A STRUCTURAL EQUATION ANALYSIS OF INTERGENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Faris M. Al-Ghazy, B.A, M.A.

Denton, Texas

May, 1997
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It has been widely believed that modernity is a byproduct of a nuclear
family system, a highly urbanized society, and a secular way of life. As such,
developing countries are characterized as modern insofar as their social and
cultural structures are able to correspond to these criteria. To examine the
validity of these propositions, data on two randomly-selected generations--
daughters and mothers in the United Arab Emirates--were generated. Data
were analyzed using LISREL. The findings of this study are as follows:

First, contrary to the hypothesized model, familism was found to have a
significant and positive relationship with modernity. In other words, it was
found that the higher the levels of familism, the higher the levels of modernity
in both generations. The consistency of this negation of the negative effect of
familism on modernity across the two generations runs against the contentions
of the modernization school concerning the relationship between familism and
modernity.
Second, the effect of familism on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation was found to be higher than the effect of familism on the levels of modernity in their mothers. Third, although the daughter generation appeared to be more modern than their mothers, the two generations shared the same levels of familistic orientation and religious commitment. Thus, it can be said that any society can be modern in some aspects and traditional in others.

Fourth, urbanism and religion (i.e., Islam) were found to have no significant impact on the extent of modern attitudes of the daughter and mother generations. Again, this finding does not support the hypothesized positive effect of urbanism or the negative influence of religion on modernity.

The implications of this study call for a reexamination of the concepts of modernization and modernity as far as the assumed universality and transcendency of Western values and norms are considered.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the most important social changes of our time is modernization. Modernization refers to a broad range of sociohistorical transformations brought about globally by the process of industrialization. One of the consequences of industrialization is urbanization, which results in compositional alterations of demographic structures in rural and urban settings. Such compositional changes facilitate the onset and spread of modernizing influences. In addition, modernization implies changes in societal institutions, such as religion and family, along with the cultural values and technologies associated with sustenance organization.

The process of modernization leads to societal transformations at a global level. As more nations modernize, it is believed that they will acquire more or less similar social structures and ideological systems. The emergence of modern institutions is often accompanied by the appearance of modern attitudinal and value systems. Thus, modernization as a global phenomenon is assumed not only to make social structures modern in a technical/physical
sense but also to transform the sociopsychological characteristics at the individual level. The normative components associated with modernization have been referred to as individual modernity. The concepts of modernism, individual modernity, or modernity—which are used in this research interchangeably—are indicated by a number of attributes and traits such as the values and behaviors that enable individuals to participate in a modern society.

It is well known that modernization is a dynamic process. The transformation of a society from a traditional to a modern one is assumed to take place over time. As a result, the impact of modernization on members of society varies generally across various age groups. These dissimilarities in the impact of modernization factors across age groups are likely to have an impact on the timing and the speed of modernization. However, the function of age differences on the evolution of modern attitudes is not well known.

The intersection of old values and newly emerging ones may result in any one of three outcomes: (a) The new values may take over; (b) the old values remain; or (c) a mixture of the old and new values may emerge. The occurrence of these three outcomes is influenced by modernization. Thus, when attitudinal changes favor modernization, the pace and magnitude of such
changes are likely to vary across generations. Furthermore, the processes leading to modernity may differ across generations.

A knowledge of the differences in both the impact of social structural factors on modernity across age groups and the variations in the process that result in modernity contributes toward an understanding of the evolution of modernity.

The purpose of the present study is to investigate selected social and structural factors that lead to modernity, mainly, the effects of familism, urbanism, and secularism. The study also examines the differences in the processes that generate modernity across two age groups—specifically, a selected sample of female college students and their mothers in the United Arab Emirates.

This is of special merit because the extant literature on modernization in general and modernity in particular has paid little attention to generational differences and their implications for social change. Mannheim (1952) recognized the value of such studies:

The problem of generations is important enough to merit serious consideration. It is one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements. Its practical importance becomes clear as soon as one tries to obtain a more exact
understanding of the accelerated pace of social change characteristic of our time. (pp. 286-287)

An Overview of Modernization

The term modernization has been employed in a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds, with varying definitions. Generally speaking, the concept is used to denote a progressive movement from one stage to another. Such a change is associated mainly with the improvement of the overall social conditions and the quality of life of a given society (Safi, 1994).

According to Apter (1968), modernization first took place in the West as a result of the commercial and industrial revolutions. These phenomena in turn led to the expansion of lending and fiscal devices, the rise of modern armies, the advancement of technology, and the growth of trade and its subsequent influence on science. Apter contended that modernization therefore involves three conditions: (a) a society's having capability for being constantly innovative and changing; (b) having differentiated and adaptive social structures; and (c) possessing a social framework through which skills and knowledge are the basis for living in a highly advanced society.

Lerner (1958) saw modernization as characterized by empathy, the ability of individuals to imagine significant positive changes in their own status; urbanization; political participation; media exposure; and education.
Lerner (1968) later expanded his definition of modernization to include self-sustaining economic development, secular orientation, geographic and social mobility, and personality transformation. Sutton (1963) outlined the characteristics of modern societies as having universal, specific, and achievement norms; high levels of social mobility; a highly developed division of labor; and egalitarian class structures. Rustow and Ward (1964) summarized a number of indicators of modernization previously used in the literature. These include a highly differentiated and integrated governmental system; rational, secular, efficient, and inclusive political and administrative decision-making strategies; national, territorial, and historical popular identifications; political participation based on achievement; and a judicial system derived from impersonal and secular laws.

According to Safi (1994), the majority of the extant information on modernization is primarily a product of the Western experience, which has long been assumed to be universal. Two interrelated factors are seen to perpetuate this assumption. These are the falsely assumed stagnant position of non-Western countries and the expanding hegemony of the Western civilizations. Within this context, Safi believed that the study of modernization in developing countries was initiated by a number of American social scientists in the early 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s,
leading eventually to the systematic birth of modernization theory. Societies were seen as evolving from primitive to modern in a steady progression with few possibilities of regression.

According to Hudson (1980), modernization studies on the Middle East have particularly emphasized the following:

(1) The inroads which secular, rationalistic ideas have made into Muslim societies, displacing religious orientations, as the result largely of the impact of the West; (2) the decline of influence of the Islamic actors—the religious and legal elites—in the political process, in the face of the rising military officers, technocrats, businessmen, and intellectuals; (3) the failure of liberal Islamic reformers to accommodate Islam with the ideas of modernization; and (4) the atavistic nature of popular, fundamentalist Islamic political movements. (p. 9)

However, the Islamic revival in the Middle East region, which had been assumed nonexistent since the 1950s, generated an abrupt setback in the analyses and assumptions advanced by the modernization school. This puzzling and unanticipated impact continued to overshadow any attempt to understand events in the Middle East throughout the 1980s and beyond (Safi, 1994).
U.A.E.: A Profile

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is one of the six oil-producing Arab countries known as the Gulf States, which include also Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The U.A.E. is located on the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and is comprised of seven autonomous states (Peck, 1986). These states are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Ajman. Formally known as the Trucial States, the U.A.E. obtained its independence from Britain in December 1971.

The native population of the U.A.E. is made up of Arabs who, for various political and economic reasons, migrated from the hinterland of the Arabian Peninsula, of which Saudi Arabia occupies the largest part. According to Ghanem (1992), Lorimer's estimate of the U.A.E.'s population in 1904 was the earliest, citing a total population of 80,000. In 1968, while the country was still under British occupation, a census showed a total population of 180,226. Four years after its independence in 1971, the size of the population increased by 655,937, a 364 percent increase in the span of seven years (Peck, 1986). The last population census of 1995 showed a total of 2,377,453. (The Ministry of Planning, U.A.E., 1996). The majority of this population is urban. The provinces of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah share 80 percent of the total
population, whereas the remaining 20 percent live in the other states (Peck, 1986).

According to Hawley (1971), prior to the discovery of oil in the 1960s, the economy of the U.A.E. depended largely on pearling, fishery, and primitive farming. Prior to the 1950s, education in the U.A.E. was limited to Islamic studies based on the holy Koran. Health care in a modern form was basically nonexistent. It consisted mainly of a one-doctor dispensary established in 1930 under British supervision. Modest educational programs began in the early 1950s with assistance rendered by Kuwait, Qatar, and other Arab countries. By 1967-1968, thirty-eight schools, with an enrollment of 10,549 students, had been established. Technical education was also marked by a late start. The first technical school, an agriculture school, was opened in Ras al-Khaimah in 1956, followed by a trade school in Sharajeah and Dubai in 1958 and 1964, respectively (Hawley, 1971).

With the increasing oil revenues, efforts to modernize the country evolved. In the health care sector, the number of government-operated hospitals increased from 16 in 1977 to 29 hospitals in 1990. In addition, medical centers were established throughout the country, totaling 93 centers in 1990. As a result, while the number of physicians per 9,000 population was
one in 1977, this number decreased to one physician per 1,000 population in 1990 (U.A.E. University, 1996).

The improvement in health care was also accompanied by a steady improvement in education. A federal ministry of education and youth was established, leading to the establishment of a national university--United Arab Emirates University--in the academic year 1977-1978. In addition, between 1979 and 1980, more than 2,600 students were sent abroad for diverse educational and training programs (Peck, 1986). By the academic year 1980-1981, a total of 108,840 students were enrolled throughout the country (Heard-Bey, 1982). The number of schools increased to a total of 978 in 1991, with a current enrollment of 490,000 students throughout the country (U.A.E. University, 1996).

The U.A.E. is a pronatalist society, with the highest annual increase rate in the world of 11.3 percent (Vander Zanden, 1990). It is a welfare state in which citizens are offered free medical care, free education, life-long employment, flexible and interest-free housing subsidies, and comprehensive social security benefits. Women's participation in the labor force in this region is still limited. Governmental and nonprofit organizations have been established for the sole purpose of financially helping youth to marry and to have children. However, massive and sudden modernization in the recent past
has severely altered its demographic structures. As a result, foreign workers came to constitute about 80 percent of the total population (Peck, 1986). This demographic shift, according to Wilson (1995), took place between 1968 and 1989. Wilson commented on such a structural transformation of the Gulf countries, of which the U.A.E. is a member: "Nowhere in modern history has culture change been so seemingly rapid or systematically pervasive than the countries of the Arabian Peninsula" (p. 144).

The Family in the U.A.E.

The family in the U.A.E. is that of the "Islamic family" whose members are "related to one another through blood ties and/or marital bonds and whose relatedness is such that it entails mutual role expectations" (Abdal-Ati, 1974, p. 38). The "Islamic family" takes the form of an extended family (A'ilah), which includes three to four generations. Those who share a common residence acquire the label residentially extended, while those who are residentially dispersed and yet retain the same functions are known as functionally extended (Farsoun, 1970).

The Islamic family functions as both social and economic institution. As a social unit, the Islamic family socializes its young to conform to the requirements of the so-called shame culture, of which self-denial and concern for one's reputation are important components. It also provides its members
with an unconditional support throughout their life span, especially the elderly, the sick, and the very young. Moreover, the Islamic family has a mediating role. This includes its involvement in the major life decisions of its members, such as the choice of education, employment, and marriage.

As an economic institution, the Islamic family is both a productive and consumptive unit. As a productive unit, it ensures the full cooperation and dedication of its members in the process of making a living. Most Islamic families tend to be involved in family capitalism as opposed to corporate capitalism, which is clear in the fact that most successful enterprises in Islamic cultures are those owned by families.

The Setting of the Study

This study was conducted at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences/United Arab Emirates University. This university was established in 1977 and is located in Al Ain city in the south-eastern part of the country. This oasis city was chosen to house the university because of its accessible location among the major cities in the country. Being the only university in the country, United Arab Emirates University has grown rapidly. The academic year of its official opening had an enrollment of 502 students (313 male and 189 female students). By the academic year of 1994-1995, the
number rose to 11,576 students, including 2,608 males and 8,968 females (U.A.E. University, 1996).

Significance of the Study

Few studies on the U.A.E. have attempted to examine individual modernity across generations. Further, the few studies examining the processes of modernization in the Gulf countries, in particular, have failed to distinguish between modernization as an institutional phenomenon (at the social level) and modernity as an individual-specific trait, "two very distinct social phenomena that do not necessarily correlate highly with each other" (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970, p. 18).

By examining the attitudes of the mother generation (the preservers of tradition) and those of their daughters (the agents of social change), this study should be of great importance in terms of understanding the nature and direction of social change. Gallagher (1974) wrote the following:

Analysis of biological cohorts has an additional byproduct in that it allows for observation of microsocietal patterns as well as a macrosocietal analysis of social transformation. A study of generationalism is simultaneously a measure of how effectively new members of society are being socialized to the appropriate cultural
design. An intrafamilial investigation of generationalism serves as a
general test of family integration. (p. 331)

This is particularly important in the light of the fact that the U.A.E.'s society
is experiencing a number of unusual phenomena: (a) a small and young native
population with high fertility rates, low mortality rates, and a very high
proportion of foreign workers; (b) an emerging drift toward privatization
through which a citizen of a welfare state will have to manage the transition
from governmental sponsorship to being managed by corporations; and (c)
equally important, the influx of massive numbers of new graduate students
from both within and abroad.

The findings of this study are applicable to the rest of the Gulf
countries, which are all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. These
countries share unique cultural, religious, economic, political, and demographic
characteristics. All of these countries adhere to the same religion, Islam; speak
the same language, Arabic; possess the lion's share of the world's oil production
and reserves; and have the same form of government, monarchical. All have
also experienced similar levels of sudden and massive modernization.

Historically, however, due to the very nature of the cultures of the Arab
Gulf countries, scientific inquiries have been limited to male respondents.
Therefore, the significance of this study lies not only in its initiative to study a
seldom-surveyed generation--female students--but also in its inclusion of an older, less educated, and more conservative population--the mother generation.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Individual Modernity: Theoretical Conceptualization

The phenomenon of modernity has been a subject of research, not only in sociology, but also in political science, history, literature, and economics, among other fields. In general, modernity can be used to denote two quite different meanings. When used to describe society, modernity refers to high levels of industrialization, massive urban growth, advanced educational institutions, and complex divisions of labor. When applied to individuals, modernity may denote universalistic attitudes, behaviors, values, ways of acting and feeling, and personality traits (Abraham, 1980; Smith & Inkeles, 1966). Thus, whereas modernization is the technical transformation through which society moves from a traditional state to a modern one in a temporal sense, modernity is the set of the normative doctrines resulting from modernization (Stephenson, 1968).

Modernity can best be conceptualized in terms of the Parsonian pattern variables (Hoselitz, 1960; Parsons, 1951; Portes, 1973). According to Safi (1994), pattern variables have been utilized mainly to study modernization in
traditional societies. The first set of these variables—the affective versus affective-neutral relationship—differentiates between modes of social organizations in traditional and modern societies. In the former, social relationships are family and/or clan/tribe centered. However, as society modernizes, such relationships tend to become impersonal and rational. The second set of pattern variables—self-orientation versus collective orientation—distinguishes between the nature of goal pursuit in traditional and modern societies. In traditional societies, individuals often pursue collective goals, whereas in modern societies these goals are geared toward the immediate self-interests of the individuals.

The third set of pattern variables—universalistic versus particularistic norms—measures the scope of the social norms in a society. In traditional societies, people subscribe to immediate, narrow, and local norms. In modern societies, however, these norms become diffused in the larger formal social institutions. The fourth set of pattern variables—the achievement versus the ascriptive—distinguishes between ascribed and achieved status of members in society. In traditional societies, individuals are assigned positions based on family or class background. Individuals in modern societies are rewarded according to their personal qualifications and abilities to compete. The final set of pattern variables—the functionally specific versus the functionally
diffused—refers to the assumption that traditional societies are characterized by simple differentiation and specialization. By contrast, modern societies are highly specialized and differentiated within complex divisions of labor.

Inkeles and Smith (1974) attempted to construct the personal attributes of the modern individual, concluding the following:

The modern man's character, as it emerges from our study, may be summed up under four major headings. He is an informed participant citizen; he has a marked sense of personal efficacy; he is highly independent and autonomous in his relations to traditional sources of influence, especially when he is making basic decisions about how to conduct his personal affairs; and he is ready for new experiences and ideas, that is, he is relatively open-minded and cognitively flexible.

(p. 290)

Peshkin and Cohen (1967) suggested that there are general and shared characteristics of modern individuals that are pervasive throughout the world. For the purpose of assaying individual modernity in Africa, the authors classified these values into four categories: economic, political, intellectual, and social. The economic values, generated by economic development, involve the use of technology, planning, positive attitudes toward manual labor, and concern for the development of the whole country rather than the village or a
given region. The political values comprise active political participation, a firm belief in equality for all regardless of religion or background, and a spirit of hard work and productivity.

The intellectual values include a modern inclination toward the ability of utilizing systematic knowledge for solving problems, undertaking rational decisions, and passing sound judgments. Along with these qualities are the ability to be open-minded, the capacity to cope with the uncertainty of life, the belief in the attainability of human progress, and the capability of human beings to improve their lot in life. The social values are those of being less reliant on relatives, more autonomous and free, and socially and economically mobile.

Triandis (1972), after reviewing extensive literature, described the characteristics of the modern individual:

The modern individual is apparently open to new experiences, relatively independent of parental authority, and concerned with time and planning and willing to defer gratification; he feels that man can be the master over nature and that he controls the reinforcements he receives from his environment; he believes in determinism and science, has a wide cosmopolitan perspective, and uses broad in-groups; he competes
with standards of excellence and is optimistic about controlling his environment. (p. 352)

Individual Modernity: Empirical Examination

Portes (1973) investigated individual modernity in Guatemala. Employing data collected from 580 lower class respondents (couples), the author sought empirical support for the hypothesized modernity syndrome. The overall findings of this study revealed that a set of indicators characterizing individual modernity (i.e., egalitarianism) seems to corroborate previous research findings. Status—measured by education, occupation, and quality of residence—and urban factors are found to have the strongest effect on modernity.

Schnaiberg (1970a) conducted a study on a selected sample of married women in the city of Ankara along with four villages in Turkey. The purpose of this study was to examine modernity values across urban-rural settings. Forty-six items believed to represent the various dimensions associated with modernity were utilized. These included extended family ties, nuclear family structure, religion, exposure to mass media, environmental orientation, and production/consumption measures. Although this study concluded that people can be modern in one aspect and traditional in another, a common association among variables appears to center on what the author termed the
"emancipation complex," comprising mass media exposure, consumption behavior, and equal nuclear gender roles.

Rosen (1964) examined what he termed the "achievement syndrome" (achievement motivation and achievement values brought about by economic development) among selected samples in both the United States and Brazil. The findings of his study revealed low achievement scores among the Brazilian subjects as compared to the American respondents. The traditional values and norms of Brazilian society (i.e., familism) were found to have an inhibiting effect on the attainment of high levels of achievement.

Yang (1981) explored the association between social orientation and individual modernity among Chinese students in Taiwan. Those selected were 110 male and 108 female students at National Taiwan University. The results of this study appear to support the assumption that modern individuals are less socially oriented than traditional ones.

Rosen and La Raia (1972) researched the effects of industrialization on selected traditional and modern attitudes and behaviors of 816 married Brazilian women residing in rural and urban communities. The respondents were asked to identify items related to their roles as women, wives, and mothers. On the average, women residing in industrial areas were found to have a high level of personal efficacy, to entertain more egalitarian marital
relationships, to emphasize independence and achievement in rearing their children, and to possess more active world views than women in non-industrialized communities. Modern values and attitudes in women were found to be positively associated with education, occupation, social status, and involvement in voluntary organizations. Family size, both preferred and actual, appears to be negatively related to modernity.

The effect of modernization on family size in developing countries has also been documented (Poston & Gu, 1995). Poston, Briody, Trent, and Browning (1985) researched the relationship between selected modernization variables—economic activity, urbanization, education, and health conditions—and childlessness in Mexico. The findings of this study reveal that regions with high economic activities show the highest rates of childlessness. Among all the variables associated with modern behaviors, adoption of health-related factors was singled out as exerting the most significant effect on family size.

The status of the elderly changes in the process of social change. Traditional societies are characterized by high regard for the aged. However, as societies modernize, such a status tends to diminish (Cowgill & Holmes, 1972). Gilleard and Gurkan (1987), using 1980 census data of 67 provinces in Turkey, found that provinces with high levels of urbanization, industrialization, and economic activities have fewer elderly men who classified
themselves as heads of households. In contrast, elderly men in rural-agricultural areas were found to hold more influential and independent positions as heads of their families.

Kaplan and Huang (1976), in their examination of a Filipino community, found that education and occupation were positively associated with modern attitudes and values. Similarly, Armer and Youtz (1971) assayed the effects of formal education on individual modernity. They interviewed 591 students in an urban-nonindustrial Islamic community in Kano, Nigeria. After examining a number of traditional and modern values, the authors concluded that Western education has a definite effect on modern values, especially in modern orientations related to individual autonomy, faith in science, and future orientation.

Modernity Studies on the Arab World

Al-Haj (1988) investigated normative and behavioral changes brought about by modernization in an Arab community living in Israel. Although Al-Haj found little change with regard to patrilineal endogamy, the author reported a number of emerging modern trends in this community: modern consumption of amenities, money economy, changing determinants of spouse selection from filial to personal factors, and a shift in the definition of kinship from biological blood ties to affiliation based on town from which the
individuals originated. Education and exposure to mass media were among the strongest modernizing factors. Similarly, Mason (1978) studied the effect of oil development on the traditional structure of a Libyan community and noted the emergence of an entrepreneurial behavior among the locals of this community.

McCord and Lutfiyya (1972) attempted to investigate the extent of modern/traditional orientations in the Middle East (Jordan and Lebanon). The sample consisted of rural, semi-urban, and highly urban individuals. The findings of this study seem to support the widely-held assumption that there exists a common denominator or a universal set of modern values and attitudes characteristic of the modern individual. In particular, this study revealed that urban dwellers are more secular, more scientifically oriented, and more efficient than their traditional counterparts.

Davis and Davis (1995) and Davis (1995) observed the influences of modern imported images and education on the apparently changing gender relations in a Moroccan semirural town (Zawiya). Youths were found to be profoundly different from their parents and grandparents in terms of the ways they view choice of marriage partners, work of the spouse, increasing contacts between the sexes, and engagement in sexual behaviors.
Al-Nouri (1980) explored the interplay between tradition and modernity on marriage patterns in Libya by interviewing 280 college student respondents. Al-Nouri tried to assess the impact of tradition on several social dimensions, such as marriage options, selected sociocultural trends, and the norms of spouse selection. As a result of education, urbanization, female occupation, and outside influences, these trends were observed:

1. There was an apparent reduction in cousin marriages.
2. Spouse selection based on personal factors, rather than kinship-oriented arrangements, was gaining prominence.
3. Polygyny no longer enjoyed a wide-scale acceptance.
4. There were increasingly evolving class-based determinants of marriage (i.e., socioeconomic positions).
5. Egalitarianism was increasing.
6. The preference for male children was diminishing.
7. Neolocal residential patterns had greatly reduced the frequency of patrilocal marriages.

El-Islam, Malasi, and Abu-Dagga (1988) examined the impact of rapid modernization on the traditional and nontraditional values and attitudes among a selected sample of Kuwaiti and Arab parents in Kuwait. In general, their findings indicate that non-Kuwaiti Arab parents, due to their higher
educational attainment and exposure to Western values, have more liberal
social attitudes. The authors related these findings to the sudden
modernization experienced by the Kuwaiti society.

Generationalism as a Sociological Concept

The idea of generation as a concept valuable for explaining the
sociohistorical processes of change was first systematically presented by Karl
Mannheim (1952). According to Mannheim, generation is made up of a
number of actors who are born during a period of historical significance. Those
who are born into it share and experience with other members of the
generation a common set of events during the period of their birth and growth
into adulthood (Weltanschauung). The perceptions and meaningfulness of
these events in the individual lives of members of a generation may differ.

The variations in perceptions and experiences of historical events may
differ, depending upon the social and economic positions that members of a
generation enjoy at a point in time. In spite of these variations, the impact of
the events on the attitudes, opinions, values, and behaviors of a generation
bears considerable similarities. This occurs as comparable early socialization
practices bring about collective and partially homogenous perceptions and
responses to historical events.
Generations are replaced as their members die and children carry the legacy of their parents. The parental generation imprints its values and aspirations on the generation of children. These values and aspirations undergo change as children face new experiences and events unique to them. Conflicts between two generations arise as perceptions of events differ across generations, and aspirations change rapidly as new social, economic, and political conditions unfold. The collective identity of a generation can become so strong that it not only binds its own members together, but it also draws the younger and older generations into its fold.

The contact between the two generations—parents and children—is moderated by birth cohorts (interim) born between the parental and children's generation. The influence of these birth cohorts on the parental and children's generations is a function of the extent of intergenerational socialization in which the interim cohorts participate. Often, events which influence the life chances of a large number of people either create intergenerational discontinuity or foster alliances (Mannheim, 1952).

The concept of generation is mostly used discursively and loosely to differentiate between the old and the young. A large body of research, however, has accorded it prominence in the study of social change (Eisenstadt, 1956, 1964; Roberts, 1986; Ryder, 1965). This is because of the accelerated
revolutionary social phenomena brought about by the rapid modernization of the past half century (Mead, 1970; Reich, 1970).

A generational gap can exist between cohort or aggregate generations (e.g., Mannheim, 1952). This historical-consciousness perspective treats generational conflict as unavoidable and as primarily caused by the inevitable sociohistorical evolution of social institutions, leading eventually to severe conflict and polarization in values and attitudes between generations.

A second approach to the study of generations is the structural functional perspective (e.g., Eisenstadt, 1956). According to Bengtson, Furlong, and Laufer (1974), the structural functional perspective "attempts to assess more precisely how generations operate as dimensions of social structure, that is, how age groups reflect strain and imbalance in the social order and, by implication, how differentiations within age groups occur" (p. 5). This perspective assigns some degree of generational conflict but not to the extent that it would disrupt the social order.

A generational gap can also exist within the family (micro-level), and as such, it acquires the term lineage gap, focusing more on the perceptions, association, and interaction between parents and their children (Bengtson, Olander, & Haddad, 1976; Mancini & Blieszner, 1989). Within this perspective a number of scholars focused on differential perceptions in
continuity among generations and attested that children tend to exaggerate differences between themselves and their parents (see among others, Acock & Bengtson, 1980; Lerner, Karson, Meisels, & Knapp, 1975). These perceptions, according to Bengtson and Kuypers (1971), whether actual or perceived, result from: (a) the developmental factors of individuals who are at different stages of socialization and who are born into different historical periods; (b) the structural evolution of social institutions; (c) the increasing status position of the older generation; and (d) the psychological-developmental determinants of both generations, or the so-called "developmental stakes". According to the latter, parents tend to minimize differences, whereas children are more likely to maximize them, because parents, due to their long-term investment in their children, stand to lose more (Hagestad, 1981).

Hamer (1976) investigated generational ties in a traditional community in Ethiopia. Although the overall conclusion of this study did not allude to a serious conflict or a breakdown between parents and their children, it indicated an emerging generational gap due to the increasing adoption of Western educational style, money economy, and new political structures foreign to such a traditional society.
Payne, Summers, and Stewart (1973) examined value differences among three generations of Americans: college students, their parents, and their grandparents. Using an 85-item instrument to assess the amount of guilt in conjunction with selected moral types of behavior, this study found that differences between students and their parents were less than those between parents and grandparents. Age, maturation, and changing sex roles, on the one hand, and massive technological advances, on the other, were found to generate these differences. The authors predicted that the differences between students and their parents will intensify as both generations grow older.


Intergenerational Studies on the Arab World

There are few studies on the intergenerational-modernity gap in the Arab world. El-Islam (1983) contended that rigid parental control, exposure to outside influences, and the lack of parental supervision are the common causes for this conflict. Wardi (1967) also observed a discord between modernization in its Western form and the dominant traditional Iraqi culture
that has generated a new breed of secular generation whose identification with the past no longer exists.

El-Islam (1976) suggested that modern forces such as excessive exposure to mass media and the receiving of a formal education, along with a traditional/tribal political organization and extended family system, are the major sources of conflict between the young and their older generation in Qatari society.
CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FAMILISM, URBANISM, SECULARISM, AND MODERNITY ACROSS GENERATIONS

The conceptual model chosen to guide this research deals with two objectives. The first objective is to examine the extent of empirical support for modernization theory, which proposes several social-structural determinants of modernity. Modernization theory suggests that three dimensions—familism, urbanism, and secularism—specifically influence the level of modernity. Furthermore, the theory contends that the context of socialization into modern roles and behaviors may vary across age groups. The young are seen as active agents of social change, whereas the old are viewed as active yet resistant to social change. Thus, the presence of generations may moderate the amount of modernity. The second objective of this study is to examine the differences in the effects of familism, urbanism, and secularism on modernity among these two generations, mothers and daughters.
Familism, Modernity, and Generations

As new institutions and organizations fulfill the functions no longer provided by the family, young individuals find it beneficial and, at times, necessary to participate in formal institutions in order to attain the security once provided by their parents. The contacts these individuals develop with such institutions bring about changes in familial roles and relationships associated with emotional nucleation within the family setting. In the process, functions exclusively characteristic of families (e.g., socialization) are no longer idiosyncratic to the family. Metamessages—messages that the family passes to its young about the content of social norms—partly become the function of the formal social institutions (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974).

In Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or community and society, Toennies (1957) also differentiated between traditional and urban societies in terms of the nature of their modes of social relationships. The Gemeinschaft (community) is characterized by intimate and family-based relationships. Individuals in this type of social organization lose their autonomy to the collectivity of the family and the village. The Gesellschaft (society), on the other hand, is more or less similar to today's mass societies in which individuals are seen to enjoy impersonal, autonomous, competitive, and rational ways of life. This type of social organization is viewed by Toennies
(1957) as "a multitude of natural and artificial individuals, the wills and spheres of whom are in many relations with one another, and remain nevertheless independent of one another and devoid of mutual familiar relationships" (p. 76).

Durkheim (1949), while attempting to explain the course of societal transformation, distinguished between what he termed mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity exists when cohesion among members of society is the outcome of their resemblance or likenesses. This type of society is found in primitive social organizations. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, is a characteristic of highly developed and differentiated societies in which individuals are more dependent on formal societal institutions than on the family, clan, or tribe. Durkheim raised the question "Why does the individual, while becoming more autonomous, depend more upon society?"
The answer lies in "the growing development of the division of labor" (p. 37).
Similarly, Cooley's (1956) assumption of the substitution of a primary group by a secondary one is another example of how family structures are altered in the process of modernization.

Modernization theory categorizes individuals into two discrete and independent categories: the modern individual and his or her traditional counterpart. The latter is seen as trapped in the past, reluctant to change, and
enjoying a large patriarchal extended family under one roof. These forms of traditional familial organizations are expected to constrain the adoption of modern ways, for they encourage members of society to lose reliance on their own resources and talents. However, as societies become technologically developed, social ties become more individualized (Duncan & Schnore, 1959). Wirth (1938) observed that "the family as a unit of social life is emancipated from the larger kinship group characteristic of the country, and the individual members pursue their own diverging interests in their vocational, educational, religious, recreational, and political life" (p. 21), thus increasing their intake of modern influences.

A number of studies have examined the negative effect of extended family structure on individual modernity. Kahl (1968) studied a selected sample in Brazil and Mexico and found that familistic values are negatively correlated with values associated with modernity. Straus (1969), employing a sample of 448 rural-urban married women, examined what he termed a "kinship deterrent theory"--the negative effect of kinship on modernity--and found that respondents who frequently interact with relatives are more likely to have lower achievement values and possess fewer educational aspirations for their children.
The sweeping societal transformations generated by modernization impact generations differently. The mother generation was born into patriarchal families that emphasize the cohesion among family members as an important aspect of sustenance organization for production and consumption. The changes necessitated by the loss of function of the family are, in general, accommodated slowly and at times rejected by the mother generation. The daughter generation, however, is born during times of societal changes. The capacity and readiness of the young to adopt and accommodate changes in meaningful ways in their lives are far higher than those of the older individuals in the family. Ryder (1965) concurred that the younger generation is more likely to espouse values different from those of their parents, who are no longer adequate models. This is because they "are old enough to participate directly in the movements impelled by change, but not old enough to have become committed to an occupation, a residence, a family of procreation or a way of life" (p. 848). As a result, it can be assumed that the impact of familism on modernity among the mother generation is likely to be higher than its impact on modernity among the daughter generation (see Figures 1 and 2).

Urbanism, Modernity, and Generations

As noted earlier, the transformation from Gemeinschaft to Gessellschaft has been the focus of study by many of the pioneers in the field of social
change. Urbanism as a process is highly correlated with modernization. It is believed that extensive overtime exposure to urban institutions and structures has an inducing effect on modernity. During the initial stages of industrialization, there exist vast differences between rural and urban areas in terms of the accessibility and availability of social and economic opportunities. Urban settings, which promote social mobility through achievement criteria, generate the concepts of efficiency, spatial human interaction, and the development of complex human relationships. These facilitate socioeconomic mobility through achievement rather than ascription.

At a macro-level, urban areas vary in characteristics such as size, density, and heterogeneity. These properties, peculiar to urban settings, result from complex human, social, and economic relationships. The influx of a large number of people into cities has an individualizing and differentiating impact on the nature of their social organizations. This includes altering the residential patterns they once enjoyed in rural areas, limiting their opportunities to know each other personally, and creating a competitive social milieu which creates impersonal, bureaucratic economic institutions (Weinstein & Pillai, 1979). As the number of city dwellers increases, their concentration in certain areas intensifies. Consequently, social relationships become increasingly superficial, and the place of work is no longer the place of
residence. The end result of this process is the emergence of a heterogeneous, stratified, money-economy based, institutionally regulated, and mass-media-manipulated society (Wirth, 1938).

The modernizing effects of urbanism have been more recently examined by a number of researchers. Fischer (1972, 1975, 1982, 1984, 1995), Jang and Alba (1992), and Wilson (1986, 1991) examined the effect of urbanism on the values and norms of urban dwellers and found that cities, unlike rural settings, are more likely to espouse nontraditional subcultures.

The availability of educational institutions and diverse mass-media choices contributes to the effect of urbanism on modernity. Education is an attitude-modifying factor through which individuals "acquire knowledge, are exposed to values and develop modes of thinking" (Selznick, Gertrude, & Steinberg, 1969, p. 93). Mass-media, on the other hand, diffuse the values and ethics of hard work, individualism, consumerism, and the like (Hornik, 1988; Lerner, 1958).

Given that the duration and the age at exposure to urban experiences are likely to influence the readiness for change and hence the susceptibility to modern ideas and values, young urban persons are likely to be more modern than their older counterparts. This is because the complex sets of stimuli offered by technological changes in urban centers are far more easily absorbed
by the younger generation than by the members of the older generation. The
ability to use and deal with urban characteristics, such as anonymity, for
personal gains and advancement is higher among the younger generation than
the older. Thus, the impact of urbanism on the daughter generation's
modernity is higher than that of their mothers (see Figures 1 and 2).

Secularism, Modernity, and Generations

The third explanation of modernity is secularism. Perhaps one of the
most salient consequences of industrialization is the emergence of educational
institutions, with the resulting spread of mass literacy, which is more likely to
prompt individuals to cast doubts on their ideological beliefs and practices by
questioning their usefulness and accuracy (Roof, 1976). Further, education
provides people with new ways of thinking, or what Stouffer (1955) termed
"contact effects," which generate contradicting elements between the illogical
nature of religious values and the realities of life, which in turn leads to the
adoption of a more secular view of life. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism, Weber (1958) maintained that one of the barriers to the
development of capitalism in early 17th-century Europe was the prominence of
traditionalism, or what Weber termed "traditional modes of action" in which
religion was a primary source of verifying knowledge. Such a prominence of
religion was seen by Weber to have negatively hindered the development of the non-Western societies on the Asiatic continent.

The transition from agricultural societies to industrial societies leads to the restructuring of sustenance organization, which necessitates rational behaviors based on cost-benefit approaches and optimal use of science and technology. Belief in rational approaches to problem solving attenuates the role of religious institutions in the day-to-day life of industrial society. In addition, new jobs and occupations are likely to reduce the time and energy available for the performance of religious rituals and practices. Consequently, religion no longer becomes a part of the total social institutions. Rather, it becomes a privatized matter in people's lives (Berger, 1967; Parsons, 1963) because it has lost its primacy over other societal institutions (Wilson, 1985).

Among the several indicators of secular/religious behavior are group involvement, belief-orthodoxy, religious socialization, and sociodemographic factors. Group involvement is built on the premise that religion is a collective phenomenon. Individuals who enjoy stronger ties with their secondary groups than with their primary groups are more likely to be less religiously committed (White, 1968). Moreover, given that modernization brings about an alteration in the structure of social relationships, modern individuals are likely to interact more frequently with secondary groups, hence making them less
inclined to be religious. Belief-orthodoxy is thought to have a strong correlation with religious involvement; that is, those with high levels of belief orthodoxy are more likely to become involved in religious activities (Hoge & Carroll, 1978; Stark & Glock, 1968). Religious socialization has an impact on the individual's secular/religious orientations, for it "includes the transfer of attitudes and social statuses, as well as a process whereby individuals are channeled into friendships and experiences that maintain the beliefs and attitudes of the former generation" (Cornwall, 1989, p. 589). However, in modern societies, socialization is primarily undertaken by formal social institutions such as mass media and formal educational institutions. A modern individual's religiosity, therefore, is less likely to surpass the secularizing influences of mass society.

Sociodemographic variables have been found to have an impact on religious involvement (Hoge & Carroll, 1978; Welch, 1981). People who are not socially and economically gratified are more inclined to be religious (Glock, Ringer, & Babbie 1967; Glock & Stark, 1965).

Religion is a family matter (Coleman, 1964). The commitment to religion is brought about by religious socialization processes that instill religious values from generation to generation. Institutions such as the family and religious organizations play a crucial role in this process of religious
socialization, but the context of this socialization is dramatically altered with the onset of the forces of modernization. Inkeles (1969) classified the factors leading to modernity into early and late socialization experiences. Early socialization centers on education, while late socialization includes industrialization, migration, travel, and exposure to mass media. As the young are socialized into religious ways of conduct, the existence of secular values presents new choices, which were absent when the older generations were socialized into religious ways of conduct and behavior. The young are more likely to be open to the new ideals of secularism than the old. At higher levels of secularism, the likelihood of being modern increases (see Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1

The proposed theoretical model (the daughter generation)

![Diagram for the daughter generation]

Figure 2

The proposed theoretical model (the mother generation)

![Diagram for the mother generation]
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Three independent dimensions—familism, urbanism, and secularism—were assumed to affect the levels of modernity in two generations: mothers and daughters. This section deals with instrumentation, the conceptualization and operationalization of variables, the hypotheses of the study, and population and sampling.

Instrumentation

Factors such as familism, urbanism, and secularism, which are assumed to affect modernity, are sociopsychological attributes. Data from two randomly selected samples, Emerian female college students and their mothers, were collected. Two identical survey instruments containing items related to the various sub-dimensions of familism, urbanism, secularism, modernity, and demographic characteristics were designed. Due to the fact that the original design of these survey instruments was in English, a parallel translation to Arabic was undertaken by the researcher prior to his travel to the setting of the study. Throughout the process of translation, a number of
precautionary steps to ensure precision and compatibility were undertaken. Among these were consulting with an expert on Arabic Language, pilot-testing, and providing the student respondents with certain guidelines so as to help their mothers complete their survey questionnaires.

Conceptualization and Operationalization of Variables

The hypothesized model of this study suggests three independent dimensions: familism, urbanism, and secularism, all of which are assumed to influence the dependent variable, individual modernity, across generations. These dimensions are conceptualized and measured as follows:

The Dependent Dimension

The dependent dimension of this study is individual modernity. Individual modernity refers to the set of attitudes, values, and ways of thinking and acting that enable the individual to participate effectively in a modern society. The modernity dimension is measured by the OM Scale--overall modernity--(Smith & Inkeles, 1966). This scale is a by-product and shortened form of a larger scale that was utilized to examine individual modernity in 5,500 men from six developing countries: Argentina, Chile, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Nigeria.

The OM-Scale (Forms 5 and 6) consisted of six sub-dimensions containing items variously concerning such attitudinal topics as aspiration;
changing perception and valuation; political identification; efficacy; family planning; and awareness. The attitudinal items are scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). The awareness items are scored from 1 (always) to 4 (never), with a total range of 21 to 84. Low scores signify high levels of modernity, and high scores convey low levels of modernity. Some items that have reversed scoring are rescored to conform to the general patterns of scoring. An example of the attitudinal items is: A person's high education and special knowledge are the most important qualification for holding high office, as contrasted with family background, devotion to traditional ways, and popularity. An example of the awareness items is: How often do you read newspapers or magazines from abroad?

The reported reliability of the OM-Scale ranged from the lowest in Pakistan (0.622) to the highest in India (0.736). Similarly, the reliability of the awareness scale varied from the lowest in Pakistan (0.660) to the highest in India (0.769). With the construction of this scale, Smith and Inkeles (1966) concluded that they had constructed the following:

A theoretically broad, empirically tight, administratively simple measure of individual modernity which has been widely tested cross-nationally and can be used with little or no adaptation under all field conditions in either research or practical work which requires one to
judge the modernity of individuals or groups in developing countries.

(p. 376)

The Independent Dimensions: Familism, Urbanism, and Secularism

Familism. Familism is strictly defined here to refer to the extended type of family, such as that of the "Islamic family. According to Abdal-Ati (1974), the Islamic family is an aggregate of individuals who are "related to one another through blood ties and/or marital bonds and whose relatedness is such that it entails mutual role expectations" (p. 38). In this study, familism was measured by a revalidated and revised construct initially designed to reflect five sub-dimensions of familism (Heller, 1970, 1976). These include: (a) belonging, the feeling on the part of all family members that they belong to the family as one group; (b) integration, the extent to which individual activities are geared toward the achievement of family interests and objectives; (c) sharing, the exchange of material goods, property, and assistance among family members; (d) concern, the perpetuation of the family as one unit; and (e) mutual aid, family-oriented relationships between parents and their children.

The sample of this study consists of two generations: female college students and their mothers. For this reason, a number of items in the familism scale had to be modified. Two items, one for the daughter generation and the other for the mother generation, follow as examples:
Daughter generation: If your mother has a medical bill of $5,000 which she cannot pay, you are morally obligated to pay this debt.

Mother generation: If your daughter has a medical bill of $5,000 which she cannot pay, you are morally obligated to pay this debt.

The five sub-dimensions of the familism scale constitute a total of 15 items. With a score range of 1 to 4 for a single item, 1 (strongly agree), to 4 (strongly disagree), the theoretical range of total scores is from 15-60. Low scores indicate high levels of familism, whereas high scores refer to low levels of familism.

Constructed and published in 1970, the 15-item familism scale was first validated by means of recursive validation, using the same respondents to observe any error variance. Four questions were used as validation checks. These questions were related to the respondents' conception of the term family, visiting with the extended members of the family, frequency of attendance at family gatherings, and residential preference. These four variables were found to be significantly related to familism. Cross-validation procedures based on interviews of 334 subjects residing in three different regions of the U.S., along with a test-retest rewording technique, were also undertaken to further revalidate this scale (Heller, 1976).
Urbanism. Urbanism refers to the cultural patterns, attitudes, and values associated with residing in an urban area (Streib, 1970). For the purpose of this research, a factor-based scale was constructed to measure this independent dimension. Previous research findings (Fischer, 1972, 1973, 1995; Wirth, 1938) have revealed a number of characteristics associated with living in highly urbanized centers. Among these are anonymity, autonomy, and unconventionality. The sub-dimension anonymity is used here to refer to such items as the frequency of interaction with neighbors, sharing confidences such as the confinement of residential addresses to close friends and relatives, and the tendency of not trusting strangers.

The sub-dimension autonomy contains questions pertaining to whether or not one prefers to live alone, independent from parents and relatives. It also includes the preference of having a relative neighbor as opposed to a stranger. The third sub-dimension of urbanism, unconventionality, refers to any behavior that deviates from the social norms (Fischer, 1995). This includes tolerance of crime, as reflected in the respondents' attitudes toward capital punishment, and having a neighbor from a different religious or ethnic background. The urbanism scale is scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree), with some items reversed to conform to the general scoring patterns.
The theoretical range of urbanism scale is from 8 to 32. Low scores indicate a high level of urbanism, and high scores convey a low level of urbanism.

Secularism. Secularism is used here to refer not to the widely-held assumption purporting secularism as the total absence of religion in society. Rather, secularism is conceptualized here to refer specifically to the impact of religion on the individual level, regardless of the persistence and/or the absence of its societal significance. Empirically, secularism is measured by a religiosity scale (Faulkner & DeJong, 1965). This scale was originally designed to measure several sub-dimensions of traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs. For this reason, the scale was modified in order to make it relevant to an Islamic society such as that of the United Arab Emirates. For example, items referring to the Holy Bible and church were replaced by references to the Holy Koran and the mosque. Similarly, items related to issues of ultimate existence, such as the story of creation versus evolution, were omitted because they would be offensive to some respondents, particularly in the mother generation. The original scale is composed of five sub-dimensions of religiosity, consisting of 12 items. These are the ideological sub-scale, ritualistic sub-scale, experiential sub-scale, intellectual sub-scale, and consequential sub-scale. The theoretical range of this scale is from 12 to 33. Low scores indicate high levels of religiosity, whereas high scores reflect low levels of religiosity. No evidence for validity of
the religiosity scale was reported. As to the various sub-scales, the following reproducibility coefficients were obtained: ideological, 0.94; ritualistic, 0.92; experiential, 0.92; intellectual, 0.93; and consequential, 0.90.

Hypotheses of the Study

Six hypotheses derived from the theoretical model constitute the major hypotheses of this study. These are as follows:

1. The higher the level of familism, the lower the level of modernity.
   
   Familism \rightarrow Modernity

2. The impact of familism on the level of modernity in the mother generation is higher than the impact of familism on the level of modernity in the daughter generation.

3. The higher the level of urbanism, the higher the level of modernity.
   
   Urbanism \rightarrow Modernity

4. The impact of urbanism on the level of modernity in the daughter generation is higher than the impact of urbanism on the level of modernity in the mother generation.

5. The higher the level of secularism, the higher the level of modernity.
   
   Secularism \rightarrow Modernity
6. The impact of secularism on the level of modernity in the daughter generation is higher than the impact of secularism on the level of modernity in the mother generation.

Population and Sampling

The population of this study is full-time female college students attending United Arab Emirates University, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, during the Spring 1996 semester, and their mothers. In case of the possibility of the death of the biological mother, the term mother was used here flexibly to include a female guardian of the daughter respondents. A number of reasons called for exclusively limiting this study to same-gender generation members. First, the university under study housed separate campuses for males and females. Second, it was undertaken to ensure comparability on a straight descendent basis (Gallagher, 1974). Third, in patriarchal cultures such as that of the United Arab Emirates, socialization of children is characterized by a gender division of labor. Girls are more likely to be reared by mothers. Thus mothers have more significant influences on daughters than fathers. Fourth, female students were overrepresented. In academic year 1994-1995, out of the total enrollment of 11,576, females numbered 8,963.
A systematic sampling technique was utilized for the purpose of the selection of the respondents. Random selection is a crucial concept in the theory of probability sampling. It ensures that "each element has an equal chance of selection independent of any other event in the selection process" (Babbie, 1989, p. 172).

Upon arriving at the setting of the study, the researcher obtained permission from and consulted with the associate dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences/United Arab Emirates University. The researcher was given a copy of the registration roster. With a population size of 4,000 students and a sampling interval of 20, the process of the selection of the respondents yielded a sample size of 200 students. A number of faculty members delivered the survey questionnaires to the selected students. Upon the completion of the survey by the daughter generation, each respondent was asked to have her mother fill out the designed questionnaires. The cooperation rendered by the associate dean of the college and its faculty members played a crucial role in the acceleration of the completion of these survey instruments. A total of 145 female students completed the survey at the classroom level, yielding a return rate of 73 percent. Of these students, 106 were successful in having their mothers fill out their intended questionnaires, with a return rate of 53 percent.
CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Data analysis was conducted in four stages. The first was the descriptive stage, in which frequency distributions, measures of central tendency and variability of all variables, sub-scales, and scales in the model were presented. The second stage of analysis utilized a t-test to examine mean differences in the extent of modern, familistic, urban, and religious orientations of the two generations. The third stage employed a regression analysis to further test the assumption of no cross generational differences in the proposed processes of modernity. In addition, the reliabilities of the scales were presented. The fourth statistical test undertaken was a structural equation modeling approach. This technique, known as LISREL (Linear Structure Relation), is an advanced extension of multiple regression analysis and analysis of variance. It is a causal modeling method consisting of two interrelated models: the measurement model and the structural equation model, which Joreskog and Sorbom (1983) described:
The measurement model specifies how the latent variables or hypothetical constructs are measured in terms of the observed variables and is used to describe the measurement properties (validities and reliabilities) of the observed variables. The structural equation model specifies the causal relationships among the latent variables and is used to describe the causal effects and the amount of unexplained variance. (p. 3)

The Daughter Generation

Descriptive Analysis

Demographic Data

Participating in this study were 145 female students. The descriptive analysis revealed the following demographic characteristics:

Table 1 shows that the age of the daughter generation ranges from 18 years to 27 years. Age group 18-20 years constituted 52 percent, followed by age group 21-23 years, with 43 percent. Age group 24-27 had the lowest percentage, 5, and a frequency of (9). Table 2 presents the academic classification of the respondents. Accordingly, 19 percent (27) freshmen, (39) percent (56) sophomores, 34 percent (48) juniors, and 8 percent (12) seniors participated in this study. As to their marital status, 91 percent (132) are single, as opposed to nine percent (13) who are married (Table 3). The
percentage of those living at home with parents, 94 percent (136), far exceeds those who live alone, six percent (9) (Table 4). As shown in Table 5, urban dwellers appeared to constitute the majority of the respondents, 83 percent (120). Table 6 indicates that 77 percent (83) of the daughter generation speak one foreign language, 11 percent (12) speak two foreign languages, and 12 percent (13) speak three or more foreign languages. Finally, Table 7 illustrates that 70 percent (96) of the respondents have traveled abroad.

Table 1

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-23</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Academic Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic classification</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freshman</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophomore</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Patterns of Living

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Live with parents</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Rural/urban Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm/village or city</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm/village</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by the Number of Spoken Foreign Languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of languages spoken</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One foreign language</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two foreign languages</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or more foreign languages</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation by Travel Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traveled abroad</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Descriptive Analysis of the Variables and Sub-scales in the Model (the Daughter Generation)

The Dependent Dimension: Modernity

As previously illustrated, modernity as a dependent dimension was measured by six sub-scales, including aspiration, changing perception and
valuation, political identification, efficacy, family planning preference, and awareness. Together, these sub-scales constituted a 21-item composite scale. The obtained frequencies and measures of central tendency and variability—means, medians and standard deviations—revealed the following results:

The first sub-scale, aspiration, had two variables. The first explored the respondents' involvement in issues of importance to their country. Of the daughter generation, 76 percent (110) strongly agreed and 24 percent (35) agreed that they had been involved in issues related to the well-being of their country, with a mean of 1.24, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.43. The second variable suggested that, if possible, the respondents should acquire as much education as they could. Of the respondents, 88 percent (127) strongly agreed and 12 percent (18) agreed with having as much education as possible. This variable had a mean of 1.12, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.33.

The aspiration sub-scale had a theoretical range of 2 to 8, with a mean of 2.37, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.58. These results indicate high levels of aspiration among the daughter generations (Table 8).

The second modernity sub-scale, changing perception and valuation, reflected the respondents' flexibility and willingness to undertake new measures to improve their statuses and those of others. Two variables made up this sub-
scale. The first examined the respondents' attitudes toward enhancing their productivity by enrolling in a computer training program. Accordingly, 70 percent of the respondents (100) strongly agreed, and 30 percent (44) agreed, with a mean of 1.32, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.48. The second variable signified the extent to which the respondents viewed women as having as many rights as men. Of the respondents, 54 percent (78) strongly agreed, 38 percent (55) agreed, 7 percent (10) disagreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.56, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.69.

The theoretical range of the changing perception and valuation sub-scale was from 2 to 8. The mean was 2.88, median was 3, and standard deviation was 0.86. These results indicate high levels of flexibility and willingness to improve status among the daughter generation (Table 9).

The third modernity sub-scale is political identification. It contained four variables exploring attitudes toward the most important qualifications for holding a high office. Specifically, the respondents were asked to choose whether family background, devotion to old and honorable ways, popularity, or education and knowledge was the most important qualification for a person to hold an office. Family background generated a percentage of 41 (60) who strongly disagreed, 36 percent (52) disagreed, 20 percent (29) strongly agreed,
and 3 percent (4) agreed that family background was the most important qualification for holding an office. This variable had a mean of 1.84, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.84. The second variable—devotion to old and honorable ways—had a percentage of 33 (48) who strongly disagreed, 47 percent (68) disagreed, 17 percent (24) agreed, and 3 percent (5) strongly agreed with devotion to old ways as being the most important qualification for holding an office. The mean of this variable was 1.90, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.79. The third variable—popularity—had 46 percent (67) of the respondents who strongly disagreed, 41 percent (58) disagreed, 10 percent (15) agreed, and 3 percent (5) strongly agreed that popularity was the most important qualification for holding an office, with a mean of 1.71, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.79. The final variable—education and knowledge—had 77 percent (111) and 23 percent (33), respectively, who strongly agreed or agreed that education and knowledge were the most important qualifications for holding a high office, with a mean of 1.25, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.48.

The political identification sub-scale had a theoretical range from 4 to 16, with a mean of 6.70, median of 7, and standard deviation of 2.07. These results convey high levels of modern political identification among the daughter generation (Table 10).
The fourth sub-scale of modernity—efficacy—reflected the respondents' attitudes across two categories of variables. The first category involved three variables, including hard work as being the most needed for the welfare of their country, as opposed to God's help and good luck. Hard work was conceptualized to reflect modern attitudes, whereas God's help and good luck were expected to indicate traditional ones. Accordingly, 93 percent of the respondents (134) strongly agreed, 6 percent (9) agreed, 1 percent (2) disagreed or strongly disagreed with hard work, with a mean of 1.10, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.38; 73 percent (105) strongly agreed, 17 percent (25) agreed, and 10 percent (15) disagreed with God's help, with a mean of 3.56, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.84. Concerning good luck, 30 percent (44) strongly agreed, 36 percent (52) agreed, 27 percent (39) disagreed, and 7 percent (10) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 2.10, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.92.

The second category of variables of the efficacy sub-scale inquired whether it was very beneficial, somewhat beneficial, somewhat harmful, or very harmful that scholars in universities were studying such things as to what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant. The results were as follows: very beneficial, 24 percent (35) strongly agreed, 50 percent (73) agreed, 12 percent (17) disagreed, and 14 percent (20)
strongly disagreed, with a mean of 2.15, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.95; somewhat beneficial, 24 percent (35) strongly agreed, 58 percent (84) agreed, 12 percent (17) disagreed, and 6 percent (8) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.99, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.77; somewhat harmful, 27 percent (39) strongly disagreed, 50 percent (72) disagreed, 17 percent (25) agreed, and 6 percent (9) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.03, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.83; very harmful, 39 percent (56) strongly disagreed, 42 percent (61) disagreed, 10 percent (15) agreed, and 9 percent (13) strongly agreed, with a mean of 1.90, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.92.

The efficacy sub-scale had a theoretical range of 7 to 28, with a mean of 14.83, median of 15, and standard deviation of 3.25. The overall results suggest high levels of efficacy among the daughter generation (Table 11).

The fifth modernity sub-scale was family planning preference. Two variables made up this sub-scale. The first variable asked the respondents if the number of children should be limited so that parents could take better care of those they already have. Of the respondents, 9 percent (14) strongly agreed, 28 percent (40) agreed, 29 percent (42) disagreed, and 34 percent (49) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 2.87, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.99. The second variable explored the respondents' attitudes toward family
planning by their responses to the statement: It is wrong for a man and his wife to limit the number of their children. Of the respondents, 8 percent (12) strongly disagreed, 34 percent (49) disagreed, 27 percent (39) agreed, and 31 percent (45) strongly agreed. The mean of this variable was 2.81, median was 3, and standard deviation was 0.97.

The family planning preference sub-scale had a theoretical range of 2 to 8, with a mean of 5.68, median of 6, and standard deviation of 1.90. These results reveal mixed scores of family planning preference among the daughter generation (Table 12).

Finally, the awareness sub-scale examined the awareness levels of the respondents by four variables. The first variable—listening to or watching local news—generated 23 percent (33) of the respondents who contended that they always listened to or watched local news, 54 percent (79) who did so often, and 23 percent (33) who did so rarely. The mean of this variable was 2, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.68. The second variable—listening to or watching world news—had 16 percent (23) of the respondents who always listened to or watched foreign news, 52 percent (75) who did so often, 29 percent (41) who did so rarely, and 3 percent (5) who never did so. The mean of this variable was 2.19, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.74. The third variable—reading local newspapers or magazines—had 41 percent (59) of
the respondents who said that they always read their local press, 48 percent (69) who said that they did so often, and 11 percent (16) who contended that they rarely did so. The mean of this variable was 1.70, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.66. For the final variable--reading newspapers or magazines from abroad--the respondents, 11 percent (16) said that they always did so, 31 percent (45) often did so, 46 percent (66) rarely did so, and 12 percent (18) never did so, with a mean of 2.59, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.85.

The awareness sub-scale had a theoretical range of 4 to 16, with a mean of 8.47, median of 8, and standard deviation of 2.13. These results indicate high levels of awareness among the daughter generation (Table 13).

Table 8

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Aspiration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(76) (24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(88) (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Changing Perception and Valuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Political Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devotion</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>$\bar{x}$</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard work</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God's help</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.84</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Good luck</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
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<td>0.77</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(42)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-scale   | 14.83 | 15 | 3.25 |
Table 12

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Family Planning Preference**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>SD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Limit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9 )</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No limit</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8 )</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 13

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Awareness**

<table>
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</thead>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign news</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(16)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Read</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<td>(41)</td>
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<td>(11)</td>
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<td>(46)</td>
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</table>
The Independent Dimensions

The independent dimensions of this study are familism, urbanism, and religiosity. The descriptive analysis of the daughter generation revealed the following results:

Familism. A 15-item composite scale was employed to measure the familistic orientation of the daughter generation. This scale consisted of five sub-scales, including: belonging, integration, sharing, concern, and mutual aid. The first familism sub-scale--belonging--consisted of three variables, all of which examined the extent of the feeling of all family members that they belong to the family as one group. The first variable explored the respondents' attitudes toward a situation in which a family member is insulted or injured and whether they would feel more strongly about it than if the injured person were not a member of the family. Of the respondents, 81 percent (118) strongly agreed and 19 percent (27) agreed, with a mean of 1.19, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.39. The second variable asked whether, if a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let herself be influenced by outsiders to change these views. Of the respondents, 68 percent (98) strongly agreed, 26 percent (37) agreed, 6 percent (10) disagreed, with a mean of 1.40, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.64. The third variable of the familism sub-dimension--belonging--examined the respondents'
willingness to participate more with their family as a group. Among the respondents, 83 percent (120) strongly agreed, 16 percent (16) agreed, and 1 percent (2) disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.19, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.42.

The theoretical range of the belonging sub-scale was from 3 to 12. The mean was 3.77, median was 3, and standard deviation was 1.01. These results indicate high levels of familistic belonging among the daughter generation (Table 14).

The second familism sub-scale—integration—was designed to measure the extent to which individual activities are geared toward the achievement of family interests and objectives. Three variables were employed for this purpose. The first variable stated to the respondents that they owed it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests. Among the respondents, 68 percent (98) strongly agreed, 26 percent (37) agreed, and 6 percent (10) disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.40, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.64. The second variable of the integration sub-scale inquired whether a person would find a new job if her current job ran against her family's values. Eighty percent (116) of the respondents strongly agreed, 16 percent (23) agreed, and 4 percent (6) disagreed, with a mean of 1.25, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.55.
The third variable of the integration sub-scale stated to the respondents that they should always talk over their important life decisions with family members before taking action. Seventy percent (104) of the respondents strongly agreed, 27 percent (39) agreed, and 1 percent (2) disagreed, with a mean of 1.30, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.49.

The theoretical range of the integration sub-scale was from 3 to 12. The mean was 3.94, median was 4, and standard deviation was 1.14. This analysis reveals high levels of familistic integration among the daughter generation (Table 15).

The third familism sub-scale, sharing, explored the extent of exchange of material goods, property, and assistance among family members. This sub-scale contained three variables. The first variable examined the respondents' willingness to share their homes with the brothers and sisters of their husbands. Accordingly, 47 percent (67) strongly agreed, 51 percent (73) agreed, and 2 percent (4) disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.58, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.60. The second variable solicited the respondents' attitudes in regard to this statement: Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their children. Of the respondents, 94 percent (136) strongly agreed and 6 percent (8) agreed, with a mean of 1.07, median of 1,
and standard deviation of 0.28. The third and final variable of the sharing sub-scale asked the respondents whether, if one of their parents had a medical bill of $5,000 which he or she could not pay, they were morally obligated to pay the debt. Ninety percent (133) strongly agreed, and 8 percent (11) agreed. The mean of this variable was 1.08, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.27.

The sharing sub-scale had a theoretical range of 3 to 12, a mean of 3.73, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.80. This analysis indicates high levels of familistic sharing among the daughter generation (Table 16).

The fourth sub-scale of familism, concern, reflected the perpetuation of the family as one unit. This sub-scale involved three variables. The first variable asked the respondents if marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than as creating new families. Of the respondents, 76 percent (110) strongly agreed, 20 percent (29) agreed, and 4 percent (6) disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.28, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.54. The second variable probed the respondents' attitudes toward the importance of the family name to be carried on. Among the respondents, 95 percent (138) strongly agreed and 5 percent (7) agreed, with a mean of 1.05, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.22. The third variable stated to the respondents that keeping the family going is a very important reason for sons
and daughters to expect to marry and have children. Seventy percent (103) of the respondents strongly agreed, 22 percent (32) agreed, 6 percent (8) disagreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.37, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.66.

The sub-scale, concern, had a theoretical range of 3 to 12, a mean of 3.70, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.07. These results show high levels of familistic concern among the daughter generation (Table 17).

The fifth and final sub-scale of familism, mutual aid, measured the extent of family-oriented relationships between parents and their children. This sub-scale consisted of three variables. The first variable suggested that married children should live close to their parents so that they could help each other. Among the respondents, 50 percent (72) strongly agreed, 39 percent (56) agreed, 10 percent (15) disagreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.63, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.72. The second variable of the familism sub-scale, mutual aid, reflected the respondents' attitudes toward this item: It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents. Ninety-six percent (139) of the respondents strongly agreed and 4 percent (6) agreed, with a mean of 1.04, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.20. The final variable of the mutual
aid sub-scale explored the respondents' attitudes in regard to the sharing of as many activities as possible by married children and their parents. In response, 89 percent (129) strongly agreed, and 11 percent (16) agreed, with a mean of 1.11, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.31.

The theoretical range of the mutual aid sub-scale was from 3 to 12, mean was 3.79, median was 4, and standard deviation was 0.91. These results suggest high levels of familistic mutual aid among the daughter generation (Table 18).

Table 14

| Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Belonging |
|---------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Variables** | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | X | MDN | SD |
|**Member** | 118 (81) | 27 (19) | | | 1.19 | 1 | 0.39 |
|**Moral** | 98 (68) | 37 (26) | 10 (6) | | 1.40 | 1 | 0.64 |
|**Soci** | 120 (83) | 16 (16) | 2 (1) | | 1.19 | 1 | 0.42 |
|**Sub-scale** | | | | | 3.77 | 3 | 1.01 |
### Table 15

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Integration**

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>( \bar{x} )</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(6)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(27)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td>1.14</td>
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### Table 16

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Sharing**

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<th>4</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.73</td>
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</table>
Table 17

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Concern

<table>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td>1.28</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0.66</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.07</td>
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</table>

Table 18

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Mutual Aid

<table>
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<th>4</th>
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<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>(39)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Urbanism. Three urbanism sub-scales were utilized to measure the urban attitudes of the daughter generation: anonymity, autonomy, and unconventionality, all of which were made up of eight variables. The first urbanism sub-scale, anonymity, contained three variables. The first variable stated that neighbors should visit each other as often as possible. Of the respondents, 3 percent (5) strongly disagreed, 17 percent (24) disagreed, 67 percent (96) agreed, 13 percent (19) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.90, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.66. The second variable contended that personal affairs such as phone numbers and residential addresses should be kept private. Thirty-seven percent (53) of the respondents strongly agreed, 47 percent (68) agreed, 14 percent (20) disagreed, and 2 percent (3) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.81, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.75. The third variable of the anonymity sub-scale probed the respondents' attitudes toward rendering help to someone they did not know. Of the respondents, 4 percent (6) strongly disagreed, 19 percent (28) disagreed, 50 percent (72) agreed, and 27 (38) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.99, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.79.

The theoretical range of the anonymity sub-scale was from 3 to 12, mean was 7.69, median was 8, and standard deviation was 1.43. These results
suggest moderate levels of urban anonymity among the daughter generation (Table 19).

The second urbanism sub-scale, autonomy, consisted of three variables. The first variable assessed the respondents' attitudes toward living alone, independent of parents and relatives. Five percent (7) of the respondents strongly agreed, 12 percent (17) agreed, 41 percent (59) disagreed, and 42 percent (60) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 3.20, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.84. The second variable of autonomy investigated the respondents' attitudes toward residing in a neighborhood where nobody knew them. Four percent (6) of the respondents strongly agreed, 4 percent (6) agreed, 32 percent (47) disagreed, and 60 percent (86) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 3.47, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.76.

The third and final variable of autonomy assayed the respondents' attitudes toward borrowing money from relatives or friends. Of the respondents, 8 percent (11) strongly disagreed, 21 percent (30) disagreed, 61 percent (89) agreed, and 10 percent (15) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.74, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.74.

The theoretical range of the urban autonomy sub-scale was from 3 to 12. The mean was 9.41, median was 10, standard deviation was 1.70. These
scores reveal low levels of urban autonomy among the daughter generation (Table 20).

The third and final urbanism sub-scale, unconventionality, referred to any form of attitudes that deviates from the social norms of a society. Two variables constituted this sub-scale. The first variable examined the respondents' attitudes toward capital punishment. Accordingly, 7 percent (10) strongly disagreed, 12 percent (17) disagreed, 35 percent (50) agreed, and 46 percent (67) strongly agreed. The mean of this variable was 3.21, median was 3, and standard deviation was 0.91. The second variable of the sub-scale, urban unconventionality, measured the respondents' attitudes toward having a neighbor from a different religious or racial/ethnic background. Twenty-six percent (37) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the item that "it makes a difference to have a neighbor from a different religious or racial/ethnic background;" 61 percent (89) disagreed, 8 percent (12) agreed, and 5 percent (7) strongly agreed. The mean of this variable was 1.92, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.73.

The theoretical range of the urban unconventionality sub-scale was from 2 to 8, the mean was 5.12, median was 5, and standard deviation was 1.31. These results indicate moderate levels of urban unconventionality among the daughter generation (Table 21).
Table 19

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Anonymity

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td>(67)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Render</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrow</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Unconventionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differ</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religiosity. Initially, the religiosity scale was composed of five sub-scales. However, due to problems associated with reliability testing (e.g., lack of variations), two sub-scales had to be eliminated. These were the intellectual and consequential sub-scales. As a result, three sub-scales of religiosity were utilized: ideological, ritualistic, and experiential. These sub-scales measured the levels of the religious commitment of the respondents, with a total of seven variables. The ideological sub-scale involved two variables. The first variable asked the respondents if they believed that the world will come to an end according to the will of God. Of the respondents, 99 percent (144) asserted that they believed such a statement, and 1 percent (1) was uncertain about it, with a mean of 1, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.08. The
second variable probed the respondents' attitudes toward the necessity for a person to repent before God will forgive his or her sins. Ninety-nine percent (144) contended that God's forgiveness would come only after repentance, and only 1 percent (1) believed that God did not demand repentance, with a mean of 1.01, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.08.

The theoretical range of the ideological sub-scale was from 2 to 6, the mean was 2.01, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.12. These results reveal high levels of ideological religiosity among the daughter generation (Table 22).

The second sub-scale of religiosity, ritualistic, contained three variables. The first variable asked the respondents how often during a week they have read the holy Koran and other religious literature. Thirty-eight percent (54) of the respondents said that they read the holy Koran every day, 60 percent (87) every other day, and 2 percent (3) asserted that they never read the Koran, with a mean of 1.65, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.52. The second variable of the religiosity sub-scale, ritualistic, inquired about the respondents' frequency of performing Friday prayer. Eighty-nine percent (122) of the respondents reported that they always performed Friday prayer, 9 percent (13) said often, and 2 percent (3) said never, with a mean of 1.14, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.40. The third and final variable of the ritualistic sub-
scale investigated whether prayer was a regular part of the respondents' behavior or if they prayed primarily in times of stress or need, but not much otherwise. Accordingly, 99 percent (141) of the respondents said that prayer was a regular part of their behavior, and 1 percent (1) indicated that she prayed primarily in times of stress or need, but not much otherwise, with a mean of 1.01, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.08.

The theoretical range of the ritualistic sub-scale was from 3 to 10, mean was 3.79, median was 4, and standard deviation was 0.73. These results indicate high levels of ritualistic religiosity among the daughter generation (Table 23).

The third and final sub-scale of religiosity, experiential, contained two variables. The first variable asked the respondents their views in regard to the following statement: Would you say that one's religious commitment gives life a certain purpose which it could not otherwise have? Ninety-seven percent (140) of the respondents strongly agreed, and 3 percent (5) agreed. The mean of this variable was 1.03, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.18. The second variable probed the respondents' views toward this statement: Islam provides its followers an interpretation of their existence which could not be discovered by reason alone. Of the respondents, 96 percent (139) strongly
agreed, and 4 percent (6) agreed. The mean of this variable was 1.04, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.20.

The theoretical range of the experiential sub-scale was from 2 to 8. The mean was 3.08, median was 2, and the standard deviation was 0.27. This analysis reveals high levels of experiential religiosity among the daughter generation (Table 24).

Table 22

**Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the Sub-scale: Ideological Religiosity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repent</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the

Sub-scale: Ritualistic Religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>( \bar{x} )</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ReadKor</td>
<td>54 (38)</td>
<td>87 (60)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AttFri</td>
<td>122 (89)</td>
<td>13 (9)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pray</td>
<td>141 (99)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24

Frequency Distribution of the Daughter Generation's Attitudes Toward the

Sub-scale: Experiential Religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>( \bar{x} )</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>140 (97)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>139 (96)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of Findings

The descriptive analysis of the daughter generation's modern, familistic, urban, and religious orientations reveals that the majority of the respondents appear to have high levels of modern attitudes, high levels of familistic orientation, average levels of urbanity, and high levels of religious commitment.

Reliabilities of the Scales (The Daughter Generation)

Table 25 shows that the reliability coefficients of the four scales employed to measure the daughter generation's attitudes are as follows:

The 21-item modernity scale had a reliability coefficient of 0.64; the 15-item familism scale showed a reliability coefficient of 0.71; the 8-item urbanism scale generated a reliability coefficient of 0.43; and the 7-item religiosity scale had a reliability coefficient of 0.18. The latter coefficient, although considered very low, may be due to the lack of variations in the participants' responses. Other possible explanations may be cultural in nature, given that this scale was originally constructed to measure religious attitudes in the United States.
Table 25

Reliabilities of the Scales (The Daughter Generation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Mother Generation

Descriptive Analysis

Demographic Data

For this study, 106 mothers participated. The descriptive analysis revealed a number of demographic characteristics. Table 26 shows that the mothers' age ranges from 25 to 65 and older. The age category 38-48 constitutes the highest frequency (43), followed by the age category 50-60, with a frequency of 29. The age categories 25-37 and 65 and older have frequencies of 20 and 9, respectively. Table 27 reveals that 93 percent (98) of the respondents are married, 1 percent (2) divorced, and 6 percent (6) widowed. Two percent (3) of the respondents reported having one child, whereas 26 percent (27) had two to five children, and 72 percent (76) had six children
or more (Table 28). As shown in Table 29, the mother generation, 100 percent (106) reported having adult children living at home.

Although 56 percent (59) of the respondents were born on a farm or in a village, as opposed to 47 percent (44) who were born in a city (Table 30), 84 percent (89) reside in a city and 16 percent (17) still live in a rural area (Table 31). As to the mother generation's educational attainment, 35 percent (37) reported having no formal education, 19 percent (20) with elementary level, 31 percent (33) with junior level, and 15 percent (16) with college/graduate level (Table 32).

Table 33 shows that 9 percent (9) of the respondents are self-employed, 29 percent (30) hold governmental jobs, 9 percent (10) are retired, and 53 percent (56) are housewives. In terms of income, 39 percent (32) reported a yearly income of less than $40,000, 7 percent (6) with an income range of $40,000 to $50,000, 13 percent (11) with an income range of $50,000 to $60,000, and 41 percent (33) with an income of $70,000 and more (Table 34). Table 35 reveals that 56 percent (23) speak one foreign language, 7 percent (3) speak two foreign languages, and 37 percent (15) speak three or more foreign languages. Finally, 89 percent (94) of the respondents conveyed that they have traveled abroad, as opposed to 11 percent (12) of those who have not (Table 36).
Table 26

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age category</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Marital Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 28

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Number of Children**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5 children</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 or more children</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Adult Children Living at Home**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult children living at home</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Place of Birth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural/Urban</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm/village</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 31

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Place of Residence (Rural/Urban)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm/village</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Educational Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational attainment</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary level</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/graduate level</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 33

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 34

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $40,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,000-$50,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$60,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$70,000 or more</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 35

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by the Number of Spoken Foreign Languages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of spoken foreign languages</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One foreign language</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two foreign languages</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or more foreign languages</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 36

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation by Travel Abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traveled abroad</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Descriptive Analysis of the Variables and Sub-scales in the Model (the Mother Generation)**

**The Dependent Dimension: Modernity**

As noted earlier, modern attitudes of the mother generation were measured by a 21-item scale. This scale consisted of six sub-scales: aspiration,
changing perception and valuation, political identification, efficacy, family planning preference, and awareness. The descriptive analysis—means, medians, and standard deviations—of the mother generation's attitudes toward modernity revealed the following results:

The first modernity sub-scale, aspiration, contained two variables. The first variable explored the participants' involvement in issues of importance to their country. Table 37 shows that 84 percent (89) of the respondents strongly agreed, 14 percent (15) agreed, 2 percent (2) disagreed, with a mean of 1.19, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.48. The second variable suggested that, if possible, the respondents would obtain as much education as they could. Eighty-five percent (90) of the respondents strongly agreed, 14 percent (15) agreed, and 1 percent (1) strongly disagreed. The mean of this variable was 1.17, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.45.

The theoretical range of the aspiration sub-scale was from 2 to 8, mean was 2.36, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.82. These results reveal high levels of aspiration among the mother generation (Table 37).

The second modernity sub-scale, changing perception and valuation, reflected the respondents' flexibility and willingness to undertake new measures to improve their status and that of others. Two variables constituted this sub-scale. The first variable conveyed the respondents' attitudes toward enhancing
their productivity by enrolling in a computer training program. Accordingly, 47 percent (49) of the respondents strongly agreed, 43 percent (44) agreed, 7 percent (7) disagreed, and 3 percent (3) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.65, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.74. The second variable signified the extent to which the respondents viewed women as having as many rights as men do. Thirty-six percent (38) of the respondents strongly agreed, 43 percent (46) agreed, 13 percent (14) disagreed, and 8 percent (8) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.92, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.89.

The theoretical range of the changing perception and valuation sub-scale was from 2 to 8, mean was 3.58, median was 3, and standard deviation was 1.26. These results indicate moderate levels of flexibility and willingness among the mother generation to improve their status and that of others (Table 38).

The third modernity sub-scale, political identification, contained four variables examining attitudes toward the most important qualifications for holding a high office. Specifically, the respondents were asked to choose whether family background, devotion to the old and honorable ways, popularity, or education and knowledge was the most important qualification for a person to hold a high office. Thirty-one percent (32) of the respondents strongly disagreed with family background as an important qualification for
holding an office, whereas 28 percent (29) disagreed, 29 (30) agreed, and 13 (12) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.23, median of 2, and standard deviation of 1.03. For the second variable, devotion to the old and honorable ways, 21 percent (22) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 29 percent (30) disagreed, 38 percent (40) agreed, and 12 percent (13) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.42, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.96.

The third variable, popularity, had 30 percent (31) of the respondents who strongly disagreed with the popularity of a person as a qualification for holding an office, 32 percent (34) disagreed, 26 percent (27) agreed, and 12 percent (13) strongly agreed. The mean of this variable was 2.21, median was 2, and standard deviation was 1.01. Concerning the final variable, education and knowledge, 71 percent (75) of the respondents strongly agreed, 26 percent (28) agreed, and only 3 percent (3) disagreed, with a mean of 8.17, median of 8, and standard deviation of 2.65.

The theoretical range of the political identification sub-scale was from 4 to 16, mean was 8.17, median was 8, and standard deviation was 2.65. These scores convey average levels of modern political identification among the mother generation (Table 39).

The fourth modernity sub-scale, efficacy, reflected the mother generation's attitudes across two categories of variables. The first category
included hard work as being the most needed for the welfare of the respondents' country, God's help, and good luck. Hard work was conceptualized to reflect modern attitudes, whereas God's help and good luck were expected to indicate traditional ones. Accordingly, 87 percent (92) of the mother generation strongly agreed with hard work, 11 percent (12) agreed, and 2 percent (2) disagreed, with a mean of 1.16, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.46. Seven percent (8) of the respondents strongly disagreed with God's help as needed most for their country, whereas 1 percent (1) disagreed, 24 percent (25) agreed, and 68 percent (71) strongly agreed, with a mean of 3.50, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.86. As to the variable, good luck, 23 percent (24) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 31 percent (33) disagreed, 33 percent (35) agreed, and 13 percent (14) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.37, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.98.

The second category of efficacy variables inquired whether it is very beneficial, somewhat beneficial, somewhat harmful, or very harmful that scholars in universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant. Eleven percent (11) of the respondents strongly agreed that it is very beneficial, 28 percent (29) agreed, 35 percent (36) disagreed, and 26 percent (27) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 2.77, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.96.
The variable, somewhat beneficial, yielded 8 percent (9) of the respondents who strongly agreed, 41 percent (43) who agreed, 30 percent (31) who disagreed, and 21 percent (22) who strongly disagreed, with a mean of 2.63, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.91. The variable, somewhat harmful, had 12 percent (13) of the respondents who strongly disagreed, 37 percent (39) who disagreed, 37 percent (38) who agreed, and 14 percent (15) who strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.52, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.89. The last variable of the efficacy sub-scale, very harmful, generated 24 percent (25) of the respondents who strongly disagreed, 38 percent (40) who disagreed, 21 percent (22) who agreed, and 17 percent (18) who strongly agreed. The mean of this variable was 2.31, median was 2, and standard deviation was 1.02.

The theoretical range of the efficacy sub-scale was from 7 to 28, mean was 17.25, median was 17, and standard deviation was 3.68. These results indicate low levels of efficacy among the mother generation (Table 40).

The fifth modernity sub-scale, family planning preference, constituted two variables. The first variable asked the respondents if the number of children should be limited so that parents could take better care of those they already have. Eleven percent (12) of the respondents strongly agreed, 15 percent (16) agreed, 24 percent (25) disagreed, and 50 percent (52) strongly
disagreed, with a mean of 3.11, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.05. The second variable probed the respondents' attitudes toward having no limit on the number of the children to be born. Fourteen percent (15) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 19 percent (20) disagreed, 21 percent (22) agreed, and 46 percent (48) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.98, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.11.

The theoretical range of the family planning preference sub-scale was from 2 to 8, mean was 6.10, median was 6, and standard deviation was 2. These scores show low levels of family planning preference among the mother generation (Table 41).

Finally, the awareness levels of the mother generation were assessed by four variables. The first variable asked the respondents if they always, often, rarely, or never listened to or watched local news. Forty-six percent (49) of the respondents said that they always did so, 37 percent (39) often did so, 14 percent (15) rarely did so, and 3 percent (3) of the respondents never listened to or watched their local news. The mean of this variable was 1.74, median was 2, and standard deviation was 0.81. The second variable inquired whether the respondents listened to or watched world news. Thirty-three percent (35) revealed that they always did so, 35 percent (37) said they often did so, 19
percent (20) rarely did so, and 13 percent (14) never did so, with a mean of 2.12, median of 2, and standard deviation of 1.02.

The third awareness variable was reading local newspapers and magazines. Twenty-nine percent (31) of the respondents said that they always read, 17 percent (18) often did, 17 percent (18) rarely did, and 37 percent (39) never did, with a mean of 2.61, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.25. The fourth and final awareness variable is reading foreign newspapers and magazines. Accordingly, 9 percent (10) of the respondents always read, 12 percent (13) often read, 23 percent (24) rarely read, and 56 percent (59) never read, with a mean of 3.25, median of 4, and standard deviation of 1.

The theoretical range of the awareness sub-scale was from 4 to 16, mean was 9.72, median was 10, and standard deviation was 3.17. These results indicate low levels of awareness among the mother generation (Table 42).

Table 37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-dimension: Aspiration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Plearn</td>
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<td>Sub-scale</td>
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Table 38

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the**

**Modernity Sub-scale: Changing Perception and Valuation**

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Table 39

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the**

**Modernity Sub-scale: Political Identification**

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Table 40

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Table 41

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation’s Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Family Planning Preference**

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Table 42

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Modernity Sub-scale: Awareness**

<table>
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The Independent Dimensions

As noted earlier, the independent dimensions of this study were familism, urbanism, and religiosity. The descriptive analysis of the mother generation revealed the following results:

Familism. Five sub-scales of familism constituting a 15-item composite scale were utilized to measure the familistic orientation of the mother generation. The descriptive analysis revealed the following results: The first sub-scale of familism, belonging, consisted of three variables examining the extent of the feeling of all family members that they belong to the family as one group. The first variable stated to the respondents: If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person were not a member of the family. Of the respondents, 84 percent (89) strongly agreed and 16 percent (17) agreed, with a mean of 1.16, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.37. The second variable asked the respondents if a family group has strong common moral values, a member should not let herself be influenced by outsiders to change these views. Fifty-one percent (52) of the respondents strongly agreed, 34 percent (36) agreed, 14 percent (15) disagreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.69, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.79.
The third and final variable of the sub-scale, belonging, examined the respondents' willingness to participate more with their family as a group. Eighty-seven percent (91) of the respondents strongly agreed, 12 percent (13) agreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.18, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.51.

The theoretical range of the belonging sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 4.03, median of 4, and standard deviation of 1.13. These results show high levels of familistic belonging among the mother generation (Table 43).

The second familism sub-scale, integration, was used to measure the extent to which individual activities are geared toward the achievement of family interests and objectives. Three variables were employed for this purpose. The first variable stated to the respondents that they owed it to their children to put family interests above their own personal interest. Eighty-two percent (86) of the respondents strongly agreed, 16 percent (17) agreed, and 2 percent (3) disagreed, with a mean of 1.23, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.52. The second variable inquired whether a person would find a new job if her current job ran against her family's values. Sixty-eight percent (71) of the respondents strongly agreed, 29 percent (30) agreed, 2 percent (3)
disagreed, and 1 percent (2) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.40, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.64.

The third and final variable of the familism sub-scale, integration, stated to the respondents that they should always talk over their important decisions with family members before taking action. Of the respondents, 76 percent (80) strongly agreed, 23 percent (24) agreed, and 1 percent (2) disagreed, with a mean of 1.26, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.48.

The theoretical range of the integration sub-scale was from 3 to 12, mean was 3.89, median was 3, and standard deviation was 1.11. These results signify high levels of familistic integration among the mother generation (Table 44).

The third familism sub-scale, sharing, explored the extent of exchange of material goods, property, and assistance among the respondents and their family members. Three variables constituted this sub-scale. The first variable examined the respondents' willingness to share their homes with the brothers and sisters of their husbands. Accordingly, 66 percent (69) of the respondents strongly agreed, 33 percent (35) agreed, and 1 percent (2) disagreed, with a mean of 1.37, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.52. The second variable probed the respondents' attitudes in regard to this statement: Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their
parents as they have for the welfare of their children. Ninety-six percent (102) of the respondents strongly agreed, 3 percent (3) agreed, and 1 percent (1) disagreed, with a mean of 1.05, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.25.

The third and final variable of the sharing sub-scale probed the respondents' willingness to pay a medical bill of $5,000 if one of their children could not afford to pay. Ninety percent (95) of the respondents strongly agreed and 10 percent (11) agreed, with a mean of 1.10, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.31.

The theoretical range of the sharing sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 3.52, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.75. This analysis indicates high levels of familistic sharing among the mother generation (Table 45).

The fourth familism sub-scale, concern, examined the perpetuation of the family as one unit. Three variables made up this sub-scale. The first variable asked the respondents if marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than as creating new families. Eighty-six percent (91) of the respondents strongly agreed, 13 percent (14) agreed, and 1 percent (1) disagreed, with a mean of 1.15, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.39. The second variable examined the respondents' attitudes toward the importance of the family name to be carried on. Of the respondents, 94
percent (99) strongly agreed, 6 percent (7) agreed, with a mean of 1.07, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.25.

The third and final variable of the concern sub-scale stated to the respondents that keeping the family going is a very important reason for sons and daughters to expect to marry and have children. Accordingly, 81 percent (85) strongly agreed, 16 percent (17) agreed, 2 percent (3) disagreed, and 1 percent (1) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.25, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.55.

The theoretical range of the concern sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 3.46, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.89. This analysis reveals high levels of familistic concern among the mother generation (Table 46).

The fifth and final familism sub-scale, mutual aid, examined the extent of family-oriented relationships between parents and their children. This sub-scale was composed of three variables. The first variable suggested that married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other. Sixty-six percent (70) of the respondents strongly agreed, 24 percent (25) agreed, 6 percent (7) disagreed, and 4 percent (4) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.48, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.78. The second variable reflected the respondents' attitudes toward this item: It is the
responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents. Ninety-six percent (101) of the respondents strongly agreed and 4 percent (5) agreed, with a mean of 1.05, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.21.

The third variable of the mutual aid sub-scale examined the respondents' attitudes in regard to sharing as many activities as possible by married children and their parents. Of the respondents, 92 percent ((97) strongly agreed and 8 percent (9) agreed, with a mean of 1.08, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.28.

The theoretical range of the mutual aid sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 3.61, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.01. These results show high levels of familistic mutual aid among the mother generation (Table 47).

Table 43

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<td>3</td>
<td>3.89</td>
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<td>1.11</td>
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</table>

Table 45

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the

Familism Sub-scale: Sharing

<table>
<thead>
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</table>

(table continued)
Table 46

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Concern**

<table>
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<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Pkeep</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
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</table>
Table 47

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Familism Sub-scale: Mutual Aid

<table>
<thead>
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<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pactive</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(92)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.01</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urbanism. Three sub-scales of urbanism containing eight variables were utilized. The first urbanism sub-scale, anonymity, involved three variables. The first variable stated that neighbors should visit each other as often as possible. Accordingly, 8 percent (9) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 12 percent (13) disagreed, 48 percent (50) agreed, and 32 percent (34) strongly agreed, with a mean of 3.03, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.89. The second variable suggested that personal affairs such as phone numbers and residential addresses should be kept private. Forty-eight percent (49) of the respondents strongly agreed, 38 percent (40) agreed, 12 percent (13)
disagreed, and 2 percent (3) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 1.71, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.79.

The third variable of the urban anonymity sub-scale examined the respondents' attitudes toward helping someone they did not know. Seven percent (8) of the respondents strongly disagreed with helping someone they did not know, 15 percent (16) disagreed, 49 percent (51) agreed, and 29 percent (31) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.99, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.87.

The theoretical range of the anonymity sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 7.73, median of 8, and standard deviation of 1.71. These results convey low scores of urban anonymity among the mother generation (Table 48).

The second urbanism sub-scale, autonomy, consisted of three variables. The first variable assessed the respondents' attitudes toward living alone, independent of children and relatives. Two percent (3) of the respondents strongly agreed with living on their own, 8 percent (9) agreed, 28 percent (30) disagreed, and 62 percent (64) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 3.46, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.77. The second variable of the sub-scale, autonomy, investigated the respondents' attitudes toward residing in a neighborhood where nobody knew them. One percent (2) of the respondents
strongly agreed, 3 percent (4) agreed, 26 percent (27) disagreed, and 70 percent (73) strongly disagreed, with a mean of 3.61, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.66.

The third and final variable of the autonomy sub-scale assayed the respondents' attitudes toward borrowing money from relatives or friends. Eight percent (8) strongly disagreed, 15 percent (16) disagreed, 52 percent (55) agreed, and 25 percent (26) strongly agreed, with a mean of 3.94, median of 3, and standard deviation of 0.84.

The theoretical range of the autonomy sub-scale was from 3 to 12, with a mean of 10.02, median of 11, and standard deviation of 1.65. These results suggest low levels of urban autonomy among the mother generation (Table 49).

The final urbanism sub-scale was unconventionality. It referred to any form of behavior that deviates from the social norms of a society. Two variables constituted this sub-scale. The first variable examined the respondents' attitudes toward capital punishment. Accordingly, 15 percent (16) strongly disagreed with capital punishment, 16 percent (17) disagreed, 37 percent (38) agreed, and 32 percent (34) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.86, median of 3, and standard deviation of 1.04. The second variable measured the respondents' attitudes toward having a neighbor from different religious or
racial/ethnic backgrounds. Seventeen percent (18) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the assumption that it makes a difference, 60 percent (63) disagreed, 12 percent (13) agreed, and 11 percent (11) strongly agreed, with a mean of 2.16, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.83.

The theoretical range of the urban unconventionality sub-scale was from 2 to 8, with a mean of 5.02, median of 5, and standard deviation of 1.32. These results reveal low levels of urban unconventionality among the mother generation (Table 50).

Table 48

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Anonymity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>$\bar{x}$</th>
<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
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<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddres</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.71</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<td>(49)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td>1.71</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 49

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(62)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phood</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pdire</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.65</td>
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</table>

Table 50

Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Urbanism Sub-scale: Unconventionality

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.86</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pdiffer</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1.04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Religiosity. The religiosity scale consisted of three sub-scales: ideological, ritualistic, and experiential. The ideological sub-scale contained two variables. The first variable asked the respondents if they believed that the world will come to an end according to the will of God. Accordingly, 98 percent (104) contended that they believe in this, and 2 percent (2) said that they are uncertain about this. The mean of this variable was 1.02, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.14. The second variable asked the respondents if it is necessary for a person to repent before God will forgive his or her sins. Of the respondents, 100 percent (106) believed that God's forgiveness comes only after repentance, with a mean of 1, median of 1, and zero standard deviation.

The theoretical range of the ideological sub-scale was from 2 to 6, with a mean of 2.02, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.14. These scores indicate high levels of ideological religiosity among the mother generation (Table 51).

The second religiosity sub-scale, ritualistic, contained three variables. The first variable inquired how often during a week the respondents read the holy Koran and other religious literature. Accordingly, 45 percent (47) of the respondents said that they read the holy Koran every day, 48 percent (50) read every other day, and 7 percent (8) never read, with a mean of 1.63, median of
2, and standard deviation of 0.62. The second variable asked the respondents how often they performed Friday prayer. Accordingly, 95 percent (98) said that they always performed Friday prayer and 6 percent (5) did often, with a mean of 1.06, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.23. The third variable examined whether prayer was a regular part of the respondents' behavior or if they primarily prayed in times of stress or need. Of the respondents, 99 percent (104) of the respondents said that prayer is a regular part of their behavior, whereas 1 percent (2) revealed that they primarily prayed in times of stress or need, but not much otherwise, with a mean of 1.02, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.14.

The theoretical range of the ritualistic sub-scale was from 3 to 10, with a mean of 3.70, median of 4, and standard deviation of 0.79. These results reveal high scores of ritualistic religiosity among the mother generation (Table 52).

The third and final measure of religiosity, the experiential sub-scale, had two variables. The first variable probed the respondents' views regarding the following statement: Would you say that one's religious commitment gives life a certain purpose which it could not otherwise have. Accordingly, 98 percent (103) of the respondents strongly agreed and 2 percent (3) agreed, with a mean of 1.03, median of 1, and standard deviation of 0.17. The second
variable stated that Islam provides its followers an interpretation of their existence which could not be discovered by reason alone. Of the respondents, 93 percent (97) strongly agreed, whereas 8 percent (7) agreed. The mean of this variable was 1.09, median was 1, and standard deviation was 0.31.

The theoretical range of the experiential sub-scale was from 2 to 8, with a mean of 3.15, median of 2, and standard deviation of 0.63. These results signify high levels of experiential religiosity among the mother generation (Table 53).

Table 51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Sub-scale: Ideological Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Prepent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-scale</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 52

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Sub-scale: Ritualistic Religiosity**

<table>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.02</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.79</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 53

**Frequency Distribution of the Mother Generation's Attitudes Toward the Sub-scale: Experiential Religiosity**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>MDN</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>1.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(98)</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
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<td>1.09</td>
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<td>Sub-scale</td>
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<td>3.15</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.63</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Summary of Findings

The descriptive analysis of the mother generation reveals that the majority of the respondents appear to have low levels of modernity, high orientation of familism, low levels of urbanity, and strong religious commitment.

Reliabilities of the Scales (The Mother Generation)

Table 54 shows that the obtained reliability coefficients of the scales employed to measure modern, familistic, urban, and religious orientations of the mother generation are as follows:

The reliability coefficients of the modernity scale had a reliability coefficient of 0.85. The familism scale generated a reliability coefficient of 0.71. The urbanism scale yielded a reliability coefficient of 0.31, and the religiosity scale showed a reliability coefficient of 0.61.

Table 54

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
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<td>Modernity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intergenerational Modern, Familistic, Urban, and Religious

Attitudes: Comparison by Scales

Intergenerational Differences in Modernity

As previously noted, modern attitudes of the daughter and mother generations were measured by a 21-item composite scale (the OM-scale). The theoretical range of this scale was from 21 to 84. Table 55 shows that the overall mean of the daughter generation's modern attitudes was 40, the median was 41, and the standard deviation was 5.58. By contrast, the mother generation generated a mean of 48, median of 47, and standard deviation of 8.48 (Table 56). These results indicate that there exists a difference in attitudes toward modernity between the daughter and mother generations.

Intergenerational Differences in Familistic Orientation

The familistic orientation of the two generations was assayed by a 15-item composite scale (Heller, 1976), with a theoretical range of 15 to 60. The daughter generation scored a mean of 18.95, median of 18, and standard deviation of 3.27 (Table 55). In comparison, the mother generation's attitudes generated a mean of 18.52, median of 18, and standard deviation of 3.29 (Table 56). These scores convey high and similar levels of familistic orientation between the two generations.
**Intergenerational Differences in Urban Attitudes**

The urban attitudes of the daughter and mother generations were examined by a factor-based urban scale (8 items). The theoretical range of this scale was from 8 to 32. The analysis reveals that the daughter generation's urban attitudes had a mean of 22.22, median of 23, and standard deviation of 2.78 (Table 55). On the other hand, the mother generation's urban attitudes had a mean of 22.73, median of 23, and standard deviation of 2.81 (Table 56). The overall conclusion of these scores indicates that the two generations share similar low levels of urbanity.

**Intergenerational Differences in Religious Commitment**

The religious commitment of both generations was measured by a 7-item composite scale (Faulkner & DeJong, 1965). The theoretical range of this scale was from 7 to 24. Accordingly, the daughter generation's religious commitment had a mean of 8.87, median of 9, and standard deviation of 0.80 (Table 55). Similarly, the mother generation's religiosity had a mean of 8.87, median of 9, and standard deviation of 1.21 (Table 56). This analysis reveals that both generations share the same levels of high religious commitment.
Table 55


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$</th>
<th>MDN</th>
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</tr>
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<td>41</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
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<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 56

Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations of the Mother Generation's Modern, Familistic, Urban, and Religious Orientations (by Scales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$</th>
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<td>Modernity</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
T-test of Intergenerational Mean Differences in Modernity, 
Familism, Urbanism, and Religiosity

The second statistical technique undertaken to test for intergenerational differences in modernity, familism, urbanism, and religiosity was a t-test. This test of significance is useful for making mean comparisons between two independently drawn samples (Table 57).

**Intergenerational Mean Differences in Modernity**

The difference in the two means of attitudes toward modernity for both generations appeared to be significant. The calculated t (-7.14) exceeded the table t (1.980, P <= .05) in a negative direction. This means that a significant population difference in attitudes toward modernity actually exists between the daughter and mother generations. Therefore, it can be concluded that attitudes toward modernity significantly vary across categories of the daughter and mother generations.

**Intergenerational Mean Differences in Familism**

The familistic orientation of the two generations appeared to be very similar. The obtained t (1.02) did not exceed the table t (1.980, P > .05). Therefore, it can be concluded that familistic orientation does not significantly vary across categories of the daughter and mother generations.
Intergenerational Mean Differences in Urbanism

Intergenerational attitudes toward urbanism generated a t-value of -1.42. This obtained t-value did exceed the table t (1.980, P>.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that urban attitudes do not significantly vary across categories of the daughter and mother generations.

Intergenerational Mean Differences in Religiosity

The two generations appeared to share the same levels of religious commitment. The calculated t-value (0.059) was far less than the table t (1.980, P>.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that religious commitment does not significantly vary across categories of the daughter and mother generations.

Table 57

T-test of Intergenerational Differences in Modernity, Familism, Urbanism, and Religiosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>Level of Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>-7.14**</td>
<td>&lt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = significant at .05 level
Regression Test of the Assumption of No Cross Generational Differences in the Proposed Processes of Modernity

The third statistical method was employed here to test the assumption of no cross generational differences in the proposed processes of modernity was regression. As mentioned earlier, familistic orientation, urban values, and religious commitment were assumed to impact the levels of modernity in the two generations differently. The validity of this assumption was tested as follows:

First, a new data set was created by combining the responses of both generations. Second, composite scales for modernity, familism, urbanism, and religiosity were designed. The items of these composite scales were the same for the daughter and mother generations. Third, a dummy variable was created in which mothers were coded 1 and daughters were coded 0. In addition, three interaction terms were devised. These interaction terms were obtained by multiplying each of the familism, urbanism, and religiosity scales by the dummy variable, generations.

Finally, the modernity scale was regressed on familism, urbanism, religiosity, and the dummy variable, generations. These regression results indicate that only one term, the interaction of generations and urbanism, was
found to be significant at the .05 level. This further suggests that the level of modernity is not the same across the daughter and the mother generations (Table 58).

Table 58

Regression Test of the Assumption of No Cross Generational Differences in the Proposed Processes of Modernity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>-.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>.728**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations</td>
<td>4.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations * Familism</td>
<td>.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations * Urbanism</td>
<td>-.792**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations * Religiosity</td>
<td>-.342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = p < .05
Structural Equation Analyses

The fourth statistical technique used to test the hypothesized models of modernity across generations was LISREL. As noted earlier, LISREL is an advanced extension of multiple regression using a factor analytical method.

When it can be assumed that exogenous variables are measured without error, multivariate least-squares (or maximum likelihood) regression techniques may be used. However, the validity of this assumption is questionable, because, when error is assumed to be present, then the so-called "error-in-variables" problem arises, leading to biased estimates of the regression coefficients. Measurement in independent variables tends to attenuate explained variance and standardized regression coefficients. One of the assumptions of the LISREL model is that observed variables are measured with error, which facilitates the estimation of measurement of "error-in-variables" (Long, 1983). Further, LISREL provides several measures that assess the overall fit of the proposed model to the covariance structure of manifest variables.

The latent factors (variables) for both generations are modernity, familism, urbanism, and religiosity. There are two types of latent factors (variables), endogenous and exogenous. The endogenous factors are measured
by Y-variables, whereas exogenous factors are indicated by X-variables. These latent factors contribute to the variance in the observed variables.

LISREL has two components: the measurement and structural models. The measurement model designates the relations between the observed and latent variables. The structural model specifies the relations among latent factors and the relationship between common factors.

Confirmatory factor analysis is used to estimate the measurement model. Each of the observed variables loads on a latent factor. The observed variables, aspiration, valuation, political identification, efficacy, and family size preference load on the latent (endogenous) dimension, modernity. The observed variables, belonging, integration, sharing, concern, and mutual aid load on the latent (exogenous) dimension, familism. The observed variables, anonymity, autonomy, and unconventionality load on the latent (exogenous) dimension, urbanism. Finally, the observed variables, ideological religiosity, ritualistic religiosity, and experiential religiosity load on the latent (exogenous) dimension, religiosity.

The structural portion of the model testing examines the relations among latent variables. As mentioned above, there are two types of latent factors, exogenous and endogenous. The exogenous factors in the model are
familism, religiosity, and urbanism, whereas the endogenous factor is modernity.

In this study, factors were assigned a scale for measurement. Each latent factor shared a scale of one with one of its indicators. In addition to factor loading, squared multiple correlations (SMC) were used to estimate the reliability of the observed variables in relation to the constructs.

The Daughter Generation

The Measurement Analysis

Modernity. The value of SMC for the aspiration variable was 0.662. This indicates that about 66 percent of the variance in the observed variable, aspiration, may be accounted for by the latent factor, modernity. The value of SMC for the valuation variable was 0.006. This indicates that about 1 percent of the variance in the observed variable, valuation, may be accounted for by the latent factor, modernity. The value of SMC for the political identification variable was 0.010. This indicates that only 1 percent of the variance in the observed variable, political identification, may be explained by the latent factor, modernity. The value of SMC for the efficacy variable was 0.002. This shows that only 0.2 percent of the variance in the observed variable, efficacy, may be accounted for by the latent factor, modernity. Finally, the value of SMC for the family planning preference variable was 0.018. This means that
about 2 percent of the variance in the observed variable, family planning preference, may be accounted for by the latent variable, modernity (Table 59).

**Familism.** The value of SMC for the familism variable, belonging, was 0.696. This means that 70 percent of the variance in the observed variable, belonging, can be accounted for by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the variable, integration, was 0.500. This means that about 50 percent of the variance in the observed variable, integration, may be explained by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the sharing variable was 0.108. This means that 11 percent of the variance in the observed variable, sharing, can be explained by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the variable, concern, was 0.141. This means that 14 percent of the variance in the observed variable, concern, may be accounted for by the latent variable, familism. Finally, the value of SMC for the mutual aid variable was 0.142. This means that 14 percent of the variance in the observed variable, mutual aid, can be explained by the latent variable, familism (Table 59).

**Urbanism.** The value of SMC for the anonymity variable was 0.700. This means that 70 percent of the variance in the observed variable, autonomy, can be explained by the latent variable, urbanism. The value of SMC for the autonomy variable was 0.055. This means that about 6 percent
of the variance in the observed variable, autonomy, can be accounted for by
the latent variable, urbanism. The value of SMC for the variable,
unconventionality, was 0.017. This means that about 2 percent of the
variance in the observed variable, unconventionality, may be explained by the
latent variable, urbanism (Table 59).

Religiosity. The value of SMC for the ideological religiosity variable was
0.700. This means that 70 percent of the variance in the observed variable,
ideological, can be explained by the latent variable, religiosity. The value of
the SMC for the ritualistic religiosity variable was 0.061. This means that 6
percent of the variance in the observed variable, ritualistic, can be accounted
for by the latent variable, religiosity. The value of SMC for the experiential
religiosity variable was 0.002. This means that 0.2 percent of the variance in
the observed variable, experiential, can be explained by the latent variable,
religiosity (Table 59).
Table 59

Measurement Model Parameter Estimates: Slopes, and Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) of the Daughter Generation's Model (Standardized Estimates in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variables</th>
<th>Observed variables</th>
<th>Slope</th>
<th>SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Y1: aspiration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y2: valuation</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3: political</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y4: efficacy</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y5: family size</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preference</td>
<td>(-0.135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>X1: belonging</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.829)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2: integration</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X3: sharing</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X4: concern</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table continued)
The Structural Model and Test of the Hypotheses

As noted earlier, the structural portion of the model consists of the relations among latent variables. Structural model specifies the hypothesized relationships among constructs in the model.

The model proposed a negative impact of familism on modernity among the daughter generation. The higher the level of familism, the lower the level of modernity. This hypothesis was not supported. On the contrary, a significant and positive relationship was found between familism and modernity (regression coefficient = 0.356, t-value = 3.256). In other words, the
higher the level of familism, the higher the level of modernity. This empirical finding sharply contradicts the proposed negative relationship between familism and modernity (Table 60 and Figure 3).

Urbanism was hypothesized to have a positive impact on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation. In other words, the greater the level of urbanism, the greater the amount of modernity. However, although the effect of urbanism was in the expected direction, the relationship with modernity was insignificant (regression coefficient = 0.017, t-value = 0.146). Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no significant impact of urbanism on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation (Table 60).

Religiosity was hypothesized to have a negative impact on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation. In other words, the greater the amount of secularism, the greater the amount of modernity. However, the structural equation analysis revealed that religiosity had insignificant relationship with modernity in the daughter generation (regression coefficient = 0.035, t-value = 0.329). Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no impact of religiosity on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation (Table 60 & Figure 3).
Table 60

Structural Model and LISREL Estimates—Maximum Likelihood—of the Daughter Generation's Model (Standardized Estimates in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous factors</th>
<th>Endogenous factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>0.356** (0.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderation</td>
<td>0.017 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.035 (0.039)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = p < .05

Figure 3

The reduced model (the daughter generation)
The Overall Fit of the Model

The assessment of empirical support for each of the proposed hypotheses is often accompanied by the assessment of the fit of the overall model to data. A simple method of detecting misspecification of latent trait models involves the use of Q-plot, which is a graph of the normalized residuals. When residuals are distributed along the diagnosis of the Q-plot graph, the model may not be misspecified. Residuals that deviate widely away from the diagnosis and are distributed nonlinearly suggest a misspecified model. The residuals from the estimated model of the daughter generation appear not to deviate from the diagnosis, suggesting an adequately specified model, as shown in Figure 4.

Further, LISREL provides fit statistics with information about the adequacy of the model. The most frequently used measures are GFI, AGFI, and RMSR. The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI) are used to estimate model fit. GFI measure is not affected by sample size and is robust against departure from normality. Theoretically, GFI ranges from 0 to 1. A value closer to one indicates a better model fit. A small
Figure 4

Q-Plot of the overall fit of the daughter generation's model
difference between GFI and AGFI also indicates that the model fits well to the data. The GFI and AGFI values of the daughter generation's model were 0.855 and 0.809, respectively. These results again suggest that the proposed model of the daughter generation adequately fits the data (Table 61).

The third measure of model fit is the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR). It is a measure of the mean discrepancy between data and the implied variances and covariances. It represents the average deviation of the predicted from the actual correlation matrix. The lower the index, the better the fit of the model to the data. The RMSR value of the daughter generation's model was 0.098. This value is much higher than the desirable value of RMSR below .05. Generally speaking, when GFI, AGFI, and RMSR are considered together, it can be said that the overall fit of the model to the data is satisfactory (Table 61).

Table 61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Fit of the Daughter Generation's Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GFI--AGFI--RMSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Mother Generation

As previously mentioned, LISREL has two components: the measurement and the structural models. The measurement model designates the relations between the observed and latent variables. The structural model specifies the relations among latent factors and the relationship between common factors.

The Measurement Analysis

Modernity. The value for SMC for the aspiration variable was 0.645. This means that 65 percent of the variance in the observed variable, aspiration, can be explained by the latent variable, modernity. The value of SMC for the valuation variable was 0.218, which means that 22 percent of the variance in the observed variable, valuation, may be accounted for by the latent variable, modernity. The value of the SMC for the political identification variable was 0.126. This means that 13 percent of the variance in the observed variable, political identification, can be explained by the latent variable, modernity. The value of SMC for the efficacy variable was 0.094, which means that 9 percent of the variance in the observed variable, efficacy, may be accounted for by the latent variable, modernity. The value of SMC for the family planning variable was 0.29, meaning that 29 percent of the variance in the observed variable,
family planning preference, may be explained by the latent variable, modernity (Table 62).

**Familism.** The value of SMC for the belonging variable was 0.683. This means that 68 percent of the variance in the observed variable, belonging, may be accounted for by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the integration variable was 0.155, which means that 16 percent of the variance in the observed variable, integration, can be explained by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the sharing variable was 0.248. This means that 25 percent of the variance in the observed variable, sharing, can be accounted for by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the concern variable was 0.205, meaning that 21 percent of the variance in the observed variable, concern, can be explained by the latent variable, familism. The value of SMC for the mutual aid variable was 0.279. This means that 28 percent of the variance in the observed variable, mutual aid, may be caused by the latent variable, familism (Table 62).

**Urbanism.** The value of the SMC for the anonymity variable was 0.698, meaning that 70 percent of the variance in the observed variable, anonymity, can be accounted for by the latent variable, urbanism. The value of SMC for the autonomy variable was 0.080, which means that 8 percent of the variance in the observed variable, autonomy, can be explained by the latent variable, urbanism.
variable, urbanism. The value of SMC for the variable unconventionality was 0.000. This means that zero percent variance in the observed variable, unconventionality, may be attributed to the latent variable, urbanism (Table 62).

Religiosity. The value of the SMC for the ideological religiosity variable was 0.698. This means that 70 percent of the variance in the observed variable, ideological religiosity, can be attributed to the latent variable, religiosity. The value of the SMC for the variable ritualistic religiosity was 0.043. This means that 43 percent of the variance in the observed variable, ritualistic religiosity, can be attributed to the latent variable, religiosity. The value of the SMC for the experiential religiosity variable was 0.019. This means that 2 percent of the variance in the observed variable, experiential religiosity, can be accounted for by the latent variable, religiosity (Table 62 and Figure 5).
Table 62

**Measurement Model Parameter Estimates: Slopes and Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) of the Mother Generation's Model (Standardized Estimates in Parentheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent variables</th>
<th>Observed variables</th>
<th>Slope</th>
<th>SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Y1: aspiration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.738)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y2: valuation</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3: political</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y4: efficacy</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y5: family P.</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>X1: belonging</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.804)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2: integration</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X3: sharing</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[table continued]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X4</td>
<td>concern</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X5</td>
<td>mutual aid</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>X6: anonymity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X7: autonomy</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X8: unconven.</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>X9: ideological</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X10: ritualistic</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X11: experiential</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5

The reduced model (the mother generation)
The Structural Model and Test of Hypotheses

The model proposed a negative relationship between familism and modernity in the mother generation. The higher the level of familism, the lower the level of modernity. This hypothesis was not supported. In fact, a significant and positive relationship between familism and modernity was found (regression coefficient = 0.238, t-value= 1.88). In other words, the higher the level of familism in the mother generation, the higher the level of their modernity. These results suggest the acceptance of the null hypothesis of no negative impact of familism on modernity. Also, these results specify a positive direction between familism and modernity, which goes against the assumption of modernization theory purporting a negative relationship between familism and modernity (Table 63 and Figure 4).

Urbanism was hypothesized to have a positive relationship with modernity in the mother generation. In other words, the greater the level of urbanism, the greater the level of modernity. However, although the effect of urbanism on modernity appeared to be in the expected direction, the relationship with modernity was not significant--regression coefficient = 0.044, t-value = 0.33. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no impact of urbanism on the levels of modernity in the mother generation (Table 63 and Figure 4).
Religiosity was hypothesized to have a negative impact on the levels of modernity in the mother generation. However, the structural analysis revealed that religiosity had no significant relationship in either directions with modernity (regression coefficient = 0.081, t-value = 0.63). Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no impact of religiosity on the amount of modernity in the mother generation (Table 63 and Figure 4).

Table 63

**Structural Model, LISREL Estimates--Maximum Likelihood--of the Mother Generation's Model (Standardized Estimates in Parentheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous factors</th>
<th>Endogenous factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>0.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.081</td>
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<td>(0.092)</td>
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** = P < .05
The Overall Fit of the Model

As previously mentioned, in addition to providing an assessment of empirical support for each of the hypotheses in the model, LISREL permits an assessment of the fit of the overall model to data. A simple method of detecting misspecification of latent trait models involves the use of Q-plot, which is a graph of the normalized residuals. When residuals are distributed along the diagnosis of the Q-plot graph, the model may not be misspecified. Residuals that deviate widely from the diagnosis and are distributed nonlinearly suggest a misspecified model. The residuals from the estimated model appear not to deviate from the diagnosis, suggesting an adequately specified model (Figure 6).

Further, LISREL provides fit statistics with information about the adequacy of the model. The most frequently used measures are GFI, AGFI, and RMSR. The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) are used to further estimate the model fit. GFI measure is not affected by sample size and is robust against departure from normality. Theoretically, GFI ranges from 0 to 1. A value closer to one indicates a better model fit. A small difference between GFI and AGFI also indicates that the model fits well to the data. The GFI and AGFI values were 0.795 and 0.729,
Figure 6

Q-Plot of the Overall Fit of the Mother Generation's Model
respectively. These values suggest that the proposed model of modernity of the mother generation adequately fits the data (Table 64).

The third measure of model fit is the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR). It is a measure of the mean discrepancy between data and the implied variances and covariances. It represents the average deviation of the predicted from the actual correlation matrix. The lower the index, the better the fit of the model to the data. Accordingly, the value of the RMSR of the mother generation's proposed model was 0.124. This value was higher than the desirable value of RMSR below 0.05. Generally speaking, when GFI, AGFI, and RMSR are considered together, it can be said that the overall fit of the mother generation's model to the data is satisfactory (Table 64).

Table 64

**Overall Fit of the Mother Generation's Model: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), and Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR)**

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<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGFI</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSR</td>
<td>0.124</td>
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</table>
A Structural Equation Comparison of the Impact of Familism, Urbanism, and Religiosity on Modernity Across Generations

The three factors that have been hypothesized to influence modernity across generations are familism, urbanism, and religiosity. The effects of these factors on the levels of modernity can be compared across the two generations. The maximum likelihood regression coefficients of the effects of exogenous factors on modernity were utilized.

Familism and Modernity Across Generations

The effect of familism on the levels of modernity across the daughter and mother generations appeared to be significant for both generations (regression coefficient for the daughter generation (0.356, t-value = 3.256; regression coefficient for the mother generation, 0.238, t-value = 1.88). These values indicate that familism is significantly and positively related to modernity in both generations. In other words, the higher the levels of familism, the higher the levels of modernity of both generations. These results suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference in the impact of familism on the levels of modernity across generations. Moreover, the impact of familism on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation is higher than the impact of familism on the levels of modernity in the mother generation (0.356-0.238 = 0.118 difference) (Table 65).
Urbanism and Modernity Across Generations

Urbanism appeared to have no significant impact on the levels of modernity in both generations. The regression coefficient of the impact of urbanism on modernity in the daughter generation was 0.017, t-value = 0.146, whereas that of the mother generation was 0.044, t-value = 0.33. These results indicate that the impact of urbanism on the levels of modernity in both generations was the same. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no difference in the impact of urbanism on the levels of modernity in both generations (Table 65).

Religiosity and Modernity Across Generations

Religiosity appeared to have no impact on the levels of modernity in both generations. The regression coefficients of the impact of religiosity on the levels of modernity in the daughter and mother generations were 0.035, t-value= 0.329, and 0.081, t-value = 0.63, respectively. These coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no difference in the impact of religiosity on the levels of modernity across the two generations be accepted (Table 65).
Table 65

**Regression Coefficients and T-values of the Impacts of Familism, Urbanism, and Religiosity on Modernity Across Generations (T-values in Parentheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The daughter generation</th>
<th>The mother generation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
<td>0.356**</td>
<td>0.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.256)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.081</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
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** = P<.05
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION, REBUTTALS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Conclusion

The issue of modernization, in general, and modernity, in particular, has been an unsettled subject in cross-cultural sociological research. Past research, especially studies conducted on developing countries, has been marked by conceptual as well as empirical difficulty in distinguishing between these two distinctive yet related phenomena. Conceptually, modernization is the technological/physical transformation of a society. Individual modernity, on the other hand, is the normative aspects brought about by modernization. Empirically, modernization assumes a social level of analysis, whereas modernity is an individual-specific trait.

Furthermore, modernity has been conceptualized in terms derivative of Western values and norms, whose universality is assumed to transcend the cultural specificity of all non-Western cultures. At the core of this process is the contention that extended family system, rurality, and religion are the antitheses of modernization and, hence, of modernity.
In order to examine these arguments, this study employed data on two randomly selected samples of two generations, 145 female students and 106 mothers from the United Arab Emirates. Both the descriptive analyses and the structural equation modeling revealed the following:

1. Familism was found to be significantly and positively related to modernity across the two generations. In other words, the higher the levels of familism, the higher the levels of modernity.

2. Urbanism and religion (i.e., Islam) were found to have no effect, whether positive or negative, on the amount of modernity in the two generations.

3. Third, although the daughter generation appeared to be more modern than their mothers, the two generations shared similar and high levels of familistic orientation and religious commitment.

4. The impact of familism on the levels of modernity in the daughter generation was found to be greater than the impact of familism on the levels of modernity in the mother generation.

Rebuttals and Implications

According to modernization theory, to invoke the term extended family or religion is to bring to mind a host of issues closely associated with traditionalism. Traditionalism is perceived as an obstacle to modernity.
Familism and religion, as important components of traditionalism, have been treated as the fixed antitheses of modernity, hence hindering economic development and perpetuating a parochial way of life.

These assumptions are the outcome of the well-known tradition whereby Western social scientists have always assumed the universality of Western secular as well as religious ideologies (e.g., Weber's Ethic, Parsons' Lead Society, Inkeles' Individual Modernity). Historically, these Eurocentric assumptions have materialized into the so-called Judeo-Christian values, which have become the sole criteria for progress and development. The result of this process was that neither the practicality nor the universality nor the applicability of non-Western cultural settings was accorded any recognition. On the contrary, these cultures have been viewed as pathological, whose only cure is to follow the Western experience, of which having a nuclear family and a secular, or rather, an ambivalent religious orientation, are important attributes.

In the light of the overall findings of this study, this section presents a number of fallacies espoused by modernization theory. Specifically, this section examines the advantages of familism, the myth of the disintegration of primary group relations in the course of modernization, the utility of the
coexistence of tradition and modernity, and, finally, the contextual meaning of fatalism in Islam.

Advantages of Familism

Among the findings of this study, one in particular is of special merit. It concerns the fact that familism was found to be positively associated with modernity. In other words, it was found that the higher the levels of familism, the higher the levels of modernity across the two generations. This finding goes against the heart of modernization theory, which has treated familism as the enemy of modern values and attitudes. These misconceptions concerning familism are derived from the sole historical experiences of the disadvantaged minorities during their initial years of, and subsequent experiences with, immigration to the West, mainly the United States. Any introductory sociology textbook would attest to the fact that the 1930s was the time that came to shape the American sociology. With the eclipse of the organic evolutionary ideas, a research discipline represented by the Chicago School of Sociology arose. Its main focus was to tackle the then-rising phenomenon of social problems. Subsequently, the term social problem came to be viewed, for the most part, as immigration generated. This view was clearly laden with value implications. First, it implied that social problems had not existed in America, at least on a large scale, before the advent of immigrants. Second,
immigrants came to be known to espouse large families who, for the sake of their basic survival needs, filled the ghettos and enjoyed a high intensity of filial interaction. As a result, most traits characterizing the early experience of the immigrants and not shared by the larger society came to be defined as social problems.

With the waning of the Chicago School of Sociology, a rising discipline, structural functionalism, gave impetus to the already-established negative view of familism. In other words, structural functionalism defined the family only as a consumption unit, peculiar to white middle-class America. This conceptualization was a direct consequence of the fact that development was historically seen as an evolutionary one whereby larger institutions, as society became increasingly complex and more specialized, were assumed to have replaced the family (Margavio & Mann, 1989).

Modernization theory picked up the threads of such an abstraction and then generalization approach, only to apply it to other cultural settings whose developmental levels and value systems were different. Put differently, the immigrants' experience, as disadvantaged minorities struggling with institutionally-built barriers in America, came to reflect their entire cultural backgrounds. Nash (1977) wrote as follows:
At birth, then, the idea of modernization was ethnocentric, limited to the rise of capitalism, suffused with nostalgia for the loss of communities, and retrospective as to process. It also bore, as did most nineteenth-century social thought, the burdens of an evolutionary view of social change, with implicit notions of higher and lower, of progress and stagnation. (p. 17)

The extended family system involves economic and social as well as psychological advantages. It has inherent motivational factors which, according to Margavio and Mann (1989), can foster wealth accumulation. Family solidarity, generated by love, loyalty, concern for one another, and the restriction of trust to kin, can motivate other family members to labor and increase their productivity. Margavio and Mann (1989) examined Italian immigrants to Louisiana and found that familism helped these immigrants pull their resources together, overcome the institutionalized economic and social barriers, and move upward. The authors contended that "when minority groups are faced with institutional obstacles (such as racial or ethnic discrimination) to economic success because of their ascribed characteristics, the family can serve as a bulwark against the harsh realities of the economic system" (p. 116).
Winch, Greer, and Blumberg (1967) also observed that some minority
groups (e.g., Jews) have succeeded in maintaining a higher socioeconomic
status in the United States because of the fact that they have remained
involved in family capitalism. In family capitalism, unlike in corporate
capitalism, "ownership is separated from control and the pains of frequent
bureaucratic transfers are mitigated by the corporation's replacement of the
clan as the protective community" (p. 266). Weiner (1966) echoed such a
conclusion:

Values most of us would describe as "traditional" may hasten
development, depending on social context and the use to which these
values are put. After all, even family particularism need not be an
obstacle to modernization, as recent scholarship on the development of
family enterprises in modern Japan suggests. Furthermore, Marwari,
Jain and Parsi entrepreneurs in India, though committed to family
particularism, have impressive records of successful entrepreneurship."
(p. 6)

In a study conducted in the Philippines, Kaplan and Huang (1976)
observed that, as the number of family members working in the same industry
increased, the level of modernity increased. In explaining this particular
finding, the authors believed that recruitment strategies were based on relatives
recommending relatives. Those in the same social class are more likely to have similar educational levels; thus, family ties, solidified by a common interest in the factory, function to increase productivity.

On the social level, familism serves to reinforce the values and norms of the larger society. The recurrent socialization of children within the confines of an extended family system functions to minimize negative external influences, such as those of the media and peer groups. This type of "extended socialization" also provides children with the opportunity to interact with more than one role model. Further, the constant presence of parents and relatives supplies children with a wide range of interests and ideas, prepares them to face real-life situations as they grow older and hence becomes "a stabilizing element on juvenile caprice which no husband-wife team or single parent has at his disposal" (Alfaruqi, 1978, p. 251).

By and large, the extended family functions as the psychiatric clinic for its members. Frequent and constant supervision of children by parents and relatives brings about readiness to uncover and remedy any behavioral irregularities, an advantage that is not fully attainable in societies whose socialization of children is divided among parents, child-care centers, and the larger societal institutions.
The utility of familism can also be seen in regard to the status of the elderly and their overall well-being. Palmore (1975) found that the Japanese elderly, although living in a highly industrialized society, are still valuable and respected members of their multigenerational households. They serve as senior advisors in family matters, help socialize their grandchildren, play an integral role in their community, and enjoy an overall high status. Likewise, the elderly in Islamic societies, such as that of the United Arab Emirates, receive care, love, and respect, which not only are demanded culturally but also are mandated by religion. Islamic scripts are replete with heavenly rewards conditioned by the quality of unconditional love and care that an individual renders to his or her parents. These heavenly rewards are further multiplied as the parents become frail and more dependent upon their children. Abandoning one’s parents is thus harshly sanctioned by cultural and religious awes. Therefore, the elderly in Islamic societies are afforded the best place in the residence, are served first, receive standing ovations when entering or leaving the room, and command total obedience and discipline. Such a status is clearly reflected by the language, Arabic, which espouses unusually respectful terminologies for communicating with the elderly.
The Myth of the Disintegration of Primary Group Relations

As noted earlier, the two generations appeared to enjoy high filial relations. This finding negates the assumptions advanced by the pioneers of modernization and social change who have singled out the disintegration of the extended family and the demise of the primary group relations as a prerequisite for and direct consequence of modernization (Inkeles, 1969; Toennies, 1957; Wirth, 1938). However, according to Lapiere (1954), sociologists who have adhered to the assumption that modern society, unlike traditional ones, is characterized by a prominence of secondary relations have never been able to explain what really held such a modern society together. Further, these sociologists, whether aware or not, have long overlooked the fact that modern people are also held together by social ties of which primary relations are an integral part. Durkheim, himself, Lapiere contended, was disturbed by the declining function of the family and found no evidence to support the assumption of enlightened self-interest. Lapiere further questioned the fallacy of conceptualizing folk society as simple and modern people as non-fock. This is because the Western people's "independence as individuals, their social sophistication, and their selfishness and rationality have been greatly exaggerated" (p. 22).
According to Key (1961), the assumption of the disintegration of extended family relations in the course of modernization was made by the American urban sociologists who, as previously mentioned, appeared to have drawn conclusions based on what seemed to have been a temporary phenomenon peculiar to the early experiences of immigration to America. After the immigrants had settled, however, they began both to create families of their own and to associate with relatives and kin.

Sussman (1988) has seriously questioned the assumption that views the American nuclear family as an isolated unit. According to Sussman, the American family system is an extended one consisting of three interrelated nuclear families: the family of procreation, the family of orientation, and the family of affinal relations (in-laws). These three types, although not living in the same household, share a communal (residential) space through which they frequently engage in significant activities, ranging from mutual assistance to recreational, economic, and ceremonial functions.

Drawing upon data obtained on family and kin relationships in Cleveland, Ohio, Sussman (1988) also found that 100 percent of the middle class and more than 92 percent of the working class respondents were deeply involved in a reciprocal scheme of giving and receiving help from family members. Of all the participants, 70 percent of the working class and 45
percent of the middle class had relatives residing in the same neighborhood.

In the light of these findings, Sussman (1988) believed that the mythical assumption of the nuclear family's being isolated was more probably an outcome of a time lag between urban and family theory and research. It may also be a result of a cultural lag between what was then and what is now. In other words, Sussman contended that the founding fathers of sociology characterized—and rightly so—their societies as pathological and disorganized. This approach was to be extended to our time, only to materialize into "what is wrong with the American family," a model that developing societies have to follow if they are to modernize. That being the case, one can rightly argue that, if such an approach as that stressed by Sussman is flawed in its originality, it should be more than flawed in its applicability to other foreign cultural settings.

The Coexistence of Tradition and Modernity

Another finding generated by this study is the coexistence of tradition, found among members of the mother generation, and modernity, held by the daughter generation. Several modernity studies have pointed out the fact that a society can be modern in one aspect and traditional in another (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Schnaiberg, 1970b). Gusfield (1967) has observed that tradition and modernity are not mutually exclusive. Gusfield used the
Japanese experience, to which one can add other Asian countries that followed suit:

Japan is unlike the Western societies in the ways in which feudalism and industrial development have been fused to promote economic growth. Commitment to emperor and to family, a collectivistic orientation, and a high degree of vertical immobility have been factors supporting social and economic change in the Japanese context while they appear to have been factors producing resistance in the individualistic culture of the West. (p. 355)

To borrow Coser's (1956) term concerning the functionality of social conflict, tradition can serve as a "safety valve." The coexistence of traditional parents and modern children brings about check and balance factors through which a smoother and more peaceful social change can be achieved without disrupting the social system. This coexistence may also involve conscious modifying effects through which stagnant cultural elements can be modified dynamically at the right time and for the right place, which in the end prevents the shocks of sudden and dramatic social phenomena.

The coexistence of modernity and tradition can also serve a reciprocal function or a resocializing effect (from the child to the parent). Sociologists have long assumed that value transmission from generation to generation is a
one-way channel, or as Groenman (1960) termed it, "a one way traffic" through which the values of the older generation are passed on to and hence carried out by the succeeding generation. The validity of this assumption has been proven by means of early socialization (see, for example, Kalish & Johnson, 1972; Thomas, 1971). However, socialization in developing cultures is primarily homemade, and there is thus room for mutual influencing or dialectical impacting. In other words, a modern child living in the same household with parents and believing, for example, in the efficacy of science and technology would be more likely to influence his or her ailing parents to seek modern medical help. Likewise, a modern child who values education would also be more likely to explain to his or her parents the importance of being literate and to encourage them to seek education. Additionally, this modern child, whose traditional upbringing did not affect his or her modern orientation, will by means of the very nature of tradition be able to relate to the larger society and become more adjusted and productive.

This coexistence of tradition and modernity is upheld by an examination of the extent of conflict between the two generations (Youn & Song, 1989). Although not part of the hypothesized model, this descriptive analysis showed that both generations revealed no generational gap or conflict (daughter generation, $\bar{x} = 14.87$; mother generation, $\bar{x} = 12.76$). This generational
continuity is consistent with studies mentioned in the literature review that contended that discontinuity and polarization of values and attitudes between the old and the young during the course of modernization is a myth or is at best exaggerated. Groenman (1960) commented that "tradition is effective in the direction of conservation. By means of tradition, habits, attitudes, and beliefs are transferred to the next generation. In this way society gets temporal depth or, in other words, acquires stability" (pp. 106-107). Such a stability, as reinforced by tradition and enhanced by modernity, is no doubt an ideal form of social change.

Aside from coexisting, what makes traditions persist? Is it because of their functionality or otherwise assumed dysfunctionality? According to Dube (1988), "traditions cannot be treated as vestigial remains of an ancient past. They survive because they have definite functions. They contribute to a community's special sense of being, they provide bases of social integration, and offer guidelines to action during periods of uncertainty" (p. 508). Dube asked, "Is it necessary or desirable to destroy the traditions of caring and sharing, and promote mindless hedonism and self-indulgence? The collectivity-orientation and community-orientation emphasized by several cultures have their positive aspects" (p. 508).
The Cotextual Meaning of Fatalism in Islam

In the present study, a persistent finding across the two generations was that the respondents, when revealing their modern attitudinal orientations, would score low or, at best, would provide mixed responses in regard to questions with religious or cultural connotations. Modernization theory misconstrues people's religious and cultural sentiments and classifies them as modern or pre-modern, accordingly. For example, the respondents were asked to choose whether hard work or God's help was needed the most for the future of their country. The first item was designed to signify modern attitudes, whereas the latter was expected to reveal traditional ones. In responding to this particular question, the majority of the respondents chose both items. To an outside observer, these results should convey a traditional, or at least, mixed orientation of modern attitudes. Contextually speaking, however, both answers can be said to involve modern attitudes. This is because one of the misconceptions of Islam as a counter-modernity force is generated by the misunderstanding of the concept fatalism.

Although it is not the aim of this study to present a detailed account of fatalism in Islam, because it is a complicated topic and surely goes beyond the purpose intended, a brief overview of its meaning is nonetheless in order.
Fatalism in Islam, while it entails a submission to the will of God, involves a deterministic ingredient through which such a submission becomes the basis for force or power "to get the job done." In other words, it adds a divine motivation to the existing, yet limited, human determination. A person who concludes "God willing" is, in effect, implying that, with the help of God, he or she is determined to undertake the matter at hand, regardless of any circumstances. Such a process of connecting the mundane (hard work) with the sacred (God's help) constitutes utmost reassurance and confidence, while it leaves room for unexpected or out-of-control outcomes. It has been reported that the prophet of Islam was once asked by one of his companions if he should tie his camel or leave it to the will of God, to which the prophet replied, "Trust in God, but tie your camel," implying that faith and action go hand in hand.
APPENDIX A

ISLAM VERSUS MODERNITY: A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As previously mentioned, modernity has been conceptualized in terms derivative of the Protestant Ethic as articulated by Weber and developed by other Western social scientists. As such, modernity involves rationality, hard work, and logical evaluation of means and goals, which leads to the crystallization of a systematic way of accumulating wealth and prosperity. Based on this Western view, developing countries came to be characterized as ethic-lacking societies, whose religiously based cultures are to blame. This section, therefore, is a refutation of modernization theory's premise contending the necessity of religious influences to recede in order for modernization to take place. Included is a brief historical, social, and political overview of the factors that led to and perpetuated the inaccurate view that Islam, the religion of the country under study, does not espouse an ethic of its own. These factors include Crusadism, Orientalism, and Colonialism.

While Europe was going through the so-called Dark Ages, the scope of scholarship in the Muslim World was at its peak. Muslim scholars had been making scientific contributions that were "superior to any found elsewhere in the contemporary world" (Sullivan, 1960, p. 117). Their great particular innovations were in medicine. The great scientific works of Al-Razi (A.D. 865-925) and Ibn Sina (A.D. 980-1037), known in the West as Rhazes and Avicenna, were especially of great importance to the development of medicine
in the West. Avicenna's treatise on medicine, which was translated into Latin in the 12th century, remained the essence of medical teaching in Europe until modern times. Muslim cities of that time saw the spread of hospitals and the scientific licensing of medical doctors. In astronomy and chemistry, Muslim scientists generated enormous scientific observations and experiments. Because travel was accessible within the Islamic Empire, Muslim geographers were able to draw accurate descriptions of the earth and its elements in a way that had not existed before. In the field of mathematics, algebra and the Arabic methods of numbering were passed to the West to become the basis for modern mathematics (Sullivan, 1960).

Muslim scientists made advances, not only in the natural sciences, but also in the fields of philosophy and other social sciences. Their contributions began with the translations of Greek philosophy and the synthesis of these works so as to fit Islamic ideology. Philosophers such as Al-ghazzali (A.D. 1058-1111), Ibn rusd (A.D. 1126-1198), known in the West as Averroes, and Ibn Khaldun (A.D. 1332-1406) were among the most notable scholars in history whose works came to profoundly influence Western thought (Sullivan, 1960).

Sullivan (1960) wrote as follows concerning the cultural superiority of the Muslim World:
[It] is especially important to a student of Western European history because of its impact on the revival of cultural life in the West. . . . so strong was the impact of Muslim learning on Europe that historians say it contributed to a twelfth-century renaissance. . . . The deep significance of ninth- and tenth-century Muslim cultural history lies not only in its role as a unifying force within the Muslim world, but also in its role as a civilizing force far beyond Muslim boundaries. (p. 119)

A contemporary Christian writer revealed his disappointment in the intellectual gap generated by the victorious Islamic culture:

Where is the layman who now reads the Latin commentaries on holy scriptures, or who studies the Gospels, prophets, or apostles? Alas! all talented young Christians read and study with enthusiasm the Arab books; they gather immense libraries at great expense; they despise the Christian literature as unworthy of attention. They have forgotten their language. For every one who can write a letter in Latin to a friend, there are a thousand who can express themselves in Arabic with elegance.

(Savory, 1976, p. 128)

In the West, this cultural victory generated self-reflection, hence hostility, toward Islam and its followers, ironically similar to the reversed present situations of our modern history. This self-reflection began with
"derogatory and abusive myths about the Saracens [the Arabs]" (Rodinson, 1987, p. 5). Latin scholars produced massive inaccurate accounts of Muhammad's life. Muslims were depicted as savage infidels, and they increasingly became the object of pure fictions generated by popular folklore and ignorance, one of which was that Muhammad was made the God the Muslims worshiped (Rodinson, 1987).

These constructed negative images culminated in the first Crusade of 1095, which aimed at the capture of Jerusalem, which was, according to Pope II, "held captive by the enemies of Christ, and is subjected by those who do not know God, to the worship of the heathens" (as cited in Cantor, 1968, p. 207). Although historians have different accounts as to the actual number of the Crusades, Savory (1976) believed that they totaled eight wars, ranging from the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, to the final defeat of the Crusaders and their subsequent expulsion from the Middle East in 1291.

Out of such an interaction with the modern East, Europe gained impetus to social, political, and economic changes. Toward the end of the 15th century, Europe also saw the end of its internal ideological wars. A new era, which Savory (1976) termed the "exotic period," had evolved:

The West, ceasing for the moment to see the Islamic World as the abode of unimaginable evils and vices, put in its place the concept of the
"Exotic East," the home of the rare and the bizarre, of fabulous riches and voluptuous delights . . . . More people, especially merchants, traveled to the Middle East, but their accounts of life there were not always reliable, and many merely fed the needs of a public avid for exotica. (p. 134)

Hence, the waves of the so-called Orientalism were to begin. According to Said (1979), Orientalism emerged as a result of the changing historical patterns of power between East and West: "During its political and military heyday from the eighth century to the sixteenth, Islam dominated both East and West. Then the center of power shifted Westward" (p. 205). Orientalism involved the idea of studying the East. It was, however, undertaken by narrow-minded Western individuals who analyzed the East by their own cultural standards (Rodinson, 1987).

From the mid-19th century onwards, "one phenomenon more than any other determined the European image of the East, and that was imperialism" (Rodinson, 1987, p. 64). It was triggered by the idea of European superiority and thus the inferiority of the insignificant others which, according to Rodinson, (1987), solidified an already well-established Eurocentrism. The organized campaigns against Islam intensified:
The missionaries credited the triumphs of European nations to Christianity while blaming the misfortunes of the Muslim World on Islam. The perception was that, if Christianity was inherently favorable to progress, then Islam must, by its nature, encourage cultural and developmental stagnation. (Rodinson, 1987, p. 66)

The legacies of these historical epochs culminated in what amounted to massive secondary data upon which Western social scientists of the turn of the century relied in their attempts to construct their evolutionary visions of modern and pre-modern forms of human organization. However, Von Der Mehden (1986) contended as follows:

Much of the literature on the Third World available to these scholars presented a stereotyped, often inaccurate picture of indigenous religions and their adherents, portraying both as obstacles to progress. Without experience in the field themselves, many social scientists had to depend on this faulty foundation. (p. 15)

Recognizing the impact of Weber's work on the subsequent Western social thought and the fact that "the work of Max Weber is the fountainhead of contemporary studies of modernization" (Nash, 1977, p. 17), a brief critical view of selected Weberian views on religions in general and on Islam in particular is in order.
Generally speaking, a number of Western scholars have criticized the premises of the Weberian Ethic. Wagner (1964) believed that the pure form of orthodox Calvinism long ago ceased to be a driving religious force. As such, the link between the Protestant Ethic and economic development can neither be upheld nor negated in denominational America. Others (e.g., Greeley, 1974; Hudson, 1961) pinpointed the apparent waning of religion in the advanced secular West as a refuting factor of the assumed relationship of hard work and Protestantism. Bellah (1963) believed that one of the serious limitations of Weber’s Protestant thesis was that he overemphasized the importance of the motivational aspects of economic development at the expense of the historical and institutional contexts and settings. Eisenstadt (1973) disputed Weber’s interpretation of social change as contingent upon economic reductionism. Eisenstadt further contended that the Ethic was influential because it coincided with other favorable social, political, and cultural factors.

As is well known, in his attempt to validate his Protestant Ethic thesis, Weber selected foreign Eastern countries whose developmental levels, along with their value systems, were not parallel or compatible with those of Germany. He overlooked a geographically closer and culturally similar society, Scotland, whose economic situation, according to Robertson (1959) "does not
easily support the theory that Scots Calvinism was a doctrine which favored
the rise of a capitalist organization of industry. During the . . . seventeenth
century, and for a large part of the eighteenth century, Scotland remained poor
and backward" (p. 99).

According to Turner, Weber's assertion that Islam did not espouse a spirit of
capitalism, that its spread was due to mystic and militaristic factors, and that it
lacked a rational law, was false. On the contrary, Turner contended, Islam was
primarily urban, commercial, and literate. Mecca was a thriving commercial
center, and hard work ethics were stressed in the holy Koran and the sayings of
the Prophet of Islam. Turner further argued that "pure Islam is based on an
ascetic, activist, this-worldly ethic. The enemy of both pure Islam and modern
society is a set of attitudes--fatalism, passivity, mysticism--. . . introduced into
Islam by the Sufis, Berber marabouts and related groups" (p. 240).

Weber's analysis of Islam is historically anachronistic. Sufism in Islam
aroise rather late, "at a time when Islamic doctrines, due to countless
superimposed interpretations, had become extremely confusing" (Ali, 1977, p.
48). Further, these practices were viewed by the Muslims themselves as
anything but Islamic, to the extent that "orthodox Ulema [Muslim scholars] in
every century and in every Muslim country, had grave doubts about the
Islamic contents of mysticism. They found symptoms of all kinds of heresies in their practices" (Ali, 1977, p. 55).

Analyzing the essence of an ideology by factors that caused its demise, such as Weber and some Western social scientists often did in regard to Islam, would be the equivalent of analyzing the Protestant Ethic in the light of abnormal historical events of the Christian West, such as German Nazism, American segregationism, or more remotely, the realities that characterized medieval Christianity during what is commonly known as the Dark Ages.

Further, if the spread of Islam was due not to its rationality but rather to its militaristic nature, then what explains the fact that Islam is among the fastest growing religions of the late 20th century, supposedly an age of reason and rationality? Finally, if military power brings about an ideological conversion, why has it not been the case that the military strength of colonial Europe, along with the so-called great powers has not been historically successful in combining military conquests with ideological ones?

As to the absence of rational law in Islam, Turner (1974) observed a paradoxical notion in Weber's assumption when he viewed the Shari'a (the Islamic holy Law) as substantive and rational, only to single out the Khadi-Justice system in Islam—which is derived from and based upon the Shari'a—as a barrier to its economic progress. According to Turner (1974), Weber noted
that England achieved its economic supremacy "not because but rather in spite of its judicial system" (p. 236), although the British justice of the peace system was described by Weber himself as being similar to the Islamic Khadi-justice system to an extent unknown on the European continent.

Another challenge to the charge leveled against the role of Islam concerning the economic misery of its followers was undertaken by a French scholar, Rodinson (1978). Rodinson, however, unlike Weber, did not rely upon secondary data whose authenticity was in question. Rather, Rodinson utilized the holy Koran and the collection of the prophet's sayings, both of which signify the purity and the actual form of Islam. Through this method, Rodinson was able to contend that there was nothing to imply any notion of an obstacle to economic development in Islam. On the contrary, Rodinson reiterated the historical fact that Mecca was a center of trade and that hard and productive work was an Islamic theme. Moreover, Rodinson concluded that "down to the Fourteenth Century . . . the merchants of the Muslim Empire conformed perfectly to Weber's criteria for capitalist activity. They seized any and every opportunity for profit, and calculated their outlays, their encashment and their profits in money terms" (p. 30).

Finally, an obvious question, though seldom raised, is what happened to a religion that, once upon a time not only was able to create a great civilization
of its own, but also to absorb and fuse other civilizations? In other words, and to borrow C. R. Mills' (1959) Sociological Imagination, what are the historical and biographical problematic relations that have befallen Islam and what are their political, social, and economic consequences upon the current situations of the Islamic World? Ali (1987) contended:

The economic backwardness that prevails in the Arab States and other developing countries, therefore, should be put in historical and institutional perspective and should not be attributed to religious belief. Attributing complete validity to the role of a work ethic, without regard for other motivational components and societal constructs, could be misleading. (p. 576)
APPENDIX B

THE DAUGHTER GENERATION'S SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Section: 1. Demographic Data

1. Age ( )

2. Marital status:
   1. single
   2. married
   3. divorced
   4. widowed

3. Do you live with your parents ?
   1. yes
   2. no.

4. Were you born in a village/farming area or in a city ?
   1. village/farming area
   2. city

5. Do you currently live in a village/farming area or a city
   1. village/farming area
   2. city

6. Please indicate your current academic classification at United Arab Emirates UN.
   1. freshman
2. sophomore
3. junior
4. senior

7. How many language/s other than Arabic do you speak?
   1. one foreign language
   2. two foreign languages
   3. three or more foreign languages

8. Have you traveled abroad?
   1. yes
   2. no

Section 2: Individual Modernity Scale.

Please read each of the following questions carefully and then circle the items that best describe your attitude. Remember that you are to choose only one response for each question.

9. You have always been concerned about some public issues (such as traffic accidents, national budgetary and security issues) that you want to do something about.
   1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

10. If possible, you would have as much education as you could.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

11. You had a job which in the past did not require any technological skills to perform. Your boss suggested that you enroll in a computer training program which would help you do your work better. Would you

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

12. A person's family background is the most important qualification for holding high office.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

13. A person's devotion to the old, and revered, time-honored ways is the most important qualification for holding high office.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

14. A person's popularity is the most important qualification for holding high office.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know
15. A person's high education and special knowledge are the most important qualifications for holding high office.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

16. The hard work of its people is the most needed for the future of the UAE.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

17. God's help is the most needed for the future of the UAE.

   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know
18. Good luck is the most needed for the future of the UAE.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

19. It is very beneficial that scholars in universities are studying such things as to what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

20. It is somewhat beneficial that scholars in universities are studying such things as to what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
21. It is somewhat harmful that scholars in universities are studying such things as to what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.

   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know

22. It is very harmful that scholars in universities are studying such things as to what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.

   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know

23. It is necessary for a man and his wife to limit the number of their children so that they can take better care of those they already have.
1. strongly agree

2. agree

3. disagree

4. strongly disagree

5. do not know

24. It is wrong for a man and his wife to limit the number of their children so that they can take better care of those they already have.

1. Strongly disagree

2. disagree

3. agree

4. strongly agree

5. do not know

25. Women have as much rights to work as men do.

1. strongly agree

2. agree

3. disagree

4. strongly disagree

5. do not know

26. How often do you listen to or watch local news?

1. always
2. often
3. rarely
4. never
5. do not know

27. How often do you listen to or watch world news?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know

28. How often do you read local newspapers or magazines?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know

29. How often do you read newspapers or magazines from abroad?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
Section 3: Familism Scale

31. A married woman should always be willing to share her home with brothers and sisters of her husband.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

32. Married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

33. If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person were not a member of the family.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

34. It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

35. Children owe it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know
36. If a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let herself be influenced by outsiders to change these views.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

37. As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

38. If you found that your job ran so much against your family’s values that severe conflict developed, you would find a new job.

   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. agree
   4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

39. Whenever possible, a woman should talk over her important life decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

40. Marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than as creating new families.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

41. It is important that the family name be carried on.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
42. Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their children.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

43. Keeping the family going is a very important reason for sons and daughters to expect to marry and have children.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

44. At a community or social affair, a family should participate as a group rather than allow members to go their own way with their personal friends.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

45. If your mother has a medical bill of $5,000, which she cannot pay, you are morally obligated to pay this debt.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

Section 4: Urbanism Scale

46. Neighbors should visit each other as often as possible.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

47. Personal affairs such as phone numbers/residential addresses should be kept private.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

48. I would not hesitate to help someone I did not know.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know

49. If I could, I would live alone.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

50. If I could, I would live in a neighborhood where nobody knew me.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
3. disagree

4. strongly disagree

5. do not know

51. If I were in dire need, I would borrow money from a relative or friend.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know

52. I am against capital punishment.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

53. It does make a difference if my neighbor is from a different religious or racial/ethnic background.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

Section 5: Religiosity Scale

54. Do you believe that the world will come to an end according to the will of God?
   1. Yes, I believe this.
   2. I am uncertain about this.
   3. No, I do not believe this.

55. Do you believe that it is necessary for a person to repent before God will forgive his/her sins?
   1. Yes, God's forgiveness comes only after repentance.
   2. No, God does not demand repentance.
   3. I am not in need of repentance.

56. How often during a week would you say you read the holy Koran and religious literature?
   1. every day
   2. every other day
   3. never

57. How often do you perform Friday prayers?
1. always
2. often
3. never

58. Which of the following best describes your participation in the act of prayer?
   1. prayer is a regular part of my behavior.
   2. I pray primarily in times of stress and/or need, but not much otherwise.
   3. my prayer is restricted pretty much to formal worship services.
   4. I never pray.

59. Would you say that one's religious commitment gives life a certain purpose which it could not otherwise have?
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree

60. How would you respond to the statement: "Islam provides its followers an interpretation of their existence which could not be discovered by reason alone".
   1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly agree

Section 6: Intergenerational Perceived Conflicts Scale (Youn Scale)

61. I discuss some matters with my mother.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

62. I think my mother understands me.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

63. I can exchange confidences with my mother.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

64. My mother tends to approve my opinion and advice.
   1. always
   2. often
65. I feel that I am a useful child
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

66. I feel that I am inconveniencing my mother
   1. Never
   2. Often
   3. Always

67. My mother respects my taking part in family matters.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

68. I do feel alienated from my mother.
   1. Never
   2. Often
   3. Always

69. I feel that it is convenient for me to live with my mother.
   1. always
   2. often
3. never

70. I feel that my mother is content with me as a child.

1. always

2. often

3. never
APPENDIX C

THE MOTHER GENERATION'S SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Section 1: Demographic Data

1. age ( )

2. What is your marital status?
   1. single
   2. married
   3. divorced
   4. widowed

3. How many children do you have?
   1. one child
   2. two to five children
   3. six or more

4. Do any of your adult children live with you?
   1. yes
   2. no

5. Were you born in a village/farming area or a city?
   1. village/farming area
   2. city

6. Do you currently live in a village/farming area or a city
   1. village/farming area
2. city

7. Please indicate the highest level of your educational attainment.
   1. no formal education
   2. elementary level
   3. junior level
   4. senior level
   5. college/graduate

8. What is your occupation?
   1. business
   2. governmental job
   3. retired
   4. housewife

9. What is your estimated annual income?
   1. less than $40,000
   2. $40,000 - $50,000
   3. $50,000 - $60,000
   4. more than $70,000

10. How many language/s other than Arabic do you speak?
    1. one foreign language
    2. two foreign languages
3. three or more foreign languages

11. Have you traveled abroad?
   1. yes
   2. no

Section 2: Individual Modernity Scale.

Please read the following questions carefully and then circle the items that best describe your attitude. Remember that you are to choose only one response for each question.

12. You have always been concerned about some public issues (such as traffic accidents, national budgetary and security issues) that you want to do something about.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

13. If possible, you would have as much education as you could
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

14. You had a job which in the past did not require any technological skills to perform. Your boss suggested that you enroll in a computer training program, which would help you do your work better. Would you

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

15. A person's family background is the most important qualification for holding high office.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

16. A person's devotion to the old, and revered, time-honored ways is the most important qualification for holding high office.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

17. A person's popularity is the most important qualification for holding high office.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

18. A person's high educational attainment and special knowledge are the most important qualifications for holding high office.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

19. The hard work of its people is the most needed for the future of the U.A.E.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

20. God's help is the most needed for the future of the U.A.E.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

21. Good luck is the most needed for the future of the U.A.E.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

22. It is very beneficial that scholars in universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

23. It is somewhat beneficial that scholars in universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

24. It is somewhat harmful that scholars in universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
25. It is very harmful that scholars in universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

26. It is necessary for a man and his wife to limit the number of their children so that they can take better care of those they already have.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

27. It is wrong for a man and his wife to limit the number of their children so that they can take better care of those they already have.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

28. Women have as much rights to work as men do.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree

29. How often do you listen to or watch local news?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know

30. How often do you listen to or watch world news?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know
31. How often do you read local newspapers or magazines?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know

32. How often do you read newspapers or magazines from abroad?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. rarely
   4. never
   5. do not know

Section 3: Familism Scale.

32. A married woman should be willing to share her home with brothers and sisters of her husband.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

33. Married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. don't know

34. If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person were not a member of the family.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

35. It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

36. Children owe it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

37. If a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let herself be influenced by outsiders to change these views.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

38. As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents.
   1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

39. If you found that your job ran so much against your family's values, you would find a new job.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

40. Whenever possible, a person should talk over his/her important life decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know
41. Marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than creating new families.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

42. It is very important that the family name be carried on.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

43. Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their own children.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know.
44. Keeping the family going is a very important reason for sons and daughters to expect to marry and have children.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

45. At a community or social affair, a family should participate as a group rather than allow members to go their own way with their personal friends.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

46. If your daughter has a medical bill of $50,000, which she cannot pay, you are morally obligated to pay this debt.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

Section 4: Urbanism Scale

47. Neighbors should visit each other as often as possible.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

48. Personal affairs such as phone numbers and residential addresses should be kept private.

1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. agree
4. strongly disagree
5. do not know

49. I would not hesitate to help someone I did not know.

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. agree
4. strongly agree
5. do not know

50. If I could, I would live alone.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

51. If I could, I would live in a neighborhood where nobody knew me.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

52. If I were in dire need, I would borrow money from a relative or friend.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know
53. I am against capital punishment.
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree
   5. do not know

54. It does make a difference if my neighbor is from a different religious or racial/ethnic background.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. disagree
   3. agree
   4. strongly agree
   5. do not know

Section 5: Religiosity Scale.

55. Do you believe that the world will come to an end according to the will of God?
   1. Yes, I believe this.
   2. I am uncertain about this.
   3. No, I do not believe this.
56. Do you believe that it is necessary for a person to repent before God will forgive his/her sins?
   1. Yes, God's forgiveness comes only after repentance.
   2. No, God does not demand repentance.
   3. I am not in need of repentance.

57. Which of the following best expresses your opinion concerning miracles?
   1. I believe the report of the miracles in the Koran.
   2. I do not believe in the so-called miracles of the Koran.
   3. I neither believe nor disbelieve the so-called miracles of the Koran.

58. How often during a week would you say you read the holy Koran and religious literature?
   1. every day
   2. every other day
   3. never

59. How often do you perform Friday prayer?
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

60. Which of the following best describes your participation in the act of prayer?
1. prayer is a regular part of my behavior

2. I pray primarily in times of stress and/or need, but not much otherwise.

3. my prayer is restricted pretty much to formal worship services

4. I never pray.

61. Would you say that one's religious commitment gives life a certain purpose which it could not otherwise have?
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree
   4. strongly disagree

62. How would you respond to the statement: "Islam provides its followers with an interpretation of their existence which could not be discovered by reason alone".
   1. strongly agree
   2. agree
   3. disagree

Section 6: Intergenerational Perceived Conflicts Scale.
63. I do discuss some matters with my children.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

64. I think my children understand me.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

65. I can exchange confidences with my children.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

66. My children tend to approve my opinions and advice.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

67. I feel that I am a useful parent.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never
68. I do feel that I am inconveniencing my children.
   1. never
   2. often
   3. always

69. My children respect my taking part in family matters.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

70. I do feel alienated from my children.
   1. never
   2. often
   3. always

71. I feel that it is convenient for me to live with my children.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never

72. I feel that my children are content with my being a parent.
   1. always
   2. often
   3. never
REFERENCES


