A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSIC ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Andrew Anderson, B.M., M.M.
Denton, Texas
December, 1995
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Many of the early writings and lectures of the German phenomenological philosopher Martin Heidegger involve investigations into the question of Being. An important part of these investigations is his examination of how we go about the everyday business of existing—doing our jobs, dealing with things in our environment, working through problems, thinking, talking—and what our ways of operating in these everyday activities tell us about our Being in general.

Musicians have their own everyday musical tasks, two of the most prominent of which are composing and performing. Composers and performers, like everyone else, have a 'world'—Heidegger's word for the structure of relationships between equipment, persons, and tasks and the way in which a person is situated in that structure—and that 'world' allows them to cope with their musical environment in ways that enable them to make music as composers and performers.

Analyzing music is an activity that a Heideggerian approach sees as derived from the primary musical activities of composing and performing. A music analyst trades the possibility of primary musical involvement for a kind of
involvement that points out determinate characteristics; hence in adopting an analytical stance, the analyst trades doing something musical for saying something about music. In making such a trade, however, a prior musical involvement—a basic musicality—is always presupposed.

Every way of analyzing music has its own way of making determinations, and after detailing the manner of the derivation of the general analytical attitude, this study examines several types of analysis and the ways in which they exemplify the derivative nature of analytical activity. One extended example, an analysis of Jean Sibelius's The Swan of Tuonela, provides several opportunities for discussion (via interspersed passages of commentary) of a view of music analysis drawn from Heideggerian phenomenology.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................. vi

Chapter

1. THE ANALYSIS OF MUSIC ANALYSIS .............. 1

2. GENERAL EVERYDAYNESS ............................. 22
   Being-in-the-world
   The 'Here' (Da-) of Dasein
   Interpretation
   Falling

3. MUSICAL EVERYDAYNESS ............................. 68
   Composing
   Performing

4. THE DERIVATIVE NATURE
   OF MUSIC ANALYSIS ................................ 110
   The Mechanics of the Derivation
   The Possibility of Everyday Analysis

5. AN ANALYSIS OF SIBELIUS'S THE SWAN
   OF TUONELA WITH COMMENTARY .................. 151
   Introduction
   An Analysis of Sibelius's
   The Swan of Tuonela

6. CONSEQUENCES .................................... 201

WORKS CITED ........................................ 221
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Beethoven, Op. 10, No. 3, first movement (measures 7-10) ........................................ 118

Figure 2. Brahms, Op. 39, No. 1
(analytic sketch) ........................................... 123

Figure 3. Schoenberg, Op. 19, No. 4
(Functional Analysis) .................................... 131

Figure 4. Derivation of the gesture from Functional Analysis, measure 48 ................................... 135

Figure 5. Alternate compositional presentation of derivation shown in figure 4 .............................. 136

Figure 6. Formal diagram of Swan ........................................... 165

Figure 7. Themes and motives in The Swan of Tuonela ...................................................... 165

Figure 8. Circular diagram of form of Swan ........................................... 167

Figure 9. Motives al and cl ........................................... 167

Figure 10. Motives and themes derived from A and D material ............................................. 168

Figure 11. Sketches of themes E and F ........................................... 168

Figure 12. Motive n ........................................... 168

Figure 13. Section I, sketch of measures 1-7 ........................................... 176

Figure 14. Section I, sketch after inclusion of material from section IV .................................... 177

Figure 15. Adjustment of cl2 according to cl1 ........................................... 179

Figure 16. Extension of section I through al4 ........................................... 179

Figure 17. Rewriting section II, beginning ........................................... 180

Figure 18. Swan, measures 24-25, with tritone ........................................... 182

Figure 19. Sketches of rewritten section II ........................................... 183
Figure 20. Sketch of Sibelius's section III . . . . . 185
Figure 21. Sketches of two versions of measures 38-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Figure 22. Sketch of first part of section III . . . . 188
Figure 23. Sketches of two versions of measures 58-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Figure 24. Measures 9-12 and 58-70 compared . . . . . 190
Figure 25. Two versions of the section III intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Figure 26. Sketch of section III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Figure 27. Sketches of rewritten version and Sibelius's version of Swan . . . . . . . . 193
ABBREVIATIONS

(Note: Abbreviations of works by Martin Heidegger in this list are arranged alphabetically; only the works cited and particular editions used are included. Citations are given parenthetically in the body of the text as abbreviation and page number).


CHAPTER I

THE ANALYSIS OF MUSIC ANALYSIS

Most of our lives are spent in activities that do not ask to be examined. Yet, while it is true to say that we generally do not think through everything that we do, to say that we are merely "going through the motions" most of the time may be too strong, since to say so might imply that it would be better not to do those things than to do them without thinking about them. It is safe to say, however, that we do perform many of the tasks that we do every day without explicit consideration of their legitimacy or any examination of their foundations. We do them because they work for us, and for most of us for most of the time, that is enough.

For many musicians, analyzing music is one such activity. At times it may seem as though analysis itself has come under consideration, for example when a musician wonders about the most appropriate analytical approach to take toward a particular work, but in such a case it is primarily the work rather than analysis that is under examination. In such a case, alternative methods of analysis are being considered, but analysis as such does not become the subject of an interrogation.
Sometimes music analysis itself does come under special scrutiny, often because the inquirer feels a need to clarify the motives behind analysis, and this need may grow out of a feeling that the activity requires some justification or clarification. On the one hand, the one who is out to justify does so against presumed charges of illegitimacy or, perhaps worse, superfluity. While such charges may represent a certain amount of musical irresponsibility, they nevertheless represent common perceptions, and teachers of music theory are often faced with questions that grow out of just such perceptions. If brought to the surface, the charges might read: analyzing is not one of the things one is supposed to do with music; music is there to be heard—not just to be written or played—and analysis diverts music from this primary purpose. On the other hand, the one who is out to clarify may wish to do so because analysis often proceeds with poorly-founded or unexamined assumptions, and an activity that is sometimes relegated to the intellectual end of the musical spectrum ought to be an informed activity; it should be aware of what it is doing.¹

¹ There are, of course, other motives for examining music analysis, but often these motives are closely allied with the two general categories that I have named. Michael Kowalski engages the charges of illegitimacy from within enemy territory, so to speak, and even concludes that music does not need analysis (Analysis as Composition, DMA Thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1979 [Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986], 10). Alan Walker portrays the same charge as one against which analysis has been vindicated, but what emerges in his portrayal is a kind of apologia in spite of itself: "Now musical analysis is not so
The questions, "What is music analysis?" and "Why do we do it?" account for much of the inquiry that goes on with respect to the subject. Most often, the question or questions are simply assumed, not stated directly, and answered either with the formula "Music analysis is..." or "Music analysis should...." In any case, it is worth asking to what extent these represent the same question about or the same way of thinking about analysis. The what-question assumes that music analysis is a thing, and that this thing can be examined in isolation, and the process of answering the question becomes an examination of the characteristics of the activity. The why-question assumes that, whatever its nature, analysis is undertaken in order to serve some greater end, and the process of answering the question becomes an examination of the function of the activity in relation to that end. These two questions in their explicit forms have been with music analysis at least much concerned with explaining mysteries as with establishing facts. If some of the facts it has discovered from time to time have also explained a mystery, and thereby raised the ire of those musicians who prefer not to think about their art, it has also stimulated others to look a little deeper and to think a little harder about the subject. The situation has a certain reward in that it is now no longer necessary for anyone to write a defence of music analysis before embarking on it" (A Study in Music Analysis [New York: the Free Press of Glencoe, 1962], 13-14.) The introductory remarks to Ian Bent's historical survey of music analysis, however, are a species of clarification; the function of his statements is to prepare the way for the study that follows and to clarify his criteria for selection of the analytical systems that he examines (Analysis, with a glossary by William Drabkin [New York: W. W. Norton, 1987], 1-5).
since it became a self-conscious activity, around the end of the 16th century; as implicit questions, they have probably been around as long as music theory itself has. While these factors bode ill for any exhaustive treatment of the ways the questions have been asked--and sometimes not asked--it is practical to illustrate the general tendencies that the questions exhibit.

Many who essay to describe music analysis take it as an examination--either a process or product--and especially as an examination of coherence, unity or structure. In his discussion of problems of analysis in the 20th century, Robert Morgan quotes Edward Cone's apparently simple statement as to the marked contextuality of the analysis of recent music: "The good composition will always reveal, on close study, the methods of analysis needed for its own comprehension." The goal of analysis, then, is comprehension of the musical work, and presumably we can read this part of the statement as Cone's answer to the question, "What is analysis?": it is a tool for comprehending music. This is, however, an oversimplification of Cone's response; indeed it may be seen as a tool for comprehending the musical work, but the means for determining the proper tool is apparently analysis as

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well. By what means, then, does the analyst determine the proper method for determining the proper method of analysis? Is this, too, revealed through "close study?" It appears that analysis of recent music has not divested itself of the circularity Morgan ascribes to the development of the discipline between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. What is analysis? In the Morgan/Cone version of things, it is a tool that enables us to say things about works that we "enjoy and admire"—this is important, since we rarely bother analyzing works that we care nothing about—and this saying-things-about should take the form of something beyond "mere description." Even though Morgan leaves this mereness undefined, I think its source is the analytical circle itself. Descriptive non-analysis, in this account, results from an early exit from the circle.

While some descriptions of analysis relate clearly to the what-question, at first glance many responses appear to relate more to the "why" than the "what." In one of his many discussions of the relationships between music theory, musicology, analysis, and criticism, Joseph Kerman has introduced one characterization of analytical activity thus: "By removing the bare score from its context in order to examine it as an autonomous organism,..."3 The italicized

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3 Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 73, my italics. Kerman's characterization may be part of a rhetorical ploy at this point in his essay, but this is beside the point that analysis is often described in the way
phrase focuses upon the purpose of the activity, and can be read as a response to the implicit question, "Why analyze music?" Isolation of this exchange, however, reveals its tautological nature: we analyze music in order to analyze it as an organism. This is not the same kind of circularity found in the Morgan/Cone response; there, the circle forms an essential part of the argument, while here the circle results from a misconstrual of Kerman's words. Rephrasing may seem to help, but to say "We analyze in order to see how the musical work functions" is really only to disguise the tautology. If, on the other hand, Kerman's phrase is read as an answer to the question, "What is music analysis?" the exchange becomes logically acceptable: Music analysis is an examination of a musical organism.

Another "what" disguised as a "why" appears in Allen Forte's sketch of the basic requirements for analysis: "an analysis should undertake to explain the essential relationships within a composition, their genesis, ordering, interaction and relative importance to the parts and to the whole of the work." Forte's use of "should" appears to cast the sentence as a response to a species of the why-question, this time in the form, "Why analyze in this way?" In this instance, however, the emphasis is on analysis as a

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finished product (an analysis) whose function is to explain, ostensibly to someone else. The response, then, is not really a response to the question of why one should analyze in such a way—not yet, anyway—but is more an introduction to the implicit answer. It is as if, when asked the question, Forte responded that, since music analysis is supposed to explain in this way, one should choose a way of analyzing that does so most thoroughly. Forte’s response to an implied "Why analyze thus?" is an implied question of his own: "What qualities characterize good analysis?" Or, put somewhat baldly, "What is analysis?"

One of the earliest theorists to provide a rationale for analysis is Joachim Burmeister, one of the first theorists to acknowledge the activity at all. The section of his Musica Poetica that deals with analysis begins with an answer to the what-question: "Musical analysis is the examination of a piece belonging to a certain mode and to a certain type of polyphony." Following this statement, he describes the analytical process as the dividing a piece into its affections or periods, and to this description he appends an answer to the why-question: "so that the artfulness with which each period takes shape can be studied and adopted for imitation." To oversimplify, we might say that composers analyze in order to imitate. But

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Burmeister's focus is not simply on imitating the piece, but on imitating "the artfulness with which" a section of music is put together, so that what is really in view is the adoption—or perhaps assumption or even assimilation—of that technique. It is also significant that his picture of this studying lays such stress on identification of characteristics, particularly those of mode and type of polyphony. It is through study of the ways in which effects in these areas are achieved that composers add to their own technique, and the starting point for this studying, indeed the starting point for all analysis, must be a wondering about; even the ability to ask questions about a piece must grow out of a musicality of some sort. For a composer, this wondering can take the form of asking after the causes of something of interest. For a performer, it can take the form of asking after the means by which it might be most effectively executed. Burmeister's answer to the question, "Why analyze?" might therefore be read as follows: "The more experience a composer has in following the ways in which others have achieved their effects, the better equipped he or she will be to invent some (apparently) new ones."

While some theorists, Burmeister for one, tend to justify analysis on the basis of its being an aid to performance or composition, Johann Philipp Kirnberger appears to grant the practice a measure of autonomy, and in this respect his response to an implicit why-question may at
first seem unusual. He prefaces his analysis of a fugue of his own composition with the following paragraph:

It has been mentioned with regard to regular and irregular passing notes that it is sometimes difficult to find the principal notes and to detect the true harmony as conceived by the composer. So that beginners can practice the correct judgement in a few rather complex situations, the following keyboard piece has been inserted here, and below the actual parts, three additional staves with bass clef have been added to clarify the harmony.

Once beginners have acquired skill in the accurate analysis of harmony in this piece, we recommend to all of them that they also study the works of great masters in a similarly thorough way. In that way they will be in a position to solve the most difficult harmonic structures. Moreover, they will find that harmonies about which people sometimes form very strange notions and in which some people imagine finding quite odd composite or superimposed chords, are in fact nothing other than mere triads or seventh chords.\(^6\)

His answer to the implied question, "Why analyze?" proceeds first with the definition of a problem: some musicians have trouble determining the essential notes in a composition—the notes that determine harmonies. The second part of his answer is the solution: if these musicians practice analyzing, first by going over Kirnberger's own analysis and then by analyzing other works in the same way that Kirnberger has analyzed his fugue, these musicians will be able to make distinctions between essential and nonessential notes in practice and thus unravel "difficult harmonic structures."

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\(^6\) Johann Philipp Kirnberger, The Art of Strict Musical Composition, trans. David Beach and Jürgen Thym, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 266; *auflösen*, rendered "solve" by the translators, also might be translated with "unravel," or even "analyze."
structures" outside the laboratory, so to speak. The musician analyzes, then, in order to "detect the true harmony as conceived by the composer." Put in these terms--unraveling harmonic structures, detecting harmonies--analysis seems like something undertaken for its own sake, like the solving of a jigsaw puzzle, rather than a means to some greater end. Earlier in his text, however, Kirnberger has recommended the removal of embellishments from arias in order to see how such pieces then have the characteristics of "a well-composed and correctly declaimed chorale," and this recommendation arises in the context of discussion of training of young composers in the writing of chorales. Furthermore, he warns that "the principal harmony and simple melody must be made perceptible in all embellished arias;" and this implies that the musician should use both conventional analysis--in order to see how embellishments have been applied to arias--and a kind of analysis-in-reverse--in order to apply embellishments in such a way as to make clear "the principal harmony and simple melody" in a performance. If we read Kirnberger's later remarks in the larger context in which they appear, we might take them as a promotion of a traditional view of analysis: it is useful for instructing composers and guiding performers.


8 Kirnberger illustrates this kind of analysis in his text via reductions of two arias from operas by C. H. Graun (*Strict Musical Composition*, pp. 234-235).
In what other ways might analysis be of service to performers besides helping them to define harmonies more accurately? Wallace Berry provides one answer:

...if, as commonly conceded, there is no "best" or "correct" interpretation of a piece, there are nonetheless infinite possibilities of misrepresenting, and of interpretive intrusion; analysis must often tell the performer what should not be done. And multiple meanings of an event may suggest that the execution be as neutral as possible and that the notes be allowed to speak for themselves.9

Thus several interpretations may be equally correct, and it is not possible to choose between readings on these terms. What makes choice possible is the danger of interpretive error, elevating by default the interpretation that does not possess such error over those that do. The most desirable performance (interpretation?) is the one free from error, and one function of analysis is to guide the performer past errors. If analysis is unable to isolate only one correct interpretation, at least it can show what a mistake might look like. In the clear-cut situation when there is but one correct reading, one correct way of performing an event, the performer should certainly choose this way of performing--indeed, this does not amount to a choice at all. The presence of multiple correct choices for interpretation, however, implies that the "best" performance of an event is the one that enables the audience to interpret the event in

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the way they think best, and the function of analysis in this case is to show when responsibility for misinterpretation should be passed along from the performer to the audience, or to show when to let the notes "speak for themselves;" but the notes should only be allowed to do this in the difficult interpretive situation involving multiple correct readings. Analysis can thus assist the performer in determining when a performance decision should not be made. But can notes "speak for themselves?" Can a performer decide not to decide? After a performer identifies several potentially correct readings of a passage, can that performer perform the passage as though those readings did not exist?

If we take for granted that the primary function of analysis is to help out composers or performers, we necessarily—if sometimes unintentionally—engage questions regarding the divisions of labor, so to speak, within music. Are performing and composing dependent on analysis, or is analysis dependent on performing and composing? Are these the only two alternatives? Answers to questions like these tend to blur boundaries between analysis, composition and performance, and while attempts at clarification of the boundaries that have been blurred may seem to get closer to the essence of the relationships, to proceed with this kind of investigation of the relationships should not begin until some other, more fundamental problems have been cleared up.
As we have seen, answers to the why-question also have ways of painting peculiar pictures of music-making. Berry's way of answering the question puts the performer-analyst in an epistemologically difficult position of having to not-know something that has been specifically identified. Burmeister's way of answering casts the composer-analyst as a kind of musical parrot—or perhaps parakeet, since this particular version of imitation seems somewhat loose. Kirnberger occupies a position somewhere between Burmeister and Berry, advocating analysis as something without which good performing or composing will not take place, but which does not exist unto itself. These three answers all cast analytical activity as a subordinate, but an unusually assertive subordinate.

What is revealed when someone asks the question, "How is analysis?" Alternative renderings of this question are the more colloquial "How does it show up?" and the more precise "What are the conditions for the possibility of analysis?" Neither of these alternatives seem to differ much from the why-question, since both appear to look at analysis as a member in a sequence of things and how it takes its place in that sequence. But to ask about the conditions for the possibility of something is really to ask how something makes X possible in the first place rather than simply how
does X follow from something.\textsuperscript{10} For the question of conditions for possibility, inquiry into characteristics or functions are not adequate. What-questions proceed from a subject-object orientation and produce, by way of answer, an enumeration of qualities that cannot do justice to something as complex as a human activity. Why-questions, while not as clearly hampered by a subject-object dichotomy, nevertheless reveal more about the relationship of analysis to the ends served than about analytical activity itself and furthermore assume that the ends served are themselves well understood. The how-question requires a different sort of orientation. The question of how something is what it is, is a question of ontology—it asks after the Being of something rather than about the being itself.\textsuperscript{11}

My approach to the question of the Being of music analysis takes as its foundation the early work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. His writings and lectures from the 1920's and early 1930's deal with the

\textsuperscript{10} Furthermore, to say "condition of the possibility" is not simply to say that "'you can't have one without the other.' A is the condition of the possibility of B means...[also] that A makes B possible" (Paul Gorner, "Husserl and Heidegger as Phenomenologists," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23/2 [May 1992]: 153).

\textsuperscript{11} In the paragraphs that follow (and according to convention in Heidegger studies), I use the term Being to approximate the term das Sein, and being for das Seiende (sometimes translated "entity"). These two German nouns—one formed from an infinitive, one from a participle—point to an exceedingly important distinction: the ontological difference, discussed below.
question of Being—as distinct from beings—through examinations of how we are in our everyday activities. This project is sometimes referred to as "fundamental ontology" because the study of the ways in which we are in general furnishes a perspective from which to view our basic understanding of Being as well as a perspective from which to view Being in more restricted aspects.

The Heidegger of the 1920's and 1930's treats the question of Being—whether of the Being of some thing or other, or of Being in general—as the most basic of all philosophical questions, occupying the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle as it did before receding in the face of assumptions that it was not a legitimate field of inquiry. Basic though it may be, Heidegger deems the

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12 In *Being and Time*, Heidegger enumerates three assumptions that seem to render unnecessary an investigation into the meaning of Being. The first is that Being is such a pervasive concept that understanding anything entails a prior understanding of it; Heidegger's reply is that universality does not imply universal clarity. The second assumption is that, since Being is not a being, the concept of Being is indefinable; but "the indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face." The third is that, as a concept, the meaning of Being is self-evident; this is attested to by the constant use of forms of the verb 'to be' (this footnote alone has used the word "is" nine times so far, not counting the one in this parenthesis). The frequency with which Being thus arises without being clearly grasped—as well as the persistence of the question of Being in the face of such "self-evidence"—points more to the strength of a convention of the language rather than a real understanding of Being (BT 21-23).

His point in bringing up these assumptions is not to show that the assumptions themselves are completely untrue, but to show that in every case they make inquiry into the meaning of Being more necessary rather than rendering it
question to be in need of a "reawakening," since these traditional assumptions each rest on a neglect of the so-called ontological difference: the difference between Being and beings. But to approach the question via any inquiry into beings would be to make the same mistake; to examine, for example, some array of beings and thereby to define Being as something that these beings have in common is also to neglect the ontological difference.

Heidegger's writings and lectures from this period are often viewed as leading up to, or elaborating upon, what is widely regarded as his most important work, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), published in 1927. Although this work sets forth his fundamental ontology in systematic form, the texts of several of his lecture courses from Marburg University are valuable for the ways in which they shed light on some of the concepts that appear in Being and Time; notable among these lecture courses are those from

unnecessary. Compare, for example, his treatment of the third assumption in Section 41 of KPM, 154-155.

Heidegger does not make this claim in these words in Being and Time, but each of his replies to the three assumptions brings up the ontological difference, each in its own way; for his more explicit treatment of the difference, see ER 27-29 and BP 17, 120.

the summer semester of 1925, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena) and the winter semester of 1925-6, Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Logic: the Question of Truth). In addition, a lecture that Heidegger delivered to the Marburg Theological Society in 1924 entitled Der Begriff der Zeit (The Concept of Time) also presents many of his concerns from this period in substantially developed form. From the years following the publication of Being and Time come the texts for the lecture course from the summer semester of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology), and for the course from the summer semester of 1928, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (Metaphysical Foundations of Logic) as well as the two books from 1929, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics) and Vom Wesen des Grundes (The Essence of Reasons). These later texts provide summaries, extensions and adjustments of concepts from Being and Time.

To draw upon the work of Heidegger is to invoke the terminology and philosophical ideas of phenomenology, and such an invocation is not new to music analysis. Often when phenomenology and music are brought together, the phenomenology is of a kind that depends more on the work of Heidegger's teacher, Edmund Husserl. Husserlian phenomenology aims at the objects of our experience in order to understand them as they are "in themselves," that is, as
they are without reference to our usual ways of attending to them; understanding these objects typically involves taking them as they present themselves to consciousness, describing them rather than explaining and categorizing them, and suspending the privilege of one reality over another—that is, accepting as real that which presents itself to consciousness without regard for its respectability or compatibility with other phenomena.¹⁵ Studies that have taken a Husserlian angle on music analysis are those of Thomas Clifton and his predecessor Alfred Pike, and more recently those of Judy Lochhead and David Lewin.¹⁶ Some studies have appeared, however, that depend more on Heidegger for their phenomenological orientation. Heidegger's phenomenology contrasts with Husserl's in significant ways, one of the most significant being Heidegger's emphasis on the problem of that which is concealed in the Husserlian objects of experience. Studies

¹⁵ For a particularly accessible explanation of Husserl-style phenomenology, see Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: an Introduction (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), the study from which the preceding statements were adapted.

that have adopted a Heideggerian orientation are those of David Greene, Lawrence Ferrara, Gregory Smith, and John Covach.¹⁷

Most of these approaches, Husserlian and Heideggerian,¹⁸ involve applications of phenomenology to music; that is, phenomenology is taken up as yet another tool with which to ply the music-analytical trade. Those studies that adopt the Husserlian mode do so in order to describe the musical experience better. From this angle, phenomenology, with its "[rejection of] all a priori constructions and system building,"¹⁹ is a means for examining musical perception-structures and related phenomena as well as a means for circumventing the kinds of music analysis that tend to pigeonhole the works they analyze. Of those that adopt the Heideggerian mode, the


¹⁸ By the phrase, "Husserlian and Heideggerian," I do not mean to exclude the possibility that thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gadamer, Derrida or others might be of interest to musicians. It is the case, however, that Husserl and Heidegger together form the headwaters of virtually all phenomenological philosophy.

studies by David Greene and Gregory Smith are concerned with Heidegger's philosophy as it might relate to musical time, while the main interest of Ferrara's book is "referential meaning." Only John Covach's study applies Heidegger's philosophy, particularly his critique of the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy, to the activity of music analysis.

The present study looks at other ways in which the German philosopher might help us to understand analysis better—why we do it and what it is, yes, but more importantly, how it is. This last problem must come at a later stage in the investigation, however, because prior to the "how" of analysis must come the "how" of more basic musical experiences—performing and composing. The understanding of the "how" of these experiences, too, is dependent upon an understanding of how each of us is in general and in our most mundane activities; it is with Heidegger's examination of this last subject that I begin.

In the first division of Being and Time, Heidegger states that what is necessary for an investigation into Being is first of all an interrogation of the being that can interrogate itself—the human being. It is in this context

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20 F. Joseph Smith's The Experiencing of Musical Sound: Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1979) occupies a position that is difficult to categorize, a position that might be considered a mixture of the approaches of Heidegger and Husserl, but which he characterizes as non-dependent upon (as opposed to independent of) either one: "...we ought to be simply phenomenological thinkers..." (27).
of humanity as self-questioning that Heidegger introduces
Dasein\textsuperscript{21} as the subject of his study and embarks on his
preliminary examination of human existence through an
investigation of how we are in our everyday activities.

\textsuperscript{21} Heidegger gives this standard German term for
existence a special definition, appropriate for this context:
"This entity which each of us is himself and which includes
inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being..." (BT
27). Elsewhere we find a more elegant formulation of Dasein
in its capacity as self-interrogating: "The Metaphysics of
Dasein is not just metaphysics about Dasein, but is the
metaphysics which occurs necessarily as Dasein" (KPM 157-158;
Heidegger's italics).
CHAPTER II

GENERAL EVERYDAYNESS

Heidegger repeatedly draws upon the craftsman's workshop for his illustrations of matters relating to everydayness. Indeed, the hammer is mentioned so often, both in his writings and in the secondary literature, that I often wonder whether the hammer might be as important to the philosopher as it is to the craftsman. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the seeming obligation to employ the same illustration, I offer here my own illustration of everydayness.¹

Much of what I do as a landscaper involves tools that are generally recognized as tools: shovels, turning forks, hoes, lawn mowers, and so forth. These tools are pieces of

¹ The paragraphs that follow contain almost no original material; virtually all of the points of my example are adapted from Heidegger's illustrations and explanations. I will delay specific citations from his writings, however, until the explanatory section that follows this one.

equipment that I use in the performance of tasks that arise in the landscaping jobs that I take on: I use the shovel for digging holes or trenches, the turning fork for handling compost or moving certain kinds of debris, the hoe for breaking up the ground and removing unwanted vegetation, the lawn mower for cutting grass. The uses of these tools, however, are not limited by those I have enumerated. I may use the lawn mower, less traditionally but no less effectively, for picking up dead leaves; I may use the shovel to pry an unwanted tree stump out of the ground; I may use the handle of the hoe to knock the dirt off my shoes. Each tool is appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others. While the lawn mower is similar in many respects to a mechanical tiller—both have rotating blades, gas-powered engines, handles, wheels—it is even something of an understatement to say that a lawn mower is inappropriate for soil tilling. Furthermore, some combinations of tool and task are worse than inappropriate. To use a turning fork to repair a damaged tree limb is something that would not be considered ridiculous by a landscaper; it simply would not be considered.

Thus far I have taken into account only those tools that are generally recognized as tools, but I could broaden the definition of tool slightly, however, to encompass anything that I use in the course of my landscaping tasks. Strictly speaking, however, it is not a dictionary
definition of "tool" that needs broadening here, but the normal way of thinking of such things. A wristwatch thus becomes a tool with its own place in the activities, as does the trailer that transports the equipment to a job site, as do the heavy shoes and gloves, fertilizer, sunglasses and first-aid kit. All these tools—shovels as well as sunglasses, lawn mowers as well as bandages—share some fundamental characteristics: each is used in the service of a task, and each is appropriate for certain tasks and inappropriate for others.

Perhaps more importantly, each tool takes its place in a context of relations: to the landscaper, the job, other equipment, and other people. A shovel, for instance, is not simply "for digging a hole," as though this phrase were a comprehensive account of the tool, as though the digging of the hole were something undertaken in isolation. The shovel is for digging a hole, yes; and the hole is for placement of an ornamental shrub, and the placement of the shrub is for the completion of the landscape according to the customer's specification, and the chain could no doubt continue through to my most basic reasons for doing what I do. Furthermore, the shovel also has connections to other people—by its being manufactured by them—and to nature—by its being manufactured out of certain materials. All of which is to say, in my everyday landscaping chores, there is no such thing as simply-a-shovel. What defines a shovel as a shovel
is the place that it takes in all of these connections, and most important among these is its connection to the activities of someone who is doing something with it. In its relationships to other persons and equipment, the "simple tool" reveals itself to be more complicated than we are accustomed to thinking.

The involvement of the user with the tool is also more complicated than our customary thinking provides for. In preparing to install a shrub, I do not think something like, "I need to dig a hole, so I should pick up my shovel and dig." On the contrary, I bypass such thoughts as these, and—more automatically than thoughtfully—I pick up the shovel and dig. In a sense, the need to dig the hole does the thinking for me. It is not going too far to say that the I do not even really "see" the shovel; I have the entire context in view. Better, I move around in the relations of the context, and individual items only show up by themselves when something goes wrong with them.

Just as the ordinary ways of thinking about the relationships of tool to task and tool to user are inadequate, so is the customary way of thinking about the relationship of the task to the one performing the task. The ordinary way of thinking would probably have me doing my landscaping work in order to fulfill some goal that I have in mind. In going about the everyday tasks of landscaping, however, rarely does any goal appear so explicitly. There
was not a specific time when I, as an undifferentiated person, suddenly took on the goal of being the landscaper that we are considering. Put positively, everything that a person does grows out of what he or she already is and already has done. If a person suddenly does sit up in the middle of the night and say, "I think I'll become a landscaper," it is only because everything in life up to that point has made such a realization possible.

Not only are a person's present circumstances dependent on what that person have already been through, but those circumstances always matter in specific ways that are also determined by what has already been. As a landscaper, I may either be pleased or dissatisfied with the way business is running, but such feelings do not arise in a vacuum. Feelings about circumstances grow out of the ways in which circumstances matter and the fact that things are the way they are and, considering what has happened, that they could not be otherwise. Yet my relationship to circumstances involves more than the fact that these circumstances matter in specific ways. Circumstances also present me with possibilities. In the course of my various landscaping involvements, there are appropriate ways of dealing with the different things that can happen. When rain comes, I may delay the work; yet to complete it in spite of the rain is also a possibility. If the wrong kind of fertilizer is delivered, I may accept or reject it. Money that I make
from a project I may save, spend, or reinvest in the company. Yet having these possibilities is not dependent on my ability to list them and consider them explicitly, or even to think them through beforehand. Like the other aspects of everyday activities, having possibilities and making choices with reference to them goes on behind the scenes, so to speak, with little or no interference from the person whose possibilities they are.

I have various ways of expressing my relationships to my landscaping work, tools and the relationships between them. In some cases I may make assertions about something. I may have occasion to state that the handle of my shovel is .75 meters long. Such a statement, however, does not reflect my most basic relationship to the shovel as a serviceable tool. I can express this relationship in words, however. If I should say that the shovel's handle is too long for my purposes, my statement now has more to do with my involvement with the shovel in my landscaping activities than did my bare observation about the length of the shovel's handle. I may go even further, however, and dispense with words. My most basic way of expressing my relationship to a tool is to use it.

All of these relationships that I have been discussing can be referred to by themselves, but they may also be referred to in ways that integrate them into something comprehensive. I can discuss my relationship to a tool, as
well as my relationship to the relationships between tools, to my possibilities, to my disposition toward circumstances, and to everything else that I come up against as I go about my everyday activities. But I can take a step further and speak of myself as the meeting-point for all these relationship inasmuch as they each have the character that they have for me by virtue of their reference to me. I could refer to this meeting-point as here, where I am right now—as long as it is understood that this "here" is not a location in space, but a "here among circumstances"—and this is precisely what Martin Heidegger does in his analysis of everyday human existence. He uses the German compound Dasein, a term that transfers to English somewhat imprecisely as "to be here (or there)." A moment's reflection on the many uses of the English expression "here," will reveal that this erstwhile definition has little power of differentiation. It is partly for this reason that Heidegger's translators invariably leave this term untranslated and simply inform his readers that the term designates human Being (again, though, not as a human being--Dasein refers to Being rather than a being) and is a standard German term for human existence. Moreover, it is one of the strengths of Being and Time that the term Dasein, a term that would be familiar to German readers--is not so much assigned a definition as it is allowed to acquire
Heidegger's own definition precisely through his analysis of Dasein.\(^2\)

**Being-in-the-world**

The everyday way of Being—the way in which Dasein operates most of the time—stands in contrast to occurrentness (Vorhandenheit), the way of Being that belongs to objects that have no equipmental character.\(^3\) For the way of Being that belongs to Dasein in its everyday mode, Heidegger coins Being-in-the-world,\(^4\) and for the purpose of

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\(^2\) Cf. Gelven, Commentary, 28.

\(^3\) The traditional translation is "presence-at-hand," but I have opted for Dreyfus's rendering, since it is somewhat more accessible; I have taken up Dreyfus's translations of several of Heidegger's terms—I often find them easier to understand, although they have not found their way into common Heideggerian parlance—and will note that I have adopted Dreyfus's less orthodox terms from his summary, along with the more traditional translations, as they arise.

\(^4\) One of the most striking—and often difficult—aspects of Heidegger's early writings is his peculiar terminology; the reader encounters artificial compounds consisting of a string of familiar words connected with hyphens, such as 'Being-in-the-world' (In-der-Welt-sein); once-familiar words mangled with hyphens, such as 'dis-stance' (Ent-fernen); words coined out of extrapolations from familiar words, such as 'having-been-ness' (Gewesenheit, the past participle of sein transformed into a noun via the suffix -heit, roughly equivalent to the English -ness); and transformation of pronouns into nouns, such as 'the They' (das Man, the indefinite pronoun man converted via capitalization and addition of the definite article); the point of his verbal and grammatical unconventionality is that much of our muddled thinking about the subject of Being is a result of our using familiar terms without thinking about them. Replacing the traditional terms with words manufactured for the purpose, frustrating though they may sometimes be, forces the reader to give thought to concepts that otherwise would be ignored out of familiarity.
laying out the structure of this concept, he discusses the
term's two components: 'Being-in' and 'world'.

When we speak of 'Being-in', what comes most readily to
mind is Being present in a location. Certainly the most
pervasive use of the preposition in is one that signifies
spatial containment, as when we speak of some object being
in something else: "the fodder's in the shock." This 'in',
however, is the 'in' of occurrence; it indicates a location
in space, one that we could conceivably represent by
referring to a system of coordinates. As a locative
preposition, it refers to entities that we think of as being
'there', and there in a way that Dasein cannot be, since
Dasein is not a being. Heidegger explains the usual,
spatial sense of in as categorial, since it refers to a
characteristic of things, and the sense that belongs to
Dasein he explains as existential, characteristic of
Dasein's way of Being: the 'in' of involvement. This
existential 'in', as involvement in circumstances, occurs in
phrases such as one that is used of someone involved in a
precarious situation: "She is in a fix." This sense of in,
characterizing circumstances and how someone is affected by

5 Heidegger explains that Dasein should never be taken
as some exceptional kind of occurrent being; Dasein is
personal and takes its Being personally, whereas the Being
of objects cannot matter one way or another to them (BT 67-
68); there is a spatial aspect to Dasein, but it is an
existential spatiality (see below, n. 15, in the explanation
of distance with reference to equipment) rather than a
location in Cartesian space (BT 82).
them, is generally regarded as derivative and metaphorical, while we are accustomed to considering the spatial sense as primary. But Heidegger, furnishing an etymological critique of this hierarchy, relates the preposition to certain German verbs of being and dwelling, and his intent is to indicate that neither the spatial nor metaphorical senses should take precedence (BT 80, HCT 158). This conclusion may run counter to our usual way of thinking, yet he argues further that it is precisely this trading of the existential for the categorial—trading Being for beings—that brings about Dasein's propensity for misunderstanding itself (BT 36-37).

Occurrentness is one of the two most important modes of Being that belong to entities other than Dasein; the other, the most important for approaching the Heideggerian concept of 'world', is the mode of Zuhandenheit, or availability. This is the way of being of what Heidegger terms equipment, which not only includes things such as the picks and shovels of my landscaping business, but also walls, books, clothing, calendars, and trombones. Most of the time I treat things such as these not as items that require reflection upon their use, but as things that already have meaning, so that

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6 Dreyfus reads Heidegger's etymological work on "in" as an attempt to take the preposition back to a stage when the distinction between metaphorical and literal meanings had not yet been made (Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 42).

7 Dreyfus's rendering; the usual translation is "readiness-to-hand."
The walls are already present [for us] even before we think them as objects. Much else also gives itself to us before any determining of it by thought. Much else—but how? Not as a jumbled heap of things but as an environs, a surroundings, which contains within itself a closed, intelligible contexture (BP 163, my gloss in brackets).

Furthermore, the availability of equipment is not a quality added on to something occurrent, as though someone in our culture, upon being told that the stack of paper stuck together on one end is a book and that people read it, would by virtue of this explanation transform something that was without meaning a moment ago into a piece of equipment.

First of all, most people in our culture are socialized into an acceptance of books from ages so early that they cannot remember a time when they did not know about them. Even most persons who are unable to read do not find books entirely unintelligible inasmuch as they do not need to think about what books are for. Accordingly, the tools that we employ in our everyday activities are not items first given to us whose functions are subsequently given to us for careful consideration; in the planting of an ornamental shrub, I do not think something like "take the shovel,...now

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8 "Such an interpretation would overlook the fact that in this case these entities would have to be understood and discovered beforehand as something purely occurrent, and must have priority and take the lead in the sequence of those dealings with the 'world' in which something is discovered and made one's own." (BT 101) Heidegger has already shown in section 13 (BT 86-90) that knowing as it is commonly understood (knowing about something) is derived from our everyday mode of Being-in.
dig the hole...,” nor do I simply think about digging the hole. I generally think past or through the equipment, and even past what I will do with it (BP 163-164).  

The way in which equipment shows up for us is in the kind of sight with which we see things most of the time, a mode of seeing termed circumspection (Umsicht). Far from an empty gaze in which we are aware of the images on our own retinae—far from "mere sight," in other words, but Heidegger is quick to point out that circumspection is not blind, either (BT 98)—circumspection denotes our normal concerned orientation toward the equipment around us in the ways in which we walk past it, use it, avoid it, tend to it, and so on (BP 163). This manner of sight is not simply

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9 cf. BT 99, in which this thinking-past is characterized as the equipment's "withdrawal," presumably from our thinking about it directly, although this is not explicit in the text; cf. further HCT 191: "...[the equipment's] genuine reality appears in looking away from it as a mere thing on hand...and it is characteristic of practical usage that no scrutinizing objectification occurs" (Heidegger's italics).

10 Dasein's normal orientation also has a spatial aspect, but as mentioned above, its spatiality is primarily existential after the fashion of Dasein's -in (as in Being-in). Heidegger explains this existential spatiality in terms of the degree of remoteness of equipment, a remoteness which the concern of circumspection establishes according to the kind of involvement it has, and, in establishing such remoteness, establishes the place to which equipment withdraws. To employ the illustrations that appear in Being and Time, the glasses on one's nose are environmentally farther away than something that is across the room at which one looks through those glasses; the street, though constantly touching one's feet, is set by the concern of circumspection as something farther away than the people one meets at a considerably greater (metric) distance as one walks (BT 139-142; HCT 225-227).
our accommodation afforded to the equipment—as though the only way we see the chair as we walk past it is as a potential obstacle, or the only way I see the shovel is as a tool for digging a hole; this is still too explicit a kind of sight. What circumspection sees is not the tool simply as a thing or simply for something. It sees the manner in which the tool is involved in the task to be performed. Perhaps this involvement could be understood as a single connection, as though a line were drawn from the tool to the job (as with the chair and the shovel, above), but Heidegger's contention is that there is more to the situation than this supposition allows. Involvement is always involvement in a "manifold of assignments" (ein Mannigfaltige der Verweisungen, BT 97);¹¹ In this context, an assignment is a reference to one of several kinds of connections: some connections can be understood as intermediate, such as the in-order-to reference (das Um-zu) that connects a piece of equipment to other equipment, forming a totality of equipment (BT 97): shovel, gloves, heavy shoes, and an indeterminate number of other tools make up the totality of equipment required for my digging a hole. Other kinds of assignments may be termed teleological, inasmuch as they point towards a goal, such as the towards-

¹¹ Dreyfus translates Verweisung as "reference," and there are several other possible translations, none of which captures the German very well. On the problem of translation of this word, see Macquarrie and Robinson's footnote (BT 97, n.1).
which (das Wozu) that indicates a proximate goal or, better, a concretization of the in-order-to: my taking up of the shovel, gloves, heavy shoes, and so forth, is done towards the specific purpose of digging a particular hole. Such a proximate goal is not free-standing, though, since it is taken up as part of another towards-which (BT 116), in this case the planting of a shrub. And this planting is no ultimate goal, since the planting of a shrub must have its own towards-which, such as its Being a part of this job I have taken on as a professional landscaper; or, if I am not a professional, perhaps it is to be part of the decoration of my yard. In any case, the assignments of proximate goals to more remote ones leads to the assignment of a for-the-sake-of-which, the towards-which that has special significance for the Being of Dasein, since it is the ultimate, existential reason for taking up the task in the first place (BT 116-117). In this context, such a goal might be that of making a living (if I am a professional landscaper) or being perceived as one who takes pride in the appearance of his yard (if I am an amateur). What Heidegger would emphasize, however, is that these "goals" are generally not things I have in mind; while I might conclude that they are the main reasons I have for doing whatever I do, it might be more to his point to say that these reasons have me, since I need not apprehend them specifically (BT

nor need I choose them from among alternatives that I perceive explicitly.\textsuperscript{13}

Similar to the way in which most of these teleological assignments operate—they are not held in mind but are nonetheless effective for me—so operate a range of non-teleological assignments of the equipment, by which the equipment points back, or of which my employment of the tools is the culmination. Also, the materials that I employ as tools are for the most part produced for my use by others who are thus implicitly present in the work I do. The materials from which my tools are made—wood, metal, leather—have been employed by these others as equipment in-order-to produce the equipment I now use (BT 100). There is also the possibility that the landscape I produce—as a professional landscaper, for instance—will itself be employed by others for ends to which I may not have access.

It is tempting to define Heidegger's sense of 'world' as the sum of all of these different kinds of assignments, because in some contexts this indeed appears to be his way of defining the concept. To do so, however, would omit several important aspects as well as create the distinctly un-Heideggerian impression that 'world' is a thing that can...
be broken down into other things. Arriving at a more satisfactory definition of 'world' requires first of all a connection of the manifold of assignments to Dasein's Being-in. Recall that Being-in, rather than locating spatially, locates Dasein among circumstances, and that these circumstances are what Dasein sees, via concerned orientation (circumspection), in terms of assignments. These assignments--some of which I have classified as teleological, non-teleological and intermediate, but which could be classified in several other ways--amount to connections between the things assigned: tools have their assignments to me as Dasein as well as to other tools and to other Daseins. The organization of these assignments into contexts take the forms of the equipmental totality (die Zeugganzheit), which primarily takes into account the complex of tools; the referential totality (die Verweisungsganzheit), which takes into account the equipment and its interrelations; and the involvement totality (die Bewandtnisganzheit) which accounts for the equipment and its interrelations with special reference to Dasein's circumstance-governed, goal-oriented behavior toward them. This totality of involvements, understood as the

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14 Heidegger does occasionally place the word "world" in scare quotes to signify the common conception of the world as a collection of things.

15 This description of the three totalities, adapted from Dreyfus, may be misleading, however, since Heidegger never deals explicitly with distinctions and relationships
'wherein' (das Worin) of involvement—in other words, of Being-in—may serve as a provisional definition of 'world'.

The way in which this 'wherein' manifests itself for Dasein is in the form of a context of self-assignments and assignment-relations that are already understood by Dasein but are usually not noticed. The most readily accessible of these is Dasein's assignment of itself from a for-the-sake-of-which to an in-order-to, a general kind of involvement entailing generally understood activities: landscaper,
plumber, accountant, musician, even vagrant. From the in-order-to proceeds a series of towards-which assignments, proximate goals that define Dasein's activities by prescribing the equipment to be used toward the completion of the task; that is to say, the towards-which provides a situation in which Dasein can let equipment be involved (BT 119). Thus Heidegger explains the 'wherein' of these assignments--Dasein's self-assignments as well as the various assignments in which Dasein lets entities be involved--as the phenomenon of world; and Dasein's self-assignments furnish the structure of the worldhood of the world, or worldliness, in which the assignments and their contexts are seen as "correlations of meaning, meaningful contexts" (HCT 199, 203, Heidegger's italics; cf. BT 119).

The phrase "Dasein lets something be involved" exhibits the interdependence that characterizes the relationship of Dasein and 'world', since that which is involved must already have this kind of involvement but still requires Dasein to 'free' it for this or that purpose. Therefore, while "world reveals itself to Dasein" (ER 85), and thus provides the means and the basis for the understanding of the ways Dasein can behave and what it can

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17 For Heidegger, Dasein's "freeing" something means enabling something to be encountered as a piece of equipment, since the equipment is unable of itself to engage in an encounter; in other words, it is enabled, by virtue of our involving it our involvement, to be what it already is (BT 114, 117): I free a shovel--I enable it to be a shovel--by digging with it.
behave toward (ER 101), and while Dasein is socialized into
a 'world' that is already there, yet equipment and
assignments are what they are by virtue of Dasein's
involvement, since they make up "the totality of what exists
for the sake of Dasein at any given time" (ER 89, 101).
Dasein is thus in a 'world' which its socialization enables
it to constitute, but which in turn constitutes Dasein (HCT
202).

Despite its importance for Dasein, 'world' is for the
most part a hidden phenomenon. Nevertheless, there are
two important ways in which 'world' shows itself explicitly
(though not in its entirety); the first of these occurs when
something disturbs the normal course of everyday activities.
When all is going properly--when tools are working, when
Dasein's self-assignments are not in question--'world' is
transparent, and Dasein looks past assignments straight to
the work being performed. When there is a disruption--when

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18 My phrase "hidden phenomenon," though apparently
self-contradictory--how can "a thing that appears" (a common
translation of the Greek φανερωμένον) be hidden?--is
nevertheless sanctioned by Heidegger's own conception of the
word phenomenology (see BT 51-63) as the task of exhibiting
"something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which
proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at
the same time it is something that belongs to what thus
shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to
constitute its meaning and ground" (BT 59, Heidegger's
italics). Though often connected with terms that imply a
certain passivity or detachment (cf. HCT 86: phenomenology
as a "letting be seen"), his sense of exhibition also
involves a struggle with the phenomena (discussed briefly in
Reiner Schnürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From
Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1990), 71).
a piece of equipment breaks down or is missing or is otherwise unusable—certain assignments bring themselves forward, so that when the handle of my shovel breaks and forces at least a momentary cessation of digging, various assignments become explicit: I look around for something else with-which I may dig; I consider the time and expense necessary to procure a replacement and thereby consider alterations to my towards-which; I may reflect upon the incompetence of the producer of the tool in using inferior materials in the handle or upon my own negligence in buying an inferior product. In the equipment's showing its place in the context in which I operate, it throws my entire operation—landscaping, in this case—into relief as a

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19 In this section of my study, I have chosen to highlight just one aspect of the description of how the world can be made to show itself explicitly: disruption as the source of the visibility of assignments. The other aspects are: the conspicuousness of unusable or damaged equipment, in which the occurrent aspect of a piece of otherwise available equipment shows up; the obtrusiveness of the remainder of the equipmental totality when one of its component tools is unusable, in which the remaining usable equipment, in yet being available, loses that very availability in the face of the damaged equipment on which it depends; and the obstinacy of equipment that presents itself as an impediment, in which undamaged equipment is ill-suited to the task and which demands that corrective action be taken before the task can once again be taken up. The last of these is also closely related to my concerns, since obstinate equipment imposes assignments that are in a special sense involuntary and which stand in the way of the assignments to which I more willingly submit (BT 102-104; cf. HCT 188f.).

20 Heidegger observes that the assignments do not become visible simply because a piece of equipment has become unusable but because the assignment itself has been disturbed (BT 105).
region of 'world' by causing me to notice things about 'world' that normally go on below the surface in requiring me to adjust my behavior to new (frustrating) circumstances.\(^{21}\)

There need be no disturbance, however, for equipment and operating context to show themselves as parts of 'world'. It is the function of the sign, says Heidegger, to draw attention to the 'world' out of which it arises and in which Dasein may be involved (BT 110-111). The signs that warn of underground cables in the yard in which I am digging are not simply items, produced by the telephone company, whose function it is to stand above the cables; standing in conspicuous colors with obtrusive texts ("WARNING!") above the cables, their function is to show the common context in which the telephone company's cables and I are operating, to make explicit my relationship to the cables and their owners. Rather than showing the context by stopping my operation, the sign exhibits the context and directs my behavior in-order-to keep all assignments in place. Rather than responding to the sign by looking at it, the way a dog

\(^{21}\) Not every adjustment, of course, is a result of a breakdown; indeed, most of our everyday coping involves making adjustments as part of the normal course of our activities. What concerns Heidegger in Being and Time, Section 16, is the unexpected event that calls a halt to our activity, the unexpected unexpected, as opposed to the kind of occurrence that we often refer to as unexpected but for which we often make provision within our normal activities; a musical example of such an expected unexpected is the progression of dominant to submediant, a "deceptive" progression.
may regard the pointing hand rather than directing its attention to the thing to which the hand points, I respond to the sign by directing my attention to what is indicated by the sign and in so doing cope with my context—as it shows up just then.  

The 'Here' (Da-) of Dasein

The subject of the nature and structure of 'world', or that which Being-in-the-world is in, passes naturally to matters of how Dasein is in this 'world'; or, to put it interrogatively, how is Dasein Da?

In exploring this question, it is important to remember that the totality of assignments in which Dasein moves is not something with which Dasein must familiarize itself prior to operating effectively. Dasein, already in the middle of circumstances (but never simply "there"), has

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22 "The sign is not authentically 'grasped' if we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. The sign...addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit 'survey' whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circumspective survey does not grasp the available; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment" (BT 110; Heidegger's italics).

23 Significantly, Heidegger deals with the questions of what Dasein is in ('world'), how Dasein is in it, and who this Dasein is, but never needs to deal with when Dasein is there; the irrelevance of this question is reflected in the fact that "inasmuch as Dasein exists qua Being-in-the-world, it is already out there with beings; and even this manner of speaking is still imprecise since 'already out there' presupposes Dasein is at some point on the inside" (MFL 167); to circumvent the intrusion of this presupposition, he
the means necessary for effective operation by virtue of socialization and experience that provides its current specific circumstances. A clearing (Lichtung)—a term that suggests an open area in which the constituents of Dasein's 'world' can show up and make sense—provides the constant context for all of Dasein's encounters in its 'world' at every stage of life. If I am indeed at all involved in landscaping, I am already able to function as

might have substituted his favored "always already" for "already."

24 This clearing is usually explained in spatial terms: as a clearing in a forest into which light can pass and illuminate that which is in the cleared area (and Heidegger himself speaks of it in these terms in the lectures from the Winter semester of 1937/38 [BQP 178; cf. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 163, 165]); or, more generally, as a "space' or locale in which both equipment and we ourselves can then appear" (John Richardson, Existential Epistemology, 25). But Guignon's non-spatial account avoids the problem of making this clearing something outside of Dasein, discourages the tendency to think of Dasein in individual terms, and clarifies the connections between Dasein as its own "here" and the clearing. Dasein, as a "mass noun...captures the idea of a 'clearing' of intelligibility which can more properly be understood as a cultural totality than as a collection of individuals" (Charles Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 104. Whether Dasein truly is a mass noun, however, is still a matter of debate.

25 "Constant context" should not be read as a synonym for "unchanging context;" in fact, contexts are constantly changing. In his lecture course from the Winter of 1930/31, Heidegger explains a more spatially focused version of this context as a "here" which I see "wherever I turn and wherever I am...I always take the here with me. Wherever I stand, the where is already turned into a here. To put it more exactly: the here first makes possible the where as the there which we interrogate from the here. The here remains, but what has the character of a here is in each case something else" (HPS 63).
the landscaper that I am, and there never was a time when the tools that I use in my activities were truly unintelligible. Any constituent of my landscaping 'world' became part of my clearing—that is, it was an intelligible thing—before I first took it up to use it.

My way of operating in this clearing is characterized by sensitivity, which is to say that things and circumstances already matter (BT 176-177), and Heidegger's term for this sensitive way of operating is Befindlichkeit, or disposition. This first of three aspects of Being-here is recognized by Dasein as its mood (Stimmung), or how the present circumstances show up for Dasein. The

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26 Macquarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit as "state-of-mind," but concede that the "-of-mind" is a part of the English idiom that is not really part of the German; moreover, it has the possibility of conveying a meaning completely at odds with Heidegger's. The Dreyfus version, "affectedness," has the advantage of conveying the personal, quasi-emotional side of the term, but I have chosen the term used by Guignon, Kisiel and Dostal (for discussions of the problems surrounding this term, see BT 172, n. 2, and Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 168).

27 I am leaping directly to the term "Being-here" ("Being-there," according to Macquarrie and Robinson) in order to avoid transitional locutions such as "Being-in the 'here,'"

Discussion of another aspect of Being-here, understanding, follows the discussion of disposition, but presentation of the third aspect, falling, appears in this study after the sections on interpretation and discourse (as it does in Being and Time).

28 Mood discloses how Dasein is in its world: "With every mood wherein 'something is this way or that,' our Being-there [Da-sein] becomes manifest to us" (KPM 155). The temptation is to describe mood in terms of how Dasein feels about or behaves toward circumstances, but Heidegger takes care to point out that mood is "neither from 'outside'
explanation underscores the givenness of Dasein's situation: "In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be" (BT 173). Thus Dasein shows, in its mood, not simply that things show up for it in a certain way, but that, by virtue of circumstances and choices made relating to them, such things could show up in no other way. This characteristic of being delivered over to what already is, this contingency, is Dasein's thrownness (Geworfenheit), a colorful term expressing the constant (if not utter) dependence on the way things already are.

Gelven terms Dasein's disposition the "mode of the actual," since it expresses an aspect of Dasein's

[behavior] nor from 'inside' [feelings], but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being" (BT 176, my glosses in brackets; cf. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 171-172).

This is not to say that Dasein's mood cannot change, but to say that there is never a time when Dasein is without a mood and can choose one from among many. At any time, the only way to have a different mood is to turn from one's current mood to another (BT 175).

Occasionally, thrownness appears vaguely threatening. Thus reads the definition in the 1929 interpretation of Kant: what is thrown is "determined by the dependency of Dasein on the being already in the totality, a dependency over which Dasein itself does not have control" (KPM 161); and in the 1928 lectures: "Only what is essentially thrown and entangled in something can be governed and surrounded by it" (MFL 138). The threat is genuine, however, only if one is looking for a way out of thrownness altogether.
relationship to the way things already are, and he contrasts it with the "mode of the possible," the understanding (Verstand) that expresses a part of Dasein's relationship to the way things might be.\textsuperscript{31} This second aspect of Being-here is inextricably bound up with disposition and mood, so that when Heidegger writes that "a disposition always has its understanding...[and] understanding always has its mood,"\textsuperscript{32} he is expressing the interdependence of our relationship to the way things have been, our relationship to the way things can be, and how Dasein is attuned to both relationships.

One way of approaching Heidegger's concept of understanding first requires a recognition that his use of the term "to exist" corresponds more to a literal translation of the Latin cognate (exsistere, "to step out") than to its ordinary use as a synonym for the verb "to be."\textsuperscript{33} When he states, for instance, that "the essence of

\begin{footnotesize} 
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gelven, \textit{Commentary}, 80 (disposition [Gelven: affectedness]) and 86 (understanding).
\item BT 182 (I have substituted "disposition" for the translators' "state-of-mind").
\item In order to call attention to this difference in use, many Heidegger expounders use the term in hyphenated form, "ex-sist" (see for instance Kockelmans, \textit{Phenomenology and Physical Science}, 52); this use is probably derived from slightly later Heidegger (it appears, for instance, in \textit{On the Essence of Truth} from the late 1930's), but is foreshadowed in his hyphenation of the Latin in \textit{Basic Problems of Phenomenology}: "...Dasein has always already stepped out beyond itself, ex-sistere, it is in a world" (BP 170; Heidegger's italics).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Dasein lies in its existence" (BT 67), he is referring to Dasein's capacity for relating to a 'world' via the everyday activities described above. The activities involved in this existence are organized by assignments that are themselves organized by ultimate for-the-sakes-of-which, and the way Dasein operates in light of these assignments is by dealing with the possible ways of handling them. This dealing with possibilities, this Being-able to do what each situation requires, is what Heidegger means by understanding.

34 In speaking here of possibilities, it is important to emphasize their practical nature. These are not all the conceivable possibilities, no matter how outlandish, nor all the logical possibilities, but the things that will present themselves to me as options in the current circumstances—in other words, the things that my clearing will allow. This room-for-maneuver (Spielraum—Heidegger's term for this range of possibilities that make sense for me; BT 185, cf. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World 189-191) enables me, as landscaper, to consider planting photinias or boxwoods as ornamental shrubs, but does not allow things like potatoes (logically possible, but inadvisable) or microphones (illogical, but possible) even to enter into my considerations.

35 To say that one does what each situation requires is not to say that one always makes the correct choices, or even necessarily the best ones. If it is not stated explicitly in Heidegger's writings, it is nonetheless a Heideggerian observation that it is the fact of understanding that makes anything like making a poor choice possible. A poor choice only exists in light of better choices, so that one who is without understanding in a situation—assuming this is even possible—could neither be blamed for making poor choices nor commended for making good ones.

I will resist the temptation to speak of understanding in terms of knowing, since Heidegger tends to resist it himself. In one text, for instance, we find the disclaimer that "the understanding...is not just a type of knowing, but on the contrary is primarily a basic moment of existing in
Understanding, as the way of dealing with the possibilities that assignments entail, operates primarily by means of projection (Entwurf). We might think first of a projection as a plan that Dasein thinks through; but, for Heidegger, possibilities are the future towards which assignments point, and projection is having possibilities rather than thinking about them (this should surprise no one who remembers that the teleological assignments—in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which—are not goals that Dasein sets up and pursues). And, since grasping a projection thematically would reduce a way of Being to a way of thinking, it is general...

(KPM 159). Only with careful qualification should cognitive terminology enter the discussion, as when Dreyfus writes, "I know how to go about what I am doing, I am able to do what is appropriate in each situation" (Being-in-the-World, 185, Dreyfus's italics). In this quote, "knowing how" could be eliminated from the sentence as pleonastic and slightly misleading, with the emended result being only apparently pleonastic: "I go about what I am doing, I am able to do what is appropriate...."

Heidegger explains that it is the very nature of Dasein—of Being situated, of Being-here—to be projecting, indeed already to have projected, and that the only escape from this projecting is to have no possibilities, to have nothing to project upon—in short, to be dead. In his words, "Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities" (BT 185). This is not to say that Dasein cannot think about possibilities, or that as soon as it does think about them, it somehow ruins them. His point here is that it is the nature of possibilities not to be comprehended—a result of their being interconnected with a host of other contingencies that one cannot possibly consider. Then, several pages later, he does explain how the—presumably partial—thematic grasp of a totality of
perhaps better to say that, rather than having a projection in mind, Dasein has a projection in mood, that is, it projects in the way that it does by virtue of the way its disposition allows it to. To put it another way, Dasein's projection upon possibilities is based upon where Dasein already finds itself; like Dasein, projection is thrown (BT 188). And, at least as much as what I have done defines me, it is also my projecting that defines me as the person that I am; I am my possibilities as well as my accomplishments.

To characterize understanding in more concrete terms, all my activities connected with my landscaping business—designing a landscape or maintaining one, accepting business or turning customers away, taking lunch breaks, hiring assistants, and anything else I can think of (and much that I cannot)—are organized in terms of interconnected assignments which, for the purposes of discussion, can be isolated. The designing of a landscape, for instance, is perhaps done in-order-to present to a client and, pending his or her approval, in-order-to provide me with a guide for installation. These assignments point back to more remote ones: I perform these things in-order-to make money for my business in-order-to improve it in-order-to be able to take on more business, and so on. In back of all of these are the ultimate reasons why I do all these things, perhaps to assignments disappears from view, "recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the background" (BT 191).
provide for my family or myself in some way or another. I understand each of these assignments, from those closest to the surface to those in the background, in similar ways. Each assignment points toward the future by presenting me with possibilities, and, not knowing these possibilities so much as having them in my projection of how things can be, I am able to work through them by carrying out the appropriate activities. I occasionally make mistakes, but they are always appropriate mistakes; I may have put too much fertilizer on the shrubs, but I did not paint them blue.

Interpretation

New possibilities are continually showing up for Dasein because understanding does not persist in a constant form, but develops itself by means of interpretation (Auslegung; BT 188). As the understanding's self-cultivation, interpretation works by highlighting what something is for, thereby highlighting also the various in-order-to, towards-which, and for-the-sake-of-which assignments into which the thing in question enters; in other words, it works by considering something "in terms of its 'as what,' considering something as something" (HCT 261, Heidegger's italics; cf. BT 189). This considering need not be construed as any kind of explicit deliberation, and much less as a process of making verbal observations about what is under consideration; our very seeing of equipment, our "mere encountering of something," already has an
understanding behind it and an interpretation in place. When I use the shovel to dig a hole, I am interpreting the tool in terms of one of its "towardses-which;" I consider it "as a shovel," however, not by saying, "Ah! A shovel! With this I shall dig," but by actually digging the hole. I may also use the shovel to pry a stump out of the ground, and thus opt for an alternate interpretation: the shovel "as" a lever.

In considering something as something, interpretation operates on the basis of what is already in place in the understanding, on the basis of the possibilities that I already have. The totality of involvements, always in force in one way or another, provides an interpretation with a fore-having, a background that furnishes context to whatever is under consideration. By virtue of my own background and environment, I already have the possibility of using the shovel as spade or lever. Furthermore, we not only have context for our interpretation of the tool, but we consider the tool from a particular perspective, from a fore-sight of how it is to be taken. I am always oriented towards my possibilities for using the shovel as spade or lever before actually using it. And in our conceptualization of what we are considering, we do so with some idea of how it should be interpreted, by our fore-conception of what is under

37 "Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the available is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets" (BT 189).
consideration, which is itself an interpretation of our pending interpretation (BT 191). In saying "interpretation of our interpretation," I mean to suggest that, when we consider something as something, we are actually considering something as (something as something). The very equipmental nature of my tools grows out of interpretation, so that when I take up this shovel-thing, it is always the shovel-thing as the tool as the lever. It is here, with the fore-structure as our point of entry, that we first explicitly encounter the circular nature of interpretation. Our grasp of any interpretive whole depends on our grasp of the parts, and our grasp of the parts proceeds with some idea as to how they form a whole; or, put in terms more immediately applicable, our understanding cultivates itself through interpretation which in turn depends on understanding for its basis.

38 The German words are Vorhaben (fore-having), Vorsicht (fore-sight), and Vorgriff (fore-conception).

39 It is a point of entry only to the discussion of the matter, not to the interpretive circle—the "hermeneutic circle"—itself. We essentially have no discernible entry point to interpretation itself, but are "always already" interpreting; similarly, we have no real exit from the circle, but, as is the case with thrownness, this is only a problem for someone who is looking for a way out (cf. BT 194-195).

40 Heidegger invests this "hermeneutic 'as'" with a clear connection to projection in the "if...then" structure that he describes in Division II of Being and Time. The fore-structure shows up in Dasein's initial grasp of possibilities for a situation in its seeing everything in terms such as "if this or that...is to be produced, put to
The fore-structure is possible because of the familiarity we have with our background practices and environment, which Heidegger calls 'sense' (Sinn), "the 'upon which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something." To lend clarity to this, we might say that 'sense' is where projection gets the possibilities that it presents to Dasein. Furthermore, the 'sense' of something—the familiarity that we already have with it—is articulated so as to present Dasein with particular possibilities rather than an amorphous, undifferentiated, unarticulated mass of something called "familiarity with...."  

Interpretation contrasts with assertion (Aussage), which Heidegger defines as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates" (BT 199) or "communicatively determinant exhibition;" at the grammatical heart of these definitions is apophansis (ἀποφάνσις), a pointing-out or exhibition. In using the Greek expression to clarify his definition, he intends for use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed" (BT 410, my emphasis); Projection shows up in both the prodosis--"if this is to be"--and the apodosis--"then this will be"--of the conditional that I have formulated explicitly here and which goes on behind the scenes in all interpretation.

41 BT 153 (Heidegger's italics); I have adopted the translation used by Dreyfus, Hofstadter, and others instead of the MacQuarrie and Robinson translation, "meaning."

42 Articulation is further explained below in the section dealing with discourse.
us to understand that this pointing-out is an exhibition of the thing itself, not someone's idea about the thing (BP 210). When I make the assertion, "this shovel's handle is .75 meters long," I am not pointing out something about an idea of the shovel in general, or something abstractly connected to shovels, but this shovel right here. To borrow Heidegger's explanation of the Greek prefix apo (ἀπο), apophansis thus shows something "from itself." In addition, the exhibitive quality governs the second structural aspect of assertion: *predication*, the "giving something a definite character." In assigning a predicate to a subject, I put forward the subject as having a particular characteristic—hence the derivation of predication from pointing-out. But in putting forward the subject in this way, I also am in view, since it is I who assigns the predicate; so if I say, "the shovel's handle is .75 meters long," certainly I put forward the shovel itself, but I put it forward as I wish it to be seen. The shovel is present as the subject, but I too am present in the "is .75 meters long," particularly in the "is." The effect of my assigning a predicate to a subject is therefore to restrict the view to the characteristic that I wish to point out (BT 197). Pointing-out also governs the third structural aspect of assertion, *communication*, or the uttering of the assignment of subject to predicate in order to share it with others. What is thus shared, however, is not the words making up the utterance, but a way of behaving
toward what is in view, so that when I say, "the shovel's handle is .75 meters long," I direct the attention of my listeners, not to the five or six words I have used, but to the shovel in its length. As Heidegger says, what is to be shared is the "understanding comportment toward the entity about which the assertion is made" (BP 210; I have adjusted the translation slightly in the interests of accessibility).

Assertion, with its structural components of pointing-out, predication and communication, is essentially a derivative mode of interpretation, since all of the structural moments of assertion are themselves only possible because of a prior interpretation already in place. In pointing-out something, I must be able to differentiate it from that which surrounds it; in predication, the assigning of a predicate requires that I be able to dislodge the predicate from within its subject so as to express the definite character and make it stand out.43 In communicating, the sharing of understanding behavior assumes that my subject is intelligible in a general way to those to whom my assertion is addressed. Therefore, as a derivative mode of interpretation, assertion does not reveal in any kind of primary way.44 Another way of describing this

43 As Heidegger puts it, "...by this explicit restriction of our view, that which is already manifest may be made explicitly manifest in its definite character" (BT 197; Heidegger's italics).

44 Heidegger devotes section 33 of Being and Time to the exploration of this matter.
situation is to say that the subject with which I am dealing—a shovel, here—already has a complete context for me before I start making assertions about it; in Heidegger's terms, it is available as equipment, something with-which I can be involved. But in making the shovel the subject of an assertion, I transform it from something available into to something occurrent, something about-which I wish to convey information. My pointing-out of the shovel disengages it from prior involvements and effectively puts it in the spotlight on a bare stage. My assigning of a definite character to the length—the quality of being .75 meters long—is performed, not on the shovel in its context of my landscape project, but on the isolated shovel-thing, and questions of involvement-in-context are bypassed.\textsuperscript{45}

What makes such a derivative interpretation possible would have to be something prior to it by which the possibilities of that which is interpreted first show themselves. For the purposes of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in its everydayness, that function is fulfilled by discourse (\textit{Rede}).\textsuperscript{46} The essence of discourse is that, out

\textsuperscript{45} This discussion allows only for the limit case of complete divorce from context (cf. LFW 158). For a more complete discussion, see the section dealing with musical analysis and the problem of the assertion, below.

\textsuperscript{46} Another term with many translations in the Heidegger literature, McQuarrie and Robinson represent \textit{Rede} with "discourse," while Dreyfus translates it "telling;" Guignon, however, noting that Heidegger uses the Greek \textit{λόγος} synonymously with the German term, uses the Anglicization of the Greek (\textit{logos}). I have adopted the standard term even
of the possibilities of a situation, real possibilities come to expression, so that in my landscaping activities, one kind of pre-linguistic discourse consists, not in talking about a shovel and its possible uses, but in using it to dig the hole that I have planned for a shrub. Heidegger describes this phenomenon as the "Articulation of intelligibility," in which the Articulation is the showing of a choice or choices—digging, in this case—from among a host of already understood possibilities for something available—the shovel—and the intelligibility signifies the totality of real possibilities—including in this case (but not limited to) digging, transporting, and

though I recognize that Dreyfus's term has the advantage of representing the articulative aspect of the term—as in telling things apart (Being-in-the-World, 215)—and that Guignon's has the advantage of representing both its linguistic and pre-linguistic aspects.

In the 1924 Marburg lecture, speaking (Sprechen) appears to possess characteristics of assertion and discourse; Heidegger seems not yet to have made any distinction between the two, and even maintains that "it is predominantly in speaking that man's being-in-the-world takes place" (CT 8E).

47 This "choice" is not cognitively based, as though it represents the culmination of my deliberations over the possibilities for my shovel. Instead, it has its basis in the background that I have grown up with and into, so that I could say with confidence, but without considering the matter beforehand, that "that is what the shovel is for," if in fact I were to take so much recognition of my "choice" at all.
prying (BT 203-204). In discourse, a particular choice made is not simply held in mind, but brought to expression.

This bringing-to-expression has its own peculiar structure. First, the discourse is about something. This makes it sound as though the expression must be verbal, but it need not be so; my digging a hole is certainly about something in the context of my landscaping. What a discourse is about should be thought of as what is under consideration in a general way, as my discussion of a landscape project with a client is about that landscape (as is my digging a hole). Second, at any point in the discourse, I am expressing something specific, such as my referring to the ornamental shrubs along the front of the building. Heidegger calls such things 'the said', or what-is-said-in-the-talk (das Geredete). Third, I

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48 This intelligibility constitutes 'sense', (discussed above), and is that out of which Dasein, in projecting, gets its possibilities (Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 113-115).

49 This is an extension of Heidegger's statement that "spoken Articulation can belong to the logos, but it does not have to" (BF 207); cf. BT 316: "Vocal utterance...is not essential for discourse;" cf. further Dreyfus's comments in Being-in-the-World, 215. This is not to say, however, that the "about-which" of my digging is simply the production of a hole. If someone were to ask what I am doing, I might answer with the specific, "digging a hole," or the more general "planting a shrub," or the still more general, "fixing up this yard." In fact, there is a--somewhat precious--way of asking what someone is doing: "What are you about?"

50 The relationship between the about-which and 'the said' corresponds roughly to that of the for-the-sake-of-which and the towards-which; in the assignment-relation, the
am communicating; I am making it possible for others to come into an appropriative relationship to the concerns of my discourse. Fourth and finally, I express what I express in a specific way. These four structural moments constitute the way in which the possibilities of our situation, given in our clearing through 'sense', are articulated by what we do or say (HCT 262, BT 205-206).  

**Falling**

In order to take up this third structural aspect of Being-here, it is first necessary to examine Dasein from a slightly different perspective. If the preceding sections answered the question of how Dasein is in its 'world', here we must ask the question of who it is that is in this 'world', or as Heidegger says, "who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness" (BT 149). His opening suggestions are typical, considering his conception of phenomenology as a "dismantling of concealments" (HCT 86); the obvious answer to this who-question, that "it is I who in each case Dasein is"—in other words, that everyone encounters himself or herself as "I"—is short-circuited by his retort that "it

towards-which, grows naturally out of the more fundamental for-the-sake-of-which, and in the structure of discourse, 'the said' is a focal point of the more general about-which.

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51 Communication is the explicit sharing of Being-with, whether in word or deed, and expression is the way in which it is shared: "what is expressed is...the way in which one currently has a disposition (mood)."
could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'" (BT 150, Heidegger's italics). 52

Heidegger clarifies this statement by demonstrating that Being-in-the-world is never something belonging only to Dasein as an individual, that in everyday activities there are always other Daseins involved. These others may show up for me by their being involved in related activities in my presence, or they may show up in non-teleological assignments, for instance those by which resources consumed in my everyday work are attributed to others (BT 153). Dasein encounters these others as part of its 'world' as organized by assignments, and it encounters itself primarily in everyday activities and "in those things environmentally available with which it is proximally concerned" (BT 155; I have amended the translation to conform to Dreyfus's terms).

But others are not simply part of my 'world' as they relate to my everyday activities. First, they are also understood to be there as part of their own 'world', every one among them with his or her own everyday activities, many of which are intertwined in various ways with my activities. Since I, in my Being-in-the-world, encounter them in their

52 Cf. Guignon: "Our 'direct' understanding of ourselves is always the product of a template of traditional schematizations which circulate as 'common sense' in our culture, and tend to distort and disguise as much as they reveal....Our normal, 'self-evident' self-interpretation is generally a misinterpretation" ("Heidegger's 'Authenticity' Revisited," Review of Metaphysics, no. 38 (December 1984): 324.)
Being-in-the-world, it is proper to speak of Being-with as one of Dasein's essential characteristics. Second, and in keeping with this Being-with, these others are not a group from which I am excluded in any important way; speaking thus of "others" has more the effect of including me, as it does when we speak of the "other members" of some group--others in my church, others in my social class, others in my work unit, and so on. I hence understand myself as part of the 'world(s)' of these others.

My encountering of myself in terms of my everyday activities is therefore colored by my figuring into the 'world' and activities of others. It is not, however, simply the fact of Being-with-one-another that is of concern, but how I differ from the others: how what I do compares to what they do, how far ahead or behind them I am, and what is to be done about this (BT 163-164).

53 Heidegger's explanation is typical and instructive: "Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is available or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this" (BT 156-157, Heidegger's italics; I have amended the translation in the interests of consistency with the rest of my study).

54 "By 'Others' we do not mean every else but me--those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself--those among whom one is too" (BT 154).

55 Cf. HCT 244: "With regard to the others and to what the others pursue, one's own concern is more or less effective or useful; in relation to those who provide the exact same things, one's own concern is regarded as more or less outstanding, backward, appreciated, or the like."
Furthermore, in this process of comparison and proceeding on the basis thereof, Dasein effectively subjects itself to the others in a subservience that, for the most part, goes unrecognized, and it is here in Heidegger's explanation that we first obtain an answer to the question of the "who" of Dasein. Dasein is "not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'One'" (BT 164).

This impersonal 'One' exerts forces upon Dasein that bring about a concern over averageness and a levelling off of anything exceptional. What the average way of doing things dictates—what one thinks, how one does this or that—is desirable, and everything that would bring attention to Dasein as distinct from the others is to be avoided or, if already present, made to conform to the average (Heidegger: "Every exception is short-lived and quietly suppressed"). Further, part of the One's attractiveness lies in its ability to absorb responsibility that might otherwise attach to Dasein. If the average is what governs what is done,

56 The German is das Man, one of Heidegger's manufactured words (see p. 29, n. 6). There are several translations of the term in circulation, all corresponding roughly to the German, and each with its own strengths and shortcomings. MacQuarrie and Robinson translate it "the they," drawn no doubt from English expressions such as "they say..."; Kisiel employs "the Anyone," probably on the basis of passages such as the following: "The Anyone is the who which all and none are" (HCT 247, my italics; Guignon also prefers this translation); McNeill and Dreyfus prefer 'the One' presumably because of the correspondence between the English and German idioms: "man sagt, man hört...." for "one says, one listens..." (CT 9 and 9E).
thought, and so on, this transfers a great deal of the burden of decision-making from Dasein to the One who can always take the blame for problems because it has no reputation to maintain (HCT 244-247, BT 164-165).

Falling characterizes the relationship of the One to Dasein's Being-here and, along with disposition and understanding, determines how Dasein is 'there' by

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57 There appears to be some confusion in the literature as to how falling fits with other structural aspects of Dasein, or at least how to apply the terminology to that relationship. In three commentaries, for example, the relationship is described in three different ways. According to Dreyfus, falling belongs to "the three-fold structure of being-in," a structure which includes understanding and disposition (Dreyfus: affectedness), and a quote from *Being and Time* provides the rationale (See Dreyfus, ch. 9 of *Being-in-the-World*). Gelven's commentary describes fallenness as a "general characteristic"—presumably of Dasein, but this is none too clear from the context—and elsewhere speaks of the two ways in which Dasein finds itself in a 'world': disposition (Gelven: state-of-mind) and understanding (Gelven, *Commentary*, 92, 106). Richardson reports that Heidegger "distinguishes four aspects of...Being-in," the last of which is falling, while the other three are understanding, disposition (Richardson: state-of-mind), and discourse (Richardson, *Existential Epistemology*, 26, 32, 36, 38). There are other accounts, such as those of Baugh and Dastur, which leave out fallenness but are otherwise the same as Richardson's (see Bruce Baugh, "Heidegger on Befindlichkeit," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 20/2 [May 1989]: 127; and Françoise Dastur, "Language and Ereignis" in John Sallis, ed., *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 358). There are good reasons why each of these accounts arises in the way that it does, as Blattner observes: while Heidegger always includes understanding and disposition (Blattner: affectivity) in the disclosedness-structure's constitution (and in Dasein's Being-in, therefore), at times he includes discourse (Blattner: telling), at others falling, and at still other times both (William D. Blattner, "Existential Temporality in *Being and Time*" in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, [Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1992], 125, n. 5).
structuring the absorbed way in which Dasein goes about everyday things and doing simply what anyone (One) would do in the same circumstances. Being thus absorbed—doing what anyone (One) would do—Dasein becomes interchangeable with anyone else with similar abilities and inclinations, and fallenness describes Dasein's acquiescence to this interchangeability.

Heidegger names three ways in which falling manifests itself: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Idle talk (das Gerede) is a mode of discourse—and, as he so often says, its being a mode means it has undergone a modification—that concentrates on 'the said' while grasping the about-which of discourse only superficially. 'The said' is subsequently circulated in such a way that it "takes on an authoritative character," yet it possesses an understanding that is grounded not in experience but in hearsay, an average understanding—and averageness, remember, is one of the defining features of the One. One effect that this mode of discourse has on Dasein's understanding is to encourage it treat open questions as already settled (BT 212-213). In curiosity (Neugier), Dasein adopts a mode of seeing—a synecdochic way of describing perception in general—that is satisfied with simply seeing, and "lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world," so that novelty for is sought out purely for its own sake (BT 216). Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) arises as a sharpening of the fallenness of
idle talk and curiosity. That which is discussed in idle talk and that which is currently of interest in curiosity, and particularly how tainted these matters are by the One, can only be second-guessed: "it looks as though the matter is genuinely seen and discussed, and yet it is not; it does not look that way, and yet perhaps it is" (HCT 278).

It is easy to see Heidegger's exposition of falling as moral commentary, as though fallenness were a kind of Hyde that contrasts with the Jekyll of a more responsible existence. Some do, in fact, take the exposition this way, even though Heidegger's writings contain many warnings to the contrary. Monitory or not, however, his discussion makes clear that falling is unavoidable for Dasein; and

58 "[Falling] does not refer to the possibly negative occurrences in human life..." (KPM 161), the term "does not express any negative evaluation...," and "[we must neither] take the fallenness of Dasein as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'..." nor as "a bad and deplorable ontological property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves..." (BT 220); and "the characterization of these phenomena should not be interpreted as a moral sermon..." (HCT 273). Some commentators take Heidegger at his word; Gelven, for example, calls the three aspects of fallenness (idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity) "necessary mode[s] of one's Being-in-the-world" (Gelven, Commentary, 108), and warns readers not to see the phenomenon as anything worthy of censure (106). Others, such as Richardson, see Heidegger as one who perhaps protests too much: "it would be inappropriate to take [his comments as to the amorality of fallenness] at face value" (Richardson, Existential Epistemology, 38). It is especially difficult to take the comments from History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (p. 273, quoted above) as anything but ironic, given the particularly vicious treatment that idle talk—in the context of the professional conference—has received at the beginning of the very same paragraph.
however distasteful we might find the suggestion, it might well be that the phenomenon is as essential to Dasein's makeup as are understanding, disposition, and discourse.
CHAPTER III

MUSICAL EVERYDAYNESS

"Practical" comportment is a condition of the possibility of "theoretical" comportment. But Being-in-the-world is a condition of the possibility of "practical" comportment.¹

What constitutes an everyday activity is largely dependent upon the context of the activity. As Heidegger points out, a factor such as the breakdown of a piece of equipment can impinge upon our everydayness, causing us to focus upon what we are doing to different degrees and in different ways. In addition, what is an ordinary activity for someone at one time might not always have been so or continue to be so. Driving a car, for instance, is a task many of us take for granted; much of what is involved is automatic even when the transmission is not. A person's first driving experiences, however, are anything but ordinary; the young driver may be all too aware that on his or her every action rides the fate of everyone in the car. What changes in later years is not the significance of the actions themselves but the driver's perception of their

¹ Gorner, "Husserl and Heidegger as Phenomenologists," 154.
significance. Amount of experience in doing something surely has its effect on the possibility of an action ever to become ordinary, a fact also seen in the attentiveness that the actions of a surgeon would require from someone who is not a surgeon.

Accordingly, some kinds of musical behavior may seem to have more in common with the actions of a surgeon than with those of the operator of an automobile—depending on the context of the actions, of course. As seemingly basic an activity as listening to music, for instance, might have different characteristics for musician and non-musician—or even for different musicians—to the extent that if the characteristics of the different listenings were considered in isolation and compared, they might not appear to belong to activities that could go by the same name at all. Listening, performing music, ignoring it, analyzing it, composing it—all of these could be categorized in different ways, depending on who is involved and the circumstances surrounding the activity.

Performing and composing seem to stand out among the possible modes of musical behavior, however, probably because it is these activities more than others that seem to define a musician as one who produces music in one form or another—a perspective that makes listening seem a less practical activity, since it is difficult to talk about
anything being produced by listening. But if we define a musician as one who makes music, does this indicate that, for everyone who either writes or plays music, the writing or playing is rightly called an everyday activity? Only if they really do such things every day, or at least often enough to produce a level of competency in which many of the components of the activity are in some way automatic.

Taking Gorner’s comments quoted above as a guide, the sections that follow examine the practical activities of performance and composing in their ordinariness in order to clarify how they show up as specific ways of Being-in-the-world. Examination of these musical comportments will then illuminate how they might be conditions for the possibility of the more theoretically oriented comportment of musical analysis.

Composing

At the beginning of an investigation of Dasein as composer, the question looms: Why ask how Dasein composes when it is a person, not a philosophical abstraction, that actually thinks of musical ideas and writes them down? It would be simple enough to brush the question aside with a quick recapitulation of facts about Dasein, how it is not simply an abstraction but a way of designating the way

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2 Music analysis is also problematic in this respect and is a subject addressed in the fourth chapter of this study.
humans—whether taken individually or as larger cultural units—go about the business of Being, how it takes into account someone's Being in the middle of circumstances, and how this study has already dealt with this matter, anyway. Yet the question may not be so impertinent. There appears to be a difference between talking about Dasein planting a shrub and dealing with general landscaping problems and talking about Dasein's composing music and being creative and going about everyday activities that actually are not everyday for anyone but the talented few. In other words, there seems to be a substitutable quality in my choice of the landscaper's activities as everyday. In fact, it took little effort to come up with a substitute for Heidegger's favorite example of the craftsman with his hammer, and I could employ another just as easily; I could use an accountant, butcher, chimney-sweep, mobster or anyone else as a means of discussing how Dasein is in a 'world', how equipment shows up in that 'world', how Dasein deals with assignments, and so on. The tasks of such persons are everyday tasks that everyday people do. There seems to be an additional quality, however, that a composer has that these others I have listed do not possess. Is not being a composer different in that there is present in a composer an innate talent for coming up with musical ideas? Is this not this innate talent creativity?
The real problem with the question of Dasein as composer is that, at least in the way it has been formulated above, it sees the various other endeavors that I have named as essentially non-creative, with the special person, the composer, in possession of something additional, something almost like an internal organ that others do not have. I will grant that the composer is special, but only if I am granted that the landscaper is special, too, along with the butcher, mobster, and everybody else. Who says that there is no creativity in landscaping, anyway? Creativity in meat-cutting might seem more problematic, since we prefer to think of creativity as the pulling of ideas out of some Platonic realm and translating them into the terms of our world. Real creativity, however, lies in the dealing with possibilities into the range of which any Dasein--butcher, composer, accountant--has been placed in advance.\(^3\) This is another way of saying that "All projection--and consequently, even all of man's 'creative' activity--is thrown, i.e., it is determined by the dependency of Dasein on the being already in the totality..." (KPM 161).\(^4\)

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\(^4\) A few pages earlier, Heidegger refers to our understanding of Being as "[making] possible the so-called 'creative' capacities of the finite human creature" (KPM
Heidegger's use of quotation marks to enclose the word "creativity" is telling; it shows that he considers creativity—the artistic, for our purposes—to be precipitated by thrownness into a particular set of circumstances in a way that is not essentially different from the thrownness that precipitates the activities of the accountant or the landscaper. Viewed in this way, the vocation of the artist is not a special case in contrast to that of the accountant, but only in addition to it. Each is a "factical concretion" of the neutral Dasein which is the origin of every possibility of human existence (MFL 136-137). It should pose no more of a problem to speak of

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5 Nicholas Wolterstorff has suggested that the tendency to elevate artistic activities into a quasi-religious realm is a result of our desire to "see it as above society" and to preserve it from "social contamination" ("The Work of Making a Work of Music," in What is Music? ed. Philip Alperson [University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987], 127).

6 His point is that the neutral Dasein is not what exists. What exists are the specific cases of Dasein, each with its own particular version of world, and the general, neutral, "abstract" Dasein is the condition of the possibility of all of these concrete instances; it is the "primal source of intrinsic possibility that springs up in every existence and makes it intrinsically possible." From this point of view, every case is a special case.
the composer, therefore, than it should to speak of the landscaper as Dasein.

Although it no doubt shares many ways of Being-in with other activities, composing has its own ways peculiar to it. The most everyday of these, and most important for the purpose at hand, may well be the way a composer is 'in' a composition. For a composer to say "I am in the middle of a string quartet" signifies neither the state of Being literally surrounded by stringed instruments nor that the composer is in the process of writing out the work—copying parts, for instance. The normal way that composers employ the phrase expresses something like "I am in the process of creating a piece for string quartet; the ideas are with me constantly, and I am 'working on it' even while I am talking to you about something else." As stated above, this 'in' characterizes circumstances and how the composer is affected by them: a composition is under way, and the composer is expressing a way of being involved with musical ideas while in their presence. He or she is making a piece with them.

Musical equipment has its direct and fairly obvious sense: the things with which one makes music—musical instruments. Considered from this perspective, a composer's main piece of equipment might be a piano or computer, or the particular instrument for which he or she is writing at the moment, especially if that instrument is immediately available (especially if the composer can play the
instrument, in other words). But while instruments used in such a capacity may sometimes be a catalyst for what the composer is writing—to aid in bringing musical thoughts to expression—they are primarily for checking the sound of what is being written or how a passage lies on the instrument. There are other obvious kinds of equipment also, such as pencil and eraser, pen, ink, computer software, and so on. Again, however, these are aids in bringing a composition to expression. Still another class of equipment includes such things as the set of symbols that the composer manipulates in the creation of a score: staff, notes, rests, time signatures, etc. But there is yet another class, the more conceptual equipment of harmony, meter, melody, and instrumentation (not just the instruments themselves, but the ways in which they relate to each other). With this last category we enter the area of the composer's most characteristic equipment. The other, more obvious kinds of equipment are shared with other musicians, and the concepts of harmony and such are also shared, but only as concepts. The way this kind of equipment shows up as equipment for the composer is in the form of musical ideas.

That a composer's manipulation of musical ideas can be equipmental is more apparent from some of Heidegger's

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7 Idea can be taken here in the colloquial sense of any musical detail. The Schoenbergian "Idea" will be discussed further shortly.
statements than from others. For instance, when he says that equipment is constituted mainly by its in-order-to, this reads as if musical equipment should be defined by its ability to get something done—and the musical equipment par excellence should then be musical instruments. It is only if we remember that the in-order-to (das Um-zu) designates an assignment within a totality of equipment that the equipmental nature of a composer's musical ideas begins to show up. When a musical idea—a theme or motive, for example—"occurs" to a composer, and he or she toys with it, how it can be used appropriately will show itself because of the composer's already being involved with music in general and with instruments and their capacities in particular. "Use" of the idea means "being able to use it" and does not simply mean settling on a way of employing the idea. This ability-to-use can include thinking it through on different instruments because, just as the idea as an idea is as yet unwritten, it is incorporeal, so the use need not be a physical use. To say "use of the idea enables it to be encountered as equipment" is therefore the same as saying "the idea as equipment is constituted by its in-order-to."

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8 This is not to deny that a composer may, in working with an idea, pass into a way of dealing with it that seems more theoretical. Such things as examining the intervallic content or rhythmic structure of a motive may resemble musical analysis, but they are analyses that are oriented toward the use of the idea in the composing. As Heidegger says, "looking toward the produced or the to-be-produced does not yet need to be theoretical contemplation in the narrower sense but is at first simply looking-toward in the
The idea is, in terms of this assignment, in-order-to compose (complete) a piece—if not this piece, then some other (that aspect is not in view at this point)—just as the trombone is in-order-to perform (complete) a piece—again, if not this one, then another.

Musical ideas, when encountered equipmentally, are viewed with a composer's concerned circumspection, the normal use-oriented way of seeing; and, just as with the example of the landscaper's shovel, the way ideas are seen is not simply as something or for something, but in terms of a manifold of assignments. The assignment of an in-order-to (earlier termed an intermediate assignment) has already been mentioned, but the idea can also have more proximate goals connected to it, the towards-which (das Wozu), which names the place the musical detail takes in both a narrower and larger musical context and therefore names proximate reasons for taking up the equipment. The idea is also connected through a series of these towards-which assignments to a for-the-sake-of-which, the ultimate—perhaps undefinable—reason for composing in the first place. To speak of reasons for doing things might create the impression that the composer has Being a composer as a goal; we can bring such goals more into line with Heidegger's terms, however. The composer should be thought of as one who "moves about" sense of circumspective self-orientation" (BP 109). I will take up this question in more detail when dealing with musical analysis and the matter of assertion, below.
in these teleological assignments rather than one who has such goals in mind.

Non-teleological assignments, present and fairly easily identified in the case of the landscaper's equipment, take on a different appearance when we consider the composer's ideas as equipment. In the case of the landscaper's shovel, some non-teleological assignments may include the materials from which the shovel is made and those who produced it. Such backward-looking assignments may be much more difficult to identify when considered in connection with musical ideas since they involve consideration of things such as influences upon the composer. Some such influences, of course, are readily identifiable; virtually any serial idea points back to Arnold Schoenberg as a kind of father-figure (some might say stepfather-figure) of the twelve-tone method. Some are even more easily identified, as in the case of a composer engaging in quotation of material from another composer's piece, especially when the quoted work is well-known. But there are always many influences that affect the ways in which a composer arrives at an idea and what it looks like when it arrives, and many of these are generally inaccessible and subject only to surmise even on the composer's part.

In considering a composer's 'world', it may be helpful to review how these assignments, teleological and non-teleological, relate one to another. The equipmental totality
(die Zeugganzheit) refers to the complex of tools and their interrelations, but without specific assignment to a task. For the composer, this would include the two categories of musical equipment, both musical instruments and musical material. These items of equipment, viewed from the perspective of the equipmental totality, are considered in terms of their in-order-to; that is, they are considered in their potential practical relations to other equipment but without reference to a specific instance of a specific task --without a towards-which defined by a specific Dasein, in other words. Neither this totality nor the referential totality (die Verweisungsganzheit), which focuses more upon the interrelations themselves than upon the equipment, takes up the matter of specific teleological orientation as does the involvement totality (die Bewandtngszanzheit), Heidegger's way of looking at equipment and its interrelations with reference to Dasein's activities.

A totality of involvements is a context of self-assignments and assignment-relations that proceed from the most basic for-the-sake-of-which--in this case, Being a composer. We can view those that are subordinate as a series of towards-which assignments, proximate goals that define the composer-Dasein's activities by prescribing what is to be done and how. These goals--they may be explicitly understood as goals, but it is not their primary character to be so--might take concrete form in such things as
obtaining a degree in composition, studying with a particular composer, securing a commission, simply composing something, or some other large-scale towards-which applicable to the primary for-the-sake-of-which. The musical ideas that a composer encounters in these pursuits carry an appropriateness for some contexts and an inappropriateness for others, thereby defining the kinds of involvements they can have; and every possible involvement brings with it a host of other involvements with other equipment. The totality of these musical involvements finally points back to Dasein's for-the-sake-of-which, the ultimate towards-which that forms a basis for all the composer's involvements. The very having of an idea implies that it has a place in this totality of involvements, that it has already been freed for involvement, that the composer has let it be involved—and all this in the very process of coming up with it. That which constitutes the 'wherein' of such involvements, the overall context that gives rise to all other more specific contexts and in which they have their place, is the phenomenon of the composer's 'world'.

'World' may show up explicitly in the two ways described above, through the breakdown of equipment and through the sign.\(^9\) A breakdown could result from the unusability of music equipment that happens when an instrument is unsuited to a musical idea's presentation

\(^9\) See Ch. II, pp. 40-43.
because of timbre, practical range or some other limitation. Or it could result from actual breakdown of musical ideas, something a bit more difficult to envision. I suggest that such a breakdown could take the form of a composer's version of writer's block: knowing that something is needed in addition to what is available, but not knowing specifically what. This would bring about the same kind of obtrusiveness of the remaining available material that occurs when a piece of landscaping equipment breaks down (remember the broken shovel), but with an important difference. In both cases the remaining equipment loses its availability to occurrentness, but in the landscaping example the offending equipment is well-known, whereas in the composing of a piece, the unavailable has its unavailability in the form of both the well-known and the unknown. The missing compositional material thus acquires its conspicuousness through absence, since it is not clear just what the material is—-it is seen as neither available nor occurrent. But world also shows itself through the signs found in musical notation. Assuming a culture in which there is a musical notation-system, that system exists as a means of exhibiting a practical context, the common

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10 As Heidegger says of the apparent or false, it is "a being which is not as it is supposed to be—-it lacks something, it is a $\mu^n \delta\upsilon$. The apparent and false is not nothing, not an $\delta\upsilon$, but a $\mu^n \delta\upsilon$, a being, yes, but affected with a defect" (BP 208); in this case, the defect would be the failure to show up.
context of the performer and the composer; its function is to show someone else what to do. By extension, the score provides a complex of notational signs that enable a kind of orientation by "indicating...what sort of involvement there is with something" (BT 111) by directing behavior, so that our proper "reaction" is not automatic—not simply a look at it or a mechanical press of a key or a production of a sound--but is musical: we play it, conduct it, hum it.

The sign exhibits a practical context, but Dasein's orientation toward the context precedes the exhibition. The sign may indeed trigger a specific orientation as a kind of replacement, but in such a case the new orientation is still something that Dasein has in advance as a possibility. Dasein does not first notice the sign, figure out its reference, figure out what action should be taken, and finally take that action and thereby achieve an orientation. In fact, the ability even to notice the musical sign as something that directs behavior presupposes a musical orientation. A person with absolutely no musical orientation at all would not see anything like a sign in printed music. What enables this musical orientation is the clearing (Lichtung) that allows anything to make musical sense and--to get back to Dasein as composer--allows things to show up for the composer in ways that make compositional sense. This clearing is the composer's means of access to the world; things "in the clearing" will make sense to some
extent and in some way, while things not accounted for by this clearing—things that are not cleared—will not make sense or even really show up at all. A self-taught composer who is oriented toward a popular idiom, for instance, will most likely not know of or care about Italian trecento notation. Some such person with no exposure to ligatures, mensuration signs, dots of division, and so forth, will not even recognize that something is missing from their experience. Indeed, it may not even be proper to say that something such as the conventions of an earlier notation system constitutes something that actually could be missing in such a case. In other words, for a person in those circumstances, what needs to show up or can show up will show up; what does not or cannot, will not. Things not cleared are, accurately stated, beyond consideration. If they can be considered, they are in some sense part of the clearing (Lichtung) and thus are illuminated (gelichtet) in some way.

A composer's orientation within this world is accounted for in part by the fact that things make sense, but additionally by the way in which the composer is disposed toward those things and in the ways in which they make sense.11 Things and circumstances already matter in some

11 Befindlichkeit signifies "an awareness of 'how one is doing' or one's basic disposition," but it remains "a non-explicit an non-conceptual awareness" of this orientedness (Bruce Baugh, "Heidegger on Befindlichkeit," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20, no. 2
way or other, and this mattering affects how the composer-
Dasein operates—in an inexplicit awareness of how things
are going, in a disposition. The way in which this
disposition shows up for the composer is in a mood
(Stimmung), the means by which one's Being-in-the-world
"becomes manifest" (KPM 155). Although it is not entirely a
mistake to connect this mood with, say, the emotional tone
of a particular composition, nevertheless no matter how
elusive or how certain the emotional content may be, it is
never more than the residue of a mood. Mood is primarily
not a means of operating in composing, and to rely on the
identification of a perceived mood of a piece with the mood
of its composer is really no more dependable than relying on
what the composer says or does for a disclosure of mood.12
Most important, however, is the impoverishment of the

[May 1989]: 126). Stimmung (mood), on the other hand, is
the way that Dasein's Befindlichkeit manifests itself to
Dasein (see above, Ch. II, p. 45-46).

12 Cf. James DiCenso: "Just as art is inadequately
understood as a "mirror of nature," so is it equally
diminished and deformed if seen as an exteriorization of
subjectivity (whether of the artist or of the interpreter)"
(Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: a Study in the
Work of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur [Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1990], 66). Heidegger does,
however, allow that the structure of discourse includes a
manifestation of the disposition (mood) of the one who is
discoursing, but there is a difference between communicating
that disposition and simply manifesting it. Manifestation
takes disposition into account while not making a point of
it, but communication of one's disposition requires a
thematization of it. Yet, since Heidegger includes this
kind of communication as a possibility of poetic discourse,
it should probably not be excluded entirely from the
possibilities of composing.
concept of mood that results when we identify it with emotional tone. A composer's mood may be best described as the way in which the composer's disposition toward the current composing climate—however that may apply to an individual composer—shows up for the composer. One composer may be "right at home" and operate comfortably within the current conventions of a genre. Another may be dissatisfied with the way things are and possibly seek to push beyond the dictates of current conventions; or the composer may simply give up. In any case, the composer's disposition is revealed, not in reactions to surroundings and circumstances (and least of all in translations of these reactions into music), but in the moods that form the basis for any reaction. \(^{13}\)

Disposition and its moods reveal not only how a composer is in a world and affected by circumstances, but also the fact that this world and circumstances are not of the composer's own making, the fact of the composer's thrownness (Geworfenheit). As Heidegger explains, the revelatory nature of mood is such that our thrownness is revealed in our seeking mastery of moods, and this attempted mastery manifests itself primarily in our turning away from moods, rather than such that the mood itself makes us aware of our circumstances and our standing with regard to them. Thus the dissatisfied composer's mood discloses dependence

\(^{13}\) Baugh, "Heidegger on Befindlichkeit," 131.
on the way things are (thrownness), not in the noticeability of the dissatisfaction but in the attempts to exchange that mood for another via pushing beyond conventions (presumably bringing about satisfaction, although this would be no more explicit than the dissatisfaction) or giving up altogether (trading dissatisfaction for desperation in hopes of its being supplanted by yet another mood).  

The consideration of this turning away from a mood requires that we take into account something more than actuality, something beyond the way things are. In the composer's attempts to overcome thrownness (or, better, the consequences of thrownness as received in disposition) by looking for ways to overcome a mood, there is an implicit dealing with possibilities, and consideration of possibilities requires consideration of another structural aspect of the composer's Being-here: understanding (Verstand). As stated above, understanding is misunderstood if we take it primarily to be a form of knowing. Instead, understanding is properly taken as Being-in-the-world's quality of Being disclosed to Dasein through the "for-the-sake-of-which." For the composer, understanding amounts to competence for Being-in-the-world, because the composer is

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14 To replace one mood with another, rather than freeing the composer from contingency, would only further reveal thrownness: "Thrownness is neither a 'fact that is finished' [Tatsache] nor a Fact that is settled [Faktum]. Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw..." (BT 223; Heidegger's emphasis).
able to Be-in-the-world by virtue of having the possibilities that grow out of Being a composer. Part of this competence consists in having compositional possibilities, but this does not mean that everything is equally possible. The composer's having room-for-maneuver (Spielraum) at all implies that this area is in some way closed off--this idea shows up in the Raum of Spielraum--so that by virtue of who and when the composer is, certain things that we might think of as possibilities are not actually possibilities at all;\textsuperscript{15} thus the composer's thrownness governs the understanding as well as disposition.

À propos further clarification of the composer's understanding, we can consider a faculty that Arnold Schoenberg has described, his formal sense. First, however, we must clarify the distinction between musical ideas as musical details, and the musical Idea as that which--in Schoenberg's account of things, at least--stands behind the musical details and even causes them to appear.\textsuperscript{16} In an

\textsuperscript{15} "Dasein is from the outset deprived of certain possibilities..." (ER 111). Wolterstorff, in his own way, concurs: "The situation is not that the composer's invention, if left unchannelled...would toss up all sorts of sounds for which his society has no established hearing-habits....[It] has been schooled so that for the most part it doesn't offer him sound-sequences for which there are no nearby hearing-practices" ("Making a Work of Music," 122).

\textsuperscript{16} In the remainder of this section I will maintain this distinction between ideas (details) and the Idea (the source of those details) through the capitalization of the word when I intend the latter sense of the term. Schoenberg's distinction between ideas and the Idea amounts to a particular version of the ontological difference; here,
essay from 1931, for example, he identifies the Idea with a composer's sensing of a work in its entirety prior to any actual writing-down or working-out of material. It is not a notion of the work's structure, nor any part of that structure, nor is it motives, themes, sections, movements, or anything else that is subordinate to the whole. The Idea seems instead to be that from which the composer draws all of these details; it is the top from which the composer's top-down perspective on the composition arises, and it is that from which all points of structure and material proceed.\textsuperscript{17} The ability to address this Idea, the ability to foresee the consequences of details as they are drawn out of the Idea and incorporated into the work—we might even say the condition of the work's possibility—is the formal

\textsuperscript{17} Arnold Schoenberg, \textit{Style and Idea}, ed. Leonard Stein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 107-108. Actually, Schoenberg would probably say "from which all points of structure and material should proceed." He maintains that to begin with details and a plan for connecting them, thereby producing something that did not previously exist, is an inferior way of working. He would, no doubt, agree with Arnold Berleant's description of the activity as "not an act of combination but a process of producing sound sequences and structures by drawing out the generative possibilities of the musical material. Writing music is an expansive activity, not a retentive or constructive one" ("Musical De-Composition" in Alperson, \textit{What is Music?}).
sense, a product of the composer's education and experience.\textsuperscript{18}

As room-for-maneuver, the formal sense allows the composer to see possibilities within the Idea, possibilities for its working-out, but only those possibilities that truly are possibilities. As thrown, the formal sense can be accounted for in large measure by its dependence upon education and experience. Consequently, the Idea as well as the ideas which proceed from it must also be thrown, another way of saying that any piece—and even the Idea for any piece—is historically and culturally conditioned. But the sense, which is in part a having of possibilities, also enables the pressing forward into the possibilities that the composer has, and so it has the character of projection, the aspect of the understanding that enables Dasein to deal with compositional possibilities by actually composing.

As is the case with the composer's thrownness—and perhaps because of it—understanding does not persist in a

\textsuperscript{18} His formal sense is "tested in so many cases, trained by the best masters," and is, for him, beyond all questioning in that it guarantees that whatever he writes will be correct (Schoenberg, Style and Idea, 292); if we make some equation between the formal sense and understanding, the qualities of infallibility and clairvoyance must certainly be toned down; yet there does seem to be a measure of correspondence between these two qualities and Dasein's lack of control over the understanding combined with the certainty of the elimination of the senseless. It is also important to point out that Schoenberg does not trust his formal sense because he is able to confirm that the works he writes are good after the fact; by his account, any such approval would be superfluous.
steady state but changes, developing itself via interpretation (*Auslegung*). It is in this self-developing capacity that an understanding apprehends "something as something" (the hermeneutic "as").\(^{19}\) It is in the explanation of the as-structure that Heidegger shows just how far away from describing the true character of our understanding of equipment we would be even if we were to describe it as an apprehension of the equipment's in-order-to assignments. The in-order-to is actually still too close an examination of, say, a hammer as something for pounding nails into boards, and consequently this characterization is still too far from our actual way of operating. We apprehend a being—an equipmental one, here—"out of the towards-which of its serviceability...What we know if we know our way around, and what we learn, are the 'towardses-which'" (LFW 144). To know a piece of equipment is not simply to know that it can be used for such-and-such a task, but is to apprehend the equipment from out of the larger context into which that task figures. The complex of towards-which assignments in which a piece of equipment can be involved constitutes a field of 'sense' which the as-structure of a particular interpretation articulates, and so to speak of apprehending a musical idea as equipment means not that the composer apprehends that it could be used as

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\(^{19}\) "This is a having entirely in the sense of an everyday having-to-do-with-something, not a considering" (LFW 144).
this or that kind of detail, but that, from his or her thrown condition and vantage point, he or she apprehends a context for the idea, and that the idea, in such a context, can function in a particular way.

How clear a composer might be about details and contexts such as these depends on how well-developed a fore-structure is in place. A composer's fore-structure—a fore-having, or a context from which to start; a foresight, or a perspective from which to start; and a fore-conception, or an interpretation from which to start—governs how the composer sees such things as what kinds of works can be written, what shapes those pieces can take (how they can "go"), as well as what a detail for one of those pieces can look like, what place it can have in such a context, how other details can relate to it, and so forth. It is this fore-structure that gives a musical detail its field of 'sense',\(^{20}\) the complex of towards-which assignments in which a detail can be involved and from which "appropriative interpretation" arises (BT 203).

The towards-which assignments themselves, understood as possibilities that proceed from a field of 'sense', are prior to any such interpretations. The consequent intelligibility that these possibilities represent can be particularized by Dasein—and the possibility of this

\(^{20}\) "That which can be articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called 'sense' (BT 204).\)
particularization arises from Dasein's articulation of intelligibility—through discourse. If we remember that discourse is not necessarily verbal, seeing composing as "articulation of [an] intelligibility" presents few problems.\(^{21}\) We can think of intelligibility, the range of real options that someone has in a situation, as the ways in which a composer can use a musical detail—a theme, motive or other unit. These possibilities are not something that the composer puts into the detail after it arrives, as if a theme were to occur truly out of nowhere. The possibilities, given before the fact as a result of the composer's background, are present in the details from the moment they show up, so that articulation is, in a sense, already present for the composer and is demonstrated in the use of those details in one or more of the ways defined by their possibilities.\(^{22}\) It is this \textit{a priori} aspect that

\(^{21}\) F. Joseph Smith has observed that, in order for discourse to be as Heidegger describes it, it must (also) be musical: "This pre-structuring, which \textit{Rede} [discourse] articulates, is the entirety of relationship that the phenomenological world reveals. It is this which gives meaning to words, as we know them, i.e. not to mere words but to musical words. For primordial word cannot be split into spoken or written word and sung word. Living speech is musical....In discourse the world speaks forth as the whole world of structured relationships that make meaning possible at all" (The Experiencing of Musical Sound, 34; Smith's italics).

\(^{22}\) This constitutes the thrownness of creativity as well as discourse (see above, p. 72 and n. 4); in discourse, "the intelligibility of something has always been articulated even before there is any appropriative understanding of it" (Heidegger, Being and Time, 203). For the composer, for whom every idea already has its
underlies the discourse-structure of composing, furnishing the basis for a composition's aboutness, its what-is-said, its communication, and the way in which what-is-said is communicated.

To speak of what a composition is about would seem to place emphasis on musical ideas, on themes or motives. After all, is not a fugue about its subject? The answer seems obvious, but I think we do disservice to musical details and aboutness if we allow ourselves, hypnotized by the familiarity of the terms, to answer with an unwavering affirmative. Heidegger explains that "what is talked about in talk is always 'talked to' in a definite regard and within certain limits." In applying this to music-compositional discourse, we should ask, What is it that a particular fugue "talks to," and in what regard and within what limits does it talk? Taking the last qualification first, the limits upon fugal composition could either be internally imposed by the theme (the fugue's subject), or externally imposed by the historical circumstances under which the fugue's composer was working. Now, while there might be certain limits that a theme itself could impose--possibilities for a tonal answer, for instance--these would

appropriate places, the truly unintelligible Idea is literally unthinkable.

23 BT 205; the translators have opted for "talk" as a translation of reden/das Rede in order to preserve a semblance of Heidegger's word-play in this context.
not be limits that would determine whether or not something was to be a fugue, nor would such limits aid in determining that something, for all its anomalies, was still a fugue. It is the external limits, those historically determined genre-determining characteristics, that allow something to appear as fugue, and allow it to contribute to the determination of future fugues. Paraphrasing Heidegger, these limits constitute the range which regulates and marks out how a work in general must appear in order to be able, as a fugue, to offer the appropriate look. Moreover, it is only within such externally imposed limits that anything like an unusual fugue could occur.

If the "certain limits" are the historically focused ways in which a work can be a fugue, the "definite regard" may signify the position that a particular fugue takes within its genre, a characterization that highlights a portion of the dialogue with other fugues in which every fugue participates. This is another way of saying—and I

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24 He goes on to say, "this initial sketching-out of the rule is no list in the sense of a mere enumeration of the 'features' found in a [fugue]. Rather it is a 'distinguishing' of the whole of what is meant by {a term} like '[fugue]' (KPM 65, translator's gloss in braces); I have substituted the word "fugue" for his example, "house"); in this context, Heidegger does not mention the historical conditioning of terms.

25 The fugue that Kirnberger analyzes in the introduction to Die Kunst des reinen Satzes (pp. I-VII)—a fugue of his own composition that never modulates from the home key of e minor—is only unusual on this basis (vols. I-II [1771; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968].
have delayed using these terms because, again, their familiarity tends to obscure rather than clarify—that a work is not only about its genre, but about its material, or, in Schoenbergian terms, about its Idea. These expressions may make us think of details; but when we use the word "material" with reference to clothing, we understand the material not to be the individual threads that make up the cloth, but the whole cloth, and even the cloth considered beyond its participation in a particular article of clothing. Similarly Schoenberg, when speaking of the musical Idea, refers not to individual musical details but to "the totality of a piece," understood as the conditions for the possibility of all the details and their relationships to one another. 26 Thus a work can be about both a genre and itself; a fugue is be about fugues as well as about its own material. This represents one way of accounting for the ways in which a work "talks to" what it is about. Heidegger goes on to say that, whenever one expresses oneself about something, "something said-in-the-talk" (ein Geredetes) is involved, 27 and it is here that the details of a discourse—in this context, musical details—enter the picture. A fugue's 'said' consists of its subjects, answers, episodes, and other formal traits, but also everything else within it that might constitute a

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26 Schoenberg, Style and Idea, 122-123.

27 BT 205.
detail, such as individual harmonies or rhythmic figures as they appear in the work.\textsuperscript{28} It is these compositional particulars (ideas) that are the means by which the about-which of a discourse (the Idea) can be shared with others.

Through this sharing of the Idea through ideas, communication can occur. The Idea is unable to communicate on its own and, in order to be shared, must be rendered in sensible form of the kinds we normally refer to as music: scores, performances, recordings or other means of presenting musical discourse. These enable others to come into an appropriative relationship, through what is said, to that which the discourse is about (HCT 263; cf. BT 205). This sharing is not a conveying of hitherto internal content to the external world, but an expressing of something that can make sense to others on the basis of generally shared practices.\textsuperscript{29} Finally, in expressing oneself musically about something, the one who communicates can convey a certain state-of-mind with respect to the music by casting the musical utterance in a certain way. Perhaps through

\textsuperscript{28} I want to be careful here not to be too rigid in saying that any of these details, either by themselves or in combination with others, stands for the 'said', since Heidegger seems to have in view the about-which of discourse (considered from the standpoint of details) rather than the details themselves (considered as freestanding characteristics). To focus upon the 'said' without keeping the about-which in view is a characteristic of the fallen mode of discourse, idle talk.

\textsuperscript{29} On the nature of these practices, see Wolterstorff, "The Work...," 109-115.
orchestration or other expressive means, but always through choices from among possibilities, the way of expressing the music shows something about how the composer wishes the expression to be received.

Performing

Just as the practical musical activity of composing has equipment that it shares with other musical activities as well as equipment that is unique to it, so it is in the practical activity of performing music. And, as was the case with the composer, some things are obviously equipmental, such as musical instruments, while others are not so readily seized upon as equipment; it is these less obvious tools that are most characteristic of the performer. I am referring here to the performer's technique, something that pianist Josef Hofmann has even called "...a chest of tools from which the skilled artisan draws what he needs...." The complex of abilities known as technique thus encompasses those aspects of dexterity that have been

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30 Josef Hofmann, *Piano Playing, with Piano Questions Answered* (1920; reprint New York: Dover Publications, 1976), 80. Hofmann goes on to say that "the mere possession of the tools means nothing; it is the instinct--the artistic intuition as to when and how to use the tools--that counts. It is like opening the drawer and finding what one needs at the moment." Compare Heidegger's discussion of the equipmental character of the hammer: "Equipment [such as a hammer]...is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering...has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable" (BT 98, Heidegger's italics).
deliberately developed and must be maintained through drill as well as those that seem to come naturally, but it also includes the ability to apply this dexterity appropriately. For each musician, the complex will consist of different tools, but in every case the equipment is constituted by the way the performer uses it--by its in-order-to.

In this context the in-order-to of technique is the place that the elements of technique have in relation to each other and to other pieces of equipment (such as instruments and printed music): the place that it has within the totality of the performer's equipmental assignments. But the pianist, for example, does not see the various scale-fingering patterns primarily as fingering patterns for performing scales; rather he or she sees them in terms of the place that these patterns can take in the preparation of a work for performance. The fact that performers drill such patterns regularly merely points to the equipment's constant need for maintenance, just as the carpenter's tools require maintenance to keep them in working order. When the equipment is separated from contexts in order that such maintenance may be undertaken, it is so separated only so

31 "Dexterity" should be understood in the broadest sense so as to take into account everything that is generally required for a performer to make his or her way around on an instrument comfortably--not just swift fingers, but also a swift larynx, arm, lip, or whatever else the instrument requires.
that it may be more effectively used in the execution of the tasks for which it is suited, so that it may reintegrated in contexts once again. These tasks take their place in the service of towards-which assignments that point ultimately to the self-assignment of the performer-Dasein to a for-the-sake-of-which.

This for-the-sake-of-which provides the means for considering the performer's 'world', since this is the assignment in terms of which the other assignments are ordered. But these assignments are so "ordered" before the performer-Dasein ever explicitly considers them because the performer has, in a sense, been brought up with them and the ways in which they can relate to each other. Before the performer "decides" to become a performer, he or she has already been found in a context in which Being a performer is an option, a context in which things are already organized in terms compatible with such a for-the-sake-of-which. The performer is already in a 'world'. Once the performer "decides" to become a performer, he or she may focus upon certain assignments in a different way than

32 Busoni's suggestion could not be more apt: "Attend to your technical equipment [technische Apparat] so that you are prepared and armed for every possible event; then when you study a new piece, you can turn all your power on to the intellectual content; you will not be held up by the technical problems" (from "Rules for Practising the Piano," The Essence of Music and Other Papers, trans. Rosamond Ley [New York: Dover, 1965]); taken from a letter to his wife dated July 20, 1898 (Ferruccio Busoni, Briefe an seine Frau, ed. Friedrich Schnapp [Erlenbach-Zürich: Rotapfel Verlag, 1935], 22.
before the decision, but 'world' does not suddenly form around the decision.

A breakdown of equipment, a situation in which 'world' may show itself explicitly, is something that happens regularly in the preparation of music for performance. Often the performer is faced with a difficult passage which must be carefully worked out in order to reintegrate it into its proper musical context. Fingering problems for the pianist, breathing problems for the wind player, and range and intonation problems (many of which are not instrument-specific) all constitute equipmental breakdown. A flutist's problem with breath control can result in the conspicuousness of the problematic equipment forcing the player into a deliberate focus on breathing, something that the experienced player deals with automatically for much of the time. The same problem can bring about an obtrusiveness of the problem equipment, so that the lung-capacity or its use becomes something that must be developed further before the preparation for performance can be considered complete.

Musical notation, as a system of signs, has a special significance for the performer in the way it causes an explicit display of 'world'. Especially in ensemble playing, the coordinating action of such signs as bar-lines draws attention to the shared world of the performers. Perhaps more important than the signs that the printed score provides are those signs that the players provide for
themselves and each other: a trombone-player draws a pair of glasses on his part as a reminder to watch the conductor at a certain point, or a string-quartet's first violinist gives an upbeat-upbow as a signal to the other three players for when and how to begin the piece. In such ways signs call attention to the intricate system of assignments that constitutes ensemble playing, the shared 'world' in which the musicians are operating.

Considering the complete structure of the way in which performers are in a 'world' is not crucial. Having gone through the concepts of disposition and mood (Gelven's "mode of the actual") both in general form and in the particular case of the composer, I will not recapitulate the characteristics as they relate to the performer. Only a little more explanation is necessary for a grasp of the performer's understanding (Gelven's "mode of the possible"): thanks to his or her clearing, the performer is able to deal with those things that come up in the course of musical involvement. The performer has possibilities—a performer's ways of handling what comes up—and the situation that is completely unintelligible does not arise (if it should, would we even refer to it as a situation?).

A discussion of interpretation as it relates to performance requires careful handling, however, because interpretation is an element of performance that is often discussed in ways that tend to obscure what is actually
being discussed. When we speak of a performer's interpretation of a piece, we are usually referring to the conception of the work that the performer appears to have and the way in which that conception is conveyed to an audience, but this scheme of externalization of some inner mental content is not entirely compatible with Heidegger's concept of interpretation. In order to come to terms with the Heideggerian sense of interpretation in the context of performance, it is first necessary to point out that, just as the performer's technique is equipmental (available—zuhanden), so is the music—in the narrow sense of the score from which a performer might begin working—and it is constituted as such by its place in the performer's involvement-structure, that is to say it is constituted as equipment by the assignment of an in-order-to. In interpretation, what is interpreted is the available in its availability (or the equipment in its equipmentality), and the activity of interpretation shows up in all "preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, [and] rounding-out," which is to say that interpretation arises in certain aspects of our involvement with the available, particularly those aspects that incorporate an "explicit" understanding as opposed to an understanding that allows simple everyday coping (BT 189).³³

³³ BT 189.
Performance involves this more explicit kind of understanding of the music, and as interpretive activity it proceeds with the fore-structure described previously both in general and in the context of composing. The performer's initial impression of a piece as "tonal," "easy," "romantic," "atonal," "baroque," or "difficult" represents the performer's background as an organizing force in the interpretation of the piece in question (forehaving). An impression of how to approach the problems that a particular piece poses—for instance, seeing Chopin's Etude, op. 12, No. 1, as a study in arpeggiation of tertian chords and therefore an example of common practice tonality in action—represents a way of seeing the piece in terms of what is already known (foresight). And the performer's expectations as to how the piece will go—how the arpeggii will be executed, the kind of preparation that will be required in order to perform it, the overall shape of the piece—represents a way of conceiving the piece in a way that conforms to the experiences the performer has had with perceivedly similar pieces; a performer with a Schenkerian

34 By "initial impression" I do not necessarily mean absolutely the first encounter a musician has with a piece; what I do mean is the impression that a musician would have prior to any active attempt at interpretation. This impression could be compared to knowing about in the sense of knowing some facts about the piece, as opposed to knowing in the sense of being closely involved with the piece. Similar distinctions are discussed in the section dealing with music analysis, below.
bent might even begin by wondering whether the piece was a "5-line" or a "3-line" (foreconception).

In interpreting, the performer's projection of possibilities for performing a piece of sense invokes the as-structure that is "the primary form of all interpretation" (HCT 261); the piece is seen as..., its parts are taken as..., its individual gestures are to be performed as.... In working possibilities out, the performer highlights the in-order-to assignments of parts in relation to whole and vice-versa as they show up for that performer at that time so as to bring out the referential correlations accessible at any given time" (HCT 260). In a sense, interpretation is what the piece is for: it is what the performer does with the piece as a performer. The 'sense' of a piece, then, is the performer's understanding of the 'as'. If it appears that this "performerly" taking of something-as-something is not as simple as the familiar illustration of the hammer--it is taken as something for hitting nails--perhaps the perceived simplicity of hammering hides a more complex structure. Heidegger says that in the "mere encountering of something, it is understood in terms of a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides in itself the explicitness of the assignment-relations which belong to that totality" (BT 189). We should expect that a scrutiny of hammering would reveal a structure comparable to that of performing in its complexity; and, just as hammering
shows how a craftsman can use a hammer, so performing shows how a performer can play a piece.

But the equipment of technique also requires interpretation. When the performer's technique, with which the performer has an everyday kind of involvement, is used not on its own terms but in terms of a particular piece, an interpretive forestructure is in place and guides the initial stages of the working-out of the interpretation of the piece. The pianist takes certain fingering patterns for granted and uses them until they show themselves to be inappropriate or inadequate for a piece. In such a case, a particular arpeggiation pattern could be taken as a way of dealing with a particular portion of the score, and this would be coordinated with surrounding technical problems and the technical equipment used to handle them in a way that represents a working-out of technical possibilities for the work; and in this working-out, the pianist sees technique essentially as possibilities, as ability to (do something).\textsuperscript{35} The performer's involvement with that technical aspect of music is what is laid out (ausgelegt) in the performer's interpretation of that particular aspect of his or her technique.

From the foregoing discussion of interpretation in performance both in its technical and musical aspects, it is

\textsuperscript{35} This, I think, is the point of Hofmann's observation that "technique represents the material side of art" \textit{(Piano Playing...}, 80).
apparent that musical interpretation, as the phrase is commonly used, is not the equivalent of the Heideggerian concept. The common way of understanding musical interpretation focuses upon interpretation as a thing, a finished product; it is what the performer presented at the recital last night, as though it were the culmination of the performer's study of the music, so that he or she could now lay that piece aside and move on to others (assuming that we found the interpretation satisfactory). Seen in this way, interpretation is not something ongoing, something circular, as we see in Heidegger's account. Seen from his point of view, however, any interpretation must be taken as provisional. The performer is always preparing the piece, and possibilities are only really exhausted when the performer dies.

Interpretation appropriates what is already understood. But what is already understood is already intelligible, and not an undifferentiated blob of something called 'sense'; it is intelligible because of the priority of discourse which articulates--differentiates or gives shape to--the field of sense, the source of possibilities that Dasein has. For the performer, a kind of musical, non-verbal discourse underlies interpretation of both kinds of equipment discussed above. Interpretation is not the way the performer played the piece last night, as though the interpretation that could stop once the performance stopped, but rather it is the making
explicit of the performer’s relation to the piece as that relationship now stands. What makes the explicitation of this relation possible is the performer's capacity for discourse, for articulating the intelligibility of the music. In this articulation, the performer's discourse is structured by the following moments: an about-which, which we may take in a narrow sense as referring to a particular piece or in a broader sense as referring to a genre or some other way of grouping musical works; something-said-in-the-performance, i.e. the individual gestures as the performer plays them ("in this 'something said,' discourse communicates" [BT 205]); the communication, the actual playing of the piece understood both as a unit and as a sum of gestures; and the manifestation, the self-expression of the performer, in which the performer's disposition at the time of the performance is shared.\(^{36}\)

This structural description makes it appear as though discourse is the expressing of an interpretation, a scheme that places interpretation prior to discourse. But interpretation, remember, is not monolithic but is always in flux, so that a performer's interpretation in a performance is simply an expression of where the interpretive process,  

\(^{36}\) Again, this does not guarantee that the expression of disposition will be rightly received to those to whom it is expressed, for the opportunities for misreading disposition are endless. Nervous frenzy may be taken for enthusiasm, boredom may be taken for despondency, and any mood may be counterfeited. In such a case, the faking of a mood could be a manifestation of contempt for the audience.
the developing as-structure, stands at that point. On the contrary—at least on the Heideggerian account of things—discourse is prior to interpretation (BT 204), which means that discourse forms the basis for, lies behind, and is the condition for the possibility of all interpretation. But isn't this backwards? Does not interpretation provide the basis for talking about something that has been interpreted? Even going along with Heidegger as far as to grant that all interpretation has an as-structure, do we not first take the shovel as a tool for digging holes and, only after that, find ourselves able to talk about the tool?

Answering objections such as these will be unproductive unless we first revise the flawed conception of discourse that lies at the root of the objections, the conception that holds that discourse must be verbal. On such a view, discourse is a vocal expression of what we know and thus has language as is basis. As has been shown above, however, the reverse is the case: it is discourse that makes language possible (BT 203). Discourse is not primarily talking, but rather is articulation of the intelligibility of a situation. This intelligibility is seen primarily in terms of possibilities, and discourse is the faculty that enables Dasein to distinguish one possibility from another; discourse "tells" possibilities in the sense of telling them
apart.\footnote{This analogy between "telling things apart in using them" and the kind of telling that we connect with talking furnishes Dreyfus's motivation for translating Heidegger's \textit{Rede} (discourse) with "telling" \textit{(Being-in-the-World, 215).}} If interpretation is the working-out of explicit possibilities, this activity is only possible when something prior to the working-out, namely discourse, has rendered the possibilities distinguishable. Accordingly, discourse articulates (differentiates) the possibilities around which the as-structure can form, so that discourse can be seen in the context of both the composer and performer--somewhat indistinctly, but this is not necessarily a defect of expressing it this way--as making music.
CHAPTER IV

THE DERIVATIVE NATURE OF MUSIC ANALYSIS

The preceding two chapters of this study have shown that the practical musical behaviors of performing and composing involve interpretation in the Heideggerian sense and are therefore possible because of a musical, nonverbal discourse that forms their basis. In this section I point out, from the same perspective, how music analysis may be considered a derivative form of these practical endeavors; I will also assess what implications of this derivation there might be for a view of music analysis.

In discussions of music analysis, the words "discourse" and "interpretation" often show up. For instance, in *Music and Discourse*, Nattiez speaks of "analytical discourse," "musicological discourse," and "interpretive freedom" in the context of his treatment of analysis.¹ While I do not intend to take issue with his terminology, I must point out that Nattiez, like the rest of us, rarely uses such terms in ways that are compatible with Heidegger's rather technical employment of them. Nattiez uses "discourse" to refer to a written or verbal linguistic phenomena having to do with

music, or about music analysis, or about anything, and he uses "interpretations" to refer to the particular ways in which we talk about such things. For Heidegger, however, discourse is pre-linguistic articulation of how something is intelligible, and this articulation can find its way into expression. Discourse stands behind interpretation, which is a hermeneutic taking-of-something-as-something; furthermore, the as-what is understood from that towards-which the thing is serviceable, and this is not a passive serviceability (how something can be used) but an active one (how I may use it).²

The Mechanics of the Derivation

Analysis, in contrast to interpretation and the discourse that underlies it, is apophantic: in its most familiar forms, analysis points things out. This pointing-out may occur in overtly apophantic form: "F and G assume initial functions. They are points of departure, places from which motion elsewhere is initiated."³ In this context, the text directs our attention to two pitches as

² This divergence between Heidegger's technical use of the words and the common understanding of them obtains in other disciplines--literary criticism, historiography, and philosophy, to name a few--as well as in music analysis. Even a philosopher as closely associated with Heidegger as Paul Ricoeur can entitle one of his books Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning without necessarily having Heidegger's use of the terms in mind.

abstracted from the context of the piece in question—they are pointed out from themselves, as Heidegger might say—and then to the place those two pitches have in the structure of the piece. Pointing out may, however, appear in other, less obvious forms such as the following "vague and gestaltic rumination:" "Featherflight return to exploded-from space; shapes implosively pushing outward, upward and downward; dissolving. . . ."\(^4\) Here, the manner of expression is different—less technical, and perhaps closer to our "experience" of the piece—but our attention is still directed toward determinate aspects of return, expansion, and dissolution. If we are not sure exactly to what our attention is being directed, still this does not detract from the pointing-out that shows up in this text, because even a poor job of pointing-out may still point something out (this should not be taken as an indictment of Snarrenberg's analysis; his imprecision in this case is calculated). Like interpretation, the pointing-out of determinate aspects of something has an as-structure—it is a taking of something-as-something—but this 'as' is a derivative form of the hermeneutic 'as' that we find in interpretation.

All of our everyday dealings grow out of the ways in which things are 'given' to us; the things we use,

\(^4\) Robert Snarrenberg, "Hearings of Webern's Bewegt," Perspectives of New Music 24, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1986): 389.
manipulate, avoid, and so forth, are not simple, meaningless objects, to which we later attach meanings depending on what we need to do. Our dealings are primarily with things that are for this or that task, and by virtue of our having things in this way, our dealings have the character of a "'having' of something as something" (LFW 144).\(^5\) We have already seen how the composer's as-structure, with reference to a musical detail, provides contextual possibilities for the detail so that the detail can function in an appropriate way. Likewise, the performer's hermeneutic 'as' applies both to the interpretation of a piece and to the musician's technique. In the former case, the performer takes anything from the smallest gesture to the entire piece as something, while in the latter, the performer takes familiar ways of doing things as ways of dealing with problems that the piece poses. This 'having' applies not just to things that Dasein uses, however, but to those things that Dasein perceives in the environment (and therefore perceives via an oriented perception [LFW 145]):

"what we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling" (BT 207).

In contrast to this oriented perceiving, an "as-like" (als-\(^5\) Heidegger emphasizes in his footnote that "this is a having entirely in the sense of an everyday having-to-do-with-something, not a contemplating."
haft) having—a hearing the of the sound of a dripping faucet simply in terms of its acoustic properties, for example—requires a special kind of detachment from the way in which we normally go about; such a hearing requires a reduction from the primary, hermeneutic as-structure that is otherwise always present (LFW 145).

The hermeneutic as-what is not something that Dasein, as musician, doctor, or anything, grasps explicitly but is something in which Dasein lives and moves about (LFW 146). In an assertion, on the other hand, the primary 'as' of everyday behavior is levelled off to a determination of characteristics. The thing that was originally (from the towards-which) taken as something available now becomes occurrent, and when we point out characteristics we are pointing out occurrent properties in this occurrent thing, so that our having-to-do-with-it is reduced to a letting-it-be-seen. Originally, the towards-which assignments gave us the with-which, the assignment that is the towards-which as seen from the perspective of the equipment's function within the task rather than from the perspective of Dasein's involvement; we might consider the with-which as a kind of product of the hermeneutic as-structure. When our dealings with the equipment involve making assertions, this with-which becomes the about-which of a pointing-out. Furthermore, since the letting-be-seen that thus comes about focuses on the about-which of my speaking-to the thing, the
about-which is "elevated" (gehoben) from out of thing spoken-to itself, and the 'as' that was originally obtained from the towards-which of serviceability is now derived from the occurrent subject of the assertion (LFW 155). Yet, with the exchange of the available for the occurrent, the involvement with the thing is not lost entirely; Heidegger is careful to point out that making assertions about something is also a species of involvement, although not the same kind that we find in the everyday use of tools. It is rather an involvement in the sense of address or consideration, and moreover an address that has its own considering in view. The involvement, the having-to-do-with, has consequently withdrawn from using and working with the thing into a restricted concern for occurrent qualities in an occurrent item (LFW 157).

6 "The assertion...is in the broadest sense a having-to-do-with, but not in the sense of the craftsman's orientation, but rather exclusively in the sense of speaking-to" (LFW 156).

7 Joseph Rouse, in his essay, "Science and the Theoretical 'Discovery' of the Present-at-Hand" (in Descriptions, ed. Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman [Albany: SUNY Press, 1985], 200-210) has argued that there is no exchange of availability for occurrentness in scientific investigation, and his argument could be extended to other apophantic endeavors--music analysis included--whose primary activity consists in thematization of otherwise available tools of Dasein's concern. He maintains that the thematization that occurs in scientific investigation is just another example of "everyday concernful absorption in the world," and that this world has its own tools and assignments, just as the world of the craftsman or the landscaper does.

The chief problem with Rouse's argument can be traced to an emphasis upon Heidegger's account as it stands in
In a way that corresponds to this withdrawal of Dasein's involvement, the true Being-character of what is under consideration recedes so that, levelled off to the status of a mere thing, the subject of the assertion is equivalent, as far as the assertion is concerned, to other things (LFW 158). The fact of this levelling-off attests to the primacy of the way of Being that the levelling takes as its point of departure, namely the way that it shows up for Dasein in understanding comportment. And through the determining that both establishes a characteristic and confers that characteristic upon the music as a now-occurent thing, the assertion has the effect of concealing the subject's available nature (LFW 159). Construction of

Being and Time at the expense of other, earlier texts—like Logik—that give more complete accounts of the relationship between hermeneusis and apophansis. The problem itself is a neglect of the contrast between apophantic activity within a hermeneutic framework—Heidegger's too-grainy chalk (see below, note 17)—and hermeneutic activity within an apophantic framework. Scientific investigation, in concerned circumspection that characterizes anyone's everyday dealings with a world, does indeed manipulate the equipment of and move about in the assignments of its world, but this world has an apophantic orientation whose more fundamental towards-which's are primarily those of determination, exhibition, and definition.

Rouse's essay is not the first to show that, while Being and Time may indeed be Heidegger's magnum opus, it often does not give the whole story. Much of the structural description, especially in Division I, is condensed and adapted from earlier lectures, and is probably best not considered complete on its own.

8 It is worth considering whether this determinative stance is the source for any difference that there might be between the ways in which we talk about "music"—perhaps this reflects a hermeneutic (discursive) orientation?—and the ways in which we refer to "the music"—perhaps this
an assertion therefore lets the subject be seen while concealing its true Being.\(^9\)

Assertion thus proves to be a derivative rather than a primary disclosure of the Being in question, and thus music analysis, as primarily assertive (apophantic) in nature, is a derivative approach to the music that it analyzes. Composing and performing interpret: they take music as something from out of the towards-which of serviceability. Analysis transforms the with-which, the music from the perspective of the use itself, into the about-which of an assertion, so that the assertion points out characteristics of music. Analysis transforms that which was defined by involvement based on serviceability for the performer and composer into something defined by an involvement that grows out of consideration.\(^{10}\) Having-to-do-with music has withdrawn into a restricted concern for occurrent characteristics in music that has itself become occurrent.

reflects an apophantic (assertorical) orientation?

\(^9\) This concealing is not always present in the same way or to the same degree; Heidegger allows that there are assertions that can be related more closely to our everyday involvements and takes as his example the assertion, "the chalk is too grainy." In this statement, what is in view is not primarily the establishing of the characteristic of graininess in the chalk, but rather how this characteristic of graininess impedes my writing (LFW 157).

\(^{10}\) Cf. LFW 155: "The assertion as concern, a comportment of Dasein, is in the broadest sense also an involvement, but not in the sense of a craftsman's orientation, but rather exclusively of consideration." I examine analytical consideration as involvement in the final section of this chapter.
One of the most obvious kinds of analytical determination is the assignment of Roman numerals to chordal structures. Labels are generally assigned to chords in order to codify harmonies in some respect, yet whatever these labels represent—pitch content, chord quality, relationship to a tonal center, harmonic function—the different kinds of labels are tailored towards the making of specific kinds of determination. Some Roman numeral systems, for example, may identify relationship of a chord root to a tonal center as well as the general relationship of the notes above to the bass voice; some systems also have signs that attach to the numerals that provide information about the quality of the chord being labeled. Some systems that use the same set of numerals regard chord quality as a harmonic red herring and view harmonies represented by the numerals as representatives of a scale-step that controls a harmonic span.

In figure 1, I have labeled three chords in a musical excerpt.

![Figure 1. Beethoven, Sonata Op. 10, No. 3, first movement (measures 7-10).](image-url)
The orientation of the analyst requires an as-structure that differs from that of the performer or composer. The performer would take the music quoted here as the end of a phrase, not by saying "this is the end of the phrase," or writing "phrase end" on the score, but by playing it in a way that a performer would play the end of a phrase that is put together in the way this one is (the phrase in question has a dynamic marking of *piano*, and the following phrase has a marking of *forte*). Of the performance-assignments involved in this example, the most immediate towards-which might be "ending the phrase," from which the performer obtains the as-what that will characterize this phrase ending. Seen from the perspective of the task, the towards-which becomes the with-which, the assignment that provides the performer with the means of fulfilling the 'as': play it this way. Similarly, the composer would not take this as the end of a phrase by verbally characterizing in that way, but using it 'as' the end of a phrase. The composer's towards-which, like the performer's, is something like "ending the phrase;" the corresponding with-which becomes the choice of notes and provides the specific gesture.

The performer's and composer's practical orientations do not typically involve the pointing-out that characterizes the orientation of the analyst. The theoretical orientation that makes possible the assigning of Roman numerals in the way that I have in figure 1 also enables the establishment
of a cluster of characteristics such as how the chords, so labeled, are related to a tonal center (the key whose tonic receives the Roman numeral I). The with-which of practical orientation becomes the thematic about-which, and this apophantic assignment is taken up (gehoben) from the chords as chords, "from the things spoken to" themselves. The 'as' is correspondingly obtained from the occurrent subject--these notes here--rather than from a towards-which of practical involvement with the phrase. By focusing upon "these notes here," the analyst levels off the primary way of Being of the notes--their inclusion in a practical way in the context of the sonata--so that the notes are, from the standpoint of the activity of asserting, equivalent to other phrase-endings and chord structures.\textsuperscript{11}

The determination that the analyst makes, which in this case takes the form of assignment of Roman numerals to chords, reveals a restricted range of characteristics through pointing-out. The establishment of a determinate characteristic--relation to a tonal center, perhaps implying harmonic function--thus specifies a particular way of looking at the notes; the analyst further confers that

\textsuperscript{11} Actually, when Heidegger says that such occurrent subjects are equivalent to any other things, he means any other things: "It [a piece of chalk] does not differ any other thing, the sheet of paper or the lamp, insofar as I conceive them as mere things" (LFW 158). In my account I have restricted the range to similar musical things, but Heidegger's broader range actually holds: these notes here, as far as asserting is concerned, are also equivalent to the sheet of paper or the lamp.
characteristic upon the notes, saying in effect "here is an example of this kind of thing." In revealing a way of looking at them, other aspects of the notes are concealed. These other aspects include occurrent ones, such as the ways in which this example differs from other progressions of the same kind or the rhythmic structure of the example (the list could be extended to ridiculous proportions); and, more importantly perhaps, available ones, such as we find in the practical orientation characteristic of the performer and composer. Through all of this, the analyst's involvement proves to stem not primarily from a towards-which of getting something done, but from an about-which of consideration. When a towards-which appears in such a context, it appears within the framework of apophansis.

The levelling-off that is characteristic of apophantic activity shows up especially clearly in reductive analysis, particularly in that of the Schenkerian variety. In fact, one of the points of Schenkerian graphing is this levelling-off itself; Schenker himself says that the Ursatz resolves all diversity into ultimate wholeness,\(^{12}\) so that the process of tracing the foreground back to its Ursatz is essentially a tracing of the non eodem modo that constitutes

\(^{12}\) Heinrich Schenker, Free Composition (Der freie Satz), translated and edited by Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, Inc. 1979), 6.
the foreground of a work back to the semper idem of its background.¹³

Figure 2 represents a typical graph showing foreground, middleground and background. What this three-part graph shows is how I, the analyst graphing the piece, derived one level from another; it shows in a simplified way the manner in which I obtained the Ursatz from the foreground material.¹⁴ In thus showing levels (in the Schenkerian

¹³ The Latin comes from Schenker's oft-quoted motto, semper idem, ed non eodem modo--always the same, but not in the same way (borrowed from Kant).

There is a tension between the order in which Schenker --as well as Jonas, in his account of Schenker's theories--presents his material in Free Composition as well as in the Five Graphic Music Analyses, and the order in which the concepts of his theories are usually presented. Schenker works from the background to the foreground, taking principles of the composition abstracted from a sampling of "masterworks" as his point of departure; he intends to show how this masterwork grows out of this Ursatz (hence the title of his book, Free Composition, instead of something like "Reductive Analysis Done Right"). Most presentations and applications of his theories, however, proceed from the musical surface back to the Ursatz in order to show how the piece exemplifies the Ursatz as seen in a series of steps from the foreground to the background. Schenker's presentation thus proceeds in top-down fashion from the semper idem to the non eodem modo, while the analysis, seen as the process of arriving at a satisfactory graph of a piece, proceeds bottom-up from the non eodem modo to the semper idem.

¹⁴ What is to be understood from a graph is to be gathered from all levels taken simultaneously. This is evident from Schenker's first example from the first German edition of Der Freie Satz in which he represents the various structural levels (schichten) all at once as a truncated pyramid (Matthew Brown, "Schenker, Cognition, and Debussy's Compositional Process," unpublished paper). Schenker shows that his reductive analysis is only truly complete when all levels are taken together and that such an analysis is only properly read by passing back and forth between the levels.
Figure 2. Analytic sketch of Waltz Op. 39, No. 4 (Brahms); a, foreground; b, middleground; c, background.
sense), it shows how I have levelled off (in the Heideggerian sense) Brahms's foreground.

In the first transformation (figure 2a), I have removed from consideration such things as rhythm and dynamics, as well as some of the surface details, and I have done so by means of a specialized musical notation that enables me to point out—with a fair degree of accuracy if I graph the piece properly—what I wish to place under consideration. In the second transformation (figure 2b) I remove from consideration all diminutions but those directly connected to the Ursatz, while in the third transformation (figure 2c) I show the Ursatz itself. In this reduction of detail from level to level, I have progressively levelled things off to the final state that appears in the third transformation, and this graphic process of levelling off parallels the levelling-off of my involvement with the piece; I level off the true Being of the work while still letting it be seen in the way that I wish it to be considered. While I may wish to show that the piece is to be taken 'as' an example of a 3-line, this kind of

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15 By use of the word "properly" I do not mean to downplay the flexibility of the system; I am, however, characterizing the system fairly by saying that it is possible to make mistakes with the graphic notation. It is possible, for instance, to connect two occurrences of a bass note that do not represent the prolongation of a single harmony. It is possible to do this connecting knowingly—I might see a prolongational relationship that, according to the way the system is generally used, is not there—or unknowingly—I might not realize that what appears in my graph is not what I intended to show.
consideration is still too far removed from the kind of consideration that the analysis is supposed to engender. Schenker's treatment of levels suggests that I am to take the piece as a product of applications of successive levels of diminution, and my graph presumably reflects my understanding of these applications.

There are certain things that such a graph does not do. Certainly, it does not show rhythm—a charge often laid to this method of analysis—but Schenkerian analysis is not so concerned with temporal aspects as it is with a special view of voice-leading. A Schenkerian graphic analysis of this sort is supposed to show how the fundamental structure—its horizontalization of the tonic triad through the arpeggiation in the bass and passing motion in the fundamental line—is composed-out.\(^{16}\) More important than the elimination of rhythmic considerations is the fact that the graph does not give its reader something to perform. Yes, you can play it if you want to, but that is not its primary function, and even though you can play it, you cannot perform it.\(^{17}\) This point attests to the withdrawal

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\(^{17}\) For the basis for this statement, see Thomas Carson Mark, "Philosophy and Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XLI/3 (March, 1981), 306ff. Mark never deals with anything like an analytical graph, but his description of the conditions for performance are applicable here. His professor who can quote a passage from Brahms—or an entire
of involvement from practical use of the piece into theoretical consideration of it, and thus to the primacy of the practical endeavors over the analyzing. Such analyses could certainly be used to support a particular way of performing the piece—in fact they often have been so used—but the playing of a phrase-ending in a certain way, supported by the analysis, would not actually have the analysis as its basis, even if the analysis were to precede the explicit recognition of this way of playing; rather it would have as its basis a prior involvement in music that would allow such a way of seeing and playing the phrase-ending. Analysis in general, and Schenkerian analysis in particular, does not of itself present or clarify the assignments of practical involvement (the towards-which or with-which assignments). Yet these assignments are already (always already!) present in the hermeneutic activities of performing and composing. The apophantic activity of piece—in class, but can never perform it, is like the theorist who plays a Schenkerian graph. In both cases, the music is "rendered inert" (309). How is it so rendered? In Mark's account, by playing it, the professor can say something "about [the Brahms piece] but not with it" (307) and thus can make an assertion (but in Heidegger's, not Mark's, sense of the word; Mark has quite a different thing in mind when he refers to assertion). But a full Heideggerian account would add that the apophantic classroom context is the means for rendering the piece "inert." Likewise, in playing a Schenkerian graph, the theorist can only quote an assertion and can therefore only say something about a graph about a piece.

For more on the possibility of a musical assertion, see the section below dealing with Hans Keller and Functional Analysis.
analysis is unable of itself to go beyond its own about-which.

One way of analyzing that appears to avoid apophantic orientation is Hans Keller's Functional Analysis, a way of analyzing that emphasizes the common background of contrasting material within a piece. By virtue of their reliance on music rather than words, Keller's analyses appear to cast the analyst in the role of composer and analysis in the role of discourse; after all, Functional Analysis does not tell, it shows. The question here is, Does this participation in discourse, if that is what it is, liberate it from the apophantic orientation of the assertion?

One problem with equating Keller's brand of analysis with discourse is the difference between the way discourse shows and the way Functional Analysis shows. Discourse shows possibilities by articulating the intelligibility of a situation, while analysis—the Functional variety included—shows by pointing out. But does not the wordlessness of Functional Analysis somehow enable it to transcend the apophantic orientation of verbal analysis? This question, phrased in this way, resembles a question dealt with above with respect to discourse itself; then, the question was, Must discourse be verbal? Now, the question is, Must assertion be verbal? Is apophasis, is pointing-out and letting-be-seen in a certain respect, only possible within
verbal limits? Keller himself is sensitive to the issue to a certain extent:

"...I have to refrain, for the time being, from discussing the technique of analytic composition, confining myself to the general proposition that fundamentally, compositorial methods always remain the same; and that the basic difference between a creative and an analytic structure does not lie in how you express things, but in what you express."\(^{18}\)

Whether or not Keller ever read Heidegger—and with his remarkable range and depth of knowledge, he very probably had--his concern in this quotation is very much the concern of this portion of my study. His proposition as to the consistency and even identity of all compositional ("compositorial") methods confirms that, for him, expressing something musically is always a musical activity. The compositional connecting of ideas is subject to the same requirements whether the ideas are one's own (so-called original) ideas, or whether the ideas are derived from another's work. The difference, says Keller, between a creative structure (something that shows up in the original) and an analytic structure (something that shows up in a wordless Functional Analysis) is not a difference in way the pieces are put together. Good composing is good composing. The difference lies in the nature of what is expressed by the structures. The composer of the original work composes

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from out of the towards-which assignments of the ideas, and
the composing is itself a use-oriented hermeneutic activity.
The functional-analyst composes from the about-which, and
the composing is an exhibition-oriented apophantic activity.

To consider the matter in greater detail: the musical
Idea's assignments are a nested series of towards-which
assignments, so that the assignment, (for instance) "towards
the composition of this phrase" helps form the assignment,
"towards the composition of this period," "towards the
composition of this section," and so on. From the
composer's point of view, these assignments bring about a
comprehensive view of how a detail fits into the work, and
from the point of view of the work being composed, they
constitute a correspondingly nested complex of with-which
assignments. In order for a musical assertion to come
about, involvement that is oriented toward use of detail
would have to withdraw into involvement that is oriented
toward thematic consideration of the detail and its place in
both the piece and the analytical score. Again, the
functional-analyst does use the details that are so
considered, but only within a larger context of pointing-
out. Furthermore, from the point of view of the score, one
detail is like another, because everything that happens in
the analytical score has the status of a mere thing, a
detail that has been abstracted from its context for the
purpose of considering it with respect to particular ways of
looking at the work that the analyst's 'there' (pre-)
determines. This consideration has the effect of concealing
the involvement, the true Being of the details that are thus
abstracted, while at the same time letting the details be
seen in a specific way: the way in which the functional-
analyst wishes to show how they are involved.\(^{19}\)

One of the problems of Functional Analysis with respect
to its status as assertion—and, by the way, one of the
reasons why Functional Analysis never developed any wide
following—is probably best illustrated by referring to an
example, my own Functional Analysis of Arnold Schoenberg's
op. 19, no. 4, shown in figure 3.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) This difference between involvement and how
something is involved is a difference that has arisen
repeatedly in the course of this study. The difference is
one that I have at times expressed as the difference between
an active—how I may use something—and a passive—how
something is used; at bottom, however, the issue is the
ontological difference, the difference between Being and
beings, between how something is and what it is.

\(^{20}\) Two of Keller's analytical scores have appeared in
print: one in *The Score* 22 (February 1958): 56-64, analyzing
Mozart's D minor quartet, K. 421; and one more recently in
Quintet in G minor, K. 516. It is not practical, however,
to quote all of either of these in its entirety, so I have
composed a Functional Analysis of my own using a piece that
is on a scale consistent with the scope of my discussion.

It might seem that Keller would not approve of what I
do here, namely, explain aspects of an example of Functional
Analysis verbally, Keller himself did this on more than one
occasion (see "The Home-Coming of Musical Analysis," *The
Musical Times* 99 (December 1958): 657; and "Wordless
(1958): 194-195. A Functional Analysis is supposed to be
its own explanation, but sometimes how something musical can
point something out needs pointing out.
Figure 3. Functional analysis of Schoenberg's No. 4 from the *Sechs kleine Klavierstücke*, op. 19: Analytical prelude (measures 1-32), Schoenberg's piece (measures 33-45) and Analytical postlude (measures 46-65).

**Analytical tempo**

(\% of Schoenberg's tempo)
Perform Op. 19, no. 4

Rasch, aber leicht (d)
Figure 3—Continued

Continued on next page
I confine my explanatory remarks to measure 48 (shown in figure 4d) from the analytical postlude.\textsuperscript{21} In this measure, I have recast Schoenberg’s opening melody and accompanying tritone, shown in figure 4a, in terms of the left-hand gesture from measure 36, shown in figure 4b. I

\textsuperscript{21} Measure numbers refer to the measures of my analysis and Schoenberg’s piece taken together, so the first measure of Op. 19, No. 4, is referred to as measure 33.
have recast it thus in order to show the nature of the similarity between the sonorities of measures 33-34 and measure 36. Figure 4c shows that the material from measure 36, when verticalized, is virtually the same as a verticalized version of the material from measures 33-34; the differences lie in the voicing of the chords, the low F in measure 36, and the respective qualities of the upper fourth (F-B, an augmented fourth) in figure 4c1 and the lower fourth (D-G, a perfect fourth) in figure 4c2. Figure 4d shows the derived gesture that appears in measure 48.

![Figure 4](image)

Figure 4. Detailed derivation of the gesture from measure 48: a, Schoenberg's opening melody and accompanimental tritone, measures 33-34; b, the left-hand gesture from measure 36; c, 1. verticalization of the sonority from measures 33-34, and 2. inversion of the verticalized notes from measure 36; d, gesture from measure 48.

All of this reworking and recasting could have been expressed in the analysis, too, I suppose, in the form shown in figure 5. The problem with presenting things as I have in figure 5 is that, if I were to make every analytical step explicit, the resulting analysis would be so large as to dwarf the piece that it analyzes. I take one of the requirements of a Functional Analysis to be one of
compatibility, in scope as well as tonal language, with the analyzed work; thus there will be a considerable "suppressed background" even in my Functional Analysis.\textsuperscript{22}

Now, to the problem. In presenting this analysis, I am characterizing certain things about the piece in certain ways, letting them be seen in determinate respects. To someone who knows Schoenberg's op. 19, no. 4 well, many of my characterizations may be obvious—perhaps too obvious. But to someone who does not know the piece well—even to an

\textsuperscript{22} Keller cites one of the difficulties of Schoenberg's music as being his "simultaneous suppression and definite implication of the self-evident" that every masterwork embodies, combined with the facts that "what was self-evident to him was not self-evident to everyone" and that the "terms of reference for [his] suppressed backgrounds" pose greater difficulties than those of Mozart's music (Hans Keller, "K. 503: The Unity of contrasting Themes and Movements--I," The Music Review 17, no. 1 (February 1956): 51.)
experienced theorist—my analytical score may require several hearings in conjunction with the piece, and perhaps some separate from it, before it can be comprehended. An analytical paragraph or two, or perhaps a motivic graph or table, would be more quickly and easily assimilated. More important, however, is the congruence of understanding—or the feeling of it, anyway—that these traditional methods of analysis would produce. If I say as clearly as I can what I want to convey, I can have confidence that an experienced musician will be able to follow my argument and, if not agree with me, at least argue with me on similar terms. To present an analytical score like this without the accompanying explanation is to invite misunderstanding because of the absence of verbal confirmation of my ideas. Even if a musical assertion were possible, how could it convey my analysis with the accuracy of verbal expression?

Behind this question lies the assumption that we can compensate for the imprecision of an otherwise "correct" verbal analysis by multiplying words, that the problem with some cases of pointing-out is that they don't point out well enough. 23 Once again, however, I must point out that

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23 This protean assumption—that the remedy for inadequate explanation is just more explanation—seems to inform nearly everyone's conception of analytical activity. One example is David Lewin's computer analysis-model as it appears in Parts II and III of "Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception," esp. 335-353. As I point out in the paragraphs that follow, even Keller's conception is not immune to this criticism.
pointing-out is still pointing-out even when it is done poorly or inaccurately or musically,\textsuperscript{24} and the confidence that someone has in his or her own Functional Analysis will be in proportion to his or her confidence in an ability to express something musically.\textsuperscript{25} One reason, therefore, for the lack of any kind of following for this species of analysis is undoubtedly the mistrust of assertions musically expressed as opposed to those verbally expressed ones with which we are so familiar; if we have something to say about a piece, is it not better just to come right out and say it? A natural consequence of this near-universal mistrust is the lack of any kind of standard for analysis of this type. Just what is the finished product supposed to look like? Keller's reply would probably treat the adequacy of the particular Functional-Analytical score in its ability to show the unity of contrasts present in the analyzed work. If the analytic score does its job, there will be comprehension; if there are two different expressions of the unity of contrasts, it will only be necessary to play both of them to see which is better.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. the brief remarks on Snarrenberg's analysis on pp. 106-107 and note 5.

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Keller's statement, quoted above, that the difference between the functional-analyst and the composer is not how he or she expresses things, but what he or she expresses.

\textsuperscript{26} Keller, "Wordless functional Analysis: the First Year," 199-200.
Keller's assessment of Functional Analysis is thus that it is entirely adequate to the task of expressing the unity of a work's contrasts completely. One analytic score will be objectively better than another that treats the same work. If one is faced with two rival Functional Analyses of the same piece, and the first presents the unity of contrasts better than does the second, but the second includes some analytical point that the first does not, all that is necessary is to integrate this missing point from the second into the first, and the result will be the best analysis so far.\textsuperscript{27} Such an assessment implies that musical apophansis is able, through simple addition of more musical assertions, to do what verbal apophansis cannot through addition of more verbal assertions.

Whatever merits Functional Analysis may have, a Heideggerian scrutiny will not allow that such analysis could possess such univocality with the works it analyzes.\textsuperscript{28} If indeed Keller's way of analyzing consists

\textsuperscript{27} This idea is my extrapolation from Keller's statements about the objectivity of Functional Analysis. Nowhere is he terribly explicit about the requirements for a bad Functional Analysis.

\textsuperscript{28} I find Keller's insistence on the objectivity of Functional analysis incomprehensible, especially so in light of his obvious esteem for "the music's dynamism" ("Wordless Functional Analysis: the second year and beyond--I," The Music Review 21 [1960]: 76) which makes the musical presentation of his analytical ideas so appropriate. This seems to have been a sensitive area for him, and his resistance to his own phrase, "music about music"--he later changed it to "the music behind the music"--at least shows his awareness of the consequences of attributing apophantic
of making musical assertions, then these assertions no more have access to an aspect of the work's true Being than do verbal assertions. Musical assertions may possess characteristics, namely their exemption from laws of conceptual logic, that make them especially appropriate for analysis.\textsuperscript{29} Alogicality, however, is unable to elevate musical assertions from the realm of the apophantic. While indeed there is a path from the towards-which of serviceability to the about-which of a pointing-out, for Heidegger it is a one-way path. We may derive assertions from our Being-relation to something, but the Being-relation is not something that we are able to "un-derive"--which would amount to derivation renamed--from assertions.\textsuperscript{30}

The Possibility of Everyday Analysis

In my examination of music analysis from the standpoint of its derivation from practical musical activity, I have applied Heidegger's analysis of Dasein to the subject of analysis in the way that seems the most straightforward; there is another possible application to music analysis, however, and it is an application that has some precedent in status to his analyses.

\textsuperscript{29} In particular, "...the laws of identity, of contradiction, and of excluded middle" (Keller, "Functional Analysis: its pure Application," 205).

\textsuperscript{30} "Assertions do not first bring about this relation, but rather the converse is true. Assertions are first possible on the basis of an always latent comportment to beings" (MFL 126).
Heidegger studies. Instead of looking at music analysis from the point of view of the practical activities from which it is derived, we can examine it on its own terms—that is, we can interpret music analysis as a species of practical activity in its own right—and thereby come to a fuller appreciation of its relationships to Dasein's activities in general and musical activities in particular.

While not widely discussed, the matter of focusing upon the practical side of the theoretical has been the subject of several essays. Robert Brandom's article encourages us to see the occurrent as equipment available for the practice of making assertions ("Heidegger's Categories in Being and Time," The Monist 66, no. 3 [July 1983]: 387-409, esp. 399-407). David Kolb argues that the production of scientific assertions about the occurrent is not only a practice in its own right, but is of a character that is both different from the business of making "ordinary assertions" and superior to it—closer to the "thing in itself"—by virtue of its explanatory capacities ("Heidegger on the Limits of Science," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 14, no. 1 [January 1983]: 50-64, esp. 57-60). Joseph Rouse, in the course of claiming that "there is no genuine phenomenon corresponding to occurrentness [Rouse: presence-at-hand]" and that "theorizing is a mode of practice," speaks of "the entirety of our scientific equipment, including our basic concepts and the techniques for applying them" (Rouse, "Science and the Theoretical 'Discovery' of the Present-at-Hand," 200, 204, 208; my italics). I have already discussed what I regard as some shortcomings of Rouse's essay (see Chapter IV, note 13), and those criticisms apply in general to Kolb's article; the only thing that is missing from either article is the recognition that these (secondary) practices may indeed operate on a hermeneutic level, but they do so within a more general apophantic framework.

The paragraphs that follow do not go through the entire structure of Being-in-the-world as it might apply to music analysis; I merely touch on what I consider some of the more important or interesting aspects of this way of seeing analysis. I do, however, deal with some portions of the structure that are omitted from the following discussion...
In deriving analysis from composing and performing, it was necessary to show that the tool is transformed into an object, that the practical assignment (the with-which of concerned involvement) is transformed into what we might term an "inferential assignment" (the about-which of assertion). With respect to Dasein's everyday activities, this transformation from availability to occurrentness represents a "de-worlding" (Entweltlichung) of the practical in order to say something about the de-worlded thing. As Brandom has pointed out with respect to the activity of making assertions, however, the assertion itself may be taken as a kind of tool that takes its place in a world of analytical-theoretical activity. The two 'worlds'—one of practical activity, one of theoretical activity—each can be taken as 'worlds' in which Dasein can be involved, the theoretical being a sub-'world' of the practical. In order to look at Dasein's music-analytical involvement as something practical, then, it is only necessary to preface the following paragraphs with the qualifying phrase, "With respect to analysis as practical activity...."

The 'world' of music analysis, put in Heidegger's terms, must be the 'wherein' of involvement in analysis. As was the case with the more general 'wherein' of Dasein's

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33 Brandom, "Heidegger's Categories," 399.
'world', this more specific version of 'world' furnishes a context, in this case an already-understood context for any analytical encounter. It is fundamentally a "structure of relations," and these relations are the terms in which the analyst-Dasein understands itself (ER 83-85). The most fundamental of these relations is the analytical for-the-sake-of-which, the ultimate--and often, for the analyst, undefinable--motivation for analyzing music. This motivation leaves traces in whatever answers can be given to questions like those mentioned in the first chapter of this study, questions such as Why do I analyze? I may indeed answer that I want to know how the piece is put together, but why do I want to know this? Perhaps I feel that I became a better musician as a result of my study of the piece. Perhaps, however, my reasons go deeper and are less accessible to me than I may care to admit. Perhaps--and this not only a difficult reason to articulate but one to which many musicians have an instinctive resistance—

This resistance undoubtedly rests on the two sine quibus non of music: music is only truly music as sound, while an analysis is not primarily a sonic event; and music can only take place in time, while an analysis is an representation outside of time (the "atemporal nature" of the Schenkerian graph as mentioned in Reed J. Hoyt's review of Barbara R. Barry's Musical Time: The Sense of Order [MLA Notes 49, no. 2 (December 1992): 593]). As to the former criticism (music as sound), Heidegger's concept of discourse as prior to language has already received its extension into the musical realm, both in my study and elsewhere (see Chapter III, pp. 23-27 and 36-39); as to the latter (music as time), we might well counter with Hans Keller's question, "[Do we] know of anything which doesn't 'take place in time?'" ("Knowing Things Backwards," Tempo 46 [Winter 1958]:}
perhaps analyzing is a way of participating in the music that I am studying, a kind of creative act in itself.\textsuperscript{35}

The whys and related questions that may grant some access to the ultimate motivations for analyzing also shed light on the assignments that point toward the for-the-sake-of-which, assignments by which we further define the relationships within an analytical 'world'. In both the general and the more specific accounts of everydayness, some of these relationships took the form of in-order-to assignments that connected part of an equipmental context to other equipment. Other assignments were termed teleological so as to characterize the towards-which aspect of their pointing toward a specific task with Dasein's context. Others were termed non-teleological so as to characterize their pointing back to sources considerably removed from Dasein's situation. These three types of assignments also apply to the analyst's 'world', but defining them becomes difficult if the basic equipment of music analysis is left unclarified.

\textsuperscript{35} David Lewin suggests something along these lines, but has in view the literary aspect of analysis more than the musical-participatory aspect ("Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception," 383), although toward the end of his paper he devotes considerable attention to reading as a mode of performance (385-387; the same ground is travelled more thoroughly and systematically in his "Music Analysis as Stage Direction" in Music and Text: Critical Inquiries, ed. Steven Paul Scher [Cambridge: University Press, 1992], 163-176). I return to the question of analysis as a creative endeavor in the closing chapter.
Some analytical equipment is easily recognized: pencils, erasers, staff paper and so on. Some kinds of equipment tend to escape notice because of their intangibility, however, such as the concepts by which the analyst analyzes. Some concepts are pliable; such is the case with concepts of form and tonality, concepts that are not only adaptable to the practices of many different analysts— it might be that no two theorists would use chord labels in the same way—but also adaptable within the practice of a single theorist— I might apply labels in one way in one piece at one time and apply them in another, slightly or not-so-slightly different way at another time, yet to the same work; the difference between my two applications could be accounted for by an appeal to the difference between the contexts in which I am operating at the different times and the fact that one occasion precedes, and therefore colors my involvement in, the other. In these respects analytical concepts are really no different from, say, the seemingly more versatile tools of the landscaper, but they are considerably more elusive. Some concepts, those represented by many Schenkerian graphic conventions

Intangibility is no handicap for equipment's equipmental nature, since tangibility is not a requirement: "The specific thisness of a piece of equipment, its individuation, if we take the word in a completely formal sense, is not determined primarily by space and time in the sense that it appears in a determinate space- and time-position. Instead, what determines a piece of equipment as an individual is in each instance its equipmental character and equipmental contexture" (BP 292; Heidegger's italics).
for instance, are more rigid in that they have fewer options for their use; they are formulated to represent a narrow range of analytical situations. This is the case with such things as the Schenkerian unfolding symbol, misuses of which are common and easily identified by those who are familiar with the equipment.

To say that the music itself helps determine the analytical approach—or helps determine what concepts will be employed and in what ways—is apparently to paraphrase Cone's dictum, "the good composition will always reveal, on close study, the methods of analysis needed for its own comprehension," and hence to lead us into Morgan's (only apparently vicious) circle described in Chapter I of this study. We might clarify the nature of this circle, however, by referring to Heidegger's treatment of the nature of the relationship between tool and task: "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to.' And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection" (BT 98, Heidegger's italics). Thus our dealings with tools do grow out of the tasks, and in this context this is equivalent to saying that the task, which is "to analyze some music," will determine what concepts will be useful and in what respects they will be useful; but this determination subordinates the concepts in specific ways through Dasein's circumspection. Furthermore, circumspection's ways of relating tools and
tasks result from its preferred ways of seeing things, to which the analyst-Dasein often submits only too willingly. To illustrate: if I undertake an analysis of Schoenberg's Op. 19, No. 4, my so-called knowledge that this work was written during the composer's so-called free atonal period enables me to decide that my analysis will take a rigorous set-theoretical approach. This particular kind of knowledge—perhaps unacknowledged assumption would be a better term—of Schoenberg's compositional styles may well be the only "close study" that occurs in this process of the music's revealing what method of analysis I "should" employ. My circumspection has laid out the concepts of set theory without really giving me any opportunity to object—but if I have appropriated the concepts prior to this analysis, would I really have objected had I been granted the opportunity? The way in which I have done things up to this point, therefore, is the way I will continue to do things until I see some good reason to change. \(^{37}\) Circumspection thus exhibits the tendency toward fallenness characteristic of

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\(^{37}\) Cf. Stanley Fish's remarks to the effect that, in order to be able see that any of my beliefs are "incorrect," I must have already taken up another position; I will not be able to accept that which constitutes evidence for a contrary position unless I have already changed my way of looking at things ("A Reply to John Reichert," in Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980]: 299).
all of Dasein's dealings with the world;\textsuperscript{38} \textit{das Man} is always at the analyst's side.

When analytical concepts "work"—when they help the analyst find what they are built to show, so to speak—'world' remains transparent. But when there is an equipmental breakdown—when one or more concepts appear unsatisfactory and cause concepts and the music that I am analyzing to obtrude—the analytical context consisting of the analytical concepts and the assignments that relate them to one another and to the task can all be illuminated in ways that they cannot be when all is going well; the analytical 'world' has the opportunity to announce itself (BT 105).

In accordance with the account of interpretation given above,\textsuperscript{39} interpretation in music analysis is primarily to be found in the analyst's using his or her equipment. This using involves taking each piece of equipment as something, and this 'as' proceeds from the towards-which of its serviceability—again, the hermeneutic 'as'. To interpret an analytical concept, rounded binary form for instance, is thus to deem it appropriate for the task of describing the form of a work, Brahms Waltz, Op. 39/1, for instance. We may deem it an appropriate concept, but with qualifications

\textsuperscript{38} Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time}, 256-257.

\textsuperscript{39} See Chapter II, pp. 51-54.
the return of the A section's material is in the subdominant rather than the tonic; notwithstanding a string of "even thoughs" (even a list long enough to render the original rounded binary model unrecognizable), it is still as much the concept as the piece that is being interpreted.40

Yet we may also say that the piece, too, is being interpreted if the music to which the concept is being applied is taken as equipment in the same way as it was taken in the case of the performer.41 In fact, there are remarkable, even alarming similarities between the interpretive activities of the performer and that of the analyst. The piece as equipment is so constituted by its place in the analyst's involvement-structure—the piece is something in-order-to, and in this case it is in-order-to analyze. The analyst is involved in the same kind of relating of whole to parts and parts to whole as is the

40 Jim Samson, "Chopin Reception: Theory, History, Analysis," Chopin Studies 2, ed. Jim Samson and John Rink (Cambridge: University Press, 1994): 16. Samson refers to Ingarden's The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity for further discussion of this point, and it may be that I am misreading Samson or Samson is misreading Ingarden; in either case, Ingarden's "schematic structure" which the analyst analyzes is simply the score. By "interpreted concepts" I mean to suggest that, for the purposes of analytical everydayness, it is as much the concept—any kind of structure to which the piece or some part thereof is compared—as the musical work that is analyzed. This also is how I read Samson's "schematic structures," a use that I think fits his context better than Ingarden's use of the phrase does.

41 See Chapter III, p. 104.
performer. The analyst's process of interpretation begins with a forehaving, in which background (thrownness) determines how the analyst will pre-organize an approach to the piece; a foresight, in which the analyst sees the piece and its problems in terms of what is already known; and a foreconception, in which the analyst anticipates a certain outcome or vision of the how the finished product will look.

Does the difference between the piece as something in-order-to perform and as something in-order-to analyze lie in the fact that in the former case the product is a realization of the work in sound on an instrument, while in the latter case the product is a written or spoken text? Preliminary to my addressing this question in the closing chapter, I present first an analysis of Jean Sibelius's symphonic poem *The Swan of Tuonela*; concurrent with my analysis runs a commentary based on the two ways of viewing analysis that my Heidegger-based approach has yielded. Some comments see the analysis as an apophantic activity, as a pointing-out, while others see it as a hermeneutic activity, as an interpreting. Some comments see the analysis as derived from the practical musical activities of performance and composition, while others take the analysis as embodying a practice of its own and thus as an activity with a 'world' in its own right.
CHAPTER V

AN ANALYSIS OF SIBELIUS'S THE SWAN OF TUONELA
WITH COMMENTARY

Introduction

Many of the points made in the foregoing pages may be clarified by extended commentary in the context of a complete analysis. Commentary upon analysis is nothing new; it is present whenever someone quotes another's analytical observations, whether to clarify, situate, approve, expand upon, or refute those observations. Recent examples of analysis-analysis such as those of Marion Guck or Fred Everett Maus, however, possess a self-consciousness that is not always present in other, more traditional kinds of commentary. Guck's article, consisting of close readings of some recent analyses by Edward T. Cone, Allen Forte, and Carl Schachter, has an eye for ways in which analytical language can convey the kind of involvement the analyst has with the music under analysis. Maus's commentary likewise deals with kinds of language--dramatic and technical--in analysis, and particularly how the different kinds of language interact to produce different effects and different
views of the same musical phenomenon; his article might even
have been entitled, "Music Analysis as Drama."\footnote{Marion Guck, "Analytical Fictions," \textit{Music Theory Spectrum} 16, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 217-230; Fred Everett Maus, "Music as Drama," \textit{Music Theory Spectrum} 10 (1988): 56-73; Maus's article is something of an exception because his commentary consists of reflections on his own analysis.}

The example of analysis that I have chosen for my purpose is my treatment of Jean Sibelius's tone poem, \textit{The Swan of Tuonela}. I have chosen this analysis for several reasons. First, it is my own analysis; after all, the point of the commentary is not to pick apart someone else's analysis of Sibelius's work, rather it is to clarify aspects of the Heideggerian views of analysis that I have propounded elsewhere in earlier chapters. Second, the analysis is one that I did not put together for the purposes of this study; while some of the wording has been adjusted recently, much of the work was done almost six months before the topic of my study was very clear to me, and thus I have avoided the unnerving position of analyzing the work and simultaneously analyzing my own analysis. At the same time, however, the analyzing of the music did not take place so long ago that I cannot remember what I was thinking. Third, some of the issues that are raised in the course of the analysis are especially applicable to the larger context of my study of music analysis in general; to the analysis, commentary, and larger study there is a circularity that I think Heidegger might have appreciated.
The beginnings of the sections of commentary are set off from the text of the analysis by a single line that extends from margin to margin, while the ends are set off by a double line, also margin to margin. The Footnotes are numbered sequentially through both analysis and commentary.

An Analysis of Sibelius's The Swan of Tuonela

Commentary I. To attempt to circumscribe a clearing—whether my own or someone else's—is fundamentally impossible. It would be necessary to trace every thought back to some origin, and Heidegger makes clear that 'clearing' is not a bunch of dissociated points (much less "points of origin"), but, rather, is a figural area that enables Dasein to be prepared to deal with something. I bring up 'clearing' at this point because of this fact of preparation. The name Sibelius will most likely not send readers running to the biographical dictionaries to find out who this character is. For some, he is "a figure so much behind the spirit of his time as to be meaningless," while for others, he is a composer whose greatest service to music was an early retirement from composing. Most who read this

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2 See this study, Chapter II, pp. 42-44 and Chapter III, pp. 78-79.

essay will already have an opinion about him, and those who might say they have no opinion will at least have placed him as a composer, possibly one of Finnish origin. All of this is to say, while most everyone who reads the following paragraphs will be prepared in some way, not all will be prepared to accept the idea of serious analytical work on Sibelius's music.

Sibelius's symphonic poem that we know as The Swan of Tuonela was intended as the overture to a never-to-be-completed opera entitled The Building of the Boat (Veneen Luominen), a Wagnerian music-drama with a libretto consisting of a conflation of two parts of the Kalevala, Finland's national epic. The basis for the action, taken from the poem's eighth canto, was to be one of the outlandish tasks put to Väinämöinen, one of the Kalevala's heroes, by the Daughter of the Moon as a condition of marriage: he must build a boat from bits of her spindle. For the opera, Sibelius wanted to replace the last part of this tale—a gory section in which Väinämöinen accidently cuts his foot with his own axe and cannot remember the incantation that will stop the bleeding—with a portion of

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4 From Canto 8:1-236. His previous tasks—to split a horsehair with a bladeless knife, to tie an egg in invisible knots, to peel a stone, and to cut fenceposts from ice without breaking any pieces off—have all been completed to her satisfaction, but no explanation is offered as to how they were accomplished.
canto 16 in which the hero is building another boat, this
time by singing it into existence. After fixing the keel,
sides, and ribs of his craft with three songs, he requires
"...three words/for putting on the handrails/for raising the
prow/rounding off the stern." He determines that the
place to obtain these incantations is from Tuonela, the land
of the dead, where "a squat maid of the dead land" argues
with him, then puts him to sleep. In the original,
Väinämöinen fails to procure the spells from her, obtaining
them instead from the giant, Antero Vipunen, whom the hero
raises from the dead. In Sibelius's reorganized version,
the maid of Tuonela does give him the proper words while he
sleeps. Upon his return from Tuonela he completes the boat
and marries the Daughter of the Moon, or at least rides away
with her in the boat he has built.

The opera itself was scrapped, but various materials
from the project were to appear in several subsequent works;
one is the opera's overture depicting the river that
surrounds the island of Tuonela in which a single swan swims
and sings; this piece, or musical material from this piece,
became the symphonic poem The Swan of Tuonela, itself the
second movement of the Four Legends from the Kalevala,

Sibelius's Op. 22. Much of the plot for the opera reappeared—in a slightly adjusted version—as the story for Sibelius's tone-poem, op. 49, Pojholo's Daughter (the title of which is more accurately rendered "The Daughter of the Northland"). In this reworking, not only does Väinämöinen not make the trip to Tuonela, he altogether fails to complete the boat.

The development of the material for the opera came at the peak of Sibelius' enthusiasm over the possibility of writing something in the Wagnerian tradition. This enthusiasm, waxing and waning as it did in the early 1890's, resulted in his apparently extensive studies of the scores of Lohengrin and Die Walküre, as well as his attendance at performances of many of Wagner's operas; Tristan appears to have made a particularly deep impression upon him. Yet before he could complete his own opera, he seems to have realized that his abilities were suited more to the symphonic poem; the source of this change in compositional

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6 Sketches from the period of his work on The Building of the Boat contain a motive that was apparently slated for appearance in the opera (it is identified as the Maid of Tuonela's motive) but appears to have been recycled for the third movement of the Four Legends, "Lemminkäinen in Tuonela" (Erik Tawaststjerna, Sibelius, vol. 1 (1865-1905), trans. Robert Layton (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976).

7 Kalevala, 678.

8 In a letter (dated 19 August 1894) to his future wife, Aino Järnefelt, he claims that he has "found [his] old self again," that his view of music is more Lisztian than Wagnerian (Tawaststjerna I, 158).
heart is not necessarily so clear as it has been represented, however. It remains an open question whether his study of *Tristan und Isolde* caused him to realize that he was not equal to the task of completing his own opera, as Tawaststjerna observes, or whether his feelings of inadequacy regarding his own project weakened his taste for Wagner. And it is by no means clear how far the relationship between certain moments in Wagner's operas—*Tristan*, in particular—and portions of Sibelius's music may be pressed. To be sure, it might be interesting to attempt some kind of combined analysis of the *Swan of Tuonela* and the English horn solo from the third act of *Tristan und Isolde* (the shepherd's "alte Weise"), especially since there are significant correspondences between the two pieces at strategic points; nevertheless, these relationships and questions about them must remain, for the time being, unexplored. The fact is that *The Swan of Tuonela*, however

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9 Tawaststjerna I, 157; contributing to the composer's insecurity could have been Finnish Theatre director Kaarlo Bergbom's lack of enthusiasm for the project and his criticism of Sibelius's work on the opera as "too lyrical" (Tawaststjerna I, 143; Harold E. Johnson, *Jean Sibelius* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959], 56).

10 Tawaststjerna is of the opinion—virtually unsupportable, but interesting nevertheless—that the alte Weise was the probable inspiration for Sibelius's casting *Swan* as an English horn solo (Tawaststjerna I, 172).

11 I am referring in particular to the repeated fifths (C-G) in the horns of measures 65-68 *Swan*, their counterparts in measures 78-81 of the third act of *Tristan*, and the F-sharp/G-flat "resolutions" of both of these passages.
it was originally intended, presents plenty of problems quite apart from matters pertaining to its other life as an overture.

Commentary II. The opening paragraphs, functioning as introductory material, may appear to be included as courtesy to those who may not know the background of the work; the opening also has a vaguely defensive purpose as well, though, because of the low value that has for some time been placed upon Sibelius's music. Before the appearance of Pike's book, virtually no thorough analytical study of the composer's work had appeared in English (probably for the reason discussed in Commentary I). Furthermore, whatever status these introductory paragraphs have as a courtesy is not entirely innocent; I may actually think it is a good idea to include the information, but the fact remains that, unless One is going to discuss an extremely well-known work, One should always include some background information prior to settling down into analytical discussion. One doesn't just plop One's audience down in the middle of things in a presentation of this sort.

I have made a point of emphasizing One (das Man) over the course of the last couple of sentences to underscore the hold that the "analytical public" has over the way analysis

is presented.\(^\text{13}\) Even something like Snarrenberg's avant-garde analysis mentioned above is introduced almost apologetically and in a thoroughly conventional manner.\(^\text{14}\)

Erik Tawaststjerna, Sibelius' most highly respected biographer, in observing that a formulaic analysis of Swan would not do it justice, hints at what anyone who has spent any time at all studying the work knows: the piece resists violently any attempt to categorize its structural principles. Tawaststjerna himself ventures no analysis, but this is not surprising in view of his biographic orientation toward the composer and his work. His pronouncement did not deter Tim Howell, however, from undertaking an extended analysis of the work in his outline of progressive tendencies in Sibelius's symphonies and symphonic poems.\(^\text{15}\) Howell's analysis has many strengths, one of which is the observation of a tonal arch that structures the work; another is the application of reductive analytical methods to Swan, but this strength brings with it the glaring weakness of foisting upon the music a concept of tonality—Schenkerian—that it refuses to bear. Still, in many

\(^{13}\) See the discussions of fallenness in Chapter II, pp. 58-64.

\(^{14}\) See Chapter IV, pp. 106-107.

\(^{15}\) Tim Howell, Jean Sibelius: Progressive Techniques in the Symphonies and Tone Poems (New York: Garland, 1989); pages 219-228 contain his analysis of Swan.
respects, his analysis avoids the problems of facile categorization against which Sibelius's biographer warns. It is possible that Tawaststjerna's caveat was prompted by the analysis of Swan by Ernst Tanzberger published in 1943, a treatment that casts the work as a bar form made up of three smaller bar forms (Tanzberger's phrase is *potenziert bar*—an "exponentiated" bar). One of the problems with Tanzberger's evaluation is its lack of clear definition as to what constitutes repetition in order to clarify the forms that make up the various sections—in other words, it is not always clear in what respect the second Stollen of a given bar form is similar to the first, and even if the relationship were made clear, it is not certain whether the degree or kind of similarity would be sufficient to ward off comparisons with Procrustes. His analysis is not without its own strengths, however; his perceptions of what constitutes formal division within the piece appears to be far less of an imposition upon the music than Howell's more recent analysis.

In my own treatment of Swan, I intend to react now and then to Howell's and Tanzberger's analyses as well as to draw upon some concepts developed by James Hepokoski in his

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16 Ernst Tanzberger, *Die symphonischen Dichtungen von Jean Sibelius*, Musik und Nation, Band IV (Würzburg: Konrad Trilitzsch, 1943); pages 18-23 contain his analysis of Swan.
monograph on Sibelius' *Symphony No. 5*, but the greatest analytical debt that this study owes is to Hans Keller, the potential of whose wordless Functional Analysis has been grossly underestimated. My own Functional Analysis is not of the wordless variety, though, but resembles Keller's work prior to his turn to the analytic score. Yet there is a similarity to Keller's compositional analysis in that one by-product of my analysis is in some sense a musical work—one that could, from my sketches and descriptions, be reconstructed into a score. In this respect it also resembles the kind of work done by David Lewin in his analysis of Amfortas's prayer from Wagner's *Parsifal*, an analysis which rewrites certain portions of its musical text.

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19 Lewin's aim in the *Parsifal* study is to clarify the tonal changes that occur by providing a version of Amfortas's prayer that is entirely in D minor, whereas the original moves in and out of several keys ("Amfortas's Prayer to Titurel and the Role of D in *Parsifal*: the Tonal Spaces of the Drama and the Role of the Enharmonic C\textsubscript{b}/B\textsubscript{b}," *19th Century Music* 7, no. 3 (3 April 1984): 336-349; some similar rewriting occurs in Lewin's "Parallel Voice-Leading in Debussy," *19th Century Music* 11, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 59-72, esp. 67-70; and "Some Notes on Analyzing Wagner: The Ring and *Parsifal,*" *19th Century Music* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1992): 49-59.
Commentary III. One way of providing background to an analysis is to retrace what I, the analyst, may deem the most important initial steps in my research on the piece—or at least that is how I may present the material. Actually, the strict order of the events of my analyzing will in all probability have little in common with the information as it is presented in the introductory portions of the essay. Howell's analysis, for example, was unavailable to me until several months after I started work on the analysis of Swan. The placing of information such as the effect that Howell's work has on my study does have a hermeneutical purpose, though: such a presentation may fill holes in the hermeneutic circles of my readers. While Commentary I pointed out that readers are already at work interpreting from before the moment they take up the essay, the information about other analyses functions in many ways as a guide to help readers follow me through my own analysis.

This sharing of information, however, is not exactly what Dreyfus has in mind when he speaks of interpretation's working on the basis of a "shared understanding." What he is referring to is the fact of an interpretation's thrownness, since understanding (on which an interpretation is based) is based on what is already there for Dasein (cf. the discussion on clearing in Commentary I). Recall the

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three-part structure of the basis of interpretation: the analyst's forehaving--the ever-present and largely unexplored background to the analysis--the foresight--the initial means of approach to the work--and the foreconception--the analyst's expectations about how things will turn out. These function on the level of analysis as a subspecies of interpretation, but they function as well in the larger context of analysis as a possible way of behaving toward music. Forehaving, from this angle, has as its basis an "involvement whole which is already understood" (BT 191), a fundamental musicality of the analyst that allows analysis to be an option. Foresight, as the analyst's instinctive approach, is not only an ability to see some analytical methods as possibilities, but is also that which allows Swan to be seen as analytically worthwhile. And foreconception, a predisposition toward what will be found in the course of analysis, need not be an expectation of specifics; the feeling that there will be analytical results is enough to provide this advance grounding of analysis.21

All of this interpretive background remains just there

21 If it seems from this paragraph as though forehaving, foresight and foreconception are not all that different one from another, this is as it should be. The forestructure of interpretation is often described as though it consists of three different components, each of which must be present in order for interpretation to take place. It is probably better to think of the "three-fold structure of interpretation" as three ways of looking at how interpretation is grounded in advance, and to say that, once interpretation is present, the forestructure is necessarily in place.
—in the background—for the analyst for most of the time, and is all but inaccessible to the essay's readers due to the rhetorical structure of the analysis, since it is most often a presentation of results rather than an account of the process by which the results were obtained. Almost all such essays will attempt to divert attention from interpretive rough spots, ignore the writer's early interpretive "mistakes," and cajole the reader into thinking that, from the moment the music was taken up, all was smooth sailing.

Before I proceed with my quasi-Kellerian analysis, some general analytical observations about The Swan of Tuonela are in order. Whatever view we take of the form of the work, there are 24 separable bits of music to account for. Figure 7 shows where these bits occur and what their tonal references are, and they are all cross-referenced to a sort of motivic-thematic roster in Figure 6. Figure 8 shows an alternate way of viewing the sequence of these bits: a circular diagram that relates, by simple concatenation, the opening material with the closing material, thereby representing graphically the tonal and thematic returns of the final section. These motives and their

22 In the paragraphs that follow, I will refer to shorter motives with lower-case letters and longer tunes with upper case letters. Thus a1 refers to something that is more fragmentary than the more periodic A2.
Section: I
 Measures: 1 5 9 12 16 18 25
 Motive: \[ X_{a_1} \quad b_1 \quad c_1 \quad b_2 \quad a_2 \quad b_3 \quad c_2 \quad D_1 \quad D_2 \]
 Tonality: \[ a \quad g \quad b \quad f# \quad b \quad a \quad c \quad g\# \quad c \quad Gb \]

Section: III
 Measures: 36 40 54 58
 Motive: \[ A2_A2_2 \quad A_3_2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad c_2 \quad E \quad c \quad d \quad f\# \quad g\# \quad g\# \quad f\# \quad A \quad C \]
 Tonality: \[ e \quad f\# \quad a \quad c \quad d\# \quad f\# \quad - \quad g\# \quad g\# \quad f\# \quad A \quad C \]

Section: IV
 Measures: 70 73 93 97
 Motive: \[ b_4 \quad F_1 \quad F_2 \quad X \quad c_1 \quad b_5 \]
 Tonality: a

Figure 6. Formal diagram of The Swan of Tuonela.

Figure 7. Themes and motives in The Swan of Tuonela (continued on next page).
Figure 7—Continued
Figure 8. Alternate (circular) diagram of form of Swan.

interrelationships contribute to—indeed, they constitute—the surface unity of Swan. Figure 9 clarifies the close relationship between motives a₁ and cl:

Figure 9. Two closely related motives from Swan, with graphic reductions to facilitate comparison. a, motive a₁; b, motive cl.
Figure 10. al, A2, A3, D1 and D2; occurrences of motive n (stepwise ascent through major 3rd) are marked with rounded brackets, and occurrences of another prominent motive, the often-decorated descent through a minor third, are marked with square brackets.

Figure 11. E and F (reductions).

Figure 12. Motive n
Figure 10 illustrates the relationships between a1 and the
tunes derived from it, A2 and A3, as well as the factors
from D1 and D2 that contribute to these derived forms, while
figure 11 shows the relationship between the melodic
contours of E and F as well as some relationships of these
tunes to some other motives; figure 12 extracts from the
various bits the surface-motivic occurrences of the stepwise
ascent through the interval of a major third (motive n), a
ubiquitous motive whose key-defining characteristics are
explained via Roman numerals beneath the different
occurrences.

Commentary IV. What is involved in the citation of musical
elements? Several kinds of examples have appeared in the
essay so far: (1) portions of the score are cited in ways
that condense musical material in order to render the
citation practical (figures 1 and 4); (2) some citations
call attention to specific details within the score (figure
10); (3) some musical excerpts are presented as linear-
reductive graphs to facilitate or encourage a particular
kind of comparison or comprehension (figure 11);
Furthermore, the password-like nature of such analytic
equipment should not be overlooked; (4) some details are
cited with only minimal co-citation of the musical context
in which they occur (figure 12). Such examples provide an
especially clear example of the assertion as equipment
within analytical involvement. In producing them, the analyst focuses not so much upon the example itself as upon the clearest means of conveying the point; both the music and the concept of the example are treated as available, and the analyst looks past both to the larger context of the essay.

Sometimes the production of examples involves suppression of some details, as in figure 11, in which the "important" notes (important to my pointing-out of a relationship) have been attached to a supporting structure like parts of one of Calder's mobiles, while "auxiliary" notes (the ones that do not help me make my point and that could possibly be used against me) have been given a particularly tenuous cast. Sometimes production of examples involves the obliteration of everything but the "important" details; figure 12, even more than figure 11, leaves the reader with only the vestigially musical so that we might even question whether we rightly may call this a musical example. Sometimes the examples may be closer to musical reality, however, as in the cases of figures 9 and 10; even if the reader does not know the work from which the examples are taken, he or she will be given the impression of knowing this part of it.

As analytical equipment, and primarily equipment for the expression of analysis— but sometimes this ideal priority is reversed, and expression precedes analysis—
these methods of citation do what they do by virtue of their derivation of an about-which from more basic kinds of musical involvement (presupposed in any analytical act). Examples point out by means of a levelling-off which highlights some aspects and suppresses others. A side effect of this levelling process is that the examples are no longer simply part of Sibelius's piece; I have added to his music stems and beams that do not appear in the original as well as explanatory captions, analytical symbols, connections of events (the "guilt by association" method of Figures 5 and 6), and finally my text into which I have transplanted his music; they are part of his text, but now they belong to mine as well. My transplanting, furthermore, speaks of my removal of the rest of Sibelius’s text from consideration. The margins, the triple space above and below the example that set it off from the text, the contrast of expressive marks--letters and punctuation marks vs. musical and analytical symbols--all testify to what Miller calls "sins of omission,"23 a colorful way of referring to the fact that every quotation, every example, is a misquotation, since the only way to be "true" to the author/composer and the text would be to quote the entire piece. Yet is there any guarantee that going even to these lengths would keep the work "pure"? Strictly speaking, it

appears that there is nothing I can do to keep from defiling the piece except to ignore it, since whatever I could do, even if it were intended as a preservative measure, would still be something of mine that would attach to the work. And yet, music seems to have a resilience that enables it to withstand all of these crimes perpetrated upon it and to escape the adverse effects of whatever an analyst, performer, transcriber, or anyone else—listener, too?—might do, even if what is done is inadvisable or downright wrong.

If tune F is taken as the culmination of the music's previous activity—and the suddenly static A minor tonality after so much tonal wandering-about certainly supports this view—we might view Swan's overall form in terms of a teleological genesis resulting from two large rotations of material, in effect a deformation of Bar form. If we

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Some of Hepokoski's most significant contributions to the analysis of nineteenth-century music in general, and Sibelius's music in particular, can be summarized under the headings of the three concepts of teleological genesis, rotation, and deformation. The first term, teleological genesis, refers to the treatment of some formal or thematic goal as being present in a work's earlier stages of development, and the material tending toward this goal grows from embryonic form into a final definitive stage; an example is Richard Strauss's treatment of the Transfiguration theme in his symphonic poem, *Death and Transfiguration*. The second term, rotation ("varied strophic form"), refers to the more or less cyclical treatment of large blocks of material; Hepokoski cites the second part of Sibelius's *Night Ride and Sunrise* as an example. Deformation is the employment of standard formal conventions as points of reference which are overridden by
take Howell's suggestions of departure-from and return-to A minor as defining features, and choose to emphasize the return of the opening motives X, b and c1 at the end, then we might prefer to see the form as some variety of arch or arch-deformation.

Nevertheless, I am uncomfortable putting a formal description in such terms because of the tendency of these models--of which Swan is a supposed deformation--to attach themselves to the various sections and override the deformative. Instead of simply embracing the deformations--turning up their volume, so to speak--and calling Swan's form "self-defining" or otherwise sidestepping the issue, I propose to eliminate the problems by rewriting the portions of the music in which they occur in order to render the work intelligible, and it is here that my adjusted version of Hans Keller's approach comes in.

Keller was interested in showing the unity of contrasting themes and movements within a composition; my application of some of his ideas is not so consciously directed. I might wish to rewrite a piece so as to show how it might have been composed (or how I might have composed other musical considerations; examples are Berlioz's overtures, Les franc-juges and Benvenuto Cellini; cf. the discussions in James Hepokoski's monograph on Sibelius's fifth symphony, and his essay, "Fiery-pulsed Libertine or Domestic Hero? Strauss's Don Juan Reinvestigated," in Richard Strauss: New Perspectives on the Composer and his Works, ed. Bryan Gilliam (Princeton: University Press, 1992), 67-89.

or I might wish to rearrange bits of it so as to show thematic and formal unity. What I will do, however, is rewrite selected bits and leave others intact so as to produce, not a better piece, but...

Commentary V. Does rewriting the subject-piece really constitute an analysis? Why not analyze what is there? What do I hope to gain by changing the text? The possibility of such questions motivates a disclaimer: "not a better piece, but..."

a kind of background on which to project the piece as it stands, a background that is both unique to this piece and familiar by virtue of its derivation from the work. More than anything else, I will show what "should" happen, thereby to aid in understanding better what actually does happen. Primarily, this rewriting will take the form of voice-leading sketches in order to depict large-scale events economically (the use of such sketches need not carry a complete set of Schenkerian principles along with them, as

"Should" here does not have ethical force; rather it indicates dependence on a model, a dependence which is only really effective from the analyst's perspective; in my analysis of Swan, I focus upon a model that is peculiar to the piece I am analyzing; in a sense it is the piece, at least for the purposes of this analysis. Or, put another way, the problems with which I will deal are mostly analytical problems. They are problems of reading the piece, problems that the reading both encounters and introduces.
Forte and McAlpine have shown). In addition, more detailed and specific rewritings will appear when they are required.

Commentary VI. My position: I am pretending that I am fixing a poorly written piece; if it were not poorly written, I would have no trouble understanding it and expressing its structure concisely. This position may not be a familiar music-analytical position, but it is nevertheless intelligible as an approach to analysis because everyone has used such an approach in other kinds of everyday practices; it doesn't work, so fix it. In this context, "it doesn't work" means "it doesn't present itself to my analysis without causing a breakdown in my conceptual equipment." I am not serious about "fixing" things—the piece has got along quite well without me up to now—but my ironic acceptance of the work's "problems" as problems is as much a part of my approach as if I were serious about it. My ironic stance, my non-seriousness about rewriting—in short, my analytical disposition—is as much a part of my analytical 'there' (da) as it is my musical 'there', meaning it colors my analytical approach to the music (I want to analyze it) and my expressive approach to the essay (I want

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others to share my appreciation for the work) as well as my involvement with the piece (I know it well and like it—or perhaps that's backwards).

The first of the work's features that requires rewriting is the way Sibelius begins, or, to be more precise, the way he has failed to begin. Many pieces begin with an ending—Chopin's Mazurka in G# minor, Op. 33/1 begins with something that sounds like a closing gesture (and is in fact used that way). The Swan of Tuonela may be unique in its failure to begin with a closing gesture (not the same as not beginning with a closing gesture), a failure rendered intelligible as a failure by the way the second chord does not logically follow the first; these chords are bracketed in the voice-leading sketch of Section I, shown in figure 13.

![Figure 13. Swan, Section I (mm. 1-7)](image)

Concisely put, Swan begins with a closing gesture that it fails to complete. What the section requires is a rewriting according to the pattern of events that follow the bracketed portion of figure 13: after motive X should come motives cl and b in the key of A minor. Actually, this requires no rewriting—just some reshuffling of measures. The very last
two things that occur in the piece are, in fact, cl and b in the key of A minor, as shown in the two formal diagrams, figures 7 and 8. Comparison of these diagrams with figure 13, however, shows that the material really does not require all that much reshuffling; we should just begin a little earlier in the circle and move the first occurrence of X to maintain its position as the first thing that happens. Figure 14 is a voice leading sketch of Section I after these restorations have been accomplished.

![Figure 14](image)

Figure 14. Section I with interpolations of cl and b from Section IV.

These changes provide Section I with the clear tonal reference that is lacking in Sibelius's original. The key of A minor is established through the association of that key with tonally stable thematic material rather than by simply sounding an A minor chord and following it with a G minor chord, tonally lethal under the circumstances (Howell is quite right in his observation that the opening chord, motive X, is insufficient to establish the key); furthermore, the material that is so used is material that is already present in the piece, and I am using it as
Sibelius wrote it and I even maintain the order of events (aside from my having to move X).  

After fully establishing this opening tonality at the beginning of Section I, the sequence that follows presents no particular problem. What is problematic is the way Sibelius halts the sequence. According to the pattern he sets up, cl₂ should end on the dyad E-G♯, suggesting C♯ minor (just as the dyads D-F♯ and E♭-G suggested B minor and C minor, respectively). My comparison of cl₁ with cl₂ in figure 9 shows, however, that cl₂ has been changed so as to end on the C major chord of measure 18. The music suggests two ways of rewriting the end of this section. First, we

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27 He is, at least, quite right from his own Schenkerian perspective when he writes that "the absence of any further members of the A-minor collection prohibits interpretation in a key" (Howell, Progressive Techniques, 221). I find it difficult, however, to accept his assignment of tonic status to A minor on the basis of the key's (chord's?) reappearance in measure 21 (with D1 in Section II). Other criteria, such as Daniel Harrison's "[tonic] position assertion" might be more appropriate here, both musically and historically (See Daniel Harrison, Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994], 75-90).

Commentary VII. Concepts, as analytical tools, differ from theorist to theorist, just as shovels differ from landscaper to landscaper; my concept of tonality differs from Howell's, at least as the concept is applied to Swan. Just as one of my concepts might differ from someone else's, however, so might my concept of tonality as applied to a different work differ from my concept as applied to Swan. My circumspection arranges tools for each analytical project, but it also arranges the tools that seem most appropriate. For the landscaper: not just any shovel, but the most appropriate one I can manage; for the analyst: not just any concept of tonality, but the best I can come up with under the circumstances.
can extend Sibelius's sequence through the cl₂ as rewritten in figure 15b and continue with alternations of a₁-b with cl₁-b until we reach a₁₄, as shown in Figure 16. The sequence is thus extended through the keys of C# minor, D minor, and D# minor into E minor. I have stopped the sequence here because E minor is the key of the next occurrence of Motive A as it actually shows up in Swan at the beginning of Section III. If we incorporate this sequence and leave out Section II entirely, we can begin Section III as is without any tonal reorientation.

![Figure 15. Rewriting cl₂. a, cl₁ (at pitch); b, cl₂ (Sibelius's version, transposed down a whole step to facilitate comparison); c, cl₂ as it "should be" (rewritten at the proper pitch level).](image)

![Figure 16. Extension of Section I sequence through a₁₄.](image)
The second alternative for rewriting the end of this section is simply to halt the sequence where Sibelius does, in measure 18, on a C# minor triad, and then to proceed with Section II. The consequences of this choice for the second section must be examined, however. The harmonies of measures 19-22—C minor-B minor-A minor—must now be rewritten to accommodate initiation on C# minor harmony. Figure 17 presents one way of rewriting the progression and its consequences for the first phrase of D1. If there is a problem with the rewritten version in figure 17b, it is the B# minor triad that follows the C# minor triad; half-step motion between two minor triads is a progression for which there is no precedent in Swan as it stands (the B# minor-A# minor progression is a simple transposition of the A minor-G minor progression that opened the piece).

![Figure 17. Rewriting section II, beginning. a, D1 with accompanying harmonies (Sibelius); b, D1 transposed and adjusted to accommodate C# minor-B# minor-A# minor harmonies.](image-url)
Possible justifications of the C♯ minor-B♯ minor progression are: (1) the use of keys in the sequence from Section I. This sequence proceeds in minor keys, albeit by ascending semitone rather than by descending. To justify the progression on this basis amounts to using a middleground event to justify a reversed form of that event in the musical foreground. (2) the use of D♯-G in measure 54. This dyad, which can be taken as representative of a B♯-minor triad, follows a C♯-minor triad; the plausibility of this rationale rests on how comfortable we are in supplying the missing tonic note of the supposed B♯-minor triad (I find the dyad D♯-G easier to relate to the E-minor chord that follows in measure 55). (3) the possibility of interpreting the progression in G♯-major. In terms of this key, the progression would be analyzed iv-iii-ii. While this particular progression indeed has no precedent within the piece as it stands, it is not far from the bounds established by the stepwise root movement found elsewhere in the piece.

Commentary VIII. There are some concepts—analytical equipment, again—that are fairly easy to talk about, such as a concept of tonality. Others, such as the concept of what kinds of things can happen in a piece, present more difficulties. It might even be that this "concept" is a
relationship between concepts (hence actually an assignment) rather than a concept itself.

Assuming that at least one of these justifications is acceptable, what are the consequences of transposing the remainder of Section II up a semitone? If the music is otherwise left intact, the final—but far from conclusive—chord of the section becomes C↓-E↓-F#-A# or some enharmonically spelled version thereof (Sibelius's original chord is B↓-D#-F↓-A↓). If the transposed version of this chord were interpreted in E minor, the key that begins the next section, the motion from F#-A#-C↓-E↓ to F#-A↓-C↓-E↓ becomes nothing more than the trading of one kind of supertonic harmony for another by lowering the third of the chord from A# to A↓.

Leaving the rewriting of the section at a simple transposition, however, ignores one of the most distinctive features of the section, the progression from a dominant seventh chord on G to a dominant seventh on D↓ of measures 24-25, shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Swan, measures 24-25 (Sibelius's version; dual-purpose tritone bracketed).
By far the most active interval within the dominant seventh chord is the tritone, and these two dominant sevenths share the B/Cb-F tritone as common tones. If the two dominant sevenths in these measures are taken as interchangeable in some sense, we should be able to transpose D2 down (or up) a tritone and maintain the first dominant seventh all the way through these two measures as shown in Figure 19.

As the sketches demonstrate, the harmonic effect of the transposition of D2 up a tritone (figure 19b) is to arrive

![Figure 19. Sketches of Swan, section II. a, transposition of the section incorporating D2 as rewritten in figure 11b (otherwise Sibelius's version as in figure 12) of D2; b, section II as in a with D2 transposed up a tritone.](image)

28 The treatment of chords (or keys) a tritone apart as being equivalent "in some sense" has a firm footing in nineteenth-century harmonic theory, and recognition of the possibility of such an equivalency extends at least as far as the theories of Kirnberger and Marpurg in the eighteenth-century. For detailed discussion of the concept and some of its implications, see Graham H. Phipps, "The Tritone as equivalency: a Contextual Perspective for Approaching Schoenberg's Music," *Journal of Musicology* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1985-86): 51-69.
at the very harmony that ended the untransposed version (figure 19a), C♯-E♭-F♯-A♯, while the voice-leading effect is to prolong further the G♯ to which the primary tone ascended in section I and which was prolonged in D♯.

Section III, in many ways the most complicated of Swan's four sections, presents several problems.

1. The relationship of the period made up of the statements of A2 to the four statements of A3 that follow it. Measures 36-39—A2₁ + A2₂, in E minor—follow by four statements A3, in F♯ minor, A minor, C minor and D♯ minor, respectively, suggesting a return to E minor and the section's primary tone of G through a prolongation of a neighbor figure; this supposed neighbor complex takes the form of a composed-out diminished seventh chord, F♯-A-C-D♯ (D♯=E♭ in figure 20). This expectation is not fulfilled, however, because of

2. The prolongation of D♯ (♭ of D♯ minor, 5 of G♯ minor). D♯ is treated as though it were the goal of the harmonic motion of the section up to that point, the resolution of the tension created by the tonicizations of the four chords mentioned in problem #1.

Howell (Progressive Techniques, 225) equivocates the tonalities of the various parts of this section, referring to the key of measures 36-39 as "A Dorian (E minor)," the next as B Dorian (F♯ minor)," and so on. At many points in Swan, the modality of the music is Dorian, and at others it may indeed be equivocal; the beginning of Section III, however, is unquestionably in E minor.
3. The intrusion of c2. The statement of c2 interrupts what would otherwise under the circumstances be an unremarkable progression from a D# minor triad to a G# minor triad.

4. The non-resolution of the F# dominant-seventh chord that closes the section. The F# dominant seventh chord in measure 69 is followed by—can it be called a resolution?—the A minor chord that begins Section IV.

Figure 20 summarizes these four points. None of these "problems" are in themselves really all that troublesome, but their cumulative effect is to create an imbalance that receives no counterbalance; none are resolved, all are simply abandoned.

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Commentary IX. To return to matters discussed in V and VI ("it doesn't work"): rewriting is a way of dramatizing the equipmental breakdowns that had occurred in my analytical experiences with this piece. For example, the F# dominant seventh of measure 69: I might say that a chord with this intervallic structure can operate in one of two ways: either in the style of a true dominant seventh, that is, with root
movement by descending fifth or ascending second and dissonant seventh resolving down by step; or in the manner of an augmented sixth chord, with the spelled root of the chord resolving down by half-step and the spelled seventh resolving up by half-step. A concept of dominant-seventh resolution that is unable to accommodate root movement by minor third and a dissonant seventh that is retained as a common tone becomes conspicuous (I may begin to search for analogues to this resolution by searching through the works of Sibelius, Strauss, Grieg, and others for misbehaving dominant sevenths) and obstinate (my concept still holds for most other occurrences of a chord with this structure, so why won't it work here?), and my entire approach as to how chords can operate may now become obtrusive, if indeed my approach is allowed to be called into question. With such a breakdown in analytical equipment, my analytical 'world' can show itself explicitly.

The first of these problems, the relationship of the section's opening period\textsuperscript{30} to the material that follows it, can be approached by transposing the first occurrence of $A_3$ in order to produce a stronger tonal connection to the opening period. To rewrite this relationship thus is to

\textsuperscript{30} I am using the term "period" in a looser, more Kochian manner than is customary in order to indicate something like a melodic sentence rather than a determinate form of melody.
cover up the tonal seam between the last A2 and the first A3 by creating the illusion that the period is being repeated, as shown in figure 21.

Figure 21. Sketches of alternate versions of Swan, measures 38-41. a, A2 and the beginning of A3 (Sibelius); b, A3 rewritten to accommodate E minor.

One consequence of this change is the transposition of the sequential passage of measures 40-53 down a whole step; whereas the passage originally tonicized F# minor, A minor, C minor and D# minor, these keys are now E minor (as in figure 21b), G minor, Bb minor, and C# minor. Furthermore, what was interpreted as the composing-out of the F#, lower neighbor to the section's primary G, now stands revealed as an incomplete sequence, one that, by dividing the octave symmetrically into minor thirds, promises to traverse the entire octave.31 The shortcomings of the sequence are

31 As Richard Bass has observed, in a conventional treatment of symmetrical octave-partitioning, "the same harmony initiates and terminates...the pattern, completing a cycle in which the interior harmonies are equally
easily remedied, though, by adding another iteration of A3
in order to complete the octave. By including this revision
with those shown in figure 21b, we incorporate the tension
that the sequence provides, and we return to E minor as
well; such a return effectively dispenses with problem
#2, the prolonged F#, since the completed sequence returns
the line to G. The sketch of figure 22 summarizes the
changes in this section up to this point.

![Figure 22. Section III up to this point.](image)

In order to rewrite the remainder of the section
properly, it is necessary to clarify what the harmonic goal
should be in order that the rewritings may tend toward that

The result is a chromatically embellished
prolongation of the harmony that frames the cycle" ("Liszt's
Un Sospiro: an Experiment in Symmetrical Octave-Partitions,
Journal of the American Liszt Society 32, (July-December
1992): 16). While Bass's examples involve successions of
major chords, however, Sibelius's cycle involves successive
tonicizations of minor harmonies, and these minor harmonies
are plagally defined; whereas the conventional use of such a
cycle will use dominant seventh chords both to help define
key areas and propel harmonic motion, Sibelius's cycle in
Swan uses ii₄°₇ harmonies for these purposes.

Bass observes further that most incomplete cycles
of this sort are not prolongational but transitional (Bass,
20). In both the original and in my rewritten versions,
however, Sibelius's goal can be considered wrong, or at
least more difficult to deal with than the completed
versions.
goal. This entails next taking up problem #4, the section's final (improperly resolving) F# dominant-seventh chord. In order to lead properly into the return of A minor in Section IV, the final chord of Section III should be a dominant seventh in that key. In order to produce this result, the passage in measures 63-68 and the material preceding it, as far back as measure 58, must be transposed down a whole-step, as shown in Figure 23.

![Figure 23. Swan, measures 58-68. a, Sibelius's version; b, rewritten version (transposed).](image)

One result of this revision is worthy of special attention. The progression spanning measures 58-64 is now revealed as an expanded version of c1, which appeared in measures 9-10: F# minor-E minor-G major; the Bb-major chord of measures 65-66 (see figure 23b) substitutes for the B minor harmony that appeared in measures 10-11; both function as variants of supertonic harmony in A minor, the tonality of Section IV, as shown in figure 24.

The rewriting of material flanking the intrusion of c2—my problem #3—has in many respects already clarified what is supposed to happen in the intrusion itself. First of all, the presence of an expanded c1, as seen in my
Figure 24. Comparison of two portions of Swan. a, the chords of measures 9-12 (Sibelius); b, the progression of measures 58-70 as rewritten.

rewritten version (figure 24b), suggests that the intrusion in Section III should be considered a representative of a1 rather than of c (refer to figure 9 for a comparison of the two motives); just as c1 followed a1 in Section I, so here. But we can extend this just-as further: we can substitute a schematic version of a1—one without the English horn material—at the tonal level of its first occurrence in measure 5-6, i.e. beginning on an A-minor chord, ending on a Bb-minor, producing a1+c1 at the tonal levels of their respective first appearances. In terms of the harmonic language of Swan, getting into this new occurrence of a1—call it a14—is entirely acceptable because the E minor-A minor progression mimics the key-defining use of plagal harmonies that appear throughout the piece.33 Getting out of the intrusion is likewise acceptable, since the final Bb-minor chord of the intrusion followed by the F# minor chord of the intrusion followed by the F# minor

33 To cite only a few locations: measures 36-37 and 38-39 (iv-ii7-i in E minor); measures 41-43 contain this progression transposed to F# minor, and measures 44-46, 47-48, and 51-54 transpose this progression a minor third higher each time. Measures 6-7 contain a similar key-defining progression in Bb minor (VI-Iv-i), and measure 10 and measures 13-14 contain transpositions thereof.
harmony in measure 58 also produces one of Swan's characteristic harmonic successions. Figure 25a shows the tonal relationships of the original intrusion, and figure 25b shows the rewritten $a_{14}$ and its relationships to the surrounding material. As Figure 26 shows, Section III has, through rewriting, become an extended development of motive $a (A_{21} + A_{22}, A_{31-5}, a_{14})$ followed by an extended version of $c_1$, all of which is held together on a middleground level by the prolongation of $G$, followed by the descending third-progression to $E$ that represents the regaining of the work's primary tone.

![Figure 25](image1)

**Figure 25.** Two versions of the Section III intrusion. a, the intrusion as $c_2$ (Sibelius); b, The intrusion as $a_{14}$ (rewritten version).

![Figure 26](image2)

**Figure 26.** Voice-leading sketch of Section III.

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34 Specifically, measures 8-9 ($B_b$ minor-$F\#$ minor), measures 15-16 ($C$ minor-$G\#$ minor), and 43-44 ($F\#$ minor-$D$ minor), as well as measures 46 and 48, which contain transpositions of the progression in measures 43-44.
When we come to Section IV, we find—in a kind of doubling of Swan's thematic structure—that the rewriting that the section requires has already taken place. We need only proceed through the section's b, F1, F2 and X as they stand, and leave the A-minor statements of c1 and b—which we moved at the beginning of this rewriting exercise—at the beginning of the work where they belong. Since neither c1 nor b provides any melodic closure (there is no final descent from the primary tone of E), we gain nothing by including them at the conclusion as well. Figure 27 presents sketches of the original and rewritten versions of Swan, and the two are situated so that musical events in one are lined up with corresponding events in the other (to the extent that this is possible).

There are at least two reasons why rewriting this piece might be worthwhile. First, my rewritten piece provides a unique schema—one that is allowed to build itself over the course of the analysis—for considering the form of Swan. A problem with generally accepted formal models such as rounded binary, ternary, arch, bar, and others is the authority that these models exercise over our thinking about specific musical works the forms of which they are supposed to describe. Whatever advantages there may be to considering Swan as an example of large-scale bar form, as Tanzberger advocates, the distance between this formal ideas and the piece itself is considerable.
Commentary XI. The concept of formal category possesses a structure that helps delineate the differences between the two ways of looking at analysis. On the one hand, from the perspective of music analysis as derivative of a more general musical involvement, formal labels are assertions.
The application of the label, "Rounded Binary form," to Brahms's Waltz, Op. 39/1, for example, indicates that an about-which (about "form" as a determinate characteristic of the piece) has been elevated from a with-which of practical involvement (with the piece as a performable musical complex that "goes like this:" [play it]). On the other hand, from the perspective of music analysis as a kind of involvement, the rounded-binary concept is a piece of analytical equipment with its own place in the involvement whole. Teleological assignments connect it in various chains to various goals (often inexplicit ones) with reference to the analyst (in-order-to explain the form, in-order-to present it to a class or in an essay, in-order-to...); non-teleological assignments connect the form back to the materials from which it is made (letters of the alphabet by means of which we often symbolize the sections and subsections of a form, as well as other concepts such as those of repetition and modified repetition); and intermediate assignments connect the form to other pieces of equipment (concepts of tonal areas—although we might also involve this concept in a non-teleological assignment—as well as other forms—terrnary, for instance—and even works that are supposed to be "in" Rounded-Binary form). As a piece of equipment, the formal concept is a tool for levelling-off. It is an assertion that, when applied to Brahms's Op. 39/1, levels off the piece to "Rounded Binary"
and enables other assertions to made about it on this basis, such as "the return of the A material is in the wrong key." With this example, we can see clearly what Adorno's "what is going on underneath the formal [schema]" really entails. The work—a waltz for piano by Brahms—is "underneath" the formal schema that I use to describe it. Once I employ the label, "Rounded Binary," I establish a level beyond which the piece is not permitted to go. Even my qualifying assertion about wrong keys does not allow the work to go beyond the boundary that I have introduced; indeed, subsequent qualifications even serve to entrench the piece more firmly in the area I have marked off for it.

If I am to consider bars 1-35 of Swan as Stollen #1, bars 36-74 as Stollen #2, and bars 75-102 as the Abgesang, as Tanzberger recommends, I have to perform a mental adjustment of the music in order to be able to accept the scheme. In rewriting the work in the ways that the music seems to suggest to me, I produce a schema that truly belongs to this piece. Disagreements over how things should be written aside, the only real shortcoming that the schema presents is that it is couched in musical terms, and this seems a fairly respectable shortcoming. Furthermore, even though the analytical result is neither a term—compound ternary,

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sonata-rondo or the like—nor a set of letters—A A B, A B A, or whatever—the rewritten piece is still able to fulfill Adorno's prescription for analysis: it shows the "relationship of deviation to schema," and yet, since the rewritten version has no real life of its own, it can neither take over the form of the piece from which it is derived nor escape to commandeer form in any other works.

The second value of rewriting is a consequence of the first: by considering what it takes to "solve" the "problems" of the piece, and through practical dealings with

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Even though, as a consequence of my rewriting, it is no longer clear just which is the schema—Swan or my rewritten version?—and where is the deviation—in the original or in mine? On the one hand, Swan presents the rule, the true, the schema, and the rewrite presents what it was necessary for me to do in order to bring this schema into correspondence with my concepts of what should happen. On the other hand, my rewritten version is a re-presentation of what Swan and what it could have had in common with other musical works; thus it is a schema in the Kantian sense, something against which Sibelius's original forms a deviation.

I could perhaps represent the form of my rewritten version—and, by extension, Sibelius's version—by the letters A B A C. To do so, however, seems to invest the sections with a tonal stability that they do not have and to posit stronger connections between the two A-sections than there actually are. It might be interesting to apply a graphic gimmick borrowed from Heidegger (one later taken up by Jacques Derrida); I could print some letters and then cross them out, thus: A B X C, or X B X C, or even X X X X. The object of such writing "under erasure" (sous rature, Derrida's term; see Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak [Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], xiv) is to show that something is not the case in a special way: since the letter A is necessary, I write it, yet since it does not convey what I wish it to, I cross it out—but I let both the letter and the deletion stand.

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36 Even though, as a consequence of my rewriting, it is no longer clear just which is the schema—Swan or my rewritten version?—and where is the deviation—in the original or in mine? On the one hand, Swan presents the rule, the true, the schema, and the rewrite presents what it was necessary for me to do in order to bring this schema into correspondence with my concepts of what should happen. On the other hand, my rewritten version is a re-presentation of what Swan and what it could have had in common with other musical works; thus it is a schema in the Kantian sense, something against which Sibelius's original forms a deviation.

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the musical implications of the solutions, it is possible to obtain an intuitive appreciation for the way things happen, and sometimes why they happen in the way that they do. By assessing the compositional consequences of an E♯ dominant seventh, it becomes possible to see how great the gulf between the F♯ dominant seventh sonority of bar 69 and the A minor of bar 70 is. By working with Sibelius's motives in the various contexts in which they show up, it becomes possible to see how closely related musical units such as motives a and c are. Finally, by actually working out the consequences of a proposed circular form, it becomes possible to see how the piece might paint a picture of the circularity of the river that surrounds Tuonela.

Like the hero Väinämöinen, Sibelius may never have completed The Building of his Boat, and from all accounts he needed more than just three words to finish it off. Nevertheless, whether it represents most of the hull of that Boat or only the front half or just the oarlocks, what little of it he did sing into existence is more than seaworthy. In fact, at least one sometime composer can give to The Swan of Tuonela one of the highest compliments a composer can bestow on another's work: the phrase, "I wish I'd written that."

Commentary XII. Although it might seem somewhat anticlimactic, a final word is appropriate concerning the
activity of analysis and the 'world' that is generated by the activity. In specific analyses, assumptions are always in force, submerged though they may be, but the assumptions of the foregoing analysis are perhaps even more difficult to extract than usual because of the different levels of argumentation employed. On one level, for instance, I am pretending that I am assuming certain things: that Swan has problems, that application of certain "normative principles" will fix them, and that this manner of proceeding is appropriate (cf. Commentary V and VII). On another level, however, I am in the possession of assumptions that are not explicitly stated nor necessarily able to be so stated: that there are ways of analyzing that will reveal something about the piece, that one of those ways is to pretend to fix problems posed by the analytical tough spots in the piece, that simply looking at the piece in normal ways—strict Schenkerian, modified Schenkerian à la Howell, Roman numeral, Formenlehre—will not be as productive, that no one will misunderstand my rewriting as constituting a real assault on the work, and so on. It reflects the Heideggerian orientation of this study to say that these assumptions—those that really are assumptions primarily, but also those that I am pretending to have—generate a 'world' in which I operate and in which my analysis functions. Assumptions do encourage certain kinds of analytical behavior and do not encourage others. The
analytical assignments configure themselves around the equipment (concepts and other tools) that I use in the analysis and encourage my seeing of certain things and ignoring others—or remaining ignorant of them, which is not the same thing. Yet it is also appropriate to approach assumptions from another, apparently contradictory, angle, and to say that my involvement with the piece generates my assumptions. This statement is not as simple as it appears. What I see when I first look at the piece does have some bearing upon what I subsequently do with it analytically; but this kind of bearing is only possible because of my involvement in music in the first place, and even that involvement—along with my 'clearing' and the understanding that proceeds from it—is thrown, is dependent upon my already being in an involvement totality (KPM 161). It is all of my previous involvements, musical and non-musical (if it is even possible to separate involvements this way), that produce whatever possibilities I have.

That an analytical 'world', or any 'world' at all, for that matter, can be both a generator (a producer of assumptions, here) and result of that generating (a product of the assumptions) is a reflection of the circularity of interpretation, the hermeneutic circle. This circularity is something that people generally accept in some areas; it is the source, for example, of the generally unfinished nature of interpersonal relations—can anyone know another person
completely?—and much of the sense of loss that accompanies the termination of a relationship, whether through death of the other or by mutual agreement. Interpretive circularity applies with equal validity in other areas, too, however, musical involvement included. This circularity is one source of my discomfort at the suggestion that my analysis of Swan is finished because the bell rang. Another source, no doubt, is my mistaken but no less persistent impression that, if I were only to spend more time with the work, I would surely get it "right," and then my analysis would truly be finished—we might call this a will-to-dogma. The analytic circle can really only be a source of irritation to dogma, which is another way of saying that the interpretive circle has the nature of a problem only if one is looking for a way out of it.

"If we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up" (BT 194, original in italics).
Musing on the somewhat troubled intellectual climate of contemporary music analysis, Craig Ayrey writes that some current analytical trends, borne of a turn to post-structuralist literary theory combined with a vaguely threatening pluralism

[tend] to displace the analytical project from the analysis of works to the criticism of analytical discourse, that is, to the analysis as text, to the metacritical analysis of analysis. Undoubtedly, this flight into postmodernism has increased our understanding of theory as an activity, but the opening up of a field of limitless commentary risks occluding works themselves.¹

If Ayrey is correct, the present study is yet another installment in the modern/postmodern evasion of the true purpose of analysis. Seen in this way, my Heideggerian dissection of the activity represents effort wasted on a marginal subject, effort that would have been better spent analyzing some "works themselves" (even my salute in the direction of analysis is marred by an intrusive commentary).

Yet, even if one does not accept entirely Ayrey's assessment of these problems of analysis, it is perhaps worthwhile to ask the questions, What good is a study like this? and What are the consequences of looking at analysis in this way? Some things this study clearly does not do. It does not tell a theorist how to analyze properly, improperly or otherwise. Examination and evaluation of methods of analysis is not its focus, although someone might find support for their favorite way of looking at music somewhere in my appropriation of Heidegger; it is emphatically not the purpose of this study to arm any particular analytical system, however. Nor does it come straight out and tell anyone how to tell a good analysis from a bad one. Nor does it go very far toward the validation of analysis as an activity, what with its frequent references to its status as a "derivative" endeavor. Indeed, I could have chosen wording in some strategic places—wording that would have come straight out of Heidegger's writings, such as "deficient"—that would have confirmed the suspicions of those who have always thought that analysis had too high an opinion of itself.

Yet, through the definition and clarification of the place analysis takes among musical activities, it is possible that certain objections to analysis might be clarified. I take as an illustration an objection adapted
from Adorno,² but one on which he owns no copyright. Anyone who has taught music theory has certainly heard this objection in one of its many forms, of which I cite two: that it is doubtful whether the composer could have been aware of all the things that a particular example of analysis points out, or that it is doubtful whether any performer could ever hope to perform the results of many analytical observations. In addition to sharing the assumption that a musical analysis should be able to do something—or that I should be able to do something with it, a point to which I return—these two objections share a muddled thinking about analysis that my adaptation of Heidegger can help to unmuddle.

The first line of defense against this objection is usually an answer such as, "Yes, the composer was undoubtedly aware of all of this," or "You certainly can perform this so as to bring out this analytical point." Rather than a frontal assault by way of an answer, however, we can appeal to Heidegger's account of circumspection: it is sight, even awareness, yet inexplicit. As an inexplicit awareness, circumspection enables the composer or performer to move around in the complex of assignments—especially, for this context, the assignments as relations between pieces of equipment that make up the musician's 'world'. An explicit sight, an "as-like" having that is able to look at

and notice assignments and equipment, is derived from, and therefore only possible on the basis of, the more primary way of seeing that helps constitute everyday coping with the environment. As a landscaper, for example, I do not "see" (in the sense of explicit notice) the relationship of the pulling-a-plant-out-of-a-pot to my shovel. Yet I can point out the relationship and make it explicit: I remove the plant from the pot in-order-to put it in the hole that I made with the shovel. As a landscaper, am I aware of the relationship? Not in the way I have explained it; awareness in this case takes the form of involvement in the whole complex of landscaping activities dictated by my for-the-sake-of-which, and a more explicit sight of things would not only be out of character, it might even make my involvement more difficult. By the same token, the composer's "awareness" of the things of which analysis takes notice need not be an explicit awareness in order for it to count as something that the composer brings to composing, and a performer's circumspection need not be a sight that brings about a specific and thematizing performance action that puts across an analytical point. Both composer and performer need only be involved in their respective musical activities that are dictated by their for-the-sakes-of-which in order for them to qualify as "seeing" and "knowing" participants, because involvement-in provides the very kind
of seeing and knowing-about that is appropriate to their respective kinds of musical activity.\(^3\)

To bring circumspection to bear upon the question of what a composer knew about or what a performer could possibly execute does not answer the objection so much as neutralize it. A yes-or-no answer is not provided; rather the objection is demonstrated to be inappropriate, at least in the form that it takes here. The assumption that the only valid kind of involvement is one in which we take explicit notice of everything we do is an assumption that everyday involvement can do without.

A Heideggerian view of analytical matters can thus clear up some misunderstandings about what relationships and what differences there are between practical musical activities and analysis, but it can also clarify other matters, such as the nature of what it is that analysis analyzes. To be more precise, a hermeneutico-phenomenological approach toward analysis encourages us to see music as a text—but not music as score or score as

\(^3\) When Heidegger writes "the botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedge-row" (BT 100), he has just this contrast of different kinds of seeing and knowing in view. To point out that the poet does not "really know" the flower because he or she does not know anther and stamen as anther and stamen is to hold that I can really know a flower as a flower only if I know it as the botanist knows it, and sees it as the botanist sees it, with a botanist's assignments determining my relationship to it. I might certainly prefer one kind of seeing or knowing over another, but when I invoke preference I also call upon a more explicit relationship to things than is customary for everydayness.
text, as this is too narrow a definition of text. Text, in this context, is a confluence of assignments. This definition certainly admits the musical score within its purview, but also includes things that do not exist in written form, such as Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein is a text that is read and re-read throughout his early writings and lectures, with varying interpretations of this text given at various times. Virtually anything can become a text for us, and while it might seem superfluous to say that music, too, can be a text (wasn't it one already?), I mean by this statement to recommend that we might see more of the implications of music's textuality.4

4 Although use of the term "text" to apply to anything that Dasein might interpret amounts to catachresis—use of a figurative term to apply to something for which there is no proper literal term—there is nevertheless plenty of precedent in the secondary literature on hermeneutics for such an application. Graeme Nicholson writes that "the translator can be said to be interpreting the black marks of the Greek script in his text, but those inscribed marks do not sufficiently define what he is translating. It is a poem he is translating" ("Seeing and Reading: Aspects of Their Connection" in Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde, eds. [Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1985]: 37); his point is that there is more to "text" than the idea of a bunch of pages written upon and stuck together on the side, that "text" can apply to anything perceived, because perception necessarily involves—even depends upon, as Nicholson's Heideggerian orientation makes clear—interpretation (cf. Patrick Heelan's essay "Perception as a Hermeneutical Act" in the same collection as Nicholson's). Furthermore, Jean-Luc Nancy can refer to "the text of philosophy" when referring to the philosophy in general (as opposed to the texts of philosophy) only because of such a view of the nature of textuality (Jean-Luc Nancy, "Sharing Voices" in Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: from Nietzsche to Nancy, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift [Albany, NY: SUNY press, 1990]: 212).
Even if we try to confine such textuality to the score, however, the situation is not necessarily uncomplicated. We might agree to discuss Schubert's Eighth symphony. Which edition? Do we take Brian Newbould's extrapolations for the third and fourth movements seriously? What about the nickname, "the Unfinished," that appears on the cover of the score, and even on the inside, at the top of the first page? Do we take it as part of the piece? Certainly not, that was added later. But now, back to the question of what edition to use; does not the very idea of an "edition" speak of something added later? Just how much of "what we have" of the Eighth is mine, how much is yours, how much belongs to Schubert, and how much to Aaron Copland? Compound these relatively simple problems with the different sets of assumptions that you and I bring to our discussion of the score. Many assumptions—as to the way tonality works in the piece or the means by which we ascertain the relative importance of certain musical events—are so far below the surface of our discussion that we may take them to be something that is actually in the piece (a 5-line, a V⁷ chord, a double period, a repeat sign). They may indeed actually "be there," but they nevertheless have what status they have for us by virtue of the assignments that make up the involvement totality for each of us. Further complicating matters is the element of our experience(s) with works; my earliest experience of the first movement of
Schubert's Eighth was in the context of my preparation of the work for performance high school, but in a transcription for band. I came to know it first in its transcribed form, but my experience with this version of the work is, for me, inseparable from the orchestral version (does the existence of the transcription really relegate the original to the status of "version?" Or does the possibility of a derived version point to some kind of incorporeal Ur-version?). All of this chatter may seem to be the product of an imagination run wild, but I am afraid I have not even really begun to uncover the assignments that might combine to give us (me?) even the mere score of Schubert's Eighth.

"If this is what Heidegger gets us," someone might say, "then get rid of him;" and I must admit that the relentlessness of my questioning puts the seriousness of the questions in question. Yet a questioning does not always need to take such an abrasive tone as I have in order to be a productive kind of questioning, informed in part by Heidegger's philosophy, but also inspired by his way of pursuing philosophy, of taking the very obviousness of a question's answer as a sign that something important may lie concealed beneath a veneer of self-evidence. For instance, when he describes the phenomena proper to the activity that is phenomenology, Heidegger writes of some ways in which a phenomenon can be covered up: it can simply have escaped notice altogether and stand undiscovered, or it can be
buried over, having once been uncovered but since that time having become progressively covered up once again (BT 63). Furthermore, the covered-upness may be complete or partial, and in the latter case the phenomenon in question acquires a disguise, creating the situation that is "both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn" (BT 60). The way in which such phenomena present themselves as clear, well-known and obvious-to-all allows them to entrench themselves within processes of thought and yet be regarded as somehow off the premises, a kind of textual absentee landlord.

Many of the assignments that go into making the text a text have just this character of partial coveredness. Many of those things that I unconsciously bring to the reading of a piece, but no less certainly the things that I consciously bring, have the character of "everyone knows that...:" everyone knows that the score is not really the music; everyone knows that it is impossible to hear a piece for the first time twice; everyone knows that a performance is but an imperfect rendition of the score. These things that everyone is supposed to know, as well as matters like the musical status of nicknames such as "Unfinished" and the musical effects of the size of the page on which the music is printed--matters dispensed with via the magic words ceteris paribus (puribus?)--are the very things that a
Heideggerian view of everydayness, and musical/analytical everydayness in particular, can illuminate, if by no other means than by encouraging a radical questioning of any assignment that has the nerve to present itself as something obvious.\(^5\) We owe the apparent obviousness in part to thrownness, to our "already Being in the totality" (KPM 161) which provides ways for looking at things before we are even really aware of the things we might look at, and which in turn lends a transparency to those ways of looking (and sometimes to the things themselves); we are always situated somehow, and situated in such a way that we can normally look through all assignments, thanks to the transparent but perpetual hegemony of Being-there.

The customary way of operating is to treat "the music" as though it is unitary and manageable, structured by "facts." If instead, however, "the music" is multiple and incorrigible, structured by assignments that are always in flux for a single person\(^6\)—never mind the person with whom

\(^5\) The effects of fallenness on musical-analytical phenomena should not be underestimated: "The fact that something has been said groundlessly [which does not necessarily mean incorrectly, just without due consideration for its foundations], and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off" (BT 213; my gloss in brackets).

\(^6\) It is in part because of this quality of Being-in-flux that I have chosen the phrase "confluence of assignments" to define a text. Furthermore, the derivation of the German word fluß from the Latin flux calls to mind the German city of Koblenz (Latin Confluentes), so named because of its location at the meeting of the Moselle and Rhine rivers. This is an apt illustration for the nuance
I intend to discuss the piece—it would not hurt to keep this in mind, even if I end up analyzing in the same way I always have.

Ayrey calls attention to the current fashion of analytical orientations adapted from literary criticism, but his essay is one of the few that takes notice of the trend that does not do so in order to disparage that trend with some phrase to the effect that music theory cannot seem to come up with something new on its own and must rely on other disciplines to supply the novelties. Yet the very view of music's textuality propounded in the paragraphs preceding this one make such borrowings look more legitimate all the time. Literary critics are old hands at dealing with things like reader-constituted texts (i.e. the fact that what the reader brings to a text, his or her 'there', conspires with other factors—seemingly incidentally, sometimes, the written text—to constitute a particular reading). To that I want to give to the "structure" of text as a confluence, because, just as it is impossible to locate a precise point where the two rivers become one—and after they flow together, is the Rhine still partly the Moselle?—so is it impossible to fix, separate, number or circumscribe the assignments whose totality is a text.

7 Ayrey's essay adapts Derridean deconstruction—widely regarded as occupying a position somewhere between literary criticism and philosophy—to form an analytical tool for dealing with the music of Debussy.

8 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, 344; cf. p. 327: "Skilled reading is usually thought to be a matter of discerning what is there, but if the example of my students can be generalized, it is a matter of knowing how to produce what can thereafter be said to be there."
take "the music" as a text, that is to say, as a confluence of assignments, is to take seriously the matter of reading that text. Music theory should not have to apologize for attempting to improve its reading skills.

It is, however, just such a view of musical textuality that has brought about the metacritical state of affairs that Ayrey finds distressing, and the examination of the product of the examination of the musical texts that "risks occluding works [texts?] themselves." What is the nature of this risk? Is it a risk posed to music or to analysis? In other words, is the risk here a risk of losing "the music" entirely, or is it a risk of losing "the music" as analyzed, losing something that we could otherwise point to and name as "an analysis of...?" Clearly the danger is not one of losing music entirely; if anything, metacriticism would be doing music a positive service by diverting the theorist from analyzing "a work itself" and perhaps getting it wrong (as though even this could damage the piece somehow).

Besides, as the examination of everydayness has shown, music analysis is an activity that is derived from the primary musical activities of performing and composing, and losing this derivative activity need not have grave consequences for music-making of any kind, since the direction of derivation is a one-way street: we can derive assertions from our musical orientation toward a work, but we cannot un-derive the work from the assertions of analysis, as I
have shown. And if anyone is still concerned about some loss of music through too much metacriticism, probably the most straightforward suggestion would be that they should play the music, or perform it, or compose something.

On the other hand, if the risk is a loss of the music in music analysis to metacriticism, it still seems as though the risk to "works themselves" is minimal. Analysis need not take the form of verbal displayings of works in order to be analysis, because the ground for calling analysis what it is, is what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude, the way of looking at music that derives determinate characteristics from works of music. The derivation of characteristics can take place in either a general apophantic context (Music Analysis, the thing that theorists do) or in a hermeneutic context (music analysis, which is always operating in performing or composing anyway). In the former case, music is deworlded and remains in a deworlded context with respect to practical involvement with music, while in the latter case, music is temporarily deworlded only in order to be "reworlded," reintegrated into the practical, musical, hermeneutic context. Consequently, whether the context is apophantic or hermeneutic, analysis is always with us; we are never not analyzing in some way. From the standpoint of music, at least, to lose the version of analysis that keeps music in a deworlded state does not
seem so much of a loss after all, and metacriticism will never stand in the way of composing or performing.

The mimetic aspect of analysis—a concept that cannot be developed to a great extent here—also has a bearing upon the questions of metacriticism and textuality, especially for consideration of analysis as text. Since the text that is produced by the activity of analysis (it can be a verbal text, or again, a text consisting of perceptions or action) is in some sense mimetic—involving similarity, difference, and ways of mediating between the two—it seems that study of the mechanics of this species of mimesis and the ways in which mediation occurs might in some ways be as important for music theory as attending to "works themselves," especially if that attention is compelled by an "analytical project" which is imposed—from outside, as it were—upon those who analyze. At bottom, we will analyze because we want to, not because someone tells us we should.

9 I am taking mimesis in a modern sense, adapted from writers such as Arne Melberg (Theories of Mimesis [Cambridge: University Press, 1995], 1: Melberg's second sense of mimesis as "the meeting-place of two opposing but connected ways of thinking, acting and making: similarity and difference") and Karl F. Morrison (The Mimetic Tradition of Reform in the West [Princeton: University Press, 1982], xv: mimesis as a "strategy for mediating asymmetries"). Perhaps more important for a consideration of music-analytic mimesis, however, is the interpretation that Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe derives from some of Heidegger's writings that post-date those on which my study relies: mimesis not as imitation but as production, "as poiesis in general" (Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. Christopher Fynsk, Introduction by Jacques Derrida [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 80).
If a study of ways in which Heidegger's thought might apply to music analysis clarifies the status of both music and music analysis as texts, it also raises some interesting—and possibly disturbing—related questions as to the status of analysis as a creative activity. The suggestion of analytical creativity may seem presumptuous, but it nevertheless is always submerged in discussions of analysis and usually surfaces in disclaimers like "of course, my analysis is no substitute for the music" (the disclaimer would lose its force if there were not some danger of the analysis altering the music or perhaps secretly, like a changeling, supplanting it). And it is the possibility of analytical creativity—and its perceived conflict with the "true purpose" of analysis—that undoubtedly fuels both this disclaimer as well as objections such as those given above regarding the likelihood of a composer's awareness of an analytical point and the likelihood of a performer's ability to execute certain kinds of analytical observations. The disclaimers and objections gain strength because of the distastefulness of the charge that the analyst may have added to the "work itself"—or, worse, made something else out of it—and thereby overstepped the undrawn lines of the discipline, to say nothing of the bounds of good manners. Indeed, most everything seems to militate against taking music analysis as a creative endeavor, even the nature of the alleged objet
d'art, since the analytical product seems to lie somewhere between literature and music, including a little of both but not enough of either. Besides, analysis is derivative, anyway; even Heidegger has to endorse an objection on that basis.

But what if we take the possibility of analytical creativity seriously? Analysis is, on a basic level, the making of another text (an-other text), and is an activity that bears some frightening resemblances to another musical step-child, transcribing. Both are based on a pre-text, both show a particular perspective on that pre-text, and both do something to that pre-text that at once changes it and leaves it the same. Transcription, however, is usually --if sometimes grudgingly--regarded as creative, even if highest esteem is reserved for only the exceptional pieces of this type. Such works can be, and have been, praised for surpassing the worth of the works from which they are derived, their pre-texts. Can anyone envision the same kind of regard for an analysis? Were someone to praise the "creativity" of one of Keller's Functional Analyses, such praise would surely have caused him chagrin, earned his disdain, and possibly prompted a torrent of his sarcasm; Functional Analysis is supposed to show what is already there, and to praise the technician's (or the technique's) "creativity" is not so much to miss the point as to ride roughshod over it.
The prime area of contrast between transcribing and analyzing, at least for the purpose of considering the creativity question, is thus the parergonal status of the texts that analyzing produces. Like the frame around the painting, or the clothing on the statue, or the column adorning the temple, an analysis is at once part of the work and part of the general (here, musical) surroundings, yet it is frequently disowned by both (or perhaps it is self-effacing with respect to both). With respect to music in general, an analysis merges with the work of which it is an analysis—it is regarded as "an analysis of..."—while with respect to the work, the analytical text often disappears, or perhaps is chased, into a figurative area outside and is not allowed to attach to the work (itself).

10 Generally speaking, a transcriber does produce a new piece that can take on a life of its own, that has the ability to exist though cut off from its pre-text—the hymn transcription Flos vernalis in the Robertsbridge codex (Brit. Lib. MS add. 28550), for which we have no "original" to which we can compare it, is but one example. The transcription is anastomatic; it creates a conduit between itself and another piece, even though "the other" might be missing. Analysis usually does not involve anastomosis, and even when it might (Keller's Functional Analyses might), what is created is a conduit from a work of music back onto itself (Andrew Anderson, "The Epistemology of Transcription," Sonus, Spring 1998 [forthcoming]).

11 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian MacLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 61. Parergonal status often seems to apply even to performance (the quintessentially musical activity in the eyes of many); performances, too, are always "performances of...," but their significance recedes when discussion turns to the "work itself," which is always accorded the honor of being independent of its performances (e.g., Roman Ingarden:
of analysis as parergon helps us to locate the source of the problem of an affirmation of creativity in analysis as being therefore the same as that of the problem of aesthetic judgement in general: the problem of outside-the-work and inside-the-work, a distinction that can never be maintained with any rigor, and it is this same problematic distinction that positively begs for Heidegger's intervention into the questions and problems discussed in this concluding chapter. Heidegger's concept of 'world'—along with its attendant concepts of understanding, disposition, discourse, clearing, and so on—has a way of insinuating itself into any situation in which the subject/object, inside/outside dichotomy appears to govern. Whether the question is one of what a composer can "know," what a performer can "put in" (or should I say "bring out" during?) a performance, what constitutes a text, or what creativity might mean, a Heideggerian view of 'world' can reorient the question so that, even if it multiplies the questions and makes answers more difficult to come by, justice can be done to analysis and music-making as human activity.


12 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 63.
In answering the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter—What good is a study like this? and What consequences are there to this view of analysis?—I have taken a circuitous route by way of issues that, as issues, as matters proceeding or following from a premise, are consequences, in a sense. Yet, from a slightly different perspective, I am able to give a semblance of a straightforward answer: there are no consequences to a Heideggerian view of musical activities (analysis included), or at least no new ones. As stated above, such a view will probably not alter anyone's way of analyzing nor color anyone's evaluations of the various methods of analysis or of particular analyses. All such a view can provide is an indication of obligations and consequences that were already in force, however much they might have been covered over. A consensus probably does exist concerning the theorist's or performer's obligation to "the music," however we reckon the term; the theorist has a duty to the musical text, however broadly or narrowly we might conceive that text. But what about obligations to other musicians? No consensus there. Nevertheless, the consequences of reading do not stop with the text, and they never have. Readings of texts "do things."\textsuperscript{13} Pollini's reading of Chopin's Etudes compelled

\textsuperscript{13} According to Miller, "Reading is...a happening that makes something else happen, though never anything that can be named ahead of time, promised or foreseen" (J. Hillis Miller, \textit{Ariadne's Thread: Story Lines} [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992], 225). This characterization puts
me to buy the recording; my reading of Heidegger's texts helped prompt this study; my readings of Schoenberg's Op. 19/4 or of *The Swan of Tuonela*, if presented in a class, might prompt someone else to make a career of music theory—or to get out of music altogether. And if, heaven forbid, we should extend the concept of reading to include composing...the mind reels with the possibilities of readings doing things. Compositions prompt performances, transcriptions, analyses, and who-knows-what-else. Readings prompting readings! It seems as though nothing is safe anymore—even analytical or performance readings can prompt other readings, and just as unpredictably. Is there nothing musical, derivative or otherwise, that I can do that will leave things as they are, or were? It seems not, but then, there never was. The consequences of doing music were always already there. Heidegger just helps us see those consequences a little more clearly.

in a new light his much earlier statement that "There is no innocent reading..." (*Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire* [Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard, 1970], viii); reading becomes a doubly culpable act: culpable with respect to the text--the earlier quote is describing the reader's violation of the text by reading and the impossibility the text's remaining pure--and with respect to others--the later quote is concerned with the ethics of reading, with reading as a public act that prompts other's actions. Reading of music is certainly no less culpable in both senses.


Fish, Stanley. *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.


