

Need to
Train like
w/

Issue: If two regional war scenarios used, what would look like? Are there two P-3 centers on W. Coast? ^{closer to each other}
DCN 119 Issue: Could more efficiencies be achieved by single-site locating of all P-3s on E. Coast at Jacksonville rather at two separate locations on E. Coast?
(wear and tear on aircraft, increased costs, maintenance, time not spent on actual training - readiness but ensure, duplicate parts and equip must be kept at two locations)

Brunswick

- Naval Air Station has 3925 employees (3134 mil/791 civ)

- cannot perform P-3 depot level maintenance

* - within airspace are five uncontrolled civil airports
two of the five will be taken over by FAA in 95 (Augusta/Waterville)

check on * - CINCLANTFLT WSMR based on prolonged global war rather than 2 regional conflicts

"The definition of threat in the WSMR does not support two major regional conflicts. If the WSMR is changed the mission may change accordingly"

* base provides some support for Bath Iron Works

* - 40 P-3s and 9 EP-3s are permanently stationed at base
- unit flies to West Palm Beach for underwater test range (3.7 hrs) (1220 nm)

- unit also goes to Puerto Rico (4.8 hrs) for weapons training

- " goes to Charleston for mines training (2.5 hrs) } same enroute

- goes to Cherry Point for Operations 2.5 hrs

- local area below 12,000 ft

- Smeil. recon training time in local area 89 hrs. (Boston area)

most of this time spent South of Brunswick!

* - Brunswick has an abundance of range time that is available

* - Brunswicks admin bldgs are over 50 years old

there is no excess admin. capacity at Brunswick for expanding of personnel services (Will require 500k to expand)

* No MILCON programmed through 97

- has enough real estate to site ≈ 60,000 sq. ft. of additional range

Brunswick cont'd (could accommodate 3 additional squadrons)

- could construct up to 8 P-3 sized hangar bays for ~~27.4~~ 27.4

* - Brunswick is not allowed to provide third level maintenance. It provides first level or the lowest levels which can be performed within the squadron.

* - does not have encroachment problems, however, geographical features on both runway approaches limit development.

* SERES drill participation for the last three years is 100%

** - regardless of their homeport, P-3s will always have to transit to the Va. Capes Operational area to work with the fleet units. Brunswick does not have the advantage of close proximity to where P-3s routinely work with their fleets.

co
Analysis
27R

Other

favorable features:

- the airfield has two parallel 8000 runways
- no encroachment problems
- can accommodate C-130s due to commonality of parts etc.
- can easily expand facilities, has 11,856 available for development
- has a low crime rate in the local area

Environmental

- has 103 acres of grasshopper sparrow (on the endangered list)
- * - developmental ^{plans} have not been constrained
- base has federal wetlands, but hasn't had a wetlands survey
- * - base has a moderate non-attainment ozone problem

Brunswick cont'd.

Personnel

- The number of aircraft that can be supported can be divided into two categories:

- an additional 11 P-3 aircraft (within existing facilities and manning) - have ^(200 direct labor) 297 personnel
- an additional 41 P-3's can be added if manning were increased to 540. (+250) which would provide an additional 190 direct labor pers (by working three shifts at 180 per shift the base could accommodate increased personnel without increases in facilities and equipment)
(It takes about 610 maint. hours per mo. for each P-3 aircraft. At 610 hours per month the base could ~~be supported~~ support 89 aircraft)

Constn
Costs

- the base could be more efficient by adding \$3.2 million in construction for an apron, fueling system, and a flight line electrical distribution system.

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 23 NOVEMBER 1994

cost of \$2.4 million for a satellite linkage to Canada for use by Canadian personnel displaced by the closure of NOPF Whidbey Island should not be included. The BSAT advised that a 20% reduction in movement costs for data processing equipment at Whidbey Island may be attainable and recommended further cost investigation. The BSEC directed the BSAT to run the analysis again without the \$2.4 million in recurring costs for the satellite linkage to Canada and to investigate any potential additional savings in costs.

Brunswick

7. Mr. Wennergren briefed the COBRA analysis for closing NAS Brunswick and moving the 3 P-3 Squadrons and 1 VPU to NAS Jacksonville. See enclosure (5). The analysis resulted in one-time costs of \$51 million and an immediate return on investment. There were 783 billets/positions eliminated and 1,838 billets/positions moved. Military construction costs at NAS Jacksonville totaled \$21.4 million. The major cost was \$20.9 million for the construction of a Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (the current occupancy rate at the Jacksonville BEQ is 98%). Included in the costs of closing NAS Brunswick were \$1.2 million per year for maintaining Whitehouse as an outlying field and \$1.2 million per year for Pinecastle electronic warfare range to support the VPU squadron. With the closure of Cecil Field, the BSEC agreed that the cost was appropriately included in the analysis. The BSAT advised that the analysis included a recurring cost of \$3.0 million to provide berthing support for personnel at Bath, Maine. Those personnel currently use the facilities at NAS Brunswick. The BSEC accepted the COBRA analysis as presented.

8. Mr. Wennergren briefed the COBRA analysis for closing Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Charleston. See enclosure (6). There will be no mission for FISC Charleston by FY 1997. The analysis reflected one-time costs of \$2.3 million (overhead costs) and a return on investment in 2 years. As the move was local there were no moving costs. The closure scenario resulted in the elimination of 2 billets/positions and the movement of 83 billets/positions (64 of the 83 billets/positions move to NISE East). The BSEC accepted the results of the COBRA analysis.

9. Mr. Wennergren briefed the COBRA analysis for the following scenarios: ALT1: Close FISC Guam, with AFS Loadout/Resupply and DGAR Support RSS to FISC Yokosuka, and HHG/POV, HAZMAT minimization, Freight Delivery and warehousing commissary/Navy Exchange stores to NAVMAG Guam; and ALT2: Close FISC Guam, with AFS Load/Resupply and DGAR Support RSS to FISC Pearl Harbor, and HHG/POV, HAZMAT minimization, Freight Delivery and warehousing commissary/Navy Exchange stores to NAVMAG Guam. See enclosure (7). The ALT1 one-time costs are \$14.3 million and the return on investment is immediate. The ALT2 one-time costs are \$27.2 million and the return on investment is immediate. For both alternatives the analysis resulted in the elimination of 344 billets/positions

12768

Maine Congressional Delegation

William S. Cohen
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Olympia J. Snowe
UNITED STATES SENATOR



James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to file number
when responding 950309-4

Dear Chairman Dixon:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

As the military continues to downsize both internationally and domestically, the strategic importance of NAS Brunswick and its P-3 support mission becomes greater. NAS Brunswick is the only remaining operational (active duty) Naval Air Station in the Northeast Quadrant of the United States and the only operational military airfield (Navy or Air Force) in New England.

The Navy confirmed the critical importance of NAS Brunswick's location in its 1993 base closure analysis. It determined that on the entire East Coast, NAS Brunswick and NAS Key West are the only operational air stations whose locations have strategic military value. If NAS Brunswick were to close, the Navy's most northern operational air station east of the Mississippi River would be NAS Norfolk.

In his visit to NAS Brunswick last September, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral J. M. Boorda, stated that NAS Brunswick's location is a strong point and that the airfield is "located in an important part of the world that was strategically important during the Cold War and could be very very important if things don't go right in Russia... It's clearly one corner of the United States where we don't have much else right now. So for all those reasons that airfield is very good."

Although the cold war has ended, the multi-mission capability of the Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA) force remains critical to the success of today's changing Navy. Currently, P-3's are on station flying surveillance flights in the Persian Gulf, supporting Bosnia operations in the Adriatic Sea, providing world wide battle group support/anti-surface warfare operations as well as conducting drug detection and monitoring operations in the Caribbean. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) remains an important MPA mission as the submarine threat has not gone away.

The Russian Navy continues to invest in advanced submarine capabilities and future generations will have stealth and quietness levels that may very well meet or exceed U.S. submarine levels. In the future, these submarines may be patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean, making NAS Brunswick even more important to the security of the United States. There is concern that our attack submarine force could decrease to as few as 30 submarines by the year 2010; thus the requirement for P-3's and their ASW capabilities will be even greater in the 21st century.

Recognizing the strategic importance of NAS Brunswick, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has provided over \$24 million for infrastructure upgrades to the base. This includes funds for aircraft hangars, an Anti-Submarine Warfare Center and a soon to open, state of the art, 1.7 million gallon capacity fuel farm.

NAS Brunswick has the capability to expand its base loading or provide surge capability with little or no additional funds required for infrastructure improvements. NAS Brunswick's airfield and facilities are in excellent condition. The base has no encroachment problems and no endangered species problems which could limit future growth. With 35,000 square miles of overwater operating areas less than 15 minutes of flight time from NAS Brunswick, it is estimated that the main flight training area usage can be increased by 77 percent, the Boston Operating area can be increased by 75 percent and the Small Point Mining Range can be increased by 75 percent.

Presently, NAS Brunswick has the capability to accommodate two additional squadrons. These could be additional VP squadrons, a Naval Reserve VP or VR (logistic C-130 aircraft) squadron, or VQ-2, a special operations squadron. With the return of many U.S. forces from Europe to the United States, NAS Brunswick is the ideal location to meet the basing, training and maintenance requirements of VQ-2 which is stationed in Rota, Spain.

NAS Brunswick is capable of parking 65 P-3 aircraft, with a surge capability of 95 P-3 aircraft. Hangar space is available for 18 P-3 aircraft and 19 under surge conditions. The base infrastructure can easily accept additional personnel as the

water and sewage systems are only operating at 33 percent of their capability. Housing, medical services and the school system are available for additional military personnel and their families.

The cumulative economic impact to Maine by base closures and defense cutbacks has been dramatic. Maine trails only California and South Carolina in enduring the most severe downward economic impact caused by base closures and military downsizing. If NAS Brunswick were to close, civilian unemployment in the local area would increase by 48 percent and bring the unemployment level of the Brunswick/Bath area to nearly 12 percent. In the Bath-Brunswick labor market area, NAS Brunswick generates 14 percent of total employment, 10 percent of the total income and 11 percent of the purchase of all goods and services.

Since the late 1980's, the 75 mile stretch of coastal Maine, from Bath to Kittery/Portsmouth, has absorbed deep defense employment reductions: 5,845 direct/indirect jobs lost at Bath Iron Works; over 4,676 direct/indirect jobs at Portsmouth; and, 7,598 direct/indirect jobs with the closing of Pease Air Force Base. Recently, Loring Air Force Base closed, causing a loss of 8,016 direct/indirect jobs in Northern Maine.

These figures help to explain why Maine's unemployment rate has run about 20 percent higher than the national average this year, and why economists at the Maine State Planning Office predict "extremely slow economic growth" for the next 10 years.

One of your stated goals is to ensure that military members and their families are provided the best quality of life possible. This is one area where the Bath-Brunswick area is unsurpassed. The close relationship between the military and the surrounding community is an example for other communities to emulate. There is complete integration of the military members and their families into the schools, churches and every organization in the community.


There are over 1,700 military housing units available at NAS Brunswick. Over \$15 million has been spent on renovations to these housing units since 1989 and off base housing is readily available. Health care facilities can accept a major patient increase and the Town of Brunswick is in the advanced planning stage for a new hospital. The school system is also capable of increased enrollment (from its present 630 students to 1400) and has an enviable pupil/teacher ratio of 14 to 1.

NAS Brunswick is vital to our Nation's self defense. Its military value and strategic location cannot be underestimated. The value of NAS Brunswick will only increase as the Navy uses this installation to its full potential in the future. It is important to keep in mind a statement made by the Secretary of

the Navy to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in April 1991 when he stated, "Given the limited coastal land available, any surrender of coastal property or near-coastal property containing entities that support coastal bases, can be expected to be irreversible. We believe that we must avoid divestiture of assets that may be lost forever, lest those assets be needed again."

We urge you to give full consideration to the above factors as you analyze the Navy's future Naval Air Station requirements. Several charts are enclosed for your consideration. We appreciate your attention to this important matter as you continue your evaluation of the Navy's installations as part of the 1995 base closure process.

Sincerely,


Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senator


William S. Cohen
United States Senator


James B. Longley, Jr.
Member of Congress


John E. Baldacci
Member of Congress

Enclosure



DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR FACILITY ADAK, ALASKA

INSTALLATION MISSION

Naval Air Facility supports the anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- The Navy wants to close the facility and is in the process of drawing down it's presence there. Currently, there are no assigned aircraft at Adak. Facility has decreased in size from 5000 to 1000.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The Navy views the facility as excess to it's needs when viewed in the context of it's planned force structure for the year 2001. In addition, the Navy says that it would be difficult to change or expand the mission because most of Adak's facilities are of WWII vintage. For example, to upgrade the facility would require investing almost \$10 million to upgrade ramps, taxiways and hardstands. To upgrade the hangars would require an additional \$11 million. Most of the administrative space is considered substandard. The Navy has invested about \$40 million in construction costs since 1988. Closing the facility, however, would save about \$26 million in annual base operating costs.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Cost: \$9.4 million
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$108 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$26 million
- Break-Even Year: Immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: \$354.8 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions	1044	75	0
Realignments	0	0	0
Total	1044	75	0

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
1044	75	0	0	(1044)	(75)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Closing the facility will have a positive effect on the environment since there are no other air emission sources in the area.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Tony Knowles
Senators: Ted Stevens
Frank H. Murkowski
Representative: Don Young

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 894 jobs (678 direct and 216 indirect)
- Adak, AK MSA Job Base: No local population
- Percentage: 10.4
- Cumulative Economic Impact (year-year): 10.4

MILITARY ISSUES

- The facility has a ship berthing capacity but the piers are about 40 years old. The power and generator systems are old and the water system is old. It could be turned over to the Coast Guard or to NOAA, Interior, etc. CINCPACFLT however, has no further use for the facility and plans to continue it's anti-submarine mission out of the continental western U.S.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- None at this time.

DRAFT

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- Adak scored very low in the military value category.

D.L.Reedy/Navy/04/13/95 6:35 PM

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 23 NOVEMBER 1994

support role of the BSAT is to aggressively challenge cost estimates to ensure consistency with standing policies and procedures (COBRA algorithms/process, DON cost considerations, and OSD policy) and reasonableness of cost estimates (savings and costs). Enclosure (2) reflects the procedures and rules for the review/analysis of BRAC-95 scenario development data call responses.

4. The BSEC recessed at 1120 and reconvened at 1145. All BSEC and BSAT members present when the session recessed were once again present. In addition, Captain Michael Nordeen, USN, Captain David Rose, USN, Captain Kevin Ferguson, USN, Commander Loren Heckelman, SC, USN, Commander Robert Souders, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Beth Leinberry, CEC, USN, were also present.

5. Mr. Wennergren briefed the results of COBRA analysis for the closing of Naval Air Facility (NAF) Adak. See enclosure (3). The analysis reflected one-time costs of \$12.1 million and return on investment in 1 year. The one-time costs included: \$1.0 million for Personnel (including severance pay and unemployment costs for 61 civilians); overhead costs of \$8.9 million; and moving costs of \$2.1 million (which included unique shipping costs for 500 personal vehicles at approximately \$3,000 per vehicle). The BSAT excluded environmental clean up costs of \$220 million, \$1.8 million of which was for the removal of 620 abandoned vehicles. This is in accordance with OSD policy which provides that environmental costs at losing bases will be excluded. However, a \$650,000 cost to remove caribou off the island was included because of an existing agreement between the DON and the State of Alaska regarding the disposition of the herd in the event of the base's closure. The number of billets/positions eliminated was 601 and the number of billets/positions moved was 0. The BSAT advised that the analysis was based upon the elimination of billets/positions in FY 2001, even though the last operational activity other than NAF Adak is scheduled out in FY 1995. Noting the desire of the DON leadership to close bases as quickly as possible, the BSEC decided that if the last operational activity other than the NAF is out of Adak in FY 1995, then the analysis should reflect NAF Adak personnel being out in FY 1997 vice FY 2001.

6. Mr. Wennergren briefed the COBRA analysis for closing NOPF Whidbey Island and consolidating facilities at NOPF Dam Neck. See enclosure (4). The one-time costs were \$35.3 million and the return on investment was 100+ years. The analysis resulted in the elimination of 139 billets/positions and the movement of 122 billets/positions. New requirement military construction costs at NOPF Dam Neck were \$0.5 million. In its review, the BSEC agreed that a recurring cost of \$2.4 million for a satellite communications link from Whidbey Island to Dam Neck was appropriately included. However, the BSEC decided that a recurring

Anchorage - 1200 miles
 Fairbanks - 1500 miles
 Seattle - 2000 miles

Adak - NAF

- * - current mission is to support Naval Security Group Activity Operations in the process of drawing down to modified support status as a result of unilateral CINCPACFLT action
- Pec OPNAVNOTE 5450 dtd (April 7, 1994) station redesignated as a facility
- minimal support to P-3 aircraft required (what is minimal)
- transient aircraft and resupply flights mostly

Frequency ~~Support~~ For FY93

<u>AC</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
P-3	ASW	3-7
130 (Coast Guard)	Search and Rescue	36
HH65 (Coast Guard)	(SAR)	36
LR35 - medical	Evacuation	6
L100	Southern Air	2
C-141 (USAF)	Weekly food flights	52
C-130 (USAF)	Cargo	18

+ 9 commercial flights each week *

* Adak also has 4 commercial flights each week (Reeve Alenton Airways) and 5 per week (Alaska Airlines) (nearest airport is 1200 miles at Anchorage)

- station does not have designated airspace for training
- no other DOD installation within 400 miles

* - facility mission is not expected to change

Capacity

- facility will need about \$ in MilCon, if it remains op.
- have about \$40 million in construction costs since 1988
- most of the admin. space is substandard (68,867) no longer in use
- * - could be turned over to Coast Guard, NOAA, Interior Dept
- Adak has extreme weather conditions

Adak cont'd

Capacity
Cont'd

- two hangars available and about 1 million feet of unused ramp space is available
- under drawdown rules, all tours to Adak are unaccompanied (occupancy rate is 63%)
- airport (Mitchell field) has two runways 5/23 and 18/36
5-23 is 7800 ft 200 ft wide, 18-36 is 7200 ft
- X - would be difficult to expand mission. Most facilities are WWII. Would require \$9.8 million to upgrade ramps and ILM for hangars taxiways, hardstands etc.
- currently there are no assigned aircraft
- ship berthing capacity, piers are about 40 years old
- power and generator systems are old, water system is old (40 years) all designated as C-3 and C-4 in Base ops
- base is in drawdown from 5000 to 1000 with no dependents

Operating Costs

- FY96 operating costs will be about • \$26 million

Personnel Numbers

as of Jan 1994

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>
<u>Military</u>	1044	1380
<u>Civilian</u>	75	136

Environmental ~~and Fuel Storage~~

~~Page 1 of 1~~ ~~last~~ ~~by~~ ~~me~~ ~~on~~ ~~10/10/10~~

~~300-2000-1000000~~
~~Subsistence~~
~~Cost~~

Adak cont'd

Legal

- legal agreements with Non-DOD agencies (formal support agreements) (minor)
 - Alaska Dept. of Public Safety
 - NOAA
 - Interior fish and wildlife
 - Alascom
 - logistical support (minor)
 - logistical support "
 - " " "
 - utilities (major)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

copy to Doyle

LT-0792-F16
BSAT/OEN
31 May 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

LT-0792-F16
*** MASTER DOCUMENT ***
DO NOT REMOVE FROM FILES

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Mr. Yellin of your staff asked on 30 May 1995 for our comments on the Secretary of Transportation's letter dated May 12, 1995, concerning the recommendation to close Naval Air Facility (NAF) Adak, Alaska. We have reviewed the correspondence, and our comments are provided below.

The Department of the Navy has excess capacity in its operating air stations. As indicated in the COBRA analysis supporting our recommendations, we spend \$25 million a year to operate NAF Adak. No active or reserve squadrons are stationed at NAF Adak, and all major tenants are closing their facilities at the station. Consequently, as NAF Adak no longer contributes to the Department's mission accomplishment, complete closure is the most economical way to reduce unneeded capacity, for only by closure can the overhead and personnel costs incurred to maintain an installation be totally eliminated and thereby result in savings.

Operating bases solely for incidental use by another Department or Agency neither supports our efforts to maintain the military capabilities and readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps nor represents sound stewardship. In addition, to keep Adak open solely for use by the Department of Transportation would amount to one Federal agency augmenting the appropriations of another Federal agency without specific Congressional sanction, a violation of the general prohibition against augmentation of appropriations.

In this instance, the Department of Transportation has a number of alternatives. Shemya AFB is currently an operational site for the Coast Guard, and the Air Force projects the base will remain operational for the foreseeable future. Other facilities (Coast Guard and commercial) in Alaska could supplement Coast Guard operations in the North Pacific. Finally, existing law permits the Secretary of Defense to transfer property that is being closed to Coast Guard with or without reimbursement; however, the Pryor Amendment (Public Law 103-160, §2904) requires the determination of whether Department of Transportation wishes to accept such transfer not later than six months after the date of approval of closure of the installation. Both Midway (BRAC-91/93) and Adak will be available for transfer.

We could work some of this into funding Ben



Plans, Policy and Evaluation Division
U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

Office Number: (202) 267-2355
Fax Number: (202) 267-4401

Date: 21 June 95

To: Mr. Ben Borden

Office/Routing Symbol: _____

Work Phone: _____

Fax Phone: 703-696-0550

From: Kathy Scott

Comments: Attached is an advance copy of
verbiage on Adak for your use.
We are still clearing this language.
Should there be changes, we will contact
you by phone.

Number of pages to follow this cover sheet: 1

This fax machine is "UNATTENDED"
and receives automatically 24 hours a day.
Please let me know that you are sending a document.

The Commission recognizes the Department of Defense has provided outstanding support to the Coast Guard in one of its primary operating areas by allowing aircraft and cutters to use bases in the Aleutian Islands. The Coast Guard's use of these facilities is essential for continued performance of maritime law enforcement, safety and security missions in the North Pacific. The closing of Naval Air Facility Adak will have a detrimental impact on Coast Guard operations. This facility provides forward deployment capability for search and rescue and law enforcement operations, logistic and communications services, and a medical evacuation transfer point. The loss of Adak will cause the Coast Guard to obtain support at a greater distance from this operating area, increasing costs and time away from critical missions. The Coast Guard has requested continued Department of Defense support in maintaining similar services provided by the Navy and Air Force facilities at Shemya and Midway Island, should Naval Air Facility Adak close.



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

May 12, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon -
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0150517-6

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Coast Guard has a significant interest in the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment process. We are reviewing the list of closures and realignments provided by the Secretary of Defense and are assessing the impacts to our operations. We intend to provide comments directly to your staff, as well as through public hearings.

Initial review of the list provided by the Secretary of Defense indicates the potential closure of Naval Air Facility Adak. This causes great concern as Adak is important for Coast Guard cutter and aircraft operations in this primary operating area. The loss of Adak will cause the Coast Guard to obtain support at a greater distance from this operating area, increasing costs and time away from critical missions. I have enclosed a synopsis of the Coast Guard's use of Adak and other Department of Defense facilities in the Northern Pacific.

In this time of reinventing government, it is essential that we continue to meet our customers' needs. To that end, I ask that you consider the Coast Guard in your recommendations to the President. Should you have questions, please contact me or Steven Palmer, Assistant Secretary for Governmental Affairs, at (202) 366-4573.

Sincerely,

Federico Peña

Enclosure

Palmer would like to come over and talk to the Commission sometime during the week of June 14-16. Do we have a Commissioner that can get in.

SYNOPSIS OF COAST GUARD USE OF
DOD NORTHERN PACIFIC FACILITIES

PROBLEM: The U.S. fishing trade in the Northern Pacific exceeds \$1.2 billion annually; its impact on the U.S. economy approaches \$20 billion. The Coast Guard presence there provides for the enforcement of maritime laws and treaties that protect and support U.S. fishing industries and the environment. In addition, the Coast Guard provides critical search and rescue, medical evacuation, navigational, and communications support. In turn the Coast Guard relies on numerous Department of Defense facilities for logistics and forward operating bases. Closure of these facilities in these vital remote areas would have a tremendous adverse impact to the Coast Guard's ability to provide these services. It is crucial for the industry and the environment that these services continue in the Northern Pacific.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FACILITIES: Adak, Shemya, and Midway all serve as vital forward operating support bases for Coast Guard law enforcement, aids to navigation and search and rescue missions; these bases may close within the next five years.

COAST GUARD IMPACTS: Affected programs and units include: Search and Rescue, Law Enforcement and Aids-to-Navigation programs and LORAN Station Attu, Air Station Kodiak, Adak LORAN Monitor, and Communications Station Kodiak units.

SAR
Law Enf.
Navigation
Aids

Our cutters and particularly aircraft rely on these facilities to accomplish Coast Guard missions. If all are closed, we expect the following:

◆ Search and Rescue: Forced to stage long range search and rescue in the western portion of our area of responsibility from Cold Bay, Dutch Harbor, or St. Paul. Each of these is nearly 1,000 miles further to the east of Shemya. This would substantially decrease aircraft on-scene time for search and rescue and will result in increased loss-of-life cases, crew fatigue, and safety violations. Closed medical facilities will delay initial medical treatment of medical evacuation patients a minimum of 3.5 hours. Likewise, cutters will expect to spend extra days in transit for medical evacuation cases.

◆ Law Enforcement: Similarly, forced to stage from airports to the east, law enforcement aircraft will drastically reduce on-scene periods for law enforcement. We will be unable to fly 80% of the High Seas Drift Net area resulting in major U.S. economic impact due to lack of enforcement. Attempts to maintain current levels of service will result in increased crew fatigue, loss of profitable patrol hours, and perhaps a greater dependancy on out-of-district recovery areas such as Japan, Guam, and Hawaii. Tension between the United States and Japan over the issue of fishing practices is likely to increase if we rely more heavily on them to stage our enforcement of the High Seas Drift Net area and other regulations on Japanese fishing vessels. Cutters will

lose numerous days in transit for each patrol for fueling purposes.

♦ COMMUNICATIONS: Loss of communications services provided will have a severe impact on unit effectiveness and morale of LORAN Station Attu. The cost to overcome this loss will include acquiring a satellite earth station for installation on Attu. Also the high frequency communications repeater at Adak will require a costly replacement.

♦ AIDS-TO-NAVIGATION: Loss of airstrip at Shemya will force uncompleted logistics missions to Attu due to weather and will severely disrupt delivery of food/mail to Attu. Loss of LORAN monitoring station at Adak will force a very expensive relocation of the site.

EXISTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT:

- Use of runway facilities for search and rescue, emergency landings and navigational support
- Medical services at clinics (includes medical evacuations which means delayed initial medical treatment of patients)
- Use of fueling pier for cutters
- Commissary and servemart assistance during High Seas Drift Net patrols
- Flight crew messing and berthing
- LORAN C monitoring site
- High frequency transmitter/receiver and medium frequency transmitter remotely operated from Kodiak.
- Refueling, alternative landing site, emergency airfield and navigational support
- Minor and emergent runway repairs
- LORSTA Attu landline communications-telephones

IMPACT OF DOD FACILITY CLOSURES/REALIGNMENTS

DRAFT

DOD INSTALLATION	AFFECTED CG UNITS	IMPACT
NAVAL AIR FACILITY ADAK, AL (Closure)	LORAN STATION (LORSTA) ATTU AIR STATION (AIRSTA) KODIAK ADAK LORAN MONITOR COMMUNICATION STATION KODIAK	Closure of this facility will have a major impact on CG operations in the North Pacific. Loss of use of this facility will impair our ability to perform maritime law enforcement and safety and security missions. Adak currently provides both cutter and aircraft support for CG ops. Loss of this facility will result in decreased aircraft on-scene time and delay of medical evacuation patients. It will result in fewer on-scene cutter days for law enforcement patrols. Loss of Loran monitoring station at Adak may force a relocation of the site at great cost. CG cutters also use Adak for JP-5 refueling. They could potentially switch to diesel fuel available at Dutch Harbor, but with negative impacts. Naval Security Group Adak currently supports COMMSTA Kodiak remote MF and HF transceivers and receivers. Its closure will terminate the Inter-service Support Agreement (ISSA). Other support alternatives are being investigated.
CHARLES MELVIN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER, IL (Closure)	NAVAL ENGINEERING SUPPORT UNIT (NESU) ST. LOUIS ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE DETACHMENT (EMD) ST. LOUIS MARINE SAFETY OFFICE (MSO) ST. LOUIS	NESU & EMD St. Louis are existing tenants of this facility. MSO St. Louis currently maintains their small boats and pollution responses equipment in a building at the Support Center. A planning proposal for a new Base St. Louis at this site has been approved. Anticipate closure will lead to a Title 10 transfer of 22 acres to the CG for the new base. Impact on NESU and EMD St. Louis is unknown. Charles Melvin Price Support Center also provides an exchange, commissary, gym, golf course and club house that are used by CG personnel. The Army Depot at Granite City will remain active, providing

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USCG G-CPP

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DOD
INSTALLATION

AFFECTED CG UNITS

IMPACT

CHARLES MELVIN PRICE
SUPPORT CENTER
cont.

commissary/exchange services to CG personnel. CG Auxiliary would be directly impacted by closure of this facility. The Support Center houses the Auxiliary's National Supply Center (ANSC). The ANSC is the storage and distribution center for Auxiliary pubs, awards, member course, etc. The ANSC is operated under contract, with CG managing the contract and overseeing operations. The Auxiliary may be forced to lease the same space, most likely at an increased cost, or move the location, requiring transportation of inventory and development of a new contract. The CG District 2 armory is currently in shared Army space. A new armory is included within the scope of the new Base St. Louis design. There may be an opportunity for future consolidation of the NESU, EMD, and MSO at the new base site.

SELFRIDGE ARMY GARRISON,
MI
(Closure)

AIRSTA DETROIT
GROUP/BASE DETROIT
MSO DETROIT
STATION BELLE ISLAND
STATION PORT HURON
STATION ST. CLAIR SHORES
AIDS TO NAVIGATION TEAM (ANT)
DETROIT
CG CUTTER (CGC) BRISTOL BAY

Airsta Detroit is a tenant command of this facility. It is unlikely that the Airsta will have to relocate as the airfield property is under the custody of the Michigan Air National Guard (ANG). Operational services are supported by an ISSA between the Air Station and Michigan ANG. With a total closure of this base, CG may lose commissary, exchange, medical, and child care services. Fire fighting services and Airfield Crash and Rescue are 50% funded by the Army and 50% by the 127th Fighter Wing of Michigan ANG. If the ANG is unable to absorb 100% funding, a significant cutback in the airfield support could occur or CG might have to provide additional funds to continue support of this service. CG occupies 116 of 745 Army housing units. The Army has no plans to continue to run this housing. Closure could mean expanding our leased housing for eligible members.

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USCG G-CRP

DOD INSTALLATION	AFFECTED CG UNITS	IMPACT
SENECA ARMY DEPOT, NY (Closure)	LORSTA SENECA	<p>Staffing at LORSTA Seneca is programmed to decrease from 20 personnel to 4 with the completion of a LORAN consolidated control project 7/97. The nature of LORAN operations makes movement of the LORAN facility impossible and the option to acquire the property has been explored locally. The effect of closure of Seneca housing, 32 units, would minimally impact the CG. Additional minor concerns include the transfer of LORSTA water and sewer currently provided by Seneca Army Depot, to Seneca County. The Army also manages a profitable MWR recreational travel camp, used by Active Duty Military and retirees as vacation cottages. The depot also provides telephone services to LORSTA Seneca.</p>
NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MA (Closure)	SOUTH WEYMOUTH BUOY DEPOT STATION SCITUATE CG DISTRICT 1	<p>South Weymouth Buoy Depot is a tenant command of this facility. The CG does not own or lease, just has use of the site. The ISSA with the Navy states that an additional 6 acres could be made available to the CG if the NAS ever closed. The NAS Fire Department provides protection and safety inspections for the Depot. We may be able to rely on the local Fire Department to provide protection services. We currently lease 50 housing units from the Navy for CG families in the Boston area. The housing is poor and considered to be a maintenance burden; however, other housing options are limited. The NAS housing may be unnecessary for Boston-area members; District 1 needs to address this in the future. The Navy exchange may close; may be feasible for CG Exchange System to take over if a CG presence remains. The CG may see a significant decrease in the established ISSA with the Navy at Airsta Cape Cod. The CG provides the Navy use of 95 units of housing at Cape Cod.</p>

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USCG 5-011

DOD
INSTALLATION

AFFECTED CG UNITS

IMPACT

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MA
cont.

The NAS South Weymouth closure may reduce the Navy need for housing by as much as 80 units. The CG will still own these units, but not receive maintenance funding. Loss of commissary and exchange facilities will impact drilling reservists in the area. Closure of the clinic will have a minor affect on CG personnel at Station Scituate. D1 field operations will be impacted to a limited degree if the NAS closes: D1 provides semi-annual intelligence briefings to the P-3 squadron at South Weymouth, who in turn provide Target of Interest information to the district during/after flights. The squadron has also been an additional reconnaissance asset during AMIO operations.

NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TX
(Realignment)

AIRSTA CORPUS CHRISTI

AIRSTA Corpus Christi is a tenant command of this facility. The Navy may desire to relocate several tenants to maximize space utilization. At one time, NAS expressed an intent to use the CG hangar for the USN minesweeper helos. If that occurred, the Navy has indicated they would provide CG with another location on base and would attempt to assist with move/remodeling costs. The latest BRAC developments/recommendations make it likely that CG will retain its current location in Hangar 41.

MCCLELLAN AFB, CA
(Closure)

AIRSTA SACRAMENTO

AIRSTA Sacramento is a tenant command of this facility. Closure of the AFB would force relocation of CG airta. The CG does not desire to become an airfield landlord. The Air Force currently provides interservice support such as airfield, control tower, crash and fire, weather office, and civil engineering support. They also provide family support services such as housing, medical, dental, exchange, commissary, etc. Airsta Sacramento also receives courier service, communications support and is a local user of the Air Force Classified Material System account. The CG has

DOD
INSTALLATION

AFFECTED CG UNITS

IMPACT

NAVAL SHIPYARD LONG BEACH, SUPRTCEN SAN PEDRO
CA
(Closure)

The shipyard and SIMA provide direct, high quality ship repair services to local CG. Service connectivity for the RAPIDS program and the Defense Switched Network at CGD11 are provided by the Naval Shipyard. Alternate service points will have to be identified. This closure will also impact support services for the CG, i.e., a Family Support Center, commissary, exchange, barber shop, pharmacy, medical services, child care. CGD11 Response Advisory Team houses our Vessel of Opportunity Skilling System at the Shipyard. SUPRTCEN San Pedro uses the Navy clinic for some x-ray and laboratory services. Because of the distance of San Pedro from any other federal direct care inpatient or specialty service provider, the CG may have to contract for or obtain an MOU with the Dept. of Veterans Affairs for many of these services. Closure may also eliminate berthing/messing opportunities for reservists augmenting CG commands in the area. PSU 311 is in the process of being established using a warehouse on the shipyard. They are currently setting up temporary storage facilities and will probably require additional warehouse cost if they have to relocate.

MCCLELLAN AFB, CA
(Realignment)

~~AIRSTA SACRAMENTO~~
See Previous Impact
on McClellan

~~McClellan is slated for realignment. Currently 29 CG families reside there in Air Force housing. If the realignment results in more AF families at McClellan, the CG may see a reduction in government owned housing opportunities. Consolidation of workloads at McClellan should not impact CG operations at Airsta Sacramento as long as the runway remains operational and the current support provided by the Air Force continues.~~

DOD

INSTALLATION

AFFECTED CG UNITS

IMPACT

EGLIN AFB, FL
(Realignment)

LORAN MONITORING SITE
STA DESTIN
FT WALTON NATIONAL DISTRESS
SYSTEM
CAPE SAN BLAS NATIONAL
DISTRESS SYSTEM

STA Destin, FT Walton NDS, Cape San Blas NDS all located on Army property but managed by Eglin (utilities, tower, equipment hut, etc) Impact unknown.

NSWC CRANE DIVISION
DETACHMENT, KY
(Closure)

CGYD
MLCLANT
MLCPAC

This closure will have a major impact on field support of the MK75 gun, MK15 CIWS and MK36 SRBOC. This center provides technical and parts assistance, overhauls and defines maintenance procedures for these weapon systems. The Navy may continue to support the MK15 CIWS and MK36 SRBOC, but is removing the MK75 from its inventory. CG YARD may be able to fill this gap.

NUWC NEWPORT DIVISION
NEW LONDON DETACHMENT
NEW LONDON, CT
(Closure)

CGC EAGLE
CGC REDWOOD
STA NEW LONDON

CGC EAGLE currently moors at Pier 7 when in homeport. SECDDOD recommendation is for Pier 7 to remain open. This pier also provides a homeport for the CGC REDWOOD. Anticipate STA New London will acquire its current site and will retain access to Pier 7.

NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL
AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE
CENTER, IN-SERVICE
ENGINEERING CENTER
EAST COAST DETACHMENT,
NORFOLK, VA
(Realignment)

G-T
MLCLANT
MLCPAC

Headquarters, Headquarters units, and MLCs contract with NISE East for electronics engineering support. Unclear from the recommendations as to what functions may be deleted. Major moves of personnel/equipment may result in project elimination or delays.

FORT HAMILTON, NY
(Realignment)

May affect USCG personnel remaining in NY area if GI relocates and commissary/exchange close. Other potential impacts unknown.

DOD

INSTALLATION

AFFECTED CG UNITS

IMPACT

NAS POINT MUGU, CA

CG DISTRICT 11

local radio transceivers and antennae installed in the Air Force hangar, such as VHF and HF.

The CG has a National Distress System VHF-FM High Level Site at Point Mugu. The Navy provides the control circuits, power and emergency power to the site.

BAYONNE MILITARY OCEAN
TERMINAL, NJ
(Closure)

This site is being considered as a proposed location for several NY area commands. Closure of this facility will probably make Army barracks unavailable for CG cutters tentatively planned to homeport there as part of the Streamlining proposals.

FORT DIX, NJ
(Realignment)

ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM

Atlantic Strike Team is a tenant command of this facility. FY95 AC&I project to construct equipment facility with construction award anticipated 3/30/95. No impact anticipated.

USCG G-CPP

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DOD INSTALLATION	AFFECTED CG UNITS	IMPACT
GREATER PITTSBURGH IAP AIR RESERVE STATION, PA (Closure)	MSO PITTSBURGH	Closure of this facility will impact Reserve personnel who stay at this facility when drilling. Costs of Reserve drills will escalate in the Pittsburgh area because of high costs associated with temporary lodging.
SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND ARLINGTON, VA (Change to previous BRAC)		Relocation of this command to San Diego will make it difficult to participate in Navy electronic systems programs affecting CG, e.g. Defense Message System, high speed fleet broadcast, NTCS-A/JMCIS, NAVMAC-II.
FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER, CO (Closure)		Primary impact on health care services will be the relocation of the Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Ft Sam Houston, TX. This laboratory provides military eyewear support to CG personnel west of the Mississippi River. Loss of service may only be temporary during transfer to Texas.
FORT BUCHANAN, PR (Realignment)	CG BASE SAN JUAN	Closure of the family housing units and conversion to a primary reserve unit will affect health care provided by the Army clinic primarily for CG dependents.
NAVAL AIR STATION ALAMEDA, CA (Change to previous BRAC)	PACAREA	PACAREA (Pi) presently picks up Defense Courier Service material at NAS Alameda. A new delivery system will need to be developed to take care of delivery of classified material in a timely manner. PACAREA (Pi) provides over the counter Sensitive Compartmented Information traffic service to local Navy ships and CG units. When NAS closes, PACAREA anticipates losing the assigned Navy billets that assist the staffing for this service.
OAKLAND ARMY BASE, CA	CG PACIFIC AREA	Anticipate telephone circuit (secure and non-secure impacts).

DOD INSTALLATION	AFFECTED CG UNITS	IMPACT
FORT GREELY, AL (Realignment)	LORSTA TOK	LORSTA Tok personnel use the commissary and exchange at Ft Greely. Ft Greely closure will not impair LORAN operations. The Army metrology lab at Greeley repairs and calibrates all electronics equipment on inventory at LORSTA TOK. If the lab were to close as part of this realignment, the CG would have to pay for this service or purchase \$25K worth of calibrating equipment.
SHIP REPAIR FACILITY, GUAM (Closure)	MARSEC MSO GUAM CGC BASSWOOD CGC GALVESTON ISLAND	Closure of this facility could lead to eventual closure of the naval station clinic and hospital, the primary source of medical care for the 116 CG personnel and their dependents in Naval housing. Vessel maintenance and repair assistance has been provided at this facility, as well as dry dock capability. Additional cutter transit time will be required for this type of maintenance. In addition, the Navy metrology lab repairs and calibrates all electronics equipment on inventory at MARSEC Guam. If the lab closes, the cost for this work would increase by an estimated \$5K per year.
NAVAL ACTIVITIES GUAM (Realignment)	MARSEC MSO GUAM CGC GALVESTON ISLAND CGC BASSWOOD	Naval Activities Guam supports active duty and reserve CG on Guam in many ways as tenant activities. ISSA's are in place with the Navy Public Works Center for general, electrical, water/sewer and housing support, as well as telephone services for our buildings, offices and grounds on NAVACT. MARSEC, MSO and the 2 cutters are located on CG property within NAVACTS. CG units are directly supported by almost every department of NAVACTS. The Navy provides security, training spaces, MWR services, food services, consolidated bachelor quarters, portion operations, commercial travel, fire department response, legal services, etc.

DOD INSTALLATION	AFFECTED CG UNITS	IMPACT
EAST FORT BAKER, CA (Closure)	STA GOLDEN GATE	The Fort has some limited housing, currently used by a few CG families. Recent degradation in maintenance has already influenced a decision to vacate.
RIO VISTA ARMY RESERVE (Closure)	STA RIO VISTA	This facility is adjacent to Station Rio Vista. Do not anticipate any impact due to closure.
MOFFET FEDERAL AIRFIELD AGS, CA (Closure)	AIRSTA SACRAMENTO	The 129th Air National Guard Air Rescue Squadron is located at this facility. Occasionally, this squadron flies long range SAR for the CG and maintains long range SAR guard when CG C-130's are down. SECDOD recommendation is for Squadron to relocate to McClellan AFB which should facilitate an improved working relationship between Airsta Sacramento and the Squadron.
NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE CENTER, IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING WEST COAST DIVISION, SAN DIEGO, CA (Closure)	G-T MLCLANT MLCPAC	Headquarters, Headquarters units, and MLCs contract with NISE West for electronics engineering support. Unclear from the recommendations as to what functions may be deleted. Major moves of personnel/equipment may result in project elimination or delays.
ROBINS AFB, GA (Realignment)	AR&SC ELIZABETH CITY	AR&SC receives complete Air Force support for repair of CG C-130's through ISSA agreements. AR&SC does not have the facilities to repair C-130's. Impact on ISSA's unknown.
the		
KELLY AFB, TX (Realignment)	AR&SC ELIZABETH CITY	AR&SC receives complete Air Force support for repair of CG C-130's through ISSA agreements. ARSC does not have the facilities to repair the C-130's. Impact on ISSA's unknown.
HILL AFB, UT (Realignment) AVIATION TROOP COMMAND, MO (Closure)	AR&SC ELIZABETH CITY	These facilities provide ISSA support to AR&SC. They do depot level preventive maintenance on our C-130's and H60s.



Alaska State Legislature
House of Representatives
Office of the Chief Clerk

State Capitol, Rm 214
Juneau, AK 99801-1182
(907) 465-3725

Official Business

Assigned to file number
corresponding 950512-11

May 5, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 N. Moore St. Ste. 1425
Arlington, WA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As directed, I am enclosing a copy of the following resolution:

HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 10
Relating to the conversion of the Naval Air Facility in Adak.

The resolution was passed by the Alaska House of Representatives on
May 2, 1995.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Suzi Lowell".

Suzi Lowell
Chief Clerk

Enclosure as noted.

STATE OF ALASKA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1995

Source
HR 10

House
Resolve No.
9



Relating to the conversion of the Naval Air Facility in Adak.

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

WHEREAS the closure of the Naval Air Facility in Adak, Alaska, is anticipated to occur in 1996; and

WHEREAS the land and existing infrastructure of the facility could be used after the closure to benefit people and businesses in the state, as well as to serve the long-term interests of the state and the federal government; and

WHEREAS the closure of the facility presents a unique opportunity to develop a new community for the western Aleutians, to promote commercial ventures, and to use the existing land and infrastructure for community purposes; and

WHEREAS, unless appropriate steps are taken immediately to preserve the buildings and other infrastructure from damage by wind and moisture, the future use of the existing infrastructure and the development of the Adak community will be jeopardized:

BE IT RESOLVED that the House of Representatives supports the conversion of the Naval Air Facility in Adak, Alaska, into a facility that can be used beneficially by the citizens of the western Aleutians; and be it

FURTHER RESOLVED that the House of Representatives respectfully requests the

United States Department of the Navy, Department of the Interior, and Department of Defense
to

(1) take effective and timely measures to preserve the infrastructure that constitutes the Naval Air Facility in Adak, Alaska;

(2) work closely with all federal and state agencies and the Aleut Corporation regarding the future use of the facility after its closure;

(3) designate in a timely manner an authority, preferably the Aleut Corporation, for developing the future use of the property constituting the facility; and

(4) arrange for the transfer of the property that constitutes the facility to the Aleut Corporation as part of the corporation's entitlement under 43 U.S.C. 1601 - 1641 (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act).

COPIES of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable Bill Clinton, President of the United States; to the Honorable Al Gore, Jr., Vice-President of the United States and President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chair of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission; and to the Honorable Ted Stevens and the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. Senators, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

TED STEVENS, ALASKA
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO
PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI
SLADE GORTON, WASHINGTON
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY
VNIIE MACK, FLORIDA
RAD BURNS, MONTANA
WARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA
WES M. JEFFORDS, VERMONT
JUDD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROBERT F. BENNETT, UTAH

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
TOM HARKIN, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HARRY REID, NEVADA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON

J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. ENGLISH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

May 8, 1995

950514-1

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission
1700 North Monroe Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Alan:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Commission during your hearings in San Francisco. Lee Clune and I appreciated the chance to present the views of the Delta Junction community on the proposed realignment of Fort Greely.

During my testimony, I reflected on the broader significance of Alaska military bases to our Nation's security interests. As I know you appreciate from your tenure as a Member of the Armed Services Committee, our forces in the Asia-Pacific region are spread very thin. Alaska units provide a strategic reserve and strike capability on American soil--an irreplaceable asset.

In San Francisco, I noted the dual deployment capability of the Alaska bases--providing double the deployment flexibility of units in the lower 48 states. This translates to reduced requirements for airlift and sealift--already in short supply.

As the Commission proceeds to evaluate the addition of other bases to the list forwarded by the Department of Defense, I urge you to reject any proposals to consider closure or downsizing of the forces remaining in Alaska. Two Administrations, three Secretaries of Defense, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and all three previous Base Closure Commissions looked closely at this issue, and rejected proposals to eliminate the five primary operating bases in Alaska.

Please feel free to call on me if you have any questions or concerns about information related to the military installations in Alaska. I will do everything I can to assist on any matter related to the bases in my State.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ted Stevens

It was good to see you in S.C. Thanks for staying so late

MARK O. HATFIELD, OREGON, CHAIRMAN

TED STEVENS, ALASKA
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO
PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI
SLAYBORN, WASHINGTON
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BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HARRY REID, NEVADA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON

J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. ENGLISH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

March 2, 1995

Please refer to this number
when responding 950307-12

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I understand that as part of the Base Closure and Realignment submission, the Department of Defense has recommended that Fort Greely, Alaska be realigned and that Adak Naval Station, Alaska be closed.

As you begin your review of the Alaska bases, I would like to offer my personal assistance to facilitate your assessment. I hope that in the course of your deliberations, that you and the other Commissioners will have the opportunity to visit these two installations. Accordingly, I would ask that you advise me when the Commissioners or staff intend to visit Alaska.

Base closures are not a new issue for Alaska. Since 1968, over 150 separate installations and sites have been closed in Alaska by the three military services. As the Department of Defense has reorganized and downsized, the excess capacity in Alaska has already been eliminated.

The realignment of Fort Greely would have a severe economic impact on the community of Delta Junction. Delta Junction is very reliant on the Army's presence in such areas as schools, jobs as well as community support.


I look forward to working with you and the Commission as you review this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

TED STEVENS

Alan: I would like the hearing on Ft. Greely held at big Delta - not Fairbanks.



DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR STATION KEY WEST, FLORIDA

INSTALLATION MISSION

Provides support to aviation units performing air combat training.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Realign the air station to a facility, and dispose of piers, wharfs and buildings in the Truman Annex and Trunbo Point.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- In order to continue full access to the training airspace and ranges while at the same time reducing unneeded infrastructure.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Cost: \$.4 million to close the facility
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$ 8.2 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 1.8 million
- Break-Even Year: Immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: \$.25.5 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions	0	26 (20 direct and 6 indirect)	
Realignments	0	0	0
Total	0	26	0

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline	0	0	0
Reductions	20	0	0
Realignments			
Total	20	0	0

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
20	0	0	0	(20)	0

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Closing the facility will have a minimal but positive effect since no aviation assets are being moved out of the facility.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: Lawton Chiles
Senators: Bob Graham
 Connie Mack
Representative: Peter Deutsch

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 26 jobs (20 direct and 6 indirect)
- Key West, FL MSA Job Base: 26 jobs
- Percentage: 0.1 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1994-2001): 0.1 percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- The Navy wants to retain airspace rights for training purposes and in doing so it will have to retain a military presence in the area.

DRAFT

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
Base Summary Sheet**

Naval Air Station

Key West , Florida

INSTALLATION MISSION

Operational air base that supports training

RECOMMENDATION:

- **Realign to become an air facility and dispose of the waterfront assets but retain the infrastructure necessary to support future operations**

JUSTIFICATION

In order to continue full access to the training airspace and ranges, the Navy wants to reduce infrastructure

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

This is one of the few unrestricted areas of airspace left for the Navy to train over water

COST CONSIDERATIONS

- **One-Time Cost:** \$.4 million
- **Net Costs and Savings During Implementation:** \$8.2 million
- **Annual Recurring Savings:** \$1.8 million
- **Break-Even Year:** Immediate
- **Net Present Value Over 20 Years:** \$

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions			
Realignments			
Total			

DRAFT

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 22 NOVEMBER 1994

Otherwise, it may make decisions that are not supported by the numbers, or the BSEC will have to perform budget analysis to bring the numbers in line with reality. Mr. Nemfakos reminded the Owners/Operators that when they provide COBRA responses, they also have an opportunity to suggest a better solution, not as to which activity closes but as to what happens to the necessary functions at the closing activity. The alternative can be better operationally or fiscally.

8. Rear Admiral Moore asked whether the final recommendations would leave commanders with any discretion regarding the location of functions. The BSEC will try to protect that prerogative; however, there are dangers in being either too general or too specific. Owners/Operators will have access to the final language.

9. Admiral Flanagan advised that the airspace at Key West is what is critical at that activity, and the COBRA scenario response for closing NAS Key West tried to reflect that fact. He also advised that six submarines were scheduled to go to New London and that is the reason the COBRA response for closing New London showed 20 vice 14 submarines being relocated. Admiral Flanagan also reported that Norfolk had no piers for patrol craft and that he believed Norfolk was being overloaded. He recommended a close look at Norfolk's pier capacity. Mr. Nemfakos invited Admiral Flanagan to send up some of his staff to review the data that the BSEC was using.

10. Admiral Zlatoper advised the BSEC that it was not necessary to keep excess capacity in Guam in order to maintain DoN's strategic presence there. He also stated that DoN does need to maintain a small number of submarines on the west coast because of the training conducted there.

11. The BSEC will meet with the Assistant Secretaries next week to update them. The following week, the BSEC will meet with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Owners/Operators to let them know what the specific recommendations look like.

12. The deliberative session adjourned at 1540.



ORVAL E. NANGLE
LTCOL, USMC
Recording Secretary

Key West

* - Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and Reserve Training Support System ~~is~~ data used as a basis for Key West planning resulted in zero surge and expansion requirements.

? CINCLANTFLT LSMP is currently based on a prolonged global war rather than two major regional conflicts.

* Key West provides adversary / dissimilar air combat maneuvering training. A-4 / F-16 / F-5 aircraft (ACMI?) (Air Force)
(next closest range is in Beaufort) - what is their utilization rate?
Where and how many air-train fighters are within range of Key West?

* The Navy is currently conducting a study to determine the effect bombing at Patricia Target has on wildlife

* Key West is an extremely isolated, high cost, resort area

Because of a requirement to maintain a training capability on the east coast, due in part to the realignment of aviation basing, Key West was converted from a Naval Air Station to a facility. The Navy proposes to dispose of piers, wharfs, and buildings in the Truman Annex and Trumbo point. Basically the proposal reduces excess capacity ~~but~~ ^{while} retaining access to airspace and training ranges.

Key West (Cont'd)

- Cost to downsize is \$.4 million. Net savings during implementation is \$ 8.2 m. Annual recurring savings is \$ 1.8 m. Over 20 years, it is \$ 25.5 m. Reduction of 26 jobs during the period 1996-2001. 0.1 % of the active employment base. (Contractor workyears on base = 121)

- cost avoidance for MILCON if downgraded:

1997	Gym	2.0
1997	Child Ctr	3.4
1999	Water Storage	8.0
2000	Bachelor Qtrs	15.6
		<u>29.0</u>

- Operating costs

Naval Legal Office	7.0	0 \$/M
Naval Air Station	51.8	0 \$/M / MPN
	21.0	Other
Human Resources Office - JAX	283.0	Admin.
	11.0	Other
Family Housing Budget	1,290.0	

- Maximum runway loading 117,000 (small aircraft only)
ramp load bearing capacity 470,000 lbs (exceeds runway capab.)

Key West (cont'd)

could increase
by 30-35%

- additional operational capacity could be realized by encouraging detachments to utilize facilities in other than winter months
- aircraft permanently stationed at Key West:

10 - F-18
11 - F-5 } through 2001

3 - UH-3 and 1 UC-12B

- Key West hosted 145 detachments during 1993 in sizes ranging from 1 aircraft to 54. Average utilization is 60-65%.

* to enhance the facility will need a Tactical Combat Training System that can monitor 100 high activity aircraft, 24 ships and 6 submarines

Other

- controls 165,000 square miles of unencumbered air space up to 70,000
- hosted 135 squadrons/units w/ 667 aircraft in 1993
- provides intermediate maint. support
- training areas are 3 miles north

Personnel

2072 military authorized 661 civilians



BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

MAYOR Shirley Freeman, District 3
Mayor Pro tem Jack London, District 2
Wilhelmina Harvey, District 1
Keith Douglass, District 4
Mary Kay Reich, District 5

Mayor Emeritus Wilhelmina Harvey
310 Fleming Street
Key West, Florida 33040



March 30, 1995

Please refer to the number
when responding 950331-3

The Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Va. 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon,

I am writing to express the appreciation of the people of Monroe County and the City of Key West for the opportunity to appear at the Regional BRAC hearing in Birmingham, Alabama.

In light of the intense schedule of the Commissioners and the need for other communities to make their cases to the BRAC Commission, I would like to suggest that Monroe County and the City of Key West forego the opportunity to make a formal presentation at the regional hearing.

As you know, the Secretary of Defense's recommendation for a limited realignment at NAS Key West will cause only a small reduction in the number of personnel assigned and will have a very modest economic impact on our region. The cost savings and efficiencies brought about by the realignment action are more than acceptable to our community and appear to be in the best interests of the American taxpayer.

Attached you will find a brief prepared statement in support of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation regarding NAS Key West. If you deem it appropriate, I would appreciate it if this statement could be included in the record of the regional hearing.

Should the Commission wish to have additional information or input from the community regarding any issue relating to NAS Key West, we would be pleased to respond promptly.

With best wishes to you and the other Commissioners, I am,

Sincerely,

Mayor Emeritus Wilhelmina Harvey
Mayor Emeritus Wilhelmina Harvey

Chairperson
Monroe County, Florida BRAC Commission



STATEMENT TO THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

April 4, 1995 - Birmingham, Alabama

Chairman and Commissioners,

It is a privilege to address this Commission on the important issue of military base closures and realignments. Your task is a difficult and a thankless one and yet it is essential that this task be done well in order to protect the interests of the American taxpayer and keep our national defense as lean and efficient as possible.

Surely the majority of presentations to the Commission will be from communities which are seeking to overturn the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense regarding proposed base closures or realignments. However, in this case, the County of Monroe and the City of Key West are pleased to support the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary's recommendation to realign Naval Air Station Key West is a sound one. It seeks to make more efficient the Navy's operations at NAS Key West and yet it reaffirms the importance of the naval facilities at Key West as a key facility which should remain in the inventory of military installations of the United States.

A brief look at "our" military base demonstrates the high military value which is resident in the facilities at Key West. The Naval Air Station has modern facilities to support the advanced combat training of pilots from all the U.S. military services as well as pilots from the military forces of key allies. It has the best air combat training airspace anywhere in terms of weather and unrestricted space. It has a deep water port and support facilities, facilities for underwater training, and Key West is a key part of counter-drug operations.

I could go on at length about the strategic location of Key West (close to Cuba and the Caribbean theater) and its tremendous military value. However, I believe that a letter which was sent recently to the Secretary of the Navy by three former Commanding Officers of Naval Air Station Key West articulates best the continued importance of NAS Key West to the defense of our country. The text of the letter follows:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As former commanding officers of Key West Naval Air Station (NAS), we are writing to ask you to support the position that Key West be retained as an active participant in implementing the Navy's mission into the next century.

As you know, the base has unique strategic value by virtue of its location in relation to Cuba, other Caribbean countries, South America, and the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico. Approximately sixty percent of our waterborne commerce passes through choke points between Cuba and the Florida Keys, or Cuba and the Yucatan Peninsula. Our nation has vigorously guarded these passages for nearly two centuries. Key West has, in the past, played a decisive role in this defense mission and should continue to do so in the future.

Another grave concern is the flow of drugs from South America into our nation. The role played by our Navy, the United States Coast Guard, the United States Air Force and other military units under the aegis of Commander JIATF (East), formerly JTF-4, has been successful in interdicting huge quantities of illicit drugs from entering the United States.

Many other benefits accrue from the location of NAS Key West: ideal flying conditions year round; 165,000 square miles of unencumbered air space (1400 square miles instrumented); ideal water conditions year round; the best shallow water anti-submarine warfare training site;

three long runways situated so civilian housing can NOT be built close to them or their approach flight paths; and the excellent weather, fine runways and airspace under total Navy control provide a near perfect environment for student pilots qualifying for carrier landings offshore from NAS Key West. Also, 6,750 feet of berthing space at a pier with a controlling depth of 30 feet; deep water located six miles from the pier, and substantial weapons storage availability offer great support capabilities. Additionally, since the base operating budget is only about \$25,000,000, exclusive of military salaries, it would seem that moving all the tenant facilities to other locations, or merely relocating some of them, would not be cost effective.

Quality of life in Key West is unsurpassed. Bachelor Quarters and 1,391 housing units are ready for immediate occupancy by military personnel and their families. Morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) facilities include marinas, RV parks, beaches, clubs, gyms, and a flying club. Unparalleled fishing and a civilian golf course are close at hand. Key West is blessed with a very low incidence of crime and citizens move about freely without fear for their well-being.

The climate contributes to the scheduling of training nearly 365 days in the year if desired. Support facilities for visiting squadrons are in place and available.

The desirability of joint interaction is a major objective of the Department of Defense. NAS Key West is an ideal location for such interservice cooperation. The following activities are tenant commands of the station: JIATF (East), CARIBROC - (C3 for USACOM in Caribbean area), NSGA and 23RD Intel Squadron, United States Coast Guard Group - Key West, USCG Cutters - Thetis and Mohawk, JFK Special Warfare Training Center, Naval Air Warfare Center Detachment (acoustic and non-acoustic ASW device testing and ship hull shock testing), NRL (corrosion and hull material testing), USDA Animal Import Quarantine Facility, Florida Air National Guard (Southeastern Sector Air Defense), VF 101 Det. (Fleet readiness Squadron Training - supports F-14 Detachments), VF 45, and Tactical Air Combat Training System (TACTS). The personnel of these activities represent the United States Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard.

Over 230 aviation detachments, 125 ships and special operations units of Navy Seals, Marines, and Army Special Forces are hosted by the station annually.

NAS Key West is a good neighbor to the community, giving it economic stability (it is the second largest employer in Monroe County - second only to the County itself), employees for its work force, students for its public schools, and volunteers for its many charitable non-profit organizations. In return, there is a long history of strong support for the armed forces by the community and its leaders.

It can be readily seen that NAS Key West enjoys a unique combination of location, climate, mission capability, joint armed forces relationships, quality of life, and neighborly cooperation. For these reasons and many more, it should be a top priority for retention on the roll of active naval facilities.

Respectfully,

Thomas W. Brown
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret)

William J. Denning
Captain, U. S. Navy (Ret)


Michael P. Currie
Captain, U. S. Navy (Ret)

In closing, allow me to express again the views of the vast majority of people of Monroe County and Key West. We love the Navy and its dedicated personnel -- both military and civilian. We appreciate their presence and they will always be welcome in our community. We are proud to support the important missions of this important military base. We are pleased that the Navy Department and the Secretary of Defense have reaffirmed the importance of the naval and joint military facilities at Key West.

We urge the Commission to endorse the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense with respect to Key West.

Thank you,

Wilhelmina G. Harvey *West*



DRAFT

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
Base Summary Sheet**

**Naval Air Facility
Detroit, Michigan**

INSTALLATION MISSION

RECOMMENDATION:

- **The Navy wants to relocate the center to Selfridge, Michigan. This is a redirect of a 1993 recommendation**

JUSTIFICATION

The Navy wants to save money on the costs of moving to Minn.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

The Navy wants to stay in the Detroit area where they believe recruiting is good

COST CONSIDERATIONS

- One-Time Cost: \$ 0 million
- Net Costs and Savings During Implementation: \$9.4 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$0 million
- Break-Even Year: Immediate
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: \$9.3 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions			
Realignments			
Total			

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

DRAFT

DRAFT

No changes
REPRESENTATION

Senators: Levin and Abraham

Representative: Levin
MILITARY ISSUES

- **Will maintain a recruiting presence in the Detroit area**

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss:
- MSA Job Base:
- Percentage:
- Cumulative Economic Impact (year-year):

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

-

D.L.Reedy Navy03/10/95 7:06 PM

Detroit MCAS

- No Civil Service workforce involved
- * - Changing the receiving site from Twin Cities, Minn to Selfridge, Mich will avoid the cost of moving to Minn
Will save \$9.4 m. (8.3 mil con + .5 moving expense + .7 unique savings)
- BOS costs for 1996 are \$206.2 m (utilities = \$77.5) (Transp. \$19.7m)
- * - Selfridge Air National Guard Base is 30 miles away
- mission of the Hq and Svc Co. 1st Bn, 24th Marines is to ensure:
 - combat readiness of reserves
 - technical assistance
 - public Affairs / community relations
- Units = Headquarters 1st Bn 234 assigned
 - Mobilization Sta. 10 "
 - Recruiters 2 "
- * - average age of all buildings / facilities is 64 years (mostly admin and storage)
- will cost 100K to upgrade 20K is programmed
- * - the current building was built in 1930 and has been nominated for the register of National Historical Sites
(could be costly to maintain i.e. preserve, could be expensive)
- * - Does selfridge have space available?
- * - 47% of employees live within 25 miles of Selfridge
(26% live within 5 miles of Detroit)
- * - crime rate is high

robberies	1756, 1518, 1451
Assaults	3580, 4437, 4369
Veh larceny	833, 1011, 810
Narcotics	4983, 4635, 4915
Deaths	489, 503, 464

Detroit

Navy	23
* - Reserve manning is 23 through 2001	23
- ^{Reserve} MC billets are 230 through 2001	210
- FTS 11 through 2001	11
- USMC 12 " "	12
- HQ Co. USMC 233 " 2001	233
- MC stab mobilization station 10 through 2001	10
- I Staff 24 through 2001	24
	<hr/>
Total	323

- Note * c/be right decision for the wrong reason
(avg age 64 - historic preservation)
1. maint. costs will increase with little flexibility in use
 2. high crime rate area
 3. 49% of troop live near Selfridge

- Navy cites cost avoidance ~~of~~ for MilCon as their reason for selecting Selfridge -



ROI Summary Air Station Wrap-Up

29 Dec 94

Scenario	One-Time Costs	One-Time Savings	Steady-State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
✓ Close NAS Adak	\$9.4	\$0	-\$26.2	1997 (Immed)	-\$357.0
✓ Close NAS South Weymouth	\$16.2	\$0.3	-\$25.1	2001 (1 Yr)	-\$289.1
✓ Realign NAS Key West	\$0.7	\$0	-\$3.2	1997 (Immed)	-\$45.3
Redirect NAS Agana (Anderson AFB)	\$41.7	\$181.1	-\$21.9	1997 (Immed)	-\$423.1
Redirect MCAS El Toro (HMT & H-53)	\$3.9	\$11.2	-\$4.0	1996 (Immed)	-\$67.0
Redirect Cecil Field F/A-18s (to Atlanta, Oceana & Beaufort)	\$42.7	\$332.3	-\$14.6	1997 (Immed)	-\$488.1
Redirect Cecil S-3s	\$33.8	\$17.5	\$2.9	Never	+\$56.0
Redirect Miramar Navy (to North Island & Oceana)	\$86.1	\$356.7	-\$2.9	1997 (Immed)	-\$291.1
✓ Redirect NAF Detroit (from Twin Cities to Selfridge)	\$0	\$9.4	\$0	1996 (Immed)	-\$9.3
Redirect NAS Barbers Point (PWC and landfill, MWR)	\$0	\$16.9	-\$0.1	1996 (Immed)	-\$18.5

All Dollars shown in Millions

2091 2

(Encl 2)

Encl (2)

Operational Air Stations ^{Support.}

Adak, Alaska and Key West

- the principal measure of capacity is defined as hangar space, line space, admin. space, and maintenance space to house one squadron

- a squadron of shore based aircraft such as P-3's, or a large compliment of officers would require more space than F-18's with a smaller compliment of aircraft and personnel (type II hangar for large aircraft)

can't compare
units
shore to sea

- When measured as a part of Total Force capacity, both operational air stations and reserve air stations The number of available squadrons in FY 2001's force structure will exceed capacity by 22 percent.

- military value for operational air stations received more weight than the reserve forces
military assessment: (airspace, ranges, facilities, infrastructure
other areas: encroachment, environment, maintenance, base loading. (scores = 30 + 83 out of 95)

Adak - Adak scored very low due largely to the lack of training areas and facilities. ~~Adak~~ no longer supports operational aviation units. The Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires these facilities to support its aircraft.

2.

- the configuration analysis is that the average military value of all air stations left open must be equal to the average military value of all stations considered. (Introduction of aircraft types not currently stationed there is not allowed)

- The BSEC used the configuration analysis as a starting point for scenario development

Weymouth

- While the COBRA analysis on the closure of NAS Brunswick showed a reasonable return on investment, the BSEC considered the operational requirement expressed by CINCLANTFLT for a fully-capable operational air station north of Norfolk. In order to reduce excess capacity while preserving the operational capability of Brunswick, the BSEC investigated the feasibility of closing Weymouth. Brunswick was considered to be more capable because of its dual 8000' foot runways; more extensive infrastructure; flight operations not constrained by civilian air traffic. In addition, its geographical proximity to maritime patrol areas that can support active and reserve training Brunswick could absorb (has capacity) to absorb reserve mission at Weymouth without an adverse effect on recruiting. (In this way capacity was reduced and maximum flexibility was maintained)

traffic
Air density?



Key West

Because of the continued requirement for a robust training capability on the east coast, due in part to the realignment of the aviation force basing, Key West was converted to a Naval Air Facility. The conversion avoids the loss of a training asset (urged by (CINCLANTFLT) and reduces operational costs through consolidation of services and excessing of under-utilized assets.

- * What is the future role of the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission?
- * Is the ^(need) ~~(threat)~~ for submarine surveillance greater in the North Atlantic or in the Caribbean basin?
- * What are the maritime patrol areas for the east coast?
- * What is the traffic density now in Weymouth ~~and~~ (incl. civilian) and Brunswick, and what figures were used to justify Weymouth?
- * What ~~is~~ the ^{daily weather} average ~~a~~ condition found at Brunswick and Weymouth (density altitude, IFR/VFR days each year) and computed distance needed for DC-9s to take off and land?
- * According to the data call submissions how much capacity existed at Weymouth and Brunswick? Was the means of measurement comparable? (ie. Type II hangar space vs type I)
- * What is the difference between an air station and an air facility?
- * How big is the area that is calculated in economic impact ie. on employment?

Adak

- NAF Adak is an attainment ~~area~~ area for CO, ozone, and PM-10, by removing the facility, a source of ozone will be removed, thus having made an improvement in ~~of~~ air quality. There are few other sources of air emission problems in the area. It will cost \$9.4m to close the facility, net savings will be \$108 million. An immediate return on investment is expected. Net value of savings over 20 years is \$354.8m.

Key West

Relocation air station to air facility, and dispose of piers, wharfs and buildings in the Truman Annex and Trumbo Point. (An effort to reduce excess capacity) Can retain access to airspace and training ranges by maintaining a smaller facility. Basically, disposes of waterfront assets, but retains ranges. Cost to downsize is \$.4m. Net savings during implementation is \$8.2m. Annual recurring savings is \$1.8m. Over 20 years it is \$25.5m. Reduction of 26 jobs over 1996-01 in Monroe County, Fla. 0.1% of area employment.

Reserve air stations

Weymouth

- due to a similarity of missions, the same capacity data call was used to evaluate active and reserve air stations.
- the principal measure of capacity was hangar and line space. The method was refined for 1995 to focus on "squadron module" as the primary measure. The amount of space required for a module varies based on the number and type of airplanes. The data call distinguished between hangar types.
- military value includes, contingency, mobilization, future force requirements, condition and availability of land, facilities and airspace, training ranges, and quality of life.
- the scores for six reserve air stations ranged between 51.11 and 65 out of a possible 97. All air (reserve) stations with the exception of Atlanta were ranked. Atlanta was excluded because of its recruiting considerations.

- Configuration analysis allowed for only one admin squadron per base (C-9 or C-130). Except for two in Washington, D.C. Only Navy hangars were considered (Coast Guard, customs, Coast Guard). Didn't include Navy T&E facilities or non-DDD activities.

The first solution closed Atlanta and kept the other five stations open. The second solution kept all six stations open. The results were driven by Type II hangar requirements. COBRA analysis scenarios revealed that alternative receiving sites were limited because of poor reserve demographics. Atlanta was rich because it is an airline hub and because of 1993 Marine reserve ^{air station} closures in 1993. NAS Atlanta is a tenant at Dobbins Air Reserve Base. Dobbins was used in the 1993 BRAC as a receiving site for reserve assets.


Detroit

Naval air facility

Change the receiving site of the 1993 BRAC (P. 1-25) ~~from~~ ^{from} the Mt Clemens, Mich (MC reserve center) ~~center~~ center at Twin Cities, Minn. to Selfridge, Mich. Will avoid the cost of moving to Minn. and maintain a presence in Michigan. There are no one-time costs involved. Will initially save \$9.4 m. and over 20 years will be \$9.3 m.

Causes no employment changes in the area. By moving to a Guard facility, the unit will be able to remain in the area.

Reserve Air Station Configuration Model Specifications



Laydown Outside the Model

- Reserve squadrons at DON T & E facilities
- Reserve squadrons at non-DON activities

Not considered

Model Output Measures

- Air stations open or closed

Generation of Alternatives

Model allows the generation of three solution sets

- Best solution-for a given set of constraints and data
- Next best-obtained by excluding the first solution
- Third best-obtained by excluding the first two solutions


419 Squadron Modules
50
52

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analyses can accommodate

- Future potential force level changes
- Reserve-Active station interaction
- Check feasibility of solution

RESERVE AIR STATIONS



Air Station Characteristics

<u>Station</u>	<u>Type I</u>	<u>Type II</u>	<u>MILVAL</u>	
South Weymouth	0	3	62.0	(5)
Willow Grove	2	4	64.7	(2)
Washington, DC	8	2	65.1	(1)
Atlanta	1	3	50.4	(6)
New Orleans	2	3	62.7	(5.4)
Fort Worth	3	2	62.7	(5.4)

Aircraft Squadron Characteristics

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MODULE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MODULE</u>
F-14	I	✓C-9	II
EA-6	I	✓C-130	II
FA-18	I	C-20	I
AV-8	I	H-1	I
E-2	I	H-46 (USMCR)	I
✓P-3	II	H-53 (USMCR)	I
HS	I	H-53 (USNR)	I
HSL	I		

- All reserve squadrons receive 100% in port factor

Initial Reserve Model Output

- 5 stations remain open
- 1 station closed (Atlanta)
- Initial average military value: 61.1
- Final average military value: 63.7
- 4 excess squadron modules retained by model ✓

Secondary Reserve Model Output

- 6 stations remain open
- No station closed
- Initial average military value: 61.1
- Final average military value: 61.1
- 8 excess squadron modules retained by model
- Tertiary solution is identical to second solution.

Check on →
- Navy responses to "will provide"s at hearings

- module criteria, type II requires large hangars (P-3, C-9, C-130)
 - ^{Why} did Navy ^{not} consider squadrons that are tenants on other ^{than Navy} bases?
 - what will the force size be in squadrons? Bottom-up review?
 - Washington considered in run/skew results?
 - Why not consider T&E (Navy) - how much is there? How about reserve squadrons at NON-DoD activities? How much?
- Initial run - Atlanta (closed) (4 excess squadrons)
 Second run - no stations closed (8 excess squadrons)
- ^{Why} Did the Navy leave ~~Atlanta~~ ^{Atlanta} open even though Military value was low?

* Hearings, stated closing Weymouth not based on Atlanta, based on pop. near Brest and Brunswick capabilities

Process

- Budget decline, infrastructure not keeping pace, need more cuts
 - 1) - data call - identify capacity (based on 2001 force)
 - 2) - military value (not quant) - four criteria
 - 3) (BSEC start) - configuration analysis - optimum solution (avg mil value of all left open must be equal to avg value of all considered)
 - 4) - scenario development -
- What are NAVFAC P-80 standard measures?

Brunswick	Scenario #	1-01-0001-004	- LANFELT	COBRA - Brunswick
Weymouth	" #	1-01-0022-103	- RESFOR	" - SOWEY

- principal measure of capacity is:

principal measure $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{hangar space} \\ - \text{line space} \\ - \text{admin. space} \\ - \text{maint. space} \end{array} \right\}$ to house one squadron



DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION Base Summary Sheet

NAVAL AIR STATION, SOUTH WEYMOUTH South Weymouth , Massachusetts

INSTALLATION MISSION

- To provide facilities and services in support of aviation activities of the Naval Reserve and other activities as directed. Home field for a squadron of reserve C-130's and H-1's.

RECOMMENDATION:

- Close NAS South Weymouth and relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to NAS Brunswick, Maine.
- Relocate the Marine Corps Reserve support squadrons to another facility in the local area or to NAS Brunswick.
- Reestablish Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, and change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission.

JUSTIFICATION

- Current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in force levels and thus there is additional excess capacity that must be eliminated.
- Satisfaction of these needs both to further reduce excess capacity and to honor CINCLANTFLT's operational imperative can best be accomplished by the retention of the most fully capable air station in this geographic area, NAS Brunswick, Maine in lieu of the reserve air station at South Weymouth.
- The consolidation of several reserve centers at the Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, provides demographics consideration for surface reserve assets.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

-

COST CONSIDERATIONS

- | | |
|--|------------------|
| • One-Time Cost: | \$ 17.3 million |
| • Net Costs and Savings During Implementation: | \$ 50.8 million |
| • Annual Recurring Savings: | \$ 27.4 million |
| • Break-Even Year: | 1 year |
| • Net Present Value Over 20 Years: | \$ 315.2 million |

DRAFT

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS

Military Civilian Students

Baseline

Reductions
Realignments
Total

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- NAS Brunswick is in an area that is in attainment for CO and PM-10 but is in moderate non-attainment for ozone, which may require a conformity determination to evaluate air quality impacts.
- Water supply and wastewater treatment services are provided to NAS Brunswick from off-base and are not limited by capacity.

REPRESENTATION

Senators: Kennedy
 Kerry
Representative: Studds
Governor: Weld

SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

MILITARY ISSUES

-

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 1443 jobs (936 direct and 507 indirect)
- [City] MSA Job Base: x jobs
- Percentage: 0.1 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1994-2001): 0.1 percent decrease

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

-

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AIR STATION, SOUTH WEYMOUTH

April 28, 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Josue (Joe) Robles, Jr.

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

None.

COMMISSION STAFF:

Doyle L. Reedy

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Lt. Gov. Argeo Cellucci
Senator Ted Kennedy
Senator John Kerry
Maj. Gen. Raymond Vezina

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

- The air station trains reservists for their mobilization assignments with the active forces, and provides administrative coordination and logistic support for the tenant reserve squadrons and commands.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Close NAS, South Weymouth. Decommission ten P-3 aircraft, and relocate four C-130 airplanes to NAS Brunswick. In the event that the P-3 squadron is not decommissioned, the squadron will be sent to NAS Brunswick.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- The current Force Structure Plan shows a declining force level including a reduction in the overall number of Naval aviation carrier air wings from 11 to 10. Similarly, the number of P-3 squadrons is declining. In an effort to take advantage of existing capacity at an active duty

base, the Navy wants to relocate the Reserve aircraft at South Weymouth to the active duty base at Brunswick, Me.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- The Commissioner visited all of the base facilities including VP-92, VR-62 and the Marine Support Element.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- Although the Navy ranked South Weymouth as fourth in military value out of six reserve air stations considered by the BSAT, the Navy recommended closing only South Weymouth.
- The Navy has provide little documentation to support it's position that South Weymouth should be closed.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- The Navy analysis was flawed and deviated from established policy. Specifically, the community believes that there were two breakdowns in the Navy BRAC analytic process: the comparison of unlike facilities mid-way through the process, and the lack of documentation available on the decision.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- None.

DRAFT

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUMMARY SHEET

NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS

INSTALLATION MISSION

- Air station provides a training base for reservists and support for Naval operational aircraft stationed at Weymouth, and base services for transient aircraft.

DOD RECOMMENDATION

- Close Naval Air Station, South Weymouth. Decommission ten P-3 aircraft, and relocate four C-130 airplanes to Brunswick. In the event that the P-3 squadron is not decommissioned, the squadron will be sent to Brunswick.

DOD JUSTIFICATION

- The current Force Structure Plan shows a declining force level including a reduction in the overall number of Naval aviation carrier air wings from 11 to 10. Similarly, the number of P-3 squadrons is declining. In an effort to take advantage of existing capacity at an active duty base, the Navy wants to relocate the remaining C-130s at Weymouth to Brunswick as the P-3s are being decommissioned.

COST CONSIDERATIONS DEVELOPED BY DOD

- One-Time Cost: \$ 17.3 million
- Net Savings During Implementation: \$ 50.8 million
- Annual Recurring Savings: \$ 27.4 million
- Break-Even Year: 1 year
- Net Present Value Over 20 Years: \$ 315.2 million

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION (EXCLUDES CONTRACTORS)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Students</u>
Baseline			
Reductions	380	189	0
Realignments	311	21	0
Total	691	210	0

DRAFT

MANPOWER IMPLICATIONS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING THIS INSTALLATION (INCLUDES ON-BASE CONTRACTORS AND STUDENTS)

Out		In		Net Gain (Loss)	
<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
691	210	0	0	(691)	(210)

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Weymouth is next to designated wetlands and cannot expand. In addition, the base has been cited as a non-attainment area which may require a conformity determination to evaluate the impact of continued aviation operations. Fuel storage is rated as C-4 (inadequate) due to environmental and storage constraints.

REPRESENTATION

Governor: William F. Weld
Senators: Edward M. Kennedy
 John F. Kerry
Representative: Gerry E. Studds

ECONOMIC IMPACT

- Potential Employment Loss: 1443 jobs (936 direct and 507 indirect)
- South Weymouth, MSA Job Base: Greater than 2 million
- Percentage: 0.1 percent decrease
- Cumulative Economic Impact (1994-2001): 0.1 percent decrease

MILITARY ISSUES

- Navy considerations were based on the total force concept.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS/ISSUES

- Weymouth supporters are concerned about the decision to close Weymouth rather than the air station in Atlanta which received a lower military value rating.

ITEMS OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

- In preparing its list of recommended closings the Navy initially considered closing down Brunswick as an active duty base. However, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet said he wanted to keep open a fully capable base in the northeast and that left South Weymouth going head-to-head with Brunswick.

D.L. Reedy/Navy/04/07/95 3:45 PM

DRAFT

RESERVE NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS

INSTALLATION REVIEW

Mission

- Air Station provides a mobilization point and a training center for reservists.

Location

- South of Boston, MA.

Background

- The 1993 BRAC rejected the Navy's proposal to close South Weymouth and relocate its assets to three other locations. The Commission rejected the proposal on the grounds that information provided by the Navy inflated savings and deflated costs in favor of the Navy's recommendation. The current Navy proposal is to relocate the reserve units to Brunswick, ME, a distance of about 150 miles in order to make better use of the unused space at an active duty base with the northeastern region. The Navy proposes to close the facility at South Weymouth.

Considerations

- According to the Navy, Brunswick Naval Air Station is a significantly more capable air station than South Weymouth. In addition to hangar space, Brunswick, a 3221 acre active duty base 120 miles north of Boston, has several features that surpass those of the South Weymouth reserve base: two parallel runways, a NATO sponsored intelligence center, and a \$67 million P-3 Orion flight simulator. With virtually unhindered air space in which to fly, Brunswick flight training can be conducted around the clock. In addition, the Navy believed it would be more difficult for South Weymouth to accommodate Brunswick's four active duty squadrons, with a total of 36 planes, or its reserve ground battalion squadron and special projects squadron with three planes. South Weymouth straddles three towns, is smaller, and serves reservists, who train primarily on weekends.

Base Comparisons

- See attached from the Boston Patriot Ledger dated March 23, 1995 comparing the two bases. Conversations with the Public Affairs Officer at Brunswick disclose that the two bases generally agreed with the data as it is presented, and in fact the author received assistance from Navy personnel in making the comparison.

DRAFT

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 8 NOVEMBER 1994

The auditors are still reviewing the data for air stations, so these numbers could change slightly.

9. Mr. Nance presented a draft approach for Reserve Air Station (RAS) Configuration Analysis which is based on the same capacity analysis methodology approved by the BSEC for NAS/MCAS. The configuration analysis approach is similar to that for NAS/MCAS except as noted below.

a. The C-20 squadrons were placed at NAS Washington to support senior DoN officials located there.

b. Five of the RAS are joint facilities. The analysis excludes hangar space belonging to other Military Departments and DoN hangar space occupied by other Military Departments.

c. The analysis also excludes squadrons located at DoN Testing and Evaluation facilities and non-DoN activities.

d. Only one C-9 and one C-130 squadron can be placed at any one station. Since these are used and scheduled by the CINCs, they should not all be located at one location.

e. As with NAS/MCAS, NAS Washington was given credit for two type II modules because it presently hangars two type II aircraft squadron modules though it does not meet NAVFAC type II hangar standards.

See enclosure (3). The output of the model will be three alternatives which close bases so as to reduce excess squadron modules. The BSEC concurred with the model parameters and rules.

10. Mr. Nance briefed the BSEC on the results produced by the model for RAS. See enclosure (3). The model produced the following solutions:

a. Initial Solution. The model's first solution would close one RAS (Atlanta) to reduce excess to 4 squadron modules. Average military value would increase to 63.7.

b. Second and Third Solutions. The model's second and third solutions would close no RAS.

Captain Nordeen, Colonel Stockwell, Captain Vandivort, Captain Rose, Captain Ferguson, Commander Souders, Commander Heckelman, Mr. Nance, and Lieutenant Commander Leinberry departed the deliberations.

11. The BSEC decided that decisions regarding NAS/MCAS may affect decisions regarding RAS. Consequently, the BSEC decided to delay

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 21 FEBRUARY 1995

Island, and Cherry Point), with the lowest four bases maintaining the same ranking (Roosevelt Roads, El Centro, Key West, and Adak). Beaufort decreased 1.63 due to the existence of unusual flight patterns (Question 45) and Brunswick decreased 1.49 because DoD did not manage the airspace (Question 12). NAS Adak (the only closure recommendation) and Key West (NAF recommendation) remained at the bottom of the rankings. The BSEC accepted the data revisions as presented.

14. Captain Nordeen briefed data revisions to the Reserve Naval Air Station Military Value Analysis. See enclosure (11). A Naval Audit Service check of Military Value scores resulted in 15 revisions (1.87% out 804 questions (100% review)). One base maintained the same score (Willow Grove (64.36)); 3 bases gained in military value (New Orleans had the largest gain (1.64)); and two bases decreased in military value (Fort Worth had the largest loss (2.12)). Washington maintained its top ranking (65.16) and Atlanta maintained its bottom ranking (51.14). The BSEC accepted the data revisions as presented.

15. Commander Heckelman briefed data revisions to the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) Military Value Analysis. See enclosure (12). Certified data call revisions resulted in three changes to military value matrix scoring. The Naval Audit Service review identified one error in the data call response which resulted in a revision and two changes to military value matrix scoring. There were no changes in military value rankings. No systemic problems were found to exist in the FISC Military Value Analysis. Specific FISC military value changes are reflected in enclosure (12). Commander Heckelman then briefed a revision to the FISC Capacity Analysis. See enclosure (13). The capacity measures included capacity and requirements. Capacity is the historic "high water mark" in 4 areas from the capacity data call: requisition volume; contracts; fuel; and workyears. Requirement is a direct lift from activity projections in the capacity data call. The Capacity Analysis Summary reflected that excess capacity existed in all 4 areas of the data call. Commander Heckelman noted that an error had been found in the capacity calculation for contracts. The corrected percentage of excess capacity in contracts was 35%. The previously made decision to proceed with military value analysis is still valid.

16. Captain Nordeen, Captain Rose, Captain Ferguson, Commander Heckelman, Commander Souders, and Lieutenant Commander Leinberry departed the deliberative session. Captain Bryan Eubank, USN, Captain Martha Hills, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Steve Bertolaccini, CEC, USN, entered the deliberative session.

17. Lieutenant Commander Bertolaccini clarified for the deliberative record previous BSEC directions concerning Training

Subj: REPORT OF DELIBERATIONS ON 29 NOVEMBER 1994

after FY 1997. Subsequent to that decision CINCPACFLT determined the need to keep a cadre of submarines in San Diego. PACFLT is actively pursuing funding and personnel resources for SUBASE San Diego through the established program review process; however, the initiative to retain a presence at SUBASE San Diego will not be resolved until June 1995. CINCPACFLT expressed his concern that the resource data provided in the data call response could be interpreted to suggest that SUBASE San Diego is already planned for closure by CINCPACFLT, and could result in a double cut in funding and personnel, once to PR-95 and again when budgets are put together based on COBRA derived savings expectations. CINCPACFLT further provided that since the program review decision will not be made until June 1995, any BRAC-95 scenario to close SUBASE San Diego should assume funding will be restored to operate the base until closure. The BSEC decided that its decisions could not be made on the basis of unexecuted budget assumptions. Accordingly, the BSEC decided that the costs associated with relocating the operational units should not be borne by BRAC since SUBASE San Diego was essentially closed outside the BRAC process.

13. Mr. Wennergren briefed the results of the COBRA analysis for the closing of NAS Atlanta. See enclosure (10). The following scenarios were reviewed.

a. Close NAS Atlanta, move C-9 squadrons to South Weymouth and H-1 squadron to MCAS, New River. The analysis reflected one-time costs of \$57.5 million and a return on investment in one year. The scenario resulted in the elimination of 508 billets/positions and the movement of 406. The analysis included a \$6.5 million military construction cost for a Naval Air Reserve Center (NARCEN) at Dobbins Air Force Base. The BSAT advised that the NARCEN would serve the approximate 800 air related reserve billets remaining in the demographically productive Atlanta area. Mr. Wennergren advised that \$50,000 in costs for taking down display aircraft and shipping them to NAS Pensacola had been disallowed. Regarding the move to MCAS New River, the analysis reflected military construction (new requirements) costs of \$30.7 million, with the construction of a Reserve Center (\$9.2 million), Maintenance/Hangar Type 1 (\$6.9 million), and Family Housing (\$4.9 million) constituting the major costs. The BSAT advised the BSEC that there was concern that MCAS New River could not demographically support the Reserve units being moved there. The data reflected that only 69.6% of the Marine Corps Reserve unit billets in the New River area are currently filled. Should the Marine Corp Reserve units from Atlanta be moved to New River, the estimated annual shortfall is 260 drilling reservists. The Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, considers the movement of the Marine Corps Reserve units at NAS Atlanta to MCAS New River to be demographically insupportable. The BSAT advised the BSEC that the Reserve Force considered Jacksonville to be demographically capable

Subj: REPORT OF DELIBERATIONS ON 29 NOVEMBER 1994


of supporting the squadrons. The BSEC discussed the high military construction costs and the demographic issues involved in a move to MCAS New River. The BSEC then discussed the moving of the C-9 squadrons to South Weymouth. The move required new military construction costs of \$2.5 million for a runway extension to accommodate C-9 operations under adverse conditions and the building of a new training building. Upon discussing the above the BSEC directed the BSAT to run another scenario which closed NAS Atlanta, moved the C-9 squadron to NAS Brunswick, and moved the H-1 squadron to Naval Station Mayport.

b. The BSEC then reviewed the analysis of the scenario, Close NAS Atlanta, C-9s to Dobbins AFB, and H-1 to MCAS New River. In discussing this scenario the BSEC noted the low military construction costs involved in moving the C-9s to Dobbins Air Force Base, and its remaining in the Atlanta demographic area.

c. The BSEC then reviewed the analysis of the scenario, Close NAS Atlanta, C-9s to New Orleans, and H-1 to MCAS New River. In its discussion, the BSEC noted the high military construction costs (\$13.2 million) involved in moving the C-9s to NAS New Orleans.

Upon discussion, the BSEC directed that a scenario be run which sends the C-9s to Dobbins AFB and relocates the H-1 squadron to Naval Station Mayport.

14. The meeting adjourned at 1500.


RICHARD R. OZMUN
CAPT. JAGC, USN
Recording Secretary

BSAT - Vandivort 681-0485

✓ Eric-Adak

1. Demographics
2. Scenario 97

Purser re: Robles to Weymouth

Base Comparison

Favor

Weymouth

Favor

Brunswick

Cannot expand (wetlands) ✓

has capacity for 2 squadrons

~~can~~ can not accommodate C-5 ✓

only one runway can accom. 141 ✓

congested air traffic pattern

airfield (runway minimums)

Fuel storage inadequate (1 mill.) ✓

✓ Admin. capacity

Can expand

has capac. for 2 squadrons (60,000 ft ramp space)

✓ can accommodate C-5

✓ ~~two~~ runways avail.

✓ not congested

✓ (runway minimums)

No admin. capacity (500k needed)
(no million planned)

may need hangar

LOCATION - congested area /

FACILITY - older vs. newer / runway capability /

ENVIRONMENT - contamination / wetlands / attainment

QUALITY OF LIFE - cost of living /

neither site has advantage of close proximity to training area

- military assessment:
 - airspace
 - ranges
 - facility
 - infrastructure
 - other (encroachment/environment)
 - maintenance, base loading
 - (only one admin. squadron per base for CINCS)
- military value includes:
 - contingency
 - mobilization
 - future force requirements
 - condition and availability of facility and airspace
 - quality of life

Weymouth - Parking at Weymouth can accommodate two (9 plane) Squadrons and one C-130 squadrons + 14 helicopters (taxiway aprons not included in projections) No additional construction for parking has been submitted. Could construct a 66,500 apron for P-3 aircraft for a cost of \$3.7 million. Parking areas could be expanded by 50%. MCNR project P-450 to extend an overrun area on Runway 17/35 to lengthen runway to 8000'

Doit have an aircraft acoustical enclosure - not programmed

Weymouth - NAS

- excell. reserve demographics SERRES 99.7 off. ent. 88

Background * air station is a mobilization point for reservists assigned to train at the facility

- records not kept on numbers of sorties flown in 1993

* - flight training area is 75 nm. from airfield (~~to the east~~)

* - 350 NM to Warren Grove Range, N.J. (air-to-ground ordnance)

* - next to designated wetlands, cannot expand

* - no space is classified as inadequate C-3 or C-4

* - simulators not available :

weapons System	- Brunswick
Flight - P-3	- Jacksonville
C-130	- Cherry Point

- approx. 3% of sorties are cancelled due to weather

Capacity (+) * hangar space exists for two additional squadrons
* land exists for two additional hangars

- runway are 6 and 7000 ft. 150-200 ft wide

- can support C-5 and C-141^s - C-5 cannot take off at maximum

* Wt load of 796,000 lbs can take off at 600,000

* C141 weight of 344,000 can only be used on one runway

* practice GCA approaches ^{to runway 17} are limited, are limited due to close proximity ~~to~~ ^{of} Logan airport, Boston ¹⁷ nm.

- flight activity data includes Gen. Aviation flights

- can accommodate 12 inst. app. per hour and 60 VFR

* - closest airway is 6.5 nm. surrounded by low altitude runways, approach to runway 4 at Logan comes within 8 nm of Weymouth. There are 5 GA airports within a 20 nm. radius.

* - would have to install centerline lighting to be able to lower

landing minimums (Also 333 ft obstruction within 1.7 mile of Rwy 35)

What do flights stay within 20 nm radius?

Weymouth cont'd

- * - difficult to expand because of AICUZ restrictions due to proximity of commercial and residential areas (can't lengthen runway)

Personnel -

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1991</u>	Helicopter Sq. began in 1994 62 auth, 67 actual
Auth	283	283	328	
Actual	<u>252</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>230</u>	Logistics Sq. 51 and 60
	-31	-36	-98	

* Auth pos. as of Sep 1994 81 officer / 768 enlisted / 261 / civ / 2400 Reserves

- * - one unit that flies C-95 is in the process of relocating from Selfridge

air ft -

	<u>Current Aircraft</u>	<u>Could be parked</u> (using NAVFAC P-80 standard measures)
→ P-3	10	18 +8
mixed H-1	7	14 +7
C-12	1	
- C-130	4	8 +4

- * - current parking arrangements could accommodate two P-3 squadrons and one C-130 squadron 14 helicopters could be accommodated

* could build a 66,500 SF apron (for P-3's) at a cost of \$3.7 million

- * parking areas could be expanded by 50% before expansion would be a limiting factor. Proposal is to extend the overrun area on rwy 17/35 to 8,000 ft.

* one additional maint. hangar could be constructed at a cost of \$7 million

* both hangars could hold two P-3's and one C-130 at once

Waymouth cont'd

Environmental - * fuel storage is rated C-4 inadequate due to ^{environmental and} storage constraints

- FY1998 planned fuel mgmt. complex is scheduled for \$ 855.0

Other Facilities

* Medical and Communications are rated C-3 (substandard) because of size and age. (medical project is \$600k (unprogrammed))

* - maint. costs have increased by over 100% while the value of real property has increased by 50%.

Not keeping pace w/ investment

	<u>Maint. Cost</u>	<u>Value</u>
FY1985	1.2	181.0
FY1996	2.8	290.0

* costs have outpaced appreciation

Question How much has been invested in const. during the period 1985-1996? (return on investment ratio?)

<u>Costs</u>	1996	Base operating costs (000's)
		\$ 2046
		60
		1.121
		.418
		6.850 (labor mostly at \$5.067)
		other
		\$ 12.769
		Annual costs to operate

Weymouth cont'd

Other costs cont'd

Ordinance Maint Co. for FY96

Utilities \$6.588

Transp. 1.952

Admin. 1.952 (?)

Other 7.686

\$18,178

Other

- the base has 88 acres of wetlands

* - base has been cited for low levels of VOCs, ozone base is in a ~~non-attainment~~ non-attain^{ment} area

* - environmental clean-up could cost close to \$1 million

* - to clean up asbestos will cost \$4.5 million

* - recurring environmental costs (operating costs) are \$500,000 for FY96

Cong Studds

Mark Michaud (202) 225-3111

Paul Haley

2830

were key in their analysis of the ATCOM and other leases. The conclusion reached was that affected operational efficiencies would be optimized through the ATCOM realignment. Also, Army officials indicated that consideration regarding the ability of the receiving installation to accommodate ATCOM (availability and condition of land and facilities) at both the existing and potential receiving locations was also necessary in reaching the decision that this lease could be vacated. Data regarding the ability to expand, and costs at the receiving and losing locations, was also available for consideration.

The Army's COBRA analysis did not take into consideration costs to GSA in this realignment proposal; however, the precise cost to the government is not clear given the uncertainty over future use of the vacated space. Also, see our response to question 6 under the Army portion of these Q&As.

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN GERRY E. STUDDS

Questions 1 and 2: In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy has apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value," according to the Navy's own criteria. In the case of NAS Atlanta--which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure--the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value matrix for reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.

GAD Report
In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when "a base recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value--particularly in the case of South Weymouth--as a problem in its decision-making process?

Answer: The goal of the Navy's 1995 BRAC process, as in the 1993 round, was to reduce excess capacity and maintain average military value across each subcategory of activity. This approach gave rise to instances where activities with higher military value were recommended for closure over activities with lower military value in their respective subcategories. The recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth is such an example.

The Navy's military value analysis is the second step in what is, essentially, a four step process: (1) capacity analysis, (2) military value analysis, (3) configuration analysis, and (4) the derivation and assessment of BRAC alternatives/scenarios. The

determination of relative military values for each activity in a subcategory was not the sole determinant for closing activities. The results of capacity and military value analyses were used in a configuration analysis to identify potential BRAC actions.

In the case of reserve air stations, the Navy's configuration analysis indicated the possibility of closing NAS Atlanta. However, the results of the Navy's analysis of operational air stations left NAS Brunswick, Maine, open, after CINCLANT indicated that the Navy should retain an operational air station north of Norfolk. This permitted the BSEC to consider another reserve air station option. By closing NAS South Weymouth and moving any necessary aircraft and functions to NAS Brunswick, which the Navy determined to be a more capable air station, excess capacity was reduced in both operational and reserve air station subcategories, while not adversely affecting demographic concerns in that area. The resulting average military value for operational air stations increased, while the reserve air station subcategory essentially maintained its average value, dropping only a few decimal points (61.12 vice 61.16).

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN HAROLD FORD, SENATOR BILL FRIST, AND SENATOR FRED THOMPSON

Question 1: The Department of Defense and Defense Logistics Agency created a 1,000 point ranking system to evaluate its distribution depots. Within this 1,000 point system, only 20 points related to a depot's transportation capabilities. Does GAO believe it was appropriate to allocate only 2 percent of the evaluation of a distribution depot to the issue of transportation capabilities?

Answer: DLA's methodology provided that a total of 90 points could be awarded for transportation related questions in its military value analysis of stand-alone depots. Of those 90 points, 60 points were possible based on a depot's transportation capabilities, and 30 points were possible based on a depot's transportation cost operational efficiency. Had a greater number of points been assigned to these questions, the number of points awarded would still be proportional to the points awarded to other depots. The points each depot received was based proportionally on the number of points awarded to the depot which had the greatest transportation capability or the lowest transportation cost. An important aspect of the BRAC process, one enhancing its credibility, was the assignment of values and weights before data is collected and evaluated.

Question 2: How can the GAO validate DLA's procedures when the installation military value rankings placed the oldest depot with the highest real property maintenance as the top installation?

Configuration Rule: "average military value of air stations left open must be at least equal to the average military value of all air stations."							
BASE		RANK				MILITARY VALUE SCORE	
Washington		1				65.16	
Willow Grove		2				64.36	
New Orleans		3				63.99	
South Weymouth		4				61.37	
Ft. Worth		5				60.94	
Atlanta		6				51.14	
AVERAGE MILITARY VALUE						61.16	
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS S. WEYMOUTH						61.11	
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS ATLANTA						63.16	

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Personnel

As of 3/15/95	Active	SELRES Drill On / Off	CIV
- NAS	442	936 / 154	275
- Tenant			
Aviation Squadrons	233	329 / 0	0
Naval Reserve Center	24	379 / 190	0
Other Non-Aviation	86	0 / 0	30
Marines	67	393 / 0	0
TOTAL	852	2,381	305
- New England Demographics		- No Airlift Support Required For Any Drilling Unit	


DFI INTERNATIONAL

MEMORANDUM

Date: May 17, 1995
To: John Yaney
From: Erika Warner
Subject: Comparison of NAS Atlanta closure scenarios

As we discussed, I went back and took an in-depth look at the Navy's COBRA analyses for NAS Atlanta. Focusing primarily on the one-time costs associated with closing the base, I reexamined each of the 11 scenarios and came up with the following comparative analysis.

The chart below depicts the one-time costs across the 11 different closure scenarios. As you can see, the numbers fall into two reasonably distinct groups. Although there are several receiving base options within each group, the overriding difference between the two categories lies in how the H-1 Squadron* is realigned. Those scenarios which preserve the squadron as a cohesive unit generate one-time costs in the upper range. If, however, the squadron is divided up between two or more receiving bases, the one-time costs to close NAS Atlanta drop significantly (Windy Hill Annex is assumed to be separate from Dobbins in this case).



* H-1 Squadron is understood in this context to consist of MAG-42, HMLA-773, HMLS-773, MALS-42, MWSS-472, H&S Det 4th LAAD, BTRY B, and 4th LAAD

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 Fifth Floor
 Washington, DC 20036
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 fax: 202/785-9034



5/17/95 - 2

The scenario used for the May 10th hearing was Scenario 097. Although it is the most recently dated COBRA run, its estimate of one-time costs falls in the upper range. As you'll see in the enclosed document, these costs are primarily generated from military construction and one-time "other" costs necessary to prepare NS Mayport to receive the H-1 Squadron.

The advantages and/or drawbacks of maintaining the integrity of the H-1 Squadron in these scenarios are unclear from the COBRA materials. You or your associates in the Naval Reserve may have some further insights into this issue and into how it might affect the military value of the H-1 Squadron.

I hope this will be of some use as you proceed with your own analysis of the numbers. Let me know if we can be of any further assistance.

Close NAS Atlanta Scenarios

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-001

Description:

Move C-9 Squadron to NAS South Weymouth. Move H-1 Squadron to MCAS New River.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-001A

Description:

Move C-9 Squadron to Dobbins AFB. Move Naval Air Reserve Training Center to Dobbins AFB. Move H-1 Squadron to MCAS New River.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-001B

Description:

Move C-9 Squadron to NAS New Orleans. Move Naval Air Reserve Training Center to Dobbins AFB. Move H-1 Squadron to MCAS New River.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-097

Description:

Relocate MAG-42, HMLA-883, MALS-42, MWSS-472, H&S Det 4th LAAD, BTRY B, 4th LAAD, and Branch Clinic to NAS Mayport, FL. Relocate NARCEN, C-9 Squadron, NAVREP FAA South, Branch Clinic, and Dental to Dobbins AFB.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-097A

Description:

Retain the MWSS and LAAD SMCR at the "Windy Hill" Annex. Relocate MAG-42, MALS-42, HMLA-773, NARCEN, C-9 Squadron, NAVREP FAA South, Branch Clinic, and Dental to Dobbins AFB.

5/17/95 - 3

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-097B**Description:**

Retain the MWSS and LAAD SMCR at the "Windy Hill" Annex. Relocate MAG-42, MALS-42 and HMLA-773 to NS Mayport. Relocate C-9 Squadron, NAVREP FAA South, Branch Clinic, and Dental to Dobbins AFB.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-097C**Description:**

Retain MWSS and LAAD SMCR at the "Windy Hill" Annex. Relocate HMLA-773 Element to MCAS New River. Relocate MAG-42, MALS-42, HMLS-773, VR-46 (C-9s), NARCEN, NAVREP FAA South, Branch Clinic, and Dental to Dobbins AFB.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-098**Description:**

Relocate C-9 Squadron (VR-46), Branch Clinic, and Dental to NAS Brunswick. Relocate MAG-42, HMLA-773, MALS-42, MWSS-472, H&S Det 4th LAAD, BTRY B, and 4th LAAD to NS Mayport. Relocate NARCEN Atlanta and NAVREP FAA South to Dobbins AFB. Relocate NAESU to NAS JRB New Orleans and NAS JRB Fort Worth.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-098A**Description:**

Relocate C-9 Squadron (VR-46), Branch Clinic, and Dental to NAS Brunswick. Relocate MAG-42, HMLA-773, MALS-42, NARCEN, and NAVREP FAA South to Dobbins AFB.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-098B**Description:**

Relocate C-9 Squadron (VR-46), Branch Clinic, and Dental to NAS Brunswick. Relocate MAG-42, HMLA-773, MALS-42 to NS Mayport. Relocate NARCEN and NAVREP FAA South to Dobbins AFB. Relocate BTRY B, 4th LAAD, MWSS-472, and H&S Det 4th LAAD to Windy Hill. Relocate NAESU to NAS JRB Fort Worth and to NAS JRB New Orleans.

Scenario Number: 1-01-0020-098C**Description:**

Relocate C-9 Squadron (VR-46), Branch Clinic, and Dental to NAS Brunswick. Relocate MAG-42, HMLA-773, MALS-42, NARCEN, and NAVREP FAA South to Dobbins AFB. Retain BTRY B, 4th LAAD, H&S Det 4th LAAD, and MWSS-472 at Windy Hill. Relocate HMLS-773 Element to MCAS New River.

GERRY E. STUDDS
TENTH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

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June 20, 1995

Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this document
when responding 950620-43

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As the Commission's final deliberations approach, I am writing one last time to strongly urge the Commission to fully consider alternatives to the closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth, Massachusetts. I also want to take this opportunity to address some disturbing inaccuracies provided to the Commission by the Navy last week with regard to NAS South Weymouth's ability to accept new units.

First, I want to thank Commissioners Robles, Kling, Davis, and Cornella for their personal visits to the South Weymouth facility. On behalf of the local communities and the Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth, I am grateful for the amount of time and attention that the Commission has given to a fair and thorough evaluation of the Navy's recommendation.

However, the Navy has recently prepared new cost-analysis information for the Commission which, in our view, needs to be refuted. Last month we proposed a scenario to the Commission that would close NAS Atlanta and relocate H-1 helicopter and F/A-18 units to Weymouth. Additionally, a C-9 squadron would remain in the Atlanta area by moving over to Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB) -- at which NAS Atlanta is a tenant facility -- and a reserve P-3 squadron at South Weymouth would be transferred to NAS Brunswick. In our view, this scenario not only provides a cost savings at least equal to the proposed closure of NAS South Weymouth, it preserves reserve air activities at both Atlanta and Weymouth. It also creates two joint-facilities at Dobbins and Brunswick.

Last week, Mr. Charles Nemfakos, Vice Chairman of the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC), provided the Commission with two COBRA (cost of base realignment) scenarios similar to our proposal. In our view, Mr. Nemfakos' letter not only grossly overstates and misinterprets the operational obstacles to stationing

Chairman Dixon
June 20, 1995
Page 2

new units at NAS South Weymouth, it also inflates the associated costs at Weymouth and ignores far greater problems at Atlanta.

Mr. Nemfakos states that South Weymouth is not a suitable location for F/A-18 aircraft because of inadequate runway length, cold weather conditions, distance from maintenance facilities, and inadequate local training ranges. While we recognize that, under ideal conditions, the Navy would prefer to have 8,000 foot runways at all its facilities, this is neither a requirement nor an impediment to tactical air operations elsewhere. Weymouth's 7,000 foot runway is, under the Navy's own guidelines, adequate for F/A-18 training and operations. In fact, the F/A-18's predecessor, the A-4, was successfully stationed at South Weymouth for many years.

Mr. Nemfakos' claim that the Navy must acquire more than 200 acres of private and commercial property for the extension and clear zones not only is in excess of the Navy's own standards, it is a gross exaggeration of the cost of an extension project. The Navy's Six Year Plan for NAS South Weymouth includes two projects (P-146 and P-400) which would lengthen runway 17-35 to 8,000 feet and acquire associated clear zones. These projects call for the acquisition of 49 acres of privately-owned *undeveloped* land. It should be noted at this point that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has made \$100 million in state funds available for improvements at military facilities. Therefore, any extension ultimately deemed necessary could be conducted at no cost to the Pentagon.

The Navy also chose to overlook encroachment difficulties at NAS Atlanta. The Air Force declared the Dobbins ARB's infrastructure unsuitable for fighter missions of any kind. Additionally, the Navy's own analysis for Atlanta identifies more than \$50 million in property it would be required to purchase to eliminate "saturated" clear zones.

The Navy's contention that F/A-18s should not be stationed at "cold weather" facilities raises serious questions with regard to the perceived limitations of these aircraft and the combat readiness of their crews. It is highly unlikely that operational situations requiring tactical air support will conveniently occur during ideal weather conditions. Operations in North Korea, Bosnia, or off the deck of a carrier in the North Atlantic all present potentially adverse weather conditions for which tactical air crews should be adequately prepared. It should also be pointed out that weather at NAS South Weymouth has accounted for only 0.32 percent of cancelled operations. Additionally, I would imagine that the Navy's concerns would be viewed with apprehension by the Canadian Department of National Defense, whose F/A-18 squadrons form the backbone of that country's air defense

Chairman Dixon
June 20, 1995
Page 3

forces. The governments of Finland and Switzerland are also preparing to introduce F/A-18 to their armed forces. The Navy's claims would probably also come as a surprise to the F/A-18's manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, which markets the plane as an "all-weather" fighter.

It is my understanding that -- once necessary equipment is installed -- the aircraft maintenance facility at South Weymouth will be able to adequately support these squadrons. The F/A-18's engines are manufactured at the nearby General Electric plant in Lynn, Mass. This provides a local source for parts and technical assistance. Also, Navy maintenance facilities at NAS Oceana in Norfolk, VA are available.

There are several training and operating areas located near South Weymouth. These include local warning areas, Noman's Island target range off Martha's Vineyard, Warren Grove range in New Jersey, training areas at the Massachusetts Military Reservation on Cape Cod, and two large Military Operating Areas (Condor and Yankee) in northern New England and New York. All of these resources are well within aircraft operating distance of NAS South Weymouth.

Mr. Nemfakos' letter further asserts that South Weymouth "has historically been an unacceptable location for light attack helicopters..." He goes on to claim that a similar reserve helicopter squadron (HML-771) was recently deactivated at South Weymouth because of low readiness. This statement is contradicted by the fact that South Weymouth has been a successful home for Marine Corps helicopters for more than 40 years. In fact, the Navy took pains to note that readiness was not a factor when it transferred HML-771 in 1994. As detailed above, adequate training areas are available in close proximity to South Weymouth. Additionally, both the Massachusetts and Rhode Island Air National Guard operated light attack helicopters in the area.

I have enclosed a copy of a letter from David K. Danner (LtCol, USMC-Ret.), the former commanding officer of the Marine Detachment at NAS South Weymouth. I think you will find that his insight and experience attests to the capability of South Weymouth to accommodate new helicopter and tactical air units.

The Navy also indicates that considerable new construction would be required at South Weymouth (including runway extension, hangars, barracks, maintenance facilities, and engine test cells) to accommodate new units. I think it should be pointed out that, two years ago, the Commission unanimously agreed to remove NAS South Weymouth from the Pentagon's list of proposed closures. In doing so, the Commission found "several inconsistencies between the COBRA analysis and

Chairman Dixon
June 20, 1995
Page 4

data call submissions regarding...military construction for receiver bases. These inconsistencies tended to inflate savings and deflate costs in favor of the Secretary's recommendation." (1993 Commission Report to the President) We believe that this has occurred once again.

As noted above, acquisition of land for a runway extension and clear zones is not required under the Navy's own guidelines. At any rate, any such project would be subsidized by the state of Massachusetts. Furthermore, the Navy did not apply similar encroachment-related acquisition costs to Atlanta.

With regard to hangar and barrack space, NAS South Weymouth has historically accommodated up to four squadrons comprised of more than 40 mixed aircraft. Additionally, Navy requirements specify that only 10 percent of a squadron's aircraft need to be physically housed in hangars at any one time. Hangar and associated apron space at the base can accommodate the additional squadrons under these scenarios with no new additional construction. South Weymouth also has adequate housing available for these units.

In closing, I want to again thank the Commission for its tireless efforts in reviewing the national security merits of the Pentagon's recommendations. In 1993 the Commission voted to keep South Weymouth open. As I have stated in earlier correspondences to the Commission, the Navy has, in my view, once again substantially deviated from its selection criteria in targeting NAS South Weymouth for closure. Furthermore, in light of the issues raised above, it appears that the Navy is now attempting to falsely portray that facility's capabilities. I, therefore, respectfully request that the Commission give full consideration to alternatives to the closure of NAS South Weymouth -- specifically the closure of NAS Atlanta.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,



Gerrit E. Studds

Enclosure

132 Webb Street
Weymouth, MA 02188
617-337-4325

June 18, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Dear Mr. Dixon:

As a former active duty Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment, Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, (1988-1990), and Operations Officer of the Weymouth Marines (1981-1984) I have watched and listened with great interest as the debate over the possible closure of NAS South Weymouth has intensified. I realize that many factors will enter into the final decision and, while I am not equipped with knowledge to judge all of them, I think my experience as a twenty-four year veteran of Marine Corps aviation and my six years at Weymouth flying jets and helicopters gives me a better than average perspective on some.

I have heard it alleged that the last tactical jet squadron to operate from South Weymouth, VMA-322, was shut down because of "an historic lack of readiness." This is simply not so. VMA-322 was a casualty of the end of the Cold War and aged aircraft. It was at one time planned to equip the squadron with F/A-18 aircraft after the retirement of the A-4s we flew for many years, but the plan was scrubbed as both active and reserve forces shrunk in the late 80s and early 90s. I cannot be certain, but I believe the Department of the Navy's often stated desire to close NAS South Weymouth also played a major part in this decision.

VMA-322 had an excellent reputation in the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing. The squadron routinely participated in the full range of military exercises, including Red Flag and other multi-service tests of readiness. There was never any question of the squadron's ability to perform its missions. In fact, along with its sister squadron at NAS Memphis, VMA-322 was even sent to Europe during the mid-80s in support of major NATO exercises. Other-- highly sensitive-- missions in support of active duty forces during the Cold War were also assigned to the squadron. These are not the hallmarks of a unit with low readiness; quite the opposite.


My own experience with operations from NAS South Weymouth indicates that the base does, indeed, have some limitations but that these can actually contribute to readiness, rather than degrade it. The A-4 pilots at Weymouth frequently planned very precise and complicated mission profiles for their training flights, often involving air-borne tanking evolutions and delivery of ordnance across the international border into Canada. Cold Weather operations were a matter of routine for Weymouth pilots, as were transcontinental flights in support of West Coast exercises. The Weymouth Marines, for a long time, operated the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing's only operational

Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, an arrangement between the jet squadron and engineer unit. What some might conceive of as problems were considered interesting challenges by the Marine officers and enlisted personnel at Weymouth. Rather than degrading capabilities, these challenges actually contributed to a high state of readiness and morale. All the Marine units at Weymouth, and especially the tactical aircraft squadrons, were a solid credit to Marine Corps Reserve readiness. The record speaks for itself. If you are in any doubt about this, I recommend you ask the Marine Corps to furnish, from its historical files, copies of the official Command Chronologies (annual historical summaries) of VMA-322, MAG-49, Det A, and HML-771. Therein you will find the Combat Ready Percentages of these units, officially endorsed by the Fourth Marine Aircraft (Reserve) Wing. Compare the figures with those of units from other sites and decide for yourself if readiness of **any** Marine unit at Weymouth was degraded by home location in the Northeast. I am confident that you will find Weymouth units were rated at a high state of readiness.


I have heard, too, that some officials consider Weymouth's 7000 foot runway too short for F/A-18 operations. Granted, 7000' is less desirable than 8000'. Likewise, 8000' is less desirable than 10,000', and 10,000' is less desirable than 15,000'. It is probably a bit academic to worry about 7000' being enough runway for a jet designed to operate off a 200' carrier deck. The old A-4, a much less capable aircraft than the F/A-18 in the takeoff and landing environment, operated for years at Weymouth without any difficulty. In any event, the 7000' runway at Weymouth was considered long enough in the late 80s when it was planned to site F/A-18s here. It was sufficient then and it is sufficient now.

I know your commission has difficult decisions to make and I don't envy you your job. Somewhere, folks are going to be mad at you, no matter what you recommend. If you tell me that Weymouth must close for purely economic reasons or for other good and compelling considerations, I will reluctantly say, "Well and good." I cannot, however, stand silently by and listen when others cast aspersions on the Marines who drilled so faithfully at NAS South Weymouth, **and to such good effect**. Their units were first-rate, and deserve to be remembered as such.

I swear to you that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection.



David K. Danner
LtCol, USMC (Retired)
Former Commanding Officer, MAG-49 Detachment A



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
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WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNORARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

May 24, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC)
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing with regard to the attached May 8th article from the *Navy Times*, which highlights the Navy's increasing difficulty in recruiting Reservists, particularly for aviation units. This article supports the Weld-Cellucci Administration's assertion that the Naval Reserve should not abandon the demographically rich Boston area, where recruiting Naval aviators has been highly successful for decades. Serious concerns remain about the inconsistent standards used by the Navy when making closure recommendations in the category of Reserve Air Stations. In addition, we are disturbed by the Navy's apparent failure to consider other closure scenarios that would meet its stated goals of preserving Reserve demographics and reducing excess capacity at Naval Air Station Brunswick.

As you know, the 1993 BRAC directed the Navy to consolidate several Naval and Marine Reserve units, and to create a new Naval Reserve Center (NRC) at Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth. The new NRC is now open, and morale has improved dramatically as many of these Reservists had previously been located in substandard or crowded buildings. Unfortunately, the 1995 BRAC recommended that this new NRC be closed and the units be dispersed again with the majority returning to the dilapidated NRC at Quincy, a building they recently vacated.

The Navy's recommendation also jeopardizes the viability of two key Marine Reserve units. One of those units is recommended to leave the area, despite the demographics; the other has failed to find a suitable location in the area. The BRAC staff has testified that the units transferred to Brunswick will retain sufficient manpower; however, as you know, their assessment is purely speculative and not based on detailed analysis. Lieutenant Governor Cellucci and I believe that there are many risks in relocating our aviation Reservists to NAS Brunswick. These units are performing with distinction at NAS South Weymouth; their ability to remain viable will not be improved by relocating to NAS Brunswick. Indeed, by sending these units to Brunswick, the Navy is risking some of its finest Naval Reserve aviation units at a time when it is having difficulty manning Reserve aviation units elsewhere.

In short, every single Reserve unit being dispersed from NAS South Weymouth will find itself in a more precarious position regarding either its facilities or its ability to recruit qualified

Reservists. At a time when it is increasingly difficult to attract qualified Reservists, it seems imprudent to disrupt the most successful location for Navy Reservists recruitment. More importantly, given NAS South Weymouth's relatively high military value rating in comparison to two other Naval Air Stations in the same category, its recommended closure seems a clear deviation from the 1995 BRAC selection criteria in the areas of readiness, mobilization, and facilities.

The risks being taken with these Reserve units might be easier to accept if the Navy's recommendation were the result of an impartial application of a consistent standard of judgment; it appears, however, that the importance of "rich demographics" was inconsistently applied during the Navy's process. I recognize that the Navy may, indeed, have a legitimate military reason to weigh demographic concerns heavily when judging its Reserve Air Stations. Our concerns, however, derive from the fact that other Naval Reserve Air Stations enjoy immunity from closure on the grounds of "rich demographics," while NAS South Weymouth—which was rated first in demographic richness—does not enjoy similar immunity. Such concerns are exacerbated by the consistent lack of documentation of the Navy's decisions at key points in the process.

Our Administration has carefully examined documents that explain the different closure scenarios considered by the Navy prior to March 1, 1995. It is clear that after November 1994, NAS South Weymouth was not considered as a receiving location for helicopter and fighter aircraft that needed to be sited. Despite NAS South Weymouth's strong demographics for recruiting pilots, its history of successfully operating helicopter and tactical fighter aircraft, its close proximity to over-the-water training areas, and its ability to absorb these units without military construction costs, the Navy simply ignored the potential of NAS South Weymouth. In fact, without considering NAS South Weymouth as a receiving location, the Navy opted to consider scenarios that entailed significant military construction, such as building new hangars, at locations that do not enjoy Greater Boston's demographics.

Moreover, the Navy apparently failed to consider a host of scenarios for reducing excess capacity at NAS Brunswick, other than the risky transfer of Reserve units from NAS South Weymouth. While the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet may have legitimate military reasons to maintain NAS Brunswick as a fully capable air station, the only solution considered for this strategic dilemma was dismantling a highly successful and demographically rich Reserve Air Station at South Weymouth.

In Massachusetts, we believe in the BRAC process, and we have witnessed its successes in the past. At this time, we ask that the BRAC make its decision based upon what is best for the Naval Reserves and the security of our nation. On those grounds, we believe that the case is strong not only to preserve NAS South Weymouth, but to send new assets to this base to take advantage of its unique ability to absorb new missions at a low cost and to recruit high-quality Reservists in large numbers.

Sincerely,



William F. Weld

Attachment

cc: The Honorable Joe Robles, Jr.

Room for you: Reserve recruiters must be more convincing than ever to entice sailors and Marines to join these days.

All signs say: Help Wanted

Recruiting gets fiercer than ever in a drawdown

By Jon R. Anderson
Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — Call it a paradox of the drawdown.

Most would expect that deep cuts to the Marine Corps and Navy would leave their reserve components overflowing with those cut from the active rosters. Most would think that if the reserves had been hit with major reductions of their own, the result would be units slim and trim, but definitely full up.

Those thoughts would be wrong.

For the Naval Reserve, the numbers are staggering in the billets unfilled among the junior ranks. More than 7,000 of the Naval Reserve's 30,643 jobs for selected reserve petty officers third class and below are empty, according to a reserve spokesman.

For Marine Forces Reserve, the numbers are not nearly as bad. While over strength in the officer ranks, there are 550 unfilled enlisted Selected Marine Corps Reserve billets. Still, recruiters say the challenge to find people willing to give the reserve a try is greater than ever.

"It's harder now than I've ever seen it," said Capt. Rex Settlemoir, one of the Naval Reserve's top recruiting officials.

The numbers may surprise those on waiting lists to get into units, said Settlemoir, but the anomaly of a shrinking force struggling to find people cuts right to the heart of the problem: The reserve, while now experiencing an overabundance in many ratings, is just plain hurting to fill others.

Officials in both the Marine Corps and naval reserves say the realign-

ment of units and base closures has been a big part of the problem:

The reservist dilemma

While a unit move for full-time reservists is no big deal, for the more typical part-time drilling reservists tied to civilian jobs, a unit move can mean the end of service. And for every reservist who can't commute to the new location once a month, manpower planners fall that much farther behind. Not only must a replacement be found, said officials, but in many cases they must be trained or retrained for the specific job.

For instance, aviation squadrons in the Naval Reserve have been hit particularly hard with several units now basically having to start from scratch.

Recruiting for the reserves amid a drawdown is made especially difficult by shifting demographics, where potential new hires are often moving away from established reserve centers. Where active-duty recruits are available for worldwide assignment once completing their initial training, most reserve recruiters must find a unit close to a potential recruit's home.

This year the Naval Reserve's ability to recruit people and then send them to boot camp was lost altogether, making it especially tough to fill the 7,000-person void of junior sailors.

The program, called Sea and Air Mariner, or SAM, was deemed too expensive for the Reserve and was ended last October. While a smaller version of SAM will bring in 400 new Seabees next year, recruiters are still left with essentially two options for finding junior sailors: Recruit them as they leave active duty or find civilians already good at skills the Navy needs and put them directly into a reserve unit without going to boot camp.

The first option is usually best, officials said. It costs little and gets sailors fresh from the fleet. A new program for the reserve, called Rescore, broadens

NAVY TIMES MAY 8 1995
that option by giving reserve units money to retrain otherwise unqualified sailors in needed skills. Service members coming from other branches also can join the Naval Reserve.

The second option, called Advanced Paygrade Program, takes about 1,800 civilians a year and puts them directly into reserve units as E-4s. They attend a two week mini-boot camp in New Orleans where they learn the basics of being a sailor.

Recruiters for both the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve said despite the difficulties they're making their quotas — barely.

Marine Corps recruiters, who recruit for both the active-duty force and reserve, said they have been dipping deeply into their Delayed Entry Program sign ups, or DEPs, just to meet monthly goals.

DEPs can wait up to a year before going to boot camp after signing up for the Corps. Recruiters use them as "money in the bank" toward meeting their monthly goals, but can usually talk them into going to basic sooner — often immediately. But the more they get to go earlier, the less margin down the road.

Getting officers into reserve units can be challenging in some quarters. For instance, about half the 1,145 officers the Naval Reserve needs to recruit this year will be doctors and nurses.

"There just aren't that many coming off of active duty to support our needs," said Settlemoir. Instead, they must find civilian doctors and nurses willing to join, usually an exercise in record checks and paperwork. Worse, stories of many reserve doctors losing their practices while being called to active duty for the Persian Gulf war make many wary.

"There's this erroneous assumption out there that reserve recruiting should be a cakewalk right now," said Settlemoir, but the bottom line is that "it's just not so."

GERRY E. STUDDS
TENTH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

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May 22, 1995

Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore St, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

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Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to share with the Commission correspondence I have received from the Navy with regard to its decision to recommend the closure of Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth, Massachusetts.

First, I want to thank the Commission for voting to consider alternatives to the closure of NAS South Weymouth and review the merits of NAS Atlanta. As you know, I have been working closely with the local "Save the Base Committee" and we believe there is a very compelling case to keep open the Weymouth facility.

I wrote to Navy Secretary Dalton in April to request several items with regard to the Navy's base closure process. Earlier this month, I received a response from Navy Assistant Secretary Robert Pirie. Copies of both letters are enclosed.

Unfortunately, rather than illuminating how the Navy reached its recommendations, these replies have instead raised serious new concerns with the Navy's decision-making process. It would appear that the decision to close the South Weymouth facility was based on entirely on anecdotal -- and undocumented -- information and conjecture which, ultimately, resulted in the inappropriate comparison of bases in two separate subcategories.

In my letter to Secretary Dalton, I requested that the Navy provide me with the documents that would support its claim that NAS Brunswick could demographically accommodate the reserve units which were being relocated there from NAS South Weymouth. Assistant Secretary Pirie responded that the Navy has "no demographic information (certified or otherwise) concerning this move." Instead, the Navy Base Structure Analysis Committee (BSEC) staff was "advised" by the Commander of the Naval Air Reserve (COMNAVAIRRESFOR) that there were sufficient demographics available at Brunswick.

Chairman Dixon
May 22, 1995
Page 2

The absence of a formal demographic study suggests that the Navy did not adequately consider the ramifications of its recommendations. Both BRAC and the Navy recognize the national security importance of the Weymouth facility in attracting qualified Naval reservists. Two years ago, the Commission removed NAS South Weymouth from the Secretary of Defense's closure list in order to preserve it as the only reserve facility in the Northeast. Furthermore, by its own analysis, the Navy ranks NAS South Weymouth first in demographic value. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why the Navy would jeopardize its ability to recruit and retain reservists in this region by neglecting to fully determine the impact of moving Weymouth's reserve units to a remote location in Maine.

Additionally, according to the Navy report to the Commission, it apparently decided to "trade-off" NAS South Weymouth and NAS Brunswick after the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) expressed the "operation desire" to have the most "fully-capable" air station north of Norfolk available to support his fleet. This recommendation was apparently made during consultations between BSEC and CINCLANTFLT.

I have requested the records of these discussions so that we -- and BRAC -- can examine the assumptions, justifications, and merits of the "policy imperatives" developed during these meetings. I have not received this information and -- after this and numerous other attempts -- can now only assume that it does not exist.

This obviously raises serious concerns about the integrity of the Navy's recommendations. The complete documentation of all information used in formulating recommendations, including relevant deliberations, is one of the foundations of the base closure process. However, it would appear that the only factor which led to the Navy's decision to close NAS South Weymouth is both uncertified and undocumented. Furthermore, it would appear that the Navy gave greater weight to the "desire" of one individual than the rest of its empirical data.

The CINCLANTFLT's recommendation resulted in a comparison between an operational base (Brunswick) and a reserve base (South Weymouth). This decision -- which may violate Defense Department directives -- suggests that the Navy ignored its own analysis that distinguishes between reserve and active duty missions and capabilities. The data calls for reserve and operational facilities are not compatible. Similar questions are weighted differently and, in some cases, entire subcategories are omitted. In fact, following the Navy's logic, a comparison of the military value scores for the four Naval Air facilities north of Norfolk (NAS South Weymouth, NAS Washington, NAS Willow Grove, and NAS Brunswick)

Chairman Dixon
May 22, 1995
Page 3

would reveal that NAS Brunswick ranks last. In short, the Navy has compared apples with oranges.

I have enclosed information prepared by the "Save the Base Committee" that further details our concerns with Assistant Secretary Pirie's letter. In my view, this analysis strongly indicates that the Navy substantially deviated from its selection criteria in recommending NAS South Weymouth. I request that the Commission give this material its full consideration.

I applaud the efforts of the Commission to date and look forward to working closely with you in the coming weeks to ensure that the national security merits of the Navy's recommendations are fully scrutinized.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,



Gerry E. Studds

Enclosures



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

MAY 6 1995

The Honorable Gerry B. Studds
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Studds:

Thank you for your letter of April 18, 1995, to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting information on the Department of the Navy's 1995 base realignment and closure process for reserve air stations and, in particular, Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth, Massachusetts. I am responding for Secretary Dalton.

As you know, the Department of Defense recommended to the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission that NAS South Weymouth be closed. This and all of our base realignment and closure recommendations resulted from a careful, in-depth and objective review of our infrastructure, consistent with a smaller force structure and based on criteria established by the Secretary of Defense.

Since the 1993 round there have been significant reductions in naval aviation forces. For instance, we have retired the A-6 attack aircraft series, reduced the maritime patrol aircraft inventory by about one-third and have eliminated approximately fifty percent of the Navy's F-14 inventory. Additionally, the Naval Reserve stood down an entire carrier air wing.

These significant reductions in Naval Aviation forces clearly indicated there was excess capacity to support aircraft at East Coast Naval Air Stations. Initial scenarios and Department of the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) discussions focused on closing NAS Brunswick and moving the P-3 squadrons to NAS Jacksonville. However, during BSEC iterative discussions with major owner/operators, CINCLANTFLT addressed the need to keep the most capable air base north of the major fleet concentration in Norfolk. Considering the fleet commander's needs and the demographic concerns which militated against closing NAS Atlanta to reduce reserve air station excess capacity, the BSEC decided the best Total Force answer was to close NAS South Weymouth. This solution would reduce the excess capacity at Reserve Air Stations, keep open the most capable air station in the Northeast while more fully utilizing its capacity, and relocate reserve assets from NAS South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick without requiring military construction expenditures.

At the time the BSEC decision was made to recommend closure of NAS South Weymouth, the data call response submitted by Commander, Naval Reserve Force indicated the P-3 squadron at NAS South Weymouth would be decommissioned. Later, the Naval Reserve

decided to move the P-3 squadron from NAS South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick, Maine and decommission the P-3 squadron at Naval Air Facility, Washington, D.C., instead. Therefore, we have no demographic information (certified or otherwise) concerning this move. However, as recently as April 19, 1995, my staff has been advised by COMNAVAIRESFOR that sufficient demographics are available in the Brunswick area to support both a P-3 and a C-130 squadron.

As to administrative support squadrons, the BSEC decided while finalizing the configuration model, not to allow more than one administrative support squadron (VR squadron) to be stationed at any one air station because a decentralized force could better support the organic air transport needs of the fleet concentrations.

Although not discussed as part of the base closure process, the Naval Air Reserve did play a valuable role in support of contingency operations. For the operations you specified, Bosnia, Somalia, Persian Gulf and Haiti, the Naval Air Reserve contribution totalled 25,170 hours and 3,943 sorties.

There were two principal procedures used to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information contained in our 1995 Base Structure Data Base: data certification and independent validation by the Naval Audit Service. The certification procedures ensured the data forwarded for use by the Secretary of the Navy was reviewed and updated, as appropriate, at each level in the chain of command responsible for certifying the accuracy and completeness of such data. Independently, the Naval Audit Service examined and validated the accuracy of the data gathered and analyzed. Through their review, the Secretary of the Navy was apprised that the established internal controls were effective and that the certified data used in the process was reasonably accurate and complete. The opinion of the Naval Audit Service was reported to the Secretary of the Navy before he forwarded his base realignment and closure recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. A copy of the audit report is provided to show the procedures employed by the Navy auditors to validate the accuracy and reliability of the data. Furthermore, the General Accounting Office (GAO) observed and assessed the verification efforts of the Navy auditors. The GAO reported to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission there was no basis to dispute the conclusions of the Naval Audit Service.

I trust this information satisfies your concerns. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,


ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR.

Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0706-F14
BSAT/LH
5 May 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street,
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

This is in response to a request from Mr. Alex Yellin of your staff for information regarding the data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) in their review of the Reserve Air Station category of activities.

Our evaluation of demographics for the reserve air stations began with the Demographics Section of the Reserve Military Value Matrix. Using the aggregated unit participation figures for 1993 as a surrogate measure of demographics, we were able to determine that all reserve air stations had sufficient demographic resources to adequately man their reserve programs.


In the configuration analysis stage of our process, which looked at specific scenarios, we had to look at recruiting demographics and how each scenario impacted the Reserves' ability to man its aviation and ground units. Field activities were required to highlight any issues or deficiencies in recruiting demographics for each of the scenarios in the scenario data call responses. We also consulted with representatives from MARRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR to ensure no demographic issues would prevent successful implementation of a scenario. At no time did we compare the demographics of the losing air station with the gaining air station. There was not a relative measure of recruiting demographics, but rather, a yes/no assessment of whether or not the gaining air station could man the existing unit(s) and/or units being transferred to the gaining activity.

The results of the configuration analysis showed that both Atlanta and Brunswick had sufficient recruiting demographics. Only two cases, both involving the movement of Marine Corps Reservists to MCAS New River, North Carolina and Mayport, Florida, were found to be affected by insufficient recruiting demographics. The Naval Reserve had also forwarded a request for a redirect away from MCAS Beaufort, prior to the


BRAC-95 recommendation to redirect F/A-18 aircraft to NAS Atlanta, based on having learned in the BRAC-93 round that there were insufficient recruiting demographics to support a reserve squadron at Beaufort. In all other scenarios the recruiting demographics were sufficient.

As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. Nemfakos', written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned above the printed name and title.

Charles P. Nemfakos
Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE HOUSE • BOSTON 02133

(617) 727-3600

WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNOR

ARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Joe Robles, Jr.
Commissioner
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC)
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear General Robles:

Lieutenant Governor Cellucci and I are pleased to submit the enclosed proposal for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to fund improvements at Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth to accommodate a Field Artillery Battalion of the Massachusetts Army National Guard (MA/ARNG).

This proposal satisfies several goals of the 1995 base closure process by allowing two military services to share an asset and by raising the military value and improving the infrastructure of a Defense Department facility at no cost to the federal government.

The MA/ARNG is slated to receive a new Field Artillery Battalion of 650 authorized personnel, including towed 155mm Howitzers as well as other associated vehicles and equipment. This battalion is a high priority, contingency pool unit. Stationing the unit at NAS South Weymouth would centrally locate the entire unit, increasing its readiness and improving the efficiency of maintenance and training exercises. Moreover, its proximity to the military airfield at the base provides ready access for deployment or mobilization exercises, critical for a high-priority unit. Additionally, the demographics of the South Weymouth area are ideal for Guard and Reserve units.

As you may know, on February 9, 1995, I signed into law a \$100 million capital improvement fund to be used at Massachusetts' military facilities that are expanded under the 1995 base closure process. In the case of NAS South Weymouth, a portion of these funds would be used to construct two buildings to accommodate the Guard battalion--one building of 85,000 square feet to house the military unit, and the second building of 12,000 square feet for equipment maintenance; the approximate cost of this construction is \$12 million. The state is willing to negotiate with the Navy or the BRAC for use of the state's capital fund for improvements at facilities of the base that would be used jointly by the Navy and the Guard, such as the medical

clinic, fitness center, and galley. These funds are also available for other infrastructure improvements at NAS South Weymouth that may be necessary to receive additional Defense Department assets. Please note, however, that these funds are unavailable, even to the MA/ARNG, in the event of the NAS South Weymouth base closure.

The recent General Accounting Office report to the BRAC lamented the lack of asset sharing on the part of the military services. At no cost to the Defense Department, the enclosed proposal would, if approved by the BRAC, represent an important step in the sharing of military infrastructure by Guard and Reserve units. As the Guard and Reserves play an increasingly important role in responding to combat contingencies, I believe our proposal could serve as a model to the nation in the joint use of facilities by the Guard and Reserves.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



William F. Weld

Enclosures

APR-16-95 TUE 11:43 AM
04/14/85 14:15
04/14/85 12:50

PUBLIC WORKS HAS BOWEN
8
89 1 202 225 2212

PAK NO. 617 786 2847
CUNG STUMS - DC 777 40111

6/002

GERRY E. STUDDS
Tenth District, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES
CHAIRMAN

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

April 14, 1995

WASHINGTON
227 Cannon Building
Washington, DC 20515-2110
202-226-3111

SOUTH SHORE 1-800-784-2911

QUINCY
1212 Federal Street
Quincy, MA 02169

WROCKTON
Federal Building
100 Main Street
Wrocton, MA 02440

PLYMOUTH
120 Water Street, Suite 401
Plymouth, MA 02360

CAPT COD AND ISLANDS 1-800-870-2828

HYANNIS
100 Main Street
Hyannis, MA 02601

Alan Dixon, Chairman
The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1200 North Moore St, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to request that the following issues with regard to the Navy's process and recommendations in targeting NAS South Weymouth for closure be raised at next week's BRAC hearing with the Government Accounting Office (GAO).

In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value," according to the Navy's own criteria.

In the case of NAS Atlanta -- which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure -- the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value Matrix for Reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.

In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when "a base was recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value -- particularly in the case of NAS South Weymouth -- as a problem in its decision-making process?

Again, I respectfully request that the BRAC direct the GAO to respond to this issue during next week's hearing.

I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,


Gerry E. Studds

04/21/85
04/20/86

08:47
19:17



SENT BY:

04-14-95 08:46AM

6177278685

617 787 079 002

90492



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1000

April 5, 1995

The Honorable William F. Weld
Governor of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts
The State House
Boston, MA 02133

Post-It [®] brand fax transmittal memo 7871		Page 2 of 2
To <i>Bill Smith</i>	From <i>Julie Schroy</i>	
Co.	Co.	
Dept.	Phone #	
Fax #	Fax #	

Dear Governor Weld:

Thank you for your letter of February 8, 1995, to the Secretary of the Navy concerning the Massachusetts National Guard's interest in moving a field artillery battalion to the Naval Air Station at South Weymouth, Massachusetts. I am responding for Secretary Dalton.

As you know, on March 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense submitted the Department of Defense's recommendations to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and recommended closure of Naval Air Station, South Weymouth. Thus, if Secretary Perry's recommendation is adopted by the Commission and approved by the President and Congress, the Department of the Navy will proceed to close the Air Station within six years of the date when closure is approved. In that event, the Department of the Army could request property at the base for use by the Massachusetts National Guard's field artillery battalion.

Since the focus of the 1995 base closure process has now shifted to the Commission, however, it may be prudent to defer consideration of the Guard's expression of interest until the Commission submits its Report to the President on July 1, 1995. During the interim, if I may be of assistance, please call me at (703) 693-4527.

We appreciate your interest in this important matter and look forward to working with you on all matters related to NAS South Weymouth.

Sincerely,

William J. Cassidy, Jr.

WILLIAM J. CASSIDY, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Conversion and Redevelopment)



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE HOUSE • BOSTON 02133

(617) 727-3800

WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNOR

ARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

February 8, 1995

The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000

Dear Secretary Dalton:

This letter is to follow up on our recent phone conversation concerning Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth.

As we discussed, the Massachusetts National Guard is impressed with the facilities at NAS South Weymouth and, with the Navy's approval, is interested in locating a unit onto the base. Specifically, the Guard is interested in moving a field artillery battalion totaling 45 full time and 600 part time Guardsmen as well as their trucks, howitzers, and other equipment. This is a new, high priority unit that is assigned to the "Contingency Force Pool."

Locating this unit onto NAS South Weymouth would require the construction of two buildings, one of 85,000 square feet to house the military units, and one of 12,000 square feet for the maintenance of their equipment. As we discussed, the state could fund such construction from a \$100 million capital improvement fund intended for the state's military installations. Moreover, the state would willingly negotiate with the Navy to fund the improvement of other facilities or infrastructure at NAS South Weymouth that would be used jointly by the Guard and Navy personnel. As I mentioned, the legislation authorizing this capital improvement fund specifies that state funding is available only if NAS South Weymouth is enhanced or expanded under the 1995 base closure process.

If it is all right with you, I would like to send my staff to Washington to discuss this possible option with your installation experts. Your staff can contact Jim Kane in my office at: (617) 727-3600. Thanks very much for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Weld".

William F. Weld

02/06/95 mv

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH CONSTRUCTION STATUS
(AS OF 27 JANUARY 1995)

<u>ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>CURRENT AMOUNT</u>	<u>AWARD DATE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>	<u>COMPLETION DATE</u>
Radar Facility & Control Tower	\$2,379,495	9/14/94	5	04/21/96
Aircraft Parking Apron Repairs	\$560,021	2/22/94	80	04/04/95
HVAC Rehab AIMD	\$660,001	01/14/94	90	09/03/94
Wetland Mitigation	\$141,963	08/30/94	60	12/08/95
Replace Heating Sys Navy Family Housing	\$1,140,495	04/21/94	80	09/16/95
Indefinite Qty Asbestos Removal	\$27,128	04/01/93	95	04/16/94 Extended
Repair Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	\$109,334	09/27/93	90	05/23/94 Extended
Pest Control Facility	\$243,135	11/30/94	0	06/13/95
Alterations & Repair PSD BRAC REALIGNMENT BLDG #2	\$424,154	05/02/94	80	01/09/95
Alterations & Repairs BRAC REALIGNMENT BLDG #17 SELRES	\$216,500	05/02/94	15	03/08/95
Fire Station Addition	\$754,000	09/23/94	20	04/06/95
Backflow Devices Various Locations	\$59,925	09/21/94	75	01/04/95 Extended
Indefinite Quantity Painting	\$111,509	06/17/94	95	07/02/95
Indefinite Quantity Interior Repairs Housing	\$218,930	07/06/94	98	07/21/95
Indefinite Quantity Pavement Repairs	\$	12/23/94	0	01/07/96 Waiting Bonds/Ins
Resurface Taxiway Charlie	\$448,000	03/01/95	0	03/15/96

COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION <u>1994/1995</u>	CURRENT <u>AMOUNT</u>	COMPLETION <u>DATE</u>
Family Housing Repairs	\$748,865	12/13/94
A/C Installation Galley	\$132,200	11/30/94
Roof Replacement Hangar 2	\$134,700	02/17/94
Replace Roof & HVAC EM Club	\$237,124	11/03/94
Indefinite Quantity Painting NAS	\$66,339	02/10/94
Bathroom Rehabs Housing	\$218,054	08/02/94
Barracks #75 & #76 Head Rehabs	\$161,825	07/13/94
Station Roof Repairs	\$109,524	12/16/93
Airfield Paving Hangar #1	\$468,410	09/22/94
Repairs Service Station Fuel Tanks	\$27,600	12/08/94
Storm Sewer Installation	\$77,250	11/07/94
Construct Spill Prevention Control	\$69,400	11/04/94
Airfield Tree Brush Clearing	\$40,745	02/10/94
Indefinite Quantity Painting Station	\$75,174	04/18/94
Repairs & Reinsulate HVAC Hangar #1 & #2	\$38,344	08/04/94
Replace Flush Hydrants Hangar #2	\$41,980	07/15/94

10/24/94

NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH
CLARIFICATION OF RUNWAY 17-35 EXTENSION


DESCRIPTION OF FEBRUARY 3, 1992 SUBMITTAL TO NAVFAC

1. Proposed Construction: Extend runway 17 & taxiway B (Bravo) by a length of 1,000 linear foot yards in a northerly direction and connect taxiway B to the extension. Accommodate the extensions with runway & taxiway edge lighting. (The present runway 17-35 length is 7,000 lf).

2. Clarification of the term DISPLACED THRESHOLD: A displaced threshold exists where the threshold for landings is located down the runway from the physical end of the runway. The displaced area between the runway end and the landing threshold may be used for takeoffs (from the 17 end an 8,000 lf runway) or for rollout when landing from the other direction (from the 35 end an 8,000 lf runway). Often the reason for the displaced threshold is to provide additional clearance of obstructions in the approach area where it is not practical to remove the obstruction. This clarification is directly quoted from NAVAIR 01-50AAA-2 Technical Manual.

3. Project Status: Has not been funded at present for A&E design by COMNAVRESFOR.

Enclosures: Project Data Sheet
Location & Site Plan
Full Size Development Plan



East Coast	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Instead of (93 Recomm.)</u>
	Cecil Field F-18 ^s	Oceana Beaufort	Cherry Point
	Cecil Field S-3 ^s	Jacksonville	Oceana
	Cecil Field (Reserve) F-16 ^s	Atlanta	Beaufort

West Coast	Miramar F-14	Oceana	Lemoore
	Miramar E-2 ^s	North Island	Lemoore

Recommended Closures	<u>Training Air Stations</u>	<u>Reserve Air Station</u>
	Meridian Corpus Christi (changed from NAS to NAF)	Weymouth Detroit - change to previous BRAC

West Coast	<u>Operational</u>	
	El Toro	
	Tustin	
	Cecil	
Northwest and East Coast	Agana (Guam)	
	Aak Key West - converted to NAF from NAS - conversion rather than close as directed in 1998	

COMMANDER NAVAL AIR RESERVE FORCE

TYPE MODEL SERIES SUMMARY

01-ACT-95

TYPE MODEL SERIES	EA6B	F14A	UC12B	DC9	C9B	F5E	F5F	CT39G	CT39E	FA18A	FA18B	E2C	EP3J	P5C
ACTUAL INVENTORY (PAI)	6	24	13	10	17	12	7	1	92	6	4	2	78	

PRIMARY ACFT ALLOWANCE (PAA)	4	14	13	10	17	12	1	7	1	96	4	4	2	72
BACKUP ACFT AUTHORIZED (BAA)	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	7	1	1	0	4
TOTAL ACTIVE ACFT AUTHORIZED (TAAA)	5	16	13	10	17	13	1	8	0	103	5	5	2	76

Post-It™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671 # of pages 4

From	DOYLE KEDDY (MILT BESSER)
Co	CNARF A12
Dept	363-1143
Fax #	703-696-0550
Fax #	504-948-5912

TYPE MODEL SERIES	C20D	C20G	KC130T	C130T	SH2G	SH3H	UH3H	HH60H	MH53E	CH46E	RH53D	UH1N	AH1W	GRAND TOTAL
ACTUAL INVENTORY (PAI)	2	4	24	14	16	10	6	16	12	26	17	20	19	459

PRIMARY ACFT ALLOWANCE (PAA)	2	2	24	12	14	12	4	16	12	24	15	18	36	449
BACKUP ACFT AUTHORIZED (BAA)	0	0	4	4	0	2	0	2	1	2	0	2	0	36
TOTAL ACTIVE ACFT AUTHORIZED (TAAA)	2	2	28	16	14	14	4	18	13	26	16	20	36	484

PAI = TOTAL AIRCRAFT IN REPORTING CUSTODY
 PAA = TOTAL AIRCRAFT ALLOWANCE
 BAA = AIRCRAFT ALLOWANCE FOR PIPELINE
 TAAA = TOTAL ACTIVE AIRCRAFT ALLOWANCE (PAA+BAA)

PAI AS OF: 01 FEB 1995 = 455
 TOTAL ACFT RCVD = 5
 TOTAL ACFT TRFD = 1
 PAI AS OF: 01 MAR 1995 = 459

TOTAL NAVY AIRCRAFT ONBOARD = 284 TOTAL MARINE AIRCRAFT ONBOARD = 175

COMMANDER NAVAL AIR RESERVE FORCE

01-AP-95

NAV AIRCRAFT BY WING

19 '012

COMHELWINGRES	TOTAL PAI	60 COMFLECGS	SPRING	TOTAL PAI	58	TOTAL PAI	58								
NORTH ISLAND CA	TOTAL PAA	58 DALLAS TX		TOTAL PAA		TOTAL PAA	58								
SQUADRON	PUC	SP25	FM60H	WH83E	UH3H	SH3H	SQUADRON	PUC	C98	C200	C130T	C739E	C735G	DC8	C203V
HCS-4	PAI	001553	7				CFLSW:DET	PAI	001739	2					2
NORFOLK	PAA		8				WASHINGTON	PAA		2					2
HCS-5	PAI	001854	9				CFLSW:DET	PAI	001909			1			3
PT MUGU	PAA		3				NOLA	PAA				1			3
HM-16	PAI	001841	5				CFLSW:DET	PAI	001931						2
NORFOLK	PAA		5				HAWAII	PAA							0
HM-15 RES	PAI	001865	5				VR-46	PAI	001546						4
ALAMEDA	PAA		8				ATLANTA	PAA							5
HS-75	PAI	001149	8				VR-48	PAI	001542						2
JACKSONVILL	PAA		8				WASHINGTON	PAA							2
HSL-34	PAI	001168	6				VR-52	PAI	001541	2					2
NOR IS	PAA		7				W GROVE	PAA		2					2
HC-85	PAI	001169	6				VR-55	PAI	001544			4			
NORIS	PAA		4				WASHINGTON	PAA				4			
HSL-94	PAI	001807	8				VR-54	PAI	001457						4
W GROVE	PAA		7				NOLA	PAA							4
COMNAVAIRESFOR	TOTAL PAI		9				VR-55	PAI	001638						4
AIR STATION	TOTAL PAA		9				SANTA CLARA	PAA							4
STATION	PUC	UC12					VR-56	PAI	001639	4					
ATLANTA	PAI	000589	1				NORFOLK	PAA		4					
	PAA		1				VR-57	PAI	001702	4					
DALLAS	PAI	000590	1				NORIS	PAA		4					
	PAA		1				VR-58	PAI	001703	4					
SANTA CLARA	PAI	001929	1				JACKSONVILL	PAA		4					
	PAA		1				VR-59	PAI	001756	3					
NEW ORLEANS	PAI	000588	2				DALLAS	PAA		3					1
	PAA		2				VR-61	PAI	001539						4
SOUTH WEYMOUTH	PAI	000603	2				WHIDBEY	PAA							4
	PAA		2				VR-62	PAI	001846						2
WASHINGTON	PAI	000530	1				SOWEY	PAA							2
	PAA		1												
WILLOW GROVE	PAI	000604	2												
	PAA		2												

11

11:00 06/04/95

OFF 05/95

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LNHKT

COMRESPATWINGPAC TOTAL PAI 34				CAG-20				TOTAL PAI 82			
NAR SANTA CLARA TOTAL PAA 32				CECIL FIELD FL				TOTAL PAA 74			
SQUADRON		PUC	P3C	SQUADRON		PUC	E2C	EA6B	F14A	FA18A	FA18B
VP-65 PT MUGO	PAI	001253	9	VAW-78	PAI	001151	4				
UD II.5	PAA		8	NORFOLK	PAA		4				
VP-69 WHIDBE	PAI	001257	8	VF-201	PAI	001101			24		
UD I	PAA		8	DALLAS	PAA				14		
VP-91 SANTA	PAI	001259	9	VFA-203	PAI	001125				12	
UD III CLARA	PAA		8	CECIL	PAA					12	
VP-94 NOLA	PAI	001262	8	VFA-204	PAI	001126				11	
UD II.5	PAA		8	NEW ORLEANS	PAA					12	
COMRESPATWINGLAN	TOTAL PAI		46	VAQ-209	PAI	001650		6			
NORFOLK VA	TOTAL PAA		42	WASHINGTON	PAA			4			
SQUADRON		PUC	EP3J	P3C	VFC-12		PUC				
VP-62 JAX	PAI	001250		8	OCEANA	PAA				11	2
UD III	PAA			8	VFC-13	PAI	001603			10	2
VP-64 WILLOW	PAI	001252		9	MIRAMAR	PAA				12	2
UD II GROVE	PAA			8							
VP-66 WILLOW	PAI	001254	2	8							
UD II GROVE	PAA		2	8							
VP-68 D.C.	PAI	001256		9							
UD II.5	PAA			8							
VP-92 SOWEY	PAI	001261		10							
UD II	PAA			8							

NAS NORFOLK		NAS SANTA CLARR		NAS WASHINGTON DC	
TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED	QTY	TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED	QTY	TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED	QTY
SQUADRON T/M/S		SQUADRON T/M/S		SQUADRON T/M/S	
VAW-78	4	VP-91	9	CFLSW DET	2
VR-56	4	VR-55	4	C-20D	2
HCS-4	7	STATION	1	VAQ-209	6
HM-8	6	UC-12B	1	VP-88	9
MAG-42B	13			VR-48	2
		STEWART A.N.G.B.		STATION	1
		UC-12B		VR-53	4
NAS NORTH ISLAND		TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED		MAG-49A	
			12	FA-18A	11
				FA-18B	1
TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED		SQUADRON T/M/S		CT-39G	
	20		QTY	UC-12B	
SQUADRON T/M/S		MAG-49B			
	QTY	KC130T		2	
	12				
VR-57	4			NAS WILLOW GROVE	
HSL-84	3	NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH			
HC-85	6			TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED	
	2	TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED		41	
		SQUADRON T/M/S		QTY	
NAS OCEANA		SQUADRON T/M/S		QTY	
		VP-92		DC-9	
		VR-62		C-9B	
		STATION		P-3C	
		UC-12B		EP-3J	
				P-3C	
				SH-2G	
		NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND		STATION	
				UC-12B	
				MAG-49	
		TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED		8	
		SQUADRON T/M/S		QTY	
NAS PT MUGU		SQUADRON T/M/S		MCAS YUMA	
		VR-61		TOTAL A/C ASSIGNED	
		VP-69		13	
		DC-9		SQUADRON T/M/S	
		P-3C		QTY	
				VMFT-401	
				F-5E	
				12	
				VMFT-401	
				F-5F	
				1	

01-Apr-35

NAVY
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT

ACTIVITY	DC-9	C-98	UC-128	C-200	C-20G	C-7-55E	CT-39G	C-190T	EA-6B	FA-18A	FA-18B	EP-3J	P-3C	HP-40	MK-52	SF-26	SM-38	E-2C	U-43	TOTAL	
ALBUQUERQUE	PAA																				6
ATLANTA	PAA	4	1																		6
CECIL	PAA	3	1																		5
CALLAS	PAA																				4
	PAA	3	1																		12
	PAA	3	1																		12
JACKSONVILLE	PAA																				24
	PAA																				14
KANEOHE	PAA																				8
BAY	PAA																				8
MILWAUKEE	PAA																				2
	PAA																				0
MILWAUKEE	PAA																				10
	PAA																				12
NEW ORLEANS	PAA																				11
	PAA																				3
	PAA																				4
NORFOLK	PAA																				11
	PAA																				3
	PAA																				4
	PAA																				4
NORTH ISLAND	PAA																				4
	PAA																				4
OCEANS	PAA																				11
	PAA																				12
POINT MUGU	PAA																				9
	PAA																				8
SANTA CLARA	PAA																				9
	PAA																				4
	PAA																				4
SOUTH WEYMOUTH	PAA																				2
	PAA																				2
WASHINGTON	PAA																				2
	PAA																				2
WHIDBEY ISLAND	PAA																				4
	PAA																				4
WILLOW GROVE	PAA																				2
	PAA																				2
NAVY TOTAL	PAA	10	17	9	2	4	1	5	14	6	24	4	2	78	16	12	10	4	6	284	
	PAA	9	17	5	2	2	1	5	14	4	14	4	2	72	16	14	12	4	4	265	

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ROI Summary Air Station Wrap-Up

2000 Dec 22 11:41

Scenario	One-Time Costs	One-Time Savings	Steady-State Savings	ROI Years	20 Year NPV
Close NAS Adak	\$9.4	\$0	-\$26.2	1997 (Immed)	-\$357.0
Close NAS South Weymouth	\$16.2	\$0.3	-\$25.1	2001 (1 Yr)	-\$289.1
Realign NAS Key West	\$0.7	\$0	-\$3.2	1997 (Immed)	-\$45.3
Redirect NAS Agana (Anderson AFB)	\$41.7	\$181.1	-\$21.9	1997 (Immed)	-\$423.1
Redirect MCAS El Toro (HMT & H-53)	\$3.9	\$11.2	-\$4.0	1996 (Immed)	-\$67.0
Redirect Cecil Field F/A-18s (to Atlanta, Oceana & Beaufort)	\$42.7	\$332.3	-\$14.6	1997 (Immed)	-\$488.1
Redirect Cecil S-3s	\$33.8	\$17.5	\$2.9	Never	+\$56.0
Redirect Miramar Navy (to North Island & Oceana)	\$86.1	\$356.7	-\$2.9	1997 (Immed)	-\$291.1
Redirect NAF Detroit (from Twin Cities to Selfridge)	\$0	\$9.4	\$0	1996 (Immed)	-\$9.3
Redirect NAS Barbers Point (PWC and landfill, MWR)	\$0	\$16.9	-\$0.1	1996 (Immed)	-\$18.5

All Dollars shown in Millions


(Encl 2)

Encl (2)

Activity: NAF ADAK

Economic Area: Aleutians West Census Area, AK


Employment Data



Percentage: 0.0%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%


Per Capita Personal Income Data



Percentage: 8.3%

U.S. Average Change: 5.3%


Unemployment Percentages



Activity: NAS KEY WEST

Economic Area: Monroe County, FL


Employment Data



Percentage: 3.6%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%


Per Capita Personal Income Data



Percentage: 7.4%

U.S. Average Change: 5.3%

Unemployment Percentages




Activity: NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

Economic Area: *Essex, Middlesex, Suffolk, Plymouth, Norfolk Counties, MA




Percentage: 0.0%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%



Percentage: 5.9%


U.S. Average Change: 5.3%



Activity: NAS BRUNSWICK

Economic Area: *Cumberland County, ME


Employment Data



Percentage: 1.2%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%


Per Capita Personal Income Data



Percentage: 6.5%

U.S. Average Change: 5.3%


Unemployment Percentages



Activity: NAS ATLANTA

Economic Area: Atlanta, GA MSA


Employment Data



Percentage: 3.6%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%


Per Capita Personal Income Data



Percentage: 5.2%

U.S. Average Change: 5.3%


Unemployment Percentages



Activity: DOBBINS ARB

Economic Area: Atlanta, GA MSA


Employment Data



Percentage: 3.6%

U.S. Average Change: 1.5%


Per Capita Personal Income Data



Percentage: 5.2%

U.S. Average Change: 5.3%

Unemployment Percentages



CNA
Copeland's
rest.
- 95N
L. King West
L. West Copelands

Operational, Reserve and Training Air Stations

According to the Navy, the Navy's force structure in 2001 when measured against currently available capacity at air and reserve stations will show an excess capacity greater than 20 percent. The Navy has attempted in its 1995 BRAC proposals to (1) reduce its excess airfield capacity; (2) preserve its operational capability and (3) maintain its operational flexibility. The principal measure the Navy used for determining airfield capacity was hangar and line space. For 1995 the Navy "refined its unit of measurement to focus on "squadron modules" as its primary means of measurement. The amount of space required for a module varies based on the number and type of airplanes that require basing.

Once excess capacity has been identified the Navy subjects its findings to a configuration analysis that determines an average numerical value which is then assigned to each base. This value is referred to as military value. Military Value includes contingency and mobilization requirements, and an expressed value for the condition of the land, facilities, airspace, training ranges and overall quality of life. According to the Navy, the decision threshold that it established for leaving bases open was that the average value of all air stations left open must be at least equal to the average value of all stations that were considered. In addition, the Navy calculated a Return on Investment (ROI) for each base that was recommended for closing. The Navy used a computer model it refers to as COBRA to compare standard cost factors at bases and to estimate closing costs and savings that could be realized over a period of time if a base were to be closed.

→
NAF Adak

At a Base Closure Commission hearing held March 6, 1995 the Navy said that it plans to have less patrol aircraft in its inventory in the coming years than it does at the present time. In the case of the air facility at Adak, the Navy says that it no longer requires the facility to perform its anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission. Adak, no longer supports operational units, and scored very low in the military value category because of its lack of training areas and facilities.

According to the Navy, it will cost \$9.4 million to close the facility. The net savings in the near-term is expected to be \$108 million with a net savings value of \$354.8 million over 20 years. Closing Adak could result in a loss of around 900

jobs which is about 10% of the area's employment.

NAS Key West

The Navy's 1995 recommendation to the Commission is to convert this air station to a Naval Air Facility (NAF) This conversion avoided closing the facility at Key West and Maintains a presence at the facility because CINCLANTFLT did not want to loose a training facility and it's associated ranges. Realignment of Key West means disposing of its waterfront assets such as piers, wharf's and buildings at the Truman Annex and Trumbo Point.

The Navy estimates it's cost to downsize will be less than one-half million dollars. Near-term savings is expected to be about \$8 million, and over 20 years the Navy anticipates saving \$25 million or more. The loss of jobs (26) will be a loss to the community of less than 1% of the areas employment

insert → El Toro, Tustin, Cecil, Agana
II Reserve Air Stations

Although military value data calls were the same for both operational and reserve air stations, the military value was expanded in areas of particular concern to the Reserves. For example, recruitment for reservists was included as a value item. In addition, the BSEC considered the mobilization to be more important for reserve air stations than near-term readiness. The scores for all 6 reserve air stations that were considered (with the exception of Atlanta) were grouped very closely because of similarities in capabilities and infrastructure. Atlanta ranked lowest due to a lack of warning areas within a 100 mile radius of the air station. The first scenario the Navy ran closed Atlanta and kept the other five stations open

NAS South Weymouth

Additional scenarios developed by the Navy suggested closing NAS Brunswick as an alternative to closing Weymouth however maintaining a fully capable operating base north of Norfolk had been expressed as an interest of CINCLANTFLT.

Although Brunswick was marked for closure by the initial scenario, the Navy

believed that the air station at Brunswick offered more extensive and complete base infrastructure than did South Weymouth. In addition, capacity analysis showed that South Weymouth could be absorbed by Brunswick.

The 1993 BRAC rejected the Navy's proposal to close South Weymouth and relocate Weymouth's assets to three other locations. The Commission rejected the proposal on the grounds that information provided by the Navy inflated savings and deflated costs in favor of the Navy's recommendation.

The community at Weymouth believes that they can support additional responsibilities at the air station. The community says that the Navy's data call was for possible basing (3) C-9 aircraft at the station. Weymouth believes they can accommodate that because at the present time C-9 aircraft use the air station in route to other stations, and there is enough hangar space available to bed-down C-9 aircraft (or P-3's) who could be permanently stationed there. In Addition, a runway could be expanded for \$2.7 million to accommodate F-18's. Finally, the community believes they are an excellent reserve recruiting area due to their proximity to a number of universities and technical schools. The Navy says that it will cost about \$17 million to close Weymouth and move the naval reservists to Brunswick. They estimate the net savings at \$50 million and expect to save \$315 million over 20 years. The move could result in a loss of about 1500 jobs in the Weymouth area.

NAF Detroit

The Navy considered the relocation of the Marine Corps Reserve Center at Detroit because the Detroit air facility was closed by the 1993 BRAC and the Reserve Center is a tenant there. The Navy wants to relocate the center to Selfridge in order to take advantage of a multi-use facility. This is a redirect which would change the relocation site from Minneapolis as originally proposed by the Navy in 1993. The Navy believes that this proposal would avoid the cost of relocating the unit to Minnesota, while maintaining a Marine Corps recruiting presence in Michigan

The Navy believes it will save about \$9 million through the redirect. There are no effects expected on employment at Detroit, and a small loss of anticipated jobs at Minneapolis.

~~Robert J. ...~~
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~~...~~

MCAS EL TORO/ MCAS Tustin

The 1991 commission recommended the closure of MCAS Tustin and its 1993 recommendation was to redirect rotary wing aircraft from Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twenty-nine Palms to NAS Miramar. The community maintained that those recommendations would cause overwhelming operational problems because they would place both rotary and fixed wing aircraft at NAS Miramar. The Tustin community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission's closure decision to remain intact.

The 1993 commission recommended the closure of MCAS El Toro and to relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to other naval air stations primarily, NAS Miramar and MCAS Camp Pendleton. Additionally the commission recommended changing their 1991 recommendation which was to close MCAS Tustin and relocate its helicopter assets to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms as follows: relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island. NAS Miramar or MCAS Camp Pendleton.

The 1995 DOD recommendations calls for the redirect of aviation assets. Specifically change the receiving sites for "squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar" specified by the 1993 Commission(1993 Report, pg. 1-18) from "NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon" to "other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, NAS North Island and NAS Fallon." Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS NORTH Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton" to "other naval air stations, primarily MCAS New River; MCB Hawaii (MCAF Kaneohe Bay); MCAS Camp Pendleton; and NAS Miramar."

There has been some congressional interest in a possible redirect of rotary wing assets from the above 1995 DOD Recommendations to March AFB however they are not in either the Navy or DOD Recommendations that were provided to the commission. Anticipate some follow up on this area of interest.

NAS Agana

The 1993 DOD Recommendations did not include a recommendation for NAS Agana but was added by the commission. The Commission recommended the following: close NAS Agana. Move aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment to Andersen AFB, Guam. Retain housing at NAS Agana necessary to support Navy personnel who have relocated to Andersen AFB.

The 1995 DOD Recommendation is: Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report at pg. 1-21) for “the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment” from the closing NAS Agana from “Andersen AFB, Guam” to “other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental United States and Hawaii.”

Aircraft affected include a squadron of helicopters performing logistical functions in support of these vessels. The Fleet Commander-in-Chief desires operational synergy for his surveillance aircraft, which results in movement away from Guam. This redirect more centrally collocates those aircraft with similar assets in Hawaii and on the West Coast, while avoiding the new construction costs required in order to house these aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

NAS Alameda

The 1995 DoD Recommendation: Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission for the closure of NAS Alameda (1993 Commission Report, at pg. 1-35) for “aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support” and “reserve aviation assets” from “NAS North Island” and “NASA Ames/Moffett Field,” respectively, to “other naval air stations, primarily the NAF, Corpus Christi, Texas, to support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas.”

NAS Cecil

The Navy has proposed a redirect by disbursing aircraft stationed at NAS Cecil Field, Oceana, Beaufort, Jacksonville and Atlanta. The Navy believes that by closing so it will: (1) save on construction costs at Cherry Point and capitalize on existing facilities capacity at Oceana; (2) permit collocation of all fixed wing carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft at Jacksonville, and (3) takes advantage of

reserve recruiting available at Atlanta. The Navy redirected the previous BRAC decision by sending the f-18's at Cecil to Oceana, Beaufort and Atlanta rather than Cherry Point. In addition, the redirect moves s-3's from Cecil to Jacksonville rather than Oceana where they can be collocated with other anti-submarine warfare assets. Finally, the Reserve F-18's at Cecil are proposed to go to Atlanta rather than Beaufort to take advantage of what the Navy believes is a better recruiting area.

The total estimated one-time cost is expected to be \$66 million. Net savings for the period is about \$335 million with annual savings of about \$11 million. Over a 20 year period the Navy expects to save about \$437 million.

The Beaufort delegation in its presentation to the 1995 BRAC, claimed that they have the capacity to nearly double their home based squadrons because they have unused existing facilities on the air base, and the fact that encroachment is virtually non-existent makes it attractive as a receiving base. Beaufort claims that they could accommodate eighty to ten squadrons beyond the eight stationed there already. Moreover, Beaufort says that it would make an ideal joint-use base.

Training NAS Meridian

According to the Navy, undergraduate pilot training was evaluated separately from other air stations because their mission differs from other types of air stations. Evaluation emphasis was placed on : (1) requirements for access to special-use airspace; (2) runway condition and types that were available; (3) number of outlying fields; and (4) encroachment as it relates to expanding or changing the airfield mission. Another determining factor according to the Navy, was the ability of each air station to support jet strike training and large volumes of air traffic. The measurement used to evaluate air stations was the annual number of pilots and flight officers that need to be trained each year. The Navy believes that excess capacity in the range of 19 to 42% exists at training stations.

The first two runs of the Navy's configuration analysis closed the air station at Meridian. NAS Meridian was recommended for closing because it could not accommodate a 10-20% increase in pilot training requirements. The Navy concluded that closing Meridian and moving the supply school to Athens, Ga. and Newport would be cost effective. The Navy believes that NAS Meridian alone cannot support strike and primary pilot training without substantial construction

because it is not located near other naval bases. The Navy believes that all aviation training can be done at its existing facilities in Florida and Texas. Strike training at Meridian under this option would be done in Corpus Christi at a single base.

The 1993 BRAC recommended that Meridian remain open because two bases would be needed to accommodate future pilot training. The Navy believes that two things have occurred since the 1993 BRAC. First, there is less force structure now since the number of air wings have been reduced from 11 to 10. Secondly, the SecDef has expressed interest in consolidating functional pilot training where possible.

The cost to close Meridian will be about \$83 million with a net savings of \$158 million. Recurring costs are \$33 million, and over 20 years the Navy anticipates saving \$471 million. About 3200 jobs will be lost in Mississippi, which is about 8% of Meridian's employment base.

NAS Corpus Christi

According to the Navy's plans, the Navy will consolidate primary fixed wing training at Pensacola and move strike training from Meridian to ~~Corpus Christi~~. ^{Kingsville} Corpus Christi is also scheduled to receive helicopter mine warfare assets out of a re-direct proposal for NAS Alameda helicopters. The Navy figures its return on investment based on the savings achieved from closing Meridian. The recommendation could result in a potential job loss of 152 jobs at Corpus Christi and affect less than 1% of the job base there.

NAS ATLANTA AIRCRAFT HISTORY

- Since 1990, NAS Atlanta has experienced transitions to new aircraft; unit redesignations; units and the arrival of a newly assigned unit. In addition, one squadron was decommissioned and was not replaced.

- The changes are attributed to:
 - - VA-205 transitioned from A-7 aircraft to A-6's during 1991 and 1992. In 1993, VA-205 began drawing-down and decreased from 16 aircraft to 8 aircraft in late 1994. The last A-6 left in the fall of 1994.

 - - HMA-773 was redesignated in 1993 and began acquiring six UH-1N helicopters in addition to the AH-1 Cobra's it already had.

 - - VMO-4 was a squadron flying the OV-10 Bronco's. The squadron was deactivated on April 1994.

 - - VR-46 is receiving it's fourth C-9 which is a result of a 1993 BRAC decision to relocate the C-9's to Atlanta.

COBRA Analyses: Difference Between DON and Alternative Scenarios

Option	ROI Years	One-Time Costs	Steady State Savings	20 Year NPV Savings
DON Recommendation - Close NAS South Weymouth:	1 Year	\$17.3	\$27.4	\$315.2
Close Atlanta - F-18s to New Orleans	6 Years	\$88.8	\$17.0	\$120.6
Close Atlanta - F-18s to Ft Worth	5 Years	\$73.4	\$17.1	\$137.4
Close Atlanta - F-18s to New Orleans & Ft Worth	5 Years	\$78.2	\$16.8	\$129.1
Close Atlanta; leave South Wey. open E-2s to Dobbins	12 Years	\$132.8	\$13.3	\$33.7
Close Atlanta; leave South Wey. open E-2s to Jax	12 Years	\$132.9	\$13.5	\$36.2
Alternative 1: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey. open (C-9s to Jax; F-18s to South Wey.):	13 Years	\$149.9	\$14.2	\$29.1
Alternative 2: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey open (C-9s to Self; F-18s to South Wey.):	13 Years	\$147.5	\$14.1	\$30.2
Alternative 3: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey open (C-9s to Self.; F-18s to Brunswick):	9 Years	\$106.5	\$14.6	\$75.1

(all figures shown in \$ millions)

POINT PAPER ON NAS ATLANTA

- Sending the F-18's to Ft. Worth is the lowest cost option should Atlanta be closed. The cost for Milcon would be about \$47million.
- The cost breakdown is as follows: Dobbins would require \$5 million for moving expenses and \$3 million for planning. In addition Dobbins would require \$6 million for a maintenance facility and \$7 million for a NARCEN.

Mayport will require \$18 million for Milcon and \$17 million for one-time unique costs. (construction for vehicle parking \$2 million, training building \$10 million, and \$5 million for environment)

Ft. Worth will require \$17 million. (\$12 for a maint. facility, \$3 for a taxiway, and \$1 for POV parking)

- Personnel breakdown is as follows:
 - Mayport - 253 military
 - Ft. Worth - 83 military and 13 civilians
 - Athens, Ga - 24 military and 8 civilians
 - Norfolk - 57 military
 - Dobbins 128 military and 3 civilians
 - Atlanta - 22 military

- Positions eliminated would be 151 civilian positions and 17 early retirements



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 1000 NAVY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0834-F16
 BSAT/DMW
 20 June 1995

The Honorable Gerry E. Studds
 House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Studds:

Thank you for your letter of 2 June 1995 to the Chairman of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission concerning additional COBRA analyses for the closure of NAS Atlanta. Chairman Dixon has asked me to respond directly to you.

As requested, we have conducted three additional COBRA analyses on the closure of NAS Atlanta. In all of these scenarios, E-2s are relocated to NAS Jacksonville and H-1s are relocated to NAS South Weymouth. In the first scenario, C-9s are relocated to NAS Jacksonville and F/A-18s are relocated to NAS South Weymouth. In the second scenario, C-9s are relocated to Selfridge ANGB and F/A-18s are relocated to NAS South Weymouth. In the third scenario, C-9s are relocated to Selfridge ANGB and F/A-18s are relocated to NAS Brunswick. A copy of the COBRA output reports, Scenario Development Data Call responses and electronic copy of the COBRA data files are attached to this letter.

We continue to believe that the proposed closure of NAS Atlanta in general, and these particular scenarios, are not in the best interests of the Department of the Navy (DON). Both the Commander, Naval Reserve Force and the Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve advise that there are a number of serious operational issues raised by the proposed relocations to NAS South Weymouth in these scenarios. They believe that NAS South Weymouth is not a suitable location for F/A-18 aircraft. First, an 8,000 foot runway length is required to ensure safe operations and training. NAS South Weymouth's longest runway is only 7,000 feet long. Extension of the runway would require purchase of over 200 acres of private residences and commercial properties for both construction and clear zone easements (and the potential for the lengthy condemnation process required to obtain these property interests). Second, the F/A-18 is a foreign object damage sensitive aircraft not suited to permanent basing at locations with regular severe icing conditions and frequent ice and snow on the runways and taxiways during the winter months. Since the F/A-18 has no anti-ice or de-ice systems, operations will be severely curtailed when icing conditions exist in the area. These ice and snow problems would be of similar concern in the third scenario, where F/A-18s are relocated to NAS Brunswick. Third, the significantly greater distance from South Weymouth (as opposed to Atlanta) to the intermediate maintenance level logistics at NAS New Orleans would degrade aircraft readiness. Finally, South Weymouth lacks adequate training ranges in the local training area, thus degrading aircrew training readiness.

Operational Concerns
 - runway
 - FOD
 - distance
 to intermediate maint.

The Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve advises that NAS South Weymouth has historically been an unacceptable location for light attack helicopters (HMLA), due to the lack of nearby ranges for gunnery training, night vision and low-level terrain flying. As a result of these problems, HML-771 was deactivated at South Weymouth in the early 1990s. The last fixed wing TACAIR squadron at NAS South Weymouth (VMA-332) was also selected for deactivation based on historically low readiness ratings. In addition, moving Fourth MAW squadrons from the Atlanta area to the Northeast would significantly decrease air support for other Marine Reserve units in the southeast United States.

The second and third alternatives analyzed require relocation of C-9s to Selfridge ANGB. While we have not yet received certified data from the Air Force on the availability of existing facilities at Selfridge, we have gone ahead and conducted our COBRA analyses so that we could respond both to you and to the Commission prior to the final voting later this week. Our research indicates that hangar facilities for the C-9s are available at Selfridge, and this fact is incorporated into our analysis. What we cannot accurately quantify at this time is the additional continuing operating costs to the Department to re-establishing an aviation activity at Selfridge. As you will recall, as a result of BRAC-93, DON closed the Naval Air Facility at Selfridge and removed all DON aviation assets. This proposed scenario would require us to bring aviation assets back to Selfridge and then incur the costs to maintain an additional aviation support activity at a time when we are trying to reduce the number of support activities which we will need to operate.

In conjunction with these operational concerns, these scenarios also involve significant up-front costs for construction and land purchases. The scenario requires foregoing the substantial annual savings which would be obtained by the Departments's recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth. The table below highlights the differences in costs and savings associated with the DON recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth and the three alternatives that close NAS Atlanta instead of NAS South Weymouth.

COBRA Analyses: Difference Between DON and Alternative Scenarios

Option	ROI Years	One-Time Costs	Steady State Savings	20 Year NPV Savings
DON Recommendation - Close NAS South Weymouth:	1 Year	\$17.3	\$27.4	\$315.2
Alternative 1: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey. open (C-9s to Jax; F-18s to South Wey.):	13 Years	\$149.9	\$14.2	\$29.1
Alternative 2: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey open (C-9s to Self; F-18s to South Wey):	13 Years	\$147.5	\$14.1	\$30.2
Alternative 3: Close Atlanta; leave South Wey open (C-9s to Self; F-18s to Brunswick):	9 Years	\$106.5	\$14.6	\$75.1


(all figures shown in \$ millions)

As shown above, the Department of the Navy recommendation costs between \$90 and \$130 million less in up-front costs, and saves twice as much per year (\$13 million more per year). The Navy recommendation results in a 20 year NPV of savings which is between \$240 and \$290 more than the proposed alternatives.

We believe that retention of NAS Atlanta is essential for continued access to both the demographics/recruiting opportunities and the major airline hub in the Atlanta area. Further, our savings associated with the closure of NAS Atlanta would result in increased costs to the Air Force for such services as medical care, which are currently provided by the Navy. Finally, those economies afforded by collocation with the Air Force are not reflected as an offset to the savings shown in our COBRA analyses because we cannot firmly quantify them. Under the DON BRAC-95 plan, NAS Atlanta is fully loaded with five Navy/Marine Corps squadrons, and we continue to take advantage of the synergies and operational efficiencies resulting from collocation with the Air Force.

I have provided a copy of this letter and attachments to the Chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I trust the information provided satisfactorily addresses your concerns. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Charles P. Nemfakos
Vice Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
 1000 NAVY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0827-F16
 BSAT/DMW
 13 June 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
 Chairman, Defense Base Closure
 and Realignment Commission
 1700 North Moore Street
 Suite 1425
 Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As requested, we have conducted two additional COBRA analyses on the closure of NAS Atlanta. In the first scenario, E-2s are relocated to Dobbins ARB. In the second scenario, E-2s are relocated to Jacksonville. In both scenarios, C-9s are relocated to Dobbins ARB, H-1s and F/A-18s are relocated to NAS South Weymouth and VP-92 moves from South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick. A copy of the COBRA output reports, Scenario Development Data Call responses and electronic copy of the COBRA data files are attached to this letter. Please note that in order to provide you the most timely response possible, we are forwarding an advance copy of the certified Scenario Development Data Call response used to conduct our COBRA analysis. We will forward a final copy of the data call response, with any attendant changes, certified through the entire chain of command, as soon as we receive it.

We continue to believe that the proposed closure of NAS Atlanta in general, and these particular scenarios, which leave NAS South Weymouth open, are not in the best interests of the Department of the Navy (DON). Both the Commander, Naval Reserve Force and the Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve advise that there are a number of serious operational issues raised by the proposed relocations to NAS South Weymouth in this scenario. We believe that NAS South Weymouth is not a suitable location for F/A-18 aircraft. First, an 8,000 foot runway length is required to ensure safe operations and training. NAS South Weymouth's longest runway is only 7,000 feet long. Extension of the runway would require purchase of over 200 acres of private residences and commercial properties for both construction and clear zone easements (and the potential for the lengthy condemnation process required to obtain these property interests). Second, the F/A-18 is a foreign object damage sensitive aircraft not suited to permanent basing at locations with regular severe icing conditions and frequent ice and snow on the runways and taxiways during the winter months. Since the F/A-18 has no anti-ice or de-ice systems, operations will be severely curtailed when icing conditions exist in the area. Third, the significantly greater distance from South Weymouth (as opposed to Atlanta) to the intermediate maintenance level logistics at NAS New Orleans would degrade aircraft readiness. Finally, South Weymouth lacks adequate training ranges in the local training area, thus degrading aircrew training readiness.

F-18's < Cost - would have to extend runway (purchase land)
 Operational - icing / readiness

Helicopters - operational concerns
(no suitable training areas)

The Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve advises that NAS South Weymouth has historically been an unacceptable location for light attack helicopters (HMLA), due to the lack of nearby ranges for gunnery training, night vision and low level terrain flying. As a result of these problems, HML-771 was deactivated at South Weymouth in the early 1990s. The last fixed wing TACAIR squadron at NAS South Weymouth (VMA-332) was also selected for deactivation based on historically low readiness ratings. In addition, moving Fourth MAW squadrons from the Atlanta area to the Northeast would significantly decrease air support for other Marine Reserve units in the southeast United States.

In conjunction with these operational concerns, this scenario also involves a significant up-front cost for construction of hangars, runways, barracks, engine test cell and associated maintenance facilities, as well as the purchase of 225 acres of residential and commercial land. The scenario requires foregoing the substantial annual savings which would be obtained by the Department's recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth. The following table highlights the differences in costs and savings associated with the DON recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth and the two Commission alternatives that close NAS Atlanta instead of NAS South Weymouth.

COBRA Analyses: Difference Between DON and Commission Scenarios

Option	ROI Years	One-Time Costs	Steady State Savings	20 Year NPV Savings
DON Recommendation - Close NAS South Weymouth:	1 Year	\$17.3	\$27.4	\$315.2
Commission Alternative - Close NAS Atlanta; leave South Weymouth open (E-2s to Dobbins):	12 Years	\$132.8	\$13.3	\$33.7
Commission Alternative - Close NAS Atlanta; leave South Weymouth open (E-2s to Jacksonville):	12 Years	\$132.9	\$13.5	\$36.2

(all figures shown in \$ millions)

As shown above, the Department of the Navy recommendation, costs \$116 million less in up-front costs, saves \$14 million more per year. The Navy recommendation has almost 10 times as high a 20 year NPV of savings as the Commission alternatives.


As noted in my previous letter to you on the subject of closure of NAS Atlanta, we believe that retention of NAS Atlanta is essential for continued access to both the demographics/recruiting opportunities and the major airline hub in the Atlanta area. Further, our savings associated with the closure of NAS Atlanta would result in increased costs to the

Air Force for such services as medical care, which are currently provided by the Navy. Finally, those economies afforded by collocation with the Air Force are not reflected as an offset to the savings shown in our COBRA analyses because we cannot firmly quantify them. Under the DON BRAC-95 plan, NAS Atlanta is fully loaded with five Navy/Marine Corps squadrons, and we continue to take advantage of the synergies and operational efficiencies resulting from collocation with the Air Force.

In accordance with Section 2903(c)(5) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, and in consideration of the comments noted above, I certify the information provided to you in this transmittal is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I trust the information provided satisfactorily addresses your concerns. As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Charles P. Nemfakos
Vice Chairman
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments



Disadvantages of Scenario CR95-14

NAS South Weymouth is not a suitable location for F/A-18 aircraft. 8000' is the minimum runway length required to assure safe operations and training. NAS South Weymouth's longest runway is only 7000'.

- The F/A-18 is a foreign object damage sensitive aircraft not suited to permanent basing at locations with snow and ice on the ground. The F/A-18 has no anti-ice or de-ice systems so operations will be severely curtailed when icing conditions exist in the area.
- Extension of the runway to 8000' will require the purchase of land for construction and clear zone easements. This would require relocating private residences and commercial properties to meet the 3000' clear zone requirements. No runway overrun is possible.
- Attached study discusses lack of de-ice and anti-ice equipment on board F/A-18's.
- Significant MILCON (\$39 M) is required for this scenario for the construction of jet engine test cell, runway extension, hangars, additional barracks, power check pad, fuel tanks, A/C parking, as well as rehabilitation of hangar 1 and associated apron. Land acquisition was estimated at \$100K/acre, actual costs could be more than twice that. The condemnation process of 225 acres and more than 100 residential and commercial properties could take years.
- NAS JRB New Orleans provides intermediate level maintenance support for these F/A-18 squadrons. The logistics tail is lengthened significantly.

ADDITIONAL USMCR CONCERNS

- Geographic dispersal of Group Headquarters that would be lost by placing two Groups in the northeast, leaving the southeast vacant.
- Cause significant loss of training time for the helicopter squadron due to inclement weather
- Less training range availability for the helicopters
- Loss of operational effectiveness of all units for a minimum of three years due to re-training and recruiting time required
- High cost of living would place undue hardship on junior troops
- Would significantly reduce air support for ground units in entire southeastern region
- 4th MAW recently removed helicopters from South Weymouth because it was one of the least desirable training areas within the MAW

J a



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES RESERVE
4400 DAUPHINE STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70162-6400

- REPLY REFER TO:

3000

5

11 June 95

From: Commander, Marine Forces Reserve
To: Commander, Naval Reserve Forces

Subj: BRAC DATA CALL SCENARIO NO. CR95-014/014A

1. The subject scenario proposes the closure of NAS Atlanta, GA. This proposal would relocate three USMCR Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing units from NAS Atlanta to NAS South Weymouth, MA. Additionally, a USMCR F/A-18 squadron at NAS Cecil Field, FL, would relocate to NAS South Weymouth instead of NAS Atlanta as detailed in the Department of Navy BRAC-95 recommendations. Finally, the scenario would relocate two Fourth MAW units, a support squadron and a STINGER missile air defense unit from NAS Atlanta to Naval Station, Mayport, FL.

2. Regarding the prospect of siting Fourth MAW units at NAS South Weymouth some background is instructive. We deactivated a fixed wing attack squadron, VMA-332, in June of 1992 as a result of Active Force downsizing. The Active Force endstrength required to support the squadron's reserve personnel and aircraft was simply no longer available. VMA-332 was selected for deactivation because of historically low readiness ratings. These low ratings stemmed from less than optimal intermediate maintenance which was available only off-site, and inadequate training range availability within a reasonable ferry distance. Also, in parallel with Marine Corps reorganization, we deactivated HML-771 at South Weymouth. This was part of a Marine Corps initiative which organized a smaller number of light attack composite squadrons (HMLA) to reduce command overhead. NAS South Weymouth was an unacceptable location for an HMLA because of the lack of nearby ranges for gunnery training, night vision, and low level terrain flying. Gunnery training represents a high percentage of the HMLA training and readiness syllabus. Similar to the fixed wing support, South Weymouth was also less than satisfactory in terms of helicopter intermediate maintenance. Dynamic helicopter components such as engines, transmissions, and rotors were repaired in Norfolk, VA. This factor resulted in HML-771 averaging only 40% full mission capable, half the acceptable rate and among the lowest of 4th MAW squadrons.

3. Having reviewed the history above and the Navy concerns discussed in the data call response, the following factors are noted by the Commanding General, Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing, arguing against more flying units at NAS South Weymouth:

a. Fixed wing issues:

(1) Current runway length for F/A-18 operations is below minimum safe length for continuous training operations. A minimum of 8,000 feet would be required to provide a margin of safety to ensure safe daily training operations in all weather conditions.

(2) South Weymouth lacks adequate fixed wing training ranges in the local training area. The reduced access to viable training ranges for F/A-18 operations significantly degrades aircrew training readiness.

(3) The distance from South Weymouth to intermediate maintenance level logistics at NAS New Orleans degrades aircraft readiness.

(4) South Weymouth's location significantly degrades training time availability because of more inclement weather.

b. Rotary wing issues:

(1) Limited training ranges are available for helicopter training. In particular, there are no air to ground gunnery range for helicopters within local training area.

(2) Inclement weather reduces training time.

(3) Maintenance support for helicopter operations at South Weymouth has historically been a problem. Negative maintenance and training issues for South Weymouth prompted MAFORRES to move this helicopter asset to a more viable training site.

c. Personnel Readiness issues:

(1) South Weymouth has the second highest cost of living in CONUS which puts significant financial hardship on junior Active Force Marines assigned to the South Weymouth area.

(2) Access to commercial air transportation is constrained with significant commuting distance between major commercial airport and NAS South Weymouth. This will limit participation of drilling reservists from outside the Boston area.

d. MARFORRES training issues:

(1) Marine Forces Reserve units train as they will be employed in war with air, ground and service support units working together. Consequently, our units within ground, air and service support elements are organized and sited regionally. Moving Fourth MAW squadrons from the Atlanta area to the northeast would significantly decrease air support for other Marine Reserve units in the southeast United States.

(2) There are no station caretaker billets assigned at the USMCR squadron level. Remain behind station caretaker billets are incorporated into the Marine Aircraft Group headquarters. Assigning VMFA 142 and HMLA 773 to South Weymouth without corresponding transfer of the Marine Air Group headquarters would result in no support for South Weymouth squadrons during mobilization.

(3) On the other hand, moving the Group headquarters to the New England area would place two Marine Aircraft Group headquarters in the northeast, thus extending the lines of communication for wing units in the southeast United States, working counter to the Marine Forces Reserve regional concept.

4. Recruiting. While the Boston area has adequate prior service recruiting populations, the Atlanta area is populated with more than double the number of people employed in aviation skills (35,000 Atlanta, 14,000 Boston - 1990 census). These figures support the DoN recommendation for retaining NAS Atlanta and relocating the F/A-18's from NAS Cecil Field to NAS Atlanta. As one of the largest airline hubs, the presence of Atlanta's international airport ensures adequate numbers of both fixed and rotary wing pilots, living locally and commuting inexpensively from out of the area.

5. Loss of readiness and continuity. If the subject proposal is adopted, the units involved would suffer an unacceptable loss of readiness for 3-5 years. Readiness impacts are additive. With the closure of NAS Atlanta more than two thirds of the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing will have undergone significant loss of unit readiness. With a smaller Active force the Marine Corps relies upon combat ready Reserve augmentation and reinforcement in the national strategy for major regional conflict. The Marine Corps needs these units now. Actions such as closing NAS Atlanta result in long-term gaps of combat ready unit availability.

6. Additional costs. This scenario would exact millions in military construction, moving and recruiting/training costs. Coupled with 3-5 year loss of unit readiness, these proposals run counter to the BRAC imperative of saving taxpayer dollars.

7. In summary, the scenario proposed would result in the following major disadvantages:

- (a) Inadequate fixed and rotary wing training ranges for units relocated to NAS South Weymouth
- (b) Inadequate fixed and rotary wing intermediate maintenance
- (c) Less favorable recruiting in the Boston area
- (d) Millions in construction costs
- (e) Loss of key unit capability for 3-5 years, affecting warfighting readiness.

8. Recommendation: In the interest of combat readiness and efficient management, retain NAS Atlanta as an operating Reserve air station. Do not relocate USMCR units currently stationed at NAS Atlanta.



K. J. POTTHOFF
By Direction



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Please refer to this number
when responding 950609-10

6 June 1995

Dear Chairman Dixon,

I appreciate you sending Commissioners Kling and Cornella to visit NAS Atlanta yesterday. We were pleased to have the opportunity to show them the outstanding facilities and explain the superb operational capabilities of NAS Atlanta.

The opportunities for joint training and the cost savings associated with the collocation of NAS Atlanta and Dobbins ARB can not be overstated. Closing NAS Atlanta would not save Department of Defense money, but merely transfer costs to the Air Reserve. Additionally, we estimate costs to duplicate the infrastructure at another location would include over \$60 million of MILCON.

The Atlanta area offers unique availability of aviation industry personnel and population growth which clearly have a strong positive influence on the demographic needs and recruiting programs of the Navy. These factors combined with the operational requirements of the Fleet Commanders enforce my strong conviction that NAS Atlanta is a vital aviation asset.

I hope we clearly communicated to the Commissioners the positive attributes of NAS Atlanta and its importance to our Navy and the Department of Defense. Should you or your fellow commissioners desire additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

BASE VISIT REPORT

NAVAL AIR STATION, ATLANTA, GA

5 JUNE 1995

LEAD COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner S. Lee Kling

ACCOMPANYING COMMISSIONER:

Commissioner Al Cornella

COMMISSION STAFF:

Mr. Doyle Reedy

LIST OF ATTENDEES:

Senator Sam Nunn
Senator Paul Coverdell
Representative Newt Gingrich
Representative Bob Barr
Representative Saxby Chambliss
Representative Mac Collins
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Pirie
Admiral Prueher
General Hearney
Vice Admiral Johnson
Rear Admiral Olson
General Burba
Rear Admiral Robert J. Natter
Brigadier General Whitnell
Brigadier General Randy West
Mr. Arnold Punaro
Mr. Norton
Colonel Connolly
Captain Hargis
Colonel Terry Paul
Colonel Briggs
Mr. Holliday
Colonel Haber
Captain Frazier
LtCol Young
LtCol Haber

Commander Williams

BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:

- The air station trains reservists for their mobilization assignments with the active forces, and provides administrative coordination and logistic support for the tenant reserve squadrons and commands.

DOD RECOMMENDATION:

- Not Applicable.

DOD JUSTIFICATION:

- Not Applicable.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- The Commissioners visited all of the base facilities including VP-46, MAG -42 and various support elements such as the maintenance facility, hangars, and cable rework facility.

KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

- Although the Navy ranked NAS Atlanta as sixth in military value out of six reserve air stations considered by the BSAT, the Navy recommended keeping NAS Atlanta open.
- The Navy maintains that the Military Value Matrix is only the starting point for making a decision about whether or not to close a facility, and that operational needs and the opportunity to achieve jointness at the least cost to the individual services may sometimes override initial rankings.
- The Navy says that the Data Call for NAS Atlanta represents only a snapshot of the air station and resulted in a lower ranking than would otherwise be the case if the base is viewed in a historical context.
- The Navy believes that because it is a tenant on Dobbins Air Force base the Navy saves money by not paying for essential airfield services and coupled with no construction costs, it can train pilots and personnel at a lower cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

- The Cobb Chamber of Commerce believes that using the NAS Atlanta facility is in the best interest of the taxpayer because of it's ready infrastructure, available capacity, joint-use savings and rich demographic pool of potential reservists.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

- None at this time.

6 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: MG(R) Joseph Robles

SUBJECT: Georgia BRAC Actions

I'm sorry I could not welcome you and the other Commissioners to Atlanta. I'm contractually obligated to be in Pennsylvania and could not arrange a release.

I'm very concerned about distorted information you have received on one of your field trips and its impact on Naval Air Station (NAS)-Atlanta. This information is associated with the military value matrix and model used in the BRAC process.

The Navy staff and DOD used their BSAT value matrix and Cobra model as tools in making their BRAC recommendations. In so doing, they fully understood that no model nor matrix could perfectly find application to all their installations. The complex dimensions of their bases' structure, infrastructure, and readiness requirements simply defy the universal and rigid application of one matrix or model to determine absolute comparative results. A matrix/model or parts thereof and its timeline for data calls that perfectly addresses one base's situation imperfectly addresses another and visa versa. The Navy staff and leadership did the right thing; they used the best matrix/model possible then applied heavy doses of common sense and military judgement in making their decisions.

For these reasons the Navy reasonably applied "over-ride" options to the matrix/model results that characterized NAS-Atlanta with inferior demographics and training area capabilities. They knew that the BSAT data call occurred during an "old-to-new" structure hiatus when personnel fill was purposefully being drawn down while the old structure was still technically on the books and before personnel requirements for the new structure had become operative.

They also knew that NAS-Atlanta, as well as aviation units from the six other Reserve components in the Atlanta area (all at Dobbins), historically had among the best if not the best personnel fill of unit's throughout the U. S. That reality stands to reason given the Atlanta location of Delta Air Lines major hub along with Lockheed, McDonald Douglas, Hewlett Packard and many other defense related firms. By national census Atlanta has one of the most demographically rich pools of aviation skills in the U. S.

The Navy also realizes that its previous aviation squadrons in Atlanta, as well as those of other services in the area, traditionally have enjoyed high training readiness despite not having a warning area within 100 nautical miles. They know that 90% of required training can be conducted locally at splendid MOA's, air-to-ground ranges and a supersonic test flight area. When a warning area is required by the F-18's programmed to come to Atlanta, they can reach one within 40 minutes. As you know it frequently takes the Army longer than that to move its tanks to gunnery ranges on their home installations. For these reasons, the 10 point BSAT matrix

decrement for warning area criteria was appropriately put in a positive context by the Navy and DOD BRAC decision makers.

The Marine leadership also has a major stake in NAS-Atlanta. Their helicopter gun ships and logistical support units here must be centrally located to the supported tri-service rapid deployment units in the Southeast. They also must tap into the aviation rich demographics of Atlanta. They can't do that from other Navy/Marine stations in this part of the country without incurring unacceptable penalties in personnel fill.

Finally, and very importantly, NAS-Atlanta is likely the most cost effective installation in DOD. They enjoy this advantage because the Navy and Marines are two of 6 Reserve Components that share the base operations costs at Dobbins AFB. This is the joint paradigm of cost and combat effectiveness envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and which makes so much sense to the nation. We should be finding ways to build more of these joint bases not tearing down the ones we have. It would be a travesty to the American taxpayer and to DOD readiness to move NAS-Atlanta from Dobbins when substantial BRAC closures and savings can occur elsewhere.

Our Military Affairs Committee in Georgia has worked hard to insure that whatever we do or whatever we stand for has a reciprocity of benefit to the nation, to DOD and to our State. We also strive to conduct our business based on principles and behavioral proprieties. I'm concerned that well meaning, yet overly-zealous and distorted input you are getting from other quarters will drown out what we consider our more reasoned and ethical approach to the BRAC process. That is the main reason I'm forwarding this memorandum to you.

We just ask the BRAC Commission to sort through the distortions and consider our "quieter input " equally with the more pervasive, "louder" input you are receiving elsewhere.

Sincerely,


Edwin Burba, Jr.



U. S. Department of Justice

Drug Enforcement Administration
75 Spring Street SW
Suite 740
Atlanta, GA 30303

June 6, 1995

FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
JUN 15 1995
950615-20

Mr. Alan Dixon
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Dixon,

I am deeply concerned regarding the attention that the Naval Air Station (NAS) Atlanta has received by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I hope that the committee fully appreciates the significance and importance of NAS Atlanta. NAS Atlanta is a vital link in our government's drug interdiction effort. NAS Atlanta's support of the drug interdiction reaches across the entire southeast United States.

NAS Atlanta's strategic location allows for the most rapid response to both east and gulf coast drug importation hot spots. NAS Atlanta's mission capability is already substantial. The arrival of the E-2 surveillance aircraft can do nothing but enhance NAS Atlanta's drug interdiction and support mission. We at DEA have relied heavily on NAS Atlanta in the past, and we are planning an expanded role for the base in the future.

As our nation's efforts against the scourge of the mighty drug cartels increase, we at DEA seek support in our mission from the military. NAS Atlanta is vital to our success in our constant effort to provide a drug free America.

Your support in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Raymond J. McKinnon
Special Agent in Charge

RJM: am

NAS Atlanta

Closure Will Result in:

- Duplicating Infrastructure at Other Locations
- Avoidable One-Time Costs of \$75 Million
- Losing Joint Training Opportunities
- Minimal Savings Because:
 - NAS Is Co-Located With Dobbins ARB
 - Some USNR Missions (I.E. Medical) Must Be Assumed by USAFR
- Transfer of Reserve Squadrons Will Result in:
 - Loss of Access to Rich Demographic Area
 - Increase in Training Costs Due to Airlift Requirements

*infrastructure (increased costs)
minimal savings*

*Increased Costs
- duplicate
- infrastructure increase
- training costs*

*no offset
Minimal Savings
- major costs borne by others
- medical borne by USAF*

- In the primary scenario DON must build at NAS Mayport for the Marine Corps Reserve and build at NAS New Orleans for the Navy/Marine Corps F-18s. The total MILCON bill for this scenario is \$63 million.
- The NAS Atlanta/Dobbins ARB complex hosts all six reserve components. It is one of the very few DoD facilities that does.
- NAS Atlanta is the least expensive reserve NAS to operate (more than \$4 million cheaper than the closest competition). Dobbins ARB assumes all costs for operating the runways.
- Closing NAS Atlanta will not save DoD money, but mainly just transfer costs to the Air Reserve.
- The Atlanta Area grew 40% from 1980 to 1992. It has 35,000 aviation industry personnel in the area and a large number of returning prior service personnel. Moreover Atlanta's diverse population allows NAS Atlanta to play a key role in minority recruiting for the DON.
- If NAS Atlanta is closed, airlifts (at increased costs) must be used to get Atlanta reservists to other sites and meet manning objectives.

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - What one-time cost avoidances will be realized by not closing NAS Atlanta?

Answer: The Navy will save between \$73 and \$89 million in one-time costs by not closing NAS Atlanta (including as much as \$63 million in MILCON).

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - How much excess capacity will be eliminated with the closure of NAS Atlanta?

Answer: Very little excess capacity will be eliminated. Because of demographics, the F-18 squadrons will need to go to NAS New Orleans or NAS Fort Worth (or a combination of these two sites) and the Marine helicopters and supporting units to NAS Mayport. All of these moves would require building additional infrastructure.

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - Why did the Navy's Military Value Matrix not reflect NAS Atlanta's true demographic value?

Answer: The Matrix was a snapshot of demographics on 30 September 1993. At that time, the Marine Corps had just moved a large number of billets into NAS Atlanta (1 July 1993) and had not yet filled the billets (even though the billets had been moved to NAS Atlanta because of the rich demographics). This resulted in the low demographic scores.

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - Why did NAS Atlanta score low in training areas/airspace in the Military Value Matrix?

Answer: The main reason NAS Atlanta scored low in training areas/airspace is the air station is more than 100 miles from an ocean and lost over seven points in the scoring of Warning Areas (special use airspace over water). Clearly training syllabus workarounds exist for the lack of warning areas. Isolated special events such as missile shoots and supersonic flights can be accomplished through "out and in" flights to warning areas around the Southeast coast.

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - Given that you knew about these two anomalies that resulted in a low military value ranking, why didn't you go back and adjust the scoring criteria?

It must be remembered that the military value ranking was just a starting point in the analysis. We did, in fact, use military value in our configuration models. But, those model outputs only were used as initial points of departure for developing base closure and realignment scenarios. The final scenarios and recommendations were made, rather, during detailed discussions in countless deliberative sessions for which you have the minutes. It was our firm policy to not change military values after the scoring had been completed realizing that some might view such a change as "cooking the books."

Question: Re: Close NAS Atlanta - Why do the Base Operating Costs for NAS Atlanta run well

below the norm for Reserve Naval Air Stations?

Answer: Because NAS Atlanta is co-located with Dobbins ARB, cost sharing reduces expenditures for both reserve components. The Air Reserve provides runway maintenance, radar, weather support, and crash and fire protection. The Navy/Marine Corps team operates the MEDICAL Facility and the child care center while Lockheed operates the base sewage facility. These are examples of the synergies that reduce Navy Department costs at NAS Atlanta.

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - How many Reserve Components actually drill at the Dobbins/NAS Atlanta complex?

Answer: NAS Atlanta/Dobbins ARB is one of the few facilities in the entire Department of Defense that is home to each of the six DoD reserve components: the Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard all work and drill on the site. This is truly a Joint use facility.

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - Are there any benefits or disadvantages associated with the co-location of other units?

The head of our Naval Reserves has stated that there are immense benefits with locating his reserve squadrons with either active naval aviation squadrons or other military department reserve aircraft squadrons. The synergies associated with joint infrastructure support, common training objectives, and professional interests cannot be overstated. If you endorse our recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth, all remaining reserve air stations will be joint bases.

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - How well can NAS Atlanta's infrastructure accommodate the three squadrons that are recommended by DON/DoD to be located there?

Answer: Current existing facilities at NAS Atlanta can house all three squadrons proposed to be transferred to NAS Atlanta. No MILCON is required. This is truly a "drive up" facility that can continue to house the two squadrons currently assigned plus the additional three squadrons proposed to move to the air station (tomorrow!).

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - Is the lack of a crosswind runway at NAS Atlanta a limiting factor?

Answer: The lack of a crosswind runway is not a limiting factor. Local records at Dobbins ARB show an aircraft has not been diverted for crosswinds in the last four years. The length of the runway is a much more important factor with extra runway length needed for taking off with heavy loads and dealing with emergencies. All fixed wing Navy/Marine Corps aircraft prefer to operate off runways that are at least 8000 feet long.

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - Why did you decide that the new reserve E-2 squadron, VAW-77 should be located in Atlanta rather than remain in Norfolk, the site of the old active duty squadron?

Once again it boils down to demographics. There are an abundance of skilled naval aviators and maintenance technicians in the Atlanta area due, in part, to the large commercial airline industry in the Atlanta area. Additionally, Atlanta is closer to the area in which these aircraft will be employed conducting routine drug interdiction surveillance operations.

Question: **Re: Close NAS Atlanta** - Why did the DON elect not to close NAS Atlanta when it had the lowest military value score?

Answer: The short answer is that we could not abandon the rich demographics of the Atlanta area. Our review of reserve air stations did initially conclude that NAS Atlanta should be evaluated for potential closure. However, after thoroughly examining all of the requirements that would have to be replicated elsewhere, we concluded that NAS Atlanta could not be closed. Now, I want to be very clear here. We did not then decide to propose that NAS South Weymouth be recommended for closure. In fact, at that point there was a decision that no reserve air stations would be closed.

It was during our analysis of active stations that we started to look at the closure of NAS South Weymouth. As you may recall, we initially looked at closing NAS Brunswick. This proposal, however, was viewed with concern by our operational commanders. Specifically, we were asked to see if we could keep the most capable of our two north eastern air bases, Brunswick, and to see if Brunswick could accommodate the reserve squadrons located at South Weymouth. As you are aware, we were able to do just that. So any conclusion that NAS South Weymouth was proposed for closure because we decided to retain NAS Atlanta is just not correct!



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Please refer to this number
when responding 950605-6

2 June 1995

Dear Chairman Dixon,


It has come to my attention that there might be a misperception or a concern about the Navy BRAC decision-making process as it relates to East Coast Naval Air Stations and some question regarding the input provided by the Fleet Commander.

Since 1993 there have been significant reductions in naval aviation force structure. Consequently, excess aviation support capacity exists on the East Coast. Accordingly, the Department of the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) considered various scenarios and alternatives for reducing excess capacity. One scenario included closing NAS BRUNSWICK and moving P-3 Squadrons to NAS JACKSONVILLE. However, during iterative BSEC discussions with major owners/operators, the Fleet Commander (CINCLANTFLT) identified the need to maintain at least one capable naval air station to support real world and exercise requirements north of the major fleet concentration in Norfolk, Virginia. This consideration was an important factor in the decision not to close NAS BRUNSWICK.

Similarly, Fleet Commander operational needs and demographic considerations militated against closing NAS ATLANTA to reduce Reserve Air Station excess capacity. The BSEC decided that the best Total Force decision was to close NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH and relocate its reserve assets to NAS BRUNSWICK. NAS BRUNSWICK can accommodate these units without a requirement for military construction expenditures.

The Fleet Commander's role in all our BRAC deliberations was vital and ensured a proper operational perspective. Indeed, an independent GAO assessment supported our methodology and endorsed the involvement of the operational commanders.

Sincerely,



J. M. BOORDA
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 8 NOVEMBER 1994

decisions regarding the RAS. NAS Atlanta was identified by the model as a potential closure; however, since NAS Atlanta is a tenant on another facility, savings in closing it may be limited. The BSEC decided to release a COBRA scenario development data call to collect further cost information on NAS Atlanta's closure.

12. The BSEC then focused on the model's best solution for NAS/MCAS as a starting point. Adjustments will be made to that solution based on the BSEC's judgment.

a. Closing the runway and associated air facilities at Mayport makes no sense in terms of dollar savings as the Naval Station Mayport is a carrier homeport which is remaining open. The budget for the entire Naval Station Mayport (which includes the air facilities) is \$57 million, so there would likely be little saving in closing the runway and associated air facilities alone. Because of its location, the air facilities have the added value of supporting carrier operations.

b. As previously discussed regarding naval stations, CINCLANT has expressed the need to keep Roosevelt Roads for its training capabilities (see the BSEC deliberative report of 31 October 1994).

c. Similarly, El Centro plays an important role as a training facility.

The BSEC decided to send out COBRA scenario development data calls on the four remaining NAS/MCAS identified in the model's solution (Adak, Key West, Brunswick, and Beaufort) to gather more information on the costs and savings associated with their closure.

13. Because the DoN infrastructure is declining, the BSEC agreed that it must look at the total laydown of DoN aircraft and discussed the possibility of closing one or more RAS and realigning the squadrons to a NAS/MCAS to enhance capabilities. Ultimately, the BSEC decided to consider these matters incrementally by waiting for the COBRA analysis on the stations specified above.

14. The deliberative session adjourned at 1506.



ORVAL E. NANGLE
LTCOL, USMC
Recording Secretary

Subj: REPORT OF BSEC DELIBERATIONS ON 12 DECEMBER 1994

97
98
103

14. Mr. Wennergren briefed the results of the COBRA analysis for Scenarios 097 and 098 and that part of Scenario 103 affecting RESFOR assets. See enclosure (15). Upon reviewing the analyses of Scenarios 097 and 098, the BSEC noted that from a cost analysis perspective the scenarios paid off (e.g., return on investment was either immediate or in one year). The BSEC also noted the previously expressed concerns of RESFOR regarding the loss of the demographically-rich Atlanta area that would result from a closure of NAS Atlanta. The BSEC further noted CINCLANTFLT's concern regarding the loss of the only major base north of Norfolk that would result from the closure of NAS Brunswick. Upon discussion, the BSEC decided not to further consider Scenarios 097 and 093. However, the BSEC did accept that part of Scenario 103 concerning RESFOR assets in which: NAS Atlanta remains open, Atlanta/Dobbins capabilities are fully utilized, the C-9s move from NAS Atlanta to Dobbins AFB; and Navy/Marine Corps F/A-18 Reserve Squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort (as a result of BRAC-93) move to NAS Atlanta; NAS South Weymouth closes; and NAS Brunswick remains open, with the C-130s moving to NAS Brunswick. In addition, the BSEC accepted proposals contained in the data response that moved Marine Reserve support squadrons (MASS-6 and MWSS-474) to Otis AFB, moved the Ordnance Maintenance Contract Company to Quantico, and maintained surface Reserve units at Quincy vice moving to NAS South Weymouth as previously directed in BRAC-93. The BSEC disapproved a proposal contained in the data response which established a NARCEN at Quincy. The BSEC directed that the NARCEN be established at NAS Brunswick and that \$100,000 in military construction costs be allowed to rehabilitate existing facilities (vice the \$5.9 million in military construction costs to build a NARCEN at Quincy). The above scenario would continue to be considered in the base closure process.

15. Mr. Wennergren briefed the results of COBRA analysis for the aviation layoffs set forth in scenarios 099 and 103. See enclosure (16). Scenario 103 is identical to scenario 099 except that the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Reserve squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort move to NAS Atlanta vice NAS Pt. Mugu and NAS New Orleans. Upon review of the baseline scenarios and scenario alternatives, the BSEC directed the BSAT to further clarify the various scenarios by more clearly identifying the air stations, squadrons, and movements involved in the various aviation layoffs. This would be of assistance to the BSEC in the evaluative process. The BSEC would continue its review of these scenarios at its next session.

16. Commander Heckleman briefed the results of COBRA analysis for the closing of FISC Oakland (Scenario 024). The one-time costs were \$68.8 million, return on investment was in 9 years, and the 20 year NPV was \$38.6 million. See enclosure (17). The analysis reflected the elimination of 181 officer/enlisted/civilian

RESFOR
CINCLANT

*



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

5450

Ser N095/5U568983

2 Jun 95

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION

Subj: NAVAL AIR STATION ATLANTA

Please refer to this number
when responding 950605-3

1. NAS ATLANTA, which as you know is located aboard DOBBINS Air Reserve Base (ARB), is one of our finest joint Reserve facilities. It is an extremely low cost, high return Naval Air Station located in the demographically rich Atlanta area. Greater Atlanta has grown in population by over 40 percent from 1980 to 1992 and as the hub of a major national airline is one of our finest and richest demographic areas for Naval Reserve aviation personnel. The DOBBINS/NAS ATLANTA complex supports Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force personnel and through the common use of facilities for operations, training and infrastructure takes advantage of numerous economies and efficiencies.
2. The Navy and Marine Corps continues with its plans to move units aboard NAS ATLANTA. These moves, when combined with the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve's personnel who are already there, will amount to 2,524 Selected Reservists and 1,200 Full Time Support (military and civilian) personnel and will strengthen the position of NAS ATLANTA as one of our country's most important Reserve operating bases. Without NAS ATLANTA there would be a critical demographic void in the Southeast for drilling Reservists and the carefully crafted demographic plan for the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve would unravel.
3. I am encouraged that the commission will visit NAS ATLANTA and will have the opportunity to see first hand this outstanding model of joint efficiency and operations. We should continue to strengthen NAS ATLANTA and proceed with the DOD plan for making the NAS ATLANTA/DOBBINS ARB complex one of the premier examples of joint cooperation in our national defense arsenal.

T. F. Hall

T. F. HALL
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Reserve



MICHAEL J. BOWERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Law
State of Georgia

40 CAPITOL SQUARE SW
ATLANTA, GA 30334-1300

June 1, 1995

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL
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Honorable Alan Dixon
Chairman
The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1200 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

950607-24

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing in reference to the Navy E-2-C Squadron at Naval Air Station Atlanta. I understand that this squadron will be available for use in counterdrug activities. As someone who works closely with state law enforcement officials at all levels, I cannot overemphasize the importance of the availability of military resources to be used in assisting law enforcement in the counterdrug effort. This squadron will be a significant enhancement to the capability of Georgia law enforcement officials at all levels. Its location at the Naval Air Station is extremely significant in this regard.

If you have questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Michael J. Bowers
MICHAEL J. BOWERS
Attorney General

MJB:lb

DJYLS



May 8, 1995

Mr. Alex Yellin
The Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Yellin:


After an analysis of the Base Closure and Realignment records in your library, we noted that certain members of the South Weymouth community may have caused some confusion by their comments about the viability of NAS Atlanta. We would like to take this opportunity to respond.

Attached is a brief fact sheet about NAS Atlanta, its demographics and its record as a most successful air station. Additionally, we would like to point out that **NAS Atlanta is a modern facility and will require no milcon for any of the scheduled or recommended moves of aircraft or personnel to NAS Atlanta.**

We thank you for this opportunity to point out some of the facts as they relate to NAS Atlanta. We believe that a fair analysis of these facts substantiates the Department of Defense's recommendations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Cordially,


Larry Wheeler
Chairman


Ben Haskew
President & CEO

LW/BH/sj

NAS ATLANTA DEMOGRAPHICS A FORMULA FOR SUCCESS

The importance of demographics in the success or failure of any reserve activity cannot be argued. A viable demographic pool is the key element in any installation's ability to fully man its reserve units with qualified individuals which can meet mobilization needs and conduct safe day-to-day flight operations. The combined assets of NAS Atlanta and the Naval Surface Reserve Center (which is relocating to Dobbins ARB) total 1760 drilling reservists living within 50 miles. The effortless commute to Atlanta allows an additional 450 reservists to drill in Atlanta, for a total of 2210 reservists drilling on site. The following data clearly shows that NAS Atlanta has one of the richest manpower pools in the country:

- NAS Atlanta is one of the few Naval Air Reserve Activities that does not rely on airlifts to bring in reservists. This is a considerable savings in aircraft operating costs and allows these valuable logistic assets to be used for fleet support.

- Currently NAS Atlanta (including Naval Reserve tenant commands) is allowed 897 enlisted billets with 873 currently allowed to drill in a pay status. If non-pay reservists were allowed to drill in a pay status the drilling reservist numbers would increase to 896, **99.9% enlisted manning**.

- Officer manning is currently capped at 170 officers (including Naval Reserve tenant commands) and NAS Atlanta will have to transfer 15 officers out, in order to reach these reduced numbers. If non-pay reservists were included the numbers would increase to 344 officers, **150% officer manning!**

- FY-93 all NAS Atlanta augment units were in a R-1 status, the highest possible combined rating of personnel manning and mobilization readiness. NAS Atlanta was the only Naval Reserve Air Station to achieve this unprecedented overall level of readiness.

- FY-94 NAS Atlanta had all augment units in a R-1 status. NAS Atlanta, during a Commander Naval Air Reserve Force inspection, was cited as having one of the best reserve training departments in the Naval Air Reserve Force!

- FY-95 NAS Atlanta stood up a new Carrier Group Unit 0867 to directly support fleet Carrier Battle Groups. Within six months this prestigious unit was at 70% readiness, with an expected 90% readiness rating (R-1) by the close of the fiscal year.

The demographics can be argued as can any statistically based study. However, the number of awards won by NAS Atlanta point to a combination of reserve support and

quality of life that spell success. The following awards clearly show that NAS Atlanta is one of the top reserve sites in the nation:

- NAS Atlanta received a **Chief of Naval Operations Installation Excellence Award** in July 1994.
- VR-46, based at NAS Atlanta, was selected as the 1994 Noel Davis Award winner as the **number one fleet logistics squadron!**
- 1993 Conway Trophy winner as the **number one Naval Air Reserve Activity!**
- NR Naval Station Rota 0167, based at NAS Atlanta, was the winner of the 1993 Barto Trophy as the **number one Naval Air Reserve Augmentation Unit!**
- 1992 Robert S. Gray Maintenance Award winner for **best maintenance department.**
- Winner of the 1992 **Naval Air Reserve Activity Safety Ashore award.**
- Commander Naval Reserve Force nominee for the 1992 Bronze Hammer Award.
- Honorable mention, Chief of Naval Operations 1992 NEY competition.
- Meritorious Unit Commendation awarded in 1990.
- The continued success of NAS Atlanta was recently recognized by the awarding of a **Meritorious Unit Commendation for sustained superior performance** from 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1994.

In closing there are four major factors to consider when considering what is responsible for the success of Dobbins/NAS Atlanta Joint Reserve Base.

- Outstanding Demographics as previously addressed.
- Geographics; commercial growth attracts high quality personnel essential to a good reserve program.
 - Jointness; at few other bases will you find all 6 DoD reserve components at the same location.
 - Community and business support for the DoD mission.
 - FY-95 NAS Atlanta was selected as the site for the newest asset in the Naval Air Reserve, VAW-77. This squadron will fly the E-2 early warning aircraft to assist the DEA in the vital drug interdiction mission. This decision was made in part due to the number of Naval Aviators available in the Atlanta area to fly and manage the avionics systems of the E-2.

- FY-95 Commander Naval Air Reserve Force requested a BRAC redirect to place VFA-203 and CVWR 20 at NAS Atlanta. These were decisions again based on reservist availability to staff these prestigious units.

- **Naval Reserve Recruiting, located in Atlanta, has consistently attained high recruiting goals:**

⇒ Atlanta has three reserve Officer recruiting Officers assigned to its demographic area, the largest number assigned in the U.S.

✓ ⇒ In FY-94, NAS Atlanta was the #1 NAS in Officer Recruiting.

⇒ Metro Atlanta area is critical to the minority recruiting effort.

⇒ Atlanta reserve recruiting made significant contributions to the FY-93 nation wide recruiting effort which is directly related to the Atlanta area (Detachment Four) being awarded Naval Reserve Recruiting Command Detachment of the year for FY-93.

⇒ As a major hub for Delta, ASA, Value Jet, KIWI and Air South, the local availability of pilots and aviation rates for manning of aviation units is facilitated.

⇒ A comparison of Naval Reserve Recruiting Command data for FY-94 shows Atlanta as a clear leader:

	ATLANTA	SOUTH WEYMOUTH
ENLISTED		
Veterans	254	155
SAM's	22	20
Total	276	175

OFFICER		
Total	42	16

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BRAC 95 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The Department of the Navy must move aggressively toward a substantially smaller, more affordable infrastructure, while maintaining a high quality, fully responsive force beyond the year 2008. This infrastructure must be the minimum essential to support our "...From the Sea" doctrine while enhancing readiness and quality of life.

BRAC 95 represents an important opportunity to significantly reduce our infrastructure. Greatest savings will be realized when total closures are emphasized and realignments and relocations are minimized. To be successful, BRAC decisions must be based on hard facts. We must ask the right questions, collect the right data, and make the right choices. Department of the Navy decision making during BRAC 95 deliberations will be characterized by four central concepts:

- Support geographic concentration
- Eliminate redundancy
- Increase reliance on joint capabilities and capacities
- Preserve unique core capabilities

The following infrastructure strategies will be our guiding principles:

BASING STRATEGY

The strategy for basing will make efficient use of existing resources by concentrating Naval forces at specific geographic locations where a full spectrum of core support functions already exist, and for which the additional cost of assimilating realigned activities will be minimal. A regional basing plan eliminates redundancy of fixed cost support functions and makes efficient use of existing airspace, sea space, land space, and facilities within each region. Activities outside of regional concentrations will be considered for closure.

MAINTENANCE

A minimum core maintenance infrastructure consistent with future force structure must be retained. This strategy must consider both public and private depot maintenance capacity to provide an affordable maintenance infrastructure. The core organic Naval maintenance capabilities and capacities will be achieved through integration of intermediate and depot level maintenance in a regionally oriented structure.

DRAFT

TENANTS

The strategy for reducing infrastructure must include identifying related, but dispersed, tenant activities and co-locating those activities to maximize efficiency. Specific attention should be focused on large manpower intensive activities. When evaluating tenant moves from bases recommended for closure, only those activities essential to maintain readiness will be relocated.

RESERVE

~~The strategy for reducing Department of the Navy Reserve infrastructure will maximize joint use of facilities.~~ Reserve readiness requires that units be located where demographics and geography can support mission requirements.

The following are guiding principles that are specific to the BRAC process:

CLAIMANT INPUT

Department of the Navy BRAC process will include claimant input in data call formulation.

COMMON RESOURCE BASELINE

A common resource baseline is essential prior to the BRAC 95 process. Programmatic imbalances in dollars and manpower must be reconciled at the claimant level across the FYDP before formal data calls.

PREVIOUS BRAC DECISIONS

The Department of the Navy process for BRAC 95 will not revisit closure decisions already having the force of law under the provisions of PL 101-510. However, Department of Navy recommendations should consider unit relocations and realignments included in previous Commission reports in those cases where significant force structure changes have occurred.

**Remarks as delivered by
The Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment)
to the 1995
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
6 March 1995**

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, it is an honor for me to appear with Secretary Dalton, Admiral Boorda and General Mundy today. I will try not to repeat nor dwell on points they have previously made, but to take you through the Department of the Navy's process for the 95 BRAC round. I will illustrate the process in detail by showing how the Department of the Navy addressed one specific area, the ship depot maintenance infrastructure requirement to support and maintain the 2001 force structure.

The Department focused on a qualitative target, rather than quantitative goals, to measure our efforts in this round of base closure. Admiral Boorda described these goals and their support of the Department's posture for the twenty-first century. This final round of base closure mandated by the Base Closure Act is a continuation of the prior strong commitment to the process begun in the 1988, 1991 and 1993 base closure rounds.

The list of major closures highlights the strong focus on the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation activities this round, as well as the continuing rationalization of our Operational Bases, Industrial Facilities, and Training establishment.

Clearly, the process is driven by a hard budget reality. Each successive round of base closures has acted to close a widening gap between the Department's bottom line and our infrastructure overhead. The close alignment of personnel and installation numbers after this final round of base closure is an indication of our success in this effort.

I will now lead you through the Department of the Navy process used to carry out the Act and the DoD guidance on base closure for 1995. The Department's organization to implement the law was formally established by the Secretary on December 8, 1993. Building on the lessons learned from the 1993 round, a two tiered organization was constituted to collect, analyze and evaluate the Department's infrastructure and requirements. Again, the Office of General Counsel and the Naval Audit Service were called upon to provide senior level support on staff, throughout the process.

The Base Structure Evaluation Committee, or BSEC, is the team of Navy Flag Officers, Marine Corps General Officers, and SES civilian leaders who were tasked to evaluate the certified data received and make the required recommendations on closures and realignments to Secretary Dalton. In addition to myself, the BSEC members include Mr. Charles P. Nempfakos, the Executive Director of the BSAT, our supporting staff, and the DASN (FBIRA); Vice Admiral Richard C. Allen, COMNAVAIRLANT; Vice Admiral William A. Earner, the DCNO

for Logistics; Lieutenant General Harry W. Blot, DC/S Aviation; Lieutenant General J. A. Brabham, DC/S, I & L; Mrs. Genie McBurnett, the Deputy at SPAWAR; and Ms. Elsie Munsell, the DASN (E&S). This group provided the broad spectrum of experience and mature perspective required to make the difficult decisions required by the Act.

The Base Structure Analysis Team, or BSAT, working under Mr. Nemfakos, provided staff support to the BSEC and is filled with some of the top military and civilian talent available in the Department of the Navy today. The breadth and depth of their experience provided a sound footing for the BRAC-95 analytical process undertaken. Examples of members include the former Director of Navy Labs, and former Commanding Officers from an Aircraft Carrier, a Naval Air Station, and the NADEP community. Day to day representation from the Naval Audit Service and the Office of General Counsel ensured that the process was fair, accurate and in accordance with the law and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

The DON process ran for more than a year. Improving on lessons learned from previous BRAC rounds, the major owners and operators of our forces and stateside infrastructure, together with the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, participated in all aspects of the process, and the judgment of these senior leaders helped shape the final outcome. The process was designed to satisfy the analysis required by the eight DOD selection criteria.

Beginning in January 1994, the Department polled the 16 major owners and operators of the Navy and Marine Corps installations to identify the issues that they felt were imperative in accomplishing the DON mission. The themes of their imperatives dovetailed with the DON target described earlier, and reinforced the sense of direction the process should take in this round.

The universe of over 800 DON activities was divided into five categories and 27 sub-categories. These groupings allowed similar activities to be compared, and allowed the flexibility of process required to ensure a common sense answer resulted.

The process for the Department began with the development of data calls to gather the certified information necessary to measure the capacity and military value of all the installations in the DON universe. Every data call question was approved by the BSEC, and again improving upon previous rounds, those data calls were provided to the activity commanders for comment and to ensure maximum understanding, before final issue of the data call for response. Data calls were structured so that all responses would be generated at the individual activity level, and the activity commander would certify that the data was complete and correct. As the data was forwarded and reviewed by the chain of command for use by the BSEC in deliberative session, each intervening commander also certified the data's correctness. The certified responses received to these calls provide the backbone for the subsequent analysis.

Capacity analysis was conducted on each of the 27 sub-categories. Quantitative measures of capacity, to assess the "throughput", were developed for each sub-category, and related to the established force structure for Fiscal Year 2001. The capacity for each individual

activity was determined and they were summed across all activities in a sub-category to determine what was in excess of the total DON requirements to support the 2001 force.

The gross excess capacity calculation that resulted would allow a significantly larger force to be supported, therefore subsequent military value analysis was required in 19 of the original 27 sub-categories. It is important to understand that the Department's capacity in many areas is not evenly distributed, not exactly sized for typical units of the force composition, and therefore that some interstitial capacity would remain even if all removable excess were eliminated.

To illustrate the analysis process, I have chosen the Naval Shipyard / Ship Repair Facility sub-category. The gauge chosen to measure capacity and requirement for 2001 was "Direct Labor Man Years". The capacity and requirement were determined in detail, and accumulated into two basic types, nuclear work and non-nuclear work. Overall excess capacity in ship depot repair was calculated to be 7,500 Direct Labor Man Years or 29.4%. Of this, 6,000 DLMYs of the excess was in nuclear capable capacity, and 1,500 DLMYs was in non-nuclear capacity.

A military value analysis was conducted on each of the 19 sub-categories that demonstrated excess capacity. We used a method that was as objective as possible to evaluate activities within a sub-category across the complete spectrum of areas that constitute military value. Each sub-category had a tailored set of "yes/no" questions that covered an aspect of overall military value. Individual questions were associated with the four DoD criteria to which they applied and were weighted based on their importance. It is important to remember that the output score is only a relative measure, and only valid between activities within the same sub-category. Some of the specific questions were "cascaded", so in most military value matrices, the highest possible score was not 100.

The military value analysis was conducted in sequence to ensure the legitimacy of the process. I will again use the Shipyard / Ship Repair Facility sub-category to illustrate the process. The question bank was proposed by the BSAT with questions grouped into subject areas, and each question was approved by the BSEC after deliberation. For Shipyards, there were 149 questions grouped into nine subject areas: Drydocks; Production Workload; Cost and Manpower Factors; Environment and Encroachment; Strategic Factors; Operating Factors; Contingency Factors; Crews of Customer Ships; and Quality of Life. The questions were initially assigned into one of three bands of importance. The BSEC next assigned the DoD criteria to each question, and assigned a weight to each of the four DoD criteria: Readiness, Facilities, Mobilization, and Cost and Manpower, and a score from one to ten to each of the questions. The BSAT then calculated the weight of each of the questions, based on the algorithm the BSEC had previously approved for use, utilizing the weights, bands and scores approved in deliberative session. The weights for individual questions and the subject areas were reviewed in deliberative session for consistency. Only then were individual activity answers to the questions entered into the matrix and activity military value scores computed. The review of the activity military value scores ensured the result was in harmony with the perspectives developed during deliberative session while assigning individual question values.

As you can see, the five Naval Shipyards scored in a range between 38.0 and 57.6 out of 79.1 possible points. The Ship Repair Facility on Guam scored significantly lower. The first column in the chart shows the weight of each of the nine subject areas considered in the military value of shipyards. Drydock capability and Production Workload each account for about thirty percent of the score. Cost and Manpower factors account for another fifteen percent. The Quality of Life score has relatively low weight in this category, because of the small size of the active duty component present in the shipyard work force.

The configuration analysis used a Linear Programming Model to combine the results of the capacity and military value analyses and assist the BSEC in developing a starting point for deliberation. The model was designed to minimize excess capacity and to maintain the initial average military value in the sub-category. The model was constructed to allow a sensitivity analysis for changing force structure or workload. I want to stress that the model results were used only to focus the preliminary BSEC discussions of possible alternatives.

The military perspective of the BSEC members was key to the generation of potential scenarios from the initial model results. The generation of scenarios and measurement of return on investment was an iterative process, with additional scenarios issued after deliberation on the results of the initial scenario results. While the model highlighted possible solutions, it was not the driving factor in the generation of possible scenarios.

Configuration analyses resulted in scenario generation in 18 of the 19 remaining sub-categories. The Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity sub-category was considered to be a follower group of activities and no scenario data calls were issued. The scenario data calls addressed the myriad details required to weigh the costs and benefits from the proposed closure or realignment. The data calls gathered the detailed financial information necessary for the return on investment analysis, as well as information necessary to measure the impact on the communities designated as receiving sites. Owners and operators were permitted to propose alternate receiving sites for the functions at the closing activities. In total, the BSEC reviewed 174 responses involving 119 activities.

The DoD COBRA algorithms were used as the tool to conduct the return on investment analysis. These algorithms provide a consistent method of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of proposed realignment or closure scenarios, but are not intended to develop budget quality data. The BSEC aggressively challenged cost estimates provided from the field to ensure that cost estimates were reasonable and consistent. COBRA was used as a method of ensuring that DON recommendations were cost effective, rather than to identify the "lowest cost" alternative.

The shipyard model used the common rules on capacity and military value, and included the additional rule that nuclear workload could only be accomplished at a nuclear capable yard, while non-nuclear workload could be accomplished by either nuclear or non-nuclear ones. The initial model results proposed the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Ship Repair Facility on Guam. Secondary and tertiary solutions were also developed by requiring the model to specify the "next best" solutions. Only Long Beach Naval

Shipyard was contained in all three solutions.

After deliberation, and a review of the sensitivity analysis conducted by assuming workload increased by ten percent and decreased by ten or twenty percent, the BSEC directed that scenario data calls be generated for all three activities proposed in the initial solution. These data calls requested the certified information required for the COBRA algorithm, as well as information on where the Fleet Commanders and Systems Command leadership would send the unique facilities and workload to on the closure of the indicated activity.

The Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance also completed an analysis and forwarded alternatives to the BSEC for consideration and incorporation in the DON process. Many of these alternatives dealt with the interservicing of workload from shipyards to other service depot activities as well as other shipyards. The depot group did recommend the closure of Long Beach and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards. Because of the requirement for a strong presence in the Central Pacific, the Pearl Harbor closure scenario was not considered in a return on investment analysis. The Long Beach joint scenario was considered, but the return on investment was higher in the original DON scenario.

The closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard showed immediate and strong positive return on investment. After deliberation, the BSEC decided not to recommend the closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The closure of all three activities listed in the "optimum" solution reduced excess capacity to essentially zero. Nuclear shipyards, considered impossible to regenerate, had already been extensively reduced in the 1993 BRAC round. The workload flexibility associated with a submarine center of excellence, both in refueling and defueling for decommissioning, warranted retention of the nuclear capable asset at Portsmouth.

To further reduce the excess capacity in ship depot repair capability, over one million hours of depot work on ships systems were transferred from Technical Centers to the remaining shipyards. The NUWC Keyport realignment indicated on this chart, as well as the closures of NSWC Louisville and NAWC Indianapolis are the primary sources of this adjusted workload.

The Ship Repair Facility on Guam is closed, with the floating drydock, crane, and waterfront retained in the custody of the Naval Activities to ensure emergency access in the Western Pacific, even though the robust repair capability on Guam is no longer required. The release of the surge docking assets at Philadelphia retained in a previous BRAC round completes the picture of the scenario and return on investment deliberations in this complex area.

Economic impact analysis was conducted on each candidate for closure or realignment. This employment based analysis, calculating both the direct and indirect jobs lost due to the proposed action determined both the absolute change, the number of jobs lost, and the percentage change in unemployment for the affected labor market area. This impact was weighed against the historical trend in that area, based on available Department of Labor statistics. This analysis is conservative because any potential recovery or reuse of the candidate facilities is not considered. Across all the candidate closures and realignments, the total direct

and indirect jobs lost is estimated to be less than 33,000 over the six year implementation period of the actions. The national job growth rate is about 300,000 jobs per month, so on a national scale, the proposed closures do not have significant impact.

The information on the Los Angeles - Long Beach area illustrates the data reviewed in deliberative session. The Long Beach area mirrors the country as a whole: no extraordinary impact is seen. While the economic impact is 13,000 jobs, that number is only 0.3% of the total employment in the metropolitan area. The scenario proposed shifts 1500 workyears of effort from the shipyard to the private sector in the area, further mitigating the loss.

The final two areas that required review in compliance with the DoD selection criteria were the impact on the local community receiving the assets from closing and realigning bases, and the environmental impact of the proposed action. Both areas were reviewed for each candidate action, and no significant community infrastructure or environmental impacts were identified for any candidate scenario. Community impact looked at the total number of personnel the community gained and the current DON population in the community. Required MILCON was reviewed and any community impact MILCON was highlighted.

Some of the Long Beach Shipyard personnel transferred to the Supply Center in San Diego. The San Diego summary used by the BSEC to weigh the community impact on San Diego is illustrated. Although the total MILCON required to effect all moves into the San Diego area totals \$80 million, none was required for community impact. The number of personnel gained is not significant, compared to the already large DON presence in the area.

Environmental assessment was accomplished by studying the impact of installation restoration (IR), air quality, natural & cultural resources, and unrestricted property available at the gaining base. The assessment compared the amount of DON management effort necessary at both gaining and losing bases to comply with statutes in the environmental arena. No activity required removal from the list of potential gaining sites due to environmental issues.

The proposed closures and realignments remove significant excess infrastructure from the Department's account. There is little overhead left in the Department's infrastructure. What we are proposing for closure in this, the final round, cuts deep into capable productive infrastructure. Unfortunately, it is infrastructure that we can not afford and can not fully utilize with the significantly smaller force anticipated in 2001.

The specific wording of each recommendation has been carefully crafted, for this is the last chance. There may never be further rounds to correct oversights in the recommendation wording, so each was carefully crafted to ensure the widest possible set of options for community reuse is permitted. Additionally, the language allows the military commanders the flexibility to position their forces in response to operational requirements. This is done recognizing that flexibility of decision in implementation inevitably invites external pressure for solutions that the Department may not believe to be in the best public interest. The proposals forwarded by the Department of the Navy for this, the final round under the current Act,

complete the actions started in the three previous BRAC rounds to rationalize our infrastructure for the force of the twenty first century.

Weymouth who have spent years in reserve duty and now will be faced with the additional hardship of being away from their families for two nights each month because their post of duty is being moved more than 100 miles away?

**HOLD UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE**

STATEMENT OF

JOSHUA GOTBAUM

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ECONOMIC SECURITY)**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIES**

OF THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

FEBRUARY 23, 1995

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I am Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security.

This is my first appearance before your subcommittee. I am especially pleased to be asked to testify on the crucial issues of base closure and reuse. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organizations and individuals responsible for these important efforts report to me:

- The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations works with the Services in deciding what installations will be recommended for closure or realignment.
- The Base Transition Coordinators are the Department's on-site ombudsmen at closing bases; and
- The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) helps communities plan for the reuse of the facilities.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS

Obviously, I cannot comment on the recommendations that the Secretary of Defense will make next week. I am happy to summarize the process and its importance to Defense.

As you all know, the size of our military force and our budget both have been shrinking. Unless we downsize our infrastructure as well, we run the risk that funds will be spent on infrastructure that ought to go to readiness and modernization -- in effect, that the "tail" would swallow the "teeth".

Congress recognized that any base closing process must unquestionably be fair. The BRAC process was designed to be as objective, as public, as auditable as any process in government. The law requires that every BRAC recommendation must be made in accordance with the force posture. It must be made in accordance with a specific set of published criteria. Furthermore, all the data used must be signed, certified, and made available to the public and every interested party. The entire process is audited and overseen by the General Accounting Office.

Within the Department, the Services have historically taken the lead responsibility for developing and analyzing possible closures. They have done so not only because they are best acquainted with their real estate and missions, but also because they have the staff to handle the massive data analysis and provide the necessary audits. They then make their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Historically, the Secretary has accorded great deference to the Services' recommendations.

Recommended closures are selected on the basis of eight criteria (attached). These criteria relate to military value, savings and return on investment, and the economic and environmental impacts of closure. These same basic criteria were used in all previous BRAC rounds. We believe they serve us well. They provide the basis for recommendations that are consistent.

The final protection of the BRAC process is, of course, the BRAC Commission. This independent body receives information and testimony from every party and reviews each DoD recommendation, to ensure consistency with the force structure and the criteria.

For BRAC 95, the Department made a number of changes based upon the nature of the excess capacity we faced. //

One change in this round is that, for the first time, the Department has developed procedures to consider areas in which the different Services perform similar or identical functions. Five "joint cross-service groups" (JCSGs) were established in functional areas with significant cross-service potential. These areas are: depot maintenance, test and evaluation, laboratories, medical treatment facilities, and undergraduate pilot training. Each JCSG has representation from OSD and from each Military Department. Each was tasked to analyze the capacity and requirements for each function across all services, from the perspective of DoD's overall work load. After doing so, the joint groups then suggested possible configurations to the Military Departments, which considered them as part of their overall BRAC deliberations.

Another enhancement we made for BRAC 95 was to develop a more consistent method for applying criterion six, "economic impact on communities." Although economic impact had always been a criterion, there was no consistency in the data gathered to assess it or on the method for doing so. So this year we established an economic impact joint cross-service group. The Economic Impact Joint Cross-Service Group established guidelines for the DoD Components to measure the economic impact of base closure and realignment alternatives, including cumulative economic impact from past BRAC actions.

The Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering the service recommendations. Next Tuesday, the Secretary will announce his recommendations and forward them to the BRAC Commission.

Most observers consider the BRAC process an unparalleled success. It has already resulted in hundreds of closures and realignments within the United States, 70 of which are identified as "major" closures. By comparison, in the 10 years prior to BRAC 88, the Department was able to close only 4 major facilities.

Does BRAC Really Save Money?

Some have questioned whether -- given that closing a base initially requires rather than saves money -- the taxpayers actually save as a result. The answer to that question is a resounding "Yes". Initially, of course, there are upfront costs, mostly to construct facilities and accommodate moves to receiving bases. But these initial costs are fully offset by savings within the six year closure period that the law allows. The first three rounds of BRAC will, we believe save some \$4 billion per year when fully implemented. Even after the programmed environmental costs are taken into account on a present value basis, we expect the first three rounds to save the taxpayers and the Department over \$30 billion. (We do not include the cost of environmental cleanup in making BRAC decisions since the Department must comply with the law whether a base is open or closed. Nonetheless, cleanup costs are substantial.)

BRAC Savings in \$Billions

<i>Round</i>	<i>Net Savings Within Six Years¹</i>	<i>Ongoing Savings / Per Year²</i>	<i>Total Savings³</i>
BRAC 88	\$0.5	\$0.6	\$6.8
91	\$3.0	\$1.5	\$15.8
93	\$	\$2.0	\$15.7
Total	\$5.1	\$4.1	\$38.3

Excludes environmental cleanup costs.

¹ Then-year dollars.

² FY96 constant dollars.

³ 20 year net present value (NPV) in FY96 constant dollars with 4.2% discount rate.

Some have noted, accurately, that the original projections of large proceeds from the sale of base real estate have not been realized in practice. Nonetheless, by far the majority of the benefits of BRAC are the result of avoiding infrastructure costs we otherwise would pay.

Others have questioned whether BRAC provides full savings to the taxpayer, because the Department or other agencies sometimes choose to keep and use parts of a closing base. However, this mistakes the real purpose of the BRAC process, which is to permit both closure *and* realignment. Many times it makes sense to keep and use one part of a base (for example, housing or reserve facilities) while closing the rest.

BASE REUSE PROCESS

The Federal Role in Reuse & Redevelopment Today

The Administration, the Department, and I personally have placed great emphasis on improving the process by which base closure properties are disposed and redeveloped into productive civilian uses. Rapid reuse is not only important to the communities and workers impacted by the base closure, it is also essential in our efforts to cut costs.

The Federal Government currently affects reuse in two separate ways:

1. Property disposal policies and procedures; and
2. Assistance in local economic development.

Property Disposal Policies and Procedures

Under the Base Realignment and Closure Act, authority to dispose of military facilities was delegated by the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Secretary of Defense and subsequently redelegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Since DoD is operating under delegated authority, it must adhere to the statutory authorities and regulations promulgated by GSA. Often times, this has not worked well with large-scale property disposals.

Currently, base property disposal is governed by no fewer than five statutes, ranging from the most recent amendments of the Base Closure Act to the Federal Property Act of 1949. After a closing decision is made, DoD must first offer the property to other DoD components, then to other Federal agencies, then to state and local governments, and finally to local communities, developers and providers to the homeless.

Federal law provides for transfer of surplus property for any of several purposes at no costs: education, parks, airports, and to homeless providers. And, as I will discuss, the Congress has given us authority to make transfers for job creation as well. But the standards and procedures for doing so differ, case by case.

Assistance in Local Economic Development

For any large scale real estate development effort, there are three distinct, sequential phases: organization, planning, and implementation. DoD directly assists local communities in the organization and planning phases. We offer technical advice on what type of organizations have worked in the past and provide planning grants to underwrite part of the organization's costs. The amount we provide over a three to four year period has ranged from \$45,000 to more than \$3 million.

We also help indirectly in the implementation phase, by working with the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) and the Department of Labor (DoL). We involve other Federal Agencies early in the process so that the transition from planning to implementation can occur smoothly.

Reinventing Base Reuse

In 1993, after reviewing the historical base property disposal process, the President himself concluded that it did not work very well. It was clear from the 1988 and 1991 closures that the Federal property disposal process was not designed to promote quick economic redevelopment in base closure communities. Confounding rapid reuse were:

- Federal and State laws and regulations that never contemplated land reuse transactions as massive as those resulting from base closures.
- Environmental cleanup processes that can take years, even decades, to complete.
- Traditional property disposal rules that focus on getting cash up front, with little consideration given to long term development and job creation in the community.

The President resolved to change it. He announced a new Federal policy to support faster redevelopment at base closure communities. And, I am pleased to say, today we have the legal authority and have begun to implement each of the President's proposals: //

Property disposal that puts local economic redevelopment first. Thanks to the Congress, we now have legislative authority to convey property for job creation purposes. Interim leases for facilities have been encouraged and approval for leasing has been delegated to lower organizational levels. Federal screening for reuse of facilities and equipment has been expedited. Finally, DoD now consults with local communities before removing personal property from a closing base. These changes allow communities to begin their reuse planning without delay. We have learned from bitter experience that without an active community and community consensus, redevelopment simply cannot occur.

“Fast track” environmental cleanup, to remove needless delays. A Base Cleanup Team (BCT), comprised of experts from DoD, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and State representatives, has been established at all closing or realigning installations where property is available for transfer. Our goal is for the BCT’s to be able to make many decisions on the spot, to speed up clean up. Achieving that goal will require changes in many of the individual agencies, but we have been making some progress.

Transition coordinators. For every major base slated for closure, we now have a base transition coordinator. These on site ombudsmen and women make sure that communities and other interested parties have the information they need, when they need it. BTC’s have access to all parts of DoD, to the base commander, and to other Federal and State Agencies. At every closing base I visit, I ask the mayor and local officials who their BTC is. They always know.

More effective economic development assistance. The Department's economic adjustment support through our Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) has long been recognized as highly professional and helpful. As the BRAC process continues, our workload has increased. The average “major” base closure community receives technical assistance and a planning grant of on the order of \$300,000 per year for 3 to 5 years. We have also accelerated the time it takes to award grants. For most communities, the grant approval time is now within a matter of weeks, not months.

Commerce’s Economic Development Administration and the Department of Labor have also been charged to play an active role in economic development and worker retraining. Both departments were given significantly more funding. Labor now sends a team to each base closure community, to describe their job training programs and to help set up local job referral services. These Departments, too, have reduced their grant processing time.

Another major improvement, about which we are very pleased, is the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994. It exempts base closure properties from the requirements of McKinney Act Title V, which gives automatic priority use of any surplus Federal property to homeless assistance providers. The new law requires communities to integrate the needs of the homeless into their broader redevelopment procedures. As a result, arguments about priorities have become agreements that lead to economic development. Nearly 50 communities have elected to use the new process.

Accomplishments

I am pleased to say that we are beginning to see the effects of these changes.

First, we’ve learned to act more quickly. As a result, the average base in BRAC 93 will be closed in half the time it took in the first BRAC round only five years earlier.

Second, local communities and local developers are moving faster as well. In BRAC 88, the average community took nearly two and a half years to create a reuse plan; in the last round that time dropped to only a year.

Faster reuse benefits the Department as well as base closure communities, because only when a community begins to take responsibility for base property can DoD cease its security and maintenance expenses. Protection & maintenance costs for a closed base can easily run \$2-3 million per year; for large industrial facilities, such as shipyards, the annual charge can be more than \$10 million. The faster local communities develop reuse plans and the property is transferred, the sooner DoD is released from millions of dollars in annual holding costs. In this context, our technical advice and planning grants -- if they speed up the process by even a few months -- begin to look like a very good investment.

Already, the redevelopment of closed bases has created nearly 8,000 new jobs and over 200 tenant businesses. The types of reuse are as diverse as the communities themselves. England Air Force Base in Alexandria, Louisiana and Chanute Air Force Base in Rantoul, Illinois have become the engines of their communities' economic growth by creating over 1,500 jobs on base in less than two years after closure. Today on those two former bases, there are more civilians working than before the bases were closed.

Not every story is so encouraging, but there are plenty of others: At the former Lowry Air Force Base, tenants include a community college and a museum. At Wurtsmith Air Force Base in rural Michigan, 425 new jobs have been created by aviation, educational, industrial, and office-related activities.

And today, on the site of the former Sacramento Army Depot, Packard Bell is producing computers -- on an interim lease, even before the final transfer is completed. Ultimately the company expects to employ 3,000 people. Follow-on employment by Packard Bell's suppliers could mean thousands more.

Sometimes reuse means other public services: airports, schools, parks, prisons, even other government offices. Such activities can reduce government costs, while at the same time provide stability for development. Their presence at the installation early in the reuse process helps attract other tenants and jobs.

We have also begun to use our new jobs-centered property disposal authority to approve conveyances to local communities. In many of these conveyances we will receive fair-market value back to the taxpayers, but we will do so with flexible payment terms, over time as that value is realized by economic recovery.

This process is not easy. It is not quick, and it is certainly not smooth. Some communities have a tough time attracting new businesses, and sometimes doing so takes considerable time, but it does happen. For example, the Department has tracked nearly 100 pre-BRAC closures, from 1961 through 1993. Almost 90,000 civilian jobs were eliminated from these closures. How many new jobs have been created to replace them? *Over 170,000 jobs -- almost twice as many.*

And we are helping. All these changes -- to the law, to regulations, in policies, programs and communication -- should make new job creation easier and faster.

Next Steps

But there is much more to be done:

Better Communication

First, better communication. Within the next month, long before BRAC 95 becomes final, we will publish a guide to help community leaders understand closure and reuse. This summer and fall, we will hold conferences throughout the country, explaining what tools are available and introducing communities to EDA, DoL and other sources of support. We've always known that the most successful reuse comes when community leaders act early and knowledgeably. And we intend to help them do so.

Clearer Guidance & Priorities

Our next step is to make clear what we can and cannot do. This spring, we will follow-up on the community handbook with a detailed manual geared to the Military Departments and Federal Agencies who will carry out the new laws, regulations, and policies. And we will accompany it with a new set of rules, developed by all parts of the Department after receiving nearly 1,000 comments from 126 communities and organizations.

Further Streamlining

Last, but certainly not least, we hope you will agree to further legislative reform. Base reuse is still at the mercy of an incredibly complex maze of laws. Many of those, we believe, were drafted in a simpler time, for simpler transactions. They were not created to deal with the challenges of property transfer on this grand scale.

For some months now, we have been reviewing ways to streamline the process and make it work better for DoD and the communities. We are looking at ways to work Federal, state, and local issues in parallel, rather than going down to the "slowest common denominator". There are also proposals to permit near-term job creation, by allowing leasing on still-operating bases.

Sometime this spring, I hope we can discuss just these steps with the Congress, and that you will give them the same high priority that we do.

Closing

In closing, let me reiterate three points:

1. First, we strongly support the BRAC process, and believe it will ultimately save the taxpayers and the Department billions of dollars.
2. Second, we are proud of the achievements we have made to reform the reuse/property disposal process. Mayors and Governors from around the country have told us that our efforts to make the process more "user friendly" are on the right track.

3. But, third, there is much more to do. With your help, we will continue looking for ways to streamline our laws and procedures, to permit faster disposal and more effective job creation. Because, after all, that is part of what economic security is about.

I appreciate the opportunity this committee has provided, and would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Department of Defense

Final Selection Criteria

1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Attachment

Conolly

- was there more that could be reduced
- * Navy did enough, AF and Army may have more capacity
- COBRA analysis is done in aggregate
- * some can't break out singly
- did Navy close base although value ranked higher in mil value than some, ~~is~~
- * yes, will supply a list for increased
- what is the value of the savings in redirects
- * about 1B in const. costs

Cox — is 3B in budget request in for closing bases

- * yes
- 93 BRAC found Navy needed two strike training bases
- * no longer need, smaller no. of aircraft now, 1 less air wings
- brigs force structure down 11 carriers and 10 airwings
- has military value criteria changed since 93
- * not devoted as much attention to quality of life value
- white out why
- * cost savings

Davis — will you have to ask for additional money to accompl. closures

- * should be able to use money saved
- UPT what about combining mission and AF base in Columbus, Ohio
- * closed because no longer needed, considering
- interservice planning, moving F-18 back
- * 2/3 of Navy's work done in other-5vc facilities, now have one on each ~~coast~~ coast, cheaper to do on west coast

Kling — excess capacity remains, where

- * will provide
- what about hospitals
- * on soils outside BRAC
-

- Can we combine reserve training sites

* want a reserve presence in every state, primarily former active duty
need to look at demographics

- Weymouth moving because 64% of people live within
less than 150 miles of Brunswick

Montoux - environment can be used as an excuse, were installations eliminated

* no

Robles - what about helicopter UPT, ~~can~~ why not combine?

* end result is different. mc will need fixed wing exp. in U-22
also not financially feasible

Cox - shipyard capacity in shipyards is 40%

* will respond

Canady

- looked at closing Atlanta, but didn't close

- closing Weymouth not based on Atlanta

* based on capabilities in Brunswick, only maritime patrol bac left
CNO recommended to Sec.

Cox -

BRAC-95 INSTALLATION CATEGORIZATION

Operational Support

- ✓ Operational Air Stations
- ✓ Reserve Air Stations
- Naval Bases
- Marine Corps Bases
- Supply Centers
- Communications
- Security Group
- Surveillance
- Naval Facilities
- Naval Satellite Op. Center
- Construction Battalion Centers
- Misc. Other Support

Industrial Support

- Weapons Stations
- Aviation Depots
- Shipyards
- Public Works Centers
- Marine Corps Log. Bases
- Supervisor of Shipbuilding
- Inventory Control Points
- Industrial Reserve Plants
- Naval Reserve Maint. Facilities

Tech Centers/Labs

- Technical Centers/Labs

Educational/Training

- Training Air Stations
- Training/Educational Centers

Personnel Support/Other

- Medical
- Dental
- Admin. Activities
- National Capital Region
- Reserve Centers

BRAC-95 Scenario Development Data Calls

Operational Air Stations:

103Z Amendment to AIR STATIONS - Rev 2.

This is an amendment to Scenario Number 1-01-XXXX-103. Please provide a Scenario Development Data Call response for the following:

Realign NAS Key West to a Naval Air Facility; retaining ^{only} those assets to allow for full utilization of NAS Key West air space and Tac ranges for continued fleet training support.

This scenario also assumes the following:

- *Single site F-14s at NAS Oceana.*
- *Move 2 operational Navy F/A-18 squadrons from MCAS Cherry Point to MCAS Beaufort.*
- *Move all remaining East Coast active Navy F/A-18 squadrons, Navy F/A-18 RAG, and the AIMD from MCAS Cherry Point to NAS Oceana.*
- *Move Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Reserve Squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort (as a result of BRAC-93) to NAS Atlanta.*
- *Move S-3s and ES-3s from NAS Oceana to NAS Jacksonville.*
- *Close NAS South Weymouth. Move C-130 squadron to NAS Brunswick.*
- *NAS Atlanta remains open with current squadrons assigned. Fully utilize Atlanta/Dobbins capabilities. Move C-9s from NAS Atlanta to Dobbins AFE.*

Note that NAS Brunswick remains open in this scenario..

13 Dec 94

Encl (1)

Scenario Number	Jt Gp	Major Claimant(s)	MC Alt	COBRA File Name	Report Page (Recommendation)	Scenario Title	Losing Base(s)
1-01-0020-001		COMNAVRESFOR		ATLANTA		NAS ATLANTA	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-001A		COMNAVRESFOR	1	ATLANTA1		NAS ATLANTA A	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-001B		COMNAVRESFOR	2	ATLANTA2		NAS ATLANTA B	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0012-002		PACFLT		ADAK	C-7	NAF ADAK	NAF ADAK
1-01-0003-003		LANTFLT		NEWKEY		NAS KEY WEST	NAS KEY WEST ✓
1-01-0001-004		LANTFLT		BRUNSWIC		NAS BRUNSWICK	NAS BRUNSWICK ✓
1-01-0007-005		CMC		BEAUFO3		MCAS BEAUFORT	MCAS BEAUFORT
1-02-0025-006		LANTFLT		LCRKCLA2		ALT 1-NAVAL BASES	PHIBASE LITTLE CREEK
1-02-0025-007		LANTFLT		LCRKCLA2		ALT 2-NAVAL BASES	PHIBASE LITTLE CREEK
1-02-0040-007		PACFLT		SDGOSUB			SUBASE SAN DIEGO
1-02-0025-008		LANTFLT		CRKBIG2		ALT 3-NAVAL BASES	PHIBASE LITTLE CREEK
1-02-0032-008		LANTFLT		NLONALOW			SUBASE NEW LONDON
1-02-0032-009		LANTFLT		NLONALOW		ALT 4-NAVAL BASES	NAVSTA NORFOLK
1-02-0040-009		PACFLT		SDGOSUB			SUBASE NEW LONDON
							SUBASE SAN DIEGO
							NAVSTA NORFOLK
1-02-0025-010		LANTFLT		CRKBIG2		ALT 5-NAVAL BASES	PHIBASE LITTLE CREEK
1-02-0032-010		LANTFLT		NLONALOW			SUBASE NEW LONDON
1-02-0040-010		PACFLT		SDGOSUB			SUBASE SAN DIEGO
							NAVSTA NORFOLK
2-14-0114-011		NAVSEA		LBNSY11A		ALT 1- SHIPYARDS	NSYD LONG BEACH
2-14-0117-011				PNSY011R			NSYD PORTSMOUTH
2-14-XXXX-011				PHILDD			NSYD Norfolk Det Philadelphia
2-14-0117-011A		NAVSEA	3	PNSYNU11		ALT 1-SHIPYARDS	NSYD PORTSMOUTH
2-14-0114-012		NAVSEA		LBNSY12B	I-9	ALT 2-SHIPYARDS	NSYD LONG BEACH
2-14-0209-012				KEY13	X-23		NUWC KEYPORT
2-14-0202-012				CRANE012			NSWC CRANE
2-14-0195-012				LOU013		LOU013	NSWC LOUISVILLE
2-114-XXXX-012				PHILDD	I-11		NSYD Norfolk Det Philadelphia
2-14-0202-012A		NAVSEA	4	CRANE12A			NSWC CRANE
2-14-0114-013		NAVSEA		LBNSY13A		ALT 3- SHIPYARDS	NSYD LONG BEACH
2-14-0209-013				KEY13			NUWC KEYPORT
2-14-0202-013				CRANE012			NSWC CRANE
2-14-0195-013				LOU013			NSWC LOUISVILLE
2-14-0117-013				PNSY013			NSYD PORTSMOUTH
2-14-XXXX-013				PHILDD			NSYD Norfolk Det Philadelphia
2-14-0117-013A		NAVSEA	5	No COBRA		ALT 3-SHIPYARDS A	
4-21-0227-014		CNET		TNASA1		ALT 1-TRNG AIR STATIONS	MERIDIAN Closes
4-21-0227-014D		CNET	6	TNASA1D		ALT 1-TRNG AIR STATIONS	Alt Relocation of NTTC
4-21-0225-015		CNET		TNASA2		ALT 2-TRNG AIR STATIONS	MERIDIAN Closes/CORPUS Closes
4-21-0225-015D		CNET	7	TNASA2D		ALT 2- TRNG AIR STATIONS	Alt Relocation of NTTC
4-21-0225-016		CNET		TNAS16-3		ALT 3-TRNG AIR STATIONS	MERIDIAN Closes/CORPUS Realigns
4-21-0227-016D		CNET	8	TNAS6D4A	C-11,F-7,F-9,G-9	ALT3-TRNG AIR STATIONS	Alt Relocation of NTTC
1-08-0078-017		PACFLT		WHIDBEY2		NOPF WHIDBEY	CLOSE NOPF WHIDBEY ISLAND
2-18-0142-018		NAVSUP		ASOREV		ALT 1-ICP	ASO PHILADELPHIA
2-18-0142-019		NAVSUP		ASOREV		ALT 2- ICP	ASO (DLA COMPOUND)
1-10-0095-020		NAVFAC		WESTDIV2		WESTDIV	WESTDIV
				SDIV61A		SOUTHDIV	SOUTHDIV
				EFAW		EFA NORTHWEST	EFA NORTHWEST
2-14-0113-021		PACFLT		SRFGM21A	I-7	SRF GUAM	SRF GUAM
1-02-0035-022		PACFLT		GUAMFLT1	A-7	NACACT GUAM	NAVACT GUAM (NAVSTA)
1-10-0093-023		NAVFAC		WESTDIV2		ALT 2-EFD	WESTDIV
							SOUTHDIV
							EFA NORTHWEST
1-06-0051-024		NAVSUP		FISCHAS1	N-5	FISC	FISC CHARLESTON
				FISCOAK2			FISC OAKLAND
				FISGUAMA			FISC GUAM
1-06-0051-024A		NAVSUP	9	FISGUAM1	N-7	FISC	FISC GUAM
2-17-0129-025		NAVSEA		BATGR05		ALT 1- SUPSHIP	SUPSHIP BATH
				JAXCHR5			SUPSHIP JACKSONVILLE
				NRLPAS5			SUPSHIP NEW ORLEANS
2-17-0129-026		NAVSEA		BATGR06		ALT 2-SUPSHIP	SUPSHIP BATH
				JAXPOR6			SUPSHIP JACKSONVILLE
				NRLPAS6			SUPSHIP NORTH ISLAND
				CHAPRT6			SUPSHIP CHARLESTON
				ZLONSAN	AA-5		SUPSHIP LONG BEACH
				BAYPAS6			SUPSHIP STURGEON BAY

Scenario Number	Jt Gp	Major Claimant(s)	MC Alt	COBRA File Name	Report Page (Recommendation)	Scenario Title	Losing Base(s)
3-20-0161-027		NAVAIR		NAWC11		NAWC IND ALT 1	NAWC INDIANAPOLIS
3-20-0161-028		NAVAIR		NAWC12		NAWC IND/LOUIS ALT 2	NAWC INDIANAPOLIS
				NSWCLV			NSWC LOUISVILLE
3-20-0161-028A/B		NAVAIR	10	NAWC12AB		NAWC IND/LOUIS	Indianapolis/Louisville
3-20-0161-028C		NAVAIR	11	NAWC12C		NAWC IND/LOUIS	Indianapolis/Louisville
3-20-0161-028Z		NAVAIR		INDYLOUI	X-21, X-27	NAWC IND/LOUIS	Indianapolis/Louisville
3-20-0202-028		NAVSEA		NAWC12		NSWC LOUIS/IND ALT 2	NSWC LOUISVILLE
3-20-0162-029		NAVAIR		NAWCL1A		NAWC LAKEHURST	NAWC LAKEHURST
3-20-0221-030		SPAWAR		WARMN2	X-49,X-51	NAWC/NCCOSC WARMINST	NAWC/NCCOSC WARMINSTER
3-20-0160-031		NAVAIR		NATSF		NATSF	NATSF PHILADELPHIA
3-20-0160-031A		NAVAIR	12	NATSF A		NATSF	NATSF PHILADELPHIA
3-20-0160-031Z		NAVAIR		NATSFANI	X-39	NATSF	NATSF PHILADELPHIA
3-20-0158-032		NAVAIR		NAWCO	X-35	NAWC ORELAND	NAWC ORELAND
3-20-0159-033		NAVAIR		NAESU		NAESU PHILADELPHIA	NAESU PHILADELPHIA
3-20-0159-033Z		NAVAIR		NAESUNI2	X-41	NAESU PHILADELPHIA	NAESU PHILADELPHIA
3-20-0202-034		NAVSEA		NSWCC		NSWC CRANE	NSWC CRANE
3-20-0198-035		NAVSEA		NSWCA		NSWC ANNAPOLIS	NSWC ANNAPOLIS
3-20-0198-035A		NAVSEA	13	NSWCA1R	X-13	NSWC ANNAPOLIS	NSWC ANNAPOLIS
3-20-0205-036		NAVSEA		IH-FULL/IH-R&D		NSWC INDIAN HEAD	NSWC INDIAN HEAD
3-20-0188-037		NAVSEA		NSWCS		NSWC SULLIVAN	NSWC DET SULLIVAN
3-20-0208-038		NAVSEA		NUWC1	X-29	NUWC NEW LONDON	NUWC NEW LONDON
3-20-0212-039		NAVSEA		NWAD		NWAD CORONA	NWAD CORONA
3-20-0212-039A		NAVSEA	14	NWAD-A		NWAD CORONA	NWAD CORONA
3-20-0212-039B		NAVSEA	15	NWAD-B		NWAD CORONA	NWAD CORONA
3-20-0212-039C		NAVSEA	16	NWAC-REV		NWAD CORONA	NWAD CORONA
3-20-0194-040		NAVSEA		AEGM		AEGIS MOORESTOWN	AEGIS MOORESTOWN
3-20-0186-041		NAVSEA		AEGWI		AEGIS WALLOPS ISLAND	AEGIS WALLOPS ISLAND
3-20-0207-042		NAVSEA		NSWCWO-W	X-53	NSWC WHITE OAK	NSWC WHITE OAK
3-20-0215-043		SPAWAR		NISEN-A	X-33	NISE NORFOLK	NISE EAST DET NORFOLK
3-20-0223-044		SPAWAR		NISESD	X-43	NISE SAN DIEGO	NISE WEST SAN DIEGO
3-20-0213-045		SPAWAR		NAVMASS	X-19	NAVMASSO	NAVMASSO
3-20-0213-045A		SPAWAR	17	NAVMASS2		NAVMASSO	NAVMASSO
3-20-0175-046		CNR		NRL0	X-37	NRL ORLANDO	NRL DET ORLANDO
3-20-0173-047		BUPERS		NPRDC-FF	X-47	NPRDC SAN DIEGO	NPRDC SAN DIEGO
3-20-0184-048		BUMED		NAMRI-RE	X-17	NAMRI	NAMRI
3-20-0184-048A		BUMED	18	NAMRIB		NAMRI	NAMRI
3-20-0181-049		BUMED		BIOLAB		NAVBIODYNLAB	NAVBIODYNLAB NEW ORLEANS
3-20-0181-049A		BUMED	19	BIOLABA	X-31	NAVBIODYNLAB	NAVBIODYNLAB NEW ORLEANS
4-22-0240-050		CNET		No COBRA		TRAINING/ED CENTERS	ASWCENLANT
4-22-0249-050		PACFLT		EWTGPAC2		TRAINING/ED CENTERS	PHIB SCHOOL CORONADO
4-22-0250-050		LANTFLT		EWTGLANT		TRAINING/ED CENTERS	PHIB SCHOOL LITTLE CREEK
5-26-0658-051		COMNAVRESFOR		CAD	E-9	NRC CADILLAC	NRC CADILLAC
5-26-0735-052		COMNAVRESFOR		EUGENE		NMCRG EUGENE	NMCRG EUGENE
5-26-0603-053		COMNAVRESFOR		HVILLE	E-9	NMCRG HUNTSVILLE	NMCRG HUNTSVILLE
5-26-0695-054		COMNAVRESFOR		SANA	E-9	NRC SANTA ANNA	NRC SANTA ANNA
5-26-0708-055		COMNAVRESFOR		LAREDO	E-9	NRF LAREDO	NRF LAREDO
5-26-0688-056		COMNAVRESFOR		POMONA	E-9	NMCRG POMONA	NMCRG POMONA
5-26-0777-057		COMNAVRESFOR		SJOSE		NMRC SAN JOSE	NMRC SAN JOSE
5-26-0696-058		COMNAVRESFOR		BOYGAN	E-9	NRC SHEBOYGAN	NRC SHEBOYGAN
5-26-0693-059		COMNAVRESFOR		STAISL	E-9	NRC STATEN ISLAND	NRC STATEN ISLAND
5-26-0635-060		COMNAVRESFOR		STOCK	E-9	NMCRG STOCKTON	NMCRG STOCKTON
5-26-0544-061		CMC		ALBANY		MCRC ALBANY	MCRC ALBANY
5-26-0547-062		CMC		AUSTIN		MCRC AUSTIN	MCRC AUSTIN
5-26-0559-063		CMC		NASHVILL		MCRC NASHVILLE	MCRC NASHVILLE
5-26-0542-064		CMC		FRESNO		4TH LAAM BN FRESNO	4TH LAAM BN FRESNO
5-26-0577-065		CMC		NEWBURGH		MAG 49 DET B NEWBURGH	MAG 49 DET B NEWBURGH
5-26-0640-066		COMNAVRESFOR		OLATHE	E-9	NAVAIRESCEN OLATHE	NAVAIRESCEN OLATHE
5-26-0641-067		COMNAVRESFOR		NARMGU		NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU	NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU
5-26-0641-067B		COMNAVRESFOR	20	NARMGU-B		NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU	NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU
5-26-0641-067C		COMNAVRESFOR	21	NARMGU-C		NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU	NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU
5-26-0641-67D		COMNAVRESFOR	22	NARMGU-D		NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU	NAVAIRESCEN PT MUGU
5-26-0836-068		COMNAVRESFOR		REDCOM7	E-9	REDCOM 7 CHARLESTON	REDCOM 7 CHARLESTON
5-26-0828-069		COMNAVRESFOR		RDCM11		REDCOM 11 DALLAS	REDCOM 11 DALLAS
5-26-0828-069A		COMNAVRESFOR	23	RDCM11-A		REDCOM 11 DALLAS	REDCOM 11 DALLAS
5-26-0828-069B		COMNAVRESFOR	24	RDCM11-B		REDCOM 11 DALLAS	REDCOM 11 DALLAS
5-0535-070		NAVSEA		NAVSEA1		ALT 1-ADMIN	RELOCATE NAVSEA/HRO(NDW)
5-0520-070		BUMED		BUMED1		ALT 1-ADMIN	RELOCATE BUMED(NEBRASKA)
5-25-0533-070		OUSN		OGC1		ALT 1-ADMIN	RELOCATE OGC(NDW)
5-25-0528-070		OUSN		NISMC1	Y-7	ALT 1-ADMIN	RELOCATE NISMC(NDW)

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5-25-0508-070		CMC		MCDIST		ALT 1-ADMIN	CLOSE 1ST MCD GARDEN CITY
5-25-0535-071		NAVSEA		NAVSEA2	Y-9	ALT 2-ADMIN	RELOCATE NAVSEA/HRO(NDW)
5-25-0535-071A		NAVSEA	25	NAVSEA3		ALT 2-ADMIN	RELOCATE NAVSEA/HRO(NDW)
5-25-0520-071		BUMED		BUMED1		ALT 2-ADMIN	RELOCATE BUMED(NEBRASKA)
5-25-0533-071		OUSN		OGC1		ALT 2-ADMIN	RELOCATE OGC(NDW)
5-25-0528-071		OUSN		NISMC1		ALT 2-ADMIN	RELOCATE NISMC(NDW)
5-25-0508-071		CMC		MCDIST		ALT2-ADMIN	CLOSE 1ST MCD GARDEN CITY
5-25-0537-071		SPAWAR		SPAWAR	Y-11	ALT 2-ADMIN	SPAWAR(NCCOSC SAN DIEGO)
3-20-0176-072		CNR		ONR-1		ONR	ONR/ARMY/AF (NEBRASKA)
3-20-0176-072A		CNR	26	ONR-2ROI		ONR	ONR/ARMY/AF (Ballston)
4-21-0229-073	1	CNET		TNASA4C		ALT 4-TRNG AIR STATIONS	NAS WHITING FIELD
				TNASA4D			
3-20-0183-074	2	BUMED		NHRC	X-45	NHRC SAN DIEGO	NHRC SAN DIEGO
3-20-0167-075	3	NAVAIR		No COBRA		NAWC CHINA LAKE	NAWC CHINA LAKE
3-20-0168-076	4	NAVAIR		No COBRA		NAWC PT. MUGU	NAWC PT MUGU
3-20-0163-077	5	NAVAIR		No COBRA		NAWC PAX RIVER	NAWC PAX RIVER
2-13-0111-078	6	NAVAIR		NI-078		NADEP NORTH ISLAND	NADEP NORTH ISLAND
2-13-0110-079	7	NAVAIR		CP-079		NADEP CHERRY POINT	NADEP CHERY POINT
2-13-0112-080	8	NAVAIR		JAX-080		NADEP JACKSONVILLE	NADEP JACKSONVILLE
2-14-0114-081	9	NAVSEA		LBNSY081		NSY LONG BEACH DM1	NSY LONG BEACH DM1
2-14-0114-082	10	NAVSEA		LBNSY082		NSY LONG BEACH DM2	NSY LONG BEACH DM2
2-14-0117-083	11	NAVSEA		PNSY083R		NSY PORTSMOUTH DM1	NSY PORTSMOUTH DM1
2-14-0117-084	12	NAVSEA		PNSY084R		NSY PORTSMOUTH DM2	NSY PORTSMOUTH DM2
2-14-0115-085	13	NAVSEA		NORF085		NSY NORFOLK DM1	NSY NORFOLK DM1
2-14-0115-086	14	NAVSEA		NORF086		NSY NORFOLK DM2	NSY NORFOLK DM2
2-14-0116-087	15	NAVSEA		PEARL087		NSY PEARL HARBOR DM1	NSY PEARL HARBOR DM1
2-14-0116-088	16	NAVSEA		PEARL088		NSY PEARL HARBOR DM2	NSY PEARL HARBOR DM2
2-14-0118-089	17	NAVSEA		PUGET089		NSY PUGET SOUND DM1	NSY PUGET SOUND DM1
2-14-0118-090	18	NAVSEA		PUGET090		NSY PUGET SOUND DM2	NSY PUGET SOUND DM2
3-20-0202-091	19	NAVSEA		CRANE091		NSWC CRANE DM	NSWC CRANE DM
3-20-0195-092	20	NAVSEA		LOUSV092		NSWC LOUISVILLE DM	NSWC LOUISVILLE DM
3-20-0209-093	21	NAVSEA		KEYPT093		NUWC KEYPORT DM	NUWC KEYPORT DM
2-16-0127-094	22	CMC		ALBAN094		MCLB ALBANY	MCLB ALBANY
2-16-0128-095	23	CMC		BARST095		MCLB BARSTOW	MCLB BARSTOW
1-10-0093-096		NAVFAC		SDIV6		SOUTHDIV-REV 1	SOUTHDIV
1-01-0020-097		COMNAVRESFOR		ATLNTA97		NAS ATLANTA-REV 1	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-097A		COMNAVRESFOR	27	ATLNT97A		NAS ATLANTA-REV1	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-097B		COMNAVRESFOR	28	ATLNT97B		NAS ATLANTA-REV1	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-097C		COMNAVRESFOR	29	ATLNT97C		NAS ATLANTA-REV 1	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-098		COMNAVRESFOR		ATLNTA98		NAS ATLANTA-REV 2	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-098A		COMNAVRESFOR	30	ATLNT98A		NAS ATLANTA-REV 2	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-098B		COMNAVRESFOR	31	ATLNT98B		NAS ATLANTA-REV 2	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0020-098C		COMNAVRESFOR	32	ATLNT98C		NAS ATLANTA-REV 2	NAS ATLANTA
1-01-0005-099		LANTFLT		S3JAX		AIR STATIONS-REV1	NAS OCEANA
1-01-0008-099		CMC		F18OCNA			MCAS CHERRY POINT
		CMC					MCAS BEAUFORT
1-01-0015-099		PACFLT		LEM1212			NAS LEMOORE
1-01-0015-099A		PACFLT	33	MAJBASE			NAS LEMOORE
1-01-0015-099B		PACFLT	34	E2NORISL			NAS LEMOORE
5-25-0537-100	24	SPAWAR		SPAWARAR		SPAWAR-REV1	SPAWAR to Ft Monmouth
5-25-0537-101	25	SPAWAR		SPAWARAF		SPAWAR-REV 2	SPAWAR to Hanscomb AFB
2-13-0112-102	26	NAVAIR		JAX-102		NADEP JAX DM REV	NADEP JAX
2-13-0112-102A		NAVAIR	35	JAX-102A			NADEP JAX
1-01-0005-103		LANTFLT		S3JAX	C-15	AIR STATIONS-REV 2	NAS OCEANA
1-01-0008-103		CMC		F18ATL	C-15		MCAS CHERRY POINT
		CMC					MCAS BEAUFORT
1-01-0015-103		PACFLT		LEM1212			NAS LEMOORE
1-01-0022-103		COMNAVRESFOR		SOWEY	D-7		NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH ✓
1-01-0015-103A		PACFLT	36	MAJBASE			NAS LEMOORE
1-01-0015-103B		PACFLT	37	2ENORISL	C-17		NAS LEMOORE
1-01-XXXX-103Z				KEYWEST	C-19		NAS KEY WEST TO NAF ✓
5-23-0369-104	27	BUMED		NHBEAU			REALIGN NAVHOSP BEAUFORT
23-0370-105	28	BUMED		NHCORP			REALIGN NAVHOSP CORPUS
21-0228-106		CNET		WHRLTWR1	H-5	NAS PENSACOLA	NAS PENSACOLA(WHIRLTWR)
2-17-0130-107		NAVSEA		ZCHZJAX		ALT 3-SUPSHIPS	SUPSHIP CHARLESTON

Scenario Number	Jt Gp	Major Claimant(s)	MC AR	COBRA File Name	Report Page (Recommendation)	Scenario Title	Losing Base(s)
2-17-0138-107				ZSANFRAN			SUPSHIP SAN FRANCISCO
2-17-0140-107				ZBAYNORL			SUPSHIP STURGEON BAY
1-01-0649-108		COMNAVRESFOR		SLFRDG	D-5	MWSG-47 TO SELFRIDGE	NARCEN TWIN CITIES ✓
1-01-XXXX-109		CMC		LOSAL		MC TO LOS ALAMITOS	NASA AMES
1-01-0016-110		CMC		53RELIGN	C-17	MCAS MIRAMAR	MCAS MIRAMAR
1-01-XXXX-111		PACFLT		GUAMAVIA	C-9	GUAM AVIATION ASSETS	Andersen AFB
4-21-0228-112		CNET		TRACEN1	G-13	MESSMAN "A" SCHOOL	NAS PENSACOLA
4-22-0256-113		CNET		TRACEN2		GREAT LAKES SCHOOLS	NTC GREAT LAKES
4-22-0256-113A		CNET	38	TRACEN2A	G-13	GREAT LAKES SCHOOLS	NTC GREAT LAKES
1-01-0017-114		PACFLT/BUPERS		RDSANDI	Y-17	RECRUIT DIST SAN DIEGO	NAS NORTH ISLAND
5-25-XXXX-115		SECGRU		SECGRUAF		SEC GRP POTOMAC	SECGRUDET Potomac (Ft Meade)
5-25-XXXX-115A		SECGRU	39	SECGRU2	Y-15	SEC GRP POTOMAC	SecGruDet Potomac (Ft Meade)
1-02-0032-116		LANTFLT		NPSCHAS2	G-11	NUC PWR SCH TO CHASN	NucPwrSci (SUBASE New Lon)
1-02-0032-008Z		LANTFLT		No COBRA		AMEND. TO SUBASE NL	NucPwrSci (SUBASE New Lon)
5-25-XXXX-117		CNET		CRUITCOM	Y-13	CRUITCOM TO MEMPHIS	CRUITCOM (NTC Great Lakes)
1-01-XXXX-118		PACFLT		BARBERS	C-13	BARBERS POINT SUPPORT	NAS Barbers Point
3-20-0215-119		SPAWAR		NISEN1		NISE NORFOLK-REV 1	NISE NORFOLK
5-26-0838-120		COMNAVRESFOR		RDCOM10	E-9	REDCOMS-REV 1	REDCOM 10-NEW ORLEANS
5-26-0838-120A		COMNAVRESFOR	40	RDCOM10A			REDCOM 10-NEW ORLEANS
5-26-0838-120B		COMNAVRESFOR	41	RDCOM10B			REDCOM 10-NEW ORLEANS
4-22-0232-121		CMC		MCRDPI-3		MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND
4-22-0233-122		CMC		MCRDSD-3		MCRD SAN DIEGO	MCRD SAN DIEGO
3-20-0162-123		NAVAIR		NAWCL13	X-25	NAWC LAKEHURST-REV 1	NAWC LAKEHURST-REV1
3-20-0174-124	29	CNR		NRL-AF		NRL WASHINGTON	NRL WASHINGTON
3-20-0219-125	30	SPAWAR		No COBRA		NCCOSC RDT&E	NCCOSC RDT&E San Diego
3-20-0205-126	31	NAVSEA		IH-PIC		NSWC INDIAN HEAD	NSWC INDIAN HEAD

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and
Facilities, Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives

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MILITARY BASES

Challenges in Identifying and
Implementing Closure
Recommendations

Frank C. Conahan, Senior Advisor to the Comptroller General
for Defense and International Affairs Programs



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to provide you with an overview of our work involving the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. This includes our legislatively mandated role in assessing DOD's recommendations and process of selecting closure candidates and our subsequent work examining the implementation of BRAC decisions.

Today, I will (1) provide a brief historical account of the BRAC process, including our role in that process; (2) summarize some of the conclusions we have drawn in assessing DOD's decision-making process in prior BRAC rounds and identify improvements that DOD and its components have made to the process; (3) share with you the results of our work on previous base closures--including planned reuse and environmental cleanup of these facilities; and (4) make some preliminary observations about BRAC issues that may extend beyond the life of the current BRAC legislation.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BRAC

As DOD budgets, force structure, and personnel began to be reduced in the mid-to-late 1980s, it became increasingly important to ensure that scarce DOD resources be devoted to the most pressing

operational and investment needs rather than maintaining unneeded property, facilities, and overhead. Historically, however, closing unneeded military facilities had not been an easy task, in part, due to public concerns about the effects on communities and their economies and concerns about the impartiality of the decision-making process. Additionally, legislative provisions enacted in the 1970s requiring congressional notification of proposed closures and preparation of economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports severely hampered base closure efforts.

Legislation enacted in 1988 (P.L. 100-526)--which was used only for that year--facilitated a successful round of base closure decision-making. It outlined a special process for considering closing actions, authorized a special commission to propose closures and realignments, and provided relief from certain statutory provisions that were seen as hindering the base closing process.

Efforts by the Secretary of Defense in January 1990 to initiate additional base closure actions--without special enabling legislation--encountered difficulty and were not completed. Concerned about the Secretary's January 1990 proposals, the Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX, P.L. 101-510) halting any major closures except those following the new act's requirements. The act created the independent BRAC commission and outlined procedures, roles, and

time lines for the President, the Congress, DOD, GAO, and the Commission to follow.

The 1990 legislation required that all bases be compared equally against selection criteria and DOD's current force structure plan, provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The legislation mandated rounds of BRAC reviews in 1991, 1993, and 1995. For each BRAC round under the 1990 legislation, the services and DOD agencies submitted their candidates for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense for his review. After reviewing their candidates, the Secretary submitted his recommendations to the BRAC Commission for its review. The BRAC Commission, which could add, delete, or modify the Secretary's recommendations, then submitted its recommendations to the President for his consideration. The President could either accept or reject the Commission's recommendations in their entirety; if he rejected them, the Commission could give the President a revised list of recommendations. If the President accepted the Commission's recommendations, he forwarded the list to the Congress, which became final unless the Congress enacted a joint resolution disapproving it in its entirety.¹

Base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993 produced decisions to fully or partially close 70 major domestic bases and to close,

¹See enclosure 1 for an overview of BRAC 1995 outlining DOD's selection criteria, key steps taken by DOD components in identifying BRAC candidates, and key milestone dates.

realign, or otherwise downsize scores of other bases, installations, and activities.² I need to emphasize that the number of bases recommended for closure in a given BRAC round is often difficult to tabulate precisely because closure actions are not necessarily complete closures, and closures may involve activities and functions rather than bases.

The term "base closure" often conjures up the image of a larger facility being closed than may actually be the case. Military installations are diversified and can include a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility, or leased facility. Further, more than one mission or function may be housed on a given installation. Individual base closure and realignment recommendations may actually affect a variety of activities and functions without fully closing an installation. For example, in 1993, the Navy recommended closure of its Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) in Norfolk, Virginia, which is an aircraft maintenance facility. The Norfolk NADEP is located on the Norfolk Naval Base, which includes among other activities the Norfolk Naval Station and Naval Air Station, which were not closed by BRAC 1993.

Complete closures, to the extent they occur, may involve relatively small facilities, rather than the stereotypical large military base. Thus, the term "base closing" used in conjunction with BRAC

²See enclosure 2 for definitions pertaining to DOD base realignment and closure actions.

should be viewed generically as referring to facilities, installations, and activities of varying sizes. Closings and realignments, whatever their size, however, are designed to reduce unneeded infrastructure and achieve operational savings--that is the bottom line in terms of what the base closure process is all about.

DOD is still completing base closures and realignments approved in prior years. DOD must currently initiate closure and realignment actions no later than 2 years after the President submits his list to the Congress and must complete implementing actions within 6 years. DOD data indicates that as of January 1995, 51 percent of the 70 major closing actions of the prior three rounds had been completed. Implementing actions on BRAC 1995 recommendations must be completed by 2001.

The 1990 legislation mandated that GAO analyze the Secretary's selection process and recommendations for each BRAC round and submit a report to the Congress and the BRAC Commission.³ For BRAC 1995, this report must be submitted within 45 days after the Secretary makes public his list of proposed realignments and closures. Our next report must be submitted by April 15, 1995.

³See Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-91-224, May 15, 1991) and Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments (GAO/NSIAD-93-173, Apr. 15, 1993).

ADEQUACY OF DOD'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Several statutory or policy requirements of the BRAC process are designed to enhance its fairness and integrity and have been strengthened over time. They include the following:

- All DOD components must use specific models for assessing (1) the costs and savings associated with BRAC actions and (2) the potential economic impact on communities affected by those actions. We have identified shortcomings in these models and their use in prior BRAC rounds and have seen model improvements made each round to improve their effectiveness.
- Information used in DOD BRAC decision-making must be certified. That is, certification that the information is accurate and complete to the best of the submitting person's knowledge and belief. This requirement resulted from a 1991 amendment to the Base Closure and Realignment Act, and it was designed to overcome concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in the process.
- DOD components must develop and implement internal control plans to foster accurate data collection and analyses and documentation of decisions. A component of the internal control plans is extensive involvement by service audit agencies and DOD Inspector General personnel to better ensure the accuracy of data used in decision-making and to enhance the integrity of the process. These audit groups have performed admirably, under tight time constraints, to conduct real-time assessments of data used in the decisions. They have pointed out errors and tracked corrections to help ensure the most accurate data possible was being used.

Our reports on prior BRAC rounds have pointed out problems with documentation of decisions and some recommendations by DOD components, but overall we found their decision-making processes were generally sound, and most decisions adequately supported. In the most recently completed BRAC round, 1993, we found that (1) the

Navy generally completed return-on-investment analyses primarily to test the feasibility of an alternative, not to determine which, of competing alternatives, produced the greatest savings; (2) the Army chose not to recommend a base for closure, in part, because of environmental cleanup costs--a factor that is not supposed to be considered in calculating closure costs; (3) the Air Force's documentation of some of its final recommendations made it difficult to understand its justification, although subsequent oral explanations seemed to justify the recommendations; and (4) the Defense Logistics Agency overstated estimated savings of some realignments.

Our 1993 report also stated that OSD did not exercise strong leadership in overseeing the military services and DOD agencies during the process. Consequently, some technical problems occurred, and the opportunity to consider consolidation of maintenance facilities on a DOD-wide basis was lost. DOD responded to these problems by attempting to strengthen the process for BRAC 1995 and sought to encourage its components to explore opportunities for cross-service use of common support assets. It did this by organizing cross-service review groups to propose alternatives for the components to consider in five functional areas: (1) maintenance depots, (2) laboratories, (3) test and evaluation facilities, (4) undergraduate pilot training, and (5) medical treatment facilities.

Our assessment of the 1995 BRAC process is underway and will not be completed until we issue our report in April. Our staff will be undertaking a short, but intensive, scrutiny of the Secretary's recommendations once they are final and made public on March 1, 1995. Operating under tight time constraints, we will track selected recommendations back through the components' decision-making processes to test their logic, consistency, and reasonableness. We will report any concerns to the BRAC Commission and the Congress.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS BASE CLOSURES

Let me now discuss the status of previous closure decisions. While the implementation of BRAC 1993 is still in its early stages, DOD and local communities have had more time to develop and implement reuse plans for the two earlier rounds. We reported earlier on the results of our review on 37 base closures from the 1988 and 1991 rounds.⁴ While the findings remain unchanged, we have updated the figures for you today (see enclosure 3).

Federal property that is no longer needed is not automatically sold. Rather, DOD is required to first screen excess property for possible use by other DOD organizations and then by other federal agencies. If no federal agency has a need for the excess property,

⁴Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991 (GAO/NSIAD-95-3, Nov. 1, 1994).

it is declared surplus to the federal government and generally is made available to qualifying nonprofit organizations and state and local governments. Any property that remains is available for sale to the general public. DOD is required to comply with environmental laws for disposing of real property. These laws call for all relevant parties to agree on the extent of cleanup required before property can be transferred within the federal government and that property be cleaned up before it can be transferred to nonfederal users.

Originally, DOD estimated that \$4.1 billion would be received from the sale of property from BRAC 1988 and 1991 rounds to help pay for the costs of realignments and closures. DOD property sales currently total about \$63 million. The primary reason for the low property sales is that about 88 percent of the property we reviewed at these 37 installations was being retained by DOD or transferred at no cost to other federal agencies or state and local jurisdictions. Of the remaining 12 percent, 3 percent is planned for sale and 9 percent is undecided. Closure costs not paid from property sales revenue will have to be paid from congressional appropriations.

In addition to requesting property at no cost, communities are also asking the federal government to provide cash grants, income producing properties, and building and infrastructure improvements to assist with the conversion of military properties to civilian

uses. Communities have received nearly \$300 million in cash grants from various federal agencies to assist with the planning and implementation of base reuse plans. DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment has provided \$33 million; the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration has provided \$83 million; the Department of Labor has provided \$46 million; and the Federal Aviation Administration has provided \$130 million.

Communities are also seeking the public benefit conveyances of readily marketable properties, such as military golf courses and family housing, to support reuse activities. Communities are asking for these revenue generating properties to help fund the operating expenses while they implement their reuse plans for activities such as airports or educational institutions.

Finally, communities are asking DOD to renovate buildings, upgrade utility systems, construct roads, and improve other infrastructure. Some requests have been for converting buildings from their former military use to classroom facilities and to bring buildings up to current state and federal standards. Other requests have been for infrastructure system upgrades to gas, water, and sewage systems and the construction of access roads. Communities are asking DOD to perform this work, provide the funds to do the work, or deduct the funds from property sales revenue.

Our work also shows that reuse planning and disposal of property are being delayed for several reasons. These include (1) disagreements over reuse alternatives, (2) changing laws and regulations, and (3) environmental cleanup of contaminated properties.

Disagreements over reuse arise when competing federal agencies, local jurisdictions, or other members of the community cannot agree on reuse alternatives. We have seen disagreements between cities, counties and cities, federal agencies and cities, Indian groups and local communities, and homeless assistance organizations and local communities. When conflicts arise, DOD base closure officials have urged all parties to reach an accommodation; however, DOD has the discretion to determine the final use of the property.

Changing laws and regulations delay reuse planning. When new legislation is passed, communities that are in the midst of reuse planning often choose to delay decisions until implementing regulations are finalized. For example, the Congress passed legislation in 1993 to expedite the base conversion process and support economic development in communities facing base closure. DOD issued interim rules in April 1994 and amended them in October 1994. Final rules are expected to be published in mid-March of this year.

With respect to environmental cleanup of contaminated properties, we have just released our report on the environmental impact at closing military installations.⁵ This report addresses the significant environmental cleanup challenges that face the Congress, DOD, the state, and local communities before the property can be reused.

The Congress, DOD, and the Environmental Protection Agency have taken a number of actions over the past several years to resolve environmental cleanup issues at bases that are being closed and realigned. However, problems still remain. For example, our report shows that DOD's cost estimate for cleaning up 123 closing and realigning activities/installations increased to \$4 billion in its fiscal year 1995 budget request.⁶ However, later, more comprehensive estimates developed by 84 installations for their April 1994 cleanup plans totaled about \$5.4 billion. We found that even these estimates were understated.

Our report also shows DOD has made all closing and realigning installations eligible for high priority cleanup funding. This high priority accelerates DOD's cleanup funding needs. However,

⁵Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations (GAO/NSIAD-95-70, Feb. 23, 1995).

⁶The 123 activities/installations are those that are identified in DOD's fiscal year 1995 base realignment and closure budget justification documents. This number differs from other summary figures for base closures because of the way DOD aggregated these numbers for budget purposes.

63 percent of the \$5.4 billion estimate is for installations that would not have been given a high priority for cleanup funding if they were not closing or realigning. Also, most of the property will remain as federal lands and may not have to be cleaned up before reuse. In addition, in 1994 DOD received authority to use long-term leases so property can be placed into nonfederal reuse before cleanup is completed. To date, only a few leases have been signed.

Finally, our report shows that DOD's cleanup progress has been limited. Most sites at closing and realigning installations are in the earliest stages of investigation and study and may be 10 years or more away from cleanup. DOD has made limited cleanup progress for several reasons. First, the study and evaluation process is lengthy. Second, some of the contaminated sites are just too large or prohibitively expensive to clean up and some of the cleanup methods are unsure. Decontaminating groundwater is costly, difficult, and sometimes impossible. Third, new technology is frequently not a ready option because it may involve unacceptable risks or contractors may prefer other technology based on their past experiences.

To accelerate the environmental cleanup at closing installations, DOD established the Fast Track Cleanup program in July 1993. While certain elements in the program have achieved desired results, others have not, and opportunities for improvement remain.

For example, one initiative focused on quickly identifying and transferring uncontaminated property. However, although the services identified about 121,000 of about 250,000 acres at 1988 and 1991 closing installations as uncontaminated, the regulators only concurred on about 34,000 acres. Moreover, most of the uncontaminated property that has been identified is usually undeveloped, remotely located, and often not desirable for reuse.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

BRAC 1995 represents the last round of base closing reviews authorized under the 1990 legislation. Questions exist about whether sufficient infrastructure reductions will be made in the current round or whether additional rounds will be needed. Further, the BRAC round in 1993 was used to obtain BRAC Commission approval for changes to BRAC decisions made in 1991; the same is expected to occur in BRAC 1995 relating to prior BRAC decisions. Since DOD cannot unilaterally change a BRAC Commission decision, questions exist as to how any adjustments to 1995 BRAC decisions will be made in the future once the 1995 BRAC Commission has completed its work.

The question of whether the 1995 and earlier BRAC rounds will have eliminated sufficient excess infrastructure cannot be fully answered yet. However, recent statements by the Secretary suggest that excess infrastructure may remain after the 1995 BRAC round.

DOD's goal for the 1995 round was to reduce the overall DOD domestic base structure by at least 15 percent of DOD-wide plant replacement value--an amount at least equal to the three prior BRAC rounds. Recently, the Secretary said that he expects that the 1995 round reduction will be smaller than the 1993 round. This suggests that the current round may not meet DOD's stated goal. Our review of the 1995 round will address DOD's reasoning for the degree to which excess infrastructure was retained.

If further BRAC rounds are needed, the recent history of base closures suggests that some form of authorizing legislation may be needed to overcome problems which inhibited base closures in the past. However, I am not suggesting such legislation at this point, because we have not completed our review of the current BRAC round. In addition, we plan to complete a more detailed assessment of lessons learned from these rounds to determine what worked, what did not work as well, and what might be done differently to facilitate any additional reductions.

Regarding changes to prior BRAC decisions, the history of recent BRAC rounds suggests that some mechanism will be needed to authorize changes to 1995 BRAC decisions. I am not recommending a specific approach at this time. However, we would be glad to provide some alternatives for your consideration at a later date.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions from you or Members of the Subcommittee.

OVERVIEW OF BRAC 1995

The following is an overview of BRAC 1995 outlining DOD's selection criteria, key steps in DOD components' decision-making, and key dates pertaining to the BRAC process.

DOD SELECTION CRITERIA

Military Value (receives priority consideration)

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of DOD's Total Force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated air space at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return On Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential cost and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Community Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

KEY STEPS TAKEN BY DOD COMPONENTS IN IDENTIFYING BRAC CANDIDATES

- Categorizing activities.
- Collecting data needed to identify excess capacity and establish military values at individual locations.

- Identifying realignment and closure candidates and analyzing alternatives/scenarios.
- Performing analyses to gauge potential costs and savings from realignment and closure alternatives/scenarios.
- Determining economic, community, and environmental impacts.
- Recommending candidates for realignment and closure.

KEY DATES

The 1995 BRAC process is governed by certain key dates. No later than:

- March 1, 1995: The Secretary of Defense reports his recommendations for realignments and closures to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This point marks the first public release of proposed realignments and closures and public availability of DOD BRAC documents.
- **April 15, 1995:** GAO provides Congress and the Base Closure Commission with "a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process."
- July 1, 1995: The Base Closure Commission reports to the President on its recommendations for realignments and closures.
- July 15, 1995: The President transmits to the Commission and Congress a report containing his approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.
- August 15, 1995: Should the President disapprove any of the Commission's recommendations, the Commission must transmit a revised list to the President.
- September, 1995: Congress has 45 days in which to enact a joint resolution should it desire to disapprove the entire package of realignment and closure recommendations.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEBASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE DEFINITIONS

The following definitions were provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the Department of Defense (DOD) components for use in the 1995 base closure and realignment process. The definitions remain unchanged from the 1993 process.

CLOSE

All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal which are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

CLOSE, EXCEPT

The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the military, civilian, and contractor personnel will either be eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally, active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count against the "small portion retained."

REALIGN

Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of the base. Only a portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being realigned if it will experience a net reduction of DOD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

RELOCATE

The term used to describe the movement of missions, units, or activities from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they relocate.

RECEIVING BASE

A base that receives missions, units or activities relocating from a closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net increase of DOD civilian personnel.

MOTHBALL, LAYAWAY

Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency needs of DOD. Bases or portions of bases "mothballed" will not be excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim economic uses.

INACTIVATE, DISESTABLISH

Terms used to describe planned actions that directly affect missions, units, or activities. Fighter wings are inactivated, bases are closed.

PLANNED PROPERTY DISPOSALS AT SELECTED BASES CLOSED IN THE 1988 AND 1991 ROUNDS

December 1994

Base	Federal			Public benefit transfers					Econ dev transfer	Market sales	Undetermined	Total acres
	DOD	FWS/BLM	Other federal	Homeless	Airports	Park/recreation	Education	Other				
Army MTL, MA							7					37
Bergstrom AFB, TX	356				2,860						30	3,216
Cameron Station, VA				8		64				93		165
Castle AFB, CA			660	8	1,581	18	132	13		365		2,777
Chanute AFB, IL	13				1,181	147	62			729		2,132
Chase NAS, TX									262			3,757
Davisville NCBC, RI	380		10			219			3,399	96		1,280
Eaker AFB, AR					1,690	484	300		512		159	3,286
England AFB, LA					2,282					3	809	2,282
Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN	244			4		1,550			548	150	5	2,501
Ft. Devens, MA	5,598	800	260	20					2,633			9,311
Ft. Ord, CA	1,190	15,009		133	846	2,605	338		2,681			27,725
Ft. Sheridan, IL	310			46		103	4				4,923	712
Ft. Wingate AD, NM	13,000	8,812									249	21,812
George AFB, CA			900	34	2,300		63		1,443	328		5,068
Grissoni AFB, IN	1,398								1,324			2,722
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN		47,500							2,764		5,000	55,264
Lexington AD, KY	4					210			566			780
Long Beach NS/NH, CA	592		17	26			62		178		57	932
Loring AFB, ME	1,223	6,600	35				18				1,611	9,487
Lowry AFB, CO	115			47		175	220	22	711	576		1,866
Mather AFB, CA	57			28	2,883	1,462	95			1,169	22	5,716
Moffett NAS, CA	130		1,440							7		1,577
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC					1,244		15			1,559	926	3,744
Norton AFB, CA	112		33	4	1,267	24	10	39	641			2,130
Pease AFB, NH	230	1,095			2,305				600			4,257
Philadelphia NS/NH/NSY, PA	550		1			30		6		13	902	1,502
Presidio of San Francisco, CA			1,480									1,480
Puget Sound NS, WA		4	10	18		82	21	16				151
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO	214				202					12		428
Rickenbacker AGB, OH	300				1,635						80	2,015
Sacramento AD, CA	79			29			4		373			485
Tustin MCAS, CA	10			54		103	219			875	359	1,620
Warmminster NAWC, PA	100										740	840
Williams AFB, AZ					3,262		642			138		4,042
Woodbridge ARF, VA		580										580
Wurtsmith AFB, MI			2	7	1,600	15	10	5				3,541
Total acreage	26,205	80,400	4,848	466	27,138	7,298	2,215	390	18,373	6,602	17,285	191,220
Percent of total	13.70	42.05	2.54	0.24	14.19	3.82	1.16	0.20	9.61	3.45	9.04	100.00

Legend

FWS/BLM

Fish and Wildlife Service/Bureau of Land Management

Econ dev transfer

Economic development transfer

Mr. Secretary, through previous BRAC processes some services have been more aggressive than others in reducing excess capacity, in fact I believe only one service made it an issue during the 93 round. In light of the new cross service focus in the BRAC 95 round, how were decisions made to consolidate functions between services where one service had already reduced its excess capacity ?

Was the service who got onboard with the closure process early penalized ?

Mr. Secretary, the selection criteria for a base closure or realignment have not changed throughout the last three rounds yet the lessons learned point to up front environmental cleanup costs being prohibitive for services to implement base closures. First, are we keeping bases open because we cannot afford to close them due to lack of funds for environmental clean up ? Secondly, do you believe the eight criteria should be readdressed to reflect lessons learned from the previous closure rounds ?

Mr. Secretary, according to the Navy, results from the configuration computer model used for the base closures in 1993, were not always adopted by the Navy's BSEC. The Navy said that the results were merely the starting point for applying "military judgement" before making a final decision. For example, the Navy configured their computer model for determining berthing capacity at Naval bases so as to ensure that ships were split evenly between the Atlantic and the Pacific in the ratios reflected in the President's FY 1994-95 Budget Submission. Obviously, imposing an assumption on the process overrides the results of the capacity analysis. In addition, some bases with excess capacity were excluded from the 1993 capacity analysis because (according to the Navy) they did not want to have ships homeported at certain facilities. Could you tell us if similar accommodations were made before the 1995 list of recommended closures was made ?

Mr. Secretary, according to the Navy, in the 1993 closures ship berthing was given more weight when making capacity projections than was the capability of bases to perform intermediate ship maintenance. Was the same decision-making process applied to the 95 list ? What is the Navy policy for determining berthing needs ? For example, in 1993 the Navy planned for providing 67 percent of it's fleet with the exception of it's aircraft carriers. It was assumed that the balance of the fleet would either be at sea or in a shipyard

Mr. Secretary, in 1993 the Navy assumed that it would require 50 percent less capacity in it's aviation maintenance depots in order to support the DOD Force Structure Plan. Assuming your current list of recommended closures is favorably acted on , what percent of aviation depot maintenance capacity will remain after 1995 ?

Mr. Secretary, the key Navy measurement during BRAC 1993 for determining excess capacity at naval shipyards was direct labor mandays for both nuclear and non-nuclear work. Even though excess capacity was found to exist at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the Navy's BSEC made a "military judgement" to keep the shipyard open because of the absence of carrier dry-docks on the west coast. Has the Navy recommended maintaining excess shipyard capacity after the 1995 rounds of closures are completed and if so what are the labor mandays that are considered excess?

Mr. Secretary, with regard to redirects from previous base closure rounds, was it your department's policy to unilaterally address local issues perceived as remaining from previous rounds, or did DoD study such issues only if requested by concerned local communities?

Mr. Secretary, the third selection criterion deals with contingency and mobilization requirements. When addressing and quantifying excess capacity, to what extent did you formally account for surge and contingency requirements, and how did you quantify them for study?

Mr. Secretary, a USD(A&T) memo of 31 May 94 provides for the exclusion of a base from study for closure and realignment if it is found to be militarily/geographically unique or mission-essential. As this is rather broad, could you give some examples of how it was applied and what sort of specific characteristics qualified bases for exclusion from study?

Mr. Secretary, DoD guidance provides that bases excluded from study for closure or realignment on the basis of being military/geographic unique or belonging to a category in which no excess capacity exists will remain subject to joint cross-service review. Were there any instances of the cross-service review resulting in a recommendation for a realignment or closures which was at variance with an individual Service decision to exempt a base for study?

Remarks as delivered by
The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
6 March 1995

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, it is an honor for me to appear before you today to provide an overview of the recommendations for closure and realignment of Navy and Marine Corps bases and installations.

These recommendations have been generated through a process that builds upon the successful BRAC-93 procedures. That process was validated in the last round by both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BCRC) after a very thorough and extensive review.

Mr. Chairman, our primary goal for BRAC-95 was, of course, to reduce Department of the Navy infrastructure to the minimum shore facilities required to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps forces through 2001. But, more than that, we are seeking to design a more streamlined, efficiently located, and responsive baseline of support, capable of meeting the needs of a forward deployed, expeditionary force. This is an absolutely critical requirement. Our visibility throughout the world must be reflective of a potent force that is able to demonstrate our resolve wherever it is deployed.

With our transition in operational focus to a "...From the Sea" fighting force, we must also undertake "rightsizing" of our infrastructure support. Such "rightsized" infrastructure must be able to sustain naval forces in the broad spectrum of responses which I'm sure, Mr. Chairman, you fully appreciate, based on your many years of experience in defense matters as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We have been careful to ensure that the remaining Navy and Marine Corps base structure is correctly configured to maintain a broad range of demanding operational requirements well into the foreseeable future. While we recognize that the resources freed up by this process are vital to future readiness, we are mindful of our obligation to preserve readiness today as well. With it comes a responsibility that has caused us to scrutinize each detail of each decision in each recommendation to be sure that we do not, through lack of foresight, leave our nation vulnerable in any way. We embrace the base closure process as a unique opportunity to properly tailor our shore support organization and have sought to take full advantage of that opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation, you highlighted the fact that this is the last round of base closure authorized under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. You also indicated you are interested in a process for future base closure. There is no question that your previous experience, combined with your current position, places you in a unique position to influence the direction of this process today and well into the future.

With this in mind there are two questions that need to be asked. First, "how soon should we begin this process again?" This, I believe, is dependent on the availability of adequate funding necessary to carry out the base closures already approved by previous BRAC decisions. If we are forced to retain installations because of a shortfall in funding two negative situations will result. First, the Department of the Navy will not be able to achieve all the benefits we are counting on with our "rightsizing" effort. And, secondly, communities will not be able to convert these installations for economic redevelopment. This would be the worst of all possible worlds. Couple this with the expected further downsizing of our force structure, and I believe we may once again need the streamlined, open process allowed by this Base Closure Act to reorient our infrastructure as required by then-current conditions. Without that process, we have a very limited ability to affect such changes on our own.

The second question I believe is this, "is there a better way to do this work in the future?" From the Department of the Navy's perspective, the Base Closure Act has worked well. I think, Mr. Chairman, you and your former colleagues on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees accomplished a remarkable achievement with this legislation. If it is possible to duplicate it for future rounds of base closure, it has our endorsement.

On the other hand, because this is the last scheduled round of closures, we have proceeded as if this were our final chance to bring the size of our infrastructure into balance with the declining size of operating forces.

We have faced a very different challenge from the first rounds of base closure. As we performed detailed studies of our remaining support infrastructure, it was evident that the margin separating activities to keep, and those to give up, was slight. Nevertheless, we have arrived at a coherent set of recommendations which, when taken together with the decisions made in all previous rounds, result in a Navy and Marine Corps infrastructure able to support the kind of fast-paced, flexible, world-wide operations that our men and women will be conducting well into the next century.

Four principal themes are evident in our process and recommendations. First, we must retain the ability to pursue or sustain essential technological effort. Next, we must provide appropriate maintenance support to fleet assets. Third, our operational homeports must be structured to provide the necessary degree of flexible responsiveness. Finally, we will position forces, training and support functions in a manner supporting the Total Force concept. With BRAC-95 we have eliminated unnecessary duplication in the Navy and Marine Corps without adversely impacting the quality of life achievements recently attained. The savings we generate from this process are absolutely critical to recapitalization -- the linchpin of our future readiness.

After all BRAC decisions are implemented, the bases and installations that remain will support the critical warfighting effectiveness of our Sailors and Marines. We have

maintained the infrastructure necessary for them to train, to perform needed maintenance to ships, aircraft and other weapons systems, and to provide other support to operating forces. These also are the places where our men and women live. Therefore, it is important that these bases and stations contribute to overall morale, and thus operational readiness, by providing acceptable housing, and sufficient social, recreational, religious, and other support for Sailors, Marines and their families.

With these objectives in mind, I charged the Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Danzig, to assemble a Base Structure Evaluation Committee for the evaluation and deliberations required to satisfy the mandates of the Act. This Committee was chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment, Mr. Robert B. Pirie. The Vice Chair is Mr. Charles P. Nemfakos, a senior career civil servant. The other members of the Committee are four Flag and General officers and two additional Senior Executive Service career civilians.

We employed a methodology characterized by the highest standards of analytical rigor. The Committee was supported by the Base Structure Analysis Team, whose responsibility was to collect data and perform analysis as directed by the Evaluation Committee. The Analysis Team was composed of about 50 senior military and civilian analysts. They represent a broad spectrum of operational and technical expertise.

The Naval Audit Service worked in conjunction with the Analysis Team to ensure that the standards of integrity which the public has every right to expect were strictly followed. These auditors reviewed and validated the data gathering process from top to bottom, employing over 250 auditors from coast-to-coast and in Washington.

To ensure that the process was responsive to Navy and Marine Corps leadership, the Evaluation Committee held a number of deliberative sessions with the Fleet Commanders in Chief and other major commanders to apprise them of the progress of the process and to discuss potential impacts on Fleet operations, support, and readiness. Prior to making my final decision, I met with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps several times to seek their advice as well.

When considered in conjunction with the previous rounds of base closures, BRAC-95 represents the continuation of a significant initiative to correctly align infrastructure with the operational forces it must support. Clearly, excess capacity remains. But where it remains, it has been identified as peculiar to a particular type of installation, or it is being retained to protect future flexibility.

The efforts of the Department of Defense Joint Cross-Service Groups complemented our process. The task of these multi-service analytical groups was to identify possible asset sharing opportunities in five functional areas and the crucial area of economic impact. Members of our Analysis Team were assigned to each of the Cross-Service Groups, to ensure that both technical and base closure knowledge and experience were applied to

the functional analyses conducted by the groups. Many alternatives forwarded by the Joint Groups were anticipated by Department of the Navy scenarios already under study. We formally considered all of the Joint Cross-Service alternatives, and many of our recommendations include Joint Group suggestions. The joint cross-service process not only gave us a broader sense of what was possible, it also confirmed the validity of our evaluation process.

I'm confident that the Commission recognizes the enormity of the task involved in reviewing over 800 activities in five categories fully considering all mechanisms to reduce excess capacity. The consistent theme in looking at that large universe of activities was to ensure that we could satisfy our goal of having a shore infrastructure that had the full range of capability to support our Navy and Marine Corps Team.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss each of our five major groupings and to portray how our evaluation of each is consistent with what we believe our naval forces need to satisfy our future requirements.

It was clear, Mr. Chairman, from the beginning of this round, that we must proceed very carefully in our search for excess capacity. We could not afford to give up what we might need in this uncertain world to retain the flexibility that our Operational Commanders require. The approach taken in this final round was profoundly affected by the 1993 base closure round. As you recall, in 1993, my Department completely closed two major ship homeports and both a Navy and a Marine Corps major aviation center. Our decisions this time were carefully constructed to ensure that our forces had sufficient capacity remaining at operational bases to ensure the flexible response to changing operational requirements that has become so vital to the Naval forces' ability to go in harm's way, as well as to perform emerging new peacetime missions.

Much of the remaining ship home porting capacity is located in our fleet concentrations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. While our aggressive operating tempo would allow some additional closures, I did not think it prudent to further reduce our stateside infrastructure beyond the actions from the BRAC-93 round.

The changing shape of our Pacific fleet, and the changing nature of Pacific deployment patterns, allowed us to reduce our Western Pacific presence in Guam, while retaining the necessary wharves, infrastructure, and equipment to allow continued access. The realignment of the Naval Activities on Guam eliminates the day-to-day presence of the Fleet Combat Support Ships, supply stores, and ashore maintenance organization, while retaining the necessary infrastructure from these activities to allow reconstitution if the need arises. The Naval Magazine, Hospital, Communications Station and on station afloat emergent repair capability remain on the island, providing a robust Navy presence.

In a related realignment, the Naval Aviation assets presently on Guam, and scheduled

for relocating from the Naval Air Station closed in the BRAC-93 round to Andersen Air Force Base, are recommended to be relocated with the Supply Ships they support or collocated with similar aviation assets at existing bases elsewhere.

The remaining Naval Stations are sized and located to allow the Operational Commanders the flexibility they need to conduct the day-to-day training, maintenance and logistics support to guarantee the force readiness required to meet the Department's global commitments.

For Naval Aviation, previous round closures were cost effective but had significant start-up costs at existing bases for the transfer of assets from closing bases. Naval Aviation assets have continued to be significantly reduced in the force structure plan. Our analysis this time considered realignment of prior BRAC movements in order to minimize future expenditure of scarce resources by better using existing facilities through collocation of like airframes and grouping of common missions at existing bases.

Reassigning carrier based anti-submarine warfare assets to Naval Air Station Jacksonville builds a synergy of anti-submarine warfare platforms and allows single siting of all Navy F-14 and Navy Atlantic Fleet strike-fighter tactical aviation in existing capacity at Naval Air Station Oceana. Pacific Fleet carrier support aviation is redirected to North Island. The combination of these redirections saves military construction at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and Naval Air Station Lemoore equivalent to an entire naval air station, and avoids the building of new capacity for Naval Aviation.

The shift in location and reduction in maritime patrol operations allows the closure of Naval Air Station Adak. The vital asset at Naval Air Station Key West is its ⁱⁿ irreplaceable training airspace, so I have recommended realigning it to a Naval Air Facility to release unneeded excess infrastructure not associated with the operational training mission.

When considering Reserve aviation infrastructure, we focused on the fleet commander's desire to have the best possible aviation capability in the Northeast region. The best way to meet fleet operational needs, support Total Force requirements and reduce excess capacity was to close Naval Air Station South Weymouth and move Reserve assets to Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine. This supports integration of regular and Reserve forces, preserves demographics and gives us the most capable base north of Norfolk to support fleet operations.

total force concept?

Depot maintenance is a cornerstone of fleet readiness and of forward presence and power projection sustainment. Our ability to provide the required depot support for our operational forces is critical to ensuring the nation's ability to continue meeting the high operational tempo associated with contingency operations. Our BRAC-95 analysis

focused on eliminating excess capacity while ensuring that the right combination of capability and capacity remained to meet fleet operational requirements. The Navy Department's depot capabilities are the most diverse in Department of Defense and span aviation, surface ships, submarines, and ground combat weapon systems. While excess capacity was fragmented across a large number of diverse categories, significant reductions overall will be achieved through our BRAC-95 recommendations.

The smaller force structure with little relief from operational requirements dictates a highly responsive, robust industrial maintenance capability at major fleet concentrations. The Department must safeguard a level of nuclear ship repair capability and the ability to meet both scheduled and emergent depot maintenance requirements to support fleet assets forward deployed around the world. Our BRAC-95 depot maintenance recommendations are a continuation of the efforts that began in 1991 and include the closure the Ship Repair Facility at Guam and our last remaining non-nuclear shipyard at Long Beach. The decreased ship depot maintenance requirements associated with a smaller force and changing deployment patterns enable the closure of these activities, while meeting fleet requirements to support Unified Commanders' taskings.

Additional excess capacity was eliminated through consolidations, divestiture of facilities, and the incorporation of technical center industrial workload into remaining depot activities. These actions, along with previous closures equate to a reduction of 50% of our aviation depots, 64% of our shipyards and ship repair facilities, and 64% of the depot maintenance functions that were previously located at our technical center activities. The magnitude of these reductions clearly demonstrates the Department's firm commitment to "rightsize" to levels commensurate with future requirements.

We applied a great deal of emphasis and energy to the review of our array of Technical Centers. Our efforts were focused on "rightsizing" to the appropriate minimum set of sites that would give significant overhead cost reductions, while, at the same time, ensuring that we could pursue essential technologies and develop warfighting systems capability well into the twenty-first century. We tried to match our infrastructure reductions with the changes in numbers and use of our operational forces. Our emphasis was to minimize the amount of topline money going into the cost of operating and maintaining a large infrastructure and to focus our limited resources on the development, acquisition, and operation of warfighting systems.

We developed a mosaic map of the workload and capabilities of all Navy technical activities. We then attempted to reduce excess capacity through consolidation of similar work into the larger sites with full spectrum, total life cycle and total systems responsibilities. We continued our historical thrust of the collocation of our laboratory and development responsibilities with sites where major ranges exist. Throughout our deliberations, we were ever mindful of the need to provide immediate technical support and maintenance to the major fleet concentrations.

I am pleased to report that we have developed a list of recommendations that we feel will significantly improve technical support to the fleet while reducing overhead costs and duplication. We shed depot and industrial functions from the Technical Centers and returned these efforts to the Navy Industrial activities or made the decision to depend on the private sector.

An example of this industrial consolidation is our recommended closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky. This action consolidates ships' weapons systems--primarily guns and associated equipment-- with the general industrial workload at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, which already has many of the required facilities. This functional workload distribution also offers an opportunity for cross-servicing large gun barrel plating functions to the Army Watervliet (Water-vallay) Arsenal in New York. Some engineering will relocate with other engineering workload at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Port Hueneme, California. The Close-in-Weapons Systems depot maintenance functions collocated with similar functions at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane Indiana.

Likewise, the closure of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana collocates similar efforts into Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana, but also consolidates weapons workload into the extensive laboratories and ranges at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California, and moves aircraft related efforts into the significant consolidations that form the Aircraft Center of Excellence at Patuxent River, Maryland. By these consolidations we also realize both a reduction in excess capacity and major reductions in cost.

Obviously, Mr. Chairman, the closures were difficult decisions. But the reduction of excess capacity, the relocation of functional workload to activities performing similar work, and the economies that will be gained in the management of these similar functions demanded our consideration and resulting recommendations. Our recommendations both reduce our technical infrastructure and result in significant savings to the taxpayer and the Department of Defense, without impeding our ability to provide the forward presence, power projection and warfighting responsibilities for which we are responsible.

Operational education flexibility was the key to the Department's examination of the existing capacity within the training establishment. To support the smaller force levels dictated by the Force Structure for 2001, it might appear that we could dramatically shrink our capacity. However, we were concerned that our training activities be able to support fleet operational requirements to allow Sailors and Marines to be trained in their homeports, and that we continue to offer graduate level education and the opportunity to participate in the type of policy decision-making exercises the Naval War College offers in the joint service world. Accordingly, we eliminated excess aviation training capacity by closing and realigning two training air stations to take advantage of the full airspace and ground support synergies at the West Florida and South Texas

complexes. We also realigned "schoolhouse" training activities to be more responsive either to the fleet or to follow-on training opportunities. The result of these actions are centralized, economically-based training center complexes which serve fleet sailors and marines. Our recommendations result in educational institutions, fleet training centers, and training air stations which provide personnel-oriented, family-supportive training complexes that meet requirements for today and the future. These recommendations build on and support initiatives endorsed by previous BRAC decisions.

In the Personnel Support/Other category the Department evaluated the changes that were necessary to reflect force downsizing and closures. The focus in Reserve centers was to retain an infrastructure that supports a Reserve force that is robust, demographically sound and supports fleet readiness. For administrative activities, we pursued further streamlining to eliminate excess and support the President's National Performance Review. Reduction of management layers continues and further refines the process begun by the Department in BRAC 93.

Our recommendations resize the Reserve infrastructure by closing eleven Reserve Centers. These closures, in conjunction with BRAC 93 recommendations, maintain a presence in each state, maintain a demographically sound Reserve establishment, and are supportive of the fleet, Reserve recruiting, and readiness.

Six actions for closure and realignment are recommended for administrative activities. All of these actions reflect a concerted effort to balance the need to reduce infrastructure against that of supporting force readiness. The redirect of Space and Naval Warfare Command Headquarters to San Diego is an example of the effort to create a synergy between the Navy's headquarters commands and the fleet. This redirect consolidates a command activity with its technical activity in an area of fleet concentration. It collocates those providing the requirement with those having the requirement, and eliminates one entire management layer. This action will allow translation of fleet requirements into a product that functions in the operational environment with minimal delays.

With these recommendations I am happy to report that our BRAC-95 goals have been achieved. They reflect the closure or realignment of 62 Department of the Navy activities. Annual savings will exceed \$600 million per year, with a net present value of savings of \$8.5 billion over 20 years. These actions should be viewed in conjunction with the significant actions undertaken by the Department during BRAC-93, where our actions resulted in annual savings of \$1.4 billion and a net present value of savings of \$9.7 billion over 20 years.

For example, if implemented, the elimination of the excess capacity represented in our current recommendations could translate, in the first year alone, to the capability to accomplish nearly \$1-billion in research and development work, plus the overhaul of 12 major combatants, the training of 800 naval aviators, and the basing of approximately

two carrier air wings.

While this round of base closure evaluation was underway, the Department of the Navy continued the process of implementing the prior three rounds of BRAC decisions. For Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 we have requested over \$3 billion to execute our base closure program. Ninety-eight Navy and Marine Corps bases were identified for closure in the previous three rounds. Thirty-eight other bases were selected for realignment. Of the original 98 bases, 49 have been closed and 11 others have been realigned. We would like to be further along on implementing these decisions, but we have been hampered by less than adequate funding. These resource limitations have restricted our ability to close facilities in a timely manner and have delayed our expected savings. These delays not only jeopardize force modernization, they also delay return of these facilities to productive civilian use.

With our BRAC-95 recommendations, Mr. Chairman, the Department of the Navy also anticipates considerable savings once the actions are realized. Obviously, if the implementation process is delayed or full funding is not received, the savings we have projected will not be realized. We already expect, and we are basing our Department budget projections on the realization of \$1.9 billion per year in savings from earlier BRAC rounds. It is, therefore, absolutely vital that we stay the course; we must make these suggested cuts in excess infrastructure. Our future readiness depends on it.

The base realignment and closure process, as you and your colleagues had the foresight to envision when you gave us these tools, has come a long way from those early days of 1988, which I know you remember well, Mr. Chairman. I can fully assure you that our process of selection has been as accurate, fair, responsible, and responsive as we could possibly make it.

As in the previous rounds, Mr. Chairman, this is a very painful process. We are saying goodbye to trusted friends and dedicated communities. They have nurtured and adopted our bases. They have fed and housed our troops. They have entertained and counseled our families during those long absences for which our maritime forces are well known. They were always there to welcome us home and to honor those who gave all they had to give. Because of this long-standing relationship, I believe the efforts of your committee are critical in ensuring the citizens of these communities that the correct decisions have been made.

Throughout the Nation we are seeing the successful reutilization of our Navy and Marine Corps installations. Local leaders are implementing plans to diversify the use of land and facilities closed and realigned under previous BRAC actions. We are confident that with the President's "Five Part Community Reinvestment Program" we can work together with communities to create new jobs. You can be confident we will do every thing we can to revitalize our communities.

And now I would like to introduce Admiral Mike Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, General Carl E. Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Pirie, Chairman of our Base Structure Evaluation Committee, and Mr. Charles P. Nemfakos, Executive Director of our Base Structure Analysis Team.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

08 December 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subj: COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT
OF 1990

The Department of the Navy continues to be involved in a wide range of planning efforts aimed at further reducing infra-structure. Elements of these planning efforts will be reflected in POM-96 and POM-97. In this connection, it is important to take into account the restrictions imposed by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, P.L. 101-510, as amended by P.L. 102-190 and P.L. 102-484 (10 U.S.C. 2687 note) (the Act). Where the Act applies, it is the exclusive authority for selecting military installations for closure or realignment or for carrying out any closure or realignment. Further, the Act provides that no funds may be used to identify, through any transmittal to Congress or through any public announcement or notification, any military installation under consideration for closure or realignment except as provided in the Act.

The Act prohibits (except in accordance with the process established by the Act) any action to effect or implement: (a) The closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed; (b) Any realignment (at an installation authorized to employ 300 or more civilian personnel) involving a reduction by more than 1,000 or by more than 50 percent in the number of authorized civilian personnel; or (c) any construction which will be required as the result of relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which (a) or (b) applies. Unless "below threshold" activities have been recommended for closure or realignment by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Commission), the Act does not restrict the closure or realignment of installations with less than the requisite number of civilian employees. Similarly, the Act does not restrict the closure or realignment of overseas installations or reductions in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

Additionally, the Act requires that, in considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary "shall consider all military installations within the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department."

Concurrent herewith, I am issuing SECNAVNOTE 11000, which establishes procedures for carrying out the 1995 round of base closures and realignments pursuant to the Act. All planning efforts outside the established base closure process must adhere to the following guidance:

- While planning must continue and be reflected in POM-96 and POM-97, planning and recommendations for reducing the infrastructure must be limited to requirements and overall capacity and must not consider or identify specific installations for closure or realignment.

Subj: COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT
OF 1990

- Notwithstanding any planning efforts or proposed reductions included in POM-96 and POM-97, no action may be taken to effect or implement any closure or realignment that exceeds the numerical thresholds set forth in the Act until the 1995 Commission, the President, and the Congress have discharged their responsibilities under the Act.

- In determining whether the Act's numerical closure or realignment thresholds are met, individual closure or realignment actions may be considered separately. There is no need to take into account the cumulative effect of individual actions. However, closure or realignment actions shall not be broken into smaller increments for the purpose of avoiding application of the Act. Individual actions must be independently justified irrespective of any consideration of thresholds. Subject to the foregoing, individual closure or realignment actions that do not exceed the numerical thresholds set forth in the Act may proceed outside the established base closure process.

- Questions that arise in connection with this guidance shall be referred to the General Counsel, who is responsible in the Department of the Navy for determining whether the legal requirements of the Act and other statutes and regulations affecting closures and realignments under the 1988, 1991, and 1993 rounds of closures and realignments, and under the forthcoming 1995 round of closures and realignments, are being met by the Department.

It should be noted that studies should not be initiated whose sole purpose is to influence the base closure process. As outlined in the SECNAV Notice, analyses and evaluation will be based only on certified data collected and included in the Base Structure Data Base.


John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy

Distribution:
(See next page)

Lt Col DRETAR, USAF
J381, 477-1161
J3
5 November 1992

INFORMATION PAPER

Subj: USCINCPAC TWO-TIERED COMMAND STRUCTURE

PURPOSE

- Provide an understanding of the command and control (C2) concept USCINCPAC will use to respond to contingencies short of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC).

DISCUSSION

- USCINCPAC is the PACOM warfighter. As such, he is the first tier in the C2 concept. As such, he exercises operational control (OPCON) of all assigned forces through designated operational field commanders acting as Joint Task Force Commanders (CJTF). The CJTF is the second tier of the C2 concept.

- Designated CJTFs include COMSEVENTHFLT, CDR ICORPS, and CG III MEF. COMALCOM is also designated CJTF for disasters requiring a military response in Alaska. Finally, JTF-510 acts as CJTF for SOF missions and as possible interim CJTF.

- On-island Service Component Commanders, previously in the OPCON chain, now retain administrative and logistical resupply authority only. The end result is a more streamlined chain of command which is more suited to responding to the quickly evolving contingencies in this theater.

- Integral to the C2 concept is the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) which is a team of approximately 72 personnel who routinely train, deploy, and exercise together in support of JTF contingency operations.

-- Team is composed of multi-service, multi-disciplined personnel, with approximately half the team sourced from USCINCPAC staff and half from on-island Service Component Staffs.

-- When activated, team is tailored to the mission and needs of the CJTF which typically results in 20-26 personnel deploying.

-- Team maintains a six-hour alert status and is trained in crisis-action planning, equipped for field conditions, and provides limited organic C4I capabilities.


-- Upon arrival, team reports to CJTF and becomes part of his staff.

- Two-tiered C2 concept has been validated in three disaster relief operations and numerous command post and field training exercises.

CONCLUSION

- USCINCPAC two-tiered C2 concept is a proven one. It allows USCINCPAC the flexibility to quickly respond to all contingencies with the optimal staff organization, the right force mix and the most effective command structure possible.

National Joint Task Force



RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION AND TEST & EVALUATION

The strategy for reducing infrastructure at RD&A and T&E activities and ranges will include vertical cuts in non-core programs, consolidation of core functions at key installations, innovative cross service integration, partnerships with the private sector, and disposal of excess real property. Activities and ranges will retain minimum infrastructure to support essential core competencies and capacity requirements.

LOGISTICS

The strategy for reducing logistics infrastructure will include regional consolidation of common functions, process improvements, realignments, and use of efficiencies gained from advances in technology. Naval logistics infrastructure will retain unique maritime integrated logistics support capability and capacity needed to support our Naval mission.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

~~The strategy for reducing formal Naval training and education infrastructure will include using technological advancements, joint opportunities, privatization, out-sourcing, and consolidations. Formal training and education infrastructure will be sized to provide unique Naval skills for active duty and reserve personnel.~~

MEDICAL

The strategy for reducing medical infrastructure will co-locate health care capability with Naval force concentrations to support both readiness and health care provider training. Navy medical infrastructure will be sized to the ^{minimum} essential level necessary to support peacetime and contingency missions. Health care facilities will be considered for closure or downsizing when the number of Department of the Navy active duty and dependent beneficiaries is not sufficient to support a cost effective infrastructure, and adequate civilian or other federal sources of health care are available in the area.

DRAFT

16 DEC 1993

CHARTER FOR INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION JOINT MANAGEMENT BOARD

BACKGROUND:

Department of Defense must move aggressively toward a substantially smaller, more affordable infrastructure, while maintaining high quality, fully responsive forces beyond the year 2000. This infrastructure must be the minimum essential to support our national interests while enhancing readiness and quality of life.

ISSUE:

No cooperative mechanism exists to identify joint infrastructure reduction opportunities.

ACTION:

~~A joint management board is chartered for the purpose of identifying specific interservice opportunities to reduce infrastructure to an efficient level which supports the needs of the Armed Services into the 21st century.~~ Key to this effort is the requirement to resolve cross service data inconsistencies and traditional barriers to interservice cooperation. Management board strategies to accomplish the goal include but are not limited to:

- consolidating common support functions across Services to reduce infrastructure duplications.
- assigning operational units with similar missions from more than one Service to one base.

GOAL:

Retain minimum infrastructure within DoD to support JCS assigned Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Services.

MEMBERSHIP:

4 star level representatives from the following:

- USN
- USMC
- USAF
- USA

TIMELINE:

This Joint Management Board should report their findings NLT 30 January 1994.

BRAC 95

16 DEC 1953

~~FLEET SUPPORT GROUP~~
~~TASK~~
~~ACTION~~
~~TEAM~~

Handwritten notes:
1235
1555

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

OUTLINE OF BRIEF

⇒ Tasking

⇒ Process

⇒ Recommendations

- Navy Guiding Principles

- Joint Doctrine

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

*Use one word "minimum" several
don't like it.
"only"*

GOAL:

"Retain the minimum infrastructure
necessary to support the force structure
of FY 2000."

BRAC 95
TASK ACTION TEAM

TASKING

"A set of policy and guidance statements which are appropriate to shaping the Navy's support infrastructure in the 21st century."

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

TEAM MEMBERSHIP

NAVSEA

RADM(SEL) Jim Taylor

NAVSUP

CAPT Frank Guerard

MSC

CAPT Bill Armstrong

*HQMC (I&L)

*LTCOL Terry Doran

USMC pulled him out after they discovered purpose of mtg. Did not want any USMC concerned of the project.

091

CDR Ron Cooper

N8

CDR Steve Oster

N6

Mr. John Eggener, GM-15

N4

CDR Fred Beckmann

N2

CAPT Ivan Dunn

SPAWAR

CAPT George Klein

LCDR Steve Iselin

* Attended 6-10 Dec only

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

TEAM MEMBERSHIP

NAVAIR	CDR Ted Miller
NAVFAC	LCDR Will Mckerall
N1/BUPERS	CDR Al Sack
CNET	Mr. Steve Sheppard, GM-15
BUMED	CAPT Dave Morton
ONR	CAPT Mike Brinkac
NAVRESFOR	CAPT Jim Turner
CINCLANTFLT	CDR Bob Parsons
CINCPACFLT	CAPT Lee Champagne
JAG	LCDR Jim Messengil, JAGC, (Consultant)

BRAC 95

TASK ACTION TEAM

PROCESS TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS

- ⇒ **Facilitated mtg in Norfolk 6-16 Dec 93**
- ⇒ **Review Tasking**
- ⇒ **Individual presentations by team members**
- ⇒ **Consensus on Approach**
- ⇒ **Establish Assumptions**
- ⇒ **Define characteristics desired in Guiding Principles**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

- ⇒ Title 10, other USC, etc.**
- ⇒ JCS Roles and Missions**
- ⇒ Bottom up Review**
- ⇒ Navy Policy Book**
- ⇒ Base Realignment And Closure Law 1990**
- ⇒ Lessons learned in previous rounds**
- ⇒ SECNAVNOTE 11000 of 8 Dec 93 on BRAC 95**
- ⇒ OSD Initiatives on BRAC 95**

BRAC 95

TASK ACTION TEAM

**TASK ACTION TEAM
RECOMMENDATIONS**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

NAVY GUIDING PRINCIPLES

CHARACTERIZED BY FOUR CENTRAL CONCEPTS:

- ⇒ Support geographic concentration
- ⇒ Eliminate redundancy
- ⇒ Increase reliance on joint capabilities and capacities
- ⇒ Preserve unique core capabilities

↳ How do we get to "core" deficit.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

RECOMMENDED NAVY INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION STRATEGIES

- ① Looks OK but may need some word-smithing on the strategies.
 - Some members want the acronym defined for the CDR requirements or states in the ground.
 - Some Corps Requirements may have already been identified.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

BASING STRATEGY

The strategy for basing will make efficient use of existing resources by concentrating Naval forces at specific geographic locations where a full spectrum of core support functions already exist, and for which the additional cost of assimilating realigned activities will be minimal. A regional basing plan eliminates redundancy of fixed cost support functions and makes efficient use of existing airspace, sea space, land space, and facilities within each region. Activities outside of regional concentrations will be considered for closure.

Handwritten notes:
The strategy for basing will make efficient use of existing resources by concentrating Naval forces at specific geographic locations where a full spectrum of core support functions already exist, and for which the additional cost of assimilating realigned activities will be minimal. A regional basing plan eliminates redundancy of fixed cost support functions and makes efficient use of existing airspace, sea space, land space, and facilities within each region. Activities outside of regional concentrations will be considered for closure.

Handwritten notes:
Wanted to delete this sentence as politically inflammatory & required to analyze from any way.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

*OMB wants to see more specific
statements concerning keying system
rather than "brown funds" that we
can not live without.*

MAINTENANCE

redundant

A minimum core maintenance infrastructure consistent with future force structure must be retained. This strategy must consider both public and private depot maintenance capacity to provide an affordable maintenance infrastructure. The core organic Naval maintenance capabilities and capacities will be achieved through integration of intermediate and depot level maintenance in a regionally oriented structure.

*OMB wants it
deleted*

*Don't take
this because
of the OMB
looking at it.
Don't view it as
get it up for
to get it out
in data call.*

BRAC 95

TASK ACTION TEAM

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION **AND TEST & EVALUATION**

The strategy for reducing infrastructure at RD&A and T&E activities and ranges will include vertical cuts in non-core programs, consolidation of core functions at key installations, innovative cross service integration, partnerships with the private sector, and disposal of excess real property. Activities and ranges will retain minimum infrastructure to support essential core competencies and capacity requirements.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

*Much has
already
done*

LOGISTICS

The strategy for reducing logistics infrastructure will include regional consolidation of common functions, process improvements, realignments, and use of efficiencies gained from advances in technology. Naval logistics infrastructure will retain unique maritime integrated logistics support capability and capacity needed to support our Naval mission.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The strategy for reducing formal Naval training and education infrastructure will include using technological advancements, joint opportunities, privatization, out-sourcing, and consolidations. Formal training and education infrastructure will be sized to provide unique Naval skills for active duty, *Don Civilians* and reserve personnel.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

TENANTS

The strategy for reducing infrastructure must include identifying related, but dispersed, tenant activities and co-locating those activities to maximize efficiency. Specific attention should be focused on large manpower intensive activities. When evaluating tenant moves from bases recommended for closure, only those activities essential to maintain readiness will be relocated.

No Research

Dental and
Clinic
Branch
Inspect!

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

RESERVE

The strategy for reducing Department of the Navy Reserve infrastructure will maximize joint use of facilities. Reserve readiness requires that units be located where demographics and geography can support mission requirements.

BRAC 95
TASK ACTION TEAM

**THE FOLLOWING ARE
RECOMMENDED NAVY GUIDING
PRINCIPLES THAT ARE SPECIFIC
TO THE BRAC PROCESS:**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

CLAIMANT INPUT

Department of the Navy BRAC process will include claimant participation in data call formulation.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

COMMON RESOURCE BASELINE

A common resource baseline is essential prior to the BRAC 95 process. Programmatic imbalances in dollars and manpower must be reconciled at the claimant level across the FYDP before formal data calls.

(e.g. "Clear Wedges")

*Want to
come up with a
statement that says
what the resource base
will be -
Needs to happen before
March 94*

*Some wedges have
already been done.
Be sure you know where
you are starting from.*

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

PREVIOUS BRAC DECISIONS

The Department of the Navy process for BRAC 95 will not revisit closure decisions already having the force of law under the provisions of PL 101-510. However, Department of Navy recommendations should consider unit relocations and realignments included in previous Commission reports in those cases where significant force structure changes have occurred.

delete →

**BRAC 95
TASK ACTION TEAM**

RECOMMENDED JOINT DOCTRINE

BRAC 95
TASK ACTION TEAM

ESTABLISH DOD GOAL:

Retain minimum DOD infrastructure to support JCS assigned Roles, Missions and Functions of the Services.

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

JOINT DOCTRINE

CHARACTERIZED BY FOUR CENTRAL CONCEPTS:

- ⇒ Support geographic concentration**
- ⇒ Eliminate redundancy**
- ⇒ Increase reliance on joint capabilities and capacities**
- ⇒ Preserve unique core capabilities**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

REDUCTION STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT DOD GOAL

- ⇒ Consolidation of common support functions across Services to reduce infrastructure duplication.**
- ⇒ Assignment of operational units with similar missions from more than one Service to one base.**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

JOINT SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION INCLUDE:

- ⇒ Joint Basing.**
- ⇒ Depot Maintenance.**
- ⇒ Test and Evaluation Ranges.**
- ⇒ Technical Centers and Laboratories.**
- ⇒ Education and Training.**
- ⇒ In-patient Medical Treatment Facilities.**
- ⇒ Communications.**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

BARRIERS TO BE OVERCOME TO ACHIEVE JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTIONS

- ⇒ Lack of common measures, baselines and databases.**
- ⇒ Differences in service business practices.**
- ⇒ Historical lack of interservice cooperation.**
- ⇒ Time**

BRAC 95 TASK ACTION TEAM

RECOMMENDATION:

*Currently Vice Chief of
Asst CoS sit on a
Board. May use it.*

**Establish Joint Four Star Management
Board empowered to make
recommendations on joint opportunities
for infrastructure reductions.**

BRAC 93 LESSONS LEARNED

1. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: The Fleet Commanders were not provided a formal opportunity to present their views of desired shore infrastructure reduction. While the Navy cannot be perceived to have made their BRAC decisions early in the process and then dedicating their data collection efforts towards supporting these decisions, it is still essential that the Fleet Commanders be given an opportunity to present their ideas.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide a mechanism so that the Fleet Commanders are afforded an opportunity to provide their thoughts and alternatives on infrastructure reduction.

2. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: The tight time constraints for nearly every BRAC 93 data call submission did not allow sufficient time for development and review of the data call packages.

RECOMMENDATION: Start the data collection process earlier (1st quarter FY 94) and allow more time to provide requested data so that each level of the chain of command can spend the time needed to provide quality submissions.

3. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Because of difficulties with modem transmission and OPNAV's inability to utilize overnight mailing services, some of the hard copy data call packages were received after their due date.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish systems and train personnel so that modem transmissions can be used whenever possible. If this can't be done, the OPNAV BRAC team should pursue a waiver so that they can use overnight mail.

4. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: The OTIS program utilized by the BSAT/BSEC to determine excess capacity at receiving installations did not provide sufficient detail to allow an informed decision as to whether a particular installation's existing assets could accept a new mission. For instance, although a station may have sufficient square yardage of parking apron to accept a KC-130 squadron, if the aircraft pavement was designed for much lighter aircraft loadings the apron may not be able to be used for a new KC-130 mission.

RECOMMENDATION: Expand and validate OTIS data at each base and notify the program so that it gives a more accurate picture of existing assets. Information provided in the BRAC 93 data collection effort should also be evaluated for input. Ensure NCB personnel are trained in the use of OTIS.

5. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Some confusion was experienced during development of the data call packages because of lack of detailed guidance on how the packages were to be put together.

RECOMMENDATION: Early in the data collection process provide

detailed instructions on how the packages should look. Recommend this guidance address the following areas:

- How pen and ink changes should be made (initialed, dated, etc.).
- Hard copies should be "one-sided".
- Do not allow comments in cover letters, insist that meaningful comments be part of the data call package. It is important to recognize that footnotes and annotations to answers sometimes provide essential information in the evaluation of an answer.
- Either request that all blanks be filled in with NONE, N/A or put a statement at the beginning of the package that all blank blocks were left blank intentionally.
- If the base CO or Commander is out of town and can't sign the certification, ensure that the position title for the individual providing the certification signature is labeled "ACTING".
- Copies of any changes made to a package must be distributed to next lowest level of chain of command so that everyone knows what the final version looks like.
- Although it is well understood that the certification chain starts where the data is generated, there is confusion as to whether all certifications should be forwarded to OPNAV or only the certifications of those in command.
- Do a page count to ensure that all pages are numbered and there are no missing pages.
- Forward original versions of data calls to the next level in the chain of command. Copies are retained by submitting activity.
- Any data call which involves coordination or extraction of information from a previous data call should be clearly identified as such and the previous data call number should be listed.
- Base Loading and personnel migration data should be distributed in standard spreadsheet software (LOTUS or other user friendly version) so that totals are automatically calculated.

6. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Valuable time, money and energy was expended at each level of the chain of command in tracking and forwarding "original ink" signatures.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate the requirement for "original ink" certifications. Where hard copies are required, facsimile versions should suffice.

7. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: The WordPerfect 5.1 files with charts, boxes and special fonts were difficult to keep uniform, hard to transmit, slow to print and added little value.

RECOMMENDATION: Avoid use of boxes, charts and special fonts in word processing programs.

8. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Several data calls requested information that had already been provided to OPNAV, NAVFAC, etc. under a different program/format. This placed an unnecessary burden on the activities and resulted in unnecessary duplication in both data formatting and chain of command certification.

RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate duplication and maximize use of validation/review of existing data bases rather than generating new ones.

9. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Some confusion existed as to what data calls needed to be answered at the activity level and which could be answered at the TYCOM/claimant level. In large part, this was due to different "level" questions being included in the same data call.

RECOMMENDATION: Break out data calls so that the appropriate level of the chain of command can provide the required data. For example, Data Call 35 contained questions regarding support requirements for ships currently homeported as well as a question requesting four options for ship mixes that could be used to accommodate additional ships. Clearly, questions regarding currently homeported ships are best answered at the TYCOM/claimant level.

10. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Segmentation of the data collection process resulted in duplicate efforts from different claimants (CINCLANTFLT, BUMED, etc.) within the same geographic area. This occasionally resulted in conflicting data being provided by two co-located activities.

RECOMMENDATION: Appoint a lead command to coordinate responses to all questions addressing regional or local area matters.

11. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Short-fused taskings and inquiries often resulted in confusion as information was passed down the chain of command. This was due, primarily, to the fact that a major portion of the taskings, etc. were communicated over the telephone and never confirmed in writing.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide all taskings, inquiries, etc. in writing.

12. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Time constraints sometimes required the BSAT to task activities directly with providing information. This complicated the certification process and sometimes caught the major claimants "off-guard".

RECOMMENDATION: Use the chain of command.

13. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Development of the Scenario Development data calls was sometimes delayed because of the difficulty in determining the exact force structure (loading) that was to be

relocated.

RECOMMENDATION: Development of the Scenario Development data calls was sometimes delayed because of the difficulty in determining the exact force structure (loading) that was to be relocated.

14. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: SECNAV provided the BCRC with a list of proposed technical changes during their deliberations. CINCLANTFLT was informed that this action had been taken after the fact. For CINCLANTFLT, the two corrections recommended were not considered necessary and the changes that CINCLANTFLT would have liked to have made were not included.

RECOMMENDATION: If technical corrections are to be submitted, solicit input/comments from the major claimants before passing them to the DCRC.

15. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: On a number of occasions we approached OPNAV or the BSAT for a clarification and were told - "we know the answer to that one because another major claimant already asked the question." Confusion in interpretation of a question could result in the different major claimants answering the same question in different ways.

RECOMMENDATION: Have the members of the OPNAV/BSAT BRAC teams keep a record of their "clarifications for the day" and fax them to all major claimants at COB.

16. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Referring to some of the completed data calls was extremely difficult because the questions were not numbered and the page numbering often changed as the activities completed the packages.

RECOMMENDATION: Number questions by section or paragraph.

17. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Confusion existed as to who was a host, major tenant, small tenant, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: Before the data collection process begins, all hosts and tenants should be identified and classed as either small, medium or large.

18. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Several data calls involving cost and personnel data did not differentiate between AF, NAF, contractor, Reserves and TAR personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide guidance in the data call(s) whether the information being requested includes AF, NAF, contractor, Reserves and TAR personnel.

19. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Use of student "average on board" (AOB) to compare usage with training capacity is misleading because of surge loading, specialized training assets (labs, trainers,

etc.), classroom size and scheduling variances.

RECOMMENDATION: Use "utilization of training space" vice AOB when comparing usage with training capacity.

20. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Claimants were not provided with copies of COBRA data and were unaware of what the "final" data input looked like. However, on several occasions the claimants were asked to defend differences between current cost estimates and those reflected in the COBRA runs.

RECOMMENDATION: As a minimum, claimants should be informed of any modifications made to the input they provided.

21. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: Although OPNAV N44 tasked the claimants with providing a listing of their BRAC points of contact and recommended that each claimant do the same with each of their activities, there was never a consolidated Navy-wide listing of BRAC points of contact. Many of the scenarios worked in the later stages of the data collection effort involved identification of gaining base support requirements which crossed claimancy lines.

RECOMMENDATION: Compile and distribute a Navy-wide BRAC point of contact listing early in the data collection effort.

22. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: During the budgetary process questions were raised questioning the need for certain MILCON projects. The nature of the questions indicated a lack of understanding of fundamental requirements and geography.

RECOMMENDATIONS: NAVCOMPT personnel must be trained on OTIS or claimant/TYCOM/NCB personnel should conduct site surveys of every requested MILCON project.

23. PROBLEM EXPERIENCED: There was a lack of understanding by various levels of the chain of command of what was desired during the data calls and budget submissions. As a result much effort was expended on needless work while important information was not forwarded.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Conduct training sessions for claimants/TYCOMS/activities. Sample data calls and budget submissions should be examined to show ALCON how they can improve their own work.

24. PROBLEM EXPERIENCE: During the budget hearings it was discovered NCB could not fund the desired SECNAV relocations. In less than a week alternate less expensive plans were made and funding was provided based on these hasty estimates.

RECOMMENDATION: NCB inform claimants early of proposed SECNAV relocations that can not be funded so that detailed alternate plans can be better developed.

NAVY HEARING

Navy Dalton, Mundy, Borda

- Objective is to eliminate capacity
- GAO looked at military value
- Sec Nav. made some decisions based on economic / removed some installations
- Montoya - capacity - reduction of 20% in ships but no reduction in naval stations, piers, etc
 - * CNO, need surge, see 346 ships, bottom up review (some ships are constantly deployed)
 - wharfs: excess capacity
 - * training air stations, ~~and~~ ship yards
- Robler
 - how much consid. given to past BRAC impact
 - * BSEC decision, need to combine w/ previous rounds everything put on table except economic
 - where does funds for closing come from, and where does savings go
 - * ~~the~~ budget submission will pay for hope savings come back
 - would you have done more if you didn't have to pay him - up-front costs
 - * no
 - Navy is heavy on redirs. its, why
 - * chances since 93, MC w/ the USN, Bottomup 128 Navy - maintain A-6 was a player, want now less patrol ac in inventory, and quieting in general ie less F-18's, avoiding mil con to save \$ 1B

Stark

- Calif, Guam excluded
- * based on economic impact
- inter-servicing, why not more
- * costs could go up unless we do it ourself
- plans for using private sector
- * didn't look at that
- President said want close Portsmouth
- *
 - Guam job loss
 - * transient job loss mostly

Canella

- more needs to be reduced @ in cross-servicing
- * looked at all suggestions, adopted 20 closed, Hans Beach, Louisville, etc



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0650-F13
BSAT/CD
24 March 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street

Please refer to this number
when responding 950327-5

NAVY QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD RESULTING FROM THE 06 MARCH NAVY HEARINGS

1. Question: Has the Navy provided to the Commission all of the information used in its decision-making process? If not, please provide it within the next five days.

Answer: Yes. The Base Structure Data Base, which contains the certified data used for analysis, and the minutes and deliberative reports, which contain the decision-making record, were transmitted to the Commission on March 1, 1995. Copies of the analytical tool outputs for each subcategory (including capacity analysis summaries, military value matrices, and configuration analysis summaries) were transmitted on March 9, 1995. Revisions to the certified data, which were received by the Navy after transmittal of the Base Structure Data Base, were forwarded on March 14, 1995. Final certified data for several COBRA scenarios was transmitted on March 20, 1995.

2. Question: Secretary Gotbaum described the method used by the Services to create a military value ranking for each base in a category which was used to determine closure or realignment choices. Are there any circumstances where the Navy closed or realigned bases which ranked higher than bases not included on the Navy list? If so, please explain the reason for not following the military value rankings.

Answer: There are a number of instances where the Department of the Navy's recommendations close or realign bases with higher relative military value scores than bases which were not affected by recommendations. The reason for these results is inherent in the process followed by the DON, which was identical to that used and validated by the Commission in BRAC-93.

As described in our report on pages 21 to 25, military value analysis was conducted of each subcategory of activities to arrive at a relative score which represented how each activity in a subcategory related to a series of questions which portrayed the characteristics of the subcategory. The results of the military value analysis and the capacity analysis for each subcategory were then used as inputs to the linear programming model used for configuration analysis. For the Department of the Navy, configuration analysis sought to identify that set of installations for each subcategory that both would satisfy the future force structure requirements and would allow the retention of installations whose overall military value average was at least equal to the average of the current set of existing installations. This methodology was developed because of the nature of naval installations, which tend to be multi-functional activities (as opposed to one unit/mission = one base) with locational limitations (e.g., support to the fleet in the Atlantic and Pacific). The restriction on average military value derives from the philosophy that the Department, after base closure, should be in at least as "good" a position as it is now vis-a-vis the installations it retains. The operational flexibility that is central to naval forces depends on operational and forward deployment requirements. As these requirements change, the nature of and requirements for our bases change. As a result, although we use individual activities to arrive at a perspective on the military value of a particular subcategory, the overall value to the Department is

oriented on the aggregate. Configuration analysis allowed us to seek the best installations which would satisfy our future requirements in an operationally feasible manner.

The use of this methodology and the resultant closure scenarios developed do lead to results where installations are recommended for closure as a function of satisfaction of force structure requirements rather than absolute military value. An example of this result, as noted during our testimony before the Commission on March 6, 1995, is Long Beach Naval Shipyard. While Long Beach's military value is about .02 points higher than the military value of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Long Beach was selected for closure to eliminate excess shipyard capacity. Portsmouth was considered for closure but not recommended because of concerns over future nuclear force requirements. Another example may be found in training air stations, where NAS Meridian was recommended for closure and NAS Corpus Christi was recommended for realignment. Both have higher military value scores than NAS Whiting Field, which is to be retained. The two recommendations are the result of the various installations' ability to satisfy pilot training requirements, rather than an arbitrary military value cut-off. Given the diverse nature of the activities in the Technical Center subcategory, the Administrative Activities subcategory, and the Reserve Activities subcategory, while military value was helpful in arraying the capabilities of these activities, satisfaction of future capacity requirements was key to the scenarios which were considered and which resulted in the Department's final base closure recommendations.

In summary, the nature of naval bases is such that they do not have equal capacity to support the force structure. In determining which bases to close, we need to be able to retain bases with the best collection of military value that also satisfy capacity requirements. If this analytical approach was not followed, we would either have to keep more excess capacity than we need or to close more base structure than we can operationally afford, resulting in a requirement to build additional capacity at the remaining bases.

3. Question: Some communities have expressed concern about inconsistent levels of cooperation from base commanders in preparing their rebuttals to the DoD proposals. What guidance did the Navy give its base commanders regarding cooperation with local communities during the BRAC process?

Answer: The primary guidance to commanders regarding conduct of the BRAC process was contained in public affairs messages issued on April 15, 1994; January 18, 1995; February 3, 1995; February 15, 1995; February 23, 1995; and February 24, 1995. Key points relating to dealings with local communities are as follows:

- The importance of maintaining open lines of communication between base commanders and local communities cannot be overemphasized. Uninterrupted base participation in face-to-face meetings with community leaders/neighbors is important to reinforce longstanding community partnerships, to address possible rumors and misinformation, and to make sure all our neighbors are getting the big picture. All commands can and should continue to pursue all current and planned community

relations and partnership/outreach activities, but should remain mindful of longstanding Navy policy to remain impartial.

- Prior to the Secretary of Defense's forwarding of the BRAC-95 recommendations to the Commission, no public release of the Navy recommendations, or data or analysis compiled in support of those recommendations, was authorized. However, commands were authorized to respond to inquiries using normally releasable, unclassified information, such as number of employees, military population, payroll, command and tenants' missions, current base contracts, etc.
- Following submission of the DoD recommendations, inquiries received by local commands relating to factual information upon which naval installations were recommended for closure or realignment can be answered to the extent that factual and accurate information is on hand, properly coordinated, and cleared for release by the local command's chain-of-command. Details concerning an installation's mission, size, number of personnel, payroll, and other local information normally releasable may continue to be released. However, commanders were advised to avoid speculation about whether the Commission will approve or disapprove the list of recommendations, what impact closure of a specific installation would have upon local areas or military capabilities, and what savings may be gained.
- There are no restrictions on hosting informational briefings or tours of base facilities for community group representatives. The decisions to accept such visit requests may be made at the command level. With regard to Congressional visits, commanders were advised that members of Congress should be given access to installations for the purpose of learning about base operations and missions and about community relations-related topics, such as the impact of the base on the local community. Further, base commanders should be prepared to provide this type of information to anyone seeking it. The only limitation is that commanders must avoid speculation on whether their installation should or should not be approved for closure or realignment.
- In their official capacities, naval personnel must remain neutral and should avoid the appearance of taking sides relating to a decision to close or realign a certain base. Command officials must exercise discretion in hosting on-base activities, accepting invitations to speak, or attending public functions in their official capacity which could be considered inconsistent with DoD standards of conduct policy or misconstrued as support for any particular cause vis-a-vis BRAC. In their capacities as private citizens, however, DON personnel are permitted to attend hearings, while not in uniform and during off-duty hours.

4. Question: Will the Navy have excess capacity in any major categories or installation groupings if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission? Please elaborate.

Answer: Some excess capacity will remain in virtually every subcategory of activity evaluated by the Department. The nature and extent of the excess varies from subcategory to subcategory. In some cases, elimination of this excess was infeasible due to the configurations of particular types of installations or to the nature of the excess capacity. For instance, in the Training and Education subcategory, significant excess capacity will remain in fleet training activities. While various closure scenarios were considered by the Department for eliminating this excess, given a requirement for fleet training to be located proximate to the fleet and given that most of this excess capacity represents individual classrooms, no obvious, cost-effective solutions could be developed which would eliminate this excess. Likewise, analysis of the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair demonstrated that, while there is excess capacity, execution of the workload of these activities is strictly tied to the locations of the private sector contractors to whom ship work has been awarded. Closure of any of these activities with more than nominal future workload requires considerable travel and remote support and offers no appreciable savings.

In other cases, the Department determined that retention of the excess capacity was prudent to protect future flexibility. For instance, in naval stations, the Department determined that it was unwilling to recommend closure of homeporting operations at several installations because of future uncertainty in operational tempo and the size of the active force. While closure of additional naval stations was possible, it is critical to understand that the excess capacity that was calculated based on requirements to have significant portions of the fleet forward deployed at all times. In fact, the capacity that will remain in naval stations and air stations, if the Secretary of Defense's recommendations are accepted by this Commission, will be insufficient to house all of the ships and aircraft that are in the FY 2001 force structure than would be the case if the naval forces were to be viewed as static and in a garrison status. Similarly, in the case of Ordnance Activities, we calculated significant excess capacity. However, no recommendations were issued due to concern over long-term storage requirements (based on the uncertainty of overseas rollbacks, removal of fleet assets, and the ability to demilitarize our existing inventories) and the deficiency identified in outload capacity to transfer ordnance during wartime contingencies.

5. Question: The Navy recommendations include a long list of redirects. What is the value of the military construction costs eliminated by the redirects? Are these costs based on the 1993 COBRA analyses or on the more detailed assessments performed during implementation planning?

Answer: Department of the Navy BRAC-95 redirects would result in construction cost avoidances of \$1,305 million. Construction cost avoidance estimates included in our return on investment analyses are a reflection of our most recent assessment of actual implementation requirements.

6. Question: Have the Navy and the Air Force agreed to a fully integrated Undergraduate Pilot Training program? How did this affect the Navy's recommendations to close or realign pilot training bases?

Answer: No. The Deputy Secretary of Defense in an October 24, 1994 memorandum, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, approved Air Force and Navy plans to implement joint fixed-wing flight training programs and additional joint training initiatives. Today, these consist of a consolidated initial fixed-wing aircraft training program and three joint NFO programs (advanced navigator, electronic warfare officer, and weapons system officer training). Navy helicopter and carrier aviation training (strike and advanced E2/C2) will not be integrated.

In developing its recommendations, during configuration analysis, the Navy accounted for Air Force training that is projected, under current agreements, to be conducted at naval air stations. Likewise, the Navy adjusted its PTR to reflect training that is scheduled to go to Air Force facilities.

7. Question: The Navy has requested significant changes in the plan for basing aircraft that resulted from the 1993 decision to close Marine Corps Air Station El Toro in California and Naval Air Station Cecil Field in Florida. Please explain what has changed since 1993 that caused the Navy to require such a dramatic change?

Answer: Since BRAC-93 there have been significant reductions in Naval Aviation Forces. For instance, we have retired the A-6 attack aircraft series, reduced the maritime patrol aircraft inventory by about one-third, and eliminated approximately fifty percent of the Navy's F-14 inventory with further reductions forthcoming. After reviewing several options for reducing this excess, we concluded that utilizing existing excess air station capacity and avoiding unnecessary new construction were both more cost-effective and operationally responsive. In the process we were able to avoid incurring about three-quarters of a billion dollars in new construction costs, a clear savings to the taxpayer.

8. Question: When considering the redirect involving Marine Corps Air Stations Tustin and El Toro, did the Navy consider redirecting any aviation assets to March AFB, California? If so, why wasn't the option to use excess capacity at March acceptable to the DON?

Answer: Yes, we did discuss the possible use of March AFB during deliberations. However, since March AFB was previously closed as an operational base, this alternative would have involved the reopening of a previously closed base, which is not consistent with the Department's policy. Additionally, because the Air Force is eliminating the hospital, commissary, exchange and all other quality of life support infrastructure, as part of reopening this facility, we would have been faced with the task of recreating and replicating facilities that already exist at the base to which the Marine Corps aircraft units are currently scheduled to relocate.

9. Question: It appears that the Navy ran a consolidated Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or COBRA, on Naval Air Warfare Center Indianapolis and Naval Surface Warfare Center Louisville. Were closure decisions based on the combined COBRA and not on individual assessments? What are the specific costs to close and the twenty year Net Present

Value for the separate recommendations affecting Indianapolis and Louisville? Please provide separated COBRA information for any other consolidated COBRA analyses.

Answer: Our assessment of the potential closure/realignment of technical centers began with individual activity assessments. During our analysis, we looked at a series of closure alternatives involving Indianapolis, Louisville and NSWC Crane, activities with some similar functions and facilities. Our final decision was to close Indianapolis and Louisville, and as a result, transfer some functions from both activities to a common receiving site, NSWC Crane. Combining these two actions into a single COBRA analysis allowed us to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with this consolidation at NSWC Crane.

The costs and savings associated with the separate Indianapolis and Louisville recommendations are as follows: NAWC Indianapolis: One-Time Costs - \$77.6 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - \$392.1 M; NSWC Louisville: One-Time Costs - \$103.9 M, 20 Year NPV (Savings) - \$243.7 M.

In two cases, our analysis resulted in a single COBRA run for physically separated installations. In both cases, the analysis was consolidated to more accurately and completely portray an interrelated set of closure/realignment actions, as follows:

a. Indianapolis/Louisville. As noted above, in our final deliberations on technical centers, the closures of NAWC Indianapolis and NSWC Louisville were combined into a single COBRA analysis to most accurately portray changes in costs associated with consolidation at NSWC Crane. As requested, we have broken this analysis into two separate COBRA runs, one for Indianapolis (see Tab 1) and one for Louisville (see Tab 2). The "stand-alone" Indianapolis scenario also includes a revision to the construction cost avoidances shown at Indianapolis (to reflect final certified data). The "stand-alone" Louisville scenario also includes minor revisions to both one-time moving costs and the identification of workload transferred to Watervliet (to reflect final certified data). A revised version of the consolidated Indianapolis/Louisville run, incorporating these revisions, is also provided (see Tab 3).

b. Undergraduate Pilot Training. In the area of Undergraduate Pilot Training, we conducted a single COBRA analysis that comprised two separate installations: (1) closure of Meridian and (2) closure of the training air station at Corpus Christi and subsequent establishment of Naval Air Facility Corpus Christi (to include the redirect of mine warfare helicopters to Corpus Christi). These actions were interrelated, and consequently, more accurate and complete cost and savings estimates were obtained by considering these actions in a single COBRA analysis. For example, the closure of Meridian results in the need to use Corpus Christi for primary flight operations necessary for advanced strike training. Similarly, the consolidation of mine warfare assets is facilitated by the realignment of the training air station mission at Corpus Christi. As requested, we have broken this COBRA analysis into two COBRA runs, one for each of the two separate installations involved in the scenario (Meridian (see Tab 4)

and Corpus Christi (see Tab 5)). The "stand-alone" Corpus Christi scenario also includes a refinement to our estimation of changes in base operating support associated with consolidation of mine warfare assets at NAF Corpus Christi. A revised version of the consolidated Corpus/Meridian COBRA run, incorporating this revision, is also provided (see Tab 6).

In two cases (NAS Cecil Field redirect and MCASs El Toro/Tustin redirect), a single DON recommendation incorporated more than one COBRA run. Based on discussions with your staff, to assist in your evaluation of these recommendations, we have also provided a consolidated COBRA run for each of these two recommendations (see Tab 7 for the East Coast redirect and Tab 8 for the West Coast redirect).

10. Question: Did the 60%-40% depot workload split between public and private facilities required under current law have any effect on the Navy's recommendations? At the present time what are the Navy's public-private depot workload percentages?

Answer: No, the 60/40 requirement did not impact our recommendations. The cumulative effect of all of our recommendations, if approved, will not inhibit our ability to comply with the law. We do not have certified data on the current public-private depot workload percentages, but will obtain such data. The response to this part of the question will be forwarded separately.

11. Question: Minutes from the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee deliberations during the 1993 round state that the Committee was "concerned that there was insufficient capacity on the West Coast for dry-docking carriers and other large ships." Therefore, they agreed not to consider Long Beach Naval Shipyard for closure. What has changed since 1993 that allows you to recommend the shipyard for closure?

Answer: The force structure that drives requirements declined by almost 20% overall since the 1993 BRAC analysis. These reductions are reflected in the 1995 BRAC capacity analysis, which supports the closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

12. Question: According to the Navy's COBRA analysis, the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard results in an immediate return on investment and a 20 year Net Present Value of more than \$2 billion and ongoing savings of \$150 million per year. Was this level of savings compared to the projected costs of improving the 688-class submarine work capabilities at other shipyards? What is the capability of the private sector submarine builders to do non-refueling submarine overhaul work? Did you consider the use of this capacity in your analysis?

Answer: Our BRAC-95 analysis was based on programmed workload scheduled to be performed in organic naval shipyards. Private sector capability was not considered, and, as specified in the BRAC law, only certified data was utilized. Our analysis identified different combinations of potential naval shipyard closures, some of which included moving

Portsmouth's workload to other naval shipyards. At the conclusion of the analysis process, it was the BSEC's military judgment to remove Portsmouth from further consideration for closure. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine.

13. Question: Based on our staff's preliminary review of the Navy's information, it appears that nuclear shipyard capacity is approximately 40% in excess of needs, yet the Navy is only closing the only shipyard with no nuclear capacity. Please explain why this excess capacity is being carried?

Answer: In analyzing Naval Shipyards, the relevant measure to determine excess capacity was the aggregate capacity of all of the shipyards. Nuclear and non-nuclear capacity were calculated only to see if there were individual capacity limitations. Force structure downsizing has reduced the overall numbers of nuclear ships/submarines, which could support the closure of an additional shipyard. However, in the Department's military judgment with respect to the uncertainty of future nuclear workload (refueling versus inactivation), it was prudent to maintain sufficient organic capability to meet unanticipated nuclear work requirements.

14. Question: Did the Navy consider the alternative of moving Naval Air Warfare Center Point Mugu test and evaluation missions to Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base as suggested by the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The DON did not examine the Point Mugu-China Lake alternative, since Pt. Mugu is already part of China Lake. While physically separate, the missions of these activities are interdependent, and both the sea range at Point Mugu and the land ranges at China Lake are required by the Department.

The DON did request a gaining service COBRA response from the Air Force for movement of Point Mugu T&E missions to Eglin AFB. Data was not received, so no further analysis could be performed.

15. Question: The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in a 13 February 1995 memo, stated, "The laboratories retain significant duplication and excess capacity..." To reduce this excess, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the consolidation of C-4I acquisition and R&D at Fort Monmouth and explosives to Picatinny Arsenal and the Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake. The Navy did not accept these alternatives and decided to move C-4I to San Diego and to maintain explosives at Indian Head. Why did the Navy not adopt the alternatives recommended by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

Answer: The alternatives of moving C⁴I to either Fort Monmouth or Hanscom AFB were considered, as was a DON alternative of combining Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command with its subordinate element, Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance

Center (NCCOSC), at San Diego. The consolidation at San Diego produced five times as great an annual savings and a 20 year net present value of over \$300 M more than either of the two cross-service alternatives.

Regarding movement of explosives to Picatinny and China Lake, COBRA analysis was performed on completely closing Indian Head and moving all functions to China Lake. Our analysis showed that up front costs were very large, both in absolute terms and in relation to potential savings. This fact, coupled with the lengthy payback period, made this alternative unacceptable. The DON requirement for Insensitive Munitions aboard ships is unique within DoD for both explosives and propellants. The replication costs for duplicate Energetics-Explosive facilities at Picatinny, while retaining the facilities at Indian Head required for Propellant efforts, were not cost-effective.

16. Question: Regarding the Navy's decision not to close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, the Navy report states: "the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings." This implies an inaccuracy in the data. Please explain this comment.

Answer: The return on investment for the COBRA scenario which closed ASO and consolidated functions at SPCC was viewed as marginal because of limited savings. In the context of the COBRA analysis, the BSEC recognized that savings were slight because ongoing consolidation efforts between ASO and SPCC are leading to a more efficient organization by reducing the overall cost of operations and that COBRA costs and savings were being measured at a point in time before those consolidation efforts were complete. Once all planned "in-place" management initiatives have been completed, it was likely that fewer savings would accrue than as calculated by the COBRA algorithms for the relocation to SPCC. Additionally, the BSEC felt that the costs and potential inefficiencies of disrupting these consolidation efforts could outweigh the relatively small benefits of the COBRA savings estimates.

17. Question: The Defense Logistics Agency plans to move some of the Defense Industrial Supply Center's mission out of Philadelphia. Did the Navy's analysis relative to the two inventory control points in Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg consider the DLA recommendation and excess office space that it will make available in Philadelphia?

Answer: No. The Navy's analysis focussed on the capacities at the two inventory control points. We were unaware of the DLA recommendation relating to the Defense Industrial Supply Center until after SECNAV's recommendations were forwarded to SECDEF.

18. Question: With regard to closing the facilities on Guam, please explain how operational commanders in the Pacific provided input and participated in the decision?

Answer: As directed by the Secretary of the Navy, the BSEC actively interacted with the major owners/operators of Navy and Marine Corps installations on matters concerning fleet operations, support and readiness. Accordingly, there were a series of BSEC deliberative sessions with the Fleet CINCs, Fleet Marine Force Commanders, Systems Commanders, the Navy and Marine Corps personnel chiefs, and the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Force Commanders. During these meetings, the BSEC provided information on all aspects of the DON BRAC-95 process including data collection, analytical approaches, capacity and military value analyses, and the development of alternative closure and/or realignment scenarios. These meeting provided CINCPACFLT a direct forum to address the potential operational impacts of BSEC recommendations. Additionally, the CINCs and other major claimants provided the direct responses to COBRA scenario data calls including such information as functions which could be eliminated and/or transferred and the identification of potential receiver sites. The deliberative session discussions and the COBRA scenario responses provided the basis for a clearer understanding of the need to only maintain access to Guam rather than continued presence.

19. Question: The Navy's Detailed Analysis states that the Navy intends to retain the waterfront assets on Guam for contingencies and to support the afloat tender. If the Navy were guaranteed access to necessary facilities in the event of hostilities, would it consider allowing the Government of Guam access to the waterfront? What Navy property on Guam will be disposed of after implementation of the recommendations?

Answer: Decisions regarding the retention of specific waterfront and other property at Naval Activities Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved. The Navy is, however, committed to closing bases right. Our goal is to empower local communities to play a principal role in determining what happens to a base when it closes. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies.

20. Question: The Navy's justification for recommending the closure of the Naval Air Facility, Adak in Alaska is that the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires the facility to base or support its aircraft. According to documents submitted to the Commission, the air facility at Adak has already been drawn down to meet Congressionally-mandated budget reductions and the Navy's overall downsizing initiatives. Does this mean that there has been a decrease in the threat since 1993, or has the mission of anti-submarine warfare that was carried out at Adak been transferred elsewhere?

Answer: The decision on the mission of NAF Adak had already been appropriately made by CINCPACFLT. In fact, certified data relating to capacity and military value indicated that continuous maritime patrol aircraft deployments to NAF Adak were discontinued in FY 1994. The base closure process is not the process by which the DON makes operational decisions. Our decision on Adak was, in part, predicated on the fact that there was no operational need for Adak.

21. Question: As the Navy made its closure and realignment decisions, what role did environmental compliance play in its analysis? For example, did the fact that a base's expansion potential is limited by environmental restrictions play a major role in the analysis? Were bases in Clean Air Act or other non-attainment areas viewed differently from those in attainment areas?

Answer: The Navy issued a comprehensive environmental data call that captured the full range of environmental issues on each base. The presence of environmental management issues, their impact on operations, and any limitations they presented were characterized for each environmental area including endangered/threatened species, cultural/historic resources, wetlands, environmental facilities, air quality, pollution control, hazardous materials, installation restoration sites, Air Installation Compatible Use Zones, and land use. The current and past impact of these environmental issues on base operations and development was included, as appropriate, in the military value analysis. Once closure/realignment alternatives were identified, an environmental summary for each scenario was prepared which noted the anticipated air quality impacts and other anticipated environmental impacts resulting from the action for both closing and receiving bases. In no case did the environmental condition of a base, or the anticipated impact and/or the expansion potential of a receiving base, necessarily preclude a recommendation. Many of the recommendations resulted in a positive environmental impact.

Bases in non-attainment areas were not viewed differently from those in attainment areas. While the air quality status of the area in which a base was located was reviewed as part of the environmental analysis, in no case did air quality impact the process of selection or determination of closure or realignment sites.

22. Question: How many installations recommended for closure in this or prior rounds are expected to have substantial portions of land placed into caretaker status due to unique contamination problems?

Answer: For the installations identified for closure under BRAC-95, no contamination sites have been identified for which recognized/accepted remediation processes are unavailable. Installation restoration site characterization and clean up will continue after operational closure, if not yet completed.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Connecticut)

With respect to the Navy recommendation to relocate the Nuclear Training Commands (NTC) from Orlando to Charleston:

1. Question: How will BRACC Appropriations already committed and spent for planned relocation of NTC at New London, be recouped in this redirection action?

Answer: The 1993 Commission recommended, and Congress and the President concurred in, the closure of Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando. This recommendation directed the move of a tenant of NTC Orlando, Naval Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center (NNPPTC), to Submarine Base New London. The Department of the Navy, in accordance with the base closure law, has begun the planning and budgeting process to move this school. The DON will not know what appropriations are able to be recouped until the BRAC-95 recommendations are finalized.

2. Question: How have savings promised in 1993 been recouped in the 1995 recommendations to redirect the NTCs? Are these savings lost permanently?

Answer: The savings calculated in BRAC-93 result from the closure of NTC Orlando, which will still occur. The recommended redirect for NNPPTC does not affect those savings.

3. Question: If the proposed savings and return on investment (ROI) from the redirect of the NTCs are so substantial as to require the 1995 BRACC to overturn the 1993 BRACC decision, why were the savings not recognized in 1993? Was Charleston considered for relocation in 1993?

Answer: The 1993 Commission overturned the DON's recommendation relating to closure of the piers at Submarine Base, New London, making the move of NNPPTC unacceptable because classroom and berthing facilities at New London anticipated to be used for this relocation were no longer available.

Charleston was not considered as a receiving site in 1993. In selecting a receiving site in BRAC-93 for this tenant of NTC Orlando, it was determined that the movement of NNPPTC to Submarine Base New London would create a training center of excellence by locating the NNPPTC with the Submarine School, taking advantage of the infrastructure vacated by the relocation of fleet operational units. In the absence of these facilities, a similar center of excellence will be created by locating the NNPPTC with the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit and the follow-on training with the moored training ships at Charleston.

4. Question: What methodology was applied to identify Charleston as the new location of the NTCs? What other sites were examined? What were the associated military values and cost?

Answer: During BRAC-95 deliberations, the BSEC recognized that the 1993 Commission's decision to retain the piers at New London had significantly increased military construction (MILCON) costs for relocating NNPPTC to New London, making this receiving site much less attractive. Accordingly, Weapons Station Charleston was introduced as an alternative which will achieve similar expected training synergies and greater savings from reduced MILCON and PCS costs. No other sites were examined. The one-time cost associated with the redirect to Charleston is \$147.9 million; the one-time savings is \$162.5 million; and the annual recurring savings is \$5.3 million.

5. Question: What are the specific flaws in the 1993 BRACC decision that require the proposed redirection at this time?

Answer: The 1993 Commission did not accept the Department of the Navy's recommendation to close the piers at New London, resulting in unavailability of facilities for the NNPPTC move upon the closure of NTC Orlando.

With respect to the Navy decision to close the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) in New London, Connecticut:

1. Question: Total estimated costs for BRACC implementation: a detailed (by line item) of cost expenditures to date comparing costs spent or obligated to date vs. costs to complete the redirection as proposed.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

2. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from Norfolk, VA to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

3. Question: A complete accounting of billets and actual personnel transferred from New London, CT to Newport, RI as of this date.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

4. Question: Savings in personnel and operating costs achieved per year to date at New London.

Answer: A data call has been issued to obtain certified data to respond to this question. The response will be forwarded separately.

5. Question: What would be the impact upon laboratory military value and cost analysis to co-locate all Navy acoustic research and development and system engineering at New London, Connecticut?

Answer: The BSEC did not evaluate such a scenario. The BRAC-95 recommendations relating to acoustic R&D and system engineering complete the steps taken in earlier rounds of base closure to concentrate these functions at NUWC Newport, NUWC Keyport, and NSWC Crane. Appropriate functions from four technical centers (NRL Det Orlando, NAWC Oreland, NAWC Det Warminster, and NUWC New London) will be relocated to NUWC Newport.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Wendell Ford (Kentucky)

1. Question: In regard to Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, Kentucky would you comment on the data used by the Base Structure Executive Committee to make the decision to place that facility on the list? I have heard the data call information forwarded to the Department of the Navy, by Crane Division and NAVSEA, indicated the cost of moving the Phalanx work, currently being done at Louisville, to Crane, Indiana would be less than official originally determined. I also understand the discrepancies in those figures were brought to the attention of the Inspector General who conducted an audit and verified that indeed the figures submitted were not correct, and the cost of moving the work to Crane, Indiana would be higher than the figures given to the Navy's Base Structure Executive Committee. Please comment on this information. I request that a copy of the Inspector General's audit be provided to this commission.

Answer: The data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) is contained in the Base Structure Data Base. The BSEC did not use any data other than that provided through the DON certification process to make a decision. Costs which are provided by the major claimants to the BSEC as part of scenario development data calls were subject to review by the BSEC, which applied military judgment to the inclusion of costs in the COBRA analysis.

With regard to the audit being conducted on the data supplied for the Louisville scenario, although the investigation is not yet complete, it is our understanding that the focus of the audit is primarily on process (data flow up and down the chain of command).

2. Question: Also in the case of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, how do you evaluate and justify splintering the current work being done by the Louisville workforce of engineers and machinists - those places being Norfolk, Virginia, Port Hueneme, California, and Crane, Indiana? Was not it the determination of an early BRAC Commission to not close the Louisville facility in order to keep the Navy's 5-inch gun work, and now Phalanx work, consolidated and centrally located to ship ports on both coasts of the United States?

Answer: The workload being performed at Louisville is an amalgam of work similar to that being accomplished at a number of other Navy depot and technical activities. Our recommendation consolidates the Louisville workload with other similar depot and engineering efforts at other sites and achieves savings by closing an entire installation.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator Rick Santorum (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: Machinery systems engineering has been migrating to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Philadelphia for several decades. The BRAC 95 proposal to continue this migration by moving all machinery Research and Development to NSWC-Philadelphia consolidates a majority of machinery systems responsibility in Philadelphia (approx. 2000 people and \$800 M worth of machinery facilities) and is a logical progression in reducing infrastructure and improving overall machinery development and performance. In order to provide further reduction in infrastructure, have you considered consolidating the entire function of machinery systems in NSWC-Philadelphia, some of which is still being performed in NAVSEA headquarters?

Answer: No. The BRAC effort is concerned with closing and realigning bases. Workload allocation is a management prerogative that can be accomplished at any time.

2. Question: BRAC 93 decisions included moving the Naval Sea Systems Command from Crystal City to White Oak. The BRAC 95 proposes closing White Oak and moving NAVSEA to the Washington Navy Yard. Was there any consideration given to relocating NAVSEA to the Philadelphia Naval Base?

Answer: No. Given the requirement of Naval Reactors (NAVSEA-08) to be located in the Washington, D.C. area to satisfy responsibilities to the Department of Energy, and the Navy's desire not to fragment NAVSEA Headquarters, relocation options were restricted to the Washington metropolitan area in both the 1993 and 1995 round of base closures.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert A. Borksi (Pennsylvania)

1. Question: In your proposal to close and relocate the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) to North Island, CA, you appear to achieve most of your savings by eliminating 52 positions. How is this more cost effective than keeping NATSF in Philadelphia and eliminating those same positions?

Answer: The savings are attendant to the command elimination, the subsuming of regional offices and detachments, and the integration into another NAVAIR organization. This cannot be accomplished in place.

2. Question: In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned your recommendation to close and relocate NATSF. In its report, the Commission "found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload" of establishing a central DoD technical publications organization under the auspices of NATSF. To what extent did the Navy work with other services to explore this possibility? Why did the Navy choose not to recommend this idea in its 1995 BRAC recommendations?

Answer: None of the Joint Cross-Service Groups suggested this as an alternative to consider. The Navy felt its decision to send the function to NADEP North Island was sound, fostered proper internal synergies, helped to reduce capacity at the critical NADEP site, and demonstrated good cost savings.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Stephen Horn (California)

1. Question: The purpose of the base closure process is to reduce as much excess capacity as possible and to save the greatest amount of money. However, the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard closes the least amount of excess capacity, and does nothing to reduce capacity in the nuclear category, where the excess is greatest. Moreover, according to the COBRA data, closure of Long Beach would save less money over the next 20 years than, for example, Portsmouth. Why has the Navy targeted the one shipyard for closure whose closure would do the least in meeting the goals of the BRAC process?

Answer: The Department's process analyzed excess capacity for the entire NSYD/SRF community and then sought solutions to eliminate that excess. Non-nuclear workload can be accomplished in a nuclear shipyard, but nuclear workload cannot be accomplished in a non-nuclear shipyard. While our analysis considered Portsmouth for closure, it was removed from consideration for closure based on the BSEC's military judgment. Future decisions to refuel, defuel and inactivate SSN Class 688 submarines make the precise determination of nuclear requirements difficult, and Portsmouth has a unique role as the center of excellence for the 688 submarine. The Navy is satisfied that its recommendations to close Long Beach Naval Shipyard and SRF Guam result in a significant overall reduction of excess shipyard capacity, with a collective annual savings of \$168.4M and a 20 year net present value savings of \$2477.6M.

2. Question: In 1991 and 1993, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was the third highest ranked naval shipyard, behind only Puget Sound and Norfolk. Curiously, the Navy's new military value matrix now ranks Long Beach as below Pearl Harbor in military value and only slightly above the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Why has this ranking changed from the two previous base closure rounds?

Answer: In response to constructive criticism by, among others, the Commission and Members of Congress, for BRAC-95, the DON shipyard military value matrix was adjusted where appropriate to be more reflective of the nature and scope of work being conducted at these activities. While this causes the absolute scores for the activities to change, the results are consistent with those of previous rounds. Consistent with the relationships demonstrated in BRAC-93, these industrial activities fall into three distinct groups. As in BRAC-93, Long Beach Naval Shipyard is in the middle group whose military value scores are tightly grouped and which falls below the two large shipyards at Puget Sound and Norfolk. Because the scores are so close, the relative placement of the shipyards in this middle group is affected by changes that were made not only to respond to criticism but also to portray as accurately as possible the characteristics of these activities.

3. Question: From an examination of the Navy's base closure deliberations minutes, it seems as if the Navy only really considered closing two shipyards--Portsmouth or Long Beach--and decided to not recommend Portsmouth for closure because of a desire to retain nuclear repair capability. Were other scenarios actively considered? For instance, was a closure option for Norfolk Naval Shipyard considered, and scenarios run? If not, why not? Was Pearl Harbor considered for closure, or considered for realignment along with Long Beach?

Answer: Every activity within the shipyard subcategory was equally considered. Capacity and military value analyses was conducted on all activities. Using the results of these analyses, possible closure candidates were identified during configuration analysis. In various combinations, the potential candidates were Long Beach, Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor, and SRF Guam. The configuration analysis demonstrated that the Puget Sound and Norfolk shipyards had to be retained to satisfy capacity and military value requirements. The BSEC eliminated Pearl Harbor from further consideration due to its unique strategic location and full service capability. Closure scenario data calls were sent to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Ship Repair Facility Guam, Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Surge Dry Docks at Philadelphia, and several technical centers that perform depot level work.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Mississippi)

1. Question: I am concerned about how the Navy determines such factors as the pilot training rate (PTR). The certified data which the commission will receive appears to be, quite frankly, a compilation of conclusions rather than a trail of hard facts leading to a conclusion. Is the Navy going to give the Commissioners and the communities access to the critical data used to determine such conclusions as the daytime operations necessary to generate one new pilot? Moreover, will commissioners and communities have access to base operational data? I hope you will provide any requested data directly to Commissioners and affected communities.

Answer: The Navy has provided the Commission and Congress with all the data used in its analysis. If there is any additional information that may be required after a review of the basic data, it will be provided upon request by the appropriate level within the DON. As we have already related in a separate response to a question for the record from the Commission, the Secretary of the Navy has issued specific public affairs guidance to all activities of the Department that provides for their release of unclassified base information.

Specific information on the number of daylight flight operations required per student (for each type and level of undergraduate pilot training) can be found in the Data Call Two (Capacity for Training Air Stations) responses from each training air station under Section: Mission Requirements, Subsection: b. Flight Training, questions 3 and 4. These questions instructed the fleet to base requirements on historic flight operations. The certified responses to these questions were the input for the calculations used in the Navy analysis.

QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Representative Robert Underwood (Guam)

Naval Base Guam, Fleet Ind. Supply Center and Ship Repair Facility

1. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your recommendations for BRAC 95, you recommend closing the Ship Repair Facility and disestablishing the Fleet Industrial Supply Center and you recommend reducing and the "mothballing" the waterfront activities of the Naval Base. This eliminates a large source of income for the citizens of Guam, but it does not allow these valuable industrial and port facilities to be used as economic recovery tools for Guam to help replace their lost revenues. Isn't it true that these facilities could be turned over to the Government of Guam for economic development with the proviso that they could be used for military contingency operations at the request of the Federal Government?

Answer: We are committed to working with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in the development of a reuse plan to focus the community's intentions and ideas concerning how it desires excess property/facilities to be utilized. In the case of the facilities in Guam, since our recommendation is clear that we need to maintain access to this strategic location, a careful balance will be struck between community reuse and the retention of the necessary facilities for potential operational contingencies. Decisions regarding the retention of specific property on Guam will not be finalized until the BRAC recommendations are approved.

NAS Agana

2. Question: Mr. Secretary, last year this Commission recommended that the Navy consolidate the air operations at NAS Agana with the Air Force operations 10 miles away at Anderson AFB. During the last two years, however, you have disestablished one of the three fixed wing squadrons on Guam and moved the other two to bases on the West Coast. In spite of the Navy's rhetoric two years ago, you have also agreed to return all of the enlisted administrative buildings and the officer housing on a piece of land that is essential for the development of an expanded international aviation complex on Guam. You are also in the process of building 300 brand new family housing units. Isn't it true that with all of these reductions this year you should have quite a bit of excess Navy housing? Isn't it also true that the retention of this one isolated section of family housing has more to do with the view than the need for military housing island-wide?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary

critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Fena Reservoir

3. Question: Mr. Secretary, in your report, you did not mention the large watershed and reservoir at Fena that currently sits outside the Naval Magazine on Guam. It is no longer needed as a "buffer" for Naval Magazine, Guam, and the magazine no longer contains special weapons. In view of the economic hardships these closures will impose of the citizens of Guam, why couldn't this watershed be returned to the Government of Guam for use in its water system and as a "low environmental impact" recreation area?

Answer: Our recommendations did not affect the Naval Magazine on Guam. This facility will continue to execute its full function and mission. Accordingly, all of the current infrastructure and supporting buffers, including the reservoir at Fena, must be maintained.

Navy Water System on Guam

4. Question: Mr. Secretary, I am amazed to hear that the Navy maintains an island-wide water distribution system on Guam that duplicates one maintained by GovGuam. With the disestablishment of most of the Navy activities on Guam, it seems inefficient and expensive for the Navy to maintain a separate system. Are there any other locations in the United States or its Territories where the Navy does not procure water from the local government and maintains its own water system? In light of the huge reductions in the Navy presence and the dichotomy this issue seems to raise, doesn't it make more sense for the Navy to turn its water system over to the Public Utility Agency on Guam, assist Guam financially in consolidating the two systems, and then satisfy its water needs from the Public Utility Agency, as it does in most other locations?

Answer: There are a number of naval installations which operate water treatment and distribution systems, such as China Lake, Roosevelt Roads, and others. With respect to the system in Guam, the continued operation of that system will be evaluated, if necessary, after a final determination is made regarding the retention of naval facilities on the island.

Island-wide Navy Housing on Guam

5. Question: Mr. Secretary, as can be seen from the above points, most of the current Navy activities on Guam that remain from previous closures or reductions are recommended for closure, disestablishment or realignment. No mention is made, however, of the disposal of the large amounts of housing that served those units. Guam has always had a deficit of housing for its civilian population and this housing could be used to provide housing for the citizens of Guam, provide an income stream for GovGuam through lease payments, and provide the Navy with a source of properly maintained military housing in the event of a

Western Pacific military contingency. Wouldn't it seem reasonable to seek the transfer to GovGuam of all Navy housing that does not serve the needs of the few remaining Navy activities? Doesn't it also make economic sense to then combine the remaining Navy housing and the existing Air Force housing under one Federal/DoD housing authority and maintain the transferred Navy housing under rules that permit it to be leased back to the Navy during extended military contingencies?

Answer: The final determination of what facilities will be deemed in excess will not be made until after the BRAC-95 recommendations are approved. As you are aware, even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. We are committed to maintaining the highest quality of life possible for those personnel. Retention of necessary critical married family housing units will be one of our principal objectives. Where excesses may exist, however, you can be assured that we will work with the local community and the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to develop a sound community reuse plan.

Navy Command Structure

6. Question: Mr. Secretary, with the disappearance of most Navy facilities on Guam, there does not seem to be a great need for a Navy Admiral command on Guam. Could you not move the remaining overall island-wide Navy Commander and his staff to joint spaces at Anderson AFB on the northern end of Guam and then transfer all the remaining command assets, including the housing area on Nimitz Hill to GovGuam for their economic development?

Answer: Our recommendations do not address the location of the headquarters for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas, nor does the DON use the BRAC process to address flag officer billet requirements. Even if all of all of our recommendations regarding naval activities on Guam are approved, we will continue to have a significant number of naval personnel on Guam. It should be noted that the issue of the amount of presence left on Guam does not detract from the importance that the Department places on access to Guam for purposes of support to operations in that part of the Pacific.

Long-term Economic Impact (Section 30 of the Guam Organic Act)

7. Question: Mr. Secretary, Guam receives quite a bit of funding under section 30 of the Guam Organic Act. Have you included those revenues in your economic impact studies?

Answer: The Office of the Secretary of Defense required that all DoD Components analyze the economic impact on communities through the use of the DoD Economic Impact Data Base (see OSD Policy Memorandum Three). This data base is used to calculate the total potential direct and indirect job change (both as a total number of jobs and as a percentage of economic area employment) which will result from a closure or realignment action. Review of the economic impact methodology by the Joint Cross-Service Group on

Economic Impact confirmed that changes in employment, as calculated by the data base, provided a reasonable proxy for levels of impact associated with other aspects of the economy. These other impacts could include, for example, changes in expenditures, population, number of school age children, local government revenues and expenses, and, in this specific case, revenues to Guam resulting from the provisions of the Guam Organic Act.

8. Question: Mr. Secretary, in light of the closings, realignments and reductions on Guam that you are recommending, there seem to be services that could be provided more efficiently to the remaining Navy personnel and the Air Force through more consolidated activities, now that both are essentially in a caretaker status. Could you not provide some of these services more efficiently by combining such activities as Recreation, Public Works, Housing Management, Medical and Dental?

Answer: Following approval of the BRAC-95 recommendations, we will carefully determine what specific facilities need to be retained at Naval Activities and FISC Guam. We will then revise our infrastructure support requirements, as appropriate, taking into account operational requirements, quality of life, and potential community reuse/dual use. Our goal is the retention of those facilities that are both cost-effective and operationally responsive, which could encompass consolidation with the Air Force support infrastructure.

GERRY E. STUDDS
TENTH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES
CHAIRMAN

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

April 14, 1995

WASHINGTON
237 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2110
202-225-3111

SOUTH SHORE 1-800-794-8811

QUINCY
1212 HANCOCK STREET
QUINCY, MA 02169

BROCKTON
FEDERAL BUILDING
198 MAIN STREET
BROCKTON, MA 02401

PLYMOUTH
225 WATER STREET, SUITE 401
PLYMOUTH, MA 02360

CAPE COD AND ISLANDS 1-800-870-2626

HYANNIS
148 MAIN STREET
HYANNIS, MA 02601

Alan Dixon, Chairman
The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1200 North Moore St, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to request that the following issues with regard to the Navy's process and recommendations in targeting NAS South Weymouth for closure be raised at next week's BRAC hearing with the Government Accounting Office (GAO).

In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value," according to the Navy's own criteria.

In the case of NAS Atlanta -- which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure -- the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value Matrix for Reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.

In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when "a base was recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value -- particularly in the case of NAS South Weymouth -- as a problem in its decision-making process?

Again, I respectfully request that the BRAC direct the GAO to respond to this issue during next week's hearing.

I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,


Gerry E. Studds

Secretary Dalton
April 18, 1995
Page 2

In recent years, the Naval Reserve personnel and units have played an important role in overseas operations. *Please provide me with information detailing the number of sorties conducted by the Naval Air Reserve in support of operations in the former-Yugoslav Republics, Somalia, the Persian Gulf and Haiti.*

With regard to the SECNAVNOTE of December 8, 1993, what procedures were approved for the BSAT's "Internal Audit Control Plan" (DoD Report to BRAC, Vol. IV; p. 10) to ensure accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary of the Navy would base his recommendations for closure/realignment? Furthermore, what procedures were employed by the Naval Audit Service to validate the accuracy and reliability of data provided by Department of Navy activities?

Due to the time restraints involved in the base closure process, I would respectfully request a immediate response to these requests.

I appreciate you attention to this matter.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,



Gerrit E. Studds

SOUTH SHORE



CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

April 28, 1995

Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, VI 22209

Dear Members of the Commission:

As President and CEO of the South Shore Chamber of Commerce, I ask on behalf of our members to keep the South Weymouth Naval Air Station open. I understand that your decision is a difficult one and that you will weigh all the information presented.

In your deliberations, I hope you will question as to why we were compared to active military bases when we are a reserve base? Why are we losing the only naval reserve base in the northeast? Why did we make the closure list if our military value is four out of six and those lower were not put on the list?

A survey conducted by us of local area merchants indicates that businesses would be significantly impacted anywhere from 5% to 25% if the Base were decommissioned, and would be forced to close or lay off some personnel.

The South Weymouth Naval Air station is an asset to the South Shore. It is the largest employer in the 15 mile radius around south Weymouth. The Base has civilian contracts to over 60 merchants which averages over \$1.3 million a year.

The government came to us years ago to build this base, and it was a good idea. Business grew around the base. Mutual aid agreements were developed between the three towns of Abington, Weymouth and Rockland. No one else can boast of a base so close to the ocean or near superior medical and educational institutions.

Again, I ask that you get us some answers to our questions as to why we are on the list and remove us from closure at this time.

Respectfully,

Ronald E. Zooleck, President
South Shore Chamber of Commerce

International Association of Fire Fighters

AFFILIATED WITH AFL-CIO -- CLC



James E. Tynan

1275 Glebe Street

Taunton, Ma. 02780

PRESIDENT

ADDRESS

CITY

STATE

William Price

40 Megansett Drive

Plymouth, Ma. 02360

SECRETARY

ADDRESS

CITY

STATE

April 20, 1995

DATE

Local No. F-98

To: Alan Dixon Chairman
1995 B.R.A.C. Commission

Subject; Proposed Closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Ma.

Dear Mr. Dixon ,

I am writing you to voice my concerns on the proposed closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth , Massachusetts.

For years the Air Station has trained thousands of Naval and Marine Reservists from this demographically rich area of So. Weymouth/Metro Boston . Many which served and support operations in the Persian Gulf, Haiti, and most recently in Eastern Europe.

Our P-3 Orion Aircraft Have patrolled countless Hours and miles in search of foriegn Submarines, Drug surveillance for the Drug Enforcement Community and other various maritime missions. With the pride, determination, and dedication of a highly trained and skilled professional in the truest tradition of the Naval Air Reserve. Along with this, the 1993 B.R.A.C. Commission, sent the new C-130T Aircraft for them to operate thier logistical mission from South Weymouth, and with the new Naval Reserve Center to truly make this one of the Navy's finest Reserve Station .

This base is completely supported by the Communities that surround it. When South Weymouth was placed on the B.R.A.C. Closure list again, these Communities stood tall with their support for keeping the base open. This support only compliments the operation of Naval Air Station on a everyday basis. In return we try to serve these communities with the same dedication and support.

There is a great deal of concern among these towns, as well as the civilian employees and the Naval reservist that drill here, about the future of the Air Station. There is also a growing concern in the fire service community which we serve and support. Once the highly trained and specialized Firefighter are gone, their expertise and support, which is an asset to the South Shore Area, in all probability will not be replaced by local towns placing a heavy toll and burden on an already taxed fire service in the local area. Like many others, I feel losing So. Weymouth would be a devastating loss of a major asset to the Navy, local communities, and the Nation as a whole.

In closing I must compare both Fire Fighters and Naval Reservist in the same manner. Because of the nature of their missions, they too, have become, the world's "911 force" ready when the call comes to serve and protect as needed.

This is the exact reason why N.A.S. So. Weymouth should not close. So the men and the women in the Naval Reserve have the place to train in Southern New England in an environment that is cost effective to both Navy and to those Reservists that drill here. This can be done at So. Weymouth for a fraction of the cost.

It is my sincere appreciation for all your time and effort to assist us in keeping N.A.S. So. Weymouth open permanently

Respectfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James E. Tynan". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

James E. Tynan
President Local F-98



Town of Abington

OFFICE OF BOARD OF SELECTMEN

33 RANDOLPH STREET
ABINGTON, MASS. 02351
(617) 982-2100

March 15, 1995

Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
c/o South Shore Chamber of Commerce
36 Miller Stile Road
Quincy, Ma. 02169

Dear Mr. Dixon:

The Board of Selectmen wishes to express its very strong opinion that your commission re-consider the recommendation to close the South Weymouth Naval Air Base in Weymouth, Ma. Based on information presented to us we believe that the base is high in military value and cost effectiveness while serving as a superb regional facility for the navy reserve.


If this base were closed it would seriously damage the ability of men and women throughout New England and New York to serve in the Naval Reserve. It is clear to us that Brunswick ME simply does not meet the needs of the military in this regard. Additionally, in this time of trimming defense expenditure, it is incumbent upon all citizens and taxpayers to demand that every dollar spent is done so with an eye towards the maximum benefit to the armed services. The Weymouth facility clearly outranks other facilities of its class in military value by the military's own calculation, yet it is being singled out for closure.

South Weymouth also serves a vital economic and emergency management role in the region that must also be considered in this process.

Our request is only that you re-consider the merits of the facility based on the criteria that we can all agree are most important to the national interest - military value and cost effectiveness.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at your convenience.

For the Board of Selectmen:


Richard J. LaFond
Executive Secretary

RJL/kms



ABINGTON FIRE DEPARTMENT

WILLIAM B. MILLETT, JR. CHIEF
MALCOLM B. WHITING, DEPUTY CHIEF
ABINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02351

TELEPHONES

(617) 878-1414 EMERGENCY
(617) 982-2114 GENERAL
(617) 982-2104 FACSIMILE

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: March 26, 1995 TIME: 0910
TO: Mr. Alan Dixon PHONE:
Chairman
SS Chamber of Comm. FAX: (617) 479-9274
FROM: Malcolm B. Whiting PHONE: (617) 982-2114
FAX: (617) 982-2104
RE: South Weymouth Naval Air Station

CC:


Number of pages including cover sheet: [1]

Message

Dear Mr. Dixon

There is a great concern within the Fire Service regarding the closing of the South Weymouth Naval Air Station. The Base has provided the surrounding towns in the area with Mutual Aid when needed as the surrounding towns have in turn provided men and equipment when called on. The greatest concern to the Fire Service would be the availability of the much needed "Crash Trucks" in the event of a on or off Base crash of an aircraft or fuel tanker. The need for these "Crash Trucks" is very real with the amount of air traffic and everyday over the road potential hazards existing in the communities. Please include this letter and words of concern to those involved in the process of considering the closing of this Base.

Sincerely,


Malcolm B. Whiting

April 24, 1995
Town of Abington Airport Committee
102 Spruce Street
Abington, Ma 02351

Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
c/o South Shore Chamber of Commerce
36 Miller Stile Road
Quincy, Ma 02169

Dear Mr. Dixon:

RECOMMENDATION- The Abington Airport Committee vehemently supports the retention of South Weymouth Naval Air Station. The Brac-93 Commission realized the strong military value of NAS South Weymouth and wisely overruled the Navy's suggested closing of it by a vote of 7 to 0. NAS South Weymouth is again on the closure list and we ask the Brac-95 Commission to consider a vote for retention based on NAS South Weymouth's strong military value. Use of Cobra formulas producing the Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Ranking Base precludes political influence from saving other Naval Reserve bases at NAS South Weymouth expense.

JUSTIFICATION- According to the Force Structure Plan from the Secretary of Defense regarding Contingency Forces, it is stated that the Cinc's will have a need "for the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lifts and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation." NAS South Weymouth does reconnaissance search and destroy missions of enemy submarines using the P3's at present due to its proximity to the Ocean. NAS South Weymouth can also perform lift and vital missions with the C-130's. Can NAS Atlanta offer such missions being located approximately 250 miles away from the Ocean ?

NAS South Weymouth is the only Naval Air Reserve Base on the Northeast coast. The Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Ranking rate NAS South Weymouth overall as # 5 while Atlanta is ranked # 6. The reason Atlanta was saved over NAS South Weymouth according to the Base Closure and Realignment Report was due to demographics. How can this be justified when in fact NAS South Weymouth scored # 1 in demographics while Atlanta was # 6 in demographics ?

RETURN ON INVESTMENT- NAS South Weymouth has 165 units of family housing and 389 units of bachelor housing while Atlanta has 5 military housing units with active duty contingent living in surrounding communities. Was all of NAS South Weymouth's prime real estate factored into Cobra figures for "Return on Investment" dollars ? What does it cost the "taxpayers" to house the active duty contingent to live off base in Atlanta ?

How much additional expense will the "taxpayers" bear for travel allowances and housing the reserve units if they must fulfill their reserve duty at Brunswick, Ma ?

How many "taxpayers" dollars have already been spent to honor the Brac-93 Commission decision to send Quincy, Chicopee, and Lawrence Reserve Units to NAS South Weymouth, including renovations to accommodate these units ? The Base Closure and Realignment Report recommends returning these Reserve Units to Quincy.

How much has already been expended to the "taxpayers" for a new control tower and renovations to the fire station at NAS South Weymouth ? Is this time, effort, and money to be abandoned ?

ECONOMIC IMPACT- There have been several plant closings within the last few years which have had a severe negative impact on the economy of the communities surrounding NAS South Weymouth. Some of these are: General Dynamics-4,000 jobs lost, Armstrong World Industries-250 jobs lost, Proctor and Gamble-330 jobs lost, Boston Whaler-175 jobs lost, Boston Gear-125 jobs lost. There are 320 civilian employees at Nas South Weymouth which would be added to the above list. All of these jobs lost are in Plymouth and Norfolk Counties. Therefore, I believe the 0.1 percent of the economic area employment as quoted on 5-53 of the Base Closure and Realignment Report is erroneous.

"The NAS South Weymouth is considered a significant socio-economic asset" as quoted from the NAS Master Plan. The Federal Register does recognize that the closure of NAS South Weymouth will have an impact on the local economy which this committee feels will be devastating to the Town's socio-economic stabilization and growth.

COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPACT- The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has committed the amount of \$12 million dollars to deploy an Army National Guard Unit to be located at NAS South Weymouth. The Commonwealth has also voted funds to make the necessary renovations to house such a unit at no cost to the Navy. NAS South Weymouth would then become a joint use base which the DOD recommends.

COMMENTS- The Town Of Abington has always considered NAS South Weymouth as our "GOOD NEIGHBOR" and has maintained an excellent rapport with each Captain and his staff. The Town is forever grateful to the personnel, both military and civilian, who have shown their dedication, respect, and willingness to help with community outreach services.

Please let the record show that the Abington Airport Committee on behalf of the Town of Abington strongly supports the retention of NAS South Weymouth.

Sincerely,



Chairman, Abington Airport Committee



Charles J. Cristello
Executive Secretary

TOWN OF HINGHAM

Office of Selectmen

7 East Street
Hingham, Massachusetts 02043

Telephone (617) 741-1400

Fax (617) 740-0239

MARTIN CRANE, M.D., Chairman
KATHARINE W. REARDON
IRIS M. DAIGLE

March 29, 1995

Ms. Maureen A. Rogers
Manager - Community Development
South Shore Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
36 Miller Stile Road
P. O. Box 488
Quincy, MA 02169

Dear Ms. Rogers:

The Board of Selectmen strongly support all efforts to keep the South Weymouth Air Base in active status.

The continued use of the Base is a valuable economic asset to Weymouth as well as all surrounding communities. The loss of the Base will have a severe effect on local employment, both on the site and in the neighboring merchant communities.

Please convey our concerns to the appropriate officials.

Yours sincerely,

Martin Crane, M.D.

/bt

TOWN OF ROCKLAND

Chairman

Patricia A. Murphy

Vice Chairman

John R. Ward

Lawrence J. Chaffee

Andrew G. MacDonald

George T. Joy

Executive Secretary

Kevin R. Donovan



Town Hall
242 Union Street
Rockland, MA 02370

Phone: (617) 871-1874
Fax: (617) 871-0386

BOARD OF SELECTMEN

March 8, 1995

Ms. Maureen A. Rogers
Manager-Community Development
South Shore Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
36 Miller Stile Road-P.O. Box 488
Quincy, MA 02169

Dear Ms. Rogers:


This is to serve as notification that the Board of Selectmen is most interested in participating in discussions concerning the future status of the NAS-South Weymouth and submit this letter as support for the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce in coordinating discussions concerning this matter.

Please continue to keep the Board of Selectmen informed on meetings and other matters that come to your attention by contacting Selectman George T. Joy, who serves as the Board's representative in this matter, or myself.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (617) 871-1874.

Very truly yours,

FOR THE BOARD OF SELECTMEN


Kevin R. Donovan

Executive Secretary



ROCKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT

P.O. Box 542
360 Union Street
Rockland, MA 02370-0542

KEVIN T. HENDERSON
Chief

Phone (617) 878-2123
Fax (617) 982-0302

April 18, 1995

Base Closure Committee
c/o Chief John R. Carpenter
Crash Rescue/Structural Division
Naval Air Station
South Weymouth, MA 02190-5000

Re: Impact on the Rockland Fire Department Should the Naval Air Station Close

Dear Committee Members:

As Chief of the Rockland Fire Department, I am extremely concerned and very dismayed that the Naval Air Station at South Weymouth is again listed on the closure list of federal installations. There are many reasons why the Rockland Fire Department depends on the Naval Air Station Fire Department but I will only discuss a few.

First, the firefighters from the Naval Air Station are highly trained to extinguish large fires containing flammable liquids. They also have the crash truck apparatus that contains large amounts of foam to extinguish a large flammable liquid fire. The Town of Rockland has many gasoline service stations. A potential threat of a tank truck fire or gasoline leak always exists. Rockland also has several businesses that handle large amounts of flammable chemicals. Just these two threats could become catastrophic if the right equipment and properly trained personnel are not available.

Secondly, we depend on the Naval Air Station Fire Department for manpower when fighting structure fires. Being a small fire department, they have augmented our personnel many times. In return, we have also backed them up whenever requested.

Thirdly, the Naval Air Station has conducted several mass casualty incidents which is very valuable to my men. Since the Town of Rockland lies in the path of major aircraft using Logan International Airport, this training could be utilized any day. The trained personnel at the base, not only in the Fire Department, could be utilized during a mass casualty incident which would prove invaluable.


Due to the budget cuts in the State of Massachusetts caused by "Proposition 2 1/2", we

lost 25% of the Rockland Fire Department. In these years from 1981 to present, Federal Revenue Sharing has also dried up trying to balance the budget. Please do not try to balance the budget by closing the South Weymouth Naval Air Station. Even though it is a small facility, the effects on the surrounding communities would be enormous.

I hope that this letter shows how I feel about keeping the South Weymouth Naval Station OPEN. A small town such as Rockland cannot afford to buy a crash/foam truck or hire more manpower. We're lucky to keep what we have. This equipment and personnel are already in place at the Naval Air Station.

I would certainly look forward to meeting with you when you visit this base. Thanking you in advance for your kind consideration, I remain...

Sincerely,




Kevin T. Henderson
Chief of Department

KTH./mpr

BOARD OF SELECTMENWILLIAM B. BARRY, JR.
ChairmanDAVID W. CHANDLER
Vice ChairmanGREGORY P. HARGADON
Clerk

PEG GOUDY

JOSEPH R. PIPER

(617) 335-2000
TDD (617) 337-5703
FAX (617) 335-328375 Middle Street
East Weymouth, Mass. 02189RUSSELL J. CONNOR, JR.
Executive Administrator**THE TOWN OF WEYMOUTH**

April 20, 1995

Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
c/o South Shore Chamber of Commerce
36 Miller Stile Road
Quincy, MA. 02169

Dear Mr. Dixon:

The Board of Selectmen wishes to express its very strong opinion that your commission reconsider the recommendation to close the South Weymouth Naval. Based on information presented to us we believe the base is high in military value and cost effectiveness while serving as a superb regional facility for the navy reserve.

If this base were closed it would seriously damage the ability of men and women throughout New England and New York to serve in the Naval Reserves. It is clear to us that Brunswick Maine simply does not meet the needs of the military in this regard. Additionally, in this time of trimming defense expenditure, it is incumbent upon all citizens and taxpayers to demand that every dollar spent is done so with an eye towards the maximum benefit to the armed services. The Weymouth facility clearly outranks other facilities of its class in military value by the Navy's own calculation, yet it is being singled out for closure.

South Weymouth also serves a vital economic and emergency management role in the region that must also be considered in this process.

Our request is only that you reconsider the merits of the facility based on the criteria that we can all agree are most important to the national interest - military value and cost effectiveness

If you have any questions please feel free to contact us at your convenience

Sincerely Yours,


William B. Barry, Chairman
Weymouth Board of Selectmen

AJGE Local 2438

NAVAL AIR STATION
SO. WEYMOUTH, MA 02190



Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman 95 BRAC

c/o SOUTH SSHORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
36 MILLER STILS ROAD
BOX 488
QUINCY, MA 02269

10 April 1995

Dear Mr. Dixon,

I am writing you about my concern at the proposed closing of the Naval Air Station South Weymouth. I have read many articles about the closure, and appreciate all the support and work you have done on the base's behalf.

The Air Station employees over 1,000 military and close to 300 civilian personnel. There are 47 drilling units on station each month. Naval Air Station South Weymouth is the only Naval Reserve Facility in the New England and New York areas. To lose this air station would deprive the entire Northeast the opportunity to drill in the Naval reserve.

Our reserves are trained to help in case of a national crises as they did in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In an emergency, it will be too late to call up the Reserves and expect them to use equipment or complete missions if they have little or no experience or training. NAS South Weymouth provides valuable training to New England's Naval and Marine Reservists and the lives up to its motto of "Strength Through Readiness".

The base closure will have a sever economic impact upon the towns surrounding the base. Not only will businesses and housing in the area suffer, but many people will feel the effect layoffs or permanent job loss. The South Shore at this time, is already under depressed economy and cannot handle any further hardships.

I am asking that you please do everything you can to prevent the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) from closing NA South Weymouth. I hope that you will be successful in your endeavor to keep the base open. I thank you again for all your help in the past and in the future.

Respectfully,


R. J. DE BOTH
President

WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNORTHE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTA. DAVID RODHAM
DIRECTOR

MASSACHUSETTS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

April 26, 1995

Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dixon:

In the summer of 1993 the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) was faced with the loss of one of the three Reception Centers supporting an evacuation of the Emergency Planning Zone for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) in Plymouth Massachusetts in the event of an accident at PNPS. Fortunately, we were able to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of the Navy and the South Weymouth Naval Air Station to utilize their facilities for this purpose on October 1993.

Following an extensive recruiting and training program, the South Weymouth Reception Center passed a Federal Emergency Management exercise in March 1994 and has been a powerful asset to the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program of Southeastern Massachusetts since that time.

Because of the excellent cooperation of the civilian and military personnel of the South Weymouth Naval Air Station and their superb physical facility, a bond was formed between the local community, the State and the Federal Government that has made the base an integral part of comprehensive emergency planning for the entire area in addition to the specific nuclear preparedness mission.

With the help and dedication of Lt. Dave Murphy, formally with the base Public Works Department, and now directing the Environmental Group, and Chief John Carpenter and the entire Naval Air Station Fire Department, the Reception Center was formed and plans were enacted that would eventually position the Naval Air Station as a potential location for a federal staging area in the event of any disaster, natural or manmade, in Massachusetts, and for that matter, the entire Northeastern United States.

Already many State and Federal agencies have utilized, or planned the use of the "weekend" billeting and training facilities for weekday seminars and conferences saving the government many thousands of dollars. Also in the planning stages is utilization of the facilities and airfield as a possible staging area for the American Red Cross. The arrival of a C-130 Naval Air Squadron at the air station has added to the feasibility of this concept. In addition, the use of the facility by the Civil Air Patrol has given this emergency response unit a greater role in responding to requests to assist MEMA in the event of an emergency.

2

Next Month, on May 20th, the Naval Air Station will be augmenting and providing support to a Public Safety Fair at their facility which is designed to showcase the many federal, state, local and private firms which work together to safeguard the safety of all the citizens of the Commonwealth. State Police, Coast Guard, Medivac Helicopters, Civil Air Patrol as well as the EPA, DOT, and many other county local police, fire and other public safety organizations will be displaying their equipment and talents. The visitors who attend will be able to see first hand the capabilities of the naval air station fire department in providing mutual aid for the entire South Shore of Massachusetts and more important, how all these various federal, state, local communities and private companies work together in support of Public Safety.

In Summary, the developmen of the potential support available from the South Weymouth Naval Air Station in other areas such as weather, shear radar, the large runway and many other facilities is in its infancy. The possibilities of discovering new ways to provide support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has just begun. The loss of these valuable assets would be devastating, not only to the public perception of the new role of the military, but also to the economy of the surrounding area and the potential support to the Public Safety.

Request that your commission reconsider the recommendation for base closure and recommend the South Weymouth Naval Air Station remain open and viable, if not for the Department of the Navy, at least by another Federal Agency or Department.

Sincerely,


JOHN J. GALVIN
Regional Planner

cc: D. Murphy
J. Carpenter



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

MAILING ADDRESS:

20 April 1995

Mr. Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Dear Mr. Dixon:

This letter is in reference to the possible closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts. We have occupied 5.5 acres of land since 1 March 1972 which is controlled by, and a part of, the Naval Air Station. The South Weymouth United States Coast Guard Centralized Buoy Maintenance Facility is the only one of its type throughout the Coast Guard. The facility has proven to be very successful and consistently excels in its mission. The centralized location of the facility is a major, contributing factor to its success. The support the Naval Air Station has contributed over the past 24 years has been tremendous.

Mission

Our primary mission is to supply the 1st District Coast Guard with critical aids to navigational equipment, i.e., buoy hulls, light towers, mooring chain and sinkers. The Depot supports 10 Coast Guard units, 5 USCG ships and 6 navigation teams. The range of these units is from Long Island Sound, NY, to the Canadian Border and consists of approximately 5,000 buoys that are on a 6-year turnaround cycle. Along with winter reliefs, the USCG Buoy Depot refurbishes between 800 and 1,000 buoy hulls each year.

Support Agreement

Since 1972, the U. S. Coast Guard Centralized Buoy Maintenance Facility (Depot-level), has held a support agreement between the U. S. Coast Guard and NAS South Weymouth. The use agreement contains general provisions for services provided by NAS South Weymouth. Support agreements cover specific services such as fire alarm systems, its maintenance and fire protection, surveillance/security of all USCG Depot property stored at the Depot, snow removal, etc. From time to time, NAS South Weymouth supports the USCG Depot with other services such as special vehicles, manpower, fuel to operate equipment, parts, etc., when available and as necessary.

Future Potential

The Coast Guard is in the process of streamlining its services to the public. One proposal is to close Governors Island, NY, and move their buoy maintenance responsibilities to the South Weymouth facility, provided, of course, that NAS South Weymouth stays open and agrees to increase the current acreage allowance.

Conclusion

The U. S. Coast Guard would like to continue operating at NAS South Weymouth, and hopefully, be given the opportunity to expand. For this reason, U. S. Coast Guard facility supports NAS South Weymouth's efforts to remain open. Any consideration you may give to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



E. F. WOODSIDE
Foreman
USCG Buoy Depot

U.S. NAVAL SEA CADET CORPS.
SQDN. 7 ZULU
SOUTH WEYMOUTH NAVAL AIR STATION
SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA.



10 April 1995

Mr. Alan Dixon
Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Committee

Dear Sir:

I am taking this opportunity to inform your office of the activities of our Sea Cadet unit at Naval Air Station, South Weymouth.

The station has had a Sea Cadet unit since 1958 and has had its Reserve personnel, officer's and enlisted alike, teaching, counseling, and drilling providing countless hours of service. Summer sessions included hands on training from many professionals from the tenant commands.

Many of these personnel on their own time have willingly and respectfully given unselfishly, a devoted duty to these cadets. If the base does close as recommended, there would be no other environment that could lend a spirit nor promote the future of these fine examples of youth that have numbered into the hundreds over the years. The spirit of a career to those who have been exposed to a way of life exemplified by the example of our station's personnel would be negatively affected. Our cadets travel from more than 14 towns to come here for their weekly training, and from all over the country for summer training. I ask that the Naval Air Station continue in its fine tradition to be a mainstay to these cadets.

Thank you for this consideration.

Sincerely,

Lt. R. F. Dallas
Commanding Officer

Robert J. Alvarez

34 John Adams Drive
Norwell, Ma. 02061
617-749-9844

Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Committee

18 April 1995

Re: South Weymouth Naval Air Station, S. Weymouth, Ma.


Dear Mr. Dixon,

This letter is with regard to the Dept. of the Navy's decision to offer NAS S. Weymouth as a selection for closure on the 1995 BRAC list. I am a public health/sanitary engineer and president of a consulting firm who is presently considering re-entry into the Naval Reserve. The prospect of losing a drill station within reasonable distance is daunting and will substantially influence my decision on whether serving the Navy again is worthwhile. What is most disturbing is that this very region of the country provides the most significant talent pool for the Naval Reserve in the job skills most critically undermanned by the Navy.

As you are probably aware of, the medical and engineering professions have been persistently undermanned in the Navy, and the Boston metropolitan area offers the most available and varied prospects in the nation for filling this need. I have always been dismayed as to why the Navy hasn't attempted to expand it's Reserve presence in Boston for this very reason, therefore it seems contrary to proper strategic planning to further diminish thier presence. This comes especially at a time when reliance on Reservists to fill voids left in the active service drawdown is escalating, and seems to be a future trend. Over the coming years, this concept is the only viable solution to the country's need to balance military readiness with deficit reduction (for example, see Navy Times, 4/24/95 edition, pg. 20). Accordingly, logic dictates that reserve facilities such as NAS S. Weymouth should be expanding thier roles, not subjected to shutdowns in order to satisfy near term political and budgetary goals.

Please also consider that the process of withdrawal from this region has been methodical over the past decades, i.e. Charlestown Navy Yard, Chelsea Naval Annex, Hingham Naval Shipyard, Hingham Munitions Depot, Squantum Naval Air Station and Chelsea Naval Hospital which are all closed. At present, Naval Air Station South Weymouth is all that is left to serve a major population area of the United States, and to expect Reservists to commute 3 or more hours to such a remote location as Brunswick, Maine will only serve to further isolate the Naval Reserve from a vast and invaluable talent pool.

Respectfully Submitted,



Robert J. Alvarez

Ken Goldsmith
15 Athens Street, Apt.3
Cambridge, MA 02138-6001

27 March 1995


The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Dear Mr. Dixon,

I strongly urge you to reconsider the proposed closure of Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA. This facility, while perhaps not terribly important from a military perspective, is incredibly important to the **thousands** of Naval Reservists who drill here. I am one of the many Reservists who absolutely depend on NAS South Weymouth and the squadrons located here in order to continue to serve my country. We cannot fly or fix aircraft anywhere else. This is the *only* place Naval Reservists in the very large population of southern New England can drill *productively* within any reasonable commuting distance. Closing this base and sending the squadrons far away would deprive hundreds of highly skilled and motivated people of the opportunity to contribute materially to our nation's readiness. Please don't leave us just pushing meaningless paper. We need Naval aircraft located within a reasonable distance.

As an officer with a Reserve commission, I was forced out of the active-duty military during the drawdown. If NAS South Weymouth closes and Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 62 moves far away, I will be forced out of serving my country altogether. This is the real impact of this base closure.

Sincerely yours,



Ken Goldsmith

DEMOGRAPHICS

CATEGORY	NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH	NAS ATLANTA	NAS BRUNSWICK
DEMOGRAPHICS			
- TOTAL POP	5,992,712	6,773,364	1,236,348
- VETERAN POP	656,850	693,225	159,333
- VIETNAM VETS	340,420	421,801	77,003
- ADJ VETS ¹	316,430	271,424	82,330
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- COLLEGE GRADS	536,536	378,254	73,784
- TOT EMPLOYED	587,263	519,292	74,986
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NAS BRUNSWICK SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH RESERVE AIR STATIONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH DOD AND DON POLICY THAT PLACED EACH BASE IN A PARTICULAR CATEGORY AND 'FURTHER DIVIDED [THEM] INTO SUBCATEGORIES TO ENSURE THAT LIKE INSTALLATIONS WERE COMPARED TO ONE ANOTHER AND TO ALLOW IDENTIFICATION OF TOTAL CAPACITY AND MILITARY VALUE FOR AN ENTIRE SUBCATEGORY OF INSTALLATIONS. . ."

- DON ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS VOL. IV, P. 19

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Scenario 1 - Close NAS ATLANTA GA		Scenario 2 - CLOSE NAS ATLANTA GA	
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ROI = 1 YEAR NPV = \$256,069K ONE TIME COST = \$ 55,570K RECURRING SAVINGS = \$ 23,841K		ROI = IMMEDIATE NPV = \$260,529K ONE TIME COSTS = \$ 47,283K RECURRING SAVINGS = \$ 23,658K	
PROS - EXPANSION CAPABILITY PRESERVED AT DOBBINS - FACILITY AVAIL FOR SELRES AIRLIFT - IMPROVED READINESS WITH BETTER MANNING AT SOUTH WEYMOUTH - IMPROVED MILITARY VALUE FOR RESERVE NAS SUBCATEGORY	CONS - NOT THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE SCENARIO - NO DEMOGRAPHICS FOR MCAS NEW RIVER	PROS - HIGHEST SAVINGS OF ALL SCENARIOS CLOSING NAS ATLANTA - LOWEST ONE TIME COST FOR CLOSING NAS ATLANTA - EXPANSION CAPABILITY PRESERVED AT DOBBINS - FACILITY AVAIL FOR SELRES AIRLIFT - IMPROVED MILITARY VALUE FOR RESERVE NAS SUBCATEGORY	CONS - NO CHANGE IN UNIT MANNING/READINESS - STILL IN ATLANTA SMSA WITH SAME DEMOGRAPHICS - NO DEMOGRAPHICS FOR MCAS NEW RIVER

CLOSURE SCENARIOS

Scenario 3 - Close NAS ATLANTA GA		Scenario 4 - CLOSE NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA	
RELOCATE: VR-46 TO NAS JRB NEW ORLEANS LA MAG-42 (HMLA-773) TO MCAS NEW RIVER		RELOCATE: VR-46 TO DOBBINS AFB VR-62 TO NAS BRUNSWICK SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO NAS BRUNSWICK USTRANSCOM UNIT TO GROTON OR NEWPORT AUGMENTING/SUSTAINING UNITS TO QUINCY USMCR ORDINANCE UNITS TO QUANTICO MAG-42 (HMLA-773) TO MCAS NEW RIVER NO DISPOSITION FOR VP-92	
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RESERVE UNIT MANNING COMPARISON (% OFF/ENL)

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH		NAS ATLANTA	
UNIT	MANNING	UNIT	MANNING
MWSS-473	112.4/ 89.0	HMA 773	61.4/ 65.1
HML-771	100.0/153.1	VMO-4	77.1/ 69.4
MALS-49 DET C	77.8/117.6	MALS-42 (1)	94.1/106.1
MASS-6	82.7/ 93.9	MALS-42 (2)	320.0/ 14.1
VR-62	100.0/ 96.1	4TH LAAD H&S DET A (1)	50.0/111.1
VP-92	98.5/ 91.2	4TH LAAD H&S DET A (2)	100.0/130.0/
NAVAIR 1391	100.0/ N/A	4TH LAAD BTRY B	60.0/146.0
NVR COMP 691	75.0/100.0	4TH LAAD BN 04715	300.0/100.0
MED MAG 49	40.0/65.0	VR-46	100.0/ 62.9
DPRO SIKORSKY	100.0/ N/A	VA-205	100.0/ 79.0
NORA 1094	100.0/ 69.6	NORA 1567	100.0/100.0
DPRO LYNN	100.0/ N/A	COMPHIBGRU 0867	94.7/ 78.6
DPRO GRUNMAN 0591	100.0/ N/A	CARGRU 0667	100.0/89.7
TSC 191	100.0 / 75.6	ONI 2109	87.5/ 70.0
TSC 0791	100.0/ 75.6	NAWC 0167	100.0/ 80.0
NAVSTA ROTA 0391	325.0/110.4	NAVSTA ROTA 0167	276.9/100.9
NAVAIR 0891	106.7/ N/A	NAVAIRSYS	150.0 / N/A
MED DEN 0191	121.4/143.5	NR MED DEN	168.8/170.0
NAVMED 0191	150.0/100.0	4TH MED/MAW DET B	100.0/89.5
CV-67 0291	275.0/ 83.0	CV-65 0167	160.0/80.5
CV-67 0191	600.0/102.5	CV-60 0167	237.5/ 95.4
NAS SOWEY 1291	100.0/175.0	NAS JAX 0167	190.9/102.5
NAS BRUNS 4291	150.0/132.0	NAS CECIL 0667	600.0/144.4
AIC 0291	92.0/108.0	AIC 0867	95.7/104.0
AIC 0191	92.6/ 82.4	AIC 0967	90.9/ 90.9
NISRO 0201	90.0/100.0	NISRO 1407	100.0/100.0
NISRO 0502	100.0/200.0		
NISRO 0301	90.0/100.0		
NAVMIC 0391	103.6/150.0		
NAVMIC 2401	94.3/ 76.5		

IMPORTANCE of MILITARY VALUE and CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS

"The criteria for the BSEC is not to maximize military value. It is to reduce excess capacity consistent with retaining average military value at least as high as going in and, therefore, a more sophisticated and powerful analytical tool is required to meet that criteria. ...describe that tool as 'Configuration Analysis', noting, "It comes up with an optimum solution that minimizes excess capacity while maintaining average military value."

Robert B. Pirie, Asst. Secretary for Installations and Environment
Chairman, Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC)
Testimony to BRAC Commissioners, 6 March 1995

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"The foundation of the analysis was the military value criteria, which are the first four of the eight selection criteria issued by SECDEF for making base closure and realignment recommendations and are given priority consideration."

Dept. of the Navy, ANALYSES and RECOMMENDATIONS (Vol. IV), page 21

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- DON ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS VOL. IV, P. 19

CLOSURE SCENARIOS

<p style="text-align: center;">Scenario 1 - Close NAS ATLANTA GA</p> <p>RELOCATE: VR-46 TO NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA MAG-42 (HMLA-773) TO MCAS NEW RIVER</p> <p>ROI = 1 YEAR NPV = \$256,069K ONE TIME COST = \$ 55,570K RECURRING SAVINGS = \$ 23,841K</p> <p>PROS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EXPANSION CAPABILITY PRESERVED AT DOBBINS - FACILITY AVAIL FOR SELRES AIRLIFT - IMPROVED READINESS WITH BETTER MANNING AT SOUTH WEYMOUTH - IMPROVED MILITARY VALUE FOR RESERVE NAS SUBCATEGORY 	<p style="text-align: center;">Scenario 2 - CLOSE NAS ATLANTA GA</p> <p>RELOCATE: VR-46 TO DOBBINS AFB MAG-42 (HMLA-773) TO MCAS NEW RIVER</p> <p>ROI = IMMEDIATE NPV = \$260,529K ONE TIME COSTS = \$ 47,283K RECURRING SAVINGS = \$ 23,658K</p> <p>PROS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HIGHEST SAVINGS OF ALL SCENARIOS CLOSING NAS ATLANTA - LOWEST ONE TIME COST FOR CLOSING NAS ATLANTA - EXPANSION CAPABILITY PRESERVED AT DOBBINS - FACILITY AVAIL FOR SELRES AIRLIFT - IMPROVED MILITARY VALUE FOR RESERVE NAS SUBCATEGORY
<p>PROS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NOT THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE SCENARIO - NO DEMOGRAPHICS FOR MCAS NEW RIVER 	<p>CONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NO CHANGE IN UNIT MANNING/READINESS - STILL IN ATLANTA SMSA WITH SAME DEMOGRAPHICS - NO DEMOGRAPHICS FOR MCAS NEW RIVER

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR NAS BRUNSWICK

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

The Navy has proposed that NAS South Weymouth be closed and its aviation assets be relocated to NAS Brunswick in order to help address the excess capacity situation at the latter base. This memorandum discusses several alternatives to that proposal, all of which would allow South Weymouth to remain open, with its squadrons remaining at South Weymouth.

Relocation of VQ-2 to NAS Brunswick

Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Two (VQ-2) is employed in the electronic monitoring role. It utilizes the EP-3E aircraft, the same airframe as the P-3Cs stationed at Brunswick but having a different interior. The squadron is based at NS Rota, Spain, but operates throughout the Atlantic area.

The Navy recently relocated this squadron's Pacific counterpart (VQ-1) from NAS Agana in Guam back to the mainland U.S., specifically to NAS Whidbey Island in the State of Washington. The squadron now deploys detachments throughout the Pacific where and when needed, as appropriate. The Navy apparently believes that, due to the reduced threat level, it is no longer necessary to permanently base this squadron overseas.

We would suggest that a similar strategy could be employed in the Atlantic theater of operations. That is, VQ-2 could be relocated from Rota, Spain to Brunswick, Maine, with this squadron, in turn, sending aircraft detachments to various locations when needed. Meanwhile, the bulk of the squadron would remain at Brunswick. Such a strategy would save the Navy money by reducing the need to maintain family housing overseas, while improving morale of squadron personnel. It is also very likely that aircraft maintenance efficiencies and cost savings would result by maintaining these aircraft at Brunswick, since Brunswick has all of the capabilities for such maintenance already in hand.

If this pattern of operation can be successfully implemented in the Pacific by VQ-1, it would seem logical that it can be duplicated in the Atlantic.

Relocation of an Active Duty VP Squadron to NAS Brunswick

Active-duty P-3C squadrons are presently homeported at Brunswick, Maine; Jacksonville, Florida; Whidbey Island, Washington; and Kaneohe, Hawaii. It may make sense to relocate a P-3C squadron from one of the latter three bases to Brunswick, with a squadron from Jacksonville perhaps being the most likely candidate.

The Navy originally planned to close Brunswick and move its P-3s to Jacksonville. However, these plans changed when the proposal was made to send NAS Cecil Field's S-3s to Jacksonville rather than to Oceana, Virginia. Moving S-3s to NAS Jacksonville will result in that base being home to P-3s and S-3s in addition to H-3/H-60 anti-submarine helicopters. The combination of turboprops, jets, and helicopters will result in crowded conditions at NAS Jacksonville, both in the air and on the ground. In fact, a new hangar to accommodate the needs of VP-30, the Navy's P-3 training squadron, is presently under construction at Jacksonville.

Given the situation described above, the logic and potential efficiencies of moving a P-3 Squadron to Brunswick from Jacksonville in order to relieve the crowded conditions at the latter base should be investigated.

Relocation of VR-46 to NAS Brunswick

At least one scenario studied by the Navy with regard to the possible closure of NAS Atlanta resulted in the proposal by the Navy to move squadron VR-46 and its C-9B aircraft from Atlanta to NAS Brunswick. Should Atlanta be closed and South Weymouth be kept open, new homes would have to be found for all of Atlanta's aircraft. Certainly, South Weymouth would like to obtain as many of those aircraft as possible. However, if the Navy is adamant that the Brunswick area can support Reserve operations with its demographics, relocate the C-9 squadron to Brunswick and the remaining Atlanta aircraft to South Weymouth.

Of the squadrons presently at or proposed to be located at Atlanta (C-9s, AH-1/UH-1s, FA-18s), the C-9 squadron is likely to be the smallest in terms of required personnel and would, thus, have the greatest chance for success at Brunswick. Brunswick claims in its data call that it can locate a C-9 squadron in one of its hangars for only \$100,000. Brunswick also has 8,000-foot runways which the Navy prefers for this type of aircraft.

Relocation of Atlanta's squadrons to South Weymouth and Brunswick would allow Atlanta to be closed, thus saving the Navy between \$200 and 300 million, while keeping open a Reserve base (South Weymouth) with significantly higher military value than Atlanta and with significantly better demographics than Atlanta. The issue of Brunswick excess capacity would also be addressed through the transfer of VR-46.

Realign NAS Brunswick to NAF Brunswick

This scenario would involve the realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick to Naval Air Facility Brunswick, similar to proposals currently being considered by BRAC95 for NAS Key West and NAS Corpus Christie.

Under this scenario, the airfield and associated facilities would be retained for training purposes, access to nearby ranges, airspace, etc. Its strategic location would be preserved, with the base's facilities available for use, as required. All or most of the existing aircraft at the base would be relocated elsewhere.

While the savings associated with this scenario can not be estimated at this time, they could be expected to be considerable.

Summary

These scenarios represent only a sample of those which could potentially be developed and are meant to be representative of a range of possible options. Others, of course, are possible and should be developed by the Navy for evaluation, with the goal being to both keep South Weymouth open while maintaining the strategic presence of Brunswick.

LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSING NAS ATLANTA OR NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

One of the key differences between closing NAS Atlanta or closing NAS South Weymouth relates to the long term implications for the availability of the respective airfields.

Specifically, NAS Atlanta is a tenant of Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB), as are several other military and civilian organizations. There are no plans to close the ARB, regardless of what happens to NAS Atlanta. The airfield (runway, taxiways, etc.) will remain open to serve the Air Force Reserve and its other tenants. Accordingly, it would be possible to put the facilities of NAS Atlanta in "mothballs" if the Navy so desired. Should some national emergency arise in the future, NAS Atlanta could be quickly reopened. In the meantime, should NAS Atlanta be selected for closure, its reservists could be airlifted each weekend from Dobbins to other Naval Air Reserve activities in the Southeast (e.g., NAS New Orleans, NAS Fort Worth, NAR Jacksonville, etc.). Or, these same reservists could attempt to affiliate with the reserve activities of the other military services located aboard Dobbins ARB (e.g., the Air Force Reserve, the Army Reserve, the Georgia Air National Guard).

If, on the other hand, NAS South Weymouth were to be closed, its airfield facilities could very likely be lost forever, since there is no guarantee that the airfield will be taken over by civilian authorities and operated as an airport. Thus, under that scenario, the airfield at South Weymouth would not be available in a time of national emergency. Also, and just the opposite of the situation in Atlanta, closure of the airfield at South Weymouth eliminates the opportunity for the Navy to airlift local reservists to other training sites, thus forcing these reservists to either drive long distances to maintain their military affiliations or to drop out of the program.

**AIRCRAFT TYPES POTENTIALLY RELOCATABLE TO
NAVAL AIR STATION-SOUTH WEYMOUTH**

By
John C. Yaney

“Save Our Base Committee”

NAS South Weymouth has the necessary capacity and supporting infrastructure to support additional aviation units. In addressing the issue of potential additional aircraft types to relocate to NAS South Weymouth in order to reduce excess capacity and to help assure the future of this base, a logical approach is to examine existing squadrons and their aircraft types at bases which have a lower military value. For bases within the Reserve Claimancy, two locations were determined in the most recent 1995 analysis to have a lower military value than South Weymouth. These bases are NAS Atlanta (Military Value = 51.14) and NAS Fort Worth (Military Value = 60.94). Accordingly, presented below is a tabulation of squadrons at those bases and the types of aircraft which they currently operate.

NAS Atlanta		NAS Fort Worth	
VR-46	C-9B	VR-59	C-9B
HMLA-773	UH-IN/AH-IW	VF-201	F-14A
VFA-203	F/A-18A*	VMFA-112	F/A-18A
VMFA-142	F/A-18A*	VMGR-234	KC-130T

Given these aircraft types, below is presented a discussion of several of them which would appear to be most operationally feasible to station at South Weymouth and which could be readily accommodated in existing facilities there.

C-9B

C-9B aircraft are very frequent visitors to NAS South Weymouth and operate from there with no difficulty, either to destinations throughout the United States or overseas.

C-9B aircraft require a Type II hangar, with NAS South Weymouth having two hangars of this class. Hangar 1 is presently occupied by only VP-92 and its P-3C aircraft. That hangar can accommodate three or four P-3C and/or C-9B aircraft simultaneously. Ramp space surrounding Hangar 1 can easily accommodate a C-9B squadron, or another P-3C squadron for that matter. Historically, until the recent demise at HSL-74, this hangar has traditionally accommodated two squadrons. Thus, with VP-92 as its sole occupant now, C-9B aircraft could be maintained within it with no difficulty.

*These two squadrons, presently located at NAS Cecil and directed by BRAC 93 to relocate to MCAS Beaufort, are now proposed by the Navy to be redirected by BRAC 95 to NAS Atlanta.

- (1) Several over-the-ocean "Warning Areas" (W104, W105, etc.) are located very close to South Weymouth, permitting short transit times to and from these areas and, thus, allowing maximum training time within the areas.
- (2) Two military operating areas (Condor and Yankee) are located in nearby New Hampshire and Maine. VMA-322, when it was based at South Weymouth, made frequent use of these MOAs. The Syracuse MOA is located nearby in New York.
- (3) Nearby South Weymouth-owned No Mans Island target range is available for use with inert weapons. Live weapons can be employed at locations in New York (Fort Drum) or New Jersey (Warren Grove).
- (4) Opportunities abound for Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) with other Massachusetts and New England-based tactical jet aircraft. For example, the Massachusetts Air National Guard operates F-15 aircraft at Otis Air National Guard base, located only 30 nautical miles from South Weymouth. The Massachusetts Air National Guard also operates A-10 aircraft, as does the Connecticut Air National Guard. F-16s are flown by the Vermont Air National Guard. The dual fighter/attack roles of the F/A-18 make the availability of these DACT training opportunities and nearby MOAs and warning areas of critical importance.
- (5) Practice in-flight refuelling opportunities for the F/A-18s are plentiful in the area. For example, the Marine Air Reserve operates a squadron (VMGR-452) of KC-130T refuelling aircraft at Stewart ANGB in New York, a base located only slightly more than 150 nautical miles away from South Weymouth. That squadron frequently supported VMA-322 operations in the past. The New Hampshire Air National Guard operates KC-135R refuelling aircraft at nearby Pease ANGB. The Maine Air National Guard also operates KC-135 aircraft. These squadrons make frequent use of the refuelling tracks located off the Massachusetts coast.
- (6) As opposed to the single-runway Reserve bases such as NAS Atlanta, NAS Willow Grove, and NAS Fort Worth, for example, NAS South Weymouth has two runways oriented at 90 degrees to each other. This configuration almost guarantees that the allowable crosswind components of small tactical jet aircraft are never exceeded, thus improving safety and permitting operations to occur at all times. Flights are never cancelled because of wind conditions nor are landing aircraft required to divert to other airfields because of wind conditions. This fact is of critical importance for the F/A-18 with its narrow-track landing gear.
- (7) The climate at NAS South Weymouth permits pilots to be trained for operating conditions that may be encountered at any potential location throughout the world, including conditions of heat, cold, rain, or snow. Pilots must be well prepared to operate in any of these conditions, as no one can tell where the next world crisis requiring the activation of the Reserves will develop.

Concern has been expressed by some about operating F/A-18s in wintry conditions. This should not prove to be a problem at South Weymouth. For example, F/A-18s are currently operated by Canada, and soon will be operated by both Norway and Switzerland. These three countries are among the coldest and snowiest in the world. If they can operate F/A-18s under those conditions successfully, there is no reason why F/A-18s cannot be operated in less harsh conditions at South Weymouth. As stated previously, tactical jet aircraft of several types are currently operated successfully in New England. South Weymouth itself did so for 40 years.

- (8) F/A-18 engines are manufactured by General Electric in nearby Lynn, Massachusetts, only 20 miles from NAS South Weymouth. This closeness assures strong and timely product support from the manufacture, with its employees providing a likely source for recruiting squadron maintenance personnel

F/A-18s, while currently not based at South Weymouth, are very frequent visitors there. They can be found on the transient ramp almost every weekend. Again, these aircraft do not experience any difficulty in operating from either of South Weymouth's existing runways. However, as stated previously, there is an option to extend Runway 17-35 by 1000 feet, with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts potentially picking up the entire cost of that runway extension.

The Department of the Navy is currently proposing a BRAC redirect which would result in two Reserve squadrons (one Navy, one Marine) of F/A-18s originally proposed to be transferred from NAS Cecil Field to MCAS Beaufort now being sent instead to NAS Atlanta. We would suggest that NAS South Weymouth be considered as a site for one or both of those squadrons. Another potential source of Reserve F/A-18 aircraft for NAS South Weymouth relates to a Congressionally-mandated study of how many Marine Air Reserve F/A-18 squadrons are necessary to fight two wars simultaneously. It is conjectured by some that the number of Marine Air Reserve F/A-18 squadrons may have to be increased by up to two to meet this requirement. If so, South Weymouth would be an ideal location for such basing. In fact, the Marines have previously made a commitment to South Weymouth with this regard should these two squadrons stand up and South Weymouth remain open.

Manning F/A-18 squadron(s) at NAS South Weymouth should, again, not prove to be difficult. Many of VMA-322's Reserve personnel still reside in the area. And, as stated previously, the area's demographics are superb, rating first in the 1995 Military Value matrix of Reserve bases. It should also be noted that during the 1960's before the reorganization of the Reserve Forces, NAS South Weymouth was home to two Marine Air Reserve jet attack squadrons (VMA-217 and VMA-322) as well as two Naval Reserve jet attack squadrons (VA-911 and VA-912). This fact conclusively demonstrates the strength of the area's demographics.

KC-130T

This type of aircraft could theoretically be supported at NAS South Weymouth, using Hangar 1 and its available apron space, sharing these facilities with VP-92. However, the logic of stationing a VMGR squadron at South Weymouth is not strong, given the nearby siting of VMGR-452 at Steward ANGB in New York.

F-14A

Due to the complexity of this aircraft type and the fact that only one such squadron is operated in the entire Naval Air Reserve, its relocation to South Weymouth is very unlikely.

P-3C

Although not based at either of the two locations listed at the beginning of this text, P-3C aircraft are ideal for basing at NAS South Weymouth. This type of aircraft is currently utilized by VP-92 at South Weymouth. As stated previously, Hangar 1 and its associated aircraft parking apron have the ability to accommodate another VP squadron flying P-3Cs.

GENERAL

Discussion to this point has indicated several aircraft types which could individually be accommodated within existing facilities at NAS South Weymouth. However, it is important to note that extensive additional development would be possible at the base to serve even more units. Specifically, the so-called East Mat area, once used for the outside mooring of blimps, is an area of over 40 acres on which at least two hangars and accompanying aprons could easily be constructed. These facilities could serve several squadrons, either Reserve or Active Duty.

SITING OF RESERVE AVIATION SQUADRONS

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

In its justification for recommending the closure of NAS South Weymouth, the Department of the Navy made the following statement:

"In addition, this recommendation furthers the Departmental preference to collocate active and reserve assets and personnel wherever possible to enhance the readiness of both."

Regarding the basing of Reserve squadrons at active duty bases, it would appear that the navy itself, irrespective of the above statement, is not convinced of its merits or, at the very least, the Navy is inconsistent in its actions. One has to look no further than the 1993 closure process to see that actions speak much louder than words with regard to the Navy.

Specifically, the 1993 base closure process resulted in the closure of four Naval Air Stations within the Reserve Claimancy; namely, NAS Dallas, NAF Detroit, NAS Glenview, and NAS Memphis. The closure of these four bases certainly presented the Navy with the perfect opportunity to put its belief of moving reserve squadrons to active bases into practice. Yet, not one squadron from any of these four bases has since been relocated by the Navy to an active duty base! Rather, the remaining assets from these four Reserve bases have all been transferred to other Reserve activities. And, in fact, the Navy went so far as to create a new Reserve base! This latter base is located at the former Carswell AFB and is in the process of being opened under the new name of NAS Fort Worth at a cost of several hundred million dollars.

The opening of NAS Fort Worth is especially interesting to analyze, since it would appear to entirely contradict the Navy's stated preference of collocating reserve and active assets. Specifically, the closure of NAS Dallas gave the Navy the chance to relocate the Reserve F-14s of VF-201 from NAS Dallas to NAS Oceana, the only active duty base on the East Coast where F-14s are stationed. Similarly, the Marine Reserve F-18s at NAS Dallas could have been relocated to MCAS Beaufort in South Carolina, the only active duty Marine Corps base on the East Coast where that type of aircraft is stationed. But, when given the opportunity to locate these valuable reserve assets from a closing reserve base to an active duty base, the Navy chose not to do so. Apparently, the Navy recognized that the highly-skilled manpower required to staff these squadrons can only be found in highly-populated urban areas where reserve bases have traditionally been sited.

Another aircraft type to be found at the new NAS Fort Worth is the KC-130T tanker flown by the Marine Air Reserve. This type of aircraft is flown by squadron VMGR-234,

which relocated to Forth Worth from NAS Glenview when the latter Reserve base was ordered closed by BRAC 1993. Here was another perfect opportunity whereby this squadron could have been moved from Glenview on to an active duty Marine Corps Air Station already having this type of aircraft stationed there. MCAS Cherry Point in North Carolina is such a base, since it currently is home to two active duty Marine Corps squadrons flying the KC-130. But, was this the Marines chosen course of action? The answer is no. MCAS Cherry Point is not located in an urban area from which the manpower needed to operate this squadron could have been drawn. The nearest major urban area is Norfolk, Virginia, slightly more than 150 miles away. Since VMGR-234 ended up at Fort Worth and not Cherry Point, one could conjecture that it was believed that the 150 mile distance was too far to attract Reservists to Cherry Point. Boston to Brunswick is also approximately 150 miles.

Similar comments to those stated above can also be said for many other types of squadrons in the Naval and Marine Air Reserve. They would all show this same pattern of inconsistencies between the so-called policy of the Navy to locate its Reserve squadrons at active-duty bases and the actual actions taken by the Navy in siting these squadrons. In the interest of brevity, only the issue of the siting of Reserve P-3 and C-130 squadrons will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

There are presently many Reserve P-3 squadrons that are based at Reserve bases. These Reserve bases housing P-3 squadrons include NAS Willow Grove (2 squadrons), NAS New Orleans, NAF Washington, Moffett Field, and, of course, NAS South Weymouth. Additionally, there is a Reserve P-3 squadron at NAS Point Mugu, an active duty base but which has no active-duty P-3 squadrons stationed there. If it is so advantageous for the Navy to prepose to move VP-92 from NAS South Weymouth to the active duty base of NAS Brunswick, why has the Navy not proposed to also relocate the other Reserve P-3 squadrons to active duty bases, particularly active duty P-3 bases. The answer is simple. All of these Reserve P-3 squadrons, including VP-92 at NAS South Weymouth, are located near major population centers where the necessary manpower that these large squadrons need to operate can be easily obtained. It makes no sense to remove these squadrons from Reserve bases to remotely-located active duty bases where squadron manning would prove to be very difficult, if not impossible. Again, the navy apparently recognizes this fact in light of its actions to keep the majority of these squadrons at Reserve bases, yet it persists in trying to make an exception out of VP-92 at South Weymouth. If a move to active duty bases does not make sense for all of these squadrons, then it does not make sense for VP-92 either.

The C-130T is one of the newest aircraft in the Navy inventory and is operated exclusively by the Naval Air Reserve. However, much of the utilization of these aircraft is devoted toward the direct support of the active duty Navy throughout the country and, literally, around the world. Yet, when the four Reserve squadrons which fly this type of aircraft were established, all four were sited at Reserve bases (NAS South Weymouth, NAF Washington, NAS New Orleans, and Moffett Field) -- not active duty bases. Again, the Navy has apparently recognized that the large manpower requirements of these squadrons can only be found in areas of high population densities -- areas where Reserve bases, not active duty bases, are typically sited. One can only

conclude that moving VR-62 and its C-130s from South Weymouth to Brunswick would result in severe manning difficulties for the squadrons.

The basing practices of the Reserve components of the U.S. Air Force have been examined as a comparison with those of the Navy. These components consist of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The examination indicates that the Air Force bases only a relative small percentage of its aviation squadrons at active duty bases, and thus appears to indicate that the Air Force apparently does not see any great advantages in doing so.

Looking first at the Air National Guard, America's largest aviation reserve force according to any definition, that organization, based on 1992 data, operates a total of 98 aviation squadrons. Of those 98 squadrons, 80 of them are located at civilian airports near major population centers where personnel to man those squadrons are readily available for recruitment. Only 18 squadrons in the Air National Guard are located aboard purely military facilities. Of those latter 18 squadrons, 12 are located at active-duty Air Force bases, with the remaining 6 being sited at one Air Force Reserve base and 5 Naval Air Stations.

One might presume that the 12 Air National Guard squadrons located at active-duty Air Force Bases are sited at those locations in order to obtain some special advantages as a result of that arrangement. However, upon closer examination, this does not appear to be the case in most instances. Rather, their location at active-duty bases appears to be largely for convenience only. Specifically, of the 12 squadrons, only 3 are located at active-duty bases where the active-duty forces fly the same type of aircraft as the Guard units stationed at those same bases. For example, the State of Washington Air National Guard has a KC-135 squadron stationed at Fairchild AFB, where the active-duty forces at that same base also fly the KC-135. These units may, accordingly, have some opportunities to work with each other train together. On the other hand, a Kansas Air National Guard F-16 tactical fighter squadron stationed at McDonnell AFB presumably has few working relationships with the B-1B bombers flown by the active-duty forces stationed at that same base.

In summary with regard to the Air National Guard, only 3 out of a total of 98 squadrons are based at locations where those squadrons operated the same type of aircraft as their active-duty counterparts. This fact would seem to indicate that the Air Force, through its National Guard Bureau, does not appear to see major advantages in locating its Air National Guard squadrons at active-duty bases and, even when it does locate them at those locations, far more often than not the types of squadrons so assigned would appear to bear no direct relationship to the active-duty squadrons at those same bases.

The Air Force Reserve in 1992 had a total of 37 aviation squadrons that actually operated their own assigned aircraft. Of those 37 squadrons, 20 were located at active-duty Air Force bases. However, only 6 of those 20 fly the same types of aircraft as the active forces at those same bases. Once again, it would appear that the basing of Air Force Reserve squadrons at active-duty bases is also largely a matter of geographical convenience rather than from any perceived military advantage in doing so.

GERRY F. STUDDS
TENTH DISTRICT MASSACHUSETTS

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CHAIRMAN

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
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April 18, 1995

John H. Dalton, Secretary
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350

Dear Secretary Dalton:

I am writing to request several items with regard to the Navy's recommendation to close Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth. I am working closely with the local community to examine the national security merits of this decision and we will be presenting our case to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) in the coming weeks.

In its recommendation to close the Weymouth facility, the Navy has indicated that it will transfer the Naval Air Reserve assets (specifically a Reserve P-3 squadron), equipment, personnel to NAS Brunswick, Maine. *Please provide me with the any demographic data and analysis used in formulating and justifying this scenario.*

The Navy's Analysis and Recommendations (DoD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Volume IV) states that "the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), expressed the desirability of having a fully-capable operational air station north of Norfolk, Virginia." (p.D-4)

Please provide me with the minutes of the BSEC/CINCLANTFLT discussions with regard to the recommended closure of NAS South Weymouth and the retention of NAS Atlanta and NAS Brunswick. Also, what "policy imperatives" (DoD Report to BRAC, Vol. IV; p.12) were developed and justified during these discussions? Additionally, please provide me with the minutes of any BSEC/COMNAVRESFOR & COMNAVAIRRESFOR deliberations on the same subject.

The Navy's Configuration Analysis with regard to Reserve Air Stations states that "only one administrative support-type squadron (e.g., C-9 or C-130) can be assigned to any station." (DoD Report to BRAC, Vol. IV; p.D-3) *Please detail the rationale for this restriction.*

Secretary Dalton
April 18, 1995
Page 2

In recent years, the Naval Reserve personnel and units have played an important role in overseas operations. *Please provide me with information detailing the number of sorties conducted by the Naval Air Reserve in support of operations in the former-Yugoslav Republics, Somalia, the Persian Gulf and Haiti.*

With regard to the SECNAVNOTE of December 8, 1993, what procedures were approved for the BSAT's "Internal Audit Control Plan" (DoD Report to BRAC, Vol. IV; p. 10) to ensure accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary of the Navy would base his recommendations for closure/realignment? Furthermore, what procedures were employed by the Naval Audit Service to validate the accuracy and reliability of data provided by Department of Navy activities?

Due to the time restraints involved in the base closure process, I would respectfully request a immediate response to these requests.

I appreciate you attention to this matter.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,



Gerrit E. Studds

Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town

Acton, MA.	6	Holbrook, MA.	6	Milford, MA.	5
Arlington, MA.	6	Medfield, MA.	3	Millbury, MA.	2
Ashland, MA.	4	Medway, MA.	9	Northbridge, MA.	2
Ayer, MA.	1	Millis, MA.	1	Oxford, MA.	2
Belmont, MA.	11	Milton, MA.	10	Shrewsbury, MA.	7
Billerica, MA.	14	Needham, MA.	5	Sterling, MA.	2
Boxborough, MA.	1	Norfolk, MA.	4	Sutton, MA.	3
Burlington, MA.	4	Norwood, MA.	18	Upton, MA.	2
Cambridge, MA.	15	Plainville, MA.	4	Webster, MA.	2
Carlisle, MA.	4	Quincy, MA.	44	Westborough, MA.	2
Chelmsford, MA.	11	Randolph, MA.	29	Worcester, MA.	18
Concord, MA.	3	Sharon, MA.	7	Barnstable, MA.	15
Draught, MA.	2	Stoughton, MA.	14	Bourne, MA.	4
Everett, MA.	7	Walpole, MA.	9	Falmouth, MA.	8
Framingham, MA.	14	Wellesley, MA.	11	Mashpee, MA.	1
Holliston, MA.	5	Westwood, MA.	8	Sandwich, MA.	6
Hopkinton, MA.	3	Weymouth, MA.	55	Acushnet, MA.	3
Hudson, MA.	2	Wrentham, MA.	8	Attleboro, MA.	19
Lexington, MA.	5	Abington, MA.	9	Dartmouth, MA.	2
Lincoln, MA.	2	Bridgewater, MA.	15	Easton, MA.	9
Lowell, MA.	15	Brockton, MA.	37	Fairhaven, MA.	6
Malden, MA.	13	Carver, MA.	3	Fall River, MA.	13
Marlborough, MA.	10	Duxbury, MA.	11	Mansfield, MA.	10
Medford, MA.	13	Halifax, MA.	3	New Bedford, MA.	11
Melrose, MA.	8	Hanover, MA.	11	Norton, MA.	7
Natick, MA.	8	Hanson, MA.	14	Raynham, MA.	5
Newton, MA.	17	Hingham, MA.	6	Rehoboth, MA.	3
Reading, MA.	3	Hull, MA.	11	Seekonk, MA.	3
Shirley, MA.	1	Kingston, MA.	3	Somerset, MA.	2
Somerville, MA.	15	Lakeville, MA.	7	Swansea, MA.	2
Stoneham, MA.	1	Marshfield, MA.	11	Taunton, MA.	15
Stow, MA.	1	Middleborough, MA.	12	Westport, MA.	1
Sudbury, MA.	4	Norwell, MA.	9	Amesbury, MA.	4
Tewksbury, MA.	9	Pembroke, MA.	19	Andover, MA.	9
Tyngsborough, MA.	2	Plymouth, MA.	29	Beverly, MA.	11
Wakefield, MA.	6	Rochester, MA.	2	Boxford, MA.	4
Waltham, MA.	13	Rockland, MA.	16	Danvers, MA.	8
Watertown, MA.	6	Scituate, MA.	6	Essex, MA.	5
Wayland, MA.	1	Wareham, MA.	7	Georgetown, MA.	2
Westford, MA.	9	Whitman, MA.	10	Hamilton, MA.	2
Weston, MA.	1	Boston, MA.	144	Haverhill, MA.	12
Wilmington, MA.	6	Chelsea, MA.	6	Ipswich, MA.	2
Winchester, MA.	8	Revere, MA.	5	Lawrence, MA.	4
Woburn, MA.	7	Winthrop, MA.	5	Lynn, MA.	24
Avon, MA.	2	Auburn, MA.	1	Lynnfield, MA.	4
Bellingham, MA.	1	Blackstone, MA.	3	Marblehead, MA.	7
Braintree, MA.	18	Clinton, MA.	2	Methuen, MA.	11
Brookline, MA.	7	Douglas, MA.	1	Nahant, MA.	5
Canton, MA.	6	Grafton, MA.	1	Newburyport, MA.	4
Cohasset, MA.	6	Harvard, MA.	1	Peabody, MA.	9
Dedham, MA.	5	Holden, MA.	3	Rowley, MA.	3
Dover, MA.	2	Hopdale, MA.	2	Salciv, MA.	15
Foxborough, MA.	8	Leominster, MA.	2	Salisbury, MA.	1
Franklin, MA.	4	Mendon, MA.	2	Saugus, MA.	1

Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town

Swampscott, MA.	6
Wenham, MA.	2
Hudson, NH.	4
Nashua, NH.	10
Atkinson, NH.	1
Plaistow, NH.	2
Salem, NH.	5
Seabrook, NH.	1
Windham, NH.	1
Barrington, RI.	8
Bristol, RI.	5
Warren, RI.	1
Warwick, RI.	16
Little Compton, RI.	4
Middletown, RI.	11
Portsmouth, RI.	7
Tiverton, RI.	4
Cranston, RI.	4
Cumberland, RI.	1
Foster, RI.	1
Lincoln, RI.	5
North Providence, RI.	5
Pawtucket, RI.	5
Providence, RI.	16
Scituate, RI.	6
Woonsocket, RI.	3
Total Count	1,503

Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of Brunswick Naval Air Station by Town

Norway, ME.	1
Paris, ME.	4
Bath, ME.	12
Bowdoinham, ME.	3
Phippsburg, ME.	1
Richmond, ME.	4
Topsham, ME.	19
Biddeford, ME.	2
Kennebunk, ME.	4
Newfield, ME.	1
Saco, ME.	5
Damariscotta, ME.	2
Newcastle, ME.	2
Wiscasset, ME.	3
Rockport, ME.	1
Augusta, ME.	2
China, ME.	1
Gardiner, ME.	5
Hallowell, ME.	2
Litchfield, ME.	1
Manchester, ME.	1
Monmouth, ME.	2
Randolph, ME.	1
Winthrop, ME.	1
Brunswick, ME.	12
Cape Elizabeth, ME.	5
Cumberland, ME.	2
Falmouth, ME.	3
Freeport, ME.	5
Gorham, ME.	3
Portland, ME.	17
Scarborough, ME.	3
Westbrook, ME.	1
Windham, ME.	1
Yarmouth, ME.	4
Auburn, ME.	5
Durham, ME.	1
Greene, ME.	1
Lewiston, ME.	6
Lisbon, ME.	13
Mechanic Falls, ME.	1
Turner, ME.	1
Total Count	164



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE HOUSE • BOSTON 02133

(617) 727-3800

WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNOR

ARCEO PAUL CELLUCCI
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR

January 9, 1995

To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives:

Today we are filing amendments to Chapter 300 of the Acts of 1992. The proposed amendments are in the spirit of that Chapter and are designed to attract important federal facilities to the Commonwealth.

As you may know, this year the United States Department of Defense will make recommendations pursuant to the 1995 base closure and realignment process. This round of base closures is expected to be the largest in the history of our country. A number of bases in the Commonwealth serve as important economic engines. In the case of Hanscom Air Force Base, a closure would represent a severe economic setback for the entire Commonwealth and New England region since Hanscom accounts for over 29,000 jobs and has an economic impact of \$3.1 billion for Massachusetts.

This legislation will make it more attractive for the Department of Defense to consolidate closing military bases onto our bases in Massachusetts rather than closing our bases and sending them elsewhere. The bill provides \$100 million in bond authorizations to improve any military installation in the Commonwealth that is recommended for enhancement or expansion during the base closure process.

The bill would continue our commitment to providing financial support for the DFAS Center planned for Southbridge. The amendments would extend such incentives to bring additional jobs to other military installations in the Commonwealth, including, but not limited to: Hanscom AFB, U.S. Army Laboratory at Natick, Naval Air Station South Weymouth, and Westover Air Reserve Base in Chicopee.

There are tens of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars worth of economic development resources at stake in the Commonwealth during this base closure round. The proposed bond authorization would give our congressional delegation a tangible tool to convince the Defense Department to expand our facilities rather than close them. We urge your speedy consideration and approval.

Respectfully submitted,

William F. Weld

William F. Weld
Governor

Argeo Paul Cellucci
Argeo Paul Cellucci
Lieutenant Governor

04/21/95

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04-14-95 08:46AM

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617 727 8797 002

SENT BY:

30492



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1000

April 5, 1995

The Honorable William F. Weld
Governor of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts
The State House
Boston, MA 02133

Post-It™ brand fax transmittal memo 7871		# of pages = 2
To <i>Bill Smith</i>	From <i>Julie Schroy</i>	
Co.	Co.	
Dept.	Phone #	
Fax #	Fax #	

Dear Governor Weld:

Thank you for your letter of February 8, 1995, to the Secretary of the Navy concerning the Massachusetts National Guard's interest in moving a field artillery battalion to the Naval Air Station at South Weymouth, Massachusetts. I am responding for Secretary Dalton.

As you know, on March 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense submitted the Department of Defense's recommendations to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and recommended closure of Naval Air Station, South Weymouth. Thus, if Secretary Perry's recommendation is adopted by the Commission and approved by the President and Congress, the Department of the Navy will proceed to close the Air Station within six years of the date when closure is approved. In that event, the Department of the Army could request property at the base for use by the Massachusetts National Guard's field artillery battalion.

Since the focus of the 1995 base closure process has now shifted to the Commission, however, it may be prudent to defer consideration of the Guard's expression of interest until the Commission submits its Report to the President on July 1, 1995. During the interim, if I may be of assistance, please call me at (703)693-4527.

We appreciate your interest in this important matter and look forward to working with you on all matters related to NAS South Weymouth.

Sincerely,

William J. Cassidy, Jr.

WILLIAM J. CASSIDY, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Conversion and Redevelopment)



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE HOUSE • BOSTON 02133

(617) 727-3800

WILLIAM F. WELD
GOVERNORARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR

February 8, 1995

The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000

Dear Secretary Dalton:

This letter is to follow up on our recent phone conversation concerning Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth.

As we discussed, the Massachusetts National Guard is impressed with the facilities at NAS South Weymouth and, with the Navy's approval, is interested in locating a unit onto the base. Specifically, the Guard is interested in moving a field artillery battalion totaling 45 full time and 600 part time Guardsmen as well as their trucks, howitzers, and other equipment. This is a new, high priority unit that is assigned to the "Contingency Force Pool."

Locating this unit onto NAS South Weymouth would require the construction of two buildings, one of 85,000 square feet to house the military units, and one of 12,000 square feet for the maintenance of their equipment. As we discussed, the state could fund such construction from a \$100 million capital improvement fund intended for the state's military installations. Moreover, the state would willingly negotiate with the Navy to fund the improvement of other facilities or infrastructure at NAS South Weymouth that would be used jointly by the Guard and Navy personnel. As I mentioned, the legislation authorizing this capital improvement fund specifies that state funding is available only if NAS South Weymouth is enhanced or expanded under the 1995 base closure process.

If it is all right with you, I would like to send my staff to Washington to discuss this possible option with your installation experts. Your staff can contact Jim Kane in my office at: (617) 727-3600. Thanks very much for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Weld".

William F. Weld

GERRY E. STUDDS
TENTH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES
CHAIRMAN

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

April 14, 1995

WASHINGTON
237 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2110
202-225-3111

SOUTH SHORE 1-800-794-9911

QUINCY
1212 HANCOCK STREET
QUINCY, MA 02169

BROCKTON
FEDERAL BUILDING
188 MAIN STREET
BROCKTON, MA 02401

PLYMOUTH
226 WATER STREET, SUITE 401
PLYMOUTH, MA 02380

CAPE COD AND ISLANDS 1-800-870-282

HYANNIS
146 MAIN STREET
HYANNIS, MA 02601

Alan Dixon, Chairman
The Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1200 North Moore St, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing to request that the following issues with regard to the Navy's process and recommendations in targeting NAS South Weymouth for closure be raised at next week's BRAC hearing with the Government Accounting Office (GAO).

In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value," according to the Navy's own criteria.

In the case of NAS Atlanta -- which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure -- the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value Matrix for Reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.

In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when "a base was recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value -- particularly in the case of NAS South Weymouth -- as a problem in its decision-making process?

Again, I respectfully request that the BRAC direct the GAO to respond to this issue during next week's hearing.

I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

With kind regards.

Sincerely


Gerry E. Studds



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NINETY-

AN ACT

RELATIVE TO SIMULATING EMPLOYMENT ENCOURAGING THE SITING OF CERTAIN FEDERAL FACILITIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

SECTION 1.

Section 1 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the words "economic activity" in clause (4) the following words:-;the preservation and enhancement of the commonwealth's high-tech economic base.

SECTION 2. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by deleting section 1A and inserting in place thereof the following new section:-SECTION 1A. To provide for the projects and expenditures provided for in this act, the secretary of administration and finance is hereby authorized to spend the sum set forth in section two of this act for the several purposes of this act, subject to the conditions specified under the

provisions of this act and subject to the provisions of law regulating the disbursement of public funds and the approval thereof.

SECTION 3. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 4 the following words:-or for capital projects to enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 4. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "requirements" in line 9 the following words:-,or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 5. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 21 the following words:-or enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 6. Section 3 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in the definition of "Selected Site" the following words:-,or any United States Department of Defense facility in the commonwealth selected for enhancement or expansion as the result of the 1995 base closure and realignment process.

SECTION 7. Section 3 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "chosen" in line 8 the following words:-including any land or buildings, or interest therein, necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SECTION 8. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "facilities" in line 4 the following words:-or upon notification by the United States Department of Defense to the base commander or facility administrator of a Department of Defense facility that the facility has been selected for enhancement or expansion as the result of the 1995 base closure and realignment process.

SECTION 9. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "requirements" in line 12 the following words:-or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 10. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "Services" in line 6 of paragraph (c) the following words:- or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 11. Section 5 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "facilities" in line 7 the following words:-or prior to the notification by the United

States Department of Defense that facilities in the commonwealth have been selected for enhancement or expansion.

SECTION 12. Section 6 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "Government" in line 4 the following words:-, or to any United States Department of Defense contractor performing work for a Department of Defense facility.

SECTION 13. Section 7 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "Services" in line 6 the following words:-, the Department of Defense facilities that have been selected for enhancement or expansion, or a Department of Defense contractor performing work for a Department of Defense facility that has been selected for enhancement or expansion.

SECTION 14. Section 9 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 3 the following words:-or enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 15. Section 9 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by deleting the word "ninety-four" in line 4 and inserting in place thereof the following word:-ninety-six.

SECTION 16. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding the following new section:-SECTION 8A. To meet

the expenditures necessary in carrying out the provisions of this act, the state treasurer shall, upon request of the governor, issue and sell bonds of the commonwealth, in an amount to be specified by the governor from time to time, but not exceeding, in the aggregate, the sum of one hundred million dollars. Said bonds shall only be issued and sold after final approval by the United States Congress of the recommendation of the Department of Defense to locate said Finance and Accounting Services Facility in the town of Southbridge or after final approval by the United States Congress of a recommendation from the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth. All bonds issued by the commonwealth, as aforesaid, shall be designated on their face, Federal Facilities Enhancement Act of 1995, and shall be issued for such maximum term of years, not exceeding thirty years, as the governor may recommend to the general court pursuant to Section 3 of Article LXII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the commonwealth; provided, however, that all such bonds shall be payable not later than December thirty-first, two thousand and thirty. Bonds and the interest thereon issued under the authority of this section, notwithstanding any other provisions of this act, shall be general obligations of the commonwealth.

SECTION 17. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding the following new section:-SECTION 8B. The state treasurer may borrow from time to time on the credit of the

commonwealth such sums of money as may be necessary for the purposes of meeting payments as authorized by this act and may issue and renew from time to time notes of the commonwealth therefor, bearing interest payable at such time and at such rates as shall be fixed by the state treasurer. Such notes shall be issued and may be renewed one or more times for such term, not exceeding one year, as the governor may recommend to the general court in accordance with Section 3 of Article LXII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the commonwealth, but the final maturities of such notes, whether original or renewal, shall not be later than June thirtieth, two thousand and seven. Notes and interest thereon issued under the authority of this act, notwithstanding any other provision of this act, shall be general obligations of the commonwealth.

Demographics, The Navy's Future, Our Nation's Security

Introduction

We believe the Navy's decision to close the South Weymouth Naval Air Station was carried out without the examination or consideration of all pertinent demographic data. This documentation includes findings generated internally during the base closure and realignment process, specifically the Navy's own data calls and BRAC testimony. Additionally, more supporting evidence has been gathered using the most recent census data and an independent, "Best Cities Study", conducted in 1993 by the respected management firm of Moran, Stahl and Boyer for the November edition of Fortune Magazine. To ignore this important demographic data amounts to the surrender of the Navy's position in the Northeast and will lead to the eventual disintegration of the New England contingent of the Naval Reserves.

Navy Demographics

Throughout the process the Navy has their own demographic findings. Please review the demographic section contained in the Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (Scoring), dated 2-21-95. (See Chart #1) South Weymouth's score of 7.82 (See Chart #2) was the highest in the reserve air station category. But throughout the process, there are references to the "demographically rich" Atlanta area. As an example, the following remark was made by Mr. Charles Nemfakis. The following is an excerpt from Section 5a. of the BSEC deliberations dated 9 February 1995.

Mr. Nemfakis; 5a. South Weymouth. NAS Atlanta actually had a lower military value score than South Weymouth, but NAS Atlanta could not close because of demographics.

Many similar references to the "demographically productive and demographically rich Atlanta area", from a variety of sources, are littered throughout the process. Yet, the Navy's own standard of measurement places Atlanta last in demographics. These references are misleading and weaken the credibility of the Navy's conclusions.

In fact, Navy Data Calls fail to define meaningful statistics as they relate demographics to Naval Reserve Recruiting. To do so, you must first identify the sources for recruiting qualified Naval Reservists. A variety of programs exist that define these sources: NAVET, OSVET, APG, SAM, OSAM and Direct Commissioning. Let us examine each in turn.

1. **NAVET**: The NAVET Program focuses on honorably discharged, physically qualified Naval Veterans who have earned a favorable re-enlistment code.
2. **OSVET**: The OSVET program targets physically qualified Other Service Veterans with Honorable Discharges and favorable re-enlistment codes. Additionally, their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) must convert readily to Naval Enlisted Ratings or Naval Officer Designators.
3. **APG**: APG enlisted recruits are assessed directly from civilian occupations which can be converted to advanced paygrade level navy ratings. These personnel must demonstrate proficiency by successfully completing the prescribed professional leadership and rating correspondence courses and passing applicable leadership and advancement exams within prescribed timeframes to make their advanced paygrades and ratings permanent.
4. **SAM and OSAM**: The Sea and Air Mariner and Officer Sea and Air Mariner programs focus on high school and college graduates respectively.

After an initial active duty training period at boot camp or Officer Candidate School, these recruits are assigned to further professional training at A & C Schools for enlisted, or Surface Warfare School and follow-on sea duty for officers. Upon completion of this initial training, these reservists are released from active duty and assigned to reserve units in a obligor status. These programs create a pool of junior level reservists.

5. Direct Commissioning: This program targets selected professional non-prior service civilians with skills directly convertible to specific Naval Officer Designators and Naval Officer Billet Codes.

In all of these programs, a reservist must be able to complete twenty (20) satisfactory years of service prior to reaching age sixty (60), or high year tenure in their particular paygrade. Further, they must fall within the criteria specified under RAMOS for enlisted personnel and ORAMOS for officers. They must also meet the Reserve Functional Assignment Substitution Codes for the billets to which they will be assigned.

The numbers of personnel listed in Data Call 16 as awaiting billet assignments are meaningless, because the Data Call fails to answer the following questions:

1. For Pilots: How many are fixed-wing qualified? How many are rotary-wing qualified? How many are single-engine rated? How many are multi-engine rated?
2. For NFO's: How many are familiar with each type of aircraft on board the station? How many are familiar with each type of aircraft projected to be transferred in to the station?

3. For Other Officers: What is their distribution by Designators, NOBC's and paygrade? How does this relate to the ORAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?

4. For Enlisted: What is their distribution by Ratings and NEC's? How does this relate to the RAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?

In fact, Navy Data Calls for NAS Atlanta have historically shown that this station has been unable to maintain a level of reserve manning that allows its assigned units to maintain an R-1 Readiness Rating. As illustrated by Chart #3, in many cases, units fail to maintain a personnel manning that would allow them to be designated as a mobilizable asset for meeting contingency operations or a state of emergency or war.

It must also be remembered that more than pilots are required to safely operate aircraft. Fully two-thirds of a reserve squadron is made up of reservists. The enlisted portion of these units is tasked with the demanding duty of repairing and maintaining the many technical systems that allow a given airframe to operate safely. NATOPS prescribes the required maintenance schedules, and prudence demands that they be followed to the letter to ensure the safety of the aircrew, the continued efficient service life of the aircraft, and the continued ability of the unit to successfully complete its assigned missions in support of National Policies. For unlike many Naval Surface Reserve Units, the Naval Air Reserve is tasked with operational missions. It currently provides 100% of the Logistics Support Squadrons and 24% of the Maritime Patrol Squadrons (Table 2-2 Reserve Component Programs FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board). Inability to adequately man these units will have a detrimental effect on the Navy's overall ability to perform these missions.

Further contradictory evidence can be found in the most recent census data and the 1993 independent study conducted by Moran, Stahl and Boyers for Fortune Magazine's, November 1993 "Best Cities" article.

Census and Best Cities Data

When the demographic data is compared and analyzed, it is actually the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area that is proven to be demographically rich and best suited to support the mission of the Naval Reserves.

The 1993 MS&B study conducted for Fortune Magazine ranks the South Weymouth/Boston statistical area as a leader in the areas of educational opportunities, college enrollment, and skilled workers. Combined with the diverse minority pool, the South Weymouth/Boston area should be viewed as one of the richest resources for the Navy. The study published in Fortune Magazine supports the Navy's own demographic documentation that ranks South Weymouth/Greater Boston at the top of the Nation. Overall, the study ranks the Boston area 3rd, with the first two spots going to Raleigh/Durham and New York. The study reveals that there are more than a quarter of a million students in the greater Boston area. Of the six metropolitan areas that play host to a Naval Reserve Station, Boston ranks first in education. As charts #3a and #4 illustrate, 28.8 percent of the population holds a four year degree or higher while 11.2 percent of the people age 25 or older have earned a graduate degree. NROTC programs exist on the campuses of Boston University, Boston College, Harvard University, Tufts University, Northeastern University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). NROTC programs also operate in the City Of Worcester, approximately 35 miles from Boston at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Worcester State College.

All of the preceding schools are recognized nation-wide as the finest educational institutions in the country, the perfect breeding ground for future reservists. Boston ranked 2nd in the category of four year college enrollment, 8th in the availability of a quality labor force, 5th in the availability of skilled workers, 1st in the presence of high quality colleges and universities, and topped the country as the best city for knowledge workers. (See Chart #5)

Reservists Pool

The population of the Greater Boston/South Weymouth metropolitan area is 5,992,712. In key sections of the population considered to be prime recruiting targets, namely able-bodied veterans and people within the 17-35 age bracket, South Weymouth/Greater Boston easily outdistances both Atlanta and Brunswick. Over 316,000 veterans call the Greater Boston area home. Veterans in the Atlanta area number 271,000 while Brunswick records just over 82,000 veterans. Over 46 percent of the population base in the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area is between the ages of 17 and 35. The problems with closing South Weymouth are only magnified when you consider the negative affects the current DON plan will have on reservists reassigned to Brunswick, Maine, which is located approximately 160 miles north of South Weymouth. And, like Atlanta, Brunswick is also unable to man existing billet space. The following response was recorded in the Brunswick data call, "recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating is already the single largest problem for unit readiness." The shortage in manpower is evident, especially when you look at NRTSC 791 and NRTSC 191.

As of March 95, only 29 of 35 billets for NRTSC 791 were filled and in the case of NRTSC 191 only 18 of 33 billets could be filled. In the case of South Weymouth vs. Atlanta, both are located near a major airport and naturally attract a high number of pilots.

But, we have not seen any documentation that details the specific abilities and qualifications of the "rich" Atlanta demographic pool. Pilot qualifications such as, fixed-rotary wing or single/multi engine NFO qualifications, other officer designators or enlisted ratings and NECS have not been documented by the Navy. But, at South Weymouth, as recently as 24 months ago, they were able fully man an A-4 Sky Hawks Squadron, VMA-223. While it appears the availability of qualified personnel at Atlanta is in question, South Weymouth can support with local personnel, a Navy or Marine Squadron. Additionally, South Weymouth would still have enough qualified personnel available to man an F-18 Navy Squadron. This could be accomplished without the need to airlift personnel.

Failure to produce documentation to substantiate the closure of South Weymouth is not the Navy's only mistake. There are some loose ends, nowhere in the plan does the Navy mention what will happen to South Weymouth's 545 Air Reservists. These reservists need to drill at an air station, yet their future has never been addressed. Action that would move these reservists to Brunswick would be met with the reality that Brunswick, according to data call responses, has inadequate housing and space needed to make such a move feasible. In essence there is no plan.

Another factor affecting a move by reservists to Maine is the distance they will have to travel if they intend to continue serving in the Navy Reserves. As you can see in maps 1-3, the overwhelming majority of reservists affected by the decision live outside of the 50 mile border set down by the Navy as the distance that determines whether or not a reservist must be compensated for housing during reserve activities. The problem with the distance raises two important questions; what will be the messing and berthing cost to the Navy for reservists traveling from outside the 50 mile radius and how this will affect the attrition, retention and recruitment of reservists?

It is our contention that the traveling distance will have a serious adverse affect resulting in the loss of many highly skilled reservists, as well as increased difficulty in recruiting qualified reservists. The bottom line, no other reserve NAS facility can match the people resources within the South Weymouth/Greater Boston community.

Recruiting Goals

In July of 1994, as reported in the August 18th edition of the Navy Times, Navy Secretary John Dalton announced his first major equal opportunity initiative. He announced then that by the turn of the century, he wants the naval services officer corps to "reflect society". He went on to say that by the year 2000, the number of minority officer accessions into the Navy and Marine Corps should in some cases, almost triple.

While these future goals should be lauded, it should be noted that the Navy has failed to meet current minority recruiting goals. Let's put this in the context of testimony from Secretary Dalton during the March 6, 1995 Defense Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting. Secretary Dalton noted that reservists play an important role in the area of recruitment. He said, "We asked our reservists to assist in recruiting". At the same time, he conceded that new recruitment targets will be difficult because the American public is under the misimpression that the draw down means the Navy isn't hiring. We make a similar conclusion, a lack of presence by the Navy in the South Weymouth/ Greater Boston area will further contribute to the impression that the "not hiring" sign is hanging in the Navy's door essentially closing out the richest recruitment area in New England and arguably the whole country.

Conclusions

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda explained during the March 6th Open Meeting that it is important to put our Reserve centers where there are Reservists of the right skill levels and quality for us to have in our force. Additional support comes from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States in its testimony to the House and Senate MILCON Subcommittees, "If the BRAC 95 recommendations are approved, the Naval Reserve will be reduced to less than 200 air and surface facilities nationwide. This amounts to the smallest number of demographic centers for Naval Reserve activity since World War II and one third fewer than were in operation in 1978 when the number of drilling Reservists was approximately the same as it is today". This being the case, then the Navy cannot afford to lose South Weymouth.

The documentation generated by the Navy and other sources demonstrate on a consistent basis that South Weymouth is rich in demographics providing high quality recruits and reservists who are invaluable to the Navy and its mission. Unlike other facilities, South Weymouth is capable of handling its current mission and if the need arises, an expanded mission.

The Navy's demographic case is similar to the one presented in 1993. They have made statements that cannot be substantiated. The Navy has wrongly inflated the demographic importance of other Naval Bases and Air Stations while ignoring the value of South Weymouth. Deviation from the facts amounts to a deviation from the process.

**Table 2-2
NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NAVY**

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Number Units</u>	<u>Percent of Navy¹</u>
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	28	100%
Logistics Support Squadrons	10	100%
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams (NEAT)	7	100%
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare Support Helicopter Squadrons	2	100%
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Groups	2	100%
Fighter Composite Squadrons (U.S. Based)	2	100%
Heavy Logistics Support (C-130)	3	100%
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	27	99%
Cargo Handling Battalions	15	98%
Military Sealift Command (Personnel)	38	85%
Mobile Construction Battalions	12	80%
Intelligence Program (Personnel)	3,513	59%
Mobile Diving & Salvage Units	14	60%
Special Boat Units	2	50%
Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons	2	40%
Fleet Hospitals	6	50%
Frigates (FFG-7s)	16	40%
LAMPB MK-I Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadrons	2	13%
Naval Special Warfare Units	16	38%
Mobile Mine Assembly Groups (MOMAG)	11	26%
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units	5	33%
Carrier Air Wings	1	9%
Maritime Patrol Squadrons	9	24%

Note:

1. Percentages determined by counting like-type units or personnel.

Source: Naval Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1994.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Forces Selected Reserve units augment and reinforce Active component units. Selected Marine Corps Reserve units are not categorized as early or late deploying; all are considered "M-Day" assets. The Active and Reserve components are closely integrated

through horizontal fielding of equipment, weaponry, technology, and training. When task organized, there is no distinction between Active and Reserve component Marines.


The Marine Forces Reserve provides peacetime command, control, and resource allocation for the Marine Corps Reserve. It provides unity of

Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Rankings – POST AUDIT/PRE BSEC 2/21/95


Codes	D	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
159	Military Value Area	Weight	WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		Mean
160	Flight Training Area/Airspace	20.00	20.00	20.10	20.55	10.10	25.05	20.12		23.09
161	Flight Training Area/Airspace rank		2	3	1	6	4	6		
162	Flight Training Area/Airspace difference from mean		3.15	2.30	4.72	-7.74	1.22	-3.71		
163	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure	10.04	11.30	0.73	10.05	10.05	11.57	10.07		10.07
164	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure rank		2	6	3	5	1	4		
165	Air Station Facilities and Infrastructure difference from mean		1.20	-3.34	0.50	-0.03	1.50	-0.00		
166	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment	12.97	0.13	0.31	7.05	0.47	0.32	7.13		7.13
167	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment rank		6	3	4	1	2	5		
168	Expansion, Encroachment and Environment difference from mean		-1.58	0.01	0.17	0.77	0.62	-0.58		
169	Quality of Life	10.42	4.00	3.62	4.00	4.00	0.00	5.23		4.02
170	Quality of Life rank		4	6	6	3	1	2		
171	Quality of Life difference from mean		-0.00	-1.30	-0.00	0.05	1.00	0.31		
172	Demographics	0.00	4.50	7.07	4.40	3.05	4.00	4.04		4.04
173	Demographics rank		3	1	4	6	5	2		
174	Demographics difference from mean		-0.37	2.03	-0.55	-1.10	-0.02	0.00		
175	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities	0.05	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	5.52		4.02
176	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities rank		3	3	3	3	2	1		
177	Airfield Maintenance and Unique Facilities difference from mean		-0.37	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37	-0.03	1.50		
178	Military/General and Support Missions	0.77	4.54	4.37	2.57	3.45	3.14	5.67		3.90
179	Military/General and Support Missions rank		2	3	6	4	5	1		
180	Military/General and Support Missions difference from mean		0.50	0.41	-1.30	-0.51	-0.01	1.71		
181	Training	0.54	2.25	0.02	2.25	0.02	2.25	2.25		1.71
182	Training rank		1	5	1	6	1	1		
183	Training difference from mean		0.55	-1.00	0.55	-1.00	0.55	0.55		
184	Total Military Value	00.02	04.20	61.37	63.00	51.14	65.16	60.04		61.16
185	Overall Rank		2	4	3	6	1	5		
186	Military Value Differential		0.20	0.21	2.03	-10.02	4.00	-0.23		
187			WILGRO	S.WEYM	NEWORL	ATLAN	WASH	FT WRTH		

Navy Demographic Rankings

Data supplied by U.S. Navy/Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses




Undergraduate Education



% of people with 4 year degree

Statistics compiled by Moran, Stahl and Rover-1993

People age 25+ Grad. Degree




Statistics compiled by Moran Stahl and Boyer-1993


Top Ranking

South Weymouth/Boston Metropolitan Area


1	High Quality Colleges/Universities
1	Knowledge Workers
2	College Enrollment
2	Research Dollars
2	Venture Capital
3	Innovative Firms
3	Research Centers
4	Patents
5	Skilled Workers
6	Interaction Business and Academics
8	Industry Leaders
8	Education Level
9	Quality Labor Force



Statistics compiled by Moran, Stahl and Boyer-1993



Location of Naval Reservists Attached to the South Weymouth Naval Air Station



Scale @ 1" = 30 miles, April 24, 1993

Note: 183 SWNAS Reservists Located Outside of New England

Source: South Weymouth Naval Air Station

Prepared by the Weymouth Office of Planning and Community Development

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH ENVIRONMENT

To: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

From: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

The following paragraphs briefly describe several key environmental issues as they relate to the proposed closure of NAS South Weymouth and the transfer of its squadrons to NAS Brunswick.

Noise

South Weymouth receives very few noise complaints from the surrounding communities, as stated in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the Navy for the base in 1990. In that same document, noise problems at other bases (NAS Jacksonville, etc.) were well documented. Many of those bases were described as having noise problems both on- and off-base, with hundreds or thousands of housing units and other sensitive land uses experiencing noise levels today of between 65 and 75 Ldn or more. Measures required to help mitigate the noise problems at those bases include the prohibition of afterburner takeoffs by jets, the prohibition of practice approaches, and the prohibition of touch-and-go operations by jets, for example. No such constraints exist at South Weymouth. On-base housing at South Weymouth is located well away from the flight lines, while the key approaches (Runways 26 and 35) to South Weymouth are located for the most part over undevelopable land (wetlands, generally), thus helping to ensure the continuing freedom from noise complaints.

South Weymouth has a key advantage compared to many other bases with regard to noise, in that the base has two runways at 90 degrees (perpendicular) to each other. Thus whatever little noise that is generated by flight activity can be distributed (weather permitting) over these two runways so that the same people are not constantly exposed to noise day in and day out, as happens at many other bases with only one runway. Several other Reserve bases have only one runway. NAS Willow Grove is such a base, as is NAS Dallas now and the new NAS Fort Worth at the former Carswell AFB. NAS Atlanta is another example of a reserve base having only one runway. NAF Washington, still another Reserve base does have two runways, but they are parallel, thus still exposing the same areas on the runway approaches to constant noise, regardless of which (or both) runway is in use. At all these bases, there is no possibility for "spreading out" the noise, as is done at South Weymouth.

At NAS Brunswick, there are two runways, but as for NAF Washington, they are parallel to each other and very closely spaced. Again, regardless of which runway at Brunswick is in use (often they both are), noise sensitive areas off the runway ends are constantly exposed to noise. Moving additional P-3Cs from VP-92 and C-130Ts from VR-62 at South Weymouth to Brunswick will add to the overall noise level there.

As an aside, having two perpendicular runways as South Weymouth does provides for improved safety of flight operations when compared with bases having only one runway or parallel runways. That is, the two runway configuration at South Weymouth permits aircraft to take off and land directly into the wind much more often than is the case otherwise. By having the capability of doing so, the chance of an accident occurring as a result of an aircraft being blown off course while attempting to land or take off is greatly reduced, particularly when the wind is strong.

Air Quality

The same general comments as stated above with regard to noise also apply to the air quality issue. That is, South Weymouth's relatively low level of activity when compared to some other bases does not result in significant degradation of the region's overall air quality. On the other hand, moving South Weymouth's squadrons to another base already having much higher existing levels of aeronautical activity can do nothing but result in negative air quality impacts at that location. Since that base already has greater levels of activity than South Weymouth, one can reasonably presume that air quality there in the immediate vicinity of the base is poorer than that at South Weymouth. Adding additional aircraft will exacerbate those conditions.

The Navy's 1995 Recommendation for Closure with regard to NAS South Weymouth, in its environmental impact section, noted that South Weymouth is in a severe non-attainment area for ozone. As the attached recent article from the Boston Globe indicates, it is expected that this non-attainment label for the Boston area will soon be removed.

Traffic

Traffic congestion is always an important environmental issue. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for South Weymouth, previously referenced, documented traffic congestion problems at other Reserve bases, but none at South Weymouth. Also, the base has no parking problems and has a new main gate only several years old, which is served by a modern traffic signal system which assures efficient traffic management.

South Weymouth will soon have another advantage that no other base may have. Specifically, a new commuter rail station will soon be constructed to serve the town of South Weymouth. It will be located adjacent to the base's Trotter Road gate. Thus, many base personnel would potentially be able to arrive from origins throughout eastern

Massachusetts by using public transportation direct to the base. Any such use would, naturally, reduce vehicular volumes on the regional roadway system as well as reduce air pollution, etc.

From another perspective with regard to traffic, South Weymouth's two aviation squadrons, VP-92 and VR-62, are proposed to be relocated to NAS Brunswick, Maine. Given the rural character of Maine in general, demographics suggest that the squadrons will continue to have to rely on reservists from the Boston area for manning. Because of the lack of public transportation, these reservists will all most likely drive to Brunswick, resulting in a round trip typically of 300 miles or so, compared with the short drive from the Boston area to South Weymouth.

NAS Brunswick is located adjacent to U.S. Route 1, one of the most heavily congested roadways in Maine. Traffic congestion on this roadway is extremely severe during the summer tourist months, as this is the main roadway serving Maine's famous coastline. Traffic congestion in Maine has become of such concern that the State's voters in a recent referendum voted to prohibit the widening of the Maine Turnpike between the New Hampshire border and Portland in an attempt to discourage more vehicles from coming to the State. Thus, the addition of reservists from VP-92 and VR-62 will only serve to make Maine's roads even more congested than they already are.

Land Use

In this category of evaluation, it is useful to quote from Section V of the 1981 Master Plan prepared by the Navy for NAS South Weymouth in which, on Page 4, it is stated the following: "Generally, except for a very few situations, the relationship of on-station land uses to each other is nearly ideal." With regard to off-station land uses, existing flight paths to key runway ends pass over largely undevelopable land, as stated previously. This latter fact not only keeps the number of noise complaints to a minimum but also improves safety in the event of an accident. Local communities have taken a number of steps to help preserve land use compatibility between the base and land uses in the surrounding towns. An example of such a recent step was the refusal of one of the towns to permit the development of a large multi-unit housing complex near the approach to one of the runways.

Ecosystems

According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Massachusetts Heritage Program, there are no endangered or threatened species or critical habitats on the base.

SUMMARY

From this information , it is clear that NAS South Weymouth enjoys a good relationship with the surrounding environment. Accordingly, from an environmental point of view, it makes little sense to close South Weymouth, where there are few environmental problems, and then create more environmental problems at a base which already has a higher level of activity, and thus more environmental impacts on the environment, than South Weymouth.

AREA BASE CLOSINGS OR REALIGNMENTS

By
John C. Yaney

"Save Our Base Committee"

The following military facilities in New England have been closed or substantially reduced in size since 1970, resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of military and civilian jobs and severe impacts to the regional economy. Many of these facilities are concentrated in the Boston and Providence areas, a combined geographical area smaller in size than some counties in western and southern states.

1. NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH (1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION)
2. Sudbury Training Annex (1995 DOD Recommendation)
3. Hingham Cohasset Army Reserve Center (1995 Recommendation)
4. Naval Officer Candidate School Newport (1993 BRAC)
5. Naval Reserve Center New Bedford (1993 BRAC)
6. Naval Reserve Center Pittsfield (1993 BRAC)
7. Fort Devens (1991 BRAC)
8. Loring AFB (1991 BRAC)
9. Watertown Massachusetts Army Material & Mechanics Research Center (1988 BRAC)
10. Pease AFB (1988 BRAC) (Major downgrading from active Strategic Air Command Base to Air National Guard Base)
11. Naval Shipyard Boston
12. Naval Shipyard Boston (South Boston Annex)
13. Naval Station Boston
14. Naval Hospital Boston (Chelsea)
15. Headquarters First Naval District (Boston)
16. Boston Army Base
17. U.S. Army Arsenal (Watertown)
18. Naval Reserve Center Brockton
19. Otis AFB (Major downgrading from active Air Defense Command base to Air National Guard Base)
20. Westover AFB (Major downgrading from active Strategic Air Command base to Air Reserve Base)
21. Naval Air Station Quonset Point
22. Naval Construction Battalion Center Davisville
23. Naval Station Newport, including Cruiser/Destroyer Force LANT
24. North Truro AFS
25. Naval Security Group Activity Nantucket

Prior to the closings listed above, there were also many additional closings of major military facilities in the Boston/New England region. These additional facilities include:

26. Naval Ammunition Depot Hingham
27. Naval Ammunition Depot Hingham (Cohasset Annex)
28. Springfield Armory
29. Grenier AFB

30. Dow AFB
31. Presque Isle AFB
32. Ethan Allen AFB

While every region in the country must share in defense cutbacks, we here in New England and especially here in the Boston area believe that we have already contributed far more than our fair share of closings. We are aware of no other area of the country that has been called upon to bear so many closing or major cutbacks in such a small, concentrated geographic area. As can be seen from the lists presented above, many of the closings had to be endured before the BRAC process came into being, giving us no opportunity at the time to publicly defend the value of those bases to the nation's defense effort. Not specifically mentioned above is the fact that the area also lost the huge General Dynamics Fore River Shipyard in Quincy, largely as the result of lack of contracts from the Navy. In addition, essentially all of the smaller private ship repair yards in Boston have been put out of business, again largely the result of Navy decisions to no longer homeport ships in Boston and Newport.

During recent testimony of DOD personnel earlier this year before the newly-formed 1995 BRAC, it was stated that certain bases in California were not considered for closure due to the history of prior closings in their immediate areas and the impacts which those closures had. We believe that the Boston area should have been given similar consideration.

When BRAC 1993 approved the closure of the Naval Station and the Naval Shipyard in Charleston, SC, there was general agreement by everyone that the loss of these two major facilities in one city was devastating. Yet, Boston has also lost its Naval Station and Naval Shipyard, as well as its Naval Hospital, its Naval Ammunition Depot, its Army Base, its Army Arsenal, and its Naval District Headquarters, not to mention the loss of nearby Fort Devens, the last major active Army combat presence in New England. (The latter loss was particularly painful, since a previous BRAC had voted to expand Fort Devens, only to be reversed by BRAC 1991.) Now, NAS South Weymouth is proposed once again to be closed, despite a 7-0 decision by BRAC 1993 to keep the base open and to expand it. It is not just that one city should be asked to sacrifice so much over the years while some other areas of the country have remained relatively unscathed.

It is sincerely hoped that the 1995 BRAC Commission in its work will consider the cumulative impacts which these prior closings have already had on this region. With particular regard to the proposed closing of NAS South Weymouth, it is also hoped that the Commission is aware that it was here in Massachusetts that the U.S. Navy was born and that the whole concept of a reserve force in readiness was created and first put to the test at Lexington and Concord. It was also here in Massachusetts that the first Naval Air Station in the country devoted to the training of Naval Air Reservists was established right up the road from South Weymouth at Squantum. Keeping South Weymouth open will allow the proud tradition of the Naval Air Reserve in Massachusetts to continue.

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH INFRASTRUCTURE

THE NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH IS LOCATED ON 1,444 ACRES OF LAND LOCATED IN THE TOWNS OF WEYMOUTH, ROCKLAND AND ABINGTON. ON THIS FACILITY, BUT NOT ALL INCLUSIVE ARE TWO RUNWAYS, TWO AIRCRAFT HANGARS AND 165 UNITS OF HOUSING, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 105 UNITS LOCATED IN QUINDY, MA. AND AN ADDITIONAL 95 LEASED UNITS FROM THE U.S. COAST GUARD AT THE OTIS ANG, BOURNE, MA.

THE OVERALL CONDITION OF THE NAVAL AIR STATION IS EXCELLENT.

\$5,014,000 IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS WERE COMPLETED IN 1994/1995 WITH AN ADDITIONAL \$8,050,000 IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS TO UPGRADE THIS FINE FACILITY. THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF COMPLETION OF THE 16 CONTRACTS IN PROGRESS IS 82% WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE 95% COMPLETION STAGE.

I. INTRODUCTION UTILITIES: THE CONDITION OF NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH UTILITIES IS EXCELLENT AND SHOULD PROVIDE THIS COMMAND WITH UNINTERRUPTABLE SERVICE INTO THE YEAR 2040. DUE TO OUR ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAMS AND RECENT UPGRADE OF UTILITY SYSTEMS OUR TOTAL UTILITY COST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 WAS THE LOWEST IN THE CLAIMANCY FOR FULL FLEDGED AIR STATIONS. OUR PRIMARY UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS REPLACED IN 1992, CENTRAL HEATING PLANT WAS UPGRADED IN 1992, THE PRIMARY UNDERGROUND STEAM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS REPLACED IN SEPTEMBER OF 1993 AND THE SEWAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS UPGRADED IN 1991.

II. INTRODUCTION AIRFIELD: A PAVEMENT CONDITION SURVEY OF THE AIRFIELD WAS CONDUCTED BY THE NAVY IN 1990 AND OUR RUNWAYS WERE RATED IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL 8 NAVAL AIR RESERVE STATIONS IN THE

CLAIMANCY. RUNWAY 17/35 HAS THE SECOND HIGHEST LOAD & WEIGHT RATING IN THE CLAIMANCY AND 6TH AMONG 51 NAVAL AND MARINE CORPS STATIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

OUR AIRFIELD LIGHTING IS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION WITH A NEW ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COMPLETED IN 1991, THE TAXIWAY LIGHTS WERE REPLACED IN 1992 AND RUNWAY LIGHTS IN 1983.

WE HAVE TWO AIRCRAFT HANGARS THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE ALL BUT ONE OF THE 38 TYPES OF AIRCRAFT UTILIZED BY THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TODAY.

THE AIR STATION HAS THE CAPABILITY OF SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. THE HANGARS AND ASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT PARKING APRONS HAVE THE ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE A VARIETY OF AIRCRAFT SUCH AS C-130'S, P3-C'S, C-9'S, FA-18'S, UH1N'S AND AH-1W'S.

III. INTRODUCTION STATION: ALL STATION BUILDINGS ARE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND WELL MAINTAINED. MANY OF THE BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN UPGRADED WITH INTERIOR RENOVATIONS AND ENERGY EFFICIENT UTILITY SYSTEMS. TO COMPLIMENT QUALITY OF LIFE, THE PERSONNEL ABOARD NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH HAVE A FULL RANGE OF SUPPORT SERVICES AT THEIR DISPOSAL SUCH AS MEDICAL/DENTAL, FAMILY SERVICE CENTER, NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, CHID CARE CENTER, YOUTH CENTER, A FULL FLEDGED RECREATIONAL CENTER, NAVY EXCHANGE, CHAPEL, TWO BALL FIELDS, SWIMMING POOL, SNACK BAR, RESTAURANTS AND CLUBS FOR OFFICERS, CHIEFS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

IV. INTRODUCTION HOUSING: ALL 270 HOUSING UNITS ARE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND WELL MAINTAINED. A STRONG EMPHASIS ON RESIDENTIAL QUALITY OF LIFE IS SUPPORTED BY THE PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT BY PROVIDING CONTINUOUS IN-HOUSE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS.

V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLANS: THE NAVAL AIR STATION HAS THE CAPABILITY TO EXPAND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF

ITS LOCATION. THE FOLLOWING PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DEFINED IN THE NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH BASE MASTER PLAN FOR FUTURE PROJECT CONSIDERATIONS.

- A. AIRCRAFT HANGARS AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ON A PRESENTLY CLEARED 44 ACRE SITE ADJACENT TO THE AIRFIELD.
- B. A SITE HAS BEEN SELECTED FOR FIFTY ADDITIONAL HOUSING UNITS.
- C. A DESIGN FOR A BACHELOR ENLISTED QUARTERS THAT WILL ACCOMMODATE 160 ENLISTED PERSONNEL.
- D. AN AIRFIELD PLAN FOR A 1000 FT EXTENSION (DISPLACED THRESHOLD) TO THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY #17.

NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 16 TOTAL AMOUNT \$8,049,773

04/15/95 mv

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH CONSTRUCTION STATUS
(AS OF 06 APRIL 1995)

<u>ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>CURRENT AMOUNT</u>	<u>AWARD DATE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR COMPLETION DATE</u>
Alterations & Repairs BRAC REALIGNMENT Bldg #17 NAVAL RESERVE CENTER (NRC)	\$216,500	05/02/94	95%	02/25/95 (93' BRAC FUNDED)
Alteration & Repairs Personnel Support Det Bldg #2	\$425,959	05/02/94	95%	10/25/94 (93' BRAC FUNDED)
HVAC Rehab AIMD Bldg #117	\$660,001	01/14/94	95%	09/03/94
Replace Exhaust Fans Boiler Plant Bldg #8	\$54,490	03/09/94	95%	11/03/94
Demolition of 30 Inactive Housing Units Quincy, Ma.	\$431,902	09/03/93	80%	09/06/94 Delete Remaining Work
Radar Facility & Control Tower	\$2,381,711	9/14/94	12%	04/26/96
Aircraft Parking Apron Repairs	\$560,021	2/22/94	80%	04/04/95
HVAC Rehab AIMD	\$660,001	01/14/94	95%	09/03/94 Extended
Wetland Mitigation	\$165,363	08/30/94	80%	12/08/95
Replace Heating Sys Navy Family Housing	\$1,132,395	04/21/94	85%	09/16/95
Indefinite Qty Asbestos Removal	\$27,128	04/01/93	95%	04/16/94 Extended
Repair Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	\$109,334	09/27/93	90%	05/23/94 Extended
Pest Control Facility	\$243,135 ** Not Included in total **	11/30/94	0%	06/13/95 Work Suspended
Fire Station Addition	\$754,000	09/23/94	50%	04/06/95
Backflow Devices Various Locations	\$59,925	09/21/94	75%	01/04/95 Extended
Indefinite Quantity Painting	\$127,979	06/17/94	95%	07/02/95
Indefinite Quantity Interior Repairs Housing	\$283,064	07/06/94	98%	07/21/95

NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 21 TOTAL AMOUNT \$5,013,539

<u>COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION</u> <u>1994/1995</u>	<u>CURRENT</u> <u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>COMPLETION</u> <u>DATE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Exterior Repairs Hgr #1 Hgr #2 & Bldg #115	\$57,555	10/14/94	
Family Housing Repairs	\$748,865	12/13/94	
A/C Installation Galley Bldg #103	\$132,200	01/25/94	
Roof Replacement Hangar 2	\$134,700	02/17/94	
Replace Roof & HVAC EM Club Bldg #112	\$237,124	11/03/94	
Replace PCB Transformers Airfield	\$229,384	02/22/95	
Indefinite Quantity Painting NAS	\$66,339	02/10/94	
Steam Distribution Replacement	\$1,855,290	10/13/93	Closed out/completed 02/17/95
Remove Jet Fuel Storage Tanks	\$323,625	10/18/94	Close out/completed 03/14/95
Bathroom Rehabs Housing Naval Terrace Quincy	\$94,330	06/05/94	
Barracks #75 & #76 Head Rehabs	\$161,825	07/13/94	
Station Roof Repairs	\$109,524	12/16/93	
Airfield Paving Hangar #1	\$468,410	09/22/94	
Repairs Service Station Fuel Tanks	\$27,600	12/08/94	
Storm Sewer Installation	\$77,250	11/07/94	
Construct Spill Prevention Control	\$69,400	11/04/94	
Airfield Tree Brush Clearing	\$40,745	02/10/94	
Indefinite Quantity Painting Station	\$75,174	04/18/94	
Repairs & Reinsulate HVAC Hangar #1 & #2	\$38,344	08/04/94	
Replace Flush Hydrants Hangar #2	\$41,980	07/15/94	
Install Vehicle Exhaust Fire House Bldg #96	\$23,875	02/07/95	

4/19/95

1993 BRAC REALIGNMENT/CONSOLIDATION

On June 27th 1993, the 93' BRAC voted unanimously on the Committee to Save NAS South Weymouths proposal to consolidate 3 Navy Reserve Centers and place them aboard NAS South Weymouth Ma. A BRAC Commissioner passed comment that this was a sound economical proposal & should be used as a model by the U.S Navy. With the use of BRAC Realignment funds in the amount of \$216,500., the Navy re-habbed Bldg#17 in order to support the consolidation of the Navy Reserve Centers. The Naval Reserve Center (NRC) South Weymouth has been occupied as of February 25, 1995.

The Personnel Support Detachment was the occupant of the NRC building prior to the re-hab, in turn the Navy used BRAC Realignment funds in the amount of \$425,959. for the relocation of this detachment in Bldg #2. Consolidation makes sound economic sense, whether it is through joint servicing or inter-servicing within or outside the DOD.

Again in the 1995 BRAC another proposal is being made in the concept of consolidation by the Massachusetts Army National Guard. They have submitted a proposal to stand up a new Field Artillery Battalion at NAS South Weymouth, which will be totally funded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the amount of \$12,000,000. The benefits to the DOD relative to this proposal consists of the following; Increased Readiness of the unit, use of the airfield for Deployment & Mobilization, and Support Services.

The rationale for the Committee to Save NAS South Weymouth in submitting the realignment/consolidation proposals consist of the following merits; Reduced Fiscal Expenditures, Full Fledged Support Services, Improved Quality of Life and Enhanced Readiness.

In the concept of mobilization, the Naval Air Station South Weymouth is a Self Sufficient Mobilization Processing Site. The advantages of being a self sufficient site consist of the following merits; in-processing services including full medical and dental exams, legal advisors, uniforms, gear, a family service center, an airfield for deployment and out-processing relative to Demobilization.

04/05/95

NAVAL AIR RESERVE DEMOGRAPHICS

The mission of the Naval Reserve and its ability to carry out that mission falls from demographics as does readiness. The first and probably most important is demographics, because on that almost everything else impacts. Retention and recruiting fall from demographics.

There are two components for the Navy and the Marine Corps Reserves. There is an active duty component, which is full time military people and reservists, who are weekend sailors and marines, thus weekend warriors.

If an activity closes or moves, the active duty personnel are moved with that activity or transferred elsewhere and most of the time the reservists who are tied to a geographic location by their domicile and their civilian occupation will not transfer.

The make up of a Navy or Marine Corps Reserve aircraft squadron consists of approximately one third active duty members and two thirds part time sailors and marines, which brings up the question of retention when you increase the distance that a reservists must travel from their homes.

This is a quote from the Reserves Forces Policy Board "surveys show that an individuals employment situation is a major factor in deciding whether to enlist or re-enlist in the reserve components. To the extent that the employer-related issues have an impact on recruiting and retention, they have an impact on readiness." For those individuals who would attempt to remain affiliated with the migrating units, they would have to take time away from family and their jobs on a Friday to get to a drill on Saturday, and come back Sunday night, and then be back to work Monday morning, and that would be little bit difficult in of these cases.

The primary reasons why people in the Naval or Marine Corps Reserve elect not to continue their affiliation are family and job conflicts.

04/27/95 11:48
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CUNG STUDDS - DC
SEN COHEN DC

002/003

WILLIAM S. COHEN
United States Senator

THOMAS H. ANDREWS
Member of Congress



**Maine
Congressional
Delegation**

GEORGE J. MITCHELL
United States Senator

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
Member of Congress

December 1, 1994

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DELEGATION MEMBERS MAKE STRONG CASE FOR BRUNSWICK NAVAL STATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Current and prospective members of the Maine Congressional Delegation met today with high-ranking Navy officials to make a strong case for keeping the Brunswick Naval Air Station off the next base closure list.

The members stressed the strategic importance of the station and the missions of its P-3 aircraft in their presentation to Admiral Stanley Arthur, vice chief of naval operations; William J. Cassidy, deputy assistant secretary of defense for conversion; and Cheryl Kandaras, assistant secretary of the Navy for installations and environment. All will play a role in recommending which bases should be closed.

Delegation members attending the meeting were Senators Bill Cohen and George Mitchell, Senator-elect Olympia Snowe, Representative Tom Andrews, and Representatives-elect James Longley and John Baldacci.

The session was one in a series of meetings that Delegation members have had with Navy officials to press the case for Brunswick and for the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

The members argued that Brunswick is one of only two strategically important operational air stations on the East Coast, the only active duty station in the northeast quadrant of the United States and the only operational military airfield in New England.

"As the military continues to downsize both internationally and domestically, the strategic importance of Brunswick Naval Air

Station and its P-3 support mission becomes greater," the members said in a joint statement.

"We made this point strongly to Navy officials and will continue to press the case for Brunswick at all levels as the Pentagon makes decisions on which military installations to recommend for closure during the 1995 round."

The members noted that Brunswick's P-3s are flying surveillance flights in the Persian Gulf, supporting Bosnia operations in the Adriatic Sea, conducting drug detection and monitoring operations in the Caribbean, and engaging in a number of other missions.

They also cited the excellent condition of the base's airfield and facilities, its lack of encroachment problems that could limit future growth, a training area that can be increased substantially and its ability to accommodate two additional squadrons.

"In addition to these strong points in the base's favor, we also pointed out the dramatic cumulative economic impact in Maine of previous base closures and defense cutbacks," the members said. "We believe that Maine has already borne more than its fair share of military downsizing."

They also stressed the high quality of life in the area, the ease with which military families have been integrated into the community's schools, churches and organizations, the large number of high-quality housing units available to military families, and the area's exceptional health care and educational institutions.

"Brunswick Naval Air Station is vital to our nation's self defense," the members said. "Its military value and strategic location cannot be underestimated."

For more information, contact:
Kathryn Gest (Cohen) - 202-224-2523
David Bragdon (Mitchell) - 202-224-5344
Nicholas Graham (Snowe) - 202-225-6306
Bob Stein (Andrews) - 207-772-8240

Sheet1

Configuration Rule: "average military value of air stations left open must be at least equal to the average military value of all air stations."							
BASE		RANK			MILITARY VALUE SCORE		
Washington		1			65.16		
Willow Grove		2			64.36		
New Orleans		3			63.99		
South Weymouth		4			61.37		
Ft. Worth		5			60.94		
Atlanta		6			51.14		
AVERAGE MILITARY VALUE					61.16		
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS S. WEYMOUTH					61.11		
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS ATLANTA					63.16		

BG 11-22-94

Air depot appears to lose out to Fla.

BRUNSWICK, Maine — A base considered to be Brunswick Naval Air Station's rival in next spring's round of base closings has been assigned to do repairs on one of the military's most advanced planes. The Air Force's stealth fighter will go to Florida's Jacksonville Naval Air Station for work on its engines, further strengthening that base's massive repair depot. The new work will bring only a dozen or so jobs to the base, but it is important because it demonstrates the Pentagon's confidence in the base, officials in Jacksonville said. Some officials believe that the East Coast needs just one base to house the Navy's P-3 Orion subhunter aircraft. (AP)

Maine asks Navy to keep base open

PORTLAND, Maine — The state's congressional delegation has made the case for keeping Brunswick Naval Air Station open during a meeting with high-ranking Navy officers. The delegation stressed the strategic importance of the base and the mission of its P-3 Orion subhunter aircraft on Thursday. The members noted that Brunswick is one of only two P-3 Orion bases on the East Coast, the only active duty station in the Northeast and the only operational military airfield in New England. (AP)

BG 3 DEC 94

2 Navy facilities safe, senator says

Sen. William Cohen of Maine said yesterday that he believes the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Brunswick Naval Air Station will not appear on the Navy's list of bases recommended for closure. After a series of meetings with high-ranking Navy officials, the senator released a statement saying, "My instincts tell me that the Navy will look favorably on the importance of both installations and will not recommend that they be closed." Cohen is a member of the Armed Services Committee and the incoming chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Navy. (AP)

BG 14 DEC 94



April 21, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am Chairman of the "Save the Base" Committee, a composite group of local officials, reservists, base employees, and concerned citizens, formed under the auspices of the South Shore Chamber of Commerce. Herein, I outline some of the essential points we intend to make as part of our presentation to Commissioner Robles when he visits the South Weymouth Naval Air Station on April 28, 1995.

In 1993, South Weymouth NAS was removed from the closure list when Commissioner Stuart, citing lowered demographics at receiving sites and the prospective loss of a base rated third in military value of eight naval air reserve stations evaluated, moved the Commission to find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and the final criteria in making his recommendation. The Commission voted unanimously 7-0 to reject the Secretary's recommendation. Commissioner Stuart said in making his motion:

"I am impressed with the logic of maintaining a Reserve Facility which we already own, and it looks like a superb facility that is available to the Northeast, where there are a lot of reservists operating. I think we have to keep in consideration that all parts of the country need to have facilities available to them. (BRAC Transcript of June 26, 1993, page 319).

What has happened at South Weymouth in the interim? As a result of BRAC 93, a 4-plane C-130 squadron (VR-62) was stood up in February of this year, a Surface Reserve Center was established to accommodate over 500 surface reservists from NRC Lawrence, NRC Chicopee and NRC Quincy which were ordered consolidated at Weymouth as a result of the Community's suggestion. Additionally, other construction projects that had been on hold for

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
April 21, 1995
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several years under the threat of closure, went forward, including the rehabilitation of several other buildings, a new addition to the fire house, a new air control tower, a new liquid oxygen farm and a new Dopplar Weather Radar.

However, despite BRAC 93 and the actions taken as a result, the continued high military value of South Weymouth as borne out by the Navy's military value matrix, Weymouth's high level of contributory support and its overall readiness, the Secretary once again recommended South Weymouth for closure. We maintain the recommendation is not supportable through any application of the selection criteria and is in contradiction to that which is required to meet the needs of the long-term force structure plan.

South Weymouth is a Reserve Air Station. The sole purpose of its active duty personnel is to train reservists who will be capable of effectively mobilizing during a major conflict. In more recent years, reservists have been additionally called upon for contributory support, side by side, with fleet units to meet operational goals. Why? because it is cost-effective to rotate citizen-sailors for short periods to meet various contingencies at the same skill level but at 1/6th the cost. Numerous personnel from South Weymouth answered the call in support of Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Many others volunteered but were not needed. Today, we have reserve aircrews, rotating back and forth from Europe for 17 day stints in support of operations near Bosnia. Last summer, these same crews rotated out of the Caribbean, flying numerous missions in support of operations in and about Haiti.

To fully utilize capable reservists, training sites must be accessible to reservists where they live and work. South Weymouth is located in the heart of metropolitan Boston which is the most highly-educated population center in the country. Many young reservists come off active duty to use the G.I. bill to further their education at the many fine institutions of higher

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
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learning located in Boston and the surrounding area. There is no better area to site a reserve air station than in the middle of this demographic mecca.

The Navy's own analysis rated South Weymouth #1 in demographics, arguably the single most important factor in selecting an installation which can support a force structure plan that will undoubtedly include an even greater compliment of reservists in the years to come in the face of dwindling resources. The Army and Air Force now have a higher percentage of reserve forces in their makeup than they ever had in their history. The Navy recognized the uniqueness of its Reserve Air Station when designing its selection process comparing one against each other, particularly in the area of demographics. The evaluation done was different from those conducted for Operational Air Stations. Most notably, the inquiries made to the two separate subcategories were not the same and there was no analysis completed in evaluating reserve demographics or reserve recruiting potential in the analysis done on active duty operational facilities.

The decision to close South Weymouth which links a reserve facility with an active facility is without analytical support. To have provided justification, a comparison of military values across categories where no data existed would have been required. Such a procedure would be flawed. The Navy virtually admitted as much as demonstrated on page 25 of the Department of the Navy's Analysis and Recommendation (Volume IV), March, 1995, when DOD reported:

"The score for a particular installation is a relative measure of military value within the context only of the subcategory in which that installation is being analyzed. . . . Furthermore, the score obtained by an activity in one subcategory has no relevance for comparison to the score obtained by an activity in another subcategory since the question and quantitative scores were different for each matrix."

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Despite this emphasis in separating Reserve and Operational Naval Air Stations, the BSEC eventually saw fit to measure NAS South Weymouth against NAS Brunswick in an effort to meet the CINCLANTFLT's "desire" to have a fully capable air station north of Norfolk. This comparison resulted in a serious departure from BSEC's initial findings: NAS Brunswick had been marked for closure during BSEC's initial configuration model output for Operation Air Stations, and NAS South Weymouth had been "kept open" during similar phases in the Reserve Air Station analysis. Moreover, this comparison is out of sync with the internal control procedures set forth by Secretary Perry's January 7, 1994 memorandum, stating that the accuracy of BRAC data collections and analyses depends at a minimum, "on uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources." (Department of Defense Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1995 Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC): Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities, January 7, 1994, p.9).

While the use of military judgment in selecting bases is certainly acceptable, it is intended to be a tool in the analysis of like facilities, rather than the decisive factor in choosing among unlike facilities. The Navy, however, chose to incorporate the CINCLANTFLT's input by dismissing its own analysis and commencing a comparison of apple and oranges.

Even if the Commission were to determine that the comparison of naval and operational air stations was somehow justified, the inconsistency of the process employed by the Navy seems unacceptable. If naval and operational air stations could be easily and logically compared, why was the configuration not utilized at the outset? The last minute methodological shift on the part of BSEC looks like an attempt to justify the CINC's expressed operational desires by presenting an either/or alternative, under which any

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman
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Reserve Naval Air Station, regardless of its ranking within its own subcategory, would, by definition, lose to an Operational Station, regardless of the Operational Stations's relative ranking.

It is apparent that the BSAT conducted a series of deliberative sessions with various CINC's and compiled "Policy imperatives" based on those discussions. Such a critical step in the process is surely worthy of written public record, and yet we have been unable to uncover any related documentation. Under the Base Closure Act, the Secretary of Defense must include with his recommendations a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation and a justification for each recommendation, as well as certification of the accuracy and completeness of the information on which the recommendations are based. (Department of the Navy: Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV), March 1995, p.10). We have been unable to obtain documentation concerning either the CINCLANTFLT's request for a single air station north of Norfolk, or the BSEC's response. For these reasons the Secretary's recommendation is flawed and should not be adopted.

This gap in information is disturbing because it requires the community to simply trust that the Navy correctly interpreted the CINC's request. If the CINC's input holds more weight than any other aspect of the process-- and particularly if that input is not assigned a procedural weighing or ranking in importance--then it stands to reason that there should be a record of that input and that it should be available to communities. Indeed, if final recommendations depend solely on-- and can be justified by-- a single missive from a Commander-in-Chief, why not dispense with the entire analysis before this point? Clearly this was not the impartial and logical process envisioned by the framers of the BRAC legislation.

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We have attached detailed memoranda on various issues which we feel should be considered by the BRAC in its deliberation. All focus on the strengths of NAS South Weymouth. We are troubled that despite South Weymouth's high military value and its unmatched demographics there was only one scenario of the hundreds conducted which considered keeping South Weymouth open. Despite certification from the local command that the scenario to keep South Weymouth open (which called for the closure of NAS Atlanta and the transfer of a C-9 squadron located there moving to Weymouth) could be readily accommodated at minimal expense, there were no follow-on scenarios which considered South Weymouth for other type of aircraft such as tactical aircraft flown by Marine and Navy reservists.

Any recommendation that spared NAS Atlanta ahead of South Weymouth was in contradiction to the stated mandate that where excess capacity existed in a subcategory, a scenario which rendered an average aggregate military value of those stations remaining less than the average aggregate military value of all installations in the subcategory, that scenario should not be followed. NAS Atlanta's poor military value--some ten points less than South Weymouth and the other reserve installations--should have dictated early on that any scenario sparing Atlanta would always result in an average below that which was required by the state control factor. Any scenario which considered keeping Atlanta should not then have been considered.

We look forward to Commissioner Robles visit in order to demonstrate the outstanding capabilities of this facility and to further justify to him how additional air activities could be supported here. Whether fixed-wing or rotary, tactical jet or logistics, Weymouth is ready, willing and able to support these types of missions with its available infra structure and with its highly capable and motivated personnel.

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We thank you for your anticipated consideration.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul R. Haley".

Paul R. Haley

PRH/rmi
Enclosure

DEVIATIONS FROM BRAC CRITERIA

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

In June of 1993 the BRAC voted, without deliberation, to not close Naval Air Station So. Weymouth by a unanimous, 219-0 vote. What happened between June 1993 and the Dept. of Navy's recommendation of March 1995 to again target NAS So. Weymouth for closure?

The Recommendation for Closure cites the need to close the Naval Reserve Air Station at So. Weymouth in order to support the operational desires of CINCLANTFLT and to maintain the active duty Naval Air Station at Submarine. It goes on to state that moving all of the assets and supporting personnel and equipment less than 150 miles away provides most acceptable reserve demographics. Further, the BRAC 93 decision to move and economically consolidate the surface Naval Reserve Centers from Lawrence, Chicopee, and Quincy onto NAS So. Weymouth is reversed and the Quincy NRC is to be rehabilitated and reopened. To arrive at this recommendation a number of significant deviations from the established BRAC Criteria for Closure had to take place.

Specifically, the Department of the Navy:

1) ignored the standards set in the Base Closure Act and ignored all of their own established controls to "ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information" upon which decisions would be made. The GAO has questioned this procedure on previous rounds of closure as the DON process clearly relies heavily upon the acceptance of certain assumptions and military judgements with no documentation to support the decisions.

2.) Regardless of the DON praise for the equality and fairness of military value ranking and the process of arriving at it, the Navy disregarded NAS So. Weymouth's clearly superior standing and made their recommendation in defiance of the BRAC 95 goal to reduce excess capacity.

3.) To accomplish its recommendation the Navy had to deviate substantially from the selection criteria not at the last minute, and only to satisfy an undocumented desire of a CINC to sacrifice Reserve NAS So. Weymouth by making comparison to active duty NAS Brunswick, a documented operationally unnecessary facility.

Let's look at some specifics:

A. Referring to the record of BSEC deliberations through 29 November 1994, all scenarios and discussions point to the closure of NAS Atlanta. NAS Atlanta was recommended for closure by the DON's computer configuration analysis of military value. Throughout the BSEC process, NAS Atlanta consistently scored lower than NAS So. Weymouth and NAS Ft. Worth. NAS Atlanta's military value score and ranking were 51.14, 6th of 6 reserve bases scored. This is 10.23 points lower than NAS So. Weymouth and 10.02 points lower than the average military value of all 6 reserve bases. (NOTE: Please refer to item B. below for more discussion on this point.) Then according to the BSEC deliberations of 1 December, 1994, NAS So. Weymouth is recommended for closure with the C-130 squadron moving to NAS Brunswick. It goes on to state that, "This alternative responds to the Reserve Force leadership's support of the demographically productive Atlanta area and maintains a major air facility in the northern CONUS." During the BSEC deliberations of 12 December, 1994, there is further reference to CINCLANTFLT's concerns about losing NAS Brunswick and RESFOR's concerns "regarding the loss of the demographically-rich Atlanta area." While the need to consider input from the relevant CINC's into the DON closure proceeding is understood, why is there no public record of that input? By the DOD and

DON's own admission, in the DON Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), dated March 1995, under Record Keeping, page 11. "Another significant documentation control was the requirement to prepare minutes of all formal meetings which were part of the decision making process (e.g., all meetings of the BSEC) in arriving at recommendations for base closure." It further states that "Their records of meetings and deliberative reports provide an extensive description of the information presented to the BSEC and the rationale for the decisions based upon that information." In testimony before the Commission on 6 March, 1995, Secretary Dalton stated "...the Evaluation Committee held a number of deliberative sessions with the fleet commanders in chief and other major commanders to apprise them of the progress of the process and to discuss potential impacts on fleet operations, support, and readiness." Secretary Dalton goes on to say that "When considering reserve aviation infrastructure, we focused on the fleet commander's desire to have the best possible aviation capability in the Northeast Region." Where is the written record of the input that Secretary Dalton focused on to make his decision?

B. With reference to military value, we again see considerable deviation from the DON's prescribed rules of analysis when considering the fates of NAS So. Weymouth, NAS Atlanta, and NAS Brunswick. Referring again to the above referenced DON Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV) page 21. "Whenever the capacity analysis indicated the presence of meaningful excess capacity within a particular subcategory, each installation in that subcategory was subjected to a military value analysis. The foundation of the analysis was the military value criteria, which are the first four of the eight selection criteria issued by SECDEF for making base closure and realignment recommendations and are given priority consideration." In the testimony before the Commission on 6 March, 1995, Assistant Secretary for Installations and Environment Pirie stated, "that military value computations occupy a slot somewhere in the middle of the process, not the end of the process, simply a way of beginning it." Later in his presentation he states "The criteria for the BSEC is not to maximize military value. It is to reduce excess capacity consistent with retaining average military value at least as high as going in and, therefore, a

more sophisticated and powerful analytical tool is required to meet that criteria." He goes on to describe that tool as "Configuration Analysis", noting, "It comes up with an optimum solution that minimizes excess capacity while maintaining average military value." Following Mr. Pirie's presentation, Mr. Nemiakos apparently felt that the topic needed amplification and joined in by noting that a simple "rack and stack mechanism" would not work in evaluating activities and reduce excess capacity. He notes that, "The technique that we used in the '95 round of base closure that was reviewed by the GAO and confirmed as appropriate and that we have used again this time is a technique that looks at the military value, because that is the key ingredient, and then ensures that our average military value for all activities of a sub-category remains at least as good when we get through closing activities as it was before." Again referring to the DCN Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), "it is important to understand what a military value score is, and what it is not. The score for a particular installation is a relative measure of military value within the context only of the subcategory in which that installation is being analyzed." In that regard, NAS So. Weymouth should be looked at versus only the other (5) Reserve Air Stations. In which case the closing of number 4 ranked NAS So. Weymouth results in the lowering of the average military value as compared to all (6) Air Stations. See Table 1 attached. Furthermore, closing NAS So. Weymouth leaves excess capacity of (5) BSEC modules. Closing NAS Atlanta and retaining NAS So. Weymouth leaves (4) excess modules. This was confirmed by the configuration analysis that indicated that NAS Atlanta should close. A word about the Configuration Analysis. From page 25 of Analyses and Recommendations, "The purpose of configuration analysis was to identify, for each subcategory of installations, that set of installations that bests meets the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, in light of future requirements, while eliminating the most excess capacity." Later, in the same reference paragraph describing the program used for the configuration analysis, it states that the program solver would, "generate multiple solutions which would satisfy capacity requirements for the future force structure, would maintain an equivalent or greater average military value for the retained installations (when

compared to the current mix of installations), and would meet parameters required by operational or policy considerations."

C. In light of points A. and B. above, Mr. Nemfakos stated "...the recommendation to close NAS So. Weymouth was not as a result of an analysis of the reserve air stations... rather, it was our intent to be able to support retaining Brunswick, which is a much more capable active duty base... So the tradeoff was made ... in our process, not in the Reserve air station analysis, then, as a mechanism of retaining Brunswick." Admiral Boorda joined with, "Brunswick remains the only base, operating maritime patrol base, which gives you the window into the North Atlantic in cooperation with Keflavik, Iceland. It was the operating nature of that base that led me to recommend what we did to the Secretary." Deviations abound within those simple statements. Why is NAS So. Weymouth now being compared to an active duty base in clear violation of the established criteria? In the active duty base configuration analyses Brunswick was ranked 16 of 20 bases and was picked for closure on all (3) computer runs. A note on the computer runs: runs 2 and 3 disregard the solution to run 1. Referring to Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV) page 25, "'rules' about a subcategory were added so that the model would not select an operationally infeasible solution." Therefore closing NAS Brunswick was, and still is, an operationally feasible solution. Also on the noted page 25 is "...the score obtained by an activity in one subcategory has no relevance for comparison to the score obtained by an activity in another subcategory." Furthermore, the maritime patrol operates from NAS Jacksonville, not Brunswick. Brunswick F-3 crews do their level 3 training at NAS Jacksonville. Deployments to Keflavik are 6 month deployments to relieve the squadron there. They are not daily operations from NAS Brunswick. If in fact NAS Brunswick is operationally necessary to the DON Force Structure Plan, which has not been documented other than in reference to a CINC's "desire," why aren't assets from other active bases considered for transfer to NAS Brunswick? Shouldn't the DON be supporting what they consider an operationally important base with assets from excess active bases as identified by the computer

models? The computer model outputs for active duty bases listed (5) stations for closure on all three runs: Brunswick, Mayport, Adak, Roosevelt Roads, and Beaufort. El Centro and Key West show up on two outputs each. Under the "best case" scenario dictated by the computer model 49 excess modules would be retained. Yet, the DON is only closing NAS Adak, a reduction of only (3) modules. This is not consistent with their stated primary goal of reducing excess capacity.

Let's also look at an interesting trend in the BSEC deliberations regarding NAS So. Weymouth:

1. In the BSEC meeting of 9 November, 1994, scenario 001 calls for the closure of NAS Atlanta and moving the C-9 squadron to NAS So. Weymouth and the H-1 squadron to MCAS New River. Scenario 004 calls for the closure of NAS Brunswick and moving (3) P-3 squadrons and (1) VPU squadron to NAS Jacksonville.

2. During the meeting of 29 November, 1994, "The BSAF advised the BSEC that there was concern that MCAS New River could not demographically support the reserve units being moved there. The data reflected that only 69.6% of the Marine Corps Reserve billets in the New River area are currently being filled. Should the Marine Corps Reserve units from Atlanta be moved to New River, the estimated annual shortfall is 260 drilling reservists." The Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command advised that he "considers the movement of the Marine Corps Reserve units at NAS Atlanta to MCAS New River to be demographically insupportable." Prior to these statements considerable attention was paid to new military construction costs that would be necessary, due to the closure of NAS Atlanta, at Dobbins AFB for a NARCEN (\$6.5 million) and at MCAS New River for hangar (\$6.9 million), reserve center (\$9.2 million), and family housing (\$4.9 million). The total new construction costs would be \$30.7 million for MCAS New River. The one time total costs for NAS Atlanta would be \$57.5 million.

3. On 1 December, 1994, the BSEC recommended moving Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons from MCAS Beaufort (a BRAC 93 action) to NAS Atlanta, C-9's from NAS Atlanta to Dobbins AFB, and the closure of NAS So. Weymouth with the C-130 squadron moving to NAS Brunswick. The remaining assets at NAS So. Weymouth were addressed during the BSEC meeting of 12 December, item 14, through a rather elaborate moving scenario. The justification for this is that, "This alternative responds to the Reserve Force leadership's support of the demographically productive Atlanta area and maintains a major air facility in the northern CONUS."

4. On 9 February, 1995, Mr. Nemfakos briefed the BSEC on the recommended closure by geographic location. Item 5a, states "NAS Atlanta had a lower military value score than South Weymouth, but Atlanta could not close because of demographics. There was also an operational need to have an air station north of Norfolk, and NAS Brunswick is the most capable of those air stations. South Weymouth is closing to reduce excess capacity and to permit DON to retain NAS Brunswick."

What has happened here is that:

- 1.) NAS So. Weymouth was never considered for any additional assets other than the C-9 squadron. Yet, NAS So. Weymouth has been home for Navy and Marine Corps rotary, fixed wing propeller, and jet aircraft. A detailed report on the aviation capabilities of NAS So. Weymouth is attached.
- 2.) The Atlanta demographics were ranked 6th and So. Weymouth ranked no. 1, with over twice the point value of Atlanta and 50 % better than all other reserve bases. In fact, to quote from the 6 March, 1995 testimony of Mr. Nemfakos in regards to demographics, "...in the final analysis, we heaved up the number of assets that were in Atlanta and also jointly based at Dobbins, with the Air Force, in order to take advantage of that." Why weren't the assets of NAS So. Weymouth "heaved up" to take advantage of

not only the far superior demographics, but also the rich history of squadron types historically deployed there? Furthermore, where is the major justification of demographics? It appears to be in MCAS New River's inability to support the H-1 squadron, not a Navy issue. After the injection of the Marine Corps' argument against MCAS New River, there is no substantiated argument for the Atlanta demographics. Every reference thereafter to Atlanta and the transfer of assets to Brunswick is qualified in terms like, "...does not believe that this movement will present any demographic problems.". (BSEC 13 Jan., 1995).

if the DON considers Atlanta to be demographically rich (or productive) and it scored last in the DON demographics category on military value, how must they regard So. Weymouth, demographically perfect?

3.) New military construction costs for NAS So. Weymouth were never considered beyond those associated with the C-9 move and those appear to have been inflated. Due to the historic deployment of aircraft at NAS So. Weymouth new MILCON would be minimal.

4.) To justify the closure of NAS So. Weymouth vs. its strong military value rating, a comparison had to be made out of its subcategory. When queried about the difference between Long Beach and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards Admiral Boorda stated that you couldn't compare, "...apples and oranges. One is on the east coast, one is on the west coast; one repairs surface ships, non-nuclear, the other does primarily submarine nuclear work with heavy emphasis on refueling. These are not the same things." How do you then justify comparing Reserve and active duty bases to choose "the much more capable base"? The testimony clearly shows that NAS So. Weymouth is the perfect excuse to justify a CINC "desire" to maintain NAS Brunswick: a base clearly operationally unnecessary by the DON's own computer model and military value ranking.

5.) No where in the BSEC deliberations or testimony is there reference to the P-3 squadron at NAS So.

Weymouth being sent to NAS Brunswick, only the C-130 squadron is mentioned for transfer. The P-3 squadron could be covered by the reference to NAS So. Weymouth's "aircraft and necessary personnel..." in the recommendation for closure.

6.) By it's own, volunteered data call responses, NAS Brunswick has a continuing recruiting problem. All indications are that VP-92 would be transferred to NAS Brunswick and then disestablished for lack of manpower. The demographics of Brunswick will not support VP-92. See the attached demographic discussion.

7.) It is also interesting to note that on 10 February, 1995, a letter from Governor Weld of Massachusetts, dated 8 Feb., was hand delivered to the Secretary of the Navy informing him of the intentions of the MA National Guard to sight a field artillery battalion at NAS So. Weymouth. The state legislature has approved a \$100 million bond issue to pay for the \$12 million in new construction required for the National Guard. Furthermore, money from the bond issue could be used to pay for any improvements the DON felt necessary to sight C-9 or F/A-18 squadrons, including runway lengthening and enhancement. It should be noted that there is no mention of this valuable offer by the state in any BSEC deliberation or public testimony, nor was the letter acknowledged in writing until April when Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy Wm. Cassidy Jr., responding on behalf of Secretary Dalton in a letter dated 5 April, suggested that "...it may be prudent to defer consideration of the Guard's expression of interest until the Commission submits its report to the President on July 1, 1995."

8.) NAS So. Weymouth appears to have been again placed in a position for closure with absolutely no regard for the BRAC criteria that, by law, is intended to provide a fair and equitable decision making process. There is no reason for NAS So. Weymouth to close. Despite repeated closure threats, NAS So. Weymouth has not lost its spirit, nor its ability to attract talented and highly skilled personnel, and

continues to be a stellar example of what the Naval Reserve is all about: readiness, mobilization and the high degree of skilled personnel that has served this country since 1915 in every declared war, police action, and regional conflict in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, where as we speak NAS So. Weymouth assets are deployed.

In summary, one of the primary tasks of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission is to review the means by which the Navy arrived at their recommendations. The methodology that the Navy employs is as important as the actual recommendations they produce as it is the BRAC process that inspires public trust in, and the ultimate acceptance of, the final outcome; despite the hardship a base closure inevitably places on a community. If the community feels that the BRAC process is fair, above board, and equally applied, they are better able to accept their fate.

Herein lie the problems with the Navy's final recommendation to close NAS So. Weymouth: the process by which the Navy made its decision appears to violate several of the statutes, public laws, OSD guidance, and policy statements which, taken as a whole, form the foundation of the process. First, we are concerned about the last minute effort to justify the undocumented desires of CINCLANTFLT. The gap in information is particularly disturbing as it requires the community to trust that the Navy correctly interpreted the CINC's request. If, in fact, the CINC's input holds more weight than any other aspect of the process, and if that input is not assigned a procedural weighting or ranking of importance, then it stands to reason that there should be a record of that input and it should be made public. Furthermore, if the final recommendations depend solely on, and can be justified by a single desire of a CINC, why not dispense with the analysis to that point?

Our second concern is when the Navy, in a blatant attempt to justify the undocumented desires of CINCLANTFLT, forced a simple comparison between two different types of Naval Air Stations very late in

the process. This attempt so late in the process by the Navy to combine all Naval Air Stations is quite disturbing. If the Navy intended to conduct such a combined analysis, it should have done so from the very beginning. Anything else is inconsistent, unfair to the air station and community, and may well be in violation of Public Law no. 101-501.

Third, we find press releases and newspaper articles from Maine's Senator Cohen, who is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Chair of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Navy, about his instincts concerning NAS Brunswick and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, issued on or within days of the Navy's decision to reverse its findings to close Brunswick to be too convenient to be coincidental. Furthermore, the similar language in his releases and the closed BSEC deliberations stretches the imagination and seriously damages the public trust in accepting the Navy recommendation. Also, while we have found no political influence, the fact that, in the Navy's own words, "Atlanta could not close" in the face of its above documented poor demographic standing, poor strategic location, and overall last standing in the military value measures, measures defined by the Navy that originally chose NAS Atlanta for closure has raised a lot of questions around the timing of the change in congressional power and NAS So. Weymouth's nomination for closure.

Secretary Perry stated that the "process has worked well so far, and we have followed it to the letter." As applied to NAS So. Weymouth, we can hardly view this as an example of careful analysis using rigid criteria. The level of objectivity that is critical to the base realignment and closure process is clearly missing here. The commissioners can not possibly accept the Navy's recommendation and expect the community to believe that the process works. To do otherwise would be a contradiction of the facts, a serious challenge to not only the originators of the Base Closure Act, who created the logical and impartial standards of the process, but to the BRAC 93 Commissioners who saw the irrationality of the 93 recommendation for closure

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Personnel

As of 3/15/95	Active	SELRES Drill On / Off	CIV
- NAS	442	936 / 154	275
- Tenant			
Aviation Squadrons	233	329 / 0	0
Naval Reserve Center	24	379 / 190	0
Other Non-Aviation	86	0 / 0	30
Marines	67	393 / 0	0
TOTAL	852	2,381	305
- New England Demographics		- No Airlift Support Required For Any Drilling Unit	

Fleet Support

NAS South Weymouth Reserve Units / Individuals

- ▶ FY 91/92 Desert Shield / Desert Storm 32,000 Man Days

- ▶ FY 93 Multiple Worldwide Support Missions

- ▶ FY 94 Same as FY 93

- ▶ FY 95 Currently Supported Operations Include:
 - UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti
 - SOUTHERN WATCH, Saudi Arabia
 - SHARP GUARD, Adriatic Sea / Bosnia
 - DRUG INTERDICTION, Caribbean Sea
 - FLEET EXERCISES, Mediterranean Sea

Configuration Rule: "average military value of air stations left open must be at least equal to the average military value of all air stations."							
BASE		RANK			MILITARY VALUE SCORE		
Washington		1			65.16		
Willow Grove		2			64.36		
New Orleans		3			63.99		
South Weymouth		4			61.37		
Ft. Worth		5			60.94		
Atlanta		6			51.14		
AVERAGE MILITARY VALUE					61.16		
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS S. WEYMOUTH					61.11		
AVERAGE MV MINUS NAS ATLANTA					63.16		

The following remark made by Mr. Charles Nempfakis is an excerpt from Section 5a. of the BSEC deliberations dated 9 February 1995.

Mr. Nempfakis; 5a. South Weymouth. NAS

Atlanta actually had a lower military value score than South Weymouth, but NAS Atlanta could not close because of demographics.


IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY VALUE

"The technique that we used in the '93 round of base closure that was reviewed by the GAO and confirmed as appropriate and that we have used again this time is a technique that looks at the military value, because that is the key ingredient, and then ensures that our average military value for all activities of a sub-category remains at least as good when we get through closing activities as it was before. "

Charles P. Nempfakos, Vice Chairman,
Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC)
Testimony to BRAC Commissioners, 6 March 1995

Navy Demographic Rankings

Data supplied by U.S. Navy/Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses



The following is an excerpt of a letter from Mr. Charles Nempfakos to Chairman Jim Courter dated 20 May 1993. The certified information provided is in response to a commission inquiry regarding Navy Reserves and Surface Reserves activities.


Q: Reserve units are geographically tied to demographics (i.e., areas with populations of highly educated veterans or civilians with technical skills directly related to military specialties) in order to maintain manning levels. In addition, reservists currently assigned to units are restricted in ability to relocate because of their civilian occupations and part-time military status.

Q3. What factors were considered in determining ability to retain qualified incumbent reservists and recruit new personnel at the gaining sites?

A3. A major factor in determining the ability to recruit and retain qualified reservists at a gaining site is proximity to reservists' homes. The Naval Reserve Force has consistently placed reserve activities within major population areas. This maximizes the reserve pool from which to draw within a "reasonable commuting distance", generally defined as 100 miles.

The ability to recruit and retain qualified individuals has remained exceptionally high within these areas. This demographic factor was considered by the BSEC in deliberative sessions concerning Naval Reserve activities.

Location of Naval Reservists Attached to the South Weymouth Naval Air Station



Scale: 1 inch = 30 miles

Note: 103 Naval Reservists located out of New England

Source: South Weymouth Naval Air Station, 4/95

Prepared by Weymouth Office of Planning and Community Development

Supplemental Information for Question 59.

Unit	Active or Reserve	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1997	FY 1999	FY 2001
NRTSC 191	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
NRTSC 791	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
NRVTU 9191	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
4th Marine Div. Reserve Rifle Co.	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X

For each of these other reserve Navy/Marine Corps units at your air station, provide the number of authorized billets and the number of personnel actually assigned to the squadron for the past three fiscal years. Provide this information in the format below for both Selected Reservists (SELRES) and Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) Navy reservists/Full-Time Support (FTS) Marine Corps reservists. Explain differences between authorized and actual manning in the remarks section.

NR Activity/Unit: NRTSC 191	FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual	
	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS
Officer	11	0	11	0	12	0	12	0	12	0	12	0
Enlisted	28	0	1	0	28	0	17	0	38	0	28	0

Remarks: Recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating continues to be the single largest problem for unit readiness.

NR Activity/Unit: NRTSC 791	FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual	
	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS
Officer	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	10	0
Enlisted											33	0

Remarks: Recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating continues to be the single largest problem.

62A

R(18 Oct 94)

NAVAL AIR STATION, SOUTH WEYMOUTH

RECENT CONSTRUCTION 1995

<u>Project</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Current Amount</u>
Air Traffic Control Tower / Ground Control Approach Radar	25% Complete	\$2,400,000
New Personnel Support Detachment	Complete	\$ 426,000 (93 BRAC funded)
New Navy Reserve Center	Complete	\$ 217,000 (93 BRAC funded)
Fire Station Addition	50% Complete	\$ 756,000
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance New Heating Ventilation & A/C	Complete	\$ 660,000
Navy Family Housing Heating System Replacement	90% Complete	\$1,132,000

Calendar year 1995 began with \$8,049,000 in active construction contracts. A sample of these contracts are listed above.

An additional \$306,000 in '93 BRAC funds was used for furnishings, communication equipment, etc. for the new Naval Reserve Center and Personnel Support Detachment.

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER

CURRENT SITE

- NRC SOUTH WEYMOUTH (LOCATED NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH)

SUPPORTED BY MED/DEN CLINIC

SUPPORTED BY PERSONNEL SUPPORT DETACHMENT (PSD)

SUPPORTED BY BILLETING/GALLEY

SUPPORTED BY RECRUITING

SUPPORTED BY MWR/FITNESS FACILITIES

- ONLY SITE IN UNITED STATES THAT PHYSICALLY SHARES EXISTING ASSETS....WE USE NAS SPACES

- THE LARGEST RESERVE CENTER IN NEW ENGLAND

- MORALE AND QUALITY OF LIFE HAVE IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY.

***REDUCED OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL RESERVE CENTER.**

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER

POSSIBLE SITE (DOD RECOMMENDATION)

- NRC SOUTH WEYMOUTH RETURN TO QUINCY
 - REHAB BUILDING (\$2.5 MILLION REHAB)
 - INCREASE MED/DEN COSTS
 - INCREASE BILLETING COSTS
 - INCREASE MEAL COSTS
 - PERSONNEL SUPPORT DETACHMENT ???

QUALITY OF LIFE

- NO EXCHANGE (CLOSEST NAVY NEWPORT)
- NO BASE HOUSING
- NO MWR FACILITIES

*** INCREASE OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL RESERVE CENTER.**

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR NAS BRUNSWICK

- Relocate VQ-2 from NS Rota, Spain to Brunswick

- Relocate an Active-Duty P-3C squadron from NAS Jacksonville or elsewhere to Brunswick

- Downsize NAS Brunswick to a NAF, similar to Navy proposals for Key West and Corpus Christie

SOUTH WEYMOUTH SQUADRONS AND AIRCRAFT

SQUADRON

AIRCRAFT TYPE

Existing

VP-92

P-3C (Anti-Submarine)

VR-62

C-130T (Cargo)

Base

UC-12B (Passenger)

Recent Past

VMA-322

A-4M (Attack Jet)

HSL-74

SH-2F (Anti-Submarine Helicopter)

HML-771

UH-1N (Utility Helicopter)

AIRCRAFT TYPES POTENTIALLY RELOCATABLE TO NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH

C-9B (Passenger/Cargo DC-9 Jet)

- Common visitor
- Fits into either hangar
- Strong airline demographics in Boston area

UH-IN/AH-IW (Utility/Attack Helicopters)

- 40-year history of Marine Reserve helicopters at South Weymouth
- South Weymouth ideal for over-water and over-land training
- Large available pool of personnel

FA-18A (Fighter/Attack Jet)

- Numerous over-water and over-land training areas nearby
- No Mans Island target range
- Dissimilar Air Combat Training opportunities
- Practice air refueling opportunities
- All weather training
- Superb demographics for squadron manning

P-3C (Anti-Submarine Warfare 4-Engine Turboprop)

- Aircraft Type already operated at South Weymouth
- Closest Reserve base to Greenland-Iceland-UK gap
- Closest Reserve base to the open ocean

6

Naval Air Station So. Weymouth
Dept. of the Navy, BRAC 95 Selection Criteria Deviations

- 1) Ignored the standards set in the Base Closure Act and ignored all of their own established controls to "ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information" upon which decisions would be made. The GAO has questioned this procedure on previous rounds of closure as the DON process clearly relies heavily upon the acceptance of certain assumptions and military judgements with no documentation to support the decisions.

- 2) Regardless of the DON praise for the equality and fairness of military value ranking and the process of arriving at it, the Navy disregarded NAS So. Weymouth's clearly superior standing and made their recommendation in defiance of the BRAC 95 goal to reduce excess capacity.

- 3) To accomplish its recommendation the Navy had to deviate substantially from the selection criteria by, at the last minute, and only to satisfy an undocumented desire of a CINC, sacrifice Reserve NAS So. Weymouth by making comparisons to active duty NAS Brunswick, a documented operationally unnecessary facility.

SUMMARY

1. Closure of NAS BRUNSWICK ME is a non-starter because it removes the only operational Naval Air Station in the Northeastern U.S. AND compares Reserve Air Stations with Operational Air Stations.
2. Closure of NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA is predicated on faulty COBRA Data that does not reflect all significant MILCON and associated recurring costs.
3. Closure of NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA permanently removes the only Naval Air Reserve presence from the Northeastern U.S.,
 - presuming reservists will be able to consistently travel 150 miles to NAS BRUNSWICK ME during winter months.
 - presuming NAS BRUNSWICK ME can provide berthing for commuting reservists.
 - presuming no loss of unit readiness and mission capability.
4. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA does not remove a significant Naval Air Reserve presence from the Southeastern U.S. because NAS JACKSONVILLE FL, home to many reserve units, will remain.
5. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA did not consider possibility of relocating reserve units to NAS JACKSONVILLE FL
6. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA with transfer of reserve assets to NAS JACKSONVILLE FL
 - provides significant reserve support already in place
 - retains facilities to conduct airlift of reservists preserving unit retention
 - avoids reservists commuting by car during severe winter weather
 - provides for ability to reinsert Naval units similar to the recommendation to place Marine Corps Reserve Units into ARNG Selfridge (formerly NAF Detroit).
 - provides additional population from which to recruit reserves for units historically undermanned.
7. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA improves overall Military Value of Naval Reserve Air Stations. All other options degrade Military Value.

Fleet Support

NAS South Weymouth Reserve Units / Individuals

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
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
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Prepared by Weymouth Office of Planning and Community Development

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4th Marine Div. Reserve Rifle Co.	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X

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62A

R(18 Oct 94)

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QUALITY OF LIFE

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- Downsize NAS Brunswick to a NAF, similar to Navy proposals for Key West and Corpus Christie

SOUTH WEYMOUTH SQUADRONS AND AIRCRAFT

SQUADRON

AIRCRAFT TYPE

Existing

VP-92

P-3C (Anti-Submarine)

VR-62

C-130T (Cargo)

Base

UC-12B (Passenger)

Recent Past

VMA-322

A-4M (Attack Jet)

HSL-74

SH-2F (Anti-Submarine Helicopter)

HML-771

UH-1N (Utility Helicopter)

AIRCRAFT TYPES POTENTIALLY RELOCATABLE TO NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH

C-9B (Passenger/Cargo DC-9 Jet)

- Common visitor
- Fits into either hangar
- Strong airline demographics in Boston area

UH-IN/AH-IW (Utility/Attack Helicopters)

- 40-year history of Marine Reserve helicopters at South Weymouth
- South Weymouth ideal for over-water and over-land training
- Large available pool of personnel

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- Aircraft Type already operated at South Weymouth
- Closest Reserve base to Greenland-Iceland-UK gap
- Closest Reserve base to the open ocean

Naval Air Station So. Weymouth
Dept. of the Navy, BRAC 95 Selection Criteria Deviations

- 1) Ignored the standards set in the Base Closure Act and ignored all of their own established controls to "ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information" upon which decisions would be made. The GAO has questioned this procedure on previous rounds of closure as the DON process clearly relies heavily upon the acceptance of certain assumptions and military judgements with no documentation to support the decisions.
- 2) Regardless of the DON praise for the equality and fairness of military value ranking and the process of arriving at it, the Navy disregarded NAS So. Weymouth's clearly superior standing and made their recommendation in defiance of the BRAC 95 goal to reduce excess capacity.
- 3) To accomplish its recommendation the Navy had to deviate substantially from the selection criteria by, at the last minute, and only to satisfy an undocumented desire of a CINC, sacrifice Reserve NAS So. Weymouth by making comparisons to active duty NAS Brunswick, a documented operationally unnecessary facility.

Maine Congressional Delegation

William S. Cohen
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Olympia J. Snowe
UNITED STATES SENATOR



James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Benjamin F. Montoya
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Montoya:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

As the military continues to downsize both internationally and domestically, the strategic importance of NAS Brunswick and its P-3 support mission becomes greater. NAS Brunswick is the only remaining operational (active duty) Naval Air Station in the Northeast Quadrant of the United States and the only operational military airfield (Navy or Air Force) in New England.

The Navy confirmed the critical importance of NAS Brunswick's location in its 1993 base closure analysis. It determined that on the entire East Coast, NAS Brunswick and NAS Key West are the only operational air stations whose locations have strategic military value. If NAS Brunswick were to close, the Navy's most northern operational air station east of the Mississippi River would be NAS Norfolk.

In his visit to NAS Brunswick last September, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral J. M. Boorda, stated that NAS Brunswick's location is a strong point and that the airfield is "located in an important part of the world that was strategically important during the Cold War and could be very very important if things don't go right in Russia... It's clearly one corner of the United States where we don't have much else right now. So for all those reasons that airfield is very good."

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James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS



March 6, 1995

The Honorable Rebecca G. Cox
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Cox:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable S. Lee Kling
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Kling:

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UNITED STATES SENATOR

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James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Wendi L. Steele
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Steele:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Alton W. Cornella
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Cornella:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Josue Robles, Jr.
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Robles:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon
Chairman
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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William S. Cohen
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Olympia J. Snowe
UNITED STATES SENATOR



James B. Longley, Jr.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

John E. Baldacci
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

March 6, 1995

The Honorable James B. Davis
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Davis:

We're writing to address the strategic value and importance of Naval Air Station (NAS) Brunswick to the Navy and to the defense of the United States. We urge you to give full consideration to NAS Brunswick's merits as you continue your analyses of the Navy's recommendations for the 1995 base closure process. We look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss this matter further.

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Although the cold war has ended, the multi-mission capability of the Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA) force remains critical to the success of today's changing Navy. Currently, P-3's are on station flying surveillance flights in the Persian Gulf, supporting Bosnia operations in the Adriatic Sea, providing world wide battle group support/anti-surface warfare operations as well as conducting drug detection and monitoring operations in the Caribbean. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) remains an important MPA mission as the submarine threat has not gone away.

The Russian Navy continues to invest in advanced submarine capabilities and future generations will have stealth and quietness levels that may very well meet or exceed U.S. submarine levels. In the future, these submarines may be patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean, making NAS Brunswick even more important to the security of the United States. There is concern that our attack submarine force could decrease to as few as 30 submarines by the year 2010; thus the requirement for P-3's and their ASW capabilities will be even greater in the 21st century.

Recognizing the strategic importance of NAS Brunswick, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has provided over \$24 million for infrastructure upgrades to the base. This includes funds for aircraft hangars, an Anti-Submarine Warfare Center and a soon to open, state of the art, 1.7 million gallon capacity fuel farm.

NAS Brunswick has the capability to expand its base loading or provide surge capability with little or no additional funds required for infrastructure improvements. NAS Brunswick's airfield and facilities are in excellent condition. The base has no encroachment problems and no endangered species problems which could limit future growth. With 35,000 square miles of overwater operating areas less than 15 minutes of flight time from NAS Brunswick, it is estimated that the main flight training area usage can be increased by 77 percent, the Boston Operating area can be increased by 75 percent and the Small Point Mining Range can be increased by 75 percent.

Presently, NAS Brunswick has the capability to accommodate two additional squadrons. These could be additional VP squadrons, a Naval Reserve VP or VR (logistic C-130 aircraft) squadron, or VQ-2, a special operations squadron. With the return of many U.S. forces from Europe to the United States, NAS Brunswick is the ideal location to meet the basing, training and maintenance requirements of VQ-2 which is stationed in Rota, Spain.

NAS Brunswick is capable of parking 65 P-3 aircraft, with a surge capability of 95 P-3 aircraft. Hangar space is available for 18 P-3 aircraft and 19 under surge conditions. The base infrastructure can easily accept additional personnel as the

water and sewage systems are only operating at 33 percent of their capability. Housing, medical services and the school system are available for additional military personnel and their families.

The cumulative economic impact to Maine by base closures and defense cutbacks has been dramatic. Maine trails only California and South Carolina in enduring the most severe downward economic impact caused by base closures and military downsizing. If NAS Brunswick were to close, civilian unemployment in the local area would increase by 48 percent and bring the unemployment level of the Brunswick/Bath area to nearly 12 percent. In the Bath-Brunswick labor market area, NAS Brunswick generates 14 percent of total employment, 10 percent of the total income and 11 percent of the purchase of all goods and services.

Since the late 1980's, the 75 mile stretch of coastal Maine, from Bath to Kittery/Portsmouth, has absorbed deep defense employment reductions: 5,845 direct/indirect jobs lost at Bath Iron Works; over 4,676 direct/indirect jobs at Portsmouth; and, 7,598 direct/indirect jobs with the closing of Pease Air Force Base. Recently, Loring Air Force Base closed, causing a loss of 8,016 direct/indirect jobs in Northern Maine.

These figures help to explain why Maine's unemployment rate has run about 20 percent higher than the national average this year, and why economists at the Maine State Planning Office predict "extremely slow economic growth" for the next 10 years.

One of your stated goals is to ensure that military members and their families are provided the best quality of life possible. This is one area where the Bath-Brunswick area is unsurpassed. The close relationship between the military and the surrounding community is an example for other communities to emulate. There is complete integration of the military members and their families into the schools, churches and every organization in the community.


There are over 1,700 military housing units available at NAS Brunswick. Over \$15 million has been spent on renovations to these housing units since 1989 and off base housing is readily available. Health care facilities can accept a major patient increase and the Town of Brunswick is in the advanced planning stage for a new hospital. The school system is also capable of increased enrollment (from its present 630 students to 1400) and has an enviable pupil/teacher ratio of 14 to 1.


NAS Brunswick is vital to our Nation's self defense. Its military value and strategic location cannot be underestimated. The value of NAS Brunswick will only increase as the Navy uses this installation to its full potential in the future. It is important to keep in mind a statement made by the Secretary of

the Navy to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in April 1991 when he stated, "Given the limited coastal land available, any surrender of coastal property or near-coastal property containing entities that support coastal bases, can be expected to be irreversible. We believe that we must avoid divestiture of assets that may be lost forever, lest those assets be needed again."

We urge you to give full consideration to the above factors as you analyze the Navy's future Naval Air Station requirements. Several charts are enclosed for your consideration. We appreciate your attention to this important matter as you continue your evaluation of the Navy's installations as part of the 1995 base closure process.

Sincerely,


Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senator


William S. Cohen
United States Senator


James B. Longley, Jr.
Member of Congress


John E. Baldacci
Member of Congress

Enclosure

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950113-2

FROM: RICH, HARRY	TO: YELLIN
TITLE: RADM, USN (RET)	TITLE: NAVY TEAM LEAD
ORGANIZATION: NAS BRUNSWICK TASK FORCE	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NAS BRUNSWICK	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	INFO COPY	ACTION COPY	INIT
SENATOR DIXON				COMMISSIONER			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER			
				COMMISSIONER			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓟ		COMMISSIONER			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		Ⓟ	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFO SERVICES DIVISION							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Ⓟ	Prepare Direct Response (coordinate w/ Exec.Sec.)
Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

IN SUPPORT OF NAS BRUNSWICK ; 1994 REPORT ATTACHED -
LOCATED IN THE LIBRARY.

Due Date: 950120

Routing Date: 950113

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when responding 950113-2

The Brunswick Naval Air Station provides support to both the Naval Communications Station, Cutler, Maine, and the Naval Security Group Detachment Winter Harbor, Maine, in the following areas:

- Navy Exchange/Commissary
- Navy Legal Support Office (NLSO)
- Medical/Dental
- Morale, Welfare & Recreation (MWR)
- Public Works
- Environmental
- Supply
- Defense Disposal (DRMO)
- Family Service Center (FSC)

The Navy Exchange and Commissary offer storage and transport of material for both sites. NLSO support is used by both the commands and the assigned individuals for investigations, legal support and legal advice. Medical and Dental Clinics offer technical support and reference in addition to transporting cases to military hospitals. MWR offers training and support in the New England Networking region. The Public Works and Environmental staff offer technical and engineering assistance as required. The BNAS Supply Dept. offers significant assistance to both Winter Harbor and Cutler in ordering and storing/transporting many of their supply requirements. DRMO offers the same services to commands as to the BNAS. (It is the only defense disposal command in the State.) The FSC offers all of their training to both commands. Ombudsmen, Navy Relief and counseling are among the most demanded assistance areas.

RADM Harry Rich, USN (RET)
RRS Box 2355
Brunswick, ME 04011-9621

NAS BRUNSWICK

TASK FORCE

1994 REPORT

TO

**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

MAY 1994

**NAS BRUNSWICK TASK FORCE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
59 PLEASANT STREET
BRUNSWICK, ME 04011
(207) 725-8797**

NAS BRUNSWICK

TASK FORCE

**1994 REPORT
TO
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

MAY 1994

**NAS BRUNSWICK TASK FORCE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
59 PLEASANT STREET
BRUNSWICK, ME 04011
(207) 725-8797**

NAS Brunswick Task Force

Robert C. Shepherd, Chairman, Shepherd Agency
Harry G. Rich, RADM USN (Ret.)
Van McCullough, Capt. USN (Ret.), Thornton Oaks
Mary Denzer, Denzer Associates
Charles Mull, Capt. USN (Ret.), Stowe Travel International
David Gleason, Coldwell Banker/Gleason Real Estate
Larry Cilley, Topsham Town Administrator
Tom Dixon, Dixon Consulting
John Bibber, Brunswick Industrial Development Committee
Jeff Hathaway, Civilian Chairman, Military Community Council,
J. Hathaways' Restaurant
Barbara Norton, The Highlands
William Kelly, Kelly Hospitality
Donald Gerrish, Brunswick Town Manager
Ron Janowski, Aegis Apartments
Betsey Alden, People & Pets
Ed Barron, Syscon Corp.
Tom Broussard, Syscon Corp.
Carl Veazie, Retired Economist
Dewey Nelson, Middaugh B&B
Ray Farrell, O'Farrell Gallery
Margaret Murphy, Economic & Community Development Director,
Town of Topsham
Chris Wagoner, NAGE Local R#1 - 77
John Olsen, SCORE
Wanda L. Plumer, Executive Director,
Chamber of Commerce of the Bath-Brunswick Region

NAS Brunswick Task Force
Chamber of Commerce
59 Pleasant Street
Brunswick, ME 04011
(207) 725-8797

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NAS Brunswick is a modern Naval Air Station with assets and advantages not found elsewhere on the East Coast. It is ideally suited to meet the training needs of P-3 flight crews and support personnel and can accommodate all seven of the currently projected Atlantic Fleet VP squadrons with no additional military construction required. Also, beyond current needs, there is room for significant expansion within the unencumbered air space and undeveloped land area presently available.

NAS Brunswick is the only remaining operational Naval Air Station in the Northeast Quadrant of the U.S. and the only military airfield in northern New England. Because the future is so uncertain, particularly in Europe, a long range strategic perspective must include geographic location considerations. Brunswick's proximity to the North Atlantic shipping lanes makes it unique in this regard. On the entire East Coast only NAS Brunswick and Key West were identified as having "strategic military value" in the BRAC-93 Operational Air Station Military Value Matrix.

NAS Brunswick has no encroachment problems or concerns and none are projected in the foreseeable future. There are no environmentally sensitive areas and no endangered or threatened species that impair operations or limit the potential for future growth.

Maine already ranks third in the nation in negative economic impact resulting from reduced military spending. Closing NAS Brunswick would mean economic havoc in coastal Maine.

NAS Brunswick was not recommended for closure by either the Department of Defense or the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission during the 1991 or 1993 review process. All of the logic that justified the two previous decisions remains valid today.

NAS Brunswick is uniquely suited to making a substantial and flexible contribution to the changing defense needs of the United States well into the 21st century.

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Acknowledgements

Photography Courtesy of Tom Jones
Brunswick, Maine
and
U. S. Government

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and
Brunswick Coal & Lumber
Brunswick, Maine

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The NAS Brunswick Task Force was formed in anticipation of a new round of base closures, to update information previously submitted to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission by the citizens of the Greater Brunswick area. Our purpose is to ensure that all relevant information is presented to decision makers during the BRAC-95 process, and the information submitted is accurate, complete and verifiable.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The selection criteria for developing the BRAC-95 list will be the same as BRAC-93 set forth in DEPSECDEF memo dated 10 Dec 92. (IAW Section 2903 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended.)

2. The initial Force Structure plan used for analysis will be as submitted in the President's FY'95 Budget. A final plan will be provided by the Secretary of Defense.

3. There will be seven active VP squadrons, with nine P3C's each stationed on the East Coast and six on the West Coast. (Reduction to 13 squadrons will be accompanied by an increase to nine aircraft per squadron.)

4. The goal of the BRAC process is to achieve an optimum balance between Base Infrastructure and the projected Operational Force Structure; where feasible, eliminate base structure identified as excess; and, in the process, maximize the effectiveness of the total Force.

BACKGROUND

NAS Brunswick was originally built during the World War II era and was closed after the war ended. It was reopened in 1951 and since then has functioned primarily as a Master Long Range Maritime Patrol base with strong ties to NATO. During the early 1960's, the VP Force Structure consisted of 30 operational squadrons, 15 on each coast. Each squadron had 12 P2V or P5M aircraft. The Atlantic Fleet squadrons were home based at NAS Jacksonville (5), NAS NORFOLK (2), NAS PATUXENT RIVER (3) AND NAS BRUNSWICK (5). In the late 1960's the total number of VP squadrons was reduced to 24 (12 on each coast). Subsequently the East Coast squadrons were split evenly between NAS Jacksonville and NAS Brunswick (6 each). After Fleet introduction of the P-3 Orion commenced in

late 1962, the number of aircraft in each squadron equipped with P-3's was reduced to nine. The number of aircraft assigned to each P2V squadron remained at 12. The Brunswick squadrons commenced transitioning to the P-3 in 1967 and the last P2V left NAS Brunswick in 1970. Base loading at NASB (6 VP squadrons with 9 P-3's each) remained constant until 1991 when the total active VP Force was reduced to 20 squadrons, and one squadron at NASB was disestablished in the process. Nearly simultaneously, the number of aircraft per squadron was reduced from nine to eight. In 1992 the VP Force structure was further reduced to 18 squadrons, with two PACFLT squadrons disestablished.

In 1994 the structure was reduced to 16 squadrons, with one Jacksonville squadron and one PACFLT squadron disestablished. Currently NAS Brunswick has five operational VP squadrons with eight planes each and NAS Jacksonville has four.

NAS Brunswick was not nominated for closure in 1991 or 1993 by the Department of Defense and was not selected by the Defense Base Closure or Realignment Commission.

NAS BRUNSWICK IN BRIEF

NAS Brunswick is located 20 miles northeast of Portland on the relatively flat Maine seacoast. The main station occupies 3,091 acres, approximately half of which have been developed. There are 261 additional acres at the Topsham Annex, off-base military housing, a remote antenna site, plus 12,466 acres at the Redington Training Site (70 air miles, north, near Rangeley, Maine).

There are two parallel runways, 8,000 feet long and 200 feet wide, capable of operating all aircraft in the current or projected inventory. The inboard runway is fully instrument equipped. Current runway utilization, both IMC (instrument conditions) and VMC (visual conditions) is less than 50 percent of capacity. Ramp space (481,057 square yards) is sufficient to park 86 P-3 aircraft under normal operating conditions (using NAVFAC standards), 95 under surge operating conditions. A total of 253 P-3 aircraft could be parked under maximum surge conditions by using the outboard runway and a closed runway. There are five hangars, four of which can house 18 P-3 aircraft under normal conditions. The fifth (Hgr 2) is an older hangar, but can house one additional P-3 if required.

NAS Brunswick has a new state-of-the-art, 1.7 million gallon capacity, NATO-funded fuel storage facility.

Currently there are 3,134 military personnel and 791 civilians assigned to NASB.

Unencumbered airspace for training is abundantly available for use by Brunswick based P-3 flight crews including 35,420 square miles of overwater operating areas less than 15

minutes flight time from the base.

Built during World War II, NAS Brunswick has been continuously upgraded and modernized since it was reopened in 1951. Over \$87 million of major construction has been completed since 1979. Very few of the WW II structures remain.

In conclusion, NAS Brunswick is fully capable of supporting all mission and training requirements for the seven active duty East Coast maritime patrol squadrons with assets currently in place. No additional MILCON is required. Sufficient land and airspace are currently available to support significant expansion if required.

BASE LOADING

PEOPLE

The current total population of NAS Brunswick is 3,134 military and 791 civilians. These numbers include seven operating units (5 operational VP squadrons, one special projects squadron and COMPATWING 5 staff) plus 28 other activities ranging from medical and dental support to oceanography, Fleet Aviation Special Operations, etc.. See Enclosure 1 for detailed breakdown.

SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES

In addition to its primary mission of supporting the aviation squadrons and units assigned, NAS Brunswick currently supports 11 non-aviation activities (See enclosure 2 for listing). The most significant of these is SUPSHIPS BATH (Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath, Maine).

Bath Iron Works (7 miles from NASB) is the lead shipbuilder of the Arleigh Burke AEGIS destroyer program (DDG-51 class). It is expected that BIW will be building these ships over the next 10 years. Follow-on programs are likely.

Nucleus crews of ships under construction and Navy personnel assigned to SUPSHIPS staff receive berthing and messing support at NASB, plus medical, dental, some family housing, personnel support (including PAY), and a wide range of other "people support" activities common to most large military bases. At the present time there is an average of 250 ship's personnel in the area each month. That number increases to between 500 and 600 when a full crew is readying their ship for post delivery tests and crew qualification exams.

The Human Resources Office at NASB provides full personnel support for about 250 civil service personnel at SUPSHIPS BATH.

During AEGIS sea trials, NAS Brunswick provides ammunition and weapons, plus support for the visiting attack type aircraft and helicopters used by BIW and SUPSHIPS for combat systems trials.

AIRCRAFT

Current Inventory

<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Utilization</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
50	P3C	Maritime Patrol	5 Operational VP sqdns. See Note 1.
1	C12	Missions Support	
2	HHIN	Mission Support/SAR	See Note 2.

Note 1. Historically one third of the P-3 aircraft have been absent from NASB on a continuing basis due to squadron deployments and detachments.

Note 2. NAS Brunswick has the only all-weather maritime Search and Rescue helicopter in the State of Maine. During the past three years NASB helo crews have been directly responsible for saving the lives of six people and recovering four bodies. All were civilians.

CURRENT MAXIMUM CAPACITY

Parking

<u>Type</u>	<u>As Is</u>	<u>NAVFAC Standards</u>	<u>Surge</u>	<u>Max Surge</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
P-3	65	86	95	253 (note)	Existing ramp space is 481,057 sq. yds.

Note: Using outboard runway for parking.

Hangared

P-3	18	19			5 Hangars, 4 of which were built or modified for P-3's
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NASB has room for six squadrons at Brunswick. With two squadrons on deployment, this means NASB could house five P-3 squadrons at any one time, plus one reserve P-3 or C130 squadron, without any additional MILCON. If the number of Atlantic Fleet VP Squadrons is reduced to six, NASB could accommodate both the Reserve VP Squadron plus the Reserve C130 squadron in addition to all six of the operational VP squadrons.

BASE LOADING CONCLUSION:

The seven operational VP squadrons that are projected for the Atlantic Fleet can be accommodated at NAS Brunswick with existing facilities. No additional military construction is required.

HOUSING


Currently there are over 1,700 Navy housing (Government owned) units in Brunswick and Topsham, including about 756 family units and 960 bachelor units. During the past five years, more than \$15.7 million have been spent on renovations for family housing units. The bulk of these improvements (\$11.8 million) was just completed in 1993.

On the civilian side, the availability and affordability of housing in the Brunswick-Topsham Area have improved considerably over the last five years. A deepening recession has caused the cost of housing to fall about 7.5% since February 1989, according to the local multiple listing service. Since then, the number of available single family residences has increased 16%.

As jobs have become scarcer, more residents are leaving the area, thus causing a higher vacancy rate in rental housing, now about 10%. As a result, many landlords have lowered rents. There are more than 400 advertisements for rental units each day in the two daily newspapers serving the Brunswick area. There is ample housing available to accommodate increased military personnel.

MISSION TRAINING

Two of NAS Brunswick's greatest assets for full mission flight crew training are an abundance of available unencumbered air space and ample room for expansion.



Tom Jones Photo

From downtown Brunswick
looking East to NASB in background



Tom Jones Photo

From East Brunswick looking West
with NASB in background

FLIGHT TRAINING

NAS Brunswick is essentially a single type (P-3) air station. Except for occasional transients, VP flight crews have exclusive use of all of the facilities in the area. This unique feature significantly improves flight training efficiency and enhances flight safety. If OPTAR funds were available for fuel, pilot and flight crew training at NAS Brunswick could be doubled now.

The mission of VP squadrons requires that flight crews be trained in all-weather flying and be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Cold weather training/experience for both flight and ground crews is essential for wintertime operations from airfields in Norway, Iceland and Greenland. NAS Brunswick is the only Naval Air Station on the U.S. East Coast that provides ample opportunity to maintain readiness in this vital area, ensuring that crews hit the ground running when they deploy.

NAS Brunswick also operates the Small Point Mining Range located 14 miles southeast of the main station where splash points of practice mines are observed and recorded, and the Redington Training Facility located 70 air miles northwest where Tomahawk Missile Testing has been conducted. Other than funding, there are no limiting factors that would preclude greatly increased utilization of these facilities.

GROUND TRAINING

NAS Brunswick currently has in place and in service an Operational Flight Trainer (2F87) used for pilot training and proficiency and a Weapons Systems Trainer (2F 140) used for air crew training and proficiency. There are additional trainers for tactical training of Naval Flight Officers, Acoustic Sensor Operators, Electronic Warfare and Radar Operators.

NASB also supports the Atlantic Fleet Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) program conducted at the Redington Training Facility's 12,468 acre site in Rangeley, Maine. In addition, a new Aviation Physiology Training Facility was opened at NASB in November 1992.

All of these state-of-the-art trainers and facilities have the capacity to fully support the projected Atlantic Fleet VP Force (7 sqdns.) without new military construction or major additional funding.

ENCROACHMENT

NAS Brunswick currently has no encroachment problems or concerns nor are any anticipated in the foreseeable future.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Military spending cutbacks to date have had the third worst impact on Maine among all 50 states, trailing only California and South Carolina.

Closing NAS Brunswick would raise area civilian unemployment about 48%, from 8.2% to nearly 12%.

In the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market Area, NASB generates 14% of total employment, 10% of total income and 11% of purchases of all goods and services.

The 75-mile stretch of coastal Maine, from Bath to Kittery-Portsmouth, has already absorbed deep military employment reductions: 3,000 jobs lost at Bath Iron Works (only seven miles from NASB); 4,000 jobs lost already and more likely at Kittery Naval Shipyard, and 5,200 jobs lost with the closing of Pease Air Force Base, Portsmouth. That is a total of 12,500 jobs lost in coastal Maine, on top of another 5,200 jobs scheduled to be lost in northern Maine with the closing of Loring Air Force Base this fall.


These figures help explain why Maine's unemployment rate has run about 20% higher than the national average this year, and why State Planning Office economists predict "extremely slow economic growth" for the next 10 years. They help explain why the population of the Bath-Brunswick Labor Market Area (LMA) has dropped .3% since 1990. They emphasize the importance of NASB to the Bath-Brunswick area and to the entire coastal Maine region.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

There are no environmentally sensitive areas and no endangered or threatened species that impair operations or limit the potential for future growth.


While there are wetlands and other environmentally sensitive areas aboard NASB, these do not impair operations or limit the potential for future growth.

Between 1981 and 1983 several former hazardous waste disposal sites were identified aboard NAS Brunswick. The station was placed on the EPA's National Priorities list (Super Fund) and remediation actions were initiated. Construction is underway that will close five sites, and a contract to correct a "time critical" site is nearing completion. NAS Brunswick has an active and effective restoration program in place and is working closely with Federal and State regulators, local officials and citizens' groups to expeditiously remediate the identified areas. None of these areas have any impact on current operations nor would they limit future expansion.



Tom Jones Photo

From South of NASB,
looking Southward



Tom Jones Photo

Nearby Popham Beach
State Park

QUALITY OF LIFE

For a half century, Navy personnel have lived as our friends and neighbors. They have been welcomed into our schools, churches and every organization of our community. In turn, they have made unique contributions to our lives, as coaches to our children, as eager canvassers for our charities, as leaders in our churches and fraternal groups; in brief, as indispensable citizens.

They have helped create one of the safest communities in one of the least violent states in the country.

Like our children, the Navy's have benefited from enlightened and supportive school systems, learning in and contributing to, a wholesome environment enhanced by a pupil-teacher ratio of 14 to 1.

Like all of us, Navy personnel have convenient access to a broad range of health care resources and specialties, which are supported by a variety of health care programs, and hundreds of physicians, specialists and health care workers and eight hospitals, all within 25 miles of NASB.

Also close by are untold recreational opportunities made especially inviting by 3,500 miles of beaches and rugged Maine coastal coves, inlets, bays and nearby islands; hundreds of inland lakes and ponds, and, within two hours, the scenic mountains and lakes region with some of the best skiing, hiking, hunting and fishing in North America.

Within a half hour's drive of NASB are found extraordinary retail and cultural opportunities, in which virtually every major brand name is available, often at discount, and where scores of colleges, museums, art galleries, restaurants, historical sites, theaters, fairs, festivals and performances draw thousands daily.

Many of these opportunities are set in small villages that stretch up and down the coast, each with its own charm and special story. They are one reason why this region is often described as having a "village flavor and city flair," the best of both worlds.

The unique blending of the military, Bowdoin College and the civilian community is a principal reason why over 3,000 retired Navy personnel have returned to the Brunswick area.

In addition, the Brunswick - Topsham - Bath Military Community Council - - one of the few, if not the only, organizations of its kind in the country - - continues to work to integrate active duty personnel into the community.

STRATEGIC LOCATION

Freedom of the seas has been a vital U.S. national interest since the birth of our nation. Historically, our most important sea lines of communication have been between North America and Europe. Within the U.S., the closest operational military airfield to the North Atlantic shipping lanes is NAS Brunswick, Maine. Should Brunswick be closed there would be no operational Naval Air Station in the northeast quadrant of the United States and no military airfields in northern New England.

Because the future is so uncertain, particularly in Europe, a long range strategic perspective must include geographic location considerations. On the entire East Coast, only NAS Brunswick and Key West locations were classified as having "strategic military value" in the BRAC 93 Operational Air Station Military Value Matrix.

The Secretary of the Navy, in his 15 April 1991 statement to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, made the following point: "Given the limited coastal land available, any surrender of coastal property or near-coastal property containing entities that support coastal bases, can be expected to be irreversible. We believe that we must avoid divestiture of assets that may be lost forever, lest those assets be needed again."

CONCLUSIONS


NAS Brunswick is the only operational naval air station in the entire northeast quadrant of the United States. This fact, coupled with its singularly strategic location, makes it a vital link in the readiness posture of the Atlantic Fleet.

NAS Brunswick is fully capable of supporting all seven of the projected Atlantic Fleet VP squadrons without new military construction or major additional funding.

Available land, an abundance of unencumbered air space, no encroachment problems, strong community support and high quality of life all indicate NAS Brunswick has no significant constraints that would deter future expansion.

Closing NAS Brunswick would have a devastating effect on the economy of a state already under economic stress. This is due in large part to military spending cutbacks which to date have had the third worst impact in Maine among all 50 states, trailing only California and South Carolina.

Closure of NAS Brunswick would represent the loss of a strategically vital national defense asset, one which would likely be lost forever.



A Brunswick morning

Enclosure 1

**BASE LOADING
OPERATING/SUPPORTING**

Command Name	UIC	Location	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
NAS BRUNSWICK	60087	BRUNSWICK	38	533	607*

* AF (APPROPRIATED FUND) = 312 NAF (NONAPPROPRIATED FUND) = 295

SUB TOTAL 38 533 607

• Tenants residing on main complex (shore commands)

Tenant Command Name	UIC	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
FASOTRAGRULANT	0348A	5	71	6
NMCB-27	08867	0	5	0
(Reserves)		24	250	0
NAESU	30860	1	1	17
NAVMEDCLINIC	32615	10	35	24
NAVCOMTELDET	33242	2	50	12
NAVSECGRUDET	35293	1	12	0
CPW-5 TSC	35381	12	48	0
NAVY EXCHANGE	39222	1	3	0
FLTIMAGCENLANT	39358	0	4	0
NAVDENCLINIC	41775	3	8	2
ROICC	44214	4	0	10
PERSUPPDET	44343	1	15	13
NCIS	44525	0	0	5
NAVLEGSVOFFDET	45458	3	1	1
NAVSECGRUACT	45485	0	1	0
CPW-5 STAFF	53823	11	23	8
FLEET MARITIME PATROL MOCC	55619	2	10	0

SUB TOTAL 80 537 98

Activity: 60087 NAS Brunswick ME

Tenant Command Name	UIC	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
NETPMSA	68322	0	0	2
NLMOF	66458	1	22	3
CPW-5 SPINTCOMM	66848	0	2	0
HRO GROTON (BRUNSWICK BR)	68570	0	0	10
DIS	HS11BX	0	0	9
DRMO	SX1021	0	0	6
SUB TOTAL		1	24	30

• Tenants residing on main complex (homeported units).

Tenant Command Name	UIC	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
VP-23	09043	57	243	0
VP-11	09367	57	243	0
VP-26	09610	57	243	0
VP-10	09639	58	250	0
VP-8	09661	58	250	0
VPU-1 SPECIAL PROJECTS	53869	24	126	0
SUB TOTAL		311	1355	0

• Tenants residing in Special Areas (Special Areas are defined as real estate owned by host command not contiguous with main complex; e.g. outlying fields).

Tenant Command Name	UIC	Location	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
COMRESPATWINGLANT DET	39047	Topsham Annex	1	2	2
NAVY RESERVE RECRUITER	44768	Topsham Annex	0	2	0
DECA (COMMISSARY)	48876	Topsham Annex	0	4	36
SUB TOTAL			1	8	38

Activity: 60087 NAS Brunswick, ME


Tenant Command Name	UIC	Location	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian
4th MARINE DIV RIFLE COMPANY	80251	TOPSHAM ANNEX Active Reserve	1 7	8 189	0 0
USAMEDDAC (VET)	W1U5 34	Topsham Annex	1	5	1
US ARMY RECRUITING BATTALION (Reserves)	W14G R11	Topsham Annex	6 0	24 5	17 0
SUB TOTAL			15	231	18
TOTAL			446	2688	791
			3,134		


Enclosure 2

NAS BRUNSWICK

SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES

BATH	SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING, CONVERSION AND REPAIR (SUPSHIPS)
BATH	AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEMS SUPPORT GROUP (AEGISCSSGSSHP)
CUTLER	NAVAL COMPUTER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATION (NCTS)
WINTER HARBOR	NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY (NAVSECGRUACT)
CASTINE	NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORP UNIT, MAINE MARITIME ACADEMY (NROTCU)
AUGUSTA	MAINE AIR NATIONAL GUARD (MEARNG)
AUGUSTA	U.S. AIR FORCE - CIVIL AIR PATROL (USAF-CAP)
PORTLAND	MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING STATION (MEPS)
PORTLAND	NAVAL RESERVE CENTER (NRC)
MAINE	MAINE INLAND FISH AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT AND MARINE PATROL DEPARTMENT
NAGE	UNION LOCAL R1-77





NASB Strategic Value

- **Navy identified NASB in 1993 as having "strategic military value"**
 - ONLY NAS BRUNSWICK AND NAS KEY WEST, FLORIDA CALLED STRATEGIC BASES ON EAST COAST
- **NASB closest to North Atlantic shipping lanes**
 - RUSSIAN SUB THREAT STILL EXISTS -- JUST NOT DEPLOYED
 - NASB PROVIDES SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS FOR NORTHERN ATLANTIC
- **NATO's payment for infrastructure**
 - NATO HAS CONTRIBUTED OVER \$24 MILLION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AT NASB
 - THIS INCLUDES A SOON TO OPEN - STATE OF THE ART - 1.7 MILLION GALLON FUEL FARM
- **NASB only operational NAS north of Norfolk, VA**
 - ONLY OPERATIONAL MILITARY BASE IN NEW ENGLAND (NAS OR AIR FORCE BASE)

NASB Military Value

- **Expansion with little or no cost**
 - CAN ACCEPT TWO MORE SQUADRONS NOW--HANGAR SPACE AVAILABLE
 - COULD ACCEPT VQ-2 FROM ROTA, SPAIN SHOULD THE NAVY DECIDE TO MOVE THEM TO CONTINENTAL U.S.
 - OR COULD ACCEPT NAVY RESERVE P-3 SQUADRON OR C-130 SQUADRON
- **No encroachment problems**
 - NO ENDANGERED SPECIES PROBLEM
- **Proximity and expansion of training area**
 - ONLY 15 MINUTES FROM OVERWATER TRAINING AREAS
 - 35,000 SQUARE MILES OF OPERATING AREAS
 - CAN EXPAND USAGE BY 75 PERCENT
- **Provides surge capability**
 - CAN EXPAND FROM 65 AIRCRAFT TO 95 AIRCRAFT
- **Northern most base east of Mississippi River**

Quality of Life at NASB

- **SecDef/SecNav priority for the future**
 - ONE OF THE TOP THREE MILITARY PRIORITIES OF THE FUTURE
- **Abundant military & private housing available**
 - 1700 MILITARY UNITS AVAILABLE
 - \$10 MILLION SPENT ON UPGRADES
 - 10 PERCENT RENTAL VACANCY
 - 88 PERCENT COMMITTE TO WORK LESS THAN 10 MILE DRIVE
- **Superb school system - 14 to 1 student/teacher**
 - NEW HIGH SCHOOL CAPACITY 1400 -- ONLY 630 STUDENTS PRESENTLY ATTENDING
- **Health care in area expanding**
 - MARTINS POINT HEALTH CARE CENTER IS EXPANDING
 - TOWN OF BRUNSWICK IN FINAL PLANNING STAGE FOR A NEW HOSPITAL
- **Outstanding community relationship - military/civilian**
 - GREAT ENVIRONMENT FOR FAMILIES
 - CRIME IS VIRTUALLY NON EXISTANT

Economic Impact if NASB Closes

- **NASB represents 14% of local employment**
- **NASB represents 11% of all purchases**
- **Unemployment increases by 48%**
 - UNEMPLOYMENT IN BATH-BRUNSWICK AREA WOULD INCREASE FROM 8 PERCENT TO 11.8 PERCENT
- **Over 750 civilian jobs eliminated at NASB**
- **3100 military personnel re-assigned**

Cumulative Economic Impact on Maine with Drawdown and Closures

- **Maine - 3rd most impacted state in U.S.**
- **5845 direct/indirect jobs eliminated at Bath Iron Works**
CALIFORNIA 5500 DIRECT
SOUTH CAROLINA 2345 INDIRECT
75 MILE STRETCH FROM BRUNSWICK TO PORTSMOUTH HIT THE HARDEST
- **4676 direct/indirect jobs eliminated at Portsmouth Ship Yard**
2800 DIRECT
1876 INDIRECT
- **7598 direct/indirect jobs eliminated at Pease AFB**
4550 DIRECT
3048 INDIRECT
- **8016 direct/indirect jobs eliminated at Loring AFB**
4800 DIRECT
3216 INDIRECT

MAINE STATE PLANNING OFFICE PREDICTS "EXTREMELY SLOW GROWTH" FOR NEXT 10 YEARS

MISSION SLIDE


SITE SUPPORT ELEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1994 FOLLOWING THE
DISESTABLISHMENT OF MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 49 DETACHMENT C. OUR
PRIMARY MISSION AS LISTED IN THE SLIDE IS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTION AND
SUPPORT TO THE MARINE RESERVE UNITS AT THIS SITE. (MARINE AIR SUPPORT
SQUADRON 6 AND MARINE WING SUPPORT SQUADRON 474 DETACHMENT B).
ADDITIONALLY WE ADMINISTRATIVELY SUPPORT SEVEN SMALLER UNITS AND
VARIOUS MARINE PERSONNEL STATIONED IN THE BOSTON AREA.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS SITE SUPPORT ELEMENT




MISSION:

TO COORDINATE, SUPERVISE AND SUPPORT TRAINING OF ASSIGNED SMCR UNITS;
SUPERVISE PRE-MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS;
AND, UPON ORDER, ASSIST IN MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPORT OF
MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS



SITE SUPPORT ELEMENT



TRAINING

OBJECTIVE:

- READINESS FOR MOBILIZATION
- READINESS FOR COMBAT

PME:

- AS REQUIRED/REQUESTED

LEADERSHIP TRAINING:

- DAILY..ONGOING

MISSION TRAINING:


- DAILY..ONGOING

SKILL PROGRESSION TRAINING:

- DAILY..ONGOING

BST:


- AS SCHEDULED



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS SITE SUPPORT ELEMENT


TRAINING AREAS

ON SITE; SOUTH WEYMOUTH TRAINING AREAS
CAMP EDWARDS/OTIS AFB
FORT DEVENS



OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST

- ✓ BRAC 1995 SITE SURVEY RESULTS
- ✓ COMMUNITY RELATIONS
- ✓ ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS/INVOLVEMENT
- ✓ OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS
- ✓ SITE TRAINING SCHEDULE
- ✓ SITE INSPECTIONS(INDIVIDUAL AND SECTIONS)



FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

CURRENTLY OCCUPY:

BLDG 81

BLDG 140

BLDG 132

BLDG 82/HANGAR II

TOTAL SQFT REQUIREMENTS

33,800sqft as a reserve center


4,848 sqft of vehicle maintenance space

800 sqft armory space

**est cost of new construction

per 6 Apr DD form 1391:

\$5.4 million



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
SITE SUPPORT ELEMENT**



NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MASSACHUSETTS

VR-62 MISSION

1. Conduct Comprehensive Ground and Flight Training of Squadron Personnel to Support World-Wide Logistics Flights.
2. Provide Mission-Ready Aircraft Capable of Conducting Global Logistics Support Flights as Directed by Air Logistics Office.
3. Support CINC Requirement, CNARF Goal for Full Time VR C-130T Logistics Support in European and WESTPAC Theaters.

OUR VISION

**A professional, fully trained, and well
equipped Fleet Logistics Support
Squadron providing
World-Wide logistics support to the
fleet in a constantly changing arena
of operations through
Total Quality Leadership and
Personal Excellence.**

C-130T BASING

Strategically Located

- * VR-62 - South Weymouth
- * VR-55 - NAR Santa Clara
(Moffett Federal Field)
- * VR-54 - New Orleans
- * VR-53 - Washington DC

4 C-130T HERCULES TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

- PROVEN DESIGN, DELIVERED NEW
 - Newest technology upgrades.
- 25 TON AIRLIFT CAPABILITY
 - Quick rig for cargo pallets and/or passengers.
 - Ramp load heavy vehicles and equipment.
- RANGE: 3000 NM PLUS RESERVE.
 - Non-Stop quick reaction support of European theater operations.

* THE NAVYS' ONLY HEAVY LIFT AIRCRAFT ASSET.

RECENT HOMEPORT CHANGE

- * 01 APR 1994 VR-62 Completes Homeport Change to NAS South Weymouth, MA
- * 03 FEB 1995 VR-62 Receives First Two Production C-130T Transport Aircraft
- * PROJECTED
- * 31 AUG 1995 VR-62 Receives Third and Fourth C-130T Aircraft
- * 30 JUN 1996 VR-62 Completes C-130T Transition and is Fully Operational

SQUADRON MANPOWER RAPID GROWTH UNDERWAY

TOTAL BILLETS AUTHORIZED

OFFICER	AUTHORIZED	ONBOARD	
TAR	13	9	69%
SELRES	27	27	100%
ENLISTED	AUTHORIZED	ONBOARD	
TAR	116	111	96%
SELRES	142	56	39%

HOMEPORT CHANGE ISSUES

NAS South Weymouth to NAS Brunswick

PERSONNEL

- * PCS moves
 - 5 officers
 - 80 enlisted

- * Home Owners Assistance Program.
 - 15% of Squadron TAR Members are Homeowners.

- * 53% of Affiliated SELRES Members Reside Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth

* SELRES RETENTION

- Enlisted:	Onboard	Willing to Relocate
56	30	21%
- Officers:	Onboard	Willing to Relocate
27	27	100%

FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

HANGAR:

Hangar Bay	4 Aircraft Hangared	80,000 sq. ft.
Min Height	2 Aircraft Hangared 40' Entry/43'Bay	40,000 sq. ft.

SUPPORT WORKSPACES:


Offices, Workcenters, Equipment and Storage	24,000 sq. ft.
--	----------------

RAMP AREA

296,000 sq. ft.

VR-62 NOR'EASTERS

WORLD WIDE FLEET SUPPORT



Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

	<u>ACTIVE DUTY</u>	<u>RESERVES</u>
OFFICERS	8	67

ENLISTED	109	140
-----------------	------------	------------

Total Personnel 325

11 P-3C II AIRCRAFT

12 COMBAT AIRCREW

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

OPERATIONS

FY-95 - 2885 FLIGHT HOURS ALLOTTED

1500 HOURS FLOWN TO DATE

**710 HOURS(47%) TO DATE DEVOTED
TO CONTRIBUTORY SUPPORT**

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
VP-92

▶ **OUT CONUS DETS**

- ▶ Roosevelt Roads - 6 Weeks
85 Personnel / Counter Narcotics
- ▶ Roosevelt Roads - 5 Weeks
68 Personnel / Operations Support Democracy (Haiti)
- ▶ Rio DeJaniero - 2 1/2 Weeks
38 Personnel / UNITAS 35-94
- ▶ Roosevelt Roads - 2 Weeks
34 Personnel / Counter Narcotics
- ▶ 13 CREWS FOR 15 WEEKS = 1994 MAJOR COMMITMENTS

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
VP-92

▶ **CONUS OPERATIONS**

- ▶ Brunswick - 4 Surface Surveillance Flts
- ▶ Jacksonville - 2 Surface Surveillance Flts
- ▶ Brunswick - 4 Submarine Support Flts
- ▶ Jacksonville - 12 Torpex Events
(Actually 6 Flts / 12 Quals)
- ▶ Brunswick / Jacksonville - 3 ASW Exercise Events
- ▶ South Weymouth - Expendable Mobile ASW Training Target
(EMATT) Testing & Certification (1 Crew, 1 Week)

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92



Sigonella 95 Detachment Summary

Dates: 15 February - 08 April 1995

Crews: 6

Aircraft: 3

Total Personnel: 142

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

- ▶ **FLIGHT HOUR SUMMARY**

- ▶ **Sharp Guard - 371.8 Hrs. / 79 Flts.**

- ▶ **Noble Dina - 19.9 Hrs. / 4 Flts.**

- ▶ **Sharem III - 5.2 Hrs. / 1 Flt.**

- ▶ **Passex / TOO - 17.4 Hrs. / 3 Flts.**

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92



**MINUTEMAN
SAFETY/NATOPS**

1994 CNO SAFETY AWARD WINNER

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

MAINTENANCE TEAM

**1993 - WINNER OF GOLDEN WRENCH AWARD
FOR MAINTENANCE EXCELLENCE**

**1994 - COMRESPATWINGLANT RUNNER-UP
FOR GOLDEN WRENCH AWARD**

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
VP-92

▶ **1994 RESULTS**

- ▶ **Won an Unprecedented Four COMRESPATWINGLANT Crew of the Quarter Awards for Combat Aircrew Excellence.**
- ▶ **COMRESPATWINGLANT Bloodhound Award for Torpedo Delivery Excellence**
- ▶ **COMRESPATWINGLANT Runner-Up for Battle "E" for Combat Excellence**

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

1994 Sigonella Detachment



MISSION

Seamless intergration with active duty units in support of operational and exercise tasking.

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

VP-92

DEMOGRAPHICS: Reservists Who Live Within:

50 Miles of: NAS South Weymouth NAS Brunswick

111 of 225 26 of 225

100 Miles: 157 of 225 33 of 225

200 Miles: 201 of 225 173 of 225

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
VP-92

▶ **MISSIONS**

- ▶ **Designed Primarily for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)**
- ▶ **Increasing Emphasis on Multi-Mission Capabilities**
- ▶ **Over-the-Horizon Surveillance and Targeting**
- ▶ **Maritime Patrol**
- ▶ **Carrier Battle Group Support**
- ▶ **Interdiction Operations**
- ▶ **Littoral Warfare**

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER SOUTH WEYMOUTH

MISSION


TO PROVIDE A HIGHLY CAPABLE AND MOTIVATED FORCE READY TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF MOBILIZATION, CRISIS RESPONSE, AND PEACE TIME SUPPORT.

VISION

TO SET THE STANDARD OF EXCELLENCE FOR THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE BY BEING THE SAFEST, MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT NAVAL RESERVE ACTIVITY. WE WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST QUALITY SUPPORT SERVICE AND TRAINING TO OUR CUSTOMERS. OUR COMMITMENT OF QUALITY IS FOUNDED ON OPEN COMMUNICATIONS, INDIVIDUAL WORTH, TEAM SPIRIT, PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, INNOVATION, AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT.

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER

- A SURFACE RESERVE COMMAND



- SURFACE SHIPS, SUBMARINES, CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, SUPPLY SUPPORT, EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS FORCE (100% RESERVE).

- OUR UNITS BEGAN DRILLING AT NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH IN OCT 94.

- THE FULL TIME SUPPORT STAFF MOVED IN MARCH 95.

** MORALE AND QUALITY OF LIFE HAVE IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY.

OVERALL TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS

OTE 90%

OVERALL PERSONNEL FACTOR

MANNING 92%

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER

- ONLY SITE IN UNITED STATES THAT PHYSICALLY SHARES EXISTING ASSETS....WE USE NAS (AIR) SPACES
- AIR UNITS DRILL TWO(2) WEEKENDS (NAS)
- SURFACE UNITS DRILL TWO WEEKENDS (ONE WEEKEND OFFSITE)
- WE ARE THE LARGEST RESERVE CENTER IN NEW ENGLAND

WHERE WE DRILL (IDT)

BLUE WEEKEND (OFFSITE)

4TH MARDIV 1/25
(CAMP EDWARDS, MA)

CNCWU 201
(BOSTON, MA)

COMSUBGRU 2 DET 101
(GROTON, CT)

SUBLANTREL 101
(GROTON, CT)

NAVINFO NE BOS 101
(BOSTON, MA)

ONR TECH 201
(BOSTON, MA)

NSY PORTS NH 201
(PORTSMOUTH, NH)

DCMD BOSTON A101
(BOSTON, MA)

WHERE WE DRILL (IDT)

GOLD WEEKEND (LOCAL)

ONBOARD NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

INSHORE BOAT UNIT DET 201

MSCCFN SEA 101

ABFC D3A TANK FARM E101

NC SO NOREUR 301

NH LONG BEACH 301

VTU 1005R

NMCB 27 DET 1627

SSB

COMSCEUR 101


NDCL NEWPORT

SPAWAR HQ 101

NAVAL RESERVE CENTER
SOUTH WEYMOUTH



UNIT DRILL SITES



PORTSMOUTH, NH
(NSY PORTS 201)

BOSTON, MA
(NAVINFO BOSTON 101)
(CNCWU 201)
(DCMD BOSTON A101)
(ONR TECH 201)

SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MA
(IBU 21)
(VTU SUPPLY 0108)
(NDCL NPT 401)
(COMSCERU 101)
(ABFC SSB HQ 101)
(ABFC D3A TK FM E101)
(MSSCCF NSEA 101)
(NCSO ATLANTIC 301)
(NH LBCII 301)
(SPAWAR HQ 101)
(NMCB 27 DET 1627)

CAMP EDWARDS, MA
(4TH MARDIV 1/25)

GROTON, CT
(COMSUBGRU 2 D201)
(SUBLANTREL 101)

PERSONNEL

1. PTS (PART TIME SUPPORT) SELRES

- 226 OFFICERS

TOTAL - 569

- 343 ENLISTED

2. FTS (FULL TIME SUPPORT) TARS/USN

- 2 OFFICERS

TOTAL - 24

- 22 ENLISTED

*** NOTE THIS DOES INCLUDE MIUW SUPPORT 11 OFFICERS AND 51 ENLISTED NB PORTSMOUTH.**

FACILITY

*** 7,500 SF Building 19 (MOBILIZATION CELL)**

(1 Conference Room)

(1 Class Room)

***USE OF NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH (HANGER 1), 15,000 SF**

34 Class Rooms (CO - SHARE WITH NAS)

Large Drill Hall (HANGER DECK)

21 Unit/Staff Offices (CO - SHARE WITH NAS)

***TRAINING ASSESTS**

Comprehensive Training Library

Audio Visual Equipment

Professional Instructors

*** PROFESSIONAL, MOTIVATED FULL TIME SUPPORT STAFF**

BRAC 95

1. DOD RECOMMENDATION:

REESTABLISH NAVAL RESERVE CENTER, QUINCY, MA, AND CHANGE THE RECEIVING SITE SPECIFIED BY THE 1993 COMMISSION (1993 COMMISSION REPORT, PAGE 1-64) FOR CONSOLIDATION OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER, LAWRENCE, MA: NAVAL RESERVE CENTER, CHICOPEE, MA, AND NAVAL RESERVE CENTER, QUINCY, MA., FROM "NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MA." TO NAVAL RESERVE CENTER, QUINCY, MASSACHUSETTS."

BRAC 95

(WHERE PERSONNEL LIVE).

SELRES % OUTSIDE 50 MILES FROM NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH:

- TOTAL NUMBERS (110 - 507) (SEE NOTE 1)

21 % TOTAL

FTS (FULL TIME ACTIVE) % LIVING IN ABINGTON, ROCKLAND, OR SOUTH WEYMOUTH:

- TOTAL NUMBERS (2 - 24)

4 % TOTAL

NOTE 1 THESE NUMBERS DO NOT INCLUDE MIUW.

SELECTED RESERVE

ONSITE (NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH)

379

OFFSITE

190

BRAC 95

PLANNING ONLY

- IF DOD RECOMMENDATION ACCEPTED.
- RELOCATE EQUIP/FURNITURE (OCT 97)
- REHAB 85 SEA ST. QUINCY, MA.

85 SEA STREET

- APPROX 35,000 SQ FT
- BUILT 1957

CURRENT SITE

- NRC SOUTH WEYMOUTH (LOCATED NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH)

SUPPORTED BY MED/DEN CLINIC

SUPPORTED BY PERSONNEL SUPPORT DETACHMENT (PSD)

SUPPORTED BY BILLETING/GALLEY

SUPPORTED BY RECRUITING

SUPPORTED BY MWR/FITNESS FACILITIES

BUILDING 17 - 7,500 SQ FT - MOBILIZATION CELL, FTS OFFICES, COMPUTER/STAFF SUPPORT.

CO - SHARE

HANGER 1 - 15,000 SQ FT - CLASSROOMS, UNIT SPACE, DRILL DECK

* QUALITY OF LIFE

- NEX

- BASE HOUSING

REDUCED OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL RESERVE CENTER.

POSSIBLE SITE

(DOD RECOMMENDATION)

- NRC SOUTH WEYMOUTH RETURN TO QUINCY
 - REHAB BUILDING (\$2.5 MILLION REHAB)
 - INCREASE MED/DEN COSTS
 - INCREASE BILLETING COSTS
 - INCREASE MEAL COSTS
 - PERSONNEL SUPPORT DETACHMENT ???

QUALITY OF LIFE

- NO EXCHANGE (CLOSEST NAVY NEWPORT)
- NO BASE HOUSING
- NO COMMISSARY
- NO MWR FACILITIES

*** INCREASE OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL RESERVE CENTER.**

**OUR CNCWU UNIT SUPPORTED
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY - HAITI
FROM OCT 94 TO DEC 94. MOBILIZED 17
INDIVIDUALS FOR 3 MONTHS.**

MISSION BY UNIT

NMCB 27: The mission of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 27 is to provide highly skilled construction support to the Atlantic Fleet and active Seabee units. Through rigorous training, NMCB-27 maintains a high readiness posture, able to deploy in 42 days. The reservists of NMCB-27 deliver high quality, cost effective construction in a rapidly deployable, self sustaining mode. (O-7 E-97)

NSY PORTSMOUTH 201: Naval Reserve Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, NH 201 provides Engineering Duty Officers and Warfare qualified officers trained to fill in behind their active duty counterparts in support of shipyard projects. These reserve officers serve as Ship Superintendents, Planning and Estimating Superintendents, Design Superintendents, ship type representatives, senior Department Heads and senior repair management personnel. The unit provides outgoing contributory support with unit Officers replacing active duty watches as ship safety superintendents for shipyard weekend work. The unit also provides services in the areas of environmental and facilities engineering in direct support of shipyard needs. (O-8)

CNCWU 201: Composite Naval Coastal Warfare Unit 201 is a joint Navy/Coast Guard expeditionary command created to train, mobilize and deploy a Harbor Defense Command in support of regional contingencies. Manned by 45 select reservists, the unit is prepared to provide Naval Coastal Warfare defense and security of ports used in support of United States or United Nations sponsored military, humanitarian or civil relief operations anywhere in the world. (O-15 E-30)

INSHORE BOAT UNIT 21: The mission of Inshore Boat Unit 21 is to provide a rapidly deployable, armed, small boat capability to support Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Mine Search Units, Mobile Dive and Salvage Units and other expeditionary warfare forces operating in littoral regions. Primary mission tasking is to directly support Naval Coastal Warfare, Port Security and Harbor Defense objectives. The unit is also provides Security Support during Maritime Force Pre-positioning, Joint Logistics Over the Shore, Assault Follow-on Echelon Security, Submarine Security and mission support for active and reserve MIUW, EOD, MSU and MDSU operations. (O-2 E-42)

NH LONG BEACH 301: Naval Hospital Long Beach 301's primary mission is to mobilize to the Naval Hospital Long Beach, California to augment that facility's medical treatment staff. Its secondary mission is to provide contributory support to the Branch Medical Clinic South Weymouth. All fourteen of the unit's personnel are medical treatment providers. Current members offer specialty expertise and services in Hematology, Clinical Psychology, Emergency Nursing, Intensive Care Nursing, Neonatal Nursing, Operating Room Technology, Laboratory Technology, Intravenous Therapy and Emergency Medical Technology. (O-10 E-4)

COMSCEUR 101: The mission of Military Sealift Command Europe 101 is to mobilize trained individuals, to rapidly expand Military Sealift Command's capabilities for Strategic Sealift. The unit supports national security objectives by providing common-user sealift and Maritime Prepositioning Force to meet the needs of the Department of Defense in times of war or national emergency. When activated, MSCEUR 101's 35 reservists augment as full-fledged members of the Commander Military Sealift Command Europe's strategic mobility sealift team, providing the capacity to rapidly deploy and sustain military forces wherever and whenever needed, for as long as operational requirements dictate. MSCEUR 101 accomplishes its vital role by setting up and operating MSC outposts throughout the world on short notice, scheduling and monitoring operations of dry cargo ships and tankers, chartering ships for sealift and coordinating the repair and maintenance of MSC controlled ships. (O-18 E-17)

SSB: Naval Reserve Aviation Boatswain Fuel Chief D31 Supply Support Battalion Headquarters 101 has a primary mission of providing tailored supply support in an expeditionary environment. The unit provides support at an Advanced Logistical Support Site, a Forward Logistics Site or a host command as a functional supply department. When mobilized, the unit establishes, provides and maintains supply support operations on a 24-hour continuous basis within the theater of operations. The 42 members of the unit are responsible for managing budget and finances, customer services, local delivery of cargo, providing basic materials handling equipment and transporting equipment and personnel. (O-5 E-37)

ONR SCI & TECH DET 201: The mission of Naval Reserve Office of Naval Research Science and Technology Detachment 201 is to provide and maintain a cadre of Naval Reserve personnel ready for mobilization. The eleven, uniquely qualified members of the unit are experts in their scientific and technical fields and experienced in Fleet operations and technical project management. The unit is capable of supporting the Office of Naval Research with peacetime contributory support or acceleration of science and technology during periods of recall in the event of crisis response, regional conflict or global war. (O-10 E-1)

NCSO NOREUR 101: The mission of Naval Control of Shipping Atlantic 101 is to provide for the safe passage of merchant ships during a contingency situation or in time of war or national emergency. NCSO LANT 101 trains for mobilization by classroom and exercise training in the direction and protection of merchant shipping. The unit's 38 personnel are divided, for mobilization purposes, into three Naval Liaison Teams and one Shipping Control Team. (O-27 E-9)

DCMD BOSTON A101: Defense Contract Management District Northeast Boston A101's mission is to augment the Defense Logistics Agency in providing Department of Defense branches with contract management support. In addition, DCMDN contributes support in the fields of Quality Assurance, Production and Transportation. The unit is comprised of eleven Navy Officers, two Air Force Officers and one Army Officer drilling at DCMDN Headquarters in Boston, MA. (O-11)

MSCCFNSEA 101: The mission of Military Sealift Command Central Facility North Sea 101 is to provide for the sealift capability of strategic and wartime requirements and to establish offices for the logistic support of MSC shipping when and where necessary. The 51 members of MSCCFNSEA 101 augment Commander Military Sealift Command Europe, which provides logistical support in the area of sea transportation to sustain US Forces in Europe, North Africa, and Southwest Asia. Unit members are trained to respond to situations within and outside their specialties in any port within the area of responsibility of COMSCEUR. (O-22 E-29)

ABFC D3A TK FM E101: Naval Reserve Aviation Boatswain Fuel Chief D3A Tank Farm E101's mission is to provide advanced base, quick response, multi-mission support to the active operating forces by augmenting fixed fuel facilities and/or establishing and operating expeditionary fuel facilities. When mobilized, the unit is charged with setting up, operating and maintaining a 40,000 gallon storage and dispersing system to fuel high speed aircraft. The storage system consists of four 10,000 gallon bladder storage containers which can be transported by air without the use of material handling equipment. (O-2 E-21)

COMSUBGRU 2 DET 101: Naval Reserve Commander Submarine Group Two Detachment 101 is a staff unit assigned to support Commander Submarine Group Two. In time of war or other national emergency, the detachment augments the active duty staff in support of their missions. The 26 reserve members of the unit provide significant peacetime support to the Group's Public Affairs Officer and on special projects assigned by COMSUBGRU TWO. (O-7 E-19)

SPAWAR HQ 101: Space and Naval Warfare Headquarters 101's mission is to provide fully qualified individuals to augment Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in the event of national emergency. The unit provides ongoing long term technical support for the Commercial Satellite Communications System Acquisition Program. SPAWAR HQ 101's 25 members, drawn from the surface, submarine, air and intelligence communities, accomplish this through project management support using their technical and professional backgrounds. The objective is to provide Naval Commanders with a decisive warfare advantage through the development, acquisition and life cycle management of effective and responsive undersea, terrestrial and space sensors; information transfer systems; information management systems; and systems for the denial of these capabilities to opposing forces. (O-16 E-9)

SUBLANTREL 101: The mission of Naval Reserve Submarine Force Atlantic Religious Support 101 is to train chaplains for mobilization within the Submarine Force, Atlantic and to provide contributory support to the active duty chaplains of Submarine Group Two. The chaplains of NR SUBLANT REL 101 provide spiritual ministry, pastoral care, religious programming and advisory leadership to SUBLANT and SUBGRU TWO. The unit operates in support of the free exercise of religion for all Sea Service personnel and their families in order to promote hope, community, moral leadership and the advancement of Navy Core Values. (O-5)

4TH MARDIV 1/25: The mission of the Naval Reserve, Fourth Marine Division, First Battalion, Twenty-Fifth Marines Headquarters and Service Company is to staff a Corpsmen Battalion Aid Station and provide corpsmen to directly support the Battalion Weapons Company. The 33 reservists from the unit comprise one section of a medical platoon and provide medical and religious support to two companies of a Marine Corps Reserve Battalion. The unit provides direct medical care in support of combat operations, as well as medical administration, routine medical services and preventive medicine. The unit is a Priority One deploying unit and its members are ready to deploy with the Marines on short notice. (O-4 E-29)

NAVINFO NE 101: The mission of the Naval Reserve Navy Office of Information New England 101 is to provide public affairs training, guidance and support to active duty and reserve commands worldwide. In maximizing their mobilization readiness, the twelve officers and four enlisted members of NAVINFO 101 use the tools of media relations, special events, community relations and internal communications to deliver the Navy message to a wide range of public audiences. The unit's mobilization site is the active duty Navy Office of Information, located on Boston's historic waterfront. (O-12 E-4)

NDCL NEWPORT 401: The primary mission of NR NDCL NPT 401, is to provide reinforcement and expansion of the Navy Dental Corps to meet crucial requirements for support to sustain combat operations. Manning numbers include two officer billets and three dental technicians. (O-2 E-3)



Naval Air Station, South Weymouth History

- ▶ 1942 - NAS South Weymouth Established as a Lighter-Than-Air Facility
- ▶ 1946 - Shea Field Dedicated
- ▶ 1949 - Deactivated - Placed in "Caretaker" Status
- ▶ 1953 - Reactivated as a Reserve Naval Air Station
- ▶ 1961 - Last Operational Blimp Unit Disestablished
- ▶ 1990-91 - Desert Shield/Storm
NS Rota & Medical Units Recalled
- ▶ 1992 - Celebrated 50th Anniversary


Naval Air Station, South Weymouth BRAC

- ▶ 1990 - Manpower Authorization Reduced
- ▶ 1991 - Station On Navy's Closure List But Not On DoD BRAC Recommendation List
- ▶ 1992 - Mass. Congressional Delegation Asked SECNAV To Use BRAC Process vs Navy Closure
- ▶ 1993 - Station On Navy / DoD Closure Recommendation List
 - BRAC Removes Station From List
- ▶ 1994 - NAS Manpower Document Reinstated
- ▶ 1995 - Station On Navy / DoD Closure Recommendation List


Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
Family Service Center

- ▶ Spouse Employment Assistance
- ▶ Transition Assistance , Veteran's Benefits
- ▶ Relocation Assistance (Outbound & Inbound)
- ▶ Exceptional Family Member (EFM) Program
- ▶ Career Counseling for Separating Military & Family Member
- ▶ Immigration & Naturalization
- ▶ Workshops for Resumes/Job Search/Interviewing Skills
- ▶ Educational Services , Computer Training
- ▶ Counseling - Individual & Family , Self Improvement Programs
- ▶ SHARE Program (Co-Op Food Purchase / Community Service)


Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Station Map



Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Installation Restoration (IR) Sites




Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Wetlands




BRAC32 CH3

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Quincy Housing Areas Squantum Gardens / Naval Terrace



Naval Air Station, South Weymouth No Man's Land Island



Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
BACKGROUND

- ▶ **History**
- ▶ **BRAC**
- ▶ **Family Service Center**
- ▶ **Station Map**
- ▶ **Installation Restoration Sites**
- ▶ **Wetlands**
- ▶ **Quincy Housing**
- ▶ **No Man's Land Island**

Naval Air Station
South Weymouth, Massachusetts

Command Presentation

***"Home of the
Naval Reserve
in New England"***

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

Briefing Contents

- Mission
 - Commands
 - Reserve Units
 - Personnel
 - Facilities
 - Construction
 - Operating Costs
-
- Environmental
 - Quality of Life
 - Community Relations
 - Community Support
 - Demographics
 - Fleet Support

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
Mission

Current Mission:

"To train Naval Reservists for their mobilization assignments with the active operating forces of the United States Navy; and to provide administrative coordination and logistic support for the tenant Naval Reserve Force squadrons and commands."

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Tenant Commands (Aviation)

- ▶ VP-92 Eleven - P-3C Orion

- ▶ VR-62* Four - C-130T Hercules
 - * Two C-130T On Board
 - Two to be Delivered in August 95

- ▶ Naval Air Logistics Office (NALO)
 - One - UC-12B Super King Air 200

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Tenant Commands (Non-Aviation)

- Naval Reserve Center

1000 plus

- Marine Site Support Element

- Personnel Support Activity Detachment

- Medical/Dental Clinic

- Defense Courier Service

- Reserve Intelligence

Programs Office

- Naval Training Meteorology and
Oceanography Detachment

- Naval Reserve Recruiting

- Human Resource Office Groton

- Resident Officer in Charge
of Construction

- Naval Criminal Investigative
Service

- Joint Personal Property
Shipping Office

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

Naval Air Reserve Units

(Drill On - Site)

- | | |
|---|---|
| - USS John F. Kennedy
CV-67 (2-Units) | - Naval Air Systems
Command (2-Units) |
| - Naval Station, Rota
Spain Support Unit | - Naval Meteorology and
Oceanography Reserve Activity Unit |
| - Naval Air Station, South
Weymouth Support Unit | - Fleet Support Squadron
Component Unit |
| - Medical Marine Air
Group Support Unit | - Mobilization Assignment
Control Group Unit |
| - Medical / Dental
Support Unit | - Volunteer Training
Unit (2-Units) |

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
**Naval Air Reserve Units
(Intelligence Units - Drill On-Site)**

- ▶ Atlantic Intelligence Command
2-Units
- ▶ Office of Naval Intelligence Unit
- ▶ Reserve Intelligence Area Commander Unit
- ▶ Intelligence Volunteer Training Unit
- ▶ Naval Security Group Unit
- ▶ Intelligence Specialist "A" School

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Naval Air Reserve Units (Drill Off-Site)

- ▶ Tactical Support Center, NAS Brunswick
(2-Units)
- ▶ Defense Plant Representative Office Sikorsky Unit
- ▶ Defense Plant Representative Office GE Lynn Unit
- ▶ Defense Plant Representative Office Grumman Unit
- ▶ Naval Intelligence Service Regional Office Unit
- ▶ Office of Naval Intelligence Unit

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Personnel

As of 3/15/95	Active	SELRES Drill On / Off	CIV
- NAS	442	936 / 154	275
- Tenant			
Aviation Squadrons	233	329 / 0	0
Naval Reserve Center	24	379 / 190	0
Other Non-Aviation	86	0 / 0	30
Marines	67	393 / 0	0
TOTAL	852	2,381	305
- New England Demographics		- No Airlift Support Required For Any Drilling Unit	

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Facilities

- ▶ 1,442 Acres. Overlies towns of Weymouth, Rockland & Abington. Adjoins Hingham.
- ▶ 2 Hangars: Hgr. 1 - 54,000 sq.ft.
Hgr. 2 - 38,400 sq.ft.
- ▶ 2 Runways: Rwy. 8/26 - 6,000' x 150'
Rwy. 17/35 - 7,000' x 200'
- ▶ No Man's Island Target Range
 - Aerial Bombing & Strafing (Unmanned)
 - Restricted Area R - 4105
 - 53 n.m. South of NAS South Weymouth
 - 2.7 n.m. South of Martha's Vineyard Island

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Facilities (Continued)

- ▶ Family Housing - 365 Units in Three Locations
 - South Weymouth - 165
 - Quincy: Squantum - 57, Naval Terrace - 48
 - Otis ANGB - 95 (Cape Cod)
- ▶ BOQ - Capacity: 114
- ▶ BEQ (3 Buildings) - Capacity: 220
 - Runner-up for "Innkeeper of the Year" Award.
 - Recently Received Four Star Rating.
- ▶ Galley - Full Service - Capacity: 165
 - Semi Finalist for NEY Award.
- ▶ MWR - Fitness Center / Bowling Alley
 - Youth / Child Development Centers
 - Auto Hobby / Rental Centers
 - 2 All Hands Clubs
- ▶ Medical / Dental Clinic
- ▶ Navy Exchange

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
Facilities (Continued)
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Dept. - 44, 768 sq.ft.

Production Control

Quality Assurance

Powerplants

- T-56 Engines
- Propellers
- Aux. Power Units

Avionics

- Radios
- Navigation
- Batteries

Aviator's Equipment

- Parachutes
- Survival Gear

Maintenance Admin

Materials Control

Airframes

- Inspections
- Hydraulics
- Painting

Support Equipment

- Tow Tractors
- Starting Units
- Deicers

Armament Equipment

- Bomb Racks

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Facilities (Continued) Weapons / Magazines

- ▶ 3 Active Magazines - 4,164 sq.ft.
 - Bldgs. 92, 93 & 94
 - 1,388 sq.ft. each

- ▶ 2 Inactive Magazines - 1,492 sq.ft.
 - Bldg. 51 - 1,352 sq.ft.
 - Bldg. 52 - 140 sq.ft.

- ▶ Weapons Build-Up
 - Missiles
 - Mines

- ▶ Small Arms
 - Procurement
 - Storage
 - Maintenance

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Facilities (Continued) Utilities

- ▶ **Electrical Distribution System:**
 - Transmission Line Supplied by Mass Electric
 - 23,000 Volts Switching Station
 - 13,800 Volts Through Two Main Distribution Transformers
 - Emergency Generator Backup for Base Primary Circuits
 - Base Housing Supplied by Separate Power Grid

- ▶ **Steam Production and Distribution:**
 - 4 Oil Burning Boilers
 - Capacity 30,000 - 42,000 lb/hr
 - Provides 22 Buildings Within Industrial Area of Base

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Facilities (Continued) Utilities

- ▶ **Water:**
 - Supplied by Town of Weymouth
 - Source 10" and 8" Water Main
 - Elevated Steel Water Tank Contains 250,000 gal.
- ▶ **Sanitary Sewer:**
 - All Station Sewage Treated at Metropolitan Sewage Treatment Plant
- ▶ **Telecommunications System:**
 - Served by Dimension 2000 Analog Switch
 - 499 Lines and 506 Touch Tone Stations
 - Fiber Optic Lines to be Laid Summer '95 - In work
- ▶ **Natural Gas System:**
 - Limited Gas Distribution to Family Housing
 - Supplied by Boston Gas

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Recent Construction

Project	Status
Air Traffic Control Tower / GCA	Framed
FAA Weather Radar	Complete
New PSD	Complete
New Reserve Center	Complete
Fire Station Addition	75% Complete
AIMD HVAC	Complete
Navy Exchange Store Rehab	In Progress

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
Pending Construction

Project	Status
Apron / Runway / Hangar Repairs	On Hold
Training Dept. Renovation	On Hold
Flight Line Security	On Hold
Navy Exchange Gas Station	On Hold
Rehab Marine Portion of Hangar 2 to Accommodate Lawrence, MA Unit	On Hold

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Operating Costs

	FY-94 (Millions)	FY-95 (Millions)
CIVPERS - Air Station (Appropriated)	7.8	8.4
Base Communications	0.3	0.2
Flight Operations	6.4	7.4
Quarters	0.3	0.1
Base Operating Support	2.5	2.6
Morale, Welfare & Recreation	0.2	0.2
Utilities	1.0	1.1
Environmental	0.5	0.3
Maintenance, Repair of Property	1.3	1.0
TOTAL	20.3	21.3

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Environmental

- ▶ New Department
- ▶ National Priority List
- ▶ Installation Restoration Program (8 Sites)
- ▶ Central Distribution Center / HAZMART
- ▶ Recycling Program

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Environmental

- ▶ **Clean Air Act (CAA)**
 - NAS South Weymouth is in a Serious Non-Attainment Area for Ozone and is in Full Compliance With the 1990 CAA Amendments

- ▶ **Clean Water Act (CWA)**
 - NAS South Weymouth is in Full Compliance
 - NAS South Weymouth is Permitted by the EPA

- ▶ **Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)**
 - NAS South Weymouth is in Full Compliance
 - NAS South Weymouth Receives Its Water From Local Municipality Which is Regulated by the EPA and State

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth

Quality of Life

- ▶ Medical / Dental Clinic
 - Health Care Programs
 - Facility Expansion Needed

- ▶ Housing
 - Quincy / NAS Rehab
 - BEQ Rehab

- ▶ Family Service Center
 - Transition Assistance Program for Massachusetts

- ▶ Morale, Welfare and Recreation
 - Nor'Easter Club Rehab
 - Information, Tickets, and Travel Program
 - Youth / Child Development Center Upgrade
 - Annual Air Show

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Community Relations

- ▶ Political Interface
- ▶ South Shore Chamber of Commerce
- ▶ Local Business Economics

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Community Support

- ▶ Boston Edison / MEMA MOU
- ▶ Firefighting / Ambulance
- ▶ MBTA / Old Colony Railroad
- ▶ Boy Scouts / Sea Cadets


Naval Air Station, South Weymouth Demographics

Concentration of Reservists Who Drill at NAS

Within 50 miles	574
50 to 100 miles	219
Outside 100 miles	298*

Total Drilling Population: 1,091

DEMOGRAPHICS BY STATE PERSONNEL HOME SITES



STATES: CH3

Fleet Support

NAS South Weymouth Reserve Units / Individuals

- ▶ FY 91/92 Desert Shield / Desert Storm 32,000 Man Days

- ▶ FY 93 Multiple Worldwide Support Missions

- ▶ FY 94 Same as FY 93

- ▶ FY 95 Currently Supported Operations Include:
 - UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti
 - SOUTHERN WATCH, Saudi Arabia
 - SHARP GUARD, Adriatic Sea / Bosnia
 - DRUG INTERDICTION, Caribbean Sea
 - FLEET EXERCISES, Mediterranean Sea

Schedule of Events

1600 - 1625 NAS South Weymouth Command Presentation

1625 - 1650 Civilian Community / Congressional Presentations

1650 - 1800 Mr. Kling Windshield and Walking Tour of NAS.
The Tour Will Visit NRC South Weymouth, Aircraft
Intermediate Maintenance Department, VP-92,
VR-62, and Marine Detachment.

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth
Welcome Aboard
2 June 1995

Base Realignment and Closure
Commissioner S. Lee Kling

Commanding Officer
Captain R. A. Duetsch

Executive Officer
Commander S. A. Beaton

SUMMARY

1. Closure of NAS BRUNSWICK ME is a non-starter because it removes the only operational Naval Air Station in the Northeastern U.S. AND compares Reserve Air Stations with Operational Air Stations.
2. Closure of NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA is predicated on faulty COBRA Data that does not reflect all significant MILCON and associated recurring costs.
3. Closure of NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA permanently removes the only Naval Air Reserve presence from the Northeastern U.S.,
 - presuming reservists will be able to consistently travel 150 miles to NAS BRUNSWICK ME during winter months.
 - presuming NAS BRUNSWICK ME can provide berthing for commuting reservists.
 - presuming no loss of unit readiness and mission capability.
4. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA does not remove a significant Naval Air Reserve presence from the Southeastern U.S. because NAS JACKSONVILLE FL, home to many reserve units, will remain.
5. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA did not consider possibility of relocating reserve units to NAS JACKSONVILLE FL
6. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA with transfer of reserve assets to NAS JACKSONVILLE FL
 - provides significant reserve support already in place
 - retains facilities to conduct airlift of reservists preserving unit retention
 - avoids reservists commuting by car during severe winter weather
 - provides for ability to reinsert Naval units similar to the recommendation to place Marine Corps Reserve Units into ARNG Selfridge (formerly NAF Detroit).
 - provides additional population from which to recruit reserves for units historically undermanned.
7. Closure of NAS ATLANTA GA improves overall Military Value of Naval Reserve Air Stations. All other options degrade Military Value.