"THE BEST STUFF WHICH THE STATE AFFORDS"

A PORTRAIT OF THE FOURTEENTH TEXAS INFANTRY IN THE CIVIL WAR

1862 - 1865

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of North Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Scott Dennis Parker, B.A.

Denton, Texas

December, 1998
Parker, Scott Dennis, "The Best Stuff Which the State Affords" A Portrait of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry in the Civil War, 1862-1865. Master of Arts (History), December, 1998, 110 pp., 14 tables, 5 maps, 111 titles.

This study examines the social and economic characteristics of the men who joined the Confederate Fourteenth Texas Infantry Regiment during the Civil War and provides a narrative history of the regiment's wartime service. The men of the Fourteenth Infantry enlisted in 1862 and helped to turn back the Federal Red River Campaign in April 1864.

In creating a portrait of these men, the author used traditional historical sources (letters, diaries, medical records, secondary narratives) as well as statistical data from the 1860 United States census, military service records, and state tax rolls. The thesis places the heretofore unknown story of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry within the overall body of Civil War historiography.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The historiography of the Trans-Mississippi West, compared to the entire body of literature on the American Civil War, amounts to a few sparse scrubs scattered around the base of old and giant trees. Battles west of the Mississippi did not compare to an Antietam, a Gettysburg, or a Fredericksburg. There were, however, some major events. There was the famous battle at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, and the failed Confederate attempt to conquer New Mexico during the first year of the war. And there was the largest campaign west of the Mississippi River: the Red River Campaign of 1864. If the Confederate New Mexico Expedition was the Gettysburg of the West, then the Federal Red River offensive of 1864 was the Peninsula Campaign of the West.¹

While most of the other campaigns of the Civil War were quickly recounted in print, either by veterans of the conflict or by historians, it was not until 1958 that the Red River Campaign received a thorough history by Ludwell H. Johnson. Originally a doctoral dissertation, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War examined the events that led to such a disastrous military experience for the Union army in northwestern Louisiana, the battles that took place, and the aftermath of the campaign. Historians soon published others major works on the Trans-Mississippi West, including Stephen B. Oates’s Confederate Cavalry West of the River (1961); Robert L. Kerby’s Kirby Smith’s Confederacy (1972); Alvin Josephy’s The Civil War in the American West (1991); and William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess’s Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West (1992).

Like other investigations into a particular campaign, these authors related a particular battle or campaign as it progressed, explaining what the generals thought and how they moved their men around on the field of battle. Sometimes, campaign histories can become unwieldy, overwhelmed by the minutia of ground-level details. For a picture of what the common soldier did and said, unit histories are essential.

Regimental and unit histories began to appear in print shortly after the defeated Confederates stacked their rifles and battle flags at Appomattox Court House in Virginia. While the stories of regiments from eastern campaign could fill up many bookshelves, unit histories of the Trans-Mississippi are few and far between. The following titles are among the major examples: J. P. Blessington’s *The Campaigns of Walker’s Texas Division* (1875); Xavier Blanchard Debray, *A Sketch of the History of Debray’s (26th) Regiment of Texas Cavalry* (1884); Carl L. Duaine, *The Dead Men Wore Boots: An Account of the 32nd Texas Volunteer Cavalry, C. S. A., 1862–1865* (1966); Anne Bailey, *Between the Enemy and Texas: Parson’s Texas Cavalry in the Civil War* (1989); the recently published dissertation by Jane Harris Johansson, “Peculiar Honor:” The 28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) in the Civil War (1992); and the recently published master’s thesis “Daniel’s Battery: A Narrative and Socio-economic Study of the Ninth Texas Field Battery” (1996) by John Drummond Perkins.

Unit histories written by veterans of the conflict are helpful for understanding the life of the common soldier and the ways that soldiers reacted to the war, but these accounts suffer greatly from the limited point of view of the writer. A unit history by a Confederate colonel who fought at Gettysburg is likely to have an entirely different account of the battle from that of a victorious Union author. Historians have always understood this, but it was not until Bell Irvin Wiley, who used material from many different unit histories from both sides of the Mason–Dixon line, as well as other primary sources, including United States census data, that a new style of soldier history developed. In his two books, *The Life of Billy*
Yank and The Life of Johnny Reb, Wiley created portraits of the typical fighting soldier and made generalizations on the type of man who fought for the Blue and the Gray. It was not long before other historians began to follow Wiley's lead. Among the best are The Twentieth Maine (1957) by John J. Pullen, The Iron Brigade (1961) by Alan T. Nolan, and James I. Robertson Jr.'s The Stonewall Brigade (1963).

In the past two decades, a new statistical approach to regimental history has emerged. Examples include Michael Barton's Goodmen: The Character of Civil War Soldiers (1981); Gerald F. Linderman's Embattled Courage (1987); James I. Robertson Jr.'s Soldiers Blue and Gray (1988); Joseph T. Glatthaar's The March to the Sea and Beyond (1985); Reid Mitchell's Civil War Soldiers (1988); and Warren Wilkinson's Mother, May You Never See the Sights I Have Seen: The Fifty-Seventh Massachusetts Veteran Volunteers in the Army of the Potomac, 1864–1865 (1990). With these new studies, historians began to use quantitative methods in conjunction with traditional historical techniques to paint a broader portrait of the social background of the men who took up arms. Among the first topics addressed using this new method were occupation and age patterns of the soldiers, as typified in David F. Riggs's "Sailors of the U. S. S. Cairo: Anatomy of a Gunboat Crew," and "The 12th Missouri Infantry: A Socio-Military Profile of a Union Regiment." Douglas Hale explored the relationship between rank and wealth in his article "The Third Texas Cavalry: A Socioeconomic Profile of a Confederate Regiment," while the question of the types of men who enlisted was answered by three different historians: "Who fought for the North in the Civil War? Concord, Massachusetts Enlistments," by W. J. Rorabaugh; "A Poor Man's Fight: Civil War Enlistment Patterns in Conway, New Hampshire," by William Marvel; and "Confederate Volunteering and Enlistment in Ashe County, North Carolina, 1861–1862," by Martin Crawford. The connection between wealth and desertion rates was examined in "Civil War Desertion from
a Black Belt Regiment: An Examination of the 44th Virginia Infantry" by Kevin Ruffner.  

The story of Colonel Edward Clark and the Fourteenth Texas Infantry Regiment has heretofore remained untold. This unit originated in east Texas and was a part of John G. Walker's division of Texas soldiers, known for their extensive marching across three states, thus earning them the name "Walker's Greyhounds." The division saw action in only five battles: Milliken's Bend, Bayou Bourbeau, Mansfield, and Pleasant Hill, all in Louisiana, and Jenkins' Ferry, Arkansas. The Fourteenth participated only in the latter three conflicts. In all of their contests, the Texans claimed victory and achieved their primary goal: to keep the invading Union army out of Texas and thus, to protect their

---


3 Edward Clark was born on 1 April 1815 in New Orleans, Louisiana. He lived a few childhood years in Georgia where his uncle, John Clark, served as governor from 1819 to 1823. He passed his bar exam in Alabama in the 1830s and set up his law practice in Marshall, Texas, in December 1841. From the county seat of Harrison County, Clark prospered in state politics, serving as a delegate to the Texas Constitutional Convention in 1845, a member of both the Texas House of Representatives and Senate, the secretary of state for Texas Governor Elisha Pease (1853–1857), and in the appointed position of state commissioner of claims in 1858. In 1859 Clark ran as lieutenant governor with Sam Houston as independent Democrats, winning the election. Clark's previous military experience, prior to the Civil War, was as a member of the staff of General J. Pinckney Henderson in the Mexican War, when Clark received a citation for bravery in the battle of Monterrey. After the Civil War, Clark joined other prominent Confederate military and political leaders and fled to Mexico. He returned to Marshall shortly afterward and tried his hand at various business ventures before returning to law. He died on 4 May 1880 and is buried in Marshall. See "Edward Clark," in Ron Tyler, editor-in-chief, The New Handbook of Texas, 6 vols. (Austin: The Texas State Historical Association, 1996): 1:132; "Edward Clark," in W. C. Nunn, ed., Ten Texans in Gray (Hillsboro, TX: Hill Junior College Press, 1968): 18–33; "Edward Clark," in Richard N. Current, editor-in-chief, Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 4 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995): 1:341.
In order to construct the history of the Fourteenth Infantry, this thesis uses the traditional narrative of the unit's experiences combined with quantitative methods to determine the type of man who fought in this unit. This places the Fourteenth's story among the new military histories of recent years. Along with the traditional sources of diaries and letters, the non-traditional sources included military service records, casualty lists, census schedules, and tax records, the intent being to have a record of each soldier from the Fourteenth Texas Infantry. These data were collected and entered into a database. Statistical software was used to scrutinize many different variables. As a result, an analysis can be made of the different ages, birthplaces, family connections, occupations, slave holdings, and wealth holdings, disclosing a great deal of information about the type of man who joined the Fourteenth Texas Infantry in the spring of 1862. Moreover, these findings can be compared to similar data for the east Texas region, determining whether the men who joined the Fourteenth were representative of their region. With such information, the Fourteenth can be compared to other units who fought for the Union and the Confederacy. This comparison will produce answers to basic questions in Civil War historiography: Was the Civil War a rich man's war and a poor man's fight? What motivated these men to enlist and fight? Another, perhaps more important, outcome of this study is that the story of this unit now has a narrator, allowing the account of this heretofore obscure Texas regiment to be placed in the broader scope of Civil War history.

CHAPTER 2

THE MEN OF THE FOURTEENTH TEXAS INFANTRY:
A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PORTRAIT

With the Texas Revolution in 1836, many residents of the United States began to migrate westward toward the new republic. The rate of migration into Texas greatly increased after it became a state in December 1845. The population of Texas in 1850 was 212,592; it nearly tripled by 1860 to 614,215. The new Texans, especially those originating from the Old South, were lured to the Lone Star State by the promise of cheap land, rich soil, and the chance to start their lives anew. Even with this population increase, parts of the state were still sparsely settled. In 1860 the largest city in Texas, San Antonio, numbered only 8,235 people. The second-largest city, Galveston, followed with 7,307, Houston had 4,845, and the state's capital, Austin, numbered only 3,494. The East Texas region from which the men of the Fourteenth Infantry came, included only two towns with populations of more than one thousand: Marshall, the county seat of Harrison County; and Tyler, in Smith County (see Figure 1). Thus, the major population centers in East Texas were small compared to other major towns in various regions of the state.¹

In their book Wealth and Power in Antebellum Texas, Randolph B. Campbell and Richard G. Lowe divided Texas into four regions. Region I (East Texas) incorporates thirty-five counties within its borders. Campbell and Lowe describe East Texas as “a

Figure 1. East Texas in 1860. (Based on Stephens and Holmes, *Historical Atlas of Texas*)
relatively homogeneous region of small and middling farms and plantations peopled mainly by Southern-born Protestants.” By a margin of nearly three-to-one, these southerners came from the Lower South (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina) as opposed to the Upper South (Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina). On average, the small southern farmers, the predominant group in the region, owned few, if any, slaves and possessed wealth ranging between $1,000 and $4,999. They lived in a region, however, in which a minority possessed a disproportionate amount of wealth and power. This situation, on the whole, represented all of Texas and most of the South and the nation.  

How did the men of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry compare to other East Texans, soldiers in other Confederate regiments, the Confederate army, and the Union army? To answer these questions, an examination of a number of characteristics must be considered. These characteristics include the man’s status in the household, his marital status, living arrangements, age, wealth, heritage, slave ownership, and agricultural data. As recorded in the military records for these soldiers (Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas), 1,118 men served in the Fourteenth Texas Infantry. The men of First Company K were transferred out of the

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3For a detailed explanation of methodology, see Appendix.

4Begun in 1903 by the United States War Department, the Compiled Service Records organized all of the Confederate and Union records according to regiment. This process continued until its completion in the late 1920s. For the Confederacy’s regiments, the War Department used Confederate War Department papers, muster rolls, payrolls, rosters, medical records, prisoner of war records, inspection reports, and other types of documents to create a summary of each soldier’s service. For each man who served in the war, the Records indicate name, first rank, last rank, enlistment age, enlistment county, enlistment date, medical
Fourteenth shortly after the regiment's organization, leaving 1,035 men in the Fourteenth. Of the 1,035 men, the researcher located 525 (50.7 percent) in the 1860 United States Census.  

In 1860 the men who would compose the Fourteenth Texas Infantry lived in northeastern Texas. As the call for volunteers went out, certain counties were designated as mustering areas. For the Fourteenth, there were four main mustering counties: 346 men, or 33.8 percent of the regiment, enlisted in Harrison County; 290, or 28.3 percent, enlisted in Smith County; 237, or 23.1 percent, enlisted in Upshur County; and 99, or 9.7 percent, enlisted in Rusk County (see Figure 1). The remaining 5.1 percent (52 men) emerged from Polk County, located in the southern East Texas region. The soldiers who mustered from Harrison and Smith Counties composed nearly two-thirds of the regiment, filling the muster rolls of six companies.

A substantial range of ages existed among the enlistees. The youngest soldier was G. W. Price of Company H, aged fourteen, while the oldest was Company C's L. P. Butler, aged fifty-one. Sixty-five men were forty years of age or older, a percentage of 7.6, a greater percentage than was found by Bell Irvin Wiley in his study of Confederate soldiers. In fact, Company C included the two oldest men of the regiment, Butler and

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5For a more in-depth description of methodology, see Appendix.

6The figures add up to 98 percent. The discrepancy is accounted for by the absence of 1st Company K. The Fourteenth Infantry's military accounts were incomplete, but the enlistment records were surprisingly comprehensive, with only ninety-four cases out of 1,118 recording no data. This number can be reduced to six when the information for first Company K, which listed only name and company in the Compiled Service Records, is removed.

7For the 1,035 men on the rolls, enlistment ages were recorded for 885, a percentage of 82.6.
Jesse Ricey, one year younger. Sixteen percent of the southern army was in their thirties as compared to 29.2 percent for the Fourteenth. The largest age group was men in their twenties, representing 44.4 percent of the regiment. 8 Teenagers constituted 18.8 percent of the regiment. Eighteen was the most common age, constituting 5.8 percent of the Fourteenth and 8.8 of the entire sample in Wiley's study. The men of Company H were the youngest company of the regiment, with an average age of 24.8. Not surprisingly, the officers of H Company were the youngest of the entire regiment. Company C was the second oldest company of the regiment, marginally younger than Captain N. S. Allen's A Company. In all, six of the ten companies had average ages above the regimental mean of 27.4, and a seventh company, with an average age of 27.3, was merely one-tenth younger than the average. 9

The average enlistment age is another indicator of the age of the Fourteenth. The Fourteenth’s average enlistment age was 27.4, slightly older than the soldiers of the Union army (26.8). By comparison, the average ages of men in four other Confederate units were all lower than those for the men of Clark’s regiment: the Tenth Virginia (24.3), the Thirteenth Virginia (25.0), the Thirtieth Virginia (25.7), and the Thirty-first Virginia (24.0). There were two Federal units for which there are statistics: the 154th New York Infantry (25.8) and the Twelfth Missouri (27.0). In relation to other Texas units, Clark’s

8Unfortunately, Wiley did not measure twenty-year-olds. He did report on the percentage of men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine (80.0). In the Fourteenth Texas, 63.2 percent was in this age group. See Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 331.

9Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 331. In his companion to *Johnny Reb, The Life of Billy Yank*, Wiley did not record the same types of numbers. There are no figures that directly equate to *Johnny Reb*. The only meaningful statistic Wiley discovered regarding age categories was that 98.0 percent of the Union army fell between the ages of 18 and 45. The Fourteenth possessed 92.4 percent of the regiment within the same age groups. See Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952): 299, 302-3.
men were more than four years older than the Third Texas Cavalry, (23.0). The
differences between the Fourteenth and two other Texas units from the same region are

Table 1
Enlistment Ages
All Members

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<tr>
<td>Under 19</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>36.2(^{a})</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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\(^{a}\)The data for the 28th Texas Cavalry did not include figures for men in their thirties and men over age forty. The figures in the table corresponds to the percentage of men aged thirty and over.

\(^{b}\)Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," 65.
\(^{c}\)Johansson, "'Peculiar Honor,'" 14.
\(^{d}\)Dunkelman and Winey, The Hardtack Regiment, 197.
\(^{e}\)Wallace, 17th Virginia Infantry, 84.
\(^{f}\)Krick, 30th Virginia Infantry, 5.
\(^{g}\)Ashcraft, 31st Virginia Infantry, 110.

...statistically insignificant: the 28th Texas Cavalry (27.1) and the Ninth Texas Field Battery (27.2). What these age figures demonstrate is that the men who joined Edward Clark’s regiment in 1862 were, on average, older than other soldiers from the South and older than many of the soldiers who fought on the side of the Union.\(^{10}\)

Edward Clark’s infantrymen reflected their East Texas southern heritage. Of the 525 men identified in the Census records, the birth states of 522 men were ascertained.

The number of soldiers born in southern states was 495 (95.0 percent). By a two-to-one

margin, those from the Lower South outnumbered those from the Upper South—338 (64.7 percent) to 157 (30.2 percent). Of the men who had ancestry in the deep South, most hailed from Alabama (120, or 23.0 percent), with the 113 Georgians (21.6 percent) following close behind. The men from Tennessee were the third largest group—and the largest single group from the Upper South—at 109 (20.9 percent), accounting for almost 70.0 percent of the soldiers from the Upper South. Only 5.4 percent of Clark’s soldiers were born in the Lone Star State, not surprising considering Texas’s relative youth. Of particular note, the number of men born in northern states—10 (2.0 percent)—was lower than the number whose birthplace was in a foreign land—16 (3.1 percent). No soldiers in the Fourteenth Texas Infantry were born in the New England states. In all, Clark’s men came from nineteen states and three foreign countries. According to Wiley, who studied both Union and Confederate soldiers, Texas was second only to Louisiana in the number of foreign-born soldiers. Wiley did not give a specific figure because, as he stated, any attempt to arrive at an actual number in relation to the Confederate army was often guesswork because many of the Confederacy’s records were destroyed. He indicated, however, that the proportion of foreign-born soldiers fighting for the South was less than the 25 percent of Union foreign-born soldiers.\textsuperscript{11}

In regard to occupation, the soldiers of Clark’s regiment mirrored the region’s propensity for many “small and middling farms and plantations.”\textsuperscript{12} Agricultural

\textsuperscript{11}Wiley, \textit{Johnny Reb}, 322–23; Wiley, \textit{Billy Yank}, 307. The Twelfth Missouri, a Union infantry regiment, listed 741 out of 802 men who were foreign-born citizens, Germans constituting 628. While this regiment was probably the exception to the rule, it is interesting to note that such units did exist. See Hess, “12th Missouri Infantry,” 60. The Trans-Mississippi theater had one of the most famous foreign-born soldiers, Brigadier General Camille Polignac, known as “General Polecat” by his Texans. See Josephy, \textit{Civil War in the American West}, 194

\textsuperscript{12}Campbell and Lowe defined eight types of occupational classifications: agricultural, professional, commercial, public service, manufacturing, unskilled labor, skilled labor, and other occupations. Examples of agricultural jobs included planters, farmers, overseers, stock raisers, farm
occupations held the foremost place in the Fourteenth, with 73.5 percent. Skilled workers followed, with 35 men (8.0 percent). There were 24 professionals (5.3 percent), 19 unskilled workers (4.3 percent), 17 in commercial businesses (3.9 percent), and 14 public officials (3.1 percent). There were also four students and one gentleman. The most common specific occupation was farmer (188, or 42.5 percent), followed closely by farm laborer (86, or 19.5 percent), tenant farmer (43, or 9.7 percent), laborer (19, or 4.1 percent), carpenter (16, or 3.6 percent), and merchant (14, or 3.2 percent). The remaining occupations numbered fewer than ten individuals for each category. In all, the men of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry represented thirty-one different vocations. Some of the men with more notable professions included Lieutenant Governor, then Governor, Edward Clark; Thadeus L. Hart (Company D), a hotel keeper; Peter Burke (Company F), a ship’s laborers, and tenant farmers. Professionals included lawyers, doctors, teachers, ministers, editors, engineers, and ship captains. Commercial professions included merchants, grocers, land agents, and a tavern or hotel keeper. Clerks, sheriffs, tax collectors, judges, and state legislators were some of the vocations of public officials, including Edward Clark, lieutenant governor and governor. Manufacturing occupations included wagon making, sugar manufacturing, furniture making, and gin making. Unskilled workers usually were simply laborers, though sometimes they could be wagon drivers. Skilled occupations included blacksmiths, carpenters, tailors, tanners, printers, bakers, mechanics, and cooks. "Other" occupations included student and gentleman. See Campbell and Lowe, Wealth and Power, 29.
captain; W. W. Lee (Company I), a publisher of Bibles, and F. Lang (Company A), a minister. What is important is that the Fourteenth was not simply a group of farmers; virtually all the necessary occupations required to sustain a town were included among the 1,035 men of Clark’s regiment.

Table 3 compares the data for the Fourteenth with other Texas regiments and regions of the state of Texas. As can be discerned, the percentage engaged in agriculture is roughly comparable to the figure for the East Texas region and slightly higher than the percentage in the entire state. Moreover, public officials in the Fourteenth were over-represented in relation to the other Texas groups combined, 3.1 to 1.8. In comparison to the Confederate group, the Fourteenth appears over-represented in the agriculture category yet under-represented in the other five fields.

The U.S. Census also indicates whether a man was a head of household and whether he was married. Of the 525 men located in the Census, 273 were heads of households in 1860, a percentage of 52.0. The remaining 252 soldiers fell into two categories: those young soldiers who lived with their parents in 1860 (170 men), referred to as dependent children, and those who were not a head of household and did not live with their parents (82 men), referred to as non-heads. For this entire group, 282 of the 525 located individuals were married, a percentage of 54.0. Considering only the heads of households, 262 of the 273 heads of households were married, 96 percent. Whereas the Fourteenths Texas Infantry had an average enlistment age of 27.4, the heads of household of the unit had an average enlistment age of 32.7, a substantial five-year difference. The non-heads were slightly younger than the regimental mean (27.4 to 27.0), and the average enlistment age of those men living with their parents was only 20.8.

The wealth of the soldiers of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry is an important characteristic in forming a profile of the regiment. In the 1860 manuscript census, a dollar figure for the real-estate value and personal-estate value was given for every head of
household and every non-head. The figures for real property and personal property for the

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<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>14th Texas (%)</th>
<th>28th Tx. Cav. (%)</th>
<th>9th Tx. Batt. (%)</th>
<th>East Texas (%)</th>
<th>Texas (%)</th>
<th>Confederate Army sample %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Office</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Trades</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Trades</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*McPherson did not measure these categories.


bPerkins, "Daniel's Battery," 83.

cCampbell and Lowe, Wealth and Power, 30.

dMcPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 614. McPherson used these data, drawn from 9,057 men, from original research by Bell Wiley for his Life of Johnny Reb.

Fourteenth, for two other units from the region, for the state of Texas, and for East Texas are illustrated in Table 4. As the table illustrates, Clark's men were generally poorer than other groups.

In the Fourteenth Texas Infantry, 37.0 percent of the heads of households, or 18.7 percent of the entire regiment, owned at least one slave. In his examination of slavery in Texas, Randolph B. Campbell stated that less than a third of Texas families owned slaves.
James McPherson concluded that two-thirds of all southern whites owned no slaves. The Fourteenth's percentage of slaveholders was similar to that in East Texas (37.0 to 34.4 percent) and higher than that in Texas (37.0 to 27.3 percent). Clark's men fall considerably short when contrasted to the Third Texas Cavalry, 37.0 to 53.0 percent. This latter comparison is an aberration, really, for the men of the Third Cavalry were disproportionately wealthy when compared to all of the former groups. 13

Table 4
Value of Real Estate and Personal Estate (Heads of Household)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average Real Estate (in dollars)</th>
<th>Average Personal Estate (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Texas Infantry</td>
<td>$1,239</td>
<td>$2,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Texas Cavalry</td>
<td>$1,841</td>
<td>$3,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Texas Battery</td>
<td>$1,666</td>
<td>$2,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Texas</td>
<td>$2,238</td>
<td>$4,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas (state)</td>
<td>$2,699</td>
<td>$3,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Johansson, ""Peculiar Honor,"" 20.

A typical East Texas slaveholder owned between one and nine slaves, a grouping that included 28.6 percent of the Fourteenth's slaveholders. In East Texas, 23.4 percent of the region fell into the one-to-nine group (see Table 5). Similarly, 85.7 percent of the Ninth Texas Battery's slaveholders and 26.5 percent of the 28th Texas Cavalry's slaveowners owned between one and nine slaves. There are no comparable figures for the

Third Texas Cavalry. Among all the slaveholders of the Fourteenth, the average number of slaves held was 6.9. As with the percentage of slaveholders, except for the Third Texas Cavalry, which was disproportionately wealthy, the Fourteenth was generally comparable to all other groups studied: the Ninth Texas Battery (6.9 to 5.7); the Twenty-eighth Texas Cavalry (6.9 to 7.1); Texas (6.9 to 9.4); East Texas (6.9 to 9.9); and the Third Texas Cavalry (6.9 to 12.0). Thus, in regard to slavery, these data indicate the Fourteenth was comparable to the rest of East Texas.\footnote{Campbell and Lowe, \textit{Wealth and Power}, 140.}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Slave Ownership (Heads of Household)}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Number of Slaves} & \textbf{14th Tx.Inf. Regimental Frequency} & \textbf{14th Tx.Inf. Regimental Percentage} & \textbf{East Texas Percentage}\footnote{Campbell and Lowe, \textit{Wealth and Power}, 140.} \\
\hline
Zero & 175 & 64.1 & 65.7 \\
\hline
1-4 & 50 & 18.3 & 15.6 \\
\hline
5-9 & 28 & 10.3 & 7.8 \\
\hline
10-19 & 11 & 4.0 & 6.8 \\
\hline
20-29 & 4 & 1.5 & 2.1 \\
\hline
30-39 & 3 & 1.1 & 0.7 \\
\hline
40-49 & 1 & 0.4 & 0.7 \\
\hline
50-99 & 0 & 0.0 & 0.6 \\
\hline
100-highest & 0 & 0.0 & 0.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The Fourteenth's figures again remained similar to East Texas figures in the case of those slaveholders who owned twenty or more slaves. The data revealed that 5.8 percent \footnote{Campbell, \textit{An Empire for Slavery}, 209; Campbell and Lowe, \textit{Wealth and Power}, 28, 116, 140; Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," 93; Johansson, ""Peculiar Honor,"" 29.}
of the Fourteenth's slaveowners (those with 20 or more slaves) owned 46.7 percent of all the bondsmen held by the regiment. For the same category, 4.2 percent of the slaveowning families in East Texas owned 46.3 percent of all slaves in the East Texas region. Only two men in the Ninth Texas Battery and 2.5 percent of the 28th Texas Cavalry owned more than twenty slaves. The biggest difference came with the Third Texas Cavalry. Hale noted that 106 of the 581 slaveowners came from families that possessed at least twenty slaves, a percentage of 18.2. What these figures demonstrate is that the Fourteenth Texas Infantry's slaveholders were typical of the East Texas region and comparable to those in other Texas units mustered into Confederate service in 1862.15

Real- and personal-property figures reveal that the Fourteenth's heads of household were poorer than other soldiers. This trend also holds true for those men whose occupation was in agriculture. As earlier stated, three-fourths of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry engaged in agricultural occupations. Among the 273 heads of household located in the census, 178 listed their occupation as farmer, a percentage of 69.0, all but equal to the 68.9 percent of farmers in East Texas.16 For comparisons of farm data, this study uses improved acres (those acres of land that were prepared for cultivation or some other

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15Campbell and Lowe, Wealth and Power, 140; Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," 93; Johansson, "Peculiar Honor," 29; Hale, Third Texas Cavalry, 41. The three largest slaveholders were fathers of soldiers who lived with their parents in 1860. Dr. W. C. Swanson of Harrison County, father of Private C. E. Swanson, held the most slaves, 72. The next largest owner, J. B. E. Taylor (father of Private T. A. Taylor), also of Harrison County, owned 46. Two men owned 42: J. M. Waskom of Harrison County (father of Private A. B. Waskum) and Private J. P. Douglas of Smith County. Two other men, both actual heads of household, owned 38 slaves, Private L. L. Sherrod of Harrison County and Private William Dickson of Upshur County. According to one study, in 1860 Texas, Swanson was one of 263 persons whose total wealth was $100,000 or more. See Ralph A. Wooster, "Wealthy Texans, 1860," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 71 (Fall 1967): 176.

16Campbell and Lowe use the term "farmer with a farm" to signify a person who actually operated a farm. "Farmer with a farm" signifies a person who lists his occupation as farmer in the population schedule and also has his name in Schedule IV, the agricultural census. This leads to the conclusion that the soldier who, in the 1860 population census, registered himself as a farmer, but was unlisted in the agricultural census, worked on a farm (laborer, overseer, or tenant farmer) and did not own a farm. See Campbell and Lowe, Wealth and Power, 21, 28, 47–48, 116, 140.
productive use), total acres (the sum of improved and unimproved acres), and cash value of the farm. As Table 6 indicates, farmers of the Fourteenth cultivated fewer improved acres and owned farms valued less than those for other groups, including northern farmers. Most of the land owned by the heads of household of Clark's unit was in unimproved acres, probably accounted for because many of the settlers had only recently arrived in Texas. These figures reinforce the argument that the men of the Fourteenth were poorer than other examined groups.

### Table 6
Comparison of Farm Data (Heads of Household)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average Number of Improved Acres</th>
<th>Average Number of Total Acres</th>
<th>Average Cash Value of Farm (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Texas Infantry</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>319.4</td>
<td>$1,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Texas Cavalry</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>345.6</td>
<td>$1,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Texas Battery</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>282.2</td>
<td>$2,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Texas</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>462.4</td>
<td>$2,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>543.8</td>
<td>$2,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Farmers</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>130.6</td>
<td>$2,824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Johansson, "'Peculiar Honor,'" 31.

*b* Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," 90.


If one examines only heads of households, nearly half of the unit remains unaccounted for. As mentioned previously, 273 of the 525 men located in the Census were heads of households in 1860. The remaining 252 soldiers fall into two categories: those younger men who lived with their parents in 1860 (170 men), referred to as dependent children, and those who were not a head of household (82 men), referred to as non-heads. The non-heads are a minor group, whose data shed little light onto the present discussion. Suffice it to say, they were poorer than the heads of households ($674 real estate value and
$1,974 personal estate value) and had little material property. Although the conclusions for this analysis are based on the data of the heads of households, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the actual heads of households with the data gathered from the parents of the soldiers who were dependent children.\(^{17}\) Table 7 clearly depicts that those soldiers who still lived with their parents in 1860 were from families that were generally wealthier, owned more slaves, and possessed more property than the actual heads of households in the regiment.

To summarize, the Fourteenth Texas Infantry's household heads were typical East Texans. They lived in northeastern Texas, mostly within the four major mustering counties of Harrison, Smith, Upshur, and Rusk. The average enlistment age for the heads of households was 32.7, over five years older than the mean enlistment age of the entire regiment (27.4). Almost every man had married by 1860 (96.0 percent), and these soldiers were overwhelmingly southern in origin. Their mean real-estate value ($1,239) and mean personal-estate value ($2,572), while lower than those for the East Texas region and other Texas units from the area, were nonetheless not different enough to make any drastic contrasts. Slightly over one-third of the heads of households (37.0 percent) owned at least one slave, with the average number of bondsmen held being 6.9. Only seven men owed twenty or more slaves, yet these seven owned 46.7 percent of all slaves possessed by the Fourteenth's men. Sixty-nine percent of the heads of households were farmers. Their average number of improved acres (52.3), their average total number of acres (319.4), and the average cash value of their farms ($1,585) were all less than the regional means and the figures from other local Civil War regiments. In short, the heads of households of Edward

17With regard to dependent children, the enlistment information is the material that the soldier gave to the mustering officer in 1862. The census data are those of his parents in 1860. During data collection, the following rule was used: for any soldier twenty-years-old or younger and living with his parents, wealth data for the parents were recorded. For any soldier who was twenty-one or older and lived with his parents, wealth data for his parents were not recorded.
Clark’s infantry regiment were, on average, older and poorer than other men who joined the Confederate army.

Table 7
Comparison of Data for 14th Texas Infantry (Heads of Households and Parents of Dependent Children)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Heads of Household</th>
<th>Dependent Children; Parents of Dependent Children</th>
<th>East Texas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlistment Age</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>20.8†</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status (%)</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>4.1†</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Value ($)</td>
<td>$1,239.0</td>
<td>$2,633.0†</td>
<td>$2,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Estate Value ($)</td>
<td>$2,572.0</td>
<td>$5,543.0†</td>
<td>$4,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaveowners (%)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>39.0‡</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Slaves</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.8‡</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Farmers</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>61.0‡</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Improved Acres</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>124.2‡</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Total Acres</td>
<td>319.4</td>
<td>567.9‡</td>
<td>462.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Value of Farm ($)</td>
<td>$1,585.0</td>
<td>$3,342.0‡</td>
<td>$2,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxable Property</td>
<td>$4,090.0</td>
<td>$7,699.0‡</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from soldiers who were dependent children.
†Data from the parents of soldiers who were dependent children.

Even though the men of the Fourteenth were typical southerners, why were the heads of household of Clark’s regiment poorer and older than those in other Confederate regiments? The date of enlistment helps explain this discrepancy. As hostilities broke out in the spring of 1861, most people believed that it would be a short war, and southerners expected the Confederacy to prevail. The reason for this assumption was a strong antebellum myth shared by citizens on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line: southerners
generally made better military men than did northerners. The men of the slave states were predominantly rural, and, thus, more accustomed to outdoor life than their more urban enemies. James McPherson offers other suggestions explaining this prevalent stereotype. In the 1850s, Charleston, South Carolina, boasted twenty-two military units, one for every two hundred white men. There was no city in the free states that could match this statistic. Another telling fact was that while 40 percent of the army officers in the antebellum United States army were from the South, the slave states themselves constituted only 30 percent of the population of the United States. Southerners, thus, were disproportionately represented in the United States Army. In addition, sixty percent of the volunteer soldiers in the Mexican War were of southern origin. With ideas and facts such as these, it is no surprise that Charles DeMorse, the editor of the Clarksville Standard in Clarksville, Texas, declared the North's aggression to be "the most supreme folly of the age." 18

With eagerness and confidence, their eyes glazed with the visions of returning home war heroes, many young single men—most of whom were in their late teens and early twenties with either few domestic responsibilities or whose absence would not disrupt the household economy—rushed to enlist in their local companies, little expecting the harsh reality of military life. One southern soldier remembered that his unit was "young, ardent, and full of enthusiasm," marching to war "with as little thought of coming trouble, as if on the way to some festive entertainment." These eager young men were determined to win fame and glory for themselves, their communities, their families, and, for southern soldiers, independence for their new nation. Personal honor was intertwined as well as a certain amount of community peer pressure. As Tennessee soldier, James Cooper, stated "I was a mere boy and carried away by boyish enthusiasm. I was ambitious and felt that I

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should be disgraced if I remained at home while other boys no older than myself were out fighting." Boys in their middle teens often lied about their age to join the army before their eighteenth birthday. These boys were "rarin' for a fight." 19

Older soldiers throughout the South—generally in their late twenties and thirties and with a great deal of domestic responsibilities as the primary, if not sole, wage-earners in their families—did not enlist in the same proportion during the intoxicating days of 1861. The prevalent opinion was for a short war and a quick southern victory. James Cooper went on to proclaim that "I was tormented by feverish anxiety before I joined my regiment for fear the fighting would be over before I got into it." With this mind set, there was little or no impetus for older men to join the army and disrupt their lives. The Confederate victory at Manassas, Virginia, merely reinforced their decision. Additionally, for the older men of Texas, the conflict was half a continent away. Most of the heads of households who would join the Fourteenth Texas Infantry (as well as the Ninth Texas Battery and the 28th Texas Cavalry) stayed home in 1861. They had farms and families to attend to while their younger friends and brothers won the war. 20

But these older and poorer men finally did enlist. What factors existed in early 1862 that were not present in 1861 to impel these men to enlist in the Fourteenth Texas Infantry regiment? By late 1861 and early 1862 an urgency began to spread throughout Texas, created by two types of events: Union victories and the deaths of local men. As 1861 wore on, the Union won some important engagements, chipping away at Confederate defenses and weakening the South. The combined forces of the Federal navy and army resulted in the capture of four forts along the North and South Carolina coasts, preventing

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20Robertson, Soldiers Blue and Gray, 5;
Confederate blockade runners from using those ports to evade the growing Union encirclement of the southern coasts. The Confederate defeat in New Mexico sealed off the potential gold supply from the Richmond government and severed most of west Texas from the Confederacy. These defeats damaged southern morale. No doubt these events weighed heavily on the minds of East Texans, but the war was still far away. There were two military events, however, that brought the Civil War home to East Texas.

February 1862 saw the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson—located along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, respectively. This was the first strike of the wedge the Union drove into the South along the Mississippi. This in itself began to affect East Texas, for Union control of the Mississippi meant that it would be increasingly difficult to get cotton to markets in Europe through New Orleans. More important, local soldiers gave their lives fighting for the Confederacy. Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Clough and Captain William B. Hill, both of Harrison County, died defending Fort Donelson. Feelings of anger and revenge naturally arose in the hearts of the people in Harrison County and the surrounding counties. The easiest way to strike out at Lincoln’s army was to enlist in the Confederate Army and fight. Company B of Harrison County took their revenge one step further, adopting the name “Clough and Hill Avengers” in honor of their fallen comrades.21

As angry as northeastern Texans were about the deaths of their brethren, at least the Union army was still far away. In the spring of 1862, this situation changed. The Union victory at the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, was a stunning blow to the Confederacy. With one stroke, the Union army had removed all of southern Missouri and northern Arkansas from Confederate control and placed a Federal presence in that region. Suddenly, the East Texans realized, the Union army was not so far away; it was in the next

21Campbell, *Southern Community in Crisis*, 205.
state. Again, for the men of the future Fourteenth Texas Infantry, the best option to remove the Federal army from Arkansas and defend their homes from invasion was to enlist in the Confederate army. This they did in early 1862.

How did the institution of slavery play in the minds of the men who joined the Fourteenth Texas? While the rallying cry for southerners in 1861 was shrouded in states’ rights and constitutional liberty, at the root of all justifications for secession lay slavery. One can scan American history from 1776 forward and clearly see the effect African slavery had on the nation. Abraham Lincoln knew that slavery was the foundation for the war, stating in his Second Inaugural that “All know that this interest [slavery] was, somehow, the cause of the war.” Confederate President Jefferson Davis opined that secession was the only recourse to protect an establishment from those northern elements bent on destroying slavery. Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens accused the Republicans as “the immediate cause of the late rupture and the present revolution.” It was not only southern political leaders who pronounced the defense of slavery the motivating factor in secession but its soldiers as well. One Georgian stated that “our homes out firesides our land and negroes and even the virtue of our fair ones is at stake.” Another soldier gave a more immediate explanation: “Better, far better! endure all the horrors of civil war than to see the dusky sons of Ham leading the fair daughters of the South to the alter.”

Slavery, then, was the central issue in the secession of the southern states and the defense of the nation by the North. So if only slaveowners joined the army—McPherson estimated that one-third of the total southern population owned slaves, including women and elderly men too old to fight—the Union army would have had little difficulty defeating

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the Confederate army. But non-slaveholders joined the Confederate army as well. The only idea that might spur the non-holder on would be the knowledge that the South would undeniably change if the Union remained intact. The poor white farmer, for example, knew that with slavery, he was not at the absolute bottom rung on the social ladder. There were black slaves who were inferior to him, or so he had been led to understand. If the Union defeated the Confederacy and eradicated slavery, this poor farmer would have to compete, using already scarce land and resources, for work against these freedmen. With slavery in place and a Confederate victory, he would win and come out on top, even though he would probably never own a single black person in his life. For some non-holders, this argument was enough to get them into a uniform.

So, the heads of household for the Fourteenth Texas Infantry Regiment were typical East Texans, just slightly poorer and older. They waited almost an entire year before they volunteered in the Confederate army. The contributing factors that impelled them to enlist were a natural desire to protect their families and homes from invasion, the knowledge that with a southern defeat and slave emancipation, their entire world would change, and some peer pressure, especially when other local men lost their lives fighting for the Confederacy.
CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION OF THE FOURTEENTH TEXAS INFANTRY
AND THE FIRST WINTER, 1861-1862

Ten weeks before Confederate batteries opened fire on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, the state of Texas seceded from the United States and raised the new Confederate flag. This action was in spite of the strident efforts of Governor Sam Houston, who thought it in Texas' best interests to stay in the Union. After the voters of the Lone Star State ratified secession with an overwhelming ballot of 46,129 to 14,697, the Texas secession convention required that all state officials swear allegiance to the Confederacy. Convinced that his beloved state was taking the wrong course of action, the governor remained holed up in his office on the day Texas state officials were to take the oath to the new government. Three times the cry carried through the halls of the state building in Austin for Governor Sam Houston to come to the podium and take the pledge, and three times the cry met with silence. Declaring the office vacant, the victorious convention members called for Houston's successor. Never one to let an opportunity pass, the tall bearded lieutenant governor eagerly stepped forward and proclaimed his loyalty to the infant Confederate republic. Edward Clark of Marshall was now the eighth governor of Texas.¹

For a little more than nine months, Clark, a native Georgian, presided over turbulent times in the history of Texas, guiding the state through the early months of the war. The new governor raised all the Texas troops that the Confederacy requested during his term.

and oversaw the expulsion of federal soldiers from the state and the surrender of all Union munitions to the state of Texas. Clark faced many problems, and, although he did try to create solutions where none was apparent, one idea never left his mind: the people did not elect him to be governor. Had he been elected, he might have assumed more power in order to solve some crucial problems, but that was not his manner. Governor Clark let the people of Texas speak through him, never the opposite. Clark’s brief tenure ended in August with his defeat by Francis Lubbock in the gubernatorial election. Having lost by a slim margin—only 124 votes separated the two candidates—Clark could have cried foul and demanded a recount. Indeed, Marshall’s local newspaper, the *Texas Republican*, implied fraud: “If all the counties had sent in returns, it is doubtful what would have been the result.” That was not Clark’s philosophy, however, because the people of Texas had spoken. The eighth governor of Texas gracefully accepted the result and retired from public service.  

Clark returned home to Harrison County and had been in Marshall for only a few months when, in November 1861, he accepted a commission as a colonel in the Confederate army and agreed to raise a regiment of infantry in his home county of Harrison and other surrounding counties. As his lieutenant colonel, Clark chose his former state

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3A Confederate regiment normally consisted of ten companies, usually designated with the first ten letters of the alphabet, excluding either I or J because the handwritten letters were so similar in shape. A full company usually included four officers, nine noncommissioned officers, one hundred privates, and sometimes, two musicians, for a total of 115 men. See Marcus J. Wright, comp., and Harold B. Simpson, ed., *Texas in the War, 1861-1865* (Hillsboro, TX: The Hill Junior College Press, 1965), xviii.
adjutant general, William Byrd, a prominent Democrat from Marshall. In January 1862
Clark recommended Pendleton Murrah, another local Marshallite and staunch states-righter,
for the post of quartermaster and commissary of the newly forming regiment. Although
Murrah suffered from periodic tuberculosis, the South Carolina native helped Clark gather
the physical material a regiment needed, mainly wagons and supplies.

Apparently there was some confusion about whether this new unit was to serve as a
Texas unit or go directly into the Confederate army. In a letter to the Texas Republican,
Clark rectified the matter, stating that his authority came from the Confederate government
and that “the State ha[d] nothing to do with it.” According to the letter, the men were to
muster at a place near their homes and then proceed to the rendezvous point near Tyler,
Texas, located in Smith County, approximately sixty miles southwest of Marshall. Like
many of the men across the South, the Texans were to “arm and equip themselves as best
they [could] and furnish at least one hundred pounds of ammunition.” Since many of the
poorer men in the area had little money for weapons, Clark gave assurance that the
Confederacy would provide them muskets and rifles. He had high hopes that the men of
his region would answer the call of duty.  

During the spring of 1862, with Federal armies chipping away at the Confederates
perimeter, a Union force in Arkansas, and the recent deaths of local men, the individuals
who would constitute the nine companies of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry Regiment
volunteered and enlisted in the Confederate army for a term of one year. The process of
creating the regiment was similar throughout North and South. A prominent citizen would
recruit men in his local area, and, when there were approximately one hundred men on the

4U. S. National Archives and Record Service, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers
Who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas (United States National Archives and Record Service,
Washington, D C, 1960): Microcopy 323, Rolls 372-75. This source will hereafter be cited as Compiled
Service Records. Also see Meiners, “The Texas Governorship,” 259; Marshall Texas Republican, 8
February 1862.
roll, he would designate it a company. By the end of March, 778 (84.5 percent of the eventual total) men had volunteered and filled the ranks of Companies A through I of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry.

The companies of Clark's regiment formed largely along county lines. The earliest company mustered into service on 16 January 1862. The 117 men later designated as Company F lived in Upshur County, led initially by Augustus H. Rogers. Two Harrison County companies formed next, John Miller's H Company (8 February) and N. S. Allen's A Company (24 February). Another Upshur County unit mustered into military service on 1 March, William Coppedge's Company I, followed on 8 March by another group from Harrison, Company B (H. L. Berry, captain). The first Smith County company assembled on 13 March (W. J. Smith's Company C) with the only company from Rusk County joining two days later, Robert F. Wyley's D Company. Two additional units from Smith county gathered later, one, J. J. Flinn's Company E, and W. M. Bradford's Company G. Men who lived in Harrison County offered the greatest percentage of men to Clark's regiment (33.8 percent), followed by Smith (28.3 percent), Upshur (23.1 percent), and Rusk (9.7 percent). By the time the Fourteenth was ordered to march to its first assignment, 972 men from northeast Texas had joined Clark's regiment and could call themselves soldiers of the Confederacy.

Since the four main counties from which Clark recruited his men were large, the recruiting officers usually gathered their companies in areas of the home counties where most of the men lived. Company H, for example, first met in far northeast Harrison County.

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County, "just north of Smyrna...[in a field] which is still known as the Muster Ground," near the farm of their captain, John Miller. Company G mustered into service around the town of Jamestown in Smith County. After each company organized, the first order of business was to elect officers. The men elected three lieutenants and one captain. In practice, the enlistees elected to the captaincy those individuals who had served as recruiting officers, an official recognition of their community status. Professional military men from both armies—that is, the men who went to military academies to learn military discipline and tactics—deplored this practice. Yet in a country in which the enlistees were accustomed to electing everyone from local officials to the president of the United States, it was a natural extension.

The last stage of making a military company was provided by the civilians of the towns and the counties. Local citizens provisioned the men with supplies, uniforms, and, sometimes, weapons. Harrison County started an effort to provide all of its companies with blankets, a drive that eventually succeeded. Moreover, the communities from which the men came usually showed their support by hosting large celebrations, much like the one in Marshall on 19 March, when Companies A and B were presented with their company banners in the main square and immediately set off to the rendezvous point in Smith County.

All the newly formed companies had orders to march to Smith County and assemble at Camp Murrah. By the end of March, six of the nine companies were at the camp. In a letter to the *Marshall Texas Republican*, an anonymous private recounted the "fine spirits"

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of the new soldiers and their eagerness to move on to other assignments at the earliest opportunity. The private also wrote that the quartermaster—Pendleton Murrah, presumably for whom the camp was named—was receiving many accolades from the men for his “indefatigable exertions in supplying the troops with all necessities of life, with a few of the luxuries.”

Three weeks later, T. A. Patillo, a local Marshall lawyer and father of J. R. Patillo, a nineteen-year-old musician in B Company, wrote another letter to the newspaper, describing camp life. Patillo had arrived at the camp on a Sunday, just as the “large, respectful, and attentive congregation” was dispersing from morning worship. The camp had many benefits, according to Patillo. Its location, thirteen miles northeast of Tyler among the tall pines, included a good water supply, a clean campsite, and a “good order that prevailed throughout the entire encampment.” He wrote also that Captains Allen and Berry paid close attention to the needs of their men, creating a close bond that would serve them all well during battle. Another letter stated that there were plank houses for the enlisted men and an excellent place for drills. Unfortunately, a harbinger of army life appeared in the Texas Republican one week prior to Patillo’s letter. Kemp Scott, aged forty-eight, died of disease on 9 April, the first casualty of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry.

The regiment formally organized with nine companies on 3 May 1862, but events in Richmond, Virginia, were soon to alter radically the nature of the regiment. After moving to Camp Davis, two and one-half miles east of Marshall, the men of Clark’s regiment learned of the Conscription Act, the first such legislation in American history. The Confederate Congress, seeing enthusiasm begin to erode as the full extent of the war’s costs became known, feared that many of the soldiers who volunteered for one year would

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9Marshall Texas Republican, 29 March 1862,

10Marshall Texas Republican, 5 April 1862, 19 April 1862, 26 April 1862.
leave the army and go home, leaving the southern armies depleted for the spring campaigns. Therefore, the first national conscription law passed in American history specified that all able-bodied white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were liable for military service. More important, those soldiers already in regiments and who were within this age span found their terms of service extended to three years. The law compelled officers to discharge any man outside the prescribed ages.  

The conscription law substantially affected the appearance of some companies while other companies remained relatively untouched. The largest unit of the regiment, Company B’s 137 men, was still the largest unit after reorganization, discharging only twelve men. Company C faced the severest cuts among their number, losing thirty-three men, bringing their composite force down to ninety-eight. Of the nine companies that numbered more than one hundred men prior to the law, only two—B and F—had more than one hundred men after reorganization. In all, a total of 130 men were discharged for being outside the specified age range. The total number of men now in the Fourteenth Infantry was 843.  

The constitution of the officer corps changed as well. The captain of Company F, Augustus H. Rogers, became the major of the Fourteenth regiment. W. L. Coppedge, the forty-year-old captain of Company I, returned home to Upshur County. The following two tables better illustrate the changes the conscription law had upon the Fourteenth Infantry. Notice the reduction in the mean age, wealth, and number of slaves  

The men of Company H faced a unique situation: a near complete turnover in the officer

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12 Compiled Service Records, reels 372-75.
corps. Captain John Miller, a husband, a slaveowning farmer from Illinois, and the wealthiest officer Company H ever had, was thirty-eight and chose not to run again for captain. Lieutenant Malcolm Gillis, the oldest man in the company at forty-six, declined to run for election as captain, choosing to be paid for his time and return home to his farm and his wife. Twenty-three-year-old First Lieutenant B. F. Taylor wanted to become captain, but lost the election to Second Lieutenant John Buchan, aged twenty-four. Buchan was married, but he and his wife still lived and worked on the Buchan family farm. Three

Table 8
Original Captains of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry, 3 May 1862.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Home County</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>No. of Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>N. S. Allen</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Md.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>H. L. Berry</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>S. C.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>W. J. Smith</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>--†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Robert F. Wyley</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Ga.</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>J. J. Flinn</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>A. H. Rogers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ala.</td>
<td>Upshur</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>W. M. Bradford</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>John Miller</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>10,735</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>W. L. Coppedge</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Upshur</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd K</td>
<td>L. B. Wood</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>Polk</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,764</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†W. J. Smith and A. H. Rogers were not found in the 1860 Census, Schedule 2 (Slaveholders).

privates subsequently became officers: Milam McKinney, twenty-one, first lieutenant; Jesse Woodard, twenty-four, second lieutenant; and James E. Buchan (John’s brother)
aged twenty-three, also second lieutenant. 13

This piece of legislation substantially altered the profile of the officer corps of the Cypress Tigers. Woodard was the only head of household in this second set of officers for Company H; he was also the only farmer, the other three listing their occupation as farm laborers. Slaveownership in the first set of officers—Miller owned five slaves and Gillis owned one—while not considerable, is nonetheless pertinent considering none of the second group owned any slaves. The only person to own slaves in the second set of officers was the father of John and James Buchan. Moreover, the wealth figures dropped

Table 9
Post-Conscription Act Captains, 31 December 1862.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Birth-place</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>No. of Slaves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>N. S. Allen</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Md.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>W. L. Pickens</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>8,260</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>W. J. Smith</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Robert F. Wyley</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Ga.</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>J. J. Flinn</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>E. B. Gassaway</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>S. C.</td>
<td>Upshur</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>2,400†</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>D. C. Laird</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>John F. Buchan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ga.</td>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>Farm Laborer</td>
<td>3,557‡</td>
<td>0‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>J. M. Spratt</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>S. C.</td>
<td>Upshur</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd K</td>
<td>L. B. Wood</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>Polk</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$5,857</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†E. B. Gassaway was not located in the 1860 Census Schedule 1 (Population).
The above number is taxable property.
‡John Buchan lived with his parents. His father's numbers are used for comparison.

13B. F. Taylor and John Miller subsequently reported to Richmond, Virginia, on special orders.
significantly as did the age of the officers. The conscription act reduced the average age of the officers of Company H by ten years, from thirty-three to twenty-three. The significance of this becomes clearer when considering that nearly all of these men had never before been soldiers. Judging from the actions of the men of H Company, it seemed that any man, regardless of social and economic background, could attain officer rank. This new roster of officers stayed secure for most of the next two years until the battle of Pleasant Hill caused another election.\(^{14}\)

The reorganized Fourteenth Texas Infantry finally received orders to move to Arkansas, where they would join other units west of the Mississippi River. In late summer 1862, they began their march northeast toward the rendezvous. Along the way, the commander of the Trans-Mississippi District—either General Thomas C. Hindman or Major General T. H. Holmes, depending on the unknown date of the order—transferred a tenth company into the Fourteenth, designating the new group Company K. Company K, formerly Company L of the Eighteenth Texas Infantry, did not long remain with Clark's regiment because, by the end of October, Company K had moved out of the Fourteenth and into the Seventeenth Texas Cavalry. Still having only nine companies, the Fourteenth received Company M from the Twenty-eighth Texas Cavalry, a regiment composed of eleven companies. The new company, Samuel J. Lyle's soldiers from Polk County (located in southeastern Texas near Huntsville), was designated Second Company K. With the addition of the Polk County men, Clark's regiment now had 889 soldiers.\(^{15}\)

The rendezvous point was Camp Nelson, Arkansas, approximately twenty-five miles

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\(^{14}\)Compiled Service Records, reel 372.

northeast of Little Rock, along a branch of the White River (see Figure 2). There the Fourteenth was attached to a division of soldiers commanded by General Henry E. McCulloch. It was not McCulloch under whom the division became famous, however, but Major General John George Walker, the division's second and most famous commander.\(^{16}\)

The division originally included four brigades, standard for a Confederate division, but the fourth one was detached soon after the organization of the division. Walker's Division remained with three brigades for the duration of the war. The Fourteenth Texas was part of the second brigade, commanded by Horace Randal.\(^{17}\) The second brigade consisted of Randal's own Twenty-eighth Texas Cavalry, recently dismounted; two infantry regiments, Clark's and the Eleventh Texas (commanded by O. M. Roberts, the president of the Texas Secession Convention in 1861); Robert S. Gould's Battalion of dismounted cavalry; and Captain J. M. Daniel's battery of light artillery. The brigades of Overton Young, first


\(^{17}\)Horace Randal was a native of Tennessee whose family moved to Texas in the 1830s. He was the first West Pointer from Texas, graduating in 1854 ranked forty-fifth out the forty-six members of that class. In 1861 he resigned from the Union army as a second lieutenant. He became a second lieutenant in the Confederate army and fought in the Virginia theater. After petitioning Confederate President Jefferson Davis for a higher rank, he was commissioned a colonel of the Twenty-eighth Texas Cavalry. He was subsequently named commander of the second brigade in Walker's division, although his promotion to brigadier general never became official. See Mamie Yeary, ed., *Reminiscences of the Boys in Gray* (reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Press, 1986): 629; Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, 678; Terrence J. Winschel, "John Walker's Texas Division and its Expedition to Relieve Fortress Vicksburg," *Civil War Regiments* 3 (no. 2): 41.
brigade, and George Flournoy, third brigade, were similarly arranged.  

One word could sum up the experience of Walker’s division: marching. Walker’s soldiers marched and countermarched, obeying what seemed like conflicting orders from their superiors. Captain N. S. Allen kept a diary from October 1863 until late 1864. In his diary, he provided many glimpses of daily life in Clark’s regiment. He recorded the types of orders the division received: “Tuesday 15th [March 1864]...—Passed through Chaneyville and Bivouacked 2 1/2 miles beyond, making 21 miles, ordered to unload the wagons and cook rations—half hour afterward, ordered to leave the wagons again -- and be ready to move at a moment’s warning.” Over the next few days, the division marched ninety-seven miles with very little sleep or food. The division became so synonymous with marching that it became known as “Walker’s Greyhounds.” According to one historian, the division earned the name “because of their many long and rapid marches from one front to another.” A regimental return dated 15 July 1863 described one of the Greyhounds’ many marches.

The regiment left Pine Bluff, Ark. on April 25th, 1863 with Col. Randal’s Brigade and reached Monticello, Ark. on the evening of the 29th April, 1863. Our march was a dry and fatiguing one, but the men proved to be more accustomed to the fatigues than was anticipated.  

The weather made camp life for the Texans a diverse experience, sometimes manageable, sometimes deplorable. The winter of 1862-63 in Arkansas was an indication

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18McPherson, _Battle Cry of Freedom_, 330, n. 25; Blessington, _Walker’s Texas Division_, 44, 50, 52-54; Simpson, _Texas in the War_, xviii; Winschel, “John Walker’s Texas Division,” 41. A battalion usually consisted of five companies.

19Max S. Lale, “For Lack of a Nail...,” _East Texas Historical Journal_ 30, no. 1 (1992): 36; Josephy, _Civil War in the American West_, 186; Compiled Service Records, reel 372. Allen’s original diary is in Collection 144, Department of Archives and Special Collections, Noel Memorial Library, Louisiana State University in Shreveport.
of how bad life in the Confederate army could be, especially during the inactive time of winter quarters. While stationed at Camp Nelson in the winter of 1862-63, J. P. Blessington noted that the trees were “stripped of their foliage [and] afforded little shelter, while the ground was saturated and muddy from rain.” The weather continually played on the men’s emotions, with bad weather often contributing to further demoralization. In a letter to his wife in Texas, James H. Armstrong, a private in Company F, commented on the effect the weather could have on a soldier, stating that it was “verry [sic] disagreeable for more than week and I could not get about much to shake off my gloom but was confined a great deal to our cramped up leaky tents.” Captain Allen observed similar findings. On one day, with the sky “threatening rain at 1 O’Clock all men . . . felt very badly,” while on the following day, he wrote that the morning was “very pretty,” the weather raising the spirits of the men.20

Rain was the chief obstacle in military operations in the west as in the east, and not just in combat. Allen’s diary cited numerous examples of the mud, the rain, and the cold affecting the men of his company. One such day was Friday, 30 October 1863.

It commenced raining about 8 o’ clock — tremendous storm and rain — Everything in the tent floating had to pile the bed clothes on the trunks and hold the tent up to keep it from blowing down — water ankle deep in the tent.21

The rain affected combat as well. At the last battle of the Red River Campaign, Jenkins’ Ferry, Arkansas, 30 April 1864, rain caused the ground to become a morass of mud that


21N. S. Allen Diary, 30 October 1863.
seriously impeded maneuverability of artillery, thus silencing the usual artillery barrages. Unlike men or machines, weather was an adversary that could attack at any time and bring more hazards than mere flying lead and exploding shells.22

Conditions such as these did not lend themselves to sanitary health habits. Bad weather fostered conditions that degenerated into disease, the most ruthless foe of either army in the Civil War, and sickness abounded for the entire war. Most soldiers, whether west or east of the Mississippi River, could not imagine camp life without illness. Doctors, to say nothing of the enlisted men, knew nothing about germs, the promoters of disease. Without knowing about germs, doctors never adequately sanitized their surgical instruments. Throughout the Civil War, more men died in hospitals than from actual combat. The soldiers had bad sanitation habits, particularly with regard to latrines. These necessary areas were badly constructed and often placed upstream from the regiment’s water supply. This contaminated the soldiers’ water. Moreover, with the mass enlistments, rural and urban men were thrown together. Men from the cities had likely been exposed to various diseases and had developed immunities to them. Rural men, accustomed to a life separated from his neighbors by miles, almost immediately contracted new diseases. Measles, smallpox, mumps, whooping cough, and chicken pox were the most common diseases plaguing rural soldiers, according to James I. Robertson. Many died from these new illnesses while others were incapacitated and forced to leave the ranks.23

Even if a man were to escape these childhood diseases, life in camp would soon take its toll. Aside from disease, the primary reason for poor health was the lack of adequate, healthy rations for the soldiers. One Federal soldier from New Jersey reminisced that


23McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 487; Robertson, Soldiers Blue and Gray, 149-50.
Figure 2. The Arkansas-Louisiana Theater, 1863-1864.
(Based on Josephy, Civil War in the American West)
"mess pans were used to fry our pork in and also as a wash bason [sic]. Our soup, coffee and meat were boiled in camp kettle . . . which were also used for boiling our dirty clothes." According to Bell Irvin Wiley, for the Confederates, food was often a higher priority than fighting northern soldiers. When rations did arrive for the troops, the food was poor in quality. Captain Allen complained that one day there were "no potatoes issued to my company & only 1/2 lb. Beef to the men." Walker's men often had to march all day on only half-rations. Armstrong complained to his wife about another situation regarding the lack of adequate rations.

Our mess (consisting of 9 [men]) had bought 22 dollars worth of potatoes at 1 dollar per bu. we have also paid 15 or 18 dollars for honey at 1 dollar per lb. It looks hard that soldiers should have to pay rich prices out of their own wages for things that Government should furnish but they will do it rather than do without. I have not tasted beef but twice in 3 days.24

The surgeon for the Fourteenth Infantry, W. S. Fowler, kept a running total of the men who were ill and the strength of the unit, starting from July 1863 and ending in April 1865. Using his figures, the average number of men fit for duty during those months was 300. The number of men sick during these months ranged from a low of 73 to a high of 197. Illness had quite an effect upon the men of Clark's unit.25

In that first winter, two officers died, and H. L. Berry, Captain of Company B, perhaps because of the poor conditions, resigned and returned to Texas. First Lieutenant W. L. Pickens replaced Berry and remained captain of Company B for the rest of the war.


25 Fowler, W. S., Medical Register, 1863-1865, Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas. Hereafter cited as Fowler Register. Fowler subdivided the mean strength of the regiment into officers and enlisted men. The above figure includes officers.
In all, sixty men from the Fourteenth Infantry died of disease that first winter in the army with at least thirty documented cases of soldiers being sick in local hospitals. The deaths were distributed evenly throughout the ten companies, with no unit losing more than ten soldiers. It is likely that many more Texans were sick, either at Camp Nelson or in hospitals, but the written record left these men nameless. The Foshee family from Smith County lost both their sons within one month, John in October and younger son David on 11 November. Private D. J. Winn saw his father, W. R., die in the bitter cold of November 1862, and he himself died nine months later. By New Year’s Day, 1863, Edward Clark’s regiment of infantry fielded only a few more than eight hundred men.26

26Compiled Service Records, reels 372-75.
CHAPTER 4

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1863 AND THE
BATTLE OF MANSFIELD, 8 APRIL 1864

The year 1863 was eventful for the Confederacy—eventful, yet demoralizing. The fledgling Confederate States of America, after an extraordinary series of martial victories, began to experience the closing vise of Federal power. One side of the vise was the Emancipation Proclamation, issued by Abraham Lincoln on New Year's Day. This document, which freed the slaves in the Confederate areas of the South, introduced a moral tone to the conflict, discouraging European powers from intervening on the side of the Confederacy. This was a great advantage for the Union because the federal government was then able to deal with the rebellious states in its own time. The opposite side of the closing vise, the Federal military, made navigation of the Mississippi River by the Confederates increasingly difficult.

In May 1863 the Union army in the West, under command of General Ulysses S. Grant, began its siege of Vicksburg, Mississippi, one of the last two Confederate bastions along the banks of the river. In response, General E. Kirby Smith, overall commander of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, wanted to sever Grant’s sixty-three-mile-long supply and communication line, located on the west (Louisiana) bank of the Mississippi River. While devising a way to help his fellow Confederates in Vicksburg,

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1Edmund Kirby Smith was a native Floridian born in 1824. He was graduated from West Point in 1845 and served as an infantryman in the Mexican War, winning two brevets in that conflict. He transferred to the cavalry in 1855 in order to fight Indians, a position he held until his resignation from the United States Army shortly after Texas seceded. His first assignment was in the Confederate cavalry before being promoted to Chief-of-Staff of the Army of the Shenandoah. Before his appointment as commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, Smith’s most notable achievement was his invasion of Kentucky, driving Federal soldiers out of most of that state and earning himself a promotion to lieutenant general. See
Smith began to move his army. He ordered Walker's division to march from Pine Bluff, Arkansas, to Monroe, Louisiana, located in the northeastern part of the state. From this position, Smith had two options. He could move Walker's division east to attack Grant's supply line, only seventy miles away, or Smith could send Walker's men south to central Louisiana, to aid Richard Taylor's army in central Louisiana.\(^2\) Despite his record of good military decisions, Smith made bad command decisions in May and June 1863. He sent Walker's division to help Taylor's army, but too late to offer any substantial assistance. When Walker was in central Louisiana with Taylor, Grant crossed the Mississippi, exposing his supply line on the Louisiana side. It was at this moment that Walker could have struck and made a difference, but his division was too far away. It was not until late May that Smith decided that Walker's men should stage simultaneous attacks on both Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, two positions along Grant's supply line on the Louisiana bank of the Mississippi, just upriver from Vicksburg. Unfortunately for Walker's Texans, they would not know victory in eastern Louisiana. There was a policy dispute between Smith and his subordinate, Richard Taylor. Smith did "win" the argument, being the superior officer, but how Taylor carried out his orders showed his displeasure. Taylor gave Walker vague directions on how to attack the two towns and left it to Walker to carry them out. The argument, however, was moot; Grant had already

\(^2\)Richard Taylor, commander of the District of West Louisiana, was the son of President Zachary Taylor (1848-50) and a former brother-in-law to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Born in Kentucky, Taylor received his education from Yale and Edinburgh, Scotland, before becoming his father's military secretary during the Mexican War. He settled in Louisiana, owned a plantation, and voted for secession in 1861. He rose in rank quickly, from the colonel of the 9th Louisiana to brigadier general in Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, learning strategy from the legendary Virginian. Soon after his service in the East, Taylor took over as the commander of the Department of West Louisiana, a post he held until the summer after the Red River Campaign of 1864. See Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, 827; Sifakis, *Who Was Who in the Civil War*, 643; Warner, *Generals in Gray*. 

moved his supply line to a more secure location on the east side of the Mississippi, thus making the attack on the two towns irrelevant.

As the division neared Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend on 6 June, they reached a fork in the road, located near Oak Grove Plantation. Walker ordered his third brigade, now commanded by James M. Hawes, to Young’s Point, and he sent his first brigade, under the new command of Henry E. McCulloch, to Milliken’s Bend. Horace Randal’s second brigade, including the Fourteenth, stayed at the plantation in reserve and thus saw no action on 6-7 June 1863. Both operations ended in failure, not because of a lack of qualified leadership, but because of poor strategic planning and coordination and the oppressive 95-degree heat. Additionally, Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend were adjacent to the Mississippi River and were vulnerable to bombardment from the Union Navy. The ultimate irony was that in the intervening days used to resolve the argument between Smith and Taylor, Grant had moved his supply line. There was actually no need for Walker to attack Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend on 6 and 7 June. After the raids, the division retreated to a camp at Delhi, Louisiana, approximately thirty miles west of Vicksburg, along the Vicksburg-Monroe railroad.3

Less than a month later, during the night of 3 July, Walker’s men “remained awake all night to listen to the cannonading [at Vicksburg], which could be distinctly heard.” When the cannons fell silent around dawn, the Texans feared the worst. Their fears were realized three days later when they received confirmation of Vicksburg’s capitulation. The loss must have been especially hard on Clark’s regiment and the rest of Randal’s brigade, having had no part in the previous battles. The men of the Fourteenth would have their moment in the spotlight, but it would not come in 1863. What lay ahead

for the men of Clark’s regiment was a year of marching and sickness.\textsuperscript{4}

In the days after the fall of Vicksburg, while their morale was already at a low ebb, Walker’s Texans suffered the return of another enemy—sickness. “My division looked like a vast moving hospital,” lamented Walker. According to the division commander, illness abounded among the men as a result of the “excessive heat of the weather, the deadly malaria of the swamps, [and] the stagnant and unwholesome water.” As usual, the Texans had no time for recuperation, marching throughout northern and central Louisiana for much of the remainder of the year. The bulk of the operations in the latter half of 1863 was devoted to little skirmishes and raids intended to deprive the Federals of coveted cotton. On 29 June, at Mounds Plantation, located ten miles south of the Mississippi River town of Lake Providence, the Fourteenth finally saw some brief action. Randal’s brigade participated in the capture of a small fort, manned by black soldiers and their three white officers. The officers quickly surrendered after seeing the enemy force surrounding their position. The action was minor, but Clark’s men witnessed their first victory as Confederate soldiers.\textsuperscript{5}

Throughout the fall, the bickering between Taylor and Smith continued. Each disagreed with the other’s style of military planning, but with Smith’s higher rank, he usually won any arguments, especially in regard to troop movements. Despite their disagreements, the two men did concur on one thing: they both feared an imminent Federal

\textsuperscript{4}Blessington, \textit{Walker’s Texas Division}, 116.

invasion up the Red River the following spring.\(^6\)

The Confederates’ fears were indeed real, for the Union had already assessed the potential rewards, both military and political, that a successful excursion up the Red River would produce. The Lincoln administration could sell confiscated southern cotton to manufacturing interests in the northeast, thus assuaging their concerns and earning future political rewards for the Republican party. Lincoln had already partially rewarded New England business interests by naming a Massachusetts man, General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, as commander of the Union Department of the Gulf, located in New Orleans.\(^7\)

A Union-occupied Texas and Louisiana would serve to block any Confederate assistance that French-controlled Mexico could offer, as well as severely curtail Confederate trade through Mexico, a convenient way to avoid the Union naval blockade. Furthermore, having a former rebellious state rejoin the Union in time for the presidential election of 1864 would all but guarantee electoral votes for Lincoln and the Republicans, to say nothing of the moral victory of capturing Shreveport, Louisiana, the headquarters of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. In addition to all of these grand concerns was a personal one. By early 1864, Union General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, the man who devised the Red River invasion, had become fixated with the project and viewed the


\(^{7}\)N. P. Banks, "the Bobbin Boy of Massachusetts," was a political man from the beginning. Having no prior military experience, he rose to the rank of major general by political clout. He earned his nickname for his work in a cotton mill as a young boy. During his adult life, he had a successful political career, including congressman before and after the Civil War, Speaker of the House in the Massachusetts legislature as well as Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. He was one of fourteen officers who received the thanks of Congress for "the skill, courage, and endurance that compelled the surrender of Port Hudson." He continued his political career until 1890 and died four years later. See Sifakis, *Who Was Who in the Civil War*, 30-31; Ezra Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964): 17-18.
Confederate Trans-Mississippi, no military threat, as a real problem.\(^8\)

Halleck’s plan included advances on two fronts. General Banks was to march north up the Red River, while General Frederick Steele’s army, situated in Little Rock, Arkansas, would march south and assist Banks in the capture of Shreveport. The Massachusetts general, clearly possessing presidential ambitions, initially disagreed with the planned excursion, instead favoring an attack on Mobile, Alabama, to provide him with the military glory needed for postwar political activities. After contemplation, however, the awesome rewards that could come to a man who was the Conqueror of Texas and the Hero of Louisiana soon materialized in Banks’s mind, and he enthusiastically launched the campaign. Banks had at his disposal an army of impressive size. Along with his own 17,000 troops from the Department of the Gulf, Halleck had given Banks 10,000 battle-hardened soldiers detached from William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee. The aggregate number of ground forces—which included infantry, cavalry, artillerymen, and other men crucial to the operation of an army—was 30,000. Furthermore, along with the ground army, Banks had the assistance of Admiral David D. Porter’s fleet of twenty-three ships, including thirteen ironclads, the largest naval force ever assembled on inland waters. Knowing the strength of his army and the relative weakness of the Confederates in Louisiana and Texas, Banks’s victory was all but assured, and he could almost taste his future political glory.\(^9\)


The army of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi also numbered 30,000, but it was widely separated. One third was along the Texas coast, and another third was facing the Union army in Arkansas. That left the final third of the Confederate army, including Walker’s division, in Louisiana, commanded by Richard Taylor. For Taylor’s troops, the first few months of 1864 were taken up with mundane military activities in the bayou area surrounding the convergence of the Red and Mississippi Rivers. Walker’s three brigades were separated from each other, each occupying a different area around Marksville and Simmesport. Randal’s brigade, commanded by Edward Clark during Horace Randal’s absence, was near Fort De Russy. Believing that fixed fortifications served only to hamper naval advances, leaving any defenders susceptible to ground attack, Taylor had only reluctantly agreed to Smith’s order to strengthen the fort, a small garrison along the Red River that was the only impediment to a Union advance up the river. The Fourteenth, commanded by N. S. Allen while Clark was serving as brigade commander, was detached from the brigade and given guard and fortifying duty at the fort. Clark’s lieutenant colonel, William Byrd, oversaw the fortifications at Fort De Russy while Major Augustus Rogers attended a court martial hearing in nearby Marksville. The feelings of all of Clark’s Texans were summed up by Private Armstrong, who wrote that “our guard duty comes once in 4 or 5 days and our living verry [sic] poor,” but “we have little else to do.”

In early February, while the men were busily preparing ramparts and felling trees, Taylor inspected the first and second brigades, the former now commanded by Thomas Waul, a native of South Carolina who had served in the first Confederate Congress. Taylor noted that he had “never seen any troops in finer condition. No troops ever

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11 Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 896-97; Warner, Generals in Gray, 328-29.
exhibited greater improvement in all the qualities of soldiers, and their present condition reflects great credit on the division and brigade commanders.” Taylor’s report seemed to contradict the observations of Private Armstrong in a letter to his wife dated 9 March. Armstrong noted that he had recently suffered from diarrhea and that “there are some [men] here that have not been clear of that disease more than 3 days at a time for 2 or 3 months.”

Sickness or no sickness, by early March, Walker’s Greyhounds were in a dire situation. They were scattered near Mansura, Louisiana, a small town in central Louisiana near Fort De Russy, with the Union invasion looming. Taylor and Walker estimated that their combined forces could defeat Banks’s 17,000-man Army of the Gulf, especially with the politician Banks in command. Indeed, Taylor had learned the deficiencies in Banks’s military thinking while an officer in Stonewall Jackson’s army in Virginia. What the Confederate generals did not know, however, was that Sherman’s battle-hardened soldiers, commanded by Major General A. J. Smith, had already sailed into the Red River along with Admiral Porter’s thirteen gunboats. Surprised at this revelation, Taylor ordered Walker’s men to “take more than ordinary hazards” when defending the fort. Walker, fearing that his entire division would fall into the hands of Smith’s soldiers, withdrew his men, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Byrd with only a small force to defend Fort De Russy. It took little effort for two of A. J. Smith’s brigades to capture the fort on 14 March, capturing almost all the defenders, including Byrd himself.

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After the surrender of Fort De Russy on 14 March, the Confederates retreated rapidly in the face of the Union invasion, with Randal's brigade, including the Fourteenth Infantry, guarding the Confederates' rear position. Taylor, knowing that the Union navy had begun scouring the Louisiana countryside to confiscate southern cotton, ordered all cotton to be burned as his army retreated, burning Federal money as he marched.

As the last days of March passed, several problems arose for the Confederates. The constant retreating left food, clothing, and shoes in great demand among the soldiers. Rain and sleet hindered their retreat. The easy capture of a Confederate cavalry unit by the Federals on 21 March left Taylor with few means to gain information about the approaching Yankees. Furthermore, the cavalry of Colonel Thomas Green, ordered to assist Taylor, was still on the march to Louisiana from Texas, leaving Taylor's army blind and undermanned against the larger Union force. These factors led to Taylor's decision not to fight Banks's army at the river town of Grand Ecore, four miles north of Natchitoches, in northwest Louisiana. Instead, Taylor turned his army inland along a narrow, dusty stagecoach road that led to Shreveport.  

Although they both had agreed that a Union invasion was coming, Kirby Smith and Taylor continued to bicker over military strategy. Taylor was an impetuous man who wanted to defeat Banks first and then face the Union army in Arkansas. Smith was more cautious, wanting to attack General Steele's army in Arkansas first, believing that this goal could be accomplished before Banks reached Shreveport. Smith based his thinking on Banks's slow movement up the river, stopping at every captured town to pursue political activities. Although Banks was carrying out Lincoln's Reconstruction plan, had the Union general concentrated his efforts solely on the military task at hand, he probably could have captured Shreveport with few difficulties. Military thought was not Banks's forte,

however, a characteristic he demonstrated when he made a major military blunder.\textsuperscript{15}

On 6 April the Union army and navy reached Grand Ecore. The river road, along which Banks’s ground forces had marched from Alexandria, seemed to end at Grand Ecore. Banks ordered his men to survey the area, searching for another road along the river. Although a road existed, for some reason the Union soldiers were unable to locate it. As a result, Banks decided to turn inland away from the river and march to Shreveport along a narrow stagecoach road, the one taken earlier by Taylor’s soldiers. The narrowness of the road forced the Union general to string his army along the road for miles, making a concentration of his forces impossible. More important, Banks removed his army from the protection and supplies of the Union river flotilla. This did not seem to matter to the militarily inexperienced Banks. He did not expect the retreating Confederates to make any show of force until the Federals reached Shreveport.\textsuperscript{16}

Meanwhile, the tired Confederate soldiers continued their retreat, urged on long hot marches by their officers. The afternoon of 2 April was especially tiresome. The men were forced to march five miles in one hour to Pleasant Hill, the Union cavalry close on their heels. J. P. Blessington, a private in Walker’s Division, wrote, “Our commanders must have believed that we were made of cast-steel, the way they marched us.” There was little water in the area, and the men were ordered to remain in battle formation throughout the night. On 4 April, according to Captain Allen, the ragged Confederates marched through the town of Mansfield, twenty miles north of Pleasant Hill and only thirty-seven miles south of the Federal army’s destination, Shreveport. For the next three days, the Confederates rested, welcomed the arrival of Green’s cavalry, and prepared for their next


move.\textsuperscript{17}

On Friday morning, 8 April, not having any new orders from Smith, Taylor decided to follow his own plan and make a stand at Mansfield. The Union forces had reached Pleasant Hill the previous evening and currently were marching toward Mansfield. Taylor ordered Walker's division to move south, back through Mansfield, with Waul's brigade in front followed by Randal and the third brigade, now commanded by William R. Scurry. As Walker's men marched through Mansfield, the citizens of the town cheered their defenders:

\begin{quote}
Next came Randall's [sic] Brigade, under that heroic and indefatigable officer. They marched forward at a quick step, in their usual rollicking and bold style, overflowing with impatient and long-restrained ardor for the fight, the promise of which had reconciled them to their long and laborious retreat before the enemy.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Around noon, the division formed a line of battle to the right of the road leading to Pleasant Hill. Facing east, the men were behind a rail fence just inside a line of trees that bordered the field. Randal was closest to the road, Waul in the middle, and Scurry on the far right.\textsuperscript{19} For three hours, the Texans could easily hear the sound of the Confederate cavalry skirmishing with the Union forces. On Walker's right were two regiments of cavalry commanded by Hamilton P. Bee. Just to the left of Randal's brigade, across the Mansfield road, was Alfred Mouton's Louisiana division and James P. Major's division of cavalry (see Figure 3). The total Confederate force, according to Taylor, numbered 8,800 (5,300 infantry, 3,000 mounted cavalry, and 500 artilleryists). Were the armies to meet in

\textsuperscript{17}Blessington, \textit{Walker's Texas Division}, 178-80; N. S. Allen Diary, 2 April - 7 April 1864.

\textsuperscript{18}Blessington, \textit{Walker's Texas Division}, 182-83, 185; Brown, \textit{Journey to Pleasant Hill}, 392.

\textsuperscript{19}All directions are from the Confederate viewpoint. The Confederate left corresponds to the area east of the Mansfield/Pleasant Hill road; the right was the west.
an open field, the Union army's superior numbers easily could have crushed the few
Confederate divisions. With Banks's army strung out, however, only portions of it would
be able to fight Taylor.20

Resting in battle formation among the shadows of the trees, the men of the
Fourteenth Texas waited anxiously, knowing that the day they would face their greatest test
as Confederate soldiers. It is pertinent to note the unique experience of the Fourteenth, and
indeed, all of Randal's brigade. Having not participated in the battles of Milliken's Bend
and Young's Point, Clark's soldiers and those of Randal's brigade had had no substantial
battle experience by April of 1864, three years into the conflict. The battles in western
Louisiana were a year removed from the war's end, and the Fourteenth were steeling
themselves for their first true battle experience.

By the middle of the afternoon, the Union advance units, travelling on the
stagecoach road, emerged from the line of trees on the far side of the field. The Union
soldiers, under the command of William J. Landram, seemed to realize an attack was
imminent judging from the Confederate force clustered just behind the treeline. Landram,
therefore, placed his infantry division on his right, east of the road, and ordered N. A. M.
Dudley's cavalry to protect the Union left, west of the Mansfield road. The Federal
infantry occupied a small hill in the field's middle, the entire position resembling a slight
arc facing outward toward the Texans. Two Federal batteries of artillery deployed, one
straddling the Mansfield road, the second placed somewhat behind the Federal line of
battle. In all, the total effective force for the Union was 4,800.21

20Brown, Journey to Pleasant Hill, 392; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction (New
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1879; reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 190-91; Blessington,
Walker's Texas Division, 185.

21Johnson, Red River Campaign, 133.
Figure 3. The Battle of Mansfield, 8 April 1864
Late in the afternoon, Randal’s brigade received a brief respite from the waiting when they were ordered to move to their left across the road, thus strengthening Taylor’s left and buttressing Mouton’s and Major’s men. Randal’s Texans did not wait in their new positions long before the sound of gunfire erupted from their left. As soon as the brigade was in its new position, approximately 4:00 PM, Taylor ordered an assault on Banks’s advance units, thus beginning phase one of the Battle of Mansfield (Sabine Crossroads, according to the Union).22

Guessing that the Federals were not fully ready for an attack, the impatient Taylor ordered Mouton’s men—many were Louisianians eager to seek revenge for the damage the Union invaders had caused—to attack and take “first blood.” After the initial surprise, Landram’s men regained their senses and returned the Confederate fire. The toll this action took on Mouton’s division was heavy. In one Louisiana regiment engaged in this leading assault, seven standard bearers died. It was not long before several bullets found Mouton, killing him. The Confederates were leaderless only a short time because Prince Camille Polignac, a Frenchman leading one of Mouton’s brigades, took command of Mouton’s division and renewed the assault. While Major’s dismounted cavalry advanced, shoring up Polignac’s left, the order came for Randal’s Texans to shoulder their arms and move against the enemy.23

Taylor, sitting astride his horse and surveying his soldiers’ actions, ordered Randal to move his men forward in echelon formation against the preoccupied Federals. With their muskets loaded, Clark’s men waited for the Eleventh Texas to move first, marching

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22The line of battle for Randal’s brigade was, starting with the unit nearest to Mouton’s position, the 11th Texas, the 14th Texas, Gould’s Battalion, the 28th Dismounted Texas Cavalry, and Daniel’s Battery adjacent to the Pleasant Hill road. Johansson and Johansson, “Two ‘Lost’ Battle Reports,” 173; Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 133.

forward as the last company of the Eleventh passed their position. The Fourteenth marched in line by company, with N. S. Allen’s Marshall Mechanics leading the Fourteenth. Clark’s men attacked with the Rebel yell. Frank McGregor, a soldier of the Eighty-third Ohio, observed that “the enemy act differently [than Union soldiers], they never shout until they break our line or are coming on a charge.” Taylor later commented on Randal’s personal “vigor, energy, and daring,” and wrote that the Texan’s infantry “displayed the high qualities which have distinguished him on so many fields.”

While Randal, Green, and Polignac occupied the Union right, Taylor ordered the remainder of Walker’s division, the brigades of Waul and Scurry, to fix bayonets, advance, and engage the left wing of the enemy. The combined Confederate attack, both left and right, pushed the confused and beaten Federal forces back, retreating across the field toward the far treeline. In their haste to escape the Confederate onslaught, the artillerymen of Ormand F. Nims’s battery lost all six of their cannons to the Confederates, and the Chicago Mercantile Artillery barely escaped with their guns, and then only temporarily. As these Federals retreated, a serious problem arose. Albert L. Lee’s cavalry had been the vanguard of the Union force marching toward Shreveport. Through some conflict among the Union officers, Lee’s baggage train was directly behind his cavalry, actually blocking infantry reinforcements from coming forward on the road, which was bordered on both sides by a thick treeline. To make matters worse, the cavalry’s train was mired in the mud of a small creek, stopping many wagons in the process of turning around and thus further blocking the small road. Therefore, after Landram ordered his men to retreat, the orderly withdrawal became a rout when the frightened soldiers saw their only

escape route blocked.25

Randal's brigade played a crucial role in destroying and capturing the Union wagon train. In Randal's report, he stated that his infantry "broke the enemy's line and captured his trains together with the staff wagons of Genl. [Albert L.] Lee and Ransom." Captain Allen noted that Taylor gave him, Allen, the personal responsibility of escorting the captured wagons back to Mansfield and turning the supplies over to the Confederate quartermaster. Allen listed his bounty as "182 wagons and ambulances, 2 pieces of artillery and a number of mules and horses.26

The Confederate pursuers became disorganized as they chased their enemies over the thickly wooded terrain. At 6:00 PM, two hours after Taylor attacked the Federals, Brigadier General William H. Emory, commander of the First Division of the Union Nineteenth Corps, set up a final line of defense. His division occupied the Pleasant Hill side of Chapman's Bayou, approximately two miles from where the fighting began and the only source of water between Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. In their defensive position, Emory's men met the fleeing Union soldiers, "rushing past in every possible manner." The fresh Union soldiers opened their line "to permit the retreating forces to pass through, each regiment of this fine division closed up on the double quick, [and] quietly awaited the

25Johnson, Red River Campaign, 137; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 344. According to a reporter from the Philadelphia Press, traveling with Banks's army, there was so much nonmilitary material because the deeper the Union got into slaver territory, "every non-commissioned officer [had] a servant, and every servant a mule." See J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955): 507.

26N. S. Allen Diary, 8 April 1864; Blessington, Walker's Texas Division, 188-89; James T. Huffstodt, "Ransom at the Crossroads: One Man's Ruin on the Red River," Civil War Times Illustrated 19, no. 8 (1980): 14; Official Records, ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. i, 266-68, 291, 462-63; Johansson and Johansson, "Two 'Lost' Battle Reports," 174. James Armstrong noted in a letter to his wife that he was detailed to guard the captured wagon train. From the wagon he "got me a gum elastic overcoat" for himself and some other things which he sent on to Texas. See James Armstrong to Martha Armstrong, 13 April 1864, James Armstrong Letters.
approach of the rebels." Taylor urged his exhausted men forward to drive the Union enemy from the bayou. During this last engagement, Colonel Clark and the Fourteenth exhibited particular bravery, enough to be recognized by General Hamilton Bee. Taylor later wrote that "There was some sharp work, but we persisted, the enemy fell back, and the stream was held, just as twilight faded into darkness." By the end of the day, the soldiers of the Confederacy had thoroughly defeated the Union invaders and controlled the only water supply for miles around.27

While the dark of night encompassed the battlefield, the officers of both armies began to assess the damage. Unbeknownst to Banks, even as he called a council of war to plot his next move, the Federals' unmolested advance up the Red River had come to a halt. All of his dreams—to be the Savior of Louisiana, the Conqueror of Texas, and President of the United States—lay in ruins among his dead and wounded soldiers along a narrow, dirt stagecoach road in northwestern Louisiana. The loss of Union war material was high. In his report, Albert Lee stated that the Rebels captured his cavalry's 156 supply wagons, including nearly eight hundred mules. His ammunition train was still in Federal hands, but the 20,000 rations and much of the camp equipment for his men were on the captured wagons, making living conditions for his soldiers considerably worse. Furthermore, the Confederates captured between twenty and twenty-two artillery pieces, including all of Nims's Battery. The human cost of Banks's folly was substantially more severe. The Federals suffered 2,186 casualties, nearly 1,500 of them prisoners. Some regiments, such as the Forty-eighth Ohio and the One Hundred Thirtieth Illinois, were nearly annihilated.

27Frank M. Flinn, Campaigning with Banks in Louisiana, '63 and '64, and with Sheridan in '64 and '65 (Lynn, MA: Thos. P. Nichols, 1887): 109; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 164; Brown, Journey to Pleasant Hill, 392; Official Records, ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. i, 607.
losing over half their number.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Casualties in Randal's Brigade at Mansfield, Louisiana 8 April 1864\textsuperscript{f}}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Group} & \textbf{Killed} & \textbf{Wounded} & \textbf{Missing} \\
\hline
14th Texas Inf. & 1 & 15 & 1 \\
11th Texas Inf. & 2 & 6 & 2 \\
28th Texas Cav. & 4 & 17 & - \\
Gould's Battalion & 2 & 14 & 3 \\
Daniel's Battery & N/A\textsuperscript{2} & N/A & N/A \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 9 & 52 & 6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{f}Jane Harris Johansson and David H. Johansson, "Two 'Lost' Battle Reports: Horace Randal's and Joseph L. Brent's Reports of the Battle of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, 8 and 9 April 1864," \textit{Military History of the West} 23 (Fall 1993): 174. \\
\textsuperscript{2}Daniel's Battery did not participate in the Battle of Mansfield.
\end{flushright}

The men of Taylor's army fared a bit better; their casualty figures neared only one thousand. Randal's brigade lost only nine men to death; fifty-two were wounded, and six were missing in action. The Fourteenth emerged from the battle relatively unscathed. Although Randal did not mention individual names in his casualty report for the Mansfield engagement, the casualty figures for Clark's Texans included one killed, fifteen wounded, and one missing.\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{28}Johnson, \textit{Red River Campaign}, 134; Winters, \textit{Civil War in Louisiana}, 347. \\
\textsuperscript{29}Johansson and Johansson, "Two 'Lost' Battle Reports," 173-74. In Captain Allen's diary entry the night of the battle, 8 April 1864, he named the dead man as W. L. Banite (actually W. L. Barrett in the CSR); a private in B Company. After the bi-monthly roll call in January/February 1864, there were no more muster rolls until April 1865. Through use of the service records, along with newspaper accounts, a proper compilation of the casualties of Clark's regiment was obtained. The publication of Randal's battle reports help to clear up any inconsistencies between newspaper accounts.
\end{flushright}
The night did not bring rest for the Confederates because they spent most of the night burying their fallen comrades and tending to the injured. Mary Higgenbotham, a local resident, recounted the appearance of Walker's division the following Saturday afternoon, hours before they would again be ordered into battle at a place ironically called Pleasant Hill. What she saw was "a column of ragged, weary, gray-clad men marching in columns of fours." They rested in front of the Higgenbotham house.

Some had blood-stained bandages on their heads—some had an arm suspended in a bloody bandage or wore bandages on their necks or shoulders. Many of them fell prostrate on the ground, too exhausted to move. Others staggered toward the house to beg for a bite to eat. The yard and house were soon full of the tired and haggard—some with the most haunted look in their eyes.30

Higgenbotham's mother began to feed the men, even from the family's own food reserves. The men used whatever they had to hold food—"dirty hats... bare hand[s]... cups or on pieces of boards they had picked up"—and ate everything they were given "like a pack of hungry wolves." The desperate men of Walker's division thanked the woman profusely, many handing her Confederate money or praising the "blessings of Heaven upon her." A blast of the bugle soon brought the men back to the road, where they secured their rifles and quickly lined up. Then the order rang out sharp and clear, "'Attention! F-o-h-r-w-a-r-d-M-a-r-c-h!' Soon they disappeared in a cloud of dust in the direction of Pleasant Hill."31


The little town of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, was located approximately twenty miles south of Mansfield. It consisted of a few houses and businesses located on a slight swell of the land, hardly a town at all. After the ignominious defeat and retreat of his army, Banks decided to camp around the little town and recuperate for his continuing march toward Shreveport. He ordered the fresh troops of A. J. Smith’s division to guard the point nearest to the advancing Confederates. At the farthest point in advance of the Union lines, William T. Shaw’s brigade replaced the tired forces of James McMillan. Shaw had four regiments, three of which he placed on the southern side of the Mansfield road; the fourth, the Twenty-fourth Missouri, remained on the northern side accompanied by a battery. The four regiments of Colonel Lewis Benedict’s brigade found themselves on Shaw’s left, directly behind a small creek named Deep Ditch. Unfortunately for the Union soldiers, a wide space separated the two brigades, thus leaving both of Shaw’s flanks open to attack. The remainder of A. J. Smith’s soldiers occupied a position behind Benedict’s men (see Figure 4).

On the Confederate side, Taylor knew that his tired men could not stand up to the numerically superior forces of Banks’s full army, spearheaded by A. J. Smith’s fresh soldiers. Taylor wanted to defeat the force directly in front of him and then march to the river to capture the Union fleet, which was having trouble with low water. Taking the
Figure 4. The Battle of Pleasant Hill, 9 April 1864
lessons he learned from Stonewall Jackson, Taylor envisioned a classic flanking maneuver. He devised a plan in which Thomas J. Churchill’s division was to march in a wide flanking movement through the forest and around the Union left. Upon hearing the sound of Churchill’s actions, Walker’s division, formed in brigades, was to march in echelon across the open field and attack Shaw’s men, connecting with Churchill’s left flank. The cavalry of Thomas Green and Hamilton Bee were to shore up Walker’s left and advance upon seeing the retreat of the Federals. In order to camouflage Churchill’s movements, Taylor directed that an artillery barrage be fired into the regiments of Shaw’s brigade. The plan was simple on paper, but when actually performed, too many problems could arise, and they did.¹

After a two-hour rest, one that his men badly needed, Taylor set Churchill’s men to their task at 3:30 p. m. Ninety minutes later, just over twenty-four hours after he started the battle at Mansfield, Taylor again took the initiative. Receiving word that Churchill was nearly in position, Taylor ordered the Confederate artillery to open fire on the Twenty-fifth New York artillery battery, protecting the Twenty-fourth Missouri of Shaw’s brigade on the east side of the Mansfield road. At 5:00 the Union battery withdrew, conceding the victory of the Rebel cannoneers. Shortly thereafter, on the Confederate right, the sound of Churchill’s guns could be heard. As planned, Walker ordered his troops to advance across the eight-hundred-yard open field by brigades. The brigades were, from right to left, Scurry’s, Waul’s, and Randal’s.

Walker’s men moved across the open field, seemingly heedless of the fire directed at them by Shaw’s Iowans. General Walker himself was wounded, and Taylor had him removed from the field. The men from Texas soon fell into disorder. Scurry’s brigade took a punishing volley of lead, and it looked as if the Union soldiers would force Scurry

¹Johnson, Red River Campaign, 154; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 195-96; Parrish, Soldier Prince of Dixie, 357-58.
into a retreat. Seeing the precarious position of Scurry's men, Taylor ordered Randal and Waul to charge the enemy line, running over the bodies of their dead and dying fellows. Colonel Clark, personally spearheading the Fourteenth, fell wounded with a shot in his leg. Undeterred, the Texan drew his sword, brandished it over his head, and urged on the Fourteenth. Seeing the personal bravery of their fallen colonel, the Fourteenth and Randal's brigade charged Shaw's forces. This Confederate charge, with the assistance of Colonel J. P. Major's cavalry and the men of Polignac's brigade, turned Shaw's line and caused his retreat. According to W. H. Guy, a sergeant in the Thirty-second Iowa, "On they came over the bodies of their fallen friends and formed their line in spite of the murderous fire that was being poured into them from our death-dealing rifle muskets, and then the battle began to rage with inconceivable fury." Blessington noted the actions of those brigades:

Most gallantly did those two brigades [Waul's and Randal's] sustain their well-earned reputation, stimulated and encouraged by the conduct of their officers, and wakened to a perfect enthusiasm by the presence of their brigade commanders, Generals Waul and Randall [sic], who, utterly regardless of all danger, rushed into the thickest of the fight, rallying their troops, where they showed any signs of wavering, disposing of their forces so as to protect their weakest point.²

In his report describing the action of his brigade, Randal stated that "no veteran troops ever made a more brilliant charge." With obvious exaggeration, Randal related that his soldiers overran the Union position "although out numbering me five to one."³

²John Scott, The Story of the Thirty Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers (Nevada, IA: John Scott, 1896): 188; Blessington, Walker's Texas Division, 197; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, 349, 353; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 157; Parrish, Soldier Prince of Dixie, 363-64.

³Johansson and Johansson, "Two 'Lost' Battle Reports," 175. In the Edward Clark Papers, located in the Marshall Historical Museum in Marshall, Texas, there is a sketch partly derived from an undated Shreveport Times article by David Hawkins. The author related the battle of Pleasant Hill and Clark's actions. Although given to obvious exaggeration, Hawkins described a vivid scene: "It was on the second
As on the previous day, the approaching darkness played an important role in the decisions Taylor made. Churchill's men had been forced back, colliding with the rightmost units of Walker's division. A. J. Smith, seeing Benedict's line crumble in chaos, moved his remaining fresh soldiers from their defensive position into the attack. Doing to Churchill's right side what Churchill had been ordered to do to the Federals, Smith's forces flanked the Confederates, turning Churchill's right flank upon itself. This was a result of Churchill's attack from the wrong angle. Taylor had ordered Churchill to flank the Federals. As his men were marching to their position, however, Churchill stopped his division too soon and attacked the Union lines from a point that left Smith's Federals on his right. This mistake allowed Smith to bash Churchill's flank rather than vice versa. The twilight caused more confusion in both armies, who sometimes fired into their own ranks. Taylor wanted another assault, one that he believed would thoroughly defeat the Union army, but his men had no more energy. Leaving some cavalry to act as a buffer, Taylor ordered his men to withdraw from Pleasant Hill. The Union soldiers made no effort to stop the Confederates. Taylor withdrew his men on the evening of 9 April. Soon thereafter, Banks retreated to Grand Écore.4

Although the battle of Pleasant Hill was a tactical stalemate, Taylor achieved the strategic victory, putting to an end Banks's move north to Shreveport and the proposed Union invasion of Texas. The price Taylor paid for this victory was high. The casualties

day near Pleasant Hill that our fighting Texas governor, Colonel Edward Clark, was shot from his horse. Colonel Clark, Texas's first secessionist governor, urged his horse soldiers forward, covered himself with glory in this action, a part of the Battle of Mansfield. Colonel Clark was in full uniform about six feet in advance. When thirty yards from the enemy, the Feds opened fire, Col. Clark fell, shot through the leg just below the knee. Clark urged his men on; letting loose their Rebel yell, they charged the log fortress, fired into the retreating mass, killing 800 Yankees in a pile. Clark's men were armed with old muskets loaded with buck-and-ball cartridges (one ball and 10 buckshot). Clark lost 3 men killed and ten were wounded.

4Parrish, Soldier Prince of Dixie, 364; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 160-62; Blessington, Walker's Texas Division, 200.
for the second consecutive day of battle were approximately 1,626 for the Confederates and 1,369 for the Union. Pleasant Hill had a more pronounced effect on the Fourteenth than did Mansfield, as it claimed five lives, twenty-nine wounded, and one missing. Colonel Clark was wounded "severely" in the knee after his horse was shot out from under him. His brave actions gained the attention of his superiors. In his report, Randal praised the "conspicuous gallantry" of the former governor and noted that Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee received "gallant support" from Clark and Randal.5

In helping Clark and Randal to receive their commendations, the Cypress Tigers of Company H lost their captain, John F. Buchan. His brother, James, a second lieutenant in the same company, received a slight wound in the knee. James Armstrong, in a letter to his wife dated 12 April, stated that Lieutenant A. Nutt of Company F would soon die of his wounds. Armstrong also told of his son's battle wound, a musket ball in the arm. N. S. Allen recorded one extraordinary incident in his diary. All the men believed that Private Peter Richardson was dead, "having been shot in the head," but the lucky man regained consciousness and lived. With Clark wounded, Captain Allen took command of the Fourteenth. Unfortunately for Allen, he, too, felt "very bad after getting to camp" and placed Captain Samuel J. Lyle of Second Company K in regimental command. In two days of fighting, the Fourteenth recorded six dead, forty-four wounded, and two missing.6

5Johansson and Johansson, "Two 'Lost Battle Reports,'" 175; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 168-69.

6Johansson and Johansson, "Two 'Lost Battle Reports,'" 175; Official Records, ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. i, 607; Houston Telegraph, 2 May 1864; Compiled Service Records, reels 372-75; James Armstrong to Martha Armstrong, 12 April 1864, James Armstrong Letters; N. S. Allen Diary, 9 April 1864. Despite the crowded conditions of the make-shift hospitals—there were three men in a place where one should be—Armstrong also described the good attention that the women of the area gave to the wounded and sick men, giving them "milk, soup, coffee and loaf bread."
Table 11
Casualties in Randal’s Brigade at Pleasant Hill, Louisiana
9 April 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Texas Cav.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gould’s Battalion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel’s Battery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The victorious Confederates rested just north of Mansfield for a few days, getting some much needed rest. Probably sooner than the men wanted, the Confederate attention turned north; there was still the problem of Frederick Steele’s Union army in Arkansas. On 14 April, after five days’ rest, Walker’s Greyhounds joined Churchill’s division and Mosby Parsons’s cavalry and began marching north toward Arkansas. At this time, Banks’s Union soldiers were busy constructing a pontoon bridge across the Red River at the town of Grand Ecore. That would enable them to march up the east side of the river, link up with Steele, and attack Shreveport directly. Taylor and Smith both suspected this was Banks’s plan. To prevent Banks and Steele from contacting each other, Kirby Smith ordered Walker’s division to march from Mansfield, north to Shreveport, and then east through Minden, Louisiana, in order to interpose itself between the two Union armies. As the division marched through the town, grateful young women gave the Texans bouquets of flowers and cheered the Greyhounds’ victory against the Union forces. The other two

*Mosby Persons was born in 1819 and fought in the Mexican War. In 1861, when the Civil War started, he raised the Missouri State Guard which fought in the battles of Wilson’s Creek and Pea Ridge. As a result of his actions, Parsons was appointed brigadier general in November 1862. After his actions in the Red River Campaign, Parsons was killed in action on 17 August 1865 in Mexico, where he fled after the surrender of the Confederacy. See Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 622; Warner, Generals in Gray, 228–29.*
divisions marched directly north toward Arkansas, where they set up an encampment just
inside the Arkansas border.\(^8\)

Ten days later, as Banks's movement south made it clear that he was not going to
march north and continue his invasion, Walker's men started from their encampment at
Minden. Having learned of Banks's complete retreat from northern Louisiana, leaving the
Union soldiers in Arkansas with no chance of reinforcements, Steele made the decision to
retreat from Camden, Arkansas, to Little Rock. Moreover, Steele's men had few supplies.
In one week, between 18 April and 25 April, two separate Union wagon trains were
destroyed by Confederate forces, at Poison Spring and Marks's Mill, respectively. There
was no other rational decision; Steele began his withdrawal from Camden on 26 April,
marching northeast toward Little Rock. The only obstacle in the way of an easy Union
retreat was the Saline River. Kirby Smith, now personally commanding the pursuing
Confederates, decided that his soldiers could march quickly and catch Steele at Jenkins'
Ferry, the crossing of the Saline River. The pursuit began.\(^9\)

For two consecutive nights, 28 and 29 April, Walker's men, now reunited with the
larger Confederate force, awoke at 3:00 a.m. and chased the enemy, with rain and mud as
their constant companions. At midnight on 29-30 April, Kirby Smith wakened his ragged
army and set them to march over soggy land made worse by a thunderstorm that soaked
both soil and soldiers. Finally, around daybreak on 30 April, the Confederate column,
consisting of Churchill's Arkansas soldiers, Mosby Parson's Missourians, and Walker's

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\(^8\)N. S. Allen Diary, 16 April 1864; Blessington, Walker's Texas Division, 243; Joseph H. Parks,

\(^9\)Blessington, Walker's Texas Division, 246-47; Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith's Confederacy:
The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972): 312-13; Parks,
Texans bringing up the rear, overtook Steele’s army at Jenkins’ Ferry.\(^{10}\)

Steele correctly believed that his Confederate pursuers might catch up with him before he crossed the muddy Saline River. To protect his supplies and insure a successful crossing, Steele deployed his infantry in a defensive perimeter around the Union pontoon bridge. The land was easily defended with a near impassable swamp on the Union left and Cox’s Creek on the right. Furthermore, the land itself was thick with woods and underbrush. Two cultivated fields, both parallel to the Saline River and separated by trees, were the only open spaces around, and most of these areas were under water and mud. This eliminated the possible use of artillery, for there was no maneuverability. Thus, the only way for the Confederates to attack Steele’s forces was to march over the open fields, easy targets for the experienced Federal soldiers, many of whom were positioned behind fallen trees. Steele knew his position was formidable yet not impregnable. To insure success, he organized nearly four thousand men to guard his escape (see Figure 5).\(^{11}\)

Although the Union position was strong, “strengthened by such logs as they could conveniently get at,” according to Blessington, Kirby Smith assumed that Steele would leave few soldiers to guard the bridge, probably only a division. Ankle-deep water and mud prevented any substantial artillery fire, although a Confederate battery unit got off fifteen shots before mud claimed the weapons; some of the weapons were later captured by

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\(^{11}\)Castel, *General Sterling Price*, 181; Ralph R. Rea, *Sterling Price: The Lee of the West* (Little Rock, AR: Pioneer Press, 1959): 112; Blessington, *Walker’s Texas Division*, 249. Colonel Adolph Engelmann, a brigade commander for Steele, described the terrain. “The ground over which the battle was fought, with the exception of the two open fields near the road, was a majestic forest, growing out of a swamp, which it was very difficult to pass through on horseback, the infantry being most of the time in the water up to their knees” (See Richards, “Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry,” 7).
Figure 5. The Battle of Jenkins' Ferry, 30 April 1864
the Federals. With this in mind, Smith ordered General Sterling Price, then in command of the soldiers of Churchill and Parsons, to have Churchill’s men attack the Union line, leaving Parsons in reserve. Price sent one regiment, the Nineteenth Arkansas, north across Cox’s Creek to remove that portion of the battlefield from Union occupation. Two Union regiments deflected the Arkansans’ attempts, forcing Price to abandon that avenue of attack.12

The remainder of Churchill’s men faced a fierce volley from Union muskets, yet they did manage to make the Federals’ front line retreat toward their rear line. Steele, having crossed the river with most of his army, was apprised of the intense situation and sent back across the Saline three extra regiments to aid his men. This occurred at almost the same time that Parsons’s men moved forward to assist their badly damaged Confederate colleagues. Gathering resolve, the combined forces of Churchill and Parsons redoubled their efforts in an assault on the Union lines. The crossfire pummeled their ranks, eroding the second Confederate charge man by man. There was one last hope for a southern victory that day—Walker’s Greyhounds. In retrospect, it would seem improbable that one fresh division could achieve a victory where two had previously failed. But Kirby Smith considered the Union position weak, softened up by the morning’s fighting, so the assaults continued.13

As Parsons and Churchill were engaging the enemy, Walker had found a road along the swamp area leading to the Union left. It was his hope that the path would lead around Steele’s left. If this were so, Walker’s men could flank Steele’s army, turning it and gaining access to the bridge and Union supplies. Scurry’s brigade led the way with

12Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 249; Castel, General Sterling Price, 181.

13Rea, Lee of the West, 112; Richards, “Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry,” 9-11; Castel, General Sterling Price, 182.
Randal and Waul following. Kirby Smith ordered Scurry’s and Randal’s brigades to attack Steele’s left flank, holding Waul’s brigade in reserve. When the Texans had given up the safety of the woods, they had a surprise. The road did not lead directly to the Federal left but rather into the open field that Churchill and Parsons had recently abandoned. Furthermore, the Federal regiments located on the north side of Cox’s Creek were still there, positioned at a right angle to the main line of bluecoats. For all intents and purposes, the Texans were caught in a crossfire.¹⁴

At the appearance of Scurry’s and Randal’s brigades in the open field, both sets of Union muskets open fired on the exposed Confederates, catching them in a punishing crossfire. Brigadier General W. R. Scurry was fatally wounded while urging his men forward. Horace Randal, yelling orders to his brigade, was mortally wounded by a bullet in the abdomen. His brother, Leonard, left his regiment and was with Horace as the officer was taken by wagon from the field. Seeing the confusion caused by the lack of brigade officers, Smith sent Waul’s brigade to Randal’s left side to shore up the failing line. Parsons’s Missourians regrouped and followed Waul, but neither Waul nor Parsons made any substantial contribution. Waul was wounded, leaving the Confederates without any brigade leaders. Seeing Parsons’s ineffective actions, Smith ordered Churchill’s men to support Waul, giving some relief to the battered Texans.¹⁵

Behind the enfilading fire of the Yankee muskets, Steele extended his left side, flanking Walker’s right, which was occupied by Scurry’s men. The confused Texans dissolved into disorder and began to fall back to the edge of the open field, just inside the

¹⁴Richards, “Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry,” 11-13; Rea, Lee of the West, 112-13; Castel, General Sterling Price, 182-83; Kerby, Kirby Smith’s Confederacy, 314; Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 251-52.

¹⁵Johnson, Red River Campaign, 199-200. The description of Randal’s injury is in the Horace Randal File, located at the Harrison County Historical Museum, Marshall, Texas.
protection of the woods. At 1:30 p.m., while the Confederates rested in order to make a final assault, Steele began to withdraw his soldiers, destroying half the pontoon bridge. Having no pontoon bridge of his own, Kirby Smith was forced to let Steele escape. It was just as well, because his own soldiers were hurt, tired, and sick of fighting. Steele continued unimpeded toward Little Rock while the battered Confederates tended to their injuries and assessed the damage.16

The Confederates declared victory because they held the field of battle. This claim is only partially true. The southern portion of Arkansas was free from roaming Union armies, and, with Steele’s retreat, the threat to Texas was alleviated. The cost of this minor tactical victory, however, was severe. Kirby Smith’s opportunity to destroy Steele’s army was irrevocably lost. Lost, too, were two brigadier generals. Both Randal and Scurry died on 1 May. The casualties on both sides were difficult to count. Of the nearly six thousand soldiers Smith sent into battle on 30 April, somewhere between eight hundred to one thousand were killed or wounded. Steele’s men suffered approximately seven hundred casualties out of four thousand. Eight men were killed and twenty-three wounded among the Fourteenth Texas Infantry. Were it not for Dr. Fowler’s medical registry, it would be difficult to place names with the casualties. N. S. Allen had left the regiment because of sickness and missed the action at Jenkins’ Ferry, and James Armstrong’s letters contained no reference to that battle either. The Compiled Service

Records list only Frank N. Cooner of Company H as wounded at the battle in Arkansas.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Texas Cav.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gould's Battalion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel's Battery</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12  
Casualties in Randal's Brigade at Jenkins' Ferry, Arkansas  
30 April 1864

1Alwyn Barr, "Texan Losses in the Red River Campaign," 106; Houston Daily Telegraph, 16 May 1864;  
2Daniel's Battery did not participate in the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry.

The Red River Campaign was over, as was the direct military importance of  
Walker's Texas Division. In a letter to all the soldiers of the Trans-Mississippi  
Department, dated 4 May, Smith praised the actions of his men, telling them that their  
determination and sacrifice yielded great bounties and that their homes were saved from the  
Union invaders. Of the Texans, nearly 150 soldiers were killed and almost 700 were  
wounded. Randal's brigade lost its commander and 420 men, more than the other two  
brigades Walker commanded.  

17Johnson, Red River Campaign, 202; Alwyn Barr, "Texan Losses in the Red River Campaign,  
1864," Texas Military History 3 (Summer 1963): 106. Horace Randal died never knowing that he had been  
promoted to brigadier general by Kirby Smith on 13 April 1864, the result of all promotions having to go  

Table 13
Total Casualties in Randal's Brigade in the Red River Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Texas Inf.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Texas Cav.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gould's Battalion</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel's Battery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 14
Total Losses of Union and Confederate Armies in the Red River Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confederate</th>
<th>Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualties (Louisiana and Arkansas)</td>
<td>6,575</td>
<td>8,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns Lost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons Lost</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Mounts Lost</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Vessels Lost</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 278.

The cost to the Fourteenth Texas Infantry in the defense of their homes for the entire war was 14 killed, 67 wounded, and 24 missing in action, a total of 105 men. One hundred five men may seem like a large number of casualties; after all, a company is usually one hundred men. When compared to regiments that served in the eastern theater, however, it is apparent that the Fourteenth and the other units that served in the Trans-Mississippi had a very different military experience. The best regiment with which to compare with the Fourteenth is the Fifty-seventh Massachusetts. These men, like the
Fourteenth Texas, began their fighting in 1864, only a year away from the Confederate surrender. Where the Fourteenth Texas lost 105 men, the Fifty-seventh Massachusetts lost 213 men in their campaigns in Virginia. The Seventeenth Virginia Infantry suffered 45 combat deaths and 73 wounded men in four battles that spanned from First Manassas in 1861 to Dinwiddie Court House in 1865. Another Union regiment, the Twelfth Missouri Infantry, lost 49 men in their years of army life, while the Tenth Virginia lost fifty-two men in only two battles, fourteen at the Battle of Second Manassas and thirty-eight at Chancellorsville. Texans serving in the eastern theater did not escape unharmed. The First Texas Infantry, part of John Bell Hood’s famous Texas Brigade, endured 332 killed and 620 wounded, totalling 952 in battle casualties.19

If the Fourteenth’s casualties paled in comparison to those for regiments from the east, how do they compare to other units from the Trans-Mississippi? The Fourteenth’s 14 battle deaths account for 1.7 percent of the regiment, while the 67 wounded correspond to 7.9 percent. The Twenty-eighth Texas Cavalry campaigned in the Red River Campaign along with the Fourteenth and suffered 38 deaths (3.7 percent) and 96 wounded soldiers (9.3 percent). Daniel’s Battery lost only three men to combat deaths, two were wounded, and five went missing. One anomaly was the Third Texas Cavalry. While it did fight east of the Mississippi River, its main theater of operations was in the southeast, away from the carnage in Virginia. It too had been formed in East Texas, in the same region as the Fourteenth Infantry and the Twenty-eighth Cavalry. The Third Texas lost 90 men killed in

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battle (7.0 percent) and 221 were wounded (16.0 percent).\(^{20}\)

What these figures suggest is that in terms of actual combat casualties, the Fourteenth waged a different type of war and emerged from the war with fewer battle casualties. Another indicator that the Fourteenth’s military experience was different from that of eastern units was turnover rate of the captains. Nineteen men served as captains, yet the turnover of the captain’s rank in Clark’s regiment was very low. Three companies started and ended their service in the Confederate army with the same man as captain. If one accounts for the promotion of two captains to regimental offices and the resignation of two others due to age—both of which happened by the winter of their first year—seven of the ten captains were still in that rank in April 1865. Only one captain was killed in battle, John Buchan of H Company, at Pleasant Hill. Thus, the Fourteenth’s small number of battles, combined with their entire experience being in a secondary theater, directly contributed to their low number of combat casualties.

There were, however, other means by which a man could leave a regiment, those of a non-combat nature. One way was by discharge. A man could receive a discharge for anything from being too old (when the Conscription Act went into effect), chronic illness, resignation (for an officer), and other varied causes. One hundred fifty men (14.5 percent) of the original 1,035 were discharged. This number includes the one hundred thirty (12.6 percent) who left as a result of the conscription act in the summer of 1862. Seventy-four (7.2 percent) of the Twenty-eighth Cavalry were discharged, and forty-two men (19.1 percent) from Daniel’s Battery left their regiment. The Fourteenth, however, had a greater number of men join the regiment before the conscription act forced out older and younger men, accounting for the larger number of discharges because of age. The Twenty-eighth’s enlistment surrounded the date of the conscription act, so by the time the unit formally

organized, they had compensated for the provisions of the act.\textsuperscript{21}

The other category of non-combat casualty is death from disease. For the entire Confederate army, the number of actual combat casualties, that is, the number killed, wounded, or captured on the battlefield or those who died of complications related to injuries sustained on the battlefield, did not equal the number of those who died from disease. Put another way, a man was less likely to be killed fighting the Union army than he was to die because of disease. The Fourteenth Texas Infantry reflected this pattern. Nine hundred five men began their first winter in the army at Camp Nelson, Arkansas.\textsuperscript{22}

Of the 905, sixty men (6.6 percent) never even began formal military operations in the spring, succumbing to disease and unsanitary conditions. Thirty-three more men died of disease during the remainder of the war, totalling ninety-three men, or 10.3 percent. The number of disease-related casualties climbs to 112 (12.4 percent) if the men who were discharged because of illness are included. Taken together, the total number of causes that permanently removed a soldier from the ranks—death, discharge, transfer, resignation, and other minor occurrences—was 310 of 1,035 men (30.0 percent).\textsuperscript{23}

It was not long before the leadership of Walker's brigades changed. On 11 May, the wounded Thomas Waul resigned, leaving all three brigades without commanders. Smith soon rectified this deficiency, naming Brigadier General Richard Waterhouse to replace Scurry, while Major R. P. MacClay took over Randal's brigade, and Colonel

\textsuperscript{21}Johansson, "Peculiar Honor," 222; Perkins, "Daniel's Battery," 69; Hale, Third Texas Cavalry, 282-83.

\textsuperscript{22}This percentage was derived using the number 905, that is the total 1,118 minus the 83 from First Company K and the 130 who were discharged because of age.

\textsuperscript{23}The key word here is "permanently" (i.e., how a man left the unit and did not return). The figure in Chapter 4, fn 12, notes that the unit had only 375 men in March 1864. This figure was based on medical records. In March 1864, many of the men were absent from the unit either because of illness or furlough, temporary reasons for a man to be away from the unit.
Wilburn H. King, formerly of the Eighteenth Texas Infantry, succeeded Waul.\(^{24}\)

The division continued to march throughout Arkansas and Louisiana for the remainder of 1864. Morale was low, and the condition of the men was even worse. According to one of the surgeons in the unit, “It would almost make your heart bleed could you see the haggard and worn looks of our men.” In the summer, Kirby Smith made a move that infuriated the men of Walker’s division. The animosity between Taylor and Smith never dissipated, especially since Taylor blamed Smith for Banks’s escape. Therefore, on 17 July, Smith put Walker in command of the District of West Louisiana, thereby supplanting the disgruntled Taylor. The saddened Texans said goodbye to their beloved leader, temporarily replaced by Brigadier General Wilburn King and later replaced by Major General John H. Forney.\(^{25}\)

The Texans in Walker’s division were disgruntled even before their favorite leader left them. Some soldiers wanted out, believing that the war west of the Mississippi River was over. When the division received orders in August 1864 to cross to the eastern side of the Mississippi River, many deserted, feeling that the army was taking them away from their homeland, which they had already saved from Union occupation. Moreover, sickness, fatigue, and numerous transfers also affected the number of men in the division and in the Fourteenth. An example of this was Company H. By 18 July 1864, the Cypress Tigers counted only sixteen men, out of the original 111, on its muster roll, and thus Company H received orders to consolidate with Company A. The Tigers’ officer corps, still without a captain since the Pleasant Hill battle claimed John Buchan, lost two of its remaining three lieutenants as a result of this charge. Lieutenants Malcolm Gillis and Jesse Woodard evidently resigned over the loss of autonomy of their company. Shortly

\(^{24}\)Blessington, *Walker’s Texas Division*, 261.

thereafter, P. G. Nebbut, formerly the captain of Company B, took the office of captain of H Company, finally replacing Buchan. W. R. Adams was promoted to the first-lieutenant position, while James Buchan remained a second lieutenant, leaving the company with only three officers until the end of the war.26

"Almost every week strengthens my faith in the war’s closing soon," James Armstrong wrote to his wife in August 1864, eight months before Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Believing that the duty of Walker’s division was over, he expected to rejoin his family in Upshur County by Christmas. Armstrong mentioned that the men of his regiment were in good spirits, but after John Forney officially assumed command of the division, he, Forney, tried to straighten up his straggling men. On one march, the general ordered a roll call at every rest stop, a formal procedure and one that the men felt was unnecessary. Forney’s adherence to regulations did not endear him to the Greyhounds. The belief that they had defended their homes and that their military usefulness was fading, coupled with the new strict commander, furthered the men’s disillusionment, and the division began to erode, man by man. Edward Clark, not having fully recovered from his Pleasant Hill injury, was promoted to brigadier general, although there is no record of what brigade he commanded. Augustus Rogers, the major of the Fourteenth Infantry, evidently resigned or was promoted, because N. S. Allen noted in his diary that he became the major of the regiment. Furthermore, Major Allen began to lead the entire regiment, as noted in a letter from Armstrong. When the first lieutenant of F Company resigned, no one took his place. In the first week of January 1865, four officers from four companies resigned, and no other men filled the vacant positions; Company F had only two officers for the

26Compiled Service Records, reels 373-75. There is no record of when Company H returned to its own individual command. The most common transfers were to the teamsters, the engineering corps, and the quartermaster department.
The Louisiana weather still plagued the men, as did Forney's roll calls during periods of rest. This probably reduced the number of stragglers, but not entirely. Not one man in the regiment, to say nothing of the division, knew why he was still in the army. Private Armstrong, writing on 1 March 1865 from camp near Shreveport, noted that many of the men were sick and that some perhaps would never recover. He voiced the complaints of his fellow soldiers when he wrote, "Our command is still lyeing [sic] here for some purpose I do not know what." Four days later, the men's hopes were realized. By this time, stragglers and deserters were so numerous that General Forney decided that the only sensible thing to do was to turn his men around and march them back to Texas. In addition, there was a rumor of a new threat to Texas. This new movement, as well as the comprehension that the Confederacy was dying, prompted many soldiers simply to leave the ranks of the army and return home after they had crossed into the Lone Star State. By the time the men reached Camp Groce, near Hempstead, Texas, just north of Houston, the division scarcely warranted the name.\(^2^8\)

Word of Lee's surrender on 9 April 1864 reached Kirby Smith and the soldiers of the Trans-Mississippi ten days after the fact. Smith took Lee's surrender to mean that his army would have to redouble their efforts in order to throw off the tyranny of the United States. Calling upon his men to "stand by your colors [and] maintain your discipline," Smith wrote his army on 21 April, that "the crisis of our revolution is at hand." He urged his soldiers to continue the fight, saying that other nations, "who already deeply sympathize with you," would undoubtly send aid. The general's pleas, however, fell on

\(^{27}\text{James Armstrong to Martha Armstrong, 3 August 1864, James Armstrong Letters; Compiled Service Records, reel 372; N. S. Allen Diary, undated entry at the end of the diary.}\)

\(^{28}\text{Compiled Service Records, reel 372; James Armstrong to Martha Armstrong, 1 March 1865, James Armstrong Letters.}\)
deaf ears.\textsuperscript{29}

On 20 April, five days after arriving at Camp Groce, and one day before Smith's proclamation, General Forney granted his soldiers furloughs designed to be their discharge papers. The remaining men of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry gathered their few belongings and began the long trip back to northeast Texas. Their thoughts, like all the musings of returning soldiers, were on friends lost, battlefield victories, national defeat, and a return to the responsibilities of civilian life. In how many minds was the conviction of a surgeon in Walker's division: "I would willingly undergo it again for the sake of our poor bleeding country"?\textsuperscript{30}

In New Orleans two weeks later, before many of the men had returned home, General Kirby Smith accepted the inevitable and surrendered the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. Kirby Smith's army, John Walker's Greyhound division, and Edward Clark's Fourteenth Texas Infantry passed out of existence and into memory.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29}Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, 457.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The men of the Fourteenth Texas volunteered for armed service in the spring of 1862 to serve in former Texas governor Edward Clark’s infantry regiment. These East Texans were assigned to John G. Walker’s infantry division, the only such unit—either Union or Confederate—with all regiments from a single state. This division became known for the long marches it was forced to endure, earning them the sobriquet of “Walker’s Greyhounds.” After their first winter at Camp Nelson, Arkansas, a harsh winter in which disease and unsanitary conditions decimated the division, they began their campaigns against the Union in the spring of 1863.

That year was a time of long marches and demoralizing defeats for the Confederates. Robert E. Lee’s loss at Gettysburg a day before the Confederate fortress of Vicksburg, Mississippi, fell to the Union on 4 July was only the beginning of the long road to defeat for the southern army. The Vicksburg capitulation happened despite a belated rescue attempt by Walker’s division. As a part of Horace Randal’s brigade, the Fourteenth Texas was kept in reserve and did not take part in the battle to relieve Vicksburg. By the end of 1863, after many seemingly meaningless marches around Louisiana, the Fourteenth found itself in central Louisiana, building fortifications for Fort De Russy, along the lower Red River. Southern military leaders were expecting the Union to advance up the Red River as the first stage in an invasion into northeast Texas, designed partly to capture Texas cotton for the factories in New England. The Red River Campaign also served as an arena for securing political rewards for the Lincoln administration in the upcoming presidential election. The use of the army for political purposes was a practice that repeatedly hampered the Union war effort, especially in the Red River Campaign which had, as its overall
commander, the political appointee and militarily-inept Nathaniel P. Banks. Banks and his army began their move up the Red River in early 1864, easily occupying undefended towns along the way. One of the Fourteenth’s own, Lieutenant Colonel William Byrd, was in command of Fort De Russy when the Federals captured the fort on 14 March 1864, setting into motion a Confederate retreat northward toward the headquarters of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department in Shreveport, Louisiana.

After days of constant marching, Confederate General Richard Taylor, the field commander of the southern forces in Louisiana, grew tired of the constant retreat. He bypassed his superior officer, General Edmund Kirby Smith, and made a stand against the Federal army at Mansfield, Louisiana, approximately thirty-seven miles south of Shreveport. On 8 April 1864 the Fourteenth Texas Infantry helped rout the leading units of Banks’s army, capturing many wagonloads of supplies. The next day Taylor again ordered an attack at the town of Pleasant Hill. Though the tactical outcome of the battle was indecisive, strategically the Confederates won, for Banks turned his army around and headed back toward New Orleans. Although Edward Clark’s regiment played an active role in pushing back the Federals, the defeat of the blue army was not without southern casualties. Colonel Clark himself was wounded in his leg, and Company H lost its captain, John Buchan, the only captain killed in battle.

The division’s last battle was 30 April 1864 at Jenkins’ Ferry, Arkansas, another tactical stalemate marred primarily by the deaths of two brigade commanders, Horace Randal and William Scurry. The Union forces did retreat, however, leaving southern Arkansas free from Federal control. Clark’s men stayed in the army for the remainder of the war, though most knew their days of usefulness were over. The official end of the Fourteenth’s military service occurred when General E. K. Smith surrendered the Trans-Mississippi Department in May 1865. Edward Clark’s regiment of infantry had all but dissolved away and had returned to their civilian lives back in East Texas.

The story of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry regiment is not complete with only a
narrative of their Civil War exploits. What type of man was the typical soldier in the Fourteenth Texas Infantry? The men of Clark’s regiment were, on the whole, average citizens of East Texas with strong southern roots. Most of Clark’s men were born in the southern states, two-thirds coming from the Lower South. When the 1,035 men enlisted in 1862, their ages and wealth varied widely. The ages of the men ranged from fourteen to fifty-one. In comparison with other Confederate units, Clark’s men were slightly older. Rich men, and rich men’s sons, joined the regiment beside men of little or no wealth. Three-quarters of the men were engaged in agriculture, extremely common in antebellum eastern Texas, yet the soldiers followed a variety of occupations. Of all the men who joined the Fourteenth to fight for the Confederacy, only a third of them owned slaves, equivalent to the proportion of slaveholders in the entire South.

Within this group of rich and poor, young and old, was the Fourteenth a democratic organization? The word democratic is not used in the traditional sense. A military regiment is inherently undemocratic, as enlisted men and junior officers must obey orders from their superiors. Here, democratic is meant to illustrate that any man, regardless of social and economic standing, was able to move through the ranks and achieve officer status. In this case, all evidence points toward open access to officer status. When the soldiers cast their first vote for the officers, they usually chose their recruiting officers, generally notable men from the region. These newly elected officers were generally wealthier than the enlisted men. When the conscription act forced a second vote, however, men of wealth did not necessarily win the positions. The men of Company B elected a new captain whose wealth was higher than that of the previous captain; companies I and H elected men who were poorer. Age did not seem to matter in the selection of captains during the reorganization election. None of the original officers in Company H returned. In their place, the men of Company H elected John F. Buchan, a twenty-four-year-old man who lived with his parents, the youngest captain of the regiment. The average age of the second set of officers for Company H dropped ten years from the average age of the first set. What these
examples indicate is that younger and poorer men did have opportunities to become officers.

Did slaveownership make a difference as to who joined the regiment and fought in the Confederate army? Of all the men who joined the Fourteenth, only 34.0 percent owned slaves. Thirty-seven percent of the heads of household owned at least one slave. Both of these figures were similar to the East Texas region and other Texas units that enlisted in 1862. Moreover, across the entire South, slaveowners made up only a third of the population, making the Fourteenth’s percentage equivalent to the rest of the Confederacy. There were some Texas units, like the Third Texas Cavalry, that had a disproportionate number of slaveowners compared to the region, but these units were not representative of the region. Slaveownership in the Fourteenth, therefore, coincided with regional and Confederacy-wide slaveownership figures, having little bearing on who joined the unit. The men of the Fourteenth joined the unit just as one could have predicted.

Did slaveholders, or their sons, have an advantage in becoming officers? The answer to this question, unlike that regarding wealth, is yes. Of the twenty men who were the original captains and those who became captain as a result of the conscription act, twelve, or 60.0 percent, owned at least one slave. This 60.0 percent is almost double the percentage of slaveholders among the heads of household (60.0 to 37.0) and the slaveholders among the entire regiment (60.0 to 34.0). Therefore, judging from these data, slaveownership seemed to increase a man’s possibility of becoming an officer. The number of slaves owned, however, did not seem to increase an individual’s chances of becoming an officer. Of the men who became captains, either original or post-conscription, nine slaves was the highest number for any one man. The men who owned the greatest number of slaves all became privates. Even Dr. W. C. Swanson, one of the richest slaveowners in all of the state, did not wield enough influence to make his son anything other than a private. Thus, slaveownership increased the chances that a man might be elected to the officer’s ranks, but number of slaves owned nor wealth guaranteed
an officer's commission.

If the men of the Fourteenth were similar to other East Texans and other Civil War soldiers in terms of civilian statistics, their experience in the military was markedly different. The relatively small number of combat deaths is significant, directly attributable to the Fourteenth's limited battle experience. The division fought in five true battles, but Clark's men were in only three. The regiment was mustered into service during the second year of the war, and the entire life of Clark's unit was in the Trans-Mississippi, away from the bloody carnage of the eastern and western theaters. Indeed, the regiment's first battle was almost exactly one year before the end of the war. Moreover, in the forested countryside of Louisiana and Arkansas, the use of artillery was limited, reducing casualties from that source. The low percentage of battle casualties of the Fourteenth, as well as other units that fought in the Trans-Mississippi, is directly attributable to the lower level of campaigning in the west.

Soldiers in the 1860s and historians ever since have wondered whether the Civil War was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight." For the Fourteenth Texas Infantry, the answer is no. Men of all economic and social stations joined Edward Clark's regiment of infantry. Once in the regiment, a remarkable display of democracy emerged. Any man, regardless of social position, had a chance to become an officer. All economic and social groups suffered the ravages of war—inefficient diet, disease, crowded camps, interminable marches—together.¹

For the men of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry, the Civil War was not a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight" but an everyman's war and an everyman's fight. The men who made up the Fourteenth Texas Infantry came from all walks of life to create a unit to fight their common enemy and protect their homes and families. Unlike the nation for which they

¹In other Confederate units, the number of combat casualties helps to answer the question. The small number of actual combat casualties for the Fourteenth eliminates the possibility of systematic quantitative analysis of class and casualties.
fought, these men had been successful, yet they still had to live with Confederate defeat. As their colonel, Edward Clark, wrote in 1862, the men of the Fourteenth were "the best material which the state affords."  

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2 Compiled Service Records, reel 372.
METHODOLOGY

Data collection for the study of the unit entailed the use of many sources, including the compiled service records of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry; the population, slave, and agricultural schedules of the 1860 United States Census for Texas; tax rolls for the appropriate counties; casualty lists from contemporary newspapers; and other historical material gathered at various historical sites.

In 1903 the United States War Department began to organize all of the Confederate and Union records according to regiment. This process continued until its completion in the late 1920s. For the Confederacy's regiments, the War Department used Confederate War Department papers, muster rolls, payrolls, rosters, medical records, prisoner of war records, inspection reports, and other types of documents to create a summary of each soldier's service. Unfortunately, the loss and destruction of many Confederate records left many southern records incomplete. This was the case with the Fourteenth Texas Infantry; their records were spotty at best. With the exception of occasional records at the war's end, they stopped inexplicably with the January/February 1864 muster roll.¹

The service records of the Fourteenth Texas Infantry yielded 1,118 men as part of the unit. The information gathered for each soldier from the Compiled Service Records were name, company, enlistment date, late date of record, enlistment age, enlistment rank, last rank of record, casualties, and the state in which the casualty occurred. This

¹Henry Putney Beers, The Confederacy: A Guide to the Archives of the government of the Confederate States of America (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1986), 404-5, 407. The company muster rolls were for a two-month period beginning November/December 1862. October 1862 was the only single-month muster roll.
information was entered into two large paper binders. There was only one noticeable deficiency, that being the 267 men (or 23.9 percent) who lacked an enlistment age.

Eighty-three of these cases are easily explained, because the records for First Company K, a unit included with the Fourteenth Texas Infantry but which saw action as part of the Seventeenth Texas Cavalry, listed no information other than names. If First Company K is excluded, the percentage of missing enlistment ages becomes 16.5, an acceptable figure. There were only ninety-three (8.3 percent) records with missing enlistment counties, and there were 10.2 percent missing enlistment dates.

After the completion of the two binders of service information, the population schedule of the 1860 United States Census for Texas was consulted. This schedule—arranged by state, then county, and finally, by beat, or district, number—contains much useful information, including name, age, profession, values of real estate and personal property, place of birth, whether the individual was married, a head of household, living with his parents, and whether the person could read or was attending school. An index for the 1860 census lists county and town of residence and the page number in the census where that person can be found. Unfortunately, the index is often incorrect. A larger problem involved soldiers who lived with their parents. The researcher’s only hope of finding them was to look in the index under the soldier’s surname and try to match the county of residence. Luckily, the enlistment county in 1862 was often the county of residence in 1860, but there were a few exceptions. For best results, this researcher made lists of the soldiers by enlistment counties and then searched the pertinent counties page by page, usually finding many on the list by the end of the pagination. Particularly for Harrison and Smith Counties, most of the men of a certain company lived in roughly the same place in 1860. For example, the men of Company H lived in northeast Harrison
County, while Company C's soldiers lived in Flora, Smith County. The differences in the spelling of surnames between the service records and the census caused occasional problems—Dan Dapelmayer (Dopplemayer), for instance—but none that seriously hampered the search. Despite the problems associated with this search, information from the manuscript returns of the census was found regarding 525 men, a percentage of 50.7. This percentage is comparable with other studies that use 1860 census data. Because data for some soldiers could not be located, the data and conclusions for this study are based on the group of 525 “found men.”

The agricultural schedule for 1860 was canvassed after the search through the population census. This schedule lists all the farm operators of a certain county—usually arranged by beat numbers—and records the number of improved and unimproved acres, the value of the farm, the number of livestock, and a report of crops and other farm products generated by the farmer. The only data from this schedule used here were the number of improved acres, the total number of acres—derived by adding the number of improved and unimproved acres—and farm value. As in the slave schedule, sometimes a person was discovered in the agriculture schedule but not found in the population census.

After the agriculture schedule, the slave census was examined. This schedule simply lists the slaveholder's name and how many slaves he owned. Occasionally, a soldier was found who was not located in the census. Only 172 cases (15.4 percent of located men) owned slaves, as listed in the slave schedule and tax rolls. The county tax

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rolls often listed the number of slaves as different from that on the slave schedule. Because the researcher desired consistency and believed that a slaveholder could have more slaves to his name—perhaps on land in an adjacent county—the tax rolls were the final authority in regard to the number of slaves a person owned. Through use of both the agricultural and slave schedules, categorization by beat numbers sometimes aided in finding a person missed in the population census.

The last source of quantitative data was the county tax rolls. These microfilm rolls are arranged by county and then by year. The classification of these records is alphabetically by surname, with additional lists of those who owned any property in a different county. For every person found in any of the three census schedules, the tax rolls for 1860 were examined first, followed by 1861 and 1862 if necessary. The types of data on these records include total taxable income, acreage owned, number of slaves owned, and taxes assessed. For this study, the only applicable numbers were the total taxable income and number of slaves. Only 277 (24.8 percent) of the men were found in the tax rolls.

Measurements for enlistment county, place of birth, enlistment age, and occupation include all the found men. For heads of households—the group on which the major conclusions of this study are based—the following characteristics were examined: enlistment age, marital status, real and personal estate, taxable income, slaveowning status, the number of slaves held, farmer status, improved acres, unimproved acres, total acres, and the cash values of farms. To complete the portrait of the men of the Fourteenth, the data for the heads of households are compared to the data for those soldiers who were dependent children and those who were not household heads. If a soldier was twenty years old or younger and living with his parents, the wealth figures for the father, or other
head of household, were counted. For any soldier twenty-one or older and still living at home, only the data directly pertaining to the soldier were recorded in the database. In short, for this group of men, any data for the parents was not included. This could explain some discrepancies in the above percentages, notably the tax rolls. After all these sources were examined, the data were entered into a computer. The statistics program SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) for Windows was used to manage the data.

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