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The study of terrorism has been both broad in scope and varied in approach. Little work has been done, however, on the territorial aspects of terrorist groups. Most terrorist groups are revolutionary to one degree or another, seeking the control of a piece of territory; but for the supportive population of a terrorist group, how important is the issue of territory? Are the intangible qualities of territory more salient to a given population than other factors? Are territorially based terrorist groups more durable than their ideologically or religiously motivated cohorts? This paper aims to propose the validity of the territorial argument for the study of political terrorism.
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by

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 2011 an elite group of United States Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden, leader of the al’Qaida terror network. The political fallout of this operation is yet to fully develop, as bin Laden was found in Abottabad, Pakistan, roughly 40 miles from the capital Islamabad, in a $1 million mansion, roughly a half-mile from the Pakistan Military Academy. There is some consensus (Crenshaw 1991, Cronin 2009) that capturing the leader of a terrorist group is better than killing him; but it remains to be seen what effect the death of bin Laden will have on the al’Qaida terrorist network. It may be the case that al’Qaida will dissolve relatively quickly without bin Laden’s financing, direction, or recruitment power. So far, al’Qaida has survived despite the death of bin Laden with its most active branches located in Yemen and the Islamic Maghreb, or parts of Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. What is clear is that bin Laden was not the first, nor will he be the last person to adopt terror—broadly defined as violence that intentionally targets civilians or other symbolic targets in order to influence an audience and attain a political outcome—as a means to an end.

The importance of terrorism as a domestic and foreign policy concern of the United States and of the international system has skyrocketed since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Of course, the September 11th attacks on America were not the only high profile attacks on Western populations. On March 11, 2004, a coordinated attack left 1800 dead in the Madrid Train Bombings, and on July 7, 2005, a series of four suicide bombings took place in London. Our understanding of terrorist behavior, however, has lagged behind our collected commitment to preventing terrorist attacks. While work has been done on understanding the motivations of terrorists (Crenshaw 1981, 2001), types of terrorist actors (Robinson et al. 2006,
Caplan 2006), the people who support them (Caplan 2006), where terrorism is likely to be seen (Robinson et al. 2006: 2012; also, Schock 1996; Marshall and Gurr 2003; Hegre et al. 2001), how terrorism ends (Cronin 2009), and some have observed that certain groups last longer than others (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer, 2010), no one has sought to explain why some terrorist groups last longer than others. Understanding why some groups last longer than others may prove an important piece of the counter-terrorism puzzle – if governments can identify which groups are likely to die out with little to no repressive or counter-terrorist activities, and which are likely to resist such efforts, then institutions can begin to craft more effective policies that can eliminate terrorist groups, or prevent likely terrorists from adopting this tactic to begin with.

It is reasonable to assume that all terrorist groups face transaction costs—or negative effects of a given activity incurred by the persons engaging in said activity. Some terrorist organizations have persisted in the face of significant pressure from governments while others have ceased terrorist operations. Sometimes, groups halt terror campaigns after achieving an objective, such as the original embodiment of the Irish Republican Army. Others after they are defeated militarily, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in 2009 or the Black September Organization (which carried-out the Munich Massacre of 1972 and was dismantled, person by person, by Israeli intelligence forces over the span of two decades). Others are “one-hit wonder,” groups that perform one or a few acts of terror and then disappear. While others still continue to use terror as a means of maintaining power in territory that they control while abandoning the group’s original, often revolutionary mission, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Some groups have given up the use of terror as a tactic, while other groups continue to employ its use in the face of pressure from states to stop. For example, Aum Shinrikyo collapsed in the face of government pressure following the 1995 sarin gas attack on the
Tokyo subway, while Hamas has been an active organization for over two decades, despite constant pressure from Israel – the competing Palestinian Liberation Organization has not employed terrorism since adopting the Oslo framework.

Why, then, do groups vary in their durability—their ability to survive over time in the face of high transaction costs and carry out future attacks? Empirical evidence supports the view that groups engaging in terror on behalf of a sympathetic population eager to claim a piece of indivisible territory will last longer than groups motivated purely by ideology or religion—groups for which control of indivisible territory is not the most salient issue for the supportive or sympathetic population. The desire to control territory that provides either-or a) access to lootable resources, and b) terrain suitable to sustain an insurgency, such as mountainous, forested, or other remote areas, is an important cofactor in explaining long-duration conflicts. Needless to say, failed states often times offer ideal environments for terrorist and other non-state armed groups to operate from.

However, the existence of lootable resources or insurgency-friendly terrain in a given territory is secondary to the salience of the psychological, cultural, religious, historical, and political aspects of certain pieces of territory to specific peoples, creating what Fearon (1995) calls “effectively indivisible issues.” The physical characteristics of a piece of territory can provide advantages to terrorist groups that behave as an insurgency – they can help to insulate the group from government actions and reduce the need for a large population of sympathetic citizens. The non-physical characteristics of a given piece of territory, however, provide little in the way of material support to a terrorist insurgency. What these characteristics do provide is a great deal of propaganda and moral support in conflicts based on ethnicity, religion, or identity.
It is important to note, however, Fearon and others in his theoretical tradition conceived of “indivisible issues” and related topics in order to explain conflict between states or between competing forces within states, few have attempted to apply this logic to the study of terrorist groups. However, the study of terrorism from various fields has advanced several theoretical frameworks to explain the rise and longevity of terrorist organizations.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Social Theories of Terrorist Origins

Robinson, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) use quantitative methodology to explore the veracity of three competing theories of transnational terror. First, they define transnational terrorism as, “the premeditated use of extranormal violence or brutality by subnational groups to a political, religious or ideological objective through the intimidation of a huge audience, usually not involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence” (Robinson, et al. 2006: 2010, quoting Enders and Sanders 2002: 145-46; also Mickolus et al. 203; Li and Schaub 2004; Li 2005). The authors proceed to examine the four “families” of transnational terrorist activity before executing a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression using data obtained from the ITERATE database of terrorist attacks for the years 1973-2003.

The first “family” of theories the group examines, “posit that rapid development creates social disorganization and strains, thereby encouraging political violence” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2011). The social disorganization/strain theorem suggests that the rapidity of development can lead to high levels of urbanization in a short period of time, facilitating the growth of social, political and economic inequality. If an erosion of traditional social norms accompanies this rapid urbanization, religiously motivated terrorism may result. The related phenomenon of demographic change may increase economic inequality. The authors also make mention of the role education plays in the growth of transnational terrorist movements: “given that schools and universities are often incubators of idealized views of the world, they expose the young to ideologies that promote radical change and social activism” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2011).
While social disorganization may explain some incidents of transnational terrorism, the authors also examine theories advancing the argument that, “quasi-authoritarian and partial democracies are more prone to internal armed conflicts and civil war” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2012; also, Schock 1996; Marshall and Gurr 2003; Hegre et al. 2001). As a theory of political order, the above statement and refinements, such as Li (2005), Lai (2004), Krueger and Laitin (2003), Eubank and Weinberg (2001) and Li and Schaub (2004) are attractive to political scientists for, among other attributes, their structural basis. A society’s institutions, regime type, rights and liberties, or the lack thereof, may explain the growth of transnational terrorism. Unfortunately, the theoretical framework for explaining transnational terrorism as a singular phenomenon with a singular, political/institutional/etc. cause is chaotic to say the least.

Related to theories of political order are theories of systemic order/anti-systemic violence. Just as rapid urbanization may create disparities in wealth distribution within a society, systemic theories posit that the rapid pace of globalization and the unprecedented power of the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union may serve as the *raison d’être* for transnational terrorism, especially in the post-Cold War system. For example, “Pape (2005) contends that U.S. military basing policy in the Middle East is a key precipitant of anti-U.S. suicide terrorist attacks, but his research is narrowly focused on some 300 acts of suicide bombing” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2012). Just as with other political theories of terrorism, it seems that systemic theories need a degree of refinement.

Identity/civilizational theories explaining the occurrence of transnational terrorism represent the final “family” of theoretical explanations of transnational terrorism explored by the authors. The authors review Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilization” thesis as an explanation for Islamic terrorism. “Civilizations” state the authors, “as dense bodies of cultural
understandings and social organization, provide a significant component of human identity as the largest meaningful in-groups in the world” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2012). Transnational terrorism, then, would be one form of political conflict between civilizations. “According to the logic of ‘civilizational clash’” the authors assert, “we would expect higher production of Islamic attacks originating in countries characterized by greater competition between Islam and other religions” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2013).

The authors find support for a “fourth wave” of terrorism that is characterized by its Islamist nature. They find that the US is the principle symbolic target of these attacks; and that Islamist Terrorist groups are more lethal, on average, than Leftist groups. “Global international integration” conclude the authors, “is destabilizing, at least with respect to Islamist transnational terrorism, only where it is anchored in cultural cleavages” (Robinson et al. 2006: 2022). Without surprise, military dependence on Western powers (read: the United States) positively drives both forms of terrorism, somehow supporting the assumption that Western military dependence undermines state legitimacy. The authors do not explain the causal mechanism. That said, the authors do find that direct foreign investment negatively affects the incidence of transnational terrorism—this is likely due to increased economic opportunity for those who would otherwise choose to become terrorists.

One of the earliest behavioral scientists to study the phenomenon of political terrorism was Martha Crenshaw. In a 1981 piece for *Comparative Politics*, Crenshaw established a definition of criteria, or factors, that contribute to the adoption of terrorism. She makes a distinction between preconditions and precipitants that allow for the rise of terror. A precondition is a factor or set of factors that “set the stage for terrorism over the long run” and precipitating factors are, “specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism”
(Crenshaw 1981: 381). She subdivides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors, “which provide opportunities for terrorism to happen [in the case of the former], and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns [in the case of the latter]” (Crenshaw 1981: 381). Modernization factors, such as sophisticated transportation enable terrorists to move quickly and cheaply, and communication networks provide an excellent means, not only to coordinate attacks, but also for publicity by terrorists. Understanding the role these modernization factors play, therefore, are important in understanding the rise of terrorist campaigns.

One can remember news coverage of the 1972 Munich Olympics, when members of the Palestinian group Black September held the Israeli wrestling team hostage. Even that, in ages past, would have taken days or weeks to spread around the world was disseminated in real-time. The advent of smart phones with cameras and direct connections to social-media sites such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter provide an even faster spread of knowledge of similar events. If, as Crenshaw argues later, a major goal of terrorists were to gain attention for the cause, the rise of social media and instant communication would provide significant preconditions for the emergence of terrorism in a given society. The advent of jet travel made skyjacking a favored tactic of terrorists in the 1970s and 80s; the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. would have been impossible were it not for the ubiquity of jet travel.

If modernization factors contribute to the emergence and sustainability of terrorism, so to do political factors such as the dynamics between majority and minority groups within a society. “Concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority” (Crenshaw 1981: 383). The second important precipitating factor for the emergence of terrorism is “the lack of opportunity for political
participation [of minority groups]” (Crenshaw 1981: 383). As Bueno de Mesquita (2005) would expand upon, this also includes economic opportunity. Crenshaw points out that it is the perception of fairness by the disaffected members of society that matters. Quoting a study on political attitudes, Crenshaw argues that, “it is the perceived injustice underlying the deprivation that gives rise to anger or frustration” (Blumenthal, et. al. 1975, quoted by Crenshaw 1981: 383). In Crenshaw’s age, terrorist activity essentially resulted from elite dissatisfaction (especially in Western Europe). Certainly this is the case for much of the leadership of terrorist organizations, ranging from Sendero Luminoso of Peru, to Aum Shinrikyo of Japan, to the Red Army Faction of Germany, to al’Qaida. Crenshaw points out that many terrorists are, “young, well-educated, and middle-class in background” (Crenshaw 1981: 384). Finally, she points to precipitating events, such as the British government’s execution of participants in the Easter Rising of 1916 as an important situational factor for the emergence of terrorism. The terrorist’s own perceptions and interpretations of the world and the events that transpire within it, then, are the most important factors in determining the causes of terrorism – including which populations are appropriate or legitimate targets, and which are not.

Jeff Goodwin advances a theory that terrorist activity is not as random in its targeting of civilian populations as past research and the popular media believe. Instead, he proposes that terrorist groups choose to intentionally target “complicitous civilians” instead of truly selecting their targets at random. Goodwin further proceeds to categorize targets, which he calls “selective” or “individualized,” these targets are “noncombatants who are targeted because of their individual identities or roles” (Goodwin 2006: 2030). An example of selective targets would be journalists in Iraq following the US invasion of that country in 2003, or the kidnapping of American personnel from Lebanon during the 1980s. Targeted assassinations and
disappearances could also easily fit within this category. “These individuals” writes Goodwin, “typically include politicians and (unarmed) state officials, usually those held responsible… for the social and political arrangements and government policies that the revolutionaries oppose” (Goodwin 2006: 2030). Der Rote Armee Fraktion [the Red Army Faction] of Germany primarily employed targeted terrorism to overthrow the West German government during the 1970s and 1980s, without Soviet and Stasi support, the RAF’s activities petered-out following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany.

Goodwin draws a distinction between selective terrorism and “indiscriminate” or “categorical” terrorism. Here I have a difference of opinion with Goodwin, which is entirely semantic. By choosing to label terrorist acts that target indiscriminately “categorical” he confuses all acts of terror. The above category of targeted killing is a classification of terrorist activity defined by the principle targets of the terrorists. This category (which I henceforth refer to only as “classification” to avoid confusion) is directed against “anonymous individuals by virtue of their belonging… to a specific ethnic or religious group, nationality, social class or some other collectivity” (Goodwin 2006: 2031). Herein lies the confusion—the individual targets themselves can be considered indiscriminate (i.e., bourgeois West Germans) as opposed to a specific person (Al Haig when he was serving as SACEUR). However, under Goodwin’s own typology these hypothetical victims belong to a specific classification or category (bourgeois West Germans), so neither the act nor the targets are indiscriminate. “No distinction among the individual identities as targets [are made]… however, such terrorism is very discriminate, being directed against specific categories of people and not others” (Goodwin 2006: 2031). So as we can see, Goodwin’s theory is sound, but his typology could use some refinement.
If the lack of access to political and economic opportunity, combined with some other
political, religious or ideological motive are the main drivers of terrorist activity, why do we tend
to see terrorists coming from well-educated, middle-class backgrounds (i.e., populations that
tend to have the greatest access to political and economic activity)? Bueno de Mesquita (2005)
proposes a model to help explain why terrorists seem to fit this particular mold.

Rational Models of Terrorist Behavior

Although brilliant from both a theoretical and methodological perspective, by ignoring
exogenous factors such as reliance on Western (read: United States) military aid or foreign direct
investment (in general or from the West), Bueno de Mesquita’s analysis is a far cry from
explaining the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita’s model
does not take into account factors such as ethnic fractionalization, political and religious
ideology, as well as other questions about an actors’ identity, some or all of which may be
important cofactors. Also, his model explicitly does not attempt to capture how terrorism
benefits the terrorist organization (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 519). The principle contribution
from Bueno de Mesquita’s work, however, is his proposal that most terrorist organizations have a
screening process, explaining why terrorists tend to be more educated and better off financially
than the societal mean. “If screening takes place” Bueno de Mesquita argues, “one cannot reach
conclusions about the composition of the pool of those who are willing to become terrorists by
studying only those who actually do become terrorists” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 515). His
model includes factors such as education, economic opportunity and opposition to government;
factors the author claims are important in understanding the recruitment potential of terrorist
organizations.
Ultimately, Bueno de Mesquita begins to look to the empirical record to find support for his model, noting: “The most convincing evidence that terrorist organizations screen volunteers for ability can be found in the al Qaeda training manual… These instructions stress two key qualifications: (1) commitment to Islam and al Qaeda and (2) ability” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 523). A list of 14 “necessary qualifications” includes: “intelligence and insight, ability to observe and analyze, truthfulness and counsel, ability to act, change positions, and conceal oneself, caution and prudence, maturity, concealing information, and patience” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 523). For example, an important factor Hamas uses when screening operatives is the recruit’s ability to pass himself off as an Israeli.

The model presented by Bueno de Mesquita predicts that terrorists are not likely to be poor or uneducated; however, “people without economic opportunity or good educations are more likely to be willing to mobilize… Terrorist organizations choose not to use low ability and uneducated sympathizers because there are better options available” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 524). Further, Bueno de Mesquita looks to developments in the Palestinian labor market during the 1980s contending that while levels of education amongst Palestinians rose, there was an accompanying contraction of economic productivity. “Hence, while the skill of Palestinians increased this did not translate into increased economic opportunity due to a recessionary economy… this situation is expected to cause an increase in mobilization” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 524). Hamas’ boycott of Israeli business in 1988 is an excellent example of this phenomenon in action. There are political groups with various ends in mind—some of which have national liberation as their primary goal—which adopt terror as a means to that end. As most Palestinians care deeply about national liberation, they are generally supportive of terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. In 1988, Hamas called for a general strike of all Palestinians
employed by Israeli business. This was especially troublesome for Gazans working in Israel, as income generated by day laborers account for roughly 40% of Gaza’s GDP. The general population of Palestinians, therefore, ignored the strike and continued to work. Israel, however, closed their borders in response to terrorist attacks, and so it took Israel to play the role of an outside enforcer to implement Hamas’ desired strike (Caplan 2006: 95).

Thus, although Palestinians generally support Hamas and would therefore have been expected to participate willingly in the strike, rational self-interest prevailed. Bueno de Mesquita further observes that terrorist organizations always have the ability to provide selective incentives, public or private goods, and propaganda in order to “increase the supply of high-quality terrorists” and “fan the flames of antigovernment resentment, thereby improving recruitment” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005: 525). Bueno de Mesquita’s selection theory dovetails nicely with research by Bryan Caplan (2006). Seeking to test the feasibility of the rational actor hypothesis on terrorist populations, Caplan divides terrorist groups into three major sub-categories: the sympathetic population (read: selectorate or winning coalition), the active terrorist, and the suicide terrorist. Before examining Caplan’s categorical scheme, it might be helpful to provide a brief introduction of the rational actor hypothesis.

The rational choice or rational actor model is a popular generalization of human behavior in the fields of political science and economics. The basic assumption behind rational choice is that actors in any system, if they are rational, will always seek to maximize their expected utility. By way of example, imagine two people at a market. One person is selling a good and another person is buying a good. The seller is looking to offload his goods at the highest price possible; the buyer is looking to purchase goods at the lowest price possible. Since each actor knows that the other will seek to get the best price for the good relative to one another, the two actors will
haggle until they reach a compromise, or equilibrium price. In other words: people will always seek to get the most for the least.

As has been the case for the field of political science since the 1970s, this economic theory has been adapted to explain political behavior. The rational choice model has serious problems when applied to political behavior, however. For example, the rationality of voting is often cited as an example of rational choice’s failure to account for political behavior. With roughly 150 million registered voters, even in a small state, like Montana (by population), the effect of one person’s vote on the outcome of a presidential contest is microscopic. With so many other choices available to voters (opportunity cost), why take the time to vote? Gordon Tullock, who specializes in the economics of revolution, points out that “during the typical revolution, the vast majority refuses to make significant voluntary sacrifices for either side… revolutionary movements [therefore] have to offer selective incentives” (Tullock 1974, quoted by Caplan 2006: 92; emphasis added, internal quotations removed). Taking his cues from Tullock’s account of the rational revolutionary, Caplan applies a similar vein of rationality to terrorist behavior—even the suicide terrorist.

In Caplan’s analysis, terrorism (especially in the Muslim world) would be far more commonplace (even suicide terrorism) if the “standard rational choice model did not roughly apply.” (Caplan 2006: 92). Likewise, if the standard assumption about the rational *homo economicus* applied evenly to everyone, then there would be no acts of terrorism (or by extension, other types of illegal violence). To support his argument Caplan devises several categorizations for both rationality and for terrorist populations. Beginning with rationality, he divides rationality between thinly and thickly rational behaviors. A thickly rational actor will always seek to maximize his expected utility by way of three standards of behavior, courtesy of the field
of applied economics. The least demanding or thinnest set of rational behaviors that can be considered “thickly” rational is responsiveness to incentives. Another standard would be familiar to followers of Ayn Rand and is oft characterized as narrow selfishness. Finally, if an actor’s beliefs are correct, on average, then he is said to have rational expectations; “a person who repeatedly makes the same mistake is irrational in this sense” (Caplan 2006: 93).

A thinly rational actor, according to Caplan’s reading of “high-theory” rational choice is someone who uses a means to achieve an end. Of course, everyone uses some means to achieve some end, and so, this definition of rationality is suspect at the very least. For the remainder of this piece, persons who simply respond to incentives will be considered thinly rational. A criminal who has taken a hostage in order to extract a ransom, under some high-theoretic definitions of the term is already acting rationally. The kidnapper is utilizing a means in order to pursue an end (especially if he views his behavior as realistically likely to bring about that end). Culture, regime-type and perhaps most importantly, adherence to the rule of law play an important role in determining an actors expected utility curve for kidnapping. In most of the developing world, there is little threat of incarceration or death for kidnapping. In other words, it generally works. In the developed world, however, kidnapping rarely works. For example, a kidnapper in the United States should have no reasonable expectation that his actions will result in a positive outcome. A kidnapper in the United States, therefore, would be an irrational actor. If, however, said kidnapper responded to an incentive, perhaps if police offer him a limited amnesty if the hostages are released immediately, then he would be thinly rational. He ended his irrational behavior in order to pursue a better alternative than the one presently facing him. Are terrorist populations as rational as our hypothetical kidnapper?
The sympathetic population is the largest population of any terrorist group and is not usually composed of members of the group per se; but instead make up a population of persons generally supportive of the terrorists. It is the population terrorist organizations draw their recruits and funding from. Caplan employs the rational actor approach to the study of terrorism, and concludes that religious and politically motivated terrorism fails the rational expectation test. “The certainty” says Caplan, “of bin Laden and his admirers is another symptom of departure from rational expectation” (Caplan 2006: 97). After all, bin Laden: (1) believed that Allah not only directed his mission, but supported the slaughter of women and children (activities expressly forbidden by the Quran) and (2) ultimately believed that a military defeat for the United States would cause it to cease its financial and military support of Israel and Middle Eastern autocrats which in turn would increase the likelihood of a successful uprising of the umma, in turn replacing the current (mostly) secular governments of the region with one of a more religiously fundamentalist nature. Bin Laden’s goal seems as far-fetched as some 19th and 20th century anarchist and socialist movements. It is possible that bin Laden’s goals were not irrational by objective criteria, but certainly unrealistic and the justifications given for harming and killing non-combatants (including Muslim women and children) are, to say the least, problematic.

Political and Economic Explanations of Terrorist Behavior

In a recent article published in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer aim to “improve our understanding of the life cycle dynamics of transnational terrorist organizations by examining the patterns of their attacks over time” (Blomberg et al. 2010: 304). Utilizing the latest release of the ITERATE data set, the group employs a set of statistical techniques known as hazard models (also known as duration analyses and time-to-failure
models). The aim of the researchers was to seek to fill a large whole in terrorism research, observing that, “no research has specifically considered the full range of transnational terrorist activity when estimating the life cycles of these organizations (Blomberg et al. 2010: 304-5). Further, they update the overall empirical picture of transnational terrorist activity through their application of an innovative form of quantitative analysis.

The authors’ first finding demonstrates evidence for negative duration dependence (the likelihood of a terrorist group to last from one year to the next). Second, socioeconomic, political and geographic variables are important for explaining a group’s hazard rate (the measure of a group’s duration dependence). Third, the authors find evidence that an organization’s level of violence is positively correlated with a group’s longevity. Finally, when the researchers consider only recidivist groups (those that successfully execute more than one attack) and include “relevant covariates, [they] find substantial evidence of positive duration dependence: the longer an organization is alive (active), the less likely it will survive to the next year” (Blomberg et al. 2010: 318). This is a remarkable finding with serious implications for the future of terrorism research and is in line with the authors’ finding that “over time several groups will begin to monopolize the production of transnational terrorism” (Blomberg et al. 2010: 305).

Additionally, the authors find that “many of the factors discussed in Crenshaw (1981) appear to be important in determining the duration and sustainability of terrorist organizations” (Blomberg et al. 2010: 320-21). However, they find that some of these are not statistically significant. Still, among the population of organizations that survive to perpetrate a second attack, the older a group is, the more likely it is to “die” in a later period. Finally, the authors note that, “several socioeconomic factors significantly affect the duration dependence for recidivists, imply that policy actions may be able to reduce the durability of established organizations… in
short, terrorist organizations appear to be born for many diverse reasons, but once established they do predictably obsolesce over time” (Blomberg et al. 2010: 326). The presence of other forms of political unrest, including “war, revolution, guerilla warfare, strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots or group terrorist actions” may prove to be a catalyst for terrorist activities within a state. Generally speaking, “the closer the proximity of unrest, the higher the likelihood that it will act as a catalyst for terrorism” (Ross 1993: 323).

Furthermore, terrorism is more easily facilitated in the presence of political support. Finances, training, intelligence, false documents, donations or sales of weapons, safe havens, propaganda, ideological, political or religious justifications, legal services and a constant supply of recruits are all cited by Ross as forms of support that can help facilitate the adoption of terrorism by groups. The main reason these groups may receive support is that one or several of the terrorist’s goals may intersect with the goals of a larger population (i.e., Caplan’s concept of a sympathetic population)—and the provision of certain selective incentives, as listed above, no doubt contribute to popular support for some terrorist groups.

The failure of counterterrorist organizations is an obvious factor in the sustainability of terror campaigns. Ross cites several factors related to a state’s inability to confront terrorism, including failure to develop, organize, and monitor terrorist groups, deter terrorists by increasing transaction costs, and make effective changes to preexisting counter-terrorist agencies (Ross 1993: 324). Some of these categorizations are redundant or extremely context specific; however, they reflect Ross’ post-hoc approach to previous studies of terrorism and are, in effect, an inclusive list of counterterrorism failures listed by previous scholars.

Finally, the availability of weapons and explosives and the existence of grievances are the final precipitant causes for terrorism listed by Ross. The ease with which terrorist groups can
obtain weapons and explosives is an unambiguous correlate of terrorist activity. The presence of grievances, “actual and perceived, putative and general, are hypothesized to be the most important variable” (Ross 1993: 325). Unheeded grievances can lead to social movements, interest groups, parties, extremist individuals (lone-wolves) and groups or other organizations that engage in terrorism. As stated earlier, there is robust room for other scholars to theorize on the likely explanations for this observation. Bueno de Mequita’s screening may play an important role in determining the longevity of terrorist groups; but other factors may be important as well—such as broad-based support from a large sympathetic population or control of territory that is amenable to sustained insurgency or has access to lootable resources. The role of territory in inter-state conflict has received much attention in the International Relations literature of the past few decades. One advocate of the “issues approach” is Paul Hensel, whose work on the Issue Correlates of War project has helped to revolutionize the study of conflict.

International and Civil Conflict

Paul Hensel’s research on the role of certain issues as correlates in warfare has received a great deal of positive attention over the past two decades. Although he focuses on conflicts between states, his research may provide insight into the causes of warfare between state and non-state actors, such as terrorists. In his chapter, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict” for Vasquez’s book What Do We Know About War? (2000), Hensel provides an excellent primer for understanding the role territory plays in inter-state conflict.

Applying the same rationale to conflicts between state and non-state actors may prove to be a fruitful endeavor in understanding some terrorist campaigns. Hensel proposes that conflicts between states typically begin with disagreements over some contentious issue or set of issues. If
these issues are seen as salient by a segment of the population that wields policy influence, then Hensel expects to see an increase in militarization of the conflict. He also expects for these issues to be difficult to resolve to both sides’ satisfaction. (Hensel 2000: 58).

Territory, as an issue over which actors find themselves in conflict is seen as more salient for three primary reasons: (1) the tangible attributes or contents (such as lootable resources); (2) the intangible or psychological value of the territory in question; and (3) the effect controlling territory has on a state’s reputation. The tangible qualities of territory include factors such as access to lootable or other important resources (oil, lumber, farm land, precious metals and gems, etc.), but also because of the people who inhabit the land, “particularly when it includes members of an ethnic or religious group that inhabits a neighboring state” (Hensel 2000: 59). Another important tangible attribute of territory is the value of certain parcels of territory that can enhance a state’s perception of power or its physical security. The Golan Heights in Israel is a perfect example of a strategically important piece of territory over which states have engaged in conflict repeatedly over the course of history. Command of the heights provides whomever controls it with a commanding view of the surrounding area, reducing the risk of a surprise attack by the side that does not control the Heights (Hensel 2000: 59).

Territory can also be salient for its less tangible qualities. For example, “territory is argued to lie at the heart of national identity and cohesion, with the very existence and autonomy of a state being rooted in its territory” (Hensel 2000: 59). The intangible qualities of territory, such as a perceived historical connection to the land by one or more ethno-religious communities, may result in what Fearon (1995) calls “effectively indivisible issues.” Most issues, to Fearon, can be divided in such a way that peaceful resolution of a contentious issue can be preferable to conflict. Indivisible issues, however, are much more difficult for decision makers on either side
of a conflict to resolve. This is perhaps seen most clearly in Israel and Palestine, where decision
makers and citizens on both sides see the territory as indispensible to national identity and
cohesion. Citing an argument proposed by Toft (1997), Hensel suggests “members of a nation
can develop an attachment to territory that becomes indivisible from their conception of self and
nation, essentially preventing compromise over what is seen as a vital part of the national
identity” (Hensel 2000: 59). Finally, a state’s reputation often rests on the idea that it and only it
has a monopoly on the administration of a piece of territory.

show intriguing parallels that warrant closer examination and application to the study of terror
groups. Gurr (1968) notes that, “the perception of frustration is said to arouse anger, which
functions as a drive” (Gurr 1968: 249). Frustration over the situation with Israel is almost
certainly very high for the majority of Palestinians in Gaza. Further, the nationalist aspirations of
the Palestinian population have been impeded for over six decades. The frustration-aggression
reaction is likely to lay at the very heart a group’s decision to use terror. What are the steps,
however, between anger over an issue and the adoption of collective violence? The first step in
any form of collective violence is overcoming the collective action problem itself. The Rebel’s
Dilemma simply states that in the face of high transaction costs, actors seeking change through
the means of political violence will opt to “free ride” rather than join the cause themselves. For
example, to paraphrase John Adams, a third of the continental population during the American
Revolution was behind the cause, a third against, and a third was on the fence. For the third that
was on the fence, it was not rational to engage in revolution because, if the colonials lost, anyone
serving in a militia or the continental army might face severe punishment. Opposing the rebel
cause would mean similar costs in the event of a colonial victory. Either way, a fence sitter would reap the benefits of peace without contributing to the war effort either way.

Will Moore (1995) seeks to “asses the state of efforts to employ rational choice theory to explain participation in large “N” armed rebellion” (Moore, 1995: 420). He looks at three ways groups can overcome the collection action problem through provision of selective incentives.

First, he notes efficacy, or the inability of individual actors to accurately gauge the impact of their participation on the outcome of the rebellion. Second, he follows the logic of political culture in suggesting that social organizations, through “contacts and conventions,” can overcome the free-rider problem. Finally, he describes how tipping phenomena can cause a rebel group’s numbers to swell after observers perceive that the rebel cause may be victorious. This is mostly a function of how much popular support a group already has. He notes a distinction between rational choice approaches that “take into account the interdependency among actors’ decisions,” and game theoretic accounts, which “assumes that actors have utility functions” and will “seek to maximize their utility” (Moore 1995: 422).

He asserts that groups that are able to offer selective incentives to potential members will be able to mobilize more members than those groups that lack this ability. He further subdivides selective incentives between two primary groups—economic selective incentives and social selective incentives. By economic selective incentives, he refers to material goods, such as lootable resources. Social selective incentives are possibly more difficult to see, since they include concepts such as “emotional and psychological goods such as friendship, camaraderie, etc.” (Moore 1995: 427). In addition to supplying material goods, such as health care and education, Hamas may also be providing the Palestinian population with satisfaction for causing Israel harm, or they may provide a common identity for Palestinians to rally under. Much of the
attention in terrorism research has focused on the causes of terrorism. But what about terrorism’s decline? Audrey Cronin has spent an illustrious career examining the ways in which terrorist groups die.

How Terrorism Ends

“Terrorism” begins Cronin, “is a complicated, eclectic phenomenon, requiring a sophisticated strategy oriented toward influencing its means and ends over the long term. Few members of the U.S. policymaking and academic communities, however, have the political capital, intellectual background, or inclination to work together to forge an effective, sustained response” (Cronin 2002-03: 30). In the realm of public policy, terrorism, especially Islamic Terror, is highly politicized and prone both to ineffectual moral relativism and chest-thumping jingoism. Due in part to the politicization of the term, the lack of a singular cause, and because terrorism springs up across a wide-array of historical, cultural and political contexts, few in the realm of academia are eager to approach the topic. To put it more simply (and bluntly), terrorism is hard, so no one wants to tackle it.

After the collapse of the Cold War, the United States remained focused on threats arising from states, and had been slow to adapt to the dynamic threat presented by non-state actors. For example, US nuclear deterrent strategy ensures that any state with the capacity to conduct a chemical or biological attack against the US would face a nuclear reprisal. This deterrent is good at persuading states against attacking the US, but what about non-state actors? Cronin reiterates the ubiquitous factors of instant global exposure and communication that Crenshaw (1981) highlights in her piece. “The current wave of international terrorism,” Cronin writes, “characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a
reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it; the US response to this reality has been reactive and anachronistic” (Cronin 2002-03: 30, emphasis added). In other words, in the unipolar world that characterized the international system after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the threat of transnational terrorism increased.

Cronin proceeds to ask an important question: are decolonization and antiglobalization movements drivers of terrorism? Looking to broad historical trends for clues, Cronin finds evidence suggesting that terrorist activity has had political aims against, “1) empires, 2) colonial powers, and 3) the U.S.-led international system marked by globalization” (Cronin 2002-03: 34). For example, nineteenth-century anarchist movements were a response to absolutism in Europe and Russia, followed by anarcho-terrorism in the crumbling Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires prior to World War I, followed by another wave of terrorism opposed to colonial rule in Africa and Southeast Asia. The modern wave of jihadi terrorism is nothing particularly new in Cronin’s analysis. It is, as she states, “more accurate to see it as part of a larger phenomenon of antiglobalization and tension between the have and have-not nations; as well as between the elite and underprivileged within those nations” (Cronin 2002-03: 35).

Specifically, this new species of terrorism has matured from its origins with the anti-Soviet Mujahideen in Afghanistan. “The jihad era,” argues Cronin, “is animated by widespread alienation combined with elements of religious identity and doctrine—a dangerous mix of forces that resonates deep in the human psyche” (Cronin 2002-03: 38). Al’Qaida’s growth and successes in the 1990s and 2000s is due in no small part to the “secondary support and sanctuary it receives in vast areas that have not experienced the political and economic benefits of globalization” (Cronin 2002-03: 38). This includes places like the Maghreb, Yemen, Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan.
Similar to Crenshaw’s typology, Cronin classifies several different species of terrorist organizations—a useful variation on Crenshaw’s original leitmotif. Cronin divides groups into leftist, rightist, ethnonationalist/separatist and religious or “sacred” terrorist groups. Leftwing groups, according to Cronin, are driven by “liberal or idealist political concepts, [and] tend to prefer revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, antimaterialistic agendas” (Cronin 2002-03: 39). Right-wing groups tend to be less cohesive, and tend to choose targets based on race, religion or ethnolinguistic background. Ethnonationalist and separatist groups are the most conventional and the most common; they tend to have paramilitary structures and institutions; most importantly, they tend to have sources of support among the local population who share their goals. This final characteristic is what Caplan (2006) dubbed a “sympathetic population.” Cronin gives five reasons why religiously motivated or “sacred” terrorism might be the most difficult to deal with in the international system. First, the Manichaean struggle of good and evil which most “sacred” terrorists feel engaged in makes negotiating difficult to say the least.

Violent behavior is often seen as directly commanded by, or will please a deity. Answering only to that deity, such terrorists scorn secular laws and norms. Coincidentally, religiously motivated terrorists often suffer from a sense of alienation or isolation from society. Finally, “sacred” terrorism may find significant, if dispersed, support from civil society.

Looking to data collected over the past half-century, Cronin finds troubling correlations. Arguments about post-hoc analysis aside, the trends Cronin notices are real and they are worth serious consideration: the overall number of terrorist attacks declined from an average of 543 per annum during the 1980s to 382 per annum during the 1990s, while the absolute number of casualties skyrocketed from a low of 344 in 1991 to 6,693 in 1998. Further, the number of deaths
per incident rose from 102 killed in 565 total incidents in 1991 to an astonishing 741 killed in 274 incidents in 1998. The trend Cronin finds, then, is of increasingly more efficient terrorist groups.

Moreover, “U.S. nationals consistently have been the most targeted since 1968… This is perhaps a consequence of the increased role and profile of the United States in the world, but the degree of increase is nonetheless troubling” (Cronin 2002-03: 43). Given the indications that the United States has increasingly been the target of terrorist activity, and given the United States’ unique role in the modern international system, Cronin proposes ideas on how the US can meet this particular challenge. She cites the use of information technology, such as the Internet in recruiting, coordinating, transferring funds and carrying out terrorist attacks, as a principle cause of concern for US policymakers. Further, and as Crenshaw pointed out 30 years ago, the ubiquity of instantaneous information transmission via satellite communications, and now, the Internet, provide terrorists with larger audiences than ever before. Finally, the ubiquity of air travel, and the ease with which false documents can be manufactured or procured (not to mention weapons of mass casualty or destruction) makes carrying out transnational terrorist attacks easier than ever. Cronin goes on to note that, “globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic and communicative)” (Cronin 2002-03: 51). As terrorism “threatens international stability, and particularly U.S. global leadership” the United States must end its predilection toward treating terrorism as a peripheral, rather than a primary threat.

Defining Terrorism
One of the most contentious issues in the study of terrorism is its definition. This is due in part to its evolution over time; but also to the fact that it is an activity that is intentionally subjective. The maxim “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” is apt.

“Specialists” states Cronin, “in the area of terrorism studies have devoted hundreds of pages toward trying to develop an unassailable definition of the term, only to realize the fruitlessness of their efforts: Terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by different observers” (Cronin 2002-03: 32). Still, she finds several significant overlapping features of the numerous definitions for terrorism found in the empirical record.

First, there is always a political dimension to terrorism—it is designed to precipitate political change. The second commonality she finds is terrorism’s non-state character. Of course, states are perfectly capable of committing acts of terror. But for the most part, when policymakers and academics alike talk about terrorists, they’re talking about non-state actors.

Third, terrorists intentionally target civilians or non-combatant—what Cronin terms “innocents.” I intentionally choose the terms “civilians or non-combatants” because, of course, the innocence of the target population is subjective. In Osama bin Laden’s “Letter to America” the now-deceased al’Qaida leader justified the killing of American civilians when he states, “the American people are the ones who choose their government by way of their own free will; a choice which stems from their agreement to its policies” (bin Laden, 2002). Finally, terrorists shirk international law and norms in order to maximize the psychological value of their attacks. I therefore propose the following definition of terrorism that may be useful to future academics: terrorism is a politically motivated act or threat of extranormal violence by non-state actors, targeting a non-combatant or civilian population in order to influence an audience and bring about a desired change in policy.
Terrorism is a difficult topic for states and academics to investigate precisely because of the subjectivity of the term itself. The old adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” seems trite. However, in an international system where norms can be as important as laws and the availability of information is becoming more ubiquitous it is becoming more and more difficult for states to isolate the political speech of terrorist actors. Moreover, the ability of actors to cross international boundaries has dramatically increased in the past half century.

Numerous states in the system are home to ethnic or religious minorities that are denied basic political rights such as the equal protection of the law, the ability to govern local affairs, freely practice their religious beliefs, or participate in political and economic activities.
CHAPTER 3
THEORY

The basic assumption that pervades the study of terrorism, both in academic and non-academic settings, is that terrorist groups are qualitatively different from non-terrorist groups. As discussed, some have proposed to frame political terror as a tactical choice of political actors, and that is not representative of or beholden to a specific ideology. If terrorism is merely an effective way of bringing attention to a cause or weaken the perception of government legitimacy then it could be that we may not have been properly investigating the issue. Little work has been done on the question of how identity, territory and cherished beliefs combine to affect the durability of a terrorist group. As mentioned above, some terrorist groups have disappeared, or have changed form and given up violence as a means of achieving a political goal. I argue that territorial issues will produce more durable terrorist groups.

As Crenshaw explained and as will be elaborated below, political actors adopt the tactic of terror for numerous reasons. Some fight because of ideological or religious beliefs, such as Shining Path or al’Qaida. Some engage in terror to halt certain government policies or to inhibit the progress of private enterprises, such as the Earth Liberation Front. Some engage in terror to gain autonomy for an ethnolinguistic or religious group, such as Abu Sayyaf or ETA. Whatever issue area around which a group organizes and adopts terrorism as a tactic, I assume that an actor’s “fidelity to cherished beliefs” (Caplan 2006: 98) is the impetus for committing to the tactic of terror. This process may proceed along the following steps: 1) if a particularly salient issue (such as control over an indivisible piece of territory) is not adequately addressed, then an actor will begin to view the government of the state in which they live as illegitimate. Once a group of political actors view government as illegitimate, these actors may; 2) view non-violent
forms of political expression as effective. If the actor’s grievances are not redressed to his satisfaction he will, 3) view the use of terrorism as legitimate. Finally, 4) our hypothetical actor will commit to the use of terrorism as a means to addressing his grievance. For the sympathetic population, this process works quite similarly, except they will not actively pursue terrorist activities themselves, but merely support the use of terror by others.

The work of Hensel, elaborated above, suggests that territorial issues are more salient than non-territorial issues in interstate conflict. The desire to control territory that provides either-or a) access to lootable resources, and b) terrain suitable to sustain an insurgency, is an important cofactor in explaining long-duration conflicts. However, the existence of lootable resources or insurgency-friendly terrain in a given territory is secondary to the salience of the psychological, cultural, religious, historical, and political aspects of certain pieces of territory to specific peoples, creating what Fearon (1995) terms “effectively indivisible issues.” The physical characteristics of a piece of territory can provide advantages to terrorist groups that behave as an insurgency. They can help to insulate the group from government actions and reduce the need for a large population of sympathetic citizens. The non-physical characteristics of a given piece of territory, however, provide little in the way of material support to a terrorist insurgency. However, they provide a great deal of propaganda value and moral support in conflicts based on ethnicity, religion, or identity. The group may be fighting to gain sovereignty over a piece of territory that has a highly symbolic, psychological, and cultural value to a large population of people that are sympathetic to the goals of the group and are willing to accept high levels of violence targeting civilians in order to gain control of that territory.

So the salience of the territorial issue derives from its economic value, but also from intangible values. Jerusalem, for example, has incalculable value to Jews, Christians and
Muslims alike because of its historical, cultural, and religious significance to adherents of those three faiths. Moreover their local communities will view control or free access to these pieces of territory as more salient than those in the diaspora. Sometimes, a state may not wish to grant an ethnolinguistic or religious group autonomy in a specific region for reputation. The Falklands War is the classic demonstration of this phenomenon between states. The Basque region in Spain is a classic example in the study of ethnic violence and terror. To reiterate, if a terrorist group’s leadership (a subset of the active terrorist group) is able to successfully link its goals to the territorial aspirations of its sympathetic population, then it will be more durable than other groups.

I define durability as a period of time wherein an organization adopts terror as a tactic. I use the term durability interchangeably with duration. However, durability implies not just longevity of a group’s existence and use of terrorism, but also because durability implies the additional quality of being able to withstand high transaction and audience costs. I define terrorism as a “politically motivated act or threat of extranormal violence targeting a non-combatant or civilian population, in order to influence an audience and bring about a desired change in policy.” Kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, assassinations and collective violence have been employed by terrorist groups in the past to coerce the behavior of states. The violence need not target individuals. The Weather Underground Organization, which operated in the United States in the 1960s, targeted government and civilian buildings during off-hours. The aim was not to kill civilians, but to bring attention to the cause, intimidate an audience, and make the government look weak. “In an interdependent world… the audience [has grown] larger, more diverse, and more accustomed to terrorism, terrorist must go to extreme lengths to shock” (Crenshaw 1981: 386). This definition of terrorism does not preclude the inclusion of states as
possible practitioners of this particular tactic. However, this theory only seeks to explain the tactic as employed by groups of non-state actors.

Further, I assume that terror tactics carry high transaction costs, especially after the first attack. Additionally, the ability of a terror group to provide selective incentives to its “sympathetic population” (Caplan 2006: 93), the more support it will garner from that population. The more support it has garnered, the longer the organization will last, as this interaction will draw recruits in, as well as provide the group a safe haven from which to operate. I distinguish between “economic” and “social” selective incentives. Economic selective incentives are material goods (cash, weapons, clothes, food, healthcare, etc.); and social selective incentives include “emotional and psychological goods such as friendship, camaraderie, etc.” (Moore 1995: 427). Economic selective incentives, then, may be exogenous to the effects of territorial salience. Social selective incentives, however, may be directly related to the territorial issue.

I define two primary classifications of issues that may prompt disaffected political actors to adopt the tactic of terror. These primary classifications are “ideal types” in the Weberian sense and include 1) claims to indivisible pieces of territory and 2) groups reacting to specific attributes or actions of government based on ideological, political, religious, or cultural reasons (read: policies). To one degree or another, all terrorist groups are revolutionary in nature; they seek to replace the existing political status quo with one more amenable to their position. We can further refine these ideal types into a number of sub-categories. Within the first category, we have native populations fighting a foreign occupier to reclaim a piece of indivisible territory and a minority settler population fighting an indigenous population to claim a piece of indivisible territory. Within the second category, we have groups fighting against ethnic, linguistic or
religious policies that discriminate against the group’s members. Reactionary or conservative
groups fighting to prevent changes meant to alleviate discriminatory policies. There are also
groups fighting for ecological concerns, such as environmental degradation or animal safety.
Finally, groups with a particular religious, ethnic identity, or political ideology that wish to see
their government take on attributes related to that identity or ideology. The salience of the issue
area to the group’s sympathetic population will contribute to the group’s durability. Territorial
issues relating to a people’s sense of identity, those most likely to fall along the first category will
be the most salient.

In line with Caplan’s (2006) examination of the rationality of terrorist actors, I define
three distinct types of terrorist (from least rational to most): the suicide terrorist, the terrorist and
the sympathetic population. Caplan finds that the sympathetic population is the most “thickly”
 rational. Correspondingly, the sympathetic population, or selectorate, will face the greatest
amount of difficulty in overcoming the rebel’s dilemma. Indeed, active and suicide terrorist
populations are difficult to explain under normal conceptions of rationality. As the rebel
literature suggests, the ability to provide selective incentives is one way for a group seeking to
engage in collective violence to overcome the rebel’s dilemma. As noted above, the ability to
provide economic selective incentives may be exogenous to a sympathetic population’s support
for a group that employs terrorism (and the use of terror itself). Providing social selective
incentives, however, may be part of of the group’s larger repertoire of activities. Hamas’
frequent attacks against Israel may be an extremely potent psychological selective incentive but,
to the sympathetic population of Aum Shinrikyo, the use of terror may not provide any incentives
at all.
Therefore, my theory argues that a particular issue will cause a group of political actors to become disaffected with the current status quo. If the issue is perceived as being highly salient and government is perceived as being unable, unwilling or too slow to redress the group’s grievances, then the political actors will turn to terrorism. Once the group has adopted terrorism, they will face varying levels of pressure from government and the greater, non-sympathetic population to abandon their chosen tactic. These costs are typically referred to as transaction costs. Depending on how salient the issue is to the group’s sympathetic population, the more it will be able to resist government pressure. If, after all, terror is a tactic employed by political actors, then it stands to reason that the largest segment of a terrorist population, the sympathetic population, should be treated as any other group of political actors for the purposes of social science. Because of the qualities of territory that contribute to an actor’s identity, specifically, the intangible qualities, then territorial issues will be more salient than non-territorial issues, and therefore, groups that employ terrorism to address the territorial issue will be more durable than other groups.

A brief pair of case studies should prove as an example of my theory in action. As has already been discussed, Aum Shinrikyo and Hamas are two organizations that have a history of using political terror as a tactic to cause general anxiety in the population, weaken the perception of government legitimacy and bring attention to the group’s goal in order to affect a particular political outcome. The cases, however, also reveal the divergence of the two group’s sympathetic populations.

For the Palestinian population, which composes Hamas’ sympathetic population, six decades of quasi-statehood and occupation by Israel has produced a population highly accepting of terror in order to achieve its goal of establishing a Palestinian state. For Aum Shinrikyo, the
larger sympathetic population of the group sought spiritual enlightenment and other post-materialist concerns and there is very little evidence to support the view that the average sect member wanted political control over Japan. Moreover, these cases have been selected because of the divergence in their longevity. Hamas has been employing terrorism as part of a larger insurgency against Israel since 1990, whereas Aum Shinrikyo only conducted one major terrorist attack in 1995 and a smattering of kidnappings bovver a five-year period compared to Hamas’ 22 plus year history. Moreover, both groups operated in urban environments. Obviously, I explain this divergence by arguing that the size and ambitions of each group’s sympathetic population are dissimilar enough to warrant a difference in the salience of the territorial question and hence, the longevity of the group itself.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION

Before discussion begins on the cases selected for this study, some descriptive statistics may prove helpful. Table 1 provides data on 46 groups designated foreign terrorist organizations by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based out of the University of Maryland in conjunction with the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The sample is taken from the United States State Department’s Country Reports on Terror 2009 and is all officially designated foreign terrorist organizations and because it includes three of the four terrorist groups examined by this study. Dichotomous coding is used to indicate whether or not the group is territorially based or not. To reiterate, a terrorist group is considered territorially based if its objective is to expel a foreign colonizer or occupying force, or if it is an ethnonationalist group seeking control of an indivisible piece of territory. The group’s duration is determined from the period of time between its first recorded attack and its last reported attack according to the GTD data. The GTD data is compiled from 1970 through 2008 for the present study. A group is considered to be “short” in its duration if it lasts fewer than thirteen years. Intermediate or “medium duration” groups are those that exist for thirteen to twenty-five years. And groups are considered to be “long duration” if they exist for longer than twenty-six years.

The Red Army Faction (RAF) is not currently included on the State Department’s List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as the RAF has not conducted a terrorist attack in over twenty years. However, it has been added to the dataset for a total of 47 groups to ensure that the sample is as complete as possible. Therefore, this study presents cases on one short-duration group, Aum Shinrikyo, two intermediate-duration groups, Hamas and the Red Army Faction, and one long-
duration group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since data collection for this study ends in 2008, it is worth noting that since time of data collection and the preparation of the accompanying case studies, the LTTE has ceased operations and entered into a negotiated settlement with the Sri Lankan government. Hamas continues to utilize terrorism as a tactic in its continuing struggles against Israel. Hamas is on the threshold of becoming a long duration terrorist movement. Further, the GTD contains data on three attacks since 2001 carried-out by the RAF – but since even the GTD data does not posit the attacks directly to the RAF but, rather, to unknown actors, their inclusion by the GTD is puzzling to say the least and has been dropped from this study. As a final note, this theory does not purport to explain the ferocity of a terrorist group. It only purports to explain why some groups are able to last longer than others.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Territory?</th>
<th>#Attks (GTD)</th>
<th>Duration (n yrs)</th>
<th>In GTD (1st attk)</th>
<th>Out GTD (last attk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2/18/1994</td>
<td>12/28/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-ÁÁ Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10/30/2000</td>
<td>9/27/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-ÁÁ Shabaab (AS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11/2/2007</td>
<td>12/27/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-ÁÁ Islam (ANIs)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4/3/2002</td>
<td>12/31/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (GIA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2/1/1994</td>
<td>1/21/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbat al-ÁÁ Ansar (AsAn)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4/15/1990</td>
<td>5/16/1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1/31/1970</td>
<td>12/30/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1/19/1977</td>
<td>6/14/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (HAM)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12/14/1990</td>
<td>11/4/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat ul-ÁÁ Jihad---i-ÁÁ Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI---B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3/7/1999</td>
<td>10/30/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat ul-ÁÁ Mujahideen (HUM)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9/29/1999</td>
<td>10/8/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah (HZ)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4/1/1981</td>
<td>6/22/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Jihad Union (IUU)/Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IJM)</td>
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<td>6</td>
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CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES

Aum Shinrikyo

On the morning of March 20, 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect coordinated one of the deadliest terror attacks on Japanese soil to date. In five simultaneous attacks, the release of sarin nerve gas killed 13 and injured 6,252 civilians. Officially organized in 1987, Aum Shinrikyo (now called Aleph), is one of a myriad of “new new religious (shinshinshukyo)” movements in Japan which promises to cater to “the more spiritual and mystical desires of financially secure people who seek answers to questions on the meaning of life or who are in need of self-awareness in a control-oriented society” (Metraux 1995: 1141). By traditional measures, Aum Shinrikyo is a cult. It is a “small voluntary group of strict believers who choose to live apart from the world” (Metraux 1995: 1142). Aum Shinrikyo is also considered a “criminal cult” as its leaders have allegedly abducted and killed its own followers and detractors, and was engaged in the manufacture and transfer of illicit narcotics (Metraux 1995: 1143). The central tenant of Aum Shinrikyo is millennial in nature. We are currently living through the final period of Buddhist cosmology, during which the teachings of the Buddha are largely abandoned or ignored, and a coming World War between the United States and Asian powers will result in the destruction of Japan. Only the faithful shall be saved.

Members of the sect are primarily young, highly educated and disaffected members of the middle-class. For this reason, it is essentially a post-materialist phenomenon. One member, identified as Kanoko T., self-reported a surge in musical creativity and fulfillment after joining the group and rigorously following the prescribed rituals of meditation and personal reflection to attain a state of “Buddhahood” (Metraux 1995: 1145-46). The group’s leader, Asahara Shoko,
was born Matsumoto Chizuo in 1995 in Kumamoto Prefecture. Born with glaucoma, he graduated from Kumamoto Prefectural School for the Blind and moved to Tokyo, where he failed to gain entry to Tokyo University (Metraux 1995: 46). Asaara had held political ambitions since his youth, predicting he would one day become Prime Minister (Metraux 1995: 1153). Asahara and his followers viewed multiple aspects of the Japanese government and society, such as its close ties with the United States, its commercialism and its moral relativism, as illegitimate and sought to correct these problems through obtaining political power. In 1990, 25 members of the sect ran for election to the House of Representatives – all of them lost. It was at this point that Asahara and his closest lieutenants adopted the strategy of terror in order to disrupt and discredit the Japanese government and in the ensuing chaos, seize power (Metraux 1995: 1153).

Following a trip to the Himalayas in the early 1980s, Asahara returned to Tokyo and registered Aum Shinrikyo with the Japanese government in 1989 (Metraux 1995: 1147).

When Asahara came to the conclusion that the world was living through the final stages of Buddhist cosmology is not evident, nor is it clear when he and his top lieutenants decided to adopt terrorism. However, there is evidence to suggest that the top leadership of Aum Shinrikyo went to the length of establishing a kind of shadow government complete with a full cabinet.

Obviously, the belief is that this would have allowed him to establish order quickly following his seizure of power. Asahara’s plan was to use terrorism to destabilize the Japanese government, somehow spurring a cataclysmic, nuclear war with the United States. Either during the conflict, or immediately after its conclusion, Asahara and his shadow government would fill the vacuum left by the deceased or defeated legitimate government of Japan. Since only the faithful would be saved, Asahara and his top followers would reign over a peaceful society following the tenets of his cult. To this end, Asahara focused his recruitment efforts at finding
bright and young yet socially maladjusted or psychologically depressed individuals with strong educational backgrounds. This recruitment effort was focused on finding those members of Japanese society with backgrounds in chemistry and engineering.

Following the arrest of Asahara and many of his top aides, the group lost over 95% of its members, dropping from 40,000 members worldwide in 1995 to roughly 1650 today (Cronin 2009: 24). The remaining members renamed the sect to Aleph and barred the conspirators from returning to the group. Despite the group’s large size at the time of the Tokyo Subway Bombings, the segment of that population that supported using terrorism as a means of bringing about a war between the United States and Japan and then take over the Japanese government in the ensuing chaos was quite small. It is clear that the group’s nefarious aims were shared only by Asahara and his top lieutenants. Although the group continues to be listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on the US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, the remaining members have announced that they have given up the tactic of terror and no subsequent terrorist attacks are credited to it. In short, the group was not able to adapt after the decapitation of its top leadership, and as such, gave up terror in the face of rising transaction costs.

Hamas

In its current organizational form, Hamas was formed in 1987 following Sheik Ahmad Yassin’s decision to separate the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza from the main body of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the first intifada began in the occupied territories. “The goal of the founders was to become directly involved in the intifada and ultimately gain control of the Palestinian movement and bring it more in line with fundamentalist Islamic thought” (Congressional Research Institute: 1993). Hamas was built-up slowly over time. Each individual
sub-unit of Hamas was “working independently before the Intifada flared up, but without specific names or agendas” (Chehab 2007: 30). For example, “the youth wing, or Al Ahdath… was established at the beginning of the Intifada to ensure maximum participation by the public in strikes and demonstrations” (Chehab 2007: 30). For Sheik Yassin, “the first phase [in establishing Hamas] was to build its institutions; charities and social committees which would open their doors to the young and old – anyone who could play a role in resisting the occupier” (Chehab 2007: 21).

Subsequent events, such as Hamas’ acquiring political authority over Gaza following the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, lends support to the view that “Hamas founders were just one of many Palestinian opposition groups, including the PLO, that were vying to gain control of the demonstrations” (Congressional Research Institute: 1993). The successes Hamas has had in gaining popular support among the Palestinian population may stem from “the PLO's inability to make headway toward a solution of the 'Palestinian problem’” (Congressional Research Institute: 1993). It is likely that Hamas’ popular success comes in part from the frequency of its attacks against Israel, although it is more likely that Hamas enjoys the support of the Palestinian population because of its provision of selective incentives such as education and health care. Hamas has not only formed a government following the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, but also were providing these public goods long before the 2006 elections. However, for governments and those in the academic community, Hamas is defined more by their paramilitary actions than by their humanitarian outreach. According to the Global Terrorism Database, Hamas has been responsible for 248 successful terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories over its 25-plus-year history (Global Terrorism Database, START).
Unlike the Aum Shinrikyo case, Hamas has thrived since the 2004 assassination of its founder, Sheik Yassin. This implies truth in the aforementioned observation that it is better to arrest a terrorist leader than assassinate him.

Aum Shinrikyo collapsed as a terrorist group after its first major attack and the subsequent arrest of its top leadership. Despite more than two decades of continued operations against Israel and the death or capture of some of its members, Hamas remains an active terrorist organization. There are religious, cultural and historical differences between the two organizations to be sure. But members of both groups can be characterized as highly religious in nature. Both groups sought to wrest control of territory from governments they viewed as illegitimate. However, there are several key distinctions between the groups. Hamas enjoys the support of a majority of the Palestinian population, and by comparison, Aum Shinrikyo was a relatively small movement within Japan. Furthermore, the members of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan were overwhelmingly Japanese and did not view the ruling government as a foreign occupier or colonizer. Many in the Greater Middle East, especially the Arab-speaking and Muslim populations of states in the region view the history of colonialism in the Greater Middle East, the history of events preceding and following the founding of Israel and (especially) the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, view the very existence of Israel as an exercise in colonialism. Remaining members of Aum Shinrikyo, have given up terror as a political tactic while Hamas remains an active terrorist organization.

These cases are illuminating, but are inadequate to satisfactorily support the theory that the salience of territorial issues is the most important factor determining the length of terrorist campaigns. Further case studies may prove helpful in demonstrating the connection between the salience of the territorial issue and the longevity of a terrorist campaign. To that end, the cases of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and the Red Army Faction in West Germany will be explored. These cases are selected along similar criteria for the Hamas and Aum Shinrikyo cases: one group, the LTTE, represents an ethnolinguistic minority group attempting to establish a regional autonomous government in a developing nation. The other group, the RAF, was composed of ideologically-motivated disaffected elites in an advanced industrialized country. The LTTE is further differentiated from the other cases in this study by the geography of the environment in which they operated, which is highly mountainous and forested – prime real estate for insurgents. The RAF is unique amongst the four cases as it drew financial, logistical, and other forms of support from the Soviet Union. Not coincidentally, the RAF ceased to function following the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.

Red Army Faction

Like many of the left-wing terrorist organizations of the 20th century, Germany’s Red Army Faction began as a student movement during the 1960s. The Socialist German Student Union (SDS), the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) began to radicalize in the mid-1960s, largely in response to the US War in Vietnam (Moncourt and Smith 2009: 3). Numerous lone-wolf and small cells of urban guerillas began operating in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) prior to the formation of the RAF. But by May of 1970, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Thorwald Proll, and Horst Söhnlein had formed the nucleus of the Red Army Faction (Moncourt and Smith 2009: 5-6). By the summer of 1970, “twenty future RAF members received training at a Fatah camp in Jordan” (Moncourt and Smith 2009: 6). In April of 1971, the RAF had published their manifesto “Urban Guerilla Concept.” It is a typical left-wing manifesto arguing for the armed struggle of proletarians against a
parliamentary democracy where parliament had abrogated its responsibilities of protecting the working class against the abuses of the bourgeois. In it, the authors argue that, “armed struggle is a necessary precondition for [proletarian organizations doing political work in factories and neighborhoods] to succeed and progress” (Moncourt and Smith 2009: 11).

Over the course of the organization’s 22-year history several of its principle members, especially Andreas Baader, were captured by FRG authorities and imprisoned. The case of Baader’s incarceration was a matter of great importance to the RAF. The RAF’s manifesto, the Urban Guerilla Concept, cites Baader’s incarceration as a rationale for armed struggle, “[Baader was sentenced to] three years for arson, a further six months on probation, and approximately six months for falsifying documents. Of these 48 months, Andreas Baader had served 14 in ten different Hessian prisons – nine times he was transferred because of bad behavior, for example, organizing mutinies and resistance” (Moncourt and Smith 2009: 10). The frequent transfers of prisoners such as Baader, as well as the practice of isolating RAF prisoners from one another “has always been a main RAF selling point in recruiting new members” (Pluchinsky 1993: 139). In 1992 there were still some 40 members of the RAF serving time in 18 federal German prisons. Some of these members had renounced the RAF.

Following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of the German State, by April of 1992 the RAF commando level had issued a communiqué renouncing the use of violence as a means of obtaining their political objectives. The commando level was the operational component of the RAF – those members responsible for carrying out assassinations, bombings, paramilitary attacks, and other forms of terrorism. There were three additional levels of the RAF, “prisoners, resistance, and sympathizers or political supporters... major ideological pronouncements of the RAF have originated from the imprisoned RAF members” (Plunchinsky
The 1992 communiqué indicated what one analyst termed “fatigue” and further posited that, “the longer the RAF commando level maintains the cease-fire, the more difficult it will be for it to return to armed struggle” – a prediction that has held true (Plunchinsky 1993: 144).

In their communiqués of 1992, the RAF stated, “for everything that is now beginning and for all those who are looking for new directions, attacks by us against top officials of the state and the economy with intent to kill cannot advance the process that is now necessary because they will result in an escalation of the whole situation” (Plunchkinsy 1993: 149). In other words, the RAF recognized that, absent the greater international Communist apparatus and direct support from the Soviet Union, the RAF could no longer afford to suffer high transaction or audience costs. In the face of the ideological bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism in the early 1990s, the basis for support for the RAF’s politics and its tactics evaporated. As it relates to the theory presented in this paper, the case history of the RAF demonstrates that purely ideologically-driven movements lack the inertia necessary to sustain terrorism in the face of rising transactions costs absent a large sympathetic population or terrain amenable to an insurgency. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, by contrast, enjoyed both geography amenable to a paramilitary insurgency, as well as a large population of sympathetic Tamils both in Sri Lanka and the diaspora community.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Without question, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bare the deadliest, longest lasting, and most effective terrorist group discussed in this project. From humble origins the LTTE grew into an advanced military with an army of roughly 20,000 cadres, a navy with
rudimentary submersible capabilities and numerous fiberglass swift boats, and a nascent air force. It was able to do so because the LTTE drew upon the financial, logistical, political, and moral support of millions of diaspora Tamils as well as maintain control of the northeastern portion of the island of Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2009: 1023). Finally surrendering to Sri Lankan forces in May 2009, the Sri Lankan Civil War displaced or killed over one million people and transformed Sri Lanka into one of the most dangerous places on earth for over three decades.

Prior to independence, the British controlled Sri Lanka and as they had done in other colonies, gave preferential treatment in terms of educational opportunities, employment in the civil service, and other state-run or funded institutions to the Tamil population of Sri Lanka. Included in this discriminatory policy was the relocation of thousands of Tamil laborers from southern India (site of the modern state of Tamil Nadu). Following independence from Great Britain in 1948, S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike, a Sinhalese Buddhist of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party began a program of reverse discrimination against the predominantly Hindu Tamil minority by enacting a “Sinhalese only” policy in all state-run and funded institutions. These policies included requiring Tamil students to score higher on standardized tests to enter university or study abroad, refusing to honor credits earned abroad for credits at Sri Lankan universities, the withholding of developmental assistance funding, and the relocation of Sinhalese-speaking Sri Lankans into Tamil-speaking areas (DeVotta 2009: 1025-26). Following Bandarnaike’s assassination by a Buddhist monk in 1958, his widow Sirimavo accelerated the Sinhala-only policies of her husband.

By 1972, a plethora of increasingly militant groups competed to establish themselves as the representatives of the Tamil population of Sri Lanka (Joshie 1996: 20). The first political assassination carried-out by a Tamil group on a Sri Lankan official was 17 year-old Velupillai
Pirabhakaran’s shooting of Alfred Duriappah, mayor of the northeastern city of Jaffa, in July 1975. Shortly thereafter, Pirabhakaran robbed a bank, netting him nearly half a million rupees that was put to use founding the Tamil New Tigers, which was quickly renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. By 1978 the group had carried-out its first bombing of a passenger airliner (Joshie 1996: 21). A major precipitating event for the rise of the LTTE was the 1981 anti-Tamil riots wherein security forces, acting under immunity, burned the library of Jaffna. The library of Jaffna was home to 97,000 texts and rare “palm leaf manuscripts, and local historical materials” that caused “many Tamils to feel the Sinhalese Buddhist state was determined to destroy their culture as well” (DeVotta 2009: 1028). In retaliation, the LTTE ambushed and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in 1983, sparking another wave of riots that resulted in the destruction and looting of Tamil-owned businesses and homes, 2,000 deaths, and countless rapes of Tamil women (DeVotta 2009: 1028). The concept of eelam, or homeland, was the driving force behind the LTTE’s decades-long campaign. The LTTE formed in reaction to increasingly discriminatory and authoritarian measures undertaken by the Sri Lankan government to ensure Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony on the island. Pirabhakaran and others concluded that the only way to ensure the rights of the Tamil population on Sri Lanka was the establishment of a separate Tamil state in the predominately Tamil-dominated northeast. This goal was shared by a large number of Tamils in the diaspora community, particularly the 60 million living in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (Joshie 1996: 21; DeVotta 2009: 1023).

What evolved was without exception one of the most brutal civil wars in the post-colonial period, prosecuted by a brutal, clever, well-equipped, and funded paramilitary organization. It is not a stretch of the imagination to say that the LTTE is one of the most professionalized terrorist organizations in history, rivaling that of Hamas, the PLO, and the IRA. The favored tactic of the
LTTE was the assassination of high-value individuals, such as former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan President Ransinghe Premdasa, and Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne (Joshie 1996: 19). However, the LTTE’s lack of support of political pluralism, intolerance of dissention within Tamil society, corrupt and authoritarian practices within areas it controlled helped contribute to its eventual downfall (DeVotta 2009: 1031-32). It lost some international legitimacy through its authoritarian practices, but largely lost the sympathy of the states like the US by repeatedly using cease-fire agreements to resupply, rearm, and launch surprise attacks against Sri Lankan military and civilian targets. In 2004, these practices led to the splitting of the LTTE between Prabhakaran’s northern wing and the eastern wing led by Colonel Karuna (a nomme de guerre for Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) which began cooperating with the Sri Lankan military headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s (elected in 2005) brother Gotabhya (DeVotta 2009: 1037-38).

The period between 2006 and 2009 was the most brutal of the protracted conflict. With the LTTE split along geographic lines and the cadres commanded by Colonel Karuna coopted, the Sri Lankan military had a free hand to decimate the northern Tamil population. Although losing the support of Western governments, Sri Lanka turned to China, Iran, and Pakistan for financial, and logistical support in their prosecution of a scorched-earth policy against the Prabhakaran’s wing. This included the intentional shelling of government-designated safe zones such as residential areas, hospitals, schools, and religious sites. Forced disappearances, arrests, detainments, torture, and rapes became commonplace in Tamil-populated areas controlled by the ever-encroaching government forces. By May 2009, the LTTE controlled a 10-mile strip of land near the northern coastline, which the government shelled and bombed relentlessly. Finally, Prabhakaran dead, the remaining leaders of the LTTE surrendered to government forces, bringing
to an end one of the bloodiest, longest-lasting civil wars and terrorist campaigns in modern history.

Although the impetus for the LTTE’s campaign was the Sinhala-only campaign of S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike, within a few short years it morphed into a desire for eelam, or a homeland for the Tamil people on the island of Sri Lanka. The native Sri Lankan Tamil population as well as those on India’s mainland and in the diaspora rightly or wrongly concluded that the creation of a Tamil nation-state was the only solution to the majoritarian rule of the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority. It is difficult to imagine the LTTE becoming the elite paramilitary force it would become in the 1990s and 2000s without the support of the diaspora. And it is difficult to imagine the support of the diaspora absent the promise of eelam. In short, the LTTE, like Hamas, demonstrate the power the issue of control of indivisible territory can be. Conversely, in the absence of support for an ideologically aligned Great Power, the Red Army Faction completely collapsed in the early 1990s, and the esoterically inclined supportive population for Aum Shinrikyo was repulsed by their own organization’s methods and goals and withered in the face of public opinion and government pressure.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Territorially based issues are generally more difficult to solve than non-territorially based issues. A satisfactory conclusion to the Israel-Palestine dispute has been sixty years in the making, and the prospects still appear grim. The Basque population of northern Spain have sought regional autonomy, on and off, since the Reconquista. Despite apparent widespread support for the current situation in Ireland, groups like the Continuity IRA continue to view the current regime as illegitimate because of the division between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would likely continue their extremely violent campaign against the Sinhala-Buddhist unitary state, were it not for the brutal campaign of the Sri Lankan military from 2006-2009. And of course, the plight of Palestinians will continue to be a driver of terrorism in the Middle East at least as long as that population remains a nation without a state.

The cases selected above were done so because of the unique mixture of traits they had in common and did not have in common. Aum Shinrikyo was a popular new-religious movement in Japan and at its height claimed over 40,000 active members, many of whom sought spiritual enlightenment and emotional enrichment. They did not share their leader’s plans for the violent takeover of Japan, nor his apocalyptic vision of the future. Following the Tokyo Subway Bombings of 1995, the Japanese government began an efficient law enforcement campaign aimed at rooting-out the group’s leaders and bringing them to trial. Of the four cases studied in this paper, it is perhaps the most successful from a counterterrorism point of view. The group was publicly discredited, its leadership gutted, and its membership fleeing in droves. Today, Aum Shinrikyo, under its new name Aleph, has few followers, mostly confined to the Russian
Federation, and has officially renounced terrorism. They are, for all intents and purposes, extinct.

If Aum Shinrikyo is an exemplar of judicious prosecution of a terrorist group, then the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is its mirror image. The LTTE was born out of the political chaos of a post-colonial regime where ethnic outbidding caused discriminatory policies aimed at reducing the once privileged position of the Tamil minority to that of second-class citizens subservient to the Sinhala-Buddhist majority. In response, a bidding process of its own ensued on the Tamil side, with various groups vying for the opportunity to be the sole legitimate representative of the Tamil population on the island of Sri Lanka. Through a brutally violent terrorist and paramilitary campaign aimed not only at the Sri Lankan government, but also its citizens (including those Tamils that publicly disagreed with LTTE practices) the LTTE became one of the most efficient, competent, violent, and professionalized terrorist groups in modern history. No other terrorist group, to this author’s knowledge, fielded an army of 20,000 cadres complete with a navy and rudimentary air force. Only the FARC of Colombia has been able to control a comparable amount of territory for decades. And it was only after an organizational split and brutally repressive and multi-pronged counterinsurgency campaign by the Rajapaksa Administration that finally brought the LTTE to its knees.

The Red Army Faction is perhaps the most novel of the terrorist groups studied in this project. With its origins in the anti-Vietnam movements of the 1960s, a smattering of young, educated, radical students created a well-known and somewhat effective terrorist group that was able to carry-out attacks in the heart of Western Europe. The segregation and frequent movements of RAF members in prison was a prime-recruiting factor for the group even though
the support it drew from left-leaning members of West German society paled in comparison to
the financial support of the Soviet Union and Democratic German Republic (East Germany).

With the end of the Cold War, the political collapse of the Soviet Union and the
ideological bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism, together with the measured released of several of its
members from German penitentiaries, the RAF was unable to cope with the winds of change
around them. Without a huge population of politically discontented Germans to provide money,
safe havens, weapons, and members, the group was forced to abdicate terrorism in the early
1990s and continue the struggle for worker’s rights through purely political means.

Of all the groups that have been examined, Hamas is the only one that is still operational
and capable of carrying out terrorist attacks. It is also the only political situation that has yet to
be resolved. Despite numerous attempts by the Israeli government to destroy Hamas, it has
endured. Through embargos, direct military intervention on land and in the air, the withholding
of tax revenue, and through large amounts of diplomatic pressure from some of the world’s most
powerful states, Hamas continues to administer the Gaza Strip and launch attacks against Israel.
So long as the Palestinians remain a nation without a state, Hamas, or groups like it, will continue
to find support from the Palestinian populations of Gaza, the West Banks, the diaspora, and
concerned non-Palestinian Arab, Muslim, and other peoples throughout the region and the world.
Even if Hamas decides to end terrorism, which needless to say, is the hope and aim of this author,
it will survive as a viable political entity in the region for decades to come. As with the Tamil
population’s desire for eelam, the Palestinian desire for a viable and secure state proves more
powerful than all but the most brutal and systematic applications of state violence.

For researchers examining the complexities of egoistic identities in populations and the
link to territory understanding the territorial component of terrorist groups may prove to be an
illuminating field of research. This is an area where the discipline of psychology and an interdisciplinary approach will provide much needed assistance. Examining the interaction of other factors, such as climate, geography, GDP, the presence of ongoing militarized interstate disputes, civil conflict, etc., will provide a fuller view of the correlates of terror. It is worth reiterating, however, that this theory does not account for lone wolf or state terror, and makes no distinction between domestic and transnational terrorist attacks.

Policy makers may find this study troubling, especially with regard to terror attacks in Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The solution for Iraq and Afghanistan may be as simple as the end of foreign military occupation in those countries, and negotiated settlements between Iraqi and Afghani national actors and the non-state actors engaging in terror may prove to be an achievable option. Although conversely, so long as the national governments of Iraq and Afghanistan remain, at least in the eyes of a highly motivated segment of the population, the puppets and instruments of colonial forces, then it is likely that there will be no appreciable decrease in terrorist violence in either of those states. Of course, one should also be aware of the comparatively low organizational capacity that the Iraqi and Afghan national governments have and eye with caution the example of Sri Lanka. An important component of the violence in Iraq and Afghanistan is ethnic and the LTTE case should illuminate the dire consequences of letting an ethnic conflict get out of hand. On the Israeli-Palestinian dimension, the issue is even more confounding, as both sides view a very limited geographic space as legitimately belonging to only one side or another. A two-state solution may be the most likely end to the current conflict, but it may not end the use of terrorist tactics by groups like Hamas, as with the Irish example, some actors will inevitably feel dissatisfied with the solution. Finally, one must remember that terrorism is a phenomenon we are likely to see continue for decades if not centuries to come.
Hopefully, this study can shine a light on the pernicious nature of disputes arising over ethnic identities that are tied to pieces of physical territory and policy makers can craft equitable solutions to disputes over indivisible pieces of territory that avoid the shedding of innocent blood.
WORKS CITED


