Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs

July 16, 2009
Summary

The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world's most capable air-to-air combat aircraft. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a total of 187 have been procured through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009.

The administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s proposed FY2010 budget does not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010. The administration argues, among other things, that 187 F-22s will be sufficient in conjunction with other U.S. tactical aircraft, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), to meet operational demands for U.S. tactical aircraft.

Supporters of the F-22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and subsequent years. They argue, among other things, that Air Force officials have stated that 243 to 250 F-22s would be needed to meet operational demands at a moderate level of operational risk.

The issue of F-22 procurement has emerged as one of the highest-profile items of debate on the FY2010 defense budget. The White House on July 13 vowed to veto any bill that supports the acquisition of F-22s beyond the 187 that have been procured through FY2009.

The issue for Congress is whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, or reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years. Additional issues for Congress for the F-22 program include the reliability and maintainability of in-service F-22s, the F-22 modernization program, and the potential sale of F-22s to Japan.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), recommends authorizing $368.8 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011. The report recommends $12.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service F-22s—a reduction of $338.0 million from the administration’s request. Section 131 of the bill would repeal a provision limiting the obligation of FY2009 F-22 advance procurement funding. Section 132 would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan for the preservation and storage of unique tooling related to the production of hardware and end items for F-22s. Section 1237 would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on issues relating to the potential sale of F-22s to Japan.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), recommends authorizing $1.75 billion for the procurement of seven F-22s in FY2010. Section 122 of the bill would repeal a provision limiting the obligation of FY2009 F-22 advance procurement funding. Section 123 would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on issues relating to the potential sale of F-22s to Japan.

On July 16, 2009, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release stating that the subcommittee had completed its markup of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill. The release stated that the bill as marked by the subcommittee up includes an additional $369 in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s.
Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

Background .................................................................................................................. 2

The F-22 In Brief ......................................................................................................... 2

Program Origin and Milestones.................................................................................... 3

F-22 Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown................................. 4

Contractors .................................................................................................................. 4

Employment ................................................................................................................ 4

Production Line Shutdown ......................................................................................... 5

Procurement Quantities ............................................................................................... 6

Planned Total Procurement Quantity ......................................................................... 6

Annual Procurement Quantities .................................................................................. 8

Costs and Funding ....................................................................................................... 8

Estimated Total Program Cost and Prior-Year Funding ............................................... 8

Legislated Limits on F-22 Costs .................................................................................. 9

FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s .................................................................. 10

FY2010 Funding for Procurement of F-22s .................................................................. 11

F-22 Modernization Program ....................................................................................... 11

GAO Assessment of F-22 Program .............................................................................. 12

Potential Sale of F-22s to Japan .................................................................................... 13

Issues For Congress .................................................................................................... 15

Procuring Additional F-22s .......................................................................................... 15

OSD and Air Force Views ............................................................................................ 15

Summary of Arguments ............................................................................................... 18

Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s ....................................................... 22

July 10, 2009, News Report .......................................................................................... 22

Rebuttals to July 10, 2009, News Report ..................................................................... 24

F-22 Modernization Program ....................................................................................... 30

Potential Export to Japan .............................................................................................. 31

Summary of Arguments ............................................................................................... 31

Additional Discussion of Factors to Consider .............................................................. 33

Legislative Activity in 2009 .......................................................................................... 37


Request ......................................................................................................................... 37

House ........................................................................................................................... 37

Senate ............................................................................................................................ 39

FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill ............................................................................... 42

House ........................................................................................................................... 42

FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32) ................................ 42

Request ......................................................................................................................... 42

House ........................................................................................................................... 42

Senate ............................................................................................................................ 42

Conference .................................................................................................................. 43
Tables
Table 1. Planned Total Number of Production F-22s ................................................................. 7
Table 2. Annual Procurement Quantities of Production F-22s .................................................. 8
Table 3. FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s ............................................................... 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................. 43
Introduction

The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world’s most capable air-to-air combat aircraft. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a total of 187 have been procured through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009.

The 24 F-22s procured in FY2009 include 20 aircraft that were fully funded in the FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) and four additional aircraft whose procurement cost was recently completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009).1

The administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s proposed FY2010 budget does not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010. The administration argues, among other things, that 187 F-22s will be sufficient in conjunction with other U.S. tactical aircraft, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), to meet operational demands for U.S. tactical aircraft.

Supporters of the F-22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and subsequent years. They argue, among other things, that Air Force officials have stated that 243 to 250 F-22s would be needed to meet operational demands at a moderate level of operational risk.

The issue of F-22 procurement has emerged as one of the highest-profile items of debate on the FY2010 defense budget. The White House on July 13 vowed to veto any bill that supports the acquisition of F-22s beyond the 187 that have been procured through FY2009.2

The issue for Congress is whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, or reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years. Additional issues for Congress for the F-22 program include the reliability and maintainability of in-service F-22s, the F-22 modernization program, and the potential sale of F-22s to Japan. Congress’ decisions on this issue could affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements, the U.S. tactical aircraft industrial base, and U.S. relations with Japan and other countries.

---

1 As part of its action on the FY2009 defense appropriations act, Congress funded the procurement of 20 F-22s in FY2009 and also provided $523.0 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 20 additional F-22s in FY2010. In late 2008, DOD released enough of the advance procurement funding to purchase long leadtime items for four F-22s. As part of its action on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act, Congress provided $600 million to complete the procurement cost for these four aircraft. These four aircraft are now recorded as having been procured in FY2009, along with the 20 F-22s that were fully funded in the FY2009 defense appropriations act.

Background

The F-22 In Brief

The F-22, known more formally as the F-22A, is the world’s most capable air-to-air combat aircraft. It also has an air-to-ground (i.e., attack) capability. The F-22 incorporates a high degree of stealth, supercruise, thrust-vectoring for high maneuverability, and integrated avionics that fuse information from on-board and off-board sensors.

The F-22 and the multi-service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) are considered the world’s first two fifth-generation tactical aircraft. Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable than earlier-generation (e.g., fourth-generation and below) aircraft. The F-22 is intended to replace the Air Force’s aging F-15 air superiority fighters, while the F-35A (the Air Force version of the F-35) is intended to replace the service’s aging F-16 fighters and A-10 attack aircraft. The F-22 is a bit more stealthy than the F-35, and more capable than the F-35 in air-to-air combat. The F-35A is intended to be a more affordable complement to the F-22, and is a strike fighter—a dual-role aircraft with significant capability in both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter) operations. If the F-15/F-16 combination represented the Air Force’s earlier-generation “high-low” mix of air superiority fighters and more-affordable dual-role aircraft, then the F-22/F-35A combination might be viewed as the Air Force’s intended future high-low mix of air superiority fighters and more-affordable dual-role aircraft. The Air Force states that:

Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and the F-35 are key elements of our Nation’s defense and ability for deterrence. As long as hostile nations recognize that U.S. airpower can strike their vital centers with impunity, all other U.S. Government efforts are enhanced, which reduces the need for military confrontation....

Both the F-22A and the F-35 represent our latest generation of fighter aircraft. We need both aircraft to maintain the margin of superiority we have come to depend upon, the margin that has granted our forces in the air and on the ground freedom to maneuver and to attack. The F-22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together

---

3 The F-22 is referred to more formally as the F-22A, meaning the first version of the F-22. As no other versions of the F-22 are currently planned, this CRS report refers to the aircraft as the F-22.
4 Although the F-22 was originally conceived as an air superiority fighter with minimal air-to-ground capability, the Air Force subsequently placed more emphasis on F-22’s air-to-ground capability. In September 2002, in recognition of the aircraft’s air-to-ground capability, the F-22 was redesignated the F/A-22, with the A standing for attack. In December 2005, the Air Force changed the aircraft’s designation back to F-22.
5 Supercruise is the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners. The F-22 is expected to have a level speed of about Mach 1.7 using afterburners and a cruise speed of about Mach 1.5 without afterburners.
6 The F-22’s two Pratt & Whitney F-119 turbofan engines are equipped with thrust-vectoring nozzles.
7 For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
8 The term high-low mix refers to a force consisting of a combination of high-cost, high-capability aircraft and lower-cost, more-affordable aircraft. Procuring a high-low mix is a strategy for attempting to balance the goals of having a certain minimum number of very high capability tactical aircraft to take on the most challenging projected missions and of being able to procure tactical aircraft sufficient in total numbers within available resources to perform all projected missions.
provide the synergistic effects required to maintain that margin of superiority across the spectrum of conflict....

The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force’s primary air superiority fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for air supremacy, homeland defense and cruise missile defense for the Joint team. The multi-role F-22A’s combination of speed, stealth, maneuverability and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft the ability to gain access to, and survive in, high threat environments. Its ability to find, fix, track, and target enemy air- and surface-based threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all Joint forces.9

Program Origin and Milestones

The F-22 program was initiated in the early 1980s with the aim of developing a highly capable successor to the F-15 that would be capable of defeating all known and projected enemy fighters, including those being developed at the time by the Soviet Union.10 The F-22 program was given Milestone I approval in October 1986. The first flight of an F-22 prototype occurred in August 1990,11 and the first flight of a development version of the aircraft occurred in September 1997.12 The program was granted approval for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in August 2001, and the first LRIP F-22 was delivered in June 2003. The F-22 achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in December 2005.13

9 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5), Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), [and] Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, pp. 7-8.

10 In the early 1980s, the Air Force began to develop a stealth aircraft called the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), which was then expected to enter service in the 1990s as the replacement for the F-15. The ATF program was initiated in response to advances in Soviet combat aircraft that were expected to occur in the 1990s. A naval variant of the ATF that could operate from aircraft carriers—the NATF—was initiated as the replacement for the Navy’s F-14 fighter, but the NATF program was subsequently terminated.

11 To help control ATF costs, DOD used competitive prototypes for ATF airframes, engines, and avionics. The Air Force selected two teams of contractors to develop ATF airframe prototypes: Lockheed teamed with Boeing and General Dynamics; and Northrop teamed with McDonnell Douglas. On October 31, 1986, the Air Force awarded each team a $691-million fixed-price contract to build two prototypes. Lockheed’s prototype was designated the YF-22, while Northrop’s was designated the YF-23. The prototypes were powered by new-design engines. One YF-22 prototype and one YF-23 prototype were powered by Pratt & Whitney’s F119 engine, while the other YF-22 prototype and YF-23 prototype were powered by General Electric’s F120 engine. The Air Force announced in 1989 that the full-scale development phase would be delayed to allow more time for development of engines and avionics. Each contractor team reportedly spent over $1 billion in company funds to develop competing their prototypes, which were flight-tested and evaluated in late 1990.

12 On April 23, 1991, the Air Force selected the Lockheed’s YF-22 design, as powered by Pratt & Whitney’s F119 engine, for development as the F-22. Air Force Secretary Donald Rice stated that the choice was based on confidence in the ability of the Lockheed team and Pratt & Whitney to produce the aircraft and its engine at projected costs. Rice emphasized the importance of the Lockheed team’s management and production plans, and added that the YF-22 offered better reliability and maintainability. Neither design was judged significantly more maneuverable or stealthy than the other. On August 2, 1991, contracts totaling $11 billion were awarded to Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) of the F-22, then including 11 development/prototype aircraft.

13 On December 12, 2005, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command declared that the first squadron of 12 F-22s—27th Fighter Squadron of the 1st Fighter Wing, based at Langley Air Force Base (AFB)—had achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). On January 21, 2006, the F-22 flew its first operational sorties, taking part in an on-going air superiority mission over the United States.
Lockheed Martin in the past has studied the idea of a fighter-bomber version of the F-22 called the FB-22, but the Air Force currently has no program to develop or acquire such an aircraft.14

**F-22 Contractors, Employment, and Production Line Shutdown**

**Contractors**

The major contractors for the F-22 program are Lockheed Martin of Marietta, GA, and Fort Worth, TX, along with Boeing of Seattle, WA, for the F-22’s airframe; and United Technologies of East Hartford, CT (the parent firm of engine maker Pratt & Whitney) for the F-22’s F119 engines.

A map provided by Lockheed shows a total of roughly 1,040 F-22 suppliers in 44 states (all but Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming).15

**Employment**

Lockheed states that the F-22 program in 2009 supports a total of 8,800 direct jobs at Lockheed’s Marietta, GA, and Fort Worth, TX, locations, and at Boeing and Pratt & Whitney. Lockheed estimates, on the basis of purchase order receipts, that the F-22 program supports an additional 16,200 supplier jobs in 44 states around the country. Lockheed combines these two figures to estimate that the F-22 supports a total of about 25,000 direct jobs. Using a multiplier of 2.8 to estimate jobs elsewhere in the economy that are indirectly supported by these 25,000 jobs, Lockheed estimates that an additional 70,000 jobs are indirectly supported by the F-22 program.

---

14 The FB-22, which would employ a delta wing (i.e., a triangular shaped wing), would have double the F-22’s range and a significantly larger internal payload. Some observers have estimated that the FB-22 could carry up to 30 250-lb Small Diameter Bombs. (Richard Whittle, “F-22 Bomber Studied,” *Dallas Morning News*, July 30, 2002; Frank Wolfe, “Sambur: F-22 Must Prove Itself Before FB-22 Becomes Formal Program,” *Defense Daily*, March 4, 2002.) These potential improvements in range and internal payload would likely result in reduced performance compared to the F-22 in other areas, such as acceleration and maneuverability.

Some Air Force leaders in the past have expressed some enthusiasm for the FB-22 idea. In 2002, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche reportedly favored the FB-22 as the potential platform of choice for providing better close air support for tomorrow’s ground forces. (Ron Laurenzo, “Roche Envisions Close Air Support F-22,” *Defense Week*, July 1, 2002.) Roche suggested in testimony to Congress in 2003 that up to 150 FB-22s could be procured, with full-rate production achievable by FY2011, if development funds were committed in FY2004. (Lorenzo Cortes, “Air Force Issues Clarification on FB-22, FY’11 Delivery Date Possible,” *Defense Daily*, March 10, 2003.) Some Air Force leaders in the past have said the FB-22 could serve as a bridge between the current bomber force and a next-generation long-range bomber. Other Air Force leaders have reportedly shown less enthusiasm in the FB-22 concept. Air Force acquisition chief Marvin Sambur said in 2002 that the F-22A’s difficulties would have to be solved before the FB-22 could be considered. (Bill Sweetman, “Smarter Bomber,” *Popular Science*, June 25, 2002.)

Some observers argue that the FB-22 could be developed and produced economically by reusing the F-22’s cockpit, engines, computer systems, production methods, and materials. Other observers argue that redesigning an aircraft to perform a new mission is difficult and usually expensive. Some observers estimate that developing the FB-22’s modified airframe could cost up to $1 billion. Other observers have questioned the potential cost effectiveness attractiveness of a medium-range bomber with a payload smaller than that of current long-range bombers.

15 Lockheed map entitled “F-22 Raptor[.]” The 2009 Industrial Base,” provided to CRS by e-mail on July 13, 2009. The map shows four states with no suppliers (North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming) and does not depict two other states (Alaska and Hawaii).
Lockheed combines the figures of 25,000 and 70,000 to estimate that a total of 95,000 jobs are supported either directly or indirectly by the F-22 program.16

A map provided by Lockheed shows roughly 25,800 direct F-22-related jobs in 44 states. According to the map, states with more than 1,000 direct F-22-related jobs include California (6,532 jobs), Texas (3,526), Georgia (2,821), Connecticut (2,205), New Hampshire (2,197), Washington (1,491), and Florida (1,025). The map shows several states with a few hundred to several hundred direct F-22-related jobs each, and a number of states with fewer than 100 (in some cases fewer than 25) direct F-22-related jobs each. The map shows four states—North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming—as having no direct F-22-related jobs in 2009. The map does not depict Alaska or Hawaii.17

Production Line Shutdown

The administration’s FY2010 defense budget submission states that the 20 F-22s procured in the regular (aka “base”) FY2009 defense budget are to be delivered to the Air Force between January 2011 and December 2011, with one or two aircraft being delivered each month.18 Lockheed states that the four additional F-22s funded in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act will be built after these 20 aircraft.19 If the four additional F-22s are delivered to the Air Force in monthly quantities of one or two aircraft, the last of these four aircraft might be delivered in February or March of 2012.

If no additional F-22s are procured in FY2010 and/or subsequent years, then the earlier parts of the F-22 production line (including F-22 suppliers who provide materials or components that are delivered during the earlier stages of the F-22 assembly process) will begin to shut down prior to the delivery of the final four F-22s, when those four aircraft act move beyond the earlier parts of the production line. The administration’s FY2010 budget submission, for example, shows that although the 20 F-22s funded in the regular FY2009 defense budget are to be delivered starting in January 2011, the F119 engines for these aircraft are to be delivered starting in February 2010—11 months earlier.20

The administration’s FY2010 budget submission states that the $95.2 million in FY2010 procurement funding requested for the F-22 program “includes $64M [i.e., $64 million] to continue production line shutdown activities, which preserve necessary assets for long-term F-22 fleet sustainment.”21 The use of the word “continue” in this statement suggests that under the

16 Source: Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 13, 2009.
17 Lockheed map entitled “F-22 Raptor[:] The 2009 Industrial Base,” provided to CRS by e-mail on July 13, 2009.
18 Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol. 1, May 2009, Exhibit P-21, Production Schedule, F-22 (Raptor). The 20 aircraft are to be delivered in monthly quantities of 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2.
19 Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 15, 2009.
proposed FY2010 budget, some F-22 production line shutdown activities are anticipated to occur in FY2009.

Lockheed states:

Since further orders have not yet been placed beyond the four aircraft in the FY09 Supplemental, F-22 Advanced Procurement suppliers are beginning to adjust their workforce and phasing out their F-22 production capability. Suppliers that will first experience the absence of continuing production work beyond the 4 aircraft authorization begin with raw material suppliers of titanium and other long lead raw materials, followed by forging houses and other long lead components. As production jobs and capability decline, the ability to recover those critical skills becomes increasingly expensive, particularly where F-22 comprises a large share of their overall business.\textsuperscript{22}

The Air Force in 2007 estimated that of about 1,000 first-tier F-22 suppliers, roughly 110, or about 11%, were also F-35 suppliers. The Air Force believes this figure probably has not changed significantly since 2007. The Air Force believes the percentage of F-22 suppliers that are also F-35 suppliers is not higher than about 11% because the F-35 program involves significant international participation and thus features a large number of foreign suppliers.\textsuperscript{23} On this basis, it would appear that if F-22 production ends, most F-22 suppliers would not be supported by F-35 production.

**Procurement Quantities**

**Planned Total Procurement Quantity**

Since the submission to Congress in early 2005 of the FY2006 budget, DOD plans have called for procuring a total of about 187 F-22s—a figure that includes:

- 179 production aircraft;
- 6 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft; and
- 2 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft funded with research and development funding.\textsuperscript{24}

The figure of 179 production aircraft includes four F-22s whose procurement cost was recently completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act. Prior to the funding of the four additional aircraft, the planned total was 183 F-22s, including 175 production aircraft.

The Air Force originally envisaged a production run of 750 F-22s. The figure was reduced to 648 in 1991. DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) reduced the planned number of production F-22s to 438 (plus four pre-production versions, later reduced to two), which was enough to support four F-22 fighter wings in a total Air Force force structure of 20 wings (13 active; seven

\textsuperscript{22} Lockheed e-mail to CRS, July 15, 2009.

\textsuperscript{23} Source: E-mail from Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison to CRS on July 15, 2009.

\textsuperscript{24} Some DOD documents show slightly different planned procurement totals, such as 184 (a figure that includes one replacement test aircraft) or 181 (a figure that includes 172 production aircraft and 9 non-production aircraft). The most commonly cited figure is 183.
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reduced the planned number of production F-22s to 339, which was enough to support three F-22 fighter wings in a 20-wing force structure (12 active; eight Reserve/National Guard). Table 1 shows planned total numbers of F-22s in the budget submissions for FY1999 to the present.

Table 1. Planned Total Number of Production F-22s
As shown in budget submissions for FY1991 to the present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget submission</th>
<th>Planned number of production F-22s</th>
<th>Planned total number of F-22s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY1991</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1992</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1993</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1994</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1995</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1996</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1997</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1998</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1999</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2000</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2001</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2002</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2003</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2004</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2005</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2006</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2007</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>175(^{\text{b}})</td>
<td>183(^{\text{b}})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by CRS based on Air Force information paper of July 8, 2009, provided to CRS on July 9, 2009 (for FY1991-FY1998), and DOD budget submissions (for FY1999-FY2010).

a. This total includes production F-22s from the previous column, plus 6 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft, plus (beginning in FY2006) 1 or 2 EMD aircraft funded with research and development funding.

b. The proposed FY2010 budget was submitted to Congress in early May 2009, prior to the completion of action on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act, and consequently does not reflect the four additional F-22s whose procurement cost was completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act. If these four aircraft had been included in the FY2010 budget submission, the submission would have shown 179 production F-22 and a total of 187 F-22s.
Annual Procurement Quantities

Table 2 shows annual procurement quantities for the 179 production F-22s procured through FY2009. The 64 F-22s procured in FY2007-FY2009 include 20 F-22s per year that were procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement, plus the four additional F-22s whose procurement cost was completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act.

Table 2. Annual Procurement Quantities of Production F-22s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY01</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY02</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY03</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY04</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY05</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>20\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY08</td>
<td>20\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY09</td>
<td>24\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total through FY09</strong></td>
<td><strong>179</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.

\textsuperscript{a} The 64 F-22s procured in FY2007-FY2009 include 20 F-22s per year that were procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement, plus four additional F-22s in FY2009 whose procurement cost was completed in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act.

Costs and Funding

Estimated Total Program Cost and Prior-Year Funding\textsuperscript{25}

As of December 31, 2007, DOD estimated the total acquisition cost (meaning the sum of research and development cost, procurement cost, and military construction [MilCon] cost) of an 183-aircraft F-22 program about $64.5 billion in then-year dollars (meaning dollars across various years that are not adjusted for inflation). This figure includes about $30.4 billion in research and development costs, about $33.5 billion in procurement costs, and $650 million in MilCon costs.

Of the program’s total estimated acquisition cost of $64.5 billion in then-year dollars, more than $62 billion has been provided through FY2009.

\textsuperscript{25} Figures in this section are taken from the December 31, 2007, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the F-22 program.
As of December 31, 2007, the 183-aircraft F-22 program had a Program Acquisition Unit Cost (or PAUC, which is the program’s total acquisition cost divided by the total number of aircraft acquired [including non-production aircraft]) of $350.8 million in then-year dollars, and an Average Unit Procurement Cost (or APUC, which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by 175 production aircraft) of $191.6 million in then-year dollars.

Legislated Limits on F-22 Costs

The F-22 program since FY1998 has operated under legislated limits on total engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) cost and on total production cost. The limit on EMD cost was repealed as part of action on the FY2002 defense budget, leaving in place the limit on total production cost.26 The limit on total production cost is adjustable for inflation after September 30, 1997, and for changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997. For

26 The history of the legislated limits is as follows:
- Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997) limited the total cost of the F-22 program’s engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase to $18.688 billion, and the total cost of the F-22 program’s production phase to $43.4 billion. The section stated that both of these figures could be adjusted for inflation after September 30, 1997, and for changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997.
- Section 8125 of the FY2001 defense appropriations act (H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259 of August 9, 2000) limited the combined cost of the F-22 program’s EMD and production phases to $58.0282 billion. The section stated that figure could be adjusted for inflation as under Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (i.e., for inflation and for changes in federal, state, and local laws). In an apparent reference to Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (see above), Section 8125 also stated that “This section supersedes any limitation previously provided by law on the amount that may be obligated or expended for engineering and manufacturing development under the F-22 aircraft program and any limitation previously provided by law on the amount that may be obligated or expended for the F-22 production program.”
- Section 219 of the FY2001 defense authorization act (H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398 of October 30, 2000 – the conference report on H.R. 4205 [H.Rept. 106-945 of October 6, 2000] enacted the provisions of H.R. 5408), which was signed into law after the FY2001 defense appropriations act (see above) – amended Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act by permitting the cost limit on the F-22 program’s EMD phase to be increased by not more than 1.5% if the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, after consulting with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, determines that the increase is necessary in order to ensure adequate testing. In an apparent reference to Section 8125 of the FY2001 defense appropriations act (see above), Section 219 also stated that the individual cost limits on the EMD and production phases of the F-22 program established by Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act shall continue to apply “without regard to any provision of law establishing a single limitation on amounts obligated and expended for engineering and manufacturing development and for production for that program.”
- Section 213 of the FY2002 defense authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107 of December 28, 2001) repealed the limit on the total cost of the F-22 program’s EMD phase established by Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act, leaving in place Section 217’s limit on the total cost of the F-22 program’s phase. Section 213 also repealed Section 8125 of the FY2001 defense appropriations act, and repealed the part of Section 219 of the FY2001 defense authorization act that stated (in an apparent reference to Section 8125) that the individual cost limits on the EMD and production phases of the F-22 program established by Section 217 of the FY1998 defense authorization act shall continue to apply “without regard to any provision of law establishing a single limitation on amounts obligated and expended for engineering and manufacturing development and for production for that program.”
FY2009, the adjusted limit on total production cost is $37.6432 billion in then-year dollars.27 The 187-aircraft F-22 program appears to be more than $3 billion below this cap.28

FY2009 Funding for Procurement of F-22s

Table 3 summarizes FY2009 funding for the procurement of F-22s.29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008)</th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>Adjusted2a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>3,054.2</td>
<td>2,907.2</td>
<td>2,897.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance procurement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>523.0</td>
<td>521.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009)**

| Procurement | 600.0 | 600.0 | n/a |

**Source:** Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.

a. Funding levels in the FY2009 defense appropriations act were adjusted by DOD after enactment.

The George W. Bush administration wanted to end procurement of F-22s at 183 aircraft, and consequently did not request any advance procurement funding in FY2009 for F-22s to be procured in FY2010.

Congress, in acting on the FY2009 budget request, provided $523.0 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 20 additional F-22s in FY2010. After enactment of the FY2010 defense budget, DOD adjusted this figure to $521.6 million, which is what appears in the FY2009 column of the FY2010 budget request. Section 134 of the FY2009 defense authorization act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008) prohibits obligating more than $140.0 million of FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the President certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-22s is in the national interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national interest. The certification was to have been made not earlier than January 21, 2009 (the first full day of President Obama’s term in office), and not earlier than March 1, 2009. The Senate Armed Services Committee states in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390) that the President made no such certification.30

At a November 19, 2008, hearing before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee members criticized John Young, the DOD acquisition

---

27 Source: Air Force information paper of July 8, 2009 provided to CRS on July 9, 2009.

28 As stated in the previous section, as of December 31, 2007, the 183-aircraft F-22 program had a total estimated procurement cost of $33.5 billion in then-year dollars. The four additional F-22s whose procurement cost was completed with $600 million in funding in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act would increase that figure to something above $34 billion in then-year dollars.

29 (The F-22 program also includes procurement funding for purposes other than procuring F-22s, such as modification of in-service F-22s, as well as research and development funding and military construction funding.)

executive, for not obligating the FY2009 advance procurement funds to purchase long-lead items for an additional 20 F-22s. Young testified that DOD was complying with provisions in the FY2009 defense authorization act, but some subcommittee members disagreed strenuously, and urged Young to immediately disburse sufficient funds for the advance procurement of long-lead time items for 20 F-22s. Subsequent to the hearing, DOD released funds sufficient for purchasing long-lead items for four Raptors.31

**FY2010 Funding for Procurement of F-22s**

The Obama administration wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and consequently has not requested funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s. The administration has requested $95.2 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the F-22 program, but this funding is requested for activities associated with completing a 187-aircraft program and shutting down the F-22 production line, not for procuring additional F-22s.

**F-22 Modernization Program**

The Air Force in 2003 established a program to modernize its F-22s. The program includes upgrades to the aircraft’s air-to-ground and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In November 2008, DOD officials stated that modernizing F-22s would cost an estimated $8 billion that was not accounted for in the F-22 program of record.32 The Air Force testified in May 2009 that:

Similar to every other aircraft in the U.S. inventory, there is a plan to regularly incorporate upgrades into the F-22A to ensure the Raptor remains the world’s most dominant fighter in the decades to come. The F-22A modernization program consists of two major efforts that, together, will ensure every Raptor maintains its maximum combat capability: the Common Configuration program and a pre-planned product improvement (P3I) program (Increments 2 and 3). We are currently in year six of the planned 13-year program.

As of 1 May 2009, the Air Force has accepted 139 F-22A aircraft, out of a programmed delivery of 187. Most of these aircraft include the Increment 2 upgrade, which provides the ability to employ Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) at supersonic speeds and enhances the intra-flight data-link (IFDL) to provide connectivity with other F-22As. The Air Force will upgrade the F-22A fleet under the JROC-approved Increment 3 upgrade designed to enhance both air-to-air and precision ground attack capability. Raptors from the production line today are wired to accept Increment 3.1, which when equipped, upgrades the APG-77 AESA radar to enable synthetic aperture radar ground mapping capability, provides the ability to self-target JDAMs using on-board sensors, and allows F-22As to carry and employ eight Small Diameter Bombs (SDB). The Air Force will begin to field Increment 3.1 in FY11. Future F-22As will include the Increment 3.2 upgrade, which features the next generation data-link, improved SDB employment capability, improved targeting using multi-


ship geo-location, automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto GCAS) and the capability to employ our enhanced air-to-air weapons (AIM-120D and AIM-9X). Increment 3.2 should begin to field in FY15.

The current F-22A modernization plan will result in 34 Block 20 aircraft used for test and training, 63 combat-coded Block 30s fielded with Increment 3.1, 83 combat-coded Block 35s fielded with Increment 3.2, and 3 Edwards AFB-test coded aircraft. Consideration is also being given to upgrade the 63 Block 30s to the most capable Block 35 configuration.33

**GAO Assessment of F-22 Program**

A March 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the following about the F-22 program (including both production and modernization):

**Technology Maturity**

One of the F-22A modernization program’s three critical technologies-processing memory-is mature. The two remaining technologies-stores management system and cryptography-are approaching maturity, and have been tested in a relevant environment. The maturity of these technologies has not changed in the past year. According to program officials, the current F-22 production and modernization plans do not commit to incorporating new technology into developmental increments until the underlying technologies have been tested in a relevant environment and do not commit to fielding these technologies until they have been proven in developmental and operational testing. The number and mix of technologies identified by program officials have changed since the modernization effort began, reflecting changes in program direction, priorities, and work content. Some of these have been deferred to future modernization efforts, which the Air Force plans to undertake in a separate major defense acquisition program.

**Design Maturity**

The design of the first increment of the F-22A modernization program appears stable, almost 2 years after its critical design review. The program office reported that all expected engineering drawings have been released. According to program officials, they did not plan to release drawings at the design review because most of the design consisted of software changes or modifications of existing hardware. Even though the design of the first increment appears stable, additional design work may be necessary, and the program still needs to demonstrate two of its critical technologies in operational environments. In addition, the program is just beginning developmental and operational testing for a number of capabilities. According to the program office, two developmental test aircraft and six operational test aircraft are being modified in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to prove out technologies before fielding or production incorporation.

**Other Program Issues**

33 Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5), Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), [and] Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8), May 20, 2009, pp. 8-9.
According to the F-22 program office, implementation of the modernization program’s three increments has been delayed by 3 years because of numerous budget decreases and program restructurings. Since fiscal year 2002, the F-22A’s modernization budget has been decreased by over $450 million. Nearly $200 million of the reductions can be attributed to program restructuring by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In fiscal year 2008, the conference report accompanying the Defense Appropriation Act recommended $611 million in research and development funds for the F-22A modernization program, about $132 million less than requested by the Air Force. The 2009 Defense Appropriation Act appropriated an additional $523 million for advance procurement for 20 additional aircraft. However, the 2009 Defense Authorization Act limited the obligation of the advance procurement funds to $140 million pending a certification by the President that the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of the United States or that the termination of the production line for F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of the United States.

The current F-22A multiyear procurement contract for 60 aircraft will end the program’s planned procurement when the final aircraft is delivered in 2011. Program officials reported that some contractors are already beginning to cease their F-22-related efforts and would need to be replaced if additional aircraft are purchased. According to the program officials, a decision on additional F-22 purchases needs to be made by in early 2009 to avoid losing additional contractors. Further, program officials stated, it is unclear how new aircraft would affect future modernization efforts. The additional aircraft could be configured the same as previous production models (Increment 2), or they could possibly be produced as the newest increment available (Increment 3.1).

**Program Office Comments**

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.34

**Potential Sale of F-22s to Japan**

Japan’s fighter force includes, among other aircraft, about 200 F-15s and two squadrons of aging F-4 Phantoms. To replace the F-4s, Japan reportedly wants to purchase 40 to 50 new fighters. Japan reportedly would prefer to purchase F-22s as the replacements, but is considering five other candidate aircraft types as well: the F-35, a version of the F-15 designated the F-15FX, the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet (a strike fighter that has been procured for the U.S. Navy since FY1997), the Eurofighter Typhoon (an aircraft built by European consortium), and the Dassault Rafale.35

---


Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reportedly recommended the F-35 over the F-22 and other candidates in a meeting with Japan’s defense minister on May 1, 2009, but Japan reportedly still would prefer to purchase the F-22. To facilitate a purchase of F-22s, Japan reportedly is willing to contribute $300 million toward the cost of developing an export version of the aircraft, and reportedly is willing to pay about $290 million for each F-22, or roughly twice the procurement cost of F-22s procured for the U.S. Air Force.

Congress since FY1998 has prohibited the use of appropriated funds to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to any foreign government through a provision in the annual defense appropriations act known as the Obey Amendment. Congress from time to time has reconsidered the prohibition on foreign sales of the F-22.


39 The provision states: “None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to approve or license the sale of the F-22 advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government.” (In Section 8067 of the FY2006 defense appropriations act, the aircraft’s designation was changed to F/A-22. For a discussion of this designation, see footnote 4. The aircraft’s designation reverted to F-22 in Section 8058 of the FY2007 defense appropriations act.) The table below summarizes occurrences of the provision in annual defense appropriation acts since FY1998.

### Sections in annual defense appropriation acts prohibiting sale of F-22 to foreign governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Bill/Public Law</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>H.R. 2266/P.L. 105-56</td>
<td>8118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>H.R. 4103/P.L. 105-262</td>
<td>8097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>H.R. 2561/P.L. 106-79</td>
<td>8092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259</td>
<td>8087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>H.R. 3338/P.L. 107-117</td>
<td>8088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248</td>
<td>8077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87</td>
<td>8075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287</td>
<td>8074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>H.R. 2863/P.L. 109-148</td>
<td>8067a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289</td>
<td>8058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116</td>
<td>8060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329</td>
<td>8059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by CRS based on conference reports.

a. In Section 8067 of the FY2006 defense appropriations act, the aircraft’s designation was changed to F/A-22. For a discussion of this designation, see footnote 4. The aircraft’s designation reverted to F-22 in Section 8058 of the FY2007 defense appropriations act.
Issues For Congress

Procuring Additional F-22s

A key issue for Congress for FY2010 for the F-22 program is whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, or provide funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent fiscal years.

OSD and Air Force Views

The issue of whether to end F-22 procurement at 183 (now 187) aircraft has in the past been a topic of apparent disagreement between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Air Force leaders, with OSD supporting a total of 183 (now 187), and Air Force officials supporting procurement of substantially more than 183 (now 187). Disagreement on the issue appeared to come to a head in June 2008, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asked the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff to resign. It was reported in press articles, and later confirmed by the former Air Force Secretary, Michael Wynne, that their reluctance to support a total of 183 F-22s was the key factor leading to their resignations.

Air Force leaders and officials from other military services currently support ending F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft on the grounds that procuring more would reduce funding for other programs and 187 is enough to meet operational needs under emerging U.S. military strategy. On July 9, 2009, U.S. Marine Corps General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that a recently completed DOD study concluded that a force of 187 F-22s would be sufficient, in conjunction with other U.S. forces, to meet the needs of a U.S. military strategy that is emerging in the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Cartwright said this emerging strategy focuses on preparing for future conflicts similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan while also having forces sufficient to fight a single major regional peer competitor. Such a strategy, he said, would be in contrast to the defense-planning standard first established in the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, of having forces sufficient to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

40 The figure of 187 aircraft includes the four F-22s funded in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill. Prior to this, the apparent disagreement between OSD and Air Force officials was whether to end F-22 procurement at 183 aircraft or procure substantially more than 183.


42 A July 9, 2009 press report states:
The Defense Department has completed a new analysis that affirms a requirement for 187 F-22A fighters, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said today – a finding he said fits with a developing war-planning strategy that assumes the U.S. military must be prepared to fight one major theater war at a time.

Gen. James Cartwright, during his confirmation hearing for a second two-year term as vice chairman, told the Senate Armed Services Committee the new study dovetails with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ decision – which the Marine Corps general said he supports – to cap the production of the fighter at 187 aircraft, a proposal some in Congress want to roll back.

“There is a study in the Joint Staff that we just completed and partnered with the Air Force that said: Proliferating within the U.S. military fifth-generation fighters from all three services is going to be more significant than having them based solely in just one service, because of the way we deploy and because of the diversity of our (continued...)
that a desire to preserve funding for procurement of EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft (an electronic warfare version of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighter) was a key factor behind DOD’s decision to propose ending F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft.  

43 A July 9, 2009, press report states: The need for more F/A-18G electronic warfare aircraft played heavily in the decision to halt F-22 production at 187 jets, says U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cartwright told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9 that he was one of the “most vocal and ardent supporters” of ending the Raptor program at 187. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the decision, along with about 50 other program cuts, in early April. Cartwright, appearing before the panel for a confirmation hearing as part of his nomination for a second stint as vice chairman, said the Joint Staff and Air Force had just concluded a study on sizing the F-22 fleet. He said the study concluded it was more important to focus on fielding fighters for all three services “because of how we deploy.” It ultimately endorsed ending the F-22 program at 187 jets and fielding more F-35s and both models of the F-18 fighter. Cartwright said the latter jet’s Growler model, designed for electronic warfare tasks, became a key part of the
A July 15, 2009, news item stated that the DOD study referred to by Cartwright was not so much a formal analysis as a pair of briefings by DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) office and the Air Force.44

In the past, Air Force officials have stated that a total of 381 F-22s would be sufficient to meet operational demands at a low level of risk. In early 2009, prior to the submission of the proposed FY2010 defense budget, they reportedly were of the view that a total of 243 to 250 would be sufficient to meet operational demands with a moderate level of risk.45 These statements may relate to a defense-planning standard of having forces sufficient for fighting two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

(...)continued

decision to halt the F-22 program.

That’s because the military’s war fighting commanders, in conversations with Cartwright, all expressed a desire for more aerial EW capability. And right now, that means more Growlers.

Cartwright said Pentagon brass have three priorities for tactical aircraft: field fifth-generation fighters; “keep a hot production line”; and keep open the F-18 production line, largely to maintain the flow of new Growlers.

The latter is key, he told the panel, because a hot F-18 line means “we can also produce front-line fighters” - the F/A-18 E and F models - for traditional fighter aircraft missions.

Some Air National Guard (ANG) leaders have expressed support for procuring additional F-22s for the purpose of replacing some of the ANG’s existing fighters.

Summary of Arguments

Supporters of ending F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft could argue one or more of the following:

- A total of about 183 F-22s has been planned by DOD since 2005. A total of 187 F-22s will be sufficient, in conjunction with other U.S. forces (including numerous F-35s), to counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems that U.S. forces might encounter in a future conventional conflict against another country, such as China, that might field significant numbers of such aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. A recently completed DOD study concluded that a force of 187 F-22s would be sufficient, in conjunction with other U.S. forces, to meet the needs of emerging U.S. military strategy, which focuses on preparing for future conflicts similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan while also having forces sufficient to fight a single major regional peer competitor.

- A total of 187 F-22s is supported by current Air Force leaders and officials from other military services in light of constraints on Air Force funding and the need to fund other Air Force programs. Procuring additional F-22s would reduce funding for other programs, such as the F-35, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G aircraft programs, which could create operational risks for the U.S. military. DOD in coming years needs to focus on improving its capabilities for irregular warfare operations, and the F-22 is not a key program for improving those capabilities. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified in February 2008 that “the reality is we are fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a single mission in either theater.”

- Although the F-22 achieved IOC in December 2005, in-service F-22s continue to experience relatively low mission-capable rates, and are expensive to maintain. (See “Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s” below.) Procuring additional F-22s would add to total F-22 fleet maintenance costs, reducing funding available for other Air Force programs.

- The projected Air Force fighter gap of up to 800 aircraft by 2024 that Air Force officials identified in 2008 testimony is open to question, because it is strongly influenced by assumptions on threats and whether the United States will fight alone or as part of a coalition. Even if such a fighter gap does emerge, procuring F-22s is not necessarily the most cost-effective way to address it –

---


47 See, for example, the testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, at an April 9, 2008, hearing before the Airland subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on the FY2009 Budget for Air Force and Navy aviation programs. (Source: Transcript of hearing.)

other potential options for addressing the shortfall would include procuring less expensive aircraft, such as F-35s, upgraded F-15s, or upgraded F-16s.

- The Air National Guard (ANG) can perform the air sovereignty alert (ASA) mission sufficiently in the future with the F-35. Shifting to a future ANG fighter force composed of a single aircraft type (F-35s) will permit economies in the operation and support of ANG fighters. The ANG’s existing inventory of F-15s and F-16s can be maintained until it is replaced by F-35s through careful management of individual aircraft use and (if necessary) service life extensions.

- Although a total of 381 F-22s would be needed to permanently attach a certain number of F-22s to each of the Air Force’s 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), certain Air Force aircraft—including bombers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft—are too few in number to be permanently attached to each of the AEFs and are instead assigned to AEFs on an as-needed basis. The same can be done with F-22s. If F-22s are to be used infrequently, organizing them outside the AEF scheme and using them on an as needed basis would be appropriate.

- In light of Congress’s annual prohibition since FY1998 on sales of the F-22 to any foreign government, there would be little value in procuring additional F-22s for the U.S. Air Force for the purpose of keeping the F-22 production line open until a modified version of the F-22 could be made ready for a potential sale to Japan.

- F-22 procurement funding at this point is better spent on modernizing the 187 F-22s, so as to maximize their utility and realize a better return on the investment made in developing and procuring these aircraft. 

Supporters of procuring more than 187 F-22s could argue one or more of the following:

- A force of 187 F-22s would be inadequate to meet operational demands at an acceptable level of risk. Although Air Force and other DOD officials have stated this year that the service cannot afford to procure more than 187 F-22s, Air Force officials in the past have stated that they believe a total of 381 F-22s would be sufficient to meet operational demands at a low level of risk, and that a total of 243 to 250 would be sufficient to meet operational demands with a moderate level of risk. The recently completed DOD study referred to by General James Cartwright in his July 9, 2009, testimony reportedly is not so much a formal analysis as a pair of briefings by DOD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) office and the Air Force. In a letter dated June 9, 2009, General John Corley, the Commander of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, stated: “At Air Combat Command we have held the need for 381 F-22s to deliver a tailored package of air superiority to our Combatant Commanders and provide a potent, globally arrayed asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries. In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term. To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military

49 The AEF is the primary organizational unit that the Air Force uses to rotate equipment and personnel among training, maintenance, and operational assignments.
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

strategy. Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with Headquarters Air Forces, shows a moderate risk force can be obtained with an F-22 fleet of approximately 250 aircraft. In light of the QDR now in progress, it is premature for DOD to declare that 187 F-22s would be sufficient. DOD has deferred a number of other defense program questions to the QDR; it is inconsistent for DOD to not do so with the F-22. Until the final report on the QDR is issued next year—and then reviewed by Congress—it is not certain whether future U.S. defense strategy will (or should) drop the defense-planning standard that has been in place since the early 1990s of being prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

• Procuring additional F-22s could help mitigate a projected fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft by 2024 that Air Force leaders identified in 2008 testimony. Procuring additional F-22s would also provide a hedge against the risk of unexpected age-related problems developing in the Air Force’s legacy force of F-15 fighters. The breaking apart of an F-15 in flight in November 2007 suggests that these risks are not fully known and are potentially catastrophic.

• Procuring additional F-22s could begin a needed recapitalization of the ANG’s inventory of aging F-15 and F-16 fighters, which is responsible for providing homeland aerial defense for the United States and is primarily responsible for executing the ASA mission as part of the national defense strategy. The F-22’s speed and detection ability gives it a unique capability for defending the country against seaborne cruise missiles. Given the age of ANG F-15s and F-16s and the costs and technical uncertainties associated with possibly attempting to extend their service lives, it would not be prudent to wait until F-35 production ramps up

---


Thank you for your letter and the opportunity to comment on the critical issue of F-22 fleet size. At Air Combat Command we have held the need for 381 F-22s to deliver a tailored package of air superiority to our Combatant Commanders and provide a potent, globally arrayed asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries. In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term. To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy. Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with Headquarters Air Forces, shows a moderate risk force can be obtained with an F-22 fleet of approximately 250 aircraft. While OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] did not solicit direct input from Air Combat Command, we worked closely with our Headquarters in ensuring our views were available. We realize the tough choices our national leadership must make in balancing current warfighting needs against the fiscal realities our Nation faces. The F-22, a critical enabler of air dominance, plays a vital role and indispensable role in ensuring joint freedom of action for all forces and underpins our ability to dissuade and deter. Thank you for your continued support of the US Air Force and Air Combat Command.


51 On November 2, 2007, an F-15 broke apart during a training mission, and the entire F-15 fleet was grounded until the cause could be determined. An investigation discovered that the event was caused by the failure of a structure (the “longeron”) that holds together the F-15 cockpit and fuselage, and that longerons in other F-15s were suspect. The F-15 fleet was grounded a second time on November 28, 2007, when a more sensitive test found that the longeron problem was evident in more F-15s than previously believed. (Michael Sirak, “Moseley: Questions Remain Over F-15C Crash As F-15Es Returning to Flight,” Defense Daily, November 19, 2007; Gayle Putrich, “F-15s Ordered Out of the Air Again; Could Help USAF Make Case for More F-22s,” Defense News, December 3, 2007; “USAF Orders F-15s Grounded ... Again,” Air Safety Week, December 3, 2007.)
before beginning to recapitalize the ANG fighter force. A recapitalized ANG fighter force consisting of two types of aircraft (F-22s procured now and F-35s procured later) can be operated and supported economically because it will take advantage of operation and support facilities created for the Air Force’s future fighter force of F-22s and F-35s.52

- As the Air Force continues to gain operating experience with F-22s, the aircraft’s mission-capable rate will increase, and F-22 maintenance costs per flight hour will come down. F-22 mission-capable rates are increasing. (See “Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s” below.) Although the F-22 is an expensive aircraft to operate, the F-22’s capabilities are worth the costs.

- Allocating F-22s to the AEFs on an as needed basis would obviate the principal benefit of the AEF system, which is to provide predictability and stability for airmen.

- Procurement of F-35s has only recently begun, and has not yet increased to planned higher annual rates. Until production of the F-35 has been successfully demonstrated at these planed higher annual rates, it would be imprudent to shut down the F-22 production line, which is the only other U.S. production line for a fifth-generation aircraft.

- Congress could reconsider the current prohibition on sales of the F-22 to foreign governments, so procuring additional F-22s for the U.S. Air Force could be of value in keeping the F-22 production line open until a modified version of the F-22 could be made ready for a sale to Japan.

52 A letter from Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard, to Saxby Chambliss, undated but perhaps from June or early-July 2009 (posted on InsideDefense.com), states the following (emphasis as in the original):

Thank you for your inquiry and the opportunity for me to discuss what I believe to be a serious threat to the Air National Guard’s ability to fulfill our Nation’s highest strategic priority; defending the homeland. The ANG has proudly performed the bulk of this mission, while simultaneously participating in overseas contingency operations, with aircraft that are rapidly nearing the end of their service life. While I believe our Nation has the capacity to recapitalize the ANG, I am not aware of any plan that commits to doing so. As such, we are in need of an immediate solution in order to ensure that America’s most cost effective force can continue to perform its most important mission.

While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and future asymmetric threats to our Nation, particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a fighter platform with the requisite speed and detection to address them. The F-22’s unique capability in this arena enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats that the ANG’s current legacy systems are not capable of addressing. I am fond of saying that “America’s most important job should be handled by America’s best fighter.”

Indeed, I am keenly aware of the severe strain that our current economic situation has placed on the Department of Defense as it attempts to modernize for an ever evolving threat environment. Given this reality, finding more efficient ways to protect our Nation’s interests at home and abroad is the new imperative. Many say this will mean making tough choices, but I believe we can maintain our vitality by making smart choices; leveraging the cost effective and dual use nature of the ANG is the answer. Basing F-22s (and eventually F-35s) at strategic ANG locations through the United States while simultaneously making them available to rotationally support worldwide contingency operations is the most responsible approach to satisfying all of our Nation’s needs.

Again, thank you for your inquiry and your continued support of the Air National Guard.

• Although the F-22 modernization program will maximize the utility of existing F-22s, it will not mitigate operational risks that can arise from not having enough F-22s to conduct operations in multiple locations at the same time.

Reliability and Maintainability of In-Service F-22s

A second issue for Congress for the F-22 program concerns the reliability and maintainability of in-service F-22s. In February 2009, it was reported that the F-22’s mission capable rate (MCR), one measure of an aircraft’s reliability and maintainability, was a disappointing 60%. Critics of the F-22 noted that a 60% MCR is unacceptable by the Air Force’s own standards. Air Force leaders defended the F-22, arguing that the aircraft was experiencing typical growing pains.53

July 10, 2009, News Report

On July 10, 2009, it was reported that the F-22 has recently required more than 30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the skies, pushing its hourly cost of flying to more than $44,000, a far higher figure than for the warplane it replaces, confidential Pentagon test results show.

The aircraft’s radar-absorbing metallic skin is the principal cause of its maintenance troubles, with unexpected shortcomings – such as vulnerability to rain and other abrasion – challenging Air Force and contractor technicians since the mid-1990s, according to Pentagon officials, internal documents and a former engineer.

While most aircraft fleets become easier and less costly to repair as they mature, key maintenance trends for the F-22 have been negative in recent years, and on average from October last year to this May, just 55 percent of the deployed F-22 fleet has been available to fulfill missions guarding U.S. airspace, the Defense Department acknowledged this week. The F-22 has never been flown over Iraq or Afghanistan....

“It is a disgrace that you can fly a plane [an average of] only 1.7 hours before it gets a critical failure” that jeopardizes success of the aircraft’s mission, said a Defense Department critic of the plane who is not authorized to speak on the record....

But other defense officials – reflecting sharp divisions inside the Pentagon about the wisdom of ending one of the largest arms programs in U.S. history – emphasize the plane’s unsurpassed flying abilities, express renewed optimism that the troubles will abate and say the plane is worth the unexpected costs.

Skin problems – often requiring re-gluing small surfaces that can take more than a day to dry – helped force more frequent and time-consuming repairs, according to the confidential data drawn from tests conducted by the Pentagon’s independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation between 2004 and 2008.

Over the four-year period, the F-22’s average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from 20 hours to 34, with skin repairs accounting for more than half of that time – and more than half the hourly flying costs – last year, according to the test and evaluation office.

The Air Force says the F-22 cost $44,259 per flying hour in 2008; the Office of the Secretary of Defense said the figure was $49,808. The F-15, the F-22’s predecessor, has a fleet average cost of $30,818.

‘Compromises’

Darrol Olsen, a specialist in stealth coatings who worked at Lockheed’s testing laboratory in Marietta, Ga., from 1995 to 1999, said the current troubles are unsurprising. In a lawsuit filed under seal in 2007, he charged the company with violating the False Claims Act for ordering and using coatings that it knew were defective while hiding the failings from the Air Force.

He has cited a July 1998 report that said test results “yield the same problems as documented previously” in the skin’s quality and durability, and another in December that year saying, “Baseline coatings failed.” A Lockheed briefing that September assured the Air Force that the effort was “meeting requirements with optimized products.”

“When I got into this thing ... I could not believe the compromises” made by Lockheed to meet the Air Force’s request for quick results, said Olsen, who had a top-secret clearance. “I suggested we go to the Air Force and tell them we had some difficulties ... and they would not do that. I was squashed. I knew from the get-go that this material was bad, that this correcting it in the field was never going to work.”

Olsen, who said Lockheed fired him over a medical leave, heard from colleagues as recently as 2005 that problems persisted with coatings and radar absorbing materials in the plane’s skin, including what one described as vulnerability to rain. Invited to join his lawsuit, the Justice Department filed a court notice last month saying it was not doing so “at this time” – a term that means it is still investigating the matter, according to a department spokesman.

[David G. Ahern, a senior Pentagon procurement official who helps oversee the F-22 program,] said the Pentagon could not comment on the allegations. Lockheed spokeswoman Mary Jo Polidore said that “the issues raised in the complaint are at least 10 years old,” and that the plane meets or exceeds requirements established by the Air Force. “We deny Mr. Olsen’s allegations and will vigorously defend this matter.”

There have been other legal complications. In late 2005, Boeing learned of defects in titanium booms connecting the wings to the plane, which the company, in a subsequent lawsuit against its supplier, said posed the risk of “catastrophic loss of the aircraft.” But rather than shut down the production line – an act that would have incurred large Air Force penalties – Boeing reached an accord with the Air Force to resolve the problem through increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air Force.

[Pierre Sprey, a key designer in the 1970s and 1980s of the F-16 and A-10 warplanes,] said engineers who worked on [the F-22] told him that because of Lockheed’s use of hundreds of subcontractors, quality control was so poor that workers had to create a “shim line” at the Georgia plant where they retooled badly designed or poorly manufactured components. “Each plane wound up with all these hand-fitted parts that caused huge fits in maintenance,” he said. “They were not interchangeable.”

Polidore confirmed that some early parts required modifications but denied that such a shim line existed and said “our supplier base is the best in the industry.”
The plane’s million-dollar radar-absorbing canopy has also caused problems, with a stuck hatch imprisoning a pilot for hours in 2006 and engineers unable to extend the canopy’s lifespan beyond about 18 months of flying time. It delaminates, “loses its strength and finish,” said an official privy to Air Force data.

In the interview, Ahern and Air Force Gen. C.D. Moore confirmed that canopy visibility has been declining more rapidly than expected, with brown spots and peeling forcing $120,000 refurbishments at 331 hours of flying time, on average, instead of the stipulated 800 hours.

There has been some gradual progress. At the plane’s first operational flight test in September 2004, it fully met two of 22 key requirements and had a total of 351 deficiencies; in 2006, it fully met five; in 2008, when squadrons were deployed at six U.S. bases, it fully met seven.

“It flunked on suitability measures – availability, reliability, and maintenance,” said [Thomas Christie, the top weapons testing expert from 2001 to 2005,] about the first of those tests. “There was no consequence. It did not faze anybody who was in the decision loop” for approving the plane’s full production. This outcome was hardly unique, Christie adds. During his tenure in the job from 2001 to 2005, “16 or 17 major weapons systems flunked” during initial operational tests, and “not one was stopped as a result.”

“I don’t accept that this is still early in the program,” Christie said, explaining that he does not recall a plane with such a low capability to fulfill its mission due to maintenance problems at this point in its tenure as the F-22. The Pentagon said 64 percent of the fleet is currently “mission capable.” After four years of rigorous testing and operations, “the trends are not good,” he added.

Pentagon officials respond that measuring hourly flying costs for aircraft fleets that have not reached 100,000 flying hours is problematic, because sorties become more frequent after that point; Ahern also said some improvements have been made since the 2008 testing, and added: “We're going to get better.” He said the F-22s are on track to meet all of what the Air Force calls [the F-22’s] KPP[s] – key performance parameters – by next year.

But last Nov. 20, John J. Young Jr., who was then undersecretary of defense and Ahern’s boss, said that officials continue to struggle with the F-22’s skin. “There’s clearly work that needs to be done there to make that airplane both capable and affordable to operate,” he said.54

Rebuttals to July 10, 2009, News Report

On July 14, it was reported that Lockheed on July 13 had circulated an unsigned document on Capitol Hill saying that the plane has “performed extremely well” and that its maintenance problems are abating. The paper was a response to a report in The Washington Post last week [the July 10 news report cited above] disclosing that the Defense Department had calculated the hourly flying cost for an F-22 at $49,808 and that tests last year showed that the mean time between critical failures during an F-22 flight was 1.7 hours.

54 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Premier U.S. Fighter Jet Has Major Shortcomings,” Washington Post, July 10, 2009: 1, 4. The phrase in brackets “[an average of]” appears in the original; the other bracketed material was inserted by CRS for clarity. Bracketed material that identifies people being quoted reproduces wording used elsewhere in the article.
Lockheed’s document confirmed that “structural retrofit repairs” are still being made to F-22s and said the plane’s canopy has been redesigned because of problems in maintaining its transparency. But it said that the new canopies will meet requirements and that maintenance downtime is diminishing. Responding to criticism that the plane has never flown over Afghanistan and Iraq, the company said, “The best weapon may be the one that isn’t used but instead deters a conflict before it begins.”

A separate document circulated by the Air Force in response to the report confirmed that Defense Department tests showed that 30 hours of maintenance were needed for every hour of F-22 flying time and said the F-22 fleet’s “mission capable rate” – a measure of its readiness to meet military requirements – improved from 62 percent to 68 percent between 2004 and 2008.

A spokeswoman for the Office of the Secretary of Defense said last week that this rate measures only the readiness of planes that are not in depots for repair and noted that the F-22 program and the Air Force traditionally focus on a separate measure of the fleet’s availability for missions. That availability, she said, was improving but stood at 55.9 percent for the past five months.55

On July 14, 2009, Senator Saxby Chambliss inserted into the Congressional Record a document he described as an Air Force rebuttal to points made in the July 10, 2009, article cited above. Below is the document as printed in the Congressional Record.56

---

RESPONSE TO F-22 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE BY JEFF SMITH

CLAIM …30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the skies… (Para 1)

AF RESPONSE True based on the DOT&E Report from 2007 at 34 hours.

CLAIM …hourly cost of flying to more than $44,000… (Para 1)

AF RESPONSE The total variable cost per flying hour includes: aircraft part repairs (depot level repairs [DRLs]), replenishment spares, consumables, engine parts and aviation fuel. The F-22 FY08 total variable cost per flying hour (17,711 total hours flown) was $19K and the F-15 FY08 total variable cost per flying hour (122,762 total hours flown) was $17K.

Costs included in the variable cost per flying hour are a subset of total operational cost per flying hour. For the F-22, contractor support is included in both the variable cost per flying hour and the operational cost per flying hour. Contractor costs which meet the definition of a variable cost are included in the $19,750 Variable CPHF, along with appropriate government costs. Other contractor support costs are added in, along with appropriate government costs, to obtain the total $49,808 Operational CPHF.

F-22 vs. F-15
2008 Cost Comparison Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Costs Variable w/ Flying Hours</th>
<th>Costs Variable w/ # of a/c</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-22</td>
<td>$19,750 CPHF*</td>
<td>$2.5M cost per a/c</td>
<td>$276M total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>$17,465 CPHF*</td>
<td>$2.4M cost per a/c</td>
<td>$318M total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Activities: (by category)</td>
<td>Repairs (DRLs)</td>
<td>Depot Maintenance</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spares</td>
<td>Base Operations</td>
<td>Tech Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td></td>
<td>Program Mgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost comparison includes all O&S costs (both CLS and organic)
Once costs are bucketed into categories, F-22 and F-15 costs are similar
Note: * Costs variable with flying hours are preliminary estimates.

CLAIM …radar-absorbing metallic skin is the principal cause of its maintenance troubles, with unexpected shortcomings… (Para 2)

AF RESPONSE True.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLAIM</th>
<th>AF RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…such as vulnerability to rain and other abrasion… (Para 2)</td>
<td>Not true. Rain is not the cause of skin issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… aircraft fleets become easier and less costly to repair as they mature, key maintenance trends for the F-22 have been negative in recent years, and on average from October last year to this May…(Para 3)</td>
<td>Not true. Have been improving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… just 55 percent of the deployed F-22 fleet has been available to fulfill missions guarding U.S. airspace, the Defense Department acknowledged this week. The F-22 has never been… (Para 3)</td>
<td>Fleet average 64.5 and Operational Fleet (LAFB, EAFB, HAFB) 61.5. The mission capable rate has improved from 62% to 68% percent from 2004 to 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… only 1.7 hours … (Para 5)</td>
<td>True based on the FOT&amp;E Report. The F-22 program does not measure mean time between critical failure. However, Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) has dramatically matured from 0.97 in 2004 to 3.22 as demonstrated by Lot 6 aircraft performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…$350 million apiece… (Para 5)</td>
<td>$350 million then-year cost is true for the programs average unit cost (PAUC) for 184 aircraft, which includes all RDT&amp;E and procurement costs. The fly away cost of the F-22 is $142.6M each for Lot 9 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…Structural problems that turned up in subsequent testing forced retrofits to the frame …(Para 19)</td>
<td>Misleading. The F-22 had a series of structural models that were tested throughout its development in a building block manner. Lockheed Martin completed static and fatigue testing in 2005 on two early production representative airframes. The results of those tests required upgrades to the airframe in a few highly stressed locations. Follow up component level testing was completed and structural redesigns were verified and implemented into the production line. For aircraft that were delivered prior to design change implementation, structural retrofit repairs are being implemented by a funded program called the F-22 Structural Retrofit Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… changes in the fuel flow… (Para 19)</td>
<td>False. The F-22 fuel system has NOT required redesign. The F-22 program has improved the reliability of individual fuel system components as part of our reliability and maintainability improvement program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAIM</td>
<td>...forced the frequent retesting of millions of lines of code,... (Para 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF RESPONSE</td>
<td>False. Diagnostic software is designed to automatically detect and isolate system faults. Currently it detects system faults 64% of the time and isolates the fault 92% of the time. This is up from 42% and 63% respectively in 2006. The F-22 program continues to incorporate diagnostic improvements as part of our reliability and maintainability improvement program. We do not see anything inherent in the way the software is written that makes it hard to change. The avionics systems, air vehicle systems and engine systems and their operating software require highly qualified personnel to implement changes and require an increased amount of system-level integration testing. Very strict coding and documentation standards are used in the design and development of the F-22 software. Adherence to these standards is what positions the code to allow for future changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAIM</td>
<td>... Skin problems ... (Para 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF RESPONSE</td>
<td>The issues noted from the FOT&amp;E 2 Report are: 1 abrasion, 1 canopy, 3 missing filler, 4 roll up, 12 tip breaks and ~150 tip/edge damages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAIM</td>
<td>... Over the four-year period, the F-22's average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from 20 hours to 34, ... (Para 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF RESPONSE</td>
<td>Misleading, the two numbers cited are from FOT&amp;E 1 and FOT&amp;E 2 averages respectively. The F-22 program does not measure mean time between critical failure. However, Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) has dramatically matured from 0.97 in 2004 to 3.22 as demonstrated by Lot 6 aircraft performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAIM</td>
<td>... The Air Force says the F-22 cost $44,259 per flying hour in 2008; the Office of the Secretary of Defense said the figure was $49,808. The F-15, the F-22's predecessor, has a fleet average cost of $30,818. ... (Para 22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF RESPONSE</td>
<td>The total variable cost per flying hour includes: aircraft part repairs (DLRs), replenishment spares, consumables, engine parts and aviation fuel. The F-22 FY08 total variable cost per flying hour (17,711 total hours flown) was $19K and the F-15 FY08 total variable cost per flying hour (122,762 total hours flown) was $17K. Costs included in the variable cost per flying hour are a subset of total operational cost per flying hour. For the F-22, contractor support is included in both the variable cost per flying hour and the operational cost per flying hour. Contractor costs which meet the definition of a variable cost are included in the $19,750 Variable CPFH, along with appropriate government costs. Other contractor support costs are added in, along with appropriate government costs, to obtain the total $49,808 Operational CPFH.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**F-22 vs. F-15**

2008 Cost Comparison Breakdown
## Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Costs Variable w/ Flying Hours</th>
<th>Costs Variable w/ # of a/c</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-22</td>
<td>$19,750 CPFH*</td>
<td>$2.5M cost per a/c</td>
<td>$276M total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>$17,465 CPFH*</td>
<td>$2.4M cost per a/c</td>
<td>$318M total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Activities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(by category)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs (DLRs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tech Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Program Mgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost comparison includes all O&S costs (both CLS and organic)
Once costs are bucketed into categories, F-22 and F-15 costs are similar

Note: * Costs variable with flying hours are preliminary estimates.

---

**CLAIM**

... of "catastrophic loss of the aircraft."... (Para 28)

**AF RESPONSE**

False. The Air Force has determined that there is no need for costly repairs, now or in the future. Boeing reported to USAF that for a limited number of F-22 titanium fuselage boom structures fabricated up to that time period, the titanium material used did not meet stringent F-22 specifications. It had different fatigue mechanical properties than what was certified for production. After extensive review of the titanium by Program experts it was determined that the as-fabricated fuselage boom structural assemblies did not require costly production repairs or scrapping of these high-cost fuselage boom assemblies. However, additional structural inspections had to be imposed on these particular parts to satisfy airworthiness certification requirements per the F-22 Aircraft Structural Integrity Process. These inspections are now in place and conducted in a routine manner per F-22 maintenance instructions.

---

**CLAIM**

...through increased inspections over the life of the fleet, with expenses to be mostly paid by the Air Force.... (Para 28)

**AF RESPONSE**

False. Fair and reasonable consideration was provided by the contractor to the AF for additional inspection burden.

---

**CLAIM**

...It delaminates, "loses its strength and finish".... (Para 31)

**AF RESPONSE**

False. Each F-22 canopy costs $120k. Canopies do not lose strength over time and are removed due to optical degradation NOT safety of flight. The F-22 canopy coating life requirement is 800 hrs. Canopy coatings are unique to the F-22 system. The requirement was achieved and demonstrated in laboratory tests in Engineering and Manufacturing Development. During early operation usage the program discovered previously unknown impacts due to environmental effects that reduced coating durability. Presently, canopy coatings last an average of 331 flight hours. The program...
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

| CLAIM | ...$120,000 refurbishments at 331 hours of flying time, on average, instead of the stipulated 800 hours...(Para 32) |
| AF RESPONSE | Misleading. Each F-22 canopy costs $120k. Canopies do not lose strength over time and are removed due to optical degradation NOT safety of flight. The F-22 canopy coating life requirement is 800 hrs. Canopy coatings are unique to the F-22 System. The requirement was achieved and demonstrated in laboratory tests in Engineering and Manufacturing Development. During early operation usage the program discovered previously unknown impacts due to environmental effects that reduced coating durability. Presently, canopy coatings last an average of 331 flight hours. The program has incorporated several coating improvements. Coating life continues to improve. |
| CLAIM | ... it fully met two of 22 key requirements...(Para 33) |
| AF RESPONSE | There are only 11 key performance parameters. |
| CLAIM | ... After four years of rigorous testing and operations, "the trends are not good...(Para 35) |
| AF RESPONSE | False. The mission capable rate has improved from 62% to 68% percent from 2004 to 2009. The F-22 program does not measure maintenance time per repair. Direct Maintenance Man-Hours per Flying Hour (DMMH/FH) has improved from 18.10 DMMH/FH in 2008 to 10.48 DMMH/FH in 2009. |
| CLAIM | ....It will, among other things, give F-22 pilots the ability to communicate with other types of warplanes; it currently is the only such warplane to lack that capability... (Para 38) |
| AF RESPONSE | Provides the F-22 to transfer digital data to other (Multi-function Advanced Data Link) MADL equipped aircraft. |
| CLAIM | ... One of the last four planes Gates supported buying is meant to replace an F-22 that crashed during a test flight north of Los Angeles on March 25, during his review of the program...(Para 40) |
| AF RESPONSE | Misleading. All 4 Lot 10 aircraft will be combat coded. |
| CLAIM | Paragraph 40-41 |
| AF RESPONSE | Cannot comment on this information because the report has not been released yet. |

F-22 Modernization Program

A third potential issue for Congress for the F-22 program concerns cost effectiveness of the F-22 modernization program. Supporters of the program could argue that upgrading the F-22’s air-to-ground and ISR capabilities will expand the aircraft’s mission flexibility and thereby realize a greater return on the significant investment made in developing and procuring the aircraft. Air
Force officials have emphasized the F-22’s potential to execute many of the ISR missions that UAVs have performed in support of counter insurgency and low-intensity conflicts.57

Skeptics could argue that upgrading the F-22’s air-to-ground and ISR capabilities is not critical in light of the substantial air-to-ground capability of the F-35, which is to be procured in large numbers, and the ISR capabilities of other existing or planned DOD systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They could argue that resolving instability problems with the F-22’s advanced avionics has been a significant contributor to the program’s development cost, and that adding a new feature such as an air-to-ground radar or new communications capabilities could jeopardize the progress that has been made in the F-22’s avionics software. They could argue that controlling the F-22’s electronic emissions is a key component of making the aircraft elusive to enemy defenses, and that if the upgrades make the F-22 less stealthy, the benefits of these modifications might not be worth the risks.

Potential Export to Japan

A fourth issue for Congress for FY2010 for the F-22 program concerns the potential export of the aircraft to Japan. As mentioned earlier, Congress from time to time has reconsidered the legislated prohibition on foreign sales of the F-22. Some Members reportedly have expressed interest in 2009 in reconsidering the prohibition.58

Summary of Arguments

Supporters of selling F-22s to Japan could argue one or more of the following:

- Selling F-22s to Japan would enable Japan to effectively counter highly capable combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems that have been or will likely be deployed by regional neighbors such as Russia and China. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is less capable in countering these highly capable enemy fighters and surface-to-air missile systems.59 The U.S. Air Force is procuring F-22s because it

---

57 See, for example, Michael Bruno, “Air Force ISR Chief Foresees Downplaying ‘F’ in F-22, F-35,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 22, 2007. Although the F-22 may have effective on-board sensors and the ability to receive additional information from other ISR platforms, it has limited ability to transmit targeting information to other platforms or command and control (C2) assets. This restricted communications capability was intended to make the F-22 more elusive to enemy defenses. In August 2008, it was reported that Air Force officials wanted to reprogram $85 million to accelerate an upgrade that would enable the F-22 to more effectively share information with other aircraft. (Marcus Weisgerber, “Air Force Loots to Shuffle $85 Million to Accelerate F-22A Mods,” Inside the Air Force, August 8, 2008.)


59 For an example of an article that presents this argument, see David A. Fulghum, “Converging Problems Argue For More F-22s, Officials Says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July 10, 2009: 3. The article states in part:

Japan’s F-15J force, once top of the line, is now “outclassed by the new generation of Chinese fighters” such as the Su-30MKK, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard Myers (ret.), tells Aviation Week.

(continued...)
does not believe that a force composed entirely of F-35s will be sufficient to effectively counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. Improving Japan’s ability to effectively counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems would enhance regional deterrence, contributing to regional stability, and reduce requirements for U.S. forces in the region.

- Selling F-22s to Japan would demonstrate U.S. support for Japan as a high-priority U.S. ally more powerfully than would selling F-35s to Japan.
- Selling F-22s to Japan would maximize interoperability between Japanese and U.S. Air Force front-line fighters defending the western approaches to Japan.
- Concerns about a sale of F-22s to Japan creating a risk of inadvertent technology transfer can be mitigated by selling Japan an export version of the F-22 that lacks highly sensitive technologies. Japan reportedly is willing to contribute $300 million toward the cost of developing an export version of the F-22. Although an export version of the F-22 would take time to develop, it could be delivered to Japan more quickly than could the F-35, production of which is only beginning, and thus permit Japan to improve its fighter force sooner than would be possible with the F-35. Agreeing on the configuration of an export version of the F-35 can pose its own challenges.
- Producing F-22s for Japan could reduce the cost of any F-22s that are produced at the same time for the U.S. Air Force by more fully spreading the fixed overhead costs associated with F-22 production, and could reduce the cost of any F-22s that are later produced for the U.S. Air Force by moving F-22 production further down the production learning curve.
- Producing F-22s for Japan could increase or preserve U.S. jobs related to F-22 production.

Opponents of selling F-22s to Japan could argue one or more of the following:

(...continued)

Moreover, China’s air defenses, which include variants of Russian-made, long-range SA-10s and SA-20 (S-300 family) missiles, can only be penetrated by the fast, high-flying, stealthy Raptor. Japan’s Defense Ministry has studied the problem closely and, at least internally, has produced “a very impressive tactical rationale” for buying the F-22 if its sale is approved by the U.S. Congress. Myers predicts that any resistance within the U.S. Air Force to selling Raptor technology to Japan, “an incredibly staunch ally,” will be isolated and not critical.

Such considerations are pressing because tensions are growing over Japan’s far-flung island empire, some of it mineral rich, that stretches to within 125-150 miles of China. That distance, interestingly enough, is the range of the Raptor’s advanced radar, compared to 56 miles for the F-15. Japan feels it must be prepared to defend its area of responsibility from a new generation of regional threats – including China’s increasingly sophisticated fighter force, which boasts the J-10 – that can carry its new, small-radar-signature, air-launched cruise missiles. Japan also needs a precision bombing capability if any of its islands are occupied.

Japan does not need the F-22 to be able to effectively counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. Like the U.S. Navy and U.S. allies in Europe, Japan can effectively counter highly capable enemy combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The U.S. Navy, which cannot always count on the presence of Air Force F-22s, plans to counter enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems in the future with a combination of F-35s and earlier-design F/A-18E/Fs. U.S. allies in Europe, including the United Kingdom, plan to rely on F-35s to effectively counter highly capable enemy aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. The F-35 is more affordable than the F-22, so Japan could purchase more F-35s than F-22s for a given amount of funding, and thus provide one-for-one replacements for a larger portion of its fighter force than would be possible through an equal-cost purchase of F-22s.

- Selling F-35s to Japan would sufficiently demonstrate U.S. support for Japan as a high-priority U.S. ally.
- Selling F-35s to Japan would maintain substantial interoperability between Japanese and U.S. tactical aircraft, particularly since the F-35, unlike the F-22, is to be purchased in large numbers by multiple U.S. military services.
- Selling F-22s to Japan could prompt a destabilizing regional arms race in northeast Asia, which would not be in the U.S. interest. Even absent an arms race, selling F-22s to Japan could complicate U.S. relations with China and Russia, and perhaps also with South Korea — a U.S. ally that has maritime territorial disputes with Japan, and whose relationship with Japan is influenced by memories of Japan’s 40-year annexation of the Korean peninsula.
- Even with a financial contribution from Japan, developing an export version of the F-22 could require a substantial expenditure of U.S. funds. The F-35, in contrast, was designed from the beginning with sales to other countries in mind, so a version suitable for Japan could be developed at relatively little additional cost. Removing highly sensitive technologies from F-22s sold to Japan would make the aircraft less capable, and thus closer in capability to the F-35.
- Producing F-35s for Japan could reduce the cost of F-35s that are produced at the same time for the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy by more fully spreading the fixed overhead costs associated with F-35 production, and could reduce the cost of any F-35s that are later produced for these three services by moving F-35 production further down the production learning curve.
- Producing F-35s for Japan could increase or preserve U.S. jobs related to F-35 production.

Additional Discussion of Factors to Consider

The following sections provide further discussion of some factors relating to a potential sale of F-22s to Japan.63 The sections were authored primarily by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs (echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov; 7-7748).

---

63 The material in this section previously appeared in CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by (continued...)
Japan’s Defense Policy

For the United States, its alliance with Japan provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. About 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S. forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region. Echoing his predecessors, President Obama has labeled the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cornerstone of East Asian security.” High-level U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives since 2001 declared an expanded commitment to security cooperation by outlining major command changes and calling for greater interoperability between the two militaries. Several of the agreements have stalled, however, due to resistance to base realignment by local host governments and political gridlock in Tokyo.

Japan faces a challenging regional context: both direct and potential security threats, as well as suspicion from other states that changes to Tokyo’s defense policy indicate a return to its militarist past. North Korea poses a particularly acute and proximate threat to Japan, heightened by Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear explosive device tests in 2006. Historical enmity and contemporary competition for influence with China makes Beijing’s military modernization worrisome for Japanese defense planners. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF, the official name for Japan’s military) has detected periodic Chinese military activities in areas surrounding Japan’s outlying islands, including submarine incursions close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships near a disputed gas field. Tokyo also faces difficult relations with South Korea because of Korean distrust based on the memory of Japan’s 40-year annexation of the peninsula and some territorial disputes.

Technology Transfer

Air Force leaders have consistently described the F-22 as the world’s most technologically advanced and capable fighter aircraft. Protecting U.S. intellectual property in F-22 technologies and denying adversaries access to these technologies are high national security priorities.

It is unclear whether the United States and Japan could agree on the terms and conditions for selling F-22s to Japan. Japan would likely want version of the F-22 that is the same as, or similar to, the version flown by the U.S. Air Force. Japan might also want to license or co-manufacture the aircraft, which would create manufacturing jobs in Japan and permit Japan to acquire F-22 engineering and design knowledge. U.S. officials, on the other hand, might want to sell Japan a version of the F-22 that is less capable than what Japan might prefer, in part to protect key F-22 technologies, and might not support licensing or co-production.

(continued)

Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery. In addition to the factors discussed here, Congress in the late 1980s debated and denied a DOD request to co-develop a fighter aircraft with Japan based on the F-16. Some of the issues considered during that debate may be relevant today. For a discussion of those issues, see CRS Report 90-309 F, Japanese FSX Fighter Controversy, by Richard Grimmett (out of print; available upon request).


65 Japan has traditionally placed great value on developing industrial defense “autonomy,” that is, indigenous weapons production, although this imperative has relaxed somewhat in recent years, in part to cooperate with the United States on missile defense. (Richard J. Samuels, “Give & Take; The Outlook for U.S.-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation,” Armed Forces Journal, February 1, 2006.)
The potential for technology transfer touches upon both military and economic concerns. Unlike some countries, Japan does not have a track record of re-exporting technology that it acquires through import. However, an inadvertent leak of U.S. technology or knowledge could also be a threat. The leak of secret data associated with the Aegis weapon system by Japanese military personnel in 2002 is an example of this potential danger.\textsuperscript{66} Japan is a military ally, but also considered by some to be an economic rival. Many of the F-22 technologies or industrial processes could have commercial application. Some may be concerned that F-22 technology or knowledge could find their way into a myriad of Japanese products, to the competitive detriment of U.S. industry.

A second proliferation issue relates to the effect an F-22 sale could have on other countries. Other countries in the region could perceive the F-22 as causing an imbalance of military power in favor of Japan, and inciting them to seek their own advanced aircraft or defensive systems. Once Japan sets the precedent of F-22 export, other countries might pressure U.S. policy makers to sell them F-22s. Israel, for example, has reportedly expressed interest in the F-22.

**Interoperability and Interdependence**

Bilateral agreements aim to expand the benefits of the alliance by increasing the interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, therefore multiplying their collective capability. Several joint facilities are planned, including an air operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base, to be operational by 2010. Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would boost interoperability because both militaries could use identical, state-of-the-art equipment. Because of the U.S. security guarantee to Japan, Japan’s possession of the F-22s may allow the United States to rotate its own aircraft out of the region when necessary. Similarly, by fielding the F-22, Japan could make up for the deficit of 198 Raptors the U.S. Air Force says it needs but cannot afford.

Despite these ambitions, however, achieving true interoperability is a difficult task. Constitutional, legal, and normative constraints limit SDF participation in many of the operations and training that traditionally integrate different national forces (see section below). Increasing the sophistication of bilateral training requires funding and facilities, currently under pressure because of SDF’s budget requirements. Language barriers and differences in military doctrine also present challenges. In addition, localities affected by the noise of military bases, particularly those hosting aircraft, have been vocally opposed to many of the U.S. troop realignment proposals.

**Regional Security**

China and South Korea have voiced concern about Japan’s intention to upgrade its military capabilities, largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945 militarism. Some analysts caution that selling the F-22s to Japan could destabilize the region, possibly even sparking an arms race, and contribute to an image of Japan becoming America’s proxy in the region. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with China. South Korea has already registered its unease at Japan acquiring F-22s, and at one point

Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

suggested that it may seek a deal to purchase the aircraft in order to match Japan’s capabilities. Although the Lee Myung-bak government has made moves to strengthen U.S.-South Korean alliance, the Seoul-Washington relationship has been strained at times over the past several years, and some South Koreans chafe at indications that the United States prioritizes defense ties with Japan above those with Korea.

Japanese defense officials have pointed to China’s acquisition of increasingly sophisticated air capabilities to justify their request for the F-22s, asserting that China’s modern air fleet will soon dwarf Japan’s. Despite the relatively strong state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the two nations remain wary of each other’s intentions. Although the risk of military confrontation is considered small, there is the potential that territorial disputes over outlying islands could escalate into armed clashes, or that conflict could break out in the Taiwan Strait between the United States and China, which could involve Japan. For this reason, some U.S. and Japanese commentators have supported the sale of F-22s to Japan as necessary to maintain the “Taiwan balance.”

Japanese Restraints

Japanese Restraints

Japan faces an array of legal and budgetary concerns about enhancing its military, raising questions about whether Tokyo could follow through on an F-22 sale. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” Although Article 9 states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” the Japanese SDF is in practice a well-funded and well-equipped military. Constitutional concerns do not appear to be significant for the purchase of the F-22, but provide a sense of the overall context and challenges to acquiring advanced weapons systems in a country with a strong pacifist sentiment.

Under a self-imposed ban on exporting arms, Japan cannot in principle participate in joint development that requires it to export weapons parts and research data to other countries. This ban has been loosened to allow Japan to work on missile defense with the United States, but the issue remains contentious. Japan’s aversion to military export led to Tokyo’s decision not to participate in the international consortium to co-develop the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

A second legal issue that could generate debate in Japan, and therefore affect the sale, is the question of whether the F-22 is an offensive weapon; under the current interpretation of the Japanese constitution, the SDF is only allowed to possess defensive capability. Military aircraft are almost inherently flexible weapon systems and can be difficult to classify as “offensive” or “defensive.” They can be used in primarily defensive roles, such as defending indigenous airspace from attack, or to attack an adversary’s homeland or air forces. When the F-22 program was threatened by congressional budget cuts, advocates argued that its offensive capabilities mandated its continuation. Consistent emphasis on the F-22s’ ability to penetrate contested airspace and destroy enemy defenses could lead many to believe that the Raptor is primarily an offensive weapon.

At $44 billion (2007), Japan’s defense budget is among the largest in the world. However, Japanese leaders are under pressure to stem government spending, and many ministries face

---

67 In 2008, South Korea purchased 39 F-15ks and plan to buy 21 F-15K level aircraft between 2010-2012.
68 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data.
budget cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Overall, Japan’s defense budget has steadily if modestly declined over the past several years. Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although the cap is not a law. Tokyo’s defense expenditures include ongoing host nation support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan (totaling $110 billion from 1978-2007)\(^6\) and an estimated $20 billion for the realignment of U.S. troops in the region. Based on these burdens, some analysts have voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of becoming a “hollow force” because of its insufficient procurement system. Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the demographic reality of an aging and shrinking population with a shortage of workers.

**Legislative Activity in 2009**


**Request**

The administration has not requested funding in FY2010 for the procurement of additional F-22s. The administration has requested $95.2 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the F-22 program, but this funding is requested for activities associated with completing a 187-aircraft program and shutting down the F-22 production line, not for procuring additional F-22s. The administration has also requested $350.7 million in FY2010 procurement funding for the modification of in-service F-22s, as well as additional research and development funding and military construction (MilCon) funding for the F-22 program.

**House**

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647), recommends authorizing $368.8 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011, with the funding to be transferred from funding requested for the Defense Environmental Cleanup program. The recommendation was approved by a vote of 31 to 30 at the full committee’s markup of the bill.\(^7\) The committee’s report states, in the section on the Defense Environmental Cleanup program, that:

> the committee believes that the need to sustain the F–22 production line warrants an additional transfer from Defense Environmental Cleanup of $368.8 million. The committee recommends that the Secretary of Energy also derive this decrease from among sites that are projected to meet regulatory milestones ahead of schedule in fiscal year 2010, or that are at greatest risk of being unable to execute P.L. 111-5 [the American Recovery and

---

\(^6\) CIA World Factbook; Japan. CIA (2007-03-15).

The Reinvestment Act of 2009] and fiscal year 2010 funding as planned in fiscal year 2010. (Page 586)

The report also recommends $12.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service F-22s—a reduction of $338.0 million from the administration’s request. The committee’s report states:

The committee notes that $523.0 million was authorized and appropriated for the advance procurement of 20 F–22As for fiscal year 2009, that the Department of the Air Force will procure only four additional F–22As, and that the Department of the Air Force plans to obligate only $185.0 million of that amount, leaving $338.0 million that could be applied to meet fiscal year 2010 F–22A modification requirements. (Page 100)

Regarding the projected shortfall in Air Force fighter aircraft, the committee’s report states:

The committee notes that for the past year, the Department of the Air Force has informed Congress that it requires 2,200 fighter aircraft, and that the Department projects a shortfall in its fighter aircraft inventory that would begin in fiscal year 2017 and grow to approximately 800 aircraft by 2024. The committee believes that such a shortfall will adversely affect the ability of the active duty forces and air reserve forces to meet future requirements for both air expeditionary forces and for the air sovereignty alert mission in the United States.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2010. The report should include statements from both the Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve describing their separate and independent views to Congress, as applicable. The report should address the so-called ‘‘fighter gap’’ issue in the long- and short-term with alternative solutions including but not limited to: accelerated procurement of fifth generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35; an interim procurement of so-called “4.5 generation” fighters; and fleet management options such as service life extension programs. The report must include a detailed analysis of the effect that any shortfalls will have on the Air National Guard and the air sovereignty alert mission specifically, including the loss of Air National Guard flying missions throughout the United States and the resultant loss of Air National Guard pilot and maintenance capability. (Page 101)

Section 131 of H.R. 2647 would repeal Section 134 of the FY2009 defense authorization act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008), which prohibits obligating more than $140.0 million of FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the Obama administration certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-22s is in the national interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national interest. The certification was to be made by March 1, 2009.

Section 132 of H.R. 2647 would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan for the preservation and storage of unique tooling related to the production of hardware and end items for F-22s that would (1) ensure that the Secretary preserves and stores such tooling in a manner that allows the production of such hardware and end items to be restarted after a period of idleness; (2) identify, with respect to the supplier base of such hardware and end items, the costs of restarting production; and (3) identify any contract modifications, additional facilities, or funding that the Secretary determines necessary to carry out the plan. The provision also states that none of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by the bill or otherwise made available for FY2010 for the Aircraft Procurement, Air Force appropriation account for F-22s may be obligated or
expended for activities related to disposing of F-22 production tooling until a period of 45 days has elapsed after the date on which the Secretary submits the report to Congress.

**Section 1237** of H.R. 2647 would require Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the potential sale of F-22s to Japan. The report is to include assessments of (1) the cost of developing an exportable version of the F-22, (2) whether an exportable version of the F-22 is technically feasible and executable, and the timeline for achieving such an exportable version; (3) the potential strategic implication for allowing the sale of the F-22s to Japan; (4) the impact of foreign military sales of the F-22 on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry; and (5) any changes to existing law needed to allow foreign military sales of the F-22 to Japan.

The committee’s report contains additional views of several members of the committee on various issues relating to the bill. The F-22 program is discussed in these additional views on pages 672 and 677-678 of the report.

The above provisions and funding levels were not altered by any floor amendments when the full House considered, amended, and passed H.R. 2647.

A June 24, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 2647 as reported in the House states:

*F-22 Advance Procurement*: The Administration strongly objects to the provisions in the bill authorizing $369 million in advanced procurement funds for F-22s in FY 2011. The collective judgment of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the military departments suggests that a final program of record of 187 F-22s is sufficient to meet operational requirements. If the final bill presented to the President contains this provision, the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.71

**Senate**

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), recommends authorizing $1.75 billion for the procurement of seven F-22s in FY2010. The recommendation was approved by a vote of 13 to 11 at the full committee’s markup of the bill.72 The committee’s report states:

The budget request included $95.2 million in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force (APAF), for the F–22A aircraft program, including $64.0 million for shutting down the production line.

The committee recommends an increase of $1.75 billion to purchase an additional seven F-22A aircraft in fiscal year 2010. The committee also directs that the production shutdown costs be applied to other program requirements.

---


The Air National Guard is charged with providing homeland aerial defense for the United States and is primarily responsible for executing the air sovereignty alert (ASA) mission as part of the National Defense Strategy. In carrying out this mission on a daily basis, the Air National Guard relies on more than 1,600 Air National Guard men and women who operate legacy F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. The committee has been informed that the projected retirements of these legacy aircraft with which the Air National Guard currently executes the ASA mission will leave the Guard short of the required number of aircraft to execute this mission. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office has commented that “unless the Air Force modifies its current fielding schedules or extends the service lives of its F-15s and F-16s ... it will lack viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations at some of the 18 current ASA sites after fiscal year 2015.”

The committee is concerned that no plan has been developed to fill this shortfall, either through modernizing legacy aircraft or buying new aircraft. Of specific concern is the fact that 80 percent of the F-16s will be gone in 8 years and since the majority of the ASA mission is accomplished by these F-16s, this will negatively impact the Air National Guard’s ability to execute the ASA mission.

In a recent letter, the Director of the Air National Guard commented, “While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and future asymmetric threats to our Nation, particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a fighter platform with the requisite speed and detection to address them. The F-22’s unique capability in this arena enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats that the Air National Guard’s current legacy systems are not capable of addressing ... basing F-22 (and eventually F-35s) at strategic Air National Guard locations throughout the United States while simultaneously making them available to rotationally support worldwide contingency operations is the most responsible approach to satisfying all of our Nation’s needs.”

For these reasons, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan, including force structure and basing requirements, for executing the ASA mission over the next 2 decades. The Secretary shall deliver that plan to the congressional defense committees no later than March 1, 2010. The plan shall give full consideration toward: (1) stationing the additional F-22s procured in fiscal year 2010 at strategic Air National Guard locations; (2) creating new or expanding current Active/Guard associate units in which both active-duty and Air National Guard personnel could operate these additional aircraft, as well as F-22s and F-35s procured in the future; and (3) transitioning earlier model F-22s as well as F-35s procured in the future to the Air National Guard at the first possible opportunity. (Pages 24-25; ellipses as in original)

The committee’s report also recommends rejecting the administration’s request for $350.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service F-22s, and reducing by $32.3 million the administration’s request for F-22 procurement funding that was to be used for purposes other than procuring new F-22s.

Section 122 of S. 1390 would repeal would repeal Section 134 of the FY2009 defense authorization act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008), which prohibits obligating more than $140.0 million of FY2009 advance procurement funding for the F-22 program until the Obama administration certifies to the congressional defense committees that procurement of F-22s is in the national interest, or that the termination of the F-22 production line is in the national interest. The certification was to be made by March 1, 2009.

Section 122 also states that “Subject to the provisions of appropriations Acts and applicable requirements relating to the transfer of funds, the Secretary of the Air Force may transfer amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009 by section 103(1) for aircraft procurement for
the Air Force and available for advance procurement for the F-22A fighter aircraft within that
subaccount or to other subaccounts for aircraft procurement for the Air Force for purposes of
providing funds for other modernization priorities with respect to the F-22A fighter aircraft.”

Regarding Section 122—as well as the committee’s recommendation to reject the
administration’s request for $350.7 million in procurement funding for modification of in-service
F-22s, and the committee’s recommendation to reduce by $32.3 million the administration’s
request for F-22 procurement funding that was to be used for purposes other than procuring new
F-22s—the committee’s report states:

In section 134 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress authorized $523.0 million in funds for F-22A advance procurement, but
prohibited obligation of more than $140.0 million of that amount until the President certified
to the congressional defense committees that: (1) the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft is
in the national interest of the United States; or (2) the termination of the production line for
F-22A fighter aircraft is in the national interest of the United States. The certification was
required to be submitted before March 1, 2009.

The President made no such certification. The Department has determined that, since the
President did not make a determination under section 134 of P.L. 110-417, the remaining
$383.0 million is unavailable for obligation.

The President’s budget request includes a proposal to terminate production for the F-22A
and includes no funds for additional F-22A aircraft. The budget request also includes a
request for $95.2 million to fund various activities related to the F-22A production line, and
$350.7 million to purchase and install various modifications for the F-22A fleet.

The committee recommends a provision [Section 122] that would: (1) repeal section 134 of
P.L. 110-417 to lower the fence around the $383.0 million that might have been used for
advance procurement; and (2) allow the Secretary of the Air Force to reallocate those funds
for other priorities. Lowering that fence would allow the Secretary to use these fiscal year
2009 funds to pay for fiscal year 2010 F-22A funding needs. The committee believes that,
subsequent to action on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32) the Air
Force should have $383.0 million available for such purposes.

Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $383.0 million to Aircraft Procurement,
Air Force, with $350.7 million of that amount applied to the F-22A modifications request,
and $32.3 million applied to the full funding line. (Pages 14-15)

Section 123 would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State
and in consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on potential foreign military sales of the F-22A
fighter aircraft. The report is to include assessments of (1) the cost of developing an exportable
version of the F-22; (2) whether an exportable version of the F-22 is technically feasible and
executable, and the timeline for achieving such an exportable version; (3) the potential strategic
implication for allowing the sale of the F-22s to Japan; (4) the impact of foreign military sales of
the F-22 on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry; and (5) any changes to existing law needed
to allow foreign military sales of the F-22 to Japan. The committee’s report summarizes Section
123 on page 15.
FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill

House

On July 16, 2009, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release stating that the subcommittee had completed its markup of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill. The release stated that the bill as marked by the subcommittee up includes an additional $369 in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s.73 This appears similar to the House Armed Services Committee’s recommendation for the FY2010 defense authorization bill (H.R. 2647—see above), which provides $368.8 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding for the procurement of 12 F-22s in FY2011.

FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32)

Request

As part of its proposed FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill, the administration requested $600 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s for which Congress had provided advance procurement funding in the FY2009 defense appropriations act. (As discussed earlier in this report, Congress, as part of its action on the FY2009 defense budget, provided $523 million in advance procurement funding for the procurement of 20 F-22s in FY2010. In late 2008, DOD released enough of this funding to fund the procurement of long-lead time items for four of these 20 F-22s.)

House

The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 111-105 of May 12, 2009) on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346) recommended approving the administration’s request for $600 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s (see page 21).

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 111-20 of May 14, 2009) on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (S. 1054) recommended $498 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s—a reduction of $102 million from the administration’s request. The report also recommended an additional $45 million in procurement funding for the F-22 program for “Full funding for fiscal year 2009,” and recommended reduction of $147 million in procurement funding for the F-22 program so as to “Delete shut-down funding” (see page 43).

---

Conference

The conference report (H.Rept. 111-151 of June 12, 2009) on the FY2009 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2346) recommended approving the administration’s request for $600 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of four F-22s (see page 93). The conference report also stated:

> The Air Force has informed the Congress that funding in the amount of $45,000,000 is required for the F-22 Raptor program to avoid a work stoppage in material processing and fabrication activities during fiscal year 2009. The conferees direct the Secretary of the Air Force to use $45,000,000 from within the funds provided to ensure that work proceeds on schedule. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be used to finance activities to shut-down the F-22A production line. Funds may be used to explore options to develop an export variant of the F22A. (Page 97)

The four F-22s whose procurement cost was completed by H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 are recorded as having been procured in FY2009, along with the 20 F-22s procured in the FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008).

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610