

SPEAKING POINTS OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES
REGIONAL HEARING BEFORE THE BRAC COMMISSION
MAY 4, 1995
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND - BALTIMORE COUNTY

MADAM CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION. THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO SUPPORT OUR COMMUNITIES IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE DEFENSE.

I ALSO WANT TO THANK YOU FOR SCHEDULING THIS REGIONAL HEARING HERE IN MARYLAND AND EXPRESS OUR SPECIAL APPRECIATION TO COMMISSIONER COX, CORNELLA AND MONTOYA AND THE BRAC STAFF FOR VISITING OUR AFFECTED INSTALLATIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, MARYLAND WAS HEAVILY IMPACTED BY THE DOD'S RECOMMENDATIONS WITH 5 OF OUR INSTALLATIONS SLATED FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT.

MARYLAND WOULD LOSE UP TO 1,700 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN JOBS, AS WELL AS THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF GAINING UP TO 3,800 JOBS FROM NAVSEA AS ORIGINALLY RECOMMENDED BY THE 1993 BRAC.

BUT PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE BELIEVE OUR NATION WILL LOSE NOT ONLY CRITICAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES SUCH AS THE HYPERVELOCITY WIND TUNNEL AT WHITE OAK, AND THE DEEP OCEAN MACHINERY SIMULATION FACILITY AT ANNAPOLIS, BUT THE HIGHLY DEDICATED AND PROVEN TEAMS OF EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH ALL THESE INSTALLATIONS.

MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT DOD FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR COST SAVINGS AND CROSS SERVICING SUCH AS CONSOLIDATING THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY - WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO FORT RITCHIE, THE DOD-WIDE CONSOLIDATION OF ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTERS TO BALTIMORE AND ST. LOUIS, AND THE JOINT SPECTRUM CENTER TO ANNAPOLIS. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF THE DOWNSIZING OF

KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL AT FORT MEADE ON ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL.

OUR DELEGATION AND OUR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES AND CONCERNED CITIZENS IN SCRUTINIZING THE DOD'S JUSTIFICATIONS AND IN PREPARING FOR TODAY'S HEARING.

WE ARE HERE TODAY TO UNDERSCORE THE STATE'S SUPPORT OF OUR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR CONCERNS WITH DOD'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, AND TO AVOID INTERFERING WITH THE COMMUNITY'S PRESENTATIONS, I WILL DEFER TO

GOVERNOR GLENDENING, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MARYLAND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION FOR SOME BRIEF REMARKS.

SENATOR BARBARA MIKULSKI

CONGRESSMAN STENY HOYER

CONGRESSMAN BEN CARDIN

I'VE ASKED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION WHO ARE ABLE TO STAY TO DEFER THEIR REMARKS TO THE END OF THEIR COMMUNITY'S PRESENTATION.

FORT RITCHIE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

OUR FIRST WITNESSES ARE MR. HERB MEININGER AND MR. LONNIE KNICKMEIER WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE FORT RITCHIE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ALSO KNOWN AS 'FORMAC'. AS YOU KNOW, DOD RECOMMENDED CLOSING FORT RITCHIE.

AS WAS REVEALED DURING COMMISSIONER CORNELLA'S VISIT TO FORT RITCHIE, FORMAC HAS IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT OVERSIGHTS REGARDING DOD'S COST SAVINGS ANALYSIS WITH CLOSING FORT RITCHIE AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF ITS MILITARY VALUE.

O MR. HERB MEININGER

HERB MEININGER WAS A FORMER GARRISON COMMANDER AT FORT RITCHIE WHERE HE SPENT THE LAST 4 AND 1/2 YEARS OF HIS 30 YEARS OF FEDERAL SERVICE. HE REPRESENTS FORMAC A COMMUNITY GROUP COMPRISED ENTIRELY OF VOLUNTEERS.

O MR. LONNIE KNICKMEIER

LONNIE KNICKMEIER SPENT THE LAST 4 AND 1/2 YEARS OF HIS CAREER AT FORT RITCHIE WHERE HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITION OF THE 7TH SIGNAL COMMAND FROM ARMY TO DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY - WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS PART OF DMRD 918. HE RETIRED AS THE ASSISTANT DEPUTY OF THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS FOR DISA - WESTHEM EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 1, 1995. HIS CAREER IN FEDERAL SERVICE SPANS 36 YEARS.

O DICK PALMER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS ALSO HERE THIS MORNING.

ADVOCATES FOR NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANNAPOLIS

THE 1995 DOD RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE CLOSING THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER AT ANNAPOLIS. THE ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT IS THE NAVY'S ONLY FACILITY FOR MACHINERY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED AT THIS CENTER IS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL TO OUR NATION'S LEADERSHIP IN SUCH AREAS AS SUBMARINE SILENCING, SHIP SURVIVABILITY, COMBAT READINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE.

AS YOU KNOW, DOD PROPOSED DISESTABLISHING THIS DETACHMENT TWO YEARS AGO, BUT THE 1993 BRAC COMMISSION UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED ITS FLAWED RECOMMENDATION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE CURRENT DOD RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE THE DETACHMENT, ABANDON TWO MAJOR FACILITIES, AND RELOCATE THE REMAINING FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IS AS SERIOUSLY FLAWED NOW AS IT WAS TWO YEARS AGO.

I HAVE KNOWN AND WORKED WITH BOTH LARRY AND JIM FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND I KNOW FIRSTHAND THEIR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE NAVY IS PREPARED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.

O MR. JIM CORDER

JIM CORDER SERVED FOR NEARLY 30 YEARS AT NSWC ANNAPOLIS IN A VARIETY OF POSITIONS STARTING WITH THE DEEP SUBMERGENCE GROUP UNTIL HE RETIRED IN 1993 AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MACHINERY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY, AND HAS HAD A LONG AND DISTINGUISHED CAREER IN THE NAVY RECEIVING NUMEROUS AWARDS INCLUDING TWO NAVY MERITORIOUS CIVILIAN SERVICE AWARDS.

O MR. LARRY ARGIRO

LARRY ARGIRO WAS THE HEAD OF THE MACHINERY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE AT NSWC ANNAPOLIS PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT IN JUNE OF 1994. HIS CAREER SPANNED NEARLY 50 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE NAVY DURING WHICH HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANY INNOVATIONS WHICH HAVE MADE U.S. SUBMARINES THE QUIETEST IN THE WORLD. LARRY'S CAREER IS ONE OF REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT.

WHITE OAK TASK FORCE (NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER --
WHITE OAK)

THE WHITE OAK NSWC AND THE PEOPLE THAT HAVE WORKED THERE HAVE BEEN A VITAL PART OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE EFFORTS AND OF OUR COMMUNITY.

IT IS HOME TO A NUMBER OF CRITICAL RESEARCH AND TESTING FACILITIES THAT ARE UNIQUE IN THE WORLD INCLUDING: THE HYPERVELOCITY WIND TUNNEL, THE CASINO AND PHOENIX X-RAY SIMULATORS AND THE ONE-OF-A-KIND HYDROBALLISTICS FACILITY.

TWO YEARS AGO THE BRAC RECOMMENDED THAT WHITE OAK AND ITS UNIQUE FACILITIES BE RETAINED FOR USE BY NAVY AND DIRECTED THAT THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS (NAVSEA) COMMAND MOVE FROM LEASED SPACE IN ARLINGTON, VA TO WHITE OAK.

AS PART OF ITS 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS, DOD HAS NOW ABRUPTLY REVERSED ITSELF AND RECOMMENDED THAT WHITE OAK BE CLOSED AND THAT NAVSEA BE "REDIRECTED" TO THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD.

O MR. JOHN TINO

OUR FIRST PRESENTER FOR WHITE OAK, JOHN TINO, IS AN EXPERT IN THE WORK STILL BEING DONE AT THIS FACILITY. HE SPENT 36 YEARS AT WHITE OAK PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT TWO YEARS AGO. BEFORE RETIRING HE SERVED AS THE DEPARTMENT HEAD FOR BOTH THE HYPERVELOCITY WIND TUNNEL AND THE HYDROBALLISTICS FACILITY. AND HE ALSO WORKED IN THE MAGNETIC SILENCING R&D DEPARTMENT. HE HAS BEEN EITHER RESPONSIBLE FOR, OR CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH, ALL OF THE VERY IMPORTANT FACILITIES REMAINING AT WHITE OAK. HE HOLDS DEGREES IN PHYSICS, MATHEMATICS AND MANAGEMENT, AND HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE COUNTY'S WHITE OAK TASK FORCE. MR. TINO WILL DISCUSS ISSUES RELATING TO THE WHITE OAK CLOSURE RECOMMENDATION.

O MR. MIKE SUBIN

THE SECOND PRESENTER WILL BE MICHAEL L. SUBIN WHO WILL PRESENT THE COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON THE RECOMMENDATION TO REVERSE THE BRAC 93 DECISION ON NAVSEA. MR. SUBIN IS CHAIRMAN OF THE WHITE OAK TASK FORCE AND IS A MEMBER OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY COUNCIL. I MIGHT ADD THAT HE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, HAVING SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME THERE OVER THE YEARS AS A NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER.

O COUNTY EXECUTIVE DOUG DUNCAN

OUR FINAL SPEAKER FOR WHITE OAK WILL BE MONTGOMERY COUNTY EXECUTIVE DOUG DUNCAN. DOUG WAS RECENTLY ELECTED TO THE COUNCIL AS COUNTY EXECUTIVE. HE HAS WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH THE TASK FORCE TO PREPARE FOR TODAY'S HEARING.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER, BALTIMORE

AS YOU KNOW, DOD RECOMMENDED CLOSING USAPDC BALTIMORE AND TO CONSOLIDATE ITS FUNCTION AT USAPDC ST. LOUIS. OUR COMMUNITY PRESENTATIONS WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT AN INTERSERVICE, DOD-WIDE CONSOLIDATION AT THE TWO PREMIERE ARMY CENTERS, BALTIMORE AND ST. LOUIS FAR OUTWEIGHS AN INTRASERVICE CONSOLIDATION BY THE ARMY.

O MS. CATHY KROPP

CATHY KROPP WORKS AS A COMPUTER ASSISTANT AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE CENTER'S WAREHOUSE CONTROL SYSTEM. CATHY IS THE WIFE OF A SOLDIER STATIONED AT ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND. SHE HAS BEEN WORKING AT THE BALTIMORE CENTER FOR 9 YEARS AND IS HOPING TO STAY IN THIS AREA FOREVER.

O MR. BILL WEIMAN

BILL WEIMANN WORKS AS A FORKLIFT OPERATOR IN RECEIVING, AND HAS BEEN VICE PRESIDENT OF AFGE LOCAL # 1409 FOR 8 YEARS. BILL AND HIS WIFE BONNIE, ALSO A CENTER EMPLOYEE, ARE ONE OF THE MANY HUSBAND-AND-WIFE TEAMS WHO ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO COMPLETING THEIR CAREERS AT THE BALTIMORE CENTER.

O MICHAEL VAN BIBBER

ALSO SITTING WITH OUR SPEAKERS TODAY IS MIKE VAN BIBBER. MIKE IS A MANAGEMENT ANALYST WITH THE BALTIMORE CENTER. HE CAME TO THE CENTER AS PART OF THE DISABLED VETERANS OUTREACH PROGRAM. HE HAS WORKED HERE FOR 5 YEARS AND IS EXCITED ABOUT THE NEW POLY FILM WRAPPERS HE IS INSTALLING. HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO COMPLETING HIS CAREER AT THE CENTER.

FORT MEADE ADVOCACY COMMITTEE

THE CROSS-SERVICE GROUP ON MEDICAL TREATMENT HAS RECOMMENDED THAT FORT MEADE BE REALIGNED BY REDUCING KIMBROUGH ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL TO A CLINIC, ELIMINATING ITS INPATIENT SERVICES.

KIMBROUGH IS KNOWN FOR THE COST EFFECTIVE AND SPECIAL CARE ITS HAS PROVIDED THE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE FORT MEADE AREA. WE BELIEVE DOD HAS OVERESTIMATED THE COSTS SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS REALIGNMENT AND UNDERESTIMATED THE IMPACTS TO THE COMMUNITY.

WE WILL NOW CONCLUDE OUR COMMUNITY PRESENTATION'S WITH OUR FINAL PRESENTATION BY COLONEL MENSER.

O COLONEL KENT MENSER

COLONEL MENSER'S FINAL ASSIGNMENT IN THE ARMY WAS AT FT. MEADE WHERE HE SERVED AS GARRISON COMMANDER FROM 1990 TO 1993. HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AT FT. MEADE INCLUDED DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO INTEGRATE 500 ADDITIONAL TENANT EMPLOYEES AND OVER \$100 MILLION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION TO FT. MEADE. DUE TO HIS KEY LEADERSHIP, FT. MEADE RECEIVED THE 'MOST IMPROVED INSTALLATION' BY THE ARMY IN 1993. COLONEL MENSER HAS A LONG AND DISTINGUISHED CAREER WITH THE ARMY RECEIVING NUMEROUS AWARDS INCLUDING THE BRONZE STAR, THE LEGION OF MERIT AND THE AIR MEDAL.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

IN THE REMAINING TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT THE MAJOR ISSUES RAISED BY OUR COMMUNITIES. THEY HAVE RAISED SOME EXCELLENT AND VERY STRONG CONCERNS ABOUT DOD'S 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE HEAVY IMPACT ASSESSED TO MARYLAND WITH 5 OF OUR INSTALLATIONS SLATED FOR CLOSURE OR REALIGNMENT. WE BELIEVE DOD SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM ITS SELECTION CRITERIA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

FORT RITCHIE

AS FORMAC EXPLAINED EARLIER, DOD HAS MADE SERIOUS OVERSIGHTS IN ITS COST SAVINGS ANALYSIS FOR CLOSING FORT RITCHIE. DOD'S RECOMMENDATION FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSOLIDATE DISA-WESTHEM AT FORT RITCHIE, AS WELL AS THE IMPORTANT SYNERGIES WHICH EXIST AMONG RITCHIE'S TENANTS AND ITS CRITICAL SUPPORT FOR SITE R.

NSWC ANNAPOLIS

WE BELIEVE THAT DOD'S RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE NSWC ANNAPOLIS IS AS SERIOUSLY FLAWED NOW AS IT WAS TWO YEARS AGO.

IN OUR VIEW, DOD ONCE AGAIN UNDERESTIMATED THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AT ANNAPOLIS AND SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERESTIMATED COSTS AND OVERSTATED POTENTIAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH CLOSING NSWC ANNAPOLIS. THE ESTIMATES OF THE COST TO MOVE NSWC ANNAPOLIS TO PHILADELPHIA (\$25 MILLION) ARE IDENTICAL IN 1993 AND 1995 EVEN THOUGH THE 1995 RECOMMENDATION CALLS OR RELOCATION OF MOST FACILITIES AS WELL AS PERSONNEL. HOW CAN THE NAVY MOVE OVER \$300 MILLION WORTH OF MACHINERY AND PERSONNEL FOR THE SAME COST THAT IT PLANNED TO MOVE JUST PERSONNEL IN 1993?

WE ARE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE PROPOSAL TO CLOSE NSWC ANNAPOLIS WILL IMPACT SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE NAVY'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OUR NATION'S LEADERSHIP IN SUCH AREAS AS SUBMARINE SILENCING, SHIP SURVIVABILITY, COMBAT READINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE.

NSWC WHITE OAK

AS YOU HAVE HEARD AND HAS BEEN UNDERScoreD BY GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI, THE GAO, ADMIRAL WEST, AND OTHERS DOD FAILED TO RECOGNIZE MILITARY VALUE OF WHITE OAK'S UNIQUE FACILITIES, PARTICULARLY THE HYPERVELOCITY WIND TUNNEL AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TEST FACILITY (PHONEIX/CASINO) AND DOD'S JOINT CROSS SERVICE REVIEW PROCESS BROKE DOWN BY FAILING TO PRODUCE A RECOMMENDATION FOR RETAINING THESE FACILITIES.

MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE DOD SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERESTIMATES THE COSTS TO CLOSE WHITE OAK AND OVERSTATES THE SAVINGS OF MOVING NAVSEA TO THE NAVY YARD, AND WILL BE PROVIDING THE COMMISSION WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OVER THE NEXT MONTH TO FURTHER SUPPORT THIS CLAIM. IT IS OUR STRONGLY HELD VIEW THAT THE COMMISSION MADE THE RIGHT DECISION TWO YEARS AGO IN APPROVING THE MOVE OF NAVSEA TO WHITE OAK AND WE HOPE THAT THE COMMISSION WILL UPHOLD THAT DECISION.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER AT BALTIMORE

THE COMMISSION ALSO HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS BY RECOMMENDING A CONSOLIDATION OF DOD'S PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION MISSION AT THE TWO FULLY AUTOMATED ARMY CENTERS. THE COST SAVINGS GENERATED BY AN INTERSERVICE CONSOLIDATION FAR OUTWEIGH THOSE WHICH WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY A CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE ARMY.

KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL AT FORT MEADE

THE PROPOSED DOWNSIZING OF KIMBROUGH HOSPITAL AT FORT MEADE HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ASSESSED THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACTS ON ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL. DOD'S COST ESTIMATES OVERESTIMATE THE SAVINGS AND UNDERESTIMATE THE IMPACTS TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.

ADDITIONAL POINTS

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TO THE COMMISSION'S ATTENTION SOME ADDITIONAL DOD RECOMMENDATIONS THAT AFFECT MARYLAND FACILITIES NOT MENTIONED DURING THE PRESENTATION PERIOD.

WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE DOD RECOMMENDATION TO RELOCATE THE DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE FROM FORT HOLABIRD TO FORT MEADE. THIS MOVE WOULD ACCOMPLISH A LONG NEEDED UPGRADE OF THEIR FACILITY AND ENSURE THAT A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE EMPLOYEE BASE STAYS INTACT.

A SECOND ISSUE CONCERNS THE PROPOSED CLOSING OF THE NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND. WHILE WE SUPPORT THE RELOCATION OF THE INFECTIOUS DISEASES PROGRAM TO THE NEW WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE AT FOREST GLEN, MARYLAND, WE QUESTION DOD'S PROPOSED PARTIAL RELOCATION OF THE NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE'S (NMRI) MANNED DIVING COMPONENT TO PANAMA CITY, FLORIDA. THIS RELOCATION WOULD DISRUPT A HIGHLY INTEGRATED RESEARCH PROGRAM, AND ABANDON KEY RESEARCH FACILITIES SUCH AS THE HYDROGEN GAS RESEARCH AND DIVING TANKS AT BETHESDA.

MADAM CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK ALL THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THEIR TIME AND ASK THAT THEY SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE POINTS RAISED BY THE COMMUNITIES OF MARYLAND TODAY. EACH COMMUNITY GROUP HAS PROVIDED THE COMMISSION WITH A HARD COPY OF ITS PRESENTATION MATERIALS AS WELL AS OTHER DOCUMENTATION. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF I CAN ASSIST WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THE COMMISSION MAY NEED.

Document Separator

From the office of

**SENATOR
PAUL SARBANES**

Maryland



Contact: Bruce Frame (202) 224-4524
Bill Toohey (410) 962-4436

*For Immediate Release
May 4, 1995*

BRAC OVERVIEW

**The five major facilities to be closed in Maryland under the BRAC Process
More Than 1600 Jobs at Stake Throughout the State**

Fort Ritchie, Washington Co.: Located in the Catoctin mountains, at 638 acres, it is the largest military facility in Maryland targeted to be closed. Its "tenants" are primarily high-tech signal units providing sophisticated communications and information services for other East Coast military units including what is known as Site R. This is the "underground Pentagon" to be used by top military commanders in the event of war.

If closed, 1,011 military jobs on the base would be lost along with 878 civilian positions. (Although 936 of those positions would be transferred to Ft. Detrick in Frederick County.) Also lost would be 866 related off-base jobs. The Ft. Ritchie staff makes up 4.8% of the work force in the Hagerstown area. Estimated annual savings for the Pentagon: \$65 million.

Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak, Montgomery Co.: The Navy attempted to close White Oak in 1993, but was overruled by the BRAC commission then. Members of the Congressional delegation and local community reps are fighting once more to reverse the Navy decision, based on the facility's unique high-tech contribution to the American defense effort. It is home to a number of critical research and testing facilities that are unique in the world. One is the hypervelocity wind-tunnel that is used by a number of government agencies including NASA. There is nothing like it anywhere else on the globe.

Closing the base and transferring its personnel to other Navy facilities would mean the loss of 202 jobs on the base and 444 indirectly serving the installation. **Even worse however, this would reverse the 1993 BRAC decision to move the Naval Sea Systems Command with 3,800 jobs to White Oak from rented office space in Crystal City Virginia, as called for by the 1993 BRAC Commission.** Those jobs would go instead to the Washington Navy Yard.

(more)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis: The Navy also attempted to close this facility in 1993 but was overruled by the BRAC Commission then. This is the only Navy facility dedicated to research and development on machinery, and work done here has made the U.S. a world leader in the field of silencing submarines. It is a center of sophisticated engineering research. 40% of its staff have advanced degrees, and the average worker has 21 years experience. It has a number of extremely complex and sophisticated research systems, and estimates of the replacement cost range from \$500 million to \$1 billion. If it is closed, 430 civilian jobs and 1 military job would be lost and 261 civilian jobs would be transferred to other Navy facilities.

Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore: This is in Middle River and is one of two Army facilities for storing and issuing publications and forms to Army users around the globe. The other is in St. Louis. This is a highly efficient, and automated facility which has recently won a Hammer award given by Vice-President Gore's National Performance Review for high efficiency. Closing would mean the loss of 2 military and 129 civilian jobs. The Maryland Congressional delegation proposes taking advantage of its automation and efficiency by using it and St. Louis for ALL of the Pentagon's distribution needs, and not limiting its activities to the Army.

Kimbrough Army Hospital, Ft. Meade: The Military would eliminate the facility's inpatient services, reducing Kimbrough from a hospital to a clinic. Inpatient services currently include 4 intensive care Units, a 32 bed inpatient ward, same day surgery, an operating room and a recovery room. Patients currently served at Kimbrough would be served at other military and/or private facilities. 129 jobs directly serving Kimbrough would be lost, along with 74 jobs dependent on the facility indirectly

From the office of

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Maryland



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**U. S. SENATOR PAUL SARBANES
Statement
Fort Ritchie
Washington Co., Maryland**

I have been fighting very hard to keep Fort Ritchie open and, working with the local community and other members of the Maryland delegation, I will continue to fight very hard for the base. In a number of areas, the Army has not shown clear justifications for proposing to shut down Fort Ritchie.

In its decision to close Fort Ritchie, the Army seriously underestimated the Fort's military value. Ritchie serves Site "R" and other military customers based on the east coast with a variety of sophisticated, high-tech communications and information services. It also provides critical support service for Site R such as fire-fighting and security. The proximity of Ritchie to these customers is critical to the Army's readiness and responsiveness. Moving these services to Arizona or other locations will not help the Army carry out its mission.

The various military tenants based at Fort Ritchie work closely together, efficiently and economically. The synergy not only upgrades efficiency, it also cuts costs. In deciding to close Fort Ritchie, the Army has not looked closely enough at the potential costs of losing this synergy.

The Army may have also made a serious error in calculating the cost of closing down the Fort. In developing its cost estimates, the military came up with a \$23 million annual figure for the cost of housing. Officials at the base say the actual figure is closer to \$3 million. If that is indeed the case, the Army's projected savings for the next 20 years may be off by as much as \$20 million a year for a total error of \$400 million.

Fort Ritchie boasts a highly motivated, technically skilled and experienced work force. Many of these men and women have not only devoted their lives to military service, but also to the mission at the Fort. This is a talented and dedicated work-force of military and civilians and a careful review of the evidence will indicate their base should not be closed.

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**U. S. SENATOR PAUL SARBANES
Statement
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
Annapolis, MD**

The Annapolis Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) has been a vital part of our national defense efforts for over 80 years

It is the Navy's only facility for machinery research and development. It is home to many large, highly specialized experimental facilities unavailable anywhere else in the world and has a specially trained and experienced staff, whose skills will be required to maintain the Navy's technical superiority for years to come.

The work of this research center is critical to our nation's leadership in such areas as submarine silencing, ship survivability, combat readiness and environmental compliance.

Two years ago, the Department of Defense proposed the "disestablishment" of the Annapolis detachment. Working with the local community we took our case to the Base Closure Commission and the Commission voted unanimously against the plan.

This year again, DOD has recommended closing the Center -- a decision that is as flawed now as it was two years ago.

In my view, DOD has once again underestimated the military value of this Center, overstated costs, and exaggerated savings.

From the office of

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May 4, 1995*

**U. S. SENATOR PAUL SARBANES
Statement
White Oak Naval Surface Warfare Center
Montgomery County**

For over 50 years, the White Oak Naval Surface Warfare Center and the people who have worked here have been a vital part of our national defense efforts and of our community.

It is home to a number of critical research and testing facilities that are unique in the world, including:

- * the hypervelocity wind tunnel, the nation's premier high-Mach number test facility, valued at \$143 million and described recently by no less than the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff as a "unique national capability, a capability that serves military research and development needs and that is used as well by other agencies, including NASA."
- * the one-of-a-kind hydroballistics facility: a nine-story, 1.75 million gallon tank that simulates the entry of weapons into water.
- * Casino and Phoenix x-ray simulators which are used the all the services to simulate nuclear effects, valued at \$37 to 40 million.

Our delegation, our state and Montgomery County place a very high premium on this installation as I believe is underscored by our attendance here today and by the priority we have given to the base closure issue.

Two years ago, the Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that White Oak and its unique facilities be retained for use by the Navy and directed that the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command move to White Oak from leased space in Arlington, Virginia. Our delegation strongly supported that recommendation and had been working closely with Montgomery County and the State to help implement that decision and welcome NAVSEA to White Oak.

(more)

Earlier this year, however, the Department of Defense, in its recommendations to the 1995 Base Closure Commission, abruptly reversed itself and recommended that White Oak be closed and that NAVSEA be "redirected" to Washington Navy Yard. In our view this recommendation is completely unwarranted and severely flawed. It fails to recognize the military value of White Oak's unique facilities and capabilities. It severely underestimates the costs to close White Oak and overstates the savings of moving NAVSEA to the Navy Yard.

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**U. S. SENATOR PAUL SARBANES
Statement
U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center
Baltimore, MD**

The Department of Defense should not close the Army Publications Distribution Center in Middle River in Baltimore County (PDC-Baltimore). To the contrary, the Department has the opportunity to achieve considerable savings and increased operational readiness by crossing service lines and consolidating all of its Publications Distribution Centers at Baltimore's fully-automated center and its other PDC in St. Louis. This would be a far more cost efficient decision than shutting down the Baltimore facility as the Army has proposed, and moving its activities to St. Louis.

The Pentagon itself has identified significant savings over the next six years which would be generated by a consolidation of ALL DOD publications distributions facilities. The magnitude of these savings dramatically outweighs the \$35 million in savings over the next 20 years to be achieved by consolidating only the Army Centers

I know firsthand of the Baltimore Distribution Center's superior capabilities and for a number of reasons I believe it provides an excellent location to help achieve a consolidation for all of DOD.

- * The Baltimore Center is a fully automated operation including DOD's only fully-automated warehouse with a fully-integrated control computer system.
- * It is ideally located for world distribution, with exceptional access to air, rail, sea, and road transport.
- * It is located in close proximity to the National Capitol Region and 45% of CONUS (Continental US) DOD installations.
- * PDC-Baltimore won Vice-President Gore's National Performance Review Hammer Award in recognition of its superior efficiency.
- * It is a finalist in the Army Communities of Excellence Special Categories Awards Program.

PDC-Baltimore should not be closed down. It is a tremendous resource for the nation: an opportunity waiting to happen.

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U. S. SENATOR PAUL SARBANES

Statement

**Kimbrough Army Hospital
Fort Meade, MD**

In working with members of the community surrounding Fort Meade, we have heard their concerns raised about the proposed downsizing of Kimbrough Hospital. There are fears the Army has not adequately assessed the substantial impacts on active-duty and retired military personnel and worries that cost estimates by the Department of Defense overestimate the savings and underestimate the impact on members of the local community.

The downsizing would turn a hospital into a clinic. Currently Kimbrough has an operating room and a recovery room, a four-bed intensive care unit, a 32 bed inpatient ward and same day surgery. All these inpatient services would be eliminated, along with 129 jobs at the facility, and 74 other jobs indirectly related to its operations.

This facility serves current personnel at Fort Meade, both active duty staff and retirees. The Department of Defense believes that alternative medical services could be provided by either Walter Reed Army Medical Center or the Naval National Medical Center without additional costs. In working with members of the local community, we have found many questions were raised about whether or not the Army has accurately calculated the costs of such a system.

Document Separator

REMARKS OF U.S. SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
BRAC HEARINGS
MAY 5, 1995
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE COUNTY

Thank you Senator Sarbanes and members of the commission.

We give you a very cordial welcome to Maryland and thank you for the very assiduous way you're going about your duties. We welcome you to our state. We know how faithful you've been in examining the issues and to your very cooperative staff.

The openness and the professionalism has been most appreciated.

The Maryland delegation will be able to get to make our case at the hearing in June, so I just want to focus on a few things.

First - listen to the community. When you listen to the community, you will find that they will make their presentation on military value. Not on hand-wringing or whining or bleeding hearts. They want to make sure they tell you why they are of value to the nation, why they're a substantial return on investment and yes, the impact on the local community if this is closed.

We know that the military needs to be downsized, but we don't want it to be downgraded. We in Maryland feel that we offer a unique combination of facilities and physical and intellectual infrastructure. We're in close proximity to premiere civilian laboratories, higher education facilities and the entire support system from the Pentagon.

Our location, our technological facilities are superior and could not easily be replaced.

I'd like to take a few minutes, however, to focus on the workforce.

In each and every facility, you are going to find not only superb technological facilities, but also a unique workforce. They bring unique skills.

They bring an extraordinary work ethic. They work by the book, but they don't work by the clock. And their spirit of patriotism is something that I think our whole private sector needs to imitate. They are as fit for duty as the military that they support. Now this is a very unique area here, and if you look at these facilities - if you go to the laboratories while they're developing the smart technology for the smart weapons of war, we see the quality of what they do. At the David Taylor Lab, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis, we see that 82 percent of the staff are scientists and engineers and they are backed up by highly-trained machinery and support staff that work hands on with engineers.

In the private sector, it would be called a "center of excellence." And it would take more than ten years to assemble this caliber of people.

At White Oak, we also know that they had very unique technological facilities, like the hypervelocity wind tunnel. It takes an unusual group of people - a unique team again of scientists, engineers and support staff, whether they have PhD's or union cards, it is the only team in the world.

And up at Fort Ritchie, there is a highly-skilled workforce that manages a very intricate communications system. When the president dials 911 around the world, it is at Fort Ritchie that they make sure that those calls go through. And in those rolling hills up there in Western Maryland there are round-the-clock, 24-hours-a-day, regardless-of-weather, regardless of world conditions, they are right there.

At the Army Distribution Center, in Middle River, what we see is a military version of Federal Express - highly motivated workforce, moving things along on a highly-automated system, with the National Guard right across the street, when our military departs on a peacekeeping mission, they can't take all their paperwork with them, all their rules and requirements, all the kinds of documents they need - they need to take their weapons. But over there at Middle River, they move it right along on their assembly line, hand it off to the National Guard and it goes wherever our military is. You just can't replace that type of system.

And at the Kimbrough Army Community Hospital, this is where we have dedicated nurses and doctors providing a full-range of medical service - and you should know that their hands-on cost effectiveness is 40 percent less than any other military hospital than any other military hospital in Washington, D.C.

So, my dear commissioners, when you listen to the arguments, listen to this workforce, try to picture replacing, try to picture what it would cost to replace it, in terms of money and time. And also take a look at this workforce because of their work ethic and their spirit of patriotism and I know you just won't be able to say no to them.

Thank you very much.

CLOSING

Thank you. On behalf of the Maryland delegation and all of the people of Maryland who testified today and were represented at this hearing, we thank the commission for its very careful attention to the testimony, the courtesies given.

I would just like to sum up by saying this:

There is a book now that won a Pulitzer Prize called No Ordinary Time. It's about the Roosevelts, but more about America during World War II and the extraordinary effort that was done to organize and mobilize the United States of America to meet the test in World War II. That concept of "no ordinary time" can be applied to the legacy of the military facilities in this room. You are no ordinary facilities. This is no ordinary workforce. We know that you will not make any ordinary decisions. You are no ordinary base closing commission and we're counting on you.

Thank you very much.

Document Separator

**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
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THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995

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- 4. PENNSYLVANIA BASE INFORMATION- MORNING SESSION**
- 5. REMARKS BY THE CHAIR PRECEDING PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD**
- 6. OPENING STATEMENT- AFTERNOON SESSION: COMMISSIONER COX**
- 7. PENNSYLVANIA BASE INFORMATION- AFTERNOON SESSION**
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- 9. NORTH CAROLINA BASE INFORMATION**
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**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**BALTIMORE, MD & NEW YORK REGIONAL
HEARINGS**

MAY 4, 1995


**UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE COUNTY
FIELDHOUSE
5401 WILKENS AVENUE
BALTIMORE, MD 21228**


&

MAY 5, 1995

**USS INTREPID
SEA AIR SPACE MUSEUM
WEST 46TH STREET & 12TH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10036**

EXEC SEC





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

SCHEDULE FOR REGIONAL HEARING

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

May 4, 1995

8:30-8:40 a.m.	Opening remarks	
8:40-10:50 a.m.	Maryland	130 minutes
10:50-11:00 a.m.	break	
11:00- 11:55 a.m.	Pennsylvania	55 minutes
12:00-12:30 p.m.	Public comment: Maryland, Pennsylvania	
12:30-1:35 p.m.	break	
1:35-3:25 p.m.	Pennsylvania	110 minutes
3:25-3:35 p.m.	break	
3:35-5:15 p.m.	Virginia	100 minutes
5:20-5:40 p.m.	North Carolina	20 minutes
5:45-5:50 p.m.	West Virginia	5 minutes
5:55-6:15 p.m.	Public comment: Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, West Virginia	

(AS OF 5/1/95)





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

OPENING STATEMENT

COMMISSIONER REBECCA COX

REGIONAL HEARING

Baltimore, Maryland

May 4, 1995

GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THIS REGIONAL HEARING OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION.

MY NAME IS REBECCA COX AND I AM A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF EVALUATING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REGARDING THE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

ALSO HERE WITH US TODAY ARE MY COLLEAGUES, COMMISSIONERS WENDI STEELE, AL CORNELLA, LEE KLING AND JOE ROBLES.

FIRST LET ME THANK ALL THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ASSISTED US SO CAPABLY DURING OUR VISITS TO THE MANY BASES REPRESENTED AT THIS HEARING. WE HAVE SPENT MANY DAYS LOOKING AT THE INSTALLATIONS THAT ARE ON THE SECRETARY'S LIST AND ASKING QUESTIONS THAT WILL HELP US MAKE OUR DECISIONS. THE COOPERATION WE'VE RECEIVED HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE BASE VISITS WE HAVE CONDUCTED IS TO ALLOW US TO SEE THE INSTALLATION FIRST-HAND AND TO ADDRESS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION OF THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE BASE.

IN ADDITION TO THE BASE VISITS, THE COMMISSION IS CONDUCTING A TOTAL OF ELEVEN REGIONAL HEARINGS, OF WHICH TODAY'S IS THE TENTH. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE REGIONAL HEARINGS IS TO GIVE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THESE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS A CHANCE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. WE CONSIDER THIS INTERACTION WITH THE COMMUNITY TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND VALUABLE PARTS OF OUR REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT ALL OF OUR COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF ARE WELL AWARE OF THE HUGE IMPLICATIONS OF BASE CLOSURE ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES. WE ARE COMMITTED TO OPENNESS IN THIS PROCESS, AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO FAIRNESS. ALL THE MATERIAL WE GATHER, ALL THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ALL OF OUR CORRESPONDENCE IS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.

WE ARE FACED WITH AN UNPLEASANT AND PAINFUL TASK, WHICH WE INTEND TO CARRY OUT AS SENSITIVELY AS WE CAN. AGAIN, THE KIND OF ASSISTANCE WE'VE RECEIVED HERE IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

NOW LET ME TELL YOU HOW WE WILL PROCEED HERE TODAY, AND HAVE PROCEEDED AT ALL OUR REGIONAL HEARINGS.

THE COMMISSION HAS ASSIGNED A BLOCK OF TIME TO EACH STATE AFFECTED BY THE BASE CLOSURE LIST. THE OVERALL AMOUNT OF TIME WAS DETERMINED BY THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS ON THE LIST AND THE AMOUNT OF JOB LOSS. THE TIME LIMITS WILL BE ENFORCED STRICTLY.

WE NOTIFIED THE APPROPRIATE ELECTED OFFICIALS OF THIS PROCEDURE AND LEFT IT UP TO THEM, WORKING WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES, TO DETERMINE HOW TO FILL THE BLOCK OF TIME.

THIS MORNING, WE WILL HEAR TESTIMONY FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND FOR 130 MINUTES AND PENNSYLVANIA FOR 55.

AT THE END OF THE PENNSYLVANIA MORNING PRESENTATION, WE HAVE SET ASIDE A PERIOD OF 30 MINUTES FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, DURING WHICH MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC FROM PENNSYLVANIA AND MARYLAND MAY SPEAK. WE HAVE PROVIDED A SIGN-UP SHEET FOR THIS PORTION OF THE HEARING AND HOPE THAT ANYONE WHO WISHES TO SPEAK HAS ALREADY SIGNED UP. WE WOULD ASK THOSE OF YOU SPEAKING AT THAT TIME TO LIMIT YOURSELVES TO TWO MINUTES.

AFTER THE PUBLIC COMMENT, WE WILL BREAK FOR LUNCH AND RECONVENE ABOUT 1:35 P.M. FOR 110 MINUTES OF TESTIMONY FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 100 MINUTES FROM VIRGINIA AND 20 MINUTES FROM NORTH CAROLINA. AFTER THOSE PRESENTATIONS, THERE WILL BE ANOTHER 30-MINUTE PERIOD FOR PUBLIC COMMENT FROM PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA. THE HEARING SHOULD BE OVER AROUND 6:30 P.M.

LET ME ALSO SAY THAT THE BASE CLOSURE LAW HAS BEEN AMENDED SINCE 1993 TO REQUIRE THAT ANYONE GIVING TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION DO SO UNDER OATH, AND SO I WILL BE SWEARING IN WITNESSES, AND THAT WILL INCLUDE INDIVIDUALS WHO SPEAK IN THE PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION OF THE HEARING.

WITH THAT, I BELIEVE WE ARE READY TO BEGIN.

(FIRST WITNESS...ADMINISTER OATH)

**OATH BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE
ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH?**



MARYLAND

130 Minutes

BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES

Opening Remarks

8:40AM - 8:55AM

15 Minutes

Senator Sarbanes

Senator Mikulski

Governor Glendening

Representative Hoyer

Representative Cardin

Fort Richie, MD

8:55AM - 9:25AM

30 Minutes

Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier, Retired Employee,
Ft. Richie, Deputy Asst Ch. of Staff,
Operations, Defense Investigative Service,
Western Hemisphere

Mr. Herb Meininger, Retired Garrison
Commander, Ft. Richie

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis

9:25AM - 9:50AM

25 Minutes

Mr. Jim Corder, Retired Assistant Head of
Propulsion and Auxiliary Systems
Directorate, NSWC, Annapolis

Mr. Larry Argiro, Retired Head of the
Machinery R&D Directorate, NSWC,
Annapolis

Naval Surface Warfare Center, White Oak

9:50AM - 10:15AM

25 Minutes

Mr. John Tino, Retired Employee, NSWC,
White Oak, Former Department Head,
Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel and
Hydroballistics Facilities

Mr. Mike Subin, Chair, White Oak Task Force

US Army Publications Distribution Center,
Baltimore, USAPDC

10:15AM - 10:30AM

15 Minutes

**Ms. Cathy Kropp, Computer Assistant,
USAPDC**

**Mr. Bill Weiman, Forklift Operator and Local
Union 1409 Vice President, USAPDC**

Fort Meade, MD

10:30AM - 10:40AM

10 Minutes

**Colonel Kent Menser, Retired Garrison
Commander, Ft. Meade**

10:40AM - 10:50AM

10 Minutes

Concluding Remarks by Senator Sarbanes

MARYLAND

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**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**

MARYLAND STATE MAP

FORT RITCHIE

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANNAPOLIS

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, WHITE OAK

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

US ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report


FORT MEADE

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

STATE CLOSURE HISTORY

MAP NO. 21

MARYLAND



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports

MARYLAND

Fort Ritchie

1. Is the community aware that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that a one hour response time from Fort Detrick, Maryland to Site R for support purposes meets Joint Staff requirements? Does the community have a response?

Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division Detachment Annapolis, MD

1. What will happen to the Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) replacement program if NSWC is moved to Philadelphia and what is the potential impact on the Navy if the project slips behind schedule?
2. In your opinion, is there enough work at Annapolis for NSWC Annapolis? What is happening to the workload at NSWC Philadelphia?

Naval Surface Warfare Center White Oak, MD

1. If the current recommendation to move Naval Sea Systems Command to the Washington Navy Yard were not approved and the command moved to White Oak, a significant number of private contractors would presumably follow. Has the community made any plans to accommodate this influx of workers? If so, what are they?

Baltimore Distribution and Publication Center Middle River, MD

1. Is it feasible to consolidate all Publications and Distribution Centers within DoD?

Kimbrough Army Community Hospital Fort Meade

The realignment of Kimbrough Army Community Hospital at Fort Meade may lead to more efficient use of civilian hospitals in the Baltimore/Washington area. Many patients currently using Kimbrough will now be turning to civilian hospitals for inpatient care, increasing demand in the civilian health care sector. If excess capacity exists there (as it does elsewhere), increased demand may improve efficiency in the civilian sector. If civilian healthcare resources are in short supply, the increased demand may exacerbate access problems.

1. Have you had the opportunity to consider the impact of closing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital on local civilian hospitals?
2. Does excess capacity exist in the local civilian hospitals such that this excess could be used to satisfy the need created by the elimination of inpatient beds at Kimbrough?

...



...

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Recommendation: Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.

Justification: This recommendation assumes that base support for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to Fort Detrick will: (a) maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; (d) collocate signal units that were previously separated at two different garrisons; (e) consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations; and (f) provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements. These relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's garrison and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$93 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$83 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$65 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$712 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,210 jobs (2,344 direct jobs and 866 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Hagerstown, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 4.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT RITCHIE, MARYLAND

MARCH 24, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER : Mr. Al Cornella

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER: None

COMMISSION STAFF:

David Lyles, Staff Director
Ed Brown, Army Team Chief
Rick Brown, Army Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Congressional Delegation

Senator Paul Sarbanes
Senator Barbara Mikulski
Congressman Roscoe Bartlett

State Delegation

Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
State Assistant Adjutant General - Brigadier General Thomas Baker, Army National Guard

Department of the Army

LTC Dave Powell, Total Army Basing Study (TABS)
Ms. Theresa Persick, Office of Army Assistant Chief of Staff- Information Management
Mr. Jerry King, Army Information Systems Command-Base Realignment and Closure

Fort Ritchie

Brigadier General Frederick Essig, Deputy Director Defense Information Systems Agency -
Western Hemisphere (DISA WESTHEM), & Commander, Fort Ritchie
Mr. Art Callahan, DISA WESTHEM Command Actions Group
Mr. Raymond Pirrello, Technical Applications Office (TAO)
Mr. Bob Brooks, 1108th Signal Brigade
Mr. Glenn Sanders, Information Systems Engineering Command - CONUS
Mr. Steve Blizzard, Public Affairs Office
Major Dilandro, U. S. Army Garrison Fort Ritchie
LTC Cashiola, Staff Judge Advocate Fort Ritchie

Community Representatives

Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier, Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Provides base operations and real property maintenance for the garrison installation, the Alternate National Military Command Center Facility Site R, satellite activities, and other tenants (including Camp David).

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Ft. Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.

DOD'S JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTION:

BASOPS for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be transferred to nearby Fort Detrick, MD. Relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's garrison and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation. Installation closure and activity transfer will :

- maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (Alternate National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction;
- maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness;
- collocate signal units that were previously separated at two different garrisons;
- consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations;
- provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

We conducted a driving tour of the installation. Fort Ritchie is a small rural installation set in the Cococtin Mountains on the Maryland / Pennsylvania border. Most of the buildings are 1930s vintage made of native stone. The installation headquarters, post exchange/commissary, fire station, computer training center and Technical Applications Office buildings are either relatively new (within past 5-6 years), or recently renovated. Installation family housing comprises approximately 340 sets of quarters over twenty years old. The computer training center houses a video teleconference (VTC) facility linked with the unclassified DOD network.

The DISA Regional Control Center provides integrated control of DISA's sixteen mega-center infrastructure, applications and data management. The center has fiber-optic and microwave connections that allow visibility over DOD's CONUS distributive communications data centers. They perform trend analysis and fault identification over CONUS management database links. The Regional Control Center will relocate if Fort Ritchie is closed.

Site R is the Alternate National Military Command Center. Site C, operationally aligned with Site R, provides Site R with a mobile satellite terminal designed to provide jam-resistant, secure communications. Support to both sites will continue regardless of Fort Ritchie's status.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

DISA strength figures were not included in the cost analysis. During initial Army data calls DISA was not formally established, and Army anticipated its relocation under force structure rules. Consequently, DISA relocation was not costed. The same rationale was applied to the Regional Control Center: thus, its reconstitution was not costed. Net effect; underestimated personnel relocation, military construction, and family housing construction costs.

Critical support to Site R provided by Fort Ritchie garrison was not included in the relocation strength figures moved to Fort Detrick, MD. The garrison Unit Identification Code (UIC), with assigned personnel was eliminated in the detailed cost analysis. Site R's military police security organization and facility engineer functions are part of the garrison UIC. Effect was overestimating personnel relocation savings.

Savings from closing family housing at Fort Ritchie was apparently overstated by a factor of ten. The number of on-post family housing used in the cost model included unaccompanied barracks space. Thus, annual savings from terminating family housing was estimated at approximately \$23 million per year. Actual costs approach \$3 million per year.

A newly-completed National Guard Armory had escaped the data calls detailing Reserve Component property. The armory receives select base operations support from Fort Ritchie.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

The community was represented by the Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee (FORMAC). They raised the issues listed above. The FORMAC also described a potential environmental concern for insufficient water at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The committee further noted increased operational costs to relocated units serving their East Coast customers. Lastly, they highlighted the economic impact on the local area that will result from base closure.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Pursue resolution of the apparent cost estimate inaccuracies with Army (TABS).
- Query DOD on their acceptance of degraded reaction time to Site R from Fort Detrick (security force reaction, fire-fighting back-up, and facility engineer trouble-shooting teams).
- Determine if presence of the National Guard Armory will require modification to the DOD recommendation in order for it to continue after Commission action.
- Work with FORMAC representatives on the specifics of their concerns.
- Follow-up the staff request for data on Fort Ritchie civilian employees by zipcode to properly analyze the economic impact of DOD's closure recommendation.

Rick Brown/Army Team/ (703) 696-0504 ext 197

1. 2. 3.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the Department of the Navy budget through 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The total closure of this technical center reduces overall excess capacity in this category of installations, as well as excess capacity specific to this particular installation. It results in synergistic efficiencies by eliminating a major site and collocating technical personnel at the two primary remaining sites involved in hull, machinery, and equipment associated with naval vessels. It allows the movement of work to other Navy, DoD, academic and private industry facilities, and the excessing of some facilities not in continuous use. It also collocates RDT&E efforts with the In-Service Engineering work and facilities, to incorporate lessons learned from fleet operations and to increase the technical response pool to solve immediate problems.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$36.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$14.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$175.1 million.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,512 jobs (522 direct jobs and 990 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, Maryland PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC Annapolis does not involve the transfer of any industrial-type activities. NSWC Carderock and NRL are currently in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide and attainment for PM-10; however, the movement of personnel into those areas will not adversely impact the environment in those areas. NSWC Philadelphia is in a non-attainment area for carbon monoxide. In the case of each receiving site, a conformity determination may be required to assess the impact of this action. At all receiving sites, the utility infrastructure is adequate to handle the additional personnel. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, cultural/historical resources as a result of this recommendation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER (NSWC), CARDEROCK DIVISION,
DETACHMENT ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

27 MARCH 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Rebecca Cox

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. David Lyles
Mr. Alex Yellin
Mr. David Epstein

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator Paul Sarbanes
Senator Barbara Mikulski
Representative Wayne Gilchrest
Representative Steny Hoyer
Governor Parris Glendening
Rear Admiral David Sargeant, Jr. (USN) (Commander, NSWC);
Captain James Baskerville (USN) (Commander, NSWC, Carderock Division)
Commander Roger Walker (USN) (Officer-in-Charge, NSWC, Carderock Division, Annapolis Detachment)
Colonel George "Ron" Flock (USAF), Commander, Joint Spectrum Center
Mr. Larry Argiro (retired) - previous Director, Machinery R&D Directorate
CAPT Robin Bosworth (Ret.) - prior Officer-in-Charge NSWC Annapolis

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION: is to provide research, development, test and evaluation, fleet support, and in-service engineering for surface and undersea vehicle, hull, mechanical and electrical systems, and propulsors; provide logistics R&D; and provide support to the Maritime Administration and the maritime industry. Specific efforts supported include RDT&E, Acquisition, and In-Service Engineering of

- Surface, Undersea and USMC Vehicle Vulnerability and Survivability Systems
- Surface and Undersea Vehicle Active and Passive Acoustic Signatures and Silencing Systems
- Surface and Undersea Vehicle Non-Acoustic Signatures and Silencing Systems
- Surface and Undersea Vehicle Propulsion Machinery Systems and Components
- Surface and Undersea Vehicle Auxiliary Machinery Systems and Components

The Annapolis Detachment has some unique missions involving ship vulnerability and survivability, ship active and passive signatures, and surface and undersea vehicle hull machinery, propulsors and equipment.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close NSWC, Carderock Division, Detachment Annapolis, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis
- Transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing
- Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily NSWC, Carderock Division, Detachment, Philadelphia, PA; NSWC, Carderock Division, Carderock, MD; and Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC
- Joint Spectrum Center (DoD cross-service tenant) will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- Sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001 which leads to excess capacity in these activities.
- This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable.
- This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced excess capacity.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- Visit began with a 15 minute overview in the Melville Room of the Headquarters Building.
- Two hour tour of the base, including the Non-CFC Elimination lab, the Deep Ocean Vehicle Facility, the Propulsion Shaftline Facility, the Electrical Power Technology laboratory, the Machinery Acoustic Silencing lab, the Fluid Dynamics facility, the Magnetic Field Lab, the Pulse Power Systems complex, and the Advanced Electrical Machinery facility.
- Dean Shapiro of the United States Naval Academy discussed the benefits to the Academy its faculty and the Midshipmen who work on projects at NSWC Annapolis.
- Colonel Flock, USAF, described the mission and requirements of the Joint Spectrum Center, which was recently transferred from Air Force to Defense Information Systems Agency and his interest in consolidating his personnel
- Mr. Tim Doyle lead a 25 minute wrap-up and answered questions.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- The professional staff at the installation indicated that they are unlikely to move to Philadelphia. This, along with the difficulty of moving sensitive equipment, could result in the substantial delay of ongoing projects. Several major projects, particularly the one to develop equipment to handle CFCs might be adversely impacted. This would jeopardize international treaties and could be extremely expensive. In the case of other projects, there is the possibility that lead ships in some classes might be built without the enhanced systems being developed at Annapolis. Those systems might be later retrofitted at additional cost.
- It will be difficult if not impossible to move some of the equipment at Annapolis. The Deep Ocean Vehicle Facility would simply be abandoned. This could result in costly testing at sea with less reliability. Concern was also expressed over the magnetic, noise, and vibration at NSWC Philadelphia, particularly because of the industrial nature of the shipyard complex and proximity to the major interstate highway and airport.
- Costs for a tenant, the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC), a Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) activity could increase by one million dollars per year if they have to move into commercial space. These costs were not considered. The JSC supporting contractor, the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, is currently paying \$1.5 M per year to rent commercial space in Annapolis which is reimbursed by JSC. There would be sufficient space (after the departure of Materials Department Staff to Carderock, per BRAC '91) at NSWC to house all of the JSC staff including some currently in Washington, as well as IITRI. Cost of renovating base facilities and adequacy of space at NSWC Annapolis for JSC are being examined. If Annapolis were to close, JSC could move to Fort Meade, to leased space in Annapolis, or elsewhere.
- Dean Shapiro of the Naval Academy pointed out that the loss of NSWC would result in greatly diminished opportunities for Naval Academy midshipmen, particularly engineering majors, to gain exposure to practical engineering and R&D work. Faculty members would also lose opportunities to get good summer projects.


COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Navy claims on savings were disputed.
- Programs will be disrupted.
- Key people will be lost and a winning team will be broken up.
- Synergy with Naval Academy will be lost.
- There will be no benefit from sale of or reuse of land, since NSWC is surrounded by Naval Station Annapolis.
- Philadelphia and Carderock do not have the magnetic, sound, and vibration free environments to conduct testing.
- Lives of employees will be disrupted.
- As the U.S. downsizes its military, it is even more important that high tech superiority be maintained.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Commissioner Cox requested that Mr. Epstein

- Investigate various aspects of the DoD claimed savings.
- Obtain information on the 78 major capabilities of the NSWC community, with particular emphasis on the statement that NSWC Annapolis has primary responsibility for 3 of the top 10 items on that list.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the functions, personnel and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics research and development to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland, reduces this excess capacity, and its consolidation with two other major technical centers that already have capability will result in further economies and efficiencies. This closure also eliminates unnecessary capabilities, since a few Navy facilities were left at NSWC White Oak only because Naval Sea Systems Command was relocating there as a result of BRAC 93. However, those facilities can be excessed, and the Naval Sea Systems Command can be easily accommodated at the Washington Navy Yard.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$28.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$85.9 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 646 jobs (202 direct jobs and 444 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC White Oak Detachment will have a generally positive impact on the environment. A portion of the personnel being relocated will transfer to NSWC Dahlgren, which is in an area that is in attainment for carbon monoxide. As regards personnel movements to NSWC Carderock, a conformity determination may be required to assess any air quality impacts. In each case, however, the personnel relocating, when compared to expected force structure reductions by FY 2001, represent a net decrease in base personnel. There is adequate capacity in the utility infrastructure at the receiving sites to handle additional personnel loading. Likewise, there is sufficient space for rehabilitation or acreage of unrestricted land for expansion for new facilities. There is no adverse impact to threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

**NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, DAHLGREN DIVISION DETACHMENT,
WHITE OAK , MD**

27 MARCH 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. David Lyles, Staff Director
Mr. Alex Yellin, Navy Team Leader
Mr. Jeff Mulliner, Navy Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator Paul Sarbanes
Senator Barbara Mikulski
Representative Steny Hoyer
Representative Connie Morella
Representative Albert Wynn
Governor Parris Glendening,
Lieutenant Governor Kathleen Kennedy Townsend,
Rear Admiral David Sargent Jr., Commander, Naval Surface Warfare Center
Captain James Baskerville, Commander, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division
Captain John Overton, Commander Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
Captain James Perry, Officer in Charge, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division,
White Oak Detachment
Mr. Michael Subin, Montgomery County Council member
Mr. John Tino, retired NSWC Department Head
Ms. Betty Gay, retired NSWC Department Head
Mr. Frank Pierce, Hillandale Citizens Association member
Ms. Betty Bretz, past president of Hillandale Citizens Association
Mr. Mike Levin, past president of Hillandale Citizens Association and Allied Civic Association

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

To provide research, engineering, test and evaluation, and Fleet support for surface warfare systems, surface ship combat systems, ordnance, mines, amphibious warfare systems, and strategic systems.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren Division Detachment.
- Relocate the functions, personnel, and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, Maryland and the functions and personnel associated with reentry dynamics research and development to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- Excess capacity in technical centers permits the closure of this facility and its consolidation with two other major technical centers.
- Few facilities were left at White Oak as a result of the disestablishment of the organization by BRAC-93 and its realignment as a detachment of NSWC Dahlgren.
- White Oak was being retained primarily because it was designated by BRAC-93 to be the relocation site for the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) which was being moved from leased property in Arlington, Virginia. A separate BRAC-95 recommendation now moves NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard, and the facilities at White Oak are no longer needed.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- Main Building (site of Naval Sea System Command BRAC-93 relocation)
- Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel
- Hydroballistics Facility
- Nuclear Weapons Effect Facility
- Magnetic Ship Silencing Complex

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- As stated in The DoD recommendation, the Navy intends to abandon the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel and the Nuclear Weapons Effect (NWE) Facility. Site visits and documentation contained in data calls point to a continuing tri-service as well as interagency mission for both facilities. If these facilities are still critical and core to government research, it is unclear who will operate them.


Relative costs to move Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to White Oak or to the Washington Navy Yard remain an important issue attendant to both the White Oak recommendation and the NAVSEA redirect. Careful scrutiny of construction and rehabilitation costs at both sites is required.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- No military analysis, or cross-service review was done to evaluate the unique facilities represented by the Wind Tunnel and the Nuclear Weapons Effects facility.
- Cost estimates for closure of White Oak do not include cost of continued operation or relocation of unique facilities.
- Navy's analysis of costs to move Naval Sea Systems Command is flawed.
 - Recurring costs and MILCON costs for move to Washington Navy Yard are underestimated.
 - BRAC-95 MILCON costs to move to White Oak increased 360% from those used in BRAC-93
- Quality of life considerations have been overlooked.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- None other than continuing analysis in the areas identified above as key issues.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland

Recommendation: Close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.

Justification: Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis, combines the wholesale and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. The consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one less costly lease.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$3 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$35 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 213 jobs (131 direct jobs and 82 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

**US ARMY PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION CENTER
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND**

24 MARCH 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

None

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Michael Kennedy, Army Team
Wm Clifford Wooten, Army Team

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator Paul Sarbanes
Jonathan Davidson, Office of Senator Sarbanes
Mike Morrill, Office of Senator Mikulski
James Scholtes, Office of Rep. Ehrlich
R. Karl Auman, Office of Rep. Ehrlich
John Porcari, Office of the Governor
Raj Geol, Office of State Delegate Kenneth Holt

Colonel Michael Mayer-Kielman,
Commander , Publications
Major Chuck Fletcher, TABS
Theresa Persick, DAIM-BO
Jerry King, ISC- BRAC
LTC Brad Beasley, Commander
Bill Weiman, Union Vice President
Cathy Croop, Computer Assistant

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Store and issue publications and blank forms to authorized users worldwide.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close by relocating the US Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the US Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

Consolidation of the US Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the US Army Publications Center, St. Louis combines the wholesale and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. The consolidation eliminates a manual operation in Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two lease into one less costly lease.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

We toured the entire Publications Center. The warehouse operation is controlled by an automated warehouse control system (only one in DoD) which links all facets of the operation with a real-time state-of-the-art system which monitors an order from start to finish. In addition, the Center has automated guided vehicles which deliver the incoming material to the appropriate warehouse location, where wire-guided forklifts pick-up and store the material.

The Center has a computer program which allows them to shop freight rates between United Parcel Service, Real Property Service, and the US Postal Service. Within the Postal Service the system can shop between 8 different rates i.e. from book rate to first class. This is the only DoD Center with this capability. The St. Louis Center is installing a freight system but it will not have the capability to shop rates within the Postal System.

The Center also has an automated mailing system which sorts outgoing packages by destination.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

The Baltimore Center is highly automated and not a manual operation as indicated in the Army recommendation. The automated warehouse control system is the only one in DoD, although one is being installed in the St. Louis Center.

A 1992 Army Management Review estimated that \$250 million could be saved over 5 years if DoD consolidated from 15 to 3 Publication Distribution Centers (there are less than 15 Centers now). In addition, the Review estimated that the consolidation would save \$1.26 billion over 20 years. The Army recommendation to close the Baltimore Center will save \$35 million over 20 years. Senator Sarbanes noted the Army took a narrow view and the Commission needs to consider the DoD wide implications.

The Army Center is collocated with the Air Force Center responsible for administrative publications. The AF Center is staffed with 60 personnel and is a manual operation. LTC Beasley stated the Army Center could absorb the AF workload with no increase in staff, equipment or space.

The National Security Agency has approximately 100,000 SF of controlled space for storing classified material in the same warehouse. NSA is vacating this space and moving their

classified storage to Ft. Meade. Once NSA departs, the Baltimore Center would have the capacity to store classified documents without incurring any construction cost.


The Baltimore Center has the flexibility to expand and absorb related missions from other DoD agencies, which is not available at the St. Louis Center. The St. Louis Center does not have the capacity to expand at the current location. In fact, the St. Louis Center recently obtained warehouse space at the Price Support Center, which is scheduled to close. Therefore, the Army would be required to lease additional space in St. Louis in order to absorb the Baltimore Center's workload as well as replace the warehouse space at the Price Center.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

None at this time.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Commission staff needs to review the recent studies of the feasibility and desirability of consolidating DoD Publication Centers as alluded in the attached letter.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Meade, Maryland

Recommendation: Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$50 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 203 jobs (129 direct jobs and 74 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, MD Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT MEADE, MD

APRIL 4, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Staff Visit

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONERS:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

David Lewis

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

COL David Roberts, Commander, Kimbrough Army Community Hospital (KACH)

COL Ross, Director of Nursing, KACH

LTC Markelz, Deputy Commander for Administration, KACH

Bert Rice, Anne Arundel County Councilman

Robin Laird, office of Senator Sarbannes

Denise Nooe, office of Senator Mikulski

John Bohanan, office of Representative Steny Hoyer

Mary Larkin, office of Representative Gilchrist

Derek Abrams, office of Representative Ben Cardin

Also, approximately 300 citizens attended a community meeting scheduled as part of this visit.

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Provide base operations support to intelligence activities and other tenants, including the National Security Agency, First U.S. Army (inactivating in fiscal year 1995), Defense Information School, Naval Security Group Activity, 902nd Military Intelligence Group, First Recruiting Brigade, and 48 other tenants.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient activity.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

Eliminates excess medical treatment capacity. Inpatient care available at other nearby military medical activities and through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. The Medical Joint Cross Service Group suggested this realignment.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Kimbrough Army Community Hospital

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- Loss of level II emergency room.
- Graduate Medical Education and "reverse referral" support for Walter Reed and Bethesda.
- Negative impacts on Exceptional Family Member Program.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Loss of access to inpatient care for retirees.
- Loss of hospital support, including emergency room, for active duty and family members living on base.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Develop Exceptional Family Member Program issues.
- Identify potential negative impacts on Walter Reed and Bethesda.

David Lewis/Army Team/24 April 1995



CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MARYLAND

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A						
	ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND	88/91	DEFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close former NIKE site at the northwestern edge of the installation; completed FY 93; pending disposal</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Army Research Institute MANPRINT function realigned from Alexandria, VA; completed FY 93</p> <p>6.1 and 6.2 materiel elements realigned from the Belvoir Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, VA; scheduled FY 93-95</p> <p>Army Materials Technology Laboratory (less structures element) realigned from Watertown, MA (Change to 1988 SECDEF Commission recommendation); scheduled FY 95</p>
	ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER	91	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	<p>1991 DBCRC: Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics realigned from Fort Belvoir, VA; scheduled FY 97</p> <p>Electronic Technology Device Laboratory realigned from Fort Monmouth, NJ; scheduled FY 95</p> <p>Battlefield Environment Effects element of the Atmospheric Science Laboratory realigned from White Sands Missile Range, NM; scheduled FY 97</p> <p>Research Facility realigned from Harry Diamond Laboratories, Woodbridge, VA; completed FY 94</p> <p>Realign fuze development and production mission (armament related) to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; completed FY 94</p> <p>Realign fuze development and production mission (missile related) to Redstone Arsenal, AL; completed FY 94</p>
	ARMY RESERVE CENTER, GAITHERSBURG	88	DEFBRAC	COMPLETE	CLOSE	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close; completed FY 92; pending disposal</p>

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MARYLAND

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	FORT DETRICK	88/91	DEFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNDN	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Letterman Army Institute of Research realigned from Presidio of San Francisco, CA (Changed to be disestablished by 1991 Defense Base Closure Commission)</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Disestablish the U.S. Army Biomedical Research & Development Laboratory; transfer medical materiel research mission to the U.S. Army Medical Materiel and Development Activity at Fort Detrick; collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH; scheduled FY 92-96</p>
	FORT HOLABIRD	88	DEFBRAC	ONGOING	PART CLOSE	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close that portion occupied by, and realign, the Crime Records Center of the Criminal Investigation Command to Fort Belvoir, VA; scheduled FY 95</p>
	FORT MEADE	88/90/93	DEFBRAC/PR/DBCRC	ONGOING	PART CLOSE	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close the ranges, airfield and training areas (approximately 9,000 acres); 7,600 acres transferred to the Department of the Interior on 16 Oct 91 in accordance with the FY 91 National Defense Authorization Act; 500 additional acres transferred to the Department of the Interior in FY 93; remaining 900 acres to be disposed of by FY 95</p> <p>1990 PRESS: Inactivate Headquarters, 1st Region, Criminal Investigation Command; scheduled FY 93</p> <p>1993 DBCRC: Naval Security Group Command (including Security Group Station and Security Group Detachment, Potomac) realigned from the National Capital Region; scheduled FY 96</p>
AF	FORT RITCHIE					
	ANDREWS AFB	90	PRESS	PROPOSED	REALGN	1990 Press Release indicated realignment. No specifics given.
	MARTIN STATE AGS					

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MARYLAND

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
D	DMA HYDROGRAPHIC/TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER	88	DEFBRAC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	1988 DEFBRAC: Activities realigned from Defense Mapping Agency site in Herndon, VA; scheduled FY 95
N	D W TAYLOR NAV SHIP R&D CTR					
	NAVAL AIR TEST CTR, PAX RIVER					
	NAVAL COMM UNIT, WASHINGTON					
	NAVAL ELECTRONIC SYS ENGR ACT, ST INIGOES	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Directed the closure of Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA) St Inigoes, MD and relocation to NESEC Charleston, SC. The ATC/ACLS facility, the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory, Identify Friend or Foe, Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS), and special warfare joint program support are to remain at St. Inigoes but be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command.
	NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND-NCR					
	NAVAL ORDANCE COMMAND INDIAN HEAD	91/93	DBCRC	COMPLETED	REALIGNDN	1991 DBCRC: Recommended realignment as part of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Combat & Weapons System Engineering and Industrial Base Directorate. 1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of the Sea Automated Data System Activity (SEAADSA) and relocation of needed functions, personnel, equipment, and support to NSWC Indian Head, MD.

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN MARYLAND

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER WHITE OAK	91/93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	<p>1991 DBCRC: Recommended realignment as part of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Combat & Weapons Systems R&D Directorate.</p> <p>1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, VA; NSWC-Indian Head, MD; NSWC-Dahlgren, VA; and Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL. Property and facilities will be retained for relocation of Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command.</p>
	NAVY RADIO TRANS FAC ANNAPOLIS	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	<p>1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of the NRTF Annapolis. The Navy will retain real property.</p>
	NSWC CARDEROCK, ANNAPOLIS DET	93	DBCRC	CANCELLED	CLOSE	<p>1993 DBCRC: Directed that the NSWC - Carderock, Annapolis Det remain open despite OSD's recommendation to close the detachment.</p>
	US NAVAL ACADEMY					



PENNSYLVANIA

Morning Session

55 Minutes

BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES

11:00AM - 11:12AM

12 Minutes Opening Remarks

**Governor Tom Ridge
Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Rick Santorum**

Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA

11:12AM - 11: 55AM

43 Minutes **Representative Bud Shuster**

PENNSYLVANIA- MORNING SESSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**


PENNSYLVANIA STATE MAP

LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

MAP NO. 39

PENNSYLVANIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports



BASE VISIT REPORT

LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT — LETTERKENNY

24 MARCH 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Al Cornella

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

David Lyles, Staff Director

Glenn Knoepfle, Cross Service Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator Rick Santorum

Congressman Bud Shuster

Col James P. Fairall, Commander, Letterkenny Army Depot

LTC Leslie Carlow, Commander, Defense Distribution Depot - Letterkenny

Mr. Peter Scott, General Manager, United Defense, Paladin Production Division - Letterkenny

Mr. Robert Shively, Chief, Vehicles Shop Division, Directorate of Maintenance, Letterkenny
Army Depot

Mr. David Goodman, Chief, Missile Electronics Shop Division, Directorate of Maintenance,
Letterkenny Army Depot

Ms. Hallie Bunk, Chief BRAC Implementation Office, Letterkenny Army Depot

Mr. Ed Averill, Chief Ammunition Storage Directorate, Letterkenny Army Depot

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

- Letterkenny's maintenance depot overhauls tactical missiles, artillery systems, and other support equipment to like-new condition for far less than the cost of buying new items. Entire systems are repaired, modified, and integrated.
- Under a teaming effort, United Defense has collocated on-site to work with depot personnel to modify M109 Howitzers into the Paladin configuration.

- The depot's Directorate of Ammunition Operations stores, ships, and demilitarizes ammunition; and maintains and up-grounds missiles.
- Letterkenny supports more than 15 tenants, including a DLA distribution depot and DISA megacenter.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

- Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot.
- Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage.
- Change the 1993 Commission's decision directing the consolidation of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny. Transfer consolidated missile guidance workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

Letterkenny Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance facilities has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DOD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Letterkenny receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. A review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground vehicle maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one or two depots. The heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston cannot be absorbed at Letterkenny without major construction and facility renovations. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Letterkenny the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Letterkenny is supported by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance. The Army's recommendation to transfer missile workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot preserves Letterkenny's missile disassembly and storage mission. It capitalizes on Tobyhanna's electronics focus and retains DOD missile system repair at a single Army depot.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Letterkenny Army Depot Missile Electronics Shops Division
 Letterkenny Army Depot Vehicle Shops Division
 United Defense Enterprise for Paladin Conversion

PENNSYLVANIA

Letterkenny Army Depot Chambersburg, PA

1. I understand the Paladin Enterprise project has been extremely successful. It has saved taxpayers almost \$50 million and serves as a model partnership arrangement for other government agencies to follow. The Paladin contract is due to expire in fiscal year 1998.

How will termination of this effort effect overall depot utilization rates? If Letterkenny stays open, does the community have a plan to "bridge the workload gap" resulting from termination of Paladin production work?

2. The 1993 Commission recommended consolidation of DoD's tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny. The recommended consolidation effort involves the transfer of similar work from 12 locations to a single site at Letterkenny. Losing sites included Army, Navy, Air Force and contractor activities.

Please comment on the status of consolidation efforts completed to date. What more needs to be done? What benefits have been realized as a result of the tactical missile consolidation effort?

3. What percentage of the mission supports the Army's maintenance mission ?

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania (DDLDP)

Recommendation: Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at DDLDP at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its largest customer. While Collocated Depots may support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Letterkenny's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The Distribution Concept of Operations states that DLA's distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be disestablished.

The recommendation to disestablish the Letterkenny depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign Letterkenny Army Depot, Letterkenny's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce infrastructure. The Letterkenny depot was rated 3 of 17 in the Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, that military value ranking was based on support to the maintenance missions. With the realignment of the Army's maintenance mission to the Anniston Army Depot that value decreases significantly. Other customers within the Letterkenny area can be supported from nearby distribution depots. Production and physical space requirements can also be met by fully utilizing other depots in the distribution system.

Disestablishing DDLDP is consistent with both the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to disestablish DDLDP.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$44.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$21.2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$12.4 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$102.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 748 jobs (378 direct jobs and 370 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Franklin County, Pennsylvania economic area, which is 1.2 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 8.5 percent of employment in the area.

(periodic testing) for all other DOD missile systems. Currently, Letterkenny stores and maintains uprounded missiles for a significant portion of the Army's inventory, and almost all Air Force tactical missiles except AMMRAM. Navy systems are stored and uprounded at either Fallbrook, California or Yorktown, Virginia.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

Congressman Shuster provided a briefing on behalf of the community organization. The community organization calls itself the LEAD Coalition. Essentially, Congressman Shuster's group is concerned about keeping the base open and keeping the current staff of trained personnel employed. He reiterated the BRAC 1993 recommendations, the benefits of Paladin Enterprise and questioned the logic behind the Army's evaluation which placed Letterkenny among the least valued depots.

The community pitch was critical of the DOD BRAC 95 recommendation which decentralizes missile electronics and vehicle maintenance functions. The community questions whether or not (1) the receiving activity can store guidance and control sections which are "Class C" explosives, (2) if the receiver can paint Patriot systems in a high bay area with antenna and outriggers attached, and (3) if space and facilities are available to support radar testing of Patriot systems. Finally, the community stated that reversal of the BRAC 93 recommendation will increase maintenance costs, turnaround time, and that additional military construction projects would be required at the receiving sites.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Evaluate problems or concerns regarding the transfer of workloads between Letterkenny Army Depot and Tobyhanna Army Depot.

Glenn Knoepfle, Cross Service Team, 3/27/1995

Defense Distribution Depot - Letterkenny

The distribution depot is comprised of 29 masonry warehouses and 60 covered storage shelters. The depot is about 73 percent full. About 49 percent of the distribution depot's business is derived from the Letterkenny maintenance depot. They are currently receiving supply items from Lexington - Bluegrass Army which was closed during BRAC 88.

The distribution depot is responsible for the storage of approximately 7500 vehicles of various types and in conditions ranging brand new to unserviceable awaiting major overhaul or disposal. Outside vehicle storage covers about 100 acres, and presently 33 acres are occupied. The depot vehicle parking grounds are either blacktop or packed gravel. They have no cement hard stand storage. Based on DLA's military value, the Letterkenny distribution depot was ranked third from a total of 17 distribution depots collocated with a maintenance depot. While, the Letterkenny Distribution Depot is a highly valued DLA resource, if the Letterkenny maintenance depot mission is terminated, the distribution depot would also no longer be needed.

Lower Capacity in Comparison to Other Army Depots

The Letterkenny Army Depot believes it received a lower military value rating because its capacity was low, compared to other Army Depots. If capacity were based on the number of useable square feet, instead of workstations, the Letterkenny Army Depot would be ranked among the most valuable. For example a single bay could accommodate two work positions and a large tracked vehicle or 50 workstations configured to repair hundreds of individual circuit cards.

The Letterkenny Army Depot workload fell off during the 1991 and 1992 time period due the "on again / off again" transfer of missile work from Anniston Army Depot. During this time, Letterkenny transferred some vehicle work to other areas, anticipating missile work in its place. However the transfer of missile work was challenged by Anniston labor unions and a court injunction blocked the transfers. Therefore Letterkenny's assigned workload dropped substantially, capacity utilization was low, and average direct labor hour rates increased to the point where Letterkenny was no longer competitive.

Letterkenny's capacity utilization and labor rates are driven by assigned workload. The commanders briefing indicates that utilization will exceed 100 percent in the 1996 and 1997 timeframe and then fall to between 70 and 80 percent in 1999 upon completion of the Paladin upgrade program.

Letterkenny's One-Stop Proposal for Tactical Missile

While Letterkenny is proceeding with implementation of the consolidated tactical missile maintenance program as directed by BRAC 93, the base believes it should be the designated storage and intermediate maintenance site for all future missile systems. In addition, they believe they should have responsibility for storage and intermediate maintenance

least 28 acres of flat open land space. Commission staff will follow-up to determine how Tobyhanna might accomplish Patriot testing.

About \$26.6 million has already been expended to facilitate the tactical missile maintenance consolidation -- \$4.9 million for building renovation, \$4.0 million to move 72 personnel and their families from the losing activities, \$7.5 million to recruit and train about 190 newly hired electronics technicians, \$6.1 million to transport and install equipment from 8 different losing sites, and \$4.1 million for procurement of new equipment. Also, equipment valued at about \$100 million has been recovered from 8 losing sites and then installed at Letterkenny.

Artillery work - Paladin

In accordance with the BRAC 1993 recommendation, Letterkenny continues to perform major overhaul and maintenance on small to medium tracked vehicles. In addition the depot refurbishes a variety of wheeled vehicles that transport Army missile systems and components.

A tour of the vehicle shops disclosed that the depot recently completed construction of a new high tech painting booth costing \$6.2 million. Letterkenny has one of three DOD X-ray facilities for examining the quality of steel welded products. The vehicle shops total more than 350,000 square feet of work space.

Letterkenny has established an ongoing teaming arrangement with a private sector firm, United Defense, to produce 630 upgraded M109A6 Paladin artillery systems. Under this arrangement, dubbed "Paladin Enterprise" the old gun turret is removed in Letterkenny shops. The Letterkenny shop overhauls the chassis to like new condition and returns it the contractor.

United Defense fabricates a new turret at its York, Pennsylvania plant, and sends the turret to the Letterkenny depot, where it is outfitted with new wiring, hydraulic hosing and component parts. The completed turret is then installed on a refurbished chassis received from the Letterkenny vehicle shop. Lastly, the completed system is test driven and fired on the Letterkenny test track and range. The joint project has saved the taxpayers about \$15 million and is scheduled for completion in October 1998.

Discussions with Letterkenny and United Defense officials revealed that 120 more systems could be upgraded if contract options are exercised. United Defense is also looking to expand its business into other tracked vehicle systems. The company is closing its California production facility and consolidating its work at the York, Pennsylvania plant, which is located about 50 miles from Letterkenny. The company manager indicated that United Defense has produced and worked on all current tracked vehicles used by the U. S. military except the main M1 battle tank.

Windshield Tour of Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny facilities including selected vehicle storage yards
Ammunition storage area (staff visit only)

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

Letterkenny Army Depot now includes more than 19,000 acres. Under DOD's proposal about 12,000 acres would be retained for storage of conventional ammunition and uprounded missiles. The ammunition storage activity would also continue to have responsibility for periodically testing and recertifying uprounded missiles.

The DOD recommendation would consolidate tactical missile maintenance at one central site, however the maintenance consolidation point would be established at Tobyhanna Army Depot, rather than Letterkenny. The guidance and control sections will be removed from uprounded missiles stored at Letterkenny, or other established storage locations and then trucked to Tobyhanna for repair and overhaul. The repaired sections would be returned to the storage site for uprounding. Vehicles which provide the platforms for missiles or command and control apparatus for Army missile systems would be transported between Tobyhanna and Anniston, Alabama. Anniston would refurbish the vehicles, and Tobyhanna would integrate and test the complete system.

The DOD recommendation would retain conventional ammunition and tactical missile storage and disassembly at Letterkenny. Based on the Army's COBRA model, personnel authorizations of 490 civilian and one military would be retained at Letterkenny to support the realigned ammunition storage mission.

Tactical Missile Maintenance:

BRAC 93 established Letterkenny as the consolidated DOD depot for tactical missile maintenance. Similar workloads conducted at 12 different locations were to be consolidated at Letterkenny. The depot has made substantial progress toward implementing the missile maintenance consolidation plan. As of March 1995, workload transfers for 12 of the 21 missile systems designated for consolidation at Letterkenny have been completed. Maintenance work on 10 of the transferred systems have completed first article testing and are in full production. Workloads for 9 more missile systems are scheduled to transfer during the period FY 1995 through FY 1998. By FY 1999, the consolidated missile maintenance work will provide Letterkenny about 760 million direct labor manhours of work. Letterkenny has work spaces totaling 290,000 square feet for repair and overhaul of guidance and control sections. Interservicing, now accounts for 35 percent of the total tactical missile maintenance workload. Upon completion of the consolidation effort, about 55 percent of the total workload will be derived from Interservicing actions.

Letterkenny has established radar testing ranges to integrate all subsystems of overhauled Patriot missile systems. According to the Letterkenny officials this requires at

1. 2. 3.





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

**REMARKS BY CHAIR AT BEGINNING
OF PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION OF
BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING**


(MORNING SESSION)

WE ARE NOW READY TO BEGIN A PERIOD SET ASIDE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT. OUR INTENTION IS TO TRY TO INSURE THAT ALL OPINIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY AFFECTING PENNSYLVANIA AND MARYLAND ARE HEARD. WE HAVE ASSIGNED 30 MINUTES FOR THIS PERIOD -- 15 MINUTES FOR EACH STATE. PENNSYLVANIA WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE AFTERNOON PUBLIC COMMENT.

WE ASKED PERSONS WISHING TO SPEAK TO SIGN UP BEFORE THE HEARING BEGAN, AND THEY HAVE DONE SO BY NOW. WE HAVE ALSO ASKED THEM TO LIMIT THEIR COMMENTS TO TWO MINUTES, AND WE WILL RING A BELL AT THE END OF THAT TIME. PLEASE STOP AFTER YOUR TWO MINUTES ARE UP. WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ANY LENGTH IS WELCOMED BY THE COMMISSION AT ANY TIME IN THIS PROCESS. IF ALL THOSE SIGNED UP TO SPEAK WOULD RAISE YOUR RIGHT HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.

**OATH BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE
ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH?**





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WENDI LOUISE STEELE

OPENING REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER COX FOR AFTERNOON SESSION
BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING

GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO OUR AFTERNOON SESSION. I AM REBECCA COX AND WITH ME ARE MY FELLOW COMMISSIONERS AL CORNELLA, LEE KLING, JOE ROBLES AND WENDI STEELE.

THIS AFTERNOON WE WILL HEAR A PRESENTATION FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA WHICH WILL LAST FOR 110 MINUTES, A PRESENTATION FROM VIRGINIA FOR 100 MINUTES AND A PRESENTATION FROM NORTH CAROLINA FOR 20 MINUTES.

AS IS THE CASE WITH ALL OUR REGIONAL HEARINGS, THE COMMISSION HAS GIVEN A BLOCK OF TIME TO EACH STATE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS ON THE LIST AND THE JOB LOSS. WE HAVE LEFT IT TO ELECTED OFFICIALS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS TO DECIDE HOW TO FILL THE BLOCK OF TIME.


AFTER THE NORTH CAROLINA PRESENTATION, THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF 30 MINUTES FOR ADDITIONAL PUBLIC COMMENT FROM VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA AND PENNSYLVANIA. THE PERSONS WHO WISH TO SPEAK AT THAT TIME SHOULD HAVE SIGNED UP OUT IN THE LOBBY. THEY ARE ASKED TO LIMIT THEMSELVES TO TWO MINUTES, AND THAT LIMIT WILL BE ENFORCED.

WE WILL BE READY TO BEGIN THE PENNSYLVANIA AFTERNOON PRESENTATION AS SOON AS I HAVE SWORN IN THE WITNESSES.

**OATH BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE
ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH?**

1. 2. 3.



PENNSYLVANIA

Afternoon Session

110 Minutes

BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING SCHEDULE OF WITNESS

Fort Indiantown Gap, Lebanon

1:35PM - 2:00PM 25 Minutes

**Mr. Stephan Vegoe
Lebanon Valley Chamber of
Commerce
Representative George W. Gekas
Brigadier General James Mac Vay
Adjutant General
Representative Tim Holden**

Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station

2:00PM - 2:25PM 25 Minutes

**Representative Frank Mascara
Mr. Charles Holsworth
Esquire, Base Reservist,
Holsworth and Associates and
President, South Hills Chamber of
Commerce**

Support Staff

**Judge John Brosky, MGEN (Ret.)
Mr. Joseph Knapick, Westinghouse Corp.
Mr. Joseph Poznick, Western PA
Coalition
Mr. Steve George, Former Dir. of
Aviation, Pittsburgh Intl Airport
Mr. Lance Schaeffer, President,
Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce**

Kelly Support Center, Pittsburgh

2:25PM - 2:35PM 10 Minutes

Colonel Rodney Burns (Ret)

**Naval Air Warfare Center, Human
Centrifuge/Dynamic Flight
Simulator, Warminster, PA**

2:35PM - 2:38PM 3 Minutes

**Mr. Malcolm Taylor, Former Chief of
Staff, Naval Air Warfare Center
Headquarters and Former Naval
Attack Pilot**

**City of Philadelphia, (Defense Industrial
Support Center**

2:38PM - 2:42PM 4 Minutes

**Opening Remarks
Mayor Edward Rendell,
Philadelphia, PA**

Defense Industrial Supply Center

2:42PM - 3:00PM 18 Minutes

**Mr. Vince Stampone
Former DISC Deputy Commander
Mr. David Thornburgh
Pennsylvania Economy League**

**Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Philadelphia, PA**

3:00PM - 3:13PM 13 Minutes

**The Honorable John F. Lehman
Former Secretary of the Navy**

**Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit
(NAESU)**

3:13PM - 3:17PM 4 Minutes

**Ms. Karen Derry
NAESU Employee**

**Naval Air Technical Services Facility
(NATSE)**

3:17PM - 3:22PM 5 Minutes

**Mr. Frank Maimone
NATSE Employee
Mr. Glenn Weder
NATSE Employee**

Closing Remarks

3:22PM - 3:23PM

1 Minute

Mayor Rendell, Philadelphia

3:23PM - 3:25PM

2 Minutes

BGEN Joseph McCarthy, (Ret.)
Chairman, Base Realignment and
Closure Pennsylvania Action
Committee

PENNSYLVANIA

Fort Indiantown Gap Lebanon, PA

1. Since the Pennsylvania National Guard has expressed its intent to maintain virtually all of the training areas, ranges, and National Guard buildings as part of the enclave, do you know of any Reserve Component units that are currently scheduled to conduct their Annual Training at Fort Indiantown Gap that would have to go elsewhere? If so, why?
2. The current lease held by the Army states that the land occupied by Fort Indiantown Gap must be "returned in a natural state" and/or "a safe condition" to the Commonwealth following closure of the installation.

What does that mean? Could that requirement be modified or waived? It seems to be a potential impediment to continued Reserve Component training after the active duty garrison departs.

Greater Pittsburg International Airport Air Reserve Station

1. What would be the lease cost of the Air Force Reserve Station at Pittsburgh if the unit acquires the additional 30 acres of land offered by the city? What would be the cost for the other 47 acres of land that were informally offered?

Charles Kelly Support Facility Oakdale, PA

1. The Army recommends transferring 30 personnel to Fort Drum to perform the area support mission now done at the Kelly Support Facility. Is it reasonable to assume the area support mission can be performed at Fort Drum with these resources?
2. The 99th Army Reserve Command, located on the Kelly Support Facility, has been designated as a Reserve Support Command. How will this impact the proposed recommendation to realign the Kelly Support Center?

**Naval Air Warfare Center
Naval Command and Control Ocean Surveillance Center
Warminster, PA**

1. How does the Navy plan to ensure priority use of the remaining facilities at Warminster? Please explain.

**Defense Industrial Supply Center
Philadelphia, PA**

1. What percentage of weapon system coded items do you manage versus the percentage of those managed by Defense General Supply Center (DGSC)?
2. In 1993, Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC) was directed to move to the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound.

When was that mission scheduled to be relocated to the Aviation Supply Office Compound?

Has any of that mission been relocated to the compound to date?

How much has been spent on the renovation of the compound?

Will renovations still be needed under the current recommendation ?

3. Troop and General Support and Weapon System items are different in the way they are bought and managed. If the Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC) were to be collocated with Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), what efficiencies could be gained and would there be any consolidation in the mission as a result?

**Naval Surface Warfare Center
Philadelphia, PA**

1. What percentage of the machinery division personnel who worked at Annapolis in June 1993 are likely to move to Philadelphia in the 1997-98 timeframe?

**Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit (NAESU)
Philadelphia, PA**

1. I understand that a large percentage of NAESU employees may not be willing to move to San Diego following the closure of NAESF and consolidation to NADEP North Island California. Please explain why.

**Naval Aviation Technical Services Facility (NATSF)
Philadelphia, PA**

1. I understand that a large percentage of NATSF employees may not be willing to move to San Diego following the closure of NAESF and consolidation to Naval Aviation Depot North Island California. Please explain why.

2. How much of your time is spent in support of the Aviation Supply Office?

3. How much of your time is spent in support of North Island?

4. Approximately, how many trips did NATSF employees make to Naval Aviation Depot North Island during FY94?

PENNSYLVANIA- AFTERNOON SESSION

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THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**

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- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

KELLY SUPPORT CENTER, PITTSBURGH, PA

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

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- **NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER (NAWC)**
- **NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CENTER (NCCOSC)**

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NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, PHILADELPHIA, PA

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report


NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE UNIT (NAESU)

- Facility Summary Sheet
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NAVAL AIR TECHNICAL SERVICES FACILITY (NATSF)

- Facility Summary Sheet
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STATE CLOSURE HISTORY



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum.

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for \$1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$13 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$67 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$23 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$285 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 789 jobs (521 direct jobs and 268 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.2 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.2 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA

APRIL 10, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Al Cornella

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

LTC Steve Bailey, Army Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Representative George W. Gekas
MG Gerald T. Sajer, Pennsylvania Adjutant General
Maj Gen Frank H. Smoker, Jr., U.S. Air Force (Retired)
LTC Thomas Banasik, Garrison Commander
LTC Steve Trinkl, Deputy Commander
LTC David Cook, U.S. Army (Retired), Lebanon Valley Chamber of Commerce

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Support active Army and Reserve Component training.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

The Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces and must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements. Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations, and has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Forts Dix, A.P. Hill, and Drum.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Garrison Headquarters, Community Club, U.S. Army Readiness Region I Headquarters, Region I NCO Academy, Regional Training Site-Medical, Eastern Army National Guard Aviation Training Site, United States Property and Fiscal Office, Combined Direct Support/General Support Maintenance Shop-East, Muir Army National Guard Airfield, Pennsylvania Army National Guard Unit Training and Equipment Site, U.S. Army Reserve Equipment Concentration Site, Small Arms Ranges, Tank Table VIII Range, Army Aviation Support Facility and Helicopter Flight Simulators, and the Air to Ground Range.

Commissioner Cornella received briefings from MG Sajer, LTC Banasik, and other personnel who worked at Fort Indiantown Gap. He had the opportunity to meet and to hear the views of local community members, and conducted a ten-minute press availability prior to his departure.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

Costs and Savings Data--Pennsylvania Army National Guard officials provided cost factors and savings projections which result in a different analysis than that of the The Army Basing Study's COBRA analysis. The cost of the Reserve Component enclave is not included in the Army's report to DoD, and if the National Guard Bureau absorbed the entire costs of running the enclave, they believe there would be minimum or no savings to the federal government.

Ranges and Maneuver Training Acres--The COBRA analysis does not include data that would credit the installation with a new Tank Table VIII live-fire range, a Remote Electronic Target System (RETS) range to be constructed next fall, or the 710 square miles of land currently used for aviation tactical training under a letter of agreement with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Bureau of Land Management. The increased weight given by the Army to the amount of acres available for training was also questioned, with larger training areas scoring higher for land that they might not need.

Training Utilization--Concern was expressed that Fort Indiantown Gap was perceived as only a part-time training facility with few Reserve Component soldiers training there except for peak Annual Training periods in the summer months.

Training and Readiness--State National Guard leaders are concerned about potential adverse effects on the training and readiness of National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units if Fort Indiantown Gap is closed, believing that the State would not provide funding to continue running the installation. Training time may decrease and transportation costs may increase if some units must train elsewhere.

Lease Requirements--The current lease of the installation's land by the Army requires a one-year notice to the state before termination and requires the land be "returned to a safe condition".

Enclave Size--The training load, number of new facilities, and post configuration indicate an "enclave" of Fort Indiantown Gap would necessarily be virtually the entire installation.


COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

MSA Impact on Unemployment--Citizens are concerned over potential job losses, and pointed out that the Department of Labor's MSA consisting of Lebanon, Dauphin, and Cumberland Counties skews the potential unemployment rate. Cumberland County has approximately 5% of Fort Indiantown Gap's employees, yet Schuylkill County (with the highest unemployment rate among the four-county area), has over 25% of the post's workforce and is not counted in the MSA.

Community Relations--Generally excellent Military-Community relationship and tradition of mutual support would be missed by most citizens if Fort Indiantown Gap closes.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Obtain The Army Basing Study's (TABS) review and written comments concerning the contents of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard reviews (dated 4 and 10 April 1995) of the TABS Analysis of Fort Indiantown Gap costs and savings.
- Determine which specific reserve component units would continue to train at Fort Indiantown Gap if it is closed and only an enclave remains.
- Request TABS to identify, in agreement with the National Guard Bureau and U. S. Army Reserve Command, which reserve component units currently conducting Annual Training at Fort Indiantown Gap would have to go elsewhere, including where they would go and what additional costs may be incurred.
- Determine what the actual civilian payroll is for various components of the civilian workforce at Fort Indiantown Gap. (The Commission has been presented with at least five different figures. TABS established the amount as \$11.2 million using the COBRA model; the Pennsylvania National Guard briefed that the actual FY 1993 amount was only \$6.4 million; but, some of the same personnel later briefed that the economic impact of closing would result in direct "payroll salary losses" of "\$67 million", and at the end of the visit a figure of "over \$120 million" was stated).
- Obtain the National Guard and U. S. Army Reserve's concept of enclaves for Fort Indiantown Gap if the recommendation for closure is adopted.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station (ARS). The 911th Airlift Wing will inactivate and its C-130 aircraft will be distributed to Air Force Reserve C-130 units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia, and Peterson AFB, Colorado.

Justification: The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. Although Greater Pittsburgh ARS is effective at supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields. In addition, its location near a number of AFRES and Air National Guard units provides opportunities for its personnel to transfer and continue their service without extended travel.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$22.3 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$36.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$13.1 million with a return on investment expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$161.1 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 631 jobs (387 direct jobs and 244 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, counties economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Review of demographic data projects no negative impact on recruiting. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal, and restoration of the Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS will continue.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance activity in Valley Grove, WV, to the Kelly Support Center.

Justification: Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort Drum, NY, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property.

The Kelly Support Center is last in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills. It possesses no permanent facilities or mobilization capability.

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet of semi-permanent structures, from the Army's inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group Pittsburgh.

Relocating the Army's Reserve activity from Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with its parent unit and saves \$28,000 per year in lease costs.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$36 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$22 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$5 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$28 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 209 jobs (128 direct jobs and 81 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, & Westmoreland Counties, PA, area which represents less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the realigning or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

CHARLES E. KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY

21 APRIL 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

None

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Michael Kennedy, Army Team

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Representative Frank Mascara
Kurt Flood, Office of Senator Arlen Specter
Chester Wolicki, Deputy Commander, Kelly
Jennifer Yocum, Director Resource Management
BG (Ret) Joseph Mc Carthy, Chairman, State BRAC Office
Judge John Brosky, Chairman Western Pa. Colalition
Col (Ret) Rodney Burns, Former Commander, Kelly
Col (Ret) Robert Hodor, Former Commander, Kelly

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Provide administrative and logistical support to Army units in western Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels.
- Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance facility in Valley Grove, West Virginia to the Kelly Support Center.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

The Kelly Support Center is low in military value when compared to other command, control/administrative installations. It possess no permanent facilities or mobilization capability. Relocating the reserve activity from Valley Grove, WV will consolidate it with its parent unit and save lease costs.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

The tour included four of the five parcels. The Neville Island parcel was not visited, because it is not affected by the recommendation. First stop was a parcel that contained an office building for Public Works and a temporary GSA office building and fleet parking facility. This parcel is one of the two recommended for disposal.

The next stop was the parcel where the commissary, FAA facility, outdoor storage, and an office building were located. We went on a walking tour of the office/storage facility which housed the transportation, contracting, logistics and computer operations.

The tour ended at the main parcel which has the facilities for the 99th ARCOM.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

The following issues were identified.

Reserve Support-- The 99th ARCOM has been designated as a Reserve Support Command which will increase staffing at Kelly as well as the number of reservists supported. The recommendation calls for the support to be provided by 30 positions being relocated to Fort Drum, however, the current implementation plan indicates support will be provided by 70 percent of the current workforce moving to Fort Drum.

Reimbursable Positions-- Thirteen of the current 113 positions are funded by reimbursements from the 99th ARCOM, 83rd ARCOM, FAA, and DeCA. These activities will continue to require these services and will fund them elsewhere.

Valley Grove Facility-- The maintenance facility at Valley Grove will not relocate to Kelly, since there is a new facility being built for this activity in Wheeling, WV.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

The community raised the following issues.

Personnel Savings-- The projected personnel elimination's are overstated by 15 because Kelly only has 113 civilian positions and not 128 as included in the recommendation. Furthermore, the average salary is only \$37,800, which is \$8,200 less than the salary used to project the personnel savings.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Request a new certified data call.
- Follow-up on the personnel required for the Reserve Support Command mission.
- Discuss the projected personnel savings with TABS based on the current staff levels and reimbursable positions.

Michael Kennedy/Army Team/April 26, 1995

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1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the management of the relocated functions at the new receiving sites. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Inertial Navigational Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of these facilities to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$7.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$104.6 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,080 jobs (348 direct jobs and 732 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.0 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Environmental Impact: The closure of both NAWC Warminster and NCCOSC Det Warminster will have a positive effect on the environment because their appropriate functions and personnel will be relocated out of an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone and from an activity that is included on the National Priorities List. The personnel being relocated to NCCOSC San Diego represent an increase in personnel of less than six percent, which is not considered of sufficient size to adversely impact the environment at that sites. However, a conformity determination may be required to determine this impact. At both receiving sites, the utility infrastructure capacity is sufficient to handle the additional loading. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, AIRCRAFT DIVISION WARMINSTER, PENNSYLVANIA

INSTALLATION MISSION

A full spectrum RDT&E and in-service engineering center for weapons systems associated with air warfare, missiles and missile subsystems, aircraft weapons integration and airborne electronic warfare systems. The Center is the Navy's principal engineering and fleet support activity for naval aircraft, engines, avionics and aircraft support systems.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the Navy budget through fiscal year 2001. Closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the consolidation of the relocated functions with its parent command at the new receiving site. This closure completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Costs:\$8.4 million
- Net Savings During Implementation:\$33.1 million
- Annual Recurring Savings:\$7.6 million
- Return on Investment Year: Immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 years:\$104.6 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	136	5,204	0

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the consolidation of the relocated functions with its parent command at the new receiving site. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Human Centrifuge/Dynamic Flight Simulator Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of this facility to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

Return on Investment: The return on investment data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster. The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$8.4 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$7.6 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$104.6 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: The economic data below applies to the closure of NAWC Warminster and the closure of NCCOSC Det Warminster. Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,080 jobs (348 direct jobs and 732 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Environmental Impact: The closure of both NAWC Warminster and NCCOSC Det Warminster will have a positive effect on the environment because their appropriate functions and personnel will be relocated out of an area that is in severe non-attainment for ozone and from an activity that is included on the National Priorities List. The personnel being relocated to NAWC Patuxent River represent an increase in personnel of less than 1 percent, which is not considered of sufficient size to adversely impact the environment at that site. However, a conformity determination may be required to determine this impact. The utility infrastructure capacity at NAWC Patuxent River is sufficient to handle the additional loading. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on other lakes that exist in the DON inventory.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$50 thousand. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$33 thousand. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$15 thousand with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$.2 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not affect any jobs in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no community infrastructure impact since there are no receiving installations for this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of the NAWC OWTF Oreland will have a beneficial effect on the environment since any impact of military activities on jurisdictional wetlands will be eliminated. Because this closure has no accompanying transfer of functions or personnel, there are no other environmental impacts associated with this closure. There will be no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

**NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER , AIRCRAFT DIVISION
and
NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CENTER, RDT&E
DIVISION DETACHMENT
WARMINSTER, PENNSYLVANIA**

OPEN WATER TEST FACILITY, ORELAND, PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 7, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Al Cornella

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None.

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Lester C. Farrington, Cross Service Team Analyst
Mr. David Epstein, Navy Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

NAWC Representatives

CAPT William L. McCracken, Commander
Thomas Castaldi-Executive Director
Stuart Simon-Deputy Director
Franz Bonn-Transition Manager
Joseph Cody-Base Transition Office
Richard Coughlan-Head of Acoustics Dev.
David Polish-Public Affairs Officer
Thomas Milhous-Head of Crew Systems
Dr. Philip Whitley-Crew Systems
Herb Seligman-Navigational Systems Dev.
Steve Ganop-Integrated Navigation Systems
Jim Eck-Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance
Center, RDT&E Div. Detachment

Congressional Staff

Pete Johnson-Congressman James Greenwood's Staff 8th District

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

NAWC Aircraft Division is the principal Navy research, development, test and evaluation center for aircraft, airborne anti-submarine warfare and aircraft systems. The Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center is a high-accuracy navigation sensor laboratory that conducts research and development of new technology sensors, including various types of gyros. NAWC's Open Water Test Facility tests active and passive transducers and sonobuoy subsystems.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

Close the NAWC, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center and relocate appropriate functions, personnel equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Div., San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

Close the NAWC's Open Water Test Facility in Oreland, Pennsylvania.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

Overall reduction in operational forces and sharp decline of the Navy budget through FY 2001 is resulting in reduced technical workload and excess capacity. These closures complete the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91. Excess capacity is being reduced by eliminating redundant capability and requirements that can be met elsewhere in Navy.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

NAVIGATION LABORATORY(NRAD)

Inertial Navigation Test Facility

Global Positioning System Laboratory

Ships Motion Test Facility

CREW SYSTEMS FACILITIES

Human Centrifuge

Dynamic Flight Simulator

OPEN WATER TEST FACILITY (not viewed by Messrs. Cornella and Epstein)

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

The primary issue revolves around control over and Navy use of the major RDT&E facilities at NAWC-Warminster that are unique and may be needed to meet current and future Navy requirements. Three structures--the Inertial Navigation Facility, Centrifuge and Dynamic Flight Simulator--were retained after BRAC 91 . These facilities are massive and cannot cost-effectively be moved. Closure and excessing of the facilities provides the opportunity for transfer to the public educational or commercial sectors , and thus maintaining access by Navy on as as-needed basis. During BRAC 91, it was decided that these facilities be retained. A reuse plan for NAWC has been prepared for business and recreational use.

While BRAC 95 closes the remainder of NAWC-Warminster, the issue is that whatever activity ends up controlling the aforementioned R&D facilities, the Navy wants to have priority use of these unique facilities to meet their requirements. However, a potential issue may develop over the extent that the Navy will have to fund these activities after the facility is closed.

While closure of the Open Water Test Facility at Oreland and transfer of workload to Crane, Indiana is not an issue, a fixed tow rail in combination with a quiet ambient noise level is needed. The tow rail exists at Oreland and not at Crane. It can be purchased or moved depending whichever is more cost-effective. NAWC plans to recommend to Navy that Crane be given BRAC funding to upgrade their in water facility with a fixed tow rail to transition flow noise testing from NAWC's Oreland facility. This was apparently an oversight in developing closure plans for NAWC Warminster during BRAC 95.


COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

None.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Follow-up with Navy to substantiate future requirements for the major facilities to be left at NAWC Warminster. Also review justification and cost information of upgrading the Crane facility if formally presented to DBCRC.

Document Separator



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: The Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. Distribute the management of Federal Supply Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA Inventory Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for the management of troop and general support items at the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for the management of weapon system-related FSCs at the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, OH and the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, VA.

Justification: Four of the five Inventory Control Points manage differing mixes of weapon system, troop support, and general support items. Troop and general support items largely have different industry and customer bases than weapon system items. They are also more conducive to commercial support, and are thus managed differently than weapon system items. Consolidating management of items by the method of management required will improve oversight, streamline the supply management process, increase internal efficiency, and reduce overhead.

DLA manages nearly five times as many weapon system items as troop and general support items. A single troop and general support ICP is adequate, but two weapon system ICPs are necessary. DPSC is almost entirely a troop support ICP. No other ICP currently manages troop support items. The percentage of general support items at other ICPs is relatively small. Singling-up troop and general support items under DPSC management is the most logical course of action.

DISC had the lowest military value of the three hardware ICPs. The Columbus and Richmond centers are host activities of compounds which house a number of DLA and non-DLA activities, conforming to the DLA decision rules concerning maximizing the use of shared overhead and making optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities. Both the Richmond and Columbus sites have high installation military value, and take advantage of the synergy of a Collocated Depot. Both also have considerable expansion capability. The facilities at Columbus are the best maintained of any in DLA, and Richmond has several new buildings completed or in progress. DISC is a tenant on a Navy compound. Disestablishing DISC allows the Agency to achieve a substantial cost avoidance by back-filling the space already occupied by DISC and substantially reducing the amount of conversion required to existing warehouse space. Based on the above, military judgment concluded that disestablishing DISC is in the best interest of DLA and DoD.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time costs to implement the recommendation is \$16.9 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$59.3 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$18.4 million, with a return on investment expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$236.5 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,198 jobs (385 direct jobs and 813 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the area.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could also result in a maximum potential reduction of 981 jobs (358 direct jobs and 623 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Columbus, Ohio Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.1 percent of the area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area.

The Executive Group concluded that the data did not present any evidence or indication that would preclude the recommended receiving community from absorbing the additional forces, missions, and personnel proposed in the recommended realignment scenario. The environmental considerations present at the receiving installations do not prohibit this recommendation from being implemented.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland

Recommendation: Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the Department of the Navy budget through 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The total closure of this technical center reduces overall excess capacity in this category of installations, as well as excess capacity specific to this particular installation. It results in synergistic efficiencies by eliminating a major site and collocating technical personnel at the two primary remaining sites involved in hull, machinery, and equipment associated with naval vessels. It allows the movement of work to other Navy, DoD, academic and private industry facilities, and the excessing of some facilities not in continuous use. It also collocates RDT&E efforts with the In-Service Engineering work and facilities, to incorporate lessons learned from fleet operations and to increase the technical response pool to solve immediate problems.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$36.7 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$14.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$175.1 million.


1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,512 jobs (522 direct jobs and 990 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Baltimore, Maryland PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to less than 0.1 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NSWC Annapolis does not involve the transfer of any industrial-type activities. NSWC Carderock and NRL are currently in moderate non-attainment for carbon monoxide and attainment for PM-10; however, the movement of personnel into those areas will not adversely impact the environment in those areas. NSWC Philadelphia is in a non-attainment area for carbon monoxide. In the case of each receiving site, a conformity determination may be required to assess the impact of this action. At all receiving sites, the utility infrastructure is adequate to handle the additional personnel. Also, there is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, cultural/historical resources as a result of this recommendation.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island. Additionally, it enables the consolidation of necessary functions with a depot activity performing similar work and results in a reduction of costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2.5 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$5.9 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.5 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$29.5 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 145 jobs (90 direct jobs and 55 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NAESU Philadelphia will have a generally positive impact on the environment because it removes POV air emission sources from an area that is in non-attainment for carbon monoxide. The additional personnel relocating to NADEP North Island represent less than a one percent increase in current base personnel loading, which will not affect the environment. Further, the utility infrastructure capacity at the receiving site is sufficient to handle these additional personnel. There is no adverse impact on

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE UNIT (NAESU) PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

7 April 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Alton Cornella

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. David Epstein

Ms. Marilyn Wasleski

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Representative Robert Borski

Mayor Edward Rendell

Captain Lonnie Mitchell (USN) Executive Officer, Aviation Supply Office (ASO)

CDR John Van Sickle (USN), Commanding Officer, NAESU

Ms. Jean Aldridge, Comptroller and Head of Contracts, NAESU

Ms. Karen Deery, Fiscal Officer, NAESU

Mr. Al Fanelli, Contracts Division Head, NAESU

Mr. Paul Martin, TQM Manager and Safety/Workmen's Compensation Officer, NAESU

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

- To provide field engineering assistance and instruction to Naval Aviation activities in the installation, maintenance, repair, and operation of all types of aviation systems and equipment.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- Sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001 which leads to excess capacity in these activities.
- This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable.
- This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced excess capacity.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- No tour was conducted due to very tight time constraints (30 minutes for entire visit)

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- Cost of living in San Diego -- significant concern that employees will not move.
- Synergy with Aviation Supply Office
- Fleet support would be adversely affected, by move.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Navy claims on savings were disputed -- Navy COBRA did not reflect cost of doing the work at NADEP North Island that would be done by personnel who did not move. The employees pointed out that ASO could provide the same services at significantly less cost, because there was no synergy at NADEP North Island.
- Key people will be lost and a winning team will be broken up.
- There will be no financial benefit associated with the move and the ASO compound will not close so this does not accomplish a base closure.
- Lives of employees will be disrupted and most employees can not afford to move.
- There is very little, if any synergy between NAESU and NADEP North Island, but significant synergy with ASO and a fair amount with NAVAIR.
- There would have to be many, expensive trips to ASO and NAVAIR (3 days instead of part of 1) Documentation of this was provided.
- Philadelphia is the only city which might be affected by BRACs 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. The Cumulative Economic Impact dating back to BRAC 1988 includes closure of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, Naval Station Philadelphia, tenants at DPSC and, and now potentially most of DISC, NATSF, and NAESU.
- There is synergy with Naval Regional Contracting Center, which is moving next month to the ASO compound from South Philadelphia and will be renamed Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Norfolk, Philadelphia Detachment.. A copy of the signed MOU was provided.
- The COBRA standard salary figure is significantly higher than NAESU's average salary.
- The number of personnel to be moved according to the COBRA (approximately 40) is incompatible with the number in the certified data (approximately 54)
- NADEP North Island is a minor customer of NAESU -- only about 1% of NAESU's was in support of the NADEP North Island. NAESU is oriented towards Organizational and Depot level maintenance, while the NADEP is a Depot.

- The employees questioned the military value which was assigned.
- The employees said the function could be done at less cost in Philadelphia as part of ASO.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

None at this time.

David Epstein/Navy/04/25/95 9:32 AM

INTERVIEW 3/13/95 with Gerald Schiefer (Alternate on Joint Cross Service Group):



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

Justification: There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island and achieves the synergy from having the drawings and manuals collocated with an in-service maintenance activity at a major fleet concentration. Additionally, it enables the elimination of the NATSF detachment already at North Island and results in a reduction of costs.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$5.7 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$1.5 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$2.2 million with a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$22.7 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 715 jobs (227 direct jobs and 488 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-New Jersey PMSA economic area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 1.2 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

Environmental Impact: The closure of NATSF Philadelphia will have a generally positive effect on the environment because this activity will be vacating leased space in an area that is in non-attainment for carbon monoxide. The additional personnel being relocated represent less than a one percent increase in base personnel at North Island, and adequate capacity exists in the utility infrastructure to handle this additional personnel loading. There will

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

be no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AVIATION TECHNICAL SERVICES FACILITY (NATSF) PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

7 April 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Alton Cornella.

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None.

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. David Epstein.

Ms. Marilyn Wasleski.

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Representative Robert Borski.

Mayor Edward Rendell.

Captain Lonnie Mitchell (USN) Executive Officer, Aviation Supply Office.

Mr. William Smith, Technical Director, NATSF.

CDR Cocarota, Head Technical Manual Policy Office, NATSF.

CDR John Van Sickle (USN), Commanding Officer, NAESU.

INSTALLATION MISSION:

- Plan for, acquire, conduct product/process reviews and coordinate updates of Technical Manuals and Directives for NAVAIR aircraft, weapons, targets, common avionics and support systems.
- Produce NAVAIR Work Unit Code Manuals.
- Provide technical expertise to Program Managers for requirements definitions and acquisition of Technical Data Packages, including providing product/process reviews for these packages.
- Maintain the NAVAIR Repository of Engineering Data, including the initial distribution and all subsequent deliveries to Fleet Customers, NADEPs and ASO, among others.
- Implement process and product improvements for Technical Data through the use of advanced technologies.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- Sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001 which leads to excess capacity in these activities.
- This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable.
- This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced excess capacity.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- No tour was conducted due to very tight time constraints (30 minutes for entire visit).

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- Cost of housing in San Diego -- significant concern that employees will not move.
- Synergy with Aviation Supply Office and Defense Printing Service, Navy International Logistics Control Office (NAVILCO) (handles Foreign Military Sales)
- Fleet support would be adversely affected by move.
- Defense Printing Service located its only Technical Manual Print on Demand System (TMPODS) Digital Storage and Production Facility on the ASO compound because of NATSF's location there. (This system is used primarily by NATSF in support of NAVAIR, NAVSEA, NAESU can use also at additional cost.)
- With advances in teleconferencing and digital imaging, does it matter where NATSF is located?

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Lack of synergy with NADEP North Island
- Navy claims on savings were disputed -- the Navy COBRA did not reflect the cost of doing the work at NADEP North Island that would be done by personnel who did not move. The employees pointed out that ASO could provide the same services at significantly less cost, and there was no synergy at NADEP North Island.
- Key people will be lost and a winning team will be broken up.
- There will be no financial benefit associated with the move and the ASO compound will not close anyway so this does not accomplish a base closure.
- Lives of employees will be disrupted and most employees can not afford to move because of housing prices.
- There is very little, if any, synergy between NATSF and NADEP North Island, but there is significant synergy with ASO and a fair amount with NAVAIR.

- If there were synergy with NADEP North Island (and they think there is not) , then with advances in teleconferencing and digital imaging, does it matter where NATSF is located?
- There would have to be many, expensive trips to ASO and NAVAIR (three days instead of part of one) NATSF personnel made about 17 times as many trips to Washington, DC as they did to San Diego and almost twice as many trips to Philadelphia area commands which involved driving (i.e., excluding ASO, Defense Industrial Supply Center, Defense Printing Service) than were made to all commands in San Diego. Documentation of travel was provided.
- Philadelphia is only city which has faced recommended closures in each BRAC ('88, '91, '93, and '95) The Cumulative Economic Impact dating back to BRAC 1988 includes closure of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, Naval Station Philadelphia, tenants at DPSC, and now potentially most of DISC, NATSF, and NAESU, and NAWC Warminster.
- The COBRA standard salary figure is significantly higher than NATSF's average salary, thereby overstating whatever savings do exist.
- NADEP North Island is a minor customer of NATSF -- only about 5 - 10% of NATSF's work was in support of the NADEP North Island. However, ASO constitutes about 30% of NATSF's business.
- The employees questioned the military value which was assigned.
- The employees said the function could be done at less cost in Philadelphia as part of ASO.
- San Diego's environmental constraints will necessitate contracting out some work currently performed in-house (aperture cards). NATSF Management later said additional environmental scrubbers could eliminate that problem.
- During BRAC 93, NATSF proposed to the Commission that NATSF be made into a "purple (DoD)" organization to become the consolidated center for DoD aircraft drawings. The employee proposal was informally provided to Naval Air Systems Command. The proposal was never formally acted upon.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

None at this time.


David Epstein/Navy/04/25/95 9:35 AM

Interview with Gerald Schiefer (Alternate on Joint Cross Service Group):

- NAESU and NATSF were moved out of Washington about ten years ago to blunt criticism that the Systems Commands were getting too big. NAESU oversees contractor (1200 WY) and civil service (500 +/-) personnel in about 42 activities around the country who sort of act like a MOTU (Mobile Technical Unit).
- The BSEC considered moving NAESU and NATSF to Pax, but decided Pax was growing too large and too much MILCON would be required.
- Consideration was given to moving the two activities to Pt. Mugu or China Lake or Warminster.
- A major reason for the move is to utilize excess capacity at NADEP North Island.
- There is some benefit from eliminating overlap of the NAESU group at North Island.

THOUGHTS OF DAVID EPSTEIN

- NAESU argument is keyed to eliminating command structure and consuming excess capacity at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island. This would lower the average overhead cost of the NADEP.
- BSEC evaluated NAESU with 75%, 40% and 0% then chose 40% !! see Tab 41 1/10/95 paragraph 5c.
- NAESU provides technical representatives to Aviation activities.
- According to the BSAT, locating at NADEP North Island permits consolidation that eliminates command structure and consumes excess capacity at the NADEP.
- Moving activities from ASO also potentially reduces the cost to DLA to move its printing services to ASO compound. I have not been able to ascertain what this refers to.
- Given the greater steady-state savings and 20-year net present value, the BSEC approved the analysis with the assumption that rehabilitating spaces at NADEP North Island would cost 40% of new construction costs. The COBRA standard is 75%.



CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A	CARLISLE BARRACKS					
	CHARLES E. KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY					
	FORT INDIANTOWN GAP					
	LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT	88/91/93	DEFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNDN	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Supply and material-readiness missions realigned from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY; completed FY 93</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Realign Depot Systems Command with the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and form the Industrial Operations Command (SIMA-E changed by 1993 Defense Base Closure Commission); scheduled FY 95</p> <p>1993 DBCRC: Tactical missile maintenance realigned from Anniston Army Depot, AL; Red River Army Depot, TX; NADEP Alameda, CA; NADEP Norfolk, VA; NWS Seal Beach, CA; MCLB Barstow, CA; and Ogden ALC, Hill AFB, UT; scheduled FY 94-95</p> <p>Retain Systems Integration Management Activity-East (Change to 1991 Defense Base Closure Commission recommendation)</p>
	NEW CUMBERLAND DEPOT					
	SCRANTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT	90	PRESS	ONGOING	LAYAWAY	<p>1990 PRESS: Layaway; scheduled FY 95</p>
	TACONY WAREHOUSE	88	DEFBRAC	ONGOING	CLOSE	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close; completed FY 92; pending disposal</p>
	TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT	88/93	DEFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Communications-electronics mission realigned from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY; scheduled FY 93-94</p> <p>1993 DBCRC: Maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center realigned from Vint Hill Farms, VA; scheduled FY 96</p>

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
AF						
	GREATER PITTSBURGH IAP AGS					
	HARRISBURG OLMSTED IAP AGS					
	WILLOW GROVE ARS					
D						
	DEFENSE CLOTHING FACTORY	93	DBCRC	COMPLETE	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Accept DoD recommendation to close.
	DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT DISTRICT M	93	DBCRC	COMPLETE	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Accept DoD recommendation. Close DCMD Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA, and relocate its mission to the remaining three DCMDs.
	DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT LETTERKENNY	93	DBCRC	COMPLETE	REJECT	1993 DBCRC: Reject DoD recommendation to closed DDLP and relocate its mission to other DDDs. Maintain DDLP at the Chambersburg, PA, site to retain key support functions it provides Letterkenny Army Depot.
	DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER	93	DBCRC	COMPLETE	REJECT	1993 DBCRC: Reject DoD recommendation to close. Maintain DISC at ASO compound to realize the most cost-effective option.
	DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER					
	DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER	93	DBCRC	COMPLETE	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Reject DoD recommendation to close and move to New Cumberland. Close and move to ASO to realize best cost efficiencies.
N						
	NAS WILLOW GROVE					
	NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER WARMINSTE	91	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1991 DBCRC: Recommended realignment as part of the Aircraft Division, Naval Air Warfare Center.
	NAVAL HOSPITAL PHILADELPHIA	88	DEFBRAC	CLOSED	CLOSE	1988 DEFBRAC: BRAC1 recommended closing Naval Hospital Philadelphia because the existing facilities are unsafe and inadequate, and cannot be efficiently modernized. Retain the Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station, a hospital tenant, in the Philadelphia area.

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	NAVAL STATION PHILADELPHIA	90/91	PRESS/DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	<p>1990 PRESS: DOD Secretary proposed NAVSTA Philadelphia as a closure in his 1990 press release.</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Recommended closing NAVSTA Philadelphia, reassigning its ships to other Atlantic Fleet Homeports and relocating the Naval Damage Control Training Center to NTC Great Lakes, IL.</p>
	NAVY AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE	93	DBCRC	CANCELLED	CLOSE	<p>1993 DBCRC: Cancelled the OSD recommended closure of the ASO, Philadelphia, PA and relocation of needed personnel, equipment, and support to the Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC) Mechanicsburg, PA.</p>
	NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTR NRC ALTOONA	93	DBCRC	CLOSED	CLOSE	<p>1993 DBCRC: Recommended closure of NRC Altoona, PA because its capacity is in excess of projected requirements.</p>
	PERA (SURFACE) HQ, PHILADELPHIA	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	<p>1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of PERA Philadelphia and relocation of needed functions, personnel, equipment, and support to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, CA, Portsmouth, VA and Newport News, VA.</p>
	PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD	90/91	PRESS/DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	<p>1990 PRESS: DOD Secretary proposed NSY Philadelphia as a closure in his 1990 press release.</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Recommended closing and preserving the shipyard for emergent requirements. The propeller facility's Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility and Naval Ship System Engineering Station will remain.</p>



VIRGINIA

100 Minutes

BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES

3:35PM - 3:50PM

15 Minutes Governor George Allen

Senator John Warner

Senator Chuck Robb

Fort Pickett

3:50PM - 4:30PM

40 Minutes Representative Norman Sisisky

Colonel Chuck Williams (Ret)

Member, Fort Pickett Support Group

General Alfred M. Gray (Ret)

Former Commandant of the Marine
Corps

Mr. William Armbruster

Chairman, Fort Pickett Support Group

Kenner Army Hospital, Fort Lee

4:30PM - 4:45PM

15 Minutes Representative Norman Sisisky

Representative Robert Scott

Major General William K. Hunzeker (Ret)

Member of Crater Planning District
Commission

**U.S. Army Information Systems Software
Command, Fairfax County**

4:45PM - 4:50PM

5 Minutes Representative Tom Davis

**U. S. Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command, Arlington**

4:50PM - 5:00PM

**10 Minutes Ms. Ellen Bozman
Vice Chairperson
Arlington County Board**

**Dr. Barry Blechman
Representative of Charles E. Smith
Properties**

Naval Air Station, Oceana and Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk

5:00PM - 5:15PM

15 Minutes Representative Owen Pickett

Mayor Paul Fraim, Norfolk, VA

**Mayor Meyera E. Oberndorf
Virginia Beach, VA**

VIRGINIA

Fort Pickett Blackstone, VA

1. The U. S. Navy SEALs maintain a small detachment compound at Fort Pickett. Where will this detachment go if the Commission approves the recommendation to close Fort Pickett, will?
2. The U. S. Army has offered to negotiate with a regional authority for the future disposition of the water reservoir on Fort Pickett, but the voters of Nottoway County defeated the referendum to do so on March 28, 1995. Are there any plans by Nottoway County or other local government authorities to conduct another initiative to establish a regional water authority?
3. If the Commission approves the recommendation to close Fort Pickett, does the National Guard plan to request that Blackstone Army Airfield be included in the enclave? If not, what are possible options for its disposition?

Kenner Army Community Hospital Fort Lee, VA

The realignment of Kenner Army Community Hospital at Fort Lee may lead to more efficient use of civilian hospitals in the Richmond and Petersburg, VA area. Many patients currently using Kenner will now be turning to civilian hospitals for inpatient care, increasing demand in the civilian health care sector. If excess capacity exists there (as it does elsewhere), increased demand may improve efficiency in the civilian sector. If civilian healthcare resources are in short supply, the increased demand may exacerbate access problems.

1. Have you had the opportunity to consider the impact of closing Kenner Army Community Hospital on local civilian hospitals?

2. Does excess capacity exist in the Richmond/Petersburg civilian hospitals such that this excess could be used to satisfy the need created by the elimination of inpatient beds at Kenner?

**U.S. Army Information Systems Software Command
Fairfax, Virginia**

1. The DoD recommendation calls for the Command to relocate to an existing building on Fort Meade. Has the building been identified?

**Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)
Arlington, VA**

1. Please briefly explain the mission of SPAWAR, Arlington, VA and Naval Command Control Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA.

2. Is there a logical alternative to having SPAWAR move to San Diego?

**Naval Air Station, Oceana, VA
(Redirect of NAS Cecil Field, FL)**

1. Has a conformity determination been drafted for the receipt of additional planes and personnel at the Naval Air Station Oceana?

If not, has one been initiated?

2. Has the local air district been contacted to work with the Navy on the conformity determination for a possible move to Oceana?

VIRGINIA

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**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**

VIRGINIA STATE MAP

FORT PICKETT

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- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

FORT LEE (KENNER ARMY HOSPITAL)

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

US ARMY INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOFTWARE COMMAND, ARLINGTON

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

US NAVY SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND (SPAWAR), ARLINGTON

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report


NAS OCEANA AND NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, NORFOLK

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

STATE CLOSURE HISTORY

MAP NO. 47

VIRGINIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Pickett, Virginia

Recommendation: Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, NJ.

Justification: In the past ten years, the Army has reduced its active and reserve forces considerably. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

Fort Pickett is very low in military value compared to other major training area installations. It has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for reserve units that now use Fort Pickett can be conducted easily at other installations in the region, including Fort Bragg, Fort A.P. Hill and Camp Dawson. The Army intends to license required facilities and training areas to the Army National Guard.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$25 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$41 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$21 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$241 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 362 jobs (254 direct jobs and 108 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Nottoway & Dinwiddie Counties, VA area, which represents 0.8 percent of the area's employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT PICKETT, VA

28 MARCH 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Ben Borden, Director of Review and Analysis

Mr. Ed Brown, Army Team Leader

LTC Steve Bailey, Army Team Analyst

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator John W. Warner

Senator Charles S. Robb

Representative Norman Sisisky

Representative L.F. Payne

Governor George Allen

Secretary Robert Skunda, Virginia
Department of Commerce

Dr. James Harris, Mayor of Blackstone

Dr. John Cabin, Southside Community
College, Fort Pickett

Colonel James H. Allen, Post Commander

Mr. Jim Caul, Post BRAC Transition Chief

LTC Harry L. Bryan, Jr., Army National

Guard Analyst, The Army Basing Study

Mr. Asher Weaver, Range Operations Officer

CSM Steven M. Foust, Post Sergeant Major

COL Larry R. Fulbright, U.S. Army (Retired)

General Sam Wilson, U.S. Army (Retired)

COL Charles J. Williams, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired),

Fort Pickett Support Group

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Regional training center that supports active Army and Reserve Components and other Department of Defense activities.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, NJ.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

The Army has reduced its active and reserve forces considerably and must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future needs. Fort Pickett is very low in military value compared to other major training area installations, and has virtually no active component tenants. Annual training for reserve component units can easily be conducted at other posts such as Forts Bragg, A.P. Hill, and Camp Dawson.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Media Center (Bldg 310), Mobilization and Training Building (Bldg 316), Virginia Army National Guard Mobilization and Training Equipment Site, Central Wash Facility, Pesticide Building and Railhead, United States Army Reserve Center, Equipment Concentration Site #88, Forces Command Petroleum Training Module, Pickett House, Direct Support/General Support Maintenance Area, Recycling Operations, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)/MOUT Assault Course, Water Treatment Plant, Waste Water Treatment Facility, Peregrine Brigade Complex, Annual Training Area, and Blackstone Army Airfield.

Commissioner Cox held a fifteen-minute press availability with members of the Virginia Congressional Delegation, followed by a working lunch and community support group presentation in "Mitchell's" contracted Community Club on post.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

During an interesting tour of facilities and several informative presentations by base personnel, elected officials, and community leaders, the following key issues were raised:

Installation Budget & Cost Savings--More analysis of some factors which may not have been taken into account merit further study to see if they affect potential cost savings. Examples include a possible future transfer of the Water Treatment Plant and Waste Water Treatment Facility to a regional authority, environmental funding, increased federal funding for National Guard/Reserve operation of enclaves, and additional costs that may occur if forces (any component) have to travel further to train elsewhere.

Training Area Availability--A review of other regional training area installations' capacities and capabilities seems warranted to determine if there will be enough land to handle the maneuver, impact area, and drop zone requirements for all components of all services which use Fort Pickett, should its training areas be closed. One speaker observed that Fort Bragg (160-170 miles from Fort Pickett) was having difficulty handling its own forces' training needs due to the restrictions imposed to protect the red-cockaded woodpecker, and that the Army wanted to obtain 100,000 more acres for training there.

Nearest Railhead--The Army has corrected the error in their analysis which listed the nearest railhead as 9 miles away. In fact, two railheads are on main post and a third is by the airfield.

Joint Usage of Fort Pickett--The U.S. Navy has stationed a detachment of 14 personnel at Fort Pickett. Several additional active component units have conducted training at Fort Pickett, primarily from Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, increasing active component training by Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units to approximately one-third of all personnel who trained there in Fiscal Year 1994. Over 3,600 civilian law enforcement personnel also utilized training ranges and facilities. It may be useful to seek a more definitive position on useage from the other services, and to review scheduling conflicts and alternative training sites in event of closure. Alternative cost savings obtained from increased joint service usage of Fort Pickett, rather than at other ranges and training areas more distant from Navy, Marine, and Air Force units' home stations, is worth examination.

Enclave(s) and Future Funding--Relevant questions exist about the specific details of the definition of "enclave", whether the answers meet the training and readiness needs of the Reserve Components, and how the enclave(s) will be funded, all of which require resolution.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

Economic Impact--Fort Pickett is the largest single employer for the Nottaway and Lunenburg county area. The standard MSA used by DoD, based on the 1992 Census Data, for Fort Pickett was the Nottaway-Dinwiddie County MSA. Few Fort Pickett employees live in Dinwiddie; many do reside in Lunenburg, hence the economic impact by county is different than forecast. The community group also claims a total job loss figure more than twice as high as DoD (840 vice 362), but without a detailed analysis.

Military Value--local citizens do appear to genuinely support the retention of Fort Pickett.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Determine the costs for a company-size Reserve Component unit to operate and maintain a Reserve Component enclave at Fort Pickett.
- Determine the cost savings if the operation and maintenance of the Water Treatment Plant were transferred to the town of Blackstone, and Fort Pickett then purchased its water.
- Ascertain whether the \$30 thousand annual Fish and Wildlife appropriation would continue if Fort Pickett closed.
- Identify which National Guard and/or Reserve units would still maintain their equipment at Fort Pickett and continue to conduct training there following closure.
- Determine how the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Army Reserve Command decide how or if to fund the enclave for Reserve Component training.
- Request a classified briefing by Special Operations Command on Navy SEAL and other special operations training conducted on Fort Pickett or the surrounding area.



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Lee, Virginia

Recommendation: Realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

Justification: This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Lee, VA by eliminating inpatient services at Kenner Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other nearby military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$2 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$16 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$4 million with a return on investment expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$51 million.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 321 jobs (205 direct jobs and 116 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Richmond-Petersburg, VA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which represents 0.1 percent of the area's employment.

The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior round BRAC actions in this area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential increase equal to 0.1 percent of employment in the area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.

BASE VISIT REPORT

FORT LEE, VA

APRIL 5, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Staff Visit

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONERS:

None

COMMISSION STAFF:

David Lewis

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Fort Lee:

MG Thomas Robison, CG, USACASCOM
COL Bates, CDR, 23D BDE
COL Matthews, CDR, 49TH GP.

Kenner Army Community Hospital:

COL Baker, Commander
LTC Wheeler, Deputy Commander for Administration.

Local and national officials:

Representative Robert Scott

Representative Norman Sisisky

Mr. Dennis Morris, Crater District Planning Commission

MG(RET) William Hunzeker, Crater District Planning Commission

Mr. Larry Fulbright, Crater District Planning Commission

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

Fort Lee is the home of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command which provides command and support to the garrison, the Quartermaster Center and School, the Army Logistics Management College, and other Combat Service Support schools sited at other installations. Various deployable Forces Command units, including the 49th Quartermaster Group are also sited at Fort Lee. Fort Lee is home to the Defense Commissary Agency, U.S. Army Information Systems Software Development Center-Lee, and 21 other tenants.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

Realign Fort Lee by reducing Kenner Army Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient activity.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

Eliminates excess medical treatment capacity. Inpatient care available at other nearby military medical activities and through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. The Medical Joint Cross Service Group suggested this realignment.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

Kenner Army Community Hospital

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED:

- Too few staff will remain after realignment to perform all functions of a "super clinic."
- Loss of support for Fort Lee training missions, including Advanced Individual Training.
- Delays in medical discharge processing.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- Distance to other military hospitals.
- Many other military hospitals had lower functional value scores.
- Access to health care services for retirees.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- Identify users of Kenner ACH by beneficiary type and geographic area.
- Identify Army and/or Health Affairs guidance on clinic staffing.

David Lewis/Army Team/24 April 1995



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia

Recommendation: Close by relocating Information Systems Software Command to Fort Meade, MD.

Justification: In 1993, the Commission suggested DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. The annual cost of the current lease is \$2 million.

Return on Investment: The total one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of \$2 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$1 million with a return on investment expected in six years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$8 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will not result in a change in employment in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area because all affected jobs will remain in that area. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing site or receiving installation.

BASE VISIT REPORT

INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOFTWARE CENTER

MARCH 22, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

None.

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None.

COMMISSION STAFF:

Michael Kennedy, Army Team

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

ISSC

Colonel David Wallen, Commander
Tina America, Facilities Manager
Jerry King, USAISC-BRAC

Department of the Army

Wes Blaine, OSAA-SBMS
Theresa Persick Arnold, DAIM-BO
LTC Rusty Pritchard, DAIM- BO
Charlotte Rodriquez, MDW-BRAC

Fort Meade

Dan Hopkins, DPW
Lee Galiber, Master Planner
Major Gray, Facilites Manager

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

To provide Post Deployment Software Support to Standard Army Management Information Systems in the fields of personnel, military police, force accounting, housing management, installation support modules, and sustaining base information services.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

Close by relocating the Information Systems Software Center to Fort Meade, MD.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. The annual cost of the current lease is \$2 million.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

A walking tour of office space on the fifth, six and seventh floors of the Crown Ridge building. In addition, 2 computer labs and the main computer room were visited. The computer room consisted of about 10,000 SF of raised floor space, but the requirement is for only 2,000SF. When the lease was under negotiation there was a requirement for 10,000SF of raised floor space, but the need for main frames was eliminated shortly before moving into the space.

A walking tour of the first and second floors of the First Army headquarters building.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

The Army recommendation assumed ISSC would occupy space in the First Army Building at Fort Meade. However, there is no space in the First Army building for ISSC. There is an approved backfill plan which keeps some current tenants, moves in other organizations on Fort Meade from World War II wood buildings, and relocates some Second Army personnel from Fort Gillem. There is no other permanent administrative space available on Fort Meade, so new construction would be acquired to accommodate ISSC. There is available land and utility capacity. The estimated military construction costs in COBRA is based on renovating space, and may be understated.

When ISSC moved into the lease space, it spent \$2 million to install a Local Area Network (LAN). The new space must include this requirement.

ISSC provides space to 141 contract personnel. This space requirement is not included in the COBRA scenario. However, if the contractors are not provided space in the new location, they can renegotiate their contract for their space costs.

ISSC is developing a plan to consolidate offices to eliminate the need for one floor, which would reduce their lease cost. ISSC could also reduce lease cost by collocating the Executive Systems Directorate (69 personnel) with their headquarters at Fort Belvoir.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

None.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

Follow-up required with the Army Basing Study on the information obtained during the base visit.



DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA REDIRECT

INSTALLATION MISSION

To oversee the development of electronics programs, including Research and Development, planning, and implementation.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Change the BRAC 93 SPAWARS' recommendation from relocate "to Government-owned space within the NCR (National Capital Region)" to "to Government-owned space in San Diego, California, to allow consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command headquarters."
- This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, DC.
- This relocation does not include the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- Administrative Activities must continue to reduce.
- Space available in San Diego permits further consolidation of the SPAWAR command structure and the elimination of levels of command structure.
- This consolidation will achieve not only significant savings from elimination of unnecessary command structure but also efficiencies and economies of operation.
- In addition, by relocating to San Diego instead of the NCR, there will be sufficient readily available space in the Washington Navy Yard for the Naval Sea Systems Command.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Cost: \$ 24.0 million
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$120.0 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 25.3 million
- Break-Even Year: Immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: \$360.0 million

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia

Recommendation: Change the recommendation for the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "[r]elocate...from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "Relocate...from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, California, to allow consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command headquarters. This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at NRL, or the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region."

Justification: The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions in administrative activities. Space available in San Diego resulting from personnel changes and work consolidation permits further consolidation of the SPAWAR command structure and the elimination of levels of command structure. This consolidation will achieve not only significant savings from elimination of unnecessary command structure but also efficiencies and economies of operation. In addition, by relocating to San Diego instead of the NCR, there will be sufficient readily available space in the Washington Navy Yard for the Naval Sea Systems Command.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$24 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$120 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$25.3 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$360 million.


Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,821 jobs (1,133 direct jobs and 681 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia-West Virginia PMSA economic area, which is 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.6 percent of employment in the economic area.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Environmental Impact: The relocation of this activity from leased space in the NCR to San Diego, California, likely will not have an adverse impact on the environment. Because San Diego is in a moderate non-attainment area for carbon monoxide, a conformity determination may be required to evaluate air quality impacts. There is no adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.



NAS OCEANA, VA

1993 VERSUS 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS

The DoD Recommendations to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission included a recommendation to close the Naval Air Station at Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to MCAS Cherry Point; NAS Oceana and MCAS Beaufort. This recommendation essentially directed that the aircraft located at NAS Cecil Field would be distributed to the following airfields:

- 126 F/A-18's To MCAS Cherry Point
- 48 S-3's To NAS Oceana
- 24 F/A-18's To MCAS Beaufort

The DoD Recommendations to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission includes a redirect of the NAS Cecil Field aircraft, approved by the Commission in 1993. Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, Department of the Navy force structure experiences a reduction of over 10% by the year 2001. There continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. The above, combined with the accelerated retirement of the A-6 type aircraft previously based at NAS Oceana, has created an excess capacity at this airfield. Therefore, the 1995 DoD Recommendation to the Commission recommends a redirect of the 1993 proposal to the following:

- 135 F/A-18's To NAS Oceana
- 48 S-3's To NAS Jacksonville
- 24 F/A-18's To MCAS Beaufort
- 24 F/A-18's To NAS Atlanta (Reserves)

1993 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.

Justification: Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by the requirement to "bed down" different mixes of aircraft at various air stations. In making these choices, the outlook for environmental and land use issues was significantly important. In making the determination for reductions at air stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity which could be eliminated with assets most readily redistributed to receiving air stations. The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-18s which were relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort and Cherry Point. These air stations both had a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems and dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air station with a lower military value, because NAS Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to support military operations of these aircraft. Its excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$312.3 million. Annual recurring savings for both are \$56.7 million, with a return on investment in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$200.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Cecil Field will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 3.0 percent of the employment base of the Jacksonville Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Relocations to MCAS Cherry Point will require increased classroom space in the local schools. Remediation of this impact is included in the cost analysis. There are no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste and pollutant generation will be eliminated. Similarly, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operating areas) and reduce noise levels and air emissions. Environmental cleanup will continue until completed.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from "Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure." In addition, add the following: "To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area."

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. This recommended redirect achieves several important aims in furtherance of current Departmental policy and operational needs. First, it avoids the substantial new construction at MCAS Cherry Point that would be required if the F/A-18s from NAS Cecil Field were relocated there, which would add to existing excess capacity, and utilizes existing capacity at NAS Oceana. This avoidance and similar actions taken regarding other air stations are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. Second, it permits collocation of all fixed wing carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air assets in the Atlantic Fleet with the other aviation ASW assets at NAS Jacksonville and NAVSTA Mayport and support for those assets. Third, it permits recognition of the superior demographics for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta, Georgia.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$66.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$335.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$11.5 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$437.8 million.

Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current employment in the Craven and Carteret Counties, North Carolina economic area. However, the anticipated 7.5 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Environmental Impact: The reallocation of Navy and Marine Corps aviation assets in this recommendation will have a generally positive impact on the environment, particularly on the air quality at Cherry Point, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida. The introduction of additional aircraft and personnel to the Norfolk, Virginia, area is not expected to have an adverse impact on the air quality of that area since the net effect of moving these particular assets, when compared to the force structure reductions by FY 2001, is a reduction of personnel and aircraft from FY 1990 levels at this receiving activity. However, it is expected that conformity determinations will be required for the movements to NAS Oceana and NAS Atlanta. The utility infrastructure at each of the receiving sites is sufficient to handle the additional personnel. At none of the receiving sites will there be an adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.



CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A	ARLINGTON HALL STATION					
	ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE	91	DBCRC	COMPLETE	REALGNDN	1991 DBCRC: Realign MANPRINT function to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; completed FY 93
	CAMERON STATION	88	DEFBRAC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1988 DEFBRAC: Close; scheduled FY 95 Realign Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Engineer Activity Capital Area, and the Joint Personal Property Shipping Office to Fort Belvoir, VA; scheduled FY 95
	FORT A.P. HILL					

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	FORT BELVOIR	88/91/93	DEFBRAC/DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Engineer Activity Capital Area, and the Joint Personal Property Shipping Office realigned from Cameron Station, VA.; scheduled FY 95</p> <p>Corrosion prevention and control related research realigned from Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown, MA (Changed to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD by 1991 Defense Base Closure Commission)</p> <p>Realign Information Systems Command activities to Fort Devens, MA (Changed by 1991 Defense Base Closure Commission)</p> <p>Crime Records Center of the Criminal Investigation Command realigned from Fort Holabird, VA; scheduled FY 95</p> <p>Criminal Investigation Command realigned from leased space in Northern Virginia; scheduled FY 95</p> <p>1991 DBCRC: Realign Information Systems Command activities to Fort Ritchie, MD or another location in the National Capital Region (Change to 1988 SECDEF Commission recommendation); Under Secretary of the Army approved consolidation of activities from seven buildings to one building at Fort Belvoir</p> <p>Realign 6.1 and 6.2 materiel elements of the Belvoir Research and Development Center to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; scheduled FY 93-95</p> <p>Realign Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics to Adelphi Laboratory Center, MD; scheduled FY 97</p> <p>1993 DBCRC: Disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center; completed FY 94</p> <p>Eliminate Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment,</p>

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
						and Support Equipment Business Areas; scheduled FY 96
						Realign Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Detroit Arsenal, MI; scheduled FY 96
						Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate of the Communications and Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Fort Belvoir; scheduled FY 96
	FORT EUSTIS					
	FORT LEE	88	DEFBRAC	COMPLETE	REALGNUP	1988 DEFBRAC: Supply specialist advanced individual training realigned from Fort Jackson, SC; completed FY 93
						Food service specialist advance individual training realigned from Fort Dix, NJ and Fort Jackson, SC; completed FY 93
	FORT MONROE					
	FORT MYER					
	FORT PICKETT					
	FORT STORY					
	HARRY DIAMOND LABORATORY. WOODBRIDGE	91	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1991 DBCRC: Close; scheduled FY 94
	PENTAGON RESERVATION					
	RADFORD ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT					

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	VINT HILL FARMS STATION	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	<p>1993 DBCRC: Close; scheduled FY 97</p> <p>Realign maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; scheduled FY 96</p> <p>Realign Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate, Program Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, and remaining elements of the Intelligence Material Management Center to Fort Monmouth, NJ; scheduled FY 96-97</p>
AF	LANGLEY AFB					
	RICHMOND IAP AGS					
D	DEFENSE GENERAL SUPPLY CENTER					
	DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY-HERNDON	88	DEFBRAC	ONGOING	CLOSE	<p>1988 DEFBRAC: Close and realign activities to DMA Hydrographic-Topographic Center, Brookmont, MD; scheduled FY 95</p>
MC	CAMP ELMORE					
	HQMC, HENDERSON HALL					
	MCCDC, QUANTICO					
N	BUREAU OF NAVY PERSONNEL, ARLINGTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	<p>1993 DBCRC: Recommended the realignment of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to NAS Memphis, TN.</p>
	FLEET ASW TRAINING CENTER, LANT					
	FLEET COMBAT TRAINING CENTER, LANT					
	NAS NORFOLK					
	NAS OCEANA					
	NAV SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY					

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	NAV UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER NORFOLK	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of the Norfolk Det of the NUWC and relocation of its functions to NUWC, Newport, RI.
	NAVAL ADMIN CMD - AFSC					
	NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, ARLINGTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended realignment of NAVAIR Systems Command and relocation to NAS Patuxent River, MD
	NAVAL AMPHIB BASE LITTLE CREEK					
	NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT NORFOLK	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Directed the closure of NADEP Norfolk and relocation of repair capability to other depot maintenance activities, including private sector.
	NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND, AL	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended relocating Naval Facilities Engineering Command from leased space to government owned space within the National Capitol Region.
	NAVAL HOSPITAL PORTSMOUTH					
	NAVAL MEDICAL CLINIC					
	NAVAL MINE WARFARE ACTIVITY YORKTOWN	91	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1991 DBCRC: Recommended closure and relocation of mission to Dam Neck, VA
	NAVAL RECRUITING COMMAND, ARLINGTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended the realignment of the Naval Recruiting Command and relocation to NTC Great Lakes, IL.
	NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, ARLINGTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended relocating the Naval Sea Systems Command from leased space to government owned space within the National Capitol Region.
	NAVAL STATION NORFOLK					
	NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER NORFOLK					
	NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND, ARLINGTO	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended realignment of Naval Supply Systems Command and relocation to Ship Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, PA

CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
	NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, PORT HUE	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme and relocation of its function, personnel, equipment and support to Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, VA.
	NAVCOMM AREA MASTER STA LANT					
	NAVY PUBLIC WORKS CENTER, NORFOLK					
	NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD					
	NRC STAUNTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Recommended closure of NRC Staunton, VA because its capacity is in excess of projected requirements.
	PERA (SURFACE) ATLANTIC, NORFOLK	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	DISESTAB	1993 DBCRC: Directed the disestablishment of PERA Norfolk and relocation of its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Deigo, CA, Portsmouth, VA and Newport News, VA.
	TACTICAL SUPPORT OFFICE, ARLINGTON	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALIGNDN	1993 DBCRC: Recommended realignment of Tactical Support Office to Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet Norfolk, VA.



NORTH CAROLINA

20 Minutes

BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES

MCAS, Cherry Point

5:20PM - 5:22PM	2 Minutes	Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr.
5:22PM - 5:27PM	5 Minutes	Governor James B. Hunt, Jr.
5:27PM - 5:32PM	5 Minutes	Senator Jesse Helms
5:32PM - 5:37PM	5 Minutes	Senator Lauch Faircloth
5:37PM - 5:40PM	3 Minutes	Governor James B. Hunt, Jr.

NORTH CAROLINA

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point

1. If this Commission should decide that the FY95 DoD recommendations substantially deviated from the FY93 recommendations, what would be your estimate of the total military construction required to support the revised force levels identified in the FY95 recommendations?
2. Concerning military housing costs, what would be your estimate of the housing costs required to support the revised FY95 force levels?

NORTH CAROLINA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**

NORTH CAROLINA STATE MAP


MCAS CHERRY POINT

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report

STATE CLOSURE HISTORY

MAP NO. 34

NORTH CAROLINA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports



MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC

1993 VERSUS 1995 RECOMMENDATIONS

The DoD Recommendations to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission included a recommendation to close the Naval Air Station at Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to MCAS Cherry Point; NAS Oceana and MCAS Beaufort. This recommendation essentially directed that the aircraft located at NAS Cecil Field would be distributed to the following airfields:

- 126 F/A-18's To MCAS Cherry Point
- 48 S-3's To NAS Oceana
- 24 F/A-18's To MCAS Beaufort

The DoD Recommendations to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission includes a redirect of the NAS Cecil Field aircraft, approved by the Commission in 1993. Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, Department of the Navy force structure experiences a reduction of over 10% by the year 2001. There continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. The above, combined with the accelerated retirement of the A-6 type aircraft previously based at NAS Oceana, has created an excess capacity at this airfield. Therefore, the 1995 DoD Recommendation to the Commission recommends a redirect of the 1993 proposal to the following:

- 135 F/A-18's To NAS Oceana
- 48 S-3's To NAS Jacksonville
- 24 F/A-18's To MCAS Beaufort
- 24 F/A-18's To NAS Atlanta (Reserves)

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.

Justification: Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by the requirement to "bed down" different mixes of aircraft at various air stations. In making these choices, the outlook for environmental and land use issues was significantly important. In making the determination for reductions at air stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity which could be eliminated with assets most readily redistributed to receiving air stations. The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-18s which were relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort and Cherry Point. These air stations both had a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems and dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air station with a lower military value, because NAS Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to support military operations of these aircraft. Its excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$312.3 million. Annual recurring savings for both are \$56.7 million, with a return on investment in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$200.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Cecil Field will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 3.0 percent of the employment base of the Jacksonville Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Relocations to MCAS Cherry Point will require increased classroom space in the local schools. Remediation of this impact is included in the cost analysis. There are no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste and pollutant generation will be eliminated. Similarly, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operating areas) and reduce noise levels and air emissions. Environmental cleanup will continue until completed.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida

Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from "Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure." In addition, add the following: "To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area."

Justification: Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. This recommended redirect achieves several important aims in furtherance of current Departmental policy and operational needs. First, it avoids the substantial new construction at MCAS Cherry Point that would be required if the F/A-18s from NAS Cecil Field were relocated there, which would add to existing excess capacity, and utilizes existing capacity at NAS Oceana. This avoidance and similar actions taken regarding other air stations are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. Second, it permits collocation of all fixed wing carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air assets in the Atlantic Fleet with the other aviation ASW assets at NAS Jacksonville and NAVSTA Mayport and support for those assets. Third, it permits recognition of the superior demographics for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta, Georgia.

Return on Investment: The total estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$66.6 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of \$335.1 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$11.5 million with an immediate return on investment expected. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$437.8 million.


Impacts:

Economic Impact on Communities: Since this action affects unexecuted relocations resulting from prior BRAC recommendations, it causes no net change in current employment in the Craven and Carteret Counties, North Carolina economic area. However, the anticipated 7.5 percent increase in the employment base in this economic area will not occur.

1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications

Community Infrastructure Impact: There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation.


Environmental Impact: The reallocation of Navy and Marine Corps aviation assets in this recommendation will have a generally positive impact on the environment, particularly on the air quality at Cherry Point, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida. The introduction of additional aircraft and personnel to the Norfolk, Virginia, area is not expected to have an adverse impact on the air quality of that area since the net effect of moving these particular assets, when compared to the force structure reductions by FY 2001, is a reduction of personnel and aircraft from FY 1990 levels at this receiving activity. However, it is expected that conformity determinations will be required for the movements to NAS Oceana and NAS Atlanta. The utility infrastructure at each of the receiving sites is sufficient to handle the additional personnel. At none of the receiving sites will there be an adverse impact on threatened/endangered species, sensitive habitats and wetlands, or cultural/historical resources occasioned by this recommendation.



CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
A	FORT BRAGG					
	MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL-SUNNY POINT					
AF	BADIN AGS					
	CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS IAP AGS					
	POPE AFB	91	DBCRC	ONGOING	REALGNUP	1991 DBCRC: Directed realignment of one A/OA-10 squadron each to Pope AFB and to Shaw AFB from the Closing Myrtle Beach AFB.
	SEYMOUR JOHNSON AFB					
MC	MCALF BOGUE					
	MCAS CHERRY POINT					
	MCAS NEW RIVER					
	MCB CAMP LEJEUNE					
N	NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT CHERRY POINT					
	NAVAL HOSPITAL CAMP LEJEUNE					



WEST VIRGINIA

5 Minutes

BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING

NO WITNESSES SCHEDULED

WEST VIRGINIA

**Valley Grove Maintenance Facility
Valley Grove, WV**

1. Is it your understanding that a new facility is being constructed in Wheeling, WV for Valley Grove Maintenance Facility, even though this unit was recommended to relocate to the Kelly Support Center?

WEST VIRGINIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

**BALTIMORE, MD REGIONAL HEARING
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995**

WEST VIRGINIA STATE MAP


VALLEY GROVE AREA MAINTANENCE SUPPORT ACTIVITY

- Facility Summary Sheet
- DoD Recommendation
- Commission Base Visit Report


STATE CLOSURE HISTORY

MAP NO. 49

WEST VIRGINIA



Prepared By: Washington Headquarters Services
Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports



1995 DoD Recommendations and Justifications


Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, West Virginia

Recommendation: Close Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA). Relocate reserve activity to the Kelly Support Center, P.A. provided the recommendation to realign Kelly Support Center is approved.

Justification: Valley Grove AMSA, located in Valley Grove, WV, consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of leased maintenance facilities. Its primary mission is to provide maintenance support to Army Reserve activities. Consolidating tenants from Valley Grove AMSA with the Reserve Component activities remaining on Kelly Support Center will reduce the cost of operation.

Return on Investment: The cost and savings information for the closure of Valley Grove AMSA is included in the recommendation for Charles E. Kelly Support Center.

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Wheeling, WV-OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of the areas employment. There are no known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving installations.



CLOSURE HISTORY - INSTALLATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA

05-Apr-95

SVC	INSTALLATION NAME	ACTION YEAR	ACTION SOURCE	ACTION STATUS	ACTION SUMMARY	ACTION DETAIL
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AF

SHEPHERD FIELD AGS (EWWRA)
 YEAGER AIRPORT AGS

N

NRC PARKERSBURG	93	DBCRC	ONGOING	CLOSE	1993 DBCRC: Recommended closure of NRC Parkersburg, WV because its capacity is in excess of projected requirements.
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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA
REBECCA COX
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)
S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

**REMARKS BY CHAIR AT BEGINNING
OF PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION OF
BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING**

(AFTERNOON SESSION)


**WE ARE NOW READY TO BEGIN A PERIOD SET ASIDE FOR PUBLIC
COMMENT. OUR INTENTION IS TO TRY TO INSURE THAT ALL OPINIONS ON
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY AFFECTING PENNSYLVANIA,
VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA ARE HEARD. WE HAVE ASSIGNED 30
MINUTES FOR THIS PERIOD.**

**WE ASKED PERSONS WISHING TO SPEAK TO SIGN UP BEFORE THE
HEARING BEGAN, AND THEY HAVE DONE SO BY NOW. WE HAVE ALSO ASKED
THEM TO LIMIT THEIR COMMENTS TO TWO MINUTES, AND WE WILL RING A
BELL AT THE END OF THAT TIME. PLEASE STOP AFTER YOUR TWO
MINUTES ARE UP. WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ANY LENGTH IS WELCOMED BY
THE COMMISSION AT ANY TIME IN THIS PROCESS.**

**IF ALL THOSE SIGNED UP TO SPEAK WOULD RAISE YOUR RIGHT
HANDS, I WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH.**

**OATH BEFORE THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION**

**DO YOU SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE TESTIMONY YOU ARE
ABOUT TO GIVE TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION SHALL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH?**





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
AL CORNELLA
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S. LEE KLING
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

CLOSING REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER COX
BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING

WE HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THIS HEARING OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION. I WANT TO THANK ALL THE WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED. YOU HAVE BROUGHT US SOME VERY VALUABLE INFORMATION WHICH I ASSURE YOU WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMISSION MEMBERS AS WE REACH OUR DECISIONS.

I ALSO WANT TO THANK AGAIN ALL THE ELECTED OFFICIALS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS WHO HAVE ASSISTED US DURING OUR BASE VISITS AND IN PREPARATION FOR THIS HEARING. IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK GOVERNOR GLENDENING AND HIS STAFF FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN HELPING TO OBTAIN THIS FINE SITE.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE CITIZENS OF THE COMMUNITIES REPRESENTED HERE TODAY THAT HAVE SUPPORTED THE MEMBERS OF OUR ARMED SERVICES FOR SO MANY YEARS, MAKING THEM FEEL WELCOME AND VALUED IN YOUR TOWNS. YOU ARE TRUE PATRIOTS.

THIS HEARING IS CLOSED.



**1995 List of Military Installations
Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment**

Part I: Major Base Closures

Army

Fort McClellan, Alabama
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado
Price Support Center, Illinois
Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois
Fort Ritchie, Maryland
Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey
Seneca Army Depot, New York
Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
Red River Army Depot, Texas
Fort Pickett, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
Ship Repair Facility, Guam
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts
Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania

Air Force

North Highlands Air Guard Station, California
Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, California
Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York
Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, Ohio
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas
Reese Air Force Base, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah

Part II: Major Base Realignments

Army

Fort Greely, Alaska
Fort Hunter Liggett, California
Sierra Army Depot, California
Fort Meade, Maryland
Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
Fort Dix, New Jersey
Fort Hamilton, New York
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
Fort Lee, Virginia

Navy

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Activities, Guam
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington

Air Force

McClellan Air Force Base, California
Onizuka Air Station, California

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

***Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignment,
Disestablishments or Relocations***

Army

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, California
East Fort Baker, California
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California
Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut
Big Coppett Key, Florida
Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, Maryland
Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts
Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), Missouri
Fort Missoula, Montana
Camp Kilmer, New Jersey
Caven Point Reserve Center, New Jersey
Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey
Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York
Fort Totten, New York
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina
Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Virginia
Camp Bonneville, Washington
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA), West Virginia

Navy

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West
Coast Division, San Diego, California
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London,
Connecticut
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland,
Pennsylvania
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment,
Warminster, Pennsylvania
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast
Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, Alabama
Stockton, California
Santa Ana, Irvine, California
Pomona, California
Cadillac, Michigan
Staten Island, New York
Laredo, Texas
Sheboygan, Wisconsin

Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, Kansas

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, Louisiana (Region 10)
Charleston, South Carolina (Region 7)

Air Force

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, California
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, Georgia
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas

Defense Investigative Service

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Maryland

Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations

Army

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland

Navy

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California
Naval Air Station Alameda, California
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California
Naval Training Center, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida


Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.
Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.

Air Force

Williams AFB, Arizona
Lowry AFB, Colorado
Homestead AFB, Florida (301st Rescue Squadron)
Homestead AFB, Florida (726th Air Control Squadron)
MacDill AFB, Florida
Griffiss AFB, New York (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division)
Griffiss AFB, New York (485th Engineering Installation Group)


Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California




1995 DoD Recommendations Major Base Closures

● NAS, Adak



1995 DoD Recommendations Major Base Realignment

■ Fort Greely




● Naval Activities, Guam

Fort Buchanan,
Puerto Rico


● NS, Key West

Legend	
■	Army (12)
★	Air Force (10)
●	Navy (4)

1995 DoD Recommendations Redirects







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




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Document Separator

Senator Charles S. Robb
Submitted Remarks

Baltimore Regional BRAC Hearing

May 4, 1995

Madame Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this hearing on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia and thank you again for visiting Fort Pickett with us a few weeks ago. We appreciate the contributions you and each of the Commissioners and the Commission staff are making to reach the difficult decisions required.

In the interest of using our time effectively, I will limit my remarks this afternoon to only three of the sites affected by this year's BRAC process. Other members of the delegation will address other facilities in Virginia about which we are concerned, but I fully support their testimony.

Virginia has the second largest number of DoD employees in the country. Nearly 15 percent of the Virginia payroll comes from Defense. Virginia realizes that we must take our "fair share" of base closures and other cuts in order to bring our military infrastructure in line with the threats in a post Cold War world. In fact, Virginia has already made significant

sacrifices in the reduction of our military establishment. Through previous BRAC rounds this state has lost nearly 15,000 military and civilian jobs. We understand that in this round we will undoubtedly lose more. But I will focus on three of the facilities under your purview which I believe require closer scrutiny and whose closure or realignment would be contrary to the best interests of our national defense.

Space and Warfare Command (SPAWAR)

In the 1993 BRAC round SPAWAR, the Space and Naval Warfare Command -- located in Crystal City -- was directed to move from leased office space in Arlington to either the Navy Annex or the Washington Navy Yard. In the current round, when the Navy requested a redirect of the Naval Sea Systems Command from White Oak to the Washington Navy Yard, -- a position that we agree with -- the government space became unavailable for SPAWAR.

The Navy now proposes to move SPAWAR to San Diego and combine it with its subordinate command, the Naval Command and Control Center. My study of this process leads me to believe that the Navy based this decision almost entirely on the desire to leave leased office space and did not give appropriate regard to the adverse impact this move would have on the efficiency and military effectiveness of the command.

I understand the desire of the Navy to vacate leased office space as much as possible. The funds for this rent comes out of increasingly scarce O&M funds. Sometimes, however, unique commands acquire special synergism with their customers based upon physical location. These synergies become crucial to the mission of the command. The Navy recognized this factor when it recommended that the Office of Naval Research (Arlington) remain in leased space due to

*"... the synergy obtained by having the activity located in proximity to the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation. Further, this action provides the opportunity for future collocation of like activities from the other Military Departments, with attendant joint synergies which could be realized. While this action results in a recurring cost, the **cost is minimal in light of the importance of these two significant opportunities.**" DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report - March 1995 p. 5-103.*
(Emphasis added)

After reviewing the Navy's data call for BRAC 95, I am concerned that this proposal -- moving the headquarters of this command across the country from its primary customers -- will severely degrade SPAWAR's ability to carry out its primary mission.

As a major hardware and software acquisition command, I believe that it is critical for SPAWAR to remain close to the agencies and sub-contractors that depend upon the coordination and resources of this command. NAVSEA, NAVAIR the Defense Intelligence Agency and other agencies of the Department of Defense look to SPAWAR to develop and acquire the special -- and often highly classified -- equipment required to maintain our lead in command and control. This headquarters staff needs to remain physically close to their customers to ensure that their needs are properly met in the most efficient and cost effective fashion.

SPAWAR has been successful in recent years in reducing their overall work force by out-sourcing many of their functions. The vast majority of the contractors who are performing work for SPAWAR are located in the National Capitol Region. The Navy's proposal to leave behind approximately 15 people to manage this projects is unrealistic.

I believe that the Navy has made the best argument for keeping SPAWAR in its present location. During the BRAC 95 data call, the SPAWAR command indicated that:

*"If SPAWAR were relocated outside the NCR, the mission would be **performed slower,** with **greater technical risk,** and **greater expense** due*

to a different, less experienced work force. It would be more difficult to perform the required close coordination and information exchange, essential to SPAWAR's C⁴I mission, with DOD, JCS, ASN(RD&A), OPNAV, NISMC, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, PEO (SCS), and other agencies ..."

SPAWAR Certified 1995 BRAC Data Call 31,
page 2. (Emphasis added)

The rest of the BRAC Data Call, which SPAWAR submitted as a result of the BRAC 95 process, contains extensive and cogent arguments for keeping this command in its present location. I strongly urge the Commission to carefully review the SPAWAR data call and reverse the proposal to move this critical command to San Diego.

Congressman Jim Moran, who could not be here today, has asked me to submit for him his written statement concerning SPAWAR. I would also like to submit a report, on behalf of concerned citizens and employees of SPAWAR, regarding the downside of this proposal. Ellen Bozman, from the Arlington County Board of Supervisors, will speak on SPAWAR later in this presentation. She is representing the county which has already lost over 12,000 jobs in previous BRAC decisions. Moving SPAWAR to San Diego will remove another 1100 highly skilled and specialized contract and program specialists from Northern Virginia.

SPAWAR needs to stay where it is.

Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk

In the BRAC 93 round, Naval Air Depot Norfolk was recommended to be closed and move its functions to the Naval Air Depot in Jacksonville, Florida. Although it is estimated that the Department of Defense still retains over 40 million man-hours of excess capacity -- I strongly urge the Commission reconsider the closure of NADEP Norfolk based upon the changing nature of the Naval infrastructure from the 93 BRAC round.

The movement of all the F-14 squadrons as well as several F/A-18 squadrons to NAS Oceana has concentrated the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet Air Wings in the Hampton Roads megabase. This co-location with the fleet that they support I believe makes sense and we applaud the Navy for rethinking their earlier recommendations which would have spread these air wings up and down the East Coast. We think that it also makes sense to keep the depot maintenance activities, which support these aircraft, co-located in the same geographic region.

The present plan is for NADEP Jacksonville to assume responsibility for the F-14 and EA-6 rework when NADEP Norfolk closes. The cross-service group, which examined

depot maintenance capacity across all the services, recommended that NADEP Jacksonville be closed. The Navy rejected this argument but indicated that a Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) in the Southeast may eventually absorb NADEP Jacksonville outside the BRAC process.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Navy is on the right track with the Regional Maintenance Center concept . The RMC concept is much farther along in the Hampton Roads area than it is in the Southeast. The present timeline for installing this concept, however, will not be completed before NADEP Norfolk is closed forever and the critical skills needed to support these modern aircraft are irretrievably lost. I believe that we must retain in Hampton Roads the skill base and industrial capacity necessary to support the concentration of fleet activities in this strategic area. The only way in which we can do this is to keep NADEP Norfolk alive. If at a later date, the Navy in its exercise of prudent military judgment, believes that NADEP Norfolk could be absorbed into a RMC in the Norfolk area then it can be easily accomplished -- as is presently proposed for the NADEP in Jacksonville. In the meantime, we must ensure that we retain the capacity to continue the quality support and efficiency to our fleet units in Norfolk.

Earlier this year I joined other members of the Virginia Congressional delegation in formally requesting that closure of NADEP Norfolk be reconsidered by this year's Commission. I

strongly urge you to reconsider the previous BRAC
recommendation and reverse the closure of NADEP Norfolk
before it is too late.

Clarendon Square -- Arlington

The 1993 BRAC round directed that two Navy Department commands move out of leased office space in Clarendon Square in Arlington. These commands are the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, HQ, USMC and the USMC Systems Command.

I am concerned that factors outside the control of the Navy Department may make the timing of these moves ill-advised and contrary to the intent of the BRAC legislation of 1993.

The DCOS for Installations and Logistics was directed to move to the Pentagon. Unfortunately, the 10-year Pentagon renovation schedule precludes the timely move of this command. Complicating this issue is the present occupancy rate at the Pentagon which is 110 percent.

The USMC Systems Command was directed to move into new facilities to be constructed at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, VA. The MILCON request for these facilities was not submitted until this year and has not yet been approved. I am concerned that this construction will not be completed in time for a smooth transition for the Systems Command.

Along with these remarks I have included a more detailed analysis of the situation at Clarendon Square. I have also included a copy of a letter signed by members of the Virginia Congressional delegation which seeks the addition of Clarendon Square to the list of facilities for consideration by the BRAC Commission before May 17. I urge the Commission to add Clarendon Square to the list so that these two commands can work to find the most efficient solution for their present situation.

Thank you for your consideration of these issues.

COMMITTEE
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AND OVERSIGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE
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COMMITTEE
ON

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

JAMES P. MORAN
8TH DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
405 CANNON HOUSE
OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4608
(202) 225-4376

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4608

Statement of Representative James P. Moran
at the Regional BRAC Hearing, Baltimore, Maryland
May 4, 1995

Mister Chairman, I regret my schedule precludes my attendance here today. However, I appreciate the opportunity to present this statement for the record. I am aware of the demanding task you and the other members of this Commission are undertaking and commend you for your resolve and dedication.

I wish to address the relocation of the Space and Naval Warfare Command from Crystal City, Virginia to San Diego, CA. I will further expound on three reasons why this proposed move is not in the best interest of the mission requirements for the Department of Defense.

First, and of paramount importance to any military unit's effectiveness, is its ability to perform the mission assigned, whether implicit or explicit. SPAWAR is a United States Navy technical command responsible for developing, acquiring and supporting effective, integrated and responsive: undersea, terrestrial and space sensors; communications systems; command, control and intelligence systems; and systems for selective denial of these capabilities to opposing forces. This is a significant mission statement. Relocating SPAWAR from the National Capitol Region to San Diego would degrade and compromise the mission this command is tasked with performing.

The Navy in SPAWAR Certified 1995 BRAC Data Call 31, page 2 states "If SPAWAR were relocated outside the NCR (National Capitol Region), the mission would be performed slower, with greater technical risk, and greater expense due to a different, less experienced work force." I cannot find a more relevant argument, coming from the affected command, to support a redirection that SPAWAR remain in Crystal City.

Additionally, this move would impede international cooperation with military allies in the area of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence activities. Presently, SPAWAR works closely with these allies who need ready and secure access to their Embassies in order to facilitate information exchanges and C4I interoperability.

The second point is the effect this move would have on the contractor support and its associated network. Currently, these contractors also provide services to NAVSEA, NAVAIR, the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Science Foundation and an International Program Office. There are approximately 4,000 experts who will be affected by this move; a significant loss to corporate knowledge and expertise in the field of C4I.

My final point is that potential savings were overstated and construction costs were understated. Personnel cost savings need not be realized solely by relocating to San Diego. Rather, streamlining the staff can be accommodated at the present location using sound management practices. Savings could also be achieved by pursuing other opportunities for consolidation. One alternative would be to consolidate the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center with SPAWAR in the NCR or consolidate common support functions across technical commands. Additionally, construction costs were not addressed or allocated. It is difficult to assume the relocation of 1160 personnel, and associated equipment would not require the buildout of workspaces, installation of computer equipment and networks, and improvements to the Secure Compartmented Information Facility.

I urge the Commission to take into consideration the statements offered by SPAWAR in their data call and reconsider the proposal to relocate this essential command to San Diego. These arguments provide substantive support for keeping SPAWAR in its present location.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Moran", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

ROBERT C. (BOBBY) SCOTT

3D DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

501 CANNON OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4603
(202) 225-8351

COMMITTEES:

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-4603

DISTRICT OFFICES:

NEWPORT NEWS:

2600 WASHINGTON AVE.
SUITE 1010
NEWPORT NEWS, VA 23607
(804) 380-1000

RICHMOND:

THE JACKSON CENTER
501 N. 2ND STREET
RICHMOND, VA 23219-1321
(804) 644-4845

PETERSBURG:

(804) 748-6442

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN SCOTT TO THE BRAC COMMISSION

MAY 4, 1995

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

"My time is limited so let me get right to the heart of the matter. I am here today to ask that we not do something stupid. What we are all about is saving this country, and its taxpayers, some money. Realignment of the hospital will not alter the fact that people in the Ft. Lee area will still get sick and require health care. If the current method of care is less expensive to the federal government than that being considered here today - then the decision ought to be easy. We do not want to simply transfer the cost of care from Ft. Lee to some other line in the federal budget, and just as significant, then ask our military personnel and their family members to pay out of pocket expenses not now incurred for the same level of treatment. Maintaining the hospital at Ft Lee open is the right thing to do and I urge you to do the right thing. Let me introduce Major General (Retired) William Hunzeker, a former commander of Ft Lee, who will speak to the issues."

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Thank you for your consideration of these issues.

**STATEMENT OF ELLEN M. BOZMAN
VICE CHAIRMAN, THE COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
TO THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
MAY 4, 1995**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Commissioners, on behalf of the Northern Virginia community, its governmental leaders and our businesses, I want to thank you for the time today to testify on the proposed relocation of the Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) from the National Capital Region.

As an elected member of the Arlington County Board for over two decades, and as a former budget examiner for the predecessor agency to the federal Office of Management and Budget, I have analyzed many government proposals -- both good and ill-advised.

Today, my co-panelist, recognized defense expert Barry Blechman, and I come before you to ask you to challenge the proposed move of SPAWAR.

There are five primary reasons not to move SPAWAR -- many of which are supported by the Navy in its data calls:

1. The proposed move is not in the national interest and would compromise military and mission effectiveness.

The high technology mission of SPAWAR -- which is important to future military activity -- is unique and may be threatened by relocating from the National Capital Region.

2. SPAWAR contractors suggest that moving the command across the country will result in reduced efficiencies, and as a result, higher contract costs, and potentially less effective space and naval warfare systems.
3. Many of the existing synergies with its clients and contractors, located in or near the National Capital Region, will erode.

SPAWAR's current location is just two Metrorail stops from the Pentagon, and approximately a 20-minute trip from the proposed new NAVSEA location at the Navy Yard.

4. Two of SPAWAR's primary clients, NAVSEA and NAVAIR, are to remain close by. Creating unnecessary distance between SPAWAR and its customers does not make good business sense.

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DRAFT

**REMARKS BY
GOV. TOM RIDGE
BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT HEARING
Baltimore, MD
May 4, 1995**

**Good Morning - Chair Cox, distinguished members
of the Base Closure Commission.**

**On behalf of Senator Specter, Senator Santorum,
and all the citizens of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, I am honored to open Pennsylvania's
portion of today's testimony.**

As a former Congressman, I am acutely aware of federal budgetary constraints. I have seen first hand the need to reduce waste in our military in the context of overall reductions in defense spending.

As a former soldier who served in the Army and fought in Vietnam, I also understand the consequences of a nation willing to negate its military readiness. And I firmly believe that we must never compromise our ability to respond to any threat to our national security.

**The challenge is to balance our nation's military
might with the pressures to reduce unnecessary
excess.**

**As governor, I can tell you that Pennsylvania
supports the BRAC Commission and this important
role.**

**It has been a necessary process. But, it hasn't been
easy. And, in Pennsylvania, it hasn't been without
costs.**

Time and time again, Pennsylvania has been asked to sacrifice more than its fair share in the name of budget reductions. Despite that, the Department of Defense has asked that Pennsylvanians sacrifice even more.

In the name of Pennsylvania's communities that have paid so dearly -- and in the interest of a strong national defense -- enough is enough.

Just take a moment to reexamine BRAC's

recommendations in 1988, 1991 and 1993.

There, you will find, a clear and consistent pattern pointing to fact that despite Pennsylvania's strategic location and military merits, we have suffered a disproportionate hit in jobs lost.

To date, 13,000 of Pennsylvania's defense-related jobs have been eliminated as a result of the BRAC process.

If the 1995 recommendations are enacted, this

inequity will only grow.

Pennsylvania will have a cumulative net impact of almost 17,000 jobs - leaving us second -- only to California -- in net jobs lost through the BRAC process.

An equally disturbing trend is revealed when we look at the proportion of jobs lost as compared to the total number of defense personnel employed in our state.

Such an examination reveals that Pennsylvania will have the dubious honor of having been hit even harder than California.

These numbers don't just reflect our military personnel. We are talking about thousands of civilians -- the engineers, maintenance technicians, repair personnel and support staff who have dedicated their careers to our national military interests.

In fact, when it comes to civilian job cuts,

Pennsylvania's disparate treatment is far more pronounced.

To date, civilian jobs lost exceed 10,000. And that number is expected to grow to almost 14,000 if the 1995 recommendations are accepted.

Our state has a mere 2.3% of our county's defense-related jobs. Yet, almost 13% of the total cuts in

civilian jobs are found in Pennsylvania.

The conclusion is clear: Pennsylvania has paid and paid dearly in comparison to other states.

Faced with the fourth and final round of closures, I am here today to ask you to:

***listen* to the testimony of our communities today;**

***hear* of the invaluable role that Pennsylvania's bases**

play in our national defense;

***examine* the logic of the Department's**

recommendations;

***question* data that is many times flawed;**

***consider* the consequences of non-implemented**

directives of prior BRAC Commissions;

and finally, ask yourself, does this really make sense?

-- Is it worth it?

I would now like to turn to my friend Senator Arlen Specter who will address Pennsylvania's value as a home for military bases.

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**TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO REGIONAL MEETING
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
MAY 4TH, 1995**

This testimony is submitted on behalf of the Schuylkill County Commissioners, the Schuylkill Economic Development Corporation and the Schuylkill Chamber of Commerce, acting jointly, to express our collective concerns regarding the matters now before the Commission regarding realignment of Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.

Schuylkill County residents represent 27% of the employees who would lose their jobs if the base realignment recommendations as originally presented are implemented as proposed by the Department of the Army. Schuylkill County would lose 261 of the more than 700 jobs that would be lost at Fort Indiantown Gap. An additional 900 part-time jobs, 245 of them in our county, would also disappear.

All of us in Schuylkill County have been working in partnership for thirty five years to recreate our economy. In 1960 unemployment in Schuylkill County stood at 22%. Our single-focused anthracite coal based economy became the victim of a changing world economy, so we banded together as a regional community to develop public-private partnerships to begin the long path of industrial and economic revitalization. We have been successful in the past thirty five years in lowering our unemployment rate to where it is currently 8.7%,(a) while doubling our work force. Loss of the Fort Indiantown Gap employees would push our unemployment rate above 9.3%. The successes of our efforts have been rooted in core beliefs that federal and state government would be legitimate partners, and that work ethic, developing the greatest service efficiencies, and shared investment would always lead to proper recognition and reward in return for excellent service.

The recommendations of the Department of the Army, as they relate to Fort Indiantown Gap, creates serious doubt in our ability and desire to continue our beliefs in the fairness of the democratic process as demonstrated in the Base Realignment and Closure process. Not only is the documentation that the Department of the Army has prepared to substantiate its recommendations seriously flawed, but more importantly, it appears that even after the data is corrected, the outcome for Fort Indiantown Gap will be no different than if the corrections were not offered.

It appears that the American concept of working hard, and offering the greatest efficiency and quality of service humanly possible no longer matter in today's Army environment.

Documentation submitted to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission by the Fort Indiantown Gap community coalition, at a minimum, should require a total resubmission by the Department of the Army of its data and recommendations regarding defense realignment. Fort Indiantown Gap has earned that consideration through years of efficient and reliable training services at the best cost available to the Army. The rich tradition of the Gap and the thousands of defenders of democracy who have marched and trained there deserve a complete re-evaluation of the Army's recommendations.

The amount of federal defense funding directed at Fort Indiantown Gap has assured a national defense preparedness at minimum expense. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania offers 19,000 acres of strategically, and (for the citizen soldier) conveniently located site, that offers a wide range of training services. Many of the training components and facilities available at Fort Indiantown Gap are unavailable anywhere else on the East Coast.

Last year more than 780,000 training day active component, reserve and national guard men and women were trained at the Gap at a fraction of the cost of some of the Army installations currently ranked as having greater value to the Defense Department than the Gap.

Every American citizen recognizes the need to competely re-evaluate the value of defense installations and their capabilities to deliver services to today's Army. We also recognize and share in the desire to down-size government while maintaining a defense establishment that assures national defense potential that protects the national interest without doubt. But the difficult decisions required to reach these objectives cannot be made when the information used to reach proposed recommendations is flawed and unreliable.

Fort Indiantown Gap touches so many Schuylkill County residents with vital services which are of immense value. For example, the 56th Ordinance Detachment provides 24-hour-a-day support to civilian authorities in a 74 county area of Pennsylvania, Maryland and West Virginia. How can we define the loss which could strike our community without this support? Without the efficient and ready detachment of trained technicians able to provide assistance in the disposal, detection, and elimination of bomb attacks, the Secret Service, State Department and Department of Defense could also be exposed to greater threat from the growing challenge of terrorist bombings. Typical of Fort Indiantown Gap, the Explosives Ordinance Disposal Detachment is well respected and very efficient.

Today, we ask you to require the real value of Fort Indiantown Gap to be measured. We see the synergies of strategic geography, co-located Army National Guard Flight Facilities, and no frills efficiencies as being unvalued in the previous report.

It is our sincere request that the Base Realignment and Closure Commission demand an entire review of the Department of the Army recommendations concerning Fort Indiantown Gap. The investments made in Army and National Guard training and facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap have been some of the most effective expenditures of Defense Department dollars made anywhere in the defense establishment. To effectively close Fort Indiantown Gap by redirecting defense investment elsewhere will lead to significant disruption to our regional economy at the least, and a seriously impaired response potential to national defense challenges long term.

Decisions regarding Fort Indiantown Gap and all of America's military installations must be based solely on defense value, and not on political influence or any other factors that the Base Realignment and Closure Commission may encounter. To make decisions and affect the national defense capability that protects America's future, security must be accomplished fairly, in the national interest, and with the highest degree of professionalism that every citizen deserves and expects. We request that assurance, nothing more, and definitely nothing less!

Footnotes: (a) Figures cited are from February, 1995 Report of Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, "Unemployment... A Geographic View", page 9.

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO REGIONAL MEETING
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
MAY 4TH, 1995 BY WILLIAM HANLEY

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Documentation submitted to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission by the Fort Indiantown Gap community coalition, at a minimum, should require a total resubmission by the Department of the Army of its data and recommendations regarding defense realignment. Fort Indiantown Gap has earned that consideration through years of efficient and reliable training services at the best cost available to the Army. The rich tradition of the Gap and the thousands of defenders of democracy who have marched and trained there deserve a complete re-evaluation of the Army's recommendations.

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REMARKS BY MAYOR PAUL D. FRAIM

CITY OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

ON BEHALF OF THE NORFOLK CITY COUNCIL

BEFORE

THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

MAY 4, 1995

Chairman Dixon, Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.....

I am Paul D. Fraim, Mayor of Norfolk, home of the world's largest and greatest Naval Base.

I am here today speaking for the entire Norfolk City Council who want the record of these proceedings to reflect how much we in Norfolk appreciate the Navy. The Navy is an integral part of our community. Moreover, the points I want to make today strongly confirm that **THIS TIME** the Navy's recommendations to the BRAC Commission are best for the Navy and the country.

Some reasons why the Navy is important to Norfolk and why there is a Norfolk - Navy partnership --

POPULATION BASE AND LAND USE

- o Navy families are 15% of Norfolk's residential households
- o the Navy owns and operates almost 2000 dwelling units in Norfolk
- o the Navy barracks population is a key 10%-15% of Norfolk's population total
- o the Navy's property in Norfolk is about 19% of our total land area

NORFOLK'S AND THE REGION'S ECONOMY

- o the Navy's jobs, military and civilian, employ 30% of Norfolk's workforce
- o the Navy's civilian and military payroll is a significant component of Norfolk's civilian goods and services economy -- both directly and through the "multiplier effect" -- both in Norfolk and in the region (dollars spent elsewhere in region make business for Norfolk-based business)
- o Navy repair contracts are an important component of Norfolk shipyard and ship repair companies' annual volume of work
- o jobs paid by the Navy and related to Navy contracts are traditionally among the better paying jobs in the area

NAVY TRADITION OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT

- o Navy commands and personnel actively support "Adopt A School"
- o Navy commands and personnel actively support homebuilding efforts under "Habitat for Humanity"
- o Navy commands and personnel frequently undertake "ad hoc" humanitarian efforts

PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES

- o the Navy is a good neighbor, e.g. shared use of Fleet Recreation Park for Little League sports and shared Fire Department support, cooperation agreement
- o the Navy is a good customer, buys City water

As good as present conditions are, the Navy - Norfolk partnership is growing even stronger and reflects tremendous synergies for the future. COMNAVBASE's excellent 2010 master planning initiative has led to the proposal for an executive steering group joining COMNAVBASE, CINCLANTFLT and myself on behalf of the City to leverage ongoing and anticipated activities for maximum benefit to the Navy and the community.

Hampton Roads is home to the nation's largest concentration of naval forces and facilities and Norfolk is a Megabase for the 21st Century. The Norfolk Naval Base complex currently home ports the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet while hosting nine major headquarters and nearly 200 tenant activities representing virtually every component of the Navy and numerous joint service and DOD agencies. Oceana Master Jet Air Station and Little Creek, the Navy's primary amphibious forces base, lie just to the east. The Norfolk Navy Shipyard, Newport News Ship Building, Yorktown Weapons Station, and major Army and Air Force facilities are conveniently collocated in adjacent communities. This unequaled military presence is no accident. Hampton Roads offers a unique combination of advantages for military basing. Most importantly, collocation of major headquarters, command and control facilities, operational units and support services at a Megabase like Norfolk enhances readiness and enables savings through economies of scale and reduced personnel costs.

The Norfolk Naval Base complex is sited in one of the world's finest deep water ports. The broad approaches to the port afford easy access to the open sea and ample maneuvering space during departures and arrivals. Norfolk's central location on the East Coast provides

convenient transit to training and operational areas of the North and South Atlantic, Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Just off the coast, the Virginia Capes Operations Area offers ample Navy-controlled sea and air space ideal for unit training or large scale exercises while the calm expanses of the Chesapeake Bay provide excellent training sites for small craft.

Norfolk and surrounding communities vigorously support a strong military presence, and area demographics support a wide variety of large Reserve units including ships and aircraft squadrons. Increased base loadings are welcomed and can be accommodated without adverse impact on local infrastructures. Norfolk's large, existing housing supply is responsive to the Navy's needs. Encroachment and environmental restrictions pose no insurmountable problems for military operations.

The Norfolk complex offers an unequalled array of support services and other complementary activities. Virtually all training, logistics, maintenance/repair, medical and other services required by the Fleet are locally available.

Hampton Roads is also a major military command center, second only to Washington, D.C. in its population of major headquarters. Norfolk hosts the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) headquarters, a joint staff responsible for molding military assets within the continental U.S. into combat-ready force packages for deployment by the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The Air Combat Command headquarters at nearby Langley AFB and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Eustis are key USACOM subordinates, while

the Atlantic Fleet is USACOM's Navy element. On the Navy side, the Atlantic Fleet is unique in having all of its headquarters components in a single location. This collocation enables daily personal contact between the Fleet Commander-in-Chief, operational commander (Second Fleet), type commanders (surface ship, air, submarine and amphibious forces) and key fleet support elements.

Norfolk is also a center of NATO activity. CINC USACOM is 'dual-hatted' as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), while the Atlantic Fleet, Second Fleet and Submarine Force, Atlantic are dual-hatted as NATO commands subordinate to SACLANT.

The operational significance of this headquarters concentration cannot be overstated. The resulting opportunity for direct and in-depth interaction between major staffs greatly enhances coordination and planning for joint, Navy and NATO operations throughout the Atlantic theater.

As emphasis on joint operations increases, Hampton Roads is well situated to play a pivotal role. Along with USACOM, the area already hosts the Joint War Fighting Center (Fort Eustis) and the Joint and Navy Doctrine Centers (Norfolk). USACOM plans to establish a Joint Training and Simulation Center in 1995. The Armed Forces Staff College provides graduate level training for mid-grade officers in its Joint War Fighting School, Joint Staff Officer School, and Joint Command & Control/Electronics Warfare School. These complementary activities make Hampton Roads a major center for joint operational planning and development of doctrine and tactics.

Megaporting is a boon to the moral, welfare and stability of Navy families. The resulting number and variety of jobs provides an excellent opportunity for follow-on assignments in Hampton Roads without jeopardizing professional development and career progression. Successive assignments provide continuity in dependent schooling, spousal employment and medical care while allowing service members to enjoy the long-term benefits of home ownership and community involvement.

The local availability of full-service shipyards is particularly important to Navy families who would otherwise endure lengthy separations during ship repair and overhaul periods in addition to the family hardships imposed by training and overseas deployments.

For both married and single members, Hampton Roads is an attractive duty station treasured for its hospitable climate, moderate cost of living, and ample housing at affordable prices. A popular vacation spot, the area's exceptional recreational assets include Colonial Williamsburg, Busch Gardens and world-class beaches. The City of Norfolk offers urban amenities such as professional baseball and hockey teams, a large concert and sports arena, the Nauticus National Maritime Center, the Norfolk Opera House, and the Chrysler and MacArthur Museums. For those seeking to continue their education, Old Dominion University and other local colleges offer a variety of programs well suited to part time military students.

Post-Cold War defense policy correctly emphasizes cost efficient maintenance of smaller, well trained and highly capable military forces. While "strategic dispersal" of our defense

infrastructure served its Cold War purpose, concentration of assets in suitable key areas offers obvious readiness and cost advantages in the current defense environment.

The Norfolk Naval Base and greater Hampton Roads military complex represent a Megabase that could not be duplicated elsewhere. Few areas offer the same locational advantages and capacity for expansion, and relocating Norfolk's existing capabilities would be cost prohibitive. Collocation with Fleet or other local organizations is essential to effective mission performance for most of the nearly 200 tenant activities in Norfolk -- and numerous synergistic relationships exist with activities elsewhere in Hampton Roads. To protect the current defense investment in Hampton Roads and fully capitalize on potential cost savings, the Norfolk Naval Base should continue to expand its role as the locus of naval activity on the East Coast.

Thank you.

Document Separator

**STATEMENT BY
HON. OWEN B. PICKETT**

**BEFORE THE BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING
OF THE
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995

INTRODUCTION

**IT IS MY PLEASURE TO BE HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS
BRAC '95 REALIGNMENTS AFFECTING MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS IN MY DISTRICT IN HAMPTON ROADS,
VIRGINIA. JOINING ME AT THE TABLE ARE PAUL D. FRAM,
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK, AND MEYERA E.
OBERNDORF, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH.
WHILE THERE ARE BOTH GAINS AND LOSSES FOR THE
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN MY DISTRICT, I SUPPORT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.**

NAS OCEANA

THE REDIRECT OF F/A-18 SQUADRONS FROM NAS CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA TO NAS OCEANA, VIRGINIA, AND THE REDIRECT OF S-3 SQUADRONS FROM NAS CECIL FIELD TO NAS JACKSONVILLE HAVE RECEIVED THE MOST ATTENTION AND PUBLICITY.

THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, HOWEVER, ARE FULLY SUPPORTED AND JUSTIFIED BY A THOROUGH, COMPLETE, AND DETAILED ANALYSIS PREPARED BY THE NAVY BASED ON VALIDATED, CONFIRMED, AND CERTIFIED DATA.

THIS REDIRECT OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS --- WHICH IS TO SIZE AND SHAPE OUR MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE AND OPERATIONALLY EFFICIENT WAY.

THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE IN MAKING ITS STATUTORY REVIEW OF DOD'S BRAC '95 PROCESS CONCLUDED THAT THE NAVY'S PROCESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AIR STATIONS SUBCATEGORY WERE SOUND.

REDIRECTING THE F-18'S AND SINGLE SITING THE F-14'S AT OCEANA WILL NOT OVERLOAD THIS BASE. DURING THE 1980'S AN EVEN LARGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WERE SUCCESSFULLY AND ROUTINELY ACCOMMODATED AT THIS VERY CAPABLE AND WELL EQUIPPED MASTER JET BASE. THE INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT FACILITIES, AND COMMUNITY QUALITY OF LIFE RESOURCES ARE ALL IN PLACE AND READY FOR USE.

NORFOLK NAVAL BASE

**TWO HELICOPTER MINE COUNTER-MEASURES
SQUADRONS NOW STATIONED AT THE NORFOLK NAVAL
BASE ARE PROPOSED FOR RELOCATION TO THE NAVY'S MINE
WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AT INGLESIDE TEXAS.
WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS MOVE, WE
WILL MISS THE FINE MILITARY MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES
IN OUR COMMUNITY.**

NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT - NORFOLK

IN A LETTER DATED MARCH 2, 1995, I REQUESTED THAT THE COMMISSION REVIEW THE BRAC 1993 DECISION CONCERNING NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT (NADEP) NORFOLK. WITH ALL F-14'S BEING SINGLE SITED AT NAS OCEANA, JUST 20 MILES FROM NADEP NORFOLK, THERE ARE STRONGER ARGUMENTS NOW TO SUPPORT THE NEED FOR THIS PREMIER F-14 MAINTENANCE FACILITY. THE TARGET DATE FOR CLOSURE OF THIS FACILITY IS NOW SEPTEMBER 30, 1996. I REQUEST THAT THE COMMISSION CONSIDER REVERSING OR MODIFYING THE ACTION TAKEN IN THE BRAC '93 PROCESS WITH RESPECT TO NADEP NORFOLK. THERE ARE NEW FACTS BEARING ON THIS ISSUE THAT SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS REVIEW PROCESS THIS YEAR. CLOSING THIS FACILITY AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED DEFIES LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE.

MAYOR FRAIM

IT IS NOW MY PLEASURE TO PRESENT THE HONORABLE PAUL FRAIM, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK. MAYOR FRAIM IS A STRONG AND LOYAL SUPPORTER OF OUR MILITARY AND HAS WORKED TIRELESSLY TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION WITH THEM.

MAYOR OBERNDORF

IT IS NOW MY PLEASURE TO PRESENT THE HONORABLE MEYERA OBERNDORF, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH. MAYOR OBERNDORF HAS BEEN VIGOROUS AND CONSISTENT IN FURTHERING THE STRONG TIES VIRGINIA BEACH HAS WITH THE MILITARY. SHE IS A TIRELESS WORKER ON BEHALF OF MILITARY FAMILIES AND RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS.

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*Remarks of Mayor Meyera E. Oberndorf
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
BRAC-95 Regional Hearing
Baltimore, Maryland
May 4, 1995*

(After introduction by The Honorable Owen Pickett)

*Thank you Congressman Pickett, chairman Dixon, and distinguished members
of the BRAC-95 Commission, GOOD AFTERNOON!*

*As Mayor of the 37th largest city in the nation, I am delighted to be here and
honored to have the opportunity to speak to you today. I would like to take just a
few minutes of your valuable time to express our sincere appreciation for all your
hard work on a most difficult tasking -- "Rightsizing" our country's military
infrastructure.*

*As a city with a long history of strong ties to its military, the citizens of
Virginia Beach are keenly aware of the magnitude of your charter and fully realize
when times are tough and bucks are tight, some unpopular and sometimes gut-
wrenching decisions must be made to ensure our nations' military remains efficient
and effective, but "second to none," as we move rapidly toward the twenty-first
century.*

*Downsizing and realignments stir great emotions, regardless of whether you're
in the "loss" or "gain" column. During previous BRAC rounds, the City of Virginia
Beach has been on both sides of the coin.*

Today however, I am pleased to announce we strongly concur with the BRAC-95 decision, concerning the realignment of Naval Air Station Oceana, as put forth by the Secretary of the Navy and subsequently approved and announced by the Secretary of Defense on 28 February, 1995. It is without question, the logical decision, for a multitude of reasons, but the main issue that cannot be denied concerns real and substantial tax dollar savings. Single siting the Navy's F-14 "Tomcat" community, re-directing (8) fleet squadrons and (1) fleet replacement squadron of F/A-18 "Hornets" from NAS Cecil Field, Florida and moving the Navy's east coast S-3 "Viking" community to NAS Jacksonville, Florida will result in an up-front savings equivalent to closing a major naval air station on either coast.

The above realignment initiatives will result in a combined up-front savings to the American taxpayer of over 3/4 of a billion dollars. YES -- that's over 3/4 of a billion dollars with a capital "B" and that's not small potatoes!

The City of Virginia Beach has taken bold action on several initiatives, in close cooperation with the Commanding Officer, to ensure NAS Oceana continues its role as the Navy's premier Master Jet Base:

On August 23, 1994, Virginia Beach City Council unanimously approved a comprehensive Airport Zoning Ordinance limiting the height of structures around the airfield, requiring existing owners and realtors to disclose the noise zones to potential buyers, requiring any structure built in the noise area to incorporate acoustic

treatments in their construction and defines what can be built in terms of compatible use in any of the noise zones around the field.

In addition, we have budgeted approximately \$25 million dollars to move two elementary schools, built over 40 years ago, presently located in the NAS Oceana Accident Potential Zone (APZ). Our School Board has selected the alternate sites and engineers are currently engaged in the necessary design work.

Also we are pleased that we have signed an agreement with the state of North Carolina allowing the Lake Gaston Water Supply Project to be completed by 1998.

I can assure you the City of Virginia Beach and her sister cities that make-up the Greater Hampton Roads Area, already have the community infrastructure, in place to provide the absolute finest in "Quality of Life" for our wonderful soldiers, sailors, airman, marines, civil service employees and their dependents. Over crowding is a non-issue. As a matter of fact, I have been told by reliable sources that by the time the BRAC-95 initiatives are executed, the base loading at NAS Oceana, with respect to the number of personnel, number of squadrons and total aircraft, will be at a level below what has already been assigned there during the mid to late 1980's prior to both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Therefore, this is not new ground for the City of Virginia Beach/NAS Oceana team. We've been there before, tested and proven winners. On behalf of the citizens of Virginia Beach, we salute you and the integrity of the Navy's BRAC

process. We eagerly await the opportunity to "roll out the red carpet" for the welcome home of America's best and brightest to Naval Air Station Oceana, the Navy's new "Fighter Town East."

(PAUSE)

We love the sound of Freedom!!

Thank you

Document Separator

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BRAC-95 Regional Hearing
Baltimore, Maryland
May 4, 1995*

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process. We eagerly await the opportunity to "roll out the red carpet" for the welcome home of America's best and brightest to Naval Air Station Oceana, the Navy's new "Fighter Town East."

(PAUSE)

We love the sound of Freedom!!

Thank you

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Federal Lands Reuse Authority of Bucks County

Page 1

Closure of NAWC, Warminster, PA
Commissioner Michael Fitzpatrick

Introduction

- The purpose of this brief is to highlight events particular to the realignment of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Warminster, PA. and put focus on the economic impact that will result from its realignment.
- My name is Michael Fitzpatrick and I am on the Bucks County Board of Commissioners. Warminster is within Bucks County and the Commissioners' offices are in the Bucks County Courthouse, Doylestown, PA.

Robert J. Finley
Chairman

Kathleen M. Belsky
Vice Chairman

Martin J. Westermann
Secretary

Dr. James J. Links
Treasurer

Topics of Discussion

Harry J. Barford, Jr.

- Some of the main ideas of this brief include:
- NAWC size and employment statistics
- NAWC as a major purchaser of goods & services
- Centennial School District and associated impacts
- NAWC Flight Simulator, Centrifuge, Laboratory Testing and other fixed equipment

Francis B. J. Branagan

Joseph Butch

Robert T. Hasty

Norman Kelly

Victor J. Lasher

Anthony F. Visco, Jr.

Sheila Bass
Acting Administrator

The BRAC '91 realignment of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division from Warminster, PA to Patuxent River, MD is to be completed by September 30, 1996. The NAWC occupies an 840-acre site in Warminster Township, Northampton Township, & Ivyland Borough, PA, and provided direct employment for some 2400 military and civilian personnel during June 1993. More than 87 percent of these employees live in Bucks and Montgomery Counties.

Page 2

In addition, the NAWC contracts for goods and services locally; of particular concern are contracts with professional services firms in the two counties which have some 1,500 employees. These firms have been dependent on the NAWC for most of their business.

The NAWC is a major purchaser of goods and services produced in Bucks and Montgomery Counties. Of total of **\$287.6 million** obligated by the NAWC during FY 1993, **\$76.6 million** was obligated for contracts with companies located in the counties. Of this amount, **\$48.8 million** was spent for engineering services, indicating the severe impact of the realignment on the NAWC Contractors. All of this funding was assumed to be lost as a result of this realignment.

Because Centennial School District serves the NAWC, and surrounding areas, the district is most impacted by the realignment. In fiscal year 1993, Centennial received **\$417,243** of impact aid payments related to the NAWC; the impact aid on behalf of the NAWC will cease when the realignment is completed.

⇒ Total impact as a result of the '91 BRAC in 1993 is **\$135 million**.

⇒ **BRAC '95** adds the Navigation Center with over 250 employees and revenues of **\$73 million** FY '95 with a payroll of **\$13 million**.

Page 3

It is, first of all, important to realize that the NAWC is truly unique in both its mission and the nature of the men and women who work there. As result, filling the void in Bucks County is not the same as filling the void, for instance, in Fort Dix or England Air Force Base.

NAWC is where our early astronauts were trained. Today it remains the hub of America's navigational genius. It remains a setting for brilliant research, and extremely sensitive and extraordinary technical military projects.

Many NAWC scientists and others say they want to stay here and not move to Maryland. We also want them to stay because they are a remarkable human resource. Thus, when most operations of NAWC relocate, we will need to offer not just jobs, but jobs that will encourage them to remain in Bucks and Montgomery Counties. And here's where privatization and university participation would come into play.

We, therefore, respectfully request that the Navigation Center, with its Navigation Centrifuge, flight simulator, laboratory equipment, and other fixed equipment be kept open until this facility can be brought back into the community's economy.

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PAUL E. KANJORSKI
11TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND CREDIT FORMATION

COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE
AND CIVIL SERVICE

DEMOCRATIC WHIP-AT-LARGE



Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515-3811

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2429 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3811
(202) 225-6511

DISTRICT OFFICE:
10 E. SOUTH STREET BUILDING
WILKES-BARRE, PA 18701-2397
(717) 825-2200

TOLL FREE HELP-LINE
(800) 222-2346

MEMORANDUM

TO: Base Closure and Realignment Commission
FRM: Tim Rosado, 225-6511
RE: Statement
DTE: 5/4/95

Attached is a copy of the statement on Tobyhanna Army Depot we faxed to you on May 3, 1995. Please let me know if you need any additional information for your records. Thank you.

PAUL E. KANJORSKI
11TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS

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STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN PAUL E. KANJORSKI

to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
on Tobyhanna Army Depot
Baltimore Regional Hearing

May 4, 1995

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Commission, I regret not being able to attend today's hearing. I wanted to share with you in person my views on the proposals of the Secretary of Defense concerning Tobyhanna Army Depot. In short, I would urge you to sustain the Secretary's recommendations.

As you know, the recent recommendations of the Secretary of Defense provided that Tobyhanna Army Depot would remain open and, in addition, would receive the missile workload of Letterkenny Army Depot. The Secretary's recommendation is a clear reflection of DOD's determined efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the military depot system, while preserving those facilities that have the most to offer our military of the future.

Tobyhanna is the only Depot whose primary mission is high technology electronics, so critical to today's battlefield. As a result, it has the largest professional engineering staff of all of the Army's maintenance depots. This staff undertakes extensive work in sophisticated communications - electronics, including everything from hand-held radios to satellite communications.

In performing its critical missions, Tobyhanna has proven that it is working hard to meet the responsibilities it has to our Nation, the taxpayers, and the surrounding community in which it operates. Tobyhanna has earned numerous awards for excellence in maintenance, hazardous waste minimization, and recycling. It has earned national acclaim from the National Performance Review for efforts in fostering labor-management cooperation. The facility averages over \$2 million annually in documented Value Engineering savings. The cost of doing business at Tobyhanna is the lowest of all military depots.

Tobyhanna is indeed a national asset in every sense of the word. The facility has \$225 million in total assets, and manages a staggering \$3.4 billion inventory. It employs more than 3,650 dedicated, hard working, and highly trained employees.

Workers and management of Tobyhanna have worked closely with DOD to position the facility to take on added responsibilities and an increasing amount of interservicing arrangements. Interservicing work between the branches of the military is clearly key to the future viability of the depot system given federal budgetary constraints and the need for government to be much more efficient. Members of Congress, including myself, have urged DOD to move forward more rapidly on interservicing and DOD is continuing to move forward. Tobyhanna has the physical capacity, modern facilities, effective management, and the skilled personnel to meet the challenges of interservicing.

I would therefore urge you to sustain the recommendations of the Secretary on Tobyhanna. Under this round of closings there will be much hardship imposed on many other facilities and communities in Pennsylvania and around the country. This must not, however, prevent us from making the right decisions no matter how difficult they might be. Keeping Tobyhanna open is simply the right thing to do no matter how you look at it. The mission of Tobyhanna is critical, it is a center of employee and management excellence, and it has the capacity to meet the demands of the depot system of the future. No other depot can benefit DOD and the nation like Tobyhanna can. I am sure after careful review and analysis of other options you will come to the same conclusion.

Thank you for the opportunity to express my views on this important subject.

Impact of Base Closure and Realignment (States with more than 40,000 Defense Jobs)

Total Defense Personnel as of September 30, 1994	NET BRAC JOB (LOSSES)/ GAINS ('88, 91', and 93' BRACs)	NET CUMULATIVE JOB IMPACT WITH 1995 D.O.D. PROPOSAL	PROPOSED CUTS AS A % OF TOTAL DEFENSE PERSONNEL
CA 243,126	CA (78,488)	CA (81,874)	PA 36.6%
VA 188,873	FL (14,750)	PA (16,635)	CA 33.7%
TX 156,885	PA (13,305)	FL (10,317)	CO 14.5%
NC 113,608	VA (9,242)	CO (6,866)	FL 11.3%
GA 96,976	SC (8,135)	VA (5,399)	AL 8.4%
FL 91,090	CO (4,705)	SC (3,535)	SC 6.6%
MD 69,286	OH (3,228)	AL (3,458)	OH 3.4%
WA 62,743	KY (791)	OH (1,403)	VA 2.9%
HI 59,199	HI 24	KY (785)	KY 1.7%
SC 53,509	OK 706	IL 371	IL *N/A
OK 47,281	IL 1,031	TX 726	TX *N/A
CO 47,490	AL 2,012	MD 1,544	MD *N/A
KY 45,783	GA 2,048	HI 1,792	HI *N/A
PA 45,435	MD 3,236	OK 2,197	OK *N/A
IL 44,136	NC 6,226	GA 2,226	GA *N/A
OH 41,464	TX 7,707	NC 6,929	NC *N/A
AL 40,994	WA 17,013	WA 17,793	WA *N/A

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TALKING POINTS FOR STATE SEN. IDA G. RUBEN
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION HEARING

MAY 4, 1995

Mr. (or Madam) Chairman and members of the
commission. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to
speak on behalf of my community. My name is Senator Ida G.
Ruben. I represent the local community in the state legislature
and have lived in the neighborhood surrounding White Oak for
33 years. I am also a member of the Montgomery County
NAVSEA Task Force.

Since the BRAC 93 decision to move NAVSEA to White
Oak, the community has worked hard to put out the welcome
mat. The government of Montgomery County had been
concerned about making the impending NAVSEA move a
smooth one. They appointed a task force to facilitate the

transition and work with the local community. The task ^{FORCE} has been meeting and working for over a year to ensure that all areas of need for the NAVSEA move were addressed. The local community has been extremely enthusiastic and supportive of the move of NAVSEA to White Oak.

For example, Betsy Bretz, who is a member of the task force and lives in the community, and the members of the Hillendale Citizens Association, have worked with NAVSEA since 1993. They have collected information for NAVSEA on schools, babysitters and spousal employment opportunities, and have met with NAVSEA representatives on numerous occasions. They have conducted an open house for the community to review NAVSEA construction plans and have invited NAVSEA employees ^{to} join in neighborhood social functions.

Betsy led the community in collecting petitions in support of NAVSEA from the local citizens. Approximately 1,500 signatures have been collected over the past two months from Silver Spring residents, expressing their wholehearted support for having NAVSEA move to White Oak. The originals will be transmitted to the BRAC staff for inclusion in the official files.

The Navy, at White Oak, has always been a good neighbor, and we've been proud to have them. You can tell from my comments that the neighborhood is anxious to have NAVSEA as our neighbor. We are confident that when you have analyzed all the facts, and look closely at many of the arguments that have been presented today, you will conclude that the BRAC 93 decision was the right decision. We believed in the BRAC process then, and we believe in it now.

WE CAN
HOPE TO CONTINUE TO
SIN IT '95

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Department to be 521 jobs, including 385 civilian positions.

A third Army installation, the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility, has provided critical administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve Units throughout Western Pennsylvania. Of particular concern is the fact that inaccurate data was apparently used in arriving at the recommendation to close this facility, particularly those figures related to anticipated cost savings and the amount of time before a return on the closure investment would be seen.

The 911th Air Force Reserve Airlift Unit in Pittsburgh has received numerous awards over the years for its outstanding service in the area of airlift support. It is an important military installation that has come to our nation's aid in times of war, such as during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and in times of humanitarian need both here in the United States and abroad. A recent offer by Allegheny County to add an additional seventy-seven acres to the unit's lease only enhances its value to our nation's military. The approval of this expansion should be considered by the Commission in its review of the 911th since it would greatly expand the unit's capabilities.

Facilities throughout the Philadelphia area, an area already hard hit by past base closures, also continue to provide critical support to our nation's military. The Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) and Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit (NAESU) are lending important technical assistance to the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) continues to provide outstanding logistical support to the whole of our nation's military in the areas of general troop supplies and weapons and hardware support. The Defense Department's recommendation to disestablish DISC is contrary to the 1993 Commission's decision to consolidate supply operations in Philadelphia. Further, it is clear that the analysis used by the Defense Department in reaching their decision was once again flawed when

**Statement by Senator Arlen Specter
Before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
Regional Hearing
Baltimore, Maryland
May 4, 1995**

Madame Chair and distinguished Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, I welcome this opportunity to testify before you today concerning the impact of this and past base closure rounds on Pennsylvania and the tremendous importance of Pennsylvania and its installations to the Department of Defense. The task that you have been given -- namely, to review the Defense Department's 1995 base closure recommendations and to add and subtract from that list according to your own best judgment -- is an enormously important one, and the hearing in which we find ourselves is a most valuable means of fulfilling that task.

Testimony to be placed in Hearing Book

Having represented the state of Pennsylvania in the past several years, I am well acquainted with the tremendous importance of its installations. I have seen firsthand the excellence with which the men and women of these installations have served their country; and, unfortunately, I have witnessed the grossly disproportionate burden that Pennsylvania has borne in the three base closure rounds that have preceded this one. As Governor Ridge has already demonstrated, Pennsylvania has been hit much harder than fairness would recommend, and the facts bear this out unmistakably. Pennsylvania entered the "era of base closures" in 1988 with 2.6 percent of the nation's military and civilian jobs, and yet we enter 1995 having borne nearly eleven percent of all personnel reductions nationwide in the base closure rounds of 1988, 1991 and 1993. In 1988, 5.6 percent of the Defense Department's civilian employment was found in Pennsylvania, and yet we have borne over twelve percent of

the Department's civilian reductions in the same three base closure rounds. For these reasons, on January 19, 1995 Senator Santorum and I wrote to Secretary of Defense William Perry urging him to spare Pennsylvania any further closures. Once again, however, Pennsylvania has been slated for significant hardship. The Department of Defense has recommended the closure, realignment or disestablishment of twelve Pennsylvania installations which would result in the additional loss of 221 military and 3,379 civilian jobs -- the fourth highest civilian job loss figure and the fifth highest job loss overall in this year's round. Pennsylvania's inequitable treatment would only continue.

Madame Chair, I do not contest the unavoidable reality that in such a time as this -- a time of changing priorities in our national defense establishment and of ever-tightening fiscal constraints -- some base closures and realignments are necessary. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am well acquainted with the reality of our fiscal constraints in fashioning the defense budget, and I have long been sensitive to the importance of fiscal responsibility. I *do* contest most strenuously, however, the proposition that Pennsylvania ought to bear more than its fair share of these closures, and yet over the last several years this is precisely what we have seen.

Pennsylvania's disproportionate burden in the past is especially difficult to understand in light of all that Pennsylvania has to offer to the needs of our national defense. Pennsylvania offers our national defense establishment an economy that combines sophisticated high-technology with excellence in heavy industry, agriculture, and health sciences. Pennsylvania is uniquely located to take advantage of the railways and waterways of the Eastern Seaboard, and its 40,000 miles of highway allow for the effective and rapid transportation of all sorts of commodities -- including military personnel. Pennsylvania is clearly well-situated and well-

equipped to serve the needs of our nation's military, and the importance of its military installations has always borne this out. I have had numerous opportunities to visit these facilities throughout the years that I have been in the Senate. I have seen firsthand the skill and dedication of the men and women who serve at these installations. Day in and day out, they are performing crucial functions for the operation of our nation's military -- both here in the United States as well as on deployment overseas -- and they are doing so with commitment and with excellence.

The Letterkenny Army Depot, for example, is doing outstanding work in the area of munitions and vehicle maintenance and repair. Letterkenny is a model of the sort of excellence and efficiency that is the basis of our military preparedness. It is of particular concern to me, then, that the Defense Department seems to have stacked the deck against Letterkenny in this year's round by using faulty data and outdated assumptions, including information that was used in 1993 prior to significant changes at the facility. Let us not forget that in 1993 the Defense Department recommended the realignment of Letterkenny, and that the Base Closure and Realignment Commission found that that recommendation had "deviated substantially" from its final selection criteria. The facts are plain: Letterkenny is an efficient operation, and it is the facts -- and not misinformation and outdated assumptions -- that must form the basis of the Commission's recommendations.

Fort Indiantown Gap is another facility that has performed crucial work for our nation's armed forces: namely, the training of hundreds of thousands of soldiers annually and their mobilization in times of conflict. This, combined with its enormous economic importance to the surrounding community, makes it clear that Fort Indiantown Gap is an installation that ought to stay open. Its economic value to the local community has been estimated at nearly \$160 million annually, and job losses resulting from its closure have been estimated by the Defense

determining job loss figures.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Philadelphia is the Navy's only source for in-service engineering and for the testing and evaluation of ship machinery systems. It is also one of the key ingredients in the City of Philadelphia's plan to make efficient reuse of the Naval Shipyard; the NSWC serves as a key component in the plan to attract private companies to the Shipyard and to make the most profitable use of these facilities. I believe that the Defense Department is wise to recommend the consolidation of additional NSWC activities at the Philadelphia site and that serious consideration should be given to the proposal to relocate other Naval operations to the NSWC, Philadelphia beyond those recommended in this year's Defense Department list.


The importance of these various facilities to the economies of their communities is yet another significant factor that argues in favor of their continued operation. As you are well aware, your Commission has been charged to consider the criterion of economic impact alongside that of military value -- and in both of these respects, the facts are on the side of Pennsylvania's facilities. Pennsylvania's inordinate economic burden in past base closure rounds has already been demonstrated; the economic hardship that would result from these 1995 recommendations is just as clear and must be given serious consideration in the course of your deliberations.

Madame Chair and Members of the Commission, this 1995 base closure round amounts to an opportunity to finally afford Pennsylvania the fair treatment that it -- and every state -- deserves and to recognize the value of its military facilities to the national defense. As this 1995 base closure and realignment process continues, and especially today as Pennsylvania, its installations and communities are given the opportunity to testify before you, I urge you to

consider seriously the tremendous importance of Pennsylvania's military facilities and the imperative to uphold the fundamental principle of fairness for Pennsylvania and every state affected by your decisions. In these ways, the best interests of the people of Pennsylvania -- and of the nation as a whole -- will have been served, and the excellence of our national defense establishment will truly have been advanced.

Thank you.

Document Separator



4 MAY 1995

MY NAME IS HENRY GRIERSON. I AM THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT OF OUR UNION, THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, (NAFFE). I REPRESENT 92 BLUE COLLAR SUPPORT PERSONNEL, MOSTLY IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE MACHINERY R&D DIRECTORATE. I HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED AT THE ANNAPOLIS SITE FOR OVER 20 YEARS AND LIKE THE MAJORITY OF MY CO-WORKERS, I AM A LIFE LONG RESIDENT OF THE ANNAPOLIS AREA.

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT EXCESS CAPACITY RELATED TO MAN YEARS.

THIS DIRECTLY CONCERNS ME BECAUSE OF THE SHOP SUPPORT NUMBERS. OVER 45,000 HOURS OF OVERTIME WERE WORKED IN FY '94 BY THE SHOP SUPPORT PERSONNEL OF THE CARDEROCK DIVISION. OF THIS NUMBER, ABOUT 30,000 HOURS WERE WORKED AT THE ANNAPOLIS SITE, MOSTLY IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF SPONSOR FUNDED PROJECTS. THE REASON FOR THIS HIGH NUMBER IS SIMPLE. IN 1991, THERE WERE 168 SHOP SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN ANNAPOLIS COMPARED WITH ONLY 92 TODAY, A REDUCTION OF 45%. OUR WORKLOAD HAS INCREASED YEARLY AND IS PROJECTED TO INCREASE THROUGH THE TURN OF THE CENTURY. THIS WORK, BY THE WAY, CAN NOT BE DONE COST EFFICIENTLY BY OUT-SOURCING. BY ADDING THE LOWER NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES WITH THE INCREASED WORKLOAD AND THROWING IN THE HIRING FREEZE, WE ARE APPROXIMATELY 15 MAN YEARS UNDERSTAFFED. IF NOT FOR SOME EXCESS EMPLOYEES FROM PHILADELPHIA BEING DETAILED TO ANNAPOLIS

Local 2123

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF
THE EMPLOYEES AT THE ANNAPOLIS SITE.



HENRY GRIERSON
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT
NFFE
(W) (410) 293-4944
(H) (410) 757-4907

TO PERFORM FACILITIES MAINTENANCE AND GENERAL SUPPORT, THE 15 MAN YEARS WOULD BE GREATER.

RESULT - NO OR NEGATIVE EXCESS CAPACITY AT ANNAPOLIS.


THEREFORE, WE ASK THE COMMISSION THAT IF BRAC '95 RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE THE ANNAPOLIS SITE IS SUCCESSFULLY OVERTURNED, THE SHOPS DIVISION BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE AS A FIRST CLASS SUPPORT CAPABILITY TO THE MACHINERY R&D DIRECTORATE AT THE ANNAPOLIS SITE. GRANTED, IN DUE TIME OTHER PEOPLE COULD EFFICIENTLY REPLACE US IN OUR MISSION. BUT NOW, WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS STARTING TO LOSE GROUND IN ITS SUPERIOR DOMINANCE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAN WE AFFORD DOWNTIME IN OUR PROGRAMS? ONLY YOU, COMMISSION MEMBERS, CONTROL THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

IN CLOSING, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A LETTER SENT TO YOU BY THE PHILADELPHIA CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION DATED APRIL 5, 1994. PART OF THIS LETTER ADDRESSES THE OVERHEAD COSTS. CURRENTLY, OVERHEAD COST AT ANNAPOLIS (PER PERSON) ARE SLIGHTLY HIGHER BECAUSE ANNAPOLIS IS THE HOST ACTIVITY. I SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WHEN THE SHIPYARD CLOSES IN THE FALL OF 1995 AND NAVSES, PHILADELPHIA LOSES IT'S TENANT ACTIVITY STATUS AND BECOMES HOST, THEIR OVERHEAD COST WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN ANNAPOLIS. WE AT ANNAPOLIS TAKE PRIDE IN OUR WORK AND THE FACT THAT THE REVENUE GENERATED AT OUT LAB MAKES US SELF-SUPPORTIVE.

TWO YEAR COMPARISON OF DIRECT HOURS


Code 36 Performance

FY93 HOURS



195343 TOTAL HOURS
(OT 26633)

FY94 HOURS



213940 TOTAL HOURS
(OT 45264)

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 5, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number
when responding 950406-1

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We write to express our strong support for the Department of Defense recommendation to realign functions from the Annapolis, Maryland site of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWC/CD) to Philadelphia. This consolidation will promote the enhanced readiness of our armed forces, lower Navy machinery lifecycle costs and improve efficiency while assisting in the conversion of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. In terms of comparative economic impact, the Philadelphia region has lost more than 40,000 direct and indirect jobs as a result of closures recommended in all three preceding base closure actions, while the entire state of Maryland has lost a mere 1,700 direct civilian jobs.

NSWC/CD-Philadelphia is the Department of the Navy's only source for in-service engineering and for testing and evaluating (T&E) ship machinery systems. In total, over 10,000 machinery systems including propulsion, auxiliary, electrical and environmental systems and 200,000 models of components are currently operating on Navy surface ships and submarines. A full twenty percent of the Navy's annual budget is devoted to lifecycle costs for these vital systems. NSWC-Philadelphia makes a strong contribution to maintaining military readiness, and consolidating NSWC-Annapolis' research activity would improve on this in a cost effective manner. Consolidating NSWC activities in Philadelphia and Carderock, Maryland began in 1991, as a result of a BRAC order. We agree with the Navy's recommendation to the Commission that we continue to consolidate NSWC activities in Philadelphia because it supports the three core concepts the Commission uses in evaluating realignments, as outlined below.

I. Military Value: The Navy's Position To Consolidate NSWC Activities In Philadelphia Because It Advances Readiness.

Consolidating research and development, testing and engineering in Philadelphia will foster the critical readiness of Navy systems. Merging Annapolis's R&D activities with the extensive NSWC/CD-P facilities and in-service engineering responsibilities will ensure that full life-cycle development and deployment of all machinery systems will be conducted at one activity. This realignment will promote "synergistic efficiencies", according to the Navy, providing the following advantages:

- Streamlining the acquisition and development process, enabling the Navy to purchase more capable systems at a lower cost.
- Increasing the Navy's ability to respond rapidly to solve immediate problems related to machinery systems, thereby improving operational readiness.

On top of these anticipated savings the Navy will further reduce costs as a result of this realignment due to the lower overhead costs in Philadelphia. Currently, overhead costs per person at Annapolis are significantly higher than those at NSWC/CD-Philadelphia. Implementation of the BRAC '91 reduction at Annapolis will further degrade Annapolis' cost structure. Similarly, implementation of DoD's BRAC '95 recommendation to close Annapolis will further improve NSWC/CD-Philadelphia's already cost efficient operation.

It has come to our attention that inaccurate statements have been made that the Navy's ability to perform CFC reduction research would be adversely affected in the event of the Annapolis consolidation to Philadelphia. This is untrue. As indicated in the responses given by officials at NSWC/CD-Philadelphia to questions fielded by the Navy prior to the BRAC '95 recommendation, Philadelphia has existing CFC facilities and is conducting on-going non-CFC testing. These facilities will enable implementation of BRAC '95 consolidations with little or no schedule interruption and can be accomplished for \$2 million, not \$10 million as claimed by Annapolis.

II. Return On Investment: The Navy's Recommended Consolidation Will Save \$175.1 Million Over 20 Years.

The facilities at the Philadelphia site of the NSWC/CD are considerably more extensive and capable than those in Annapolis and, therefore, the proposed consolidation can be accomplished quickly, without environmental impact, and inexpensively. DoD estimates that the realignment can be completed for a one time cost of only \$25 million. The anticipated return on this investment is expected within one year, with annual recurring savings after consolidation of \$14.5 million, and a total 20 year cost savings of \$175.1 million.

III. Impacts: This Consolidation Will Help Philadelphia Create Jobs After Losing 40,000 Jobs In Three BRAC Rounds, While Maryland Has Lost Only 1,700 Direct Civilian Jobs.


The Philadelphia region is the only region in the country to have military installations closed in all three of the previous BRAC rounds. These actions are forcing 40,000 workers out of their jobs and is resulting in \$50 million in lost tax revenue to the City. These direct and indirect job losses make Philadelphia one of the single hardest hit cities in the country. In BRAC 1991 alone, the Philadelphia region suffered more civilian job losses than any region in the country. The 10,000 direct civilian jobs lost accounted for more than one-third of the national total for this round. This year the Defense Logistics Agency is recommending the disestablishment of the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) in Philadelphia meaning a potential loss of 1,198 direct and indirect jobs.


The history of job losses in the Philadelphia region and Pennsylvania stands in sharp contrast to the losses sustained by Maryland. All totaled, the entire state of Maryland has suffered much smaller civilian job losses in the three previous BRAC rounds totaling 1,700 positions.


The realignment of Annapolis functions to Philadelphia would greatly assist our efforts to recover from these losses by boosting our efforts to successfully convert the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The 1,600 engineers, scientists, and technicians as well as the extensive test facilities at NSWC/CD-P have made it an important anchor tenant at the Shipyard, directly responsible for attracting new, technology-oriented business to the site. At this time, Westinghouse Corporation has committed to establishing operations at the Yard citing their desire to locate near NSWC. By coupling the Annapolis R&D activities with Philadelphia's T&E and in-service engineering responsibilities, we anticipate that the activity's business attraction potential will increase significantly.

Consolidation of Annapolis functions began as a result of BRAC '91, with the relocation of over 400 personnel to NSWC-Carderock, Maryland and 100 personnel to Philadelphia. It is our strong belief that the Navy is correct in making the BRAC '95 recommendation based on the compelling military readiness, cost savings and efficiency factors. We thank you for your time and attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,


THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA
Member of Congress


CURT WELDON
Member of Congress


ARLEN SPECTER
United States Senate



ROBERT A. BORSKI
Member of Congress




RICK SANTORUM
United States Senate



ROBERT E. ANDREWS
Member of Congress




JOSEPH M. MCNAMEE
Member of Congress




CHAKA FATTAH
Member of Congress



JAMES C. GREENWOOD
Member of Congress



JON D. FOX
Member of Congress



JIM SAXTON
Member of Congress



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
703-696-0504

April 10, 1995

The Honorable James C. Greenwood
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Please refer to this number
when responding 950406-1R1

Dear Representative Greenwood:

Thank you for your letter expressing support for the Secretary of Defense's recommendation concerning Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Philadelphia (NSWC/CD-P). I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on the NSWC/CD-P.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon
Chairman

AJD:js
ECTS#: 950406-1

Document Separator

TALKING POINTS FOR MIKE LEVIN

MR CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: MY NAME IS MIKE LEVIN. I HAVE BEEN A RESIDENT AND NEIGHBOR OF THE LABORATORY AT WHITE OAK FOR 39 YEARS. I RECENTLY RETIRED FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WHERE I WAS A CAREER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. I PROUDLY WEAR THE SYMBOL OF OUR NATIONS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEDAL.

THERE ARE SERIOUS SECURITY RISKS INHERENT IN RELOCATING NAVSEA TO THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD; RISKS WHICH GIVE WHITE OAK A CLEAR ADVANTAGE.

OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS THE NAVY HAS LED OR PARTICIPATED IN NUMEROUS ACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN POWERS THAT SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. BECAUSE OF THIS, SECURITY MUST BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. AS WE HAVE JUST LEARNED, THERE ARE ALSO SERIOUS SECURITY RISKS WITHIN OUR OWN BORDERS.

AT THE NAVY YARD ACCESS IS EASY AND FREQUENT. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO TERRORIST ATTACKS THERE IN THE PAST DOZEN YEARS. THE NAVY EXPECTS 400,000 VISITORS THIS YEAR, MOST OF THEM TO VISIT THE NAVY MUSEUM AND THE DISPLAY SHIP BARRY. THIS IS A POTENTIAL SECURITY NIGHTMARE.

WHITE OAK, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS AN IDEAL SETTING. THE BUILDINGS ARE SET BACK 1200 FEET FROM THE FRONT AND SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET ON THE SIDES FROM THE BASE PERIMETER. THIS PROVIDES A SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY BUFFER.

THIS BUFFER ALSO SERVES AS AN ELECTRONIC BUFFER, MAKING THE SUBURBAN WHITE OAK SITE FAR LESS VULNERABLE TO ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING THAN THE URBAN NAVY YARD SITE.

CLEARLY, FROM A PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY STANDPOINT, THE LAND AND FACILITIES AT WHITE OAK ARE MUCH MORE SUITABLE THAN THOSE AT THE NAVY YARD AS THE HEADQUARTERS OF A MAJOR NAVY COMMAND WITH NEARLY 4000 EMPLOYEES.

FINALLY, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NATIONAL SECURITY, OUR NATION CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE THE SPECIAL CAPABILITIES OF THE ONE-OF-A-KIND FACILITIES AT WHITE OAK. YOU HAVE HEARD THAT FROM THE SCIENTISTS AT THE PENTAGON; YOU HAVE HEARD IT FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND NOW YOU HAVE HEARD IT FROM THE PEOPLE. THANK YOU.

MJL 4 MAY 95

Document Separator

CONGRESSMAN HOLDEN'S REMARKS

GOOD AFTERNOON COMMISSIONERS. I AM CONGRESSMAN TIM HOLDEN OF THE 6TH DISTRICT. MANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO WORK AND TRAIN AT THE GAP ARE MY NEIGHBORS. I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION BY TURNING TO THE FINANCIAL SIDE OF THIS CLOSURE.

(SLIDE SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED)

THE ARMY IN ITS COBRA ANALYSIS CLAIMED IT WILL SAVE 23.8 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR BY CLOSING AND ENCLAVING THE FORT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FORT ONLY HAS AN ANNUAL BUDGET OF 13.5 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS MAY HAVE MISLED THE DECISION MAKERS IN PROPOSING THIS CLOSURE ACTION. WE CHALLENGED THIS FIGURE, GAVE THEM OUR REVIEW, AND AS A RESULT THE ARMY BASE STUDY CONDUCTED A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. THAT ANALYSIS PROJECTS AN 11.2 MILLION DOLLAR ANNUAL SAVINGS OUT OF THE INSTALLATION'S 13.5 MILLION DOLLAR BUDGET. WE BELIEVE THIS ANALYSIS IS ALSO SERIOUSLY FLAWED AND WE HOPE THAT CLAIM WILL NOT MISLEAD THIS COMMISSION. SPECIFICALLY, THE SCENARIO FAILS TO PROVIDE FOR THE COST OF THE POST'S INFRASTRUCTURE, THE NECESSITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO YOU. IT ALSO FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS OF TRAVEL WHICH THE PROPOSAL REQUIRES.

(SLIDE OFF)

FTIG IS THE HOME OF MANY FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, RESERVE UNITS AND OTHER USERS. THESE ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT LEAVE. THE ARMY HAS SAID THESE ACTIVITIES MUST REMAIN AND HAS RECOMMENDED THEY BE ENCLAVED. AS YOU HAVE HEARD THE FACILITIES ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE POST. THE ARMY HAS ALSO STATED THAT THE TRAINING AREAS AND RANGES ARE STILL NEEDED FOR THE LARGE POPULATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT'S USE. THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ENTIRE INSTALLATION BE RETAINED. THE NATURAL QUESTION THAT FOLLOWS IS, WHAT WOULD BE THE RESULT OF PULLING OUT THE ARMY GARRISON AS THE SECRETARY PROPOSES?

(SLIDE ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE)

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP COULD BE COMPARED TO A LARGE OFFICE BUILDING. ALL THE USERS OF THE INSTALLATION ARE THE RENTERS IN THE BUILDING, WHILE THE REGULAR ARMY IS THE MANAGEMENT. THE ARMY, BY RECOMMENDING THIS CLOSURE, HAS SAID THE OCCUPANTS WILL STAY BUT THE MANAGEMENT AND STAFF WHO RUN THE BUILDING WILL BE DISMISSED.

(SLIDE INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATED)

IMAGINE THAT YOU ARE AN OCCUPANT IN THE BUILDING AND GO TO WORK TO FIND THE WATER, ELECTRICITY AND SEWER TURNED OFF AND ALL

OTHER ESSENTIAL SERVICES DISCONTINUED. WHAT WOULD YOU DO? NATURALLY YOU WOULD RELOCATE. BUT THE ARMY HAS SAID, NO, IT WILL COST TOO MUCH FOR YOU TO LEAVE. THE ARMY HAS ESTIMATED THAT MOVING THESE FUNCTIONS TO ANOTHER INSTALLATION WOULD COST IN EXCESS OF \$300 MILLION.

(SLIDE \$11.2 MILLION SAVINGS)

NOW LET US RETURN TO THE \$11 MILLION DOLLARS IN ANNUAL SAVINGS THE ARMY HAS CLAIMED IT WILL ACHIEVE BY CLOSING THE POST'S INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISMISSING THE EMPLOYEES WHO RUN IT. WILL THERE REALLY BE A SAVINGS? SOMEONE WILL NEED TO TAKE OVER THE INFRASTRUCTURE. THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD, AGAIN, BE FEDERALLY FUNDED. THE ARMY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT THE MANY FACILITIES ON THE INSTALLATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH RESERVE COMPONENT, ARE FEDERAL MISSIONS. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT PRACTICAL TO EXPECT ANY SAVINGS. YOU CAN'T SAVE MONEY SIMPLY BY SAYING YOU ARE GOING TO STOP PAYING THE BILL.

THE ARMY IS SIMPLY SHIFTING THE BILL FROM THE REGULAR ARMY TO THE RESERVE COMPONENT. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING, HOWEVER, BASED ON THE GUIDANCE THE ARMY BASE STUDY WAS GIVEN. THE ARMY INSTRUCTED ITS ANALYSTS TO "MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF MAJOR TRAINING AREAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING SUPPORT" AND IN ITS DIRECTIONS TO ITS ANALYSTS IT FURTHER STATED

**"CONSIDERABLE OVERALL DOD SAVINGS COULD BE REALIZED BY
MAXIMIZING THE USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT ENCLAVES."**

(SLIDE WHY CHANGE MGT)

**THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION SHOWS THAT THE SECRETARY'S
ENCLAVE PROPOSAL IS OPERATIONALLY NOT PRACTICAL AND THAT THE
CLAIMED SAVINGS CAN NOT BE REALIZED. IN LIGHT OF THESE FACTS, I
WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THE LOGIC BEHIND DISRUPTING AN
EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE WORK FORCE, WHO HAVE SELFLESSLY
SERVED THEIR NATION, SOME FOR THEIR ENTIRE WORKING LIFE, FOR THE
SAKE OF A PAPER SAVINGS THAT WILL NEVER MATERIALIZE. WHAT IS THE
POINT OF SPENDING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DISMISS THESE EMPLOYEES,
ONLY TO HIRE REPLACEMENTS. THE TURBULENCE AND INEFFICIENCY
THAT WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FROM THE CHANGE IN THE PRESENT
GARRISON OPERATIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY IMPACT ON THE
READINESS OF THE THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS WHO TRAIN AT THE GAP
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.**

(SLIDE OFF)

**I WOULD FURTHER ASK YOU TO SPECIFICALLY REQUEST THAT THE
GAO LOOK AT THE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP ANALYSIS.**

(SLIDE REALITY OF PROPOSAL)

THE ARMY BASING STUDY TELLS US THAT "THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF BRAC IS TO SAVE MONEY THROUGH SOUND BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIONS." THIS WAS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REDUCING EXCESS PROPERTY, EXCESS FACILITIES AND EXCESS OVERHEAD. THE FACTS THAT WE HAVE SHOWN YOU, WE BELIEVE, ESTABLISH THAT NONE OF THESE APPLY TO FORT INDIANTOWN GAP. WHAT THE SECRETARY PROPOSES IS NOT SOUND.

(SLIDE A WINNING RELATIONSHIP)


THE GAP IS AN INSTALLATION THAT IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE THOUSANDS OF SERVICE MEMBERS WHO TRAIN THERE. THERE IS NO OTHER PLACE FOR THEM TO GO. ITS GREAT VALUE IS IN ITS ACCESSIBILITY, SUITABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY. WE CANNOT DO WITHOUT IT.

ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH WE WOULD ASK THAT THERE BE MADE PART OF THIS RECORD A SUBMISSION WHICH DETAILS THE SPECIFICS IN WHICH WE BELIEVE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED FROM THE SELECTION CRITERIA.

I BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE REASONS WHICH WE HAVE DETAILED AND ASK THE COMMISSION TO REMOVE FORT INDIANTOWN GAP FROM THE LIST.


(COVER SLIDE ON)

SAVINGS OVERESTIMATED- RECURRING COSTS UNDERESTIMATED



FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE



**Occupants: RTS-MED, AASF, EAATS, RTS-MAINT, REGION
NCO ACADEMY, BOMBING RANGE, DMA, RESERVE CTR, ETC.**

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATED



No Water, No Electricity, No Sewer
 NO ESSENTIAL SERVICES
 FORT INDIANTOWN GAP


? 11.2 Million Dollar Savings ?

- **SAVINGS FROM EMPLOYEE DISMISSALS?**
- **NEW EMPLOYEES WILL NEED TO BE HIRED!**
- **ALL ESSENTIAL SERVICES MUST BE PROVIDED**
 - **FEDERALLY FUNDED**

NO REALISTIC SAVINGS

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Why Change THE MANAGEMENT?




REALITY OF PROPOSAL

- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PROPERTY**
- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS PERMANENT FACILITIES**
- **NO REDUCTION IN EXCESS OVERHEAD**

PURPOSE OF BRAC NOT ACHIEVED

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

FTIG A WINNING RELATIONSHIP INTO THE FUTURE



TAKE FTIG OFF THE BRAC LIST


FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

MAJOR ROUTES TO UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY CAMPUS

From Baltimore City and southern portion of I-695 (Baltimore Beltway): Proceed south on I-95 to exit 47B, Route 166. Follow Route 166 toward Catonsville and follow signs to UMBC.

From I-695 (Baltimore Beltway): Take exit 12C Wilkens Avenue and continue one-half mile to the entrance of UMBC on the left.

From Washington and all points South: Proceed north on I-95 to exit 47B, Route 166. Follow Route 166 toward Catonsville and follow the signs to UMBC.



Document Separator

11-1-95

CAMPUS MAPS

University of Maryland Baltimore County



UMBC Telephone Extensions

Emergency
Police-Fire-Ambulance
3133

Admissions	(410) 455-2291
Alumni Affairs	-2904
Athletics Facilities Use & Events	-2129
Bookstore	-2665
Health Services	-2542
Registrar	-3158
Residential Life	-2591
University Center/Information	-3458
University Relations	-2902

Temporary parking permits for unregistered vehicles may be obtained for one day from the Office of Parking Services, located in the Physical Plant building, or from the campus police.

717 861 8446 P. 15

Nursing. It has implemented the nation's first undergraduate major in Emergency Health Services, as well as the first curriculum in Applied Molecular Biology. Undergraduate students also have the option of designing their own majors. Complementing its outstanding faculty, UMBC has modern, well-equipped science and language labs, fine arts studios, state-of-the-art TV and recording studios, and a radio station. The university's satellite transmissions for foreign language students have received national recognition.

UMBC also has the state's largest cooperative education programs for students who want to alternate their studies with full or part-time employment. Under this arrangement, students can receive credit for their work off campus. The Albin O. Kuhn Library & Gallery ranks among the nation's leading university libraries in automation-enhanced information systems.

At its contemporary 500 acre campus, ten minutes from downtown Baltimore, and convenient to Washington, Annapolis, and the BWI Airport, the University of Maryland Baltimore County maintains the traditions and values of a liberal arts institution while advancing knowledge across a variety of disciplines. Its 28 undergraduate degree programs range from the sciences and engineering through the arts and humanities. Its graduate program, conducted with the Baltimore City campus of the University of Maryland (UMAB), offers 68 degree programs, 42 on the UMBC campus.

In addition to the traditional course offerings in the humanities, arts, and sciences, UMBC offers degree programs in Information Systems Management, Engineering, Computer Science, and

Welcome to UMBC

MAY-02-1995 12:02 USFPO PG

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY


BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21228
BUILDING DIRECTORY


1. ACADEMIC IV/LECTURE HALL IV
2. ACADEMIC SERVICES/ADMISSIONS
3. ADMINISTRATION/LECTURE HALL III
4. ALBIN O. KUHN LIBRARY & GALLERY
5. ALUMNI HOUSE
6. BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
7. CHEMISTRY/PHYSICS
LECTURE HALL II
8. CHESAPEAKE (HALL)
9. DAY CARE CENTER
10. DINING HALLS 1, 2, & FACULTY/STAFF
11. ENGINEERING/COMPUTER SCIENCE
LECTURE HALL V
12. FIELDHOUSE/POOL
13. FINE ARTS/GALLERY
14. GREENHOUSE
15. GYM I
COMMUTER CAFETERIA
16. HEALTH SERVICES
17. HILLCREST RESIDENTIAL LIFE OFFICE
18. HILLSIDE APARTMENTS

18-1 BRETON	18-5 MANOKIN
18-2 CASSELMAN	18-6 PATUXENT
18-3 DEEPCREEK	18-7 POCOMOKE
18-4 ELK	18-8 SIDELING
19. LECTURE HALL I
7. LECTURE HALL II
3. LECTURE HALL III
1. LECTURE HALL IV
11. LECTURE HALL V
20. MAINTENANCE SHOPS
21. MARTIN SCHWARTZ HALL
22. MATHEMATICS/PSYCHOLOGY
23. PATAPSCO HALL
24. PHYSICAL PLANT
25. POLICE
26. POTOMAC HALL
27. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BLDG.
13. RECITAL HALL
28. SOCIAL SCIENCES
29. STADIUM
30. SUSQUEHANNA HALL
31. TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE CENTER
BUILDINGS (TEC & TEC 2)
32. TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH CENTER
33. TEMPORARY FACILITY I
34. TEMPORARY FACILITY II
35. TERRACE I APARTMENTS

35-1 ANTIETAM	35-5 NANTICOKE
35-2 CHINCOTEAGUE	35-6 SASSAFRASS
35-3 GUNPOWDER	35-7 TUCKAHOE
35-4 MONOCACY	35-8 WICOMICO
2. THEATRE
36. UNIVERSITY CENTER/BOOKSTORE
37. WAREHOUSE
38. WESTHILL APARTMENTS

38-1 CHESTER	38-5 TANGIER
38-2 CHOPTANK	38-6 SEVERN
38-3 MAGOTHY	38-7 WYE
38-4 OFFICE & LAUNDRY	





ST. RAVENNA

Document Separator

**STATEMENT BY
HON. OWEN B. PICKETT**

**BEFORE THE BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING
OF THE
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995

INTRODUCTION

IT IS MY PLEASURE TO BE HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS BRAC '95 REALIGNMENTS AFFECTING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN MY DISTRICT IN HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA. JOINING ME AT THE TABLE ARE PAUL D. FRAM, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK, AND MEYERA E. OBERNDORF, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH. WHILE THERE ARE BOTH GAINS AND LOSSES FOR THE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN MY DISTRICT, I SUPPORT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

NAS OCEANA

THE REDIRECT OF F/A-18 SQUADRONS FROM NAS CECIL FIELD, FLORIDA TO NAS OCEANA, VIRGINIA, AND THE REDIRECT OF S-3 SQUADRONS FROM NAS CECIL FIELD TO NAS JACKSONVILLE HAVE RECEIVED THE MOST ATTENTION AND PUBLICITY.

THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, HOWEVER, ARE FULLY SUPPORTED AND JUSTIFIED BY A THOROUGH, COMPLETE, AND DETAILED ANALYSIS PREPARED BY THE NAVY BASED ON VALIDATED, CONFIRMED, AND CERTIFIED DATA.

THIS REDIRECT OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS --- WHICH IS TO SIZE AND SHAPE OUR MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE AND OPERATIONALLY EFFICIENT WAY.

**THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE IN MAKING ITS
STATUTORY REVIEW OF DOD'S BRAC '95 PROCESS
CONCLUDED THAT THE NAVY'S PROCESS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AIR STATIONS SUBCATEGORY
WERE SOUND.**

**REDIRECTING THE F-18'S AND SINGLE SITING THE F-14'S
AT OCEANA WILL NOT OVERLOAD THIS BASE. DURING THE
1980'S AN EVEN LARGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WERE
SUCCESSFULLY AND ROUTINELY ACCOMMODATED AT THIS
VERY CAPABLE AND WELL EQUIPPED MASTER JET BASE. THE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT FACILITIES, AND COMMUNITY
QUALITY OF LIFE RESOURCES ARE ALL IN PLACE AND READY
FOR USE.**

NORFOLK NAVAL BASE

**TWO HELICOPTER MINE COUNTER-MEASURES
SQUADRONS NOW STATIONED AT THE NORFOLK NAVAL
BASE ARE PROPOSED FOR RELOCATION TO THE NAVY'S MINE
WARFARE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AT INGLESIDE TEXAS.
WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS MOVE, WE
WILL MISS THE FINE MILITARY MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES
IN OUR COMMUNITY.**

NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT - NORFOLK

IN A LETTER DATED MARCH 2, 1995, I REQUESTED THAT THE COMMISSION REVIEW THE BRAC 1993 DECISION CONCERNING NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT (NADEP) NORFOLK. WITH ALL F-14'S BEING SINGLE SITED AT NAS OCEANA, JUST 20 MILES FROM NADEP NORFOLK, THERE ARE STRONGER ARGUMENTS NOW TO SUPPORT THE NEED FOR THIS PREMIER F-14 MAINTENANCE FACILITY. THE TARGET DATE FOR CLOSURE OF THIS FACILITY IS NOW SEPTEMBER 30, 1996. I REQUEST THAT THE COMMISSION CONSIDER REVERSING OR MODIFYING THE ACTION TAKEN IN THE BRAC '93 PROCESS WITH RESPECT TO NADEP NORFOLK. THERE ARE NEW FACTS BEARING ON THIS ISSUE THAT SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS REVIEW PROCESS THIS YEAR. CLOSING THIS FACILITY AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED DEFIES LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE.

MAYOR FRAIM

IT IS NOW MY PLEASURE TO PRESENT THE HONORABLE PAUL FRAIM, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK. MAYOR FRAIM IS A STRONG AND LOYAL SUPPORTER OF OUR MILITARY AND HAS WORKED TIRELESSLY TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION WITH THEM.

MAYOR OBERNDORF

IT IS NOW MY PLEASURE TO PRESENT THE HONORABLE MEYERA OBERNDORF, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH. MAYOR OBERNDORF HAS BEEN VIGOROUS AND CONSISTENT IN FURTHERING THE STRONG TIES VIRGINIA BEACH HAS WITH THE MILITARY. SHE IS A TIRELESS WORKER ON BEHALF OF MILITARY FAMILIES AND RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS.

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*Remarks of Mayor Meyera E. Oberndorf
to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
BRAC-95 Regional Hearing
Baltimore, Maryland
May 4, 1995*

(After introduction by The Honorable Owen Pickett)

*Thank you Congressman Pickett, chairman Dixon, and distinguished members
of the BRAC-95 Commission, GOOD AFTERNOON!*

*As Mayor of the 37th largest city in the nation, I am delighted to be here and
honored to have the opportunity to speak to you today. I would like to take just a
few minutes of your valuable time to express our sincere appreciation for all your
hard work on a most difficult tasking -- "Rightsizing" our country's military
infrastructure.*

*As a city with a long history of strong ties to its military, the citizens of
Virginia Beach are keenly aware of the magnitude of your charter and fully realize
when times are tough and bucks are tight, some unpopular and sometimes gut-
wrenching decisions must be made to ensure our nations' military remains efficient
and effective, but "second to none," as we move rapidly toward the twenty-first
century.*

*Downsizing and realignments stir great emotions, regardless of whether you're
in the "loss" or "gain" column. During previous BRAC rounds, the City of Virginia
Beach has been on both sides of the coin.*

*Today however, I am pleased to announce we strongly concur with the BRAC-95 decision, concerning the realignment of Naval Air Station Oceana, as put forth by the Secretary of the Navy and subsequently approved and announced by the Secretary of Defense on 28 February, 1995. It is without question, the logical decision, for a multitude of reasons, but the main issue that cannot be denied concerns real and **substantial** tax dollar savings. Single siting the Navy's F-14 "Tomcat" community, re-directing (8) fleet squadrons and (1) fleet replacement squadron of F/A-18 "Hornets" from NAS Cecil Field, Florida and moving the Navy's east coast S-3 "Viking" community to NAS Jacksonville, Florida will result in an up-front savings equivalent to closing a major naval air station on either coast.*

The above realignment initiatives will result in a combined up-front savings to the American taxpayer of over 3/4 of a billion dollars. YES -- that's over 3/4 of a billion dollars with a capital "B" and that's not small potatoes!

The City of Virginia Beach has taken bold action on several initiatives, in close cooperation with the Commanding Officer, to ensure NAS Oceana continues its role as the Navy's premier Master Jet Base:

*On August 23, 1994, Virginia Beach City Council **unanimously** approved a comprehensive Airport Zoning Ordinance limiting the height of structures around the airfield, requiring existing owners and realtors to disclose the noise zones to potential buyers, requiring any structure built in the noise area to incorporate acoustic*

treatments in their construction and defines what can be built in terms of compatible use in any of the noise zones around the field.

In addition, we have budgeted approximately \$25 million dollars to move two elementary schools, built over 40 years ago, presently located in the NAS Oceana Accident Potential Zone (APZ). Our School Board has selected the alternate sites and engineers are currently engaged in the necessary design work.

Also we are pleased that we have signed an agreement with the state of North Carolina allowing the Lake Gaston Water Supply Project to be completed by 1998.

*I can assure you the City of Virginia Beach and her sister cities that make-up the Greater Hampton Roads Area, already have the community infrastructure, **in place** to provide the absolute finest in "Quality of Life" for our wonderful soldiers, sailors, airman, marines, civil service employees and their dependents. Over crowding is a **non-issue**. As a matter of fact, I have been told by reliable sources that by the time the BRAC-95 initiatives are executed, the base loading at NAS Oceana, with respect to the number of personnel, number of squadrons and total aircraft, will be at a level below what has already been assigned there during the mid to late 1980's prior to both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.*

*Therefore, this is **not** new ground for the City of Virginia Beach/NAS Oceana team. **We've been there** before, tested and proven winners. On behalf of the citizens of Virginia Beach, we salute you and the integrity of the Navy's BRAC*

process. We eagerly await the opportunity to "roll out the red carpet" for the welcome home of America's best and brightest to Naval Air Station Oceana, the Navy's new "Fighter Town East."

(PAUSE)

We love the sound of Freedom!!

Thank you

Document Separator

REMARKS BY MAYOR PAUL D. FRAIM

CITY OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

ON BEHALF OF THE NORFOLK CITY COUNCIL

BEFORE

THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

MAY 4, 1995

Chairman Dixon, Members of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.....

I am Paul D. Fraim, Mayor of Norfolk, home of the world's largest and greatest Naval Base.

I am here today speaking for the entire Norfolk City Council who want the record of these proceedings to reflect how much we in Norfolk appreciate the Navy. The Navy is an integral part of our community. Moreover, the points I want to make today strongly confirm that THIS TIME the Navy's recommendations to the BRAC Commission are best for the Navy and the country.

Some reasons why the Navy is important to Norfolk and why there is a Norfolk - Navy partnership --

POPULATION BASE AND LAND USE

- o Navy families are 15% of Norfolk's residential households
- o the Navy owns and operates almost 2000 dwelling units in Norfolk
- o the Navy barracks population is a key 10%-15% of Norfolk's population total
- o the Navy's property in Norfolk is about 19% of our total land area

NORFOLK'S AND THE REGION'S ECONOMY

- o the Navy's jobs, military and civilian, employ 30% of Norfolk's workforce
- o the Navy's civilian and military payroll is a significant component of Norfolk's civilian goods and services economy -- both directly and through the "multiplier effect" -- both in Norfolk and in the region (dollars spent elsewhere in region make business for Norfolk-based business)
- o Navy repair contracts are an important component of Norfolk shipyard and ship repair companies' annual volume of work
- o jobs paid by the Navy and related to Navy contracts are traditionally among the better paying jobs in the area

NAVY TRADITION OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT

- o Navy commands and personnel actively support "Adopt A School"
- o Navy commands and personnel actively support homebuilding efforts under "Habitat for Humanity"
- o Navy commands and personnel frequently undertake "ad hoc" humanitarian efforts

PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES

- o the Navy is a good neighbor, e.g. shared use of Fleet Recreation Park for Little League sports and shared Fire Department support, cooperation agreement
- o the Navy is a good customer, buys City water

As good as present conditions are, the Navy - Norfolk partnership is growing even stronger and reflects tremendous synergies for the future. COMNAVBASE's excellent 2010 master planning initiative has led to the proposal for an executive steering group joining COMNAVBASE, CINCLANTFLT and myself on behalf of the City to leverage ongoing and anticipated activities for maximum benefit to the Navy and the community.

Hampton Roads is home to the nation's largest concentration of naval forces and facilities and Norfolk is a Megabase for the 21st Century. The Norfolk Naval Base complex currently home ports the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet while hosting nine major headquarters and nearly 200 tenant activities representing virtually every component of the Navy and numerous joint service and DOD agencies. Oceana Master Jet Air Station and Little Creek, the Navy's primary amphibious forces base, lie just to the east. The Norfolk Navy Shipyard, Newport News Ship Building, Yorktown Weapons Station, and major Army and Air Force facilities are conveniently collocated in adjacent communities. This unequaled military presence is no accident. Hampton Roads offers a unique combination of advantages for military basing. Most importantly, collocation of major headquarters, command and control facilities, operational units and support services at a Megabase like Norfolk enhances readiness and enables savings through economies of scale and reduced personnel costs.

The Norfolk Naval Base complex is sited in one of the world's finest deep water ports. The broad approaches to the port afford easy access to the open sea and ample maneuvering space during departures and arrivals. Norfolk's central location on the East Coast provides

convenient transit to training and operational areas of the North and South Atlantic, Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Just off the coast, the Virginia Capes Operations Area offers ample Navy-controlled sea and air space ideal for unit training or large scale exercises while the calm expanses of the Chesapeake Bay provide excellent training sites for small craft.

Norfolk and surrounding communities vigorously support a strong military presence, and area demographics support a wide variety of large Reserve units including ships and aircraft squadrons. Increased base loadings are welcomed and can be accommodated without adverse impact on local infrastructures. Norfolk's large, existing housing supply is responsive to the Navy's needs. Encroachment and environmental restrictions pose no insurmountable problems for military operations.

The Norfolk complex offers an unequalled array of support services and other complementary activities. Virtually all training, logistics, maintenance/repair, medical and other services required by the Fleet are locally available.

Hampton Roads is also a major military command center, second only to Washington, D.C. in its population of major headquarters. Norfolk hosts the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) headquarters, a joint staff responsible for molding military assets within the continental U.S. into combat-ready force packages for deployment by the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The Air Combat Command headquarters at nearby Langley AFB and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Eustis are key USACOM subordinates, while

the Atlantic Fleet is USACOM's Navy element. On the Navy side, the Atlantic Fleet is unique in having all of its headquarters components in a single location. This collocation enables daily personal contact between the Fleet Commander-in-Chief, operational commander (Second Fleet), type commanders (surface ship, air, submarine and amphibious forces) and key fleet support elements.

Norfolk is also a center of NATO activity. CINC USACOM is 'dual-hatted' as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), while the Atlantic Fleet, Second Fleet and Submarine Force, Atlantic are dual-hatted as NATO commands subordinate to SACLANT.

The operational significance of this headquarters concentration cannot be overstated. The resulting opportunity for direct and in-depth interaction between major staffs greatly enhances coordination and planning for joint, Navy and NATO operations throughout the Atlantic theater.

As emphasis on joint operations increases, Hampton Roads is well situated to play a pivotal role. Along with USACOM, the area already hosts the Joint War Fighting Center (Fort Eustis) and the Joint and Navy Doctrine Centers (Norfolk). USACOM plans to establish a Joint Training and Simulation Center in 1995. The Armed Forces Staff College provides graduate level training for mid-grade officers in its Joint War Fighting School, Joint Staff Officer School, and Joint Command & Control/Electronics Warfare School. These complementary activities make Hampton Roads a major center for joint operational planning and development of doctrine and tactics.

Megaporting is a boon to the moral, welfare and stability of Navy families. The resulting number and variety of jobs provides an excellent opportunity for follow-on assignments in Hampton Roads without jeopardizing professional development and career progression. Successive assignments provide continuity in dependent schooling, spousal employment and medical care while allowing service members to enjoy the long-term benefits of home ownership and community involvement.

The local availability of full-service shipyards is particularly important to Navy families who would otherwise endure lengthy separations during ship repair and overhaul periods in addition to the family hardships imposed by training and overseas deployments.

For both married and single members, Hampton Roads is an attractive duty station treasured for its hospitable climate, moderate cost of living, and ample housing at affordable prices. A popular vacation spot, the area's exceptional recreational assets include Colonial Williamsburg, Busch Gardens and world-class beaches. The City of Norfolk offers urban amenities such as professional baseball and hockey teams, a large concert and sports arena, the Nauticus National Maritime Center, the Norfolk Opera House, and the Chrysler and MacArthur Museums. For those seeking to continue their education, Old Dominion University and other local colleges offer a variety of programs well suited to part time military students.

Post-Cold War defense policy correctly emphasizes cost efficient maintenance of smaller, well trained and highly capable military forces. While "strategic dispersal" of our defense

infrastructure served its Cold War purpose, concentration of assets in suitable key areas offers obvious readiness and cost advantages in the current defense environment.

The Norfolk Naval Base and greater Hampton Roads military complex represent a Megabase that could not be duplicated elsewhere. Few areas offer the same locational advantages and capacity for expansion, and relocating Norfolk's existing capabilities would be cost prohibitive. Collocation with Fleet or other local organizations is essential to effective mission performance for most of the nearly 200 tenant activities in Norfolk -- and numerous synergistic relationships exist with activities elsewhere in Hampton Roads. To protect the current defense investment in Hampton Roads and fully capitalize on potential cost savings, the Norfolk Naval Base should continue to expand its role as the locus of naval activity on the East Coast.

Thank you.

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Federal Lands Reuse Authority of Bucks County

Page 1

Closure of NAWC, Warminster, PA
Commissioner Michael Fitzpatrick

Introduction

- The purpose of this brief is to highlight events particular to the realignment of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Warminster, PA. and put focus on the economic impact that will result from its realignment.

Robert J. Finley
Chairman

Kathleen M. Belsky
Vice Chairman

Martin J. Westermann
Secretary

Dr. James J. Links
Treasurer

- My name is **Michael Fitzpatrick** and I am on the **Bucks County Board of Commissioners**. Warminster is within Bucks County and the Commissioners' offices are in the Bucks County Courthouse, Doylestown, PA.

Topics of Discussion

Harry J. Barford, Jr.

Francis B. J. Branagan

Joseph Butch

Robert T. Hasty

Norman Kelly

Victor J. Lasher

Anthony F. Visco, Jr.

Sheila Bass
Acting Administrator

- Some of the main ideas of this brief include:
 - NAWC size and employment statistics
 - NAWC as a major purchaser of goods & services
 - Centennial School District and associated impacts
 - NAWC Flight Simulator, Centrifuge, Laboratory Testing and other fixed equipment

The **BRAC '91** realignment of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division from Warminster, PA to Patuxent River, MD is to be completed by September 30, 1996. The NAWC occupies an 840-acre site in Warminster Township, Northampton Township, & Ivyland Borough, PA, and provided direct employment for some 2400 military and civilian personnel during June 1993. More than 87 percent of these employees live in Bucks and Montgomery Counties.

Page 2

In addition, the NAWC contracts for goods and services locally; of particular concern are contracts with professional services firms in the two counties which have some 1,500 employees. These firms have been dependent on the NAWC for most of their business.

The NAWC is a major purchaser of goods and services produced in Bucks and Montgomery Counties. Of total of **\$287.6 million** obligated by the NAWC during FY 1993, **\$76.6 million** was obligated for contracts with companies located in the counties. Of this amount, **\$48.8 million** was spent for engineering services, indicating the severe impact of the realignment on the NAWC Contractors. All of this funding was assumed to be lost as a result of this realignment.

Because Centennial School District serves the NAWC, and surrounding areas, the district is most impacted by the realignment. In fiscal year 1993, Centennial received **\$417,243** of impact aid payments related to the NAWC; the impact aid on behalf of the NAWC will cease when the realignment is completed.

⇒ Total impact as a result of the '91 **BRAC** in 1993 is **\$135 million**.

⇒ **BRAC '95** adds the Navigation Center with over 250 employees and revenues of **\$73 million FY '95** with a payroll of **\$13 million**.

Page 3

It is, first of all, important to realize that the NAWC is truly unique in both its mission and the nature of the men and women who work there. As result, filling the void in Bucks County is not the same as filling the void, for instance, in Fort Dix or England Air Force Base.

NAWC is where our early astronauts were trained. Today it remains the hub of America's navigational genius. It remains a setting for brilliant research, and extremely sensitive and extraordinary technical military projects.

Many NAWC scientists and others say they want to stay here and not move to Maryland. We also want them to stay because they are a remarkable human resource. Thus, when most operations of NAWC relocate, we will need to offer not just jobs, but jobs that will encourage them to remain in Bucks and Montgomery Counties. And here's where privatization and university participation would come into play.

We, therefore, respectfully request that the Navigation Center, with its Navigation Centrifuge, flight simulator, laboratory equipment, and other fixed equipment be kept open until this facility can be brought back into the community's economy.

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THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950510-18

FROM: TEETER, FRED K	TO: DIXON
TITLE: EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: WASHINGTON CO. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	ORGANIZATION: DBLCC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT RITCHIE, LETTERKENNY	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				LIBRARY	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING TESTIMONY FOR THE RECORD FOR BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING IN SUPPORT OF INSTALLATIONS.

Due Date: 950517	Routing Date: 950510	Date Originated: 950504	Mail Date:
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**CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE**

Hagerstown-Washington County

May 4, 1995

950510-18

Mr. Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

RE: Fort Ritchie, Maryland

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I attended the BRAC public hearing at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County this morning. For lack of time, I was unable to convey my remarks supporting the continued military mission at Fort Ritchie and Letterkenny Army Depot. Please accept this written testimony for the record.

With nearly 6,000 jobs between the two, many of them civilian, Fort Ritchie and Letterkenny exert an economic influence on Washington County, Maryland, and neighboring Franklin County, Pennsylvania, that exceeds the economic importance of other bases to their communities. The towns of Cascade, Pen Mar, Blue Ridge Summit, Sabillasville, High Field, Rouzerville and other, larger municipalities nearby rely heavily on these Bases. If either or both closed, we would confront two primary concerns. First, many local businesses that deal with the Bases directly, or indirectly with federal employees and their families, would suffer severe revenue losses. Bankruptcies would follow, threatening the economic survival of the towns. Second, job losses among local residents affected by closure would not be absorbed by these communities. Few employers of any significance exist nearby. Businesses that do not serve these Bases or their employees would suffer losses as the impact of this aspect of closure became apparent. Hundreds of empty apartments and un-marketable homes would precipitate a rapid decline in the region's real estate market, forcing banks to foreclose on loans for property they would rather not own.

Though steady, new employment growth in Washington County is unspectacular. We celebrate the occasional, seldom more often than annual, arrival of a business that employs 100-200 workers. As in other areas, corporate downsizing and the recent recession have hurt. Two local London Fog garment factories closed last year, our prominent aerospace component manufacturer Rohr has dropped half its workers, our large P.I.E. freight terminal closed, the venerable and substantial Baer Foods wholesale business disappeared along with many smaller employers. Between 1980 and 1990, Washington County's population grew just 6.7% while unemployment averaged 8%, well above Maryland and U.S. averages. This unfortunate statistic makes us an official "entitlement community". Losing major employers like Ft. Ritchie and Letterkenny would produce dire consequences.

111 West
Washington St.
Hagerstown, MD
2 1 7 4 0

Phone
301-739-2015
Fax
301-739-1278


Mr. Alan J. Dixon
May 4, 1995
Page 2

While the military value of both Bases is considerable, I want to point out and ask you to consider strongly their social and economic contributions to the communities that serve them. The two Bases, located just 20 miles apart, serve and are served by a common population. To many of these towns, this federal presence is the difference between economic success and failure. Losing the Bases could yield conditions that set a new and unenviable standard for social and economic dislocation. Federal "re-use" grants available to communities that lose Bases and which fund the re-training of dislocated workers are useless without a cadre of employers willing and able to hire the re-trained. We cannot absorb the massive new unemployment that closure would ensure.

Once again, the region that serves these Bases is extremely rural, with little annual job growth and lacking the capacity of larger, fast-growing, job-rich areas to absorb significant new unemployment. I urge the BRAC Commission to maintain military operations at both Ft. Ritchie and Letterkenny for reasons that address their considerable military value and their considerable social and economic contributions to their communities.

Thank you for your consideration.

Best regards,


Fred K. Teeter, Jr.
Executive Vice President

FT

Document Separator

BRAC - REGIONAL HEARING
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MAY 4, 1995

SUBJECT: KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY,
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

BY: JUDGE JOHN G. BROSKY,
CHAIRMAN, WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA COALITION

DISTINGUISHED COMMISSIONERS, I AM
JUDGE JOHN G. BROSKY OF THE SUPERIOR COURT IN
PENNSYLVANIA; ALSO A RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA
COALITION OF THE TRI-STATE AREA TO SPEAK ON
BEHALF OF THE KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY AND THE
911TH AIRLIFT WING.

FIRST, LET ME ADDRESS THE KELLY
SUPPORT FACILITY.

OUR BRIEFERS ARE ALLOCATED 10
MINUTES.

IT APPEARS TO BE MINIMAL TIME YET IT
IS SUFFICIENT TO PRESENT THE SHOCKING
REVELATION THAT IN ALMOST ALL CATEGORIES IN

THE DOCUMENT GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION, THERE IS ERROR AFTER ERROR AFTER ERROR, AND, I MEAN SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS.

OUR ACTUAL FIGURES AND CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT IF THE KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY IS REALIGNED AS PROGRAMMED, IN 20 YEARS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL STILL BE IN THE RED BY 14 MILLION DOLLARS.

THERE IS ONE OTHER REVELATION THAT CAME TO LIGHT ON MARCH 31ST WHEN THE ARMY ANNOUNCED IT IS GOING TO KEEP OPEN THE KELLY SUPPORT FACILITY BUT AT 85% OF THE PRESENT COMPLIMENT OF PEOPLE.

THAT WAS GOOD NEWS TO 41,000 RETIRED VETERANS IN WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA, WEST VIRGINIA AND PARTS OF OHIO. VETERAN RETIREES ARE AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR SOCIETY THAT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN IN ALL THESE CLOSINGS.

IF THIS MATTER WERE IN MY COURT, I WOULD REMAND IT TO THE PARTIES.

I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONERS DO LIKEWISE AND SEND THIS PROGRAM BACK TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FOR ITS RESOLUTION.

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UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MAY 4, 1995

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THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUDGE'S CHAMBERS
SUITE 2703 GRANT BUILDING
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15219
(412)565-3509

JOHN G. BROSKY
SENIOR JUDGE

May 5, 1995

Elizabeth L. King, Esquire
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Ms. King:

As you suggested, enclosed are my remarks in support of the 911th Airlift Wing in Pittsburgh which were to be presented to the Honorable Commissioners at the BRAC Regional Hearing held at the University of Maryland on May 4, 1995.

Also enclosed is a copy of my remarks on behalf of the Kelly Support Facility which I had presented during the "public comment" segment.

I commend you, your staff and the Honorable Commissioners who must make extremely difficult decisions as tough as any Judge has had to make.

Best wishes to all.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John G. Brosky". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

Judge John G. Brosky
Chairman, Western Pa. Coalition
To Save the 911th Airlift Wing
And the Kelly Support Facility.

JGB/jec

Enclosures

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EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950510-17

FROM: <u>LEHMAN, CHRIS</u>	TO: <u>COX, REBECCA</u>
TITLE:	TITLE: <u>COMMISSIONER</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>COMMONWEALTH CONSULTING CORP.</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>PITTSBURGH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				<u>LIBRARY</u>	✓		


TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:
FORWARDING ~~THE~~ TESTIMONY FOR THE RECORD FROM JOHN G. BROSKY IN SUPPORT OF PITTSBURGH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950510</u>	Date Originated: <u>950508</u>	Mail Date:
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TO: COMMISSIONER REBECCA COX
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

FROM: CHRISTOPHER M. LEHMAN 

DATE: 8 MAY 1995

Attached you will find a brief written statement regarding the 911th Airlift Wing located at Pittsburgh International Airport. This statement was intended to be a part of the public comment of Judge John G. Brosky, Chairman of the Western Pennsylvania Coalition, during the regional hearing in Baltimore.

Because the judge was speaking in support of two facilities in Western Pennsylvania, there was insufficient time to complete the statement supporting the 911th Wing.

As you suggested at the time of the hearing, a written statement is hereby submitted for inclusion in the Record of the hearing. Please share this statement with the other Commissioners.

The judge wanted me to express again his appreciation for your courtesy.

Should there be a need for additional information, Judge Brosky may be contacted at the following address:

John G. Brosky
Chairman, Western PA Coalition
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Judge's Chambers
Suite 2703 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

BRAC - REGIONAL HEARING
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MAY 4, 1995

SUBJECT: 911 AIRLIFT WING,
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

BY: JUDGE JOHN G. BROSKY,
CHAIRMAN, WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA COALITION

DISTINGUISHED COMMISSIONERS. I AM
JUDGE JOHN G. BROSKY OF THE SUPERIOR COURT IN
PENNSYLVANIA; ALSO A RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA COALITION
TO RETAIN THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING IN
PITTSBURGH.

THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING IS MORE THAN
A MILITARY BASE. IT'S A BASE OF HUMAN
SERVICES.

THERE'S A LOT OF EARTH SHAKING
PUBLICITY THESE DAYS ABOUT CERTAIN MILITANT
GROUPS WHO ADVOCATE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS
OVER-STEPPED ITS BOUNDS AND FORGOT ABOUT THE
PEOPLE.

THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING IS PART OF AND REPRESENTS THE UNITED STATES AND OVER THE YEARS THE 911TH WAS AMONG THE FIRST OF MILITARY UNITS TO HELP PEOPLE IN TIMES OF WAR, EMERGENCY AND DISASTERS LIKE THE RECENT AIRPLANE CRASH OF FLIGHT 427.

UNKNOWN AND UNPUBLICIZED IS THAT THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING EMPLOYS A NUMBER OF AUTISTIC AND MENTALLY HANDICAPPED PEOPLE FOR CLEANING SERVICE. THIS IS SIGNIFICANT WHEN YOU REALIZE 80% OF SUCH PEOPLE ARE NOT GIVEN EMPLOYMENT IN OUR SOCIETY.

WHEN GENERAL MICHAEL DUGAN WAS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, HE TOLD ME AS A PAST NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION THAT THERE ARE THREE ELEMENTS FUNDAMENTAL TO AN EXCELLENT MILITARY FORCE. THEY ARE PERFORMANCE, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFESSIONALISM. THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE IN THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING.

OUR BRIEFERS WILL HIGHLIGHT THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE 911TH WITH COST EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IN SAVING THE 911TH AIRLIFT WING YOU WILL SAVE MONEY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

THANK YOU.

Document Separator

BRAC - REGIONAL HEARING
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MAY 4, 1995

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PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

BY: JUDGE JOHN G. BROSKY,
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TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF THE
ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT OF THE CARDEROCK
DIVISION, NSWC

BY

LARRY J. ARGIRO

4 MAY 1995

CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION

BRIEF HISTORY OF LABORATORY

FOUR GOLDEN NUGGET FACILITIES

TECHNICAL DISCUSSION

CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

I AM HERE AS A MEMBER OF A VERY SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITY AS YOU CAN SEE BY THE NUMBER HERE TODAY.

I RETIRED IN JULY 94 AFTER SPENDING 47 YEARS AT THIS LABORATORY, THE LAST 9 YEARS AS HEAD OF THE MACHINERY R&D DIRECTORATE (THE ONE TO BE DISPLACED). THE INFORMATION THAT I WILL PRESENT SUPPORTS THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE LABORATORY AND I ASSURE YOU THAT THIS INFORMATION COMES FROM MY FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE AND IS GIVEN WITHOUT ANY NAVY CONSTRAINTS.

LET ME SAY THAT WE WERE FLABBERGASTED TO LEARN THAT THE NAVY HAD PLACED THIS LAB ON THE CLOSURE LIST - PARTICULARLY AFTER BRAC 93 HAD VOTED 7 TO 0 TO KEEP IT OPEN. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING AFTER MR. CORDER'S AND MY PRESENTATIONS AS TO THE ROLE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS LABORATORY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NAVY AND ITS FUTURE.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE ANNAPOLIS LABORATORY

SINCE 1903 THE ANNAPOLIS LABORATORY HAS BEEN PART OF THE NAVY. IT WAS ESTABLISHED BY LAW TO BE PART OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY. SINCE THAT TIME IT HAS WORKED TO MAKE OUR NAVY THE BEST IN THE WORLD AND ITS AS WILLING TO GIVE IT'S BEST TO MAKE IT SO. THE LABORATORY HAS ALWAYS RESPONDED AND DISCIPLINE TO WORK THE PROBLEMS AT HAND WITH PROFESSIONALISM AND DEDICATION FOUND NOWHERE ELSE.

HAVING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING ADVANCE MACHINERY SYSTEMS NEW TECHNOLOGIES WERE CONCEIVED THAT PROVIDED THE NAVY WITH A STRATEGIC MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND A SUPERIOR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OVER ITS ADVERSARIES. THIS ADVANTAGE LASTED MORE THAN 40 YEARS AND HELPED TO WIN THE COLD WAR.

CONTRIBUTIONS WERE NUMEROUS AS DEPICTED ON IT'S

GENEALOGY CHART. IT SHOWS THE WIDE RANGE OF TECHNOLOGIES THAT WERE DEVELOPED THAT HELPED MAKE OUR NAVY THE VERY BEST FOR EXAMPLE:

A. ICR GAS TURBINE, B. SUPER CONDUCTIVITY, C. PULSED POWER, D. STEALTH, E. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, F. FUTURE SHIP DESIGNS, AND E. OTHERS AS NOTED.

TO ACCOMPLISH THESE RESULTS AN OUTSTANDING TEAM WAS ASSEMBLED THAT WAS RESEARCH ORIENTED BY EDUCATION, (I.E. ADVANCED DEGREES) HAD CLOSE TIES TO ACADEMIA, (PARTICULARLY THE NAVAL ACADEMY) PARTICIPATED IN TECHNICAL SOCIETIES AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS.

SINCE MR. CORDER HAS DISCUSSED MOST OF THESE I WILL ONLY DISCUSS SEVERAL PARAMOUNT TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED AND ARE CERTAIN TO ADD MAJOR COSTS TO THE NAVY ESTIMATES OF MOVING THE ANNAPOLIS LAB.

THE LABS RESEARCH FACILITIES ARE VALUED AT WELL OVER \$300 MILLION AND ARE CONTINUALLY UPDATED.

FOUR OF ITS FACILITIES WERE PLACED BY NSWC IN THE GOLDEN NUGGET CATEGORY (SO IMPORTANT THAT NAVY CANNOT DO WITHOUT) (INCIDENTALLY PHILADELPHIA HAD ONE) (A) MACHINERY SILENCING LABORATORY, (B) DEEP OCEAN PRESSURE FACILITY, (C) MAGNETIC FIELDS LABORATORY, AND (D) THE SUBMARINE-FLUID DYNAMICS FACILITY. THIS WAS LATER REDUCED TO TWO BY THE NAVY.

IN ORDER TO SAVE MOVING COST FROM ANNAPOLIS, IT IS PROPOSED BY THE NAVY TO MOVE ALL FACILITIES EXCEPT TWO, DEEP OCEAN SIMULATION AND SUBMARINE FLUID DYNAMICS FACILITIES. THESE TWO FACILITIES REPRESENT THE ONLY SUBMARINE SAFETY FACILITIES DEALING WITH HIGH PRESSURES IN THE FREE WORLD. THEY ARE IN CONSTANT USE BY THE NAVY AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY, OTHER COUNTRIES ARE INTERESTED AND ARE PRESENTLY NEGOTIATING FOR THEIR USE. LOSS OF THESE RESEARCH FACILITIES REQUIRED FOR SUBMARINE SURVIVABILITY


WOULD SEVERALLY HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED MACHINERY, PIPING, EMERGENCY DEBALLASTING SYSTEMS ETC. SENSITIVE TO DEEP OCEAN PRESSURES.

AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CLOSING THESE MOST CRITICAL FACILITIES, THE NAVY PROPOSES TO PERFORM TESTING AT SEA ON AN OPERATIONAL SUBMARINE. TESTING OF HIGH PRESSURE SENSITIVE MACHINERY, PIPING, DEBALLASTING SYSTEMS ARE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COULD SINK A SUBMARINE AND MORE IMPORTANTLY PLACE ITS CREW AT HIGH RISK AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE THRESHER. DEALING WITH THE UNKNOWN IS BEST DONE IN THE LABORATORY. IT CAN SAVE LIVES AND EXPENSIVE SHIPS! THESE TWO FACILITIES MUST REMAIN OPEN AT ANY COST.

THE NAVY'S CNO, ADM BOORDA, RECENTLY STATED THAT "BEING QUIET IS EVERYTHING IN SUBMARINE WARFARE" NSWC ANNAPOLIS HAS BEEN THE RECOGNIZED LEADER FOR MACHINERY SILENCING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SHIP SILENCING PROGRAM. AS A MATTER OF RECORD EVERY MACHINERY SILENCING TECHNOLOGY INSTALLED ON BOARD EVERY SUBMARINE SINCE THE FIRST NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, WAS DEVELOPED BY THE ANNAPOLIS LABORATORY AND ITS TALENTED PEOPLE.

THE MACHINERY SILENCING LABORATORY IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE GEM OF THE NAVY SINCE ITS SPECIAL ACOUSTIC FEATURES ARE NOWHERE ELSE DUPLICATED. FOR EXAMPLE IT HAS THREE LARGE ANOCHOIC CHAMBERS WHOSE SIZE ARE DICTATED BY THE LOW FREQUENCIES FROM MACHINES, ITS WALLS ARE THREE FEET THICK TO PREVENT NOISE INTERFERENCE FROM THE OUTSIDE, AND ITS MASSIVE TEST FLOORS ARE ISOLATED FROM THE BUILDING IN ORDER TO BE CAPABLE TO MAKING EXTREMELY LOW VIBRATION MEASUREMENT ASSOCIATED WITH TODAY'S SUBMARINE MACHINERY. ALL OF THESE FEATURES MUST BE MAINTAINED PARTICULARLY IF DUPLICATED IN PHILADELPHIA WITH ITS ACOUSTICALLY HARSH ENVIRONMENT WITH ITS OPERATION OF LARGE MACHINERY, INDUSTRIAL TRAFFIC, AND CLOSE PROXIMITY OF A MAJOR AIRPORT. IN OTHER WORDS, TO BE USEFUL THE LABORATORY MUST BE DUPLICATED AND NOT JUST PARTIALLY REBUILT IN SOME OLD BUILDING. I AM CERTAIN THAT NAVY NEVER CONSIDERED THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS IN ITS

MACHINERY SILENCING IMPACT



1954

Time

2010

RIDICULOUSLY LOW COST ESTIMATE.

BECAUSE OF TIME LIMITATION I HAVE ONLY SHOWN SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF THE NEED TO CONSIDER AND MAINTAIN THE TECHNICAL INTEGRITY OF A FACILITY. THE COST OF DOING SO CAN BE COMPLEX AND INVOLVED. IN MOST CASES ITS MORE THAN HIRING A MOVING VAN TO LOAD AND UNLOAD EQUIPMENT. IN MOVING TO A NEW SITE ALL PARAMETERS MUST BE CONSIDERED THAT MAY EFFECT THE FACILITY BUT ALSO ITS TRUE COST OF BEING DISRUPTED (AN EXAMPLE -CRITICAL TIME LINES IN CFC ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL.)

IN CONCLUSION:

ANNAPOLIS LAB THROUGH ITS CONTRIBUTIONS HAS ENSURED THAT THE NAVY HAS HAD THE BEST AND QUIETEST SHIPS IN THE WORLD. IT MUST REMAIN OPEN TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE NAVY WITH THE ADVANCED RESEARCH NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THAT LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE 21ST CENTURY. MOVING IT TO A NON R&D ACTIVITY WITH INADEQUATE FACILITIES WILL DESTROY THAT CAPABILITY. AS A RESULT THE NAVY WILL FALL FURTHER BEHIND THE RUSSIANS AND THE WORLD, TO BECOME A SECOND RATE POWER.


WE HOPE AND PRAY THAT THIS WILL NEVER HAPPEN

NON SIBI, SED PATRIAE


Prepared by:

Larry J. Argiro, Retired
Former Member of SES
Director, Machinery R&D
NSWC, Annapolis, MD

Deep Ocean Vehicle and Machinery Pressure Simulation Facility




CURV III
Remotely
Operated
Vehicle




Pressure
Tank
Complex


Magnetic Fields Laboratory



Magnetic Fields Measurement Building




Internal Representation of Measurement Building



Minesweep Generator Stray Magnetic Field Measurements



Data Acquisition and Analysis Room, Control Building



Sensors and Magnetometers Measurement Building Lower Levels




NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER


CARDEROCK DIVISION, ANNAPOLIS

ANNAPOLIS, MD


GENEALOGY OF THE MACHINERY R&D DIRECTORATE




Machinery Acoustic Silencing Laboratory




Quiet Pump R&D Facility




Quiet Fan R&D Facility



Machinery Acoustic Silencing Building




Noise Transmission Research Model




Advanced Mount R&D Facility


Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility




High Pressure Water
Quiet Flow Laboratory




Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility



High Pressure Air Storage
and Quiet Flow Laboratory



Sea Wolf Depth Control Valve



High Pressure Air
Compressors and Dryers

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Congressman Albert Wynn

TALKING POINTS FOR MAY 4 BRAC HEARING

- * AS YOU HAVE JUST HEARD, IT SEEMS THAT THE NAVY HAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERESTIMATED THE COSTS OF MOVING NAVSEA TO THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD.
- * I, TOO, BELIEVE IN STREAMLINING GOVERNMENT AND CUTTING SPENDING. THESE ARE DIFFICULT TIMES, AND SACRIFICES MUST BE MADE.
- * BUT I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY DECISION BASED ON THE NAVY'S ANALYSIS OF COSTS FOR THE NAVY YARD MOVE, BECAUSE IN A YEAR OR TWO, WE MAY FIND THAT THE COSTS WILL SKYROCKET.
- * THE MASTER PLAN FOR THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD ALLOWS AN EXPANSION THERE UP TO 10,000 EMPLOYEES. BUT IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE NAVY YARD SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE SPACE TO ACCOMODATE SUCH A HIGH NUMBER OF PERSONNEL, WITHOUT MAKING SIGNIFICANT QUALITY-OF-LIFE IMPROVEMENTS.
- * THE NAVY HAS OVERLOOKED THE COSTS FOR ALL OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS.
- * ON MARCH 19, A LETTER TO THE EDITOR APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON POST CRITICIZING THE NAVY YARD OPTION. THE WRITER POINTED OUT THAT THE YARD LACKS ADEQUATE PARKING AND THAT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE.

- * ON APRIL 30, THE COMMANDANT OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL DISTRICT, EDWARD MOORE, JR. RESPONDED BY STATING THAT MOVING MORE PEOPLE TO THE YARD COULD LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS IN LOCAL MASS TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS MY FEELING THAT IT IS NOT GOOD PUBLIC POLICY TO MAKE MAJOR DECISIONS BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAPPEN.

- * ADMIRAL MOORE ALSO INDICATED THAT CONSTRUCTION AT THE NAVY YARD IS POSSIBLE, IN SPITE OF THE VERY HIGH WATER TABLE. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT CONSTRUCTION IS POSSIBLE. MY CONCERN IS THAT IT IS VERY EXPENSIVE, AND THAT THE STANDARD COBRA COST CALCULATIONS DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ADDITIONAL EXPENSE.

- * FINALLY, I HAVE VISITED BOTH WHITE OAK AND THE NAVY YARD. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT WHERE THE NAVY YARD IS OLD AND OVERCROWDED, WHITE OAK IS SPACIOUS AND COMFORTABLE.

- * PLEASE UPHOLD THE DECISION THIS COMMISSION MADE IN 1993. NAVSEA BELONGS AT WHITE OAK. IT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO.

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**Testimony on Behalf of the Annapolis Detachment
of Carderock Division, NSWC**

**by
James L. Corder
4 May 1995**


Agenda

- What is NSWC Annapolis Detachment
- DoD Proposal
- Similarities Between '93 and Now
- Reasons for Rejecting '93 Recommendations
- 1995 Deviations from BRAC Criteria
- Underestimated Costs - Over Estimated Savings
- Underestimated Military Value of Facilities
- Underestimated Military Value of People
- No Excess Capacity
- Missed Cross Service Opportunities
- Conclusions

NSWC - ANNAPOLIS DETACHMENT

Functions

- Technology & Hardware Development
- System Tradeoffs & Integration
- Specification & Qualification
- Technology Assessments



Mission

**Perform Research and Development of Naval Shipboard Machinery
Including Stealth and Energy Conservation
(Annapolis Detachment is the only activity performing this mission)**

1995 DoD Proposal for Annapolis

“Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis, to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.”

BSEC CLAIM:

One Time Costs of \$25M

Yearly Savings of \$14.7M

Return on Investment of 1.5 Years

Similarities Between '93 and '95

'93 Recommendations

- Disestablish Annapolis
- Reduction in Personnel
Move Some to Philadelphia
- Keep Facilities Operational at Annapolis (move none)
- Total Cost \$24.7M

'95 Recommendations

- Close Annapolis
- Reduction in Personnel
Move some to Philadelphia
- Abandon Two (2) Facilities
Relocate 8 Facilities to Philadelphia
Replicate Magnetics Facilities at Carderock
- Total Cost \$25M

Reasons for Rejecting '93 Recommendation

- Projected savings exaggerated and inefficiencies not considered
- Major savings from staff reduction does not require relocation
- No Closure since site is surrounded by Navy Property and no practical alternative use identified

1995 Deviations from BRAC Criteria

- **Underestimate Costs - Over Estimated Savings**
- **Underestimated Military Value of Facilities**
- **Underestimated Military Value of People**
- **No Excess Capacity in Machinery R&D**
- **Missed Opportunities for Cross Service Thrusts**

Economic Analysis of BRAC '95 Impact on NSWC/Annapolis

<u>Item</u>	<u>With Selected Data Used by the BSEC (\$)</u>	<u>With Certified Navy Data Supplied to the BSEC (\$)</u>
<u>One-time costs</u>		
- Unique	6513K	23232K
- Military Construction	8000K	8000K
- Moving	6854K	49015K
- Overhead	2905K	2487K
- Personnel	<u>764K</u>	<u>760K</u>
TOTAL	25036K	83494K
<u>Recurring Savings</u>		
- Personnel	7623K	3630K
- Overhead	<u>6904K</u>	<u>2047K</u>
TOTAL	14527K	5677K
<u>COBRA Results</u>		
- One-time Costs	25M	83.5M
- Annual Savings	14.5M	5.7M
- Breakeven	1 year	19 years
- Net Present Value (20 years)	175M	(-5.6M) Short

Underestimated Military Value of Facilities

- Abandoned Facilities
 - Deep Ocean Pressure Tanks*
 - Submarine Fluid Dynamics
- Risks of At-Sea Testing
 - Uncontrolled Conditions
 - Human Life
 - Loss of Vehicles
- Costs of At-Sea Testing
 - 10:1 or Greater

*Considered "Must Have" Facility by NAVSEA

Deep Ocean Pressure Simulation Facility Annapolis, MD

Facility Cost Impacts

Comparative Costs for the Last 24 Tests That
Required the Specialized Characteristics of this Facility

NSWC Facility Test Cost
(24 Items Tested)

Less than \$0.6 Million

_____ IF FACILITY WERE CLOSED _____

Costs for At Sea Testing
(10 Items Requiring Testing Prior to Use)

More than \$5 Million

Equipment and Programs Put at Risk by Not Testing
(14 Items Not Tested Prior to Deployment)

\$200 Million Plus
(\$50M for One System Alone)

Underestimated Military Value of People

Annapolis Machinery R&D Directorate

Total Population = 374 People

Scientist & Engineers = 82%

Highest Degree as a % of Total

BS Degrees = 47%

MS Degrees = 28%

PHD = 7%

Patents* 71

Patent Applications* 74

% of Funding from R&D Programs
More than 90%

Philadelphia ISE Technical Directorates

Total Population = 1410 People

Scientist & Engineers = 55%

Highest Degree as a % of Total

BA & BS Degrees = 49%

MA & MS Degree = 6%

PHD = 0.1%

Patents* 1

Patent Applications 1

% of Funding from R&D Programs
Less than 10%

*Since January 1990

Excess Capacity

- Increasing Program Funding at Annapolis

\$ 90M in FY 93

\$110M in FY 95

FYDP for Typical Program Elements Shows Growth

- Facilities Expanding

Three New Facilities Since '93

- Philadelphia Facilities are ISE Facilities - NOT R&D

- Work Load

- NAVCOMP Projections for Year 2001 are 418 Manyears

- Present Allowance is 430 Manyears

Strategic Planning Assessments at NSWC and the Carderock Division

- The Military Value of Annapolis Technical Capabilities are in the Top 10 of 78 in NSWC
- The Machinery R&D Directorate is the Best Manpower Investment in the Carderock Division Based on Benefit to the Navy

Missed Cross Service Opportunities

- Joint Spectrum Center Headquarters (136 People) Currently a Tenant
- About 600 Employees in Rented Space
- Consolidate at Annapolis

In Conclusion

- The Navy's 1995 Proposal is Both Costly and Damaging to an Essential Capability
- DoD's Recommendations for Annapolis Were Rejected as Wrong in 1993
- 1995 Recommendations are Substantially the same as Those of 1993
- 1995 Recommendations Should Be Rejected Also

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Remarks for the Regional Hearing

Hello, I am Congressman Bob Ehrlich and I represent the Second Congressional District, home of the Army Publications Center in Middle River, Maryland. What you have just seen and heard not only constitutes a compelling argument for removing the Middle River Center from BRAC, but also points up the enormous potential benefits of DoD Consolidation -- and all presented by people who have firsthand knowledge, the workers.

The Army Publications Center was the first place I visited after being elected last November. What I witnessed, as did members of your staff during their visit, was a professional and efficient group of dedicated individuals working hard in a fully automated, first rate facility.

I appear here today because I am convinced the Middle River Center enhances military readiness and saves money for the taxpayer. Accordingly, the Commission should seize the chance to fulfill its goal of creating jointness by expanding Middle River's mission -- not ending it. I know this will be a long and arduous day in a very important process, but I respectfully ask you to seriously consider the Joint Cross Service Consolidation in order to provide more efficient service for less money. After all, these are the ultimate goals of this Commission.

The bottom line is that we must look at the three "P's." Performance -- Middle River has won the Vice-President's Hammer Award. Pride -- this is a family; the employee turnover rate is one employment-related change every fifteen years. (The private sector should be this successful at employee longevity). Finally, a plan -- we should use existing technology, investment, and space to achieve consolidation, increase preparedness, and keep "BRAC ON TRACK."

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today.

Comments by Congressman Roscoe Bartlett (6th - Maryland)
BRAC Hearing 4 May 1995 UMBC (Baltimore)

May 4, 1995

HIGHLIGHTS FOR RGB CONCLUSION:

Rebecca

1. Thank Mrs. Cox for her consideration of FORMAC's presentation and for meeting with you on this issue earlier this year. Urge full and careful consideration of each and every point ...especially the fact (and it is fact) that the Army's numbers -- on so-called cost savings -- are wrong. The Army admits its numbers are wrong. They were wrong at the outset and they are wrong this morning. They are wrong by 843 percent. They are so wrong, in fact, that the Army is scrambling to re-crunch them even as we meet here today. The Army owes the Commission an explanation and I hope the Commission will be relentless in demanding it.

As a result of flawed -- that is, dead wrong -- numbers and assumptions and facts and figures, I am confident that we'll be talking about the future of Ft. Ritchie again. The case before the Commission is, in my view, one of Army credibility and efficiency. Ft. Ritchie should not have to make a case for its part in our national security and readiness.

* The Army should be explaining how its miscalculations and mismanagement could be so far off base.

2. Acknowledge the Ft. Ritchie visit (on March 24) by Commissioner Al Cornella. Note, again, the importance of Ft. Ritchie to Site R (-- the alternate Joint Chiefs of Staff site) which is absolutely essential to our national security. It cannot be sufficiently supported from any other location and it is an integral part of a crucial armed forces network which loses its balance if Ft. Ritchie is closed. The Army's numbers --- off by 843 percent, mind you --- make that case. Mention that

Congressman Bartlett

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Commissioner Cornella -- to his credit and on his own initiative -- expanded his March 24 agenda to include a visit to Site R. Any discussion involving Ft. Ritchie consequently involves a concern about Site R. They are linked. That fact cannot be ignored or avoided in the tinder box world we are leaving for our children.

3. Emphasize three primary items: _____

-- projected cost-savings are in error. The greatest cost we'll bear will be the loss of the base and its functions. The Army's numbers are embarssingly wrong and they know it.

-- doubt. The Army's case gives us more than reasonable doubt about the necessity for even considering closing Ritchie. Ritchie has been targeted for execution. But the more I examine the case the Army's so-called case for closure, and the more I find to be the truth, the more convinced I am that Ritchie deserves to be commended, not eliminated. And, mind you, this conclusion is coming from a cost-cutting, conscientious, no nonsense, bare-bones conservative who is dedicated to saving tax dollars. What I see is a recommendation in need of rejection.

-- risk. Knowing what we know about the mission of Site R and the responsibilities of Ft. Ritchie coupled with the fragile, volatile, terroristic, time-bomb world we're confronting in this day and age, I don't believe it is wise at all to put this nation at further risk by locking the gates at Ft. Ritchie and telling an anxious America that they can sleep safely tonight. If you are convinced that Site R is safe and sound as a result of moving significant elements of its support further away and further out of reach, then you are more secure with the Army's assumptions than I. We have to be vigilant. We have to be prepared.

~~Weapons launched from central Asia can~~ Weapons launched from central Asia can arrive faster at a U. S. target than a convoy can make the 32 mile trip from Ft. Detrick to Ft. Ritchie.

Congressman Bartlett

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And both mandates require Ritchie. We owe the American people nothing less than a full measure of readiness.



PRESS RELEASE

Congressman

Ben Cardin

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 4, 1995

CONTACT: Susan Sullam
Phone: 410-433-8886

**REP. CARDIN TELLS BASE CLOSING COMMISSION THAT THERE ARE POSITIVES
AND NEGATIVES CONNECTED TO IMPACT ON FT. MEADE**

BALTIMORE -- U.S. Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin testified to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) regional hearing at UMBC that there were some positives advantages for Ft. Meade in the announced proposals, but that he had concerns about the plan to downgrade service at Ft. Meade's Kimbrough Army Community Hospital.

"I am pleased by continued efforts to reshape Ft. Meade into a 21st Century campus for federal facilities. This process is going well and has included moving an E.P.A. laboratory, a Library of Congress facility, and a training center for military public affairs officers onto the base," said Rep. Cardin. "In addition, I am very pleased that the offices of the Defense Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Information Systems Software Command should be moving to Ft. Meade as a result of the BRAC plan."

However, the Congressman went on to tell the Commission that he "has serious concerns about plans to downgrade service at the Kimbrough Hospital. I hope that the BRAC will take a closer look at the number of people that will be affected by downgrading, reexamine original estimates of savings, and decide to maintain current hospital services."

Rep. Cardin commended the Commission for holding its regional hearing in Baltimore. In addition to testimony about closings in Maryland, the regional hearing also included presentations about base closings in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.

--#--

Baltimore Office: 540 E. Baltimore Ave., Suite 211, Baltimore, MD 21202 (410) 336-8886

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DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING

Thursday, May 4, 1995

8:30 a.m.

University of Maryland Field House
Baltimore Campus
Baltimore, Maryland

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COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Rebecca G. Cox
Alton W. Cornella
S. Lee Kling
Josue Robles
Wendi Lousie Steele

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good morning, ladies and
2 gentlemen. Welcome to the regional hearing of the Defense
3 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is Rebecca
4 Cox, and I am a member of the commission charged with
5 evaluating the recommendations of the Department of Defense,
6 regarding the closure and realignment of military
7 installations in the United States. Also here with me today
8 are Commissioners Wendi Steele, Al Cornella, Lee Kling, and
9 Joe Robles.
10
11 First, let me thank all of the military and
12 civilian personnel who have assisted us so capably during our
13 visits to the many bases that will be discussed today. We've
14 spent a lot of days looking at these installations and asking
15 questions, and the cooperation that we've received has been
16 very, very helpful. The main purpose of the base visits
17 we've conducted is to allow us to see the installations and
18 to address with the military personnel the all important
19 question of the military value.
20 In addition to the base visits, as you all know, we
21 are conducting a total of 11 regional hearings, of which
22 today's is the tenth. The communities affected by the

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1 closure are the main purpose of the regional hearings today,
2 so that we can hear from them and consider their views. We
3 consider this interaction to be one of the most important
4 parts of our deliberations.
5 Let me assure you that all of the commissioners and
6 the staff are well aware of the tremendous impact of closure
7 on the communities. We are committed to openness and
8 fairness in this process, and all of the material we gather,
9 all of the information we get from the Department of Defense,
10 and all of our correspondence is completely open to the
11 public. We are faced with an unpleasant and painful task,
12 which we intend to carry out as sensitively as we can. The
13 kind of assistance we have received here is very helpful.
14 As far as how we will proceed today, we will do the
15 same as we have done in all of our regional hearings, and
16 that is that the commission has assigned a block of time to
17 each state affected by the closure, and the overall amount of
18 time was determined by the number of installations on the
19 list, and the amount of job loss. The time limits will be
20 enforced, strictly.
21 We notified the appropriate elected officials of
22 this procedure, and left it up to them, working with the

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1 communities, to determine how to block the time given to the
 2 state. This morning, we will hear testimony from the State
 3 of Maryland for 130 minutes, and from Pennsylvania, for 55
 4 minutes.

5 At the end of the Pennsylvania morning
 6 presentation, we have set aside a period of 30 minutes for
 7 public comment, during which members of the public from
 8 Pennsylvania and Maryland may speak. There has been a sign-
 9 up sheet provided for this portion of the hearing, and we
 10 hope that anyone who wishes to speak has already signed up.
 11 We would ask that those of you speaking at that time to limit
 12 yourself to two minutes.

13 After the public comment period we will break for
 14 lunch, and reconvene about 1:35 for 110 minutes of testimony
 15 from Pennsylvania, 100 minutes from Virginia, and 20 minutes
 16 from North Carolina. After those presentations, there will
 17 be another 30-minute public comment period from Pennsylvania,
 18 Virginia, and North Carolina, and we expect the hearing to
 19 end promptly at 6:30.

20 Let me also say before we start, that the base
 21 closure law has been amended since 1993 to require that
 22 anyone giving testimony before the commission do so under

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1 concerned citizens in examining the DOD's justification,
 2 preparing for today's hearings. I think you're going to hear
 3 some very perceptive analysis of the cost justifications put
 4 forth by DOD. The elected officials are here to underscore
 5 the state's support of our communities and their concerns
 6 with the DOD's recommendations.

7 What we're going to do is, we're going to ask the
 8 governor to speak briefly and then some members of the
 9 delegation who will have to depart because of their pressing
 10 schedules. I hope everyone understands the intense pressure
 11 the governor and some of our delegation members are under.

12 Others will stay for the presentation by their
 13 communities and will speak at the end of that presentation.
 14 Congressman Bartlett, for instance, at the end of the Fort
 15 Ritchie presentation, will then close with his observations.

16 We've asked everyone to be brief. We're anxious to
 17 hear from the communities, and with that I now defer to
 18 Governor Glendening and then to Senator Mikulski and then
 19 Congressmen Hoyer and Cardin. Governor?

20 GOVERNOR GLENDENING: Senator Sarbanes, thank you
 21 very much. Madame Chair and members of the commission, we
 22 welcome you first to Maryland, and many of you, we welcome

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1 oath. And so I will be swearing in all of the witnesses, and
 2 that will include the individuals who will be speaking for
 3 the public comment period later. So that we can get started,
 4 we could swear you all in as a group. If you wouldn't mind
 5 standing, please. Anybody who will be testifying or
 6 answering questions.

7 (Witnesses sworn.)

8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. You may begin. We
 9 have a very distinguished delegation here from the State of
 10 Maryland, and we're pleased to see all of you. And let me
 11 turn it over to you to go through your program.

12 SENATOR SARBANES: Madame Chairman and members of
 13 the commission, thank you very much for this opportunity to
 14 appear in support of our communities and their response to
 15 the 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations with
 16 the Department of Defense.

17 We also want to thank the commission for scheduling
 18 this regional hearing in Maryland, and we express our
 19 particular appreciation to each of the commissioners who's
 20 here with us this morning and to the BRAC staff and also,
 21 especially, to those commissioners who have been able to
 22 visit installations in our state.

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1 you again to Maryland. We certainly appreciate everything
 2 that you've been doing. The lieutenant governor and I are
 3 delighted to be hosting this next to last meeting.

4 And we also thank the University of Maryland in
 5 Baltimore County and President Freeman Browsky, who is in
 6 Germany and couldn't be here today, but has been very helpful
 7 to us. Commission members, I know that this has been a very
 8 grueling schedule for you. We appreciate your willingness to
 9 give the time and attention to those whose lives will be
 10 directly affected by the decision that you have been called
 11 upon to make.

12 I can tell you very sincerely that we are deeply
 13 concerned about the impact of the base closings that have
 14 been recommended to you. We are concerned about the impact
 15 on the communities, of which the bases are a very important
 16 and integral part. We're concerned about the impact on our
 17 national defense. You'll be hearing a set of very excellent
 18 presentations from community leaders.

19 They have raised, I think, very legitimate
 20 questions about the national defense significance of the
 21 bases, but they've also raised issues that we believe are
 22 extremely important in terms of the economic well-being of

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1 As you know, Maryland was heavily impacted by the
 2 DOD's recommendations with five of our installations slated
 3 for closure or realignment. This would cost us 1700 military
 4 and civilian jobs and also, because of a reversal by the
 5 Department of Defense of the '93 recommendation, the loss of
 6 almost 4,000 jobs which are coming from NAVSEA to White Oak.

7 More importantly, though, we believe our nation
 8 will lose critical military capabilities as a consequence of
 9 the recommendations that have been made, and also lose highly
 10 dedicated and proven teams of experienced personnel
 11 associated with these installations. As you will be hearing
 12 this morning, we think DOD failed to adequately consider
 13 other opportunities for cost savings and cross servicing,
 14 such as consolidation.

15 For example, the Defense Information Systems Agency
 16 to Fort Ritchie; the DOD-wide consolidation of Army
 17 Publication Distribution Centers, which would then involve
 18 Baltimore in responding to that challenge; and the Joint
 19 Spectrum Center, to Annapolis. We have deep concern about
 20 the downsizing of the Kimbrough Hospital at Fort Meade.

21 Our delegation and our state and local governments
 22 have worked closely with the affected communities and

Page 12

1 the communities, as well.

2 I will be very brief, so that we can hear from the
 3 citizens, but I do want to underscore our state's strong
 4 support for these bases and for the community advocates.
 5 Lieutenant Governor Townsend, who has been part of several of
 6 your visits to the state, will be with you throughout the
 7 morning, as well.

8 I thank you for your time, and for the special
 9 thanks to the citizens who have come out this morning and who
 10 have been so supportive, and I can tell you, who have made
 11 absolutely excellent substantive presentations throughout
 12 this process. I understand that the passion and the
 13 enthusiasm, and the very real concern -- the legitimate
 14 concern -- that the citizens have raised.

15 We have participated with people from White Oak,
 16 from Fort Ritchie, and from the Army Publications
 17 Distribution Center. And I believe that their comments will
 18 indeed be very telling. And I thank you citizens for your
 19 active participation, as well, and commission members, thank
 20 you.

21 SENATOR MIKULSKI: Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. To
 22 the members of the commission, we give you a very cordial

1 welcome to Maryland, and thank you for the very assiduous way
 2 you're going about your duties. We welcome you in our state.
 3 We know how faithful you've been in examining the issues, and
 4 to your very cooperative staff. The openness, the
 5 professionalism has indeed been most appreciated.
 6 We, the Maryland delegation, will be able to get to
 7 make our case in June, so I just want to focus on a few
 8 things. First, listen to the community. When you listen to
 9 the community, you will find that they will make their
 10 presentation on these issues -- not on hand wringing, or
 11 whining, or bleeding heart.
 12 They want to make sure they tell you why they are a
 13 value to the nation, why their a substantial return on the
 14 investment, and yes, the impact on the local community, if
 15 this is closed. We know that the military needs to be
 16 downsized, but we don't want it to be downgraded. We, in
 17 Maryland, feel that we offer a unique combination of
 18 facilities, of physical and intellectual infrastructure.
 19 We're at close proximity to premier civilian
 20 laboratories, higher education facilities, and the entire
 21 support system from the Pentagon. Our location, our
 22 technological facilities, are superior to none -- I mean, are

1 superior, and could not easily be replaced.
 2 I would like to take a few minutes, however, to
 3 focus on the work force. In each and every facility, you are
 4 going to find not only superb technological facilities, but
 5 also a unique work force. They bring unique skills. They
 6 bring an extraordinary work ethic. They don't work only
 7 by -- they work by the book, but they don't work by the
 8 clock.
 9 And their spirit of patriotism is something that I
 10 think our whole private sector needs to imitate. They are as
 11 fit for duty as the military that they choose to support.
 12 Now, this is a very unique area here. And as we look at
 13 these facilities, as we go to the laboratories, while we're
 14 developing the smart technologies for the smart weapons of
 15 war, we see what this is.
 16 At the David Taylor lab, the naval lab, we see that
 17 this is where 82 percent of the staff are scientists and
 18 engineers, and they are backed up by highly trained machinery
 19 and support staff that work hands on with engineers. In the
 20 private sector, it would be called a center of excellence.
 21 And it would take more than 10 years to reassemble this
 22 caliber of people.

1 At White Oak, we also know that they have very
 2 unique technological facilities, like the hypervelocity wind
 3 tunnel. But it takes an unusual group of people, a unique
 4 team, again, of scientists, engineers, and support staff.
 5 Whether they have PhDs, or union cards, it is the only team
 6 in the world. And up at Fort Ritchie, there is a highly
 7 skilled work force that manages a very intricate
 8 communication system.
 9 When the President dials 911 around the world, it
 10 is at Fort Ritchie that they make sure that those calls go
 11 through. And in those rolling hills up there in Western
 12 Maryland, they are around the clock, 24 hours a day,
 13 regardless of weather, regardless of world conditions, they
 14 are right there.
 15 At the Army Distribution Center in Little River,
 16 what we see is a military version of Federal Express: highly
 17 motivated work force moving things along on a highly
 18 automated system, with the National Guard right across the
 19 street. When our military deploys on peace-keeping missions,
 20 they can't take all their paperwork with them, all their
 21 rules and requirements, all the kinds of documents they need.
 22 They need to take their weapons.

1 But over there at Little River, they move it right
 2 along on the assembly line, hand it off to the National
 3 Guard, and it goes wherever our military is. You just can't
 4 replace that type of system. And at the Kimbrough Army
 5 Community Hospital, this is where we have dedicated nurses
 6 and doctors providing a whole range of medical service. And
 7 you should know that their hands-on cost effectiveness is 40
 8 percent less than any other military hospital in Washington,
 9 D.C.
 10 So, my dear commissioners, when you listen to the
 11 arguments, listen to this work force. Try to picture
 12 replacing it. Try to picture what it would cost to replace
 13 it in terms of money and time. And also, take a look at this
 14 work force, because of their work ethic and their spirit of
 15 patriotism. And I know you just won't be able to say no to
 16 them. Thank you very much.
 17 (Applause.)
 18 CONGRESSMAN BOYER: Mrs. Cox and members of the
 19 commission, following Barbara Mikulski is very bad planning,
 20 as some of you know.
 21 (Laughter.)
 22 CONGRESSMAN BOYER: I'm not going to take long --

1 or we won't take long. We have some real experts here --
 2 people that have worked on the site, and they're the ones
 3 you'll want to hear from. However, we believe there are some
 4 very strong cases to be made to you, and you want these
 5 experts who are the most familiar with the places to present
 6 it to you.
 7 I want to commend the Department of Defense for
 8 recognizing the extraordinary military value of two of the
 9 primary assets in my district, and for the national defense:
 10 the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head and the
 11 Patuxent River Naval Air Station. These are terrific
 12 facilities, and I am proud to have them in my district and
 13 our state, and I'm pleased that DOD made a similar
 14 observation.
 15 However, I'm here because we have some other
 16 quality facilities in Maryland that you've been asked to
 17 review and assess. Kimbrough Army Hospital at Fort Meade has
 18 long been an important part of the service we offer to the
 19 soldiers stationed at Fort Meade and the many military
 20 retirees in our community. As you will hear today, it also
 21 fulfills unique -- unique is a critical word that you're
 22 going to hear today -- around the clock needs of the National

1 Security Agency.
 2 I also, members of the commission, want to
 3 encourage you to take a close look at the Naval Surface
 4 Warfare Center's Annapolis detachment. The center's
 5 machinery work requires specialized facilities that the navy
 6 cannot afford to duplicate elsewhere, despite our need to
 7 accelerate submarine research. We can't afford to lose that
 8 capability or the people who make it work.
 9 I hope you will duplicate what Mrs. Cox,
 10 Congresswoman Byron, who is sitting in Fort Ritchie right
 11 now, and other members of the commission did the last year.
 12 In addition, it houses one of the country's unique national
 13 assets, and that is the hypervelocity wind tunnel, of which
 14 I'm sure you're going to hear more. As Senator Sarbanes has
 15 said, you will also hear strong presentations about the Army
 16 Publications Distribution Center in Baltimore and, of course,
 17 about Fort Ritchie.
 18 The Defense Department, in my opinion, failed to
 19 take into account the logic that consolidated that Defense
 20 Information Systems Agency, Western Hemisphere, at Ritchie,
 21 and the invaluable support that Ritchie provides for Site R.
 22 I look forward, members of the commission, to

1 bearing all of the testimony and facts being presented today.
 2 I thank all of the witnesses who have volunteered their time,
 3 so we'll all have a clearer picture of the impact of the
 4 department's recommendations.

5 You have a tough job. Very frankly, in '93, we
 6 think the commission, of which Mrs. Cox was a member, did an
 7 excellent job. We believe that you will do an equally good
 8 job. It's a tough job. We thank you for your time. We
 9 thank you for your service, not only to us, but to the
 10 country.

11 SENATOR SARBANES: Thank you very much, Steny.
 12 Congressman Ben Cardin.

13 CONGRESSMAN CARDIN: Thank you. Thank you Senator
 14 Sarbanes. Let me also welcome you here to Maryland at
 15 Baltimore and thank you for your service to our country on
 16 serving on this commission. Our delegation is united in
 17 support of the testimonies that you'll be hearing from the
 18 community and from the experts, as it relates to
 19 recommendations that affect our nation's security. I support
 20 those -- the testimony that you will hear later.

21 I think you'll find that based upon BRAC criteria,
 22 that there should be adjustments made in the recommendations

1 podium, spent the last four and a half years of his career at
 2 Fort Ritchie, where he is involved in the transition of the
 3 Seventh Signal Command from Army to the Defense Information
 4 Systems Agency.

5 He retired as the assistant deputy of the chief of
 6 operations on February 1st, 1995, literally, just now. And
 7 his federal career spans 36 years, and we're happy to turn
 8 the presentation over to him.

9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Welcome, and thank you.

10 MR. KNICKMEIER: Thank you very much.

11 (Applause.)

12 MR. KNICKMEIER: Good morning, members of the
 13 commission. As mentioned, my name is Lonnie Knickmeier. I'd
 14 like to start out by inviting your attention to the upper
 15 left-hand corner of this chart, where you see a
 16 communications tower coming up over the side of that
 17 mountain. You'll see it on your sheet that you have in front
 18 of you also. That is Site C. I'm going to be making
 19 reference to Site C today, in conjunction with Site R.

20 I would like to point out that Fort Ritchie is
 21 about 70 miles north of Washington, D.C. I'm going to give
 22 you the overview. We're going to go right to the bottom line

1 that are before you. I would like to spend my minute talking
 2 about the facility located in the third congressional
 3 district, which is Fort Meade. Fort Meade is being
 4 transferred into a 21st century campus with federal
 5 facilities to better serve our nation. And the community and
 6 I are very pleased about this transformation.

7 Let me say, additionally, that there are two
 8 recommendations that are being made that will further that
 9 goal. And that is, to add two additional tenants to Fort
 10 Meade's offices of the Defense Investigator Services and the
 11 U.S. Army Information Systems Software Command, which is
 12 consistent with the new mission of Fort Meade. And we
 13 support both of these changes. Our major concern today,
 14 though, is the downgrading of the Kimbrough Army Community
 15 Hospital.

16 I believe that after you've heard the testimony --
 17 or if you've done the visits, after you've looked at these
 18 circumstances -- you'll find that based upon BRAC criteria
 19 there should be no downgrading of services at Kimbrough. And
 20 we support the continuation of that facility as an
 21 instrumental part of nation's defense. Thank you.

22 SENATOR SARBANES: Madame Chairman, as I said,

1 and tell you what we believe is the situation with regard to
 2 the defense recommendation. We're going to place heavy
 3 emphasis on the three major categories of the criteria. We
 4 will talk about the military value.

5 I'll talk about the tremendous errors that have
 6 been made in the return on investment portion, and we'll talk
 7 about the impacts. You can see here the flow of the briefing
 8 that I'll be giving you.

9 First of all, the bottom line. By any measurement,
 10 the Army and DOD did a very poor analysis on the economic and
 11 the military value of Fort Ritchie, Maryland, and I'm going
 12 to prove that to you in the next 25 minutes.

13 First of all, they ignore the irreplaceable
 14 military value of Fort Ritchie in the national defense, and
 15 I'm going to talk about that. And you can see the most
 16 important thing on this chart probably is -- and next to the
 17 military value -- is the tremendous errors that they have
 18 made in the analytical portion of the review.

19 Next chart. I'd like to start out by indicating
 20 the organizations that are at Fort Ritchie, and just a
 21 sentence or two about what each of them do. If you start at
 22 the upper center portion of this chart, you'll see Sites R

1 Congressman Bartlett will speak at the close of the Fort
 2 Ritchie presentation, which is what we will now move to.

3 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much to the panel,
 4 for your helpful and insightful information, and thank very
 5 many of you for visiting the bases with us. That's been
 6 helpful as well, and also the governor, to the governor, for
 7 his help in arranging the hearing today. We appreciate that,
 8 and that of your staff.

9 SENATOR SARBANES: As I indicated, some of my
 10 colleagues will have to depart for other commitments. Our
 11 first presenters this morning, speaking with respect to Fort
 12 Ritchie, are Herb Meininger, and Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier, who
 13 are members of the Fort Ritchie Military Affairs Committee.
 14 I think, as was revealed during Commissioner Cornella's visit
 15 of Fort Ritchie, this group has identified significant
 16 deficiencies, we believe, in the DOD cost savings analysis,
 17 with respect to Fort Ritchie.

18 I don't know of two more expert people we could
 19 have to make this presentation. Herb Meininger to my right
 20 was a former garrison commander at Fort Ritchie, where he
 21 spent the last four and a half years of his 30 years of
 22 government service. Mr. Lonnie Knickmeier, who is at the

1 and C.

2 Site R is the alternate command center. It's the
 3 emergency relocation facility for the Pentagon. It's
 4 commonly referred to as the underground Pentagon. Site C is
 5 a facility just outside of Fort Ritchie that you saw on the
 6 first chart, that provides jam-resistant communications.

7 If you look at Fort Ritchie going clockwise on this
 8 chart, you'll see that it provides the base operating support
 9 to all those tenant organizations that are located at Fort
 10 Ritchie proper, as well as Site R and Site C. The U.S. Army
 11 Information Systems Command BRAC office is at Fort Ritchie,
 12 and it plans all of the things that are associated with the
 13 information management structure of the Army, as relates to
 14 any of the BRAC actions.

15 The technical applications -- or technology
 16 applications office has a mission which I can't discuss in
 17 this forum, but the commissioners are briefed, and we can
 18 make arrangements for them to find out exactly what that
 19 organization does.

20 The U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering
 21 Command, Continental U.S., is physically located at Fort
 22 Ritchie. It's the single largest tenant organization there.

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 25</p> <p>1 I'm going to talk about that organization, and its 2 engineering support, not only to the Army, but to the entire 3 defense department, and intergovernmental agencies. 4 The 1108 Signal Brigade and the 1111 Signal 5 Battalion are located at Fort Ritchie. The 1111 Signal 6 Battalion has its primary responsibility as providing support 7 to Site R. And the 1108 Signal Brigade provides strategic 8 communications management for the U.S. Army for a number of 9 systems to include voice, data, and satellite. 10 And finally, the Defense Information Systems 11 Agency, Western Hemisphere, from where I retired on 12 1 February, is a defense information systems agency 13 organization that is responsible for managing the defense 14 megacenters around the country, as well as the continental 15 U.S. portion of the defense communication systems 16 infrastructure. 17 I'd like to emphasize on this chart the absolute 18 inextricable relationship that exists between Fort Ritchie, 19 and Site R. As you know, Site R supports the Pentagon. Fort 20 Ritchie supports Site R. It's crucial to the defense of the 21 nation and to the efficiency of the operation at Site R, that 22 Fort Ritchie remain in place.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 28</p> <p>1 permit something to happen where we relocate the MPs and the 2 firemen 32 miles away, when they can be right next door at 3 Fort Ritchie. The U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering 4 Command COMUS is the biggest single tenant at Fort Ritchie. 5 You can see here their customer base. 6 Look at the chart, and see the percentage of their 7 customers that are east of the Mississippi. It does not make 8 sense to us, and I don't think it makes sense to anyone that 9 uses any rationality, that you would relocate the majority of 10 that organization to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which takes them 11 2,200 miles from their primary customer base. The Defense 12 Information Systems Agency, Western Hemisphere, operates a 13 daily hands-on operational facility at Site R. 14 You can see from this chart the vast number of 15 existing networks and systems managed. There are four more 16 networks that are DOD wide. They're scheduled to come on 17 line in the very near future. Again, the vast majority of 18 those customers are located east of the Mississippi. It's 19 interesting to note that DOD didn't even consider the 20 disposition of DISA-WESTHEM when they submitted their report 21 for the BRAC Commission. 22 This chart will give you an appreciation of the</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 26</p> <p>1 The current world situation may not require us to 2 relocate to Fort Ritchie today, but who knows, with all the 3 wild people running around in the world, what might happen in 4 the future. And we believe that Site R has to have absolute 5 and immediate response for any kind of a contingency 6 situation that might occur. I would point out that when Mr. 7 Cornella visited Fort Ritchie on the 24th of March, he had 8 the opportunity to ride the road that exists between Fort 9 Ritchie, Site R, and then down to Fort Detrick, Maryland. 10 I'd now like to talk about the military value of 11 Fort Ritchie. As with many things, the most important thing 12 is location, location, location. And Fort Ritchie is the 13 best location for providing all kinds of support to Site R. 14 We're going to talk about the proximity of Fort Ritchie to 15 Sites R and C, and we're then going to talk about the 16 proximity of the tenant activities at Ritchie, to its 17 customer base. Next chart. 18 This chart will show you Fort Ritchie in 19 relationship to Site R. It's 6 miles. It's 32 miles between 20 Site R and Fort Detrick, where a lot of the organizations are 21 being recommended to relocate. The Defense Information 22 Systems Agency has a facility in Site R. It receives backup</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 29</p> <p>1 facility that exists at Fort Ritchie, to manage all of those 2 networks. Again, Mr. Cornella has had the opportunity to see 3 that facility, and get an explanation as to what those folks 4 do for a living. Next chart. There's tremendous synergisms 5 that go on at Fort Ritchie. All of those organizations you 6 see listed under the critical relationship are located at 7 Fort Ritchie, or elements of them are at Fort Ritchie. 8 And the relationship that has been forged there in 9 terms of doing the DOD job is unequal to anyplace. As a 10 matter of fact, it is my contention that instead of breaking 11 up what's at Fort Ritchie and the synergism that exists 12 there, what we really ought to be doing is moving more things 13 in to Fort Ritchie, taking Fort Ritchie as a model as to what 14 can be done within the defense department, to utilize 15 different organizations to do jobs, and not tear it apart. 16 You saw in an earlier chart the relationship of 17 Site R with Fort Ritchie. This chart shows the capability 18 that exists that gives Site R increased survivable 19 communications. You'll notice that Fort Ritchie and Site R 20 both have access to the outside world with voice and data 21 communications. But the red line shows you a fiber optic 22 link that exists between Fort Ritchie and Site R, that's</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 27</p> <p>1 support from the people that work at Fort Ritchie. 2 There are some very unique things about Site R. 3 It's carved out of a solid piece of granite. It's 4 underground, and it's very prone to problems that don't exist 5 in above-ground facilities. 6 For example, security. There's an MP company at 7 Fort Ritchie, whose sole responsibility is to support Site R. 8 Within that MP company there is a platoon that is specially 9 trained in special reaction activities. In the fire and 10 safety area, they have a fire department within Site R, but 11 they receive augmentation from the fire department at Fort 12 Ritchie. 13 Because of the fact you're in an enclosed facility, 14 have a number of generators and batteries and other things 15 that cause some unique things related to fire fighting, those 16 fire fighters at Fort Ritchie are specially trained. I would 17 like to share with you just a moment Mr. Herb Meininger's 18 experience when he was the commander of Fort Ritchie. He 19 left Fort Ritchie one day. By the time he got to Site R, 20 there was a fire inside of Site R. 21 The firemen were cutting away the infrastructure in 22 there to keep it from spreading. We cannot, we must not</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 30</p> <p>1 government owned, and it gives you then, a geometric increase 2 in the capabilities at both Site R and Fort Ritchie. 3 That's government owned. You do not want to rip 4 that apart. If anything happens to the communications at 5 Site R, they've got to be able to reach the outside world, 6 and the best way to do that is through Fort Ritchie. I would 7 like to now move into the area of return on investment. We 8 have done a total review of the DOD numbers, and we find them 9 to be gravely flawed. 10 As a matter of fact, those of you who are in 11 business, if someone gave you these kind of numbers and were 12 as far off as these numbers are, I suspect you'd probably 13 fire them. You'll notice that their numbers are off by 843 14 percent. And I'm going to prove to you in a few moments that 15 they are, in fact, off by 843 percent. We pointed out to Mr. 16 Cornella when he visited Ritchie on the 24th of March, the 17 tremendous errors in these numbers. 18 As a result of that visit, guidance has been 19 provide back to the DOD and to the Army, to redo the numbers. 20 I can tell you that those numbers are being redone, and I can 21 also tell you that I will have no more confidence in those 22 numbers when they come out. They've had a month now to</p>

1 develop the numbers, and they're still not available to
 2 anybody.

3 And when they come out, they're still going to be
 4 in error, and I can guarantee you that the organization that
 5 I'm a part of is going to continue to be in place, and we're
 6 going to review those numbers, and we're going to bring to
 7 the attention of the BRAC Commission the errors that
 8 obviously will exist.

9 I will also like to point out that as a result of
 10 Mr. Cornella's visit on the 24th of March, BG Shane, who is
 11 the director of management for the U.S. Army at the
 12 headquarters DA level, sent out a directive to the folks in
 13 the Army to redo the numbers, because they were so screwed up
 14 that they were invalid. This chart shows you graphically
 15 what I'm talking about, when I talk about the 843 percent.

16 The DOD said it would take \$93 million one-time cost
 17 to close up Fort Ritchie, and relocate the tenant
 18 organizations. They said over a 20-year period, they could
 19 save \$712 million. I'm going to prove to you that that's
 20 poppycock. It's not true, can't be done, never will be done.
 21 Our numbers show that it will take \$127 million to close Fort
 22 Ritchie and dispose of the organizations there, and it will

1 and the other organizations at Fort Ritchie, and Site R.

2 I would point out to you that Tab E of your book,
 3 we have a much more detailed break out of these numbers. The
 4 next page, I will not get into, except for one thing. If
 5 they move the technology application office, and ISEC COMUS
 6 to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which takes them 2,200 hundred
 7 miles away from most of their customers, the temporary duty
 8 pay and cost of the DOD is going to increase. Guess who pays
 9 that bill. It's not paid for by the Information Systems
 10 Command, who are proposing to move these people.

11 It's paid for by the customers that these
 12 organizations support. Was their consultation with those
 13 customers? I can tell you unequivocally, there was not.
 14 Next chart. What I'd like to do now is to show you an area
 15 where they missed an opportunity to, in fact, increase
 16 efficiency, and reduce cost. Headquarters DISA-WESTHEM at
 17 Fort Ritchie is geographically disbursed with its overall
 18 headquarter staff.

19 There's a number of people located in leased space
 20 in Denver, Colorado. There's a number of people located in
 21 leased space in northern Virginia. We have done an analysis,
 22 and in a three year period, you can get a return on

1 Take 9-plus years to amortize that investment cost.

2 And if one elects to go out to the 20 year period,
 3 you'll find that there's only a \$75 million savings. But I
 4 believe the next chart is the most important chart. Anyone
 5 who has been involved in trying to project cost savings or
 6 any other numbers knows for a fact that anytime you project
 7 beyond five years, you are out in never-never land.

8 And if anyone thinks that those kind of numbers are
 9 going to continue to evolve over the 20 year period, they're
 10 smoking some really heavy stuff. It isn't going to happen,
 11 it hasn't happened in previous BRAC reviews, and it certainly
 12 is not going to happen at Fort Ritchie.

13 The next two charts show you in some detail the
 14 eight major areas where we have found tremendous flaws in the
 15 Department of the Army and Department of Defense numbers. I
 16 would just like to address couple of them. Take the first
 17 one, the garrison budget. The DOD made a mistake in terms of
 18 how much it costs to run Fort Ritchie, by some \$35 million
 19 per year.

20 That's a tremendous error, and it's inexcusable and
 21 unexplainable as to how the Department of Defense could err
 22 that largely. I can tell you that these numbers are correct.

1 investment by taking those people that are in Denver,
 2 Colorado, in leased space, and relocating them to Fort
 3 Ritchie. Not only do you save the money, but you also
 4 increase operational efficiency.

5 Having been the assistant DESOPS at DISA-WESTHEM, I
 6 can tell you it is a tremendously inefficient organization,
 7 and it's primarily due to the fact that its staff is so
 8 geographically disbursed. Anyone who knows anything about
 9 organizational structure will tell you that you don't
 10 disburse your staff if you can possibly avoid it. Next
 11 issue. The DOD submission to the BRAC Commission stated "no
 12 known environmental impediments at the closing or receiving
 13 installations". That's pure unadulterated bull.

14 There is a huge issue on the table as we speak in
 15 Sierra Vista, Arizona, which includes Fort Huachuca. There
 16 are two lawsuits on the books today. There's another lawsuit
 17 going to be filed next week. I have provided to you in your
 18 book at the tabs -- there are 16 individual pieces of paper
 19 that I've given you to demonstrate the fact that there is, in
 20 fact, an environmental issue that is critical at Fort
 21 Huachuca, Arizona.

22 They have completely avoided that fact, and to

1 I will be proven that they are correct when the new numbers
 2 come in from DOD. I've met with the people at headquarters
 3 Department of the Army, and they didn't like what they heard,
 4 but they understood what they heard, and they know that their
 5 numbers are bad, and they've got to redo them.

6 The second area is really interesting. The
 7 Department of Army and Department of Defense claimed a 100
 8 percent savings from the elimination of an MP company at Fort
 9 Ritchie. It's kind of interesting, because that MP company
 10 has one purpose in life, and that is to support Site R. They
 11 can not, should not, be able to take credit for that, because
 12 those people must remain. And regardless of where they're
 13 located, their job is to protect Site R.

14 The third area I'd like to bring up is the fact
 15 that the DOD totally forgot about a 246 civilian and a 46
 16 military organization at Fort Ritchie, called DISA-WESTHEM.
 17 That's the organization I came out of.

18 They totally ignored that that organization
 19 existed. They totally ignored that it would have to be
 20 disposed of. They totally ignored there would be a
 21 tremendous cost in relocating those people. They totally
 22 ignored the synergism that exists between that organization,

1 prove it, the training and doctrine command which owns Fort
 2 Huachuca, has come out with guidance that says we must now do
 3 an environmental impact study. And I can tell you where that
 4 came from. It came from the information that we provided
 5 from the FORMAC group to Mr. Cornella on the 24th of March.
 6 If we hadn't have brought that up, they would have railroaded
 7 this thing through the BRAC Commission.

8 And nobody would have been the wiser until all
 9 those people moved out to Fort Huachuca. There's a serious
 10 economic impact. The payroll at Fort Ritchie is \$75 million
 11 a year. You can see that there's over 2,300 civilian and
 12 military people that work at Fort Ritchie. I mentioned
 13 earlier that some of those people that are carried on the
 14 books at Fort Ritchie, physically work at Site R.

15 Fort Ritchie is in Washington County, Maryland.
 16 Washington County, Maryland is part of the Appalachian Region
 17 Commission, which is, in fact, a economically depressed area.
 18 The unemployment rate within Washington County has
 19 historically been well below the Maryland average. I would
 20 like you now to look at this chart, that shows you what that
 21 comparison is, between 1986 and 1994. If Fort Ritchie
 22 closes, that's going to tremendously increase that ratio

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p> <p>1 between the economic health and welfare of the State of 2 Maryland, versus Washington County.</p> <p>3 In summary, ladies and gentlemen of the BRAC 4 Commission, I would like to point out to you that we are 5 convinced that the recommendation to close Fort Ritchie would 6 be militarily, fiscally and environmentally irresponsible. 7 We believe the commission can not support the Army and DOD 8 recommendation that will put civilian and military people at 9 Site R at risk.</p> <p>10 We do not believe that the BRAC Commission can 11 follow the recommendation that would decrease the operational 12 responsiveness, and readiness of Site R, and other DOD 13 activities. And finally, we believe that failure to 14 implement these actions to save money and improve 15 organizational efficiencies by consolidating portions of 16 DISA-WESTHEM at Fort Ritchie, would also be irresponsible.</p> <p>17 I'm going back now to the egg. I showed you 18 earlier the organizations that are at Fort Ritchie. I would 19 like to now emphasize the intricacy and the relationship that 20 exists between those organizations. We don't want to destroy 21 that synergism that exists. It should, in fact, be used as a 22 model within the DOD as to how you can bring organizations</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p> <p>1 advice and recommendations, and to Commissioner Cornella, who 2 came all the way up to Fort Ritchie, and made the trip up to 3 Site R, and then down to Fort Detrick.</p> <p>4 It's obvious in this presentation, I think, that 5 Fort Ritchie is an essential military installation. And its 6 value has been very impressively underscored by the 7 presentation that Lonnie just made today. But, I'll tell 8 you -- Fort Ritchie is more than just buildings and 9 machinery. Any installation like this, the most important 10 thing there are its people, and the community that supports 11 it. And here they are out in front of you today, and I think 12 that they go a long way to making our case about how 13 important Fort Ritchie is.</p> <p>14 These are the people who give life, and give us the 15 security needs and expects. And I salute the group that came 16 here this morning. Actually, the little things they're 17 wearing in front of them that I hold up here today, save Fort 18 Ritchie, expresses what I think is a conclusion that I would 19 draw that the commission should draw from this presentation.</p> <p>20 I want to draw just three quick points. First of 21 all, a major consideration in this round of closings was to 22 be cost savings. I think that it's obvious in this</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p> <p>1 together from different forces at DOD, and take advantage of 2 the expertise of those organizations, and improve the overall 3 cost-effectiveness and operational responsiveness of the DOD 4 activities.</p> <p>5 I would now like to indicate to you what our 6 recommendations are. We believe that, based on the 7 information that I have provided you today, and that is in 8 the tabs in your book, the information that we have and will 9 continue to provide to the BRAC Commission staff, that our 10 recommendation is that you totally disapprove the DOD 11 recommendation relative to Fort Ritchie, and that you direct 12 the Defense Information Systems Agency to relocate that 13 portion of DISA-WESTHEM that's in Denver, Colorado, to Fort 14 Ritchie, Maryland.</p> <p>15 I would like now to go back to the chart that talks 16 about the relationship between the Pentagon, Fort Ritchie, 17 and Site R. We must keep that linkage unbroken. The 18 commission can not, and should not destroy this vital linkage 19 that exists. The commission must not permit those people 20 with a myopic viewpoint of the strategic importance of Fort 21 Ritchie, to prevail. To do so would be very short sighted. 22 We believe that retaining Fort Ritchie is the right answer.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 41</p> <p>1 presentation that the numbers that were prepared by the Army 2 are just dead wrong -- 843 percent off. And as we meet 3 today, they're recrunching those numbers. The savings 4 absolutely do not justify closing this base. Considerable 5 doubt has been generated today.</p> <p>6 There's more than just reasonable doubt. And I'd 7 like to add just one other figure, just one other element to 8 this doubt. The Army says that in its downsizing, this round 9 of closings, it's brought us down to the bottom-up review 10 level of infrastructure for the Army.</p> <p>11 The National Security Committee in the House 12 believes that, if that's true, that's too much, because in 13 our National Security Revitalization Act, in Title I of that, 14 we set up a commission to relook at the bottom-up review. 15 That was done according to the Vice President's budget 16 numbers, and our committee is not very tranquil with what -- 17 the conclusions drawn by that study.</p> <p>18 I would just like to emphasize again one of the 19 things that Lonnie came back to a couple of times, and that 20 is the relationship with Site R. We still live in a very 21 dangerous world, and Site R is still essential. Just two 22 points relative to that.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p> <p>1 As a matter of fact, we're recommending that you 2 increase the responsibility of Fort Ritchie, not decrease it.</p> <p>3 Ladies and gentlemen, I would be happy to answer any 4 questions.</p> <p>5 MR. MEININGER: Madame Chairman, I would like to 6 have you refer back to chart 21.</p> <p>7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: 21? All right.</p> <p>8 MR. MEININGER: And this is just for the record. I 9 think that you've noticed the figures in chart 21, but I want 10 to make sure that, for the record, the unemployment, 11 Washington County, has historically been above the 12 unemployment figures for Maryland.</p> <p>13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, very much. I think 14 that we are all set. Thank you. Your presentation was so 15 helpful. You've covered everything. Congressman Bartlett, 16 we're --</p> <p>17 (Applause.)</p> <p>18 CONGRESSMAN BARTLETT: Thank you very much, Lonnie, 19 for a very excellent presentation. I want to thank the 20 commissioners for giving us this opportunity to make our 21 case. I especially want to thank Commissioner Cox for coming 22 to our office, and meeting with us, and giving us excellent</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 42</p> <p>1 One is, when it takes longer to get the support 2 personnel from Fort Detrick, which is where they would send 3 them, than it takes a missile to come from half way around 4 the world, the continental USA, that obviously makes the 5 point that we need the support people closer. Closer to 6 Site R, where they are now, just 6 miles away. The second 7 thing I really want to emphasize is that redundant 8 communication link.</p> <p>9 I don't know if that was made sufficiently clear to 10 you. Anything that Site R can do, Fort Ritchie can do. And 11 so we have, for this very essential capability in Site R, a 12 redundant communication link. We think that when all of the 13 facts are considered, that there is no question that the 14 military significance, the military importance of Site R, is 15 such that it shouldn't have even been considered for being on 16 this list. Thank you, Lonnie, for your presentation. Thank 17 you, commissioners for this opportunity to meet with you. 18 Thank you for your support.</p> <p>19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, very much, Congressman 20 Bartlett, and the folks from Fort Ritchie, thank you.</p> <p>21 SENATOR SARBANES: Madame Chairman, we're now ready 22 to move on to the next facility. I do want to underscore, I</p>

1 think you just heard a very powerful presentation with
 2 respect to the Fort Ritchie case. And, of course, we will
 3 continue to present to the commission and its staff
 4 additional information and analysis as we proceed toward a
 5 decision.

6 We're now going to turn to the Naval Surface
 7 Warfare Center in Annapolis. The 1995 DOD recommendation is
 8 to close this center in Annapolis. It's the Navy's only
 9 machinery research and development facility. We think the
 10 work at this center is absolutely critical to our nation's
 11 leadership in such areas as submarine silencing, ship
 12 survivability, combat readiness, and environmental
 13 compliance.

14 As you know, DOD recommended disestablishing this
 15 detachment two years ago. But the 1993 BRAC Commission
 16 unanimously rejected this recommendation, and we are
 17 convinced that the current DOD recommendation to close the
 18 detachment, to abandon some major facilities, to relocate the
 19 remaining functions, is even more flawed than was the
 20 recommendation two years ago.

21 We have two very able experts her today to make the
 22 presentation: Jim Corder, who served for nearly 30 years at

1 While I personally disagreed with the
 2 recommendations in '91 to the BRAC, there was some logic, at
 3 least, behind the final results in leaving the machinery R &
 4 D directorate intact at the Annapolis site. I can see no
 5 logic behind the recommendations in '93, and even less in
 6 '95. As you can see, in the next few graphs -- as you can
 7 see in this, the Annapolis detachment is completely
 8 surrounded by the naval station.

9 The functions performed there are technology and
 10 hardware development, systems trade-off and integration,
 11 specifications development in qualifications in technology
 12 assessments. As the senator says, the Annapolis detachment
 13 is the only place that has the mission to perform research
 14 and development for navy shipboard machinery, including
 15 stealth and energy conservation.

16 To put the importance of machinery research and
 17 development in perspective -- the DDG 51 class of ships, less
 18 the combat system, one half of the ship's weight is in the
 19 propulsion, auxiliary, and electrical systems, and the fuel
 20 they use. One half of the ship's cost is in the propulsion,
 21 auxiliary, and electrical systems. The focus of the work
 22 done in the machinery R & D detachment directorate is on one:

1 the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Annapolis. He's a
 2 distinguished graduate of the Naval Academy. He's had a long
 3 career in the Navy. When he retired, he was the deputy
 4 director of the machinery research and development
 5 directorate. And Larry Argiro was the head of the machinery
 6 research and development directorate, prior to his retirement
 7 this past June.

8 Larry Argiro has had a very impressive career.
 9 He's responsible for many of the innovations which have made
 10 U.S. submarines the quietest in the world. He's received
 11 numerous awards. He's really an outstanding scientist. And
 12 we're delighted that both of these gentlemen are here to
 13 present the case to the commission.

14 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you, very much. Let me just
 15 ask Mr. Argiro -- I'm not sure you were on the stage when we
 16 did the oath. Were we able to swear you in?

17 MR. ARGIRO: No.

18 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Would you mind if I gave you the
 19 oath? Unfortunately, it is required by law for anybody
 20 testifying. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the
 21 testimony you are about to give before the Defense Base
 22 Closure and Realignment Commission shall be the truth, the

1 affordability. The cost of acquisition, maintenance,
 2 manning, and fuel. Two, environmental compliance.

3 And the greatest emphasis there is on the CFC
 4 Replacement Program, and if there's any delay in the efforts
 5 ongoing in Annapolis, the Navy would be in noncompliance with
 6 international agreements. Third, stealth -- acoustics and
 7 magnetics, and safety and survivability. The proposal in
 8 1995 by DOD was to close the Annapolis site, including the
 9 NIKE site, and transfer the fuel storage and fuel site, and
 10 the water treatment plant to the naval station in support of
 11 the naval station in the Naval Academy.

12 And relocate appropriate functions, personnel,
 13 equipment and support, primarily to Philadelphia, Carderock,
 14 and the Naval Research Laboratory. The Joint Spectrum
 15 Center, a DOD cross service tenant, would be relocated in the
 16 Annapolis area. And the BSEC claim is that there's a one
 17 time cost of \$25 million, yearly savings of \$14.7 million
 18 dollars, with a return on investment of one and a half years.
 19 The similarities between the '93 and '95 recommendations are
 20 shown here.

21 '93 was to disestablish Annapolis, reduce
 22 personnel, and move some of the people to Philadelphia, while

1 whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

2 MR. ARGIRO: I do.

3 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you. Go ahead, Mr. Corder.

4 MR. CORDER: Thank you, Senator Sarbanes, for the
 5 introduction. I would like to thank the commission for the
 6 opportunity to testify about my concerns as a private citizen
 7 and tax payer on any decision to close the Annapolis
 8 detachment, NSWC. I especially want to thank Commissioners
 9 Cox and Montoya, for their taking time from their busy
 10 schedules and bringing their considerable knowledge and
 11 expertise to the Annapolis lab. I hope that maybe some
 12 others may also visit.

13 As Senator Sarbanes said, I was the deputy director
 14 of the machinery R & D directorate for 12 years, and it's
 15 that directorate that's a preponderance of what would be left
 16 at the Annapolis site, as a consequence of the BRAC '91
 17 process. If there's any additional information you'd like
 18 about me, there's bio data sheet at the back of your package.
 19 I retired a little over two years ago, so my paycheck comes
 20 from the Office of Personnel Management the first of every
 21 month, regardless of what happens to the Annapolis
 22 detachment.

1 keeping the facilities at the Annapolis site operational, at
 2 a cost of \$24.7 million. In '95, again, they recommend
 3 closing Annapolis, reducing the personnel, and moving some to
 4 Philadelphia, but this time, abandon two facilities, relocate
 5 eight facilities to Philadelphia, and replicate the magnetics
 6 fields laboratory at Carderock, for a cost of \$25 million.

7 I'm sure that Commissioners Cox and Montoya, having
 8 seen the facilities at Annapolis that are to be relocated and
 9 replicated, have serious doubts that that can be accomplished
 10 with a \$300,000 difference between the '93 and '95
 11 recommendations. The reason for rejecting the 1993
 12 recommendations were projected exaggerated savings and
 13 inefficiencies that were not considered. Major savings from
 14 the staff reduction can be accomplished without any
 15 relocations.

16 And there's no closures in society surrounded by
 17 navy property, and there's no practical alternatives use
 18 identified. The 1995 BRAC recommendations -- the criteria
 19 that were deviated from -- were again, underestimated cost,
 20 overestimated savings, underestimated military value of
 21 facilities, underestimated value of people, and there's no
 22 excess capacity in machinery R & D, though there may be

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1 excess capacity in the overall R & D establishment. And
 2 missed opportunities for cross service thrust.
 3 In the economic analysis you see in this next
 4 chart, the column on the right consists of the certified data
 5 that was submitted to the BSEC. The column in the center is
 6 that selected data that BSEC chose to use. This ignores
 7 several things. One, the column on the right doesn't even
 8 include the impact of closing or abandoning the two
 9 facilities, and I'll elaborate on the 10-to-1 cost increase
 10 in another slide.
 11 But, this does not take into consideration the
 12 recurring cost of a 10-to-1 increase in cost for conducting
 13 tests at sea, instead of using the facilities that are going
 14 to be abandoned. So you can see, instead of the \$25 million
 15 one time cost, it really should be \$3, and in my talking with
 16 people more recently there, they've identified additional
 17 military construction costs that will probably bring an
 18 additional \$20 million requirement on it.
 19 The other estimated value -- military value -- of
 20 facilities shown from this side of the abandonment of the
 21 Deep Ocean Pressure Tanks, and Submarine Fluid Dynamics
 22 facility. In 1994, the Naval Sea Systems Command did a

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1 cost \$1.5 million, if it had had to have been -- if the
 2 submarine it was tested on had to have been dried off, the
 3 system installed, and then taken to sea. There were 14 items
 4 that probably could not have been tested prior to this at sea
 5 deployment, and the estimate cost of those systems in their
 6 program is \$200 million.
 7 A specific example was the New Generation SOSA
 8 System that was estimated would put a \$50 million program at
 9 risk. The functions performed at Philadelphia are essential
 10 to the Navy, but the nature of the equipment and the people
 11 required to perform those functions are different than those
 12 that perform the machinery and R & D functions at the
 13 Annapolis site. The equipment in the land based test site
 14 facilities in Philadelphia is planned -- for the most part --
 15 is planned to be installed on a new class of ships, or during
 16 a major upgrade.
 17 And as the name implies, the equipment in the in-
 18 service engineer unit portion is equipment already in
 19 service. The equipment in the facilities at the Annapolis
 20 site, for the most part, are red board models used for proof
 21 of principle or concept demonstrations through prototypes,
 22 and these are significantly different than the operational

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1 facility study, and determined that the Deep Ocean Pressure
 2 Tanks were an absolute essential, must have capability. Yet,
 3 before the year was over, the Navy recommended to the BRAC
 4 that it be abandoned.
 5 I will not elaborate on all of the facilities that
 6 are going to be moved, because Mr. Epstein, and I believe,
 7 Commissioners Cox and Montoya have both received copies of
 8 the hand out at the lab when they were there. But, my
 9 concern is primarily with the risk associated with at-sea
 10 testing of things that cannot be tested if the facilities are
 11 closed down. There are uncontrolled conditions at sea, and
 12 human life and loss of vehicles can even be a consequence,
 13 and I've used the example.
 14 Both of these facilities were created as a
 15 consequence of the thresher disaster in the early 1960s.
 16 We've had no similar one since, and the submarine emergency
 17 balancing system specifically is the thing that is used --
 18 the original Submarine Fluid Dynamics facility was created
 19 for. The creativity and the innovation of the facility's
 20 manure has expanded the use of the facilities, beyond that,
 21 however.
 22 This line shows some information garnered from a

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1 equipment in the fleet. As with the facilities, the people
 2 are different.
 3 As you can see from here, the large percentage of
 4 the Annapolis machinery and R & D directorate population that
 5 are scientists and engineers, and the high number of advanced
 6 degrees they have, as compared to the people that perform the
 7 essential work in Philadelphia. I think a further indication
 8 of the difference in the kinds of innovative thinking and
 9 processes that go on in the two places, are indicated by the
 10 numbers of patents.
 11 From 1990 to the present, the machinery R & D
 12 personnel have received 71 patents, and have an additional 74
 13 patent applications in, as contrasted to 1 patent and 1
 14 patent application among the Philadelphia people. When I
 15 testified in 1993, I pointed out that for the year 1992, I
 16 had done an analysis, in while the machinery R & D
 17 directorate had only 9 percent of the employees of the
 18 Carderock division, those same people had received 44 percent
 19 of the patents issued that year.
 20 There is no excess capacity program for the
 21 machinery R & D directorate. Funding has increased from \$90
 22 million in 1993 to \$110 million in 1995, and the 5 year

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1 study that was done to determine the cost impact. I
 2 mentioned the 10-to-1 cost increase, if the -- assuming it
 3 were abandoned, and a test had to be conducted at sea. There
 4 were 24 tests analyzed that required specialization
 5 characteristics of this facility for testing. These are not
 6 all of the tests that were conducted there. There were other
 7 tests conducted, but those could have been conducted at other
 8 facilities.
 9 The 24 items tested -- the test cost less than
 10 \$600,000. If the facility was closed, there would only be 10
 11 of those items that could have been -- that would have
 12 absolutely required --
 13 CHAIRMAN COX: Can I just interrupt for a minute?
 14 I'm sorry, it's getting very loud and difficult for us to
 15 hear. I wonder if we could ask those of you who are in the
 16 back of the room to keep your conversations down, and
 17 possibly sit down, so that we don't have the background
 18 noise. Thank you very much, and we won't take that out of
 19 your time.
 20 MR. CORDER: Sure. The 10 items that could have
 21 been tested at sea would have cost more than \$5 million. As
 22 an example, the SSN 21 Secondary Propulsion System would have

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1 defense plan, in the typical program elements executed at the
 2 Annapolis site, are growing. Facilities are expanding.
 3 There have been three new facilities created at the Annapolis
 4 site since 1993, and two other major facilities have been
 5 significantly expanded and upgraded.
 6 The magnetic fields laboratory has had a \$5 million
 7 upgrade in the last five years, and the chlorofluorocarbon
 8 facilities have had a \$5 million upgrade within the last two
 9 years. The work load at the Annapolis site, machinery R & D
 10 directorate, is presently at 430. The NAVCOMP projections
 11 for the year 2001 are 418 man years. I don't see that as a
 12 significant difference. To further emphasize the capacity,
 13 and the importance of what's done there, I'll give you some
 14 results of a strategic planning process that was done at the
 15 Carderock division, as well as NSWC-wide.
 16 It was determined that there were 78 technical
 17 capabilities throughout the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and
 18 that the Annapolis site had the lead on three of those.
 19 Those three are in the top 10 of those 78. Propulsion
 20 machinery is number 3, auxiliary machinery, number 7,
 21 electrical systems, number 10. And the number 1 priority,
 22 stealth, while the lead is at Carderock, the lead at 2 major

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1 subsets, machinery silencing, and magnetic silencing, are at
 2 the Annapolis site.
 3 Further indicting of the importance of what they do
 4 and the need for those people, was issued from a model we've
 5 used during this strategic planning process. The postulation
 6 was that the Carderock division would have to be downsized
 7 over a period of years, by 18 percent, and that model result
 8 showed that during the same time period, there was a need for
 9 a 4 percent increase in the machinery R & D directorate.
 10 Missed cross service opportunities. During both
 11 Commissioners Cox and Montoya's visits, COL Flock, United
 12 States Air Force, commander of the North Spectrum Center,
 13 said that he had 136 people in his headquarters route that
 14 are a tenant there at the Annapolis detachment. And he has
 15 an additional 600 people that are in leased space in the
 16 Annapolis community, and as a consequence of the BRAC '91
 17 process, there was going to be a significant exodus to other
 18 sites, leaving space at the Annapolis site.
 19 And it was his intent to consolidate those
 20 functions at the Annapolis site. If Annapolis is closed,
 21 that can't happen. The cost of moving headquarters would be
 22 an added burden. Also appearing in these two visits, Dean

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1 even just next door. As for the schedule, I believe it's '98
 2 that -- I believe it's in '96 that CFC can no longer be
 3 manufactured, and the supply -- and there's been a limit on
 4 how much could be produced, set out by the international
 5 agreements.
 6 And, the stock pile that the Navy has been able to
 7 get, would, if I recall correctly, be depleted in 2001, and
 8 we're expecting to start replacing some of those systems at
 9 sea in '98, as I recall. Being two years removed from that
 10 program, I'm not absolutely current. But I can get that
 11 information.
 12 CHAIRWOMAN COX: That would be helpful, and as I
 13 understand it, there would be at least a several year delay
 14 in the program, which is pretty close to --
 15 MR. CORDEL: Best estimate was two years, and we're
 16 just barely going to make this schedule as it is.
 17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: As it is. And, presumably, there
 18 are no other options at the moment for pulling on ships
 19 except CFCs?
 20 MR. CORDEL: All of the machinery has been designed
 21 and developed for those refrigerants, and working fluids, and
 22 it takes major redesigns in compressors, heat exchangers --

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1 Shapiro, the dean of the Naval Academy, pointed out the
 2 significant benefits of having the Annapolis detachment in
 3 such close proximity to the Naval Academy.
 4 Numerous professors work at the Annapolis lab
 5 during the summer, and part-time during the afternoon and
 6 year, and they get direct experience on navy systems that
 7 they can relate back to the midshipmen in the classroom.
 8 Some first class midshipmen work on some of the machinery
 9 projects, and innocents that are waiting on the beginning of
 10 their flight school or submarine school class work on
 11 machinery and R & D projects also. The dean said it would be
 12 a significant loss if the Annapolis detachment were closed.
 13 In conclusion, the Navy's 1995 proposal is both
 14 costly, and, I feel, damaging to the essential capabilities
 15 of the Navy. DOD recommendations for Annapolis were rejected
 16 as wrong in 1993. The recommendations are substantially the
 17 same, except for the moving, or abandoning of facilities. I
 18 feel the 1995 recommendations should be rejected as well. I
 19 want to thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and
 20 if there are any questions, I'd be happy to try to answer
 21 them.
 22 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I just have two questions. One,

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1 to adapt to fluids that have different characteristics than
 2 the CFC's the equipment was designed to use.
 3 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much.
 4 MR. CORDEL: Thank you.
 5 (Applause.)
 6 MR. ARGIRO: Before I get started, let me just say
 7 that, yes, we're working on things like thermoelectric, but
 8 this is for small stuff. You're really talking about major
 9 cooling in the particular submarines and surface ships.
 10 Madame Chairman, members of the commission, I'm here as a
 11 member of a very supportive community, as you can see from
 12 the number out there.
 13 I retired in June as Senator Sarbanes has
 14 indicated. In '94, after spending 47 years at the Annapolis
 15 laboratory. The last 9 years as head of the machinery R & D
 16 directorate, and as Jim had just pointed out, this isn't one
 17 that you're talking about displacing. The information that I
 18 will present supports the military value of the laboratory,
 19 and I can assure you that this information comes from my
 20 first-hand knowledge, and is given without any Navy
 21 constraints.
 22 Let me say that we in the community were

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1 the deep sea pressure lab that is proposed to be abandoned --
 2 you had some figures there on what the cost would be to do
 3 that kind of testing at sea, if you could do them at sea --
 4 MR. CORDER: Yes, ma'am.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Is there another facility
 6 somewhere in the United States?
 7 MR. CORDER: It's the only one like it in the free
 8 world.
 9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I see. So there isn't any other
 10 option except at sea testing.
 11 MR. CORDER: No.
 12 CHAIRWOMAN COX: And you also mentioned the CFC
 13 work that you all were doing, and the concern that it would
 14 be delayed.
 15 MR. CORDER: Yes, ma'am.
 16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I wonder if you could just
 17 elaborate on that a little bit. There are certain deadlines,
 18 as I recall, that we had to meet, and how long do you think a
 19 delay might be?
 20 MR. CORDER: Oh. The engineers, that are doing the
 21 work there estimated to take as long as two years to get
 22 those facilities recreated and operational in another site,

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1 flabbergasted at learning that the Navy had placed this
 2 laboratory on the closure list. Particularly, as Senator
 3 Sarbanes had said, after BRAC had voted 7-0 to keep it open.
 4 We hope that you will receive a good understanding today,
 5 after, listening with Mr. Corder, and my presentation, as to
 6 the role and importance of the laboratories countless issues
 7 to the Navy in its future.
 8 Permit me now, to sort of go on with an
 9 introduction to the Annapolis laboratory. Since 1903, the
 10 Annapolis laboratory has been part of the Navy. It was
 11 established by call as a part - to be part of the Naval
 12 Academy. Since that time it has worked to make or Navy the
 13 very best in the world, and it was willing to give its best
 14 to make it so. The laboratory's own responded with the
 15 strength of technical knowledge, and discipline to work the
 16 problems at hand with the professionalism, dedication found
 17 no where else.
 18 Having the responsibility of developing advanced
 19 machinery systems, new technologies were conceived that
 20 provided the Navy with a strategic military advantage, and
 21 it's superior operational capability over its adversaries.
 22 This advantage lasted for more than 40 years, and certainly

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1 has helped to win the Cold War. Contributions were numerous,
 2 as dependant on this chart.
 3 Now this is a very busy chart, and certainly I
 4 don't want you to read it, but I will point out certain
 5 factors to it. It shows, first, the wide range of
 6 technologies that were developed, that certainly have made
 7 our Navy the very best. For example, the ICR gas turbines,
 8 that when installed on board ships will save 30 to 50 percent
 9 in fuel that's being used aboard your surface ships.
 10 Superconductivity, and there's no need to go into that,
 11 because it has all sorts of uses, including your medical
 12 fields.
 13 False power. Stealth. Environmental control.
 14 Future ship designs, and others as noted. Let me now show
 15 you just the stealth, and what was involved in that
 16 particular area. Here, we have the machinery silencing in
 17 what the Annapolis laboratory has done to our particular --
 18 am I out of time?
 19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We're getting close. You might
 20 want to think about wrapping up.
 21 MR. ARGIRO: We're getting close?
 22 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Right.

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1 SENATOR SARBANES: Madame Chairman, I think we have
 2 a little surplus of time at the end. I'd give two minutes
 3 out of that time so Mr. Argiro could continue, and then if
 4 they would give him the bell, we would know, but Larry, take
 5 a couple of minutes.
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Okay. Thank you very much,
 7 Senator.
 8 MR. ARGIRO: The machinery silencing has on
 9 submarines, it shows the nautilus of the top of the pyramid
 10 on the left hand side. It shows the Seawolf on the bottom
 11 side. Every machinery silencing feature ever installed on a
 12 submarine from the Nautilus to the Seawolf has been developed
 13 at the Annapolis lab. Incidentally, just to give you some feel
 14 as to what that is, basically, if the Nautilus was heard
 15 thousands of miles, in fact, in England. The Seawolf will be
 16 in hundreds of yards.
 17 To accomplish these results, an outstanding team
 18 was assembled that was research oriented by education, that
 19 has advanced degrees, had close styles to the academia,
 20 particularly, the Naval Academy, and incidently, last year,
 21 there were 40 -- 36, sorry -- 36 professors working at the
 22 laboratory. For just -- these special people participated in

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1 technical societies and technical exchanges at national and
 2 international levels.
 3 As a matter of fact, in addition to the
 4 contributions shown, this small technical staff, as Jim had
 5 said, has produced more patents than all the NSWC combined,
 6 produced more R & D publications, 200 or more. And received
 7 more awards than any other move from NSWC, and then from that
 8 end, your example of its dominance in the technical world,
 9 this small group typically contributes more than 25 percent
 10 of the technical papers at the ASN annual national meeting,
 11 and have been recognized by them as -- with every major
 12 award, ASN has to offer.
 13 We talked about facilities. The Annapolis
 14 laboratory is the only activity in the United States whose
 15 role is to develop advanced ship board machinery. Since the
 16 machinery under development is usually five to ten years
 17 ahead of what is installed the fleet, it's facilities are
 18 unique and no where else duplicated. As a matter of record,
 19 and NSWC declared that four of these facilities were golden
 20 nuggets, that is, could not do without.
 21 All facilities were constantly being modernized at
 22 sponsor's expense. Also, these facilities are extremely

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1 important to private industry, since there are no others like
 2 them in the free world. Presently negotiations -- and I will
 3 stop -- are ongoing with the U.K., Australians, and others
 4 for their particular use.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, and we would
 6 appreciate it if you have more of a statement, we'd love to
 7 have it in the record, and it will be very helpful.
 8 MR. ARGIRO: I have much more to say, and you will
 9 receive it. Thank you very much.
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Mr. Argiro.
 11 (Applause.)
 12 SENATOR SARBANES: Just one sentence about the
 13 Annapolis facility. As you saw, in the winning of the
 14 patents, this is a highly skilled, highly trained facility.
 15 Very high educational level. Informal surveys that have been
 16 done indicate that well under half of our force would move to
 17 Philadelphia, if the move took place. You, in effect, would
 18 destroy the unit which is a scientific paradigm, really, in
 19 the services, and we think that's a very important point.
 20 Madame Chairman, we're now going to turn to White
 21 Oak, and I would suggest to the presenters, if -- you know,
 22 they need to move to the podium in a hurry. Every second it

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1 takes to get there is time lost out of their presentation.
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: You're right.
 3 SENATOR SARBANES: We think the White Oak facility
 4 is an extremely important facility. We thought the
 5 recommendation two years ago was a very good recommendation.
 6 (Applause.)
 7 SENATOR SARBANES: It would retain some of the
 8 unique facilities like the wind tunnel, the casino in
 9 Phoenix, x-ray simulator, the hydroballistics facility, and
 10 it would have shifted NAVSEA to White Oak. Now they're
 11 talking about taking NAVSEA to the Navy Yard, which will be
 12 brought under criticism here.
 13 John Tino is our first presenter. He worked 36
 14 years at White Oak, prior to his retirement two years ago.
 15 He was a department head, both for the wind tunnel and the
 16 hydroballistics facility. He knows all of the activities at
 17 White Oak, and we're pleased that John's here, who will be
 18 followed by Mike Subin, who is the member of the Montgomery
 19 County Council, a naval reservist who knows this field very
 20 well indeed, and chairman of the White Oak task force.
 21 And then the County Executive of Montgomery County,
 22 Doug Duncan, who has taken a very strong and keen interest in

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1 this issue. John?
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Just before you start,
 3 I think I saw all of you take the oath, but I wanted to make
 4 sure that you did before we started.
 5 MR. TINO: Yes, I did.
 6 MR. SUBIN: Yes, I did.
 7 MR. DUNCAN: Yes, I did.
 8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much.
 9 MR. TINO: Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Good
 10 morning, commission, Commissioner Cox.
 11 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good morning.
 12 MR. TINO: As the Senator said, I spent 36 years at
 13 White Oak prior to my retirement in February, 1993. I have
 14 lead and managed three of the key facilities remaining at
 15 White Oak, and am very familiar with the White Oak
 16 facilities. Our community believes the recommendation
 17 regarding White Oak, and the Naval Sea System Command,
 18 deviates substantially from the base closure criteria in the
 19 following four ways.
 20 First, the recommendation to close White Oak fails
 21 to take into account the extremely high military value of
 22 certain, irreplaceable, one-of-a-kind, national assets at

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1 White Oak. Second, the White Oak recommendation
 2 substantially understates the cost to close White Oak,
 3 particularly with regard to these facilities we're going to
 4 talk about. Third, the NAVSEA recommendation is founded on a
 5 faulty analysis of the cost of moving NAVSEA to the
 6 Washington Navy Yard, versus the cost of moving them to White
 7 Oak.

8 Fourth, and finally, the NAVSEA recommendation
 9 fails to account for the fact that the land facilities at
 10 White Oak are far superior to those in the Navy Yard. I will
 11 present the community's position on the first two deviations,
 12 those concerning White Oak. In the aftermath of the BRAC '93
 13 at White Oak, there are four key facilities remaining at
 14 White Oak. The hyperballistic wind tunnel, the nuclear
 15 weapons effects facility, the hydroballistic tank, and the
 16 magnetic synergy control R & D facility.

17 For the first three of these, the wind tunnel,
 18 nuclear weapons facility and the hydroballistic tank, the
 19 Navy had doctored what it called "a walk away approach".
 20 That is, the Navy decided to simply abandon the place, and
 21 literally walk away from them. The White Oak COBRA included
 22 absolutely no cost for these facilities. Not from moving

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1 is quote, "essential, since it is the only national facility
 2 capable of providing the flight environment for ballistic
 3 missile defects is a valued development."
 4 Such as the Army BATA system, which is undergoing
 5 tests in the tunnel, and the Navy's interceptor program. To
 6 some, there is an overwhelming body of authority to conclude
 7 that the recommendation to abandon the wind tunnel ignores
 8 this high military value, as well as DOD's current and future
 9 joint mission requirements, including theory of ballistic
 10 missile defense.

11 I'm now going to turn briefly to the nuclear
 12 weapons affects, or x-ray test facility. The certified
 13 response in a scenario development data call says this
 14 facility has, quote, "three of the world's largest, and most
 15 capable nuclear radiation simulators. The Phoenix, the
 16 Casino and the TAC Facility."
 17 The sponsor in the Defense Nuclear Agency, or DNA.
 18 Last year, DNA made a decision to consolidate its x-ray tank
 19 in White Oak, but shutting down x-ray tank facilities at two
 20 other locations. DNA included in writing that it is relying
 21 on the continued operation of the facility at White Oak,
 22 particularly, sought x-ray -- this Phoenix facility, to serve

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1 them, not from replacing them elsewhere, not even from our
 2 following them, in case we needed them again.

3 I will focus only on the hydroballistic wind
 4 tunnel, and the nuclear weapons facility, since these are
 5 critical, multi-service national defense assets. However,
 6 the other two are invaluable to under sea warfare, and our
 7 world of literal warfare. The hydroballistic wind tunnel
 8 represents the most noteworthy example of the Navy's
 9 disregard for the base closure criteria relating to military
 10 value. The tunnel is used about one-third of the time for
 11 the Navy, and the other two-thirds of the time, by Army, Air
 12 Force, NASA, and industry.

13 It is truly a joint cross service asset to our
 14 nation. The NSWC certified response to this scenario
 15 development data call refers to the wind tunnel as "a unique
 16 national asset". The Military values data call response
 17 states that there is no Navy, DOD, NASA, or industry
 18 facility, which can approach the capability of this wind
 19 tunnel.

20 The potential loss of the wind tunnel is one of
 21 only three BRAC issues, where concern was publicly expressed
 22 by the Chairman for the Joint Chief of Staff. And testimony

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1 future electronic and interceptive systems.
 2 Again, the Navy decision to abandon this facility
 3 appears to disregard high military value as a national
 4 defense asset, for which there is a clear, continued, and
 5 essential mission, as we defend ourselves against weapons of
 6 mass destruction. I would also like to point out, that the
 7 Navy did not perform a military value analysis for White Oak,
 8 or for the key national defense assets remaining there,
 9 except for the wind tunnel, the nuclear weapons facility, and
 10 the air lift facility.

11 The Navy has concluded and can see that there's a
 12 response of questions from the Maryland members of Congress.
 13 Our delegation here today. This is yet another indication
 14 that the Navy failed to account for the extremely high
 15 military value of White Oak's national assets. We had also
 16 stated in our testimony before this commission on April 17,
 17 that neither the joint cross service group and laboratory,
 18 nor the one on test evaluation, conducted a military value
 19 analysis of the inter-replaceable national defense asset,
 20 White Oak.

21 In addition to this regard, in the military value
 22 of White Oak's national defense asset, the second deviation

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1 on his commission his very first day appeared. As you may
 2 recall, the chairman testified that the loss of the wind
 3 tunnel, and I quote, "could eliminate a unique national
 4 capability that serves military research and development
 5 needs." He said the wind tunnel should be retained.

6 One can hardly imagine a better source to certify
 7 the military value of a defense facility. Yet, the Navy
 8 recommendation would not only shut down the wind tunnel
 9 facility, but abandon it completely.

10 Other highly authoritative sources have been
 11 unanimously reviewed -- that the wind tunnel should remain in
 12 operation. For example, the Deputy Command in Chief, in a
 13 memo to the Joint Chief of Staff, disagreed with the Navy's
 14 recommendations to abandon the wind tunnel. He described it
 15 as "vital to the continued credibility of the ballistic
 16 missile force, defending our nation."

17 The GAO, in his report to the commission last
 18 month, made only three recommendations on the Navy BRAC
 19 issues. One was that a way be found to keep the wind tunnel
 20 operating. Finally, just last week, on April 25, the
 21 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, BMDO, informed the
 22 Navy, in writing, that continued operation of the wind tunnel

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1 from the base closure criteria accrued by virtue of an
 2 incomplete analysis of the cost to close the base. I'll now
 3 address that. The White Oak COBRA shows the one time cost to
 4 close of only \$2.9 million. However, as I mentioned earlier,
 5 this figure includes no cost, whatsoever, for the wind tunnel
 6 nuclear weapon facility. It also showed the recurring
 7 savings of \$6 million per year, and we'll show how this is in
 8 fact, a vital facility.

9 The responses to the military value data call
 10 estimates an optimistic cost of \$143 million to replicate the
 11 wind tunnel elsewhere -- no site given -- and \$102 million to
 12 move it. If estimation agrees with the Chairman of the Joint
 13 Chief of Staff, that the wind tunnel should continue in
 14 operation, then either the cost to close White Oak will
 15 become enormous if the tunnel replicated or moved, or there
 16 will be a continuing cost to operate it at White Oak, if the
 17 tunnel remains there. Either way, the current COBRA numbers
 18 just don't hold up. They are woefully inadequate.

19 For the nuclear weapons facility, data call has
 20 estimated that the cost to replicate it or move it is at
 21 least 37 to 40 million dollars. Clearly, it is too expensive
 22 to move the critical national defense assets of White Oak.

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1 Not only must they keep operating, but they must be kept at
 2 White Oak. And if this is done, then the projected recurring
 3 cost of \$6 million just will disappear.

4 In conclusion, the recommendation to close White
 5 Oak deviated from the base closure in two ways: one, by
 6 failing to recognize a high military value of critical
 7 national defense assets and the continued mission
 8 requirements for them in today's new world order; two, by
 9 relying on the closing costs that are unrealistically low.

10 In fact, if one concedes that White Oak must be
 11 retained for operation somewhere else, the cost to close will
 12 skyrocket by almost \$200 million. We now turn to the NAVSEA
 13 recommendations, which will be addressed by Mike Subin.

14 (Applause.)

15 CHAIRSMAN COX: Mr. Subin, I'm sorry. Before you
 16 start again, if I could please ask the people in the back of
 17 the room to refrain from discussions in here. Perhaps you
 18 could take those outside if you do need discussion. It's
 19 hard for us to hear, and we are very anxious to get the
 20 information that is being offered. Thank you.

21 MR. SUBIN: Thank you. Good morning, Commissioner
 22 Cox and members of the Commission. I am Michael Subin. I am

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1 moving NAVSEA to the Navy Yard are far too low, perhaps by
 2 tens of millions of dollars. And the estimate for White Oak
 3 are far too high with no indication of any attempt by the
 4 Navy to value engineer that entire project.

5 I would now like to regress the Navy Yard costs.
 6 As stated earlier, the Culvert analysis estimates it will
 7 cost \$149 million in real time moneys to move 4,200 employees
 8 to the Navy Yard. There are currently 5,400 military and
 9 civilian employees located there. Planned relocations from
 10 BRAC '93 not being implemented by the Navy would add another
 11 650 employees, with the 4,200 for NAVSEA. That total comes
 12 to 10,250. Even with some reorganization, that total still
 13 would put 10,000 employees at the Navy Yard.

14 Now, why is that number important? Why are we
 15 concentrating on that? Well, there are two fundamental
 16 questions that we feel must be addressed here. The first is,
 17 does the Navy Yard currently have the capacity to accommodate
 18 10,000 employees? Second, are the Navy's current cost
 19 estimates for moving to the Navy Yard accurate?

20 With regard to capacity, any expansion to the Navy
 21 Yard must comply with the yard's master plan which was
 22 approved by the National Capital Planning Commission in

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1 chair of the White Oak Task Force. We are a group of civic,
 2 business, religious, and governmental organizations focused
 3 on maintaining the operational viability of White Oak and
 4 looking forward to housing NAVSEA there.

5 I would first like to add to Mr. Tino's comments by
 6 stating that the assets he described are national treasures,
 7 both the wind tunnel and the nuclear effects facilities. If
 8 we lose those scientific capabilities, we lose a major piece
 9 of our industrial base. And as you are aware, industrial
 10 mobilization in time of war will never be able to fill this
 11 void in time. And given the current testing moratoria in the
 12 air, sea, and water, we must retain those treasures.

13 As Mr. Tino also stated, while we believe the Navy
 14 deviated substantially from BRAC's criteria regarding the
 15 assets of White Oak, we also believe that the recommendation
 16 regarding NAVSEA's relocation deviated substantially from the
 17 base closure criteria in at least two ways: first, because it
 18 is based on a faulty analysis of NAVSEA's relocation costs;
 19 second, because it fails to account for the fact that the
 20 land and facilities at White Oak are far more expandable than
 21 those at the Navy Yard.

22 I would like to first discuss what we consider to

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1 October 1990. That master plan makes it clear, we admit, the
 2 Navy Yard can accommodate 10,00 persons. And it would do so
 3 by converting high bay industrial buildings to office space.

4 However, however, there are three very critical
 5 caveats to that. The first is that the Navy yard is a
 6 national historic landmark. Consequently, all renovations
 7 and new construction must be consistent with the
 8 architectural and historic qualities of the existing
 9 structures.

10 For example, exterior brick facades must be
 11 renovated or made part of any new construction. Design plans
 12 must be approved by the National Capital Planning Commission,
 13 by the District of Columbia Historic Preservation officer and
 14 the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. It appears
 15 that the Navy's covert cost estimates did not take any of
 16 that into account.

17 And in response to questions from Maryland
 18 Congressional Delegation, the Navy stated that its estimates
 19 for renovating the industrial buildings at the yard were
 20 based solely on the standard covert algorithm of 75 percent
 21 of new construction. That algorithm is an overall average
 22 and does not include any -- it doesn't include any of those

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1 be the most serious flaws in those numbers and then conclude
 2 by showing how the land and facilities of White Oak are far
 3 more desirous than the Navy Yard.

4 In its Culvert analysis, the Navy conceded that it
 5 will actually cost almost \$2 million more to relocate NAVSEA
 6 to the Navy Yard than to White Oak. The one-time cost is
 7 shown in back of me on these graphics.

8 I also call your attention to the MILCON numbers.
 9 The stated cost to the Navy Yard is \$16 million more than
 10 White Oak. The covert then goes on to conclude that there is
 11 annual recurring savings of \$9.4 million in the Navy Yard as
 12 opposed to White Oak, which, the Navy claims, more than
 13 offsets the one-time cost of the move.

14 Now, the community, in all candor, has had quite a
 15 bit of difficulty getting the Navy to pinpoint some of the
 16 assumptions on which their conclusions are based. However,
 17 we have closely reviewed all the data available and believe
 18 that their numbers are very wide. We are convinced that the
 19 Navy's current numbers are so erroneous that they neither
 20 should nor could be used as a justification to overturn the
 21 BRAC '93 recommendation to move NAVSEA to White Oak.

22 Our analysis indicates that the cost estimates for

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1 above considerations.

2 Now, we would submit to you that there are
 3 numerous additional factors, all of which add to the costs.
 4 In addition to the preservation of historic qualities, a
 5 second factor present at the Navy Yard that is not normally
 6 found with other rehabilitation projects is that most of the
 7 Navy Yard, including all five of the buildings slated for the
 8 relocation of NAVSEA, lie within the 100-year flood plane of
 9 the Anacostia River.

10 What does that mean for renovation projects? Just
 11 one month ago the National Capital Planning Commission
 12 approved preliminary preservation plans for building 33 at
 13 the Navy Yard. The commission recommended that in the final
 14 plan the Navy use flood-proofing techniques such as, and I
 15 quote, "elevating essential equipment and services above the
 16 flood level and using durable floodproof material in the
 17 interior."

18 Clearly, floodproofing will add to the renovation
 19 costs. Yet again the Navy does not appear to have considered
 20 those costs or attributed any of those to the move.

21 Third and finally, the master plan states that
 22 certain improvements should be made at the Navy Yard in order

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to provide a satisfactory quality of life for the 10,000 employees, and these considerations aren't considerations that our group has devised. These come straight out of the master plan.

And they include the following: conversion of building 46 from office to retail space; providing additional food services; providing recreational and day care facilities; adding a waterfront promenade with an amphitheater and providing new landscape throughout the yard. Those conditions would cost tens of millions of dollars, tens of millions of dollars which would not be needed at White Oak.

Now, the way we see it, since NAVSEA would account for approximately 40 percent of the employees at the Navy Yard, it would be reasonable to attribute 40 percent of those additional costs to NAVSEA. However, again, again, the Navy failed to have added any of those costs, and they are not reflected in the standard Culvert algorithm and would not be necessary without the NAVSEA location.

In sum, we believe the Culvert estimates for the Navy Yard are seriously deficient and that they overlook added costs related to historic preservation requirements,

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much as \$5 million, perhaps by more. We see numerous other problems with recurring costs comparisons and will be forwarding them to you.

The bottom line, however, is that any recurring cost advantages to the Navy Yard, and we are not sure that any exist at all, would be so small as to be immaterial and not outweigh the one-time cost.

Finally, in addition to a faulty cost savings analysis, we believe the NAVSEA recommendation represents a deviation from the base closure criteria having to do with facilities for potential receiving installations. We believe any fair comparison would favor the land and facilities at White Oak even without the cost comparison.

First, White Oak consists of over 730 acres with some 400 acres available for expansion. The Navy Yard, on the other hand, sits on about 70 acres, would be stretched to capacity by the NAVSEA move and could not accommodate any future expansions.

Second, White Oak has an excellent security buffer with facilities set back from the perimeter. The Navy Yard this year will have approximately 400,000 visitors due to the museum, summer pageant, and other tourist attractions. And

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floodproofing requirements, and quality of life requirements, all of which would be required.

The community is preparing some cost estimates for the Navy Yard move with the help of planning and construction experts, and we will be furnishing these to the Commission along with supporting data. We will also be furnishing our comments regarding additional deficiencies and the cost comparisons.

Equally confusing to us are the recurring cost comparisons. Again, the Navy claims it will realize recurring costs savings of \$9.4 million annually at the Navy Yard which would make up for the White Oak one-time cost advantage. The graph before you depicts the manner in which the recurring costs were calculated. As you can see, the two key differences are in civilian salaries of \$3.4 million which they attribute to White Oak and additional miscellaneous costs of \$6 million.

The Navy says that by moving to the yard, it can eliminate 68 jobs. That is so because NAVSEA would be a tenant there rather than a host activity. Therefore, so their reasoning goes, NAVSEA would not have to perform those functions at the Navy Yard. That explanation is contained in

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in case anybody needs to be reminded, in 1984 terrorist with easy access to the Navy Yard blew up the Officers Club.

The final point I would like to make is that quality of life factors clearly favor White Oak. There is convenient surface parking, nearby shopping, and dining facilities are plentiful. The base itself has a spacious cafeteria and an auditorium that can hold 500 people for classified briefings. By contrast, none of that exists at the Navy Yard and would have to be added.

In conclusion, our presentation has shown that the current recommendations on White Oak and NAVSEA deviate substantially from the base closure criteria. There is overwhelming evidence to the effect that certain national defense assets at White Oak must remain operational. According to certified cost estimates, it is too expensive to move them elsewhere, and they must remain at White Oak.

In its flood analysis, the Navy first concluded that it was going to shut down White Oak completely. It then had to, as a result of that flood analysis, reverse the well-reasoned BRAC '92 recommendation to move NAVSEA to White Oak.

Our community firmly and sincerely believes that the Navy's cost analysis does not support a move by NAVSEA to

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their response to questions from Congress and is contained in your briefing book.

The graphic depicts how the Navy calculated those miscellaneous incurred costs to White Oak. Please note, please note that there are \$4.5 million included for what are called host costs. We would submit to you that there are two problems with their number. One of them appears to be a double charge for the same function.

I just mention that the Navy says it needs an additional 68 NAVSEA employees at White Oak to perform host activities. Now, in addition to the \$3.4 million for the salaries, the Navy is tacking on another \$4.5 million for host cost salaries. That cost comes to \$8 million.

We could only conclude that this is a double cost for the same functions and bring those matters to the Navy's attention with the expectation that the Culvert will be corrected.

In addition, the Navy says its recurring cost for the White Oak are based on an April 1994 study by NAVTAC, but the White Oak costs in that study are only about \$2 million, not the 3.4, not the 4.5, not the 6.2. Our conclusion is that the annual host functions are overstated perhaps by as

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the Navy Yard. What makes the most sense is to sustain the BRAC '93 recommendation, keep those programs operational at White Oak, and move NAVSEA there. That is the right decision then, and it is the right decision now. Thank you for your attention and consideration.

(Applause.)

CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. We just have 11 seconds left on White Oak. So I know you will be --

SENATOR SARBANES: Madam Chairman, let me do this. I give a minute to Duncan to come out of mine and I give two minutes to Congressman Wynn. I don't want Duncan and Subin to have a quarrel over not being heard.

CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, Senator.

MR. DUNCAN: Senator Sarbanes, thank you very much. Members of the Commission, good morning. I want to touch on an issue related to the NAVSEA garrisons, which is the enormous increase of the Navy's estimates of the cost to prepare White Oak for NAVSEA. In 1993 the military construction estimate for work that needed to be done there was just \$34.6 million. Two years later the Navy is telling us it is going to cost \$124.5 million to accommodate NAVSEA at White Oak.

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1 Using that figure, that's a 360 percent increase in
 2 the estimated cost of construction in just two years. Our
 3 Congressional delegation asked the Navy that question. First
 4 the Navy said that the BRAC estimates were for 3,500
 5 employees and in '95 it's 4,100.
 6 We would respectfully suggest that the Navy appears
 7 to be wrong on both counts. We would ask you to look at the
 8 figures there. Then they said because of asbestos and other
 9 renovations that would increase the costs. We would again
 10 respectfully suggest that you examine very closely the Navy's
 11 cost estimates for NAVSEA and scrutinize them very much.
 12 Thank you very much.
 13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And we would
 14 like to have any further information that you would like for
 15 the record. Thank you. Congressman Wynn. I don't believe I
 16 have the honor of swearing you in earlier, and that is
 17 required by statute. So if you wouldn't mind.
 18 (Witness sworn.)
 19 CONGRESSMAN WYNN: Thank you, Madam Chairman and
 20 members of the Commission. I appreciate this opportunity to
 21 say a few words on behalf of the White Oak facility. I think
 22 it's abundantly clear this morning that the facilities that

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1 these points. I also want to especially thank
 2 representatives from the White Oak community who, as you have
 3 seen, bring a great deal of enthusiasm to this project.
 4 Thank you very much.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Congressman
 6 and everyone from White Oak.
 7 (Applause.)
 8 SENATOR SARBANES: Madam Chairman, I think we are
 9 coming right in on the mark here. We have two more
 10 presentations, 15 minutes allocated to the Army Publication
 11 Distribution Center and 10 minutes to Kimbrough Hospital.
 12 And that would, I think, bring us in on the mark.
 13 Congressman Ehrlich will speak as part of the 15-minute
 14 presentation at the end. They have, I think, a 12 to 13-
 15 minute presentation. And then he will take a couple of
 16 minutes to close out.
 17 We think this underscores something the Commission
 18 ought to be looking at, and that is interservice DOD-wide
 19 consolidation in terms of savings. We think this is a
 20 classic example for it. Kathy Kropp and Bill Weisman will
 21 make the presentations. Kathy is responsible for maintaining
 22 the center's warehouse control system. Bill Weisman is vice

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1 have been described in some detail have essential strategic
 2 military value, that the Navy's proposed walk-away strategy
 3 is not really viable. I think the wind tunnel, the nuclear
 4 weapons effects facility all are essential to our country's
 5 interests.
 6 One of the pieces of evidence that came forward was
 7 the fact that the relocation and relocation costs are
 8 prohibitively high. Someone will have to step up to the
 9 plate and maintain these facilities in operational status.
 10 Moreover, the projected cost savings from closing these
 11 facilities are essentially eliminated if, in fact, you accept
 12 the premise that the facilities are essential to our national
 13 security.
 14 I believe in this context the military's interest
 15 are best served by sustaining the BRAC '93 recommendation to
 16 have the Navy continue to serve as the host for these
 17 facilities, these essential facilities and move NAVSEA to
 18 White Oak rather than the Navy Yard.
 19 I'd like to make just three quick points. First,
 20 military construction at the Navy Yard is 16 million more
 21 than at White Oak. Two, that the standard Culvert algorithm
 22 did not consider the special costs associated with the Navy

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1 president of the AFG local 1409. Michael Van Biver is with
 2 us, and Barry Weiss and Donald Lee Weiss, who also are
 3 employees of the center. Kathy?
 4 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Before we start, and I
 5 know there are a number of people coming in from other states
 6 and that perhaps are not as interested in Maryland as we are,
 7 but we hope as you come in you will please keep the
 8 conversations down and not move around so that we can hear as
 9 we go through these presentations. I know you would want
 10 them to do the same for you.
 11 Before we start, did I get a chance to swear all of
 12 you all who will be testifying in? Okay. Thank you.
 13 MS. KROPP: Madam Chairman and members of this
 14 Commission, I want to make sure that my presentation to you
 15 is as quick and painless as possible. I'll keep it both
 16 simple and short. And you have in front of you a packet with
 17 the details. To make things easy, I'm going to let you know
 18 what we want from you right up front.
 19 First, we want you to remove the U.S. Army
 20 Publication Distribution Center from the BRAC list. Since
 21 the center doesn't meet the threshold, the Department of
 22 Defense can close the center at any time.

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1 Yard which have been described in detail, the historic
 2 preservation costs, the costs for floodproofing, and the
 3 costs for quality of life improvements that would be
 4 essential if we are to maintain the standards that we have
 5 had in the past with regard to our facilities.
 6 There is also, I think, a very significant question
 7 that I hope the Commission will investigate with respect to
 8 the possible double charging of certain expenses associated
 9 with the facility.
 10 And finally, I guess, the overreaching analysis is
 11 that the White Oak facilities are superior, 700 acres with
 12 400 available for expansion versus 70 acres, recreation
 13 facilities, parking facilities, above-ground parking
 14 facilities that are suitable, eating facilities all already
 15 in place compared to the Navy Yard.
 16 So the two elements of the equation appear to come
 17 down like this: one, we have to have these facilities; they
 18 are in our country's best interest; two, the best place to
 19 locate those facilities are where they are currently placed,
 20 at White Oak; and three, that White Oak would be a perfect
 21 situation to house the NAVSEA facility.
 22 I urge the Commission's favorable consideration of

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1 Second, we want this Commission to direct that a
 2 joint cross-service group conduct an independent study into
 3 the feasibility of consolidating the publications
 4 distribution mission throughout the entire Department of
 5 Defense. We are an opportunity to just waiting to happen.
 6 This Commission can be the one to take advantage of this
 7 opportunity and initiate a cross service consolidation that
 8 will save hundreds of millions of dollars.
 9 Our objective is not to close the Army's St. Louis
 10 center. They are our sister center. We are not looking to
 11 put them on the list in our place. We just want to keep BRAC
 12 on track with its goals of creating jointness. We believe
 13 BRAC has the right idea. Looking at cross-service and
 14 intraservice opportunities is the best way to streamline
 15 Department of Defense, maintain the readiness of the force,
 16 and still save the taxpayers money.
 17 Consolidation is a good idea, but we shouldn't have
 18 tunnel vision. It is not enough to just consolidate within
 19 the Army. To really produce large savings, a joint service
 20 consolidation is necessary. We need to look at the big
 21 picture and evaluate all of the Department of Defense
 22 distribution missions. Consolidation must not threaten

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1 readiness. It must ensure all savings possible are realized.
 2 It must plan for the future of the Department of Defense.
 3 And it should consider the current facilities' expandability.
 4 Closing the U.S. Army Publication Distribution Center in
 5 Middle River does not meet the goals of BRAC and contradicts
 6 the Commission's own selection criteria.
 7 Our Publications Distribution Center is located at
 8 the Middle River Federal Depot across the street from the
 9 Martin Airport, home of the Maryland Air National Guard. Our
 10 building was where they assembled B-26 bombers during World
 11 War Two. We have a long history of service to this country
 12 and continue to adapt and improve to meet the needs of the
 13 changing Army.
 14 Today we distribute publications worldwide ranging
 15 from training manuals to survival guides, and we ship about
 16 9,000 tons each year. We are very proud of our history and
 17 what we know we can do. If the Army had any idea of our
 18 capabilities we wouldn't be here today. We'd be at work,
 19 where we belong. But it's obvious by the Army's submission
 20 to this Commission that it has no inkling of what the Army
 21 Publications Distribution Center is or does.
 22 Let me give you the three biggest examples. First,

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1 And, remember, if we close, the \$10 million already invested
 2 in the Baltimore facility will be lost. This deviates from
 3 criteria number five.
 4 The only real solution is working towards jointness
 5 and using both the St. Louis and Baltimore facilities to
 6 house all the DOD publications and forms. So, as you can
 7 see, the Army's justification to close the Middle River
 8 Center is full of errors. But that is not the only reason we
 9 believe we should be removed from the BRAC list.
 10 Let's take a look at readiness, your first
 11 criteria. Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a good example.
 12 More than 1,800 tons were shipped. Baltimore was responsible
 13 for 86 percent of what was shipped but only 73 percent of the
 14 cost. Even with the two fully automated centers, a backlog
 15 of over 500,000 orders existed at the end of Desert Storm.
 16 Baltimore's part was only 30 percent of that.
 17 During this time, Baltimore's order fill time for
 18 routine work increased to 20 days, while St. Louis's went up
 19 to 42 days. If two fully automated centers were not able to
 20 keep up with the demands of this 10-month mobilization, one
 21 consolidated center will never be able to. This deviates
 22 from criteria number three.

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1 they say consolidation will combine wholesale and retail
 2 functions. That's not a new idea. We do it now. Last year
 3 of the two Army centers Baltimore did 59 percent of the
 4 retail distribution and 70 percent of the bulk distribution.
 5 Second, they say Baltimore is manual, St. Louis is
 6 automated. This is just not true. Ask your staff that
 7 visited us, or take a look at our seven-minute video, and
 8 we'll prove it. From the minute the stock comes through the
 9 door, it is stored away, picked to fill orders, packed,
 10 sorted, and shipped back out the door.
 11 The work is computer-directed, computer-controlled,
 12 computer-monitored, and completely automated. We know what a
 13 manual operation is. We used to be one. Now we are what the
 14 private sector uses as their model. Your staff saw how
 15 automated we were when they visited.
 16 Our system is both flexible and expandable. The
 17 St. Louis center is neither, which deviates from BRAC's
 18 criteria number three. Our system links all of its parts
 19 together but allows for replacements. That's the flexible
 20 part. Right now we occupy less than one-third of the two-
 21 million-square-foot facility. That is the expandable part.
 22 This expandability and flexibility is what makes

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1 Two centers are not a redundancy. They are a
 2 necessity in case of mobilization of disaster like fire or
 3 floods or even terrorist attack. During Desert Shield/Desert
 4 Storm Baltimore developed an innovative hot pick system.
 5 Picking, packing, and shipping begins seconds after the order
 6 is input. This system is still used for emergencies such as
 7 Operation Restore Hope and was activated again just two weeks
 8 ago because of the tragedy in Oklahoma City.
 9 We also modified our system to allow order picking
 10 right off the receiving dock to save processing time. The
 11 Middle River Center is always improving to meet the demands
 12 of the changing military. We not only have our everyday
 13 mission. We are ready when the forces mobilize, whether it
 14 be a combat or peacekeeping mission. We support the Army
 15 every day in every way and are ready to do the same for the
 16 entire Department of Defense.
 17 The Army's Baltimore and St. Louis Centers are two
 18 state-of-the-art, automated, and cost-efficient warehouses.
 19 Both have won awards for their abilities. Last year
 20 Baltimore won Vice President Al Gore's Hammer Award for
 21 helping make a government that works better and costs less.
 22 This year Baltimore is a finalist in the Army's Communities

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1 our center perfect for the cross-service consolidation of all
 2 Department of Defense publication distribution missions.
 3 Finally, they say the move consolidates two leases
 4 into one lease. This is misleading. There may be one lease,
 5 but there will still be two or more warehouses, and all but
 6 one will be totally manual. St. Louis doesn't have the room
 7 to absorb Baltimore's stock. They will have to use
 8 warehouses at Granite City, 45 mile away.
 9 The cost for operating these warehouses is high,
 10 and transportation charges must be added to the operational
 11 costs. A 1994 economic analysis warned that this type of
 12 split operation can cause inefficiency, increase throughput
 13 time, a degradation of customer service, and a threat to
 14 readiness. This deviates from criteria one and three.
 15 The Army has looked at other ways to accommodate
 16 Baltimore stock. None of them are good. One proposal is to
 17 destroy all stock beyond a three-year supply. They are
 18 calling that economizing, even though it will destroy
 19 millions of dollars worth of stock.
 20 Another proposal is to add onto the St. Louis high
 21 rise. The Army is still paying back GSA for building the
 22 tower in the first place and owes us more than \$3 million.

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1 of Excellence Award program.
 2 These are not examples of organizations which
 3 should be closed. These are organizations which should be
 4 taking on more missions so that they are used to their
 5 capacity. This Commission has the perfect opportunity to
 6 consolidate DOD publication distribution in a joint manner.
 7 Don't let this opportunity escape by closing us.
 8 According to a 1992 Army management review, there
 9 were 15 publications distribution centers in the Department
 10 of Defense. Defense Logistics Agency has taken over some of
 11 these sites, but reducing the number of sites even further to
 12 two or three strategically located centers would
 13 significantly cut costs and manpower without threatening
 14 readiness.
 15 We believe Baltimore and St. Louis are the centers
 16 to absorb the DOD publications distribution mission. The
 17 savings from closing the Middle River Center is about \$35
 18 million over 20 years. That's peanuts compared to what can
 19 be saved by consolidating all DOD publication distribution
 20 centers. Studies have estimated these savings at anywhere
 21 from \$114 to \$257 million over just the first six year.
 22 That's a real savings. This is a real opportunity. And

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1 that's why we need to take advantage of it.
 2 We need you to: one, take the U.S. Army
 3 Publication Distribution Center off the BRAC list; two, take
 4 advantage of the joint cost service opportunity. We can
 5 begin by consolidating of publications already in
 6 the building with us. Then you can direct that an
 7 independent study be completed which examines the
 8 consolidation of all publications and forms distribution
 9 centers.
 10 The Department of Defense will realize tremendous
 11 joint savings, and the Army Publications Distribution Center
 12 in Middle River will be ready, able, and waiting to provide
 13 worldwide distribution of publications for all of the
 14 Department of Defense with pride.
 15 (Applause.)
 16 MR. WEIDMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, what you see
 17 before you is the real deal. We have no hired guns to come
 18 out and speak on subjects we know nothing about. The people
 19 you see back here at this sign that says, "We work together,"
 20 that says the publication center. We support total quality
 21 management. We have implemented it completely. This
 22 committee shows it right here.

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1 plan, the third P, to use existing technology, to use
 2 existing investment and the space to achieve what you are
 3 about, consolidation in a cost-efficient way to increase
 4 military preparedness and to keep BRAC on track. Thank you
 5 all very, very much.
 6 (Applause.)
 7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, Congressman and those
 8 of you from Middle River. Thank you.
 9 SENATOR SARBANES: Madam Chairman, our final
 10 presentation is addressed to the Kimbrough Army Community
 11 Hospital at Fort Mead. Kimbrough has a national reputation
 12 for its cost effectiveness and special care. We think,
 13 again, there has not been adequate consideration given to
 14 other activities within the Department of Defense impacting
 15 on Fort Meade that are relevant to what is happening at
 16 Kimbrough.
 17 The final presentation will be by COL Kent Menser,
 18 whose final assignment was at Fort Meade, where he served as
 19 garrison commander from 1990 to 1993, where he provided
 20 outstanding leadership in the division plan for Fort Meade.
 21 Also, we have with us GEN Bill Richer and COL Gosman Black,
 22 who have been very active with the Fort Meade Advocacy

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1 Our turnover rate at the center is one person every
 2 15 years. That's it. And that includes military dependents.
 3 That is the only reason it is that high. We work better, we
 4 work faster, and, most importantly, we work cheaper, and
 5 that's what this Commission is about. We'd like to thank you
 6 for taking the time. And on behalf of AFGE 1409 and the Army
 7 Publication Center we'd like to say thank you, and end it
 8 with, and the center said, "Whoo-ha."
 9 (Applause.)
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Congressman
 11 Ehrlich, I don't believe I got the honor of swearing you in,
 12 if we could do that, if you would raise your right hand.
 13 (Witness sworn.)
 14 CONGRESSMAN EHRLICH: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
 15 What you see here is the real thing. My staff prepared a
 16 written statement for me, but I thought I would just take 90
 17 seconds to speak to you from the heart. I am here,
 18 obviously, I represent these folks in Middle River. But I am
 19 also here because I believe what you have seen is a real
 20 thing and constitutes a compelling case not to save jobs but
 21 to expand a mission for a real fine facility.
 22 If I may take just one of my two minutes to tell

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1 Council. And I will turn it over to COL Menser now.
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Welcome.
 3 COL MENSER: Good morning. I represent the Fort
 4 Meade Joint Services Advocacy Group. This is our
 5 presentation. The important part is down towards the end. I
 6 will go through very quickly the first part unless you have a
 7 question.
 8 Our objective is simple. Maintain Kimbrough as an
 9 Army hospital. Fort Meade is an Army installation. It's got
 10 a great joint mission, joint services mission. And Army,
 11 Navy, Air Force, and Marines are at Fort Meade in a very
 12 complex resourcing environment at Fort Meade with 57 tenants
 13 from all the services.
 14 Fort Meade is continuing to grow as we speak. In
 15 each of the last three BRACs we've gotten additional tenants.
 16 People of Fort Meade, these are on your handouts, but again,
 17 you can see the jointness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and
 18 Marines. It's a large post from the population standpoint.
 19 People support. This is a Fort Meade slide that
 20 talks about people that they touch within 25 miles of Fort
 21 Meade. Again, all services, almost -- most of the National
 22 Capital Region is in the 25 miles, and they use some part of

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1 you I had never heard of the Middle River facility, but the
 2 day after the election these folks called me -- I'm talking
 3 about the day after I was elected to represent Maryland's
 4 Second District.
 5 They called me and said, "We want you down here.
 6 We want you to find out what we are about." And I went down
 7 there, and what I saw that day, and I've been through a few
 8 warehouses in my life, was a first-rate facility manned by
 9 people who really knew what they were doing and had a lot of
 10 pride. Think about that turnover rate, one every 15 years.
 11 I wish the private sector had that sort of pride and turnover
 12 rate in private business.
 13 What I saw that day and what my staff saw in the
 14 interim has not changed. What you see is what you get at
 15 Middle River. And when you begin your deliberations, I would
 16 just ask and respectfully request you remember the three Ps.
 17 The performance. You've heard about the awards.
 18 You know how good these people are at what they do. The
 19 second P I would like you to remember is pride. One every 15
 20 years. That's a family up there. And that's the sort of
 21 pride that this Commission should have a lot of pride in.
 22 And lastly, I would like you to really focus on the

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1 Fort Meade services.
 2 The hospital, Kimbrough Community Hospital. This
 3 is what takes place there now in terms of primary care, in-
 4 patient care, and emergency room services. This is the
 5 catchment area. And that's an area within 40 miles of the
 6 hospital that does not overlap with other hospital catchment
 7 areas. And the personnel that are presently assigned to the
 8 hospital's civilian, military, and contract.
 9 In the BRAC we have a recommendation basically the
 10 hospital reduce to a clinic. One twenty-nine, and they show
 11 203 in your handout, but 129 direct positions would leave
 12 Kimbrough. And the idea would be to save \$50 million over a
 13 period of 20 years.
 14 The consequences of that action is loss of the
 15 emergency room, which is very important, the loss of in-
 16 patient care, mobilization beds, and loss of the surgical
 17 clinics. Again, consequences are increased CHAMPUS costs and
 18 increased patient care costs. And I'll talk about those
 19 later in the Brief.
 20 Talk about one of our 57 tenants, and it's the
 21 biggest one, National Security Agency. It's a major 24-hour-
 22 a-day operation with 24-hour-a-day expectations on the

1 support side, to include medical. It even has light
 2 manufacturing associated with it working with different
 3 chemicals and so on, and, in fact, our emergency room two
 4 years ago was updated with a decontamination capability to
 5 meet their requirements.

6 In the past 12 months 75 employees from that
 7 particular tenant have had basic emergency transportation to
 8 our emergency room and were treated for different things.

9 A program, not a tenant on Fort Meade, but a
 10 program on Fort Meade is the Exceptional Family Member
 11 program where people with special needs, family members of
 12 service personnel, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, who
 13 have special needs come to Fort Meade, and we have the
 14 largest EFMP program in DOD, 778 families are enrolled in
 15 that program. And between 200 and 300 families participate
 16 in some way but don't enroll for their own particular
 17 reasons.

18 You can see the breakdown with adults, children.
 19 Sixty-five percent, as it shows there, are chronic or
 20 terminally ill. One-fifth of our housing on Fort Meade is
 21 dedicated to the EFMP program families, over 418 families. A
 22 post becomes special from the EFMP standpoint when it has

1 percent would be an addition to CHAMPUS; and 10 percent would
 2 do third party, which is basically insurance or pay their own
 3 way kind of thing.

4 Now, what does that mean? Well, we know again from
 5 Army documentation that the cost per patient at Walter Reed
 6 is 39 percent higher than the cost per patient at Kimbrough.
 7 So when you factor that in, again from Army figures, that's
 8 an additional \$3.3 million for that 66 percent to go to
 9 Walter Reed. The additional 24 percent on CHAMPUS, again
 10 using Army figures, is another \$3.6 million. The third party
 11 is a 700,000, and basically that's money that will not be
 12 spent by the Army.

13 When you sum these up you get an additional \$6.2
 14 million in order to execute this action of closing or
 15 reducing the hospital from a hospital to a clinic, \$6.2
 16 million. When you subtract, then, that \$400,000 savings on
 17 personnel, you get then a net of \$5.8 million a year in order
 18 to execute this BRAC action.

19 Our conclusion. The evaluation criteria was not
 20 met. I can't emphasize enough there was no feedback from any
 21 of the 57 commanders on the installation on this. And that's
 22 why the EFMP thing did not come up at the highest levels.

1 availability of special care to treat that person, whether it
 2 be a child or an adult in that family.

3 Critical also once they are in the area is the
 4 availability of an emergency room, and that's what Kimbrough
 5 provides, and then also military housing. What military
 6 housing does, these families are challenged from the
 7 financial standpoint, particularly in the Washington, D.C.,
 8 area, but also with their special needs. and so putting them
 9 on the base is a help to them from the financial standpoint.

10 Let's talk about deviations from criteria. Let's
 11 start with military values. Number one, of course, is the
 12 current and future mission requirements and impact on
 13 operational readiness. We don't know what that is. I don't
 14 think anyone knows what that is because this action was not
 15 staffed with the four services on Fort Meade. The 57
 16 commanders in that installation did not get a chance to
 17 contribute their comments. They did not come to Fort Meade
 18 for staffing.

19 Number three, the ability to handle mobilization or
 20 expansion on the installation, force development. Again, it
 21 was not staffed. So we don't know if it's a great deal or a
 22 bad deal or a horrible deal because there wasn't input from

1 Again, mobilization and contingency, we don't know
 2 the answers. We know that the mission and people will
 3 adversely suffer at Fort Meade. We just don't know how much,
 4 because we ourselves didn't staff it with 57 to get the
 5 feedback. But we know it will suffer. And I demonstrated
 6 that with NSA and the EFMP.

7 And, again, the net savings that they had hoped for
 8 by using Army figures just will not take place. And I don't
 9 know what the reason is.

10 Our recommendation, straightforward, that we
 11 maintain Kimbrough as a hospital, and in doing so we can
 12 serve our people on the installation and all around the
 13 installation, serve our special programs, and, surprisingly
 14 enough, save the government money. Any questions?

15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. That was
 16 most helpful.

17 (Applause.)

18 SENATOR SARBANES: Madame Chairman, I think we have
 19 a couple of minutes left on our time, and I'd like to just
 20 make a concluding remark, and then I'll yield. I'll take
 21 about a minute and yield a minute to Senator Mikulski.

22 First of all, I want to say we are very proud of

1 the installation itself.

2 Again, deviation from criteria, return on
 3 investment, this differs slightly from your last page in your
 4 brief. Again, they talked about \$50 million savings over a
 5 20-year period. Most of that was due to a \$3.5 million
 6 savings in civilian personnel costs. There's 129 that are
 7 being transferred, 129 that are leaving Fort Meade.

8 In the Army basing study documents it discusses \$12
 9 million that goes from the Fort Meade budget to the Walter
 10 Reed budget to cover the increase in personnel going to
 11 Walter Reed. A part of that \$12 million is \$3.1 million for
 12 civilian personnel costs. So I am saying here \$3.5 million
 13 savings helped with this \$50 million 20-year savings. We
 14 find that in the Army documentation that 3.1 of that goes to
 15 Walter Reed. So there is no 3.5 net savings. There is a
 16 \$400,000 net savings for the Army on this.

17 Additionally in our group findings the people who
 18 this past year used the in-patient services were part of an
 19 Army study. And they basically determined that those people,
 20 rather than being at Fort Meade or going to Fort Meade
 21 because the facility is not going to be there would go other
 22 places in this way: 66 percent would go to Walter Reed; 24

1 our communities and the presentation they have made here
 2 today. We think it has been a tough-minded analysis. I
 3 think it has stuck to the criteria which the Commission is
 4 required to use under the law. And I think they have raised
 5 a number of possibilities or alternatives that are extremely
 6 important for the Commission to consider.

7 First of all, we think we've had some excellent
 8 cost analysis. You just heard it, of course, right here with
 9 respect to the Kimbrough Hospital, but it's run through the
 10 other presentations as well. We think the cost figures in
 11 many of these instances were faulty and lacking.

12 Secondly, we believe strongly that there are unique
 13 facilities here that are simply being, as it were, walked
 14 away from without consideration of what should be done with
 15 them. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has spoken
 16 about the importance of the wind tunnel at White Oak. And
 17 yet they are going to close that facility. And there goes
 18 the wind tunnel. Now, someone needs to do that wind tunnel.
 19 It is very clear.

20 So what we need from the Commission is a sort of
 21 department-wide perspective and analysis. We think that this
 22 world-class scientific team at Annapolis ought not to be

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1 destroyed. I mean, they are the clear patent winners within
 2 the service. And we think it needs to be helped together.
 3 Fort Ritchie has a site R, the unique facility
 4 which the Commissioner visited when he was there. We think
 5 there's a lot of opportunity here for the Commission to
 6 achieve department-wide savings. That was dramatically
 7 illustrated with the Publication Distribution Center. But it
 8 applies to some of our other facilities as well.
 9 Let me just close with this observation. As we go
 10 through succeeding rounds of BRAC, the decisions get tougher
 11 and tougher. I've been through these rounds, and I
 12 understand that. I think what the Commission needs to bring
 13 to the process is more of an interservice analysis in terms
 14 of savings. The way the process works within the Defense
 15 Department, although they have a cross-service task force, it
 16 tends very much to be within each service.
 17 So a service is taking measures to try to get some
 18 cost savings which from a narrow perspective may -- may, and
 19 I emphasize may -- have some logic to it. But if you broaden
 20 the perspective to a department-wide view, it doesn't make
 21 sense.
 22 There are other alternatives. And the people who

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1 Pennsylvania group of facilities and are very pleased to see
 2 here that we have Governor Ridge, Senator Specter and Senator
 3 Santorum. I'm pleased that you are able to join us today and
 4 am looking forward to hearing from you all.
 5 So let me turn it over to you.
 6 GOVERNOR RIDGE: Good morning.
 7 CHAIRMAN COX: Oh, I'm sorry. You're absolutely
 8 right. I forgot that we are required to swear you in, under
 9 the statute. So if you wouldn't mind rising and raising your
 10 right hands.
 11 GOVERNOR RIDGE: You want all of us, Madame
 12 Chairman?
 13 CHAIRMAN COX: Yes. If we could just do
 14 everybody at once, we will not have anybody who is going to
 15 testify or who might answer questions -- if you would go
 16 ahead and be sworn in at this point.
 17 (Witnesses sworn.)
 18 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much. Governor?
 19 GOVERNOR RIDGE: Thank you. Good morning, Chair
 20 Cox, distinguished members of the Base Closure Commission.
 21 On behalf of Senator Specter, Senator Santorum and the 12
 22 million citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I am

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1 have come here today have each presented other alternatives
 2 which result in cost savings. They are sensitive to the
 3 considerations that are at stake. So we urge the Commission
 4 to carefully examine -- we, of course, will stay in touch
 5 with you and bring you further information and analysis as
 6 the process goes forward.
 7 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you, Senator.
 8 SENATOR MIKULSKI: On behalf of the Maryland
 9 delegation and all of the people of Maryland who testified
 10 today and who are represented at this hearing, we thank the
 11 Commission for their very careful attention to the testimony,
 12 the courtesies given.
 13 I would just like to sum up by saying this. There
 14 is a book now that has won a Pulitzer Prize called "No
 15 Ordinary Time." It's about the Roosevelts but more about
 16 America during World War Two and this extraordinary effort
 17 that was done to organize and mobilize the United States of
 18 America to meet the test in World War Two.
 19 That concept of "no ordinary time" can be applied
 20 to the legacy of the military facilities in this room. These
 21 are no ordinary facilities. This is no ordinary work force.
 22 We know that you will not make any ordinary decision. You

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1 honored to open Pennsylvania's portion of today's testimony.
 2 As a former Congressman, I'm acutely aware of
 3 Federal budgetary constraints. As a former infantry soldier
 4 who fought in Vietnam, I also understand the consequences to
 5 a nation that compromises its military readiness. We must
 6 never compromise our capacity to respond to any threat to our
 7 national security.
 8 The challenge is to balance our nation's military
 9 might with our nation's fiscal integrity. Pennsylvania
 10 supports the BRAC Commission. It is a necessary process.
 11 But in Pennsylvania, it hasn't been easy or without enormous
 12 cost. In the name of Pennsylvania's communities that have
 13 paid so dearly and in the interest of a strong national
 14 defense, we ask you to scrutinize more carefully than ever,
 15 more carefully than ever before, the recommendations
 16 effecting Pennsylvania jobs and facilities.
 17 As Pennsylvanians we are proud to have served and
 18 to have contributed to our country in time of war and in
 19 peace. We have always accepted our responsibilities and made
 20 the necessary sacrifices. But ladies and gentlemen, we
 21 believe this last round is flawed in its analysis in value
 22 and worth and unequal, and some might argue, unfair in its

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1 are no ordinary Base Closing Commission. And we are counting
 2 on you. Thank you very much.
 3 (Applause.)
 4 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much, Senator. Let
 5 me thank all of the folks who were here from Maryland. The
 6 presentations were very helpful and informative and will be
 7 most useful to us as we go through our process, and also to
 8 thank the very distinguished group of officials from the
 9 State of Maryland who have ably represented their state as
 10 always. Thank you.
 11 Now we will finish with the State of Maryland at
 12 that point, and we will begin testimony from the State of
 13 Pennsylvania. And I would like to get started with that
 14 right away.
 15 I realize that people from Maryland may be leaving
 16 the room and folks from Pennsylvania coming in. I would hope
 17 you would do that as quickly and as quietly as possible so
 18 that we can stay on schedule and give everybody plenty of
 19 time as scheduled. So if we could move the Pennsylvania
 20 group up here.
 21 (A brief recess was taken.)
 22 We are ready to begin the session starting the

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1 share of the burden.
 2 Just take a moment to examine BRAC's
 3 recommendations in '88, '91, and '93. Despite Pennsylvania's
 4 strategic location and military merits, we have been asked to
 5 endure a disproportionate share of the cost. To date, 13,000
 6 of Pennsylvania's defense related jobs have been eliminated
 7 as a result of the BRAC process. If the 1995 recommendations
 8 are enacted, this inequity will grow.
 9 Pennsylvania will have a cumulative net impact of
 10 almost 17,000 jobs lost, leaving us second only to California
 11 in net jobs lost through the BRAC process. This burden is
 12 even greater when we look at the proportion of jobs lost as
 13 compared to the total number of defense personnel employed in
 14 our state.
 15 If this is the standard of measure, we've been hit
 16 even harder than California. We started in Pennsylvania with
 17 substantially fewer jobs, and we have given up substantially
 18 more. These numbers don't just reflect our military
 19 personnel, we are talking about thousands of civilians, the
 20 engineers, the maintenance technicians, repair personnel, and
 21 support staff who have dedicated their lives and their
 22 careers to our national military interest.

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1 Pennsylvania to date has lost in excess of 10,000
 2 civilian jobs, and that number is expected to grow to almost
 3 14,000 if the '95 recommendations are accepted. Our state
 4 has a mere 2.3 percent of our country's defense related jobs,
 5 yet almost 13 percent of the total cuts in civilian jobs will
 6 be found in Pennsylvania.

7 The conclusion is clear, Pennsylvania has paid
 8 dearly in comparison to other states. Faced with this fourth
 9 and final round of closures, as Governor of the Commonwealth,
 10 I ask you with all the sincerity, firmness, and advocacy I
 11 can muster, please listen carefully to the testimony of our
 12 communities.

13 Bear of the invaluable role that Pennsylvania's
 14 bases play in our national defense. Examine the logic of the
 15 Department's recommendations. Question the data that, in
 16 many times, is flawed. Consider the inequitable consequences
 17 to Pennsylvania of nonimplemented directives of prior BRAC
 18 Commissions, and finally, ask do these recommendations serve
 19 our country not only in times of peace but will these
 20 recommendations serve our country in times of conflict as
 21 well.

22 I would like to turn to my friend, Senator Specter,

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1 importance and very important impact on our state. Thank
 2 you.

3 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you, Senator.

4 SENATOR SANTORUM: Thank you. What I'd first like
 5 to do is I'd like to thank the Commissioners and their staff.
 6 From the process of going through the hearings on your
 7 nominations and approvals to throughout the course of this
 8 BRAC, the commissioners, and I think the public needs to
 9 know, they have been accessible.

10 The staff has been cooperative. The information
 11 has been shared and I want to commend you for the job you're
 12 doing. It is a very difficult job under very stressful
 13 circumstances, and I can only say that -- at least from our
 14 perspective -- you earn very high marks.

15 What I'd like to focus my testimony on is the
 16 mistakes that were made relative to each of the bases that
 17 are the list from Pennsylvania. Because of these mistakes,
 18 the list that the Department of Defense sent you with respect
 19 to Pennsylvania will not maintain the best military readiness
 20 and will not achieve the cost savings that we should get out
 21 of this BRAC process.

22 The first situation I'd like to talk about is

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1 who would address Pennsylvania's value as a home for military
 2 bases. Senator?

3 SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Governor Ridge and
 4 Madame Chairman and members of the Commission and
 5 distinguished group of concerned Pennsylvanians throughout
 6 this enormous hall. It is a little hard in the course of
 7 four minutes to adequately state the impact on military
 8 preparedness and job losses.

9 But in the 14 years-plus in the United States
 10 Senate, serving on the Appropriations Committee and the
 11 Defense Subcommittee, and with substantial experience on the
 12 issues of what is valuable for the nation, we will be making
 13 an enormous impact on preparedness if these Pennsylvania base
 14 closures are put through.

15 Letterkenny is illustrative of the valuable
 16 military contributions of Indiantown Gap and the Pittsburgh
 17 Reserve unit and those in Philadelphia and elsewhere on
 18 contribution. It is very, very important from a national
 19 security point of view, and there is a very important aspect
 20 on fairness on job loss.

21 It is just fundamentally unfair to have a state
 22 with a little over 2 percent of the nation's military take a

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1 Letterkenny. The mistake there is very simple. The
 2 Department of Defense continues to ignore the recommendations
 3 of this BRAC Commission from 1993 and the stated purpose of
 4 trying to do more interservicing and to do joint teaming
 5 arrangements.

6 Letterkenny is a success story. While most bases
 7 are at about 5 to 10 percent interservicing, Letterkenny has
 8 already achieved 50 percent interservicing. They have an
 9 innovative model of the joint teaming arrangement with the
 10 United Defense on the Paladia, which you will hear from. So
 11 I don't think we should punish success, an object that's
 12 clearly stated with this BRAC Commission of doing more
 13 interservicing.

14 Second, I'd like to talk about the mistakes on
 15 Indiantown Gap, Fort Indiantown Gap. New data will be
 16 presented to you today which will dramatically alter the
 17 military value of the Gap and we will also have testimony
 18 which -- and by the way, that military value will place them,
 19 instead of ninth on the list of bases in their category all
 20 the way up to third, and also the cost savings at the Gap
 21 were dramatically overstated by the Army and we will present
 22 evidence to show that.

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1 hit of 13 percent, and that is a legitimate factor to be
 2 concerned.

3 What is different about 1995 from 1993? It's that
 4 we come to this round of hearings already having suffered
 5 enormously. And if I may be just a little blunt, I think the
 6 Department of Defense and the Base Closing Commission owes
 7 Pennsylvania a little from what happened on the Philadelphia
 8 Navy Yard last year. When we appeared before this
 9 Commission, there was an expectation that we would have an
 10 opportunity to present in court the evidence of fraud which
 11 lead to the loss of thousands of jobs, not only in
 12 Philadelphia, but spreading across the state.

13 And for technical reasons, the Supreme Court of the
 14 United States -- and we took it all the way to the Supreme
 15 Court -- said there was no jurisdiction on technical grounds,
 16 so we can never present the evidence of fraud and Navy
 17 concealment, and that cost Pennsylvania thousands of jobs.

18 So I don't think it is too blunt or too forward to say
 19 that Pennsylvania is owed a little, and I hope that you will
 20 give us that consideration, both in terms of national defense
 21 and preparedness and also of the jobs.

22 This assembly here is a stark testament to the

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1 With respect to the 911th out of the Greater
 2 Pittsburgh Airport, this is a clear mistake that the Air
 3 Force has already admitted, that they input the wrong data,
 4 not just on this base but on a couple other bases. They used
 5 the same data for three different bases. With the new data
 6 running, they go from the most cost -- highest cost operating
 7 base to the lowest cost operating base for a civilian
 8 airfield.

9 So this is a clear mistake that the Department of
 10 the Air Force and the folks at the Air Force have admitted
 11 that is wrong, and I'm hopeful that the BRAC commissioners
 12 will -- the numbers that they crunch will find that that is
 13 also the case.

14 With respect to the Charles E. Kelly Support
 15 Center, it shouldn't be here. Charles E. Kelly Support
 16 Center is 209 jobs, that doesn't qualify for the BRAC process
 17 and shouldn't be on the list, and shouldn't be considered by
 18 this BRAC. It should be done in the course of that
 19 internally handled by the Department of the Army.

20 With respect to the Defense Industrial Support
 21 Center in the city of Philadelphia, you heard Senator
 22 Specter, you'll hear Mayor Rendell talk about what's happened

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Letterkenny completely refurbishing the chassis, new turrets are manufactured in nearby York, Pennsylvania, and sent to Letterkenny's United Defense plant.

United Defense stores the materials in their Letterkenny storage facility, and after rework, Letterkenny provides the chassis to United Defense. United Defense then integrates the chassis and turret, returning it to Letterkenny.

Letterkenny then performs tests and paints the vehicle, after which the Paladin returns to United Defense for the final check. The joint United Defense-Letterkenny team insures, through a series of tests and evaluations, that the new Paladin is delivered on time, below cost, and in as new condition.

This program is currently two months ahead of schedule. United Defense was so convinced that the partnership would work, that they invested over \$3.4 million to join Letterkenny in this project. The efficiencies of co-location have generated taxpayer savings already of \$61 million, \$46 million will return to the Army budget by the program management, and \$15 million have been saved by eliminating bureaucracy and waiving 27 Army and 3 DOD

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1 The Army's calculation for capacity is driven by
 2 work positions. The other two variables in the equation are
 3 fixed. Now, how your square footage is broken into work
 4 positions completely drives a base's capacity.
 5 What's a work position? Well, here's their
 6 definition for your review, "A work position is a space
 7 occupied by one worker to accomplish an assigned task on a
 8 full time basis. The work position may include more than one
 9 location if the worker moves to accomplish the assigned
 10 task."
 11 Let me show you with this slide and two models,
 12 which I believe we are going to put up, how a textbook
 13 definition can distort the true picture. Large industrial
 14 work positions may occupy tremendous square footage,
 15 additionally, certain work positions may only be utilized at
 16 critical stages in the industrial process. These factors
 17 have a dramatic impact on capacity calculations.
 18 The models which we're putting up here show the two
 19 installations depicted actually have equal areas, two models
 20 in front of you, there now, actually have equal areas to
 21 perform their assigned activities. But due to particular
 22 workload assigned, the depot that works on smaller work

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regulatory requirements.

Again, to summarize, \$61 million already saved, \$15 million anticipated in recurring annual savings. Based on the bang for the buck that the Army has already realized through this partnership, we anticipate the Army exercising options for additional Paladins, coupled with the anticipation of robust foreign military sales.

The Paladin line at Letterkenny has a life well beyond the six year review of the Commission. In your briefing book, we've included a letter from United Defense. As observers of the BRAC process, we've been a bit astonished by the number of communities stating that they are partnership ready and capable. We are the trailblazer in this effort and we know that it was not an overnight success. The wheel doesn't have to be recreated elsewhere, the people in experience for continued partnership, success, and expansion already are functioning at Letterkenny.

Now, all this success begs the question, why were we BRAC'd again in 1995? The answer lies in the Army process that grossly overemphasizes and distorts capacity while giving no credit for interservicing and penalizing -- actually penalizing -- institutions that are in transition

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1 packages is credited with 84 work positions, the model on
 2 your left, while the depot that is working on track vehicles,
 3 the model on your right is credited with only 10 work
 4 positions. Under the distorted capacity calculations the
 5 Army used, that means that the model on your left gets 8.4
 6 times the value that the model on your right gets.
 7 Now, this anomaly has a tremendous impact on
 8 establishing the military value of a particular depot. This
 9 doesn't make sense. Incredibly, a depot's military value is
 10 based substantially on its assigned workload mix and not on
 11 the facilities available.
 12 Again, capacity under the Army's procedure is
 13 driven by work positions, therefore, the entire capacity
 14 analysis is weapon systems unique.
 15 Criteria 2 should look at land and facilities
 16 available to effectively meet any assigned mission. Again,
 17 how can Letterkenny have more land and the second highest
 18 amount of facilities and be ranked last in this category?
 19 This time the Army weighed age and permanent facilities as
 20 the basis for its ranking in this criteria.
 21 With three of the four Army depots under discussion
 22 all being built during the same period and all having had

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from past BRAC actions.

In fact, had Letterkenny been reviewed under the Navy or the Air Force methodology, due to unique workload, Letterkenny would have been excluded from the BRAC consideration.

The Army still looked to four critical factors in 1995. However, 33 attributes were used to quantify these factors in 1993, but only 18 attributes were used in 1995. These manipulations, each one of them, drove Letterkenny to a lower score.

You are probably already familiar with the way of the four military value criteria used by the Army. Now, this pie graph illustrates that breakdown of the military value criteria.

I'd like to point out that Criteria 1 and Criteria 4 combined represent 65 percent of the Army's military value calculation. Capacity drives the value of both Criteria 1 and 4 and that capacity calculation is grossly distorted.

Under Criteria 1, we see the first problem is the overemphasis the Army based on capacity. How can Letterkenny have the most acreage and the second most facilities and have the lowest capacity. It doesn't make sense.

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1 extensive facility upgrades, how can the Army base 22.5
 2 percent of its analysis on these factors.
 3 And last, when the raw numbers for acres and
 4 facilities are considered, Letterkenny is first. However,
 5 the smallest credit at 12.5 percent of the analysis is given
 6 in this area. Letterkenny's clear capabilities in land and
 7 facilities needed to meet future mission are not given
 8 adequate weight to accurately influence Letterkenny's true
 9 military value.
 10 Criteria 4 shows the second instance where an Army
 11 infatuation with distorted capacity drives a very
 12 questionable result. Rather than review the true cost to
 13 operate an installation, using costs divided by square
 14 footage or some other appropriate factor, such as workload,
 15 the Army chose work positions as the driver to calculate cost
 16 of operations.
 17 Now, this Commission is privileged to have some of
 18 our nation's business leaders who will recognize that the
 19 appropriate way to calculate true costs is to divide the
 20 costs of your operation by the workload produced. The Army
 21 failed to use this common sense approach.
 22 Commissioners present during the Dallas Regional

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 121</p> <p>1 to the city of Philadelphia in this process. What I will say 2 is that what's left in Philadelphia is not excess capacity. 3 DISC is doing a tremendous job and what was not factored in 4 the mistake is that the Department of Defense did not factor 5 in the cost to move the weapons systems support items from 6 DISC, which is an \$80 million cost, which will prove that 7 this move is not a cost-effective move.</p> <p>8 The Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit and the 9 Naval Air Technical Service Facilities, both will present 10 testimony to you today to show you that closure is not the 11 best scheme there, that they will be able to downsize. We'll 12 present a plan to you to downsize, which will be more cost- 13 effective and will not compromise at all military readiness, 14 which is obviously a very important goal.</p> <p>15 Finally, I just want to talk about the Naval 16 Surface Warfare Center in Philadelphia. I know that's not 17 scheduled for closure, it's scheduled for an add, and I want 18 to say that that is a very appropriate add, that this is a 19 facility that can take more capability, that the MILCOM 20 dollars there are minimal and it is a very appropriate place 21 to ship that mission. Thank you.</p> <p>22 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much, both for your</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 124</p> <p>1 through a Department of Defense study, Letterkenny was 2 selected from 20 candidates as the site for tactical missile 3 consolidation. This plan effectively eliminated 12 sites. In 4 October of 1992 due to a separate non-BRAC action, an 5 injunction was filed to stop the consolidation by preventing 6 Anniston's missiles from consolidating at Letterkenny.</p> <p>7 This was the first challenge to the tactical 8 missile consolidation. DOD overstated the threats to 9 consolidation from the Anniston injunction and questioned 10 numerous other movements into Letterkenny. This was our 11 second challenge. In 1993, the Department of Defense 12 completely reversed its 1990 position and recommended the 13 closure of Letterkenny, completely scrapping the 14 consolidation of tactical missiles. However, a good idea in 15 1990 still made sense in 1993, and in this current 16 downsizing, makes even more sense in 1995.</p> <p>17 The 1993 Commission recommended the consolidation 18 of 21 tactical missile systems and the efficient elimination 19 of 12 duplicate sites. Letterkenny is the leader in 20 interservicing and while other installations talk about 21 successful interservicing, at less than 10 percent of their 22 work load, the Letterkenny consolidation will have the depots</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 122</p> <p>1 testimony and your hitting the time exactly on. 2 (Applause.)</p> <p>3 CHAIRMAN COX: We're now ready to move on to the 4 presentation for Letterkenny. I see there are a number of 5 people here from Letterkenny. Welcome.</p> <p>6 (Applause.)</p> <p>7 CHAIRMAN COX: Congressman Shuster, I believe you 8 will be moderating and leading the debate here.</p> <p>9 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Thank you very much, Madame 10 Chairman.</p> <p>11 We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 12 today. With me are Mr. David Sciamanna from the Greater 13 Chambersburg Chamber of Commerce, Mr. John Redding, a former 14 Department of Defense employee, Mr. Bob Estep, a Letterkenny 15 union representative, and Mr. Dave Goodman, chief of the 16 Electronic Missile Shop.</p> <p>17 Two of the fundamental principles that should be 18 the wave of the future for DOD to follow in accomplishing the 19 necessary downsizing of defense are interservicing, or 20 consolidation, and teaming public/private partnerships.</p> <p>21 Letterkenny represents great success stories in 22 both interservicing and teaming. Despite the fact that</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 125</p> <p>1 doing over 50 percent of its work on DOD systems. 2 Here you see an example of the 13 systems that 3 already have been transitioned and are being worked at 4 Letterkenny. Since 1993, the Army has spent \$26 million in 5 BRAC funds implementing this decision. Expensive and 6 sensitive equipment has been relocated to Letterkenny to 7 support the consolidation. It's in place, it's up, and it's 8 working.</p> <p>9 To support the consolidation and in anticipation of 10 systems to transition, Letterkenny has brought on the finest 11 DOD experts in tactical missile maintenance, experts that 12 moved from such far away places as Alabama and California.</p> <p>13 And here are further examples of the state of the 14 art facilities modernized to support the new purple mission 15 at Letterkenny.</p> <p>16 This next slide is a summary of the taxpayers' 17 commitment to the new purple mission at Letterkenny. The 18 projected return on their investment is an annual savings of 19 \$29 million.</p> <p>20 Once again, 13 of the 21 systems have already 21 transitioned into Letterkenny. Twenty-six million BRAC 22 dollars have been spent, \$100 million worth of additional</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 123</p> <p>1 everyone at Defense from the Secretaries of Defense to the 2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have talked about the 3 importance of interservicing, it never would have happened 4 because of interservice resistance, but for the BRAC 5 Commission in 1993 directing that it be done with the 6 missiles at Letterkenny.</p> <p>7 And, astonishingly, forgetting Letterkenny for a 8 moment, there are no new interservicing initiatives for 9 depots in DOD's BRAC 1995 recommendations. There's clear 10 evidence to show that the interservicing of missiles at 11 Letterkenny is a great success story, thanks to BRAC's 12 directive and that interservicing of missiles at Letterkenny 13 should not only be continued but expanded and streamlined to 14 a one-stop shop.</p> <p>15 And there is clear evidence to show that DOD's 16 recommendations to kill the interservicing of missiles at 17 Letterkenny is based on fundamentally flawed analysis.</p> <p>18 Teaming is the second important wave of the future, and here, 19 too, the Letterkenny-United Defense teaming on the Paladin 20 program is a great success story and should be continued an 21 expanded.</p> <p>22 First, the background on interservicing. In 1990,</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 126</p> <p>1 equipment has been transitioned into Letterkenny, 72 experts 2 have been hired, 3 construction projects have been completed.</p> <p>3 Now, as our blown-up chart in front of you shows, 4 in fact, in February of this year, the Inspector General of 5 the Department of Defense conducted an audit that reported, 6 and I quote, "The transition of tactical missile maintenance 7 to Letterkenny and related military construction are 8 generally proceeding within budget and on schedule."</p> <p>9 Concerns over eroding industrial base capabilities 10 combined with gross overcapacity in depots lead the 11 Department of Defense to support an innovative approach to 12 addressing both of these problems.</p> <p>13 And this next slide, chart, that you're going to 14 put up shows that the teaming of public depots with private 15 defense contractors is viewed as a way to utilize excess 16 capacity, preserve the industrial base, and save taxpayers 17 millions of dollars through greater efficiency.</p> <p>18 I said that DOD supported this idea that was born 19 in Pennsylvania, at Letterkenny, and the strength of our 20 partnership lead Congress to codify teaming arrangements.</p> <p>21 Now, let me address how our partnership works. The 22 partnership, in the slide you see now before you, has</p>

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1 Hearing were shown the bar graph on the left in front of you
 2 coupled with the overemphasis and miscalculation of capacity.
 3 Another critical factor which skewed Letterkenny's
 4 profitability numbers was the transition period for the
 5 implementation of BRAC 1993. The chart on the right shows
 6 that during Letterkenny's period of uncertainty and
 7 transition, starting in 1992, profits obviously fell.
 8 To implement any new business, there will be a
 9 period when your upfront costs exceed your return. But as a
 10 business plan becomes fully operational, anticipated savings
 11 and efficiencies will be realized. To take a snapshot at
 12 Letterkenny during transition of the BRAC 1993
 13 recommendations underlines all of the BRAC decisions.
 14 Now, as this chart clearly demonstrates
 15 Letterkenny's actual costs are not out of line with the other
 16 depots in the Army. In fact, our actual cost to operate are
 17 the second most of all the depots; however, as is clearly
 18 shown, when rates are calculated with an unreasonable
 19 emphasis on a distorted capacity figure, an accurate picture
 20 of Letterkenny's true costs is not portrayed.
 21 As you know, the Army process only focused on low-
 22 rated installations for closure analysis. The Army moved

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1 before the analysis was run, and based on their contrived
 2 criteria, Letterkenny and Red River would be their lowest
 3 rated depots, and therefore closure candidates. The Army ran
 4 COBRAs for only Letterkenny and Red River. All one-time
 5 costs for the Letterkenny recommendation have not been
 6 reported in DOD's submitted totals.
 7 The actual one-time cost may be as high as \$231
 8 million, but as this chart shows, using a more conservative
 9 figure, omitted costs were at least \$187.9 million.
 10 Additionally, the COBRA underestimated other significant
 11 costs including those associated with transferring both
 12 personnel and equipment.
 13 As I mentioned, the COBRA did not analyze the costs
 14 associated with the transfer of the tenants now at
 15 Letterkenny. A verifiable cost figure to move tenants
 16 exceeds \$99 million. The true break-even point to achieve a
 17 return on investment is over 100 years.
 18 Again, let's revisit the proposal as submitted to
 19 you by the Army and the Department of Defense. No where in
 20 the proposal are significant tenants at Letterkenny accounted
 21 for. We don't know where they're going to be sent and the
 22 Army obviously doesn't know at what cost. None of those

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1 figures are included.
 2 Now, this next complicated chart shows the present
 3 proposal in contrast to the Commission's 1993 recommendation,
 4 the one now before you. This is not a consolidation or a
 5 streamlining of industrial operations, on the contrary,
 6 inefficient separation of mutually supportable missions will
 7 actually reduce efficiency, inflate costs, and increase the
 8 time required to field critical mission systems.
 9 Our proposal builds on the sound recommendation of
 10 BRAC '93 and the creative partnering environment now already
 11 present at Letterkenny. It makes sense to expand the
 12 successful missile consolidation and save even greater
 13 dollars by implementing a one-stop shop for all DOD tactical
 14 missile systems.
 15 (Applause.)
 16 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: In addition, why would the
 17 Commission put their faith in the partnering Johnny-come-
 18 lately who claim that they can develop partnerships in the
 19 future when the partnership team and the experience are
 20 already at Letterkenny and this is where partnering should be
 21 expanded, where it is already succeeding.
 22 (Applause.)

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1 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: When we talk one-stop shop
 2 for all tactical missiles, what do we mean? It's important
 3 to understand that for all efficiencies to be realized, all
 4 components of missile maintenance should be consolidated in
 5 one location from storage to certification to component
 6 maintenance, de-mil, and all upground reconstitutions, and
 7 Letterkenny is the only site in DOD which has the ability to
 8 realize the efficiencies.
 9 Now, despite the efficiencies realized by the BRAC
 10 '93 consolidation, they're only partial, this chart shows
 11 that the unconsolidated portion of tactical missile depot
 12 operations is still somewhat disjointed and inefficient.
 13 Unquestionably, further streamlining can achieve additional
 14 savings.
 15 Now, a picture is worth a thousand words, in this
 16 case, less is more. A one-stop shop eliminates duplication,
 17 inefficiency, and worthless expansion. I understand that
 18 representations were recently made to this Commission that
 19 Hill Air Force Base in Ogden, Utah, may be the most
 20 appropriate place to consolidate DOD tactical missile
 21 maintenance.
 22 Now, they weren't selected by DOD in 1990. They

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1 weren't selected by the BRAC Commission in 1993, and once
 2 again, the Hill consolidation was rejected just recently by
 3 the joint cross service working group in 1995 as testified by
 4 General Klugh before you on April 17th and all for good
 5 reason.
 6 As the blow-up on the big chart shows, Letterkenny
 7 presently has the capability to work 15 interservice systems,
 8 while Hill presently has the capability to work only two.
 9 Any suggestion that the Air Force's capability to work on
 10 ICBMs translates somehow to inefficient -- to efficient
 11 capabilities on tactical missile systems is simply
 12 unsupported by the facts.
 13 Now, the next chart there on the easel depicts a
 14 side by side comparison, showing that in every critical area
 15 Letterkenny is superior to Hill Air Force Base, whether it's
 16 experience, present interservice work, capacity, storage or
 17 dollars invested. Letterkenny is the only logical site for
 18 the implementation of DOD tactical missile consolidation.
 19 (Applause.)
 20 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Now, we understand that the
 21 Hill Air Force Base community stated in its testimony that
 22 Hill does 42 percent of the DOD guidance and control work.

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1 What was not stated is that that 42 percent represents only 6
 2 percent of the total DOD tactical missile workload ordered to
 3 be consolidated under BRAC '93.
 4 Now, in this next slide, the color coding is what's
 5 important. It shows that the Army tactical missile systems
 6 per the 1993 missile consolidation, all the functions
 7 depicted in blue would be performed at Letterkenny. Our
 8 recommendation is to make a good idea even better. For all
 9 the Army missile systems the functions depicted in purple on
 10 the next slide could best be accomplished at Letterkenny and
 11 should be consolidated. And, again, the color is what
 12 counts.
 13 Now, let's focus on the interservice workload.
 14 Based on the Commission's recommendations in 1993, those
 15 interservice depot functions colored in blue are in
 16 transition to Letterkenny. A particular note are the two Air
 17 Force systems, Sparrow and Sidewinder. For nearly 10 years,
 18 Letterkenny has been the depot responsible for performing all
 19 upground and storage on these systems. In addition, the 1993
 20 BRAC Commission recommendation actually reversed an
 21 inefficient practice of sending guidance and control rework
 22 from Letterkenny to Hill.

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1 This optimizes the one-stop shop consolidation for
 2 the U.S. Air Force Sparrow and Sidewinder missions. Now all
 3 three functions are being consolidated at Letterkenny.
 4 Again, the color code tells the story here. Our
 5 recommendation to maximize the benefits of a one-stop shop
 6 for tactical missiles is to make this entire chart purple,
 7 consolidate all the tactical missile depot functions at
 8 Letterkenny.
 9 (Applause.)
 10 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Now, previous charts show our
 11 vision upon the present inventory of tactical missiles can
 12 and should be consolidated at Letterkenny. As this chart
 13 showed, this area of weapon systems is sure to grow in the
 14 near future. The highest efficiencies can be realized by
 15 implementing the one-stop shop concept from the birth of a
 16 system.
 17 Redundant field storage certification and
 18 maintenance capabilities never need to be created for these
 19 new systems. All of these capabilities already are resident
 20 at Letterkenny.
 21 Turning again to our recommendation concerning
 22 partners. Unlike what you were told in Dallas, this slide

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1 I'd like to close this morning, ladies and
 2 gentlemen, by quoting again from the undersecretary of the
 3 Army Joe Reeder, he continues in his memo to General Klugh,
 4 "Finally, closing Letterkenny would significantly complicate
 5 ongoing consolidation of virtually all tactical missile
 6 workloads directed by BRAC '93. As you know, this
 7 consolidation was directed after DOD submitted its plan to
 8 close Letterkenny. Apart from the missile consolidation,
 9 arguments for closure today do not seem to be any more
 10 compelling than those previously rejected, and in fact, DOD
 11 would lose the synergy and efficiencies we hope to gain by
 12 consolidating missile maintenance workload and missile
 13 storage."
 14 In fact ladies and gentlemen, we find it totally
 15 astonishing that the services continue to drag their feet on
 16 this issue, and that the Department of Defense has no new
 17 initiatives for interservicing or consolidating of depots,
 18 all at a time when our top military experts have openly
 19 called for such consolidation.
 20 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, back in 1993, said,
 21 I quote, "With respect to maintenance of depots, there was
 22 not sufficient time for the Office of Secretary of Defense to

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1 depicts a true representation of the whole family of heavy
 2 Army vehicles worked at Letterkenny.
 3 The skilled workforce and facilities needed to meet
 4 emergent and surge requirements in track vehicles exists
 5 already today at Letterkenny, and for much more than just
 6 Paladin, as you can see from this slide.
 7 In particular, the United Defense-Letterkenny
 8 partnership stands ready to make a good program better. Due
 9 to the ORN status of the United Defense on the family, the
 10 whole family of Bradley fighting vehicles as well as the
 11 strategic collocation of their headquarters in nearby York,
 12 Pennsylvania, our team is poised to maintain an upgrade of
 13 these track vehicles well into the next century.
 14 As Commissioner Cornella heard during his visit,
 15 that United Defense wants to consolidate their heavy
 16 industrial operations in Pennsylvania. It's simple logic for
 17 this Commission to take advantage of United Defense's
 18 business plan and experience at Letterkenny and to bless an
 19 expansion of this operation.
 20 Ultimately, this Commission, of course, will
 21 address the capacity of all depot operations. The Commission
 22 will optimize the available facilities while most efficiently

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1 review all potential interservicing possibilities. I suggest
 2 that the Commission examine those possibilities."
 3 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then,
 4 Colin Powell, said, "Unnecessary duplication exists
 5 throughout the individual service depots, especially when
 6 viewed across service boundaries." In addition, a depot
 7 maintenance consolidation study found that the current depot
 8 structure in DOD and the services has not resulted in
 9 substantial interservicing.
 10 Ladies and gentlemen, it's never going to result in
 11 substantial interservicing because of service rivalries
 12 unless this BRAC Commission acts as it did previously. Just
 13 last month current Secretary of Defense William Perry
 14 reiterated the same thing of increased jointness among the
 15 services in a Washington Post article.
 16 And last but perhaps most importantly the future of
 17 interservicing is largely in your hands as a member of this
 18 Commission, as a matter of fact, a former chairman of the
 19 BRAC Commission stated, "There won't be any interservicing
 20 unless BRAC directs it."
 21 With these thoughts in mind, I would hope that you
 22 would look very closely at the tremendous success story that

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1 meeting the Army's ongoing and wartime requirements. It's
 2 been said time and again that the optimal capacity
 3 utilization for peacetime depot operations is roughly 90
 4 percent. This modest 10 percent buffer allows for
 5 flexibility in meeting emerging work or process modification.
 6 The right mix for the Army requires the retention
 7 of Letterkenny. The retention of Red River and Anniston
 8 maintains too much excess capacity at a suboptimal, 80
 9 percent capacity utilization as this chart shows. A loss of
 10 both Red River and Letterkenny would leave Army depots in a
 11 capacity shortfall situation and a critical shortfall in any
 12 wartime scenario.
 13 In a memo, Joe Reeder, then the undersecretary of
 14 defense for logistics to General James Klugh, Secretary
 15 Reeder clearly highlights the overcapacity issue that I just
 16 discussed. He writes, I quote, "Closure of Red River alone
 17 forces us to accept a substantial shortfall of combat vehicle
 18 capacity against our full wartime requirement." In this
 19 commodity area alone, additional closure of Letterkenny
 20 compounds the core shortfall of commodity areas, possibly
 21 requiring further expansion of Anniston's capabilities. It
 22 also ranks our desired alignment with the commodity commands.

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1 is taking place at Letterkenny and reject the fundamentally
 2 flawed military worth and cost analysis made by the Army, and
 3 I ask that you continue to support interservicing and public-
 4 private teaming that's being accomplished right now at
 5 Letterkenny Army Depot.
 6 Thank you.
 7 (Applause.)
 8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Congressman.
 9 I have just one question, and you sort of covered it, but our
 10 concern is, you know, in 1993, was to consolidate the missile
 11 work and that's why we ended up at Letterkenny and I know
 12 that the DOD understands that you can't do the disassembling
 13 and storage at Tobyhanna and that's why the recommendation
 14 this year -- and you did mention the Hill capabilities, but I
 15 wonder if you know if Hill can do the disassembly and storage
 16 at Hill?
 17 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: I am told that they cannot.
 18 I would call on Dave Goodman who is our missiles expert on
 19 that.
 20 MR. GOODMAN: I have to agree with Congressman
 21 Shuster. It has been identified to us that they do not have
 22 the capability to do the ground support equipment associated

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1 with our product line.
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I see.
 3 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: I might also point out that,
 4 of course, the Army has been very cooperative in moving.
 5 Already 13 of the missile systems have moved in. The Navy
 6 has been very cooperative. But some of the other services
 7 really have been dragging their feet, and one of the reasons
 8 all of the missiles aren't in yet, even though they were on
 9 schedule as the audit says, it's really been -- it's been
 10 like pulling teeth to get cooperation elsewhere.
 11 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I see. Thank you very much.
 12 CONGRESSMAN SHUSTER: Is that it? Thank you.
 13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you.
 14 (Applause.)
 15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. We are now
 16 going to go into the public comment section. As I mentioned
 17 earlier, there will be 30 minutes for both Maryland and
 18 Pennsylvania public comment. There will be further
 19 Pennsylvania public comment after this afternoon's session.
 20 People who have -- who are interested in doing this
 21 should have already signed up this morning, and I have a list
 22 of those who are willing to do it. And what I'd like to do

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1 anyone to this initiative. We thank you very much for your
 2 difficult task and for your efforts.
 3 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Well, Mr. Hughes, thank you very
 4 much. You're an unusual testimony.
 5 MR. HUGHES: Yes, ma'am.
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Mr. Boehman, am I
 7 pronouncing that right?
 8 MR. BOEHMAN: Good morning. You pronounced it
 9 correctly.
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good. Thank you.
 11 MR. BOEHMAN: My name is Robert Boehman. I'm a
 12 retired Army Lieutenant Colonel. I have served as the deputy
 13 commander in and as the commander of the United States Army
 14 Garrison at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, from July '90 to January
 15 of '93.
 16 Two specific issues, security and safety stand out
 17 at Fort Ritchie at the Site R relationship. Site R, first,
 18 security. Site R houses key Department of Defense
 19 organizations during times of national crisis. The Fort
 20 Ritchie military police company is a well-equipped, combat
 21 capable unit whose mission is the armed security of Site R.
 22 During the Gulf War, Site R was heavily guarded by

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1 is have everyone -- all of the people who are going to be
 2 doing the public comment come forward at this time. I'll
 3 read off your names so that we can swear everyone in
 4 together. I apologize if I massacre your name in reading it
 5 off.
 6 William Hughes from Maryland, Robert Boehman from
 7 Maryland, Greg Delauter, Maryland, Delegate Ken Holt, Middle
 8 River, Senator Ida Rueben from White Oak, Henry Grierson from
 9 Annapolis, Patricia Field from Annapolis, and Karen Lewis
 10 from Fort Meade. That should be the Maryland delegation for
 11 the public comment.
 12 And then from Pennsylvania, Stephen George, Lance
 13 Shaeffer, Michael Morar, Jason Morar, Michael Robeson, David
 14 Goodman, Jerry Mittenhouse, and John Brosky. It should give
 15 me 16 people standing right up here at front. Can we come
 16 right up so we make sure we have everyone?
 17 I can identify the Letterkenny folks in any case.
 18 One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. Pennsylvania?
 19 Maryland. Okay.
 20 (Witnesses Sworn.)
 21 Thank you very much. And we will start with
 22 William Hughes from Maryland. Mr. Hughes?

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1 the MP company ready to repulse or destroy any threat.
 2 Security provided is not just gate or entrance security, the
 3 military police company provided perimeter security, internal
 4 security, security from the transmitter towers on top of Site
 5 R, as well as the capability to stop aerial intrusion. And,
 6 by the way, intruders would have been wazaly but not
 7 graciously received.
 8 Second, safety considerations are the Fort Ritchie
 9 fire department is specifically trained for fire and rescue
 10 work in underground structures. They are very knowledgeable
 11 of the Site R underground complex, and contracting this
 12 service out equates to accepting a lesser safety standard.
 13 Security and safety cannot be measured in dollars
 14 but in terms of effectiveness and responsiveness. Either of
 15 these services located outside of Fort Ritchie places Site R,
 16 a vital defense contingency resource, at unacceptable risk.
 17 Thank you.
 18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr.
 19 Delauter?
 20 MR. DELAUTER: Yes. Hello. I'm Greg Delauter. I
 21 speak to you today as a farm boy and a small business owner
 22 and someone that really cares about the fate of this

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1 MR. HUGHES: Yes. Good afternoon.
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Before we start -- please, I know
 3 that people are leaving the room, but this is very important,
 4 we want to hear from these folks. Please do it quickly and
 5 quietly. Thank you, Mr. Hughes.
 6 MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. My name is Bill
 7 Hughes. I'm the deputy director of the Defense Investigative
 8 Service. I am hear to voice support for the realignment for
 9 the Fort Hollabird complex to Fort Meade. We have 450
 10 people, who I believe still very much believe in the American
 11 work ethic. They're highly unique, highly specialized, and
 12 we're the only ones in the entire United States Government
 13 that performs the function in our like business.
 14 The building we are housed in was built in 1954, it
 15 was built as a counterintelligence school. In short, it's
 16 shot, it's worn out. The infrastructure is caput. What we'd
 17 like to do is that we believe this realignment to go to Fort
 18 Meade and to a structure out there supports the edicts of the
 19 BRAC Commission while it also does not destruct the readiness
 20 and the wartime capabilities of the Defense Department.
 21 It also has the support of the community. As best
 22 I can determine, there has been absolutely no opposition by

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1 community. I own a convenience store in Cascade, Maryland, a
 2 town without any formal local government. I am a
 3 representative of a hundred family owned businesses that
 4 would be devastated if this Commission endorses the closure
 5 of Fort Ritchie.
 6 My wife and I have built our business on hard work
 7 and common sense. I ask you to give proper consideration to
 8 an economic catastrophe that would be created in an
 9 economically depressed area if you support the closure of
 10 Fort Ritchie.
 11 In closing, I speak to you as a taxpayer that wants
 12 my money's worth. Are we meeting the taxpayers' needs by
 13 closing Fort Ritchie, then trying to duplicate those same
 14 services elsewhere. I do not see any real savings in closing
 15 Fort Ritchie. Please listen to the facts and maybe even use
 16 some good old farm boy common sense in your recommendation on
 17 Fort Ritchie. Thank you.
 18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Delegate Ken
 19 Holt, welcome.
 20 DELEGATE HOLT: Good afternoon, Madame Chair and
 21 members of the Commission. My name is Ken Holt. I'm a
 22 member of the Maryland House of Delegates representing Middle

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River, Maryland, and the employees of the Army Publication Distribution Center at Middle River.

This may be a small facility in terms of numbers, but it looms very large in the history of our nation's military and the future of our nation's security. Here in World War II, the parents and grandparents of these folks built the B-26 bomber known as the Liberator of Europe. They turned out a bomber almost in 24 hours every day.

For the next 50 years to this day, the employees of this facility have been unrivaled in their efficient commitment to the country, doing whatever the commander in chief asked, doing it better than anyone else. What we have at this little center is essentially the soul of America's military reflected in human terms, not in smart bombs or in electronic warfare.

We're talking about can-do hustle, devotion to duty and success. They are the best DOD publications distribution center in the nation. The presentation earlier this morning showed this in numbers and Vice President Gore's Hammer Award for efficiency in government confirms it.

Middle River was born out of military necessity. Lockheed Martin-Marietta, the Maryland Air National Guard,

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1 having NAVSEA move to White Oak.
 2 We have the petitions and we will present them to
 3 you. The Navy at White Oak has always been a good neighbor
 4 and we've been proud to have them. You can tell from my
 5 comments that the neighborhood is --
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I'm sorry, Senator. We will have
 7 to end, but we would love to have any more of your thoughts
 8 in writing and I thank you for your hospitality when I was
 9 there.
 10 Mr. Grierson?
 11 MR. GRIERSON: Good afternoon. My name is Henry
 12 Grierson. I'm the first vice president of our union, the
 13 National Federation of Federal Employees. I represent 92
 14 blue collar support personnel mostly in direct support of the
 15 machinery R & D record. I would like to talk about excess
 16 capacity related to man years.
 17 This directly concerns me because of the shop
 18 support numbers. Over 45,000 hours of overtime were worked
 19 in Fiscal Year 94 by the shop support personnel of the
 20 Carderock Division.
 21 Of this number, about 30,000 hours were worked at the
 22 Annapolis site, mostly in direct support of sponsor funded

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the Air Force and Army publication distribution center operates side by side there and they should remain side by side. This is where the talent is.

I am confident that your careful examination will determine that we can't do without our best people in our best facility, and that all publication distribution work should be consolidated in Middle River, Maryland, and St. Louis, Missouri. There is no gray area, it makes the most common and economic sense.

Thank you.
 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Delegate Holt. Senator Ida Rueben, welcome.
 SENATOR RUEBEN: Thank you, Madame Chair and members of the Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak on behalf of the White Oak-Hillandale Community. I am Ida G. Rueben a state senator from that area. I represent the local community in the state legislature and I have lived in the neighborhood immediately adjacent to the facilities for the past 33 years.

I am also a member of the Montgomery County NAVSEA task force. Since the BRAC '93 decisions to move NAVSEA to White Oak, the community has worked very hard to put out the

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1 projects.
 2 The reason for this high number is simple. In 1991
 3 there were 168 shop support personnel in Annapolis compared
 4 with 92 today, a reduction of 45 percent. Our workload has
 5 increased yearly and is projected to increase through the
 6 turn of the century. This work, by the way, cannot be done
 7 cost efficiently by outsourcing. By adding a lower number of
 8 employees to the increased workload and throwing in a hiring
 9 freeze, we're approximately 15 man years understaffed.
 10 If not for some excess employees from Philadelphia
 11 being detailed to the Annapolis site to perform the facility
 12 with maintenance and general support, the 15 man years would
 13 be greater. The result, no or negative excess capacity at
 14 Annapolis.
 15 In closing I would like to call your attention to a
 16 letter sent to Chairman Dixon by the Philadelphia
 17 Congressional delegation dated April 5, 1994. Part of this
 18 letter addressed the overhead costs. Currently, overhead
 19 costs in Annapolis per person are slightly higher because
 20 Annapolis is the host activity.
 21 I suggest to you that when the shipyard closes in
 22 the Fall of 1995 when NAVSES Philadelphia loses its tenant

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welcome mat. The Government in Montgomery County had been concerned about making the pending NAVSEA move a smooth one. They appointed a task force to facilitate the transition and work with the local community. The task force has been meeting and working for over a year to be sure that all areas of need for the NAVSEA move were addressed.

The local community has been extremely enthusiastic in support of the move of NAVSEA to White Oak. For example, a member of the task force who lives in the community, Betsy Bretz, and the members of the Hillandale Citizens Association have worked with NAVSEA since 1993. They have collected information for NAVSEA on schools, babysitters and spousal employment opportunities and have met with NAVSEA representatives on numerous occasions, including one with you, Madame Chairman.

They have conducted an open house for the community to review NAVSEA construction plans and have invited NAVSEA employees to join in neighborhood social functions. Ms. Bretz lead the community in collecting petitions in support of NAVSEA from the local citizens and approximately 2,000 signatures have been collected over the past from Silver Spring residents expressing their wholehearted support for

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1 activity status and becomes host, their overhead costs would
 2 be significantly higher than that of Annapolis.
 3 We at Annapolis take pride in our work and the fact
 4 that the revenues generated in our lab makes us self-
 5 supported. Thank you very much for your time.
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Mr. Grierson.
 7 Ms. Fields?
 8 MS. FIELDS: Yes. My name is Patricia Fields and I
 9 am recent retiree from Annapolis Laboratory. I was employed
 10 there as a physicist managing R & D programs approximately 30
 11 years, and what I have to tell you today is that Annapolis is
 12 not just a job, it's a way of life.
 13 I came there 30 years ago. I raised my family
 14 there. I fit in. You have an identity there and an
 15 atmosphere of the community in the lab. In fact, one of my
 16 sons is now an electrical engineer at the lab. I'm very
 17 proud of him, of course.
 18 But one of the things that I want to emphasize here
 19 is that what this continuity brings to the Annapolis site is
 20 the effectiveness of our job, the fact that we have the
 21 publications. We have the inventions. We have the
 22 expertise, because people come, people stay and spend their

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1 entire careers there, because of the atmosphere that's been
 2 created there.

3 This, of course, has been over -- you know, the
 4 place has been there 90 years. I haven't been there the
 5 whole 90 years, just 30. But what I would like to emphasize
 6 to the Commission is that we can move machinery and we can
 7 move billets, okay, you cannot move identity, you can't move
 8 atmosphere, you can't move a way of life, and this is what I
 9 think is threatened. Thank you.

10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Ms. Fields.
 11 Ms. Lewis, Karen?

12 MS. LEWIS: My name is Karen Lewis. My family has
 13 been living at Fort Meade for the past 12 years. The Army
 14 has stabilized our family there because we have a chronically
 15 ill child. Her needs are very severe, but her most severe
 16 needs are respiratory. She breathes through a tracheostomy,
 17 has asthma, has frequent bouts of pneumonia.

18 Now, when Elizabeth needs care, we need to use the
 19 emergency room at Kimbrough Army Hospital. Walter Reed and
 20 Bethesda are about 45 minutes from us during good travel
 21 time. Our nearest civilian facility is about 20 minutes
 22 during good travel time. In order to use the civilian

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1 single additional acre of land.
 2 Time will not permit me to enumerate the many
 3 additional benefits that the 911th enjoys at Pittsburgh
 4 International at virtually little or no cost. I underscored
 5 the runway system because it exists today. It would cost the
 6 Federal Government hundreds of millions of dollars to
 7 duplicate such a resource elsewhere. Why would the
 8 Government want to close down the 911th and lose this
 9 capability. It just doesn't make any sense.

10 The most cost-effective way is for the 911th Air
 11 Lift Wing to continue its operation at Pittsburgh
 12 International Airport and thus provide the Air Force and our
 13 country unmatched and unsurpassed capability in carrying out
 14 its mission. Thank you.

15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr.
 16 Shaeffer?

17 MR. SHAEFFER: Good afternoon, members of the
 18 Commission, Madame Chair. I am Lance Shaeffer, executive
 19 director of the Greater Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, which
 20 is the regional or metro chamber in greater Pittsburgh, and
 21 I'm here to speak on behalf of the 911th Air Lift Wing.
 22 We know that the nation's debt is in trouble. Your

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1 community hospital, we would also be required to use CHAMPUS.
 2 This is an expensive cost to CHAMPUS among other
 3 things, plus, CHAMPUS does not totally cover the emergency
 4 room situation for us. Therefore, it adds an additional
 5 financial burden to our family along with the burden of her
 6 illness.

7 Now, as a citizen, I understand the need that we
 8 need to cut back for the Government. I also as a military
 9 spouse I understand that we will probably be losing some of
 10 our benefits over the next few years as the military
 11 completes its drawdowns. But I'm here today as a mom, and as
 12 a mom, I urge you to remember that saving lives, especially
 13 my daughter's life, to me, is much more important than saving
 14 money.

15 Once again while you reconsider everything that you
 16 have to do, please remember that Fort Meade has a high
 17 percentage of children and adults who are special needs, and
 18 we have the highest percentage of those in the military.

19 We need a Fort Meade community hospital. We need
 20 Kimbrough. We need the emergency room. We need to maintain
 21 it as it is. Please don't discount our children. Thank
 22 you.

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1 work on the BRAC Commission is very, very important to
 2 reducing the nation's debt and our nation's defense expense
 3 and it can be a serious enemy as any we might face, and your
 4 work is a very important part of that effort. But another
 5 vital part of what you're doing is to make sure that the
 6 closures and realignments truly save our country money while
 7 not jeopardizing the present and future military capabilities

8 I join every business person here and in the
 9 country supporting our country's need to balance our budget,
 10 but the important operative word is balance. Will closing
 11 the 911th improve our military readiness and save our country
 12 money? You'll see a little later in our presentation that it
 13 will not.

14 To take a military operation worth hundreds of
 15 millions of dollars, strategically placed in the midst of the
 16 largest most modern airport in the eastern United States,
 17 designated by BRAC's own analysis as one of the two top C-130
 18 installations in Criteria 1, and to disperse this elite unit
 19 to other lesser facilities makes no sense.

20 We believe that the case of the 911th Air Lift Wing
 21 will speak for itself in our presentation later. The facts
 22 will show you that keeping the 911th operation saves our

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1 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr. George?
 2 MR. GEORGE: My name is Steve George. I am the
 3 former director of aviation for Pittsburgh International
 4 Airport. Shortly, you will hear a very impressive
 5 presentation by the 911th Air Lift Wing, which is located at
 6 Pittsburgh International Airport, and therefore benefits from
 7 the phenomenal resources this airport offers.

8 This is no ordinary airport. Please make note of
 9 the fact that Pittsburgh International is the largest land
 10 mass airport in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern United
 11 States with over 12,000 acres, larger than JFK, Newark, La
 12 Guardia, Boston Logan, and Washington National combined.

13 Also focus on the runway system that few airports
 14 in the country can match. The 911th can utilize anyone of
 15 four major runways ranging in length from 8100 feet to
 16 11,500, the later in fact, is a designated emergency landing
 17 strip for the space shuttle.

18 By 1998 we shall have a fifth runway in operation,
 19 which will give the airport simultaneous triple arrival and
 20 departure capability. Only Denver and DFW can do that, one
 21 runway airports can't. After the year 2000, a sixth runway
 22 can be built when necessary without the need to purchase a

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1 country money, improves our military capabilities now and in
 2 the future. We ask that you will seriously consider our
 3 recommendation and our response that the data and the
 4 conclusions are flawed. We think the evidence will present
 5 our conclusions the 911th Air Lift Wing should be kept open.
 6 Thank you.

7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Michael Morar?
 8 MR. MICHAEL MORAR: Yes.
 9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Are you related to Jason?
 10 MR. MICHAEL MORAR: Good afternoon, Commissioners.
 11 My name is Michael Morar. I am a missile systems technician
 12 at Letterkenny Army Depot. As a factory trained technician
 13 at NAS in Alameda, California, we and others were tasked to
 14 train Letterkenny personnel for six months total on Sparrow
 15 and the Phoenix test systems due to BRAC '93 decisions.
 16 This just gets the technician barely familiar with
 17 the missile and equipment. Many of us were offered positions
 18 at Letterkenny to help get the Navy's expensive sensitive
 19 equipment back on line to produce missiles after the move to
 20 Letterkenny, but only a few experienced experts went.

21 With great difficulty, my family and I chose to
 22 transition with the tactical missile workload. With that

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1 decision came separation from family and friends to come to a
 2 strange land. After working at Letterkenny for a few months,
 3 many of us found that some equipment was broken or lost in
 4 transit from California.

5 It took several months to get these test systems
 6 operational again. With BRAC '95 hanging over us, if all
 7 this equipment were to be moved again, more equipment would
 8 get broken or lost, but more importantly, even more of the
 9 expertise would be lost, because not everyone would be
 10 willing to move again.

11 As a taxpayer I am concerned about using BRAC '95
 12 funds to tear down, ship, and get tactical missiles systems
 13 operational again somewhere else. Thank you for allowing me
 14 to speak.

15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And Mr.
 16 Jason Morar?

17 MR. JASON MORAR: Good afternoon, Commissioners.
 18 My name is Jason Morar. I am 15 years old and I am a student
 19 at Krauss Junior High in Chambersburg. I represent all the
 20 kids whose moms and dads work at Letterkenny. I asked my
 21 classmates if they want me to say something today.
 22 Basically, they all said, "I don't want to leave home." I

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1 1990, I participated in a joint services study of tactical
 2 missile maintenance for the Defense Depot Maintenance Council
 3 which identified Letterkenny as the only site which provided
 4 the necessary infrastructure to accommodate tactical missile
 5 maintenance consolidation.

6 The merits of this study were recognized and
 7 incorporated into the corporate business plan of 1991 and
 8 consolidation planning was started. In BRAC '93, the
 9 Commission validated the need for consolidation throughout
 10 the services and gave renewed credibility to the ongoing
 11 efforts at Letterkenny.

12 We have successfully transitioned 13 of 21
 13 designated systems. This effort has been timely and within
 14 budgetary guidelines. The current 1995 recommendation for
 15 alignment will fragment true consolidation, increase costs,
 16 delay the organic capability and substantially reduce the
 17 readiness due to the loss of training of artisan personnel.

18 Letterkenny provides a unique opportunity to the
 19 DOD community, one-stop shopping. It can store, repair,
 20 overhaul, and test its current and future workloads
 21 efficiently. The 1993 BRAC Commission recognized the merit
 22 of consolidation well in the planning phase.

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1 myself as well as a few others already moved from NAS
 2 Alameda, California, as a result of BRAC '93.

3 I miss home and I don't want to miss my second
 4 home, Letterkenny, either. Opportunities to better ourselves
 5 as students have and will pass us by as a result of being
 6 relocated. For example, because of moving, I am repeating
 7 the ninth grade for a second year. This happened because I
 8 didn't have requirements I did not have, nor was needed,
 9 living in California. I will have a dilemma in 23 years. My
 10 dilemma is which high school reunion should I go to, where
 11 are my friends, where is home?

12 If Letterkenny closes, Chambersburg's main industry
 13 will be gone and not only will Chambersburg take an economic
 14 plunge now, but the future of Chambersburg will be no more.
 15 The future for me and my fellow students. I do not want to
 16 go through this emotional roller coaster again, nor do
 17 anybody else. Thank you for allowing me to do my speech.

18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, and you have
 19 certainly admirably represented the other students.

20 Mr. Robeson?

21 MR. ROBESON: Yes. Good morning. My name is
 22 Michael Robeson. I'm an instrument mechanic from Letterkenny

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1 I ask you, the commissioners of the 1995 BRAC
 2 Commission, to sustain your vote of confidence in Letterkenny
 3 as the plan has been executed on time and on cost. Insure
 4 DOD readiness, vote yes to save Letterkenny Army Depot and
 5 continue consolidation. Thank you for your consideration.

6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, sir. Mr. Wittenhouse?
 7 MR. WITTENHOUSE: Good afternoon, Madame Chairman.
 8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good afternoon.

9 MR. WITTENHOUSE: I am the Paladin partnership
 10 champion at Letterkenny, and I'm going to share with you
 11 today a real success story about governmenting those reform
 12 operations. Letterkenny and United Defense conceived the
 13 Paladin-Howitzer enterprise to be collocated on the depot
 14 back in 1991. It remains the only such situation within the
 15 DOD even today. This pioneering of partnership has saved
 16 many tens of millions of dollars through the waiver of
 17 regulations and through the implementation of real
 18 streamlining.

19 The Paladin program is currently two months ahead
 20 of schedule, under budget, and all the vehicles have been
 21 accepted unconditionally, that evidences the high quality.
 22 In acquisition I would tell you that is world class

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1 Army Depot. I work with the Sidewinder missiles. My wife
 2 along with my three children and I transitioned from Norfolk,
 3 Virginia, recently. We sold our home, left our friends and
 4 family there, and have since purchased a home in
 5 Chambersburg.

6 The major reason we decided to relocate was the
 7 BRAC '93 decision to consolidate tactical missiles at
 8 Letterkenny Army Depot. We were lead to believe that this
 9 was a good choice, and I believe it was the right choice.

10 If all of the missile systems are transitioned
 11 again, the readiness of all the branches of military would be
 12 jeopardized due to the down time moving these various systems
 13 along with the irreplaceable expertise that is lost due to
 14 transition after transition.

15 Letterkenny Army Depot is the only place a true
 16 one-stop consolidation can occur. To stop the progress that
 17 is made
 18 would be a terrible mistake. Thank you.

19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr. Goodman?
 20 MR. GOODMAN: Commissioner Cox, distinguished
 21 commissioners, my name is Dave Goodman. I am chief of the
 22 Electronic Shops Division at Letterkenny Army Depot. In

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1 performance. United Defense is the developer and producer of
 2 all track compact vehicles within the DOD inventory with the
 3 exception of the main battle tank.

4 United Defense is consolidating their California
 5 production operations in south central Pennsylvania, that
 6 includes their \$3.4 million facility at Letterkenny. This
 7 Commission has the unique opportunity to serve the best
 8 interest of the soldiers, the taxpayers, and the industrial
 9 base by consolidating all light and medium combat vehicle
 10 workloads at Letterkenny -- that would be depot workloads,
 11 excuse me -- building upon the established partnership with
 12 United Defense.

13 The bottom line here, I think, is what I'd like to
 14 get across is, ladies and gentlemen, the future is available
 15 today at Letterkenny Army Depot. Thank you.

16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, and our final witness
 17 today, Mr. John Brosky.

18 MR. BROSKY: Madame Chairperson and honorable
 19 commissioners, I am Judge John G. Brosky of the appellant
 20 court of Pennsylvania. I am also a retired major general of
 21 the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and I am the chairman of
 22 the Western Pennsylvania Coalition in the tri-state area to

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1 save the 911th Air Lift Wing and the Kelly Support Facility.
 2 First as to the Kelly Support Facility, our
 3 briefing this afternoon has been allocated ten minutes. It
 4 appears to be minimum, but really, it's sufficient time to
 5 show to you the shocking revelation that in the document
 6 given to the Commission, there is nothing but error after
 7 error after error and those are substantial.
 8 Our actual figures and calculations will show that
 9 at the end of 20 years if you accept the program given to
 10 you, at the end of 20 years, the United States Government
 11 will still be in the red by 14-plus million dollars. And
 12 then there is another shocking revelation, on March 31st, the
 13 Department of Army announced, they want to keep the Kelly
 14 Support Facility and 85 percent of the complement of those
 15 folks that are there. Now, that is an interesting
 16 revelation, again, to 41,000 retirees from Western
 17 Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio who use that facility.
 18 Honorable commissioners, if this case were in my
 19 court, I would remand it right back to the parties and so I
 20 respectfully request that you, honorable commissioners, send
 21 it right back to the Department of the Army and let them
 22 resolve the problem.

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1 witnesses. And as you all know, this is required by statute,
 2 so if you wouldn't mind raising your right hands.
 3 (Witnesses sworn.)
 4 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, we're ready
 5 to begin. Congressman? Thank you.
 6 MR. VEGOE: I'm Stephen Vegoe, President of the
 7 Lebanon Valley Chamber of Commerce, and a member of our Fort
 8 Indiantown Gap coalition. Before I introduce our three
 9 speakers, let me briefly set the stage for you. Fort
 10 Indiantown Gap has been a military training installation
 11 since 1932. The Gap is located in the Blue Mountains of
 12 Pennsylvania, 20 miles northeast of the capital of
 13 Harrisburg.
 14 It has served as mobilization and training site for
 15 every war beginning with World War II, and is now primarily
 16 training base for the Department of Defense. Of the 10 major
 17 training areas in the United States, Fort Indiantown Gap is
 18 the second most heavily used. In 1994, we supported 780,000
 19 man days of training. The Gap is a no-frills, low-cost,
 20 ideally-located and essential major training base. The Gap
 21 is not redundant and not replaceable. It is, in fact, one of
 22 the Department of Defense's well-kept secrets.

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1 Now, as to the 911th Air Lift Wing, you're going to
 2 hear a lot about military -- is that my two minutes?
 3 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I'm sorry. But we would love to
 4 have your thoughts on it in writing, if we could.
 5 MR. BROSKY: I will do that, but let me just close
 6 by saying, for the courtesy extended me here, if any of you
 7 should ever come into my court, I'll give you the same fine
 8 reception and I'll give you a pass to get free you from any
 9 jail in Pennsylvania.
 10 (Laughter.)
 11 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. I hope we
 12 won't need it. This concludes the morning session of the
 13 hearing today. We will begin promptly at 1:30 this
 14 afternoon. Thank you.
 15 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., a luncheon recess was
 16 held.)

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1 The Gap is an ideally-located place to train
 2 soldiers. As we will show you in the next few minutes, it is
 3 extremely cost-effective. Now, let me introduce you to the
 4 members of our delegation. First, Congressman George Gekas,
 5 representing the 17th District of Pennsylvania. Congressman
 6 Gekas will discuss the Army's recommendation and his
 7 perspective on what the Army is needlessly giving up.
 8 Next, Pennsylvania's new Adjunct General, Brigadier
 9 General James MacVay will thoroughly review the military
 10 value of Fort Indiantown Gap, and review how the Army's
 11 analysis differs from what we believe is reality. GEN MacVay
 12 will also discuss the Army's enclave theory and compare it,
 13 as well, to reality. Next, I'm pleased to introduce
 14 Congressman Jim Holden, from Pennsylvania's 6th District.
 15 Congressman Holden will review how the Army's analysis is, in
 16 fact, so seriously flawed that it no longer passes the common
 17 sense test.
 18 The Army claims, for instance, they can save twice
 19 what it costs to operate the base. We doubt it, and think
 20 you will as well. Finally, if we have any time left at the
 21 end, I'll come back with a quick wrap-up and conclusion.
 22 Now, Congressman George Gekas.

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1 AFTERNOON SESSION
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good afternoon, ladies and
 3 gentlemen, and welcome to the afternoon session of the
 4 regional hearing of the Base Closure and Realignment
 5 Commission. This afternoon we will hear presentation from
 6 the state of Pennsylvania, which will last for 110 minutes; a
 7 presentation from Virginia, which will last for 100 minutes;
 8 and a presentation from North Carolina, which will last for
 9 20 minutes.
 10 As is the case with all of our regional hearings,
 11 the Commission has given a block of time to each state, based
 12 on the number of installations and the jobs lost. We have
 13 left it to the elected officials in each of the communities
 14 and the communities to decide how to fill that block of time.
 15 After we finish with the North Carolina presentation, there
 16 will be 30 additional minutes from this morning for public
 17 comment from Virginia, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.
 18 People who wish to speak at that time should have
 19 already signed up now, out in the lobby, and are asked to
 20 limit themselves to two minutes, which will be very strictly
 21 enforced. We will be ready to begin the Pennsylvania
 22 afternoon presentation as soon as I have sworn in the

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1 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: I thank you. Good afternoon to
 2 the members of the Commission.
 3 (Applause.)
 4 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: On behalf of Central
 5 Pennsylvania, we greet you.
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Which seems to be here with you.
 7 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: All but three people from
 8 Central Pennsylvania are here today. My initial task is to
 9 review with you the value of Indiantown Gap as a training and
 10 readiness center for the United States Army Reserves. And so
 11 if you will follow along as we exhibit up here, that will be
 12 the initial stage of our presentation. Pennsylvania has one
 13 of the largest Guard and Army Reserve populations in the
 14 nation.
 15 For these dedicated men and women, proximity to
 16 Fort Indiantown Gap is not just a convenience, but rather, a
 17 necessity, if they are to remain in the Reserve. Within the
 18 200-mile radius of the Gap, there are nearly 57,000 Reserve
 19 component members. The Gap is the only training facility in
 20 Pennsylvania for these units. The Gap's location and
 21 accessibility make the base indispensable to the large
 22 training population that does now rely on.

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1 The Gap has been compared, of course, with bases
 2 throughout the nation. Unlike its active Army counterparts,
 3 the Gap's reserve force structure is located in Pennsylvania,
 4 and cannot be moved. These forces must be supported from and
 5 trained near their homes. That goes without saying. The Gap
 6 is one of the most cost-effective Department of Defense
 7 installations in the nation. As the slide indicates,
 8 accurate cost data shows that over 783,000 military training
 9 days -- that's an astounding figure -- the Gap is the Army's
 10 best bargain.

11 The Secretary's recommendation is to "close Fort
 12 Indiantown Gap, except for minimal essential facilities as a
 13 Reserve component enclave." That's perplexing. A careful
 14 analysis of the facts demonstrates that Fort Indiantown Gap
 15 cannot be placed within the context of this definition. The
 16 essential units and training institutions would still be
 17 stationed at the Gap after the active component garrison
 18 leaves. The Army itself concluded that it would be cost-
 19 prohibitive to relocate all the training facilities currently
 20 managed at the Gap to other DOD installations.

21 Thus, even if the active component garrison leaves,
 22 the overhead cost of running the post and its infrastructure

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1 has no value. That is why comparison with distant places has
 2 no relevance. To us, accessibility is the prime value. It
 3 comes from the old adage that there are three things that
 4 gives value to real estate -- location, location and
 5 location.

6 The Gap is a very accessible base, located in the
 7 center of a large DOD military population; easily reached on
 8 an excellent interstate highway system; and the least travel
 9 time and the least travel cost. To the Reserve components,
 10 accessibility, suitability for mission and central training,
 11 and affordability are what passes muster and gives the Gap
 12 the highest military value of any Reserve component training
 13 base in the United States.

14 The Gap is also a very suitable base. The training
 15 which support structure conducts here is wide-ranging,
 16 diverse, and mission essential. Fort Indiantown Gap has been
 17 the key to the readiness of military units in the 13-state
 18 area. At Fort Indiantown Gap, we can fire all of the weapons
 19 of a mechanized infantry division. We have one of the three
 20 tank table VIII ranges in the Northeast, upon which we can
 21 qualify our tank and Bradley crews. We can fire 155
 22 millimeter, self-propelled, provision artillery time-on

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1 would still be there. That's what's odd about the situation.
 2 I repeat, the costs will still be there. This undermines the
 3 Department of Defense, its main argument in this regard. A
 4 National Guard Bureau team has recently studied the post and
 5 concluded, first, Fort Indiantown Gap is the second most
 6 heavily used major training center for Reserve components in
 7 the United States.

8 Second, the entire post must be retained after your
 9 work has been completed. Third, the essential infrastructure
 10 and base operations functions of the post must be retained.
 11 While some barracks areas can be eliminated, no significant
 12 savings would result. I'd like to repeat that -- no
 13 significant savings would result. We believe that, and we
 14 believe we'll be able to prove that to you.

15 In addition, the Army Reserve's BRAC '95 data call
 16 stated, "closure of Fort Indiantown Gap will result in a
 17 substantial increase in the cost incurred for Reserve units
 18 to reach the training area at Fort Dix." And so there we
 19 have it. We have shown in many different ways that Fort
 20 Indiantown Gap is of high military value. One of the ways we
 21 show it is to have you review the record of one of your
 22 predecessor BRAC Commissions, which so found, four years ago.

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1 target simultaneously.

2 We have an 11-mile training corridor on which an
 3 entire dismounted brigade can maneuver. We conduct platoon
 4 mechanized and armored drills. All of the training our
 5 forces require can be conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap. The
 6 28th Division converted from a walking infantry division to a
 7 mechanized division, and is the readiest of the eight
 8 divisions in the Guard, due to the suitability and
 9 accessibility of the Gap.

10 We have the second largest Army aviation training
 11 site in the nation, with six helicopter simulators. It is a
 12 simulator complex for all Army aviation in the Northeast,
 13 including component units, such as the 10th Mountain
 14 Division. In addition, we have the largest National Guard
 15 aviation support facility for aircraft maintenance. We have
 16 710 contiguous square miles of uninhabited, state-owned
 17 terrain, through which our helicopters can fly the contours
 18 of the earth and at night, conducting essential night vision
 19 flying.

20 This is a national asset for Army aviation, the Air
 21 Force, as well as Navy and Marine Corps flying units. In
 22 vital aviation -- this vital aviation training area was not

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1 And followed up by which was additional funding,
 2 additional investment in Fort Indiantown Gap, based on the
 3 military value. Thanks very much for the brief time you've
 4 given me.

5 (Applause.)

6 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Congressman,
 7 for your remarks. General.

8 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: I'm Brigadier General
 9 MacVay, the acting adjunct general of the Commonwealth of
 10 Pennsylvania. And our governor, Tom Ridge has asked me to
 11 appear before you on behalf of the Commonwealth and on behalf
 12 of the more than 30,000 Guardsmen and Reservists stationed in
 13 our state for training at the Gap.

14 The Commonwealth vigorously opposes the
 15 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense to close
 16 Indiantown Gap because we regard its present operations as
 17 essential to training and the readiness of these soldiers.

18 We are the nation's strategic insurance and must be
 19 prepared to carry out that mission. The Secretary's military
 20 attributes and selection criteria place the greatest value on
 21 land, the number of acres. Clearly, if the land is not
 22 accessible to the force structure to be supported, then it

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1 considered in the past military value assessment. Our
 2 bombing and strafing ridge can be restored. It is one of 15
 3 in the nation, and is used day and night throughout the year,
 4 with over 1,300 sorties annually. This range is in a
 5 military operations area that covers most of the Eastern part
 6 of the state, and is used on the National Guard and Reserve,
 7 as well as the active Air Force, Navy and Marines.

8 Both the range and the military operations area are
 9 national assets. The Gap is also the most affordable base to
 10 the force structure. It is the most cost-effective of the
 11 bases with which it was compared. It is a bare-bones, no-
 12 frills, only essentials place. Situated in the center of the
 13 state, it is the most affordable in travel time and dollars.
 14 The garrison staff at minimal levels, it is the Army's best
 15 bargain. The Gap is the second most heavily used major
 16 trading area by the Reserve component in the nation.

17 Heavy use, I submit, is evidence of high value.

18 Unlike other Reserve component training bases, every day of
 19 the year, we have almost 3,000 people on post, the equivalent
 20 of a brigade, who are either working, stationed or training
 21 here. There are several active component tenants, and many
 22 Army Guard, Air Guard and Reserve units are stationed here as

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1 well.

2 There are several Reserve component institutions,
3 or schoolhouses, that operate at Fort Indiantown Gap --
4 probably more than on any other installation in our category.
5 This training is year-round, and all together, some 15,000
6 students are trained at the Gap school. Weekend and annual
7 training is conducted at the Gap all 12 months of the year.
8 Each Thursday, we see the arrival of our advanced detachments
9 of brigade-sized task forces, which come for weekend training
10 on Friday.

11 On some weekends, as high as 9,000 soldiers are
12 here. Our annual weekend usage is 288,000 military training
13 days. 32,000 soldiers also attend annual training here,
14 comprising 494,000 military training days. They are not just
15 from Pennsylvania. They come from 13 other states. This is
16 a map of the cantonment area of the Gap. What you see in
17 yellow indicates daily occupancy. These are the
18 headquarters, the administrative buildings, the maintenance
19 shops, warehouses, storage compounds, schoolhouses and units
20 stationed at the Gap.

21 All these activities and facilities will still
22 function, regardless of who operates the installation. The

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1 briefly critique each post to which the Army proposes to move
2 the Gap's annual training. Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, is
3 totally unsuitable for mechanized or armored maneuver
4 training. It has no tank ranges, has poor artillery firing
5 force, and we only use it for the helicopter gunnery.

6 Fort Dix, New Jersey, is very limited in available
7 mechanized maneuver space, so that only one central battalion
8 can train there at a time. It is already heavily used, lacks
9 in tank qualification range. It is doubtful that any time
10 would be available during the few summer training months for
11 additional forces. I would also note the New Jersey Army
12 National Guard -- their brigade does not conduct its annual
13 training at Fort Dix, provides the training at Fort Drum, New
14 York.

15 Fort Pickett and Fort Drum offer the better
16 alternative sites for training. But obviously, they cannot
17 satisfy the requirements of the Gap's daily or weekend usage,
18 which I have outlined in some detail. As you know, Fort
19 Pickett is also on the closing list and could be unavailable,
20 or much less desirable than enclave. Fort Drum has a
21 capacity for annual training, and would be overtaxed with
22 additional troops if a war started.

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1 red area shows those areas being demolished, or those that
2 have been demolished. We are all over post-modern charity.
3 The infrastructure is under and on top of us, and thus the
4 cantonment area cannot be possibly be enclave. It just
5 doesn't make sense. That's why the National Guard Bureau, in
6 its study, has concluded that the entire post must be
7 retained.

8 The enclave idea is not only an impractical one,
9 but it's a bad idea. Conversion to an enclave will mean what
10 is stated on this slide. We emphasize three things -- first,
11 the cantonment area will be abandoned; second, irrespective
12 of whether all troops come for training go directly to and
13 will live in the field; and third, the proposed action will
14 have an adverse impact on morale, training and readiness.
15 The quality of life of our soldiers and airmen is a readiness
16 issue.

17 In fact, the Secretary of Defense has made it the
18 number-one priority. This proposal would take from the
19 soldiers all the quality of life facilities we have for them.
20 The soldiers work all week, and on Friday evening, travel an
21 hour or two to the Gap, arriving at 2100 to 2300 hours, and
22 must go directly to the field and remain there until loaded

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1 Budget constraints determine how much of the force
2 could travel to these distant posts. Our Guard trains a
3 significant part of its forces at the Gap because of lack of
4 travel funds, because the Gap is a better suitable -- it's
5 much more suitable for training requirements. The cost of
6 travel to move a 3,500-man brigade task force, with its
7 vehicles and equipment from Pennsylvania to Fort Drum, Fort
8 A.P. Hill or Fort Pickett is five times or more the cost to
9 move the Fort Indiantown Gap.

10 Sometimes brigades will have to make a two-day
11 journey, which reduces a 15-day training time by four days,
12 or 26 percent, and which further increases our cost. If we
13 must move the entire force out of state, it could cost an
14 additional \$2 million to \$4 million more at a time when
15 travel budgets are being cut.

16 The training load model used by the Army in its
17 analysis considered only through-put and not the additional
18 cost of traveling elsewhere. I would point out that this is
19 the only military training installation in the nation that is
20 owned by the state and leased to the federal government.

21 Clearly, you cannot establish a federal enclave
22 without the consent of the state. The unique relationship

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1 up for the truck drive home. I can tell you, the morale will
2 immediately be affected. Our reenlistment rate will go down,
3 and we will lose a lot of good soldiers.

4 We cannot treat soldiers and airmen this way.
5 Lacking a good night's rest will also increase risk and
6 safety concerns. I cannot see myself or any good commander
7 taking away what little quality of life we have for our
8 soldiers, and I tell you it will not be done. This simply
9 won't happen. If the infrastructure is not manned and
10 working to provide all the required supporting services, then
11 the training operations will noticeably suffer in the
12 quality, again adversely affecting readiness.

13 If the logistics operation, supply and maintenance
14 are disrupted, there will be reduced readiness and increased
15 repair times and delays in the delivery of supplies.
16 Taxpayers of the nation have made a large investment in the
17 organization, equipment and training of these forces to bring
18 them to high standards of readiness. Every aspect of
19 training and readiness will suffer under this proposal.

20 The Secretary's enclave recommendation to close the
21 Gap and all annual training, and would send 32,000 soldiers
22 who come there to far, distant posts for training. I will

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1 was not considered by the Army's analysts, nor were the
2 exceptional costs that could flow from taking it into
3 account.

4 This lease places a burden on the federal
5 government to restore the lands to a safe condition and to
6 comply with various statutes and regulations. If the lease
7 is terminated, the state may not wish to assume regional
8 liability or responsibility for the base unless and until the
9 lands are restored and the outstanding legal issue is
10 resolved.

11 The lease could significantly alter the timetable
12 for completing the proposed action. The post must be
13 operated to satisfy the daily, weekend operational and
14 training requirements of the force. Therefore, there is no
15 sensible why annual training should not continue to be
16 conducted at the Gap. To operate enclave, with all the
17 turbulence and degradation it would cause, and then pay to
18 move all of the force out of state for annual training makes
19 no sense.

20 It is far more expensive, much less effective and
21 is unaffordable. If the Commission determines to adopt the
22 Secretary's recommendation, I tell you, this is what will

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1 happen. There will be a very reduced and less certain
 2 federal income stream. The workforce will be dismissed, and
 3 one hired to replace it. There will be a rapid deterioration
 4 of all facilities. There will be a lack of funds for capital
 5 improvement. There will be a degradation in necessary
 6 maintenance and training support. And all of this will have
 7 an immediate and adverse impact on soldier morale and
 8 readiness.

9 This is why we strongly urge you to continue the
 10 operations of this small but superb post as it is. The
 11 recommendation before the Commission does not pass the common
 12 sense test. We've had a very successful partnership with the
 13 Gap, active Guard, and Reserve for 50 years. We have
 14 customers -- the Guard, the Reserve and all who train at the
 15 Gap have received quality service from a quality workforce.
 16 This base must come off the list, Madame Chairman.

17 The successful partnership must remain in place,
 18 continuous for our troops and keep us a trained and ready
 19 force. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

20 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Congressman Holden.
 21 CONGRESSMAN HOLDEN: Good afternoon, Commissioners.
 22 I appreciate the opportunity to present testimony today,

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1 Now, let us return to the \$11 million in annual savings the
 2 Army has claimed it will achieve by closing the post
 3 infrastructure and dismissing the employees. Will there
 4 really be a savings? Someone would need to take over the
 5 infrastructure.

6 The new infrastructure would, again, be federally
 7 funded. The Army has said the responsibility to support the
 8 many facilities on the installation which, although Reserve
 9 components, are federal missions. Therefore, it is not
 10 practical to expect any savings. You can't save money simply
 11 by saying you're going to stop paying the bills. The Army is
 12 simply shifting the bill from the regular Army to the Reserve
 13 component. This is not surprising, however, based on the
 14 guidance the Army base study was given.

15 The Army instructed its analysis to "minimize the
 16 number of major training areas focused primarily on Reserve
 17 component training support." And in its directions to its
 18 analysis, it further stated, "considerable overhaul of DOD
 19 savings could be realized by maximizing the use of Reserve
 20 component enclaves. The reality of the situation shows that
 21 the Secretary's enclave proposal is operationally not
 22 practical, and that the client savings cannot be realized.

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1 because many of the employees at the Gap are my friends and
 2 neighbors. I would like to continue our discussion by
 3 turning to the financial side of the closing. The Army, in
 4 its program analysis, claimed that it would save \$23.8
 5 million a year by closing and enclaving the Fort, despite the
 6 fact that the Fort only has an annual budget of \$13.5
 7 million.

8 This may have misled the decision-makers in
 9 proposing this closing action. We challenged this figure,
 10 gave them our review and as a result, the Army base study
 11 conducted a sensitivity analysis. That analysis projected an
 12 \$11.2 million annual savings out of the installation's \$13.5
 13 million budget. We believe this analysis is also seriously
 14 flawed, and we hope that claim will not mislead this
 15 commission.

16 Specifically, the scenario fails to provide for the
 17 cost of the post infrastructure, the necessity of which has
 18 been presented to you. It also failed to consider the
 19 substantial cost of travel, which the proposal requires.
 20 Fort Indiantown Gap is the home of many facilities,
 21 activities, Reserve units and other users. These activities
 22 would not leave. The Army has said these activities must

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1 In light of these facts, I would ask you to
 2 consider the logic behind disrupting an efficient and cost-
 3 effective workforce, who selflessly serve their nation --
 4 some for their entire working life -- for the sake of a paper
 5 savings that will never materialize. What is the point of
 6 spending millions of dollars to dismiss these employees, only
 7 to hire replacements?

8 The turbulence and inefficiency that would
 9 inevitably result from change in the present garrison
 10 operations would undoubtedly impact on the readiness of the
 11 thousands of soldiers who train at the Gap throughout the
 12 year. I would further ask you to specifically request that
 13 the GAO look at Fort Indiantown Gap analysis. Thank you very
 14 much. (Applause.)

15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much.
 16 MR. VEGOS: In the very short time remaining, let
 17 me put what we have told you in perspective. The Army has
 18 recommended closing Fort Indiantown Gap. However, as we made
 19 clear this afternoon, the Gap is not redundant, and certainly
 20 not replaceable. Its military value is far too high. As
 21 part of the Army's close recommendation, we all know the Gap
 22 will continue to operate as a major training base because of

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1 remain, and has recommended they be enclaved.

2 As you have heard, the facilities are spread
 3 throughout the post. The Army has also stated that the
 4 training areas and ranges are still needed for the large
 5 population of Reserve component use. The National Guard
 6 Bureau has recommended that the entire installation be
 7 retained. The natural question that follows is, what would
 8 be the result of pulling out the Army garrison, as the
 9 Secretary proposes?

10 Fort Indiantown Gap could be compared to a large
 11 office building. All the users of the installation are the
 12 renters in the building, while the regular Army is the
 13 management. The Army, by recommending this closure, has said
 14 the occupants will stay, but the management and staff who run
 15 the building will be dismissed. Imagine that you were an
 16 occupant in the building and went to work to find the water,
 17 electricity and sewer turned off, and all other essential
 18 services discontinued.

19 What would you do? Naturally, you would relocate.
 20 But the Army has said no, it will cost too much for you to
 21 leave. The Army has estimated that moving these functions to
 22 another installation will cost in excess of \$300 million.

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1 its location in the Northeast and its proximity to 57,000
 2 Reserve component soldiers.

3 Those soldiers simply must be trained, and they
 4 must train and the best and most cost-effective training base
 5 available at Fort Indiantown Gap. Also, it's clear that the
 6 federal partnership that has existed at the Gap for more than
 7 50 years, through a very favorable lease arrangement, is the
 8 best option for the Department of Defense, the Army, and
 9 their partners in the Reserve component. Clearly, if you
 10 realign the base to another management structure, you give up
 11 too much, and you spend too much money doing it.

12 The federal partnership in place today works; it is
 13 not broken; it does not need to be fixed; it is a model of
 14 training efficiency. On behalf of everyone in the Fort
 15 Indiantown Gap coalition, please take Fort Indiantown Gap off
 16 the list. (Applause.)

17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. I believe
 18 there are a few questions, if you all have a few more
 19 minutes. Commissioner Robles.

20 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Yes. I have a question. You
 21 made a very good argument about Fort Indiantown Gap being a
 22 good place to train. And in this day of downsizing, I assume

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1 that the Army's proposal was put forth to save the base
 2 operations cost by moving that garrison out of there. And
 3 you also stated that the National Guard Bureau thinks highly
 4 of Fort Indiantown Gap. So my question to you is, have you
 5 asked, either through the Adjunct General or through other
 6 terms, whether the Guard would consider running it
 7 themselves, funding it; and to get the required dollars to do
 8 that, they would close some of those other alternative sites
 9 you said aren't very good places to train?
 10 That would seem like, to me, a proposal. You
 11 wouldn't have to fire anybody. You would take AGRs and
 12 Reservists to run it -- and there's a precedent for Reserve
 13 running installations -- and let you continue operating
 14 Indiantown Gap just the way it is.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: Sir, let me answer the
 16 first part of it by saying that Governor Ridge is looking at
 17 that. We don't have any closure on what the backfill would
 18 be, if any, at this point. But that is being studied. One
 19 correction, if I may. I did not say that the other
 20 installations were not good places to train. They were just
 21 not suitable for those soldiers that have to train at Fort
 22 Indiantown Gap, either due to the type of terrain that is

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1 important training becomes in a place where that training has
 2 been historically valuable. That's what I'm saying. All you
 3 have to do is conjure up the vision, the idea of the
 4 mobilization that took place at Indiantown Gap for Desert
 5 Storm, and then you know the immediacy that is provided by
 6 Indiantown Gap.
 7 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I guess my final comment is,
 8 I don't dispute that. I'll just say, I agree with you -- I
 9 think it has great military value, from what you laid out.
 10 But it's a matter of who pays for it. I'm just saying there
 11 are other proposals. You could get the National Guard Bureau
 12 to step up and pay for it and run it, and you would save the
 13 military value of that installation.
 14 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Congress --
 15 Commissioner Cornella.
 16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I've been promoted. I've
 17 got a couple questions. I visited the fort, and the day I
 18 was up there, I saw A-10s coming in and bombing and tanks
 19 firing, and it was rather impressive. You said that there
 20 are 15 other ranges that the A-10s -- you didn't say A-10s --
 21 but evidently, that the A-10's could use. Where would other
 22 locations be in that region, within the Northeast region?

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1 there, or to the travel distance and cost to travel to get
 2 there. Those installations are good training installations.
 3 It's just that we can't get to them.
 4 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: I understand that, because
 5 geography and other things. But a couple of your
 6 alternatives -- and there's another list you could put up
 7 there -- they're not optimal training installations. You
 8 can't train heavy; you can't train light.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: That's right.
 10 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Why can't we do a reverse
 11 logic and move them to Fort Indiantown Gap, and have the
 12 Guard Bureau look at that. And that would generate
 13 sufficient savings to pay for the garrison. And then you all
 14 could run the installation, and everybody would be happy.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: I don't have an answer
 16 to that particular proposal, but its certainly one that could
 17 be looked at, I would imagine.
 18 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: One answer that I come up with
 19 viscerally to that, Commissioner, is that in the BRAC
 20 Commission that reviewed Indiantown Gap four years ago, it
 21 was determined that the military value in place at that time,
 22 which is still the case, was so valuable that it was taken

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1 Are there quite a few in that area?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: Some in New Jersey, sir,
 3 Virginia, and out towards Indianapolis, are the three that
 4 are nearby.
 5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. Would they be at any
 6 other Army forts?
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: I'm sure there are. I
 8 could call on installations. I'm sure there are others in
 9 the United States. I can't answer exactly where they are.
 10 But I don't know -- one of the great advantages we have is,
 11 we're tied into the military operations area that's already
 12 been approved by the FAA.
 13 And these pilots could do much more training than
 14 just -- approach training, low altitude pop-up training, and
 15 that sort of thing. So it's just a perfect combination for
 16 us to use. And the computerized --
 17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You want tanks and A-10s to
 18 train together. They normally work together on a
 19 battlefield, right?
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: Yes, sir, they sure do.
 21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I know that at Fort Dix, I
 22 don't believe that A-10s train with tanks at Fort Dix.

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1 off the list. And then, increased investment was made by the
 2 very individuals who now say it should be placed on the list
 3 again.
 4 That, to me, is, like we were saying, an exercise
 5 in futility. Here we substantiate the military value,
 6 increase the investment, and now put it back on the list.
 7 That's crazy.
 8 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Well, Congressman, I
 9 understand that, I just --
 10 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: What I'm saying -- that answers
 11 your question completely, because it has already been
 12 established and reestablished.
 13 COMMISSIONER ROBLES: Well, I'll just say that four
 14 years ago, I was still on active duty. And since 1991 to
 15 now, the Army, I think, last time I remember at the back of
 16 my head, as the budget director, lost about 40 percent of its
 17 purchasing power. And so I think there's a completely
 18 different environment today --
 19 CONGRESSMAN GEKAS: But all the more reason,
 20 Commissioner, if they lost that, then the military value for
 21 a training facility becomes even more valuable. The more you
 22 downsize the entire armed forces structure, the more

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: I don't believe so, sir.
 2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I'm not here to talk about
 3 Fort Dix. I'm here to talk about Fort Indiantown Gap, but I
 4 want to understand that, because you brought it up. You said
 5 that, if I remember, that you go up to a table VIII on tank
 6 training.
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: That was tank primary
 8 qualification training, yes sir. That's --
 9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Well, you know, and I
 10 believe Fort Dix goes to a table VIX.
 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: No, sir. They have a
 12 table VIII course that is not two standard at this time.
 13 There is not a two standard radius.
 14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay. There's a
 15 qualification -- you said they have not tank qualification
 16 range.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: That's right.
 18 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Does that play into the
 19 table?
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: Yes, sir, it does.
 21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay, so explain that just
 22 briefly for us.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: Sure. Table VIII
 2 qualification course is one that has a standard set port,
 3 ranger -- specific target range, specific opening and firing
 4 times. And there are a lot of ranges on a lot of
 5 installations that approach that sort of a thing that you can
 6 train crews on, but you can't qualify them because they don't
 7 meet the standard qualification requirement that Department
 8 of the Army says our crews must have. That's a very rigidly
 9 prescribed range.

10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: When you use that tank
 11 range, do you have to shut down any other ranges?
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL MacVAY: No, sir. Right now, the
 13 safety pen does not affect any other range. But you may have
 14 displaced some indirect fire units, but it does not impact on
 15 training installation at all.

16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Okay, thank you.

17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much for your
 18 presentation. (Applause.) We'll hear next from the
 19 representatives of the Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station. We're
 20 ready to begin, if you all are ready. Before we begin,
 21 however, we are required by statute to put you all under
 22 oath. So if you wouldn't mind raising your right hand.

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1 MR. HOLSWORTH: Thank you, sir. Good afternoon,
 2 Commissioners. I would first like to introduce you to
 3 representatives and members of the Western Pennsylvania
 4 Coalition who have accompanied me here today. Sitting to
 5 Congressman Mascara's right is Judge John Brosky, Major
 6 General, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, chairman of the
 7 Western Pennsylvania Coalition. Next to him is Lance
 8 Schaeffer. Steve George is an architect, former Director of
 9 Aviation, Pittsburgh International Airport. Joe Knapick, at
 10 the next table is a Westinghouse engineer, and certainly a
 11 COBRA data analyst; Joe Poznick, another Western Pennsylvania
 12 Coalition data analyst; and Bob Moseline on the end, a
 13 Western Pennsylvania Coalition analyst.

14 If I may, my 25 years of experience in the Air
 15 Force, from Vietnam to Haitian relief has enabled me to see
 16 many facilities, land on many runways at a variety of
 17 airports, military and civilian. I have seen good
 18 facilities, I've seen bad facilities. And today, we're here
 19 to tell you about a truly one-of-a-kind, remarkable facility.
 20 The story in the numbers are, without a doubt, substantially
 21 different from that given by the Department of Defense.
 22 Located on the Pittsburgh, International Airport,

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1 (Witnesses sworn.)
 2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Congressman.
 3 CONGRESSMAN MASCARA: Good. I would like to thank
 4 my colleagues from the Pennsylvania congressional delegation.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: If we could please have as much
 6 quiet as possible. I know people are moving around, but it's
 7 very important that we hear. Thank you.

8 CONGRESSMAN MASCARA: Thank you. I would like to
 9 thank my colleagues from the Pennsylvania congressional
 10 delegation for allowing me to be here today, representing all
 11 of Southwestern Pennsylvania, for our support of the 911th
 12 Airlift Wing. We have vital military reasons for the BRAC
 13 Commission to reconsider the Department of Defense
 14 recommendation to close the 911th Airlift Wing.

15 These reasons are based on hundreds of voluntary
 16 man hours of research and analysis from the 911th Wing,
 17 Carnegie Mellon University, Robert Morris College, and
 18 Pittsburgh's major corporations. For this briefing, we are
 19 not going to burden you with the economic hardship the
 20 closing of this base will have upon the people of our
 21 community. The analysis of financial data used to arrive at
 22 the decision to close the base is simply incorrect.

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1 the fourth largest land mass in the entire country, the 911th
 2 Airlift Wing flies and maintains C-130 H aircraft. Its
 3 mission is to provide Reserve forces ready to go at a
 4 moment's notice, providing airlift and aeromedical evacuation
 5 crews anywhere in the world. The 911th Airlift Wing employs
 6 over 1,300 Reservists, with an additional 357 full-time
 7 employees.

8 Almost all are from the local area. In fact, 80
 9 percent of them live within a 50-mile radius of the base.
 10 The major airline hub at Pittsburgh International Airport
 11 makes it a valuable hub for experience, personnel and air
 12 crew recruiting. Our people live here; we do not need to go
 13 out and bring them in. The 911th is continuously manned at
 14 over 100 percent. The Wing currently has eight aircraft
 15 assigned 1987 models C-130 Hs.

16 Presently, there are two more being operated and
 17 maintained by the 911th in a sort of temporary custody
 18 arrangement, until the unit in Youngstown, Ohio, recruits
 19 enough personnel and raise enough concrete as part of their
 20 costly expansion program. Another aircraft is on station as
 21 part of a several-year modification program, run by the
 22 Lockheed Corporation, which is using one of our three hangers

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1 The 911th Wings base operating support is half as
 2 much as briefed by the Air Force when making its closure
 3 decision. Its actual predicted military construction is only
 4 one-eighth that which was given to me in answer to my
 5 questions to the Pentagon. The errors go on. This
 6 installation has the assets necessary to expand its existing
 7 facilities at no cost to the United States.

8 These expansion capabilities include additional
 9 ramp space and acreage. The Air Force Reserve presently
 10 enjoys military benefits and special facilities at the
 11 Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station that do
 12 not exist and cannot be duplicated elsewhere, without
 13 enormous military construction costs. This duplication cost
 14 was not considered during the Air Force analysis. Our
 15 research clearly shows flaws, as Charles Holsworth, President
 16 of Holsworth & Associates and President of the South Hills
 17 Chamber of Commerce is now going to show you, that the
 18 original analysis has resulted in substantial deviation from
 19 the DOD selection criteria and force structure plan.

20 Our analysis further shows that the 911th Air Wing
 21 is the finest Air Reserve facility in the command today. Mr.
 22 Holsworth.

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1 to work on all Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
 2 C-130s.

3 The Wing, at no cost, maintains two environmentally
 4 approved drop zones within 25 miles of the airport, allowing
 5 the air crews to perform combat training immediately after
 6 take-off -- a benefit not found most other places, especially
 7 at civilian airfields. The 911th communications facility is
 8 one of the most advanced in the country. This \$15.1 million
 9 dollar investment is the only operational fiber optic network
 10 in the Air Force Reserve.

11 The center serves more than 50 federal and
 12 community facilities in the area, including 100 percent of
 13 the Air National Guard requirements. There is no question
 14 that this system improves the efficiency and readiness of the
 15 911 and all its users. And yet, this center was completely
 16 overlooked by the Air Force when it came to base closure
 17 selection. If the 911th is closed, this communication system
 18 is lost.

19 The Air National Guard and other agencies will have
 20 to replace it with their own costly systems. The Pittsburgh
 21 Guard unit also depends on us for credit union, BX,
 22 gymnasium, club and building facilities. They have none --

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1 another factor completely overlooked when the Air Force said,
 2 clean kill with no impact on the Pittsburgh International
 3 Guard.
 4 Just as you heard from Fort Indiantown Gap, this is
 5 not cost avoidance, this isn't savings. This is merely
 6 shifting the cost elsewhere in the government, and spending a
 7 heck of a lot to do it. The state of the art de-icing
 8 facility with all new environmental standards has just
 9 recently been completed on the Air Force Reserve round. It
 10 greatly extends the 911th's operational capability. It is
 11 the only one available anywhere in the Air Force Reserve, and
 12 one of only three in the entire active duty Air Force.
 13 Eventually, every other base with any threat of
 14 freezing will be forced to build one. I'd like to point out
 15 another military value that cannot be overlooked, yet one not
 16 even contemplated by the Air Force -- our close proximity to
 17 the extensive Pittsburgh medical complexes. Our government
 18 has established the WDMMS at Pittsburgh, the fourth largest
 19 such system in the entire country, and something not
 20 available at many other locations.
 21 The planned use of this system will bring airlift
 22 medical evacuation of casualties to the 911th, where they

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1 could be met at Pittsburgh. This plan, the 911th Base
 2 Comprehensive Plan, was a result of that effort. A golden
 3 opportunity to implement this plan was created with the
 4 groundbreaking of the new midfield terminal. Up to 77 acres
 5 could be readily available for expansion -- the red and the
 6 blue areas on the slide, and I realize it's a little hard to
 7 see.
 8 30 acres of that total became available for use in
 9 1992, the red area. Then was the opening of the new midfield
 10 terminal at the new international airport. The 911th has
 11 utilized this capability by agreement since then. In 1994,
 12 Allegheny County culminated the 10-year planning effort by
 13 offering to include these 30 acres in the existing \$1-a year
 14 lease. In addition to this rent space, the increase has
 15 dramatically increased our present capacity to park 13
 16 aircraft.
 17 There are four different configurations of numbers
 18 and types of present and future aircraft recommended in the
 19 1988 plan for use of this additional rent space. From
 20 increasing the number of C-130s to C-5s to C-17s, and even
 21 nondevelopmental aircraft, like the 747. We now have the
 22 additional acreage available, as contemplated in this plan,

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1 will than be handled and processed by our own aeromedical
 2 staging facility, and transported to the extensive civilian
 3 care providers just minutes away. This system is practiced
 4 regularly, and was fully operational, ready to go if needed,
 5 during Desert Storm. It is here now, ready to go in any
 6 emergency or disaster.
 7 To remove the airlift wing would break this system
 8 in half. And yet this disruption was not even considered by
 9 the Air Force. Commissioners, the 911th Wing will set an
 10 unprecedented standard of Reserve volunteerism. It is no
 11 wonder the Air Force relies so heavily on the 911th to
 12 fulfill its mission requirements. The 911th forces were
 13 there in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, from deployment of
 14 aircraft and volunteer crews a few days after Kuwait was
 15 invaded, until the withdrawal of our aeromedical evacuation
 16 crews and area port volunteers after actions were concluded.
 17 The volunteer Reserve forces from Pittsburgh have
 18 carried the lion's share of the Bosnia relief efforts, from
 19 middle of the night air drops over the flashes of traces from
 20 ground fire below, to repeated missions in and out of
 21 Sarajevo Airport. A whopping 30 percent of the total airlift
 22 effort and relief efforts of Hurricane Andrew were carried by

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1 which makes Pittsburgh Air Reserve station expansion
 2 capabilities nearly unlimited.
 3 No military construction is needed to begin
 4 consolidated operations. No new costs. Instead of closure,
 5 common sense, let alone good business sense, which you heard
 6 about earlier, would say that we should be adding to this
 7 wing. Our access to those remarkable facilities at the
 8 Pittsburgh International Airport is certainly unique. There
 9 are four runways now, from 8,100 feet to 11,500 feet long.
 10 The 911th uses these at absolutely no cost. A fifth runway
 11 is going to be built in 1998.
 12 Military operations would never cease here because
 13 of something like a blown tire on a single runway operation
 14 airport. And yet some single runway operation airports
 15 support military Reserve forces. A foolish waste of
 16 resources? I will let you decide. The 911th is capable of
 17 handling any known aircraft on our existing ramp space, and
 18 at almost any numbers with the additional ramp space offered.
 19 And yet we are only one of two Air Force Reserve units
 20 considered able to do so.
 21 To reach this capacity elsewhere would cost
 22 millions of dollars in just laying of concrete alone. This

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1 the 911th Airlift Wing Reserve volunteers, responding to the
 2 request for help; to say nothing of the 500-plus Reserve
 3 volunteers assisting with the U.S. Air flight 427 disaster.
 4 And this is only the beginning. Commissioners, the
 5 figures show that the 911th has responded to higher
 6 headquarters requests on a level unequalled by any other base.
 7 Let's take a look at criteria one, two and three. Criteria
 8 one, looking at the 911th Wing, speaks for itself. The
 9 operational effectiveness of this unit, its missions, its
 10 flying requirements, are already rated the best in the Air
 11 Force Reserve.
 12 Furthermore, the airfield characteristics and the
 13 capabilities of the 911th Wing at this airport in Pittsburgh
 14 are unmatched. The alleged limited expansion capability
 15 attributed to this air base by the Air Force BRAC data is,
 16 quite frankly, wrong. Its compact physical lay out is very
 17 cost effective. Everything is within walking distance,
 18 buildings well maintained. Right now, the 911th is located
 19 on 115 acres of land, and can handle 13 aircraft without any
 20 expansion necessary, and most importantly, at no cost.
 21 In 1983, the Air Force Reserve began a master
 22 planning process to ensure any required future expansion

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1 capability has been seriously misrepresented. No additional
 2 work on the ramps, taxiways or runways is necessary to
 3 accommodate any foreseeable aircraft in the future. Closing
 4 of the 911th Airlift Wing will demand enormous investment of
 5 Department of Defense time and especially money to match this
 6 unit's existing capabilities elsewhere.
 7 No potential receiving location can match the
 8 911th's growth capabilities, but they sure can be costly in
 9 trying. When the initial shock wore off, from being on the
 10 recommended list, we began to look at DOD reasons and data.
 11 It was pretty obvious to us that something was wrong. How
 12 could this base ever be the most costly to operate, the way
 13 the Air Force reports said we were? Those numbers made no
 14 sense. We began to ask questions.
 15 First, Air Force releases, as you see here, said
 16 Pittsburgh had to go because it was the most costly C-130
 17 installation based on base operating support costs. The Air
 18 Force Reserve had to go to criteria four and five to make
 19 closure decisions. It soon became evident that these figures
 20 were totally in error and the BOS comparisons we made showed
 21 the 911th Wing is actually the least expensive of all to
 22 operate.

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Then, after our inquiry into this alarming inquiry, the Air Force replied, and I quote, "its Pittsburgh Air Reserve station operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields." We again asked why, substantiate that assertion. On April 7th, 1995, the Air Force answer was, and I quote, "Pittsburgh Air Reserve station Fiscal Year 94 OMM was \$22.83 million, sixth highest of units on civilian air fields." Commissioners, there are only six C-130 units on civilian air fields.

In Western Pennsylvania, what that means to us is that it's the cheapest to operate. The second response was, and I quote, "the Pittsburgh Air Reserve station Fiscal Year 94 RPA was \$8.67 million, highest of all." First of all, this is a totally inappropriate number to be considered in closure analysis anyway. Let's consider what Reserve Personnel Appropriations Costs really mean, and why we are the highest.

These are the costs for our people to do their job; do their job above and beyond the required annual tour; above and beyond their weekend drills. What this really means is that the 911th assumed a larger percentage of the Air Force mission than any other unit. How can anyone compare data

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1 highest to the very lowest net savings resulting from
2 closure.
3
4 Corrected COBRA reveals that the country will save
5 between \$6 and \$60 million additional dollars by selecting
6 one of these other bases, other than Pittsburgh -- anything
7 above the red line on this graph, that appears in your book.
8 So the final cost picture is not at all like depicted on the
9 Air Force AFRES BRAC '95 analysis. Pittsburgh is clearly at
10 the top in military value, and, based upon the Air Force's
11 own revised data, the least expensive to operate. Pittsburgh
12 is not at all the logical closure candidate.
13
14 It just makes no sense. I began, and again,
15 emphasize those facts, the same way Congressman Mascara
16 began, and I would like to leave you with this. The grossly
17 inaccurate data that was used to arrive at a decision to
18 close Pittsburgh Air Reserve station is truly, grossly
19 inaccurate. The Pittsburgh Air Reserve station is a solid,
20 unique facility that cannot be duplicated without enormous
21 expenditures.
22
23 The minuscule cost of future expansion at this
24 airport is a once in a lifetime deal for the United States.
25
26 Thank you for your time and patience. Are there any

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like this and treat it as a negative impact? If the Air Force wants to change it, it just has to stop calling Pittsburgh for volunteers.

The third response was, and I quote, "Pittsburgh projected MILCOM, a cost avoidance if Pittsburgh is closed, is \$33.58 million, highest by \$20 million of any unit." This figure is not substantially, but grossly inaccurate. The Pittsburgh Air Reserve station military construction from Fiscal Year 95, even projected into the 21 century, is actually only \$4.414 million. When compared to the cost of construction projected at the other Air Force Reserve C-130 bases, the highest being Youngstown, Ohio, at \$32.94 million, the 911th figures are actually the lowest of all.

The base is in great condition. Required construction projects are minimal. With the Air Force's own numbers, Pittsburgh is firmly established as the least expensive to maintain, not even to mention the highest military value in the command. We have questioned COBRA data all along. Studies of the COBRA data have indicated numerous errors in the analysis that have seriously skewed the results. Recent congressional inquiries in this regard have brought Air Force admission that there were errors made in

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1 questions?
2
3 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Commissioner Steele.
4
5 COMMISSIONER STEELE: I just have a quick question,
6 regarding the RPA. You said that Pittsburgh has gone above
7 and beyond. I wonder if you could address that. I even
8 heard something before, you were called to act in helping
9 with the U.S. Air crash and other things. If you could
10 address what's different.
11
12 MR. HOLSWORTH: I could keep naming everything
13 we've been involved in, but if you went through every action,
14 military action, the United States has taken -- any disaster,
15 just about any of them -- Pittsburgh's been there. And it's
16 our people volunteering, volunteering -- and I emphasize that
17 -- to go there on the call from higher headquarters. When
18 they call Pittsburgh for help, we go. And now they say, oh,
19 the money that we paid to Pittsburgh for our people to
20 volunteer to help out makes us the most expensive. That's
21 foolishness.
22
23 COMMISSIONER STEELE: Thanks for addressing that.
24 That's all, Madame Chairman.
25
26 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Commissioner Cornella.
27
28 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: On the slide, it was a

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the COBRA, critical cost figures, such as those where Minneapolis figures were applied to three other bases -- O'Hare, Pittsburgh, and Niagara.

Costs were seriously understated for some other affected bases. The so-called level playing field was anything but level. The Air Force has promised to supply us data, updated COBRA runs for each base in the category. But our COBRA experts have already performed corrected COBRA analysis using cost data from Air Force source documents. Serious error have been made, such as overstating the 911th's communications cost element by 170 percent; base operating support cost element by 118 percent; Youngstown nonpayroll RPA costs is at least 12 times greater than the figure used in the Air Force Reserve level play scenario.

What kind of COBRA data is that? The Air Force Reserve analysis also failed to consider the savings benefits of MILCOM cost avoidance. Pittsburgh has the lowest projected MILCOM budget over the COBRA analysis period. The Youngstown, Ohio, unit is the highest. And get this -- it's 775 percent that of Pittsburgh's. Our studies of COBRA and data supplied by the Air Force show serious miscalculations that, when corrected, show Pittsburgh moving from second

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1 little bit hard to see the adjoining ramp space. Could you
2 point it out on the photograph, please? Where the --
3
4 MR. HOLSWORTH: The bottom photo right here, is the
5 Reserve base. The present configuration of the base comes
6 right down here. This is up in the very top corner, right
7 here, of the entire airport. This was the old terminal,
8 abandoned now for the last two years -- an excellent
9 opportunity for all this ramp space, which was part of this
10 plan that began in 1983. What has happened is, last year, as
11 we pointed out, and actually for the last two years, we've
12 been using this space up here where you see our aircraft
13 parked, and in fact, one of Youngstown's aircraft parked
14 there.
15
16 We've been using this to park airplanes for the
17 last couple years. By agreement, the county last year came
18 out with a formal document offering it, at no cost, to the
19 Air Force Reserve. Well, now we find out why it wasn't
20 formally accepted, because Pittsburgh was being considered
21 for closure. But what's happened is, furthering on the
22 master plan, this 30 acres here was extended over. And
23 you'll see in the plan that's in your books, as was indicated
24 on that one slide, that these are temporary ramps on this old

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1 terminal.

2 They're in the process of being torn down. All

3 this concrete apron, all of this, has been offered to us at

4 no cost by Allegheny County.

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much for that very

7 helpful and informative presentation. And we will be moving

8 on now to the Kelly Support Center, Pittsburgh. (Applause.)

9 Alright, I have listed Colonel Burns. Will anyone else be

10 testifying? Congressman Mascara will speak first, but he has

11 been sworn in, so we don't have to do that again. Colonel

12 Burns, you were sworn in, too. All right, well, we're

13 prepared to begin if you are. Congressman.

14 CONGRESSMAN MASCARA: Thank you, Commissioner. I'm

15 here to demonstrate to the Commission that Kelly Support

16 Facility's vital contribution --

17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Excuse me, I'm sorry, Congressman.

18 Can we please have quiet? I know everybody's trying to move,

19 but we do want to hear. Thank you.

20 CONGRESSMAN MASCARA: Okay, thank you,

21 Commissioner. I'm here today to demonstrate to the

22 Commission that Kelly Support Facility's vital contribution

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1 commanding control facility. It is, as its name indicates, a

2 support facility. This is the mission of Kelly Support

3 Facility. The area supported includes Western Pennsylvania,

4 all of Ohio, and West Virginia. Information provided to your

5 commission indicated only Western Pennsylvania as the area

6 supported.

7 In addition, important tenants, the FAA, the AVES

8 and the GSA plebe maintenance facility were not included.

9 The latter is located on land designated in the proposed

10 realignment for disposal. These are the people who we

11 support. We support nearly three times more people than

12 information provided to your commission indicated. These are

13 some of the things that we do, as Congressman Mascara said,

14 quietly, efficiently, and at little cost.

15 I would like to point out the number of supply

16 transactions processed each year -- over 292,000. This is

17 indicative of the absolutely critical support to the armed

18 forces in our region, which cannot be reasonably provided

19 through other alternatives. History tells the story of Kelly

20 Support Facility. When a crisis arose, Kelly Support

21 Facility met the challenge, moving 46 units to their

22 mobilization stations. Support was not just provided to Army

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1 to our nation's defense. We cannot overlook the fact that

2 Kelly Support Facility does have an extremely important role

3 in supporting our armed forces in this region. And that its

4 responsibility is growing as the force structure is changing.

5 The Kelly Support Facility's inclusion on the base

6 realignment and closure list is not in our nation's best

7 interest. Our conclusions are three-fold. First, the Kelly

8 Support Facility provides essential support to armed forces

9 whose readiness is vital to our national defense. The

10 facility does a major job, quietly, efficiently, at little

11 cost. This facility is a real bargain for the American

12 taxpayer.

13 Second, the data presented in the COBRA realignment

14 summary was incorrect. Corrected data will show a

15 significant reduction on the return on investment for the

16 proposed realignment. In fact, the return on investment is

17 more than offset by the degradation of support to the

18 military forces in this region. Third, force structure

19 decisions driven by changing roles and missions for our armed

20 forces have resulted in change to the command and control

21 organization of our Reserve component forces.

22 The 99th Army Reserve Command, the primary tenant

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1 units.

2 Within hours of Iraq's attack into Kuwait, rations

3 were being issue to air crews, which flew out Greater

4 Pittsburgh International Airport. This chart reflects

5 incorrect information used in the installation assessment. I

6 would like to highlight the percentage of permanent

7 facilities -- 99 percent, as opposed to none. The fact that

8 nearly all of the facilities are permanent, as opposed to

9 none, certainly would have had a bearing on the decision-

10 makers.

11 I would also like to point out the square footage

12 of supply and storage facilities -- over 93,000 as opposed to

13 200 square feet. A support facility without storage and

14 supply facilities would certainly be of little military

15 value. However, this is not the case with Kelly Support

16 Facility. This chart depicts significant discrepancies in

17 the cost savings for the proposed realignment. Personnel

18 savings have been greatly overstated for a number of reasons.

19 Continued costs for moving 30 people to Fort Drum,

20 New York, were not factored into the equation, nor were the

21 costs for retaining a mail facility staff and contract

22 representatives for a maintenance facility which will remain

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1 at the Kelly Support Facility is being reorganized as a

2 Reserve support command with responsibility for maintaining

3 the readiness of nearly three times as many forces as they

4 have now. Is it prudent to jeopardize the support base for

5 these forces? Assuming the realignment is to proceed, the

6 Army has now proposed the disestablishment of the commissary

7 and PX on the base, which will affect our 40,000 retirees and

8 dependents.

9 This action is a total disregard for the servicemen

10 and women in metropolitan Pittsburgh area, which proudly has

11 a high per capita enlistment of our young adults in the

12 military. At this time, Colonel Rodney Burns will develop

13 the facts which support these conclusions. Colonel Burns

14 commanded the Kelly Support Facility from 1990 until his

15 retirement, and is exceptionally qualified to present the

16 facts. Colonel.

17 COLONEL BURNS: Thank you, Congressman,

18 Commissioners.

19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, Colonel.

20 COLONEL BURNS: During the BRAC process, Charles E.

21 Kelly Support Facility was compared with Army commanding

22 control installations. Kelly Support Facility is not a

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1 at the installation. Average salary used in the analysis was

2 overstated by over a million dollars a year. The cost for

3 retaining the Valley Grove maintenance facility and a student

4 facility at Camp Dossan, West Virginia. The bottom line,

5 Commissioners, is that the 20-year net present value has been

6 grossly overstated.

7 In fact, the initial investment for the proposed

8 realignment will not have been recovered within the first 20

9 years. And significant costs must now be passed on to

10 tenants remaining at the facility for base operations which

11 must continue. The proposal before your commission removes

12 the current workforce with no plan or funds for the

13 continuation or replacement of the services provided. The

14 expertise to provide these services resides with the current

15 workforce.

16 Its removal will only serve to cause turmoil and a

17 severe degradation to the support required. This chart

18 depicts redesignation of the 99th Army Reserve command as a

19 Reserve support command. With this vast increase in

20 responsibility for the 99th, a responsibility for maintaining

21 the combat readiness of nearly 10 percent of all forces in

22 the United States Army Reserves, it just doesn't make sense

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1 to take away their support base.
 2 Commissioners, the information I've provided is
 3 promised on the COBRA summary, which eliminates 128 civilian
 4 positions at Kelly Support Facility by the year 2001, and
 5 moves the area support mission to Fort Drum, New York, nearly
 6 450 miles away. Recently, we have received an implementation
 7 plan which is a vast departure from the information before
 8 your committee.
 9 It appears that the Army now recognizes that the
 10 area support mission cannot be completely supported from Fort
 11 Drum, as the implementation plan calls for retaining a
 12 structure at Kelly Support Facility, with a significant
 13 portion of its current workforce. Commissioners, this
 14 completely invalidates the information before you. It would
 15 be a travesty to allow Kelly Support Facility to remain on
 16 the BRAC list with such broad data, and to allow that
 17 recommendation to go forward to the President, Congress and
 18 the American people.
 19 We are asking you, the Commission, to remove Kelly
 20 Support Facility from the BRAC list, and to put the ball back
 21 into the court into which it belongs -- with the Department
 22 of Defense. The Department of Defense has the authority and

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1 allowing me a few minutes to state my concerns on the impact
 2 of the Navy and, I think, the Air Force, if the dynamic
 3 flight simulator at Warminster is not properly transitioned
 4 to the private sector. I believe in your words that are on
 5 the next page to the realignment report, talked to the
 6 importance of maintaining this requirement and capability to
 7 justifying maintaining access.
 8 Very quickly, the requirement for both services to
 9 perform these functions, and with both Brooks Air Force Base
 10 and North Warminster closing, the very real potential exists
 11 for not meeting these critical requirements that I've listed
 12 at the top of the slide, especially during this time of
 13 turnover. A seamless transition must be the number one
 14 priority as this world-class facility moves to private
 15 sector.
 16 This national asset is unique because it is the
 17 only high-speed sustained flight simulation capability for
 18 current and future fighter attack aircraft, as well as the
 19 evaluation of flight equipment and cockpit configurations in
 20 the actual environment that they will be used. The military
 21 value of the DFS is outlined in this and the following slide.
 22 While all very valuable, I particularly would draw

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1 the obligation to rationally analyze the mission and to
 2 provide for the most efficient organization to accomplish
 3 that mission. Commissioners, I appreciate your time and this
 4 concludes my briefing, and I'd like to answer any questions.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I believe Commissioner Kling has a
 6 question.
 7 COLONEL BURNS: Commissioner.
 8 COMMISSIONER KLING: Yes, sir. You know, there are
 9 some major differences here, as you're pointing out.
 10 COLONEL BURNS: Yes, sir.
 11 COMMISSIONER KLING: But you're showing that the
 12 number of square feet -- we have figures that show 200,000
 13 square feet -- or 200.
 14 COLONEL BURNS: 200 square feet, yes, sir.
 15 COMMISSIONER KLING: And you're saying 93,000.
 16 COLONEL BURNS: That's correct, sir. We have
 17 93,000.
 18 COMMISSIONER KLING: That's a big difference.
 19 COLONEL BURNS: It sure is, and like I said --
 20 COMMISSIONER KLING: 93,000 of the square feet that
 21 you say is correct. And also that 99 percent are used as a
 22 permanent -- 99 percent of that 93,000 is used permanently as

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1 your attention to the third bullet, and the capability to
 2 look at the flight envelope expansion for the F-14 in the mid
 3 '80s. Not only does this allow for examination of
 4 potentially dangerous acquisitional cycles for flight
 5 regimes, but also at what path the flight gets flown. As we
 6 liken the acquisition cycle of new, highly capable, but
 7 expected weapons systems, the DFS seems a very reasonable way
 8 to also reduce risk, as well.
 9 Another item is the G-tolerance improvement
 10 training for our East Coast Air Atlantic pilots is another
 11 tribute to the ability of this facility to allow our war
 12 fighters to more safely train as they're in flight. In
 13 summary, and this is something that I was actively involved
 14 in, the '93 closure of the North Trenton and removal of the
 15 proposal workload to Tullahoma, Tennessee, occurred, I think,
 16 because the Commission's conclusion was that the greater
 17 capability exists in Tullahoma.
 18 I see a very similar parallel to both the services
 19 and industry benefitting from a single interservice and
 20 promotional center of excellence. In my estimation, that
 21 would clearly be the Warminster Dynamic Flight Simulator.
 22 And in your brief, you have a slide that compares those

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1 a facility?
 2 COLONEL BURNS: That's 99 percent of all of the
 3 facilities on the post are permanent facilities, sir.
 4 COMMISSIONER KLING: Right, of that -- so it would
 5 be 99 percent of that 93,000.
 6 COLONEL BURNS: Yes, sir.
 7 COMMISSIONER KLING: Okay.
 8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. It's been
 9 very interesting.
 10 COLONEL BURNS: Thank you very much, and we'll be
 11 glad to respond to any other questions through your staff.
 12 (Applause.)
 13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We will now be moving on, quickly,
 14 I hope, to the Naval Air Warfare Center Human
 15 Centrifuge/Dynamic Flight Simulator, Warminster,
 16 Pennsylvania. Okay, if you're prepared, Mr. Taylor, I need
 17 to swear you in. Thank you very much.
 18 (Witness sworn.)
 19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, we're pleased to hear
 20 from you today.
 21 MR. TAYLOR: Madame Chairman, distinguished
 22 commissioners, I appreciate the opportunity today for

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1 things, but I'm not going to discuss them here. But in
 2 closing, the wording in your report recognized the deep need
 3 for this capability.
 4 It is my recommendation that until prioritization
 5 becomes operational, that this Commission take the
 6 appropriate action to provide interim support to ensure
 7 interservice requirements are met. Thank you. I'm ready to
 8 answer your questions.
 9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Are there
 10 any questions? I believe you've answered them all in a very
 11 short period of time. Thank you. (Applause.) Next, we will
 12 hear from the city of Philadelphia, Defense Industrial
 13 Support Center. (Applause.) Mayor Rendell?
 14 MAYOR RENDELL: Yes.
 15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: If you're ready, while we're
 16 passing out notebooks, we could give you the oath.
 17 MAYOR RENDELL: Okay.
 18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much.
 19 (Witness sworn.)
 20 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir, and
 21 we're pleased to have the opportunity to hear from you this
 22 afternoon.

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1 MAYOR RENDELL: Good afternoon, members of the
 2 Commission. I can honestly say that I am sorry to be back.
 3 I had the occasion -- for all of you who are new to the
 4 Commission -- I had the occasion to testify for Commissioner
 5 Cox in 1993. And I will talk about the fact that we are
 6 back, and we're a little angry that we're back. But I'll
 7 discuss that as I get into my remarks, but it is good to see
 8 Commissioner Cox again.

9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. It's good to have you
 10 back, at least under some circumstances.

11 MAYOR RENDELL: Today we're going to present
 12 testimony about four defense facilities in our city. But let
 13 me start by talking about economic impact. No city in the
 14 United States of America has suffered the impact of the BRAC
 15 process more than the city of Philadelphia. The city of
 16 Philadelphia is the only -- and I repeat, the only -- city in
 17 the United States to suffer job losses and facility closings
 18 in each and every one of the four BRACs.

19 And I will delineate those in a second. In BRAC
 20 '93, there were almost 12,000 jobs ordered closed in four or
 21 five different facilities in Philadelphia. We prepared a
 22 plan to consolidate three of those facilities at one location

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1 Department essentially transfers the ICP functions of DISC
 2 out of Philadelphia. And then this establishes DISC,
 3 although it indicates that for the city of Philadelphia, well
 4 up to at least 1,100 jobs that were currently held at DISC
 5 will go down to South Philadelphia to the Defense Personnel
 6 Supply Center.

7 So as a city, we do not suffer an enormous amount
 8 of job losses in this one category. The total estimated by
 9 DLA is 385. But what happens when you use the term,
 10 disestablish, is that these employees who have served the
 11 United States government well, who everyone can see have done
 12 an increasingly more effective job year by year by year --
 13 these employees are laid off with no job rights. Their
 14 rights are terminated. They will have to compete for the new
 15 jobs at DPSC. And that was, in my judgment, a mistake by
 16 DLA.

17 And I would call your attention to two letters in
 18 tab two, excuse me, in tab one, sent to me by Admiral Straw,
 19 who is in command of DLA. The first letter is to me, and is
 20 dated April 18th, 1995. And I would just draw your attention
 21 to the third paragraph, and I want to read an excerpt. It
 22 says, "If our BRAC proposal is approved, we will start

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1 in Philadelphia, and that plan was accepted by the BRAC
 2 Commission unanimously. And yet we're back here today with
 3 recommendations to cut against the grain -- significantly
 4 against the grain of what was decided unanimously by the BRAC
 5 '93 Commission.

6 In 1988, Philadelphia lost the naval hospital and
 7 600 jobs as a result of BRAC in 1988. In 1991, Philadelphia
 8 suffered the closing of the naval shipyard station, causing
 9 us the loss of 12,000 direct jobs and 36,000 indirect jobs.
 10 Our naval shipyard was closed, even though, at the time, it
 11 was the only government naval shipyard turning a profit in
 12 the United States of America. In 1993, five facilities were
 13 closed, costing us 1,800 jobs. And as I said, three other
 14 facilities were going to be consolidated out of the city,
 15 which would have cost us the loss of an additional 8,300
 16 jobs.

17 And this year, the Defense Department has
 18 recommended, essentially, closing four more facilities,
 19 costing us 702 jobs directly. And most importantly, and most
 20 cruelly of all, laying off 1,800 people with no job rights,
 21 in a situation where that did not have to happen. I would
 22 ask you to look, as a frame of reference, to the map that is

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1 immediately to move weapons systems and military
 2 specification items out of DISC, as we move commercial items
 3 into DISC. The DISC employees, who have been managing DISC
 4 weapons systems items, will be offered jobs managing incoming
 5 commercial items. In a worst case scenario, net loss jobs of
 6 DISC will be 385, not 1,500."

7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Mr. Mayor, I do know that you're
 8 going over a little bit now. You do have some time later,
 9 would you like us to just take it?

10 MAYOR RENDELL: Yeah, I was budgeted for five
 11 minutes, and Secretary Lehman is not going to be here, so
 12 will you ask the timekeeper to extend me to seven minutes?

13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Oh, certainly, and you have some
 14 more time later, too, if you want to take it out. We have
 15 you listed as --

16 MAYOR RENDELL: Right, I'd be happy to take that
 17 out.

18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Great, thank you.

19 MAYOR RENDELL: In a second letter, dated March
 20 31st, 1995, to Congressman Borski, Admiral Straw says, at the
 21 bottom of the second paragraph, "That recommendation creates
 22 two weapons systems supports ICBs, one in Richmond and the

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1 included in tab one, right behind my opening remarks. The
 2 facilities we are going to talk about today are located in
 3 three areas of the city of Philadelphia.

4 The Philadelphia naval base, which you see at the
 5 tip of the southern end of our city; DPSC, the Defense
 6 Personnel Supply Center, which immediately south of the naval
 7 base; and up in the northeast section of Philadelphia, ASO,
 8 the Aviation Supply Office, which is not affected by any of
 9 the Defense Department's recommendation; DISC, which is
 10 dramatically affected by these recommendations; and NATSF,
 11 which is also affected by these recommendations.

12 You heard Governor Ridge testify at the beginning
 13 that the state of Pennsylvania has suffered the second
 14 highest loss of any state in the Union in terms of overall
 15 jobs. If you actually look at it in terms of loss of
 16 percentage of jobs for the jobs we have originally had,
 17 Pennsylvania has suffered the greatest job loss of any state
 18 in the Union. The city of Philadelphia has absorbed 75
 19 percent of the job losses of the state of Pennsylvania -- 75
 20 percent.

21 I want to start by talking about the Defense
 22 Industrial Supply Center, DISC. This order by the Defense

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1 other in Columbus, and a single troop and general support ICB
 2 in Philadelphia. Philadelphia was selected as our commercial
 3 center because, among other things, it has developed
 4 outstanding expertise in executing commercial practices and
 5 support arrangements over the last five years. The result is
 6 a worst case net loss of 300 military and civilian jobs in
 7 Philadelphia."

8 I've spoken to Admiral Straw as recently as
 9 yesterday. And based on that conversation, we are asking
 10 today -- and I think if you check with Admiral Straw, he will
 11 not oppose this. We are asking the BRAC Commission to change
 12 the Defense Department's order, disestablishing DISC to use
 13 the terminology that you are merging or realigning DISC into
 14 DPSC. That will save the jobs of these good people who have
 15 done an extremely effective task for our federal government.
 16 (Applause.)

17 Secondly, the BRAC recommendation says that the
 18 DPSC, which was scheduled to move to the Northeast site, if
 19 Commissioner Cox remembers, all of our three basic facilities
 20 were going to be consolidated to the Northeast site, because
 21 it would achieve tremendous savings from just a
 22 consolidation. DOD recommendation says that DPSC will not

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1 move in '97, it will stay until '99 to avoid short-term
 2 construction costs. You will hear testimony from us that
 3 that will not save us any dollars at all, because the cost of
 4 keeping DPSC in a separate facility in South Philadelphia is
 5 actually greater than the short-term construction costs.
 6 So we want to go back to BRAC '93, in 1997
 7 everybody together in the Northeast in Philadelphia -- DPSC,
 8 DISC and ASO. Secondly, the Naval Surface Warfare Center --
 9 as you know, we were scheduled to add 265 engineering jobs
 10 through Annapolis. Because the people that are moved from
 11 Annapolis work on the same type of basic system, this will
 12 eliminate duplication and improve readiness. It will add an
 13 important research and development component to our in-
 14 service testing facility, and you will hear more about this
 15 later.
 16 We are also proposing that part of the NAVSEA
 17 command function, the NAVSEA engineering directorate be
 18 consolidated with NSWC in Philadelphia. As you know, the
 19 Defense Department has recommended that NAVSEA's 4,000 jobs
 20 be moved from Crystal City to the Washington naval base. But
 21 it makes abundant good sense to take the engineering
 22 directorate and move it to Philadelphia. Engineering

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1 term merge or realign.
 2 That will keep these employees' job rights. It
 3 will keep them working in those jobs. They deserve it. To
 4 do anything less would be cruel and unhuman punishment,
 5 violating the eighth amendment of the Constitution. Thank
 6 you very much. (Applause.)
 7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, sir. I believe we have
 8 next Mr. Stampone and Mr. Thornburgh, on behalf of Defense
 9 Industrial Supply Center. Are you all here? Could I swear
 10 both of you all in at the same time? I'm sorry, Mr.
 11 Stampone, is Mr. Thornburgh with you?
 12 MR. STAMPONE: Yes, he is.
 13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Will you be testifying?
 14 MR. THORNBURGH: Yes.
 15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Actually, if we have a number of
 16 people from Pennsylvania to be testifying, could I swear all
 17 of you all in at the same time? Everybody stand up. Anybody
 18 who will be testifying today, please stand up.
 19 (Witnesses sworn.)
 20 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr.
 21 Stampone.
 22 MR. STAMPONE: Madame Chairman, members of the

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1 components have been migrating to Philadelphia over the years
 2 anyway, and this would just be consistent with that.
 3 And lastly, we are scheduled to lose the Naval
 4 Aviation Engineering Service Unit, NARSU, and the Naval Air
 5 Technical Service Facility, NATSF, to North Island,
 6 California. Both of these functions were ruled by the BRAC
 7 '93 Commission to be moved to ASO. In fact, BRAC '93
 8 reversed the Defense Department recommendation for NATSF,
 9 that it be moved out of Philadelphia to Maryland. And the
 10 logic of the BRAC Commission in '93 was that these two
 11 functions, these naval support functions, should be next to
 12 the biggest customer, ASO, the Aviation Supply Office.
 13 There is no reason, military readiness or saving
 14 money -- there is no reason to move these away from their
 15 biggest customer, ASO in the Northeast, to California, other
 16 than just an effort to prop up North Island. It makes no
 17 sense from a military readiness standpoint. It costs money,
 18 rather than saves money. And you will hear testimony from
 19 two of the dedicated employees of those facilities as well.
 20 So to finally sum up, number one, we appreciate the
 21 work that this commission has put in. We know how hard you
 22 work. We put Commissioner Cornella through a ringer in five

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1 Commission, thank you for the opportunity to represent the
 2 employees of DISC. I have analyzed the details of the DIA
 3 BRAC proposal. And based on my 34 years in the logistics
 4 business, I can unequivocally say that it just doesn't make
 5 any sense. DISC is in the business of providing readiness
 6 support.
 7 We will show that, of all the DIA ICPs, DISC
 8 provides the highest level of service to our military
 9 customers. I have a serious concern that the DIA BRAC '95
 10 recommendation to move over 1.4 million items in a short
 11 period of time, without the requisite technical and expertise
 12 and customer and industry knowledge, poses an indoor risk to
 13 readiness.
 14 We feel that the BRAC Commission should be
 15 concerned that the economic analysis is flawed, with no real
 16 savings. Finally, I want to recommend that the sound
 17 business decision made by the Commission in BRAC '93 be
 18 sustained and augmented with a proposal that I believe is
 19 best for force readiness and the taxpayer. DISC manages 1.1
 20 million items of supply, 63 percent of which are used on
 21 weapons systems -- the highest percentage of DIA weapons
 22 inventory.

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1 or six hours in Philadelphia, and we really wanted him to go
 2 down to NSWC, but he didn't have time. We know how hard you
 3 travel, and we appreciate what you have done in the process
 4 itself.
 5 But none of this makes sense. We fought hard to
 6 win in BRAC '93. We did win. If this was a court of law, I
 7 would be here as an attorney, pleading double jeopardy. You
 8 cannot subject us to the same thing. You are rendering the
 9 work of BRAC '93's commission almost meaningless, unless you
 10 adopt the proposal that we adopt; unless you hold fast to
 11 what the BRAC '93 Commission did. It is unfair to a city
 12 that has taken body blow after body blow after body blow from
 13 the BRAC process.
 14 Again, the number one city in America -- no other
 15 city has been hit and has lost facilities in each and every
 16 one of the BRACs. We deserve relief. Our employees do a
 17 great job for the federal government. This is a great city,
 18 with a great military history. The U.S. Navy was born in the
 19 city of Philadelphia. We want to keep our facilities, and
 20 most of all, the most important thing I'm asking you is
 21 today, in a move that DIA would agree with, I believe, if you
 22 asked them -- eliminate the term disestablishment, use the

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1 DISC receives close to five million requisitions
 2 per year, with the lowest proportion of discrepancies or
 3 wrong parts issued. To state it simply, the DISC mission is
 4 to provide the right part to the right place at the right
 5 time at the right price. It sounds simple. But it requires
 6 a dedicated, knowledgeable workforce with the technical and
 7 logistical expertise to make it happen. And DISC makes it
 8 happen very well, with the highest DIA support rate of over
 9 89 percent.
 10 This means that nine out of every ten customer
 11 requirements are filled immediately. Force readiness drives
 12 us. DISC is the largest weapons systems activity in DIA. We
 13 manage 34.5 percent of all DIA weapons, and receive 40
 14 percent of all DIA weapons requisitions. We support 50
 15 percent of the DIA service maintenance business -- those
 16 industrial activities, that overhaul, repair ships, planes,
 17 tanks, all of our nation's frontline weapons systems.
 18 I have serious concerns about the DIA BRAC
 19 proposal. It plans to move 1.4 million items between ICPs
 20 over a two to four year period. Coupled with the BRAC '93
 21 decision to close defense electronics and merge with the
 22 center in Columbus, DIA will have 2.4 million, or 62 percent

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1 of their items, on the move. This is frightening. To put
 2 the DLA recommendation in perspective, it took 15 years to
 3 transfer 1.2 million items from the services, and these were
 4 products migrating into the same product lines already by
 5 DLA.

6 The new DLA plan involves exchanging product lines
 7 among centers. The magnitude of this transfer, 1.4 million
 8 items, is staggering. Given the specified timeframe, the DLA
 9 plan would require the movement of between 30,000 to 45,000
 10 items per month. To put that in perspective, this is six to
 11 nine times the 5,000 a month the center said they could
 12 handle under the service item transfer. DLA claims that this
 13 transfer will not adversely impact readiness; that it is
 14 mostly electronic; that people can be trained in a short
 15 period of time; and that good management is the key to
 16 performance, not geographic location.

17 They think the person who manages light bulbs is
 18 interchangeable with the person who manages aircraft engine
 19 bearings. How absurd. (Applause.) Although the transfer
 20 process has been greatly improved through automation, it is
 21 still labor intensive and disruptive. Weapons items require
 22 technical, industry and customer expertise to be properly

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1 annual acquisition of \$750 million. DISC manages over
 2 450,000 aviation items, with an annual acquisition of \$256
 3 million. Nowhere can be found the expanse of interservice
 4 logistics talent, expertise and capabilities to improve
 5 readiness and reduce overall DOD costs.

6 This unique pool of talent allows both DISC and ASO
 7 to apply a \$1 billion leverage on a declining aerospace
 8 industry. DISC and ASO currently have \$140 million of joint
 9 contracts on jet engine bearings and chugging blades. And
 10 this is just a beginning. DLA BRAC cites a synergy that
 11 exists with the collocation of an ICP and a depot. But they
 12 overlook the DISC ASO synergy, which was considered extremely
 13 important by the BRAC '93 Commission and the 1994 Navy BRAC
 14 Analysis Group.

15 I am not going to go into any detail on the
 16 economic analysis, because the following presenter, Mr.
 17 Thornburgh, of the Pennsylvania Economy League will cover
 18 this. But I would like to point out that DLA cost savings
 19 methodology is flawed, and two major cost elements were
 20 omitted. In fact, because of the flawed methodology, GAO has
 21 agreed to reevaluate their findings, and is now doing so.

22 The bottom line is that there are no base closings,

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1 managed. Moving items has an observable and quantifiable
 2 degradation in supportability during the migration process.

3 There are phenomena which shows that transferred
 4 items have a initial degradation period, and take years to
 5 get well. Let me explain this chart. What you see here is a
 6 supply availability rate for the percentage of requisitions
 7 that can be filled from an immediate on-hand stock. It's for
 8 Defense General, depicted by the black line, and DISC,
 9 depicted by the red line. It's for a period from 1988 to
 10 1994.

11 I bring your attention to 1988. Defense General
 12 had an incredible support level, very high support level.
 13 Then where you see the arrow, DISC transferred 50,000 items
 14 to them. You can see what happened. This is not unique to
 15 DGSC. Every center experienced the same sort of degradation
 16 during an item transfer. Now, this phenomena affects not
 17 only mission readiness, but also has a huge financial impact
 18 on DOD.

19 For example, parts shortages, causing line
 20 stoppages on the B-52 engine line, could result in a loss of
 21 as much as \$100,000 per day because of down time. This is
 22 just not about transferring items. It's about

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1 no real savings, and there will be disruption, turmoil and
 2 severe impact on force readiness. As you will hear in the
 3 next presentation, DLA's recommendation is totally flawed,
 4 and its purported savings come solely from moving items, and
 5 not from management of similar items. We have developed a
 6 lower risk alternative, logically based on ICP strengths and
 7 efficiencies, which unquestionably saves greater dollars and
 8 resources than the DLA plan.

9 However, we're not totally convinced that even
 10 this proposal warrants the inherent readiness degradation
 11 that would occur in pursuit of the ideal ICP. A more prudent
 12 approach would be to retain the existing distribution of
 13 items with only well-planned, limited tweaking by item
 14 transfers only where they make sense and over an extended
 15 time period. The overall benefit to DOD would be greater
 16 with this moderate approach. Therefore, we believe the BRAC
 17 '93 decision, which was a good, logical decision, should be
 18 implemented as planned.

19 With some minor modifications, it could even be
 20 improved. Interservice common compound support could be
 21 expanded to produce additional savings. DISC and DPSC could
 22 be consolidated into a single command, and retain the DISC

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1 disestablishing an entire business with over 32 years of
 2 commodity weapons support experience, and replacing it with
 3 an entirely new business. But this workforce has been honing
 4 their skills and commodity experience over those years.

5 Since 1986, they have reduced workforce staffing by
 6 27 percent; increased sales per work year by 16 percent; and
 7 even increased productivity by 15 percent. I could go on,
 8 but I am constrained by time. Additional achievements are
 9 listed in your package. Also in that package is a paper
 10 titled, Concept of Operations Analysis. This is the DLA
 11 blueprint for the ICP of the future.

12 This is already there. Many of the concepts have
 13 either been invented, developed or prototyped at DISC. I
 14 point this out to you because I believe this could continue
 15 to improve product line management, just as DGSC could
 16 improve management of their product lines. But neither
 17 workforce will be able to do so if they are unpacking boxes
 18 for the next two years. So why flip-flop items? Is this a
 19 good business decision?

20 The BRAC '93 Commission recognized the importance
 21 of DISC being collocated with the Navy Aviation Supply
 22 Office. ASO manages over 200,000 aviation items, with an

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1 ASO synergy. We believe that this is a win-win solution.
 2 Real savings will be achieved; the impact to enforce
 3 readiness is eliminated; the talent and expertise of the DLA
 4 workforce will be optimized through continuous process
 5 improvement to meet the challenge of maintaining the highest
 6 level of readiness while reducing the force structure.

7 Thank you for allowing me to present these facts to
 8 you. (Applause.)

9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr.
 10 Thornburgh. We're happy to have you hear Mr. Thornburgh.
 11 And just so you know, we have six minutes left.

12 MR. THORNBURGH: Thank you very much. Good
 13 afternoon. I am David Thornburgh, Executive Director of the
 14 Pennsylvania Economy League, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public
 15 policy research organization with 60 years of experience in
 16 promoting efficient and effective government. It is to
 17 achieve that end in this process that I appear before you
 18 today.

19 Let me get right to the point. DLA's analysis that
 20 argues for the disestablishment of DISC contains a number of
 21 shortcomings that causes the question, seriously, whether any
 22 net savings at all can be achieved by the proposed

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1 realignment. DLA cost benefit analysis has two serious
 2 deficiencies. First, the DLA analysis fails to account fully
 3 for all the costs inherent in the realignment that
 4 disestablishes DISC.
 5 Second, DLA's calculation of personnel reductions -
 6 - the key element in realizing any recurring savings -- is
 7 based on superficial and simplistic logic. Let me address
 8 the first area. In estimating the costs involved with the
 9 disestablishment of DISC and the transfer of items among its
 10 remaining ICPs, DLA misses two substantial and necessary
 11 expenditures. One, DLA did not calculate the full cost to
 12 transfer items from one location to another.
 13 Consumable items item transfers involve far more
 14 than the simple freight costs contained in DLA's COBRA model.
 15 They involve extensive man hours of record handling at both
 16 the sending and receiving sites. DLA has, in fact, already
 17 acknowledged this, by asking the facilities involved to
 18 develop fully the costs associated with the transfer of the
 19 items. DISC's analysis of the costs involved for its item
 20 transfers add \$66 million to the one-time cost involved in
 21 executing the DLA realignment.
 22 DLA also fails to account for the cost of

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1 realignment would produce, the consolidation of DISC and DPSC
 2 in Northeast Philadelphia, will save an additional \$116
 3 million by the year 2015. Implementing the BRAC '93
 4 consolidation process has much to commend it, beyond the
 5 concrete cost savings it realizes, since it will produce
 6 substantial cost reductions in DLA operations, with virtually
 7 no disruptions to management.
 8 Items will not be transferred back and forth, as in
 9 DLA's '95 proposal. Management will not be forced to learn
 10 new product lines and build new relationships with new
 11 customers, losing valuable time in the process. In
 12 conclusions, DISC's alternative proposal, adhering to the
 13 BRAC '93 recommendation, achieves substantial savings at
 14 little cost, with no disruption of operations and no loss of
 15 management effectiveness.
 16 In contrast, the DLA proposal now before the
 17 commission contains questionable cost savings, generated
 18 through substantial disruptions in system operations. In
 19 this case, the 1995 BRAC Commission would be well advised to
 20 return to the solutions set forth by the 1993 Commission.
 21 Thank you very much. (Applause.)
 22 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Mr.

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1 maintaining DPSC operations at its current site for an
 2 additional two years, rather than moving to ISO. Based on
 3 BRAC '93, DPSC is scheduled to move the ASO compound in 1997.
 4 DLA's proposed alignment delays the move until 1999.
 5 According to the data developed in BRAC '93, it costs DPSC an
 6 additional \$26 million a year to operate at its current site,
 7 rather than at ASO.
 8 Taking these two elements into account, the real
 9 cost of moving items and the differential costs of remaining
 10 at DPSC for an additional two years, DLA's proposal adds \$118
 11 million in one-time expenditures to the proposed realignment.
 12 Now, let me address the second weakness in DLA's argument.
 13 DLA's analysis contains a more serious error in the manner in
 14 which it calculates personnel reductions produced by the
 15 realignment.
 16 This chart illustrates the assumption DLA uses to
 17 calculate personnel reductions. DLA's basis for these
 18 assumptions is not clear. The economies of scale are not
 19 accomplished through the simple transfer of items, and
 20 personnel reductions are not generated by the movement of
 21 work from one place to another. DLA's analysis suggests that
 22 fewer people are needed to operate a consolidated operation

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1 Thornburgh. We had planned to have a witness on the Naval
 2 Surface Warfare Center next, but because of transportation
 3 problems, we will put that off until after the North Carolina
 4 presentation, and move right on to the Naval Aviation
 5 Engineering Service Unit. Ms. Derry, did you get sworn in
 6 earlier?
 7 MS. DERRY: Yes, I did.
 8 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Good, thank you.
 9 MS. DERRY: Good afternoon, commissioners. My name
 10 is Karen Derry, and I'm an employee of the Naval Aviation
 11 Engineering Service Unit. NAESU is a worldwide activity that
 12 sends technicians to the customer, both ashore and afloat, to
 13 train military personnel in the repair, or to actually do the
 14 repair, of aviation equipment and weapons systems. Our tech
 15 rep is the link to keeping naval aviation aircraft
 16 operational. The BRAC proposal is to close NAESU
 17 headquarters, and to consolidate its functions with NADEP in
 18 North Island.
 19 I am here to present an alternative to that
 20 proposal. Our team proposal achieves the objectives and
 21 consolidations that are sought by Congress and the President,
 22 but at a much higher military value than was afforded in the

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1 when an initially larger facility is moved to a smaller one,
 2 than when a smaller one is incorporated at a larger site.
 3 There is no reason to believe this would be true.
 4 The two, in fact, should be equal. In addition, DLA's logic
 5 suggests, since savings are realized from the number of
 6 personnel reductions taken in the realignment, and since
 7 personnel reductions are generated by transferring items, to
 8 maximize savings, one must maximize the number of item
 9 transfers. In other words, the greatest savings occur in the
 10 transfer of all DLA's items from one ICP to another, rather
 11 than in locating them at the most efficiently managed site.
 12 For these reasons, FEL concludes that it is
 13 impossible to determine whether the DLA realignment will
 14 produce any real personnel reduction, and hence, generate any
 15 net savings. Instead of this current proposal, we recommend
 16 that the BRAC Commission reaffirm the BRAC '93 decision to
 17 move DPSC to the ASO compound, where it will be collocated
 18 with DISC and ASO. The '93 consolidation process produces
 19 substantial and clearly quantifiable savings in personnel
 20 costs, in contrast to the back of the envelope estimate made
 21 by DLA in its current proposal.
 22 With the 190 personnel reductions such a

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1 DOD proposal, and in a more cost-effective manner. The DOD
 2 proposal does not make good business sense. It results in
 3 fleet readiness degradation. The reason for this is two-
 4 fold.
 5 First, a survey that we took at NAESU indicates
 6 that 94 percent of our employees are not willing to relocate
 7 3,000 miles away. And second, the higher depot overhead at
 8 North Island equates to increased costs for our customers.
 9 On the other hand, our proposal is to merge NAESU
 10 headquarters with ASO. This builds on the BRAC '91 decision
 11 to relocate NAESU headquarters to ASO. And we're in the
 12 process of doing that, and we will be there no later than 1
 13 July of 1995.
 14 \$712,000 of BRAC funding has already been invested
 15 to move us to the compound. This decision was made to
 16 improve NAESU's mission effectiveness and fleet readiness
 17 because of the common link NAESU has with other aviation
 18 logistics activities already located on the compound. There
 19 is no link with NADEP in North Island. A critical link on
 20 the compound is with FISC Philadelphia. In a partnership
 21 with NAESU, we provide centralized contracting for the
 22 worldwide deployment of engineering technical specialists.

1 These services cannot be duplicated at North Island
 2 without a substantial learning curve. One example of just
 3 how widespread our services are, the two Americans that are
 4 jailed in Iraq are MAESU tech reps. We were a key player in
 5 Desert Storm and in Desert Shield, and we currently have over
 6 300 technicians in Kuwait. We deploy the Navy and Marine
 7 aviation forces on every military operation, peacetime or
 8 during hostility. Our technicians ensure aviation readiness.
 9 Comparing our proposal to the DOD proposal,
 10 utilizing the COBRA model, in the DOD proposal, the cost to
 11 relocate to North Island is over \$2.5 million, where ours is
 12 only \$921,000. In the DOD, 46 positions are eliminated, an
 13 in ours, there are 50. The savings over a 20-year period in
 14 the DOD proposal show that there will be \$29.5 million. But
 15 if all the costs were truly identified, the savings would be
 16 substantially less. With our proposal, we would save \$36
 17 million.
 18 In summary, the MAESU team proposal simply saves \$8
 19 million and preserves military readiness. Thank you.
 20 (Applause.)
 21 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Now we will
 22 move on to the Naval Air Technical Services Facility. Mr.

1 should be noted that nothing I am about to suggest would
 2 inhibit the Commission from revisiting NASF employee proposal
 3 from 1973.
 4 As Commissioner Cox may remember, the 1993 employee
 5 proposal was for the creation of a DOD-wide technical
 6 documentation agency. Since at that time the alternative was
 7 not within the Commission's charter, we have developed this
 8 alternative recommendation, which deals strictly with the
 9 Navy. The next slide depicts the high points of our
 10 recommendation, and is pretty much self-explanatory. I would
 11 like to take just a moment to address just a few of the key
 12 points.
 13 The consolidation with NASF, MAESU and the Naval
 14 Air Technical Documentation personnel at ASO provides for a
 15 unified and centralized chain of command. This alternative
 16 would require no construction or hardware procurements.
 17 Additionally, as this slide depicts, a total of 332 positions
 18 could be eliminated. Our headquarters, the Naval Air Systems
 19 Command, has previously located their supply support function
 20 and the preservation and packaging logistics functions to
 21 ASO.
 22 Our recommendation will only continue the

1 Maimone. You were sworn in earlier, I believe? Were you
 2 sworn in earlier?
 3 MR. MAIMONE: Yes, ma'am.
 4 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Good. Okay.
 5 MR. MAIMONE: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen
 6 of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. My name is
 7 Frank Maimone. And on behalf of Mr. Weder and myself, I
 8 would like to say that we appreciate the opportunity to speak
 9 with you today in regards to the DOD recommendation on the
 10 relocation of NATSF to North Island, California. You have
 11 received a copy of our alternative proposal and some of the
 12 slides.
 13 These slides will highlight major points contained
 14 within our proposal. The first slide deals with the
 15 oversights in DOD's recommendation. First of all, there are
 16 the one-time costs. Their recommendation neglects to address
 17 the cost for constructing a new JEDMICS facility at North
 18 Island; the hardware purchases necessary to replace the
 19 present NASF JEDMICS facility in Philadelphia; and the cost
 20 for the high speed communications link for NASF to support
 21 ASO from California.
 22 DOD has also overlooked some significant annual

1 consolidation of the NAVAIR logistical functions at ASO. On
 2 our last slide, we have updated the DOD proposal to include
 3 their oversights. The true DOD cluster highlighted in red,
 4 while to the right of these numbers are the corresponding
 5 numbers as they relate to our proposal. It is painfully
 6 obvious that there was no justification for approval of the
 7 DOD recommendation.
 8 Leaving that to within its '93 BRAC status will not
 9 maximize your monetary savings, nor will it increase your
 10 military value as much as our proposal will. We realize we
 11 are presenting you with a unique scenario that will require a
 12 more in depth view by you and your staff. Mr. Weder and I
 13 stand ready to provide any additional assistance you may
 14 require, and are eager to answer any questions that you may
 15 have. Thank you. (Applause.)
 16 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Mr. Mayor, I
 17 believe you have two minutes to sum up.
 18 MAYOR RENDELL: Well, I think we are holding that
 19 time for Governor Lehman, but I'd just say one quick thing --
 20 that everything you've heard makes it clear that the good
 21 work that you did, Commissioner, in '93 and the BRAC
 22 Commission did should be supported. This is a waste of

1 recurring costs. For example, the establishment of a 100
 2 megabyte high-speed transmission line which would provide
 3 NASF engineering drawings and ASO spare parts for ASO spare
 4 part procurements, when priced by AT&T would cost \$100,000
 5 per month, or \$1.2 million per year. To be in support of
 6 this communications line for any additional JEDMICS facility
 7 would add approximately \$265,000 per year.
 8 Also, there is an additional \$400,000 above and
 9 beyond our present travel costs, which would be necessary to
 10 support North Island relocation. Due to California's
 11 environmental regulations, the duplication of drawings
 12 necessary for ASO bid sets would have to be contracted out of
 13 the state, rather than produced by NASF in-house, as they are
 14 now. This is due to the silver alloy emulsion process used
 15 in their production, thereby adding an additional \$759,000
 16 per year.
 17 The last item recognized is the current synergy
 18 between ASO, NASF, NAVILCO, and DPS. This synergy accounted
 19 for about 50 percent of our NASF manpower requirements,
 20 versus 5 percent for North Island's requirements in 1994. As
 21 you can see, this customer base would have a lot more
 22 relevance in Philadelphia than it would in North Island. It

1 everybody's time. (Applause.)
 2 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. I also want
 3 to thank the Mayor and all of you all for this very extensive
 4 back-up information, which we will find very useful, and will
 5 become part of the record. We are going to move now to the
 6 state of Virginia, excuse me, the Commonwealth of Virginia.
 7 We have a very distinguished panel of elected officials to
 8 start out, as well as Pickett as well.
 9 And while I have all of you together, what I'd like
 10 to do is swear everybody in who's going to be testifying who
 11 is currently on the stage, whether you're testifying with the
 12 elected officials or Fort Pickett. So if you all wouldn't
 13 mind, we can get that out of the way. Senator Robb and
 14 Senator Warner, as well. I'm sorry that it is required.
 15 (Witnesses sworn.)
 16 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And we're
 17 very pleased and honored to have with us the Governor of
 18 Virginia, and both very distinguished Senators. Let me turn
 19 it over to you all.
 20 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Good afternoon, and Madame
 21 Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for -- on
 22 behalf of the Virginia delegation -- for allowing us to have

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1 opportunity to give you some information as you go about your
 2 very difficult task and a very difficult process. We know
 3 that your task is not one of great ease. I particularly want
 4 to thank you, Commissioner Cox, and Ben Vorden, Ed Brown,
 5 David Lewis, and all the members of your staff who visited
 6 Fort Pickett in the Army -- the Kenner Hospital at Fort Lee
 7 in March.

8 I know you've been through several hearings from
 9 many states. And we very much appreciate your care and also
 10 appreciate your endurance, because it is a very important day
 11 for Virginia. Madame Chair, before we started this process,
 12 as far as we were concerned in Virginia, we wanted to be
 13 prepared as communities, as a state, as a congressional
 14 delegation to understand and present the salient facts and
 15 the attributes of the bases and facilities in Virginia for
 16 their military and national security value, and the
 17 importance of efficiently conducting their missions in
 18 protecting America's security interests.

19 The congressional delegation, Virginia's
 20 congressional delegation has been united in this effort.
 21 We've assembled an impressive team of former members of the
 22 Department of Defense and also of the armed services. And

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1 The funding of Fort Pickett through, let's say, the
 2 National Guard Bureau would do nothing more than shift the
 3 financial responsibility from the Department of Defense to
 4 just another agency. And it fails to achieve the desired
 5 goal of overall reductions within the Department of Defense.
 6 This commission must decide whether to maintain the
 7 significant and irreplaceable training assets that are at
 8 Fort Pickett, or shut it down and let the community begin its
 9 redevelopment process.

10 Right now, the Army is doing neither, and this
 11 loyal community deserves better. You'll hear more on this
 12 subject as we go forward. And now I would like to turn it
 13 over first to our U.S. Senator -- our senior U.S. Senator,
 14 John Warner, who will be followed by Senator Chuck Robb.
 15 Senator Warner. (Applause.)

16 SENATOR WARNER: Madame Chairman and members of the
 17 Commission, I wish to express my appreciation to our
 18 distinguished governor for his leadership role throughout
 19 this process, working in co- and full equal partnership with
 20 the Virginia congressional delegation and many city
 21 officials, elected and otherwise, and most importantly with
 22 the citizens from the very areas of our state that could be

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1 many of them are here with us today. Others, fortunately,
 2 don't have to be here today. We're not here to dispute every
 3 decision that the Secretary of Defense made, as far as it
 4 affects the Commonwealth.

5 In fact, after the significant losses in 1993, the
 6 Secretary as a whole has a very well reason and wise
 7 recommendations that, on a whole, I think, improved national
 8 security in an efficient way; and in fact, as an increase in
 9 the number of civilian and military jobs in Virginia.

10 However, we are here to address specific examples
 11 where A, the data collected by the services is incomplete or
 12 inaccurate; or B, where the analysis is flawed, or incorrect
 13 assumptions were entered into during the decision-making
 14 process; or C, where additional information needs to be
 15 presented before a final decision is made. In short, we're
 16 here to make sure that you have all the facts.

17 I'll be followed by Senator Warner and Senator
 18 Robb, and you'll hear from members of Virginia's
 19 congressional delegation and leaders and people who are
 20 experts on particular bases and efforts in particular
 21 communities. But since the intentions of the Commonwealth
 22 have been brought to question, regarding Fort Pickett, I feel

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1 affected by the decision to be made by your commission.
 2 And I thank all those for making the long and
 3 arduous trip up here today. Their presence here today
 4 fortifies the seriousness of the representations made by our
 5 governor and it shortly will be made by other members of our
 6 delegation. And I'm also very heartened to see here today
 7 the former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps,
 8 General Alfred Gray.

9 I've had the privilege of knowing him ever since he
 10 was a colonel. And let me tell you, Madame Chairman, this
 11 would not be the first time the Marines have ever come to
 12 rescue the Army when the appeared in court. (Applause.)
 13 Thank you, General Gray. As our distinguished governor said,
 14 with very few exceptions, the Department of Defense '95 BRAC
 15 recommendations, as they pertain to the Commonwealth of
 16 Virginia, are sound decisions in support of our nation's
 17 national security.

18 In particular, I believe the Navy's decision to
 19 redirect the eight FA-18 squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida
 20 to the naval air station Oceana is fiscally wise and
 21 operationally sound. It underscores one word, Madame
 22 Chairman, and if I only leave you with one word to remember,

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1 it's important, as governor of the people of Virginia, to
 2 make some specific comments insofar as Fort Pickett.

3 It is clear that the United States Army never
 4 intended to really close Fort Pickett. They recognized the
 5 value of the unique training assets at Fort Pickett. That's
 6 why they specified retention of a training enclave -- an
 7 enclave that would, in effect, remove all the jobs, while
 8 returning little or none of the rest of it to the community
 9 for redevelopment. The Army, United States Army cannot
 10 expect, cannot expect that the Commonwealth of Virginia or
 11 the Virginia National Guard or, indeed, the National Guard
 12 Bureau will or can assume operating expenses for this post,
 13 thereby keeping the training areas for use by the active and
 14 the Reserve army.

15 So let me be clear. Despite the important value of
 16 Fort Pickett and the jobs and also its importance to the
 17 National Guard of Virginia, and all that importance, our
 18 Commonwealth is in no financial position to assume the
 19 expense for operating or maintaining this post. It would be,
 20 in effect, an unfunded federal mandate. The United States
 21 Army should either use it or let it be used for other
 22 purposes.

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1 that is readiness. This is my 17th year that I have served
 2 on the Senate Armed Services Committee. And as we approach
 3 our responsibilities in the Congress this year, readiness is
 4 foremost in terms of our priorities.

5 And these decisions today that we are addressing
 6 directly impact on the ability of the overall defense
 7 structure to provide for America, for our allies and friends
 8 around the world, a ready force if needed. Now, turning to
 9 the problems as I see them. The first recommendation is that
 10 pertaining to Fort Pickett, which the Army wants to close,
 11 but close in a unique way.

12 We respectfully say, Madame Chairman and members of
 13 the Commission, this is an unwise recommendation. It
 14 deserves your closest scrutiny. And our delegation
 15 recommends the following. Now, I'm going to address Fort
 16 Pickett; other members of the delegation are going to take
 17 different parts of the BRAC process throughout the state. In
 18 my opinion, I frankly believe the Department of Defense and
 19 the Army were not thorough, not thorough in gathering the
 20 facts to present to this distinguished commission in terms of
 21 their decision.

22 Their analysis of the fort's capabilities and cost-

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1 effectiveness was inaccurate. I repeat that -- inaccurate.
 2 This afternoon, we present to you an alternative one, with
 3 regard to Fort Pickett; one that is the result of numerous
 4 hours of exhaustive research by the team that I mentioned in
 5 my opening statement. I believe that the facts you will hear
 6 will intensify what you, as Chairman, witnessed when you
 7 personally -- and we thank you -- came to this important
 8 military installation.
 9 Namely, in demonstrating substantial deviation,
 10 which is a requirement under your statute from the Department
 11 of Defense, the Army's statements as to military value. As a
 12 brief overview, I discuss two points. First, while the
 13 Department of Defense, its recommendations regarding Fort
 14 Pickett closure, in reality intends to keep the post open.
 15 On March 7th, in Washington, both Secretary of the
 16 Army Togo West and Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan
 17 testified before this commission that major training areas,
 18 such as Fort Pickett, which they had recommended for closure
 19 would actually remain open as enclaves, to train Reserve
 20 component units. But nowhere in any disclosure documents
 21 does the Army specify what the term, enclave, means, nor a
 22 definition.

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1 If, as the Army has recently briefed, a Fort
 2 Pickett enclave is to encompass most of the existing land,
 3 but consists of substantially less personnel than are
 4 currently assigned, the Army is creating a situation that
 5 will not serve the security interests of this country. It
 6 could well end in a failure. Experience tells everyone that
 7 a viable major training area requires sufficient land for
 8 several units to simultaneously train, plus -- and I
 9 underscore -- plus an adequate permanent cadre of people to
 10 keep the ranges open and, Madame Chairman, the adequate
 11 safety that is needed on these ranges.
 12 You can't have one without the other. It is not in
 13 the best interest to national security to take a half-hearted
 14 approach to training. I believe that creation of an enclave
 15 is nothing less than a half-hearted approach. I firmly
 16 believe the facts you will see presented today by others will
 17 greatly support keeping Fort Pickett totally open and
 18 operational.
 19 Now, the Army, in my judgment, failed to give
 20 proper emphasis to the full array of military units that
 21 utilize this base. For example, last year, 42 percent of the
 22 units and 36 percent of the people who trained in Fort

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1 Pickett were from the active military component. So that was
 2 not given proper emphasis in their calculations. First, 18
 3 active different units from Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
 4 alone, trained for a total of 223 days at Fort Pickett.
 5 Nearly half of the active units who used Fort
 6 Pickett in '94 were from services other than the Army, and
 7 the fort's unrestricted air space. That unique attribute of
 8 Fort Pickett brought 600 high-performance aircraft sorties to
 9 Fort Pickett last year. That's open air space -- something
 10 that's becoming increasingly in short supply all across the
 11 United States. With the additional squadrons designated for
 12 naval air station Oceana, it is logical to expect that in
 13 future years, the number of such sorties at the post would
 14 increase substantially.
 15 None of these points, I respectfully say to the
 16 Commission, none of these points were adequately discussed in
 17 any of the Army's documents supporting the recommendation to
 18 close Fort Pickett. Suffice it for me to include that it
 19 makes no sense fiscally, operational, or from the standpoint
 20 of safety, to close an installation which affords superb
 21 training to both the active and Reserve compound of all the
 22 services of our great United States military.

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1 Now, discrepancies are also apparent elsewhere, and
 2 I point out Fort Lee. The Army's recommendation to realign
 3 Kenner Army Hospital at Fort Lee, Virginia to be a clinic. I
 4 question the military value of closing an in-patient facility
 5 on a post that has a military population of over 7,000, on
 6 which risky parachute training is often conducted, and whose
 7 hospital provides medical support to the maneuver training
 8 area to nearby Fort Pickett, where high-risk training occurs
 9 daily.
 10 I understand that the Department of Defense Tricare
 11 medical plan is expected to handle military family members
 12 and retirees. But particularly at an installation where
 13 high-risk training is performed, it is important to have more
 14 than a mere clinic to support our brave people in uniform.
 15 And now I close, Madame Chairman and members of the
 16 committee, again, with the thesis of my comments is
 17 readiness, which is a top priority in the Congress this year.
 18 And I now invite to the stand my distinguished
 19 colleague, the junior Senator from Virginia, Senator Robb.
 20 (Applause.)
 21 SENATOR ROBB: I thank my distinguished senior
 22 colleague. Madame Chairman and members of the Commission, I

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1 thank you for this opportunity to appear. And Madame
 2 Chairman, specifically, I reiterate the thanks that Governor
 3 Allen and Senator Warner have already extended to you,
 4 personally, for coming and visiting Fort Pickett with us
 5 earlier in the year.
 6 I'm not quite certain what the colors mean, but I'm
 7 afraid that the time allotted for the three statewide
 8 officials may have expired at this point. Would you apprise
 9 me of whether or not there's any time left?
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Well, you do still have 10
 11 seconds. But we probably could extend that for a very short
 12 period of time.
 13 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairman?
 14 SENATOR ROBB: Madame Chairman, what I would --
 15 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Hold it just a second. Madame
 16 Chairman, we've tried to allocate all this time here. We
 17 actually have built in five minutes. And so I would like to
 18 extend to our senator, Senator Robb, those four minutes.
 19 Then that, again, the rest of the group doesn't use this as
 20 an example of how you allocate your 40 minutes. (Laughter.)
 21 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. Senator Robb, we'll
 22 give you five minutes.

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1 SENATOR ROBB: Madame Chairman, I thank you, and I
 2 will be very brief. I have a formal statement that I would
 3 like to include for the record. I have also a statement from
 4 Congressman Jim Moran, who was not able to be here today,
 5 particularly addressing the situation in the space naval
 6 warfare systems command, that I would like to submit for the
 7 record.
 8 I had planned to give a very brief synopsis, in
 9 trying to use our time as effectively as possible, to talk a
 10 little bit about the SPAWAR and the allocation that is set up
 11 there. We had two additional experts. I'm going to leave
 12 that entire argument -- I've already made my prepared remarks
 13 with respect to why we believe that SPAWAR ought to stay
 14 where it is and why we think that the decision to move was
 15 based solely on the concern about getting out of leased
 16 space.
 17 So I have now taken a good deal of what I had
 18 planned to cover. Moving right along, I want also to
 19 address, Madame Chairman, if I may, very briefly, NADEP
 20 Norfolk. Again, I would rely on my full testimony, but would
 21 suggest to you that once the decision was made to redirect
 22 all of the aid -- all of the F-14s, as well as a significant

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1 concentration of the FA-18s back to Oceana, that it makes
 2 sense to keep the naval rework facility which serves them in
 3 the area.

4 If you decide, or if the Navy comes to the -- the
 5 services subsequently decide to move to a combined center, we
 6 think that that would be enhanced by having the skills remain
 7 in that particular area. Again, I lay this out at some
 8 detail in my formal remarks, and I will simply make reference
 9 to them, if I may. Finally, one item that was not included
 10 and may not be on your radar screen, has to do with Clarendon
 11 Square in Arlington.

12 In 1993, the BRAC directed the two Navy Department
 13 commands move out of leased office space in Clarendon Square
 14 in Arlington. These commands are the office of the Deputy
 15 Chief of Staff for installation logistics, headquarters
 16 Marine Corps, and the USMC systems command. I am concerned
 17 that factors simply beyond the control of the Navy Department
 18 may make the timing of these particular moves ill-advised and
 19 contrary to the BRAC legislation of 1993.

20 The DCOS for installations logistics was directed
 21 to move to the Pentagon. Unfortunately, the 10-year
 22 removal of the Pentagon -- and I will even abbreviate this

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1 portion -- simply doesn't leave room. It's 110 percent
 2 occupied at this particular moment. We believe it makes
 3 sense to leave them in their current space, which was
 4 designed for their use.

5 That's essentially the argument we're making with
 6 respect to the SPANAR facilities as well. Knowing that we're
 7 already trespassing on the time of some of the experts. And
 8 joining my colleague, who also served in the Marine Corps in
 9 welcoming the former Commandant, General Gray, as well as not
 10 only other members of Congress, but many other community
 11 elected leaders will not be formally testifying.

12 There are many folks that made the trip here today
 13 to underscore what we believe are the serious concerns that
 14 we know you and the Commission will take into account when
 15 you make your decision, and we thank you.

16 (Applause.)

17 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, and we'll be
 18 very pleased to have your full statement, and that of
 19 Congressman Moran.

20 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairman, the first
 21 installation that we'd like to discuss will be Fort Pickett.
 22 Congressman Norm Sisisky, who represents Virginia's 4th

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1 Congressional District, which includes Fort Pickett has some
 2 introductory remarks, and will be presenting all the others
 3 who will be talking on that. And we'd now like to allocate,
 4 to the extent that you can put on your clock, 40 minutes for
 5 the Fort Pickett presentation.

6 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: 40 minutes. And we're honored to
 7 have Congressman Sisisky with us today.

8 CONGRESSMAN SISISKY: Madame Chair, members of the
 9 Commission, I thank you. And I also thank Congressman Paine,
 10 and the community representatives who are led by Bill
 11 Ambruster, Chairman of the Fort Pickett support group. I'm
 12 going to talk very fast, because I don't want to take too
 13 much time, and I'm going to sit right here. I'm honored,
 14 again, to be accompanied by the former Marine Corps
 15 Commandant, General Al Gray, and former Fort Pickett
 16 Commander, Colonel Chuck Williams.

17 They continue to serve their country by
 18 volunteering, volunteering to be here. And they'll provide
 19 details of what I'm about to say. On March 7th, Chairman
 20 Dixon asked if the Army consulted the leadership of other
 21 services and agencies who train at Pickett. General Shane,
 22 at that time, said, and I quote, "The answer is, yes, we had

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1 certified data calls, and Fort Pickett provided the
 2 information."

3 Chairman Dixon then asked, in other words, you
 4 talked to all the other people involved at Fort Pickett?
 5 Secretary West responded, and I quote, "General Shane said it
 6 was our practice to do so in every case, certified data
 7 calls." Now, on the surface, it sounds like they consulted
 8 with everyone who trains at Pickett before making the
 9 decision. But then the Army told me, during DOD's joint
 10 review in February of 1995, no one raised any issues
 11 regarding the Army's recommendation.

12 Now, reading between the lines, I began to suspect
 13 that there were no data calls for anyone but the Army
 14 Reserve. And since the data calls were due last September, I
 15 tried to pin them down by asking, why until September 30th,
 16 1994, and apart from data calls responded to by Fort Pickett
 17 through their chain of command, meaning the Army Reserve, did
 18 the Army issue data calls to any other military component or
 19 service or federal, state or local department or agency,
 20 regarding the use of Fort Pickett?

21 On April 15th, the Army replied, and I quote,
 22 "After reviewing the process, General Shane concurs that the

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1 Army did not issue any written data calls to any other
 2 military department or anyone else, I might add, regarding
 3 their use of Fort Pickett." Now, every party to this
 4 decision now admits existing data calls contain significant
 5 errors; and that no joint use data calls were issued.

6 Air Force, Navy, Marines, SEALS, and Special Ops'
 7 use of Fort Pickett were completely ignored. In fact,
 8 General Gray came here to deliver the Marine data call. Now,
 9 from talking to the Chief of Staff and other Army officials,
 10 I think the real issue is, the Army wants other users to
 11 share the cost of operating Pickett. And the Army is
 12 probably right. But they're wrong to use the BRAC process to
 13 collect due bills.

14 In addition, the Army does not think Pickett will
 15 close. They think they'll still be able to train there
 16 because the Guard will only lease 93 percent of the post.
 17 The enclave allows it to have their cake and eat it, too.
 18 They get to one, claim big savings by sticking someone else
 19 with the bill; two, avoid impact area environmental clean-up
 20 costs; and three, still go there to train. But as you heard
 21 Governor Allen, Virginia will not accept the unfunded federal
 22 mandate.

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1 The bottom line is, the Commission should find
 2 substantial deviation from every military value criteria.
 3 One, the Army simply never examined current and future
 4 mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness
 5 of DOD's total force. They weren't interested, and they
 6 never asked. Two, the Army patently ignored the availability
 7 and condition of land facilities and air space at receiving
 8 locations. And may I say, thank goodness for the red
 9 cockaded woodpecker. And you'll hear about that later.

10 Three, receiving locations, do not have the ability
 11 to accommodate forces that currently train at Pickett. And
 12 four, cost and manpower implications are flat out wrong. How
 13 can you save more money per year than it costs to operate the
 14 post? If you did math like that on your tax returns, you'd
 15 probably be in a little trouble. Now, I think these are
 16 sufficient grounds to reject the recommendation.

17 General Sullivan testified that we're taking a
 18 risk, that we push the edge of the envelope. You can reduce
 19 risk at very little cost by saving Fort Pickett. Now, we'll
 20 see the video, and hear from Colonel Williams. Colonel.

21 COLONEL WILLIAMS: Madame Chairperson,
 22 distinguished Commissioners, it's a pleasure to speak with

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1 you today on behalf of Fort Pickett. If you would, you have
 2 the slides available in your booklet. You may follow there
 3 if you cannot read the slides as they're on the board. I
 4 would like to stress that the Army process was flawed and
 5 distorted. And as I go through this process, this briefing,
 6 I think you will come to that conclusion.
 7 We have been told the military value was a
 8 criteria. I think at the end of this briefing, you will
 9 understand that it was budget -- who pays the bill -- that
 10 was the criteria, not military value. We will also show you
 11 that it was not a total force commitment, total force either
 12 in the Army -- as you will see, the National Guard Bureau was
 13 not in support of the decision to close Fort Pickett -- as
 14 well as other components of the Department of Defense,
 15 particularly the Navy and the Marines.
 16 If I could worry at you on Fort Pickett a bit.
 17 This is the size of Washington, D.C., overlaid on that is
 18 Fort Pickett. We're certainly not recommending that you move
 19 D.C. to Pickett, but it would probably make the folks in D.C.
 20 very happy, and the folks in Mottoway County a little safer.
 21 The next slide should depict the area that Fort Pickett now
 22 covers. And it was interesting that the decision was to

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1 existing maneuver areas and ranges is severely restricted at
 2 Fort Bragg.
 3 They've got to find another place to train. And
 4 yet we are told that Fort Bragg will absorb the units that
 5 are training at Fort Pickett. How can that be? These latter
 6 posts, and they identify a few, are too great a distance to
 7 be used for inactive duty training, training on weekends.
 8 They're too far away; you can't get there. The most
 9 essential part of readiness is training time. And that has
 10 not been analyzed in any of these analyses. What is the
 11 training time available to a unit?
 12 The five major maneuver training areas are
 13 essential to maintain training and readiness standard for the
 14 Army National Guard. You will hear about posts that can do
 15 this and do that at their post. They cannot do them
 16 unrestricted; they cannot do them without waivers. I heard
 17 Commissioner Robles ask about Fort Dix and the capability of
 18 Table VIII. No, they cannot fire Table VIII right now. They
 19 will be able to fire it if they ever get the range built.
 20 They cannot absorb the armored unit training there.
 21 Again, the National Guard has said, the funds
 22 should accompany the transfer. That does not sound to me

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1 close Fort Pickett and retain an enclave.
 2 If you would, the next, flip it, now, the average
 3 person would look at this and say, well, the enclave would be
 4 the black area. No, that's not true. The enclave is the
 5 white area. And yet we are going to operate the enclave with
 6 14 personnel. I submit to you that common sense has died.
 7 Madame Chairperson, you will recall at Fort Pickett, when
 8 asked a question, Colonel Allen replied that the data calls
 9 were sent out and that there were some errors; and yes, I'll
 10 take the hit on that.
 11 Again, flawed and distorted data was what the
 12 decision was based upon. Again, at your BRAC Commission
 13 hearing on March 7th, did the Army consult with the
 14 leadership of other services and federal agencies? The
 15 answer is, yes, according to General Shane. In other words,
 16 you talked to the other people, again pressing to get the
 17 answer. And again, Secretary West said, it was our practice
 18 to do so in every case -- certified data calls.
 19 After looking for the data calls and trying to
 20 locate the information, we went back to our elected official,
 21 Congressman Sisisky, said we could not locate them, and asked
 22 him to ask the Army where they were. And the response is

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1 like steady state savings. That sounds to me like moving the
 2 money from one pot to another. General Baratz, in a
 3 correspondence to the FORSCOM -- correction, to the Vice
 4 Chief of Staff of the Army -- through the current FORSCOM
 5 commander, who will soon be the Chief of Staff of the Army,
 6 said this, "maintenance and operation of ranges require a
 7 full-time environmental staff. The state of New Jersey has
 8 the most stringent environmental regulations. The valid
 9 missions of preparing to execute mobilization, contingency
 10 plans and other peacetime missions are not possible with a
 11 TDA of 250."
 12 I read that as, I need more people at Fort Dix to
 13 absorb the units that are going there. If you zero out and
 14 go to 14 at Pickett and you put them at Fort Dix, you don't
 15 have a savings. You saw the attributes of Fort Pickett on
 16 the video. The 45,000 acres; the 30,000-plus contiguous
 17 maneuver and training acres; the air space clearance, which
 18 exceeds almost every other post in the contiguous United
 19 States, a criteria added by the Department of the Army; the
 20 capability of taking C-17s, C-130 and C-41, which, by the
 21 way, was inaccurate in the COBRA, along with a few other
 22 things in the COBRA.

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1 clear -- after reviewing the process, Brigadier General Shane
 2 concurs that the Army did not issue any written data calls to
 3 any other military department or any federal, state or local
 4 government.
 5 I believe General Shane was under the same oath
 6 that I took, prior to talking to you. In addition, when we
 7 talk about total force commitment, we talk about the Army,
 8 the Reserve and the National Guard. You heard General Allen
 9 say that we aren't -- the state is not going to pick up an
 10 unfunded mandate. The Guard Bureau to the Department of the
 11 Army on March 31st: We are concerned about the additional
 12 costs to maintain enclaves. We are a home-based
 13 organization, we must train near our organization. We cannot
 14 consolidate its units around the few remaining training
 15 sites.
 16 Fort Pickett, as you have heard, was always a place
 17 where the Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Virginia Guard and
 18 Reserve units trained. The North Carolina National Guard has
 19 come on line with their 30th brigade enhanced -- mech and
 20 armor, if you will -- and says that the demands,
 21 environmental considerations of putting the redheaded
 22 cockaded woodpecker. The utilization of a large force of

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1 These attributes, and remember if you will, Madame
 2 Chairperson, at Fort Pickett, you asked, what is unique about
 3 Fort Pickett? Fort Pickett has all of these attributes at
 4 one location -- one-stop training, with very little
 5 constraint, with very little restriction. That is what makes
 6 Fort Pickett unique. In the Mid-Atlantic region, there are
 7 no other places that have all of those attributes. That is
 8 what is unique.
 9 Let's take a look at the training that took place
 10 at Fort Pickett in FY 94, a question that was not asked
 11 because it was focused on Reserve only. What about active
 12 forces? And that also makes Fort Pickett unique because it
 13 is one of the major training areas identified that has to
 14 support the overflow of active duty training. The 10th
 15 Mountain trains there. The 24th Division trains there. The
 16 82nd Airborne and the 18th Airborne Four train there. Those
 17 are active units.
 18 And guess what? Their training at Fort Pickett
 19 goes down, and these numbers are down because guess where
 20 they were? They were deployed. Those numbers would have
 21 been much higher. They are the first to deploy. Why do they
 22 come to Fort Pickett, their home base? Their bases are going

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1 to absorb the training from the other units? I think not.
 2 And again, total force -- who trains there; why do they train
 3 there?
 4 This is from the naval special warfare --
 5 Certifiable, predeployment SEAL training must take place at
 6 Fort Pickett. It is difficult to duplicate anywhere else,
 7 and is very costly. I don't believe they were asked up
 8 front. Commander, 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Marine Division
 9 and, again, Madame Chairperson, I believe you saw them on the
 10 ground at Fort Pickett when you were there. Facilities to
 11 accomplish this training, Table VIII -- again, we asked about
 12 Table VIII -- Table VIII without restriction, without
 13 stopping other areas of training, which you cannot do at the
 14 other locations; again, critical.
 15 If I bring my unit to Fort Pickett and I want to
 16 train and I don't get shut down, that is training time that I
 17 can use. This battalion, again, has used Fort Knox,
 18 Kentucky, at a cost of \$587,000. You did not ask how many
 19 dollars would be saved by the other services in the COBRA.
 20 That's about \$1 million a year, because they must go twice a
 21 year to certify their tank crews. Again, the commander of
 22 the 2nd Tank Battalion's commander, the commanding general of

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1 equipment, which is already located at Fort Pickett, and can
 2 be drawn.
 3 And finally, they have included in the manpower
 4 savings, the manning of the water treatment and the sewage
 5 treatment plants, which were already scheduled to go away as
 6 we privatized and turned over to the city or to the water
 7 authority. That has been included. That's about a 7 to 10
 8 percent inclusion in those figures. They're going away. I
 9 would now like to bring up the former Marine Commandant, but
 10 not the former Marine, General Al. (Applause.)
 11 GENERAL GRAY: Madame Chairman, distinguished
 12 members of the Commission, I couldn't help chuckle. In 1970,
 13 at Camp LaJeune, we began to protect the redheaded cockaded
 14 woodpecker. And I believe we've got few of them now, since
 15 we started taking care of them. I want to just say that
 16 warfighting and preparation for warfare, to include
 17 operations other than war and keeping the peace, is an art
 18 far more than a science.
 19 It's at Fort Pickett where you Marine warriors and
 20 others practiced and learned the art of warfare as we fight
 21 today in the maneuver warfare thought process. And that's
 22 summarized very well by General Steele, who commanded the

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1 the 2nd Marine Division, has said that tank crews are
 2 required to qualify twice a year -- something we cannot
 3 afford if we go elsewhere.
 4 Fort Pickett has been, is now, and will continue to
 5 be an essential training area which constitutes a critically
 6 cost-effective location from which the combat readiness -- I
 7 think we heard Senator Warner speak of combat readiness -- of
 8 one of our nation's frontline crisis response divisions, the
 9 2nd Marine Division, has maintained. Succinctly, he is
 10 stating he needs Fort Pickett to maintain his readiness.
 11 There are inconsistencies I would like to bring up.
 12 Annual training can be conducted easily at Fort Bragg -- and
 13 this is talking about the units that would no longer train at
 14 Fort Pickett. And, there are no known environmental
 15 impediments at the receiving installation. This is not true.
 16 Testimony of Lewis D. Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
 17 the Army, on 17 March, before the Senate Committee on
 18 Environment and Public Works: Fort Bragg has a 100,000 acre
 19 shortfall in training land and needs. Fort Bragg ranges have
 20 been closed intermittently and for 10 months, due to an
 21 endangered species, the red cockaded woodpecker.
 22 Units travel to other installations for normal

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1 division from 1987 to 1989. And that's in your documents for
 2 the record, because it's the 2nd Marine Division that smashed
 3 through the eastern part of Iraq and Kuwait and retook Kuwait
 4 City.
 5 And when General Steele talked to some of his
 6 commanders and officers that had been with him, even though
 7 he was no longer with the division, they said to him, in
 8 essence, it was easy -- it was just like Fort Pickett.
 9 Because, you see, there, and only there, east of the
 10 Mississippi can you really conduct the kind of combined arms
 11 warfare to include the thought process that goes behind the
 12 art of war.
 13 Because when you finish, day or night, you can go
 14 to the theater, and you can bring the corporals and the
 15 sergeants and the young officers in, and you could talk to
 16 them about what went on -- not whether you went to the left
 17 or whether you went to the right, but why did you go to the
 18 left; why did you go to the right? That's what you have to
 19 do to teach smart, young warriors today. And so Fort Pickett
 20 is very close to my heart, and it was easy to change the
 21 schedule and come back for this today.
 22 If you didn't have Fort Pickett, you're going to

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1 training. There were similar closures in '92 and in '95, and
 2 there will be in the future, because the red cockaded
 3 woodpecker will be protected. Acquisition of additional
 4 acreage will ensure readiness. If you would, we have a
 5 recent documentary that will document the red cockaded
 6 woodpecker and its habitat.
 7 I was the S-3 for the division artillery at Fort
 8 Bragg. I had to schedule training off of Fort Bragg for my
 9 units to conduct their RTAPS, to conduct KPEXs and other
 10 things. It was because ranges were shut down or we were
 11 constrained. I did an analysis of where we could go that
 12 would support our training, without constraints. Invariably,
 13 I would go to Fort Pickett, because that is where I could
 14 train unconstrained.
 15 The Army claims a \$20 million steady state savings.
 16 However, costs do not include items such as the increased
 17 personnel at Fort Dix, addressed by General Baratz; the
 18 purchase of 10,000 acres at Fort Bragg, because of their
 19 training land shortfall -- and let me tell you, when you buy
 20 land at Fort Bragg, you buy red cockaded woodpecker; new
 21 training location for the 2nd Marine Division and other
 22 services; the increased transportation costs for moving

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1 have to invent one. (Applause.) The figures, as indicated
 2 on the slides, are historical figures. They show no vision
 3 at all why Marines will have 10 times more warriors training
 4 at Pickett than that slide shows. Why? Because in 1991,
 5 120,000 were deployed around the world, almost 100,000 in the
 6 Gulf. And as you know, every three months, we go away for
 7 six months. So you've got to restore the cycle; you've got
 8 to rebuild the schedule.
 9 That's why they weren't up there -- there was
 10 nobody to go there; not when you have to go to Haiti, and not
 11 when you have to go to Somalia, and not when you have to do
 12 everything else. There are 35 percent of our warriors
 13 deployed today around the world. The norm, the schedule, the
 14 budget calls for 25 percent. And so I'd be very weary in
 15 looking at all these studies. And as you know, I'm anti-cost
 16 models. I still use a pencil and a calculator.
 17 Because when the big guys, like the Army and the
 18 Navy and the Air Force, when they do cost models, they do
 19 averages. They do things like, well, the average salary in
 20 Washington here and there is probably \$45,000, \$50,000 a
 21 year, so it's \$45,000 a year at Pickett. I'll buy all of you
 22 10 steak dinners if you can find any employee at Fort Pickett

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1 that's making \$45,000 a year.
 2 And so, you know, it's just a minor thing, you
 3 know. (Applause.) 25 percent, 25 percent of \$20 million,
 4 that's \$5 million, \$6 million. It costs about \$16 million to
 5 \$18 million to run Pickett. I know that because I've been
 6 operating and using Fort Pickett since 1981. I'm the one
 7 that made it a maneuver warfare combined arms training center
 8 there -- built around the tanks. And again, the tanks -- you
 9 cannot qualify your tank gunners anywhere else except at Fort
 10 Pickett. There aren't any Table VIIIs.
 11 And if you don't do it twice a year, you haven't
 12 honed your readiness. And you know what's going to happen?
 13 You're going to bleed, that's what you're going to do. It
 14 costs four times as much for your Marines to train elsewhere
 15 than it does Pickett. Now, that may be alright in the Army
 16 or elsewhere. That isn't very good for your Marines --
 17 \$134,034.23. You notice, we round it out, even to the cents.
 18 We just finished saving \$34,000 last year by training our
 19 assault amphibian vehicles at Fort Pickett.
 20 That's our counterpart to the Bradley. So believe
 21 me, if there's a cheaper way to do it, we'd have thought
 22 about it long ago. And so I think, really, the ball's in

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1 members of the Commission to read this letter at your
 2 earliest opportunity, for it sums up eloquently the military
 3 value and cost-effectiveness of Fort Pickett.
 4 I do want to just take a couple of minutes of my
 5 time to address the economic impact that closure would have
 6 on Southside, Virginia. We understand that any community,
 7 large or small, can tell you that there is an economic impact
 8 associated with the closure of their base. And we're no
 9 different. Nevertheless, Fort Pickett is the economic
 10 mainstay for the surrounding two-county impact region where
 11 the great preponderance of the civilian workforce reside.
 12 These two counties, Nottoway and Lunenburg, have
 13 current unemployment rates of 6.3 percent and 10.4 percent,
 14 respectively. We were surprised that Dinwiddie County was
 15 included in the DOD analysis when, in fact, two Fort Pickett
 16 employees reside there. The proof of the matter is, the
 17 inclusion of Dinwiddie County dilutes the impact of the
 18 closure. The total impact from the closure of Fort Pickett
 19 would amount to nearly 7.5 percent of the workforce for
 20 Nottoway and Lunenburg Counties.
 21 We understand that the recommendation to retain
 22 Fort Pickett will be based primarily on its military value

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1 your court. In my military judgment, based on 41 years of
 2 being a Marine, and four years as a Joint Chief, closing
 3 Pickett is ludicrous. It's absolutely ridiculous. It has no
 4 -- it makes no sense whatsoever, when you talk about not only
 5 readiness, and readiness is only a part -- anybody can be
 6 ready to get on an airplane, anybody can be ready to get on a
 7 ship -- but are you prepared, morally, and mentally and
 8 physically to win?
 9 That's the kind of capability you have at Pickett.
 10 And it sits right in Nottoway County and Blackstone, with a
 11 great bunch of American people that support you. I know
 12 you've been there; I don't know if the rest of you have. Go
 13 by the War Memorial; take a look at it. If you don't think
 14 you're sitting in the middle of America, I've missed my
 15 guess. Thank you. (Applause.)
 16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you.
 17 MR. ARMBRUSTER: I think I just got religion.
 18 (Laughter.) Chairman Cox and members of the Base Closure and
 19 Realignment Commission, as Chairman of the Fort Pickett
 20 Support Group, I wish to thank you for providing us this
 21 opportunity to share with you our strong belief that
 22 Secretary of Defense Perry has made a serious error in

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1 to the Department of Defense. However, the employment and
 2 economic impacts from the proposed closure will be among the
 3 most serious of all candidate closures nationwide. In
 4 summary, as you can see from the information we have
 5 presented, the Army made the decision to close Fort Pickett
 6 based on active Army budgetary savings, and not on the
 7 military value Fort Pickett provides to U.S. military forces.
 8 Under closer scrutiny, the budgetary savings
 9 identified by the Army are not savings to the DOD, but only
 10 to the Army. The vast majority of the alleged savings are
 11 actually costs which the Army would attempt to pass on to her
 12 sister services and to the Commonwealth of Virginia. You've
 13 heard Governor Allen state publicly, that Virginia will not
 14 accept what would be, in effect, an unfunded mandate.
 15 With respect to the military value, we believe the
 16 Army and Secretary of Defense substantially deviated from the
 17 selection criteria numbers one and three -- the operational
 18 readiness and the ability to accommodate contingency and
 19 mobilization of the DOD total force. The closure of Fort
 20 Pickett has serious implications for the force structure
 21 inasmuch as forces retained would not be able to maintain an
 22 appropriate level of readiness.

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1 recommending Fort Pickett for closure.
 2 The support group, composed of elected and
 3 government officials, community leaders, and concerned
 4 private citizens -- all volunteers -- from a seven county-
 5 area in Southside, Virginia, are here today, united in the
 6 belief that a grievous mistake has been made. And I want to
 7 take just a second to recognize this group that came up from
 8 Southside today to support us. Let them see you out there.
 9 (Applause.)
 10 If allowed to stand, this recommendation will have
 11 a significant adverse effect on the future defense posture of
 12 our nation. We are loyal, hardworking American citizens who
 13 recognize that in this post-Cold War age, downsizing of the
 14 military is necessary and, yes, even desirable. We question,
 15 however, the Department of the Army's assessment that Fort
 16 Pickett is not of sufficient military value to keep it open.
 17 You've heard General Gray and Colonel Williams make
 18 a compelling case for the military value of Fort Pickett. In
 19 your notebook, we have provided considerable data supporting
 20 this argument. But at tab 10 is a letter from General Steele
 21 that General Gray made reference to -- former commander of
 22 the 2nd Marine Division. And I would urge you and all the

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1 Based on these facts, we urge you, the Commission,
 2 to remove Fort Pickett from the Secretary's list of
 3 recommended closures. And in conclusion, I want to invite
 4 your attention to the video, because no one says it better
 5 than unit commanders and unit leaders who actually use Fort
 6 Pickett. This is an excerpt from an interview that was
 7 conducted by Channel 6 in Richmond the day after Secretary
 8 Perry's announcement.
 9 That completes our presentation. If we have time
 10 for questions --
 11 GENERAL GRAY: That's a Marine and not a soldier.
 12 MR. ARMBRUSTER: General Gray wanted me to remind,
 13 that's a Marine and not a soldier. (Laughter.)
 14 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Are there
 15 any questions? Thank you. It was such a good presentation,
 16 you've answered all of our questions.
 17 MR. ARMBRUSTER: Thank you very much.
 18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much for your
 19 courtesies when I was out there. (Applause.)
 20 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chair?
 21 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Yes, Governor Allen.
 22 GOVERNOR ALLEN: The next installation that we'd

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like to discuss would be the Kenner Army Hospital, which serves Fort Lee. We'll again hear from Congressman Sisisky, and then hear from Congressman Bobby Scott, from the 3rd Congressional District. And then Congressman Scott will introduce the presentation on this particular facility, which will be Commander Hunzeker, who is on our greater commission. I would like 15 minutes to be allocated for this facility, please.

CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much. Congressman Sisisky.

CONGRESSMAN SISISKY: Thank you. I won't go as long about Kenner as I did about Pickett. We have less time. But the issue is just as important. I'm sorry to say again that the Army and joint service groups never consulted with the Tricare officials who execute this plan. If they had, I'm certain the decision would have been different. Fort Lee is a high-risk training environment. Kenner needs in-patient facilities and the ability to isolate ill soldiers from the barracks.

Yet Fort Lee was the only initial entry training facility to have a hospital downsized. It really doesn't make sense. Of course, there's sufficient regional capacity

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1 before, in order to capture your attention. So to do that,
 2 I'm going to tell you what's different about Fort Lee and
 3 Kenner.
 4 It's located at Fort Lee, which is the center for
 5 logistics for the Army. And as those of you with experience
 6 in the services know, logistics is the foundations and the
 7 sinews of success. No military operation, peacetime or
 8 wartime, succeeds, particularly in this technological age,
 9 without superb, superb logistic support. And that's what
 10 Fort Lee is all about; it's the center of logistics.
 11 Now, there's a lot of things about logistics that
 12 are technical, et cetera, et cetera. But there is the human
 13 element. The human element that we're concerned with is the
 14 trained soldier. Fort Lee is a training center. 37,000
 15 people will transit Fort Lee this year; 27,000 of them will
 16 be military; 14,000 of them will be AJP trainees. These are
 17 soldiers that have been in the Army for 56 days, and they
 18 come to Fort Lee to learn their advanced specialty work.
 19 They train hard, and they train daily, and they
 20 train vigorously in all kinds of weather. The supply guys
 21 and girls and women are Class I, II, POL and general supplies
 22 -- the basic things you need, except for ammunition, on the

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to provide these services, but it wasn't cost. The fact that the past BRAC and DOD decisions have consolidated functions of Fort Lee means the number of trainees will increase and not decrease in future years. And Kenner's catchment area does not include the active retired beneficiary population in Western Carolina, Virginia or West Virginia.

The trade-off between eliminating in-patient services and going to Champus will cost more than it saves. We hear more about that from Congressman Bobby Scott and former Fort Lee Commander, Major General Bill Hunzeker.

CONGRESSMAN SCOTT: Thank you, Madame Chairman and members of the Commission. I'm going to be very brief because I want General Hunzeker to make the presentation. Just very briefly, what we're doing in BRAC is trying to save money. And if all we do is shift money from the Fort Lee line item to some other line item in the budget, we haven't done anything.

The fact is that the same number of people will be sick the year after we do whatever we do with BRAC than before. And if their care will be handled under Champus, which is more expensive, we haven't saved the government any money at all. And we've added insult to injury because our

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1 battlefield. What they do daily will show up when they join
 2 their units to do what they're going to do. So that's the
 3 difference between Fort Lee and all the other installations
 4 you've talked about, and the hospital reduction to take away
 5 the in-patient capability.
 6 Reduction of medical capacity at a training center
 7 is personally, to me, not the thing to do -- and that's an
 8 understatement. During my career, I had a chance to serve
 9 with a great soldier who was a National Guard master
 10 sergeant, commissioned in the field in Italy in the Big War,
 11 rose to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I
 12 had gone to him one day with the proposal to make some
 13 economies in the medical system of the Army.
 14 And he asked me a pointed question. He said, why
 15 do soldiers do the things they do, and why do they go the
 16 places they go, and what makes them fight? I said, what
 17 makes them fight is that they are well-trained and they have
 18 confidence in themselves, and they have good leaders and they
 19 have confidence in their leaders. And then there's peer
 20 pressure, because you're going to do what your buddy is going
 21 to do. And all those are a part of it.
 22 And he said, yes, that's right, Bill, but one more

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military personnel, their families and retirees will be hit with a copayment that they don't have at Fort Lee.

I would hope that we would look at the total budget, look at what affect it will have on government, and if there are no savings, not to do something stupid and close the -- and realign the hospital. I'm going recognize, at this point, Major General, Retired, William Hunzeker, former commander of Fort Lee, who will speak specifically to all of the issues.

GENERAL HUNZEKER: Thank you, Congressmen Sisisky and Scott, Madame Chairman and members of the Commission. I'm speaking now on behalf of the officials, seated over here. Please raise your hands. They're the local community and they are sponsoring this presentation. There are no economic facts to be presented. We are not complaining about the size of the reduction of Fort Lee. They are here because of their interest in Fort Lee.

And this is a very difficult presentation for me, because I'm going to say essentially the same thing that all the other people have said today -- that it's a dumb thing to do, and the savings won't accrue. And I have to do something that's more exciting and more interesting than what's gone on

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1 thing -- they know that when they're hurt, the Army's going
 2 to take care of them. And I've seen that demonstrated over
 3 and over again, particularly in Vietnam. That when you're
 4 hurt, you really get taken care of. If we start putting
 5 people out in the civilian hospitals from the training
 6 center, and a training installation like Fort Lee, I am
 7 concerned about the idea we're expressing to these soldiers.
 8 We're going to go through these charts today. I've
 9 made my speech, now let's look at some data. Next line.
 10 What I'd like you to take away from this is the renovation,
 11 the \$16.8 million renovation there for the hospital. It may
 12 be reduced from BRAC, but physically, we're going to have a
 13 hospital next year about this time that will be about 88
 14 percent complete. Also look at the \$18 million in funding,
 15 and something about the workload there in admissions.
 16 Next chart. This is the DOD announcement, and the
 17 first sentence is eminently correct. The second two
 18 sentences are subject to interpretation. They want to remove
 19 in-patient care, and the slice that they're going to take is
 20 190 spaces. By examining the authorization document, the
 21 people that are authorized there, you're not remotely come to
 22 190 who are associated with in-patient care. At the worst

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1 case, it's probably 92; and at best case, probably 55. So if
 2 they intend to do that, they are going to reduce the out-
 3 patient capability, along with the in-patient. And that will
 4 have a serious effect at Fort Lee.
 5 The second point is nearby medical facilities.
 6 There are no nearby medical facilities. Next chart, please.
 7 This shows six or seven states. And you can see Kenner at
 8 Fort Lee. There's nothing to the west of Fort Lee. The
 9 nearest is DeWitt in the north, and we have a cluster, also,
 10 to the southeast. I'd like to look at those two clusters
 11 now. Do you have the next chart? I'd like you to address
 12 the circle around Kenner and the shaded area. That is a 40-
 13 mile catchment area.
 14 Catchment area, in the medical of the Army and the
 15 services, is where you control Champus. From the center, 40
 16 miles in area, that's where your logical patient are. And
 17 you control the Champus funds through nonavailability
 18 statements at Fort Lee. Now, the rules of the game are that
 19 if you lose your hospital, you lose the catchment area. And
 20 that's documented behind those slides in the area where the
 21 rules are.
 22 What happens? About 75 percent of the population

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1 is somewhat difficult. But if you look at the early one,
 2 5.91, and the reduction of 190 from 435 on the 2nd of
 3 October, that will leave a strength at Kenner of 245 people,
 4 or a 58 percent reduction in strength from what we started
 5 with in 1 October.
 6 Intent in-patient care reduction action, reduction
 7 in total capability. And the villain is a benchmark model, a
 8 computer model used by the medical department to run down and
 9 see what a clinic should use -- untested, untried,
 10 unpracticed, and applied to this. Next slide, please. In-
 11 patient care, very briefly. Unfunded, the in-patient care
 12 portion and the out-patient care is not even addressed as a
 13 shortfall because they didn't plan it with that reduction.
 14 And if we terminate the catchment area, that's
 15 increased Champus cost. The savings will not accrue. Next
 16 slide, please. When we set up the order of merit list for
 17 Fort Lee, these are the various values we got. The bottom
 18 line is that, with the 5.91 at the bottom of the slide, Fort
 19 Lee and Kenner -- 60 installations ranked below Fort Lee and
 20 Kenner at that point. Not many below, in the order of merit
 21 lists. Next slide, please.
 22 This is where we deploy people to. The medical

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1 around Kenner go immediately to free Champus without the
 2 requirements for a nonavailability statement, which is going
 3 to increase costs, not really calculated in the Army's
 4 proposal and the DOD proposal. The two clusters you see, one
 5 is north -- there are five military facilities up there and
 6 three military facilities in the south. And you see the
 7 isolated Kenner and the isolated Patuxent.
 8 It would seem logical to me that the more isolated
 9 you are, the stronger you should be. And where you have
 10 supporting medical facilities to help out, that's where your
 11 reduction should take place. But that did not meet the logic
 12 of the programs used, and that's just my logic. Next slide.
 13 We need an in-patient capability at Fort Lee, because
 14 soldiers, young soldiers, get those kind of things. And they
 15 get injured and they suffer from dehydration on the hot days.
 16 Now, those are not admissible in civilian
 17 hospitals, because of the code. You get medicine, you go
 18 home and you get better. But soldiers don't have a home --
 19 well, trainees don't have a home. A lot of soldiers do have
 20 a home. Trainees don't have a home. And the Army used to
 21 send people to their quarters and stay in bed in the barracks
 22 and get better with medication. But when too many people

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1 people are important in deploying for shots and medical
 2 supplies. Can't deploy that way without adequate medical
 3 support, and that's where the soldiers go. Next slide,
 4 please. This is about what I've told you. There's a minute
 5 and 15 seconds to go. Military value of Fort Lee is shown
 6 there. Power projection and what a soldier needs to go to
 7 the battlefield with a warm feeling in his heart.
 8 The isolation, statistical rating scheme don't
 9 measure the training activities at Fort Lee, the benchmark
 10 model and the impact upon retirees. Next slide, please. DOD
 11 proposal, not desirable, cost-effective. And we suggest that
 12 you reverse that and recommend retaining the in-patient at
 13 Fort Lee. Next slide, please. I have 29 seconds for
 14 questions.
 15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Very efficient and productive.
 16 GENERAL HUNZEKER: Thank you very much
 17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. It was a
 18 very helpful and informative presentation.
 19 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairman?
 20 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Yes, Governor Allen.
 21 GOVERNOR ALLEN: I'd like to just thank Congressman
 22 Scott and thank Congressman Sisisky and General Hunzeker for

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1 went away to their barracks and died, some 15 or 20 years
 2 ago, they stopped doing that.
 3 And so we need that facility, that sort of care for
 4 soldiers who injure themselves. Next slide, please. Let's
 5 look at the workload. I'd like for you to take from this
 6 that the workload for in-patient visits, 1.2 percent of
 7 workload. And 190 cuts are placed against that 1.2 percent.
 8 We'll discuss the strength on the next slide. The next point
 9 I'd like you to see is that the retired families consist of
 10 30 percent of the workload of the hospital; and that's both
 11 in-patient and out-patient.
 12 Now, any detriment to capability at Kenner Army
 13 Hospital, if it loses 10 percent, 20 percent, or 30 percent
 14 of its capability. That means that the retirees will get no
 15 service from Kenner Hospital, because active duty are seen
 16 first. Detriment to out-patient care eliminates retirees.
 17 Now, I know we can't organize the Defense Department for the
 18 benefit of retirees, but it does impact. Let's look at the
 19 next slide.
 20 I'd like you to look here at the spaces related to
 21 in-patients, and then look at the proposed reduction.
 22 Getting an authorization number for the Kenner Army Hospital

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1 their presentation. I'd now like to recognize, for five
 2 minutes, Congressman Tom Davis, representing the 11th
 3 Congressional District, who will address the Army Information
 4 Systems Software Command in Arlington, Virginia, for five
 5 minutes.
 6 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Congressman Davis, welcome. Happy
 7 to see you.
 8 CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Thank you.
 9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Did I get you on the oath earlier?
 10 CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: You got me under oath. I was
 11 in the back here, and left Chris earlier today to retreat and
 12 talk about balancing the budget.
 13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We're pleased to have you here.
 14 CONGRESSMAN DAVIS: Thank you, and thank you,
 15 Governor. Madame Chairman and Commissioners, on the face of
 16 it, it appears that moving 450 military and civilian
 17 personnel and equipment of the Army's Information Systems
 18 Software Development Center from leased space in Fairfax
 19 County, to government space in Fort Meade, Maryland, seems to
 20 make sense, on the face of it. Because it's ostensibly an
 21 in-area move and personnel would be transferred to the new
 22 facility at Fort Meade without layoff.

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1 And with the pressure on the services to move out
 2 of leased space, it appears to be a good move. But it's
 3 really a bad decision, when you look underneath of it, for
 4 the Army and the government. And I would urge you to have
 5 the Army review this move thoroughly. The Army ISSC has been
 6 in Fairfax County for 20 years. When the Army went to move
 7 the ISSC out of its old facility -- and on the maps we have
 8 given you, we show you where the old facility was -- which
 9 was also leased space, and into new spaces, the Army
 10 specifically requested that GSA look for a location in
 11 Northern Virginia.

12 They even set the boundaries, as you can see on the
 13 map that each of you have been provided. The Army sought a
 14 location close to its Fort Belvoir and Pentagon customers,
 15 and close to where most of its employees had settled during
 16 the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building,
 17 located at the junction of I-66 and Route 50. GSA signed a
 18 lease with the landlord for six years, starting May 29th,
 19 1994, and that lease runs through May 28th, 2000.

20 A total of \$7.2 million dollars was spent by the
 21 landlord and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the
 22 unique requirements of the Army ISSC. The landlord spent

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1 \$1.3 million; GSA spent \$2.9 million; and DOD spent \$3
 2 million to get this building ready and up for the computer
 3 advanced technological equipment that's required. In fact,
 4 they're still in the process of upgrading and moving into the
 5 space.

6 Now, after this investment, the Army is proposing
 7 to move the ISSC to Fort Meade, Maryland, in an attempt to
 8 save \$8 million over 20 years. Apparently, the Army can now
 9 move out of the space it asked GSA to rent without penalty
 10 for appropriate notice provided. Unfortunately, the GSA and
 11 the American taxpayer -- GSA is still obligated for the six-
 12 year term of the lease. So the Army may be able to move the
 13 savings off its books, but there's another \$9 million in
 14 obligation to pay for that lease over the next three years.

15 If the Army moves out, GSA has an empty building on
 16 its hands. Not only that, but this is not an easy space for
 17 the GSA to find government customers for. Traditionally, GSA
 18 would look for locations in some proximity to mass transit,
 19 the subway, trains and bus lines. But this location is well
 20 beyond the Beltway, and there are no easy connections to mass
 21 transit.

22 To quote GSA, regarding Army plans to move out of

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1 this building, "The building was leased specifically for the
 2 Army, and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other
 3 federal agencies have not expressed interest in the location,
 4 and the building might be difficult to market." And yet
 5 there is \$9 million of obligated lease payments, after the
 6 proposed Army move out of here, that have got to be paid, no
 7 matter what happens.

8 In addition, the Army is going to have to convert
 9 four built facilities at Fort Meade. The COBRA model figures
 10 used by the Army indicate it would have to spend roughly \$5
 11 million to renovate space at Fort Meade and again move the
 12 ISSC. However, the Army has been unable to find existing
 13 space at Fort Meade, and now, after the initial report, the
 14 Army is looking at building a new facility for ISSC.

15 If new construction is being considered by the
 16 Army, even those back of the envelope COBRA numbers are
 17 incorrect. Before we go any farther with this move, we need
 18 to get accurate COBRA numbers on new construction. It's my
 19 understanding the Army is in the initial stages of reworking
 20 the numbers to reflect new construction. I don't think any
 21 action should be taken on this move until we get those new
 22 COBRA numbers.

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1 So at a minimum, the government spends \$11 million
 2 to renovate the Crown Ridge facility and the Fort Meade
 3 facility to accommodate ISSC. But if the Army gets its way,
 4 then the government also will pay \$3 million per year lease
 5 for a building which may sit empty for three years -- another
 6 \$9 million. This is not how Congress intended the BRAC
 7 process to work. The objective is to reduce cost for the
 8 government, not just the military services.

9 Clearly, the Army should have made the move before
 10 it asked GSA to sign a six-year lease. And as the people
 11 from ISSC in the audience will contend, there's a human and
 12 operational impact that's not been factored in. If ISSC is
 13 moved to Fort Meade, there will be another move to contend
 14 with, and normal work disrupted. It's a one-and-a-half hour
 15 commute, one way, to the new Fort Meade facility. ISSC
 16 civilian personnel -- roughly two-thirds of this command
 17 personnel have built their lives in Fairfax and Northern
 18 Virginia over the last 20 years.

19 The Army still has fundamental unanswered questions
 20 that need to be addressed before this move goes forward.
 21 Specifically, the Army's COBRA numbers were based on
 22 renovating existing space at Fort Meade. Now they're looking

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1 at new construction, and you still have \$9 million in
 2 obligated lease payments whatever happens. Thank you very
 3 much.

4 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Congressman
 5 Davis, for that informational presentation.

6 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairwoman, to represent
 7 the Navy space and warfare command, we have the Honorable
 8 Ellen Bozman, who's a member of the board of supervisors in
 9 Arlington County, who will address this facility with other
 10 witnesses. And I would -- we'd like to grant her 10 minutes
 11 on this subject.

12 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you. We're very happy to
 13 have you here.

14 MS. BOZMAN: Thank you, Madame Chair. As an
 15 elected member of the Arlington County Board for over two
 16 decades now, and also as a former budget examiner at the
 17 Bureau of the Budget, the predecessor to OMB, I've analyzed a
 18 good many government proposals, both good and some ill-
 19 advised. Today my copanelist, who is recognized defense
 20 expert, Barry Blechman, and I come to ask you to challenge
 21 the proposed move of SPANAR for five primary reasons.
 22 There are five primary reasons not to move SPANAR.

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1 The first is, the proposed move is not in the national
 2 interest, and would compromise military and mission
 3 effectiveness. Second, SPANAR contractors suggest that
 4 moving the command across the country will result in reduced
 5 efficiencies and, as a result, higher contract costs and
 6 potentially less effective space and naval warfare systems.

7 Third, many of the existing synergies with its
 8 clients and contractors who are located in or near the
 9 national capital region will erode. SPANAR's current
 10 location is just two Metrorail stops from the Pentagon and
 11 approximately a 20-minute trip from the proposed new NAVSEA
 12 location at the Navy yard. Two of SPANAR's primary clients,
 13 NAVSEA and NAVAIR are to remain close by. Creating
 14 unnecessary distance between SPANAR and its customers does
 15 not make good business sense.

16 We believe that if you look closely, you will find
 17 the cost of SPANAR to be vastly understated. The relocation
 18 proposal does not list any construction or facility
 19 reconfiguration costs. And its legitimate to challenge the
 20 Navy's assumptions. For example, in 1993, we stated that the
 21 projected cost to move NAVSEA to White Oak were vastly
 22 understated. In less than one year, a congressionally

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1 mandated Navy analysis demonstrated our point. And the
2 result is the redirect proposal for NAVSEA, which is now
3 before the commission.

4 Finally, Arlington County and Northern Virginia
5 provide a number of important benefits. Let me mention
6 three. We have the highest -- one of the highest educated
7 workforces in the entire United States, due in part to our
8 excellent public school systems. But whether employers seek
9 post-graduates or software experts or electrical engineers,
10 the region has them. Statistically, we rank near the top of
11 the labor force in the country.

12 The region and the state provide excellent
13 transportation access by a nearby interstate, National
14 Airport and the Metro system. And our quality of life
15 attracts and retains residents. In fact, Arlington County
16 was recently judged one of the safest communities in the U.S.
17 So the conclusion that I believe should be reached in the
18 Northern Virginia, Arlington County and the current Crystal
19 City location of SPAWAR is the best location in which the
20 command can fulfill its vital mission.

21 I strongly urge you to review the SPAWAR proposal
22 and reconsider the proposed move. And I thank you. Dr.

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1 The design of these information systems, of undersea warfare
2 systems and of overhead intelligence, space face intelligence
3 systems, are the very most sensitive technologies that we
4 work on. No matter how good our cryptographers may be,
5 moving design information over across the country would be a
6 very risky proposition.

7 So in summary -- sorry, one fourth point. Moving
8 the command would jeopardize the high caliber workforce that
9 it has now. This includes not only the command's own
10 employees, but the contractor community which has grown up
11 around it in this region. To summarize, the move would hurt
12 military effectiveness and, using the Navy's own words, if
13 SPAWAR were relocated outside the WCR, the mission would be
14 performed slower with greater technical risks at a greater
15 expense.

16 A decision to reverse that decision has to explain
17 how it differs from this conclusion -- why this conclusion
18 was incorrect. And we haven't been able to see it in any of
19 the submissions the Defense Department has made. Finally,
20 let me turn to the questionable assumptions about the
21 economy. The savings from this move, the sensible savings
22 driven by a personnel consolidation said to be made possible

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1 Blechman.

2 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Thank you, Ms. Bozman.

3 DR. BLECHMAN: Madame Chairwoman, members of the
4 Commission, it's been a long day for you. Fortunately, I
5 have a clear and compelling case, and I'll be able to be
6 quite brief. As you know, the Defense Department
7 recommendation reverses the 1993 BRAC recommendation to
8 retain SPAWAR in the national capital region. In fact, it
9 also reversed the Navy's recommendation, during the Fall of
10 1994 data call, that SPAWAR should remain in the national
11 capital region.

12 This sudden reversal, we believe, was unfounded and
13 threatens the effectiveness of the command, and does not take
14 account of the cost involved in the move. Essentially, these
15 are the two points I'd like to leave with you. Utilizing the
16 Navy's old conclusion, during the '94 data call, I think it's
17 clear that the move would undermine the military
18 effectiveness of the command. And secondly, that the move
19 would yield uncertain economic payoffs.

20 With respect to effectiveness, there are four ways
21 that the move would have adverse effects. In the first
22 place, it would diminish the ability of the command to

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1 by moving the command closer to its subordinate units. But
2 this is not a base closing.

3 We're not saving people because we're able to get
4 rid of people that operate a base, that maintain and generate
5 the security and so forth. If there is a consolidation
6 possible, that consolidation should be possible, or at least
7 most of it, with the command in its current location.

8 American corporations throughout the country have streamlined
9 their workforces, made typically 20 percent reductions in
10 workforces without physical dislocations like this.

11 So the bulk of the savings should be available
12 without the move. Secondly, there's one gaping hole in the
13 analysis here. There are no costs for construction in San
14 Diego. Now, I have a 20-person company. I can't move that
15 company without incurring a great deal of cost. There's no
16 allowance made for the secure facilities that SPAWAR
17 requires, which are very expensive; for the very
18 sophisticated computer networks that are required; for the
19 very sophisticated communications systems that would be
20 required; and so forth.

21 Obviously, some construction costs are necessary,
22 and there's no allowance for any of them. Nor is there an

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1 coordinate with its clients, with the people in the Navy
2 acquisition and with the other systems command, with whom it
3 works on a daily basis. I think the bottom quote here -- and
4 all these quotes are from the Navy's own submissions -- to
5 the Defense Department makes very clear the close
6 coordination that's required.

7 This is particularly important with respect to the
8 dynamic technologies associated with command control
9 communications and intelligence. So this is the key point
10 here. SPAWAR works on the cutting edge of military
11 technology. It's the most sensitive aspect of our hardware
12 and software developments, and it requires very close
13 cooperation with designers of ships and aircraft and the
14 other systems that are utilized here.

15 Secondly, SPAWAR carries out a great number of
16 international programs. I had a recent conversation with an
17 officer there who alone managed 12 of these programs, with
18 eight different nations. A move out of Washington would make
19 his coordination extremely difficult. Thirdly, the Navy
20 itself concluded that moving SPAWAR outside of the national
21 capital region would create unacceptable security risks.

22 I don't think you can emphasize this point enough.

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1 allowance for the added cost of carrying out their mission if
2 this move were made. SPAWAR personnel would have to fly back
3 to Washington to coordinate with NAVSEA, NAVAIR and its other
4 customers very frequently. And there's move for those kinds
5 of expenses.

6 So to conclude, I think on two grounds, military
7 effectiveness and exaggerated cost savings, the Commission
8 should move to rescind this recommendation and keep SPAWAR in
9 the national capital region. Thank you very much.

10 (Applause.) Sorry. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

11 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: I think we're all without
12 questions at this moment. Thank you very much, and we may
13 want to follow up.

14 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairwoman?

15 CHAIRSWOMAN COX: Governor Allen.

16 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Madame Chairwoman, our final
17 installation that we would like to address from the Virginia
18 team is actually a combined effort for the naval air station
19 Oceana and the naval aviation depot in Norfolk. Congressman
20 Owen Pickett from Virginia's 2nd District has some important
21 comments to make. He will introduce the mayor of Virginia
22 Beach, and I would like to allocate them 10 minutes for this

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1 presentation.

2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Congressman Pickett, Mayor, we're

3 very happy to have you.

4 CONGRESSMAN PICKETT: Madame Chairman and members

5 of the Commission, it's my pleasure to be here today to

6 discuss BRAC '95 realignments affecting military

7 installations in my district and Hampton Roads, Virginia.

8 With me is the Honorable Meyera Oberndorf, who is the mayor

9 of the city of Virginia Beach. Let me say at the outset that

10 there are both gains and losses for the military

11 installations in my district.

12 But I do support the recommendations of the

13 Secretary, made for my district. Madame Chairman, Mayor

14 Fraim of the city of Norfolk had intended to be here. I

15 would like to ask that his statement be made a part of the

16 record at this time.

17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We would be very happy to have his

18 statement.

19 CONGRESSMAN PICKETT: Concerning the naval air

20 station Oceana, Virginia, the redirect of FA-18 squadrons

21 from NAS Cecil Field, Florida, to NAS Oceana, Virginia, and

22 the redirect of S-3 squadrons from NAS Cecil Field to NAS

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1 Mayor Obendorf has been vigorous and consistent in

2 furthering the strong ties Virginia Beach has with the

3 military. She is a tireless worker on behalf of our military

4 families, and recognizes the importance to them of quality of

5 life programs.

6 MAYOR OBENDORF: Thank you, Congressman Pickett,

7 Madame Chairman and distinguished members of the BRAC '95

8 Commission. Good afternoon. I've been with you since early

9 this morning, so I know your endurance defies description.

10 As mayor of the 37th largest city in the nation, I am

11 delighted to be here and honored to have the opportunity to

12 speak to you today. I would like to take just a few minutes

13 of your valuable time to express our sincere appreciation for

14 all your hard work on a most difficult tasking -- right-

15 sizing our country's military infrastructure.

16 As a city with a long history of strong ties to its

17 military, the citizens of Virginia Beach are keenly aware of

18 the magnitude of your charter, and fully realize, when times

19 are tough, and bucks are tight, some unpopular and sometimes

20 gut-wrenching decisions must be made to ensure our nation's

21 military remains efficient and effective, but second to none,

22 as we move rapidly towards the 21st century.

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1 Jacksonville have perhaps received the most attention and

2 publicity. These recommendations, however, are fully

3 supported and justified by a thorough, complete and detailed

4 analysis prepared by the Navy, based on validated confirmed

5 and certified data.

6 This redirect of naval aircraft is consistent with

7 the purpose and objectives of the Base Closure and

8 Realignment process, which is to size and shape of military

9 infrastructure to support our national security requirements

10 in the most cost-effective and operationally efficient way.

11 The General Accounting Office, in making its statutory review

12 of DOD's BRAC '95 process, concluded that the Navy's process

13 and recommendations for the air stations category were sound.

14 Redirecting the FA-18s and single-siting the F-14s

15 at Oceana will not overload this base. During the decade of

16 the 1980s, an even larger number of aircraft were

17 successfully and routinely accommodated at this very capable

18 and well-equipped master jet base. The infrastructure,

19 support facilities, and community quality of life resources

20 are all in place and ready for use.

21 And speaking about losses in my district, I might

22 mention that there are two helicopter mine countermeasure

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1 Downsizing and realignment stir great emotion,

2 regardless of whether they are in the loss or gain column.

3 During previous BRAC rounds, the city of Virginia Beach has

4 been on both sides of the coin. Today, however, I am pleased

5 to announce we strongly concur with the BRAC '95 decision

6 concerning the realignment of naval air station Oceana, as

7 put forth by the Secretary of the Navy and subsequently

8 approved and announced by the Secretary of Defense, on the

9 28th of February, 1995.

10 It is, without question, the logical decision for

11 a multitude of reasons. But the main issue that cannot be

12 denied concerns real and substantial tax dollar savings.

13 Single-siting the Navy's F-14 Tomcat community; redirecting

14 eight fleet squadrons and one fleet replacement squadron of

15 FA-18 Hornets from NAS Cecil Field, Florida; and moving the

16 Navy's East Coast F-3 Viking community to NAS Jacksonville,

17 Florida, will result in an upfront savings equivalent to

18 closing a major naval air station on either coast.

19 The above realignment initiative will result in a

20 combined upfront savings to the American taxpayer of over

21 three-quarters of a billion dollars. Yes, that's over three-

22 quarters of a billion, with a capital b, and that's not small

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1 squadrons now stationed at the Norfolk naval base that are

2 proposed to be relocated to the Navy's mine warfare center of

3 excellence at Angleside, Texas. While we understand the

4 reasons for this move, we will still best define military

5 members and their families and their community.

6 Concerning naval aviation depot Norfolk, in a

7 letter dated March 2nd, 1995, I requested the Commission to

8 review the BRAC '93 decision concerning naval aviation depot

9 Norfolk. Of all F-14s being single-sited at NAS Oceana, just

10 20 miles from NADEP Norfolk, there are stronger arguments now

11 to support the need for this premier F-14 maintenance

12 facility. The target date for closure of this facility is

13 now September 30, 1996.

14 I request the Commission to consider reversing or

15 modifying the action taken in the BRAC '93 process with

16 respect to NADEP Norfolk. There are new facts bearing on

17 this issue that should be thoroughly considered by the

18 Commission in its review process this year. Closing this

19 facility, as presently scheduled, defies logic and common

20 sense. I hope you will agree. It's now my pleasure to

21 present the Honorable Meyera Oberndorf, mayor of the city of

22 Virginia Beach.

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1 potatoes. The city of Virginia Beach has taken bold actions

2 on several initiatives in close cooperation with the

3 commanding officer to ensure NAS Oceana continues its role as

4 the Navy's premier master jet base.

5 On August the 23rd, 1994, Virginia Beach city

6 council unanimously approved a comprehensive airport zoning

7 ordinance, limiting the height of structures around the

8 airfield; requiring existing owners and realtors to disclose

9 the noise zone potential to potential buyers; and requiring

10 any structure built in the noise area to incorporate acoustic

11 treatments of their construction; and defined what could be

12 built, in terms of compatible use in any of the noise zones

13 around the field.

14 In addition, we have budgeted approximately \$25

15 million to move two elementary schools built over 40 years

16 ago, now presently located in the NAS Oceana accident-

17 potential zone. Our school board has selected the alternate

18 sites, and engineers are currently engaged in the necessary

19 design work. Also, we are pleased that we have agreed and

20 signed an agreement with the state of North Carolina,

21 allowing the Lake Gaston water supply project to be completed

22 in 1998.

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1 I can assure you, the city of Virginia Beach and
 2 her sister cities that make up the greater Hampton Roads
 3 area, already have the community infrastructure in place to
 4 provide the absolute finest in the quality of life for our
 5 wonderful soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civil
 6 service employees and their dependents. Overcrowding is a
 7 non-issue.

8 As a matter of fact, I have been told by reliable
 9 sources that by the time the BRAC '95 initiatives are
 10 executed, the base loading at NAS Oceana, with respect to the
 11 number of personnel, number of squadrons and total aircraft,
 12 will be at a level below what has already been assigned there
 13 during the mid to late 1980s, prior to both Operation Desert
 14 Shield and Desert Storm.

15 Therefore, this is not new ground for the city of
 16 Virginia Beach. And we look forward to the sound of freedom,
 17 and we welcome our new residents.

18 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. (Applause.)
 19 Governor, I think that's the last of the group on our list.
 20 Do you have anything?

21 GOVERNOR ALLEN: I know we may have some time left,
 22 but unless you have any questions, all I would like to say

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1 to make the case for relocating the Navy wing from Cecil
 2 Field, Florida, and Beaufort, South Carolina, to Cherry
 3 Point. I believe the case is compelling, and I ask that my
 4 full statement be entered to the record.

5 CONGRESSMAN JONES: Madame Chairman, we are here
 6 today representing the people of North Carolina to request
 7 that this Commission apply the law, the spirit of the law and
 8 the rationale of the BRAC '93 Commission when it decided the
 9 F-18 aircraft from Cecil Field, Florida, to Cherry Point
 10 Marine Air Station in North Carolina. I cannot overstate the
 11 impact of your decision on the people of my district and the
 12 district represented by Mrs. Clayton and on our state.

13 Madame Chairman, we share the desire for an
 14 efficient and a cost-effective operation. We believe our
 15 case is compelling. Governor Hunt will address our opening
 16 issues. Thank you.

17 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, and welcome, Governor
 18 Hunt. (Applause.)

19 GOVERNOR HUNT: Madame Chairman and members of the
 20 Commission, in 1993, the Base Closure and Realignment
 21 Commission, on the basis of military value determinations,
 22 concluded that the aircraft in Cecil Field should be

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1 is, I'm very proud of our team from Virginia -- all the local
 2 support groups, local government officials, our members of
 3 Congress, members of the General Assembly, the generals who
 4 came here, General Gray and Hunzeker and Colonel Williams.

5 And I hope and trust that our comments you found to
 6 be cogent, instructive and useful as you deliberate in these
 7 matters when you have to be discussing and understanding
 8 everything from Hornets to health care to tank ranges to air
 9 space to cryptology -- or cryptography. And we thank you for
 10 your care and consideration, and hope and trust you will
 11 exercise good judgment for the people of America. And thank
 12 you for your service.

13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And we did
 14 indeed find your comments and thoughts across the board to be
 15 very cogent and very interesting. And we appreciate everyone
 16 who was here today, particularly everyone led by their
 17 governor. Thank you very much.

18 GOVERNOR ALLEN: Thank you, thank you. (Applause.)

19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We will now be moving on to the
 20 state of North Carolina. (Applause.) Welcome. If you all
 21 are ready, we have 20 minutes allocated to this. And we're
 22 most pleased to see quite a distinguished group representing

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1 redistributed from NAS Cecil Field to MCAS on the East Coast,
 2 Cherry Point and Beaufort. The Commission's rationale was
 3 that such a realignment would -- and let me quote here --
 4 "dovetail with the recent determination for joint military
 5 operations of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft."

6 The BRAC Commission in 1993 understood that
 7 interservice, joint military operations were necessary in
 8 order to achieve the most efficient, cost-effective
 9 utilization of our military resources. In addition to the
 10 interservice rationale, the '93 Commission also concluded
 11 that the realignment of the F-18 aircraft at Cherry Point
 12 "alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and
 13 land use problems."

14 As a result of the BRAC '93 directives, the Navy
 15 has already spent approximately \$25 million in preparation
 16 for receiving the aircraft at Cherry Point. This expenditure
 17 was entirely reasonable, in light of the unassailable
 18 rationale provided for the decision by the '93 Commission.
 19 It made sense then, and it makes sense now. The Department
 20 of Defense now, however, proposes to ignore the BRAC '93
 21 Commission decision and its underlying rationale.
 22 It recommends redirecting the F-18 aircraft from

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1 the state of North Carolina. Let me turn it over to you all
 2 to start with the program

3 CONGRESSMAN JONES: Madame Chairman, members of the
 4 Commission, I am Walter V. Jones, Jr., representative for the
 5 3rd District of North Carolina. With me today are Governor -
 6 -

7 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I'm sorry, I neglected a very
 8 important job. Statute does require that we swear all
 9 witnesses in before testimony, otherwise, we cannot take the
 10 testimony. So if you all would allow me, and raise your
 11 right arm -- right hand, excuse me.

12 (Witnesses sworn.)

13 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. I'm sorry to
 14 interrupt, and we'll start your time over.

15 CONGRESSMAN JONES: Thank you. Madame Chairman,
 16 members of the Commission, I am Walter V. Jones, Jr.,
 17 representative for the 3rd District of North Carolina. With
 18 me today are Governor James B. Hunt, Jr.; Senator Jesse
 19 Helms; and Senator Lauch Faircloth; and Representative Eva
 20 Clayton.

21 CONGRESSMAN CLAYTON: Madame Chair and members, I
 22 want to thank you for this opportunity to be part of a team

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1 Cecil Field to Oceana, rather than to Cherry Point. A few F-
 2 18 aircraft also would be assigned to Beaufort, South
 3 Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia. Madame Chairman, we
 4 respectfully suggest that this commission consider the
 5 Department of Defense recommendation to be a substantial
 6 deviation from the BRAC criteria; a deviation, as we will
 7 make clear today, which will not stand scrutiny, and ought to
 8 be reversed.

9 What happened between 1993 and 1995? And why did
 10 it happen? To answer these questions, it's important to
 11 first understand -- and I think this is crucial, Madame
 12 Chairman -- to understand that Oceana was considered by the
 13 '93 Commission as a potential receiver for the F-18 aircraft.
 14 And the Commission concluded that "the movement of Cecil
 15 Field F-18 aircraft and personnel to NAA and NAS Oceana
 16 defeats the increase in military value achieved by the
 17 integration of Navy carrier-based aviation with the Marine
 18 Corps carrier aviation at Cherry Point and Beaufort.

19 Oceana was not overlooked; it was specifically
 20 considered and rejected as an appropriate receiver site for
 21 these airplanes. We contend the rationale which supported
 22 that conclusion in 1993 is still fully applicable in 1995.

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1 And in light of new, tight budget constraints, it's even more
 2 relevant today. To justify ignoring the directive of the '93
 3 Commission, it was necessary to change the playing field.
 4 Accordingly, the 1995 Navy recommendation to the
 5 Department of Defense included a so-called rule that -- and I
 6 quote -- "the introduction of aircraft types not currently
 7 aboard a station is not allowed." This rule, of course,
 8 would eliminate Cherry Point as a receiver of F-18s, but
 9 would qualify Oceana as a receiver site because of the
 10 existence of only one Reserve squadron of F-18s at Oceana.
 11 But adherence to this rule would more than eliminate Cherry
 12 Point as a potential receiver.
 13 Madame Chairman, it would destroy the interservice
 14 synergy dictated by the '93 Commission decision. The rule is
 15 clearly designed to direct the F-18s to Oceana. Now, a
 16 review of the cost avoidance and related numbers attributed
 17 to the '93 decision and the 1995 DOD recommendations provides
 18 another example of the Navy's efforts to justify ignoring the
 19 '93 decision.
 20 In 1993, after a thorough study, the Commission
 21 determined that the costs -- this is what they said then --
 22 it would cost \$228 million to move the F-18s to Oceana, and

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1 only \$147 million to move them to Cherry Point. These
 2 numbers were based on the relocation of 13 12-plane squadrons
 3 and a training squadron. Now, in 1995, the Navy recommends
 4 to DOD, and DOD is recommending to you, an estimate that
 5 would cost only \$28 million to move the aircraft to Oceana,
 6 but \$332 million to move it to Cherry Point.
 7 How is this \$385 million flip-flop possible? Is
 8 there any basis and logic for it? The answer is clearly no.
 9 The Navy's explanation for the dramatic difference in the
 10 Commission's '93 cost determination and the Navy's '95
 11 numbers includes the reduction of squadrons from 13 to eight.
 12 It's important, however, to note that the Navy's 1995 cost
 13 figures submitted contain a plain mistake.
 14 They are based on an estimate of different numbers
 15 of planes. They assume 204 planes being transferred to
 16 Cherry Point, but only 144 going to Oceana. That's a big
 17 part of the difference in these costs. And that's just a
 18 mistake. In addition, the Navy contends that the costs
 19 attributed to Oceana would be offset by phasing out 56 A-6
 20 aircraft and the redirection of S-3 aircraft to NAS
 21 Jacksonville. Incidentally, that would be a violation of
 22 their new so-called rule.

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1 These factors simply cannot account for the
 2 difference in the '93 Commission cost determination of \$228
 3 million at Oceana and only \$28 million today under the new
 4 proposal. In addition, the Navy's 1995 cost estimate for
 5 Cherry Point includes a \$42 million cost for additional
 6 family housing units, although the Navy itself has done a
 7 study and shows that Cherry Point -- that these units are not
 8 required at Cherry Point. This was an earlier study.
 9 \$39 million is put in at Cherry Point for
 10 additional enlisted quarters, despite an existing excess
 11 capacity of 35 percent there now. \$25 million is put in at
 12 Cherry Point for an unnecessary and counterproductive
 13 parallel taxiway. Madame Chairman, the DOD recommendation is
 14 replete with inaccuracies. We just urge you to look at that
 15 hard. I know that your staff is doing it now.
 16 We're presenting accurate information to you today
 17 and in our staff we're getting to you; and that will present
 18 to you the real facts. I would like to have about a minute
 19 to close, if I may, Madame Chairman, after our senators
 20 present. Now I'm very pleased to turn over our case to North
 21 Carolina senior Senator Jesse Helms, who is the Chairman of
 22 the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Applause.)

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1 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, Governor
 2 Hunt, and welcome, Senator Helms.
 3 SENATOR HELMS: Madame Chairman, thank you so much
 4 for the opportunity for us to appear to discuss the Defense
 5 Department's recommendation that 11 squadrons of Navy F-18
 6 aircraft be transferred from Cecil Field in Florida to
 7 Oceana, Virginia, and Beaufort, South Carolina, instead of to
 8 Cherry Point, as was initially determined by the 1993 Base
 9 Closure Commission, on which a lot of planning was done and a
 10 great deal of money was spent.
 11 Now, if we sound like an a cappella choir here,
 12 it's because we're singing the same hymn; and I think we'll d
 13 the best we can. But I'll tell you, we feel a little bit
 14 like we've been left at the altar by the 1995 Base Closure
 15 Commission -- or the Defense Department, rather. But I thank
 16 you also for accommodating us and having this meeting today
 17 near Baltimore, instead of Alabama or somewhere like that.
 18 Now, with all due respect, Madame Chairman, when it
 19 comes to the disposition of the F-18s currently stationed at
 20 Cecil Field, the 1993 Base Closure Commission had it right;
 21 and the current Department of Defense had it wrong. As Al
 22 Smith used to say, let's look at the record. During the past

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1 10 years, more than \$400 million has been invested in new
 2 infrastructure at Cherry Point, based upon the 1993 BRAC
 3 determination.
 4 Now, based on the determination back there that
 5 these fighter planes would be transferred to Cherry Point,
 6 and there seemed to be no question about it, not doubt about
 7 it at the time, approximately \$25 million, therefore, was
 8 spent in preparing for the arrival. During the past seven
 9 years, 16 new bachelor enlisted quarters have been built.
 10 And in 1994, a new naval hospital was opened, providing
 11 first-rate medical care for military personnel and their
 12 families who were expected, as a result of the 1993 assurance
 13 as we took it.
 14 In the past year, new water and sewage treatment
 15 facilities have come on line, with excess capacity, I might
 16 add, in anticipation of the growth at Cherry Point. And
 17 because of these and other factors, Cherry Point has twice
 18 been awarded the Commander in Chief's award for installation
 19 excellence, and has won various environmental awards on
 20 numerous occasions.
 21 And as the servicemen and women currently stationed
 22 at Cherry Point will attest of it, there are few, if any,

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1 more desirable places to live in America. The crime rate is
 2 low; the cost of living is reasonable; there's no congestion,
 3 urban sprawl or pollution. Those who live in Cherry Point
 4 and its surrounding communities recognize that they have no
 5 higher responsibility than to take care of the courageous
 6 young men and women who are charged with protecting the
 7 freedoms and the liberty of the American people.
 8 The bottom line is that the military personnel and
 9 dependents who will be transferred, along with the fighter
 10 planes, will be well taken care of, should you abide by the
 11 1993 BRAC decision, which we pray that you will. Now,
 12 stationing these Navy aircraft at Cherry Point will also
 13 promote the goal of interservice cooperation advocated by the
 14 Defense Department itself, as a means of stretching U.S.
 15 defense dollars -- and where I work, that's very important --
 16 and preparing our troops for future conflicts.
 17 That was the judgment of the 1993 BRAC. It was the
 18 correct judgment, we insist. And if the Navy or Marine
 19 Corps, with their common heritage and common mission, cannot
 20 train and work together, then how realistic is it to expect
 21 further association of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines?
 22 And finally, Madame Chairman, in all sincerity, there is the

<p>Page 337</p> <p>1 issue of fairness.</p> <p>2 The overwhelming majority of Navy air-to-ground</p> <p>3 training occurs in and over the state of North Carolina. So</p> <p>4 if the aircraft are stationed at Oceana, the end result will</p> <p>5 be that North Carolina will get all of the noise, all of the</p> <p>6 negative environmental impact of the aircraft, but none of</p> <p>7 the economic benefits. If the pilots flying these aircraft</p> <p>8 are going to train in and over North Carolina, they should be</p> <p>9 based there as well.</p> <p>10 As I close, let me raise a question; and it's</p> <p>11 relevant. I understand that in recommending that their jets</p> <p>12 be transferred to Virginia instead of to Cherry Point, the</p> <p>13 Navy state that it needs the aircraft stationed close to</p> <p>14 their home aircraft carriers at Norfolk. If that is the</p> <p>15 case, Madame Chairman, then why did the Navy recommend that</p> <p>16 F-14s, whose home carriers are docked in San Diego,</p> <p>17 California, also be transferred to Virginia?</p> <p>18 Madame Chairman and members of the Commission,</p> <p>19 thank you for the opportunity to let us state our case as to</p> <p>20 why America's national security and the care and training of</p> <p>21 our young servicemen and women will be both best served if</p> <p>22 the decision of the original 1993 Base Closure Commission is</p>	<p>Page 340</p> <p>1 operational readiness of the military. It just makes no</p> <p>2 sense to introduce a force of 4,000 new people into an area</p> <p>3 that is already hard pressed to have enough water to support</p> <p>4 its current population.</p> <p>5 Another issue is the ground water quality at</p> <p>6 Oceana. It has been reported in the Virginia and national</p> <p>7 press that there is widespread fuel contamination in Oceana.</p> <p>8 This contamination apparently leaked into the groundwater,</p> <p>9 and has made some of the buildings at Oceana uninhabitable.</p> <p>10 To put it another way, there is not only a water problem, but</p> <p>11 there is a clean groundwater problem for what water does</p> <p>12 exist at Oceana.</p> <p>13 It is our assessment that the Oceana facility is</p> <p>14 not comparable to Cherry Point. Cherry Point is a modern,</p> <p>15 ready-to-go facility, located in an area with high quality of</p> <p>16 water. It would seem that given the comparison between the</p> <p>17 two air stations, based on the facts we have presented, and</p> <p>18 the facts in your briefing book, it is absolutely in this</p> <p>19 country's best interest, and in the best interest of the</p> <p>20 Marine Corps, sailors and airmen, to direct the location of</p> <p>21 the F-18 aircraft to Cherry Point.</p> <p>22 Governor Hunt will now make a brief summation of</p>
<p>Page 338</p> <p>1 reaffirmed. At this time, it's my pleasure to present my</p> <p>2 colleague and good friend, the junior senator from North</p> <p>3 Carolina, Lauch Faircloth. Mr. Faircloth. (Applause.)</p> <p>4 SENATOR FAIRCLOTH: Thank you, Jesse, and good</p> <p>5 afternoon, Madame Chairman and members of your staff and</p> <p>6 ladies and gentlemen. I am Lauch Faircloth of North</p> <p>7 Carolina. I was born, reared, and lived in Clinton, North</p> <p>8 Carolina, which is about 80 miles to the west of Cherry</p> <p>9 Point. In Eastern North Carolina, we have a relatively</p> <p>10 unpopulated forested area, which ideally suits itself to</p> <p>11 military training and to training which leads itself to</p> <p>12 safety.</p> <p>13 You don't fly over large shopping malls, or have</p> <p>14 thickly populated areas to land in Cherry Point. The density</p> <p>15 is not what you will find in Norfolk or Oceana. It's simply</p> <p>16 a fact. Our landing patterns and training routes are clear,</p> <p>17 unimpeded, and our communities do not in any meaningful way</p> <p>18 encroach on the one-way and training area. I know the</p> <p>19 hardworking and independent nature of the citizens of North</p> <p>20 Carolina. And I can tell you, they welcome the military and</p> <p>21 need the jobs that these planes will bring.</p> <p>22 The economic impact of this move on an area such as</p>	<p>Page 341</p> <p>1 our testimony.</p> <p>2 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, Senator.</p> <p>3 GOVERNOR HUNT: Madame Chairman and members of the</p> <p>4 Commission, we believe that we presented a case, and the</p> <p>5 information that we submit to you will, that establishes that</p> <p>6 the Navy-DOD recommendation to this commission represents an</p> <p>7 unsupported rejection by the Navy and the Department of</p> <p>8 Defense of the 1993 Commission decision, and a substantial</p> <p>9 deviation from the BRAC criteria.</p> <p>10 This recommendation ignores the joint service</p> <p>11 operations decision and the environmental and land use</p> <p>12 determinations of the '93 Commission. It appears that the</p> <p>13 Navy has concluded that Oceana is at risk of closure if it</p> <p>14 does not receive these airplanes. And the Navy wants to keep</p> <p>15 Oceana open at all costs. We've established today that the</p> <p>16 at-all-costs standard is very high, and a cost that is being</p> <p>17 paid with taxpayers' dollars.</p> <p>18 The Honorable Owen Pickett, who appeared here</p> <p>19 today, is a member of the district in which Oceana is</p> <p>20 located, I think explained the natives' logic very well in</p> <p>21 this matter when he said -- and I quote him -- "when the</p> <p>22 military wants to do something and it is expensive, they</p>
<p>Page 339</p> <p>1 Hampton Roads, with an existing population of 1.5 million</p> <p>2 people, is negligible. However, the economic impact on</p> <p>3 Craven and Crowder County is 15 times greater. Even if</p> <p>4 everything were equal, which it isn't, this one criteria</p> <p>5 should determine the issue in favor of Cherry Point.</p> <p>6 Our military value is unsurpassed. Cherry Point</p> <p>7 has four 8,000-foot runways with excellent approaches. In</p> <p>8 fact, a '93 Commission determined that there was ample</p> <p>9 capacity for five additional 12-aircraft squadrons. To put</p> <p>10 it another way, 60 additional aircraft can be accommodated</p> <p>11 with minimal military construction investment. In addition,</p> <p>12 our area has an abundance of water.</p> <p>13 We do not have rationing, and our water is also</p> <p>14 clean. It will last for any number of years. Despite a</p> <p>15 recent agreement concerning the Lake Gaston pipeline, I am</p> <p>16 sorry to say, our neighbors to the north are not blessed with</p> <p>17 sufficient water. Oceana and the Norfolk area have suffered</p> <p>18 from a severe water shortage since 1981. And to this date,</p> <p>19 mandatory water use restrictions are imposed.</p> <p>20 Not only will the lack of water impact on the</p> <p>21 living conditions and the quality of life of our young</p> <p>22 service personnel, but it is bound to impact on the</p>	<p>Page 342</p> <p>1 underestimate the cost. And when they don't want to do</p> <p>2 something, they overestimate the cost."</p> <p>3 Because of the demonstrated aviation and the clear</p> <p>4 and major mistakes in computing costs that is in this</p> <p>5 recommendation, we request the Commission to reject the DOD</p> <p>6 recommendation and uphold the '93 Commission decision to</p> <p>7 locate the F-18s at Cherry Point. Thank you very much for</p> <p>8 this opportunity to appear before you today.</p> <p>9 And we want to invite your staff to come to Cherry</p> <p>10 Point and see what we have there; see all of these living</p> <p>11 quarters that are not being used now and are ready to be</p> <p>12 used. And we'll be happy to entertain any questions that you</p> <p>13 would like. (Applause.)</p> <p>14 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. There don't</p> <p>15 appear to be any questions at this time. I might just say,</p> <p>16 as a member of the 1993 BRAC, I appreciate your strong belief</p> <p>17 in our infallibility and wisdom. Thank you. (Applause.) I</p> <p>18 believe that we will now have -- we have reserved 11 minutes</p> <p>19 of Pennsylvania's time for the Naval Surface Warfare Center,</p> <p>20 because former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was</p> <p>21 unavoidably detained.</p> <p>22 And so we will now move to do that particular area.</p>

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1 Is Secretary Lehman here? We will go ahead with Secretary
 2 Lehman. We very much appreciate the fact that you're here,
 3 and look forward to your testimony.
 4 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Well, Madame Chair,
 5 Commissioners, thank you very much for accommodating me. I
 6 very much appreciate it. It's a great pleasure to be here.
 7 And I particularly am grateful for being the position of
 8 clean-up batter.
 9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: You know, Secretary Lehman, you
 10 remind me, when you talk about clean-up batter, I'm not sure
 11 that I had forgotten to swear you in, which is required by
 12 our statute. So if you don't mind, I would ask you. Thank
 13 you very much.
 14 (Witness sworn.)
 15 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, sir.
 16 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Madame Chair, as Henry VIII used
 17 to say to his wives, I promise not to keep you long. I have
 18 submitted my testimony for the record, and so I'll just give
 19 you a brief summary and answer any questions that you might
 20 have. I am here to strongly endorse the position and
 21 recommendation of the city of Philadelphia, and half of the
 22 recommendation of the Department of Defense to consolidate

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1 03, which is the engineering directorate is a little more
 2 complicated. And I would urge you to look at it in a simple
 3 way. Don't try to micromanage NAVSEA and tell the director
 4 of NAVSEA exactly which billets to do it, but there is no
 5 doubt in my mind that a substantial number of the functions
 6 being done in NAVSEA 03 in Washington can be far better done
 7 in Philadelphia; and that there should be a substantial net
 8 reduction in people.
 9 Since we left, there has been an enormous growth in
 10 that office. It has now some 650 people in that one part of
 11 NAVSEA in Washington. And that is simply far too many to be
 12 efficient. And so by moving all or most of the functions
 13 that are not directly related to ship design and
 14 coordination, the efficiencies and reductions can be
 15 accomplished, I think, in a very rapid way. I think the cost
 16 savings are enormous. I think the difficulties are few.
 17 I think the costs of moving are grossly overstated.
 18 I am an industrialist, and have a good deal of experience in
 19 the buying, the selling, the building and the moving of
 20 industrial plants. And I think the \$25 million estimate to
 21 move NAVSEES from Annapolis could be done for a fraction of
 22 that if it were done in best business practice. So I would

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1 the engineering center of the NSWC from Annapolis to
 2 Philadelphia, to the central center of excellence at NAVSEES
 3 in Philadelphia.
 4 And second, to strongly endorse the recommendation
 5 to move some of the functions of the headquarters NAVSEA 03
 6 that are closely related to NAVSEES, also to Philadelphia.
 7 The reason I feel enthusiastic about endorsing these two
 8 recommendations is that one of the major efforts that was
 9 made back in the '80s, during the build-up of the 600-ship
 10 Navy was to streamline and reduce the Navy bureaucracy and
 11 the headquarters bureaucracy in Washington, particularly.
 12 And during the period when we were building up the
 13 600-ship Navy from about a 400-ship Navy, as the Cold War
 14 required, we also reduced the bureaucracy, which should
 15 greatly facilitate the building of the ships and the
 16 tremendous expansion of the Navy at that time. We eliminated
 17 a net of 2,600 billets from NAVSEA, NAVAIR, SPAWAR and other
 18 headquarters staffs inside the Beltway.
 19 And unfortunately, with the confusions of peace and
 20 the success of the build-up, the attention to reducing
 21 streamlining bureaucracy went the other way. And since the
 22 end of the Cold War, all of those 2,600 billets have been

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1 guess a jaundiced eye at that cost estimate.
 2 Just to summarize, I think this is a great
 3 opportunity to put the Navy headquarters back in an efficient
 4 and tight basis. We have shown in the past that when we
 5 reduced bureaucracy, we actually speeded decision-making and
 6 improved the quality of the product; and we can do it again
 7 here. It's grown like topsy, as bureaucracy always does,
 8 unless it's given a periodic top-down cut.
 9 Again, don't try to micromanage COM NAVSEA. He
 10 understands the problem, but he really needs you to mandate a
 11 top-down targeted cut, in order to take on the baronies that
 12 he must take on to accomplish this. That is the burden of my
 13 message, and I urge you Godspeed in carrying it out. I would
 14 be happy to answer any of the questions that you might want
 15 to raise.
 16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: I think we are very much
 17 appreciate your testimony, and of course, we'll take your
 18 full testimony for the record. And we are honored that you
 19 would be here today to provide us with this easy to
 20 understand testimony, and that's always helpful. Thank you
 21 very much.
 22 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Thank you, Madame Chair.

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1 added back to Washington area headquarters, plus another 400.
 2 And that is not for a 600-ship Navy, but for a 300-plus ship
 3 Navy. So I'm here to urge you to take those measures that
 4 will once again bring a tightness and efficiency by reducing
 5 headquarters' layers of bureaucracy.
 6 And I think there's no better example to be found
 7 than the consolidation of the functions now being done at
 8 Annapolis, which, in many ways, are redundant, and in every
 9 case, closely related to the work being done in Philadelphia.
 10 The NAVSEA 03 consolidation is also related because many of
 11 those people are really overseeing and coordinating functions
 12 because they're at more than one sight.
 13 And so the two are related. There are, in the case
 14 of Philadelphia, so many areas of expertise. It is, of
 15 course, the central area of excellence for ship systems
 16 testing and R&D. And while the work done at Annapolis has
 17 been excellent in every way, there seems to be no serious
 18 case for not consolidating them, and reducing the net number
 19 of positions at the same time.
 20 So I won't spend much time on that. The case is
 21 well made in the technical papers that have been provided to
 22 the Commission. The movement of -- consolidation of NAVSEA

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1 CHAIRWOMAN COX: We are now at the point of the
 2 second period of public comment.
 3 MR. MCCARTHY: Madame Chair, Commissioners, I'm Joe
 4 McCarthy, and I'm chairman of the Pennsylvania action
 5 committee for Governor Ridge. I'm also a retired Army
 6 general, and as such, I approach my mission looking at the
 7 military criteria. And the first criteria that I observe in
 8 going around these bases is the strategic location of
 9 Pennsylvania.
 10 And by the strategic location, I mean the state
 11 itself, with respect to mobilization and ports and so on,
 12 highways. But also I mean the location, with respect to
 13 other functions -- the collocation of functions and the
 14 interservicing possible and also location with respect to
 15 bases, that is, Pennsylvania Guard requiring a place to
 16 train; Kelly Support Center close to the place where it's
 17 supporting troops. So location is a very big item.
 18 Other items in military value would be the, I
 19 think, for your consideration, the very effective bases that
 20 we have. I think we've shown that these bases and the people
 21 concerned are very effective in supporting the forces. And
 22 they're also cost-effective. One thing that I think is

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1 alarming, with respect to military operations is the
 2 responsibility that the Department of Defense has for
 3 supporting the Reserves and the National Guard.
 4 And I think that this has been abdicated in a way,
 5 with respect to Indiantown Gap and with respect to the Kelly
 6 Support Center and the 911th Wing. I wanted to also mention
 7 the disproportionate impact, cumulatively, in Pennsylvania of
 8 the previous BRAC things. And I think Governor Ridge
 9 probably left this with you.
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Yes, thank you.
 11 MR. MCCARTHY: That's a very telling thing. Now,
 12 that's economic impact, but I want to put that into military
 13 value. In Pennsylvania, our recruitment enlistment, both in
 14 the active services and in the Guard and Reserve, have always
 15 been high. And we are at the point now where the military
 16 present in Pennsylvania is very seriously reduced; and these
 17 figures show that.
 18 And this is going to affect recruitment and
 19 enlistment and the general support of the public for the
 20 military. This concerns me. So I've approached this from
 21 the military value standpoint. And I want to say that I've
 22 seen Commissioner Cornella, and I've seen you all in

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1 fort will save \$23.8 million a year; when in fact it only
 2 costs \$13.5 million last year to operate the base.
 3 Correcting these and other misleading factors, the
 4 overall rating of Fort Indiantown Gap changes from being
 5 number nine out of 10, to becoming number three out of 10.
 6 In view of the discrepancy, I urge the BRAC Commission to
 7 have GAO reevaluate the data. Finally, it's my strong
 8 recommendation that the BRAC Commission retain the federal
 9 presence of Indiantown Gap and take Fort Indiantown Gap off
 10 the list. Thank you.
 11 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir.
 12 MAJOR GENERAL SAJER: Madame Chairman,
 13 Commissioners, I'm Major General Gerry Sajer, former Adjunct
 14 General of Pennsylvania. Thank you for your patience and
 15 perseverance. In its analysis of major training areas, the
 16 Army failed to consider daily usage, schoolhouse usage and
 17 weekend usage. Now, this allowed the Army to use a one-size-
 18 fits-all approach, the enclave plan -- to abandon containment
 19 areas, eliminate the infrastructure, dismiss the employees,
 20 and then claim the overhead as savings.
 21 While the enclave plan may work at some posts, it
 22 will not work at the Gap. No other base must support the

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1 operation. I have great sympathy for the tolerance you've
 2 shown all of us, and the sympathy. And you have a tough job;
 3 we understand that. We thank you very much.
 4 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much for that wrap-
 5 up on behalf of Pennsylvania. Thank you. We have now
 6 reached the point of our second public comment period. This
 7 will be a period of 30 minutes. And we'll take those
 8 affecting Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina. I would
 9 like to have all of those wishing to speak right here.
 10 It looks like, perhaps, you are already lined up so
 11 that we could swear you in all at one time. So if you would
 12 please raise your right hands.
 13 (Witnesses sworn.)
 14 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And I
 15 believe we will be starting with Pennsylvania. Yes, okay.
 16 With Mr. Stephen George? No. Okay. Maybe you could just
 17 give us your name as you start.
 18 MAJOR GENERAL SMOKER: Madame Chairman, I am Major
 19 General Frank Smoker, United States Air Force, Retired.
 20 Having served at Fort Indiantown Gap for many years, the last
 21 seven years as commander of the Pennsylvania Air National
 22 Guard, my experience at Fort Indiantown Gap provides me with

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1 very large training population we have. No other base has
 2 the large daily population we have. No other base has the
 3 large number of schoolhouses we have. No other base has the
 4 large numbers of diverse training opportunities we offer. No
 5 other base even comes close on the throughput of 780,000
 6 soldiers a year. The other bases are at 160,000 or less.
 7 Now, the enclave idea, I suggest, was not well
 8 thought through. You cannot close your eyes to reality; you
 9 cannot escape your responsibility for federal funding; and
 10 you cannot ignore the responsibilities we have to our
 11 soldiers. The enclave plan takes away from these soldiers
 12 their simple pleasures -- their barracks, their showers,
 13 their mess halls, their post exchange, their gym -- all of
 14 their quality of life.
 15 Soldiers do not wish to be babied, but they do
 16 expect their leadership to anticipate their needs, do the
 17 best they can to provide for them. That's what's being
 18 ignored here. Can you imagine a group of soldiers at the
 19 Gap, standing around in the cold and the rain, looking at
 20 recently modeled barracks and told they can't use them
 21 because the Army wouldn't fund it? You're right -- they'll
 22 feel left out in the cold.

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1 a unique perspective of the tremendous military value that
 2 the fort provides to combat readiness.
 3 Unfortunately, the Army's criteria for determining
 4 military value of major training areas did not allow for
 5 accurate measurement of the uniqueness of Fort Indiantown
 6 Gap's military value. For example, the criteria did not
 7 fully take into account the very valuable air-to-ground
 8 gunnery and bombing range -- one of only 15 in the United
 9 States. This is a national asset.
 10 It did not consider this restricted air space used
 11 by the Air Force, Navy and Marines, as well as the Army and
 12 Air National Guard, or the 191 miles of low-level training
 13 routes leading into the range at Indiantown Gap. Being aware
 14 of today's environmental concerns, once gone, these extremely
 15 assets can never be duplicated. The criteria did not
 16 consider the 710 square miles of the northern training area,
 17 currently used for tactical aviation training.
 18 The criteria did not take into account the six
 19 modern helicopter flight simulators, which provided a cost
 20 avoidance to the taxpayer last year of over \$68 million. In
 21 studying the tab's data, it's obvious that the input data
 22 must have been flawed, since the Army claims that closing the

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1 And that's the reason why we're not taking care of
 2 soldiers with this enclave plan. I would recommend that the
 3 Commission abandon it. It will not work. Take the Gap off
 4 the list. Thank you very much for your patience today.
 5 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. Senator
 6 Brightbill.
 7 SENATOR BRIGHTBILL: Good afternoon. My name is
 8 David Brightbill, I'm a state senator, member of the General
 9 Assembly.
 10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Welcome.
 11 SENATOR BRIGHTBILL: I have lived in the Lebanon
 12 area for my 52 years, and I've been in public service for
 13 about 16 or 18 of those years. I believe that the Gap has a
 14 unique value, and I think that we've well expressed it, and
 15 I'm going to bring a little bit different perspective. We
 16 have a small but very real support -- excuse me, we have
 17 substantial support for the Gap from the local community.
 18 I've never had a complaint about the helicopters.
 19 I've never had a complaint about the jets. I've never had a
 20 complaint about the Howitzers. And the thing I'd like to
 21 leave you with is this, this simple thought. During the
 22 Vietnam War, when we saw many, many protests of military

1 people, military installations, for Lebanon, Pennsylvania,
 2 for the soldiers at Indiantown Gap, we would fill high school
 3 auditoriums, places like this, to say simply that we were
 4 proud to be an American; we were proud to have Indiantown Gap
 5 there.

6 We've supported the Gap not only here today, not
 7 only on the base closure, but we've supported it back in the
 8 '60s and the '70s and the '80s. And I think that's a
 9 consideration for you, too. Thank you for your time.

10 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you, Senator. Mr. Schott.
 11 MR. SCHOTT: Madame Chairman and Commissioners, my
 12 name is Leonard Schott. I am President of the Farmer's Trust
 13 Bank in Lebanon, and current Chairman of the Lebanon Valley
 14 Chamber of Commerce. I've spent my entire life in the
 15 Lebanon Valley. In fact, the Gap and I are just about the
 16 same age. The Gap is the largest employer in Lebanon County.
 17 Roughly 2,800 men and women work full time at the Gap every
 18 day.

19 That employment base generates an annual payroll of
 20 more than \$90 million. The Gap is also by far the largest
 21 purchaser of goods and services in our community. Closure
 22 obviously would have a significant impact on all of us who

1 we're talking over 800 billets, and to move from the
 2 Washington area to the West Coast, you've got to cut so many
 3 people in this -- far more people are going down to
 4 Charleston. The estimated cost for their move is \$44 million
 5 -- or \$44,000. So if we take 800 people and move them to the
 6 West Coast, we've got \$40 million, not \$24 million.

7 That doesn't count the cost of moving the furniture
 8 or anything else, contents or any improvements. So I think
 9 that's vastly understating. That brings us to the second
 10 point -- the savings of personnel that they're talking about.
 11 I heard former Secretary Lehman said, and I saw Congressman
 12 Murtha walking around. He was instrumental in putting a bill
 13 through that made us reduce headquarters, okay?

14 If we were to come in at 1,350 people in 1990 and
 15 we're down to 900, we gained nobody back, okay? So we've
 16 lost one-third of our workforce. If we take another
 17 reduction, 250, 300 people, we're on a ragged edge of town;
 18 we ain't going to make it. So I don't know how we're going
 19 to integrate in San Diego and make that. Now, if the Defense
 20 Department is so concerned about us integrating or something,
 21 we have another option for them.

22 We have our sister command, larger command, is

1 work and live here; and every aspect of our local economy
 2 would be impacted. Too many good jobs will be lost, and our
 3 local tax base will be seriously affected.

4 But what I want to talk to you about this afternoon
 5 is the community support for the Gap that you'd give up if
 6 you close this training base. As I have said, I've lived in
 7 this community all my life. The Gap is part of our
 8 community, and we are proud of the function it serves in our
 9 national defense. Helicopters, Howitzers, tanks and mortars
 10 are noisy. Low level flying training flights by A-10s, C-
 11 130s, Blackhawks and Chinooks generate plenty of noise
 12 throughout the community.

13 Yet, those of us who live there in the Pennsylvania
 14 Dutch country understand and support those training
 15 activities; and we don't call the garrison commander to
 16 complain. We don't even complain about the convoys that pass
 17 through our small communities on the way to the Gap.
 18 Honestly, the military's presence in our community is taken
 19 as a fact of life, and is appreciated.

20 And having served in the U.S. Army at a number of
 21 bases, I know that that's not the case in many communities
 22 with the military present. Fort Indiantown Gap is a good

1 NAVSEA. It sits right next to us, and we support them
 2 heavily in ship design and everything else. And if they're
 3 so worried about saving on us, then merge us with NAVSEA and
 4 introduce the national capital area as an integrated ship
 5 design team. Thank you for your time.

6 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir. Mr.
 7 Fred Lebert.

8 MR. LEBERT: Lebert.

9 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you.

10 MR. LEBERT: I'm an employee with the space naval
 11 warfare systems command. I'm representing myself. I'd like
 12 to talk about the military value of SPANAR remaining in their
 13 local area, the national capital region, if you will. You
 14 have heard the presentation earlier about SPANAR, so I'm not
 15 going to address that. What I'd like to talk about is
 16 added -- the changes that have taken place recently in
 17 military environment that is beyond the normal downsizing
 18 integration effort.

19 What is taking place now is an increase in the
 20 requirement of the services to integrate among themselves.
 21 They are building an inadequate integration effort, if you
 22 will, as far as Congress is concerned. Congress has tasked a

1 employer and a good neighbor. Our community supports the
 2 training activities that occur there. Fort Indiantown Gap is
 3 part of our community. Finally, as a banker --

4 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir, and we'd
 5 be happy to have any written testimony for the record, either
 6 today or later. I believe we're now moving on to the state
 7 of Virginia. Mr. David Sivillo.

8 MR. SIVILLO: Sivillo.

9 CHAIRMAN COX: Sivillo. Thank you very much.

10 MR. SIVILLO: Madame Commissioner -- Chairman and
 11 commissioners, my name is David Sivillo. I'm a manager in
 12 space naval warfare systems command. But I'm representing
 13 myself, okay?

14 CHAIRMAN COX: Well, we're happy to have you.

15 MR. SIVILLO: I'd like to bring forth a couple
 16 things that was brought up generally in the thing. When you
 17 were talking about relocation costs, you know, the Navy and
 18 the DOD put together a cost -- \$24 million employer cost.
 19 I'd like to offer, as a point of reference, SPANAR moved five
 20 years ago, a block and a half, they changed buildings, and
 21 that cost \$10 million.

22 Now, looking at the cost of what we're doing here,

1 Mr. John White to put together a report by May, this month,
 2 if you will, on roles and missions of the military, with
 3 emphasis on how they would be consolidated even more than
 4 they are today. But Congress is unhappy with the degree of
 5 consolidation.

6 This increased consolidation is going to force
 7 significant more coordination between SPANAR, which is a
 8 major contributor to the military picture. So SPANAR, in
 9 this condition of increased coordination, surely cannot be
 10 leaving the area where all the activity is. All our major
 11 sponsors and our coordination, if you will, at the joint
 12 services, with the NAVSEA and the NAVAIR -- NSA, we're
 13 playing a much more significant role with NSA.

14 There are recent OPNAV instructions that have the
 15 role increasing between SPANAR, the Naval Security Group
 16 activities, the Naval Information Warfare activities, as well
 17 as the NSA. So the degree of coordination is going to be
 18 significantly greater. That was not adequately expressed
 19 today. That's all I have.

20 CHAIRMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir. We
 21 appreciate your coming. Mr. Robert Higginbotham. Welcome.

22 MR. HIGGINBOTHAM: Thank you. My name is Bob

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1 Higginbotham. I've been a contracted supporter of SPAMAR for
 2 the past 10 years. As a contractor, I'm of course concerned
 3 with losing my job, should SPAMAR relocate to San Diego. But
 4 as a taxpayer, I'm also concerned with the cost estimates
 5 that have been presented on how much it would cost to make
 6 the move.

7 I would ask that the Commissioners carefully review the
 8 cost estimate of the move to San Diego, and consider the
 9 possibility that we could move with NAVSEA and retained in
 10 the Washington metropolitan area, possibly collocated with
 11 them at the Navy yard or at White Oak. Thank you.

12 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, sir. Mr. James
 13 Blevins? No. Okay.

14 MR. BLEVINS: My name is James Blevins, Madame
 15 Chairman, and I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to
 16 speak before the committee. I'm Superintendent of Schools in
 17 Nottoway County, Virginia, and I'm here today to express my
 18 concerns about the inclusion of Fort Pickett on the most
 19 recent round of military installation closures. I believe
 20 that the closure of Fort Pickett would severely damage the
 21 mutual, beneficial working relationship that has been
 22 developed between the military and the residents of a small

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1 cities area, and of great military value to the United States
 2 military. Today I'm speaking specifically on behalf of
 3 Kenner Army Community Hospital, because during the past 33
 4 years, I've worked in public education. I also serve
 5 currently as the provost of a two-year branch of the College
 6 of William of Mary in the area.

7 And I have had personal contact from kindergartners
 8 through college-age students of dependents of military
 9 personnel who are stationed at Fort Lee. Both in our
 10 communities, in the residential areas, as well as in the
 11 military community, I have never heard during my 33 years in
 12 public education, hear anyone complain about the services
 13 rendered by Kenner Army Hospital.

14 And to me, Kenner Hospital is an integral part, for
 15 both the in-patient as well as the out-patient services.
 16 When one reduced patient care internally and in the hospital,
 17 you also reduce out-patient care. Of the 215,000 cases and
 18 visits that went to Kenner Hospital this past year, one could
 19 see very easily the fact that without the number of doctors
 20 and physicians and nurses that were there, Kenner would be
 21 insufficient to carry out the needs.

22 With all of the things that go on at Kenner, I

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1 rural community, such as Nottoway County.

2 This relationship has included a tie between the
 3 schools and the military. In a school system that has
 4 approximately 750 high school age youngsters, almost 25
 5 percent of these support the military through participation
 6 in our Junior Reserve Officer Training program at Nottoway
 7 High School. Much of that success of this fine program,
 8 which identifies and trains the potential military personnel
 9 is a result of continued positive presence of a military
 10 installation in this rural area.

11 I also believe that a primary reason we have been
 12 able to attract quality military personnel as instructors for
 13 this program is the proximity to the military installation.
 14 Many of the family members have been employed at Fort Pickett
 15 in a part-time summer job capacity, thereby creating a
 16 positive relationship between the civilian population and the
 17 military.

18 It would seem to me that this type of relationship
 19 between rural communities and the military would be an
 20 appropriate consideration. There have been a number of
 21 written articles and radio, news commentators in Virginia who
 22 have said the inclusion of a base on the closure list is

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1 would conclude my remarks by saying that if one removes
 2 Kenner in-patient services, then we're doing an injustice to
 3 the military community. Thank you very much.

4 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir. Now, I
 5 understand we have four from the state of North Carolina. And
 6 we do need to swear you in, if you would all raise your right
 7 hands.

8 (Witnesses sworn.)

9 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. And Mr. John
 10 Nichols?

11 MR. NICHOLS: Yes, ma'am.

12 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Great, thank you.

13 MR. NICHOLS: Madame Chairman, members of the
 14 Commission, I'm John Nichols and I represent the people of
 15 the 3rd District in the North Carolina House of
 16 Representatives. I appreciate this opportunity, because I'm
 17 extremely troubled by what I've heard said here today. I
 18 understand money, and obviously I understand politics. The
 19 1993 BRAC decisions to send the F-18s to Cherry Point was
 20 based on realistic costs and military value assessments
 21 comparing Cherry Point to Oceana.

22 The 1995 redirection recommendation is clearly

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1 strictly a military decision with no regard to the economic
 2 impact on a community. While I am sure the primary concern
 3 is one of financial impact on the military, as a citizen and
 4 a veteran, I find it difficult to believe that the military
 5 would blatantly disregard the impact on the community.

6 As a veteran, I can recall that during this time,
 7 for individuals across this land were outspoken against the
 8 military. It was often the small rural communities, such as
 9 Nottoway County, who continued to support.

10 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir. And Mr.
 11 James McNair.

12 MR. MCNAIR: My name is Jim McNair, and I am
 13 representing Crater Academy. I'm representing the cities of
 14 Colonial Heights, Petersburg, Hopewell, and the counties of
 15 Prince George, Dinwiddie and Chesterfield. I serve as mayor
 16 of the city of Colonial Heights, and chairman of the Crater
 17 Planning District Commission. We feel like that Kenner Army
 18 Community Hospital is a very important and vital link in the
 19 entire health care network for the community of Fort Lee.

20 We call ourselves the quad-city areas. And when I
 21 spoke to the BRAC Commission in Norfolk in 1993, we all
 22 agreed that Fort Lee was an integral part of the entire tri-

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1 based on politics. I have sat here all day, listened to the
 2 Cherry Point and Oceana presentations. And it can now be
 3 clear to me that neither Virginia politics nor the Navy want,
 4 or ever did want to have airplanes at Cherry Point. A lot of
 5 money seems to have been spent to see that that doesn't
 6 happen. It doesn't seem to matter that our base and our
 7 local communities have worked very hard since the 1993
 8 recommendation to prepare for the arrival of the planes.

9 Nor does it matter that millions of dollars,
 10 taxpayers' dollars, have already been spent at Cherry Point.

11 Members of the commission, political interests are trying to
 12 in-run you and your process. Unless you stop it here, and in
 13 justice to the people of North Carolina, and the long-term
 14 best interest of our military forces will be perpetrated.

15 Thank you very much for your attention.

16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, sir. (Applause.) Ms.
 17 Beverly Perdue.

18 MS. PERDUE: Thank you.

19 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Welcome.

20 MS. PERDUE: Madame Chair, members of the
 21 Commission, I am Beverly Perdue, State Senator for the 3rd
 22 District of North Carolina, and Chair of the Senate

1 Appropriations Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
 2 speak to you today. Local communities must be able to rely
 3 on Base Closure and Realignment Commission decisions. There
 4 must be certainty and predictability in the process.

5 In 1993, your predecessor commission, after
 6 extensive investigation, ordered that 116 Navy F-18 Hornets
 7 would be relocated from Cecil Field to Cherry Point. That
 8 recommendation was adopted by our Congress and signed into
 9 law by our President. For the last two years, citizens and
 10 taxpayers of our region in Cherry Point have passed school
 11 bonds and constructed schools. We built medical facilities
 12 and utilities.

13 The private sector has invested millions of dollars
 14 in new housing and service industries. Our local communities
 15 have made every investment possible, requested by the DOD.
 16 Now, just 18 months later, and on very questionable data, the
 17 Department of Defense is attempting to directly overrule the
 18 1993 decision and send the Hornets to Virginia. If the
 19 Commission decisions can be so casually overturned, the
 20 process will lose all of its credibility. And local
 21 communities and our citizens in this great country will be
 22 unfairly penalized. Thank you.

1 Realignment Commission regional hearing. We want to thank
 2 all of the witnesses who testified today. You've brought us
 3 some very valuable information, and I can assure you it will
 4 be given careful consideration as we go through our decision-
 5 making process.

6 Let me also thank all the elected officials who
 7 have helped us on our base visits and in preparation for this
 8 hearing. And finally, let me thank all of you all from the
 9 communities represented here today, because you have
 10 supported the members of our armed services for so many
 11 years, making them feel valued in your town. And you are
 12 indeed patriots. Thank you.

13 (Applause.)
 14 (Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., the hearing was
 15 concluded.)

16 * * * * *

1 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you, ma'am. (Applause.)
 2 Mr. William Wainright, welcome.

3 MR. WAINWRIGHT: Madame Chair and members of the
 4 Commission, my name is William Wainright. I am a member of
 5 the North Carolina House of Representatives, and reside in
 6 Craven County, North Carolina. I am proud to be able to say
 7 that, by comparison with other areas of the country, we enjoy
 8 an extremely low crime rate in the area around Cherry Point.

9 We have the safe streets that are the envy of more
 10 metropolitan areas, and which give our residents and their
 11 children comfort and peace of mind. This is a benefit that
 12 our service personnel deserve where available. And we would
 13 like to share our communities and this atmosphere with the F-
 14 18s squadrons' families. Thank you very much, Madame Chair
 15 and members of the Commission.

16 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much, sir.
 17 (Applause.) And Miss Jean Preston. Welcome.

18 MS. PRESTON: Thank you very much. Madame Chair,
 19 members of the Commission, I am Jean Preston, State
 20 Representative for North Carolina's 4th District, and the
 21 wife of a career military man. I'm here today to ask you to
 22 give us the airplanes if we're going to have the noise. Our

1 area gladly supports the military training which occurs in
 2 Eastern North Carolina at the electronic warfare ranges, the
 3 bombing ranges, and in the restricted air space.

4 We willingly accept the occasional hardships caused
 5 by the noise and disruption of civilian air traffic as a very
 6 small price to pay for freedom. These new F-18s will be
 7 training in the air over Eastern North Carolina, regardless
 8 of where they are based. It would be grossly unfair to the
 9 North Carolinians who have supported the expansion of
 10 military air training facilities to have this Commission
 11 ignore the modern, up-to-date facilities at Cherry Point, and
 12 locate the airplanes at Oceana.

13 I ask you, let us benefit from our longstanding
 14 patriotism, and send these planes to the best air station in
 15 the country, the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point.
 16 Unlike the metropolitan area surrounding Oceana, our people
 17 will feel the impact of your decision in a very significant
 18 way. Please, let that impact be a positive one, both for our
 19 sake and for the sake of our national defense. Thank you
 20 very much. (Applause.)

21 CHAIRWOMAN COX: Thank you very much. This does
 22 now conclude the 10th hearing of the defense Base Closure and

Document Separator

Anthony J. Morrison
Director and General Manager
Northern Eastern Division



April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a representative of the Southeastern Connecticut business community, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. It has now come to light that inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider that decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make a informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be 59.5 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.



TOWN OF LEDYARD CONNECTICUT

Post Office Box 38
Ledyard, Conn. 06339
(203) 464-8740
FAX (203) 464-8455

Joseph A. Lozier, Mayor
Gloria J. Hosmer, Administrative Assistant

April 28, 1995

BRAC Commission
1700 N. Moore
Arlington, VA 22209

Attention: Chairman Dixon

RE: Naval Undersea
Warfare Center

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As Mayor of the Town of Ledyard, Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

SOUTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS

139 Boswell Avenue / Norwich, Connecticut 06360

Tel. (203) 889-2324 / FAX: (203) 889-1222

27 April 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

The Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments urges the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The primary justification for reversing the 1991 decision is the poor quality of information presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies. After reviewing this information, we believe the BRAC Commission should conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the cost of this relocation and overstated the savings.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated, and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were not included in the calculations. One-time costs, such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance plan, have been grossly underestimated.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat, and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique synergism. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

Knowing that the 1991 BRAC decision was made based on highly inaccurate information and misleading analysis, we respectfully urge that the 1995 BRAC Commission correct what clearly was a poor decision and favorably consider the alternative, which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, at its present location.

Thank you for considering our views. We ask that this statement become a part of the official record of the 1995 BRAC process.

Sincerely,



Thomas A. Sheridan
Chairman

Member Municipalities: Bozrah • Colchester • East Lyme • Franklin • Griswold • City of Groton • Town of Groton • Ledyard • Lisbon • Montville • New London • North Stonington • Norwich • Preston • Salem • Sprague • Town of Stonington • Stonington Borough • Voluntown • Waterford

April 28, 1995
Chairman Dixon, BRAC
pg. 2

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make a informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of the move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

April 28, 1995
Chairman Dixon, BRAC



THE CITY OF GROTON
CONNECTICUT 06340

295 MERIDIAN STREET

Office of the Mayor

Telephone (203) 446-4103

FAX (203) 445-4058

April 28, 1995

**Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
and Members of the BRAC Commission**

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a government official of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known, revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat, and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information, and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information you will conclude that the process in 1991

underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly under-estimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation, and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,



Catherine Kolnaski
Mayor

CK/kc

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. Hanson".



CITY OF NEW LONDON
CONNECTICUT


May 1, 1995

Chairman Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

My name is M. John Strafacci and I am Mayor of the City of New London. I urge you to consider the presentation you have just seen and sustain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center/New London as a center of acoustical excellence. Not only does this make sense and save the taxpayers money, but it maintains the synergy between the Underwater Sound Lab, the Naval Submarine Base, and Electric Boat in Groton. Additionally, the loss of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center from New London would create an additional adverse economic impact in New London due to the relocation of contractors associated with this facility following to the Newport area rather than remaining in New London. While the commute is only 55 miles, it is easily an hour and a half ride over two bridges and subject to summer traffic and winter storm conditions. Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,



M. John Strafacci
Mayor



CITY OF NEW LONDON
CONNECTICUT

May 1, 1995

Chairman Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

My name is Richard M. Brown and I am City Manager of the City of New London. I also urge you to sustain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center/New London as the center of excellence for acoustic research and development. We urge you:

1. to reject the DOD/Navy NUWC New London Closure Plan for 1995,
2. retain the NUWC Acoustics/Sonar Billets in New London, and
3. realign billets and activities as recommended in the presentation.

The Navy's NUWC recommendation for 1991 was based on underestimated costs and is therefore flawed, and should not be compounded by the Navy's recommendation for closure in 1995.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center in New London is not only vital to the economy of the New London area, but is an important component in the national defense posture of the United States. The synergy created between the fleet at the US Submarine Base New London-Groton, the research facilities at NUWC, and the submarine builders at Electric Boat are unique and cannot be duplicated elsewhere. The City of New London is committed to retaining this facility and has offered to provide Fire/EMS Service in order to reduce base operating costs. Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Brown
City Manager

618 Poquonnock Road
Groton, Connecticut 06340
(203) 448-4886

April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a professional of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC, Detachment New London, should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is due to the poor quality of information in projecting the true government costs and projected savings, and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.


The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, new construction in Newport, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London, right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reconsider the BRAC 1991 decision and to reject the Navy 1995 proposal to close the NUWC Detachment New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Martha M. Fox', written over a large, light-colored scribble or mark.

Martha M. Fox
Associate Director

Chairman Dixon and Members
of the BRAC Commission
April 28, 1995
Page 2

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,




Thomas A. Sheridan
First Selectman

April 28, 1995
Chairman Dixon, BRAC
pg. 3

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph A. Lozier". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

Joseph A. Lozier,
Mayor

JAL:gjh

15 ROPE FERRY ROAD



WATERFORD, CT. 06385-2886

April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As First Selectman of the Town of Waterford, Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

John Parker & Associates

47 Laurel Hill Drive
Niantic, CT 06357-1536
(203) 739-4589

April 27, 1995

Dear: Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

New London CT Detachment, NUWC


I am writing as a professional who works with business owners throughout our region to urge the 1995 BRAC Commission to reconsider the decision to relocate the New London CT NUWC detachment to Newport R.I.

I base my request on two overall points:

- The unique synergism, unduplicated anywhere else in the U.S., which exists between NUWC New London, Subase New London, Electric Boat and other defense commands and organizations makes NUWC an integral part of the Southeastern CT region.
 - + This synergism brings efficiencies in many areas which have a positive affect and a significant influence well beyond our region.
 - + The savings for the Department of Defense from this synergism are immeasurable.
- In addition to current and future savings from this synergism the primary justification for not moving the remainder of the Detachment is that complete facts on cost and impact etc. were not available to the 1991 BRAC Commission.
 - + Our community representatives have provided specifics on the overestimated savings, poor quality/inaccurate information, and the flawed assumptions.

Based on these two points I highly recommend the 1995 BRAC Commission correct this situation by not closing NUWC's New London Detachment and maintain it right were it is.

Thank you for the opportunity to consider local input.



John C. Parker

618 Poquonnock Road
Groton, Connecticut 06340
(203) 448-4886

April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a professional of Southeastern Connecticut and a former (13 year) employee of NUWC, Detachment New London, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC, Detachment New London, should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is due to the poor quality of information in projecting the true government costs and projected savings, and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.


Also, the merging of the two organizations does not really integrate along functional lines. Maintaining NUWC, Detachment New London, and combining it with other technically similar units already proposed for other moves allows the Navy to create a "Center of Excellence." Combining this center with significant cost savings is in the best interest of the Navy and the country.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Detachment New London, right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reconsider the BRAC 1991 decision and to reject the Navy 1995 proposal to close the NUWC Detachment New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jerry C. Lamb".

Jerry C. Lamb, Ph.D.
Campus Dean



CITY OF NEW LONDON

CONNECTICUT April 28, 1995

Chairman Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Re: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As City Manager of New London, Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to stop the 1991 decision and to reconsider the 1995 recommendation to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment to Newport, Rhode Island. The primary justification for reversing the 1991 decision is the poor quality of information presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies. After reviewing this information, we believe the BRAC Commission should conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the cost of this relocation and overstated the savings.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated, and significant cost savings such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were not included in the calculations. One-time costs, such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance plan, have been grossly underestimated.

Knowing that the 1991 BRAC decision was made based on highly inaccurate information and misleading analysis, we respectfully urge that the 1995 BRAC Commission correct what clearly was a poor decision and favorably consider the alternative, which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, at its present location.

Thank you for considering our views. We ask that this statement become a part of the official record of the 1995 BRAC process.

Sincerely,



Richard M. Brown
City Manager

Five Shaw's Cove
Suite 100
New London, CT 06320

C.RED

Phone (203) 437-4659
Fax (203) 437-4662

CORPORATION FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INC.

April 28, 1995

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As Southeastern Connecticut's public-private partnership of local government, business and higher education, the Corporation for Regional Economic Development, Inc. (C.RED) urges the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. It is now known that the 1991 BRAC Commission was presented with inaccurate and flawed information which deviated significantly from established criteria. The current BRAC Commission must reconsider the erroneous 1991 decision and conclude that the Naval Undersea Warfare Center should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral member of a greater community of organizations which exist to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division, and a variety of other military commands. Together, they provide a unique synergism not duplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes real sense from both military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information, and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented the specific inaccuracies and discrepancies as part of the record.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it has available in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 both

*A public-private partnership promoting business development and job growth in Southeastern Connecticut
and adjacent Rhode Island*

underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings. Based on what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would result in a payback period exceeding 100 years!

The 1991 realignment decision estimated costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated, and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were left out of the calculations. In addition, one-time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is significant deviation from established criteria. Understanding that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and consider favorably the alternative proposal to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express our feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for your patience and willingness to listen to local input.

We at C.RED strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official records.

Sincerely yours,



Cedric C. I. Kam
Executive Director



David S. Burdge

William S. Brown

John P. O'Connell

TOWN OF STONINGTON

152 Elm Street • P.O. Box 352 • Stonington, Connecticut 06378-0352

April 27, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As the First Selectman of the Town of Stonington, a town located in Southeastern Connecticut, I am writing to you today to urge you and your Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. Inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. The current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision, knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, and conclude that the Naval Undersea Warfare Center should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique cooperative, unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12 makes sense from both a military and operational perspective.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross misrepresentation, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 Million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services, were not included in

April 27, 1995


the calculations. One time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its cooperation and willingness to listen to local input regarding decisions that will dramatically affect our communities.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this letter part of the official record.

Very truly yours,


David S. Burdge
First Selectman

DSB:jmv

Andrews Quinn Cosgrove & Young^{pc.}

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

LOIS G. ANDREWS
BARBARA M. QUINN
EMMET L. COSGROVE
JAMES L. YOUNG, JR.
PAUL M. GERAGHTY
ROBERT J. CARY, JR.

216 BROAD STREET, P.O. BOX 751
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT 06320
TELEPHONE (203) 444-2101
FACSIMILE (203) 440-2615

May 2, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a practicing attorney of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The Brac Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make a informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.


The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$120 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Very truly yours,


James L. Young, Jr.

JLY/bab

April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a local business person of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subbase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subbase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be 59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.




There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.


Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Andy Russell". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned to the left of the typed name.

Andy Russell
Station Manager
WTYD/WNLC



CRYSTAL MALL

Re: Removing NUWC from New London, CT, to Newport, RI

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a concerned member of the business community, I sincerely question the efficacy of transferring NUWC operations from New London to Newport.

While I am neither an expert in defense matters nor in the technological work done at NUWC, I do believe that the US Navy will not realize cost savings from the move - which was the reason for its suggestion.

The best information available today suggests that the costs associated with the move will be more than double the estimate of only 3-4 years ago. In 1991, the realignment decision predicted the costs to be slightly under \$60 million. Today the costs are expected to be over \$120 million.

Secondly, the work that the lab is greatly involved with is directly related to the mission of Subase New London and the work at Electric Boat. From this manager's viewpoint the synergism and ease and efficacy of communication are greatly enhanced by NUWC remaining in New London rather than going to Newport.

I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider and reject the plan to transfer NUWC from New London.

I thank you for accepting my letter and I ask that you make it a part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Grad
General Manager



Anchor Associates

125 Shaw Street
Suite 108
New London, CT 06320

May 2, 1995

BRAC Commission
Washington D.C.

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission,


As small business owners, and taxpayers, we strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate Naval Undersea Warfare Center New London, to Newport Rhode Island. Time has shown that the 1991 decision was flawed, based on false information, and should be reconsidered. The Subbase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut has documented these inaccuracies and discrepancies. Please note closely their facts.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) was born here during World War 2 and owes much of its success and proud history to the synergy and benefits of co-location with Electric Boat, Subbase New London, Submarine Squadron 12 and many other commands based here. That synergy still exists. That synergy, plus the millions in savings in taxpayer dollars, is still a powerful argument for maintaining the status quo.

Thank you for this opportunity. Again, as taxpayer, we strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment. Please make this letter part of the official record.

Sincerely


Pierce Connair


Jane Walsh

May 3, 1995

TO: Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

As a Board member of the Southeastern Connecticut Chamber of Commerce and a concerned citizen, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; inaccurate information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that the NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision should be based on the inaccurate information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.


The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings and significant credits were also overestimated, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the Housing Assistance Program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles H. Hill III". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Charles H. Hill III

Board Member, Southeastern Connecticut Chamber of Commerce



Whaling City Ford

475 Broad Street, P. O. Box 750
New London, CT 06320-0750

Tel: (203) 443-8361
Fax: (203) 443-0597

May 4, 1995

Chairman Dixon
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
New York, NY

Re: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate this chance to present my views to your commission.

I urge your commission to reverse the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center [NUWC], New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. That decision was based on poor information and significant errors in interpretation.

It seems to me that there are two main points here. The first is financial. The cost of relocation is now known to be nearly twice as great as what was estimated back in 1991, and the savings estimated at that time were also vastly overestimated.

The second point is that NUWC plays a vital and unique role in the submarine related community here in New London. Its facilities and its contributions would not be duplicated in Newport. Moving NUWC would be a terrible and completely unnecessary loss to the navy and to our national defense, without offsetting benefits.

As a business owner, I urge the commission to make a good business decision: protect a vital asset; don't throw away a productive facility.

Very truly yours,

Charles Primus
Vice President



BIG BROTHERS/BIG SISTERS OF SOUTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT

224 Eastern Point Road * Groton, Connecticut 06340 * (203) 445-2274 (Voice & Fax)

May 1, 1995

Maureen Plumleigh, Executive Director

RE. Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a concerned citizen, and director of a social service agency of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs, such as planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.



Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

May 1, 1995


Page 2

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Maureen Plumleigh".

Maureen Plumleigh
Executive Director

MP:JL



TOWN OF GROTON

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

Dolores E. Hauber

Mayor

45 Fort Hill Road, Groton, Connecticut 06340-4394

Telephone (203) 441-6630

Fax (203) 441-6638

April 28, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a government official of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the gross negligence, poor quality of information and significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition in Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The BRAC Commission should carefully consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make a informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this move and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission
April 28, 1995
Page two


The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$59.5 million. We now know that cost has nearly doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been grossly underestimated.

There is a significant deviation from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for its patience and willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,



Dolores E. Hauber
Mayor

DEH:mw



DATE: May 1, 1995

RE: Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a business owner of Southeastern Connecticut, I urge the BRAC Commission to reconsider the 1991 decision to relocate the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment, to Newport, Rhode Island. The facts are now known; revealing inaccurate and flawed information was presented to the 1991 BRAC Commission which significantly deviated from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made erroneously, the current BRAC Commission must reconsider this decision and conclude that NUWC should remain in New London.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) is an integral part of a greater community of organizations whose purpose is to support the submarine force. The Groton/New London area is home to Subase New London, Electric Boat and a variety of other military commands which together amass a unique, synergism unduplicated anywhere else in the United States. Having the NUWC facility in close proximity to Subase New London, especially Submarine Development Squadron 12, makes sense from military and operational perspectives.

The primary justification for overturning the 1991 decision is the inaccurate and flawed information with significant errors which were presented to the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Subase Realignment Coalition of Southeastern Connecticut have documented, as part of the record, the specifics regarding these inaccuracies and discrepancies.

The 1995 BRAC Commission needs to consider the most accurate information it can assemble in order to make an informed and meaningful decision. After reviewing this information, you will conclude that the process in 1991 underestimated the costs of this more and overstated the savings as well. Given what we know today, the 1991 realignment decision would exceed a 100 year pay back period.

The 1991 realignment decision estimated the costs to be \$120 million. We now know that cost has doubled. Recurring savings were also overestimated and significant credits, such as the City of New London providing the fire and EMS services were not included in the calculations. One-time costs such as, planning and management, building rehabilitation, and the housing assistance program (HAP) have been significantly underestimated.

12 CASE STREET, SUITE 215
NORWICH, CT 06360
(203) 889-3388

P.O. Box 1018
HALLS ROAD
OLD LYME, CT 06371
(203) 434-9003


15 WILSON STREET
WILLIMANTIC, CT 06226
(203) 456-3500

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on already completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Shirley S. Langford
President
Interim HealthCare
of Eastern Connecticut, Inc.

Document Separator

John Parker & Associates

47 Laurel Hill Drive
Niantic, CT 06357-1536
(203) 739-4589

April 27, 1995

Dear: Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

Redirect of Nuclear Power School to Charleston. S.C.


I am writing as a professional who works with business owners throughout our region to urge the 1995 BRAC Commission to support the 1993 BRAC decision and reject the proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Subase New London to Charleston S.C.

I believe the 1993 BRAC decision met the established criteria and should stand because of these points.


- Locating the Nuclear Power School at Subase New London results in a synergy with the other schools, operating nuclear fleet submarines, unique submarine development activities, and other naval service facilities throughout the region.
- The savings and efficiencies which come from this synergism are not available elsewhere. These far out weight the costs and any advantages only one quarter of the Nuclear Power School students might gain from the school being close to the moored training ships in Charleston.
 - + Then too, the long history of Subase New London students interacting in our community means Nuclear Power School students will benefit in many ways from the Subase and community businesses.
- The facilities available at Subase New London and the money spent in anticipation of this move provide significant savings vs. only estimated costs and many unknown and potentially significant expenses in Charleston.

I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the redirect proposal.

Thank you for this opportunity to consider input from the local area.



John C. Parker



BIG BROTHERS/BIG SISTERS OF SOUTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT

224 Eastern Point Road * Groton, Connecticut 06340 * (203) 445-2274 (Voice & Fax)

Maureen Plumleigh, Executive Director

May 1, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a director of a social service agency I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Sub Base New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida, to Sub Base New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Sub Base New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Sub Base New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Sub Base New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Sub Base New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Submarine Development Squadron Twelve and Submarine Group II. Sub Base New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Sub Base New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will



Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

May 1, 1995

Page 2


utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Sub Base New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina, significantly deviates from the established criteria wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida, to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Maureen Plumleigh".

Maureen Plumleigh
Executive Director

MP:JL



Whaling City Ford

475 Broad Street, P. O. Box 750
New London, CT 06320-0750

Tel: (203) 443-8361
Fax: (203) 443-0597

May 4, 1995

Chairman Dixon
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
New York, NY

Re: Redirection of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate this chance to present my views to your commission.

I urge your commission to reject the proposed redirection of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 decision to move the school from Orlando, Florida, to Subase New London satisfied the established criteria and should be upheld.

New London provides a location and facility that is educationally, geographically and financially superior to Charleston.

As a business owner, I urge the commission to make a good business decision: do not redirect the location of the school.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Charles Primus'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'C'.

Charles Primus
Vice President

May 3, 1995

TO: Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

As a Board Member of the Southeastern Connecticut Chamber of Commerce and a concerned citizen, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.


While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of

Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the criteria reviewed by the 1993 BRAC Commission, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and appears to be strictly politically motivated.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles H. Hill III". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Charles H. Hill III
Board Member, Southeastern Connecticut Chamber of Commerce



Anchor Associates

125 Shaw Street
Suite 108
New London, CT 06320

May 2, 1995

BRAC Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission,

As small business owners and taxpayers, we strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the politically motivated decision to move the Nuclear Power School to Charleston, S.C. instead of the earlier decision to locate the facility at Subase New London.

We are proud of our long history of support for the military in this area. The synergy of co-location with the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, Electric Boat facility, and many other military commands located here, plus the availability of existing facilities makes this area the logical, and most cost effective choice.


To succumb to the political pressure of Senator Strom Thurmond would come close to pandering, and is totally opposed to your reason for existence, and to what the American people voted for last November.

Thank you for this opportunity. Again, as taxpayers, we strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to move the Nuclear Power School to Charleston vice Subase New London. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely

Pierce Connair

Jane Walsh



CRYSTAL MALL

Re: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, SC

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a member of the business community and a concerned citizen, I strongly support the transfer of the Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Orlando, FL, to Subase New London - as this was directed by The 1993 BRAC Commission.

I understand that consideration is now being given to move the school to Charleston, SC. While I am not an expert on defense, I do understand from a business manager's perspective the synergistic and cost value of locating complementary facilities in close proximity to one another.

Subase New London is already the location for the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technological schools. It also co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. It is home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The US Navy has already spent close to \$10 million on architectural and engineering fees to accommodate this move. Estimated costs which have been generated are based on quality numbers from the architectural and engineering reviews. I would guess the cost information presented in support of the Charleston move would not have the reliability of these figures.

I believe the change in plans for the Nuclear "A" School will only result in increased costs and may actually be a political response to the earlier 1993 BRAC Commission decision which this process was meant to eliminate or certainly greatly reduce.

Thank you for accepting this letter. I would appreciate it being a part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Grad
General Manager

April 28, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission

As a local business person, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.



The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can provide "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Andy Russell". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Andy Russell
Station Manager
WTYD/WNLC

Andrews Quinn Cosgrove & Young^{pc}

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

LOIS G. ANDREWS
BARBARA M. QUINN
EMMET L. COSGROVE
JAMES L. YOUNG, JR.
PAUL M. GERAGHTY
ROBERT J. CARY, JR.

216 BROAD STREET, P.O. BOX 751
NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT 06320
TELEPHONE (203) 444-2101
FACSIMILE (203) 440-2615

May 2, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a practicing attorney I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in

anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.


While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?


The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Very truly yours,


James L. Young, Jr.

JLY/bab



David S. Burdge

William S. Brown

John P. O'Connell

TOWN OF STONINGTON

152 Elm Street • P.O. Box 352 • Stonington, Connecticut 06378-0352

April 27, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As First Selectman in the Town of Stonington, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military and their families, specifically the Submarine Force. The cooperative that has been created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarter will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.


April 27, 1995

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 Million has been spent, to date, on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies. The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. We can produce "completed" staff work, can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to political influence.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion, on behalf of the Town of Stonington. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Very truly yours,



David S. Burdge
First Selectman

DSB:jmv

CORPORATION FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INC.

April 28, 1995

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As Southeastern Connecticut's public-private partnership of local government, business and higher education, the Corporation for Regional Economic Development, Inc. (C.RED) strongly urges the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The decision of the 1993 BRAC Commission to move the Nuclear Power Schools from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be reaffirmed by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for our military, especially the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice for relocating the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with the other schools which presently reside at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine schools and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power Schools with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group 11. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities for the schools are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has already been spent on architectural and

engineering services in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. In contract, Charleston has justified its situation base on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage. However, a closer examination of Charleston's capacity and student travel costs reveals that New London is not only more economical but also provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the Submarine Service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility. The remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

Renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work, but can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina deviates significantly from the established criteria, wastes the millions of dollars spent to date, and unfortunately, compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express our opinion. We at C.RED strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official records.

Sincerely yours,



Cedric C. I. Kam
Executive Director



CITY OF NEW LONDON
CONNECTICUT

April 28, 1995

Chairman Dixon
BRAC Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As City Manager of New London, Connecticut, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida, to subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

Chairman Dixon

Re: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina
Page 2

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida, to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Richard M. Brown
City Manager

618 Poquonnock Road
Groton, Connecticut 06340
(203) 448-4886

April 28, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston,
South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a professional and educator, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, Detachment New London, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando to New London.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted personnel and officers in the Submarine Service.


The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical. Also, avoiding yearly enlisted instructor PCS changes not only saves money but reduces moving impacts on our Navy families.

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Jerry C. Lamb, Ph.D.
Campus Dean

SOUTHEASTERN CONNECTICUT COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS

139 Boswell Avenue / Norwich, Connecticut 06360

Tel. (203) 889-2324 / FAX: (203) 889-1222

27 April 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

The Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments strongly urges the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando. The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with the basic and advanced submarine schools and other advanced technical schools currently located at this facility. Additionally, Subase New London would co-locate the Power School with operating nuclear fleet submarines. New London is home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II, and Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service. We believe that New London is more economical than a redirect to Charleston and provides a more stable, continuous duty station for personnel who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service.

Necessary facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are "budget quality" numbers. In contrast, cost figures for Charleston are based on computer estimates without engineering or architectural studies.

Thank you for the opportunity to express our views. We request that this letter become a part of the official 1995 BRAC process record.

Sincerely,



Thomas A. Sheridan
Chairman

Member Municipalities: Bozrah • Colchester • East Lyme • Franklin • Griswold • City of Groton • Town of Groton • Ledyard • Lisbon • Montville • New London • North Stonington • Norwich • Preston • Salem • Sprague • Town of Stonington • Stonington Borough • Voluntown • Waterford

15 ROPE FERRY ROAD



WATERFORD, CT. 06385-2886

April 27, 1995

RE: Redirect Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina:

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As First Selectman of the Town of Waterford, Connecticut, and Chairman of the Southeastern Connecticut Council Of Governments, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Board, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and many private contractors and consultants makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando. The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with the basic and advanced submarine schools and other advanced technical schools currently located at this facility. Additionally, Subase New London would co-locate the Power School with operating nuclear fleet submarines. New London is home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II, and Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service. We believe that New London is more economical than a redirect to Charleston and provides a more stable, continuous duty station for personnel who wish to continue their military careers in the Submarine Service.

Necessary facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are "budget quality" numbers. In contrast, cost figures for Charleston are based on computer estimates without engineering or architectural studies.

Based on the proposed costs associated with the New London station compared to computer estimates for Charleston, I see no reason to add to the millions of taxpayers dollars spent to date.

Yours truly,

Thomas A. Sheridan
First Selectman



TOWN OF GROTON

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

Dolores E. Hauber
Mayor
45 Fort Hill Road, Groton, Connecticut 06340-4394
Telephone (203) 441-6630
Fax (203) 441-6638

April 28, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a government official, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subbase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subbase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subbase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subbase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subbase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subbase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subbase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subbase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

Chairman Dixon and members of the BRAC Commission
April 28, 1995
Page two


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The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Dolores E. Hauber
Mayor


DEH:mw

April 28, 1995
Chairman Dixon
pg. 3

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Joseph A. Lozier,
Mayor

JAL:gjh



DATE: May 1, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a business owner, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

12 CASE STREET, SUITE 215
NORWICH, CT 06360
(203) 889-3388

P.O. Box 1018
HALLS ROAD
OLD LYME, CT 06371
(203) 434-9003


15 WILSON STREET
WILLIMANTIC, CT 06226
(203) 456-3500

This deviation was significant from the established criteria. Knowing that the 1991 decision was made in error, it is incumbent upon the current members of the BRAC Commission to correct this situation and to favorably consider the alternative proposal which is to maintain the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London Detachment right where it is.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my feelings on this issue. The BRAC Commission should be commended for it's willingness to listen to local input.

I strongly urge you to reject the Navy proposal to close the NUWC Detachment at New London. Please make this part of the official record.

Sincerely,



Shirley S. Langford
President
Interim HealthCare of
Eastern Connecticut, Inc.



TOWN OF LEDYARD CONNECTICUT

Joseph A. Lozier, Mayor
Gloria J. Hosmer, Administrative Assistant

Post Office Box 38
Ledyard, Conn. 06339
(203) 464-8740
FAX (203) 464-8455

April 28, 1995

BRAC Commission
1700 N. Moore
Arlington, VA 22209

Attention: Chairman Dixon

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, SC

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As Mayor of the Town of Ledyard, Connecticut, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subbase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subbase New London met with established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.


The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subbase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

April 28, 1995
Chairman Dixon
pg. 2

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?



THE CITY OF GROTON
CONNECTICUT 06340

295 MERIDIAN STREET

Office of the Mayor
Telephone (203) 446-4103
FAX (203) 445-4058

April 28, 1995

**Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission
and Members of the BRAC Commission**

**RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South
Carolina**

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a government official of Southeastern Connecticut, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in

contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.

While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work; can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Catherine Kolnaski
Mayor

CK/kc



TOWN OF GROTON

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

Dolores E. Hauber
Mayor
45 Fort Hill Road, Groton, Connecticut 06340-4394
Telephone (203) 441-6630
Fax (203) 441-6638

May 5, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

My name is Dee Hauber and I currently serve as Mayor of the Town of Groton. For your information, Subbase New London is actually located in the Town of Groton. Given the time constraints for public comment, I won't even attempt to explain our complex form of government.

Instead, I want to use my time more effectively and urge you to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina.

Groton is proud to be a Navy town. We are known throughout the country as "The Submarine Capital of the World". The community has provided our country with a strong national defense and Navy personnel have contributed to our quality of life.

For example, Groton and many area towns have adopted submarines and their crews. Navy personnel in Town have adopted Groton by becoming Big Brothers/Big Sisters, little league coaches and volunteering for community projects like adopt-a-highway programs. I do not want to leave any doubt in your minds that the Town of Groton and Southeastern Connecticut support the Navy presence and welcome the Nuclear Power Schools.

In summary, I urge you to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston. Locating these schools in Groton continues the synergy of many other government and private military installations in the area, adds to the military value of our national defense and uses common sense in co-locating this school with many other training schools now located in Groton. During the past five years, Southeastern Connecticut and Groton have suffered a cumulative economic impact created by defense reductions. Adding the Nuclear Power School to the Subbase will help offset these economic losses. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Submitted by,

Dolores E. Hauber
Mayor - May 5, 1995



TOWN OF GROTON

OFFICE OF THE TOWN MANAGER

Ronald P. LeBlanc
Town Manager
45 Fort Hill Road, Groton, Connecticut 06340-4394
Telephone (203) 441-6630
Fax (203) 441-6638

May 5, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:


My name is Ron LeBlanc and I am the Town Manager for Groton, Connecticut. I, too, am here to urge the Commission to reject the redirect of the Nuclear Power School to Charleston, South Carolina.

We have demonstrated substantial deviation from the established criteria as the basis of our arguments. In addition to the military value arguments, Groton and Southeastern Connecticut have suffered greatly from the cumulative economic impact resulting from cutbacks in the defense industry. As such, the region is strongly supporting transfer of the Nuclear Power Schools from Orlando, Florida to Groton as recommended by the 1993 BRAC.

I would like to submit for the record, over 40 letters from the region, supporting the Nuclear Power School and the NUWC facility in New London. These letters represent support from a variety of local and regional entities, including local governments, public and private utilities, non-profit organizations, chambers of commerce, councils of government, schools, colleges and universities.

Thank you for your consideration.

Presented by,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ron LeBlanc".

Ron LeBlanc

Town Manager - May 5, 1995

GOOD MORNING, MY NAME IS BOB BULMER AND I WAS EMPLOYED
FOR 33 YEARS AT NUWC NEW LONDON, 20 YEARS AS A
SUPERVISORY PHYSICIST IN SUBMARINE SONAR.

THE ONE THING I HOPE YOU REMEMBER FROM MY COMMENTS IS
THIS: "IF NUWC NEW LONDON IS CLOSED DOWN, THERE WILL
BE A QUANTUM DROP IN SONAR EXPERTISE AND CORPORATE
MEMORY BECAUSE MANY KEY PEOPLE WILL LEAVE." THIS LOSS
WILL TAKE PLACE BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIQUE
HIRING REGULATIONS IMPROVED ON ALL GOVERNMENT
LABORATORIES OVER THE YEARS. CIVILIAN BILLETS ARE
LINKED TO MILITARY OFFICER BILLETS WHICH GO UP IN WAR
TIME AND DOWN IN PEACE TIME. THE LAST MAJOR HIRING
EFFORT WAS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR WHICH ENDED IN 1973.
VERY LIMITED HIRING WAS DONE THEREAFTER!

AS A RESULT, A MAJORITY OF THE NEW LONDON SONAR EXPERTS
TYPICALLY HAVE OVER 23 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AND CAN
RETIRE IF THEY SO CHOOSE. BECAUSE OF THE RECURRING
HIRING FREEZES, AN INADEQUATE POOL OF QUALIFIED
SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS EXISTS WHO CAN TAKE OVER IF
THE NEW LONDON EXPERTS LEAVE EN MASSE.

THESE EXPERT SCIENTISTS GAINED THEIR KNOWLEDGE BY
SPENDING MANY WEEKS AT SEA TESTING SONAR SYSTEMS. WITH
THE DRASTIC CUT-BACK IN WARSHIPS, DEDICATED TEST TIME
HAS VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED AND SCIENTISTS NO LONGER HAVE
THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN THIS EXPERIENCE.

THE EXISTING EXPERTS ARE MY CONTEMPORARIES. I HAVE
DISCUSSED THE MOVE TO NEWPORT WITH SOME OF THEM AND NOT
ONE IS WILLING TO MOVE!

OH, THEY'VE INDICATED TO UPPER MANAGEMENT THAT THEY
WILL MOVE, BUT ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS IN THEIR BEST
INTEREST TO SAY SO. BUT, WHEN THE MOMENT OF TRUTH
COMES, THEY WILL RETIRE! THIS WILL DRASTICALLY REDUCE
THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE REMAINING ORGANIZATION. THE
BOTTOM LINE IS: "MOVE 'EM AND LOSE 'EM!" THIS MEANS
OUR COUNTRY ALSO LOSES ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE IN SONAR
TECHNOLOGY. IF THIS HAPPENS, AGGRESSOR NATIONS NEED
NOT WORRY ABOUT AMERICA'S SUPERIOR SUBMARINE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT. THE SUPERIORITY WILL HAVE BEEN LOST IN THE
MOVE TO NEWPORT.

VERY RESPECTFULLY,

BOB BULMER

618 Poquonnock Road
Groton, Connecticut 06340
(203) 448-4886

April 28, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston,
South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a professional, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

The Groton/New London area is proud of its long history of support for the military, specifically the Submarine Force. The synergy created by the co-location of Subase New London, Electric Boat, the Naval Underwater Warfare Center, Detachment New London, and many private contractors and consultants, and a variety of other military commands makes Southeastern Connecticut the logical choice to relocate the Nuclear "A" School from Orlando to New London.

The Nuclear "A" School should be transferred to Subase New London and co-located with other schools that exist currently at the Base. Subase New London is home to the basic and advanced submarine school and other advanced technical schools. In addition, Subase New London co-locates the Power School with the operating nuclear fleet submarines. We are home to Development Squadron Two and Submarine Group II. Subase New London is the ultimate permanent duty station for many enlisted personnel and officers in the Submarine Service.

The facilities are available at Subase New London. Approximately \$10 million has been spent to date on architectural and engineering fees in anticipation of this move. As a result, the engineering estimates and proposed costs are based on "budget quality" numbers. Charleston, in contrast, has justified its situation based on computer generated estimates without any engineering and architectural studies.


While Charleston claims that co-location with moored training ships is the ultimate advantage, a closer examination of the capacity at Charleston and the travel costs for students reveals that New London is more economical as well as provides a more stable, continuous duty station for officers and Sailors who wish to continue their military careers in the submarine service. Only one-quarter of Nuclear Power School students will utilize the Charleston facility, the remaining three-quarters will train on reactors located in either Idaho or New York.

The renovation costs at Subase New London are based on completed architectural and engineering studies. These numbers are more accurate than the computer generated estimates proposed by the Navy for the Charleston facility. We can produce "completed" staff work, can they?

The proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina significantly deviates from the established criteria, wastes millions of dollars spent to date, and compromises the integrity of the BRAC process by yielding to the political influence of Senator Strom Thurmond.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,



Martha M. Fox
Associate Director

Anthony J. Morrison
Director and General Manager
Northern Eastern Division



April 28, 1995

RE: Redirect of Nuclear Power Schools to Charleston, South Carolina

Dear Chairman Dixon and Members of the BRAC Commission:

As a representative of the business community of Southeastern Connecticut, I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the proposed redirect of Nuclear Power School/Nuclear "A" School from Subase New London to Charleston, South Carolina. The 1993 BRAC Commission decision to move the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Subase New London met the established criteria and should be supported by the 1995 BRAC Commission.

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Thank you for this opportunity to express my opinion. I strongly urge the BRAC Commission to reject the Navy proposal to redirect the Nuclear Power School from Orlando, Florida to Charleston, South Carolina. Please make this letter part of the official BRAC record.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "C. M. Hanson". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".