PROSPECTS OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION: ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING NATIONAL INTEGRATION

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Koo-Hyun Kim, B.A., M.A.
Denton, Texas
December, 1992
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This study examined the prospects of Korean reunification. The study explores how the factors of integration affect North and South Korea after the country was divided into the two sides despite its millennium of unity. A sample of both North and South Korean newspapers covering a 47-year period of Korean reunificational efforts were analyzed as a major source of data to discover if there is any evidence of Korean national will to integrate among Koreans in the two countries. Content analysis is a major method of this research.

The most obvious findings of this study are that the newspapers in North Korea did not show any significant change in their tones or attitudes throughout 47-year period studied. The North Korean regime which controls what is published in the papers is still fiercely ideological and hostile toward South Korea. The South Korean papers, on the other hand, showed marked changes in their tones and attitudes toward reunification during this period.
Korean reunification remains a matter of time because the political development of South Korea, combined with remarkable economic progress, can surely heal the broken unity and national will among Koreans. The enormous financial burden to rebuild the North Korean economy which will fall upon South Koreans is a major challenge. The road to Korean reunification and the future of reunified Korea depend upon the willingness, wisdom, patience, freedom and courage of the South Koreans to assume the tremendous burden to rebuild North Korea and to strengthen diplomatic relations with the United States as well as neighboring countries to develop more positive inter-Korean relations based upon their cultural, social and economic contacts, cooperations and transactions between the two sides. If Koreans have such willingness, wisdom, patience and courage to accomplish their freedom and hope of unity, the divided Korean peninsula will be reunified and will become one nation again.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes of the Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief Description of Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies on German Reunification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies on Korean Reunification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EVOLUTION OF KOREAN NATIONALISM: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF NATION BUILDING IN KOREA</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Location Has Led to Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Unification in 668 A.D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Millennium of Korean Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>668 A.D.-1910 A.D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition between Neighboring Powers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Korea, 1885-1905</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Under Colonial Rule of Japan, 1910-1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea After World War II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EFFECTS OF THE POST WORLD WAR II DIVISION ON NATIONAL REUNIFICATION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the North and South Korean Regimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpowers' Interests and Participation in the Korean War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Animosity After the Armistice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the International Environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affecting Inter-Korean Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking to the Future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. FACTORS FAVORING INTEGRATION IN KOREA TODAY</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War and the Separation of the Korean Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing Attitudes Toward National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunification in North and South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure and Data Used in Analyzing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents of Newspapers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings From Content Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Decade After the Korean War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Decade After the Korean Way</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Decade After the Korean War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Decade After the Korean War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative Content Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dates Selected for Sampling Newspaper Articles Pertaining to Integration and Reunification</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Violent Acts by North Korea Against South Korea (1965-1975)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strategic Location of Korea</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Korea at the Height of Territory</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Area of Koguryo not Included in the Unified Korea</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Competition of Neighboring Powers Over Korea, 1895-1933</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Allied Forces Occupied Korea at the End of World War II</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Percentage of North Korean Articles on Factors of Integration</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Percentage of North Korean Newspaper Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Reunification</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Percentage of South Korean Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Integration</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Percentage of South Korean Articles on Cultural, Social, Economic, and Political Subjects</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Number of North Korean Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Reunification</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Number South Korean Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Reunification</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For the first time since the Korean War, the prime ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), also known as South Korea, met on September 5, 1990, to discuss the possible reunification of North and South Korea. Hopes of reunifying Korea abounded, and many believed that Germany's experience in reunification might be a pattern to follow. Despite high hopes, little resulted from the first meeting of the Prime Ministers. Perhaps the most positive result was that they agreed to continue the dialogue. Although hostile relations continued between the two governments, these initial discussions raised questions about reunification: To what extent were the cultures of the two Koreas integrated? Was there evidence of change in the political, social, economic, or cultural climate which might indicate the possibility of reunification of the two Koreas in the near future?

Until it fell to the Japanese in 1910, Korea had experienced a long history of being a unified independent nation. However, for 35 years, Korea had been under
Japanese rule. At the end of World War II, Korea was freed from this colonial yoke only to be divided by the victorious Allies into the present North and South Korea.

Although there has been debate over why the Allies divided Korea, in part this was due to the nature of international politics at that time (Chyung, 1984; Eckert, Lee, & Lew, 1990; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. II, 1960; FRUS, Vol. VI., 1969; Henderson, 1968; Kim, 1989; Senate Documents of the United States, Vol. 12, 1946; Whelan, 1990). The location of the Korean peninsula was vital to the Allies, because Korea was surrounded by China (PRC), the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Japan. Korea's location was also important to the United States as a major naval power in the Far Pacific Basin (Gregor & Chang, 1984). International politics as well as factors of internal integration have affected Korea's national destiny. Reunification of the two Koreas has depended on both geopolitical factors and on the degree of integration within the society. To determine the likelihood of reunification, this study has examined both of these factors.

**Purposes of the Study**

This study has examined factors which might have contributed to the political reunification of North and South Korea. Theories of national integration, inter-
dependence, and political unification guided this research. Comparisons were made of various aspects of the political, economic, social, and cultural environments of the two Koreas in order to determine the degree of integration in Korean society and to determine whether societal changes have occurred in these two countries during the past 47 years. The state of international politics has been a major factor affecting the fate of the Korean peninsula, therefore, changes in international politics which might affect the possibility of reunification have also been examined.

Significance of the Study

Understanding the integrative factors affecting national reunification of a divided country (or more than two different countries) has always been an important task of political science. This study of the possible reunification of Korea was especially timely and and potentially useful in view of the recent changes in both international and inter-Korean relations—changes that seem to be favorable to the reunification of the divided Korea: (a) the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, (b) the reunification of Germany, (c) South Korea's diplomatic normalization with many Eastern European countries, (d) the reestablishment of relationships between
South Korea and the former USSR, (e) the growing relationships between South Korea and China, (f) the acceptance of both the North Korean and the North Korean membership in the United Nations, (g) increasing economic transactions and individual contacts between North and South Koreans, and (h) the continuation of the discussions initiated by the two Prime Ministers in 1990 concerning cooperation between the governments of North Korea and South Korea.

Theories of political integration have focused largely on cultural, economic, social, and political aspects within a society. These aspects of the two Koreas have been examined to ascertain whether they have tended to grow more alike or more dissimilar during the post World War II era.

The results should be significant to scholars as well as to Korean decision makers involved in efforts to reunify the two Koreas. The study has:

1. Explored the forces of integration in the divided Korea,

2. Examined the degree of change in attitudes toward unification in the post war era, and

3. Analyzed the external and geopolitical factors affecting the integration of Korean societies.

Research Questions

To achieve the purposes of this study, these questions were formulated:
1. What political changes (internal and external) helped initiate the Prime Ministers' meetings to discuss reunification in 1990?

2. What progress toward reunification has resulted from these discussions by the Prime Ministers?

3. Have attitudinal changes occurred in the political regimes of these two countries in recent years?

4. Have there been significant increases in interactions and communications between the people in these two countries?

5. What cultural conditions have tended to foster feelings of national unity in the two Korean states?

6. What cultural conditions have hindered national unity?

7. What have been the primary obstacles to Korean reunification?

8. What possible impact would Korean reunification have on international politics in the United States, the former Soviet Union, China, East Asia, and the rest of the world?

Methodology

This study has explored factors affecting the possibility of the reunification of North Korea and South Korea. Little or no research has been done examining the cultural and geopolitical factors affecting a sense of political unity between the two Korean nations. Most
studies have viewed Korean reunification as an examination of international relations or politics. Few have attempted to analyze both the internal and external factors affecting the integration of the societies.

The methodology used was both qualitative and quantitative, because it sought to explore and to explain the complex societal processes of integration through five research processes:

1. A historical review of Korea's nation building was made in an attempt to identify factors influencing political unification in the Korean peninsula.

2. The cultural factors which helped develop a sense of nationhood during the past thirteen centuries, as well as those which hindered integration, have been explored.

3. The effects of the Japanese occupation on national unity have been considered.

4. International politics in the post World War II era, which led the division of the peninsula into two nations for more than 40 years, were examined.

5. The impact of the division of Korea on the attitudes and feelings of the Korean people was explored.

The first and perhaps the most essential step of historical research is to define the problem. According to Borg and Gall:

The essential steps involved in doing a historical research project are... define the problems or questions to be investigated, search for sources of
historical facts, summarize and evaluate the historical sources, and present the pertinent facts within an interpretive framework. . . . The search for historical facts and interpretation of these facts are not necessarily discrete, sequential phases of a historical project. (Borg & Gall, 1983, p. 803)

Korea was a unified country from 618 A.D. to 1910 and has been either a conquered province or a divided nation since 1910. The main focus in this study was to determine the societal factors influencing the feelings of kinship which are essential to the integration of a people into a nation.

Historical analysis has sought to determine how cultural, social, economic, political, and geopolitical aspects have encouraged and discouraged Korean national integration. An attempt has been made to discover whether, since the end of the Korean War, changes have occurred in public attitudes about political integration of the two Koreas. A content analysis of samples from newspapers, periodicals, speeches, and other publications from both North Korea and South Korea has been used to compare both differences and similarities in attitudes toward integration as well as to understand the changes in these attitudes during the years since World War II.

The analyses of materials published in the two Koreas were assigned positive (+) or negative (-) values to denote attitudes favorable or unfavorable toward integration and reunification throughout the period. A tally of the articles expressing both positive or negative attitudes
during different time periods has been used to indicate the trends, or changes in attitudes, toward integration. An increase in articles expressing positive attitudes was interpreted as reflecting progress toward integration and reunification, whereas an increase in articles expressing negative attitudes was interpreted as reflecting a tendency toward disintegration and separation.

Governmental documents, political writings, speeches of officials, political party platforms, and other politically motivated materials were analyzed to assess the attitudes of the regimes toward reunification. Finally, the influences of international politics on reunification were examined through a political analysis of international events affecting Korea.

Because newspapers are considered a primary factor shaping public attitudes in these countries, selected newspapers in both North Korea and South Korea were a major source of data about the Korean people's attitudes toward integration and reunification. In order to discover changes in attitudes about integration and reunification based on free Korean national will, samples of articles related to Korean reunification reported in the two newspapers in the two countries were analyzed through quantitative examination.

The samples were taken from the newspapers of the two countries across the entire period from 1945 to 1991.
Whereas four samples a year were taken from newspapers published during the early years of the period (1953-1981), a sample per month was taken from each paper published in the two countries during the later years (1982-1991).

Dates of significant historical and cultural events in the two Koreas were selected to be sampled. For example: (a) August 15, 1945, Korean liberation from Japanese colonial rule; (b) March 1, 1919, Korean people's uprising against Japanese colonial rule; (c) June 25, 1950, the beginning of the Korean War. (See Table 1.)

The papers under study for the dates sampled were surveyed to discover the number of articles expressing attitudes about integration and reunification. A comparison was made between the attitudes expressed in the papers of the two countries for these dates.

The three newspapers chosen for analysis in South Korea were: The Dong-A Ilbo (East Asia Daily Newspaper), The Chung-Ahng Ilbo (Korea Central Daily Newspaper), and The Cho-Seon Ilbo (Cho-Seon Daily Newspaper). In North Korea, The Rodong-Sinmun (Labor Newspaper), The Tong-il Sinbo, and The Pyongyang Times were chosen for analysis. All six of these newspapers were in the Yenching Library (Korea Section) at Harvard University and the Library of Congress of the United States. In addition to the data collected from these newspapers, other historical and political
**Table 1**

**Dates Selected for Sampling Newspaper Articles Pertaining to Integration and Reunification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1, every year</td>
<td>The State message to the nation by Presidents of the two Koreas</td>
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<td>August 27, 1910</td>
<td>Japan began to rule over the Korean Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1919</td>
<td>Korean people's uprising against Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1945</td>
<td>Korean Liberation from Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25, 1950</td>
<td>The beginning of the Korean War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27, 1953</td>
<td>Armistice of the Korean War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 1971</td>
<td>The first meeting of the representatives of the Red Cross Societies of the two Koreas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2, 1972</td>
<td>Lee Hu-Rak, Director of South Korean Central Intelligence Agency crossed over to North Korea for four-day discussion with Kim Il-Sung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 1972</td>
<td>North Korea's Vice Premier Park Sung-Chul visited South Korea to confer with President Park Chung-Hee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1972</td>
<td>The first formal announcement of common agreements between North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 1985</td>
<td>The First Preliminary Political Meeting between North and South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8, 1985</td>
<td>The First Exchange of Materials between the two Koreas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
information was collected from the various research centers, departments, and schools as well as from the libraries at Harvard University: (a) the Yenching Library, (b) the East Asian Language and Civilization Department, (d) the Center for International Affairs, and (e) the John F. Kennedy School of Government. The data were collected during a 17-day research visit from June 18 to July 3, 1991, as well as during an 8 day visit to the Library of Congress of the United States from June 12 to June 20, 1992. Information about international events influencing Korea was also obtained from The New York Times, The London Times, and The Washington Post, as well as from scholarly articles in various journals and books—which was then compared with the information from the samples.

Brief Description of Organization

The introduction to this study of Korean reunification has analyzed the following factors affecting the Korean peninsula:

1. The domestic social, economic, cultural, and political aspects of the two Korean societies, as well as the geopolitical factors in international politics affecting Korea have been explored. Integration processes in Korea have been studied from a historical perspective in order to discover various factors affecting the Korean society prior to the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1910.
Causes of the disintegration of Korean unity from 1910 until the Korean War have also been examined.

2. The degree of integration in Korean society has been analyzed using theories of national integration, and the forces of integration in the divided Korea have been explored.

3. The presence or absence of integrative forces have been studied from the post World War II era until the modern Korean societies were divided into North Korea and South Korea. The disintegrative aspects of the Korean War and the postwar negotiations have been reviewed. How the two Korean regimes were developed, and how they changed in ideologies from 1945 to 1991, have been examined.

4. This study reported how the division occurred, how the Korean people responded, how the North and South Korean regimes were established. Superpowers' interests and participation in the Korean War were examined. Continuing animosities between North and South Korea, as well as changes in the international environment affecting Korean reunification, were also examined.

This study has attempted to discover whether there was any evidence, among Koreans, of national will to integrate the two countries. The forced division of the Korean society after the Korean War has been examined and public attitudes toward peaceful reunification of the two countries have been assessed. Procedures and data used in
analyzing contents of newspapers have been explained. Findings taken from content analysis were examined from decade to decade.

This study concluded with an evaluation of the presence or absence of integrative forces favorable to the reunion of the divided Korea, and presented several suggestions for North and South Korean people that might further enhance and consolidate their reunion efforts.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Although political integration today has been considered a vital aspect in the study of political science, few studies on this subject were made before the beginning of the behavioral movement in the post World War period. The primary focus of political science before World War II was on historical, institutional, legal, and philosophical concerns. Vital political processes such as integration were largely ignored. The new challenges of redrawing national boundaries, creating international organizations, and promoting development and modernization during the post World War II era forced scholars to look for new ways of explaining politics and international relations.

The increasing focus of political studies in the post World War II era has been on political processes such as integration, nation-building, unification, institutionalization, political development, participation, distribution, penetration, and socialization (Al-Kahtani, 1989; Deutsch, 1953, 1970; Deutsch & Foltz, 1963; Etzioni, 1965; Haas, 1958, 1975, 1976; Keohane & Nye, 1975, 1977; Mitrany, 1943; Nye, 1968).
As a result of this new focus of political science, a number of seminal works emphasizing political processes have been written. One of the first scholars to address integration was Mitrany (1943) who discussed the need to establish an international government or system. Although Mitrany advocated development of an international organization for the purpose of achieving world peace and cooperation, he recognized that the sense of unity among nations—which had been evident during the war—could disappear once the war was over.

Mitrany also recognized that the problems of redrawing national boundaries after the war could disrupt social life in the countries involved. He proposed an approach which would take into consideration the common habits and characteristics of the people of a region. He stated that different groups' recognition of what constitutes a country, what are the deeply-rooted loyalties of the people in the country, and what social integration of the groups in the country were essential in creating national boundaries. Furthermore, a sense of integration among all nations would be necessary before an international governmental system could emerge. The vast differences between nations were seen as a major hindrance to the creation of world government. Throughout his work, Mitrany emphasized the need to understand the factors integrating people into a nation.
Communication has been essential to the creation of a sense of nationality, and a common culture has been essential to political integration:

A common culture . . . is a common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men's attention, and behavior, as well as in their thoughts and feelings. Many of these preferences may involve communication; it is usually easier for men to communicate within the same culture than across its boundaries. In so far as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a community. (Deutsch, 1953, p. 62)

In 1970, Deutsch stated that the fundamental problem of international politics was to create conditions under which stable, peaceful relations among nation states were both possible and likely. Political integration was essential if there was to develop a sense of community which could preserve peace and order. He believed that such a secure community could be attained.

1. Political amalgamation may be achieved through voluntary merging of previously independent countries into a single unitary state.

2. A union of several unitary states would require a strong sense of political integration.

Deutsch also suggested a world federal union with a federal army superior to those in the constituent states, which might have been created with a somewhat lesser sense of integration. He listed five approaches essential to the creation of a secure community:

1. Psychological role-taking dealt with integrating the world community by seeking to increase common feelings
and beliefs in the various political units, thus creating a sense of togetherness which would lead to unification.

2. Assimilation was similar to psychological role-taking because it was a learning process of different cultures throughout the world community. Deutsch used the assimilation of diverse people in the United States as an example of this process.

3. Mutual interdependence increased economic ties between countries.

4. Mutual responsiveness established lasting bonds.

5. Simple pacification encouraged people to work together in order to promote feelings of integration.

The dream of a European community also became the focus of integration studies during the post World War II era. Haas (1958) suggested that the removal of barriers to trade in Western Europe would be the first major step in developing European integration. Haas recognized that the cohesive factors essential in a state were lacking in Europe. He believed that economic integration would help European countries develop a sense of European community. New centrally made fiscal, labor, welfare, and investment policies were essential before integration could occur. The integration process, therefore, would require gradually removing the barriers between the European countries.

Nye (1968) wrote concerning an approach to conceptualizing and measuring integration. He argued that
the term integration, as used in discussions of the European Common Market, was confusing. Integration was used to describe political, economic, or social integration. Without clarification, it meant only more free trade among groups of people.

Given the ambiguity of common usage and the historiographical fact that dynamic or causal models have preceded static or measurement models in the development of the field, it is not surprising that different usages by different scholars have given rise to misunderstandings. . . . Various disputes have arisen over the relationship of economic and political integration which are partly the fault of terminology. And there is no adequate scheme for translating the concept used by one scholar into that used by another. (Nye, 1968, p. 857)

According to Nye, there was an urgent need to develop appropriate indices for measuring integration of the free and autonomous transactions between equal partners. For social integration, he suggested three societal transactions as indices: (a) trade, (b) mail and (c) tourism. Political integration, on the other hand, could be measured by polls probing the sense of a common awareness and the degree or intensity of such feelings among both the elite and the masses.

It was not until 1965 that the issue of political unification of nations was addressed in a theoretical research. Etzioni (1965) concentrated on power relations, stating that political unification evolved in competing elites' struggling over the distribution of power, and that
unification could occur only if one of the power groups could maintain order.

Etzioni stated that the process required change in member-units and in the relationships among them. It was difficult to achieve unification, however, because the various segments of society resisted change in their status. Those sub-units, whose interests were strongly endangered, resisted all attempts to unify the country. Whether a country could be unified or not depended upon the distribution of power and the mobilization of the country's power for integration.

Etzioni also asked questions about (a) the state of the various sub-units, (b) the relationships among them, (c) the factors encouraging or discouraging unification between or among these units, and (d) the distribution of power resources. He raised four questions about the conditions under which the process of unification was initiated:

1. What was the state of each of the society units that was to become a member of a particular union, and was the unit likely to resist or to support unification?

2. What was the nature of the aggregate of these units? Were most units ready to unify, or were only a few ready?

3. Were environmental factors favorable for unification?
4. What was the degree of interdependence and integration before the occurrence of specific attempts at unification?

The impetus to study integration grew out of the recognition that the world community was rapidly changing as a result of modern transportation and communication. The concept of the global village expressed this change. Keohane and Nye (1977) recognized the need to consider the growing interdependence of peoples and of nations. All transactions through mail, trade, tourism, student exchange as well as shared television and radio programs increased the level of social contacts and added to the interdependence. Keohane and Nye pointed out that Eastern European governments were not able to prevent their younger generations from imitating the aspects of Western culture. Those governments failed in controlling their people largely because of people's increased understanding of Western society via television and radio.

Studies on German Reunification

The increasing number of television sets in East Germany has also presented contrasts between the values and development of Western culture with those of East German communists. As a result, many of those in East Germany have called for change and have been willing to risk their life for the free, diverse, pluralistic, wealthy, and
multidimensional society which television had shown them. These demands for political reunification have provided the impetus for additional studies of integration.

In 1987, thirty-eight years after their division into separate Eastern and Western German nations, East Germany's head of state Erich Honecker visited West Germany to discuss economic cooperation. Honecker was the first head of the East German state to visit West Germany. Factors which led to this dramatic turn around, and to the subsequent reunification of Germany in 1990, have been the focus of a number of recent studies on political unification.

One study by Gasteyger (1990) emphasized the profound changes which occurred in the Soviet Union as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's program of *glasnost* (openness). This new openness affected not only the former Soviet Union but also most communist countries in Eastern Europe—especially East Germany. The impact of the change has been described:

> Europe has lived and is still living through a triple revolution: the end of communist rule in most countries of Central-Eastern Europe, the creation of a "Single Market," within the European Community by early 1993, and the unification of the two German states as they have existed in the last forty years. In one way or another, all these revolutionary changes are linked to and are at least partly influenced by each other. The changes in Eastern Europe and German unification would not have been possible without profound changes within the Soviet Union and President Gorbachev. (Gasteyger, 1990, p. 25)

The vast differences between the economies of the Western capitalists' and communists' societies became more
apparent as East German society became more open. Increasing numbers of young East Germans began to visit the Federal Republic of West Germany to see the material abundance and to witness greater personal freedom. Therefore, their desires for German reunification became intensified.

In the years between 1969 and 1975, progress toward the West German goal of an improvement in human contacts was achieved. The number of West Germans allowed to visit the GDR [East Germany], for example, increased from 1.1 million to 3.1 million. . . . The travel of West Berliners to East Berlin averaged about 3.2 million per year. In 1978, the total of West Germans and West Berliners visiting East Berlin and/or the GDR reached 7.7 million. (Littlejohn, 1985, p. 8)

The increasing societal contacts were reflected in increasing trade between East and West Germany, thus helping to rebuild a community among Germans and to rekindle the historical aspirations of German nationalism (Hanhardt, Jr., 1984; Hirsch, 1972).

The continuing intrusion of Western information into East Germany by way of West German television also helped dissolve the boundaries between the two Germanies. The television images of Western abundance and freedom overwhelmingly influenced the aspirations of East Germans. As this change in attitudes occurred, the political will of the East German elite to sustain a separate German state was eroded. Concomitantly, popular revulsion against communism aided East Germans to undermine the system (Cotton, 1990). Glaring contradictions between party
pronouncements and the realities of daily life ultimately led to the collapse of the communists' regime in East Germany (Littlejohn, 1985).

Another factor contributing to German reunification was the convergence of international events, which resulted in a situation where both of the international powers—the United States and the former Soviet Union—who could have blocked German reunification no longer objected. As for the Soviet Union, which had opposed German reunification:

The Soviet Union, facing a domestic economic crisis and widespread ethnic tensions, simply could not afford to underwrite the East German system. The division of Germany for which the Soviet Union had worked so hard no longer enhanced Soviet security. . . . The 40-year-old edifice of the "first workers and peasants' state on German soil" crumbled within two months. Its reason for a separate existence extinguished, the GDR [East Germany] quickly became extinct. Thus the Soviet Union ultimately helped create what had always been depicted as its worst postwar nightmare—a united capitalist Germany in NATO. (Stent, 1990/1991, p. 61)

As for the United States, the reunification of Germany enhanced its perceived vital interests and supported the position it had called for since the end of World War II.

The strong support and unfaltering leadership by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, as well as by other West German leaders, helped the Germans to realize their longing for reunification.

The constellation of leaders was truly exceptional, both in their qualities as statesmen and their capacity to cooperate in what became the most intensive phase of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in European history. All key personalities were politicians of unusual experience, having previously cooperated and
developed personal relationships, in some cases approaching friendship. (Kaiser, 1991, p. 179)

The reunification of Germany gave impetus to a movement for Korean reunification. The collapse of communist ideology in the former Soviet Union raised hopes that it would be possible to reunify the divided Korea.

Studies on Korean Reunification

One of the earliest works on the reunification of Korea was entitled *The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs* (Barnds, 1976). The book was a compilation of presentations to the American Council on Foreign Relations. The communist victory in Vietnam in the spring of 1975 provided motivation for the Council's meeting. Korean reunification was considered because it was believed to be vital to peace in the region. "A united, independent Korea is . . . in the interests of the United States . . . [and Korean reunification] should be an important American long-term commitment" (Henderson, 1976, p. 125).

Henderson further suggested that neutralization of the peninsula might provide a means of reunification. He believed that a climate favorable to reunification of Korea could be developed under an Austrian type unification plan in which there was a declaration of permanent neutrality. On the other hand, a divided Korea was a threat to world peace as well as to the lowering of military expenses for
the major powers. In addition, an agreement among the four major powers (United States, the former USSR, China, and Japan) to neutralize the peninsula of Korea would help relieve tensions in the region.

The major thrust of Barnds' work was that geopolitical factors were the predominant roadblock to the reunification of Korea.

The urge for unification is strong among the homogeneous Korean people, who have preserved their national identity and culture over the centuries despite invasions and pressures by Mongols, Chinese, Manchurians, Russians, Japanese, and Americans. But conflicting ideologies and interests of the elites in both North and South Korea—together with great power rivalries—have sustained fratricidal division and confrontation for many years. (Barnds, 1976, p. 4)

In 1977, Keon expressed skepticism about the peaceful reunification between North and South Korea. This skepticism, based on the strong ideological differences between the two political regimes, viewed these differences as a major roadblock to Korean national reunification. These ideological differences prevented the development of trust between North and South Korea. As an example, Keon called attention to the attempted assassination of President Park Chung-Hee of South Korea (1968-1974).

North Korea deliberately sent out specially trained commandos to cross the Demilitarized Zone to kill President Park. Although the assassins' attempts failed, a police chief guarding the President was killed—along with numerous innocent civilians. This treacherous act occurred
despite the fact that North Korea's policy was reported to support peaceful unification. Under such circumstances, essential trust between the two countries could not develop. South Koreans could not trust the North Korean President's statements concerning peaceful unification as long as armed provocations were regularly being master-minded by the regime (see Table 2.)

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Acts by North Korea Against South Korea (1965-1975)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Incidents Between North and South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Korean Subversive Incidents</td>
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<td>1967 - 829</td>
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<td>1973 - 7</td>
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<td>1974 - 9</td>
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Note: * Through August 18, 1972.  
Source: Zagoria & Kim, 1976.

According to Muldon (1980), violence growing out of ideological differences was decreasing in both North and South Korea. Therefore, the possibility of diplomatic
agreement evolving was enhanced. The conflicting goals pursued by the two Koreas made peaceful reunification extremely difficult, because the North Koreans had stressed political and ideological solidarity with communists in the third world, and South Korea had emphasized economic developments in the western tradition.

According to Chung (1980), the theory of integration was that three stages of development had to occur in a divided country before unification was possible. The divided country had to move from the stage of conflicting clashes to that of cooperative relations; only then could it move to the final stage of cooperation. The process of Korean reunification had not even reached the stage of cooperation, or trust, between the two countries. Chung further asserted that successful economic reconstruction in Europe had not brought about political reunification, although it had helped to achieve the stage of independence of the divided nation.

Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen (1983) examined in detail the conflicting political rivalry between North and South Korea as well as that of their international supporters. Their findings bear out the fact that in 1983 North and South Koreas had not reached a stage of cooperation. They also pointed out that this conflicting situation was a result of the major powers' Cold War policies.
In the case of the two Koreas, the state of conflict is the product of the modern . . . Cold War era. Korea has one of the longest records of peaceful unification of any country in the world (some 1,200 years). Historically, Koreans have never initiated a foreign war, and have never sought to extend their territory. It is in this respect that the major powers are the enemies of the Korean people in that they have brought their philosophies and animosities to focus on the Korean peninsula. (Winn, 1983, p. 35)

The reason for conflicts between the North Koreans and the South Koreans was that ideologies of the competing world powers dominated the two countries. Under these conditions, Winn held that reunification would not be possible until the major powers changed their policies.

Kwak, Patterson & Olsén (1983) concluded that there would be a peaceful Korean reunification if the incompatible values, goals, and ideologies would change and if a mutually acceptable unification formula would be developed between North and South Korea. Fundamental changes in values, goals, and ideologies were most difficult because Korean reunification was dependent upon the structures and processes of the global international behavior of the two Koreas.

Despite recognition of the difficulties of bringing about Korean reunification, Koo (1983) recommended that steps be taken to encourage transitional relations between the two Korean nations. Koo also suggested that South Koreans should concentrate on domestic factors which preserve internal political stability as well as a strong
defensive posture, while at the same time promoting economic growth. A strong, stable, and economically viable environment in South Korea would encourage exchange programs between the two nations. In time, increasing cultural contacts might help to promote Korean reunification.

Kwak, Kim, and Kim (1984) compiled presentations made at a symposium on the problems of Korean reunification. The emphasis was on political unification, not on the economic, cultural, or social perspectives of the reunification of the divided nations.

The chances of Korean reunification at this point in history are non-existent. Since 1945, the Korean problem has been "globalized" and "militarized" involving the critical interests of the major powers. Largely due to the increasing confrontation of the U.S. and the Soviet union, the birth of People's Republic of China[,] and the re-emergence of Japan, new and complicated factors have been added to the already difficult Korean problem. As a result, all the great powers with stakes in Korea find almost unanimously that the status quo (i.e. the division of Korea) is more closely harmonious with their respective national interest. None, therefore, wants to change the situation and strive for a genuine solution. . . . Japan's position is most definitely set against any movement toward the unification of Korea, because the status quo serves Japan's interest best vis-a-vis all the concerned powers. (Rhee, 1984, pp. 16-17).

The conclusion drawn by Kwak et al. (1984) was that before there could be a realistic hope to reunite the divided Korea, there had to be a change in the attitudes and policies of the four major powers involved in the politics of Korean reunification (The United States, The
former USSR Union, China, and Japan). The prospects of such a major change in the policies of the countries involved, however, was unlikely because the division was to the advantage of these countries. For example, there was little likelihood of any significant change in Japan's Korea policy supporting the status quo of the two partitioned Koreas because "a divided Korea has served Japan's interests well in the post World War II period" (Kim, 1984, p. 222).

Few approaches to reunification were considered at this symposium because the fundamental conclusion was that it would be difficult to reunify Korea at that time. Reduction of tension between North and South Korea, as well as an increase in dialogue between the two countries, was called for. Baek (1984) argued that in the long run economic cooperation was the only feasible way to bring about peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. He argued that the two Koreas should proceed to the improvement of economic relations.

Chyung (1984) analyzed how North Korea had altered its strategies on unification in the period from 1948 to 1982. He analyzed 206 samples of unification strategies based on North Korean official messages regarding Korean reunification, using a coding scheme of 73 theme categories. Chyung concluded that the true intentions of North Korean leaders could not be deduced from these public statements.
The North Korean decision-makers seldom disclose their real strategic intentions in their public statements. No matter how elaborately North Korea may embellish its peaceful unification formula, the goal of communizing all of Korea remains unchanged. (Chyung, 1984, pp. 458, 480)

Sullivan and Foss (1987) compiled discussions at conferences presented by the American Friends Service Committee in 1981, 1982, and 1983. These discussions explored the domestic issues of the two Koreas, as well as the influence of international politics on Korean reunification. Domestic problems of the two Koreas were analyzed, and it was pointed out that both of the Koreas suffered from repression of free speech.

In both societies, public debate is inhibited or prevented on such important but sensitive issues as military factionalism, military influence on politics and policies, human rights, the political influence and organization of labor unions, and faults of the top leadership. The South adds to these its problems of pollution and the hazards of industrial or military nuclear materials. The North so far lacks these problems but removes genuine public debate from virtually all controversial subjects including trade and foreign relations, which are constantly debated in the South. (Henderson, 1987, pp. 114)

The repression of free communication hindered interactions within and between the two countries and slowed down the improvement of inter-Korean relations essential to rekindling Korean unity. In other words, more freedom of speech would help North and South Koreans to increase interactions, or communication, within their own societies as well as between the two countries. More freedom of
speech in North and South Korea to discuss even sensitive issues—such as influences on politics and policies, human rights, political leadership, and political culture—would contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations as well as international relations affecting Korea.

Haas (1989) has traced several possible alternatives for Korean reunification, including Galtung's neutralization and Haas' functionalist approaches. The overall conclusion was that there was little hope of any of the approaches being successful.

The review of related literature has shown that, although there have been a number of studies on Korean reunification, there was still a need to consider the international aspects of integration as well as the internal aspects influencing Korean nationalism.
CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF KOREAN NATIONALISM: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF NATION BUILDING IN KOREA

Bordering on the Manchurian region of northeastern China and the Maritime Krai (territory) in the Russian Republic (formerly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]), the Korean Peninsula extends west into the Yellow Sea and east into the Sea of Korea (124°11' and 131° 52' Longitude, 33°06' and 43° North Latitude).

The harbor of Vladivostok, located just north of the Korean border, is Russia's only warm water port to the Pacific Ocean. At the most southern tip, Japan lies only 130 miles (208 km) away (see Figure 1).

Strategic Location Has Led to Conflict

Over the centuries, the strategic location of Korea with regard to Russia, China, and Japan has led to numerous conflicts. Each of the countries sharing borders with Korea has exerted influence on nation building in Korea as well as on evolution of Korean nationalism. One of the ancient Chinese kingdoms, the Yen Dynasty (770 B.C.-222 B.C.), invaded Choson (ancient Korea) numerous times. *Beginning with Yen's invasion around 300 B.C., there
Figure 1

Strategic Location of Korea

Source: Whelan (1990, p. x.)
occurred a continuous penetration of Chinese political, military, and economic power into the region of the kingdom of Choson" (Lee, 1984, p. 16). "China extended direct rule over ancient Korea when the Han Dynasty (ancient China, 206 B.C.-220 A.D.) invaded Choson in 109-108 B.C. and established four commanderies in the northern two-thirds of the peninsula" (Fairbank, Reischauer, & Craig, 1978, p. 279). These Chinese commanderies continued to exercise suzerainty over the whole of ancient Korea and remained outposts of China for more than four hundred years (108 B.C.-313 A.D.). Although periodical warfare persisted, around 313 A.D. the Chinese colonies in Korea were finally defeated by local Korean kingdoms.

In spite of external pressures, primarily from China, three feudal-type Korean kingdoms emerged and competed for power in the Korean peninsula: (a) Koguryo (37 B.C.-668 A.D.), (b) Paekche (18 B.C.-663 A.D.), and (c) Silla (57 B.C.-935 A.D.). Often these kingdoms fought each other, allying themselves with either China or Japan to gain supremacy in their domestic struggles. None of these ancient Korean kingdoms was strong enough alone to unify the peninsula of Korea; however, one of the them (Silla), with China's help, was finally able to defeat the other two in 668 A.D.
Korean Unification in 668 A.D.

Silla, however, did not succeed in unifying the whole of the territory in the Three Kingdoms. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, the newly unified Korea did not include much of the northern portion of the kingdom of Koguryo, which remained outside the control of the newly unified country and later became a part of China and Russia.

The newly unified Korea was greatly influenced by China, because China had provided military aid to Silla which defeated Koguryo and Paekche. After unification of Korea, China created several mechanisms by which it disguised the Chinese influence over the unified Korea. In reality, however, China dominated much of the policy of the new government. In time, China's dominance was challenged, and open warfare ensued. The Chinese ultimately withdrew, leaving the Koreans under an independent Korean government.

Even after the withdrawal of the Chinese commanderies, foreign invasion from the north continued to threaten Korea. The Mongols from Mongolia, a rival to China as well as to others in the region, invaded Korea numerous times, dominating it for more than one hundred years (1231 to 1356 A.D.). Fortunately for Korea, the Mongols were almost continuously at war with either China, India, or Japan—which occupied their forces and diverted their attention away from Korea.
Figure 2

Korea at the Height of Territory In the 5th Century

Figure 3

The Area of Koguryo Not Included in the Unified Korea

In addition to threats of northern invasion, Korea was also threatened from the South by Japan—which attempted to conquer Korea on numerous occasions. At that time, Korea's only non-threatening neighbor was Russia—which did not pose a threat until the 19th century. In the early years Russia was busy with its European development. Nor was Russia strong enough to bother its Asian neighbors. By the 19th century, however, Russia had become strong enough to be a major threat to Korea. The need for a warm water port for its navy gave Russia an incentive to assert claim to the territory near Vladivostok.

Despite its precarious strategic location, Korea had remained basically a unified nation from 668 A.D. until the Japanese invasion in 1910 (Unger, 1992). Thus, Korea had been successful in maintaining its national unity:

Korea ever since its unification by Silla has remained a basically unified country, with only occasional and relatively brief periods of political division. Already in the seventh century it was essentially the same country it is today in geographic extent, race, language, and underlying culture, and the Koreans have had a strong sense of political continuity ever since. In the whole world only China among existing nations can claim a clearly longer history as a unified political entity. (Fairbank, Reischauer, & Craig, 1978, p. 287)

The Millennium of Korean Unity
668 A.D.–1910 A.D.

During the centuries of political unity, Koreans had developed a sense of nationalism which reflected their
common racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds. These common factors helped integrate Korean society. In addition, Koreans had inherited Chinese legal and political institutions as well as the Chinese written language. The religions of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, imported from China, permeated Korean society and helped establish the mind-set of Koreans.

In the cultural history of Korea, religion has played the most important generic role; as in other civilizations, the major cultural activities were evolved from religious ideas: ... providing a spiritual basis for management of ... life as a whole ... the early Koreans sought peace and harmony as the ideals of life and the universe. (Joe, 1982, p. 87-88)

Confucianism, which continues even today to influence the culture of Korea, concentrated on spiritual and group values rather than on materialism and individualism. The Korean mind has been greatly influenced by Confucius' view of the responsibility of the state, the family, and the individual. The social system based on Confucius' authority-obedience formula created a paternalistic society in which parents, kings, and political authorities were to be obeyed and respected. In this system, individualism was suppressed. Patriarchal authority in political and social contexts tended to be absolute, as expressed in the Confucian adage: Parents can do no wrong (Joe, 1982).

Korean nationalism reflected this heritage and the paternalistic nature of authority led Koreans to see the whole country as one big family, with the king as the
authority over all. As a result of this sense of nationalism, it has been difficult to establish either a Western or a communist governmental system, both of which were based on different values and ideologies.

Buddhism was also influential in Korea. According to Lee, another Korean historian:

The concept of a single body of believers all alike devoted spiritually to observing the way of the Buddha, taken together with the notion of the whole of the nation's people serving the king as one, surely played a major role as a force for unity and cohesion in these early Korean states. (Lee, 1984, p.59)

Buddhism met the needs of a centralized aristocratic state headed by a king. As a result, it became a central feature in the Korean sense of nationalism, and was the official state religion after 918 A.D. Buddhism also served the needs of individuals, who could turn to the deity to seek aid for their personal problems. Koreans following this faith continue to believe that their prayers help bring peace, prosperity, and happiness—not only to the individual but also to the nation.

Next to Confucianism and Buddhism, the most durable religious philosophy inherited from China was Taoism, the essence of which was the concept of a natural force under which the world and all life is ordered. Although it does not suggest a purpose or objective of life, as most religions do, Taoism successfully maintained itself in Korean thought. In time, its precepts were absorbed into
the Korean version of Buddhism and Confucianism. The influence of Taoism on Korean culture is evident even today, not only in the design of the national flag of South Korea but also in the works of Korean artists, poets, and philosophers.

Other factors which played a role in integrating the Korean nation and creating a sense Korean nationalism among the Korean people were (a) the racial homogeneity of Korean people, (b) the unique and creative Korean language (Korean Alphabet: Han-geul), and (c) a long history under a centralized Korean government. These factors made travel, trade, and communication possible as well as easy among Korean people. These factors also helped Koreans to repel numerous foreign invasions. The sharing of this history further helped Koreans to develop the sense of integration and nationalism.

The sufferings incurred during numerous invasions helped develop a closer sense of unity among the Korean people. For example, the Japanese attack on Korea in 1592 A.D., launched to lessen the dangers of an attack on Japan by either the Mongols or the Chinese, instead began the devastating Seven Year War. The Korean King and his court were forced to flee as far north as Pyongyang (the present capital of North Korea). To pacify China, which at this juncture was increasingly threatened by Japanese actions, Japan proposed a division of Korea. However, since both
China and Korea opposed it, Korea was not divided (Chyung, 1984; Nahm, 1988). Koreans continued their fight. When the Japanese military leader who had ordered the attack suddenly died in 1598, Japanese troops withdrew from Korea.

This Japanese military expedition against Korea caused great suffering to the Korean people.

The population markedly decreased, and whole villages were laid waste. Famine and disease ensued... The loss of cultural treasures in fires set by Japanese troops also was substantial... The volumes stored in three of four history archives were reduced to ashes. (Lee, 1984, 214)

Another historian described the Korean devastation after this war: "The long war reduced the productive capacity of Korean farmlands to one-third... tens of thousands of skilled workers were either killed during the war or taken to Japan as captives" (Nahm, 1988, p. 124). In even more graphic terms, a sixteenth century Korean poet, Il-lo Park, recounted the calamities wrought by the Japanese:

Higher than mountains
The bones pile up in the fields
Vast cities and great towns
Became the burrows of wolves and foxes
(cited in Nahm, 1988, p. 125)

Despite the tremendous losses from a series of foreign invasions throughout its history, Korea prevailed, the living through and the telling of these historical events, evoked a sense of national pride. Patriotic Koreans consolidated their already strong sense of nationalism by focusing on the contributions of the heroes who had united
to defend their country. Their sacrifices have been an inspiration to all patriotic Koreans, and even today both North and South Koreans still honor the heroes of these battles in which brave people died defending their country.

Competition between Neighboring Powers

Over Korea, 1885-1905

Although during the last half of the 19th century European and American powers were involved in the political competition over the Far East, by far most competitive of Korea's neighboring countries were China, Japan, and Russia. In 1853, Japan began an era of development and growth after the American Navy forced it to open its ports to Western trade. National growth ensued, which in time caused the resource-poor island nation of Japan to covet the resources of its larger and more affluent neighbors, especially the mineral resources essential for industrialization. This lust for resources was an underlying cause of Japan's threat to Korea in 1876. Korea's other neighbors—especially the Chinese—were threatened by Japan's military actions because China had long claimed special rights over Korea and was in fact collecting an annual tribute. Increased rivalry between China and Japan ultimately resulted in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)—which Japan won.
After the Japanese victory, China was forced to forfeit all claims to Korea, and the Korean government was forced to legitimize the Japanese military occupation of Korea.

In the ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded between the two powers, China's acknowledgement of the full independence of Korea was detailed in the very first article. But to reiterate a point made several times before, the purpose of this clause was not in fact to guarantee Korea's independence but rather to repudiate China's claim to suzerainty over Korea. The treaty also called for China to cede Liaotung Peninsula [of China] and Taiwan to Japan, thus revealing that Japan's territorial ambitions extended even to Manchuria. Naturally Japan believed that Korea now had been brought firmly within its grasp. (Lee, 1984, p. 289-90).

The Korean government, however, refused to yield to Japanese pressure and counter-demanded that Japan should withdraw its forces. Despite Korea's vain-glorious efforts, Japan's military forces occupied the country in order to achieve their economic objectives. The Japanese occupying forces remained in Korea from 1904 until the end of World War II in 1945.

After the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, which had formerly not shown a great interest in Far Eastern matters, became alarmed over Japan's increasing strength and her encroachment on Korea. Russia perceived that its vital interests were threatened by Japan's rise to power. Russia was building the Trans-Siberian Railroad as well as a section of the Chinese Eastern Railroad across Manchuria to connect with its port of Vladivostok. Furthermore, Russia had leased two Manchurian harbors, Port Arthur (Lu-shun in
Chinese) and Dairen (Talien or Lu-ta in Chinese) to link the new railroad lines to these ports (Lee, 1984; Fairbank, 1981). To protect these vital naval ports, Russia needed a fort on the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Russia sought to lease a Korean port as a midway point between its own naval ports. Japan's actions in Korea seriously threatened Russia's plans. Russia's actions also threatened Japan's vital interests. "The Japanese minister in London . . . stated that 'it was a matter of life and death' for Japan to keep Russia out of Korea" (Nahm, 1988, p. 202). (See Figure 4.) In 1904, this increased competition between Japan and Russia over Korea ultimately became the major cause of the Russo-Japanese War. When the Russian military moved into Manchuria, the competing territorial ambitions of Japan and Russia openly clashed.

Just before the War, Russia purchased land at the mouth of the Yalu River in Korea and began building barracks and telegraph lines between Korea and Manchuria (Nahm, 1988). Russia demanded that a neutral zone be established in Korea between the 39th parallel and the Yalu-Tumen border (the present border lines between China and Russia). This proposal was unacceptable to Japan, which broke off relations with Russia on February 8, 1904—just before hostilities began.

As the war was about to break out, Korea realized that it was too weak militarily and too underdeveloped economi-
Figure 4

Competition of Neighboring Powers Over Korea, 1895-1933

Imperial Japan: Democracy and Militarism

GROWTH OF JAPAN'S EMPIRE


Used by permission.
cally to compete with the stronger powers. As a result, on January 21, 1904, Korea formally proclaimed its neutrality (Nahm, 1988). Japan, however, ignored this action by Korea and sent additional troops into Seoul to increase its hold on the country. At this time, Koreans had no treaty ties with stronger powers such as the United States and England because Korea had attempted to maintain the old traditional order rather than open the country to more foreign influences. Korea's historical experience with numerous foreign invasions and forced payment of tribute had caused them to be afraid of opening up their country. As a result, Korea easily fell to Japan. In September 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War; Russia acknowledged Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests to Korea and pledged not to interfere (Lee, 1984).

Other countries besides Russia recognized Japan's dominant interests over Korea; both the United States and England sided with Japan. President Theodore Roosevelt ignored the advise of his minister to Korea, Horace N. Allen, who had "urged his government to intervene in the Korean situation in order to block Japanese aggression" (Lee, 1984, p. 309).

He [Theodore Roosevelt] took the view . . . that Japanese control over Korea was an appropriate means to prevent the further expansion of Russian power. Roosevelt felt . . . that it was necessary to acquiesce in Japanese domination of Korea as a quid pro quo for
Japan's recognition of U.S. hegemony over the Philippines. This deal between the U.S. and Japan is revealed in the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement of July 1905. (Lee, 1984, p. 309)

The impact of this understanding between the United States and Japan became evident when Homer B. Hulbert, an emissary of the Korean King, presented himself in Washington in late October, 1905, to counter the Japanese demands. President Roosevelt refused to see him (Nahm, 1988).

After the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, the Japanese military demanded that the Koreans should sign a Japanese Protectorate Treaty over Korea—which would lead to Japanese colonial rule. Korea refused, but was forced to sign. In 1907, Korean emissaries went in protest to the Second Hague Peace Conference in the Netherlands to denounce Japan's threat to Korea. It was ruled, however, that "Korea was not entitled to participate in the conference, having lost authority over its own diplomatic affairs when it became a protectorate of Japan" (Lee, 1984, p. 311). Thus, the Korean petition to the international community was ignored.

However, Korean resistance to Japanese rule continued. On October 26, 1909, An Chung-Geun—a young Korean patriot and an officer in the Korean Independence Army in Manchuria—awakened the international consciousness. The Korean army officer kindled the Korean spirit of unity and nationalism by assassinating the Japanese ruler over Korea,
Ito Hirobumi, who arrived at the city of Harbin in Manchuria for the purpose of securing the reaffirmation of Russia's acquiescence concerning the Japanese annexation of Korea (Nahm, 1988, p, 217; Lee, 1984, p, 310). The Korean underground resistance forces continued to fight the Japanese throughout this entire period, and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in China (Shanghai) in April 1919. A poem by one Korea's leading poets, Choi Nam-Son, illustrates how strongly Koreans held on to their beliefs in Korean nationalism:

We have nothing to lose
Neither sword nor gun
But we do not fear.
Even with an iron rod
They cannot prevail.
We Koreans would shoulder arms of righteousness
And march forward without fear.

Righteousness is our sword
With which we watch over the way.

Korea Under Colonial Rule
by Japan, 1910-1945

The Korean people resisted the take-over of their country by the Japanese; opposition had ignited a spirit of Korean patriotism. Patriots such as Min Young-Hwan and Cho Pyong-Se publicly committed suicide rather than live under the tyranny of the Japanese. The Korean people continued to protest the establishment of the Japanese protectorate and the loss of Korean sovereignty. To escape the Japanese
rule, tens of thousands of Korean emigrated to China, Manchuria, Russia, or the United States (Nahm, 1988). "By 1910 more than 17,600 Korean fighters had lost their lives in the struggles to defend their country" (Lee, 1984, p. 317). Clashes between Korean fighters and Japanese forces continued throughout the thirty-five years of occupation—resulting in tragic losses for Koreans.

Once the Japanese had taken over Korea, they enforced a harsh rule: banned Korean public assemblies, closed Korean newspapers and magazines, banned use of Korean text books in schools, and closed most schools for Korean students. "Only 0.37 percent of Korean children attended public elementary schools in Korea in 1919. . . . The number of children attending the elementary schools in later years grew . . . but the result was only about 2.2 percent of the school age children throughout the 1930s" (Nahm, 1988, 250, 252). During the entire period of the Japanese rule over Korea (1910 to 1945), the Korean people had no voice in their government, use of the Korean language was outlawed, and Koreans were even forced to adopt Japanese names rather than use their traditional Korean names.

The Japanese did everything in their power to stamp out Korean nationalism, to suppress the Korean language, to abolish the Korean press, to eradicate both Christianity and native Korean religious sects, to use the educational system for pro-Japanese indoctrination, and, in general, to force the Koreans to come to think of themselves as Japanese in every way. Late in the 1930s laws were even passed ordering Koreans to adopt the Japanese state religion, Shinto, with its emphasis
on Japanese emperor worship, and . . . to replace their Korean surnames with Japanese ones. Such extreme measures could not help but provoke extreme resentment and defiance. (Whelan, 1990, p. 21)

According to the cultural policy of the Japanese Governor General in Korea, nationalism and racial consciousness were to be destroyed. In spite of this, the patriotic underground organizations kept the dream of Korean Nationalism alive. The Korean people continued to protest, through secret organizations, against Japanese rule. Throughout the harsh rule by their colonial master, Korean patriotism and a sense of unity remained. The Koreans maintained an unflagging and intrepid sense of nationalism, but periodically hostilities against the Japanese broke out across the country.

After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination inspired the Koreans to take steps to regain independence from Japan. Many of the Koreans had been proselyted by American missionaries, and the Korean Christian community became an integral part of the Korean independence movement.

The Christian concepts of freedom, rights, and equality became a catalyst for Korean nationalism. . . . Foreign missionaries . . . such as Drs. Homer B. Hulbert, Frederick W. Schofield, and George S. McCune, became deeply involved in Korea's fight for freedom. . . . The Korean Christians continued their non-violent struggle for freedom and rights, as well as the restoration of the independence of their country. They made various efforts to let the world and Christians everywhere know that Korea still existed and that its people would not give up their hopes and aspirations for national liberation. (Nahm, 1988, p. 288)
During these years, the independence movement—by Koreans abroad as well as in Korea—grew. Korean Christians and Buddhists united in the movement for independence. When the former Korean King died suddenly on February 22, 1919, the official announcement by the Japanese gave no cause of death. Rumors quickly spread that he was poisoned. The wrath of the Korean people was ignited, resulting in spontaneous demonstrations.

The independence movement (March 1, 1919) openly challenged the Japanese rule when the leaders of this movement wrote a Declaration of Korean Independence. Its author, Choi Nam-Son, declared:

> We hereby proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. We announce this to the nations of the world in order to manifest the principle of the equality of man. . . . The Age of force is gone, and the age of Reason and Righteousness has arrived. The spirit of moral law and humanity nurtured and perfected . . . is about to shed light of a new civilization upon the affairs of mankind. . . . Therefore, the independence of Korea is to induce our people to pursue our rightful course for life and prosperity. . . . to enable Japan to give up an evil path and fulfill her responsibilities. (Cited in Nahm, 1988, p. 538)

The 33 leaders who signed the Declaration belonged to all three of the major religions in Korea: 16 were Christians, 15 professed the Korean native religion (Chondo-gyo), and 2 were Buddhists. A Buddhist poet Han Yong-Un added to the Declaration of Independence a non-violence principle which stated: "Let all Korean actions be orderly and solemn so that Korean demands and
attitudes may be honorable and upright" (cited in Nahm, 1988, p. 539).

The Japanese continued to pressure Korean Christians to participate in Japanese Shinto rituals as a means of displaying loyalty toward the Japanese Emperor. Many Korean Christians refused to do so, and as a result the Japanese closed their churches and unleashed a wave of terrorism against them (Nahm, 1988). Despite these actions, Korean Christians continued to resist Japanese tyranny. This brutality toward the Korean Christian community caused the number of Korean Christians "to decline from 700,000 in 1938 to about 250,000 by 1941 and most foreign missionaries in Korea left" (Nahm, 1988, p. 290).

Despite the continuous adversities, Korean traditional religious, social, cultural, and intellectual leaders remained committed to the dream of an independent Korea. Korean identity and patriotism burned brightly in the hearts and minds of the Korean people; Korean heroes in the struggle for independence were revered throughout the country. Despite Japan's efforts to absorb Korea, the sense of Korean nationalism and unity increased.

Many Koreans lost their lives in this independence movement, but it did serve as the vehicle to communicate to the world the plight of Koreans under Japanese domination. On numerous occasions, Koreans demonstrated that under the
Japanese colonial rule the Korean spirit of independence and unity was alive.

Despite the Korean resistance, in the 1930s Japan set up more military training centers throughout Korea in preparation for another Sino-Japanese War. Koreans were forced to contribute to these Japanese war efforts. From 1939 to 1945, almost one million Korean youths were drafted and shipped to work in mines and factories in Japan (Nahm, 1988). As a result, the Korean population residing in Japan rose to 2,400,000 during this period. Many Korean women (around 200,000 ages 13 to 40) from all across Korea were also seized and sent to war fronts to provide "comfort services" for Japanese troops (Many Korean, 1992). The inhumanity of the treatment of these women was described in recent confessions by a senior Japanese director in charge of organizing the comfort services.

Women were hunted like animals by force, arrested, imprisoned and sent to the war fronts. I myself seized one thousand women by force and sent them. . . . Two hundred thousand women were seized and sent by force. It was worse than animal hunting. After the war, Japanese troops massacred many of those women and left the rest there to die. [Trans. from Korean by the researcher.] (Japanese director, 1992)

Throughout these brutal years, the Japanese continued to speak of the unification of Korea with the Japanese empire. The Koreans never acquiesced.

Korea after World War II

At the end of World War II, Korea was liberated from the Japanese military occupation, but the dream of an
Figure 5

Allied Forces Occupied Korea at the End of World War II

Source: Chyung (1984, p. 43).
independent Korea did not come true. Instead, Korea was divided by occupation forces into a northern and a southern half (See Figure 5). Even though Russia did not declare war on Japan until August 8, 1945, Soviet forces marched toward North Korea in August, 1945 (Whelan, 1990). Among the Soviet troops entering North Korea, there were some 300 Korean communists. One of them, Kim Il-Sung, was installed by the Soviets as the military ruler over North Korea (Nahm, 1988). As a result, the Soviets were able to govern North Korea and to integrate the newly-created North Korean government into their political sphere. The Russians had finally gained control over the vital naval outlets it had long coveted, and Stalin's dream of incorporating Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea into a single great Soviet economic system became a possibility.

Throughout the nineteenth century, every British victory over Russian expansionism in southwestern Europe forced the strangled giant to search elsewhere for outlets to the sea. As both a European and an Asian nation, Russia turned invariably to the Far East, and especially to Manchuria and Korea. . . . With his country having suffered so grievously in the West during World War II, Stalin set his sights on the East for the resurrection of the prostrated Soviet nation. But he could make the necessary gains in the East only if the Soviet Union contributed to the defeat of Japan. (Whelen, 1990, pp. 6-7).

It was early September, 1945, before American forces moved into South Korea and received the Japanese surrender of South Korea. The American troops holding the southern part installed Syngman Rhee, the one time head of the
Korean Government in exile, as president of South Korea. President Rhee had received most of his education in the United States and had lived most of his life in America. Clearly he was America's spokesman.

The resulting division of Korea was not the preference of the Korean people, who had no say in the fate of their country; nor was this division of Korea the preference of the American people. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel became a reality as a result of the Russian forces' moving into Korea almost a full month before the American forces landed. The Russian forces began entering Korea on August 12, two days after the Japanese surrender offer on August 10 (Henderson, 1968; Whelan, 1990).

The text of the message (August 24, 1945) to the Japanese by the victorious American General Douglas MacArthur—who had ordered the procedures regarding the Japanese surrender—recognized the division of Korea at the 38th parallel by providing that the Japanese surrender in Korea south of the 38 parallel should be to the American general and the surrender in Korea north of the 38 parallel should be to the Soviet general (Senate Documents, 1946). By this time the Russian forces had already occupied North Korea.

One month before the text of General MacArthur, President Truman at the Potsdam Coherence on July 24, 1945, had given Stalin a series of questions pertaining to the
operational zones of all Allied forces—prepared by the
United States General of the Army George C. Marshall for
Soviet Army General Antonov (Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS), Vol.II). One of these questions
pertained to naval operations off the coast of Korea north
of latitude 38 degrees.

United States submarine forces will operate without
restriction in the Sea of Okhotsk and Japan, south and
east of a line established by connecting the following
points: Coast of Korea at latitude 38° north, thence
to latitude 40° north longitude 135° east. (FRUS),

Generalissimo Stalin delivered written answers to President
Truman the following day (July 25, 1945). The reply
prepared by General Antonov to that portion of the document
pertaining to Korea stated:

Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set
up for the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the
Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be
along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of
Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45°
45' north 140° east thence along the parallel 45°
north to the line connecting Cape Carillon (Kondo) . .
410).

As for air operations, Soviet General Antonov designated
the boundary to be north of the Korean peninsula. His
answer read:

The boundary line between operational zones of the
United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and
Manchuria shall be follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun,
Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence
along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.

United States aviation will operate south of this
line including all the above-named points. U.S.S.R.
aviation will operate north of this line (FRUS, Vol.
According to Soviet General Antonov's answer, the entire area of Korea was to fall within the American air and naval operation zones. On August 8, 1945, the Russians finally declared war on Japan as urged by President Truman. On August 10, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Harriman, cabled President Truman and urged him to take Korea.

Considering the way Stalin is behaving in increasing his demands. . . . I recommend that these landings be made to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea. I cannot see that we are under any obligation to the Soviets to respect any zone of Soviet military operation. (FRUS, VII, 1969, p. 967)

Despite the agreement at the Berlin Conference between the United States and Russia drawing the operational zones by which Russian forces were not supposed to come into Korea, Russian forces did came into Korea on August 12, 1945; two days after the Japanese offer of surrender, Russia occupied northern portion of the Korean peninsula. With this occupation, a divided Korea became an accomplished fact. By the Instrument of Japanese Surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945, on board the United States Battleship Missouri--de facto division of Korea was made official.

(b) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 28 [38] degrees north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East.

(e) The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary
forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the commander in chief United States Army Forces in the Pacific. (Senate Documents, 1946, Vol. 12, p. 103)

Although the surrender documents include a provision pertaining to Korea north of the 38 parallel, the issue had already been settled by the Russian invasion. Neither the Soviet nor the American forces were willing to withdraw from territory after the Japanese surrender in Korea. In time the two Koreas became the lackey-states of the newly emerging superpowers and adopted the uncompromising political ideologies of their patrons. North Korea took the views of the Russian communists, but South Korea embraced the views of its Western patrons--particularly the United States. The differences between these rival ideologies caused intense animosities between the two Koreas, reflecting the hostilities of the Cold War and leading to the arming of the respective Korean proteges by the competing superpowers.

As a result of the division of Korea, colonial rule did not end with the defeat of the Japanese. Neither the new North nor the new South Korea reflected the age-old dream of an independent Korean nation. The leadership patterns in these separated countries reflects the patron status of Korea as well as the competing ideologies of the East and the West. How this division has ultimately affected the spirit of the Korean people and their long-held dream of a
united Korean state is not yet known. After 47 years of division, it is not known whether Korea can ever recapture to its dream to create a truly independent and united Korean state, nor is it known whether Korean nationalism is still alive in the hearts and minds of the Korean people.
CHAPTER 4

EFFECTS OF THE POST WORLD WAR II DIVISION
OF KOREA ON NATIONAL REUNIFICATION

The dream of Korean nationalism, which had survived the 35 years of Japanese rule, was threatened even more seriously by the post World War II division of Korea and by the competition between the two Korean states. This chapter has explored how the division occurred and how the Korean people responded. Actions taken by the two regimes to secure power have been examined to see how they influenced national unification. The conflicts between the two regimes which resulted in the Korean War, as well as the post war animosities, have been studied. Finally, an examination has been made of changes in the international environment which have occurred since the war, and of how these changes have affected the possibility of Korean reunification.

Division of Korea

Once Allied military forces moved into Korea and liberated it from Japanese control, the Korean people began to agitate for the creation of an independent and unified nation. Korean nationalism, after a hiatus of 35 years
during Japanese rule, reasserted itself. To prevent division of the country, dedicated Korean nationalists mobilized. The Secretary of State of the United States as well as officials of Russia, England—and subsequently China, agreed at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, to divide Korea between a joint United States-U.S.S.R. commission and to work out an agreement for a four-power trusteeship for a period of to 5 years (Henderson, 1968; Herz, 1975; Shin, 1991). Despite the protestations of the Korean people, this decision has never been changed.

Russian and American occupation forces moved into Korea in 1945. The Russians stayed until 1948 and the Americans until 1949. The American forces in South Korea were ill-prepared for this task. Almost none of them spoke Korean nor did they understand Korean culture, society, economics, or politics. Immediately after the liberation of Korea (1944-1945), the Japanese Governor-general had burned the governmental files of Korea--creating chaos both for the government and for the economy throughout the entire peninsula (Henderson, 1968).

Even before the Allies' agreement regarding occupation, the Russians moved into North Korea--bringing with them over 300 Korean communists who had been trained in Russia to take control of the country (Nahm, 1988). These Koreans not only spoke Korean as well as Russian but were also dedicated communists who followed the Russian line and
carried out its goals—including the support of the division of Korea.

Disagreements over how the trusteeship was to operate arose soon after the Allied forces were in place. Russians in North Korea saw themselves as the sole rulers of their region, and they were supported by their North Korean communist followers. Koreans in the South were concerned about preventing the division of the country and appealed to both the United States and Russia. On November 4, 1945, Dr. Syngman Rhee, Chairman of the United Central Council in Seoul, presented a resolution to the Four Allied Powers urging them not to permanently divide the country. He pointed out that the Korean people were one people, one nation, and that the division of Korea would seriously injure the national psyche and endanger peace in the region. The resolution stated:

Each day the harmful economic and political effects of the division grow deeper and spread wider. . . . We are informed of a joint trusteeship proposed for the control of Korea. This news has caused shock and consternation of a most profound nature throughout the entire Korean Peninsula. . . . It would be a grave mistake in the Korean policy of the United States.

(Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Vol. II, 1960, pp. 1110-1111)

Immediately after this resolution, Kim Koo, President of the Korean Provisional Government, also forwarded a message to the President of the United States stating his opposition to the trusteeship of Korea—a message which he
requested be submitted to the heads of state of the each of our Allied Powers.

We oppose the decision reached at the Moscow Conference on trusteeship of Korea for the following reason[s]:

1st. It is against the desire of the entire people of Korea who uphold the principle of national self determination.

2nd. It is against the assurance given repeatedly by your nation during the Second World War.

3rd. None of the three articles relating to the trusteeship contained in the United Nations Charter is applicable to Korea.


Even though numerous nationalists were arrested and imprisoned for advocating national unity, nationalists in North Korea agitated against the division of the country and the creation of a trusteeship (Korean Nationalists, 1991). One of the most notable nationalist leaders from the North, Cho Man-Sik, was imprisoned for his nationalist views, even though earlier he had been asked by the Russian forces to lead the nation and to be the president of North Korea (Korean Nationalists, August 8, 1991). His refusal on the grounds that he did not want to be the leader of a divided country caused him to fall from favor with the new communist masters—which ultimately led to his house-arrest in 1946. He was later imprisoned where he died.

Hostilities soon broke out among people in both North and South Korea, especially between committed nationalists and ardent communists. After it was introduced in 1925 by Russians and Chinese, Communism had spread throughout
Korea, leading to the establishment of the first Korean communist party in Seoul (Henderson, 1968). Although the number of communists in Korea at the end of World War II was relatively small, communist members were found throughout Korea (Henderson, 1968). Their ideology—based upon class warfare—called for the creation of a world-wide communist movement, led by the party of the proletariat rather than for the creation of a separate Korean nation. Although they wanted unification under the banner of communism, the Communists rejected the dream of Korean national unification held by nationalists.

Conflicts of ideology between communists and nationalists led to violent clashes between these groups during the period of Allied occupation. Kim Il-Sung, a Korean communist who later became the President of North Korea, expressed the revolutionary character of communism at a meeting of the party in Manchuria:

A guerrilla base must be set up. A solid guerrilla base makes it possible to continually expand the armed ranks and wage protracted guerrilla warfare. . . . We badly need our own firm military base. . . . . This base is absolutely necessary in order to progress with preparations for the founding of the communist party and the revolutionary movement as a whole. (Kim Il-Sung, 1975, p. 11).

Korean communists, supported and guided by Russian military leaders, soon gained full power over North Korea. They immediately set about purging Korean nationalists who objected to control of North Korea by the Soviet Union.
The North Korean communists did not so much want to create an independent nation of North Korea, but rather to have communism dominate the entire peninsula. Their political efforts, therefore, were to take over the South as soon as the American forces withdrew.

Strong nationalist sentiment pervaded the whole political atmosphere in post-liberation Korea. The importance of nationalism can scarcely be exaggerated. . . . The division of the country had not yet hardened, and all political groups saw unification as an immediate and pressing goal. . . . [T]he northern leaders, overcompensating perhaps for their close relationship with the Soviet authorities, adroitly exploited the unification issue: organizing . . . conferences, conducting . . . underground elections, establishing the the DFUF [Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland], and creating the Korean Workers' Party by merging the Communist Parties in the South and North. (Merrill, 1989, p. 185)

By infiltrating the various groups desiring national unification, the communists intended to gain power throughout Korea. If it had not been for the presence of American forces in Korea at this time, the communists probably would have occupied the entire country.

The best established mechanism for achieving cohesion in Korea in 1945 was communism; no groups rivaled the Communists in discipline and hierarchy. If not opposed by USAMCIGN [United States forces], the communists probably would have come to dominate the Korean political scene south as well as north of the 38th parallel. (Henderson, 1968, p. 274)

In South Korea, American occupation forces at first supported Kim Koo, the nationalist leader and President of the Korcan Provisional Government. However, because of
Kim's opposition to division of Korea as well as the trusteeship, the Americans later supported Syngman Rhee.

The trusteeship imbroglio eliminated the Kim Koo faction of the Korean Provisional Government from consideration for the role of figurehead for the governing commission. . . . Hodge [United States commander-in-chief over South Korea] had given Kim and his supporters body-guards, American vehicles, the use of traditional Korean Court facilities, and so on. . . . On December 31 Hodge informed his staff that Kim Koo and the Korean Provisional Government were behind the anti-trusteeship demonstrations. . . . Thus Hodge turned back to Syngman Rhee (Cummings, 1981, pp. 230-231).

By February, 1945, the die was cast; Korea would be divided because the United States, Russia, China, and England had all agreed that it would be so. According to an American document, the trusteeship of Korea was decided.

On 8 February 1945, during a discussion on the Far East . . . President Roosevelt explained to Marshal Stalin his intentions with regard to Korea.

The President said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He felt the trusteeship might last from 20 to 30 years. Marshall Stalin said the shorter the trusteeship period the better, and he expressed approval when the President said foreign troops would not be stationed in Korea. . . . Stalin agreed to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. . . . The President informed Chiang [The President of Nationalist China] on 15 June that U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States agree to a Four-Power Trusteeship for Korea. (FRUS, Vol.I., 1960, pp. 309-310).

Establishment of the North and South Korean Regimes

Despite objections of the Korean nationalists, Korea was divided--creating two separate states. With this
division, the political future of Korean people fell into the hands of these new Korean states. Any expression of Korean nationalism calling for unification of the entire country now threatened the new regimes and met with their disapproval. Once legitimized by the Allied trusteeship, the regimes in the two Koreas set about building their power bases and developing their portion of the country—each following the competing ideologies of their patrons. A communists regime—mirroring its new supporter, Russia—was established in North Korea while South Korea attempted to follow the ideology of its patron, the United States.

Soon after occupying North Korea, Russian forces recommended to Marshall Stalin that Kim Il-Sung, a Korean communist, be nominated by Russia to lead North Korea. But two other North Koreans had been considered for the position before Kim Il-Sung. One of those passed over was the nationalist, Cho Man-Sik, who had refused the Russian offer to be the leader of North Korea because he objected to the division of the country (Special Tutorial, 1991). Kim Il-Sung, having no such objections, was designated the President of North Korea.

As the North Korean regime, along with its Russian supporters, built its power base in 1947 it became increasingly defensive concerning relations with Americans and South Koreans. Even though a United Nations resolution
called for a supervised national election throughout the entire Korean peninsula, North Koreans refused to let the United Nation's representatives enter their country. The resolution introduced by the United States calling for a supervised national election throughout Korea was seen as a means of resolving the growing conflicts between the two Koreas (Lee, 1984).

The rationale of the Russian's refusal to participate in the national election was that the North Korean regime had already been established, with Kim Il-Sung in charge. There was no need for an election, reasoned the Russians and their North Korean charges. The newly created leader of North Korea, President Kim Il-Sung, in his acceptance speech on June 14, 1947, showed his loyalty to the Russians:

> As you know, the hope and happiness of Korean people will depend upon the realization of the agreement at the Moscow Conference. Koreans welcomed the agreement (of trusteeship) with great applause because the agreement complied with the fundamental interests of Korean people (audience applauded greatly). [Trans. from Korean by the researcher.] (Russia's suggestions for Korean self-independence, 1945, pp. 2-3).

In South Korea, anti-trusteeship demonstrations continued throughout this period. The demonstrations opposing division of the country and the creation of a trusteeship were led by nationalists who continued to hold to the dream of a unified and independent Korean state.

In 1948, general elections were held in South Korea. North Korea refused to participate, and communists
attempted to subvert the creation of a South Korean government because they hoped to control the entire country under communism. The communists' attempts failed; the South Korea government was established by this election.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was officially established on August 15, 1948, with Syngman Rhee as president. Rule by the United States Military Government automatically ended with the creation of a new government. Soviet troops withdrew from North Korea soon after the South Korean government was officially established, and the American forces left the following year. Even though the Russians withdrew from Korea, their nearness permitted them to continue controlling North Korea. Because Russia shared a border with North Korea, communications and goods easily crossed back and forth. With the American withdrawal, the vast distances across the Pacific Ocean made it much more difficult for the Americans to intercede and to help South Korea. North Korea had the advantage of being close to its patron and of being able to obtain Russian aid.

In a speech just before the creation of the Republic of Korea in the South, President Kim Il-Sung of North Korea, let it be known that once occupying forces were gone, North Korea planned to seize control of the entire Korean peninsula.

Only when the Soviet and the United States troops withdraw from Korea can the Korean people be provided with opportunity of establishing a government for themselves without the aid and participation of the Allied powers. (Kim Il-Sung, 1947, pp. 2, 4)
American troops withdrew from Korea in June 1949. One year after the withdrawal, North Korea made its move to absorb South Korea. The war, known on both sides of the world as The Korean War, had begun.

Superpowers' Interests and Participation in the Korean War

North Korea's invasion of South Korea was perceived by the two superpowers as affecting their vital interests. Russia was not openly involved in the war, even though expansion of North Korea was obviously to its advantage. Americans believed, however, that the attack was planned and supported by the Russians and was a threat to their national interests. As a result, the United States began to mobilize to face this communist challenge.

Before the Americans could respond, North Korean forces with modern weapons supplied by Russia moved swiftly down the peninsula through South Korea. Once the attack began, President Truman sought authorization from the United Nations to resist the aggression. Fortunately for the United States, Russia—who had a veto in the Security Council—absented itself at the time this matter was debated. As a result, the Security Council of the United Nations was able to act; it empowered the United States to lead a military operation on its behalf against the North Korean aggression. Under this authorization American
forces, supplemented by ground forces from 14 other countries, were commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. Some 30-odd other nations also rendered various kinds of aid to South Korea.

As a result of a brilliant strategy, the landing by the United Nations forces at Inchon harbor turned the military situation around, driving the North Korean forces back almost to the Yalu River—the border of China. As the Americans pushed the North Koreans out of South Korea, the Chinese premier warned the United States that if United Nations troops moved across the 38th parallel—the border between North and South Korea—Chinese forces would enter the war (Foot, 1990). Despite this warning, the United Nations forces drove northward almost to the Chinese border.

On October 15, General MacArthur met with President Truman to assess the possibility of Chinese intervention. MacArthur reported to the President that he considered the possibility of the Chinese entering the war to be remote (Stoessinger, 1979). Unbeknown to the American leaders, even as they met the Chinese People's Volunteers had already crossed the Yalu River and were moving into North Korea (Foot, 1990). The war changed radically after the Chinese invaded Korea. United Nations forces were thrown back almost to Seoul (the capital of South Korea) before a blood-letting stalemate stopped them. General MacArthur proposed stemming the flood of Chinese coming across the
border by bombing strategic points in mainland China. His proposal which caused great consternation in the American administration, which was afraid that such actions would cause both China and its Russian communist ally to enter the war—turning it into a third world war.

At the time of this debate in America it was believed that, although they were supplying arms to North Korea, Russian forces were not participating in the fighting. However, recently released secret documents from the former Soviet Union show that Russia was not only giving aid to North Korea but had also been involved in initiating the attack—actually sending battle seasoned Russian troops as well as units of the air force to fight clandestinely in Korea. (Soviet Army, 1991; Russian Forces, 1991; Russian Armies, 1992). According to these reports, the Russian army and air force from Manchuria actually participated in the fighting throughout the war.

Russia probably became involved initially because Stalin believed that the Americans were not prepared to defend Korea. In a speech on January 12, 1950, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly defined the military defense perimeter of the United States, saying, "in Asia, it extended to Japan and the Philippines" (Stoessiner, 1979). Secretary Acheson had omitted Korea from the territory considered vital to America's interest. General MacArthur was on record as
stating to a British journalist that: "Our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia" including the Philippines, the Ryukyus, Japan, and the Aleutians (Goulden, 1990).

Again Korea had not been included. Even the United States Congress appeared to be on record for excluding Korea from its defense line by voting down military aid requested by South Korea. Once the war was under way, the Russians could ill afford to let North Korea fail—especially since United Nations forces had captured most of North Korea. The Russians became increasingly involved with their Chinese communist allies in the conflict.

Once a stalemate was reached after the war had seesawed up and down the peninsula, casualties mounted rapidly on both sides. As a result of the fatigue of battle, the two sides attempted to arrange a ceasefire. On December 14, 1950, The United Nations established a ceasefire group that attempted to end the war. The American delegation was instructed by their President to support the resolution (Foot, 1990). General MacArthur, however, opposed an armistice and virtually demanded China's surrender. As a result, China's rejection of the 13-power draft for a ceasefire resolution was all but overlooked in the turmoil over General MacArthur's stance. The President of the United States wanted the war to end, while the General wanted it to continue until the United Nations forces were
victorious. This conflict over civilian control of the American military has been described:

On April 30, 1951, President Truman finally dismissed General MacArthur from all his commands. . . . MacArthur's emotional appeal for victory over the communist enemy was simply more seductive than President Truman's policy of long-term, patient containment. Only the passage of time would vindicate the president. . . . Once the president had accepted the general's judgment that the Chinese would not intervene, he had to face the awesome consequence: a limited war with China. (Stoessinger, 1979, p. 95).

On June 23, 1951, the Soviets suggested an armistice which the United Nations forces finally accepted. The Soviet's Ambassador to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, called for a ceasefire and a mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel (Foot, 1990). Fighting continued, however, until the Armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953 (Kim, 1977). President Syngman Rhee of South Korea continued to oppose an armistice. The truce line called for a two-and-a-half mile wide, 155-mile-long demilitarized zone at or near the 38th parallel.

Continuing Animosity After the Armistice

Although there was a cessation of military operations, animosity between the two sides continued. Even after the signing of the armistice, they continued to verbally spar with one another and to glare hostiley across the truce line. No amiable or even courteous communications passed
between North and South Korea; the military talked only about violations to the ceasefire agreement. There were no social contacts. Even families with relatives divided by the war could not talk, visit, or write letters to members of their families separated by the truce line. The two opposing regimes attempted to close their societies to each other.

In fact, the two Korean societies continued to act as if they preferred to fight rather than to compromise and settle their differences. Each continued to boast of conquering the other. President Rhee constantly urged a march northward to destroy the communist government.

Similarly, North Korea's President Kim Il-Sung persisted in ordering his commandos to attack South Korea. Such provocations as the seizure of the American ship the Pueblo, the downing of an American EC-121 reconnaissance plane, the attempted assassination of South Korea's President Park Chung-Hee by a North Korean commando in 1968, and the efforts of the North Koreans to tunnel under the truce line in order to attack South Korea demonstrated the continuing harassment between the two Koreas. In 1972, during the period of the East-West detente, a joint communique was agreed to between North and South Korea whereby both North and South Koreans pledged more peaceful relationship between the two countries (Gwertzman, 1972; Harris, 1972; Hornsby, 1972; North and South Korea, 1972).
During his state visit to Burma in 1983, an attempt was made by North Korean commandos to assassinate President Chun Doo-Hwan of South Korea. Just before President Chun arrived for a meeting, North Korean commandos set off bombs --killing 16 high ranking South Korean officials. An investigation by the Supreme Court of Burma found that the incident was undertaken by North Korean commandos (North Korean Terrorists, 1991; Supreme Court of Burma, 1991). President Chun said:

The incident was the result of a carefully premeditated plot... We will not be the only ones who point to the North Korean communists, the most inhuman group of people on earth... Few will doubt that the crime was their animosities conducted in view of their universally known character, and in view of the fact that they, as our enemy, have tenaciously mounted provocations with the intent of destroying our peace and security. (Korea and World Affairs, 1983, pp. 735-736)

Even more recently, on November 29, 1987, a South Korean Air Liner was sabotaged by the North Koreans, exploding over the Andaman Sea off the coast of Burma and causing the loss of the 115 persons aboard (McManaway 1988, p. 199). Testimony before the United States Foreign Relations Subcommittee showed that there was compelling evidence to conclude that North Korea had planned, organized, and carried out this act of terrorism (Korea and World Affairs, 1988). Later, a North Korean saboteur caught by the Burmese police confessed to having set off the bomb at the directions of the North Korean government.
One result of the continuing hostility between the two Korean states has been that the two states have been largely isolated from one another. During this period, both governments attempted to teach hatred of the other to their citizens rather than pointing to their common cultural past. This hostile climate has obviously affected the people's political attitudes as well as dissipated their long-held dream of Korean nationalism.

Changes in the International Environment Affecting Inter-Korean Relations

Since the end of the Korean War, significant changes have occurred in the international environment: (a) the Sino-Soviet dispute, (b) the Sino-American rapprochement, (c) East-West detente, (d) Japan's remarkable economic growth, (e) the oil embargo crises, (f) the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Russia, (g) German reunification, (h) changes in America's internal politics, (i) the Tiananmen Square incident, and (j) the signing of a peace treaty between North and South Korea. All of these events have directly impacted Korea's fate--especially on possibility of reunification.

The hardening of relationships between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union since the 1960s caused China to turn away from Russia, although in 1950 Russia and China had signed a 30-year treaty pledging
friendship and mutual assistance (Fairbank, 1981).
Immediately after World War II, Russians were venerated by
the Chinese, who looked to them for advice and support in
developing a communist society. However, the honeymoon
between Peking and Moscow did not last—in part because of
the reassertion of Chinese nationalism.

By rewriting Marxist-Leninist thought during the 1960s,
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung alienated purist proponents of
international communism. Mao insisted that communism take
into consideration the cultural aspects of the Chinese
nation. The ideological conflict over nationalizing the
revolutionary movement led to a deep schism between the
two centers of communism, and the conflict expanded as the
PRC developed militarily—finally building an atomic bomb.
As each began to see the other as a potential enemy across
a long and dangerous border between their countries,
increasing belligerency developed between the two former
allies.

On the level of theory, Mao continued to warp and bend
communist doctrine to fit it to local needs. . . . To
be sure, the Twentieth Congress doctrine (February
1965) of "many paths to socialism" gave ground to the
Maoist. . . modifications of Marxism-Leninism and also
accepted Peking's claim to be the model for Asia to
follow. . . . From this time forward, the split
widened . . . [into] full public polemics. . . . In the
1960s a lively fear of Chinese fanaticism and expansion
grew up in the Soviet Union, and by 1969 armed border
clashes arose both along the Amur in the northeast and
in Central Asia. (Fairbank, 1981, p. 424)
As a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, as well as the East-West detente during the 1960s, changes occurred in the attitudes of leaders of both North and South Korea.

As the result of the Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1960s the North Korean leadership assumed an independent and self-reliant posture toward its allies. The South Korean leadership had begun to have doubts about the U.S. commitment as the result of U.S. rapprochement and detente with the PRC and the Soviet Union. The emergence of a multipolar constellation based on a balance of power and the shifts in U.S. foreign policy paved the way for the two Koreas to explore their shared sense of nationhood. (Kim, 1987, p. 120)

As the schism between China and Russia developed, North Korea was pressured to make a most difficult decision—whether to side with one or the other. China had openly come to North Korea's defense during the Korean War with more than a million men, but the Russians had also helped North Korea. During the war, the Russians supplied both North Korea and China with both technical personnel as well as military supplies.

Furthermore, Russia was economically more advanced than China, therefore better able to assist North Korea. Before its economic collapse in the 1970s, "one of the most interesting aspects of Sino-Soviet relations, vis-a-vis North Korea, is that only the Russians were able to supply, in substantial amounts, the heavy equipment demanded by the North Korean military" (Ha & Luebbert, 1977, p. 741). North Korea truly faced a crucial dilemma, so it attempted to appease both Russia and China—but satisfied neither.
At the Fourth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in Pyongyang in 1961, North Korea adopted a policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. "The dispute caused the Soviet Union to withdraw its economic and technical aid from both China and North Korea" (Kim, 1987, p. 123). Consequently, South Korea's Gross National Product (GNP) continued to grow at a rate of 24.9 per cent between 1965 and 1974, but North Korea's grew only 5.9 per cent. During this same period, North Korea's military budget absorbed an average 13.6 per cent of its GNP, while South Korea's military budget averaged only 4.8 per cent (Ha & Luebbert, 1977).

The Sino-Soviet disputes caused China to reject North Korea's proposal for joint Chinese and Soviet action to aid North Korea. During the Cultural Revolution in 1965-69, the disputes led the Red Guards—the fanatic followers of Mao—to verbally attack the North Korean leader Kim IL-Sung as a fat revisionist and the Khrushchev of Korea (Kim, 1987).

The schism between Russia and China left China without a source of aid for its desperately needed economic development program. China was forced to go it alone during the Vietnam War period, because it was supporting North Vietnam—which completely alienated it from possible aid from the West. After the war, as Americans began to pull out, China again looked to the United States as a possible source of economic support.
Secret discussions were begun which led ultimately to the rapprochement between the United States and mainland China. In October 1971, this change culminated in the admission of the PRC to the United Nations and the expulsion of the Nationalist Republic of China (Fairbank, 1981). In 1972, the opening of Peking to the United States and Japan ushered in a new era in Northeast Asia.

"North Korea's economic prospects looked dismal because of slow economic growth, increased prices of Soviet oil, mismanagement, and an extraordinary level of military spending" (Ha & Luebbert, 1977, p. 737). As trade between China, the United States, and Japan increased, and North Korea—which was suffering from the reduction of aid from China and Russia—began to look covetously at a possible rapprochement with non-communist nations such as Japan.

Because of its remarkable economic development, Japan had emerged as the strongest economic power in the region and as the best possible source for investment capital for developing countries such as North Korea. In the face of its desperate economic plight, North Korea began to view Japan as a source of capital for its development (Ha & Luebbert, 1977). The North Koreans believed that the best way to proceed in gaining support from Japan, or other non-communist, states was to improve their relations with South Korea. In 1971, North Korea became much more amenable to South Korea's proposals to cooperate. A
beginning was made in normalizing formal relations between
the two countries.

North Korea gained significant benefits from its
gesture of normalizing formal communications with South
Korea.

North Korea . . . found the new atmosphere created by
the initiation of North-South negotiations highly
favorable in many aspects. The de facto recognition of
North Korea by the ROK (South Korea) government made it
possible for the latter to launch an intense offensive
that led to the establishment of diplomatic ties with a
number of non-communist countries. . . . The changing
political climate (the notion of two Koreas gained a
strong momentum in the Japanese political arena)
facilitated rapid increase in the trade volume between
the DPRK and Japan . . . in 1972. Importation of
major industrial plants from Japan on favorable credit
terms is expected to contribute significantly to the
201)

North Korea also benefited from the growing rapprochement
and from normalization with South Korea in that both Russia
and the PRC began to woo North Korea as a means of
protecting their interest in the region.

As Sino-American relations improved, the rivalry
between the Soviet Union and the PRC for the support of
North Korea increased. Thus the DPRK was able to exact
an agreement on economic cooperation from PRC in August
1971. In December the Soviet union agreed to provide
additional economic and military assistance to the DPRK

All of the major international actors affecting Korea--
the United States, China, Russia, and Japan--sought to
mitigate tensions in East Asia, particularly in the Korean
peninsula. They believed that it was to their advantage to
terminate the Cold War, despite the continued hostility
between the two Koreas. Despite the new international
cclimate, the North Korean leadership did not at first show
any fundamental attitudinal change. In fact, Premier (now
President) Kim Il-Sung continued to call for the overthrow
of the South Korean government. However, the major powers
in the region—in the Shanghai communique issued by
President Nixon and Premier Cho En-Lai on February 23,
1972—made it clear that they wanted a reduction of
tensions in the region. Later that year, a joint
communique issued on July 4 by North and South Korea
demonstrated that both administrations understood this
message.

China and Russia, desperately needing economic capital
and technology, were indirectly helped by the Arab oil
embargoes of the 1970s because the price of energy
increased astronomically, setting off a world wide search
for new resources. Off-shore sites in the China Sea as
well as in Russia's Siberia were promising fields for
exploration. After rapprochement and normalization of
relations, Japan began to negotiate with China and Russia,
entering into agreements for joint development of these
energy sources. Once these agreements were made, Russia
and China no longer were willing to defend or support the
belligerency of North Korea.

None of the four powers (China, Russia, Japan and the
United States affecting Korea) have any apparent reason
to believe that they would either benefit from such
Japan, before the rapprochement with China and Russia, had perceived Korean reunification as a possible means of creating an independent Korea which could act as a deterrent against an attack from either China or Russia. According to Gregor and Chang (1984), Japan at this time believed that Korea was crucial to the defense of Japan. However, once Japan entered into trade relations with China and Russia, its perception changed. Any effort to reunify Korea had been viewed as a possible cause of conflict which would exacerbate the quarrel between Russia and China as well as decrease the role of the Western-oriented South Korea—which seemed to its disadvantage. No longer did Japan look favorable upon efforts to reunify Korea; it began a process leading to detente with North Korea—supporting a de jure division of the two Koreas (Ha & Luebbert, 1977).

America's perception about Korean reunification was also affected by these international developments. In the early 1970s, President Nixon's visit to Peking—the capital city of the people's Republic of China—coupled with the development of detente with the former Soviet Union, improved relationships between the United States and China as well as Russia. The rapprochement between these former violent opponents permitted the United States to begin
planning for pulling back militarily from the Asian continent. Military support for South Korea was increasingly seen by the American as a heavy burden—especially after the tremendous expense of the war in Vietnam. The thaw in the Cold War, which occurred concomitantly with detente, led President Carter to propose withdrawing American troops from South Korea. He was checked, however, by the Congress which "embodied a rider to the State Department appropriation bill which said: 'United States policy toward Korea should continue to be arrived at by joint decision of the President and Congress'" (Franck & Weisband, 1979, p. 212).

Although these changes in the international environment in the 1970s had initiated a normalization of relations between the two Korean states as well as a sense of euphoria among those hoping for reunification, the two sides soon fell back into the hostility pattern of calling one another by disparaging names. The divided societies remained entirely sealed off from one another throughout the decades of the 1980s—and remain so even today.

The dramatic upheavals in the international environment continued in the decade of the 1980s, which further changed all four of the major powers with a stake in the Korean peninsula: Russia, China, America, and Japan. As a result of the increasingly serious economic problems in Russia, the Soviet Union could not afford to provide economic or
military aid to support its communist allies, including North Korea. As a result of the critical internal problems in Russia and its inability to assist its client states, communism literally disintegrated in Eastern Europe. The weakening of the Soviet influence significantly contributed to German reunification.

Finally, in face of the failure of its economic system, Russia itself collapsed. The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was broken up; the name of the Soviet Union was obliterated from the map. The Cold War fear of a communist attack on the West had been eliminated. Because of these calamitous events, North Korea lost the possibility of getting support from the center of communism on which it had depended and was forced either to obtain help from China or to make peace with South Korea.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States faced was an entirely different diplomatic world. No longer was it necessary to continue the arms race against a highly sophisticated enemy. The Cold War was over and the Americans had won. As military expenditures decreased, the American people began to speak of a peace dividend. They saw this dividend as a means of meeting the soaring national debt, which had been increased during the 1980s largely due to military expenditures. Under the new conditions, tremendous military expenditures were no longer needed. Without a Russian threat, the American people
came to realize that they had no vital interest to protect either in Korea or in Europe. Growing popular opinion held that the country should begin withdrawing American troops from overseas.

Early in 1990, the American administration began discussions with South Korea about reducing American forces in that country. An agreement was reached which stated that a reduction of united forces in South Korea would occur in three stages: the first in 1991-1993, the second in 1994-1995, and the third following 1996 (Kihl, 1990). By then, unless military relations between North and South Korea change drastically, American forces will be completely out of South Korea. The United States may continue giving aid, but South Korea will be urged to deal with North Korea. The possibility of reunification will be left to the Korean people.

Looking to the Future

The priority of the Korean reunification issues among the various foreign policy objectives of the United States of America, Russia, China, or Japan is no longer seen as one of their major responsibilities nor is unification considered to be of interest to these nations. This attitudinal change in the international actors' position on Korean reunification impacts both North and South Korea. With all four major powers affected by their decisions,
South Korea now finds much support for its position on reunification.

North Korea is in much the same position. The Soviet union is completely out of the picture. Although the old line communist position was hardened somewhat by the Tiananmen Square situation. China is in no position to support the continued belligerency of North Korea. Pressures are on both North and South Korea to work out their own fate.

The upheaval in the international environment has also affected the PRC. The opening of China to trade with the outside world not only brought improved economic conditions but it also permitted new ideas to enter China—which challenges the status quo. In the universities, particularly, the virtues of democracy began to be espoused by students and faculties alike. Protest movements even occurred calling for changes in the society. The ruling communist regime in China wanted economic growth, but objected strenuously to the challenges for political change. The regime believed that communism itself was being challenged by this movement. Ultimately, the communist party forcefully squelched this student movement in Tiananmen Square.

The hardening of the Chinese communist party's attitude coincided with the changing attitudes of the North Korean regime which had consistently resisted any change in its
doctrine. China, however, wanted to retain its economic relations with the United States and Japan because it desperately needs new capital and technology. Therefore, China cannot encourage, nor can it risk, belligerency by its ally. Neither can it afford to continue providing the North Koreans with military support.

To any of the key international actors, Korean reunification is not a high priority today. If the reunification of Korea is to occur, the impetus must come from nationalists within Korea itself (Break Through, 1972). The main question is: What has the hostile division of 47 years done to the age-old Korean dream of unity?
Korean reunification, as we have seen, is not a high priority to any of the key international players today. If reunification is to occur, therefore, the impetus must come from nationalists within Korea itself (Kwon, 1991; Lee, 1991a; Lee, 1991b; Kim, 1991). One crucial question remains: What has the division into hostile rival camps for nearly 50 years done to the age-old Korean dream of unity?

War and the Separation of the Korean Society

During the period since the division of the country, conflicts have continued between the two Koreas. Each country has sought to degrade the other in the minds of its people. As a result, "North Korean people believe that South Korea is like a hell and South Korean people believe that North Korea is like a hell" (Lee, 1990, p. 152). Each calls the other the enemy. Rather than stressing common aspects of their culture and life as well as the things which would integrate them, each exaggerates differences and encourages hatred of the other. Each has closed its
society to the other. Even though a peace treaty was signed between the two countries in 1991, almost no contacts have been permitted. Families divided by the truce line still can not visit one another. Even today they cannot write or telephone one another. The division is so complete that the situation for the ten million divided families is total isolation—as if the others living in either North or South Korea were dead (Watanabe, 1992).

Even though the two sides formally ended the Korean War with the signing of the Peace Treaty on December 13, 1991, both countries still restrict contacts between their people. Most normal contacts between countries are not allowed in the divided Korea today. The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, not only restricts trade and contact with South Koreans but also makes it illegal for North Koreans abroad to communicate with South Koreans unless they first receive permission from the government. Similar animosity and distrust are evident in the Republic of Korea (ROK), also known as South Korea.

As late as May 1990 the South Korean government ruled that contact with North Koreans was a violation of the National Security Act subject to punishment (North Korea, 1990; Overthrow the dictatorial, 1990). In 1992, two university students in South Korea were sentenced to imprisonment for from four to six years for encouraging a
female colleague to make an unapproved trip to North Korea via Berlin (Security Law, 1992). The court reasoned that even today North Korea is still an enemy country which wants to communize South Korea by force.

As a result of the harsh provisions, there are no student exchanges between the two countries, even though student exchanges are common between other countries. Evidence of the continuing hostility toward South Korea is ever present in North Korean newspapers. South Korea is regularly called an enemy country, and abusive articles calling for "the overthrow of the dictatorial government of South Korea" continue to be printed regularly in North Korea (Overthrow the dictatorial, 1990).

Communications through the postal system or telephone also are forbidden between North and South Korea. There is little traffic between the two countries and tourism is forbidden. Until July 20, 1991, trade was prohibited entirely between the countries, and even today trade between the two Koreas is hampered by restrictive governmental regulations.

Even radio and television communications—which normally spill over the borders of countries permitting each side to gain glimpses of the other—have not been a major factor in Korea. Both Korean states have harsh laws prohibiting their citizens from listening to or viewing such programs. The fact is that North Korea has such a low
standard of living that only a relative few North Koreans own radios or televisions. As of 1990, there was only one television set per 83 persons in North Korea (Comparison of, 1992). The Gross National Product (GNP) of North Korea for that year, in United States currency, was $23.1 billion—only 10 per cent of the amount of the GNP for South Korea (Eberstadt & Banister, 1991; Watanabe, 1992; Gross national, 1991; Rhee, 1992).

Because in North Korea only cities are electrified, the use of electricity in homes is limited to a few hours per day—providing little opportunity for North Koreans to listen to programs broadcast from South Korea, even for those fortunate enough to own radios and televisions. These conditions effectively prevent North Koreans from hearing programs broadcast from South Korea. Neither do South Koreans often hear programs broadcast in North Korea. For years, South Korea has blocked or jammed radio and television programs broadcast from North Korea (Haas, 1989; Kihl 1984). Only recently has this changed. Today South Koreans may listen to or watch a few radio or television programs from North Korea—those that are approved by the government and rebroadcast through South Korean stations.

Assessing Attitudes Toward Reunification in North and South Korea

Although there is a need to evaluate the constructive forces for integration in the divided Koreas, there is
relatively little information about public attitudes in either North or South Korea. Research, such as attitudinal surveys which might reflect poorly on the dominant regime or disagree with the party line, is either discouraged or expressly forbidden. Furthermore, citizens in both countries are not secure enough to openly express opinions on subjects they might consider to be controversial or sensitive. Neither of the Koreas, according to Western scholars, is an open society where survey research can effectively be undertaken.

Neither the political system of North Korea nor that of South Korea can truly be called democratic, despite constitutional provisions and claims to the contrary. Instead, both political systems of divided Korea are modifications of forms initially intended to be democratic. . . . While the political system in the South embodies a type of authoritarianism . . . the political system of North Korea epitomizes an extreme form of modern totalitarianism revolving around the life of the founding leader (actually boss Kim Il-Sung). . . . Under Kim Il-Sung, North Korea has become a Confucian communist state (in which Kim Il-Sung is the father of every North Korean and father cannot be wrong). (Kihl, 1984, p. 6)

Later Eberstadt and Banister elaborated on the South Korean government:

South Korea's political evolution . . . should not be minimized. In 1987, the country experienced the first basically free and competitive election in the history of the Korean people. . . . Yet mass election, even when conducted honestly, do not necessarily signify an overarching commitment to the rule of law. . . . The current South Korean government continues to demonstrate that it does not consider itself to be a state fully bound by the rule of law--as this concept is understood in the West. (Eberstadt & Banister, 1991, p. 50)
Without data from survey research, newspapers are one of the few sources one may use to ascertain public attitudes. Newspapers both influence and reflect public attitudes, are the major source of news and information, as well as a tool for indoctrination by the ruling regimes in both countries. Although regulated and highly censored by the state, newspapers often provide the only source from which one can discern changes in attitudes in the two countries. By comparing the substance and tone of articles pertaining to factors affecting integration over a period of years, one can detect trends and changes in the attitudes of regimes and societies.

Because newspapers are also a major force shaping individual opinions and attitudes, perhaps changes in attitudes can be inferred from the trends and changes in the tone of articles over a long period. Because few other avenues are available for studying public and individual attitudes toward Korean reunification, a sample of newspapers covering 40-odd years in both North and South Korea were read and analyzed during this study to determine whether any change in attitudes toward reunification could be identified. The findings taken from these newspaper articles pertaining to integration were compared with other literature available about public and individual attitudes in the two Korean societies.
Procedure and Data Used in Analyzing Contents of Newspapers

A modification of content analysis was used to discover changes in the attitudes toward integration and reunification. Content analysis is a method of research frequently used to study societal changes based upon written sources such as newspapers. The basic goal of content analysis was to take non-quantitative sources and modify or transform them into more objective, systematic, and quantitative data (Bailey, 1982).

There are two broad methods of content analysis: qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative content analysis counts frequency of the content mentioned in written sources, while the qualitative content analysis relies upon an evaluation of the content without an actual counting. The assumption of both of these methods is that other scholars using the same rules and materials could arrive at the same result. While qualitative content analysis does not rely on the counting process, it does assume that scholars could replicate the research and arrive at the same conclusion if the same material were being evaluated.

The first step in content analysis is deciding what sample of materials to include in the analysis. . . . The second task in any content analysis is to define the categories of content that are going to be measured. . . . The third task is to choose the recording unit. For example, from a given document
news source, or other material, the researcher may want to code 1) each word, 2) each theme, 3) each character or actor, 4) each sentence, 5) each paragraph or 6) each item in its entirety. When measuring concern . . . in the daily newspaper, the recording unit might be the article. . . . Finally, a researcher has to devise a system of enumeration for the content being coded. The presence or absence of a given content category may be measured . . . [or the researcher may measure the] "strength of intensity with which the category is presented." (Johnson & Joslyn, 1986, pp. 207-208)

This research used a modification of both methods of content analysis because the purpose was to ascertain whether changes have occurred in attitudes toward integration, or reunification, during the period from 1953 to 1991. A modification of quantitative content analysis was undertaken on one major newspaper in both North and South Korea, and a qualitative content analysis was made for three other newspapers in each of the two countries. The tone or intensity, rather than the content, of articles discussing factors thought to affect integration was considered to be most important. As each paper was read, the articles dealing with any aspect of integration (cultural, social, economic, or political) were noted and rated as being either positive, negative, or neutral in tone. On the selected days, the content and the tone of the article were examined simultaneously.

Articles about the cultural, economic, social, or political aspects of integration or reunification were rated as to the intensity of their support or opposition in the quantitative study. If tone of the article could not
be clearly determined, that article was rated neutral. Such matters as common historical occurrences, traditional music, sports, national literature (including prose and poetry, art forms), and national heroes of two countries were the typical articles expressing the cultural factors of national integration. Social integrations, as well as identification with cultural traditions, include such matters as the acceptance of traditional patterns of conduct toward different groups in society—the elderly, teachers, priests. Articles discussing mutual economic dependence, cooperation, or the possibilities of greater development through various aspects of economic integration of countries were categorized under economic factors of integration. The articles discussing the common creeds and ideologies of countries, obedience and support for the laws and institutions of government, as well as general support and cooperation between the countries were considered to be political integration.

During each year under consideration in the quantitative analysis, notes were made for each paper of the content and the tone of articles for each paper—in an attempt to show changes or trends from one decade to another. The counts of the numbers of articles reflecting positive, neutral, or negative attitudes were compiled for each decade. These trends have been displayed in graphic
form so that trends toward or away from integration could be seen.

After reading the sample for the qualitative from each newspaper, articles were not counted but rather were evaluated to determine whether they reflected positive, neutral, or negative positions. After each decade, an evaluation was made to determine if there was evidence of change compared to previous years.

The sample of newspapers from both countries was chosen to determine what attitudes were reflected about matters essential to integration and reunification of the country. The sample for the quantitative analysis was taken from the one major paper published in each country (The Rodong-Sinmun for North Korea; The Dong-A Ilbo for South Korea). These papers were chosen because they have the largest circulation in both countries. For the qualitative analysis, samples were taken from publication of three other major papers from each country (The Rodong-Cheongnyeon, The Pyongyang Times, and The People's Korea for North Korea; The ChungAhng Ilbo, The Cho-Seon-Ilbo, and The SaeGae Ilbo (The SaeGae Times) for South Korea).

In North Korea, there are no privately owned newspapers, magazines or journals. All newspapers are totally controlled by North Korean government and by the ruling party—the North Korean Workers' Party. As a result, dissidence or opposition to the government is
rarely reported. In South Korea, all newspapers are
privately owned.

Almost all South Korean newspapers have at one time or
another published articles opposing governmental policies. All
newspapers for four important days each year from 1953
to 1982 were analyzed. The newspaper analysis began with
editions published in 1953, rather than in 1946 when the
country was divided, because the year 1953 marked the end
of the Korean War as well as because copies of the North
Korean newspaper *The Rodong-Sinmun (Nodong-Sinmun)* from
1946 to 1951 were not available in the Library of Congress.

For the period from 1983 to 1991, the sample was
increased to 12 days per year. The total number of papers
in the sample for the latter period was increased because
it was believed that changes in attitudes were more likely
to have occurred in recent years. The days chosen for
sampling were days of historical importance to both
countries because it was believed that papers for those
days were more likely to discuss matters of integration and
reunification.

Table 1 on page 17 shows the days selected for the
sample. The entire issue of each newspaper for the
selected days was analyzed. Two newspapers (one for North
Korea and one for South Korea) were examined for each
selected day in the quantitative analysis, and three papers
in each country each day for the qualitative study—making
a total of 120 issues of each newspaper in the sample covering the period from 1953 to 1982, and 108 issues of each newspaper in the period from 1983 to 1991. The grand total used in the quantitative analysis was 456 papers, while 1,368 newspapers were read and analyzed for the qualitative analysis.

Findings From Content Analysis

As might be expected, newspapers reflect domestic and international environments. Table 3 illustrates the findings from the quantitative analysis—showing the number of articles which reflected positive, neutral, or negative attitudes toward peaceful integration and reunification of the nation.

First Decade After the Korean War

During the first decade (1953-1962) immediately after the war, few if any articles published in either North or South Korean papers had anything good to say about the other side, or about peaceful reunification. As can be seen in Table 3, for the first decade, only 18 articles in the sample of the North Korean newspapers concerned cultural, social, or economic subjects pertaining to integration and reunification, while 92 articles out of 110 (83.6%) concerned political subjects.
Table 3
Number of Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Korean Reunification: 1953-1991

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*The sample increased from 4 to 12 days a year.*
Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of articles during each decade published in the North Korea papers concerning cultural, economic, social and political subjects. The fact that the two countries had just signed an armistice after a bloody three year war is reflected in the large percentage of articles on political subjects. During the
period from 1953 to 1962, there was no contact between the two countries other than military talks, and any mention of the other side in newspapers was usually in derogatory terms (see Table 3). During this first decade after the war, ninety-six (87%) of 110 articles concerning all four factors considered in the sample of the North Korean newspaper expressed negative or hostile attitudes toward peaceful integration or reunification (see Figure 7).

Figure 7
Percentage of North Korean Newspaper Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Reunification
Only 3 articles (2.8%) expressed a positive attitude toward inter-Korean relations on any of the four factors of integration for the decade. In South Korea from 1953 to 1962, twenty two articles (59.5%) were negative, or derogatory, concerning all four factors of integration while 5 articles (13.5%) reflected positive attitudes and 10 articles (27%) were neutral (see Figure 8).

Figure 8
Percentage of South Korean Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Integration
Most articles in the North Korean papers during the first period concerned political subjects; only a few articles discussed anything about the cultural, social, or economic aspects of integration or reunification. However, the North Korean papers often carried pictures and laudatory articles about their Soviet allies. For example, the North Korean paper carried a full page picture of Stalin along with laudatory articles praising him and the Soviet Union (Generalissimo Stalin, 1952; Soviet Union, 1952; Soviet Union, 1954). At times, the Chinese were also praised—but not as frequently or as favorably as the Soviets. Peaceful reunification, as the term was used by Kim Il-Sung several times during this period, always meant that if the United States would withdraw from South Korea, the entire nation could be unified—implying that North Korea would unify the country by military means. The phrase, "peaceful reunification of Korea," always implied that Communism inevitably would prevail throughout Korea.

Until 1962, South Korean papers were similar to those North Korea in that they mainly concentrated on political factors rather than on any other aspects of integration. They frequently carried stories concerning: (a) reconstruction plans, (b) the president and his regime, (c) democracy and freedom, (d) the Korean War and anti-communism, (e) the United Nations, and (f) the United States. Korean reunification, when mentioned, was most
often discussed in terms of a demand for the surrender of North Korea. Implying that reunification would come about only by a victory of South Korea, President Rhee said, "There will be no peace before reunification of Korea" (There will, 1958).

The South Korean writers also reflected a strong anti-communist stance, insisting that the only way to overcome Communism, and to reunify the nation, was through force (Wealth of Strength, 1960). There were frequent articles about democracy and freedom rather than about reunification. The papers did carry special items such as the talk between President John Kennedy and Korean Ambassador Il-Kwon Chung in Washington during which Kennedy said that South Koreans would be able to achieve reunification (President John, 1961). President Park, however, later refuted this statement, saying that that reunification on an anti-communism basis could come about only through military force (Today is not, 1966).

One reason for the lack of discussion in South Korean newspapers on the subject of reunification during the early years (1950s to 1960s) was that on June 25, 1966, President Park Chung-Hee had announced that the time was not appropriate for reunification of the country. He suggested that it would be the late 1970s before the issue could be realistically discussed (Today is not, 1966). His statement had the effect of preventing South Korean
journalists from writing or printing articles about reunification; there was danger being jailed if journalists discussed such significant matters against governmental policy. As a result, during that period the issue of Korean reunification was not often discussed publicly in South Korean newspapers.

Perhaps another reason why reunification was not often discussed during the early decades after the Korea War ended was that the major powers preferred the status quo and were not interested in the issue of Korean reunification.

Neither communist backer [Russia nor China] is prepared to accept the substantial risks that the initiation of renewed warfare would entail. Similarly there is reason to doubt that either Communist backer is anxious to confront a unified strong Korea—regardless of the means used to achieve unification—because of other risks a stronger Korea might pose. . . . It will be more difficult for the Soviet union or China to deal with a unified Korea rather than a divided Korea. (Olsen, 1984, p. 155)

Still another reason why reunification was not frequently discussed in the South Korean papers during these early decades was that public attention focused on other issues. For example, a key issue in South Korean newspapers during that time was the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. This was a politically delicate issue with strong opposition. The attention of press and public focused on the demonstrations of college and university students against diplomatic relations with
Japan. These demonstrations continued for years on the campuses as well as on the streets of Seoul and other South Korean cities.

As a means of indoctrinating people with the prevailing political and economic ideology of the regime, newspapers in South Korea continued to print numerous articles about democracy, freedom, economic development, and free enterprise. During the early decades after the Korean War (1953-1972), few articles were found on the subjects of cultural, social, or economic integration. During this era, the newspapers continued to carry predominantly articles about politics. The number of articles about politics which expressed a hostile or negative attitude decreased from 22 in the first decade to 6 in the second decade (1963-1972).

Second Decade After the Korean War

During the second decade after the Korean War (1963-1972), few articles were published in the newspapers of either country concerning cultural, social, or economic factors related to integration or peaceful reunification. Most articles published in both North and South Korea still pertained to politics. The attitudes reflected in the articles of the North Korean paper were still predominantly hostile (125 out of 139 articles) toward integration or peaceful reunification. However, in the sample of South
Korean papers during this second decade, the political articles were not nearly as hostile in tone as they had been in the previous decade. Of 41 South Korean articles in the sample discussing political issues during the decade of 1963-1972, only 6 conveyed a negative or hostile attitude toward integration or peaceful reunification, whereas 21 articles were neutral in tone and 14 showed a positive attitude (see Figure 9).

Figure 9
Percentage of South Korean Articles on Cultural, Social, Economic, and Political Subjects
Toward the end of the 1960s, the newspapers in South Korea began to reflect the changing conditions of the international environment. In the early 1970s inter-Korean relations began a new era. Changes occurred in the international environment due to the increasing belligerency between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the impact of the Vietnam War, and detente between the PRC and the United States. The sample of the North Korean newspapers, however, did not reflect this change as much as did the South Korean newspapers.

Despite these changes in the international environment, North Korean papers showed little change in their outlook about reunification. In North Korea the pattern for cultural, social, and economic factors was almost identical during the first two decades (1953-1962 and 1963-1972). The number of political articles reflecting hostility actually increased from 87 in the first decade to 105 in the second decade. The North Koreans continued their belligerent attitudes toward both South Korea and the United States. In 1968, this hostility was acted out when the North Koreans attempted to assassinate President Park Chung-Hee of South Korea, and when the USS Pueblo with 80 Americans aboard was seized by the North Koreans.

In the South Korean newspapers during the decade of 1963-1972, positive attitudes in the articles toward peaceful integration and reunification increased from 13.5%
for 1953-1962 to 29.4% for 1963-1972. However, South Korean papers, like those in the North, continued to concentrate on political matters which made up 80.3% of the total discussions on integration and reunification during this period. Evidence that South Korea was reacting to the change in the international environment was found in an article about President Park Chun-Hee's announcement that South Korea was ready to normalize diplomatic relations with communist countries—including mainland China and North Korea (South Korea, 1971). This dramatic change in South Korea's stance toward Communist countries reflected, in part, the fact that the United States was reconsidering their policy of containment of communism—which would leave South Korea without military and economic support.

Reconsideration of free speech in South but not North Korea also helps to explain why South Korean newspapers carried many more positive political articles than previously, but North Korean papers did not change their hostile stance. South Korea was in the process of seeking a new policy to meet the changing international environment, although North Korea was attempting to maintain its unchanged position. During this second period after the Korean War, hostile political attitudes were still reflected in 105 out of 111 articles (94.6%) in the sample of the North Korean papers.
As a result of its attempts to reach a rapprochement with North Korea during the early 1970s, South Korea published many more articles concerning the hardship of families divided by the war. In the South Korean papers, the focus of these articles was on the human side of separated families rather than on political aspects of this issue. The common identity and kinship of all Koreans was emphasized in many of these articles.

In 1971, the growing concern over divided families led President Choi Doo-Sun of the South Korean Red Cross to initiate talks with the head of the North Korean Red Cross to discuss how to meet the needs of the divided families. The first political agreement between North and South Korea took place on July 4, 1972. Even though the countries were officially at war and the armistice provisions still applied, an agreement was reached to preserve, maintain, and protect peace between the two countries (Hornsby, 1972, p. 7).

Third Decade After the Korean War

During the third decade (1973-1982), President Park Chung-Hee advocated a two-Korea policy as the goal of South Korea even though he still envisaged national reunification (South Korea recognized, 1973; McGovern's warning, 1977). He called for the admission of both North and South Korea into the United Nations and for a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of both Koreas. South Korea's bringing about a rapprochement with North
Korea evidently superseded the President's desire for reunification—which might be the long term goal, but President Park agreed to the two-Korea policy by which North Korea would be recognized as an independent state.

South Korea's hope of establishing a rapprochement with North Korea was dashed by North Korea's continued attempts to assassinate President Park. On August 15, 1974, a national holiday celebrating Korea's Liberation from Japanese colonial rule, First Lady Yook Young-Soo of South Korea, President Park's wife, was assassinated in Seoul by a North Korean communist. The President was delivering an independence speech calling for non-aggression between North and South Korea. President Park Chung-Hee became a hero (Korean War: 40 years, 1990; Keon, 1977; Kim, 1991; Korea's careful, 1988).

In the third period (1973-1982), North Korean newspapers published increasing numbers of political articles reflecting a hostile or negative attitude (105 from 1963-1972; 152 in the third decade (See Figure 10). This hostile rhetoric increased despite the July 4, 1972, agreement of between the two countries to stop calling each other by abusive words and to renounce the use of force.

North Korean papers continued to write that everything in South Korea was terrible and everything in North Korea was great. According to this article, "The workers of South Korea were forced to work like slaves," while
South Korea were forced to work like slaves," while conditions in North Korea were described as a paradise (North Korea is, 1974). Many articles praised Kim Il-Sung, who promised North Koreans to reunify the entire Korean peninsula.

Figure 10
Number of North Korean Articles Showing Attitudes Toward Reunification
The increasingly hostile stance reflected in North Korean newspapers during the decade of 1973-1982 led to further hostile actions. North Korea tried to tunnel under the demilitarized zone with a tunnel large enough for military vehicles and weapons to support a surprise attack on South Korea. Fortunately, the tunnels, similar to those used by North Vietnam in the War against the United States, were discovered before an attack could occur (Kim, 1990).

The United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, leaving the country in the hands of the communists, caused great fear in South Korea that it would suffer a similar fate. This fear led to a reconsideration of both its domestic and foreign policies. A prevailing theme in South Korean papers at that time was that events similar to Vietnam could happen to South Korea if North Korea initiate another war (Kim, 1990).

During the decade of 1973-1982, the number of articles in the South Korean paper expressing negative attitudes toward to integration and reunification decreased, and the number of articles reflecting positive attitudes increased (Figure 11). According to an article about a survey which was conducted in Seoul in 1977, only 7.7% of the people believed that Korea would be reunified in the 1970s, and 28% reported that they did not see the possibility nor the need for reunification. However, 60% of the people surveyed did believe that Korea ultimately would be unified—perhaps during the 1990s (Survey of, 1978).
Despite the agreement with South Korea calling for non-interference, North Korea insisted throughout the 1970s that Korea was one country. North Korea did not agree to a two Korea policy. North Korean newspapers continued to
harp on political issues and to express hostile attitudes toward both South Korea and the United States.

According to the North Korean papers, the United States had initiated the Korean War (1950-1953) and continued to be the major aggressor in the world (United States initiated, 1978; 1985; 1991). This bellicose insistence led to another attempt to tunnel under the demilitarized zone to attack South Korea. Fortunately, this attempt was also discovered. North Korean papers concentrated predominantly on political aspects reflecting negative or hostile attitudes toward South Korea and the United States (Lee, 1981).

The fear of a similar fate as that of South Vietnam caused the South Korean government to clamp down on contact between North and South Koreans during this period. Although since the Korean War, it had been illegal for South Koreans to contact North Koreans or to support North Korean causes, over the years the South Korean government had grown quite lax in enforcing these provisions.

However, beginning in 1980, after the assassination of President Park, numerous individuals were arrested and tried for violating these provisions of the Security Law of South Korea. Discussions on reunification were verboten, and any mention of rejoining North Korea disappeared from the press. The hostility and fear of being left in the position of South Vietnam was further intensified by
President Carter's visit to South Korea and by his statements that more American troops would be withdrawn from South Korea. The issue of Korean reunification remained a highly restricted subject to the press of South Korea until recently.

Fourth Decade After the Korean War

During the most recent years (1983-1991), the North Korean newspapers in the sample showed little change from previous decades (Lee, 1985). They continued to express, in abusive rhetoric, their hostile feelings about South Korea and the United States. As the papers continued to concentrate on political subjects, scarcely any change occurred in their attitudes toward inter-Korean relations. These hostile attitudes by North Korea in 1983 were also reflected in an attempt to assassinate President Chon Doo-Whan of South Korea while he was visiting Burma. Three North Korean military terrorists were arrested, tried, and convicted by Burmese Courts. The government of Burma reported to the United Nations that the attempted assassination was undertaken by North Korean terrorists and that the bombs used in the attempt were made in North Korea (North Korean terrorists, 1991).

Another hostile act by North Korea against the South was the bombing of the Korean Airline by North Korean terrorists in 1987—which occurred just before the Olympics
were to begin in Seoul and killed 115 people. Acts like these reflect little evidence of a will in North Korea to peacefully reunite the two countries (North Koreans' animosities, 1988; South Korea does, September 20, October 31, November 1, 1991; Suh, Lee, Oh, & Kahng, 1990).

Even admission of both North and South Korea into the United Nations in 1991 did not change North Koreans' hostile attitudes. North Koreans continued to emphasize their solidarity with the Soviet Union almost up to the time it collapsed. The North Korean newspaper also continued to reiterate their derogatory statements about South Korea, United States, and capitalists generally—even though North Korea was attempting to open trade relations with some capitalists countries (South Korea does, September 20, October 31, November 1, 1991; South Korea is, May 25, 1991; January 25, April 4, May 16, 1992). An American reporter, who had visited North Korea, recently wrote: "Though its ideological rhetoric still decry the evils of capitalism, American imperialists and Japanese colonial masters, North Korea is turning to all three—among others—for help" (Watanabe, 1992 p. 1). Most of the capitalist countries, however, believed that North Korea was planning to develop nuclear weapons (Sanger, 1991). Even though North Korea recently accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency's requirement of inspection, Tokyo and other countries with ties to the West were still leery of
accepting North Korea as a full trade partner (Shim, 1992).

Throughout the four decades since the end of the Korean War, the abusive tone and rhetoric of North Korean newspapers did not change much. Even after signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation on December 13, 1991, North Korea's hostile attitude toward both the South and the United States continued to be decried in the North Korean newspapers. The recent talks on reunification between the Prime Ministers of the two countries began in September 1990. Because of the talks, many Koreans had for the rejoining of the divided land. Although one would expect that a change would occur in the official attitudes of North Korean newspapers, no change occurred; negative and hostile views continue to dominate the news. For the last forty seven years, eighty-eight percent of all articles on integration or peaceful reunification published in the North Korean newspaper under survey were either negative or hostile in tone. Even with the recent changes in the international environment, no change has occurred in the attitudes reflected in the North Korean newspaper.

One example of cooperation between North Korea and South Korea occurred in 1984. After a devastating flood ravaged the country, North Korea sent aid to the South Koreans. Despite the hope that this friendly gesture
provided an opening for improving relations between the two countries, the North Koreans quickly demonstrated that the event was nothing but a propaganda ploy. Hostility between the two countries continued.

Another opportunity for improving relations occurred when an attempt was made in 1985 to reunite members of divided families. However, North Korea limited the effort to only 151 Koreans out of almost a million separated Korean families. Furthermore, these visits also were turned into propaganda tirades against South Korea by the North. Another period for visitation of separated family members was scheduled for August 15, 1992—seven long years since the first attempt to reunite the families. The yearning by thousands of families to visit their loved ones continued to be denied. North Korea was adamant that only 240 members from each side be permitted to visit their families (Watanabe 1992; Mutual visits, 1992). The reuniting effort seemed to be only a propaganda game.

The sample of the South Korean newspapers reflected an entirely different pattern of attitudes during the fourth decade (1983-1991). The number of articles expressing negative political attitudes toward integration and reunification decreased (7 out of 112 articles), whereas there were 407 hostile articles (92%) in the sample of the North Korean newspaper. Articles reflecting positive
attitudes in the sample of the South Korean newspaper grew during the four decades (from 13.5% to 46%).

South Koreans could succeed in achieving greater freedom from their governmental restrictions on North Korean materials after July, 1988. (South Koreans may, 1988; Yim, 1988; Shin, 1988). The laws which describe North Korea as the enemy were also repealed. These actions were a part of President Roh Tae-Woo's Northern Policy, which hoped to encourage integration and peaceful reunification between the two countries (Roh, 1990; Special announcement, 1988). This new stance by South Korea was clearly evident in the tone of the articles in South Korean papers. As a result of this relatively free new climate, an increasing number of South Koreans visited their families in North Korea. As the numbers visiting North Korea grew, and as North Korean newspapers began to carry articles about these visits, the South Korean government changed its mind and began to arrest some of visitors when they returned. Some are now in prison in South Korea—for visiting North Korea. As a result of these governmental actions, travel between the countries has almost stopped. Few North Koreans, except officials on business, have traveled to the South throughout this entire forty-seven years.

In 1990, another attempt was made to encourage Koreans to travel between the two countries. The soccer teams of
the two countries were invited, and played, in both North and South Korea. These games were televised and publicized in the newspapers. In 1991, the success of this venture led to the creation of a joint Korean table tennis team to play in the World Championship games in Tokyo. After the unified Korean team won first place, newspapers in both countries were full of stories on the unified team. The articles often discussed Korean integration and reunification as well as the success of the team. The first unified Korean soccer team led to perhaps the single most significant public discussion on integration and reunification in the media of both North and South Korea during the 47 years of division.

The South Korean newspaper, *The Dong-A Ilbo*, employed a Seoul marketing survey firm to survey attitudes about the possibility of reunification. This report, published in the newspaper on January 1, 1991, showed that 61% of the people interviewed believe that reunification was possible, while 23% people believe that it was not possible. The percentage of those believing that reunification was a possibility had increased from 33% in 1988 to 46% in 1989, rising again to 51% in 1990. Ninety percent of the sample wanted a summit meeting called immediately to consider reunification.

Many, however, were skeptical that reunification would occur any time soon. Only 32% believed that reunification
would occur within the next 10 years. Thirty-eight percent of those surveyed believed that it would take at least 20 years to reunify Korea, and 19% more believed that it would be at least 30 years before reunification could occur. Korean Reunification seemed to be a remote possibility to most Koreans.

In January, 1991, the South Korean newspaper under examination carried a story about a conference on Korean reunification held in Germany—jointly sponsored by the Korean newspaper and a German university (Choi, 1991). The conference stressed the importance of the cultural ties which bound the Koreans together within the two societies. It warned against accentuating ideological difference and urged that the advantages of unity be stressed, called for greater democratization in both countries, and advocated an open process in the reunification negotiations. Neither the North nor the South Korean governments formally embraced these findings, although the South Korean government did not object to the article's publication. The conference was not mentioned in any of the North Korean papers.

It is interesting to note that throughout the 47 year period studied, the newspapers in North Korea did not change significantly. The North Korean regime, which controls what is published in the papers, was still sharply divided ideologically and remained hostile to South Korea
On the other hand, the South Korean papers showed a marked change in attitudes during this period. The number of articles expressing positive attitudes increased, and the negative articles decreased significantly. Over all, in both North and South Korea, there has been relatively little demand from the citizenry that an attempt be made to reunify the nation. No Korean political figures from either side have made reunification their main emphasis, nor have they risked their careers to speak on behalf of Korean unity.

Qualitative Content Analysis

In addition to the quantitative analysis of two Korean papers, a qualitative content analysis of six other Korean newspapers was also conducted: three from North Korea and three from South Korea for the same dates. The evaluation from the analysis was basically the same as in the quantitative study. Neither of the regimes seemed anxious to pursue free and peaceful reunification, nor were they willing to give up their existence and create a new unified government. Neither seemed ready to abandon their political or economic ideology (Kim, 1991).

A number of insightful articles showing other aspects of the problems of reunifying Korea were found in this larger sample. For example, a survey of the concerns of the South Korean people was undertaken by another leading
newspaper, The Cho-Seon Ilbo, in Seoul in January, 1992. It reported that only 0.6% of South Koreans surveyed thought that reunification was among the most important issues facing the nation. The economy and consumer prices dominated concerns of South Korean people, and there seemed to be little interest in reunification. However, 61%, believed that there was a real threat of war with North Korea, and 79% felt American troops continued to be essential to their safety and defense.

All the leading South Korean newspapers reported on Shim's 1992 article: "Korean unity: The cost," published in the Far Eastern Economic Review. This article pointed out that North Korea was near economic collapse and that under a unified government South Korea would have to provide a gigantic relief program for the North (Eberstadt, 1992; Shim, 1992; Watanabe, 1992). The article suggested that South Korea begin negotiating with the World Bank to ensure that it has the needed resources for this purpose. The article also stated that unification of the tax system would be required, and higher taxes might be levied against Southerners if the country reunified. A political scientist, Koo Young-Nok, was quoted as saying that it would take decades—not years—to successfully bring the two sides together socially.

After almost 50 years of separate existence, the two sides now have virtually nothing in common, with the exception of language. Even the common cultural
heritage is weakening on both sides. North Koreans have developed distinct lifestyles and a similar mind under a Stalinist autocracy. Endless brainwashing and study sessions have made them the most collectivist-oriented people in the world today (Koo cited in Shim, 1992, p. 60).

There also have been a number of articles of South Korean papers about the possibility of a domestic collapse in North Korea, which might be similar to the fall of East Germany. These articles, reflecting the content of books and journals, point out the weaknesses in the North Korean economy as well as the poor standard of living compared with South Korea (Kwon, 1991). Some articles predicted that the collapse of North Korea would occur either as a result of Kim Il-Sung's death and the requirement to transfer power, or in a military coup (Kwon, 1991). Few believed that a civilian uprising would overthrow the regime in North Korea (Carlin, 1991; Lee, 1991). However, all recognized that South Korea will face a major challenge if the North Korean government fell. Some South Koreans appear to be having second thoughts about the desirability of reunification.

From both the quantitative and the qualitative content analysis of the newspapers in both North and South Korea over the past four decades, there is little evidence of a national will to reunify the country. (Ahn, 1991: Chira, 1991; Sanger, 1991). If the assumption that newspapers reflect and shape the attitudes of individuals is correct,
the integrative bonds among the Korean people—which might pull the country together—are lacking at this time. Since both international and internal factors have shaped the destiny of Korea, we must now attempt to synthesize both the findings about geopolitics affecting Korea and the internal conditions in the two countries. (Herz, 1975; Jordan & Taylor, 1988; In Asia, 1990; Korean incident, 1976; Korean solution, 1980).
CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany in 1990 raised hope among Koreans that their country would soon be unified. This study has examined whether the hope of Korean reunification is realistic or unrealistic at this time. Korea's fate has always been affected by its geographical location and the geopolitics of the region, as well as by internal conditions in the country. This study has examined both the geopolitics involved in Korea and the public attitudes toward the integration of North and South Korea.

Dramatic changes have occurred in the international environment since the Korean War, changes which have caused Korean reunification to be less significant to the major international players. America's commitment to the policy of containment, as well as the Cold War strategy against communism has been abandoned. The Cold War is over, but America is unwilling to lead the movement for the unification of Korea. The breakup of the Soviet Union took that super power out of the game and left North Korea without its main supporter. Communist China, officially the People's Republic of China (PRC) is desperately attempting
to build an economy capable of supporting its huge population and is dependent upon the international community for the technology and capital to undertake this task. As a result, it is against PRC's interest to continue to support the militant communists in North Korea in their efforts to reunify the country by force, because such an action on China's part might injure its economic relations with the West. Japan also seems to gain from there being two divided Koreas, because dealing with two divided weak nations is easier than dealing with a unified and stronger nation.

The geopolitics in the region ensure that none of the neighboring countries which have shaped Korea's past will sacrifice their positions for the issue of Korean reunification. If serious efforts to reunify Korea develop, it is uncertain what position these major players will take. The United States has long declared that it is committed to freedom and democracy in Korea, and that it supports Korean reunification—with peace and freedom for the Korean people. Russia is facing an internal crisis which prevents it from becoming seriously involved in the issue of Korean reunification. China, which is still committed to communism, has ideological ties with North Korea and might resist a Western attempt to unify Korea. What Japan would do is questionable, although it probably would go along with Korean reunification. However, from a
Japanese viewpoint, a unified Korea presents either a potential danger or a possible burden to Japanese national defense. Therefore, Japan might prefer the status quo in Korea.

Whether Koreans still want reunification, after being divided for nearly 50 years, is a major unanswered question. A content analysis of the newspapers in North and South Korea sought to determine if there was any evidence that the Korean people support unification. From the analysis of those newspapers, it was evident that the ruling regimes in both countries have demonstrated little desire for peaceful reunification and that they still talk as if they believe that each will conquer the other side. The regimes on both sides are unwilling to consider surrendering power or ideology in order that a new unified government can be created. Furthermore, this research surveying the South Korean newspapers has shown that unification is far from being of vital concern to either the North or the South Korean people.

South Koreans, after the euphoria of the German reunification faded, began to have second thoughts as they estimated the expense of reunifying the nation. The cost of rebuilding the North Korean economy after reunification would be astronomically high. Most of the burden will fall on the more prosperous South. Increasingly, questions are being raised about what South Korea—after suffering a
devastating war, enduring fifty years of division, and following an entirely different path of development—has in common with North Korea.

Koreans are divided not only ideologically but also culturally, economically, socially, and politically. Few integrative factors, except language and ethnicity, appear to remain to bind the Korean people together. Many Koreans have been torn by divisive factors against their will: both the division of their country and the Korean War. Some may still have doubts about both possibility and the potential benefits of a peaceful reunification of North and South Korea.

But the benefits of a Korean reunification led by South Korea are clear for all of the international players (the United States, Russia, China, and Japan) involved in Korean affairs: the economic benefits of improved trade and low cost of defense due to the geopolitical stability in East Asia. Now it remains a matter of time.

Koreans enjoy few of the conditions which aided East and West Germans to reunite. Despite the Cold War, West Germans continued to enjoy relatively stable political, economic, and social conditions throughout the years of division—without being threatened during the entire period—while North and South Koreans felt threatened continuously by militants from the other side acting jointly with their military allies.
Trade between East and West Germany continued in increasing amount throughout most of post war period; millions of Germans visited the other side during the years of division. Radio and television programs in Germany spilled over the borders informing each side about the other. German unification continued to be one of the main political issues in Germany throughout the years of division, and German political parties as well as individual politicians took up the banner of German unification. None of these favorable conditions exists in Korea. The two Korean nations were isolated from each other. Until recently, no one wrote or spoke of peaceful reunification or of common ties between Korean people of the North and South. No Korean political leader has dared to lead the way to bridge the chasm.

In North and South Korea today, few integrative factors except language and ethnic tradition are present. There was no direct trade between North and South Korea until 1991. In fact, there was little contact of any kind between the two sides, and no political parties or politicians had taken up the cause of reunification during the almost forty-seven years of division.

The most important difference between Germany and Korea, however, is that Germany did not fight a blood letting war as did North and South Korea. The animosities and hatred caused by the war between North and South Korea
branded the competing ideologies into the souls of the Korean people. As a result, North Koreans abhor South Koreans as well as Americans. South Koreans, likewise, do not trust either North Koreans, Communist Chinese, or Russians. Each side sees the other as the villains who killed the grandparents. This legacy of hatred remains almost unchanged even today, particularly in North Korea. The findings from the content analysis of the newspapers in North and South Korea bear out the fact that there is little evidence of a national will among Koreans—either in the North or in the South—to reunite the divided nation, even though the two Prime Ministers have been talking of cooperation and reunification during recent years.

During the recent talks between the two Prime Ministers of North and South Korea, there seems to be hope for progress toward reunification. As long as the competing ideologies of the two present regimes dominate the country, free and peaceful Korean reunification will be difficult. However, unexpected world events as well as the country's internal development have a way of shaping the destiny of nations in spite of their governmental and public attitudes and actions. Such uncontrolled events could trigger a momentum for Korean reunification. When 80-year-old Kim Il-Sung dies, or his son Kim Jong-Il's and the family loses power, North Korea will be seriously challenged to maintain itself. The weakness of its economy, the low standard of
living, as well as the potential for conflict among military leaders hardly bode well for the stability of the North. Under these conditions, North Koreans—especially after they are able to see the relative prosperity and freedom of South Koreans—may clamor for Korean reunification as East Germans did after they were attracted by the prosperity and freedom of West Germans. Korean reunification could come about as a result of just such unforeseen events.

What North Korean leaders are afraid of is that they may lose their joy of life as well as their jobs. Should Korean reunification occur in an unexpected fashion, it would be hard for Koreans to rebuild a stable and unified country because many of the integrative national bonds which unified Koreans for over a millennium have been cut. These bonds of unity between the North and South are now in the buds of Korean restoration.

Korean reunification remains a matter of time because the political development of South Korea, combined with remarkable economic progress, can surely heal the broken unity and national will among Koreans. The enormous financial burden of rebuilding the North Korean economy, which will probably fall upon South Koreans when reunification occurs, is a major challenge. The road to Korean reunification and the future of a reunified Korea depend largely upon the willingness, courage, wisdom, and
patience of the South Koreans: (a) the willingness to assume the tremendous burden to rebuild North Korea, (b) the courage to strengthen Korean diplomatic relations with the United States as well as neighboring countries, (c) the wisdom to develop more positive inter-Korean relations based upon mutual cultural, social, and economic contacts, and (d) the patience to develop cooperation and to pursue enough transactions between the two sides to develop stable ties. If Koreans have enough willingness, courage, wisdom, and patience, they may yet accomplish their freedom and realize their dream of unity. The divided Korean peninsula will be reunified and will become one nation again when Koreans develop their capability of cooperating with their friends in the larger family on both sides of the border.
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