PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PRC
AFTER MAO, 1976-1990

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Lu-haun Theodore Hung, B.A., M.A.
Denton, Texas
December, 1991
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The importance of party-military relations in the People's Republic of China was succinctly stated by Mao in his dictum that "political power comes from the gun" and "the Party should command the gun." Party-military relations in the PRC have never fully conformed to Mao's warning. This study seeks to analyze the nature and types of party-military relations in the PRC during the post-Mao period and the factors affecting change in these relations.

An examination of Chinese politics and factors influencing party-military relations in Communist countries was undertaken. Six variables influencing party-military relations in the PRC were identified. A qualitative content analysis was made the literature on party-military relations to identify the factors influencing change.

Three different patterns of party-military relations and six factors influencing change were discovered. In the first period after Mao, Chinese politics were characterized by factional conflict, and the military was greatly involved in politics. The military enabled Hua to become the power holder and party-military relations in this period tended to be conflictual. Factional politics was the main factor affecting party-military
relations in this period.

During Deng’s reign, politics became more institutionalized and the military more professional. The military lost its political influence and party-military relations tended to be more cooperative. The most significant factor influencing party-military relations in this period was the historical legacy of civilian supremacy. During and after the Tiananmen crisis, the military regained political power, and party-military relations became more conflictual once again. Emphasis has been placed on political indoctrination.

The Party in the PRC has close connections with the military, since the People’s Liberation Army functions as a party army. The military takes on characteristics of the party, since military officers are party members, participating in party affairs. This symbiotic relationship shapes the patterns of party-military relations.
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ABBREVIATIONS

BR  Beijing Review
CCP  Chinese Communist Party
CMC  Central Military Commission
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSC  Central Standing Committee
FBIS  Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China
GPCR  Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
       (Cultural Revolution)
GPD  General Political Department
JFJB  Jiefangjun bao [Liberation Army News]
JFRB  Jeifang ribao [Liberation daily], Shanghai
JPRS  Joint Publications Research Service
KMT  Kuomintang of Nationalist Party
NCNA  New China News Agency
NPC  National People's Congress
PCS  Political Commissar System
PLA  People's Liberation Army
PRC  People's Republic of China
RMRB  Renmin ribao [People's daily]
ROC  Republic of China
RSC  Revolutionary Soldier Committee
SCMP  Survey of China Mainland Press
XH  Xinhua
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

This study is an analysis of party-military relations in the People's Republic of China (PRC) after Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1976-1990). It seeks to describe and explain the dynamics of party-military relations in the PRC during this period as well as to analyze the factors which have affected party-military relations.

A period of great societal transformation has occurred in the PRC, including major changes in the political system, since the death of Mao Zedong and the downfall of the "Gang of Four." Virtually every institution and policy in the PRC—from communes to corporate enterprises, from the party to the army, from cadre to intellectual policy, from policies on agriculture to industry, rural to urban, literature to education—has undergone thorough re-examination and great change. The political processes themselves also have been altered, including party-military relations. The primary focus of this study seeks to discover what these new relations between the Party and the military are. Is there a party (civilian) supremacy or military dominance? What
roles does each perform? Are they cooperative or conflicting, or do they fall somewhere between these poles? Also, what factors have caused the modifications in the party-military relations in the post-Mao period? These are the questions which this study addresses.

Three models in contemporary literature have been used generally to study civil(party)-military relations (Janowitz 1971; Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1982). One, the democratic or liberal model where the regime dominated by elected politicians comes to power through party competition and popular elections. In party-military relations, party or ideological involvement is non-existent between soldiers and the state. Emphasis is placed on the military becoming professionally and politically neutral, while civilian control is institutionalized by enhanced governmental legitimacy and effectiveness (Welch 1976; Welch & Smith 1974). Military officers stay neutral or politically inactive because of their specialized training in military affairs and their acceptance of the ethic which enables them to abide by the formal set of rules of civilian control. The second model is the praetorian model where the regime is dominated on the whole by the military, or by a coalition of the military and the bureaucracy, or a coalition of military, civilian politicians and technocratic groups. These military elites innovate political structures and implement policies aiming to dominate the regime. The third model is the communist model or party control model, where a regime is dominated by a single noncompetitive party.
Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience from military officers by penetrating the armed forces with political ideas and political personnel. None of these models are fully adequate for studying the questions posed by this dissertation of the PRC since Mao.

In the democratic model, most Western scholars in the past two decades have relied on dichotomous frameworks for analyses of these relations where civilian functions are clearly distinguished from military functions. Such a clear line probably cannot be drawn between the Party and military sectors in the PRC since functions of the party and military sectors intertwine and overlap in such a party-dominated society. Neither does the explanation used by Huntington (1977, 7)—that relations between the civilian party and military are antagonistic and always in a state of latent or actual crisis—seem adequate for examining these relations in the PRC. Serious flaws exist with this view since all middle- and high-ranking military officers in the PRC also are party members and actively participate in party decision-making.

In the praetorian type, the boundaries between politics and policy are clearly permeable and the nature of the political domination is either illegitimate or unstable. Civilian control is not required. Military intervention, which is invited by the absence of an institutionalized political party system, is what characterizes the nature and structure of the regime and its institutional arrangements (Perlmutter 1982, 311). Obviously,
this model differs from the communist model, in which the military is intertwined with the party and the regime considered to be legitimate and stable.

Unfortunately, most studies on party-military relations in communist countries have focused primarily on the Soviet Union. Because of the historical and cultural differences, as is evidenced in the factional nature of politics and the various roles the military plays in society in the PRC, the studies focusing on the Soviet system are not entirely applicable to the PRC.

Some scholars used to rely heavily upon their understanding of party-military relations in Western and developing countries and attempted to generalize to build a conceptual framework based on comparisons among those countries. Often, as in the case of Huntington (1957), these writers tried to build a general theory of civil-military relations from a perspective emphasizing the national security of a liberal democratic system. These attempts to create general conceptual frameworks are not particularly useful in understanding civil-military relations in communist or party-dominated countries or in most developing countries with praetorian political systems. Clearly, experiences of the militaries of Western countries, or even developing countries, do not fit the militaries of a communist country such as the PRC because the two central assumptions are largely irrelevant (Dreyer 1985; Joffe 1965; Perlmutter 1982; Powell 1963b; Whitson 1973). For instance, there is no clear line between party and
military in the PRC, and these two institutions (the party and the military) do not have necessarily different interests. As a result, relations between them are not inherently conflictual. In the PRC, there is substantial congruence of values between Chinese Communist Party (CCP/Party) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders concerning the ultimate objectives of their society, the legitimacy of party rule and the importance of the role of the PLA. Further, high ranking military men of the PLA are involved in the two key party organs—the Central Committee and the Politburo, while the Party penetrates the military through the Political Commissar System. It is a misconception, therefore, to regard party-military relations as involving a situation where two concrete, dichotomous groups with real conflicting interests contend and bargain with each other.

Neither does the notion that party-military relations, especially in communist countries, have a sort of inherent or unchangeable nature adequately explain these relations. According to the "development model" suggested by Herspring and Volgyes, party-military relations in Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have changed. Whatever the specific reasons for the shift in party-military relations in each country, the nature of party-military relations changes (Herspring & Volgyes 1978). In the PRC change in party-military relations seem also to have occurred, especially during the Deng era. This is investigated later in this study.
The lack of a fully developed model or framework for studying party-military relations has led some comparative scholars, such as Albright to use a "continuum approach" for explaining civil-military relations in communist countries, where the continuum is between the poles of cooperation and conflict. Albright identified ten variables affecting where a country falls on this continuum (Albright 1980).

Another scholar, who uses the pseudonym, PLA Watcher, suggests a continuum or spectrum of political involvement of the PLA in politics. The real issue, according to him, is one of assessing the degree and style of involvement in politics by the PLA. His continuum ranges from control to simply influence by the PLA. The various degrees of political involvement range from most direct and active to the least direct and active or as he defined the various steps, control--intervention--participation--involvement--influence (PLA Watcher 1990).

PLA Watcher’s continuum of political involvement focused only on the military’s political involvement or participation rather than on the party-military relations in the post-Mao period in general. Neither does he propose variables for explaining the changes in party-military relations.

The problem faced by all scholars in this field is how to explain the change in party-military relations, which occurs as a result of societal transformations, without a fully developed model or framework for undertaking such studies. The researcher is fully aware of this problem and the difficulties it presents
as he begins this project.

Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of this study is to examine party-military relations in the PRC after Mao. Specifically, the study seeks to accomplish the following: first, to discover and analyze the factors which affected change in party-military relations of the PRC after Mao; second, to examine the nature and type of party-military relations in the PRC in this period; and finally, to evaluate the utility of the factors used to discern change and to explain the nature in party-military relations in this period.

Significance of the Study

The study of party-military relations in the PRC is significant not only to the academic but also to policy-makers. The study should enable a policy-maker to better understand and more effectively deal with what is an increasingly potent PRC military establishment. Moreover, it may lead scholars to a better understanding of the nature of civil-military relations in general, as well as to contribute to knowledge of the dynamics of the political process in the PRC.

Because of the complicated nature of China's party-military relations, scholars on Chinese military politics such as
Albright, Bullard, P. Chang, J. Cheng, T.K. Chin, Domes, Dreyer, George, Gittings, Godwin, Harding, Jencks, Joffe, Johnson, Kau, A. Liu, B. Liu, Nelsen, Nethercut, Powell, Sandachneider, Segal, Whitson and Yu, have not produced a conceptual model for analyzing China's military politics similar to those formulated for the study of the Soviet military politics. Works analyzing relations between the military and the party as a result tend to be largely descriptive and historical in nature. Even seminal case studies of particular party-military relations during various historical periods are rare.

This study helps to advance our understanding in that it seeks to:

1. describe changes in the dynamics of the party-military relations of the PRC after Mao, focusing on current trends and patterns of change.

2. develop an alternative approach toward the explanation of party-military relations in the PLA.

3. evaluate the utility of the factors used to discern change in party-military relations and to recommend additional research needed.

Method of Analysis

In spite of the opening of the PRC to more Western visitors in recent years, it is still difficult to obtain information or survey data from the PRC. In addition, researchers cannot
conduct field work and probably will be unable to in the near future. As a result, most contemporary research approaches cannot easily be used to analyze the Chinese political system or the relations between the Party and the PLA. As in the past, research on Chinese politics has to rely on other techniques, such as historical methods and logical inferences from limited sources of information. Due to these difficulties, each researcher is forced to defend his or her approach.

Early in this study, an examination of the various approaches used by other writers in the study of Chinese politics was undertaken. It was found that scholars attempting to study aspects of Chinese politics often constructed idiosyncratic models to organize and analyze data. The models of the leading scholars were examined to see if they helped in explaining the PRC’s political process as it affects party-military relations in the post-Mao period. Since the study of the relations between the Party and the military involves political organizations, especially the Party and the PLA, the structure and operation of the PLA, with emphasis on the Party’s control system within the military, was examined. Finally, works by scholars of comparative party-military relations in communist countries were reviewed to identify the variables they found influencing party-military relations (Albright 1980). From these sources, our methodological approach was devised.

Six broad factors which were thought to influence the nature of relations between the Party and the military were identified.
These factors are similar to those used by Albright, but modified to better reflect the Chinese society in the post-Mao period, since some of Albright's variables were either included within the six factors used here, or were clearly not relevant to the Chinese society during this period. Also it was possible to apply the six factors not only to the conflictual-cooperative continuum proposed by Albright, but also to PLA Watcher's proposed continuum between influence and control by the military.

Literature from the post-Mao period was examined to see if evidence could be found that these six factors influenced change in the party-military relations. These factors in turn became the theme of succeeding chapters. The following is an explication of these factors, and a justification of why they were included.

1. **Historical Legacy**: Communist countries continue to be influenced by divergent national pasts despite a common ideology, similar political institutions, ruling elites, and approaches to political socialization (Brown and Gray 1979). The historical experiences in China before and since the communist take-over are implicitly important variables in explaining party-military relations in the PRC (Albright 1980, 575; *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 11[3], 1978).

2. **Party Apparatus in the Military**: This factor examines party-military relations from the view of structural aspects. In all communist countries, the party attempts to maintain political control over the military by building party organizations into
the military. The extent of penetration of party structures in the military shows the degree of party control.

3. **Dynamics of the Political Commissar System:** The extent of political officers' roles and influence gives a picture of how the Political Commissar System in the military operates and help explain the relations between the Party and the military.

4. **Political Indoctrination:** The party in communist countries monopolizes, plans, and carries out political education in the military. It is assumed that the most effective way of ensuring that soldiers are politically reliable is through such political education. This educational process shows how the party socializes the military. Political indoctrination is included within the chapter on the dynamics of the Political Commissar System since it is such a vital part of commissars' activities.

5. **Military Participation in the Party:** The extent of military participation in party organs, especially in the Central Committee and Politburo, can be seen as an indicator of relationships between the Party and the military.

6. **Factional Politics:** Factional politics emphasize the essentially personalistic nature of Chinese politics. Chinese Communist politics is depicted as conflict among personal networks of various members of the leadership elite and it affects party-military relations.

In an attempt to develop a means of using these factors in a qualitative content analysis of relevant literature from the
Table 1. Questions Pertaining to Each Factor Considered as Affecting Party-Military Relations in the PRC in the Post-Mao Era

1. The country's historical legacy

A. What is the historical Chinese attitude toward the military?
B. Does this factor contribute to the explanation of party-military relations?
C. How do the experiences of Chinese Communist leaders in the early revolutionary period affect the evolution of party-military relations?

2. Party apparatus in the military

A. What is the pattern of party apparatus in the PLA?
B. What functions does each party in the organ have?
C. To what extent have party organs penetrated the PLA?

3. Dynamics of Political Commissar System

A. What political roles do political commissars play within and without the PLA?
B. To what extent do the activities of the Party have influences on party-military relations?

4. Military participation in the Party

A. What percentage of the Central Committee and Politburo is occupied by military in the professionals?
B. To what degree is the military involved in the politics?

5. Political indoctrination

A. What is the main content of ideological education?
B. How effective is the political education in making soldiers politically reliable?
C. What is the significance of such indoctrination to party-military relations?

6. Factional politics

A. What are the causes, the processes and the political results of factional struggles?
B. Is there factional political struggles within the military and with the party?
C. How does such factional conflict affect party-military relations?
post-Mao period, a number of questions were developed from each. These questions are stated in Table 1. The questions, in turn, served as a focus in directing the researcher's attention as the literature was surveyed for the factors affecting party-military relations. Use of the notes taken through this approach facilitates an evaluation of the dominant factors affecting change in the party-military relations during the period.

A ranking of the relative influence of these factors found in the literature of party-military relations was made to help explain the change that occurred throughout the post-Mao period. There were three political leaders during this period, Hua, Deng and Jiang, and party-military relations tended to vary in each of these periods. The ranking of the factors found in the literature from the PRC during each of these periods was used to indicate which factors most significantly effected change. Also a second ranking was made based on the researcher's reasoned interpretation after reading the totality of the literature from all sources of the factors thought to explain the nature of party-military relations. The principal sources searched consisted of the official documents and newspapers published in the PRC during the post-Mao period, and other primary sources originating in the PRC but published in other countries, as noted in the following data section.

A scale of 1 to 6 was used, where 6 indicates the most significant factor found in the literature and 1 the least important factor or a weaker relationship in affecting party-
This study of party-military relations in post-Mao China falls within the scope of classical political analysis. A classical approach is based largely on historical methods (Best 1977; Wiersma 1986), relying primarily on qualitative judgments. A qualitative content analysis is also used to more methodically examine the factors affecting changes in the party-military relations (George 1959; Holsti 1969). Qualitative content analysis was used to identify and evaluate the influence of factors affecting party-military relations in the PRC.

Qualitative content analysis involves a thorough examination of a body of materials without the counting process. Use of this modified qualitative content analysis technique assists the researcher in identifying factors affecting party-military relations since Mao's death in the voluminous survey of the literature.

Data Sources

The main sources of information about changes in party-military relations in the PRC are found in documents, official statements, books, monographs, articles and reports in various magazines and newspapers published primarily in the PRC. Some of the primary materials pertaining to the PRC, however, are available only from sources published in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United States, and Great Britain. For instance, recordings of radio and
television transmissions from the PRC and speeches of party leaders are available only from several sources outside of China, such as Issues and Studies published in Taiwan, which contains CCP documents and speeches of party leaders. The Hong Kong PRC-owned and pro-PRC press constitutes a rich source of fact and opinion concerning PRC developments. Also several Hong Kong China-watching journals exist. Another source is the writings of foreigners in PRC, such as diplomats, journalists, visiting officials, and scholars. Materials from the Chinese written media in the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are now more readily available, although they reflect differing ideological points of views. Selection among materials available is difficult because all of PRC's mass media are controlled either by the party or by the government. Thus, information from these sources always reflects official views. Furthermore, PRC's official documents or official statements are, more often than not, issued mainly for self-serving benefits. Thus, one cannot get an accurate political picture by depending merely on official publications or announcements. The fact that information about politics and the relations of the party and the military in the PRC has to be obtained partially from materials published in Hong Kong and Taiwan further complicates the problem of interpreting materials. All materials are written either from a communist or anti-communist viewpoint. The viewpoint of writers depends on where the author comes from, since authors from the various countries advance their national viewpoints. All such materials have to be
weighed very carefully. Only materials from the PRC are used in the process of identifying the dominant themes regarding party-military relations. Materials from both the PRC and elsewhere were used in the process of interpreting the impact of these various factors on party-military relations.

Historical Background

The establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, represented the culmination of an arduous and costly revolutionary struggle by the Chinese Communists that took place for more than two decades. At the beginning of July, 1921, the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held under the aegis of, and in affiliation with, the Communist International (Comintern), which was dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CCP was at first a purely political body without independent military support and it relied on the armies of the Chinese Nationalist Party--Kuomintang (KMT)--with which it had formed the first United Front. Before 1927, the Chinese Communist Party concentrated on building a labor organization and organizing strikes in urban centers. A politically conscious urban working class was thought to be the best guarantee to ensure an eventual communist victory in China. When collaboration with the KMT was destroyed at the time of the 1927 Shanghai Massacre, the Chinese Communists decided to build an army to counter the Nationalists' monopoly of firepower. The new
Army, called the Chinese Red Army (renamed the People's Liberation Army in 1946), under the command of Zhu De (Chu Teh) and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), was established in 1928.

From that time to the founding of the PRC, the PLA played a crucial role under the leadership of the CCP in determining the outcomes of the Civil War and foreign invasion by the Japanese. The PLA not only fought against the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists, but also participated in activities designed to integrate rural villages into the communist political system, undertook various productive activities, mobilized the masses, and indoctrinated the masses with the Communist ideology in an effort to win support for the CCP's programs. Mao emphasized the political role of the PLA and stressed the need to mobilize and provide a channel for mass line politics, including mobilization of peasants (Mao 1965). The PLA performed a combination of military and political functions that helped to advance the Communist revolution in China.

The PLA played an important role in the country's political development as Mao recognized in 1927 when stating that "political power comes from the barrel of the gun" (Mao 1965, 224). Throughout contemporary Chinese history, however, the relationship between the Party and the PLA has never conformed completely to Mao's advice when he cautioned that "the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party" (Mao 1965, 224-25). Party-military interaction has never been static. As Johnston states,
For the Party this has meant a contradiction between its desire to limit the political role of the military and the necessity of relying on the military organizational structure, social prestige, and ideological heritage to implement policies (Johnston 1984, 1012).

Party-military relations before 1949 were characterized as party-military symbiosis as a result of the prolonged armed struggle with the KMT. As Ralph L. Powell states, "prior to 1949 it was almost literally true that the Party was in the Army, but it is also true that the Army has always belonged to the Party" (Powell 1963b, 347). During this long period, most party leaders were serving simultaneously as military leaders and vice versa (Joffe 1965; Whitson 1973).

From 1949 to 1953, party leaders authorized military commanders to control local and provincial governments throughout the newly liberated areas in China, since the country was experiencing administrative chaos, economic inflation, and social disorder. The PLA helped the Party to consolidate political control, to implement land reform, and to rehabilitate a war-torn economy. Also, the power of the PLA increased when China participated in the Korean War, and it had great influence in party decisions during that time.

During the period of the Great Leap Forward from 1954 to 1965, a major conflict occurred over Chinese military policy between those stressing the need to construct a modernized army capable of sophisticated operations and those stressing the need to ensure that such an army preserved its revolutionary character and remained under the control of the party. This basically was
a conflict between "professionalization" and "revolutionalization."

Potential for conflict between these two views was rooted in the need for the modernization and professionalization of the PLA which began to be recognized as soon as the Chinese leaders founded the communist state in Mainland China. But it was not until the Korean War intensified the problem and encouraged movement away from the revolutionary model that the issue became an open conflict. A conscription and ranking system had been introduced which provided the basic element of a professional army by Peng Dehuai (Peng Tehuai), the Minister of National Defense and a leader in the attempt to professionalize the army.

Reaction against professionalization soon followed the dismissal of Peng Dehuai, because Peng had criticized the shortcomings of "The Great Leap Forward" policies in 1959. In the aftermath of his removal, a new attempt was made to restore the essentials of the revolutionary model in the PLA, especially in the political control structure. The push to return to the revolutionary model reached a high point in 1964 when the entire Chinese nation was encouraged by the new Minister of Defense, Lin Biao (Lin Piao) to "Learn from the PLA" (Joffe 1965; Gittings 1967; Johnson 1966; Hsieh 1962; Powell 1963a).

The PLA was heavily involved in politics during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR/Cultural Revolution) of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It dispatched military work teams totalling some two million men to restore order in urban schools,
factories, and offices which were disrupted by the Red Guard movement. The PLA established military governments in nearly every province and major city, and sought to perpetuate its control over Chinese society by institutionalizing military participation in civilian politics (Harding 1987a). Following the death of Mao in October, 1976, senior military commanders who favored Hua Guofeng supported a successful palace coup against the four most powerful supporters of the Cultural Revolution: Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing; theoretician Zhang Chunqiao; Honqi editor Yao Wenyuan; and Shanghai’s labor leader, Wang Hongwen—the so-called "Gang of Four."

In a communist country where the party dominates, it is assumed that the military submits to party authority under all circumstances, while it is also assumed the military is to be involved in party politics. For most of its history, the PLA had loyally submitted to civilian authority, even when its policy proposals were rejected by party leaders (Harding 1987a). For example, in the early 1950s, after its extensive involvement in civil affairs during the post-war years of crisis, the PLA obeyed Party orders to go back to the barracks and to return its administrative responsibilities to civilian hands. Also, the regional army commanders accepted a series of reassignments and transfers in 1973, 1980, and 1985 that clearly were intended to limit their political power. The PLA obeyed party orders even on those occasions when its requests for more rapid military modernization and higher defense expenditures were rejected by Party
leaders in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. PLA leaders even agreed to a Party decision to reduce its troop strength by one million or nearly 25 percent in 1985 (Dreyer 1989a, 98).

Since the end of the Maoist period, and especially since Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of his position as China's paramount leader in the late 1970s, China has been swept by major changes which Deng has termed "a second revolution." This "revolution" has been distinguished by a dramatic drive to modernize which has reshaped all sectors of Chinese society (Joffe 1987). In the military sector, Deng's leadership helped launch a series of reforms designed to modernize the Chinese armed forces and to make it capable of defending China effectively against a modern army. As the modernization of the PLA occurred during the years of Deng's rule, the political role and relations with the Party were concomitantly changing. The PLA tended to become more of a professional army, rather than a revolutionary political force. However, since the Tiananmen incident on June 4, 1989, the PLA again has taken an increased role in politics and the question of Party control of the military has once more been raised.

Organization of Dissertation

This study consists of eight chapters. Chapter I sets forth the statement of the problem and explains the purpose and significance of the study. The Chapter also presents the theoreti-
cal framework with a description of the methodology and the data used. Chapter II presents the review of literature. It analyti-
cally reviews the related literature of civil-military relations
in general and of communist countries with an emphasis on the
PRC.

Chapter III examines how the historical legacy has
influenced party-military relations in the PRC since Mao. Its
impact from traditional China and the Communist revolutionary
experience in the PRC is also reviewed. Chapter IV investigates
the influence of the factor of the party apparatus in the mili-
tary on party-military relations. Party-military relations are
examined from the view of structural aspects, and the Political
Commissar System is described.

Chapter V analyzes the impact of the dynamics of the Politi-
cal Commissar System on party-military relations. It examines
the political officers' role and influence in party-military
relations in the PRC, emphasizing the political role of the
political commissars. Attention is paid to the stand that
political commissars tend to take in cases of conflicts between
party and military elites. Political work and indoctrination,
the most important work of the political officer, also is dis-
cussed in the second section of this chapter. Political in-
doctrination is included within the Chapter since it is such a
vital part of the commissar's activities.

Chapter VI examines military participation in the party to
assess this factor in party-military relations in the PRC. It
examines the military representation in the party organs, especially in the Central Committee and Politburo and seeks to describe the extent of the military involvement in politics. Chapter VII examines factional conflicts between the Party and the military. Finally, Chapter VIII evaluates the utility of the six factors thought to influence party-military relations during the tenure of Hua, Deng, and Jiang. The rankings of the relations of these factors on party-military relations during the post-Mao period are analyzed to see if these factors are useful in explaining changes in party-military relations. Finally, the utility of the methodology is evaluated, and recommendations for additional research were made.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The study of civil-military relations has gone through at least three stages during the last five decades. As democratic and liberal political scientists in the United States reacted against the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism in the 1930s, a number of scholars began to study civil-military relations. One of these scholars, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote about the "garrison state" which was emerging in totalitarian systems (Lasswell 1941).

The garrison state, according to Lasswell, is not a single regime, but a world tendency toward the "predominance in power of the managers of violence." In the words of Lasswell, the garrison state is

a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society. ... the trend of our time is away from the dominance of the specialists on bargaining, who is the businessmen, and toward the supremacy of the soldier (1941, 455).

Military values are dominant in the garrison state and all activities are subordinated to war and the preparation for war. The garrison state is therefore a political order that considers military power its highest goal and value. Lasswell, in his later works in the 1960s, concludes that his key hypothesis "that
the arena of world politics is moving toward the domination of
the specialists in violence” is still relevant (Lasswell 1962,
51). He reasserts that "the garrison hypothesis provides a
probable image of the past and future of our epoch" (Lasswell
1962, 67).

Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith in 1974 analyzed factors
of military intervention and the roles of the military in the
politics of developing countries with particular reference to
Thailand, Nigeria, Peru, and Egypt and concluded that

the garrison state hypothesis provides a reasonably accurate
image of the development of civil-military relations
throughout much of the world. The burgeoning strategic arms
race and the accelerating proliferation of the various means
of organized violence continue to lend persuasive support to
Lasswell’s view of coercion as a political currency (Welch &
Smith 1974, 259).

The increasing growth and importance of militaries in
countries throughout the world today continues to support
Lasswell’s view.

Literature on Non-Communist Countries

The model of the liberal and civilian-oriented professional
soldier, however, replaced emphasis on the totalitarian-oriented
garrison soldier among American scholars after World War II.
Americans traditionally have viewed large standing military
forces both as a threat to peace and to democracy. The political
roles of the military force were seen to be limited and
relatively unimportant in American political life. After World
War II, however, national security became the main goal of foreign policy and it became increasingly necessary to accept an expanded role for the military. Students of civil-military relations were caught in a dilemma between the demands for security and American traditional liberalism. The military must be given power during times of threat, yet the anti-military bias of liberalism resists increasing the power and roles of the military. As a result, liberals are forced to seek ways of maintaining civilian control over the military under these new conditions (Ekirch 1956).

Huntington seeks a solution to this dilemma of reconciling national security with traditional liberalism by proposing increased professionalization of the officer corps and an ideological shift from liberalism to conservatism (Huntington 1981). There are only two ways to ensure civilian control of the military, according to Huntington. One is to control the military through "subjective" civilian control which can be achieved by maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. In practice, this has permitted the group controlling the government to use the power of the military for its own purposes. The second way to ensure civilian control of the military is through "objective" civilian control, which is made possible by the rise of a professional officer corps. "The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism" according to Huntington, while "the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial
of an independent military sphere" (Huntington 1981, 81-85). He argues that a high degree of civilian control can be achieved in the modern state only by a high degree of differentiation of military from other social institutions, and that the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps is the best way to prevent the military from intruding into political areas. Professionalization produces a political neutrality, which relies on political guidance from statesmen.

Professionalization of the officer corps, however, is not a complete solution to the dilemma, according to Huntington. He further argues that a basic shift in American values from liberalism to conservatism is essential (Huntington 1957, 59-79). The "military mind," according to Huntington, is fundamentally conservative since it consists of values, attitudes, and perspective inherent in the performance of the professional military function. It rests upon beliefs in the weakness of man and the supremacy of a power-oriented society which sees war as inevitable; it espouses nationalistic and pacific sentiments, believing in preparedness and the limitation of foreign commitments. Therefore, Huntington concludes:

Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure (Huntington 1957, 464).

Ways to make the military professional became one of the major theoretical themes of the scholarly literature on civil-military relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Studies on the role
of the military were systematically organized by Huntington and Janowitz, and the military was examined as a way of life. In addition, Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) initiated a systematic study of military politics, while Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* (1960) is the classic study of the armed forces and society. Janowitz’s basic thesis is that technological and other developments have produced major changes in the military establishment. He asserts that the impact of the technology of new weapon systems and changes in warfare have changed the organization and ideology of the armed forces, and that "the military have accumulated considerable power, which protrudes into the political fabric of contemporary society" (Janowitz 1960, 21). To Janowitz, the military is a politically sensitive profession and only institutional constraints provide a measure of civilian control.

The study of civil-military relations took a new direction from the beginning of the 1960s. The research in this period focused on developing countries and produced a new prototype, the "soldiers in mufti" or the "praetorian soldier" (Nordlinger 1970). The focus of these studies shifted to the causes of military intervention and the role of the military in these societies. Still other studies sought to evaluate the performance and consequence of military regimes.

A number of studies investigated why the military staged coups. Military coups in the beginning of the 1960s were conceived to be either a consequence of the failure of democracy or
a consequence of the advantages and strengths of military organizations. For instance, Janowitz (1960) finds that most military interventions are not the result of some praetorian conspiracy, but a reaction to civilian incompetence which makes it relatively easy for the stronger military to march into the political arena (Janowitz, 1964). Similarly, Samuel Finer concludes that two factors must coincide: first, the disposition of an army to intervene in politics, and second, the opportunity to intervene (Finer 1976). Welch and Smith seek to understand both internal and environmental factors which cause military intervention. Internal factors refer to characteristics of the military establishment, including its mission and organizational characteristics such as cohesion, autonomy, structural differentiation, functional specialization, professionalization, and political awareness. Environmental factors influencing military intervention, on the other hand, are the social and political contexts within which the armed forces exist (Welch and Smith 1974). Both the internal and environmental factors, according to these authors, must support the military before it can move into the political sphere.

The primary motivation of military intervention, according to Perlmutter, is political. There is little correlation with other factors frequently studied, such as the frequency of military coups and the size, internal structure, or budget factors of the military organization (Perlmutter 1977). Also, he states that the factors often studied as causes of military
intervention, such as the decline of authoritarian political power, historical legacies, or the failure of democracy, do not adequately explain military intervention. In place of these he argues that military intervention is purely a political decision. He states:

the military group replaces an existing regime: (a) when the military is the most cohesive and politically the best organized group at a given time in a given political system, (b) when no relatively more powerful opposition exists ... the decision to intervene, that is, to execute the coup, is a purely political decision ... (Perlmutter 1981b, 19-23).

Perlmutter and Finer also challenge Huntington's argument that a high degree of civilian control can be achieved by differentiation of the military and the creation of a professional officer corps. Professionalism alone does not prevent military intervention in politics, they argue. Military officers must have an independent adherence to the principle of civilian control or professionalism alone may spur the military to political intervention. Military men may see themselves as servants of the state rather than of the government in power. They may become so concerned with the needs of military security that they will act to override other values, and they may object to being used to maintain domestic order (Finer 1976, 239-242). Perlmutter further argues that corporatism, that is, group consciousness with a dominant concern for the organization, and not professionalism, is a primary cause for interventionism. According to Perlmutter,

(1) military professionalism can be achieved and fulfilled without an exclusively corporate orientation and behavior,
(2) the corporate, not the professional orientation of the
military, determines its objective or subjective political behavior, (3) the degree of commitment to corporatism rather than to professionalism determines the level of political intervention by the military... (Perlmutter 1981b, 15-16).

The performance and consequences of military regimes were the subject of other studies in the 1960s. Whether or not the military constitutes a modernizing force promoting economic growth and changes in political and social structures became one of the controversial themes about military regimes during this period. Most authors consider the military a highly effective instrument of modernization. John J. Johnson, one of these scholars, believes that the military facilitates modernization and political development in developing countries. Lucian Pye also argues that the military, as the only organized institution in a transitional society, has the most modern and rational organization, and plays a prominent role in newly emerging countries (Pye 1962, 69-89). Similarly, Marion Levy maintains that in modernizing societies, the military is typically the organization most efficient at "combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control" (Levy 1966, 603).

The positive perspective that the military promotes economic growth and political development was seriously challenged in the 1970s (Finer 1976; Jackman 1976; Makinlay & Cohan 1976; Nordlinger 1970, 1977; Makinlay & Cohan 1976; Perlmutter 1970). The military establishment, it is argued, holds to military values calling for rank, order, and hierarchy which causes it to be
primarily concerned with preserving and maintaining order once it assumes power. Social and economic development, therefore, are largely neglected. But, even if the original intervention in politics called for economic development and social change, military governments are unlikely to have sufficient political and organizational skills to pursue modernizing policies (Bienen 1971, 17-19). Furthermore, the corporate self-interest of the military hinders socio-economic change and popular responsiveness (Nordlingr 1970; Sohn 1968, 103-121). Military governments are most likely to be concerned with maintaining and increasing the prerogatives and status of the military, even when such efforts produce conflicts with society at large.

Other scholars, such as Huntington, argue that whether or not the specific outcome of military rule promotes development depends upon the level of a nation’s social and economic development. For examples, Huntington states

as society changes, so does the role of the military ... the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military (Huntington 1968, 221).

The reason for the military being a modernizing force, according to Moshe Lissak, is that it may have advantages over the society generally. The advantages it may have are (1) its pioneering in technological-logistic and administrative jobs, (2) the combination of traditional structural features plus a division of labor based on universalistic principles, and (3) the solidarity role it played in a fragmented society (Lissak 1976,
Whether or not it uses these advantages to promote development depends on other factors influencing the military. Other scholars in this period sought to empirically evaluate whether military or non-military regimes promoted the most development in developing countries. Interestingly, they found that there were no major differences between military and non-military regimes in promoting social change and modernization (Jackman 1971; Mackinlay & Cohen 1971; Schmitter 1971; Weaver 1973).

Lack of success in answering the questions of whether military or non-military regimes best promote development led some scholars such as Huntington, Perlmutter, Luckham Welch and Smith, and Finer to attempt to categorize civil-military relations to create a typology which might give insights to some of these questions. Huntington classified civil-military relations into two categories: the objective and the subjective models based on four characteristics of the military: (1) expertise--the management of violence; (2) clientship--responsibility to its client, the society or the state; (3) corporations--group consciousness and bureaucratic organization; and (4) ideology--the military mind (Huntington 1962). An alternative threefold typology of military types is suggested by Perlmutter; it includes militaries which are professional, praetorian, and revolutionary, and based on six basic characteristics of the military, including expertise, client, corporations, conscription, ideology, and disposition to intervene (Perlmutter 1977).
Yet other scholars altered these methods of classifying militaries based solely on these military characteristics and began to look at both the militaries and the social and political conditions within these countries. Luckham, for instance, developed a typology of civil-military relations based on three factors: (1) the strength or weakness of civilian institutions; (2) the strength or weakness of the military, the coercive, political and organizational resources at its disposal; (3) the nature of the boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political environment (Luckham 1971). Similarly, Welch and Smith built a typology based on four variables; (1) the extent and nature of political participation of the populace, (2) the strength of civil institutions, (3) military strength, (4) the nature of military institutional boundaries (Welch and Smith, 1974).

This approach for classifying militaries and socio-political conditions in countries was further expanded by such writers as Finer who designed military regimes based upon social and political dimensions. He suggests five major categories of military regimes based on two criteria: the extent to which the military control the major policies of the society, and the degree of overtness with which they do so. These he characterized as (1) direct rule, (2) either open or quasi-civilized, (3) dual rule, (4) indirect rule, and (5) either continuous or intermittent (Finer 1976). This classification was further changed by Nordlinger who suggests a typology of military regimes based on two
other dimensions; the extent of governmental power that the military exercises, and the ambitiousness of its objectives. He identified three types of military regimes which he called (1) moderators (veto power; preserves status quo), (2) guardians (governmental control; preservers of the status quo and/or correctors of malpractices and deficiencies), and (3) rulers (regime dominance; effects political change and sometimes socioeconomic change) (Nordlinger 1977, 21-22).

These efforts to create a typology of civil-military relations are still incomplete. To a large degree, communist countries have been ignored, partly due to Western assumptions about the role of the military in society. According to David Albright, the assumptions which have affected Huntington as well as other Western researchers include views that (1) the military and civilians constitute two distinct groups, (2) relations between both groups are inherently conflicting in nature, (3) what keeps the conflict within bounds is the subordination of the officer corps to civilians except on matters requiring military expertise, (4) shifts in civil-military relations take place as a function of the degree of effectiveness of civilian control, (5) the first necessity in analyzing civil-military relations is to examine characteristics of the modern military. Since communist ideology views the civil-military relations from a different perspective, it follows that research based on such assumptions is inadequate to explain the civil-military relations in communist countries. Next, we turn to attempts to understand these
relations in the communist world.

**Literature on Party-Military in Communist Countries**

Communist doctrine as interpreted in most communist countries holds that the military is an instrument of political power which needs to be under the Party's control. As a result, a political control system, sometimes called a political commissar, is found in most militaries in communist countries. This difference gives civil-military relations in communist countries a distinct difference.

Most studies of party-military relations in communist countries to date have focused on the Soviet experience; other communist countries are generally ignored. Also, there are few theoretical works on party-military relations in communist states, except in the case of the Soviet Union. Most works about communist countries other than the Soviet Union are descriptive and nomothetic. These do not provide a comparative perspective. Only recently has there been any comparative works on party-military relations in communist countries which present comparative conceptual frameworks (Albright 1980; Herspring & Volgyes 1978; *Studies in Comparative Communism* 1978, 11[3]; Wolpin 1981).

Kolkowicz's book on the Soviet Military and the Communist Party in 1967 was, in a sense, a counterpart to Lasswell's seminal work on the garrison state. It also initiated great interest in numerous other studies of party-military relations in
the Soviet Union. Kolkowicz’s research relies on the interest
group or institutional conflict model and investigates two basic
assumptions about Soviet military politics. First, there are two
principal actors in Soviet military politics, the Communist Party
and the military, which have distinctively different attributes,
goals, and orientations toward society. Second, the Party and
the military are engaged in a chronic and multifaceted conflict
stemming from their incompatible outlooks and interests. The
relationship between the Party and the military, Kolkowicz wrote,
"is essentially conflict prone and thus presents a perennial
threat to the political stability of the Soviet state" (Kolkowicz

The military’s main objective, according to Kolkowicz, is to
acquire and maintain professional autonomy. The Party, on the
other hand, seeks not only an efficient military instrument but
also a defense establishment over which it has "hegemony." The
cause of this conflicting relationship is to be found in the
diametrically opposed interests and objectives of the Party and
military leadership. The military, according to Kolkowicz, holds
values of elitism, professional autonomy, nationalism, detachment
from society, and heroic symbolism. Counterpoised to these are
the following values the Party wants the military to possess:
egalitarianism, subordination to ideology, proletarian inter-
nationalism, involvement with society, and the practice of
anonymity (Kolkowicz 1967, 21).
Another aspect of Soviet military politics which produces conflicts, Kolkowicz states, is that the military may alter the vital internal balance of the Party by giving or withholding its support to the delicately balanced system of power relationships among ruling party elites (Kolkowicz 1967, 21). He suggests also that the military has political ambitions that go beyond the assertion of autonomy within its professional sphere, and he concludes that "we may assume that the Soviet military bureaucracy is subject to the generic endeavor of military establishments in other societies to assume a social and political role in the state" (Kolkowicz 1967, 322).

The nature of relations between the party and the military became one of the most frequently discussed issues by scholars of civil-military relations in communist countries as a result of Kolkowicz's work. In the last two decades, it was generally assumed that these relationships were antagonistic (Deane 1977a; Fainsod 1963; Garthoff 1966; Goldhammer 1975; Kolkowicz 1967; Wolfe 1970). Recently, however, scholars have argued that relations between the party and the military are not conflicting, but are cooperative and harmonious, although considerable dispute exists between these two views (Colton 1979; Dreyer 1985; Herspring & Volgyes 1978; Odom 1973; Warner 1977). In general, those who focus on party and military interactions maintain a non-conflict viewpoint, while those who emphasize party control over the military see conflicting relations.
One of the writers who rejects the conflicting viewpoint of relations between the military and the party in the Soviet system is William E. Odom. He rejects Kolkowicz’s ideas entirely and relies on a historical and bureaucratic approach, Odom surveys party-military relations of the 1920s and traces the patterns of the civil-military congruence back to pre-revolutionary Russia.

According to him,

...behavior in the Soviet military is viewed as fundamentally a bureaucratic political matter; and politics within bureaucracies is essentially a struggle by the top leadership to impose its value preferences on the lower bureaucratic levels (Odom 1978, 27-52).

He asserts that this is generally the pattern throughout the entire Soviet era, and while these may be bureaucratic struggles it is not interest group conflict. Odom suggests an alternative conceptualization to Kolkowicz’s assertion of institutional conflict which rests on five assumptions about the contemporary nature of Soviet party-military relations. He said:

First, the military is an administrative arm of the Party, not something separate from and competing with it ... Second, the party-military relationship has symbiotic aspects in domestic politics ... Third, the military is first and foremost a political institution ... Fourth, the military’s political life is bureaucratic in character, not parliamentarian and not lobbyist ... Fifth ... a mechanistic factor at work to make top-level military policy making distinct from decision-making at the lower levels (Odom 1978, 41-45).

Military officers, according to Odom, are executives just as the party cadres and their influence in policy is purely bureaucratic, not politically competitive with the party. Conflict is largely bureaucratic and intra-institutional between the lower and higher levels of the military bureaucracy.
Some scholars, such as Timothy J. Colton, criticize both Kolkowicz and Odom because they put the main actors—the military and the party—into dichotomous categories. This excessive preoccupation with the process of party control, Colton argues, should be replaced by an approach for analyzing military participation in politics (Colton 1978b, 63). Colton further contends that there are three advantages to using the concept of military participation in analyzing party-military relations (Colton 1978b). First, we do not need to assume that the main actors—the army and the party—have to be put into dichotomous categories; second, it encourages analytic flexibility; and third, it brings more than one level of complexity to the analysis.

The main interface between the military and the party, according to Colton, is the Political Commissar System within the armed forces, the Main Political Administration (MPA). The MPA is closely linked to the Communist party and the prime instrument for controlling the military. Furthermore, Colton asserts that: (1) the MPA is more closely integrated with the military command than with civilian party agencies, (2) one of the MPA’s functions as external political controller and monitor of the military command has yielded to a role that can be called “military administration,” (3) the military party apparatus has few of the attributes that an effective monitoring organization should have, (4) on most political issues in which MPA officials have taken a major part, they have done so as allies rather than antagonists.
of the military commanders with whom they work (Colton 1979, 9-112).

The military, according to Colton, has its own institutional interests which up to now, the party has satisfied by permitting it to solve its own internal problems, and by allowing it to participate in the party decision-making process either as expert advisors or by adopting policies with which the military generally agrees. His view on party-military relations clearly differs with that of Odom and Kolkowicz as he states:

In contrast to the institutional congruence model I have read into Odom’s work, I find it necessary to retain a notion of civil-military boundary—a boundary that is permeable, to be sure, but that has a definite shape and location. But unlike Kolkowicz and other adherents of the institutional conflict model, I do not find outright conflict across this boundary to be a characteristic feature of Soviet military politics. Military participation in Soviet politics constitutes a complex set of reciprocal interactions between institutions and across institutional boundaries, which merit study in their own right (Colton 1979, 73).

The first comparative study of civil-military relations in a communist country other than the Soviet Union was made by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes in 1977. They presented “development model” of civil-military relations in communist systems based on East European experience. The development rested on two premises. First, the party and the military are distinct, identifiable institutions, and the military possesses the greatest potential threat to the party hegemony. Second, the nature of party-military relation changes over time. The scope and direction of such change depends on the degree to which the party
has succeeded in socializing the officer corps in accepting the party’s value system (Herspring & Volgyes 1977, 249-269).

Herspring and Volgyes’ developmental perspective provides an explanation for the contradictory findings and interpretations between the conflict and non-conflict view on party-military relations. The Soviet Union, as well as other communist societies, experiences a series of stages—transformation, consolidation, and system maintenance. Accordingly, the views of both Kolkowicz and his opponents may be time-bound and reflect only a country’s experiences in one period. For example, Kolkowicz’s conflict model may be relevant in the transformation and consolidation stages of civil-military relations, while Odom’s institutional congruence model may be appropriate for explaining civil-military relations in the system-maintenance period.

Literature on the Party-Military in the People’s Republic of China

Most studies on party-military relations before the 1970s failed to include the PRC in their typologies since it was assumed that the Chinese pattern was so unique that it did not fit either the Western or Soviet patterns (Feld 1958; Janowitz 1964; Shils 1962). The Cultural Revolution seems to be a turning point in the study of the Chinese military. Many studies since then have sought to conceptualize the party-military relations,
although they are still methodologically quite underdeveloped.

One study by Welch and Smith in the early 1970s attempted to classify Chinese party-military relations according to Huntington's model (Welch & Smith 1974). They held that the party sought control of the military by maximizing power of the party authorities in relations to the military. The essence of this subjective control is basically a denial of an independent military sphere. The military is a part of the party and vice versa. Accordingly, the means of civilian control of the military is as follows:

In these systems, military institutions lack autonomy. This may be because civilian authorities do not recognize the existence of an independent sphere of activity for the military and hence seek to subordinate military values and interests within those of the larger society. This appears to be the general case in the People's Republic of China after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ... (Welch & Smith 1976, 48).

Welch later added to the means of civilian control of the military a discussion about the Political Commissar System with "utilization of party control, through the creation of parallel hierarchies of command" over the military (Welch 1976, 506).

Another classification of party-military relations in the PRC which denied the separation of the civilian and military spheres was proposed by Luckman in 1971. He described the PRC as a "revolutionary nation-in-arms." Rapoport's concept of a nation-in-arms was modified to "the revolutionary nation-in-arms" (Rapoport 1962). Party-military relations are thought to be integrated by the revolution so that civilian and military
values, institutions and personnel superseded the notion of control. This type of party-military relations arise in a place "where the revolutionary army's strategic and political functions are shaped very strongly by the political imperatives of the struggle" (Luckham 1971, 25).

Later the concept of the revolutionary nation-in-arms was expanded by Perlmutter. Although he accepted the view that the revolutionary character unified the party and the military, he believed the military could become a professional army without losing the revolutionary character, and he classified the military in the PRC in this category (Perlmutter 1977, 9-17).

A conceptual framework for understanding Chinese military politics similar to those for the Soviet military still has not been fully developed, despite these attempts to place the military party relations in the PRC into existing typologies. Most studies of party-military relations in the PRC analyze the PLA and the CCP descriptively and historically.

These studies of the Chinese military report that in the period from 1927 to 1949 there was little or no conflict in party-military relations since the period was dominated by civil war and the war with the Japanese. Three major factors led to the harmonious relations between the civilian and military: (1) the Chinese communist struggle against the Nationalists and the Japanese (1937-1945) was mainly a guerrilla war and the PLA played a major political role; (2) the revolutionary goals of both the Party and the army were tied up with defeating the
enemies and building a communist society in China; (3) most party leaders were at the same time military leaders as well as party leaders. The power of the PLA increased from 1949 to 1953. Local military commanders were appointed by the Party and given control over local and provincial governments throughout all newly liberated areas in China, since China was confronted with problems of administrative chaos, economic inflation, and social disorder. Also, when China participated in the Korean war, the PLA not only enjoyed considerable autonomy, but greatly influenced the Party's decision-making.

Experts on Chinese military politics in this period tended to emphasize conflicting aspects in the relations between the CCP and the PLA despite the fact that the Party maintained supremacy over the military. They assumed that a major and unresolvable conflict existed in China's military policy between the needs to construct a modernized army capable of providing a sophisticated defense, and the need to ensure that such an army retained its revolutionary character under party control. The conflict between "revolutionalization" and "professionalization" created a tension between those who believe professionalization is essential for military morale and efficiency and those who assert the primacy of party control.

Joffe's 1965 monograph, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control, 1949-64*, focuses on the conflict between the demands of an emerging military professionalism and the need for political control. According to him, this is essentially a
generational conflict between those differing in experience, outlook, and responsibilities. Veteran leaders of the "guerrilla generation" are more "red" or ideological than the younger officers of an increasingly "professional generation" who are more "expert" or pragmatic in outlook and who stress the need for a professional military (p. 10). The elements of conflict between the Party and the officers are two fundamentally different points of view on the relative importance of man and weapons in warfare, and consequently on the nature of the modernized army (p. 48).

The need for the modernization and professionalization of the PLA arose soon after the Chinese leaders founded the communist state in mainland China. The Korean war intensified this need and encouraged a drift away from the revolutionary mode of operation. Military conscription and ranking system introduced after the Korea war, along with recognition of the need to be prepared against a modern foe, provided the impetus for professionalizing the army. Reaction against the movement to professionalize the army similar to the Soviet military, however, helped cause the dismissal of the Minister of Defense, Peng Dehuai in 1959. At that time, there was an attempt to restore the essentials of the PLA's revolutionary model, especially the political control structure. This movement to restore the revolutionary model in the PLA reached a high point in 1964, when the entire Chinese nation was exhorted to "learn from the PLA" (Gittings 1967; Haich 1962; Joffe 1965; C. Johnson 1966; Powell
1963b). This revolutionary doctrine provided a key theoretical underpinning for party supremacy over the army, which was exercised through the Political Commissar System (Joffe 1965, 58).

Almost all writings on Chinese party-military relations since the mid 1960s have focused on the role and behavior of the PLA in Chinese politics. The main reason for this increased interest in the PLA is the greatly expanded political participation of the PLA and its leaders in Chinese domestic politics during and after the Cultural Revolution. The major issues dealt with in this period include the following: (1) causes, processes, and impacts of the PLA intervention in politics, (2) the evolving power, political role and orientation, and political status of the PLA, (3) the extent of participation of military leaders in important party committees, (5) reorganization of the military system and reconstruction of the militia, (6) conflicts between the PLA and Red Guard, between central and local military leaders, and conflicts among top military leaders, (7) Deng's and Hua's rise and fall, the "Gang of four," and effects of Chou and Mao's death, (8) the PLA's role in intra-party conflict after the deaths of Chou and Mao, (9) the modernization problem of the PLA, and (10) recently, the role of the military during and after the Tiananmen incident. Most writings emphasize the PLA's independence, power, and uniqueness compared to the military in the Soviet Union, as well as to the decisive contribution of the PLA to the reestablishment of political order (P. Chang 1972; Domes 1970; Godwin 1978; Nielson 1981; Powell 1979; White 1973).
The approaches used in the studies of the PLA have varied widely over the years. At least five major conceptual frameworks can be identified in these works, namely, the party-in-control approach, the field-army approach, the military-professionalism approach, the military-participation or military-involvement approach, and the military-bureaucracy approach (Joffe 1985; PLA Watcher 1990; Sandshneider 1989).

The "party-in-control" approach rests upon the thesis that since the mid-1950s, relationships between the Party and the PLA have been dominated by conflict resulting from the growth of a professional officer corps with differing basic beliefs from the politically-oriented leadership. According to this approach the two sectors (party and military) within the political leadership of the Chinese Communist system are clearly separated by institutional and organizational dividing lines, and the relationships between party and military tend to be characterized by diverging institutional interests that lead to political tensions and conflict. Conflict between the party and the military is usually solved in favor of the party (Sandschneider 1989, 322).

The organizational manifestation of this relationship in the armed forces is focused on the political commissars, who represent the party in the PLA and who exercise control on its behalf. Professional commanders often resent intrusion of these political functionaries into what they consider purely military affairs. Thus, a basic question which might be raised is, why does the military elite obediently act in accordance to the Party's claim
for absolute control? Why are there no military coups or other attempts by the military elite to oust the political leadership?

To answer these questions, most observers concentrate on political, ideological, institutional and personal controls exerted by the party over the military. Political control over the military is seen to be maintained because of the institutional system of political commissars, ideological indoctrination and personal penetration. Individuals at the top of formal control structures, especially of the Party's Central Committee Military Commission, are seen to play key roles in maintaining and preserving party-military relations.

The emphasis on the control by hierarchical leaders leads to the creation of the Mao-in-command conceptual framework which dominated up to 1976 and later the Deng-in-command since 1978 (Yu 1985a, 34-57). In both of these frameworks, the leader is assumed to have all power and authority over the military.

A number of scholars question whether the Political Commissar System actually provided civilian or party control over the military. For instance, Harvey W. Nelson, as a result of his study of the PLA during the Cultural Revolution, argues that the personnel from the Political Commissar System in the military tended to take on the same attitudes and values as the military commanders, rather than acting as the party controllers in the military. He found that civilian control is exercised by CCP leaders through the Central Military Commission (Nelson 1972; 1981).
Other specialists on the Chinese military, such as Paul H. B. Godwin (1978, 1980) and Monte R. Bullard (1985) echo this finding. Bullard, in his recent study of the interlocking roles of CCP elites, for instance, challenges the conventional conception of party control of the military. Generally, however, these scholars have done little more than reject the conventional concept of political control, and the significance of such rejection on civil-military relations has not been fully explored.

An even more serious rejection of the concept of political control over the military is raised by Eberhard Sandschneider in 1989. He argues that expressions of "party-army" is at best misleading and even wrong if used without qualifications when speaking about the Chinese Communist system. According to him,

Quite contrary to this traditional conflict approach, it shall be argued here that political control, in the sense of Mao's famous statement "the party controls the gun," never worked in political reality and the army's role in Chinese politics cannot be sufficiently explained with a basically dichotomic view (p. 334).

To understand party-military relations, he suggests an alternative approach called the military-professionalism approach. This approach will be discussed later.

Still another argument against a dichotomous view of the party-military in China grows out of the "field-army" approach first suggested by William Whitson in 1969. This approach basically argues that the PLA is in reality five different regional groupings of competing military leaders whose power is
based on informal personal affiliation networks in the five geographic regions conquered during the civil war. In these geographic regions, elite recruitment created leadership cliques which was reflected in the career patterns of military personnel in the PLA. After the establishment of the PRC, these military groupings became the basis for distribution of power among the field armies, and an equilibrium of positions and regional power bases maintained a balance of power among the field army elites. These regional forces, which have not been relocated since the Korean war, permit field officers to remain in the same locale for many years rather than being rotated from region to region. As a result, power bases of military elites are developed in these regional groupings.

This approach is useful in explaining military career patterns in the PRC and, to some extent, in explaining the political behavior of military leaders before the Cultural Revolution. But the Cultural Revolution undermined the validity of this thesis since the regional armies were dispersed throughout the entire country in an attempt to deal with national chaos. Furthermore, the networks of leadership cliques were destroyed or impaired by the purging of some military leaders, and by the fact that many of the field army units were reshaped and manned with new personnel from other regions. Military behavior in politics after the Cultural Revolution can hardly be explained by using the field-army approach alone. As Ellis Joffe points out,

The central leadership had the determination and the power to move main force units without regard for the political
considerations and the personal connections that were the essential underpinning of the field army thesis (1985, 169). Although the field-army approach may still be a useful instrument of analysis in certain cases, its general validity for an overall assessment of the party-military relations is restricted” (Sandeschneider 1989, 338).

Scholars began to analyze the military’s continuous attempts to safeguard its professional or corporate interest, almost at the same time, that the Cultural Revolution was emphasizing the revolutionary character of the PLA, and that the PLA was heavily involved in political action. These writers begin with the case of Peng Dehuai who, after the Korean war, urged the professionalization of the army. Furthermore, this approach, called military-professionalism, assumes that there is a corporate sense of unity in the military, which cause continuous conflict between the Party and the military over questions of organization and modernization priorities.

Writers following the military-professionalism approach often assume that the level of professionalism and the existence of a corporate identity can be deduced from how an army organizes to fight, how it develops weapons, and what weapons it fields for combat. The more professional military not only has more advanced technology, but also has a complex set of institutions and actors involved in the processes of resource allocation and expenditures for defense. These professional militaries also are involved in setting the priorities pertaining to national moder-
nization. As a result of the growth of a professional military in the PRC, the Chinese army, according to Paul Godwin, is in reality the Chinese defense establishment. By this he means that the Chinese army is in fact a complex set of institutions, actors and processes involved in a spectrum of military and defense-related activities. He saw the growth of a professional military taking place in the PRC.

Development of a professional military in the post-Mao period, according to Joffe's 1987 book, The Chinese Army After Mao, has been accompanied by a transformation of the PLA's political role and relations with the Party. Under the Deng Xiaoping's aegis, the PLA has been removed from involvement in political affairs, and its influence in central policy-making organs has been greatly reduced. Party control over the defense establishment has been reasserted through personal changes and institutional controls. Deng's leadership has tended to foster co-operation between the Party and the professional military (Joffe 1987a, 180-183).

Professionalization of the PLA also is the main theme of Harlan W. Jencks' work, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981. According to him, professional soldiers value order, hierarchy, division of labor, public safety, and strong civil authority, and they prefer to concentrate their energies upon the specialized problems of military security and to avoid non-military affairs. He believes that these values of professionalism are rooted in the history of
the PLA and are likely to grow stronger over time. "The Chinese corps has exhibited these 'professional' preferences throughout much of the past three decades, most notably when the PLA was thrust into the Cultural Revolution." He asserts further that the "Maoist" impact on the PLA has not arrested the professional trend despite some conflict with it (Jencks 1982, 255).

Despite the emphasis on the professionalization of the PLA and the discussion of the disengagement from politics by the PLA, other writers, such as Welch, Sandschneider, and PLA Watcher have challenged this assertion. For instance, Claude Welch states that,

all armed forces participate in politics in various fashion. They cannot be precluded from the political arena, given their organizational identity, autonomy, and functional specialization...No military, in short, can be shorn of political influence, save through the rare step of total abolition" (Welch 1976, 2).

Similarly, writers such as Sandschneider and PLA Watcher, express doubt that the PLA went "back to the barracks" during the 1980s. Their disbelief is rooted in a belief that the "PLA and its leadership elite will remain what it always was in the political system of the PRC," namely, a political participant (Sandschneider 1989, 349).

These skeptics about the military disengaging from politics in the PRC advocated still another approach for investigating the role of the PLA in politics called the military-participation or military-involvement approach. One of these writers, Sandschneider, bases his advocacy for the approach upon two assumptions:
The military leadership may not be regarded as a distinct and counter-elite but rather as an integral part of the overall political leadership in the PRC, with legitimate rights of political participation at all levels of decision-making and (2) Members of other elite systems do not regard political participation of military leaders in the PRC as illegitimate but as a normal and useful means of promoting overall political stability (1989, 339). As a result of these assumptions, he asserts that research should not be looking for aspects of civilian or military domination in a policy process, but at

the spectrum of political interactions for forms of political cooperation, competition and division of labor in which different parts of the military leadership elite participate on their own or on external initiatives (340).

A more recent effort to interpret the party-military relations has been made by PLA Watcher in an article entitled, "China's Party-Army Relations After June 1989: A Case for Miles' Law?" He discusses four approaches to study how the party and army interact in China, namely, the party-army relation, military-professionalism, military-involvement, and military-bureaucracy. Among these, only the military bureaucracy approach has not been discussed here because focuses on the military as a bureaucratic actor and stresses organizational behavior and interest. It assumes that the army, as well as other societal institutions, lobby for its institutional interests in the political arena and that change occurs incrementally. For instance, he points out that "We have usually measured national
military influence by the number of uniformed people on the Central Committee and Politburo: Uniforms mean military" (PLA Watcher 1990, 13). The number of positions held indicates the relative political influence of the army in the policy centers.

This bureaucratic approach, according to PLA Watcher, has been ignored largely because we do not know much about the organizational behavior in the military or Party in the PRC. Jencks agrees and states that little is known about the internal workings of the Ministry of Defense in China (PLA Watcher 1990, 12-14). Another observation by PLA Watcher is that the military-bureaucracy approach is best suited to explain party-military relations in the context of regularized institutionalized politics. It is less helpful in explaining military intervention or unusual political events such as occurs in times of intra-elite crises (p. 14).

Although most Western scholars of civil-military relations do not rule out political participation by militaries, none of the present approaches fully reflects the extent of such political participation or involvement. The real issue, according to PLA Watcher, is one of assessing the degree and style of involvement. He states, "A key problem with our analysis of Chinese party-military relations is that we have seldom differentiated the degree of military involvement" (p. 5). He proposes a continuum or spectrum of political involvement in the context of Chinese politics, namely, control--intervention--participation--involvement--influence. Control requires direct military invol-
vement. Intervention is an intrusive act by the military. Participation is considered to be a legitimate attempt to influence policy and program decision. Involvement is a less direct form of participation, and influence is where the military uses its social prestige to affect the system. This continuum of political involvement gives relative weight to different degrees of involvement. With such a continuum one can better explain party-military relations since the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen incident.

David Albright in his article "A Comparative conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations" proposes a continuum of cooperation-conflict for the explanation of civil-military relations in communist states (1982). Where a country's civil-military relations falls on the continuum between the poles of conflict and cooperation are determined by a number of pertinent variables. These variables affecting the nature of party-military relations include: (1) the circumstances under which the government came to power, (2) relations with other states, (3) the extent of functional specialization among upper-echelon elements of the ruling elite, e.g., an increase in functional specialization increases conflict between military and civilian authorities, (4) the degree of factional strife within the governing elite, (5) the amount of bureaucratization of politics, (6) the country's military doctrine, (7) the extent of domestic order, (8) historical attitudes concerning the role of the military in political life, (9) the institutional structure of
society and (10) the degree of corporate interests of the military. In these ten variables, Albright found the first seven of these variables in his assessment of sixteen communist states, and he added the eighth one after reflecting on the experience of these states. The last two variables Albright took from Huntington’s work. According to Albright, alterations in any one of these variables causes change in the degree of conflict and/or cooperation prevailing in a nation’s civil-military relations.

One needs to recognize that civil-military relations can range across a broad spectrum and precisely where a country fall on that spectrum depends on a multiplicity of variables. Focusing on merely one or two of these variables is not adequate since it can produce a seriously distorted picture (Albright 1982, 576).

The complexity of separating and identifying military involvement in politics, however, is also illustrated by Dreyer (1985). He insists that there is no clear cut distinction between civil and military institutions, and the spheres considered proper for civil institutions in the West are not applicable in the PRC. In part this is due to the fact that many Chinese military leaders hold high ranking positions in both military and non-military institutions, and that virtually all high ranking military leaders are in the CCP. Furthermore, since the PLA traditionally was involved in all aspects of society, there are no historical distinctions for defining the proper sphere of the civil institutions. Civil-military relations in China, however, are best characterized not in terms of the
politics of confrontation between the two institutions but by a process of coalition politics among factions within each that cut across institutional lines (Dreyer 1985, 28).

Finally, the need to emphasize the political culture in the study of civil-military relations was emphasized by Welch. He pointed out that in China, Confucian ethics in imperial China reflected a clear sense that the military should be subordinate to the civilian authority. The Confucian perspective on civil-military relations are still relevant to understanding civilian control in contemporary society. Furthermore, relying on Laurence Radway's "research tradition," he suggests that only the approaches to civil-military relations that fully incorporate attention to political culture, that give attention to change, and that include attention to the nature and extent of industrialization can claim to be truly universal (Welch 1985, 194).

Summary

As can be seen from this literature review, the study of how the party and the military interact in the PRC has taken several forms or approaches. The various approaches have been party-in-control, field-army approach, Mao-in-command or Deng-in-command approach, military-professionalism, military-participation or military-involvement, military-bureaucracy and coalition politics, as well as an emphasis on considering the political culture.
As this survey of approaches demonstrates, there is no agreed upon methodology for studying the civil-military relations in the PRC. The assumptions of each of these approaches may lead to insights or to misrepresentations. Care must be taken that use of one approach does not exclude alternative explanations which may be more insightful.

In comparison with the Soviet case, all studies published on party-military relations in the PRC are still conceptually and methodologically at a embryonic stage of development. A more systematic conceptual framework which can be used to describe, explain, and predict, to some extent, is still lacking, and needs to be developed. The utilization of a synthesis of these various approaches to study Chinese party-military relations seems to be the most productive and useful approach at this time.
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CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL LEGACY OF

PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PRC

Mao Zedong, the preeminent figure in the history of the People’s Republic of China, declared in 1929 that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and that “the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party” (Mao 1965, 224). This standard or motto for describing the correct relations between the Party and the military became an integral part of the legacy of party-military relations in the PRC. This Chapter first reviews the history of party-military relations in Mao’s era to see if and how his dictum was in fact realized during his era. Next, the historical legacy factor was sought in the literature of the post-Mao period, to see if it played a role in the party-military relations, thereby helping to explain changes in these relations.

Historical Legacy: the Military in the Early Years
from 1927 to 1949

Mao Zedong, the founder of the PRC, believed that both the Party and the Red Army were equally important to China’s nation-
building. Without the Party, China’s revolution would be without the yeast which provides strong leadership to the nation since it is the vanguard of the proletariat. Without the military, the Party would have no power; it would have no tool to build a nation. Both the Party and the army are essential, but the military is the Party’s tool and should follow absolutely the leadership of the Party.

Mao’s concept that political power comes from the gun has been realized in the past 60 years of the CCP movement as is evident in that the PRC emerged as a sovereign nation. Mao was able to use the military to defeat the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and to eliminate those who opposed him. He came to govern the hundreds of millions of Chinese throughout much of his life.

Mao’s assertion that the Party commands the gun in China is questionable at times the army clearly obeys the party; at other times it has not; and some times it is unclear as to whether the Party or army is in control. The second part of Mao’s doctrine of party-military relations, which states that the Party should control the military, has been much more difficult to carry out.

The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921 and the Red Army was created in 1927 with a political commissar system to control it. This system is similar to the Soviet commissar system to control it. Political commissars became the representatives of the Party in the military. Despite the centralism of party control, traditional provincialism in the country coupled
with poor communication and transportation facilities caused the
armed forces at times to be almost autonomous and independent
from the control of the Party (Kung 1973, 38-39). As a result,
the Party's control of the military was nominal in this early
period.

The party-military relations changed in the Jiangxi Soviet
period (1930-1934). Mao played a dual role at this time. He was
then both Secretary General of the Front Committee (Party) and at
the same time the General Political Commissar of the First Front
Red Army. From these two positions Mao was able to set up his
own base of command in Jiangxi, a mountainous region some dis-
tance from Shanghai where the Central Committee of the CCP was
under siege by the Nationalist forces. Since he held both key
positions in the Party and in the military, he was able to
proclaim that the Party commands the gun. In reality, he led the
Red Army to oppose the instructions of the Central Committee and
disobeyed the Central Party's leadership in Shanghai.

The Red Army in Jiangxi was controlled by Mao, not by the
Party as a whole (Hsiao 1961; Kung 1973; Kuo 1969). Mao at this
time was not fully in control or at the top of the Party leader-
ship, and it is doubtful that the Party controlled the gun. For
example, in an attempt to separate Mao from his Red Army, the CCP
Central Committee in Shanghai ordered Mao to leave Jiangxi for
Shanghai, but Mao refused (Kuo 1969, 76). The army did not obey
the Party as Mao's doctrine provides.
Mao's power began to be weakened, however, by changes in the Party after 1930. The Third Party Congress of the CCP in September, 1930, sought to strengthen central leadership and control over the Red Army in those areas of the Jiangxi province under their control. It established a Central Bureau, a control unit of the Central Committee of CCP throughout Jiangxi Soviet areas. Xiang Ying, the Chairman of the CCP Military Affairs Committee, was appointed concurrently as Secretary of the Central Bureau and from the time of his appointment he challenged Mao’s power in Jiangxi, particularly in the army. Mao was removed from the post of Secretary General of the Front Party Committee. All party committees in the Red Army also were placed under the control of the Central Bureau. Xiang removed Mao from the position of General Political Commissar of the First Front Red Army and demoted him to the post of Director of the Political Department. To further weaken Mao’s power in the Red Army and in the Party, Xiang and the CCP Central Committee transferred Mao to the post of Chairman of the Soviet Central Government in Jiangxi, a position without real power. Serious criticisms were levelled against Mao for mistakes in the policy of rectification in Jiangxi by Xiang and his colleagues, such as Zhu De, Peng Dehua, Huang Gonglu and Zhou Enlai (Kuo 1975, 76-77).

Zhou Enlai succeeded Xiang Ying as Secretary of the Central Bureau in December 1931 and concurrently became the General Political Commissar of the First Front Red Army. Mao’s political fortunes continued to plummet. He lost his position as a member
of the Central Bureau in late 1932, when the CCP Central Commit- 
tee was moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi. Furthermore, those who 
tended to disagree with his views, the so-called "International-
lists," gained control of the Party as well as the military in 

Attacks on Jiangxi by the Nationalist army in 1934 forced 
the Red Army and CCP to retreat to Yenan in northern China. As a 
result of this retreat called the "Long March," two important 
developments affected Mao's career and the future of the country. 
Mao gained a position of power in the CCP as a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo. He was also made Chairman 
of the Military Affairs Committee at the Zunyi Conference in 
January 1935, which was a turning point in his career. During 
this time, Zhang Guotao, General Political Commissar of the 
Fourth Front Red Army openly opposed Mao's leadership, but Mao's 
supporters rallied to his side and Mao was triumphant (Kuo 1969, 
1975). Mao, as a result of these events, legitimately gained a 
seat in the center of political power of both the Party and the 
military. He became Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee 
before the Long March ended at Yenan, North Shanxi, and was soon 
to gain power over the military (Kung 1973, 40).

Mao strengthened his control over both the Party and the 
army in the Yenan period from 1935 to 1945. The Politburo 
abolished the Secretary General of the CCP Central Bureau in 
December 1937, the office which had challenged Mao's power in 
Jiangxi. Also, Mao was appointed as Chairman of the Preparatory
Committee for the Seventh Party Congress, a post which gave him much influence over the future composition of the Party. With these new bases of influence, he gained power in the Party as well as the military (Kung 1973, 40), and Mao was able to eliminate the influence of his opponents Zhang Guotao and the Internationalists. With his new power, Mao launched a campaign to rectify the Party and purged almost all of his political opponents. He assumed the most important positions in the Party and the military after the Seventh Party Congress, including the Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, Chairman of the Politburo, Chairman of the Central Secretariat and Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

With the firm control of both the Party and the army, Mao could claim that his second basic principle, "The Party commands the gun," was valid. The Political Commissar System, together with the party committees in the army at all levels, controlled the military (Kung 1973, 40). The Political Commissar under instructions of either the CCP Central Committee or the General Political Department (GPD) had the highest authority to control all political and military activities. For example, a political commissar had the authority to choose, evaluate, and supervise a military commander, including mobilizing the masses or drawing up plans for war operations (T. Chien 1974; Gittings 1967, 1970; Joffe 1966; Lewis 1968). The Political Commissar's orders were superior to any military commander. If a commander's orders were inconsistent with that of the commissar, such orders were void
(Chien 1974, 195). As a result, it was difficult for a military commander to exercise independent leadership as he found himself in a highly circumscribed position where conflict could easily occur if he acted with independence.

After the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, the conflict in China became focused entirely on the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists. No longer were there attempts by the Red Army to cooperate with the Nationalists in a coalition against the Japanese. The civil war now spread throughout China. As a result of the expansion of the fighting, real control over the Red Army was modified.

In this period the party committee in the army collectively, rather than the political commissar alone, became dominant in decisions. The party committee, made up of the commissar, commander, deputy commander, director of the political department, chief of staff, and veteran party members in the lower echelons collectively made decisions. The power of the commissar was diluted by this collective decision-making (T. Chien 1974, 195). Decisions relating to military tactics and strategy during this time were made by the commander without the consent of the commissar (Chien 1974, 195-196). Although the commissar’s power was weakened, he still had influence over the behavior of the commanders because he remained the secretary of the party committee in the military.

The Red Army was successful in this period and the Nationalist forces were forced to retreat to Taiwan. The People’s
Republic of China controlled the entire mainland of China by 1949. Throughout the struggle from 1927, no matter how the Party used the army, there was no major challenge of the Party by the army against party leadership.

There are several possible explanations for the army retaining submissive relationships with the Party. The struggles against the Japanese (1937-1945) and the Chinese Nationalists were conducted mainly as guerrilla wars which depended on local initiative and local autonomy. Despite the ideology of centralism, party leaders generally encouraged such initiatives. Common goals were held by both the military and the party, which helped to limit conflict and to reconcile differences between them, especially since most party officials were also military leaders (Joffe 1966, 45).

Historical Legacy: Party-Military Relations from 1949 to 1976

After the Beijing regime was established in October, 1949, the military assumed an entirely new role. The PRC was confronted with a very chaotic environment as a result of the collapse of the political, social, and economic systems. Under these circumstances, military commanders were authorized by the Party to control and govern local and provincial governments throughout the newly liberated areas in China.
In December 1949, the new Beijing regime created six major administrative regions throughout the country which coincided with six major military regions. Each province within these regions was controlled by the military (Chou 1974, 167-188; Gittings 1967, 263-279). Theoretically, while military control was centralized at the highest party level, in reality local military commanders controlled local education, culture, administration, economy, and social order.

With the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950, the PRC was faced with another major challenge. Although the PLA already was heavily involved in the domestic sphere, it was called to support the communist brothers in North Korea. The role of the military in decision-making increased and the PLA enjoyed considerable autonomy. Under these circumstances, Mao's second basic principle, "the Party commands the gun," was difficult to enforce.

Party-military relations changed again in the period after the Korean War. Mao attempted to re-establish party control over the army, while the top military leaders opposed the reassertion of party control, since they were desirous of modernizing the army. Relations between the Party and military became increasingly conflicting during this period.

Mao, in order to obtain his political goals, began to change the military system in 1954. All military control committees at the local level were abolished, and administrative responsibilities were turned over to civilians. The six military and administrative regions were abolished and were replaced by 13
smaller military regions with no administratrive powers. Local commanders of these regions were made responsible to the PLA Headquarters in Beijing. The highest decision center on military matters, the People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC) was replaced by a National Defense Council consisting of almost 100 members. The effect of this change was to cause the new National Defense Council to be overshadowed by the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP Central Committee. Also, a new Ministry of National Defense (MND) was established which was officially subordinate to the State Council but was in reality was controlled by the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP. Finally, the "field army" system was modified in an attempt to break up close personnel cliques, and at the same time, a conscription system was established to bring in new personnel. The militia organizations which were not directly under the army were strengthened. The effect of all of Mao's changes of the military system was to decrease the power of the military and to increase the party's control over the army (Chiang 1961, 220).

Mao's attempt to strengthen party control over the army was seriously challenged by members of the army in the period from 1953 to 1959. The first of these challenges was by Gao Gang, the Commander of the North-east Military Region, and Rao Shushi, the Political Commissar of the East China Military Region. Gao attempted to defend regional power against the CCP Central Committee represented by Mao. In addition, he urged strengthening of efforts to promote industrialization, and he opposed further
agricultural collectivization as urged by Mao and his followers (Gittings 1967, 275-276). The seriousness of these challenges can be seen by the intensity of Mao's response. Gao was charged with the crime of being a "big conspirator," an "independent kingdom maker" and a "rightist capitalist-roader." Rao was charged with the crimes of adopting a rightist policy, of protecting the counter-revolutionaries in East China, and supporting Gao in order to split the Party (Gittings 1967, 275; Tsun 1975, 204-214). In essence, the Gao-Rao case was an ideological conflict and a power struggle between the central Party organs and the local military authorities. After Gao and Rao were purged, Gao committed suicide and Rao disappeared from public.

Confrontation between the Party and the military intensified after Marshall Peng Dehuai replaced Marshall Zhu De as the Minister of National Defense in September 1954. Peng and his military officers demanded modernization and professionalization of the army and strongly opposed Mao's view of "politics in command" in the army because it hindered professionalization (Joffe 1965, 1-45). As this conflict developed, Mao reacted strongly. He criticized Peng for attempting to replace Mao's Military Affairs Committee with a "military commission" under his control (H. Li 1967). Peng also was accused of causing non-cooperation between military officers and political commissars, and of helping to alienate officers from their troops, as well as worsening relations between the people and the army. Failure to coordinate education in military schools and in army units, and
failure to coordinate tactical and technical training were other criticisms leveled at Peng (New China Fortnightly 1956, 21:5). As a result, Peng and his General Chief of Staff, Huang Kecheng, were dismissed from their offices, and Peng was charged with the crimes of being an anti-Party conspirator and of being the actual leader of the Gao-Rao alliance (Chiang 1961).

To ensure that his revolutionary army views prevailed, Mao instituted a number of reforms after Peng. He ordered a full-scale campaign to indoctrinate military officers in 1956 (NCNA February 21, 1956; December 22, 1956). In the following year, he instituted a program of rectification in the army to ensure ideological purity (Chiang 1961; JFJB, January 12, 1957; Mao 1965; NCNA, April 20 & May 12, 1957). The argument with Peng was primarily an ideological rather than a power struggle intended to oust Mao.

Mao, with support from Marshall Lin Biao in the period of 1960 to 1965, gained full control of the army and reinforced his perspective that the army should be a revolutionary force. During the same period, Mao was facing challenges to his power in the Party outside of the military. Although Mao was Party Chairman, he did not effectively control the whole Party. His opponents, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and their followers, were able to control the Party outside the army.

To counter the power of this opposition in the Party, Mao began the Cultural Revolution in 1966 with the criticisms of his opponents Liu and Deng. As the Cultural Revolution gained
momentum, students, the so-called "Red Guards," were mobilized to "seize power" and "court Mao's favor." The destruction of the Party outside of the army as a result of the Cultural Revolution took place while the army was under orders to stand by. Only when the Red Guards began to cause great internal discord was the army finally ordered to step in and prevent the chaos.

During the earlier period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), Mao used the army as his power base to purge his opponents, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping together with their supporters, and to destroy the Party which he could not dominate. From the perspective of the PLA, the most important effects of the Cultural Revolution were the impressive increases of military representation in Party leadership at all institutional levels and an increase within the military leadership ranks of regional military officers, as compared to the central military elites. The final result of the Cultural Revolution was that the military gained a greater degree of influence in the Party.

The heavy involvement in politics by the military during the Cultural Revolution continued into the early 1970s and helped cause the planning of a coup by the Minister of Defense, Lin Biao. This incident led Mao to again seek ways to weaken the powers of the military. He pursued various tactics to reduce the influence of the military during the years from 1971 until his death in 1976. These tactics were not completely successful. Although the number of military men in the party apparatus at both the central and the local levels decreased, the military was
able to retain considerable power in Chinese politics.

Party-Military Relations in the Post-Mao Period

China lost three of its veteran political leaders in 1976, Zhou, Zhu, and Mao and in the same year experienced a successful "coup" with Hua gaining control over the CCP and control over much of the country's decision-making apparatus. Intra-party conflicts increased after the death of these veteran leaders, and the army was in a position to play a key role in the governance of the country. Without Mao's influence, the army took the side of Hua in this factional conflict and supported the coups. Mao's bodyguards, led by Wang Dongxing, arrested Hua's factional opponents, the so-called "Gang of Four." To deal with the followers of the "Gang of Four," the army enforced military control over those provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions which supported them.

Party-military relations in the new environment after Mao found the military to be much more influential in decision making. Although Hua, like Mao, continued to maintain that the Party should command the gun and exercise control over the military, his statements reflected more his wishes than political reality (RMRB, February 10, 1977; RMRB, April 19, 1977; in NCNA, April 23, 1977). In fact, Hua's position in the Party, the government, and the military was quite tenuous and highly dependent upon support from the military. Although Hua was Chairman
of the Central Military Commission and Premier of the State
Council, his image and prestige were far less than Mao's. Many
powerful military leaders did not pay special attention to Hua's
wishes and did not follow closely his instructions (T. Li 1977).
For example, Hua continued to espouse Mao's proletarian view that
the military should retain its revolutionary character, while at
the same time he was forced to meet the army's demands for
modernizing and professionalizing the military (NCNA, February 5,
he said, professionalism in the military prevailed. Such a
change should not be surprising, as Mao himself had difficulty in
controlling the army and ensuring its loyalty.

Hua fell from power in 1982 as a result of the loss of
military support. The military at the Third Plenary Session of
the Tenth Party Congress threw its support to Deng Xiaoping, who
had a long historical connection with the army and was thought to
support modernization. Despite Deng's newly attained prestige
and power he, like his predecessor, could not attain his politi-
cal goals without military support. If Deng had taken measures
to control the military, he would have encountered strong resis-
tance from local military commanders, since the military had
greater numbers and powers in the key decision-making centers
(Fact on File, September 17, 1977; Ming Pao, October 8, 1977).
Deng's record as leader will be examined later.

As can be seen from this historical sketch, party-military
relations have been in an almost constant state of change throug-
hout the history of the PRC. Although the relationship between the Party and the military were quite harmonious in the revolutionary period, they became increasingly conflicting during the late 1950s. Numerous conflicts involving intra-party fights, intra-military clashes, and party-military conflicts dominated almost the entire post-Korean War period. As a result, Mao doctrine that the Party control the gun, does not adequately explain party-military relations in the PRC. Numerous temporary coalitions of party-military relations dominated the political scene in this period (S. Wang 1977).

Impact of Historical Legacy on Party-Military Relations in Post-Mao period

The cultural context of China here designated as the historical legacy factor, has helped shape civil-military relations. Historically, the traditional political systems of China were authoritarian in character. Subordination of the military to the regime was characteristic of the various Chinese dynasties, all of which came into being as a result of successful military action. Founders of these dynasties were successful generals who had to control the armies once they won political power. In part, this was done by socializing the people to the idea of civilian supremacy. The idea of civilian supremacy over the military was an accepted cultural value relatively early in Chinese history, probably since the Han dynasty before 221 B.C.
This tradition was described by the historian, Fairbank, who stated that "The triumph of civil over military (wen over wu, literate culture over brute force) was not merely fiction implanted in the record by the civilian chroniclers who monopolized it" (Fairbank 1974, 4)

Acceptance of the value of civilian supremacy was supported by political and philosophical beliefs of the Chinese. Respect of intellectual and moral values and disesteem of physical force and violence was deeply imbedded in Confucian thought. As a result, military officers had little status or respect in the Chinese society. Military education for its officers was much poorer than for civilian counterparts, and the military was of such low social status it became an unwanted hereditary obligation (Ho & Tsou 1968; Needham 1960; Dreyer 1972; Fairbank 1974). Dreyer described the characteristics and the results of the degraded status of the Chinese military class as:

...characterized by the usurpation of military functions by civil officials, the failure of the officer class to develop military professionalism, and the tendency of the common soldier to sink to the bottom level of society. These characteristics resulted in the failure of Imperial China to develop armies capable of maintaining their morale, organization, and military technique for any long period of time, and the want of such force exacerbated the troubles caused by foreign invasion and domestic rebellion (Dreyer 1972, 14).

Introduction of communist doctrine into China in the early twentieth century added another perspective of civil-military relations. The perception of early Chinese Communist leaders was shaped under entirely different circumstances. The humiliating
defeat of China by Japan in 1895, the instability, fragmentation and weaknesses of the Chinese state under increasing Western pressure, were all part of an unforgettable past in Chinese national psyche. The communist leaders, therefore, had greater appreciation of the role and importance of military power. They saw the army basically as an arm of the Party which could defeat the Japanese and the Nationalists and help advance the Communist cause.

Although the Chinese Communist leaders gave more importance to the military than imperial Chinese leaders, they too maintained the belief of the superiority of the party over the military. The difficulties of keeping the military subservient to the party during the Jiangxi Soviet Republic era, the Long March and the early Yenan period must have caused great concern among these leaders (Adelman 1980).

Despite these incidences of conflict, the Party and army during the revolutionary period could hardly be distinguished. Historical circumstances and the length of the civil war recreated a relationship of high dependency. Most communist leaders held leadership positions concurrently in the military and party organizations.

This revolutionary character in the early year of the communist struggle in China created a symbiotic relationship between the Party and the army. Such a relationship is suggested by Perlmutter in his article, "The Party in Uniform." He used the term "symbiosis" from biology to describe the relationships
between the Party and the army, since they represent an organizational structure with specialized functions that are related in a division of labor. He suggests that the Party and the military are characterized by "low levels of differentiation between military and nonmilitary elites, and the circulation of elites between military and non-military posts" (1982, 784).

The symbiotic characteristics of the party-military relations remain prominent today. At the topmost level of military command in the CMC, one still finds, as one has for decades, the elder generation of revolutionary leaders. To label them "military" or "civilian" is misleading. Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Chen Yun, and others had been both military and Party or civilian leaders most of their lives. They were revolutionaries in whom such institutional identifications simply did not apply. The same was true of Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, who joined the Red Fourth Front Army at the age of 15 in 1929 (W. Chao 1989, 59-61). The same can be said of Yang Baibing, the GPD director. He joined the Red Army in 1938 and served throughout the liberation war, and subsequently as a Political Commissar (Jin Bo 1989, 88-89). General Chief of Staff Chi Haotian joined the Eighth Route Army in June 1944 at the age of 16. It was only during the Korean War that he distinguished himself and began his rapid rise through the ranks (W. Chao 1989, 16-21).

The concept of party supremacy over the military espoused by Mao Zedong was basically an extension of the communist doctrine reflecting Lenin's belief that only the party could be the
legitimate leader of the communist movement. It also had roots in their interpretations of Chinese history of the 1920s and 1930s. Communist leaders believed that the forces of the warlords were unable to unite the country after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty largely because they did not maintain any prominent political program or ideology. They believed that only if military force were subordinate to a political party could it acquire political legitimacy and attract popular support (Harding 1987b).

Mao’s enunciation of the principle of party supremacy gave it increased legitimacy which often was relied upon to settle disputes between party and military leaders. Furthermore, it appeared to be institutionalized in the system of political commissars and party organizations—mechanisms which the CCP adopted from the Soviets.

The early experiences in the death struggle against common enemies united the lives of the Chinese Party and military leaders whose lives and functions were inextricably intertwined. A sense of comradeship evolved, as the party leadership until the 1950s was relatively cohesive and united. Also, the Party enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy and popular support throughout this revolutionary period, and this helped develop the coalition relationship between the Party and the military (P. Chang 1976).

The military continued throughout this period to outwardly obey the Party despite the fact that it was called upon to govern
much of the country. When the Party in the 1950s ordered the military to return to the barracks and give up its political power, the leaders obeyed and by 1954 the vestige of military rule had disappeared (Chang P. 1976).

Other evidence of the strength of the doctrine of party control may be seen in the military leaders, support of the Party instead of Defense Minister Peng in the late 1950s, when he resisted the Party's crackdown on military professionalism. Here the military acted against its organizational preferences and obeyed the party leadership. Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution, military commanders continued to accept the Party's authority even when that authority had been greatly weakened by internecine strife and when the Party's political control organs in the military had ceased functioning. This fundamental commitment of the military to the principle of civilian supremacy, according to Joffe, mainly came from "a commitment born out of their nationalism and buttressed by their indoctrination, training, and experience" (Joffe 1984, 19-20).

Civilian control over the military has been a major cultural value in the PRC, despite the fact that the military helped Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to purge Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao, had helped Hua Guofeng to arrest the "Gang of Four," and helped Deng Xiaoping to regain political power. In the entire history of the PRC, "no civilian leader has ever become the military's hostage" (B. Liu 1988; Joffe 1985).
A significant theme of the literature on party-military relations in the post-Mao period has been about civilian supremacy, assuming that the Party should control the military. Mao's doctrine was frequently quoted, especially and expectedly immediately after Mao's death. Yet, during this period when party control was most emphasized, the military was most powerful in the Party. Later, after Deng's assumption of power, there was a change in the themes in the literature dealing now with professionalization of the military and saying less about the role of the military in the political, social, and economic spheres. In fact, many of the articles in Deng's period denigrated the political involvement of the army. After the Tiananmen incident, dominant themes in the literature again changed, emphasizing political indoctrination, party supremacy and the proper role of the military in politics. These findings support the premise that historical legacy constitutes a significant component in party-military relations and that during periods of transition or crisis, historical legacy especially the theme of party supremacy becomes a major justification in Chinese politics (Albright 1980; Brown & Gray 1976; Studies in Comparative Communism, 11[3], 1978).

Summary and Conclusion

The focus of this chapter is on the historical legacy of civilian (party) supremacy over the military. The PRC has
largely succeeded in maintaining civilian control and has en-
forced party priorities within the PLA. This success seems to be
attributed to these factors: (1) Chinese cultural legacy and
Chinese attitude toward the military; (2) Chinese Communist
leaders' experience, which is embodied in Mao's doctrine; (3) the
symbiotic relationship between the Party and the military; and (4)
the fact that the country's leaders, such as Mao and Deng,
enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy and popular support.

The cultural value of civilian supremacy over the military
also has been institutionalized in a variety of organizational
mechanisms, many of which were established and have been main-
tained since the Communist Revolution (Gittins 1967; Nelsen
1981; Jencks 1982). The PLA is penetrated by a network of
political control systems which consists of the party committees
and the political department. The former is ultimately respon-
sible to the Party's Central Military Commission. Virtually all
officers above company level are party members, and, therefore
subject to party discipline, as well as to the military chain of
command. The political department conducts indoctrination
designed to maintain a commitment to party policies. The formal
political system and policies also are designed to maintain party
control over the military. These will be examined later.

The literature in the post-Mao period supports the view that
the historical legacy factor is an important variable affecting
party-military relations in the PRC. Party-military relations in
China have been influenced by their cultural and historical context, differing somewhat from other communist countries, despite the common ideology and similar political institutions.
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PARTY APPARATUS IN THE MILITARY

The extent of penetration of party structures in the military is the second factor considered to influence party-military relations. The institutional structure for controlling the military by the party is examined in this chapter. The organizational components of the Political Commissar System and the functions of each are reviewed.

The party control system established in China was adopted from the Soviet model at the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement. The Political Commissar System was first introduced in 1924 with the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy by the Kuomintang. After the creation of its own army, the Chinese Communists in 1928 also introduced the Political Commissar System as a part of the party control mechanism for the army. Zhu De was appointed the first commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army and Mao Zedong, the first political commissar. From this introduction, the political control system which consisted of a political commissar, a party committee, a political department, a party secretariat, and party cells has continued to function over the past 50 years, and the basic organizational features have remained largely unchanged (Y. Kau 1971, 29-35; F. Liu 1956,
The importance of the political control system within the military of communist countries has been pointed out by numerous scholars. Several works have noted that although there have been military coups in numerous Third World countries, the communist countries have not experienced such occurrences largely as a result of the political control systems (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971; Nordlinger 1977). Janowitz's "Totalitarian Model" and Nordlinger's "Penetration Model" suggest that civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience from military officers by penetrating the armed forces with political ideas and political personnel. In other words, the institutional mechanism represented by the political commissar system gives the party or civilian authorities the ability to control the military (Janowitz 1971, 24-25; Nordlinger 1977, 11-19).

Constitutional Provisions Pertaining to Party-Military Relations in the PRC

In communist countries such as the PRC, there are state constitutions establishing and empowering state institutions, as well as party constitutions which establish the party structure and their functions. Since the party is the dominant political force in these societies, the party constitution is as important, or even more important, than the state constitution.
The constitution of the PRC established a government made up of the National People’s Congress, the highest government authority. The congress carries out various legislative duties, and appoints a Chairman, who is chiefly a ceremonial official. A State Council headed by the premier acts as the executive arm of government. The Premier, elected by the Central Committee of the CCP, is the official head of the government. There is also provision for a judiciary system called the Supreme People’s Court. In addition, the state constitution provides for a functional committee to direct the military, the state Central Military Commission, and for a Ministry of Defense, subordinate to the State Council, which is to manage national defense personnel, supply, and financial affairs.

The Party’s unique role in government is recognized in several ways in the state constitution. In the previous constitutions of 1954, 1975, and 1978, the Party’s roles were spelled out in great detail, but in the most recent state constitution of 1982, the Party is rarely mentioned. It stresses only that “the Party must conduct its activities within the limits permitted by the constitution and laws of the state” (Beijing Review 1982, 10).

The new state constitution of 1982 reflects attitudes of the post-Cultural Revolution and of Deng’s desire to modernize the PRC and to avoid concentrating power in the Party. Whereas the previous constitutions had said the CCP was to play the leading role in changing society, the new constitution stresses the major
role of the government in modernizing China. Furthermore, the
new constitution seems to emphasize more the professional,
depoliticalized roles of the PLA. For instance, a new state
organization, the Central Military Commission, is provided for to
"direct the armed forces of the country." The state, rather than
the Party, is to direct the army according to this new state
constitution. It should be noted that the head of state was not
given power of command over the PLA. The chairman of the state
Central Military Commission was given this power, while the
state's Defense Ministry has authority over equipment, personnel
and budgetary affairs.

Generally, the party constitution is dominant and the state
constitutions tend to reflect decisions made in the Party. This
can be seen in a comparison between the party constitutions of
1977 and 1982. The party constitution of 1977 recognized the
Party's role over the military in article 14 as follows: "the
People's Liberation Army . . ., must accept the absolute leadership
of the Party" (Peking Review, September 2, 1977, 16-22). In
Deng's era, the party constitution was revised, and the above
provision pertaining to the military was deleted, the implication
being that the military belongs to the state, rather than to the
Party. This implication was specifically stated in the 1982
state constitution by giving direction of the military over to a
state organization, the state Central Military Commission.

Despite this apparent shift away from party control of the
military, the Party in reality still has power over the leader-
ship and command of the military in the PRC. The pinnacle of the PLA hierarchical pyramid is the Party’s Central Military Commission (PCMC), which is responsible to the Central Committee of the CCP. In September 1982, as previously seen, the new state constitution created a state Central Military Commission responsible to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s legislative branch. This new agency, according to newspaper reports in the Remín Ribao, was to be the “topmost military organization of the country, which leads and directs all the armed forces of the country” (January 20, 1983, 5). Little was said about what were to be the relationships between the state’s new Central Military Commission (SCMC) and the Party’s Central Military Commission. In reality, both of these agencies are composed of the same leader and members (see Table 2). Party control over the military is thus ensured, although the government is recognized as being a participant in the control process. The combined Central Military Commissions of the Party and the state not only make military policies, but they dominate its operation.

The Pinnacle of the Military Hierarchy in the Party:
Central Military Commissions

According to communist practice, the General Secretary of Communist Party should be the leader of the country, as well as the leader of the military. The fact that leadership of the 1
Table 2. Current Members of Both the Party and State CMC (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in CMC</th>
<th>Position in CCP</th>
<th>Position in PLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Shangkun</td>
<td>First vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Politburo member</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Huaqing</td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Central Advisory Commission member</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Baibing</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>CC member &amp; Secretary</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin Jiwei</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Politburo member</td>
<td>Minister of the MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Xuezhi</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>Central Advisory Commission member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Haotian</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>CC member</td>
<td>Chief of the GSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Nanqi</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>CC member</td>
<td>Minister of the GLD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Military in the present PRC constitution is shared between the PCMC and the SCMC differs from these beliefs and perhaps reflects differences within the CCP. Furthermore, the fact that the Chairman of the PCMC rather than the General Secretary of the Party during Deng’s era was in reality the leader of the country further indicates differences within the Party.
The chairman of the state in the 1954 constitution officially was designated as the supreme commander of all armed forces in the PRC. Under the constitutions of 1975 and 1978, this was changed and the position of supreme commander was reserved for the chairman of the Party's Central Committee. The present 1982 constitution amended this provision again and made the chairman of the state's Central Military Commission the supreme commander. Despite the constitutional provisions, for several decades the PCMC has been the decision-making locus of all important military affairs. Military policy and strategy, budgeting, training, military technology, command of forces, political work, approving promotion of officers at division level and above, political indoctrination, and inspection and investigation are all under the control of the PCMC (Nelson 1981, 45-49).

The importance of the PCMC is stated in this fashion by Nelson: "Whoever controls the Central Military Commission controls the PLA" (Nelson 1981, 49). If one looks at the national leaders in the PRC, this certainly seems true. For instance, the PCMC was chaired by Mao Zedong for 41 years, from January 1935 to his death in September 1976; Hua Guofeng held this position from October 1976 to December 1980; Deng Xiaoping was its leader from January 1981 to November 1989, and Jiang Zemin took Deng's position from November 1989 to the present (see Table 3).

The Party's CMC is the power center where all military directives originate. It not only sets military policy and
strategy, it also controls all aspects of administration within the military (Nelsen 1981, 45). Military regional commanders and service arms and branches are all closely supervised by and must over the seven service arms, as well as the two service branches, the naval and air forces. The three general departments of the A also are responsible to the PCMC. It supervises the entire military establishment. The PCMC may investigate military morale, combat operations, troop disposition, or party rectification campaigns or any other aspect of the military. It may send orders and directives to levels as low as the regimental level, bypassing all intermediate echelons. It is the highest authority over the PLA.

Only the Party had a CMC in the pre-Cultural Revolutionary period, and the state did not have a separate military arm of its own until 1982. In 1982, the SCMC was established, with the purpose of institutionalizing governmental control over the military. However, when the first SCMC was placed in office by
the Sixth National People's Congress in June 1983, it turned out to be a very small group of nine members, identical with the Standing Committee of the Party's CMC (T. Chang 1984, 65-66; Domes 1985a). This seems to indicate Deng's failure to separate the Party from the government (Dittemer 1985). The state's CMC has served only a symbolic function, at least up to 1990, since it is staffed by the same party military leaders and chaired by the same chairman as the Party's CMC.

The chairman is the most powerful figure as joint deliberations and consultations are not used in decision making in the PCMC. Several functional committees assist the Commission, including the General Office Committee which acts as the internal executive organ, the Operations Department overseeing the General Staff Department of the PLA, the Committee for Training and Research which is responsible for supervising training and research, and the Inspection Office which inspects military officers' behavior and activities.

The chairman of the Party's CMC officially is subordinate to the head of the CCP, the Secretary General of the Central Committee. In reality, however, this has not been the case. It occurred only during the short period from 1976-1980 when Hua Guofeng concurrently held the three chairmanships of the state, the Party and the CMC. Usually the country's de facto leader holds the position of chairman of the PCMC and is never in reality subordinate to the heads of the Party or of the state. For instance, Mao Zedong in the early 1960s chaired the PCMC
while Liu Shaoqhi and Deng Xiaoping were the chairman of state and the Secretary General of the Central Committee respectively. Mao obviously was not subservient to these officials. Similarly, Deng chaired the Party's CMC without being head of the Party, which was chaired by Hu Yaobang first and then Zhao Ziyang. As with Mao, Deng was not subservient to this party post. The idea of ensuring party control over the military by placing the head of the Party over the chairman of CMC has not functioned as it was conceived.

The fact that all powerful leaders in the PRC have held the chairmanship of the PCMC is evidence that control over the military is a key source of power in the PRC. The "real" leaders in the PRC are those who controlled the PCMC, not the Party Central Committee or the civil bureaucracy. Although this phenomenon does not necessarily mean whoever controls the PCMC controls the Party or the country, it does highlight the fact that military leadership is important for political leadership in the PRC.

Party Penetration of the Military:
The Political Commissar System

Party organizations intricately penetrate the PLA through the Political Commissar System. The PLA consists of all ground, naval, and air forces of the PRC. As in militaries generally, it is commanded through a hierarchical organizational arrangement
(see Figure 1). At the top are the Party’s Central Military Commission and the state’s Central Military Commission, which are in reality one control center. These two commissions composed of the same personnel decide the PRC’s military policies, strategies and budgets. They are the high command of all military forces. Under them, there are three channels through which the PLA operates: the General Political Department (GPD,) which is the Political Commissar System; the General Staff Department (GSC), which is the military command system; and, the General Logistic Department (GLD), which is the supply service system. Figure 1 show the relations among the Party, the government, and the military in the PRC. The following sections discuss the functions of the General Political Department and the structure and functions of each level through which the tasks of political control over the PLA operates.

General Political Department

The PLA, as shown earlier, operates through three functional divisions: the General Political Department, the General Staff Department, and the General Logistic Department. This section looks at the GPD, sometimes referred to as the Political Commissar System.

The GPD supervises a pyramid-like network of party-political organization’s within the military. Every organization in the PLA down through the regimental level must have a party
Figure 1. Institutional Relationships Among the Party, the Government, and the Military (1950s–)

Party

CCP Central Committee (Politburo)

- Party CMС

Military

State CMС

- GPD

- GSD

- GLD

- Barry

- Division

- Regiment

- Military Regions

- Group

- Armies

- Prov Mil Districts

- Prov Prov PC

- PC PD

- PC PD

- Mil Sub-Districts

- Militia

Government

State Council

- MND

- MPS

- PAPF

Notes: ——direct line of command; —— indirect line of command; identical bodies; NPC=National People's Congress; MPS=Ministry of Public Security; PAPF=People's Armed Police Force; GPD=General Political Department; GSD=General Staff Department; GLD=General Logistics Department; PD=Political Department; PC=Party Committee.

Sources: H. Cheng 1988; Domes 1985a, Figure 5.1, 6.1, 7.1; Jencks 1982, Figure 5.1, 7.1; H. Kuo 1990; T. Lin 1989, Figure 1; B. Liu 1988, 29; S. Wang 1990, 132; C. Wu 1981, Figures 1, 2. & 3; Yang 1989, 195.
committee, political department (office), and commissars. Below the regimental level each organization has a party branch or political instructor.

Ideology, discipline, and morale of the military are major concerns of the Political Commissar System. The GPD functions to ensure that party leadership prevails over the military and that party policies are implemented. The GPD is responsible for political indoctrination and for preserving ideological correctness. It indoctrinates through general educational, cultural and recreational programs, and activities within the military. As for discipline, the GPD has broad responsibilities for internal security and for military justice. It is specifically charged with observing and recording the political and ideological quality of high ranking cadres. It also keeps track of assignments, promotions, dismissals, rewards, and punishments within the PLA. As for morale, the GPD is responsible for ensuring satisfactory conditions of the soldiers and their dependents as well as preserving proper relationships between officers and men. The GPD in wartime also is responsible for political warfare against the enemy.

Party-Political Organizations and Functions within the PLA

Party Committees

The party organization in the military and the regular party composed of civilians are separate and distinct organizations.
The party organization (party committees) in the PLA is known
collectively as the Political Commissar System and is the most
important linkage between the Party and the military within the
PLA. Military and civilian parties, in reality, are different
because their organizational allegiances are different (Bullard
1985). Civilian members of the Party owe primary loyalty to the
party or to government organizations in which they work.
Military party members, on the other hand, owe loyalty primarily
to the PLA. The two party organs, therefore, are quite distinct
in that they have different identity-forming experiences and
their daily activities are different. Military party cadres are
educated totally within the PLA's political commissar schools and
generally serve their entire careers within the military. Their
lives and belief systems are built around the military.
Similarly, their lifestyles, as shaped by the military party
cadre, which permit more discipline than groups managed by
civilian cadres. Thus, the Political Commissar System in the PLA
should not be considered an exact extension of the civilian party
system.

The party organizations in the military are not formally
part of the PLA organization; rather, they represent the party
membership within the PLA. At each echelon, the party committee
is normally led by the political commissar, who handles routine
matters on his own authority and serves as the committee secre-
tary and de facto representative of the GPD. The commander and
key staff officers also are members of the party committee. The
party committees are responsible only to the next higher party committee and not to the military chain of command. Figure 2 shows the structural links among the military and the political Commissar System and the relations between the party committee and the political department.

Figure 2. Structural Links Among the Military System and the Party-Political Work Systems

Unlike the party committee, the political department which serves as an arm of the Political Commissar System, is an integral part of the army's structure. It is attached directly to the headquarters of every unit as low as the regimental level (Gittings 1967; Nelsen 1981). It carries out the policy decision of the party committee and is responsible for implementation of measures intended to educate the rank and file of the PLA.

At each level of the military hierarchy, there is a political commissar who chairs the party committees and enforces policies based upon these collectively made decisions. The military command system and the political system (referred to as the political work system in Chinese materials) have equal institutional status, and both are subordinated to the party committee at each level.

The Political Commissar System undertakes two types of work: party work and political work. Party work is conducted by the party committee to ensure party leadership and the implementation of party policies in the military. Political work refers to activities aimed at promoting military effectiveness by improving the capabilities and the morale of the military. The concept of "party work" and "political work" are often used interchangeably in discussing the Political Commissar System. However, the objectives of party work are aimed toward party members in the military, while the objectives of political work are aimed at all members of the military, whether or not they are party members. Both a party organization and political organization exist in the
PLA and each performs somewhat distinctive functions. Within the PLA, the party committees, including the political commissar, do primarily party works, and the political department is responsible for political work.

Party committees are found at all levels from the company level up. The committees are perceived by the Chinese as the critical means by which the Party assures control over the army. The party committee in the PLA is expected to exert "leadership at each level," to become a "fighting bastion" of the Party, and to be the "vanguard" for recruits (H. Wang 1985, 129; C. Wu 1981, 42-43). The purposes of the party committee are to place the leaders of the troops under collective leadership on the one hand and to promote their initiative and enthusiasm on the other" (Xiao 1982, 12).

Generally, the works of the party committees can be divided into three tasks: (1) organizational work, which includes the establishment, development and operation of organizations for recruitment, training, evaluation, and personnel control of party members; (2) implemental of party policies, which may range from basic national policies to party regulations; (3) surveillance of troops to ensure the loyalty of military personnel to the Party, to prevent dissonance among the rank and file, and to ensure that party policies and directives are implemented, as well as to prevent "bureaucratic pathologies," such as alienation, and corruption (Cheng 1988).

The party committee is the locus of military authority and
the link between the military system and the political system. "The party committee system," according to Mao, "is an important institution of the Party to ensure collective leadership and to prevent one-man-command by any individual" (in Y. Hua 1985, 59). Later, the system was officially defined as the "System of Division of Labor and Responsibility among the Leaders under the Collective Leadership of the Party Committee." The system was established to curtail the power of both military commanders and political officers—including the Political Commissar and the Director of Political Department—by subordinating them to collective leadership. All important decisions, including warfare, training and personnel, have to be discussed and finalized in the committee. The committee is composed of the political commissar (i.e., the secretary and the chair of the party committee), the commander, the vice-political commissar, the vice-commander, the director of political department, and the chief of staff. Military decisions, as a result, are collective decisions. All important affairs, according to Regulations for the Party Committee of 1963, shall be discussed in and finalized by the party committee, except for occasions of emergency (Xiao 1982, 12).

Once the party committees have made a decision, military commanders are responsible for implementing those relating to military work, and political commissars are responsible for implementing those concerning party-political work. Both the commander and the commissar are subject to the leadership of the
party committee and must carry out the committee’s resolutions.

Horizontal civilian party control over the military is maintained by the fact that usually the First Political Commis-
sars are concurrently the highest ranking civil-party cadre at
the various levels of the military. The civilian party organiza-
tion at the provincial and district levels parallels the military
regions and districts. Normally, the commissars in these area
are also the head of the civilian party, in effect, giving the
civilian party actual control over the military (Bullard 1985,
10-11).

The party committee in the PLA officially is subordinate
only to the party committee at higher levels, creating formally a
single chain of command. In practice, however, the command
structure frequently appears at the provincial and district
levels as having dual leadership with both the commissar and the
military commanders wielding authority, since the commanders also
participate in party committee deliberations. At times the
commissar gains the upper hand in the party committees, at other
times the commanders appear to be dominant, despite the official
claim that the commander and the commissar have equal institu-
tional status (T. Chin 1981, 9-10; C. Wu 1981, 44).

Although the commissar plays a dominant role in the party
committees and controls the political system (Y. Kau 1971; Lo
1939), the role of commissars largely has been transformed into
co-leaders of the military. They share responsibilities with the
commander and they have similar limited authority because of the
collective leadership system. When the principle that the party commands the gun and that political work is party work gains ascendance, the commissar’s role is enhanced. But when the revolutionary zeal declines, the influence of the commissar as compared to the military commanders, also declines. Nevertheless, the commissar’s authority remains powerful throughout the history of the PRC, especially during the periodical rectification campaigns.

**Political Department**

As a part of the political commissar system, every military unit has not only a party committee, but also a political department to implement decisions dealing with political work made by the party committees. These departments are directed by political officers who function under the political commissar with their own staff (L. Chu 1982; Hsu 1983). Political departments exist at all levels from the central office of the General Political Department, to the political offices at the regimental level. Unlike the party committee, the political department is an integral part of the army’s structure. It is attached directly to the headquarters of every unit as low as the regimental level (Gittings 1967; Nelsen 1981). It carries out the policy decisions of the party committees and is responsible for implementation of measures intended to educate the rank and file of the army (Gittings 1967, 107).

At the divisional and regimental levels, the political
department or political office, as it is called at the regimental level, is headed by a political commissar who is responsible for organizational maintenance and cadre training, in other words, all personnel actions such as nominations for promotions, assignments or schooling within the division, and supervision of the activities of the China Youth League at lower levels. There is also a propaganda section in the department responsible for news releases, cultural-recreational activities, assuring that the troops understand "why" they do what they do, and for propaganda generally. This department is also responsible for security and performs a counter-intelligence function. It is concerned with enemy infiltration or personnel security as opposed to physical security which is handled by a similarly named section on the military staff. Another section of the department conducts programs to encourage "good citizenship" and a sense of nationalism in every soldier during his service and after his discharge. During the last decade, this effort has been manifested in the attempts to create a "socialist spiritual civilization."

At lower levels of the military, the battalion, company, and platoon levels, there are political officers or political fighters as they are called at the platoon level, whose functions are to build strong party-political organizations in these basic military units. At this lower level, especially at the company level, political indoctrination, mass organization, military life, military administration, general education and counterintelligence are emphasized.
A political instructor represents the political department and provides the essential link between the chain of command, and the rank and file which carries out decisions and command (Gittings 1967, 109). Both the function of party works, which at higher levels is undertaken primarily by party committees, and political work, which is performed by the political department, are performed by these political instructors. In addition, there are branch committees composed of a secretary (the political instructor), a vice-secretary (the military commander), and several committee members who must be party members elected at a branch congress annually. These branch committees in theory practice "collective leadership," but in practice this may not be the case since committee members are non-commissioned officers or enlisted men who often are inhibited from expressing opinions different from or critical of, their superiors.

Summary and Conclusion

The Chinese Communist Party in the PRC seeks to control the military by making it subservient to the Party's Central Military Commission, which is appointed by the Central Committee and whose chairman is made the supreme commander of the military, and by penetrating the military through the Political Commissar System with personnel and political indoctrination. An elaborate organizational structure has been created to counter the military organization in the PLA. Party committees are led by a party
member political commissar who in turn is found throughout the military organization. The political department implements party policies and supervise the military. Collective decision-making results from this intertwining of military and party at every level. To fully assess the party-military relations in the PRC, one needs to not only comprehend the structure of the the Political Commissar System but also its dynamics, since decisions are made collectively at every level in the PLA. The next chapter looks at the actual workings of the Political Commissar System.

The Party's institutions in the military are major factors shaping party-military relations in the PRC. Almost every article, newspaper, or book read on the subject of party-military relations in the post-Mao period refers to the party apparatus in the military. These institutions are accepted by every one as being important in shaping party-military relations. But they were not a significant factor in explaining change during the post-Mao period. In all three of the periods in the post-Mao era, this factors was the least significant in explain change of any of the six factors considered. While the dynamics of the Political Commissar System, as we shall see later, reflected change in party-military relations, particularly during the tenure of Hua and in the period after the Tiananmen crisis, the major features of the institutional structures themselves were not a useful factor for indicating change.
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CHAPTER V

DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR SYSTEM

The third factor examined to determine the nature of the party-military relations in the post-Mao period is the dynamics of the Political Commissar System. The Political Commissar System complicates the decision process in the PLA, as it intertwines the party organization with the military. How the Commissar System works since the time of Mao under these circumstances help explain the relations between the Party and the military.

Conflict is inevitable in all organizations, but by intertwining the ideological orientation of party members with career orientations of the military, the possibilities of conflict are greatly increased. However, since members of the Commissar System in the PLA, both military party members and the GPD, tend to be co-opted by the military ethos, the real conflicts are not so much between the military and the political commissar, but rather between the military, including the political commissar organizations, and the Central Party. Furthermore, factionalism within the Central Party of the CCP may lead to differences between the Central Party and the PLA and cut across groups in both the Party and the military. How the various groups and
individuals interact in this organizational environment are examined here.

Attention is paid to the political stand that the political commissars tend to take in cases of conflicts between party (civilian) and military elites. The discussion proceeds in accordance with the changing patterns of party-military relations, and indeed with the major political changes in the PRC. The intent is to identify the political roles the GPD plays in the PRC’s party-military relations. Another question to answer is the extent of the activities of the Party, especially the GPD, that influence party-military relations.

Traditionally the Party has attempted to maintain control over the military in two ways: one, by appointing politically reliable personnel to key posts throughout the political control system, and secondly, through political indoctrination of not only political officers but all military personnel in general. In the second section of the chapter, political indoctrination, the fourth factor thought to influence change in party-military relations is discussed.

Operation of the Political Commissar System

During Mao’s Period

Theoretically, decisions in military units, except during emergencies, are to be made by party committees and implemented by military commanders and political commissars, according to
their respective functions. In reality, the ideal has never been realized. Similarly, in theory the GPD is to be subordinate to the Party Central Committee. Again practice and theory have never fully coincided, even during Mao's era.

Demands in the post-Korean War period generated in the military a desire to modernize. Spurred largely by the experience of fighting a highly modernized American army, the modernization drive was modeled after the Soviet Red Army.

A one-man command system (Edinonachalie), as practiced in the Soviet Army was proposed to substitute for the collective leadership of party committees. Military specialists were stressed at the expense of party-political work. Political officers' roles were grossly de-emphasized or ignored in military operations. Military professionalism was favored during Peng's tenure as Ministry of National Defense in the late 1950s even by Tan Cheng and Xiao Hua, the director and vice director of the GPD, illustrating how these party institutions in the PLA can be co-opted by the military ethos. To further illustrate how little attention was paid to party-political work, some 7,000 companies in the PLA during this period, according to Powell, did not have branch committees, most of the platoons lacked party cells, and squads had no party members (Powell 1963a, 8).

Opposition to the political commissar ethos continued to flourish despite the promulgation of the draft "political work regulation" in 1954 to re-assert the principle of collective leadership and the importance of party-political work. The
ideological conflict over military professionalization continued until the dismissal of the Minister of National Defense, Peng Dehuai. In addition to opposing Mao over the issue of military modernization, Peng opposed Mao's socio-economic development plans, known as the Great Leap Forward. As a result, Deng and Tan Cheng, the director of the GPD, were removed from office and purged (Dome 1985b, 99).

Lin Biao replaced Peng as Minister of National Defense in 1960 and began an intensive effort to emphasize party-political work and to promote the institutional status of political officers. Intensive campaigns of political indoctrination, centering on the study and application of Mao's thought, called for the entire nation to "learn from the PLA." The status and roles of political commissars in the PLA were further institutionalized in the "Political Work Regulations for the Chinese People's Liberation Army" in 1963 (Kau 1971). Political officers at all levels of the military hierarchy were to actively participate in implementing military policies as formulated by Mao and Lin (J. Cheng 1966, 595).

As a result of divisions in the Central Committee of the CCP in mid-1960s, Mao undertook a radical program of change, known as the Cultural Revolution. The PLA was drawn into this intra-party conflict and helped Mao spearhead it. At the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the GPD was at the forefront urging political action. After the creation of the Red Guards in the summer of 1966 and the threat of "revolution from below,"
however, there was a growing struggle in the PLA, especially in the GPD. The GPD became a major target between factions in the Maoist camp.

Mao, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relied on a group of four supporters, led by his wife, Jiang Qing, in the Central Committee of the CCP in planning and directing the movement. Later this group became increasingly radicalized and sought to gain control of the GPD which was directed by Xiao Hua. Intra-factional conflict spread among Mao’s own supporters. Mao’s opponents in the Central Committee, including Liu, Chairman of the state and Deng, Secretary-General of the CCP at this time, were much more moderate in economic policies, but also found themselves at odds with the GPD.

According to accepted doctrine, the GPD was responsible to the Central Party Committee, but it was not following its instructions. In this situation, the military, as led by Lin Biao and the “radicals,” headed by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, allied under Mao’s leadership in an attempt to seize political power from Liu-Deng’s administration. Conflicts over the control of the GPD between Lin and Jiang dramatically intensified after the PLA was formally ordered to intervene in the Cultural Revolution in January 1967. Serious organizational damage to the GPD was the result of this intense political struggle. The GPD was finally crippled shortly after the Wuhan Mutiny on July 20, 1967. The Director of the GPD, Xiao Hua, was dismissed from his position and the GPD was ordered to suspend operations for two years.
and three months. It could not operate during this period from August 1967 to late 1969, and the Political Commissar System was headless and unable to act (Nelsen 1981, 105). After this period, Li Desheng was appointed in 1970 as the new director of the GPD, and he had the difficult task of rebuilding the Political Commissar System.

Several aspects about the Commissar System can be gleaned from the political conflict and factional struggles during the Cultural Revolution. Most obvious is that factional groups in the Central Committee which desired to seize power of the military, attempted to do so through the GPD. But it also seems that within the PLA, it is questionable that exclusive control over all political affairs and the political direction of the military resides in the GPD. The co-responsibility system between the commander/commissar, which had been institutionalized in the PLA, may have caused an exaggerated view by some scholars of the degree of cleavage between the military and commissar (H. Cheng 1988, 231).

In the course of the Cultural Revolution, the GPD consistently has shown its institutional integrity in the military establishment and its lack of strong connections with the civilian party in conflicts over intra-military political affairs. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution when there was little harm to the military, the GPD responded positively to Mao-Lin’s call to challenge the civilian Party and successfully toppled the Liu-Deng’s administration. However, when the radicals later
threatened to take over the control of intra-military political affairs, the GPD resisted civilian intrusions. These observations indicate that the GPD favored the PLA's interests, rather than serve as an instrument for the civilian party to control the military (H. Cheng 1988). The GPD reflected essentially the goals and values of the military party leadership, rather than mirroring the goals and values of the civilian party, according to an analysis of Nelsen (1981) and Waitan (1976). As Godwin states, "Earlier Western models of party-military relations in the PRC, in assuming civilian party domination of the PLA, may well have been in error" (1980, 77).

Relations between the military and the Party were to change in the late period of the Cultural Revolution (1970-1976), and the PLA tended to reflect a tendency towards praetorianism (Godwin 1980, 80; Nelsen 1983, 142). The tendency is seen in the officially alleged "coup d'état" attempted by Lin Biao in 1971 and in the critical role the PLA played in the political succession of 1976 when they arrested supporters of Mao, the so-called "Gang of Four," permitting Hua Guofeng to take power.

The GPD can hardly be regarded as an institutional mechanism for civilian party control during or immediately after the Cultural Revolution. Rather, the GPD during this period was utilized by some civilian political leaders to control the military for their own political purposes. The GPD became an arena for factional conflict in the Central Committee. For instance, Li Desheng's appointment in 1970 as the GPD's new
director after the GPD was forced to cease operations for two years and three months following the Wuhan Mutiny, suggests that Li may have been used by Mao to curtail Lin Biao’s power (Nelsen 1981, 105-106). This suspicion seems even more probable since Li was transferred from his GPD position in late 1973 and was made commander of the Shenyang Military Region during the general reshuffle of military regional commanders. Following his leaving the directorship of the GPD, the post again remained vacant for over a year.

The politics of factionalism in the Central Committee also affected the reshuffling of military personnel, but did not affect the basic relationships between the commanders and commissars in the PLA. Godwin found in an analysis of the careers of commanders and commissars in 1972 and 1974 that no systematic and consistent pattern of assignment existed to indicate that commissars were appointed to function as the civilian party’s watchdog to control the commanders (1976).

Another example of the GPD’s being the target of factional politics in the Central Committee can be seen in the attempt by the “Gang of Four” to gain control of the GPD and seize control of the military in the 1970s. Two of these supporters of Mao gained important military posts. Zhang Chunqiao became director of the GPD and Wang Hongwen took a seat on the Party’s CMC. During Zhang’s tenure as director of GPD, the radicals made their strongest efforts to seize control over the PLA and use it as a political weapon serving their cause (Joffe and Segal 1978; A.
Liu 1979). They failed when they were arrested in the military-backed coup in October, 1976. Their actions aroused strong resentment against the PLA, which was openly criticized as fighting only to protect its corporate interest. Belief in the ability of the Party to control the military through the Political Commissar System was shaken by these events. As can be seen from this section, the political dynamics of Commissar System is a good indicator of the nature of party-military relations in the PRC.

Operation of the Political Commissar System

since Mao (1976-1988)

After Mao’s death and the "coup" in 1976, Hua Guofeng emerged as the official leader of the PRC. He held the key posts in the nation, including General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Party’s CMC, and Premier of the State Council. Factional politics in the Central Committee of the CCP, however, continued to cut across the Party, military, and government. One major opposition faction was led by Deng Xiaoping, a twice rehabilitated party official who had been purged by Mao. He soon became a major opponent as he was able to attract supporters from both the Party and military from his posts as Chief of Staff of the army and member of the Politburo. By 1982, Deng was able to unseat his opponent Hua Guofeng with his call to modernize China.
When Deng Xiaoping became China's paramount power holder, the military still played a prominent political role in the PRC. One of his prime aims was to withdraw the PLA from politics and reassert political control over the military (Joffe 1987). He sought to exercise close control over the military establishment from his post as PLA's Chief of Staff and Chairman of the CMC, and to accomplish his aims of reasserting political control, through personnel changes and institutional controls.

For Deng, as for any Chinese Communist leader, the most effective way of ensuring internal control over the military is to appoint his supporters to key positions in the PLA. Although the process has been difficult (Joffe 1987a), Deng has steadily placed officers of his choice in key positions. At the top level of the hierarchy, Deng made four key appointments (Johnston 1984, 1016-17): Yang Dezhi replaced Deng as chief of staff in 1980, Zhang Aiping replaced Geng Biao as defence minister in 1982, Yu Qiuli took over from Wei Guoqing as head of the PLA's GPD in 1982, and Yang Shangkun as secretary-general of the CMC.

Numerous other personnel changes were also made at lower levels, from the deputy directors of the three general departments and their staffs, the managers of the military industry, the regional commanders and their subordinates, and down to commanders of combat units (Joffe 1987a). These new officers are generally much younger and better educated than their predecessors. They represent the fruition of professional officers who have worked up through their specialties (XH, October 27, 1985).
From Deng's perspective, this is the best guarantee for the maintenance of party control over the military.

Deng sought to win over the GPD to his policies. He criticized the former political cadre in the GPD, and many of them were targets for expulsion or re-education, according to Deng's personnel policy (Deng 1984, 74).

The Commissar System in the PLA was substantially revamped after the fall of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. Director Zhang Shunqiao and two of the four vice directors of the GPD were removed. Wei Guoching, a former political commissar and a party member, was appointed as the new director of the GPD. The middle and lower levels of the GPD also underwent systematic rebuilding during Hua Guofeng's and Deng Xiaoping's tenure as Chairman of the CMC.

The intervention of party committees and political commissars had been one of the main sources of conflict between professional officers and party leaders since the late 1950s. The professional officers opposed such intervention on the grounds that it was incompatible with the needs of a complicated army in modern war conditions. Instead, they favored the institution of the single commander system, which put operational control over military units in the hands of the military commanders.

Deng made an effort to prevent the political commissar from interfering in military operations. He emphasized that political work in the armed forces must serve military objectives. "Political work should not interfere with the command structure and it
should play a supporting role during military training," a statement that was reported in one army paper report (FBIS, November 15, 1984, K12). An article in Hongqi, an official publication owned by the Central Party also said, "Our political work must become a forceful guarantee for our troops...so that the tasks of war can be successfully accomplished" (July 16, 1984).

Under this new regime, the Political Commissar System was altered almost beyond recognition. The basic principle of the supreme decision-making power of the party committees in military units, and of equal status of military commanders and political commissars, according to Joffe, "has in effect been jettisoned by the Chinese leadership." This was demonstrated by "the total absence of reference to the principle of collective decision making in statements on the role of political work in the PLA and in descriptions of political activities throughout the armed forces" during this period (Joffe 1987a, 166). Despite these changes, there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to support the observation of the abandonment of the basic principle of supreme decision-making power of the Political Commissar System.

Removal of the political organs in the commissar system from intervention in military affairs under Deng's new approach does not mean that they were reduced to only insignificant functions. The Commissar System continues to be responsible for the significant functions of political education and indoctrination. Political education and indoctrination take several forms, and it
attempts to explain and disseminate party policies; to prepare for or explain important measures undertaken by the army; to carry out campaigns of ideological rectification; and to enforce political discipline throughout the armed forces. Despite these significant activities, there is no denying that the GPD was degraded. The locus of supreme decision-making power of the party committees in military units was questionable. Military commanders were much more significant in military decisions.

Deng's success to a large measure rested upon his ability to maintain cooperation of the military. He was able to carry out his policies despite his actions of cutting the military budget, lowering the pay for the military, and forcing retirement on many. His program for modernizing the country and his emphasis on professionalization in the military won him support in spite of these measures. Another reason for this acceptance by the PLA is that the Chinese military had been culturally committed to the principle of civilian supremacy and had not resisted implementation of civilian policies when the party demonstrated a capacity to rule effectively.

Despite the fact that Deng was successful in his national reform program with the cooperation of the military, discontent arose in the military as a result of his measures lowering the socio-economic status of military men, cutting the military budget, forcing retirements and the reduction of the PLA's political role (Nethercut 1982; Robinson 1982; H. Tien 1984). Criticisms and hostilities of groupa in the PLA are aimed,
however, mainly at the GPD and its subordinate organs which formally supported Deng's program. One opposition faction cutting across the military and Party coalesced around Yie Jianying, who held to the Maoist ideology and expressed concern that Deng's policies had abandoned the ideology of the Chinese Revolution.

The GPD as the ideological spokesman for the Party in the military has a very difficult position when the ideological orientation of the country's leadership changes. The new emphasis on modernization since the Deng era creates tensions and conflict in the GPD, which has been indoctrinated with Mao's revolutionary views for many years. The difficulty of the GPD's situation is further complicated in that its role and purpose is perceived differently by various parties. To the PLA, the GPD represents the party's leadership, but to the Party, it represents the military's interests or positions (Barnett 1974, 99-100). Furthermore, within the GPD, the organization has its own interests and is frequently torn, not only by changes in ideology, but also by the opposing demands of the Party and the military. The GPD has always had a very delicate role in party-military relations, but it is especially difficult today.

A major fear by some in the GPD was that Deng's sweeping national reforms might eventually transform the socialist PRC into a capitalist state through peaceful evolution or reform. This over-riding fear was reflected in such issues as what assessment was to be made of Mao's historical role and his
thoughts, and the danger of losing the spiritual essence of the Chinese Revolution while attempting to build a modern China. In addition, controversial issues arise over reform policies, especially as they affect the military. These issues caused conflict between factions in the military and the Party and affect party-military relations. The factional conflict and its impact on party-military relations is examined in more detail in Chapter VII.

On the issue of how to evaluate Mao and his thought, the GPD and the military generally differed with the Party. It is almost a truism that new leaders generally denigrate actions of the old leaders they have replaced. At least, it was true in the case of Deng. At an All-Army Conference on Political Work in 1978, Deng sought to break the dogmatism of Mao's thought which was deeply rooted in the PLA. He sought to re-interpret Mao to justify his actions, and he blamed Mao for the excesses in the Cultural Revolution (Deng 1984, 127-132). His speech did not gain enthusiastic support from the PLA (H. Cheng 1988, 243).

In 1981, at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, debate was acrimonious over a resolution dealing with the Cultural Revolution. The resolution known as the "Resolution in Certain Questions in the History of Our Party ..." laid the blame for excesses during the revolution squarely on Mao (XH, June 30, 1981). This party pronouncement is generally considered by observers to have been softened considerably due to the opposition of the military (Nethercut 1982, 696).
The army's opposition to the content of resolution was well known even before it was proposed. Military leaders had spoken out and defended Mao's role in the CCP before the evaluation resolution was made. One conservative military leader, Yie Jianying, for instance, in a statement made in 1979 simply glossed over the Cultural Revolution and attributed its calamitous consequences to Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" (FBIS, October 1, 1989, 18-34).

As a result of stiff opposition in the military, the Party retreated from its most severe criticisms of Mao in the Resolution. The CCP adopted basically a critical assessment but reasserted through party policies the "Four Basic Principles," i.e., socialism, people's democratic dictatorship, leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (J. Chang 1979, 88; Nethercut 1982, 696). As can be seen from these events, ideological conflicts may occur between the Central Party and the Party in the military over non-military policies and issues.

Economic modernization raised still other divisive issues in the PLA, especially in the GPD. The reform policies introduced by Deng called for an open door policy and the introduction of some capitalist measures to reform the economy. These policies became an issue of dispute in the military as well as in the Party. How to construct a "socialist spiritual civilization" while modernizing to construct a "material civilization" was the cause of great ideological agitation.
A former Minister of National Defense, Yie Jianying, a Party hard-liner first raised this issue in 1979 in a not-so-subtle protest against the one-sided emphasis on material construction by Deng's administration. Others in the military continued to focus on this controversy. It was most frequently and sharply berated by those who had most fully embraced the revolutionary ideology. For instance, Zhao Yi-ya, a life-long commissar and advisor of the Jiefangjun Bao a publication under control of the GPD, criticized the over-emphasis on material progress at the expense of the communist ideology in an article entitled "Communist Ideology is the Core of Socialism" (JFJB, August 28, 1982).

Publication of this diaputical and controversial article led to the dismissal of the director of the GPD, Wei Guoqing, who was responsible for the publication. Also, the Jiefang Ribao, after this event, published a lengthy self-criticism for printing Zhao's article (JFRR, 28 August, 1982).

Permitting the publication of criticism of Deng's policies was not the only transgression committed by Wei Guoqing, the director of the GPD. He also had advocated "putting politics in command" in the PLA—a principle that had been forcefully rejected by Deng in the post-Mao period, and an obstacle to a professional military. In his speech at the All-Army Political work Conference in 1980, Wei said, "Experience shows that units that relax political-ideological work at any time are eventually penalized. Political work is the lifeline of our army. Putting
politics in command and political ideology above everything else is an important principle" (Beijing Domestic Service, May 8, 1980). He then called for upholding the principle of party committee leadership in the armed forces, where military commanders are subordinate to them. His actions and words demonstrated how dedicated he and his cohorts were to the older revolutionary ideology, and how difficult it would be to change the perspective of the GPD and the military.

Deng’s economic reforms and open door policies which gave more freedom to people, also came under criticism by the dissidents in the military. They objected to the appearance of "anarchism, extreme individualism and bourgeois liberalization trends of thought in society" (FBIS, 28 April, 1982, R1). For example, there was a 1979 film script "Unrequited Love" written by Bai Hua, an intellectual and member of a PLA unit in the Wuhan Military Region. The story was about a patriotic artist who was hounded to death by radical leftists. When debates over the evaluation of Mao’s role approached a climax in the Spring of 1980, the script was attacked in the army paper and denounced for "negating patriotism," and it was depicted as a reflection of "anarchism, ultra-individualism, and bourgeois liberalism" (FBIS, Apr 22, 1982, k1).

An even more dramatic event during post-Mao period was the Tiananmen incident of 1989. The universities had become more open as a result of Deng’s economic and social reforms, leading ultimately to the student uprising demanding reform in politics
and democracy. During their demonstration, the students left their campuses and converged at Tiananmen Square, the center of the government in Beijing. At first the military hesitated to break up these demonstration as ordered by Deng. In part, their refusal to act was because the students were seen to be making a peaceful protest in a patriotic manner. Some in the Party even sympathized with the students, including the General Secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang. As a result, those party members who favored more political reforms would not support taking strong action against the demonstrators. As the incidents worsened, Zhao finally was removed from his post, and the hard liners in the government and Party gained control under the leadership of Deng. Military units loyal to Deng’s leadership were called in and the demonstration was savagely put down.

Major political changes in China have occurred since the Tiananmen incident in June 1989. Deng resigned as chairman of the Party’s CMC five months later and announced he would resign his post as Chairman of state CMC in 1990. Jiang Zeman, a follower of Deng who also believed in modernization was selected as the new General Secretary of the CCP and took Deng’s place as Chairman of the Party’s CMC. Those in the military who had not obeyed commands to break up the demonstration were removed from office and a number of them purged from the Party.

Since the Tiananmen incident, the leadership has tightened its political control and supervision of the PLA and greatly increased its stress on political indoctrination. "Redness" is
again regarded as more important for cadres than "expertise," and PLA-Party relations are being recast in strong Mao terms (Wang C. 1989, 2; Luo 1989, 3). Lei Feng, the perennial PLA model hero, was once again held up for emulation (XH February 24, 1990; XH Domestic Service, March 6, 1990). Policy making is being shifted back from the PLA headquarters to the CMC, a reversal of the professional reforms of the 1970s aimed at reducing the Party's involvement in military decisions (Deng 1984, 386-390).

Increased party control over the military can be seen in a host of changes in attitudes and programs. For instance, internal security has become a major priority since the Tiananmen incident. The Central Military Commission's control over the People's Armed Police (PAP) has been increased, and the PAP which officially is supervised by the Minister of Public Security headed by Wang Fang, the First Political Commissar of the PAP, is more under the scrutiny of the CMC (Jencks 1990, 4-7). The Party seems to have sought to ensure control of the police by placing the political commissar of the PAP in charge of the police.

The doctrine of absolute leadership of the Party over the military also has re-emerged. This doctrine has been strongly emphasized by both Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the Party's CMC, and Chi Haotian, the Chief of the General Staff (Beijing Review, November 27, 1989, 9). Although Chi is known to be a leading proponent of military professionalism and modernization, he proclaimed in an article in Quishi, a national party magazine that the PLA must "ensure the
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Party's absolute leadership over the army...must be regarded as the most important task in the building of our army" (Chi 1990, 2). Furthermore, he argued in a Neo Maoist fashion that while the armed forces serve the people and the state, the army is still ultimately the servant of the Party. Those who argue that the Party and army should be separated, and the army depoliticized, according to Chi, are trying to "sow discord between the army and the Party " (Chi 1990, 37).

Chi Haotian also called for re-construction of the party committee system at all levels to insure that the troops be kept fully in line with the central authorities "ideologically and politically and in their actions" (Chi 1990, 38). He also reasserted the traditional division between political and military command, personified in every PLA unit by the political commissar and the military commander.

The political commissars, who played a crucial role in maintaining control of soldiers during the Tiananmen disturbances, have been greatly strengthened and enhanced. The director of the GPD, Yang Baibing in 1989 was promoted to the post of general secretary of the Party's CMC. In an address at the All-Army Political Work Conference five months after the June crackdown, he stated that "if political commissars had not insisted on their political stand and stuck to their positions in times of difficulty, the outcome would have been unthinkable." He further reiterated that the PLA's top priority must be to guarantee the Party's absolute leadership over the army and
obedience to the Party’s direction at all times.

Despite the re-emphasis on political commissars and party control, it is not certain that the traditional political control functions of the GPD can be re-invigorated. Recently a new Discipline Inspection Commission of the Party has emerged, according to Pollack, which may assume the political control functions previously associated with the GPD. The increased visibility of this new committee since 1989 seems to confirm this change.

Blame for the military’s failure to obey Deng’s order and for failing to distinguish between right and wrong has been placed on the neglect of political study. Need for political loyalty of the military is imperative. As a result, there has been new emphasis on political indoctrination following the Tiananmen incident.

Political Indoctrination

Political indoctrination in communist countries is seen as the most important task facing the political organization in the military. Indoctrination is not simply to produce a good soldier, but to give birth to a communist soldier. It is to change men into the new communist (socialist) men and to secure the implementation of and support for party policies. It is the fourth factor examined to determine the party-military relations in the post-Mao period.
Basically, the content of political education in the military establishment of communist countries is based on Marxism-Leninism. In addition, political education in their respective military establishments has both patriotic and nationalistic aspects. There are, therefore, similarities and differences in indoctrination programs among the communist's countries. Similarities in the content of political education are a result of communist ideology. Differences can be accounted for in terms of a series of state goals directly related to the survival, maintenance, and prosperity of political systems.

In the case of the PRC, considerable changes have taken place in terms of the contents and the intensity of ideological education in the PLA during its history. The Chinese communists have maintained Marxism-Leninism as the backbone of their ideology since the CCP was established in 1921. However, they added the thought of Mao Zedong as a key element of the guiding ideology and symbolic basic of the CCP since the Ninth National Congress in 1969. Furthermore, the Chinese communist leaders have insisted that Marxism-Leninism must not be blindly accepted but selectively adapted to the realities of China. Mao Zedong at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938, for instance, said:

...We must not study the letter of Marxism and Leninism, but the viewpoint and methodology of its creators, with which they observed and solved problems...A communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, ... if a Chinese Communist.-
...talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an abstraction (Mao 1939, 73-75).

Mao’s theory of building a people’s army relied heavily on revolutionary discipline based on political consciousness. The political commissary system in the PLA was to be responsible for indoctrinating the political consciousness and preserving the revolutionary discipline. Throughout Mao’s entire life enthusiasm for political-ideological work in the PLA was emphasized, especially during the cultural revolution.

Although Deng continued to speak of the necessity of building a modern revolutionary army, and that the PLA must strengthen ideological work to make the armed forces into a model for carrying out the party’s line, principles and policies, the impact of his program was to favor professionalism of the army over revolutionary zeal and control. Even while Deng was attempting to prevent the military’s political organs from interfering in military affairs in order to promote military professionalism in the PLA, his director of the GPD in 1982, Wei Guoqing, was insisting that political work was still the life line of the military. This difference between action and statement reflects the apparent ideological ambivalence of Deng’s era. This apparent ambivalence helped cause the ideological conflicts among factions in both the Party and the military.

The political organs in the PLA, despite Deng’s efforts to free military decisions from political interference, continue to exercise important functions. Political education and indoctrin-
ation are the most prominent. Efforts to explain and disseminate party policies in the context of the Party's history and ideology were continuously carried out in the army. The "criteria of truth" are to be the principles drawn from the party history and ideology, including the Four Basic Principles, Indoctrination also includes current Party line, principles, and policies.

Political education also is used in an attempt to explain policies affecting the military. For instance, a statement in the army paper suggested the following procedure for explaining the policy to reduce the size of the army:

the mood of personnel in the units that are being reorganized may become unstable, and unhealthy trends may occur in personnel readjustment and the handling of property and materials...It is necessary first to do ideological work among such personnel and then to step up the work of discipline inspection (Beijing Domestic Service, May 31, 1985).

Campaigns of ideological rectification also are conducted by the party commissars in the PLA. For instance, when the nationwide movement against "spiritual pollution" was launched in late 1983, the commissars were instructed to implement a campaign in the PLA. Their instructions stated:

Party committees and political institutions at all levels in our army must pay close attention to resisting spiritual pollution and have a very strong sense of urgency and responsibility in this regard. They must try to discover weak links and step up ideological and political work; measures must be taken to clear away and prevent spiritual pollution (Xinhua, Oct 30, 1983).

Similarly, in early 1987, military units seemed to be more active than other sectors of Chinese society in the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign, and the GPD exerted great efforts to
remind those in uniform that they must obey the party’s wishes.

Political work and indoctrination in the PLA was down played prior to the Tiananmen period (Dreyer 1990). After the incident, this was changed. The need to obtain political loyalty from the military turned political indoctrination into a compelling imperative. Political study shifted from being an adjunct role in support of other military goals to being an end in itself. Of all the PLA’s many tasks, Liu Huaqing, the vice Chairman of Party’s CMC, emphasized “the most important one is to pay particular attention to education in Marxism” (Huang 1989). He further added not only Marx’s works should be studied but also those of Deng Xiaoping and the military thoughts of Mao should be impressed on the military. Neglecting such political study, Liu warned, was an important reason why some people failed to distinguish clearly between right and wrong in regard to matters of political principle.

Numerous study meetings after the Tiananmen incident were held in the respective military regions and districts. Indoctrination aimed at enhancing the political qualifications of the troops and ensuring that they are able to stand the test against the influence of “bourgeois liberalization,” “peaceful evolution,” and the temptations of reform and opening-up of China, was intensified. In short, the leadership sought to ensure that the PLA was the faithful follower of Communism and the political instrument of the CCP. In addition, the GPD carried out a thorough “cleansing of the cultural environment in military
barracks," including discarding books, newspapers, magazines and audio-and video-tapes with politically dangerous or sexually explicit content (JFJB, Oct 28, 1989, 1).

Despite this massive campaign of indoctrination, it is doubtful whether the efforts to strengthen the Party's control over the PLA can be effective in the face of ten years of reform and the opening-up of China to the influences of Western ideas. Indoctrination is likely to be much less effective than in previous periods, such as during the Cultural Revolution or the Hua Guofeng era (Yu, 1990b, 24). As a result, the PRC seems at the present to be in a critical transition period. The Chinese leaders are desperately trying to produce a politicized, revolutionaryized army while at the same time develop a professional caste for the military which operates within the bounds of the laws and state constitution (1982 Constitution) (FBIS, Apr 29, 1982, K1-24; Sep 7, 1982, K11-16; Sep 14, 1982, K3,11).

Summary and Conclusion

Dynamics of the Political Commissar System and political indoctrination were both found to be a significant factors in explaining changes in party-military relations in the post-Mao period. The workings of the Political Commissar System show that the GPD's political role in the PLA has changed over time. Changing positions and attitudes of the party leadership results in changing roles in the GPD and difference in party-military
relations.

Factional conflict in the Central Party cuts across the Party and military and is reflected in the Political Commissar System. As a result, factional conflict influences the working of the Commissar System and affects the nature of party-military relations. Opposition in the military to Central Party policies influences the policy outcome, demonstrating the significance of the GPD as a political actor.

The ideological tension between the contrasting views of a politicalized as opposed to a professionalized army is reflected in party-military relations. Policies supporting one or another of the opposing concepts about the army tends to shift over time. For instance, when politicalization of the army was emphasized, the Political Commissar System rose in status and became dominant in military decisions. In the Mao’s period, the revolutionary concept of the army prevailed. As a result, the Political Commissar System was designed to ensure organizational subordination of the PLA to the Party. Similarly during Lin’s period (1960-1965) and since the Tiananmen incident (1989-) the Political Commissar System’s institutional status was highly elevated and strengthened. On the other hand, when professionalization of the military was in favor, such as in the Peng’s period (1952-1959) and the Deng’s period (1980-1988), the political commissar’s institutional status declined sharply and its political role was negligible.
All members of the PLA, however, are not of one mind on the issue of what type of military there should be. Many of the older cadre continue to favor a revolutionary military as is evidenced by the continuing support for the Maoist views. Even among the younger cadre which tends to favor a professional army, there is not entire agreement since organizational interests tends to divide them on this issue. This issue cuts across party and military and continues to be a major factor influencing party-military relations.

The Political Commissar System in the PLA is an integral part of the military institution, despite the changes in its status over time. Although the Political Commissar System was created to serve as a party control over the military, Political Commissars have tended to show the same values, concerns, and political attitudes as those held by commanders. Most of the time, in the last few decades, Political Commissars have stood by the military men in promoting military modernization, defending the PLA's corporate interests, participating in politics, even challenging the civilian party. The Political Commissar System in the PRC, therefore, generally cannot be viewed simply as an institutional mechanism for the civilian party to control the military within the PLA. In reality, it has become an ideologi- cal-political force located in the military.

The Political Commissar System is generally more sensitive to ideological disputes and more prone to be involved in politics than the PLA. It is also more vulnerable to party military
conflict. Given its officially-claimed dual institutional nature, the GPD has become a strategic point for political battles in cases of severe conflict between party leaders and military leaders. The PLA is a formidable political force, when the integrity of the military institution is threatened as shown in the Cultural Revolution and in Deng’s era. It has both an ideological-political organization, the GPD, as well as the military organization which controls the gun. In those instances, when the GPD is captured by civilian party politicians and is used to control the military, the military does not automatically become subordinate to their control, as seen during the Cultural Revolution. More likely a stalemate will occur and the GPD likely to be crippled.

The special role of the GPD effects the character of military politics in the PRC. The GPD tends to be basically a conservative force in politics since it seeks to protect the military’s interests and its own organizational values. This conservative orientation often clashes with central party positions. To the Party, the GPD is seen as an organization affiliated with it, and therefore, should submit to party leadership. The political conflict that occurs is aggravated by the fact that the GPD, like the PLA generally, long has been indoctrinated with Mao’s ideology and persists in attempts to build a socialist society. Conservatives in the GPD and PLA often show discontent with reform policies which cause moral degeneration in society and corruption among cadres. Under such circumstances, they may seek
to reverse the course of events in social development. As can be seen in this situation, the GPD has in effect become an ideological-political force in Chinese society.

The factor of the dynamics of the Political Commissar System was found to be a significant indicator of change in party-military relations. During the tenure of Hua and Deng, as well as in the period after the Tiananmen crisis, this factor in the literature indicated the changes in party-military relations which were occurring.
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CHAPTER VI

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTY

In all communist countries, a political commissar or political control system exists, which enables the party to penetrate the military establishment. Members of the military, at the same time, may participate in the party organization. To fully describe party-military relations, it is necessary not only to examine how the political control system affects the military, but also how the military participates in and affects the Party. The fifth factor used to determine change in the nature of party-military relations in the post-Mao period examines military participation in the Party. The degree of military participation in the party organization indicates the extent of the military’s influence in the party-military relations. Changes in the participation rate indicate shifts in political power and may help to explain the character of party-military relations, as well as the course of Chinese politics.

This chapter examines the fifth factor, military participation in the Chinese Communist Party, which is thought to influence change in the nature of party-military relations. It explores a number of questions: What percentage of the Central Committee and Politburo membership are held by military profes-
How do changes in the rate of military representation in the central leadership affect the party-military relations? How, and to what extent, does the military become involved in Chinese politics? Does this factor indicate change and help explain party-military relations in the post-Mao period?

The PLA’s Formal Participation in China’s Politics

Participation in politics by the military is a legitimate political right in the PRC (Sandschneider 1989; Liu 1986). The PLA is granted, in both the Party and the state constitution, an independent status, like other groups in society, such as workers, peasants, and intellectuals and is constitutionally given the right to elect its own representatives to both the CCP National Congress and the National People’s Congress of the PRC. Unlike some other political systems, the military is legally recognized as an independent interest group in society, and is legally allowed to participate in all political processes.

Significant portions of the Central Committee and Politburo, the central organs of the CCP are composed of members from the military. Commanders of the military regions and the armed services normally serve as members of the Central Committee. The percentage of PLA commanders in the Central Committee and the Politburo of CCP in the years since 1945 is shown in Table 4.

Table 4 shows that there has been substantial representation of commanders and commissars from the PLA in the Central
Committee and the Politburo during the past four decades. On the average, a third (33.9%) of all Politburo members have been

Table 4. Military Representation in the Central Committee and the Politburo of the CCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCP National Congress (year)</th>
<th>Members in the Politburo</th>
<th>Members in the Central Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Alternate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th (1945)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/13</td>
<td>22/45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th (1956)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/17</td>
<td>30/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1969)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/21</td>
<td>2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1973)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/25</td>
<td>52/195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1977)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/23</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (1982)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/25</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1985)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5/22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (1987)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Joffe 1987a, 160-161; Lee 1989, 296; B. Liu 1988, 36; Tien 1984; Yu 1985a, 47.

military representatives while in the Central Committee; therefore, the military has represented almost a third (29.8%) of its membership. The peak of military representation in the two
organs occurred during the Ninth Congress of the CCP in 1969, the period of the Cultural Revolution, when 50 percent of the members of the Central Committee and 48 percent of the Politburo were military representatives. In 1977, the military held a majority (54%) of the seats on the Politburo, which holds power to govern when the Central Committee is not in session.

The extent of the PLA's representation in the two key organs of the Party declined in the post-Mao's period after 1978, as Deng made an effort to remove the military from politics. Even after the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 at the height of Deng's era, the military occupied a significant 18 percent of the Central Party's total memberships and 11 percent of the Politburo (Table 4). Participation by the PLA high command in the innermost organs of the CCP not only results in the high status of the PLA but also enables the military to protect its interests and shape policies to its liking.

The military cadres also represent a large percentage of Provincial Party Committees as can be seen in Table 5. In 1971, military personnel represented 72.4 percent of the first secretaries of provincial committees and 62 percent of military cadres participated in leadership groups at the provincial level.

Not only do the leaders in the PLA participate in shaping national policy, but also PLA commanders play an important role in the governance of provinces and local governments. Regional armies of the PLA are organized into military regions, provincial military districts, and sub-districts. Each of seven regional
Table 5. The Percentage of Military Cadres in Provincial Committees in the PRC (1956-1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First Secretaries of Provincial Committees (%)</th>
<th>Leadership Groups of Provincial Committees (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The position of political commissar of a military region in most cases is held by the first secretary of the party committee of the area. In this fashion, the civil and military leadership are interlocked (see Figure 3). The CCP authorities at the sub-national levels are a reserve means of the Party’s control. The public security forces in the regional and subregional areas are the coercive component of regional party authority, but in case of major disturbances, a party secretary always has the force of the PLA at his command.
Although the strength of the military in key posts in the Party varies over time, the military is a major influence in the CCP at the central and regional levels. At times the number of military cadres in the key posts of the central and provincial levels appears to give it predominance in the Party. The position of the military in the Party at times raises questions about the validity of Mao's doctrine of party control over the military. It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond the simple matter of the numbers of military cadre holding key positions in party posts, to see how they behave. Do military members act in a common fashion? Do they tend to agree on policy issues? These
questions are examined later.

Changes in the Role of the Military in Politics Since Mao

Throughout Mao's latter years in the 1960s and 1970s, the PLA had occupied a decisive position in Chinese Communist politics (Joffe 1975a, 1-12; Nelson 1972, 444-71). The PLA intervened in all political affairs from the central to the local levels (Chung-kung nien-pao, 1967, 93-97). Regional commanders or political commissars became the first party secretaries in most provinces, and military men took the majority of seats in provincial party secretariats during the late period of the Cultural Revolution. For instance, of the 29 of the first Party secretaries in the early 1970s, 22 were military men, and of the 158 members of the provincial level party committee secretariats, 98 were military men (Joffe 1973, 464-8). From these powerful posts, military commanders exerted political influence in all central and regional policy-making organs. The power of the military was curtailed slightly after the Lin Biao incident of September 13, 1974 (Joffe 1973, 450-77; Kau & Perrolle 1974, 558-77). Military involvement in politics, however, basically remained unchanged and military leaders still held major political power both at the central and the local levels (Bennett 1973, 294-307; P. Chang 1972a, 999-1013; Godwin 1976, 1-20; Kowalewski 1983, 409-21).
Mao attempted to reduce the military's political power in 1973, following the CCP's Tenth National Congress. He reshuffled eight regional military commanders to remove them from their long-held realms of influence and to consolidate his leadership over the army. The political strength of the PLA, however, remained formidable throughout Mao's life, and the PLA continued its involvement in political affairs.

After Mao's death in 1976, the "October 6 Coup" occurred, in which military leaders such as Ye Jianyin, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, joined with Mao's bodyguards led by Wang Dongxing, arrested four of the radical Maoists, the so-called "Gang of Four", which permitted Hua Guofeng to take power. The military displayed, in this incident, its ability to dominate power succession in the country (A. Liu 1979, 817-37). The "October 6 Coup" demonstrated that the PLA had the capacity to initiate a coup by siding with one side in the political struggles within the Party. This military intervention was not undertaken to enable the military to assume a praetorian role, but to support a political strongman the military favored (Huntington 1968; Perlmutter 1977, 107-108).

The military's domination over politics continued through 1977 after the CCP's Eleventh National Congress. Among the 26 members of the Politburo, 12 had a military background. They pledged their support to Hua Guofeng as expected and made him the party chairman.
The key post of the Chief of Staff of the PLA after Hua became the power holder was assigned to Deng Xiaoping who had been purged by Mao. Deng immediately took steps to enhance his power within the PLA. He reshuffled the leadership personnel to place his supporters in key positions. He promoted structural reforms in order to strengthen the Party's leadership over the military, and he instituted political education to ensure loyalty of soldiers to the Party Central Committee. His ideas about modernizing the country and professionalizing the military won him support in the PLA, and by 1981 he was successful in the Party's factional struggles and became the chief power holder in the PRC.

Deng Xiaoping's views about the PLA's political role were quite different from Mao's. Mao wanted an army that would faithfully carry out his orders. Deng, however, had no intention of exercising personal control over the military. He emphasized the need to reform the military system to achieve the goal of modernizing the PLA. He aimed at establishing a comprehensive and effective system to guarantee the Party's absolute control over the army so as to prevent "gun barrels" from becoming an unstable political factor. In other words, Deng proposed to build a "people's army with Chinese characteristics," i.e., a modern army that completely obeyed the command of the Party, instead of the command of a "personage" (Deng 1984, 98). He also tried to exclude the army from political activities in his modernization process. In his view, the military should no
longer intervene in political activities but should play its primary role as a fighting force and secondarily only as a production force (Y. Yu 1984; Bonavia 1985).

As part of Deng's emphasis of the PLA's role as a production force, the PLA has participated extensively in economic construction. The military helped in the exploitation of oil fields, irrigation canals and drainage ditches, construction of reservoirs, and extending communications and transportation facilities. The PLA's secondary role was to promote economic growth. It was used in this fashion partially as a result of Deng's attempt to improve military-civilian relations, which had been seriously damaged during the long political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Such actions were an attempt to reaffirm the concept that the PLA was an army of the people, and this image of the PLA was repeatedly stressed during Deng's era.

In addition to promoting economic development, the PLA also provides many kinds of social services. For instance, the military and civilians have jointly worked together in the movement to build the two civilizations, a "socialist material civilization" and a "socialist spiritual civilization." Love of motherland, socialism, and Party are emphasized in these programs, as well as the private virtues of "decorum, courtesy, hygiene, discipline and morals," which are to beautify the "mind, language, behavior, and environment" (Yu 1985b, 40). In all of these nonmilitary activities, Deng aimed at fostering a unique political subculture among the military, a subculture where the
military accepted the Party’s leadership wholeheartedly, and was devoted to the people, the motherland, and socialism.

The concentration on modernization during Deng’s era promoted professionalization in the PLA, which by its nature is incompatible with activities outside the normal military sphere (Joffe 1987a, 150-151). In order to promote modernization in the PLA, Deng had to reduce the non-military activities of the PLA and to focus the army on military matters. As a result, the PLA was relieved of many of the non-military functions that it was performing in society, including the maintenance of public security which is the most visible and extensive function.

Beginning in 1983, Deng transferred public security from the PLA to the public security organs and established the People’s Armed Police, which became responsible for internal security, as an arm of the Ministry of Public Security (Johnston 1984, 1019; XH, April 5, 1983). The Armed Police by 1985 had established 29 divisions, 54 regiments and 1,029 battalions. It had also set up three academies for the basic-level officers, as well as a naval academy and medical school (Liaowang, August 19, 1983). To relieve the PLA from general purpose construction work on the railways, the Deng leadership also abolished the PLA Railway Corps as a military unit and transferred it to the Ministry of Railways in 1984 (XH, July 29, 1981).

The 1985 decision to reduce the size of armed forces by 25 percent over two years was the most significant action taken during Deng’s era towards professionalizing the military and
lessening the PLA's influence in politics. This resulted in the
dismissal of officers who had accumulated political influence,
while permitting the rise of a new generation of professional
oriented officers with more modern equipment.

The withdrawal of the military from politics at the provin-
cial level was more apparent than at the local level. Command of
military regions until 1973 was noted for its stability.
Regional and provincial party leaders developed close working
relationships with military commanders in these areas. However,
during the Cultural Revolution, attacks by the Mao-inspired Red
Guards on civil party authorities seriously changed these rela-
tionships. Although Mao ordered the regional commanders to
support the Red Guards, in some instances, such as in the Wuhan
region, the commanders stepped in and sought to put down the Red
Guards and to reduce the violence and disorder. As a result, Mao
ordered a transfer of regional commanders, to remove them from
their long-held realms of influence. By doing so, he was able to
consolidate his leadership over the army, but it broke up the
close relationship which had developed between regional
commanders and civil authorities.

Deng in the 1980s continued to reshuffle military commanders
and political commissars from region to region in order to weaken
their influence (L. Chu 1980, 52-61). By the first half of 1983,
commanders of ten military regions and political commissars in
most regions had been changed. At the provincial military
district level, over four-fifths of the commanders were changed.
Also, 10 to 15 percent of the military cadres at or above the divisional level were forced to retire during this period, to promote professionalization and support for Deng (Kulkarni 1983, 20).

Deng's success in reducing the "interlocking directorate" between the military and party at the provincial level was documented in a recent work on the PLA (Bullard 1985). The study indicates a gradual decline of the PLA's influence in politics because of the loss of the interlocking positions in the government and party structure. Table 6 shows the decrease in interlocking relationships for the years 1972 and 1982.

Another change, perhaps of more lasting significance, was the restructuring of the military regions in 1985. The eleven military regions were reduced to seven by merging the Jinan Military Region with Wuhan, Nanjing with Fuzhuo, Lanzhou with Urumqi, and Chendu with Kunming. Only the Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenyang Military Regions remained intact.

Another reshuffling of military regional commanders occurred in April-June 1990. It began quietly in the Spring after the Tiananmen incident and was reported only by the Hong Kong Press in mid-June 1990 (Zhen ming, 1990, June, 14-17; T. Cheung 1990a, 32; China Post, June 14, 1990, 1). Although details are still unclear, it appears that six of the seven military regional commanders and five of the seven political commissars were transferred or forced to retire.
Table 6. Interlocking Directorate Between the Party, Military, and Government at the Provincial Level in the PRC (1972-1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interlocking Roles</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissar/Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissar/Govt</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Commissar/Party/Govt</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Govt</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander/Party/Govt</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Govt</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dual Position</strong></td>
<td>325</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Triple Position</strong></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Institutional Involvement in Interlocking Roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bullard 1985, 143.

This series of unprecedented shifts of military commanders and the reorganization of the structure of the military regions has increased the responsibility and formal authority of regional commanders, which conforms to the needs of a modernized, professionalized army. From a political standpoint, however, the shifts have decreased the political power and influence of regional commanders (Joffe 1987a, 160). These changes were a
part of Deng’s fundamental reforms for promoting younger and better-educated people in order to facilitate four modernizations of China, and a means of reducing the political influence of the military by changing party-military relations.

Deng’s removal of the military from political posts resulted in a decline of the PLA’s influence in Central policy-making organs, the Central Committee and the Politburo. Representation of the military in the Central Committee at the beginning of Deng’s regime in 1981 amounted to about 30 percent, while representation in the Politburo was 54 percent. This was the zenith of military political power in the post-Mao period (Table 4). By 1982, military representation in the Central Committee had declined to about 22 percent and only 32 percent of the Politburo were military members. By the Thirteenth National Congress of the CCP in 1987, representation of the military in the Central Committee had fallen to about 18 percent, while representation on the Politburo had declined to 11 percent. Of the 22 members of the Politburo during this time, only four members were identified as men with important military connections (Bullard & O’Dod 1986, 712). This was the lowest military representation since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

As a result of the decline in military representation in the key central organs of the Party, military leaders could not block or modify Deng’s efforts to institute numerous policies which appeared to damage the PLA’s interests. The military members of the Politburo did not prevent Deng’s programs of modernizing the
military, which included the transferring of military regional commanders in 1981 and 1985, the demobilization of various units, the deemphasis of ideological politicization within the PLA, and the budget cutting for the military. That Deng’s ability to enact and implement such programs was enhanced by the fact that eight of the eleven military-connected Politburo members in 1983 were pro-Deng or active Deng followers (Barnett 1984, 6; Bullard & O’Dowd 1986, 712-713). In the Central Committee, military leaders held only 18.29 percent of the Central Committees’ total membership, and many of these also supported Deng (Sandachneider 1989, 34).

Deng, by the end of 1987, had succeeded in the process of reducing the influence of the PLA in politics. The removal of the army from a dominant political position in localities and the reduction of its power in the Central Party policy-making organs, restored the Party’s political control over the military and enabled Deng to undertake his program of modernization and professionalization of the military. Despite this apparent success, to some China-watchers it is doubtful that the army is really permanently "back in the barracks" (Joffe 1987a, 150-157; Sandachneider 1989, 346-347). These doubters point to the military’s role in the Tiananmen incident in June 4, 1989 and its aftermath, as evidence of the continuing political role of the military.
The PLA’s Involvement in the Tiananmen Incident

When tens of thousands of students took to Beijing’s streets in mid-April 1989, initially to mourn the sudden death of former CCP chief Hu Yaobang, the PRC’s leadership and military were in doubt as what actions were called for by these demonstrations. As the demonstration turned into political protests calling for democracy, an end to corruption, nepotism and other grievances against the central leadership, they became an unprecedented challenge to the Party’s authority leading ultimately to imposition of martial law, the intervention by the PLA, and ultimately to the massacre on June 4.

The Tiananmen incident raised serious challenges to fundamental aspects of the Chinese system. The legitimacy of the Party and the leadership, as well as to the communist ideology itself were challenged by the students (Saich 1989). They were calling for democracy, rather than party control. These were challenges to the authority of the leadership and the system which could not be ignored (Goodman and Segal eds. 1989; Gittings 1989).

The deep splits in China’s civilian leadership over the pace and nature of economic reform and modernization efforts proposed by Deng not only helped ferment the crisis, but also aggravated it once it started (Krug, Long & Segal 1989). Emboldened by the greater freedoms given in the reforms, first students, and then dissatisfied citizenry of Beijing, began to come into the streets
in ever larger numbers to join the demonstration.

As the crisis mounted in the streets, the Chinese leadership remained divided in its councils. Zhao, the Party General Secretary, who all along had been sympathetic towards intellectuals and reforms, took a conciliatory stand and was ready to make concessions to the students. In contrast, a more hard-line Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council and Yang Shangdung, the Chairman of the State and vice Chairman of the CMC, rejected concessions and demanded an immediate end to student defiance and suggested use of the military to break up the demonstration. Deng was influenced by this conflict among the leadership groups, and as a result delayed immediate action to curb the demonstration, permitting it to continue for over a month before declaring martial law on May 20th.

During the period of the demonstrations, some questions arose over the loyalties of the PLA. More than a thousand soldiers, for instance, from military units in Beijing, including the general headquarters, joined the demonstrations on 17th May (Hongkong Standard, May 18, 1989). Student leaflets also proclaimed that soldiers from the 38th Army were reluctant to enter the city to end the protests.

Seven prominent retired generals put their names to a letter addressed to governmental authorities and the Party’s CMC calling for extreme caution in using the army to deal with the crisis. The signatories included such notable former military leaders as Zhang Aiping, the former defence minister, Xiao Ke, the former
Military Academy commandant, Yang Dezhi, former chief of the GSD, Song Shilun, the former president of the Academy of Military Sciences, Chen Zaidao, the former PLA Railways Corps commander, and Li Jujui, the former political commissar of the Logistics Department and advisor to the CMC (Cheung 1990, 15).

Another 100 officers sent a similar statement to the CMC (South China Morning Post, May 19, 1989). It was even suggested that Major General Xu Qiannian, the commander of the 38th Army, feigned sickness rather than order his troops into the square. An unconfirmed report in a speech by Yang Baibing, director of the GPD after the Tiananmen incident, reports that 110 officers and 1400 soldiers refused to follow orders or had left their posts during the Tiananmen operation (South China Morning Post, December 28, 1989). Another such report said that 3500 officers were under investigation for violation of orders (The Economist, February 17, 1990).

By May 20, Deng and the leadership had decided to end the demonstration. Opponents to strong action, such as Zhao, the Party General Secretary were overruled. Marshall law was declared. Troops loyal to Deng from outside Beijing were brought in, and those considered to be in favor of the demonstrators were pulled out of the city. On June 4, these new troops moved in, and conflict soon erupted. The demonstrators then were savagely attacked, resulting in the death or injuries to many others.

Since the military crackdown, the leadership has tightened its political control of the PLA. To keep a widely disaffected
urban population, particularly in the capital, from taking to the streets again, the leadership is almost wholly dependent on the loyalty of its military and security forces. Consequently, increased attention is being devoted to shoring up political indoctrination among soldiers, as well as strengthening the Party’s tight control and supervision in the ranks.

The military’s involvement in the Tiananmen incident, combined with the subsequent rise of the hard-line civilian leadership such as Li and Yang, has prompted a major effort to undermine the movement toward professionalization of the military. Attempts have been made to strengthen party control and discipline at all levels. Added impetus has been given to these efforts since the armies in Eastern Europe have shown that communists armies could indeed “turn color” and support reform-oriented elements, thus promoting the overthrow of a Communist system.

The efforts to reverse the trend toward military professionalization, coupled with the attempt to purify and discipline the party, have taken several directions. Beijing is reportedly attempting a thorough investigation of all PLA leadership organs, especially those involved in Tiananmen. This investigation has been accompanied by a major reshuffling of top leaders of key PLA units, including senior officers of the seven Military Regions (Zheng Ming, November 1, 1989; Kuang Chiao Ching, no. 203, 1989; South China Morning Post, June 28, 1989).
Attempts to raise politics and ideology to a position of primary importance within the military also has been promoted by the CCP. Renewed emphasis has been placed on political study for all soldiers. Almost 70 percent of the new training curriculum for army recruits is now devoted to ideological study. As a part of this effort, a campaign has been undertaken to promote revolutionary virtues in the troops, and they are encouraged to emulate exploits and attitudes of the model soldier, Lei Feng ([Beijing Xinhua, March 5, 1990]). Ideological evaluations of officers have been resumed as part of a screening process for possible promotion. Orders from the top of the military hierarchy, the CMC, now directs that political and ideological work is to be the major task of army building. This theme now is a part of the military from top to bottom ([Tang Tai, December 30, 1989; Remin ribao, December 30, 1989]).

The leadership’s attempts to deal with the problem of military loyalty has also led to an attempt to reinvigorate the party organs in the military and to raise the influence of political commissars ([Tang Tai, December 30, 1989; January 6, 1990]). In all of these efforts, the leadership has tightened control of the PLA at all levels. Policy making is being shifted back from the PLA general headquarters to the CMC (Deng 1984, 386-390).

Political commissars have emerged with considerably enhanced importance and authority. They have been given expanded powers in operational decision-making at the expense of commanders. As
can be seen, not only is Deng's efforts to professionalize the army being reversed, but also his attempts to lessen the Party's role in politics has been weakened. The PLA seem to be regaining political power as a result of the enhancement of the role of the political commissars. Commissars are favored by the Party since they played a crucial part in maintaining political control over the soldiers during the Tiananmen incident.

Summary and Conclusion

How the military participates in the Party is a major factor influencing change in party-military relations in the PRC. This factor was found to be a most significant factor explaining the changes in party-military relations during the reign of Hua, Deng, and since the Tiananmen incident. Although the military has a legitimate right to participate in the country's politics, its participation is seen as a threat to the supremacy of party control. The power of the military in politics, as seen in its representation in the Party and government decision centers, has fluctuated, but has been a significant factor in Chinese politics throughout the history of the PRC.

The initiation of Deng's reform policies after 1978 marks a watershed for the political role of the PLA. Military representation in the key party apparatus at the central and regional levels was drastically reduced throughout Deng's era until the Tiananmen incident. Following the Tiananmen incident, the PLA
was used as an interventionist force to crush domestic disturbances, as well as an instrument of party propaganda. This incident provided the impetus for the PLA's full reentry into Chinese politics.

Understanding party-military relations in the PRC requires both an understanding of how the Party penetrates the military and how the military participates, or is involved in the Party. The extent of the military's involvement in politics may be seen in factional politics, as well as in the political process of decision making. The PLA's involvement in politics since Mao can clearly be seen in such factional conflicts as the "October 6, Coup" and the Tiananmen incident. Also, the PLA's involvement in politics can be seen during Deng's era in the decision processes which enabled him to pursue the modernization policies. The next chapter will examine factional politics in the PRC.
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CHAPTER VII

FACTIONAL POLITICS AND
PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Factional politics has continued to dominate Chinese politics, especially since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Regional military commanders and Long March veterans have played a key role in this factional conflict. This chapter looks at Chinese politics and how the military is involved. It considers what the interests and issues are, which motivate the military in these political struggles, and how alliance or coalitions are made with other factional interests in the Party. This is the sixth factor considered to influence party-military relations in the PRC.

Like all organizations, the military has essential interests which it seeks to promote through politics. Regional, ideological and personnel differences among military personnel, however, results in military leaders having different preferences and political perceptions. These differences prevent the military interest from acting as a simple monolithic interest in politics. In fact, power struggles within the ranks of the military often fuel factional politics and power struggles within the leadership of the Party. Various issues affect those having
different preferences, and as a result, conflict often occurs over issues in the military. Literature regarding these conflicts should provide clues as to changes in party-military relations.

To understand the role of military personages in the factional struggles of Chinese politics, it is first necessary to discuss factional politics in the PRC generally. There have been at least six major factions within the Party leadership, as shown in Figure 4, since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969. The Figure shows these six loosely-bound factions from left to right depending on their ideological leanings.

Spectrum of Political Factions

In the PRC, 1969-1990

On the political left, the evolution of various groups may be traced from two leftist positions that emerged after the Cultural Revolution in 1969. One group centered on Defense Minister Lin Biao, who stood for Mao’s Thought and the People’s War, and advocated development and strength through well-disciplined mass mobilization, using the army as a model. When Lin died in an airplane crash after his unsuccessful coup attempt, a “Lin Biao rump group” of supporters continued among certain military men.

Another group on the left in 1969 was the “Cultural Revolutionary Left” surrounding Mao. It later divided into two
Figure 4: Factional Groupings in the PRC, 1969-1976

**Political Left**

- Cultural Revolution Left
  - Lang of Four
    - Jiang Qing
    - Zhang Chunqiao
    - Wang Hongwen
    - Yao Wenyuan

**Political Center**

- Faction Headed by Lin Biao
  - Northern Military Command
    - Long March Veterans

- Petroluem/Gulou Faction
  - Zhou Enlai
  - Wu De
  - Ji Enshui

- Li Zheenian
  - Yu Guili

**Political Right**

- Southern Military Command
  - Reabilitated
  - Alliance
  - Wei Guoqing
  - Ku Shiyin

- Deng Xiaoping
  - Wu Youbang
  - Zhao Ziyang
  - Chen Yun
  - Wen Li
  - Yao Yilin

- Li Xiannian
  - Forced to Retire in 1989
  - Alliance
  - Broken

- Military Conservatives
  - Led by Ye Jianying
  - Centered in DPD
    - Ye Retired in 1985

- Reformation Group
  - Deng Xiaoping
  - Wu Youbang
  - Zhao Ziyang

- Li Peng
  - Yang Shangkun

- Zhao Ziyang
  - Wu Yuli
  - Wu Chwei

Sources: Fontana 1984, Figure A; Joffe 1997a; Tien 1988.
factions by 1976: the so-called "Gang of Four" and the Secret Police Left. They followed Mao's thoughts and favored mass mobilization through anarchistic decentralization as a means to achieve political consciousness.

The Secret Police Left was headed by Hua Guafeng, Minister of Public Security. It included, among other persons, Wang Dongxing, head of Mao's 8341 bodyguard unit and the secret police. This group believed in the ideals of Lin Biao and "development by disciplined mass mobilization" (Fontana 1982). By 1976, through Hua's friendship with Yie Jianying, the spokesman of northern military leaders, the Secret Police Left had forged strong ties with both the Maoist Long March Veterans and the Lin Biao rump group. The Secret Police Left became known as the "Whateverists" in keeping with the statement they coined that "Whatever policy Chairman Mao decides upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions Chairman Mao issues, we shall steadfastly obey" (Hongqi, Feb 7, 1977). With the purging of the Gang of Four in 1976, some of the Cultural Revolutionary Lefts' followers allied with the Whateverists for protection.

Two other groups had formed toward the center of the political spectrum by 1976. One slightly left of center coalesced around the elderly Defense Minister, Yie Jianying. Yie's greatest strength came from his control of, and ties with, the central military apparatus. He eventually became the spokesman for many of the Northern Regional Military Commanders and their provincial backers, as well as the Long March veterans (Fontana
Yie’s main followers were senior military men who were unwilling to accept a total discrediting and abandonment of Maoist Thought, and were unwilling to abandon the military’s long-standing prestige as a political model for the population. Ye and his allies became the main supporter for Hua Guofeng, after the Whateverists were effectively eliminated in the factional conflicts with Deng Xiaoping in December 1978. Yie’s group grew increasingly dissatisfied with Deng.

Another centrist political faction appeared to coalesce around Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli. This group became known as the “Petroleum Faction” for its emphasis on the development of China’s petroleum industry. This moderately conservative group emphasized leftist economic policies and sought to promote basic industries called for in the central state plan. The petroleum faction came under strong attack by Deng Xiaoping’s group at the Fall, 1980 National People’s Congress as it stressed following a pragmatic economic policy to promote modernization. As a result of this struggle, Li was forced to retire from his position as senior vice-premier of the State Council, and Yu Qiuli was demoted from his position as director of the Commission of State Planning.

Finally, there were two loose confederations on China’s political “right.” One was made up of Southern Military-Provincial Groups associated with the political boss, Wei Guoqing, of the Guangdong province, and commander Xu Shiyou, of the Canton military Region, plus a group of the “Victims of the Cultural
Revolution" whose most notable spokesman was Deng Xiaoping.

The Southern Military-Provincial Group acted as Deng’s ally until early 1979. The group’s principal concern seemed to be the funding of a modernized regional army and navy, which they believed weak and obsolete, especially in light of the ongoing danger from Vietnam. As a result of Deng’s policies calling for reductions in the military budget, and the slowing of military modernization, a split occurred in the Summer of 1980 between the Southern Military Commanders and Deng (Fontana 1982).

The other rightist group known as the "Victims of the Cultural Revolution" was made up mainly of senior Party and government cadres who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution and later rehabilitated. They were mainly a "programatic coalition." Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Zhao Ziyang were the spokesmen and leaders of this faction. It favored economic development with emphasis on modernization through heavy industrial programs, centralization, and control by the Party (Fontana 1982, 242).

Continuous factional conflict between these groups occurred in the period after Mao’s death in 1976. This factional struggle is explored in the next section.

Faction Conflicts During the Hua Guofeng’s Tenure, 1976-1980

After the ouster of the Cultural Revolutionary Lefts, "the Gang of Four" in October 1976, there was a precarious balance of
power among the different factions within the PLA until Deng
assumed the upper hand in the power struggle at the Third Plenum
of CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. The
devoted Maoist group, the Whateverists headed by Hua Guofeng
still had formidable strength in the PLA at the time of the Third
Plenum session of the CCP, although their strength had been
weakened both in the Party and the government. Hua and the
whateverists were able to hold on to power between 1976 and
December 1978 as a result of the support of Yie Jianyang and the
Northern Military Leaders. Yie and his followers supported Hua
because they were offended by the de-Maoization and reform
efforts advanced by Deng. Even some pro-Deng elements in the
military were angered by these programs, and as a result they
sided with the Whateverists (Dreyer 1984a, 1021-24). Xu Shiyou,
one of the leading Southern Military Commanders was a case in
point.

In the Fall of 1976 when Hua’s tenure as General Secretary
of the Party and Chairman of the Party’s CMC began, Hua’s group
had a number of major advantages. His coalition had predominant
control of the Politburo and thus over Party decisions. Also he
had gained the support of Yie Yianying and the Northern Military
Leaders, and the leftist Party cadres depended on him to defend
the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, keeping peace between
these disparate allies in the Party and central government forced
Hua to continuously maneuver to keep power. With the cooperation
of Wang Dongxing, a leader among Mao’s former bodyguards,
the military members of the Whateverists forced Hua to pledge not to change their military organizations, subordinate units, and cadres, and not to attack the Cultural Revolution (Central Daily News, March 30 1977, 3).

Hua also had to attempt to meet demands from Yie and the Northern Military Commanders, as well as the rump group of Lin Biao sympathizers. Support from Yie and the Northern Military depended mainly on Hua’s ability to meet their demands for additional military funding. Providing the additional military funding demanded by these groups was almost impossible because of the demands created by Hua’s ambitious agricultural programs and his investments in industry to improve the standard of living. Only a limited amount of funds were available for Hua to disburse to the military, and competition between the Northern and Southern Military arose over these limited funds. Hua, as a result, won no political capital from either of the military groups. Furthermore, it was difficult to compromise the ideological differences between the various factional groups in Hua’s coalition over what stance to take toward the Soviet Union.

The Petroleum Faction of Li Xiannian and Yu Quili favored central planning and heavy industry. Their position clearly clashed with Hua and the Whateverists who favored investments in agriculture and the expansion of light industry and consumer markets. These differences were used by Deng and his allies as a means of preventing the Petroleum faction from allying with Hua and to gain the faction’s support for himself. For instance,
Deng and his allies openly sided with the Petroleum Faction in economic discussions. At the Dazhei Conference in late 1976, they virtually ignored Hua’s agriculture-oriented proposals and instead focused on the petroleum-oriented proposals (Fontana 1982, 248). In this fashion, they sought to encourage and strengthen the Petroleum Faction to make their own demands within the Politburo.

While Hua was distracted by his attempts to maneuver fragile compromises within the government and the Politburo, Deng’s allies were free to work actively in the provinces. Hua was apparently so concerned with holding his coalition’s control at the center that he was unable to stop Deng and his allies’ expansion of influence and power in the provinces and in the state apparatus.

Deng’s actions in the provinces were to undermine, weaken, and purge Hua’s allies and to replace them with his own supporters. His attacks included a call for the removal of Qiao Guanhua for his “sins of association” with I Chai-chu, one of the first critics of Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution. Also he attacked Wu De, who had been responsible for Deng’s downfall in 1976.

Deng’s attack in the provinces was also a campaign to rehabilitate and reinstate previously purged cadres. By 1979 in Guangdong alone more than 40,000 basis level rural area cadres had been rehabilitated after unjust treatment during the Cultural Revolution (Bonavia 1979, 27). Many of these rehabilitated party
members identified with Deng, himself a rehabilitated party member from the Mao era.

Deng also undertook a program to reshuffle regional military commanders. In part this was to strengthen his own position by placing his supporters in key positions, but also it was an attempt to weaken the political power of regional commanders in order to strengthen Party control. He was able to move eight commanders and five Political Commissars of military regions in 1980 at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee (L. Chu 1980, 52-61). Later, in 1982, a total of 10 to 15 percent of military cadres at or above the divisional level were forced to retire (Kulkarui 1983, 20).

The turning point in Hua’s struggle to hold on to the control of power came in the Third Plenum of the CCP in December, 1978. At this meeting, the Whateverists were effectively eliminated, and their most powerful leaders were stripped of influential jobs (Nethercut 1982, 693). Hua nominally continued to hold the post of General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Party’s CMC until 1980, when he was forced to resign.

The Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in late June 1981 announced the appointments of Hu Yaobang as Party General Secretary and Deng Xiaoping as Chairman of the Party’s Military Commission. Deng in effect became the power holder in the PRC (Nethercut 1982).

In sum, politics in the PRC from 1976 to 1979 was characterized by conflict and coalitions among six major factions.
Each of the factions to gain power, sought allies with which they could coalesce. These fragile coalitions required compromises which at times were impossible. When compromise failed, so did the coalition. Hua's coalition made up of such diverse factions as Whateverists, Northern Military Leaders, and Petroleum Faction attempted to make the impossible compromises required for keeping power. When this failed, Hua and his coalitions lost power and were replaced by Deng and his coalition. Deng's coalition was made up of equally diverse factions consisting of Southern Military Commanders, Petroleum Faction and rehabilitated Party cadres. Hua and Deng, each with his allies, conflicted in a highly ideological environment for political power to control the policies in the PRC during the 1970s.

By 1980, after Deng had defeated Hua and his supporters, Chinese politics changed. The former six loosely bound factions merged into two ideological factions which proposed conflicting policies. This change in China's politics is considered next.

The New Factional Politics Since Deng Xiaoping

In the new politics following the fall of Hua and the ascent of Deng, there are two broad factions (see figure 4). Those opposing Deng and his supporters are usually called the ideologically orthodox group or the military conservatives/traditionalists. Ideologically, this group is akin to the ideas of the political left of Mao. The other faction, Deng and his sup-
porters are called pragmatists or reform group. Although these
two factions at times do openly face one another on issues, at
other times groups within the Party and the PLA divide across
institutions and issues.

The military, for instance, on some issues splits along
professional and political lines, each of which is supported by
different segments of the armed forces (Joffe 1987a). These
segments can also be roughly classified into two broad groups.
One group consists of professional officers, whose main interest
has been the modernization of the PLA. They support Deng's
military professionalization and tend to stay out of politics.
The second group consists of senior military leaders and conserva-
tives centered in the GPD and its subordinate organs, who
gathered around Yie Jianying and acted primarily in their
capacity as national figures. This group often has intruded into
political affairs and spoken out against Deng's national reforms
(Joffe 1987a, 170).

To understand the issues which have dominated politics since
Deng took power, it is essential first to examine how Deng's
career helped shape his views and politics. Deng Xiaoping was a
popular wartime leader during the revolutionary period, the
Political Commissar of the Second Field Army, and the Political
Commissar of the Southwest Military Region after 1949. As
General Secretary of the CCP from 1954 to 1966, Deng was in-
timately involved in party-military affairs, and presumably was a
key member of the unpublicized Control Group of the Party's
Military Commission in this period (Nethercut 1982). After his ouster from all posts in 1966, Deng’s return to power in 1973 was reportedly due in good measure to Mao’s concern over the PLA’s loyalty in the wake of the Lin Biao affair of September 1971. In this period, Deng acted for ailing premier Zhou Enlai in the whole range of Party and governmental affairs. In January 1975, he was named PLA Chief of Staff and appointed to the Party’s CMC as Chief of Staff. He convened a military work conference in 1975 at which he prescribed guidelines for party-military relations and pledged to modernize the PLA, noting that modern war meant fighting a "war of steel" (Hongqi, no. 8, 1976). Deng also stated that a modern PLA should withdraw from politics and revert to a strictly military role.

Deng was again stripped of his Party and government posts by Mao in April 1976. Deng’s supporters in the military (primarily Politburo member Yie Jianying and the Southern Military leaders Wei Guoqing, and Xu Shiyou) rallied to his support, and he was given sanctuary in South China. Wei Guoqing and Xu Shiyou, the Southern Regional Military Commanders, permitted Deng to associate freely with his purged colleagues and followers throughout the South. Concurrently, these Southern Military leaders applied strong pressure on Hua to bring about Deng’s second rehabilitation. In July 1977, one month after his second rehabilitation, Deng resumed his position as PLA Chief of Staff and was appointed as a Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee’s Military Commission. Deng resigned as Chief of Staff but
retained his post on the Party's CMC in early 1980.

Deng sought to consolidate his influence in the PLA after his return to power as Chief of Staff and as Vice Chairman of the Party's CMC. He moved pro-Deng elements into leading military positions by reshuffling leadership personnel, promoting structural reforms in the PLA so as to strengthen the Party's leadership over it, and strengthened political education for the military to make sure that soldiers assumed the same political stand as the Party Central Committee headed by the reformists.

Conflicts Over Policy Issues During Deng's Era

It is difficult to identify precisely the issues and the players in the leadership conflicts over China's military policy during Deng's era. The Party and the PLA have not always faced each other as separate entities, because in most instances groups within the party and the PLA create groupings that cut across institutional boundaries. The intensity of the division among factions depends on how vital the issue is to various players. Also contending factions often change on different issues, and the various factions themselves may modify their policy positions in accordance with developments.

Despite the difficulty of identifying groups and issues in this political process, there is a solid basis of information about Deng's policy proposals and the conflict over these issues and policy differences. The factional conflicts in the military
over Deng's policies can be seen in at least six major issues, namely, (1) the issue of changing military leaders' positions, (2) the reevaluation of Mao and Maoism, (3) the construction of the "Socialist Spiritual Civilization," (4) the Bai Hua Incident, (5) criticisms of the Party's economic policies, and (6) "Three supports and two militaries."

The Issue of Changing Military Leaders' Positions

The issue of reshuffling positions of military leaders was received with mixed reactions. Those favoring Deng in the military, the ones most likely to benefit in such moves, supported Deng's policy, while those opposing Deng saw the action as an attack upon the military.

Shortly after his second rehabilitation and return to his military office in 1977, Deng, in his capacity as General Chief of Staff, began to make a series of moves to reshuffle the leadership and exchange cadres between different units (Deng 1984, 73). He attempted to eliminate dissidents from all significant posts, while strengthening his position (Deng 1984, 89). He succeeded by 1980 in reshuffling those commanders and political commissars of military regions who opposed him (L. Chu 1980, 52-61).

Some of the followers of the Gang of Four not only were forced out of the military by Deng but also were purged from the Party (P. Ho 1978, 25-6). Deng did not purge followers of Mao because of strong opposition by Hua Guofeng, the General Secreta-
ry of the CCP and Chairman of the CMC, and Yie Jianying, a leading conservative in the army. Hua tried his best to draw the pro-Maoist military over to his side in order to cope with Deng. Yie Jianying and the military conservatives opposed Deng's consolidation since many of them were threatened by such moves, and they insisted on following the Maoist way of army-building.

Following the CCP's Twelfth National Congress in 1982, Deng launched a second all-out military consolidation movement. Efforts were made to replace military leaders at the central level who were not Deng's supporters. Also, commanders of the military regions and political commissars in most military regions were changed by the first half of 1983. At the provincial military district level, over four-fifths of the commanders of the provincial military districts were changed by Deng during this consolidation movement (T. Chang 1984, 68-69).

One result of these personnel changes, other than strengthening Deng's position in the PLA, was that they accentuated political divisions in the military especially in the GPD. Deng's supporters were increased, but opponents of Deng's policies, especially in the GPD, became increasingly determined in their resistance. Also, the changes of military commanders weakened the PLA's influence in the Party.

The Issues of the Evaluation of Mao Zedong and Maoism

Ideology drives much of Chinese politics. Politics in the PRC after the Gang of Four and their main allies were arrested
immediately turned to the fundamental issues of Mao and Maoism. Hua and his supporters and the conservatives surrounding Yie Jianying, who largely owed their political fortunes to Mao, remained loyal to him and insisted that his deeds and thought be followed. Such prominent figures as Hua Guofeng, Wong Dengxing, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Yonggui were included in this group. Deng Xiaoping was not among Mao’s favorites, and he could not support the group’s position of defending Mao. He and the followers such as Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Xi Zhongxun, and Yang Dezhi, asserted that Mao made serious mistakes in his later life, and that canonizing his thought was unacceptable.

Deng Xiaoping in the first “All-Army Conference on Political Work” after the Cultural Revolution (1978) took pains to reinterpret Mao, and attempted to break the dogmatism of Maoism, which was deeply rooted in the PLA. He stressed Mao’s idea of “seeking truth from facts” as the fundamental principle to be followed (Deng 1984, 127-13). His slogan that “practice is the sole criterion to test truth” implied a diminished role for Mao’s ideology, and supported his own pragmatism.

Deng’s speech did not gain enthusiastic support from the PLA. Many military leaders continued to support, either in speech or in the military newspaper, Jiefengjun Bao, a positive view of Mao’s role in the CCP, despite the Party’s derogatory evaluation resolution of Mao in 1981 (NG-Quinn 1986, 272).

Among the opponents to Deng’s criticisms of Mao were Yie Jianying, the leader of the conservative military faction, and
Hua Guofeng. Yie stated that “the immense contributions of Chairman Mao are immortal,” and he asserted that “only by strengthening revolutionaryization can we accelerate modernization.” At the same All-Army Political Work Conference in 1978, in which Deng criticized Mao, Yie took exception to Deng’s statements about Mao and claimed that “in order to win any future war against aggression we still have to rely on the magic weapon of the People’s War taught by Chairman Mao.” Yie’s views in turn were repeated by Hua Guofeng (Beijing Review, August 5, 1977, 10-14; June 23, 1978, 6-13; June 16, 1978, 6-12).

The military conservatives continued their opposition to the criticism of Mao in spite of Deng’s pronouncement. Although Yie had earlier in a major speech in October 1979 stated that the Cultural Revolution had been a disaster, thus implying that Mao had committed a major mistake, he and his conservative faction clearly favored a damage-limitation approach rather than harshly evaluating Mao. Similarly in 1979, the leftist in the military began to stress a Maoist slogan “mie zi xing wu” (eliminate bourgeois ideology and foster proletarian ideology), and the military newspaper, the Jiefangjun Bao from December 1980 to February 1981 published numerous articles expressing Maoist sentiments.

Debate between conservatives and reformers climaxed in the publication of the well-known article by Huang Kecheng in Jiefangjun Bao in April 1981. He argued that despite Mao’s mistakes, he had good intentions (Huang 1981). In a retort to
this statement, a special commentator in Renmin Ribao, a Party publication, countered that a truly "good intent" presupposes taking "consequences" into consideration. Moreover, the "well-intended" should accept sincere criticism and seek to correct mistakes (Renmin Ribao, May 27, 1981).

By 1981, the CCP, in spite of Deng's wishes, finally adopted basically a positive assessment of Mao. His "Four Basic Principles" were reasserted. A compromise seems to have been struck that the critical "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party" would be adopted, but the CCP's resolution would state that Mao's "contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes" (Beijing Review, July 6, 1981, 29). Mao's thought was also redefined to include elements of modernization desired by Deng (Fu 1981, 2-10). This compromise led to rationalizations declaring such differences as "the building of a modernized military force and the implementation of the People's War as complementing each other." Also, it was proclaimed that "many new issues different from a People's War in the past should be earnestly studied, and new ways and means to tackle them should be probed" (F. Guo 1982, 3). Mao's military thought by 1981-1982 was recast broadly and flexibly enough to accommodate even Deng's ideas of professionalization. Thus, the debate was supposedly resolved.

Ideological Conflict over the Construction of the "Socialist Spiritual Civilization"
Discontent among conservatives in the military continued over the treatment of Mao's legacy, despite the apparent compromise. They perceived that an abandonment of Maoist values in Chinese society had taken place (Joffe 1983, 1984, 1987a). They continued to criticize Deng's policies with the charge that the country was on a trend toward "bourgeois liberalism" which was having "deleterious effects on the nation's moral fibre and social discipline" (Beijing Domestic Service, April 19, 1981). Ideological conflict soon arose over two new issues, the debate on a socialist spiritual civilization and the Bai Hua's Unrequited Love incident.

The problem of how to define "socialism with Chinese characteristics," which the CCP claimed to be constructing, was complicated by the adoption of Deng's policies in 1979 providing for opening the door of China and the introduction of some "capitalist" measures to reform the economy. Controversy exploded over the ideological aspects of economic modernization. Violent debate occurred over the question of how to construct a "socialist spiritual civilization" along with the ongoing process of constructing a "material civilization." Yie Jianying in his 1979 National Day speech first raised the question. To Yie, the idea of an "advanced socialist spiritual civilization" refers to the noble and revolutionary ideals and style in education, science, and health leading to a lofty, rich and cultural life (Hongqi 1979, 10:15-16). The same ideas were repeated in a speech by Deng during the same month (1984, 180-181). The relationship

Generally, it was agreed that material civilization does not cause--but only supports--spiritual civilization. Further, it was argued that ideological aspects which are essential to the spiritual civilization in turn promote the building of material civilization (Q. Hu 1981, 15). The true purpose of this ideological quibbling apparently was to criticize Deng’s emphasis on modernization.

On the eve of the Party Congress in August, 1982, this issue became the means of launching a major assault on Deng’s policies. Zhao Yiyu published an explosive article entitled "Communist Ideology Is the Core of Socialist Civilization," in the military newspaper in Shanghai, Jiefang Ribao. He strongly criticized the overemphasis on material progress at the expense of communist ideology, repeating criticisms of the old-time themes of "redness" versus "expertise," under the new slogan of "socialist spiritual civilization" versus "capitalist civilization." He asserted that the nature of civilization was based on class, not culture (including education and science), which are bourgeois in nature. He also condemned "some comrades" for ignoring socialism, and "blurring" the distinction between "capitalist and socialist civilizations." He stated that while "we want to learn the advanced scientific and technological achievements of the capitalist world, we...cannot copy them blindly and mechanically,"
still less praise them in extravagant terms" (Jiefang Ribao, August 28, 1982).

A rebuttal to Zhao's article was published a month later in the military newspaper, Jiefang Junbao, in Beijing, arguing that the concrete substance of civilization--general knowledge, mathematics, the physical sciences, public health and sports, etc--are not of a class nature. Class analysis should not be abused or applied to all aspect of culture, knowledge, or social behavior. The intellectual fruits of the capitalist class should be critically examined before adopting them. Furthermore, the rebuttal took Zhao Yiyu's article to be evidence of leftist influence in the army, and it asserted that the absolute leadership of the Party must be upheld (Zheng Ming, 1982 November: 78-82). This whole episode suggests that there were elements in the military who saw themselves as playing a special political role of upholding the Maoist tradition.

One month later, Wei Guoqing was dismissed from the Directorship of the GPD, which was responsible for the paper. His replacement, Yu Qiuli, was a Deng supporter. Five regional commanders also were dismissed along with Wei (Lee 1983, 108-112). The newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, published a lengthy self-criticism. A three-year Party rectification campaign also was launched by Deng (Beijing Review, October 17, 1983:I-XII), which was extensively applied to the military (Renmin Ribao, July 10, 1984, 5; August 21, 1984, 1; December 5, 1984, 1).
Ideological Conflict over the Bai Hua Incident

The Bai Hua incident was another ideological issue which the military related to the evaluation of Mao's legacy. Bai Hua was the writer of the film script Unrequited Love, published in 1979. He was a prominent intellectual who worked for a PLA unit in the Wuhan Military Region. In this script, a provocative question was posed, "You love this country of ours...but does this government love you?" His script was a bitter portrayal of a patriotic young artist who was hounded to death by radical leftists, and it was a stinging indictment of the Cultural Revolution.

This script was published at the same time debate over the evaluation of Mao's role was approaching a climax, and so conservatives in the military were very sensitive to any thing that criticized Mao's legacy. The script might have been interpreted to favor the victims of the Cultural Revolution, such as Deng and Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Party. The military was incensed and indicted it as reflecting a trend toward "bourgeois liberalism" and for damaging military morale and discipline. The military's persistent criticism, and perhaps fear that other intellectuals might follow in Bai's footsteps, led the Party to criticize the script in the fall of 1981 for its "anti-Party, anti-Socialist" content.

This issue conflict demonstrates how conservative elements in the military were able to harass Party leaders. Even though Deng had a firm hold on power at this time, these ideological issues forced him to accede to the wishes of his political
opponents in the military.

Issues Over Economic Policies

Conflict over economic issues have raged between the groups of reformers and the traditionalists/conservatives even before Deng became the paramount power holder, and it is reflected in the factions within the military. Debate over priorities of China's economy is complicated, first by the fact that various groups associated with the present two factions in China's politics propose different prioritizations of economic goals from each other. Furthermore, there is a division over how to pursue economic goals. Leftist economic policies is seen as the best way to modernize by traditionalists/conservatives, while reformers/pragmatists propose a more pragmatic economic approach, even to using some aspects of capitalism.

Policy conflicts over economics from 1977 to 1980 appear to have been polarized between the reformist group and the conservative group, including the Petroleum Faction, which included Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Kang Shi-en and Song Zhenming. The reformists including Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and Yao Yilin, were committed to market principle of promotion of light industry, consumerism, and drastic reforms of rural agricultural policy. The conservatives, on the other hand, favored leftist economics, mass mobilization, and centralism to implement economic mobilization, and they favored promotion of heavy and capital industry.
Economic policy is of vital concern to the military. Ensuring a sound economy and promoting steady economic development is essential for developing a modernized army in the PRC. Industrial and scientific policies are of particular importance to the military industry. Heavy industry produces the equipment that the army needs if it is to modernize, while the scientific establishment provides the basis for research and development of new weapon systems. As a result, professional officers have opposed not only leftist policies, such as the Great Leap Forward, that sacrifice economic rationality and scientific development for the sake of ideological goals, but also rightist reforms, such as those undertaken in the early 1980s, that assigned lower priority to heavy industry than for consumer goods (Harding, 1987b, 234).

When Deng became the paramount power holder in 1981, he introduced a series of economic policies to promote modernization, much of which had been earlier supported by Zhou Enlai and Hua Guofeng. These economic policies had been developed in numerous national conferences since 1977. They called for the all-around modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense so that the PRC’s economy could come to the forefront of world economy over a ten year period. Deng stressed opening China to world trade and adopting of a more pragmatic, almost a market-style economy. Politically, he still emphasized centralized control over the economy, although he granted greater freedom for academicians and intellectuals.
Ideology is always a part of economics in China. The Party's economic policies under Deng were viewed by his opponents in the military as another manifestation of the departure from socialist values, leading to moral laxity and corruption (Beijing Domestic Service, March 27, 1981). The Party's pragmatic policy of decentralizing agricultural production down to the family level was one target of military criticism (FBIS, February 18, 1981, 1). Agricultural issues were very important to the troops since the PLA recruited mainly from the countryside. As a result, the PLA has opposed Deng's new agricultural program on the grounds that remunerations according to production will punish those peasant families whose sons, the strongest members of a family, join the army and are away serving on military duty. Others objected on more practical grounds, expressing their fears that the new agricultural system would disrupt PLA recruitment and troop morale (XH, April 5, 1981). These kinds of divisive issue constantly have fed the military's opposition to Deng's modernization program.

The military generally has supported Deng's economic reforms, since the reforms tended to stress such values as modernization and professionalization, which the military also favored. They even tolerated the liberalization in opening China to Western influences, since it too supported these values. Deng's lowering of the military's place in his modernization priorities, however, created increased resistance in the army. Deng's prioritization for modernization called for emphasis to be given
to economics, rather than national defense. Furthermore, many of his economic programs required the military to be reduced in order to free up monies for other purposes. All of these actions were received with mixed reactions by the PLA.

The division in the military over Deng’s modernization policies occurred along the professional-political line. Those aspiring to professionalize the military accepted Deng’s policies, even the reduction in size, forced retirements, and the lowering of military pay without difficulty. They saw the goal of the military becoming a professional force worthy of these sacrifices. To the more politically-oriented in the military, Deng’s policies were wrong and an attack upon their interests. This professional-political split in the military resulted in continued sniping of the GPD against Deng’s reforms.

Military Intervention: “Three Supports and Two Militaries”

The issue regarding the military’s intervention into politics during the Cultural Revolution festered throughout Deng’s era. During the Cultural Revolution Mao ordered the PLA to intervene in the power struggle to help seize power from the Liu-Deng faction. The slogan “Three supports and two militaries” was used to mobilize the military during this period. It referred to supporting Mao’s followers, the Left, industry and agriculture, while at the same time the military was to ensure order and conduct political training of Mao’s thought. The PLA’s intervention in politics resulted in increasing military-civilian con-
flict and helped to undermine social and political staability.

After Deng became China's paramount power-holder, one of his prime aims was to complete the withdrawal of the PLA from politics and to reassert political control over it. The role of the PLA in society was not only to be redefined but also restricted. To destroy the rationale for the initial entry of the PLA into politics, Deng sought to discredit the Cultural Revolution.

Since the PLA was extensively used in the Cultural Revolution, it was difficult to criticize the policy of intervention, without attacking the military leaders involved in these actions. Some high-ranking military leaders, most prominently Yie Jianying, not only participated in the intervention but were identified with Maoist leadership to one degree or another. Vast numbers of field officers also took an active part in implementing the policy of intervention. Thus, a general condemnation of this policy would reflect on the personal status of these leaders and officers and damage the prestige of the PLA (Joffe 1987a, 155). An outright negation of the PLA's intervention would have been tantamount to a negation of the right of the military, which obviously would arouse strong resistance from the PLA.

Recognition of the sensitive nature of this issue caused Deng to assume a compromising attitude toward this policy. His compromising attitude can be viewed from his talks with military personnel in the GPD in March 1981:

*We must say two things. First, that at the time it was correct for the army to go to the civilian units and deal with the situations there, which otherwise would have been uncontrollable. So the "three supporta and two militaries"
did prove useful. But second, they also did great harm to
the army, for in their wake they brought many bad things
that greatly detracted from the army's prestige. Among other
things, they were responsible for much of the factionalism
and some "left" notions and practice (Deng 1984, 358).

Deng's compromising attitude in these discussions also was
reflected in the actions at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh
Central Committee at the end of June 1981, where the policy of
military intervention was considered as a necessary action in
handling the chaos. Reports of the meeting state that "It played
a positive role in stabilizing the situation, but it also produc-
ed some negative consequences" (Beijing Review, July 6, 1981,
22).

Heated debate over the issue of military intervention arose
again in the spring of 1984 when the leadership announced a
three-year rectification drive of the Party organization to
remove the still existing pernicious influence of the Cultural
Revolution (Beijing Domestic Service, September 2, 1984). The
Party's Central Military Commission concluded that "it was
essential to totally negate the Cultural Revolution" (Renmin
Ribao, December 5, 1984). The official Party newspaper, Renmin
Ribao further added that "All factions in the Great Cultural
Revolution were wrong. Hence, "Supporting the Left" in carrying
out "three supports and two militaries" was wrong since it
supported a particular faction" (Renmin Ribao, May 20, 1984). "To
thoroughly eliminate factionalism," another Party newspaper
concluded, "it is necessary thoroughly to negate the Cultural
Revolution. Without thoroughly negating the 'Great Cultural
By 1985, the issue of military intervention during the Cultural Revolution no longer divided the military. The combined effects of the rectification campaigns and personnel changes had lessened the ideological conflict over this issue. Meanwhile, the retirement of Yie Jianging both removed the main focus for dissent in the PLA and deprived the dissidents of a voice in the Politburo. Although the ideological differences represented in this issue were muted, the full force of ideological division is ever present in the PRC, and Chinese Party and military leaders must be cognizant of the power of such issues.

The PLA and the Factional Struggle in the Tiananmen Incident

The indecisiveness of both the Party and the military at the beginning of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, reflected the deep divisions in the society over the nature and extent of reform. In spite of the muting of ideological conflicts between the conservatives and reformers in the late 1980s and the changes in members and issues in these factional groupings, difference over the nature and extent of reforms continued to divide the PRC. Evidence of this controversy can be seen even within Deng’s leadership circle. One group, the reformers maintained in general that the solution to China’s problems lay in the im-
plementation of more reforms. The conservative group, on the other hand, argued that reform had gone too far, too fast, and they urged reasserting party control. Generally, they favored more reliance on central planning and opposed the creation of clear lines of demarcation between the Party, the PLA, and the government. They also were less willing to tolerate Western political, social, and literary influences that accompanied Deng’s modernization programs.

The division between reformers and conservatives was evident in both the Party and the military. In the Politburo, the five member Standing Committee, which represents the Party’s power center, was split between reformers and conservatives. The General Secretary, Zhao Ziyin and Hu Qili represented the reformers, and Premier Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin the conservatives.

This division was reflected also in the military. The Permanent Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General of the CMC, Yang Shangkun was the leader of the military’s conservative faction. Since Yang was in fact responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the military, he was able to build a loyalty network among the upper echelons of the military, which was often called "the Yang family generals." This "family" further was strengthened by the fact that his younger brother, Yang Baibing served as head of the General Political Department and his brother-in-law was the head of the General Staff Department. He thus had loyal supporters at the head of two of the three general departments of the PLA. The
military conservatives, in addition to opposing many of the economic reforms, also were distressed over the sharp deterioration of the PLA's prestige, the reduction in salaries, the cutting of the military budget, and the military's lower status in society.

These divisions in the Party and the military help to explain the initial indecisiveness towards the demonstration at Tiananmen Square. The students themselves represented the reformer mentality that what was needed was still more reforms. There is little wonder that the reformers in the Party and military tended to sympathize with the demonstrators, while the conservatives did not.

There was dissention in the top ranks of the Party over the question of how to handle the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. In the Politburo, the reformists Zhao Ziyang and his allies urged a policy of accommodation, while Deng and Yang Shangkun, the conservatives, demanded a hard line. With the Party leadership divided, it was not surprising that the military leadership was divided as well.

The split in the Standing Committee of the Politburo was reflected in the military. Supporting the reformers in the military was Qin Jiwei, who before being named Minister of Defense, had been commander of the Beijing Military Region for the preceding decades. This helps explain why the 38th Army—which was under the command of the Beijing Military Region—was reluctant to move against the demonstrators in the Tiananmen
The conflict between the reformers and conservatives over what actions to take raged even within the CCP itself. Deng and the conservatives ultimately prevailed, and martial law was imposed. The conservatives in the CCP saw the student demonstrations from a Maoist viewpoint. They thought that a contradiction in society involving counterrevolutionaries had developed, endangering the Party's ruling authority which called for military action. Furthermore, Deng and his conservative followers believed that the problem came from within the Party by those who intended to use the mass protest as a means of preparing for a coup. The General Secretary of the Party, Zhao Ziyang, a reformer sympathetic to the student demands was seen by the conservatives as a most likely instigator of a coup against Deng. Deng expressed these ideas in a speech in early May, when he said: "We cannot retreat, the problem comes from within the Party, and martial law must be imposed. We must prepare for a nationwide struggle" (S. Pen 1989, 1-5).

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, the factional alignment within the Party was completely altered. Conservatives became dominant, and reformers, many of whom originally were Deng's supporters, lost power. Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the Party and a leading reformer, was removed from office and replaced by Jiang Zemin, a conservative supporter of Deng. As General Secretary of the Party, Jiang also became the head of the CMC after Deng resigned in 1989. The tradition begun by
Chairman Mao and followed by his immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, of holding both posts over the Party and the Military was thus continued by Jiang.

The Politburo also reflected the new dominance of the conservative faction. New members acceptable to Deng were appointed to the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo to replace the pro-reform members. None of these had direct ties to the military. The new members were former Shanghai Party chief Jiang Zemin, Party Organization Department Chief Song Ping, and former Mayor of Tianjin Li Ruishuan.

The PLA also was significantly changed after the Tiananmen incident. Deng had attempted to take the PLA out of politics, and had succeeded to a great degree of lessening the PLA's political power. This change as a result of the Tiananmen incident. The military had been called to save the Party and as a result it gained a new role.

The PLA's action, rather than strengthening the interests of the military as a whole, strengthened the power of the conservative faction of the military. The conservative faction, existed in the military, Party, and government, with interlocking membership between the military and other institutions in the PRC. As a result, conservatives gained political power and largely controlled decision making.
Significance of Factional Politics and Party-Military Relations

Factional politics is one of the most significant factors indicating changes in party-military relations, and it must be considered to understand party-military relations in the PRC. Factional politics has continued to dominate Chinese politics throughout the post-Mao period. The military in the PRC does not act as a single autonomous bureaucratic interest. Rather, different factions tend to reflect the differences within the military and to take different positions on various issues. As a result, rather than having confrontational politics between the military and the Party, the various groups within the military and Party intertwine and tend to build coalitions on various issues (Dreyer 1985). Boundaries between the Party and the military are quite indistinct since party members are in the army, members of the military serve in the Party. Virtually all high ranking Chinese military leaders are also leaders in the CCP.

The intimacy of military factions and political leaders has a great impact on the politics of the country, as well as on party-military relations. For one thing, the military plays a vital role in the succession of political leaders. After the death of Mao, the military's action in arresting the Gang of Four made possible the selection of Hua Guofeng. Similarly, later the selection of Deng Xiaoping depended upon support of the Southern
Military Commanders. The military, in effect, always affects political succession in the PRC because of their status and position.

The military also plays a major role in shaping national policies. For instance, enactment of Deng's policies of national reform depended on the support of military leaders, who were desirous of creating a modern, professional army. Often time, different military factions attempt to influence different policy agendas. The leadership in these cases is forced to compromise over certain issues with the various military factions, as Deng was forced to compromise with the conservative military faction centered in the GPD and led by Ye Jianying.

Military factions also are the main opposition speaking out on various issues. For instance, the main source of opposition to many of Deng's policies in the early 1980s pertaining to the modernization and professionalization of the military came from the GPD. Opposition of the conservative military groups to the rate of change and reform became a major issue before and during the Tiananmen incident. Frequently, the military group's opposition is clothed in ideological terms, making it very effective since ideology is so strong in Chinese society.

The intertwining of Party and military factions has greatly influenced party-military relations in the post-Mao period. It has helped reduce conflict between the military and the Party, since military politics is conducted through coalition rather than being confrontational in nature. For instance, Deng's
attempt to reduce the military's political influence and to remove it from politics did not result in open conflict pitting the institution of the military against the Party because he was successful in pacifying those military factions desiring to modernize and professionalize the military. The only opposition he faced, therefore, was from the conservative faction in the military which desired to maintain a revolutionary rather than a professional army.

Despite these positive aspects of factional politics in the PRC, the lack of institutionalized organizations and regularized rules and procedures presents major problems to the political system. The importance of various groups varies in time and fluctuates according to issues and events. Group tension permeates the political arena, particularly when ideology intensifies policy disputes or functional institutions are being weakened. The intense political conflict during Hua's tenure is an example of how group tensions permeated the political arena as functional institutions were weakening. On the other hand, when institutional development became stronger, the level of group conflict subsided, or at least is replaced by a more institutionalized pattern of group behavior. Deng's tenure in the late 1980s before the Tiananmen incident is an example of such conditions. As a result, Deng had a degree of success in lessening the political role of the military.

After Deng became China's paramount power-holder, he made an effort to institutionalize the political and military structures
by withdrawing the PLA from politics and reasserting political control over it. He was able to overcome conflict in the military primarily by limiting the scope to those not included in the professional officers' ranks. The professional officers supported Deng, since they understood that his modernization policies were essential to building a modern army. This understanding formed the basis for Party military co-operation in Deng era, which made it possible to carry a program of military modernization.

The problem of not having a strong institutionalized political system was clearly demonstrated in the Tiananmen incident. Political tension dominated the decision centers, undoing much of the progress that had been made in the years of Deng's rule. The military again became a major actor in Chinese politics, if not the dominant actor. In the next chapter, the nature of party-military relations today are examined.

Factional politics was the dominant theme of the literature on the party-military relations during Hua's period immediately following Mao's death. During Deng's era, less attention was given to factional politics reflecting the change in politics and the nature of the party-military relations. Following the Tiananmen Incident, there was an increase in the articles discussing factional politics. The trend in discussions about factional politics seems to be a good indicator of change in the party-military relations.
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CHAPTER VIII

NATURE OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PRC:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study sought to describe and explain the dynamics of party-military relations in the PRC after Mao. The primary purpose was to discover the changes which occurred in the relations between the Party and the military in the period. The following questions were addressed about these changes: Is there a party (civilian) supremacy or military dominance? What roles does each play? Are they cooperative or conflicting, or is there a mixture of cooperation and conflict? And, what factors best explain the modifications in the party-military relations in the post-Mao period?

Albright's work on civil-military relations in communist countries provides a list of ten variables influencing civil-military relations (1980). From these, the researcher identified six factors which were deemed significant in party-military relations in the PRC. These factors were looked for in the survey of literature from the post-Mao period.

In an attempt to develop a means of using these factors in a qualitative content analysis of relevant literature of the period, a number of questions were developed about each factor. These questions enabled the researcher to identify factors
affecting party-military relations during the period. A ranking of these factors was made from the notes taken in this process in an attempt to identify changes in party-military relations in the period since Mao's death. A second ranking, based upon the researcher's interpretation of materials in the period, was then made to help explain the three different patterns of party-military relations which evolved in this period. Finally, the utility of the methodology used was evaluated, and recommendations for additional research were made.

Party-Military Relations in the PRC
since Mao: Findings

First Finding  The main purpose of this dissertation was to describe and explain the dynamics of party-military relations in the PRC after Mao. According to communist doctrine, party-military relations have a distinctive or characteristic nature since the party constantly is in control of the military. In the PRC during the years since Mao, it was found that party-military relations went through three distinct stages during these years.

In the first period immediately after Mao's death, the military was intensely involved in politics through various factions, as it had been during the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the military, by its action in arresting the Gang of Four, enabled Hua to become the power holder. In a sense, the military participated in a palace coup in favor of one political faction.
On the continuum proposed by the PLA Watcher between control and influence, the PLA would be ranked nearer intervention in this first post-Mao period. Throughout this period, various party-military factions also conflicted over the ideological position to take about Mao's place in history and the Cultural Revolution, as well as policies generally. In this period although the military was not as dominant as it had been during the Cultural Revolution, it was heavily involved in factional politics and the relations between the Party and the military tended to be more toward the conflictual pole of the continuum.

In the second post-Mao period, such factions in the military as the Southern Military Commanders grew disenchanted with Hua when he failed to fulfill their desire for additional funding to improve the regional armed forces. In turn, they coalesced with Deng and his allies in taking power away from Hua. With Deng's success, the military again had affected the succession of the political leader of the PRC. If the army was not dominant over the Party, at least its involvement in politics greatly affected Chinese politics and party-military relations.

Deng's emphasis on modernization and professionalization of the military struck a responsive cord among many military commanders desirous of a professional status, and enabled Deng to carry out his program to reduce the military's influence in politics. During Deng's reign, party-military relations were quite different, and the military lost considerable political influence. Policies, rather than factions, tended to dominate
party-military relations during these years, and the relations tended to be more cooperative than in Hua’s era. On the PLA Watcher’s continuum (1990), the military’s participation in politics tended more toward the influence pole.

This new party-military relationship changed drastically with the crisis at Tiananmen Square, the beginning of the third post-Mao period. Immediately, the military, or at least the conservatives in the military, gained power. Reformists, who had originally coalesced around Deng, were removed, to be replaced by conservatives in the Party, the military, and the government. Ideology again became dominant, and political indoctrination was intensified throughout the military and the nation. Although no direct tie is evidenced between Deng’s retirement soon after the crisis, it might be speculated that this incident may have weakened his support, leading to his decision. On the other hand, some China watchers argue that Deng remains the de facto leader of China even today, although he is not the Party chief or Chairman of the CMC.

Since Deng’s retirement, the new power holder, Jiang Zemin, appears to be ideologically more sympathetic to the views of the conservative military faction. Although much of Deng’s economic policies to support modernization have been retained, the policies granting more freedom to academics and intellectuals were modified greatly. Relations between the Party and the military appear to have moved more towards the conflictual pole on the continuum between conflict and cooperation during the
Tiananmen incident. Also, the military appears to have gained a more dominant role in the governance of the country, and therefore, has moved toward the control pole on the control-influence continuum.

**Second Finding** Another finding about party-military relations in the post-Mao PRC pertains to the types of persons selected to be the power holders. Throughout its history, and especially in the post Mao era, all leaders need to have ties to the military. In fact, they need a military background to be acceptable to the military groups. Mao and Deng obviously fit in with this pattern. Both served with distinction in the military and retained ties with it throughout their careers. As a result of his ties with the military, Deng was able to become the power holder even without holding the post of General Secretary of the Party, which normally is required of the country’s leader since the Party is to lead the country. Deng held only the post of Chairman of the CMC while Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were officially the General Secretary of the Party at various times during Deng’s era. Despite not holding this key position, Deng was a powerful leader even after he retired from his post as Chairman of the CMC in January, 1990. Hua, on the other hand, although head of the Party and Chairman of the powerful CMC, never had complete control over the military since he lacked the necessary military background to become fully acceptable to the military. The current power holder, Jiang Zemin, also lacks a military background. Although he holds the post of General Secretary of
the Party and Chairman of the CMC, it will be interesting to see if he is capable of actually winning the full support of the military, or whether he will be like Hua—unable to ever gain full power.

The finding that powerful leaders must have a previous military background may be the reason why there are frequent calls by civilian party leaders for the Party's absolute leadership over the military. There evidently is a recognition that power to lead requires the military's whole-hearted allegiance to those in power, and the military does not give this power unless the power holder has a military background.

This observation becomes increasingly important during a period of change from a strong man leader, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who fully enjoyed the support of the military and could devote themselves mainly to party matters. A leader without military ties is much weakened, since he must devote a great deal of effort in an attempt to resolve problems with the military. During periods of succession from a strong leader, the question of the military's political role becomes a crucial issue, since the authority of new non-military leaders is threatened by lack of the military's support.

**Third Finding** The question of who is dominant in party-military relations, civilian or military, however, is difficult to answer in the PRC. For one thing, the dual-role elite system, coupled with the factional system of politics, makes separating the influence of the military or the civilian Party cadres almost
impossible. Furthermore, the lack of a strong corporate identity by the military and the factional split within the military between those desiring to professionalize, as opposed to those who prefer to keep the revolutionary character of the military, further makes it impossible to answer the question of who is dominant in these relationships.

One can see in the different periods since Mao, however, different patterns of influence in party-military relations. For instance, during Hua’s era, the military was dominant in these relations, while during much of Deng’s period, the civilian Party cadre dominated. During and after the Tiananmen incident, the military again appears to be dominant in party-military relations. Throughout all of these periods, the party-military relations appear to have been outwardly quite harmonious instead of conflictual, despite the fact that the military in several instances used its power in the factional conflict to determine who would hold power.

**Fourth Finding** Despite the seeming dominance of the military over the Party at various times, the military throughout the history of the country has remained essentially loyal to the party leadership. With few exceptions, such as Mao’s failure to obey the CCP’s order to return to Shanghai during the revolutionary period, the refusal of some units of the PLA to carry out Mao’s orders and to aid the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, and the support of some units and leaders for the student demonstration in the Tiananmen incident, the PLA has been remark-
ably loyal to the Party's leadership. As we have seen, however, the PLA has not always fully supported the leadership. For instance, during Hua's tenure (the first post-Mao period), although there was no open defiance of his orders, the Southern Military Commanders strongly supported his main opponent, Deng. Similarly, during Deng's era (the second post-Mao period), the conservative opposition in the military strongly opposed many of his economic proposals. This opposition to Deng's policies came largely from the GPD which, in theory, is the Party's watchdog in the military. As in many instances, however, the GPD demonstrates, by its actions, that it identifies with the military and lacks strong connections with the civilian party. Since the party mechanism in the military does not function entirely as it was conceived, other explanations are necessary to explain what limits the military in politics. The effect of this weakness as a check on the military by the party apparatus in the military is that national leaders must always weigh the possibility of the military either causing a succession, as it has done several times, or perhaps even defying its orders. In the Tiananmen crisis (the third post-Mao period), evidence of this concern was most noticeable.

Utility of Using Factors to Identify Change and Explain the Nature of Party-Military Relations in the Post-Mao Era

Another purpose of this study was to discover and analyze
the factors which affected party-military relations of the PRC in the post-Mao era. To accomplish this, an attempt was made to develop a means of using six factors believed to influence the nature of party-military relations to help the researcher identify changes in these relations. It was thought that these factors not only could aid in identifying changes in party-military relations but would also help to explain the nature of these relations.

As a result, the researcher prepared a series of questions about each of the factors and used them to help survey the materials. Originally, it was assumed that the factors which appeared as the dominant themes in the literature from the PRC were the ones affecting party-military relations, and thus influencing change. A ranking was made, based on the notes from the survey of the literature from the PRC, of how these factors influenced party-military relations during the tenures of Hua and Deng, and during and after the Tiananmen incident. Table 7 shows this ranking.

As can be seen, during the Hua tenure (1976-1980), the dominant theme of most of the literature pertained to the factor of factional politics. This tenure is interpreted as meaning that factional politics was the dominant factor affecting change in party-military relations. Factional politics also helped to explain the more conflictual nature of politics in his era. Similarly, the factors of military participation in the party and the dynamics of the Political Commissar System were significant
Table 7. Ranking of Factors in the Literature From the PRC Indicating Change in Party-Military Relations During the Periods of Hua, Deng, and since the Tiananmen Incident

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<td>3. Dynamics of the PCS</td>
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<td>4. Political Indoctrination</td>
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<td>5. Military Participation in the Party</td>
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Scales: 6-5, most significant; 4-3, significant; 2-1, less significant.

Themes of the literatures during this period, indicating that they too were useful for identifying change.

In Deng’s era (1981-1988) the dominant themes in the literature were about the dynamics of the Political Commissar System, military participation in the Party, and political indoctrination. Deng attempted to reduce the influence of the military as he professionalized it, and he was opposed by conservatives in the military, especially in the GPD. The differences between
Deng and the GPD generated a great number of articles. Also, numerous articles on political indoctrination in this period emphasized programs to support Deng's national reform policies.

The ranking for the period during and after the Tiananmen incident (1989-1990) shows political indoctrination as the most dominant theme in the literature. Obviously, this was a period of crisis when political indoctrination was seen as the way to ensure loyalty. Two other factors, military participation in the party and factional politics, also were significant themes in the literature. This may reflect the fact that the military was regaining political power it had lost in Deng era.

These findings indicate that the six factors were useful in identifying factors influencing change in party-military relations in the post-Mao period. The technique used is somewhat analogous to a prisoner in a dungeon who cannot see out, but periodically hears a great commotion outside. He may not know what is happening but he can identify some things, such as when they occur, if there are male or female voices, or if they sound angry or happy. With this technique, we also can tell from the literature when the changes occur, and what are the significant issues in the discussions.

The weakness with this technique is that the prisoner cannot explain what is taking place outside or what is causing it. The din of the crowd does not explain why or what is going on. This weakness appeared once the ranking of the factors identifying change was made. It was impossible to fully explain what the
nature of party-military relations were or why these changes occurred from this ranking of the themes from the literature.

The inability to answer these questions led the researcher to reconsider the basic premise of the ranking and to attempt to rank the factors upon another premise. The second ranking assumed that the dominant themes in the literature could help explain the finding that there were three different patterns of party-military relations in the period. The question was thus posed: Which of the factors best explains the change in the nature of party-military relations in each of the periods? The researcher considered the totality of the materials from all sources in each of these periods, this time more like a historian, and ranked the factors according to his reasoned interpretation as to which most significantly affected the nature of party-military relations in each period. The result of this process is shown in Table 8.

As can be seen, there are some similarities, but also some differences between the rankings in the two tables. In Hua's era, factional politics was found to be both the most dominant theme in the literature (Table 7), as well as the most significant factor thought to affect the nature of party-military relations (Table 8). Party-military relations in Hua's period were more conflictual and the military was more dominant. The three most significant factors to explain were factional politics, military participation, and dynamics of the Political Commissar System. These factors do help explain why these types
Table 8. Ranking of Factors Thought to Explain the Nature of Party-Military Relations in the Post-Mao Period Based on the Researcher’s Analysis of the Literatures

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<td>6. Factional Politics</td>
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Scales: 6-5, most significant; 4-3, significant; 2-1, less significant.

of relations developed. The factional struggles, the intense involvement of the military in politics, and the activities of the Commissars, all point to military dominance and conflictual relations. It is to be noted that there was agreement in this period between what was the dominant theme in the literature (Table 7) and the researcher’s interpretation of what best explains party-military relations in this period (Table 8).
In Deng’s era (1981-1988), when there was greater structural differentiation and functional specialization in politics, as well as greater professionalization in the military, party-military relations were more cooperative, with civilian (party) supremacy being dominant in the relations. The factors thought to be most significant in explaining these relations were historical legacy, military participation in politics, and factional politics (Table 8). Deng attempted to reduce the political influence of the military in politics, so there was great emphasis on civilian supremacy (historical legacy), while there was a de-emphasis on the military’s participation and factionalism in politics. From Deng’s emphasis, one might reason that there would be relatively less attention in articles about the factors being de-emphasized, and a greater emphasis on those factors which he was emphasizing, namely, historical legacy and civilian supremacy. This pattern was not found. As can be seen in Table 7 which reflected dominant themes in the literature, relatively little attention was given to historical legacy (civilian supremacy), and a significant amount given to the dynamics of the Political Commissar System, military participation in the Party, and political indoctrination. The struggle between Deng and the conservatives in the GPD may partially explain this inconsistency, but it points up the weakness in depending entirely upon the “din of the crowd” to explain the nature or causes of change. It also should be noted that the factors pertaining largely to the activities of the GPD, the dynamics of the Political Commissar
System, and political indoctrination were ranked as being the most significant in Table 7, but the least significant in Table 8, which is a ranking of factors thought to explain the nature of party-military relations.

During and after the Tiananmen incident (1989-1990), party-military relations changed as the military regained power in politics. The initial conflict between the military and the Party dissipated as the Party again turned to the conservatives in the military. The factors, political indoctrination, military participation in politics, and the dynamics of the Political Commissar System were ranked as the most significant factors explaining these relations. The Party was forced by the crisis to turn to the military. As a result, its participation partly explains these new relations, where the military was more dominant. Also, the crisis caused the Party to seize upon political indoctrination as a means of ensuring loyalty. Since the GPD was instrumental in ensuring the loyalty of the troops during the crisis, it again became influential in setting the tone of relations between the Party and the military. It also should be noted that the same rankings for the post-Tiananmen period were given in Table 7 as in Table 8, suggesting perhaps that when party-military relations become more conflictual, more vital issues affecting military politics and party-military relations are apt to dominate the literature, whereas in more cooperative periods, the literature may reflect single interest concerns, such as the GPD’s during Deng’s era.
In the researcher’s opinion, there is value in using the modified content analysis technique as a focus to survey a voluminous and diverse literature of a closed society such as the PRC, and it is helpful to rank factors identifying change and explaining the nature of the change. The most serious weakness of using factors to identify change influencing party-military relations and to help explain the nature of these relations is determining which factors should be used in the research. Without a conceptual framework of the country’s political, social, economic, and cultural system, one has no way of determining which factors should be considered. There is a great need for additional research in this field.

Recommendation for Research

A number of questions were raised during this study which could not be answered without additional research. These suggestions for research grew out of the inability to answer important questions about party-military relations with the factors used here.

1. The first suggestion is for additional research on how the PRC’s military and party relations are affected by having the Soviet Union with a modern army on its border. The factors used in this study do not provide insight about the impact of external threats to the country. Neither does it answer the question of how military decisions are made about perceived threats from
outside. Who is involved in preparing strategy and in planning to meet potential threats? Are both the Party and the military involved, and is the military dominant? A decision-making study on this subject would help answer these vital questions.

2. Little also is known about the workings of the all-important Central Military Commission. How decisions are made in the Party’s Central Military Commission have not been studied. Who are involved, and how do they participate are subjects we know relatively little about. There is a need for an organizational study to examine these types of questions.

3. We also know little about how military personnel interact among themselves. There is need for research to answer the following kinds of questions: (1) How do age and generational differences influence their interactions and decisions? (2) What is the current relationship between political commissars and military commanders within the PLA? (3) How significant are regional schisms in the military as well as the nation? (4) What are the relationships between the more professional personnel and those committed to a revolutionary army?

4. Recognition that change has occurred in party-military relations also raises the question about future changes in these relations in the PRC. Although there are major differences in how the military and party operate in the PRC and Soviet Union today, the question may be raised about future relations. Is it possible or probable that in the future, the PRC’s party-military relations will be transformed to resemble more the present
relations in the Soviet Union? Is it possible or probable that the PRC in the future no longer will use the collective decision process in the military, but move to the one-man-rule system similar to the Soviets? Can lessons be learned from changes in party-military relations in the Soviet Union which give direction in this field? This subject also needs attention.

5. One generalistic impression gained from this study is that party-military relations must be understood in the context of the entire cultural/political system of countries in which they exist. Recognition of this view points to the need to understand Chinese politics and the approaches used to study it.

Unfortunately there does not seem to be an approach to studying Chinese politics that is capable of providing an understanding of the dynamics of the military in the Party and the Party in the military, and how this relationship affects the country's politics generally.

One of the most prominent scholars of Chinese politics, Henry Harding (1984), has identified a total of eight models which have been used to explain Chinese politics, namely, structural model, normative model, Mao-in-command model, factional model, bureaucratic model, tendency model, generational model, and interest group model. Each of these models is capable of partially explaining Chinese politics and the relations of party-military relations but none provides a comprehensive approach, and most fail to perceive the unusual role of the military in politics. There is a great need for an approach to study of
politics which will integrate our understanding about the mil-
tary in Chinese society. Until the grand design of politics is
discovered, researchers must continue to use whatever tools can
be adapted to studies of various parts of this system.

To conclude this study, the researcher emphasizes again the
importance of understanding civil-military relationships in
today's world. The military plays a vital, if not dominant, role
in politics, especially in Third World and Communist nations.
Party (civil)-military relations, as a result, not only affects
the lives of nations, but also the stability of the world. The
significance of this subject makes it imperative that scholars
seek to understand these relationships and develop approaches for
understanding how change occurs.


APPENDIX

EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND HISTORICAL EVENTS
Collective Leadership in the PLA

The system of leadership where party committees in the PLA participate in all military decisions. Under collective leadership, all important matters must be discussed in party committee meetings.

The Communist International (Comintern)

An international communist organization of national parties founded in 1919 under the aegis of the Soviet Communist Party. The Comintern once ordered the Chinese Communist Party to subordinate itself to the Kuomintang, even though this almost destroyed the Chinese Communist Party in the interwar period (McCrea, Plano & Klein 1984, 314-315).

Four Fundamental Principles (Four Adherences)

A principle enunciated by Deng in 1979 as a test for political heresy. They emphasize the CCP’s continuing adherence to (1) the socialist road; (2) the people’s democratic dictatorship; (3) the CCP’s leadership; and (4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (Towaend, 1986).

Four Modernizations

A 1975 campaign proposed by Zhou Enlai identifying four general areas for development, namely (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) science and technology, and (4) national defense (Renmin Ribao, 21 January, 1975, 1).

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR/Cultural Revolution)

Mao’s political campaign launched during his last decade in power (1966-1976). It began with the purge of Mao’s political
opponents, the most turbulent phase being activities by student revolutionaries known as the Red Guards. Although an initial balance sheet was drawn at the Party’s Ninth Congress in the Spring of 1969, it was not until after the death of Mao Zedong in September of 1976 that the Revolution was officially declared terminated (Britannica 1991, vol.3, 783; Hook 1982, 291; Ziring 1985, 156).

**Great Leap Forward**

A Mao proposed campaign in 1958 to organize the population into communes to meet China’s industrial and agricultural problems. Peasants were encouraged to use their surplus labor, savings and local resources to develop labor-intensive methods of industrialization, which would emphasize manpower rather than machines for building an industrialized, developed state in one “great leap” (Britannica 1991, vol.6, 445; Ziring 1982, 303).

**Gang of Four**

An epithet used to describe four powerful supporters of Mao during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s. The group included Mao’s third wife, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan (Britannica 1991, vol.6).

**Jiangxi Soviet Area**

An area in Jiangxi province in southeastern China which was occupied by the Chinese army under the command of Zhu De and Mao Zedong in the period between the breakup of the first United Front between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1927 and the Long March in 1934-1935.
Kuomintang (KMT)

A political party founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 which governed all or part of Mainland China from 1928 to 1949, and which subsequently ruled Taiwan (the Republic of China) under Chiang Kai-shek and his successors (Britannica 1991, vol.8, 552).

Learn From the PLA

A nation-wide campaign launched by the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong on February 1, 1964 to prevent the inroad of bourgeois ideas. During the movement, the army’s Political Commissar System was used as a model to be introduced into governmental and economic organs of the nation.

Liberation War


Long March

The 6,000 mile historic trek of the Chinese Communists between 1934-1935 to escape from encirclement of the Chinese Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek, which resulted in the relocation of the Communist revolutionary base from Southeast China to Northwest China and in the emergence of Mao Zedong as the undisputed party leader.

Mao Zedong Thought

Mao’s ideology and methodology for revolution. His “Thought” represents a revolutionary method based on a distinct revolutionary outlook not necessarily dependent on a Chinese or
Marxist-Leninist context.

People’s War

Mao’s military strategy emphasizing that "it is people, not guns, that constitute the decisive factor in winning a war." Under such a strategy the enemy was to be drawn deep into China’s hinterland, and the population mobilized to engage in guerrilla warfare, which would help erode the enemy’s strength in a protracted war (Joffe 1987).

Revolutionalization

A description of the goal of the military which emphasizes the military as a tool for advancing the Communist revolution. Indoctrination of military personnel with revolutionary thoughts that would ensure proper attitudes on all important issues assuring that everyone followed the Party leadership (Bullard 1985, 24).

Red Guard

College and high school students mobilized during the Cultural Revolution by Party Chairman Mao Zedong to combat the revisionists that he felt had infiltrated the Party. Forming into paramilitary units as part of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards believed themselves to be new revolutionary rebels pledged to eliminating all remnants of the old culture in China, as well as purging all supposedly bourgeois elements within the government.

Shanghai Massacre or Shanghai coup in 1927

The decisive action taken by Chiang Kai-shek and his sup-
porters to break the Chinese Communist Party’s control of the mass movement in Shanghai and to disarm that party’s military force, the Workers’ Inspection Corps. The purge was carried out on 12 April, 1927, during which various inspection corps suppressed and hundreds of people were executed. Radical unions and other organizations were shut down, and the Chinese Communist Party was forced to move its headquarters to Hankou (Hankow).

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

A primary theme of the CCP’s task in the mid-1980s indicating a determination to maintain ideological legitimacy despite a significant departure from the Maoist model during Deng’s era. (Townsend and Womack 1986, 395).

United Front

A coalition between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (KMT) during the periods of 1924-27 and 1937-45.

Wuhan Munity (Wuhan Incident)

A military confrontation during the Cultural Revolution from July to August 1967 where the Commander of the Wuhan Military Region backed a “conservative” faction of the Red Guards rather than support the “leftist” faction of Red Guards as ordered by the regime in Beijing. This incident caused a very tense confrontation between loyalist and regional military forces (Robinson 1971; Townsend and Womack, 1986, 322-323).
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