DEALIGNMENT DECADES ON:

PARTISANSHIP AND

PARTY SUPPORT IN

GREAT BRITAIN,

1979-1996

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

University of North Texas in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Karl Ka-yiu Ho, M.S.

Denton, Texas

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This dissertation surveys electoral change in Great Britain during the period between 1979 and 1996. It analyzes the long-term factors and the short-term dynamics underlying the *evolution* of three aspects of the electorate: party identification, voting intentions and party support in inter-election periods. Drawing on cross-sectional and panel data from the British Election Studies and public opinion polls, I investigate the impacts of long-term socialization and short-term perceptions on voters' political decisions. I hypothesize that, over the last four elections, perceptual factors such as evaluations of party leaders and issues, particularly economic concerns, emerged as the major forces that account for the volatility in electoral behavior in Britain. Accordingly, this study is divided into three sections: Part I probes into the evolution in party identification across age cohorts and social classes as illustrated in trends in partisanship. Part II focuses on changes in voting intentions as affected by perceptual factors and party identification. Part III investigates the public's support for governing parties by analyzing the dynamics of aggregate party support during inter-election periods.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The British polity has been widely applauded as the prototype of representative democracy. Distinguished by its enduring political stability (Ranney 1956, Epstein 1980), the country has a primarily two-party system that is characterized by a stable social structure and durable class-party ties. This party system is deemed as the cornerstone of partisan equilibrium that contributes to the political stability the country has enjoyed throughout the twentieth century (Converse 1969, Abramson 1992). During the postwar decades prior to 1979, it was argued that the Conservative and Labour parties acquired approximate balance in governance and public support rooted in salient class cleavage. An enduring demographic structure operated to maintain a system that relied on generational replacement as the primary motor of political change (Butler and Stokes 1969).

Toward the end of the 1970s, prolonged economic malaise subjected this seemingly stable system to tremendous stress and strains. The winter of discontent in 1979 -- a landmark in British history for workers' strikes, price hikes and high-standing unemployment -- precipitated the defeat of the Labour government led by James Callaghan. The new Conservative prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, entered Downing...
No. 10 with a portfolio filled with policies that replaced the then prevalent "Butskellite" consensus. Beginning that same year, the Thatcherist government embarked on an era that brought forth a series of political and social reforms that effected a "sea change" in the British polity.

Mrs. Thatcher's espousal of a free market economy, as exemplified by her privatization policies and reduction in direct taxation, successfully "revolutionized" the political and social structure of the country (Jenkins 1988, King ed. 1993). The government's reverse social engineering in housing policies, for instance, significantly reshaped British society and yielded a considerable "political dividend" for the Tories (Crewe 1993). These policies were typified by the council house sale program that delivered home ownership to more affluent working class families. In 1950, only 29 percent of the population owned their homes; the figure soared to 67 percent in 1990. The surge in the number of homeowners helped to undermine the social base of the Labour party and resulted in a substantial swing to the Conservative party² (Heath et al. 1991).

On the economic front, Mrs. Thatcher's industrial policies aimed at the trade unions lessened the unionized workers' powers and influence. A series of employment acts systematically removed the traditional immunities and prerogatives enjoyed by labor unions in strikes and member recruitment. These policy instruments, coupled with the rise in unemployment, helped slash union membership by 3 million between 1979 and 1991 (Crewe 1993). As a consequence, the problem of strikes, which had plagued the
country in the 1970s, was scaled down to insignificance throughout much of the 1980s (Hyman 1992, Crewe 1991).

The trade unions' diminishing influence was not unexpected given the structural changes in the British economic environment. Transformations of the economy from manufacturing and large-scale plant productions to services and self-employed, small businesses led to a decline in manual worker population. In 1950, manual workers made up a majority (68 percent) of the working population; in the 1980s, the figure dropped to 48 percent. Corresponding to the decline, union membership shrank from 50 percent of the workforce in 1979 to 36 percent in 1990 (Butler and Kavanagh 1992). It has been argued that this contraction of the working class contributed to a movement toward liberal values on government economic policies which has enormously benefited the Conservatives at the expense of Labour (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985).

In the 1980s and 1990s, new political and economic developments, including the rise of a new political party, the outbreak of foreign war, the growing salience of the European Community and, in particular, the issue of a unified European currency, has brought new challenges to the British political environment and the electorate. Perhaps most importantly, as traditional social class attachments have diminished, British voters have resorted to an issue-oriented approach when making political choice and expressing political preferences (Harrop 1977; Alt 1979; Clarke, Stewart and Zuk 1986).

Even prior to 1980, the growing importance of issues among British voters, and the concomittant decline of class voting, led to a period of electoral volatility of voting
behavior (Franklin 1985). The new voting pattern focusing on issues and short-term factors continued in the 1980s. The British electorate was evolving from voting based on social structural factors to calculating utilities corresponding to political and economic evaluations. Three-quarters of the British voters, as survey evidence suggests, are no longer anchored by partisan allegiance or family-class-party ties in the general elections after 1979 (Rose and McAllister 1986). Key to this trend has been the general decline of partisanship among the British voters. The erosion of partisan loyalties -- as described by the "dealignment of degree" in party identification -- became an established pattern among British voters in the 1980s (Clarke and Stewart 1984). The decline in partisan ties, in both strength and durability, became manifest in the elections beginning in the 1970s (Rose 1974; Rose and McAllister 1986). Short-term factors such as macroeconomic conditions (e.g., fluctuations in unemployment, interest rates and inflation), party leader images and political shocks (e.g., international war and political scandals) have usurped the predominance of social class cleavages. Economic factors, specifically, voters' evaluations of the state of the national economy and their personal financial situations, have emerged as major factors governing public support for political parties and coloring the electorate's perception and support for political leaders (Lewis-Beck 1988; Clarke et al. 1992).

In recognition of these changes, this study investigates three aspects of the evolution of the British electorate: party identification, voting choice and support for governing parties in the periods between general elections. As for the first two aspects,
the focus is on probing changes in partisanship and electoral choice since 1979 and identifying factors that contribute to such variations. Specifically, it analyzes the effects on party identification and voting choices of i) sociological (long-term) factors as exemplified by such variables as occupational class, home ownership, union membership and education as well as ii) psychological (short-term) factors such as perception of party leader images, position on issues and evaluations of economic conditions. Drawing upon individual-level data from the British National Election Studies (BES) surveys, I investigate the relationship between voters' socio-demographic and psychological attributes and political choices. After examining partisanship and electoral choice at the individual level, this study utilizes time series data covering the 1979-1996 period to examine the dynamics of governing party support at the aggregate level.

1.2 Literature Review

a. Electoral Research in Britain

Research on voting behavior and elections in Britain can be traced back to the 1940s when electoral studies were an enterprise of historians. The pathfinder of the British General Elections Studies series, R. B. McCallum, pioneered by collecting historical information on election campaigns and their impact on electoral outcomes. The Nuffield series--named after their connection with Nuffield College, Oxford--had its origins in 1945 when the focus was on examining relationships among issues, political parties and leaders, coverage of mass media and ultimately, the election outcome. This
focus has been maintained by David Butler and his colleagues over the intervening decades.

The quantitative aggregate level data gathered from the studies in the 1940s and 1950s concerned voter turnout and the distribution of votes and parliamentary seats on the national and constituency level. These aggregate data provided a valuable picture of the general public's political complexion and cross-constituency and inter-election changes in collective voting outcome. However, analyses based on such data are inherently limited in ability to account for the decision process of individual voters and the effects of other intervening factors such as party allegiance, personal attributes, social economic status and personal judgment of party leaders and issue concerns.

Awareness of the limitations of the aggregate level data prompted the introduction of electoral surveys in the early 1950s. Using the sampling methodology developed in the American election studies in the late 1940s, the first British election survey was launched in 1950 studying the voting behavior of the Greenwich constituents during the general election in the same year. The first of its kind, the survey interviewed 914 Greenwich citizens to investigate the relationship between political choice and a series of sociological factors. The results were reported in *How People Vote* (Benney, Gray and Pear 1956).

The Greenwich study ushered in a proliferation of a number of other electoral surveys focusing on local elections or specific issues (Milne and Mackenzie 1954, 1958; Trenaman and McQuail 1961; see Denver and Hands 1992). Although election surveys
in the 1950s represented important advances in studying voting behavior, they were
confined to localities or several constituencies. It was not until 1963 when the first
national election survey was conducted. One year prior to the 1964 general election,
David Butler and Donald Stokes embarked on a national survey of voting behavior,
which has been followed by a series of similar studies in every subsequent general
election\(^5\) (Denver and Hands 1992).

Most of the electoral research in Britain was guided by two major voting models.
Both models emphasized long-term forces. The simple "class voting" model prevalent in
the 1950s and 1960s suggests that a voter's electoral choice is determined by long-term
social class factors. Its successor, the "social psychological" model, combines political
socialization theory with the Michigan party identification model, and argues that
electoral choice is determined by the long-term factor of social class, which, in turn,
determines partisan allegiance (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974; See also Denver and
Hands 1992). These partisan attachment tend to be durable forces in the set of
psychological factors affecting electoral choice.

In their pioneering work on electoral changes in Great Britain, *Political Change in
Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice*, Butler and Stokes analyze political change by
focusing on social class, party identification and electoral choices of the British voters.
The 1969 edition of this book, followed by a second edition in 1974, was based on data
collected in three previous national surveys (1963, 1964 and 1966 with additional survey
data from 1970 in the second edition). The authors carefully segregate the short-term
changes from the long-term evolution of a relationship between social attributes and political behavior. In their typology, changes can be categorized into three fundamental kinds. The first of these involves the generational replacement that induces attitudinal and behavioral differences among age cohorts. As Butler and Stokes argue, the "inexorable processes of birth and maturation on one hand and aging and death on the other" provide the sources of cumulative changes as the political complexion of the electorate alters little by little every year as a result of replacement of cohorts (Butler and Stokes 1969: pp. 4-5). The role of this long-term factor in effecting political change, in the authors' views, is of fundamental significance as compared with other political variables.

The second type of political change entails mutation in the elector's attachment to political parties. Embedded in the endurance of party alignments, as the authors articulate, is primarily the influence of social class cleavage. It is unlikely for a partisan to convert once a party identity is developed and behind this political allegiance among voters is the social class cleavage that has been bifurcating the British electorate since the rise of the Labour Party early in this century. Given the stability of the class-party cleavage, the demographic renewal of the electorate will therefore take years to yield meaningful changes in aggregate political alignment.

The third type of electoral variability in Britain arises from the ongoing march of political issues and political events that constitute short-term forces on electoral behavior. Such stimuli, which the authors argue have a stronger impact on younger voters,
nevertheless do not affect the lasting party alignment in the long run. The image of a
party leader, the surge of a hotly-debated issue or a controversial fiscal policy are subject
to diminution of the "more enduring bases of party strength" and the "more basic
cleavages [that] cut through the electorate."

During the 1970s, the British polity experienced a period of electoral volatility as
the linkage between class and party began to attenuate. The dealignment of party support
evident in election survey findings gave rise to a new school of electoral studies
challenging the orthodoxy of the class voting model. A new generation of psephologists
began to cast doubt on the class voting model that resorted to demographic changes in
accounting for electoral change. Instead of seeking the source of political change in long-
term sociological factors, scholars embarked on a stream of research focusing on short-
term forces as exemplified by issue concerns and economic evaluations (Sarlvik and
Crew 1983, Franklin 1985, Whiteley 1986). This "issue voting" model argues that voters
are becoming more conscious of government policies and tend to base their vote on their
assessments of government performance. In this model, short-term forces provide the
primary sources of electoral change.

The new conventional wisdom of issue voting in the 1980s did not prevail without
controversy. In the mid-1980s, debate focused on the longstanding topic of class and
partisan dealignments. Social class cleavages, and, in turn, long-term partisan
attachments, as some commentators argue, were still "alive" and acting as major forces
determining electoral behavior (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985; Rose and McAllister
Having resurrected the class factor, scholars like Heath and his colleagues adopted a new "interactionist" approach to interpret political change in the 1980s (e.g. Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985). They argued that social class was still the most prominent factor defining partisanship and voting choice. Class-based ideologies and political principles provide cues for voters to filter information when choosing between parties, while parties interact to help shape and redefine political support in the electorate (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985: p. 174).

The protracted and sometimes heated debates on class voting versus issue voting have yet to arrive at a unified model to explain relationship between long-term socialization effects and short-term perceptions in affecting electoral change. The two models are divided on the conceptualization and role of party identification and its electoral affinity with class and voting choice (Denver and Hands 1992). Drawing on individual- and aggregate-level data, this study endeavors to resolve the differences of the two models by integrating long-term and short-term forces in an explanation to the evolution of party support in the British electorate.

a. The Class Voting Model

During the postwar decades, partisanship and electoral choice in Great Britain were largely a function of social cleavages and family/parental influence. For example, the 1964 British election was a typical class-based group voting as a vast majority (up to 99%) of working class electors voted for Labour (Franklin 1985). As Peter Pulzer (1967) reckons, "(C)lass is the basis of British politics; all else is mere embellishment and
Empirical studies of elections after 1964 portrayed a different picture of the British electorate. As Butler and Stokes note, the social mechanisms and class forces that had driven the class voting pattern had "passed their peak" in influencing election results (Butler and Stokes 1974). Despite controversies over the linkage among class, party identification and vote, the decline of class voting has become widely accepted in recent research on partisanship and electoral choice (Miller 1978; Crewe 1983; Crewe 1986; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985). Subsequent studies have found that the dominant class voting pattern in the 1960s gave way to the significance of psychological or perceptual factors such as evaluation of leaders and issue preference in selection of government (Alt 1979; Franklin 1985).

b. The Issue Voting Model

The new calculus of electoral choice prevalent in the 1970s and the 1980s was partially a consequence of cohort replacement and general social changes that were not confined to the British environment (Abramson 1992). Parallel trends were observed among most Western industrial democracies including Germany, the United States and Canada (Franklin et al. 1992, Kornberg and Clarke 1992). During these two decades, erosion of the class-party-vote linkage that connected social class cleavage with perceptions of parties' issue priorities gave way to a much more flexible view of voters' issue concerns and party-issue linkages (Franklin 1985). Specifically, the notion that the working class prioritized employment as a primary concern over others in supporting leftist parties no longer dominated models of how issues affected voting. Rather, it was
argued that new generations of voters perceived issue priorities from different perspectives. Short-term factors such as movements in macroeconomic indicators, viz. inflation, interest rate and unemployment, became significant indices for voters in making electoral decisions. Economic evaluations—particularly, the "pocketbook" factor, or concerns for personal financial situations—emerged as a highly salient issue that preoccupied most voters (Sanders et al. 1987).

In the early 1990s, the prolonged economic malaise led the public to pay renewed attention to an old issue: the ailing British economy. For voters in the 1992 election, the problem of the economy was no longer bifurcated into individual aspects as "iconized" by inflation and unemployment. The "valence-issue" election of 1992, which focused on the widely-perceived national recession, reflected the fact that voters were concerned about the future and how competent were the parties to manage the economy in the years ahead. Parties strove to convince voters that they were able to handle matters better than their opponents (Newton 1993). As political analysts suggest, it was such prospective evaluations that prompted the electorate to make a last moment swing to from Labour to the Conservatives in April 1992 (Sanders 1993, Newton 1993).

c. New Directions in Issue Voting: From Spatial to Directional Models?

Against the background of class dealignment in the 1970s, there rose a new determinant of electoral choice: issue orientations. In this regard, earlier studies of issue voting focused on the proximities of voters' positions on an issue and their perceived positions of the parties. The closer the individual's issue position to that of a party, the more favorably the voter would evaluate the party (Downs 1957; Davis, Hinich and
Recent empirical research on issue voting in the United States and Norway argues that this traditional spatial model fails to evaluate the issue effect on voting decisions. Voters do not view issues in a straightforward fashion as the model assumes. As Rabinowitz and Macdonald articulate, the public does not possess specific policy preference "along a set of issue continua" (1989). At best, voters know the pros and cons or which side of an issue debate they favor. In light of this, the authors propose a directional issue position variable, which captures both the direction and intensity of a voter's stance on issues, as a better surrogate in modeling issue effect on party identification and voting choice. To investigate the impact of issues on political choice, this study replicates Rabinowitz and Macdonald's analysis in the British context and compares the explanatory power of the directional model with the traditional proximity model. By applying encompassing tests to determine which model provides a more adequate explanation (Mizon and Richard 1986; Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor 1990), the study attempts to distinguish the model that best captures how issues affect electoral choice.

1.3 Organization of the Study

employed in Chapter V come from the Gallup public opinion poll and OECD economic indicators. As an introduction, Chapter I has chronicled the social, economic and political developments of Great Britain during the period between 1979 and 1992, paying special attention to the factors that foster the structural transformations in British society. It also provides a framework in guiding the subsequent analyses.

Chapter II to Chapter IV concentrate on investigating i) trends in party identification of individual voters as reflected in the four BES election surveys from 1979 to 1992 and how partisanship fluctuates across generations; ii) social cleavage factors such as social class characteristics (occupation, self-defined class and home and share ownership), union membership that contribute to changes in party allegiance (Rose and McAllister 1986, Franklin 1985); and iii) perceptual factors that color the attitudinal disposition of political parties such as leader evaluations and issue evaluations (Clarke and Stewart 1984, Clarke et al. 1992, Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Analyses in these chapters focus on the hypothesis that voters' party identification is a function of both long-term and short-term factors. The former group of variables include a) objective class attributes like occupational class, home ownership and union membership; b) demographic attributes like age and education; and c) previous party identification. Short-term forces comprise c) the voters' issue positions as referenced to those of the political parties; and f) their evaluation of party leaders.

Specifically, Chapter II compares voters from different age cohorts on: a) effects of generational replacement, b) lifecycle effects and c) effects of other socio-demographic factors on the decline of partisanship. This chapter documents trends in partisanship in
terms of the strength of voters' attachment to the three national political parties, namely, Conservative, Labour and the Social Democrats/Liberal Democrats. Chapter III studies the determinants of the strength and direction of party identification. Contrary to the classical "Michigan" model (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960), British studies conducted in the 1980s have suggested that party identification is conditioned by a voter's evaluations of party leaders and issues (Clarke and Stewart 1984, Alt 1984). Accordingly, this chapter examines the effects of these two variables by testing a series of multivariate models. These models specify that voters' party identification in the 1992 election is a function of their previous party identifications (1987), their evaluations of party leaders and his positions on various issues. Thus, in addition to the leader image and the issue variables, a lagged dependent variable—party identification in the previous election—is also included in these party identification models. This inclusion of a lagged party identification variable is consistent with arguments that voters' partisan attachments at time t are driven, in part, by their previous (at time t-1) partisan attachments (Fiorina 1981, Clarke and Stewart 1984).

In Chapter IV, the perspective turns to the voting behavior of individual voters. To what extent does dealignment in partisanship affect the voting decision of individual voters? How does the difference in issue positions between voters and parties affect voting choice? How will the other factors affect the voter's decision at the ballot box? To address these questions, this chapter focuses on an analysis of individual voting behavior. The chapter investigates the hypothesis that perceptions of party leaders, issue position proximities, and party identification are the principal determinants of voters'
electoral decisions. A multivariate model is developed to analyze the voting with particular emphasis on assessing applicability of Rabinowitz and Macdonald's (1989) directional voting model. As indicated above, I compare the two variants of the issue voting model, namely, traditional proximity model and directional model using an encompassing test as usually applied in contemporary econometric analyses.

To examine party support in the periods between general elections, Chapter V employs time series analysis to follow the trajectory of public sentiments for political parties since 1979. Using aggregate data collected from Gallup polls on party support, a multivariate model is tested with special attention on three categories of variables. They are: 1) subjective evaluations of the economy; 2) satisfaction of the prime minister and 3) political interventions such as the Falklands War of 1982 and the currency crisis of 1992.

Chapter VI summarizes the empirical evidence gathered from the preceding chapters and reconsiders the evolution of party support in the British electorate since 1979.

1.4 Conclusion

After its narrow victory in 1992, the popularity of Conservative Party plummeted to a historic low in 1995. In the same year, Conservative leader John Major reached a nadir in prime ministerial approval, earning him both the titles of the "most popular and most unpopular" leader in this century. Meanwhile, a revitalized Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair has managed to garner tremendous amount of popular support. While almost every sign augurs a Tory doomsday in the next general election, observers
of British politics are ready to recognize that the changeable nature of the British
electorate makes electoral forecasting a very “risky business”. The following chapters
consider various aspects of this electorate and the political changes in the past two
decades that have produced this volatility that makes British politics less predictable and
perhaps more fascinating than it was before the “decade of dealignment”.
Endnotes

1. Between 1945 and 1979, the Conservatives ruled for 17 years in 5 governments and Labour ruled for 18 years in 4 governments.

2. According to Heath et al. (1991), the swing accounts for 4.8 percent of votes from Labour to the Conservatives between 1964 and 1987.

3. Noteworthy is the Social Democratic Party established by four former Labour leaders in March 1981 and its subsequent alliance with the Liberal Party eight months later. The Alliance once achieved 51 percent of popular support, leading both major parties upon its launching in late 1981.

4. The Falklands War in 1982, for instance, was a landmark in British electoral history. Significantly, the South Atlantic battle boosted popularity of the governing Conservative party along with the electorate's economic expectation that precipitated the Tory's landslide victory in the following year (Sanders, Ward and Marsh 1987; Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley 1990).


6. The time series sample used in Chapter VI extends from July 1979 to April 1996.
CHAPTER II

GENERATIONAL REPLACEMENT, SOCIAL CHANGE

AND TREND OF PARTISANSHIP

"Something is required simpler and more permanent, something which can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognised at successive elections as being the same thing that was loved and trusted before; and party is such a thing."

- Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics 1910

2.1 Introduction

Back in the dawn of this century, observers of British politics have recognized that partisanship is "such a thing" that can be loved and trusted and, more importantly, can perpetuate over time. Elections after elections, partisan allegiance signifies the psychological attachment on which voters rely in making their political choices. Voting results testify the linkage between party and the electorate, rendering psephologists evidence to put their theories on ground. Indeed, Wallas was not alone in embracing the perpetuality of "love and trust" to the political parties. Philip Converse, for instance, believes that a voter's tie with his political party grows over time. In his work on partisan stability, he argues that partisanship develops, strengthens and stabilizes over a course of three generations (1969). In the first generation, as Converse theorizes, voters, who are free from any parental influence on party choice, begin to choose and identify themselves
with political parties of their preference. During the second generation, most adults inherit party identifications from their parents. The heritage goes on as party labels are to be bequeathed to the third generation in spite of the generally weaker strength in party loyalty. Nevertheless, voters of this generation are likely to reinforce their partisan allegiance through voting and other political behavior. In addition, partisanship grows with age and life experience (Converse 1969, 1976; see also Abramson 1992).

Echoing Converse's partisan stability thesis, electoral studies prior to the 1970s in Britain delegated a high place to the role of partisanship in analyzing voting behavior. The British electorate was portrayed in these studies as a society of responsible electors: party loyalists, with stable and strong partisan ties, and a high voting turnout. These features, as Converse postulated, contribute to the maturity and stability of the political system in Great Britain as Converse postulates. Election results and corresponding research in the 1950s and 1960s provided supporting evidence to the partisan stability of the British system featured with loyal partisans (Butler and Stokes 1969).

Subsequent research on elections in the 1970s, however, reported a rather different scenario: partisanship of the two major parties, namely the Conservative and Labour, eroded progressively while the electorate became increasingly volatile during that decade (Crewe 1974; Crewe, Särlvik and Alt 1977). Studies extending to the 1979 election went further and portrayed the 1970s as a "decade of dealignment," signifying the general weakening of partisan ties across all social strata (Särlvik and Crewe 1983).

In a 1974 article, for instance, Ivor Crewe first challenged the viability of the
partisan stability model suggested by Butler and Stokes in explaining electoral change. He argued that, according to the Butler-Stokes model which was adapted from the Michigan study, the enduring and self-reinforcing feature of partisanship should lead to an increase in partisan strength over time. A stable electorate as projected from the model is, however, anomalous to what has occurred in Britain in the 1970s: the gradual fall in voting turnout, the persistent shrinkage of the major-party share of votes and accelerating volatility of party support. These findings spelled out the failure of the traditional party identification model in explaining political changes in Britain.

The trend of partisan decline became the focus of another article by Crewe and his colleagues who introduced the term "partisan dealignment" to describe the process of a general depreciation of party allegiance (Crewe, Särlvik and Alt 1977). According to the authors, partisan dealignment refers to the phenomenon in which "none of the major occupational groups provides the same degree of solid and consistent support for one of the two major parties as was the case in the earlier postwar era" (Särlvik and Crewe 1983: pp.332-333).

In his another work with Bo Särlvik, Crewe reinforced his earlier findings of a dramatic partisan decline among British voters with analysis extended to the 1979 election (1983). As Särlvik and Crewe unfolded, the number of partisans who considered themselves "very strongly" attached to a certain party fell from 40 percent of the electorate in 1964 to less than one-fifth (19%) in 1979. The "decade of dealignment," as Crewe and Särlvik note, witnessed the general depreciation of voters' bonds with parties,
particularly among lower class voters whose traditional attachments to the Labour party became more vulnerable (Särlvik and Crewe 1983).

What has caused the changes in political kinship between voters and parties? Earlier studies in the 1960s postulate that generational replacement is the major force that shapes partisanship of the British electorate. Among the most prominent is Butler and Stokes' analysis of political changes in the 1960s and early 1970s (1969, 1974). They contend that among three kinds of changes that occurred to the British electorate, the importance of demographic change is obvious. Although short-term fluctuations in partisan swings and immediate issues and events precipitate transitional variations, generational renewal of the electorate is cumulative and crucial. As new voters enter the electorate replacing the old, it brings attitudinal changes to the political complexion of the electorate. The evolutionary process of political conversion, despite its slow-ness, is the major factor contributing to the changes in political alignment (Butler and Stokes 1969).

Apart from the generational effect, Clarke and Stewart (1984) note that two other effects also account for the changes of the electorate over the course of time. The extension of voting eligibility in 1970 to 18-year-old voters brought in new voters of the younger generation who have generally weaker political party allegiance. As the authors remark, this new generation of electors, which does not have the lengthy life experiences of older generations, would not have sufficient time to be influenced strongly by the lifecycle processes that strengthen their partisan ties (Clarke and Stewart 1984). In their study, Clarke and Stewart report that these two factors have contributed to a clear
downward trend of partisanship among British voters between 1964 and 1983. Instead of describing it as a large-scale realignment or dealignment, they tag the trend as a "dealignment of degree" as they found the decline is a weakening in strength of party identifications among partisans in both major parties. Moreover, the weakening of partisanship is found to be rampant in almost all age cohorts (Clarke and Stewart 1984: pp. 694-697).

In an attempt to extend the analysis of partisan decline in Britain to elections in the 1980s and 1990s, this chapter assesses the trend of party identification over the 1979-1992 period. The trend of partisanship across age cohorts is examined by using cross-sectional and panel data from the British Election Study surveys. After studying the general trends in party identification in the four general elections, I investigate the pattern of partisan change among different generations/cohorts with comparisons extending back to 1964.

2.2 Measuring Change in Partisanship

The decline in partisanship during the 1960s and the 1970s is described in earlier studies as drastic and pervasive. Examination of the trend of partisan dealignment entails the measurement of three types of changes:

1. Change in Partisan Intensity

This type of change refers to the mobility of partisanship in terms of partisan strength with which a person's attachment to a political party is formed. Studies of these
types of changes constitute the majority of research in political change in Britain.

2. Change in Participation

Changes of this kind reflect the mobility of partisans in conversion between a party identifier and a non-identifier. This kind of change may lead to withdrawal of electors/partisans from the electorate and change in proportion or number of non-voters and/or non-identifiers. This can be reflected in the decline of voter turnout or vote shares of major parties as partisans cease to identify with these parties.

3. Change in Party Identity

The third type of partisan change alludes to the switching of partisans to other opposing parties and shifting in partisan alignments.

Put in a continuum of partisanship, these three kinds of changes can be visualized as movements along an imaginary scale with central point at zero representing non-identifiers, right end strong partisans and left end strong partisans of other parties. The first kind of change entails movements in either direction along the right-hand side of the scale, excluding zero. The second type represents the straightforward movement to zero and the third type is the movement in either direction across both arms of the scale across zero as shown below:
Most of the previous studies in partisanship have focused on measuring the first type of change, i.e., movement along the right-hand side of the partisan scale. Two series of measures were developed to examine this type of partisan change: the proportion of "very strong partisans" (e.g., Crewe 1974, Crewe and Särıväk 1983) and mean strength of partisanship (e.g., Clarke and Stewart 1984, Abramson 1992).

This chapter aims to reassess earlier studies with primary focus on the 1979-1992 period. It concentrates on the change of partisanship denoted as the first type of changes identified in previous discussion. Further scrutiny on changes of the other two types forms the task of the following chapters.

In assessing partisanship among British voters, I adopt the conventional coding of party identification as used in American election studies and previous British studies. Data are collected from the British General Election surveys, in which a series of three questions was asked regarding the respondents' party affiliations and strength. Based on the answers to the three questions, an ordinal measure of partisanship is derived from four type of partisans:

1. *very strong partisans* (for those who answer "feel very strongly" toward the chosen
2. fairly strong partisans (for those who answer "feel fairly strongly");

3. weak partisans (for those who answer "not very strongly" plus those who did not identify themselves with a party but said "closer to one" and;

4. non-identifiers, i.e., persons who do not identify themselves with a party and also state that they do not feel closer to a party. Each of the four categories is assigned a score of party identification, which ranges from 0 (non-identifiers) to 3 (strong partisans).

2.3 Partisanship in the Post-dealignment Decade

Partisan decline in the 1970s has been described in previous studies as the major feature of political change in Britain in the postwar decades. Using similar measures from these studies, this chapter scrutinizes the alleged trend of dealignment and demonstrates a different portrait of partisan dealignment during the 1979-1992 period in contrast with earlier elections.

Table 2.1 chronicles the electoral changes in Britain since 1945. It delineates a clear trend of decline in the Labour vote shares and, relatedly, the two major-party (Tory and Labour) vote shares during the last three decades. Pertaining to the former, the figure indicates that Labour suffered a remarkable plunge in the 1974 February election when the Liberal Democrats, with other nationalist parties like Plaid Cymru and Scottish Nationalist Party, surged to strip votes from the two major parties, fattening its share to almost one-fifth of the total votes. This slight "realignment of degree" led to the slide of
two major parties' votes beginning that election. Despite the October election in the same year returned Labour to office, the electoral loss was permanent for Labour. As a result, the two major-party vote descended to a level of below 80 percent (except 1979) of the total vote.

Electoral outcomes provide a rough sketch of voters' choice of governments and the tide of partisan attachment to political parties. They are, nevertheless, inaccurate indices to gauge the flow and ebb of party identification in the electorate. Table 2.2 presents a picture of partisan strength of all nine elections since 1964. Furnishing a detailed breakdown of the direction and strength of partisan attachment by parties in each election year, this table demonstrates a clear decrease of "very strong" partisans. It indicates that, prior to the 1974 February election, more than 40 percent of the partisans were "very strong" identifiers of their parties. This proportion has since been dropping dramatically, leaving less than 30 percent of "very strong" partisan thereafter. The downward trend continues and stabilizes at around 20 percent beginning in 1979 (see Figure 2.1).

The remarkable plunge in the number of "very strong" partisans as displayed in Figure 2.1, reflects a generalized weakening of partisan strength. It characterizes a less partisan electorate in Britain since the 1970s. Although it does not necessarily refer to the widespread departure of electors or contraction of the electorate, this "dealignment in degree" is evident among partisans of the two major parties, particularly to the disadvantage of Labour. Labour identifiers with "very strong" attachments, for instance,
account for 21 percent of the entire electorate in 1964. The figure dives to only 8 percent in 1992, compared to Tories' 19 to 10 percent. Also, as depicted in Figure 2.2, the proportion of Labour identifiers, regardless of intensity of identification, demonstrates a steady diminution. In 1964, 42 percent of the electors identify themselves as Labour compared to 39 percent as Tory. In the 1979 election, the lead of Labour partisans vanished as the Conservatives began to take over. This discrepancy between identifiers of the two parties continues to widen from a gap of 2 percentage points in that year to 12 in 1992.

Across different groups of party identifiers, the partisan decline varies in proportion and strength. In 1964, 50 percent of those who identified themselves with Labour (or 21 percent of the electorate) were very strong partisans, which is the modal group among others (see Figure 2.3b). The corresponding figures for the Tories and the Liberals were 19 percent and 4 percent, respectively. The "very strong" category was the mode for both major parties until February 1974 as the tide turned to the "fairly strong" partisans. Note that, for both the major parties, the proportions of "very strong" partisans decreased sharply in February 1974, after which the figures remain generally stable.

Using the second measure in examining partisan change, the mean strength of party identification, a similar picture of decline in partisanship emerges. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the average partisan strength registers a general downward trend. The overall mean strength drops from 2.23 in 1964 to 1.76 in 1992, with the nadir being 1.74 in 1983. Noteworthy is the slowdown of partisan decline beginning 1979 for both major parties.
Indeed, the general trend leveled as Mrs. Thatcher first government took office despite that the depreciation of mean strength for Liberals continued.

The trend of partisanship over the last three decades manifests a general erosion in both proportion of strong party identifiers and average strength of party support. The analyses using both distribution of strong partisans and mean strength provided above demonstrate two clear characteristics of the movement in partisanship during the twenty-eight year period. The first is the differential depreciation of partisanship across different groups of party identifiers. Consonant with previous studies, it is found that Labour suffers most in the decades of dealignment as it loses as many as 10 percent of party identifiers in the whole electorate (42 percent in 1964 slashed to 32 percent in 1992). In contrast, the Tories increases slightly in size with corresponding figures of 39 percent to 44 percent. The fact that the proportion of Conservative identifiers remains generally stable throughout the period in study (see Figure 2.3) as compared to that of Labour identifiers, illustrates this “differential dealignment.”

The second feature of the partisan trend in the 1964-1992 period is the stabilization of partisan strength since 1979. Beginning with the first Thatcher government that year, the trend of eroding partisan loyalties has slowed, while the mean strength of partisanship for the two major parties remains generally constant in spite of slight downward movements. Table 2.3 presents mean strengths of the three British parties with inter-election differences. The sudden drop between the 1974 October and 1979 elections is manifest for all three parties, with Labour’s loss being the greatest. The
level of partisan loyalty has stabilized since then with the exception of the Liberals, who experienced a minor decline in 1992.

Table 2.4 presents the distribution of party identifiers, including those who did not identify themselves with a party but only said closer to one. It portrays a more stable electorate in the 1979-1992 period. The proportions of party identifiers in different parties do not exhibit any sizable margins except a 6 percent drop of Labour partisans in 1983. Other than that, distribution of identifiers in all three parties remains relatively stable during this period. Note that the demise of the Social Democratic Party, with its Alliance with Liberals, delivers uneven blessings to the major parties in the 1992 election. Among all, the Tories benefited the most (4 percent of the electorate) while the Liberal and Labour merely secure small gains.

In earlier studies, Crewe and other observers posited that the contraction of combined Conservative and Labour shares of vote and partisans lent weight to the partisan dealignment thesis, which depicted a smaller partisan electorate in the 1970s. As analyzed above, the two-party vote share began to rebound in the 1979 election while the figure fluctuated in the 1980s. Vote gains for the Alliance in 1983 and 1984 cut the major parties' vote to as low as 70 percent (see Table 2.1). However, the figure rebounded in subsequent elections and climbed back to a moderate level in the 1992 election. It is too early to conclude that it signifies an ultimate resurgence in the 1990s. The data suggest, however, that the earlier erosion in major party support has ceased.

Pertaining to the change in proportions of major-party partisans, Särlvik and
Crewe contend that the obvious downward trend of the percentage of major-party identifiers is another evidence for the softening of electoral bases of both the Conservative and Labour parties. Using their measure, it is found that the combined percentage of two-party identifiers drops even lower in 1983 (63 % compared to 81 in 1964), given the breakaway of four prominent leaders from Labour to form the SDP in 1981. The proportion of Tories and Labours started to rise thereafter and it scored 76 percent in 1992. The moderate surge is evidenced in another analysis which takes into account those who only think of themselves as "closer to one party" than as a party identifiers (see Table 2.4).

2.4 Explaining the Trend of Partisanship

From the analyses using the mean strength of partisanship and proportion of strong partisans, a clearer picture of partisanship trend in the 1980s and 1990s emerges: the dealignment of party allegiance is in differential among various British parties and the trend of decline has been stabilized beginning the 1979 general election. These findings do not necessarily lead to a counter-argument to the dealignment thesis which has been articulated in the 1970s and early 1980s. Partisanship in Britain has been demonstrated to be a function of various effects. The cohort analysis literature proposes three kinds of effects that account for a population's attitudinal variation over time (Glenn 1977). Generational effects involve the influence of population turnover that is associated with entrance and departure of generations with distinct values. The aging effect is derived
from the life-cycle of a person in forming and altering his/her attitudes as he/she ages. Period effects refer to the influence of a certain period of time during which special events or circumstances cause attitudinal transformation (Glenn 1977).

Previous studies on electoral changes in Britain suggest that generational effect has been the major source of partisan change as older cohorts having stronger ties with parties who have departed the electorate, being replaced by younger generations with weaker party loyalties. Converse, in his well-debated theory of partisan stability, suggests that partisanship grows over time as voters age. In testing this theory, Abramson analyzes and compares eight British elections starting in 1964 in search for the generational effect that moves partisan trends (1992). Contrary to what Converse posits, he discovers that partisanship in Britain, instead of strengthening over time, declines in the last three decades. Applying cohort analyses on the proportion of very strong partisans and the mean strength of partisan loyalties, he suggests that the long-term declivity is due to generational replacement and short-term forces.

Granted the elegance of his work, Abramson's study is vulnerable to two methodological problems rampant in cohort analysis. For one, election surveys vary in sample sizes as well as age distributions. Comparison between a cohort of 200 respondents in one election and another cohort of 50 respondents in the next election will be invalidated by differences in sampling errors (Glenn 1977). This is not uncommon in analysis focusing on comparison between old age groups that may vary considerably in size in the next election owing to high mortality rate. The second drawback arises from
difficulties in disentangling different effects from each other. It is formidable, if not impossible, to discern the impact of generational replacement from period effects when cross-sectional surveys of two adjacent general elections are compared (Glenn 1977: pp. 48-54).

To circumvent the problems of incomparabilities using different election data, I apply the cohort analysis on panel data that taps the responses of the same group of respondents in two general elections. Although it does not illustrate the whole picture across all generations in the last three decades, the panel study uncovers the intergenerational and intra-cohort changes during the 1987-1992 period. The panel study of birth cohorts excels in two aspects. Age effects can be distinguished without considerable error, because the same group of respondents is observed over a fixed period of time. Moreover, comparison across age cohorts will be more reliable given the relatively small sampling error and similar size of standard deviations.

Table 2.5 documents the mean strength of partisanship across 16 age cohorts in the 1987 and 1992 general elections. Variations across the first two columns reflect the age group differences that demonstrate a positive relationship between partisanship and age in both elections. It does not necessarily suggest that adults tend to grow in their partisanship with age, but rather that cohorts born in different periods have different strengths of partisanship. In other words, adults born in 1918 have a higher average mean strength of party identification (namely, 2.05 in 1987) than those born in 1974 (correspondingly, 1.46). Reflecting the impact of different life experiences, it lends
weight to previous findings that older people are more likely to have a higher partisan
bond than younger voters (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974; Crewe, Särlvik and Alt 1977).

Column 5 of the same table shows such differences, and column 4 shows the
change of partisanship in the same cohort after five years. Similar to previous studies, it
appears that younger voters tend to strengthen their partisan attachment after successive
elections until arriving at a stable level in the middle age (see, e.g., Clarke and Stewart
1984). Starting from the 47-54 age group, all cohorts display a weaker partisan strength
as compared with the same group in the last election, suggesting inter-cohort differences
of partisanship among middle to older age cohorts. Moreover, it is the same group of
adults who began to have an intra-cohort decline in partisanship compared to what they
registered five years earlier. In other words, as these groups of adults grow five years
older, they only become less partisan than in the previous election. All age cohorts older
than that group reveal a similar downward pattern except the two oldest groups.

Unlike Clarke and Stewart's findings in 1984, analysis focusing on the two
elections in 1987 and 1992 does not exhibit an overall direction of a weakening
partisanship in all age cohorts. However, it can be argued that the age effect that registers
a positive linkage between age and partisanship is attenuated in recent elections. This
phenomenon is summarized in Figure 2.5. Both series of mean strength of partisanship in
1987 and 1992 register an upward trend, indicating a positive relationship between age
and strength of partisan loyalties. This relationship does not imply that voters tend to
increase in their partisan strength as they age. Rather, it represents the generational or
cohort effect as experienced by different cohorts. Starting from the middle age (47-53) group, the generational effect sets in as voters belonging to this or older cohorts exhibit a generally weaker strength of partisanship in comparison with the same age group five years earlier. On average, the mean strength difference is 0.1 among these nine age groups, with the largest margin of 0.16 and 0.15 among the oldest group and the 63-70 group.

Based on the findings from the cohort analysis of partisan trends in the last two elections, one cannot conclude that a general decline of partisanship is manifest in all age groups. Again, this provides evidence supporting the proposition that dealignment in differential in different parties and age groups.

The next question prompted by the argument is: how does the differential dealignment affect electoral outcomes? Does the weakening of partisan tie, particularly for Labour identifiers, suggest a higher mobility of votes switching between parties? Table 2.6, which presents the inter-election turnover based on the 1987-1992 elections panel survey, sets the stage for further inquiry on the question. As the table shows, Conservatives maintain a more stable group of partisans than Labour. More than 86 percent of Conservatives who identified themselves in 1987, representing 35 percent of the whole electorate, carry their Tory label to the next election in 1992. In contrast, Labour keeps a similar proportion of stable partisans (83 percent), but it only represents slightly more than a quarter of the electorate. The nine-point margin reflects the difference in size of the stable electoral base of the two parties. Intriguingly, the
proportion of defectors of each party to opponents appears to be relatively minor (5 to 7 percent), in spite of the alleged decline in partisanship.  

2.5 Conclusion: Differential Dealignment and Realignment of Degree

In his partisan stability thesis first published in the late 1960s, Converse postulated that partisanship tends to grow and strengthen with life and voting experiences (1969). Along this line, the traditional party identification model advanced by Butler and Stokes (1969) portrays an electorate with strong party loyalties rooted in social cleavage and class-related interests. According to what this model predicts, demographic renewal of the electorate and reinforcement of partisanship through life experiences provide the major sources for political change. However, reassessment of the model in light of political changes in the 1970s reveals the deficiency of Butler and Stokes’ argument. During that decade, the general decline of partisanship gainsays the Butler-Stokes model.

Instead of demonstrating a strengthening tie between parties and voters over time, the last three decades witnessed an erosion of party loyalties among British voters. Generational replacement does not contribute to a more stable electorate but, on the contrary, less loyal partisans. The trend of decline found in the 1970s, as evidenced in this study, did not sustain through the 1980s and early 1990s. A closer scrutiny extended over a longer period—including most recent elections—illustrates that the dealignment of partisanship in Britain is not ubiquitous, but time-bound and group-specific. As this chapter exhibits, partisanship differentially declines among various parties and age
cohorts in the “post-dealignment” decade. Meanwhile, the partisan strength of the
general electorate has become stabilized at a relatively moderate level since 1979.

Compared to the studies in the 1970s and 1980s, analyses in the chapter paint a
"similar but somewhat different" picture of the British electors than their predecessors in
the last two decades: political decisions of partisans with a moderate psychological
attachment to the parties are not habitual practices based on strong partisan loyalty;
Labor’s electoral base is weaker but not more likely to defect than the Tories one;
younger voters are likely to strengthen their partisanship with voting practice; middle age
partisans are more prone to lessen their allegiance to political parties than in the past.

The lack of a strong tie between parties and voters gives leeway for a more mobile
electorate in the 1990s. The decision of electors on choice of party and vote becomes
more open to influences of short-term forces, such as mass media coverage of political
events, evaluation of issues and image of political leaders (Clarke and Stewart 1984,
Crewe and Särlvik 1983). Franklin (1985), in his work on decline of class voting,
attributes the changes in partisanship and voting decision to the attenuation of
sociological influences such as class structure and impact of inherited partisanship. He
proposes that the British electorate now is more likely to rely on individual evaluations of
issues and policies in determining their votes. Suggesting another candidate, Clarke and
Stewart (1984, 1992) focus on the impact of party leaders in influencing public evaluation
of parties. To further investigate the factors affecting the trend of partisanship in the
post-dealignment era, analyses of these two proposed models constitute the major task of
the following chapter.
Endnotes

1. A similar scale can be created in measuring the changes in voting decisions with the zero point representing non-voters. Literature of studies of voting encompass analyses of voting turnout and ticket-splitting (Crewe, Fox and Alt 1977; Denver and Hands 1985), which are beyond the current purposes of this chapter.

2. Respondents were asked a series of questions in sequence: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, or Liberal or what?" For those who chose a party, a second question will be asked: "Well, how strongly (chosen party) do you generally feel - very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly?" Those who did not have a party preference were asked: "Well, do you generally feel a little closer to one of the parties than the others? Which party is that?"

3. This measure includes those respondents who did not choose a party outright but who indicate they are closer to one. These responses are coded 1 for weak partisans.

4. The party hit its lowest share in the electorate at 29 percent in 1983, which is a 13-point plunge.

5. Note that the figure is in proportion to the whole electorate, taking into account the portion of non-identifiers.

6. Särlvik and Crewe's finding was based on the proportion of respondents who identified themselves with one of the parties. Those who refused to answer or only said "closer to one party" are excluded.

7. This suggests the triviality of inter-party mobility mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter as the third type of partisan change.
CHAPTER III

PERCEPTION MATTERS - LEADER IMAGE, ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS AND ELECTORAL CHOICE

3.1 Introduction

The evidence we gathered on partisan change in Chapter II illustrates a new pattern in the relationship between party and voters developed since the end of the 1970s. The trend of partisanship during the 1979-1992 period exhibits a weakened but stabilized partisan commitment among British electors. While the decline of partisanship varies in degree between different parties and different age groups, explanations can hardly be subsumed under one single factor of demographic replacement. The findings in the last chapter demonstrate that the subtlety in the evolution of partisanship calls for more detailed investigations into the long-term and short-term forces that drive political choice and partisan loyalties. In this chapter, we continue to explore in a broader context these forces such as social cleavage, issue concerns and leader image to investigate the dynamics of the partisan tide in contemporary Britain.

Earlier studies on partisan change postulated that a strong class-party tie connecting voters and parties is responsible for the divide in party support between the middle and working-class voters. In defining class, Butler and Stokes employ a variety of criteria, among which the authors claimed the role of occupation provided one of the
"best predictors" in characterizing class (1969:65-80). Using a six-scale social grade measurement first employed in a 1963 study, they identified the lower three categories of manual workers as working class and another three non-manual categories as the middle class.

Based on their occupational class identifications, Butler and Stokes found that social cleavage imposes a strong partisan self-image among British voters. This is manifest in the enormous difference between the parties' shares of votes in each class. Findings based on the British national survey in 1963 and election study in 1964, for instance, demonstrate a clear class cleavage in party support. Seventy-nine percent of the self-identified middle class described themselves as Tories while a comparable proportion of working class respondents (72 percent) identified themselves as Labour. Based on this evidence, Butler and Stokes posit that the "preeminent role (of class) can hardly be questioned" (1969: 76). Accordingly, the close alignment of class identity and party label in the 1960s contributed to strong and stable partisan commitments among British citizens. In 1964, only about one-tenth of the voters describe themselves as not-very-strong partisan while almost half of the electorate (43 percent) claim they have very strong partisan ties with political parties (see Table 2.2 in Chapter II).

The sharp divide between the working- and middle-class in the 1960s is reflected in the strong correlation between class and party identification. It accords well with Peter Pulzer's widely-cited remark: "class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail" (1967). In explaining the bifurcation of political support
between the two classes, Butler and Stokes identify three models that tap into the conception of politics among voters and their psychological underpinnings of this class-party linkage. In the first model, the authors suggest that opposing class interests constitute the staple of divergence between middle-class and working-class voters. In this class-conflict model, individuals conceive of politics as a "zero-sum game" in which parties attained political payoffs for one class at the expense of the other. The belief that parties represent different and exclusive class interests projects the perceived class conflicts into a polarized partisan context in which parties are against each other as well as the "other classes." The second model is a variant of the class-conflict model. Instead of viewing politics as a zero-sum game, it relaxes the assumption of purely antagonistic class interests and suggests a "positive sum game." Parties play a similar role in this model in representing and optimizing interest ("simple representation") for their constituent classes. An individual identifying with a certain party develops a positive linkage with the party, but not necessarily a negative attitude toward the rival parties. Other reasons than class interests can also be considered in party choice and vote decisions. In the third model, Butler and Stokes seek explanation from the class culture which has evolved in the British social milieu over time. Despite that perception of class interests is integral in forming party allegiance, the normative structure in which the class-party concept is embedded is pervasive in both the middle and working classes. The norms developed within each class, along with the perceptual framework of self-identity and class interests, provide cues that guide voters' political behavior. This
Based on the theoretical framework derived from the three models, the authors construed the class-partisan bond as a result of long-term forces originating from the social class milieu in which an individual is socialized. During the socialization process, a political identity is inherited from parents, influenced by occupational self-image and socioeconomic status, and reinforced through political activities and participation. Among the two classes, Butler and Stokes found that the Labour working class has the strongest appeal for class interest. In contrast, the Tories are perceived as more concerned with interests that involve the whole nation. Class alignment, as termed in their study, is not static over time. In the revised edition of Political Change in Britain, Butler and Stokes observed five years later the "ageing" of the class-party link. As a consequence of structural changes in the British economy and general betterment of economic conditions for both classes, the decline of class alignment in the 1970s was manifest. The expansion of the goods and services sector redefined the social identification among workers who became reluctant to cling to the working-class label. Embourgeoisement of the working class narrowed the gap between the two classes. Affluence was blurring the line that divides blue-collar and white-collar workers. Class alignment was being replaced by class dealignment that contributed to an increasingly
volatile electorate with a weakened class-party tie. To substantiate their argument, the authors noted that the difference between the proportion of Conservative identifiers and Labour identifiers among the working class dropped remarkably, from 44 percent in 1963 to 28 percent in 1970. The corresponding figure for the middle class is 50 and 40 percent, respectively (Butler and Stokes 1974).

Studies of class dealignment continued in the mid-1970s and 1980s, with Crewe, Särkvik and Alt (1977) providing a generational analysis of the erosion of class-party tie. The authors demonstrate that the class basis of party support had been diminishing since the 1960s. The impact of class on party choice became gradually “fainter” regardless of the economic conditions. As discussed in the last chapter, the withering of class effects on party identification and voting choice constitutes the thesis in the former two authors’ work on partisan dealignment in 1983. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the theme of class dealignment became the orthodoxy in studies of political change in Britain.

However, this new conventional wisdom came under severe challenges after the 1983 general election. In 1985, Heath, Jowell and Curtice published findings from their study based on the 1983 election. In their book, *How Britain Votes*, they articulated skepticism regarding the previous studies that alleged a decline in class voting. Heath and his colleagues argued that dividing the electorate into two classes was problematic and it was incapable of capturing subtle changes of class-party linkages, particularly in the light of the rise of new occupational groups like the self-employed and salaried.

Employing new statistical measures based on odd-ratios and log-linear analysis, the
authors contended that the class basis of politics, as best represented by relative class voting, remained intact. The relationship between class and party was masked by the decline of absolute class voting, which merely represented the temporary changes in political support to each party. These changes in political support have been a function of the short-term performance and policy effectiveness of the governing or opposition party. They are, as Heath et al. argue, unrelated to the long-term linkage between parties' class-interest appeal and the country's social-class structure.

The controversy concerning class realignment turned white-hot following the publication of Heath et al.'s book. Crewe and Dunleavy spearheaded the debate in making counter arguments against the "resurrection" of class voting as promoted by Heath and his colleagues. The key point in the debate concerns the class basis of political choice in party identification and voting. Is there a downward trend in the influence of class on party, or are the observed fluctuations only "trendless"? Crewe (1983) defended the conventional use of the Alford Index, a measure that accounts for the class-party votes with the difference between same-class voting (working class) and cross-class voting (middle class), in demonstrating the decline of class effect on voting. The contraction of the working class, as he maintained, did indeed reflect the abatement of class impact on political outcome. From another perspective, Dunleavy (1987) critiqued methodologically the use of odd-ratio and log-linear analysis, which, he argued, is extremely sensitive to small changes and leads to exaggerated findings Heath et al. embrace.
3.2 Short-term Forces Overlay Long-term Factors

Despite the plethora of fierce arguments on the topic, it has been widely recognized that the evolution of class structure in contemporary Britain has precipitated profound changes in the linkage between class and voting, in absolute and relative terms alike. As recent studies disclose, class no longer plays a predominant role in determining party identification and electoral outcomes as in the 1960s. Clarke and Stewart, for instance, examine the long-term and short-term forces that led to partisan dealignment in the 1974-1983 period, and found the latter claims ample warrant in accounting for variations in voters’ partisan loyalties in recent elections (1984). The rise in significance of short-term forces did not gainsay the part social class plays in informing the party and voting choice, yet variables such as issue perceptions and party leader image now command much attention in recent studies of the dynamics of political support (e.g., Whiteley 1983, Franklin 1985, Stewart and Clarke 1992). “Shorter-term forces have overlaid longer-term trends,” write Clarke and Stewart (1984:700).

Regarding the first variable, issue concerns have long been accorded a role in accounting for party choice in Britain (Butler and Stokes, 1969, 1974). Evaluations of issues and government policies provide the essentials for the rational voter model as postulated in liberal democratic theory. An ideal voter, as the model projects, is the one who is well-informed, rational and utility-maximizing in his/her political decision calculus, based on judgment of issues and policies as advanced by different parties. Butler and Stokes, however, found the model wanting as they discovered that issue
factors have limited force, given the complexities of issues and inconsistence among British voters in understanding and interpreting political issues (1969). As the authors found, policy preferences and issue evaluations were, at best, “atomistic” and unstructured.

Partisan decline in the 1970s was accompanied by a resurgence of issue concerns as principal factors in predicting electoral choice. Särlvik and Crewe contend on the basis of their findings from the 1979 election study that voters’ opinions on issues and policies, together with the perceived positions taken by each party, furnish good predictors of party choices and electoral decisions (1983). In his analysis of the decline of class voting, Franklin (1985) concurs by demonstrating that issue evaluations have displaced the role of class as voters become more sophisticated in their electoral choice.

Clarke and Stewart (1984) have taken into consideration the political and economic contexts in the 1970s and 1980s in examining the role of issue evaluations. They singled out the landmark example of the “Winter of Discontent” in 1979, which put in front of voters a vivid illustration of prolonged economic malaise. A deteriorating economy heavily laden with nationalized industries, the imminence of the influential EEC, and sundry other salient issues kept voters from relying on simple class-party links to determine allegiance to a party and, in turn, to cast a vote of party loyalty. Moreover, the perception that economic hardships were linked to the aggravated strikes in the 1970s prompted the electorate to reconsider class-interest-oriented issues. Indeed, the valence issue of the decaying economy was so pervasive that it crosscut party lines. This
indirectly benefited the party with a less class-interest appeal, namely, the Conservatives. As noted by Clarke and Stewart, the contextual factors of the 1970s laid the backdrop for the rise of issue concerns as factors affecting party and voting choice.

Unlike issues, party leader image has achieved prominence in modeling party identification only in recent research. Most analysts of British politics have been reluctant to adopt the thesis that evaluations of party leaders play a major role in voters' decisions. Butler and Stokes (1974: 244), for example, assigned less than a score of pages in their 500-page book to analyzing the electoral impact of leaders. In a short chapter close to the end of the book, the authors note that the factor "remains but one" among others that determine variability in partisan strength, yet the pull of leadership impact can be "easily outweighed" by other factors. Another researcher, Ivor Crewe (1985), did not deny the influence of leader image. However, he merely attributes the 1983 election results to the negative impact of a particular Labour leader, Mr. Michael Foot, than to suggesting general predictive power to leader image variables.

It is only recently that leadership effects have become the research focus in studies of party choice and voting intentions. Clarke and Stewart (1984) note that mass media coverage of election campaigns brings to the spotlight the party leaders' style and personalities, which epitomize the capabilities of these candidates and--relatedly, their parties--in running the country. This leadership effect is most notable during campaigns, as research demonstrates leader image is closely linked to party image and has substantial influence on party support and voting choice (Miller et al. 1990; see also Bean and
Empirical studies based on time series of government popularity also reveal the close ties between a prime minister's approval and party support in voters' minds (e.g., Clarke and Stewart 1995; Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley 1996). In another study, Stewart and Clarke (1992) found that leader image is composed of two dimensions, competence and responsiveness. Using confirmatory factor analysis, the authors demonstrate that, in voters' eyes, these two dimensions are more closely connected for opposition leaders than for the prime minister. In other words, voters are more attentive and discriminating when evaluating the leaders of a governing party.

Research in the last few decades reveals that the dynamics of party support are affected by long-term forces such as social-class identification and short-term factors exemplified by issue evaluations and party leadership effects. In modeling party identification in the contemporary context, the rest of the chapter continues to investigate the changes in party identification by first reexamining the well-debated class dealignment hypothesis in the 1979-1992 period with reference to the 1960s. Then, a model of party identification including both a class variable and short-term forces is tested.

3.3 The "Aged" Class Alignment

As noted in earlier studies, the 1970s witnessed the erosion of social-class influence on party choice, owing to the structural change in British society and its economy. As a result, voters are not subscribed to a "natural" partisanship as much as in
the 1960s. Survey data gathered at the time of the 1964 elections, for instance, showed that among the two classes defined by manual/non-manual nature of occupations,² more than 57 percent of the electorate identified with their natural party, i.e., manual workers with Labour and non-manuals with Conservative. A majority of middle-class voters named themselves Tories (61 percent) in 1964, whereas the comparable proportion of working-class respondents making a similar pledge to the Labour party was 55 percent. This pattern of natural partisanship did not last. In 1979, the proportion of natural class-party identifiers fell to 50 percent, which remained stable until the 1992 election (see Table 3.1). This apparent slight drop, however, warrants closer investigation. Note that the decrease was compensated by the parallel rise in non-manual workers’ identifications with the Conservative party. Taking the proportion of natural class identifiers separately, it is noticeable that Labour suffers a substantial loss of support among manual workers. In 1964, almost 40 percent of the whole electorate were members of the working class and Labour identifiers. The figure dropped to slightly over 30 percent in 1979 and descended further to 21 percent in both 1987 and 1992. In contrast, the middle-class Tories gained more than 10 percentage points during the period, and comprised 29 percent of the electorate in 1992.

The decrease in Labour’s natural-class identifiers produced a weakening in absolute terms of the party’s electoral base. However, it does not necessarily lead to a corresponding increase for the Conservatives and a strengthened class basis for the Tories. The argument necessitates two qualifications. The first regards changes in
distribution of occupational classes in the last three decades. Table 3.2a to 3.2c present
the changes of social-class structure measured in occupations, home-ownership and trade
union membership. All three measures reflect a reversal of working-class dominance,
which was widely acknowledged in the 1960s. To summarize, manual workers dropped
from 70 percent in 1964 to less than half in 1992. More than half of the British voters did
not own their homes in 1964; more than 70 percent do in 1992. Four out of ten
respondents claimed they were trade union members in the 1964 survey, less than a
quarter do so in 1992. These figures lend weight to the argument that the working class
has diminished markedly in size after twenty-eight years, and the middle class has grown
in reciprocal proportion. It follows naturally that the Conservative party is supplied with
an augmented basis for recruits and, in turn, a better chance of stronger support, provided
that the party’s class linkage maintains. It is the stability of this class-party bond on
which the second condition for a stronger electoral basis for the Tories relies. Whether
there exists a consistent class-party alignment in both parties constitutes the prerequisite
in examining the broadly debated theme of class voting.

In previous studies of class alignment, a variety of measures have been developed
to gauge the impact of social class on party choice and vote decisions. Among them,
most widely used is the Alford index. This measure, which is derived from subtracting
the percentage of non-manual Labour (cross-class) identifiers from that of manual Labour
(natural-class) identifiers, is designed to assess the extent of class voting.\(^3\) It embodies
the assumption that “the deviation of either the manual or non-manual stratum from any
given level of vote (party identification) for one of the major parties is the important fact relevant to an assessment of class voting (party identification)” (Alford 1976: 80). Table 3.3 displays the Alford indices for the four elections between 1979 and 1992, and a comparison with the 1964 election. Including only the Conservative and Labour identifiers, the Alford indices illustrate a decline from 42.4 percent in 1964 to 29.3 percent in 1979. The figure fluctuates within a narrow range thereafter, suggesting that the relationship between social-class identities and party choice remains stable during the post-1979 period. Indices based on the whole sample including Liberal identifiers and non-identifiers yield similar results. They testify to the statement that class becomes a less influential factor when contemporary voters consider identification with a political party. Stabilization of “class dealignment” after 1979 suggests that the social factor of class still plays a role, albeit weakened, in affecting political choice in contemporary Britain.

Focusing on the 1979-1992 period, both the Conservative and Labour parties exhibit apparently stable proportions of natural class followers within each class (on average 52 percent and 45 percent, respectively). The strength of partisan allegiance aside, about half of the electors in each class still align party labels with their social-class identifications. Table 3.4 displays the mean strength for natural-party and cross-party identifiers during the period with reference to 1964. The former group registers, in general, a slightly higher partisan strength than the cross-class identifiers. Compared to that of the 1964 election, partisan loyalties are generally weaker in the most recent four
elections. Note that the discrepancy between natural-class identifiers and cross-class identifiers grows steadily wider in the 1980s and early 1990s. This sheds light on the fact that the general erosion of partisan ties renders more discernible the natural-class partisans' tie with party as compared with cross-class counterparts. To explore the mutabilities of partisan intensity comparing these two groups, a closer analysis is in order.

To test the hypothesis that party allegiance of cross-class identifiers is more susceptible to change than natural-class identifiers, survey data drawn from the 1987-1992 panel are examined. The partisanship and partisan loyalties of four categories of party-identifiers--namely, natural-class identifiers including middle-class Tories and working-class Labours and cross-class identifiers including middle-class Labours and working-class Tories--are compared in Table 3.5. Consonant with the preceding findings, natural-class partisans in the 1987 election are less likely to switch parties in 1992. Among partisans identifying with their natural class, an average of 88 percent stayed with their party label in the next election. In contrast, only 78 percent of cross-class identifiers did so, with the variability most remarkable among working-class Tories. In accordance, this group of party identifiers is found to be most volatile, among which less than half will retain a stable party tie. Working-class conservatism has been cited as one of the major factors responsible for the increasing volatility of the contemporary British electorate (Crewe 1983, Franklin 1985). It is clear from this table that instability characterizes this category of party identifiers.
Because the difference in change of partisan strength between the two groups of party identifiers is modest, the argument that class factor is the main source of partisan change has yet to be resolved. Bivariate correlations between partisan strength and the three class measures, i.e., occupational class, home-ownership, and union membership, all exhibit statistically insignificant relationships, rendering further scrutiny using more sophisticated methods necessary.

Based on the descriptive analyses above, the impact of social class on party identification and voters’ strength of allegiance to the party remains unclear. Recent research has sought to study the short-term forces in filling the vacuum vacated by the decline of class voting (Franklin 1985, Clarke and Stewart 1984). In modeling voting behavior and party strength, these studies suggested that issue evaluations and leadership effects were better candidates to explain electors’ choice (see also Särlvik and Crewe 1983, Denver and Hands 1992). The analysis that follows employs multivariate techniques to examine the influence of short-term forces on partisanship.

3.4 Modeling Partisanship in the post-Dealignment era

The rest of the chapter concentrates on developing a multivariate model of party identification based on a panel study of the 1987 and 1992 elections. To measure a voter’s attachment to a political party, a partisan continuum was used in the preceding chapter to explain changes in a voter’s partisan tie. The following analysis adopts the same measure and combines party identification with the strength of commitment to
operationalize a voter’s party allegiance. The dependent variable, PARTYID, is an ordinal variable that ranges from a value of +3, representing very strong identification to a party, to -3, that denotes very strong identification to other parties. Zero is assigned to non-identifiers.

In modeling the impacts of both long-term and short-term forces on party identification, four groups of independent variables are identified: demographics, class, issue evaluations and party leader image. The first group of variables, which entails age and educational level, is designed to study the age effects as analyzed in the last chapter and the effect of increasing educational attainments of the British voting population. The next three groups of variables merit more detailed explanations. The second group, which represents the long-term social force of class structure, uses three measures to gauge class identification based on occupation, trade union membership and home ownership. These measures represent different dimensions of changes in contemporary British society. Among them were the structural changes in the British economy that were reflected in the proportions of blue-collar and white-collar workers. Occupation is thus utilized to distinguish changes in social grades. The measure of occupational class has been deployed to index social identities since the pioneering British election studies in early 1960s. Empirical analyses based on this categorization scheme find consistent results in defining the middle class and working class using the manual and non-manual divide (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974; Crewe 1983). Despite that controversies arose on
reclassification of social grades based on different schemes of categorization (Heath et al. 1985), analysts maintained that the traditional manual/non-manual dichotomy derived from the six-point scale provides a reliable device that mirrors changes in class structure during the postwar decades.\(^5\)

Not unrelatedly, the increase of white-collar workers redefined the role of trade union as in the 1970s new middle-class occupations were unionized and developed new class values. The trend of union membership parallels changes of union movements, particularly in the aftermath of the 1979 strikes. As illustrated above, the proportion of union members in the British population dropped steadily from 40 percent in 1964 to less than 25 percent in 1992. Apart from numeric counts, union membership provides a scale for assessing class voting with which one can test the influence of unions in socialization of working-class values.

Regarding the third measure of social class, home ownership, recent research furnishes abundant evidence of the impact of Mrs. Thatcher's housing policy in early 1980s (Dunleavy 1980, Franklin 1985, Rose and McAllister 1986, Heath et al. 1991). Studies of the British housing policy under Thatcher's governments observe that the new class of owner-occupiers exhibit economic interests and values that differ from those of council tenants. A new identity developed from home ownership brought a different value system to party and electoral choice (Franklin 1985). To investigate the effects of the aforementioned class factors, dummy variables are created to represent the middle class (1) and working class (0), union members (1) and non-union members (0), and
home owners (1) and non-home owners (0).

The next two independent variables involve a group of subjective variables that garner extensive attention in recent research of British electoral studies. Evaluations of party leaders, for one, has become a focal point in recent elections as mass media increasingly emphasize coverage of political figures during election campaigns. Earlier studies on political support suggest that voters’ evaluations of party leaders are strongly associated with party choice (Stewart and Clarke 1992). To operationalize the leader effect, a summary measure is developed based upon a battery of questions designed to examine the British public’s perceptions of the political leaders in the 1979-1992 panel survey. Respondents in the survey were asked questions regarding their feelings about the political leaders on whether they are capable, caring, extreme or caring for one class. The variable, LEADERS, is the sum of responses from these questions. The ordinal variable ranges from +4 (best rating) to -4 (lowest rating).

The next variable concerns issue evaluations. Issue evaluations have been components of models of party identification and voting since the early 1960s. However, they were not accorded close attention until recently, when researchers reconsidered the influence of issue concerns as the social-class factor declined in salience. The evolution of issue agenda in the public mind is also responsible for the growth in importance of issues that involve government policies. One of the major causes is the protracted economic hardship the country has experienced during much of the postwar period. The pervasiveness of this “valence issue” of economic well-being overshadowed other
polarized class-oriented position issues and emphasized the importance of an issue-based instead of a class-based party support judgment (Franklin 1985).

When making party support decisions, issue judgments involve assessment of the distance between an individual’s issue position and his/her perception of where the parties stand on that issue. According to the spatial theory first proposed by Anthony Downs, voters choose the party whose policy position is closest to their own (1957). The requisite for this spatial model is the existence of an issue space in the voters’ minds on which they position themselves with reference to perceived party positions. However, other researchers have suggested different criteria to specify this issue space (see Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991). For present purposes, however, we focus on the “perceived” distance that a voter has with reference to a political party’s position on a specific issue. Alternative conceptualization of issue space will be considered in the next chapter that analyzes the voting models, per se.

To operationalize a voter’s projected issue distance from parties, an additive index is constructed from the sum of the differences between the respondent’s position and his/her perceived party positions on five issues. The issues are defense, unemployment versus inflation, tax and welfare, nationalization, and redistribution of wealth. Because the principal interest in the current context is the overall issue distance between the voter and different parties, the index provides information pertinent to measurement of the effect of voters’ issue evaluations on their party preferences.

Previous empirical research on American party identification models suggests that
partisan affiliation is a function of its lagged value, i.e., the party identification in the previous election (Fiorina 1981, see also Alt 1984). Analysts using these models posit that the “retrospective model” supplies information regarding past experiences with the party summarized in the lagged dependent variable in predicting the contemporaneous variable. In the current context, the model is as follows:

\[
\text{PARTYID}_t = \alpha + b_1 \text{PARTYID}_{t-1} + b_2 \text{OCLASS}_t + b_3 \text{HOMOWN}_t + b_4 \text{UMEM}_t + b_5 \text{EDUC}_t + b_6 \text{AGE}_t + b_7 \text{LEADER}_t + b_8 \text{PROXIMITY}_t + e_t
\]

(Eq 3.1)

where:
- \(\text{PARTYID}_t\) = Party identification with strength at time \(t\);
- \(\text{PARTYID}_{t-1}\) = Party identification with strength at time \(t-1\);
- \(\text{OCLASS}_t\) = Occupational class at time \(t\);
- \(\text{HOMOWN}_t\) = Home ownership dummy at time \(t\);
- \(\text{UMEM}_t\) = Union membership at time \(t\);
- \(\text{EDUC}\) = Educational level at time \(t\);
- \(\text{AGE}\) = Age at time;
- \(\text{LEADER}_t\) = Evaluations of party leader at time \(t\);
- \(\text{PROXIMITY}_t\) = Distance of issue positions between the voter and party at time \(t\);
- \(\alpha\) = Constant;
- \(b_1, b_8\) = parameter coefficients;
- \(e_t\) = error term.

Including a lagged dependent variable may lead to inconsistent estimates given the correlations between the variable (\(\text{PARTYID}_{t-1}\)) and the disturbance term \((e_t)\) (Gujarati 1988, Green 1990). To circumvent this problem, the two-stage least squares method is employed with the use of instrumental variables (Greene 1990, Kennedy 1992). In the first stage, ordinary least square analysis is applied with \(\text{PARTYID}_{t-1}\) as the dependent variable. In this first stage model, the independent variables are the lagged
versions of those in the original model, i.e. age, education level, union membership, home ownership, occupational class, leader evaluations and issue evaluations in 1987. The fitted dependent variable--namely, the predicted party identification in 1987--is utilized as the instrumental variable for estimation in the second stage model.\(^9\)

The 2SLS models as shown in Table 3.6 demonstrate the effects of various factors on the party identification. Instead of modeling the change in partisan strength (i.e. the intensity of support for a single party), I chose to analyze partisanship in the three parties separately in order to compare the effects of different variables in different groups of party identifiers. Because the dependent variable is designed to measure changes in strength of party identification in both directions, it furnishes a better device to examine both changes in strength of party loyalties and changes in party affiliation.

As expected, the lagged party identification is the single most powerful predictor among others. This variable, as Fiorina notes, represents the "past political experiences of the socializing agents" that provide ready guidance for political choices (1981: 76). As derived from the estimated value in the first stage of regression, the lagged dependent also serves as a proxy of the collectivity of various forces that formulate political identity in the previous election. In all three parties, this variable scores statistical significance on the most stringent level (p<0.01), with respectable partial effects (unstandardized B's = .648, .749, .744 for Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats, respectively). Model diagnostics suggest no clear sign of collinearity among the independent variables.\(^10\)

In the Conservative model, two of the three class variables, home-ownership and
occupational class, fail to exhibit statistically significant effects. They indicate that whether one owns his or her own home, or whether one has a blue-collar job, has no statistically significant connection with party choice. Union members, however, are less likely than others to identify with the Conservative party. Among Conservative identifiers, less than 30 percent have union membership and the mean strength of these unionized Tories is statistically lower than the rest by .69 (t-test=-6.35, p<0.001, results not in tables). Intriguingly, Conservative identifiers are the only group of partisans for which the age factor is statistically significant, indicating that older people tend to have stronger support for party. Asymmetry of the impact, however, suggests that it does not necessarily define a partisan divide between Tories and non-Tories. Its influence, which is confined to the Conservative identifiers, is, at best, from slight to modest (b=0.004).

Compared to its two counterparts, Labour is clearly a class party. All three class variables—occupational class, home ownership and union membership—register statistically significant effects for Labour identifiers, suggesting the Labour party is still attracted to the working class, the housing estate tenants and union members. This finding illuminates the fact that class, measured in all standards, has a definitive role for the Labour party. Support for party, ceteris paribus, is partially contingent upon the working class attributes among the Labour identifiers.

It is evident that the class variables have different effects for the three parties. In contrast, both the issue and leader effects delineate statistically significant results among all party identifiers. Regarding the former, the more favorably the leader is rated, the
more likely it is that a respondent will identify with his or her party with positive proportional strength. For the issue evaluation variables, the significant results across three models strongly suggest that the issue space exists in the public mind and that it operates to provide a sense of perceptual or ideological distance between party and voters. This is manifest in all party identifiers: the closer the ideological distance between party and respondent, the stronger the attachment to the corresponding party.

In general, the Conservative model registers the best fit, accounting for 71 percent of variance, as compared with 60 percent in the Labour model. In contrast, only 30 percent of the variance in the Liberal model is explained. Noteworthy, also, is the relative importance of each class of variables in the three partisanship models. Table 3.7 reports the beta (standardized) coefficients of the independent variables in the abovementioned models. Among all, issue proximities present is the most important factor in affecting party identifications (except previous party affiliations). With regard to the party leader effect, Prime Minister Mr. John Major was ascribed greater salience compared to the other two leaders when party identification is considered. In other words, Conservative identifiers are more likely to seek the judgment of the government leader in deciding their strength of affiliation to the party (Beta=.14). Interestingly, evaluations of party leaders are barely a function of political experience and seniority. Mr. Kinnock, for example, has been the Labour leader running for the general election since 1983, while both Mr. Major and Mr. Paddy Ashdown were entering their first election in 1992. Yet, the mean score for Mr. Kinnock ranks last, at 4.38 on an eight-
point scale, lagging far behind Mr. Ashdown (6.35) and Mr. Major (6.0). Mr. Ashdown’s lead, however, was not a surprise. Since he assumed leadership of the reorganized Liberal Democrats from the ruins of the disbanded Alliance, the party became more coherent with a better foundation at the local level. For his seriousness about policy and personal image, the Liberal leader’s popularity exceeded that of Mr. Kinnock and paralleled that of the prime minister (Butler and Kavanagh 1992). This is consonant to the results in the party identification models in which Kinnock’s leader effect was considered the weakest in comparison to that of his counterparts.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have addressed the issue of class-party linkages in the context of a post-dealignment Britain. A model of party identification taking into account the long-term social forces and the emergence of short-term forces based on the instrumental judgment of the voters is identified and tested. During the 1979-1992 period, the British electorate has a generally weakened but stable attachment to political parties. Structural changes in British society and the economy have provided sources for the electoral metamorphosis. Oscillations in the trend of partisanship, however, have not been as remarkable as in the 1970s. The influence of social cleavage, for instance, does not entirely wither away with regard to affiliations to political parties. Among Labour identifiers, traditional conditions for defining a “working-class” people still have validity despite the significant contraction of the percentage of such people in the population. A
decline in class voting was evident in absolute terms. For non-Labour identifiers, however, the class divide is too obfuscated for political identification. Instead, voters from this category seek other cues when making party and voting choices. In this vein, we proclaim the emergence of instrumentalism in the post-dealignment era: political identity becomes a function of a voter's individualized judgments to issues and party leader image. Evaluations based on available cues from the environment, particularly through the transmission of mass media, are the major determinants on not just what individuals identify but on how they identify with political parties. In the next chapter, we will look closer at the consequence of the rise of instrumentalism and its impact on voting behavior.
Endnotes

1. The scales are: I Higher managerial or professional; II Lower managerial or administrative; III Skilled or supervisory non-manual; IV Lower non-manual; V Skilled manual; VI Unskilled manual (Butler and Stokes 1969:70, see also Kahan, M.J., David Butler and Donald Stokes 1966. “On the Analytical Division of Social Class” British Journal of Sociology 17:127).

2. Ibid.

3. The index was originally designed for measuring impact of class on voting. I modified the index by substituting the voters’ percentage with that of identifiers in examining class-party identification.

4. The results are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>0.045</th>
<th>0.022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Ownership</th>
<th>-0.046</th>
<th>-0.065</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>-0.018</th>
<th>-0.029</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.486)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p-values in parentheses

5. The arguments on the use of the traditional scale versus the new scheme proposed by Heath et al. were detailed in Political Studies (1986) vol. 34. Crewe, one of the defenders of the former measure, contended that the new scheme was unable to capture evolution in class structure as the changes to the two new classes, salariat and proletariat were too small to reflect the mutabilities of social cleavages.

6. Four questions were selected to measure the respondent’s perception of party leader if they are capable, caring, extreme and caring for one class. The questions are: “Do you think (party leader) is extreme/good for one class/capable/caring?”

7. The variable is derived from five sets of issue position variables with a scale ranging from 1 (agree) to -1 (disagree). Each set carries four questions asking respondent’s own position and his perceived positions of the three parties on a certain issue. The formula from which the spatial variables derive is as follows:
PROXIMITY\textsubscript{\textit{k}} = \left[ \sum (I_{it} - I_{tik})^2 \right]^{1/2}

where: PROXIMITY\textsubscript{\textit{k}} = Issue Spatial variable with reference to party \textit{k} at time \textit{t}

\textit{I}_{it} = Voter's own position on issue \textit{I} at time \textit{t}

\textit{I}_{tik} = Voter's perceived position of party \textit{k} on issue \textit{I} at time \textit{t}.

8. The correlation between the disturbance and the lagged dependent variable is estimated at a statistically significant .488.

9. The 2SLS model is estimated using the Hatanaka estimator. Hatanaka's efficient two-step estimator is required if a lagged dependent variable is included in the 2SLS model. A lagged version of the independent variables should be estimated in the first stage also. In computing the estimator of \sigma^2 in the model, e'e/N is used, not e'e/(N-K), i.e., there is no degrees of freedom correction (Green 1991).

10. Although some of the pairwise correlations among the independent variables are moderately large—the highest one being -0.62 between leader evaluations and issue evaluations in the Conservative model—both the tolerance (0.585) and Variance-Inflation Factors (1.708) give no evidence to a near-dependency (Fox 1991).
CHAPTER IV

NEW DIRECTIONS IN ISSUE VOTING

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we examined a model of party identification as a function of class factors and other short-term forces such as individual evaluations of issues and party leaders. Voters' judgments on issues and party leaders, as Chapters II and III exposed, have emerged to be the major factors in affecting partisan change since 1979. The decline of class voting in the 1960s and 1970s gave rise to an individualized decision on party choice that calls for a "rational" assessment of available information. In this chapter, we continue our inquiry along this line and reason that policy issues provide the information for this rational decision-making process. In particular, we focus on the impact of issues in terms of their "spatial" relation with the voter, which has become a major topic in recent research on electoral behavior (Enelow and Hinich 1984). To start with, we first perform a graphical simulation of issue effects, followed by a multinomial discrete choice model that examines the voting behavior in the British multiple-party context.

Analyses of the relationship between voters' opinions on issues and their voting behavior were first conducted in American electoral studies. Among the pioneering studies was Converse's work on the American public's belief system and its influence on
voting decisions (1964). He argued that the “issue” impact was volatile and unclear. Voters’ positions on policies and issues were not as stable as was suggested in the traditional model of liberal democracy. His arguments place in doubt the existence of a “real” attitude toward issues and policies among the general public. In parallel studies in Britain, Butler and Stokes echoed what Converse contended in influence of issues on voting outcome. They suggested that voters’ issue orientations were subject to change and were “remarkably unstructured and inconsistent over time” (1969: 341-358).

According to what they found in the 1963 and 1964 election surveys, a majority of voters in the 1960s did not have clearly formulated issue positions and their knowledge about even highly salient issues was limited.

Analyses of political issues used a heuristic image of an “informed spectator” in making choices of policy alternatives embedded in his/her expectation of parties and government. Based on this assumption, Butler and Stokes tested against the “informed spectator” model using survey data collected from the 1963, 1964 and 1966 panel surveys. They found that the public’s understanding of policy issues fell away “very sharply” from how the ideal “rational voter” should behave. Not only are the electors poorly informed, but also they seldom understand the meaning of issues and do not possess consistent attitudinal orientations towards policy alternatives. Public opinions towards nationalization issue, for instance, were so volatile that a majority of respondents stepped across the line between supporting and opposing nationalized industries in one year. In consecutive interviews administered in 1963 and 1964, the authors found only
39 percent of the respondents can provide an identical and definite position on the nationalization issue (1969: 178). In the 1970s and 1980s, analysts reexamined the influences of issues and found that voters were better informed than were their predecessors. Franklin (1985) reported that, a decade after Butler and Stokes’ study, only a small portion of respondents (6 percent) were unable to identify two of the most important problems facing the nation, as compared to 40 percent in the 1960s.

A different approach was adopted to investigate the linkage between voting and issue positions. Instead of gauging the stability of voters’ issue responses, studies of issue voting focused on the voters’ issue positions with reference to those of the political parties. For instance, Särlvik and Crewe (1983) used a series of questions asking respondents’ own views on certain issues and their perceptions of the stands of political parties for each issue. A measure of issue positions was derived from comparing a voter’s own views with his perceived positions of the parties. The authors employed this measure to examine the importance of issue “distances” on voting decision. Their findings indicated that, once the individual’s issue position is adequately represented, the “rational” voter model has stronger support.

This “spatial” approach of studying voting or party choice was not novel. In the 1950s, Downs (1957) began to construct a spatial theory based on the voter’s utility as a function of his or her closeness of policy preference to the political party. The model was further developed by rational choice theorists who analyzed the dynamic of individual and party electoral decisions (e.g., Enelow and Hinich 1984, 1990).
spatial voting theory hinges on the individual voter’s position in a hypothetical issue space. This position, which reflects the voter’s ideal set of policy alternatives, is compared with perceptions of where the political parties stand on these issues. Based on this comparison, a voter makes his decisions in choosing a party that has issue positions closest to his/her own in the issue space. Traditional spatial models of issue voting utilize the linear distance between the voter’s and political parties’ issue positions in defining the voting utility function (e.g., Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook 1970; Enelow and Hinich 1984). This model projects a negative relationship between the proximity of issue positions and the utility returns. In other words, the closer the voter and the party in the issue space, the higher the utility in supporting and voting for this party.

Recent research on issue voting challenges this conventional “proximity” approach in specifying issue distance. Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) argue that the proximity model is flawed in its basic assumption that voters possess specific, ordered policy preferences along a set of issue continua. As they contend, issues operate in a “dispositional” or diffuse manner that the vast majority of the voters can, at best, identify which side (direction) of an issue debate they favor. As an alternative, they proposed a “directional” model that defines issue positions in terms of two qualities: direction and intensity. The former refers to the issue position the voter sides with in a dichotomous view of that specific issue. The latter represents the magnitude of support a voter assigns in evaluation of that issue. Rabinowitz and his coauthors operationalize the utility function by a scalar product (multiplication) between the issue positions of voters and
parties as opposed to the linear Euclidean distance (subtraction) specified in the traditional proximity model. In comparing the traditional proximity model with their directional model, Rabinowitz and his colleagues found supporting evidence for the latter in both the U.S. two-party system and the Norwegian multi-party system. According to their findings, the directional theory provides a better "vehicle" in modeling issue voting in "conflict- or cleavage-oriented politics" (Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991).

Rabinowitz et al.'s directional theory does not end the debate on a spatial theory of issue voting. More recent research on this topic disputes the claims made about the superiority of the directional model in explaining electoral outcomes. Ivensen (1994), for instance, applies both the directional and proximity model and a mixed model to the elections in six Western European countries and finds statistically significant results in all three models. In a recent article, Merrill (1995) compares the two models in both the American and Norwegian systems. He discovers that his findings contradict what Rabinowitz et al. have articulated in their earlier studies. He argues that the predictability of the directional model is dependent on the extent of information the voter possesses to evaluate issues. Uninformed voters may more likely be influenced by direction, while informed voters will tend to respond to proximity (Merrill 1995: 285). The author presents a combined model, taking into account both the proximity and direction of voters' issue positions, and finds better results than the previous models.

To date, a majority of the spatial models on issue voting have focused on elections in the United States and nations on the European continent in contrasting issue influences.
in the two-party and multi-party system. The impact of the two rival spatial models in the British tri-party context remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, this chapter attempts to compare the two issue voting models in the British system. Drawing data from the 1987-1992 panel survey, we evaluate the two rival models by using a "parsimonious encompassing" principle (Mizon and Richard 1986). To address the issue of model choice in the multi-party context in Britain, I test the different variants of the discrete choice model to determine which provides the most accurate characterization of the British voters’ decisions in multi-dimensional issue space.

4.2 Measuring Issues in British Elections

Butler and Stokes (1969) outlined three criteria for an issue to exert influence on voters:

a. the individual’s well-formed attitude toward a salient issue itself;

b. the skewedness or balance between the two rival bodics of such attitude/opinion on that issue; and

c. the association with parties of each side of the issue in the public mind.

The authors postulated that the theory of issue voting hinges on the assumption that voters order their preferences for the parties according to their own issue stances on the left-right dimension, as compared with the political parties’ positions. However, evidence obtained from surveys in the 1960s did not support what Butler and Stokes embrace. They surveyed voters’ views on seven issues and found a majority of the
respondents had no recognition of left-right concepts in interpreting these issues. They concluded that an issue voting model built on the assumption of left-right recognition “seemed virtually non-existent” (1969:214).

With a better measuring device, Särlvik and Crewe (1983) studied issue voting in the 1979 general election. They adopted similar requirements as proposed by Butler and Stokes in 1969, among which they were most concerned with the balance or division of the issue as perceived by the general public, i.e., whether there is a clear cleavage in opinions that determines the impact of that issue on the voters’ choice. Särlvik and Crewe employed a seven-point scale to gauge both voters’ positions and their perceived positions of the political parties. Voters’ opinions were then measured in terms of the distances between their own opinions and their perceptions of the parties’ positions. In contrast with Butler and Stokes, Särlvik and Crewe’s “distance” model produced “very reassuring” results: more than half of the variance in voting decision could be explained by the issue variable. They also found that the issues which concerned the party’s capability in managing the economic problems like nationalization, unemployment and prices were most important (1983:276).

As noted above, in a series of recent works on issue voting models, Rabinowitz and his colleagues question the applicability of the conventional spatial model employed by Särlvik and Crewe. They are dubious the linear distance is an appropriate measure to capture the “closeness” between voter and party from which political support is derived. Consider a seven-point scale on support of a policy with a neutral point at zero and +3
and -3 at two ends. A voter who positions himself at -1 (fairly unfavorable with the policy) has an equal distance with two parties standing at -3 and +1, respectively. The conventional proximity model suggests the voter will support the two parties with equal weights. In reality, however, it is more likely for the voter to choose the party at -3, given its similar view in the same direction than crossing the line to support another party with opposite opinion.

Rabinowitz et al. argue that the proximity model ignores two important elements of issue support in the public mind: direction and intensity. They believe it is implausible to assume that an individual voter has a well-ordered set of policy alternatives in a sharp positional fashion. Instead, voters view issues from a perspective of a pro-con dichotomy. Starting from the neutral point, voters choose one side of the opinion before deciding the amount of support or intensity of support to their stance on the issue. In presenting their "directional" model alternative to the traditional proximity model, Rabinowitz et al. go beyond the "positional perspective" in perceiving the role of issues and take into account these two elements.

Another key feature of the directional model is the neutral point of opinion in the public mind. Rabinowitz et al. assign this point to zero not merely to refer to those who have no opinion on the issue of concern, but also the group of voters to whom the issue has no impact at all. In this vein, the authors attempt to consider two possibilities: first, the issue has no impact if a voter is at zero on the scale or has no opinion; second, a candidate with a neutral position on an issue receives no support from the effect of that
Rabinowitz et al.'s model raises both methodological and theoretical concerns about issue voting. Regarding the former, they introduce the concept of a neutral point, from which they develop a measurement for both the direction and intensity of opinion in lieu of linear proximity. They used a scalar (multiplicative) product between the positions of the voters and parties to capture the idea of party support. When the two are in the same direction (sign), for instance, the measure will be positive, representing favorable votes on that issue. Values with different signs, on the other hand, result in negative support. Put in utilitarian terms, the higher value on either or both of the positions, the more is the utility for the voter or support for the party. Substantively, the directional theory espouses a model of advocacy in which voters are more concerned with “Are you on my side? How will you work in my interest?” than “How close are your positions to mine?” (Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991).

Recent research on the nature of issue effects on voting is divided. Merrill (1995), for example, is skeptical that the directional component is the best device to model voters’ utility. Empirical tests based on a mixture of directional and proximity components find significant results on both in different electoral systems (Iversen 1994, Merrill 1994, see also Merrill 1995). In some cases, like Platt et al.'s (1992) model on U.S. congressional roll-call votes, the proximity variable was found to be a better predictor than the directional variable.

From the methodological perspective, critics also argue that previous research
relying on binomial models falls prey to the misspecification problem in modeling the voting choice in the multi-party, multi-dimensional electoral context (Whitten and Palmer 1996). In “heightening the concern” of model selection in voting research, Whitten and Palmer lament the inappropriate practice of “structuring electoral choice by grouping parties along a single continuum” into a dichotomous choice between government and opposition for ease of estimation (1996: 231-232). As the authors contend, traditional binomial logit or probit models following this practice disallow the estimation of the balance of electoral support in the multiparty system. Specifically, probabilities of choice among different opposition parties that were improperly merged into one group, will be ignored or inaccurately estimated. To circumvent this problem, they propose that a multinomial logit model (MNL) be employed to estimate the polychotomous electoral choice.

Latest empirical research on this methodological issue, however, contests the choice of the multinomial logit model in analyzing multiparty elections. This method, as Alvarez and Nagler note, is no better than successive applications of binomial logit, with which the multinomial logit is recommended to replace (1996). The authors argue that the major weakness of MNL is its assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which implies that “the ratio of probability of choosing one party to the probability of choosing a second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third party enters the race” (Alvarez and Nagler 1996). To give an analogy in economics, from which this model is derived, consider a choice of transportation modes between driving a car or
taking a red bus. The relative probability for choosing one of the two should be .5 given an indifferent commuter. IIA assumes that this ratio will be retained if a blue bus enters the choice set. This almost approaches impossibility, however, as the blue bus not only provides a close substitute to the original bus but also the substitutibilities for the red bus and the car differ.

In place of MNL, Alvarez and Nagler suggest that a multinomial probit model (MNP), which does not impose IIA, should be employed in modeling multi-party elections. Unrestricted by the unrealistic IIA assumption, the model also allows for both choice-specific and individual-specific variables to be included as predictors of the model, which is an advantage untenable in MNL. Choice-specific variables refer to the characteristics related to the alternatives in the dependent variables (e.g., the issue position of the party), whereas individual-specific variables are the characteristics regarding the individual, such as age and education level of the voter. MNP, however, also has its Achilles' heel: its high computational cost and its sensitivity to models with large numbers of predictors. Due to its technical complications, some analysts deem the method computationally "impractical" (see Whitten and Palmer 1996). Hence, caution should be taken in estimating a parsimonious MNP model.5

In addressing the two aforementioned issues, I put the traditional proximity model and the directional model in empirical tests using data from the British election panel study in 1987-19926 and attempt to identify the multivariate model that best represents the issue effect in the British election.
4.3 A Graphical Analysis

To formalize the impact of an issue on voting decision, I define voting or party support as a function of voter and party issue positions in two forms:

1. Proximity model

\[ U_p(S) = m - \sum_{i=1}^{k} (v_i - p_i)^2]^{1/2} = m - [(v_1 - p_1)^2 + ... + (v_k - p_k)^2]^{1/2} \] (4.1)

where \( S \) is the support a party garners from the issue impact, \( m \) is the maximum issue effect or most support the party can derive from the issue factor; \( v \) is the voter’s issue position; and \( p \) is the party’s issue position. This function utilizes the linear Euclidean distance or the absolute value between voter and party positions in a \( k \)-dimensional issue space. The neutral point is not at issue in this model; only the distance will be concerned. Hence, it is not necessary to have a zero point. When the positions of the two are equivalent, the party gains the most.

2. Directional model

\[ U_d(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} v_i p_i = v_1 p_1 + ... + v_k p_k \] (4.2)

In this model, the function follows a multiplicative form, where party acquires positive support from voters on the same side of a positive-negative scale with zero as the neutral point. Negative impact results when the two are on different sides. The model is unbounded on both sides, indicating that support for a party mounts when either one
tends to approach the extreme. This, however, carries a condition as specified by Rabinowitz et al. as the region of acceptability, i.e., location beyond the region or the extreme positions produces penalties.

The two support functions are illustrated in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. The three-dimensional graphs portray the interplay between the positions of voter and party on a single issue and the support derived from the relationship between the two variables under the two voting models. The left side panel of Figure 4.1 presents two proximity models that depict the negative, linear relationship between party support and issue distance. These two plots represent the scenarios in which party and voters have congruent, opposite and extreme positions, respectively. The upper graph indicates that voters have stronger support for party as they get closer to the party on issue positions. It peaks at a point where the two have the same positions. Meanwhile, congruent positions always generate maximal support. The lower left graph describes graphically four situations when either one of the two has fixed, extreme positions. In those cases, support will be solely a function of the other side’s position. For example, if the party is at 11, or the extreme right, voters’ support for this party rises as they approach the right. To further explore these scenarios, the right-side panel elaborates interaction between the three variables. The upper right graph paints the support function when the party’s positions are fixed at 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, respectively. Except for the two extremes, the support functions bounce back after reaching the peak. Note that the lines parallel with each other, i.e., they have the same slopes. The lower right graph shows the contrary
cases in mirror images. From the main plot in the middle, it is noticeable that the support for a party (z-axis) in the proximity model peaks at the diagonal between the x and y axes, beyond which the surface declines, with the same slopes on both sides, toward the ends of the two axes.

The directional model's curvilinear surface is contrasted with the quasi-pyramid in the proximity model (Figure 4.2). The upper left graph portrays the parabolic relationships when voters and parties are at congruent and opposite positions. This reflects that the intensity of appeal is at play, i.e., the increment in support of or in opposition to the party grows at an increasing rate with issue positions of both the voter and the party. The stronger the appeal of either the voter or the party for an issue, the higher the voting return thus resulted, provided that the two are on the same side. Likewise, a negative effect kicks in, with an increasing rate, when the voter and the party are at odds on the issue. Despite that the linear relationships at extreme positions (lower left) appear the same as the proximity model, all four lines pass through the zero point, indicating the existence of neutrality or the absence of impact. The two models also differ in slopes. Graphs in the right side panel illustrate the scenarios in which either the voter or the party has fixed positions. While the lines are all tangents to either the x=0 axis or y=0 axis, they have different slopes as contrary to the proximity models.

Comparing the proximity surface, the directional model as shown in Figure 4.2’s middle main plot demonstrates that the maximum support only occurs at the two ends when the voter and the party are in congruent positions with highest intensity. Noteworthy is the
curvilinearity of the model, which suggests variable slopes instead of fixed slopes in the proximity model. In this case, voting support is a function of both the voter and party positions, rather than being independent of the latter, as the proximity model suggests.9

Having examined the properties of the two hypothetical models, we next fit them into the real situation drawing data from the 1987-92 British election panel study. The panel survey has a series of questions that were designed to gauge issue positions of respondents with reference to their perceived positions of the political parties. The series covers five policy issues that were considered most important in differentiating political parties, particularly Conservative and Labour (Heath et al. 1985; Denver 1994)10. They are: 1) unemployment and inflation; 2) taxation and government expenditure; 3) nationalization; 4) integration with the European Community, and 5) equalization of income11. For each issue question, interviewers would read two statements representing two sides of opinions before asking the respondents to place their own positions on an eleven-point scale (from A to K). For instance, on the issue of taxation and government services, the respondents will be given the two statements like: “.... we should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services” and “.... we should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services.” After indicating their own positions, the respondent would be asked to give their perceived positions of different political parties. The distributions of opinions on these five issues are demonstrated in Figure 4.3.

Displayed in the bar charts are the distributions of simplified versions of the issue
responses, which were recoded into a dichotomous scale for illustration purpose. With +1 representing supporters and -1 the opponents, all the scales have a central point of zero which refers to those who hold neutrality. As reflected in the figures, opinions on the two major economic issues—namely unemployment/inflation and taxation/government expenditure—are overwhelmingly inclined toward the left side of the scale. The British public tends to favor creating jobs and cutting taxes rather than keeping prices low and increasing government spending. Although voters are divided on the two policy issues on income equalization and integration of the European Community, opinions regarding nationalization are somewhat balanced, given a substantial proportion of respondents who put themselves at the neutral point (28 percent). In general, owing to the leftward skew on economic issues, public opinion is tilted toward the liberal side on an overall left-right issue scale (see the lower right chart in Figure 4.3). Figure 4.4 presents percentages of the vote obtained by the three parties by voters’ positions on the five issues. The vote percentages on the y-axis are the proportion of support the parties received from each group of voters having the same position on the issue. These curves demonstrate the propensity of voters to support a party that shares their issue positions. Generally, the closer the elector is to the right, the more likely he will vote for the Conservative, and vice versa for the Labour. However, voters for the Liberal Democrats do not show any issue effect, as indicated by the flat slope. Note that the slopes of the vote share curve vary from one issue to the other, which suggests the different levels of intensity. Also, most of the curves are not unbounded as to what the directional model
predicts. At the intercept of the Conservative and Labour curves is the point where the voter at that position is willing to trade votes, i.e., the probability for voting either party is the same. Most of the intersection is on the left of the scale. Interestingly, the intercept for the general left-right curves is the mean score of the general public’s overall issue positions.

Summarizing voters’ views on various issues, Table 4.1 gives the mean issue position scores of the voters and perceived positions of the three parties. The original scale was modified by subtracting 6 to give a scale ranging from -5 (most liberal) to 5 (most conservative). If the mean scores indicate the general intensity of concern on issues, the British public is most concerned with the problem of joblessness, followed by tax reduction.12 Besides the income equality issue, respondents have the widest gaps with the governing Conservative party on these two issues. Comparing the three parties, the public positions the Tories on the moderate right, the Liberal Democrats closer to the middle and Labour on the left. However, judging from the graphical demonstration and mean scores does not suffice to decipher how issues affect electoral choice. More sophisticated statistical analyses are required.

4.4 A Statistical Analysis

In the previous chapter, we tested the party identification model using four groups of predictors including demographic variables, class factors, evaluations of issues, and evaluation of political leaders. Informed by previous voting studies (Fiorina 1981, Clarke
et al. 1992), I add the dependent variable in the previous model—party identification—to analyze the voting function. In order to compare the predictabilities of the proximity and directional variables, two parallel voting models will be estimated, each of which employs one of the two spatial variables. Also, as recent electoral research has shed new light on the geographic cleavages in electoral support, I include regional dummies to examine the widely-cited North-South divide between Labour and Conservative supporters (Curtice and Steed 1982, Johnston and Pattie 1989, see also Denver 1992).

Because of the qualitative nature of the dependent variable, I first employ a binary logit model to test the voting intention in the following form (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991):

\[
p_{ij} = \frac{1}{1+e^{-Z_i}}
\]

(4.3)

where \(p_{ij}\) is the probability for voter \(i\) for selecting party \(j\) and

\[
Z_i = b_0 + b_1 \text{AGE}_{it} + b_2 \text{GENDER}_{it} + b_3 \text{EDUC}_{it} + b_4 \text{INCOME}_{it} + b_5 \text{OCLASS}_{it} + b_6 \text{UMEM}_{it} + b_7 \text{HOMOWN}_{it} + b_8 \text{REGION}_{it} + b_9 \text{PARTYID}_{t-1i} + b_{10} \text{LEADER}_{it}
\]

(4.4a)

\[
Z_i = b_0 + b_1 \text{AGE}_{it} + b_2 \text{GENDER}_{it} + b_3 \text{EDUC}_{it} + b_4 \text{INCOME}_{it} + b_5 \text{OCLASS}_{it} + b_6 \text{UMEM}_{it} + b_7 \text{HOMOWN}_{it} + b_8 \text{REGION}_{it} + b_9 \text{PARTYID}_{t-1i} + b_{10} \text{LEADER}_{it} + b_{11} \text{DIRECTION}_{it}
\]

(4.4b)

where:
Table 4.2 presents the results of the binary logit estimates of the voting models, drawing data from the 1987-1992 panel study. Lagged party identification is among the best predictors and is statistically significant at the most stringent level (0.001) across all three parties. With other factors, it helps contribute to a high percentage of correct prediction in the three voting models (80.7 percent to 90.4 percent). The leader and issue variables also achieve statistically significant results. Regarding the former, it is evident that voters' evaluations of party leaders occupy integral positions in ballot behavior among supporters for all parties. The prime minister's image consistently plays a significant role, while the opposition party leaders vary on effects of images. For instance, the leader of the Labour party, Mr. Kinnock, does not make as much difference for Liberal Democratic voting as do images of Liberal Democratic and Conservative leaders, Messrs. Ashdown and Major, respectively. Likewise, for Tory voting, Mr. Ashdown is largely irrelevant. *Pace* leadership effect issues always matter in voting
decisions. Both the traditional proximity and the directional variables register statistically significant results. Note that because the former is testing against the hypothesis of inverse relationship between distance and support, negative signs indicate correct predictions.

The remaining right-hand-side variables exhibit sporadic results. The income variable is a divider between the Conservative and Labour supporters. Voters in relatively wealthier groups tend to support the Tories rather than Labour. Income has no influence on Liberal voters, however. Similar patterns can be found for the age variable: younger voters tend to side with the opposition Labour, as compared to older supporters, who tend to opt for the Tories. Not unexpectedly, controlling for party identification, most of the class and regional variables become trivial. Regarding the latter, I test the hypothesis that voters in the affluent south incline to elect the Conservative party as the north supports Labour. Accordingly, the south is treated as the reference group in the Conservative model, whereas the north serves the same role in the Labour and Liberal models. As the Labour results demonstrate, southerners, as compared to northerners, are less likely to vote Labour. Comparatively, while voters for the governing party are insensitive to regional differences, Liberal Democrats draw support from the richer south.

These estimates provide a preliminary picture of issue influences on voting choices. Comparing the issue variables, the traditional proximity models for the three British parties predict almost identical results, as do the directional models. They report different signs owing to the fact that the former group of models testifies the negative
relationship between issue distance and support, and the latter taps into a positive impact of issue intensity. Both issue variables perform well and both score statistically significant results at the 0.001 level.

I next examine the hypothesis that the directional issue variable serves as a better predictor than proximity one, as claimed by Rabinowitz, et al. Comparing the logit estimates in the voting model does not suffice to discern a winner, and goodness of fit indices such as McKelvey’s pseudo R square and percentage of correct prediction also fail to tell the difference, given the limits of these two statistics. To achieve this goal, I employ an encompassing test to determine which of these two rival models excels.

First proposed by the London School of Economics (LSE) econometricians, the principle of encompassing furnishes a research strategy in determining the adequacy of competing models (Hendry 1995). The essence of encompassing hinges on “a standardized comparison of predictability of rival models embedded in a common framework” (Hendry 1995: 502; see Granato 1992). It requires a given model to account for the behavior or performance of other rival models (Charemza and Deadman 1992, Mizon 1984). It follows that a larger model always encompasses a smaller, nested model which is a subset of the initial nesting model (i.e., $M_1 \subseteq M_2$ if $M_2 \subset M_1$). For competing non-nested models, the encompassing test calls for a comparison of variance being explained by a different subset of parameters (variance encompassing). For $M_1$ to encompass $M_2$, for example, it must be able to predict at least as well as $M_2$ or explain the variation of errors in the latter. A variance encompassing test, however, does not
necessarily lead to mutually exclusive results; it is possible that both models encompass each other. In that case, we have to conduct an alternative test to determine a better model, or concede that both models perform equally well.

Currently, there is not a formal test for encompassing in non-linear models. To implement an encompassing test in the current context, I employ a log-likelihood ratio (LR) test based on the result from the logit models to approximate the F-test in time-series or linear regression models. The LR test tests the hypothesis that one of the two rival, non-nested models has the ability to account for the behavior of the other (Mizon and Richard 1986, see also Hendry 1995). Table 4.3 reports the results of the encompassing tests in which the general issue effect is tested, followed by individual issue effects.

The first column presents the LR test estimates with respect to the hypothesis that the directional model encompasses proximity (null hypothesis directional does not encompass proximity); the second testifies for the contrary. Entries on the first group of rows are the chi-squares for the general issue effect, which is derived from the aggregate of five individual issue variables. Following are the tests for effects of individual issues, i.e. testifying to whether one model outperforms the other in certain issues.

Comparing the two columns, it is apparent that proximity is a clear winner in all voting models. All the chi-squared statistics in the second column -- which test the null hypothesis that the proximity model does not encompass directional -- are significant, rejecting the null at the 0.05 level or better with most of coefficients reaching the most
stringent confidence level (99.9%). However, the result is conclusive in some of the Labour models. In the general effect model, for instance, the chi-squares for both tests are statistically significant, indicating the two models encompass each other. A similar pattern is revealed in the individual issue test of taxation and government spending, in which case both of the directional variables demonstrate a slightly stronger impact than those of its opponent. Thus, despite that proximity registers better results in general, the strong effect of the directional variable on the Labour voting model is too noticeable to be neglected.

Are these results peculiar to voting in the 1992 election, or do they obtain in earlier elections, as well? To answer this question, I employ data from the 1983-1987 British election panel study. The analyses are presented in Table 4.4. Intriguingly, the 1987 panel model reveals the same pattern, in which proximity dominates in all voting models except the case of Labour. In the latter, both proximity and directional variables (general) encompass each other. The directional influence even surpasses its rival in the aggregate issue variable ($X^2=14.224$, as compared to 7.567 in the proximity model), indicating its strong impact on Labour voting. Note that when the issue of defense is concerned, Labour voters appear to vote on a directional instead of a proximity basis, i.e., the former better represents the issue impact in the voter’s mind. In accordance with this finding are the consistently higher correlations between the directional variable and the Labour vote. As shown in Table 4.5, the directional variable invariably outperforms the proximity among Labour voters in the 1983, 1987 and 1992 elections, suggesting that
Labour voters tend to respond to the party’s issue appeal while supporters for the Tories and Liberal Democrats favor the party that mirrors their own political views.

From the encompassing analysis, it is reasonable to conjecture that, in general, the traditional proximity variable is a better representation of the issue impact on voting choice. This embodiment of issue influence, however, is not static over time and is strictly invariant across different parties and issues. Labour’s anomaly suggests that voters perceive the leftist party with a different expectation: besides the ideological closeness, as epitomized by the proximity variable in the current analysis, they also look up to the party for a role of “advocate” on alternative policies. Nevertheless, care should be taken in interpreting this finding, as Labour’s “directional support” does not necessarily come from its position as the major opposition party, but from its being the only leftist party in the British polity. In fact, supporters for another opposition party, Liberal Democrats, consistently elect the candidates with closest political views, like their Conservative counterparts.

Rabinowitz, et al. contend that, informed by the ideas of symbolic politics, the mass-elite linkage is built on the policy guidance delivered by the political parties. In providing political leadership, political parties derive support from voters who anticipate electoral cues from party elites. Voters in this model prefer a candidate with the same issue direction and with intense positions on issues, as well. From what we observe in the present analysis in the British context, their proposition is contradicted. When considering a ballot choice, British voters are not as concerned with intensity of issue
advocates as with ideological distance; support is based on the party with the closest political views. Based on this finding, we continue to estimate the voting utility function using a more sophisticated model that allows for the estimation of multi-party electoral choice.

4.5 Modeling Multi-party Elections

Previous voting studies have relied on the binary discrete choice models to estimate electoral choice between incumbent and opposition parties. In the multi-party context, however, differentials in support among opposition parties would be ignored in these binary models, because all the opposition parties were collapsed into one group as opposed to the governing party. Critics in recent research have complained that the practice was counter-intuitive and misinformed. Finding this method wanting, they claim binomial estimations are seriously flawed when the multiple party choice is concerned. In the latter context, more sophisticated models, which allow for estimation of probabilities for electing different parties, should be employed. Variants of the multinomial discrete choice models, as originated in econometric studies, have been proposed to resolve the issue. Among the candidates are the multinomial logit and multinomial probit models. While both models relax the limit in the categories of the dependent variable, each model has technical shortcomings. For the former, its implicit assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which supposes the probabilities across various choices being constant and independent, is unrealistic for the voting
decision model. The restriction in model parameterization that confines solely to individual specific variables (characteristics of the individual voter) also poses substantive difficulties for MNL to estimate probabilities that vary with the attributes of the choice alternatives (i.e., the parties). On the other hand, despite its more flexible assumptions, the highly-acclaimed multinomial probit model also presents technical obstacles given its high computational cost and complexities in implementation.\textsuperscript{17}

To circumvent these methodological hurdles, I apply both models successively in a discriminative manner. For the initial stage, I estimate a multinomial logit model for preliminary analysis. Based on the results from MNL models, I then estimate a more parsimonious multinomial probit model built upon the significant findings from the first model.

The Multinomial Logit model has the forms as follows:

\[
P_{ji} = \frac{e^{Z_{ki}}}{1 + \sum_{h=0}^{L} e^{Z_{hi}}} \quad \text{for } j=1,2 \text{ (Labour, Conservative)} \quad (4.4)
\]

\[
P_{j0} = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{k=0}^{L} e^{Z_{ki}}} \quad \text{for } j=0 \text{ (Liberal)} \quad (4.5)
\]

where \(P_{ji}\) is the probability for voter \(i\) for selecting party \(j\) and

\[
Z_{ki} = a_0 + b_j X_{ti} \quad (4.6)
\]

in which \(a_0\) is a constant, \(b_j\)'s are logit coefficients and \(X_{ti}\) denotes the individual-specific
variables including party identification, age, education level, occupational class, home-
ownership, union membership, region and evaluations of party leaders. Because the
multinomial logit model assumes the utility for voter i choosing party j to be a function of
an individual voter’s aspects that vary across voters but remain constant across choices,
only individual-specific variables are employed (Greene 1990). In this context, Liberal is
selected as the reference group (0) in comparison with Labour (1) and Conservative (2).
Results of MNL models are presented in Table 4.6.

In comparison with the binomial logit estimates as presented in Table 4.2, the
MNL model gives very similar results in terms of statistical inferences. All estimates are
predicted in correct signs as in the binomial model. Note that the multinomial logit
model provides more sensible estimates by taking into consideration a comparison across
three party choices. In other words, controlling for the probability of selecting another
party, say, the Conservative in the present model, the effect of each predictor on Labour
is individually estimated with reference to the base category of Liberal Democrats instead
of a combined non-Labour group. For instance, as column 1 in Table 4.6 illustrates, age
and income are found to be influential factors to Labour voters as compared to Liberal
Democrats. It suggests that, controlling for Conservative votes, younger voters and lower
income groups are more likely to align with Labour than with Liberals. Similarly, with
regard to regional differences, Labour finds more support in all other regions than
Liberals. The leader image variables have brought to light more intriguing findings:
when a voter contemplates a choice between Labour and Liberal, he or she will not only
evaluate leaders of the two parties, but also the prime minister. In contrast, when considering a vote between Conservative and Liberal, the evaluations of Kinnock become irrelevant. For the rest of the variables, the Conservative model reflects largely the same findings, except the less visible regional effect.

A caveat is in order in interpreting the party identification variables and issue effect from the MNL model. As mentioned before, the specification of MNL allows only individual-specific variables that are invariant across different categories in the dependent variables. Party identification and issue proximity, however, are conditional upon the attributes of the parties and vary from one party to another. Issue proximity between a voter and a party, for instance, is contingent upon his issue position and his perception of the party's stance on policies. This perceived distance will not be the same across the three parties. Similarly, party identification has the comparable, albeit less distinguishable, choice-dependent characteristic.\(^{18}\) That said, I include the two variables in the MNL model with other individual-specific variables for two purposes: first, to supply \textit{a priori} information for further estimation and, second, to serve as yardsticks for model comparison.

Despite its restrictive assumptions, MNL provides a feasible and easy-to-implement modeling technique for preliminary analysis of a multiple-choice model. On the basis of MNL estimates, we proceed to the next stage of the analysis that focuses on a parsimonious multinomial probit model that better approximates the reality in the British multi-party electoral context. The multinomial probit model has two advantages over its
logit opponent counterpart. First, with more flexible model specification, MNP is not restricted by the unrealistic IIA assumption that limits the applicability of the model.

Second, as a result from the first point, MNP allows more room for a theory-guided parameterization of the multiple choice model and provides the analysts with ample freedom to include different types of variables, choice-specific and individual-specific alike (Alvarez and Nagler 1996). The multinomial probit takes the same form as the multinomial logit in (4.4), except its inclusion of a group of choice-specific variables and its specification in the disturbance term:

\[
Z_{ki} = a_0 + b_i \sum X_{it} + e_i \sum W_{it} + e_i, \quad i=0,1,2
\]

\[
[e_0, e_i, e_2] \sim N[0, \Sigma]
\]

In this setup, \(X_{it}\) and \(W_{it}\) denote, respectively, the individual-specific variables and choice-specific variables, whereas, \(e_i\) is the error term in alternative \(i\) (Greene 1990), \(a_0\) is the constant and \(b_i\) and \(c_i\) are the probit estimates for the two groups of predictors.

Unlike MNL, the MNP model includes both systemic and stochastic components. In addition to the predictors, the model also estimates the sigma matrix that contains the variances and covariances of the \(k-1\) disturbance terms. In the present context, the variance-covariance matrix bears substantive meaning that pertains to the IIA assumption. It admits correlations between the probabilities of choosing different options in the dependent variable, i.e., the party choice. Specifically, a statistically significant
covariance term suggests rejection of the IIA or assertion of interdependence between choices.

The results of the MNP models are illustrated in Table 4.7. Two models are estimated focusing on the party identification, issue evaluations and leader effects. Starting values for estimation of MNP coefficients are derived from MNL estimates. As shown in Table 4.7, the MNP model performs very well and all the variables are predicted in correct directions. Most of the estimates achieve statistical significance at the most stringent 0.001 level and accord well with the substantive theory. Notice that both of the error covariance terms (\(\sigma\)'s) are statistically significant, which testifies to the fact that the IIA assumption is violated. In other words, the probability of choosing one of the three parties is dependent upon the choices of the other two.

Noteworthy is the substantive implication that the MNP model offers: it takes into account both the individual attributes and choice-dependent variables, as exemplified by the issue proximity variable. In the previous MNL model, all predictors are estimated as if they are independent from the choices, viz. parties, which is an undue assumption for certain variables. By definition, voters' issue distance does actually vary with respect to different parties. In this sense, MNP excels its logit rival by providing a modeling framework that better approximates the real world. Moreover, the model's liberation from the IIA assumption allows for an estimation of the voting decision that incorporates information from both the individual choosers and the choices. In contrast, MNL presents a deterministic model in which voting decision is determined by individual
characteristics such as age, education level and socioeconomic status. In real life, a political choice is a far cry from what this model projects. A voting decision is not simply a utility formula dependent upon static input values as derived from the predetermined personal attributes. Instead, ballot choice is an informed, rational and interactive process that is dynamic in nature and is conditioned by both the systemic and stochastic components. To serve this goal, the MNP model provides an appropriate representation of this complicated process.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we utilize different methods to explore the subtlety of the electoral choice process as conditioned by different groups of long-term and short-term factors. Comparing rival models of issue voting, we discover that, in general, the traditional proximity model provides a better representation of issue impact in the British context. The directional model, which finds significant results in the United States and other European countries, also presents applicability in Labour voting. The finding indicates that the directional model performs better in a context where parties have strong appeals and tend to take a role as advocate on alternate policies. We pay particular attention in modeling the issue factors as informed by the proposition that voting decisions are a product of a rational and educated evaluative process. This process is an interaction between the choosers and the choices—in this case, the political parties—on the basis of available political information. To this end, I test the hypothesis that issues provide an
important source of political information for voters to apply their calculus of utility when a choice of government is considered. Although our focus has been on modeling the issue effect on ballot choice, we also overcome methodological obstacles in examining the electoral decision-making process, which is interactive and dynamic in nature. We have found that the issue proximity—or the ideological distance between voters and party—in an MNP model provides a robust representation of the former feature. As our next task, we proceed in the following chapter to investigate the dynamics of political support over time in the interim between elections.
Endnotes

1. The spatial theory of voting has its very first origin from Hotelling’s work on economic decision analysis (1929). This line of research was introduced into voting studies through the analysis by Black (1948, 1958) and Downs (1957).

2. The Rabinowitz et al. directional model is in a form of:

\[ U(V) = \sum_{k=1}^{k} v_{i}p_{i} + \ldots + v_{k}p_{k} \]

where \( v_{i}, v_{k} \) represent the voter’s positions and \( p_{1}, \ldots, p_{k} \) represent the party’s positions in a \( k \)-dimensional issue space.

The traditional proximity model is:

\[ U(V) = -|v - p| = -[(v_{1} - p_{1})^{2} + \ldots + (v_{k} - p_{k})^{2}]^{1/2} \]

See also endnote 7 in Chapter III.

3. Ivensen (1994) has applied the issue voting models on six European countries, including Britain. His model, however, employs the simple binary rankings of the proximity and intensity (i.e., 1 represents closer in distance and higher in intensity, 0 otherwise) instead of the original spatial variables.

4. The issues covered in the 1963 and 1964 surveys were nationalization, nuclear weapons, entry into Common Market, immigration, death penalty, influence of big business and importance of the Royal family.

5. For instance, an MNP model written in GAUSS code with 10 predictors took a Pentium-133 five hours to reach convergence. Another model with more predictors, however, failed to converge.

6. I do not compare the issue effects in all the elections between 1979 and 1992 owing to the differences in issue questions in the four elections. Differences in scaling pose another difficulty for comparison.

7. Unlike the traditional approach, I define the support function instead of the utility function as in Rabinowitz et al. (1989, 1991) and Merrill (1995). These two, however, are two sides of the same coin. The support function is utilized in the latter part of the chapter for a multivariate model.

8. Note that in a three-dimensional graph, the vertical axis \( z \) (the support variable) is the dependent variable, whereas the horizontal planes \( x \) and \( y \) are independent variables.
Hence, the line that connects the root of spikes on the floor plane does not refer to a relationship between \( x \) and \( y \).

9. Under the proximity model, support bounces back in the same slope but in the opposite direction. Also, at the point where the two positions are equivalent (i.e., \( v=p \)) support reaches the maximum, which is a constant and independent of party position.

10. The British General Election Surveys also cover other issues such as racial equality, class conflict and abortion policy. These issue questions were not employed in the current study because they are merely designed for collecting respondents' own opinion without being referenced to the perceived positions of political parties.

11. Only five out of seven issue questions were selected for this study since responses from the other two questions, defense and standard of living, were collected from a separate subsample.

12. In this case, the position score reflects two qualities: direction and intensity of concern to the issue. While zero represents a point of no interest and no position, the two extremes signify the most favorable and unfavorable with highest interest.

13. The notation, \( \xi \), is used to represent the encompassing relationship, which properties are reflexive, anti-symmetric but not necessarily transitive (Hendry, 1995).

14. The chi-squared statistic is derived from differencing the log likelihood ratios of the model and the joint model that contains the variables in both rival models.

15. Issue coverage in the 1983-1987 panel survey was slightly different from the 1987-1992 survey. It covers issues such as inflation/unemployment, taxation/welfare, defense and nationalization. Equalization of income and issue of European Community were not available in 1983.

16. Correlations between issue effects and voting choice in 1979 were not reported, as questions on issue distance are in a different format in the 1979 survey.

17. Because of its need to evaluate multiple integrals of the normal distribution in error covariances, MNP has long been considered as impractical and computationally inefficient. See Greene (1990) and Whitten and Palmer (1996).

18. The fact that the existing coding scheme for party identification (PID) is designed for binomial models renders the variable somewhat in between the choice-specific and individual-specific characterization. A Labour identifier with a party strength of 3, for instance, will have the score -3 by default for both his Conservative and Liberal PID. The variable falls within the choice-specific category, notwithstanding its limited variation.
19. Since MNP allows for the correlation among the error terms, it is free from the restriction of the IIA assumption that sabotages the applicability of MNL (Alvarez and Nagler 1996, see also Hausman and Wise 1978).

20. For the sake of parsimony and computational efficiency, the voting models were reparameterized to focus on the major key variables, namely, party identification, evaluations of party leaders and issue proximity. Other class variables and demographic variables were dropped due to statistically insignificant results in full models. While preceding analyses using other models such as 2SLS and MNL demonstrate that including these variables does not significantly contribute to model prediction, estimation of the full model with all ten predictors is computationally costly. See endnote 5.
CHAPTER V

THE "PRESIDENTIALIZATION" OF PRIME MINISTERS:
MODELING PARTY SUPPORT BETWEEN ELECTIONS

5.1 Introduction

To date, we have studied the factors that contribute to change in British voting behavior at the individual level. Micro-level analyses in previous chapters furnish a general foundation in understanding the "electoral evolution" among individual British voters. We examine in these analyses the long-term social factors and short-term perceptual factors that contribute to electoral change in the Thatcher-Major era. With primary focus on the surveys administered before or after the general elections, the preceding investigations provide snapshots of the nation's political landscape. However, as noted in Chapter IV, voting behavior is dynamic in nature and variable over time. The volatility in voting choice ought to be studied by following the temporal trajectory of public support for political parties. To that end, the current chapter is devoted to the time series analysis of party support at the aggregate, "macroscopic" level. In particular, we pay special attention to the electoral impact of the British prime minister, who has become the focus in recent studies of "presidentialized" elections in the Western parliamentary systems (Mughan 1993). Employing Kalman filter and cointegration modeling techniques, this chapter investigates the validity of the presidentialism thesis by
analyzing the dynamics of the impact of prime ministerial approval on governing party support.

The organization of the chapter is as follows: part 1 identifies the three models of party support with special focus on leadership effects; part 2 presents time series analyses of governing party support based on the Gallup poll data drawn from the 1979-1996 period. The results of these analyses form the basis for a Kalman filter model in part 3, which tests the structural stability of the relationship between prime ministerial approval and governing party support. Part 4 concludes.

5.2 Leader Matters, Leader Matters Not? Three Prime Ministerial Models

Early studies of British elections assign little weight to the electoral effect of leader images. Voting studies in the 1950s were almost unanimous regarding what party leaders do in elections: they were “secondary components.” In the face of the preponderance of long-term forces such as social class, leaders played little role in electoral choice. Their contribution, according to some analysts, is at best the “embodiment of general political attitudes” (Trenaman and McQuail 1961). Similarly, Butler and Stokes were reluctant to classify leader images as one of the major determinants of electoral outcome (1969). The resurgence of the Tories in the 1960s, as the authors argue, has no necessary tie to the general public’s support for the then Conservative prime minister, Mr. Heath. The authors maintain that the importance of leader images cannot be discounted, but that it is only among the factors that affect
“transient shifts of party strength.” In other words, only when there is a marked, huge imbalance between the two leaders will such a difference be made. This effect will easily be “outweighed by other issues and events” of public concern (p. 388). Under the traditional “leaders-matter-not” model, leadership effect merely played in the background.

Erosion of social-class influence in the 1970s has prompted recent scholarship to call into question the “unimportance” of leader images. Empirical studies in the 1980s and the 1990s reexamine the electoral impact of political leaders using more sophisticated methods and find notably dissimilar results. Researchers noticed that the partisan dealignment in the 1970s brought substantial changes to the role of political leaders in guiding voting behavior (Bean and Mughan 1989, Graetz and McAllister 1987, Stewart and Clarke 1992). As the long-term forces generated from stable class alignment began to wither in the 1970s, electoral choice was open to individual volatility amenable to short-term influences. This is fostered by the activities of the mass media and the commercialization of electioneering. Stewart and Clarke (1992), for instance, argue that the high visibility of political leaders on television during election campaigns renders the leader image a salient factor in a voter’s choice of government. Multivariate analyses in the same study demonstrate that the leadership variable even outperforms other factors, such as economic evaluations and issue concerns in the 1987 general election (pp. 466-68). But not every analyst was convinced that the traditional model had been displaced by this “leaders-do-matter” model. Heath and his associates, for instance, posit that party
leaders are negligible vis-a-vis other social and political sources of electoral change (1991). Despite their long tenure as party leaders and prime ministers, for the authors of this study, Margaret Thatcher and Harold Wilson might not have existed to effect change in the British electorate.

The growing body of research in the 1990s finding evidence for the leadership influences, however, renders the “importance” of leader image—particularly government leaders—undeniable (Mughan 1993; Crewe and King 1994; Nadeau and Mendelsohn 1994; Clarke and Stewart 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Nadeau, Niemi and Amato 1996 and Jones and Hudson 1996). The notion that party leaders matter in affecting voting choice has, in practice, become the new conventional wisdom in contemporary electoral research (Nadeau, Niemi and Amato 1996). There persists, however, several methodological and substantive issues that concern researchers in the field. One of the primary facets is to distinguish the general public’s approval of leaders from the support for their political parties. As Clarke and Stewart have pointed out, correlations between the two series are “too close for comfort” (1995a). This concern calls for empirical answers to two major questions: Are the two variables readily distinguishable from each other? If so, is one exogenous to the other? The authors identify prime ministerial approval as weakly exogenous to governing party support. Moreover, the two series are cointegrated, i.e., they tend to “travel together” in the long run (p. 163). They also argue that the replacement of Mrs. Thatcher with Mr. Major witnessed a temporary divergence of the two series—a divergence that lends weight to the proposition that party support is
distinctive from leader evaluations.

With the empirical significance of the "leaders-do-matter" model being established, the next question concerns the extent of influence of party leaders on election outcome. Studies that take into consideration the campaign strategies of political parties point to a trend of so-called "presidentialization" of leader effects. Representative of this stream of research is Mughan's work, articulating the growing influence of party leaders in the age of mass media. He argues that elections in parliamentary systems have become more presidential in the sense that parties are more inclined to project their image through their leader in mass media during election campaigns. Political parties seek exposure on television and coverage in news reporting--particularly during the 1987 and 1992 British general elections--by highlighting their leaders via commercials and personality-based campaigns (Mughan 1993, see also Farrell and Wortmann 1987 and Bean and Mughan 1989). Mughan concludes from analyses based on the 1964-1992 election results that voters' preferences for prime minister have become more influential in recent elections. He also discovers the partisan dealignment in 1974 and the 1987 election were the onset dates for this "leaders-matter-more" or presidentialization model of general elections.

While acknowledging the impact of party leader image on voters as substantial, researchers drawing inferences from studies at different levels of analysis have yet to arrive at unanimity on the leadership model. This is partially due to the fact that a substantial portion of the empirical findings were based on micro-level (individual) analyses, while others were derived from macro-level (aggregate) time series studies. In
this chapter, we focus on the aggregate level of analysis in an attempt to arrive at a general model of leadership effect. In the following section, we proceed from the basic model in which government support is a function of prime ministerial approval, economic evaluations and political interventions. Employing time series data drawn from Gallup polls covering the period of Conservative tenure since 1979\(^1\) (July, 1979 to April, 1996), we analyze the three models, paying particular attention to leadership effects on governing party support.

5.3 Modeling Leadership Effect on Party Support

When examining the relationship between governing party support and approval of prime minister, Clarke and Stewart (1995) counsel caution. The authors are concerned with the widely accepted conception that the two measures are in fact “tapping the same thing” (p. 156). A graphical plot of the two variables reveals that the authors’ prudence is not unwarranted. As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, the two series move very close to each other. With a high correlation of 0.905, the only visible divergence occurs in a short period between where Major replaced Thatcher as prime minister and the 1992 election. Such a departure in this period, nevertheless, explains the fact that the two series are individual, separate variables (Clarke and Stewart 1995: 156-57). Bearing in mind this observation only provides intuition, statistical evidence is in order.

The fact that the two variables trend up and down closely together provides a strong hint of the existence of what is designated as a cointegrating relationship. A group
of nonstationary variables will be regarded as cointegrated if a linear combination of them constitutes a stationary series. Substantively, cointegration suggests a long-run equilibrium relationship between two or more non-stationary series being maintained by a mechanism that corrects the departure of any of the series from the common trend (error correction mechanism). In other words, whenever there is an abrupt movement of either series, its close tie with the other cointegrated series will subsequently offset such a departure and adjust the movement of the series until the original equilibrium is reestablished (Cuthbertson, Taylor and Hall 1992; see also Clarke and Stewart 1995 and Ostrom and Smith 1990). This accords well with the trajectories of prime ministerial approval and Conservative party support as illustrated in Figure 5.1.

The test for cointegration requires two conditions to be met: first, the series of interests are integrated of the same order and, second, the linear combination of the series has a lower order of integration. To determine if there exists a cointegrated relationship between Conservative support and prime ministerial approval, a series of Dickey-Fuller unit root tests is performed to demonstrate the stationarity of the two variables (Dickey and Fuller 1979). As shown in Table 5.1, which presents the findings of the tests, it is clear that both the prime ministerial satisfaction (PMSAT) and governing party support (CONS) are non-stationary. That the differenced versions of the variables exhibit stationarity suggests these series have unit roots and follow an I(1) or first-order autoregressive process (Cuthbertson, Taylor and Hall 1992, pp.129-32). The stationarity (I(0)) of the linear combination of CONS and PMSAT, ZCONSPM², provides evidence
that the two series are cointegrated with a common trend.

Modeling nonstationary variables often leads to a methodological dilemma. While applying regression analysis to these series risks misleading inference and “spurious regression” (Granger and Newbold 1974, Hendry 1995), first-differencing the variables to achieve stationarity could hardly be spared from the criticism of “throwing the baby out with the bath water” and forgoing potential long-run relationships (paraphrased from Mills 1990; see also Beck 1992 and Hendry 1995). To circumvent this problem, an error correction model is proposed to estimate the cointegrated series with the “error correction mechanism” that captures the long-run equilibrium relationship (Beck 1992, Hendry 1995, Clarke and Stewart 1995a). ECM also provides a setup for testing the assumption that support for the prime minister is distinct from support for his or her party. The test for weak exogeneity, as suggested in Charemza and Deadman, can be performed within the error correction model that estimates both the long-term and short-term elements (1992; see also Clarke and Stewart 1995a). The test for weak exogeneity stipulates two conditions: first, the error correction mechanism variable (thereafter ECM term) should be statistically insignificant in the model for the hypothesized exogenous variable (prime minister approval); second, the residuals from the model for the exogenous variable should be statistically insignificant in the model for the endogenous variable.

The setup for the error correction model that examines cointegration between prime ministerial satisfaction and party support is as follows:\[^3\]:

\[^3\]:
\[ \Delta \text{CONS}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{PMSAT}_t + \beta_2 \text{ECM}_t + \beta_3 \text{ECONEV}_t + \beta_4 \text{EVENT}_t + \beta_5 \text{FALK}_t + \beta_6 \text{MAJOR}_t + \beta_7 \text{JOHN}_t + \beta_8 \text{EL83}_t + \beta_9 \text{EL87}_t + \beta_{10} \text{EL92}_t + \epsilon_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (5.1)

where:

CONS = Conservative party support; PMSAT = prime ministerial approval; ECM = error correction mechanism; ECONEV = subjective economic evaluations; EVENT = political events; FALK = Falklands war; MAJOR = Major replaces Thatcher; JOHN = Major reelected as party leader; EL83-EL87 = Election dummy for 1983, 1987 and 1992; \( \beta_0 \) = Constant; \( \beta_i \) = regression coefficients; \( \epsilon_t \) = error term; \( \Delta \) = differencing operator

Informed by previous studies, the error correction model of Conservative party support is composed of four major classes of variables: prime ministerial approval, economic evaluations, political events and interventions and an error correction mechanism (Clarke and Stewart 1995a, 1995b; Nadeau, Niemi and Amato 1996). We hypothesize that political support for the British governing party is a function of support for the prime minister, the public’s subjective evaluations of economy, political shocks and events that color the public’s impression of government performance and, last but not least, a long-term equilibrating force that balances prime ministerial support and government popularity. Among them, the economic evaluation variables warrant further elaboration. The “subjective economy” variables include four types of economic evaluations, i.e., voters’ national versus personal evaluations in forward-looking or backward-looking perspectives. In the British case, Sanders and his colleagues have
argued that voters are guided by their personal economic expectations when making voting decisions (e.g., Sanders et al. 1987, 1990; Price and Sanders 1993). The personal expectations model (hereafter PE model), according to the researchers, provides the best predictor among the four subjective economy variables in forecasting the 1992 Conservative victory (Sanders 1993). Subsequent research in political economy, however, finds that while personal economic expectation is an important factor, other dimensions of the same variable like national retrospective evaluations, alongside such other political intervention variables as the Falklands war also matter in voting choices (e.g., Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley 1990).

To address the issue of subjective economy on electoral choice, I test the four variants of the economic evaluation variable in the error correction model in comparing Sanders et al.'s model with the other three rivals. The results are shown in Table 5.2. The four models document the short-term relationship between public support for the prime minister and her or his party, as well as the long-term profile of the country's political economy in the past twenty-seven years. All models perform satisfactorily as illustrated by the diagnostic tests on autocorrelation, functional form, model normality and heteroscedasticity. Regarding the parameters, satisfaction with the prime minister, for Mrs. Thatcher or Mr. Major regardless, is evidently a major factor for government support, and such a long-term relationship is maintained by an error correction mechanism (ECM) accounting for 27 to 28 percent in monthly adjustment. In other words, a 10 percentage point drop in either series will, ceteris paribus, be re-equilibrated
by about three points in the next month and will vanish within five months. However, the fact that the party has been plagued by a series of unfavorable interventions, particularly under Mr. Major's tenure, renders any recovery ephemeral. The predicament precipitated by the widely criticized poll tax pronounced in England in March 1990, for example, had cost the party at least three points in popularity. The impact lingered on and was eventually translated into more severe political damage for her leader, Mrs. Thatcher. Mr. Major's replacement as party leader in November 1990 did actually regain some Tory lost ground, inasmuch as he claimed in his reelection to premiership in 1995 (five and seven points respectively), other political events such as the currency crisis in 1992 and the continual loss in by-elections were yet more destructive than the momentary rebounds.

Economic factors in the model reveal no less subtlety than the political components. Conventional wisdom advises that economic evaluations play key roles in determining government popularity (Sanders et al. 1987; Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley 1990; Lewis-Beck 1988), but these effects are not ubiquitous. Consonant with an earlier study, ECM models demonstrate that not all the economic evaluation variables have statistically significant effects on governing party support (see Clarke and Stewart 1995a). Among them, the PE model performs the best both in terms of model fit (adjusted $R^2 = .571$) and size of impact (.62). While the personal retrospection and national prospection variables score marginal results ($b=0.51, t=1.599$; $b=0.018, t=1.488$, respectively), national retrospection is far from achieving statistical significance ($b=0.01,$
Encompassing tests pitting the four together, however, yield ambiguous results, suggesting that the personal expectation model may not be the best performer as claimed in Sanders et al. This finding also prompts the argument that the underlying influence of the latter three variables may operate through other forces, such as the evaluations of the prime minister. To explore further evidence on the importance of different dimensions of "subjective economy," a parallel set of prime ministerial approval models is tested, with results shown in Table 5.3.

The same battery of political intervention variables is applied to the prime ministerial satisfaction (PMSAT) models, in which the dependent variable and the economic evaluations are in first-differenced form. Most political intervention variables were statistically significant, with the effects of the variables that signify Major's replacement of Thatcher and the currency crisis outperforming the others. The sizes of the parameter estimates, which vary greatly from the party support model, suggest these events' effects are of a much larger scale on people's judgment of the prime minister: Major's succession as government leader registered a head start of at least 22 points higher than his predecessor; the currency crisis, unfortunately, cost him a free fall of about 18 points. The huge difference in effect size between the two models indicates that these political events are filtered through the voters' judgment of the prime minister before exerting influence upon the public's support for the governing party.

On the economic evaluation variables, a similar game rule applies. The public's retrospective evaluation (NR) of the general economy is highly significant in the prime
ministerial model, while it is relatively trivial in the Conservative support model. For the rest of the four, personal expectation is statistically significant with respectable size of impact ($b=.114$, $t=2.685$), as compared to personal retrospection ($b=.76$, $t=1.512$) and national expectation ($b=.053$, $t=2.785$). Encompassing tests provide a clearer picture for comparison: the NR model encompasses all, as the PE only does on personal retrospection (see Table 5.4). This testifies to the notion that, when it comes to the judgment of the head of the government, the public performs the evaluation in a different manner than the way it does on the party. The records of the national economy become the essential source of information. Yet, will the evaluations of the prime minister be directly applied to public support for the party, or will the reverse be true, given the long-term relationship as exposed in the error correction models? Apparently, the answer seems obvious. Nevertheless, justification of the answer warrants an empirical test of exogeneity between the two.

Following Charemza and Deadman (1992), the test is performed in the ECM context, in which both series were treated as dependent variables in separate models with the parallel set of regressors. The results are reported in Table 5.5. The estimates in Model A and Model B demonstrate that neither the lagged Conservative support nor ECM term has any statistically significant effect on prime ministerial support. The residual of Model B is also unable to score significant results in Conservative support, in which both PM support and ECM are statistically significant. Now, the verdict is clear: support for the prime minister is exogenous to government popularity.
From the analyses above, we found that political intervention and economic factors have different impacts on support for the prime minister and the governing party. Although some issues and events have direct and strong impact on party (e.g., the national elections), a myriad of others are attributed to the paramount leader of the government. In other words, under certain circumstance, voters are more likely to hold the prime minister than the party as a whole accountable for some policies, such as the poll tax in 1990. Voters also interpret the economy in different terms. The prime minister should be more responsible than the party for the past performance of the national economy. When it comes to a choice of future government, the general public’s judgment will be based upon personal economic expectations.

Yet, does Mr. Major’s government differ from his predecessor’s in the way the British public evaluates the economy and political support? Or does the relationship as specified in the previous models remain stable and static over time? Applying the test separately in the periods under the two governments does not render dissimilar results. However, testing the stability of the model over the long run calls for a more sophisticated technique that allows for the estimation of the model coefficients that may vary over time in a systematic manner. In the following section, we will explore the issue employing a relatively new method that estimates time-varying “hyper-parameters” in the political support model.

5.4 A Hyper-parameter Model on Prime Ministerial Approval
Above, we have built time series models based on the assumption of stable structure, i.e., the model coefficients are primarily invariant over time. Such an assumption is rather restricted, particularly in the face of an extended time period during which structural breaks—such as a change of regime or a shock resulted from a political event—are not aberrant occurrences. In fact, during the 1979-1996 Conservative period, the British polity has experienced four general elections, two international wars, a change of leadership and numerous political and economic crises. These interventions are all potential sources of structural shifts that cause variations in the effect of the independent variables. Most often, we tend to ignore the unobserved components that may potentially drive the long-term movements of the series. In the following section, we relax the time-invariant parameter assumption and analyze the party support series by taking into account the long-term, stochastic trend components in a structural time series specification.

Most of the time series models in political analysis take on a fixed coefficient-adaptive model with the static form:

\[ Y_t = \alpha_t + \beta_t X_t + \epsilon_t \]  

(5.2)

where both \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are assumed to be stable over time with a well-behaved error term \( \epsilon \).

In the variable parameter adaptive model, we relax the restriction that the intercept and coefficients are invariant over time. Interventions are also analyzed in various level of effects. The model may be rewritten in a state-space form (SSF) as follows:

\[ Y_t = \alpha_t + \lambda_t W_t + \beta_t X_t + \epsilon_t \]
in which

\[ \alpha_t = \alpha_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \]  
(a stochastic, time-varying trend)

\[ \lambda_t = T \lambda_{t-1} + \eta_t \]  
(a stochastic, time-varying adaptive parameter)

\[ \beta_t = T \beta_{t-1} + \omega_t \]  
(5.3)

where \( X \) represents explanatory variables, \( W \) denotes interventions and \( \epsilon_t, \eta_t, \omega_t \) are error terms independent of each other with zero means and constant variance. In this context, the long-run trend component signifies the general direction in which the series is moving. It may follow a random walk (a first order autoregressive process) or be at a fixed level otherwise. Similarly, the time-varying parameters \( \lambda \) and \( \beta \) for the explanatory variables and interventions represent the stochastic process with which the independent variables exert various levels of effects over time. Below, we start with the analysis of the former groups of variables--i.e., interventions--with particular emphasis on testing a regime change at the time of the Thatcher-Major leadership transition, followed by the study of time-varying parameters in the explanatory variables.

\[ \textbf{a. Analysis of Intervention} \]

In earlier analyses, we identified major political events and interventions that affect the popularity of the prime minister and the governing party. In the current context, we further investigate these intervention variables or *irregularities* regarding their impacts on structural changes in the level and trend of the party support series.\(^9\)

From the previous analyses, we have learned that one of the most noticeable
interventions affecting Conservative support was the change of leadership in 1990, when Mr. Major replaced Mrs. Thatcher as prime minister. The result was a spectacular boost in prime ministerial approval (24 points) and a smaller, but hardly inconsequential, one for the Tory party (7 points). Another visible move was, however, in another direction two years later. The controversy over the European currency unification in September 1992 caused approval for the prime minister to nosedive to 23 percent, setting a free fall record of 19 points, or 40 percent, in total support within one month (See Figure 5.1). For the Conservatives, the plummet was of a smaller scale, but it continued to haunt the party for the following months.

These pronounced shifts in the two series suggest the possibility that one or more structural breaks have caused "regime changes" in British party support. The time series analyses performed in the preceding section of this chapter only treated various events as dummy variables, without taking into account the potential structural breaks. In fact, modeling political shocks as transitory effects neglects potential structural impacts these interventions could have on the party support series. To probe into this possibility, the Kalman filter modeling technique is employed to reanalyze the currency crisis and the Major succession variables in a structural, state-space form (SSF). Providing an optimal updating scheme for analyzing unobserved components (i.e., long-run stochastic trends) and time-varying parameters, the Kalman filter performs estimation of structural time series models with a set of recursive equations (Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor 1992). Using this modeling technique, I reestimate ECM models in the state-space form, which
consists of unobserved components in the stochastic trend. The results of the structural model are presented in Table 5.6.

The state-space models are parameterized as the preceding error correction models except that only the personal economic expectation, which has been found to have a direct and strong effect on governing party support, is employed for model parsimony. In the first model, both the Major and currency crisis variables are included, but in different treatments. Singled out from other explanatory variables, the two interventions are tested in various forms. After controlling for the stochastic trend in the final state vector, the Major variable is identified as an irregular or momentary pulse. All diagnostics, including the normality and heteroscedasticity statistics, appear to be satisfactory, reflecting a generally good fit of the model. Two $R^2$s are reported, one of which is the regular coefficient of determination while the other is $Rd^2$ computed on the differences of the variables. Both recommend the model.

Note that the final state vector, which is composed of the unobserved long-term trend with stochastic level and slope, recognizes a general downward trend (-0.032, $t=-2.041$) in the series across all three models. Intriguingly, when the two variables are estimated separately, the unaccounted-for effects are reflected in the stochastic long-term components.

The currency crisis variable is modeled as a *structural break in the slope*, which takes the values 1, 2, 3... and so on after the occurrence of the intervention. Post-intervention tests testify to the change of regime as precipitated by this crisis that broke
out in late 1992. The significant Chow test statistic \(F_{63,134} = 1.586, p = 0.013\) lends weight to the suggestion of a regime change, which is further supported by the CUSUM plot illustrated in Figure 5.3. The cumulative sum of residuals curve stretches well beyond the 10 percent significant bound, testifying to the parameter instability in the model. The \textit{staircase} intervention registers statistical significance \((-0.029, t = -1.663\), implying the intervention’s steady, negative impact on the Conservative party. The small size of the coefficient speaks of the net effect of the influence of other variables. Nevertheless, the gross effect of the politically damaging event, as estimated in another model, can be up to -0.473, or almost a half-point drop every month.\(^{14}\)

b. Analysis of Time-varying parameter

The Kalman filter models demonstrate that a structural break occurred not at the change of leadership but during the current crisis under Major’s government. As evidenced in Table 5.6, the Major factor only posed as a pulse to the Conservative popularity and the booster was carried away shortly by the far more devastating “Black Wednesday” effect when Major decided to drop out of the European Monetary system on September 16, 1992. Substantively, none the less, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Major effect is mediated via other variables that operate over time in a systematic manner. This may, in turn, “masks” the impact of the leadership change and turns it into a transitory shock in the time series model. Justification is in order. First, external evidence derived from the previous chapters informs that the British electorate has
evolved from a class-oriented party loyalist to a "consumer" of government choice relying on the readily available information to make individual voting decision.

Evaluations of the party leaders become the major source of information based upon which the electoral judgment is made. Hence, there is compelling reason to infer that any shock to the leadership variable will relay the effect to the party support. Second, the importance of the leadership factor has been established in the ECM analysis, in which a long-term equilibrium relationship between support for the prime minister and the governing party is manifested. Yet, given the subtle relationship between the two series, any effects that originate from the leadership variable (i.e. the Major effect in this case) would very likely be absorbed in the "common trend" and would not be readily distinguishable in regular time series models. Using Kalman filter, the following analysis proceeds to identify the true impact of the new leadership on party support.

To test the hypothesis that the replacement of Major as prime minister exerts an indirect impact on the government support, a time-varying parameter model of party support is developed including the dependent variable and prime ministerial satisfaction (PMSAT) in level form. The simple model containing only prime ministerial support and currency crisis intervention manifests the time-varying feature of the PMSAT parameter (see Table 5.7). The hyperparameter of PMSAT is statistically significant, suggesting the stochastic nature of prime ministerial support on party support. To further investigate the time-varying parameter of PMSAT, I reanalyze the party support model using recursive least squares. The recursive least squares (RLS) approach tests the
stability of the parameters in a model by estimating the same model repeatedly, using ever larger subsets of the sample data, in a bid to detect structural change. Four party support models employing the variants of economic evaluation variables are tested and the recursive coefficients for PMSAT are plotted in Figure 5.3a to Figure 5.3d. The original PMSAT series is superimposed on the graphs to illustrate the leadership effect.

All four of the graphs demonstrate an almost identical pattern: the hyperparameters, which represent the time-varying effect of prime minister approval on party support, come to an abrupt descent right at the point Major took over the office of premiership. This is strongly suggestive of a structural break in the leadership effect on government support. The most intriguing feature of the illustrations, however, is the crossing point of the two series, where lies the crux of the delicate relationship between Major’s popularity and his impact on party support. Despite the very height of his scores at inauguration, Major’s influence was in effect falling way behind that of his predecessor! As shown in Figure 5.3a, the PMSAT coefficient, which represents the prime minister’s influence on party support, stands at approximately 0.5 before the Major government. The new Downing 10 occupant, however, registers a significantly smaller score at 0.37, suggesting that the prime minister, as the new party leader, has lost at least 20 percent of leverage as compared to Mrs. Thatcher’s influence on party support!

The erosion of prime ministerial effect reaches a lower level shortly after another smaller break occurred around late 1992. This testifies to the previous finding that the Black Wednesday posed as another structural break in level for Major’s government.
However, the two structural shifts differ in the way they characterize the new regimes. For the currency crisis, the downward shift in both level and slope (note the continuous decline after 1992) depicts a general depreciation of public confidence in the governing party’s capability to manage a crisis. Even though the erosion of public support for the party was not as pronounced as Mr. Major’s free fall in popularity, the impact was continual, leading the party to slide to its historic low of 15 points in January, 1995.

Comparatively, the leadership change effect is not as easily identifiable. Masked by the highly visible surge in prime ministerial popularity, the effect is not discernible without employing special modeling techniques. Using the Kalman filter and recursive least square analysis helps us to unveil the hidden fact that Mr. Major’s rise to leadership, in fact, precipitated a downfall in the impact of prime ministerial approval on party support!

5.5 Conclusion: The Presidentialization Thesis in Perspective

In studying recent general elections, Mughan observes that the prime minister has become increasingly “presidentialized” on the British political stage, and general elections now feature highly “leader-centered” campaigns (1993). Portraits, personality profiles and television commercials characterize modern elections in Great Britain, with an overwhelming emphasis on the party leader. As a consequence, as the author contends, the growing salience and electoral impact of party leaders has become inevitable. The author, with his colleagues, however, stops short of providing more substantive and empirical evidence to justify the assertive conclusion in his “leader-
matters-more” thesis.

In this chapter, we have analyzed British party support models with special emphasis on leadership effects. We have identified the trend that drives the movement of the government’s popularity, embedded in which—as shown in the cointegration analysis—is a long-term equilibrium relationship between public satisfaction with the prime ministers and the Conservative party. Generally downward moving, the two series both experience structural shifts in 1990 and 1992, respectively. More intriguingly, we discover that, behind the scene of Mr. Major’s all time popularity records—the highest score, the greatest climb and the steepest fall—was a decline of the impact of prime ministerial approval on party support.

Overall, our findings sparsely lend any credence to the “presidentialization” thesis. Instead of finding greater salience of party leaders, our analyses document the contrary, that is, a trend of downward movement, in both level of popular support and electoral influence, over the long haul. Revisiting the presidentialism thesis, however, places new emphasis on the role the prime minister plays in the contemporary British political arena.

As compared to his or her U.S. counterpart, the British government leader has become no less “presidential” in the media, particularly during election campaigns. The British prime minister, however, is in a different political environment. Faced with a parliamentary system, the British leader finds himself or herself embedded in a different accountability framework in which the people elect the party and the party elects its
leader. In the past, the prime minister could rely on the governing party as a "safety zone" for neutralization of any political censure. The contemporary British polity barely inherits such a "firewall" system. As the forgoing study demonstrates, the public holds the prime minister accountable for government policies in a different manner than it does the governing party. In the poll tax incident, for instance, the British voters dealt a major blow to Mrs. Thatcher, holding her responsible for the widely detested policy. The negative impact of this incident, however, lands on the Conservative party to a much smaller extent. In the 1990s, the British party leader finds no safeguard in the party in the way he or she did in the past. In this sense, the prime minister becomes more "presidentialized" where the elected leader is directly under public scrutiny by the general electorate.

On the other hand, our analysis testifies to a new asymmetry of the reward-punishment model in the British context. Given the valence issue of the economy, the electorate punishes or rewards in a different manner. For the prime minister, Key's model holds for the leader as every record in the past, pocketbook and national alike, counts (Key 1966). For the party, the public, however, looks forward in perspective when a choice of future government is made. The widely-studied reward-punishment asymmetry still operates, but in dissimilar configuration: punish the prime minister for the dark past, but reward the party for the bright future (see Sanders 1993, Bloom and Price 1975).

In sum, the chapter addresses the theory of presidentialization of the British prime
minister by analyzing the party support and leadership effects in a new methodological framework. Besides finding evidence for the thesis, the study throws new insights into the role of party leader in the British parliamentary system. The new trend of leadership effect, along with the movement in partisan support, plays a major role in the evolutionary process of the electorate in the post-dealignment Conservative era.
Endnotes

1. Data are drawn from the monthly Gallup series. The party support questions are:
   a. “If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support?” or
   b. “Which party would you be most inclined to vote for?” If the respondent answers “I don’t know” in a., the party support for the governing Conservative party will be calculated as the sum of the percentages of respondents selecting Conservative in a. or b.

   The economic evaluations questions are:
   a. Personal prospections: “How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?”
   b. Personal retrospections: “How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?”
   c. National expectations: “How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months?”
   d. National retrospection: “How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?”

   Respondents were given a five-category scale ranging from “get a lot better” at one end to “get a lot worse” at the other. The neutral point is “stay the same.” The four variables are constructed by subtracting the percentage of negative responses from that of the positive ones.

   The prime ministerial approval variable is derived from the percentage of responses to the question:
   “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with _______ as prime minister?”

2. The variable is derived from the residual of the simple OLS model in which Tory support is regressed on prime ministerial approval.

3. An alternative setup for the exogeneity test is to switch prime ministerial approval (PMSAT) with Conservative party support (CONS) like:

   \[
   \Delta \text{PMSAT}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CONS} + \beta_2 \text{ECQNEV} + \beta_3 \text{EVENT} + \beta_4 \text{FALK} + \beta_5 \text{MAJOR} + \beta_6 \text{JOHN} + \beta_7 \text{EL83} + \beta_8 \text{EL87} + \beta_9 \text{EL92} + \varepsilon_t
   \]

   Note that the ECM variable is the residual from the model that regresses PMSAT on CONS.

4. The rate of re-equilibration is:
\[ Z^*(1-\text{ECM})^n \]

where \( Z \) is the change in percentage points, ECM is the error correction mechanism and \( n \) the number of elapsed months.

5. The PE model only marginally encompasses the NR one, and tests with the other two produce inconclusive results.

6. Because the economic evaluation variables are stationary and unit root tests suggest no common trend exists between them and the dependent variable (Table 5.1), a regular OLS model is applied to the variables in first differences.

7. Informed by previous analysis, I only employ personal expectation as the economic evaluation variable, which suffices for the purpose of the exogeneity test.

8. Both the model estimates and encompassing test reveal very similar, but not identical, results.

9. In structural time series modeling, intervention effects can be analyzed in four cases taking into account the stochastic trend and seasonal components. While it can be treated as transitory effects (pulse) as in classical time series analysis, it can be a structural break or shift (step) in the level of the series or a staircase intervention or change in the slope of the trend. Interventions can also be modeled as seasonal change as most usually found in the financial series (Harvey 1989:397-98; Koopman et al. 1995). In the political context, we are mostly concerned with the structural break that an intervention can cause in a change of regime or a partisan dealignment.

10. More in-depth analysis of interventions can be conducted using the Box-Jenkins (ARIMA) approach, which adopts a different methodology than the structural time series analysis employed in this study.

11. Three statistical software packages—namely, STAMP 5.0, Reg-x 386 and Microfit 4.0—are employed to implement the Kalman filter models.

12. The \( \text{Rd}^2 \) is the comparison of the Prediction error variance (PEV) with the variance of first differences, \( \Delta y_t - y_{t-1} \). It should be noted that \( \text{Rd}^2 \) is not bound between 0 and 1. It can be negative, which indicates bad fit.


14. The structural break model, which focuses on the level for both the dependent variable and the currency crisis intervention, gauges the gross, permanent effect of the thus far most damaging event for the prime minister and the governing party alike.
15. The time-varying parameter model uses levels for analysis, as opposed to the first differenced form in the ECM context. The model can be written as follows:

\[ Y_t = X\beta_t + \varepsilon_t \]

\[ \beta_t = \beta_{t-1} + \eta_t \]

where \( Y \) is party support, \( X \) is the data matrix consisting of prime ministerial support and interventions, \( \beta \) is the time-varying parameter and \( \varepsilon \) and \( \eta \) are well-behaved error terms (Kalman 1960; see also Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor 1992 and Price and Sanders 1993).

16. The recursive least square (RLS) analysis is implemented using Microfit 4.0. The RLS approach requires a special “trick” in estimating a model with dummy variables. Because the program is unable to start estimation if a series starts with a long range of zeros (which is quite common among dummy variables), the modeler is required to implant a small value (e.g., 0.01) at the start of the series to “fake” a “non-zero.” The tiny number does not affect the estimation results.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

“If either party fails to recognize that the electorate has changed, then it will doom itself to a long period on the opposition benches in Parliament”

(Bo Särlvik and Ivor Crewe, Decade of Dealignment, 1983: 338)

Thirteen years ago when Bo Särlvik and Ivor Crewe wrote the realistic remark on partisan decline of the British electorate, they set out to predict the fate of political parties in the wake of partisanship decline in the 1970s. Students of British politics ought not be surprised by the authors' prophetic wisdom in depicting the British polity. Indeed, Särlvik and Crewe’s observation still has currency, even after thirteen years. The electorate has changed, and it is still changing.

As the title speaks for itself, this dissertation resembles Särlvik and Crewe’s exercise on analyzing political change in Great Britain after more than a decade. It surveys the British polity since the beginning of Thatcher’s first term in 1979 and examines the electorate in three primary facets: partisanship, voting behavior, and party support between elections. The question Särlvik and Crewe studied in 1983 has not lost its relevance in 1996: “Are we witnessing the erosion of the foundation of the Conservative and Labour two-party system which has so decisively put its mark on most of the post-war era?” (Särlvik and Crewe 1983:441). The rise of the Alliance in 1981
seemingly validated the authors' concern, although its demise showed it did not have any major *enduring* impact on the political system. Nonetheless, changes in the electorate *did* have such effects.

As Chapter II has demonstrated, the erosion of party loyalty among voters in the 1970s weakened the foundation of the British party system that was built on the country's long-existing class structure. The gradual dissolution of this class structure, resulting from the long-term evolution of British society, redefines socioeconomic identities for the traditional working and middle classes. Compared to the 1970s, we found more subtlety in the trend of partisanship in subsequent decades. Though attenuated, strength of partisanship has stabilized since the mid-1980s. Also, partisan dealignment is different in degree among various groups and partisans. While decline of party allegiance has affected both Conservatives and Labour, its largest effect has been to undermine the electoral base of the latter party. The shrinkage of Labour's proportion of stable identifiers is at the root of the party's electoral volatility. As a consequence, the continuing dealignment has fostered a less partisan electorate and left elections more susceptible to the inherently volatile short-term forces.

The general downward shift of party loyalties has reduced the long-term social class factor to a secondary role in determining electoral outcome. As shown in Chapter III, class-related variables like home-ownership, occupation and union membership all have become less important *vis-a-vis* the short-term judgmental variables. Does this indicate a movement toward a politically "classless" society? The answer is both no and
yes. The class influence has by no means disappeared, but it operates in a society where
class-interest, for most British voters, has waned considerably in both literal and electoral
terms. In this sense, Särlvik and Crewe anticipated the redefinition of the principal
determinants of voting in the 1990s: immediate economic interest, instead of traditional
class membership, has increased in importance. As their analysis foreshadowed, the
British electorate becomes highly vulnerable to the volatility of short-term forces. A
telling fact in Chapter III’s findings portrays a “similar but somewhat different” pattern.
In the party identification model for the 1980s, short-term factors are found to be more
important concerns for party identifiers. Intriguingly, re-paraphrasing Pulzer’s widely-
cited remarks, issues positions and judgments of party leaders usurp the place of social
class to become the “basis” of British politics, displacing the latter variable to the rank of
“embellishment and detail”!

British voting behavior has become more of a practice of rational, individualistic
decision-making than a habitual exercise of pledging allegiance to class and party.
Family heritage, peer pressure and environmental influences have all become subordinate
to individual judgments based on available information. Among all of the factors studied
in this work, I identify no single variable as influential as the class variable was claimed
to be in studies such as Pulzer’s. At the least, nothing can be found as much like a
“basis” as the previously well-acclaimed long-term force of social class. Prudent
modelers of contemporary electoral politics ought to be skeptical regarding claims for the
existence of such a ubiquitous factor.
The investigation in Chapter III confirms the impact of party identification on electoral choice. We also showed that party attachments are subject to other short-term evaluative variables, the latter being functions of various objective measures such as inflation, unemployment and political events. Chapters IV and V presented a host of similar models interwoven by "inter-dependent" variables. Party support models, for instance, are among the typical cases.

Asymmetry is another feature that characterizes partisanship and voting models. The study in Chapter III, for instance, has shown that the social class factor wields power on Labour while it exerts barely any influence on Conservative and Liberal/Alliance supporters. Although council house tenancy or manual labor jobs can be defining features of Labour identifiers, home-ownership or white-collar positions have no statistically significant relationship with a Conservative or Liberal vote. These results demonstrate that, at a minimum, more than half of the British voters have departed from the traditional model of social-class voters who form their political choice on the basis of class identity. Being a blue-collar worker no longer precludes a vote for the Tories; likewise, one can be a Labour voter and yet still be his or her own landlord.

Personal attributes have yielded to more sophisticated causes. Individual evaluations of issues, economy and party leadership have become the principal forces driving electoral choice. Chapter IV's finding that British voters can well position themselves on various issues when casting their vote presents a major anomaly to the directional model offered by Rabinowitz and his colleagues. As the authors argue, voters
in the United States and other European countries cast their votes by identifying their issue directions, or the pros and cons, as compared with the candidates. They are unable to give exactly their own positions and those of the candidates (Macdonald et al. 1991, Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In contrast, as this chapter unveils, the British voters made their electoral choices in a more sophisticated manner. Not only do they have knowledge of more precise issue positions as compared with those of the candidates, but more importantly, the voters effectively utilize this information to guide their electoral choice.

As the issue evaluations variable becomes crucial to the electoral decision, the findings on the two rival issue-voting models are revealing. Traditional voting models are at stake. The issue priority model, which suggests most working class voters have a high level of concern on unemployment as much as the middle class do on prices, has become less appealing. As the aggravated unemployment and high-standing inflation rates prevalent in the 1980s become history, British voters, Conservative or Labour alike, are more conscious with the other dimensions of the valence issue of economy than merely objective macroeconomic indices. These dimensions include individual subjective evaluations of the national and personal economy as perceived retrospectively and prospectively. Likewise, the reward-punishment model faces difficulties in explaining the contemporary elections. From the analyzes presented in Chapter V, one finds that voters will not simply punish the governing party for bad economy in retrospect. The 1992 election presents a case for the new economic voting model: instead
of punishing the Tories, the forward-looking electorate chose to retain the governing party for another term because most voters believed that the economic outlook would be gloomy under Labour rule!

The finding in Chapter V that a voter's prospective evaluations of personal financial situations is a major determinant of party support accords well with the new conventional wisdom as articulated by Sanders and his colleagues (Sanders et al. 1987, Sanders 1992). However, it does not diminish the significance of other dimensions of the subjective economy. Retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy also matter, particularly the former. Empirical evidence established in Chapter V illustrates that the impact of economic evaluations on party support are not unmediated. The judgment is mediated through evaluations of the prime minister before affecting the support for party. The conclusion is similarly asymmetric, but distinct: dismal economic record, punish the prime minister; rosy future, reward the party.

The examination of leadership effects in Chapter V provides new insights to the contemporary party support models: while Mughan's presidentialization thesis is affirmed in the Thatcher era, John Major is a different story. Recognizing the growing influence of leaders in contemporary electoral politics, we discover that this time-bound effect varies from one prime minister to another.

In sum, if the 1970s has been designated the decade of dealignment and the 1980s the decade of conviction, the evidence presented in this dissertation argues that the 1990s should clearly be called the decade of choice. Individualized evaluations prevail and
become the rudiments of voting decisions. When it comes to party support, contemporary British voters have obviously rejected the famous Thatcherist slogan that pronounces TINA (There Is No Alternative). Alternatives abound in elections of the 1990s. This is what democracy stands for, and how it evolves.

Endnotes

1. Pulzer wrote (1967): “Class is the basis of British politics; all else are embellishment and detail.”

1979

1. Party Identification

"Generally speaking do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, Social Democrat, or what?" (48, M129156)

(If none/don’t know) "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? If yes, which Party?" (49, M130157)

2. Strength of Party Identification

"Would you call yourself very strong____, fairly strong or not very strong?" (50, M131158)

3. Age

"Would you say in what year were you born?" (105, M191279)

4. Education

"Education/Qualification?" (91, M000242-M000252)

5. Income

"What is the total income of your household?" (109, M212284)
   1. Less than £3,999
   2. £4,000-5,999
   3. £6,000-7,999
   4. £8,000-9,999

* Question number and variable number are included respectively in parentheses following questions.
6. Union membership

"Are you a member of a trade union?" (61, M245190)

7. Home ownership

"Would you tell me whether your home is owned or rented?" (106A, M187A280)

8. Vote

"...which party did you vote for in the General Election?" (41, M115147)

1983

1. Party Identification

"Generally speaking, do you think of the Liberal Party as being closer to the Conservative Party or closer to the Labour Party?" (q13a)

(If none/don’t know) "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? IF YES, Which Party? [ IF “ALLIANCE” PROBE: Liberal or Social Democrat? ]?" (q13b)

2. Strength of Party Identification

"Would you call yourself very strong_____, fairly strong or not very strong?" (q13c)

3. Age
“What was your age last birthday?” (q56)

4. Education

“What did you go to school, that is, the last school you attended, was it... (READ OUT) in the U.K.?" (q59b)

5. Union membership

“Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a trade union?” (q52c)

6. Home ownership

“Do you - your household - own or rent this (house / flat / accommodation)? [OWNS or CO - OWNS: include mortgages as ownership] [if rented: From whom?]” (q65b)

7. Income

“And which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from all sources, before tax?” (q109a)

8. Vote

“Which Party did you vote for in the general election?” (q9a)

9. Leader evaluations

“Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Foot/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel is good or bad at getting things done?” (V20A1-V20A4)

1 Good at getting things done
2 Bad at getting things done
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

“Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as extreme, or moderate?” (V20B1-V20B4)

1 extreme
2 moderate
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel looks after one class, or, looks after all classes?" (V20C1-V20C4)

1 looks after one class
2 looks after all classes
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as capable of being a strong leader, or, not capable of being a strong leader?" (V20D1-V20D4)

1 capable of being a strong leader
2 not capable of being a strong leader
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as caring, or, uncaring?" (V20E1-V20E4)

1 caring
2 uncaring
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel is likely to unite/divide nation?" (V20F1-V20F4)

1 unite nation
2 divide nation
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as likeable as person?" (V20G1-V20G4)

1 likeable as person
10. Issue Evaluations

Unemployment and Inflation

Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's top priority. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government's top priority. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (28a-28d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about unemployment and inflation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Taxation and Government Services

Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (29a-29d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about taxes and government spending.
(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Nationalisation
Some people feel that government should nationalise many more private companies. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should sell off many more nationalised industries. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (34a-34d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about nationalisation and privatisation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Redistribution
Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT
(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

European Community

Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Community. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Community. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A3 9a-A3 9d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about the European Community.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?
Law and order

Some people feel that protecting civil rights is more important than cutting crime. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that cutting crime is more important than protecting civil rights. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (39a-39d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Welfare

Some people feel that the poor in Britain are entitled to more help from government. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that the poor in Britain should get less help from government and do more to help themselves. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (35a-35d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of
the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

1987

1. Party Identification

"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative Labour, Liberal, Social Democrat, (Nationalist/Plaid Cymru), or what? [IF "ALLIANCE" PROBE: Liberal or Social Democrat?" (q12a)

(If none/don't know) "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? If yes, which Party?" (q12b)

2. Strength of Party Identification

"Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong or not very strong?" (q12c)

3. Age

"What was your age last birthday?" (v58c)

4. Union membership

"Are you now a member of a trade union or staff association?" (49a)
"Have you ever been a member of a trade union or staff association?" (49b)

5. Home ownership

"Do you - your household - own or rent this (house/flat/accommodation)? (60ab)

6. Income

"And which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from all sources, before tax?" (64)

7. Vote

"Which Party did you vote for in the general election? (8a)
8. Leader evaluations

"Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel is good or bad at getting things done?" (V20A1-V20A4)

1 Good at getting things done
2 Bad at getting things done
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as extreme, or moderate?" (V20B1-V20B4)

1 extreme
2 moderate
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel looks after one class, or, looks after all classes?" (V20C1-V20C4)

1 looks after one class
2 looks after all classes
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as capable of being a strong leader, or, not capable of being a strong leader?" (V20D1-V20D4)

1 capable of being a strong leader
2 not capable of being a strong leader
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as caring, or, uncaring?" (V20E1-V20E4)

1 caring
2 uncaring
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel is likely to unite/divide nation?" (V20F1-V20F4)

1 unite nation
2 divide nation
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

"Would you describe Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel as likeable as person?" (V20G1-V20G4)

1 likeable as person
2 not likeable as person
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know
9 Not answered

9. Issue Evaluations

Unemployment and Inflation

Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government’s top priority. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government’s top priority. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (28a-28d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about unemployment and inflation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?
(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the
SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

**Taxation and Government Services**

Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on
health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other
people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and
social services. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people
have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT
RIGHT K-F) (29a-29d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views
about taxes and government spending.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you
think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of
the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the
SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

**Nationalisation**

Some people feel that government should nationalise many more private companies.
These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that
government should sell off many more nationalised industries. These people would put
themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between,
along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (34a-34d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views
about nationalisation and privatisation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you
think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Redistribution

Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (35a-35d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

Law and order

Some people feel that protecting civil rights is more important than cutting crime. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that cutting crime is more important than protecting civil rights. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (39a-39d)
(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal/Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the SDP/Liberal/Alliance?

1992
1. Party Identification

“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, or what?” (A6a, B13a)

(If none/don’t know) “Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? If yes, which Party?” (A6b, B13b)

2. Strength of Party Identification

“Would you call yourself very strong______, fairly strong or not very strong?” (A6c, B13c)

3. Vote

Which party did you vote for in the general election? (9a)

4. Age

“What was your age last birthday?” (915c)

5. Home ownership
“Does your household own or rent this accommodation?” (919b)

6. Occupational Class

“Social Class” (905m)

-2 Skp,nvr paid job had
-1 Skpd,never had job
  1 I professional
  2 II managerial and technical
  3 IIIN skilled non-manual
  4 IIIM skilled manual
  5 IV partly skilled
  6 V unskilled
  7 armed forces
  8 inadequate description

7. Income

“And which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from all sources, before tax?” (921)

  1 Less than 3,999
  2 4,000- 5,999
  3 6,000- 7,999
  4 8,000- 9,999
  5 10,000- 11,999
  6 12,000- 14,999
  7 15,000- 17,999
  8 18,000- 19,999
  9 20,000- 22,999
 10 23,000- 25,999
 11 26,000- 28,999
 12 29,000- 31,999
 13 32,000- 34,999
 14 35,000- 37,999
 15 38,000 or more
 96 ?
 97 Refused
 98 Don't know
 99 Not answered
8. Education

"Have you passed any of the examinations on this card?" (912a)

"And have you passed any of the exams or got any of the qualifications on this card?" (913a)

9. Union membership

"Are you now a member of a trade union or staff association?" (903c)

10. Leader evaluations

"Would you describe John Major/Neil Kinnock/Paddy Ashdown as extreme, or moderate?" (22a-c)

1 extreme
2 moderate
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know

"Would you say John Major/Neil Kinnock/Paddy Ashdown looks after one class, or, looks after all classes?" (23a-c)

1 looks after one class
2 looks after all classes
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know

"Would you describe John Major/Neil Kinnock/Paddy Ashdown as capable of being a strong leader, or, not capable of being a strong leader?" (24a-c)

1 capable of being a strong leader
2 not capable of being a strong leader
3 Neither or both
8 Don’t know

"And on the whole would you describe John Major/Neil Kinnock/Paddy Ashdown as caring, or, uncaring?" (25a-c)

1 caring
2 uncaring
3 Neither or both
11. Issue evaluations

Unemployment and Inflation

Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's top priority. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government's top priority. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A35a-A35d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about unemployment and inflation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Taxation and Government Services

Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A36a-A36d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about taxes and government spending.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you
think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Nationalisation and Privatisation

Some people feel that government should nationalise many more private companies. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should sell off many more nationalised industries. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A37a-A37d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about nationalisation and privatisation.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Redistribution

Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A38a-A38d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

European Community
Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Community. These people would put themselves in Box A. (POINT) Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Community. These people would put themselves in Box K. (POINT) And other people have views somewhere in-between, along here (POINT LEFT A-F) or along here (POINT RIGHT K-F) (A39a-A39d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about the European Community.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

1983-87 panel study

1. Party Identification
“Generally speaking do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, Social Democrat, or what?” (83: 7a; 87: 10a))

(If none/don’t know) “Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? If yes, which Party?” (83: 7b; 87: 10b))

2. Strength of Party Identification

“Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong or not very strong?” (83: 7c; 87: 10c)

3. Age

“What was your age last birthday?” (83: 33b; 87: 49b)

4. Home ownership

“Do you - your household - own or rent this (house/flat/accommodation)?” (83: 35b; 87: 46b)

5. Union membership

“Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a trade union?” (83: 32c; 87: 37c)

“Which party have you decided to vote for?” (83: 3a; 87: 31a)

7. Leader evaluations

“Which of the qualities on this card would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Dr. Owen/Mr. Steel has?” (83:13a-13d; 87: 18a-18d)

Caring
Determined
Shrewd
Likeable as a person
Tough
Listens to reason
Decisive
Sticks to principles

NONE OF THESE
Don’t know
8. Issue evaluations

Defence

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should get rid of all nuclear weapons in Britain without delay will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should increase nuclear weapons in Britain without delay will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY (83: 28a-28d; 87: 33a-33d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of SDP/Liberal Alliance?

Unemployment and Inflation Scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should getting people back to work should be government’s top priority will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should keeping prices down should be the government’s top priority will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY (83: 29a-29d; 87: 34a-34d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.
(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of SDP/Liberal Alliance?

Taxation and government services scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY (83: 30a-30d; 87: 35a-35d)

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of SDP/Liberal Alliance?

Nationalisation/privatisation scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should nationalise many more private companies will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P
AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should sell of many more nationalised industries will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY (83: 31a-31d; 87: 36a-36d)

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(SDP/Liberal Alliance)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of SDP/Liberal Alliance?

1987-92 panel

1. Party Identification

"Generally speaking do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, Social Democrat, or what?" (87-92: vl2a)

(If none/don’t know) “Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the Parties than the others? If yes, which Party?” (87-92: v12b)

2. Strength of Party Identification

"Would you call yourself very strong______, fairly strong or not very strong?" (87-92: v12c)

3. Age

“What was your age last birthday?” (87: v58c; 92: y322b)

4. Home ownership
"Do you - your household - own or rent this (house/flat/accommodation)?"

5. Union membership

"Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a trade union?"

"Which party have you decided to vote for?"

6. Leader evaluations

"Which of the qualities on this card would you say Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock/Mr. Ashdown?"

Caring
Determined
Shrewd
Likeable as a person
Tough
Listens to reason
Decisive
Sticks to principles

NONE OF THESE
Don't know

7. Issue evaluations

Defence Scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should get rid of all nuclear weapons in Britain without delay will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should increase nuclear weapons in Britain without delay will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY.

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.
(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Unemployment and Inflation Scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should getting people back to work should be government's top priority will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should keeping prices down should be the government's top priority will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY.

(Respondent’s own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Taxation and government services scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services will put a tick in the last box on the left
(Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY.

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?

Nationalisation/privatisation scale

Please look at this card. People who are convinced that we should nationalise many more private companies will put a tick in the last box on the left (Letter P) - POINT TO BOX P AND STATEMENT - while those who are convinced that we should sell of many more nationalised industries will put a tick in the last box on the right (Letter J) - POINT TO BOX J AND STATEMENT. So, as you can see, people who hold views that come somewhere between those two positions will tick a box somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM LEFT TO CENTRE - or somewhere along here - POINT TO BOXES FROM RIGHT TO CENTRE. RE-EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY.

(Respondent's own view)
In the first row of boxes, please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views.

(Conservative)
First the Conservative Party. In the next row of boxes, please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Conservative Party?

(Labour)
Now in the next row please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of
the Labour Party?

(Liberal Democrats)
And now please tick whichever box you think comes closest to the views of the Liberal Democrats?
Table 2.1 Vote Shares by Party and Voting Turnout in Great Britain, 1945-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CON</th>
<th>LAB</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>NAT</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
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Table 2.2 Strength of Party Identification in Britain, 1945-92

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<td></td>
<td>LABOUR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LABOUR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LABOUR</td>
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<td>LIBERAL</td>
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Table 2.2 Strength of Party Identification in Britain, 1945-92 (continued)

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<tr>
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Table 2.2 Strength of Party Identification in Britain, 1945-92 (continued)

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<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<th>1987</th>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
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Table 2.3 Mean Strength of Party Identification in Britain, 1964-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.33</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974Feb</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.14</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.73</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.93</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The mean of partisan strength ranges from 0 (non-identifiers) to 3 (strong partisans), including those who think of themselves as "closer" to a party, who are coded as not very strong partisan (1).
Table 2.4 Party Identification in Britain, 1964-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
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<td>45.1</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td>Alliance</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 
(1772) (1252) (1836) (3893) (3753) (2814)

* Includes those who think of themselves "as closer" to one of the parties. Missing values excluded.
Table 2.5 Mean Strength of Party Identification by Age Cohort, 1987 to 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
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<td>23-30</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>-0.16</td>
<td>.85</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Includes those who think of themselves "as closer" to one of the parties. Missing values excluded.
### Table 2.6 Patterns of Turnover in Party Identification: Changes in Party Affiliation, 1987-1992 Panel Survey*

#### Party identifiers in 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generally Speaking Think of Self As</th>
<th>No None</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>All/Lib/Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>35.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>All/Lib/SDP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
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<td>638</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>40.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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</table>

* Entries are percentages based on the total electorate
Table 3.1 Party Identification and Social Class: 1964, 1979-1992

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<tbody>
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<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
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<td>Non-identifiers</td>
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<td>Conservatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages are calculated in terms of all respondents in each election survey. Identifiers to other parties are excluded.*
Table 3.2 Changes in Social Class Structure, 1964-1992

### 3.2a Manual/Non-manual Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
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<td>Non-manual Worker</td>
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<td>32.6</td>
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<td>53.2</td>
<td>54.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

### 3.2b Home ownership

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Homeowner</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2c Union Membership

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Union Member</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3 Alford Indices for Class Voting, 1964, 1979-92

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WORKING</td>
<td>MIDDLE</td>
<td>WORKING</td>
<td>MIDDLE</td>
<td>WORKING</td>
</tr>
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<td>CLASS</td>
<td>CLASS</td>
<td>CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>CON</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con+Lab</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Entries are within class (column) percentages in each election survey. Identifiers to other parties are not included.
Table 3.4 Mean Strength of Party Identification by Class and Party, 1964-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-party Difference*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The difference in mean strength between the natural-class identifiers and cross-class identifiers.
Table 3.5 Changes in Party Identifications and Partisan Strength Among Natural- and Cross-Class Identifiers, 1987-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identifiers 1987</th>
<th>Party Identification 1992</th>
<th>Party Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Opposite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class Tories</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class Labour</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class Tories</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class Labour</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Entries are within class percentages. Only the three major parties are included.
Table 3.6 Two-Stage Least Square Analysis of Party Identification in Great Britain (1987-92 Panel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Conservative Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Labour Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Liberal Democrats Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.799***</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>-0.415**</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.037*</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATIONAL CLASS</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>-0.124*</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOME OWNERSHIP</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>-0.359***</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.251**</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION MEMBERSHIP</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.185**</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY ID in 1987</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.749***</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.744***</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADER EVALUATIONS</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.042**</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.094***</td>
<td>0.030</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSUE EVALUATIONS</td>
<td>-0.074***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.068***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.712 0.607 0.302
N 1,195 1,184 878

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Respondent CON Difference</th>
<th>LAB Difference</th>
<th>LID Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment/Inflation</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax/Government Services</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Redistribution</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are mean positions on an eleven-point scale from -5 to +5.
Table 4.2 Binary Logit Model: Issue Voting for Political Parties in Great Britain, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative Proximity</th>
<th>Conservative Directional</th>
<th>Labour Proximity</th>
<th>Labour Directional</th>
<th>Liberal Democrats Proximity</th>
<th>Liberal Democrats Directional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.906b</td>
<td>.726</td>
<td>-3.882a</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>4.583a</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.027a</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.024a</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.022b</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.214</td>
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<td>.034</td>
<td>.114a</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.095b</td>
<td>.033</td>
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<td>.069</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>.066</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occup. Class</td>
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<td>.268</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>-.320</td>
<td>.243</td>
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<td>Home ownership</td>
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<td>.326</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>-.400</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.591b</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>-.648b</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.402c</td>
<td>.227</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.050a</td>
<td>.263</td>
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<td>North</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Midlands</td>
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<td>.293</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>-.193</td>
<td>.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>-.687c</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>-.570</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>-1.076b</td>
<td>.366</td>
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<td><strong>Evaluations of Leader</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>.645a</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.747a</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>-.382a</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnoch</td>
<td>-.228a</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-.222a</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.428a</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashdown</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.151c</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>-.265a</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Effect</strong></td>
<td>-.229a</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.025a</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.209a</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-294.155</td>
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<td>-307.139</td>
<td></td>
<td>-321.612</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>McKelvey's Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11141</td>
<td></td>
<td>1155</td>
<td></td>
<td>1125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly Predicted (%)</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - p <= .001; b - p <= .01 c - p <= .05 one-tailed test
Table 4.3 Encompassing Tests, Proximity Model versus Directional Model on Issue Voting, 1987-92*

General Issue Effect: Aggregate of All Five Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>DIR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>36.951a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>6.447c</td>
<td>17.665a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>36.422a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual Issue Effect: Unemployment/Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>DIR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>17.109a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>3.088</td>
<td>12.401a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>42.725a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual Issue Effect: Tax/Government Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>DIR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>22.748a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>7.792b</td>
<td>7.198b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>6.324c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* entries are $X^2$ at 1 degree of freedom,

a - p ≤ 0.001 (c.v. = 10.828); b - p ≤ 0.01 (c.v. = 6.635); c - p ≤ 0.05 (3.841)

DIR - Directional model; PROX - Proximity model
$\xi$ denotes encompassing
Table 4.3: Encompassing Tests, Proximity Model versus Directional Model on Issue Voting, 1987-92*

(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Issue Effect: Nationalization</th>
<th>DTR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1.803</td>
<td>43.922a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2.414</td>
<td>14.595a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.542</td>
<td>15.099a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Issue Effect: Equalization of Income</th>
<th>DTR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>14.605a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1.770</td>
<td>4.357a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>24.929a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Issue Effect: European Community</th>
<th>DTR $\xi$</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>25.465a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>11.307a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>19.940a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* entries are $X^2$ at 1 degree of freedom,
  a - $p \leq 0.001 \ (c.v. = 10.828)$; b - $p \leq 0.01 \ (c.v. = 6.635)$; c - $p \leq 0.05 \ (3.841)$

DIR - Directional model; PROX - Proximity model

$\xi$ denotes encompassing
Table 4.4 Encompassing Tests, Proximity Model versus Directional Model on Issue Voting, 1983–87*  

**General Issue Effect: Aggregate of All Four Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIR $\xi$ PROX*</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$ DIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>20.357a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>14.224a</td>
<td>7.567b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>3.236</td>
<td>34.357a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual Issue Effect: Unemployment/Inflation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIR $\xi$ PROX*</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$ DIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td>1.864</td>
<td>9.450b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2.031</td>
<td>1.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>9.035b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual Issue Effect: Tax/Government Spending**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIR $\xi$ PROX*</th>
<th>PROX $\xi$ DIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td>2.963</td>
<td>12.309a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>7.115b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.268</td>
<td>12.157a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* entries are $X^2$ at 1 degree of freedom,  
  a - $p<0.001$ (c.v. = 10.828); b - $p<0.01$ (c.v. = 6.635); c - $p<0.05$ (3.841)  
  DIR - Directional model; PROX - Proximity model  
  $\xi$ denotes encompassing
Table 4.4 Encompassing Tests, Proximity Model versus Directional Model on Issue Voting, 1983-87 (continued)*

**Individual Issue Effect: Nationalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIR ξ</th>
<th>PROX ξ*</th>
<th>PROX ξ</th>
<th>DIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.063c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1.011</td>
<td>2.642</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>17.473a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual Issue Effect: Defence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DIR ξ</th>
<th>PROX ξ*</th>
<th>PROX ξ</th>
<th>DIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>17.463a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>8.125b</td>
<td>1.801</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>34.198a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* entries are X² at 1 degree of freedom,
  a - p≤0.001 (c.v.=10.828); b - p≤0.01 (c.v.=6.635); c - p≤0.05 (3.841)
  DIR - Directional model; PROX - Proximity model
  ξ denotes encompassing
Table 4.5 Different Impacts of Issue Variables on Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Proximity</th>
<th>Directional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.594</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>-0.467</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Alliance</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.649</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>-0.508</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Alliance</td>
<td>-0.317</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.557</td>
<td>0.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>-0.460</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Alliance</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Entries are Pearson's r between issue variables and voting intention for each party
- Coefficients for 1979 elections are not presented owing to difference in scaling
Table 4.6 Multinomial Logit Model: Multi-party Vote Choice in Great Britain, 1987-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour/Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative/Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.115a</td>
<td>0.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>0.388a</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.022b</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.098b</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Class</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1.023a</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>0.702b</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>1.310b</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1.137b</td>
<td>0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of Leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-0.118c</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnock</td>
<td>0.370a</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashdown</td>
<td>-0.486a</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Proximity</td>
<td>-0.176a</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Likelihood</td>
<td>-589.7975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a - p <= .001; \ b - p <= .01 c - p <= .05\) one-tailed test.
Table 4.7 Multinomial Probit Model: Multi-party Vote Choice in Great Britain, 1987-92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour/Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative/Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>S.E.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.413a</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>0.264a</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Leaders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-0.069c</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnock</td>
<td>0.171a</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashdown</td>
<td>-0.300a</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Proximity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>-0.079a</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>3.023a</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>2.899a</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log of Likelihood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Robust Standard Errors derived from White heteroskedastic consistent matrix
a - p <= .001; b - p <= .01 c - p <= .05 one-tailed test
Table 5.1  Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for Stationarity of Conservative Party Support, Prime Ministerial Approval and Subjective Economic Evaluations, 1979m7 - 1995m4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original Series</th>
<th>First Differenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Support</td>
<td>(CONS)</td>
<td>-2.45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministeral Approval</td>
<td>(PMSAT)</td>
<td>-2.62*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Economic Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Perspective</td>
<td>(PE)</td>
<td>-4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Retrospective</td>
<td>(PR)</td>
<td>-3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Perspective</td>
<td>(NE)</td>
<td>-5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Retrospective</td>
<td>(NR)</td>
<td>-3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

zCONSPM
Residuals of CONS=b0+b1PMSAT  
-5.73

* Fails to reject null hypothesis of unit root at .05 level
Critical Value:  -2.88, p< 0.05
Note: All tests conducted without trend. Tests with trend yield same results.
Table 5.2 Error Correction Models of Conservative Party Support, 1979m8-1996m4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔPM Satisfaction (t)</td>
<td>.402a</td>
<td>.408a</td>
<td>.411a</td>
<td>.405a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCM (t-1)</td>
<td>-.273a</td>
<td>-.273a</td>
<td>-.278a</td>
<td>-.280a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Evaluations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΔPersonal Prospective (t)</td>
<td>.060c</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔPersonal Retrospective (t)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>.051d</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔNational Retrospective (t)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔNational Prospective (t)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>.018d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.685c</td>
<td>2.850c</td>
<td>2.906c</td>
<td>2.896b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>1.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.311a</td>
<td>4.423a</td>
<td>4.455a</td>
<td>4.404a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falklands War (May 1982)</td>
<td>5.648b</td>
<td>5.806b</td>
<td>5.670b</td>
<td>5.791b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major replaced Thatcher</td>
<td>6.509a</td>
<td>6.160a</td>
<td>6.396a</td>
<td>6.563a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll Tax</td>
<td>-.2832c</td>
<td>-.3463b</td>
<td>-.3112c</td>
<td>-.2992c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Reelected</td>
<td>-.693c</td>
<td>-.717c</td>
<td>-.712c</td>
<td>-.715c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Crisis</td>
<td>4.562b</td>
<td>4.540b</td>
<td>4.730b</td>
<td>4.715b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Events</td>
<td>1.330a</td>
<td>1.286a</td>
<td>1.310a</td>
<td>1.324a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adjusted R²**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>.561</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW-statistic</td>
<td>2.161</td>
<td>2.166</td>
<td>2.175</td>
<td>2.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial Correlation</td>
<td>25.217</td>
<td>25.519</td>
<td>22.170</td>
<td>23.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Form</td>
<td>.747</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality</td>
<td>1.515</td>
<td>1.976</td>
<td>2.643</td>
<td>2.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heteroskedasticity</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PE** - Personal Expectation Model  
**PR** - Personal Retrospection Model  
**NR** - National Retrospection Model  
**NE** - National Expectation Model  

\(a - p<0.001; b - p<0.01; c - p<0.05; d - p<0.10\); one-tailed test

All diagnostic tests are in chi-square. Degrees of freedom are Serial Correlation (LM) = 12;  
functional form = 1; Normality = 2; Heteroskedasticity = 1
Table 5.3 Models of Prime Ministerial Approval, 1979M8 to 1996M4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆Personal Prospective</td>
<td>0.114b</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆Personal Retrospective</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.076d</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆National Retrospective</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.075a</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆National Prospective</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.053b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1.535</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>1.923</td>
<td>1.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-1.499</td>
<td>-1.089</td>
<td>-1.768</td>
<td>-1.097</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.457</td>
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<td>Falklands War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1982</td>
<td>8.083b</td>
<td>8.533b</td>
<td>7.303b</td>
<td>8.298b</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 1982</td>
<td>7.150b</td>
<td>6.801c</td>
<td>6.419c</td>
<td>6.700c</td>
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<td>21.890a</td>
<td>21.709a</td>
<td>21.020a</td>
<td>20.206a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poll Tax</td>
<td>-3.394c</td>
<td>-4.515c</td>
<td>-3.776c</td>
<td>-3.541c</td>
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<tr>
<td>Currency Crisis (t-1)</td>
<td>-18.192a</td>
<td>-18.620a</td>
<td>-17.950a</td>
<td>-18.556a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Reelected</td>
<td>6.198c</td>
<td>6.305b</td>
<td>6.211c</td>
<td>6.404c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Events</td>
<td>1.937a</td>
<td>1.872a</td>
<td>2.011a</td>
<td>1.988a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Form</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Normality</td>
<td>5.086</td>
<td>5.490</td>
<td>4.575</td>
<td>4.725</td>
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<td>Heteroskedasticity</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>1.164</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PE - Personal Expectation Model
PR - Personal Retrospection Model
NR - National Retrospection Model
NE - National Expectation Model
a - p<0.001; b - p<0.01; c - p<0.05; d - p<0.10; one-tailed test
All diagnostic tests are in chi-square. Degrees of freedom are LM = 12;
functional form = 1, Normality = 2; Heteroskedasticity = 1
Table 5.4 Encompassing Tests: The Effect of Four Economic Evaluation Variables on Prime Ministerial Approval

**Personal Expectation versus Personal Retrospection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>PR $\xi$ PE</th>
<th>PE $\xi$ PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Test</td>
<td>-.32768 [.743]</td>
<td>-5.4065 [.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT-Test</td>
<td>.023382 [.981]</td>
<td>-3.1161 [.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Test</td>
<td>.023386 [.981]</td>
<td>-3.0685 [.002]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Test</td>
<td>.28714 [.774]</td>
<td>2.2187 [.027]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA-Test</td>
<td>.28714 [.774]</td>
<td>2.2187 [.027]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) .082449 [.774]</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 4.9228 [.028]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personal Expectation versus National Retrospection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>NR $\xi$ PE</th>
<th>PE $\xi$ NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Test</td>
<td>-5.2818 [.000]</td>
<td>-1.3222 [.186]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT-Test</td>
<td>-4.1041 [.000]</td>
<td>-.95559 [.339]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Test</td>
<td>-3.9886 [.000]</td>
<td>-.94759 [.343]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Test</td>
<td>2.7045 [.007]</td>
<td>1.0208 [.307]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA-Test</td>
<td>2.7045 [.007]</td>
<td>1.0208 [.307]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 7.3144 [.007]</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 1.0421 [.309]</td>
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</table>

**Personal Expectation versus National Expectation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>NE $\xi$ PE</th>
<th>PE $\xi$ NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Test</td>
<td>-2.1627 [.031]</td>
<td>-1.8070 [.071]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT-Test</td>
<td>-1.6212 [.105]</td>
<td>-1.3353 [.182]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Test</td>
<td>-1.6017 [.109]</td>
<td>-1.3217 [.186]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Test</td>
<td>1.4956 [.135]</td>
<td>1.3069 [.191]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA-Test</td>
<td>1.4956 [.135]</td>
<td>1.3069 [.191]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 2.2369 [.136]</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 1.7080 [.193]</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 5.4 (cont’d) : Encompassing Tests: The Effects of Four Economic Evaluation Variables on Prime Ministerial Approval

**National Retrospection versus National Expectation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>NE $\xi$ NR</th>
<th>NR $\xi$ NE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Test</td>
<td>-.61512 [.538]</td>
<td>-3.8647 [.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NT-Test</td>
<td>-.41190 [.680]</td>
<td>-3.1905 [.001]</td>
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<tr>
<td>W-Test</td>
<td>-.41022 [.682]</td>
<td>-3.1113 [.002]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Test</td>
<td>.54393 [.586]</td>
<td>2.4500 [.014]</td>
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<td>JA-Test</td>
<td>.54393 [.586]</td>
<td>2.4500 [.014]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) .29586 [.587]</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 6.0023 [.015]</td>
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**National Retrospection versus Personal Retrospection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>PR $\xi$ NR</th>
<th>NR $\xi$ PR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-Test</td>
<td>-.068220 [.946]</td>
<td>-12.0170 [.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>NT-Test</td>
<td>.21294 [.831]</td>
<td>-6.7812 [.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>W-Test</td>
<td>.21329 [.831]</td>
<td>-6.5685 [.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-Test</td>
<td>.064499 [.949]</td>
<td>3.3528 [.001]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA-Test</td>
<td>.064499 [.949]</td>
<td>3.3528 [.001]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) .0041601 [.949]</td>
<td>F( 1, 187) 11.2416 [.001]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

FE - Personal Expectation Model
PR - Personal Retrospection Model
NR - National Retrospection Model
NE - National Expectation Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>FMSATD</th>
<th>CONSIP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Model B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔConservative Support (t)</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM (t-1)</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔPM Support (t)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual of Model B</td>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Prospective (t)</td>
<td>.125b</td>
<td>.126b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1.594</td>
<td>1.263</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-1.495</td>
<td>-1.573</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-.256</td>
<td>-.049</td>
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<tr>
<td>Falklands War (May 1982)</td>
<td>8.165b</td>
<td>8.121b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major replaced Thatcher</td>
<td>21.228a</td>
<td>20.989a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll Tax</td>
<td>-3.469d</td>
<td>-3.366d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Crisis</td>
<td>-17.847a</td>
<td>-18.023a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major reelected</td>
<td>6.453b</td>
<td>6.594b</td>
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<td>Political Events</td>
<td>1.992a</td>
<td>1.976a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.426</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>DW-statistic</td>
<td>2.348</td>
<td>2.397</td>
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<td>Serial Correlation</td>
<td>18.508</td>
<td>18.131</td>
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<td>Functional Form</td>
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<td>.978</td>
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<td>Normality</td>
<td>5.105</td>
<td>5.031</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heteroskedasticity</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>1.124</td>
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a - p<0.001; b - p<0.01; c - p<0.05; d - p<0.10; one-tailed test
All diagnostic tests are in chi-square. Degrees of freedom are LM = 12; functional form = 1; Normality = 2; Heteroskedasticity = 1
Table 5.6 Structural State-space Models of Party Support in Great Britain, 1979m7-1996m4

**Final state vector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>-1.468b</td>
<td>-2.631</td>
<td>-0.669b</td>
<td>-2.343</td>
<td>-1.406b</td>
<td>-2.449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slope</td>
<td>-0.032b</td>
<td>-2.041</td>
<td>-0.006b</td>
<td>-2.514</td>
<td>-0.033b</td>
<td>-2.069</td>
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</table>

**Explanatory variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM Satisfaction (t)</td>
<td>0.414a</td>
<td>10.605</td>
<td>0.409a</td>
<td>10.456</td>
<td>0.387a</td>
<td>9.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.305a</td>
<td>-6.574</td>
<td>-0.288a</td>
<td>-6.333</td>
<td>-0.289a</td>
<td>-6.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔPersonal Economic Expectation (t)</td>
<td>0.058b</td>
<td>2.120</td>
<td>0.058b</td>
<td>2.140</td>
<td>0.057c</td>
<td>2.041</td>
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**National Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Slope</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.616c</td>
<td>1.950</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.653</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>4.402a</td>
<td>3.340</td>
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<td>Poll Tax</td>
<td>-2.836b</td>
<td>-2.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falklands War (May 1982)</td>
<td>5.197b</td>
<td>2.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Events</td>
<td>1.360a</td>
<td>4.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Re-elected</td>
<td>5.007a</td>
<td>2.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Replaced Thatcher (Irregular)</td>
<td>6.761a</td>
<td>3.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Crisis (Slope)</td>
<td>-0.029c</td>
<td>-1.663</td>
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</table>

**Diagnostics**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>1.800</td>
<td>1.813</td>
<td>1.857</td>
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<tr>
<td>Normality</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1.506</td>
<td>1.976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heteroskedasticity(66)</td>
<td>1.661</td>
<td>1.664</td>
<td>1.825</td>
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<tr>
<td>autocorrelation(1)</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
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<tr>
<td>autocorrelation(13)</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>2.115</td>
<td>2.125</td>
<td>2.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q(13,13)</td>
<td>23.260</td>
<td>21.880</td>
<td>17.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.583</td>
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</table>

a - p<0.001; b - p<0.01; c - p<0.05; d - p<0.10; one-tailed test
Table 5.7 Time-varying Parameter Model of Leadership effect on Party Support

DETERMINISTIC (REGULAR) REGRESSION BY OLS

DEPENDENT VARIABLE : CONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>LAG</th>
<th>COEFFICIENT</th>
<th>ST. ERROR</th>
<th>T-RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PMSAT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.535a</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>19.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.604a</td>
<td>1.170</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLACKPX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-5.299a</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>-7.534</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

STANDARD ERROR = 2.92328
R² = 0.859699

TIME-VARYING PARAMETER MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>COEFFICIENT</th>
<th>STANDARD ERR</th>
<th>T STATISTIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HYPER- PARAMETERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSAT</td>
<td>0.33172E-03</td>
<td>0.12822E-03</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIXED EQUATION PARAMETERS</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CNST</td>
<td>13.405a</td>
<td>1.6432</td>
<td>8.1577a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKPX</td>
<td>0.84756</td>
<td>1.5776</td>
<td>0.5372</td>
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</table>

LOG LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -157.292248

a - p<0.001; b - p<0.01; c - p<0.05; d - p<0.10; one-tailed test
Figure 2.1 Strength of Party identification, 1964-1992
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Party Identifiers, 1964–1992
Figure 2.3a Partisan Strength of Conservatives, 1964-1992

Figure 2.3b Partisan Strength of Labour, 1964-1992

Figure 2.3c Partisan Strength of Liberals, 1964-1992
Figure 2.4 Mean Strength of Party Identification by Parties, 1964-1992
Figure 2.5 Mean Strength of Party Identification by Age Cohort, 1987-1992
Figure 4.1 Three-Dimensional Plot of Proximity Model of Issue Voting
Figure 4.2  Three-Dimensional Plot of Directional Model of Issue Voting
* -1 represents "No" or "Left/Liberal" answers while +1 "Yes" or "Right/Conservative" answers

Figure 4.3 Distribution of Views on Policy Alternatives in Britain, 1992
Figure 4.4 Party Vote Shares and Positions of Voters on Issues in Great Britain, 1992
Figure 5.3d Prime Ministerial Approval and PMSAT Hyperparameter:
National Retrospection Model
Figure 5.3c Prime Ministerial Approval and PMSAT Hyperparameter: National Expectation Model
Figure 5.3b Prime Ministerial Approval and PMSAT Hyperparameter: Personal Retrospection Model
Figure 5.3a Prime Ministerial Approval and PMSAT Hyperparameter: Personal Expectation Model
Bounds are at 10% significance level

Figure 5.2 A Structural Break at the Currency Crisis: CUSUM Graph of Model Residuals
Figure 5.1: Government Popularity and Prime Ministerial Approval in Great Britain, 1979-1996
BIBLIOGRAPHY


