THE PULL TO THE RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE:
AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL SUPPORT
FOR THE EXTREME-RIGHT

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Jody D. Fletcher, B.A.

Denton, Texas

December, 1998
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This study develops a model explaining support for contemporary extreme-right parties. The history and political setting of relevant countries are examined. The research explores necessary state-level conditions, which are postindustrialism, convergence to the center by major parties, and proportional representation. Individual support is probed using survey data with bivariate and probit analyses. Being male and younger proved to be significant variables, while socio-economic status did not. Concerning issues, personal disaffection for immigrants, favoring nationalistic hiring practices, and free-market tendencies were significant variables. Opposition to feminism and pride to be from one’s nation were insignificant explanations for extreme-right support. Implications of the analysis are discussed as are issues concerning future research.
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Academically, I wish to thank the members of my committee who offered both guidance and friendship during my studies. Personally, I wish to thank my parents, without whose support, both emotional and financial, none of this would have been possible.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the April 1998, regional elections in Eastern Germany, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union), a member of Europe's contemporary extreme-right, won 13% of the vote, securing them seats in the Bundenstag for the first time. This election marked the greatest electoral support for a German far right party since the rise of Nazism before the Second World War. In Marseilles, France on Wednesday April 26, 1995, an extreme-right party, the Front National (FN, National Front) was engaging in an act of publicity typical of its campaigns. Activists of the party hung a banner which declared "Big Business (Affairstme), Immigration (Immigration), Drugs (Drogues), and Socialism (Socialisme)" construct the letters of the acronym AIDS (SIDA). The presence of such alarming political phenomena has spurred debate among academics, politicians, and the public over the possible causes and effects of the escalation of the extreme-right in Western European politics.
The political debate has reached such a heated point that some mainstream politicians are calling for the extreme-right parties to be banned from the democratic process. Since one of the tenets of the extreme-right is disaffection with established parties, such political maneuvers would only serve to fuel the rhetoric from the right. The topic has also mired the academic world in indecision concerning the basics of social science, including the definitions of relevant terms and the relevance of theory-driven literature. The masses are undoubtedly left to their own impressions since no consistent messages or cues are emanating from the academics or political leaders.

This project has attempted to unravel many of the issues in the relevant academic literature. Also, this work has undertaken the development of a theoretical model on the success of the extreme-right that both explains the contemporary situation and offers some predictive power. Steps were taken to ensure that the model is generalizable cross-nationally, an effort endeavored in the comparative literature. I use the term "extreme-right" to describe the parties under consideration. However, during particular sections of the literature review, I will use the
terminology preferred by the authors under consideration. Additionally, during the examination of sub-categories and typologies within the extreme-right, other terms are used.

The literature on the extreme-right falls into two broad categories. The first category comprises single nation case studies. As has been noted by experts in comparative methodology, a properly executed case study is beneficial to the development of generalizable theories (Mayer 1989; Lijphart 1971). This literature examines the state level conditions, intraparty conflicts, and individual support for extreme-right parties in specific countries. (Arter 1992; Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Castles 1978; Chapin 1997; Day 1988; Durham 1996; Eatwell 1992; Foot 1969; Furlong 1992; Helms 1997; Husbands 1983, 1988; Kitschelt 1995; Knight 1992; Mink 1992; Perrineau 1988a, 1988b; Shields 1987; Westle and Niedermayer 1992). These nation-by-nation studies apply existing theories, thus strengthening them or indicating the necessity for modifications. Such "theory-building" case studies are critical in understanding political phenomena (Lijphart 1971, 692).

The second category consists of studies that are "comparative" according to Mayer's definition of the term
He held that for a study to be truly comparative, it must address two or more nations (1972). Analysts have generated a healthy body of literature that adapts to Mayer’s definition (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Hagtvet 1994; Husbands 1992; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996; Ignazi 1992, Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b; Kitschelt 1995; Weinberg 1983). This category of literature develops and tests theories cross-nationally. Throughout the literature, many themes are explored, such as defining the extreme-right and its relationship, if any, to the interwar fascists. Additionally, the literature examines two popular hypotheses, single-issue and protest votes, which propose to explain the circumstances of the extreme-right’s success or failure. The state level conditions conducive to extreme-right success, including electoral systems, are also examined.

From this body of comparative research, many shortcomings and discrepancies emerge. First, no precise and operationalizable definition of the extreme-right emerges. Next, there is no clear consensus on the issue of the contemporary extreme-right as the legacy of the interwar fascists. Last, although the authors dedicate much attention to developing testable hypotheses,
quantitative methodology is generally weak and simplistic, if not absent. In this work, I have attempted to resolve many of these issues. I have endeavored to explain the rise of the contemporary extreme-right using a combination of individual and state levels-of-analysis. Throughout this work I bear in mind the classical writings on the comparative method (Lijphart 1975, 1985, 1990; Mayer 1972, 1983, 1989). My goal was to build a rigorous model that I could then test with advanced quantitative methods on applicable data.

There are several factors that make this research project worthwhile. Is it not important to explore how political views once popularly considered criminal and viscous have evolved into legitimate issues on the agenda of civilized countries? Would academia, and dare I say the world, not benefit from a greater understanding of the rise of the extreme-right? Although no platform of an extreme-right party explicitly endorses violence, one could consider their mere existence to be tacit consent for more radical expressions of political grievances. Extreme-right disposition has many forms and targets. Appeals for the exclusion of the handicapped, foreigners, and women from the workplace are not uncommon issues addressed by the
extreme-right. Surely, society needs to understand which factors have provoked this face of democracy.

The extreme-right’s presence in the company of traditional parties has another unsettling residual effect. Many extreme-right parties are marked by little respect for the “constitutional rules of the democratic regime” (Ignazi 1992, 12). As another observer noted, “in the context of democratic politics, extreme or radical groups are ones that do not abide by the rules of the game” (Weinberg 1993, 5). The extreme-right has the potential to be a much greater threat to the liberal democracies of Western Europe from within than from the outside. The extreme-right is closer than ever to being “in the loop” of mainstream European politics. Many Europeans contend that the extreme-right is not a legitimate democratic force. However, as will be shown, the supporters of the extreme-right concentrate around an array of issues. Must mainstream conservative parties yield to pressures of the extreme-right and at least partially endorse it policies? This seems to be the only way to avoid losing votes to them, a tactic not infrequently employed by mainstream conservative parties.
Hopefully, the world will not hold its collective breath and wait for the era of the extreme-right to pass. During the late 1970s and 1980s, experts and the media postulated that the extreme-right's resurgence was just a "flash." These postulations are now two decades old, a fact that speaks to their validity. Issue voting and dealignment, two electoral factors that facilitate the rise of the extreme-right, are not abating. Other factors facilitating the electoral success of the extreme-right are not subsiding. The influx of immigrants into Western Europe is not decreasing. To exacerbate this problem, the percentage of immigrants from non-European Union (EU) countries continues to rise, another irritant of the extreme-right. The EU is expanding in both depth and breadth, as European integration accelerates. This fuels the nationalist rhetoric of the extreme-right's political entrepreneurs who conjure images of threats to ethnicity and nation. Related to this, the criteria to qualify for monetary integration has resulted in many cutbacks, predominantly in social spending. As competition tightens for fleeing welfare Franks and Marks, resentment of those who are considered to have contributed less into the system are sure to intensify. The extreme-right is attempting to
threaten the EU from within. The extreme-right has made significant electoral gains in the European Parliament (EP).

The insights gained from this work will be of benefit to both academics and politicians. Perhaps if the justification and reasoning in the individual mind of an extreme-right supporter can be understood and explained, governments would be able to address his or her concerns in a democratic manner. Will the extreme-right outlive the proportional representation electoral system that made their rise possible? It would be a shame to see the proportional representation systems of Western Europe, once heralded as hyper-democratic, dismantled, because of a distasteful residue they left behind. To academics, could these answers not serve to advance their primary goal of theory-building? In addition to developing a theoretical construct on the rise of the extreme-right, would such knowledge not benefit voting behavior and electoral system research in general? Would this research not benefit the methodological fields, both comparative and quantitative?

To carry out this study, I depend heavily on the World Values Survey (WVS) data set, which is fully described in chapters four and five. These data take great pains in
probing the socioeconomic status of the respondents, as it is determined in postindustrial societies. The WVS allows an analyst to probe employment prospects and job security. Other surveys, like the Eurobarometer, rely heavily on dated indicators like income to determine socioeconomic status. In addition, the WVS measures other factors close to the heart of the extreme-right debate. The data include crucial variables like gender and age, along with a host of other relevant traditional cleavage variables. Another prime advantage of the WVS is that it addresses the respondent's stance on key issues, such as abortion and women's rights, immigration, and the welfare state. Each of these issues is appropriately measured, allowing the researcher to avoid measurement error.

From the WVS, I was also able to construct my dependent variable, support for the extreme-right. Numerous surveys neglect the extreme-right in their vote intention questions and simply consider these parties "other." The WVS allows for more precision by offering even the most miniscule parties as alternatives. Additionally, I will use the data of Laver and Hunt (1992) to probe the actual parties of the extreme-right quantitatively, which complements my model. These data
allow me explore the distance between the major established parties in each country along the left-right continuum. Additionally, these same figures are used to determine if a party is indeed on the extreme-right on a host of issues, a critical variable in my conceptualization of the extreme-right. Laver and Hunt (1992) additionally offer data on intraparty politics, namely the power gap between party leaders and activists, a variable linked to parties with an authoritarian bent. I will make use of PROBIT analysis to test my model, the best approach for analyzing dichotomous dependent variables.

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two, titled "Political Setting," examines the background of the political and socioeconomic contexts in which the extreme-right has risen on a country-by-country basis. This chapter is also crucial in explicating the parties and personalities comprising this phenomenon. Plotting the historical circumstances of the extreme-right’s ascent should not be neglected in a broad understanding. This chapter profits from case study literature that offers deep insight from regional and country experts. The third chapter, "Review of Comparative Literature," summarizes and critiques the theory-driven
literature in the field. This includes all literature that addresses more than one country. Such literature is where the highest quality theory-building takes place by examining the similarities and differences between and among nations effecting political phenomena. However, it is less informative on a country by country basis. This explains why I examine the literature in two different chapters, allowing the strengths of both categories to profit this study. The theoretical framework and operationalizations are developed in Chapter four. I develop my theoretical model, derive testable hypotheses, and then elaborate on operationalizations for each of the variables employed. This facilitates quantitative testing of my propositions in the next chapter. Chapter five includes my statistical procedures and interpretations, elaborating on the procedures used to quantitatively test my hypotheses. Discussions, interpretations, and implications follow. Such examinations of the empirical strengths and weaknesses facilitate theory-building as unexpected results present themselves or proposed hypotheses are disconfirmed. The sixth and final chapter discusses the significance of this research and proffers suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL SETTING

Arend Lijphart wrote that "the case study method can and should be closely connected with the comparative method" (1971, 691). He noted that "by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined" (Lijphart 1971, 691). Even Lawrence Mayer, a staunch proponent of cross-national studies, remarked that "the value of the single-country studies is a function of whether such studies entail generalizations that could logically apply to other national settings" (1989, 15). Lijphart believed that such case studies could be used "for the purpose of theory-building," and he divided them into four categories (1971, 692). "Hypothesis-generating case studies" strive to develop hypotheses that may be later tested cross-nationally (Lijphart 1971, 692). The next two types are "theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies" (Lijphart 1971, 692). These case studies apply established theories and either strengthen their position in the literature or raise doubts about their validity.
validity. The fourth type of theory-driven case studies is "deviant case analyses," which explore outlyers from established theory (Lijphart 1971, 692).

In this chapter, I will draw on relevant case study literature that is theory driven in order to examine the political setting in which the rise of the contemporary extreme-right has occurred. As Betz noted, "Politics does not operate in a vacuum; it reflects as much the state of society as it seeks to influence and shape its direction" (1994, 2). As will be shown later in this work, the societal and political setting can support electoral success of the extreme-right. There exists a high degree of cynicism seen in decreasing alignment and support for major parties. This is particularly marked by a "decline in trust of political elites and institutions" (Dalton 1996, 11). Additionally, "stable party alignments are weakening," partly due to government irresponsiveness (Dalton 1996, 11). The public votes less and less along traditional cleavage lines as "issues are becoming a more important basis of voting behavior" (Dalton 1996, 11).

As described by Inglehart, the Left made great strides by profiting from such conditions (1977). However, parties on the other end of the political spectrum have also been
harvesting electoral success in this political climate. The parties of the extreme-right are truly a product of their times and serve as "one of the most significant signals of a fundamental transformation of politics in advanced Western democracies" (Betz 1994, 3). As can be seen in Figure one, the extreme-right has significant breadth and depth to its support. Since mainstream parties refuse to form coalitions with them, the extreme-right’s electoral success makes forming a functioning government even more difficult.
I now examine the political settings of six countries, which have witnessed extreme-right electoral success to varying degrees. These are France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Austria. Then I probe a country in which the extreme-right has made minimal gains, Britain. Last, I investigate the extreme-right in a very modern political setting, the European Parliament.

France

The Front National (FN, National Front) has not always been a monolithic power in French extreme-right politics. Jean-Marie Le Pen officially founded the FN in the autumn of 1972, attempting to unify the factions of France's extreme-right. One of the most powerful blocs in this camp was the Ordre Nouveau (ON, New Order), which sought to undermine mainstream political parties and politicians while stressing European ethnicity. For the ON, Le Pen was insufficiently radical. Throughout the late 1970s and into the 1980s, this infighting made electoral success elusive for France's extreme-right. "In 1981, the humiliation was complete," as the FN failed to get the meager 500 signatures to even appear on the ballot (Betz 1994, 15). However, by the mid-1980s, the FN had discovered a
successful electoral formula, which included “approval of
market capitalism” (Kitschelt 1995, 91).

The incipient FN is best understood by switching the
level-of-analysis to arrondissements, or districts. James
Shields (1987) and Pascal Perrineau (1988a, 1988b) profited
from examining these sub-national units. Shields
documented the young party’s crossing of social lines by
noting that even in the early days of the FN, its success
was not limited to poorer districts (1987). Perrineau
researched the FN’s success among urbanites and found that
they were primarily concerned with “immigrants and
insecurity” (1988a, 26). Perrineau found that, despite
their considerations for their security, the “objective
insecurities, suffered by FN voters seem weak and even
lower than those of voters for the entire electorate”
(1988a, 34). This built on the work of Sociologist H.
Lagrange who found that people often felt irrationally
insecure (1984). It was through the manipulation of such
sentiments and by attracting diverse support that the FN
acquired a foothold in French politics.

This technique was applied in Dreux for the 1982
Elections. Unskilled laborers and immigrants heavily
populated Dreux, which was fertile ground for the FN. A
representative of the extreme-right "moved into this community and began to organize support for the National Front based on racist and anti-immigration appeals" (Kitschelt 1995, 100). The FN got over 11% of the vote in the Dreux secondary elections, compared to a meager .2% nationwide. After Dreux, Le Pen would have scarce difficulty getting media coverage, because the election had "triggered initial national interest in the National Front" (Kitschelt 1995, 100).

To understand the FN one must be familiar with the day to day administrative duties of Jean-Marie Le Pen. In early April 1998, the city of Munich asked the European Parliament to suspend Le Pen's immunity, enabling him to be prosecuted for trivializing the Holocaust. Le Pen had referred to the Holocaust as a mere detail of history. This legal trouble with the German courts arose the day after he was convicted of assault back in France. During his daughter's campaign one-year earlier, Le Pen threw punches and insults at Socialist opponent Annette Peulvast-Bergeal who went on to win the Mantes-la-Jolie seat. The most notable consequence from the assault conviction is that Le Pen was stripped of his political rights, meaning he will be unable to vote or stand for election for two
years. The ban does not engage until all appeals are exhausted, the outcome of which is not known as of this writing.

(West) Germany

Nowhere else in the world is the extreme-right more closely scrutinized than in Germany. Due to not so distant historical circumstances, any activity even remotely paralleling its Nazi past immediately evokes fears of history repeating itself. Fortunately, due to several conditions present in German electoral laws and within the parties of its extreme-right, the prospects for the three extremist parties are presently somewhat limited. However, many Germans endure "socioeconomically and politically motivated dissatisfaction," while "the established parties have failed to respond adequately to these problems" (Westle and Niedermayer 1992, 83).

The first of these parties is the Deutsche Volksunion Liste D (DVU-L, German People's Union, List D). This party "grew out of the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union)," an apolitical citizen's group. Since the DVU became political, it has achieved respectable success in state-level elections. However, as was the case in the
1993 Hamburg elections and the 1989 European elections, the Republikaner (REP, Republican) often cancels out its efforts. Perhaps to avoid this scenario, the DVU-L aided the REP in their 1994 Bundestag elections (Chapin 1997). As mentioned in Chapter I, the DVU-L did manage to seat representatives in the German Parliament in 1998, shocking the world.

The DVU-L often splits votes with the REP, because the two parties are both the "primary focus of new right voters" (Chapin 1997, 57). The REP became a party "on 25 November 1983" (Chapin 1997, 58). One of its founding members, Franz Schönhuber, is a "former Waffen-SS officer" (Chapin 1997, 58). The REP has found a successful formula of issues by appealing to voters' concerns over immigration, law and order, and economics. These three issues were cultivated in the minds of the voters by the first extreme-right party of modern Germany, the Nationaldemokratische Partei (NDP, National Democratic Party).

The NDP has been described as a "neo-Nazi party hiding beneath a democratic façade" (Day 1988, 226). The NDP had an exclusionary view of citizenship favoring a "national
community based on ethnic definition" (Chapin 1997, 56). They looked back on Germany's great nationalism with nostalgia. Of great interest is that the NDP was a staunch proponent of reunification (Chapin 1997).

The political climate of the 1960s was favorable to an opportunistic extreme-right party like the NDP. A powerful centrist coalition had formed, leaving political space on the right to yield electoral returns. Although the NDP never broke through the German 5% threshold for Bundestag representation, it achieved success in state and local elections (Chapin 1997). However, the center of the leading coalition later shifted towards the right, and the NDP "declined precipitously in the 1970s" (Chapin 1997, 57). By revitalizing the immigration issue in the 1980s, the NDP managed to stage a respectable comeback. Unfortunately, the REP and the DVU-L were attracting the lion's share of the potential votes. A three decade old tradition was broken in 1994 when the NDP "decided not to run in the October Bundestag election" (Chapin 1997, 57).

Germany comprises sufficient conditions to support a monolithic extreme-right party with a respectable degree of electoral success. The numbers of immigrants, not to mention a swelling proportion of which are non-European,
"have provided the impetus for particularly negative and hostile responses to foreigners in Germany over the last decade" (Chapin 1997, 53). Also, the political system will tend to recalibrate itself "as a reaction to the rise of the post-materialist New Left (including new social movements and the Green Party)" (Minkenberg 1992, 76). However, a rallying figure like Austria's Jörg Haider or France's Jean-Marie Le Pen has yet to ascend to the throne of the German extreme-right. This has allowed the electoral laws in Germany, using a 5% threshold for Bundestag representation, to shield the national parliament from an exorbitant extreme-right presence.

Italy

As in Germany, the world holds its collective breath when Italian extreme-right parties produce a successful electoral formula. Italy has the raw materials for extreme-right prosperity, including immigration and a culture not wholly opposed to street justice. The modern Italian voter is exhibiting "unprecedented electoral volatility" (Furlong 1992, 345). The names of the individuals and parties involved may be from the late
twentieth century, but they "reflect historical unresolved problems in Italian politics" (Furlong 1992, 345).

Like many of their counterparts, the Italian extreme-right’s appeal "is based on anti-immigration policies as well as a populist attack on the distant central bureaucracy in Rome" (Furlong 1992, 345). The Italian extreme-right emulates the strategies of other extreme-right parties by striking while momentum and inaction mire mainstream politics. The opportunity exists for the political entrepreneurs of the extreme-right to take their message to the masses who display "increased popular concern at the political immobilism of the coalition parties which have governed Italy" since the War (Furlong 1992, 345). The Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement) has profited from these conditions for decades.

Founded not long after the end of the War, the MSI has averaged 5% of electoral returns for four decades. It has managed to acquire a variety of supporters, drawing from different professions and classes. Often described as "neo-Fascist," the MSI is "associated particularly with the methods" of street violence (Furlong 1992, 345). Although nothing was ever indisputably proven, the MSI was linked to
a "bomb explosion at Bologna station in August 1980, which resulted in over 80 deaths" (Furlong 1992, 347). Such actions were generally the work of "opportunistic local MSI leaders" (Furlong 1992, 347). This ran counter to the vision of the MSI's leader from 1969 to 1987, Giorgio Almirante. Almirante set out "to end the MSI's isolation" and secure some degree of legitimacy for his party (Furlong 1992, 347).

One way that Almirante attempted to evolve the Italian Social Movement was to form a coalition with another outcast party in 1972, forming Movimento Sociale Italiano - Dresta Nazionale (MSI-DN, Italian Social Movement - National Right). Although the political marriage was short lived, many still refer to the MSI by this longer name. The MSI has existed in limbo outside of the club of constitutional parties, "the group of parties who are recognized by one another as legitimate contributors to the normal workings of democratic participation" (Furlong 1992, 347). For the most part, these attempts at legitimization were failures. In 1987, Almirante stepped down, disputably succeeded by Pino Rauti.

The battle over Almirante's successor exposed deep cracks within the ranks of the MSI. This coupled with the
fact that the age of the party was becoming a handicap. In the 1990s, the Italian electorate fragmented even further, hurting all parties considered even remotely established, ironically including the MSI. Also, the MSI had been losing ground to the Leagues in the "North and Centre of Italy" (Furlong 1992, 352).

Like the MSI, the Leagues stressed "taxation, immigration, government inefficiency and corruption" (Furlong 1992, 352). However, the Leagues profit from the increasing emphasis on regionalism over nationalism and "the decline of the national party structure" (Furlong 1992, 356). The most successful of the regional Leagues is the Lega Lombarde (LL, Lombardy League), also known as the Lega Nord (LN, Northern League). This party represents the "large Northern city of Milan, which is effectively Italy's financial and commercial capital" (Furlong 1992, 351). The LL managed to acquire 2.7% of the vote in the 1987 parliamentary elections, 6.5% of the 1989 European elections, and 16.4% of the regional elections of 1990. Much like the factionalization that plagued the MSI, the Leagues have been unable to concentrate their strength. Perhaps owing to the regional nature of the Leagues' support, efforts by the LL to form a national structure for
the Leagues have failed. The individual parties are not supportive of a national structure, because "the aims of individual groups seem to militate against such collaboration" (Furlong 1992, 352).

Scandinavia

The Scandinavian countries "lack a legacy of strong right-extremist movements" that is present in much of continental Europe (Kitschelt 1995, 121). Except Finland, each Scandinavian country has a potential member of the extreme-right political family, but only two actually belong to the political family of the extreme-right. The extreme-right parties of Denmark and Norway illustrate radical politics with a Scandinavian slant. On the other hand, the Swedish extreme-right party, although already categorized as a member of Europe's extreme-right in the media, is not yet a viable political phenomenon.

The Sweden, Ny Demokrati (ND, New Democracy) "gained nearly 7% of the 1991 general election only seven months after the party's formation" (Arter 1992, 357). Among its policy positions was an approach to deal with immigrants "that included repatriation" (Arter 1992, 357). Still during its nascent years, ND "collapsed during the 1994
Swedish parliamentary elections" (Kitschelt 1995, 293).
This brief moment on the Swedish political stage renders ND
"a diffuse 'flash' party" (Kitschelt 1995, 121). However,
Kitschelt notes that many extreme-right parties required an
"extensive learning process before they found a winning
electoral formula” (Kitschelt 1995, 293).

Although less radical than their continental
counterparts, the Danish Fremskridtspartiet (FP-D, Danish
Progress Party) and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FP-N,
Norwegian Progress Party) are members of Europe's
contemporary extreme-right. However, neither of them
originated as pure extreme-right parties. "Both Parties
started out as protest parties,” but they evolved into
specimens of the extreme-right through leadership changes
and "trial-and-error" electoral appeals (Kitschelt 1995,
121). The early days of the FPs are unique from those of
other members of the extreme-right in that their initial
successes at the polls were in national, not secondary
elections. This owes to the fact that both the Danish and
Norwegian FPs addressed national issues, such as European
Union (EU) Membership and progressive tax increases that
were starting to distress the middle classes. Also
benefiting the new parties, the conditions were conducive
in the 1970s. The governing coalitions were markedly left of center (Castles 1978), making possible the "growth of the social democratic welfare state" (Kitschelt 1995, 125). This left not only sufficient political space, but it was located on the right.

The FP-D was founded by "successful tax lawyer Mogens Glistrup" in 1972 (Kitschelt 1995, 129). With the skilled opportunism of a true political entrepreneur, Glistrup took center stage in Danish politics in one fell swoop. During a 112 (Arter 1992, 362) to 118 (Kitschelt 1995, 130) second television interview, Glistrup admitted that he had been successfully avoiding paying taxes for years. Additionally, he claimed that "tax evaders made as great a patriotic contribution as the railway saboteurs had done during the German Occupation!" (Arter 1992, 363). Glistrup later expanded his program to include reductions in the "public sector and the amount of bureaucratic red-tape" (Arter 1992, 363). In the 1973 elections, these appeals rewarded the FP-D with 15.9% of the vote.

Although it briefly operated under a different name, the FP-N was also founded in 1973. Its founder, Anders Lange, was "a small businessman who had retired from running his dog kennel" (Kitschelt 1995, 130). Lange was a
skilled politician and knew how to benefit from the media, especially television. Lange possessed an "eccentric and electrifying personality" and "a gift for expressing his ideas through simple language and striking anecdotes" (Kitschelt 1995, 130). Lange laid out ten policies that he advocated, including decreasing the scope of the welfare state, lowering taxes, and slashing foreign aid. Like Glistrup in Denmark, Lange took advantage of "the highly egalitarian regulations on the access of all competing parties to the publicly controlled television networks" (Kitschelt 1995, 131). Also mirroring Glistrup, Lange operated a personal campaign without big party machinery. In the 1973 elections, Lange received 5% of the vote nationwide.

After this auspicious beginning, both parties and their leaders suffered pitfalls, not the least of which was Lange's death in 1974. Carl Hagen, who officially named the party the FP-N, replaced him. Meanwhile in Denmark, Glistrup misread the sentiments of his Danish supporters. He half jokingly announced his plan to dismantle the "Danish military and replace it with an answering service that would signal the message 'we surrender' to the Russians in case of an attack" (Kitschelt 1995, 131).
Although this would have saved tax money, such neglect of security went against the grain of capitalism, the true ideology of Glistrup's supporters. Both Glistrup and Hagen could not satisfactorily address the plethora of issues that now faced them. They tried unsuccessfully to please their constituents with policies that combined anti-tax and libertarian appeals. Glistrup lost control of the direction of the FP-D in 1983, when he was jailed for tax fraud. Upon his release five years later, "he did not manage to regain control of the party" (Kitschelt 1995, 132).

Continuing without their two founders, the Scandinavian FPs were eventually able to "find a winning formula in the second half of the 1980s" (Kitschelt 1995, 135). The attempts of libertarian appeals had given way to issues of law and order coupled with the reduction of the state in areas other than security. These issues make the FPs members of the contemporary extreme-right, "but they constitute a diluted version compared to their counterparts on the European continent" (Kitschelt 1995, 158). Due to "the general social democratic orientations" of most Scandinavians," the FPs must evade the appearance of
fostering excessively “rightist and antidemocratic views” (Kitschelt 1992, 158).

Austria

Austria has perhaps the best preconditions for extreme-right success in all of Europe. One variable benefiting Austria’s extreme-right is constant: its location. The fall of the iron curtain revealed Austria to the masses of Eastern Europe, with which Austria shares a 1,000-mile long border. Austria has absorbed mass migrations from Poland, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia both before and since its collapse. These immigrants follow many before them, including an “influx of ‘guest workers’ from Turkey and Yugoslavia in the 1960s” (Knight 1992, 296). These conditions have “given Haider an issue tailor-made for his skilled demagogy” (Knight 1992, 296).

Aspiring to becoming the next Jean Marie Le Pen, “Jörg Haider is well on the way to becoming Europe’s most successful right-wing, populist leader” (Knight 1992, 298). Haider took the reins of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO, Austrian Freedom Party) in 1986, considered the “official starting point of the FPO’s
transformation to a right-wing populist party" (Helms 1997, 40). Evolving a preexisting party was an advantage for the Austrian extreme-right. The party already had some acceptance and name recognition, since the "FPO was established as an 'electoral party' and integrated into the party system long before the intra-party transition began" (Helms 997, 48). Under Haider's leadership, the FPO has become "one of the most successful right-wing populist parties in Western Europe" (Helms 1997, 39).

During his term as the governor of Carinthia, Haider caused international turmoil by commenting "that at least the Third Reich had managed to implement 'a competent employment policy'" (Knight 1992, 285). Although he was forced to resign as governor, he managed to lead the FPO to unprecedented electoral gains in three provincial elections during the "following six months" (Knight 1992, 285). The FPO received an average of 18.5% of the vote in Styria, Upper Austria, and Vienna, an increase of 12% from previous elections. Since he took over, Haider has led the FPO along "a course of increasing radicalization" (Helms 1997, 40). So much so, that in 1993, a faction of the party deserted, which failed to dampen the Freedom Party's electoral success.
As can be seen in Table five, the FPO had been gradually increasing its share of the vote through 1994. However, their electoral returns slipped slightly back in 1995, causing the FPO to lose two of its 42 seats. Although it should not be interpreted as a direct comparison to elections for national bodies, the "FPO managed to produce its best result ever at nation-wide polls in the first European election" in 1996, which awarded them 27% of the vote (Helms 1997, 41).

The FPO was a standing member of the club of Austrian political parties before its transformation in 1986. This coupled with Austria’s electoral laws to boost the opportunities for the FPO. In order to be represented in the Austrian parliament, a party had to only surmount a 2% threshold. In 1992, the figure increased to 4%, which still renders the Austrian system one of the most proportional in Europe. These two reasons, status as an accepted party and the high probability of seating representatives, have greatly augmented the Austrian extreme-right’s prospects of continued electoral gains.

Unfortunately, these feelings of legitimacy for the extreme-right have created a situation where in order to be radical in Austria, one must be intolerably radical
compared to most of Western Europe. Anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant violence is ubiquitous in Austria as "neo-Nazi groups are showing greater self-confidence" (Knight 1992, 286). Austria even elected a President, Kurt Waldheim, whose "campaign was marred by thinly veiled anti-Semitic comments" (Knight 1992, 286). The tacit consent of such conditions by Austrians makes one believe that Haider could have easily forged an electoral base, even if he had not inherited a recognizable party. The conditions in Austria would have comfortably fostered Haider as a political entrepreneur under a guise other than the FPO.

Britain

The contemporary extreme-right in Britain has not been able to attain the electoral success of its continental counterparts. It has been plagued by internal turf wars among its leaders. Also, British electoral laws have crippled its efforts to receive votes. Perhaps most importantly, the Conservative Party resolutely occupies the political space on the right in Britain. The development of Britain's modern extreme-right has been marred by these impediments.
The British extreme-right of the 1960s was in disarray and consisted of nearly a half dozen parties. The extreme-right eventually concentrated into two camps, but "the National Party would fade away and it would be the National Front that would remain the dominant force on the extreme-right in the 1970s" (Durham 1996, 82). Being a coalition of so many competing smaller parties, the National Front (NF) saw its leadership turned over on several occasions through the mid-1970s. The electoral gains of the NF were so disappointing that additional factions and defections followed. In 1974, the NF received a meager 3.1% of the vote. Five years later, their share of the vote had decreased to a pathetic 1.3%. As one considers the history of the NF, it becomes apparent that their fate was not solely in their hands, because "development within the Conservatives were central in the extreme-right's rise - and fall" (Durham 1996, 83).

The first incident of Conservative Party politics that effected the British extreme-right was the outspokenness of Enoch Powell, a Tory Member of Parliament. Having become "discontented with the direction of his party," Powell gave two speeches promoting anti-immigration policies in the late 1960s (Durham 1996, 84). Although his Tory leaders
harshly punished Powell, the leader of the NF, A. K. Chesterton, praised him as a man who expressed "what millions think and have been unable to say" (The London Times 24 April 1968). The extreme-right felt invigorated by a Tory Member of Parliament who appeared to be following their lead on an issue. However, the extreme-right quickly became disillusioned with Powell due to his positions on other issues.

Powell was strongly capitalistic, which conflicted with the FN’s stance on building a stronger Britain through protectionism. Also, many in the leadership of the FN saw Powell as a Tory ploy to entice extreme-right members. Eventually, Chesterton equated supporting Powell to supporting the Tories (Durham 1996, 87). However, Powell’s "denunciation of immigration had undoubtedly helped the National Front" (Durham 1996, 88) by making the extreme-right party appear more creditable. Unfortunately for the British extreme-right, the double-edged sword of Powell’s legitimization of the immigration issue was soon to erode support for the FN more than it ever augmented it.

Since its inception in 1961, the Monday Club had fought to redirect the Conservative Party from within. As increasing numbers of Powell supporters filled the Monday
Club, it "became increasingly identified with opposition to immigration" (Durham 1996, 89). The FN’s leadership never considered the Monday Club as brothers in arms. To them, the Monday Club was infiltrated by liberals and still predominately loyal to the Tory mainstream. Being natural competitors, "this was not the first time that the National Front had expressed contempt for the organized Tory right" (Durham 1996, 92). In the end, the Tories would conquer most of the potential votes in this battle for political space, bolstered mostly by Margaret Thatcher.

Thatcher unceremoniously usurped the immigration issue in 1978 and 1979 by openly remarking that Britain was "being 'swamped' by alien cultures" (Durham 1996, 82). These comments may have simply accelerated the decline of the FN (Eatwell 1992 186-187). Alternatively, the remarks may have been the primary cause for numerous FN supporters to defect to the Conservative Party (Husbands 1988, 76). In either case, result was an embarrassing showing in the 1983 elections. The National Front received only 1.1%, while the British National Party (BNP) secured merely .66% of the votes per seat (Durham 1996, 97). Although "Thatcherism was to play a crucial role in the failure of the National Front," one should not forget the role of
Britain's electoral laws in hindering the extreme-right's efforts (Durham 1996, 98).

The voters of the extreme-right are often attracted by the fact that a party is speaking out on an issue that concerns them. However, because certain issues are critical to their personal agendas, these supporters will often take a rational approach in casting their votes. Under the British plurality electoral laws, voting for a party that has only a marginal chance of winning can be a risky venture. It is possible that the Conservatives received many votes from National Front sympathizers who simply could not tolerate the "ghastly Labour Party" (Durham 1996, 95). This is often referred to as "sophisticated voting," the mechanics of which will be discussed in Chapter IV (Downs 1957, 48).

European Parliament

Fieschi, Shields, and Woods address extreme right-wing parties in a setting naturally conducive to international comparative studies, the European Parliament (EP) (1996). As they show, the backdrop of the EP stretches the ideologies of the extreme-right to their breaking point. Their political entrepreneurs must double their propaganda
efforts in order to reconcile all of the contradictions exposed concerning the EU.

Despite the fact that several parties fit their conceptualization of the extreme-right, Fieschi, Shields, and Woods noted the absence of an effective network of extreme right-wing parties in the European Parliament (1996). Efforts to form an extreme-right coalition in the 1980s were thwarted by the parties' ideologies. As Fieschi, Shields, and Woods noted, "the problems over establishing the parliamentary group were an early indicator of the limits to cross-national co-operation between parties whose assertive nationalism was to the fore of their ideological platforms" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996, 235). This was coupled with a seemingly endless flow of intraparty conflicts back home (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996). Just as their relationships with each other were tense, so were their relationships to the remainder of the EP (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996).

The extreme-right's programs are confusing and "negative xenophobia remains its only real organizing principle" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996, 243). The extreme-right holds that EU policies will eventually "foreignize" Europe (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996 243).
To this end, the parties of the extreme-right have drafted resolutions to completely ban non-European immigration or at least halt the extension of suffrage to foreigners (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996). The extreme-right has also retreated to its "vague anti-capitalism" and the old battle cries of "welfare, falling birth-rates, and communism" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996 243).

The EP discloses the underlying hypocrisy of the extreme-right. It is hard to be "pro-European in principle" yet fight the EU in nationalistic language (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996 243). Fieschi, Shields, and Woods aptly call this dilemma "From a Europe under Threat to the Threat of Europe" (1996 247). Here, the extreme-right gets trapped by its instrumental "mythical, visionary Europe which informs the discourse of the extreme-right (and the) constant denunciation of the real Europe" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996 247). The lesson from all of this concerning the extreme-right is that "its political agenda is primarily a domestic one" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996 245)
Summary

From these case studies, several patterns present themselves. First, intraparty cooperation is crucial to extreme-right success. Second, a charismatic leader helps in several ways. He or she can reduce infighting within the party or family of parties. Also, a charismatic leader receives media coverage and instinctually knows when to seize the moment. Third, a party needs to have an agenda for the additional issues that they will face as they gain national recognition and scrutiny. A proportional representation electoral system will not necessarily give birth to the extreme-right. However, the absence of one, like in Britain, is a significant restraint. Also working within the electoral laws, extreme-right parties generally do better in secondary elections, except in Scandinavia. Sadly, illegal activity is anything but rare among the personalities that comprise the extreme-right.
Lawrence Mayer maintained that to be truly comparative, political science research must develop a theory addressing two or more nations (Mayer 1972). A decade later, Sigelman and Gadbois (1983) used this definition to examine the state of the field. They found that barely one third of published studies met with Mayer's criteria. "It is clear that a substantial portion, if not a majority, of the published research in comparative politics remains essentially non-comparative," according to Mayer (1989, 19). This chapter will review relevant theory driven comparative literature that meets with Mayer's criteria.

Research addressing the subject of extreme right-wing parties and their electoral support in Western Europe is not in short supply. However, none is without shortcomings. The researchers consider several themes, each struggling to construct an operationalizable definition of an extreme-right party. As an extension of
these conceptualizations, some authors offer categories, subdividing the extreme-right. The literature explores hypotheses proposed to explain the extreme-right, such as single-issue and protest voting. Each work probes the makeup of the extreme-right's electoral support in order to profile its electorate and gauge the success of the party platforms. Beyond the individual level-of-analysis, the literature probes the state level conditions and intraparty interactions effecting extreme-right success. Also, this body of research theorizes on extreme-right success through its relationships with other political phenomena, such as the new left and the interwar Fascists, offering propositions that consider the extreme-right as a reactionary outlet. The literature additionally explores the similarities and differences between the interwar Fascists and the contemporary extreme-right. Furthermore, several authors discuss the hypothesis that what exists today is merely the legacy of the interwar Fascists. This review will explore these themes and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the research.
Conceptualizing the Extreme-Right

In the early 1990s Hans-George Betz published several works proposing theories on Western Europe's emerging radical right (1993a, 1993b, 1994). All of his work has similar beliefs and appear to be inspired by one research agenda. Betz's research is among the most developed in this field in explaining "potentially the most dynamic, and disruptive, political phenomenon on the 1990s" (Betz 1994, 3). Throughout his work, Betz uses a consistent conceptualization of the extreme-right, which he addresses as "radical right-wing populist parties" (1993a, 1993b, 1994). He defines them as differing from mainstream parties in "their radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and sociopolitical system," ardent individualism, liberal economic views and an anti-statist stance (1993b, 664). Additionally, right-wing populist parties oppose "the social integration of marginalized groups and the extension of democratic rights to them" through a program of "xenophobia, if not overt racism" (Betz 1993b, 664). The parties instrumentally use an appeal to "anxiety (and) the allegedly superior common sense of the common people against the dominant cultural and political consensus" (1993b, 664). In sum, Betz's
radical right-wing populist parties "combine a classic liberal position on the individual and the economy with the sociopolitical agenda of the extreme and intellectual new right" (1993a, 414). This combination is then delivered to "those disenchanted with their individual life chances and the political system" (Betz 1993a, 414).

Herbert Kitschelt endeavored to provide a seminal contribution on the extreme-right with his study, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (1995). Kitschelt develops his definition of extreme-right based on two tests. The first is "whether a party's competitors perceive it to be located 'on the right' and not a viable coalition partner" (Kitschelt 1995, 49). This was operationalized using the Laver and Hunt (1992) data to determine the ideological left-right placement and party case studies in order to ascertain coalition history. Second, a researcher considers "when the party appeared on the political scene" (Kitschelt 1995, 49). In order to operationalize this, Kitschelt profited from case studies and used only parties "founded since the second half of the 1960s" (Kitschelt 1995, 49).

Weinberg initiates his inquiry by addressing the difficulties in defining what her terms the "Radical Right"
One trait of the members of the Radical Right is that "in the context of democratic politics, extreme of radical groups are ones that do not abide by the rules of the game" (Weinberg 1993, 5). They consider themselves above, or even below, the norms that "restrain other contestants for political power in democratic systems" (Weinberg 1993, 5). The Radical Right is also characterized by its closed-mindedness, marked by their "presumption that theirs is the one correct answer" (Weinberg 1993, 5). Several themes often employed by the Radical Right are nationalism, racism, "importance of ethnic, national, or racial group membership," favoring populism over democracy, and evocation of conspiracy theories (Weinberg 1993, 7). Weinberg notes two allegedly common threads among extreme-right parties that may or not be wholly correct: backwardness and anti-Semitism (Weinberg 1993, 6). Not all extreme-right parties "desire to turn the clock backward" (Weinberg 1993, 6). Also, the existence of an extreme-right party in Israel is sufficient cause to assume that not all parties of the extreme-right are anti-Semites (Weinberg 1993, 6).

For their study, Fieschi, Shields, and Woods develop a working definition of extreme-right based on a party's
stances on several issues (1996). If the parties "have a
view of society which is anti-liberal, anti-socialist, and
based on...ethnocentric nationalism," it has the roots of the
extreme-right (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996, 235).
Additionally, extreme-right parties are marked by a
rejection of "universal human rights" and a preference for
"hierarchical" and an "authoritarian state with
expansionist ambitions" (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996
235). Qualifying parties according to their definition
include the French Front National (FN, National Front),
Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social
Moment), and the German Republikaner (REP, Republican).
The Italian Lega Nord (LN, Northern League) was tentatively
included, because it is more of an anti-tax party and its
ethnocentrism is targeted against poorer Italians from the
South (Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996).

To forge his definition of extreme-right, Husbands
holds that one trait that "unites all of these parties is
their particular commitment to some sort of ethnic
exclusionism" (Husbands 1992, 268). This is directed at
non-European immigrants through an "aggressive nationalism
or localism" (Husbands 1992, 268). Other than this, the
parties of the extreme-right have numerous guises ",-thus,
some are indisputably more populist and less violently extremist than others" (Husbands 1992, 268). Husbands has simply included every party espousing xenophobia into the family of the extreme-right. I hold that that an ethnically rooted exclusionary view of citizenship serves well as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to extreme-right membership. Husbands neglects other issues around which extreme-right supporters rally.

To define the extreme-right, Ignazi (1992) develops a three-fold criterion. The first test is to see if the party is indeed the farthest on the right spatially. Ignazi reminds the reader that being ideologically far right is a necessary, but not sufficient, indicator of extreme-right status. Second, the party must share the basic ideology of Fascism. The third test is that the party must be attitudinally opposed to the political system in "principle" and have little respect for the "constitutional rules of the democratic regime" (Ignazi 1992, 12).

Ignazi's definition of the extreme-right is found wanting, because of its reliance on a relationship to fascist ideology. Even, Ignazi himself indicated in another work, the relationship between the interwar
fascists and the contemporary extreme-right is tenuous at best (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a). However, Ignazi’s use of disrespect for constitutional and traditional rules is appropriate, as shown in the case studies in Chapter Two.

Categories of the Extreme-Right

Kitschelt developed three categories of the modern extreme-right (1995). The first is the Master Case, or New Radical Right (NRR), which "is associated with both authoritarian and capitalist appeals" (Kitschelt 1995, 19). Since this appeals across social strata, it has consequential electoral potential, thus the designation "Master Case" (Kitschelt 1995, 19). This incarnation of the extreme-right profits from two salient political issues, which are "the revolt against higher taxes...and the rejection of immigrants" (Kitschelt 1995, 19). The Master Case will conflict with the new left in four main issue areas: gender, multicultural, environmental, and modes of political participation (Kitschelt 1995, 20).

Second, the extreme-right may also appear in a "Populist Antistatist" form whose "appeals are primarily against 'big government' and the 'political class' that dominates a country's politics through the conventional
parties" (Kitschelt 1995, 21). Because Populist Antistatist parties are less opposed to "libertarian themes," they "should not be lumped together with the NRR" (Kitschelt 1995, 21). Additionally, these parties "are also likely to attract a different and broader electorate than NRR parties" (Kitschelt 1995, 21).

Kitschelt’s last form of the contemporary extreme-right is the “Racist Authoritarian” or ”Welfare Chauvinist type” (Kitschelt 1995, 22). Careful not to alienate the lower classes, these “political entrepreneurs emphasize racist and authoritarian slogans but studiously stay away from an admiration of market-liberal capitalism” (Kitschelt 1995, 22). Additionally, Welfare Chauvinist parties put “stress on national symbols and historical reminiscences” (Kitschelt 1995, 22). The name Welfare Chauvinist is appropriate, because in their party platforms “the welfare state is presented as a system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt 1995, 22).

Weinberg also explores the differences among the extreme-right by proposing that the types are as numerous as the parties (1993). He holds that one cause of their diversity is that the extreme-right has no “sacred texts”
or "apparent body of thought" like its antagonist, the extreme-left (Weinberg 1993, 4). Also, too many parties get artificially placed under the extreme-right umbrella, despite the fact that "we are dealing with several rights" (Weinberg 1993, 4). Similarly, too many parties are wrongly labeled "Fascist" or "Neo-Fascist" (Weinberg 1993, 4). Weinberg frowns on these typologies because neither is properly defined and the substance is hardly "value neutral" (Weinberg 1993, 4). As seems inevitable, "there will be some variation based on unique national experiences" (Weinberg 1993, 8). I hold that nationally rooted differences will always exist between parties in a comparative study. The standards Weinberg requires to consider the extreme-right parties as a unit are too stringent.

Christopher Husbands writes about the difficulties in categorizing and thus researching the extreme-right (1992). In order to bring some order to the variance between the parties, Husbands creates four categories of the extreme-right (1992). The first is "Populist-Nationalist," which includes the FPO, the Danish Fremskridtspartiet (FP-D, Danish Progress Party), the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FP-N, Norwegian Progress party), Swedish My Demokrati (ND,
New Democracy), and the Italian Lega Lombarde (LL, Lombardy League) (Husbands 1992, 269). These ethnically confrontational parties concern themselves with other ethnic conflicts, like the strife in the former Yugoslavia, which is causing "a mass migration from there" (Husbands 1992, 270). The second of Husbands’s four groups is the "Neo-Fascists parties" (Husbands 1992, 273). According to Husbands, the French FN, the German REP, Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union), Nationaldemokratishe Partei (NDP, National Democratic Party), and the MSI are all examples of this category. For the third type, Husbands considers the Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB, Vlaams Bloc) the sole example of a "nationalist extreme-right party" (Husbands 1992, 279). The regional division within its state along the Flemish and Walloon ethnic territories designates this category of the extreme-right. The fourth and last of Husbands’s categories is the "traditional xenophobic party," as he characterizes the Swiss Democrats (1992, 281). The Swiss Democrats and its mother party, National Action, are both described as rooted in pure opposition to "the issue of asylum-seekers" (Husbands 1992, 281).
Some of Husbands’s findings are highly suspect. First, the failure to consider the Italian LN as the same category the Belgian VB appears to be an oversight. Also, his categorizations of several parties as single-issue phenomena flies in the face of other literature that persuasively exhibits that no extreme-right party is purely single-issue based (Kitschelt 1995; Betz 1994). As an extension of his use of the single-issue hypothesis, Husbands includes two parties from Switzerland rarely considered to be extreme-right elsewhere in the literature.

Individual Support for the Extreme-Right

Betz rejects the hypothesis that the extreme right’s support is purely a protest vote (1994). He lays down his opposing argument in three steps. First, Betz notes that extreme right supporters are not disinterested in politics. Second, he notes that the parties have a base of loyal voters, or they could not have endured. Third, Betz notes that there exists a “distinct ideological identity of the radical Right’s constituency” (1994, 63). Despite this well constructed theory, the data disproving the protest vote hypothesis are less than conclusive. To resolve this ambiguity in the literature, Betz observes a similarity
between the contemporary extreme-right and the interwar Fascists, both received some protest votes.

Kitschelt denounces two rival hypotheses explaining individual support for the extreme-right, single-issue and protest vote (1995). The single-issue politics hypothesis is conceivable, because of immigration as a catalyst issue. In the reality of Kitschelt's statistical tests, "support for such parties is rooted in broader right-authoritarian dispositions" (Kitschelt 1995, 276). As for protest politics, Kitschelt believes that this is nonsensical due to the fact that the extreme-right has support with "identifiable patterns" (Kitschelt 1995, 276).

Betz acknowledges that the shift from cleavage to issue voting is one of the factors contributing to the rise of the extreme-right (1994). The principle issues that concern extreme-right parties and their supporters are immigration, law, and order (Betz 1994). For this reason, Betz describes the extreme-right not completely but "largely the result of growing xenophobia in response to the increasingly visible presence of immigrants and refugees into Western Europe" (1994, 67). By "increasingly visible," Betz addresses the shift in the makeup of immigrants in Western Europe from predominately ethnic
Europeans to non-Europeans. This situation benefits political entrepreneurs who are able to "evoke, focus, and reinforce preexisting xenophobic sentiments for political gain" (Betz 1994, 81).

Concerning "the social bases" of the extreme-right's electoral support, Betz notes several patterns which reinforce his theory (1994, 141). First, men are disproportionately represented in the ranks of the extreme-right. Betz holds that this is because of males' traditional position in the workforce (1994). The fact that women are more religious and thus less willing to espouse the views of the extreme-right contributes to this (Betz 1994). Young people also tend to support extreme-right parties in disproportionate numbers (Betz 1994). Betz theorizes that in addition to their position in the workforce, young people are less attached to other parties. Employment in particular sectors was somewhat of an indicator (Betz 1994). Due to the anti-statist appeals of the extreme-right, public sector employees are underrepresented (Betz 1994). This is also due to the fact that women are overrepresented in public sector employment (Betz 1994). Class is a weak predictor, because the extreme-right platform draws from across social strata.
The liberal economic stance of the extreme-right attracts some middle-class independent business owners, while the xenophobic stance draws from the lower social strata (Betz 1994).

Hagtvet reconsiders three schools of theory on individual support for political parties in order to explain support for the extreme-right (1994). The first of these is "psychological explanations" (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Evoking the work of Theodor Adorno (1950), Hagtvet explains support for the extreme-right as emanating from individuals possessing "a tendency to think in terms of stereotypes and fixed categories" (1994, 242). The second group is "sociological explanations" (Hagtvet 1994, 243). This hypothesizes "that right-wing extremism and racist violence flourish in the lower strata of society during times of economic stagnation and rising unemployment" (Hagtvet 1994, 243). An exacerbating "sociological explanation" is the "increased influx of foreign minority groups" (Hagtvet 1994, 243). The third group of explanations addressing the contemporary extreme-right is "political and historical" (Hagtvet 1994, 243). These explanations hold that previous versions of the extreme-right performed best "in countries which had undergone a period of rapid modernization and
experienced a quick transformation of their social structures..." coupled with "economic crises" (Hagtvet 1994, 244).

Kitschelt explains electoral support for the extreme-right with postindustrialism, which creates a "limited but distinct demand for a combination of ethnocentric, authoritarian, and free market liberal appeals" (1995, 5). This develops an electorate not on the basis of "economic class, in the Marxian sense of property relations," but more on another variable, "market situation" (Kitschelt 1995, 5). Here, employees of internationally exposed sectors will oppose redistributive policies that they see as inefficient and burdensome (Kitschelt 1995). However, other workers, blue-collar, petit bourgeois, and lower salaried (even state workers) may constitute the extreme-right’s electorate. Individuals with losing market positions include manual workers with obsolete skills (Kitschelt 1995). It is for these reasons, that market position has supplanted class as an effective individual level-of-analysis predictor of extreme-right support.

Kitschelt did find some social factors other than market position to carry explanatory power (Kitschelt 1995). These are similar to the social cleavages developed
in Betz's (1994) work: age, sex, and gender. Theoretically, these common profiles of extreme-right voters represent a consensus in the literature. However, Kitschelt depends less on this profiling technique in developing his theory than does Betz. An example of Kitschelt's unique approaches is the evolution of intraparty politics as a level of analysis.

State and Party Support for the Extreme-Right

Again using the data of Laver and Hunt (1992), Kitschelt explores party organization as an explanatory variable of the extreme-right. One of the most striking results is that the "power gap between leaders and rank-and-file activists" is exceedingly distant for the parties of the extreme-right (Kitschelt 1995, 71). The power gap benefits extreme-right parties by allowing their leaders to seize the moment. How a political entrepreneur reacts to an opportunity "will draw different electoral coalitions and will have different 'yield ratios' within the electorate" (Kitschelt 1995, 18). The decisions of the extreme-right party elites will lead to "(1) different electoral constituencies and (2) different electoral payoffs" (Kitschelt 1995, 18). These two factors are what
yields Kitschelt's three categories of the contemporary extreme-right.

Like most political scientists, Betz addresses postindustrialism as a state-level cause for extreme-right support. Postindustrialism is held to "have had a profound impact on the work force" resulting in the "bifurcation of labor markets" (Betz 1994, 28). This leaves the society stratified into those with high quality jobs and those with "junk jobs" (Esping-Anderson 1990, 204). Postindustrialism is also held to be responsible for "the individualization of risks" (Betz 1994, 29) that has "left a sizeable portion of the population...in an increasingly precarious situation" (Betz 1994, 32).

Another residual consequence of postindustrialism that facilitated the rise of the extreme-right is "social fragmentation and political conflict" (Betz 1994, 33). This took place, according to Betz's (1994) theory, in four steps. First, the 1980's saw an increase in mass resentment and disenchantment. Second, traditional parties were not addressing new issues. Next, this provided the "window of opportunity" for the extreme right (Betz 1994, 35). And last, the immigration issue served as an "igniter" to acquire electoral support (Betz 1994, 35).
Kitschelt discusses the "supply of radical rightist parties" in his explanatory framework (1995, 13). Importantly, he notes that public demand for extreme-right parties is not a sufficient cause for their existence (Kitschelt 1995). The extreme-right parties’ "emergence depends on the strategic interactions of existing parties in the competitive system" (Kitschelt 1995, 14). One crucial ingredient in the recipe of a successful extreme-right party is a "convergence between moderate left and moderate right parties" (Kitschelt 1995, 53). This facilitates successful extreme-right parties in two ways. First, the slide toward the center will agitate "disaffection with moderate conservatives" (Kitschelt 1995, 14). Second, this situation facilitates the rise of radical left-libertarian parties, "a political provocation not adequately countered by the existing moderate conservatives" (Kitschelt 1995, 14). Kitschelt examined this proposition with the data of Laver and Hunt (1992). Kitschelt concluded that their data on party convergence "shows clearly" that this convergence enhances the extreme-right's opportunities. (1995, 56). This situation offers "political entrepreneurs...a chance to create a successful electoral coalition..." (Kitschelt 1995, 53) similar to the
"window of opportunity" for the extreme-right described by Betz (1994, 35).

As discussed in Chapter II, Britain serves as a test for the political space hypothesis. The primary impediment to the British extreme-right is that "the Conservative Party is co-opting its principal theme concerning immigration control" (Husbands 1992, 267). Although Husbands explores this as a single country study, one can generalize from his propositions. He has applied to Britain the left-right convergence hypothesis used elsewhere (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Kitschelt 1995). This serves as another confirmation why the left-right convergence hypothesis is widely accepted in the contemporary literature.

Ignazi and Ysmal agree with much of the literature in writing, "the landscape on the right side of the political spectrum has changed in the last decade" (1992a, 1). They hold that this change is a side effect of "four crucial changes in Western societies: (1) the general impact of neo-conservatism, (2) the higher tendency toward radicalization and polarization, (3) the legitimacy crisis of political and party systems, and (4) above all, the emergence of new issues such as immigration and law and
order not 'treated' by the established parties" (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1). This contributes to the body of literature, which sees the rise of the extreme-right as facilitated by postindustrialism, which is similarly defined.

Ignazi holds that "Western European party systems are facing a period of change...observable at two levels, electoral and partisan" (Ignazi 1992, 3). The electoral changes are rooted in "intraparty volatility" which is on the rise (Ignazi 1992, 3). Concerning partisan changes, dealignment is "enabling the emergence of new parties and/or new agencies for the aggregation of demands" (Ignazi 1992, 3). As illustrated in Chapter Two, such "intraparty volatility" may be either beneficial or deleterious to the extreme-right (Ignazi 1992, 3).

Relationship to the Extreme-Left

Betz addresses the hypothesis of the extreme-right's support as a reaction to the radical Left (1994). He acknowledges that this may be an alluring hypothesis. Betz notes that the new left, exemplified by Green parties, gets support from similarly unaligned young people (Betz 1994). However, Betz feels more strongly that the extreme-right
comes in too many forms to be explained as a mirror of the New Left. Betz believes that extreme-right support transcends simple left-right concerns. Its support is more likely responding to "more profound questions about individual and national identity" (1994, 182).

Contrarily, Kitschelt holds that "the New Radical Right...constitutes a mirror image of the and opposite political pole of a New Left" (1995, 2). While the New Left advocates "'leftist' income redistribution," the New Radical Right advocates "'rightist' free markets" (Kitschelt 1995, 2). Politically and culturally, the New Left is marked by "'libertarian' democratic participation and maximum individual autonomy," while the New Radical Right is marked by "'authoritarian' hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expressions" (Kitschelt 1995, 2). These two opposing orientations exhibit how "postindustrial politics is characterized by a main ideological cleavage dividing left-libertarians from right-authoritarians" (Kitschelt 1995, 2).

A characteristic of postindustrialism is a sharp increase in issue-voting and catch-all parties, which has caused a shift is party systems (Ignazi 1992). According
to Ignazi, there have been "three main outcomes: a higher electoral volatility, the rise of new parties and the decline of party as such" (Ignazi 1992, 4). All three of these shifts could theoretically facilitate the rise of extreme-right parties in Western Europe (Ignazi 1992). Therefore, the rise of the extreme-right should not have come as a surprise to analysts. However, Ignazi holds that the academic world was captivated by studies like that of Inglehart (1977), which "focuses on value change on the left pole of the political spectrum, omitting the right" (Ignazi 1992, 5).

By modifying both Inglehart's theory and book title (1977), Ignazi develops a theory called "the silent counter-revolution" (Ignazi 1992, 6). This theory holds that there exists a "cultural and political mood," not fully expressed "in the so-called neoconservatism" (Ignazi 1992, 6). This sentiment is marked by "new priorities and issues not treated by the established parties," overall partisan and political disaffection, "and a general pessimism about the future" (Ignazi 1992, 6). In this sense, Ignazi espouses the hypothesis that the extreme-right and extreme-left are both the "legitimate and the unwanted children of the New Politics" (Ignazi 1992, 6). A
“silent revolution” (Inglehart 1977) produced the Greens, whereas Ignazi theorizes that a “silent counter-revolution” yielded the extreme-right (Ignazi 1992).

Relationship to the Interwar Fascists

Betz holds that, although there are considerable differences, today’s radical right-wing populist parties are more closely linked to the interwar fascists than the extreme right-wing parties that emerged just after World War II (1993a, 1993b, 1994). He quotes Lipset, who held that Fascism grew out of a “revolt against modernity” (1981, 489). Betz believes that the contemporary extreme-right is a manifestation of a similar reaction (1993a, 1993b, 1994). Like the opportunistic interwar Fascists, Betz holds that the extreme-right profits from a “profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies” (1994, 27). As previously discussed, Betz exhibited that the contemporary extreme-right has been successful in forging an economically diverse coalition (Betz 1994). This catch-all tactic is another way that Betz parallels the contemporary extreme-right to the interwar fascists (Betz 1994).
Kitschelt expressed an alternative view on the contemporary extreme-right's relationship to the interwar fascists (1995). He believes that their divergent "structures", "origins", and "constituencies" divide them into different political categories (Kitschelt 1995, 3). Additionally, the contemporary extreme-right has had considerable success in countries lacking a history of interwar fascism (Kitschelt 1995). Lastly, whenever the contemporary extreme-right evokes the interwar fascists, it has a negative effect on their electoral success (Kitschelt 1995).

Bernt Hagtvet offers another perspective on the extreme-right's relationship to the interwar Fascists (1994). He acknowledges many parallels between the interwar fascists and the contemporary extreme-right, yet speculates that the "current debate on right-wing extremism may be excessively focused on the fascist experience of 50 years ago" (Hagtvet 1994, 245). Hagtvet notes that the contemporary extreme-right is lacking a crucial ingredient of interwar fascists: "an expansionist foreign policy" (Hagtvet 1994, 244). He prefers the explanation that "where the middle classes are feeble and where conservative
parties are weak or fragmented, that the threat from the extreme-right is most critical" (Hagtvet 1994, 245).

Despite his claim that history is not repeating itself, Hagtvet does consider nine similarities between the political landscapes of "contemporary European politics" and that of "Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s" (Hagtvet 1994, 241). First, today one sees a criticism "of representative government and the liberal, democratic values" that it stands for (Hagtvet 1994, 241). Second, this attack is rooted in populism "in the sense that they criticize the activities of elites" (Hagtvet 1994, 241). Third, instrumental evocation of national "history as particularly glorious" is widespread (Hagtvet 1994, 241). Fourth, extreme-right parties "are exclusive" along "ethnocentric(c)" and "racist" lines (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Fifth, the contemporary extreme-right is "informed by a cultural pessimism" about "modern society" (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Sixth, the issue of "law and order" is prevalent (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Seventh, and perhaps most disturbing, is the assessment of "violence as a creative, even a cleansing act" (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Eighth, the extreme-right finds its rhetorical niche by claiming "anti-communism and anti-liberalism alike" (Hagtvet 1994, 242). Last, Hagtvet holds
that the parties of the contemporary extreme-right "include an economic policy marked by state intervention and central planning" (1994, 242). This last parallel does not coincide with the platforms of most extreme-right parties.

Ignazi and Ysmal (1992a, 1992b) take a unique stance on the relationship between the modern extreme-right and historical Fascism. Ignazi and Ysmal hold that the contemporary extreme-right's electoral success is "inversely related to their relationship with fascism" (1992a, 1). By examining both the historical and contemporary case studies, Ignazi and Ysmal note that where contemporary extreme-right parties "are ideologically linked to the fascist experience they fail to grow; where they do not claim any heritage from fascism their growth displays a positive trend" (1992a, 1). This concurs with the findings of Kitschelt (1995) that revealed a similar pattern.

Summary

Betz's work is theoretically rich and offers the insight of an experienced and well-read expert. His definition of extreme right-wing parties is well refined and operationalizable, provided one understands the
detailed information contained in the party case studies. It serves as a notable contribution to the literature. However, his methodology is not equally admirable. He performs no tests of statistical significance on his hypotheses, opting for simpler measures. Also, his tenacious adherence to the similarities between the interwar Fascists and the contemporary extreme-right gets handily rejected elsewhere in the literature (Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b).

Herbert Kitschelt develops a capable theory explaining the success of the contemporary extreme-right in Western Europe based on three premises. First, postindustrial society must separate left-libertarians from right-authoritarians. Second, the major parties of the Left and the Right must converge in the political center. The extreme-right must profit from this situation and appeal to their potential electorate to complete the process.

Kitschelt's additional contributions to the study of the extreme-right in Western Europe are numerous. His three categories of the contemporary extreme-right help to resolve the differences among them and explain why generalizable theory in this field is so difficult. His operationalizations are constructive and allow future
researchers to deal with concepts like party convergence and power gaps between party elites and activists. Using factor analysis, Kitschelt is the sole researcher in this field to subject his propositions to rigorous quantitative tests.

Weinberg’s work is merely the introductory chapter for a series of case studies, and therefore presents no quantitative methodology to be critiqued. However, his theoretical contributions are appreciated. First, his analysis of the similarities and differences between the parties of the extreme right give rise to the possibility that there may not even be an extreme-right family of parties. Unfortunately, his definition of parties of extreme-right is hardly operationalizable, even with extremely detailed case studies. Other researchers conceptualized the extreme-right and did find evidence of a political species (Kitschelt 1995; Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996).

Hagtvet’s work in this field is weaker than that of his peers. The most harmful omission in his work is not developing a succinct definition of the extreme-right. His theory claims that one should not overstate the similarities between the interwar Fascists and the
contemporary extreme-right, yet he lists similarities that outnumber the differences three to one. His claiming that the parties comprising the extreme-right favor economic "state intervention and central planning" shows profound knowledge of relevant party platforms. However, Hagtvet offers few testable hypotheses, none of which he addresses statistically.

Husbands's work is not a potent example of the literature on the success of the extreme-right. His definition and categories are heavily artificial and scarcely operationalizable. These factors explain why he did not attempt to develop any statistical tests of his propositions. However, his insights exploring the explanatory variables which have rendered the extreme-right "a contagion from which Great Britain has apparently been surprisingly immune" were beneficial (Husbands 1992, 267).

Several consensus and unresolved issues emerge from this theoretically driven literature. What constitutes an extreme-right party is never clearly defined. The authors use definitions best suited to their analyses. True generalizable theory-building cannot take place until this issue is resolved. The contemporary extreme-right as the legacy of the interwar Fascists hypothesis appears to have
been disproved. The literature voiding this hypothesis is more compelling than that which perpetuates it. However, this does not mean that the political entrepreneurs of the extreme-right will not evoke images of the powerful interwar Fascists in their unscrupulous use of mythical symbols. Similarly, hypotheses holding that extreme-right electoral support is a protest or single-issue vote are handily overturned by consensus in the literature.

Unfortunately, despite invalidating several rival hypotheses, no single model emerges. To this end, I have attempted to develop a theoretical framework explaining the rise of the contemporary extreme-right that is both generalizable and quantitatively testable in the following chapter. This framework profits from an appropriate conceptualization of the extreme-right. Additionally, I develop a model addressing the electoral success of the extreme-right, which benefits of multiple levels-of-analysis.
CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS

The literature review has shown that researchers grappled with defining the extreme-right and used many variables and varying levels-of-analysis to explain its electoral success. I endeavor to expand on their efforts and improve the quality of research on this topic. My model is testable cross-nationally. I maintain generalizability as an objective but will not abandon the accuracy or the practical applicability of this work. My goal is to expand understanding about why the extreme-right has had such electoral success as the twentieth century closes.

In this chapter, I incorporate existing work in the field with my own propositions addressing the contemporary extreme-right in Western Europe. I use varying levels-of-analysis, which will reflect the real world interactions of modern politics. From this model, I derive several testable hypotheses. Then, I explain how I intend to operationalize each of the variables employed in the
hypotheses. To initiate my theoretical construct, I clarify my use of the term "extreme-right."

Conceptualizing The Extreme-Right

No consensual definition of extreme-right emerged from the literature. Each researcher used his or her own operationalizable definition in order to make cross-national comparisons (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Hagtvet 1994; Husbands 1992; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996; Ignazi 1992, Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b; Kitschelt 1995; Weinberg 1983). Therefore, I develop my own operationalizable definition that profits from a synthesis of definitions utilized in previous research. I then apply this definition to parties in countries relevant to this study. My definition derives two criteria to determine if a party is a member of the extreme-right. First will be actual placement of the party on the political right. The second is the absence of coalitions with mainstream parties.

First and foremost, extreme-right parties should situate themselves on the far right of a country's political spectrum. Fieschi, Shields, and Woods (1996) and Kitschelt (1995) used similar techniques in the literature,
although the issues they used as litmus tests differed. To this end, I use the data of Laver and Hunt (1992), as did Kitschelt (1995) in his operationalization of extreme-right. The Laver and Hunt (1992) survey was conducted in 1989 by asking political scientists to rate parties in their countries on a host of issues. The data make use of a zero to 20-point scale, with zero being complete party disapproval and 20 being complete party approval for the particular issue in question. I define extreme-right as being farthest right on at least two of three issues that capture pivotal aspects of the extreme-right’s appeal. The first is the party’s stance on privatization to capture the free-market leanings of the extreme-right. The second issue is cutting taxes, to show their anti-statist views. Last, to exhibit the moral conservatism of the extreme-right, I use their variable determining if a party is against social liberalism. As seen in table two, six parties are farther right than their competitors on at least two of the three issues relevant to the extreme-right. The only exceptions are the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO Austrian Freedom Party), which was bested by Austrian People’s Party on the social permissiveness variable and the Nationaldemokratische Partei (NPD, German
National Democratic Party) who were exceeded by the Christian Democratic Union on the tax issue. I should note that the German Republikaner (REP, Republican) and the Italian Lega Norda (LN, Northern League) were not included in the Laver and Hunt surveys. However, case studies on these two parties assure analysts that they are far right on major issues. Therefore, I continue to include them in my analysis.

Table 1 - Extreme-Right Parties' Placement on Issues Relative to Next Farthest Right Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>FP-D</th>
<th>FP-N</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>FPO</th>
<th>NDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatize</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>+3.3</td>
<td>+3.3</td>
<td>+4.5</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Taxes</td>
<td>+4.0</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
<td>+4.1</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>-.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>+4.9</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>+1.2</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laver and Hunt (1992), appendix

Another important aspect of being a member of the extreme-right is that the mainstream political parties do not consider them "a viable coalition partner" (Kitschelt 1995, 49). Kitschelt (1995) used this criterion as a test to determine extreme-right membership. None of the parties in table two, along with the RBP and LN, have ever been
invited to join a coalition with any party other than each other. This is crucial, because when extreme-right electoral support is high, the room left to form coalitions is squeezed tightly. Despite this temptation, the mainstream conservatives appraise these parties too fanatical. This allows a researcher to consider the expertise of local conservative politicians who consider these parties too "extreme," which is an advisable and crucial threshold to define the extreme-right.

Eight representatives of the extreme-right fit the criteria of my conceptualization: the French FN, the German REP and ND, the Italian MSI and LN, the Danish FP, the Norwegian FP, and the Austrian FPO. This list is used in determining support for the extreme-right, regardless of the level-of-analysis. For a national level-of-analysis, I operationalize support for the extreme-right as the average electoral success of these parties in nationwide elections as percent of vote. In order to operationalize individual level-of-analysis variables, I profit from the World Values Survey (WVS).

The WVS makes it possible to operationalize the dependent and independent individual level-of-analysis variables, a summary of which with coding is found in
Tables Seven and Eight. The variable measuring the respondent's first party preference serves my creation of a dependent variable. This survey question comprises a list of potential parties for the respective country, from which the respondent chooses his or her first preference. I recoded these on a country by country basis, because there existed little consistency from one country's coding to the next. First, I separated those expressing a preference for any party from those who had no preference. This meant declaring missing all those who have no preference, who would not vote, who did not know, and who were ineligible. I then created a new variable, which is a dichotomous variable. This new variable measures if a respondent would not vote for the extreme-right, or if he or she would vote for one of the parties fitting my definition of extreme-right.

State Level

Now that I have operationalized my dependent variable, I examine three state-level factors that I hypothesize to contribute as necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for extreme-right success. The first of these, postindustrialism, is a level of economic development which
precludes the success of the extreme-right. The second, electoral systems, is a critical factor in determining the success of extreme-right parties. The third factor, political space, is a state level variable that addresses the supply-side of the extreme-right.

Postindustrialism

Since World War II, Western Europe has performed an economic miracle with its transition from a state of war torn rubble, through industrial redevelopment, into postindustrialism. The continent has accumulated vast wealth and has even developed some of the most generous and comprehensive public service systems in the world. This has led to the maturation of postindustrial societies. Postindustrialism involves shifts in the very fabric of society. First, different employment sectors come to offer more jobs while other sectors lose ground as employment opportunities. Service and public sector employment begin to offer better opportunities, while industrial jobs become more and more rare. Education begins to usurp the willingness to work hard and a strong back as the crucial characteristic in determining an individual’s employability.
Other side effects of postindustrialism are crucial in explaining the rise of the extreme-right. Dealignment from traditional parties is widespread, "producing increased fragmentation and fractionalization in most Western party systems" (Dalton 1996, 10). Two successive variables explain this best. One, new concerns have come to dominate issue agendas in the West. And two, mainstream parties sometimes fail to sufficiently address these issues. The minds of voters are evolving, as "issues are becoming a more important basis of voting behavior as the influence of traditional group and party allegiances wanes" (Dalton 1996, 10). Cynicism dominates the political orientations of many postindustrial citizens, exhibited by a "decline in trust of political elites and institutions" (Dalton 1996, 11).

These conditions swept in by postindustrialism are necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for the extreme-right to attain electoral success. According to Kitschelt, "postindustrial politics generate a limited but distinct demand for a combination of ethnocentric, authoritarian, and free market liberal appeals," which the extreme-right tries to satisfy (1995, 4). Postindustrialism, like any economic evolution, generates winners and losers. The
losers in this case are primarily manual workers whose 
skills become increasingly obsolete. These losers provide 
the extreme-right a degree of popular support among the 
electorate. The potential voices in the masses, the 
declining loyalty to established parties, and new issues 
were the primary beneficiaries of the New Left (Inglehart 
1977). Postindustrialism’s double-edged sword is also the 
fertile ground for the extreme-right.

Electoral Systems

It is perplexing to fully understand the impact of 
electoral laws, because “the study of electoral systems is 
undoubtedly the most underdeveloped subject in political 
science” (Lijphart 1985, 3). This is indisputably ironic, 
considering that electoral systems are the rules governing 
the game that political scientists attempt to explain. 
Indeed, electoral systems are “the most specific 
manipulative instrument of politics” (Sartori 1968, 273). 
Yet, there remains little systematic understanding of 
political systems as both a result of and as an influence 
on political systems. All citizens of democracies must 
live with the effects of electoral laws, yet the power to 
manipulate them rests primarily among elites (Lijphart
1990). We have gained only a vague understanding of this ubiquitous aspect of politics, best encapsulated by Duverger.

Duverger’s law describes the relationship between electoral systems and the party structures they create. Though nearly half a century old, Duverger’s law is still widely considered a “sociological law” (Duverger 1963, 239). The essence of the law states that proportional representation systems lead to the formation of a multi-party system while plurality systems tend to produce a two-party system. Theoretically, proportional representation systems would provide a better opportunity structure for small, new parties, like those of the extreme-right.

Duverger’s law offers two reasons explaining why parties like those of the extreme-right lose votes under plurality systems. The first reason is a “mechanical effect.” This is the process by which a party may receive 49.9% of the vote, yet have no representation in governmental bodies. The second reason is a “psychological factor,” which is the desire of a voter to maximize his or her vote. In vernacular phrasing, casting a vote for a party that has a small chance of achieving representation is known as “wasting a vote.” Downs called this thought
process "sophisticated voting" (1957, 48). Sophisticated voting injures the electoral prospects for more fringe parties, because an individual's party preference is tempered by "whether this party has any chance of winning" (Downs 1957, 48). However, this ignores another sophisticated use of a vote, as an outlet for protest.

Sophisticated voting neglects to take into account individuals who are unhappy with mainstream politics and its parties. These individuals see a party that has strong electoral prospects as part of the problem. Such protest voters use their votes to send a message to their political bodies in the absence of a physical representative.

Analysts such as Kitschelt propose other reasons for doubting the effects of Duverger's law on the extreme-right. He believes that there exists "only a modest correlation between electoral laws and the strength of the extreme-right in Europe" (Kitschelt 1995, 58). Electoral laws undoubtedly hamper the prospects of the extreme-right in plurality systems, however Kitschelt held that they "do not provide a convincingly complete explanation for the weakness of the British extreme-right" (1995, 245). Rather, a more likely deterrent to supporting the National Front or British National Party is that the Conservatives
usurp them on issues. This is the battle for political space, which will be my third state level variable explaining extreme-right success.

I do not find Kitschelt's arguments against the power of electoral systems too compelling. He argues that since "countries with systems of proportional representation display rather starkly contrasting rightist party performance," electoral systems "explain very little about the dynamics of competition" (Kitschelt 1995, 60). Explaining the varying degrees of support for the extreme-right among countries with proportional representation demands too much of Duverger's law. My theoretical construct holds that a proportional representation system is far from the sole contributing factor to extreme-right success. However, for a party of the extreme-right to gain a foothold in the political arena, a plurality system offers a nearly insurmountable impediment. Therefore, I hold that the absence of a plurality system, like the presence of postindustrialism, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for extreme-right electoral success.

For a contemporary example of the role of electoral systems in extreme-right politics, one need look no farther than France. In his quest to eradicate the French
political landscape of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front, President Jacques Chirac proposed doing away with proportional voting system. This illustrates Sartori's description of electoral system's as "the most specific manipulative instrument of politics" (1968, 273). Chirac has other options available to lower the electoral returns of the National Front. He could pull his fellow conservatives to the right, thus collapsing the extreme-right's political space. Modifying the electoral system to reduce proportionality is inherently undemocratic, yet there is no mass disapproval of Chirac's proposition. This illustrates the validity of Lijphart's observation that electoral systems are the domain of elites (1990).

Political Space

As was discussed in the portrayal of postindustrialism, often traditional parties fail to timely address new issues. This provides a "window of opportunity" for new parties to gain ground in the race for votes (Betz 1994, 35). Kitschelt examined this "supply side" of extreme-right politics. He noted that the mainstream right attempts to usurp the extreme-right on certain issues by occupying the political space right of
center. If the mainstream conservatives slip toward the
center in their pursuit of votes, the opportunity exists
for extreme-right political entrepreneurs to make electoral
gains. This means that a convergence towards the center by
the mainstream parties provides political space, which is a
necessary condition for the extreme-right.

In order to probe this proposition, I must
operationalize the concept of "convergence on the center"
by the "mainstream political parties." To this end, I use
the data of Laver and Hunt (1992). Since these data
represent the behavior of the parties in the 1980s, I
operationalize "extreme-right electoral success" as their
average share of the vote in each country for elections in
the 1980s. Table Six in the appendix shows the values for
these two variables for the countries used in Kitschelt's
study. Table Three exhibits the results of bivariate
correlation between the two measures.

The correlation is statistically significant and in
the expected direction. It seems that adequate space at
the right of a country's political landscape is a third
necessary condition to extreme-right electoral success.
However, the first correlation contained Britain.
According to my theoretical explanation, the British
extreme-right is already disadvantaged by not having a previously theorized necessary condition, the absence of a plurality system. This would make its electoral system a spurious cause for the relationship observed between its political space and the electoral success of its extreme-right. As the results in parenthesis show, the relationship remains significant, although less so excluding Britain.

Table 2 - Bivariate Correlation: Political Space (L-R Diff) and Extreme-Right Electoral Success (E-R Vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L-R Diff</th>
<th>E-R Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-R Diff</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.726(-.680)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-R Vote</td>
<td>-.726(-.680)*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-R Diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>.006(.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-Tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-R Vote</td>
<td>.006(.015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-Tailed)

My model on the state-level variables effecting the success of the extreme-right consisted of three components. First, for the extreme-right to flourish, a country must have developed a postindustrial economy. Next, the absence of a plurality electoral system greatly enhances the extreme-right’s opportunity to make electoral gains. Last,
the mainstream parties must not have diverged so far from
the center that they infringe on the political space of the
far right. If any one of these conditions is not met, the
 chances for the political entrepreneurs of the extreme-
right to take their message to the people are greatly
reduced. On the other hand, the presence of all three
conditions does not guarantee the extreme-right electoral
success. That is why I consider these conditions as
necessary, but not sufficient for extreme-right electoral
success. For an extreme-right party to succeed, it forges
an electoral coalition. This brings me to my second level
of analysis, the individual.

Individual Level

The state level-of-analysis offers a glimpse into the
supply side of extreme-right politics. The individual
level-of-analysis allows exploration of the demand side.
Here, I put forth a theoretical model on the demand for
these parties. This model will explore individual voting
behavior and from it I will derive several hypotheses.
Gender

Cross-national researchers of the extreme-right note that males are more prone to be among its supporters than females (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Hagtvet 1994; Husbands 1992; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996; Ignazi 1992, Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b; Kitschelt 1995; Weinberg 1983). This remains true despite the rise of issue voting as a replacement for traditional cleavages, one of which is gender (Dalton 1996). Gender serves as a weak predictor for mainstream parties, but I hypothesize that this is not the case for the extreme-right. This occurs for a host of reasons. The first is rooted in employment evolution in postindustrial societies.

Previous research concludes that males constitute a disproportional amount of those with decreased opportunities in postindustrial employment opportunities (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Dalton 1996; Kitschelt 1995). Male dominance of the industrial sector throughout the days of heavy industry is now mirrored by their dwindling ranks in postindustrial employment, like the public and service sectors. Female dominated document processing jobs have evolved from second class in comparison to industrial jobs to become much more secure and plentiful employment.
prospects (Kitschelt 1993). Seizing this opportunity, the extreme-right actively seeks male votes by evoking their appeals for higher employment prospects. In addition to different job market positions, gender will effect an individual's stance on issues.

Theoretically, the distasteful message of the extreme-right should turn away many female voters. Being no strangers to discrimination, females may additionally feel empathy for the objects of the extreme-right's venom. Furthermore and more directly, the retrospective view of the family will undoubtedly alienate women (Mayer 1991, 116). Concerning these issues, I theorize that the extreme-right is repelling women as well as attracting men. This, coupled with aspects of postindustrialism discussed above, leads me to hypothesize that:

\[ H_1: \text{Males are more likely to support the extreme-right than females.} \]

In order to operationalize this independent variable, gender of extreme-right supporters, I make use of the WVS. I use the gender variable, which in the original data and used one for males and two for females. I renamed the variable "gender" and recoded the females to zero. These changes allow me to recall the variable more easily and to
look for a positive relationship between "gender" and my dependent variable. Having a dichotomous variable will also facilitate interpreting this variable's discrete change in probit analysis.

Age

According to the comparative literature on supporters of the extreme-right, they are generally young (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Hagtvet 1994; Husbands 1992; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996; Ignazi 1992, Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b; Kitschelt 1995; Weinberg 1983). Youth increases an individual's tendency to vote for the extreme-right in two ways. The first of these, like gender, is a side effect of market position. The second derives from studies holding that young people are not yet politically aligned (Franklin 1992; Inglehart 1977).

Young people who have little work experience often have difficulties in finding employment. Unemployment rates for young Europeans who have just completed their education, especially if that education was not taken to advanced levels, is disproportional to elder groups. When these young people cease to be unemployed, they are often underemployed. Among the young who are benefiting from
postindustrial jobs, most are women (Kitschelt 1993). This creates a vacuum of young men with decent job prospects. Dissatisfaction and uneasiness accompany this, conditions from which the entrepreneurs of the extreme-right may profit.

Inglehart noted that young people are not yet aligned with an established political party (1977). He observed how this created disproportional ranks of young people among the supporters of the new left. It has also been shown that young people are much more receptive to changes in the political climate (Franklin 1992). For these same reasons, youth will lend an individual more susceptible to the message of the extreme-right. The youth of the Left often feel that they must fight other generations that are creating situations detrimental to their future world. In the Left's case, these are environmentalism and social equality issues. The young supporters of the extreme-right also feel that older generations are tampering with their future world. Unfortunately, their concerns are notably less idealistic. I theorize that concern over growing numbers of immigrants, swelling welfare rolls, and general de-Europeization of the continent are the evolutionary
issues which concern the youth who support the extreme-right. For these reasons, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_2: \text{Younger individuals are more likely to support the extreme-right.} \]

To operationalize the age of the individual, I use the categorical age variable in the WVS. This is an ordinal variable that divides individuals into six age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and over 65 years old. Those who refused to answer are coded as missing. The value of the variable increases with age, so I hypothesize a negative relationship with my dependent variable.

Socio-Economic Status

Perhaps one of the more controversial topics in the literature is the predictive value of the socio-economic status of an individual. I agree with analysts who hold that the extreme-right has made efforts to appeal across class lines (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Kitschelt 1995). Among their ranks are undoubtedly some middle-class and petit bourgeoisie such as shopkeepers and small business owners. However, I believe that those of lower socio-economic strata will be at least overrepresented among the supporters of the extreme-right. Compared to gender and
age, socio-economic status will probably be a weak predictor of extreme-right support. The extreme-right platforms have not alienated along social strata lines the way they have along gender lines. Also, the extreme-right has not actively pursued the "poor" as much as they have the "insecure," a predicament rarely captured empirically (Peters 1988).

As Kitschelt noted, few surveys capture the most crucial factor determining winners versus losers in postindustrial societies, private versus public employment (1995). This problem is rooted in the fact that "the increasing complexity of the economic and social systems of industrial societies makes it difficult to determine who is employed in the public sector and who is not" (Peters 1988, 184). With this in mind, any attempt to develop a pure public versus private employment variable would be empirically untestable, although theoretically rich. In sum, I believe that the extreme-right still appeals to lower strata with its message of decreased competition for employment more than its other appeals may entice other social strata.

\[ H_1: \text{Individuals of lower socio-economic strata are more likely to support the extreme-right.} \]
To operationalize socio-economic status, I use the class variable in the WVS. This is an appropriate and well-constructed variable for several reasons. First, it is interviewer coded, to avoid the measurement error so common when asking respondents to describe their own socio-economic status. Second, it combines several crucial aspects of individuals that have considerable bearing on extreme-right support. It avoids pure income as a measure, since that is crude and does not capture job security or sector.

The variable's four categories adequately divide the winners from the losers of postindustrialism (Dalton 1996). The more manual a career, the more threatened it will be to foreign competition, and thus less secure. The same will hold true for less skilled employment, which is most threatened in a postindustrial society (Kitschelt 1995). The political entrepreneurs of the extreme-right will find greater support among those with trepidations about their futures, especially from those already suffering in the postindustrial transition.
Nationalism

Analysts in this field agree that immigration is a serious issue for Europeans, regardless of extreme-right political entrepreneurs exacerbating the problem (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Hagtvet 1994; Husbands 1992; Fieschi, Shields, and Woods 1996; Ignazi 1992, Ignazi and Ysmal 1992a, 1992b; Kitschelt 1995; Weinberg 1983). Betz believes that "the question of immigration has become one of the most significant social and political issues in a growing number of West European Countries" (1994, 69). Due to the horrific events of recent West European history, "xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and racism were largely driven underground" (Betz 1994, 70). However during the economic crises of the 1960s and 1970s, these darker attitudes resurfaced, as "increasing unemployment and social marginalization caused a wave of resentment toward foreign workers" (Betz 1994, 71). Unlike in today's political climate, the mainstream parties of the 1970s took quick action to curb immigration. This appropriation of a catalyzing issue for the extreme-right is not being replicated today. This serves to validate the hypothesis that unresponsive governments are strikingly responsible for the rise of the contemporary extreme-right. However,
it would be premature to hold the mainstream parties' inaction as wholly responsible for the failure to prevent the extreme right from harnessing this issue.

Contributing to the relevance of this issue is the constitution and size of the influx, as "the populations of immigrant origin have become larger and more diverse" (Brubaker 1996, 172). The increasing numbers of non-EU immigrants have undoubtedly been fodder for extreme-right political entrepreneurs. Physical appearances "make recognition at a distance, or in a fleeting instance, possible" (Nash, 25). This is a disadvantage for the non-EU immigrants "whose physical differences make an impression beyond their number" (Betz 1994, 81). With the issue of the ethnic makeup of the contemporary immigrants on the agenda, the desire to curb their numbers ceases to be purely economic. Many Europeans fear that this wave of immigration will have longer term costs than are presently being considered, because this type of immigration "threatens self-perceptions of European nations" (Hammer 1989, 633). Survey data have also shown that Europeans relate the presence of immigrants with increasing crime rates (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Perrineau 1988a, 1988b). All of these conditions have culminated in a personal
condemnation of immigrant populations among many Western Europeans. I believe that this disapproval will be heavily concentrated among the supporters of the extreme-right. For this reason, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_4: \text{Supporters of the extreme-right are more likely to be personally intolerant of immigrants than other Europeans.} \]

In operationalizing this hypothesis, I make use of an appropriate variable from the WVS that captures personal distaste for immigrants. This variable asks respondents if they would approve or disapprove of immigrants as neighbors. This variable captures negative sentiment on the part of the respondent regarding immigrants and foreign workers. The variable also reflects heightened anxieties about the presence of immigrants and stresses the personal aspect of these concerns. Each respondent is asked to list types of people that he or she would not want as neighbors. Then, the variable is coded one for mentioning "immigrants / foreign workers" or two if the respondent fails to specify them. I recoded the value two as zero, so that the variable would be a dichotomous variable and the expected direction of the relationship will be positive. This aids in interpreting the variable’s effect on the probability
that an individual will support the extreme-right in statistical analysis.

In addition to personal distaste for immigrants, the disturbance may the result from national level sentiment. Without doubts, many Europeans will react negatively to the push from certain elites to be one with all peoples within an ethnically heterogeneous physical area (McNeill 1986). Weinberg described this "intense nationalism" as "the overriding importance of ethnic, national, or racial group membership" (1993 7). This nationalism evokes fear of the "Africanization" of Europe, which is in the cache of the extreme-right’s propaganda (Chesnais 1993). By behaving Nationalistically, individuals take a defensive posture of what they feel is theirs to keep, not redistributed by a democratic mechanisms that have trouble delineating between citizens and non-citizens (Dahl 1989). Therefore, I believe that those individuals who feel heightened attachments to their nations will seek representation in the form of the political extreme-right.

Hₜ: Nationalist individuals are more likely to be a supporter of the extreme-right.

In order to operationalize this variable, I use the variable addressing an individual’s nationalism in the WVS.
In this question, the interviewer asks the respondent, "How proud are you to be (National)?" The responses are coded one for "very proud," two for "quite proud," three for "not very proud," and four for "not proud at all." Those unable or unwilling to respond were coded missing. This variable is a direct measure of nationalism. Because of the coding of the variable, the relationship must be negative and significant to confirm my hypothesis.

Without doubt, some support for the extreme-right must be grounded in individuals who are responding to one of life's cruelest realities: scarcity. Many researchers have found support for the competition component of extreme-right support by noting that it gains electoral support in regions with disproportionate figures of immigrant workers (Betz 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Perrineau 1988a, 1988b). The extreme-right has seen its lower-class support swell, so its proportion of supporters with more direct competition for lower paying jobs has equally grown (Betz 1994). There exists no statistical evidence that confirms that immigrants take job opportunities from nationals. This, of course, makes no difference if the prospective supporters of the extreme-right believe that these immigrant populations displace them in the labor market. These
individuals will undoubtedly seek protection. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_6: \text{Supporters of the extreme-right are more likely to support efforts to allocate jobs to nationals over immigrants.} \]

To operationalize this variable, I profit from a WVS Variable that captures attitudes on this policy. This variable poses this proposition to the respondent: "When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (Nation's) citizens other than immigrants." Then the respondent is asked whether he or she agrees (coded one), would consider the policy (coded two), or disagrees (coded three). All those without an opinion or who otherwise do not know are coded as missing. This variable captures the essence of my hypothesis in a direct manner. Because those disagreeing with such policies are coded higher than those agreeing are, the relationship must be negative and statistically significant to confirm my hypothesis.

Feminism

Along with the nostalgia of a Europe with notably less non-Europeans, I believe that supporters of the extreme-right have a retrospective view of social relationships. I theorize that along with a longing for the mythical days of
an ethnically pure Europe, the supporters of the extreme-right will equally long for "traditional forms of obedience and social submission" (Hagtvet 1994, 242). As was illustrated under my theoretical propositions on gender and socio-economic status, women are progressing with much greater intensity in postindustrial economics than during the industrial age. Additionally, women are now in a role new to the men of Europe, competition for scarce goods, like jobs. I believe that the rationalization of an extreme-right supporter leads him or her to believe that immigrants are competition and that the Europe of the past was a better place than today. For these reasons I believe that supporters of the extreme-right will be opposed to progressive social movements, epitomized by the women's movement. The women's movement "has played a major role in the achievement of significant social change" (Gelb 1989, 2). Drawing upon this theoretical argument, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_0: \text{Individuals less tolerant of the women's movement are more probable to be among the supporters of the extreme-right} \]

In order to operationalize this variable, I use the World Values question that gauges the respondents' views
this particular social movement. In posing the question, the interviewer states, "There are several groups and movements looking for public support. For each of the following movements that I read out, can you tell me whether you approve or disapprove of this movement?" Then, the respondent chooses from among four choices to describe how he or she feels about the "women's movement": approve strongly (coded one), approve somewhat (two), disapprove somewhat (three), and disapprove strongly (four). Since disapproval of the women's movement is coded with a higher value than approval, the variable must have a statistically significant positive relationship to confirm my hypothesis.

**Free Market and the State**

The state's intrusion into the day to day lives of Europeans is another side effect of postindustrialism. Kitschelt (1995) cited the work of Hibbs and Madsen (1980) who found that tax increases that start to scrape away from middle class households are very likely to foster revolt. First off, the state will be seen as failing in its duty to maintain sovereignty. This will be seen in the omnipresence of immigrants. Also, the state is the largest single employer in all industrialized societies. This
status as employer makes the state a target for those who it sees as unemployable, namely the losers of postindustrialism. Also, those not approving of feminism can only act with their voices and thoughts due to restrictive civil rights laws handed down by the state. As seen in the discussion of political space. The state is run by mainstream political parities that are often slow to address the issues of concern to the extreme-right. In these countries, the extreme-right will have greater success and a proportional distaste for the state. Kitschelt held, as do I, that this populism will culminate in a preference for market allocation of resources, not political redistribution (1995, 1-2). Following this line of theoretical argument, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_6: \text{Those favorable to a reduction in the role of the state will be overrepresented among the supporters of the extreme-right} \]

In operationalizing this variable, I utilize a variable in the WVS that gauges a respondent’s attitude towards the state’s role in their society. The interviewer tells the respondent that he or she will be given two opposing views, both located at the poles of a 10-point scale. The respondent is to place him or herself anywhere along the scale at the point that best reflects his or her
views. To measure the respondent’s stance on the value of a free market economy, the two poles are labeled “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” at one end of the scale. On the other end, one is offered “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.” Because support for a free market is located on the lower end of this continuum, I expect a negative relationship with my dependent variable, support for the extreme-right.
CHAPTER V

STATISTICAL PROCEDURES AND INTERPRETATIONS

The World Values Survey was "designed to enable crossnational comparisons of values and norms" in 45 countries (World Values Survey Group 1994). Of course, the scope of this research will include only a fraction of these countries. The World Values Study Group performed the survey in two waves, one from 1981-1984 and another from 1990-1993. This study will use only data from the second round for two reasons. First, the initial round neglected to offer extreme-right parties as choices in the vote intention question in several relevant countries. Second, several issue questions, such as attitudes about immigrants and nationalism, were neglected in the 1981-1984 surveys. The second survey includes all relevant variables and is a better reflection of contemporary attitudes.

Many researchers use the Eurobarometer for studies such as this. However, for the present analysis, the Eurobarometer falls short on two counts. First, precious few rounds of the Eurobarometer offer extreme-right parties
as single choices. Therefore, the extreme-right's supporters are cornered into choosing "other" or simply an offered party. Neither option facilitates this research. Second, the Eurobarometer does not include Austria, without which any study of European extreme-right politics would be incomplete. For these reasons, I maintain that the World Values Survey is the most appropriate data to empirically test the propositions put forth in this study.

Bivariate Statistics

Bivariate statistics assess the strength of the relationship between two variables. With large survey data such as these, analysts can test propositions, thus making statistical inferences. One must consider the properties of the data and individual variables when choosing an appropriate bivariate statistical procedure. The type of variables is a crucial determinant in deciding on a suitable statistical test. My dependent variable is nominal, to support or not support the extreme-right. All of my independent variables are ordinal, except for the gender variable, which is nominal. This would exclude the possibility of calculating a Pearson's R using any of my variables. Pearson's R requires interval or ratio
variables that are easily quantified. An appropriate test is the Chi-Squared ($x^2$).

Using a calculation comparing observed frequencies to expected frequencies for cells in a table, $x^2$ determines if a statistically significant relationship exists between two variables. For each hypothesis, I will calculate $x^2$ and discuss its implications. The results of these calculations are encapsulated in table 9 of the appendix. The critical values for $x^2$ are attached as table 10. Before proceeding to the statistical tests, I will discuss my dependent variable.

For theoretical reasons previously discussed, my data include respondents from six countries: France, West Germany (not reunified at time of survey), Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Austria. A number of interviews were conducted in each country proportional to its population. These data have an N of 3832, after dropping missing cases. Of these 3832 respondents, 297 expressed a vote intention for a member of the extreme-right. This constitutes 7.7% of the respondents. These figures are sufficient to allow statistical analyses. However, the 7.7% of respondents expressing support for the extreme-right in the dependent
variable could be troubling with a dichotomous dependent variable. To account for this, I will perform a scobit test before proceeding with tests of statistical inference.

Figure 2 - Percentages of Males and Females who Support the Extreme-Right

My first hypothesis held that males would be overrepresented among the supporters of the extreme-right. As Figure Two indicates, this hypothesis appears to have some validity. Despite being nearly evenly split in their support for other parties other, males are overrepresented among extreme-right supporters. Males are considerably more likely to vote extreme-right, since they include 9.58% to female 6.14% extreme-right supporters. This relationship proves to be statistically significant at the .001 level. The $x^2$ for the relationship of gender and support for the extreme-right is 15.845.
To predict extreme-right electoral support, the age of the respondent serves as my second independent variable. I concur with the literature by hypothesizing that younger individuals will be more likely to support the extreme-right than their elders will. Figure Three shows the relationship between age and support for the extreme-right does possess a downward trend. Unfortunately, the trend is not strong enough to be considered statistically significant. The $x^2$ for the relationship is 6.510, which is
significant only at the .260 level. There is a visible drop off of support among older individuals. This is probably due to the anti-statist appeals that alienate pensioners. However, the support is not extremely concentrated among younger individuals. It is possible that the exaggeration of young extreme-right supporters has been a creation of the media. Young people are generally more willing to participate in non-conventional forms of participation, such as demonstrations. This younger appearance of extreme-right activity has perhaps led to unscientific conclusions that ignore data such as these.

Figure Four clearly illustrates that the extreme-right's efforts to appeal across class lines have been successful. The percent of extreme-right within each category of socio-economic status is practically indistinguishable. Support is very evenly distributed between all categories. The different appeals and issues of the extreme-right have constructed an economically diverse coalition. Betz found that both ends of the socio-economic spectrum were enticed by issues in their own interests (1994). The xenophobic issue lures in the lower strata with promises of decreased competition for jobs. Business people represent the upper strata enticed by the
prospect of a decreasing role of the state. These data statistically confirm Betz' observation, yet disprove my hypothesis. The relationship between socio-economic status and support for the extreme right is significant only at the .811 level, falling short of the .05 threshold. The $x^2$ for the relationship is only 1.586.

Figure 4 - Percentages of Socioeconomic Categories who Support the Extreme-Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
<th>Group 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between an individual's support for the extreme-right and his or her attitude towards immigrants as neighbors is as I hypothesized. Supporters of the extreme-right were two-thirds as likely to mention that they did not want immigrants as neighbors than
respondents not supporting the extreme-right. Of the entire survey, 16% mentioned immigrants as unwanted neighbors. This figure stands alone as testimony to the fact that immigration is a serious irritant to European populations. However, over a quarter (25.59%) of extreme-right supporters had a negative attitude towards immigrants using this variable. Supporters of the extreme-right who expressed these negative sentiments towards immigrants as neighbors are numerous enough for a statistically significant relationship. The value for $\chi^2$ for this relationship is 20.169, which is significant at the .001 level. Figure Five shows the dynamics of this bivariate relationship.
Another variable that I hypothesize will predict extreme-right support is the degree of nationalism for an individual. In this case, nationalism means the degree to which an individual cherishes his or her country. This variable probes possible motives for xenophobic attitudes and the political stances emanating from them. Figure six shows the relationship between support for the extreme-right and the degree of nationalism for an individual. The

Figure 6 - Nationalist Individuals who Support the Extreme-Right

![Graph showing the relationship between support for the extreme-right and the degree of nationalism for an individual.](attachment:graph.png)
four categories of the variable measuring nationalism exhibit a similar pattern between those who do and do not support the extreme-right.

However, nationalistic tendencies start higher among extreme-right supporters (45% very proud) than non-supporters (37% very proud). From this point, nationalist tendencies decline among extreme-right supporters, yet these sentiments peak for non-supporters in the quite proud category at 45%. This shows how Europeans are wholly proud of their countries. However, extreme-right supporters are more willing to make the vocal exhibition of claiming to be "very proud," which is blatant nationalism. Non-supporters, although still nationalistic, have cooled their rhetoric. Because of this overrepresentation of supporters of the extreme-right among nationalistic Europeans, the relationship between these two variables is statistically significant. The $\chi^2$ is 9.335, which is significant at the .025 level.

As discussed in my theoretical construct, the third and final hypothesis addressing xenophobia is individual attitudes towards allocating employment opportunities to nationals. Asking if individuals believe that jobs should
be held for nationals before offered to immigrants measured this attitude. Figure Seven shows that the attitudes towards job opportunities for immigrants follows a pattern like two previous issues, nationalism and immigrants as neighbors.

Figure 7 - Attitudes of Individuals who are and are not Extreme-Right supporters towards Hiring Nationals before Immigrants

Although a near super-majority of Europeans (65%) believe that jobs should be reserved for nationals, supporters of the extreme-right are overrepresented in this category at 85%. Also, over a quarter of Europeans
disagreed with the concept of guarding employment opportunities for nationals. But once again, the supporters of the extreme-right exhibit intolerance. They are wildly underrepresented in this category, as only 11% disagree with nationalistic hiring policies. This concentration of supporters of the extreme-right among those in favor of allocating jobs for nationals before immigrants is statistically significant at the .001 level with a $\chi^2$ of 40.008.

The next issue that I hypothesize preoccupies supporters of the extreme-right is feminism. As with previous issues, supporters of the extreme-right have sentiments that are distinguishable from non-supporters. Figure 8 reveals that supporters of the extreme-right are somewhat less tolerant of the women’s movement than other Europeans. This is to be expected since females are underrepresented among the extreme-right’s supporters. However, the relationship between attitudes towards feminism and support for the extreme-right is not a statistically significant relationship. With a $\chi^2$ of only 7.030, the relationship is significant only at the .134 level. The One might suspect that a variable that measures
attitudes towards feminism and the gender variable are multicollinear. As will be revealed later, these two variables only correlate at the .15 level. This assures that they both measure unique phenomena.

Figure 8 - Attitudes of Individuals who are and are not Extreme-Right supporters towards Feminism

In addition to issues of immigration, xenophobia and feminism, I hypothesize that supporters of the extreme-right will be in favor of decreasing the role of the state. To test this hypothesis, I use a variable that measures personal attitudes towards government versus private ownership of business and industry. Figure nine
illustrates that the pattern between supporters and non-supporters of the extreme-right continues. The majority of Europeans are not in favor of increasing government ownership of business and industry. The supporters of the extreme-right share these mainstream sentiments, except that they concentrate in favor of pure privatization. Of

Figure 9 - Attitudes of Individuals who are and are not Extreme-Right supporters towards Privatization

non-supporters, it can primarily be said that they do not support government ownership, since many are relatively neutral. On the other hand, supporters of the extreme-right exhibit support for a pure free-market economy. The relationship between attitudes on privatization and support
for the extreme-right constitutes a statistically
significant relationship at the .001 level whose $x^2$ is
36.981.

Scobit

Before proceeding with the two most widely accepted
techniques for estimation of models with dichotomous
dependent variables, logit and probit, a researcher must
recall two properties of these models. First, is that “the
effects of changes in independent variables depend upon the
initial value of the dependent variable” (Nagler 1994,
230). Second, is that no variable operates in a vacuum;
they are all “interactive” (Nagler 1994, 230). This
interaction takes place, because “the effect of change of
any independent variable on the dependent variable will
depend upon the values of all of the other independent
variables” (Nagler 1994, 230). Therefore, a researcher
should pay careful attention to let the data dictate the
how independent variables affect a dependent variable, not
methodological impositions. One of these methodological
impositions is that, “probit and logit will tend to
exaggerate effects of changes in any independent variables
for those individuals having a probability closest to one-half of choosing either of the two alternatives (i.e., for those individuals with \( P_i = \text{prob}(Y_i = 1) = 0.5 \)) (Nagler 1994, 230). However, if other individuals are more sensitive to the effects of changes in independent variables, "then the probit model would represent a misspecification and lead to biased inferences about the marginal effect of changes of any independent variable (Nagler 1994, 233). Therefore, an alternative technique may be necessary.

Scobit is similar to logit and probit, except that it tries to be more data driven. Its primary goal is to "specify correctly the response curve so as to determine precisely which individuals are most sensitive to change" (Nagler 1994, 233). Jonathan Nagler describes the essence of the scobit technique:

This is accomplished via maximum likelihood estimation of an additional parameter, \( a \), that modifies the response curve so that the probability level at which independent variables have maximum impact on change in probability is not necessarily 0.5, but is instead determined by the actual patterns observed in the data.

This is not to infer that scobit is always more appropriate than logit or probit. Actually, "a researcher
not especially interested in questions of interaction between variables or heterogeneity of respondents" would benefit little from calculating scobit estimates. When I included the adjustment parameter, $a$, into my model, its coefficient was 1.117 with a standard error of 3.8. It was significant only at the .78, which led me to believe that the adjustment parameter was inappropriate in my model. Regardless of the alternative values I applied to $a$, its standard error would not descend nor would it fall into significance. Additionally, including the scobit parameter, $a$, did not change the coefficients for my variables from their logit estimations.

By running scobit, I may have faith in traditional estimation techniques for models with dichotomous variables. My data will be unrestrained to express their properties and confirm or reject my hypotheses without artificially imposed empirical restraints. Performing the scobit procedure was advisable to defend all interpretations I make from data where are a disproportionate amount of zeroes or ones in a dichotomous variable, like the World Values Survey used here. After all, "the purpose of empirical analysis is to test
hypotheses, and if the proof of our hypothesis is imposed
upon our results by our statistical model then no test is
being conducted” (Nagler 1994, 252).

Probit

In ordinary least squares regression, the dependent
variable must be continuous. Also, there are several
assumptions about the error terms, $e_i$. Primarily, ordinary
least squares regression assumes that the error terms are
normally distributed and have a zero mean, $E(e_i)=0$. Also,
the model should have homoskedasticity, which means, “the
variance of the error term is constant for all values of $X_i$
(Lewis-Beck 1980, 26). One also assumes that the error
terms is not autocorrelated: $E(e_i e_j)=0$ ($i \neq j$). Nor should
the error term be correlated with any of the independent
variables.

However, this analysis uses a discrete, dichotomous
dependent variable, whether or not an individual supports
the extreme-right. The logical outcomes are zero, would
not vote for the extreme-right, or one, would vote for the
extreme-right. The dependent variable serves “only as an
indicator of which two possible outcomes occurred” (Greene
This type of dependent variable does not have the stochastic or random qualities necessary to ordinary least squares regression. In this case, the results of a traditional regression model would be highly misleading, and inferences made from the results would be exceedingly suspect. For these reasons, I will use probit analysis.

Probit will conform to my two possible outcomes. Ordinary least squares, on the other hand, would have allowed for outcomes less than zero and greater than one. Obviously, exceeding the zero-one parameters in either direction would be nonsensical. Probit will generate unbiased and consistent parameters for my model, contrary to ordinary least square analysis. Probit analysis assumes "that underlying the observed 'indicator' of which outcome occurred is a continuous variable of which we can only observe the sign" (Greene 1985, 325). Essentially, I will use a preference for extreme-right political parties, with a mean that depends on the independent variables. Therefore, I specify this model:

\[ VOTE = \beta_1 + \beta_2 GENDER + \beta_3 AGE + \beta_4 SES + \beta_5 NEBIMM + \]
\[ \beta_6 PROUDNAT + \beta_7 JOBNAT + \beta_8 FEMINIST + \beta_9 PRIVTIZE + \epsilon \]
If the probability that an individual will vote for the extreme-right is greater than zero, probit will observe that respondent as a supporter of the extreme-right. This is derived from the distribution of \( \varepsilon \), the parameters \( \beta_i \) through \( \beta_n \), and the regressors (Greene 1985).

\[
\text{Prob}[VOTE=1] = \text{Prob}[VOTE^* > 0] = \text{Prob}[\beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{GENDER} + \ldots + \beta_n \text{PRVTIZE} + \varepsilon > 0] = \text{Prob}[\varepsilon < \beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{GENDER} + \ldots + \beta_n \text{PRVTIZE}] = \text{CDF}(\beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{GENDER} + \ldots + \beta_n \text{PRVTIZE}),
\]

where CDF is the cumulative distribution function (Greene 1985). As the preceding formulae show, the model generates the probability that the individual will support the extreme-right. Therefore,

\[
E[VOTE] = 0 \times \text{Prob}[VOTE=0] + 1 \times \text{Prob}[VOTE=1] = \text{prob}[VOTE=1]
\]

Before proceeding with probit analysis, I performed some preliminary diagnostics. As previously discussed, the first of these was scobit analysis. This proved that I could proceed with probit of logit analysis, despite only 7.7% of respondents supporting the extreme-right in my dependent variable. Next, I calculated summary statistics for all variables in order to confirm the number of
observations, the mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum to maximum values for each variable. Last, I created a correlation matrix in order to avoid multicollinearity between my independent variables. The results for these two initial tests may be found in Tables 11 and 12. Neither showed any reason to not continue with the probit analysis and interpret the results with confidence. Table Three shows the results of the probit analysis.

Table 3 Probit Analysis

| Variable     | Coefficient | Standard Error | Z    | p>|Z| |
|--------------|-------------|----------------|------|-----|
| GENDER*      | .202        | .062           | 3.240| 0.001|
| AGE*         | -.054       | .019           | -2.787| 0.005|
| SES          | -.009       | .036           | -.0267| 0.790|
| NEBIMM*      | .254        | .075           | 3.358| 0.001|
| PROUDNAT     | -.053       | .039           | -1.348| 0.178|
| JORNAT*      | -.238       | .043           | 1.213| 0.000|
| FEMINIST     | .040        | .033           | -5.435| 0.225|
| PRVTIZE*     | -.049       | .013           | -3.583| 0.000|
| CONSTANT     | -.839       | .175           | -4.784| 0.000|

*p > .05
N = 3832

Significance of Hypotheses

The image of an extreme-right supporter that I derived from the literature was that of young male who was not
among the economic winners in postindustrialism. This profile appears to not be wholly accurate. Considering the performance of the variables for gender and age of the individuals, my model holds up well to tests of statistical significance. However, my hypothesized socio-economic variable fell out of significance. This is undoubtedly due to the extreme-right's increasing appeals to a cross section of Europeans. As discussed earlier in the bivariate section, the literature that considers socio-economic status as a strong predictor of extreme-right support is challenged by emerging survey data such as these. Analysts, politicians, and Europeans in general should not feel so assured that the extreme-right's support is concentrated among its poorer citizens. This simply appears not to be the case, as I too predicted it would.

The issues of nationalism offer mixed results as a predictor of extreme-right support. I had predicted that pride to be from a particular nation would be a significant predictor of extreme-right support. However, it has failed this test of statistical significance. This could be due to the conflict that undermines the extreme-right's appeals. It is difficult to temper nationalistic appeals with anti-statist messages. The political entrepreneurs
seem to have abandoned pride in one's nation and appealed to disposition of immigrant nations. This is further confirmed by the significance of attitudes towards immigrants as neighbors or coworkers. By concentrating on anti-foreign sentiments, the extreme-right is able to be anti-immigrant and anti-statist simultaneously. The theoretical literature, not excluding my own, must reconsider pride in one's nation as a powerful independent variable in predicting support for the extreme-right.

The extreme-right's fight against modernity does not seem to have targeted the women's movement, as shown by the insignificance of the relationship between support for the extreme-right and attitudes towards feminism. The extreme-right has not survived without some degree of political tact. It has properly chosen on whom to launch its attacks. Perhaps the sheer numbers of registered women voters is enough to steer the extreme-right towards easier targets, like the state and immigrants.

The Effects of the Predictor Variables

One cannot interpret the probit coefficients with the same technique as in ordinary least squares regression. All of the independent variables in this model are discrete
variables, so the marginal effects and standard deviation are of little use. I will profit from discrete change generated by the STATA “change” command. Essentially, discrete change is the effect of an independent variable on the probability of supporting the extreme-right while the other independent variables are held at their respective means. The discrete effects of the significant variables appear in Figure 10. Each of the variables is allowed to

Figure 10 - Effects of Significant Independent Variables on the Probability that an Individual will Support the Extreme-Right
vary from their minimum to maximum values. The precise predicted probabilities for each value of the independent variables are found in the Table 13.

Females are 5.7% likely to vote for the extreme-right. The probability that a male individuals will vote for the extreme right increases to 8.3%. This marks an increase of more than 2.5%. Interpreting the age variable is not this simple, because the variable measuring gender was dichotomous.

The age variable is divided into six categories. Going from the minimum category, 18-25 years old, to the maximum category, 65 or older, decreases the probability that an individual will support the extreme-right from 8.8% to 5.2%. Although slightly, the probabilities flatten as an individual becomes older. The change from 18-25 to 25-34 year old individuals is -.8%. From to 55-64 to 65 years or older individuals, the change in probability is -.6%. All discrete changes for the categories in between these two extremes are -.7%.

The steepest line in Figure 10 is the plot for the effects of attitudes on immigrants as neighbors on the probability to vote for the extreme-right. Those who were
not opposed to having immigrants as neighbors had only 6.3% compared to 10.1% probability of voting for the extreme-right among those opposed. Having negative attitudes about immigrants as neighbors increase the probability that an individual will support the extreme-right by 3.8%.

Attitudes towards immigrants and employment are not dichotomous, so it must be interpreted like the categories addressing the respondent’s age. Also like the age variable, the probabilities derived from attitudes on immigrants in the labor market flatten out as individuals agree less with the policy of preferential hiring for nationals. Individuals who strongly support the policy are 8.8% probable to support the extreme-right, whereas those resolutely opposed are only 3.4% likely. During this decline, support has already grounded to 5.5% for those who responded as lukewarm to the idea. This is already 61% less probable to support the extreme-right while moving only halfway through the different stances for this issue.

The last significant variable in my model is the measure towards attitudes of private versus government ownership of industry. Those favoring absolute private ownership of business and industry were 8.9% probable to vote for the extreme-right. Individuals favoring pure
government ownership were 3.6% probable to vote for the extreme-right, a decrease of 5.3%. Though the effects of flattening probabilities are not profound, as with attitudes on immigrants and employment, they are still worth considering. The average discrete effect for the ten possible stances on the immigrant labor issue should be -.53% if the relationship were linear. However, the discrete change for a move of one position for the immigrant labor issue does not reach -.53% until the value for this variable reaches 6.4. With this slight flattening, the probability of voting for the extreme-right decreases 2.8% for the first five positions of immigrant labor and decreases another 2.5% for the remaining five.

The effects of the three insignificant variables on the probability of voting for the extreme-right appear in Figure 11. One sees that, although insignificant, the three variables are in the expected direction. However, if this figure serves to illustrate "where there's smoke, there's fire," the socio-economic status variable is barely an ember. Its probability line is nearly parallel to the x-axis, decreasing only .4% in probability of supporting the extreme-right. Moving from approval to disapproval of the women's movement increases the probability of voting
for the extreme-right a meager 2.5%. Nationalism fairs even worse, lowering the probability only 2.0%.

Figure 11 - Effects of Insignificant Independent Variables on the Probability that an Individual will Support the Extreme-Right

Model Fit

Unlike the $R^2$ in linear regression, probit offers no such measure of fit for the model (Greene 1985). The best solution to examine the fit of our model is to create a classification table. Basically, this allows a researcher to know the number of correct predictions made by the
model. In order to create the classification table, a new variable is created. This variable contains the values for the model's predicted probability that each individual will vote for the extreme-right. Then a second new variable is created, which is initially set as all zeroes. It is then changed to one if the probability of supporting the extreme-right is greater than the mean for dependent variable, as shown in the summary statistics. This results in the following equation:

\[ \text{PHAT1} = 1 \text{ if } \text{PHAT} > .0775052 \]

I then calculated a crosstab for the actual values of my dependent variable and the dichotomous variable derived from my model's predicted values. The results can be seen in Table Four. My model shows respectable strength in predicting extreme-right support. Its primary weakness is over-predicting that individuals will vote for the extreme-right when that is not the case.

Summary

I hypothesized that younger males of lower socio-economic strata were more likely to be supporters of the extreme-right. The variables addressing the gender and age of the respondents proved to be wildly significant. They
also have informative discrete effects on the probability of voting for the extreme-right in the expected direction. Retrospectively, the insignificance of socio-economic status makes theoretical sense, because the extreme-right has been making a determined effort to construct a more diverse coalition.

Table 4 - Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted = 0</th>
<th>Predicted = 1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote = 0</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>3535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote = 1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2118</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>3832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predicting Zeroes: \((2028/3535)\) 57%

Predicting Ones: \((207/297)\) 70%

Predicting Overall: \(((2028+207)/3832)\) 58%

Considering the issues that concern supporters of the extreme-right, I hypothesized that those individuals who are nationalistic, xenophobic, and who are opposed to the expansion of the state and progressive social movements, mainly feminism, would be overrepresented among the
supporters of the extreme-right. In the "us versus them" appeals of the extreme-right towards immigrants; the political entrepreneurs seem to have created a distasteful pure cocktail of xenophobia. Perhaps drawing from their successful anti-statist appeals, the supporters of the extreme-right are xenophobic while simultaneously exhibiting only mild nationalistic pride. Much like the extreme-right’s efforts to evade their history as a party for the poor, the extreme-right’s efforts to alienate fewer women have started to bear fruit.

Those who are markedly more xenophobic are much more probable to support the extreme-right than individuals who are more tolerant of foreigners. Both in their personal lives, as neighbors, and professionally, as co-workers, the supporters of the extreme-right consistently reject immigrants. However, as my bivariate statistics illustrated, these sentiments are only partially concentrated in the attitudes of extreme-right supporters. Anti-immigration sentiments are far from irregular in Western Europe.

Those who favor a retraction of the state from the lives of its citizens are overrepresented among the supporter of the extreme-right. Like anti-immigration
dispositions, anti-statist views are far from rare in Western Europe. However, they are denser among those who support the extreme-right.

The model does suffer from the three insignificant variables. However, the less than perfect predictive power of my model represents progress. I have learned that three variables used throughout the literature on the extreme-right in Western Europe are statistically insignificant. Disproving a hypothesis, especially when it approaches consensual acceptance in the literature, is a necessary part of the scientific method. It is also advantageous to know that many other variables have withstood another test of significance. Therefore, researchers may use them in models with increased assurance.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This research sought to summarize the political development of the extreme-right in Western Europe. Additionally, I developed a cross-national theoretical framework to explain the increasing electoral support for the extreme-right in Western Europe. A model was formulated, which profited from multiple levels-of-analysis, state and individual. To test my hypotheses on individual support for the extreme-right, I used probit analysis.

The case study literature revealed similar emergence patterns of the extreme-right in several countries. Except for the Freiheirliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO, Austrian Freedom Party), political entrepreneurs gave birth to the parties of the extreme-right from nonexistence. The importance of a charismatic leader was shown to be a crucial ingredient in the development of an incipient party. The role of electoral systems was demonstrated to have an effect on the extreme-right's prospects. Perhaps
the most conclusive finding was that proportional representation systems contribute to the electoral success of the extreme-right. One also observes how, with the exception of the Danish Frenskridtspartiet (FP-D, Danish Progress Party) and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FP-N, Norwegian Progress Party), the members of the extreme-right enjoy greater success in secondary elections.

The comparative literature revealed a body of work that leaves much room for development. Unfortunately, it is very hard to extrapolate generalizations from the work of these researchers due to the plethora of contrasting extreme-right conceptualizations. Also, much ink is spilled on the debate of the contemporary extreme-right as the legacy of the interwar Fascists. This issue is never indisputably resolved. Frankly, when one shifts from academic debate to policy relevance, this becomes a non-issue. Whether or not the modern extreme-right is the offspring of the mid-century Fascists seems trivial compared to what counts: the utilitarian treatment of the Fascists in the extreme-right's propaganda. What carries weight in the political settings of these countries is if the people are responsive by these harsh images, not if scholars are.
Interesting propositions emerged addressing intraparty politics and the supply side of the party system. The examinations of political space confirmed an accepted hypothesis. The extreme-right needs room at the right end of the political spectrum to collect support. A convergence of major parties in the political center is beneficial in two ways. First and foremost, it frees up political space. Second, it gives rise to a powerful left, which a political system will tend to balance. I integrated the profitable substantial findings from both sets of literature into my own theoretical framework on extreme-right support.

Quantitative testing of my model on extreme-right electoral support confirmed many of my hypotheses, while it also disclosed many unanticipated results. First, my profile of an extreme-right supporter showed considerable strength. The young male representation stood statistical tests of significance in both the bivariate and model settings. However, an individual’s socio-economic status never acquired statistical significance. This reveals that the efforts of political entrepreneurs to diversify their electoral coalitions have been successful. The insignificance of the nationalistic pride variable
illustrates the negative type of nationalism the extreme-right is pursuing. Instead of an arguably healthy pride in one's nation, the extreme-right emanates antipathy towards other cultures and nations. By itself in a bivariate relationship with support for the extreme-right, nationalism was significant. However, in the model setting it was not, propelling the image that when compared to personal and utilitarian dislike of foreigners, pride to be from a particular nation was a weak predictor.

The supporters of the extreme-right were for the most part indifferent to the feminist movement. Thus, the stereotype of an extreme-right supporter who wishes for the golden era of the traditional home does not pass statistical scrutiny. I believe that such anti-modern stances do occasionally materialize within the extreme-right, which always creates a media tumult. However, the media attention given to such shocking statements probably exaggerates their undistorted relevance. However, concerning the role of the state, the supporters of the extreme-right defiantly spoke in one voice. They supported a reduction in the role of the state. Since many extreme-right supporters were supporters of a free-market, this is of little surprise. It seems that outside of an organized
structure to provide law and order, they preferred a restricted role for their governments.

Another conclusion that I draw from this research is that one can only ease the symptom of these issue stances, the electoral success of the extreme-right. Altering electoral laws that benefit small parties could reduce the number of votes cast for the extreme-right. Unfortunately, such a tactic would be undemocratic in its source, elite maneuvering, and its effect, less proportionality. Additionally, such a move would equally damage all small parties with limited electoral appeal. Even sadder is the second way to rid a political system of extreme-right parties: let mainstream parties adopt their stances on key issues. This was best illustrated by the British Conservative Party’s handling of the immigration issue under Thatcher in the 1980s. In either case the extreme-right will have been deleterious to specific individual rights and democracy in general.

Future research in this field will need to make several strides, both theoretical and practical. As far as cultivating theoretical cognition of the extreme-right, we first need a conceptualization of extreme-right that is perfected and adopted within the literature. Second, state
level conditions conducive the extreme-right success must be quantitatively tested. The last theoretical development in the research should be a more profound understanding of the issue array around which extreme-right supporters converge. The greatest impediments to theoretical evolution are practical and technical. In order to quantitatively examine the state level indicators relevant to extreme-right success, time series analysis would be most beneficial. However, such data are weak at best, but more generally absent. For the dependent variable, electoral success of the extreme-right, an annual indicator is necessary. Using results from national elections is insufficient for two reasons. First, they are too sporadic, as seen in Table Five. Second, these data have even more missing values when one considers that European Parliament (EP) elections do not truly compare to national elections, despite the two elections' similarities. The best prospect for an annual indicator is the Eurobarometer. As this international survey continues to offer extreme-right parties as specific choices in its vote intention questions, a data set will develop.

None of the state level independent variables are presently sufficient for time-series analysis.
Postindustrialism is partially conceptualized, as illustrated in Chapter Four. However, as Peters (1988) demonstrated, the line between public and private sector employment is gray. Also, the present data on two other crucial state level variables, political space and electoral systems, are far from equipped to serve in a time-series setting. Data such as those of Laver and Hunt (1992) measuring a political system's space are needed on an annual basis, not at one point in time. As already mentioned concerning electoral systems, this entire topic lacks strong theory. Political science must cultivate a conception of electoral systems' role in the outcome of politics, a topic that is shamefully unexamined. Electoral systems are far from encapsulated by Duverger's Law, which offers no examination of degrees of proportionality.

To summarize, I agree with Betz who remarked that "anyone seeking a single comprehensive explanatory scheme for the rise and success of the radical Right is bound to be disappointed" (1994, 174). The support for extreme-right parties in Western Europe represents "the emergence of a powerful new line of sociopolitical and sociocultural conflict" (Betz 1994, 182). I concur with Betz's description, who remarked that "radical right-wing populist
parties are symptoms as well as distasteful by-products of the general turbulence of the present age" (1993a, 424).

As for the future of the extreme-right's electoral potential, the fall of Communism could enhance or be deleterious to it. Granted, the extreme-right lost a great catalyst when the ideology of its antithesis, the extreme-left, faded from prospects of global domination (Weinberg 1993). However, the countries of Eastern Europe are now left vulnerable to the messages of the extreme-right (Weinberg 1993). With little political sophistication, the unemployed youth of the former Soviet societies will be dry sponges for the extreme-right’s propaganda (Weinberg 1993). As long as immigration mounts into Europe while job prospects slip, the potential for the extreme-right remains promising (Weinberg 1993). I concur with Weinberg, who believed that a continued extreme-right rise is not "inevitable", but "nevertheless, necessary though not sufficient conditions are present in the democracies to make such a resurgence a troubling possibility" (Weinberg 1993, 9). To further cloud any prospects of gauging the extreme-right’s electoral potential in Eastern Europe, one must remember that all of the data obstacles previously
discussed are even more insurmountable concerning this region.

An even more developed and testable model on support for the extreme-right would be beneficial to several fields of political science. Its implications for the much-needed study of electoral systems are immense. Students of political psychology would benefit from the application of sophisticated voting and the rationalization of extremist views. Those who examine issue versus cleavage voting see a picture of a diverse socio-economic coalition united by an array of issues. Most importantly, perhaps mainstream politicians would develop methods of integrating the supporters of the extreme-right, but not their views, back into the mainstream.
APPENDIX
Table 5 - Nation-Wide Election Results for the Extreme-Right in Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Austria expressed as percentage of vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LN</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>REP</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>FP (D)</th>
<th>FP (N)</th>
<th>FPO</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.2E</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E European Elections in Italics
* French Presidential Elections
Table 6 - Political Space and Extreme-Right Electoral Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Left-Right Difference*</th>
<th>Extreme-Right Electoral Success**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>16.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>20.07</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Laver and Hunt (1992), appendix
**Source: Author's Calculations of national elections during the 1980s
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Summary Statement</th>
<th>Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Males are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Gender: GENDER; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Younger individuals are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Younger individuals: AGE; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
<td>Individuals from lowers socio-economic strata are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Lower socio-economic strata: SES; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4</td>
<td>Individuals personally opposed to immigrants are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Personally opposed to immigrants: NEBIMM; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 5</td>
<td>Nationalistic individuals are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Nationalistic individuals: PROUDNAT; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 6</td>
<td>Individuals who favor nationalistic hiring policies are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Nationalistic hiring: JOBNAT; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 7</td>
<td>Individuals opposed to the women's movement are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Opposed to women's movement: FEMINIST; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 8</td>
<td>Individuals favoring a decreasing role of the state are more probable to vote for the extreme-right.</td>
<td>Decreasing role of the state: PRVTIZE; Vote for the extreme-right: VOTE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 - Summary of Coding for Dependent and Independent Variables used in Individual Level-of-Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>WVS #</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VOTE</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No vote for extreme-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes vote for extreme-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25-34 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35-44 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45-54 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55-65 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65 years or older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Upper, upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Middle, non-manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manual workers-skilled, semi-skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Manual workers-unskilled, unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBIMM</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Would not mind immigrant neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Would mind immigrant neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROUDNAT</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very proud to be (Nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Quite proud to be (Nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not very proud to be (Nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not at all proud to be (Nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOBNAT</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agree: Jobs for (Nation) first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Considering: Jobs for (Nation) first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Disagree: Jobs for (Nation) first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approve strongly of the women’s mvt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approve somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Disapprove somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disapprove strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRVTIZE</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Private ownership of industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>[Respondent places himself between]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Government ownership of industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 - $\chi^2$ Results from Correlations of each Independent Variable and the Dependent Variable, Vote for the Extreme-Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Pearson $\chi^2$</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Asymptotic Significance*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENDER***</td>
<td>15.845</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>6.510</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>1.586</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBIMM***</td>
<td>20.169</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROUDNAT**</td>
<td>9.335</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOBNAT***</td>
<td>40.008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST</td>
<td>7.030</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRVTIZE***</td>
<td>36.981</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asymptotic Significance is based on the distribution critical values of $\chi^2$ for each degree of freedom

**Significant at $p<.05$

***Significant at $p<.001$

Table 10 - Distribution of $\chi^2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>.10</th>
<th>.05</th>
<th>.01</th>
<th>.001</th>
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<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.706</td>
<td>3.841</td>
<td>6.635</td>
<td>10.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.605</td>
<td>5.991</td>
<td>9.210</td>
<td>13.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.251</td>
<td>7.815</td>
<td>11.341</td>
<td>16.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.779</td>
<td>9.488</td>
<td>13.277</td>
<td>18.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.236</td>
<td>11.070</td>
<td>15.086</td>
<td>20.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.645</td>
<td>12.592</td>
<td>16.812</td>
<td>22.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.017</td>
<td>14.067</td>
<td>18.475</td>
<td>24.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.362</td>
<td>15.507</td>
<td>20.090</td>
<td>26.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.684</td>
<td>16.919</td>
<td>21.666</td>
<td>27.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.987</td>
<td>18.307</td>
<td>23.209</td>
<td>29.588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11 - Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables used in Individual Level-of-Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VOTE</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>.077505</td>
<td>.267426</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>.468423</td>
<td>.499067</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>3.423017</td>
<td>1.631337</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>2.545929</td>
<td>.850616</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBIMM</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>.163361</td>
<td>.369743</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROUDNAT</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>1.849948</td>
<td>.837131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOB Nat</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>1.562371</td>
<td>.855082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>2.203027</td>
<td>.919359</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRVTIZE</td>
<td>3832</td>
<td>3.848382</td>
<td>2.282279</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 - Correlation Matrix of Independent Variable used in Individual Level-of-Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GEN.</th>
<th>AGE.</th>
<th>SES.</th>
<th>NEB.</th>
<th>PRO.</th>
<th>JOB.</th>
<th>FEM.</th>
<th>PRV.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBIMM</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROUDNAT</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOB Nat</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMINIST</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRVTIZE</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13 - Values of Independent Variables (X) and Corresponding Probability of Extreme-Right Vote P[V] for individual level-of-analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>NEBIMM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X P[V]</td>
<td>X P[V]</td>
<td>X P[V]</td>
<td>X P[V]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0.057</td>
<td>1 0.088</td>
<td>1 0.07</td>
<td>0 0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.03 0.057</td>
<td>1.152 0.086</td>
<td>1.091 0.07</td>
<td>0.03 0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.061 0.058</td>
<td>1.303 0.085</td>
<td>1.182 0.07</td>
<td>0.061 0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.091 0.059</td>
<td>1.455 0.084</td>
<td>1.273 0.07</td>
<td>0.091 0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.121 0.06</td>
<td>1.606 0.082</td>
<td>1.364 0.07</td>
<td>0.121 0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.152 0.06</td>
<td>1.758 0.081</td>
<td>1.455 0.07</td>
<td>0.152 0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.182 0.061</td>
<td>1.909 0.08</td>
<td>1.545 0.07</td>
<td>0.182 0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.212 0.062</td>
<td>2.061 0.079</td>
<td>1.636 0.07</td>
<td>0.212 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.242 0.063</td>
<td>2.212 0.078</td>
<td>1.727 0.069</td>
<td>0.242 0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.273 0.063</td>
<td>2.364 0.076</td>
<td>1.818 0.069</td>
<td>0.273 0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.303 0.064</td>
<td>2.515 0.075</td>
<td>1.909 0.069</td>
<td>0.303 0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.333 0.065</td>
<td>2.667 0.074</td>
<td>2 0.069</td>
<td>0.333 0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.364 0.066</td>
<td>2.818 0.073</td>
<td>2.091 0.069</td>
<td>0.364 0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.394 0.066</td>
<td>2.97 0.072</td>
<td>2.182 0.069</td>
<td>0.394 0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.424 0.067</td>
<td>3.121 0.071</td>
<td>2.273 0.069</td>
<td>0.424 0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.455 0.068</td>
<td>3.273 0.069</td>
<td>2.364 0.069</td>
<td>0.455 0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.485 0.069</td>
<td>3.424 0.068</td>
<td>2.455 0.068</td>
<td>0.485 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.515 0.07</td>
<td>3.576 0.067</td>
<td>2.545 0.068</td>
<td>0.515 0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.545 0.07</td>
<td>3.727 0.066</td>
<td>2.636 0.068</td>
<td>0.545 0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.576 0.071</td>
<td>3.879 0.065</td>
<td>2.727 0.068</td>
<td>0.576 0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.606 0.072</td>
<td>4.030 0.064</td>
<td>2.818 0.068</td>
<td>0.606 0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.636 0.073</td>
<td>4.182 0.063</td>
<td>2.909 0.068</td>
<td>0.636 0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.667 0.074</td>
<td>4.333 0.062</td>
<td>3 0.068</td>
<td>0.667 0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.697 0.075</td>
<td>4.485 0.061</td>
<td>3.091 0.068</td>
<td>0.697 0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.727 0.076</td>
<td>4.636 0.06</td>
<td>3.182 0.068</td>
<td>0.727 0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.758 0.076</td>
<td>4.786 0.059</td>
<td>3.273 0.067</td>
<td>0.758 0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.788 0.077</td>
<td>4.939 0.058</td>
<td>3.364 0.067</td>
<td>0.788 0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.818 0.078</td>
<td>5.091 0.057</td>
<td>3.455 0.067</td>
<td>0.818 0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.242 0.056</td>
<td>3.545 0.067</td>
<td>0.848 0.094</td>
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REFERENCES


