


Fort Indiantown Gap



**A Key Department of Defense
Training Resource**

Accessible Suitable Affordable

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Military Value of Fort Indiantown Gap

1. The data used in the Army's military value analysis does not include some significant training facilities such as tank crew qualification ranges, automated air-to-ground bombing and strafing ranges, and the value of low-level flight routes which lead into a Military Operations Area (MOA) - airspace which is dedicated to military aircraft operations. These facilities all exist at the Gap and significantly contribute to its military value to the DOD, not just the Army.
2. The Army clearly did not fully understand the complexity and value of the aviation aspects of the Gap to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition, the Army's analysis of military value did not include training conducted by other services. In fact, the other services were not queried as to their training requirements at the Gap. The Marine Corps Reserves, the Air Force (both active and reserve), the Navy (both active and reserve) all train at the installation and on the bombing and strafing range. This range is part of an integrated series of ranges in the eastern U.S. The loss of any of them would overload the other ranges and severely degrade the training of the aviation units in the other services all of which use these ranges. In addition, international students are trained at the flight simulator complex as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.
3. The Army did not consider the Northern Training Area at Fort Indiantown Gap, a maneuver rights area of 710 square miles, which is used for Army Aviation training. The Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS), located at the Gap, is the second largest Army Aviation training facility in the country. It is a critical part of the Army's overall aviation training program. The land used for this training was not considered in the analysis of military value since ground maneuver is restricted within most of this area. Army aviation is a key component of the three-dimensional maneuver of the modern Army, to not recognize the value of this aviation maneuver area is in direct conflict of current Army maneuver doctrine. When this maneuver area is considered, the military ranking of the Gap in the Major Training Area category increases from ninth out of ten to third out of ten in the DOD Major Training Area category.
4. The Army's military value analysis was based on data elements which were specified by the Army and received from all installations. However, the data does not include several primary factors relevant to reserve component units; the accessibility to a given training site, the suitability of proposed alternate training sites for specific units and training, and the affordability (additional transportation costs) of moving training to more distant locations.

5. The Army used an analytical model called TRAINLOAD to determine to which installations reserve component annual training could be moved. This analysis is flawed in that its results are based on a 12 month availability of reserve component units for annual training. In reality, these units are limited to the May to September time frame due to the 15-20 percent of their soldiers who are in school during the September - May time frame. When the annual training period is thus compressed, the proposed alternate training sites (Fort Drum, Fort Dix, and Fort AP Hill) are not able to take the additional training load.

6. Two of the proposed alternate training sites have limitations on the kind of training which can be conducted. Neither Fort Dix or Fort AP Hill have tank crew qualification ranges, only one mechanized battalion can maneuver at Fort Dix at one time, AP Hill is unsuitable for mechanized training due to the density of the vegetation and limited number of tank trails, there are limitations on artillery firing at Dix and AP Hill, and AP Hill does not have a National Guard equipment site with tanks, armored personnel carriers and self propelled artillery. To create an equipment site would require extensive environmental studies, and the costs of the new construction were not considered in the Army's COBRA analysis. Thus, the Army erred in that the proposed sites cannot meet all existing training requirements of the units which currently train at the Gap.

7. The additional transportation costs of moving training to these sites was not considered in the Army's COBRA analysis. The cost is estimated at \$1.6 million annually for just the Army National Guard. The Army Basing Study's position is that they assume these costs will be funded by the Army. The reality is that the Army National Guard transportation accounts have been decreasing steadily for a number of years. Only by transferring money from other accounts (such as operations and maintenance) will the additional transportation costs be covered. This will lead to a decrease in readiness.

8. The impact of an increased training load on the alternate training sites also was not a part of the Army's analysis. The affected installation were not consulted. The increased training load will adversely affect range and training facility maintenance and increase existing environmental problems in training areas.

9. If the DOD recommendations were implemented, the Commonwealth would be responsible for environmental issues and safety on the ranges, in the training areas, and for the air space. This is clearly a Federal responsibility as the troops and units training there are Federal forces. In addition, the responsibility for the training of international military personnel would also fall on the Governor as the operator of the installation. This is clearly a DOD responsibility.

10. Under the DOD recommendation, training and readiness of all affected reserve component units would suffer. For many units the Annual Training period would be reduced by two additional days as additional travel days would be required to get to the proposed training sites.

11. The DOD recommendation is based on inaccurate and incomplete data which seriously under estimates the military value of the Gap, not only for the Army but for the other services. If implemented, the recommendation would result in the needless loss of a valuable training facility, a degradation in the training and readiness of many reserve component units, increased transportation costs to units with the funds coming from existing operations and maintenance accounts, and the shift of what should clearly be a Federal responsibility for the training of Federal troops to the Governor and the Commonwealth.

12. As a result of its high military value, Fort Indiantown Gap should be taken off the closure list.

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DA WASHINGTON DC //DAIM-ZA//
CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFCS//
CDRTRADOC FT MONROE //ATCS//
CDRAMC ALEX VA //AMCENT/AMCCS//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA //MTCS//
CDRUSAMEDCOM FT SAM HOUSTON TX
CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI //APCS/
CDRMDW WASHINGTON DC //ANCS//
CDRINSCOM ARLINGTON VA //IACS//
CDRISC FT HUACHUCA AZ //ATZS-CS//
CDRIDC FALLS CHURCH VA //CIGG-CS//
CNGB WASH DC//NGB-ZA//
OCAR WASH DC//DAAR-ZA//
CDR7THSIGCOD FT RITCHIE MD //ASCS/ASDN-OP-BRC//
CDRUSACE WASHINGTON DC //CEMP-M/CEMP-RI/CERE-M//
ZEN US ARMY CENTER FOR PUBLIC WORKS
INFO ARSTAF
DLA CAMERON STA VA//MMD//
DBRW STOCKTON CA//D//

SUBJECT: BRAC 95 PROGRAM EXECUTING GUIDANCE MSG * 2 (RC ENCLAVES)

RON GREENWELL-MAJ-DAIM-BO-693-7556

MG JOHN H. LITTLE-DAIM-BO-693-3233

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A. MSG DAIM-ZA, 311535 MAR 75, S: BRAC 75 PROGRAM EXECUTION GUIDANCE

B. HQDA MEMORANDUM DTD 25 OCT 91, S: ESTABLISHMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE AND RELOCATION OF ACTIVITIES ON ARMY INSTALLATIONS


1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THE ARMY LEADERSHIP WITH REGARDS TO THE BRAC 75 RECOMMENDATIONS ON RESERVE COMPONENT (USAR AND NG) ENCLAVES. THE ARMY'S INTENT REGARDING RC ENCLAVES IS TO ALLOW RC UNITS TO RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES (SEE PARA 5) AND MANEUVER/TRAINING AREAS. FURTHERMORE, THE ARMY'S INTENT IS FOR ANNUAL TRAINING TO BE CONDUCTED AT OTHER-THAN-CLOSING INSTALLATIONS. THE FOLLOWING BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE RC ENCLAVES AS ORIGINALLY COORDINATED WITH OCAR AND NGB:

Cost of Travel AT Plans for 96-20. Can AT Sites meet our training needs and time frame

A. CLOSE FORT PICKETT. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ARMY INTENT IS TO HAVE A NATIONAL GUARD AND U.S. ARMY RESERVE PRESENCE AT FORT PICKETT IN AN RC ENCLAVE AS FOLLOWS: CONSOLIDATE THE ARMY RESERVE INTO PERMANENT FACILITIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE USAR AND THE GUARD INTO THOSE FACILITIES LICENSED TO THE VIRGINIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. ARMY WILL LICENSE NEEDED TRAINING AREA WITH MINIMUM NECESSARY FACILITIES TO THE VIRGINIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. ANNUAL TRAINING CAN BE CONDUCTED AT OTHER INSTALLATIONS. THE ARMY WILL DISPOSE OF ALL REMAINING

(can be not will be)

If FIG is enclosed can we still conduct A who is the approving authority for AT sites

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FACILITIES.

B. REALIGN FORT HUNTER LIGGETT. INSTALLATION LOSES ACTIVE MISSION. FORT HUNTER LIGGETT REMAINS A USAR-OPERATED INSTALLATION. DISPOSE OF FACILITIES NO LONGER REQUIRED.

C. REALIGN FORT DIX. REPLACE ACTIVE COMPONENT GARRISON WITH USAR GARRISON. RETAIN ONLY THOSE FACILITIES, RANGES, AND TRAINING AREA NECESSARY FOR RC TRAINING AND AREA SUPPORT. CONTINUE TO LICENSE FACILITIES CURRENTLY LICENSED TO THE NEW JERSEY ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. DISPOSE OF REMAINING FACILITIES.

Does this relate to AT Con are refer AT support.

D. CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF DARBY USAR CENTER AND CONSOLIDATION INTO FACILITIES FOR USAR (APPROXIMATELY 450K SF) WITH SEVERAL RANGES REQUIRED BY USAR AND FACILITIES LICENSED TO ARKANSAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. LICENSE NEEDED TRAINING AREA WITH MINIMUM NECESSARY FACILITIES TO ARKANSAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. ANNUAL TRAINING CAN BE CONDUCTED AT OTHER INSTALLATIONS. DISPOSE OF REMAINING FACILITIES.

E. CLOSE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF FACILITIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE RESERVE COMPONENTS. ANNUAL TRAINING CAN BE CONDUCTED AT OTHER INSTALLATIONS.

This means branches area will be eliminated. No other changes. AT "Con be" not must be - AT Approving authority

F. CLOSE FORT MCCLELLAN. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ARMY RESERVE

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ENCLAVE INCLUDES NICHOLS USAR CENTER AND ONE FACILITY FOR MAINTENANCE AND STORAGE. LICENSE PELHAM RANGE WITH MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES (TO INCLUDE THOSE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES LOCATED ON THE MAIN POST) TO ALABAMA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.

G. REALIGN FORT BUCHANAN. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF FACILITIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY RC, AAFES, COMMISSARY, AND ANTILLES CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL PLUS LAND FOR PROGRAMMED RC CONSTRUCTION.

H. REALIGN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER. USAR ENCLAVE. RESERVE ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF CONSOLIDATION INTO FOUR FACILITIES (BUILDING IDENTIFICATION 306/IL047, 307/IL048, 203-213/IL049, AND 333/IL165) AND 47K SF OF STORAGE SPACE CURRENTLY ON PERMIT FROM PRICE (APPROXIMATELY 22 ACRES).

I. CLOSE FORT TOTTEN. USAR ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF CONSOLIDATION INTO EXISTING PYLE RESERVE CENTER AND MAINT/STORAGE BUILDING (APPROXIMATELY 303K SF & APPROXIMATELY 42 ACRES).

J. CLOSE FITZSIMMONS MEDICAL. USAR ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF MCWETHY ARMY RESERVE CENTER AND ADDITIONAL BUILDINGS #317 AND #824 (69.7K SF) AND APPROXIMATELY 18 ACRES.

K. CLOSE FORT MISSOULA. USAR AND NG ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF SGT ERNEST VEUVE HALL USARC AND FOUR OTHER BUILDINGS (#25, #26, #105,

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- AND #150) (APPROXIMATELY 73K SF & APPROXIMATELY 10 ACRES).
- L. CLOSE CAMP PEDRICKTOWN. USAR ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF SEVERS-SANDBERG RESERVE CENTER AND SIX OTHER BUILDINGS (APPROXIMATELY 140K SF & APPROXIMATELY 22 ACRES).
- M. CLOSE CAMP KILMER. USAR ENCLAVE. ENCLAVE CONSISTS OF KILMER RESERVE CENTER AND BLDGS 1065 & 1066 (APPROXIMATELY 165K SF & APPROXIMATELY 27.5 ACRES).
- N. CLOSE FORT RITCHIE. NG ENCLAVE. CONTINUE TO LICENSE EXISTING PROPERTY TO MARYLAND NATIONAL GUARD FOR ITS ARMORY.
- O. CLOSE RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT. NG ENCLAVE. CONTINUE TO LICENSE 10 ACRES TO THE TEXAS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.
- P. IN THE CASE OF USAR COMPONENTS LOCATED ON NON-ARMY HOST INSTALLATIONS (SUCH AS THE CASE AT DLA'S DEFENSE DEPOT OGDEN, UTAH), THE CREATION OF AN ENCLAVE MUST FIRST BE COORDINATED WITH THE HOST SERVICE/AGENCY PRIOR TO THE 9 MAY 1995 RC SUBMISSION, SPECIFIED IN PARA 10A OF THIS MESSAGE.
- Q. REF A PROVIDES SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ENCLAVES. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE:
- R. IAW PARA 4J, REF A, ENCLAVES SHOULD BE CONTIGUOUS, USING EXISTING FACILITIES WHEREVER POSSIBLE. IF A SUITABLE FOOTPRINT CANNOT BE

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Would War II Barracks vs. permanent construction - Could this be a BRAC Cost work already done by Russia in this area

BASED ENTIRELY ON EXISTING FACILITIES THEN NEW CONSTRUCTION MAY BE CONSIDERED WHEN THERE IS A COMPELLING NEED. BRAC FUNDS MAY BE USED FOR RENOVATING FACILITIES FOR EXISTING ON POST RC ACTIVITIES RETAINED IN THE ENCLAVE, BUT ONLY WHERE RELOCATION TO A DIFFERENT FACILITY IS REQUIRED AND THE VACATED FACILITY IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE ENCLAVE. RENOVATION WILL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN FOR ACTIVITIES REMAINING IN PLACE.

Can we allow a relocation of activities. I.E. move air second from Area 2. Take Area 1+ out of the Enclave

B. ENCLAVES WILL BE PLANNED TO MINIMIZE COSTS TO THE ARMY.
C. ENCLAVES WILL BE DESIGNED TO BE SELF SUFFICIENT FOR UTILITIES AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN CONSONANCE WITH THE PLAN FOR PRIVATIZATION (DIVESTITURE) OF THE UTILITIES AT THE CLOSING INSTALLATION.

Russia: have there been any preliminary estimates or coordination

4. ALL RECURRING FUNDING REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE MISSION & OPERATIONS OF THE ENCLAVE MUST BE PROGRAMMED THROUGH RPBS BY THE APPROPRIATE COMPONENT APPROPRIATION.

5. PLANS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BASED ON NO EXPECTED GROWTH IN OMAR & FMNG FUNDING LEVELS.

6. IN COORDINATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE MACOMs, OCAR AND NGB WILL EVALIDATE THEIR RC ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS IAW THE REVISED TIMELINES ESTABLISHED IN PARA 10, AND SUBMIT TO HQDA, ODCSOPS (DAMO-FDO).

PLANNING

7. 1383'S FOR INSTALLATIONS WITH RC ENCLAVES ARE DUE TO AEC NLT 30

*NGB already seeking info
① AT Travel and Cost Estimate
② Map of FIG Enclave and area already sent to NGB*



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FIG included, can we use this to our advantage?

By saying we must include entire post as we limit any improvement

MAY 1995. THIS ADJUSTED SUBMISSION DATE AFFECTS ONLY THOSE INSTALLATIONS LISTED IN PARA 1.

8. ANY SPECIFIC ISSUES OR CONCERNS THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE MACOM LEVEL SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE APPROPRIATE PROGRAM MANAGER AT DAIM-BO.

9. FORSCOM WILL SUBMIT TO HQDA, DAIM-BO, NO LATER THAN 30 MAY 95 A TRAINING CONCEPT WITH FUTURE ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES FOR ALL RC UNITS THAT CURRENTLY TRAIN AT CLOSING INSTALLATIONS. FORSCOM WILL VALIDATE EXPANSION OF ARMY RESERVE ECS FACILITIES AT DESIGNATED MOBILIZATION STATIONS.

10. REVISED TIMELINES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. 9 MAY 95: RC SUBMISSION TO MACOM/COPY TO HQDA, ATTN: DAMO-FDO.
- B. 30 MAY 95: MACOM SUBMISSION OF PACKETS/COMMENTS TO DAMO-FDO.
- C. 30 MAY 95: MACOM SUBMISSION OF RC LEBE'S TO AEC.
- D. 1 JUN 95: LEBE'S DUE TO HQDA.
- E. 15 JUN 95: COUNCIL OF COLONELS SCHEDULED AT DA.
- F. 6 JUL 95: FINAL SUBMISSION OF RC ENCLAVE REQUESTS.
- G. 13 JUL 95: DA GOSC (TENTATIVE)
- H. 25 JUL 95: MACOM IMPLEMENTATION PLANS DUE TO HQDA, DAIM-BO.
- 11. THE ARMY'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP IS DEDICATED TO AN ACCELERATED

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
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BRAC 75 PROGRAM. PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RC ENCLAVES
REQUIRES TEAMWORK AT ALL LEVELS.

IE. FOCS ARE MAJ RON GREENWELL, DAMO-60 (703-693-7556)- AND MAJ
IRENE BAUSS, DAMO-F00 (703-693-8056).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fort Indiantown Gap

Fort Indiantown is a small, but superb installation, located in the center of a very large reserve component population. There are more than 30,000 in Pennsylvania alone, and within 200 miles, there are 57,000 that rely on this installation for training. It is the second most heavily used Major Training Area by the reserve component in the nation, and the most cost effective per training manday. To the force structure which trains there it is the most accessible installation, the most suitable for the mission essential training of the force, and the most affordable. It has an annual budget of \$13.5 million dollars.

The Secretary of Defense has recommended that the Gap be closed except for a small portion of a few buildings and the training areas and ranges which would be enclaved for reserve component training purposes. The cantonment area and its infrastructure would be closed down and the overhead costs of operating it saved. Troops coming for weekend training would go directly to the field and all annual training at the installation would be shifted to distant out-of-state posts.

The results of the COBRA analysis indicate that by eliminating the cost of the infrastructure, \$23 million dollars could be saved annually. This analysis was seriously flawed since the total budget is but \$13.5 million dollars. Upon being notified, the TABS study group conducted a further "sensitivity analysis" which now claims \$11.6 of the \$13.5 million dollar budget could be saved annually. This analysis was also seriously flawed. It provided no funds for the necessary operation of the infrastructure and failed to consider the added \$2 to \$4 million dollars for out-of-state travel.

An independent analysis of military value using corrected and updated data elements resulted in the ranking of Fort Indiantown Gap changing from 9th to 3rd in the Major Training Area category. Details are contained herein.

Unlike most other reserve component training bases, there are almost 3,000 people on the installation every day. They are workers, the units stationed there, the soldiers there for schoolhouse training. The facilities, functions, and activities which they use and conduct are distributed across the entire installation. These facilities, functions, and activities will remain as the Army has determined the cost of moving them as prohibitive. Accordingly, the enclave proposal as applied to the Gap is unworkable and operationally impractical. The costs of operating the infrastructure must be incurred and therefore no savings will result from the Secretary's proposal.

The Gap has the highest military value to the force structure which it supports because of its accessibility, suitability, and affordability. All of the weapons of a mechanized division are fired on its ranges. It has a Tank and Bradley qualification range, an aerial bombing and strafing range used by all services, active and reserve, and the second largest army aviation training facility in the nation used by both active and reserve component units and aviators. It has an 11 mile training corridor in which an entire dismounted brigade can maneuver.

The Secretary's proposal, if adopted, will create extraordinary turbulence and disruption in the operation of the post, and in the training and readiness of the force structure which uses it. Closing the cantonment area will deprive the soldier of all of the quality of life features of the installation.

Every aspect of training and readiness will be adversely affected by this proposal.

The Secretary's proposal does not achieve the goal of eliminating excess facilities, excess property, or excess overhead. Since the entire post must be operated there will be no savings.

The Secretary's proposal deviates in a very substantial way from the selection criteria in several significant areas which are detailed in the materials before the Commission.

The Secretary's proposal does not pass the dollar test not the common sense test. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the base should be removed from the list.

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION
SUBMISSION TO THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND
CLOSURE COMMISSION
ON BEHALF OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP**

**THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT
THE PROPOSED ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE SELECTION CRITERIA, IN THAT:**

**1. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER ONE - CURRENT AND FUTURE
MISSION REQUIREMENTS:**

a. It destroys one of the Army's most cost effective training sites, and substitutes an unworkable enclave concept which denies the Pennsylvania 30,000 man force structure and the 13 other states which send RC units of an adequate training base.

b. It is not consistent with the training, operational, and readiness requirements of the force structure.

c. It does not reduce excess property, does not close excess facilities, and does not cut excess overhead costs.

d. It adversely impacts on every aspect of the training and readiness of the Pennsylvania force structure.

e. It needlessly takes away all of the soldier quality of life facilities, lowering soldier morale, readiness, and reenlistment rates.

f. It fails to recognize that almost all functions, training sites and activities will remain and require the operation of the entire infrastructure.

g. It creates substantial new travel costs by unnecessarily taking away the annual training mission of the installation.

h. It causes a loss of four training days of the 15 available by requiring travel for annual training to distant posts adversely affecting training and readiness.

2. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER TWO - AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF LAND AND FACILITIES:

a. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the Gap's accessibility, suitability for mission essential training, affordability, heavy usage and cost effectiveness.

b. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the heavily used, extensive aviation maneuver area of some 710 square miles, a national asset.

c. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the table VIII tank range, also a national asset, as it is only one of three such ranges in the northeastern region of the nation.

d. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the fully funded and designed automated rifle ranges comprising 32 firing points.

e. It proposes an inefficient and wasteful use of one of the Army's most heavily used and cost effective training bases in limiting the base to weekend use while denying it's long conducted annual training mission.

f. It fails to consider the substantial new construction and demolition work which has taken place since the data call, significantly increasing the square footage of permanent building facilities.

3. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER THREE - ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION, AND FUTURE TOTAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS:

a. It fails to consider the costs of moving mobilization facilities to alternate sites.

4. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER FOUR - COST AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS:

a. It fails in its Trainload analysis which uses throughput on an annual basis rather than limiting it to optimal reserve component training months, i.e. May through September.

b. It fails in its Trainload analysis to consider the very substantial and additional costs of travel to send Pennsylvania and other RC units to alternate annual training sites.

c. It fails to recognize that the infrastructure of the base must be retained and operated, and fails to consider the costs and manpower implications of the continuance of the infrastructure operation.

5. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER FIVE - EXTENT AND TIMING OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS:

a. It fails in its claimed annual savings of \$23 million dollars which was seriously in error as the annual cost of operation is but \$13.5 million dollars.

b. It fails in its claims of a return on first year and return on twenty year investments which were in error and also seriously flawed.

c. It fails in its sensitivity analysis by claiming an annual savings of \$11.2 million dollars of the \$13.5 million dollar annual operating budget. This was seriously flawed in its failure to consider the costs of maintaining and operating the required infrastructure.

d. It fails in creating projected savings by using a Department of the Army average \$47,000 dollars per year civilian salary rather than the site specific salary of \$27,000 dollars in its cost savings estimate. This was done in spite of the fact that a DoD Joint Process Action Team (JPAT) recommended in their report of suggested changes to the COBRA model for the 1995 BRAC that site specific civilian pay data be used to project the cost savings.

e. It proposes a more expensive and less efficient operation as the infrastructure costs must be incurred and adds thereto significant costs of travel.

f. It fails to consider the unique and exceptional costs which could be incurred in the termination or renegotiation of the land lease held by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

6. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA SIX - ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES:

a. It fails to accurately portray the economic impact since the Metropolitan Statistical Area used in the COBRA analysis does not correctly reflect where the installation's workforce lives and therefore, skews the actual impact on unemployment rates especially in Schuylkill county where the rate changes from 8.7 percent to 9.3 percent.

7. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER SEVEN - ABILITY OF BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING COMMUNITIE'S INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT FORCES, MISSION, AND PERSONNEL:

a. It fails in proposing to send units for annual training to bases that are not suitable, e.g., Fort A.P. Hill, and Fort Dix, for the required mission essential training.

b. It fails in its Trainload analysis to determine that Fort Drum and Fort Pickett are at annual training capacity and cannot accept additional forces for annual training during the prime reserve component training period.

8. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER EIGHT - ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:

a. It fails to consider the implications of the lease of the land from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the special environmental clean-up and restoration obligations thereunder.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

It is therefore respectfully recommended that the Commission reject the proposed action of the Secretary of Defense because of the multiple and substantial deviations from the Department's BRAC selection criteria, that the base be removed from the list and that operation of the base continue as heretofore.

**PENNSYLVANIA
GUARD and RESERVE
POPULATION**



**ONE OF THE LARGEST GUARD AND
RESERVE POPULATIONS IN THE NATION**

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Army National Guard	18,900
U. S. Army Reserve	10,250
Air National Guard	<u>4,500</u>
TOTAL	33,650


THEY ALL USE THE GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap has been a military training installation since 1932. The Gap is located in the blue mountains of Pennsylvania, twenty miles northeast of the state capital - Harrisburg. It has served as a mobilization site for every war beginning with World War II and now is primarily a training base for the Department of Defense.

Pennsylvania has one of the largest Guard and Army Reserve populations in the nation. These are our Guard, our Reserve, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. We have a very personal interest in them, their training and their readiness.

The Gap is a no frills, low cost, ideally located and essential major training base.


It is not Redundant and not Replaceable.



The Gap is an ideally located place to train soldiers.

These Reserve Component members are stationed throughout the state of Pennsylvania. Within 200 miles of the Gap there are nearly 57,000 Reserve Component members.

The Gap is the only training installation in Pennsylvania for our units. The stated justification for the secretary's recommendation is that the force structure in Pennsylvania has been reduced to the extent that the Gap is "Excess Infrastructure" clearly lacks merit, considering the large training population that must rely on it and its location to rail, air and sea ports.



The Gap has been compared with bases throughout the nation. However, the majority of the force structure it supports is located in Pennsylvania, and unlike active army units, reserve members cannot be moved about. These forces must be supported from and train near their homes.

1. Fort Indiantown Gap submitted and Installation Assessment through the chain of command to Department of the Army in May 1994. The data in this assessment was used by the Total Army Basing Study (TABS) in its analysis of the installations in the Major Training Area category. This analysis resulted in Fort Indiantown Gap ranking 9th out of the 10 installations in this category.

2. Subsequent to the data submission, several things occurred which alter the data originally submitted to Department of the Army. Using the same model as TABS, an independent analysis was accomplished with the following data elements changed.

- * Annual Train Days - The number of days was changed from 30,789 to 32,995.
- * IDT (Mandays) - The number of days was changed from 197,198 to 288,130.
- * Mobilization billets - This data element was changed from 10,500 to 25,288.
- * Maneuver Acres - This figure was changed from 11,000 acres to 235,250 acres.

This is due to the inclusion of the aviation Northern Training Area (710 square miles) as a maneuver rights area under a current Memorandum of Agreement.

3. The result in installation ranking differs significantly when using this newer data at Fort Indiantown Gap. Its ranking changes from 9th to 3rd in the Major Training Area category.

Cost Effectiveness

(cost per training mandays)
Data from 1995 TABS

	<u>Total Training Days</u>	<u>Cost/Manday</u>
Fort Indiantown Gap	659,033	\$ 51.60
(More Accurate Data Shows):	783,055	\$ 17.37
Fort Pickett	309,888	\$ 62.20
Fort Dix	533,237	\$130.77
Fort Chaffee	155,058	\$ 64.52
Fort Greely	2,309	\$5,940.67
Fort Hunter Liggett	50,460	\$201.37
Fort McCoy	958,201	\$ 70.26
Fort A P Hill	537,352	\$ 16.76

GAP - ARMY'S BEST BARGAIN

The Gap is one of the most cost effective DoD installation in the nation. This, combined with its large number of individual training days, make it critical to the training and readiness of DoD forces in the Northeast. As the slide indicates, when using accurate cost data it is even clearer that it is the Army's and DoD's BEST bargain.

CLOSE, EXCEPT "ENCLAVE"

- THE VAST MAJORITY OF MISSIONS CEASE OR RELOCATED
- 95% OF PERSONNEL ELIMINATED OR RELOCATED
- ALL BUT A SMALL PORTION OF BASE EXCESSED
- SMALL PORTION REMAINING WILL BE FACILITIES IN AN "ENCLAVE" FOR USE BY RESERVE COMPONENTS
- ACTIVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT CEASES
- UNMANNED RANGES AND TRAINING AREAS RETAINED FOR RESERVE COMPONENT USE

ENCLAVE THEORY NOT PRACTICAL

The recommendation of the Secretary of Defense is to "Close Fort Indiantown Gap except for minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave".

You will find that Fort Indiantown Gap can not be placed within the context of the definition of "close except".

Most of the units and training institutions currently at the Gap will remain should the Active Component garrison leave. The Army concluded in its analysis that it would be cost prohibitive to relocate all the units, schools, and training currently conducted at the Gap to other DoD installations.

In order to operate the infrastructure, we will require the skilled workforce we presently have. Even if the Active Component garrison leave, the requirement for and overhead costs of running the post and its infrastructure will still be there. This undermines the very basis of the Army's recommendation.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU CONCLUSION

- **Fort Indiantown Gap is the Second Most Heavily Used Major Training Area -**

783,055 MANDAYS

- **The Entire Post Should be Retained**
- **Infrastructure Will Still be Required**

**GAP REQUIRES A SKILLED
WORK FORCE**

A National Guard Bureau team recently studied the Post and concluded:

- * First, Fort Indiantown Gap is the second most heavily used major training area in the United States by the Reserve Components.
- * Second, that the entire post must be retained after BRAC 95.
- * Third, that the essential infrastructure and base operations of the post must be retained.

This includes the utilities, the security force, medical support, fire and ambulance support, range control and scheduling operations, buildings and grounds maintenance, and the communications system. While some barracks areas can be eliminated no significant savings would result.

In addition, the Army Reserve in their BRAC 95 data call stated "Closure of Fort Indiantown Gap will result in a substantial increase in the cost (travel and funding) incurred for reserve units to reach the training area at Fort Dix."

Fort Indiantown Gap has the highest value!

• **WHY ?**

- Accessible to 33,000 Pennsylvania soldiers and 57,000 soldiers within 200 miles.
- Most suitable - Wide range of training opportunities
- Affordable - Least travel cost, least cost to use
- Cost Effective - Most cost effective base.
Heaviest usage, daily, weekends, annual training.

Three things give real estate value:

LOCATION - LOCATION - LOCATION

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap has the highest military value to the force structure in Pennsylvania and to those forces from 13 other states who train there.

The secretary's military attributes and selection criteria place the greatest value on land, and the number of acres.

To the Reserve Components, accessibility, suitability for mission essential training and affordability are what passes muster and gives the Gap the highest military value of any RC training base in the United States.

The Gap is also a very suitable base. The training which the force structure conducts here is wide-ranging, diverse, and mission essential. Fort Indiantown Gap has been the key to the readiness of military units in a 13 state area.

Of the ten major training areas the United States, Fort Indiantown Gap is the second most heavily used. We supported 780,000 man days of training in 1994.

TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS

• LIVE FIRE

- Tank Crew Qualification Gunnery
- Artillery, Up To 8"
- Crew Served Weapons
- Demolition Training
- Aerial Gunnery



• MANEUVER TRAINING

- 11 Mile Training Corridor
- Brigade Task Force Exercises
- Mech-Armor Battle Drill
- Combined Arms Training

**CAN FIRE ALL THE WEAPONS OF A
MODERN MECHANIZED DIVISION**

At Fort Indiantown Gap we can fire all of the weapons of a mechanized division. We have one of the three Table VIII tank ranges in the Northeast upon which we can qualify our tank and bradley crews. We can fire a 155mm self-propelled division artillery time on target simultaneously. We have an 11 mile training corridor in which an entire dismounted brigade can maneuver. We conduct platoon mechanized and armored drills. All the training that our forces require can be conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap.

ARMY AVIATION

- **Second Largest Aviation Training Site in U.S..**
 - **Aircraft Qualification Training Courses**
 - **Aviation Mechanis Training Certification**
- **Has Six Flight Simulators**
 - **Attack Helicopter, Black Hawk & Huey**
 - **Programmed for Chinook Simulator**
- **Largest National Guard Aviation Maintenance Facility - 44,000 sq ft**
- **Over 90,000 Aerial Operations per Year**
- **Uninhabited Terrain for Day and Night Tactical Aviation Training**
- **710 Square Miles of Maneuver Air Space**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

At Fort Indiantown Gap, we have the second largest Army Aviation training site in the nation with six helicopter simulators. It is the simulator complex for ALL Army Aviation in the Northeast to include Active Component units such as the 10th Mountain Division.


In addition, we have the largest National Guard Aviation Support Facility for aircraft maintenance.

We have 710 contiguous square miles of uninhabited state owned terrain through which our helicopters can fly the contours of the earth, and at night, conducting essential night vision flying. This is a national asset for Army Aviation, the Air Force, as well as Navy and Marine corps flying units.

This vital Aviation training area was not considered in the TABS Military Value Assessment.

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
AIR to GROUND**

- **Joint Use: RANGE**
 - Air Force, Navy Air
 - USMC, Army Air
- **Bombing and Aerial Gunnery**
 - All Aircraft
 - Day and Night
 - Computer Scored
- **1300 Sorties Annually**
- **Military Operation Area with Attached
Low-Level Training Routes**



**ONE OF 15 NATIONWIDE
- A NATIONAL ASSET**

Our bombing and strafing range, is computer scored, one of 15 in the nation, and used days and nights throughout the year with over 1,300 sorties annually.

This range is in a military operations area that covers most of the Eastern part of the state and is used by the National Guard, the Air Reserve as well as the Active Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

Both the range and the military operations area are national assets.

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP THE MOST
AFFORDABLE
TO ARMY**

- **Most Cost Effective Major Training Area**

\$17.37 PER MANDAY

- **Budget of \$13.6 Million**
- **Transportation Costs Lowest For the Large Training Population**
- **Post Staffing is Minimal and Skilled**
- **"No Frills, Bare-Bones"**

Army's Best Bargain

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Gap is also the most affordable base to the force structure. It is the most cost effective of the bases with which it was compared; it is a Bare Bones, No Frills, Only Essentials place. Situated in the center of the state, it is the most affordable in travel time and dollars. The garrison is staffed at minimal levels. It is the Army's BEST Bargain.

A Brigade Size Element On-Post Everyday

UNIT/ACTIVITY	PERSONNEL
U. S. Army Garrison (Active Duty and DoD Civilian)	476
United States Army Readiness Group (Active Duty)	91
Pennsylvania Army National Guard (ARNG/ANG)	1,033
Tenant Activities	196
State Employees	167
Schoolhouse (Daily Average)	850
TOTAL PERSONNEL	2,813

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Gap is the second most heavily used major training area by the RC in the nation. Heavy use, is evidence of high value. Unlike other RC training bases, every day of the year we have almost 3,000 people on base, the equivalent of a brigade, who are either working, stationed or training here. There are several active component tenants and many Army Guard, Air Guard and Reserve units stationed there.

Professional Education and Training Schools

THERE IS NO BETTER PLACE FOR US TO GO

- PA National Guard Military Academy
- Region I NCO Academy
- Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS)
- Regional Training Site - Medical
- Regional Training Site - Maintenance
- AF Heavy Equipment Operator Training Site (REOTS)
- AF Professional Food Service Instruction Site



14,750 Students Every Year!


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

There are seven Reserve Components training institutes or school houses that operate at Fort Indiantown Gap; probably more than at any other installation in our category. This training is year-round, and all together over 14,000 students are trained at the Gap's schools.

Weekend and annual training is conducted at the Gap all 12 months of the year.

Training - A Full Time Business

UNITS COME FROM 13 STATES



<u>FY-94</u>	<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Training Days</u>
	Weekends	288,130
	Annual Training	494,925
	TOTAL	783,055


**ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY USED
TRAINING BASES IN THE UNITED STATES**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Each Thursday, you see the arrival of advanced detachments of the brigade size task forces which come for weekend training on Friday. On some weekends as high as 9,000 soldiers are here. Our annual weekend usage is 288,000 military training days.

Thirty-two thousand soldiers also attend annual training here comprising 494,000 military training days. They are not just from Pennsylvania; they come from 13 other states.

CANTONEMENT AREA



YELLOW - DAILY OCCUPANCY

RED - DEMOLISHED OR
SCHEDULED FOR DEMOLITION

CANNOT ENCLAVE THE GAP

This is a map of the cantonment area of the Gap. What you see in yellow indicates daily occupancy. These are the Headquarters, the administrative buildings, maintenance shops, warehouses, storage compounds, schoolhouses and units stationed at the Gap. FORSCOM has already admitted that; "the Fort Indiantown Gap enclave consists of facilities currently occupied by the Reserve Components". All of these activities and facilities will still function regardless of who operates the installation. The red shows areas demolished or in the process of demolition.

We are all over the Post. The infrastructure is under and on top of us and thus the cantonment area can not be enclaved; it just doesn't make sense that is why the National Guard Bureau in it's study has concluded that the entire post must be retained.

Reserve Component Enclave Theory

- **Withdraw US Army Management**
- **Dismiss The Work Force**
- **Active Army Funding Withdrawn**
- **Abandon Cantonment Areas Except For Essential Facilities**
- **Eliminates Infrastructure**
- **Cuts The Overhead / Results In Savings**
- **Send Units Out of State For Annual Training**
- **Will Not Degrade Readiness**
- **Keep Training Areas and Ranges**

NOT PRACTICAL

The enclave idea is not only an impractical one, but it is a bad idea. Conversion to an "enclave" will mean what is stated on this slide: we emphasize three things: first, the cantonment area will be abandoned, second, irrespective of weather, all troops coming for training go directly to and will live in the field and third, the proposed action will have an adverse impact on morale, training and readiness.

The taxpayers of the nation have made a large investment in the organization, equipment and training to bring our forces to high standards of readiness. Every aspect of training and readiness will suffer under this proposal.

ENCLAVING DEGRADES READINESS of the ENTIRE FORCE

The Chief of Staff of the Army Said, "Quality of Life is a Readiness Issue."

- **Quality of Life Facilities Lost**
- **Training Operations Will Suffer**
- **Disrupted Logistic Operations Degrade Readiness**

**Every Aspect of
TRAINING and READINESS WILL SUFFER**

The quality of life of our soldiers and airmen is a readiness issue. Infact, the Secretary of Defense has made it the number one priority. This proposal would take from the soldiers their barracks, dining facilities, latrines and showers. These are required life support, let alone quality of life.

Consider soldiers who work all week and on Friday evening travel an hour or two to the Gap, go directly to the field, and remain there until loaded up for the truck ride home, morale will be immediatly effected. We cannot treat soldiers and airmen this way. Lacking a good nights rest will also increase risk and safety concerns.


If the infrastructure is not manned and working to provide all the required supporting services then the training operations will noticeably suffer in their quality, again adversely affecting readiness.

If logistics operations, supply and maintenance are disrupted, there will be reduced readiness, through increased repair times and delays in the delivery of supplies.

**Alternate Training Site
Vehicle & Troop Movement**

Distances / Times

FT DRUM



The Secretary's enclave recommendation would close the Gap to all annual training and would send the 32,000 soldiers who come there to far distant posts for training. The matrix below lists the time/distance to recommended locations. Some convoys will have to make two day journeys which reduces the 15 day training time by 4 days or 26 percent and which further increases our costs.

	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>FT DRUM</u>	<u>FT PICKETT</u>	<u>A.P. HILL</u>
Pittsburgh	256MI/6HRS	550MI/12HRS	437MI/ 10.5HRS	337MI/8HRS
Philadelphia	128 MI/ 3HRS	348MI/7.5HRS	366MI/7.5HRS	266MI/6HRS
Scranton	110 MI/2.5HRS	212MI/5.HRS	489MI/11HRS	344MI/8HRS
FTIG	-----	322MI/7.5HRS	379 MI/8.5HRS	279MI/6.5HRS

ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES

- **AP Hill**: Heavily Wooded, not usable for mechanized operations no tank ranges, artillery firing constrained.
- **Ft Dix**: Limited Mechanized Maneuver Area for one battalion, no tank qualification ranges, constrained artillery firing. Already heavily used.
- **Ft Drum**: Suitable. Utilized for PAARNG Annual Training rotations. Realignment & closure of other installations will impact upon accessibility. Availability of summertime slots difficult, travel costs expensive.
- **Ft Pickett**: Suitable. On closure list and enclave proposal will make it less desirable.
- **Availability for Annual Training must be during summer months to accommodate a large student population.**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort A.P. Hill is wholly unsuitable for mechanized or armored maneuver training, has no tank or bradley qualification ranges, and artillery firing limitations.

Fort Dix is very limited in available mechanized maneuver space, it is already heavily used and lacks a tank qualification range. Based upon the enclave proposal it would not be available for annual training. It should be noted that even the New Jersey Guard's Armor Brigade does not conduct its annual training at Fort Dix but chooses to go to Fort Drum.

Fort Pickett and Fort Drum offer the better alternative sites for training, but obviously, they cannot satisfy the requirements of the Gap's daily or weekend usage, Fort Pickett is also on the closure list, and will be unavailable if enclaved. Fort Drum is at capacity for annual training and would be overtaxed if additional troops were forced on it.

Brigade Task Force Movement Costs (3500 Soldiers)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE MOST AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE

	<u>Soldiers</u> 3500	<u>Vehicles</u> 955	<u>Other Equipment</u> 60	
	<u>ETIG</u>	<u>Fort Drum</u>	<u>Fort Pickett</u>	<u>AP Hill</u>
Pittsburgh	\$103,824	\$504,452	\$474,584	\$433,159
Philadelphia	\$51,830	\$470,374	\$461,656	\$122,022
Scranton	\$51,830	\$126,402	\$491,616	\$447,138
Ft Indiantown Gap- 0 -		\$446,114	\$466,486	\$126,285

TRAVEL FUNDS INSUFFICIENT TO SEND EVERYONE OUT OF STATE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Budget constraints determine how much of the force can travel to distant posts. Our guard trains a significant part of its force at the Gap because of lack of travel funds, and because the Gap is suitable for their training requirements.

The costs of travel to move a 3,500 man brigade task force with its vehicles and equipment from Pennsylvania to Fort Drum, Fort A.P. Hill, or Fort Pickett is five times or more greater than the cost to move to Fort Indiantown Gap.

If we must move the entire force out of state it could cost an additional 2 to 4 million dollars more at a time when travel budgets are being cut. The trainload model used by the Army in its analysis considered only throughput and not the additional costs of traveling elsewhere to train.

THE REALITIES ARE

- **State-owned lands, Lease termination creates significant legal problems**
- **Must operate the entire infrastructure to satisfy training requirements**
- **Lack Funds to send all Pennsylvania units out of State**
- **Other suitable posts lack summertime slots**
- **Travel costs result in NO SAVINGS and may even be five times more expensive -- budget cannot support this**
- **Secretary of Defense proposal results in NO SAVINGS even be more expensive**


Retain the Entire Post

It must be pointed out this is the only military training installation in the nation which is owned by the state and leased to the federal government. Clearly, a "Federal Enclave" cannot be established without the consent of the state. The unique relationship was not considered by the Army's analysis nor were the exceptional costs which could flow from it taken into account.

The lease places a burden on the federal government to restore the lands to a "safe condition" and to comply with various statutes and regulations. If the lease is terminated, the state may not wish to assume legal liability or responsibility for the base unless, and until, the lands are restored and the outstanding legal issues resolved.

The post must be operated to satisfied the daily/weekend operational and training requirements of the force, therefore there is no sensible reason why annual training should not continue to be conducted at the Gap. To operate and enclave with all the turbulence and degradation it will cause, and then pay to move all of the force out of state for annual training, makes no sense, is far more expensive, much less effective and is unaffordable.

**SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED-
RECURRING COSTS
UNDERESTIMATED**




FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Army in its COBRA analysis claimed it will save 23.8 million dollars a year by closing and enclaving the fort, despite the fact that the fort only has an annual budget of 13.5 million dollars. This may have misled the decision makers in proposing this closure action. We challenged this figure, gave them our review, and as a result the Army base study conducted a sensitivity analysis. That analysis projects and 11.2 million dollar annual savings out of the installations 13.5 million dollar budget. We believe this analysis is also seriously flawed and we hope that claim will not mislead this commission. Specifically, the scenario fails to provide for the cost of the post's infrastructure, the necessity of which has been presented to you. It also failed to consider the substantial costs of travel which the proposal requires.


FTIG is the home of many facilities, activities, reserve units and other users. These activities would not leave. The Army has said these activities must remain and has recommended they be enclaved. As you have seen the facilities are spread throughout the post.

ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE



The Army has also stated that the training areas and ranges are still needed for the large population of reserve component's use. The National Guard Bureau has recommended that the entire installation be retained. The natural question that follows is, what would be the result of pulling out the Army garrison as the Secretary proposes?

Fort Indiantown Gap could be compared to a large office building. All the users of the installation are the renters in the building, while the Regular Army is the management. The Army, by recommending this closure, has said the occupants will stay but the management and staff who run the building will be dismissed.



Imagine that you are an occupant in the building and go to work to find the water, electricity and sewer turned off and all other essential services discontinued. What would you do? Naturally you would relocate. But the Army has said, No, it will cost too much for you to leave. The Army has estimated that moving these functions to another installation would cost in excess of \$300 million.

? 11.2 Million Dollar Savings ?

- **SAVINGS FROM EMPLOYEE DISMISSALS?**
- **NEW EMPLOYEES WILL NEED TO BE HIRED!**
- **ALL ESSENTIAL SERVICES MUST BE PROVIDED**
- **FEDERALLY FUNDED**


NO REALISTIC SAVINGS

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Now let us return to the \$11 million dollars in annual savings the Army has claimed it will achieve by closing the post's infrastructure and dismissing the employees who run it. Will there really be a savings? Someone will need to take over the infrastructure. The new infrastructure would, again, be federally funded. The Army has a responsibility to support the many facilities on the installation which, although reserve component, are federal missions. Therefore, it is not practical to expect any savings. You can't save money simply by saying you are going to stop paying the bill.

The Army is simply shifting the bill from the Regular Army to the Reserve Component. This is not surprising, however, based on the guidance the Army base study was given. The Army instructed its analysts to "minimize the number of major training areas focused primarily on Reserve Component training support" and in its directions to its analysts it further stated "considerable overall DoD savings could be realized by maximizing the use of Reserve Component enclaves."

Why Change THE MANAGEMENT?



The reality of the situation shows that the Secretary's enclave proposal is operationally not practical and that the claimed savings can not be realized. In light of these facts, consider the logic behind disrupting and efficient and cost effective work force, who have selflessly served their nation, some for their entire working life, for the sake of a paper savings that will never materialize. What is the point of spending millions of dollars to dismiss these employees, only to hire replacements. The turbulence and inefficiency that would inevitably result from the change in the present garrison operations would undoubtedly impact on the readiness of the thousands of soldiers who train at the Gap throughout the year.

REALITY OF PROPOSAL


- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PROPERTY**
- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PERMANENT FACILITIES**
- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS OVERHEAD**

PURPOSE OF BRAC NOT ACHIEVED

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Army basing study tells us that "The ultimate purpose of BRAC is to save money through sound base realignment and closure actions." This was to be accomplished by reducing excess property, excess facilities and excess overhead. The facts that we have shown you, we believe, establish that none of these apply to Fort Indiantown Gap. What the Secretary proposes is not sound.

The federal partnership in place today works. It is not broken and does not need to be fixed. It is a model of training efficiency. This proposal will create needless turbulence, disrupt operations and training, and reduce readiness.




The Army has recommended closing Fort Indiantown Gap. However, the Gap is not redundant and certainly not replaceable. Its military value is far too high. Plus, it is extremely cost effective.

Clearly, if you realign the base to another management structure, you give up too much and you spend too much money doing it.

The Gap is an installation that is indispensable to the thousands of service members who train there. There is no other place for them to go. Its great value is in its accessibility, suitability and affordability. We CAN NOT do it without it

PENNSYLVANIA



**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
THE KEY TO READINESS**

1995

Fort Indiantown Gap - An Overview

- Only State owned Base leased to the Federal Government
- 19,200 acres
- 1,517 pieces of Real Property (some State-owned and controlled)
- 61 miles of roads
- Has its own utilities systems
 - Electric System (from and including the sub-station)
 - Sewage system and Treatment Plant
 - Water Supply Infrastructure
- Majority of buildings are WWII wooden structures - many modernized with new roofs, siding, and heating systems
- Training support operations occur year around

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Pennsylvania National Guard has trained at Fort Indiantown Gap since 1932. Just before the outbreak of World War II, the active Army took command of the post and has commanded it ever since. For many years it has basically been a Reserve Component training installation. The 19,200 acres of land are state owned and leased to the Federal Government for \$1.00 for a period of 60 years.

Importantly, it has been used as a mobilization base in every war since WWII down through the Persian Gulf War. It is still a mobilization base for 12 Contingency Force Pool units as well as elements of the 28th Division, other Pennsylvania National Guard units, and units from the 79th U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Unlike many other reserve component training installations, Fort Indiantown Gap has a large daily workforce, tenant and student training population. Training occurs on a daily and year around basis.



Fort Indiantown Gap is Unique because:

- **Accessible**
 - to 57,000 members of our Total Force
 - used every day AND weekends during the whole training year
 - as a schoolhouse to a large daily population
- **Suitable**
 - ranges for all weapons in the MECHANIZED DIVISION inventory
 - up-to-date training facilities support both ground and air forces; joint usage is a fundamental strength of Fort Indiantown Gap
 - is a Central Europe look-alike for terrain, climate and vegetation
- **Affordable**
 - minimal transportation costs for a large training population
 - small federal investment; large training payoff
 - trains a soldier for \$25.00

NO FRILLS – BARE-BONES
SUPPORTS A LARGE AND DIVERSE DAILY POPULATION

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap is an extremely unique and valuable training location for the Guard. It is close (within 200 miles) to 57,000 Guardsmen and Reservists who can quickly and cheaply use the whole range of available modern training facilities. The suite of ranges for all weapons types - from rifle and pistol, all the way up to main battle tanks and fighter bombers - are all at Fort Indiantown Gap.

There is a large daily population at Fort Indiantown Gap; workforce, tenants, and students average more than 3,600 per day. The installation is one of the most heavily used training facilities in the U.S. by reserve component units.

The Air-to-Ground Bombing and Strafing Range was located at Fort Indiantown Gap because of Pennsylvania's terrain similarities to Central Europe, a valuable part of the world requiring Fort Indiantown Gap's realistic training scenarios for both air and ground forces.

Fort Indiantown Gap is an efficient, effective and desirable training destination that produces ready warriors for approximately \$24.00 per day; a no frills bare bones bargain for the United States taxpayer.

Lastly, Fort Indiantown Gap is a daily demonstration of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's "Total Force Concept", in which the regular forces were tasked as responsible for reserve component training and readiness preparation for the next contingency.

Secretary of Defense Stated:


“My recommendations are consistent with the force structure plan for the Armed Forces for the six-year period of the Future Years Defense Plan.”

From Letter, 28 February 1995 to Chairman Dixon

His recommendation:

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimal essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP




Army Recommendation Claims:

- Fort Indiantown Gap has low military value
- Fort Indiantown Gap can be closed
- Force Structure can be trained at other bases
- No adverse impact on the training or readiness of forces
- \$23 million in annual savings will result from the closure

**DOES NOT PASS THE
*COMMON SENSE TEST***

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP



Fort Indiantown Gap has the highest value!

- **WHY**

- Accessible to 33,000 Pennsylvania soldiers and 57,000 soldiers within 200 miles.
- Most suitable - Wide range of training opportunities
- Affordable - Least travel cost, least cost to use
- Cost Effective - Most cost effective base.
Heaviest usage, daily, weekends, annual training.

Three things give real estate value:

LOCATION - LOCATION - LOCATION

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


THIS SLIDE IS SELF-EXPLANATORY

Nearby Training Population

**CUMULATIVE
POPULATION PER
RINGED AREA**

<u>RINGED AREA</u>	<u>PERSONS</u>
50 MILES	9,020
100 MILES	29,565
150 MILES	47,719
200 MILES	56,761

**CUMULATIVE TOTAL
RESERVE COMPONENT
INSIDE 200 MILES**



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap trains soldiers from thirteen states. It has almost 57,000 customers within 200 miles. These "customers" are Army National Guardsmen, Army Reservists, Air National Guardsmen, Air Force Reservists, etc., who live within easy driving distance and need to train regularly with their home units. Disturbing this "neighborhood training area" proximity will adversely affect readiness and cost the taxpayer more money.

The above totals *do not* include other groups who routinely use facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap for their unique specialized training, like: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Pennsylvania State Police, various College ROTC groups, the White House Communications Agency, etc.

Some active component units from the Military District of Washington train at Fort Indiantown Gap. In addition, elements of the 160th Aviation Brigade, the Army's Special Operations aviation units train at Fort Indiantown Gap because of the unique opportunities offered by the installation's Northern Aviation Training Area.



A Brigade Size Element On-Post Everyday

<u>UNIT/ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
United States Army Garrison (Active Duty and DoD Civilian)	476
United States Army Readiness Group (Active Duty)	91
Pennsylvania Army National Guard (ARNG/ANG)	1,033
Tenant Activities	196
State Employees	167
Schoolhouse (Daily Average)	850
TOTAL PERSONNEL	2,813

ADD TO THIS THE MORE THAN
175,000 TRAINEES HERE ***EVERY*** YEAR

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The figure for the U. S. Army Garrison includes support activities and seasonal temporary and term employees.

Tenant Activities includes Readiness Group, USAR Centers, and the RTS-Maintenance.

State Employees are employees who support the National Guard.

The figures for the Air and Army National Guard include Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers who work at Fort Indiantown Gap on a daily basis.

Professional Education and Training Schools

THERE IS NO BETTER PLACE FOR US TO GO

- PA National Guard Military Academy
- Region I NCO Academy
- Eastern ARNG Aviation Training Site (EAATS)
- Regional Training Site - Medical
- Regional Training Site - Maintenance
- AF Heavy Equipment Operator Training Site (REOTS)
- AF Professional Food Service Instruction Site
- Hands On Training Site - Repair Parts Rebuild

14,750 Students Every Year!

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap also supports a variety of professional military education activities which are conducted on the installation year-around with an annual student population of almost 15,000.


Many of these training institutions have a daily student population. The training conducted varies from Helicopter Skill Qualification to leadership type training for tomorrows battlefield leaders.

Additionally, other technical area training is performed, including specialized and targeted training in the Medical, Maintenance and Computer areas.

*There are many more
professional schools at Fort Indiantown Gap
than any other Reserve Component installation.*



Nationwide Training Provided



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Small Does Not Mean Unimportant


Four of the Professional Training Activities (depicted above) train persons from National Regions and Nationwide.

The nearly 15,000 students come here from all 50 states and United States Territories



Training - A Full Time Business

THERE'S A BRIGADE EQUIVALENT HERE EVERY DAY



<u>FY-94</u>	<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Training Days</u>
	Weekends	288,130
	Annual Training	494,925
	Schools	165,590
	TOTAL	948,645


**ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY USED
TRAINING BASES IN THE UNITED STATES**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

There's a Brigade Equivalent stationed, working, and training on post every day in support of the many and various personnel training here. Many of our Reserve Component Training Institutions train students from across the United States. In addition to the various Professional Training Schools (schoolhouses), personnel come to Fort Indiantown Gap for Individual Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT). In all, there are over 900,000 training days (the number of personnel times the number of days training) conducted here each year.

The figures shown do not include Additional Training Assemblies (ATA) or Aviation Flight Training Periods (AFTP), or Additional Duty Training (ADT).

Air-Land Training Areas



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The almost 4 million acres of training area supported by Fort Indiantown Gap (Air Force airspace and Army ground use) is the only large U. S. training space that matches the terrain, climate and vegetation found in Central Europe.

The Air-to-Ground Bombing and Strafing Range was created specifically for that training scenario -vs- anticipated future needs. There are 2500+ sorties flown over 170 days/nights per year to this range by more than 25 units. This list includes forces of the USAF, AFRES, ANG, USN, USMC and ARNG.

The land maneuver area includes the 19,200 acres at Fort Indiantown Gap proper, augmented by two large training areas - the Blackwoods (7,000 acres) and the contiguous State Game Lands #211 (44,100 acres). The Blackwoods maneuver area will soon be added as a small Mechanized Unit Training Site, with money already appropriated for the purchase by the State Legislature. It is 40 minutes northeast of Fort Indiantown Gap, roughly 9.2 x 1.2 miles in size - of very rough, mountainous terrain. The adjoining SGL #211 is available for dismounted infantry training and helicopter overflight/landing on a daily basis, except during hunting season.

Again, the total training area available for Fort Indiantown Gap trainees is 3,827,900 acres for overflight, plus 68,300 acres for Army ground use, or 3,896,200 acres of unique and irreplaceable training space.

Ranges and Weapons

*ALL OF THE WEAPONS OF A MODERN HEAVY
MECHANIZED DIVISION CAN BE FIRED*

- ALL SMALL ARMS
 - 4 M16 Zero Ranges
 - 2 M16 Remote Electronic Target System (RETS) Ranges
 - 2 Combat Pistol Qualification Courses
- CREW SERVED WEAPONS
 - M60 Transition and Qualification
 - M2 .50 caliber Qualification
 - Mark 19 Grenade Launcher
 - Special Attack Weapon
- COMBAT VEHICLES
 - M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank - Tables IV, VII and VIII
 - Bradley 25mm Cannon Gunnery
 - 107mm and 120mm Mortars
- AIRCRAFT
 - AH-1 Cobra Qualification
 - UH-1 Door Gunnery
 - Air Force Bombing and Strafing Range
- ARTILLERY
 - 105mm (Towed) through 155mm (M109 Self-Propelled)
 - Multiple Launch Rocket System (with waiver)
 - Fire Support Team (FST) Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap has ranges available to support weapons systems firing up to eight inch artillery and Table VIII tank gunnery.

Another important range, a national asset, is the Air-to-Ground range. This range incorporates a Military Operations Area (MOA), which is available for high-performance aircraft as well as helicopters. It is one of only 15 in the United States and one of three interlocked and interdependent ranges in the Northeast United States.



Aviation Training (Rotary)

Eastern AARNG Aviation Training Site

Offers aviation transition, qualification and skill courses:

- Trains pilots and crews - 1,300 per year
- Second largest aviation training site in the United States
- Home of six flight-simulators (AH-1, UH-60, and UH-1)
- BNCOC & ANCOC (Phase 2)

Army Aviation Support Facility

Offers flight and maintenance training on various helicopters and provides additional flight training periods for: UH-1, AH-1, UH-60, and CH-47

- Army Aviation maintenance facility - 44,000 square feet
- Number of aircraft supported - 86
- Number of Air Operations, Takeoffs and Landings - over 90,000
- Home of an Aviation Brigade and Battalion Headquarters

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The Eastern ARNG Aviation Training Site is a satellite of the U.S. Army's primary rotary wing training installations, Fort Rucker, Alabama, and is one of two sites of this kind in the United States. EAATS trains aviators from all over the United States, but is mainly responsible for regions east of the Mississippi River. In addition to pilot training, EAATS is the only site other than Fort Eustis, VA to train enlisted soldiers in helicopter maintenance for the UH-60 Black Hawk.


The Army Aviation Support Facility at Fort Indiantown Gap is the largest helicopter facility on the East Coast, with 86 resident airframes and two types of helicopter simulators.

Muir Airfield is fully instrumented, air traffic controlled with a 3320 foot runway.

The aviation flight area includes 710 square miles of publicly owned lands, rolling terrain, uninhabited for night vision training, and adjoins Fort Indiantown Gap's northern boundary.

There were 88,000 air operations in FY-94. FY-95 air operations are projected to increase to 100,000.

Air Space - Eastern Grid



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Eastern Air-to-Ground Ranges Interlock

- Any loss in the Eastern Grid (Fort Indiantown Gap, Fort Drum, Warren Grove) increases sortie load elsewhere
- Environmental studies for new ranges are very expensive
- Alternate Air-to-Ground sites raise costs
 - Flight time per mission
 - Fuel costs
 - Time over target
- Next closest ranges to the Eastern Grid (Fort Indiantown Gap) are:
 - Alpena, Michigan 550 miles
 - Camp Atterbury, Indiana 595 miles
 - Savannah, Georgia 720 miles
- Fort Indiantown Gap range is viewed as a “National Asset”
 - Unique and Irreplaceable

Mobilization Values

- Configurable for immediate wartime use
- Adjacent to East-West/North-South railway and highway systems
- Major international airports nearby
- Deep water seaports nearby
- Used as a mobilization site for every United States contingency employment since World War II

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Fort Indiantown Gap can house and support 25,000 troops in a wartime configuration and has been used as a mobilization station where final preparations are made for units prior to overseas deployment. In 1991, Fort Indiantown Gap processed 2,711 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers for overseas deployment to Southwest Asia in support of **DESERT STORM**.

It is a historical, power-projection base. It lays astride the main east-west, north-south highway and railway systems, is close to a major C-5 capable international airport (Harrisburg) and the C-5 base at Newburgh, NY.

The installation is within one-day's travel to military Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOE) at McGuire AFB and Dover AFB, other international airports at Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, BWI, Dulles and Newark and equally close to deep water channel seaports at Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk and Bayonne.



Change to new Management NGB Enclave



Secretary of Defense Recommendation:

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

TABS Indicated:

Close Fort Indiantown Gap except for a Reserve Component enclave.

NGB Stated:

We must enclave the entire installation since all activities rely on the post infrastructure and support

**Pennsylvania Forced to Accept
Fort Indiantown Gap *Without* Adequate Funding**


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

ENCLAVE THEORY

The Army TABS study theorizes a very small part of the cantonment area being retained along with ranges and other training area. The assertion is that enclaving will reduce operating costs as trainees would go directly into the field from home, not barracks. This would permit the rest of Fort Indiantown Gap to be abandoned, turned back to the State, and thereby save money.

Upon inspection and reflection by the Chief of Civil Engineering, the National Guard Bureau, and the FORSCOM engineers, the Fort Indiantown Gap enclave proposal was dismissed as unworkable. Based on projected needs, only 3 of 10 barracks areas could be closed. Fort Indiantown Gap has a large daily tenant population and is heavily used for weekend training. Most importantly, Fort Indiantown Gap has a utilities infrastructure, such as water system, sewer plant and system, telephone central switch, and an electrical power substation that (in some cases) are separated by up to 1 3/4 miles. The utilities support must stay as configured; peak usage must be satisfied; tenants will remain -- all pointing to the fact that Fort Indiantown Gap is not enclaveable in spite of the statements to the contrary in the Army BRAC proposal.

How the "Enclaving" Would Look




FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

WHY FORT INDIANTOWN GAP CAN'T BE ENCLAVED

- No Federal enclave is possible as Fort Indiantown Gap is State owned, not Federal as at all other Posts.
- State lease requires environmental restoration.
- There continues to be a large daily use which requires the base infrastructure to remain "as is."
- Almost all of the base is being used to meet training requirements, and must remain sized as is to be mission effective.
- National Guard Bureau has stated that since most of Fort Indiantown Gap must be used, enclaving is not feasible.

Fort Indiantown Gap



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- As a military installation
 - Defense Funds are used to operate Fort Indiantown Gap now
 - As an Enclave, Defense funds would still be used
- Training requirements for Reserve Components will not change
- Fort Indiantown Gap is the ONLY Reserve Component installation that supports a Heavy Mechanized Division
- More Reserves train at Fort Indiantown Gap than at ANY OTHER installation in the United States

Alternative Training Sites

- **Accessibility**

- Cannot be used by daily or weekend population
- Long convoy movements at expense of training time
- Scheduling problems in prime time summer months

- **Suitability**

- Fort Pickett (recommended for closure) and Fort Drum are suitable
- No permanent facilities
- No tracked equipment available

- **Affordability**

- Expensive convoy movement
- Soldiers safety
- Lack of transportation dollars

A Federal Fort Indiantown Gap is still the key to the best management system for training the troops

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

There are no alternatives to Fort Indiantown Gap. Location and what can be done at the Gap gives it the highest military value to the Total Force it must continue to support.

At Fort Drum and Fort Pickett - time, distance and costs are unavoidable problems for Pennsylvania Guardsmen and Reservists.

Yes, we use both Fort Drum and Fort Pickett for Brigade Task Forces or larger. Usually, we train in a Brigade Task Force configuration and the change of venue gives us new artillery firing situations, a different tank gunnery range, and the ability to experience more situations in areas of logistical communications, command and control, and fire support. The reason we go to those places is to get different live fire opportunities for the artillery and the tankers.


Fort A.P. Hill is not suitable at all for mechanized operations. They have no tank trails, no tank gunnery ranges and no tracked equipment on station. The billeting facilities are poor and there are no railheads to support transporting or off-loading our equipment.

The Bottom Line - Fort Indiantown Gap must remain a military post to meet the needs of the Total Force stationed in Pennsylvania. Within Budgetary constraints, we will continue to use Fort Drum and Fort Pickett as our Annual Training alternatives

Vehicle & Troop Movement

Distances / Times

FT DRUM



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

This slide depicts movement distances and times based on actual road miles and average convoy motor march speeds. The distances and travel times are cut tremendously when traveling to Fort Indiantown Gap rather than Fort Drum, Fort Dix, or Fort Pickett.

On the next page are detailed monetary expenditures for the same moves.

AND, TIME IS MONEY.....

	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>FT DRUM</u>	<u>FT PICKETT</u>	<u>FT DIX</u>
PITTSBURGH	256 MI / 6 HRS	<i>550 MI / 12 HRS</i>	<i>437 MI / 10.5 HRS</i>	<i>424 MI / 9.5 HRS</i>
PHILADELPHIA	128 MI / 3 HRS	<i>348 MI / 7.5 HRS</i>	<i>366 MI / 7.5 HRS</i>	45 MI / 1 HR
SCRANTON	110 MI / 2.5 HRS	212 MI / 5 HRS	<i>489 MI / 11 HRS</i>	155 MI / 3.5 HRS
FTIG	-----	322 MI / 7.5 HRS	<i>379 MI / 8.5 HRS</i>	168 MI / 4 HRS

ITALICS DENOTES 2-DAY TRAVEL REQUIREMENT



Brigade Task Force Movement Costs (3500 Soldiers)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE MOST AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE

	<u>Soldiers</u> 3500	<u>Vehicles</u> 955	<u>Other Equipment</u> 60	
	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>Fort Drum</u>	<u>Fort Pickett</u>	<u>Fort Dix</u>
Pittsburgh	\$103,824	\$504,452	\$474,584	\$465,072
Philadelphia	\$51,830	\$470,374	\$461,656	\$15,278
Scranton	\$51,830	\$126,402	\$491,616	\$83,200
Fort Indiantown Gap	- 0 -	\$413,120	\$427,913	\$17,098

TRAVEL FUNDS INSUFFICIENT TO SEND EVERYONE OUT-OF-STATE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Annual Training (AT) is usually scheduled by Brigade size elements. The figures above indicate the number of personnel, vehicles and other equipment that travel to the AT sites. The information given above represents the three areas of Pennsylvania that have the heaviest concentration of troops. The savings difference between traveling to Fort Indiantown Gap, Fort Drum, or Fort Pickett is compared above.

Other problems not shown by these figures are the unsuitable training areas for Mechanized Armor units at Fort A.P.Hill. In addition, there are no tracked vehicles located at Fort A.P. Hill for use by the Pennsylvania National Guard.

Also not shown are the scheduling problems generated when 33,000 troops can no longer train at Fort Indiantown Gap and need to go elsewhere. This will create training scheduling problems at the remainder of the training bases in the Northeast. Their "trainload" will be adversely affected. Additionally, there will likely be some degradation in range maintenance brought on by a larger training load should annual training be shifted from Fort Indiantown Gap.


Finally, travel to distant installations will require an additional day for convoy operations, thus inflating travel costs, pay, and per diem for soldiers.

Closing the “Gap”

- Immediate and adverse effect on readiness
- Infrastructure needs to be available
- Supporting services need to be provided
- Soldiers - Quality of Life must not be degraded

FOR A FEW DOLLARS LESS
YOU WILL BUY A LOT LESS READINESS

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP



Closing Fort Indiantown Gap Degrades Readiness of the Entire Total Force

- **Quality of Life Multipliers at Fort Indiantown Gap are embodied in:**
 - Barracks
 - Dining Halls
 - Self-Help Maintenance Shops
 - Small Post Exchange
 - Gymnasium
 - Bowling Alley
- **The Chief of Staff of the Army said, "Quality of life is a readiness issue."**
 - Are the savings worth the impact on readiness?
 - Deficiencies in Quality of Life degrade Prime Time training

**Loss of any of the basic Quality of Life
assets will create deficiencies!**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Most soldiers come to Fort Indiantown Gap on Friday, leaving their full-time civilian jobs. When they are "at the Gap" they view their Quality of Life only as having a bed, latrine facilities and a dining hall -- because, when they are training here, it is in the field.

The Post Exchange and bowling alley are supported by non-appropriated funds. The gymnasium not only supports the large population at Fort Indiantown Gap, but is also the home of the All-Army Sports Program which helps to finance the facility.

This is a bare-bones, no-frills post. We have none of the "more advanced" Quality of Life multipliers -- no commissary, no federal housing, no federal daycare center, no dependent school, no hospital, no movie theater, no golf course, no bank, etc.

These facilities all impact on the Quality of Life for everyone who comes to Fort Indiantown Gap. So, the loss of any of these basic assets will create an inefficient, less effective training atmosphere.

By the way, Fort Indiantown Gap is Stated-owned and leased to the Army.
Environmental cleaning is required upon return

**LAND LEASE BETWEEN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

This lease, made and entered 12 MAY 1989 between Pennsylvania, thru the Department of General Services, as the owner hereinafter called the "Commonwealth", AND the United States of America hereinafter called the "Government" shall be for 60 years at the rate of \$1 for the entire term

. . . . for all those portions called Fort Indiantown Gap
. . . . to be used to operate a military post for training active and reserve forces, to include the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The above slide is a paraphrase of the first two pages of the official Lease binding the United States Government and Pennsylvania relative to Fort Indiantown Gap. Some other excerpts follow:


The Government shall be solely responsible for the disposal of wastes, toxic or hazardous materials and the Commonwealth does not consent to any disposal other than as expressly authorized by state and federal law and disclaims all responsibility for the location, cleanup or maintenance of waste disposal sites on the leased premises.

RESTORATION OF PREMISES. It is agreed that the Government shall be responsible to restore the leased premises to a safe condition upon termination of the lease and shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations respecting any impact areas, landfills, spill or dump sites, waste disposal areas, hazardous and toxic wastes, explosive materials, etc.

It is agreed that the Government, through the United States Army, will provide electrical, water, sewer and refuse collection to state owned and controlled or federally owned, state used facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap.



Army Implementation of DoD Selection Criteria



How a DoD recommendation to the BRAC is supposed to be accomplished is as follows:

The Army Basing Study Group (TABS) looks at all bases using three main criteria to determine the ranking value of its training and basing assets.

The First area, is **MILITARY VALUE** (#1-4, top box).

The Second area, **RETURN ON INVESTMENT** (#5 - middle box), uses a costing software accounting device called COBRA to ascertain net investment and possible savings over time.

The Third area, **ECONOMIC IMPACT** (#6-8, last box), is used to determine the local job market effect, job losses, rehousing of training needs, and environmental costs of base closure.

We have discussed **MILITARY VALUE** up to now. What follows is a COBRA analysis showing serious errors. **ECONOMIC IMPACT** is discussed elsewhere by the local Chamber of Commerce.

Savings and Expenses Overstated in COBRA



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Installations were tasked to provide actual FY-93 cost information. This was done.

Fort Indiantown Gap provided data totaling \$10.5 million for:

- Payroll,
- Real Property Maintenance Activity (RPMA) and,
- Base Operations (BASOPS)

The data which was eventually entered in COBRA shows \$34 million -- a threefold increase over the actual expenses. The following slides expound on this gross error.



Payroll

- **COBRA:** Save \$14.5 million per year
- **FACT:** Cost \$6.4 million (Actual FY-93)
-

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Erroneous data were entered and COBRA does not cross check itself.

- The analyst entered a total payroll of \$11.5 million
ACTUAL payroll is \$6.4 million per year
- The analyst entered an average salary of \$45,998
ACTUAL average salary is \$27,008
- The personnel information shows 315 civilians being eliminated.
ACTUAL FY-93 strength was 239
- COBRA multiplies the average salary by the number of eliminations to project a savings of \$14.5 million per year -- grossly exceeding the actual \$6.4 million payroll and even exceeding the erroneous \$11.5 million payroll.
ACTUAL payroll entered \$11.5 million

**COBRA does not check itself to ensure projected savings
do not exceed actual costs**

Real Property Maintenance Activity (RPMA Costs)

- **COBRA: 90% Close, Savings of \$3.7 million per year**
-
-

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

RPMA: Real Property Maintenance Activities -- i.e., Public Works. Does not include payroll costs.

RPMA calculations in COBRA are directly related to changes in facility inventory. The Fort Indiantown Gap COBRA scenario shuts down virtually all facilities which would be in the enclave and claims a savings which exceeds the total current expenses for RPMA -- effectively eliminating all RPMA support to the enclave.

- The analyst entered \$6.1 million for RPMA. **Actual costs - \$1.4 million.**
- The analyst shut down 2.7 of 4.3 million sq. ft. for and RPMA savings of \$3.7 million per year. **This is 250% above actual costs.**
- The Guard and Reserves already occupy 1,188 thousand square feet (KSF) of the 4,303KSF. Removing an additional 2.7 m leaves only 370KSF for use by the enclave. This effectively shuts down 90% of the facilities. The Army National Guard has estimated that 1,843KSF, in addition to that which they already occupy, are needed for the enclave.
- Elimination of RPMA monies eliminates all Public Works support to the enclave -- **no water, sewer, electric, roads, etc.**

Base Operations Cost (BOS)

- **COBRA: 43% reduction in population**

- Savings: \$4.4 million per year

- Soldiers who come to train are the population and will remain

- Actual FY93 costs equals \$2.7 million

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

BASOPS (Base Operations): are the costs associated with operating an installation. RPMA and payroll costs are not included. COBRA relates BASOPS costs to the mission population. Soldiers who train at Fort Indiantown Gap were disregarded by the analyst and the mission population is grossly understated.

- The analyst entered BASOPS costs of \$16.73 million.
ACTUAL cost is \$2.7 million per year. COBRA calculates \$4.4 million per year savings -- exceeding actual costs.
- The analyst entered a population of 1200.
NO accounting was made for the 630,000 supported training mandays.
- Transfers and eliminations equal 520 military and civilians.
COBRA shows a 43% reduction and calculates BASOPS savings accordingly.

BASOPS supports the units and soldiers who train.

**There is no effective reduction in training -
therefore there can be no effective reduction in BASOPS**

Area Support
Army Regulation (AR) 5-9

- **COBRA: \$0.00**

-

-

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

There is \$1.075 million in the Fort Indiantown Gap garrison budget for AR 5-9 mandated support to Reserve Centers in Eastern Pennsylvania.

The support function and the associated cost must be transferred to some **“BASE X”**.

Again, this cost was not reflected in COBRA.



Army Reserve / National Guard Enclave

- **COBRA:** \$0.00
- **FACT:** \$8.3 million (NGB Estimate)
(To fix when it breaks)
-


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

The National Guard Bureau has estimated that they would need at least \$8.3 million in additional funding to cover the costs of running the enclave.

COBRA claims savings far in excess of the actual funding, therefore there is \$0.00 available to support the enclave.



Recurring Costs Underestimated



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

There is no money in the TABS COBRA analysis for funding an enclave. In addition, since COBRA claims a savings which greatly exceeds the current expenses, then there is no money left for an enclave.

COBRA would have calculated the correct cost if the mission population and the facilities required to support them had they been correctly represented in the study scenarios.

Savings Summary

- **COBRA: \$22.6 million**
-
-

*“You can’t save more
than you spend”*

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

COBRA calculates an annual savings of \$22.6 million for
Payroll, RPMA, and BASOPS.

The total expenses in these accounts are only \$10.5 million.

It is impossible to program any savings that would result in
saving more money than was spent. Even “Uncle Sam” can not
do this!



Summary - Corrected COBRA

	Original	Corrected
• One Time Cost:	\$13 M	\$9.3 M
• Over Implementation:		\$12.6 M
• Return on Investment: 1 year		37 years
• Net Present Value:		\$5.6 M

FACT: The economics do not support the proposal!

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

A copy of the TABS COBRA database for Fort Indiantown Gap was obtained. The data were corrected and realistic enclave costs were added. The results of this independent analysis show:

- A one-time cost of \$9,326,000 to implement
- A cost of \$12,642,000 over the implementation period
- A return on investment of 37 years
- Net Present Value of \$5,650,000 (20 year total cost)

. . . . in Conclusion

- The Secretary of Defense's recommended action:
 - Fails to provide a suitable training installation for the force structure in Pennsylvania
 - Fails to consider the cost and manpower implications of the enclave
 - Faulty COBRA cost analysis shows no savings

Keep the "Gap" Open
Keep the successful 50 year partnership alive!

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

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 - Fails to consider the cost and manpower implications of the enclave
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Keep the "Gap" Open
Keep the successful 50 year partnership alive!

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component (RC) enclave.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the current force.

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an active component (AC) garrison, it has virtually no AC tenants. Annual training for reserve component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum.

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for \$1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$13 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$67 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$23 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$285 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs (521 direct jobs and 268 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA area, which is 0.2 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments to closing this installation.



CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

**MILITARY
VALUE
ASSESSMENT**

FT. POLK
FT. IRWIN

FT. DIX
FT. ASP HILL
FT. MCCOY
FT. GREELY
FT. HUNTER LIGGETT
FT. PICKETT
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP
FT. CRAFFEE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA



COSTS (\$M)

O&M	\$ 12
MILCON	\$ 0
OTHER	\$ 1
TOTAL	\$ 13

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 1

BREAK EVEN YEAR 1999

STEADY STATE (\$M) \$23 (1999)

20 YEAR NPV (\$M) \$285

CLOSE FT INDIANTOWN GAP

- RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES FOR RC ENCLAVE

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

THE ARMY BASING STUDY



IMPACT SUMMARY FT. INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

- OPERATIONAL:** Large mobilization mission
- Support 8+ RC BNS training
 - State owned property leased by active component
 - Maintains enclave for EOD team and RC
 - BRAC 91 Commission's recommendation to transfer to RC rejected

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	4	315
REALIGNMENTS	132	70

ENVIRONMENTAL: No known impediments

ECONOMIC: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs(521direct jobs and 268 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in Salinas, CA MSA, which is 0.2% of the area's employment.

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

- ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED:** Close (no enclave) Ft Indiantown Gap
- Cost = \$323 M
 - Payback = 11 years

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA

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2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the current force.

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ASSESSMENT**
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FT. SENTER LIGGETT
FT. PICKETT
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP
FT. CHAFFEE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA



FT INDIANTOWN GAP

GARRISON

COSTS (\$M)

O&M	\$ 12
MILCON	\$ 0
OTHER	\$ 1
TOTAL	\$ 13

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 1

BREAK EVEN YEAR 1999

STEADY STATE (\$M) \$23 (1999)

20 YEAR NPV (\$M) \$285

CLOSE FT INDIANTOWN GAP

- RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES FOR RC ENCLAVE

CLOSEHOLD/SENSITIVE



IMPACT SUMMARY FT. INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

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PERSONNEL:


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REDUCTIONS	4	315
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ECONOMIC: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs(521direct jobs and 268 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in Salinas, CA MSA, which is 0.2% of the area's employment.

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

- ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED:** Close (no enclave) Ft Indiantown Gap
- Cost = \$323 M
 - Payback = 11 years



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

BRAC 95 ALTERNATIVE DOCUMENTATION SET

ALTERNATIVE NO.

MT6-2

		DATE
STATUS OF ANALYSIS:	RED	[] _____
	AMBER	[] _____
	GREEN	[X] 30Jan95

DESCRIPTION

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.
Move all organizations to Base X except RC.
RIF civilians in garrison.
Enclave RC Bldg and organizations.

ANALYST: LTC BRYAN, NATIONAL GUARD ANALYST



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

**ALTERNATIVE NO.
MT6-2**

SECTION I

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

a. OPTION NUMBER: MT6-2	b. CANDIDATE INSTALLATION: Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.	c. DATE: 1 Dec 94	
d. INSTALLATION CATEGORY: Major Training Area			
e. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION / SUMMARY: Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa. Move all military organizations to Base X, except RC. RIF civilians in Garrison. ENCLAVE RC facilities and organizations.			
f. INSTALLATIONS IN SCENARIO:			
INSTALLATION NAME	STRATEGY (CLOSE/GAIN/LOSE/DEACTIVATE)	COMPLETION	
Ft. Indiantown Gap, Va.	Close	1998	
g. MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND/OR ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED (OR POTENTIALLY AFFECTED):			
UIC/SRC	DESCRIPTION:	PERSONNEL STRENGTH: OFF/WO/ENL/CIV/NAF/OTHER	STRATEGY: DESTINATION/YEAR
W0XQ05	Garrison	3/1/44/310/0/0	Base X and RIF
W49015	DFAS	0/0/0/56/0/0	Base X
1960/Y	EAATS (NG)	12/13/43/0/0/0	Enclave
W3D7!N	378 CS Bn (AR)	0/0/0/4/0/0	Enclave
W3D7!P	442 CS Co (AR)	0/0/0/1/0/0	Enclave
W3D7!Z	1079 USAG (AR)	0/0/0/4/0/0	Enclave
W3D702	1079 USAG (AR)	1/0/5/0/0/0	Enclave
W3D764	442 CS Co (AR)	0/0/3/0/0/0	Enclave
W3D770	378 CS Bn (AR)	2/1/4/0/0/0	Enclave
W3D720	ECS,79ARCOM (AR)	0/0/0/67/0/0	Enclave

h. REMARKS

* Stationing of National Guard units is the responsibility of the State Adjutant General.

National Guard construction must meet DOD 1225.7, NGR 415-10, NGB Pam 415-12 standards and be accepted by the state.

USAR units are stationed based upon demographic supportability. Arbitrarily moving AR units without studying the demographics of the gaining area is counterproductive and probably will destroy the readiness of the units involved.

RESERVE COMPONENT IMPACT:

1. RC units located on the installation? Yes. RC units located on Ft. Indiantown Gap are identified in Part G of this form with a NG or AR.
2. RC units receive support from the installation? Yes. Ft. Indiantown Gap provides a IDT facility for the RC, closing would increase travel time for RC. Ft. Indiantown Gap is also a support installation for the RC and the closing would have little impact, provided Ft. Dix stays open as a support installation.
3. Requirement for an RC enclave? Yes. Both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve wish to enclave parts of Ft. Indiantown Gap should it close.
4. Costs associated with the RC enclave? The Program Management Cost is included in COBRA.



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

**ALTERNATIVE NO.
MT6-2**

SECTION II

PERSONNEL & ORGANIZATION

DATA

09/19/94
HQRPLANS

ASIP TROOP LIST ORDERED BY MAJOR UNIT
Fort Indiantown Gap -- 42305
MAJOR UNIT Y -- TENANTS
FY 1996

Database
Ver 4.20

MC	UIC	SRC	CA RS	UNUM	BR	DESCRIPTION	OFF	WOF	ENL	TOTAL MIL	US CIV	OTHER CIV	TOTAL CIV	TOTAL POP
GB	1952/Y					NGB REG SCH I	0	0	390	390	0	0	0	390
CM	@XCX01					CONTRACT SUPPO	0	0	0	0	0	26	26	26
FC	W3D720			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	67	0	67	67
FC	W3D764			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	3
FC	W3D71Z			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
FC	W3D7!N			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
AR	10001Y					W7WTAA-1ST ARM	0	0	102	102	0	0	0	102
FC	W3D702			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	1	0	5	6	0	0	0	6
AF	FX9H			0009		AIR FORCE	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
AF	FY9B			1818		AIR FORCE	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
AR	1928/T					RTS-M, FT INDN	0	0	15	15	0	0	0	15
AR	1928/Y					RTS-M, FT INDN	0	0	7	7	0	0	0	7
NG	1960/T					NGB EAATS FT G	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	5
NG	1960/Y					NGB EAATS FT G	12	13	43	68	0	0	0	68
DF	W49015			W490		CTDRFAS INDIA	0	0	0	0	56	0	56	56
FC	W3D770			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	2	1	4	7	0	0	0	7
FC	W3D7!P			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
FC	W49015			W490		GRPRC TRN 1ST	8	0	15	23	0	0	0	23
FC	W4MS04			W4MS		US ARMY RES SP	14	0	25	39	13	0	13	52
FC	W4MSA9			W4MS		US ARMY RES SP	2	0	1	3	1	0	1	4
FC	WB60AA	09527LB00	00	0056	OD	DETEOD TEAM	1	0	16	17	0	0	0	17
							40	14	633	687	146	26	172	859

09/19/94
HQRPLANS

ASIP TROOP LIST ORDERED BY MAJOR UNIT
Fort Indiantown Gap -- 42305
MAJOR UNIT Z -- GARRISON
FY 1996

Database
Ver 4.20

MC	UIC	SRC	CA RS	UNUM	BR	DESCRIPTION	OFF	WOF	ENL	TOTAL MIL	US CIV	OTHER CIV	TOTAL CIV	TOTAL POP
FC	W0X005			W0X0		HQ GAR DRUM FT	3	1	44	48	310	0	310	358
AX	*10AN1					AAFES	0	0	0	0	0	23	23	23
HS	W2KR19			W2KR		ACTUSA MED DEP	0	0	3	3	5	0	5	8
HS	W2KR29			W2KR		ACTUSA MED DEP	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
CM	@0X003					FULLTIME CONTR	0	0	0	0	0	46	46	46
							3	1	48	52	315	69	384	436

09/19/94
HQRPLANS

ASIP TROOP LIST ORDERED BY MAJOR UNIT
Fort Indiantown Gap -- 42305
MAJOR UNIT Y -- TENANTS
FY 2000

Database
Ver 4.20

MC	UIC	SRC	CA RS	UNUM	BR	DESCRIPTION	OFF	WOF	ENL	TOTAL MIL	US CIV	OTHER CIV	TOTAL CIV	TOTAL POP
AR	10001Y					W7WTAA-1ST ARM	0	0	102	102	0	0	0	102
FC	W3D7!N			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
FC	W3D7!P			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
FC	W3D7!Z			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	4
FC	W3D702			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	1	0	5	6	0	0	0	6
FC	W3D764			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	3
FC	W3D770			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	2	1	4	7	0	0	0	7
GB	1952/Y					NGB REG SCH I	0	0	382	382	0	0	0	382
CM	@XCX01					CONTRACT SUPPO	0	0	0	0	0	26	26	26
FC	W3D720			W3D7		FTSFTS 79 ARCO	0	0	0	0	67	0	67	67
AF	FX9H			0009		AIR FORCE	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
AF	FY9B			1818		AIR FORCE	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
AR	1928/T					RTS-M, FT INDN	0	0	14	14	0	0	0	14
AR	1928/Y					RTS-M, FT INDN	0	0	7	7	0	0	0	7
NG	1960/T					NGB EAATS FT G	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	5
NG	1960/Y					NGB EAATS FT G	12	13	43	68	0	0	0	68
DF	W49015			W490		CTDRFAS INDIA	0	0	0	0	56	0	56	56

FC W49Q15	W49Q	GRPRC TRN 1ST	8	0	15	23	0	0	0	23
FC W4MS04	W4MS	US ARMY RES SP	14	0	25	39	13	0	13	52
FC W4MSA9	W4MS	US ARMY RES SP	2	0	1	3	1	0	1	4
FC WB60AA	09527LB00 00 0056 00	DETEOD TEAM	1	0	16	17	0	0	0	17

40	14	624	678	146	26	172	850
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09/19/94
HQRPLANS

ASIP TROOP LIST ORDERED BY MAJOR UNIT
Fort Indiantown Gap -- 42305
MAJOR UNIT 2 -- GARRISON
FY 2000

Database
Ver 4.20

MC	UIC	SRC	CA RS UNUM BR	DESCRIPTION	OFF	WOF	ENL	TOTAL MIL	US CIV	OTHER CIV	TOTAL CIV	TOTAL POP
FC	W0XQ05		W0XQ	HQ GAR DRUM FT	3	1	44	48	310	0	310	358
AX	*IDAN1			AAFES	0	0	0	0	0	23	23	23
HS	W2KR19		W2KR	ACTUSA MED DEP	0	0	3	3	5	0	5	8
HS	W2KR29		W2KR	ACTUSA MED DEP	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
CM	W0XQ03			FULLTIME CONTR	0	0	0	0	0	46	46	46

					3	1	48	50	315	69	384	436

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Unit Code = 42394
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TOE UNITS

WB60AA	00	0056	00	DETEOD TEAM	09527LB00300 U	OFF:	1	1	1	1	1	1
FC 33992					SMS 19941016	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25DK3			1		W5NO FC1095	ENL:	16	16	16	16	16	16
TOTAL OFF:							1	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL WOF:							0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:							16	16	16	16	16	16

TOE UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W0XQ05	W0XQ	HQ GAR DRUM FT				OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3
FC 46555	HQ USAG,	FT INDIANTOWN GAP		DAR		WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1
		1		XTEQ		ENL:	44	44	44	44	44	44
						USC:	310	310	310	310	310	310
W2KR19	W2KR	ACTUSA MED DEPT				OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
HS 46501	W2KR USA	HLTH CLM INDIANTOWN		TAD		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1		VCND	HS0295	ENL:	3	3	3	3	3	3
						USC:	5	5	5	5	5	5
W2KR29	W2KR	ACTUSA MED DEPT				OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
HS 46501	W2KR VET	INSP SEC INDNTOWN GAP		TAD		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1		VCND	HS0295	ENL:	1	1	1	1	1	1
W49015	W490	CTRDFAS INDIANAPOLIS			A	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
DF 46421	W490 DAO	FT I-GAP		DAR	19931101	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1		JDFC		ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0
						USC:	56	56	56	56	56	56
W49Q15	W49Q	GRPRC-TRN 1ST ARMY				OFF:	8	8	8	8	8	8
FC 46031	W49Q RTT	FIG		TAM		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1		TRAP	FC2095	ENL:	15	15	15	15	15	15
W4MS04	W4MS	US ARMY RES SPT GRP				OFF:	14	14	14	14	14	14
FC 66141	W4MS RG	FIG ANNVILLE		PA TAM		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
WB1R1D		1		ARFT	FC2095	ENL:	25	25	25	25	25	25
						USC:	13	13	13	13	13	13
W4MSA9	W4MS	US ARMY RES SPT GRP				OFF:	2	2	2	2	2	2
FC 66141	W4MS SRAAG	PA RCS1 ANNVILLE PA		TAM		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1		ARFT	FC2095	ENL:	1	1	1	1	1	1
						USC:	1	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL OFF:							27	27	27	27	27	27
TOTAL WOF:							1	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL ENL:							89	89	89	89	89	89
TOTAL USC:							385	385	385	385	385	385

TDA UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDY STUDENTS

1928/Y		RTS-M, FT INDNTWN GP				OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
AR		TDY STUDENTS-BILLET LOAD		ATR	2000	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1				ENL:	1	7	7	7	7	7

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

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 in Code = 42394
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UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
ASgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							
1960/Y		NGB EAATS FT GAP PA		OFF:		0	12	12	12	12	12
NG	TDY STUDENTS-BILLET	LOAD	ATR	2000	WOF:	3	13	13	13	13	13
		1			ENL:	29	43	43	43	43	43
					TOTAL OFF:	0	0	12	12	12	12
					TOTAL WOF:	0	3	13	13	13	13
					TOTAL ENL:	0	30	50	50	50	50

TYPE UNIT: TRAINEES

1928/T		RTS-M, FT INDNTWN GP		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AR	AIT TRAINEES-BILLET	LOAD	ATR	2000	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			ENL:	3	15	15	14	14	14
1960/T		NGB EAATS FT GAP PA		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG	AIT TRAINEES-BILLET	LOAD	ATR	2000	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			ENL:	1	5	5	5	5	5
					TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL ENL:	0	4	20	20	19	19

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

IDAN1	AAFES			OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AX			DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				OTH:	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
20X003	FULLTIME CONTRACT SPI			OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CM			DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				OTH:	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
FK4001	NON-APPROPRIATED FUND			J OFF:	0						
NF	INDIANTOWN GAP CHAPLAINS FUND		DAI	WOF:	0						
				ENL:	0						
FKF002	NON-APPROPRIATED FUND			J OFF:	0						
NF	FT INDIANTOWNE GAP BILLETING		DAI	WOF:	0						
				ENL:	0						
FX9H	0009 AIR FORCE			OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AF	AIR OPERATIONS		DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

my Base = **FORT INDIANTOWN GAP**
 1 Code = **42394**
 Station = **FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)**

UTC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							
FY98	1818	AIR FORCE		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AF	RESERVE ADVISOR		DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
OTHER TENANTS					TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL ENL:	2	2	2	2	2	2
					TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL OTH:	69	69	69	69	69	69

INSTALLATION TOTALS					TOTAL OFF:	28	28	40	40	40	40
					TOTAL WOF:	1	4	14	14	14	14
					TOTAL ENL:	107	141	177	177	176	176
					TOTAL MIL:	136	173	231	231	230	230
					TOTAL USC:	385	385	385	385	385	385
					TOTAL OTH:	69	69	69	69	69	69
					TOTAL CIV:	454	454	454	454	454	454
					TOTAL POP:	590	627	685	685	684	684

Supported Population (All Services)

Active:	7101
Dependents of Active:	2386
Reserve Component:	2026
Dependents of Reserve Component:	1969
Retiree:	8321
Dependents of Retiree + Survivors:	9102

	30905

Source: FY 1993 DEERS data from the Defense Medical Information System (DMIS)

Supported Unit Training Population

SRC	Unit Designation	Auth FY 95 Unit Training Load	FY 95 Unit Count	Auth FY 99 Unit Training Load	FY 99 Unit Count
03476L100	HHDCHEM BN	4.3	1	4.3	1
06302L000	HHBDIVARTY	18.5	1	18.5	1
06402L100	HHBBDE	24.1	2	24.1	2
08725L000	HSPGENERAL	76.9	1	76.9	1
08823L000	HSPCOMBAT SUPPORT	29.8	1	0.0	0
10427L000	CO PETRO SUPP LUPS	7.0	1	7.0	1
10469L000	DETWATER PURIF	10.2	2	4.7	1
11303H800	CO RADIO OPERATIONS	7.8	1	0.0	0
11623L000	CO CABLE & WIRE	20.9	1	41.8	2
11668L000	CO TROPO LIGHT	0.0	0	6.5	1
12407L000	REP REPL CO (400)	2.9	1	0.0	0
12427L000	DETPERSONNEL DET	4.8	1	0.0	0
14423L000	DETFINANCE BN A	1.9	1	3.8	2
14426L000	HHDFINANCE BN (3)	0.0	0	8.4	1
19543LE00	TM EPW ADVISORY	1.3	1	0.0	0
19543LH00	DETEPW/CI C&C	0.0	0	3.7	1
19667L000	CO GUARD	12.4	1	0.0	0
29139H300	CO SVC COLL/CLASS	0.0	0	9.0	1

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 tn Code = 42394
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)

Supported Unit Training Population

SRC	Unit Designation	Auth FY 95	FY 95	Auth FY 99	FY 99
		Unit Training Load	Unit Count	Unit Training Load	Unit Count
33708L000	CO TACTICAL SPT	7.8	1	7.8	1
34506L800	CO LING(TEST)	7.7	1	7.7	1
34624L000	CO TECH INTEL	18.6	2	18.6	2
34627L000	CO INTG&EXPL (PW SP)	5.8	1	0.0	0
34657L000	CO CI	9.4	1	9.4	1
41702L000	MHC8DE	12.6	1	12.6	1
41705L000	BN (GENERAL PURPOSE)	39.0	3	39.0	3
42414L000	CO FLD SVC DS FWD	27.2	3	27.2	3
43209L000	CO MAINT NON-DIV	23.4	1	23.4	1
55727L100	CO MDM TRK CNTR/CGO	35.0	2	35.0	2
	Total:	409	32	389	30

SOURCE: Authorized strengths from SAMAS 16 May 1994

Computation of Unit Training Load = $\frac{\text{SUM}(\text{srcpop}) \times 2 \text{ weeks}}{20 \text{ weeks}}$

Criteria: Assumes RC units utilize all 85 possible training sites, including Army, State, and other services to meet annual requirements. Further assumes resident AC units and TRADOC have priority access to training facilities.

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 n Code = 4239B
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212))

Facility ID = PA030 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
 Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212), BLDG 14-212 FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5020 Phone: 717-861-2478

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W307!J FC 66810	W307 WQZBAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0441 AG CO (FTS)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0						
		1			WOF:	0						
					ENL:	0						
					USC:	1						
W307!N FC 66810	W307 WSSPAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0378 CS BN (FTS)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					USC:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
W307!P FC 66810	W307 WQZJAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0442 CS CO (FTS)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					USC:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
W307!Z FC 66810	W307 W7V7AA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 1079 USAG (FTS)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					USC:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:	10	9	9	9	9	9	9

TDA UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDY STUDENTS

I0001Y AR	W7V7AA-1ST ARMY NCO A TDY STUDENTS-BILLET LOAD	ATR	2000	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	22	121	102	102	102	102	102	102

TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:	22	121	102	102	102	102	102

TDY STUDENTS

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

W30702 FC 66810	W307 W7V7AA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 1079 USAG (AGR)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
W30751 FC 66810	W307 WQZBAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0441 AG CO PS (AGR)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0						
		1			WOF:	0						
					ENL:	2						
W30764 FC 66810 W25AYR	W307 WQZJAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0442 CS CO (AGR)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
W30770 FC 66810	W307 WSSPAA	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM 0378 CS BN HHC (AGR)	DAI ARFU		OFF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
		1			WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
					ENL:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 n Code = 4239B
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212))

Facility ID = PA030 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
 Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212), BLDG 14-212 FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5020 Phone: 717-861-2478

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO							
Asgt TPSN		Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
DODAAC		Compo	NDEP	CCNUM	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
					TOTAL OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3
					TOTAL WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1
OTHER TENANTS					TOTAL ENL:	14	12	12	12	12	12
					TOTAL OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3
					TOTAL WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1
INSTALLATION TOTALS					TOTAL ENL:	36	133	114	114	114	114
					TOTAL MIL:	40	137	118	118	118	118
					TOTAL USC:	10	9	9	9	9	9
					TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0
					TOTAL CIV:	10	9	9	9	9	9
					TOTAL POP:	50	146	127	127	127	127

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
Code = 4239C
Location = FT I-GAP, PA (ECS/AMSA 24 (G))

Facility ID = PA031 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
Facility = ECS/AMSA 24 (G), BLDG P-10-83 UTILITY RD FIG
ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5015 Phone: 717-861-5444

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br	Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit			Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo			MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W30720	W307	FTSFTS	79 ARCOM	DAR	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810	ECS 24 (G)	(FTS)	1	ARFU	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

TDA UNITS

TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67

INSTALLATION TOTALS

TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIV:	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL POP:	67	67	67	67	67	67

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ACTIVE ARMY

ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM

Army Base = **FORT INDIANTOWN GAP**

Stn Code = **4239F**

Station = **FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #2 (10-33))**

Facility ID = **PA034** Cong Dist = **17** MUSARC = **157 IN BDE**

Facility = **FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #2 (10-33), BLDG 10-33 FIG**

ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5019 Phone: 717-861-5444

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDA AUG TO TOE UNIT

WRGEC 06 0068	BN TANK (M60)		J	OFF:	0						
FC 14157	WRGECO 6/68 AR BN CO C (FTS)	DAI	19940415	WOF:	0						
	1	ARFU		ENL:	0						
TOTAL OFF:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TDA AUG TO TOE UNIT

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

W42N29	W42N	HQ FTS 157SIB		OFF:	1						
FC 46031	WRGECO 6/68 AR BN CO C (AGR)	DAI		WOF:	0						
	1	ARFT		ENL:	2						
TOTAL OFF:					1	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:					2	0	0	0	0	0	0

OTHER TENANTS

TOTAL OFF:					1	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:					2	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL:					3	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OTH:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIV:					0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL POP:					3	0	0	0	0	0	0

INSTALLATION TOTALS

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ACTIVE ARMY
ASIP STATION REPORT : FORSCOM**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 n Code = 4239P
 ation = FT I-GAP, PA (TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17
 Facility = TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA, BLDG 10-27/11-66/19-117/19-79

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br	Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDY STUDENTS

1952/Y	NGB REG SCH I FT GAP	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GB	TDY STUDENTS-BILLET LOAD	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	ENL:	268	261	390	382	382	382	382	382	382
TOTAL OFF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:			268	261	390	382	382	382	382	382	382

TDY STUDENTS

TYPE UNIT: TRAINEES

1952/T	NGB REG SCH I FT GAP	OFF:	0	0
GB	AIT TRAINEES-BILLET LOAD	WOF:	0	0
	1	ENL:	31	0
TOTAL OFF:			0	0
TOTAL WOF:			0	0
TOTAL ENL:			31	0

TRAINEES

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

ACX01	CONTRACT SUPPORT	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CM	DET 1, 3622 MAINT CO	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	DAI	ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		OTH:	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
TOTAL OFF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OTH:			26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26

OTHER TENANTS

TOTAL OFF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:			299	261	390	382	382	382	382	382	382
TOTAL MIL:			299	261	390	382	382	382	382	382	382
TOTAL USC:			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OTH:			26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
TOTAL CIV:			26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
TOTAL POP:			325	287	416	408	408	408	408	408	408

INSTALLATION TOTALS

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
Stn Code = 4239P
Station = FT I-GAP, PA (TS FT INDIANTN GAP)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17
Facility = TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA, BLDG 10-27/11-66/19-117/19-79

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TOE UNITS

WPGDAA 00 0028 AG HHDPERSONNEL BN	12426L000100 C	OFF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
NG 30411	SMS 19931001	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25KV3 2	WGDX NG0194	ENL:	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
WPGZ-A 00 0228 CS BN FWDSP/2X1/	*63005L100100 T	OFF:	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2
NG 02028	SMSSUB 19940901	WOF:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
2	WGDF	ENL:	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
WPGZAO 00 0228 CS BN FWDSP/2X1/	42004L1000010	OFF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
NG 02028 CS BN CO A SUP	SUB	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W81HMF 2	WGDF NG0194	ENL:	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
WPGZB1 00 0228 CS BN FWDSP/2X1/		OFF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NG 02028 DET 1 CO B (MNT) 228TH FSB	SID	WOF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
W81UFO 2	WGDF 931001	ENL:	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
WPGZT0 00 0228 CS BN FWDSP/2X1/	63006L0000010	OFF:	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
NG 02028 CS BN HHD	SUB	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25KKB 2	WGDF NG0194	ENL:	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
WJEGAA 00 0109 PI DETMOBILE PUBLIC AFF	45413L000300 U	OFF:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
NG 34282	SMS 19931001	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25KJ5 2	WGDX NG0194	ENL:	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
WTP1AA 00 0104 AV CO F AVN MAINT	01933L300100 C	OFF:	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
NG 02028	SMS 19940901	WOF:	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
W81DWD 2	WGDF NG0194	ENL:	203	203	203	203	203	203	203	203
WTSYAA 00 0000 AV HHCavn BDE ID(NG)	01302L000100 C	OFF:	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
NG 02028	SMS 19940901	WOF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
W81DWB 2	WGDF NG0194	ENL:	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
WTU4CO 01 0104 AR SQ CAV (M1/M113)	17287L2000010	OFF:	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
NG 02028 AR SQ TRP C 01	SUB	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W81DWF 2	WGDF NG0195	ENL:	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116
WTU4D0 01 0104 AR SQ CAV (M1/M113)	01267L1000010	OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
NG 02028 AR SQ TRP D 01	SUB	WOF:	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
W81DWF 2	WGDF NG0195	ENL:	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
WTU4T1 01 0104 AR SQ CAV (M1/M113)		OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
NG 02028 DET 1 HHT 1ST SQDN 104TH CAV	SID	WOF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
W81EUB 2	WGDF 900901	ENL:	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
WJAS-A 02 0104 AV BN ASLT HEL UH-1H	*01125L100100 R	OFF:	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
NG 03028	SMSSUB 19920901	WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	WGDF NG0192	ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WJASAO 02 0104 AV BN ASLT HEL UH-1H	01317L2000010	OFF:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
NG 03028 AV BN CO A 02	SUB	WOF:	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42
W81N4G 2	WGDF NG0192	ENL:	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
WJASCO 02 0104 AV BN ASLT HEL UH-1H	01128L1000010	OFF:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
NG 03028 AV BN CO C 02	SUB	WOF:	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
W81N4K 2	WGDF NG0192	ENL:	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
WJASD1 02 0104 AV BN ASLT HEL UH-1H		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG 03028 DET 1 CO D 2/104TH AVN	SID	WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
W81DWC 2	WGDF 900901	ENL:	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
n Code = 4239P
ation = FT I-GAP, PA (TS FT INDIANTN GAP)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17
Facility = TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA, BLDG 10-27/11-66/19-117/19-79

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br	Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO		FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM								
WUAST-02	0104	AV BN ASLT HEL UH-1H	01126L100010	OFF:		15	15	15	15	15	15	15
NG 03028	AV BN HHC	02	SUBSID	WOF:		2	2	2	2	2	2	2
WB1M4D		2	WGDF NG0192	ENL:		81	81	81	81	81	81	81
WV5AAA	00	0128 MH DETMIL HISTORY	20017H300100	J OFF:		0						
NG 33225			SMS 19940901	WOF:		0						
WB1D64		2	WGXT	ENL:		0						
WVBEAA	00	0281 AG DETPERSONNEL DET	12427L000100	A OFF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NG 30412			SMS 19931001	WOF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
WB1U5G		2	WGNW NG0194	ENL:		46	46	46	46	46	46	46
WVGBAA	00	0028 AV CO ATS(DIV) 28AD	01427L100100	C OFF:		1	2	2	2	2	2	2
NG 30613			SMS 19950901	WOF:		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25M6N		2	WGSX NG0195	ENL:		36	46	46	46	46	46	46
WXAMAA	00	0282 AG DETPERSONNEL DET	12427L000100	A OFF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NG 30412			SMS 19931001	WOF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
WB1U5J		2	WGNW NG0194	ENL:		46	46	46	46	46	46	46
WXASAA	00	0283 AG DETPERSONNEL DET	12427L000100	A OFF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NG 30412			SMS 19931001	WOF:		1	1	1	1	1	1	1
WB1U5L		2	WGNW NG0194	ENL:		46	46	46	46	46	46	46
WXA1	00	3622 OD CO MAINT GS		OFF:		2	2	2	2	2	2	2
NG 31125	DET 1, 3622D MAINT CO		SID	WOF:		5	5	5	5	5	5	5
W25KJ3		2	WGSX 930831	ENL:		53	53	53	53	53	53	53
TOTAL OFF:						82	83	83	83	83	83	83
TOTAL WOF:						107	106	106	106	106	106	106
TOTAL ENL:						1090	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100

TOE UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDA AUG TO TOE UNIT

WTP199	00	0028	AUGBN CO E AASF		U OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG 02028				SHM 19930901	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25KYJ		2			ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WTU498	01	0104	SQ CAV (M60/M113)		X OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG 02028				SMS 19940901	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WB1M4T		2		WGDF	ENL:	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
WV7S99	00	0104	CO G MDM HEL CH47		U OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG 19001				SMR 19930901	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WB1EAW		2			ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WXCX99	00	3622	CO MAINT GS AUG CSMS		A OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NG 31125				SHM 19940601	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25KYD		2		WGSX	ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:						10	10	10	10	10	10	10

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

7NXAA	W7NX	ACTUSPFO ACTIVITY PA		X OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
46251			SHM 19901001	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25PBG		2			ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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SAMAS 15 of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 In Code = 4239P
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (TS FT INDIANTN GAP)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17
 Facility = TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA, BLDG 10-27/11-66/19-117/19-79

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Compo	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC			MDEP	CCNUM							
W7QN-A NG 46755 W80P7H	W7QN	ACTARNG EAATS 2	SMSSID WGSX	19940601 NG0194	U OFF: WOF: ENL:	18 50 50	18 50 50	18 50 50	18 50 50	18 50 50	18 50 50
W7WAAA NG 66117 W81ENT	W7WA	ACTNCO ACANEHY(BNCO) 2	SMS WGSX	19921201 NG0193	U OFF: WOF: ENL:	0 0 55	0 0 55	0 0 55	0 0 55	0 0 55	0 0 55
W7XDAA NG 46752 W81G7P	W7XD	ACTREG TNG SITE MED 2	SMS WGSX	19931201 NG0194	U OFF: WOF: ENL:	3 1 24	3 1 24	3 1 24	3 1 24	3 1 24	3 1 24
W7YNAA NG 46769 W81U4B	W7YN	DETRECON AIR INTRADI 2	SMS WGNW	19940901 NG0194	U OFF: WOF: ENL:	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
W88W-A NG 56751 W25KYC	W88W	HQ STARC PA 2	SMSSID WGSX	19940930	R OFF: WOF: ENL:	112 46 341	112 46 341	112 46 341	112 46 341	112 46 341	112 46 341
W88WA1 NG 56751 W81TD0	W88W	HQ STARC PA DET 1, HQ STARC 2	SID WGSX	900301	OFF: WOF: ENL:	5 0 0	5 0 0	5 0 0	5 0 0	5 0 0	5 0 0
W88WA2 NG 56751 W25KYF	W88W	HQ STARC PA DET 2 (MIL ACDMY), HQ STARC 2	SID WGSX	920701	OFF: WOF: ENL:	15 3 32	15 3 32	15 3 32	15 3 32	15 3 32	15 3 32
TOTAL OFF:					153	153	153	153	153	153	153
TOTAL WOF:					100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL ENL:					502	502	502	502	502	502	502

TDA UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDY STUDENTS

1952/Y	NGB REG SCH I FT GAP	ATR	2000	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GB	TDY STUDENTS-BILLET LOAD 1			WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				ENL:	268	261	390	382	382	382	382

TDY STUDENTS

TOTAL ENL: 268 261 390 382 382 382 382

TYPE UNIT: TRAINEES

1952/T	NGB REG SCH I FT GAP	ATR	1994	OFF:	0	0
GB	AIT TRAINEES-BILLET LOAD 1			WOF:	0	0
				ENL:	31	0

TRAINEES

TOTAL ENL: 31 0 0 0 0 0 0

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

QXCX01	CONTRACT SUPPORT	DAI	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CM	DET 1, 3622 MAINT CO		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			OTH:	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Stn Code = 4239P
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (TS FT INDIANTN GAP)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17
 Facility = TS FORT INDIANTOWN GA, BLDG 10-27/11-66/19-117/19-79

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

OTHER TENANTS

TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OTH:	26	26	26	26	26	26	26

	TOTAL OFF:	235	236	236	236	236	236	236
	TOTAL WOF:	207	206	206	206	206	206	206
	TOTAL ENL:	1901	1873	2002	1994	1994	1994	1994
	TOTAL MIL:	2343	2315	2444	2436	2436	2436	2436
	TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL OTH:	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
	TOTAL CIV:	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
	TOTAL POP:	2369	2341	2470	2462	2462	2462	2462

FT I-GAP, PA (TS FT INDIANTN GAP)
 INSTALLATION TOTALS

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = **FORT INDIANTOWN GAP**
 n Code = **42394**
 Station = **FT I-GAP, PA (FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)**

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br	Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN			Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC			Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W1HWAA	W1HW	ACTREG	MNT	TNG	SITE	A	OFF:							
AR 68113						19951016	WOF:		1	1	1	1	1	
			3				ENL:		11	11	11	11	11	
								TOTAL OFF:	0	0	1	1	1	1
								TOTAL WOF:	0	0	1	1	1	1
								TOTAL ENL:	0	0	11	11	11	11

TDA UNITS

	TOTAL OFF:	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
	TOTAL WOF:	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
	TOTAL ENL:	0	0	11	11	11	11	11
FT I-GAP, PA (FT INDIANTOWN GAP)	TOTAL MIL:	0	0	13	13	13	13	13
INSTALLATION TOTALS	TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL CIV:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL POP:	0	0	13	13	13	13	13

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
n Code = 4239B
ation = FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP USARC 4)

Facility ID = PA030 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212), BLDG 14-212 FIG
ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5020 Phone: 717-861-2478

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TOE UNITS

WQZBAA 00 0441 AG CO PER SVC TYPE C	12467L300100 J	OFF:	3	0						
1G 30415	SMR 19950915	WOF:	4	0						
	WRJO	ENL:	113	0						
AT BELLFERT, PA WQZJ-A 00 0442 CS CO FLD SVC GS FWD	42414L000300 C	OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
1G 31121	SMRSID 19950416	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25AYB	WRSQ	ENL:	81	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
WSSPAA 00 0378 CS HHDCORPS SUPPORT BN	63426L000100 C	OFF:	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
1G 31171	SMR 19940416	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25AXM	WRSQ AR1094	ENL:	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
TOTAL OFF:			19	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
TOTAL WOF:			4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:			237	123	123	123	123	123	123	123

TOE UNITS

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W3071J W307 FTSFSTS 79 ARCOM	DAI	OFF:	0							
FC 66810 WQZBAA 0441 AG CO (FTS)	ARFU	WOF:	0							
		ENL:	0							
		USC:	1							
W3071N W307 FTSFSTS 79 ARCOM	DAI	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810 WSSPAA 0378 CS BN (FTS)	ARFU	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		USC:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
W3071P W307 FTSFSTS 79 ARCOM	DAI	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810 WQZJAA 0442 CS CO (FTS)	ARFU	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		USC:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
W3071Z W307 FTSFSTS 79 ARCOM	DAI	OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810 W7V7AA 1079 USAG (FTS)	ARFU	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		USC:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
W7V7AA 00 1079 HQ USA GAR	X	OFF:	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
1G 46551	SMS 19911001	WOF:	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
W81EBP	WROR	ENL:	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
W7XLAA 2374 DETSIG (USAISC)	J	OFF:	0							
1G 46551	SMS 19940916	WOF:	0							
W81KAU	WROR	ENL:	0							
W8C801 0079 CMDUSAR		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1G 66782 CLASS IX HOT (REPAIR)	DAR	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	WROR	ENL:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
TOTAL OFF:			69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
TOTAL WOF:			6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
TOTAL ENL:			157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157
TOTAL USC:			10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

TDA UNITS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

ARMY RESERVE ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Stn Code = 4239B
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP USARC 4)

Facility ID = PA030 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
 Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #4 (14-212), BLDG 14-212 FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5020 Phone: 717-861-2478

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TDY STUDENTS

10001Y	W7WTA	1ST ARMY NCO A		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AR	TDY STUDENTS-BILLET	LOAD	ATR	2000	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1			ENL:	22	121	102	102	102	102
TDY STUDENTS				TOTAL ENL:	22	121	102	102	102	102	102

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

W3D702	W3D7	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM		OFF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FC 66810	W7V7AA	1079 USAG (AGR)	DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1	ARFU	ENL:	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
W3D751	W3D7	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM		OFF:	0						
FC 66810	WQZBAA	0441 AG CO PS (AGR)	DAI	WOF:	0						
		1	ARFU	ENL:	2						
W3D764	W3D7	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810	WQZJAA	0442 CS CO (AGR)	DAI	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W25AYR		1	ARFU	ENL:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
W3D770	W3D7	FTSFTS 79 ARCOM		OFF:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
FC 66810	WSSPAA	0378 CS BN HHC (AGR)	DAI	WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		1	ARFU	ENL:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
OTHER TENANTS				TOTAL OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
				TOTAL WOF:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
				TOTAL ENL:	14	12	12	12	12	12	12

				TOTAL OFF:	91	88	88	88	88	88	88
				TOTAL WOF:	11	7	7	7	7	7	7
				TOTAL ENL:	430	413	394	394	394	394	394
				TOTAL MIL:	532	508	489	489	489	489	489
				TOTAL USC:	10	9	9	9	9	9	9
				TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				TOTAL CIV:	10	9	9	9	9	9	9
				TOTAL POP:	542	517	498	498	498	498	498

FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP USARC 4)
 INSTALLATION TOTALS

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Stn Code = 4239C
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (ECS 24)

Facility ID = PA031 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
 Facility = ECS/AMSA 24 (G), BLDG P-10-83 UTILITY RD FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5015 Phone: 717-861-5444

UIC	Rgt/Unbr	Br	Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit		Source	EDATE		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DODAAC	Compo		MDEP	CCNUM								

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W30720	W307	FTSFTS	79 ARCOM		OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC 66810	ECS 24 (G) (FTS)	1	DAR	ARFU	WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

TDA UNITS

TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67

FT I-GAP, PA (ECS 24)
 INSTALLATION TOTALS

TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL MIL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL USC:	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIV:	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL POP:	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

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SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 In Code = 4239E
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP FEASC)

Facility ID = Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 416 EN CMD
 Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP FAC ENG AREA SPT CTR, BLDG 11-29 FIG

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO							
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000

TYPE UNIT: TOE UNITS

WRXM63	00 0416 EN HHCENGR COMMAND			OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
46 31303	DIANTWN EVAL TM	SIR		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	3	WRSQ	4R1094	ENL:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

WRXM64	00 0416 EN HHCENGR COMMAND			OFF:	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
46 31303	DIANTWN EVAL TM2	SIR		WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	3	WRSQ	4R1094	ENL:	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

				TOTAL OFF:	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
				TOTAL ENL:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

TOE UNITS

				TOTAL OFF:	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
				TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				TOTAL ENL:	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
				TOTAL MIL:	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
				TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				TOTAL CIV:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				TOTAL POP:	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP FEASC)
 INSTALLATION TOTALS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Stn Code = 4239F
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP USARC 2)

Facility ID = PA034 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 157 IN BDE
 Facility = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP USARC #2 (10-33), BLDG 10-33 FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5019 Phone: 717-861-5444

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
DCDAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM							

TYPE UNIT: TOE UNITS

✓ WRGECO 06 0068 AR BN TANK (IPM1)	17377L0000010 J	OFF:	5	0						
1H 14157 AR BN CO C 06	SUB	WOF:	0	0						
W25AY3 3	WRSQ AR1095	ENL:	58	0						
WRGET4 06 0068 AR BN TANK (IPM1)	J	OFF:	0	0						
1H 14157 HHC DET 3	SID	WOF:	0	0						
3	WRSQ AR1293	ENL:	11	0						
TOTAL OFF:			5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL:			69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TYPE UNIT: TDA AUG TO TOE UNIT

WRGE1C 06 0068 BN TANK (M60)	J	OFF:	0							
FC 14157 WRGECO 6/68 AR BN CO C (FTS)	DAI 19940415	WOF:	0							
1	ARFU	ENL:	0							
TDA AUG TO TOE UNIT			TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TYPE UNIT: OTHER TENANTS

W4ZM29 W4ZN HQ FTS 157SIB		OFF:	1							
FC 46031 WRGECO 6/68 AR BN CO C (AGR)	DAI	WOF:	0							
1	ARFT	ENL:	2							
OTHER TENANTS			TOTAL OFF:	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL ENL:	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

			TOTAL OFF:	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL ENL:	71	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL MIL:	77	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL CIV:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			TOTAL POP:	77	0	0	0	0	0	0

FT I-GAP, PA (FT I GAP USARC 2)
 INSTALLATION TOTALS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SAMAS as of 16 MAY 94

**ARMY RESERVE
ASIP STATION REPORT : PENNSYLVANIA**

Army Base = FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
 Stn Code = 4239G
 Station = FT I-GAP, PA (ANNVILLE USARC)

Facility ID = PA033 Cong Dist = 17 MUSARC = 79 ARCOM
 Facility = ANNVILLE USARC (1A NCO ACADEMY), BLDG 4-19 FIG
 ANNVILLE, PA 17003-5011 Phone: 717-861-2000

Lease = DACA315730006400 Exp = 08/31/22 Interest = MSTRPLAN

UIC	Rgt/Unbr Br Parent Unit	SRC	ACTCO							
Asgt TPSN	Derivative Unit	Source	EDATE	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY	FY
DODAAC	Compo	MDEP	CCNUM	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000

TYPE UNIT: TDA UNITS

W7MTAA	0001	ACDUSAONE RC NCO	J	OFF:	0						
1G 66800			SMS	19940228	WOF:	0					
W81D6H		3	WRX2		ENL:	0					

TDA UNITS	TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
-----------	------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

		TOTAL OFF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FT I-GAP, PA (ANNVILLE USARC)		TOTAL WOF:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
INSTALLATION TOTALS		TOTAL ENL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		TOTAL MIL:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		TOTAL USC:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		TOTAL OTH:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		TOTAL CIV:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		TOTAL POP:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**THE ARMY BASING STUDY
BRAC 95
COBRA WORKSHEET**

SCREEN FOUR - BASE INFORMATION (STATIC)

BASE: Ft Indiantown Gap

TOTAL OFFICERS:	<u>33</u>	RPMA NON-PAYROLL (\$/YR):	<u> </u>
TOTAL ENLISTED:	<u>119</u>	COMMUNICATN COSTS (\$/YR):	<u> </u>
TOTAL STUDENTS:	<u>529</u>	BOS NON-PAY ROLL(\$/YR):	<u> </u>
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES:	<u>581</u>	BOS PAYROLL (\$/YR):	<u> </u>
% MIL FAMILIES ON BASE: *	<u>0</u> %	FAMILY HOUS COSTS (\$/YR):	<u>69,373.75</u>
% CIVS NOT WILL TO MOVE:	<u>6</u> %	AREA COST FACTOR:	<u>1.050</u>
OFF HOUSING UNITS VACANT:	<u>0</u>	CHAMPUS IN-PATIENT (\$/VIS):	<u> </u>
ENL HOUSING UNITS VACANT:	<u>0</u>	CHAMPUS OUT-PATIENT (\$/VIS):	<u> </u>
TOTAL FACILITIES (KSF):	<u>4,303,974</u>	CHAMPUS SHIFT TO MEDICARE:	<u> </u> %
OFFICER VHA (\$/MONTH):	<u>\$129</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> HOMEOWNER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM	
ENLISTED VHA (\$/MONTH):	<u>\$77</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> UNIQUE ACTIVITY INFORMATION	
PER DIEM RATE (\$/DAY):	<u>\$109</u>		
FREIGHT COST (\$/TON/MI):	<u>.07</u>		

4,303,974

556,866

2,747,108

ALTERNATIVE #



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

**ALTERNATIVE NO.
MT6-2**

SECTION III

FACILITIES DATA



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

**ALTERNATIVE NO.
MT6-2**

SECTION IV

COBRA MODEL INPUT DATA

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name : Strategy:

 BASE X, US : Realignment
 FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA : Realignment

Summary:

 Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.
 Move all organizations to Base X except RC.
 RIF civilians in Garrison.
 ENCLAVE RC Bldg and organizations.

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
BASE X, US	FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	29	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	103	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	70	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASRX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

Total Officer Employees:	33	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,122
Total Enlisted Employees:	119	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	587	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	16,730
Total Civilian Employees:	461	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,154
Mil Families Living On Base:	1.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	89
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.05
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,304	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	129	Activity Code:	42305
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	77		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	109	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req'd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
						Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Req'd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	260	260	260
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	2,747					
						Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 100.0%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DBC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-4	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-315	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DBC.SFF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	10.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 2.90%	1997: 3.00%	1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00%
		2000: 3.00%	2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	4,381.00

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&B)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

\$260,000 annual cost to move RC personnel and equipment to new training sites.



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

ALTERNATIVE NO.

MT6-2

SECTION V

COBRA MODEL OUTPUT

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1998
 ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -284,523
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 12,735

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	-6,642	-14,622	-14,622	-14,622	-50,510	-14,622
Overhd	1,211	908	48	-8,133	-8,133	-8,133	-22,232	-8,133
Moving	0	0	4,940	0	0	0	4,940	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	676	0	0	0	676	0
TOTAL	1,211	908	-978	-22,755	-22,755	-22,755	-67,126	-22,755

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civ	0	0	315	0	0	0	315
TOT	0	0	319	0	0	0	319

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
Enl	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	70	0	0	0	70
TOT	0	0	202	0	0	0	202

Summary:

 Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.
 Move all organizations to Base X except RC.
 RIF civilians in Garrison.
 ENCLAVE RC Bldg and organizations.

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	1,299	625	625	625	3,175	625
Overhd	1,211	908	4,503	389	389	389	7,788	389
Moving	0	0	5,152	0	0	0	5,152	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	676	0	0	0	676	0
TOTAL	1,211	908	11,631	1,014	1,014	1,014	16,791	1,014

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	7,941	15,248	15,248	15,248	53,684	15,248
Overhd	0	0	4,456	8,522	8,522	8,522	30,021	8,522
Moving	0	0	212	0	0	0	212	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	12,609	23,769	23,769	23,769	83,918	23,769

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Year	Cost (\$)	Adjusted Cost (\$)	NPV (\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	1,210,630	1,194,320	1,194,320
1997	907,973	871,766	2,066,086
1998	-978,492	-914,330	1,151,756
1999	-22,755,437	-20,694,206	-19,542,450
2000	-22,755,437	-20,140,346	-39,682,796
2001	-22,755,437	-19,601,310	-59,284,106
2002	-22,755,437	-19,076,701	-78,360,807
2003	-22,755,437	-18,566,132	-96,926,940
2004	-22,755,437	-18,069,229	-114,996,168
2005	-22,755,437	-17,585,624	-132,581,792
2006	-22,755,437	-17,114,962	-149,696,755
2007	-22,755,437	-16,656,898	-166,353,653
2008	-22,755,437	-16,211,093	-182,564,746
2009	-22,755,437	-15,777,219	-198,341,965
2010	-22,755,437	-15,354,958	-213,696,923
2011	-22,755,437	-14,943,998	-228,640,921
2012	-22,755,437	-14,544,037	-243,184,958
2013	-22,755,437	-14,154,780	-257,339,738
2014	-22,755,437	-13,775,942	-271,115,680
2015	-22,755,437	-13,407,243	-284,522,923

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	412,602	
Civilian Early Retirement	157,313	
Civilian New Hires	14,417	
Eliminated Military PCS	17,524	
Unemployment	72,036	
Total - Personnel		673,892
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	2,799,583	
Mothball / Shutdown	3,433,750	
Total - Overhead		6,233,333
Moving		
Civilian Moving	1,718,429	
Civilian PPS	2,736,000	
Military Moving	644,550	
Freight	53,260	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		5,152,239
Other		
HAP / RSE	676,004	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		676,004

Total One-Time Costs		12,735,468

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	212,338	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		212,338

Total Net One-Time Costs		12,523,130

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: BASE X, US
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	14,417	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		14,417
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		14,417
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		14,417

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	412,602	
Civilian Early Retirement	157,313	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	17,524	
Unemployment	72,036	
Total - Personnel		659,475
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	2,799,583	
Mothball / Shutdown	3,433,750	
Total - Overhead		6,233,333
Moving		
Civilian Moving	1,718,429	
Civilian PPS	2,736,000	
Military Moving	644,550	
Freight	53,260	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		5,152,239
Other		
HAP / RSE	676,004	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		676,004
-----		-----
Total One-Time Costs		12,721,051
-----		-----
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	212,338	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----		-----
Total One-Time Savings		212,338
-----		-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		12,508,713

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	202	2%	0	0%	0
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-521	-43%	-2,747,000	-64%	5,272

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	0	0%	0	388,808	1%	1,925
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-3,743,952	-61%	7,186	-4,428,792	-26%	8,500

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	388,808	1%	1,925
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-8,172,745	-36%	15,687

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
BASE X	0	0	0	0	0
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	0	0	0	0	0
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Totals:	0	0	0	0	0

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: BASE X, US

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
752	4,208	1,121	2,709

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	70	0	0	0	70
TOTAL	0	0	202	0	0	0	202

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into BASE X, US):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	70	0	0	0	70
TOTAL	0	0	202	0	0	0	202

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
781	4,311	1,121	2,779

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
33	119	587	461

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	70	0	0	0	70
TOTAL	0	0	202	0	0	0	202

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	70	0	0	0	70
TOTAL	0	0	202	0	0	0	202

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	-4	0	0	0	-4
Civilians	0	0	-315	0	0	0	-315
TOTAL	0	0	-319	0	0	0	-319

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT6-2
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
-----	-----	-----	-----
4	12	587	76

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	70	0	0	0	70
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	44	0	0	0	44
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	26	0	0	0	26
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	315	0	0	0	315
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	16	0	0	0	16
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	70	0	0	0	70
Civilians Moving		0	0	57	0	0	0	57
New Civilians Hired		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	38	0	0	0	38
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	23	0	0	0	23
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	13	0	0	0	13

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	70	0	0	0	70
Civilians Moving		0	0	57	0	0	0	57
New Civilians Hired		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	13	0	0	0	13

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	70	0	0	0	70
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Civs Not Moving (RIPs)*	6.00%	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	44	0	0	0	44
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	26	0	0	0	26
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	315	0	0	0	315
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	16	0	0	0	16
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Civs Not Moving (RIPs)*	6.00%	0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilian RIPs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	38	0	0	0	38
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIPS		0	0	23	0	0	0	23
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

Base: BASE X, US

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	202	100.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	202	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	66.67%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1997	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	521	100.00%	100.00%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	521	100.00%	100.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	0	413	0	0	0	413
Civ Retire	0	0	157	0	0	0	157
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	195	0	0	0	195
POV Miles	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
Home Purch	0	0	614	0	0	0	614
HHG	0	0	407	0	0	0	407
Misc	0	0	40	0	0	0	40
House Hunt	0	0	162	0	0	0	162
PPS	0	0	2,736	0	0	0	2,736
RITA	0	0	287	0	0	0	287
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Freight	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	72	0	0	0	72
OTHER							
Program Plan	1,211	908	681	0	0	0	2,799
Shutdown	0	0	3,434	0	0	0	3,434
New Hire	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	51	0	0	0	51
POV Miles	0	0	32	0	0	0	32
HHG	0	0	469	0	0	0	469
Misc	0	0	92	0	0	0	92
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	676	0	0	0	676
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,211	908	10,617	0	0	0	12,735

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/9
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	389	389	389	389	1,555	389
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	625	625	625	625	2,501	625
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	4,056	1,014
TOTAL COST	1,211	908	11,631	1,014	1,014	1,014	16,791	1,014
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	212	0	0	0	212	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	212	0	0	0	212	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
---- (\$K) ----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	44	89	89	89	311	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	1,840	3,744	3,744	3,744	13,072	3,744
BOS	0	0	2,571	4,429	4,429	4,429	15,858	4,429
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	7,245	14,489	14,489	14,489	50,713	14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	62	123	123	123	432	123
House Allow	0	0	635	635	635	635	2,539	635
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	260	260	260	780	260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	12,397	23,769	23,769	23,769	83,705	23,769
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	0	12,609	23,769	23,769	23,769	83,918	23,769

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/9
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	570	0	0	0	570	
Civ Moving	0	0	4,508	0	0	0	4,508	
Other	1,211	908	4,201	0	0	0	6,320	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	450	0	0	0	450	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	676	0	0	0	676	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,211	908	10,404	0	0	0	12,523	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-1,840	-3,744	-3,744	-3,744	-13,072	-3,744
BOS	0	0	-2,182	-4,040	-4,040	-4,040	-14,302	-4,040
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-7,245	-14,489	-14,489	-14,489	-50,713	-14,489
CHAMPUS								
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-62	-123	-123	-123	-432	-123
House Allow	0	0	-10	-10	-10	-10	-39	-10
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	-260	-260	-260	-780	-260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-11,383	-22,755	-22,755	-22,755	-79,649	-22,755
TOTAL NET COST	1,211	908	-978	-22,755	-22,755	-22,755	-67,126	-22,755

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/9
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
-----(\$K)-----							
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	14	0	0	0	14

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	14	0	0	0	14	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	14	0	0	0	14	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td></td></td></td></td></td>	---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td></td></td></td></td>	---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td></td></td></td>	---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td></td></td>	---- <td>---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td></td>	---- <td>---- <td>-----</td> </td>	---- <td>-----</td>	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	389	389	389	389	1,555	389
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	625	625	625	625	2,501	625
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	4,056	1,014
TOTAL NET COST	0	0	1,028	1,014	1,014	1,014	4,070	1,014

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	413	0	0	0	413
Civ Retire	0	0	157	0	0	0	157
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	195	0	0	0	195
POV Miles	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
Home Purch	0	0	614	0	0	0	614
HHG	0	0	407	0	0	0	407
Misc	0	0	40	0	0	0	40
House Hunt	0	0	162	0	0	0	162
PPS	0	0	2,736	0	0	0	2,736
RITA	0	0	287	0	0	0	287
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Freight	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	72	0	0	0	72
OTHER							
Program Plan	1,211	908	681	0	0	0	2,799
Shutdown	0	0	3,434	0	0	0	3,434
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	51	0	0	0	51
POV Miles	0	0	32	0	0	0	32
HHG	0	0	469	0	0	0	469
Misc	0	0	92	0	0	0	92
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	676	0	0	0	676
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,211	908	10,602	0	0	0	12,721

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 8/9
 Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DBC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL COSTS 1,211 908 10,602 0 0 0 12,721 0

ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	212	0	0	0	212	0
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	212	0	0	0	212	0

RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	44	89	89	89	311	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	1,840	3,744	3,744	3,744	13,072	3,744
BOS	0	0	2,571	4,429	4,429	4,429	15,858	4,429
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	7,245	14,489	14,489	14,489	50,713	14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	62	123	123	123	432	123
House Allow	0	0	635	635	635	635	2,539	635
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	260	260	260	780	260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	12,397	23,769	23,769	23,769	83,705	23,769
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	0	12,609	23,769	23,769	23,769	83,918	23,769

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	570	0	0	0	570	
Civ Moving	0	0	4,508	0	0	0	4,508	
Other	1,211	908	4,187	0	0	0	6,305	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	450	0	0	0	450	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	676	0	0	0	676	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,211	908	10,390	0	0	0	12,509	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-1,840	-3,744	-3,744	-3,744	-13,072	-3,744
BOS	0	0	-2,571	-4,429	-4,429	-4,429	-15,858	-4,429
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-7,245	-14,489	-14,489	-14,489	-50,713	-14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-62	-123	-123	-123	-432	-123
House Allow	0	0	-635	-635	-635	-635	-2,539	-635
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	-260	-260	-260	-780	-260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-12,397	-23,769	-23,769	-23,769	-83,705	-23,769
TOTAL NET COST	1,211	908	-2,007	-23,769	-23,769	-23,769	-71,196	-23,769

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:41 09/29/1994, Report Created 10:10 02/21/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-2
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-2.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	0	-1,840	-3,744	-3,744	-3,744	-13,072	-3,744
BOS Change	0	0	-2,182	-4,040	-4,040	-4,040	-14,302	-4,040
Housing Change	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
TOTAL CHANGES	0	0	-4,067	-7,873	-7,873	-7,873	-27,686	-7,873



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

ALTERNATIVE NO.

MT6-2

SECTION VI

IMPACTS:

**ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES
COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL**

ECONOMIC IMPACT DATABASE

Installation: **PORT INDIANTOWN GAP**

State: **Pennsylvania** Service: **ARMY**

Report Note: **MT6-2** Comment: **CLOSE - RELOCATE TO BASE -X , ENCLAVE RC**

Previous BRAC Actions: Year: **N/A**

Action: **UNAFFECTED** Mil: **0** Civ: **0** Contr: **0** Train: **0**

BRAC95 Inputs:

Current Base Pers.: Hh: **33** Ent: **119** Civ: **461** Contr: **69** Train: **587**

Action: **CLOSING**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Military Pers. Relocated (OUT)	0	0	0	0	-132	0	0	0
Military Pers. Disestablished (OUT)	0	0	0	0	-4	0	0	0
Civilian Pers. Relocated (OUT)	0	0	0	0	-70	0	0	0
Civilian Pers. Disestablished (OUT)	0	0	0	0	-315	0	0	0
Contractor Personnel (OUT)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Training Status (OUT)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Personnel (IN)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Personnel (IN)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Contractor Personnel (IN)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Training Status (IN)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Economic Impact Data

Activity: FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Economic Area: Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA

Impact of Proposed BRAC-95 Action at FORT INDIANTOWN GAP:

Total Population of Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA (1992):	601,300
Total Employment of Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA, BEA (1992):	386,060
Total Personal Income of Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA (1992 actual):	\$12,393,644,000
BRAC 95 Total Direct and Indirect Job Change:	(789)
BRAC 95 Potential Total Job Change Over Closure Period (% of 1992 Total Employment	(0.2%)

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
Relocated Jobs:	MIL	0	0	0	0	(132)	0	0	0	(132)	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	(70)	0	0	0	(70)	
Other Jobs:	MIL	0	0	0	0	(4)	0	0	0	(4)	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	(315)	0	0	0	(315)	
BRAC 95 Direct Job Change Summary at FORT INDIANTOWN GAP:											
	MIL	0	0	0	0	(136)	0	0	0	(136)	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	(385)	0	0	0	(385)	
	TOT	0	0	0	0	(521)	0	0	0	(521)	
										Indirect Job Change:	(268)
										Total Direct and Indirect Job Change:	(789)

Other Pending BRAC Actions at FORT INDIANTOWN GAP (Previous Rounds):

MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0


Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA Profile:

Civilian Employment, BLS (1993):

313,825

Average Per Capita Income (1992):

\$20,609



Annualized Change in Civilian Employment (1984-1993)

Employment:	4,825
Percentage:	1.7%
U.S. Average Change:	1.5%

Annualized Change in Per Capita Personal Income (1984-1992)

Dollars:	\$974
Percentage:	6.1%
U.S. Average Change:	5.3%

Unemployment Rates for Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA and the US (1984 - 1993):

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
Local	6.1%	5.6%	5.0%	4.1%	4.0%	3.8%	4.3%	5.3%	5.4%	5.1%
U.S.	7.5%	7.2%	7.0%	6.2%	5.5%	5.3%	5.5%	6.7%	7.4%	6.8%

¹ Note: Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data for 1993, which has been adjusted to incorporate revised methodologies and 1993 Bureau of the Census metropolitan area definitions are not fully compatible with 1984 - 1992 data.

Economic Impact Data

Activity: FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Economic Area: Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA

Cumulative BRAC Impacts Affecting Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA:


Cumulative Total Direct and Indirect Job Change:	(73)
Potential Cumulative Total Job Change Over Closure Period (% of 1992 Total Employ	0.0%

		1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
Other Proposed BRAC 95 Direct Job Changes in Economic Area (Excluding FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)											
Army:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Navy:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Air Force:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other Pending Prior BRAC Direct Job Changes in Economic Area (Excluding FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)											
Army:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Navy:	MIL	2	48	1	0	0	0	0	0	51	
	CIV	63	340	13	0	0	0	0	0	416	
Air Force:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other:	MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	CIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Cumulative Direct Job Change in Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA Statistical Area (Including FORT INDIANTOWN GAP)											
	MIL	2	48	1	0	(136)	0	0	0	(85)	
	CIV	63	340	13	0	(385)	0	0	0	31	
	TOT	65	388	14	0	(521)	0	0	0	(54)	
										Cumulative Indirect Job Change:	(19)
										Cumulative Total Direct and Indirect Job Change:	(73)

BRAC 95 ENVIRONMENTAL AVOIDANCES**COMPLIANCE COST AVOIDANCES**

NO.	TAB NO.	RECOMMENDATION	COMPLIANCE COST AVOIDANCE (000)
1	A-1	BAYONNE	0.0
2	A-2	C. KELLY SPT CTR	0.0
3	A-3	C. M. PRICE	113.5
4	A-4	DETROIT ARSENAL	5.0
5	A-5	DUGWAY PG	0.0
6	A-6	FAMC	478.0
7	A-7	BUCHANAN	0.0
8	A-8	CHAFFEE	789.0
9	A-9	DIX	0.0
10	A-10	GREELY	0.0
11	A-11	HAMILTON	0.0
12	A-12	HUNTER LIGGETT	0.0
13	A-13	INDIANTOWN GAP	260.0
14	A-14	McCLELLAN	678.0
15	A-15	PICKETT	0.0
16	A-16	RITCHIE	330.0
17	A-17	TOTTEN	0.0
18	A-18	LETTERKENNY	2538.5
19	A-19	RED RIVER	0.0
20	A-20	SAVANNA	100.0
21	A-21	SENECA	1101.0
22	A-22	SIERRA	0.0
23	A-23	STRATFORD AEP	760.0
24	A-24	SELFRIDGE	56.0
		=====	
			7220.0

**SCREEN 5 OF COBRA IN BEGINING THE FY AFTER BADE CLOSSES
MISC RECURRING SAVINGS**



THE ARMY BASING STUDY

**BRAC 95
ALTERNATIVE
DOCUMENTATION
SET**

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MT6-2**

SECTION VII

ANALYSTS NOTES

7 FEB 95

ANALYSTS,

FINAL TOUCH-UPS TO COBRA.

THE NEXT TIME YOU ARE SITTING AROUND WITH NOTHING TO DO....

1. REVIEW THE SCREEN 1 - GENERAL SCENARIO SUMMARY/DESCRIPTION COMMENTS.

2. MAKE SURE - THE ACTION RECOMMENDED ON THE 1-PAGER IS THE FIRST LINE ENTRY.

EXAMPLE: "CLOSE FORT MISSOULA, EXCEPT..."

"REALIGN LETTERKENNY DEPOT."

COMPLETED
8 FEB 95, 1000Z

3. MAKE SURE EVERY OTHER ENTRY IS TRUE, i.e. RELOCATE UNIT X TO BASE Y, ETC.

4. MAKE SURE EVERY ENTRY IS UNDERSTANDABLE, i.e. LIMIT JARGON, ACRONYMS, ETC.

THIS MUST BE DONE BECAUSE OSD & THE PUBLIC WILL READ THE SUMMARY COMMENTS AND COMPARE THEM TO THE ACTUAL COBRA & THE 1-PAGER.

WE NEED TO HAVE THIS FIXED BEFORE THE NEXT UPDATE TO OSD; I EXPECT THAT WILL OCCUR O/A 20-22 FEB.

CHUCK

12/13/94 10:38
HQRPLANS

TABULATION OF EXISTING AND ALLOWED FACILITIES
FCG SUMMARY
FY 1997

Database
Ver 4.20

INST NAME	FCG	FCG DESCRIPTION	UM	PLANNED		SEMI	TEMP	TOTAL	TOTAL	PERM ASSETS ALLOW	PERM - ALLOW	TOTAL
				PERM ASSETS (000)	CONST PROJ (000)	PERM ASSETS (000)	ASSETS (000)	ASSETS (000)	LEASED ASSETS (000)			ASSETS (000)
INDIAN GAP	71100	FAMILY HOUSING	SF	0	0	2	349	355	3	102	-99	251
	7110F	FAMILY HOUSING	FA	0	0	1	259	261	1	76	-75	186
	7110P	OFF POST HSG	FA	0	0	0	256	256	0	0	0	256

1 SET OF QTRS
ON FIG. PER
MR. VALLONI, 13 Dec 94 (B)

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMY BASE STRUCTURE
United States
September 30, 1993**

Station Name	City	Budget Activity Code	Category Code	Military	Civilian	Other	Total	Total Acreage	BRAC Round	Major Unit-Activity Function
PENNSYLVANIA										
INDIANTOWN GAP, FORT	ANNVILLE	1.06	2	429	481	95	985	17,902		RC & ACTIVE ARMY TNG
CARLISLE BARRACKS	CARLISLE	3.02	2	701	757	388	1,846	403		US ARMY WAR COLLEGE ✓ 60%
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	CHAMBERSBURG	4.02	2	53	3,483	343	3,859	19,243	81 R	LOGISTICS DEPOT ✓ 50%
CHARLES E. KELLY SPT FAC	PITTSBURG	1.06	3	215	145	13	373	244		RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT
SCRANTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	SCRANTON	4.02	3	1	12	491	504	15		PRODUCTION-PROJECTILES(C)
TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	TOBYHANNA	4.02	2	54	3,662	162	3,878	1,293		LOGISTICS DEPOT ✓ 50%
SOUTH CAROLINA										
JACKSON, FORT	COLUMBIA	3.01	1	15,725	2,694	1,102	19,521	52,301		US ARMY TRAINING CENTER ✓ 50%
TENNESSEE										
VOLUNTEER ARMY AMMUNITION PLT	CHATTANOOGA	4.02	3	0	4	168	172	6,587		PRODUCTION-CHEMICALS
HOLSTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	KINGSPORT	4.02	3	2	30	813	845	6,117		PRODUCTION-MISC AMMO(C) ✓ 60%
MILAN ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	MILAN	4.02	2	2	40	1,467	1,509	25,124		PRODUCTION-CARTRIDGES(C) ✓ 55%
TEXAS										
BLISS, FORT	EL PASO	3.02	1	13,978	4,396	2,847	21,221	1,119,784		AIR DEFENSE CENTER & SCHOOL ✓ 40%
HOOD, FORT	KILLEEN	1.05	1	45,508	4,174	124	49,804	217,427		1ST CAVALRY/2ND ARMORED DIV ✓ 40%
LONGHORN ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	MARSHALL	4.02	3	1	38	300	339	8,493		PRODUCTION-MISC AMMO(C)
BULLIS, CAMP	SAN ANTONIO	1.06	3	554	5	0	559	27,880		RESERVE COMPONENT TNG
CAMP STANLEY STORAGE ACTIVITY	SAN ANTONIO	4.02	3	1	128	0	127	4,000		STORAGE
SAN HOUSTON, FORT	SAN ANTONIO	3.02	1	9,568	4,855	2,533	17,054	3,260		MEDICAL TRAINING HQ
LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITION PLT	TEXARKANA	4.02	3	2	30	650	682	15,546		PRODUCTION-MISC AMMO(C)
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	TEXARKANA	4.02	1	18	4,264	879	5,159	19,131		LOGISTICS DEPOT ✓ 40%
UTAH										
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND	DUGWAY	4.02	2	208	731	605	1,544	798,855		R&D TEST CENTER
TOOELE ARMY DEPOT	TOOELE	4.02	2	49	2,367	889	3,305	44,096		LOGISTICS DEPOT ✓ 50%

14 September 1994

NAME OF INSTALLATION: FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA.

1. LIST ARNG UNITS STATIONED ON FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA.

3662ND MAINT CO	CO F 104TH AVN	EASTERN ARMY AVN TNG SITE
128TH MIL HIST DET	CO A 228TH FSB	HQ STATE AREA COMMAND
HHD 228TH FSB	109TH PA DET	USPF&O
AR AVN SUPPORT FAC	REGION I NCOA	CO A 2/104TH AVN BN
CO C 2/104TH AVN	CO D 2/104TH AVN	HHC 2/104TH AVN

1a. CAN THEY BE MOVED? NO

2. LIST ARNG UNITS THAT TRAIN ON FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA.

1/109TH FA	2/103RD AR	1/103RD AR
HQ 28TH FIN BN	1/104TH CAV	121ST TRANS CO
1/109TH INF	131ST TRANS CO	103RD EN BN
876TH EN BN	628TH FIN DET	828TH FIN DET
928TH FIN DET	528TH FIN DET	

2a. CAN WE DIVEST?

2b. HOW HARD IS THAT?

3. OF THOSE THAT TRAIN ON FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA WHICH ARE "CFP OR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OR ENHANCED"?

104TH AVN CO	121ST TRANS CO	131ST TRANS CO
--------------	----------------	----------------

4. WHAT ABOUT THE REGIONAL TRAINING BRIGADES. WILL CLOSING FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THEM, AND IF SO, WHAT EFFECT?

UNKNOWN

5. ARE WE DISCONNECTING AN AC/NG PARTNERSHIP? NO

6. WHAT HAPPENS IF WE CLOSE ALL OTHER MAJOR TRAINING AREAS WITHIN 150 MILES OF FORT INDIAN TOWN GAP, PA SIMULTANEOUSLY?

No training sites will remain for the 28th Division.

7. DOES THE ARNG WANT TO ENCLAVE IT? Yes

7a. IF SO, HOW MUCH, WHERE, AND WHAT UNITS WOULD THE ENCLAVE SUPPORT? Ranges and Maneuver Areas

Units presently using the site.

8. IS IT A DESIGNATED MOBILIZATION SITE? Unknown

8a. IF SO, WHO SAYS SO? FORSCOM Recipes

8b. CAN IT BE CLOSED WITHOUT MOBILIZATION IMPACT?

9. IS THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD INTERESTED IN ASSUMING COMMAND AND CONTROL IF THAT IS THE ONLY WAY TO "SAVE" THE INSTALLATION? NGB is not, but PA may desire

10. IF TRAINING PATTERNS/HABITS ARE VARIABLE, WILL ARNG ACCEPT RECTIFYER/TRAINLOAD ESTIMATES?

No, TAG will have to decide.

11. FUTURE ARNG REPOSITIONING BASED ON THE REORGANIZATION-WAS THIS CONSIDERED?

Basing is a State decision, NGB Identifies type units.

BASEX = DENTAL AND VET
 FIRE = MEDICAL = CLINICS.

NOT POS MED
 NONE TO BASEX.
 ALL MED PERSONNEL
 TO ALL
 RUNS AS
 ON CAI 16/NEFA

MEDICAL/DENTAL ASSETS.

Ft. A.P. Hill

<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>VET</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>
0/0/5/1 (W2LF05)	NONE	NONE
1/0/1/0 (W2LF1A)		
<u>1/0/6/1 TOTAL</u>		

Ft. Chaffee

<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>VET</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>
0/0/1/1 (W2NV10)	0/0/1/0 (W2NV1A)	NONE
<u>0/0/2/1 TOTAL</u>		

Ft. Dix

<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>VET</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>
0/0/3/0 (W1US31)	1/0/1/1 (W1US26) 0/0/2/1 (W1US28)	NONE
<u>1/0/6/2 TOTAL</u>		

HUNTER LIBETT

<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>VET</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>
1/0/9/5 (W0Q126)	NONE	1/0/4/0 (W0Q127)
<u>1/0/13/5 TOTAL</u>		

INDIANTELDN CAMP

<u>MEDICAL</u>	<u>VET</u>	<u>DENTAL</u>
0/0/3/5 (W2KR19)	0/0/1/0 (W2KR29)	NONE

0/0/2/1 TOTAL

Ft. Dix

MEDICAL
0/0/3/0 (W14531)

VET
1/0/1/1 (W14526)
0/0/2/1 (W14528)

DENTAL
NONE

1/0/6/1 TOTAL

HUNTER LIGGETT

MEDICAL
1/0/9/5 (W0Q126)

VET
NONE

DENTAL
1/0/4/0 (W0Q127)

2/0/13/5 TOTAL

INDIANTOWN GAP

MEDICAL
0/0/3/5 (W2K219)

VET
0/0/1/0 (W2K229)

DENTAL
NONE

0/0/4/5 TOTAL

MICCOY

MEDICAL
0/0/2/3 (W1M132)

VET
0/0/2/0 (W1M139)

DENTAL
1/0/1/1 (W1M148)

1/0/5/4 TOTAL

PICKETT

MEDICAL
0/0/3/0 (W2LM1A)
0/0/4/3 (W2LM2)

VET
NONE

DENTAL
NONE

0/0/7/3 TOTAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

Clinic - estimate

Hospital -

≤ 50 beds estimate 163 cases
transfer other to base X

> 50 beds estimate 394 cases
transfer other to base X

Med Centers estimate 713 cases
transfer other to base X

Fort Sill - Med Center

McClallen 48 beds

Lee 49 beds

Item 2: Planning Guidance

LTC Powell,

Provided below is generic policy guidance with regard to Army medical treatment facilities located on installations identified for closure by BRAC. Note: The numbers below reflect full time equivalents (FTEs). When the time comes to make actual determinations on the break between military and civilian manpower, the US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) will make that decision based on the projected command-wide composition of the direct patient care workforce, make-buy decisions, CHAMPUS management concerns, civilian hiring constraints, local economic factors, etc.

For medical treatment facilities located on installations identified by BRAC for closure, FTEs tied to the fixed costs associated with operating the facility could be eliminated. These FTEs vary based on the size of the facility. For installations with small medical activities (MEDACs) (50 beds or less), these fixed costs total about 163 FTEs. For large MEDACs (greater than 51 beds), these fixed costs total about 344 FTEs. For Medical Centers with tertiary care capability and graduate medical education programs, these fixed costs total about 713 FTEs. Residual medical spaces not tied to fixed costs are associated with the variable costs of supporting the beneficiary population. Since there may be soldiers and their families on the closing installation migrating to other locations, USAMEDCOM must retain these assets for redistribution to offset any migration, plus any increase in CHAMPUS caused by the closure of the installation facility.

Maritime Region

DASC-HCM

755-0293



FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL HEADER SHEET
DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL

TO:

LTC. POWELL

FROM:

MR. MAURICE YAGLOM

DASG-HCM

TELEPHONE:

(703)756-0293 FAX: (703)756-7821, 0247
DSN: 289-0293 FAX: DSN 289-7821, 0247

FAX #: 697-9322

TELEPHONE: 697-0777

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Number of Pages: 3

(Includes header page)

Date: _____

Time: _____

LTC POWELL -
GENERIC INPUT FOR
POLICY GUIDANCE WITH REGARD
TO ARMY MEDICAL FACILITIES
LOCATED ON INSTALLATIONS
IDENTIFIED FOR MR.

CLOSEHOLD

ANNEX A, INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT

Fort Indiantown Gap

1. WHAT USAR UNITS/ACTIVITIES ARE STATIONED AT THIS INSTALLATION? WHAT IS THE ASSIGNED, AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED STRENGTH OF THE UNITS?

Attachment 1 provides the required, authorized and assigned force structure information for the 4 Reserve units/activities located at Fort Indiantown Gap based on the USARC FY 94 Summer Command Plan.

2. ARE ANY OF THE UNITS/ACTIVITIES SCHEDULED FOR INACTIVATION OR RELOCATION? (E-DATE)

The 2374th Signal Det (USAISC), 79th ARCOM inactivates on 15 Sep 94 and was not included in the answer to Question 1. Company C, 68 Armor Bn, 157th Inf Bde with 62 personnel inactivates on 1 Sep 95.

3. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF ASSIGNED FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL (CIVILIAN & MILITARY) OF THE USAR UNITS/ACTIVITIES AT THIS INSTALLATION?

There are 58 civilian and 19 military (AGR) personnel providing full-time support to USAR units/activities at Fort Indiantown Gap.

4. HOW MANY ACTIVE GUARD AND RESERVE (AGR) SOLDIERS ARE IN GOVERNMENT QUARTERS ON THIS INSTALLATION?

There are no AGR personnel in government quarters at Fort Indiantown Gap.

5. ARE OFF-INSTALLATION RESERVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE UNITS/ACTIVITIES?

There are no suitable USAR facilities within a 50 mile radius capable of accommodating the units/activities located at Fort Indiantown Gap. The USARC has four facilities on Fort Indiantown Gap (Fac I.D.'s PA029, PA030, PA031, PA032, PA034) which consists of 126,933 Gross Administrative and Training S.F., 25,457 Gross Shop S.F., 63,000 S.F. of warehousing and 16 acres of outside equipment storage. Attachment 2 is a current Facility Condition Assessment Report for each of the four Fort Indiantown Gap USAR facilities. Based on our analysis there are no USAR facilities within a 50 mile radius of Fort Indiantown Gap recommended for relocation. Information on the twelve facilities within 50 miles is available upon request from the USARC DCSCOMPT.

126,933 ADMIN
25,457 SHOP
63,000 WAREHOUSE
16 ACRES OUTSIDE STORAGE

CLOSEHOLD

TOTAL
S.F.
215,390

a. OPTION NUMBER: MT6-1		b. CANDIDATE INSTALLATION: Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.		c. DATE: 18 Oct 94	
d. INSTALLATION CATEGORY: Major Training Area					
e. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION / SUMMARY: Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa. Move all Army and tenant organizations to Base X. RC building requirements included. CLEAN KILL					
f. INSTALLATIONS IN SCENARIO:					
INSTALLATION NAME		STRATEGY (CLOSE/GAIN/LOSE/DEACTIVATE)		COMPLETION YEAR	
Ft. Indiantown Gap, Va		Close		1998	
g. MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND/OR ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED (OR POTENTIALLY AFFECTED):					
UIC/SRC	DESCRIPTION:	PERSONNEL STRENGTH: OFF/WOF/ENL/CIV/NAF/OTHER		STRATEGY: DESTINATION/YEAR	
W0XQ05	Garrison	3/1/44/310/0/0		Base X	
W49015	DFAS	0/0/0/56/0/0		Base X	
I960/Y	EAATS(NG)	12/13/43/0/0/0		*Base X	
W3D7!N	378 CS Bn(AR)	0/0/0/4/0/0		Base X	
W3D7!P	442 CS Co(AR)	0/0/0/1/0/0		Base X	
W3D7!Z	1079 USAG(AR)	0/0/0/4/0/0		Base X	
W3D702	1079 USAG(AR)	1/0/5/0/0/0		Base X	
W3D764	442 CS Co(AR)	0/0/3/0/0/0		Base X	
W3D770	378 CS Bn(AR)	2/1/4/0/0/0		Base X	
W3D720	ECS, 79 ARCOM(AR)	0/0/0/67/0/0		Base X	

h. REMARKS

* Stationing of National Guard units is the responsibility of the State Adjutant General

USAR units are stationed based upon demographic supportability. Arbitrarily moving AR units without studying the demographics of the gaining area is counterproductive and probably will destroy the readiness of the units involved.

National Guard construction must meet DOD 1225.7, NGR 415-10, NGB Pam 415-12 standards and be accepted by the state.

This option was unacceptable due to excessive cost to close. This option would have required the Army to purchase land and build facilities for the Reserve Components currently stationed on Fort Indiantown Gap. Additionally, the training areas, ranges and facilities are required to maintain the Reserve Component readiness.

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1998
 ROI Year : 2012 (14 Years)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -78,813
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 345,494

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	26,890	298,342	0	0	0	0	325,232	0
Person	0	0	-6,333	-14,482	-14,482	-14,482	-49,779	-14,482
Overhd	2,766	2,075	6,382	-17,659	-17,659	-17,659	-41,755	-17,659
Moving	0	0	6,632	0	0	0	6,632	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	809	0	0	0	809	0
TOTAL	29,656	300,417	7,491	-32,141	-32,141	-32,141	241,140	-32,141

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Civ	0	0	315	0	0	0	315
TOT	0	0	319	0	0	0	319

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	33	0	0	0	33
Enl	0	0	114	0	0	0	114
Stu	0	0	521	0	0	0	521
Civ	0	0	146	0	0	0	146
TOT	0	0	814	0	0	0	814

Summary:

 Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.
 Move all Army and Tenant organizations to Base X.
 RIF civilians that support Army.
 RC building requirements included.

CLEAN KILL

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars							Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001			
MilCon	26,890	298,342	0	0	0	0	325,232	0	
Person	0	0	1,545	702	702	702	3,652	702	
Overhd	2,766	2,075	12,050	5,150	5,150	5,150	32,340	5,150	
Moving	0	0	6,869	0	0	0	6,869	0	
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	809	0	0	0	809	0	
TOTAL	29,656	300,417	21,273	5,852	5,852	5,852	368,902	5,852	

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars							Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001			
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Person	0	0	7,878	15,184	15,184	15,184	53,431	15,184	
Overhd	0	0	5,667	22,809	22,809	22,809	74,095	22,809	
Moving	0	0	236	0	0	0	236	0	
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	0	0	13,782	37,993	37,993	37,993	127,762	37,993	

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:20.09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Year	Cost (\$)	Adjusted Cost (\$)	NPV (\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	29,656,451	29,256,897	29,256,897
1997	300,416,718	288,437,253	317,694,151
1998	7,490,745	6,999,555	324,693,706
1999	-32,141,340	-29,229,916	295,463,789
2000	-32,141,340	-28,447,607	267,016,182
2001	-32,141,340	-27,686,236	239,329,946
2002	-32,141,340	-26,945,242	212,384,704
2003	-32,141,340	-26,224,079	186,160,625
2004	-32,141,340	-25,522,218	160,638,406
2005	-32,141,340	-24,839,142	135,799,264
2006	-32,141,340	-24,174,347	111,624,916
2007	-32,141,340	-23,527,345	88,097,571
2008	-32,141,340	-22,897,660	65,199,911
2009	-32,141,340	-22,284,827	42,915,084
2010	-32,141,340	-21,688,396	21,226,687
2011	-32,141,340	-21,107,928	118,759
2012	-32,141,340	-20,542,996	-20,424,237
2013	-32,141,340	-19,993,183	-40,417,420
2014	-32,141,340	-19,458,086	-59,875,506
2015	-32,141,340	-18,937,310	-78,812,816

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	295,790,291	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	29,441,635	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		325,231,926
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	502,298	
Civilian Early Retirement	190,432	
Civilian New Hires	44,360	
Eliminated Military PCS	17,524	
Unemployment	87,696	
Total - Personnel		842,310
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	6,397,357	
Mothball / Shutdown	5,343,750	
Total - Overhead		11,741,107
Moving		
Civilian Moving	3,195,674	
Civilian PPS	2,736,000	
Military Moving	719,113	
Freight	218,112	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		6,868,900
Other		
HAP / RSE	809,449	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		809,449
Total One-Time Costs		345,493,693

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	236,467	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		236,467
Total Net One-Time Costs		345,257,225

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total

Construction		
Military Construction	295,790,291	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	29,441,635	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		325,231,926
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	44,360	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		44,360
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0

Total One-Time Costs		325,276,286

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		0

Total Net One-Time Costs		325,276,286

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	502,298	
Civilian Early Retirement	190,432	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	17,524	
Unemployment	87,696	
Total - Personnel		797,950
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	6,397,357	
Mothball / Shutdown	5,343,750	
Total - Overhead		11,741,107
Moving		
Civilian Moving	3,195,674	
Civilian PPS	2,736,000	
Military Moving	719,113	
Freight	218,112	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		6,868,900
Other		
HAP / RSE	809,449	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		809,449

Total One-Time Costs		20,217,407

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	236,467	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		236,467

Total Net One-Time Costs		19,980,939

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT6-1
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFP

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
BASE X	295,790	29,442	0	0	325,232
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	0	0	0	0	0
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Totals:	295,790	29,442	0	0	325,232

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

MilCon for Base: BASE X, US

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
(AR) GEN PURP ADMIN ADMIN		0	0	126,933	22,101	22,101
(AR) VEH MNT SH DS MAINT		0	0	25,457	4,516	4,516
(AR) GEN P WH-INST STORA		0	0	63,000	6,209	6,209
(NG) GEN PURP ADMIN ADMIN		0	0	28,654	4,989	4,989
(NG) BDE HQ BLDG OPERA		0	0	104,253	20,379	20,379
(NG) GEN INST BLDG SCHLB		0	0	12,858	2,196	2,196
(NG) UPH DINE FAC DINFC		0	0	4,360	1,289	1,289
(NG) MNT HANGAR AVIM AIROP		0	0	88,463	18,890	18,890
(NG) AVN OPS BLDG AIROP		0	0	9,478	2,024	2,024
(NG) VEH MNT SH DS MAINT		0	0	63,381	11,244	11,244
(NG) MNT HANGAR AVUM AIROP		0	0	9,300	1,986	1,986
(NG) GEN P WH-INST STORA		0	0	905,600	89,254	89,254
(NG) ENL UPH (PLNG) BACHQ		0	0	719	54,596	54,596
(NG) TRAINEE BILLETS BACHQ		0	0	739	56,115	56,115

Total Construction Cost:						295,790
+ Info Management Account:						29,442
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						0

TOTAL:						325,232

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: BASE X, US

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
752	4,208	1,121	2,709

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	33	0	0	0	33
Enlisted	0	0	114	0	0	0	114
Students	0	0	521	0	0	0	521
Civilians	0	0	146	0	0	0	146
TOTAL	0	0	814	0	0	0	814

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into BASE X, US):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	33	0	0	0	33
Enlisted	0	0	114	0	0	0	114
Students	0	0	521	0	0	0	521
Civilians	0	0	146	0	0	0	146
TOTAL	0	0	814	0	0	0	814

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
785	4,322	1,642	2,855

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
33	119	529	461

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	-1	0	0	0	-1
Students	0	-8	0	0	0	0	-8
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	-8	-1	0	0	0	-9

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
33	118	521	461

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	33	0	0	0	33
Enlisted	0	0	114	0	0	0	114
Students	0	0	521	0	0	0	521
Civilians	0	0	146	0	0	0	146
TOTAL	0	0	814	0	0	0	814

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	33	0	0	0	33
Enlisted	0	0	114	0	0	0	114
Students	0	0	521	0	0	0	521
Civilians	0	0	146	0	0	0	146
TOTAL	0	0	814	0	0	0	814

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	-4	0	0	0	-4
Civilians	0	0	-315	0	0	0	-315
TOTAL	0	0	-319	0	0	0	-319

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
0	0	0	0

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	146	0	0	0	146
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	15	0	0	0	15
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	22	0	0	0	22
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	93	0	0	0	93
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	53	0	0	0	53
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	315	0	0	0	315
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	16	0	0	0	16
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	146	0	0	0	146
Civilians Moving		0	0	106	0	0	0	106
New Civilians Hired		0	0	40	0	0	0	40
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	46	0	0	0	46
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	28	0	0	0	28
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	40	0	0	0	40

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: BASE X, US	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIPs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIPs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIPs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	146	0	0	0	146
Civilians Moving		0	0	106	0	0	0	106
New Civilians Hired		0	0	40	0	0	0	40
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIREMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIPs		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	40	0	0	0	40

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	146	0	0	0	146
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	15	0	0	0	15
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	22	0	0	0	22
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	93	0	0	0	93
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	53	0	0	0	53
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	315	0	0	0	315
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	16	0	0	0	16
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	47	0	0	0	47
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	46	0	0	0	46
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	28	0	0	0	28
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL YEARLY PERCENTAGES (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1997	0	0.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1998	814	100.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	16.67%
TOTALS	814	100.00%	100.00%	0	0.00%	100.00%

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

Year	Pers Moved In		MilCon TimePhase	Pers Moved Out/Eliminated		ShutDn TimePhase
	Total	Percent		Total	Percent	
1996	0	0.00%	66.67%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1997	0	0.00%	33.33%	0	0.00%	0.00%
1998	0	0.00%	0.00%	1,133	100.00%	100.00%
1999	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2000	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
2001	0	0.00%	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	0	0.00%	100.00%	1133	100.00%	100.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/9
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	26,890	268,900	0	0	0	0	295,790
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	0	502	0	0	0	502
Civ Retire	0	0	190	0	0	0	190
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	362	0	0	0	362
POV Miles	0	0	25	0	0	0	25
Home Purch	0	0	1,142	0	0	0	1,142
HHG	0	0	757	0	0	0	757
Misc	0	0	74	0	0	0	74
House Hunt	0	0	301	0	0	0	301
PPS	0	0	2,736	0	0	0	2,736
RITA	0	0	533	0	0	0	533
FRIGHT							
Packing	0	0	192	0	0	0	192
Freight	0	0	26	0	0	0	26
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	88	0	0	0	88
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,766	2,075	1,556	0	0	0	6,397
Shutdown	0	0	5,344	0	0	0	5,344
New Hire	0	0	44	0	0	0	44
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	57	0	0	0	57
POV Miles	0	0	35	0	0	0	35
HHG	0	0	524	0	0	0	524
Misc	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	809	0	0	0	809
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	29,442	0	0	0	0	29,442
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	29,656	300,417	15,420	0	0	0	345,494

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	3,607	3,607	3,607	3,607	14,427	3,607
BOS	0	0	1,543	1,543	1,543	1,543	6,171	1,543
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	702	702	702	702	2,809	702
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	5,852	5,852	5,852	5,852	23,408	5,852
TOTAL COST	29,656	300,417	21,273	5,852	5,852	5,852	368,902	5,852
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	236	0	0	0	236	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	236	0	0	0	236	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	44	89	89	89	311	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	2,909	6,122	6,122	6,122	21,275	6,122
BOS	0	0	2,714	16,598	16,598	16,598	52,509	16,598
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	7,245	14,489	14,489	14,489	50,713	14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	62	123	123	123	432	123
House Allow	0	0	571	571	571	571	2,286	571
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	13,545	37,993	37,993	37,993	127,526	37,993
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	0	13,782	37,993	37,993	37,993	127,762	37,993

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/9
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	26,890	268,900	0	0	0	0	295,790	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	693	0	0	0	693	
Civ Moving	0	0	6,150	0	0	0	6,150	
Other	2,766	2,075	7,032	0	0	0	11,873	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	500	0	0	0	500	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	809	0	0	0	809	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	29,442	0	0	0	0	29,442	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	29,656	300,417	15,184	0	0	0	345,257	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	698	-2,515	-2,515	-2,515	-6,847	-2,515
BOS	0	0	-1,171	-15,055	-15,055	-15,055	-46,337	-15,055
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-7,245	-14,489	-14,489	-14,489	-50,713	-14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-62	-123	-123	-123	-432	-123
House Allow	0	0	131	131	131	131	523	131
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-7,693	-32,141	-32,141	-32,141	-104,117	-32,141
TOTAL NET COST	29,656	300,417	7,491	-32,141	-32,141	-32,141	241,140	-32,141

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	26,890	268,900	0	0	0	0	295,790
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FRBIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	44	0	0	0	44
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	29,442	0	0	0	0	29,442
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	26,890	298,342	44	0	0	0	325,276

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	26,890	268,900	0	0	0	0	295,790	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	44	0	0	0	44	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	29,442	0	0	0	0	29,442	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	26,890	298,342	44	0	0	0	325,276	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	3,607	3,607	3,607	3,607	14,427	3,607
BOS	0	0	1,543	1,543	1,543	1,543	6,171	1,543
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	702	702	702	702	2,809	702
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	5,852	5,852	5,852	5,852	23,408	5,852
TOTAL NET COST	26,890	298,342	5,896	5,852	5,852	5,852	348,685	5,852

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/9
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	502	0	0	0	502
Civ Retire	0	0	190	0	0	0	190
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	362	0	0	0	362
POV Miles	0	0	25	0	0	0	25
Home Purch	0	0	1,142	0	0	0	1,142
HHG	0	0	757	0	0	0	757
Misc	0	0	74	0	0	0	74
House Hunt	0	0	301	0	0	0	301
PPS	0	0	2,736	0	0	0	2,736
RITA	0	0	533	0	0	0	533
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	192	0	0	0	192
Freight	0	0	26	0	0	0	26
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	88	0	0	0	88
OTHER							
Program Plan	2,766	2,075	1,556	0	0	0	6,397
Shutdown	0	0	5,344	0	0	0	5,344
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	57	0	0	0	57
POV Miles	0	0	35	0	0	0	35
HHG	0	0	524	0	0	0	524
Misc	0	0	103	0	0	0	103
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	809	0	0	0	809
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,766	2,075	15,376	0	0	0	20,217

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 8/9
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL COSTS 2,766 2,075 15,376 0 0 0 20,217 0

ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	236	0	0	0	236	0
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	236	0	0	0	236	0

RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	44	89	89	89	311	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	2,909	6,122	6,122	6,122	21,275	6,122
BOS	0	0	2,714	16,598	16,598	16,598	52,509	16,598
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	7,245	14,489	14,489	14,489	50,713	14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	62	123	123	123	432	123
House Allow	0	0	571	571	571	571	2,286	571
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	13,545	37,993	37,993	37,993	127,526	37,993

TOTAL SAVINGS 0 0 13,782 37,993 37,993 37,993 127,762 37,993

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 9/9
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIP	0	0	693	0	0	0	693	
Civ Moving	0	0	6,150	0	0	0	6,150	
Other	2,766	2,075	6,987	0	0	0	11,829	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	500	0	0	0	500	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	809	0	0	0	809	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,766	2,075	15,140	0	0	0	19,981	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-2,909	-6,122	-6,122	-6,122	-21,275	-6,122
BOS	0	0	-2,714	-16,598	-16,598	-16,598	-52,509	-16,598
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-7,245	-14,489	-14,489	-14,489	-50,713	-14,489
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-62	-123	-123	-123	-432	-123
House Allow	0	0	-571	-571	-571	-571	-2,286	-571
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-13,545	-37,993	-37,993	-37,993	-127,526	-37,993
TOTAL NET COST	2,766	2,075	1,594	-37,993	-37,993	-37,993	-107,545	-37,993

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	814	9%	2,007,441	33%	2,466
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-1,133	-100%	-4,275,000	-100%	3,773

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	3,606,845	30%	4,431	1,542,899	5%	1,895
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-6,122,000	-100%	5,403	-16,598,152	-100%	14,650

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	5,149,744	12%	6,326
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-22,720,152	-100%	20,053

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	0	698	-2,515	-2,515	-2,515	-6,847	-2,515
BOS Change	0	0	-1,171	-15,055	-15,055	-15,055	-46,337	-15,055
Housing Change	0	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-311	-89
TOTAL CHANGES	0	0	-518	-17,659	-17,659	-17,659	-53,496	-17,659

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:20 09/27/1994, Report Created 09:02 03/02/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA\SP7DEC.SPF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name Strategy:

 BASE X, US Realignment
 FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA Closes in FY 1998

Summary:

 Close Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.
 Move all Army and Tenant organizations to Base X.
 RIF civilians that support Army.
 RC building requirements included.

CLEAN KILL

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
BASE X, US	FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	33	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	114	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	146	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	521	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASEX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

Total Officer Employees:	33	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,122
Total Enlisted Employees:	119	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	529	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	16,730
Total Civilian Employees:	461	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,154
Mil Families Living On Base:	0.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	89
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.05
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,275	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	42	Activity Code:	42305
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	32		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	109	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqcd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqcd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	4,275					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	-8	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-4	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-315	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
-----		-----	-----	-----
(AR) GEN PURP ADMIN	ADMIN	126,933	0	0
(AR) VEH MNT SH DS	MAINT	25,457	0	0
(AR) GEN P WH-INST	STORA	63,000	0	0
(NG) GEN PURP ADMIN	ADMIN	28,654	0	0
(NG) BDE HQ BLDG	OPERA	104,253	0	0
(NG) GEN INST BLDG	SCHLB	12,858	0	0
(NG) UPH DINE FAC	DINFC	4,360	0	0
(NG) MNT HANGAR AVIM	AIROP	88,463	0	0
(NG) AVN OPS BLDG	AIROP	9,478	0	0
(NG) VEH MNT SH DS	MAINT	63,381	0	0
(NG) MNT HANGAR AVUM	AIROP	9,300	0	0
(NG) GEN P WH-INST	STORA	905,600	0	0
(NG) ENL UPH (PLNG)	BACHQ	719	0	0
(NG) TRAINEE BILLETS	BACHQ	739	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DEC.SFF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\MT6-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\SF7DEC.SPF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index: 0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost: 59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population): 0.54	Info Management Account: 15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)	MilCon Design Rate: 10.00%
Program Management Factor: 10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate: 6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care): 162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate: 7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF): 1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate: 24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF): 388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF): 1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI: 0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:	
1996: 2.90% 1997: 3.00% 1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb): 710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton): 284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb): 14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb): 9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile): 0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb): 6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile): 0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb): 18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years): 2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb): 35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour): 4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile): 0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$): 6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ): 700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$): 4,381.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

Document Separator

ARMY MAJOR TRAINING AREAS (ED)

- At **TAB A**, we have the first category that will be discussed – **MAJOR TRAINING AREAS**
- **CHART** ^{A-1} _{_,} and the accompanying map, **CHART** ^{A-2} _{_,} show the names and locations of the Army's 10 major training areas
- The Secretary of Defense recommended the realignment of Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Greely, Alaska; and Fort Hunter Liggett, California and the closure of Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

ARMY MAJOR TRAINING AREAS (ED)

MILITARY VALUE	INSTALLATION
1	FORT POLK, LOUISIANA
2	FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA
3	FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY (R)
4	FORT A. P. HILL, VIRGINIA
5	FORT McCOY, WISCONSIN
6	FORT GREELY, ALASKA (R)
7	FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA (R)
8	FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA (C)
9	FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA (C)
10	FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS (C)

(C) = DOD recommendation for closure

(R) = DOD recommendation for realignment


(X) = Joint Cross Service Group alternative for closure or realignment

(*) = Commission add for further consideration

A-1

(A-2: MTA's MAP)

Major Training Areas



BASE ANALYSIS

FORT DIX

- ON CHART ^{A₂B} , YOU SEE PERTINENT SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR REALIGNING FORT DIX UNDER THE U. S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
- IT IS THE FINAL PHASE OF THE VISION DEVELOPED IN 1988 TO MAKE FORT DIX A MODEL INSTALLATION FOR RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING

GOOD AFTERNOON MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS ←

FORT DIX

- ~~At Fort Dix~~, we have the first installation to be discussed, ^{is} Fort Dix, New Jersey A-3
- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Dix be realigned by
 - ⇒ Replacing the Active Component garrison with a Reserve Component garrison
 - ⇒ While retaining an enclave with minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component training

• LTC Steve Bailey will discuss Fort Dix

BASE ANALYSIS FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U. S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	3 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	11.6
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	12.2
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1999 (1 Year)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	145.4
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	82.2
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	15 / 0
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	135 / 77
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	0.0 % / - 1.2 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

ISSUES REVIEWED

FORT DIX

- THE NEXT CHART, ^{A-X,} SHOWS THAT THE ONLY ISSUE IDENTIFIED WAS THE SIZE OF THE INSTALLATION'S RESERVE GARRISON

**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY**

<p>RESERVE GARRISON</p>	
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ISSUES

FORT DIX

- THE NEXT CHART, ^{A-5,} SHOWS THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT, THIS ISSUE HAS ^{INITIAL} BEEN COOPERATIVELY RESOLVED BY ALL CONCERNED AND THE GARRISON CIVILIAN WORKFORCE IS STABILIZED AT 726

**ISSUES
FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY**

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
RESERVE GARRISON	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• INITIAL POSITION - 250 CIVILIANS TO RUN INSTALLATION• NOW AGREES WITH A 700-750 PERSON WORKFORCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• BELIEVES 741 IS OPTIMUM LEVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ISSUE RESOLVED

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT DIX

- FINALLY, ON THE NEXT CHART, THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE THAT EXCESS INSTALLATION INFRASTRUCTURE IS REDUCED, SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS ARE REALIZED, AND FORT DIX WILL BE AN ENHANCED RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING HUB
- THE ONLY NEGATIVE ASPECT IS THE DIMINISHED PRESENCE OF ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS IN THE NORTHEAST
- THIS RECOMMENDATION HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY & ELECTED OFFICIALS
- SUBJECT TO YOUR QUESTIONS, THAT COMPLETES MY BRIEFING ON FORT DIX

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY

DOD RECOMMENDATION	COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE
<p>Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U. S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.</p> <p>One-Time Costs (\$M): 11.6 Annual Savings (\$M): 12.2 Return on Investment: 1999 (1 Year) Net Present Value (\$M): 145.4</p> <p style="text-align: center;">PRO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCES EXCESS INSTALLATION INFRASTRUCTURE • SAVES MONEY • FOCUS ON RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING IS ENHANCED 	<p style="text-align: center;">CON</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCES ACTIVE ARMY PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST UNITED STATES
<p>One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):</p>	
<p style="text-align: left;">PRO</p> <p style="text-align: right;">CON</p>	

FORT GREELY

PLS put up:
A-7 & A-8

- ~~ANTHONY/M/M/M/M~~ is the next installation to be discussed, Fort Greely, Alaska
- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Greely be realigned by
 - ⇒ Relocating the Cold Region Test Activity and the Northern Warfare Training Center to Fort Wainwright, Alaska
- CHART ^{A-8} shows the relative locations of Fort Greely and Fort Wainwright
 - ⇒ The distance between the two is 107 miles

~~ANTHONY/M/M/M/M~~ will discuss Fort Greely

Alaskan Realignment



Addition
Closure
Realignment

BASE ANALYSIS

FORT GREELY

- ON CHART A-7, YOU CAN VIEW THE SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC DATA FOLLOWING THE REALIGNMENT OF FORT GREELY'S PRIMARY ACTIVITIES TO FORT WAINWRIGHT
- THE ARMY WOULD RETAIN ALL TRAINING AREAS, THE ^{TEST} ~~BOLIO LAKE~~ ^{AND BLACK RAPIDS} FACILITIES, AIRFIELD, AND PART OF THE MAIN CANTONMENT AREA WITH A SMALL GARRISON OF 18 MILITARY AND 55 CIVILIANS

BASE ANALYSIS FORT GREELY, ALASKA

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	6 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	23.1
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	17.9
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1999 (1 Year)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	210.3
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	19.1
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	135 / 114
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	245 / 73
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	- 33.7 % / - 33.7 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

A-7

(A-8; AK MAP)

ISSUES REVIEWED

FORT GREELY

- THE NEXT CHART, ^{A-9} SHOWS YOU SIX KEY ISSUES WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED:
- MILITARY VALUE
- ADDITIONAL COSTS
- ECONOMIC IMPACT
- SCHOOL IMPACT
- NWTC MISSION & CRTA MISSION

**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT GREELY, ALASKA**

<p>MILITARY VALUE</p>	<p>SIZE OF SMALL GARRISON ACTIVITY</p>
<p>ADDITIONAL COSTS</p>	<p>RETENTION OF 25-TON CRANE & MAINTENANCE BUILDING IN CANTONMENT AREA</p>
<p>ECONOMIC IMPACT</p>	<p>SECURITY & RANGE MAINTENANCE</p>
<p>SCHOOL IMPACT</p>	
<p>NORTHERN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER MISSION</p>	
<p>COLD REGIONS TEST ACTIVITY MISSION</p>	

ISSUES

FORT GREELY

- THE NEXT CHART ^{A-10,} SHOWS THE DoD & COMMUNITY POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO EACH ISSUE BEGINNING WITH **MILITARY VALUE RANKING**, WHICH I VALIDATED, BUT ^{WE} CAN'T COMPARE TO THAT OF FORTS RICHARDSON OR WAINWRIGHT (MANEUVER CATEGORY)
- **ADDITIONAL COSTS** FOR SAFARI TRIPS & NEW CONSTRUCTION AT WAINWRIGHT WILL NOT EXCEED SAVINGS AS CLAIMED BY SOME IN THE COMMUNITY; COBRA HAS ADEQUATE FUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION AT WAINWRIGHT, AND FOR SAFARIS
- 34% JOB LOSS IS VERIFIED FOR SE FAIRBANKS CENSUS AREA--BUT IS CLOSER TO 70% FOR DELTA-- **ECONOMIC IMPACT** WILL BE UNIQUELY SEVERE

ISSUES FORT GREELY, ALASKA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BELIEVE FORT GREELY IS OF HIGHER VALUE THAN OTHER ALASKA ARMY INSTALLATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VALIDATED 6 OF 10 RANKING AMONG MAJOR TRAINING AREAS
ADDITIONAL COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COSTS OF SAFARI TRIPS & FACILITY MAINTENANCE WILL BE EXCEEDED BY SAVINGS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RETURN ON INVESTMENT WILL BE NEGATED BY THESE COSTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ADEQUATE FUNDS INCLUDED IN ANALYSES
ECONOMIC IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ESTIMATES 34% JOB LOSS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROJECT 70%-80% JOB LOSS & ECONOMIC DEVASTATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SEVERE ECONOMIC IMPACT
SCHOOL IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT GREELY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL WILL STAY OPEN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOSS OF 49% OF STUDENT BODY WILL CLOSE SCHOOLS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EDUCATION PROGRAMS CURTAILED, BUT NOT ENDED
NORTHERN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER MISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTER REMAINS AT BLACK RAPIDS BUT HEADQUARTERS MOVES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SUPPORT ELEMENTS MUST REMAIN CLOSER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MISSION CONTINUES AT FORT GREELY
COLD REGIONS TEST ACTIVITY MISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BOLIO LAKE FACILITY REMAINS AVAILABLE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TESTS CAN ONLY BE DONE AT BOLIO LAKE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MISSION CONTINUES AT FORT GREELY • SAFARI FROM FORT WAINWRIGHT REQUIRED

- THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT **SCHOOL IMPACT** WITH HALF THE STUDENTS DEPARTING, BUT BOTH THE DELTA HIGH SCHOOL & GREELY ELEMENTARY WILL REMAIN OPEN
- WHILE THE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS MOVE TO FACILITIES EXISTING AT FORT WAINWRIGHT, THE **NORTHERN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER MISSION** CONTINUES AT FORT GREELY
- THE **COLD REGIONS TEST ACTIVITY MISSION** FOR TESTING WOULD ALSO CONTINUE AT FORT GREELY, WITH SAFARI EXPEDITIONS FROM FORT WAINWRIGHT WHEN TESTS ARE SCHEDULED

ISSUES FORT GREELY, ALASKA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BELIEVE FORT GREELY IS OF HIGHER VALUE THAN OTHER ALASKA ARMY INSTALLATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VALIDATED 6 OF 10 RANKING AMONG MAJOR TRAINING AREAS
ADDITIONAL COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COSTS OF SAFARI TRIPS & FACILITY MAINTENANCE WILL BE EXCEEDED BY SAVINGS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RETURN ON INVESTMENT WILL BE NEGATED BY THESE COSTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ADEQUATE FUNDS INCLUDED IN ANALYSES
ECONOMIC IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ESTIMATES 34% JOB LOSS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROJECT 70%-80% JOB LOSS & ECONOMIC DEVASTATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SEVERE ECONOMIC IMPACT
SCHOOL IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT GREELY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL WILL STAY OPEN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOSS OF 49% OF STUDENT BODY WILL CLOSE SCHOOLS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EDUCATION PROGRAMS CURTAILED, BUT NOT ENDED
NORTHERN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER MISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTER REMAINS AT BLACK RAPIDS BUT HEADQUARTERS MOVES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SUPPORT ELEMENTS MUST REMAIN CLOSER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MISSION CONTINUES AT FORT GREELY
COLD REGIONS TEST ACTIVITY MISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BOLIO LAKE FACILITY REMAINS AVAILABLE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TESTS CAN ONLY BE DONE AT BOLIO LAKE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MISSION CONTINUES AT FORT GREELY • SAFARI FROM FORT WAINWRIGHT REQUIRED

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT GREELY

- ^{A-11,} FINALLY, ON THE NEXT CHART, THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ARMY'S MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ALASKAN INTERIOR ONTO ONE INSTALLATION, SAVING ALMOST \$18M EVERY YEAR, AND THE IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE FOR SOLDIERS & THEIR FAMILIES
- ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS RECOMMENDATION, IF ADOPTED, WILL RESULT IN A VERY SERIOUS ECONOMIC IMPACT
- SUBJECT TO YOUR QUESTIONS, THAT COMPLETES MY BRIEFING ON FORT GREELY

SCENARIO SUMMARY FORT GREELY, ALASKA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Regions Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.			
One-Time Costs (\$M): 23.1 Annual Savings (\$M): 17.9 Return on Investment: 1999 (1 Year) Net Present Value (\$M): 210.3		One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):	
PRO	CON	PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONSOLIDATES ARMY'S INTERIOR ALASKAN ACTIVITIES AT ONE LOCATION • LARGE SAVINGS ACCRUE • QUALITY OF LIFE IMPROVED FOR SOLDIERS & FAMILIES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECONOMIC IMPACT ON DELTA JUNCTION 		

ISSUES FORT GREELY, ALASKA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
SIZE OF SMALL GARRISON ACTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 MILITARY & 55 CIVILIAN WORKERS REQUIRED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMUNITY WANTS BASE TO KEEP OPERATING WITH 363 MILITARY & 242 CIVILIANS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ADEQUATE
RETENTION OF 25-TON CRANE & MAINTENANCE BUILDING IN CANTONMENT AREA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRTA MILITARY OFFICIALS WANT TO RETAIN ACCESS TO THE ALLIED TRADES BUILDING AT FORT GREELY & A 25-TON CRANE FOR M1 TANKS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NONE STATED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RETENTION OF CRANE REQUIRED • ARMY VERBALLY AGREES
SECURITY & RANGE MAINTENANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMALL GARRISON FORCE IS SUFFICIENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BELIEVES LOW NUMBER OF CARETAKER PERSONNEL WILL RESULT IN SECURITY PROBLEMS, RANGE VIOLATIONS, & TRAINING ACCIDENTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY MUST PLAN ACCORDINGLY TO PREVENT PROBLEMS

ISSUES

(CHART A-12)

FORT GREELY

- SIZE OF SMALL GARRISON ACTIVITY--18 MIL/55 CIV

COMMUNITY WANTS TO KEEP 363 MIL/242 CIV

SUPPORTS TRAINING/CARETAKERS

- RETENTION OF 25-TON CRANE & MAINTENANCE BUILDING IN CANTONMENT ARE--

ALLIED TRADES BLDG/FOR M1 TANK TURRETS

- SECURITY & RANGE MAINTENANCE--73 PERS SUFFICIENT? HUNTERS, TNG ACCIDENTS

TRESPASSERS

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

UP: A-13 & A-14

15

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ the next installation to be discussed, Fort Hunter Liggett, California

- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Hunter Liggett be realigned by
 - ⇒ Relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas
 - ⇒ Eliminating the Active Component mission
 - ⇒ Retaining minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components
- CHART A-14 shows the relative locations of Fort Hunter Liggett and Fort Bliss

~~XXXXXXXXXX will discuss Fort Hunter Liggett~~

FGA: 1, 4, 5
44 reject
need op

Realigned
CHTA & N WTC
NET
Jul 1997
18-0
Completed
NET: Jul 2001

BASE ANALYSIS FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U. S. Army Test and Experimentation Center missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).


CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	7 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	6.7
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	5.7
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1999 (1 Year)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	67.6
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	10.6
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	21 / 6
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	452 / 73
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	- 0.3 % / - 3.2 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

ISSUES REVIEWED, CHART A-15

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

- CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD INTEREST
- NON-EYE SAFE LASER TESTING
- DIGITIZATION AT FORT BLISS
- FREQUENCY CONFLICT AT WHITE SANDS
- TRAINING AREA VS. TEST FACILITY
- ECONOMIC IMPACT

Relocation of TEC



Addition
Closure
Realignment

A-18

BASE ANALYSIS

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

- ON CHART ^{A-13} , THE SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE REALIGNMENT OF FORT HUNTER LIGGETT ARE DEPICTED
- TEST & EXPERIMENTATION COMMAND'S EXPERIMENTATION CENTER, THE MAJOR TENANT, WHICH IS DOWNSIZING FROM 384 TO 206 PEOPLE, WOULD MOVE TO FORT BLISS
- THE U. S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND GARRISON REMAINS AND THE POST CONTINUES AS A SUB-INSTALLATION OF FORT McCOY, WISCONSIN TO PROVIDE A MAJOR TRAINING AREA FOR RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES

**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA**

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD INTEREST

NON-EYE-SAFE LASER TESTING

DIGITIZATION AT FORT BLISS

FREQUENCY CONFLICT AT WHITE SANDS

TRAINING AREA VS. TEST FACILITY

ECONOMIC IMPACT

SUPPORT AT FORT BLISS/HOUSING

TEST ENVIRONMENT

FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

ISSUES, CHART A-16 and A-17
Put up Both:

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

- **CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD INTEREST IS ~~VERY~~ STRONG, WITH PLANS TO CONTINUE USING ALL OF THE TRAINING FACILITIES AND TRAINING AREA. NON-EYE SAFE LASER TESTING CAN BE DONE IN FHL'S UNIQUE NATURAL BOWL, BUT THE ONLY RECENT TEST REQUIRING IT WAS FOR THE APACHE-LONGBOW. WHILE MOST OF FHL IS DIGITIZED & BLISS IS NOT, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED FOR APPROX \$1M-\$2 M**
- **THE FREQUENCY CONFLICT AT WHITE SANDS CAN BE RESOLVED BY WSMR CHANGING FREQUENCY OR SIMPLE SCHEDULING DECONFLICTION; THE ARGUMENT THAT FHL IS NOT A TRAINING AREA BUT A TEST FACILITY IS NOT VALID; THE ECONOMIC IMPACT IS NOT AS LARGE AS CLAIMED (THERE WILL BE 6 JOBS LOST & 73 REALIGNMENTS)**

ISSUES

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD INTEREST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RETAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES & TRAINING AREA FOR RC ENCLAVE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL GUARD DOES NOT WANT CANTONMENT AREA-- BUT USARC DOES. • LOCALS WANT STATUS QUO FOR ENTIRE POST. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL GUARD WILL HAVE ACCESS TO TRAINING FACILITIES AND TRAINING AREA
NON-EYE-SAFE LASER TESTING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAN BE DONE WITHIN 180 DEGREE LIMITS AT FORT BLISS • ADEQUATE FOR MOST TESTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HUNTER LIGGETT HAS A NATURAL BOWL FOR 360 DEGREE TESTING & IS THE ONLY TEST SITE POSSIBLE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ONLY 1 TEST EVER HAD NEED FOR 360 DEGREE LIMITS
DIGITIZATION AT FORT BLISS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AREAS OF FORT BLISS TERRAIN CAN BE DIGITIZED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOST OF HUNTER LIGGETT IS DIGITIZED & IS ESSENTIAL TO TESTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DIGITIZATION REQUIRED • COST OF \$1-2 M
FREQUENCY CONFLICT AT WHITE SANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAN BE DECONFLICTED BY CHANGING FREQUENCY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REQUIRES PURCHASE OF NEW TEST EQUIPMENT FOR TEC COSTING \$5-8 M 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCHEDULING CAN RESOLVE CONFLICT
TRAINING AREA VS. TEST FACILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT HUNTER LIGGETT HAS BEEN A MAJOR TRAINING AREA FOR 55 YEARS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT HUNTER LIGGETT SHOULD BE EVALUATED AS A TEST FACILITY, NOT A TRAINING AREA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INSTALLATION CORRECTLY CATEGORIZED

BASE ANALYSIS

FORT PICKETT

- ON CHART A-20, YOU CAN OBSERVE THAT, IN THIS BASE CATEGORY, THE RECOMMENDATION FOR FORT PICKETT GENERATES THE MOST SAVINGS, OVER \$20 MILLION A YEAR
- THE AMOUNT OF SCHEDULED TRAINING DECREASED BETWEEN FY 1991 & 1994; IT HAS BEEN USED BY BOTH ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT ARMY UNITS, AS WELL AS OTHER SERVICES
- INITIAL DATA CALLS INACCURATELY SHOWED THE BASE HAD NO RAILHEAD--IT HAS 3; A FACTOR IN THE BASE'S ~~LOW~~ RANKING IS THAT 85% OF THE BUILDINGS WERE BUILT IN WWII

ISSUES
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA
(Continued)

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 0.3% DECREASE IN EMPLOYMENT• - 3.2% CUMULATIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• LOCAL & STATE OFFICIALS CLAIM HIGH CUMULATIVE IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• -0.3% IMPACT

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

- ^{A-18,} FINALLY, ON THE NEXT CHART, THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE THE ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE, DOLLAR SAVINGS, AND LOCATION OF TEC NEARER TO OTHER TEST RANGES AND FACILITIES, WHILE PRESERVING ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE MAJOR TRAINING AREA FOR USE BY THE RESERVE COMPONENTS
- TRUE, TERRAIN AT BLISS IS NOT AS VARIED AS THAT AT FHL, BUT THE TERRAIN DOES NOT MAKE FHL UNIQUELY ESSENTIAL AS A LOCATION FOR TESTING
- SUBJECT TO Q'S, THIS COMPLETES MY BFG ON FHL

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U. S. Army Test and Experimentation Center missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).			
One-Time Costs (\$M): 6.7 Annual Savings (\$M): 5.7 Return on Investment: 1999 (1 Year) Net Present Value (\$M): 67.6		One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):	
PRO	CON	PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ELIMINATES UNNECESSARY ACTIVE GARRISON PERSONNEL • SAVES MONEY • LOCATES TEC NEARER TO OTHER TEST RANGES • PRESERVES TRAINING AREA FOR RC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TERRAIN NOT AS VARIED 		

ISSUES

(CHART A-19)

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT

- I VISITED FORT BLISS & TOURED FACILITIES; **SUPPORT AT FORT BLISS AND HOUSING WILL NOT BE A PROBLEM** (WORLD CLASS MWR FACILITIES RATED BEST IN ARMY, E.G. LARGEST BOWLING CENTER IN DoD, 2ND LARGEST COMMISSARY IN WORLD, ETC.)
- CLAIMS THAT THE **TEST ENVIRONMENT** AT FORT BLISS WILL PREVENT TEC FROM ACCOMPLISHING ITS MISSION WERE WELL-INTENTIONED TO PREVENT A MISTAKE, BUT ARE ALSO UNFOUNDED; THE ARMY RETAINS ABILITY TO TEST AT MOST INSTALLATIONS AS REQUIRED BY UNIQUE SITUATIONS OR ENVIRONMENTS; THE TEC **FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS** ARE AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, NOT A BRAC ACTION

ISSUES
FORT HUNTER LIGGETT, CALIFORNIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
SUPPORT AT FORT BLISS/HOUSING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WILL BE SATISFACTORY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WON'T WORK • HOUSING SHORTAGE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BLISS CAN SUPPORT • HOUSING SUPPLY AMPLE
TEST ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT BLISS/WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE IS GOOD LOCATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HUNTER LIGGETT IS IDEAL DUE TO VARIED TERRAIN, ISOLATION • MAJOR HIGHWAY BISECTS BLISS TEST AREA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BOTH ARE GOOD LOCATIONS • U.S. HIGHWAY 54 GOES THRU PART OF BLISS & BETWEEN BLISS & WSMR--NOT TEST AREA
FORCE STRUCTURE REDUCTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • APPROVED NON-BRAC REDUCTIONS IN TEC WILL LOWER NUMBER TO MOVE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOME MAY CONFUSE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE WITH MOVEMENT PLAN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEW TEC END STRENGTH WILL BE 206--181 MIL/25 CIV

A-19

FORT PICKETT

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ The next installation to be discussed ^{is} Fort Pickett, Virginia

- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Pickett be closed, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components
- In addition, he recommended that the Petroleum Training Facility be relocated to Fort Dix, New Jersey
- CHART ^{A-21} shows the relative locations of Fort Pickett and Fort Dix

~~MTC Steve Bailey will discuss Fort Pickett~~

ISSUES REVIEWED

FORT PICKETT

A-22

- THE NEXT CHART LISTS THE ISSUES, BEGINNING WITH CLAIMS OF FLAWED ANALYSIS
- NAVY SEAL AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING
- ANNUAL TRAINING
- TANK RANGES

BASE ANALYSIS FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA


DOD RECOMMENDATION: Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, New Jersey.

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	8 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	25.3
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	21.8
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	2001 (Immediate)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	256.0
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	19.3
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	20 / 270
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	1 / 9
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	- 1.0 % / - 1.0 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

(A-21: PTM MAP)

A-20

Relocation of Petroleum Training Module



**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA**

FLAWED ANALYSIS

NAVY SEAL AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING

ANNUAL TRAINING

TANK RANGES

LOCATION OF PETROLEUM TRAINING MODULE

ECONOMIC IMPACT

WATER RESERVOIR

QUESTIONABLE SAVINGS

BLACKSTONE ARMY AIRFIELD

ISSUES

FORT PICKETT

- A-23*
- ON THE NEXT CHART, THE CLAIM THAT THE ARMY DID A **FLAWED ANALYSIS**--DIDN'T GET DATA CALLS FROM USN, USMC--TRUE, THE ARMY DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CONSULT THE OTHER SERVICES ABOUT FORT PICKETT UNTIL LATE MARCH, WHEN THE NAVY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FORT PICKETT IS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR NAVY SEAL OR MARINE CORPS TRAINING (~~IN A 6 APRIL MEMO~~) THE ENCLAVE DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTINUED TNG
 - **ANNUAL TRAINING** CAN BE DONE AT OTHER LOCATIONS, BUT SCHEDULING MAY BE A PROBLEM. **COST SAVINGS** ARE CORRECTLY ESTIMATED; TABLE VIII **TANK RANGES** EXIST AT OTHER BASES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC AREA & THE 2 AT PICKETT COULD STILL BE USED IF INCLUDED IN THE ENCLAVE

ISSUES FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
<p>FLAWED ANALYSIS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEPT OF THE ARMY DID NOT SEND DATA CALLS TO OTHER SERVICES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY SHOULD WEIGH VALUE OF FORT PICKETT TO OTHER SERVICES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JOINT USE IS RELEVANT BUT NOT OVERRIDING
<p>NAVY SEAL AND MARINE CORPS TRAINING</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SEALs COULD STILL USE SOME AREAS FOR TRAINING OR GO ELSEWHERE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE-ATLANTIC PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING IS HARD TO DO ELSEWHERE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAVY ACKNOWLEDGED FORT PICKETT NOT ESSENTIAL
<p>ANNUAL TRAINING</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RC ANNUAL TRAINING CAN EASILY BE CONDUCTED AT FORTS BRAGG, A.P. HILL, OR CAMP DAWSON 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INCONSISTENT WITH NEED FOR MORE LAND BY FT. BRAGG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAPACITY EXISTS ELSEWHERE • SCHEDULING MAY BE A CHALLENGE
<p>TANK RANGES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TANK RANGES EXIST AT OTHER EASTERN U. S. INSTALLATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOCAL ADVOCATES CLAIM FT. PICKETT HAS THE ONLY TABLE VII & VIII TANK RANGES BETWEEN NC AND NY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 TABLE VIII TANK RANGES EXIST AT FORTS BRAGG, DIX, DRUM, INDIANTOWN GAP; CAMP LEJEUNE, & QUANTICO

SCENARIO SUMMARY

~~A-24~~ FORT PICKETT

- FINALLY, ON THE NEXT CHART, THE ADVANTAGES OF ADOPTING THIS RECOMMENDATION ARE SHOWN, PRIMARILY THE DIVESTITURE OF A LARGE AMOUNT OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE GENERATING LARGE SAVINGS
- THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE OF THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT SOME OF THE TRAINING AREA IN THE MID-ATLANTIC AREA MAY NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE
- THE LOCAL COMMUNITY STRONGLY FAVORS KEEPING FORT PICKETT OPEN
- SUBJECT TO YOUR QUESTIONS, THAT COMPLETES MY BRIEFING ON FORT PICKETT

SCENARIO SUMMARY FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA

DOD RECOMMENDATION		COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, New Jersey.			
One-Time Costs (\$M): 25.3 Annual Savings (\$M): 21.8 Return on Investment: 2001 (Immediate) Net Present Value (\$M): 256.0		One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):	
PRO	CON	PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCTION OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE • SAVINGS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCED AVAILABILITY OF EASTERN TRAINING AREAS 		

ISSUES

FORT PICKETT

(A-25)

- **LOCATION OF PETROLEUM TRAINING MODULE--DIX CLOSER TO MOST NE RC POL UNITS**

SITE SURVEY COMPLETED

- **ECONOMIC IMPACT--1 % JOB LOSS IS CORRECT OVERALL PROJECTION**
- **WATER RESERVOIR--BOTH IT AND WATER TREATMENT PLANT COULD GO TO A REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY IF VOTERS WOULD AGREE TO ESTABLISH ONE...**
- **BLACKSTONE ARMY AIRFIELD--C-130/C-17 CAPABLE; C-141 ONLY WITH WAIVERS**

ISSUES FORT PICKETT, VIRGINIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
LOCATION OF PETROLEUM TRAINING MODULE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RELOCATE THE MODULE TO FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT PICKETT IS IDEAL FOR THE MODULE DUE TO THE AMPLE WATER SUPPLY & PROXIMITY TO FORT LEE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORT DIX IS CLOSER TO RESERVE COMPONENT PETROLEUM PIPELINE UNITS
ECONOMIC IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RECOMMENDED CLOSING WILL CAUSE 1.0% UNEMPLOYMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SECONDARY IMPACT ON LOCAL BUSINESS & INDUCED EFFECTS WILL CAUSE A 7.5% JOB LOSS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANALYSIS SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED LUNENBERG COUNTY; NET RESULT IS -3.5 % JOB LOSS
WATER RESERVOIR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WILLING TO TRANSFER WATER TREATMENT PLANT & WATER TO A REGIONAL AUTHORITY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VOTERS DEFEATED REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITY PLAN 2:1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INCUMBENT ON ARMY TO CONTINUE OPERATION
QUESTIONABLE SAVINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SAVINGS ARE \$21.8 M/YR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SAVINGS OVERSTATED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SAVINGS CORRECTLY ESTIMATED
BLACKSTONE ARMY AIRFIELD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C-130 CAPABLE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C-17/C-141 CAPABLE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C-130/C-17 CAPABLE • C-141 CAN OPERATE ONLY WITH WAIVERS AT REDUCED WEIGHT

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- ~~WPC Staff~~ ^{is} the next installation to be discussed, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Indiantown Gap be closed, except minimum essential facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components
- ~~WPC Staff~~ ^{is} will discuss Fort Indiantown Gap

BASE ANALYSIS

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- ON CHART A-26, YOU CAN SEE THE RELEVANT DATA CONCERNING FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. THE RESULTS SHOW AN IMMEDIATE RETURN ON INVESTMENT & ANNUAL SAVINGS OF \$18.4M
- THE "GAP" IS STATE-OWNED & LEASED TO THE ARMY
- 90% OF THE BUILDINGS ARE OF TEMPORARY WOODEN CONSTRUCTION FROM WWI & WWII, WHICH IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN ITS MILITARY VALUE RANKING

BASE ANALYSIS FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	9 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	8.5
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	18.4
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1997 (Immediate)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	249.2
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	16.5
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	48 / 300
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	102 / 13
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	- 0.2 % / + 0.2 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

ISSUES REVIEWED

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

A-27

- THE NEXT CHART DISPLAYS THE FIVE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATION
FLAWED ANALYSIS
- **ENCLAVE IS IMPRACTICAL**
- **MILITARY VALUE**
- **LOCATION & USAGE**
- **READINESS IMPACT ISSUES**

**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA**

<p>FLAWED ANALYSIS</p> <p>ENCLAVE IMPRACTICAL</p> <p>MILITARY VALUE</p> <p>LOCATION & USAGE</p> <p>READINESS IMPACT</p>	<p>COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING</p> <p>FUNDING FOR ENCLAVE</p> <p>COMMON SENSE TEST</p> <p>OUT-OF-STATE ANNUAL TRAINING</p>
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ISSUES

CHART A-28

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- THE **FLAWED** ANALYSIS CLAIM IS ~~JUST~~ ^{VALID} NOT ~~TRUE~~; THE AAA & GAO BOTH VALIDATED THE ARMY'S COBRA DATA.
- AN ENCLAVE OF PERMANENT FACILITIES AT THE BASE WOULD BE LARGE, BUT NOT IMPRACTICAL, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE STATE OWNS ALL THE LAND
- THE STAFF HAS VALIDATED THE MILITARY VALUE RANKING OF THE "GAP", WHICH IS 9TH AMONG THE 10 MAJOR TRAINING AREAS.

ISSUES

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
FLAWED ANALYSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TABS COBRA ANALYSES ARE VALID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBRA ANALYSES ARE FLAWED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AAA & GAO VALIDATED ARMY'S COBRA
ENCLAVE IMPRACTICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESERVE ENCLAVE IS FEASIBLE • IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS TO DA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENCLAVE UNWORKABLE FACILITIES SPREAD OUT • WANTS FED FUNDS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENCLAVE SIZE WOULD BE LARGE, BUT DOD POSITION IS REASONABLE
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VERY HIGH MILITARY VALUE TO STATE RC FORCES • BETTER RANGES THAN FORT DIX OR FORT A. P. HILL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VALIDATED 9 OF 10 • FORTS DIX & A. P. HILL HAVE MORE & BETTER RANGES, IMPACT AREAS, & MANEUVER SPACE
LOCATION & USAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HAS NOT QUESTIONED CONVENIENT ACCESS TO STATE GUARD OR USAGE RATES • COSTS OF BASE OPS IS ISSUE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2ND MOST USED MAJOR TRAINING AREA BY RC • MOST COST EFFECTIVE PER TRAINING MANDAY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OLD INFRASTRUCTURE TOO COSTLY; OTHER GOOD TRAINING AREAS IN REGION MEET NEEDS FOR SMALLER FORCE STRUCTURE
READINESS IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NO DEGRADATION • ANNUAL TRAINING CAN BE DONE AT DIX, DRUM, OR A. P. HILL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSURE WILL CAUSE TURBULENCE, AFFECT TRAINING & READINESS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • READINESS CAN BE MAINTAINED

CONTRARY TO A COMMUNITY CLAIM THAT THE "GAP" HAD BETTER RANGES THAN FORTS DIX OR A.P. HILL, JUST THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE: EACH OF THOSE BASES HAS MORE & BETTER RANGES, A LARGER IMPACT AREA, AND MORE ACRES FOR GROUND MANEUVER

- **LOCATION & USAGE**--FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS CONVENIENT FOR STATE UNITS, BUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS OLD AND TOO COSTLY TO MAINTAIN THIS TRAINING INSTALLATION WHEN OTHERS EXIST IN THE REGION, SUCH AS FORTS DIX, A.P. HILL, AND DRUM)
- WITH A RC ENCLAVE AT THE GAP & ANNUAL TRAINING DONE ELSEWHERE, **READINESS** CAN BE MAINTAINED

ISSUES
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
FLAWED ANALYSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TABS COBRA ANALYSES ARE VALID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBRA ANALYSES ARE FLAWED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AAA & GAO VALIDATED ARMY'S COBRA
ENCLAVE IMPRACTICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESERVE ENCLAVE IS FEASIBLE • IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS TO DA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENCLAVE UNWORKABLE FACILITIES SPREAD OUT • WANTS FED FUNDS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENCLAVE SIZE WOULD BE LARGE, BUT DOD POSITION IS REASONABLE
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VERY HIGH MILITARY VALUE TO STATE RC FORCES • BETTER RANGES THAN FORT DIX OR FORT A. P. HILL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VALIDATED 9 OF 10 • FORTS DIX & A. P. HILL HAVE MORE & BETTER RANGES, IMPACT AREAS, & MANEUVER SPACE
LOCATION & USAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HAS NOT QUESTIONED CONVENIENT ACCESS TO STATE GUARD OR USAGE RATES • COSTS OF BASE OPS IS ISSUE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2ND MOST USED MAJOR TRAINING AREA BY RC • MOST COST EFFECTIVE PER TRAINING MANDAY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OLD INFRASTRUCTURE TOO COSTLY; OTHER GOOD TRAINING AREAS IN REGION MEET NEEDS FOR SMALLER FORCE STRUCTURE
READINESS IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NO DEGRADATION • ANNUAL TRAINING CAN BE DONE AT DIX, DRUM, OR A. P. HILL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSURE WILL CAUSE TURBULENCE , AFFECT TRAINING & READINESS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • READINESS CAN BE MAINTAINED

SCENARIO SUMMARY

A-29 FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- FINALLY, ON THE NEXT CHART, THE ADVANTAGES OF THE RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP ARE SHOWN TO BE THE REDUCTION OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE AND SAVINGS TO THE ARMY
- THE PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THE ELIMINATION OF ONE OF THE ACTIVE MAJOR TRAINING AREAS IN THE NORTHEASTERN U.S.
- THE LOCAL COMMUNITY & COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA OPPOSE THIS RECOMMENDATION
- SUBJECT TO YOUR QUESTIONS, THIS COMPLETES MY BRIEFING ON FT. INDIANTOWN GAP

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

DOD RECOMMENDATION	COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE
<p>Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.</p> <p>One-Time Costs (\$M): 8.5 Annual Savings (\$M): 18.4 Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) Net Present Value (\$M): 249.2</p>	<p>One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">PRO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCTION OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE • SAVINGS TO THE ARMY 	<p style="text-align: center;">CON</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REDUCED AVAILABILITY OF EASTERN TRAINING AREAS
<p style="text-align: center;">PRO</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">CON</p>

A-29

ISSUES

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

(A-30)

- **COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING--FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS IS ISSUE; 2ND MOST USED RC MTA & DOES COST-EFFECTIVE TRAINING, BUT IS EXCESS TO NEEDS OF THE ARMY**
- **FUNDING FOR ENCLAVE--STATE AG SUBMITS REQUEST TO DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GUARD**
- **COMMON SENSE TEST--FISCALLY PRUDENT BUSINESS DECISION; CONSISTENT ANALYSES**
- **OUT-OF-STATE ANNUAL TRAINING--PENNSYLVANIA RC UNITS CAN (& MANY DO) TRAIN ELSEWHERE FOR ANNUAL TRAINING AT DIX, DRUM, OR A.P. HILL--WON'T CAUSE TURBULENCE (PA ANG UNITS DOING AT AT PICKETT, E.G.: 1/103 AR, 2/103 AR, 1/109 FA, 1/229 FA, 1/109 IN, 1/104 CAV)**

ISSUES

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COST OF MAINTAINING EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE, NOT TRAINING, IS THE ISSUE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GAP IS THE 2ND MOST USED TRAINING AREA BY THE RESERVE COMPONENTS & LEAST COSTLY PER MANDAY OF TRAINING 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MUCH OF FACILITY INFRASTRUCTURE EXCESS TO NEEDS OF ARMY
FUNDING FOR ENCLAVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESERVE COMPONENTS WILL SUBMIT REQUESTS & COMPETE FOR FUNDING PER THE NORMAL BUDGET PROCESS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSURE OF THE GAP IS A TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM THE ACTIVE ARMY TO THE RESERVE COMPONENT & THE FUNDS SHOULD ALSO BE TRANSFERRED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOLLARS TO OPERATE ENCLAVE WILL BE SHIFTED TO NATIONAL GUARD & WERE NOT COUNTED IN SAVINGS; REQUEST SUBMITTED & IS BEING PROCESSED
COMMON SENSE TEST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSING FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS FISCALLY PRUDENT & REAPS A RETURN ON INVESTMENT IN 1 YEAR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSURE "DOES NOT PASS THE COMMON SENSE TEST" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLOSING FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL ANALYSES
OUT-OF-STATE ANNUAL TRAINING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES STATIONED IN PENNSYLVANIA CAN TRAIN ELSEWHERE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TURBULENCE & SEVERE IMPACT ON TRAINING & READINESS WILL BE CAUSED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAJORITY OF RC FORCES CAN CONDUCT ANNUAL TRAINING AT FORTS DIX, DRUM, OR A.P. HILL

FORT CHAFFEE

~~At TAB~~ ^{is} ~~we have~~ the next installation to be discussed, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

- The Secretary of Defense recommended that Fort Chaffee be closed, except minimum essential buildings and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave

~~At TAB~~ ~~we have~~ will discuss Fort Chaffee

BASE ANALYSIS

FORT CHAFFEE

- ON CHART A-31, YOU CAN SEE THE SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR FORT CHAFFEE. AGAIN, A GOOD TRAINING AREA, BUT ITS INFRASTRUCTURE IS EXCESS TO CURRENT OR PROJECTED MILITARY NEEDS. 97% OF ITS BUILDINGS ARE OF WWII TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.

BASE ANALYSIS FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

DOD RECOMMENDATION: Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

CRITERIA	DOD RECOMMENDATION
MILITARY VALUE	10 of 10
FORCE STRUCTURE	No Impact
ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ M)	9.6
ANNUAL SAVINGS (\$ M)	13.4
RETURN ON INVESTMENT	1999 (1 Year)
NET PRESENT VALUE (\$ M)	166.1
BASE OPERATING BUDGET (\$ M)	10.0
PERSONNEL ELIMINATED (MIL / CIV)	2 / 191
PERSONNEL REALIGNED (MIL / CIV)	90 / 7
ECONOMIC IMPACT (BRAC 95 / CUM)	- 0.4 % / - 0.5 %
ENVIRONMENTAL	No known impediments

ISSUES REVIEWED

FORT CHAFFEE

CHART A-32

- THE NEXT CHART SHOWS THE ISSUES WHICH WERE REVIEWED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE:
- MILITARY VALUE
- NATIONAL GUARD ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS
- READINESS IMPACT
- TRANSPORTATION COSTS
- RAZORBACK RANGE

**ISSUES REVIEWED
FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS**

<p>MILITARY VALUE</p> <p>NATIONAL GUARD ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS</p> <p>READINESS IMPACT</p> <p>TRANSPORTATION COSTS</p> <p>RAZORBACK RANGE</p>	<p>INCREASED TRAVEL TIME</p> <p>TENANT RELOCATION COSTS</p> <p>RESERVE COMPONENT RETENTION</p>
--	---

ISSUES

FORT CHAFFEE

A-33
^

- THE NEXT CHART[^] OUTLINES THE POSITIONS AND FINDINGS. THE ARMY ASSESSED **MILITARY VALUE** AS 5TH IN 1993 AND 10TH IN 1995--THIS WAS A RESULT OF NEW ATTRIBUTES AND WEIGHTS; USING THESE, THE STAFF HAS VALIDATED THE MILITARY VALUE RANKING AND INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT.
- THE KEY ISSUE IN THIS RECOMMENDATION BECAME **INCLUSION** OF TRAINING LAND IN **NATIONAL GUARD ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS**, WHICH IS BEING RESOLVED WITHIN THE **HQ, DEPT** OF THE ARMY. THE ARMY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE WORDS "AND TRAINING AREA(S)" WERE INADVERTENTLY EDITED OUT OF THE RECOMMENDATION

ISSUES FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHANGE FROM 5TH TO 10TH IN 2 YEARS NOT UNDERSTOOD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ATTRIBUTES & WEIGHTS NEW IN '95 • VALIDATED 10 OF 10 RANKING
NATIONAL GUARD ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY INTENDS TO LICENSE REQUIRED LAND & FACILITIES TO THE NATIONAL GUARD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARKANSAS ARMY & AIR NATIONAL GUARD WANT MOST OF FORT CHAFFEE AS AN ENCLAVE & FUNDS TO OPERATE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING IS ONGOING • NATIONAL GUARD MUST PAY ASSOCIATED COSTS • TRAINING AREAS SHOULD BE PROVIDED
READINESS IMPACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • QUALITY OF TRAINING AND READINESS WILL NOT BE DEGRADED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • QUALITY OF TRAINING & READINESS WILL SUFFER SEVERELY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • READINESS CAN BE SUSTAINED IF TRAINING AREAS REMAIN OPEN
TRANSPORTATION COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMALL INCREASE FOR ANNUAL TRAINING, MORE THAN OFFSET BY SAVINGS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANNUAL COSTS TO TRAIN OUT-OF-STATE WILL BE \$3.75 MILLION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL BE INCURRED, BUT CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED UNTIL LOCATIONS ARE SCHEDULED EACH YEAR
RAZORBACK RANGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AIR NATIONAL GUARD WANTS TO RETAIN • ARMY WILL ADDRESS WITH TRAINING LAND DECISION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 188TH TACTICAL FIGHTER GROUP WANTS TO KEEP OPEN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OPERATIONS COULD CONTINUE IF RANGE INCLUDED IN ENCLAVE

- **READINESS IMPACT**--NATIONAL GUARD IS CONCERNED THAT HAVING TO TRAVEL OUT-OF-STATE FOR AT WOULD REDUCE TRAINING TIME & READINESS; COULD BE MANAGED, BUT VALID POINT, AS WELL AS **TRANSPORTATION COSTS** OF \$3.75 M
- 188TH TAC FIGHTER GROUP WANTS TO KEEP **RAZORBACK RANGE** OPERATIONAL IF THE RANGE IS INCLUDED IN THE ENCLAVE

ISSUES

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
MILITARY VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 OF 10 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHANGE FROM 5TH TO 10TH IN 2 YEARS NOT UNDERSTOOD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ATTRIBUTES & WEIGHTS NEW IN '95 • VALIDATED 10 OF 10 RANKING
NATIONAL GUARD ENCLAVE REQUIREMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMY INTENDS TO LICENSE REQUIRED LAND & FACILITIES TO THE NATIONAL GUARD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARKANSAS ARMY & AIR NATIONAL GUARD WANT MOST OF FORT CHAFFEE AS AN ENCLAVE & FUNDS TO OPERATE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING IS ONGOING • NATIONAL GUARD MUST PAY ASSOCIATED COSTS • TRAINING AREAS SHOULD BE PROVIDED
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RAZORBACK RANGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AIR NATIONAL GUARD WANTS TO RETAIN • ARMY WILL ADDRESS WITH TRAINING LAND DECISION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 188TH TACTICAL FIGHTER GROUP WANTS TO KEEP OPEN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OPERATIONS COULD CONTINUE IF RANGE INCLUDED IN ENCLAVE

SCENARIO SUMMARY

FORT CHAFFEE

- A-34
^
- FINALLY, ON MY LAST CHART, SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS TO DoD AND REDUCTION OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE ARE SHOWN AS TWO ADVANTAGES OF THIS RECOMMENDATION
 - IF ANNUAL TRAINING BY RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS IS NOT PERMITTED AT FORT CHAFFEE, A DISADVANTAGE OF THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT SOME OF THE PROJECTED SAVINGS WILL BE OFFSET BY INCREASED TRANSPORTATION COSTS
 - THE RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE IS OPPOSED BY THE STATE'S ELECTED OFFICIALS, BUT THEY WOULD SUPPORT A RECOMMENDATION TO REALIGN FORT CHAFFEE *w/ MIN EGS FRCS, LGS, & TNG AREAS*
COMMISSIONERS, SUBJECT TO YOUR QUESTIONS, THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION

(TAKE YOUR NAME TAG)

SCENARIO SUMMARY FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

DOD RECOMMENDATION		COMMISSION ALTERNATIVE	
Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.			
One-Time Costs (\$M): 9.6 Annual Savings (\$M): 13.4 Return on Investment: 1999 (1 Year) Net Present Value (\$M): 166.1		One-Time Costs (\$M): Annual Savings (\$M): Return on Investment: Net Present Value (\$M):	
PRO	CON	PRO	CON
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS TO DOD • REDUCTION OF EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOME ARKANSAS NATIONAL GUARD UNITS WILL TRAVEL FURTHER FOR ANNUAL TRAINING 		

ISSUES

FORT CHAFFEE

(CHART A-35)

- **INCREASED TRAVEL TIME--IS ARMY AWARE THAT THEIR 50/250 & 10/14 STANDARD MAY NOT BE MET IN SOME CASES?**
- **TENANT RELOCATION COSTS--FUNDED BY ARMY/MOVING COSTS IN COBRA**
- **RESERVE COMPONENT RETENTION--NO HISTORIC DATA SHOWING ILL EFFECTS**

ISSUES

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

ISSUE	DOD POSITION	COMMUNITY POSITION	R&A STAFF FINDINGS
INCREASED TRAVEL TIME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOME RESERVISTS WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL FURTHER, BUT MOST WITHIN THE 250-MILE STANDARD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONCERN THAT MORE TIME TO ANNUAL TRAINING COULD AFFECT EMPLOYER SUPPORT & RETENTION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TRAVEL DISTANCES FROM LITTLE ROCK: FT CHAFFEE-60 MI; FT POLK-316 MI; FT RILEY-512 MI; FT SILL-387 MI • CSA TESTIFIED THAT STANDARD IS 10 TRAINING DAYS DURING 14 DAY ANNUAL TRAINING
TENANT RELOCATION COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RELOCATION OF TENANTS FUNDED BY ARMY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOD SHOULD NOT CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE IN ORDER TO ALLOW TENANTS TO REMAIN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TENANT MOVING COSTS TO BASE X ARE IN COBRA
RESERVE COMPONENT RETENTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TRAINING & READINESS MAY SUFFER FROM HAVING TO DEPART EARLIER & RETURN LATER FROM TRAINING, RESULTING IN LOW MORALE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NO HISTORIC EVIDENCE THAT LOCATION OF ANNUAL TRAINING HAS DIRECT EFFECT ON RESERVE COMPONENT RETENTION/RECRUITING

Document Separator

Index

Tab A	Executive Summary
Tab B	Briefing Slides - 1995 Regional BRAC Hearing
Tab C	Briefing Script - 1995 Regional BRAC Hearing
TAB D	Fort Indiantown Gap Fact Sheet
Tab E	Fort Indiantown Gap Initial Data Call to Department of the Army
Tab F	Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition TABS Analysis Using Corrected Data
Tab G	Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition Review of the Army's COBRA Analysis
Tab H	National Guard Bureau Enclave Analysis
Tab I	Cost Effectiveness Data
Tab J	Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition Statement of Deviation from the DoD Selection Criteria
Tab K	Current Fort Indiantown Gap Lease
Tab L	Fort Indiantown Gap Coalition Analysis of Additional Travel Costs Incurred Under the Secretary of Defense's Proposed Action
Tab M	Fort Indiantown Gap Military Value Information Booklet

Executive Summary

Fort Indiantown Gap

Base Realignment and Closure Commission Regional Hearing

4 May 1995

Fort Indiantown Gap is a small, but superb installation, located in the center of a very large reserve component population. There are more than 30,000 in Pennsylvania alone, and within 200 miles, there are 57,000 that rely on this installation for training. It is the second most heavily used Major Training Area by the reserve component in the nation, and the most cost effective per training manday. To the force structure which trains there it is the most accessible installation, is most suitable for the mission essential training of the force, and is the most affordable. It has an annual budget of \$13.5 million dollars.

The Secretary of Defense has recommended that the Gap be closed except for a small portion of a few buildings and the training areas and ranges which would be enclaved for reserve component training purposes. The cantonment area and its infrastructure would be closed down and the overhead costs of operating it saved. Troops coming for weekend training would go directly to the field and all annual training at the installation would be shifted to distant out-of-state posts.

The results of the COBRA analysis indicate that by eliminating the cost of the infrastructure, \$23 million dollars could be saved annually. This analysis was seriously flawed since the total budget is but \$13.5 million dollars. Upon being notified, the TABS study group conducted a further "sensitivity analysis" which now claims \$11.6 of the \$13.5 million dollars budget could be saved annually. This analysis was also seriously flawed. It provided no funds for the necessary operation of the infrastructure and failed to consider the added \$2 to \$4 million dollars for out-of-state travel.

An independent analysis of military value using corrected and updated data elements resulted in the ranking of Fort Indiantown Gap changing from 9th to 3rd in the major Training Area category. Details are contained herein.

Unlike most other reserve component training bases, there are almost 3,000 people on the installation every day. They are workers, the units stationed there, the soldiers there for schoolhouse training. The facilities, functions, and activities which they use and conduct are distributed across the entire installation. These facilities, function, and activities will remain as the Army has determined the cost of moving them is prohibitive. Accordingly, the enclave proposal as applied to the Gap is unworkable and operationally impractical. The costs of operating the infrastructure must be incurred and therefore no savings will result from the Secretary's proposal.

The Gap has the highest military value to the force structure which it supports because of its accessibility, suitability, and affordability. All of the weapons of a mechanized division are fired on its ranges. It has a Tank and Bradley qualification range, an aerial bombing and strafing range used by all services, active and reserve, and the second largest army aviation training facility in the nation used by both active and reserve component units and aviators. It has an 11 mile training corridor in which an entire dismounted brigade can maneuver.

The Secretary's proposal, if adopted, will create extraordinary turbulence and disruption in the operation of the post, and in the training and readiness of the force structure which uses it. Closing the cantonment area will deprive the soldier of all of the quality of life features of the installation.


Every aspect of training and readiness will be adversely affected by this proposal.

The Secretary's proposal does not achieve the goal of eliminating excess facilities, excess property, or excess overhead. Since the entire post must be operated there will be no savings.

The Secretary's proposal deviates in a very substantial way from the selection criteria in several significant areas which are detailed in the materials before the Commission.

The Secretary's proposal does not pass the dollar test nor the common sense test. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the base should be removed from the list.

Fort Indiantown Gap



**A Key Department of Defense
Training Resource**

Accessible Suitable Affordable

PENNSYLVANIA GUARD and RESERVE POPULATION



ONE OF THE LARGEST GUARD AND
RESERVE POPULATIONS IN THE NATION

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Army National Guard	18,900
U. S. Army Reserve	10,250
Air National Guard	<u>4,500</u>
TOTAL	33,650


THEY ALL USE THE GAP

Nearby Training Population

**FORT
DRUM**

<u>CUMULATIVE POPULATION PER RINGED AREA</u>	<u>PERSONS</u>
50 MILES	9,020
100 MILES	29,565
150 MILES	47,719
200 MILES	56,761


**CUMULATIVE TOTAL
RESERVE COMPONENT
INSIDE 200 MILES**



**FORT
PICKETT**

MOST ACCESSIBLE

MAJOR TRAINING AREAS



**MUST TRAIN NEAR THEIR
HOME STATION**

Cost Effectiveness

(cost per training mandays)
Data from 1995 TABS

	<u>Total Training Days</u>	<u>Cost/Manday</u>
Fort Indiantown Gap	659,033	\$ 51.60
(More Accurate Data Shows): 783,055		
Fort Pickett	309,888	\$ 62.20
Fort Dix	533,237	\$130.77
Fort Chaffee	155,058	\$ 64.52
Fort Greely	2,309	\$5,940.67
Fort Hunter Liggett	50,460	\$201.37
Fort McCoy	958,201	\$ 70.26
Fort A P Hill	537,352	\$ 16.76

GAP - ARMY'S BEST BARGAIN

CLOSE, EXCEPT “ENCLAVE”

- **THE VAST MAJORITY OF MISSIONS CEASE OR RELOCATED**
- **95% OF PERSONNEL ELIMINATED OR RELOCATED**
- **ALL BUT A SMALL PORTION OF BASE EXCESSED**
- **SMALL PORTION REMAINING WILL BE FACILITIES IN AN “ENCLAVE” FOR USE BY RESERVE COMPONENTS**
- **ACTIVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT CEASES**
- **UNMANNED RANGES AND TRAINING AREAS RETAINED FOR RESERVE COMPONENT USE**

ENCLAVE THEORY NOT PRACTICAL

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU CONCLUSION

- Fort Indiantown Gap is the Second Most Heavily Used Major Training Area -

783,055 MANDAYS

- The Entire Post Should be Retained
- Infrastructure Will Still be Required

**GAP REQUIRES A SKILLED
WORK FORCE**

Fort Indiantown Gap has the highest value!

• WHY ?

- Accessible to 33,000 Pennsylvania soldiers and 57,000 soldiers within 200 miles.
- Most suitable - Wide range of training opportunities
- Affordable - Least travel cost, least cost to use
- Cost Effective - Most cost effective base. Heaviest usage, daily, weekends, annual training.

Three things give real estate value:


LOCATION - LOCATION - LOCATION

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS

• LIVE FIRE

- Tank Crew Qualification Gunnery
- Artillery, Up To 8"
- Crew Served Weapons
- Demolition Training
- Aerial Gunnery



• MANEUVER TRAINING

- 11 Mile Training Corridor
- Brigade Task Force Exercises
- Mech-Armor Battle Drill
- Combined Arms Training

**CAN FIRE ALL THE WEAPONS OF A
MODERN MECHANIZED DIVISION**

ARMY AVIATION


- **Second Largest Aviation Training Site in U.S.**
 - **Aircraft Qualification Training Courses**
 - **Aviation Mechanis Training Certification**
 - **Has Six Flight Simulators**
 - **Attack Helicopter, Black Hawk & Huey**
 - **Programmed for Chinook Simulator**
 - **Largest National Guard Aviation Maintenance Facility - 44,000 sq ft**
- **Over 90,000 Aerial Operations per Year**
- **Uninhabited Terrain for Day and Night Tactical Aviation Training**
- **710 Square Miles of Maneuver Air Space**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

AIR to GROUND

RANGE



- **Joint Use:**
 - Air Force, Navy Air
 - USMC, Army Air
- **Bombing and Aerial Gunnery**
 - All Aircraft
 - Day and Night
 - Computer Scored
- **1300 Sorties Annually**
- **Military Operation Area with Attached Low-Level Training Routes**



**ONE OF 15 NATIONWIDE
- A NATIONAL ASSET**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP THE MOST AFFORDABLE TO ARMY

- **Most Cost Effective Major Training Area**

\$17.37 PER MANDAY

- **Budget of \$13.6 Million**
- **Transportation Costs Lowest For the Large Training Population**
- **Post Staffing is Minimal and Skilled**
- **“No Frills, Bare-Bones”**

Army's Best Bargain

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

A Brigade Size Element On-Post Everyday

UNIT/ACTIVITY

PERSONNEL

U. S. Army Garrison (Active Duty and DoD Civilian) 476

United States Army Readiness Group (Active Duty) 91

Pennsylvania Army National Guard (ARNG/ANG) 1,033

Tenant Activities 196

State Employees 167


Schoolhouse (Daily Average) 850

TOTAL PERSONNEL 2,813

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Professional Education and Training Schools

THERE IS NO BETTER PLACE FOR US TO GO



- PA National Guard Military Academy
- Region I NCO Academy
- Eastern Army Aviation Training Site (EAATS)
- Regional Training Site - Medical
- Regional Training Site - Maintenance
- AF Heavy Equipment Operator Training Site (REOTS)
- AF Professional Food Service Instruction Site

14,750 Students Every Year!

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Training - A Full Time Business

UNITS COME FROM 13 STATES

Army National
Guard

Army
Reserve

Active
Component

Air National
Guard


Marine Corps
Reserve

<u>FY-94</u>	<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Training Days</u>
	Weekends	288,130
	Annual Training	<u>494,925</u>
	TOTAL	783,055

ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY USED
TRAINING BASES IN THE UNITED STATES

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

CANTONEMENT AREA



YELLOW - DAILY OCCUPANCY

RED - DEMOLISHED OR SCHEDULED FOR DEMOLITION

CANNOT ENCLAVE THE GAP

Reserve Component Enclave Theory

- **Withdraw US Army Management**
- **Dismiss The Work Force**
- **Active Army Funding Withdrawn**
- **Abandon Cantonment Areas Except For Essential Facilities**
- **Eliminates Infrastructure**
- **Cuts The Overhead / Results In Savings**
- **Send Units Out of State For Annual Training**
- **Will Not Degrade Readiness**
- **Keep Training Areas and Ranges**

NOT PRACTICAL

ENCLAVING DEGRADES READINESS of the ENTIRE FORCE

The Chief of Staff of the Army Said, “*Quality of Life is a Readiness Issue.*”


- Quality of Life Facilities Lost
- Training Operations Will Suffer
- Disrupted Logistic Operations Degrade Readiness

Every Aspect of
TRAINING and READINESS WILL SUFFER

Vehicle & Troop Movement

Distances / Times

FT DRUM



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES

- **AP Hill:** Heavily Wooded, not usable for mechanized operations no tank ranges, artillery firing constrained.
- **Ft Dix:** Limited Mechanized Maneuver Area for one battalion, no tank qualification ranges, constrained artillery firing. Already heavily used.
- **Ft Drum:** Suitable. Utilized for PAARNG Annual Trainings rotations. Realignment & closure of other installations will impact upon accessibility. Availability of summertime slots difficult, travel costs expensive.
- **Ft Pickett:** Suitable. On closure list and enclave proposal will make it less desirable.
- Availability for Annual Training must be during summer months to accommodate a large student population.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Brigade Task Force Movement Costs (3500 Soldiers)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE MOST AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE

	<u>Soldiers</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Other Equipment</u>	
	3500	955		60
	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>Fort Drum</u>	<u>Fort Pickett</u>	<u>AP Hill</u>
Pittsburgh	\$103,824	\$504,452	\$474,584	\$433,159
Philadelphia	\$51,830	\$470,374	\$461,656	\$122,022
Scranton	\$51,830	\$126,402	\$491,616	\$447,138
Ft Indiantown Gap- 0 -		\$446,114	\$466,486	\$126,285

TRAVEL FUNDS INSUFFICIENT TO SEND EVERYONE OUT OF STATE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

THE REALITIES ARE

- State-owned lands, Lease termination creates significant legal problems
- Must operate the entire infrastructure to satisfy training requirements
- Lack Funds to send all Pennsylvania units out of State
- Other suitable posts lack summertime slots
- Travel costs result in NO SAVINGS and may even be five times more expensive -- budget cannot support this
- Secretary of Defense proposal results in NO SAVINGS even be more expensive

Must retain the entire Post

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


THE SECRETARY of DEFENSE ENCLAVE PROPOSAL

- **Reduced and Less Certain Federal Funding Stream**
- **Workforce Will Be Cut Substantially**
- **Will Cause Rapid Deterioration of Facilities**
- **Lack of Funds for Capital Improvements**
- **Degrades Necessary Maintenance and Unit Training Support**

**KEEP THE SUCCESSFUL FEDERAL
PARTNERSHIP**


KEEP THE "GAP" OFF THE LIST

SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED- RECURRING COSTS UNDERESTIMATED



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE



Occupants: RTS-MED, AASF, EAATS, RTS-MAINT, REGION
NCO ACADEMY, BOMBING RANGE, DMA, RESERVE CTR, ETC.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATED



No Water, No Electricity, No Sewer
NO ESSENTIAL SERVICES

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


? 11.2 Million Dollar Savings ?

- **SAVINGS FROM EMPLOYEE DISMISSALS?**
- **NEW EMPLOYEES WILL NEED TO BE HIRED!**
- **ALL ESSENTIAL SERVICES MUST BE PROVIDED**
 - **FEDERALLY FUNDED**

NO REALISTIC SAVINGS

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Why Change THE MANAGEMENT?




REALITY OF PROPOSAL

- NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PROPERTY
- NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PERMANENT FACILITIES
- NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS OVERHEAD

PURPOSE OF BRAC NOT ACHIEVED

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

FTIG A WINNING RELATIONSHIP INTO THE FUTURE



TAKE FTIG OFF THE BRAC LIST

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

BRIEFING FOR
THE BRAC COMMISSION
REGIONAL HEARING
4 MAY 1995
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP,
PENNSYLVANIA**

(SLIDE COVER SLIDE)

GOOD AFTERNOON. THE MEMBERS OF THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP DELEGATION ARE PREPARED TO BE SWORN IN.

I AM STEPHAN VEGOE, PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANON VALLEY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND A MEMBER OF THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION. BEFORE I INTRODUCE OUR THREE SPEAKERS, LET ME BRIEFLY SET THE STAGE.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS BEEN A MILITARY TRAINING INSTALLATION SINCE 1932. THE GAP IS LOCATED IN THE BLUE MOUNTAINS OF PENNSYLVANIA, TWENTY MILES NORTHEAST OF THE STATE CAPITAL -- HARRISBURG. IT HAS SERVED AS A MOBILIZATION SITE FOR EVERY WAR BEGINNING WITH WORLD WAR II AND NOW IS PRIMARILY A TRAINING BASE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

OF THE TEN MAJOR TRAINING AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE SECOND MOST HEAVILY USED. WE SUPPORTED 780,000 MAN DAYS OF TRAINING IN 1994.

THE GAP IS A NO FRILLS, LOW COST, IDEALLY LOCATED AND ESSENTIAL MAJOR TRAINING BASE.

IT IS NOT REDUNDANT AND NOT REPLACEABLE. IT IS, IN FACT, ONE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S WELL KEPT SECRETS.

THE GAP IS AN IDEALLY LOCATED PLACE TO TRAIN SOLDIERS. AS WE WILL SHOW YOU IN THE NEXT FEW MINUTES, IT IS EXTREMELY COST EFFECTIVE.

NOW, I WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE YOU TO THE MEMBERS OF OUR DELEGATION.

FIRST, CONGRESSMAN GEORGE GEKAS, REPRESENTING THE 17TH DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. CONGRESSMAN GEKAS WILL DISCUSS THE ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION ON FORT INDIANTOWN GAP AND HIS PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT THE ARMY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARE NEEDLESSLY GIVING UP.

NEXT, PENNSYLVANIA'S NEW ADJUTANT GENERAL, BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES MACVAY, WILL THOROUGHLY REVIEW THE MILITARY VALUE OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP AND REVIEW HOW THE ARMY'S ANALYSIS DIFFERS FROM WHAT WE BELIEVE IS REALITY.

GENERAL MACVAY WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE ARMY'S ENCLAVE THEORY AND COMPARE IT, AS WELL, TO REALITY.

**NEXT, I AM PLEASED TO INTRODUCE REPRESENTATIVE
TIM HOLDEN, REPRESENTING PENNSYLVANIA'S 6TH DISTRICT.**

**CONGRESSMAN HOLDEN WILL REVIEW THE FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS WE HAVE DONE IN REGARD TO THE ARMY'S
RECOMMENDATION.**

**YOU HAVE CERTAINLY HEARD FROM MANY OTHER
INSTALLATIONS ABOUT FLAWED DATA. OUR BRIEFING WILL GO
OVER SIMILAR GROUND.**

**CONGRESSMAN HOLDEN WILL REVIEW HOW THE ARMY'S
ANALYSIS IS, IN FACT, SO SERIOUSLY FLAWED THAT IT NO
LONGER PASSES THE COMMON SENSE TEST**

**THE ARMY CLAIMS, FOR INSTANCE, THEY CAN SAVE
TWICE WHAT IT COSTS TO OPERATE THE BASE. WE DOUBT IT,
AND THINK YOU WILL, AS WELL.**

**FINALLY , IF WE HAVE ANY TIME LEFT AT THE END, I'LL
RETURN TO WRAP UP OUR COMMENTS WITH A CONCLUSION.**

NOW, CONGRESSMAN GEKAS.

CONGRESSMAN GEKAS' REMARKS

GOOD AFTERNOON TO THE COMMISSION AND STAFF. I AM GEORGE GEKAS, A MEMBER OF CONGRESS REPRESENTING THE 17TH DISTRICT IN WHICH FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS LOCATED. LET ME DESCRIBE TO YOU THE MILITARY POPULATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN PENNSYLVANIA AND HOW THE LOCATION OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP SUPPORTS NOT ONLY THEIR TRAINING BUT SUSTAINS THEIR HIGH STATE OF READINESS.

(SLIDE POPULATION SLIDE)

PENNSYLVANIA HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE POPULATIONS IN THE NATION. THESE ARE OUR GUARD, OUR RESERVE, OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN, AND MARINES. WE HAVE A VERY PERSONAL INTEREST IN THEM, THEIR TRAINING AND THEIR READINESS.

(SLIDE RING SLIDE)

THESE RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ARE STATIONED THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA IN MORE THAN A HUNDRED OF OUR COMMUNITIES WHERE THEY HAVE THEIR ROOTS. WITHIN 200 MILES OF THE GAP THERE ARE NEARLY 57,000 RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS.

THE GAP IS THE ONLY TRAINING INSTALLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA FOR OUR UNITS. THE STATED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION IS THAT THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN PENNSYLVANIA HAS BEEN REDUCED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GAP IS "EXCESS INFRASTRUCTURE" TO DoD IS CLEARLY LACKING IN MERIT ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE LARGE TRAINING POPULATION THAT MUST RELY ON IT AND ITS LOCATION TO RAIL, AIR, AND SEA PORTS.

(SLIDE USA SLIDE)

THE GAP HAS BEEN COMPARED WITH BASES THROUGHOUT THE NATION. HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE IT SUPPORTS IS LOCATED IN PENNSYLVANIA, AND UNLIKE ACTIVE ARMY UNITS, RESERVE MEMBERS CANNOT BE MOVED ABOUT. THESE FORCES MUST BE SUPPORTED FROM AND TRAIN NEAR THEIR HOMES.

(SLIDE COST EFFECTIVE)

THE GAP IS ONE OF THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE DoD INSTALLATIONS IN THE NATION. THIS, COMBINED WITH ITS LARGE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING DAYS, MAKE IT CRITICAL TO THE TRAINING AND READINESS OF DoD FORCES IN THE NORTHEAST. AS THE SLIDE INDICATES, WHEN USING ACCURATE COST DATA IT IS EVEN CLEARER THAT IT IS THE ARMY'S AND DoD'S *BEST* BARGAIN.

(SLIDE ENCLAVE CONCEPT)

THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS TO "CLOSE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP EXCEPT FOR MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AS A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE".

I THINK THAT YOU WILL FIND THAT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP CAN NOT BE PLACED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEFINITION OF "CLOSE EXCEPT".

MOST OF THE UNITS AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS CURRENTLY AT THE GAP WILL REMAIN SHOULD THE ACTIVE COMPONENT GARRISON LEAVES. THE ARMY CONCLUDED IN ITS ANALYSIS THAT IT WOULD BE COST PROHIBITIVE TO RELOCATE ALL THE UNITS, SCHOOLS, AND TRAINING CURRENTLY CONDUCTED AT THE GAP TO OTHER DoD INSTALLATIONS.

IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE INFRASTRUCTURE, WE WILL REQUIRE THE SKILLED WORKFORCE WE PRESENTLY HAVE. EVEN IF THE ACTIVE COMPONENT GARRISON LEAVES, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AND OVERHEAD COSTS OF RUNNING THE POST AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WILL STILL BE THERE. I REPEAT, WILL STILL BE THERE. THIS UNDERMINES THE VERY BASIS OF THE ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION.

(SLIDE NGB CONCLUSION)

A NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU TEAM RECENTLY STUDIED THE POST AND CONCLUDED:

FIRST, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE SECOND MOST HEAVILY USED MAJOR TRAINING AREA IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.

SECOND, THAT THE ENTIRE POST MUST BE RETAINED AFTER BRAC 95.

THIRD, THAT THE ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND BASE OPERATIONS OF THE POST MUST BE RETAINED.

THIS INCLUDES THE UTILITIES, THE SECURITY FORCE, MEDICAL SUPPORT, FIRE AND AMBULANCE SUPPORT, RANGE CONTROL AND SCHEDULING OPERATIONS, BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. WHILE SOME BARRACKS AREAS CAN BE ELIMINATED *NO SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS WOULD RESULT.*

IN ADDITION, THE ARMY RESERVE IN THEIR BRAC 95 DATA CALL STATED " CLOSURE OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP WILL RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE COST (TRAVEL TIME AND FUNDING) INCURRED FOR RESERVE UNITS TO REACH THE TRAINING AREA AT FORT DIX".

(SLIDE PROJECTOR OFF)

IN OUR VIEW, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS THE HIGHEST MILITARY VALUE TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN PENNSYLVANIA AND TO THOSE FORCES FROM 13 OTHER STATES WHO TRAIN THERE.

**BRIGADIER GENERAL MACVAY WILL NOW DISCUSS IN DETAIL WITH
YOU THE MILITARY VALUE OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP.**

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S REMARKS

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, I AM BG JAMES W. MACVAY, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. OUR GOVERNOR, TOM RIDGE, HAS ASKED ME TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AND ON BEHALF OF THE 30,000 GUARDSMAN AND RESERVISTS STATIONED IN OUR STATE WHO TRAIN AT THE GAP. THE COMMONWEALTH VIGOROUSLY OPPOSES THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO CLOSE AND ENCLAVE THE GAP BECAUSE WE REGARD ITS PRESENT OPERATIONS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE TRAINING AND READINESS OF THESE SOLDIERS. WE ARE THE NATION'S STRATEGIC INSURANCE IN THE TOTAL ARMY AND MUST BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT THAT MISSION.

(SLIDE HIGH VALUE - "LOCATION")

THE SECRETARY'S MILITARY ATTRIBUTES AND SELECTION CRITERIA PLACE THE GREATEST VALUE ON LAND, THE NUMBER OF ACRES. CLEARLY, IF THE LAND IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE TO BE SUPPORTED, THEN IT HAS NO VALUE. THAT IS WHY COMPARISONS WITH DISTANT BASES HAVE NO RELEVANCE. TO US, ACCESSIBILITY IS THE PRIME VALUE. IT COMES FROM THE OLD ADAGE THAT THERE ARE THREE THINGS THAT GIVE VALUE TO REAL ESTATE: LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION. THE GAP IS A VERY ACCESSIBLE BASE, LOCATED IN THE

CENTER OF A LARGE DOD MILITARY POPULATION, EASILY REACHED ON AN EXCELLENT INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM IN THE LEAST TRAVEL TIME AND THE LEAST TRAVEL COSTS.

TO THE RESERVE COMPONENTS, ACCESSIBILITY, SUITABILITY FOR MISSION ESSENTIAL TRAINING AND AFFORDABILITY ARE WHAT PASSES MUSTER AND GIVES THE GAP THE HIGHEST MILITARY VALUE OF ANY RC TRAINING BASE IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE GAP IS ALSO A VERY SUITABLE BASE. THE TRAINING WHICH THE FORCE STRUCTURE CONDUCTS HERE IS WIDE-RANGING, DIVERSE, AND MISSION ESSENTIAL. FORT INDIANTOWN GAP HAS BEEN THE KEY TO THE READINESS OF MILITARY UNITS IN A 13 STATE AREA.

(SLIDE TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS)

AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP WE CAN FIRE ALL OF THE WEAPONS OF A MECHANIZED DIVISION. WE HAVE ONE OF THE THREE TABLE VII TANK RANGES IN THE NORTHEAST UPON WHICH WE CAN QUALIFY OUR TANK AND BRADLEY CREWS. WE CAN FIRE A 155MM SELF-PROPELLED DIVISION ARTILLERY TIME ON TARGET SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE HAVE AN 11 MILE TRAINING CORRIDOR IN WHICH AN ENTIRE DISMOUNTED BRIGADE CAN MANEUVER. WE CONDUCT PLATOON MECHANIZED AND ARMORED DRILLS. ALL THE TRAINING THAT OUR FORCES REQUIRE CAN BE CONDUCTED AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. THE 28TH DIVISION CONVERTED FROM A WALKING INFANTRY DIVISION TO A MODERN MECHANIZED DIVISION AND IS

THE READIEST OF THE 8 DIVISIONS IN THE GUARD DUE TO THE SUITABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF THE GAP.

(SLIDE ARMY AVIATION)

WE HAVE THE SECOND LARGEST ARMY AVIATION TRAINING SITE IN THE NATION WITH SIX HELICOPTER SIMULATORS. IT IS THE SIMULATOR COMPLEX FOR *ALL* ARMY AVIATION IN THE NORTHEAST TO INCLUDE ACTIVE COMPONENT UNITS SUCH AS THE 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE THE LARGEST NATIONAL GUARD AVIATION SUPPORT FACILITY FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE. WE HAVE 710 CONTIGUOUS SQUARE MILES OF UNINHABITATED STATE OWNED TERRAIN THROUGH WHICH OUR HELICOPTERS CAN FLY THE CONTOURS OF THE EARTH, AND AT NIGHT, CONDUCTING ESSENTIAL NIGHT VISION FLYING. THIS IS A NATIONAL ASSET FOR ARMY AVIATION, THE AIR FORCE , AS WELL AS NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FLYING UNITS. THIS VITAL AVIATION TRAINING AREA WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN THE TABS MILITARY VALUE ASSESSMENT.

(SLIDE AIR TO GROUND RANGE)

OUR BOMBING AND STRAFING RANGE, IS COMPUTER SCORED, IS ONE OF 15 IN THE NATION, AND IS USED DAYS AND NIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE YEA WITH OVER 1,300 SORTIES ANNUALLY. THIS RANGE IS IN A MILITARY OPERATIONS AREA THAT COVERS MOST OF THE EASTERN PART OF THE STATE AND IS USED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD, THE AIR RESERVE AS WELL

AS THE ACTIVE AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINES. BOTH THE RANGE AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AREA ARE NATIONAL ASSETS.

(SLIDE AFFORDABLE)

THE GAP IS ALSO THE MOST AFFORDABLE BASE TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE. IT IS THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE OF THE BASES WITH WHICH IT WAS COMPARED; IT IS A BARE BONES, NO FRILLS, ONLY ESSENTIALS PLACE. SITUATED IN THE CENTER OF THE STATE, IT IS THE MOST AFFORDABLE IN TRAVEL TIME AND DOLLARS. THE GARRISON IS STAFFED AT MINIMAL LEVELS. IT IS THE ARMY'S *BEST* BARGAIN.

(SLIDE - BRIGADE ON POST EVERYDAY)

THE GAP IS THE SECOND MOST HEAVILY USED MAJOR TRAINING AREA BY THE RC IN THE NATION. HEAVY USE, I SUBMIT, IS EVIDENCE OF HIGH VALUE. UNLIKE OTHER RC TRAINING BASES, EVERY DAY OF THE YEAR WE HAVE ALMOST 3,000 PEOPLE ON BASE, THE EQUIVALENT OF A BRIGADE, WHO ARE EITHER WORKING, STATIONED OR TRAINING HERE. THERE ARE SEVERAL ACTIVE COMPONENT TENANTS AND MANY ARMY GUARD, AIR GUARD, AND RESERVE UNITS STATIONED THERE.

(SLIDE SCHOOL HOUSE)

THERE ARE SEVEN RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING INSTITUTES OR

SCHOOL HOUSES THAT OPERATE AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP; PROBABLY MORE THAN AT ANY OTHER INSTALLATION IN OUR CATEGORY. THIS TRAINING IS YEAR-ROUND, AND ALL TOGETHER SOME 15,000 STUDENTS ARE TRAINED AT THE GAP'S SCHOOLS.

WEEKEND AND ANNUAL TRAINING IS CONDUCTED AT THE GAP ALL 12 MONTHS OF THE YEAR.

(SLIDE CLOUDS)

EACH THURSDAY, YOU SEE THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCED DETACHMENTS OF THE BRIGADE SIZE TASK FORCES WHICH COME FOR WEEKEND TRAINING ON FRIDAY. ON SOME WEEKENDS AS HIGH AS 9,000 SOLDIERS ARE HERE. OUR ANNUAL WEEKEND USEAGE IS 288,000 MILITARY TRAINING DAYS.

THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SOLDIERS ALSO ATTEND ANNUAL TRAINING HERE COMPRISING 494,000 MILITARY TRAINING DAYS. THEY ARE NOT JUST FROM PENNSYLVANIA; THEY COME FROM 13 OTHER STATES.

(SLIDE MAP FTIG)

THIS IS A MAP OF THE CANTONEMENT AREA OF THE GAP. WHAT YOU SEE IN YELLOW INDICATES DAILY OCCUPANCY. THESE ARE THE HEADQUARTERS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS, MAINTENANCE SHOPS,

WAREHOUSES, STORAGE COMPOUNDS, SCHOOLHOUSES AND UNITS STATIONED AT THE GAP. ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES WILL STILL FUNCTION REGARDLESS OF WHO OPERATES THE INSTALLATION . THE RED SHOWS AREAS DEMOLISHED OR IN THE PROCESS OF DEMOLITION.

WE ARE ALL OVER THE POST. THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS UNDER AND ON TOP OF US AND THUS THE CANTONMENT AREA CAN NOT BE ENCLAVED; IT JUST DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.. THAT IS WHY THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU IN IT'S STUDY HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE ENTIRE POST MUST BE RETAINED.

(SLIDE ENCLAVE THEORY)

THE ENCLAVE IDEA IS NOT ONLY AN IMPRACTICAL ONE, BUT IT IS A BAD IDEA. CONVERSION TO AN "ENCLAVE" WILL MEAN WHAT IS STATED ON THIS SLIDE: WE EMPHASIZE THREE THINGS: FIRST, THE CANTONMENT AREA WILL BE ABANDONED, SECOND, IRRESPECTIVE OF WEATHER, ALL TROOPS COMING FOR TRAINING GO DIRECTLY TO AND WILL LIVE IN THE FIELD AND THIRD, THE PROPOSED ACTION WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON MORALE, TRAINING AND READINESS.

(SLIDE ENCLAVE DEGRADES)

THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF OUR SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN IS A READINESS ISSUE. INFAC, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS MADE IT THE NUMBER

ONE PRIORITY. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD TAKE FROM THE SOLDIERS ALL THE QUALITY OF LIFE FACILITIES WHICH WE HAVE FOR THEM.

IF SOLDIERS WORK ALL WEEK AND ON FRIDAY EVENING TRAVEL AN HOUR OR TWO TO THE GAP, ARRIVING AT 2100 TO 2300 HOURS, MUST GO DIRECTLY TO THE FIELD, AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL LOADED UP FOR THE TRUCK RIDE HOME, I CAN TELL YOU THAT MORALE WILL BE IMMEDIATELY EFFECTED, OUR REENLISTMENT RATE WILL GO DOWN, AND WE WILL LOSE A LOT OF GOOD SOLDIERS. WE CANNOT TREAT SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN THIS WAY. LACKING A GOOD NIGHTS REST WILL ALSO INCREASE RISK AND SAFETY CONCERNS. I CANNOT SEE MYSELF, OR ANY GOOD COMMANDER TAKING AWAY WHAT LITTLE QUALITY OF LIFE WE HAVE FOR OUR SOLDIERS, AND I TELL YOU IT WILL NOT BE DONE. IT SIMPLY WON'T HAPPEN.

IF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT MANNED AND WORKING TO PROVIDE ALL THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING SERVICES THEN THE TRAINING OPERATIONS WILL NOTICEABLY SUFFER IN THEIR QUALITY, AGAIN ADVERSELY AFFECTING READINESS.

IF LOGISTICS OPERATIONS, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE ARE DISRUPTED, THERE WILL BE REDUCED READINESS, THROUGH INCREASED REPAIR TIMES AND DELAYS IN THE DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES.

THE TAXPAYERS OF THE NATION HAVE MADE A LARGE INVESTMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING OF THESE FORCES TO

BRING THEM TO HIGH STANDARDS OF READINESS. EVERY ASPECT OF TRAINING AND READINESS WILL SUFFER UNDER THIS PROPOSAL.

(SLIDE MAP TROOP MOVEMENT)

THE SECRETARY'S ENCLAVE RECOMMENDATION WOULD CLOSE THE GAP TO ALL ANNUAL TRAINING AND WOULD SEND THE 32,000 SOLDIERS WHO COME THERE TO FAR DISTANT POSTS FOR TRAINING. I WILL BRIEFLY CRITIQUE EACH POST TO WHICH THE ARMY PROPOSES TO MOVE THE GAP'S ANNUAL TRAINING LOAD.

(SLIDE ALTERNATE TRAINING SITES)

FORT A.P. HILL IS WHOLLY UNSUITABLE FOR MECHANIZED OR ARMORED MANUEVER TRAINING, HAS NO TANK OR BRADLEY QUALIFICATION RANGES, AND POOR ARTILLERY FIRING. WE USE IT ONLY FOR HELICOPTER GUNNERY.

FORT DIX IS VERY LIMITED IN AVAILABLE MECHANIZED MANEUVER SPACE SO THAT ONLY ONE SUCH BATTALION CAN TRAIN THERE AT A TIME. IT IS ALREADY HEAVILY USED AND LACKS A TANK QUALIFICATION RANGE. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY TIME WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING THE FEW SUMMER TRAINING MONTHS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT EVEN THE NEW JERSEY GUARD'S ARMOR BRIGADE DOES NOT CONDUCT ITS ANNUAL TRAINING AT FORT DIX BUT CHOOSES TO GO TO

FORT DRUM, AND THAT OUR 28TH DIVISION HAS NEVER CONDUCTED ITS ANNUAL TRAINING AT DIX.

FORT PICKETT AND FORT DRUM OFFER THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE SITES FOR TRAINING, BUT OBVIOUSLY, THEY CANNOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GAP'S DAILY OR WEEKEND USAGE WHICH I HAVE OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL. AS YOU KNOW, FORT PICKETT IS ALSO ON THE CLOSURE LIST, AND COULD BE UNAVAILABLE OR MUCH LESS DESIRABLE IF ENCLAVED. FORT DRUM IS AT CAPACITY FOR ANNUAL TRAINING AND WOULD BE OVERTAXED IF ADDITIONAL TROOPS WERE FORCED ON IT.

(SLIDE MOVEMENT COST SLIDE)

BUDGET CONSTRAINTS DETERMINE HOW MUCH OF THE FORCE CAN TRAVEL TO DISTANT POSTS. OUR GUARD TRAINS A SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS FORCE AT THE GAP BECAUSE OF LACK OF TRAVEL FUNDS, AND BECAUSE THE GAP IS SUITABLE FOR THEIR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

THE COSTS OF TRAVEL TO MOVE A 3500 MAN BRIGADE TASK FORCE WITH ITS VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT FROM PENNSYLVANIA TO FORT DRUM, FORT A.P. HILL, OR FORT PICKETT IS FIVE TIMES OR MORE GREATER THAN THE COST TO MOVE TO FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. SOME CONVOYS WILL HAVE TO MAKE TWO DAY JOURNEYS WHICH REDUCES THE 15 DAY TRAINING TIME BY 4 DAYS OR 26 PERCENT AND WHICH FURTHER INCREASES OUR COSTS. IF WE MUST MOVE THE ENTIRE FORCE OUT OF

STATE IT COULD COST AN ADDITIONAL 2 TO 4 MILLION DOLLARS MORE AT A TIME WHEN TRAVEL BUDGETS ARE BEING CUT. THE TRAINLOAD MODEL USED BY THE ARMY IN ITS ANALYSIS CONSIDERED ONLY THROUGHPUT AND NOT THE ADDITIONAL COSTS OF TRAVELING ELSEWHERE TO TRAIN.

(SLIDE THE REALITIES ARE)

I WOULD POINT OUT THIS IS THE ONLY MILITARY TRAINING INSTALLATION IN THE NATION WHICH IS OWNED BY THE STATE AND LEASED TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CLEARLY, YOU CANNOT ESTABLISH A "FEDERAL ENCLAVE" WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE ARMY'S ANALYSTS NOR WERE THE EXCEPTIONAL COSTS WHICH COULD FLOW FROM IT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

THE LEASE PLACES A BURDEN ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE THE LANDS TO A "SAFE CONDITION" AND TO COMPLY WITH VARIOUS STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. IF THE LEASE IS TERMINATED, THE STATE MAY NOT WISH TO ASSUME LEGAL LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BASE UNLESS, AND UNTIL, THE LANDS ARE RESTORED AND THE OUTSTANDING LEGAL ISSUES RESOLVED.

THE POST MUST BE OPERATED TO SATISFY THE DAILY/WEEKEND OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THE FORCE, THEREFORE THERE IS NO SENSIBLE REASON WHY ANNUAL TRAINING SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED AT THE GAP. TO OPERATE AND ENCLAVE

WITH ALL THE TURBULENCE AND DEGRADATION IT WILL CAUSE, AND THEN PAY TO MOVE ALL OF THE FORCE OUT OF STATE FOR ANNUAL TRAINING, MAKES NO SENSE, IS FAR MORE EXPENSIVE, MUCH LESS EFFECTIVE AND IS UNAFFORDABLE.

(SLIDE SECDEF PROPOSAL)

IF THE COMMISSION DETERMINES TO ADOPT THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION, I TELL YOU THIS IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN:

- THERE WILL BE A VERY REDUCED AND LESS CERTAIN FEDERAL FUNDING STREAM.**
- THE WORK FORCE WILL BE DISMISSED AND ONE HIRED TO REPLACE IT;**
- THERE WILL BE A RAPID DETERIORATION OF ALL FACILITIES;**
- THERE WILL BE A LACK OF FUNDS FOR CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS.**
- THERE WILL BE A DEGRADATION IN NECESSARY MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING SUPPORT AND ALL OF THIS WILL HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND ADVERSE IMPACT ON SOLDIER MORALE AND UNIT READINESS.**

THIS IS WHY WE STRONGLY URGE YOU TO CONTINUE THE OPERATIONS OF THIS SMALL BUT SUPERB POST AS IT IS.

THE RECOMMENDATION BEFORE THE COMMISSION DOES NOT PASS

THE COMMON SENSE TEST. WE HAVE HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP AT THE GAP, ACTIVE, GUARD AND RESERVE, FOR 50 YEARS. WE THE CUSTOMERS, THE GUARD, THE RESERVES, AND ALL WHO TRAIN AT THE GAP, HAVE RECEIVED QUALITY SERVICE FROM A QUALITY WORK FORCE.

THIS BASE SHOULD COME OFF THE LIST!

THE SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP SHOULD REMAIN IN PLACE, CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OUR TROOPS, AND KEEP US A TRAINED AND READY FORCE.

(COVER SLIDE ON)

CONGRESSMAN HOLDEN'S REMARKS

GOOD AFTERNOON COMMISSIONERS. I AM CONGRESSMAN TIM HOLDEN OF THE 6TH DISTRICT. MANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO WORK AND TRAIN AT THE GAP ARE MY NEIGHBORS. I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION BY TURNING TO THE FINANCIAL SIDE OF THIS CLOSURE.

(SLIDE SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED)

THE ARMY IN ITS COBRA ANALYSIS CLAIMED IT WILL SAVE 23.8 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR BY CLOSING AND ENCLAVING THE FORT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FORT ONLY HAS AN ANNUAL BUDGET OF 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS MAY HAVE MISLED THE DECISION MAKERS IN PROPOSING THIS CLOSURE ACTION. WE CHALLENGED THIS FIGURE, GAVE THEM OUR REVIEW, AND AS A RESULT THE ARMY BASE STUDY CONDUCTED A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. THAT ANALYSIS PROJECTS AN 11.2 MILLION DOLLAR ANNUAL SAVINGS OUT OF THE INSTALLATION'S 13.5 MILLION DOLLAR BUDGET. WE BELIEVE THIS ANALYSIS IS ALSO SERIOUSLY FLAWED AND WE HOPE THAT CLAIM WILL NOT MISLEAD THIS COMMISSION. SPECIFICALLY, THE SCENARIO FAILS TO PROVIDE FOR THE COST OF THE POST'S INFRASTRUCTURE, THE NECESSITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO YOU. IT ALSO FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS OF TRAVEL WHICH THE PROPOSAL REQUIRES.

(SLIDE OFF)

FTIG IS THE HOME OF MANY FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, RESERVE UNITS AND OTHER USERS. THESE ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT LEAVE. THE ARMY HAS SAID THESE ACTIVITIES MUST REMAIN AND HAS RECOMMENDED THEY BE ENCLAVED. AS YOU HAVE HEARD THE FACILITIES ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE POST. THE ARMY HAS ALSO STATED THAT THE TRAINING AREAS AND RANGES ARE STILL NEEDED FOR THE LARGE POPULATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT'S USE. THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ENTIRE INSTALLATION BE RETAINED. THE NATURAL QUESTION THAT FOLLOWS IS, WHAT WOULD BE THE RESULT OF PULLING OUT THE ARMY GARRISON AS THE SECRETARY PROPOSES?

(SLIDE ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COULD BE COMPARED TO A LARGE OFFICE BUILDING. ALL THE USERS OF THE INSTALLATION ARE THE RENTERS IN THE BUILDING, WHILE THE REGULAR ARMY IS THE MANAGEMENT. THE ARMY, BY RECOMMENDING THIS CLOSURE, HAS SAID THE OCCUPANTS WILL STAY BUT THE MANAGEMENT AND STAFF WHO RUN THE BUILDING WILL BE DISMISSED.

(SLIDE INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATED)

IMAGINE THAT YOU ARE AN OCCUPANT IN THE BUILDING AND GO TO WORK TO FIND THE WATER, ELECTRICITY AND SEWER TURNED OFF AND ALL

OTHER ESSENTIAL SERVICES DISCONTINUED. WHAT WOULD YOU DO? NATURALLY YOU WOULD RELOCATE. BUT THE ARMY HAS SAID, NO, IT WILL COST TOO MUCH FOR YOU TO LEAVE. THE ARMY HAS ESTIMATED THAT MOVING THESE FUNCTIONS TO ANOTHER INSTALLATION WOULD COST IN EXCESS OF \$300 MILLION.

(SLIDE \$11.2 MILLION SAVINGS)

NOW LET US RETURN TO THE \$11 MILLION DOLLARS IN ANNUAL SAVINGS THE ARMY HAS CLAIMED IT WILL ACHIEVE BY CLOSING THE POST'S INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISMISSING THE EMPLOYEES WHO RUN IT. WILL THERE REALLY BE A SAVINGS? SOMEONE WILL NEED TO TAKE OVER THE INFRASTRUCTURE. THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD, AGAIN, BE FEDERALLY FUNDED. THE ARMY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT THE MANY FACILITIES ON THE INSTALLATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH RESERVE COMPONENT, ARE FEDERAL MISSIONS. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT PRACTICAL TO EXPECT ANY SAVINGS. YOU CAN'T SAVE MONEY SIMPLY BY SAYING YOU ARE GOING TO STOP PAYING THE BILL.

THE ARMY IS SIMPLY SHIFTING THE BILL FROM THE REGULAR ARMY TO THE RESERVE COMPONENT. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING, HOWEVER, BASED ON THE GUIDANCE THE ARMY BASE STUDY WAS GIVEN. THE ARMY INSTRUCTED ITS ANALYSTS TO "MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF MAJOR TRAINING AREAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING SUPPORT" AND IN ITS DIRECTIONS TO ITS ANALYSTS IT FURTHER STATED

**"CONSIDERABLE OVERALL DOD SAVINGS COULD BE REALIZED BY
MAXIMIZING THE USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVES."**

(SLIDE WHY CHANGE MGT)

**THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION SHOWS THAT THE SECRETARY'S
ENCLAVE PROPOSAL IS OPERATIONALLY NOT PRACTICAL AND THAT THE
CLAIMED SAVINGS CAN NOT BE REALIZED. IN LIGHT OF THESE FACTS, I
WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THE LOGIC BEHIND DISRUPTING AN
EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE WORK FORCE, WHO HAVE SELFLESSLY
SERVED THEIR NATION, SOME FOR THEIR ENTIRE WORKING LIFE, FOR THE
SAKE OF A PAPER SAVINGS THAT WILL NEVER MATERIALIZE. WHAT IS THE
POINT OF SPENDING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DISMISS THESE EMPLOYEES,
ONLY TO HIRE REPLACEMENTS. THE TURBULENCE AND INEFFICIENCY
THAT WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FROM THE CHANGE IN THE PRESENT
GARRISON OPERATIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY IMPACT ON THE
READINESS OF THE THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS WHO TRAIN AT THE GAP
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.**

(SLIDE OFF)

**I WOULD FURTHER ASK YOU TO SPECIFICALLY REQUEST THAT THE
GAO LOOK AT THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP ANALYSIS.**

(SLIDE REALITY OF PROPOSAL)

THE ARMY BASING STUDY TELLS US THAT "THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF BRAC IS TO SAVE MONEY THROUGH SOUND BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIONS." THIS WAS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REDUCING EXCESS PROPERTY, EXCESS FACILITIES AND EXCESS OVERHEAD. THE FACTS THAT WE HAVE SHOWN YOU, WE BELIEVE, ESTABLISH THAT NONE OF THESE APPLY TO FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. WHAT THE SECRETARY PROPOSES IS NOT SOUND.

(SLIDE A WINNING RELATIONSHIP)

THE GAP IS AN INSTALLATION THAT IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE THOUSANDS OF SERVICE MEMBERS WHO TRAIN THERE. THERE IS NO OTHER PLACE FOR THEM TO GO. ITS GREAT VALUE IS IN ITS ACCESSIBILITY, SUITABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY. WE CAN NOT DO WITHOUT IT.

ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH WE WOULD ASK THAT THERE BE MADE PART OF THIS RECORD A SUBMISSION WHICH DETAILS THE SPECIFICS IN WHICH WE BELIEVE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE SELECTION CRITERIA.

I BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE REASONS WHICH WE HAVE DETAILED AND ASK THE COMMISSION TO REMOVE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP FROM THE LIST.

(COVER SLIDE ON)

CLOSING STATEMENT

IN THE VERY SHORT TIME REMAINING, LET ME TRY TO PUT WHAT WE HAVE TOLD YOU IN PERSPECTIVE.

THE ARMY HAS RECOMMENDED CLOSING FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THIS AFTERNOON, THE GAP IS NOT REDUNDANT AND CERTAINLY NOT REPLACEABLE. ITS MILITARY VALUE IS FAR TOO HIGH. PLUS, AS WE SHOWED YOU, IT IS EXTREMELY COST EFFECTIVE.

IN SPITE OF THE ARMY'S CLOSE RECOMMENDATION, WE ALL KNOW THE GAP WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AS A MAJOR TRAINING BASE BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION IN THE NORTHEAST AND ITS PROXIMITY TO OVER 57,000 RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS. THOSE SOLDIERS SIMPLY MUST BE TRAINED AND THEY MUST TRAIN AT THE BEST AND MOST COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING BASE AVAILABLE - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP.

ALSO, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP WHICH HAS EXISTED AT THE GAP FOR MORE THE FIFTY YEARS THROUGH A VERY ATTRACTIVE LEASE AGREEMENT, IS THE BEST OPTION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE ARMY AND THEIR PARTNERS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT.

CLEARLY, IF YOU REALIGN THE BASE TO ANOTHER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE, YOU GIVE UP TOO MUCH AND YOU SPEND TOO MUCH MONEY DOING IT.

**THE FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP IN PLACE TODAY WORKS. IT IS NOT
BROKEN AND DOES NOT NEED TO BE FIXED. IT IS A MODEL OF TRAINING
EFFICIENCY. THIS PROPOSAL WILL CREATE NEEDLESS TURBULENCE,
DISRUPT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, AND REDUCE READINESS.**

**ON BEHALF OF EVERYONE IN THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION,
WE URGE YOU TO RETAIN THAT SUCCESSFUL 50 YEAR FEDERAL
PARTNERSHIP.**

TAKE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP OFF THE LIST

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

FACT SHEET

1. GENERAL:

Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, (FTIG) is located on 19,000 acres of state-owned lands leased to the Federal Government in 1989 for \$1.00 for 60 years. In a wartime configuration, the Post can house and support 25,000 troops and in peacetime, 18,000. Over 140 training areas are available to support individual skills, collective training, drills, and weapons systems proficiency up to 8-inch artillery and Table VIII tank gunnery. Two other important training areas are the hard-surfaced runway for fixed and rotary wing aircraft and the air-to-ground range incorporating a Military Operations Area (MOA), which is available for high-performance aircraft as well as helicopters. This range is one of only 15 in the United States. Entire standard infantry brigades have maneuvered on reduced frontages in the main training corridor. Over 177,000 soldiers train at FTIG during each fiscal year with 144,000 training on weekends (IDT) and 32,000 at annual training.

The Post provides a full range of support activities, including troop housing, a troop issue subsistence activity with a new 50,000 sq. ft. storage warehouse supporting more than 175 different customers from all services, and an extensive range complex with considerable maneuver areas. All of these activities combine to produce high-quality training at very low cost per soldier.

Easy access to Ft. Indiantown Gap (FTIG) is provided by a major interstate highway network. This reduces travel time and increases training time. The extensive facilities of FTIG are used for an extremely wide range of training activities. In many categories of training, the installation offers the only suitable site in northeastern United States between Fort Drum, in the uppermost New York State, and Fort Pickett, Virginia. Neither of these sites is within practical weekend IDT commuting distance. therefore, FTIG fills a vital, irreplaceable niche in the training of Pennsylvania and other National Guard and Reserve units.

FTIG has been utilized as a final preparation and mobilization site for every armed conflict since World War II. FTIG is located adjacent to a major interstate highway system, 21 miles from a railhead, 26 miles from a international airport and 93 miles from a seaport.

The continued operation of FTIG is vital to the accomplishment of the federal mission of Pennsylvania National Guard and Reserve units that train at FTIG. The Pennsylvania Army National Guard, however, does not desire to assume the landlord responsibility for FTIG. It is perceived that once the mission is accepted, the resources to support that mission will be depleted over time. State law

precludes spending state funds on federal missions as does federal law preclude spending federal funds on state missions. It is necessary that a stable and dependable source of federal resources accompany the mission.

2. FT. INDIANTOWN GAP'S DAILY OPERATIONS & ACTIVITIES:

Unlike other Reserve Component training posts, Ft. Indiantown Gap has a very large number of units and activities that are present and conducted daily, year-round. The entire Post population on a daily bases amounts to 1,745. This is broken down by unit and numbers of persons as follows:

<u>U.S. Army</u>	<u># Personnel</u>
U.S. Army Garrison & Support Activities	309
Defense Accounting Office(32)/56th EOD(13)	45
Post Exchange(12)/Clothing Sales(12)	24
Health Clinic(7)/Ambulance(9)/Laundry(2)	18
Food Service/KPs(40)/Comm. Recreation(6)	46
NAF Housing(15)/Comm. Club(27)/Bowling Ctr(3)	45
Readiness Group, FTIG	91
■ TOTAL	<u>476</u>

<u>PA Army National Guard</u>	<u>Full-Time</u>	<u>Total</u>
HQs PA Army National Guard	133	532
PA National Guard Military Academy	7	47
Region I NCO Academy	51	55
Regional Training Site-Medical	24	26
Eastern Army Aviation Training Site	124	124
109th Public Affairs Detachment	0	17
128th Military History Detachment	0	3
HHC, 28th Combat Aviation Brigade	8	76
28th ATC Platoon	2	42
2nd Bn, 104th Aviation	13	270
Det 1, HHT, 1st SQDN, 104th CAV	2	74
Troop C, 1st SQDN, 104th CAV	2	30
Troop D, 1st SQDN, 104th CAV	1	31
Co. F, 104th Aviation	4	407
HHD, 228th Forward Support Bn.	11	41
Co A, 228th FSB	20	63
Det 1, Co. B, 228th FSB	11	92
Det 1, 3622d Maint. Co.	2	104
28th Personnel Service Bn.	4	168
AASF #1	80	116
OMS #15	24	24
CSMS	90	90
UTES	30	30
RETROEurope	55	0
RETROEurope	19	0
■ TOTAL	<u>717</u>	<u>2,462</u>

<u>PA Air National Guard</u>	<u>Full-Time</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bomb Range	8	8
211 EIS	17	172
271 CCS	26	163
201 RHF	32	217
203 WF	1	22
REOTS	14	21
SVS	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
■ TOTAL	<u>98</u>	<u>609</u>

<u>Other Tenant Activities:</u>	<u>Total</u>
Region 1 NCO Academy	51
PA National Guard Academy	6
Eastern Army Aviation Training Site	117
Regional Training Site - Medical	24
Regional Training Site - Maint.(USAR)	11
USAR Center	12
Other USAR	66
State Employees	<u>167</u>
■ TOTAL	<u>454</u>

3. TRAINING POPULATION & ACTIVITIES:

Major school programs are conducted year-round as follows:

<u>School</u>	<u>Students per year</u>
Region 1 NCO Academy	6,220
PA Army National Guard Academy	1,678
Eastern Army Aviation Training Site	1,356
Deployable Medical Training Site	3,800
REOTS	593
Service School	63
Regional Maintenance Training Site (USAR)	<u>550</u>
■ TOTAL	<u>14,260</u>

The PA Air National Guard air-to-ground range supports 1,282 sorties annually. In addition, 1,747 sorties fly a variety of low-level training routes which terminate at FTIG. The military operating area is only one of 15 in the United States and one of three operating in the northeast corridor.

In addition, many conferences, meetings and seminars take place at FTIG throughout the year.

The weekend training population is one of the largest in the United States. Because of the very large National Guard and USAR population located within traveling distances, Post has over 280,000 weekend training mandays per year, with some weekends having as many as 9,000 soldiers.

The annual training population is also very large, amounting to 32,995 in FY94 with as many as 3,000 in the same two-week period. This serves the large National Guard and USAR population in Pennsylvania but units from New York, Ohio, Maryland and New Jersey also train here. Annual training mandays equate to 494,925 in FY94.

4. FTIG IS IN A STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION:

In every war, FTIG has been used as a mobilization station where final preparations were made for units prior to overseas deployment. It is, therefore, a historical, power-projection base. It lays astride the main east-west, north-south highway and railway systems, is close to a major international airport (Harrisburg), and is within one-day's traveling distance to several seaports (Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk and Bayonne) and other airports (Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore-Washington International, Dulles, McGuire, Dover and Newark).

5. CONTROL AND OPERATIONS OF POST:

The U.S. Army Garrison has controlled and administered the Post for many years. It presently has a complement of 50 military personnel, 280 civilian personnel. The complement is assigned duties as follows:

<u>Department</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Seasonal</u>
Engineering/Housing	-0-	109	120
Information Management	-0-	36	
Contracting	-0-	8	
Logistics	-0-	59	
Plans & Training	20	17	
HQs/Special Staff	<u>30</u>	<u>30</u>	
■ TOTAL	<u>50</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>120</u>

The Post has an O&M budget of \$19.1 million dollars which is broken into major categories as follows:

Civilian Pay	\$ 9,606,800
Communications	155,900
Utilities	1,249,700
Supply Operations	38,400
Maint. of Material/Equipment	433,800
Transportation Services	537,800
Food Service	619,300
TISA	12,600
Automation	281,000
Audio Visual	12,400
Laundry & Dry Cleaning	44,400
Education	36,100
Security	104,800
Community & Morale Support	42,900

Admin. Support	55,100
Engineer Support	473,300
Environmental	1,571,400
Special Activities	103,900
Maint. & Repair of Real Prop.	3,481,000
Minor Construction	126,700
Personnel Support	34,100
Misc. Operating Costs	17,300
Printing/Copier/Postage	128,900
■ TOTAL	<u>\$19,167,600</u>

6. RECOMMENDATION:

Ft. Indiantown Gap is essential to the operational readiness of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. It is used heavily by its units, many of whom come to FTIG five or six weekends a year, and a brigade with supporting slice normally spends its annual training at FTIG. Between FTIG and Ft. Drum, New York, all requirements of the Pennsylvania National Guard can be met and no other training bases are required.

The issue of realignment has been studied many times in the past. See FORSCOM Study 1986. The subject was also reviewed by the 1993 BRAC Commission, which recommended no change in status.

U.S. Army Garrison control and administration has been the best solution for FTIG because of the large number of year-round activities, schools, functions and units located at FTIG which involve all three Army components, the Air Guard, and the Marines Corps Reserves.

As managed, the Post is bare bones, no-frills, heavily used, and cost effective. There is little prospect of saving any funds or man power spaces in the operation of the Post unless a decision is made to substantially cut back on the level of support, facilities and services provided by Post. Any such reduction would restrict the available training opportunities, would degrade the status of maintenance and repair of facilities and eliminate the few quality of functions which are available at the Post. This would have an adverse impact on the operational readiness of the units of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard and other Reserve Component organizations in the geographical area.

While the presence of the U.S. Army Garrison is not large it is significant and is useful in the operation of the base and in the local communities as a neutralizing force among the various services and components and has been a very successful and cost-effective operator of the Post. We would, therefore, strongly urge the maintenance of the status quo and that there be no realignment.

Document Separator



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY GARRISON
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17003-5011



AFZS-FIG-GC (5)

9 May 1994


MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, USAG, Fort Drum, ATTN: AFZS-GC, Fort Drum, NY
13602-5000

FOR Commander, United States Army Forces Command, ATTN: AFPI-BC, Fort McPherson,
GA 30330-6000

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Data Call - Fort Indiantown Gap

1. Reference memorandum, HQ FORSCOM, AFPI-BC, undated, subject: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Data Call - Major Training Areas
2. At Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 is the BRAC 95 Installation Assessment for Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.
3. The information contained in this report is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

3 Encls


DAVID L. COOK
LTC, AV
Commanding

CLOSE HOLD

MANEUVER ACRES

1. DEFINITION: Overall land size of the installation available for maneuver and training.
2. UNIT OF MEASURE: Net total acreage of the installation available for maneuver and field training. Total does not include impact areas, cantonment areas, ranges, off limits areas, and sensitive areas.
3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Total Maneuver Acres (in thousands): 11,000

Total Maneuver rights acreage (in thousands): 0*

4. SOURCE DATA: HQRPLANS

* Figure does not include 200 square miles of aviation training area contiguous to the installation. The land is operated by the State of Pennsylvania as Game Lands and is used by agreement with the State for aviation training.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

MECHANIZED MANEUVER ACRES

1. **DEFINITION:** The largest contiguous acreage of the installation available for maneuver and training of mechanized formations.

2. **UNIT OF MEASURE:** Acreage of the largest parcel of land available to the installation for training maneuvers of mechanized forces. The area does not include impact areas, cantonment areas, ranges, off limits areas and environmentally sensitive areas.

3. **DATA TO BE REPORTED:**

Mechanized Maneuver Acres (in thousands): .772*

4. **SOURCE DATA:** Installation derived data.

* Figure does not include 7,000 acres of mechanized maneuver being purchased by the State of Pennsylvania which is located 25 miles from Indiantown Gap.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

IMPACT AREA

1. **DEFINITION:** Measures the size and capability of the land used for range impact area by the installation.

2. **UNIT OF MEASURE:** Impact acres (total acres) and range impact capability.

3. **DATA TO BE REPORTED:**

Total acres: 2000

Is installation:

Air Force bombing capable	Yes*
Attack Helicopter Capable	Yes**
Tube Artillery Capable	Yes, up to 8 inch
MLRS Capable	No

4. **SOURCE DATA:** Developed by the installation.

* - The air to ground range can provide training with scoreable conventional and tactical munitions, deliveries include strafing (up to 30 mm), practice bombs, and inert 2.75 inch rockets; TGM-65 (captive training) Maverick missiles; simulated laser targets; combat search and rescue; dissimilar air combat; electronic combat; surface to air and anti aircraft artillery simulators; communications jamming; air resupply; night munitions and air resupply devices.

** - The impact area will not support standard aerial gunnery tables. However, JAAT missions with AH-1 aircraft firing 20mm cannons are possible.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

RANGES

1. DEFINITION: The total number of firing points equipped with Remote Target System (RETS), the number of Multipurpose Range Complexes (MPRC) and the availability of a standard design MOUT range and total number of ranges are weighed and combined to provide a measure of the overall capability of the installation's range structure.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE: All ranges, MPRC, and RETS equipped ranges are measured in eaches.

3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Total number of all ranges: 35*

Number of MPRC ranges: 0

Number of RETS equipped firing points: 0

Is standard MOUT Range available? No

4. SOURCE DATA: March 1994 HQRPLANS, validated TRAINLOAD data and installation data call.

* Current data does not include the upgrade of an existing tank range on the installation to a full Tank Table VIII range scheduled for completion by the end of FY94. This range and the upgrade of a companion range to a Tank Crew Proficiency Course (TCPC) in FY 95 will support the increasing amount of armor in reserve components units located in the northeast United States (42d and 28th Divisions).

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

RESERVE TRAINING

1. **DEFINITION:** Support provided by an installation to the Reserve components, including individual and unit training.
2. **UNIT OF MEASURE:** Average number of personnel performing Annual Training at the installation and average number of mandays for Inactive Duty Training.
3. **DATA TO BE REPORTED:**

Annual Training - number of personnel

FY 1991 - 29,534

FY 1992 - 32191

FY 1993 - 30643

Inactive Duty Mandays *

FY 1991 - 189,094 (95,547)

FY 1992 - 209,270 (104,635)

FY 1993 - 193,230 (96,615)

4. **SOURCE DATA:** Training data documented by the installation..

* Figures shown reflect mandays based on 2 times the number of Inactive Duty Training (IDT) individuals for the year. Total IDT individuals trained at the installation for each year are shown in parenthesis and are listed in detail on Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 1. Figures include only reserve component personnel, not active duty military or other organizations (e.g. law enforcement agencies) which train at the installation.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

BUILDABLE ACRES

1. **DEFINITION:** Ability of an installation to expand within its current property in accordance with accepted master planning policy as reflected on the long range approve installation master plan.

2. **UNIT OF MEASURE:** Areas (in acres) compatible with new development.

3. **DATA TO BE REPORTED:**

Buildable acres - 425

4. **SOURCE DATA:** Installation analysis of MACOM approved master plan.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

WORK SPACE

1. DEFINITION: Work space is defined as the total permanent square footage of maintenance (aviation and vehicle) facilities and operational/administrative facilities on the installation.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE: Thousands of gross square feet (KSF) of permanent operations/administrative and maintenance facilities for the Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) and Facility Category Groups (FCG) shown below. New construction projects in the FY 91-FY95 Military Construction Program are counted as existing assets.

3. DATA TO BE REPORTED: KSF:

<u>EEA</u>	<u>EEA DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FCG</u>	<u>FCG DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>KSF</u>
210	AVIATION MAINT	21110	MNT HANGER AVUM	75*
		21111	MNT HANGER AVIM	
214	VEHICLE MAINT	21407	NG MAINT FAC	**
		21409	AR MAINT FAC	25
		21410	VEH MAINT SHOP ORG	
		21420	VEH MAINT SHOP DS	***
		21800	SP PURP MNT SHOP	
		21900	MNT INST O&R	****
141	UNIT OPS BLDGS	14112	AV UNIT OPS BLDG	
140	OPERATIONS	14110	AF OPS BLDG	
650	ADMINISTRATION	14182	BDE HQ BLDG	
		14183	BN HQ BLDG	
		14185	CO HQ BLDG	
		61050	GEN PURPOSE ADMIN	48*****

4. SOURCE DATA: HQRPLANS, and installation derived data based on National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve facilities on the installation.

* The FCG 21110 facility is a National Guard facility at the airfield and does include an AVIM as well as AVIM capabilities.

** HQRPLANS data does not include the following National Guard facilities located on the installation which are not on the installation's real property records:

	KSF
Combined Support Maintenance Shop (CSMS)	45
Unit Training Equipment Site	10

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

Air National Guard Maintenance Facilities

18

*** Minor construction during FY 95 will result in the conversion of a semi-permanent maintenance building to a permanent DS maintenance facility. KSF will be 18

**** MCAR construction scheduled for FY 95 will result in a new Maintenance Instruction facility on the installation. KSF will be 25.

***** Does not include MCNG construction in FY 95 of an \$8 million training facility to support officer and NOC training academies and schools operated by the State of Pennsylvania National Guard under the Regional Academy concept. In excess of 5,000 reserve component students per year train at the existing academies on the installation.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

BARRACKS

1. DEFINITION: Total number of permanent on post spaces available for unaccompanied officers and enlisted.
2. UNIT OF MEASURE: The total number of permanent Unaccompanied Officer personnel Housing (UOPH) spaces on the installation. The FCG is 72400. Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing (UEPH) is the total number of enlisted member housing spaces available on the installation. On post available spaces are measured at no more than two persons per room at 90 square feet per person. The FCG is 7210S. UEPH also includes trainee assets. The FCG is 7218P.
3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Number of UOPH spaces: 60*

Number of UEPH spaces: 150**

4. SOURCE DATA: HQRPLANS

* Does not include 200 spaces for officers in WWII wood UOPH spaces at Indiantown Gap

** Does not include 12,200 spaces in 305 WWII wood barracks buildings at Indiantown Gap (based on 40 persons per barracks)

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

DEPLOYMENT NETWORK

1. DEFINITION: Distance from the installation to its critical deployment structure: airfields, ports, railheads, and interstate highways.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE: The distance (in miles) from the installation to interstate highway, railhead, C141/747 capable airport and ocean vessel capable seaport.

3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

<u>Distance to Facility</u>	<u>Miles</u>
Railhead	21
Airport	26
Seaport	93
Highway	1

4. SOURCE DATA: FORSCOM Mobilization Expansion Capability Worksheet.

CLOSE HOLD

CLOSE HOLD

MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY

1. DEFINITION: Capability of an installation to support the reconstitution of forces through the ability to billet, train, and deploy soldiers.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE: Mobilization billets measured in spaces. Data from other attributes of Deployment Network, Ranges, Maneuver Acres, Contiguous maneuver Acres, and Work Space will be a part of this element to measure the installation's capacity to train, equip, and deploy units in a time of national emergency.

3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

	ENL	OFF PERM	ENL PERM	TOTAL BILLETS
Indiantown Gap	10,500			10,500*
Indiantown Gap	12,200			12,200**
Indiantown Gap	25,288			25,288***

4. SOURCE DATA:

* Data derived from Mobilization Station Study based on Army Mobilization Operations Planning System (AMOPS) data as of 1 August 1992.

** Data based on 40 persons per barracks for the 305 Functional Category Group (FCG) 72114 World War II wood barracks at Indiantown Gap.

*** Data derived from a 1989 Baltimore District, corps of Engineers Mobilization Capability Study which based capacity on 40 Sq Ft per person for each of the FCG 72114 barracks at Indiantown Gap.

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BASOPS/MISSION POPULATION

1. DEFINITION: Measure of the base support cost required to support the mission population.
2. UNIT OF MEASURE: Dollars per mission population. Total Base Support Costs are divided by Total mission Population.
3. DATA TO BE REPORTED: FY 93 Base Support (OMA) Costs, direct and reimbursable at summary levels listed below:

	DIRECT	REIMBURSABLE
A. BASOPS(-), Account (202096)		
A. Real Estate Leases	0.0	0.0
B. Supply Operations	1251.5	23.0
C. Maintenance of Material	362.6	1558.9
D. Transportation Services	706.8	9.5
E. Laundry and Dry Cleaning	67.0	9.4
F. Army Food Services	630.7	10.3
G. Personnel Support	56.9	0.0
H. Unaccompanied Pers Housing Ops	131.0	15.3
J. Utilities	1360.2	1553.4
M. Other Engineering Support	1989.1	151.5
N. Administration	203.9	0.0
P. Automation	91.0	6.1
Q. Reserve Component Support	0.0	0.0
S. Community & Morale Support	152.1	35.7
T. Preservation of Order	210.8	.7
U. Director of Resource Management	469.7	23.5
W. Director of Contracting	291.7	0.0
X. Security and Counterintel Ops	0.0	0.0
Y. Records Management, Pubs	0.0	0.0
B. Real Property Maintenance, Accounts (202076 & 202078)		
K. Maint & Repair of Real Property	2312.1	1112.3
L. Minor Construction	248.5	140.4
C. Environmental Programs, Account (202056)	1764.0	869.6
D. Audio-Visual, Account (208090)	37.3	0.0
E. Base Commo, Account (202095)	0.0	0.0
F. Family Programs, Accounts (878708, 878719, 878720)		

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32.9 0.0

4. SOURCE DATA: Financial data from the FY 93 Year End 218 report.

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INFRASTRUCTURE

1. DEFINITION: Capacity of water, sewage treatment, electrical distribution and cost of land fill.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE:

a. Water. maximum capacity in terms of million gallons per day (MGD) available to the installation.

b. Sewage Treatment. Same as water.

c. Electrical Distribution. Maximum capacity of electric power available to the installation at any time from the sub station in terms of million kilowatt hours (MKWH).

d. Land fill. Cost of land fill used by the installation in dollars per short ton (on or off post), determined based on historical records.

3. DATA TO BE REPORTED:

- a. WATER : 2.8 MGD
- b. SEWAGE TREATMENT: 3.5 MGD
- c. ELECTRICAL POWER: 7.5 MKWH
- d. LAND FILL: \$51.60 /ton

4. SOURCE DATA: Installation utilities analysis report from the installation master plan or utilities division.

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INFORMATION MISSION AREA

1. **DEFINITION:** Evaluation of existing IMA systems.
2. **UNIT OF MEASURE:** As given in the table at enclosure 2.
3. **DATA TO BE REPORTED:** Described in Table.
4. **SOURCE DATA:** Developed by the installation.

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ENVIRONMENTAL CARRYING CAPACITY

1. DEFINITION: Composite consideration of various environmental factors.

2. UNIT OF MEASURE:

a. Archaeology & Historical Buildings

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Number of sites on the National Register 0

Number of sites potentially eligible for 200*
the National Register

* An ongoing study by the Baltimore District, Corps of Engineers will result in a Cultural Resources Management Plan for the installation. Included as part of this study will be baseline data on archaeological and historical sites and buildings.

(2) DATA SOURCE: Installation Environmental Office.

b. Endangered Species Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED: Number of endangered and threatened species (plant or animal) present on the installation.

Number of endangered species - 1 candidate endangered species of butterfly exists on the installation. An ongoing assessment by the Nature Conservancy funded through FY 95 will determine the extent of the butterfly's existence on the installation. The species is classified as a candidate endangered since populations do exist west of the Mississippi River. Fort Indiantown Gap may have the only species east of the Mississippi River.

(2) DATA SOURCE: Installation Environmental Office.

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c. Wetlands Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED: Total wetlands acreage is currently under study by the Nature Conservancy under a Legacy Program funded by the installation.

(2) DATA SOURCE: Installation Environmental Office

d. Air Quality Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED: The Air Quality Region is not in attainment due to Ozone.

(2) DATA SOURCE: AEC surveys, Installation Master Plan documentation.

e. Water Quality Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Number of time installation has exceeded the parameters of NPDES permits during FY 92 was zero (0).

(2) DATA SOURCE: Installation Environmental Office

f. Noise Quality Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Total area (acres) of AICUZ/ICUZ zones II and/or III that extend off post is zero. Based on increasing levels of training and conversion of units using the installation, another ICUZ is currently underway by AEHA.

(2) DATA SOURCE: Installation ICUZ

g. Contaminated Sites Factor

(1) DATA TO BE REPORTED:

Total IPR sites - 0

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Total NPL sites - 0

(2) DATA: SOURCE: Installation Environmental Office

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WEEKEND/ANNUAL TRAINING SUMMARY FY93 A/O 1 OCT 93

	PAARNG	PAANG	OTHER NG	USAR	ROTC	USMCR	AC	*OTHER	TOTAL
WEEKEND TRAINING									
OCT	5783	317	13	3982	983	595	214	448	12335
NOV	4815	1	106	3076	247	150	444	105	8944
DEC	1662	3	15	810	56	114	53	81	2794
1ST QTR									24073
JAN	2746	7	68	2352	121	231	86	1094	6705
FEB	4442	3	31	2698	417	2	234	174	8001
MAR	6653	10	88	2371	238	355	495	248	10458
2ND QTR									25164
APR	6615	10	75	2774	1048	589	379	608	12098
MAY	5247	26	117	4085	664	459	756	443	11797
JUN	2808	61	8	2860	39	237	195	453	6661
3RD QTR									30556
JUL	3084	12	86	2066	0	133	239	1771	7391
AUG	4208	22	176	2783	56	314	265	678	8502
SEP	8056	75	14	1738	353	156	305	704	11401
4TH QTR									27294
TOTAL WET	56119	547	797	31595	4222	3335	3665	6807	107087

ANNUAL TRAINING									
OCT	143		0	177			155		475
NOV	363		0	441			0		804
DEC	0		0	505			0		505
1ST QTR									1784
JAN	87		0	452			35		574
FEB	885		0	110			0		995
MAR	1457		0	232			20		1709
2ND QTR									3278
APR	2302		126	721			64		3213
MAY	1442		0	1621			15		3078
JUN	5492		459	2290			292	14	8547
3RD QTR									14838
JUL	1561		0	2682			136		4379
AUG	2510		406	1328			0	49	4293
SEP	1292		71	558			150	0	2071
4TH QTR									10743
TOTAL AT	17534		1062	11117			867	63	30643

TOTAL WET & AT SUPPORT 137730

*OTHER - CIVILIAN AGENCIES
PUBLISHED BY DPTMS P&O DIV

WEEKEND/ANNUAL TRAINING SUMMARY FY92 A/O 1 OCT 92

	PAARNG	PAANG	OTHER NG	USAR	ROTC	USMCR	AC	*OTHER	TOTAL
WEEKEND TRAINING									
OCT 91	7415	127	68	4335	655	336	148	399	13483
NOV	5362	3	81	3458	846	31	236	1656	11673
DEC	1183	92	19	1206	20	415	85	112	3132
1ST QTR									28288
JAN	2000	19	0	1657	247	105	374	654	5056
FEB	4887	8	59	1852	381	324	133	234	7878
MAR	9091	6	53	2548	372	535	419	377	13401
2ND QTR									26335
APR	8181	34	274	4418	892	183	412	391	14785
MAY	6556	9	34	4920	657	696	454	252	13578
JUN	2537	49	25	2716	6	194	383	424	6334
3RD QTR									34697
JUL	1929	246	245	1205	211	164	252	904	5156
AUG	3608	9	342	1806	72	472	305	403	7017
SEP	8485	9	44	2567	423	621	216	996	13361
4TH QTR									25534
TOTAL WET	61234	611	1244	32688	4782	4076	3417	6802	114854

ANNUAL TRAINING									
OCT	728		150	86			0		964
NOV	457		0	98			0		555
DEC	467		0	67			0	1440	1974
1ST QTR									3493
JAN	699		0	148			52		899
FEB	802		131	121			0		1054
MAR	1444		0	308			0	1440	3192
2ND QTR									5145
APR	794		0	741			0	0	1535
MAY	1185		453	1011			21	0	2670
JUN	3594		352	3519			100	0	7565
3RD QTR									11770
JUL	4831		86	862			21	0	5800
AUG	2617		592	1739			193	0	5141
SEP	379		0	456			7	0	842
4TH QTR									11783
TOTAL AT	17997		1764	9156			394	2880	32191
TOTAL WET & AT SUPPORT									147045

*OTHER - CIVILIAN AGENCIES
 PUBLISHED BY DPTMS P&O DIV

WEEKEND & ANNUAL TRAINING SUMMARY FY91 A/O 10CT91

	PAARNG	PAANG	OTHER NG	USAR	ROTC	USMCR	AC	*OTHER	TOTAL
WEEKEND TRAINING									
OCT	6,536	102	137	4,040	853	295	542	253	12,758
NOV	3,828	18	29	4,284	472	254	400	124	9,409
DEC	1,153	3	4	1,137	23	5	120	115	2,560
1ST QTR	11,517	123	170	9,461	1,348	554	1,062	492	24,727
JAN	1,844	7	0	884	29	137	287	349	3,537
FEB	2,802	59	2	2,413	38	2	381	50	5,747
MAR	8,015	40	18	1,645	297	169	320	135	10,639
2ND QTR	12,661	106	20	4,942	364	308	988	534	19,923
APR	7,935	39	63	3,628	1,224	288	187	158	13,522
MAY	5,352	181	587	5,694	770	89	304	296	13,273
JUN	4,563	115	83	1,094	69	252	75	204	6,455
3RD QTR	17,850	335	733	10,416	2,063	629	566	658	33,250
JUL	2,393	25	1,905	723	0	298	959	443	6,746
AUG	1,592	357	1,615	1,475	208	13	339	844	6,443
SEP	6,909	464	26	2,145	560	239	192	992	11,527
4TH QTR	10,894	846	3,546	4,343	768	550	1,490	2,279	24,716
TOTAL WET	52,922	1,410	4,469	29,162	4,543	2,041	4,106	3,963	102,616

ANNUAL TRAINING									
OCT	310	0	0	68	0	0	34	0	412
NOV	359	0	0	494	0	0	439	0	1,292
DEC	517	0	0	110	0	0	505	0	1,132
1ST QTR	1,186	0	0	672	0	0	978	0	2,836
JAN	914	0	0	101	0	0	1,215	0	2,230
FEB	1,006	0	0	107	0	0	0	0	1,113
MAR	979	0	269	412	0	0	801	0	2,461
2ND QTR	2,899	0	269	620	0	0	2,016	0	5,804
APR	713	0	0	345	0	0	0	0	1,058
MAY	1,276	0	100	865	0	0	809	0	3,050
JUN	3,331	0	1,103	1,364	0	0	741	0	6,539
3RD QTR	5,320	0	1,203	2,574	0	0	1,550	0	10,647
JUL	2,756	0	106	454	0	0	119	0	3,435
AUG	4,744	0	0	522	0	0	0	0	5,266
SEP	1,319	0	97	101	0	0	29	0	1,546
4TH QTR	8,819	0	203	1,077	0	0	148	0	10,247
TOTAL AT	18,224	0	1,675	4,943	0	0	4,692	0	29,534

TOTAL WET & AT SUPPORT	71,146	1,410	6,144	34,105	4,543	2,041	8,798	3,963	132,150
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* OTHER - CIVILIAN AGENCIES

PUBLISHED BY DPTMS P&O DIV

INFORMATION MISSION AREA (IMA)

<u>IMA CATEGORY</u>	<u>SCORING</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. TELEPHONE SWITCHING		
1. Is Main DCOs switch digital? (if analog, go to Category B)	Yes = 5	<u>5</u>
2. Percentage of Fill (Entire digital switch system)	<70% = 5 70-90% = 3 >90% = 1	<u>5</u>
3. Lines (Equipped)	>5,000 = 5 2,500-5,000 = 3 <2,000 = 1	<u>3</u>
4. Lines (Expandable To)	>10,000 = 5 5,000-10,000 = 3 <5,000 = 1	<u>5</u>
	CATEGORY TOTAL :	<u>18</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	25 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>450</u>

**B. OUTSIDE CABLE PLANT
(IF LEASED, CATEGORY SCORE IS
ZERO, GO TO CATEGORY C)**

1. OSCAR Implementation Phase (Choose only 1)	Phase 3 Complete = 5 Phase 2 Complete = 3 Phase 1 Complete = 1	<u>5</u>
2. Cable Type (Choose only 1)	Fiber Backbone (DS3 MUX Rate) = 5 Mixed = 3 Copper = 1	<u>1</u>
3. Percentage of Fill	<50% = 5 50-75% = 3 76-100% = 1	<u>3</u>
	CATEGORY TOTAL:	<u>9</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	20 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>180</u>

C. COMMON USER MAINFRAME SUPPORT

1. Mainframe/Client Server Architecture (Choose 1 only, the highest available technology - equivalent to IBM Model)	Client Svr = 5 IBM 3090 = 5 IBM 4381 = 4 IBM 4341 = 3 IBM 4361 = 2 IBM 4331 = 1	<u>1</u>
2. Total MIPS in Mainframe Environment (For all IBM or equivalent machines)	>10 MIPS = 5 7-10 MIPS = 4 4-6 MIPS = 3 1-3 MIPS = 2	<u>3</u>

Server speed (MEGAHERTZ) in Client Server environment (Choose speed related to majority of servers)	31+ MHZ = 5 16-30 MHZ = 3 1-15 MHZ = 1 <1 MHZ = 0	<u>3</u>
3. ASIMS	RDC = 5 DPC = 3	<u>3</u>
4. E-Mail (Choose 1)	Sperry/MMDF = 5 Other E-Mail = 3 No E-Mail Host = 0	<u>5</u>
5. Front End Processor (FEP)	Yes = 5	<u>5</u>
6. Super Computer	Yes = 5	<u>0</u>
7. Common User DASD (in gigabytes)	6+ GB = 5 4-6 GB = 3 1-3 GB = 1 <1 GB = 0	<u>5</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	CATEGORY TOTAL 15 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>390</u>
D. DSN/DDN NODE DSN, MILNET, DISNET, SCINET	If any, Yes = 5	<u>5</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	CATEGORY TOTAL 5 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>5</u> <u>25</u>
E. POST WIDE WAN/LAN Fiber Optic Other	Yes = 5 Yes = 3	<u>3</u> <u>3</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	CATEGORY TOTAL 15 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>3</u> <u>45</u>
F. TCC		
1. GENSER (Choose only 1)	AMS, DINAH or FAST = 5 SRT = 3 DCT9000 or Mod 40 = 2 Courier Svc/Other = 1 None = 0	<u>5</u>
2. DSSCS (Choose only 1)	Assist = 5 DCT9000 or Mod 40 = 3 Courier Svc/Other = 1 None = 0	<u>0</u>
3. AMME or ASC	Yes = 5	<u>0</u>
4. Comm. Secure Processor (CSP)	Yes = 5	<u>0</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	CATEGORY TOTAL 5 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>5</u> <u>25</u>
G. VTC VTC facility	Yes = 3	<u>0</u>
CATEGORY WEIGHT	CATEGORY TOTAL 15 POINTS X TOTAL	<u>0</u> <u>0</u>

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BRAC 95 DATA CALL - MAJOR TRAINING AREA

INSTALLATION - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

DATA ELEMENT	DATA
Maneuver Acres	
Maneuver Acres	11,000
Maneuver Rights Acres	0 (+ 200 sq mi of aviation training area used by agreement with the State)
Ranges	
Total # all ranges	35
# MPRC Ranges	0
# RETS Equipped Firing Points	0
Standard MOUT Available	No
Deployment Network	
# Miles to Railhead	21
# Miles to Airport	26
# Miles to Seaport	93
# Miles to Highway	1
Reserve Training	
Annual Training - # of Personnel	
FY 91	29,534
FY 92	32,191
FY 93	30,643
Inactive Duty Mandays	
FY 91	189,094
FY 92	209,270
FY93	192,230
Impact Area	
Impact Area Acres	2000
Air Force Bombing Capable	Yes (practice bombs, strafing, laser simulator)
Attack Helicopter Capable	Yes (20mm only)
Tube Artillery Capable	Yes
MLRS Capable	No
Mechanized Maneuver Acres	772
Mobilization Billets	10,500 (1992 AMOPS data) 12,200 (at 40 persons per barracks) 25,288 (at 40 sq ft /person)
Buildable Acres	425
IMA - See Table	
Barracks	

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BRAC 95 DATA CALL - MAJOR TRAINING AREA

INSTALLATION - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

DATA ELEMENT	DATA
# UOPH spaces	60 (permanent) 200 (WWII wood)
# EOPH spaces	150 (permanent) 12,200 (WWII Wood)
Work Space	
AVN Maint KSF	75
VEH Maint KSF	25 (HQRPLANS) 73 (NG Facilities not on installation real property records) 25 (MCAR facility due for construction in FY 95)
Unit Ops Bldgs KSF	0
Opn KSF	0
Admin KSF	48
Infrastructure	
Water Max Cap in MGD	2.8 MGD
Sewage Treatment Max Cap in MGD	3.5 MGD
Electrical Power max Cap in MKWH	7.5 MKWH
Land Fill \$ per Short Ton	\$51.20
Environmental Capacity	
Archaeological and Historical Bldg	
Number of sites/structures on NR	0
Number of potential NR sites	200
Endangered Species	
# endangered/threatened species	1 (candidate endangered species)
Wetlands	
Total wetlands acreage	Unknown (study underway)
Air Quality	
Air quality region attainment	No (due to Ozone)
Water Quality	
# times installation exceeded NPDES permits during FY 92	0
Noise Quality	
Total acres of AICUS/ICUZ	
Zones II/III extend off post	0

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BRAC 95 DATA CALL - MAJOR TRAINING AREA

INSTALLATION - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

DATA ELEMENT	DATA	
Contaminated sites		
Total IPR sites	0	
Total NPL sites	0	
BASOPS/Mission Population		
	Direct	Reimbursable
A. BASOPS (-)	7975	3397.3
B. RPMA	2560.6	1252.7
C. Environmental	1764	869.6
D. Audio Visual	37.3	0.0
E. Base Commo	0.0	0.0
F. Family Programs	32.9	0.0

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Installation

Economic Area

Fort Indiantown Gap

Lebanon - Dauphin - and Schuylkill counties (MSA) *

* This change in the MSA more accurately reflects the area impacted by Fort Indiantown Gap.

CLOSE HOLD

Enclosure 3

Information Paper

SUBJECT: Corrected Installation Ranking in TABS for Fort Indiantown Gap

1. Fort Indiantown Gap submitted an Installation Assessment through the chain of command to Department of the Army in May 1994. The data in this assessment was used by the Total Army Basing Study (TABS) in its analysis of the installations in the Major Training Area category. This analysis resulted in Fort Indiantown Gap ranking 9th out of the 10 installations in this category. Attached as enclosures are the original TABS results and the results of the analysis when using the corrected data. The changed data are highlighted on the enclosure with a border around the cells.

2. Subsequent to the data submission, several things occurred which alter the data originally submitted to Department of the Army. Using the same model as TABS, an independent analysis was accomplished with the following data elements changed.

a. Annual Training Days - The number of days was changed from 30,789 to 32,995. This is due to the fact that Annual Training for reserve component units which use the installation as their home were not included in the original submission.

b. IDT (Mandays) - The number of days was changed from 197,198 to 288,130. This again is due to the fact that this training for those reserve component units which use the installation as their home were not included in the original submission.

c. Mobilization billets - This data element was changed from 10,500 to 25,288. The original data submission included three figures for mobilization capacity. The TABS analyst used the lowest of the three figures. The figure of 25,288 is based on a Corps of Engineers study of the maximum capacity of the installation to support mobilization within buildings of Functional Category Code 72114 (barracks).

d. Manuever Acres - This figure was changed from 11,000 acres to 235,250 acres. This is due to the inclusion of the aviation Northern Training Area (710 square miles) as a manuever rights area under a current Memorandum of Agreement. This training area is vital to the aviation training conducted by the largest of the Army's aviation training centers outside of Fort Rucker, AL., the Eastern Army Aviation Training Center. This training center qualaifies pilots in the AH-1F, UH-60A and Ch-47D aircraft; conducts Instructor Pilot courses for the UH-1H and the special operations version of the McDonnel Douglas 500MD for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Brigade (an active Army unit); and conducts night-vision aviation training. The Northern Training Area was included as a footnote to the section on manuever area in the Installation Assessment , but not included by the TABS analyst in the Army's military value analysis. Per the original Installation Assessment guidance from

Department of the Army, only one-half of this maneuver rights area 355 sq. mi. or 235,250 acres was included in our independent analysis.

e. Work Space - Since the data submission in May 1995, several construction projects were begun, several buildings converted from semi-permanent to permanent status, and a large number of square feet of WWII wood structures were demolished. When this data element includes these, the permanent square footage changes from 144,000 sq. ft. to 1,492,064 sq. ft. This change also results in a change in the average age of the buildings on the installation.

3. The result in installation ranking differs significantly when using this newer data of Fort Indiantown Gap. Its ranking changes from 9th to 3rd in the Major Training Area category.

4. Not included in the corrected data is the Remote Target System ranges funded and being constructed in FY95. These ranges are not included in the revised analysis as they are not yet complete and functional. The inclusion of these ranges in the corrected analysis would change Fort Indiantown Gap's score from 4.9 to 5.3. However, this change in score would not affect the installation ranking. Fort Indiantown Gap would still rank number 3.

Attribute	Points	AP Hill	FTIG	Hunter-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett
RANGES										
MPRC	45	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
# RETS Firing points	45	16	0	0	0	32	0	16	0	32
# Ranges	5	40	35	1	17	55	15	19	30	21
MOUT	5	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
TOTAL & TABS score	100	2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2
IMPACT ACRES										
MPRC		0	0	450	0	0	0	450	450	0
# RETS firing points		225.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	450.00	0.00	225.00	0.00	450.00
# Ranges		33.62	29.31	0.00	13.79	46.55	12.07	15.52	25.00	17.24
MOUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50
Total score		258.62	29.31	450.00	13.79	496.55	12.07	690.52	475.00	517.24
score/100		2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2
* *										
IMPACT ACRES										
Impact acres	60	27000	2000	162962	5606	14000	254103	92600	7656	4000
Tube Artillery?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Air Force bombing?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attack Helicopter?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
All three?	15	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
MLRS capable?	10	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
TOTAL & TABS score	100	4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0
Impact acres		59.50	0.00	383.09	8.58	28.56	600.00	215.63	13.46	4.76
Tube Artillery?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50
Air Force bombing?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50
Attack Helicopter?		50	50	0	50	50	50	0	50	50
All three?		150	150	0	150	150	150	0	150	150
MLRS capable?		100	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0
Total score		459.50	300.00	383.09	408.58	428.56	1000.00	415.63	313.46	304.76
score/100		4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0

EMPLOYEE #1

Original Army S Analysis

Air Quality	15	1	10	10	1	10	1	10	1	1
Water Quality	15	2	0	0	10	88	0	0	0	0
Noise Quality										
Zone II	10	5	0	800	141	445	0	0	8144	6000
Zone III	15	0	0	1000	0	135	0	0	0	100
Contaminated Sites	5	1	13	12	13	34	42	50	15	0
TOTAL & TABS score	100	8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4
Arch/Hist bldgs		99.37	0.00	78.14	87.46	99.73	99.91	99.73	99.82	100.00
Endgrd fauna/flora		0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	150.00	150.00	0.00	100.00	0.00
Wetlands		138.49	149.91	148.05	149.88	98.41	0.00	150.00	139.05	126.68
Air Quality		150.00	0.00	0.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	150.00
Water Quality		146.59	150.00	150.00	132.95	0.00	150.00	150.00	150.00	150.00
Noise Quality										
Zone II		99.94	100.00	90.18	98.27	94.54	100.00	100.00	0.00	26.33
Zone III		150.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	129.75	150.00	150.00	150.00	135.00
Contaminated Sites		49.00	37.00	38.00	37.00	16.00	8.00	0.00	35.00	50.00
Total score		833.40	686.91	504.37	905.56	588.43	807.91	649.73	823.87	738.01
score/100		8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4
* ** ** ** **										
		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett
INFRASTRUCTURE										
Capacity water	25	4	3	1	5	4	4	5	5	5
Capacity Sewage	25	1	4	1	4	8	14	3	3	6
Capacity Elect	25	12	8	12	20	28	6	46	11	9
Landfill cost	25	39	52	17	0	50	0	12	44	15
TOTAL & TABS score	100	1.8	1.5	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.1	2.2	3.8
Capacity water		62.50	41.67	0.00	83.33	62.50	62.50	83.33	83.33	83.33
Capacity Sewage		0.00	57.69	0.00	57.69	134.62	250.00	38.46	38.46	96.15
Capacity Elect		13.76	4.59	13.76	32.11	50.46	0.00	91.74	11.47	6.88
Landfill cost		114.58	69.44	190.97	250.00	76.39	250.00	208.33	97.22	197.92
Total score		190.84	173.39	204.73	423.14	323.96	562.50	421.87	230.48	384.28
score/100		1.9	1.7	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.2	2.3	3.8
* ** ** ** **										

Impact acres		322.00	210.00	266.00	287.00	301.00	700.00	294.00	217.00	210.00
Special Airspace		0.53	1.66	17.43	10.88	0.00	226.43	400.00	3.32	25.98
Total score		1326.53	689.60	1231.49	717.73	1376.62	2093.93	3247.00	1459.14	932.36
score/450		2.9	1.5	2.7	1.6	3.1	4.7	7.2	3.2	2.1
*	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
		AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett
LAND AND FACILITIES										
Work Space	60	59000.0	264000.0	144000.0	43000.0	536000.0	199000.0	548000.0	527400.0	90000.0
% Perm Facilities	30	66.4	8.0	63.0	2.7	86.2	70.6	79.9	8.3	14.3
Avg facility age	25	21.0	49.0	20.0	51.0	34.0	32.0	16.0	48.0	45.0
Infrastructure	25	1.8	1.5	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.1	2.2	3.8
Barracks	60	48.0	210.0	211.0	0.0	12841.0	806.0	1816.0	28.0	47.0
Environmental Cap	25	8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4
TOTAL & TABS score	225	3.1	1.7	3.0	1.5	6.9	3.8	5.2	2.6	1.8
Work Space		9.55	131.94	60.30	0.00	294.33	93.13	301.49	289.19	28.06
% Perm Facilities		228.86	19.04	216.65	0.00	300.00	243.95	277.37	20.12	41.68
Avg facility age		214.29	14.29	221.43	0.00	121.43	135.71	250.00	21.43	42.86
Infrastructure		45.00	37.50	50.00	105.00	80.00	140.00	102.50	55.00	95.00
Barracks		2.24	9.81	9.86	0.00	600.00	37.66	84.85	1.31	2.20
Environmental Cap		207.50	172.50	125.00	227.50	147.50	202.50	162.50	205.00	185.00
Total score		707.44	385.08	683.23	332.50	1543.26	852.96	1178.71	592.05	394.79
score/225		3.1	1.7	3.0	1.5	6.9	3.8	5.2	2.6	1.8
*	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
		AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett
CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS										
Moblzn Capability	30	3.8	2.8	3.1	2.8	5.0	2.7	6.5	5.0	3.5
Buildable Acres	35	30244.0	425.0	20000.0	7901.0	426.0	500.0	1550.0	1500.0	2400.0
Encroachment	20	37.5	301.8	110.4	100.7	1413.2	0.2	104.7	42.2	28.4
Deployment Network	30	8.4	8.7	7.1	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8
IMA	10	385.0	1100.0	275.0	265.0	965.0	765.0	1190.0	1085.0	665.0
TOTAL & TABS score	125	7.4	4.7	5.8	4.5	4.1	3.8	5.0	5.6	4.8

Original Army S Analysis

Moblzn Capability		114.00	84.00	93.00	84.00	150.00	81.00	195.00	150.00	105.00
Buildable Acres		350.00	0.00	229.76	87.75	0.01	0.88	13.20	12.62	23.18
Encroachment		194.72	157.31	184.40	185.77	0.00	200.00	185.21	194.06	196.01
Deployment Network		252.00	261.00	213.00	204.00	291.00	141.00	144.00	264.00	234.00
IMA		11.37	79.15	0.95	0.00	66.35	47.39	87.68	77.73	37.91
Total score		922.09	581.46	721.11	561.52	507.36	470.27	625.09	698.40	596.10
score/125		7.4	4.7	5.8	4.5	4.1	3.8	5.0	5.6	4.8
	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
		AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett
COST AND MANPOWER										
Cost of living index	60	102.5	101.5	117.8	91.2	111.3	120.5	99.9	92.5	107.5
Locality pay factor	35	1.0309	1.0309	1.0309	1.0309	1.0496	1.0800	1.0309	1.0309	1.0309
BASOPS/Mission popln	75	24533.33	26739.92	10017.36	74797.41	9010.50	20113.55	9301.99	25443.55	32851.16
MCA cost factor	30	0.800	1.050	1.440	0.920	1.190	2.170	1.300	1.330	0.920
TOTAL & TABS score	200	7.9	7.6	6.4	6.1	6.7	3.0	8.4	8.3	6.8
Cost of living index		368.60	389.08	55.29	600.00	188.40	0.00	421.84	573.38	266.21
Locality pay factor		350.00	350.00	350.00	350.00	216.70	0.00	350.00	350.00	350.00
BASOPS/Mission popln		557.29	532.83	718.23	0.00	729.40	606.29	726.16	547.20	465.07
MCA cost factor		300.00	245.26	159.85	273.72	214.60	0.00	190.51	183.94	273.72
Total score		1575.89	1517.16	1283.38	1223.72	1349.09	606.29	1688.52	1654.52	1355.00
score/200		7.9	7.6	6.4	6.1	6.7	3.0	8.4	8.3	6.8
	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Total points		4531.95835	3173.30068	3919.21504	2835.47332	4776.32926	4023.46266	6739.32053	4404.10909	3278.26093
Points/1000		4.5	3.2	3.9	2.8	4.8	4.0	6.7	4.4	3.3
TOTAL & TABS SCORE	1000	4.5	3.2	3.9	2.8	4.8	4.0	6.7	4.4	3.3

Fort Indiantown Gap cted TABS Analysis

Attribute	Points	AP Hill	FTIG	Hunter-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
RANGES											
MPRC	45	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
# RETS Firing points	45	16	0	0	0	32	0	16	0	32	32
# Ranges	5	40	35	1	17	55	15	19	30	21	59
MOUT	5	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
TOTAL & TABS score	100	2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2	10.0
MPRC		0	0	450	0	0	0	450	450	0	450
# RETS firing points		225.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	450.00	0.00	225.00	0.00	450.00	450.00
# Ranges		33.62	29.31	0.00	13.79	46.55	12.07	15.52	25.00	17.24	50.00
MOUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50
Total score		258.62	29.31	450.00	13.79	496.55	12.07	690.52	475.00	517.24	1000.00
score/100		2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2	10.0
		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
IMPACT ACRES											
Impact acres	60	27000	2000	162962	5606	14000	254103	92600	7656	4000	5590
Tube Artillery?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Air Force bombing?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attack Helicopter?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
All three?	15	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
MLRS capable?	10	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
TOTAL & TABS score	100	4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0	4.1
Impact acres		59.50	0.00	383.09	8.58	28.56	600.00	215.63	13.46	4.76	8.54
Tube Artillery?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Air Force bombing?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Attack Helicopter?		50	50	0	50	50	50	0	50	50	50
All three?		150	150	0	150	150	150	0	150	150	150
MLRS capable?		100	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	100
Total score		459.50	300.00	383.09	408.58	428.56	1000.00	415.63	313.46	304.76	408.54
score/100		4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0	4.1

Enclosure #2

		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
DEPLOYMENT											
Miles to rail trans	30	5	21	30	5	12	107	37	0	9	0
Miles to air trans	30	51	26	81	0	0	70	191	25	70	47
Miles to sea trans	30	125	93	145	589	45	253	166	180	115	105
Miles to highway	10	13	1	23	5	0	1	35	2	35	75
TOTAL & TABS score	100	8.4	8.7	7.1	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
Miles to rail trans		285.98	241.12	215.89	285.98	266.36	0.00	196.26	300.00	274.77	300.00
Miles to air trans		219.90	259.16	172.77	300.00	300.00	190.05	0.00	260.73	190.05	226.18
Miles to sea trans		255.88	273.53	244.85	0.00	300.00	185.29	233.27	225.55	261.40	266.91
Miles to highway		82.67	98.67	69.33	93.33	100.00	98.67	53.33	97.33	53.33	0.00
Total score		844.43	872.48	702.85	679.31	966.36	474.01	482.87	883.62	779.55	793.09
score/100		8.4	8.7	7.0	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
RESERVE TRAINING											
Annual training	25	18407	32995	3364	8125	15570	151	6223	48935	14743	4921
IDT (mandays)	75	261247	288130	0	33183	299687	44	28716	221176	88743	36684
TOTAL & TABS score	100	7.5	6.5	0.2	1.2	8.3	0.0	1.0	8.0	3.0	1.2
Annual training		93.56	168.31	16.47	40.86	79.02	0.00	31.12	250.00	74.78	24.44
IDT (mandays)		653.80	721.08	0.00	83.04	750.00	0.11	71.86	553.52	222.09	91.81
Total score		747.35	889.39	16.47	123.91	829.02	0.11	102.98	803.52	296.87	116.25
score/100		7.5	8.9	0.2	1.2	8.3	0.0	1.0	8.0	3.0	1.2
		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
ENVIRONMENTAL CARRYING CAPACITY											
Arch/Hist bldgs	10	0.00007	0.01116	0.00244	0.0014	0.00003	0.00001	0.00003	0.00002	0	0.0016
Endgrd fauna/flora	15	3	1	3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1
Wetlands	15	0.0359	0.00028	0.00607	0.00036	0.16095	0.468	0	0.03417	0.07276	0.04022
Air Quality	15	1	10	10	1	10	1	10	1	1	1
Water Quality	15	2	0	0	10	88	0	0	0	0	3
Noise Quality											

Fort Indiantown Gap Extended TABS Analysis

Zone II	10	5	0	800	141	445	0	0	8144	6000	0
Zone III	15	0	0	1000	0	135	0	0	0	100	0
Contaminated Sites	5	1	13	12	13	34	42	50	15	0	22
TOTAL & TABS score	100	8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4	9.0
Arch/Hist bldgs		99.37	0.00	78.14	87.46	99.73	99.91	99.73	99.82	100.00	85.66
Endgrd fauna/flora		0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	150.00	150.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00
Wetlands		138.49	149.91	148.05	149.88	98.41	0.00	150.00	139.05	126.68	137.11
Air Quality		150.00	0.00	0.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	150.00	150.00
Water Quality		146.59	150.00	150.00	132.95	0.00	150.00	150.00	150.00	150.00	144.89
Noise Quality											
Zone II		99.94	100.00	90.18	98.27	94.54	100.00	100.00	0.00	26.33	100.00
Zone III		150.00	150.00	0.00	150.00	129.75	150.00	150.00	150.00	135.00	150.00
Contaminated Sites		49.00	37.00	38.00	37.00	16.00	8.00	0.00	35.00	50.00	28.00
Total score		833.40	686.91	504.37	905.56	588.43	807.91	649.73	823.87	738.01	895.66
score/100		8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4	9.0
INFRASTRUCTURE											
Capacity water	25	4	3	1	5	4	4	5	5	5	13
Capacity Sewage	25	1	4	1	4	8	14	3	3	6	5
Capacity Elect	25	12	8	12	20	28	6	46	11	9	115
Landfill cost	25	39	52	17	0	50	0	12	44	15	72
TOTAL & TABS score	100	1.8	1.5	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.1	2.2	3.8	5.8
Capacity water		62.50	41.67	0.00	83.33	62.50	62.50	83.33	83.33	83.33	250.00
Capacity Sewage		0.00	57.69	0.00	57.69	134.62	250.00	38.46	38.46	96.15	76.92
Capacity Elect		13.76	4.59	13.76	32.11	50.46	0.00	91.74	11.47	6.88	250.00
Landfill cost		114.58	69.44	190.97	250.00	76.39	250.00	208.33	97.22	197.92	0.00
Total score		190.84	173.39	204.73	423.14	323.96	562.50	421.87	230.48	384.28	576.92
score/100		1.9	1.7	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.2	2.3	3.8	5.8
MOB CAPABILITY											
AP Hill											
H-Liggett											
Chaffee											
Dix											
Greely											
Irwin											
McCoy											
Pickett											
Polk											
Mob Billets	10	16877	25288	1145	13243	17350	0	4279	15828	12145	19512
Deployment Network	10	8.4	8.7	7.1	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
Ranges	10	2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2	10.0

		AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
LAND AND FACILITIES											
Work Space	60	59000.0	1492064	144000.0	43000.0	536000.0	199000.0	548000.0	527400.0	90000.0	1048000
% Perm Facilities	30	66.4	34.0	63.0	2.7	86.2	70.6	79.9	8.3	14.3	74.6
Avg facility age	25	21.0	36.4	20.0	51.0	34.0	32.0	16.0	48.0	45.0	21.0
Infrastructure	25	1.9	1.7	2.0	4.2	3.2	5.6	4.2	2.3	3.8	5.8
Barracks	60	48.0	210.0	211.0	0.0	12841.0	806.0	1816.0	28.0	47.0	5590.0
Environmental Cap	25	8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	5.9	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4	9.0
TOTAL & TABS score	225	3.1	1.7	3.0	1.5	6.9	3.8	5.2	2.6	1.8	7.6
Work Space		23.73	600.00	57.91	17.29	215.54	80.02	220.37	212.08	36.19	421.43
% Perm Facilities		228.86	112.46	216.65	0.00	300.00	243.95	277.37	20.12	41.68	258.32
Avg facility age		214.29	104.29	221.43	0.00	121.43	135.71	250.00	21.43	42.86	214.29
Infrastructure		47.71	43.35	51.18	105.78	80.99	140.63	105.47	57.62	96.07	144.23
Barracks		2.24	9.81	9.86	0.00	600.00	37.66	84.85	1.31	2.20	261.19
Environmental Cap		208.35	171.73	126.09	226.39	147.11	201.98	162.43	205.97	184.50	223.91
Total score		725.18	1041.63	683.12	349.47	1465.07	839.95	1100.48	518.53	403.49	1523.38
score/225		3.2	4.6	3.0	1.6	6.5	3.7	4.9	2.3	1.8	6.8
CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS											
		AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
Moblzn Capability	30	3.2	5.9	2.6	2.1	4.3	1.8	5.4	4.2	2.9	6.7
Buildable Acres	35	30244.0	425.0	20000.0	7901.0	426.0	500.0	1550.0	1500.0	2400.0	3877.0
Encroachment	20	37.5	301.8	110.4	100.7	1413.2	0.2	104.7	42.2	28.4	49.3
Deployment Network	30	8.4	8.7	7.0	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
IMA	10	385.0	1100.0	275.0	265.0	965.0	765.0	1190.0	1085.0	665.0	1320.0
TOTAL & TABS score	125	7.4	4.7	5.8	4.5	4.1	3.8	5.0	5.6	4.8	6.5
Moblzn Capability		96.26	175.80	77.37	61.94	129.83	54.24	161.41	126.50	85.68	202.12
Buildable Acres		350.00	0.00	229.76	87.75	0.01	0.88	13.20	12.62	23.18	40.52

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: A Closer Look at the FTIG COBRA Study

1. The following paper continues our discussion of the COBRA analysis for FTIG. Specifically, it addresses the questions that naturally flow from our two reports on the COBRA of FTIG, dated 4 and 10 April, 1995. To facilitate this examination the issues are presented in question and answer format.

2. Question: If the infrastructure is a requirement for the installation, what is the annual cost to run it?

Answer: The cost to run the Installation's infrastructure includes the cost of operations, maintenance, as well as the employees to execute these functions. The majority of the cost is the latter, some seven million dollars. The total cost to run the infrastructure is approximately 11.3 million dollars, adjusted to FY 96 constant dollars. The primary purpose of the garrison at FTIG is to run the post's infrastructure.

3. Question: Assuming that the Infrastructure of the Installation must be maintained, will the square footage of the installation be reduced by implementing the Army's recommendation and what savings would be achieved?

Answer: The answer to this question is twofold. First let us examine the issue of square footage. Then we will discuss potential savings.

The Army in its analysis has assumed the installations square footage could be reduced from 4,304,000 square feet to 1,557,000 square feet, a reduction of 2,747,000 square feet. Of the remaining square footage, most are permanent structures, and 1,180,000 are presently occupied by the facilities and activities that would not be leaving the installation. This leaves 377,000 square feet for the post's infrastructure and billets. When we compare this

SUBJECT: Questions and Answers on FTIG COBRA Study

available square footage to the requirements there is a large disparity! The infrastructure alone requires in excess of 500,000 square feet (this figure varies from 500,000 to 1,000,000, depending on what you include), while billeting for troops is estimated at 800,000 for the National Guard alone. It is reasonable to assume, since the Reserve intends to continue training at the Gap, that they will also have billeting requirements. However, just comparing the infrastructure requirements and the National Guard requirements to the available square footage, proposed by the closure, shows a deficit of available square footage of 923,000 square feet. Following the logic through, the most that square footage could be reduced at FTIG, while simultaneously providing for present tenants, the infrastructure and required minimal billeting is 1,824,000 square feet $[4,304,000 - 1,180,000 - 500,000 - 800,000 = 1,824,000 \text{ SF}]$, not 2,747,000. Although it complicates the discussion, it is also worth noting that 750,000 SF have already been demolished or are scheduled to be demolished. Again, it is worth noting that this is before Reserve Command billeting requirements.

On the surface eliminating over a million square feet of facilities would logically save money. However, those facilities which would not be funded are temporary barracks, not permanent facilities, built during the 1940s. The typical barracks is shown below.



SUBJECT: Questions and Answers on FTIG COBRA Study

These facilities are only utilized, and funds only expended, in support of troops training. As troops will continue to train, funds will continue to be expended, if not on these barracks on other barracks, which would be more heavily utilized. Finally, it is worth noting that of the installation's funds expended on maintenance, only a half a million dollars is expended on the maintenance of these W.W.II barracks annually.

In summary, it is not reasonable to assume the square footage could be reduced by 2,747,000 square feet at FTIG. While a reduced square footage might be realistic, little, if any savings, would be achieved since this reduction would not reduce the mission to support troops. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Post spends a relatively small amount, less than 5%, of their annual budget to maintain these facilities. Finally, some of these barracks are already scheduled for destruction.

4. Question: The Army has said that it has included the cost of running the enclave in their cost analysis. In your opinion have they, and if they have are the funds sufficient to run it?

Answer: The Army Base Study allows for the cost of running the enclave, after backing out their saving, in the residual amount. However, there are several problems with this allocation. First, these funds do not necessarily exist. In the Gap's case, after the savings are subtracted from the installation's annual funding there are no funds remaining, let alone the \$14 million in residual they say is available. However, this figure is also deceiving, since it includes over \$4 million dollars in reimbursables that already belong to, and are spent by, the tenants. This means that the Army believes just over 10 million dollars a year has been set aside to run the enclave. Assuming the money actually exists, would be provided and some efficiencies obtained, this might be adequate funding. However, these efficiencies could also be obtained under the present structure and the Army would save the millions of dollars in closure cost that it will expend closing this post. This is especially true when one considers the Army already had plans to pull out the Regular Army soldiers next year and leave behind a civilian garrison with a small Command Group.

5. Question: Assuming that the infrastructure was abandoned by the Army Garrison, who would take it over and how would it be funded?

SUBJECT: Questions and Answers on FTIG COBRA Study

Answer: If the Army garrison were to abandon the infrastructure of FTIG the Reserve Component would have to hire employees to take it over. These employees and the cost to run the Post would be Federally funded. Those functions operated by the Reserve Command would be directly Federally funded, while those assumed by the National Guard would more likely be funded through a Cooperative Agreement with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Since these functions would most likely fall under the training annex of the Master Cooperative Agreement they would be 100% Federally funded, with the state managing the execution of the contract. The cost of this management is also reimbursable. Operating under the Commonwealth's personnel and supply systems may be more costly than the corresponding Federal systems. For instance, the Federal force at FTIG earns an average of \$27,000 annually, including benefits, while the average salary of the State Maintenance force presently at FTIG is over \$44,000 before benefits are even considered.

6. Question: How would the Army save money by closing this installation, that is, what is the source of the majority of their savings?

Answer: The Army Base Study claims most of its savings in the area of personnel. They project that between 10 to 14 million dollars a year will be saved by dismissing the Post's employees. This figure varies depending on whether you use the sensitivity analysis or the original study, respectively. This savings is greatly overestimated for three reasons. First, the annual payroll for the employees, adjusted for FY 96 constant dollars is only 7 million dollars. Second, the cost of running the infrastructure and these savings are mutually exclusive. If you apply savings to running the "enclave" they are not savings. Instead, they are recurring costs.

7. The Army Base Study (TABS) has said that cost attributes and assumptions have been consistently applied. If this is the case why is FTIG different from the other installations?

Answer: TABS's analysts were faced with an enormous undertaking. To facilitate their journey they used standard factors and assumptions. This makes perfectly good sense and is standard practice in any cost analysis if actual data is not available or if it is not cost effective to obtain it. Since actual costs were available, it can be assumed that TABS took this approach for the latter reason. However, there are several areas in the FTIG analysis



DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17003-5002

TAGPA

4 May 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR Base Realignment and Closure Committee Chairman
and Commissioners

SUBJECT: Analysis of Projected Cost Savings for the Closure and
Enclave of Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

1. I respectfully submit three enclosed reports for your consideration. As you have heard from our testimony today, we do not believe any substantial savings will be achieved by closing this installation primarily because the Post will continue to operate under new management if the Garrison is removed.
2. All three of the enclosed papers were prepared by my Analysis and Internal Review Office. The first paper, dated 4 April 1995, discusses the Cobra from the Macro level as it relates to Fort Indiantown Gap. Its main focus is the large disparity between the Army's savings claim and the funds actually expended to operate the installation. The second paper, dated 10 April 1995, discusses the overestimation of the cost to operate the installation which resulted in the exaggerated claim of savings. Finally, the third paper addresses the more common questions that seem to arise when the Gap's analysis is discussed.
3. I hope you will find this information helpful. I deeply appreciate your service on this Commission and would hope you would feel free to call upon me to answer any questions you may have in the future regarding Fort Indiantown Gap.

3 Encls


JAMES W. MAC VAY
BG (P), PAARNG
ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
U.S. PROPERTY AND FISCAL OFFICE FOR PENNSYLVANIA
c/o DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17003-5003


PFO-AIR (11)

4 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR The Adjutant General Department of Military Affairs,
Anville, PA 17003-5002

SUBJECT: Review of TABS Data for Fort Indiantown Gap

1. Enclosed is the report for the review you requested on The Army Base Study (TABS) data for FTIG.
2. POC this memorandum is CPT Tony Gulotta, Supervisory Auditor, DSN: 491-8759.
3. USPFO - We're here to serve.


ALLEN L. KIFER
COL, NGB
USPFO for PA

CF:
GAO-BRAC Focal point
DAG-Army
DAG-Air
FTIG-Post Commander
TABS, ATTN: LTC Bryant, Analyst for FTIG
FORSCOM BRAC Team

ENCL 1

ANALYSIS & INTERNAL REVIEW DIVISION

USPFO FOR PENNSYLVANIA

FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA 17003-5003

REPORT OF INTERNAL REVIEW

INTERNAL REVIEW
OF
REVIEW OF THE ARMY BASE STUDY
FOR
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP
PROJECT # 95-17



PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

PENNSYLVANIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD

PURPOSE

This review examined The Army Base Study for Fort Indiantown Gap, which was the basis for the recommendations to close and enclave the Post made to the BRAC.

BACKGROUND

The Army Base Study (TABS) was undertaken to evaluate the Army's facilities and make recommendations to the BRAC on those installations which they believed should be closed or realigned.¹ The Army evaluated the four DoD military value criteria using the Decision-PAD (D-PAD) model.² From this analysis, Bases within the major Installation Categories were rank ordered.³ Fort Indiantown Gap (FTIG) was in the Major Training Area category.⁴ Our evaluation of D-PADs found that the selection criteria used in the major attributes were not consistent with the primary needs of the Reserve Component. Such needs include a facility which is easily accessible for Inactive Duty Training (IDT) in time and cost, and offers a wide variety of maneuver and range capabilities. However, the D-PAD did appear to be accurate based on the attributes that were used. Our evaluation of projected cost savings that would occur if the Base was closed and enclaved revealed significant discrepancies. The Army used the COBRA model for this analysis.⁵ The Army calculated that realigning FTIG will save \$23.8 million annually once it is fully implemented.⁶ Based on our review of the results, their annual savings appear to be grossly overestimated, and the annual recurring costs were similarly underestimated.

DISCUSSION

The COBRA study asserts that the realignment and enclave of FTIG is projected to save 23.8 million dollars a year and will provide a return on the Army's closure cost investment, \$12.7 million, within the first year.⁷ While this savings may be realized to some extent by FORCES Command, it will not be a real savings to the U.S. Army. The following sections highlight the major shortfalls identified in our review of the cost data used to reach the COBRA's conclusion.

¹ Department of the Army, The Army Basing Study Base Closure and Realignment 1995, Installation Assessment (IA) Process and Supporting Data (March 1995).

² Id.

³ Id.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Department of the Army, The Army Basing Study, BRAC 95 Alternative Document Set, MT6 (Feb 1995).

⁶ Id. at Section IV.

⁷ Id.

Savings Can Not Exceed Expenditures

The annual savings identified by the COBRA model are overstated by \$10,252,000. Although the COBRA does apply multiple variables, factors and algorithms to compute the savings, the amount does not pass the common sense test. You can not save more than you spend. In the Army's data call FTIG identified total costs of \$13,516,828.⁸ Yet TABS noted the Post's total annual costs at \$34 million.⁹ The difference in these numbers can be attributed to three highly inflated inputs: personnel, real property maintenance (RPMA) and base operations (BOS). This amounts to 20 million dollars more than the actual reported costs. It is important to note that the 34 million dollars input into the model are stated as actual dollars and that a factor has not been applied. This was confirmed by the designer of the software and the analyst that input the information. The analyst also stated that this was the data that was submitted by FORSCOM. The FORSCOM BRAC Team, on questioning, stated that they submitted the data that the FTIG gave them in the data call. Clearly there is a disconnect, since the data that was submitted in the data call is not what appears in TABS. The result of this is also evident. With the initial input incorrect, all subsequent analysis was incorrect. Annual savings were overestimated and no funds were set aside to run the enclave. This very substantial error brings the whole legitimacy of this cost study into question as it relates to FTIG. Running the COBRA model with the correct numbers shows a twenty years savings of only \$5.6 million as opposed to TABS's estimate of \$285 million. In addition, the return on investment changes from one year to 37 years.

To expand on this point, the savings that would be achieved by enclaving the post would be the present cost to run the post minus the cost of missions transferred to other installations and subtracting the cost to run an enclave. Unfortunately, the estimated savings outpace the actual expenditures, even before the enclave is taken into consideration. The chart below illustrates this great disparity.

Cost	FY 93 Expenses (adjusted to constant dollars, as stated in the data call, FY 96 at 3% inflation)	TABS Savings (COBRA)
Personnel Costs	7.0 million	14.5 million ¹⁰
RPMA	1.5 million	3.7 million ¹¹
BOS	2.9 million	4.4 million ¹²
Total:	\$13,516,828¹³	\$23,769,000¹⁴

⁸ Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA, "BRAC 95 Data Call-Major Training Area," 9 May 94 (Total Base Operations and Real Property Maintenance, including personnel cost, environmental costs, audio visual and family support equal \$12,369,800, adjusted for inflation to 1996 constant dollars \$13,516,820 at a 3% rate).

⁹ Alternative Document Set, at Section IV Input Screen.

¹⁰ Alternative Document Set, at Section V, Recurring Savings.

¹¹ Id. at Section V, Personnel, SF, RPMA, And BOS DELTAS.

¹² Id.

¹³ Total includes other costs, such as environmental, family support and audio visual.

Army Recognizes Its Not Economically Feasible to Close FTIG

The Army realizes it is not economically feasible to close the post. TABS showed that the closure costs for FTIG would be over \$300,000,000.¹⁵ This was assuming that zero dollars are spent for environmental restoration.¹⁶ In fact, if the post were to close, the present lease with the State requires the land to be returned to an economically safe condition. Clean up would include the impact area. Undoubtedly, such an undertaking would cost tens of millions of dollars. FTIG is unique in this respect since the land is owned by the State and leased to the Army. Instead TABS proposes that the National Guard take over the post as an enclave.¹⁷ Although this is a feasible arrangement, no funds have been reserved for this endeavor. The residual funds of 14.6 million in BOS and RPMA computed by the COBRA to support the Reserve enclave do not exist. This amount is both greater than the total presently spent on the installation and more than the difference between the total dollars inputted and the savings the Army will achieve.¹⁸ Stated another way, since the Army backs out their savings from the total costs, which were overstated by 20 million dollars to begin with, these funds just do not exist.

In addition to realizing they can not afford to close the Post, the Army also recognizes that the Army Reserve Forces need conveniently located training areas to perform their Inactive and Active Duty Training (IDT/AT). Although ironic, since this factor did not rank high in the ranking of installations, in day three of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 7 March 95, The Secretary of the Army testified those Major Training Areas presently used by the Reserve Component would still be available for training.¹⁹ Reserve units only have two days to perform training and they must be able to travel to the training area, train and return within that time frame. A training area 250 miles away, for example, will not facilitate such training. Almost 200,000 mandays of IDT were performed at Fort Indiantown Gap in FY94.²⁰ Again, although it would be feasible for the Reserves to enclave the Post, no funds are provided to do so.

¹⁴ Alternative Document Set, at Section V, Recurring Savings.

¹⁵ Alternative Document Set, MT6-1 ("Clean Kill").

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Alternative Document Set, MT6-2.

¹⁸ Alternative Document Set, MT6-2 (Residual Funds = Input RPMA + Input BOS - RPMA & BOS Savings; 22,852,000 - 8,173,000 = 14,679,000)

¹⁹ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting, 7 March 1995, 109 (Diversified Reporting Services, Inc)

²⁰ Installation Assessment, at 56.

CONCLUSION

TABS should reevaluate their COBRA analysis of FTIG. Their costs savings appear to be seriously flawed. If a decision is made based on the present information, cost savings may not be achieved and funds may not be available for the Reserve Component to utilize the training areas and Ranges at FTIG. At the same time, the Reserve Component has a continued requirement to train at FTIG. If the post is to continue to be used by the Reserve Component it makes no sense, when taking into account the 37 year return on investment that would be achieved if the actual costs of running the Post were input into the COBRA model, to disrupt the present work force and synergy of the installation by turning it over to the Reserve Component.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This review of TABS data for FTIG was conducted by Anthony C. Gulotta, Supervisory Auditor, PAARNG, from 20-31 March 1995 in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards for "other services." The consulting standards that were followed were established by NGB-IR. The analysis included the review of TABS, FTIG data call information, GAO reports, discussions with FTIG personnel, R&K Engineering Personnel, TABS Analyst and the FORSCOM BRAC Team. The Auditor can be reached at (717) 861-8759.



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
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c/o DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17003-5003

PFO-AIR (11)


10 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR The Adjutant General Department of Military Affairs,
Anville, PA 17003-5002

SUBJECT: Review of TABS Data for Fort Indiantown Gap

1. Enclosed is the follow-up report for the review you requested on The Army Base Study (TABS) data for FTIG.
2. POC this memorandum is CPT Tony Gulotta, Supervisory Auditor, DSN: 491-8759.
3. USPFO - We're here to serve.

Encl


ALLEN L. KIFER
COL, NGB
USPFO for PA

CF:
GAO-BRAC Focal point
DAG-Army
DAG-Air
FTIG-Post Commander
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission,
ATTN: LTC Bailey, Senior Analyst
TABS, ATTN: LTC Bryant, Analyst for FTIG
FORSCOM BRAC Team

ENCL 2

Internal Review Follow-up

Thru: United States Property and Fiscal Officer for Pennsylvania
To: GAO-BRAC Focal Point, Attn: Mr. Steve De Sart
From: CPT Tony Gulotta, Supervisory Auditor, United States Property and Fiscal Office, Pennsylvania National Guard (717-861-8759)
Date: April 10, 1995
Subject: Follow-up to Review of TABS Analysis, Fort Indiantown Gap

As discussed on 5 April 1995, I have been provided with the additional information needed to analyze the total costs and savings projected by TABS for Fort Indiantown Gap. In addition to running through the numbers, I am also providing comments on the most likely rationale TABS will use for their assumptions and my opinion on whether or not they are well founded. I would be willing to travel to Washington to discuss this matter with you in person, if you wish.

FTIG provided the following figures in their data call, which in turn were submitted to TABS. The Base Operations, Real Property Maintenance included Payroll Costs for civilians at FTIG. FTIG thought this was the way the information was to be provided.

Costs Per Area	Direct (000s)	Reimbursable (000s)
BOS	\$ 7,975.0 ¹	\$ 3,397.3
RPMA	\$ 2,560.6 ²	\$ 1,252.7
Environmental	\$ 1,764.0	\$ 869.6
Audio Visual	\$ 37.3	\$ 0.0
Base Commo	\$ 0.0	\$ 0.0
Family Programs	\$ 32.9	\$ 0.0

¹ Includes payroll for those individuals conducting BOS.

² Includes payroll for those individuals conducting RPMA.

TABS then applied the following assumptions to the data to arrive at their input figures:

1. TABS included \$ 4.650 million in reimbursable costs in the total cost to run FTIG.

Reimbursables are the incremental (variable) costs that are incurred by other Agencies and Components when they use FTIG or purchase services from FTIG. Utilities account for the largest amount of these reimbursables. Presently these "customers" occupy 1,180,000 square feet of the 4,300,000 total square footage reported at FTIG. However, there are also 902,254 additional square feet at FTIG which are not on the installation's real property records. These facilities include the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Area, Air National Guard, The Pennsylvania National Guard Department of Military Affairs, The United States Property and Fiscal Office and Warehouses and Area 17. In addition, there are also scores of state owned residences, including the Lieutenant Governor's and the Adjutant's General of Pennsylvania. All of these facilities and residences purchase their utilities from the installation. These purchases account for a large portion of these reimbursables. These "customers" would all buy their services somewhere else if the Post were to close.

Since this is clearly a wash transaction, the reimbursables should not have been included in any part of the cost analysis. TABS will claim that these reimbursables were subsequently backed out in residuals, but this needlessly complicates the matter.³ To further exasperate the analysis, several implications of this approach have apparently been overlooked by TABS' analyst.⁴ Again, the easiest way to handle this wash transaction is simply not include the reimbursables.

³ Although the residual is \$14.7 million, as their analysis shows there is only \$10 million (34-23.8) in real money. This money must cover the recurring costs at Base X, enclaving operational costs and the reimbursables.

⁴ The assumption that the square footage of these "users" were included - when in fact over 40% of it was not - in the Post's square footage further frustrates the computation. Since square footage is the cost driver in TABS' unit of cost analysis for RPMA, this again, results in the savings being overestimated and the residual costs being underestimated. Furthermore, since the BOS cost driver is the population and the entire Reserve population, e.g. 2,500 equivalent man-years of part-time Reserve soldiers, incurring these expenses are not accounted for, the savings is further skewed.

2. TABS adjusted upwards Base Operations (BOS) and Real Property Maintenance for a 43% increase in the Garrison population. It is said that this was based on Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) data.⁵ However, the population at FTIG has not increased.

The ASIP is a document used for stationing, recruiting and construction purposes. The ASIP is updated twice a year. Like any system updated periodically, timing differences can occur.

The reality is that the permanent population at FTIG has gone down since the data call. The consolidation of DFAS has resulted in a population decrease of 70 people. These positions are being consolidated in Rome, N.Y.

The fact that a 43% increase in the population at FTIG did not occur is easy to verify by rechecking the accuracy of the FY93 and FY94 ASIP data. It is suggested that the ASIP erroneously included part time Reservists and Guardsmen as part of the full-time post complement.⁶ Because I do not have the data, I could not verify the validity of the suggestion.

3. TABS added another payroll to the cost of running FTIG and in this case used an average salary of \$45,998⁷. This resulted in the payroll being overstated by 10.2 million dollars, since the actual payroll was already included. The average salary, including benefits, for FTIG employees is \$27,000.

In respect to the figure (\$45,998) that was used to compute the payroll cost for FTIG, while TABS will no doubt defend this salary figure as consistently applied, it grossly overstates the cost of running FTIG and the savings that would be achieved by closing the post. The Army has only recommended 12 Major Base Closures. For these installations actual numbers should be used or projected

⁵ This was initially relayed by the FORSCOM BRAC Team and subsequently confirmed by TABS' analyst that visited FTIG on 6 April 1995.

⁶ This explanation was offered by FTIG Garrison personnel.

⁷ The TABS's analyst who visited FTIG on 6 April stated the composite amount (retirement, social security, etc.) was actually \$49,000.

savings will never materialize. Actual numbers are available and, in fact, were already included in FTIG's data call.

4. Numbers were then adjusted from FY93 to FY96 constant dollars at an inflation rate of 2.9%. This makes perfectly good sense.

Based on these adjustments, the actual cost of running the installation was inflated by 300 %. The chart below illustrates how the \$34 million was arrived at for the three major considerations Payroll, RPMA and BOS:

Category	Cost to Run the Post FY 93 (data call, in millions)	Reimbursables for FY93 (data call)	Total BOS/RPMA With Reimbursables	43% Increase for "Population" Increase, Noted on ASIP	New Cost Figure With Population Increase	New Figure in FY 96 constant dollars ⁸ (COBRA Input)
Salary	\$ 6.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$ 10.2	\$ 11.2
Base Operations	\$ 8 ⁹	\$ 3.4	\$ 11.4	\$ 4.9	\$ 16.3	\$ 16.7
Real Property And Maint.	\$ 2.6 ¹⁰	\$ 1.3	\$ 3.8	\$ 1.6	\$ 5.4	\$ 6.1
Totals	\$12.4 ¹¹	\$ 5.5	\$ 15.2	\$ 6.4	\$ 31.9	\$ 34.0

The assumptions applied to these costs are not conservative. In addition, it would appear in FTIG's case that the cost and manpower implications of operating an enclave were not considered. There is nothing stated about it in the published TAB documents. I am advised that even as of 6 April 1995 the size and nature of the facilities to be included in the enclave have not been determined, and these cost figures would be at best a guess. Without this information, it is not possible

⁸ TABS applied a Future Value Factor of .0731.

⁹ This number included part of the \$ 6.4 million in payroll.

¹⁰ This number included the rest of the \$ 6.4 million in payroll.

¹¹ Actual number was \$ 12,369,800. Number has been rounded up and includes all costs reported in the data call, not just the cost of payroll, base operations and real property and maintenance. Costs included are: Environmental, Audio Visual and Family Programs. They were used in TABS analysis but do not impact on our discussion here.

to determine the cost savings that would be achieved by closing and enclaving the post. The decision to reduce the Post's square footage by 2.7 million square feet in the COBRA analysis appears to have been arbitrary.¹² I note that the NGB, after study, has recommended that the entire Post be enclaved. Clearly if the entire Post is enclaved, the operating costs would remain the same. If, however, only part of the Post is enclaved so as to require Reserve units to travel to out of state Posts for Annual Training, then the added costs of travel, which are significant¹³, would have been computed and considered. The TABS analyst who visited on 6 April 95 said they had not computed or considered travel costs.

I can empathize with TABS' desire to simplify the process, but we are now beyond the initial "war gaming" of options. Inflated costs in their analysis led to inflated savings. It is not possible to save \$ 23.8 million a year when you only spend \$13.5 million. In testimony to the BRAC Commission, The Secretary of the Army stated, "We have taken a conservative approach."¹⁴ He goes on to say, "I don't think I could say to you that we could afford to lose a single dollar of the savings we anticipate here. It will get tight right after that first dollar."¹⁵

Recommendation: It is recommended that, because of the magnitude of the errors noted in this paper, that all data be reexamined, questionable assumptions eliminated and accurate costs of operation stated. The savings, if any, could then be determined after all costs, including the enclave and travel, if applicable, have been considered.

CC:
TAG of Pennsylvania
TABS-Attn: LTC Bryant
FORSCOM BRAC Team

¹² Square footage requirements for an enclave to support a brigade and a half at FTIG are estimated to be 1.8 million square feet. When you subtract this amount from the available square footage, and further reduce it by the proposed shut down square footage there are only 400,000 square feet of real property left to support the reimbursable customers ($4.3 - 1.8 - 2.7 = 4$). Four hundred thousand square feet to support organizations which presently occupy 1.2 million square feet. In reality, only 1.5 million square feet could be shut down, not 2.7 million. Off course this again impacts on the projected savings.

¹³ See attachment of the actual travel costs for a 3500 man Task Force with its necessary tactical vehicles and equipment. If it can be determined how many 3500 man Task Forces from the 30,000 Guardsmen and Reservists stationed in PA must travel to these posts, the total costs of travel could be easily computed.

¹⁴ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting, 7 March 1995, 114 (Diversified Reporting Services, Inc)

¹⁵ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting, 7 March 1995, 115 (Diversified Reporting Services, Inc)

NGB-ARO-TS

SUBJECT: Army National Guard (ARNG) Enclave Requirements for Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC) 95

The Adjutant General

AL ARNG (Annexes A & B only)

AR ARNG (Annexes A & C only)

CA ARNG (Annexes A & D only)

FL ARNG (Annexes A only)

HI ARNG (Annexes A only)

IL ARNG (Annexes A & E only)

MD ARNG (Annexes A & F only)

MT ARNG (Annexes A & G only)

MO ARNG (Annexes A & B only)

OK ARNG (Annexes A & B only)

NC ARNG (Annexes A & M only)

NJ ARNG (Annexes A & G only)

NY ARNG (Annexes A & I only)


PA ARNG (Annexes A, J & M only)

PR ARNG (Annexes A & K only)

TX ARNG (Annexes A & L only)

VA ARNG (Annexes A & M only)

WV ARNG (Annexes A & M only)



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
111 SOUTH GEORGE MASON DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382



NGB-ARO-TS (350)

31 MAR 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATTN:
DAIM-FDO, Room 2C657, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Army National Guard (ARNG) Enclave Requirements-for Base Realignment &
Closure (BRAC) 95

1. The enclosures identify ARNG enclave requirements on BRAC 95, Army installations.
2. We are very concerned about the additional costs to maintain enclaves. However, the ARNG must have these training areas to support units in these regions. The ARNG is a home based organization and cannot consolidate its units around the few remaining training sites.
3. Point of contact is MAJ Tom Weissmiller, COMM 703-607-7360, FAX 7383/7385, DSN 327, INTERNET weissmit@arngrc-emh2.army.mil.

FOR THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU:

ERIC W. BRAMAN
Colonel, GS
Director, Operations,
Training and Readiness

Enclosures

CF:

TRADOC, ATTN: Mr David Taylor (Encls A, B, & C only)

FORSCOM, ATTN: Mr Joseph Plunket (Encls A, D, F, G, H, J, K, & M only)

OCAR: Mr Gailyn Porter (All Encls)

NGB-ARP (Encl A only)

NGB-ARL (Encl A only)

NGB-AEN (Encl A only)

NGB-ARE (Encl A only)

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SUMMARY OF ANNEXES

<u>ANNEX</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
A	Information Paper
B	Ft McClellan, AL
C	Ft Chaffee, AR
D	Ft Hunter Liggett, CA
E	Savanna Army Depot, IL
F	Ft Richie, MD
G	Ft Missoula, MT
H	Ft Dix, NJ
I	Seneca Army Depot, NY
J	Ft Indiantown Gap, PA
K	Ft Buchanan, PR
L	Red River Army Depot, TX
M	Ft Picket, VA

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INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARO-TS
31 March 1995

SUBJECT: Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC)

1. Purpose: To provide information on the ARNG involvement in BRAC, how BRAC works, the NGB position, the BRAC timeline, and schedule of Regional BRAC Hearings as of 31 March 1995.

2. Facts.

a. ARNG Involvement in BRAC:

(1) The ARNG submitted enclave requirements to the Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management, (DAIM-FDO) on the following installations:

MANEUVER TRAINING AREAS

Ft McClellan, AL
Ft Chaffee, AR
Ft Hunter Liggett, CA
Ft Indiantown Gap, PA
Ft Pickett, VA

OTHER

Ft Missoula, MT
Ft Dix, NJ
Seneca Army Depot, NY
Ft Buchanan, PR
Red River Army Depot, TX
Ft Richie, MD
Savanna Army Depot, IL

(2) In addition to the above the ARNG is evaluating enclave requirements on Air Force and Navy installations:

MacDill AFB, FL
Barbers Point NAS, HI
Kirtland AFB, NM
Bergstrom AFB, TX

b. How BRAC works:

(1) When an installation closes, the ARNG has the option to request an enclave on the installation. The Army will maintain ownership, except for Ft Indiantown Gap, and license land and facilities to the ARNG. Ft Indiantown Gap is property of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

(2) If the ARNG does not enclave, BRAC will move and rebuild ARNG facilities. There is no provision in BRAC to reimburse the ARNG for increased costs because that post is no longer available to the ARNG. Due to the nature of the ARNG as a "home town" organization and demographics, the ARNG cannot restation all its units around remaining training areas.

c. NGB Position:

(1) Maneuver Training Areas (MTAs):

(a) That the five maneuver training areas are essential to maintain training and readiness standards for the ARNG. NGB did not concur with The Army Basing Study (TABS) criteria for evaluation of value of maneuver training areas because it failed to recognize IDT and schoolhouse usage for Reserve Components.

(b) That if the five MTAs are closed or realigned and enclaved by the ARNG, NGB will only provide resources to the meet training requirements with minimal infrastructure and personnel. Mobilization requirements that are above and beyond training requirements will not be funded by NGB.

(c) That NGB will present an unfunded requirement to the BASOPS Program Evaluation Group (PEG) for the five MTAs on the basis that BRAC is a transfer in mission from the Army and the funds should accompany the transfer.

(2) Other:

(a) That Ft Dix continues to make available to the ARNG, ranges, training areas and associated services and that the New Jersey ARNG continue to license existing land and buildings.

NGB-ARO-TS
ANNEX A (Information Paper)

(b) That Seneca Army Depot is an opportunity to gain efficiencies in logistical support for the New York ARNG and to enhance training opportunities in West-Central New York. This is the only ARNG enclave request that is without significant ARNG usage or housing ARNG activities. Funding provided for Seneca will be based on savings of other programs.

(c) That NGB is reviewing a late ARNG enclave request by the Illinois ARNG for the training land and a range at Savanna Army Depot.

(d) That the other ARNG (Ft Richie, Ft Missoula, Ft Buchanan, & Red River Army Depot) are armories and admin/log sites. If these enclaves are denied, those facilities can be rebuilt at another location at BRAC expense.

d. BRAC Timeline:

DATE	RESPONSIBILITY	EVENT
28 Feb	SECDEF	BRAC 95 Announcement.
31 Mar	NGB BRAC Team	Submit enclave requirements to DA BRAC Office
12 Apr	ODCSOPS	Fwds Council of Colonels recommendations to implementing MACOMs.
15 May	ODCSOPS	Reviews MACOM recommendations with MACOMs/NGB/OCAR.
17 May	BRAC Commission	Publishes proposed changes.
01 Jul	BRAC Commission	Sends recommendations to President.
15 Jul	President	Approves/disapproves BRAC Commission recommendations.
01 Aug	MACOMs/NGB/OCAR	Submit coordinated proposal to ASA-IL&E.
15 Aug	ISA-IL&A	Responses to MACOM plans.
01 Sep	President	Deadline for sending BRAC 95 recommendations to congress.
+45 days	Congress	BRAC 95 becomes law 45 congressional working days after received from President, unless rejected by congress.

NGB-ARO-TS
ANNEX A (Information Paper)

e. Regional BRAC Hearings: (Installations with ARNG involvement only)

DATE	LOCATION	INSTALLATIONS
31 Mar	Great Falls, MT	Ft Missoula
04 Apr	Birmingham, AL	Ft McClellan Ft Buchanan MacDill AFB
12 Apr	Chicago, IL	Savanna Army Depot
19 Apr	Dallas, TX	Ft Chaffee Bergstrom AFB Red River Army Depot
20 Apr	Albuquerque, NM	Kirtland AFB
28-29 Apr	San Francisco, CA	Ft Hunter Liggett Barbers Point NAS
04 May	Baltimore, MD	Ft Richie Ft Indiantown Gap Ft Pickett
05 May	New York, NY	Ft Dix Seneca Army Depot

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MAJ WEISSMILLER/703-607-7360

ANNEX J (ARNG Enclave Requirements for Ft Indiantown Gap, PA)

1. **DD FORM 1391s:** Construction Requirements are listed below and DD Forms 1391 are attached:

Demolition of wooden WWII "Temporary Buildings"

2. **MAPS:** The following maps are attached that indicate the boundries of the enclave:

Indiantown Gap Military Installation, Topographical, 1:50,000

(Copy provided to DAIM-FDO only)

3. **UNITS:** The following National Guard units and activities are and will be stationed on the enclave:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT LOCATION</u>
HQ, PA Army National Guard	Ft Indiantown Gap
HHC, 28th Cbt Avn Bde	Ft Indiantown Gap
28th Air Traffic Control Plt	Ft Indiantown Gap
2d Bn, 104th Avn	Ft Indiantown Gap
Det 1, HHT, 1-104th Cav	Ft Indiantown Gap
Trp C, 104th Cav	Ft Indiantown Gap
Trp D, 104th Cav	Ft Indiantown Gap
Co F, Aircraft Maint	Ft Indiantown Gap
Det 1, 3622d Maint Co	Ft Indiantown Gap
109th Public Affairs Detachment	Ft Indiantown Gap
128th Mil History Detachment	Ft Indiantown Gap
28th AG Bn	Ft Indiantown Gap
Co A, 228th Fwd Spt Bn	Ft Indiantown Gap
Det 1, Co B, 228th Fwd Spt Bn	Ft Indiantown Gap
HQ PA Air National Guard	Ft Indiantown Gap
201st Civil Engineering Flight	Ft Indiantown Gap
211th Engineering Instl Sqdrn	Ft Indiantown Gap
271st Combat Communications Sqdrn	Ft Indiantown Gap
203rd Weather Flight	Ft Indiantown Gap
Det 1, 193rd Special Opns Group	Ft Indiantown Gap

<u>ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>CURRENT LOCATION</u>
Department of Military Affairs	Ft Indiantown Gap
PA Military Academy	Ft Indiantown Gap
Regional Tng Site Medical	Ft Indiantown Gap
Regional NCO Academy	Ft Indiantown Gap
Eastern Army Avn Tng Site	Ft Indiantown Gap
RETRO EUROPE - Vehicles	Ft Indiantown Gap
RETRO EUROPE - CI II & IX	Ft Indiantown Gap
Combined Support Maint Shop	Ft Indiantown Gap
Unit Tng & Equip Site (UTES)	Ft Indiantown Gap

4. **PURPOSE OF THE ENCLAVE:** To provide a cantonment area and training site for the National Guard to:

- a. Station National Guard units and activities listed above.
- b. Conduct maneuver training for mechanized/armor/artillery units.
- c. Conduct range firing of small arms weapons, artillery to 155mm, gunnery for tanks, TOWs, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
- d. Conduct air to ground bomb and straffing sorties for Air Force & Air National Guard.
- e. Conduct various combat service support training.
- f. Various schoolhouse training. See above
- g. Battle simulation training.

5. **REMARKS:**

a. In fiscal year 1994 the throughput was over 700,000 mandays. The primary user is the Pennsylvania National Guard which includes the 28th Infantry Division (MECH) and a Support Group. Alternative training sites are Ft Dix, NJ; Ft Drum, NY; Ft Pickett, VA; and Ft AP Hill, VA. The 28th Division uses Ft Drum and Ft Pickett for annual training (AT). These sites are not capable of absorbing the additional requirements of the PA ARNG for AT and the excessive distance to these sites preclude usage as IDT training sites.

NGB-ARO-TS

ANNEX J (ARNG Enclave Requirements for Ft Indiantown Gap, PA)

b. Ft Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. If the Army leaves the post, it will revert back to the Commonwealth.

c. The remaining enclave includes the entire post.

FILE:WPS\ENCLAVE\X-J.PA

1. **DD FORM 1391s:** Construction Requirements are listed below and DD Forms 1391 are attached:

None, however, the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) may have to be moved because it is in the path of the airfield. This issue needs to be resolved.

2. **MAPS:** The following attached maps indicate the enclave boundaries:

Ft Picket, VA, Topographical Map, 1:25,000
Ft Picket, VA, General Site Map

(Copies only provided to DAIM-FDO)

3. **UNITS:** The following activity is and will be stationed on the enclave:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT LOCATION</u>
No Units	
MATES	Ft Pickett

4. **PURPOSE OF THE ENCLAVE:** To provide a training area for National Guard units to conduct annual training (AT) for a brigade (4,000 troops) and inactive duty training (IDT) for two battalions plus support elements (2,000 troops).

- a. Maneuver training area for mechanized/armor/artillery companies to include M1 tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
- b. Range firing of small arms weapons, artillery cannon battery firing Tables V, VII, VIII & XI up to 155mm without trajectory limitations, up to 120mm mortar firing and tank firing tables 1-8, TOW gunnery, and DRAGON firing.
- c. Engineer demolition, road construction, and bridging.
- d. Various combat service support training.
- e. Battle simulation training.
- f. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)/Military Assault Course (MAC).

5. REMARKS:

a. Historically the primary National Guard users of Ft Pickett are PA, VA, and WV. The North Carolina ARNG, 30th Brigade (Enhanced), has used Ft Bragg in the past for a training site, however, due to increased demands and environmental considerations (Redheaded Cockaded Woodpecker) the utilization of a large portion of existing maneuver areas and ranges is severely restricted. The travel distance to Ft Pickett for a majority of the 30th Brigade elements is the same as to Ft Bragg. The 30th Brigade is now-relying on Ft Pickett as a primary training site. The only alternative (mechanized/armor) training sites are Ft Drum, NY; Ft Knox, KY; Ft Indiantown Gap, PA; Pelham Range, AL; Ft Benning, GA; Ft Stewart, GA; and Camp Shelby, MS. These latter posts are too great a distance to be used for IDT training sites and cannot absorb the additional AT requirements.

b. Proposed ARNG enclave:

(1) The enclave encompasses all training land and ranges and a portion of the cantonment area. The enclave does not include the airfield, the remaining portion of the cantonment area, water and sewer treatment plants, or the area currently used by the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

(2) The ARNG must maintain an easement for the railhead, track vehicle access from the Mobilization and Training Equipment Site (MATES) facility to training areas, and road access to, and from, the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP).

(3) The ARNG has an interest in using the airfield to fly in units for IDT weekends from WV, PA, and NC; however, usage cannot justify the cost to enclave the airfield. If the City of Blackstone or County or private entity takes ownership of the airfield, the ARNG would be a potential customer.

(4) The ARNG requests the transfer of maintenance and facility engineer equipment to continue post support.

c. The enclave will be geared to support up to one complete brigade to include CSS slice elements during peak AT periods (MAY-SEP). During IDT periods, the enclave will accommodate a brigade (-) operation. Surge capability (2400 & 2600 bldg areas) will be closed during OCT-APR time frame to reduce O&M costs.

d. To support IDT and AT training requirements the training site needs facilities to support:

(1) One brigade headquarters, eight battalion headquarters, and 40 companies.

(2) Barracks and BOQ/BEQs to support 4,000 persons during peak AT periods MAY-SEP and barracks and BOQ/BEQ to support 2,000 persons during non-peak periods OCT-APR.

(3) Supply Operations; Class I (subsistence), Class II (Supply), Class III (Petroleum, Oil, & Lubrication), Class V (Ammunition), and Class IX (Repair Parts).

(4) Maintenance facilities to provide maintenance support (Combined Support Maintenance Support) for 450 wheeled vehicles and to maintain and store 620 tracked vehicles (Mobilization and Training Equipment Site/Unit Training Equipment Site).

(5) Washrack facilities.

(6) Troop medical clinic.

(7) Training site headquarters.

(8) Engineer & logistical support to maintain the post.

(9) Railhead.

(10) Mechanized Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)/Military Assault Course (MAC) facilities.

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Information Paper

SUBJECT: BASOPS Cost Per Training Manday

1. The cost per training manday which was determined using cost and manday data in TABS results in a daily cost of \$51.60 for Fort Indiantown Gap. Using the correct Base Operations budget, the actual Real Property Maintenance amount for FY93, and more accurate manday statistics the actual cost per training manday is \$13.41 per individual. This is considerably less than the amount upon which BRAC recommendations were based.
2. Attached at the enclosure is a recapitulation of Major Training Areas, the number of mandays they supported in FY93 and the budget data for each installation. The result for Fort Indiantown Gap speaks for itself. It is the most cost effective installation in the Major Training Area category.

BASOPS COST PER TRAINING MANDAY

	Annual Training (# of People)	IDT (Mandays)	Total Training Days	BASOPS (pay+other)	RPMA	BASOPS + RPMA	Cost Per Manday
	Data From TABS			Data From COBRA			
Ft AP Hill, VA	18407	261247	537352	\$6,967,000.00	\$2,040,000.00	\$9,007,000.00	\$16.76
Ft Indiantown Gap, PA	30789	197198	659033	\$27,884,000.00	\$6,122,000.00	\$34,006,000.00	\$51.60
Ft Pickett, VA	14743	88743	309888	\$15,500,000.00	\$3,776,000.00	\$19,276,000.00	\$62.20
Ft Chaffee, AR	8125	33183	155058	\$7,203,000.00	\$2,802,000.00	\$10,005,000.00	\$64.52
Ft McCoy, WI	48935	224176	958201	\$55,173,000.00	\$12,148,000.00	\$67,321,000.00	\$70.26
Ft Dix, NJ	15570	299687	533237	\$60,608,000.00	\$9,126,000.00	\$69,734,000.00	\$130.77
Ft Hunter Liggett, CA	3364	0	50460	\$7,992,000.00	\$2,169,000.00	\$10,161,000.00	\$201.37
Ft Greely, AL	151	44	2309	\$10,855,000.00	\$2,862,000.00	\$13,717,000.00	\$5,940.67
			Average	\$24,022,750.00	\$5,130,625.00	\$29,153,375.00	\$817.27
			Average	\$19,572,714.29	\$4,128,142.86	\$23,700,857.14	\$923.99
			Minus Ft Greely				
Ft Indiantown Gap, PA	32995 *	288130 *	783055	\$9,100,000.00	\$1,400,000.00	\$10,500,000.00 **	\$13.41
Using More accurate data than that submitted to TABS							
* This data differs from that in the TABS submission due to the USAG not counting the soldiers who do IDT at FTIG but do not get counted in the normal installation total. These units are stationed at FTIG and use buildings on the installation as their "armory". Examples are the PA ANG units in areas 1 & 2 and the 28th Avn Bde elements stationed at FTIG.							
** This is the ACTUAL cost of BASOPS and RPMA for FY93 as submitted by Fort Indiantown Gap in its Installation Assessment to DA							

Document Separator

**FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION
SUBMISSION TO THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND
CLOSURE COMMISSION
ON BEHALF OF FORT INDIANTOWN GAP**

**THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COALITION RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT
THE PROPOSED ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE SELECTION CRITERIA, IN THAT:**

**1. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER ONE - CURRENT AND FUTURE
MISSION REQUIREMENTS:**

- a. It destroys one of the Army's most cost effective training sites, and substitutes an unworkable enclave concept which denies the Pennsylvania 30,000 man force structure and the 13 other states which send RC units of an adequate training base.
- b. It is not consistent with the training, operational, and readiness requirements of the force structure.
- c. It does not reduce excess property, does not close excess facilities, and does not cut excess overhead costs.
- d. It adversely impacts on every aspect of the training and readiness of the Pennsylvania force structure.
- e. It needlessly takes away all of the soldier quality of life facilities, lowering soldier morale, readiness, and reenlistment rates.
- f. It fails to recognize that almost all functions, training sites and activities will remain and require the operation of the entire infrastructure.
- g. It creates substantial new travel costs by unnecessarily taking away the annual training mission of the installation.
- h. It causes a loss of four training days of the 15 available by requiring travel for annual training to distant posts adversely affecting training and readiness.

2. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER TWO - AVAILABILITY AND CONDITION OF LAND AND FACILITIES:

- a. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the Gap's accessibility, suitability for mission essential training, affordability, heavy usage and cost effectiveness.
- b. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the heavily used, extensive aviation maneuver area of some 710 square miles, a national asset.
- c. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the table VIII tank range, also a national asset, as it is only one of three such ranges in the northeastern region of the nation.
- d. It understates the military value of the base by failing to consider the fully funded and designed automated rifle ranges comprising 32 firing points.
- e. It proposes an inefficient and wasteful use of one of the Army's most heavily used and cost effective training bases in limiting the base to weekend use while denying it's long conducted annual training mission.
- f. It fails to consider the substantial new construction and demolition work which has taken place since the data call, significantly increasing the square footage of permanent building facilities.

3. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER THREE - ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION, AND FUTURE TOTAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS:

- a. It fails to consider the costs of moving mobilization facilities to alternate sites.

4. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER FOUR - COST AND MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS:

- a. It fails in its Trainload analysis which uses throughput on an annual basis rather than limiting it to optimal reserve component training months, i.e. May through September.
- b. It fails in its Trainload analysis to consider the very substantial and additional costs of travel to send Pennsylvania and other RC units to alternate annual training sites.

c. It fails to recognize that the infrastructure of the base must be retained and operated, and fails to consider the costs and manpower implications of the continuance of the infrastructure operation.

5. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER FIVE - EXTENT AND TIMING OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS:

a. It fails in its claimed annual savings of \$23 million dollars which was seriously in error as the annual cost of operation is but \$13.5 million dollars.

b. It fails in its claims of a return on first year and return on twenty year investments which were in error and also seriously flawed.

c. It fails in its sensitivity analysis by claiming an annual savings of \$11.2 million dollars of the \$13.5 million dollar annual operating budget. This was seriously flawed in its failure to consider the costs of maintaining and operating the required infrastructure.

d. It fails in creating projected savings by using a Department of the Army average \$47,000 dollars per year civilian salary rather than the site specific salary of \$27,000 dollars in its cost savings estimate. This was done in spite of the fact that a DoD Joint Process Action Team (JPAT) recommended in their report of suggested changes to the COBRA model for the 1995 BRAC that site specific civilian pay data be used to project the cost savings.

e. It proposes a more expensive and less efficient operation as the infrastructure costs must be incurred and adds thereto significant costs of travel.

f. It fails to consider the unique and exceptional costs which could be incurred in the termination or renegotiation of the land lease held by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

6. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA SIX - ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES:

a. It fails to accurately portray the economic impact since the Metropolitan Statistical Area used in the COBRA analysis does not correctly reflect where the installation's workforce lives and therefore, skews the actual impact on unemployment rates especially in Schuylkill county where the rate changes from 8.7 percent to 9.3 percent.

7. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER SEVEN - ABILITY OF BOTH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL RECEIVING COMMUNITIE'S INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT FORCES, MISSION, AND PERSONNEL:

a. It fails in proposing to send units for annual training to bases that are not suitable, e.g., Fort A.P. Hill, and Fort Dix, for the required mission essential training.

b. It fails in its Trainload analysis to determine that Fort Drum and Fort Pickett are at annual training capacity and cannot accept additional forces for annual training during the prime reserve component training period.

8. AS TO SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER EIGHT - ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:

a. It fails to consider the implications of the lease of the land from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the special environmental clean-up and restoration obligations thereunder.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

It is therefore respectfully recommended that the Commission reject the proposed action of the Secretary of Defense because of the multiple and substantial deviations from the Department's BRAC selection criteria, that the base be removed from the list and that operation of the base continue as heretofore.

LAND LEASE

BETWEEN

The COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

and the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. THIS LEASE, made and entered this 12th day of MAY
in the year one thousand nine hundred and 89 by and
between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting through its Department of
General Services on behalf of the Department of Military Affairs, whose address
is Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and whose interest is described as that of owner, for
itself, its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, hereinafter called
the "Commonwealth," and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called
the "Government."

WITNESSETH:

The parties for the consideration hereinafter mentioned covenant and agree
as follows:

2. The Commonwealth hereby leases to the Government the following
described premises, viz:

All those certain portions of Fort Indiantown Gap, situate in East
Hanover Township, Dauphin County, and in Union, Cold Spring and

East Hanover Townships, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, comprising a total of 17,797.22 acres of land, more or less, as delineated on Exhibit "A" hereto, together with buildings listed on Exhibit "C" hereto, excluding those portions of Fort Indiantown Gap that the Commonwealth reserves for its use and which are not subject to this lease, comprising 1,388.93 acres more or less, as delineated on Exhibit "A" together with buildings and utilities, listed on Exhibit "B" as State Owned and Used Buildings.

to be used for construction, operation and maintenance of a military post for training members of the active and reserve components and forces of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard.

3. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises for the term of sixty years beginning May 12, 1989, through May 11, 2049, subject to the right of the Government or the Commonwealth to sooner terminate this lease in accordance with paragraph 7 hereof, and subject to paragraph 23 hereof; provided that, the parties agree to meet within 90 days of the tenth anniversary of the execution of this lease and at 10 year intervals thereafter at which time the parties may by mutual consent agree to extend the termination date hereof of a period of ten (10) additional years to facilitate Government capital improvements on the leased premises, and provided further that this lease shall in no event extend beyond December 31, 2079.

4. The Government shall pay the Commonwealth rent at the rate of \$1 for the entire term of this lease, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged. The Commonwealth has agreed to lease these premises to the Government for this rental in consideration of the mutual benefits realized as a result of the operation of the Fort Indiantown Gap military installation.

5. It is understood and agreed that Lease Number DA-18-020-ENG-1865, dated 16 September 1964, and all subsequent supplemental agreements thereto,

Lease Numbers DACA-31-5-73-63, DACA-31-5-76-41, DACA-31-5-77-8, DACA-31-5-78-145, DACA-31-5-82-108 and supplemental agreements thereto, and DACA-31-5-85-202 are hereby cancelled effective as of the date of execution of this lease by the Government.

6. The Government shall have the right, during the existence of this lease, to attach fixtures and erect structures or signs in or upon the premises hereby leased, which fixtures and structures, or signs, so placed in, upon or attached to the said premises shall be and remain the property of the Government and may be removed or otherwise disposed of by the Government, provided that, when such fixtures and structures are removed the Government shall restore the premises on which they were located to their natural condition. The Government shall be solely responsible for the disposal of wastes, toxic or hazardous materials on the leased premises. The Commonwealth does not consent (and has not consented) to any disposal of materials other than as expressly authorized by state and federal law and disclaims all responsibility for the location, cleanup or maintenance of waste disposal site on the leased premises at Fort Indiantown Gap.

7. TERMINATION OF LEASE.

a. **DEFAULT.** The Government or the Commonwealth may terminate this lease at any time during its term upon 90 days written notice to the other party when the other party is in default of its obligations under the terms and conditions of this lease.

b. **CONVENIENCE.** The Government may terminate this lease at any time by giving no less than one (1) year's written notice to the other party, and no rental shall accrue after the effective date of termination.

c. **END OF TERM.** Either party may terminate this lease at the end of its term and any extension thereof by giving 30 days written notice to the other party, provided that it is agreed that the Commonwealth's right to terminate the

lease at the end of its term may be subject to modification if the Government installs certain capital improvements on the demised premises within specified periods before the end of the term of the lease.

d. RESTORATION OF PREMISES. It is agreed that the Government shall be responsible to restore the leased premises to a safe condition to the upon termination of the lease and shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations respecting any impact areas, landfills, spill or dump sites, waste disposal areas, hazardous and toxic wastes, explosive materials, etc.

8. Any notice under the terms of this lease shall be in writing signed by a duly authorized representative of the party giving such notice, and if given by the Government shall be addressed to the Commonwealth as follows:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of General Services
North Office Building
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Military Affairs
Bldg. S-0-47
Fort Indiantown Gap
Annville, PA 17003-5002

and if given by the Commonwealth shall be addressed to the Government as follows:

The District Engineer
U.S. Army Engineer District Baltimore
ATTN: CENAB-RE-A
P.O. Box 1715
Baltimore, MD 21203-1715

9. The Commonwealth reserves the right to use Fort Indiantown Gap for the training of the Pennsylvania National Guard and other elements of the Pennsylvania military forces, the Pennsylvania State Police and other Commonwealth agencies, provided that the Government reserves the right to establish priorities for all military training, and it is understood that non-military use of the demised premises have a lower priority than military training.

10. The Government shall use the demised premises as a military post for training members of the active and reserve components and forces of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Government and the Commonwealth may permit organizations such as the Boy Scouts, Youth Groups, Youth Camps, FBI, police units, Civil Air Patrol and National Rifle Association to use the leased premises without securing the consent of the other party. Except as otherwise provided herein, neither party shall use the demised premises for nonmilitary purposes without the consent of the other.

11. The parties hereby license and permit each other to have the full and unrestricted right of ingress and egress from and across the premises of the other at Fort Indiantown Gap for their personnel, supplies, material, furnishers of service and their equipment, vehicles, machinery and other property to be used for Government or Commonwealth purposes.

12. It is understood and agreed that the Government has from time-to-time licensed certain buildings subject to this lease and its predecessor leases to the Commonwealth for National Guard and other purposes. These buildings are referred to as "federally-owned, state-used buildings" in Exhibits A and B hereto. It is understood and agreed that the licenses issued under the predecessor lease shall survive the execution of this lease and shall remain in full force and effect. It is understood and agreed that, in the event of mobilization or national emergency as declared by the President or other appropriate national command authorities, it may be necessary for certain "federally-owned, state-used buildings" to be vacated. The Post Commander, Fort Indiantown Gap, shall notify the Adjutant General of the identity of those properties that must be vacated in such contingencies, and the Adjutant General shall endeavor to vacate such premises as soon as practicable consistent with the mobilization mission of the units occupying the buildings but no sooner than the deployment date of the unit; provided, however, that it is understood and agreed that, with respect to buildings which are used for military purposes

by the National Guard in support of its federally-recognized reserve component mission, the best use of the buildings in the event of mobilization would be to continue to perform the same functions. Licensed premises the control of which is assumed by the Government in the event of mobilization shall be relicensed to the Commonwealth at the conclusion of the mobilization period. It is understood and agreed that the use of facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap in the event of national emergency or mobilization will be determined by the requirements of the situation and that nothing in this lease will be construed to provide to the contrary.

13. The Government will permit members of the reserve components (including the Pennsylvania National Guard) and their dependents to have access to morale, welfare and recreational facilities on Fort Indiantown Gap in accordance with applicable Army directives. It is understood and agreed that members of the Pennsylvania National Guard are required to meet certain physical fitness standards as part of the Total Force. Toward this end, the parties agree that they will, within six months of the execution of this lease, enter into a Memorandum of Understanding on uniform access to Post gymnasium and physical fitness facilities.

14. It is understood and agreed that the Government, through the Post Commander of Fort Indiantown Gap, shall enter into appropriate agreements with the Commonwealth and its agencies for the management and control of hunting, fishing, hiking and other recreational activities on the leased premises at Fort Indiantown Gap. It is understood and agreed that the Commonwealth excepts and reserves from this lease all timbering rights, oil and gas rights and mineral rights. Within one year of the execution of this lease, the parties may enter into an agreement for selective timbering at Fort Indiantown Gap and management of timber and forest resources, provided that any agreement for the harvesting of live timber on Commonwealth property, including the leased premises, shall be subject to approval by the Department of Environmental Resources. It is agreed that the parties will, within six months of the execution of this lease, enter into a Memorandum

dum of Understanding with respect to the disposition of dead fallen timber on Fort Indiantown Gap by means of wood-cutting permits.

15. The Government shall not assign this lease in any event and shall not sublet the demised premises or any part thereof, without the express written consent of the Commonwealth and will not permit the use of the said premises by anyone other than the Government, its agents and authorized representatives, without such written approval by the Commonwealth. In case of an approved sublease, the Government shall remain liable for all covenants and undertakings herein contained, except for such covenants or undertakings which are expressly released by the Commonwealth.

16. The Commonwealth warrants that no person or selling agency has been employed or retained to solicit or secure this lease upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee, excepting bona fide employees or bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Commonwealth for the purpose of securing business. For breach or violation of this warranty, the Government shall have the right to annul this lease without liability or in its discretion to deduct from the lease price or consideration the full amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee.

17. No member of or delegate to Congress or Resident Commissioner shall be admitted to any share or part of this lease or to any benefit that may arise therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to extend to this lease if made with a corporation for its general benefit.

18. (a) The Government may, by written notice to the Commonwealth, terminate the right of the Commonwealth to proceed under this lease if it is found, after notice and hearing by the Secretary of the Army or his duly authorized representative, that gratuities (in the form of entertainment, gifts or otherwise) were

offered by the Commonwealth, of any agent or representative of the Commonwealth, to any officer or employee of the Government with a view toward securing a lease or securing favorable treatment with respect to the awarding or amending, or the making of any determinations with respect to the performing, of such lease; provided, that the existence of facts upon which the Secretary of the Army or his duly authorized representative makes such findings shall be in issue and may be reviewed by any competent court.

(b) In the event the lease is terminated as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the Government shall be entitled (i) to pursue the same remedies against the Commonwealth as it could pursue in the event of a breach of the lease by the Commonwealth, and (ii) as a penalty in addition to any other damages to which it may be entitled by law, to exemplary damages in any amount (as determined by the Secretary of the Army or his duly authorized representative) which shall be not less than three nor more than ten times the costs incurred by the Commonwealth in providing any such gratuities to any such officer or employee.

(c) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law or under this lease.

(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to restrict or limit participation by personnel assigned to the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, other Army personnel and personnel who are members of the Pennsylvania National Guard from participating in social functions sponsored by representatives of either party.

19. The Commonwealth agrees that the Comptroller General of the United States or any duly authorized representatives shall, until the expiration of three (3) years after final payment of the agreed rental, have access to and the right to examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers and records of the Commonwealth involving transactions related to this lease.

20. It is understood and agreed that the Government may, from time-to-time, undertake construction projects on the leased premises and that the Commonwealth may, from time-to-time, undertake construction on Commonwealth property at Fort Indiantown Gap. The parties agree to coordinate all such construction in advance with each other. The parties agree to cooperate with each other in development and implementation of an installation master plan.

21. DISPUTES. It is agreed that the parties shall endeavor in good faith to resolve any disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of this lease at the lowest possible level. In the event any disputes arise between the Post Commander, Fort Indiantown Gap, and the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania concerning use of lands at Fort Indiantown Gap which cannot be resolved at the local level or by the mediation of the Corps of Engineers or First U.S. Army, they will be submitted to the Secretary of the Army for resolution, provided, however, that nothing in this clause shall be construed to abrogate or diminish the right of the Commonwealth to take appropriate action in the event of violation of the terms and conditions hereof.

22. It is agreed that the Government, through the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, will provide electrical, water, sewer and refuse collection services to state owned and controlled facilities and federally-owned state-used facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap and that the Commonwealth or the Pennsylvania National Guard shall reimburse the Government for such services at such rates as are paid by the Government.

23. The Commonwealth has long-range plans for permanent construction of a Pennsylvania National Guard training facility in that portion of the leased premises known as Area 14, Fort Indiantown Gap. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 (relating to the term of the lease) and Paragraph 7 (relating to termination

of the lease), it is understood and agreed that the term of the lease with respect to the area known as Area 14 shall terminate when the following conditions are met:

a. Adequate funds are appropriated by the U.S. Government so that Post and health clinic operations presently conducted in Area 14 can relocate to suitable facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap.

b. The requirements of the U.S. Army Health Services Command, which has a mobilization mission to provide a hospital at Fort Indiantown Gap, are satisfied. These requirements may be met by leaving sufficient existing buildings intact for this purpose or by offering any new buildings constructed by the Commonwealth to the USAHSC for use for this purpose the event of mobilization.

After the foregoing conditions are satisfied and the lease of Area 14 terminated, the Commonwealth will permit the Government to use all or part of Area 14 until the Commonwealth needs to take possession and control for construction of the training facility. It is anticipated that development and construction of the training facility will take place over a period of years, and that the Government will maintain use of the those portions of the premises not required for development and construction of the training facility. It is understood and agreed that, in the event of mobilization, the Commonwealth shall surrender to the Government full use and control of all or such part of Area 14, including Commonwealth constructed National Guard facilities, as the Government shall certify that it needs to respond to mobilization requirements. The lands and buildings shall revert to Commonwealth control when the Government no longer needs them for mobilization purposes. In the development of its plans for a Pennsylvania National Guard training facility in Area 14, the Commonwealth agrees to consult with the Commander, USAG, FIG, the Installation Master Planning Board, the U.S. Army Health Services Command, and such other Army agencies as may have an interest in Area 14. Such consultation shall include the opportunity to review plans and provide comments, review and concurrence on all aspects of the proposed project.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals as of the date first written above:

ATTEST:

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Eugene Khyt

David L. Jannetta
Secretary
Department of General Services

David Bell Edward T. Leger
The Adjutant General
Department of Military Affairs

Approved:

David L. Jannetta
Governor *CASEY*

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: MR. Boyer

Approved as to legality and form:

Ang F. Alabrador
Chief Counsel, DGS 4/20

John T. ...
Chief Counsel, DMA

Ernest R. ...
Office of General Counsel

John M. Hall
Office of Attorney General




COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

January 5, 1988

I, Robert P. Casey, hereby authorize David L. Jannetta, Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, to execute on my behalf documents of the Department of General Services listed below:

Deeds
Leases
Licenses
Easements
Rights-of-Way
Sales Agreements

Demolition of Buildings
Printing Estimates
Paper Contracts
Indentures
Yearly Bid Contracts
Legislatively Mandated
Conveyances


Robert P. Casey

**ADDITIONAL COST OF TRAVEL
FOR UNIT ANNUAL TRAINING
BASED ON THE PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION**

1. The Secretary's proposal would require all Pennsylvania units to travel to these distant military training posts:

Fort Pickett, VA
Fort Drum, NY
Fort A.P. Hill, VA

2. The enclosure lists the costs to send Pennsylvania units out of state for annual training. Costs were computed by dividing the state into 3 major geographical areas and calculating time and distance from the center of mass of each of the 3 areas.

3. A Brigade Task Force (3500) was used as a model for computations but figures could be applied to smaller units without changing the final results. Costs included all aspects of military convoy movement, (fuel and overnight stops when required due to mileage as well as the pay and allowances for additional travel days) and commercial transportation for soldiers not involved in the convoy movement. Computations do not include:

- a. Wear and tear on equipment.
- b. Cost of repairs.
- c. Risk of accident or personal injury.

4. Conclusion for each base (See Enclosure)

5. Cost for entire Pennsylvania Force Structure (30,000 soldiers) to perform Annual Training at:

Fort Drum	\$4,059,830
Fort Pickett	\$4,007,788
Fort A.P. Hill	\$1,947,132

6. To these increased travel costs must be added the 4 days lost training time as a result of traveling to more distant training posts. This reduces the Annual Training period from 15 days to 11 days, a 26% reduction in valuable training time. This would reduce the already limited training time available and would adversely impact readiness.

7. The Trainload model did not calculate the cost of travel nor have any additional funds been programmed to support the additional transportation requirements.

Brigade Task Force Movement Costs (3500 Soldiers)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP IS THE MOST AFFORDABLE AND ACCESSIBLE

<u>Soldiers</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Other Equipment</u>
3500	955	60

	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>Fort Drum</u>	<u>Fort Pickett</u>	<u>AP Hill</u>
Pittsburgh	\$103,824	\$504,452	\$474,584	\$433,159
Philadelphia	\$51,830	\$470,374	\$461,656	\$122,022
Scranton	\$51,830	\$126,402	\$491,616	\$447,138
Ft Indiantown Gap- 0 -		\$446,114	\$466,486	\$126,285

TRAVEL FUNDS INSUFFICIENT TO SEND EVERYONE OUT OF STATE

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

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
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
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404 669 7040

FROM: BRAC DIVISION



HEADQUARTERS FORSCOM
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
 PERSONNEL & INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT
 BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE DIVISION



TO: LTC Bryan
 TABS

FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER	VOICE TELEPHONE NUMBER	DATE/TIME /GROUP
(703) 693-9322	(703) 614-6513	950615

NUMBER OF PAGES <u>43</u> + HEADER	TELEPHONE NUMBERS
POC: Dm Bohannon	DSN: 367 - 6457
	COMM: (404) 669 - 6457
	FAX: 7040

FROM:
 HQ. FORSCOM
 DCSPIM-BC
 T. McPHERSON, GA 30330

EMARKS:
 Returns of FAX from FIG (Hegel Moyer)



M O N T H L Y U N I T T R A I N I N G

ANNUAL TRAINING - FY94

	UNIT		SCHOOLS		AC
	<u>USAR</u>	<u>NG</u>	<u>USAR</u>	<u>NG</u>	
OCTOBER	25	0	39	337	
NOVEMBER	18	434	23	312	
DECEMBER	0	0	23	309	
JANUARY	0	0	74	317	
FEBRUARY	20	110	83	375	
MARCH	132	77	108	802	207
APRIL	222	150	86	462	
MAY	516	97	461	760	
JUNE	890	3656	219	595	
JULY	1140	1236	330	435	98
AUGUST	1012	1294	193	560	49
SEPTEMBER	860	150	0	860	296
TOTAL FY94:	4835	7204	1639	6124	650

A.T.
T.Y. 93
(Oct 92 thru Sep 93)

Notes	Maint	Off	EM	Ortal	USAR	PARANG	Other NG	PA
October								
6 Oct - 30 Sep: 201 CEF (REOPS)	3 days			176	31	142		
19-29	85th Base Hosp		145	153				1
1-31	FUSA NCOA			146	146			
Total for October				475	187	142		1
November								
24-31	Reg I NCOA			363		363		
7-21	Reg I NCOA			328	328			
1-30	FUSA NCOA		33+33+31	113	113			
Total for November				804	441	363		
December								
21 Nov - 5 Dec: 365 Eng (Cst Bn)		1	15	16	16			
5-19	Reg I NCOA			409	409			
1-31	FUSA NCOA			80	80			
Total for December				505	505			
January								
8-16	Reg I NCOA			325	325			
19-25	99 ARCOM (DCST)	10	4	15	15			
19 Oct - 11 Dec: 201 CEF (REOPS)	3 days			144	83	87		
1-31	FUSA NCOA			90	90			
Total for January				574	452	87		
February								
25 Jan - 6 Feb	Reg I NCOA			422		422		
22-28 Jan - 13 Feb: RTS - Maint				15	15			
13-27	Reg I NCOA			463		463		
1-28	FUSA NCOA			85	85			
Total for February				985	110	885		
March								
8-14	PNG-MA	56	436	492		492		
8-13	Med Dept, Ft Meade			30				
6-20	Reg I NCOA			402		402		
18-23	28 Inf Div, HHC	105	45	150		150		
5-27	RTS - Maint		90	90	90			
12-28	RTS - Maint		90	90	90			
13-27	28 Signal Bn	81+5	387	473		473		
1-31	FUSA NCOA			192	192			
Total for March				1709	232	1457		
April								
21 Mar - 2 Apr: RTS - Maint				20	20			
20 Mar - 3 Apr: 300 7th Hosp		27	90	117	117			
1-6	PNG-MA	92	594	686		686		
21-10 Apr: Reg I NCOA				325		325		
5-9	213 ASG	3	7	10		10		
4 Apr - 2 Apr: 201 CEF (REOPS)	2 days			124	7			
31 Mar - 16 Apr: RTS - Maint			90	90	90			
4-17	348 Base Hosp	52	60	112		112		
15-20	PNG-MA	83	589	672		672		

AT
(Oct 92 thru Sep)

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	Prone	Other NG	RA
11-19-92	1 May: 1454 Chem Co	6	120	126			126	
11-19-92	337 Maint Bn	7	83	90		70		
11-19-92	103 Maint	10	85	95		95		
15-1	RTS - Maint		3	3	3			
17-1	Reg I NCOA		408	408		408		
1-30	FUSA NCOA			138	138			
18-17-92	348 Gen Hosp	127	187	314	314			
	Total for April			3213	721	2303	126	
	May							
24-6-92	5/5 FA Bn	30	370	390	390			
24-8	468 Engr Bn	3	70	73	73			
7-10	338 Med Bn	13	10	22	22			
5-9	PNGMA (Pre-IET)			56		56		
13-2	1005 Gen Hosp (Lbr)		5163	68	68			
15-15	950 Busc Hosp			311	311			
12-16	PNGMA (Pre-IET)			58		58		
9-22	322 Maint Co	8	66	74	74			
9-22	302 Maint Bn	16	28	44	44			
8-22	105 Cbt Apt Hosp	36	153	189		189		
8-22	Reg I NCOA		432	432		432		
13-25	PNGMA	60	460	520		520		
16-21	542 ED DCT, Ft. Meade	1	14	15				
25-27	PNGMA (Pre-IET)			47		47		
14-29	RTS - Maint		27	27	27			
27-28	Reg I NCOA		140	140		140		
15-28	677 Sup Co	2	86	88	88			
15-29	479 Engr Bn	48	393	441	441			
15-30	FUSA NCOA			143	143			
	Total for May			3078	1621	1442		
	June							
20-4-92	490 Chem Co	2	37	39	39			
22-4	130 Chem Co	3	57	60	60			
22-4	300 Chem Co	8	76	84	84			
22-5	485 Chem Bn	15	40	55	55			
22-4	103 Chem Co	5	14	19			19	
31-4	1036 USARF School	9	352	361	361			
22-4	227 FSB, C Co	6	57	63		63		
2-6	PNGMA (Pre-IET)			34		34		
28-11	319 Engr			90	90			
7-15	240 Engr Bn	19	10	29			29	
7-11	1111 Sig Bn (1108 Sig Bn)			142				16
5-19	423 Med Det	8	13	21	21			
5-19	302 Gen Hosp	64	140	204	204			
14-20	479 FA Bn	11	37	48	48			
13-20	138 MI Bn	17	57	74	74			
5-18	876 Engr Bn	43	654	697		697		
5-18	463 Engr Cmbt Bn	21	351	372	372			

AT

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARANG	Other NG	SA
9-8-90	332 Engr	3	47	50	50			
5-17	154 Comm Bn	20	389	309		309		
12-21	28 Inf Div, HHC	25	175	300		300		
12-20	28 Inf Div DISCOM	34	170	304		304		
1-23	PNGMA	116	691	807		807		
12-20	56 Bde, HHC	15	130	135		135		
30 Aug 90	30 Sep: 157 SIG (SINGAPORE)		31	31	31			
7-19	114 ATCF			17		17		
11-21	USA RG, Pittsburgh			40				
14-20	74 1/2 ADA Bn			27				
9-24	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		307	307		307		
11-15	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		136	136		136		
11-17	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		253	253		253		
18-20	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		127	127		127		
21-23	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		112	112		112		
4-20	RTS-Maint		17	17		17		
12-25	2179 USARF Det	13	65	302	302			
11-26	335 P+A Bn	8	69	77		77		
14-27	1079 USARF	17	15	32		32		
14-27	3374 Sig Det	8	30	38		38		
10-24	2/228 Comd Reg	8	33	41		41		
11-26	HHC Comd Bde, 28 ID	40	190	330		330		
19-29	78 Div MTC	9	4	13		13		
18-27	PNGMA	72	572	654		654		
20 Aug	30 Sep: 301 CEF (REITS)	2/20		127	10	35		
12-3	728 INSB			8		8		
23-27	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		307	307		307		
28-1 Sep	PNGMA (Pre-IET)		39	41		39		
19-3 Sep	445 Med Co (LLW)	4	71	75		75		
12-21	311 Sta Group	52	130	182		182		
19-3	1/108 FA Bn	28	318	346		346		
19-3	109 FA, Btry F	5	50	55		55		
18-2	131 Engr Bn (MD)	31	380	411		411		
19-3	Reg I NCOA			489		489		
35	Total for Opns			8547	2290	5492	459	2
36	Other							
19 Sep	28 Diverty	5	104	109		109		
19 Sep	RTS-Maint		35	35		35		
19 Sep	103 Engr Bn	27	385	412		412		
12-21	2290 Comd Control	24	213	237		237		
1-30 Sep	EUSA NCOA			150		150		
10-1	338 Med Bn, HHD (AT-FHQ)	16	14	30		30		
4-16	1049 USARF (MA)	8	114	122		122		
12-13	309 Med Bn	7	36	33		33		
5-19 Sep	PR30 OSUT Bde	23	530	553		553		
10-24	124 Comd Co F			85		85		
10-24	357 Sig Co	5	91	96		96		

A.T

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PROENG	Other NG	PA
10-24	369 Eng Co	1	10	11	11			
10-24	RTS-Maint		50	50	50			
10-24	223 Gen Co	5	64	69	69			
10-24	339 Gen Hoop	130	237	367	357			
9-25	2/104 Com	84	183	267		386		
10-23	365 Eng Bn	35	446	481	481			
17-30	1079 USARF	17	39	56	56			
17-31	254 (MT) Co (FS)		28	28	28			
17-31	930 Gen Co	4	51	55	55			
24-31	RTS-Maint		15	15	15			
19-30	202 MT Bn	29	107	136				136
17-30	770 Eng Co		9	9	9			
7-11	PNGMA (On-IET)		78	78			78	
14-18	PNGMA (On-IET)		77	77			77	
31-35	PNGMA (On-IET)		41	41			41	
28-10 Aug	PNGMA (On-IET)		40	40			40	
34-6 Aug	423 Med Det (CA)	6	14	20	20			
1-31	FUSA NCOA			144	144			
10-23	441 PSC			71	71			
10-24	Reg I NCOA			483		483		
Total for July				4372	2682	1561		136
August								
18 Aug-6 Aug	1035 USARF	48	147	155	155			
34 Jul-6 Aug	322 Gen Hoop	83	133	216	216			
6-11	HD STARC	130	141	141		141		
4-8	PNGMA (On-IET)		36	36			36	
5-8	193 SOG/DOTL	9	43	52			52	
5-15	412 Eng Co			110	110			
31-14	149 Surgical Hoop	29	105	134			134	
31-14	PNGMA	56	296	352		352		
7-21	444 7th Med Co	7	55	62		62		
7-21	3/42 FA Bn	27	206	233		233		
7-21	157 Apt Bn	18	175	193		193		
6-27	RTS-Maint			20	20			
14-31	140 (Weather) Flight	4	10	14		14		
15-20	56 Bde	3	87	91		91		
7-31	25 Mbrned	25	247	272			272	
27 Jul-21 Aug	335 Med Reg (RICE Program)	30	32	62		62		
5-29 Aug	Reg I NCOA		442	442		442		
31 Jul-14 Aug	Reg I NCOA		465	465		465		
14-27	254 Eng Bn	5	105	110	110			
15-27	1031 USARF	12	165	177	177			
26-1 Aug	PNGMA	46	293	339		339		
36-31	28 diversity	1	7	9		9		
11-15	PNGMA (On-IET)		31	31			31	
18-22	PNGMA (On-IET)		38	38			38	
30-8 Aug	PNGMA (On-IET)		33	33			33	

AT

Date	Unit	O&A	EM	Total	NSAR	PARMS	Other NG	TRA
Total for August				4293	1328	2510	406	
September								
31 Aug - 4 Sep	145 MASH	25	46	71			71	
29 Aug - 4 Sep	PIS - Throat		33	33	33			
27 Aug - 4 Sep	Reg I MCOA		384	384		384		
9-15	PN GAIN	85	360	445		445		
30-10	111. Apt. Co. 7th Rptal. Co.		150	150				150
12-24	914. Cbt. Spt. Group	26	115	141	141			
11-25	Reg I MCOA			443		443		
1-31 Aug	USA Reserve MCOA		155+39	194	194			
1-30 Sep	USA Reserve MCOA		131+39	170	170			
Total for September				2071	538	1392	71	150

W E T
FY 93
(Oct 92 thru Sep 93)

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PANNG	PANNG	Thin
October								
	TRADOPc Utilizations			280	181			
28-4	Det.: Billeting Walk-in			151	55	23		6
2-4	986 Maint. Co.	22	278	302	307			
2-4	1079 USARCG	74	157	231	231			
2-4	367 MP Det.	25	175	200	200			
2-4	372 MP Co.	6	100	106	106			
2-4	453 FSU	6	73	79	79			
2-4	458 Med Det.	17	95	112	112			
2-4	313 General Co.	64	394	458	458			
2-4	315 Engg Regt	8	36	44	44			
2-4	412 Engg Co.	2	33	35	35			
2-4	RTS-Maint			4	4			
2-4	2274 Sig Det.	12	47	59	59			
2-4	73 PANNG	25	200	225			225	
2-4	1/104 Cav. Hq.	38	312	350			350	
2-4	108 CSH	9	35	44			44	
2-4	Co. E, 150 Avn	8	8	16			16	
2-4	MWSS 473, Det B	5	94	99				
2-4	Det 2 Comm Co.	7	180	187				
2-4	Co. E, 2/25 Marines	4	133	137				
2-4	French Union			19				
2-4	Merheim VFW			20				
2-4	28 AG Co.	10	110	120			120	
				(3908)				
5-11	Billeting Walk-in			150	36	64		4
5-9	56 EOB	1	9	10				
9-11	698 Sup Co.	5	112	117	117			
9-11	RTS-Maint	1	24	25	25			
9-11	2/103 Comm	20	200	220			220	
9-11	237 Maint Co.	29	390	419			419	
9-11	1/109 FA, Hq.	3	72	76			76	
7	DPO TMS-CD	2	65	67			67	
9-11	Deepel Univ.			62				
9-11	Basepart State			45				
9-11	Joyola College			48				
9-12	Conisius College			53				
12-11	Co. H, 3/25 Marines	7	139	146				
11	Genible Reg #610 BSA			25				
9-11	2090 USARF Ach			29	29			
				(1266)				
12-12	Billeting Walk-in			152	29	76		
12-12	441 PSC	5	98	103	103			
16-12	1079 USARCG	1	11	12	12			
16-12	1-315 Sup	22	324	346	346			
16-12	332 Med Regt	7	24	31	31			
16-12	3-42 FA	15	201	216	216			

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Hotel	USAR	FOUNG	FOANG	Miss Crew
25-1	New Det. 1, 1-104 Cav	AP	70	98		98		
26-1	100: Billiting walk-in			153	43	97		
	Det 2nd Sgt (TSFO) (74)			26	35			
	Total for October			12335	3982	5783	317	
November								
	IMDO/C Utilization			383	45	11		
3-8	Billiting walk-in			275	43	166		
6-8	FNBMAR	15	50	65		65		
6-8	38 Inf Div DISCOM	52	10	42		42		
6-8	HAC, Com Bde, 382D	21	53	76		76		
6-8	38 Sewarty	20	45	65		65		
6-8	3 Bde, HHC	20	45	65		65		
6-8	53 Bde	21	44	85		75		
6-8	56 Bde	30	140	190		190		
6-8	2/111 Inf Bn	35	395	430		430		
6-8	Co A, 388 FSB	3	48	70		70		
6-8	1/213 ADA, HHC	15	35	50		50		
6-8	1/108 FA, Atty B	3	23	76		76		
6-8	1/109 FA, Atty B	33	438	471		471		
4-8	38 Sig Bn	10	39	49		49		
7-8	193 CATM			6		6		
6-8	338 Apt (FSB)	23	62	91		91		
6-8	365 Eng Bn	5	315	231	230			
6-8	2072 USARF Ach			13	13			
6-8	254 Sup	4	199	204	202			
6-8	RTS-Maint			92	92			
6-8	442 FSC	1	46	47	47			
6-8	327 S+S Bn			75	75			
6-8	453 Train	7	72	84	84			
6-8	378 S+S Bn	17	443	460	460			
6-8	28 Inf Div, HAC	150	150	300		300		
6-8	728 MISB, Co B	5	89	94		94		
6-8	103 Maint	12	111	123		123		
				(3839)				
4-15	Billiting walk-in			149	68	56		
10-11	A Co, 7th Cav, 7th Fleet			40				
13-15	1079 USARG	64	157	221	221			
13-15	441 PSC	7	70	77	77			
13-15	2374 Sig Bat	9	68	77	77			
13-15	416 ENCOM	4	3	7	7			
13-15	643 Sup Co			22	22			
13-15	RTS-Maint			47	47			
13-15	338 Theat Dep	7	35	32	32			
12-15	1/314 Inf Bn	22	361	383	383			
12-15	1/315 Inf Bn	28	302	330	330			
13-15	5/159 Com Ppt HAC	50	80	130	130			
13-15	104 Com Co F	18	332	250		250		

Date	Unit	PLB	EDM	Notals	USAF	Passage	Passage	Thru Bus
13-15	1/104 Conv	95	182	277		277		
13-15	1/104 Conv	58	320	378		378		
13-15	1/104 Conv, Det 1	30	45	75		75		
13-15	154 Green Brn	8	402	410		410		
13-15	198 Sig Bn	28		28				
14-15	290 MP Co	6	61	67				
12-15	Delish Union	3	3-81	86				
13-15	Loyale Union	8	100	108				
13-15	PSU - Release	1	1-13	15				
14-15	CAP Aech 1004			13				
				(3242)				
17	56 EOD	1	7	8				
17-18	Hq Co, USAG			19				
20-22	1079 USARG	1	26	27	27			
20-23	6/68 Armer	17	144	161	161			
20-23	230 MP Bde	25	40	65	65			
21-22	PNB-MTU (jersing para mpra)			200		200		
20-23	PNB-MIA	93	398	490		490		
20-22	1/109 FA	3	77	80		80		
20-22	10 Bulb Fuel	5	140	145				
20-22	Arkiana Union	3	5-28	36				
21-22	BUSA Imp #36			15				
20-23	RTS-Train			77	77			
				(1323)				
16-22	Billeting Walk-in			86	23	34	1	
24	Hq Co, USAG	1	9	10				
27-29	RTS-Train			37	37			
29	Org Spt Ctr (TSFO) (RS)			1				
23-29	Billeting Walk-in			23	11			
	Ortel for November			8947	2076	4915	1	
December								
	TRNDOR Utilization			(710 report)				
30-6	Billeting Walk-in			93	21	42		
4-6	RTS-Train	1	43	44	44			
5-6	2072 USAF Ach			9	9			
4-6	338 7th Bn	9	24	33	33			
5-6	416 ENCOIL	4	3	7	7			
4-6	1/104 Conv, Det 1	35	65	100		100		
4-6	104 Conv, Co F	30	200	230		230		
5-6	103 7th Bn Co	12	115	127		127		
4-6	PSU (Release)			56				
3-4	LEA			14				
5-6	378 S+S Bn			73	73			
				(1786)				
7-13	Billeting Walk-in			145	46	85	2	
9-10	Hq Co, USAG	1	25	26				
11-13	RTS-Train			24	24			

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	ARRNS	ARRNS	Thru Dec
11-13	1079 USAR	57	111	168	168			
11-13	453 Fin. Spt	7	78	85	85			
11-13	2374 Sig Det	14	55	69	69			
11-13	HHC, Avn Bde, 28ID	20	55	75		75		
11-13	228 FSB, Co A	2	46	48		48		
11-12	28 AB Co	12	134	146		146		
11-13	PNGMA	26	388	414		414		
11-13	E Co a/25 Thru	5	109	114				
11-13	BSA Sig #58			35				
11-12	79 ARCOM Sig			55	55			
11-13	3/104 Avn	93	192	285		285		
11-13	441 PSC			130	130			
15-20	RTS-Maint			(1599)				
17	Harrisburg Police Dept			34	34			
				15				
17-20	Billeting walk-ins			(39)				
21-27	Billeting Walk-ins			49	12	16	1	
	(Hotel for December)			16		4		
	January			2794	810	1662	3	
21	TRPOLC Utilization (Add 8 job desc)			113				
22-31 Jan	Billeting Walk-ins			(41)	81			
4-10	Billeting Walk-ins			332	1	3	2	
8-10	310 Signal Co	1	39	40	40	195	2	
8-10	744 MP Bn	8	41	49	49			
8-10	338 7th Sig Bn	10	24	34	34			
8-10	442 7th Sig Bn	2	123	125	125			
8-10	RTS-Maint			101	101			
8-10	8/158 Avn Regt, Co A			15	15			
8-10	228 FSB, Co A	2	62	64		64		
8-10	28 Inf. Div HHC			23		23		
9-10	HHC, Avn Bde, 28ID	20	55	75		75		
8-10	PNGMA	110	576	706		706		
8-10	1/104 Avn Det 1	20	65	85		85		
8-10	2/104 Avn	92	192	284		284		
8-10	104 Sig Det	2	60	62		62		
8-10	103 7th Sig Co	12	115	127		127		
8-10	1/158 Avn Sig Bn			34				
8-10	10 6th Sig Bn	4	116	120				
8-10	17WSS-473, Det B	4	101	105				
8-10	Co E, 103 Engr			20		20		
8-10	154 Signal Bn	1	15	16		16		
8-10	BSA Sig #10			60				
8-10	1/315 Sig Bn	220	22	312	312			
8-10	318 S+S Bn	12	61	73	73			
8-10	228 FSB	20	120	140		140		
				(3009)				

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARANG	PARANG	Thru
9-10	6-68 Armor			300	300			
5-10	2090 USARF Bde			17	17			
17-22	DPOTMIS-CD	1	442	28		5		
8-17	Bucknell Univ			25				
15-17	RTS-Maint			61	61			
11-14	PA Police Academy			150				
8-16	Cornish College			54				
15-17	223 Drama			18	18			
15-17	2072 USARF Bde			9	9			
				(662)				
11-17	Billeting Walk-in			60	13	12	1	
17-21	41 Inf Bde			12				
15-25	LEA	2	52	27				
22-24	442 7th Ave Co	2	163	144	144			
22-24	RTS-Maint			77	77			
22-24	453 Fin Spt Unit	6	70	76	76			
22-24	1/314 Inf	3	40	43	43			
22-24	416 ENCOM	1	3	4	4			
22-24	PNG-1A	110	568	678		678		
22-24	Rider College			15				
22-24	2374 Sig Det	14	46	60	60			
22-24	1079 USACC	74	127	231	231			
22-24	2059 USARF			23	23			
22-24	6/68 Armor			40	40			
18-24	Billeting Walk-in			364	130	187	2	
				(187)				
25-31	Billeting Walk-in			75	16	48		
24-31	157 SFB			40	40			
27-31	RTS-Maint			55	53			
30-31	PNG-MTU			35		35		
27-31	WWII Historical			676				
30	Brownie Tro #889			30				
27-30	Explosives Tro #2067			7				
27-31	441 PSC	7	65	72	72			
1-31	T5FO (RG)			1				
	Total for January			6705	2352	2746	7	
	February							
	T.M.D./C. Utilization			438	125	110		
1-7	Billeting Walk-in			314	136	118	3	
5-7	1/315 Inf Bn	4	61	65	65			
6-7	278 S.S. Bn	15	58	73	73			
6-7	416 ENCOM parvey	4	4	8	8			
5-7	RTS-Maint	1	87	88	88			
5-7	442 7th Ave Co	2	147	149	149			
5-7	358 CA Bde	52	37	89	89			
5-7	6/68 Armor	20	380	390	390			
5-7	400 MD Bn	8	54	62	62			

Date	Unit	Off	EM	UNIT	USAR	PARENT	PARENT	Thru
11-6-7	310 Grand Co	2	50	53	52			
6-7	2072 USAR John		10	10	10			
5-7	228 FSB, Co B	12	150	142		122		
5-7	1/104 Cav	57	432	470		470		
5-7	1/104 Cav, Det 1	22	79	141		101		
5-7	PNGMA	135	536	721		721		
5-7	131 Grand Co	5	139	144		144		
5-7	Group D (Div) 1-104 Cav	13	30	33		33		
6-	Delphi Union			39				
5-7	BSA Troop #1865			45				
5-7	233 Grand Co		30	30	30			
6-7	103 Maint Co			30		30		
				(2975)				
8	PNGMA			42		42		
12-14	618 Armor	4	48	52	52			
12-14	GSA Troop #1233			53				
8-14	Bulleting Walk-in			62	33	47		
12-14	RIS-Maint			60	60			
				(329)				
15-21	Bulleting Walk-in			318	59	112		
16-22	213 ASB	1	5	6		6		
18-21	131 Grand Co	6	130	136		136		
19-21	RIS-Maint			52	52			
19-21	1079 USAR	74	157	231	231			
19-21	442 FSC	3	135	158	158			
19-21	2059 USARF			24	24			
19-21	2374 Sig Det	16	53	69	69			
19-21	1/314 Stry, Co E	2	20	22	22			
19-21	1453 FSU	4	74	78	78			
19-21	348 Para Troop	120	240	300	300			
19-21	365 Emv	3	21	24	24			
19-21	338 Med Bty	9	19	28	28			
20-21	C, 8/158 Avn Regt			15	15			
19-21	PNGMA	68	542	616		616		
19-21	104 Avn, Co F			50		50		
19-21	28 MP Co	9	122	131		131		
19-21	28 Inf Div, HHC	71	179	250		250		
19-21	109 FA, F	8	50	58		58		
19-21	John Hopkins Univ			80				
19-21	Loyola College	4	569	78				
19-21	870 Eng			668		668		
12-14	Drexel Univ			88				
				(3150)				
26-28	338 Med Bty	3	38	41	41			
26-28	441 PSC	6	72	78	78			
26-28	RIS-Maint			42	42			
26-28	HHC, Avn Bde, 28 ID	20	55	75		65		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Note	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PRANG	PRANG	These
1	2/104 Com	92	185	277		277		
2	High Unit			48				
3	People Unit			31				
4	Dickinson Unit			50				
5	Bulleting Walk-in			113	49	57		
6	TSFO (RG)			44	36	18		
7	Util for February			8001	3698	4442		3
8	March							
9	TADO/c Utilization			610		210		
10	4-7 PIS-Maint	2	97	99	89			
11	5-7 744 MR Bn	9	40	49	49			
12	5-7 1079 USAR		10	10	10			
13	5-7 378 S+S Bn	13	37	50	50			
14	5-7 223 Grand Co		13	13	13			
15	5-7 442 FSC	2	98	100	100			
16	5-7 PNGMA	62	594	656		656		
17	5-7 103 Engr Bn	1	1	2		2		
18	5-7 337 Maint Bn	11	93	104		104		
19	5-7 103 Maint Co	8	129	137		137		
20	5-7 56 Bde	19	117	136		136		
21	5-7 3/109 Inf	35	538	573		573		
22	5-7 2/111 Inf	37	450	487		487		
23	5-7 2/112 Inf	36	641	677		677		
24	5-7 Det 3, Comm Co (USAR)	10	146	156				
25	5-7 I+I Staff (2E)	3	90	93				
26	5-7 473, Det 3, Wyoming	4	92	96				
27	5-7 Valley Forge Mil Acad			33				
28	5-7 1/315 Inf	24	523	547	547			
29	1-7 Bulleting Walk-in			212	76	95		3
30				(4250)				
31	12-14 442 FSC			3	3			
32	12-14 8/158 Run Reg			3	3			
33	12-14 441 PSC			3	3			
34	12-14 Dep C, 9 Cav	1	6	7	7			
35	12-14 154 Grand Bn	4	3	7		7		
36	12-14 28 Divarty			3		3		
37	12-14 28 ID Reg		5	6		6		
38	12-14 1/104 Cav			12		12		
39	12-14 1/104 Cav, Det			3		3		
40	12-14 3/104 Com			3		3		
41	12-14 328 FSB			8		8		
42	12-14 728 MSB			5		5		
43	12-14 128 FSB Hq			10		10		
44	12-14 Co E, 104 Cav			3		3		
45	12-14 PIS-Maint			65	65			
46	12-14 335 Tech Reg	8	21	29	29			
47	12-14 1/229 FA	40	460	500		500		

with cancelled
Bliss

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARMS	PARMS	Pres Dues
12-14	PNEMA	26	685	711		711		
12-14	1/107 FA	1	42	44		44		
11	PA Police Academy			50				
12-14	1/109 FA (inv + Pres)			8		8		
12-14	HMC Bn Bde, 282			3		3		
12-14	1/108 FA Bn		13	14		14		
12-14	56 Bde			3		3		
12-14	109 FA, Bn F			3		3		
8-14	Billeting Walk-in			268 (1824)	61	194		2
15-21	Billeting Walk-in			286	27	154		3
19-21	416 EDCOM	4	4	8	8			
19-21	3/42 FA Bn		15	15	15			
19-21	2059 USARF		33	33	33			
19-21	1079 USARF	20	147.5	162	162			
19-21	453 7th Inf Unit	6	71	77	77			
19-21	1/314 Inf, E	2	55	57	57			
19-21	2374 Sig Det	16	54	70	70			
19-21	RTS - Throat	5	43	48	48			
19-21	228 FSB	20	85	105		118		
19-21	1/213 ADA	26	220	256		256		
19-21	442 FSC	4	149	153	153			
20-21	464 Eng Bn (Company)	1	42	43	43			
19-21	1/104 Cav Det	38	86	124		114		
19-21	441 PSC	7	60	67	67			
19	I-E Staff, Reading	1	8	9				
19-21	Dep #50, BSA			48				
19-21	Cub Scout Pack #146			25				
12-14	56 Bde (additional units)			13 (1602)		13		
26-28	RTS - Throat		50	50	50			
27-28	2072 USARF		9	9	9			
26-28	1/110 Inf Bn	40	641	641		641		
26-28	108 CSH	35	110	145		145		
26-28	2/104 Bn	23	195	217		207		
26-28	104 Inf Det (LES)	2	31	33		33		
26-28	1/30 SFC, Co C	10	50	60				
26-28	Shippensburg Union	6	61	67				
26-28	Lehigh Union	6	2108	116				
26-28	TSU AEROC Det 720	3	1474	18				
26-28	BSA Grp #74			57				
26-28	1/315 Inf Bn	4	33	36	36			
22-28	Billeting Walk-in			195	32	108		3
26-28	6/68 Wilson			359	359			
1-31	TSFO (RG)			107		117		
	Total for Throat			10458	2391	6653		10

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USARF	PARAG	PAANG	Thru
April	TADO/c Utilization			260		100		
29-4	Billeting Walk-ins			294	56	106		
31-4	FBI			30				
2-4	484 Ave Co	2	15	17	17			
2-4	RTS - Taint	2	103	105	105			
2-4	378 S+S Em	13	95	108	108			
2-4	442 Hill Ave Co	3	97	100	100			
2-4	416 ENCOM	5	3	8	8			
2-4	5th Psyop Snp			189	189			
1-4	464 Eng	3	52	55	55			
2-4	HMB at Security	90	50	140		100		
2-4	109 EA, Mty F	8	60	68		68		
2-4	1/103 Av, Lt D	6	70	76		76		
2-4	1/107 FA Bn	27	303	330		330		
2-4	1/108 FA Bn	28	381	409		409		
2-4	1/109 FA, 7th	5	82	87		87		
2-4	337 7th Snp	13	64	76		76		
2-4	104 Avn, Co F	30	100	130		130		
2-4	109 Av (M)		42	42		42		
1-4	Millersville Univ	11	83	94				
2-4	PSU, Univ Park			383				
31-4	Agriacoe Univ			404				
2-4	W. Maryland Univ			19				
2-4	Quekwell Univ			193				
2-4	H. 3/25 Marines	5	125	130				
2-4	Det 3, Comnd	4	155	159				
2-4	4th LAI Bn			124				
2-4	BSA Div #97			30				
2-4	CT 7th Acad	15	30	46				
3-4	2090 USARF			49	49			
6	572 MIP	1	15	16				
5-1	Billeting Walk-ins			72	36	24		
				(95)				
14-16	1110 Signal Bn	1	34	35				
16-18	313 Trans Bn	59	115	174	174			
16-18	1-314 Inf, Co E	4	52	56	56			
16-18	365 Eng, Co A	5	160	166	165			
16-18	338 7th Snp	8	34	42	33			
16-18	1079 USARF	74	157	231	231			
16-18	453 FSU	6	21	27	27			
16-18	3374 Sig Det	17	55	69	69			
16-18	RTS - Taint		60	60	60			
16-18	2059 USARF		33	33	33			
16-18	1-315 Inf	26	362	388	388			
17-18	3-42nd	1	6	7	7			

Cavalry units

Date	Unit	ORA	FM	Total	USAR	PROVING	PROVING	Thres Due
16-18	28. Arm. Bde	40	48	88			68	
16-18	1-229 FA Bn	2	62	64			64	
16-18	228 FSB	8	60	68			68	
17	211 EIS		13	13			13	
16-18	1-213 ADA	15	285	300			300	
16-18	2-104. Arm	92	195	287			287	
16-18	104 Inf det	2	60	62			62	
16-18	56 Bde	18	110	128			128	
16-18	3-109. Inf	32	500	532			532	
16-18	2-111. Inf	40	320	360			360	
16-18	2-112. Inf	33	639	672			672	
16-18	128 Chem	6	46	52			52	
16-18	1-109. Inf	1	72	73			73	
17-18	Deton Hall House			36				
15-18	Arkansas House	3	53	55				
16-19	BSA Troop #384			44				
16-19	BSA Troop #103			22				
16-19	E Co, 2-25. Inf	6	140	146				
16-18	6-65 Reman	12	123	140	124			
18-18	Bulleting (walk-in)			422	152	316	4	
13-14	74 USAR, FTIB			22				
16-18	298 Maint. Co			12	14			
				(5050)				
12-12	542 EOD (C)	1	17	18				
23-25	1-219 FA Bn	3	60	63			63	
21	213 A.S.C.	2	6	8			8	
23-25	1-109. FA, 7 th	31	435	466			466	
23-25	103 Engr Bn	26	430	456			456	
23-25	154 Recon Bn	12	381	393			393	
23-25	1-104 Cbr	58	304	362			362	
23-25	1-104 Cav. Det 1	35	65	100			100	
23-25	728 MSB, Co B	6	102	108			108	
23-25	2072 USARF			9	9			
23-25	RTS-Maint		66	66	66			
23-25	1079 USARG		60	60	60			
23-25	441 TSC	6	61	67	67			
23-25	442 FSC	2	118	120	120			
23-25	2071 USARF	25	53	80	80			
23-25	365 Engr	2	32	34	32			
23-25	Det 3, 7 th STARC-SC	8	60	68				
23-25	Loyola Univ			19				
23	Harrisburg PD			12				
19-25	Bulleting (walk-in)			313	64	132	6	
25-90	DPOTMS-C.D	1	4-15	20			5	
38-29	347 PSC (Convoy)	2	10	12	12			
26-30	FBI			105				
				(2925)				

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARMS	PARMS	Thru June
04-30	TSED (RG)			133		133		
13-16	LER	1	30	31				
	Hotel for April			12098	2774	6615	10	
	May							
	60000% Utilization			490	10	45		
1-2	484 Ave Co (986 Thint)	22	122	149	149			
1-2	442 7th Ave Co	3	114	117	117			
1-2	315 Engg Bn			40	40			
1-2	458 Med Det	4	35	39	39			
1-2	453 Finy Apt Unit	6	65	71	71			
1-2	1-314 Inf (M)	11	35	46	46			
1-2	1079 USAR B	30	134	164	164			
1-2	412 Engg	2	33	35	35			
1-2	RTS - Thint		60	60	60			
1-2	338 MI Bn Co C	4	31	35	35			
1-2	817 Repl Bn	6	38	44	44			
1-2	2059 USAR F			32	32			
1-2	2374 Sig Det	15	44	59	59			
1-2	365 Eng Bn			6	6			
1-2	1-109 Inf Bn	13	135	147		147		
1-2	1-229 FA	3	97	100		100		
1-2	791 AF JROTC	1	35	36				
1-2	Det 2 Comm Co	5	160	165				
1-2	E 2/15 Marine	1	30	31				
1-2	Wpna Co 3/25 Marine	7	70	77				
1-2	I Btry 3/14 Marine	9	150	159				
1-2	BSA Exp #78			62				
				(1680)				
26-2	Billeting Walk-ins			316	57	44		
3-9	Billeting Walk-ins			239	26	26	4	
4-6	USAR B Pittsburgh	13	12	31				
7-10	1/192 Con, Co C	20	12	32				
7-9	BSA Exp #116			13				
7-8	Marine Corps Regt	3	211	214				
8-8	Bucknell Univ			18				
9-8	RTS - Thint		40	40	40			
				(1639)				
14-16	479 FA Bn	15	91	106	106			
14-16	442 7th Ave Co	7	100	107	107			
14-16	327 S+S Bn	30	205	235	235			
14-16	378 S+S Bn	27	82	110	110			
14-16	79 ACCOM, 24	22	82	104	104			
14-16	3-42 FA	30	216	246	246			
14-16	441 PSC	6	60	66	66			
14-16	372 WOP Co	1	80	81	81			
14-16	1/314 Inf Bn	20	335	355	355			
14-16	338 Med Bn	7	95	102	102			

date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARAG	PARAG	Three Star
14-16	416 ENCOM	4	4	8	8			
14-16	972 PSC	4	25	29	29			
14-16	Dep C, 9 Cav	5	30	35	35			
14-16	2072 USARF Sch		115	115	115			
14-16	1079 USARF		70	70	70			
14-16	Co F, 104 Avn	18	224	242		242		
14-16	1/107 FA, Btry C	4	106	110		110		
14-16	154 Gren Co	8	21	29		29		
15-16	Co B, 737 MSB	5	101	101		6		
14-16	109 FA, Btry F	6	41	47		47		
14-16	28 Sig Bn	11	45	56		56		
14-16	1/103 Armor, Co D	5	75	80		80		
14-16	2/104 Avn	93	195	288		288		
14-16	HHC, Avn Bde, 25 ID	46	190	236		236		
14-16	55 Bde	28	87	115		115		
14-16	HHC, 25 Divarty	15	30	45		45		
14-16	HHC, 2 Bde, 25 ID	18	13	30		30		
14-16	103 Engr Co	11	165	176		176		
14-16	56 Bde	18	117	135		135		
14-16	1/109 FA, Btry	27	418	445		445		
14-16	28 Inf Div DISCOM	96	137	233		233		
14-16	28 Inf Div HHC	70	180	250		250		
14-16	228 FSB, HHD	20	140	160		160		
14-16	2/112 Inf Bn	34	437	471		471		
14-16	1/213 ADA, Hq	16	56	72		72		
14-16	USARF - Gittsburg	12	12	24				
14-16	RTS - Thairt			35	35			
10-16	Billeting Walk-in			357	76	205		
14-16	6/67 Avn			357	359			
				(6072)				
21-23	348 Gen. Hosp	133	187	320	320			
21-23	876 Engr Co	15	235	250		250		
21-23	28 AG Co	11	139	150		150		
21-23	1/104 Cav, det 1	5	52	57		57		
21-23	1/104 Cav	38	157	195		195		
21-23	213 ASG	42	81	123		123		
19-20	Carlisle Bde			22				
21-22	442 7th Svc Co	2	98	100	100			
21-23	365 Engr Co	2	20	22	22			
18-19	1/192 Avn, Co C	20	13	33				33
20-21	1/122 Avn, Co C	21	12	33				33
22-23	OSA Trp #543			15				
23-23	Brownie Trp #79			20				
21-23	28 FSU (Trp #113 th 1st)			72		72		
21-23	RTS - Thairt		27	27	27			
21-23	2072 USARF Sch		116	116	116			
17-23	Billeting Walk-in			346	129	137	6	

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Hotel	USAR	PARAG	FRANC	TRAVEL
1-28-38	Shippensburg Train	50	357.100	448				
2-2-38	Concord College	7	55.12	70				
2-2-38	Redeater Inst.			85				
1-5-38	Millersville Train	1	67.1	8				
3-2-38	PNG-MTU	18	93	111		111		
1-30	AG-TSFO			28			29	
3-4-29	Billeting Walk-in			160	46			8
25-38	Ny Co USAR, Ft Detrick			45				
	Hotel for They			11787	4085	5347	36	1
	TRADO/c. Utilizations			75	71			
31-6	Billeting Walk-in			454	155	176		P
4-6	338 Red Sp			30	30			
4-6	214 MI Co	16	58	74	74			
4-6	3/42 FA Bn	30	355	385	385			
4-6	6/68 Armor	20	285	305	305			
4-6	1/314 Sig Bn	23	285	318	318			
4-6	1079 USAR	7	52	65	65			
4-6	1/107 FA Bn	30	170	200		200		
4-6	1/109 FA, Sig	36	451	487		487		
5-6	Ny STARC	105	210	515		515		
5-6	271 CC Sp	2	36	38			38	
4-6	2/103 Armor	3	25	28			28	
4-6	103 Maint Co	9	83	92			92	
5-6	228 FSB	18	100	118			118	
4-6	Aprs, 2/25 Marine			36				
				(2745)				
7-13	Billeting Walk-in			254	86	94		L
11-13	416 CA Co			123	123			
11-13	453 Gen Apt Unit	6	44	50	50			
11-13	1079 USAR	39	110	149	149			
11-13	338 Red Sp	10	31	32	32			
11-13	3374 Sig Det			69	69			
10-13	814 Sup Co	2	100	102	102			
11-13	28 AG Co	10	110	120		120		
11-13	2/104 Arm Bn	25	183	282		282		
11-13	E Co, 2/25 Marine			149				
11-12	Cuba Scout. Gadsden			25				
11-13	Sullivan's Youth Org			24				
12-13	986 Bld			17	17			
4-6	RTS-Maint			19	19			
11-13	RTS-Maint			20	20			
11-13	104 Arm, Co F			200		200		
				(1601)				
11-13	104 Arm, Co F (admission)		10	22		22		
13-18	Scotland Adm for Det Children		62.21	37				
18-20	4 CA Sp	17	30	47				

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	ARRRUS	ARRRUS	The
17-20	305 MP Co	4	89	91	91			
17-20	Hq. 1/107 FA	15	165	180		180		
18-20	2/110 Inf Bn	5	106	111		111		
23	Allentown Police Dept.	3	18	21				
14-20	Billeting Walk-in			323	50	158		4
19-20	363 MP Co (FON)			122 (940)	122			
25-27	Dep C, 9 Cav	5	90	95	95			
25-27	337 MI Co (conroy)	2	17	20	20			
23	State Police Youth Club			132				
21-23	LEA (SET) F.M.G.	1	30	31				
25-27	2/103 Armor			28		28		
26-27	336 Med	1	10	11				
26-27	441 PSC	5	68	73	73			
25-27	RTS-Maint			29	29			
26-27	322 Gen Hosp	42	80	122	122			
26-27	1/104 Cav Det 1	4	44	48		48		
21-27	Billeting Walk-in			327	135	193		5
28-29	York Police Dept			16				
1-30	PRG-TSFO			47	47			
26-29	BSA Det #175, Babylon, NY			60				
22	Hotel for June			6661	2860	2868		61
23	July							
24	ATTNDD/C Utilization			1356	450	900		
1-2	1/103 Armor Bn	5	123	128		128		
2-3	363 MP Co (conroy)			22	122			
6	PA. State Police Academy			46				
26-27	100 Sta Hosp	71	168	139	179			
28-4 pt	Billeting Walk-in			156 (481)	30	93		4
5-11	Billeting Walk-in			416	175	136		8
9	Letterkenny AD			15				
8-9	336 Med		10	10				
9-10	337 MI Co	3	23	26	26			
9-11	RTS-Maint			15	15			
10-11	1079 USAR	56	89	145	145			
9-11	338 Med Bn (91C)	8	48	56	56			
10-11	PNG-ATU			160		160		
10-11	PNG-MA	86	460	546		546		
9-11	121 Troop Co	5	112	117		117		
9-11	28 Fin Spt	8	85	93		93		
9-10	1/104 Cav Det 1	35	100	135		135		
10	2, 2/103 Armor	4	41	45		45		
9-11	103 Maint	7	82	89		89		
9-11	150 Ann Co E	23	22	45				
9-11	378 S+S Bn	12	25	37	37			
10-11	4, 3/25 Medic	5	114	119				

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Hotel	USAR	LOAN-6	LOAN-6	Misc
9-11	Valley Forge			1,144	142			
9-11	7-Capt. Olympical			10,500	510		10	
6-11	Abuse Christian Fellowship, Int.				90			
11-17	B.S.A. Trip #131, Annapolis				38			
				(3007)				
13	56 EOD	1	13		14			
13	LEA	1	4	4	9			
16	Letterkenny AD	2	18		31			
9-15	Hq, 99 ACCOM	2	32		34	34		
16-18	318 Throat Co	4	38		43	42		
16-18	RTS-Throat		35		25	25		
17-18	1/314 Inf	3	34		37	37		
16-18	C, 1/314 Inf	4	53		57	57		
17-18	6/88 Armor		17		17	17		
16-18	986 Throat Bn	1	54		53	55		
16-18	HHC, 4th Bde, 28ID	15	58		73		73	
16-18	1-109 FA Hq		25		25		25	
17-18	397 Throat Bn	2	33		35			
16-18	Hq, 4th Wng, CAP	23 (23/24/25)	7		30			
13	PA State Police Academy				50			
13	PA State Police Academy				50			
12-18	Billeting Walk-ins				307	133	93	
				(883)				
10-11	104 Avn, Co F	2	40		42		43	
30	572 MP	1	20		21			
21-22	277 (M) Co (convoy)	2	27		29	29		
23-25	3rd Co, 9th Cav	4	53		57	57		
24-25	453 FSU	4	47		51	51		
23-25	1/314 Inf, Bn	14	76		80	40		
24-25	2314 Sig Det	13	56		62	62		
24-25	416 ENCOM	4	4		8	8		
23-25	RTS-Throat		7		7	7		
23-25	108 Out Apt Hq	29	146		175		195	
23-25	28 AC Co	10	100		110		110	
23-25	1/104 Cav Det 1	3	57		62		62	
11-25	DDOTMA-DINA (22 mile / PA Police)				139			
22-23	LEA, FTIG	6	6		12			
28	LEA, FTIG	1	2	100	103			
11-25	Billeting Walk-ins				306	106	94	
31	453 FSC				(1231)			
31	453 FSC	5	41		46	46		
30	LEA	2	3		5			
28-30	Camp Cadet				130			
1-31	RG-TSFO				0			
24-31	PAW CAP, Lebanon (Camp)				262			
	Hotel for July				7391	2066	3084	12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Date	Unit	Off	EM	Detal	USAR	PAROUS	PAROUS	Time Base
August								
	TRADO/c Utilization			574	394			
4-10	Billeting Walk-in			312	82	142		2
2-7	Billeting Walk-in			435	152	174		6
5-6	377 Q1A Co	2	28	30	30			
6-7	320 MP BN	8	93	101	101			
6-7	1079 USARC		40	40	40			
7-7	378 S+S	12	89	84	81			
6-8	420 Eng Co	5	54	59	59			
9-8	338 Med Reg	16	14	30	30			
7-7	RTS-Maint		31	31	31			
7	193 SOG	1	17	18		18		
7-7	335 FSB	30	100	130		130		
7-7	Det 1, 1/104 Cav	5	20	25		25		
6-8	103 Maint Co	10	85	85		85		
7-7	313 ASG	75	275	350		350		
7-7	4, 3/15 Marines	7	96	103				
6	LEA	1	10	11				
7	254 Q11 Co		85	85	85			
7-7	484 Svc Co		9	9	9			
4	Comp Cabt (38 PS3)	1	16	17		17		
2-3	BFA Reg #875			12				
6-8	310 Troop Co			74	74			
4-7	Trainer Beardsall (Spencer Valley)			180 (200)				
9-15	Billeting Walk-in			226	89	72		4
10	LEA	1	8	9				
14-15	441 PSC	7	53	60	60			
14-15	365 Eng	2	22	24	24			
14-15	453 FSU	5	45	50	50			
13-15	79 ARCOM, 71g	12	101	113	113			
13-15	RTS-Maint		10	10	10			
13-15	HAC, 2/103 Armor	2	164	166		106		
12-18	PNG-MIA	42	386	428		428		
13-15	A, 2/103 Armor	3	65	68		68		
13-15	A, 1/108 FA	4	52	56		56		
13-15	HAC, Don/Sec, 28 ID	18	50	68		68		
13-15	Det 2, Comm Co	10	151	161				
10	Camp Cabt			105				
13-15	2/104 Caval	89	687	806		276		
16-22	Billeting Walk-in			312	116	154		9
16-21	PSU-Maint ROTC	2	3	27				
20-22	6/68 Armor, Co A		12	12	12			
21-22	6/68 Armor, Mortar	1	89	40	40			
18	214 MIT	4	21	25	25			
21-22	332 New Troop	40	56	96	96			

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARANG	PARANG	This Month
20-22	300 All. Hosp.	45	177	222	222			
21-22	3374 Sig Det.	13	56	69	69			
20-22	317. 7th Det.	14	23	37	37			
21-22	416 ENCOM	4	4	8	8			
20-22	1/313 ADA	15	253	268		268		
20-22	2/111. Inf	40	420	460		460		
21-22	104 Avn, Co F	40	240	280		280		
21-22	1/109. FA	2	67	69		69		
20-22	3/109. Inf	34	585	619		619		
20-22	PNG-DETU	6	34	40		40		
20-22	262 Maint	4	154	158				
				(2802)				
20-22	1079. USAR-C	55	197	142	142			
27-29	79. ARCOM	28	18	46	46			
27-29	1/315. Inf	30	350	380	380			
27-29	128. Chem Co	5	58	63		63		
26-29	York Police Dept			13				
26-29	Allentown Police Dept			16				
26-29	Lebanon High School (Camp)			58				
23-29	Billeting Walk-ins			328	22	156	1	1
				(1065)				
	Total for August			8506	2783	4208	22	17
September								
TMD/C Utilization								
30 Aug - 5 Sep	Billeting Walk-ins			149	24	19		
30 Aug - 3 Sep	Sheep Train			134	24	56	3	
Aug	RG-TSFO			27		27		
				(238)				
10-12	643 Supply	2	72	74	74			
10-12	1079 USAR-C		15	15	15			
10-12	R.TS - Maint		27	27	27			
11-12	310 Troop	3	71	74	74			
11-12	378 S+S Bn	11	30	41	41			
10-12	3/42 FA Bn	2	30	32	32			
9-12	254 Supply	5	83	88	88			
10-12	327 S+S Bn	6	3	9	9			
10-12	442 7th Inf Co	3	54	57	57			
10-12	3/112 Inf	34	653	687		687		
10-12	104 Avn, Co F	18	235	253		253		
11-12	228 FSB, HHD	10	110	120		120		
10-12	1/104 Cav, Det 1	3	58	61		61		
10-12	104 Inf Det	2	65	67		67		
10-12	2/104 Avn	92	191	283		283		
10-12	5/109 Inf	31	520	551		551		
10-12	213 ASG	40	85	125		125		
10-12	56 Bde, HHC	18	103	120		120		
10-12	1/329 FA	2	67	69		69		

Date	Unit	Off	EM	Total	USAR	PARANG	FRANG	Area
10-12	1/104 Cav	58	417	475		475		
10-11	193 SRG	12	41	53			53	
10-12	E 3/25 Medical	4	176	180				
10-11	Lehigh Univ	2	344	346				
11	Lehigh Univ	1	1280	1281				
11	Valley Forge	2	45	47				
10-12	AHC, Cond Bldg, 28 ID	15	50	65		65		
				(3626)				
17-20	338 716d Hp, HHD	8	10	18	18			
15-19	1/103 Armer	3	40	43		43		
15-19	1/229 FA	2	100	102		102		
14-19	28. Diversity (Reunion)	1	100	261			11	
14-15	USMC, Carlisle		70	70				
15-17	F.B.I.			19				
17-19	3374 Sig Bde	12	55	67	67			
17-19	416 ENCOM	4	4	8	8			
17-19	338 716d Hp (RIC Sq)	7	45	52	53			
17-19	323 Gen Hosp (HUM)	47	110	157	157			
17-19	416 CA Bn			15	15			
18-19	365 Engr Bn	3	6	9	9			
18-19	1/314 Inf, Co E		4	4	4			
17-19	Cornell Univ	4	6	10				
17-19	St. Bonaventura Univ			49				
17-19	Nicherson Univ			49				
17-19	453 Gen Inf Unit	6	36	42	42			
16-18	31 Engr Bn			42			42	
17-19	2/103 Armer	57	498	555		555		
17-19	728 MSB, Co E		12	12		12		
17-19	728 MSB 716d, Co F	8	65	73		73		
17-19	1/109 Arty	48	675	723		723		
17-19	38 DISCOM, HHC	34	155	189		189		
18-19	1079 USARV	42	121	163	163			
10-12	2/111 Arty			446			446	
17-19	55 Bde	21	65	86			86	
6-12	Billeting Walk-ins			369	67		214	6
15-19	Billeting Walk-ins			416	82		265	2
10-27	Hq STARC (Malamen)			(4070)				
10-27	Hq STARC (Malamen)	10	40	50			50	
22-26	1/316 Engr Bn	10	350	360	360			
24-26	28 AG Co	13	133	146			146	
20-26	215-1-229 FA	3	72	75			75	
24-26	103 Engr Bn	29	515	544			544	
24-26	109 FA Bty F	8	60	68			68	
24-26	1/109 FA, 7th	38	425	463			463	
20-26	1/108 FA Bn	29	382	411			411	
24-26	1/107 FA Bn	28	372	390			390	
25	Lehigh Univ			371				

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
OCTOBER				
1-3	RTS-MAINT	18		
2-3	2059 USARF SCH	16		
1-3	220 MP BDE	100		
2-3	378 S&S BN	44		
2-3	372 MP CO	130		
2-3	1079 USARG	204		
1-3	986 ORD BN	192		
1-3	2374 SIG DET	68		
1-3	1/213 ADA, HHB.		96	
6-10	1/229 FA BN	115		
8-10	337 MAINT BN		408	
8-10	228 S&S BN, HQ		320	
5TH	E CO, 150 AVN		3	
8-10	RTS-MAINT	21		
15-17	338 MED GP, HHD	54		
14-15	378 S&S BN	70		
14-17	1/315 INF BN	345		
15-17	RTS-MAINT	30		
15-17	254 SUP CO	76		
15-17	310 TRANS CO TT	53		
14-17	1/314 INF BN	517		
15-17	453 FIN SPT UNIT	64		
12-14	79 ARCOM, HQ	90		
14-17	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		68	
15-17	728 MSB, CO B		103	
15-17	3/109 INF		570	
12-17	28 MP CO		63	
15-17	1/111 INF BN		591	
15-17	2/103 ARMOR BN		300	
13-18	PA MIL ACAD		180	
15TH	128 CHEM CO		67	
14-17	2/111 INF BN		486	
14-17	154 TRANS BN		305	
15-17	2/104 AVN		284	
15-17	104 INF DET		73	
23-24	441 PSC	75		
22-24	RTS-MAINT	81		
22-24	416 ENCOM	8		
22-24	458 MED DET	31		
22-24	2090 USAR SCH	65		
22-24	HHB, 28 DIVARTY		200	
20-24	1/229 FA BN		82	
22-24	109, BTRY F		68	
22-24	2/103 ARMOR BN		175	
22-24	1/108 FA BN		458	
23-24	728 MSB(-), BQ (CO D)		10	
29-31	1079 USARG	29		

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
OCTOBER (continued)				
29-31	1/104 CAV, DET		144	
29-31	104 AVN, CO F		254	
29-31	108 CBT SPT HOSP		11	
27-31	1/229 FA BN		103	
29-31	1/104 CAV		470	
28-31	224 AVN, REG, CO F		164	
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TOTAL:	53 UNITS	2,496	6,056	

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE NOVEMBER	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
5-7	365 ENGR BN, HSC	76		
5-7	1079 USARG	25		
5-7	378 S&S BN	72		
6-7	315 ENGR GP	234		
5-7	728 MSB, CO B	109		
6-7	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		75	
5-7	420 ENGR	10		
6-7	441 PSC	21		
5-7	1/108 FA BN		358	
5-7	BTRY C, 1-108 FA		77	
5-7	2-111 INF BN		362	
5-7	2/103 ARMOR BN		175	
5-7	2/104 AVN BN		280	
5-7	1/109 FA, HQ		467	
3-8	PNGMA		246	
5-7	228 S&T BN, HQ		215	
5-7	109 FA, BTRY F		60	
5-7	3622ND, DET 1		75	
5-7	104 INF DET (LRS)		103	
11-14	1/315 INF BN	399		
12-14	1/314 INF BN	244		
12-14	453 FIN SPT UNIT	36		
12-14	1/213 ADA, HEB		380	
12-14	1/104 CAV		360	
12-14	154 TRANS BN		310	
12-14	2/103 ARMOR BN		165	
12-14	1/104 CAV, DET 1		121	
12-14	3/14 MARINES, I BTRY			119
5-7	RTS-MAINT	8		
5-7	CO E, 2/25 MARINES			135
12-14	RTS-MAINT	33		
18-21	1-103 ARMOR BN		64	
19-21	104 AVN, CO F		253	
16-17	378 S&S BN (CONF)	11		
19-21	441 PSC	60		
19-21	338 MED GP (91C)	54		
20-21	1079 USARG	211		
18-21	313 TRANS CO	547		
20-21	2059 USARF SCH	12		
19-21	RTS-MAINT	78		
18-21	3-42 FA BN	265		
19-21	2374 SIG DET	68		
19-21	416 ENCOM	8		
19-21	2090 USAR SCH	65		
TOTAL: 44 UNITS		2,646	4,146	254

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
3-5	RTS-MAINT	43		
3-5	104 AVN, CO F	250		
4-5	378 S&S BN	74		
4-5	365 ENGR CBT BN	22		
3-5	108 CBT SPT HOSP		12	
3-5	DET 1, 3622 MAINT CO		80	
10-12	416 ENGR CMD	8		
10-12	RTS-MAINT	24		
11-12	1079 USARG	193		
10-12	453 FIN SPT UNIT	82		
10-12	2374 SIG DET	68		
10-12	TRP C, 9TH CAV	90		
10-12	DET 1, 1-104 CAV		68	
8-13	PA MIL ACAD		350	
10-12	I BTRY, 3-14 MARINES			140
11-12	WPNS CO, 3-25 MARINES			138
11-12	BHD, 228 FSB		62	
10-12	228 FSB, CO A		138	
11-12	2090 USARF SCH	74		
18-19	2/104 AVN BN		298	
17-19	BHC, AVN BDE		70	
17-19	338 MED GP, (91C)	50		
17-19	441 PSC	80		
17-19	RTS-MAINT	12		
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TOTAL:	24 UNITS	1,070	1,078	278

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
JANUARY				
8-10	RTS-MAINT	51		
6-9	104 INT DET (LRS)		34	
7-8	28 INF DIV, HHC AVN BDE		50	
7-9	2/104 AVN		286	
7-9	1/109 FA, HQ		39	
7-9	228 FSB, HHD		140	
6-10	PNGMA		545	
7-9	104 AVN, CO F		250	
15-16	CO F, 104 AVN		20	
15-16	6-68 ARMOR, SCOUT PLTN	25		
14-16	2090 USARF SCH	74		
14-16	416 ENCOM	8		
10-16	RTS-MAINT	20		
15-16	378 S&S BN	67		
21-23	365 ENGR BN	11		
21-23	453 FIN SPT UNIT	51		
21-23	2/103 ARMOR BN		175	
20-24	PNGMA		539	
21-23	1/104 CAV, DET 1, HHT		150	
21-23	RTS-MAINT	24		
29-30	RTS-MAINT	42		
28-30	2374 SIG DET	68		
29-30	1079 USARG	223		
29-30	441 PSC	65		
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TOTAL:	24 UNITS	729	2,228	

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94.

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
FEBRUARY				
4-6	I&I STAFF, N&MCRC			106
4-6	420 ENGR CO	96		
5-6	2374 SIG DET	69		
5-6	416 ENCOM	8		
4-6	1-315 INF	334		
4-6	378 S&S BN	74		
4-6	365 ENGR BN	15		
3-7	PNGMA		474	
4-6	1-109 FA		50	
5-6	2090 USARF SCH	62		
4-6	RTS-MAINT	52		
5-6	DET 1, 3622 MAINT CO		71	
4-6	338 MED GP, (91C)	28		
5-6	2072 USARF SCH	32		
12-13	1079 USARG	222		
11-13	228 FSB		70	
10-14	PNGMA		468	
18-20	RTS-MAINT	57		
19-20	441 PSC	70		
19-20	2-103 ARMOR		136	
25-27	453 FIN SPT UNIT	5		
25-27	6-68 ARMOR, CO B	30		
25-27	1-315 INF BN	11		
25-27	1/104 INF DET (LRS)		107	
25-27	728 MSB, CO B		116	
26-27	728 MSB, CO C		16	
25-27	108 CSB		7	
25-27	2/103 ARMOR		182	
25-27	2/104 AVN		287	
25-27	1/103 ARMOR		80	
25-27	28 ID, HHC, AVN BDE		85	
26-27	I BTRY, 3-14 MARINES			142
25-27	RTS-MAINT	54		
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TOTAL:	33 UNITS	1,219	2,149	248

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES
MARCH				
4-6	361 EVAC HOSP	17		
4-6	RTS-MAINT	36		
4-6	2090 USARF SCH	74		
4-6	378 S&S BN	77		
4-6	365 ENGR BN	20		
4-6	338 MED GP (91C)	31		
4-6	2/111 INF BN		129	
3-7	PNGMA		463	
3-4	3-7TH SFG, CO B, DET 712			6
4-6	DET 1, 3622 MAINT		61	
12-13	416 ENCOM	8		
10-13	338 MED GP (91C)	43		
11-13	RTS-MAINT	45		
12-13	2059 USARF SCH	19		
12-13	441 PSC	85		
11-13	1/314 INF BN	671		
11-13	328 SPT BN (FSB)		349	
11-13	1/104 CAV, DET 1, HHT		72	
11-13	1/108 FA BN		409	
11-13	2/103 ARMOR		157	
11-13	228 FSB, HQ		213	
11-13	28 MP CO		140	
11-13	128 CHEM CO		56	
11-13	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		40	
11-13	1/109 FA, HQ		461	
11-13	2/104 AVN BN		279	
11-13	104 AVN, CO F		246	
11-14	728 MSB, CO B		139	
11-13	128 FSB		6	
11-13	1/104 CAV		357	
11-13	103 ENGR BN		550	
18-20	453 FIN SPT UNIT	54		
18-20	2374 SIG DET	69		
18-20	1079 USARG	207		
18-20	RTS-MAINT	31		
18-20	55 BDE		78	
18-20	1-109 INF BN		715	
18-20	1-111 INF BN		744	
18-20	2/103 ARMOR		325	
18-20	1/103 ARMOR		81	
25-27	104 INF DET (LRS)		47	
25-27	2-110 INF BN		460	
25-27	1-110 INF BN		152	
25-27	108 CBT SPT HOSP		146	
24-28	PA MIL ACAD		480	
23-24	PNG-MTU		21	
25-27	RTS-MAINT	38		
25-27	6-68 ARMOR	375		

TOTAL: 48 UNITS 1,900 7,376 6

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
APRIL					
1-3	DET 2, COMM CO			147	
6TH	1111 SIG, FT RITCHIE				50
8-10	RTS-MAINT	28			
8-10	1079 USARG	68			
8-12	2059 USARF SCH	16			
9-10	416 ENCOM	10			
9TH	322 GEN HOSP	186			
8-10	2090 USARF SCH	35			
8-10	1-315 INF BN	362			
8-10	367 MP DET	29			
8-10	2374 SIG DET	69			
8-10	1185 USA TTU	37			
8-10	320 MP BN	90			
8-10	442 FLD SVC CO	36			
9-10	2072 USARF SCH	25			
8-10	365 ENGR BN	120			
9-10	28 DIVARTY		203		
8-10	228 FSB, HHD		180		
8-10	1-108 FA BN		371		
8-10	1-229 FA BN		116		
8-10	109 FA, BTRY F		75		
8-10	2-103 AR BN		350		
8-10	PNGMA		431		
9TH	211 EIS		27		
8-10	104 AVN, CO F		244		
10TH	271 CCS		29		
8-10	L CO, 3-25 MARINES			164	
8-10	G CO, 2-25 MARINES			132	
8-10	DET 2, COMM CO			130	
8-10	378 S&S BN	68			
15-17	RTS-MAINT	36			
16-17	1079 USARG	192			
15-17	2059 USARF SCH	18			
15-17	338 MED GP (91C)	44			
15-17	322 GEN HOSP	105			
15-17	441 PSC	120			
15-17	1-314 INF BN	650			
15-18	154 TRANS		15		
15-17	HQ, 56 BDE		120		
15-17	2-110 INF BN		477		
15-17	2-111 INF BN		83		
15-17	3-109 INF BN		700		
15-17	328 SPT BN (FSB)		349		
15-17	HQ, 1-109 INF		75		
15-17	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		75		
22-24	RTS-MAINT	60			
22-24	310 TRANS CO	60			
22-24	6-68 ARMOR	375			
22-24	453 FIN SPT UNIT	61			
22-24	420 ENGR	12			

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
APRIL (continued)					
22-24	213 ASG		95		
22-24	2-112 INF BN		185		
22-24	1-111 INF BN		753		
22-24	2-103 ARMOR BN		173		
22-24	103 ENG BN		436		
22-24	128 CHEM CO		56		
22-24	PNGMA		449		
22-24	337 MAINT BN		301		
22-24	1-213 ADA		164		
22-24	28 FIN BN		78		
22-24	2-104 AVN, HQ		304		
22-24	TRP C, 9TH CAV		40		
22-24	3-14TH MARINES			525	
24-25	270 EIS/LGX		41		
22-24	1079 USARG	73			
22-24	25TH MARINES (MA)			50	
22ND	1110 SIG BN				28
29-1MAY	1-104 CAV		340		
29-1	1-109 INF BN		85		
29-1	728 MSB, HQ		387		
29-1	1-103 ARMOR, CO D		81		
29-1	HQ, 28 INF DIV		56		
29-1	1-109 FA, HQ		97		
29-1	261 SIG		8		
29-1	484 SVC CO	51			
29-1	254 QM CO	149			
29-1	5TH PSYOP GRP	155			
29-1	DET 1, HHT, 1-104		135		
29-1	RTS-MAINT	12			
28-1	104 DET (LRS)		63		
29-1	USMCR RECRUITING STA			70	
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TOTAL:	81 UNITS	3,352	8,247	1,218	78

13-15	128 MI BN	26	
9-15	28 MP CO		90
13-15	2-112 INF BN		494
13-15	104 AVN, CO F		241
13-15	128 CHEM CO		59
13-15	56 BDE, HHC		129
13-15	1-109 INF BN		69
13-15	3-109 INF BN		602
13-15	2-111 INF BN		55
13-15	2-103 ARMOR BN		216
13-15	1-111 INF BN		643
13-15	1-229 FA BN		120
13-15	28 DIVARTY		14
9-13	555 MP CO		154
13-15	RTS-MAINT	15	
13-15	445 QM CO	50	
13-15	211 EIS		171
13-15	378 S&S BN	53	
20-22	2059 USARF SCH	50	
20-22	317 DENTAL DET	44	
20-22	2374 SIG DET	58	
20-22	453 FIN SPT BN	78	
20-22	441 PSC	75	
13-15	2072 USARF SCH	105	
20-22	2072 USARF SCH	109	
20-22	338 MED GRP (91C)	33	
20-22	348 GEN HOSP (HUM)	180	
20-22	2/103 ARMOR BN		160
20-22	1-213 ADA		90
20-22	1-104 CAV		542
20-22	28 DIVARTY		11
20-22	728 MSB, CO B		99
20-22	CO A, 128 FSB		19

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
MAY (continued)					
20-22	1-108 FA BN		320		
20-22	103 ENGR BN		425		
20-22	3622 MAINT CO, DET 1		74		
20-22	2-104 AVN, HQ		298		
19-22	109 FA BTRY F		65		
20-22	1-109 FA, HQ		458		
20-21	1 BN 1 INF REGT				90
17-18	CARLISLE BARRACKS				70
18	LEA, USAG, FTIG				34
20-22	228 FSB, HQ		340		
20-22	1-104 CAV, DET 1, HHT		135		
20-22	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		75		
20-22	1079 USARG	155			
21-22	RTS-MAINT	7			
20-22	6-68 ARMOR	94			
23-25	201 RED HORSE		30		
25	HQ CO, USAG, FT DETRICK				36
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TOTAL:	68 UNITS	3,002	7,011	232	384

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94					
DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
JUNE					
3-5	154 TRANS BN		30		
3-5	365 ENGR BN	469			
3-5	1-315 INF BN	325			
3-5	378 S&S BN	42			
3-5	2374 SIG DET	58			
3-5	318 MAINT CO	130			
3-5	214 MI CO	150			
3-5	HQ, 28 INF DIV		51		
4-5	28 AG CO		80		
4-5	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		75		
3-5	3622 MAINT CO		74		
3-5	2-111 INF BN		25		
3-5	2-103 ARMOR BN		200		
3-5	BTRY F, 109 FA		28		
4-10	28 PERS SVC BN		126		
9th	572 MP				37
10-12	416 ENCOM	9			
10-12	1-314 IN, CO E	54			
10-12	453 FIN SPT BN	70			
11-12	329 MED CO (GRD AMB)	61			
9-11	414 CA BN	32			
10-12	2-104 AVN, HQ		318		
10-12	228 FSB, HHD		210		
10-12	2-103 ARMOR BN		180		
10-12	728 MAINT BN & MSB, CO B		192		
10-12	28 INF DIV DISCOM		182		
10-12	104 AVN, CO F		236		
10-12	2 BN, 8830 USA	40			
11-12	628 FIN DET		14		
10th	EAATS		64		
10-12	E CO, 2-25 MARINES			114	
14-15	2-228 REGT, CO A	13			
17-19	1079 USARG	14			
17-19	TRP C, 9 CAV	45			
17-19	6-68 ARMOR	205			
17-19	1-108 FA BN		398		
18-19	28 INF DIV, HHC		251		
17-19	338 MED GRP, HHD	35			
23-24	414 CA BN	38			
22-23	329 MED CO	61			
24-26	1-104 CAV, DET 1, HHT		135		
24-26	328 FSB, HHD		122		
24-25	DET 1/B/228 FSB		22		
24-26	I&I STAFF, USMCR			68	
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TOTAL:	44 UNITS	1,851	3,013	182	37

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
JULY					
24-26JUN:	1079 USARG	179			
24-26JUN:	817 REPL BN	89			
24-26JUN:	6-68 ARMOR	135			
24-26JUN:	441 PSC	93			
24-26JUN:	1-315 INF BN	485			
24-26JUN:	3-109 INF		525		
27TH JUN:	PNGMA		62		
3-5 JUN:	PNG-MTU		120		
9-10JUL:	1-104 CAV, DET 1		144		
7-8	1-109 INF BN		160		
6-8	1-109 FA, HQ		231		
9-10	RTS-MAJNT	12			
8-10	108 CBT SPT HOSP		194		
8-10	28 FIN BN		78		
7-8	55 BDE		60		
8-9	DET 1, CO B, 228TH		56		
9-10	1185 USA TTU	46			
8-10	378 S&S BN	41			
8-10	214 MIL INTEL CO	22			
8-10	338 MED GP	35			
8-10	254 QM CO, FS	127			
8-10	2374 SIG DET	58			
9-10	1079 USARG	146			
8-10	1004 GEN SUP CO	110			
8-10	412 ENG CO	53			
8-10	TRP C, 9TH CAV	35			
6-7	1111 SIG BN, A CO				48
15-17	3622 MAINT CO		69		
15-17	1-314 IN, CO E	47			
14-17	1-315 INF (m)	57			
15-17	6-68 ARMOR	225			
15-17	79 ARCOM, HQ	35			
16TH	104 INF DET (LRS)		56		
15-17	PNGMA		218		
20-21	1111 SIG BN				74
19-20	1-107 FA BN (CONVOY)		40		
22-23	1-107 FA BN (CONVOY)		247		
22-24	1-103 AR BN		81		
22-24	441 PSC	58			
22-24	310 TRANS CO (TT)	61			
22-24	372 MP CO	124			
22-24	220 MP BDE, HHC	23			
23-25	128 SUP CO		75		
29-31	1/314 IN, CO E	36			
27TH	56 EOD				13
TOTAL: 45 UNITS		2,332	2,416	0	135

MONTHLY UNIT TRAINING - FY94

DATE	UNIT	USAR	NG	MARINES	AC
AUGUST					
5-7	484 SVC CO	63			
5-7	441 PSC	65			
5-7	378 S&S BN	70			
5-7	365 ENGR BN	35			
5-7	254 QM CO	66			
5-7	412 ENGR CO	45			
5-7	310 TRANS CO	48			
5-7	28 FIN BN		58		
3-5	1-107 FA BN		190		
5-7	213 ASG		156		
5-7	108 CBT SPT HOSP		194		
5-7	154 TRANS BN		146		
5-7	876 ENGR BN		24		
2ND	128 SUP CO		74		
5-7	DET 2, COMM CO			218	
9TH	CARLISLE BARRACKS				9
12-14	1-109 FA, HQ	437			
12-14	1-104 CAV, DET1, HBT	144			
13-14	HQB, DIVARTY		14		
12-14	LSE CO-REIN L&S BN			100	
12-14	E CO, 2-25 MARINES			112	
12-14	1079 USARG	180			
13-14	RSS LANCASTER			52	
19-21	322 GEN HOSP (HUM)	120			
19-21	327 S&S BN	56			
19-21	416 ENCOM	9			
19-21	HQ, 2/104 AVN		325		
17-21	HD, STARC		296		
19-21	HHD, 228 FSB		112		
19-21	104 AVN, CO F		250		
23RD	LEA, FTIG				24
19-21	HHC, AVN BDE, 28ID		77		
26-28	2374 SIG DET	58			
26-28	677 SUP CO	21			
26-28	1/314 IN, CO E	53			
27-28	PNGMA		159		
25TH	56 EOD				7
29TH	56 EOD				8
20-21	PNG-MTU		20		
27-28	3-42 FA	18			
29TH	RG 27 CONSTRUCTION		12		
31ST	LEA, FTIG				23
TOTAL: 42 UNITS		1,488	2,107	482	71



COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

please refer to this number
when responding 950.6001-18

THE GOVERNOR

June 5, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman, Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As I am sure you are aware, the Department of Defense has recommended that Fort Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania be closed and that an enclave be preserved for reserve component training.

Fort Indiantown Gap is unique among military bases in that the land supporting the base is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased to the federal government at a minimal rate in exchange for certain commitments from the federal government. This lease arrangement has worked effectively for over 50 years, and I am disheartened to think that it could terminate.

However, because your Commission may decide to accept the Department's recommendation to end this mutually beneficial partnership, the Commonwealth must begin to consider its alternatives. As I begin that exercise, I have some initial concerns regarding the condition and quality of land that has been used heavily for military training for over 50 years. Artillery training, air bombing and tank firing are just some of the activities that have taken place at Fort Indiantown Gap over the years, and I believe that any future plans for the Gap must include careful consideration of the environmental impact of such activities. In fact, my General Counsel, Paul A. Tufano, recently wrote to Madelyne Creedon to make her aware of the various legal implications surrounding these important issues.

In view of my concerns, I have asked General James Mac Vay, acting Adjutant General, to evaluate alternative uses for the property at Fort Indiantown Gap. I have asked him to conduct a thorough evaluation that includes all possibilities, including the complete cessation of military training on the land. Following a careful consideration of these options, I shall then, and only then, decide upon an appropriate use for the land at Fort Indiantown Gap. Because the Commonwealth's options in this regard are likely to be far-ranging, it would be a mistake for you to assume that any facility presently located on the base will remain there following the return of the land to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Again, let me emphasize that the Commonwealth has enjoyed its partnership with the United States at Fort Indiantown Gap. It is a relationship that has served both the country and the Commonwealth well, and I have every hope that the present arrangement will be preserved. However, if a decision is made to end the relationship, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania must be prepared to consider all options consistent with our rights under the law and the terms of our lease.

With best regards, I remain

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Tom Ridge". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent flourish at the end.

Thomas J. Ridge
Governor

cc: Honorable Paul A. Tufano
General James Mac Vay

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1997
 ROI Year : 1998 (1 Year)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -88,553
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 5,054

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	-1,965	-4,331	-4,331	-4,331	-4,331	-19,288	-4,331
Overhd	115	1,995	-2,336	-2,336	-2,336	-2,336	-7,237	-2,336
Moving	0	1,170	0	0	0	0	1,170	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	118	0	0	0	0	118	0
TOTAL	115	1,317	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-25,236	-6,667

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Enl	0	45	0	0	0	0	45
Civ	0	54	0	0	0	0	54
TOT	0	102	0	0	0	0	102
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	29	0	0	0	0	29
Enl	0	73	0	0	0	0	73
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	13	0	0	0	0	13
TOT	0	115	0	0	0	0	115

Summary:

----- Ft. Indian town Gap, PA
 CHANGE TO ARMY'S INITIAL SUBMISSION.
 BOS = 6532, RPMA = 4171, SF REDUCTION = 2,249
 PERSONNEL NUMBERS = NGB WORKSHEET.
 NO EXTRA AREA SUPPORT FUNDING.
 GARRISON RIF = 95 TOTAL (45 MIL, 50 CIV)

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/2
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	836	509	509	509	509	2,874	509
Overhd	115	3,382	222	222	222	222	4,384	222
Moving	0	1,335	0	0	0	0	1,335	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	118	0	0	0	0	118	0
TOTAL	115	5,670	731	731	731	731	8,710	731

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	2,802	4,840	4,840	4,840	4,840	22,162	4,840
Overhd	0	1,387	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	11,621	2,558
Moving	0	164	0	0	0	0	164	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	4,353	7,398	7,398	7,398	7,398	33,947	7,398

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	114,793	113,246	113,246
1997	1,317,578	1,265,038	1,378,285
1998	-6,667,204	-6,230,016	-4,851,732
1999	-6,667,204	-6,063,276	-10,915,008
2000	-6,667,204	-5,900,999	-16,816,007
2001	-6,667,204	-5,743,064	-22,559,071
2002	-6,667,204	-5,589,357	-28,148,429
2003	-6,667,204	-5,439,764	-33,588,192
2004	-6,667,204	-5,294,174	-38,882,366
2005	-6,667,204	-5,152,481	-44,034,847
2006	-6,667,204	-5,014,580	-49,049,427
2007	-6,667,204	-4,880,370	-53,929,797
2008	-6,667,204	-4,749,751	-58,679,548
2009	-6,667,204	-4,622,629	-63,302,177
2010	-6,667,204	-4,498,909	-67,801,086
2011	-6,667,204	-4,378,500	-72,179,587
2012	-6,667,204	-4,261,314	-76,440,901
2013	-6,667,204	-4,147,264	-80,588,165
2014	-6,667,204	-4,036,267	-84,624,433
2015	-6,667,204	-3,928,240	-88,552,673

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/3
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	71,757	
Civilian Early Retirement	24,839	
Civilian New Hires	2,218	
Eliminated Military PCS	215,547	
Unemployment	12,528	
Total - Personnel		326,889
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	200,887	
Mothball / Shutdown	3,073,750	
Total - Overhead		3,274,637
Moving		
Civilian Moving	331,626	
Civilian PPS	460,800	
Military Moving	510,398	
Freight	31,843	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		1,334,668
Other		
HAP / RSE	117,642	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		117,642

Total One-Time Costs		5,053,836

One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	164,079	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	

Total One-Time Savings		164,079

Total Net One-Time Costs		4,889,757

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	2,218	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		2,218
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
Total One-Time Costs		2,218
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		0
Total Net One-Time Costs		2,218

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	71,757	
Civilian Early Retirement	24,839	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	215,547	
Unemployment	12,528	
Total - Personnel		324,671
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	200,887	
Mothball / Shutdown	3,073,750	
Total - Overhead		3,274,637
Moving		
Civilian Moving	331,626	
Civilian PPS	460,800	
Military Moving	510,398	
Freight	31,843	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		1,334,668
Other		
HAP / RSE	117,642	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		117,642
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Costs		5,051,618
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	164,079	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Savings		164,079
-----	-----	-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		4,887,539

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT6-4
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
BASE X	0	0	0	0	0
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	0	0	0	0	0

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: BASE X, US

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):			
Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
752	4,208	1,121	2,709

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	29	0	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	73	0	0	0	0	73
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	13	0	0	0	0	13
TOTAL	0	115	0	0	0	0	115

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into BASE X, US):							
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	29	0	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	73	0	0	0	0	73
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	13	0	0	0	0	13
TOTAL	0	115	0	0	0	0	115

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):			
Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
781	4,281	1,121	2,722

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):			
Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
183	692	521	911

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: BASE X, US	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	29	0	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	73	0	0	0	0	73
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	13	0	0	0	0	13
TOTAL	0	115	0	0	0	0	115

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA):							
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	29	0	0	0	0	29
Enlisted	0	73	0	0	0	0	73
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	13	0	0	0	0	13
TOTAL	0	115	0	0	0	0	115

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-3	0	0	0	0	-3
Enlisted	0	-45	0	0	0	0	-45
Civilians	0	-54	0	0	0	0	-54
TOTAL	0	-102	0	0	0	0	-102

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT6-4
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 151	----- 574	----- 521	----- 844

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/3
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	13	0	0	0	0	13
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Civilian Positions Available		0	5	0	0	0	0	5
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	54	0	0	0	0	54
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	32	0	0	0	0	32
Civilians Available to Move		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilians Moving		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	13	0	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	11	0	0	0	0	11
New Civilians Hired		0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	6	0	0	0	0	6
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	4	0	0	0	0	4
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	32	0	0	0	0	32
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	2	0	0	0	0	2

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/3
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	13	0	0	0	0	13
Civilians Moving		0	11	0	0	0	0	11
New Civilians Hired		0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	2	0	0	0	0	2

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	13	0	0	0	0	13
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Civilian Positions Available		0	5	0	0	0	0	5
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	54	0	0	0	0	54
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	32	0	0	0	0	32
Civilians Available to Move		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilians Moving		0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	6	0	0	0	0	6
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	4	0	0	0	0	4
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	32	0	0	0	0	32
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/9
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996 ----	1997 ----	1998 ----	1999 ----	2000 ----	2001 ----	Total -----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	72	0	0	0	0	72
Civ Retire	0	25	0	0	0	0	25
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	37	0	0	0	0	37
POV Miles	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Home Purch	0	118	0	0	0	0	118
HHG	0	78	0	0	0	0	78
Misc	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
House Hunt	0	31	0	0	0	0	31
PPS	0	461	0	0	0	0	461
RITA	0	55	0	0	0	0	55
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	28	0	0	0	0	28
Freight	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	12	0	0	0	0	12
OTHER							
Program Plan	115	86	0	0	0	0	201
Shutdown	0	3,074	0	0	0	0	3,074
New Hire	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	39	0	0	0	0	39
POV Miles	0	25	0	0	0	0	25
HHG	0	375	0	0	0	0	375
Misc	0	71	0	0	0	0	71
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	215	0	0	0	0	215
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	118	0	0	0	0	118
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	115	4,939	0	0	0	0	5,054

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	222	222	222	222	222	1,109	222
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	509	509	509	509	509	2,547	509
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	731	731	731	731	731	3,656	731
TOTAL COST	115	5,670	731	731	731	731	8,710	731
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	164	0	0	0	0	164	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	164	0	0	0	0	164	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	44	89	89	89	89	400	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	925	1,870	1,870	1,870	1,870	8,405	1,870
BOS	0	157	339	339	339	339	1,515	339
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	1,242	2,484	2,484	2,484	2,484	11,177	2,484
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	102	204	204	204	204	917	204
Enl Salary	0	694	1,389	1,389	1,389	1,389	6,249	1,389
House Allow	0	764	764	764	764	764	3,818	764
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	260	260	260	260	260	1,300	260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	4,189	7,398	7,398	7,398	7,398	33,783	7,398
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	4,353	7,398	7,398	7,398	7,398	33,947	7,398

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
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ONE-TIME NET -----(\$K)-----	1996 ----	1997 ----	1998 ----	1999 ----	2000 ----	2001 ----	Total -----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	96	0	0	0	0	96	
Civ Moving	0	824	0	0	0	0	824	
Other	115	3,174	0	0	0	0	3,289	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	562	0	0	0	0	562	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	118	0	0	0	0	118	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	115	4,775	0	0	0	0	4,890	
RECURRING NET								
-----(\$K)-----	1996 ----	1997 ----	1998 ----	1999 ----	2000 ----	2001 ----	Total -----	Beyond -----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-89	-400	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	-925	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-8,405	-1,870
BOS	0	64	-117	-117	-117	-117	-405	-117
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-1,242	-2,484	-2,484	-2,484	-2,484	-11,177	-2,484
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-796	-1,592	-1,592	-1,592	-1,592	-7,166	-1,592
House Allow	0	-254	-254	-254	-254	-254	-1,271	-254
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	-260	-260	-260	-260	-260	-1,300	-260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-3,457	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-30,126	-6,667
TOTAL NET COST	115	1,317	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-6,667	-25,236	-6,667

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
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 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	2	0	0	0	0	2

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	
RECURRING NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	222	222	222	222	222	1,109	222
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	509	509	509	509	509	2,547	509
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	731	731	731	731	731	3,656	731
TOTAL NET COST	0	733	731	731	731	731	3,659	731

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 7/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	72	0	0	0	0	72
Civ Retire	0	25	0	0	0	0	25
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	37	0	0	0	0	37
POV Miles	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Home Purch	0	118	0	0	0	0	118
HHG	0	78	0	0	0	0	78
Misc	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
House Hunt	0	31	0	0	0	0	31
PPS	0	461	0	0	0	0	461
RITA	0	55	0	0	0	0	55
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	28	0	0	0	0	28
Freight	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	12	0	0	0	0	12
OTHER							
Program Plan	115	86	0	0	0	0	201
Shutdown	0	3,074	0	0	0	0	3,074
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	39	0	0	0	0	39
POV Miles	0	25	0	0	0	0	25
HHG	0	375	0	0	0	0	375
Misc	0	71	0	0	0	0	71
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	215	0	0	0	0	215
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	118	0	0	0	0	118
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	115	4,937	0	0	0	0	5,052

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 8/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
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 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL COSTS	115	4,937	0	0	0	0	5,052	0
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	164	0	0	0	0	164	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	164	0	0	0	0	164	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
----(\$K)----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	44	89	89	89	89	400	89
O&M								
RPMA	0	925	1,870	1,870	1,870	1,870	8,405	1,870
BOS	0	157	339	339	339	339	1,515	339
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	1,242	2,484	2,484	2,484	2,484	11,177	2,484
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	102	204	204	204	204	917	204
Enl Salary	0	694	1,389	1,389	1,389	1,389	6,249	1,389
House Allow	0	764	764	764	764	764	3,818	764
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	260	260	260	260	260	1,300	260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	4,189	7,398	7,398	7,398	7,398	33,783	7,398
TOTAL SAVINGS	0	4,353	7,398	7,398	7,398	7,398	33,947	7,398

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 9/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
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Base: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

ONE-TIME NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	96	0	0	0	0	96	
Civ Moving	0	824	0	0	0	0	824	
Other	115	3,172	0	0	0	0	3,287	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	562	0	0	0	0	562	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	118	0	0	0	0	118	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	115	4,773	0	0	0	0	4,887	
RECURRING NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-89	-400	-89
O&M								
RPMA	0	-925	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-8,405	-1,870
BOS	0	-157	-339	-339	-339	-339	-1,515	-339
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	-1,242	-2,484	-2,484	-2,484	-2,484	-11,177	-2,484
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	-796	-1,592	-1,592	-1,592	-1,592	-7,166	-1,592
House Allow	0	-764	-764	-764	-764	-764	-3,818	-764
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	-260	-260	-260	-260	-260	-1,300	-260
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	-4,189	-7,398	-7,398	-7,398	-7,398	-33,783	-7,398
TOTAL NET COST	115	584	-7,398	-7,398	-7,398	-7,398	-28,895	-7,398

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	115	1%	0	0%	0
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-217	-9%	-2,459,000	-47%	11,332

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	0	0%	0	221,849	1%	1,929
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-1,870,136	-45%	8,618	-339,308	-5%	1,564

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	221,849	1%	1,929
FT INDIANTOWN GAP	-2,209,444	-21%	10,182

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 09:51 05/19/1995, Report Created 07:18 05/26/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	-925	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-1,870	-8,405	-1,870
BOS Change	0	64	-117	-117	-117	-117	-405	-117
Housing Change	0	-44	-89	-89	-89	-89	-400	-89
TOTAL CHANGES	0	-905	-2,076	-2,076	-2,076	-2,076	-9,211	-2,076

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
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Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT6-4
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
BASE X, US	Realignment
FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	Realignment

Summary:

CHANGE TO ARMY'S INITIAL SUBMISSION.
BOS = 6532, RPMA = 4171, SF REDUCTION = 2,249
PERSONNEL NUMBERS = NGB WORKSHEET.
NO EXTRA AREA SUPPORT FUNDING.
GARRISON RIF = 95 TOTAL (45 MIL, 50 CIV)

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
BASE X, US	FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	29	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	73	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	13	0	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASEX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

Total Officer Employees:	183	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	4,171
Total Enlisted Employees:	692	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	521	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,532
Total Civilian Employees:	911	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	5,672
Mil Families Living On Base:	1.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	89
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.05
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	5,204	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	129	Activity Code:	42305
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	77		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	109	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqcd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqcd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	260	260	260	260	260
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	2,459					
		Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: FT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	-3	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	-45	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	-54	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DEC.SFF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	10.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00%	1997: 2.80%	1998: 2.90%	1999: 2.90%
			2000: 2.90%
			2001: 2.90%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	4,381.00

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT6-4
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\UPDATES\MT6-4.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	--	----	-----	--	----
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

95 ELIMINATIONS = 28% OF TOTAL GARRISON OF 341, BASED ON THE WORKLOAD

REDUCTION OF REMOVING AT FROM FIG AND REDUCING 41% OF THE INFRACTURE.

28% ELIMINATIONS BASED ON:

AT MAY DAYS = 30,789

IDT MANDAYS = 197,198/2 = 98,599

TOTAL WORKLOAD = 129,883.. AT = 23%, round down to be conservative.

ADD 5% REDUCTION BASED ON THE ELIMINATION OF 41% OF FACILITIES.

TOTAL REDUCTION = 28%.

Fri May 19

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Ft Indiantowngap RPI
(Permanent facilities only)

CUSTOMER GROUP	ID	CUSTOMER	A R T E		FAC YEAR	CATCODE	DESCRIPTION	RPF USE		BLDGS	
			C C	A				GROSS AREA	UM1		CAPACITY
STAY AAFES	1R	PX (AAFES)	P	04	115 1945	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	9,115 SF		56 PN	1
AAFES	1R	PX (AAFES)	P	05	116 1948	74053	EXCH MAIN RETL	16,704 SF			1
AAFES	1R	PX (AAFES)	P	12	010 1941	73030	FIXED LAUNDRY	1,891 SF			1
*****	***										
sum								27,710			3
STAY FED TNT	2G	READINESS GROUP	P	19	076 1976	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	15,212 SF		93 PN	1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	064 1977	72330	ADM & SUP BLDG	4,558 SF			1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	066 1977	72111	ENL BK W/O DIN	4,536 SF		20 PN	1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	067 1977	72111	ENL BK W/O DIN	4,811 SF		20 PN	1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	068 1977	72111	ENL BK W/O DIN	4,811 SF		20 PN	1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	069 1977	72111	ENL BK W/O DIN	4,811 SF		20 PN	1
GARR	0E	HQ COMPANY	P	08	070 1977	72111	ENL BK W/O DIN	4,536 SF		20 PN	1
GARR	10	FAMILY HOUSING	P	13	120 1945	44270	GEN STOREHOUSE	5,876 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	08	081 1978	76020	MON/MEMORIALS	25 SF		1 EA	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	08	082 1983	73078	INFO STAND	80 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	08	083 1986	81351	SWITCH STA BLDG	1,950 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	08	084 1986	81321	SUBSTATION BLDG	80 SF			1
STAY GARR	1A	DPW	P	08	608 1986	81360	TRANSFORMERS	3 SF		70 KV	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	10	116 1988	84580	WTR DISTR BLDG	972 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	10	117 1988	84480	WTR SUP BDG DTH	800 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	11	071 1941	44275	FE STOREHOUSE	10,893 SF			1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	13	117 1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	2,407 SF		15 PN	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	13	118 1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF		174 PN	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	13	119 1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF		174 PN	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	17	064 1978	76020	MON/MEMORIALS	28 SF		1 EA	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	24	090 1960	73055	WAITING SHELTER	80 SF		2 PN	1
GARR	1A	DPW	P	24	152 1978	76020	MON/MEMORIALS	36 SF		1 EA	1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	03	114 1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF		196 PN	1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	19	207 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	284 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	24	030 1937	44221	TARGET STORAGE	684 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	24	031 1937	44221	TARGET STORAGE	102 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	26	141 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	284 SF			1
STAY GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	26	144 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	680 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	26	145 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	668 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	26	146 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	284 SF			1
GARR	1J	DPTMS	P	26	147 1983	17123	RANGE SPT BLDG	284 SF			1
STAY GARR	1M	IMO/USAISC	P	09	061 1994	13180	TEL EXCH BLDG	2,860 SF			1
GARR	1M	IMO/USAISC	P	13	176 1953	13120	COMM CENTER	2,738 SF			1
STAY GARR	1P	DPCA	P	04	116 1959	44270	GEN STOREHOUSE	9,115 SF			1
GARR	1P	DPCA	P	04	117 1941	74028	PHYS FIT CENTER	24,781 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	08	065 1977	72210	ENL PERS DINE	7,298 SF		150 PN	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	11	045 1992	84310	FIRE PRT PMP ST	412 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	11	088 1941	43210	COLD STOR WHSE	17,540 SF		210,480 CF	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	11	089 1992	43210	COLD STOR WHSE	47,093 SF		###,### CF	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	11	091 1941	44220	GEN PURPSE WHSE	120,000 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	16	153 1953	61026	TC ADMIN BLDG	2,738 SF		16 PN	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	001 1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	002 1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	003 1979	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	200 SF			1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	004 1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF			1

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Ft Indiantowngap RPI
(Permanent facilities only)

CUSTOMER GROUP	ID	CUSTOMER	A R		FAC YEAR	CATCODE	DESCRIPTION	RPF USE		BLDGS	
			R T E	C C A				GROSS AREA	CAPACITY UM2		
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	005	1979	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	200 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	006	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	007	1979	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	200 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	008	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	009	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	010	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	011	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	012	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	013	1979	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	400 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	014	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	807 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	015	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	407 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	016	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	207 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	017	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	207 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	018	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	207 SF		1
<i>STAY</i> GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	019	1942	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	407 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	020	1979	61022	ORD ADM BLDG	800 SF	4 PN	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	024	1994	21612	AMMO SURV FAC	1,689 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	026	1994	42231	STOREHOUSE	3,420 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	027	1994	82120	HEAT PLANT OIL	165 SF	MB	1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	028	1993	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	2,160 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	029	1993	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	2,160 SF		1
GARR	1X	DOL	P	25	030	1993	42240	FIXED AMMO MAG	2,160 SF		1
GARR	BNG	BLDGS & GRNDS.	P	04	114	1945	72210	ENL PERS DINE	9,115 SF	1,500 PN	1
GARR	BNG	BLDGS & GRNDS.	P	11	070	1942	21910	FE MAINT SHOP	10,893 SF		1
GARR	BNG	BLDGS & GRNDS.	P	24	022	1940	44221	TARGET STORAGE	2,467 SF		1
GARR	UTL	UTILITIES DIV.	P	04	162	1937	83114	SEW/W TR PL BDG	932 SF	357 KG	1
GARR	UTL	UTILITIES DIV.	P	13	102	1941	72220	OFF FR DINE FAC	1,909 SF	118 PN	1
***** ***								-----		-----	
SUM								345,065		71	

Fri May 19

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Ft Indiantowngap RPI
(Permanent facilities only)

CUSTOMER GROUP	ID	CUSTOMER	A R T E			FAC NUM	YEAR BUILT	CATCODE	DESCRIPTION	RPF_USE		BLDGS
			C	C	A					GROSS AREA UM1	RPF_USE CAPACITY UM2	
PA NG	ERF	EUROPEAN RPRFAC	P	05	115	1946	44270	GEN STOREHOUSE	35,328 SF		1	
PA NG	FS	201 AIR NG	N	P	26	139	1985	RANGE SPT BLDG	3,391 SF		1	
PA NG	FS	201 AIR NG	N	P	26	143	1988	INFLAM MAT STHS	144 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	10	086	1941	73016	POLICE STA	1,990 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	10	095	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF	196 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	10	102	1964	NG VEH MNT SHOP	25,555 SF	10 VE	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	10	104	1964	NG ARMORY	21,469 SF	10 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	10	105	1964	NG VEH MNT SHOP	17,103 SF	10 VE	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	059	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	9,231 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	062	1964	GEN STOREHOUSE	60,000 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	063	1964	GEN STOREHOUSE	60,000 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	064	1964	NG VEH MNT SHOP	10,666 SF	10 VE	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	065	1964	NG VEH MNT SHOP	10,666 SF	10 VE	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	066	1964	BN ADMIN & CLRM	10,666 SF	10 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	067	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	16,442 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	11	068	1942	44220	GEN PURPSE WHSE	16,442 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	069	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	8,313 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	074	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	10,893 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	075	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	8,528 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	11	076	1942	44220	GEN PURPSE WHSE	16,442 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	077	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	9,231 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	078	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	9,231 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	11	079	1964	GEN PURP WHSE	9,231 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	11	110	1985	44220	GEN PURPSE WHSE	12,800 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	17	015	1993	BN CLASSROOMS	1,800 SF	40 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	020	1949	21111	MNT HANGAR AVIM	5,810 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	19	077	1993	FLD RG LATRINES	538 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	N	P	19	079	1993	ADMIN GEN PURP	21,182 SF	40 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	081	1993	44150	INFLAM MAT STHS	114 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	101	1975	21110	MNT HANGAR AVUM	75,000 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	102	1975	12530	PUMP STA AG	144 SF	50 GM	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	108	1978	17110	AC TRAINER BLDG	9,478 SF		1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	109	1982	55010	OFF QTR TRANS	2,728 SF	PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	109	1982	72220	OFF QTR TRANS	1,587 SF	60 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	109	1982	72411	OFF QTR TRANS	20,604 SF	60 PN	1	
PA NG	UU	ARMORY BD	P	19	117	1989	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	27,148 SF	167 PN	1	
***** ***									-----			
SUM									552,633		36	
TEN CIV	FG	FISH & GAME	P	13	004	1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	2,475 SF	15 PN	1	
USAR	U1	RMTS	P	03	115	1941	44220	GEN PURPSE WHSE	2,738 SF		1	
USAR	UP	ECS #24 AMSA	P	10	044	1941	21409	AR VEH MNT SHOP	18,163 SF	12 VE	1	
USAR	UP	ECS #24 AMSA	P	10	083	1983	21409	AR VEH MNT SHOP	21,120 SF	14 VE	1	
USAR	UP	ECS #24 AMSA	P	10	128	1986	84142	WTR PUMP STA BD	144 SF		1	
USAR	UP	ECS #24 AMSA	P	10	755	1986	84141	PUMP STA	163 SF	1 KG	1	
***** ***									-----			
SUM									42,328		5	

Fri May 19

page 4

Ft Indiantowngap RPI
(Permanent facilities only)

CUSTOMER GROUP	ID	CUSTOMER	A R T E FAC YEAR			CATCODE	DESCRIPTION	RPF USE		BLDGS	
			R C C A	T E	FAC			YEAR	GROSS AREA UM1		CAPACITY UM2
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	05	118	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF	196 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	06	111	1953	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF	196 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	008	1941	14183	BN HQ BLDG	2,475 SF		1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	018	1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	2,407 SF	14 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	023	1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	2,407 SF	14 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	028	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	033	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	1,739 SF	100 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	038	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	043	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	048	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	053	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	1,739 SF	100 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	058	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	063	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	068	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	073	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	078	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	084	1941	12310	GAS STA BLDG	149 SF	2 OL	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	086	1941	12310	GAS STA BLDG	149 SF	2 OL	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	088	1941	12310	GAS STA BLDG	149 SF	2 OL	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	098	1953	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF	196 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	12	099	1953	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	2,738 SF	196 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	003	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	1,909 SF	118 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	018	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	019	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	1,739 SF	100 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	020	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	021	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	022	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	023	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	1,739 SF	100 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	024	1941	17150	BN CLASSROOMS	1,739 SF	100 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	025	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	026	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	027	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	122	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	123	1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	2,407 SF	14 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	124	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	125	1941	61050	ADMIN GEN PURP	1,739 SF	10 PN	1
WET/AT	TNG	WET/AT	P	13	126	1941	72210	ENL PERS DINE	2,407 SF	174 PN	1
*****	***										
SUM									79,171		37
									1,070,512		155

ALL ARE in the AREA 12 & 13
portion of the proposed
NG Enclave

Fort Indiantown Gap Corrected TABS Analysis

Attribute	Points	AP Hill	FTIG	Hunter-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
RANGES											
MPRC	45	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
# RETS Firing points	45	16	0	0	0	32	0	16	0	32	32
# Ranges	5	40	35	1	17	55	15	19	30	21	59
MOUT	5	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
TOTAL & TABS score	100	2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2	10.0
MPRC		0	0	450	0	0	0	450	450	0	450
# RETS firing points		225.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	450.00	0.00	225.00	0.00	450.00	450.00
# Ranges		33.62	29.31	0.00	13.79	46.55	12.07	15.52	25.00	17.24	50.00
MOUT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	50
Total score		258.62	29.31	450.00	13.79	496.55	12.07	690.52	475.00	517.24	1000.00
score/100		2.6	0.3	4.5	0.1	5.0	0.1	6.9	4.8	5.2	10.0
IMPACT ACRES											
Impact acres	60	27000	2000	162962	5606	14000	254103	92600	7656	4000	5590
Tube Artillery?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Air Force bombing?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Attack Helicopter?	5	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
All three?	15	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
MLRS capable?	10	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
TOTAL & TABS score	100	4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0	4.1
Impact acres		59.50	0.00	383.09	8.58	28.56	600.00	215.63	13.46	4.76	8.54
Tube Artillery?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Air Force bombing?		50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Attack Helicopter?		50	50	0	50	50	50	0	50	50	50
All three?		150	150	0	150	150	150	0	150	150	150
MLRS capable?		100	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	100
Total score		459.50	300.00	383.09	408.58	428.56	1000.00	415.63	313.46	304.76	408.54
score/100		4.6	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.3	10.0	4.2	3.1	3.0	4.1


Fort Indiantown Gap Corrected TABS Analysis

		AP Hill	FTIG	H-Ligget	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
DEPLOYMENT											
Miles to rail trans	30	5	21	30	5	12	107	37	0	9	0
Miles to air trans	30	51	26	81	0	0	70	191	25	70	47
Miles to sea trans	30	125	93	145	589	45	253	166	180	115	105
Miles to highway	10	13	1	23	5	0	1	35	2	35	75
TOTAL & TABS score	100	8.4	8.7	7.1	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
DEPLOYMENT (Weighted)											
Miles to rail trans		285.98	241.12	215.89	285.98	266.36	0.00	196.26	300.00	274.77	300.00
Miles to air trans		219.90	259.16	172.77	300.00	300.00	190.05	0.00	260.73	190.05	226.18
Miles to sea trans		255.88	273.53	244.85	0.00	300.00	185.29	233.27	225.55	261.40	266.91
Miles to highway		82.67	98.67	69.33	93.33	100.00	98.67	53.33	97.33	53.33	0.00
Total score		844.43	872.48	702.85	679.31	966.36	474.01	482.87	883.62	779.55	793.09
score/100		8.4	8.7	7.0	6.8	9.7	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
RESERVE TRAINING											
Annual training	25	18407	32995	3364	8125	15570	151	6223	48935	14743	4921
IDT (mandays)	75	261247	288130	0	33183	299687	44	28716	221176	88743	36684
TOTAL & TABS score	100	7.5	6.5	0.2	1.2	8.3	0.0	1.0	8.0	3.0	1.2
RESERVE TRAINING (Weighted)											
Annual training		93.56	168.31	16.47	40.86	79.02	0.00	31.12	250.00	74.78	24.44
IDT (mandays)		653.80	721.08	0.00	83.04	750.00	0.11	71.86	553.52	222.09	91.81
Total score		747.35	889.39	16.47	123.91	829.02	0.11	102.98	803.52	296.87	116.25
score/100		7.5	8.9	0.2	1.2	8.3	0.0	1.0	8.0	3.0	1.2
ENVIRONMENTAL CARRYING CAPACITY											
Arch/Hist bldgs	10	0.00007	0.01116	0.00244	0.0014	0.00003	0.00001	0.00003	0.00002	0	0.0016
Endgrd fauna/flora	15	3	1	3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1
Wetlands	15	0.0359	0.00028	0.00607	0.00036	0.16095	0.468	0	0.03417	0.07276	0.04022
Air Quality	15	1	10	10	1	10	1	10	1	1	1
Water Quality	15	2	0	0	10	88	0	0	0	0	3
Noise Quality											

Fort Indianatown Gap Corrected TABS Analysis

score/450	3.0	3.8	2.8	1.7	3.1	4.7	7.2	3.3	2.2	5.4
LAND AND FACILITIES	AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
Work Space	59000.0	1492064	144000.0	43000.0	536000.0	199000.0	548000.0	527400.0	90000.0	1048000
% Perm Facilities	30	66.4	34.0	2.7	86.2	70.6	79.9	8.3	14.3	74.6
Avg facility age	25	21.0	36.4	51.0	34.0	32.0	16.0	48.0	45.0	21.0
Infrastructure	25	1.9	1.7	2.0	3.2	5.6	4.2	2.3	3.8	5.8
Barracks	60	48.0	210.0	211.0	0.0	806.0	1816.0	28.0	47.0	5590.0
Environmental Cap	25	8.3	6.9	5.0	9.1	8.1	6.5	8.2	7.4	9.0
TOTAL & TABS score	225	3.1	1.7	3.0	1.5	6.9	3.8	5.2	2.6	1.8
Work Space	23.73	600.00	57.91	17.29	215.54	80.02	220.37	212.08	36.19	421.43
% Perm Facilities	228.86	112.46	216.65	0.00	300.00	243.95	277.37	20.12	41.68	258.32
Avg facility age	214.29	104.29	221.43	0.00	121.43	135.71	250.00	21.43	42.86	214.29
Infrastructure	47.71	43.35	51.18	105.78	80.99	140.63	105.47	57.62	96.07	144.23
Barracks	2.24	9.81	9.86	0.00	600.00	37.66	84.85	1.31	2.20	261.19
Environmental Cap	208.35	171.73	126.09	226.39	147.11	201.98	162.43	205.97	184.50	223.91
Total score	725.18	1041.63	683.12	349.47	1465.07	839.95	1100.48	518.53	403.49	1523.38
score/225	3.2	4.6	3.0	1.6	6.5	3.7	4.9	2.3	1.8	6.8
CONTINGENCY, MOBILIZATION AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	AP Hill	FTIG	Hunt Lgt	Chaffee	Dix	Greely	Irwin	McCoy	Pickett	Polk
Mobilz Capability	30	3.2	5.9	2.6	4.3	1.8	5.4	4.2	2.9	6.7
Buildable Acres	35	30244.0	425.0	20000.0	7901.0	500.0	1550.0	1500.0	2400.0	3877.0
Encroachment	20	37.5	301.8	110.4	100.7	0.2	104.7	42.2	28.4	49.3
Deployment Network	30	8.4	8.7	7.0	6.8	4.7	4.8	8.8	7.8	7.9
IMA	10	385.0	1100.0	275.0	265.0	765.0	1190.0	1085.0	665.0	1320.0
TOTAL & TABS score	125	7.4	4.7	5.8	4.5	3.8	5.0	5.6	4.8	6.5
Mobilz Capability	96.26	176.29	77.37	61.94	129.83	54.24	161.41	126.50	85.68	202.12

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP



A Key Department of Defense

Training Resource

Accessible Suitable Affordable


CLOSE, EXCEPT “ENCLAVE”

- **THE VAST MAJORITY OF MISSIONS CEASE OR RELOCATED**
- **95% OF PERSONNEL ELIMINATED OR RELOCATED**
- **ALL BUT A SMALL PORTION OF BASE EXCESSED**
- **SMALL PORTION REMAINING WILL BE FACILITIES IN AN “ENCLAVE” FOR USE BY RESERVE COMPONENTS**
- **ACTIVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT CEASES**
- **UNMANNED RANGES AND TRAINING AREAS RETAINED FOR RESERVE COMPONENT USE**

ENCLAVE THEORY NOT PRACTICAL

- **Only the Annual Training Mission Would Cease, Majority of the Missions Would Remain.**
- **Only 9% of the Personnel Would be Eliminated or Relocated (See COBRA 2090/2307, 91% Remain).**
- **Entire Post retained, Only W W II Barracks Eliminated (Not Permanent Structures).**
- **Active Component Management Would Cease Requiring the RIF of all Title 5 Civilians and Rehiring of 246 Personnel as Title 32 Civilians or Federally Reimbursed State Employees.**


ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- **Mission Will Remain.**
- **Management - Work Force Required to Run the Installation.**


CONTONEMENT AREA



YELLOW - DAILY OCCUPANCY


RED - DEMOLISHED OR
SCHEDULED FOR DEMOLITION

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP



- Since the Infrastructure Can Not be Eliminated **BASOPS and RPMA Funding are Still Required** and a New Work Force Must be Hired.
- 246 of the 259 **Civilians Would Still be Required** (see change to Army's initial submission).
- Present Work Force Would be Dismissed and New Employees Would be **(re)hired**.

SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED- RECURRING COSTS UNDERESTIMATED



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- Army's Annual Savings Projection Reduced From \$23.8 Million to \$6.7 Million.

? 6.7 Million Dollar Savings ?

- **SAVINGS FROM NON-FUNDED EMPLOYEE "DISMISSALS"**
- **OVERHEAD SAVINGS DERIVED FROM REMOVAL OF WW II TEMPORARY BARRACKS EXCEED AMOUNT EXPENDED**
- **ONE TIME COST, UNDERESTIMATED**
- **TRAVEL COSTS STILL NOT INCLUDED**

NO REALISTIC SAVINGS


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

- **Of the 50 Civilians Dismissed, Only 13 Positions are Funded.** In Addition, **Savings are Computed at Standard Rate**, Which is Significantly Higher Than the Actual Salary.
- **45 Military Positions Eliminated?** Original Study Had There Positions Relocating. Army Already Planned to Transfer Military in FY 96 Under Another Initiative.
- Only \$405,200 IN BASOPS and RPMA are Attributed to WW II Temporary Barracks. Most of the **Funding is Spent on Permanent Facilities.**
- Even Though 246 Employees are Needed, the Entire Force Would Have to be Terminated at a Cost of \$10.6 Million Because of the Change in Management, e.g. Title 5 to Title 32. **Total One Time Closure Costs Would, Therefore, Remain \$12.7 Million.**
- **Travel Costs for Units to Train Elsewhere Not Considered. Additional Costs Could Exceed \$1,000,000.**

Alternate Training Site Vehicle & Troop Movement

Distances / Times

FT DRUM



The Secretary's Enclave Recommendation Would Close the Gap to All Annual Training and Would Send the 32,000 Soldiers Who Come There to far Distant Posts for Training. The Matrix Below Lists the Time/distance to Recommended Locations. Some Convoys Will Have to Make Two Day Journeys Which Reduces the 15 Day Training Time by 4 Days or 26 Percent and Which Further Increases Our Costs.

	<u>FTIG</u>	<u>FT DRUM</u>	<u>FT PICKETT</u>	<u>A.P. HILL</u>
Pittsburgh 337MI/8HRS	256MI/6HRS	550MI/12HRS	437MI/ 10.5HRS	
Philadelphia 266MI/6HRS	128 MI/ 3HRS	348MI/7.5HRS	366MI/7.5HRS	
Scranton 344MI/8HRS	110 MI/2.5HRS	212MI/5.HRS	489MI/11HRS	
FTIG 279MI/6.5HRS	-----	322MI/7.5HRS	379 MI/8.5HRS	

THE REALITIES ARE

- **Entire Post Will Remain**
- **Permanent Facilities Will Remain**
- **Infrastructure Will Remain**
- **246 of 259 Civilian Employees Will Remain**
- **Travel Costs Will Increase by Closing Fort to Annual Training Troops**
- **No Savings Will be Achieved**
- **State-owned Lands, Lease Termination Creates Significant Legal Problems**
- **Other Suitable Posts Lack Summertime Slots**

NOT PRACTICAL

- It must be pointed out this is the only military training installation in the nation which is owned by the state and leased to the federal government. Clearly, a "Federal Enclave" cannot be established without the consent of the state. The unique relationship was not considered by the Army's analysis nor were the exceptional costs which could flow from it taken into account.
- The lease places a burden on the federal government to restore the lands to a "safe condition" and to comply with various statutes and regulations. If the lease is terminated, the state may not wish to assume legal liability or responsibility for the base unless, and until, the lands are restored and the outstanding legal issues resolved.
- The post must be operated to satisfied the daily/weekend operational and training requirements of the force, therefore there is no sensible reason why annual training should not continue to be conducted at the Gap. To operate and enclave with all the turbulence and degradation it will cause, and then pay to move all of the force out of state for annual training, makes no sense, is far more expensive and much less effective.

BOTTOM LINE

- **Fort Indiantown Gap Should Remain an Active Army Installation. Any Attainable Efficiencies Can be Achieved in the Present Structure.**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP