The Strategic and Operational Debate Over Operation Anvil: the Allied Invasion of Southern France in August, 1944 Page: 109
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and a full bridgehead should be developed by D+6. Toulon should be captured by D+20, and
Marseille D+40.78
With D-Day looming, 7th Army went into high gear. The United States 36th Infantry
Division, commanded by Major General John Dahlquist, arranged for Operation Cowpuncher II,
an amphibious landing exercise off the coast of the Bay of Gaeta, northwest of Naples.79 The
airborne force designated for Anvil received its outline plan on July 26.80 The 3d Division under
Major General John O'Daniel received Field Order #12, its official orders for Operation Anvil.
Marshall wrote to Devers that the plan for an army group was approved. He advised
Devers to keep his headquarters small, and to focus primarily on commanding his troops, rather
than administrative work. Marshall told Devers to dispense with perfectionist planning as he
believed, "we are approaching the point in Europe where carefully planned and bold and rapid
action in the application of our forces may reap successes which will shorten the war."81 Indeed,
Marshall had reason to be optimistic when Allied intelligence gathered the entire German order
of battle, as well as expected enemy build-up and movement tables.82
Intelligence during the planning phases of Anvil was prodigious. In fact, intelligence
gathering was so effective that there was a lack of personnel to handle the constant traffic of
messages. Due to Overlord, German units stationed in southern France were constantly shuffled
throughout France. The result was at times an incomplete picture of who exactly was in the
78 Ibid.
79 36th Inf Div, title "Operation Cowpuncher II," 22 Jul. 1944, Records of Mediterranean Theater of Operations,
World War II, Box 3011, RG 492, NARA. Cowpuncher II was set for 7 August.
8o HQ Seventh Army, title "Outline Plan: Employment of Airborne Forces to Assist 'Anvil,"' 26 Jul. 1944, Box 5,
Folder "Army. G-3 Sec, Opn Anvil - VI Corps Outline Plan for Opns, 15 July 44," RG 338, NARA.
81 Marshall to Devers, 16 Jul. 1944, The Papers of George Marshall, IV, 523-524.
82 HQ VI Corps, title "Operation Anvil," 16 Jul. 1944, Box 6, RG 338 NARA. See also, Carl R. Morin Jr., Anvil
Revisited. The Impact of Ultra on the Decision to Invade Southern France (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1984).
109
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Zinsou, Cameron. The Strategic and Operational Debate Over Operation Anvil: the Allied Invasion of Southern France in August, 1944, thesis, May 2013; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc271924/m1/116/?q=40: accessed February 11, 2026), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .