period, Niebuhr insists, is subordinating justification to sanctification, thus minimizing the existence of sin after

These tendencies culminate in the Thomistic interpretation of sin and grace, which views sin as the loss of an original perfection and grace as the completion of an imperfect nature. Sin is no longer seen as the corruption of Imago Dei in man; the tension between grace and nature due to man's corruption is obscured (Nature 2: 139-40). Niebuhr succinctly explains how the Catholic tendency to subordinate justification to sanctification offers room for both the self-esteem of classical man and Biblical humility. By claiming the absolute necessity of grace for man's salvation, medieval Catholicism, Niebuhr insists, first criticizes the classical concept of the self-sufficiency of man; but it eventually embraces the classical concept because the doctrine of sanctification--justification and forgiveness needed only for sins that are past--actually allows the redeemed man to remain sinless both in fact and in principle (Nature 2: 140). Niebuhr also argues that the inevitable consequences of the subordination of justification are the medieval Catholic self-righteousness in the doctrine of salvation by merit and in its ecclesiology that overestimates the sinlessness of the redeemed Church (Nature 2: 141-5).

Niebuhr insists that the Renaissance and the Reformation are "partly contradictory historical forces"
(Nature 2: 150), resulting from and accentuating the disintegration of the medieval synthesis. The Renaissance increasingly comes to regard nature as the source of perfection; on the contrary, the Reformation judges nature as radically corrupt (Nature 2: 150). The Renaissance intensifies the medieval idea of grace as chiefly God's sanctifying power in man to such a degree that the Renaissance eventually locates the capacities for fulfillment in man himself, eschewing even the idea of grace; on the other hand, the Reformation understands God's grace chiefly as justification and forgiveness of man's sins, offering no room for man's boasting of his cultural and historical achievements (Nature 2: 150, 153).

Niebuhr's answer to the ideological deadlock is a genuine instance of creative thinking, which throws enormous light on the vexing moral issues of The Faerie Queene. Niebuhr calls for a new synthesis of the Renaissance and the Reformation:

It must be a synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of Biblical religion. . . . Briefly this means that on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social or political problem in which men do not face new
possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means on the other hand that every effort and pretension to complete life, whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to stand beyond the contradictions of history, or to eliminate the final corruptions of history must be disavowed. (Nature 2: 207)

Niebuhr's dynamic view of the possibilities and limits of history clarifies the overall aim of The Faerie Queene. Spenser's poem tries to provide a comprehensive moral and social vision for the Protestant English nation through the struggles of titular heroes for perfection; but the poem is never complacent about their achievements: the Redcross Knight is denied his final victory over sin and Devil; Sir Calidore's capture of the Blatant Beast turns out to be a failure. Spenser delicately balances the possibilities and limits of culture, amply showing his critical appreciation of the claims of Renaissance humanism and Protestantism. Niebuhr's new synthesis offers a promising hypothesis for the relation of Protestantism to culture in The Faerie Queene.

Recent studies on the English Reformation strongly suggest that Spenser lived in a period which witnessed not only a flowering of lively theological and ecclesiastical discussions but also a variety of conflicting attitudes toward culture, which must have provided a fertile ground
for a new synthesis of Christianity and culture to Spenser. Recently, scholars have increasingly appreciated the vital relationship between the English Reformation and the continental Protestant movement in the changes of religious attitude and conviction; scholars have virtually abandoned the traditional thesis that the English Reformation mainly resulted from government-sponsored transformation (Seaver 272). The early English Protestants of the 1520s and 1530s, William Tyndale, Robert Barnes, and Thomas Cranmer, were solid Lutherans; Tyndale's Prologue to Romans became the vehicle bringing Luther's doctrine of justification by faith to English Protestants (Dickens 83). Having deeply influenced the Protestant refugees from Queen Mary's persecution and subsequently the best theological minds of the Elizabethan age, Calvinism largely looms over the theological manifesto of the Elizabethan Settlement, The Thirty-Nine Articles (Dickens 222). It is plausible that the lively theological discussions prompted by a steady inflow of various schools of continental Protestantism were bound to influence Spenser to examine the central principles of Protestantism critically rather than to accept them blindly; the monster Error in Book 1 of The Faerie Queene clearly reveals Spenser's disgust with the degrading effects of theological fanaticism.

The state of the Elizabethan Church strongly suggests why The Faerie Queene should be regarded as part of the
ongoing Protestant efforts to reform the Church. As Paul Seaver points out (283), the remarkable thing about the Elizabethan Settlement was how little it settled. Fundamental theological issues, such as the nature of the Eucharist and the ideal form of the pure and primitive Church, were only vaguely stated. Under formidable handicaps of clerical ignorance and reduced economic resources, the episcopal leadership just began the task of conversion and reform in 1559, the year of the Settlement (Seaver 283). Truly, the English Reformation was still an ongoing arduous process during Spenser's lifetime (Collinson ix)—hardly an achieved fact that The Faerie Queene has been supposed to celebrate. The poem has little to do with glorifying the status quo of the Elizabethan Settlement.

The controversy about Spenser's exact religious position indirectly testifies to the relatively flexible attitude of the Elizabethan Church toward its further reformation, even though its broadly Calvinistic character in theology (Ashton 151) makes it futile to locate Spenser's religious position by his theological allegiance. Questioning the prevalent tendency to see a theological conflict between "Anglicanism" and "Puritanism" in the reign of Elizabeth, A. G. Dickens insists:

[The] vast majority of Elizabethan Englishmen who cared deeply about religion were either Roman Catholics or Anglican Puritans. Until 1600 or
later that spirituality within the Anglican Church which could reasonably be described as non-Puritan remained rather exiguous. Even Archbishop Whitgift, who so fiercely disciplined Puritan mislikers of the surplice, did not differ from them upon the essential points of theology. (368)

Dickens's argument is supported by the fact that the majority of Puritans did not want to leave the Church of England but to reform it from within; furthermore, as John N. King points out (Spenser's Poetry 9), the term "Anglicanism" comes from John Henry Newman's promotion of an "Anglican" via media between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in the nineteenth century.

Scholars' efforts to locate Spenser's religious allegiance not by his theology but by his attitude toward further reformation help to clarify Spenser's religious aim in The Faerie Queene. Interestingly enough, Naseef Shaheen and Anthea Hume use the same evidence to reach different conclusions. Their common evidence is Spenser's admiration for Archbishop Grindal, the "Algrind" of the May and July eclogues of The Shepheardes Calender, his close relationship with the Earl of Leicester circle, and his service to Lord Gray as the governor's secretary in Ireland. Shaheen constantly questions the three men's seemingly friendly relation to Puritanism, defining Spenser's religious position as low-church Anglican, which should be
distinguished both from the more conservative wing of the Church and from its more radical wing of Puritanism (50). On the other hand, Hume calls them "moderate episcopalian puritans" (5), who were determined to further reform only by extracting the consent of the Queen. Avoiding these hair-splitting arguments, King broadly puts Spenser in "the progressive Protestant movement" favoring the continuation of church reform (Spenser's Poetry 9). One merit of these arguments to define Spenser's religious position by his attitude toward further reformation is to direct the reader's attention to the relation of Protestantism to both religious and secular culture—a crucially important subject permeating The Faerie Queene as a whole.

More specifically, Protestantism harshly judged the failures of the medieval Catholicism. When Luther and Calvin boldly identified the central message of the Gospel as the doctrine of justification by faith, that is, being righteous in the sight of God solely by faith, their claim was bound to strike at such Catholic institutions as monasteries and abbeys and at the popular Catholic practices of saint-veneration, pilgrimages, formal penances, and pardons. These religious forms were not merely regarded as abusive or superstitious; they were viewed as part of men's sinful efforts to increase "human merit" (Dickens 85)—ultimately self-justifying and idolatrous (Althaus 17). The meaning of idolatry cannot be confined to the narrow
denotation of the worship of idols, of false images of god; idolatry is found wherever "man hides the conditioned, contingent and dependent character of his existence and seeks to give it the appearance of unconditioned reality" (Niebuhr, Nature 1: 140). Similarly, iconoclasm not only signifies breaking idolatrous images but challenging all the idolatrous religious and cultural institutions and beliefs that claim their final authority. Protestants' attack on the supposedly idolatrous practices and institutions of the medieval Catholic Church can be properly described as iconoclastic.

Patrick Collinson's study of the dialectical interplay between iconoclastic Protestantism and Elizabethan culture points to a native tradition of the synthesis of Christianity and culture that is different in conception both from Christian humanism and the medieval synthesis. He illustrates his point chiefly by mentioning Protestants' changing views on the validity of art; but because art is the foremost expression of the culture it is part of (Richard Niebuhr 31), Collinson's study has a significant implication for the larger issue of Protestantism and culture. He argues that the first century of the English Reformation can be divided into two cultural phases. The first phase lasts approximately up to 1580 and can be described as iconoclastic in the sense that Protestantism, attacking unacceptable religious images, nevertheless
actively reformed and employed already existing artistic forms to promote the principles of Protestantism; it was hostile to mendacious art but not to art itself (102). The second phase began with the first ascendancy of Puritanism around 1580 and can be characterized by a violent attack on art itself as fundamentally corrupt and corrupting; this second phase—Collinson calls it "iconophobic" (117)—signals a clear divorce of the sacred and the secular during the last two decades of the sixteenth century.

Collinson's study helps clarify the nature of the synthesis of Protestantism and culture Spenser embodies in *The Faerie Queene* and also suggests Spenser's cultural task as a Protestant thinker. Iconoclastic Protestantism, being fully aware of the inherent tension between the Gospel and culture, avoids the errors of religious syncretism or Christian humanism and the medieval synthesis; moreover, its constructive use of cultural forms matches the more or less positive attitude toward culture shown by Christian humanism and the Thomistic synthesis. But Spenser's active poetic career (1578-99) almost exactly coincides with Collinson's iconophobic phase, when antagonism between Puritanism and secular humanism was growing strong. Spenser could not ignore the Puritan claim of culture's inherent sinfulness nor the humanistic faith in culture's potentials. Indeed, Spenser's cultural task as a Protestant thinker can be defined as offering a synthesis of Puritanism and humanism,
which incorporates but ultimately transcends the earlier synthesis achieved by iconoclastic Protestantism.

The dynamics of Protestantism and culture in *The Faerie Queene* can be more effectively defined when the three types of the synthesis of Christianity and culture emerging from this study are respectively dealt with and criticized: i.e., Christian humanism, the medieval Catholic synthesis, and "Protestant humanism"—for lack of any appropriate term. In fact, these three types are most frequently employed by Spenserians as intellectual frames of reference in reading *The Faerie Queene*.

Christian humanism is quite a vague and inclusive term, meaning different ideas of synthesis to different people. But whether interpreted positively as a religious syncretism (James E. Phillips) or viewed skeptically as a precarious intellectual harmonizing of the conflicting claims of Christianity and humanism (Michael West), Christian humanism insists there is no impassable gulf between the human and the divine. Especially, Christian humanism as a kind of religious syncretism has been championed by many Spenserians trying to extract a coherent system of allegorical meaning from the rich but seemingly chaotic confusion of Biblical and classical images in *The Faerie Queene*. James E. Phillips argues that Spenser follows those Italian Neo-Platonists in general and a more orthodox French Christian Neo-Platonist, Philip du Plessis, in particular, who
believed that Christianity shares with other esoteric philosophies and religions a striking similarity of belief and doctrine ("Spenser's" 96-97).

A good example is the narrator's comparing "the highest Mount" to Parnassus (1.10.53-54), a place where the Redcross Knight has a visionary glimpse of the New Jerusalem. Phillips argues that this passage clearly proves Spenser's identification of the apocalyptic vision and the mystic vision of the pagan esoteric initiate rediscovered by Renaissance Neo-Platonists (106). Two objections can be raised. First, Spenser's comparing does not necessarily mean his identifying. Second, Spenser's juxtaposition of Biblical and pagan allusions can be interpreted as his profound appreciation of the possibility and limit of culture and his art. The Redcross Knight is encouraged to ascend the Mount of Contemplation; but his vision is given, not achieved. In fact, a mystic's ardent and rigorous practice to apprehend the ultimate truth is exactly what Book 1 reveals as futile and sinful. Moreover, Spenser's particular attention to his poetic vision in the passage shows both his ardent faith in poetry's sacred obligation to serve the Gospel and his humble acknowledgement of the limit of his art as a form of culture. Christian humanism, especially its syncretic type, too easily obliterates the profound tension between the claims of the Gospel and of culture.
No Spenserian can be bold enough to argue that Spenser was actually a secret Catholic who pretended to be a militant Protestant. However, the medieval synthesis that finds solution not in identifying the message of the Gospel with the aspirations of culture but in subjecting culture to the higher authority of the Gospel has constantly attracted Spenserians dissatisfied with a syncretic solution. A. S. P. Woodhouse's influential essay "Nature and Grace in The Faerie Queene" argues that the Thomistic paradigm of "the unity of the whole creation under God, and the steady and relatively unimpeded ascent through nature to grace" (81) can best explain the thematic structure of The Faerie Queene. According to his argument, the poem begins with the level of grace (Book 1) because grace is the very foundation of nature; but after that, all remaining books mainly belong to the level of nature; the natural virtues of the books are worth pursuing for themselves but nevertheless are incomplete enough to be rectified by God's grace (76).

The basic pattern is that: a natural man—for example, Sir Guyon in Book 2—fully develops his good potential; but it is still imperfect, eventually needing grace's completion.

This is a remarkably satisfying way of harmonizing classical wisdom and Christian revelation, reason and faith. But man's potential is the very source of his aspiration to transcend his finite nature, inevitably resulting in the sin of pride. Furthermore, grace does not merely complete human
incompleteness; grace, as God's justifying power, condemns and contradicts all the pretensions of man's cultural striving for perfection, even though its ultimate aim is redemption—no destruction—of human nature. The comfortable scheme of grace above nature recommended by Woodhouse cannot be applied to *The Faerie Queene* without seriously distorting the meaning of the poem.

Only recently have Spenserians begun to pay serious attention both to the well-established historical fact that Spenser was a militant Protestant and to its manifold implication for the meaning of the poem. What Hume finds in *The Faerie Queene* is neither a religious syncretism nor a preference for the medieval synthesis recommended by Woodhouse (60); she finds a solid Protestantism deeply aware of the tension between grace and nature but nevertheless willing to exploit classical philosophy and literature. Extensively quoting from Calvin and major Elizabethan theologians, she presents a way of synthesizing Protestantism and culture. Protestantism first asserts that moral virtues have nothing to do with the redemption of sinful human nature; but after justification, Protestantism encourages the regenerate human will to pursue the path of virtue in co-operation with God's sanctifying power (61-66).

At this point Protestantism allows a free use of classical literature, history, and ethics not to approve of their inherent worth but "to create 'images' or 'examples' of
virtues, vices and passions" (69) for moral instruction. Actually her study further illuminates Collinson's inquiry into the iconoclastic phase of the English Reformation; Hume's and Collinson's studies, being combined, provide a synthesis of Protestantism and culture applicable to reading The Faerie Queene as a frame of reference.

But the weakness of the synthesis is that it does not adequately explain Spenser's deeply pessimistic view of the perfectibility of virtue even for his Christian heroes. Spenser persistently refuses to assume moral perfection in his heroes at the end of each book, though Spenser's pessimism does not imply that The Faerie Queene, as Alan Sinfield argues (47), shows the ultimate impossibility of any synthesis of Protestantism and humanism. Any synthesis of Christianity and culture based on Calvinism is in danger of triumphal perfectionism, tending to put too much confidence in God's sanctifying power to transform culture (Niebuhr, Nature 2: 199). This error is evident in Hume's assertion: "The regeneration of the will after [emphasis added] justification is part of the Protestant world view just as is the doctrine of the bondage of the will prior to [emphasis added] justification" (69). Reinhold Niebuhr's strong emphasis on relating justification to sanctification in a simultaneous and dynamic way corrects Hume's error. Only a thorough understanding of the doctrine of justification by faith can enable one to recognize the
paradoxical truth of "the sinful corruption in human life on every level of goodness" (Niebuhr, *Nature* 2: 104).

The dynamics of Protestant and culture that Spenser embodies in *The Faerie Queene* consist of a full interplay between the Protestant understanding of man, the Gospel, and Christian life in history on the one hand and the potentials and aspirations of culture on the other. This interplay can be divided into four phases comprising both tension and hope of transformation in each phase.

In the first phase, Protestant anthropology locates man's fundamental problem in his denial of his creaturely nature and in his vain efforts to give his own life power and security; thus, Protestantism is bound to condemn the pretensions of culture as idolatrous. In the second phase, Protestantism finds the solution of man's sin in Christ's atonement on the cross, by which God finally reveals his paradoxical character as both perfect Justice and perfect Love; that is why culture is judged sinful but given a radically new orientation and redemptive transformation. In the third phase, God's grace active in Christian life as both justification and sanctification reminds man of the persistent sinfulness of his cultural achievements but, at the same time, obliges him to face every new possibility of the good and to fulfill it. In the final phase, Protestant eschatology views history as proceeding from the cross to the Final Judgment; therefore, human history, its meaning
both fulfilled and unfulfilled, is always subject to frustration and hope of God's final resolution completing its partial successes and failures. Book 1 most clearly follows this pattern, which is reflected in a series of climatic actions: the Redcross Knight's fall, his radical new orientation in the House of Holiness, his fight with the Dragon always on the precarious verge of defeat, and his complete union with Una deferred to the future at the end of the book. The burden of this dissertation is to demonstrate how each book of *The Faerie Queene*—except Book 3 and 4—bears out these phases of Protestantism—culture dynamics in its particular realm of human experience.

Spenser's task as a Protestant thinker can be summarized as his conscious attempt to relate the insights of his Protestantism to man's various cultural efforts. His Protestant understanding of sin and grace constantly challenges and illuminates the religious, ethical, political, and social tasks of the English nation. Because the Gospel fundamentally contradicts the pretensions of culture, the Christian humanistic and Thomistic attempts to reconcile them are insufficient; but even types of Protestant humanism available to him, though fully reflecting the inherent tension between the Gospel and culture, tend to overlook the limit of reforming secular culture. Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* clearly indicates that
even reformed Protestant culture is not free of error and sin in the fallen world.

Spenser the Protestant thinker is also Spenser the Protestant poet. *The Faerie Queene* shows the poet's deep concern about the possibilities and limits of his poetry. My argument is that Spenser's complex attitude toward his art is closely related to his concern with the larger issue of Protestantism and culture. If man, though justified, remains sinner through and through (Luther, 2: 230), his cultural and artistic activities may never avoid sin which is inevitable in such activities; thus, some puritans' violent attack on art as idolatrous, especially its use of false images, is understandable. But it may be also argued that as Christ's atonement is meant to redeem man and redirect his culture—not to destroy it—merely condemning and discarding poetry actually contradicts the spirit of the Gospel. Thus, as King argues (*Spenser's Poetry* 7), Spenser's attack against "false images," for example, the idol of the Church of Geryoneo, can be regarded as part of his efforts to construct forms of literature true to the spirit of the Gospel. But art, even when it serves Christ, is not completely free of sin. The Protestant poet, like the Protestant knight, is constantly reminded of the limit of his artistic efforts, even though he is also obliged to fulfill his artistic potentials. The vanishing of the Graces on Mount Acidale in Book 6 caused by Calidore's
idolatrous attitude toward his vision poignantly reveals that Spenser himself was keenly aware of the danger of his reformed art becoming a form of idolatry (Gross 19).

Spenser's persistently critical evaluation of his own art and of the virtues of his English knights make it truly suitable to call his role as poet prophetic. The purpose of Biblical prophetism is to deliver God's judgment against "the proud pretension of all human endeavors, which seeks to obscure their finite and partial character and thereby involves history in evil and sin" (Niebuhr, Nature 2: 25). This version of prophetism should be sharply differentiated from Angus Fletcher's romanticizing of Biblical prophetism; Fletcher chiefly defines the prophet's role as mediating his inspired visions of transcendent reality to "the ephemeral world" (5). Moreover, his concept of the Prophetic poet as a developer of "a mythological grammar, whereby he can combine myths from various matrices in a large, loose, yet harmonious syncretic union" (6) clearly betrays his tendency to idealize and romanticize Spenser's poetry and his role as poet. To the contrary, Spenser finds no satisfaction merely in offering an all-embracing transcendent vision that automatically settles the tensions and frustrations of history. As this study will show, Spenser's role as Protestant poet can be summarized as his persistent efforts to "bring all of English society within the perspective of the divine activity " (Wall 83) and to seek for
possibilities for transformation with no illusion about the dangers such transformation inevitably entails.

Though Hume makes a valuable suggestion about the way some Protestants liberally used classical and secular literature for moral instruction, regrettably, she does not explain the scope and nature of the Protestant literary tradition. Recent studies by King, thoroughly inquiring into Collinson's tentative suggestions, greatly help explain the nature of the much ignored Protestant literary tradition during the reign of Edward VI, which forms a vitally important literary context for The Faerie Queene. I do not intend to survey the Protestant literary tradition exhaustively, but I think it crucial to know about its basic poetic principles.

Surveying the largely ignored English literature of the reign of Edward VI (1547-53), King surprisingly finds a vigorous English Protestant literary tradition led by such writers as Robert Crowley, William Baldwin, John Bale, Luke Shepherd, and Thomas Cranmer, who freely employed a great variety of genres including interlude, allegory, satire, millennial prophecy, and Biblical paraphrase (English 18). Two important points about this body of literature are clear: these writers creatively exploited their medieval heritage, and they introduced Protestant themes and a plain style that would continue to influence later English literature (English 3).
The unique way the Protestant writers solved the vexing question about the inherent tension between the saving truth of the Gospel and the seductive falseness of art is crucially relevant to the possibility of Protestant art. King explains:

The Bible offered the Protestant author a literary model that he could imitate on the assumption that it resolved the potential conflict between truth and art. The reformers believed that the Bible was a storehouse of precedents concerning diction, genres, and figurative language. Protestant ideals did lead to widespread iconoclasm at this time. Instead of snuffing out all art, however, the Protestant prohibition of Roman Catholic iconography and ritual encouraged sanctioned forms of literature. Thus at the same time that the reformers destroyed some literary modes on grounds of religious error, they adapted old genres and conventions, and formulated new ones. (English 14)

The great advantage of this constructive use of iconoclasm in literature, of course, is that it can maintain the inherent tension between the Gospel and art and, at the same time, allow Protestant writers to reform and reemploy various religious and secular literary genres formerly regarded as sinful. The weakness of this strategy is the
same with Hume's version of Protestant humanism: it puts too much confidence in the correctness of Protestant reformation of culture and art; even Protestant art cannot escape from its inevitable errors.

Spenser's indebtedness to this literary tradition is obvious. Spenser began his literary career by translating the strongly Protestant *A Theatre for Voluptuous Worldlings* (1569), a mixture of sonnets, allegorical visions, and an apocalyptic commentary, by Dutch Huguenot Jan van der Noot. Spenser's *The Shepheardes Calender*, hailed as "a new poetry" by Elizabethan neo-classicists, in fact, vigorously exploits the satiric eclogues of the earlier literary tradition, best exemplifying the continuity of this tradition during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (King, *Spenser's Poetry* 14). Spenser's sympathy with the native literary tradition explains why Philip Sidney, a Protestant of neo-classical taste, does not entirely approve of Spenser's poetic practice.6

King acknowledges that the literary context of Spenser's mature poetry is quite different from "the generally uncomplicated nativism, scripturalism, and didacticism of the preceding decades" (*Spenser's Poetry* 4). But he also argues that Spenser's mature poetry is best understood as a continuation of the earlier tradition in the changed literary circumstance of the later decades of Queen Elizabeth's reign (*Spenser's Poetry* 5). Thus, following the
earlier tradition which encouraged an inclusive strategy, Spenser employs a variety of classical, medieval, and Renaissance genres—classical epic, epic romance, hagiography, romance, pastoral, tragedy—in Book 1 of *The Faerie Queene* not for variety's sake but for reforming these deficient and worldly forms into "a set of purged and elevated Christian counterparts" (King, *Spenser's Poetry* 183).

Despite his invaluable suggestions for correctly identifying the Protestant literary context of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, what King ignores is that the increasing pressures both from iconophobic Puritanism and from a growing demand for neo-classical standards in literature during the last decades of the Elizabethan age forced Spenser to re-define his poetic practice radically. Spenser's poetry does not merely continue and develop the earlier tradition but radically transform it to meet the challenges of the two contradictory claims. Thus, Spenser presents himself as the *Virgil* of England, consciously modeling his career to the Roman poet's progress from a pastoralist to a national epic poet (1.Proem.1). His elaborate and learned allusions to classical epic conventions, *topoi*, and themes represent his desire to meet the challenge of the classical literary tradition of the West on its own ground; but Spenser refuses to write an epic solely following neo-classical standards, thus avoiding the
error of Pierre de Ronsard, whose neo-classically correct *Franciad* is no longer read. To meet the challenge of Puritanism hostile to art, Spenser shows his great concern with the limit of his art and ultimately proves that his art can incorporate its own harsh self-criticism in itself. Rejection of art is no solution to Spenser. Spenser's complex attitude towards the possibilities and limits of his poetry is best understood as part of his larger concern with how a Protestant understanding of man, the Gospel, and Christian life in history can answer the aspirations and futility of culture.
NOTES


2 One weakness of Niebuhr's concepts of the Renaissance and of humanism is that he too confidently emphasizes their secular nature. However, as James D. Tracy rightly points out (36), many avowed humanists, for example, Pico della Mirandola, were in fact orthodox in religious matters—not to speak of many northern European humanists who closely collaborated with the rise of Protestantism. Moreover, Paul Oskar Kristeller in his excellent essay on Renaissance humanism cautions against extracting a common philosophical outlook from such a bewilderingly complex phenomenon as the Renaissance; he insists that humanists were "committed to a cultural program" rather than a unified view of man and the world (25).

3 Niebuhr's concept of the Reformation is mainly theological and should be supplemented by many modern theories of the Reformation emphasizing its cultural contexts and impacts; for example, Keith Thomas argues that by undermining traditional Catholic belief and ritual in the
minds of many lay people the Reformation actually forced them to worse superstitions of folk magic and witchcraft (435-501). For a useful digest of theories about the Reformation, see Ozment 218-9.

4 But Calvin, in fact, regards justification and sanctification as two aspects of the same process (Niesel 138).

5 As King himself admits (Spenser's Poetry 8), Barbara K. Lewalski offers him a theoretical framework for inquiring into Protestant poetics, though her book is on seventeenth-century religious poets like George Herbert.

6 Sidney says in The Defence of Poesy: "That same framing of his style to an old rustic language I dare not allow, since neither Theocritus in Greek, Virgil in Latin, nor Sannazzaro in Italian did affect it" (3:37).
CHAPTER II

REDCROSSE'S DUAL ALLEGIANCE TO CHRIST AND GLORIANA

Introducing Redcrosse at the beginning of Book 1, Spenser presents one of the central themes of the Legende of Holinesse: the knight's dual allegiance to his spiritual and secular authorities. First of all, he is described as a faithful servant of Christ:

But on his brest a bloudie Crosse he bore,
The deare remembrance of his dying Lord,
For whose sweete sake that glorious badge he wore,
And dead as liuing euer him ador'd: (1.1.2)

But his loyalty to Christ goes hand in hand with his devotion to Gloriana, representing the person of Queen Elizabeth, a secular monarch deeply committed to the cause of Protestantism:

Upon a great adventure he was bond,
That greatest Gloriana to him gaue,
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faerie lond,
To winne him worship, and her grace to haue,
Which of all earthly things he most did craue;

(1.1.3)

Spenser's Protestantism opposes any exclusively otherworldly worship of Christ, being actively involved in reforming
secular culture under the leadership of a Christian monarch; Redcrosse's dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana is his foremost obligation. At the beginning of his adventure, the knight seems to have no difficulty in working out his dual allegiance. Stanza 3, however, suggests that the knight might understand his mission given by Gloriana too restrictively only in terms of secular achievement; he regards winning her recognition as an "earthly" thing. But it is uncertain whether he understands that his mission of defeating the Satanic Dragon and liberating the fallen Eden of Una's parents has primarily nothing to do with achieving earthly glory; it is also uncertain how he will maintain his dual allegiance despite inevitable tension between his spiritual and secular authorities.

A. Bartlett Giamatti emphasizes the humanistic ideal of directing the individual's private impulse for the common, civic good in The Faerie Queene (67); Peter Bayley recognizes the essentially Christian character of the poem promoting "the need for men to live in the light of and by the help of God's grace" (124). C.S. Lewis urges the reader to be aware of not only "Renaissance Spenser" but "Protestant Spenser" (320-1). However, the real question is not pointing out the two aspects of the poem but clarifying the complex relationship between them characterized by both enduring tension and a strong need for integration. Book 1 gradually shows that the knight's uncertain understanding of
his dual allegiance leads to the two completely opposite and erroneous attitudes toward his life in the world: the glorification of his own earthly existence at the Castle of Orgoglio and his desire to renounce the world completely at the Cave of Despair. Indeed, St George, Redcrosse's true future identity, was depicted as both saint and warrior in his popular legend, which may be one of the reasons why Spenser chose the legend as the basis of Book 1 (Nelson 150). The Legende of Holinesse is about the enormous difficulty of working out a Protestant Christian's dual allegiance as a citizen of both the City of God and the City of Man.

The religious and moral meanings of the term "holiness," the subject of Book 1, are closely related to the knight's dual allegiance. As Roger Shinn explains, holiness is "so inherently a quality of God as to belong to the very definition of deity" (167), primarily denoting "the inscrutable mystery and otherness of God" (168) separating the Creator from the creature. In this sense holiness is simply an impossible goal for the knight. But its secondary meaning of moral pureness against corruption and uncleanness (Shinn 168) sets the goal the knight should strive for. Actually, the two meanings of holiness should not be separated; only its moral sense being open to the knight, he is in danger of having the illusion of possessing holiness as a moral virtue. Holiness remains an impossible task for
the knight to achieve; he is made holy or sanctified only by the Holy Spirit dwelling in the knight.

Holiness or sanctification should be carefully distinguished from other closely related theological terms: justification and salvation. The difference between sanctification and justification has been dealt with already in Chapter 1. But the difference between sanctification and salvation, as Debra Brown-Shneider rightly points out (2), has sometimes been ignored by Spenserians. Graham Hough (143), William Nelson (151), and Isabel MacCaffrey (133) treat Book 1 as if its main theme were man's salvation. Their interpretations risk making Redcrosse's quest for holiness the condition of his salvation, a Roman Catholic error vehemently attacked by Protestant reformers. Brown-Shneider asserts:

Whether interpreted by Luther, Calvin, Thomas Becon, Richard Hooker, or other leading reformist preachers who had a direct influence on English thought, it is clear that holiness is never a part of, nor a completion of, salvation, for "Christ alone hath satisfied and appeased his Father's wrath: Christ hath merited salvation alone." (5)

However, though her emphasis on difference among sanctification, justification, and salvation is legitimate, her insistence on excluding justification and salvation altogether as serious issues from Book 1 (12-3) does not do
justice to the seriousness and depth of the knight's sinful degeneration and genuine repentance that radically reorient his relation to the self and the world. St. Paul admirably unites the three important themes of Christian life: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12-3).

The best proof of the continuing importance of God's justifying and salvific power is the "bloudie Crosse" (1.1.2) the knight bears on his breast as the symbol of Christ's death and resurrection that explicitly reveals God's intention to forgive man's sins. But Redcrosse does not wear "that glorious badge" (1.1.2) merely as a token of God's forgiveness of his past sins before he was baptized and put on the Christian armor. The continuing presence of the bloody cross even after his defeat of the Dragon reminds the knight of his unending need for God's forgiveness.

The symbol of the cross is the key to the dynamic nature of the knight's dual allegiance. First of all, the cross reveals the radical contradiction between God's wisdom and man's wisdom: "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness" (1 Cor. 1:18). Luther illuminates St. Paul's paradoxical assertion:

Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good to recognize God in his glory and
majesty, unless he recognizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. (32: 52)

Redcrosse's achieving holiness is, therefore, possible only through a profound realization of his own unholiness and sinfulness (Hume 89). But the cross does not merely contradict man's wisdom; it also reveals God's intention to redeem man from his bondage to sin, death, and the Devil and redirect his life toward holiness. The knight's radical reorientation at the House of Holiness clearly reveals this aspect of the cross. The significance of the cross continues to illuminate the knight's fight with the Dragon because even St. George, fully aware of the nature of his mission, is not free from his sinful inclination. Finally, the cross is eschatological in significance because it symbolizes hope for God's final deliverance of man; the cross soberly reminds the knight of his continuing need for patience amid inevitable frustrations; Redcrosse is not allowed to consummate his betrothall to Una until he finishes his incomplete task. Thus, the bloody cross the knight bears becomes the fit symbol of the four phases of the dynamics of Protestantism and culture explained in Chapter 1, illuminating the process of Redcrosse's painful discovery of the complexity of his dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana.

The first phase of the dynamics of Protestantism and culture in the Legende of Holinesse is manifested in
Redcrosse's gradual degradation caused by his pride and accompanied by his erroneous understanding of his dual allegiance. Far from being "a poet of very limited conceptual powers" (Frye, "Structure" 155), Spenser shows himself as a religious thinker capable of masterfully exploiting the insights of Biblical-Protestant anthropology in order to inquire into the knight's deepening subjection to the sin of pride and its larger implications: the sinfulness of pagan secular culture and Roman Catholicism that make themselves the idolatrous center of power and security.

Attempts to impose a thematic and structural coherence on the seemingly random episodes in the first nine cantos of Book 1 have failed to seriously consider both the sin of pride, the central cause of Redcrosse's fall, and holiness, the subject of Book 1. D. Douglas Waters emphasizes Duessa's role as the personification of the Roman Mass in her attempt to give coherence to the seemingly unrelated episodes (15-6). Patrick Cullen employs the medieval schema of the Flesh, the World, and the Devil in explaining the overall thematic structure of the cantos (xiii, 4). Sean Kane argues that Spenser employs the three faculties of human soul—"fantasy," "will," and "intellect"—widely discussed by Renaissance moral philosophers as the informing thematic and structural principle of the cantos (33). All three critics significantly enlighten the important
characters and episodes in the first nine cantos but do not sufficiently relate their arguments to the central issue of the knight’s pride; moreover, their arguments are unsatisfactory in showing how they may significantly clarify the relation of pride to holiness. Any attempt to offer a thematic and structural coherence to the cantos should clarify the nature of pride and its inseparable relation to holiness.

Reinhold Niebuhr’s Biblical-Protestant understanding of human nature and sin is enormously helpful in clarifying the thematic and structural concerns of the first nine cantos and strongly anticipates Redcrosse’s true future identity as St. George (from the Greek Geōrgos, meaning earth); the name shows the paradoxical union of spirit and flesh as the true state of the knight’s holiness. The Biblical doctrine that man was made in the image of God (Imago Dei) after His likeness (Gen. 1:26) suggests that man’s spirit in its height and depth transcends nature, himself, and the world with its capacity for self-transcendence (Niebuhr, Nature 1: 3, 55). However, the Bible also teaches that man was made out of dust (Gen. 2:7), insisting that the finiteness of man’s mortal life is part of God’s plan of creation and must be accepted humbly (Niebuhr, Nature 1: 167). Niebuhr’s unique contribution to Christian anthropology lies in his emphasizing the paradoxical union of spirit and nature as the key to understanding human nature (Wolf 234):
In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life. 

Niebuhr's Biblical anthropology is the necessary step to his profound analysis of sin his book is famous for. Niebuhr summarizes his view of sin:

Sin is thus the unwillingness of man to acknowledge his creatureliness and dependence upon God and his effort to make his own life independent and secure. It is the "vain imagination" by which man hides the conditioned, contingent and dependent character of his existence and seeks to give it the appearance of unconditioned reality. 

First of all, it is evident that Niebuhr follows St. Augustine and the Reformers in their emphasis on pride as the basic sin. His analysis of sin also points out that pride comprises two closely related stages or modes: the first stage or mode of aspiring pride that denies one's finite existence and the second stage or mode of idolatrous pride that makes his contingent character the source of power and security. Thus, man's sin results from his
failure to integrate his spiritual freedom into his earthly existence; the tragedy of man is that man's unique capacity for self-transcendence and freedom becomes the very condition for his corruption. Niebuhr's affinity to the Reformers is also clear because he is serious about the Devil's existence and temptation as another important condition of man's sin, though he avoids a crude dualistic demonology that completely deprives man of his responsibility for sin (Nature 1: 180-81). Sin arises when man willfully corrupts his nature, being tempted by the Devil. Spenser's delicate balance of Redcrosse's responsibility for his sin and the real danger of the powers of Evil (1.8.1) fully agrees with Niebuhr's view of sin.

Keeping Niebuhr's Christian anthropology in mind, the reader can see a clear thematic and structural pattern emerging from the seemingly random episodes. One group of episodes, for example, Redcrosse's encounters with Error, Sansfoy, and Lucifera, anatomize the knight's aspiring pride that makes him deny his contingent character and propels him to transcend it. Another group of episodes, for example, the knight's involvements with Archimago, Fradubio, and Orgoglio, inquire into his idolatrous pride that causes him to glorify his earthly existence as the very source of power. The episodes related to Una's wandering after her separation from Redcrosse are also closely related to the two modes of pride; the Abessa and Corceca episode, a satire
on Catholic monasticism, represents man's erroneous attitude toward his spiritual nature; on the other hand, the satyrs, thoroughly earth-bound creatures, represent the opposite danger of idolatry that deprives them of any taste of spiritual freedom. These two modes of pride are in fact inseparably connected, as Niebuhr points out earlier, one mode of pride facilitating and deepening the other mode of pride, which explains why Spenser arranges the episodes especially related to Redcrosse's adventure in such a way as to form a series of contrasting pairs, increasingly deepening and complicating the meaning of the two modes of pride. Of course, this thematic and structural scheme should not be rigidly applied; the Despair episode, not forming a pair with another episode, sums up the total bankruptcy of the knight's life based on pride. I concentrate my discussion on the three pairs of scenes or episodes related to such places as the plain and the Wandering Wood, Errour's den and Archimago's hermitage, the House of Pride and the Castle of Orgoglio.

The two opening scenes of Book 1—a portrait of Redcrosse and Una riding on the plain and their aimless wandering in the wood—introduce the two modes of pride. One of the easily ignored points about the stanzas portraying the couple is that Redcrosse and Una are not so innocent as they seem. The knight bears the bloody cross, the symbol of Christ's death for man's sins, and Una mourns
for her parents, whose land is ravaged by "the infernall feend" (1.1.5). Despite their seeming innocence, they evidently share the sin of the first Adam (Whitaker, "Theological Structure" 104).

More specifically, the portrait of Redcrosse subtly suggests that he is a man of proud calling, determined to overcome his humble origin as a plowman and prove his new identity as a Christian knight. His external appearance of an experienced and able knight—"Full iolly knight he seemd, and faire did sitt, / As one for knightly giusts and fierce encounters fitt" (1.1.1)—is curiously contrasted with his actual inexperience—"Yet armes till that time did he neuer wield" (1.1.1)—which suggests the knight's willful heroic spirit. Being both his potential and liability leading to his fall (Kane 34), Redcrosse's heroic aspiration is also shown closely related to the two emotions: anger and sadness. His irascibility is hinted through the image of his "angry steede" (1.1.1) disdaining its master's control; on the other hand, his "too solemne sad" face (1.1.2) betrays his spiritual uneasiness resulting from the implicit denial of his own humble existence.

The wood that Redcrosse and Una enter to escape "an hideous storm of rain" (1.1.6), symbolizing God's wrath as appearing to sinful man, is an image of the fallen creation in its rebellion against God and its arrogant claim of being the source of its own security; the Wandering Wood
foreshadows Redcrosse's committing the second mode of pride: idolatry. In contrast to his earlier heroic aspiration on the plain, the knight relaxes and enjoys hearing the birds sing, that "Seemed in their song to scorne the cruell sky" (1.1.7), an unmistakable sign of the creation's proud claim of self-sufficiency (Rose 7). In fact, the whole wood arrogantly denies its Creator:

Whose loftie trees yclad with sommers pride,
Did spred so broad, that heauens light did hide,
Not perceable with power of any starre: (1.1.7)

While it is suggested that the knight's aspiring pride might inevitably engender the emotions of anger and sadness—"the sorrow of the world [that] worketh death" (2 Cor. 7:10)—his strong inclination to be immersed in the labyrinth of the creation goes with the emotions of ease and ultimately a sense of loss. "Pleasure" (1.1.8) and "delight" (1.1.10) are the knight's guides in the labyrinth of the wood. Eventually, pleasure leads the knight to a sense of bewilderment and doubt: "So many pathes, so many turnings seen, / That which of them to take, in diuerse doubt they been" (1.1.10). This sense of loss, however, also proves that the knight is more than a creature, being capable of standing outside his creaturely existence as an image of God.

The two opening scenes do not merely foreshadow the thematic motifs concerning the two modes of pride; they also
suggest how Redcrosse's pride will make corrupt his own self and his endeavors to work out his dual allegiance. The common element uniting the plain and the wood scenes is a sense of profound uneasiness, which is hidden behind the couple's fair appearance and the seemingly pleasant atmosphere of the wood. As earlier mentioned, the knight's sadness and Una's hidden inner mourning (1.1.4) represent the spiritual uneasiness shared by all the descendants of fallen Adam and Eve. The Wandering Wood is more than an image of the fallen creation; it is Dante's selva oscura, symbolizing the rich variety and sinfulness of the mundane world (Nelson 158). Thus, the famous list of trees, a time-honored epic convention, becomes a metaphor of the sinful futility of man's cultural achievements. The first section of the list of trees representing their various human use—"the sayling Pine," "the vine-prop Elme," "the builder Oake," "the Aspine good for staues"—aptly includes "the Cedar proud and tall" and ends significantly with "the Cypresse funerall" (1.1.8). The next section of the list begins with a tree symbolic of man's heroic and poetic achievements—"The Laurell, meed of mightie Conquerours / And Poets sage"—and ends with "the Maple seeldom inward sound" (1.1.9), a sign of hidden corruption at the heart of man's cultural aspirations (Parker 65). The two opening scenes function as a prelude to the ensuing episodes that
increasingly elaborate the basic thematic motifs and deepen their cultural and religious implications.

Redcrosse's fight with Errour and his spending a troublesome night at Archimago's hermitage form another pair of episodes designed to deepen the significance of the two preceding scenes. The Errour episode further elaborates the thematic motifs suggested in the plain scene and shows that the knight's victory over Errour only strengthens his aspiring pride and jeopardizes his already uncertain understanding of his dual allegiance. The knight immediately identifies Errour as his enemy when he sees her monstrous half-woman, half-serpent shape with the help of his armor (1.1.14). Una correctly tells him the monster's true identity (1.1.13), but there is no hint that the knight really understands her nature; he is simply repulsed by her obvious external ugliness.

His uncertain understanding of the nature of Errour is inseparably related to his uncertain understanding of his own potential. Despite Una's warning against his rashness, Redcrosse shows his youthful heroic aspiration in his enthusiasm for fighting the monster Errour:

Ah Ladie (said he) shame were to reuoke
The forward footing for an hidden shade:
Vertue giues her selfe light, through darkenesse
for to wade. (1.1.12)
These lines clearly betray the knight's heroic spirit and more than hint of his aspiring pride. His full confidence in his virtue as a means of transcending any obstacle is sharply contrasted with Una's and the dwarf's far more realistic appraisal of man (1.1.13). Despite his confidence in his virtue, there is ambiguity in how he understands it: is it something derived from his Christian armor or something he inherently possesses naturally, the *virtus* or manliness of pagans? The knight's fierce fight with the monster Errour, being actually a brutal contest of physical powers, strongly suggests that the latter is what he understands. The inherent danger of the situation lies in the knight's naive understanding of Errour and his virtue; he regards Errour as an external enemy to be subdued by an exercise of his virtue understood as his intellectual and physical powers. Ironically, such an understanding proves to be a grave error later, becoming the very cause of deepening his pride.

In fact, the monster Errour represents more than theological heresies or errors the knight thinks he can subdue by his virtue. The figure of the half-woman and half-serpent monster reminds the reader not only of Adam's error at Eden (Whitaker 104) but also of the Whore of Babylon and the Beast in the Revelation (17:3), that arrogantly usurp God's authority in the world just before God's Final Judgment. The epic simile, likening Errour's
vomiting books and papers to "old father Nilus'" swelling with "timely pride" and overflowing the nearby plain and dale (1.1.21), clearly reveals the deeper significance of the monster Errour: the fallen creation's futile aspiration to transcend its limit. As the Nile leaves only monstrous creatures after its flooding in the epic simile, so theological errors are only monstrous products of man's fundamental error of pride.

As in the plain scene, the knight feels anger and sadness during his fight with Errour, the two clear emotional signs of aspiring pride. In fact, these two emotions are closely related; when he finds himself caught by Errour's tail, "His gall did grate for griefe and high disdaine" (1.1.19). His angry mood actually worsens his sadness, producing a sense of desperation:

Thus ill bested, and fearefull more of shame
Then of the certaine perill he stood in,
Halfe furious vnto his foe he came,
Resolv'd in minde all suddenly to win,
Or soone to lose, before he once would lin;

(1.1.24)

The knight's desperate attempt to resolve his peril is dangerously close to the sin of despair, the subtlest form of pride and the most heinous sin, because the knight seems to have forgotten his allegiance to and faith in Christ, daring to become the master of his own fate. Despair's cave
is not far from Errour's den. Eventually, his desperate attempt pays off, but the irony of Una's praise for the knight's victory (1.1.27) comes from the reader's knowledge of the knight's inner unsound state of which Una is unaware. Una thinks that Redcrosse has been true to his dual allegiance as a Christian warrior, but the reader knows that his claim of victory is dubious. Significantly enough, the Errour episode ends with the same situation as it began; the path that led the couple to Errour's den was one "that beaten seemed most bare" (1.1.11); but it is the same path which the couple takes when they get out of the wood: "That path he kept, which beaten was most plaine" (1.1.28). This repeated Biblical allusion (Matt. 7:13) clearly reveals the falseness of his victory and confirms the knight's deepening pride. The real problem for the knight is not the physical and mental weaknesses he cannot hide as a man of dust during his fight with Errour; the real problem for him is his belief in his virtue as a means to overcome and transcend any obstacle supposedly represented by Errour. Because the error of aspiring pride is at the root of his fallen existence, his seeming victory over the monster Errour only deepens his error.

The knight's immediate involvement with Archimago after his defeat of Errour suggests that the hermit is actually a subtler form of Errour. Harry Berger persuasively explains why the knight inevitably faces his old foe again in a far
more attractive form as the hermit Archimago, whose seeming hospitality is a welcome to Redcrosse, tired with his recent heroic battle:

Spiritual and demonic forces of evil, dwellers in his own soul, manifest themselves in such a way as to deceive the knight into thinking that they are not demonic and not inhabitants of self, that he can control them by physical and chivalric deeds. Thus he is forced to face similar evils a second time and in more critical forms. (Revisionary Play 66)

Archimago's hermitage, however, has more affinity with the Wandering Wood. Scholars have long recognized that Spenser repeats similar episodes or images in order to make his poem gain "ever expanding perspective, increasingly dense versions of experience" (Giamatti 69). The most obvious similarities between the wood and Archimago's hermitage are their seeming external attractiveness hiding inner corruption and their inhabitants' scornful attitude toward God. In the wood full of delight and pleasure, the birds scorn the sky (1.1.8); the holy father Archimago, left alone, curses "highest God, the Lord of life and light" (1.1.37). The theme of idolatrous pride, the second mode of pride, first hinted in the Wandering Wood scene, receives a deeper exploration at Archimago's hermitage.
The basic strategy of Archimago is to corrupt the knight not by strengthening his heroic aspiration but by tempting him to be immersed in his natural base and to forget his spiritual identity completely. As a creature dependent upon nature's resources, the knight understandably needs rest and sleep after his arduous fight with Errour; from the standpoint of Christian anthropology, there is nothing inherently wrong with the knight's being a creature in need of rest. But the knight's natural need becomes a deadly means of obscuring his spiritual identity when Archimago exploits it for Redcrosse's ruin. Archimago's sending an evil spirit down to Morpheus' house is not merely an example of Spenser's playful use of the classical epic convention of descent to hell. Morpheus' house represents the knight's fallen earthly existence persistently refusing its inseparable unity with Imago Dei, the source of the knight's spiritual freedom and self-consciousness. The house lies "Amid the bowels of the earth full steepe, / And low" (1.1.39). Morpheus' abhorence of Care (1.1.40), which is inseparable from man's waking life, is symptomatic of the breaking down of the union of spirit and flesh that defines the knight's holiness.

Pleasure and doubt, as hinted in the Wandering Wood scene, are two inevitable emotional states of fallen man prone to idolatrous pride. Pleasure, especially sexual desire, is inseparably rooted in the process of nature
because of its reproductive function. Like natural desire for sleep, sexual desire itself is only a function of the knight's natural existence; but it becomes concupiscence when it is abused to enhance the knight's idolatrous bondage to his earthly identity. As Martha Craig wittily points out, the knight, after defeating Erreur, continues to err through eros (319). Thus, Archimago's strategy is to arouse the knight's concupiscence with false erotic dreams by abusing his imagination (1.1.46), which is the beginning of idolatry, defined as worship of idols or false images.

Redcrosse's doubt about false Una's identity, as mentioned earlier, proves the existence of his spirit capable of standing outside his natural passion. But after the Fall, man's spirit or Imago Dei only contributes to worsening man's fallen state by claiming its own transcendence. The breaking down of the union of spirit and flesh in the knight is confirmed in his identifying Una exclusively with her spiritual aspect; thus, when Redcrosse finds false Una "a loose leman to vile service bound" (1.1.48), his doubt ironically intensifies his disenchantment with his mission; the knight is "Much grieu'd to thinke that gentle Dame so light, / For whose defence he was to shed his blood" (1.1.55). Una represents the union of Redcrosse's religious and secular allegiances as well as the fulfillment of his spiritual and earthly aspirations (Cheney 31); his betrothal to Una, revealed both as a chaste
virgin and marriageable woman in Canto 12, concretely embodies these ideas. The knight's failure to see this point makes him extremely vulnerable to Archimago's second attempt to corrupt him and ruin his dual allegiance, which is realized finally by his abandonment of Una.

The Archimago episode reveals the crucially important truth about the second mode of pride; it manifests itself always as hypocrisy. Archimago is a master of hypocrisy, pretending to be a holy man seemingly devoted to his spiritual concern; but he is, in fact, in rebellion against God, proudly indulging in his own power of magic—a clear sign of idolatry. Redcrosse's abandonment of Una is also hypocritical in essence. After having failed to catch the knight in the trap of concupiscence, Archimago changes his strategy: he shows to Redcrosse a lustful scene of false Una embraced by a young squire:

Which when [Redcrosse] saw, he burnt with
galorous fire,
The eye of reason was with rage yblent,
And would have slain them in his furious ire,
But hardly was restrained of that aged sire.

(1.2.5)

Archimago finally succeeds in completely breaking down the precarious union of spirit and flesh in the knight by stimulating both his irascible and concupiscent affections. It is quite difficult to know whether his urge to kill the
lewd couple comes from his jealousy, a clear sign of his frustrated concupiscence, or from his seemingly righteous anger at Una's supposed act of sexual immorality. This yoking of anger to lust distorts the state of holiness, defined as the union of spirit and flesh. The knight's desertion of Una is an act of hypocrisy. He seems to have maintained his devotion to his spiritual principle through his righteous anger, but it is his secret frustrated lust for Una that decisively motivates his decision to abandon her. The real problem for the knight is not merely his weak faith and unproved chastity, as Kerby Neil insists (110), but his fundamentally wrong understanding of the nature of faith and chastity, which stems from his sin of pride. From now on his hypocrisy deepens more and more; outwardly he still maintains his dual allegiance as a Christian warrior; but inwardly he becomes increasingly subject to the arrogant claims of secular culture and an idolatrous religion that pretends to be the center of power and security.

Redcrosse's experiences at the House of Lucifera and the Castle of Orgoglio form the last pair of contrasting but closely related episodes. The plain scene at the beginning of Book 1 and the Errour episode are closely related to the Lucifera episode thematically; but another similar episode, the knight's defeat of Sansfoy after his separation from Una, is more directly relevant to his sojourn at the House of Pride. The Sansfoy episode is a good example of how the
knight ironically becomes more and more imbued with a pagan heroism whenever he defeats an apparent enemy of Christianity, which clearly indicates his deepening misunderstanding of his dual allegiance. Sansfoy is "a faithlesse Sarazin" (1.2.12); but Redcrosse's fight with him is religious only in appearance; they fight as if they were "two rams stirrd with ambitious pride" and greedy for the rule of their flock (1.2.16). Moreover, Redcrosse wins the battle solely by relying on his "natiue vertue" (1.2.19); his victory over Sansfoy (faithlessness) ironically corroborates his complete abandonment of Una (true faith). Consequently, Duessa, the knight's new faith, which is false faith, leads him where pride, the source of his false faith, is the governing principle. The House of Pride is Spenser's most comprehensive anatomy of the nature of man's aspiring pride and its cultural implications; the corruption of pagan heroism and secular culture feeding on man's futile impulse to transcend his finite existence is subtly exposed.

Spenser's description of Lucifera accurately defines her nature:

So proud she shyned in her Princely state,
Looking to heauen; for earth she did disdayne,
And sitting high; for lowly she did hate:

(1.4.10)

Lucifera yearns to deny and transcend her earthly origin as the daughter of Pluto and Proserpina (1.4.11). Her
aspiration for heaven inevitably falsifies and distorts her existence as suggested in the description of the house whose faire appearance—"a goodly heape for to behould"—hides "the hinder parts" that are "ruinous and old, but painted cunningly" (1.4.5). Man, being God's image, is bound to seek security only in God; but the satanic nature of pride—as her name implies—embodied in Lucifera's aspiration for God is that she actually wants to usurp God's place, trying to become the highest of gods (1.4.11). Her spiritual identity (Imago Dei) is pushed to its limit and is erroneously identified with divinity itself by her. Her goal is the deification of her selfhood (Kathleen Williams 12), and her self-love is the driving motive behind her aspiration (1.4.10). The pride embodied in Lucifera, thus, is selfish aspiration to become God, corrupting and destroying the paradoxical union of spirit and flesh.

Because Lucifera also represents the whole idea of pride, as the name of her house (The House of Pride) implies, her six councilors or six deadly sins personify the total psychological and social consequences of the two modes of pride, their mistress. Contrary to Graham Hough's opinion (152), the famous pageant of the Seven Deadly Sins, including Lucifera, is closely related to Redcrosse's degeneration. The first three sins—Idleness, Gluttony, and Lechery—all related to the abuse of man's natural desires, represent the consequences of man's idolatrous indulgence in
his natural existence. On the other hand, the next three sins—Avarice, Envy, and Wrath—are all closely related to man's abuse of his spiritual freedom, representing the consequences of his proud aspiration to transcend his finite existence. Significantly, Redcrosse commits almost all the sins in the House of Pride (1.4.39,43).

As shown in the preceding similar episodes, aspiring pride especially breeds irascibility and sadness. In the House of Pride, Spenser explores these themes through Redcrosse's heroic fight with Sansjoy (Joylessness). Anger or furor is the driving force of pagan heroism, as the opening of Homer's Iliad clearly shows: "Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus'son Achilleus and its devastation" (1.1-2). The fact that his enemy is Sansjoy is a subtle indication of Redcrosse's implicit recognition of the futility of his heroic life (Cullen 43). But this awareness is exactly what he does not want to acknowledge fully now; as in the cases of Errour and Sansfoy, he simply externalizes his inner enemy and tries to suppress Sansjoy by his virtue or brutal force.

Spenser's ironic comments strongly suggest the ultimate futility of pagan heroism and secular culture. Pagan heroism makes the achievement of earthly glory the raison d'être of a hero. The poet seems to praise the knight's heroic life.

The noble hart, that harbours vertuous thought,
And is with child of glorious great intent,
Can neuer rest, vntill it forth haue brought
Th'eternall brood of glorie excellent:

(1.5.10)

The poet's praise, however, ironically betrays how deeply
the knight is dedicated to only one aspect of his dual
allegiance: the poet does not even mention Christ here.
Pagan secular culture, especially its art, exists only to
promote the validity of pagan heroism; thus, its music
serves "To drue away the dull melancholy" (1.5.3) that
pagan heroism inevitably produces, and its literature and
history become merely means of celebrating and recording
"Old loues, and warres for Ladies doen by many a Lord"
(1.5.3). Pagan literature and culture are futile and even
dangerous because they do not question the inherent
sinfulness of man's heroic achievements feeding on his furor
and penchant for transcendence. Now Duessa and Sansfoy's
shield become "the lawrell girlonds" (1.5.5) to the knight,
ironically revealing Redcrosse's total subjection to false
faith and faithlessness.

It is inevitable that the knight's fight with Sansjoy
is little different from his fight with Sansfoy; both
battles are nothing more than brutal contests of physical
powers. Redcrosse's Christian armor becomes merely an
instrument of wrath (1.5.6); he has no concern about his
allegiance to Christ "For all for prayse and honour he did
fight" (1.5.7). Ironically enough, it is Duessa's encouragement to Sansjoy that mistakenly revives the knight's faith (1.5.12), further confirming his subjection to false faith. False faith also means false allegiance; after the battle, he greets Lucifera:

> Wherewith he goeth to that soueraine Queene,
> And falling her before on lowly knee,
> To her makes present of his servise seene:
> Which she accepts, with thankes, and goodly gree,

Greatly aduauncing his gay cheualree. (1.5.16)

His submission to Lucifera clearly proves that human heroism only strengthens man's pride (Alpers 343). Lucifera, a perverted image of the Christian monarch Gloriana, becomes the sole object of Redcrosse's allegiance.

Duessa's visit to Night closes the seemingly bright side of pagan heroism and culture and opens their darker side based on a pagan view of the world and man. Night, the "most auncient Grandmother" (1.5.22) of all demonic powers, seems to admit Jove's rule guaranteeing "the chayne of strong necessitee" (1.5.25); but actually she reveals her rebellious spirit against Jove's iron rule of order (1.5.25). Therefore, what she really represents is a view of the world governed by an endless conflict between order and chaos, necessity and chance. This cosmic dualism excludes any concept of Christian God the Creator who transcends both
order and chaos, both fate and fortune applicable only to
the created order of nature. Moreover, the world that Night
envisions knows no justice but an endless cycle of guilt,
vengeance, and punishment, as she sternly asserts: "he the
man that made Sansjoy to fall / Shall with his owne blood
price that he hath split" (1.5.26). This is a world where
there is no hope of ending injustice nor any hope of
bringing permanent justice. It is inevitable that the proud
pagans including Aesculapius, kept in torment in the pagan
hell, are given no hope of redemption (1.5.43), deprived of
the knowledge of sin and grace.

Aesculapius, "the false Christ" (Hamilton 71), to whom
Night and Duessa bring Sansjoy for reviving, epitomizes the
futility of pagan secular culture in its efforts to overcome
man's spiritual ill with human art. The myth about
Hypolytus, for whose reviving Aesculapius was condemned to
the hell by the Jove, is a short anatomy of man's sinful
life, illustrating pride (Hyppolytus'), lust and hatred (his
stepmother's), rage and vengeance (his father's), and
finally desperation and suicide (his stepmother's). This
short exemplum of pride and its deadly consequences suggests
that Aesculapius is unable to revive Sansjoy. The futility
of his art is clearly seen in the short description of his
life in the hell: "Where long remaining, he did alwaies
striue / Himselwe with salues to health for to restore"
(1.5.40). The image of Aesculapius endlessly restoring
himself to a life of hopelessness becomes a fit emblem of the frantic activity of secular culture trying to be its own savior.

The famous Biblical and classical men kept in the dungeon of the House of Pride fell to misery because of their pride and Lucifera's envy against them (1.5.46). Their fall reveals an important truth about life in the House: one strives after the highest only in sacrifice of the rest that strive after the same. Thus, culture based on pride is bound to be self-destructive. The dwarf, representing human reason, helps the knight escape from the house after reporting to him the wretched state of the prisoners (1.5.45). But there is no reason to believe that Redcrosse escapes from the House of Pride because he penetrates into the root cause of the prisoners' wretched life. The knight's escape only causes him to have the illusion that he has actually overcome the danger of pride. As he encounters the holy man Archimago after defeating the monster Errorr, so now he encounters a far subtler and dangerous form of pride than what Lucifera represents.

Culminating the Wandering Wood and Archimago episodes, Redcrosse's fall by Orgoglio offers a comprehensive anatomy of idolatrous pride and its religious implications. The knight's encounter with Fradubio and Fraelissa transformed into two trees serves as the bridge between the earlier episodes and the Orgoglio episode. To escape fierce heat,
Redcrosse and Duessa take refuge under the shade of the two trees (1.2.29); the situation is strikingly similar to that of the Wandering Wood episode. Now the familiar themes related to idolatrous pride—concupiscence and doubt—as the name "Fradubio" implies, are manifest in Fradubio's story of his own shameful transformation (1.2.35-43), which is practically identical with Redcrosse's experiences with Archimago, Sansfoy, and Duessa. The important point, however, is not so much their similarity as the fact that Redcrosse refuses to identify his sin with Fradubio's:

When all this speech the liuing tree had spent,
The bleeding bough did thrust into the ground,
That from the bloud he might be innocent.

(1.2.44)

The knight's claim of sinlessness, ironically, eventually leads him to the most sinful state: his subjection to Orgoglio, who represents Redcrosse's arrogant idolization of his own earthly existence, whose religious consequence is the knight's subjection to the idolatry of Roman Catholicism.

At the beginning of the Orgoglio episode Spenser brings up the important themes and images of the earlier similar episodes in order to clarify the spiritual and moral conditions of the knight's fall. Putting off his Christian armor (1.7.2), Redcrosse now even gives up pretending his allegiance to Christ. The tree imagery closely related to
the Wandering Wood and Fradubio episodes—"the cooling shade," "the trembling leaves," and "green boughes" (1.7.3-4)—suggests that the knight's dangerous pretension of innocence and self-sufficiency are bound to make him inwardly unsound. Only the tree of the cross will liberate the knight resting amid the trees that enslave him in sin. Moreover, the fountain, where Redcrosse makes love to Duessa, reminds the reader of the water imagery of the Archimago and Fradubio episodes: the seemingly sacred fountain by Archimago's hermitage (1.1.34) and the mysterious pool wherein Duessa the witch baths for penance (1.2.40). More specifically, the fountain symbolizes sloth (1.7.5) and sexual indulgence, as water imagery is constantly employed when the poet describes the sexual act of Redcrosse and Duessa: "[they] bathe in pleasance" (1.7.4); "[the knight] Pourd out in loosenesse" (1.7.7). Only the water of baptism will cleanse the knight's slavery to his creaturely existence through concupiscence.

However, the fountain scene is more than Spenser's vivid anatomy of sloth and lust as the concomitants of idolatrous pride; it is an anatomy of idolatry itself. The knight's fornification with Duessa suggests the fulfillment of Archimago's earlier attempt to induce Redcrosse to make love to false Una, an idol or false image meant to be adored. The essence of idolatry is worshiping of the creature rather than the Creator (Rom. 1:25); it results
from an abuse of images from the physical world (Calvin 1:112). The false image of Una being materialized (Kane 37), Duessa becomes the object of Redcrosse's idolatry.

The knight's idolatrous fornification with Duessa is not only physical but spiritual in nature because she allegorically represents the false faith of the Church of Rome. The precedent of the Bible that treats idolatry in sexual terms, for example, the Whore of Babylon in the Revelation, enables the poet to relate his moral allegory to historical allegory. Specifically, as D. Douglas Waters' valuable study illuminates (62), Spenser satirizes through the figure of Duessa with "her golden cup...replete with magick artes" (1.8.14) the Roman Mass, regarded as an idolatrous example of whoredom and witchery by the Protestants. Her theory satisfactorily explains why the knight's drinking the stream causes him feebleness (1.7.6), which may be interpreted as the secret and dulling effects of the Roman Mass on a deceived lay man (Waters 66).

The description and genealogy of Orgoglio--meaning pride in Italian--clarify the nature of the second mode of pride. Like Archimago, Orgoglio's sin essentially consists in his arrogant rebellion against God: he is "An hideous Geant horrible and hye, / That with his talnesse seemd to threat the skye" (1.7.8). The giant's interesting genealogy further reveals his nature:

The greatest Earth his vncouth mother was,
And blustering **Aeolus** his boasted sire,
Who with his breath, which through the world
doth pas,
Her hollow womb did secretly inspire,
And fild her hidden caues with stormie yre,
That she conceiu'd; and trebling the dew time,
In which the wombes of women to expire,
Brought forth this monstrous masse of earthly
slime
Puft vp with emptie wind, and fild with sinfull
crime. (1.7.9)

The genealogy shows the two aspects of idolatrous pride. First, idolatrous pride arises when man identifies himself exclusively with his earthly existence, corrupting and perverting his creaturely identity—hence, "this monstrous masse of earthly slime." Second, this erroneous identification always leads to making man's contingent character look absolute and unconditional. This hypocritical pretension of absolute authority is essentially insubstantial and dishonest—thus, the last line: "Puft vp with emptie wind, and fild with sinfull crime." Both St. George and Orgoglio came from earth; however, Orgoglio represents the perverted self of St. George, when he succumbs to idolatrous pride (Craig 329). Until now the enemies Redcrosse has fought are all clearly identified as enemies of Christianity; but now the knight faces the most
powerful enemy of Christianity, who is ironically no one but himself.

Spenser's heavy indebtedness to the Revelation in describing Duessa and the seven-headed beast inevitably invites a historical allegory because Protestants read the Revelation as a prophecy of misery caused by Catholic popes and emperors (Heninger 132). Orgoglio's defeat of Redcrosse and idolatrous worship of Duessa (1.7.15-6) are usually interpreted as the English nation's submission to papal authority, either during the Middle Ages or during Mary's reign (O'Connel 54-5). More important than the historical allegory is Spenser's insight that a false religion is far more corrupt and dangerous than any corrupt form of secular culture. The sin of Roman Catholicism is basically that of idolatry: "From that day forth Duessa was [Orgoglio's] deare, / And highly honoured in his haughtie eye" (1.7.16). From the standpoint of Protestantism, Roman Catholicism pretends to care for man's ultimate spiritual concern, claiming its superiority to any form of secular culture; it arrogantly believes in its sinlessness, especially when it touches upon its ecclesiology, thus making its historically conditioned institution the very center of absolute power and authority. The seven-headed beast of "extorted powre, and borrow'd strength" (1.7.18) represents the brutality of political power behind the awesome façade of a spiritual authority. Orgoglio is far worse than Lucifera; she aspires
to be the highest; Orgoglio already pretends to be the highest. That is why the knight's misery in Orgoglio's dungeon is far worse than that of the pagan prisoners in Lucifera's dungeon. Redcrosse lives a death-like, hopeless life (1.8.38) because his sense of spiritual nothingness, worsened by his sense of loss, comes from his rejection of the ultimate answer of Christ closed to the pagans (Kathleen Williams 21).

Protestantism understands the Gospel primarily as justification by faith, condemning man's vain religious efforts based on the belief that man can actually contribute to his salvation. This belief easily degenerates into idolatry, as Redcrosse's fall clearly indicates. Arthur's defeat of Orgoglio, usually interpreted as the triumph of the English Reformation over the tyranny of Roman Catholicism (Kermode, Shakespeare 48), inevitably accompanies iconoclasm, the most potent expression of Protestantism's condemnation of religious idolatry. Thus, Arthur exposes the horrible crimes committed under the idolatrous altar (1.8.36). His iconoclastic activity culminates in his striping Duessa at Una's request:

> So as she bad, that witch they disaraid,
> And rob'd of royall robes, and purple pall,
> And ornaments that richly were displaid;
> Ne spared they to strip her naked all.

(1.8.46)
Arthur's pitiless iconoclasm exposes Duessa's ugly upper body (1.8.47) and filthy "neather parts" (1.8.48) to Redcrosse, a deceived Christian; only then does the knight discern the horrible hidden reality of a false, idolatrous religion.

The Orgoglio episode marks the conclusion of the first phase of the dynamics of Protestantism and culture in Book 1, revealing the fundamental contradiction between Christ and culture. This crucial insight being ignored, the knight's dual allegiance is bound to be debased into his blameworthy allegiance to Lucifera and Duessa. The following stanza sums up this insight:

What man is he, that boasts of fleshly might,
And vaine assurance of mortality,
Which all so soone, as it doth come to fight,
Against spirituall foes, yeelds by and by,
Or from the field most cowardly doth fly?
Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill,
That through grace hath gained victory.
If any strength we haue, it is to ill,
But all the good is Gods, both power and eke will.

(1.10.1)

Una's search for Redcrosse, however, anticipates the need to integrate the knight's precarious allegiances to his spiritual and secular authorities, which is a very important theme of the House of Holiness. Una's encounters with the
lion (1.3.5), the satyrs (1.6.7), Satyrane (1.6.20), and finally Arthur (1.7.29) represent not only "a process whereby truth mobilizes the hero's natural powers" (Berger, Revisionary Play 76) but her search for an ideal Christian warrior faithful to his dual allegiance. Arthur is described not so much as a type of Christ—even though he acts as such when he rescues Redcrosse—as a perfect pagan knight fully devoted to heroic life (1.7.29-36). Thus, when he accepts the New Testament from Redcrosse (1.9.19), he becomes an ideal Christian warrior devoted not only to Gloriana but to Christ, ready to work out his dual allegiance.

The House of Holiness initiates the second phase of the dynamics of Protestantism and culture: the radical reorientation of culture's potentials. More specifically, this reorientation involves the two closely related learning processes: Redcrosse's painful discovery of his true identity and a full understanding of his dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana. Central to an understanding of this phase of the dynamics is the revelation of God's true character through Christ's incarnation and atonement on the cross. Niebuhr explains Christ's incarnation from the standpoint of his Christian anthropology; Christ's dual identity as Son of God and the Second Adam—both perfectly divine and perfectly human—fulfills man's dual identity as God's image and flesh (Nature 2: 38). More important is
Christ's atonement, namely, his death for man's sins to restore man a right relationship with God, that finally reveals God's wisdom and clarifies his character, proclaiming that

He has a resource of mercy beyond His Law and judgement but He can make it effective only as He takes the consequences of His wrath and judgement, upon and into Himself. (Nature 2: 55)

Thus, Una strongly rebukes Redcrosse's self-condemnation induced by Despair's devilish distortion of God's true character.

In heavenly mercies hast thou not a part?
Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art?
Where justice growes, there grows eke great grace,

(1.9.53)

Without Christ's revelation of his true character through his death on the cross, the second phase of the dynamics cannot exist: Book 1 should end with Redcrosse's suicide at the Cave of Despair. Niebuhr lucidly explains the relation of the cross to human culture and history:

The truth which is revealed in the Cross is not a truth which could have been anticipated in human culture and it is not the culmination of human wisdom. . . . But on the other hand when the Christ is accepted, the truth embodied in him becomes the basis of a new wisdom. This is to say that while
Heilsgeschichte is not merely an aspect of general history, nor its natural culmination, neither is it a completely separate history. Its revelations are what give history meaning. (Nature 2: 62-3).

Niebuhr's dynamic conception about the relation of the cross to human culture best explains the underlying principle of the House of Holiness, the ideal image of a reformed Church of England, especially in its strong emphasis on education (Wall 113). Beginning with Fidelia's indoctrination of heavenly learning "Of God, of grace, of justice, of free will" (1.10.19), Redcrosse undergoes a painful process that culminates in the discovery of his true identity as St. George (1.10.61), both a saint and "man of earth" (1.10.52). But this identity is exactly what the knight has persistently refused to accept throughout the preceding episodes, always vacillating between heroic idealism and earthly indulgence. Patrick Cullen makes an insightful comment on the importance of the knight's dual identity:

Red Crosse must learn to come to terms with the contradictions of his own nature, to live with the difficult paradox that it is from the "guilt of bloudy field," from the "bloud [that] can nought but sin" (x.60), that the acts of his sainthood are born. The complexity of our fallen nature is such that the man of earth that we are to crucify
and that may be the source of our damnation is also inseparable from our sainthood. (65)

In the House of Holiness the regenerating process for the knight contains two stages that are intended to restore his true identity as both God's image and flesh.

The first stage purifies Redcrosse's earthly identity made corrupt by his idolatrous pride in it, thus restoring to him a correct recognition of his creaturely existence. Discerning the cause of the knight's uneasy conscience with "Inward corruption, and infected sin" (1.10.25), Patience tries to purify the corruption of the knight's flesh. The treatment is described in graphically physical terms. Patience abates the knight's "proud humors," makes him fast to mitigate "The swelling of his wounds," and lets his "superflous flesh" rot (1.10.26). Even the knight's repentance is shown closely related to purging of his flesh:

And sad Repentance vset to embay,

His bodie in salt water smarting sore,

The filthy blots of sinne to wash away. (1.10.27)

Of course, the reader does not have to read the treatment literally; but it is evident where Spenser's emphasis is: the purification of the knight's earthly identity.

But once the painful process of purification comes to an end, the knight is introduced to Charissa, whose healthy sexuality signals a different view of the human body from the one cherished by Patience, who sees only its frailty and
arrogance. Charissa represents Spenser's positive view of the body in active works of love that begin with man's married life—as the "multitude of babes about her hong" (1.10.31) plainly imply—and extend to good works for the neighbor as done by the "seuen Bead-men" (1.10.36). Their labors of love concretely embody the social mission of the Church of England: holiness is not merely a private religious virtue but should be manifested in the community.

The second stage of the knight's regenerating process purifies his spiritual identity made corrupt by his aspiring pride, thus restoring to him a correct recognition of the true worth and limit of his spiritual freedom. Purification of the knight's spiritual identity begins with his meeting with the hermit Heavenly Contemplation, whose "mind was full of spirituall repast" (1.10.48). That the second stage is especially concerned with spiritual purification is explicit in the hermit's advice to the knight:

But first thou must a season fast and pray,
Till from her bands the spright assoiled is,
And haue her strength recur'd from fraile infirmitis. (1.10.52)

As the culmination of his arduous spiritual discipline, the knight is given a vision of the New Jerusalem, thus fulfilling St. Paul's prophetic admonition: "And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly" (1 Cor. 15:49).
But the vision is not the last lesson Redcrosse learns in the House of Holiness. The knight's correct understanding of his dual allegiance involves realizing both the inevitable tension between Christ and Gloriana and the strong need to integrate their claims. The knight's deep yearning to be released from the woes of the fallen world and be absorbed in his mystic vision (1.10.63) results from his realization of the radical difference between the City of God (the New Jerusalem) and the City of Man (Cleopolis), however fair it may be (1.10.58). But the hermit's wisdom is maturer than the knight's. The hermit agrees on the fundamental difference between the two cities, but he also emphasizes the need to be actively involved in heroic life in service of Christ and Gloriana (1.10.59), being fully aware that a Christian knight's true battle ground should be on the earth, where he is daily attacked by his enemies of sin, death, and the Devil. Redcrosse's heroic life should not be abandoned but radically reoriented toward fulfilling his dual allegiance in the fallen world.

Redcrosse's heroic battle with the Dragon embodies the third phase of the dynamics of Protestantism and culture: active Christian life in God's grace. God's sanctifying power in the knight enables and obliges him to exhaust his heroic potentials in service of Christ; but he is also constantly in need of God's justifying power because of "the sinful corruption in human life on every level of goodness"
(Niebuhr, *Nature* 2: 104) The hermit Heavenly Contemplation, who strongly affirms the value of heroic life, points out its inevitable darker side:

And thou faire ymp, sprong out from English race,
How euer now accompted Elfins sonne,
Well worthy doest thy seruice for her grace,
To aide a virgin desolate foredonne.
But when thou famous victorie hast wonne,
And high amongst all knights hast hong thy shield,
Thenceforth the suit of earthly conquest shonne,
And wash thy hands from guilt of bloudy field:
For bloud can nought but sin, and wars but sorrowes yield. (1.10.60)

As Paul Alpers rightly points out (361), Spenser has no intention to substitute the knight's militant heroism with "the better fortitude of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom" *(Paradise Lost* 9:31-2), as Milton redefines Christian heroism against classical heroism. It is true that after his education in the House of Holiness, the knight is deeply aware of the limit or even danger of his heroism; but it does not necessarily mean that he should abandon it or radically spiritualize it. The hermit insists that Redcrosse's Christian life remain militant through and through both in spiritual and physical terms. Behind the hermit's admonition lies his conviction that bearing out
one's sinful life in active service to Christ is far more important than trying to make one's life sinless by detaching himself from the corruption of the world—the error of Catholic monasticism fervently criticized by the Protestant reformers.

Understanding Redcrosse's militant heroism merely as a metaphor for his spiritual struggle misses the whole point of Book 1: the inseparability between spirit and flesh, between Christ and Gloriana, despite the enduring tension between them. It is true that the knight's fight with the Dragon is not an ordinary earthly battle but an apocalyptic one, with the very evil principle of the world that tries to enslave him; but the battle nonetheless requires the whole spiritual and physical potentials of Redcrosse.

Therefore, the knight's fight with the Dragon can be described only by the epithet "heroic" in its most plain sense. Una emboldens Redcrosse by instilling a heroic spirit in him:

The sparke or noble courage now awake,
And striue your excellent selfe to excell;
That shall ye euermore renowned make,
Aboue all knights on earth, that batteill
undertake. (1.11.2)

Spenser employs the familiar themes of classical heroism—wrath, might, honor—to describe the knight's heroic fight.

The knight was wroth to see his stroke beguyld,
And smote againe with more outrageous might;

(1.11.25)

But yet more mindful of his honour deare,

Then of the grievous smart, which him did wring,

(1.11.39)

But the difference between his former battles and the present battle lies in the clear manifestation of the context of sin and grace earlier ignored by the knight. Even though the knight is a regenerate Christian, he is still prone to sin. Redcrosse is attacked by the Dragon's flame (1.11.26), which allegorically signifies "general proneness toward sin (fomes peccati )" (Kaske 426). The Dragon's sting, allegorically representing the attack of lust (Kaske 427), penetrates into the knight's shoulder; significantly enough, the knight cannot remove it completely (1.11.38-9), which suggests that he is not free from his concupiscence. Moreover, Redcrosse's terrible inner torment and desire for death (1.11.28) remind the reader of his sinful state in Orgoglio's dungeon and at the Cave of Despair.

During the fight Redcrosse falls twice but is saved by the Well of Life (1.11.29) and the Tree of Life (1.11.46), signifying the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Being the two signs of grace, the Well of Life and the Tree of Life are antidotes to all the poisonous fountains and trees of the earlier episodes that subject man to sin. The
significance of Baptism and the Lord's Supper in their relation to God's sanctification and justification is masterfully summarized by Calvin:

For baptism attests to us that we have been cleansed and washed; the Eucharistic Supper, that we have been redeemed. In water, washing is represented; in blood, satisfaction. . . . The Spirit of God is also witness of this. Indeed, "there are three witnesses in one: the water, the blood, and the spirit" [I John 5:8 p.]. In the water and the blood we have testimony of cleansing and redemption. But the Spirit, the primary witness, makes us certain of such testimony. (2: 1298)

The knight's fight with the Dragon fully reveals the dynamic tension between and integration of his heroism and his absolute dependence on grace; this point is beautifully expressed by St. Paul: "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me" (Gal. 2:20). St. Paul's powerful assertion about the dialectical nature of Christian life in grace transcends the theological disputes concerning the role of human will in the drama of salvation.
The last canto of Book 1, where Redcrosse's formal betrothal to Una is celebrated, marks the final phase of the Protestantism and culture dynamics: the eschatological dimension of Christian life always subject to frustration and hope. Canto 12 is strongly eschatological in perspective, which means that Spenser views history as both fulfilled and unfulfilled. As Niebuhr emphasizes (Nature 2: 51), "history is an interim between the first and second coming of Christ." The cross fully reveals the meaning of life and discloses the sovereignty of God in history, but it does not mean that history has reached its culmination; it should still wait for Christ's Second coming for its fulfillment. Niebuhr explains:

History, after Christ's first coming, has the quality of partly knowing its true meaning. In so far as man can never be completely in contradiction to his own true nature, history also reveals significant realizations of that meaning. Nevertheless history continues to stand in real contradiction to its true meaning, so that pure love in history must always be suffering love.

(Nature 2: 51)

The knight's marriage to Una not only symbolizes the mystical marriage of Christ and the Church at the end of time (Rev. 19:7-8) but also the complete fulfillment of his dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana because then the
tension between the City of God and the City of Man will be finally obliterated through the marriage. But Spenser reminds the reader that this is not the apocalyptic moment; Redcrosse reveals his obligation to serve Gloriana for "six yeares in warlike wize, / Gainst that proud Paynim king, that workes her teene" (1.12.18). History still remains a battleground for the knight, wherein he should work out his dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana. He should be satisfied only with his betrothal to Una.

But his betrothal symbolizes the fulfillment of his mission, which was possible because he participated in Christ's suffering on the cross and victory over sin, death, and the Devil. The knight thus lives between the two times: the crucifixion and Christ's Second Coming. The vicious attempt of Duessa and Archimago to disrupt the betrothal clearly reveals the continuing presence of evil and the continuing frustration of a Christian's life before God's Final Judgment. What gives hope to the knight, however, is the cross on his breast that symbolizes God's surpassing love for him and the promise of His final deliverance of man. The last image of Redcrosse in Book 1 is that of a knight joyfully foretasting the consummation of his betrothal but still fully mindful of the incompleteness of his dual allegiance.

Yet swimming in that sea of blisfull ioy,

He nought forgot, how he whilome had sworne,
In case he could that monstrous beast destroy,

Vnto his Farie Queene backe to returne:

The which he shortly did, and Una left to mourn.

(1.12.41)

Una's mourning sends the reader back to the very beginning of Book 1 when she "inly mournd" (1.1.4) for the loss of Eden; however now her mourning does not look backwards but forwards to the final liberation of Eden, which will consummate her betrothal to Redcrosse.

The Legende of Holinesse offers a comprehensive vision of human nature and destiny, laying the thematic and artistic foundation for the remaining books of The Faerie Queene; they will further explore the ethical, political, and social implications of Redcrosse's quest of holiness that are only hinted but not given sufficient treatment in the legend. What Spenser achieves in Book 1 as a Protestant thinker and poet is his relentless and thorough questioning of the complex relation of the Gospel to religious and secular culture, which defies any static relationship but demands a dynamic one that includes both enduring tension and a strong need for integration.
NOTES

1 St. Augustine asserts: "What other name is there for this fault than pride? 'The beginning of all sin is pride'" (477). Calvin faithfully follows St. Augustine's insight: "Indeed, Augustine speaks rightly when he declares that pride was the beginning of all evils. For if ambition had not raised man higher than was meet and right, he could have remained in his original state" (1: 245). On the other hand, Luther closely relates pride to unfaith: "The main and real sin is unfaith, despising God, which is what takes place when a man does not fear, love, and trust in God as he certainly should" (14: 84)

2 Paul Althaus emphasizes the importance of the Devil in Luther's theological thinking, asserting that Luther takes the Devil much more seriously than the Middle Ages did (162). Robin Bruce Barnes insists: "An apocalyptic view of the struggle between the Gospel and its enemies was basic to the original Protestant message" (31).

3 God's wrath is not an essential part of His true being, as Luther insists: "Anyone who regards Him as angry has not seen Him correctly, but has pulled down a curtain and cover, even more, a dark cloud over His face" (21: 37). Thus, Luther's remark supports my argument that Redcrosse
and Una are already fallen creatures from the beginning of their adventure.
CHAPTER III

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE OR ETHICS

The Legend of Temperance is a critically controversial book. Among its many hotly debated issues, one of the most important is whether Spenser's concept of the virtue is classical or Christian. Following A. S. P. Woodhouse's claim that Books 1 and 2 belong to the two different orders of grace and nature respectively (81), Lewis H. Miller argues for the secular character of the Legend of Temperance (300) and regards Guyon, its titular knight, basically as a classical hero intent on perfecting the classical virtue of temperance through his own powers (305). On the other hand, Robert Hoopes insists that the orders of nature and grace are harmonized in Book 2; Spenser attempts to reconcile "the revealed truth of Christianity and the highest insights of classical wisdom" (87). According to Harry Berger, the first seven cantos of Book 2 are classical in their notion of temperance while the rest of the book is manifestly Christian; Christian doctrine replaces the inadequate classicism of the earlier cantos (Allegorical Temper 42). These conflicting arguments about the religious nature of Book 2 are clearly indicative of the complexity of the dynamics of Christianity and ethical effort that Spenser explores.
All these arguments, however, are unsatisfactory in clarifying the complex nature of the dynamics. Miller's secular position ignores the crucial Christian truth that the Fall has transformed the order of nature into a fierce battleground between God and the powers of sin, death, and the Devil; it is impossible for Guyon the Christian knight to travel in a pre-Christian pagan world completely ignorant of God's grace. Hoopes' syncretic view is inadequate because Christ's ethical commands—to say nothing of the mystery of his atonement on the cross—frequently contradict the precepts of classical ethics (Niebuhr, Interpretation 23). Berger points to the right direction critics should take; but he contrasts classical and Christian temperance too sharply, obscuring their consistent interaction throughout Book 2. The Legend of Temperance attempts to redefine a Christian concept of temperance or ethics that dynamically relates ethical effort to the insights of Christianity. I will use the two words, "temperance" and "ethics", more or less interchangeably, for Spenser uses "temperance" to cover a far wider range of ethical issues than we do in the present; moreover, it is impossible to separate the problem of establishing an inner unity of emotions or desires—the proper realm of temperance—from that of relating one person to other persons in Book 2.

The reappearance of Archimago and Duessa and their persistent malicious intention to ruin Redcrosse at the very
beginning of Book 2 unmistakably suggests the continuing importance of the apocalyptic context in the Legend of Temperance. Archimago has never given up his malice toward the knight of holiness and tries to delude Guyon into believing that Redcrosse has committed the hideous crime of sexually molesting an innocent virgin (Duessa). Guyon's "fierce ire / And zealous hast" (2.1.13) and sudden penchant to avenge Duessa betray his incomplete mastery of temperance. Archimago's instigation also proves the inseparability of the ethical problem from its Christian context. He is actually the hidden source of the misery of incontinent knights:

For all he did, was to deceive good knights,
    And draw them from pursuit of praise and fame,
    To slug in sloth and sensuall delights,
    And end their daies with irrenowned shame.

(2.1.23)

Archimago's active role shown inseparably linked to the problem of intemperance leads the reader to strongly question the validity of the argument that temperance or ethics can be divorced from Christian doctrine in Book 2.

Another important proof for the Christian character of Book 2 is that Guyon explicitly identifies himself as a Christian knight, whose confession of dual allegiance to Christ and Gloriana testifies to the continuing importance of the theme in Book 2. Apologizing to Redcrosse for his
rash attack, Guyon admits that the cross on Redcrosse's shield is "The sacred badge of my Redeemers death" (2.1.27). With the image of Gloriana on his own shield, Guyon turns out to be a Christian knight having the same obligation to work out his dual allegiance that Redcrosse faced. And like Redcrosse, he shows a wrong understanding of the nature of his dual allegiance, making the fatal error of viewing the virtue of temperance sorely from a secular point of view in the earlier cantos.

The pledge of good will shown between Redcrosse and Guyon at their separation, however, implies the inseparable relationship between holiness and temperance. Temperance can be understood as the ethical aspect of holiness, being part of God's ongoing sanctifying process of regenerate man, which explains why the Palmer, Guyon's mentor, while praising Redcrosse's religious victory, still implores God's help for Guyon's ethical victory:

But wretched we, where ye haue left your marke,
Must now anew begin, like race to runne;
God guide thee, Guyon, well to end thy warke,
And to the wished hauen bring thy weary barke.

(2.1.32)

Calvin also emphasizes the close relationship between faith and a life of temperance:

We say also that it [i.e., faith] is the springhead and liuely breath of righteousnesse,
because hereby men do learne to liue among themselues temperately and without hurt doing one to another, if they reuerence God as the judge of right and wrong. (qtd. in Mallette, "Protestant Ethics" 46)

Holiness and temperance, however, differ from each other with respect to their primary aims, though both depend on God's grace for their perfection. Redcrosse's task is to fight against the radical sin of pride that engenders irascible and concupiscent passions in him; Guyon's is to cope with the passions that stem from his pride and jeopardize his ethical soundness (Evans 110). Holiness and temperance complement each other.

From the Christian perspective, the irascible and concupiscent passions do not merely develop into vices but into sins of lust or sensuality (Klein 175). As Reinhold Niebuhr admirably explains, the sin of pride idolatrously makes a god of the self; the sin of sensuality becomes "an alternative idolatry in which the self, conscious of the inadequacy of its self-worship, seeks escape by finding some other god" (Nature 1: 233). The ultimate aim of Mammon and Acrasia, the two archenemies of temperance, is to destroy the Christian self by subjecting it to lusting for anything—wealth, power, honor, sex, every kind of sensual pleasure—except God. It is no coincidence that the first monster appearing in The Faerie Queene is half-serpent,
half-woman Errour, whose composite shape aptly emblematizes the inseparable link in Spenser's opinion between the sin of pride and the sin of sensuality.

Guyon's error in the first seven cantos of Book 2 is quite similar to Redcrosse's in the earlier cantos of Book 1. Guyon firmly believes in the efficacy of classical ethics for controlling passions and making ethical judgements. As in the case of Redcrosse, Guyon's apparent devotion to Christ proves increasingly hollow; he is unaware how radically the assumptions of classical and Christian ethics differ from each other. An acquaintance with the assumptions is essential for appreciating the Legend of Temperaunce.

Classical ethics depends upon the basic ideas of classical cosmology and anthropology. ¹ Classical cosmology views the world dualistically as consisting of the two distinct sources of form and matter. Form is the basis of the rational principle of the universe, the cosmic Mind or Intelligence (nous); matter presupposes a substratum of uncreated primordial matter called blind chance (tyche) or Necessity (anagke). The world comes into being as Intelligence imposes forms upon primordial matter; classical cosmology thus envisages a world where the never-changing rational principle is perpetually struggling to control the ever-changing aberrant tendencies of matter-in-motion.
Classical cosmology has a direct bearing on classical anthropology. According to Plato, man, being a microcosm of the universe, is a mind-body composite, his soul occupying the intermediate position between mind and body. The mind is identified with Intelligence in its highest reach while the body originates in matter. Plato's anthropology is bound to view the body negatively, following Phytagoras' suggestion that man's body (soma) is a tomb or prison-house (sema). The inherent pessimism of Plato's idealistic anthropology is challenged by Aristotle, who envisages the rational principle of man as immanent rather than transcendent. Aristotle's teleological anthropology, emphasizing the actualizing process of man's potential toward its ideal type, views matter less negatively than Plato does. But still Aristotle shows no doubt about the radical distinction between form and matter inherent in Platonic idealism.

Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which certainly influenced the Legend of Temperance in many ways, bases its principles on the insights of classical anthropology. Aristotle insists that "the activity of soul in accordance with virtue" should be based on reason (1098A). More specifically, virtue means rationally choosing a mean between two extremes, one being a vice through excess, the other being a vice through defect (1107A). Man's rational regulation of extremes to obtain a state of balance,
however, is doomed to failure because passions and vices originate in matter that persistently refuses stasis and equilibrium; Aristotle's goal is either illusory or impossible to maintain even for a short while. Ironically, Aristotle's ethical man should be perpetually involved in balancing extremes, cherishing no hope of actually achieving a lasting balance.

From the Christian standpoint, the fundamental error of Aristotelian ethics in particular and classical ethics in general is its acceptance of the classical ideal of the excellence of man as man and its corollary that this ideal can be realized by virtue of capacities inherent in human nature (Cochrane 75). Sean Kane admirably explains the self-antagonizing tendency of classical ethics:

The root of the problem is the illusion of independence, self-control, and moral self-sufficiency which aggressive ethical codes engender. This error, which Augustine saw as the flaw in classical ethics, makes the hero a foe to his own passions and sensuality, as well as to anything else in the divine order that has been translated by self-love into a challenge to be mastered by the virtue he champions. (53)

Ernest Sirluck persuasively demonstrates that temperance in Book 2 cannot be confined to Aristotle's discussion of the virtue but actually incorporates many other ethical concerns
in his book (100). But his argument that Book 2 is actually a "poetic version of the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics" (100) can seriously mislead the reader unaware of Spenser's critical stance to Aristotle's work.

The Christian view of the world and of man is fundamentally different from the classical one. The Biblical belief that God is the creator, that the world is God's creation and is therefore good in itself (Gen. 1:31), is sharply contrasted with the Greek idea that the material world is the sphere of evil—especially in gnosticism—and a burden or a hindrance to the soul. However, the Christian doctrine of creation, as Niebuhr points out (Nature 1: 134), does not allow identifying God even with the highest rational principle of the universe: God transcends both cosmic Mind and primordial chaos, both form and matter, both the immutable and mutable realms (Fate and Fortune) of the world. Moreover, the Greek idea that man is a mind-body composite is utterly alien to the Old Testament anthropology that has no specific word for body; the Hebrew word Nephesh (soul) does not designate a part of man; it means man himself viewed as a living creature (Ladd 37). The New Testament also understands man essentially as a unity. D. R. G. Owen insists:

This personal unity that is man can be called, as a whole, either soma (body) or psyche (soul) or sarx (flesh) or pneuma (spirit), depending on the
point of view from which man is being considered, but the point is that none of these terms refers to a part of man; they all refer to the whole.

(196)

Christian temperance or ethics, therefore, identifies its true enemy not with passions and vices that originate in matter's intransigence to form but with the powers of sin, death, and the Devil that exploit them to destroy the Christian self; Mammon, Maleger, and Acrasia represent more than vices which can be controlled by reason (Berger, Allegorical Temper 51). But Christian temperance also should avoid the error of antinomianism that tends to ignore the importance of ethical efforts. Guyon has the obligation to exert his ethical resource fully to contain his passions and vices; but his ultimate aim is not to seek a mean between extremes but actively to resist the malicious will behind passions and vices. Guyon's ruthless destruction of the Bower of Bliss at the end of Book 2 plainly ignores Aristotle's exhortation for moderation, but Guyon's drastic action is preceded by his successful mastering of the sea of vices and passions during his perilous voyage to the Bower. Guyon does not merely go beyond classical ethics; he actually goes through it.

After taking leave of Redcrosse, Guyon and the Palmer witness the tragedy of Amavia, whose suicide reveals the fundamental insufficiency of classical temperance; but Guyon
overlooks this crucial point. Both Amavia and Guyon see the tragedy of human life from the classical perspective that has no room for the Christian concepts of sin and grace. Heaven appears as capricious and hostile Fortune to Amavia:

   ... careless heauens (quoth she) despise
   The doome of iust reuenge, and take delight
   To see sad pageants of mens miseries, (2.1.36)

Or it is hardly distinguishable from implacably detached Fate, as is evident when she speaks to her child:

   But thou, sweet Babe, whom frowning froward fate
   Hath made sad witnesse of thy fathers fall,
   (2.1.37)

Her classical cosmology does not give her any hope of redemption, making her will obdurate and forcing her to reject any supernatural succor (2.1.47) Suicide is the last solution left to Amavia in her self-imposed classical universe. Moreover, her understanding of human nature is plainly pessimistic, faithfully following classical dualistic anthropology: "Sharpe be [death's] wounds, but sweet the medicines bee, / That long captiued soules from wearie thraldome free" (2.1.36). Identifying the source of evil with the world outside her, she exempts herself from any stain of blame (2.1.37). Her total lack of any sense of sin is bound to lead her to accuse heaven guilty of her tragedy (2.1.49). But from the Christian point of view,
Amavia's claim of innocence is dangerously close to the sin of pride, which was the cause of Redcrosse's fall.

By Guyon's request, Amavia tells him how she succeeded in rescuing Mordant, her husband, from Acrasia's sensual thraldom and how Mordant mysteriously died when he drank from the fountain lying near her and Guyon. Significantly enough, it is not Mortdant's intemperance but Acrasia's curse on him that is directly related to his death because Amavia has already applied the medicine of classical temperance to her husband before they could escape the Bower of Bliss.

Till through wise handling and faire gouernance
I him recured to a better will,
Purged from drugs of foule intemperance;
Then meanes I gan devise for his deliuerance.

(2.1.54)

Her rescue of Mordant, however, turns out to be disastrous because his mysterious death through the fulfillment of Acrasia's curse strongly implies there exists a malicious supernatural will which attempts to exploit to its advantage even man's ethical effort to control passions.

Guyon shares with Amavia the same classical view of the world and of man, though he is far more confident in the value of classical temperance than dying Amavia is. Like Amavia, Guyon accuses fortune and fate of the tragic deaths of the couple (2.1.56). An inevitable ethical consequence...
of Guyon's reliance on classical cosmology is his solemn vow of vengeance against Acrasia (2.1.60); the classical universe has no room for a divine principle of justice transcending both implacable Fate and capricious Fortune, forcing those who feel injustice to resort to personal revenge (MacLachlan 135). Guyon's sense of injustice, however, is inadequate because he lacks the Christian insight that all men are sinners under God's judgment. Guyon should first realize the Christian insight before he becomes God's instrument of justice when he captures Acrasia.

Because Guyon, following classical anthropology, envisions man's inner life as if it were a fierce battle between reason and raging passion (2.1.57), his explanation of the cause of the couple's tragedy is also perfectly classical: "The strong [i.e., Mordant the irascible man] through pleasure soonest falles, the weak [i.e., Amavia the concupiscent woman] through smart" (2.1.57). The answer to the couple's tragedy is to practice the Aristotelian mean:

\[\text{But temperance (said he) with golden squire} \]
\[\text{Betwixt them both can measure out a meane,} \]
\[\text{Neither to melt in pleasures whot desire,} \]
\[\text{Nor fry in hartlesse griefe and dolefull teene.} \]
\[\text{(2.1.58)} \]

But the enigmas of Mordant's mysterious death and the ineradicable stain of blood on the hands of Ruddymane, the
couple's new born baby, silently question Guyon's almost naive confidence in classical temperance.

The key to the enigmas is the nature of the fountain that causes Mordant to die but is unable to wash away the stain on Ruddymane's hands. Alastair Fowler persuasively interprets the fountain as a symbol of baptism. He interprets Mortdant's death and Ruddymane's birth as an allegory of baptismal regeneration; Mordant, the old Adam, dies to sin and is reborn as Ruddymane, "the new man put on at baptism," being incorporated into Christ's body (143). The main problem with Fowler's interpretation is that both Amavia, bringing Mordant to the fountain, and Guyon, vainly washing the baby's hands in bewilderment, show no sign of Christian understanding. Moreover, the fact that Acrasia uses the fountain as the instrument to kill Mordant (2.1.55) imparts an ominous significance to the fountain.

The Palmer's account of the fountain's origin suggests that it may represent the law written in the Gentiles' hearts (Rom. 2:14). According to the Palmer's etiological myth, the nymph of the fountain was transformed into stone by Diana so that she might preserve her virginity from Dan Faunus' lustful attack. The extreme purity of the water welling up from the stone allows no filth in it, strongly suggesting the prohibitive nature of the law. In Pauline theology, the law is the antithesis of God's grace and a foil to baptism (Weatherby 343); the law actually helps sin
"work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore, Guyon's inability to cleanse the baby's bloody hands in the fountain signifies not the persistent remaining of sin even after baptism, as Fowler insists (145), but the law's inability to redeem the flesh from its bondage to sin. The classical tragedy of Mordant and Amavia betrays their complete inability to redeem themselves—hence, the pressing need for baptism and new life in Christ.

However, there is no hint that Guyon really appreciates this crucial point. When describing Guyon's vain efforts to wash away the stain on the baby's hands, Spenser significantly employs the epithet "guilty" to qualify Ruddymane's hands (2.2.3). But this important epithet is unfortunately hidden to Guyon. The ineradicable stain baffles Guyon, forcing him even to question the baby's supposed innocence (2.2.4). But the Palmer's story confirms Guyon's belief in the baby's innocence because Guyon's mentor himself regards the stain as a sacred symbol of Amavia's innocence (2.2.10). Because Guyon fails to see the radical limit of classical temperance based on classical cosmology and anthropology, he is bound to understand the problem of intemperance strictly as an ethical one—a fatal error that eventually causes Guyon's faint in Canto 7.

The House of Medina, an allegory of the Aristotelian ethical principle that moral virtue is a relative mean between extremes, shows how dubious the achievements of
classical temperance could be. After burying Mordant and Amavia, Guyon and the Palmer travel until they come to the House of Medina. Reflecting the basic idea of classical anthropology and Aristotle's tendency to view ethical conduct as the management of extremes, the house is divided into three equal parts owned by three sisters representing the three abstract qualities: mean (Medina), excess (Perissa), and deficiency (Elissa). But, ironically, the admirable equality among the three sisters only breeds endless enmity: "But strifull minde, and diuurse qualitee / Drew them in parts, and each made others foe" (2.2.13). There is no lasting peace in the nicely compartmentalized House of Medina.

Huddibras and Sansloy, who are diametrically opposed to each other in temper, are the suitable lovers of Elissa and Perissa respectively. Guyon's fierce fight with these two guests of the House signifies the knight's aggressive attempt to achieve the mean between two extreme vices concerning the emotion of anger. Spenser's generous praise of Guyon's heroic efforts to produce the forced mean (2.2.25), however, turns out to be ironic because the very next stanza suggests the futility of his struggle:

Straunge sort of fight, three valiaunt knights to see
Three combats ioyne in one, and to darraine
A triple warre with triple enmitee,
There is no way to achieve a forced balance between ever changing opposite emotions. The peace Guyon seems to achieve occasionally only turns out to be "continuall iarre" (2.2.26).

Guyon's failure is followed by Medina's conciliatory attempt to establish the Aristotelian mean. She denounces wrath for breeding self-destructive strife, extolling the merits of concord that can be reached by the two warring knights (2.2.29-31). Though her eloquent speech makes Huddibras and Sansloy check their rancor, her success is ultimately fruitless because she achieves peace only by admitting the claims of the two that are, by definition, irreconcilable. She has no interest in uprooting the vices but in establishing a semblance of peace and order between them, which is only temporary and too fragile to maintain. That Elissa and Perissa still secretly hate Medina and each other despite their seemingly cheerful appearance (2.2.34) clearly betrays the sad limit of Medina's efforts. The real weakness of Medina's solution to the problem of irascibility is that her "concord" induces the circumstance for concupiscence; the House of Medina is similar to a country alternatively visited by ravaging war and decadent peace. Perissa and Sansloy wantonly indulge in excessive pleasure and delight while Elissa and Huddibras sullenly frown at the
other couple's loose behavior. Medina's ceaseless efforts to balance the two couples opposed to each other (2.2.38) are truly heroic but at the same time hopeless; she becomes a "rueful picture of idealism beset by the pressures of human irrationality" (Evans 121). But Guyon shows no sign of disappointment with the sorry state of the house and leaves Ruddymane to Medina for his education in "vertuous lore" (2.3.2)—a clear indication of his unfailing respect for classical temperance.

Guyon's subsequent encounters with Furor, Pyrochles, Cymochles, and Phaedria provide him with opportunities for exercising his classical temperance; but his efforts increasingly prove misguided, failing to overcome his enemies, though he manages to subdue them temporarily. Phedon's tragic story and Guyon's response to it remind the reader of Amavia's tragedy and the knight's response to it earlier. The point is that Guyon does not appreciate the true import of Phedon's crimes. After subduing Furor and Occasion, who cruelly tormented Phedon, Guyon hears Phedon's story that is a classical revenge tragedy fraught with treachery, anger, and murder. Like Amavia, Phedon refuses to attribute the source of his horrible crimes to his sin but to the workings of chance and occasion (2.4.17). Guyon's advice to Phedon is the same as his to Amavia: as the cause of your crimes is intemperance, "guide thy wayes with warie gouernaunce, / Least worse betide thee by some
later chaunce" (2.4.36). What is wrong with Guyon is not
his exhortation for temperance but his misguided belief that
human tragedy can be managed by sorely relying on man's
inner ethical resource, which verges on arrogance; Guyon's
aloof moral advice sounds so ludicrously insensitive to a
cruelly tormented man who killed those he loved most. Of
course, Phedon needs self-control; but, like Amavia, he first
needs acceptance of his own sinful existence and his new
birth in Christ. For Spenser temperance has meaning only in
the Christian context.

Guyon's fights with the brothers Pyrochles and
Cymochles virtually repeat what he and Medina did to the two
warring couples earlier, showing the same inadequacy of
classical temperance. Guyon succeeds in defeating Pyrochles
by wisely waiting until Pyrochles, the irascible man, spends
his furious anger, following the Palmer's advice to weaken
the strong (2.5.11). But his victory soon becomes fruitless
because Guyon unwisely frees Pyrochles, following the other
part of the Palmer's teaching: strengthen the weak (2.5.11).
Guyon's classical strategy of balancing, however, proves
disastrous as Pyrochles soon regains his irascibility and
foolishly involves himself in the fierce broil with Furor
and Occasion. Furthermore, as Medina's conciliatory
strategy only replaces the problem of irascibility with that
of concupiscence, Guyon soon encounters Cymochles, the
concupiscent brother, on Phaedria's island after he has
aloofly detached himself from Pyrochles' fight with Furor. Guyon's exercise of classical temperance leads him nowhere but to himself endlessly struggling with his own emotions.

Guyon's encounter with Phaedria more decisively betrays the fundamental inadequacy of classical temperance because she serves a diabolical will opposed to God and man. Phaedria, her small pleasure boat, and paradisiac islet are more than the emblems of a slothful life of pleasure. Being Acrasia's servant (2.6.9), she hides her sinister nature under her wanton, careless behavior. Phaedria parodies the famous passage in Christ's Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 6:25-34) that proclaims the absolute priority of serving God wholeheartedly to satisfying natural needs and desires. Her parody is blasphemous because she tries to preach exactly the opposite of what Christ teaches: give up a life of struggle because nature offers a far easier and relaxed way of life full of pleasures (2.6.15-7).

Moreover, Phaedria perverts not only Christ's but Medina's teaching. Her speech intended to stop Guyon's fight with Cymochles (2.6.32-6) is strikingly similar to Medina's. Interestingly enough, the knight of temperance is pleased with the wanton lady's conciliatory rhetoric and simply leaves her islet without even subduing Cymochles. Guyon thinks that he has overcome his concupiscent passion; but, in fact, he shows his complete inability to understand the subtle power of Acrasia's servant when shepretends to
be a promoter of classical concord. Consequently, Guyon
next must meet a far more powerful enemy of God than
Phaedria, Mammon the god of the world, who is determined to
destroy the knight of temperance.

The Cave of Mammon is one of the most critically
controversial parts of *The Faerie Queene*. One problem is
how to interpret its dense allusions to classical mythology.
Frank Kermode emphasizes the esoteric meanings of the
episode, which require a special kind of reader and
information (60); on the other hand, Paul Alpers insists
that Spenser wants to reveal his meaning with various hints
rather than to conceal it--hence, the importance of reading
the literal surface very carefully (238). I principally
agree with Alpers because I believe that the ideal reader
for Spenser's poetry is primarily a very attentive and wary
reader--not an erudite one. Another important critical
problem is directly related to my thesis: how to view
Guyon's ethical heroism in the episode. Alpers (255) and
Roger G. Swearingen (185) refuse to admit that Guyon commits
the sin of pride by having too much confidence in his moral
excellence as Berger (*Allegorical Temper* 22) and Patrick
Cullen (84) insist; instead they emphasize the worthiness of
Guyon's ethical heroism that tries to face pressing moral
issues concerning worldly values. These two quite different
critical views stem from two types of Christian humanism
explained in Chapter 1. Alpers and Swearingen see no
fundamental contradiction between grace and man's natural virtue; what is wrong with human virtue is not its inherent flaw but its incompleteness due to human frailty. On the other hand, Berger and Cullen see in Guyon's persistent reliance on his own ethical resource the unmistakable proof of the knight's sinful pride, which is repugnant to God. In Book 2 as a whole, Spenser's interest is never confined to condemning the basic principles of classical ethics; he is far more interested in offering a feasible ethical perspective based on the insights of Christianity. But as far as the Cave of Mammon is concerned, I think Berger and Cullen are right because the episode culminates Spenser's persistent expressions about the radical insufficiency of Guyon's classical temperance.

Mammon's is a diabolical will transcending the wills of implacable fate and capricious fortune, form and matter; he is determined to force man to be an idolatrous worshipper of the world. He does not merely represent the vice of excessive stinginess whose opposite extreme and mean will be prodigality and generosity respectively. Being "God of the world and worldlings," he controls all the worldly values—"riches, renowne, and principality, / Honour, estate, and all this worldes good"—men devote their lives to (2.7.8). However, Mammon's real danger lies in his diabolic distortion of the right relationship between God and man, as his arrogant assertion clearly shows.
Loe here the worldes blis, loe here the end,
To which all men do ayme, rich to be made:
Such grace now to be happy, is before thee laid.

(2.7.32)

Words of strongly religious connotation—"blis," "end," and "grace"—are blasphemously employed to define the nature of his worldly offer. Guyon's fatal error is that he persistently views Mammon's temptations from a strictly ethical point of view, ignoring the Christian context of the whole episode; there can be no mean between God and Mammon (Matthew 6:24).

Guyon's error is further worsened by his sense of self-sufficiency. Guyon's superiority to Redcrosse lies in the former's ability to control his irascible and concupiscent affections and resist the temptations of the world, which the latter obviously lacks. But ironically Guyon's excellent temperance leads him to believe that he is invulnerable to any attack of intemperance—a very dangerous belief from the Christian standpoint.

Guyon's ethical idealism without any sense of his own sinfulness becomes his worst enemy. Guyon begins his journey as a Christian knight; but when he arrives at the cave, he is separated from the Palmer. Since the Palmer is not reason alone but reason restored by grace, as his name implies (Cullen 74), Guyon's separation from the Palmer means the abandonment of his allegiance to Christ. Now he
has become completely absorbed in the idea of his moral self-sufficiency.

And [Guyon] euermore himselfe with comfort feedes,
Of his owne vertues, and prayse-worthy deedes.

(2.7.2)

Guyon's argument with Mammon over the worth of wealth clearly betrays the philosophical base of his classical temperance. But the knight's idealistic argument against the pursuit of wealth is gradually undermined by Mammon's materialistic realism (Moore 61). Rejecting Mammon's offer of gold, Guyon argues for the superiority of heroic life to a life devoted to material gain; acquiring crowns and kingdoms is nobler than gaining money (2.7.10). But soon Mammon replies that money can buy even crowns (2.7.11), asserting the superior power of money to chivalry. Guyon is forced to resort to another idealistic argument, emphasizing the horrible effects of money on man's soul and the whole society; money is to blame for emotional torments and hideous crimes (2.7.12-3). But Mammon's following question strikes the heart of the matter.

Then Mammon wexing wroth, And why then, said,
Are mortall men so fond and vndiscreet,
So euill thing to seeke vnto their ayd,
And hauing not complaine, and hauing it vpbraid?

(2.7.14)
For the explanation of the origin of evil, Guyon resorts to the myth of the Golden Age which, despite its superficial resemblance to the Genesis account of the Fall, attributes the source of evil not to man's sin but to the change of time—"later ages pride" (2.7.16). Guyon's classical explanation, however, unwittingly makes room for Mammon's shrewd realism: because Guyon does not live in the Golden Age, he should follow the practice of the present evil age (2.7.18). Guyon loses his idealistic base everywhere until he approves of receiving gold from Mammon on the ignoble condition that it be acquired without guilt (2.7.19). His desperate efforts to be guiltless can be laudable in the classical context of moral self-sufficiency; but in the Christian context of the Fall, claiming one's innocence or guiltlessness can be the gravest sin, which is committed by both Redcrosse and the Church of Rome in Book 1.

The remarkable similarity that Philotime's court and the Garden of Proserpina bear to the House of Pride and the arbor near Orgoglio's castle where Redcrosse fell is a clear proof that ethical problems are inseparably related to the sin of pride. Like Lucifera, Philotime proudly overlooks the huge crowd of people around her, all eager to raise themselves to higher and higher positions. As the daughter of Dis and Persephone, Philotime is virtually the same person as Lucifera, the daughter of Pluto and Proserpina (Kermode, Shakespeare 70). Philotime's court, an
emblem of man's lust for power and honor, represents the ethical aspect of the House of Pride. As the knight of temperance, Guyon can refuse Mammon's offer of Philotime in marriage, which is clearly contrasted with Redcrosse's paying homage to Lucifera in the House of Pride. But the reason for his refusal—he is unworthy of such an "immortal mate" (2.7.50)—and his completely changed attitude toward Mammon—"Gramercy Mammon (said the gentle knight) / For so great grace and offered high estate" (2.7.50)—seriously undermine the reputation of Guyon as an upright, idealistic knight of temperance.

The Garden of Proserpina reveals the terrible reality hidden behind the arbor where Redcrosse fell to Orgoglio's attack. Mammon leads Guyon

Into a gardin goodly garnished
With hearbs and fruits, whose kinds mote not be red:
Not such, as earth out of her fruitfull woomb
Throwes forth to men, sweet and well sauoured,
But direfully deadly blacke both leafe and bloom,
Fit to adorne the dead, and decke the drery toombe.  (2.7.51)

The silver seat and the fruit of gold Mammon offers to Guyon symbolize a life totally devoted to satisfying natural desires for rest and food. For such a life, Tantalus'
never-ending torment through thirst and hunger (2.7.58) is a fit punishment. But the presence of Pilate endlessly washing his hands for guilt offers a clearly Christian dimension to the classical hell; actually, the Garden is a type of the Christian hell, linking the imperfectly Christian context of the first half of Book 2 to the perfectly Christian context of the second half (Davis 134).

The Garden of Proserpina with its unexpected Christian dimension demonstrates not only the limit of Guyon's classical mentality but the disturbing similarity between Pilate and Guyon: their claim of guiltlessness in the fallen world. Pilate pretended to be innocent even as he delivered to death "the Lord of Life" (2.7.62); Guyon, confident in his own moral righteousness, bitterly reproaches Tantalus for his intemperance (2.7.60).

Guyon's sojourn in the Cave of Mammon reveals the danger of Guyon's perverse reliance on his classical idealism and ethics, which finds the key to the problem of intemperance in the rational control of the irrational part of man. Guyon, followed by a dreadful fiend ready to strike him dead even at a slight sign of greed in him, relentlessly forces himself to exercise his idealistic temperance to such a degree that he loses consciousness at the end of the episode. The result is that the knight's vital powers, as Spenser suggests (2.7.65), are cut from his ethical self, which is increasingly forced to identify itself only with
its rational part. Guyon does not know that Mammon exploits even his ethical heroism to the devil's advantage.

Canto 8 marks the decisive turning point in the Legend of Temperance because here classical ethics explicitly shows its fundamental limitations and a new Christian approach to ethics emerges. The vicious attack of Pyrochles and Cymochles upon unconscious Guyon clearly indicates the limit of Guyon's efforts to achieve his temperance. Significantly, when Pyrochles and Cymochles reappear, they have a heathen identity as enemies of God (2.8.10); behind them is the Devil himself: "False Archimag prouokt their courage prow" (2.8.11). The explicit revelation of the hitherto obscure Christian context of Book 2 causes the reader to see the problem of intemperance in a wholly new perspective.

The ground of the new perspective is "th' exceeding grace / Of highest God, that loues his creatures so, / And all his workes with mercy doth embrace" (2.8.1). The Angel, hovering above unconscious Guyon for his protection, is a concrete sign of God's grace, which has been hidden in the earlier cantos. From now on the classical view of the world dominated by fate and fortune yields to the Christian view that subordinates their careless and capricious works to God's caring and purposeful Providence (Berger, Allegorical Temper 45).
One obvious ethical implication of God's love for the knight of temperance is the importance of love and selfless service among men as the true base of ethics (Mallette, "Protestant Ethics" 48). Guyon shows little sympathy for Tantalus' miserable predicament; to Guyon Tantalus is merely an example of intemperance. But when he revives from his deathlike faint after Arthur's defeat of Pyrochles and Cymochles, Guyon is a completely changed man, whose earlier arrogant self-sufficiency is replaced by a genuine sense of humble gratitude that comes only from a regenerate Christian (2.8.55). Arthur's gentle refusal of any reward for his service (2.8.56) actually follows the example of the Angels that work "All for loue, and nothing for reward" (2.8.2). Spenser reminds the reader that the true base of ethical action is charity, as St. Paul emphasizes in his letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13:3).

Spenser attempts to redefine the principles of Christian temperance through Arthur's fight against Pyrochles and Cymochles. First, though Spenser is deeply aware of the fundamental limit of classical temperance, he has no intention of replacing it with antinomianism. Though being a chosen instrument of God's grace, Arthur is vulnerable to the two heathen knights' fierce attack and needs Guyon's sword to defend himself (2.8.40), which means that man's ethical effort to contain passions and vices should be not abandoned but reoriented. Second, the aim of
Christian temperance is not to balance extreme vices but to oppose them radically (Stambler 52). While Guyon made dubious peace with Cymochles earlier, Arthur ruthlessly kills Cymochles because he is not merely a vice but the breeder of sins (2.8.45). Unlike Guyon who fruitlessly exhorts Pyrochles to fly from wrath, Arthur resolutely demands that Pyrochles choose either God or the Devil (2.8.51). Third, though Spenser is fully aware of the contradiction between Christ's absolute ethical commands and any secular ethical norm, he also knows that Christ's ethic cannot be the invariable rule of any ethical decision.

Arthur does not merely forgive Pyrochles for all his sin; when the heathen knight proudly refuses both Arthur's offer of mercy and God's grace, Arthur beheads him with both anger and pity (2.8.52). Arthur starts the process of reorienting Guyon's ethical effort, which culminates in his education at the Castle of Alma.

The Castle of Alma embodies the Christian understanding of man's soul and body as the temple of God, which illuminates the nature of Christian temperance. Throughout the episode Spenser repeatedly emphasizes the excellence and goodness of the human body by showing God's wonderful workmanship and skill (2.9.1, 33, 47). Spenser begins the episode with the following stanza:

Of all Gods workes, which do this world adorne,

There is no one more faire and excellent,
Then is mans body both for powre and forme,
Whiles it is kept in sober gouernment;
But none then it, more fowle and indecent,
Distempred through misrule and passions bace:
It growes a Monster, and incontinent
Doth loose his dignitie and native grace.

Behold, who list, both one and other in this
place. (2.9.1)

The stanza has three important anthropological implications. First, Spenser views the human body as inherently good because it is created by God; the human body is never the prison house of the soul. Second, the body as a whole is either wholesome or corrupt; the body's two different states--rather than its two different parts--are emphasized, clearly revealing the influence of Biblical anthropology on Spenser.

Third, the phrase--"mans body both for powre and forme"--suggests that Spenser, following Biblical anthropology, does not regard body and soul as two different entities. In fact, the Castle of Alma represents both the body and soul of man (Davis 123); it is a body when seen from the standpoint of structure (2.8.22); a soul, from the standpoint of vital functions. Thus, what Arthur and Guyon observe in their tour of the castle is the inseparable link between its physical anatomy and the three different activities of the soul--traditionally called the vegetative,
the sensitive, and the intellectual soul—that work harmoniously together in service of Alma. She is not depicted as reason only but as the Christian soul dedicated to Christ (Hume 124). Kane illuminates her function:

> For Spenser, unlike his contemporaries, reason has little preeminence in the picture of the temperate being, but is merely depicted as the synthesizing function among the three operations of the minds.

(71)

Alma represents the integrity of her castle that is the body and soul of man. The harmonious unity of the three souls is sharply contrasted with the unending strife among the three sisters in the House of Medina, which pictures a self compartmentalized into the rational and the irrational parts.

The striking difference between the Castle of Alma and the House of Medina is most visible when their completely different attitudes toward emotions are compared. In the House of Medina, the irascible and the concupiscent affections are deliberately polarized. Medina's role is simply to balance extremes. But in the Castle of Alma, opposite emotions are not viewed as passions to be balanced but as psychic resources for temperance. From the standpoint of Aristotelian ethics, Prays-desire and Shamefastnesse, two ladies of Arthur and Guyon respectively give much attention to, clearly represent questionable
qualities. Prays-desire is so eager to earn glory and fame that she has become sad in mind (2.9.28); Shamefastnesse is so bashful that "the strong passion mard her modest grace" (2.9.43). But, surprisingly, they define the very virtues Arthur and Guyon rely on for their ethical struggle (2.9.38, 43). Now it becomes clear why Arthur tried to convert Pyrochles to Christianity. A strong passion either serves the Christian soul or the Devil. Classical temperance actually makes passions its worst enemies by trying to control them through the policy of polarization; "divide and rule" is the perennial principle of classical temperance as well as of classical politics. Christian temperance identifies its real enemy with the powers of sin, death, and the Devil intent on using passions as means to destroy the Christian soul and body or the temple of God (1 Cor. 3:16-7).

The temple of God where God's spirit dwells, however, is made of a "thing like to that AEgyptian slime, / Whereof king Nine whilome built Babell towre" (2.9.21). This aspect of man as earthly flesh is not evil in itself but prone to corruption when it arrogantly asserts its absolute worth, being forgetful of its earthly origin. The cure of its corruption needs more than rational control of unruly passions. The word "slime" reappears in the chronicle called Briton moniments (2.9.59), which Arthur avidly reads in the chamber of the old Eumnestes (memory):
Next him Tenantius raigned, then Kimbeline,
What time th'eternall Lord in fleshly slime
Enwombed was, from wretched Adams line
To purge away the guilt of sinfull crime:
O joyous memorie of happy time,
That heavenly grace so plenteously displayd;
(O too high ditty for my simple rime.)
Soone after this the Romanes him warrayd;
For that their tribute he refusd to let be payd.

(2.10.50)

Only Christ's embracing of "slime" for its redemption can
cure its sinfulness. But his incarnation also imparts
decisive meaning and direction both to Guyon's ethical
effort to achieve the integrity of his Christian soul and to
the British nation's struggle for order and peace throughout
their troubled history. Christ enters both the personal
history of a man and the history of a nation as the decisive
power to redirect their destiny. The Castle of Alma marks
the second phase of the dynamics of Christian temperance,
which radically alters Guyon's classical understanding of
temperance and reorients his ethical effort by virtue of the
Christian understanding of man and his destiny the castle
embodies.

Maleger, the captain of the troops incessantly
attacking the Castle of Alma, is variously interpreted as
"the state of sin, both actual and original" (Hamilton 103),
"mortality" (Weatherby 346), and "libido or lust for sex" (Rollinson 109). But the first stanza of Canto 9 strongly suggests that Maleger is the body of sin or sinful flesh which the Castle of Alma as the redeemed Christian body and soul is opposed to. Maleger, closely associated with even death and the Devil (2.9.20-3), is an emblem of the flesh subject to the powers of sin, death, and the Devil. The enemy of temperance now fully reveals his sinful identity and diabolical association.

Arthur's fight with Maleger demonstrates the full dynamic interplay between his ethical potential and his need for God's grace. Christian temperance does not embrace antinomianism as the solution to the problem of intemperance. Man's ethical effort itself should not be abandoned for its inherent flaw; Spenser deliberately associates Arthur with Aeneas, the quintessential classical hero, when he describes Arthur's fierce struggle with Maleger's troops (2.11.18); the description of the arrows comes from the last battle scene in Virgil's *The Aeneid* (11: 611). But this does not mean Spenser is finally forced to admit the value of classical temperance. Arthur fully exploits the surge of his anger to his advantage and fights back when Maleger temporarily suppresses him (2.11.33). Obviously, Arthur's aim is not to balance his emotional extremes but to crush the old Adam in him.
But Arthur's exercise of Christian temperance does not exempt him from fleshly weakness. He almost faints at the combined attack of the two hags (Impotence and Impatience) and Maleger; he is only narrowly rescued by his squire, Timias. As Guyon desperately needs God's grace after his faint, Arthur's faint clearly shows the limit of ethical effort itself even when it is solidly based on the insights of Christianity:

So greatest and most glorious thing on ground
May often need the helpe of weaker hand;
So feeble is mans state, and life unsound,
That in assurance it may never stand,
Till it dissolved be from earthly band.
Proofe be thou Prince, the prouest man alive,
And noblest borne of all in Briton land;
Yet thee fierce Fortune did so nearly drive,
That had not grace thee blest, thou shouldest not survive. (2.9.30)

Arthur should be reminded that his temperance completely depends upon God's sanctifying power that perfects his ethical potential. In Christian temperance there is no room for self-sufficiency.

But even God's sanctification is not enough for Arthur to win over Maleger. Arthur's ethical effort always falls short of God's glory and cannot escape God's severe judgement; Arthur's victory over Maleger is possible only
when he fully admits his own sinfulness and seeks 
forgiveness from God. Whenever Arthur thinks he has finally 
defeated his enemy, surprisingly Maleger revives. The 
following lines clearly reveal Arthur's increasing 
perplexity.

Thereat he smitten was with great affright
And trembling terror did his hart apall, (2.11.39)

His wander farre exceeded reasons reach, (2.11.40)

Nigh his wits end then woxe th'amazed knight,
And thought his labour lost and trauell vaine,
Against this lifeless shadow so to fight:

(2.11.44)

It is only from radical self-questioning of his virtue that 
Arthur finds out the twofold answer to the question of why 
he has been unable to destroy the monster: Arthur realizes 
both the need for his heroic effort to sever the sinful 
flesh's idolatrous dependence on its earthly base and the 
need for God's justification that forgives his sin (2.1.46). Maleger is not an embodiment of original sin itself but the 
"infection of nature" that remains even after baptism (Hume 
125); therefore, as Hume rightly points out (126), Arthur's 
killing of Maleger by throwing him into the standing lake 
does not signify Arthur's baptism itself, as Hamilton 
insists (115), but the knight's remembrance of his own
baptism. Arthur should remind himself that his defeat of the body of sin is impossible without admitting his own sinfulness even after his formal baptism because, as Luther insists, "Christian life is nothing else than a daily baptism, once begun and constantly lived in" (qtd. in Althaus 354). Arthur's extraordinarily difficult fight with Maleger fully embodies a Christian's daily ethical struggle in God's grace and judgment.

The Bower of Bliss, however, subtly denies the Fall Arthur is constantly reminded of. It claims a realized eschatology that has no room for God's Final Judgment; in the Bower the creation is already fully redeemed from the consequences of the Fall and proclaims its complete self-sufficiency. The Bower of Bliss seems to be more perfect than "Eden selfe, if ought with Eden mote compaire" (2.12.52). It is Eden miraculously restored amid the fallen world, where Maleger with all his sinful attendants daily make havoc:

Thereto the Heauens alwayes Iouiall,

Lookt on them louely, still in stedfast state,
Ne suffred storme nor frost on them to fall,
Their tender buds or leaues to violate,
Nor scorching heat, not cold intemperate
T'afflict the creatures, which therein did dwell,

But the milde aire with season moderate
Gently attempred, and disposd so well,
That still it breathed forth sweet spirit and
holesome smell. (2.12.51)

This "most daintie Paradise" (2.12.58) induces its visitors to believe that the restoration of Eden or the Golden Age is man's end—not the coming of the Kingdom of God, which man has already witnessed through Christ's triumphant resurrection on the cross but whose final realization on earth man is obliged to wait for with patience and hope. The pretension of finality claimed by the Bower is the clearest indication that it has a diabolical will behind it despite its extraordinary beauty.

The Bower of Bliss persuades its visitors to believe that satisfaction of natural desires for rest, food, and sex should be the end of their life on earth. Bunches of grapes incline themselves into Guyon's hands (2.12.54); the picture of Verdant sleeping beside Acrasia after their "long wanton ioyes" (2.12.72) accurately sums up the knight's moral state completely subject to indolence and concupiscence.

The real aim of the bower, however, is not merely to trap its visitors in sensuality; it aims to destroy their soul and body, the temple of God. The diabolical nature of the Bower is suggested in Spenser's descriptions of false Genius, the "gouernall of the bower" (2.12.48), and Acrasia. Genius is described as "the foe of life, that good enuyes to all, / That secretly doth vs procure to fall, / Through
guilefull semblants, which he makes vs see" (2.12.48). His function is so similar to Archimago's. Acrasia is more than Verdant's promiscuous lover; she enslaves him through sorcery and witchcraft (2.12.72); by sucking his spirit (2.12.73) she ultimately intends to destroy him as she destroyed Mordant earlier. She is the last of a series of demonic enchantresses populating Books 1 and 2, all determined to work the fall of the knights through the bait of sensuality (Klein 199).

Only when the reader is fully aware of the diabolical will behind the attractive façade of the Bower, can he endorse Guyon's ruthless destruction of it, which always has been baffling to readers enchanted with its beauty:

But all those pleasant bowres and Pallace braue,
Guyon broke downe, with rigour pittilesse;
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might saue
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulnesse,
But that their blisse he turn'd to balefulnesse:

(2.12.83)

Guyon's harsh attitude toward the Bower is not "a Puritan frenzy," as Berger thinks (Allegorical Temper 218). Guyon's "rigour pittilesse" and "the tempest of his wrathfulnesse" are the culmination of the long painful process in Book 2 of redefining Christian ethics as radical opposition against the powers of sin, death, and the Devil that exploit the frailty of human flesh for evil purpose. But Guyon only
narrowly escapes the blame of Puritan self-righteousness because Spenser allows the Palmer to rebuke Guyon severely for his secret lust for the naked, wanton damsels in the fountain (2.12.69). Together with hoggish Grill's perverse attachment to a beastly life of sensuality, Guyon's continuing vulnerability to sensuality questions the perfectibility of any human virtue. However, Guyon restores to the reader a true eschatological perspective both by destroying a false Eden that denies God's Final Judgement and by revealing his own continuing frustration in the fallen world.

Spenser's profound concern about the nature of his art finds a suitable expression in the final episode of Book 2 because art plays the decisive role in creating the false Eden that is "A place pickt out by choice of best aliue, / That natures worke by art can imitate" (2.12.42). The art of the Bower aims at more than a full realization of the potentiality of half-ordered nature by its ordering influence (Brooke 15), which is the prevailing Elizabethan view of art. The art of the Bower tries to produce a new creation whose sole purpose for existence is to entrap man in sinful sensuality and to turn man's worship from God to itself. Because of this possibility of the idolatrous abuse of art, Spenser cannot accept the naive view of art that simply exalts its ordering and creative power over "niggard Nature" (2.12.50) -- a view quite congenial to classicists.
But Spenser is not a romantic like C.S. Lewis, whose excellent discussion about the Bower of Bliss is marred by his romantic prejudice that pits wholesome, fecund nature against corrupt, sterile art (326). However, as Ruth Nevo points out (39), both art and nature are all good in themselves and, in the fallen world, all subject to disorder and sin. In Spenser's description of the bower, art and nature strive to undermine each other in their rivalry (2.12.59); but they all end up serving the Devil that exploits the unusual beauty of the Bower achieved by their work for his purpose of destroying the Christian self.

The true worth of Spenser's art thus lies not in his supremely sensuous creation of the Bower of Bliss but in his subtle way of revealing its intrinsically idolatrous and diabolic nature. Guyon's pitiless destruction of the bower only confirms the authenticity of Spenser's Christian art (Dauber 169). Spenser's poetic art should sternly and constantly deny its own secret desire to idolize its creations.

In the Legend of Temperaunce, Spenser explores the full interaction between man's moral potential and the insights of Christianity in order to find a feasible moral vision which transcends both classical ethics and antinomianism. The significance of Book 2 can be summarized as Guyon's painful process of realizing the full Christian implication of his ethical conduct, which clearly testifies to the
impressive achievement of Spenser as an insightful ethical thinker. Throughout Book 2 Spenser is both committed to the Christian understanding of man and his destiny and deeply sensitive to pressing ethical issues that a Christian confronts in his daily struggle for the integrity of the God-given temple of his soul and body.
NOTES

1 It is impossible to deal with these vast subjects in
detail here. My purpose is to offer the most basic ideas of
classical cosmology and anthropology to the reader of Book 2
in order to help him or her understand the conceptual basis
of its complex argument. I am much indebted to the
excellent studies on the subjects by Charles Norris Cochrane
(78-82), Harry Berger (Allegorical Temper 41-51), and George
Eldon Ladd (9-40).
CHAPTER IV

THE DYNAMICS OF CHRISTIAN JUSTICE

Not every book of *The Faerie Queene* is a completely new departure from the preceding books, but in general one book is built upon its predecessors in the sense that its subject is carefully anticipated earlier. Sexuality, the main theme of Book 3, plays a significant role in the quests of Redcrosse and Guyon. Books 1 and 2, however, are mainly concerned about its sinful perversions, though Redcrosse's betrothal to Una and the underlying principle of the Castle of Alma strongly suggest Spenser's positive view of marriage and sexuality. Guyon's destruction of the Bower of Bliss thus marks Spenser's necessary step toward a positive understanding of the potentials of sexuality in Book 3, which naturally form the basis of various kinds of intimate personal relationship called friendship in Book 4. Book 5, the Legend of Justice, is mainly concerned with the peace and order of the community; but Spenser is fully aware that the community is not an impersonal entity but an intricate network of personal relationships based on various modes of love. Because friendship or brotherhood is the fundamental requirement of man's social existence (Niebuhr, *Nature* 2: 244), justice should be an instrument of its social realization.
Books 3 and 4 are not given a separate space for discussion in the present study because their main concern is not the dynamics of Protestantism and culture, which is central to other books, but a vision of nature as both creative and harmonious, upon which various modes of human love directly depend. Thus, the visions of nature glimpsed in the Garden of Adonis, the Temple of Venus, and the Wedding of the Medway and Thames are not primarily about the divine love revealed in Christ's incarnation and crucifixion but about a force governing the fertility of nature and binding diverse interpersonal and cosmic elements harmoniously.

However, it is wrong to assume that these books have nothing to do with Christianity. In fact, chastity, the subject of Book 3, is a God-given impulse as well as a sexual one and should be realized in virtuous married life that the Reformation strongly upheld against the Catholic elevation of celibacy (Heale 73). As for friendship, St. Paul essentially views brotherly love as part of charity: "But as touching brotherly love ye need not that I write unto you: for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another" (1 Thessalonians 4:9). The legends of chastity and friendship offer the foundation for a Christian community, whose peace and order Artegall, the knight of justice, is obliged to uphold.
The narrative of Book 5 follows the pattern established in Books 1 and 2, which is completely different from that of Books 3 and 4 that employ multiple characters and multiple narrative strands to explore the diverse aspects and modes of human love. The thematic relationship between the legends of holiness and temperance and the Legend of Justice is as important as their similar narrative pattern. Spenser's concept of justice cannot be separated from his religious view. His concept of justice also advocates rigorously radical action against the enemies of justice, as his concept of Christian ethics does. As Richard McCabe points out ("Masks" 226-7), a sharp distinction between religion and politics was alien to the Tudor mind; thus Duessa identified with the Whore of Babylon in Book 1 becomes Mary Queen of Scots in Book 5, whose trial imparted not only legal and political but religious significance to Elizabethans. In Book 5 the enemies of justice are ultimately the enemies of true religion. Moreover, Guyon's ruthless destruction of the Bower of Bliss anticipates Spenser's endorsement of a militant pursuit of justice in the Netherlands and Ireland. A modern liberal concept of justice favoring the separation between state and religion and the ideal of tolerance must not have been very appealing to Spenser.

The Legend of Justice always has been the least popular book of The Faerie Queene among critics because of Spenser's
pencilant for allegorizing the historical events concerning Protestant England's struggle with its Catholic enemies and his apparent advocacy of rigorous justice practiced by Artega11 and Talus. C. S. Lewis' condemnation of Book 5 represents a typically disgruntled response: "Spenser was the instrument of a detestable policy in Ireland, and in his fifth book the wickedness he had shared begins to corrupt his imagination" (349). Michael O'Connell's criticism that Spenser's use of contemporary history tends to threaten the artistry of the book (125) is no more than a moderate restatement of Lewis' harsh judgement.

Against these hostile criticisms, Judith H. Anderson defends the unsavory nature of Spenser's treatment of justice:

Upon examination, Artega11's limitations and those of his Legend prove inseparable from the virtue which he champions, for this virtue, taken as an absolute ideal, makes demands which neither human history nor individual human beings can satisfy.

(447)

Ideal justice may be impossible in the fallen world, as Spenser himself admits (5.1.11). On the other hand, Geoffrey Wagner defends Spenser by arguing that Spenser the poet should be separated from Spenser the politician; Talus' brutal use of force constantly embarrasses the reader, which suggests that Spenser the poet is implicitly disgusted with
the harsh Irish policy of Lord Gray, the historical model of Artegall, whom Spenser the politician is supposed to justify (79,85). Anderson's argument is unsatisfactory because Spenser constantly tries to envision ever higher concepts of justice despite the fact of the fall; he retains his dual vision of justice, ideal and real, throughout Book 5. Wagner is also wrong; Spenser's militant Protestantism is not confined to Book 5; it is strongly felt in the earlier books too. It is simply impossible at times to separate Spenser's religious and political concerns from his artistic one, as the Legend of Holinesse so well demonstrates.

Recent critics, following James E. Phillips' important essay on Renaissance concepts of justice, pay more and more attention to Spenser's careful analysis of various kinds or levels of justice. Phillips argues that Book 5 can be divided into three parts according to the three kinds of justice Spenser deals with: justice absolute, equity, and mercy ("Renaissance" 473). Donald Cheney identifies the first of the three with pagan and Old Testament justice, characterizing the remaining two as Christian in concept (160). Sean Kane discovers not three but four levels of justice—human, natural, spiritual, and universal—embodied in four characters: Talus, Artegall, Britomart, and Mercilla in the ascending scale (168). These studies significantly illuminate Spenser's basically analytical approach to his subject, correcting the obsession of the earlier criticisms
with Spenser's historical allegory. But what such an analytical approach tends to overlook is how persistently Spenser exposes each level of justice to the test of sinful reality.

Spenser's treatment of justice is essentially dynamic as he denies the models of both idealism and pragmatism in developing his concept of justice. On the one hand, no concept of law, even "natural law," can claim its final authority because it depends upon "an untenable faith in the purity of reason," ignoring the inevitable "ideological taint" of all the human conceptions of justice (Niebuhr, *Nature* 2:253). On the other hand, Spenser is serious about the universal principles of justice, for example, the concept of equity, which he deals with in the Temple of Isis. Equity is the highest ideal of justice man can conceive of, but in the end it remains a human ideal to be radically redefined by the higher principle of mercy or forgiveness, whose perfect expression is shown in Christ's crucifixion. Moreover, Spenser's concept of justice is deeply influenced by the Christian understanding of sin; no human achievement of justice in any level can escape corruption because of man's sinfulness, which probably explains Artegall's repeated humiliation earlier by Radigund and later by the hags, Envy and Detraction, and the Blatant Beast.
In the first eight cantos of the Legend of Justice, Spenser inquires into the possibilities and limits of the other two principles of justice: justice absolute and equity. Christian anthropology sheds light on the reasons why they are necessary but ultimately insufficient to secure the true harmony of the community. Man is the unity of reason and vitality, of soul and body; man is also a corrupt image of God, capable of transcending and perverting his rational, emotional, and physical potentials. Thus, Artegall, pursuing the ideal of justice absolute or exact retribution for criminality in the first four cantos, needs both rational judgement and physical force against those criminals who misuse their intelligence and strength for their selfish, unlawful purposes. But his defeat by Radigund because of his sentimental pity for her reveals his narrow understanding of vitality only in terms of heroic wrath and physical might. Furthermore, his too great confidence in legalism, which verges on the sin of pride, blinds him to the possibility of the abuse of justice absolute both by its offenders and by himself.

The next four cantos search for a higher principle of justice than justice absolute, which culminates in Britomart's vision of the principle of equity at the Temple of Isis. Equity is superior to justice absolute because, in its attempt to be faithful to the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law, it appreciates all aspects of human
emotion, both its irascible and concupiscent affections. But even this ideal principle of justice cannot claim its final authority because human justice, however laudable its achievements may be, are always subject to the final authority of God's justice.

Christian anthropology, when applied to the larger reality of the human community, offers another very important insight into the nature of justice and, consequently, the content of Book 5: justice is a question of politics as well as of legality. Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that justice should be viewed in terms of the power structures of the community as well as the rational principles governing it especially illuminates the intensely political character of the Legend of Justice. According to Niebuhr (Nature 2: 247-58), the laws and principles of justice are "the instruments of the spirit of brotherhood in so far as they extend the sense of obligation towards the other" (Nature 2: 248). But the sinful element in all social reality makes a harmony achieved through justice only an approximation of brotherhood. Moreover, the authority of law only does not bring about the social harmony of the community, whose forces and vitalities need both organization and balance to achieve the goal. However, the central organization and equilibrium of power, the two political instruments of justice essential for the existence of any community, are always in danger of contradicting the
spirit of brotherhood by their proneness to degenerate into tyranny and anarchy respectively. Pollente and the Giant in Canto 2 represent these two evils; at the end of Book 5, Arthur and Artegall should confront the tyranny of the Spanish rule in the Netherlands and the anarchy rampant in Ireland. The strongly political character of Book 5, frowned upon by many Spenserians, is quite understandable because justice depends on political as well as legal processes.

Artegall's education by Astraea, the goddess of justice, anticipates the kind of justice he will pursue in the first four cantos before he is defeated by Radigund. Astraea's thorough indoctrination of "the rules of justice" (5.1.5) is plainly classical in concept and underlines the natural origins of justice (Tonkin, The Faerie Queene 154). Her emphasis on weighing "both right and wrong / In equal balance with due recompence" (5.1.7) closely follows Aristotle's view that injustice is a matter of inequality and that the role of the judge is to restore an arithmetical mean between gain and loss, terms applicable both to business and to criminal transactions (1132 A). Astraea also at first lets Artegall test his justice on beasts (5.1.7); when he first appears at the tournament held by Satyrane in Book 4, the motto on his shield reads "Saluagesse sans finesse" (4.4.39), underlining the potential savagery of the justice he will pursue in Book 5.
But by associating Artegall with such classical heroes as Bacchus and Hercules, who forcefully crushed lawless men and monstrous tyrants at the dawn of civilization (5.1.2), Spenser presents an ideal knight of justice employing his rational and physical resources—the classical virtues of prudentia and fortitudo—in order to maintain the precarious order of the civilized world.

The kind of justice represented by Astraea, however, cannot be realized in the fallen world:

> Now when the world with sinne gan to abound,
> Astraea loathing lenger here to space
> Mongst wicked men, in whom no truth she found,
> Return'd to heauen, whence she deriu'd her race;

(5.1.11)

By abandoning the sordidness of sinful reality, Astraea betrays the weakness of an idealistic concept of justice that will plague Artegaall's pursuit of justice absolute. What makes her pupil's justice seemingly workable, however, is the brutal force of Talus, the iron man, whom she leaves behind for helping Artegall. Artegaall's ideal vision of justice can be imposed on the recalcitrant world only by Talus' ruthless and frequently brutal exercise of power. But it is questionable whether this odd collaboration between idealism and brutality can serve the true end of justice: the spirit of brotherhood.
Sanglier's brutal beheading of his own lady so that he might be free to take possession of the squire's beloved is the first case to which Artegaill applies his justice absolute. Artegaill's use of both "sleight" (5.1.24) and physical power against Sanglier is justified because the criminal is ready to employ the same resources for his evil intentions. Artegaill's proposal to divide the squire's lady into two by sword, reminding the reader of King Solomon's famous tactic, successfully reveals who the lady truly belongs to. Also Talus' resistless power enables his master to enforce his judgment on stubborn Sanglier, who is forced to bear the head of the lady he killed for a year as a token of his shameful action. Artegaill's pursuit of justice absolute seems to have achieved its goal of exact retribution for criminality by relying on his rational and physical resources.

But Artegaill's justice is not without flaws. As the name Sanglier (Fr. wild boar) implies, Artegaill and Talus treat him as if he were "a beast appointed to the stall" (5.1.22). Talus' power exceeds what is due; when Talus arrests Sanglier, the iron man gives him such a knock that "on the ground he layd him like a sencelesse blocke' (5.1.21). Moreover, if Artegaill thinks that Sanglier's bearing of his lady's head in shame will eventually correct his evil tendency, the knight of justice is deceived since Sanglier "As rated Spaniell takes his burden vp for feare "
(5.1.29). As the squire explains, the root cause of Sanglier's crimes is his pride, which is behind his inability to control his concupiscent and irascible affections that immediately result in the crimes of kidnapping and murder (5.1.17-8). The squire's essentially Christian understanding of the nature of crime is contrasted with Artegall's naive faith in the corrective power of justice; the knight of justice ignores the depth of the sin of pride that no enforcement of law can eradicate.

An equally important point Spenser quietly makes is the complex relationship between justice and love, which Artegall wholly ignores. The squire, though he knows the truth about Sanglier's crimes and deeply loves his lady, is incapable of redressing the injustice done by Sanglier; love alone is powerless without justice to confront the criminal on his own ground. But later the squire chooses to bear the murdered lady's head rather than let Artegall kill and divide his beloved. The squire's self-sacrificing love presents itself as a far nobler principle than Artegall's calculated guile. In the first episode of the Legend of Justice, Spenser anticipates the problem of integrating the seemingly contradictory demands of exact justice and love, which will be the central question of Book 5.

The next two episodes in Canto 2 both deal with political and economic injustice caused by two social classes, the aristocrats and the commons, whose conflicting
interests rarely coincide. Pollente and Munera represent the abuse of power and wealth by the privileged ruling class. Pollente extorts toll from the travelers crossing his bridge and plunders the poor, trying to satisfy the insatiable desire for wealth of his proud daughter, Munera. Pollente is given privileges and power for the protection of the commons in his territory; but his exercise of power degenerates into a tyranny. On the other hand, the Giant, around whom many commons gather "In hope by him great benefite to gaine / And uncontrolled freedome to obtaine" (5.2.33), represents their anarchic rebellion against the aristocracy's exploitation of the commons. Holding "An huge great paire of balance" (5.2.30) and claiming that he can restore the Golden Age by reducing everything to equality (5.2.32), the Giant parodies Astraea's justice; the Giant pretends to be justice absolute itself. In fact, being "a colossal image of pride" (Dunseath 96), the Giant completely dispenses with the notion of the Fall in his thoroughly materialistic universe, aspiring to the godhead: "Then would he ballaunce heauen and hell together" (5.2.31).

Significantly, Spenser presents both Pollente, "A cursed cruell Sarazin" (5.2.4), and the Giant as enemies of God, pointing out the root cause of the political evils of tyranny and anarchy, the sin of pride.

Artegall's attempt to redress Pollente's crime reveals the same weakness of justice absolute hinted at in the
Sanglier episode. Even a righteous use of force is prone to exceed its proper aim and, uncontrolled, degenerates into a mere show of brutal might, thus becoming its own master. Artegall's stern warning against the powerful for their abuse of power (5.2.19) also applies to himself. Talus, sent to arrest Munera, acts like a blood hound (5.2.25); he treats Munera so cruelly that even his master pities her. But now Artegall is no longer in control of the whole judicial process he began:

Yet for no pitty would he change the course
Of Justice, which in Talus hand did lye:

(5.2.26)

Subsequently, the knight of justice has no other choice but to let Talus completely destroy Munera, her wealth, and the castle without a trace. The pretension of Artegall's justice absolute proves hollow because he has nothing left to balance the losses which the poor incurred through Pollente's extortion.

Artegall's debate with the Giant shares one thing with that between Guyon and Mammon in Book 2: the two debates are essentially between idealists and materialists, whose cosmology has no room for the Fall and its sinful consequences despite their diametrically opposed views of the world. To both Artegall and the Giant, change is evil. But Artegall views the universe as divinely and ideally ordered and essentially hierarchical; in such a world
perfectly controlled by God, change brings about only confusion and peril (5.2.36). Artegall's idealism is bound to be conservative and opposed to any political and economical reform. On the contrary, the Giant views the present Iron Age daily worsening by change; the only solution is to bring back the Golden Age now by equally distributing power and wealth among the vulgar (5.2.37-8). Artegall eventually wins the debate by exploiting the weakness of materialism that confuses abstract ideas with concrete things; the Giant knows no method to weigh such abstract concepts as right and wrong on his balance (5.2.44). But the problem with Artegall's idealistic stance is that he has no interest in actually facing and reforming the unjust political and economical reality, which encourages the revolt of the Giant and his followers: "loth he was his noble hands t'embrew / In the base blood of such a rascal crew" (5.2.52). His solution is simply letting Talus crack down on them (5.2.53). Artegall's aristocratic haughtiness and presumptive faith in his justice is remarkably similar to Guyon's arrogant ethical self-righteousness before his faint, casting an ominous shadow on his pursuit of justice absolute.

After presenting the three gruesome exempla of justice absolute, Spenser offers two far gentler episodes, the tournament in honor of the wedding of Marinell and Florimell, that completes the couple's story begun in Book
3, and the dispute between the two brothers Bracidas and Amidas. These episodes inevitably remind the reader of the relation of justice to the spirit of brotherhood—a crucially important theme largely obscured in the earlier episodes. There are many similarities between the tournament opened by Satyrane in Book 4 and the tournament held by Marinell in Book 5: they both last three days; the same characters—Artegall, Braggadocio, and False Florimell appear in both the tournaments. But there is a crucial difference. Satyrane's tournament ends with confusion and jealous rivalry among the knights including Artegall, thus leaving False Florimell and coward Braggadocio triumphant in the end; on the other hand, in Marinell's tournament Artegall plays the significant role of revealing False Florimell's true identity and punishing Braggadocio for his shameless lying and championing of False Florimell that cause confusion and dismay among knights and ladies. By deliberately paralleling the two tournaments, Spenser insists that the spirit of brotherhood cannot be maintained without a proper functioning of justice. However, Artegall's murderous anger against Braggadocio, which is barely controlled by Guyon (5.3.36), and Talus' excessive humiliation of the coward boaster (5.3.37) betray the fundamental limit of justice absolute as an instrument to restore the spirit of brotherhood.
Artegall's encounter with the two brothers, Bracidas and Amidas, who vehemently argue over a treasure chest the sea has brought to the shore, offers him a good opportunity to prove that his justice absolute can restore the spirit of concord between the brothers. Artegall's judgement seems flawless; as Amidas is in possession of the part of Bracidas' inherited island washed away by the sea and deposited to his inherited one, the treasure chest brought by the sea to Bracidas belongs to Bracidas, though Amidas claims its ownership. Artegall's facile verdict seems to balance the brothers' gain and loss. But in fact, Artegall wholly follows the dictates of chance and change, subjecting his rational judgement to the whim of the sea (5.4.19). Artegall's claim that he deals equal justice to the brothers sounds hollow, for he actually gives up his obligation to find out the truth concerning the chest's ownership. Despite Artegall's proud presumption in his justice—"Certes your strife were easie to accord, / Would ye remit it to some righteous man" (5.4.16)—he fails to restore concord between Bracidas and Amidas; the younger brother has no reason to be satisfied with his judgment (5.4.20). R. J. Manning's argument that the episodes in the first four cantos show the preeminence of Artegall's justice (66) misses the important point that Spenser never forgets to imply the gap between Artegall's apparent judicial
achievements and the unpleasant, unsatisfactory realities he always leaves behind.

When Artegall shamefully succumbs to Radigund, the proud queen of the Amazons, his fall is unavoidable because his pursuit of justice absolute excludes any possibility for the integration of the two aspects of vitality: the irascible and the concupiscent faculties. This fault, however, is shared by Radigund herself, whose intense hatred and tyrannical policy against all men result from her unrequited love for Bellodant (5.4.30). But after defeating Artegall, she suffers from the vacillation between intense love and vehement anger, as her changing attitudes toward Artegall clearly testify. In a sense, Radigund is a mirror image of Artegall, who is also incapable of integrating the aspects of his vitality. When he sees the beautiful face of the Amazon defeated by him, instead of beheading her for her many crimes, he suddenly turns his stern justice into debilitating pity (5.5.12). Because Artegall has consciously repressed his concupiscent affections, he puts himself between the two incompatible choices: "the inhumanity of a static principle compulsively enforced and the two-much, too-human, humanity of a fallen world" (Anderson 455).

Thus, once he begins to pity her, the whole integrity of his justice absolute crumbles, which only helps the injustice of the Amazons: Terpine, whom earlier Artegall saved from the
The fact that even Talus does not try to save his master but simply obeys Radigund's law (5.5.19) clearly proves the fundamental limit of justice absolute when it is blind to its own weaknesses and failures. The root cause of Artegaill's fall is of course his pride, implicit in his persistently idealistic and heroic view of man and the world that does not take into account the Fall as the fundamental condition of all his judicial endeavors.

It is inevitable that Britomart, who plays the most significant role in Books 3 and 4, comes to rescue Artegaill;
combining both vigorous militancy and loving consideration in her person, she is ideally suited to search for a principle of justice transcending the narrow concern of justice absolute—namely, equity. At her first appearance in Book 5, Britomart is described as a love-tormented maid, whose strong affection for Artegall leads her to many unreasonable thoughts of jealousy and fear and makes her behave almost like an ill-tempered child (5.6.14). But after hearing from Talus about Artegall's shameful fall, she resolutely frees herself from the shackles of love's narrow and selfish demands to become a new champion of justice. Dolon's treacherous guile, disclosed in his attempt to trap her by a falling bed, and his two sons' confrontation of her on the same bridge where Artegall fought with Pollente test the knight of chastity's ability to muster the resources of wary intelligence and physical force in service of justice. But Britomart does not have to repeat Artegall's pursuit of justice absolute, that ended ignominiously.

Britomart's dream at the Temple of Isis is the culmination of Spenser's search for a principle of justice higher than justice absolute: equity which is the nearest approximation of the spirit of brotherhood man can conceive of and practice. Spenser heavily depends on classical mythology and iconography in order to convey the significance of equity. Isis and Osiris are the goddess and god of justice worshiped by ancient Egyptians (5.7.2-3).
Representing the moon and the sun (5.7.4), the feminine and the masculine aspects of justice, they correct Artegall's misdirected idealism repressing "libido in order to enlarge an artificial division between desire and duty" (Kane 165). The cult of Isis and Osiris, being based on the analogy with a sexual synthesis of opposites, also explains why Spenser is able to turn Britomart's vision of justice into a prophecy concerning her dynastic destiny. Britomart's sexual union with Artegall in her dream, being a symbol of the union of the two concepts of justice, also has important dynastic, political implications.

A crucially important point about equity is that it never excludes justice absolute in its total picture. As the High Priest of the Temple later points out (5.7.22), equity is "clemence" exercising control over the rigor of justice absolute. But equity is never clemency alone; if so, equity becomes nothing but another name for sentimental pity, whose dire consequence is plainly seen in Terpine's fate. Significantly enough, the idol of Isis, to whom Britomart offers her prayers, is accompanied at her feet by a crocodile representing Osiris, whose "forged guile" and "open force" (5.7.7) are suppressed by the goddess. As René Graziani aptly defines the term: "equity is a main ethical safety-valve between the rigid application of law and a reactive sentimental pity" (376).
Britomart's dream with its rich iconographical details illuminates the complex relationship between justice absolute and equity. In her strange nocturnal vision by the idol of Isis, she sees herself transfigured into an Isis-like person of royal authority. But to her astonishment, her temple soon becomes endangered by outrageous flames caused by a hideous tempest arising from below. Then comes the important stanza:

With that the Crocodile, which sleeping lay
Vnder the Idols feete in fearelesse bowre,
Seem'd to awake in horrible dismay,
As being troubled with that stormy stowre;
And gaping greedy wide, did streight deuoure
Both flames and tempest: with which growen
great,
And swolne with pride of his owne peerelesse powre,
He gan to threaten her likewise to eat;
But that the Goddesse with her rod him backe did beat. (5.7.15)

The key to the interpretation of the stanza is the crocodile's dual character. Representing justice absolute, the crocodile forcibly suppresses the flames and tempest of lawless injustice that threaten Britomart in her representation of the principle of equity. But Artegall's justice absolute, as his earlier practices of it betrayed,
tends to exceed its prescribed boundary and presume its own final authority, ironically becoming subject to the injustice it is supposed to overcome. Checking this dangerous tendency of justice absolute by her rod of clemency, Britomart produces a harmonious union of justice absolute and clemency both serving the principle of equity:

Tho turning all his pride to humblesse meeke,
Him selfe before her feete he lowly threw,
And gan for grace and loue of her to seeke:

(5.7.16)

Renaissance mythographers associated the crocodile not only with Osiris, the noble Egyptian god, but with his guileful and treacherous brother, Typhon (Davidson 75, Aptekar 90); Spenser brilliantly exploits the beast's dual character to reveal the ambiguous nature of justice absolute, which has both positive and negative possibilities in relation to the principle of equity.

Britomart's dream is also a dynastic prophecy. In Book 3, Merlin prophesied that Britomart would be the mother of a glorious progeny who would rule over Britain (3.3.28) and that Britomart's dynastic dream would eventually culminate in the "royall virgin" (3.3.49), meaning Queen Elizabeth. Thus, in her dream her sexual union with Artegall is given a very important political significance as the crocodile impregnates her with "a Lion of great might" that will subdue all other beasts (5.7.16). As the High Priest later
interprets (5.7.23), the flames and tempest represent not only the forces of injustice but more specifically the political powers trying to prevent Britomart from inheriting her father's crown. (The historical allegory concerning Queen Elizabeth's extremely difficult acquisition of the throne of England is obvious here.) The lion fulfills the struggle of Britomart and Artegall for the realization of their dynastic dream. But since Britomart and Artegall stand for the principles of equity and justice absolute, the lion, signifying the union of the two principles, also fulfills their struggle for justice. Britomart's richly complex dream embodies her aspiration for an ideal principle of justice for whose realization the establishment of legitimate political authority is essential.

Britomart's resolute actions against the injustice of Radigund and her subjects correct the inherent weaknesses of Artegall's justice absolute. First of all, refusing to accept Radigund's law, Britomart does not permit the Amazon to abuse the established laws of chivalry (5.7.28). Her pitiless beheading of Radigund clearly manifests that equity actually upholds the rigor of justice absolute, provided that its excessive use of force is checked; seeing Talus make a piteous slaughter of the Amazons, Britomart firmly restrains the iron man's unnecessary brutality (5.7.36). Thus, pity has room in Britomart's justice provided that it does not replace absolute justice. The most important
difference between Britomart and Artegaill is that she does not merely punish the transgressors of the law but actually reforms the unnatural practices of the Amazons that force men to shameful submission and ignoble life (5.7.42).

Through Britomart's intervention in the flawed process of justice absolute in order to redress its failures, equity proves its superiority to the legalism of justice absolute that can be abused to deepen injustice.

The Souldan and Malengin, whom Arthur and Artegaill together bring to justice, historically stand for the threat of Catholic Spain against Protestant England and its subversive operations inside the Protestant country, especially the covert activity of the Jesuits (Heale 139). Confronted with these formidable enemies, Arthur and Artegaill try to practice equity as best as they can. Though they use deceptive tactics and force to suppress the Souldan and Malengin, they have a higher purpose than merely achieving the aim of justice absolute, that is, exact retribution for criminality:

\[
\text{. . . the braue Prince for honour and for right,}
\text{against tortious powre and lawlesse regiment,}
\text{In the behalfe of wronged weake did fight:}
\text{More in his causes truth he trusted then in might.}
\]

(5.8.30)

Significantly, in the Souldan episode, Talus, for the first time in Artegaill's adventure, plays no visible role;
moreover, he kills Malengin only when the guileful man turns himself into a snake to escape (5.9.19).

However, these two episodes reveal the fundamental limit of even the best principle of justice devised by man because the Souldan and Malengin are more than simple offenders of the law; they are enemies of God. Behind the Souldan's ceaseless attempts to assassinate Mercilla (Queen Elizabeth) and overthrow her government lies the sin of idolatry (5.8.19). In the figure of the Souldan is united tyrannical abuse of power and false religion. As for Malengin, his rocky dwelling is said to go down to hell (5.9.6); the last of his bewildering transformations, a snake, suggests his diabolical nature (8.9.19). Arthur can defeat the Souldan only by unveiling his magic shield whose blinding light, a symbol of God's grace, destroys the Souldan and his formidable chariot (the Spanish Armada). The encounter of Arthur and Artegall with the explicitly anti-Christian powers demands a radical redefinition of the concept of justice, which inevitably includes the Christian dimension in it.

The importance of the Court of Mercilla as the allegorical center of the Legend of Justice was questioned by A. C. Hamilton (177), Angus Fletcher (276), and W. Nicholas Knight (283), who view the principle of equity and the Temple of Isis as the central theme and the place of vision and education in Book 5. Clifford Davidson (70),
Alice Miskimin (27), and John N. King (Spenser's Poetry 106), all agreeing on the unmistakably Christian base of Spenser's concept of justice, believe that Spenser's syncretism enables him to explore the Christian dimension of justice mainly through the pagan symbols of the Temple of Isis. The basic assumption of Davidson, Miskimin, and King is that the principle of equity, with its emphasis on the integration of justice and love, can actually incorporate the Christian concept of mercy or forgiveness into it. The assumption, however, is unfounded from the Protestant standpoint since no human love (eros) is free from the sinful element of egoism; perfect selfless love (agape) manifested only on the cross always contradicts as well as completes human love.

In fact, equity and mercy, the main theme of the Court of Mercilla, are concepts quite different from each other. Equity as the highest ideal of justice has deep classical roots. Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics asserts its superiority to justice absolute (1137b); in Roman law equity also is respected as the very foundation of law (Kermode, Shakespeare 54). Equity does not need the Christian understanding of man and his destiny for its existence. On the other hand, mercy is a peculiarly Christian concept. All men are sinful under the judgement of God; no principle of justice conceived by man can make him righteous before God except His justice whose ultimate
expression in Christ's crucifixion reveals the nature of His divine love as forgiveness to man.

The difference between the Temple of Isis and the Court of Mercilla is best shown when Spenser's descriptions of the two are carefully examined. What basically informs the Temple is its paganism (Stump 91). From the start Spenser emphasizes that the cult of Isis and Osiris is a product of human necessity:

Well therefore did the antique world inuent,
That Iustice was a God of soueraine grace,
And altars vnto him, and temples lent,
And heauenly honours in the highest place;

(5.7.2).

The term "Idoll" (5.7.6), used to describe the statue of Isis, the goddess of justice, strongly suggests the essentially pagan character of the cult and the priests' ignorance of the true source of justice. The most important proof that the religion of the priests has nothing to do with Christianity is their aversion to wine, which they believe is the blood of the giants who rebelled against Jove; their angry mother Earth turned their blood into wine to stir rebellious thoughts in man (5.7.10-11). The priests live in a classical universe divided by the two perpetually and diametrically opposed forces of order and chaos, rational control and rebellious defiance. The priests view blood only as a symbol of the sin of rebellion against Jove,
but they are completely ignorant that Christ turned blood into a symbol of redemption and hope by shedding his own blood. On the other hand, the Court of Mercilla abounds with Biblical allusions. As is the holy city of New Jerusalem (Revelation 21:25), its gate is open day and night (5.9.22); Mercilla's golden throne (5.9.27) is modeled on the mercy seat of Jehovah (Exod. 25:11); as the cherubims spread their wings over the mercy seat (Exod. 25:20), angels hover around her throne (5.9.29). The Temple and the Court reflect the completely different principles of paganism and Christianity.

Though Spenser obviously intends to redefine the concept of justice from the Christian perspective, the relation of justice to mercy, being the key to the right understanding of the Court, is anything but simple. Spenser himself admits the difficulty of clarifying their relationship:

Some Clarkes doe doubt in their deuicefull art,
Whether this heauenly thing, whereof I treat,
To weeten Mercie, be of Iustice part,
Or drawne forth from her by diuine extreate.
(5.10.1)

One thing he is certain about is that mercy is not a simple possibility for man, for it is of heavenly origin and is imparted to man by grace (5.10.1). However, it is absurd to surmise that the Court exists solely to prove the
impossibility of practicing mercy in the fallen world. On the contrary, Spenser's elaborate description of the Court and Mercilla supports the idea that mercy should be the final standard of justice; no principle of justice, however fair it may be, can escape its inherent tendency to presume its own final authority and be blind to its failures unless it is constantly reminded of the perfect justice or mercy of God. That is why Spenser describes the Temple of Isis as a place of both vision and idolatry.

Furthermore, the spirit of brotherhood, the end of justice, can be realized ultimately only by mercy that transcends the inevitable selfish demands of human love; man has the obligation to modify his justice in accord with mercy so that justice might be faithful to its end. But as Spenser earlier implied (5.10.1), mercy is also an impossible goal for man; no man can be truly merciful. Man's mercy always remains an imperfect imitation or distortion of Christ's mercy revealed on the cross. Justice may rise in indeterminate degrees to realize its end, the spirit of brotherhood, which is ultimately possible only in mercy; but, each new level of realization also includes elements that are bound to oppose God's perfect mercy (Niebuhr, Nature 2: 246).

Another important aspect of the relationship is that mercy neither replaces nor compromises justice. Theologically, Christ's atonement on the cross does not mean
that God's justice is replaced by God's mercy; it means that the full demands of each are satisfied through Christ's sacrificial death (Donald Williams 32). This crucial theological point explains why Mercilla is described as a royal judge mindful of pursuing the principles of justice absolute and equity:

Thus she did sit in souerayne Maiestie,
Holding a Scepter in her royall hand,
The sacred pledge of peace and clemencie,
With which high God had blest her happie land,
Maugre so many foes, which did withstand.
But at her feet her sword was likewise layde,
Whose long rest rusted the bright steely brand;
Yet when as foes enforst, or friends sought ayde,
She could it sternely draw, that all the world dismayde. (5.9.30)

In Britomart's dream at the Temple, the lion symbolized the union of Britomart and Artegall, equity and justice absolute. Now the lion reappears at the feet of Mercilla (5.9.33), taking the same position occupied by the crocodile in the dream, which implies that Mercilla stands for a higher principle of justice than equity and justice absolute. Also at her feet are the Litae, Jove's lovely daughters, standing for Mercilla's loving disposition for clemency (5.9.31). Spenser successfully provides a concept
of Christian justice by presenting an elaborate emblem of mercy in control of the three aspects of human justice. Therefore, mercy practiced by Mercilla, which should never be identified with God's mercy itself, can be defined as a principle of justice that is not only fully aware of the possibilities and limits of justice absolute and equity but also deeply mindful of integrating the demand of forgiveness as far as it does not replace nor compromise the integrity of justice. Or in Spenser's less verbose definition, mercy is "[the] powre and art, / That seekes to saue the subiect of her skill, / Yet neuer doth from doome of right depart" (5.10.2).

The trial of Duessa, a historical allegory about the judicial process leading to the execution of Mary Queen of Scots in 1588, is a concrete test for the extraordinarily demanding principle of mercy just defined. The trial scene has always been a controversial one among critics. Lewis finds in the trial no mercy but merely Spenser's flattering justification and defense of Queen Elizabeth (349); on the other hand, Maurice Evans insists that there was actually "no place for mercy in the dangerous world of Elizabethan politics" (201). The error of these critics is clear: they both too narrowly define mercy as opposed to the rigor of justice.

The Mercilla Spenser portrays is neither a Machiavellian politician determined to get rid of her
archrival nor an ideal judge having no difficulty in applying the principle of mercy to Duessa's case. She is described as a Christian judge trying to realize the principle of mercy as far as the circumstance allows. First of all, Mercilla fully appreciates the legal, political, and religious significance of the case, as she listens to such grave allegorical figures as the Law of Nations, the Kingdom's Care, and Religion; she is also attentive both to Zeal, who demands the rigor of justice, and to Pity, who pleads for clemency. Her tears, "Few perling drops from her faire lampes of light" (5.9.50), are a sign of neither hypocrisy nor saintliness but a genuine expression of compassion by a Christian monarch dedicated to the realization of justice. Historically, Queen Elizabeth was willing to save Mary's life, provided that she admitted any guilt for her part in the Babington plot and asked for pardon (Stump 96). But Mary refused to do so, and the Queen had no other choice under the intense political pressures demanding Mary's execution. In the poem too Mercilla lets Duessa be executed only when "strong constraint did her thereto enforce" (5.10.4).

The Court of Mercilla is the allegorical center of the Legend of Justice because it brilliantly sums up all the earlier notions of justice and radically reorients them to serve the higher Christian principle of mercy. But Spenser is not merely satisfied with defining his concept of
justice; the trial of Duessa concretely puts the principle of mercy to a difficult test, disclosing both the possibility and limit of mercy in a dire political situation.

In the last three episodes of Book 5, Spenser allegorizes Protestant England's military involvements in the Netherlands, France, and Ireland against the Catholic powers during the latter half of the sixteenth century. There are two kinds of critical opinion with respect to Spenser's intention to incorporate such contemporary events in Book 5. Cheney (165) and Phillips ("Renaissance" 151) insist that Spenser tries to test or exemplify his concept of justice by these historical events; Humphrey Tonkin (The Faerie Queene 151) and Douglas A. Northrop (277), however, emphasize Spenser's political motive of defending Elizabeth's policy and promoting the religious and political agenda of Protestant England against the papacy. But these opinions ignore how inseparably justice is related to political process, as explained earlier. Moreover, Spenser the Protestant thinker and poet was also a government officer and estate holder in Ireland, being deeply involved in the militant Protestant wing of Elizabeth's government led by the Earl of Leicester and, after his death, the Earl of Essex (Heale 5); in this heavily political Legend of Justice it is unrealistic to separate the two aspects of
Spenser as a **politically committed** individual and as a Protestant thinker and poet.

Actually, Spenser's persistent concern with the legal, political, and religious aspects of justice as shown in his treatments of Pollente, the Giant, Souldan, Malengin, and Duessa culminates in these three episodes. Spenser closely follows such contemporary legal scholars as Albertico Gentili, Jean Bodin, and Innocent Gentillet, who articulated the relationship between the laws of God, nature, and nations and various forms of government, especially, royal and tyrannical monarchies; Spenser's defence of Elizabeth's policy is based on their theories of international law (Northrop 278). But international law itself is meaningless without Protestant England's political commitment in exercising its military power against the tyranny of the Spanish rule in the Netherlands and the anarchic situations of France and Ireland. Probably the greatest difference between Spenser's concept of justice and the modern concept is that Spenser consistently attributes the cause of injustice to sin and the Devil. Arthur's victory over Geryoneo (the Spanish power in the Low Countries) and his monster menacing Belge (Holland) and her sons (its protestant provinces) receives a strongly apocalyptic significance (Tonkin, *The Faerie Queene* 152); Protestant England's victory over the Catholic power of Spain is viewed
as a type of Christ's final victory over the Satanic Dragon in the Revelation.

However, in these episodes, Spenser is never totally blind to the grim realities of history that persistently deny its apocalyptic consummation. As Sheila T. Cavanagh helpfully points out ("Ideal" 20), Arthur and Artegall at the end of Book 5 epitomize the essential duality of justice implicit in Spenser's attempt to present both the ever higher principles of justice and the recalcitrant obstacles preventing their realization. Far from being an artistic failure, the last episodes of Book 5 are Spenser's serious attempt to explore the dynamic character of history with its possibilities and inevitable limits with regard to the realization of justice.

Arthur's glorious liberation of Belge from the tyranny of Geryoneo is an idealization of England's political role in the Netherlands, which was historically far from being a success as testified by the embarrassing failure of the Earl of Leicester's campaign in 1587. In this episode Spenser explicitly justifies the aggressive interventionist policy of the Leicester party that wanted England to champion the cause of Protestantism against the Catholic powers on the continent (Tonkin, The Faerie Queene 167). First, Spenser is careful to lay the legal ground for England's intervention in the Netherlands. According to the Renaissance theory of international law, even a de facto and
**de jure** ruler can be invaded and deposed from the throne by another prince if he commits the crime of tyranny and abuses his religion by persecuting his subjects (Northrop 282). By using such precise legal terms as "tortious powre" (5.10.8) and "extort" (5.10.25) in describing Geryoneo's tyrannical killings of Belge's sons and occupation of her city (Antwerp), Spenser insists that Geryoneo is no more than a **de facto** ruler guilty of tyranny and illegal possession of Belge's country.¹ The legal basis of England's intervention is more solidified by the crimes of the Spanish Inquisition in the Netherlands that forces idolatry on Belge's subjects and even horribly sacrifices them to an idol (5.10.27-8).

The union of tyrannical power and false religion thus defines the nature of Geryoneo:

> For soothly he was one of matchlesse might,
> Of horrible aspect, and dreadfull mood,
> And had three bodies in one wast empight,
> And th'armes and legs of three, to succour him in fight. (5.10.8)

When the "matchlesse might" is conjoined with the blasphemous parody of the Holy Trinity, "three bodies in one wast," there is no limit to Geryoneo's violation of the laws of God, nature, and the nations. The embodiment of the satanic nature of his injustice is the monster hiding under the idol's altar and actually devouring Belge's subjects sacrificed to the idol (5.10.29). Arthur's victory over
Geryoneo and the monster inevitably remind the reader of his similar defeat of Orgoglio and the seven-headed monster in Book 1, which suggests the inseparable link between the sin of pride and political tyranny and the common apocalyptic milieu of the two episodes.

Artegall's support of Burbon (Henry IV) and his rescue of Irena, whose name signifies the peace of Ireland, share the similar legal, political, and religious significance because Grantorto is the common enemy of Burbon and Irena. Legally, both Burbon and Irena, who represents Queen Elizabeth's royal authority in Ireland, are in danger of losing their rightful inheritance of the throne, for "Grantorto" means "great tort" or "great theft". Politically and religiously, Grantorto (Philip II of Spain) is the instigator of the Catholic revolts causing anarchy in France and Ireland against the legitimate Protestant rulers.

Artegall's pursuit of justice, in contrast to Arthur's successful completion of his mission, turns out to be imperfect. In the Burbon episode Artegall strongly reproaches Burbon's abandonment of Protestantism for the political gain of the French crown. But Artegall has no other choice but to support, however reluctantly, the lesser evil—Burbon—against the Catholic powers in France. There is not much room in France for the ideal vision of militant Protestantism except for the need to compromise the vision to real politik. In Irena's realm, too, Artegall's pursuit
of justice is far from the ideal shown to him in the Court of Mercilla. The only difference between Artega ll's inhuman and brutal enforcement of law in the earlier episodes and his same ruthless suppression of the rebels supporting Grantorto (5.12.24) is that Artega ll practices justice absolute and employs Talus' force for a higher purpose than exact retribution for crimes: his purpose is the reformation of the war-ravaged realm of Irena:

During which time, that he did there remaine,

His studie was true Iustice how to deale,
And day and night employ'd his busie paine
How to reforme that ragged common-weale:
And that same yron man which could reueale
All hidden crimes, through all that realme he sent,
To search out those, that vsd to rob and steale,
Or did rebell gainst lawfull gournement;
On whom he did inflict most grieous punishment.

(5.12.26)

But eventually Artega ll becomes a victim of Queen Elizabeth's policy vacillating between harsh suppression and appeasement; he is called to the Faerie Court before he can reform the realm thoroughly (5.12.27), leaving behind him a country enormously suffering from the cruel effects of the vicious cycle of rebellion and suppression.
There has been much controversy over Spenser's *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, a prose treatise advocating a "thorough policy" in Ireland in order to reform its miserably chaotic state that defied any moderate enforcement of law and order. This treatise is closely related to Book 5 because the legend also seems to justify the same harsh policy (5.12.24). Clare Carroll's appraisal of *A View* from the standpoint of twentieth-century anti-imperialism represents an extreme response: "[Spenser intends] to convince the crown of the need to exterminate a majority of the Irish, to relocate those remaining, and to transform all Ireland into the rented property of English settlers" (173). On the other hand, Bayley justifies Spenser's "thorough" policy as the necessary step towards the pacification of Ireland; the constant danger of Spain's use of Ireland as the landing base for the invasion of England made the forceful restoration of justice and order, however cruel it may be initially, a political and military necessity (138).

But Spenser's ultimate purpose was more than political and military; "the transformation of Ireland into a truly Protestant society" (Canny 12) was his aim. Thus, to ask whether Spenser was an imperialist or not is anachronistic. The real question is whether Spenser's militant Protestantism can justify Lord Gray's brutal suppression of the Irish rebels and people, on which Artegaill's policy of
"grievous punishment" (5.12.26) is based. McCabe views Spenser's defense of the morally indefensible as "the inevitable consequence of religious nationalism, of equating the fate of the nation with that of the chosen race" ("Fate" 123). But his unqualified claim that the Protestant cause allows Spenser to reconcile moral necessity to political necessity ("Fate" 123) does not take into consideration the whole picture of Spenser's militant Protestantism. That Spenser is aware of both its possibilities and limits is clear when the hermit Heavenly Contemplation encourages Redcrosse's heroic life and at the same time reveals its inevitable sinfulness: "For bloud can nought but sin" (1.10.60). That is why the hag Detraction's accusation of Artegall on his way to the Faery Court has an element of truth in it, although the reader should take into account her malicious intent to disgrace him. The hag charges that "the sword of Iustice lent / Had staynd with reprochfull crueltie, / In guiltlesse blood of many an innocent" (5.12.40). Spenser knows that no ideology, Protestant or not, can guarantee immunity from the guilt of history. The hag's outrageous denunciation is the price Artegall must pay for his inevitable reliance on Talus' brutal might in his pursuit of justice. However, there is no sign at the end of Book 5 that Artegall will abandon his Protestant cause, as Burbon did earlier, because, despite the hag's fierce
railing, "he for nought would swerue / From his right course" (5.12.43).

The appearance of the Blatant Beast, an Apocalyptic beast, at the end of Book 5, and its bitter barking at Artegall are the clearest signs that Spenser does not want to give a tidy end to the Legend of Justice. By introducing two Apocalyptic beasts, one defeated by Arthur and the other raging with abandon even at the end of Book 5, Spenser reveals his essentially eschatological understanding of history as both fulfilled and unfulfilled. Arthur's defeat of Geryoneo's monster, being unmistakably reminiscent of Redcrosse's victory over the Satanic Dragon (5.11.23, 24, 27, 30, 31), represents the ultimate fulfillment of the historical mission of Protestant England, which has already begun with Christ's triumphal resurrection. But the Blatant Beast's unchecked rage grimly reminds Artegall of the unending frustrations and imperfections of history that still waits for its completion at the Final Judgment. The kingdom of Protestant England with all its partial successes and failures moves towards the Kingdom of God, but Spenser honestly admits that his fiction is unable to close the glaring gap between the two kingdoms.

Though least popular among Spenserians, Book 5 shows how masterfully Spenser inquires into the extremely complex relation of justice to love. The Temple of Isis and the Court of Mercilla represent Spenser's search for an ever
higher principle of justice that can answer both the urgent need to restore order in the community and the more fundamental need to realize the spirit of brotherhood in it, which is ultimately possible only in God's merciful love.

But to Spenser justice is not merely a matter of principle. His understanding of the process of realizing justice is inseparably linked to his political and religious views. He saw in the turbulent history of his age a great opportunity to fulfill the historical mission of his Protestant England; but he also knew that the mission was bound to be frustratingly imperfect. The toughness of Spenser as a Protestant thinker and poet lies in his firm commitment to the realization of justice even in a morally excruciating situation and in his refusal to escape the inevitable guilt of history.
NOTES

1. The exact legal meaning of the word "tort" is illegal possession of property, inheritance, land, or goods (Knight 273).

2. The ideas of pursuing a systematic scorched earth policy to break the will of the Irish rebels and displacing the native landholders by extensive English plantations (Prose Works: 148) were not new to Spenser; they were already well known even in the 1530s among the English circle in Ireland (Brady 25). A more sympathetic view of Spenser's tract is voiced by Cavanagh:

   Deeply involved with the administration of violent Ireland, he wrote The View of the Present State of Ireland primarily in the hope that an account written from personal experience could help in devising peaceful and productive coexistence. Alone, his treatise stands as a meticulously designed outline for peace. In contrast with the incendiary documents of his contemporaries, it emerges as a remarkably calm and objective treatment of a divisive issue. ("Such was" 35)

Spenser himself answers the charge of advocating extermination of the Irish:
ffor by the sworde which I named i doe not meane / 
The Cuttinge of all that nacion with the sworde, 
which farr be it from me that euer I shoulde 
thinke soe desperatlye or wishe soe vncharatiable: 
but by the sworde I meante the Royall power of the 
Prince which oughte to stretche it selfe forthe in 
her Chiefe strengthe to the redressinge and 
Cuttinge of all those evills which I before 
blamed, and not of the people which are evill: for 
evill people by good ordinaunces and government 
maye be made good / but the evill that is of it 
selxe evill will never become good. /  (Prose 
Works: 148)
CHAPTER V

THE SOURCES AND LIMITS OF CHRISTIAN CULTURE

Book 6 of The Faerie Queene, the Legend of Courtesie, may be regarded as simply one of the twelve books Spenser originally planned for his poem if one follows the poet's intention shown in the Letter to Raleigh. But Book 6, being actually the last completed book of the poem, provides a strong sense of closure which results from the poet's deliberate strategies (Woods 214); for example, the last stanza of the book is clearly the poet's envoy to the reader. Thematically, Courtesy is the most public virtue, which "spreds it selfe through all ciuilitie" (6.Proem.4); but it also touches the innermost parts of man, as Spenser emphasizes:

[The] vertues seat is deepe within the mynd,
And not in outward shows, but inward thoughts defynd. (6.Proem.5)

Moreover, according to Humphrey Tonkin,

A knowledge of Spenser's Legend of Courtesy and its ramifications is in large measure the key to the whole work. Book VI sums up and re-examines the issues raised by the work as a whole. (Spenser's 1).
The purpose of this chapter is thus twofold. It inquires into both Spenser's dynamic exploration of the meaning of courtesy and his way to give a conclusion to the poem, which inevitably leads to "Two Cantos of Mutabilitie," that transcends the overtly pessimistic tone at the end of Book 6.

Courtesy, with its strong emphasis on mercy and sensitive response toward others, is a far superior means of restoring the spirit of brotherhood among men than justice is, though courtesy does not replace justice whose primary function is to maintain the stability and order of the community. Spenser deliberately parallels the first episode of Book 6 with the Pollente episode in Book 5 in order to illustrate the difference between the two virtues. Both Pollente and Briana demand unjustified toll from the travellers using the bridge (Pollente's) and the narrow passage (Briana's). But their purposes are quite different. Pollente does so in order to satisfy his daughter's insatiable desire for amassing wealth; they commit the crime of economic monopoly and exploitation which clearly breaks the law. But Briana's shameless act, shaving away the locks and beards of the travelling ladies and knights, is intended to satisfy her lover Crudor's malicious desire to humiliate others; by perverting his relationship with Briana and causing her to break "bands of ciuilitie" (6.1.26), Crudor poses a serious threat to the society to which he belongs,
though he does not explicitly break the law, as Pollente and Munera do (Stewart 83). Moreover, while Artegaill simply executes Pollente and Munera for their crime, Calidore goes beyond Artegaill's justice by offering mercy to Crudor (6.1.42) and correcting the perverted relationship between Briana and Crudor, even further changing their disdainful and cruel minds (6.1.43,46). Courtesy deals with the domain of social experience beyond justice's reach, having the difficult aim of actually engendering the spirit of brotherhood among men.

Scholars have defined the virtue of courtesy in more specific terms. Mark Archer, extensively quoting from Seneca and Cicero, identifies courtesy with the classical virtue of liberality (18). Gerald Morgan also essentially views courtesy as the classical virtue of generosity (18), but he argues that Spenser's courtesy is inseparably linked to the peculiarly Christian virtue of humility (22). When expressed in external conduct, courtesy becomes fairness in speech and modesty in demeanor (Morgan 24). These definitions of courtesy seem to explain well Calidore's generous sparing of Crudor's life and his use of kind words to lead him to humbleness (6.1.41,42).

But Book 6 shows Spenser's deep dissatisfaction with the present state of courtesy, which is "nought but forgerie" (6. Proem.5). He is not merely satisfied with defining the virtue; he is fundamentally interested in the
root condition of courtesy which can allow him to reach the full nature of true courtesy. In the preceding books Spenser has shown that the apparent sources of the virtues are nature and the insights of Christianity, the relationship between them being always dynamic. Now Spenser explicitly states that in Book 6 his main interest lies in reaching the very root of the virtues:

Reuele to me the sacred noursery
Of vertue, which with you [the Muse] doth there remaine,
Where it in siluer bowre does hidden ly
From view of men, and wicked worlds disdaine.
Since it at first was by the Gods with paine
Planted in earth, being deriu'd at furst
From heauenly seedes of bounty soueraine,
And by them long with carefull labour nurst,
Till it to ripenesse grew, and forth to honour burst. (6.Proem 3)

This stanza admirably sums up the complex relationship among nature, grace, and culture, which The Faerie Queene is all about. The true source of virtue is never found in the sphere of corrupt culture or civilization; it is found only in the depth of nature. But the source itself should never be identified with nature itself; it is of heavenly origin. The source also is not the same with religious truth, which always turns out to be man's interpretation of grace. But
ultimately where virtue should be blossomed is the human realm of culture. Book 6 explicitly reveals its own process of redefining a virtue.

It is inevitable that one of the central issues of Book 6 is the relationship between culture and nature. As Frank Kermode's excellent study on the subject points out (The Tempest xxxiv-xlili), there were largely two humanist views on nature during the Renaissance. Some supported primitivism, arguing that the state of innocent nature devoid of any law and custom of civilization could be the most desirable state for man; on the other hand, others viewed nature as essentially something to be corrected by culture. Their argument is that, being fundamentally a political and social being, man is the worst of all creatures when outside civilization. Spenser's treatment of the Salvage Man, the Salvage Nation, and the shepherds shows his complex understanding of the potentials and limits of nature, which is based on his Christian view of nature as God's fallen creation.

Ultimately, the true source of courtesy is nothing less than God's grace, which means that true courtesy is not man's natural potential but God's gift as the name of the titular knight, Calidore (Gk. beautiful gift), suggests. Michael Tratner goes beyond Morgan's opinion that courtesy is closely related to the Christian virtue of humility. Quoting many passages from the sermons and biblical passages
from sixteenth-century English Bibles, he proves that the word "courtesy" was used in close connection to the New Testament word *agape* signifying God's unconditional and absolutely selfless love (151). St. Paul also uses this word to refer to the Christian's love for his neighbor, not because he believed that *eros* (man's mutual love) can be as completely selfless as agape but because he believed that the Christian can be the instrument and bearer of agape flowing from God (Nygren 140-41). Therefore, courtesy must characterize "the behavior of Christians in an ideal community" (Tratner 150). But courtesy as agape is no simple possibility for man; his courtesy is never totally unmotivated and selfless. Agape and courtesy thus are in a dynamic relationship. As far as true courtesy is God's gift, a man of courtesy is the bearer of God's divine love that can only establish the true Christian community; but as far as he remains sinner, his courtesy inevitably has elements of selfishness. Actually, such a relationship between agape and courtesy epitomizes the potentials and limits of other virtues.

But in Book 6 Spenser is interested in more than laying bare the dynamic process through which he defines the virtues of *The Faerie Queene*; he even questions the validity of the process itself. Truly, throughout the poem, Spenser never lets the reader forget that there is a limit in actualizing the potential of each virtue in the fallen
world. But at least until now Spenser has implicitly taken it for granted that the places of vision, for example, the House of Holiness in Book 1, can educate the misguided knights, offering them the true visions of the virtues they strive for. But surprisingly enough, in the final book of the poem, Spenser admits that there is also a limit to what the knight can assimilate of the vision offered to him: at Mount Acidale, Calidore betrays his utter inability to comprehend the significance of the Dance of the Graces. Spenser reveals the insufficiency of his own paradigm which relates culture to the insights of Christianity.

Spenser's concern about the validity of his paradigm inevitably leads him to question the validity of his poetic art. Book 6 recognizes that the root of courtesy and poetry is the same (6.Proem.3). Calidore's vision of the Graces is vitally important to the poet himself, being an emblem of not only ideal courtesy but poetry; the vision becomes "Spenser's most complete treatment of the poetic imagination (Mallette, "Poet" 57). Moreover, Richard Neuse interestingly suggests that courtesy may be "the supreme poetic possibility in human existence" (331), emphasizing their common concern about the problem of combining the spiritual with the esthetic. But the vanishing of the vision by Calidore's intrusion and the complete destruction of the pastoral world by the Brigants suggest that Spenser is deeply aware of the limit of his poetic art as an
instrument for reforming corrupt culture. Harry Berger insists that Book 6 reveals the poet's loss of confidence in "the ability of his imaginary forms to deal with the facts of social existence" ("Prospect" 104). However, Berger seems to overlook a crucial fact: Spenser's poem reveals the limitations of his own paradigm.

In the first eight cantos of Book 6, Spenser explores how the resources of nature and religion represented by the Salvage Man and the Hermit can correct the wrong concept of courtesy: adherence to socially approved norms and rules of conduct supposed to promote civility among men. Thus, despite the poet's slightly ironic assertion—"Of Court it seemes, men Courtesie doe call, / For that it there most vseth to abound" (6.1.1), the journeys of Calidore and Calepine are directed from the court to forests, to deeper nature. On the other hand, Serena and Timias, bitten by the Blatant Beast, are cured only by the religious Hermit. Man, being the union of God's image and flesh, is bound to find succor in his religious and natural instincts. But man is a sinner too; the cannibalistic and sacrilegious Salvage Nation betray the constant danger of man's sinful tendency to abuse and distort his natural and religious resources.

Calidore's encounter with Tristram plainly reveals the danger of blindly adhering to the socially established norms of conduct. Calidore surprisingly witnesses Tristram "in a woodmans iacket" (6.2.5) fighting against a fully armed
knight on horseback and eventually killing the knight, which is clearly against the law of arms, as Tristram himself admits (6.2.7). But in reality, prior to their battle, the knight shamelessly tormented his lady with his spear after failing to possess another knight's beloved; he simply does not deserve knighthood. But Tristram, though not a knight at all, is true to the spirit of chivalry since he bravely fights for the wronged lady. This episode reveals two important points: first, true courtesy has nothing to do with one's social standing—not to speak of blindly following the established norms of conduct; second, a man of courtesy needs both emotional and physical strength to be truly considerate to the needy. Courtesy needs both sensitivity and toughness.

The Salvage Man's rescue of Calepine and Serena from despicable Turpine proves that "the sacred nursery of vertue" is far closer to the Salvage Man's coarse dwelling deep in the forest than Turpine's inhospitable castle that coldly refuses shelter to the couple in a miserable condition. Both Calepine and Serena are innocent about the darker side of the civilized world that maliciously victimizes those naively expecting only civility from it. Serena grievously pays for her innocent pursuit of pleasure when the Blatant Beast, signifying slander, wounds her; as for Calepine, expecting help and kindness from Turpine, he receives only humiliating taunts and vicious physical
attacks from the villain. But the Salvage Man's behavior is quite different from Turpine's. He instantly shows his compassion for the miserable state of the couple, bravely rescues them from Turpine, and even heals Calepine's wound with herbs. His actions are a genuine example of true courtesy.

But the Salvage Man's courtesy, though amply proven by his selfless devotion to Serena and Calepine, is severely limited. He can heal Calepine's physical wound; but he has no ability to cure Serena's deep psychological hurt:

But that same Ladies hurts no herbe he found,
Which could redresse, for it was inwardly vnsound. (6.4.16)

She needs the spiritual counsel of wisdom from the Hermit who can employ the art of speech, which the Salvage Man completely lacks, in order to assuage and guide her tormented soul. Furthermore, the Salvage Man's uncontrolled power becomes more and more cruel and destructive as he is drawn into the civilized world. He needlessly knocks down Timias, Arthur's squire, when he puts his hand on Calepine's armor (6.5.26); he also brutally kills Turpine's servant as a lion would tear his prey into pieces (6.6.22). The Salvage Man needs Arthur's firm control and guidance; man's natural instinct should be carefully nurtured so that it might serve humanity.
The little Hermitage Serena and Timias visit represents another resource of courtesy: religion. Unlike the Salvage Man's dwelling in the forest, the Hermitage, in whose little chapel the Hermit leads a deeply religious life (6.5.35), lies on an open plain. Because he was formerly a renowned knight thoroughly versed in the affairs of the civilized world but deeply aware of its limits (6.5.37), his hermitage can offer a higher wisdom than the civilized world can. Significantly, it is by the Hermit that the nature of the Blatant Beast, the cause of the disease pestering Serena and Timias, is for the first time explicitly disclosed in Book 6:

Of that commixtion they [Echidna and Typhaon] did then beget
This hellish Dog, that hight the Blatant Beast;
A wicked Monster, that his tongue doth whet
Gainst all, both good and bad, both most and least,
And poures his poysnous gall forth to infest
The noblest wights with notable defame:
Ne euer Knight, that bore so lofty creast,
Ne euer Lady of so honest name,
But he then spotted with reproch, or secrete shame. (6.6.12)
The Beast symbolizes not merely slander but malicious and destructive hatred behind it. As Neuse rightly points out,
the beast is "a symbol of a disease of which the entire society is both the victim and cause" (336). Unlike the Salvage Man, the Hermit can discern the darker side of culture from the higher perspective of religion and also can employ "the art of words' (6.6.6) to cure the victims of the Beast. In the Hermit the potentials of religion and culture are well united.

But despite his devotion to religious life, his understanding of the cause and remedy of the disease tormenting Serena and Timias is classical rather than Christian. According to the Hermit, the root cause of their illness is not sin but "the stubborn rage of passion blinde" (6.6.5). Consequently, the remedy he offers is nothing more than classical self-control:

The best (sayd he) that I can you aduize,
Is to auoide the occasion of the ill:
For when the cause, whence euill doth arize,
Remoued is, th'effect surceaseth still.
Abstaine from pleasure, and restraine your will,
Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,
Vse scanted diet, and forbeare your fill,
Shun secresie, and talk in open sight:
So shall you soone repaire your present euill plight. (6.6.14)

Moreover, Christ has no room in the Hermit's advice of self-sufficiency:
For in your selfe your helpe doth lie,
To heale your selues, and must proceed alone
From your owne will, to cure your maladie.

(6.6.7)

In fact, the Hermitage has the same function as the Temple of Isis in Book 5. Like the Temple, the Hermitage offers the best wisdom man can conceive with respect to the problem of coping with the grievous effects of infamy. That the Hermit's advice is insufficient is clear because his patients make the same errors later. Forgetting his former experience with the Beast, Timias recklessly attacks Disdain and Scorn, becoming their shameful captive (6.7.49); Serena falls to the rude hands of the Salvage Nation, forgetting the danger in the world she roams (6.8.34). The Hermit is well aware of the danger of the Blatant beast; but he does not know that deep down in the Beast's malicious hatred lies sin and the Devil, as its mother's shape, half-young maiden and half-monstrous dragon (6.6.10), clearly suggests.

The Salvage Nation, who live on "stealth and spoile" (6.8.35), are not merely the enemies of the civilized world but a good example of how far man could abuse and distort his natural and religious resources. If true courtesy is ultimately selfless returning of God's gift of grace to one's neighbors, the Salvage Nation are the most discourteous people. By eating the flesh of men, they explicitly pervert their human nature; their cannibalism is
"A monstrous cruelty against course of kynde" (6.8.36). More seriously, the Salvage Nation also pervert their religious instinct. Their attempt to sacrifice Serena to their god for their expression of gratitude is a blasphemous parody of true courtesy and Christianity:

That since by grace of God she there was sent,

Unto their God they would her sacrifice. (6.8.38)

James Nohrnberg interprets the horrible episode as a satire on the Roman Catholic Mass (712); Kenneth Borris views it as Spenser’s attack on the religious practice of extreme Puritans and Separatists ("'Diuelish Ceremonies'" 175). But the important point is that, because of his sinfulness, man’s religious impulse has no limit in distorting God’s gift of divine love. Ultimately, neither nature and nor religion can be the true source of courtesy.

It is not wholly unexpected that a pastoral world suddenly turns up before Calidore’s eyes in Canto 9. The imagery of the early cantos is constantly directed toward the country rather than the city. The Salvage Man’s dwelling is in the deep forest; the Hermitage is "Far from all neighborhood" (6.5.34). Calidore’s pursuit of the Blatant Beast leads him deeper and deeper into the heart of nature:

Him first from court he to the citties coursed,
And from the citties to the townes him prest,
And from the townes into the countrie forsed,
And from the country back to private farms he scorns. (6.9.3)

The reason for the appearance of the pastoral world lies in the poet's intention to redefine courtesy thoroughly, which results from his deep disillusionment of courtesy at his time and the court itself. Pursuit of the "sacred nursery of vertue," the constant theme of the book, culminates in the pastoral world where Calidore is given a comprehensive vision of ideal courtesy and grace, the true source of courtesy.

In order to understand this pastoral section more fully, it is essential to look into what functions pastoral as a specific mode of literature fulfilled in the Renaissance (Tonkin, Spencer's 283-4). Generally speaking, it had two separate functions. First, it functioned as a satire and served as a means for criticism. It set the writer apart from his own environment and formed a base from which to criticize its standards or lack of standards. The sharp contrast between the court and the country, between art and nature, is one of the most frequent themes of Renaissance pastoral poetry. Second, it served as a device for expressing moral or spiritual aspirations, creating a world where the sordidness and conflicts of ordinary life are eliminated, where every wish is happily fulfilled. Thus, the myth of the Golden Age is one of the most favorite topics of Renaissance pastoral poetry.
Other important topics of Renaissance pastoral include religion and poetry. A very important trait of Renaissance pastoral is that, despite its classical origin, it consciously tries to fuse classical and Christian elements (Tonkin, Spenser's 286-7). The fusion is possible because the Bible itself frequently relies on pastoral imagery to convey its religious message; calling Christ the Good Shepherd is a good example. Discussion about poetry and the poet's role, an element inherited from the classical age, is also a very important theme. Thus, Spenser deals with such questions as the poet's role and patronage in the October eclogue of The Shepheardes Calender through the conversation between Pierce and Cuddye. All these functions and themes inherent in Renaissance pastoral are masterfully exploited by Spenser in the pastoral section of Book 6.

One of the most confusing and difficult problems of interpreting the Legend of Courtesie is whether it can be justified for Calidore to discard his duty of pursuing the Blatant Beast and sojourn in the pastoral world. It seems that the general trend of the book amply justifies the knight's sojourn there; the first eight cantos clearly show that true courtesy is more easily found in a savage man's coarse dwelling than in the refined court. Moreover, Calidore's chivalric quest becomes increasingly pointless in the earlier cantos (Maxwell 147). Calidore happens to embarrass Calepine and Serena by intruding into the couple's
private bower of rest (6.3.21); he is also indirectly responsible for Serena's misfortune because his lengthy discussion about his chivalric adventure with Calepine causes bored Serena to roam about (6.3.23). Surprisingly, however, it is Spenser himself who blames Calidore for the neglect of his duty when the poet refers to

... the great dishonour and defame
Which should befall to Calidore immortal name.

(6.9.1)

Calidore's sojourn in the pastoral world poses a serious moral dilemma that defies any neat solution (Rusche 150).

If one approves of Calidore's sojourn in the pastoral world, it can be argued that Calidore here has a good opportunity to reconsider the meaning of life in the court after hearing Melibee's sharp criticism of its affectations and vanity:

To them, that list, the worlds gay showes I leaue,
And to great ones such follies doe forgiue,
Which oft through pride do their owne perill weaue,
And through ambition downe themselues doe druie
To sad decay, that might contented liue.
Me no such cares nor combrous thoughts offend,
Ne once my minds vnmoued quiet grieue,
But all the night in siluer sleepe I spend,
And all the day, to what I list, I doe attend.

(6.9.22)

Melibee's advice causes Calidore to strip off his outward affectations and adapt himself to the humblest conditions of life.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that pastoral life and chivalric quest are ultimately irreconcilable. Melibee describes his life:

Another while I baytes and nets display,
The birds to catch, or fishes to beguyle:
And when I wearie am, I downe doe lay
My limbes in every shade, to rest from toyle,
And drinke of every brooke, when thirst my throte doth boyle. (6.9.23)

Berger correctly points out that Melibee's morality is in fact the same kind of excuse for laziness used by the slothful pastors of The Shepheardes Calender ("Secret Discipline" 61).

A more serious objection is directed against the fact that Calidore comes to believe the invulnerability of the pastoral world from the imperfections and threats of the real world:

How much (sayd he) more happie is the state,
In which ye father here doe dwell at ease,
Leading a life so free and fortunate,
From all the tempests of these worldly seas,
Which tosse the rest in daungerous disease?

(6.9.19)

Of course, this view is an illusion, as Maurice Evans succinctly explains:

Spenser's pastoral embodies and anatomizes the subtlest temptation in the *Faerie Queene*, the temptation to fall in love with innocence and thereby forget the fact of sin. (226)

The pastoral life Melibee describes is free from conflict and greed that violate the spirit of brotherhood uniting the community; but it contains no struggle for spiritual and moral perfection which is essential to the Christian community deeply aware of its sinful state and its need for God's grace. Calidore's truancy is eventually justified by his vision on Mount Acidale not by his sojourn in Melibee's pastoral world.

It is unanimously accepted by critics that Calidore's vision on Mount Acidale is crucial to an understanding of Book 6 as a whole. The Dance of the Graces that he witnesses leads to harmonious reconciliation of the apparent incompatibilities among grace, nature, and culture. First of all, Mount Acidale is a place where grace and nature coexist harmoniously. Much of the special richness and suggestiveness of Mount Acidale relies on insistent repetitions of similar images and motifs, a technique through which he develops an increasingly resonant pattern
of allusion. In describing Mount Acidale, an image of the Golden World, the poet subtly reemploys the images and implications of the House of Holiness and the Garden of Adonis. The hermit Contemplation lives on "an hill, that was both steepe and hy" (1.10.46); Mount Acidale is also "an hill plaste in an open plaine" (6.10.6). These are both places of divine vision and instruction like Mount Sinai or Mount Olive. There is also a striking similarity between the Garden of Adonis and Mount Acidale:

She [Venus] brought her [Amoret] to her joyous Paradise,
Where most she wonnes, when she on earth does dwel.
So faire a place, as Nature can deuize:
                      ........................................
But well I wote by tryall, that this same All other pleasant places doth excell,
(3.6.29)

For all that euer was by natures skill Deuized to worke delight, was gathered there, And there by her were poured forth at fill, As if this to adorne, she all the rest did pill.
(6.10.5)

Both the places are images of unfallen nature full of innocent joy. Mount Acidale becomes "a point at which the
undisplaced apocalyptic world and the cyclic world of nature come into alignment," to borrow Northrop Frye's expression (Anatomy 203).

Furthermore, Mount Acidale is a place where the ideal image of the human community is revealed; Melibee's pastoral world reveals and criticizes the vices of the civilized world but cannot offer an alternative. One day Calidore happens to witness "an hundred naked maidens lilly white" (6.10.11). They dance around a maiden who is also surrounded by three other ladies:

All they without were raunged in a ring,
And daunced round; but in the midst of them
Three other ladies did both daunce and sing,
The whilste the rest them round about did hemme,
And like a girlonde did in compasse stemme,
And in the middest of those same three, was placed
Another Damzell, as a precious gemme,
Amidst a ring most richly well enchaced,
That with her goodly presence all the rest much graced. (6.10.12)

The images of "ring" and "girlonde" and the final word "graced" make the Dance an ideal image of the Christian community harmoniously ordered by the working of grace that unites its members in divine love. The Dance, however, has an ugly parallel earlier in Book 6. The image of the circle
has been already employed to describe the Salvage Nation surrounding Serena:

The Damzell wakes, then all attonce vpstart,
And round about her flocke, like many flies,
Whooping, and hallowing on every part,
As if they would have rent the brasen skies.

(6.8.40)

Their circle forming an image of utter confusion and disharmony, the Salvage Nation completely and absurdly distort the meaning of grace. They do not know how to return the grace they received to the source by sharing it among them; their evil practices of human sacrifice and cannibalism are utter distortions of the idea of courtesy underlying the Dance. It is inevitable that the Salvage Nation lead a life of cruel exploitation.

Spenser borrowed the motif of the Dance of the Graces from classical mythology. The Graces are three daughters of Jove--Euphrosyne, Aglaia, and Thalia--as Colin explains after the vision vanishes because of Calidore's intrusion (6.10.22). Colin's explanation of the Dance reveals Spenser's concept of courtesy. First of all, the function of the Graces is to teach "how to each degree and kynde / We should our selues demeane, to low, to hie; / To friends, to foes, which skill men call Civility" (6.10.23). But courtesy is more than civility; it is "the roote of ciuill conuersation" (6.1.1).
Colin's explanation of their appearance and position is crucial to understanding the essence of true courtesy:

Therefore they alwaies smoothly seeme to smile,
That we likewise should mylde and gentle be,
And also naked are, that without guile
Or false dissemblaunce all them plaine may see,
Simple and true from couert malice free:
And eeke them selues so in their daunce they bore,
That two of them still forward seem'd to bee,
But one still towards shew'd her selfe afore;
That good should from vs goe, then come in greater store. (6.10.24)

Behind these lines lies a peculiar attitude toward classical myths which was widely disseminated in the Renaissance: it is to allegorize myths to deliver moral messages to the reader (Lotspeich 52). Interpreting the last four lines is very difficult because of uncertainty about how Spenser intended the word "then" in the final line to be read: whether it should be read as the adverb of time "then" or as the comparative conjunction "than" is uncertain because Spenser uses the same spelling to designate the two different words (Tonkin, Spenser's 250).

Two different interpretations occur. One is a classical interpretation going back to Seneca. E. K., the anonymous commentator of The Shepheardes Calender explains:
[The Graces] make three, to wete, that men first ought to be gracious and bountiful to other freely, then to receive benefits at other mens hands curteously, and thirdly to requite them thankfully: which are three sundry Actions in liberalitye. (1: 44)

According to this, the reader should read "then" as the adverb of time, and the final line means that we should first be generous to others so that we might receive more from them later. It is a practical lesson about how to conduct oneself in life (Geller 267).

But there is also a theological interpretation. Alexander Ross interprets the Graces theologically in his Mystagogus Poeticus published in 1648:

Faith, Hope, and Charity are the three Divine Graces. . . . In these three Divine Sisters, one only looketh to us, to wit Charity; the other two, Faith and Hope fix their eyes from us upon God.

(qtd. in Geller 252)

According to this interpretation, the reader should read "then" as the conjunction "than"; thus the line emphasizes selfless giving, which is clearly connected with charity or agape. Following this interpretation, courtesy becomes more than the classical idea of generosity which was always based on reciprocal giving and receiving; it becomes agape or God's unconditional, selfless love which man should convey
to his neighbors without expecting any return. By deliberately making Colin's explanation ambiguous, Spenser suggests that there is always an unsurpassable gap between grace itself and man's interpretation of it; in the end, even Christianity is not grace but merely its instrument subject to misunderstanding and distortion because of man's sin.

If we consider the Dance of the Graces in connection with Colin, not Calidore, we can regard it as the source of poetic inspiration. The name Colin Clout is the one Spenser used to designate his poetic self in *The Shepheardes Calender*. Now he explicitly discloses that Colin on Mount Acidale is no one but himself:

That iolly shepheheard, which there piped, was

Poore Colin Clout (who knows not Colin Clout?)

(6.10.16)

Representing Spenser's disguised self, Colin leads the Graces to harmonious order by his playing of a pipe. The relationship between Colin and the Dance is the same with that between the poet and his poetic creation. It is evident that Spenser regards his writing poems as a variant of courtesy (Mallette, "Poet" 262). The poet's courtesy is to return the gift of poetic inspiration received from the Graces to the source by his selfless service of writing poems. By transmitting the meaning of the Dance of the Graces to Calidore, Colin plays the role of an intermediator
between the ideal Golden World and the real world full of imperfections, thus lifting up the fallen state of civilization. His duty is to reveal through his verse the true form of virtue hidden from his contemporaries' sight. As Philip Sidney insists: "her [nature's] world is brasen, the Poets only deliver a golden" (3: 8). But it should not be overlooked that Calidore's completely ignorant and insensitive response to the Dance of the Graces severely jeopardizes such an exalted role of the poet.

The importance of Calidore's vision on Mount Acidale cannot be emphasized too much. But this vision itself ironically becomes a proof of the imperfection of the world; the actual world has almost no room to afford it. Calidore's clumsy intrusion makes it vanish; the Brigants ruthlessly destroy the whole pastoral world. The Legend of Courtesie holds up an ideal vision which is shattered by the malice, greed, and snobbery of the imperfect world. The dominant sense of the book is one of disillusionment, of the disparity between the poet's ideals and the reality he sees (Neuse 331). Reflecting the poet's frank acceptance of the limit of his vision, The Faerie Queene presents a remarkably wide and complex perspective on courtesy in the real world.

A serious misunderstanding of Calidore is to regard him as the apotheosis of the virtues Spenser has displayed in earlier books. Spenser presents Calidore's portrait in a
deliberately ambiguous language at the beginning of Book 6 and requires of the reader a careful scrutiny:

But mongst them all was none more courteous
Knight,
Then Calidore, beloued ouer all,
In whom it seemes, that gentleness of spright
And manners mylde were planted naturall;
To which he adding comely guize withal,
And gracious speach, did steale mens hearts away. (6.1.2)

It is uncertain whether by his intrinsic worth or by his "comely guize" and "gracious speach" Calidore is much favored in the court. Moreover, it is uncertain whether Calidore himself has insight for penetrating into the nature of true courtesy. The answer is not wholly positive. In the Tristram episode, Calidore shows more interest in Tristram's outer qualities—"his face so lovely sterne and coy" and "the answeres of his pregnant wit" (6.2.24)—than his display of the potential for true courtesy.

Calidore's sojourn in the pastoral world suggests that his inadequate idea of courtesy has not much changed since he disappeared in Canto 3 to pursue the Blatant Beast. His attitude toward Melibee and the shepherds reveals that, being a sophisticated courtier, he cannot be completely free from his inclination for "outward shows" (6.9.34) despite his conscious efforts to lower himself to the humble state
of a shepherd. And he even does so only to attract the attention of Pastorella, his new lover (6.9.36). His courtesy or show of generosity always has a calculated motive behind it. Moreover, his encounter with the Graces clearly betrays the limit of his ability to discern the true form of courtesy because he understands nothing about the Dance even after he has seen it.

But all these notions of Calidore's limits should not induce us to conclude that he is a typical example of the philistine Renaissance courtier. Spenser is deeply aware of the fundamental imperfection of man whose wit and will are radically impaired since the Fall. Calidore is no exception. But his failure to comprehend the meaning of the Dance does not mean that his vision of the Dance is unnecessary. There exists a complex relationship between agape and eros (Niebuhr, Nature 2: 81-90). First, by presenting the Dance of the Graces as an element in the central message of Book 6, Spenser insists that agape should be the final norm of eros. Calidore is obliged to approximate his love to agape because only agape can transcend man's selfish concern inherent in eros and realize the ideal of the true Christian community. But agape also contradicts all forms of goodness achieved by eros which is never free from self-assertion. Calidore has no room to boast of his generosity.
Calidore's failure in comprehending the meaning of his vision can be examined in relation to the issue of the reader's response to poetry. If the Dance of the Graces is an emblem of *The Faerie Queene*, Calidore represents the reader who fumbles around the surface of the poem. He becomes so absorbed in the external beauty of the Dance that he completely ignores its true significance:

There he did see, that pleased much his sight,
That euen he him selfe his eyes enuyde. (6.10.11)

Calidore's fault lies in that he overlooks the inner meaning of a symbolic vision (MacCaffrey 392).

Calidore's other fault is the opposite to his first one: he tries to reduce the rich metaphorical suggestiveness of the Dance to an unambiguous conceptual message as he hankers after the precise identity of the Graces (6.10.20). In the end, the Dance is only a complex metaphor of the ideal Christian community whose source is beyond man's neat conceptualization. That is why Colin refuses to disclose the identity of the maiden at the center of the Dance:

Who can aread, what creature mote she bee,
Whether a creature, or a goddesse graced
With heauenly gifts from heuen first enraced?

(6.10.25)

Spenser is deeply conscious of how easily his poem can be misread by the reader who does not understand the nature of
poetic language and metaphor which defies both literalism and crude didacticism.

The Legend of Courtesie is studded with many failures and unfinished episodes, intensifying a sense of the uncertainty and insecurity of life. Calidore's fight with the Blatant Beast, the last episode of the book, also imparts a strongly pessimistic tone to Book 6. It is ironical that Calidore rescues Pastorella from the Brigants and survives in the fight with the Beast not by means of his gentle courtesy but by his use of force:

His shield he on him [the Blatant Beast] threw, and fast downe held,

Like as a bullocke, that in blody stall

Of butchers balefull hand to ground is feld,

Is forcibly kept downe, till he be throughly queld. (6.12.30)

The description of the fighting between them is filled with violent images far different from the peaceful Dance of the Graces on Mount Acidale.

The final canto of Book 6 poignantly testifies that the vision leads to no improvement of the actual world, where the Blatant Beast rages more fiercely after escaping from its confinement (6.12.39). Book 6 presents a world hostile to any human effort to create civil harmony (Humbury 4). From the beginning it would have been impossible for Calidore to suppress the Blatant Beast completely; not only
he has fundamental limitations within himself but the beast, an allegorical creature of slander and calumny, gradually takes on the implication of evil itself. The poet compares its mouth to "the mouth of Orcus" (6.12.26) and refers to "this hellish Beast" (6.12.32) and the "serpent" (6.12.28), suggesting that it has a far more sinister character than mere slander or calumny has.

The Blatant Beast as an allegorical creature is given a visual shape and even can be controlled by the knight in some measure; however, it is possible only in the imaginary world conceived by the poet (Berger, "Secret Discipline" 61). What the beast represents is diffused among the corrupt and malicious spirits of the actual world. Its escape is nothing but the poet's frank confession that The Faerie Queene as an allegory comes to an end. The poet humbly admits that there is no possibility even for Christian culture to conform perfectly to Christ's perfect love.

But Book 6 is only an end to The Faerie Queene. The full eschatological significance of Book 6 is revealed in "Two Cantos of Mutabilitie," which fully develops the idea hinted at in Book 6 that chance or fortune, being an instrument of God's redemption, is ultimately subject to Providence (Borris, "Fortune" 137). Usually regarded as a fragment of Book 7 but in fact a brilliant philosophical and mythological reflection on the destiny of man and the whole
creation, "Two Cantos of Mutabilitie" offers quite a different view of history from that of Book 6 which seems to be preoccupied with the inevitable frustrations history is subject to. In contrast to Mutability's claim that all are subject to her ever-changing, destructive power (7.7.19), Dame Nature views the process of history essentially from a positive perspective, offering room for man's striving for perfection in history:

I well consider all that ye haue sayd,
And find that all things stedfastnes doe hate
And changed be: yet being rightly wayd
They are not changed from their first estate;
But by their change their being doe dilate:
And turning to themselues at length againe,
Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate:
Then ouer them Change doth not rule and raigne;
But they raigne ouer change, and doe their states maintain. (7.7.58)

But history cannot perfect itself; to believe so is to make it an idol. History is subject to wait for its final redemption in eschatological hope, as St. Paul proclaims in sublime words:

[The] creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that
the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. (Rom. 8:21-2)
And it is with such an earnest hope that Spenser closes his magnificent poem:

For, all that moueth, doth in Change delight:
But thence-forth all shall rest eternally
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight:
O that great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that Sabaoths sight. (7.8.2)

*The Faerie Queene* amply shows that its author is a highly disciplined and creative thinker as well as a poet of inexhaustible imagination. His dynamic mode of thinking is rooted in his profound awareness of the uneasy tension between the classical and Christian understandings of the nature and destiny of man, which became more and more acutely felt during his time. But as a creative thinker, Spenser attempts to relate the aspirations of culture to the insights of Christianity dynamically. In *The Faerie Queene* Spenser tries to present a comprehensive religious, ethical, political, and social vision for the Christian community of Protestant England. But this task might have been done by any careful and systematic thinker in his time. What is peculiar to Spenser's mode of thinking is that he maintains the tension between the demands of culture and Christianity to the end, refusing to offer a merely coherent and comfortable system of moral and social principles based on
the doctrine of Christianity. This achievement would have been impossible if he had regarded his poetic medium only as the bearer of the principles. In Spenser's hands the vast reservoir of poetic conventions, themes, and *topoi* become a powerful tool to explore both the potentials and limits of the principles. For Spenser, rigorous thinking and fertile imagination are only two inseparably related aspects of one dynamically creative process that is *The Faerie Queene*.
NOTES

1 As for the influence of the so-called courtesy books popular during the Renaissance on Spenser's Book 6, D. C. Culp flatly denies that they can illuminate the Legend of Courtesie (254). But Robin Headlam Wells argues that Spenser's concern about the deeper meaning of courtesy that goes beyond the notion of accomplished and graceful social conduct is not original but shared by Renaissance courtesy literature in general (221). Tonkin especially emphasizes the possible influence of Stefano Guazzo's La Civile Conversatione on Book 6 because of the serious moral tone of the Italian book (168).
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