

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950428-17
 DEN 1297 LTC B's copy.

FROM: <u>BUMPERS, DALE</u>	TO: <u>WEST, TOGO</u>
LE: <u>SEN (AK)</u>	TITLE: <u>SEC OF THE ARMY</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>U.S. CONGRESS</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DEPT OF THE ARMY</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>FORT CHAFFEE</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
STAFF DIRECTOR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			COMMISSIONER COX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
GENERAL COUNSEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			COMMISSIONER KLING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				DIRECTOR OF R & A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
				ARMY TEAM LEADER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING ARMY TO CLARIFY HOW MUCH OF FORT CHAFFEE WILL BE KEPT AS AN ENCLAVE.

Date: _____	Routing Date: <u>950428</u>	Date Originated: <u>950428</u>	Mail Date: _____
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DALE BUMPERS
ARKANSAS

COMMITTEE
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0401

April 28, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950428-17

The Honorable Togo West
Secretary of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Mr. Secretary:

During your recent appearance before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and in a question for the record submitted by BRAC Chairman Alan Dixon, I asked you to define the Reserve Component "enclave" which the Army plans to leave at Fort Chaffee after the proposed closure of that base. You responded that the size and characteristics of the enclave will be determined during the implementation phase of the BRAC process.

As you know, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutant General of Arkansas want to include most of Fort Chaffee's maneuver area in the enclave. However, on March 7, personnel from the Army's Base Closure Office seemed to preclude such an outcome when they told representatives of the Arkansas National Guard and members of my own and Senator Pryor's staffs that the enclave would consist of no more than small arms ranges and a small number of buildings.


To help clarify this issue, would you please answer the following questions:

A draft of the Army's BRAC recommendation for Fort Chaffee reads: "Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, ranges, and training area for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave." The Army's final recommendation deleted the words "and training area."

- o Why did the Army remove the words "and training area" from the final recommendation?
- o Has the Army already excluded the possibility that most of the base's training and maneuver area will be included in the Fort Chaffee enclave? If not, is the Army willing to include such area, if requested by the National Guard?

Please respond directly to me, with a copy to the BRAC Commission, by May 8, 1995.

Sincerely,



Dale Bumpers

cf: Chairman Alan Dixon
DB:bpm

DRAFT VERSION

Fort Chaffee, AR

1. **Recommendation:** Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, ranges, and training area for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

2. **Justification:** In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the current force.


Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, La. The transfer was completed in 1992.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain ranges for use by the RC units in the area. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

3. **Return on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$10 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$167 million.

4. **Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA area, which is 0.3 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments to closing this installation.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REPORT TO THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION



VOLUME III

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ANALYSES

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

MARCH 1995

FINAL VERSION

Fort Chaffee, AR

- 1. Recommendation:** Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave
- 2. Justification:** In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, La. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

- 3. Return on Investment:** The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$10 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$167 million.

- 4. Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.3 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to -0.4 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installation.

FAX

from _____

Senator Dale Bumpers

Phone (202) 224-4843 229 Dirksen Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20510
FAX (202) 224-6435

DATE: _____

TO: Ed Brown / Steve Berkley

FAX NUMBER TO: 703 594-0550

FROM: BRIAN MORAN

PHONE: _____

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, 3 INCLUDING COVER PAGE.

COMMENTS: Looks like the Army
has made up its mind that
chaffee envelope is small

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS, 28 APRIL 1995**1. Why did the Army remove the words "and training area" from the final recommendation?**

There was substantial editing for all of the recommendations to ensure they fully and adequately expressed the final decision made by the Army.

2. Has the Army already excluded the possibility that most of the base's training and maneuver area will be included in the Fort Chaffee enclave? If not, is the Army willing to include such area, if requested by the National Guard?

It is premature to predict the actual size of the future enclave at this time. The Army's intent for the enclave is as follows:

- Enclave consists of Daily U.S. Army Reserve Center and consolidation into facilities required by USAR and facilities licensed to Arkansas Army National Guard.
- License needed training areas with minimum necessary facilities to Arkansas Army National Guard.
- Conduct annual training at other locations.
- Dispose of remaining land and facilities.

The Army is in the early stages of formulating the reserve enclave. Army headquarters will review the recommendations later this summer.

Copied By LTC OLSON, BRACO,
0945, 12 MAY

PROVIDED TO LINDA COLEMAN
OCLL, 1000 12 MAY

INFORMED LTC BROWN,
SA OFFICER, 1005, 12 MAY

BRAC
IS AN
OPPORTUNITY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

THE ARMY BASING STUDY



TO: BRAC COMMISSION ATTN: STEVE BAILEY	HQDA, DACS-TABS THE PENTAGON, ROOM 2A684 WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200	DATE-TIME-GROUP 15 MAY 1445
	POC: LTC BRYAN	NUMBER OF PAGES
	VOICE TELEPHONE: DSN 227-1765 COM (703) 697-1765/G TABS FAX TELEPHONE: (703) 693-9322/DSN 223-9322	H + 1



*Britain
orig to
M. A. for
D. B.
HAM*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
INSTALLATIONS LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110



May 19, 1995

Honorable Dale Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Bumpers:

This replies to your April 28, 1995, letter to the Honorable Togo West, Jr., Secretary of the Army, concerning Fort Chaffee and the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Unfortunately, your letter was received after May 8, 1995, so I was unable to respond by the date you requested.

Regrettably, a draft of the BRAC analysis and recommendation was released to your office prior to all recommendations being fully reviewed and approved. To ensure that all proposed recommendations fully and adequately expressed the final decision made by the Army, some editing of that draft was required. This editing was a normal process and was followed for all installation recommendations.

It is premature to predict the actual size of the future enclave at this time. The Army's intent for the future enclave consists of the Darby U. S. Army Reserve Center and consolidation into facilities required by the U. S. Army Reserve and facilities licensed to the Arkansas Army National Guard. The enclave will also include needed training areas with minimum necessary facilities licensed to the Arkansas Army National Guard. Annual training can be conducted at other locations. The remaining land and facilities will be handled through the normal disposal process.

I trust this information will be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Alma B. Moore

For Robert M. Walker
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics and Environment)



Fort Chaffee, AR

1. Recommendation: Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, ranges, and training area for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

2. Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the current force.

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, La. The transfer was completed in 1992.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain ranges for use by the RC units in the area. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

3. Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$10 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$39 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13 million with a return on investment expected in 1 year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$167 million.

4. Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA area, which is 0.3 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments to closing this installation.



**MILITARY
VALUE
ASSESSMENT**

FT. POLK
FT. IRWIN

FT. DIX
FT. A.P. HILL
FT. MCCOY
FT. GREELY
FT. HUNTERLIGGETT
FT. PICKETT
FT. INDIANTOWN GAP
FT. CHAFFEE

FORT CHAFFEE, AR

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE



FT CHAFFEE

GARRISON

CLOSE FT CHAFFEE

- ENCLAVE RC BLDG, RANGES AND TRAINING AREAS FOR USE BY RC

COSTS (\$M)

O&M	\$ 10
MILCON	\$ 0
OTHER	\$ 0
TOTAL	\$ 10

PAYBACK PERIOD (YEARS) 1

BREAK EVEN YEAR 1999

STEADY STATE (\$M) \$13 (1999)

20 YEAR NPV(\$M) \$167

CLOSEHOLD / SENSITIVE

THE ARMY BASING STUDY



IMPACT SUMMARY FT CHAFFEE, AR

OPERATIONAL:

- No unacceptable adverse operational impacts due to closure
- Supports 9+ RC BNS training ; can divert to other installations
- BRAC 91 Commission retained AC garrison to support RC training after JRTC left
- Provides DS/GS maint for USAR in Northern AR, Northeast TX, Southeast OK

PERSONNEL:

	MILITARY	CIVILIAN
REDUCTIONS	4	189
REALIGNMENTS	36	18

ENVIRONMENTAL: No known impediments

ECONOMIC: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 352 jobs (247 direct jobs and 105 indirect jobs) over the 1996 to 2001 period in the Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA area, which is 0.3 % of the area's employment

OTHER SERVICE/DOD FACTORS: None

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED: Close Ft Chaffee (no enclave)

- Cost = \$ 46 M
- Payback = 2 years

HEADQUARTERS, 39TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEPARATE)

Arkansas Army National Guard
4700 West 8th Street
Little Rock, Arkansas 72205-5454

June 4, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950613-5

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
1200 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:


I am the commander of the 39th Infantry Brigade (Separate) of the Arkansas Army National Guard. I respectfully request that Fort Chaffee, Arkansas be protected from Base Realignment and Closure actions.

The closure of Fort Chaffee will have a severe impact on the ability of the 39th Brigade to train for its war time mission. There is no other installation within reasonable distance that provides the space to train the Brigade. To train at any installation other than Fort Chaffee requires that we spend two days in convoy to and from the installation as opposed to the one day we spend getting to Fort Chaffee or that we transport our equipment and personnel on contract carriers. To convoy to these more distant installations means that we lose two days of valuable training time. To move the 2500 soldiers who attend annual training and the almost 1,000 pieces of rolling stock of the Brigade would be extremely expensive, taking money away from other programs.

I realize that the BRAC committee must make difficult decisions and that those decisions are based on a number of factors. As a commander of one of the enhanced Brigades, I sincerely hope that the impact closure would have on readiness is a prime consideration. We have been given a difficult mission, but it is one that I am confident the soldiers of the 39th Brigade are capable of meeting if adequate resources are made available. Fort Chaffee is a training resource that I do not feel can be lost without a significant adverse impact on the readiness of the 39th Brigade. In addition, other reserve component units who routinely train at Fort Chaffee will face the same challenges in finding an acceptable and affordable substitute, with the same adverse impact on readiness.

Thank you for your time. I hope that the points I have attempted to make will result in Fort Chaffee not being included on the final list for closure. If you would like to visit with me further on this matter, I can be reached at 501-377-1248 during normal business hours.

Sincerely,



Don C. Morrow
Colonel, Arkansas Army National Guard
Commanding Officer

DAVID PRYOR
ARKANSAS

RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
(202) 224-2353

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND
FORESTRY
FINANCE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0402

ARKANSAS OFFICE,
3030 FEDERAL BUILDING
LITTLE ROCK, AR 72201
(501) 324-8338

Telecopier Transmission from Steve Ronnel, Legislative Assistant

Date: June 12, 1995

To: Steve Bailey

Company: BRAC

Fax Number: 703 696-0550

Number of Pages: 1 (not including cover sheet)

If there is a problem encountered during this transmission, please contact (202) 224-2353.

Notes: Steve,

I wanted you to see a copy of an article that ran in the Arkansas Democrat/Gazette this weekend. It's fairly accurate, except the part that says 62,000 acres would definitely be available for RC training. I always assumed the details on acreage would be resolved during implementation. Thanks for all your help. Please call if I can be of assistance.

- Steve

06/12/95

10:36

DPT + 202 224 2353

NO. 491

D02

Maumelle police

Army alters Fort Chaffee proposal

Wants to keep 62,000-acre training area for reserves

Democrat-Gazette Fort Smith Bureau

FORT SMITH — The Army has amended its Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommendation for Fort Chaffee, retaining the base's 62,000-acre maneuver training area for the region's National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers.

The report from a meeting of top Army officials Thursday said the words "training area" were inadvertently omitted from the recommendation to the closure and realignment commission that Fort Chaffee be closed. After the closure, Fort Chaffee would be left with an

"enclave" run by a small active Army unit to support training operations at the fort by National Guard and Reserve units.

According to Sen. David Pryor's office, that enclave would have operated some of the fort's small arms firing ranges. The expansive and varied maneuver area that has been popular with Army commanders was to be dropped by the Army.

"Senator Bumpers and I have been trying to keep the strongest possible military presence at Fort Chaffee," Pryor's office quoted him as saying Friday. "The Army's decision to contin-

ue training soldiers at Chaffee is welcome news indeed."

The loss of Fort Chaffee, located in Sebastian County just southeast of Fort Smith, would mean Arkansas National Guard troops and those from other states would have to travel to Fort Riley, Kan., Fort Sill, Okla., or Fort Polk, La., for their annual and weekend training. Pryor and Sen. Dale Bumpers, both D-Ark., had argued the change would cost the Arkansas National Guard a needless increase in time and money to travel to the distant bases for training.



STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

Jim Guy Tucker
Governor

May 5, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950508-20

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding Fort Chaffee.

As you may already know, I have been working with the staffs of Senator Dale Bumpers, Senator David Pryor, and Congressman Tim Hutchinson over the past two years to ensure that a viable mission is retained at Fort Chaffee. During recent public forums, the city of Fort Smith, Sebastian County, state legislators, and Arkansas' Congressional delegation have reached a consensus that Fort Chaffee should retain a military mission if at all possible.

I have asked Major General Melvin C. Thrash, the Adjutant General for the Arkansas National Guard, to advance the concerns of the Guard with local and federal officials. The response to the needs of the Guard has been favorable and supportive.

I will continue to work closely with all interested parties to help ensure that the will of the residents of Western Arkansas is met.

Sincerely,

Jim Guy Tucker

JGT:paj:ejs

Bailey, Steve

From: Bailey, Steve
To: Brown, Ed
Cc: Wooten, Cliff; Purser, Wayne; Ayeen, Ziba; Chalfant, Melissa
Subject: WHEN ED BROWN GOES TO FORT CHAFFEE INSTEAD OF ME
Date: Friday, April 07, 1995 10:04AM

Dpt DCA at 0655 for TULSA on NW#25 w/ Memphis connection onto NW# 5225, Arriving TULSA at 1055 for \$142.00, then Rental Car to Ft. Chaffee (1 hr drive: straight down Muskogee Turnpike to I-40, I-40 to Ft. Smith, then 8 miles to Chaffee).

Ed should arrive at Ft. Chaffee approximately 1230-1300 (assuming time for baggage pick-up, obtaining reserved rental car) with no problem.

He has a cottage reserved for him right by Post HQs for Monday night and through his departure Tuesday (confirmed by Jackie Holmes, DSN 692-3130--\$22.00 for the stay, with bedroom, bath, living room, and kitchen).

For his departure Tuesday, he'll return the rental car and fly from Tulsa to DCA--best choice would be NW Flight #5524/988 thru Memphis, Departing TUL at 5:10 p.m. and Arriving National at 10:50 p.m.



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY GARRISON
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas



FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL HEADER SHEET

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL HEADER SHEET			
COMMAND		OFFICE SYMBOL	TELEPHONE NUMBER
FROM: USAG, Fort Chaffee C,P&A (Mr. Ables)		ATZR-ZA	(501) 484-3130
TO: USA, Defense Base Closure & Realignment LTC Bailey			FAY (703) 696-0550
Classification	No. Pgs.	Precedence	Control #
U	H + 4	R	
Remarks: ATTN: LTC Bailey - <i>DRAFT itinerary</i>			
AUTH RELEASERS SIGNATURE		Date-Time	Month Year
<i>B</i>		6	April 1995

“DRAFT”

THE HONORABLE JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR.

Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Arlington, Virginia

Project Office: Command Section, DSN 962-2282, COM (501) 484-2282, FAX 962-2055

Escort Officer: LTC Robert A. Dow, Jr. Commander, Fort Chaffee

Date of Visit: Tuesday, 11 April 1995

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PERSON</u>
0930	Arrive, AAFLT 5325	Fort Smith Regional	LTC Dow
0930-1000	Enroute to Fort Chaffee		LTC Dow
1000-1100	Introductions Command Briefing Working Luncheon	Conf Room, B 1370	LTC Dow
1100-1115	ARNG Brief		MG Thrash
1115-1120	RTB Brief		COL Shirron
1120-1140	USARC Brief		BG Hardy
1140-1200	Fort Chaffee Committee Brief		Congressman Hutchinson Judge Harper COL Bob Boyer, USA, Ret
1200-1245	Aerial Tour (HQ Pad)		LTC Dow
1245- 1334	Ground Tour		LTC Dow
1345-1400	Media Event		LTC Dow
1400-1430	Enroute to Airport		LTC Dow
1500	Depart Flight 3866		LTC Dow

1615 AA 5040

"DRAFT"

Official Party

LTC Steve Bailey, USA, Defense Base Closure & Realignment Staff Member
LTC Harry Bryan, Staff Analyst, Total Army Basing Study (TABS), DA

Fort Chaffee Committee - City Leaders:

Congressman Tim Hutchinson, Co-chairman
Judge Bud Harper, Sebastian County Judge, Co-chairman
Mr. Ray Baker, Mayor of Fort Smith
Mr. Jerry Barling, Mayor of Barling
Mr. Sherman Hiatt, Mayor of Charleston
Mr. Joe Siegmund, Mayor of Greenwood
Mr. Bob Boyer, Spokesman for Veterans Group
Mr. George McGill, Chairman, Fort Smith City Planning Commission
Mr. Rusty Meyers, Western Arkansas Planning and Development District Inc.
Mr. Luke Gordy, Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Van Buren
Mr. Ed Warmack, Civilian Aide to Secretary of the Army
Mr. Jack White, Chairman, Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Billy Dooley, President, Fort Smith Chamber of Commerce

Congressional Leaders

Senator Dale Bumpers (Invited - no response)
Senator David Pryor (Invited - no response)

Arkansas National Guard

MG Melvin Thrash, Adjutant General
BG James Thomey, Assistant Adjutant General Air, Arkansas
COL Bill Wofford, Director Plans, Operations and Training
LTC Ron Snead, Deputy Director of Plans, Operations and Training
MAJ Bill Holmes, Facility Engineer

U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC)

BG Robert S. Hardy, Chief of Staff, USARC
Mr. Mark Tillotson, Chief, Operations Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer
Mr. Jim Bohm, Director of Facilities, USARC

“DRAFT”

FORSCOM Representative

COL William Shirron, Commander, Regional Training Brigade (RTB)

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

COL Dennis Porter, Director of Resource Management

U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Chaffee:

- LTC Robert A. Dow, Jr. Commander
- Mr. Warren Johnson, Deputy Installation Commander
- SGM Phillip Hafler, Post Sergeant Major
- Mr. Bill Ables, Chief, Personnel and Administration Division
- LTC Earl Massey, Chief, Operations Division
- Mr. Walt Garner, Chief, Facilities and Engineering Division
- Mr. Bob Julian, Chief, Logistic Division
- Mr. Glynn Ryan, Resource Management
- Mr. Max Trotter, NFFE President, Fort Chaffee

GROUND TOUR

THE HONORABLE JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR.

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

11 APRIL 1995

NCOA Field Site	B1726	Briefing	West Area
Golf Course	B3910	Drive By	25th Ave
Old Hospital Area	B3700	"	25th Ave
All Ranks Club	B1683	"	25th Ave
DOE Complex	B1789	"	4th Ave
Dining Facility 1747		"	4th Ave
RTS MED Complex	B2559,2535	Briefing	1st Ave
2/142 Motor Pool Complex		Drive By	
Old Motor Pools/Wash Rack		"	
TSC Complex	B2000	"	2nd Ave
Fire Station	B2100	"	"
TMC Complex	B 1340/1339	Walk Thru	14th St
Bldg 1337		"	
Bldg 1333		"	
Bldg 1335		"	
Bldg 1315		"	
Field House	B1318	"	Ft Smith Blvd
Industrial/Warehouse Complex		Drive By	
Garrison Maintenance Complex		"	
ECS #15 Complex	B470	"	Roberts Blvd
West Area		"	"
Swimming Pool	B557	"	"
DRMO	B5524	"	10th Ave
Fire Staton		"	
Airfield Complex	B762	"	10th Ave
MOUT Site		"	"
Fire Dept Training Pit		"	Custer Blvd
Wells Lake		"	11th Ave
Officers Club	B4769	"	"
Warehouses		"	
100 Complex	B100,01,02	"	Ft. Smith Blvd
800 Complex	B800	"	Terry St
PX Complex	B1589	"	4th Ave
Education Center	B1390	"	"
ATM	B1452	"	"
Mail Room	B1440	"	"
Post Chapel	B1481	"	"
MP Station	B1355	"	"
Post Headquarters	B1370	EOT	

"DRAFT"

FT. CHAFFEE

THE BRAC COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION SHOULD BE TO:

"REALIGN FORT CHAFFEE, WITH A RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVE THAT HAS MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FACILITIES, AS WELL AS MANEUVER AREA, ARTILLERY RANGES AND BOMBING/STRAFING RANGES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING, ANNUAL TRAINING, AND BRIGADE-LEVEL MANEUVER TRAINING."

#1

FT. CHESTERFIELD

THE ARMY'S RECOMMENDATION
MAY LEGALLY PRECLUDE
AN ENCLAVE THAT FULFILLS RC REQUIREMENTS

ARMY PLAN RC NEED

SIZE -"MINIMUM FACILITIES AND RANGES" -62,000 ACRES

FUNCTIONS -NO ANNUAL TRAINING (AT) -JDT, AT
-INDIVIDUAL TRAINING ONLY -COLLECTIVE TRAINING
-BOMBING/STRAFING

MANNING -NO ACTIVE DUTY -PART OF 5TH ARMY
REGIONAL TRAINING
BDE.

2

FT. CHAFFEE

THE ISSUE: DO WE WANT A VIABLE RESERVE COMPONENT?

- ▶ CLOSING CHAFFEE MEANS LOSING
 - 62,000 maneuver acres
 - the best bombing range in 5 state area
 - Best rivercrossing site in the U.S.
- ▶ CLOSING CHAFFEE MEANS PRIORITY RC UNITS CANNOT MEET TRAINING STANDARDS
 - No Annual Training or collective Inactive Duty Training at Chaffee
 - No funds to train elsewhere (\$11.9 mil unfunded)
 - Alternate training sites generally not available
- ▶ CLOSING CHAFFEE MEANS LATER DEPLOYING RC UNITS WILL HAVE DEGRADED READINESS

#3

FT. CHAFFEE

DISTANCES TO ALTERNATE TRAINING AREAS

39TH INF BRIGADE (LITTLE ROCK)

- ▶ *TO FORT CHAFFEE* 150 MILES
- ▶ TO FORT POLK 316 MILES
- ▶ TO FORT SILL 387 MILES
- ▶ TO FORT RILEY 512 MILES

142ND FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE (FAYETTEVILLE)

- ▶ *TO FORT CHAFFEE* 63 MILES
- ▶ TO FORT SILL 326 MILES

188TH FIGHTER GROUP (FORT SMITH)

- ▶ *TO FORT CHAFFEE* 12 MILES
- ▶ TO FORT LEONARDWOOD 260 MILES

#4

FTJ. CHAFFETIE

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS' PROPOSAL

- ▶ KEEPS 100% OF CHAFFETIE'S MILITARY VALUE AT 50% THE COST - *THE TAXPAYER WINS*
- ▶ FULFILLS RESERVE COMPONENT NEEDS - *THE MILITARY WINS*
- ▶ PROVIDES EXCESS LAND FOR COMMUNITY REUSE - *THE COMMUNITY WINS*

C

Document Separator

DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

FORT CHAFFEE

INSTALLATION MISSION

- Support active Army and Reserve Components training.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The Joint Readiness Training Center relocated to Fort Polk, LA in 1992; post has Active Component garrison, but no Active Component units.
- Ranks tenth out of ten continental United States Major Training Areas and is excess infrastructure to downsized Army's needs.
- Some Reserve Component training can still be done, but Reserve Component annual training can be done at Forts Polk, Sill, or Riley.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Costs: \$ 9.573 million
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$ 38.634 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 13.465 million
- Return on Investment Year: 1 year
- Net Present Value Over 20 years: \$167.438 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	67	250	182
Reductions	42	189	0
Realignments	3690	187	0
Total	4092	207	0

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
40	207	0	0	(40)	(207)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 39 contaminated underground sites have been identified; 26 acres of wetlands; one endangered species (the American Burying Beetle) occurs on entire installation.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Jim Guy Tucker
Senators: Dale Bumpers
David Pryor
Representative: Tim Hutchinson

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 352 jobs (247 direct and 105 indirect)
- Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA Job Base: 105,156 jobs
- Percentage: 0.3 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1994-2001): 0.4 percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- Fifth Army NCO Academy will continue to operate under control of the U.S. Army Reserve. (The 27 remaining military positions after closure are Reserve Component instructors).
- Details of the Army plan to "license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard" require coordination and agreement.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Members of the Arkansas Congressional Delegation have questioned the change in Fort Chaffee's Military Value ranking by the Army, from 5/10 in 1993 to 10/10 in 1995, as well as the projected Cost Savings figures.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- None yet identified.

Steve Bailey/Army Team/04/07/95 8:46:0AM

DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATION SUMMARY SHEET

FORT CHAFFEE

INSTALLATION MISSION

- Support active Army and Reserve Components training.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The Joint Readiness Training Center relocated to Fort Polk, LA in 1992; post has Active Component garrison, but no Active Component units.
- Ranks tenth out of ten continental United States Major Training Areas and is excess infrastructure to downsized Army's needs.
- Some Reserve Component training can still be done, but Reserve Component annual training can be done at Forts Polk, Sill, or Riley.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Costs: \$ 9.573 million
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$ 38.634 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 13.465 million
- Return on Investment Year: 1 year
- Net Present Value Over 20 years: \$167.438 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	67	250	182
Reductions	4	189	0
Realignments	36	18	0
Total	40	207	0

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
40	207	0	0	(40)	(207)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 39 contaminated underground sites have been identified; 26 acres of wetlands; one endangered species (the American Burying Beetle) occurs on entire installation.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Jim Guy Tucker
Senators: Dale Bumpers
David Pryor
Representative: Tim Hutchinson

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- Fifth Army NCO Academy will continue to operate under control of the U.S. Army Reserve.
- Details of the Army plan to "license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard" require coordination and agreement.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Members of the Arkansas Congressional Delegation have questioned the change in Fort Chaffee's Military Value ranking by the Army, from 5/10 in 1993 to 10/10 in 1995, as well as the projected Cost Savings figures.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- None yet identified.

Steve Bailey/ArmyTeam/03/16/95 8:19 AM

Army - Static Data

05025

FORT CHAFFEE

Major Training Area

AR

TRADOC

None.

Support active Army and Reserve Components training

None.

519

367

320

Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA

8 miles southeast of Fort Smith; 150 miles northwest of Little Rock

29,177,000

39 contaminated underground sites have been identified; 26 acres of wetlands; one endangered species (the American Burying Beetle) occurs on entire installation.

Major Training Areas

71,358

7,901

4,780,000

33

0

\$0

\$0

\$70

0.92

\$637,024,531

0

10 of 10

Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave.

\$9,573,000.00

\$0.00

\$0.00

\$13,465,000.00

1999 (1 Year)

247/105/352 (-0.3%)

-0.4%

None

207

40

03

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

1991 DBCRC:
Return installation to semiactive status with an Active Component garrison to be used in support of Reserve Component training; completed FY 93

Jim Guy Tucker

Dale Bumpers
David Pryor

Tim Hutchinson

Fort A. P. Hill, VA; ; Fort Dix, NJ; Fort Greely, AK; Fort Hunter-Liggett, CA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; Fort Irwin, CA; Fort McCoy, WI; Fort Pickett, VA; Fort Polk, LA

[Redacted]

JUSTIFICATION

The Joint Readiness Training Center relocated to Fort Polk, LA in 1992; post has Active Component garrison, but no Active Component units. Ranks tenth out of ten continental United States Major Training Areas and is excess infrastructure to downsized Army's needs. Some Reserve Component training can still be done, but Reserve Component annual training can be done at Forts Polk, Sill, or Riley.

MILITARY ISSUES

[Redacted]

OTHER ISSUES

[Redacted]

Fort Chaffee, AR

06-Mar-95

BRAC CATEGORY: Major Training Areas

RANK IN CATEGORY: 10 of 10

OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN BRAC CATEGORY: Fort A. P. Hill, VA; ; Fort Dix, NJ; Fort Greely, AK; Fort Hunter-Liggett, CA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; Fort Irwin, CA; Fort McCoy, WI; Fort Pickett, VA; Fort Polk, LA

MAJOR COMMAND: TRADOC

INSTALLATION MISSION: Support active Army and Reserve Components training

MAJOR UNITS ASSIGNED: None.

AUTHORIZED MILITARY: 519

AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN: 367

AVERAGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS: 320

FY 93 OPERATING COSTS:

TOTAL ACRES: 71,358

TOTAL BUILDABLE ACRES: 7,901

TOTAL BUILDING SQUARE FOOTAGE: 4,780,000

FAMILY HOUSING UNITS:

UNACCOMPANIED OFFICER HOUSING UNITS: 33

UNACCOMPANIED ENLISTED HOUSING SPACES: 0

VARIABLE HOUSING ALLOWANCE - OFFICER: \$0

VARIABLE HOUSING ALLOWANCE - ENLISTED: \$0

PER DIEM RATE: \$70

AREA COST FACTOR: 0.92

PLANT REPLACEMENT VALUE: \$637,024,531

HOSPITAL BEDS: 0

NEAREST CITY: 8 miles southeast of Fort Smith; 150 miles northwest of Little Rock

ECONOMIC AREA: Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA

NATIONAL PRIORITY LIST SITE: No

Y 94-99 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE COSTS: 29,177,000

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS: 39 contaminated underground sites have been identified; 26 acres of wetlands; one endangered species (the American Burying Beetle) occurs on entire installation.

GOVERNOR: Jim Guy Tucker

SENATORS: Dale Bumpers
David Pryor

REPRESENTATIVE: Tim Hutchinson

Base Summary Sheet

06-Mar-95

INSTALLATION NAME: FORT CHAFFEE

STATE: AR

INSTALLATION MISSION: Support active Army and Reserve Components training

DoD RECOMMENDATION: Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave.

JUSTIFICATION: The Joint Readiness Training Center relocated to Fort Polk, LA in 1992; post has Active Component garrison, but no Active Component units. Ranks tenth out of ten continental United States Major Training Areas and is excess infrastructure to downsized Army's needs. Some Reserve Component training can still be done, but Reserve Component annual training can be done at Forts Polk, Sill, or Riley.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

TOTAL COST TO CLOSE/REALIGN: \$9,573,000

ANNUAL SAVINGS: \$13,465,000

BREAK EVEN YEAR: 1999 (1 Year)

MILITARY POSITIONS LOST: 40

CIVILIAN POSITIONS LOST: 207

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS: 39 contaminated underground sites have been identified; 26 acres of wetlands; one endangered species (the American Burying Beetle) occurs on entire installation.

MILITARY ISSUES:

ECONOMIC IMPACT (DIRECT/INDIRECT/TOTAL): 247/105/352 (-0.3%)

CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT: -0.4%

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES:

GOVERNOR: Jim Guy Tucker

SENATORS: Dale Bumpers
David Pryor

REPRESENTATIVE: Tim Hutchinson

LOCAL OFFICIAL:

CLOSE HOLD

ARMY BRAC 95 LIST ARKANSAS

Fort Chaffee (-40 mil. / -207 civ.)

- CLOSE Fort Chaffee except retain minimum essential buildings and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) as an enclave (-40 mil. / -207 civ.)
- License required land and facilities to the Arkansas Army National Guard

State Personnel Summary

	Military	Civilian/Contractors
Personnel Loss	-40	-207
Personnel Gain	0	0

SECDEF will make an announcement on all DoD BRAC 95 recommendations later today, 28 Feb 95.


SECDEF will testify 1 Mar and SecArmy will testify on 7 Mar 95 before the BRAC Commission.

Copies of Army's report are available for copying in Room G2L2, Rayburn House Office Building and B15, Russell Senate Office Building.

CLOSE HOLD

MAP NO. 4

ARKANSAS



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

ARKANSAS

FISCAL YEAR 1994

(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

Personnel/Expenditures	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
I. Personnel - Total	34,387	22,403	2,601	9,214	169
Active Duty Military	5,878	1,102	101	4,675	0
Civilian	4,194	3,101	11	913	169
Reserve & National Guard	24,315	18,200	2,489	3,626	0
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					
II. Expenditures - Total	\$1,074,282	\$442,839	\$159,556	\$407,557	\$64,330
A. Payroll Outlays - Total	700,776	310,513	79,191	306,598	4,474
Active Duty Military Pay	159,246	36,918	3,286	119,042	0
Civilian Pay	144,080	116,581	372	22,653	4,474
Reserve & National Guard Pay	65,741	53,435	971	11,335	0
Retired Military Pay	331,709	103,579	74,562	153,568	0
B. Prime Contracts Over \$25,000 Total	373,506	132,326	80,365	100,959	59,856
Supply and Equipment Contracts	152,566	9,363	79,681	6,348	57,174
RDT&E Contracts	31,161	31,161	0	0	0
Service Contracts	110,671	15,769	652	91,568	2,682
Construction Contracts	18,963	15,888	32	3,043	0
Civil Function Contracts	60,145	60,145	0	0	0

Major Locations of Expenditures	Expenditures			Major Locations of Personnel	Military and Civilian Personnel		
	Total	Payroll Outlays	Prime Contracts		Total	Active Duty Military	Civilian
Jacksonville	\$192,140	\$158,375	\$33,765	Little Rock AFB	5,259	4,519	740
Little Rock	125,996	54,551	71,445	Pine Bluff	1,367	141	1,226
Camden	110,840	2,196	108,644	Little Rock	1,002	524	478
Pine Bluff	69,623	67,646	1,977	Fort Chaffee	406	62	344
Fort Smith	28,613	21,000	7,613	Camp Jos T. Robinson	379	7	372
North Little Rock	26,048	25,909	139	Fort Smith	305	55	250
Sherwood	25,895	25,895	0	Russellville	94	19	75
Fort Chaffee	23,709	21,084	2,625	North Little Rock	92	11	81
Pine Bluff Arsenal	20,803	0	20,803	Harrison	67	58	9
Hot Springs	16,922	16,346	576	Jonesboro	52	36	16

Prime Contracts Over \$25,000 (Prior Three Years)	Total	Army	Navy & Marine Corps	Air Force	Other Defense Activities
Fiscal Year 1993	\$329,160	\$140,076	\$77,936	\$51,023	\$60,125
Fiscal Year 1992	288,091	111,068	48,163	66,806	62,054
Fiscal Year 1991	306,363	144,986	12,365	77,393	71,619

Top Five Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards in this State	Total Amount	Major Area of Work	
		FSC or Service Code Description	Amount
1. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION	\$63,426	Guided Missile Components	\$62,449
2. INTERNATIONAL CHARTER EXPRESS	38,240	Air Charter for Things	36,749
3. LTV CORPORATION	51,161	RDTE/Missile and Space Systems-Advanced De	31,161
4. AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL	27,992	Air Charter for Things	27,667
5. SEQUA CORPORATION	13,011	Guided Missile Components	12,474
Total of Above	\$173,830	(46.5% of total awards over \$25,000)	

Prepared by: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

B. MAJOR TRAINING AREAS.

The installations listed below were evaluated within the Major Training Area category.

- Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia
- Fort Hunter Liggett, California
- Fort Pickett, Virginia
- Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
- Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
- Fort Polk, Louisiana
- Fort Dix, New Jersey
- Fort Irwin, California
- Fort Greely, Alaska
- Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

The following map shows the geographic location of each installation.




Figure 13.

(1) The Army Stationing Strategy.

(a) Description.

Major training areas provide facilities to active and reserve components for large unit training exercises. With the exceptions of the Combat Training Centers located at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, few active tactical units are stationed at these locations, which vary in characteristics, capabilities, and organization.

(b) Operational Requirements.

Major training areas primarily support the collective component of the "training" requirement. The Combat Training Centers provide state-of-the-art training, while other installations in this category serve as training areas for reserve component forces. These installations not only support sustainment training, but as major components of our mobilization strategy, they also support the "force generation" requirement by serving as mobilization stations and locations for major unit training of mobilized reserve component forces.

(c) Stationing Requirements.

(1) Maintain Combat Training Centers for both armored and light forces.

(2) Retain sufficient training acreage and range facilities to meet current and potential needs of both the active and priority reserve component forces (Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades).

(3) Minimize the number of major training areas focused primarily on reserve component training support.

(d) Operational Blueprint.

Combat Training Centers (CTC) are one of the primary reasons the Army was able to recover from the era of "hollowness" that developed during the 1970's. Installations supporting these Combat Training Centers must be retained to insure continued support for this vital component of readiness.

Major training areas that support reserve components should be realigned to accomplish the mission in the most cost effective manner. As field training is the focus, cantonment areas can be minimized by eliminating all functions other than those required to support unit training in a field environment. Additionally, installations where the workload reasonably can be relocated to other installations may be closed with minimal impact on operational requirements. Priority of training support will go to Contingency Force Package units, Special Operations Forces, and National Guard Enhanced Brigades.

(2) Military Value Assessment.

A Military Value Assessment (MVA) was conducted for each installation category. The MVA integrates the quantitative Installation Assessment with the qualitative operational blueprint previously discussed in The Army Stationing Strategy. The result is the Army's best judgment on the military value of its installations. The MVA provides the basis for identifying BRAC study candidates and is summarized below.




Figure 14.

(3) Installation Analysis.

Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia

Fort A.P. Hill provides training, administrative, and logistical support for Reserve Component (RC) units, Active Component units, other military departments and government agencies; however, Fort A.P. Hill's primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on Reserve Component (RC) training support. As a result, Fort A.P. Hill was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army decided that closure is operationally infeasible due to the annual training requirements of the RC.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Fort Chaffee serves as a major training area for Active and Reserve Component soldiers as well as service members from other military departments and civilian agencies. Further, Fort Chaffee has served as a site for contingency missions, including Vietnamese and Cuban Resettlement Programs. Fort Chaffee's primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Consequently, Fort Chaffee was chosen as a candidate for study. The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, except for a Reserve Component enclave.

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Fort Dix provides command and control to the New York Area Command at Fort Hamilton and Fort Totten as well as functional support to the New York Maintenance Shop Bellmore, Camp Kilmer, NJ; and Camp Pedricktown, NJ. The garrison is postured to support Active and Reserve Component training; however, its primary mission is to support RC units. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Therefore, Fort Dix was chosen as a candidate for study. The Army recommends realigning Fort Dix.

Fort Greely, Alaska

Fort Greely manages over 662,000 acres of training areas used by Army and Air Force units, the Cold Regions Test Center, and The Northern Warfare Training Center. The Army Stationing Strategy indicates that the number of major training areas should be reduced if operational requirements permit. As a result, Fort Greely was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends realigning Fort Greely.

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

Fort Indiantown Gap is a major Reserve Component (RC) training center for ground and air units. It is also the home of Headquarters, Pennsylvania National Guard. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. Accordingly, Fort Indiantown Gap was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Indiantown Gap, except for a reserve component enclave.

Fort Hunter Liggett, California

Fort Hunter Liggett's primary mission is to support RC units. It is the major maneuver area for combined arms training of the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), California Army National Guard. It is also the home to the Test and Experimentation Center which conducts field equipment testing for the U.S. Army. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to

reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. As a result, Fort Hunter Liggett was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends realigning Fort Hunter Liggett.

Fort Irwin, California

Fort Irwin is the home to the National Training Center (NTC). The NTC's mission is to provide tough, realistic combined arms and services joint training in accordance with operations doctrine for brigades and regiments in a mid-to-high intensity environment. In addition, the NTC provides lessons learned for training, doctrine, and equipment improvements. As one of two CONUS-based Combat Training Centers, Fort Irwin plays a key role in maintaining Army readiness. Therefore, it was not selected for further study.

Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

Fort McCoy's primary mission is to provide training for the readiness of RC forces. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on RC training support. As a result, Fort McCoy was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army decided that closure is operationally infeasible due to the training requirements of the RC.

Fort Pickett, Virginia

Fort Pickett's primary mission is to provide training facilities, maneuver training areas, base operations, and mobilization support to Reserve Component units, as well as the Active Component and other services. The Army Stationing Strategy emphasizes the need to reduce the number of major training areas focused primarily on reserve component training support. As a result, Fort Pickett was chosen as a candidate for further study. The Army recommends closing Fort Pickett, except for a reserve component enclave.

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Fort Polk is the home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The JRTC provides tough, realistic, light infantry and joint services training in accordance with operational doctrine for low to mid-to-high intensity environments. In addition, the JRTC provides lessons learned for training, doctrine, and equipment improvements. Fort Polk also supports the 2nd ACR and other contingency force units supporting XVIII Airborne Corps. As one of two CONUS-based Combat Training Centers, Fort Polk plays a key role in maintaining Army readiness. Therefore, it was not selected for further study.



B. MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

Major Training Areas provide facilities to both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units for training exercises. With the exception of Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, there are currently no active component tactical units stationed at these installations. These installations vary a great deal in characteristics, capabilities, and organizational structure. Fort Irwin, with the National Training Center, is a very large and sophisticated training area which is predominately AC oriented. Fort Indiantown Gap is a relatively small sub-installation with an RC orientation. The majority of the training supported by this category is performed by the RC.

The installations listed below were those evaluated within the Major Training Area category:

- Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia
- Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
- Fort Dix, New Jersey
- Fort Greely, Alaska
- Fort Hunter Liggett, California
- Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
- Fort Irwin, California
- Fort McCoy, Wisconsin
- Fort Pickett, Virginia
- Fort Polk, Louisiana

(1) Criteria, Attributes and Weights.

The following DoD Selection Criteria, attributes and weights were used to evaluate the Major Training Areas:

(a) Mission Requirements and Operational Readiness. The attributes and weights that measure this DoD Selection criteria are:

<u>Attribute</u>	<u>Points</u>
Maneuver Acres	120
Ranges	70
Reserve Training	70
Impact Area	70
Mechanized Maneuver Acres	80
Special Airspace	40
<hr/>	
Total	450

The single most important attribute for support of land forces, both Active and Reserve Component, is land. The value of land is measured by mechanized maneuver acres. The importance of maneuver land is recognized by assigning 44.4 percent (200 points) of the 450 points for maneuver acres and mechanized maneuver acres attributes.

Availability of ranges and impact areas are very essential aspects of training land forces. The importance is recognized by assigning 31.1 percent (140 points) of the total 450 points to the two attributes. Ranges are given less weight than land since ranges are easier to construct than land is to acquire.

Supporting the readiness of the RC is a very important element in evaluating maneuver installations. Since training areas, ranges, and deployment are just as important to the RC as the AC, the other five attributes assess the military value of the installations for all components. In addition to the others, this attribute attempts to measure the availability of the installations to support the RC. This attribute is assigned seventy points (15.5%).

The military control of airspace over an installation is important for the scheduling of rotary wing and fixed wing training missions in support of ground troops. This is one of several factors used to assess the relative size of the training areas controlled by installations. This attribute has been given forty points (8.8%).

(b) **Land and Facilities.** Six attributes measure an installation's ability to house its work force and family members. They are weighted as follows:

<u>Attribute</u>	<u>Points</u>
Work Space	60
Percent Permanent Facilities	30
Average Age of Facilities	25
Barracks	60
Infrastructure	25
Environmental Capacity	25
<hr/>	
Total	225

The overall availability of barracks space, the quality (measured by % permanent and average age), and quantity of work space were considered the most important aspects of land and facilities. These four attributes combined for a total of 175 points (77.8%).

The last two attributes measure an installation's ability to support its current needs plus predicts an installation's future needs when missions dictate expandability. These two attributes were given fifty points (22.2%).

(c) **Contingency, Mobilization, and Future Requirements.** Five attributes measure the ability of an installation to support contingency and mobilization missions and its ability to expand.

<u>Attribute</u>	<u>Points</u>
Mobilization Capability	30
Buildable Acres	35
Encroachment	20
IMA	10
Deployment Network	30
<hr/>	
Total	125

Mobilization capability is the ability of an installation to train, equip, house, and deploy units during times of a national emergency. This attribute is assigned thirty points (24%).

Buildable acres measures the installation's capacity to support additional permanent structures while encroachment gauges the impacts of surrounding communities on the expansion of installation operations and unit training, plus the future potential for land acquisition. These two attributes received fifty-five points (44%).

Information Mission Area (IMA) is an evaluation of existing IMA systems on the basis of available capacity, capability for expansion, and technology utilized. Although important, it was considered to be less than that of the above three attributes and received only ten points (8%).

The ability to project power or deploy forces is an important element in the defense of the nation. Although there are essentially no units stationed at Major Training Areas, a deployment network is required during mobilization for these installations to mobilize and deploy RC forces. Deployment network is assigned 30 points (24%).

(d) Cost and Manpower. Four attributes measure the cost and manpower implications of an installation. They were weighted as follows:

<u>Attribute</u>	<u>Points</u>
Cost of Living Index	60
Locality Pay Factor	35
BASOPS/Mission Population	75
MCA Cost Factor	30
<hr/>	
Total	200

The Cost of Living Index measures the relative cost of living for military and civilian personnel in communities surrounding the installation. This is an indicator of location costs to the Army to live and conduct business at the installation. This attribute was given sixty points (30%).

Locality Pay Factor measures the relative differences in the cost of the civilian work force at each installation. It measures the cost of labor -- not the cost of living -- from one geographical area to another. It was given thirty-five points (17.5%).

BASOPS/Mission Population was considered to be the most important and was assessed seventy-five points (37.5%). This attribute measures the relative cost of operating an installation in support of the mission requirements.

The Military Construction Account (MCA) Cost Factor measures the relative difference between installations for construction of the same facility. It further provides a relative index on

the cost of capital investments for the modernization of facilities. This attribute was given thirty points (15%).

(2) Installation Rankings - MAJOR TRAINING AREAS




Figure 6. Installation Assessment Rankings - MAJOR TRAINING AREAS

		FORT AP HILL	FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	FORT HUNTER LIGGETT
	WEIGHT			
MANEUVER ACRES	120	54700.0-	11000.0--	163000.0+
RANGES	70	2.6	0.3-	4.5
RESERVE TRAINING	70	7.5++	6.5+	0.2-
MECHANIZED MNV ACRES	80	54700.0	800.0-	19500.0-
IMPACT ACRES	70	4.6	3.0	3.8
SPECIAL AIRSPACE	40	62.4-	111.1-	707.3
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	--- 450	2.9	1.5	2.7
WORK SPACE	60	59000.0-	264000.0	144000.0-
% PERM FAC	30	66.4	8.0-	63.0
AVG AGE OF FACILITIES	25	21.0	49.0-	20.0
INFRASTRUCTURE	25	1.8	1.5	2.0
BARRACKS	60	48.0	210.0	211.0
ENVIRONMENT CAPACITY	25	8.3	6.9	5.0
LAND AND FACILITIES	--- 225	3.1	1.7	3.0
MOB CAPABILITY	30	3.8	2.8	3.1
BUILDABLE ACRES	35	30244.0++	425.0	20000.0+
ENCROACHMENT	20	37.5	301.8	110.4
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	30	8.4	8.7	7.1
IMA	10	385.0	1100.0	275.0
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	--- 125	7.4	4.7	5.8
COST OF LIVING INDEX	60	102.5	101.5	117.8--
LOCALITY PAY	35	1.0309	1.0309	1.0309
BASOPS FACTOR	75	24533.330	26739.920	10017.360+
MCA COST FACTOR	30	0.800	1.050	1.440
COST AND MANPOWER	--- 200	7.9	7.6	6.4

SCORE	1000	4.5	3.2	3.9
RANK		4	9	7

Table 9. Major Training Areas Decision Pad Model (Table 1 of 4)

		FORT CHAFFEE	FORT DIX	FORT GREELY
	WEIGHT			
MANEUVER ACRES	120	62046.0-	43000.0--	319500.0++
RANGES	70	0.1--	5.0	0.1--
RESERVE TRAINING	70	1.2-	8.3++	0.0-
MECHANIZED MNV ACRES	80	56441.0	10000.0-	0.0-
IMPACT ACRES	70	4.1	4.3	10.0++
SPECIAL AIRSPACE	40	459.4	48.2-	8608.3+
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	--- 450	1.6	3.1	4.7
WORK SPACE	60	43000.0-	536000.0+	199000.0
% PERM FAC	30	2.7-	86.2+	70.6
AVG AGE OF FACILITIES	25	51.0-	34.0	32.0
INFRASTRUCTURE	25	4.2	3.2	5.6
BARRACKS	60	0.0	12841.0++	806.0
ENVIRONMENT CAPACITY	25	9.1	5.9	8.1
LAND AND FACILITIES	--- 225	1.5	6.9	3.8
MOB CAPABILITY	30	2.8	5.0	2.7
BUILDABLE ACRES	35	7901.0	426.0	500.0
ENCROACHMENT	20	100.7	1413.2-	0.2
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	30	6.8	9.7	4.7
IMA	10	265.0	965.0	765.0
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	--- 125	4.5	4.1	3.8
COST OF LIVING INDEX	60	91.2+	111.3-	120.5--
LOCALITY PAY	35	1.0309	1.0496	1.0800--
BASOPS FACTOR	75	74797.406--	9010.500+	20113.551
MCA COST FACTOR	30	0.920	1.190	2.170-
COST AND MANPOWER	--- 200	6.1	6.7	3.0
	===			
SCORE	1000	2.8	4.8	4.0
RANK		10	3	6

Table 10. Major Training Areas Decision Pad Model (Table 2 of 4)

	WEIGHT	FORT IRWIN	FORT McCOY	FORT PICKETT
MANEUVER ACRES	120	330000.0++	77000.0-	30000.0--
RANGES	70	6.9+	4.8	5.2
RESERVE TRAINING	70	1.0-	8.0++	3.0
MECHANIZED MNV ACRES	80	330000.0++	39000.0	21000.0-
IMPACT ACRES	70	4.2	3.1	3.0
SPECIAL AIRSPACE	40	15169.9++	173.7	1030.4
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	--- 450	7.2	3.2	2.1
WORK SPACE	60	548000.0+	527400.0+	90000.0-
% PERM FAC	30	79.9+	8.3-	14.3-
AVG AGE OF FACILITIES	25	16.0+	48.0	45.0
INFRASTRUCTURE	25	4.1	2.2	3.8
BARRACKS	60	1816.0	28.0	47.0
ENVIRONMENT CAPACITY	25	6.5	8.2	7.4
LAND AND FACILITIES	--- 225	5.2	2.6	1.8
MOB CAPABILITY	30	6.5	5.0	3.5
BUILDABLE ACRES	35	1550.0	1500.0	2400.0
ENCROACHMENT	20	104.7	42.2	28.4
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	30	4.8	8.8	7.8
IMA	10	1190.0	1085.0	665.0
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	--- 125	5.0	5.6	4.8
COST OF LIVING INDEX	60	99.9	92.5+	107.5
LOCALITY PAY	35	1.0309	1.0309	1.0309
BASOPS FACTOR	75	9301.990+	25443.551	32851.160
MCA COST FACTOR	30	1.300	1.330	0.920
COST AND MANPOWER	--- 200	8.4	8.3	6.8
	===			
SCORE	1000	6.7	4.4	3.3
RANK		2	5	8

Table 11. Major Training Areas Decision Pad Model (Table 3 of 4)

		FORT POLK
	WEIGHT	
MANEUVER ACRES	120	163000.0+
RANGES	70	10.0++
RESERVE TRAINING	70	1.2-
MECHANIZED MNV ACRES	80	163000.0+
IMPACT ACRES	70	4.1
SPECIAL AIRSPACE	40	13628.3+
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	--- 450	5.3
WORK SPACE	60	1048000.0++
% PERM FAC	30	74.6
AVG AGE OF FACILITIES	25	21.0
INFRASTRUCTURE	25	5.8
BARRACKS	60	5590.0+
ENVIRONMENT CAPACITY	25	9.0
LAND AND FACILITIES	--- 225	7.6
MOB CAPABILITY	30	7.9+
BUILDABLE ACRES	35	3877.0
ENCROACHMENT	20	49.3
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	30	7.9
IMA	10	1320.0
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	--- 125	6.5
COST OF LIVING INDEX	60	92.4+
LOCALITY PAY	35	1.0309
BASOPS FACTOR	75	7152.170+
MCA COST FACTOR	30	0.960
COST AND MANPOWER	--- 200	9.7
	===	
SCORE	1000	6.8
RANK		1

Table 12. Major Training Areas Decision Pad Model (Table 4 of 4)

				FORT AP HILL	FORT INDIANTOWN GAP	FORT IRWIN
	WEIGHT					
# MPRC	45			N--	N--	Y++
# RETS FIRING POINTS	45			16+	0--	16+
# RANGES	5			40	35	19
# MOUT	5			N	N	N
RANGES	---	100		2.6	0.3	6.9
IMPACT ACRES	60			27000-	2000-	92600+
TUBE ARTILLERY?	5			Y	Y	Y
AIR FORCE BOMBING?	5			Y	Y	Y
ATTACK HELICOPTER?	5			Y	Y	N
ALL THREE?	15			Y	Y	N-
MLRS CAPABLE?	10			Y	N-	Y
IMPACT ACRES	---	100		4.6	3.0	4.2
MILES TO RAIL TRANS	30			5+	21	37
MILES TO AIR TRANS	30			51	26+	191--
MILES TO SEA TRANS	30			125	93+	166
MILES TO HIGHWAY	10			13	1	35
DEPLOYMENT	---	100		8.4	8.7	4.8
ANNUAL TNG (# PEOPLE)	25			18407	30789+	6223-
IDT (MANDAYS)	75			261247++	197198++	28716--
RESERVE TRAINING	---	100		7.5	6.5	1.0
ARCH/HIST BLDGS	10			0.00007	0.01116-	0.00003
ENDGRD FAUNA/FLORA	15			3-	1	3-
WETLANDS	15			0.03590	0.00028	0.00000
AIR QUALITY	15			1+	10-	10-
WATER QUALITY	15			2	0	0
NOISE QUALITY		0		0	0	0
ZONE II	10			5	0	0
ZONE III	15			0	0	0
CONTAMINATED SITES	5			1	13	50
ENV CAR CAPACITY	---	100		8.3	6.9	6.5
CAPACITY WATER	25			4	3-	5
CAPACITY SEWAGE	25			1-	4	3
CAPACITY ELECT	25			12	8-	46+
LANDFILL COST	25			\$39	\$52-	\$12+
INFRASTRUCTURE	---	100		1.8	1.5	4.1
MOB BILLETS	10			16877	10500	4279
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	10			8.4	8.7	4.8
RANGES	10			2.6	0.3	6.9
MANEUVER ACRES	10			54700	11000	330000+
MECHANIZED ACRES	10			54700	800	330000+
WORK SPACE	10			59000	264000	548000
MOB CAPABILITY	---	60		3.8	2.8	6.5

Table 13. Major Training Areas Sub Models (Table 1 of 4)

	WEIGHT	FORT CHAFFEE	FORT DIX	FORT GREELY
# MPRC	45	N--	N--	N--
# RETS FIRING POINTS	45	0--	32++	0--
# RANGES	5	17	55	15
# MOUT	5	N	N	N
RANGES	--- 100	0.1	5.0	0.1
IMPACT ACRES	60	5606-	14000-	254103++
TUBE ARTILLERY?	5	Y	Y	Y
AIR FORCE BOMBING?	5	Y	Y	Y
ATTACK HELICOPTER?	5	Y	Y	Y
ALL THREE?	15	Y	Y	Y
MLRS CAPABLE?	10	Y	Y	Y
IMPACT ACRES	--- 100	4.1	4.3	10.0
MILES TO RAIL TRANS	30	5+	12	107--
MILES TO AIR TRANS	30	0+	0+	70
MILES TO SEA TRANS	30	589--	45+	253
MILES TO HIGHWAY	10	5	0	1
DEPLOYMENT	--- 100	6.8	9.7	4.7
ANNUAL TNG(# PEOPLE)	25	8125	15570	151-
IDT (MANDAYS)	75	33183--	299687++	44--
RESERVE TRAINING	--- 100	1.2	8.3	0.0
ARCH/HIST BLDGS	10	0.00140	0.00003	0.00001
ENDGRD FAUNA/FLORA	15	1	0+	0+
WETLANDS	15	0.00036	0.16095	0.46800-
AIR QUALITY	15	1+	10-	1+
WATER QUALITY	15	10	88-	0
NOISE QUALITY	0	0	0	0
ZONE II	10	141	445	0
ZONE III	15	0	135	0
CONTAMINATED SITES	5	13	34	42
ENV CAR CAPACITY	--- 100	9.1	5.9	8.1
CAPACITY WATER	25	5	4	4
CAPACITY SEWAGE	25	4	8+	14+
CAPACITY ELECT	25	20	28	6-
LANDFILL COST	25	\$0+	\$50-	\$0+
INFRASTRUCTURE	--- 100	4.2	3.2	5.6
MOB BILLETS	10	13243	17350	0-
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	10	6.8	9.7	4.7
RANGES	10	0.1	5.0	0.1
MANEUVER ACRES	10	63059	43000	319500+
MECHANIZED ACRES	10	56441	10000	0
WORK SPACE	10	43000	536000	199000
MOB CAPABILITY	--- 60	2.8	5.0	2.7

Table 14. Major Training Areas Sub Models (Table 2 of 4)

			FORT McCOY	FORT PICKETT	FORT POLK
	WEIGHT				
# MPRC	45		Y++	N--	Y++
# RETS FIRING POINTS	45		0--	32++	32++
# RANGES	5		30	21	59
# MOUT	5		N	Y	Y
RANGES	---	100	4.8	5.2	10.0
IMPACT ACRES	60		7656-	4000-	5590-
TUBE ARTILLERY?	5		Y	Y	Y
AIR FORCE BOMBING?	5		Y	Y	Y
ATTACK HELICOPTER?	5		Y	Y	Y
ALL THREE?	15		Y	Y	Y
MLRS CAPABLE?	10		N-	N-	Y
IMPACT ACRES	---	100	3.1	3.0	4.1
MILES TO RAIL TRANS	30		0+	9	0+
MILES TO AIR TRANS	30		25+	70	47
MILES TO SEA TRANS	30		180	115	105+
MILES TO HIGHWAY	10		2	35	75-
DEPLOYMENT	---	100	8.8	7.8	7.9
ANNUAL TNG(# PEOPLE)	25		48935+	14743	4921-
IDT (MANDAYS)	75		221176++	88743-	36684--
RESERVE TRAINING	---	100	8.0	3.0	1.2
ARCH/HIST BLDGS	10		0.00002	0.00000	0.00160
ENDGRD FAUNA/FLORA	15		1	3-	1
WETLANDS	15		0.03417	0.07276	0.04022
AIR QUALITY	15		1+	1+	1+
WATER QUALITY	15		0	0	3
NOISE QUALITY	0		0	0	0
ZONE II	10		8144-	6000-	0
ZONE III	15		0	100	0
CONTAMINATED SITES	5		15	0	22
ENV CAR CAPACITY	---	100	8.2	7.4	9.0
CAPACITY WATER	25		5	5	13++
CAPACITY SEWAGE	25		3	6	5
CAPACITY ELECT	25		11	9	115++
LANDFILL COST	25		\$44-	\$15+	\$72-
INFRASTRUCTURE	---	100	2.2	3.8	5.8
MOB BILLETS	10		15828	12145	19512+
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	10		8.8	7.8	7.9
RANGES	10		4.8	5.2	10.0+
MANEUVER ACRES	10		77000	30000	163000
MECHANIZED ACRES	10		39000	21000	163000
WORK SPACE	10		527400	90000	1048000+
MOB CAPABILITY	---	60	5.0	3.5	7.9

Table 15. Major Training Areas Sub Models (Table 3 of 4)

FORT
HUNTER LIGGETT

	WEIGHT	
# MPRC	45	Y++
# RETS FIRING POINTS	45	0--
# RANGES	5	1
# MOUT	5	N
RANGES	--- 100	4.5
IMPACT ACRES	60	162962++
TUBE ARTILLERY?	5	N-
AIR FORCE BOMBING?	5	N-
ATTACK HELICOPTER?	5	N
ALL THREE?	15	N-
MLRS CAPABLE?	10	N-
IMPACT ACRES	--- 100	3.8
MILES TO RAIL TRANS	30	30
MILES TO AIR TRANS	30	81
MILES TO SEA TRANS	30	145
MILES TO HIGHWAY	10	23
DEPLOYMENT	--- 100	7.1
ANNUAL TNG (# PEOPLE)	25	3364-
IDT (MANDAYS)	75	0--
RESERVE TRAINING	--- 100	0.2
ARCH/HIST BLDGS	10	0.00244
ENDGRD FAUNA/FLORA	15	3-
WETLANDS	15	0.00607
AIR QUALITY	15	10-
WATER QUALITY	15	0
NOISE QUALITY	0	0
ZONE II	10	800
ZONE III	15	1000-
CONTAMINATED SITES	5	12
ENV CAR CAPACITY	--- 100	5.0
CAPACITY WATER	25	1-
CAPACITY SEWAGE	25	1-
CAPACITY ELECT	25	12
LANDFILL COST	25	\$17+
INFRASTRUCTURE	--- 100	2.0
MOB BILLETS	10	1145-
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	10	7.1
RANGES	10	4.5
MANEUVER ACRES	10	163000
MECHANIZED ACRES	10	19500
WORK SPACE	10	144000
MOB CAPABILITY	--- 60	3.1

Table 16. Major Training Areas Sub Models (Table 4 of 4)

Historical Economic Data

Activity: FORT CHAFFEE
 Economic Area: Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA



Total Population of Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA (1992):	180,500
Total Employment of Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA, BEA (1992):	105,156
Total Personal Income of Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA (1992 actual):	\$2,853,726,000

Other Pending BRAC Actions at FORT CHAFFEE (Previous Rounds):

MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV	(70)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(70)

Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA Profile:

Civilian Employment, BLS (1993): 85,596 Average Per Capita Income (1992): \$15,806



Annualized Change in Civilian Employment (1984-1993) Annualized Change in Per Capita Personal Income (1984-1992)

Employment:	1,195	Dollars:	\$673
Percentage:	1.5%	Percentage:	5.4%
U.S. Average Change:	1.5%	U.S. Average Change:	5.3%

Unemployment Rates for Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA and the US (1984 - 1993):

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
Local	8.1%	7.8%	7.3%	6.1%	6.7%	7.9%	7.5%	8.1%	7.3%	6.5%
U.S.	7.5%	7.2%	7.0%	6.2%	5.5%	5.3%	5.5%	6.7%	7.4%	6.8%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

~~Fort~~ Chaffee

Starting Year : 1996
 Final Year : 1998
 ROI Year : 1999 (1 Year)

Arkansas
 Brown Book

NPV in 2015(\$K): -168,185
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 9,573

-167,000 IN

NOTE: NPV doesn't match Brown Book

Net Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars		1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
	1996	1997						
MilCon	-1,200	0	0	0	0	0	-1,200	0
Person	0	0	-4,057	-8,885	-8,885	-8,885	-30,712	-8,885
Overhd	356	267	3,114	-4,580	-4,580	-4,580	-10,004	-4,580
Moving	0	0	2,303	0	0	0	2,303	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	179	0	0	0	179	0
TOTAL	-843	267	1,539	-13,465	-13,465	-13,465	-39,433	-13,465

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS ELIMINATED							
Off	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Enl	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Civ	0	0	189	0	0	0	189
TOT	0	0	193	0	0	0	193

1 > 4 ✓
 3 ✓
 189 ✓
 193 ✓

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
POSITIONS REALIGNED							
Off	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Enl	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
TOT	0	0	54	0	0	0	54

5 > 36 ✓
 31 ✓
 18 ✓
 54 ✓

Summary:

Close Ft. Chaffee, Ar.
 Move all Army and tenant organizations to last of
 RIF facilities in Gannett.

ENCLAVE RD facilities, ranges and organizations.

Steve,

I've checked this over quickly. It looks fine except NPV doesn't match that given in DoD report (Brown Book),

Bob

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/2
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Costs (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	0	563	162	162	162	1,049	162
Overhd	356	267	6,112	104	104	104	7,049	104
Moving	0	0	2,361	0	0	0	2,361	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	179	0	0	0	179	0
TOTAL	356	267	9,216	266	266	266	10,638	266

Savings (\$K)	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	1,200	0	0	0	0	0	1,200	0
Person	0	0	4,620	9,047	9,047	9,047	31,761	9,047
Overhd	0	0	2,999	4,685	4,685	4,685	17,053	4,685
Moving	0	0	58	0	0	0	58	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	1,200	0	7,676	13,732	13,732	13,732	50,072	13,732

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT2-1
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	-843,459	-832,095	-832,095
1997	267,406	256,743	-575,352
1998	1,539,299	1,438,363	863,011
1999	-13,465,536	-12,245,802	-11,382,791
2000	-13,465,536	-11,918,056	-23,300,847
2001	-13,465,536	-11,599,081	-34,899,928
2002	-13,465,536	-11,288,643	-46,188,572
2003	-13,465,536	-10,986,514	-57,175,086
2004	-13,465,536	-10,692,471	-67,867,557
2005	-13,465,536	-10,406,298	-78,273,856
2006	-13,465,536	-10,127,784	-88,401,640
2007	-13,465,536	-9,856,724	-98,258,364
2008	-13,465,536	-9,592,919	-107,851,283
2009	-13,465,536	-9,336,174	-117,187,457
2010	-13,465,536	-9,086,301	-126,273,758
2011	-13,465,536	-8,843,115	-135,116,873
2012	-13,465,536	-8,606,438	-143,723,311
2013	-13,465,536	-8,376,095	-152,099,407
2014	-13,465,536	-8,151,918	-160,251,324
2015	-13,465,536	-7,933,740	-168,185,064

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	251,149	
Civilian Early Retirement	86,936	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	19,277	
Unemployment	43,848	
Total - Personnel		401,210
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	824,502	
Mothball / Shutdown	5,807,500	
Total - Overhead		6,632,002
Moving		
Civilian Moving	534,212	
Civilian PPS	1,641,600	
Military Moving	170,341	
Freight	15,217	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		2,361,371
Other		
HAP / RSE	178,866	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		178,866
Total One-Time Costs		8,573,449
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	1,200,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	57,910	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		1,257,910
Total Net One-Time Costs		8,315,538

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	-----	-----
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
Total - Personnel		0
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	0	
Mothball / Shutdown	0	
Total - Overhead		0
Moving		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		0
Other		
HAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		0
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Costs		0
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
-----	-----	-----
Total One-Time Savings		0
-----	-----	-----
Total Net One-Time Costs		0

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
Construction		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
Total - Construction		0
Personnel		
Civilian RIF	251,149	
Civilian Early Retirement	86,936	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	19,277	
Unemployment	43,848	
Total - Personnel		401,210
Overhead		
Program Planning Support	824,502	
Mothball / Shutdown	5,807,500	
Total - Overhead		6,632,002
Moving		
Civilian Moving	534,212	
Civilian PPS	1,641,600	
Military Moving	170,341	
Freight	15,217	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
Total - Moving		2,361,371
Other		
HAP / RSE	178,866	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
Total - Other		178,866
Total One-Time Costs		9,573,449
One-Time Savings		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	1,200,000	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	57,910	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
Total One-Time Savings		1,257,910
Total Net One-Time Costs		8,315,538

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT2-1
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
BASE X	0	0	0	0	0
FT CHAFFEE	0	0	0	-1,200	-1,200
Totals:	0	0	0	-1,200	-1,200

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

MilCon for Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR

All Costs in \$K

Description:	MilCon Categ	Using Rehab	Rehab Cost*	New MilCon	New Cost*	Total Cost*
Total Construction Cost:						0
+ Info Management Account:						0
+ Land Purchases:						0
- Construction Cost Avoid:						1,200
TOTAL:						-1,200

* All MilCon Costs include Design, Site Preparation, Contingency Planning, and SIOH Costs where applicable.

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: BASE X, US

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
752	4,208	1,121	2,709

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
TOTAL	0	0	54	0	0	0	54

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into BASE X, US):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
TOTAL	0	0	54	0	0	0	54

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
757	4,239	1,121	2,727

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT CHAFFEE, AR

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
752	4,208	1,121	2,709

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
TOTAL	0	0	54	0	0	0	54

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of FT CHAFFEE, AR):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Enlisted	0	0	31	0	0	0	31
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	18	0	0	0	18
TOTAL	0	0	54	0	0	0	54

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	-1	0	0	0	-1
Enlisted	0	0	-3	0	0	0	-3
Civilians	0	0	-189	0	0	0	-189
TOTAL	0	0	-193	0	0	0	-193

> 36 ✓

> 4 ✓

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT2-1
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 0	----- 27	----- 182	----- 43

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/3
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	18	0	0	0	18
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	7	0	0	0	7
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	28	0	0	0	28
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)**		0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	113	0	0	0	113
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilians Moving		0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	2	0	0	0	2
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	18	0	0	0	18
Civilians Moving		0	0	18	0	0	0	18
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	21	0	0	0	21
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	14	0	0	0	14
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	113	0	0	0	113
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate for PCS placements involving a PCS is 60.00%.

PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/3
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT								
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED								
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN								
Civilians Moving		0	0	18	0	0	0	18
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/3
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	18	0	0	0	18
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	7	0	0	0	7
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	189	0	0	0	189
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	19	0	0	0	19
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	28	0	0	0	28
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*	6.00%	0	0	11	0	0	0	11
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	113	0	0	0	113
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	9	0	0	0	9
Civilians Moving		0	0	7	0	0	0	7
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	2	0	0	0	2
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	21	0	0	0	21
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFs		0	0	14	0	0	0	14
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	113	0	0	0	113
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%.

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/9
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996 ----	1997 ----	1998 ----	1999 ----	2000 ----	2001 ----	Total -----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	0	251	0	0	0	251
Civ Retire	0	0	87	0	0	0	87
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	61	0	0	0	61
POV Miles	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Home Purch	0	0	187	0	0	0	187
HHG	0	0	128	0	0	0	128
Misc	0	0	12	0	0	0	12
House Hunt	0	0	51	0	0	0	51
PPS	0	0	1,641	0	0	0	1,641
RITA	0	0	89	0	0	0	89
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Freight	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	44	0	0	0	44
OTHER							
Program Plan	356	267	200	0	0	0	824
Shutdown	0	0	5,807	0	0	0	5,807
New Hire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	122	0	0	0	122
Misc	0	0	25	0	0	0	25
OTHER							
Equip POC	0	0	10	0	0	0	10
OTHER							
HAF / RSE	0	0	170	0	0	0	170
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	356	267	8,949	0	0	0	9,573

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/9
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	104	104	104	104	417	104
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	162	162	162	162	648	162
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	266	266	266	266	1,065	266
TOTAL COST	356	267	9,216	266	266	266	10,638	266
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	1,200	0	0	0	0	0	1,200	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	58	0	0	0	58	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,200	0	58	0	0	0	1,258	
RECURRINGSAVED	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS								
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	1,274	2,655	2,655	2,655	9,241	2,655
BOS	0	0	925	1,230	1,230	1,230	4,617	1,230
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	4,347	8,694	8,694	8,694	30,428	8,694
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	34	68	68	68	238	68
Enl Salary	0	0	46	92	92	92	324	92
House Allow	0	0	193	193	193	193	771	193
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	799	799	799	799	3,196	799
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	7,618	13,732	13,732	13,732	48,814	13,732
TOTAL SAVINGS	1,200	0	7,676	13,732	13,732	13,732	50,072	13,732

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/9
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

ONE-TIME NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	-1,200	0	0	0	0	0	-1,200	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	338	0	0	0	338	
Civ Moving	0	0	2,191	0	0	0	2,191	
Other	356	267	6,052	0	0	0	6,676	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	132	0	0	0	132	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	179	0	0	0	179	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-843	267	8,891	0	0	0	8,315	
RECURRING NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-1,274	-2,655	-2,655	-2,655	-9,241	-2,655
BOS	0	0	-821	-1,126	-1,126	-1,126	-4,199	-1,126
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-4,347	-8,694	-8,694	-8,694	-30,428	-8,694
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-80	-160	-160	-160	-562	-160
House Allow	0	0	-31	-31	-31	-31	-123	-31
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	-700	-700	-700	-700	-3,196	-700
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-13,832	-13,465	-13,465	-13,465	-47,749	-13,465
TOTAL NET COST	-843	267	-4,941	-13,465	-13,465	-13,465	-39,434	-13,465

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 4/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Retire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Home Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Hunt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Program Plan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shutdown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
Elim POS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAF / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 6/9
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: BASE X, US

ONE-TIME NET ----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Civ Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECURRING NET ----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	104	104	104	104	417	104
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	162	162	162	162	648	162
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	266	266	266	266	1,065	266
TOTAL NET COST	0	0	266	266	266	266	1,065	266

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
ONE-TIME COSTS	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----(\$K)-----							
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIFs	0	0	251	0	0	0	251
Civ Retire	0	0	87	0	0	0	87
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	61	0	0	0	61
POV Miles	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Home Purch	0	0	187	0	0	0	187
HHG	0	0	128	0	0	0	128
Misc	0	0	12	0	0	0	12
House Hunt	0	0	51	0	0	0	51
PPS	0	0	1,641	0	0	0	1,641
RITA	0	0	89	0	0	0	89
FREIGHT							
Packing	0	0	13	0	0	0	13
Freight	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	44	0	0	0	44
OTHER							
Program Plan	356	267	200	0	0	0	824
Shutdown	0	0	5,807	0	0	0	5,807
New Hires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHG	0	0	122	0	0	0	122
Misc	0	0	25	0	0	0	25
OTHER							
Elim PDI	0	0	14	0	0	0	14
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	0	0	79	0	0	0	79
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	356	267	8,949	0	0	0	9,573

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 8/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR

RECURRINGCOSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TOTAL COSTS 356 267 8,949 0 0 0 9,573 0

ONE-TIME SAVES -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	1,200	0	0	0	0	0	1,200	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	58	0	0	0	58	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	1,200	0	58	0	0	0	1,258	

RECURRINGSAVES -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	1,274	2,655	2,655	2,655	9,241	2,655
BOS	0	0	925	1,230	1,230	1,230	4,617	1,230
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	4,347	8,694	8,694	8,694	30,428	8,694
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	34	68	68	68	238	68
Enl Salary	0	0	46	92	92	92	324	92
House Allow	0	0	193	193	193	193	771	193
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	799	799	799	799	3,196	799
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	7,618	13,732	13,732	13,732	48,814	13,732

TOTAL SAVINGS 1,200 0 7,676 13,732 13,732 13,732 50,072 13,732

APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 9/9
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Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base: FT CHAFFEE, AR

ONE-TIME NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	-1,200	0	0	0	0	0	-1,200	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	338	0	0	0	338	
Civ Moving	0	0	2,191	0	0	0	2,191	
Other	356	267	6,052	0	0	0	6,676	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	0	0	132	0	0	0	132	
OTHER								
HAP / RSE	0	0	179	0	0	0	179	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	-843	267	8,891	0	0	0	8,315	
RECURRING NET -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	-1,274	-2,655	-2,655	-2,655	-9,241	-2,655
BOS	0	0	-925	-1,230	-1,230	-1,230	-4,617	-1,230
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	-4,347	-8,694	-8,694	-8,694	-30,428	-8,694
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Salary	0	0	-80	-160	-160	-160	-562	-160
House Allow	0	0	-193	-193	-193	-193	-771	-193
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	-799	-799	-799	-799	-3,196	-799
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	0	0	-7,646	-13,732	-13,732	-13,732	-48,814	-13,732
TOTAL NET COST	-843	267	1,245	-13,732	-13,732	-13,732	-40,499	-13,732

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBR) v5.08)
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	54	1%	0	0%	0
FT CHAFFEE	-247	-49%	-4,646,000	-96%	18,810

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	0	0%	0	104,338	0%	1,932
FT CHAFFEE	-2,655,518	-95%	10,751	-1,230,363	-31%	4,981

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
BASE X	104,338	0%	1,932
FT CHAFFEE	-3,885,881	-57%	15,732

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
 Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	0	-1,274	-2,655	-2,655	-2,655	-9,241	-2,655
BOS Change	0	0	-821	-1,126	-1,126	-1,126	-4,199	-1,126
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CHANGES	0	0	-2,095	-3,781	-3,781	-3,781	-13,440	-3,781

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)
Data As Of 18:08 09/26/1994, Report Created 14:58 03/11/1995

Department : ARMY
Option Package : MT2-1
Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: Yes

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
BASE X, US	Realignment
FT CHAFFEE, AR	Realignment

Summary:

Close Ft. Chaffee, Ar.
Move all Army and tenant organizations to Base X.
RIF civilians in Garrison.

ENCLAVE RC facilities, ranges and organizations.

(See final page for Explanatory Notes)

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
BASE X, US	FT CHAFFEE, AR	1,340 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from FT CHAFFEE, AR to BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	18	0	0	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subst Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mil Light Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
heavy/Spec Vehic (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

Total Officer Employees:	752	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11,891
Total Enlisted Employees:	4,208	Communications (\$K/Year):	1,514
Total Student Employees:	1,121	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	29,982
Total Civilian Employees:	2,709	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,877
Mil Families Living On Base:	55.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,151
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.09
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	6,091	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	178	Activity Code:	BASEX
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	132		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	101	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT CHAFFEE, AR

Total Officer Employees:	6	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	2,802
Total Enlisted Employees:	61	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	182	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,988
Total Civilian Employees:	250	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	3,215
Mil Families Living On Base:	0.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	0
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	0.92
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,849	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	0.0%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	0	Activity Code:	5025
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	0		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	68	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X, US

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil Shutdown(KSF):	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Perc Family Housing Shutdown:			0.0%

Name: FT CHAFFEE, AR

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	799	799	799	799
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	1,200	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil Shutdown(KSF):	4,646					
			Perc Family Housing Shutdown:			100.0%

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: FT CHAFFEE, AR

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	-1	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	-3	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	-189	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	77.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	58.50%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	91.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	67,948.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,717.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	1,109.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	30,860.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,223.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	45,998.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	19.00%
SF File Desc:	SF7DEC.SFF	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	12.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	59.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Intc Management Account:	15.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	10.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	6.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	7.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	24.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	388.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,819.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00%	1997: 2.80%	1998: 2.90%	1999: 2.90%
			2000: 2.90%
			2001: 2.90%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.09
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	2.90
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	4,665.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	6,134.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	4,381.00

Department : ARMY
 Option Package : MT2-1
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\MT2-1.CBR
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA95\ARMY\SF7DEC.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	38	APPLIED INSTR	(SF)	114
Waterfront	(LF)	0	LABS (RDT&E)	(SF)	175
Air Operations	(SF)	130	CHILD CARE CENTER	(SF)	120
Operational	(SF)	119	PRODUCTION FAC	(SF)	100
Administrative	(SF)	106	PHYSICAL FITNESS FAC	(SF)	128
School Buildings	(SF)	104	2+2 BACHQ	(EA)	19,140
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	108	Optional Category G	()	0
Bachelor Quarters	(EA)	46,227	Optional Category H	()	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	96,040	Optional Category I	()	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	60	Optional Category J	()	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	180	Optional Category K	()	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	()	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	()	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	()	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	139	Optional Category O	()	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	()	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	()	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	()	0
Environmental	()	0			

EXPLANATORY NOTES (INPUT SCREEN NINE)

Enclave adjustment cost of \$500,000 is included in Program Planning Support Cost.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950302-5

FROM: <u>BOYER, ROBERT</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>COL, USA (RET)</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION:	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: <u>FORT CHAFFEE</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⓪		COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		β3
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

⓪	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER IN SUPPORT OF FORT CHAFFEE. Also, VARIOUS VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ADOPTED RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT AND SENT COPIES (IN FILE).

Due Date: 950309

Routing Date: 950302

Date Originated: 950221

Mail Date:

2118 No. 47th Terrace
Fort Smith, Arkansas 72904

February 21, 1995

Honorable Aian Dixon
Chairman, Base Realignment and
Closure Commission
1200 No. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding 950302-5

Dear Senator Dixon:

I am writing in regard to the future status of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas and the pending review of military installations by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC).

I became concerned about the status of Fort Chaffee after reading a Scripps Howard news article by reporter Peter Copeland on February 10th that Chaffee may be on the post closure list submitted to the Department of Defense. A subsequent article on February 11th quoted the offices of Senators Bumpers and Pryor as stating they were skeptical of Copeland's report. It would be a serious mistake to place Chaffee on the closure list.

Fort Chaffee has been a part of our national defense system since 1941 and has played important roles in training Army units and soldiers for World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Granada, Panama and the Gulf War. It is presently scheduled to continue a role in preparing for future conflicts and times of national crises.

Fort Chaffee is used for training Reserve and National Guard personnel as well as active duty troops. In August 1994 the Army announced that Fort Chaffee would also become one of the four home posts for the Fifth Army Regional Training Brigade which will assist in the training of key reserve component units which are a key element in the current United States Military Strategy.

Fort Chaffee's terrain and maneuver areas make it one of the best, if not the very best, of Army posts in the United States for training light infantry forces, a critical element in current United States military doctrine. It was also used extensively during World War II to train three armor divisions. It is interesting to note that even though the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was transferred to Fort Polk, they continue to schedule important training rotations at Chaffee because of its training area.

Approximately 10,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel train at Fort Chaffee each summer. The Army estimates that a total of approximately 60,000 troops will train at Fort Chaffee in Fiscal Year (FY) 1995. That number represents a 15% increase over 1994 levels and approximates training levels when Fort Chaffee was home to the JRTC.

Subsequent to the Scripps Howard article, Major General Simek, Commanding General of the 122nd Army Reserve Command, told the news media of the great importance to his command of Fort Chaffee's training area.

It is known that Major General Thrash, the Arkansas National Guard Adjutant General, shares that view. I understand that his artillery brigade was the only Reserve component artillery brigade that saw actual combat in Desert Storm and that the brigade was extremely successful there. Many have stated that success was directly attributable to the training areas and the training received at Fort Chaffee. I'm sure that MG Thrash would confirm that fact. Several of his artillery units are located in the Fort Chaffee area and the Guard participates in training there all year long. The arrangement of buildings and ranges on Chaffee's 72,000 acres make it one of the few posts where direct artillery firing can take place with a very minimum disruption of other activities on the post.

During September 1994 a JRTC training rotation involving 1,700 soldiers was conducted at Fort Chaffee. Troops from Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, along with special forces units from the United States Southern Command, participated in a coalition training action under the auspices of the Organization of American States to counter narco-guerilla forces. Observers of this timely scenario included representatives from three other South American countries as well as the United States State Department and several other high level agencies and commissions. The Fort Chaffee terrain makes it ideal for this most current type of exercise.

The JRTC already has plans for conducting additional training rotations at Fort Chaffee because of its outstanding training area. The JRTC involvement at Chaffee is expected to focus on special forces training and providing military expertise in medical, engineering and other areas.

Fort Chaffee is an excellent training and maneuver area with 100 square miles and 72,000 acres. Related usable areas are Camp Gruber, Oklahoma (35,000 acres), Camp Robinson, Arkansas (30,000 acres), Davis Field in Muskogee, Oklahoma as an intermediate staging base and Little Rock Air Force Base.

Fort Chaffee has a heliport and tactical assault landing strips as well as other landing zones and drop zones that can accommodate a battalion task force. High performance aircraft have made extensive use of Chaffee ranges and the close air support capability has been proven. The Arkansas Air National Guard's 188th Fighter Group uses ranges at Chaffee for bombing and strafing training on a frequent basis.

The Arkansas River site at Fort Chaffee has been evaluated as the finest location for river crossing training available to the Army. Not only is it the only location at which both sides of the river are Army land but it also has the added benefit of Lock and Dam 13 which can control the

flow speed of the river to enhance training. Training that can be conducted at this site includes fast water crossings, bridging, tactical marine assaults, barging, and modified logistics-over-the-shore training.

Fort Chaffee serves as the home of a mobile hospital training operation called RTS-Med. It also has the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy for the Fifth Army, the 142d Arkansas National Guard, 271st Maintenance Company and the 122d ARCOM's Equipment Concentration Site.

Fort Chaffee also provides training space for Navy, Air Force, Arkansas State Police, the U. S. Department of Energy, and other civilian agencies.

Fort Chaffee is centrally located in the United States and there is excellent access by air, rail, interstate highways and the inland water system. It is located adjacent to Fort Smith, Arkansas, a progressive city of more than 70,000 people with an outstanding school system (to include a community college), superb medical facilities, ample family housing and an excellent quality of life.

The United States government has made very substantial financial investments in Fort Chaffee involving many millions of dollars. There are more than 1,200 buildings of various types on the post and over 5,000,000 square feet of space under roof available for use. Chaffee has barracks, office buildings, churches, theaters, gyms, paved roads, sewage systems, and all of the infrastructure necessary to support very large numbers of troops. At one time during World War II, three armor divisions with a total of over 30,000 soldiers were stationed at Fort Chaffee at the same time.

Numerous recreational facilities have been constructed and remodeled for the troops to include the field house with its weight rooms, sauna, modern nautilus equipment and three basketball courts. There are 17 athletic fields (with lights), 8 tennis courts (also lighted), a golf course and swimming pool.

Fort Chaffee can accommodate enormous numbers of troops on very short notice and serves as the mobilization point for soldiers from several surrounding states.

The citizens of Fort Smith and the local area have always been extremely patriotic and have strongly supported the military since Fort Chaffee opened over fifty years ago. They still support Fort Chaffee remaining an Army installation and an important part of the United States national security system with whatever mission is in the best interests of our country.

The following veterans organizations have adopted resolutions urging that Fort Chaffee remain an Army post for the reasons stated in this letter:


American Legion, Fort Smith Post 31
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Fort Smith Post 8845
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Fort Smith Post 2897
Disabled American Veterans, Fort Smith Chapter 1

Fort Chaffee Retiree Subcouncil
Military Order of the Purple Heart, Border City Chapter 587
Arkansas Retired Military Association
Vietnam Veterans of America, Chapter 467
Sebastian County Veterans Committee

The Resolutions adopted by these organizations are enclosed.

The purpose of this letter is to point out to the Commission the many advantages at Fort Chaffee for the training of troops. Very few military installations have the qualities of Chaffee for this purpose. The value of Fort Chaffee was recognized by the 1991 BRAC report which retained Fort Chaffee to support Reserve Component training. We also want to assure the Commission that there is continuing overwhelming support in our community for Fort Chaffee and any mission directed to Chaffee by the Department of Defense.

Sincerely,



ROBERT E. BOYER
Colonel, US Army (Ret)

encls: as stated

Questions for Army Witnesses from Senator Dale Bumpers, Mar 7.

The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, "except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave." The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

- 1. Has the Army identified which of Fort Chaffee's 70,000 acres and 1000 buildings would be licensed to the National Guard, and which would be returned to the public for development?**
- 2. As a result of the 1991 Base Closure process, Fort Chaffee has been dedicated primarily to the training of reserve component units and individuals. Was the Reserve Component involved in the decision to close Fort Chaffee?**
- 3. How much will it cost the Army National Guard to operate the licensed portions of Fort Chaffee? Does the Army intend to provide the National Guard with the required funds?**
- 4. The Army says that the annual recurring savings of closing Fort Chaffee will be \$13 million. How can that be, since the base's total FY 1995 operating budget is only \$9.7 million?**
- 5. Does the Army's \$13 million projected annual savings consider the costs of continuing to operate the Fort Chaffee "enclave" and the extra travel costs involved for reserve component units that will now have to travel longer distances to places such as Fort Polk or Fort Sill?**
- 6. In BRAC 93, Fort Chaffee ranked #5 among 10 Major Training Areas. In BRAC 95, Chaffee was ranked last among those same 10 Major Training Areas. What factors caused Chaffee's ranking to drop so much in just two years?**

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS

The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, "except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave." The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

1. Has the Army identified which of Fort Chaffee's 70,000 acres and 1,000 buildings would be licensed to the National Guard, and which would be returned to the public for development?
2. As a result of the 1991 Base Closure process, Fort Chaffee has been dedicated primarily to the training of Reserve Component units and individuals. Was the Reserve Component involved in the decision to close Fort Chaffee?
3. How much will it cost the Army National Guard to operate the licensed portions of Fort Chaffee? Does the Army intend to provide the National Guard with the required funds?
4. The Army says that the annual recurring savings of closing Fort Chaffee will be \$13 million. How can that be, since the base's total FY 1995 operating budget is only \$9.7 million?
5. Does the Army's \$13 million projected annual savings consider the costs of continuing to operate the Fort Chaffee "enclave" and the extra travel costs involved for reserve component units that will now have to travel longer distances to places such as Fort Polk or Fort Sill?
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ARMY TEAM ROUTING SLIP

ORIGINATED BY: ED BROWN

DATE: *7 MAR*

	ACTION	INFO	COORD	APPROVE	FILE	INITIAL
ED BROWN						
J. J. GERTLER						
STEVE BAILEY		✓				<i>SB</i>
BOB MILLER						
MIKE KENNEDY						
DAVE LEWIS						
CLIFF WOOTEN					✓	

COMMENTS:

Issue for Community Concern/Issues

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950307-11

FROM: <u>ZUMBERS, DALE</u>	TO: <u>GENERAL</u>
TITLE: <u>SENATOR (AK)</u>	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: <u>U.S. CONGRESS</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCR</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>FORT CHAFFEE</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⓪		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXEC. SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	β7
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

⓪	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:
QUESTIONS FOR SEC WEST AT MARCH 7 HEARING.

File Date: <u>950309</u>	Routing Date: <u>950307</u>	Date Originated: <u>950303</u>	Mail Date:
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Please refer to this number
when responding 950307-11

Questions for Army Witnesses from Senator Dale Bumpers, Mar 7.

The Army recommends closing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, "except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave." The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

1. Has the Army identified which of Fort Chaffee's 70,000 acres and 1000 buildings would be licensed to the National Guard, and which would be returned to the public for development?
2. As a result of the 1991 Base Closure process, Fort Chaffee has been dedicated primarily to the training of reserve component units and individuals. Was the Reserve Component involved in the decision to close Fort Chaffee?
3. How much will it cost the Army National Guard to operate the licensed portions of Fort Chaffee? Does the Army intend to provide the National Guard with the required funds?
4. The Army says that the annual recurring savings of closing Fort Chaffee will be \$13 million. How can that be, since the base's total FY 1995 operating budget is only \$9.7 million?
5. Does the Army's \$13 million projected annual savings consider the costs of continuing to operate the Fort Chaffee "enclave" and the extra travel costs involved for reserve component units that will now have to travel longer distances to places such as Fort Polk or Fort Sill?
6. In BRAC 93, Fort Chaffee ranked #5 among 10 Major Training Areas. In BRAC 95, Chaffee was ranked last among those same 10 Major Training Areas. What factors caused Chaffee's ranking to drop so much in just two years?

DRAFT

QUESTIONS FOR MAJOR TRAINING AREA POST OFFICIALS

1. What construction is currently underway on post? What structures or facilities have been built in the last ten years? How much did the construction cost, in total?
2. Does your Range Control permit simultaneous artillery live firing while aircraft are flying over the impact area (with prior coordination), or do you place the artillery in a "cold" or "dry" status until the aircraft are clear?
3. What hours/days do you prohibit or limit live firing of .50 caliber and higher weapons?
4. Can MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) be fired from any firing point(s) on this installation and impact in your standard impact area? Will you show me the firing point(s) and let me examine the Safety Diagram that Range Control has on file?
5. How many attack helicopter and tactical fixed-wing sorties involving the firing or dropping of live ordnance occurred on this installation during the last one-year period for which you have data?
6. Do you have a limitation on the height of the Maximum Ordinate for firing mortars or artillery?
7. Are there any differences or substantiated changes in the basic information that your installation provided in the data call(s) submitted to The Army Basing Study group?
8. Are there any significant variations in the data contained in the Major Training Areas Decision Pad Models and Sub Models (pages 52-59, Volume II of the Army's BRAC report) from that which you believe is accurate?
9. If this installation does have to close or undergo major realignment following completion of the entire deliberative process, do you have some ideas or concepts for potential re-use that could assist in the planning for such an event based upon your experience and knowledge of the local area?
10. Is there anything on or about this training area that is so unique and irreplaceable that it could not be moved to or replicated at another location--and that is absolutely essential for the national security of the United States?
11. What is the largest level of integrated collective training that can realistically be accommodated within the training area (platoon, company/team, battalion task force, brigade with all attachments)? When was the last time that occurred and which unit was it?
12. What is the largest or most complex training event locked-in to take place here between now and the end of September 1995? Which unit(s) will participate?

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950328-16

FROM: TROTTER, MAX	TO: DIXON, ALAN
E: PRESIDENT, LOCAL 1728	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: NAT. FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES	ORGANIZATION: DIBCR
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT CHAFFEE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR. COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	1/28
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR FORT CHAFFEE.
SUPPORTING DATA INCLUDED.

Date: 950404	Routing Date: 950328	Date Originated: 950327	Mail Date:
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National Federation of Federal Employees



Local 1728 - Building 1181, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 72905-5000

March 27, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
 Chairman, Base Realignment and
 Closure Commission
 1700 N. Moore St. Suite 1425
 Arlington, VA 22209

*Please refer to this number
 when responding 950328-16*

Dear Senator Dixon:

As you are aware, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas was recommended for closure by the Secretary of Defense in his BRAC 95 submission. The recommendation was to close Fort Chaffee "except" minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave." The recommendation further state "Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard."

If Fort Chaffee was the best location for the home of the newly established JRTC in 1987, how can it be the lowest in military value in 1995 with all the improvements made during JRTC era. The JRTC continues to train the Army's elite war fighting units. From FY 88-92 JRTC trained in excess of 110,000 soldiers from the finest combat units in the Army. Only in FY 90 did the number of soldiers training at Fort Chaffee decrease and that was because of Desert Storm. Coincidentally, the 82d ABN Div, first unit trained at JRTC, was the first unit deployed to Desert Storm. During the same time frame (FY 88-92) an additional 182,000 Reserve Component soldiers trained at Fort Chaffee.

One of the greatest lessons learned by the Army during the Persian Gulf War was that it could no longer operate as it had in the past. Specifically as three distinct Army's within the Army; the Active Component, the Reserves and National Guard. Congress, having observed the readiness rifts between these organizations, directed that the Army dedicate more of its active component resources to the support of the readiness effort of the other two. The result is what is referred to as the "Total Army" and is now proudly named "America's Army." The term "America's Army" is meant to be a seamless organization whose sole goal is to be able to rapidly project its entire military power anywhere in the world in defense of our national interest. To do this, the training requirements and resources allocated to this effort must be equally seamless as no part

of the force can function without the other. In response to laws passed by Congress, the Army has responded to this mandate in the form of an organization called the Regional Training Brigade. Fort Chaffee has been designated as the home of a significant portion of this brigade specifically to support Reserve units in this region. The recent decision to "close" Fort Chaffee is an indication that the leadership of the Army has failed to support its commitments with its resources the proverbial "put your money where your mouth is."

Even since the end of WWII, Fort Chaffee has been a military post where "America's Army" trained long before it became a fashionable phrase. The National Guard has used it in significant numbers every year of its existence, as has the Army Reserve. Active Component use, with the exception of the JRTC period, has been constant but to a lesser degree than the other two members of the triad. Sadly, it is one of the very few installations that can honestly say that no one member of the triad has priority over the others. This should be a fundamental truth throughout "America's Army."

If that is the beauty of Fort Chaffee, an installation dedicated to all of America's Army, the 1995 SECDEF recommendation illustrates that it is equally the installations Achilles heel. As it shares its assets equally, there is no one use who therefore claims it as its own and preserve it for the others. This, remembering the ideals behind America's Army, shouldn't be necessary, but the reality of the situation, as highlighted by the SECDEF decision for closure, reveals the painful truth behind the phrase.

Incredibly, Fort Chaffee has historically been the responsibility of the Active Component's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); a major command with virtually no vested interest in its continued operation. TRADOC is the Army's schoolhouse. None of the missions assigned by DA to TRADOC are executed at Fort Chaffee. In fact, none of the 50,000 soldiers trained at Fort Chaffee in 1994 were for TRADOC missions. Fort Chaffee is by definition a major training area, whose primary purpose is to provide an environment for units of all components to train collectively on the war fighting skills. This is the mission of the Army's Forces Command or its subordinate U. S. Army Reserve Command. Unfortunately in years of declining resources, Forces Command was unwilling to add to its list of responsibilities. Generally, this training population was 40% National Guard, 40% Reserves and 20% Active Army. It must be noted that no one has anywhere close to a 100% interest except TRADOC; who's sole interest is in removing Fort Chaffee from its roles; simply, TRADOC is no longer willing to pay the bill for a FORSCOM mission. This does not speak well for "America's Army." This unfortunately also means that no one is willing, due to the bureaucrat seems in "America's Army," to contribute anything more than a piece of the resourcing necessary to keep it open to all; thus, it will be closed.

But will it? If one reads the fine print of the Army's closure recommendation, it calls for establishment of what it calls enclaves for both the National Guard and the Reserves. It also allows for current tenant activities to remain if their missions can be accomplished there. It allows for the continuance of the functions necessary to support these "enclaves." The interesting aspects of this is that when one combines these enclaves and tenants, the "closed" Fort Chaffee will resemble the current Fort Chaffee in size, shape and, most importantly, resourcing. The National Guard wants barracks, vehicle parking and a large area for collective training. The Reserves will want certain on-post training small arms ranges and some training area. To do this, all will need ammunition, food, power, water and roads to travel. If the training area exists, the active force will continue to use it like they have in the past (largely due to overcrowding at their own installations). All that will remain is a large portion of already unwanted infrastructure which has already been laid aside awaiting funds to have them removed. What will have changed? In essence, nothing.

What purpose is served by "closing" Fort Chaffee is not the reduction of operational infrastructure and the corresponding resources. It, in essence will be a realignment by another name. Maybe like the Presideio of Monterey, TRADOC's newest post. Fort Ord was closed by BRAC 91 but a "footprint" of the post was retained and is being run by an Active Army Garrison. The tragedy of this is that a lot of people will go through a lot of unnecessary effort and pain to end up with a realigned Fort Chaffee. Why was it not called a realignment when clearly that is what is occurring? Perhaps the need to appear as though great sacrifice is being made. Fort Chaffee is not a major installation as represented by the SECDEF. It is a subinstallation of Fort Sill with a budget that quickly identifies it as anything but a major installation.

The BRAC process recommendation to "close" Fort Chaffee highlights the fact that even the best of processes can fail to present decision makers an accurate picture of the ground truth. It very simply, was not designed to serve "America's Army" collectively but individually address the needs of each of its components. It is a disservice to America and its Army and, if the Army can not overcome this obstacle, that essential task must regretfully fall to the committee and/or concerned elected representatives.

The comparison data upon which the SECDEF decision was based was skewed. The BRAC Report does not take into account the other significant activities at the Fort but only looks at the AT/IDT figures. The recommendation stated "The post is managed by Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants". What about the Regional Training Brigade (RTB)? The RTB was

place at Fort Chaffee to support Reserve units in the region. The RTB is manned entirely by Active Component soldiers and is expected to grow to 170-200 by 1 March 1996. The fact is that the active Army has continued significant use of the Fort with no less than 6 major exercises since the departure of the JRTC, to include a JRTC special operations rotation, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Polk) and two major XVIII Airborne Corps exercises. If the JRTC and other units at Fort Polk cannot accomplish their training requirements at Fort Polk, why did they move there? The BRAC data indicates that Fort Polk has 163,000 acres of maneuver space while Fort Chaffee has only 62,000 acres. What is conveniently not stated is that approximately half of Fort Polk's acreage is national forest lands with limited use and that it has a major endangered species which further reduces useability. If the available acreage from the national forests surrounding Fort Chaffee had been included the 62,000 acres grows to 2 million plus acres. The net effect is that Fort Chaffee has a large more useable training area. This is not just conjecture, for once just ask the soldiers who use both, the 2d ACR. The data also places too great an emphasis for training areas on modern facilities for Quality of Life. Soldiers' time in a training area is too precious to be spent in the barracks, so the best training area is one that wastes very little of its asset on such mission nonessential items. The focus for a training area should be the training area - a novel concept but one that has been missed by the statisticians. If you look at it from the customers point of view - how many times have any of the premier active units gone to Fort Dix to train? Answer - none; yet it rates higher than Fort Chaffee as a training area. Fort Chaffee and Fort Polk were listed as equals in endangered species. Fort Chaffee has the burying beetle and Forts Polk and Bragg have the red-cocaded woodpecker. The beetle, essentially has no adverse impact on training as evidenced by the intense training at Fort Chaffee by the JRTC from 1988-1992 and our current training customers. This is not the case with the red-cocaded woodpecker which has a tremendous adverse impact on training at Forts Polk and Bragg. Retired General Carl Stiner who headed U. S. Special Operations Forces, in the Persian Gulf War and commanded the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg from 1988 to 1990, said it was "unconscionable" to send troops out into the field without fully training them. Stiner told the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee that the woodpecker restrictions curtail tank gunnery and helicopter gunship practice, night maneuvers and antiaircraft drills. He said readiness of the Army units at Fort Bragg "has been on a steady decline," since 1990.

In comparing miles of river training, Fort Chaffee was listed as 589 miles from the nearest port. Fort Dix was listed as only 45 miles from the deployable port. The gross error is that a major navigable river runs through Fort Chaffee and has been used by units (101st ABN) coming to Fort Chaffee to train and deploying from Fort Chaffee to home station. In fact, Fort Chaffee is the only installation in CONUS that owns land on

both sides of a major navigable river and has been declared as the "best water crossing area" in CONUS. A Lock and Dam ran by the Corps of Engineers is located within two miles of the crossing site and can adjust the flow of water based on water training capability of the unit.

The suggestion that the current AT load can be accommodated at installations like Fort Polk, Fort Sill, etc is ludicrous. Fort Polk cannot even accommodate their own active component training load as evidenced by the activities they continue to conduct at Fort Chaffee. Fort Sill can accommodate artillery fire, but has virtually no usable maneuver space. the logical progression of this line of thought is:

- Chaffee closed
- Units in fact cannot be accommodated as stated.
- Units must travel further to train
- Training days (cost) increase to meet mission requirement.
- Travel/transportation costs escalate.
- Units are eliminated, then the net result of this of this action places RC units in the eastern 1/2 of the 5th Army area at a great disadvantage (Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma) while those in other parts of the nation prosper. These states stand to loose millions of dollars if these units are eliminated. This means that the closure of Fort Chaffee is just the tip of the iceberg in overall economic impact. Eventually, virtually every community in the region will feel the adverse financial impact.

It is clear the Army has abrogated its responsibility in this action. They say close the Post but save some training area and buildings as enclaves for the NG and USARC, probably duplicating facilities at great expense rather than taking the responsibility to realign the Post to accommodate the needs of the Reserve Component units. After all, in America's Army, who is responsible for total combat readiness - the Army leadership or the NG or USAR? Clearly in this instance, nothing is broke except the alignment of Fort Chaffee. Fort Chaffee should remain just as it is; serving all America's Army with a small skilled workforce working as part of a full time active garrison. This is how it has been run since WWII and, in its mission and customers remain unchanged, this is how it should continue. If there is a change to be made, it should be rectify the long recognized malalignment by placing it in Forces Command. Status quo was the result of studies that were conducted in 1986 to 1991. The 1986 study (attached) was directed by the Secretary of Army and listed four alternatives to study: 1) Retain Fort Chaffee as a subinstallation of Fort Sill will use of AC military and DAC; 2) State Control. Arkansas ARNG assume full operational control using combination of ARNG, AGRS, and State employees. Fort Chaffee operated as a stand alone installation; 3) Active Army control (USAR AGR W/DAC). AC military are replaced with USAR AGR

personnel and DAC are retained. Fort Chaffee remains a subinstallation of Fort Sill; 4) NGB control. AC military are replace with five ARNG AGR personnel and DAC remain. Fort Chaffee is operated as stand alone installation of NGB. BRAC 91 was the second study. In both instances, the most feasible way to maintain Fort Chaffee as a training installation in support of combat readiness was leave it as it is.

I will appreciate your support on behalf of Fort Chaffee and its employees.



Max Trotter

Max Trotter

President

NFFE, Local 1728

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL
OF FORT CHAFFEE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD

DECISION BRIEFING

9 JUNE 1986

PURPOSE

- TO PROVIDE RESULTS OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FORT CHAFFEE TO THE NATIONAL GUARD
- TO OBTAIN CHIEF OF STAFF APPROVAL OF STUDY

BRIEFING OUTLINE

- OBJECTIVES
- BACKGROUND
- ALTERNATIVES
- RECOMMENDATION
- STUDY PARAMETERS
- STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
- IMPACTS
 - RESOURCES
 - MANPOWER
 - SOCIOECONOMIC/ENVIRONMENTAL
- OTHER RELATED ACTIONS
- COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION
- ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
- SUMMARY
- RECOMMENDATION
- MILESTONES

HQDA OBJECTIVES

- INCREASE THE ARNG SHARE OF THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF ACTIVE ARMY TROOPS.

BACKGROUND

- STUDY ORIGINATED FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECARMY FOR INSTALLATION & LOGISTICS.
- HQDA MSG 071500Z OCT 85, DIRECTED A REALIGNMENT SUMMARY IAW AR 5-10 OF FIVE SEMI-ACTIVE INSTALLATIONS:
 - FORT CHAFFEE, AR
 - FORT PICKETT, VA
 - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA
 - FORT BUCHANAN, PR
 - FORT MC COY, WI
- ORIGINAL STUDY GUIDANCE WAS CHANGED AND TWO ALTERNATIVES WERE ADDED (ALT C & D) BY MR. SHANNON (ASA I&L) ON 21 FEB 86.
- ON 10 APR 86 MG TEMPLE, DIR ARNG, ANNOUNCED THAT THE NGB COULDN'T SUPPORT MR. SHANNON'S GUIDANCE.

MWP-28-95 TUE 0-139 AM NFFE LCL 1726 FT CHAFFEE 501 484 2484 P.17

STUDY ALTERNATIVES

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO. RETAIN FORT CHAFFEE AS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL WITH USE OF AC MILITARY AND DAC.
- ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL. ARKANSAS ARNG ASSUMES FULL OPERATIONAL CONTROL USING COMBINATION OF ARNG AGRS AND STATE EMPLOYEES. FORT CHAFFEE OPERATED AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.
- ALTERNATIVE C. - ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL (USAR AGR W/DAC). AC MILITARY ARE REPLACED WITH USAR AGR PERSONNEL AND DAC ARE RETAINED. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.
- ALTERNATIVE D. - NGB CONTROL. AC MILITARY ARE REPLACED WITH FIVE ARNG AGR PERSONNEL AND DAC REMAIN. FORT CHAFFEE IS OPERATED AS STAND ALONE INSTALLATION OF NGB.

RECOMMENDATION

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO BE APPROVED AS THE MOST FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

STUDY PARAMETERS

- FY 86 IS THE BASE YEAR. FY 87 IS THE IMPLEMENTATION YEAR AND FY 88 IS STEADY STATE YEAR.
- BASE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS CONSIDERED IN THE BROADEST TERMS. NOT LIMITED TO BASOP'S AND RPMA ACCOUNTS.
- THE ARNG WILL OPERATE STAND ALONE INSTALLATIONS AND SERVE AS THE HOST. HOST TENANT RELATIONSHIPS ARE GOVERNED BY EXISTING ARMY REGULATIONS AND TENANTS WILL FUND ONLY EXTRAORDINARY REQUIREMENTS.
- NO NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE REQUIRED. ALL CONSTRUCTION CURRENTLY PLANNED THROUGH FY 91 WILL CONTINUE AND BE MANAGED BY FORT CHAFFEE AND THE SPONSORING (PROGRAMMING) MACOM.
- NO REAL PROPERTY WILL BE ACQUIRED OR EXCESSED.
- TENANT ACTIVE ARMY, USAR, AND NON-ARMY ACTIVITIES WILL NOT RELOCATE.
- ARNG AND FORSCOM WILL SCHEDULE ANNUAL TRAINING (AT). ARNG WILL SCHEDULE INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (IDI).
- TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY WILL NOT CHANGE. ARNG US PROPERTY AND FISCAL OFFICER (USP&FO) WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY.

STUDY PARAMETERS

- ALL CURRENTLY USED AND REQUIRED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ARNG. EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSFERRED "AS IS".
- EXISTING MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICES, COMMUNICATIONS AND POST EXCHANGES WILL CONTINUE TO BE PROVIDED BY HSC, ISC AND AAFES RESPECTIVELY.
- FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE BEING STUDIED UNDER THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM AND HAVE NOT YET REACHED THE SOLICITATION OF BIDS PHASE WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE DONE IN-HOUSE.
- IF TRANSFER OCCURS, THE ARNG WILL ASSUME EXISTING CONTRACTS.
- AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE USED.
- ALL AR 5-9 SUPPORT, BOTH ON AND OFF POST, IS TRANSFERRABLE TO THE ARNG UNLESS PROHIBITED BY LAW/STATUTE. (NO FUNCTIONS ARE PROHIBITED BY LAW)
- CURRENT "HEAD TAX", OPENING AND CLOSING COSTS, ARE NOT A STUDY CONSIDERATION. THESE FEES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER ASA I&L REVIEW FOR ELIMINATION. IF THESE FEES ARE NOT ELIMINATED A SIGNIFICANT DOLLAR IMPACT WOULD BE IMPOSED ON USAR AND ACTIVE COMPONENT UNITS WHICH MAY REDUCE USE.
- ARNG WOULD BE PROVIDED FUNDING FOR ALL FUNCTIONS PRIOR TO FY 88. THE FUNDING WILL BE TRANSFERRED IN THE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM).

STUDY ASSUMPTIONS

- THE OVERALL MISSION OF THE INSTALLATION WILL NOT CHANGE.
- ARNG WILL PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO TENANTS AND UNITS CONDUCTING TRAINING AS THEY RECEIVE AT THIS TIME.
- ARNG AND USAR UNIT TRAINING WILL NOT INCREASE OR DECREASE FROM THAT CURRENTLY PROJECTED FOR FY 86 AND BEYOND.
- BECAUSE THIS ACTION WAS NOT PROGRAMMED, NO NG TECHNICIANS AND ONLY FIVE ARNG AGR SPACES PER INSTALLATION CAN BE SUPPORTED BY THE NGB.
- ARNG AGR AND USAR AGR PERSONNEL WILL BE THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF THE AUTHORIZED ACTIVE MILITARY THAT THEY WOULD BE REPLACING.
- TRAINING READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS WILL REMAIN THE SAME.

RESOURCE IMPACTS

- STEADY STATE ANNUAL RECURRING COSTS OF THE ACTION BY ALTERNATIVES IN FY 86 DOLLARS (MILLIONS).

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>OMA</u>	<u>MPA*</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A - STATUS QUO	.316	.606	7.814	8.736
B - STATE CONTROL	0	.232	10.811	11.043
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	.316	.606	7.814	8.736
D - NGB CONTROL	.280	.476	10.211	10.967

- THE ARNG AGR AND USAR AGR PERSONNEL WOULD BE PAID WITH THE NGPA AND RPA APPROPRIATIONS.

- ONE TIME COSTS OF THE ACTION BY ALTERNATIVES IN FY 86 DOLLARS.

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>ONE TIME COSTS (\$000)</u>
B - STATE CONTROL	1,825.0
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	19.7
D - NGB CONTROL	14.1*

- REPRESENTS PCS COST ONLY. SUBSTANTIAL ONE TIME COSTS WILL BE INCURRED TO OPERATE FORT CHAFFEE AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.

MAR-28-95 TUE 09:42 AM NFFE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE SMI 484 1484 P.23

RECURRING CCSIS

ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO

	<u>CMA</u>	<u>MPA</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	2016.4	2525.4
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	43.5			43.5
FT SILL AV SEC	<u>36.2</u>	<u>130.0</u>		<u>166.2</u>
TOTAL	315.8	606.0	7813.5	8735.3

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

	<u>CMANG</u>	<u>NGPA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MISSION	509.5		509.5
BASOPS (-)	4113.6	186.0	4299.6
RPMA	<u>6188.2</u>	<u>46.0</u>	<u>6234.2</u>
TOTAL	10811.3	232.0	11043.3

RECURRING COSTS

ALTERNATIVE C - USAR AGR W/DAC

	<u>OMA</u>	<u>MPA</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	2016.4	2525.4
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	43.5			43.5
FT SILL AV SEC	<u>36.2</u>	<u>130.0</u>		<u>166.2</u>
TOTAL	315.8	606.0	7813.5	8735.3

ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

	<u>OMANG</u>	<u>NGPA</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MISSION	116.1		1369.7	1485.8
BASOPS (-)	120.0	389.0	4413.5	4922.5
RPMA		87.0	4427.4	4514.4
FT SILL CPO	<u>43.5</u>			<u>43.5</u>
TOTAL	279.6	476.0	10210.6	10966.2

ONE TIME COSTS

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

MILITARY RELOCATION (7 PERSONNEL)	\$ 20K
CIVILIAN RELOCATION (47 PERSONNEL)	1479
TERMINAL LEAVE COSTS (73 PERSONNEL)	77
SEVERANCE PAY (73 PERSONNEL)	<u>249</u>
TOTAL	\$1825K

ALTERNATIVE C - USAR AGR W/DAC

MILITARY RELOCATION (7 PERSONNEL)	\$19.7K
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ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

MILITARY RELOCATION (3 PERSONNEL)	\$14.1K
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MANPOWER IMPACTS

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE MANNING LEVELS, BY ALTERNATIVES, REGARDLESS OF STATUS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FORT CHAFFEE.

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN (INCL PT)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A - STATUS QUO	14	178	192
B - STATE CONTROL	5	255	260
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	14	178	192
D - NGB CONTROL	11	240	251

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE ACCOUNTABLE END STRENGTH THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION FOR OTHER INITIATIVES AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN (INCL PT)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A - STATUS QUO	0	0	0
B - STATE CONTROL	14	171	185
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11	0	11
D - NGB CONTROL	8	0	8

MHF-28-95, JUE 08:44 AM MFPE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE SWI 484 2484

MANPOWER IMPACTS

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE MANNING LEVELS, BY ALTERNATIVES, REGARDLESS OF STATUS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FORT CHAFFEE.

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN (INCL PT)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A - STATUS QUO	11 (+3 FT SILL)	176 (+2 FT SILL)	187 (+5)
B - STATE CONTROL	5 (ARNG AGR)	255 (STATE)	260
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11 (+3 FT SILL)	176 (+2 FT SILL)	187 (+5)
D - NGB CONTROL	11 (6 AC, 5 AGR)	238 (+2 FT SILL)	249 (+2)

- THE FIGURES BELOW DEPICT THE ACCOUNTABLE END STRENGTH THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION FOR OTHER INITIATIVES AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN (INCL PT)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A - STATUS QUO	0	0	0
B - STATE CONTROL	11 (+3 FT SILL)	169* (+2 FT SILL)	180 (+5)
C - USAR AGR W/DAC	11	0	11
D - NGB CONTROL	5 (+3 FT SILL)	0	5 (+3)

- * SEVEN TASC SPACES WILL REMAIN AND BECOME A TENANT.

MHP-28-95 TUE 09:45 AM NFFE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE 501 484 2487 P.28

MANPOWER IMPACTS

- AN INCREASE OF 62 CIVILIANS WERE ESTIMATED TO BE REQUIRED FOR THE STAND-ALONE OPERATION OF ALTERNATIVE D.
- ANALYSIS ACCOMPLISHED USING CARLISLE BARRACKS (- WAR COLLEGE) AS A MODEL.
- FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL MANPOWER THAT NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED AND/OR INCREASED ARE:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| ●● FINANCE & ACCOUNTING +20 | ●● PURCHASING & CONTRACTING +9 |
| ●● ADP +4 | ●● SAFETY +1 |
| ●● CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE +11 | ●● STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE +2 |
| ●● COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES MANAGEMENT +3 | ●● PROTOCOL +1 |
| ●● PUBLIC AFFAIRS +1 | ●● DEH +2 |
| ●● LOGISTICS +3 | ●● RECREATION SERVICES OFF. +1 |
| ●● EEO +1 | ●● DPCA +2 |
| ●● CHAPLAIN +1 | |

● BASOPS MANPOWER STAFFING ONLY

	CIVILIAN	MILITARY		
	<u>FIP</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>E</u>
CARLISLE BARRACKS (-WAR COLLEGE)	229	17	2	44
FORT CHAFFEE PRESENTLY	153	5	0	6
FORT CHAFFEE WITH ADDITIONAL STAFFING	215	5	0	6

MHP-28-95 TUE 02:45 AM NFFE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE 501 484 2484

SOCIOECONOMIC/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

- ENVIRONMENTAL.
 - THERE IS NO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.
 - A TRADOC FORM 161-R, CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION, HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.

- SOCIOECONOMIC.
 - CONDUCTED AN ASSESSMENT USING THE CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABORATORY'S (CERL), ECONOMIC IMPACT FORECAST SYSTEM (EIFS).
 - IMPACTS ARE BELOW THE HISTORICAL RATIONAL THRESHOLD VALUES (RTV).
 - MODEL INDICATES THE ACTION WOULD CAUSE NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY OF THE AREA.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS

- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER ONGOING INITIATIVES AT FORT CHAFFEE THAT MAY BE IMPACTED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION.
 - COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY REVIEW.
 - UNDER ALTERNATIVES A, C, AND D THE CA REVIEW WOULD CONTINUE.
 - NGB (ALT D) HAS STATED THAT THEY WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON FUNCTIONS BEING CONTRACTED OUT.
 - THE STATE (ALT B) IS NOT SUBJECT TO CA REVIEW BUT COULD CONTRACT OUT ON THEIR OWN.
 - THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (JRTC).
 - WOULD HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON FORT CHAFFEE, REGARDLESS OF WHO HAD OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
 - UNDER A BARE BONES STRATEGY AND HEAVY USE OF CONTRACTING THE BASOPS PLUS-UP IS ANTICIPATED TO BE 25 MILITARY AND 63 CIVILIANS.
 - THIS PLUS-UP IS CONSIDERED SUPPORTABLE UNDER ALL ALTERNATIVES.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS

- THE 5TH ARMY REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER
 - PRESENTLY BEING TESTED AT FORT CHAFFEE.
 - PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE YEAR ROUND INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING AT ONE LOCATION FOR THE USAR.
 - STAFFING ISSUES ARE STILL NOT FIRM BUT WILL BE A MIXTURE OF AGR PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS.

- WATER OBSTACLE TRAINING SITE (WOTS).
 - IT IS DESIGNED TO TRAIN AC, RC, AND NG ENGINEER UNITS IN BRIDGE BUILDING AND RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS.
 - WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 25 PERSONNEL.

COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION

PREFERRED
ALTERNATIVE

COMMAND

RATIONALE

ARKANSAS TAG	A	STATE GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT ALT B ONLY IF DA DECIDES TO CLOSE FORT CHAFFEE
COMMANDER, FORT SILL	A	MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING.
NGB	D	OVERALL THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS.
OCAR	A	WILL SUPPORT ALT C IF NECESSARY.
FORSCOM	A	MINIMUM IMPACT ON MILITARY, CIVILIAN AND LOCAL COMMUNITY. NO DISRUPTION TO THE EFFICIENCY OR EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONS. MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND CONTINUED GROWTH IN TRAINING FACILITY UTILIZATION WOULD CONTINUE UNABATED. ALLOWS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS.

COMMAND AND STAFF EVALUATION

COMMAND
TRADOC STAFF

PREFERRED
ALTERNATIVE

RATIONALE

DCSPAL	A	LEAST IMPACT.
DCST	A	MOBILIZATION, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, SAVINGS NOT WORTH THE TURMOIL.
USAR SR ADV	A	COST EFFICIENCY, LEAST TURMOIL,
DCSENGR	A	IN ANTICIPATION OF THE JRTC TRAINING BEING AT FORT CHAFFEE, THE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND FUNDING SHOULD STAY WITHIN THE SAME HQ. UNDER STATE CONTROL THE EXISTING DEH DISAPPEARS AND THEREFORE THE LOSS OF CONTROL OVER CONSTRUCTION.
DCSRM	A	IF JRTC IS APPROVED. TRANSFER TO FORSCOM IF THE JRTC IS NOT APPROVED.
PA	NONE	ALTERNATIVES B AND D HAVE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT. ALTERNATIVES A AND C HAVE MINIMAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT.
SJA	NONE	

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO. THE AC COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE FORT SILL COMMANDER.
FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS AS A SUBINSTALLATION FOR FORT SILL.

• ADVANTAGES

- EXPERIENCED IN THE OPERATION.
 - ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS.
 - PROVEN EFFICIENCY.
 - LEAST TRAUMATIC.
- NO IMPACT ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.
 - ALLOWS CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND NO DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT.
 - NO ONE TIME COST WILL BE INCURRED.
 - OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE LESS THAN ALTERNATIVES B AND D. THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE C.
 - NO LOSS OF EXPERIENCE OR INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

● DISADVANTAGES

●● DOES NOT ALLOW THE ARNG TO ASSUME A GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

●● DOES NOT PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL.

●● DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL. THE ARNG AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE ARKANSAS TAG. FORT CHAFFEE WOULD BE OPERATED AS A STAND-ALONE INSTALLATION.

• ADVANTAGES.

- ALLOWS THE ARNG A GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.
- FREES UP 171 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- FREES PARTIAL MANYEARS OF EFFORT AT FORT SILL FOR OTHER FUNCTIONS.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

● DISADVANTAGES

- COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS WOULD START ANEW AND WOULD REQUIRE AN ADJUSTMENT PERIOD.
- COMPLICATES MOBILIZATION.
- LOSE CONTROL FOR NEW INITIATIVES.
- UTILIZATION MAY DECREASE DUE TO A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES.
- ACTIVE ARMY WILL NOT DETERMINE TRAINING PRIORITIES.
- DOES NOT ALLOW ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL, THEIR DEPENDENTS, FEDERAL WORK FORCE, AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.
- CONTINUITY OF OPERATION COULD BE LOST AND A DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT MAY RESULT UNLESS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE OBTAINS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE STATE.
- ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE THE HIGHEST OF ALL ALTERNATIVES.
- ONE TIME COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ALTERNATIVE ARE THE HIGHEST AT \$1.825 MILLION.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE C - ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL (USAR AGR WITH DAC). THE USAR AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE FORT SILL COMMANDER. FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS AS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.

● ADVANTAGES.

●● NO CHANGE IN ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS.

●● PROVEN EFFICIENCY.

●● PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.

●● NO IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.

●● CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT WOULD BE MINIMUM SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE WORK FORCE WOULD REMAIN.

●● ONE TIME COST ARE MINIMAL (19.7K).

●● OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE LESS THAN ALTERNATIVES B AND D. THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE A.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

● DISADVANTAGES

- DOES NOT ALLOW ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.
- DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

ALTERNATIVE D - NRG CONTROL. THE ARNG AGR COMMANDER REPORTS TO THE DIRECTOR ARNG. AND THE CHIEF NGB. FORT CHAFFEE WOULD BE OPERATED AS A STAND-ALONE INSTALLATION.

● ADVANTAGES.

●● ALLOWS ARNG GREATER ROLE IN ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

●● PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY IN THE REASSIGNMENT OF 5 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES FROM FORT CHAFFEE AND 3 FROM FORT SILL FOR OTHER FORCE INITIATIVES.

●● NO IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND LOCAL COMMUNITY.

●● LOSS OF EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE MINIMUM SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE WORK FORCE WOULD REMAIN.

ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES

● DISADVANTAGES

- NGB HAS NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A MAJOR INSTALLATION.
- DEPARTMENTAL AGENCY BECOMES AN OPERATIONAL CONTROLLING ACTIVITY.
- COMPLICATES MOBILIZATION.
- SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED.
- LOSE CONTROL FOR NEW INITIATIVES.
- UTILIZATION MAY DECREASE DUE TO A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES.
- ACTIVE ARMY WILL NOT DETERMINE TRAINING PRIORITIES.
- DISRUPTIVE TO ACTIVE PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.
- REPLACES ONLY 5 OF THE 11 ACTIVE COMPONENT SPACES.
- DOES NOT FREE UP ANY CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- EXTENDED LINES OF COMMUNICATION, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT MAY CAUSE DEGRADATION OF THE CONTINUITY OF OPERATION AND SUPPORT.
- OPERATIONAL COSTS ARE MORE THAN ALTERNATIVES A AND C.
- IN THE CAPACITY OF A "STAND-ALONE" INSTALLATION AN INCREASE IN DOLLARS AND MANPOWER WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SUPPORT PRESENTLY INTEGRATED AND RECEIVED FROM FORT SILL.

MHP-20-95 10E 03151 HN HFE LLL 1728 FT CHFFEE SWI 484 2484

P.41

SUMMARY

RESOURCES - RECAP

ALTERNATIVES

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
MANPOWER	192	260	192	251

MANPOWER DIFFERENTIAL +68 0 +59

ACTIVE MILITARY END STRENGTH SAVED 0 14 11 8

RECURRING COSTS (\$MIL) 8.736 11.043 8.736 10.967

RECURRING COSTS DIFFERENTIAL (\$MIL) +2.308 0 +2.231

ONE TIME COSTS (\$000) 0 1,825.0 19.7 14.1*

* REPRESENTS PCS COST ONLY. SUBSTANTIAL ONE TIME COSTS WILL BE INCURRED TO OPERATE FORT CHAFFEE AS A STAND ALONE INSTALLATION.

SUMMARY

- ALTERNATIVE A IS THE LEAST COSTLY IN ONE TIME AND THE SAME AS ALTERNATIVE C IN RECURRING COSTS.
- ALTERNATIVE B HAS THE GREATEST IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE.
- ALTERNATIVE A DOES NOT PERMIT THE REASSIGNMENT OF AC MILITARY OR FREE UP 178 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- ALTERNATIVE A IS LEAST TRAUMATIC FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, SUPPORT STRUCTURE, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL.
- ALTERNATIVE A IS LEAST PROBLEMATIC FOR OTHER RELATED ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (JRTC).
- ALTERNATIVE B PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 14 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES, AND FREES UP 171 CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.
- ALTERNATIVE C PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 11 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES.
- ALTERNATIVE D PERMITS THE REASSIGNMENT OF 8 ACTIVE MILITARY SPACES.
- ALTERNATIVES B AND D PERMITS THE ARNG A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

RECOMMENDATION

- ALTERNATIVE A - STATUS QUO BE APPROVED AS THE MOST FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

REP-08-99 TUE 08:58 AM NIFE LCL 1728 FT CHAFFEE SUI 484 484

CONTINGENCY CONTROL (NOT RELEVANT)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPACT (LEAST)	1	4	2	3
COMMUNITY IMPACT (LEAST)	1	4	2	3
FLEXIBILITY FOR NEW INITIATIVES	1	4	2	3
POSSIBLE TRAINING IMPACT	1	4	2	3
ANTICIPATED USE OF FACILITIES	1	4	2	3

GOV. CLINTON HAS STATED THAT HE PREFERS TO KEEP FORT CHAFFEE UNDER ACTIVE ARMY CONTROL. BUT WILL TAKE IT OVER RATHER THAN HAVE IT CLOSED.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

JRTC

ASSUMPTIONS

- THE ACTIVE ARMY WILL BECOME THE MOST SIGNIFICANT USER OF FORT CHAFFEE ON A YEAR ROUND BASIS.
- AN INCREASE IN BASOPS SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE JRTC MISSION.
- UNDER ALTERNATIVES A AND C, FORT CHAFFEE REMAINS A SUBINSTALLATION OF FORT SILL.
- BASOPS MANPOWER AND DOLLAR COSTS WOULD BE DIFFERENT UNDER ALTERNATIVES B AND D SINCE THE POST WOULD BE OPERATED UNDER A "STAND ALONE" CONCEPT.

MILITARY: 26
TOTAL: 208

MILITARY: 26
TOTAL: 208

DOLLARS (MIL)

NON PERSONNEL: \$ 5.122
CIV. PERSONNEL: 2.952
TOTAL: \$ 8.074

DOLLARS (MIL)

NON PERSONNEL: \$ 3.070
CIV. PERSONNEL: 4.350
TOTAL: \$ 7.420

JRTC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
ALTERNATIVE B - STATE CONTROL

ADVANTAGES

- STATE HAS EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A TRAINING POST.
- ARNG ASSUMES A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.
- IT WOULD NOT COST THE ARMY ANY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN END STRENGTH.

DISADVANTAGES

- ARNG WANTS A GREATER SHARE OF THE BATTALION ROTATIONS AT THE JRTC.
- STATE GOVERNMENT WANTS THE ACTIVE ARMY TO OPERATE THE POST.
- FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE LOST.
- THE STATE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE POST.

ALTERNATIVE D - NGB CONTROL

ADVANTAGES

- ARNG ASSUMES A GREATER ROLE IN THE ARMY INSTALLATION SUPPORT STRUCTURE.

DISADVANTAGES

- NGB HAS NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING A MAJOR INSTALLATION.
- ARNG WANTS A GREATER SHARE OF THE BATTALION ROTATIONS AT THE JRTC.
- NGB HAS STATED THEY CAN ONLY SUPPORT MINIMUM AGR STAFFING (5).
- A DEPARTMENTAL AGENCY BECOMES AN OPERATIONAL CONTROLLING ACTIVITY.

SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE POST.

• IF THE JRTC DOES NOT OPERATE AT FORT CHAFFEE, THE POST SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO FORSCOM, AS HAS BEEN FORTS PICKETT AND A.P. HILL.

28E

MILESTONES

- PUBLISH FINAL STUDY 11 JUN 86
- SUBMIT STUDY TO HQDA 13 JUN 86

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS

11 April 1995

FINAL VERSION

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Josue Robles, Jr.

*Ed Brown gave Approval
by Commissioner Robles on
17 APR 95.*

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

*Steve Bailey gave 2 originals
to Jeff Campbell on 18 Apr 95;
1- Exec Sec Files, 1-Library.*

COMMISSION STAFF:

Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

LTC Robert A. Dow, Jr., Commander, US Army Garrison
The Honorable Tim Hutchinson, Congressman, 3rd District, Arkansas and Co-Chairman, Fort
Chaffee Committee
MG Melvin Thrash, Adjutant General, Arkansas
BG James Thomey, Assistant Adjutant General Air, Arkansas
BG Robert S. Hardy, Jr., Chief of Staff, US Army Reserve Command
COL William Shirron, Commander, Regional Training Brigade
COL Dennis Porter, Director of Resource Management, Fort Sill
Mr. Ed Warmack, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army
Judge Bud Harper, Sebastian County Judge and Co-Chairman, Fort Chaffee Committee
COL Bob Boyer, USA (Ret), Spokesman for Veterans Group
LTC Harry Bryan, Staff Analyst, The Army Basing Study, HQ DA
Ms. Pat Williams, Legislative Assistant, Senator Bumpers
Mr. Steve Ronnell, Legislative Assistant, Senator Pryor
Mr. Lee Pittman, Administrative Aide, Senator Pryor

BASE'S CURRENT MISSION:

Support active Army and Reserve Components training.

DoD RECOMMENDATION:

Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component training as an enclave.

DoD JUSTIFICATION:

- The Joint Readiness Training Center relocated to Fort Polk, LA in 1992; post has Active Component garrison, but no Active Component units.
- Ranks tenth out of ten continental United States Major Training Areas and is excess infrastructure to downsized Army's needs.
- Some Reserve Component training can still be done, but Reserve Component annual training can be done at Forts Polk, Sill, or Riley.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Ground tour of majority of installation with stops at USAR NCO Academy training site, USAR Regional Training Site–Medical, WWII barracks complex showing progressive upgrades, and field house. Aerial tour of river crossing site, aerial gunnery and bombing range, Rattlesnake Drop Zone, and Arrowhead Drop Zone.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- National Guard Bureau position is that “Fort Chaffee is essential to maintain training and readiness standards for the National Guard.”
- Reserve Components need installation for both annual training and inactive duty training since they cannot favorably compete for training densities at active component installations.
- Distance and time to alternative training sites, coupled with increased costs, will result in lost training time and reduce readiness.
- 5th Army Regional Training Brigade is establishing a forward headquarters at Fort Chaffee to fulfill Congressionally mandated Title IX Reserve Component training requirements.
- Tenants (5th Army Regional Training Brigade, US Army Reserve NCO Academy, Regional Training Site-Medical, Equipment Concentration Site, Department of Energy, MILES contract logistical support site, US Marshall, and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office) need to be enclave.
- FORSCOM designated mobilization site cannot be accommodated in enclave.

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED:

- Significant number of buildings are closed and awaiting funding for destruction.
- FY 95 training activity is projected to increase 34 percent over FY 94, the year used by the Army for its analysis.
- Installation contains 63,000 acres of varied maneuver space.
- Installation controls both sides of three crossing sites on Arkansas River and can control flow of water.
- No environmental detractors to training exist.
- Active component units [2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from Fort Polk, 5th Engineer Battalion (Combat) from Fort Leonard Wood, XVIII Airborne Corps, and others] are training at Fort Chaffee during FY 95.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Military value of installation was not accurately portrayed by the Army in its analysis.
- Mechanized maneuver acres are greater at Fort Chaffee than all major training areas except Fort Irwin and Fort Polk, and the Army's number for Fort Polk is disputed.
- The fact that Fort Chaffee is on a navigable river was neglected in the Army's analysis.
- Using FY 94 training statistics skews importance of Fort Chaffee to Reserve Components.
- Training at Fort Chaffee is not affected by endangered fauna or flora.
- Significant environmental clean-up costs would preclude reuse of a significant portion of the installation.
- Economic impact of recommendation does not reflect true impact on the community.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Determine costs for Reserve Components to train at sites designated in justification for recommendation.
- Determine reason and alternative locations for Active Component units training at Fort Chaffee during FY 95.

- Determine economic feasibility of transferring operation and maintenance of installation to the Reserve Components.
- Evaluate community concerns.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number
950419-3

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

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REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

LTC Robert A. Dow, Jr.
Commander
U. S. Army Garrison, Fort Chaffee
Fort Chaffee, AR 72905-5000

Dear LTC Dow:

I would like to thank you and the people of Fort Chaffee for your efforts to make my recent visit both informative and productive. The briefings and discussions with you, your staff, and community and congressional officials provided us with a great deal of valuable information about the training conducted at Fort Chaffee. This information will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Please extend my appreciation to the members of your staff for their assistance. I would particularly like to commend Mr. Bill Ables and SGM Phillip Hafler for their efforts in planning and coordinating the base visit.

Again, thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely,

MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA (Ret)
Commissioner

JR/eab