

THE STUDY OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN CONTINUUM OF CARE (COC), HOMELESS SERVICE
NETWORKS IN THE U.S.: INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK

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The dissertation investigates the form of network governance in the context of U.S. homeless service networks (namely continuum of care programs; CoCs). This research examines CoC homeless service networks by applying the institutional collective action (ICA) perspectives to understand the forms of network governance as a reflection of network context. The ICA perspective has been applied to understand the rational behavior of network members for the network governance form to mitigate the collective action problems. The ICA perspective helps understand why network members accept specific governance structures with their expectation to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs and uncertainty in their process of collaboration. This dissertation uses the data of CoC networks and point in time data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in 2019 and Census. The data developed for this study offers the homeless incidences, geographical characteristics, and governance structure based on the contact information. For an in-depth understanding, interview by CoC leaders was integrated. This dissertation consists of four essays about 1) Literature review on network governance and the theoretical argument in the ICA framework, 2) Background and network governance of the U.S. homeless service networks, 3) Factors affecting the choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form, and 4) Interviews by the representatives of CoC networks. The findings inform us of the governance structure for the effective service provisions and coordination of actions of network members and about why and how network organizations choose a form of network governance.

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By

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Scholarly interest has been growing in network and network governance, and some of studies have examined the form of network governance as a condition for networks function effectively (Kenis & Provan; 2009; Milward & Provan, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rodriguez, Langley, Beland, & Denis, 2007). Network governance is an institutional arrangement that may be agreed by diverse network participating organizations based on member organizations' circumstances and interests. Members or network understand decision making process and communication based on particular form of network governance and the form of network governance is important in understanding the mechanism for effective coordination of activities and program development. Knowing the network governance form accepted by members will capture expected benefits and costs incurred to the members participating in collective actions within network context in public service and policies.

Public policies have designed key service approaches based on cross sector network arrangements to respond complex nature of human and social services. In response to this major change in public services, scholars have studied dynamics among diverse actors in the network system services. Key mechanisms observed are in networked services are network , partnership, contracting-out, co-production etc. Among those service arrangement, network is often used mechanism that is community based and flexible in membership and cross sector and cross industry (Forrer, Kee, & Boyer, 2014). The network structure of public service has often been used in human and social services and policy. Research has also informed a network

is an effective form of service development and delivery, especially when the demand of service is diverse and solutions to the problem are multidimensional (Molin & Masella, 2016; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In the network service arrangements, the form of network governance defines internal operation of cross sector members and member organizations.

Social service policies such as services for the individuals experiencing homelessness and mental health services design services based on network-based service units in the expectation of generating synergetic effects from diverse service providers' engagement and community resource development (Raab & Kenis, 2009; Raab, Cambre, & Mannak, 2015). Since the wicked nature of social issues is complex to be solved by a single organization in isolation, a more comprehensive collective response should be developed to provide services to meet multi-dimensional demands of social issues (Klijn, 2005; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). The network of diverse community partners may improve service qualities and solve key problems in stake. Many services, including emergency management, health care, economic development, and human services, are designed and implemented by service networks to improve service integration and coordinate resources among cross-sector participants (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). According to Kapucu and Hu (2020), a network as a service unit will improve communication and information sharing and coordinate the community resource development. Also network based services engage a wide range of public, nonprofit and private organizations.

The network has distinctive characteristics to tackle complicated social and public problems. Since networks are based on interdependence by the voluntary participation of autonomous organizations rather than a hierarchical structure, network participants rely on

each other. Participation of the network-based services is non-compulsory and rather voluntary but in practice key service providers are embedded in service arrangement for years in the community. And their participation is expected (Agranoff, 2006; O'Toole, 1997). Decisions in a network are made often by discussions and consensus is pursued among network members, resulting in the network, a flexible coordination structure. This horizontal characteristic is more likely overcome the limitation of hierarchical arrangements such as inflexibility and red tape (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The parallel traits of the network also connect the formal positions to the informal ties among network participating organizations in the social service context. By connecting formally assigned positions and informal relationships, network members effectively exchange information, pool resources, and develop community knowledge for more innovative solutions to the policy problems (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). The interactive relationship of network members contributes to the durable dependencies of each other and the improvement of mutual perceptions (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).

However, networks have advantages and strengths that have to be realized in practice and have drawbacks resulting in insufficient outcomes (Agranoff, 2006; Kapucu & Hu, 2020; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Although horizontal and interactive characteristics of the network are helpful to overcome the hierarchy and bureaucratic management, decisions and process of consensus could spend much time and resources, thus producing less effective and efficient outcomes. Rapid decisions, for instance, often should be made to effectively respond to an emergency such as a tornado and earthquake, and tardy procedures and decisions in networks can constrain a timely response to those emergency situations. Another limitation of the network-based service arrangement is potential loss of accountability. Because the network is

not a legal entity and is based on voluntary participation, organizations are not confined to rules of network. Actions such as conformity to rules and processes can be focused on their circumstances and selective choices, resulting in accountability issues (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Thus the horizontal traits could be problematic when conflicts occur in the network because network participants tend to seek selective goals and pursue their distinctive values. Leading organizations may not expect other participating agencies to cordially respond to disputes, and network participants may not compromise their own stances. Such aspects of the network would make it difficult to solve the conflicts among network participating organizations.

Considering advantages and weakness of network service arrangement, the form of governance within unique circumstances of network will be essential to function and manage the network effectively and efficiently since network governance is an institutional arrangement to coordinate collective actions of network participating organizations. If we are defining network governance as an institution, the network governance is a specific structure or a form in governing the network that is established by choice or agreement of network members (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Under collective action perspective, diverse conditions and circumstances are considered in terms of network members' interests and benefits. While every organization in the network cannot be satisfied fully and seek only for their benefits and interests, they are supposed to find some ways to maximize benefits and minimize risks and uncertainties in their collective choice of governance form for their network decisions and communication. Particularly, in the public service network, many service providers participate in the network to solve problems and issues that cannot be solved alone, and they have to provide people with certain services in their environments and network context. Service

providers choose the best institutional arrangement, form of network governance to address complexities and manage unexpected situations without losing their own benefits and network success. It does not necessarily mean network members meet in face-to-face setting to make a decision of a certain form of network governance but it is assumed that the agreements had been achieved at the embedded environment among network members. In the network, institutional arrangement has been humanely established and evolved by the repeated actions, previous experiences, and trust (North, 2006; Ostrom, 1990).

1.2 Research Questions

Network and network governance literature has widely recognized by scholars in diverse approaches such as case study, unique characteristics, accountability, participation, and collaboration (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Damgaard & Torfing, 2010; Hendriks, 2008; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Among those studies some of them have explored the form of network governance chosen by network participating organizations and studied factors explaining the choice within the community characteristics and network context (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Milward & Provan, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008). The previous research of network governance and networks has focused on network effectiveness and network performances from the form of network governance and characteristics of networks (Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Kenis, 2008). By focusing on network governance that is an institution agreed among members it is expected to expand knowledge of the composition of networks and causal mechanisms, encouraging network members to choose the systematic form of network governance.

Furthermore, scholars have emphasized collective outputs and performances by the participation of autonomous organizations to network (Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; Raab & Kenis, 2009; Raab, Cambre, & Mannak, 2015). Still, the collective action problems under collective risks and benefits have been understudied in network governance. Thus, this research examines the form of network governance that is chosen or agreed by network participating organizations and identifies key factors affecting the choice of particular form of network governance. More specifically, this research examines which structure of network governance manages the entire network and which community characteristics and network context influence the network governance form. By applying collective action framework, this study proposes to understand the form of network governance from rational assessment of benefits and risks of network participating organizations. For this research, the Continuum of Care, the homeless services networks is examined because the homelessness is the serious wicked problems that a single organization cannot solve and demand collaborations by engaging diverse service industries such as government agencies, nonprofits shelters, health care clinics, hospitals, and other community organizations (Martin, 2015; Jang, Valero, & Jeong, 2020). Therefore, the primary purpose of this research is to investigate the network governance forms and its conditions and factors from the institutional collective action framework in the homeless service network context. Three questions guide this research are as follows:

1. What are the forms of network governance in homeless service networks?
2. What are the key factors affecting the choice of form of network governance?
3. What are the key functions of network governance?

The three research questions focus homeless services within the context of U.S. cross-

sector homeless service networks, defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). These research questions tests if network governance is an institutional arrangement to manage the network in controlling the uncertainty and risks to optimize the collective benefits from the network participation.

The first research question is focused on investigating the form of network governance in the homeless service networks. There are diverse forms of network governance, but this study has identified using the work of Provan and Kenis (2008). They suggest three forms of network governance: Shared-governance, Lead Organization governance, and Network Administrative governance (NAO). Each form of network governance can be differentiated by whether the full participation of network members is possible, or the leading organization is the external entity or not. For example, a shared form of network governance is based on the full participation of network members to manage the network. Leading organization and NAO forms are from the governing organization's perspective as one of the network members or an external independent entity. Depending on the form of network governance, the unique characteristics and the entire picture can be identified in the public service area for the minorities. Also, since different actors such as nonprofits and government agencies are the leading organization or the NAO in governing the entire networks (Human & Provan, 2000; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Teisman & Klijn, 2002), this research contributes to identifying the form of network governance and its compositions in the homeless service networks, thus understanding which actors are mainly influencing and governing in the homeless service policy arenas.

The second research question is focused on investigating the impact of factors on the

institutional choice of network governance form, especially network administrative organization (NAO). This research proposes certain community and network characteristics in the homeless service network context that network participating members consider for the selection of network governance form. From an angle of the institutional collective action framework, this research develops a model to test how the degree of homeless problems, characteristics of network and nonprofit of a community affect the institutional choice of NAO form humanly agreed and devised by network members. The collective action framework explains there are collective action dilemmas in the collaborative context due to uncertainty and cost (Andrew & Feiock, 2010; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Because organizations are not excluded in the collaborative context and there is not perfect information to be shared by network members together, this causes the difficulty and uncertainty to network members in their actions and efforts to the collective outcomes, the costs of building trust, obtaining reliable information, and negotiating with other organizations. To increase the effective collaboration in the networks in managing the uncertainty and costs, network participating organizations voluntarily find the best governance mechanism to coordinate the actions and characteristics in the collaborative environment.

Scholars indicate benefits and barriers to successful collaboration, such as contextual characteristics of communication, decision-making, strategic process, resource pool, and leadership (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Gazley, 2017; Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003). The collective action perspective translates into homeless service networks because diverse service providers with their own goals participate in the networks, and they should assess their benefits and risks from the participation of the network, thus choosing the

form of network governance within their community and network context. The form of network governance as an institution is not naturally made and is humanely devised by the assumed agreement, discussion, and interaction among network participating organizations (Jang & Valero, 2016; Provan & Kenis, 2008; U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2019).

Research question three examines main functions network governance that was observed during the early response of COVID 19 pandemic in 2020-2021. In the prior two questions, the network governance form and key factors influencing the NAO form of network governance in the whole network management perspectives by explaining what the network governance is and why they are important. Also, the factors are explained by applying the ICA framework in the U.S. homeless service networks. The main function and characteristics are identified to supplement the observation and understanding for the network governance by interviewing the leading people from the homeless service networks. Their experiences and insights help understand the connection between the form of network governance and its function.

1.3 Network Governance and Collective Action Dilemmas

In the public service and policy context, network governance form as an institution is decided by network participating organizations that are cross-sector and diverse service industries. The network governance form is an institution that may reduce collective action challenges and influence participating members. Collective action problems occur when diverse organizations work together to create and achieve joint goals which cannot be achieved by a single actor (Ostrom, 2005). The collective action challenges will be more complicated if the participating entities are cross-sector and come from distinctive service industries. Many cross-

sector entities such as government, private organizations, nonprofits are participating in the network to develop and implement services and programs. The potential risks and uncertainties from network members' actions and inaction directly are associated with the expected costs and benefits of network members (McGinnis, 1999; Williamson, 1985).

The skepticism of collective action among diverse organizations may be caused by imperfect information and uncertainty of the participating actors behaviors when members are experiencing information asymmetry (Andrew, Short, Jung & Arlikatti, 2015; Hawkins & Andrew, 2011). It is expected those participating organizations voluntarily join the network to gain collective benefits, but the behaviors of those individual organizations do not equally influence the collective outcomes due to their circumstances and difficulties. Organizations contributing collective goods cannot limit organizations that are without efforts for the collective outcomes (Ostrom, 2003). Moreover, imperfect information discourages network members from investing their resources and time to produce effective network outcomes. This situation causes inefficient and unfavorable collective outputs and prevents collaborative efforts in the network if there is no operational form of network governance.

Also, fragmentation of authorities and social responsibilities may incur collective action dilemmas in the network governance (Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Lowery, 2000). The challenges are critical because one network members' decisions affect other network participants that are not desired. In the network, autonomous organizations can make their own decisions to provide services and more involve in the network. The possibility of the fragmentation of authorities and responsibilities is high if there is no certain structure to manage that situations. Network members may choose an effective form of network governance to avoid

fragmentation with strategies based on the level of risks and uncertainties. Thus, to coordinate organizations' behavior and actions, network participants seek alternative governing mechanisms to safeguard joint network activities. A systematic form of network governance motivates network participating organizations to solve the collective action problems to minimize the risks and uncertainties and maximize benefits.

1.4 Data Collection

To answer the two research questions, data collection has been conducted from diverse sources of the homeless service networks. While 397 homeless service networks are existent in the U. S and the networks are identified as cross-sector organizational networks by HUD, 330 homeless networks are targeted since they are self-organized at the local level in the county or city boundaries, thus excluding state, the U.S. territories, and no-data cases homeless networks. Data for community and network context and characteristics is originated from the U.S. Department of Housing and Development, U.S. Census Bureau for key indicators such as total homeless population, sheltered and unsheltered homeless population, annual funding that awards to homeless networks by the federal government, and the types of service projects, and community demographics that geographically divided by each homeless network. The form of network governance has been respectively identified by visiting 330 networks' websites or reading documents such as meeting records, governance charter, and their mission and purpose statement under the code sheet.

Based on Provan & Kenis's (2008) work, three forms of network governance have been distinguished. Lead organization governance form has been categorized if a homeless service network is managed by a leading organization that is one of the network members or service

providers in the network. The forms of network governance have also been categorized as the type of organization such as nonprofit, government agency, or consortium, or coalition type. For example, Dallas and Irving Homeless Network in Texas (TX-600) is managed by a nonprofit organization named Metro Dallas Homeless Alliance. They are 501(3) nonprofit organizations.

To answer the third research question, this study conducts qualitative interviews by the semi-structured questions with 21 CoC leaders from the governing organizations. Every interview was recorded and transcribed based on the IRB approval and the Informed Consent. The purpose of the interview is to identify the function and the characteristics of network governance in the coordination and the decision-making of the CoC networks.

1.5 Methodology

This dissertation uses two general approaches to analyze data. For the first research question, a descriptive analysis is employed to observe the form of network governance in homeless service networks within the community and network context. The descriptive analysis demonstrates sector orientation, community and network characteristics, service demand, and so on. This analysis gives knowledge about how network governance is structured and which form of network governance is dominant. Demographics and network characteristics are also described to understand the context of the homeless policy area. The second research question is answered by employing logistic regression. This analysis tests key factors that affect the choice of network governance form and discusses how coordination costs and benefits affect the choice of network governance form in the network and community context. This research particularly focuses on the NAO choice of network governance form with the relationship with

diverse factors investigated, such as service demand, funding, network membership (size), and community and network features.

1.6 Contribution to Theory and Practice

This dissertation contributes to theory and practice. Given that network has played an important role in the policy arenas for service implementation, information diffusion, problem-solving, and community capacity building (Milward & Provan, 2006), it is crucial to understand the form of network governance for effective coordination of decision-making and communication. Since it is much complicated for organizations to work together from multiple sectors based on the interests and perspectives, it contributes to knowing the structured mechanism for diverse autonomous organizations of the network context from the cross-sector. Also, this study broadens the understanding of the homeless policy contexts with empirical evidence in the situation that there has been little scholarly conducted (Mosley, 2012, 2014).

This study is a comprehensive empirical study that analyzes how the network is structured and what form of network governance is decided by choice of network participating organizations. Studies of network governance have examined the form of network governance under circumstantial characteristics and conditions (Molin & Masella, 2016; Provan & Milward, 2008; Klijn, Koppeanjan, Termeer, 1995). However, little empirical study has been conducted to examine the form of network governance and the factors on the governance structure in the network. With a few exceptions, scholars have suggested the form of network governance, but the studies are not empirically demonstrated and focused the form of network governance about the impact on network effectiveness and performances (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan &

Kenis, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2006). Many studies of network and network governance have also been conducted in the case study to identify the governing mechanisms (Milward, Provan, Isett, & Huang, 2010; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Ysa, 2007).

Furthermore, this dissertation expands the application of the collective action framework in the network context. The policy network has apparently collective action problems, and coordination mechanisms should be captured (Carlsson, 2000). Many studies in the collective action framework focus on collaborative settings and mechanisms, but on collaboration itself in different policy contexts: *Why Collaborate?* (Anderw, Jung, & Li, 2015; Arntsen, Torjesen, & Karlsen, 2018; Song, Park, & Jung, 2018; Zeemering, 2019). It tends to less understand about how certain structure of the collaborative arrangement is well operated and chosen. Also, while the network has been identified as an important governance structure in the collective action perspectives (Feiock, 2013; Feiock & Park, 2005; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003), little study has been empirically conducted. Thus, this study provides an extensive and empirical investigation of collective action problems of network governance and the form of network governance as an effective institutional arrangement to solve the problems based on the benefits and risks of network participating organizations.

This study also makes a contribution to the practice, especially for the public services and policies. Since this research examines homeless service networks and Homelessness is one of the most serious and difficult issues related to additional social issues such as housing, health, and drugs (Galea & Vlahov, 2002; Somerville, 2013; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003), the understanding of governing structure of network within the community provides public

managers with ideas considering network governance structure with cross-sector organizations to provide diverse public services that cannot be well provided alone. These perspectives inform social actors such as governments, nonprofits, private organizations, health service providers of how they can get advantages by managing the risks and uncertainties and how they can have access to more resources, information, and expertise. Moreover, Homelessness is more serious in cities, with about 60% in the United States (HUD, 2020). However, characteristics of cities and communities in the U.S. and other countries, public managers, and social service providers prioritize the policies of homeless services. They can apply good cases to their situations to develop better solutions in terms of governing structures or management style.

1.7 Structure of Dissertation

In chapter 2 and chapter 3, to answer the first research question, definitions of network governance and the current state of research on network governance are presented. The collective action framework is examined to recognize the choice of network governance form in terms of importance and appropriateness. Based on the definition and scholarly understanding of network governance, the U.S. homeless service networks are introduced and described. To capture the present situation and key dimensions of homeless service network, data analysis is conducted to identify the sector composition, the form of network governance, and the community and network context. Chapter 3 describes the data-based information about the homeless service networks and interprets important points from the perspectives of the previous research. The chapters highlight the entire picture of network governance and discuss

research background and theoretical perspectives to understand the choice of network governance and the reality of the homeless service networks.

Chapter 4 identifies key factors influencing the choice of network governance form by reviewing literature about factors in governance structure choice in the collective action framework and understanding more three forms of network governance by Provan & Kenis (2008) to answer the second research question. Data analysis is conducted using descriptive analysis and logistic regression for the variables after introducing data and measurement based on theoretical hypotheses. This chapter argues that factors related to benefits and costs within the community and network context influence network governance choice focused on NAO form of network governance.

In chapter 5, the characteristics of network governance have been identified in terms of coordination and decision-making with the interview data of 21 representative people of the U.S. homeless service networks. This chapter gives the knowledge of what components and processes are important features. Chapter 6 clarifies the total findings of analyses from all chapters to understand the U.S. Homeless service networks and the key aspects of choice of network governance form. Then, the limitations of this study and the suggestions for future research are provided.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars and practitioners have much focused network and network governance in solving and responding to social problems and emergencies (Kapucu, Hu, & Khosa, 2017; Molin & Masella, 2016). Public policies and services have been recently implemented by networks involved with social actors because many social issues cannot be easily solved by a single organization or an actor due to the complexity and diverse dimensions to be considered such as circumstances, demographics, and areas of policy and services (Agranoff & McGuire, 2006; O'Toole, 1997). Furthermore, numerous challenges have been increased, and the raveling issues have been considered wicked problems in the public administration and management. For example, emergency management is one example of network governance in response to disasters. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has created an emergency network for national preparedness to guide and work together with all cross-sector actors such as governments, private organizations, nonprofits. Since the disaster is an urgent situation and cannot be controlled by only governments or influential private or nonprofit organizations, collaborative efforts and arrangements are needed, whose purpose is to successfully handle before and after the calamities in the shared system.

Scholars in various areas of public policies and services have studied the network and the network governance and have focused on network performances and effectiveness (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Raab et al., 2015). Most scholars would agree that networks are the distinctive structure to implement public policies and provide services by the collaboration of autonomous network participating organizations and network governance is essential to

function the networks well. However, studies have identified the factors such as resources and characteristics of networks impacted network outcomes. Few have examined the form of network governance chosen by network participants, which form of network governance is structured, and what aspects influence the choice of network governance form with few exceptions (Provan & Keni, 2008; Saz-Carranza, Iborra, Albareda, 2016). Studies examining the form of network governance, for instance, highlight the importance of the form of network governance to network outcomes and performances, not about the choice of the network governance form itself. The form of network governance reflects the benefits and the degree of perseverance for network participants' risks and uncertainties. Thus, understanding the choice of network governance form helps us know the mechanism of managing the networks and which type of organization is critical in the form of network governance, such as governments and nonprofits.

This research entirely sees the choice of network governance form in the institutional collective action framework. This is because the framework explains the emergence of governance form of multiple social actors in community or metropolitan areas based on the collective risk and benefits. As an institutional arrangement, network governance has been involved with diverse cross-sector organizations and certain governance structure has been established by the network members. The governance structure is usually chosen by their agreement and discussions among network members. However, it does not mean the network members come to a place to make an agreement and a decision for the governance structure. As indicated by North (1990), the network governance as an institution is humanely devised arrangement by the interactions and communication. For example, the CoC networks are under

the program requirements about the CoC boards and certain required programs for the homeless services. However, the governing rules and process depends on the circumstances and the conditions of each CoC network and the pattern of their communication and repeated interactions may establish the network governance as an institution that is assumed for the agreement and choice by the network members. It is closely connected with about who leads the CoC network and how the information and resources can be effectively exchanged.

Moreover, in this research, the form of network governance has been identified by the conceptual work of Provan and Kenis (2008). Although their work is one of the most cited publications and emphasizes the characteristics and context of network governance by suggesting three forms of network governance, empirical evidence is still insufficient, and little has been applied to the entire policy context to identify each form of network governance. To uncover the network governance and discuss the theoretical argument, definitions of network governance have been suggested, and how the literature has been conducted is identified. Also, the form of network governance by Provan and Kenis (2008) and collective action perspective is applied.

This chapter is a part of answering the first research question: What are the forms of network governance in the homeless service networks? This section provides a brief overview and assessment of the current state of the research on network governance and the form of network governance by defining network governance and reviewing previous literature. The collective action framework is examined for the choice of network governance form. Understanding the literature and theoretical structure is helpful to identify the U.S. homeless service networks in the next chapter, chapter 3.

2.1 Defining Network Governance

Before deeply understanding the homeless service networks in the U.S., it is important to define network governance to clarify the term and set the direction of this research. In the perspective of service delivery, public, and network management, network governance refers to “the use of formal and informal institutions to allocate resources and coordinate joint action in a network of organizations” from a wide range of sectors. This understanding of network governance recognizes the complexity and the imperfection of network that needs more effort and process by cross-sector actors (Kapucu & Hu, 2020, p.5). The definition, according to Sorensen and Torfing (2005) by five aspects, can be expanded as “1) relatively stable horizontal articulations of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors who 2) interact with one another through negotiations which 3) take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework that is 4) self-regulating within limits set by external forces and which 5) contributes to the production of public purposes.” Kim (2006) also provides a common and brief definition of network governance as “form of organizational alliance in which relevant policy actors are linked to together as co-producers where they are more likely to identify and share common interests.” Definitions of network governance imply that collaborative effort for coordination and governing among organizations in the network helps public and collective outcome production.

Network governance is also described by three key elements: 1) “the linkage of actors from different institutional levels, 2) a shift of power from previously well-established to organizations or individuals whose main role is linking and coordinating actors, 3) a change in the mode of governance, away from hierarchy and towards consultation, negotiation, and soft

law” (Coen & Thatcher, 2008, p. 50). Following Provan & Kenis (2008), network governance can be understood as the functioning and the processes of networks to produce collective outcomes based on strategic decisions and choices by network participants from multiple sectors. Because there are autonomous organizations in the networks and networks are not legal entities, the authors indicate that “some form of governance is necessary to ensure that participants engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict addressed and that network resources are acquired and utilized efficiently and effectively.” They also emphasize the focus of governance as “use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole” (p. 231). The understanding and definition imply that network governance is the institutional arrangement and mechanism to well function the networks in the certain form or structure chosen by network participating organizations from public, private, and nonprofit sectors.

2.2 Literature Review on Network Governance

Networks have emerged under limitations of hierarchical and traditional management and the increase of complexity about social issues (Meier & O'Toole, 2001; Milward & Provan, 2000). Studies of the network have increased, and interests in network governance have been boosted for decades (Hu, Khosa, & Kapucu, 2016; Kapucu & Hu, 2020; Lewis, 2011). Moreover, the scholarly interest of form of network governance has been increased because network has been considered as the distinctive unit and structure, but network is not perfect and certain governance structure should be established to well function the network with the strengths (Kapucu & Hu, 2020; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Based on the interdependence of the autonomous

organizations, form of network governance has known and understood about the choice by the assumed agreement by network participating organizations. While conceptual studies also have been conducted much, the term network governance has been used fragmentedly, meaning network itself, network as a new governance tool, or network functioning. Several terms have been used, such as network governance, network management, networked governance, governance network, and management networks in terms of governing and functioning (Kapucu & Hu, 2020; Klijn & Edelenbos, 2010; Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Several studies examine the literature under the bibliometric approach, such as the scope of network governance, methodology, and network-level of analysis (Borgatti, & Foster, 2003; Kapucu, Hu, & Khosa, 2017; Lewis, 2011; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). The authors indicate that network governance research has been conducted in the inconsistent typologies and disputed terminologies and limited methodological approaches and partial understandings have been conducted. The extant literature on network and network governance has focused on network outcome, performance, and effectiveness and has studied much in conceptual approaches. Moreover, empirical studies have been mainly conducted in social network analysis for networks in understanding network participating organizations, and case studies have been frequently utilized. Studies by different methodologies and the network as a unit of analysis are essential to understand the whole network systematically. Given that, this section briefly reviews previous literature on network governance and network to see the present and identify the gap in this research arena.

In the network governance research, much attention has been directed to explaining the diverse network result, performance, effectiveness, or outcome about the implementation

of policies, service delivery, sustainability, and accountability (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, Muller-Seitz, Raab, & Sydow, 2016; Cristofoli, Markovic, & Meneguzzo, 2014; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & WoolCoCk, 2004; Klijn, Steijn, & Edlenbos, 2010; McGuire & Silva, 2009; Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Newman, 2004; Park & Park, 2009; Raab, Mannk, & Cambre, 2013; Yi, 2017). Studies indicate that characteristics and forms of network governance impact certain types of network outcomes. Thus, policies and services have been comparatively well implemented and provided by the networks. Raab and colleagues (2013), for example, note that configurational characteristics of networks such as structure, context, and network governance form contribute to network effectiveness by analyzing 39 crime prevention networks. Research points out that network age, stability, recourse munificence, integration, and the independent and management-focused network governance form (NAO) are critical to reducing recidivism and increasing network effectiveness.

In other studies, network performance has also been studied depending on the form of network governance and network structure. Cristofoli and colleagues (2012), for instance, found that specific coordination mechanisms and abilities of the network manager in the shared form of network governance are important for the increase of the ratio of the patients cared by analyzing four public homecare service networks in Switzerland. In addition, Yi (2017) suggests that network structure plays an important role in the network outcomes by examining the clean energy self-organizing networks in 48 U.S. states. The results indicate that high closeness and clustering networks respond more to faster clean energy development. Previous research of network governance has been studied in diverse characteristics and policy contexts, and studies have been mostly focused on the network's results and performances. They

recognize the strengths and effectiveness of network-based policy implementation and service delivery and consider the governance structure or form as one factor to network performances. Studies emphasize the structural characteristics of network governance and its impact on network effectiveness.

Much conceptual and theoretical research has been conducted in understanding and clarifying network and network governance by scholars (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 1998, 2001; Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2006; Kenis & Provan, 2009; Kim, 2013; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Klijn, Koppenjan, Termeer, 1995; Morrell, 2009; O'Toole, 1997; Raab & Kenis, 2009; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005; Torfing, 2005; Weber & Khademan, 2008). Studies identify differences between network governance and other governances to highlight the benefits and strong points of the network and network governance in the policy and service context. The understanding helps us realize the necessity and prominence of network and network governance and the characteristics of a network. Agranoff (2006), for example, provides ten lessons about network management by looking at the inside of the network based on the fourteen previous empirical studies. Ten suggestions are related to collaborative management, characteristics, the role of managers, benefits, and costs, differences of management between organization and network, and decision-making. They emphasize that networks should be managed depending on their circumstances to solve wicked problems and provide services. While they are not the same in organization management, networks are sometimes similarly governed by organizations requiring a certain structure to decision-making and exchange information and resources.

In the democratic value of society, network governance has been focused on (Torfing,

2005; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005). The authors indicate that the characteristics of network governance such as diverse actors' participation and following the rules by them but also there is the undemocratic aspect of network governance due to insufficiency of accountability and unclear boundaries compared to organizational governance. Their insight broadens the knowledge of network governance in increasing democratic perceptions and of how and what points are needed to develop the democracy of society. Conceptual and theoretical studies point to the importance of network and network governance and considerations for effective management and governance in the network. The findings emphasize the importance of the whole network management in accomplishing the goal of the individual network member and the entire networks such as management of interaction of network members and establishment of the fair planning and implementing process, thus positively influencing the better outcomes and performances. Furthermore, if network governance is one of the essential parts considered in providing services and implementing policies, why and what forms and structure should be needed for the network management.

In addition to methodological focus on social network analysis (Kapucu, Hu, & Khosa, 2017), one of prominent attributes is that network and network governance research has been much conducted in the case studies (Carlsson & Sandstrom, 2008; Coen & Thatcher, 2008; Considine & Lewis, 2003; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2009; Nyholm & Haveri, 2009; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). The fields and topics are various such as strategic planning, regulatory policies, natural resource management, institutional barriers, and health services. Studies select multiple cases of networks in the fields to explain their arguments and theoretical perspectives by analyzing and comparing cases. Case studies help us

to get a deep narrative description about the complex social phenomena and to elucidate insights and meanings, but the understanding of case studies might be limited to predicting the future behavior and trend under a small number of cases (Elizabeth & Sharan, 2009). This trait may cause issues about reliability, validity, and generalizability in the case study (Hamel, 1993; Stake, 2005).

Also, the features that the case study focuses on specific characteristics and description can result in the understanding of organizations in the network or limited network characteristics due to the small number of cases and complexity as indicated by Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007). However, studies of network governance by the case study and social network analysis may provide insight into who leads the network management, and which strong and weak ties contribute to network management in the whole network perspectives. Because both methodological approaches focus on the connection and the relationships among network members, the direction and the pattern of network governance can be understood, and the internal mechanism of decision and responding to social issues are provided (Milward & Provan, 2001; Milward et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2009). Consistent with the emphasis of the whole network management, other methodological approaches such as large N study or regression can be more hardened to understand the network governance (Kapucu & Hu, 2020).

Provan and his colleagues' study network governance and suggests three forms of network governance: Shared governance, Lead organization governance, and Network administrative Organization (NAO) governance. Details of each form of network governance are described in this section. Several scholars study network governance as an institution to manage the whole network (Braun, 2018, Raeymaeckers, 2016; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012).

They emphasize the certain form of network governance in inter-organizational project management, the field of service organizations, and the public-private partnership. They think that the governing structure and mechanism are important for managing the whole network and effectively providing services. Scholars identify how networks are governed and integrated by a certain form of network governance and emphasize the importance of each form of network governance based on the service areas and policy context.

For example, Raeymaeckers and Kenis (2015) and Raeymackers (2016) explain the network management for service networks in the shared participant governance with the qualitative analysis and case study. The authors identify the integrative capacity and the characteristics of full participation of the shared governance, which is different from the lead agency and the NAO governance. Their findings suggest that shared governance influences the integration of service networks by forming tie which depends on the centralized actors' active participation, and well-planned strategies of informational exchange and competencies are important for the legitimacy of the shared governance. In the lead agency type of governance, Velotti and colleagues (2012) indicate that there are important factors to manage the cross-sector networks such as participation, transparency, and accountability by examining three policy networks. The factors in the lead agency governance positively influence the network effectiveness and sustainability.

Furthermore, the NAO governance has been studied in terms of its function and key features (Braun, 2018; Lefebvre et al., 2013; Long & Krause, 2019; Ogunro, 2016). They emphasize the role of the NAO to manage the network in the characteristics of their external and centralized structure and the main purpose for the network management. For example,

Lefebvre and the colleagues (2013) indicate that the NAO is helpful for developing the social capital of network members as the third party and brokered organization in the food service sectors, and Ogunro (2016) suggests the NAO improve the performances in the health care networks in terms of trust-building and organizational learning. Scholars identify the NAO as a unique governance structure to manage the whole networks in the diverse policy and service fields.

Scholars believe that a network is governed by a certain form of governance structure depending on the circumstances and its strengths. The form of network governance is not chosen in the official decision-making process or a specific announcement. However, network participating organizations recognize a favorable governance structure, and assumed agreement has established a form of network governance to manage the whole networks. Factors and conditions influencing the establishment of governance structure in the network are different from the policy or service context. The importance of how the network can be governed in integrating the services and behaviors of network members is the common interest for network management. In this perspective, this study seeks to understand network governance more, particularly based on the three differentiations by Provan and his colleagues.

This section shows that extant literature of network and network governance has been grown in diverse fields of policy and services, particularly focused on network performance and effectiveness. Also, many conceptual studies have been conducted in order to understand more network and network governance, and case studies and social network analysis have been mainly used as methodology. The tendency of research has explained much about the effect, the importance. The necessity of network and network governance and the strengths and

considerations for effective policy implementation and service delivery have been elucidated by answering what network and network governance is and what factors influencing network outcome. Scholars have also identified the form of network governance to manage the entire network. This research add more evidence and understanding of the form and the structure of the network and network governance by answering why certain network governance form should be chosen and what factors influence the choice. The understanding is conducted in t the U.S. homeless service network context and next section reviews the three forms of network governance in detail.

2.3 Form of Network Governance

Network members determine the form of network governance based on the consideration of network success and circumstances (Provan & Milward, 2006). A study of network governance has contributed to the conceptual and propositional understanding of network governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). They suggest three forms in governing and functioning the network: Shared governance, Lead agency governance, and Network administrative organization governance (NAO). Each form of network governance has differentiated by some criteria about whether all members manage the network or whether the governing organization is one of the members of the network or not. The authors explain whether the full participation of all members governs the network or whether the network is brokered by an influential and powerful member or by an external organization that mainly focuses on network management. Shared governance, for example, is the form of network governance that decisions in the network are based on the participation of all network participating organizations that are all parallel of power and authority in the network. Lead

agency governance form is that network management is achieved by one of the network members with more resources, power, or information rather than other participating organizations. NAO form indicates that an outer independent organization governs the network to achieve the goals. This section briefly explains and clarifies three forms of network governance under characteristics and limitations.

Shared participant governance form can be understood as the most simple and direct form of network governance without an administrative and separate entity for network management, which functioned well in the small number of network members and geographical boundaries that can be generally possible full face-to-face interaction of network members (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The fundamental approach of this form is under the idea that every member participates in every process and decision of the network. Such characteristics are originated from the equal based-communication and power and reflection of each network member on the decisions (Kenis & Provan, 2009). This decentralized form results in the members' commitment and flexibility, and responsiveness. However, the shared governance form might be inefficient in making decisions because all members' opinions should be reflected, and it is difficult to reach a consensus in the horizontal symmetrical situation (Provan & Milward, 2006). Because there is no administrative and management entity, if there are conflicts and complicated issues among network members, it is difficult to proceed with the next steps. Although there is a limitation of shared governance form, Christofoli, and colleagues (2012), in their research, study four networks in Switzerland, governed by a shared form of network governance in identifying "how to be successful in shared governance network." They found that formalized coordination mechanisms and abilities of network managers can

contribute to the high network performances in shared governance form. This understanding emphasizes the institutional, managerial processes such as rules, agreements, and meetings.

Lead organization governance is a form of network governance; the network is managed by one of the influential or major network participating organizations, and they play a role as the administrative entity and a network member (Provan & Milward, 2006). The lead organization governance is comparatively a centralized form in which major actions and decisions depend on the lead agency in the network, although network participants are still interconnected. The leading organization provides administration capacity or accelerates network members' activities and decisions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Since the lead organization has a clear direction for their own goal and network goal, this form of governance is efficient and effective, which works well based on more geographical boundaries and network members rather than shared governance. However, the lead organization can shirk its role based on its own agenda, and other network members can be easily ruled by the asymmetrical power of the lead organization (Kenis & Provan, 2009). That situation may result in opposition and disharmony among network members, thus negatively affecting network goals. A study of examining three networks under lead agency form of governance suggests that although there are some challenges about goal achievement and solving problems due to intentional indifferences of common goals by leaders and members, the decision-making process, degree of participation, legitimacy, transparency, and accountability have an impact on network effectiveness and sustainability (Velotti, Botti, & Vesce, 2012).

Network administrative organization (NAO) governance is a chosen form by network members, where the network is governed by a separate management-specialized entity.

Diverse types of organizations become NAO for network management, such as nonprofit, government agency, and private agency. (Provan & Kenis, 2008). As an external organization, compared to shared governance form and lead organization form, NAO tends to be neutral and more focused on entire network goals and purposes because the separate external organization is not one of the network members or service providers and the reason for their existence is the success of the network (Molin & Masella, 2016). NAO form is a centralized and ordered structure, but since they are closely connected with each network organization, the form can be understood as a mixed structure (Provan & Milward, 2006). Such characteristics make NAO coordinate and sustain the network well and avoid inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Because NAO can manage the tensions and integrate many network members as an outer and external organization (Raab et al., 2015; Saz-Carranza & Ospina, 2011), NAO may complement the insufficient aspects of shared and lead organization governance, and NAO is considered the most formalized and functional form that would be eventually chosen and adopted although there is the complexity of administration, necessity of financial capability, and hierarchical aspects of management (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Considering the function of NAO, some authors found that the NAO form of network governance contributes to power dynamics management and promotion of network members' inclusion and advocacy involvement (Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Saz-Carranza, Iborra, & Albareda, 2016).

This section describes the form of network governance, particularly based on three forms of network governance from the conceptual work of Provan & Kenis (2008) and other authors' understandings. Authors mostly agree that the form of network governance is chosen by the circumstances of network and network participating organizations. Also, Provan & Kenis

(2008) state, in terms of evolutionary perspectives by network size and complexity, if NAO is adopted or chosen by network members, other choices would not be easily made to shared governance form or lead organization governance, considering NAO as the most functional and stable form of network governance. Based on that recognition, this research uses the collective action framework to understand the choice of network governance form in the next section.

2.4 Collective Action Dilemma and Form of Network Governance

This dissertation understands the context of network governance as occurring collective action problems. The collective action framework assumes that collective action problems, as the inherent internal limitations of collaboration, are originated from uncertainties, the opportunism of collaborative actors, and imperfect information (Ostrom, 2005; 2010). In the collaborative context, each actor may shirk their efforts for the collective outcomes due to the opportunistic behaviors that have only benefits without contributing and paying to the collaborative performances. Because organizations tend to seek their own interest rather than the collective interests (Olson, 1971), organizations can be free-riding to get incentives at others' expense, and efforts and this situation raises uncertainties and decreases trust by imperfect information one another. To solve those collective action problems, certain institutional arrangement as a mechanism has been emerged in reducing the collective risks and improving the benefits of collaboration by agreements and discussion among actors (Andrew et al., 2015; Brown & Potoski, 2005; Car & Hawkins, 2013). The selected institutional arrangement results in minimizing uncertainties and costs and maximizing their benefits.

Network participating organizations are autonomous and voluntarily participate in the network to respond to social problems collectively because the difficulties cannot be solved

alone. By involving in the network, organizations enjoy benefits by resource change, information sharing, and networking development that creates the synergy effect and makes organizations effectively respond to the social needs and provide services as the network goals. However, in the collaborative situation, Network participating organizations have their own goals and interests and different reasons being in the network, respectively. Such characteristics may cause the concentration of self-interests of network participants and finding ways for them to get one-sided benefits from the network without contributing to the collective benefits for the network goals.

The possibility of free-riding has an impact on all network participants to increase the uncertainties and the risks and decrease the assurance being in the network by the externalities and the spillover effect. Because cross-sector entities from different service areas enter the network, those collective challenges may be more complicated and result in high costs and fewer benefits to stay at the networks. Thus, the form of network governance is the chosen institutional arrangement by the network participating organization. The alternative mechanism functions solving the collective action problems among network participants by managing and coordinating their behaviors and actions. To identify the form of network governance, this study sheds light on the U.S. homeless service networks with cross-sector organizations such as governments, private organizations, and nonprofits.

There are diverse collective action problems in the networks, and each form of network governance can be the mechanism to adjust the benefits and risks, thus solving the collective dilemmas. Shared participant governance is a form of network governance to integrate network participants' divergent interests and preferences. Based on the full involvement and

symmetrical power (Provan & Kenis, 2008), shared participant governance emphasizes communication and the interaction by regular meetings and active exchange of opinions and information, which enhances the invisible norms such as trust and reciprocity to overcome collaborative risks. According to the ICA framework (2013), the repeated interactions can develop a certain degree of trust, commitment, and common vision, and such characteristics motivate local entities to more participate in the collaborative efforts because the social norms may decrease the doubts about the behavior of other organizations in believing they focus on the collective goals and do not behave opportunistically. This environment positively influences the adjustment of the uncertainty and the risks, and the organizations would seek to make more favorable circumstances to the collaboration among other organizations.

The ICA framework also postulates that inter-organizational collaboration entails the issues of negotiation and monitoring due to information asymmetry and opportunism, which is related to the division of mutual gains and benefits. Network organizations may confront bargaining problems or effective monitoring mechanisms without perfect information of other network members' actions. It is critical for network members to secure the information and expect network members' behaviors to collective works. To share the information and negotiate the division, network members can decide the form of shared participant governance because the agreements make all decisions of the network and network members themselves are responsible for their decisions. In this situation, if network members intentionally share fake or wrong information, the negative effect is eventually on the whole network, and the opportunistic actions lead to a negative impact on the fair division of the actors. In the form of shared participant governance, all actions are shared in the same power basis, and decisions

are based on the whole fair value, which certain members cannot incline. Non-participation of decision-making and negotiation process does not ensure the objective and impartial division of mutual gains. Thus, it is difficult for them to avoid the involvement of all processes to reflect their own opinions and not exclude the collaborative benefits of networks. Although there is the possibility that the agreement needs much time in the inefficient potentials, the shared participant governance can be one of the selected mechanisms to solve collective action problems in the division problems of having perfect information and observing actions of network members.

While shared participant governance has multiple strengths in dealing with collective action problems, there are inherent limitations from the full participation and agreement of network members and the same power basis (Provan & Kenis, 2008), incurring inefficiency in decision-making and division of benefits. When the inefficiency is increased, network organizations can decide that they should shirk their responsibilities and do nothing, which can outweigh the inefficiency and the collaborative efforts. Since face-to-face communication and full participation of all the decision-making processes is strongly effective for the small number of organizations, this situation may need an alternative mechanism to handle the information and behavior of network members, and lead agency governance can be considering another choice of governing the network. Networks provide opportunities for diverse autonomous organizations to solve the problems themselves by the decision-making and the whole agreement, but the success of collaboration among the network members is not always the case. Particularly, if the network has many organizations, the issues of opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry can be hardened, which should be more controlled and adjusted.

Figure 2.1: ICA Framework for the Choice of Network Governance




Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical framework for the choice of form of network governance. The ICA framework posits that local entities may face coordination problems in collaborative works. Coordination is needed when the tasks are complicated, and the importance of interconnections is high to succeed in the collaboration (Feiock, 2013; Feiock & Scholz, 2010). However, if a broad scope of activities of diverse organizations is included, failure to coordinate would be rising, and the actor with critical resources and powers may help solve the incoordination problems (Andrew & Kendra, 2012). There are different autonomous organizations in the networks, and interdependencies are inevitably essential. The situation of incoordination makes organizations less focus on collaborative efforts because organizations feel more uncertain and think the costs of participating in the collaborative efforts would be higher rather than only focusing on their own works. Thus, lead agency or the linkage of the center actor is needed for more careful management of information and the behaviors of organizations to ensure the collaborative benefits by being willing to pay and participate in the collaborations.

In addition to the coordination problems, division and defection risks also may be the reasons to choose the lead agency governance. Organizations can have collaborative benefits and mutual gains from the networks, but they may face the situation that cannot divide the gains into fair manners and perceived costs and benefits for the division are different from network members. While it is good that all members can decide the portion of the benefits and make the agreements by all members' participation in the decision-making in effective and efficient ways, shared participant governance cannot always be possible. Reaching agreements costs high negotiation costs time-consuming situations. Additionally, when network members

negotiate the scope of agreed benefits, they tend to get more benefits than other members and not open information to be located at a better stage than others. The ICA framework contends that it is not easy for collaborative actors to effectively work together when there are division problems due to the information imbalance and the perception of joint benefits and distribution.

In the same vein, the defection problems are emerged, which is the barricade and is related to "nothing to do" or "conscious abandonment" in the alliance or duty. In the absence of managing information and uncertainty, defection risk would be high because network members may think the decisions of others negatively influence their benefits and gains, thus worsening everybody. The ICA framework considers the defection similarly to the prisoner's dilemmas situations that need the "credible commitment" (Feiock, 2013). In this situation, building trust and reciprocity is one of the important ways to handle the defection of network members (Ostrom, 1998). Therefore, to solve the collective action problems for coordination, division, and defection, lead agency governance can be a mechanism because network members cannot manage the situation of information symmetry and opportunism, which is more interested in their preferences, and the uncertainty and mistrust cannot maximize their collective benefits from the networks. As a centralized structure, a lead agency with power and authority chosen by network members can oversee network members by collecting its information. Opportunistic behaviors of network members direct them to change to contribute to network benefits. Also, the lead agency can converge opinions and ideas of network members for the division of mutual gains by joint actions. Not everybody can perfectly satisfy with all the benefits from the networks, but one of the best results can be created in the agreed

and reflected outcomes. Mostly, the lead agency is appointed or generally goes through democratic procedures like election, which has much legitimacy for the decisions and agreement.

The ICA framework indicates that collective action problems are very complex, and the role of the authorized and centralized organization is important to respond to the collaborative risks. Although the lead agency governance effectively governs the networks, there is a fundamental limitation since the lead agency is generally one of the network members, and they can be captured in their own interests and preferences (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Because the Lead agency can reach the critical information, allocate resources, and oversee the behaviors of the network, they can jeopardize the collaborative efforts and the benefits if they are adrift for their role as the lead agency. Although the information and resources should be used to solving collective action issues in coordination, division, and defection, their discretion and legitimate authority can be abused to accomplish the individual, organizational goal. Also, the lead agency can be lobbied by other network members who are more interested in organizational interests, thus increasing costs and uncertainty. Lead agency is one of the excellent forms to govern the networks adjusting the collective risks and benefits that everybody betters off. They can also behave opportunistically and make decisions with the exclusive power to approach the network information captured in their own preferences.

The form of network administrative organization (NAO) can be another option to solve collective action problems. As a centralized entity, NAO is similar to a lead agency in terms of managing resources and information, overseeing behaviors of network members, and coordinating services and functions (Milward & Provan, 2006). However, NAO is not one of the

network members or service providers but is the entity that focuses on the network management to balance costs and benefits of network members, thus decreasing the uncertainty about the decisions and dedication of collaborative efforts. Since the works and the interests of NAO are to support and coordinate the whole networks, their actions can be comparatively focusing to effectively oversee the opportunistic behaviors of network members, objectively allocate resources and information. In this characteristic, network members can actively communicate NAO without prejudice or the hidden information to get the maximized benefits from the networks, which can be helpful to building trust and reciprocity. With each network member's information and understanding, NAO efficiently divides the mutual gains to prevent conflicts and disagreement. Thus, the costs of negotiating and monitoring are decreased, and network members' collaborative benefits are increased by concentrating on their own roles as a network member or an organization, which is better off every network organization.

This section explains why the network chooses one of the forms of network governance in the context of the collective action problems under the institutional collective action (ICA) framework. Three forms of network governance are suggested by the model of Provan and Kenis (2008). There is not the best form of network governance, but the better form to give maximized collective benefits to network members. The main point is that the network chooses a form of network governance to solve diverse collective action problems by assessing the risks and benefits and adjusting the uncertainty, originated from the imperfect information and the opportunistic behavior of collaborative actors. Every network organization is not perfectly satisfied with the collective benefits. However, the network can find the optimized collective

benefits to regulate their activities and behaviors each other by the governance structure that the whole network and everybody have the betterment.

CHAPTER 3

NETWORK GOVERNANCE AND THE U.S. HOMELESS SERVICE NETWORK


This chapter focuses on identifying the U.S. homeless service networks that cross-sector organizations participate in and deal with multiple tangling issues such as health, housing, and meals, unsolved by a single organization. Based on the background and the context of the form of network governance from chapter 2, this chapter also answers the first research question in the context of the U.S. homeless service networks in answering the first research question: What are the forms of network governance in homeless service networks? This understanding is directly connected to chapter 4, about the key factors on the choice of network governance. As follows, the U.S. homeless service network is introduced and is identified to recognize the form of network governance and the type of governing organization. The understanding is conducted by the descriptive data analysis of homeless service networks within the characteristics of the community and the network. Eventually, this chapter finalizes the discussions and the conclusions under the results.

3.1 The U.S. Homeless Status and Collaborative Homeless Service Network (CoC)

Homelessness is one of the critical problems which is not only in the United States but all over the world (United Nations [UN], 2020). Over 100 million people have been estimated as a worldwide homeless population, and people who are in deficient housing have been approximated as over 1.6 billion (Habitat for Humanity, 2015; UN, 2005). Because homeless issues are closely related to other problems such as chronic illness, housing, and nutrition (Galea & Vlahov, 2002; Jang, Jesus, & Jeong, 2020; Martin, 2015; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003), the social problems cannot be solved by governments or social organizations, and there is the

homelessness in the broad scope of the age group and health conditions, thus requiring the collaborative and coordinated efforts of numerous entities from cross-sectors (Lee, 2016; Svedin & Jesus, 2020). The multidimensional approaches are important to prevent the skewed response of certain issues and duplication of services that save resources and focus on the critically vulnerable and urgent issues.

Figure 3.1: Trend of PIT of Homeless People in the United States 2016-2020



Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

In the United States, roughly 580,466 individuals who struggle in the homeless status are estimated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) at one point in 2020. As indicated by the 2020 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, the total number implies that over half of the U.S. total homeless is occupied in five states in order, including California (28%, 161,548), New York (16%, 91,271), Florida (5%, 27,487), Texas (5%, 27,229), and Washington (4%, 22,923). Considering the homeless population from recent five years, the number of individuals experiencing homelessness in the U.S. has tended to increase from 2016

to 2020. Particularly, when the total homeless population is divided into the sheltered and unsheltered, the fact that the number of unsheltered homeless individuals has increased might imply that homelessness should be more cautiously handled in providing services and more shelters at minimum. Figure 3.1 shows the trend of the point-in-time (PIT) of the homeless people from 2016 to 2020.

Another issue of homelessness is closely connected with the health conditions of homeless people. There are the homeless who need health care but still lack appropriate treatments. Scholars indicate that homeless people are much more vulnerable to preventive illness and do not reach health care programs than other populations (Baggett, O'Connell, Singer, & Rigotti, 2010; Kertesz et al., 2009; Weitzman et al., 1996). Because the homeless people basically have less financial resources and have little information, they suffer from medical problems and hospitalize more than others, continuing their chronic homelessness (Hodge, DiPietro, & Horton-Newell, 2017; Medcalf & Russell, 2014). Homeless people have experienced diverse unmet health care needs in local communities such as medical or surgical care, mental care, dental care, dermatological care, eyesight care, and so on. (Acosta & Toro, 2000; Baggett et al., 2010; Gelberg, Linn, Usatine, & Smith, 1990).

According to HUD data of Homeless Populations and subpopulations, there are several characteristics of medical needs of individuals experiencing homelessness. Table 3.1 shows that the homeless in the U.S. have a mental illness, substance abuse, HIV/AIDS, and domestic violence, 2016-2020. The table, on average, indicates that nearly 20% of individuals who experience homelessness suffer mental illness while about 16% of the population face the chronic substance abuse issue. Also, about 2% of homeless people struggle with HIV/AIDS. A

considerable percentage of exposing domestic violence has been reported for individuals who are homeless. As documented in Table 3.1, the diverse medical needs for the homeless recently have been maintained or increased. It is particularly critical to steadily increase the number of unsheltered homeless people in terms of the necessity of multifaced and collaborative efforts among social organizations.

Table 3.1: Health Service Needs of the Homeless, 2016-2020

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Severely Mentally Ill	19.60%	20.21%	20.10%	20.46%	20.78%
Chronic Substance Abuse	17.18%	16.13%	15.67%	15.65%	16.99%
HIV/AIDS	1.68%	1.84%	1.82%	1.93%	1.83%
Victims of Domestic Violence	12.45%	15.77%	8.80%	7.88%	8.36%
Unsheltered Homeless People	32.07%	34.83%	35.18%	37.22%	38.95%

Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

How have the homeless circumstances been handled in the U.S.? While many social efforts have been invested in solving homelessness, the homeless service networks play a critical and active role in responding to homeless issues in geographically local and community-based areas. The homeless service networks are named Continuum of Care (CoC) to raise the communitywide dedication and eradicate homelessness as the goals by implementing homeless policies. Cross-sector organizations such as government, nonprofit, foundation, shelter, health clinics are involved as service providers in the networks. Because homeless issues are complex, broad, and multidimensional, a collaborative and refined system is required to provide services effectively and efficiently supported by annual federal funding. Federal laws and regulations well explain and show the purpose, process, and impact of the homeless service networks.

The Federal Act of homeless assistance has been originated from the McKinney-Vento Assistance Act of 1987, which is the first federal law to support the homeless shelter programs financially, particularly focused on the elderly, the disabled, and families with children (HUD, 2010; National Coalition for the Homeless, 2006). Initial fifteen programs were included under the Act, such as “Continuum of Care Programs, Supportive Housing Program, Shelter Plus Care Program, Emergency Shelter Grant Program... and so on.” Also, the Act contributed to the establishment of “the Interagency Council on the Homeless” and has been expanded to the service scope by the multiple legislative amendments (National Coalition for the homeless, 2009). Under Clinton Administration, the Act was re-confirmed as the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 2000.

In 2009, the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act was enacted to streamline HUD’s three different homeless programs (Supportive Housing Program, Shelter Plus Care Program, and Moderate Rehabilitation/Single Room Occupancy) to a single grant program by amending and reauthorizing the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (CoC Interim Rule, 2012). HEARTH Act of 2009 legalizes CoC programs to implement the extant homeless programs under HUD to coordinate homeless services. The Act promotes the creation of CoC homeless service networks. The Act encourages local communities’ organizations to establish the CoC homeless service networks within the community context and network to work together to address homeless issues. Many local efforts to provide services from nonprofits, governments, and other organizations in the CoC homeless networks have been federally funded to end homelessness (HUD, 2009). Federal funding has been awarded by competition among CoCs, yearly through the application process of HUD.

According to the CoC Interim Rule to regulate the implementation of programs in the CoC network (2012), CoC network is the planning and the coordinating body for resources and services, comprised of representative cross-sector organizations in the geographic area, including nonprofits, housing agencies, school districts, hospitals, etc. CoC network takes the responsibility to develop programs and services and establish an information system known as the Homeless Management Information System (HMIS). The CoC network is anticipated to pool resources and make plans throughout the community. As such, the locally based network is expected to make decisions collectively, diversify financial resources, and devise a method of resource distribution and strategies to decrease homelessness (Valero & Jang, 2020; Svedin & Valero, 2020). Across the United States in 2019, there exist 397 CoC networks to respond to the homeless needs and exert efforts to eliminate the homeless problems. CoC networks have distinctive and different characteristics within the context of networks and the community, such as homeless population, category of geographic areas (major city, metropolitan, etc.), the community population, and so on.

3.2 Network Governance Form in the U.S. Homeless Service Network (CoC)

This section investigates the form of network governance in the U.S. CoC homeless service networks. The first research question in this dissertation is “What are the forms of network governance in U.S. homeless service networks?” and to answer the question, existing literature, documents, and data have been reviewed to define network governance, identify the gap in the literature, and understand the current homeless context. Given governing the whole networks, this section explores how the CoC networks have been managed in certain forms, and which types of organizations take a leading role, such as nonprofits and governments.

Under the voluntary participation by diverse cross-sector organizations, CoC networks are self-organized and find distinctive tactics themselves depending on the characteristics of the community (HUD, 2012). Furthermore, CoC networks appoint one entity, known as “collaborative applicant,” They are the only organization and a collaborative representative that applies to the funding opportunities from HUD, manages the whole CoC networks and coordinates funded projects and services to address the homeless problems.

Every CoC network has the collaborative applicant as the lead agency, designated by network participating organizations. The representative role in the CoC networks has been played by different types of organizations such as government agencies, nonprofits, and health service providers. For example, the CoC network in the Dallas area (TX-600) is administered by a nonprofit organization known as Metro Dallas Homeless Alliance. They manage the regular meeting and coordinate the homeless services among all network members. Also, the government agency, Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, is the collaborative applicant and the representative organization in the CoC network of Los Angeles (CA-600). The different composition of the collaborative applicant in the CoC network identifies the particular type of the collaborative delegate and captures the form of network governance. Considering the circumstances of the community and the network, governance of the whole network in a certain form depends on which structure of decision-making, communication, coordination in the network as well as whether the networks are governed by internal or external organization collaboratively decided by network participating organizations, thus enabling the best accomplishment of the goals of the network and individual network participants (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Milward & Provan, 2006).

The choice of network governance form in CoC networks can also be connected to solving collective action problems in the homeless policy context. The collective action problems occur when organizations work together to achieve the collective goal that a single organization cannot accomplish. Homeless problems are not solved by an organization or a government. Collaboration among other organizations is essential, and many cross-sector organizations participate in CoC networks to work together. For example, a health care clinic provides health services to the homeless who have an illness. Still, they do not provide the services for meals when the homeless are hungry because the feeding is not their strength or ordinary services offered. Also, homeless people usually do not have financial capabilities, and it is difficult for organizations to provide services without financial support. Thus, the role of foundations or governments is also critical to support service providers to continue certain services to the homeless.

However, establishing effective and efficient collaboration among organizations in CoC networks can be viewed as a paradox in the collective action problem. Although network participating organizations such as government, nonprofits, and private organizations, are in the CoC networks to collaboratively pool and share resources, exchange information, and minimize the duplication of the services, each participating organization has individual interests and service areas that make them shirk collective and network goals (HUD, 2012). Also, organizations are not excluded since the hurdle of entering the network is not high and being a network member is dependent on voluntary participation. That characteristic may result in the situation that network participating organizations only reap benefits from the CoC networks without contributing to the collective and network goals, known as Free-Rider Problem. This

tendency causes the cost and uncertainty to build the CoC networks as the collaborative policy bowl in the homeless policy context.

In this situation, the trust among network participants is low. The cost of exchange of reliable information and resource will be high, which directly influences the network benefits of network participating organizations by increasing the collective risks and costs. Furthermore, information asymmetry among network members makes them doubtful about others' free-riding, and it is difficult for them to communicate with each other and exchange resources, thus incurring high costs and uncertainty. When there is no effective form of network governance in managing and coordinating the behaviors and services of network members, the costs of negotiation, communication, and information are increased. If the cost weighs benefits, cross-sector organizations refuse to participate in the collective action to solve homeless issues. To solve the collective action problems, CoC networks, therefore, choose the different types of the collaborative applicant and the form of network governance in terms of decreasing costs and uncertainties and increasing and maximizing the benefits.

Based on the collective action perspectives, this research proposes different forms of network governance that influence effective and efficient collaboration chosen by network participating organizations in the CoC networks. The form of network governance in CoC networks has been identified using the work of Provan and Kenis (2008), whose conceptual research suggests three forms of network governance such as Shared Governance, Lead Organization Governance, and Network Administrative Organization Governance. 397 CoC networks in 2019 were targeted to collect data, but 330 CoC networks were eventually used to analyze by excluding the statewide, U.S. territory CoCs, and no-data cases. That is because the

former is strongly influenced by a certain state agency or the state itself rather than by network participating organizations. The latter, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, have different environments and circumstances about their locations and culture compared to the U.S. mainland. The information of all CoC networks, such as contact person and list of CoC network, was collected from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development website. With that information, each CoC was manually identified by visiting their websites and searching the documents (governance charter, meeting notes, etc.), and the descriptive statistics was conducted to attain an in-depth understanding of the collaborative homeless networks for capturing the form of network governance and the type of governing organization in the CoC networks.

Table 3.2 shows which form of network governance manages the CoC networks and what percentage of each form of network governance is occupied. We found that a shared governance form governs about 2% of CoC networks, and approximately 41% of CoC networks are managed in the lead organization form of network governance. The percentage of network administrative organization form accounts for 57% in governing the CoC networks. The results indicate that the network administrative organization form is the most chosen form of network governance in CoC networks, and CoC networks have much-chosen lead organization form. There are not many CoC networks in the form of shared governance compared to the other two forms, but the result also suggests that several CoC networks are managed by shared governance under the full or majority participation of CoC networks members. While these statistics do not directly identify the circumstances and the characteristics of community and networks for the choice of the form of network governance, the numbers certainly highlight

that 98% of CoC networks have been governed by the lead organization and network administrative organization form. Both forms of network governance are not a panacea, but several studies have attempted to emphasize the strength of both forms of network governance, such as the decision-making process, legitimacy, sustainability, and balance of power (Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Raab et al., 2015; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012).

Table 3.2: Form of Network Governance in CoC Networks

Form of Network Governance	N (%)
Network Administrative Organization (NAO)	187 (57%)
Lead Organization Governance	135 (41%)
Shared Governance	8 (2%)
Total	330 (100%)

As documented in Table 3.2, CoC networks have a certain governance form chosen by network participating members. The choice of network governance form is also dependent on the choice of the type of representative organization. As mentioned above, because all CoC networks should appoint and choose a representative organization, the organization's choice is closely connected to how CoC networks are governed. CoC network members have designated nonprofit, government agencies, or private health clinics as their representative organizations to manage and coordinate procedures and actions. They can be an influential service provider and a nonprofit organization that only focuses on managing the network, not as a service provider in CoC networks. Provan and Kenis (2008) indicate that each form of network governance may be a diverse type of organization by the service and policy areas or the type of productions. Table 3.3 shows that the organizational composition of the form of network governance in CoC networks. The table suggests nonprofit organization and government (office,

agency, department, division, etc.) overall play an important role, accounting for 78%, and coalition structure of the organization (named, coalition, consortium, alliance, and partnership) is another portion of the organization in the form of network governance from CoC networks.

Table 3.3: Type of Organization of Network Governance Form in CoC Networks

	Nonprofit	Government	Coalition	Total
Network Administrative Organization	100 (30.5%)	18 (5.5%)	69 (21%)	187 (57%)
Lead Organization Governance	58 (17.5%)	77 (23.5%)	-	135 (41%)
Shared Governance	2 (0.5%)	2 (0.5%)	4 (1%)	8 (2%)
Total	160 (48.5%)	97 (29.5%)	73 (22%)	330 (100%)

Source: HUD

The shared form of network governance implies the full or majority participation of network members for governing the whole network. Because it is not easy for all or most network members to participate in the process of governing and decision-making due to geographical distance and different schedules (Hendriks, 2020; Provan & Kenis, 2008), shared form is considered better in the network with the small number of network members (Antivachis & Angelis, 2015). In the CoC networks, about 2% of CoC networks are identified as shared form. There is the representative organization as collaborative applicant such as nonprofit, government, and coalition under the rule of HUD for CoC networks. However, each CoC network has a board structure or the regular governance meeting that all or most network participants get together. For example, two California CoC networks in Yolo County and Humboldt County (CA-521 and CA-522) can be understood as shared form. As the structure of coalition, which is not nonprofit and the incorporated, CoC network of Yolo County has a board

of voting members that all members can be one of the members if they meet some conditions such as the minimum attendance of meeting in a previous year and CoC network of Humboldt County holds a monthly governance meeting that every member discuss ideas and services and decides any public statements agreed upon by the whole memberships.

Other examples of shared governance in nonprofit organizations and government can be Tarrant County CoC network in Texas (TX-601) and Livingston County CoC network in Michigan (MI-518). The representative organization of TX-601 CoC network is a nonprofit organization named Tarrant County Homeless Coalition (TCHC), whose name has "Coalition," but is different from CA-521 and CA-522. They have a CoC Board of Directors constructed by Leadership Council (5 elected officials) and Membership Council (28 community representatives). TCHC reports 30 network member agencies such as nonprofit, municipality, and school districts, meaning almost every network member participates in the decision-making process. For the CoC network of Livingston County, there is a Homeless Continuum of Care Committee that each member attends to discuss service coordination and finding a county-wide homeless solution. 5 CoC networks out of 8 CoC networks under shared governance form cover a low homeless population from about 50 to 270 and have less than 30 members. That is consistent with scholars' assertion that the shared form of network governance fits the small size of networks. However, shared governance still works for the sizable network such as Tarrant County CoC network that provides services to over 1500 homeless people and has over 30 network members.

Lead organization form simply signifies that one of the network members with more resources and capacities than other members lead and manages the whole network. In CoC

networks, 41% of lead organization form of governance has been identified, and the lead organizations are mainly government agency (24.5%) and nonprofit organization (17.5%). Government agencies play the role of the lead organization in CoC networks, such as the Community Development Department, Housing Department, Health and Human Services Department, Community Service Department, and Social Services Department. For example, CoC networks of Alameda County in California (CA-502), Fulton County in Georgia (GA-502), Madison County in (IL-504), other CoCs have been led by community development of the department. Department of social services or department of human services has led CoC networks of Saint Louis County in Missouri (MO-500), Mecklenburg County in North Carolina (NC-505), and so on. As indicated by examples, government agencies providing community and social services perform as the lead organization in the CoC networks. Because government agencies have many resources and information, they can play the leading role in the network as the collaborative arrangement in building capacity, training, and educating network members to facilitate the networks (Townsend, 2006).

Furthermore, scholars indicate that in the community, nonprofit organizations have taken initiatives for providing various services, diversifying financial resources, and developing collaboration among other community organizations (Dropkin & Hayden, 2001; O'Regan & Oster, 2000; Ott & Dicke, 2012). Nonprofit organizations function as the leading organization in the CoC networks because they have had experiences providing certain services in the homeless policy context and have the capacity to find funding resources. For example, United Way of each community has led CoC networks of Columbia/Midlands in South Carolina (SC-502), Sedgwick County in Kansas (KS-502), Kent County in Michigan (MI-506), and other CoCs,

although United Way also performs as Network Administration Organization in multiple CoC networks. Community action agencies or housing or human service nonprofits play the leading organization such as United Community Services of John County in Kansas (KS-505), Central Massachusetts Housing Alliance Inc in Massachusetts (MA-506), Harford Community Action Agency, Inc in Maryland (MD-502), and others. In CoC networks, many nonprofit organizations provide various services to homeless people and play a leading role with other network members.

Network administrative organization (NAO) form indicates that the network is externally managed by an independent and separate entity, whose purpose is effective management and whose concentration is network success (Milward & Provan, 2006). NAO form is distinctive from the shared form or lead organization form in that the main role of NAO is to coordinate and sustain the network and be more effective than the other two forms of network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Because NAO is not a network member providing its services, NAO comparatively does not have its own interests and can be more focusing on governing the whole network by making network members more participating, balancing the power of network members, and improving accountability (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Mosley & Jarpe, 2019). Many NAO form has a board of directors or governing committee.

In CoC networks, about 57% has been identified as NAO form of network governance, and the role of NAO has been played by nonprofit organizations (30%), governments (5%), and coalition type (21%). For example, nonprofit organizations such as Metro Dallas Homeless Alliance in Texas (TX-600), Ending Community Homelessness Coalition in Texas (TX-503), Tennessee Valley Coalition to End Homeless in Tennessee (TN-512), and Strategies to End

Homelessness in Ohio (OH-500) manages the whole networks and coordinate services and activities of network members, which do not usually provide direct services but connect homeless people with organizations providing appropriate services. In the same vein, government agencies such as the Office of Homeless Services in Philadelphia (PA-500), Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority in California (CA-600), Office of Homeless Services in California (CA-609), Homeless Task Force in Kansas (KS-503), and Office of Homelessness Prevention and Intervention in Kentucky (KY-502) are taking their role as NAO in the network governance. They function as the administrative and financial management entity or educate network members for the collaborative process of policy and service programs.

Coalition type organization is another composition of NAO form of CoC networks. The coalition type organization has used different names such as the coalition, partnership, alliance, council, and network, but they are different from nonprofit organizations with similar names. While nonprofit is incorporated and official tax-exempted organization with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax code such as 501©3, coalition type organization generally is not incorporated nonprofit organization and a specified collaborative organization established by network members. Based on the CoC rules, the CoCs by the coalition appoint a collaborative applicant, but usually, the organization plays a role in the administrative process and assistance of programs. Decisions and governing processes, and communication have been made in the regular meeting and governing committees by a board of directors or member representatives. CoC in Imperial County of California (CA-613) can be an example. A collaborative organization has managed the CoC by CoC members, named Imperial Valley Continuum of Care Council. They are not a nonprofit or a government agency as a service provider. However, they only

focus on the engagement of CoC members and management of CoC by planning the regular executive board meeting and membership meeting matching services to the homeless individuals and announcing funding opportunities. The service department of the county assists the administrative process, but the coalitional organization has made all decisions and governing CoC.

Another example is the CoC of the Plymouth County area in Massachusetts (MA-511). The CoC is governed by a coalitional network, known as South Shore Regional Network. Governing the CoC has been done by the executive committee established by network members. The committee leads decisions and oversight of network implementation. The network organization plays the main role in connecting with community partners and network members and updating governance charter and membership annually. They are not a service provider, and they are the very organization to manage the whole CoC network and coordinate services from network members. In addition to two examples, there are CoCs by coalition type of organization in NAO form such as Fall River Homeless Service Providers Coalition (MA-515), Homeless Leadership Coalition (OR-503), Lancaster Coalition to End Homelessness (PA-510), Southern Maryland Local Homeless Coalition (MD-508), Homeless Initiative Partnership (FL-601) and so on.

3.3 Conclusion and Discussion

Following chapter 2 and chapter 3, the purpose of these chapters is to answer the first research question: What are the forms of network governance in homeless service networks? To answer the question, network governance is defined, and the extant literature of network governance is reviewed to understand the tendency and identify the gap in this field.

Furthermore, the form of network governance is explained and understood by the collective action framework, which suggests the lens about how the form of network governance can be recognized in terms of the choice and decision by network participating organizations.

Understanding the definition of network governance indicates that network governance has related to network management and mechanism to function the network in its specific form and structure. Scholars identify network governance as the effective use of institutions to coordinate actions and exchange resources to overcome network complexity and insufficiency. By the literature review, it is understood that studies of network and network governance have addressed the importance of network management and factors on network outcomes. However, a few studies identify the form of network governance, which is also understood as a factor influencing network performances, and the form of network governance has been less captured in the network policy arenas.

The U.S. homeless context is examined to understand the importance of solving the homeless issues and the background and community characteristics of collective homeless service networks, named Continuum of Care (CoC). As a choice by network participating organizations, the form of network governance in homeless service networks have been identified. CoC networks at the community level such as city, county, and metropolitan region are considered to identify the form of network governance by excluding CoC networks state level and U.S. territories. Statewide CoCs tend to be more led by certain state agencies or governments themselves rather than collaborative approaches from network members. CoCs in U.S. territories can be differently operated due to the unique environment and rules, compared to the CoCs in the U.S. general local areas. Thus, a form of network governance is identified

from 346 CoC homeless service networks out of 396 and is captured by the form of Shared governance, Lead organization governance or Network Administrative Organization governance from the conceptual research of Provan and Kenis (2008).

Under the data collection, this chapter analyzes the CoC data by the descriptive statistics to understand each form of network governance in CoC homeless service networks in the United States. The finding indicates that CoC networks are governed by shared form (2%), lead organization form (41%), and NAO form (57%), and the forms of network governance is operated by nonprofit (48.5%), government (29.5%), and coalitional organization (22%). For example, nonprofit organization plays an important role to manage the whole CoC networks in shared governance form (0.5%), lead organization form (17.5%), and NAO form (30%). Government agency takes initiatives as the governing role of the CoC networks in shared governance form (0.5%), lead organization form (24.5%), and NAO form (5%). The coalitional organization also implements the managerial role of CoC networks in shared form (1%) and NAO form (21%). The results suggest that NAO has mainly implemented CoC networks and lead organization form (98%), and nonprofits and government agencies (78%) play a critical role in governing the CoC networks.

This chapter deals with an entire picture of the U.S. homeless policy context, the CoC homeless service networks, and the form of network governance in the collective action perspective. The understandings shed light on the U.S. homeless issues and the function of CoC networks to respond to homelessness in certain forms of network governance. However, this study has several limitations that need further examination. Although this chapter seeks to understand the form of network governance, this study is limited to the context of the

homeless policy and homeless service networks and then is only analyzed by the descriptive statistics to understand the network governance form without identifying the causal effect on the choice of form of network governance. Thus, future research would be stronger when the scope of other policy contexts and networks are considered and expanded, and the important key factors are more deeply identified in detail.

CHAPTER 4

KEY FACTORS OF CHOICE OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE FORM

4.1 Overview

The widespread fields of policy implementation and service delivery have been relying on networks of organizations, and the incentives for community entities have been studied about the engagement of networks (Agranoff & Mcguire, 2004; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012; Svennson, Trommel, & Lantiank, 2008). Many studies document the beneficial aspects of collaborative networks and their effective provision and service delivery (Agranoff & Mcguire, 2001). Despite the potential and typical strengths of collaborations in the networks, sustaining and retaining the advantages is closely connected with how networks are managed and governed because collaborative outcomes may not be accomplished, and the network is not perfect. Scholars in the field of public administration and management have recognized the importance of network governance in the arenas of services and policies. Kapucu and his colleague (2020) emphasize that the practical function of collaborative networks would be made by network governance.

Network participating organizations gradually face complicated and cross-sectoral issues that cannot be easily solved and exceed the present managerial function in coordinated or collaborative actions. The solution to such problems requires more operational resource sharing and choosing a form of network governance. Fragmented function and decentralized and autonomous entities within a network arise collective action problems and need an advantageous governance structure to mitigate the problems. This situation is similar to the perspectives of institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas. The collective action problems

arise from fragmented management because collaborative entities are connected and mutually influenced by the scope of service areas and externalities (Feiock, 2013; Feiock, Krause, & Hawkins, 2017). Their collaborative actions are ensured when benefits transcend the transaction costs of negotiations, oversight, and implementation due to the incentives to free-riding, and opportunistic behaviors and absence of a managerial mechanism to coordinate and integrate individual entities' actions and decisions may result in inefficient outcomes (Feiock, 2009; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009).

This research applies the institutional collective action (ICA) framework to network governance, and the form of network administrative organization (NAO) is considered by voluntary choice of network participating organizations to mitigate the collective action problem within the network. As an independent and externally centralized entity, a network administrative organization (NAO) governs the whole network in terms of coordinating the actions of network organizations, managing the resource and information, and overseeing opportunistic behaviors (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Also, network administrative organization (NAO) generally is not one of the service providers or network members. Still, they are a management-focused organization that can be reliable and effective because they have no self-interests or preferences. The existence of themselves is to manage the network, compared to other forms of network governance. Extant studies of network governance have diversely studied the network effectiveness and performances, but the literature of the choice of form of network governance has been limited by the perspectives of the plentiful benefit of networks (Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Raab et al., 2015). Because understanding the form of network governance is not about the choice itself but the

mechanism and process in the network collaboration among network members. Thus, it eventually contributes to network performances.

This study is guided by two research questions: (1) What are key factors influencing the choice of Network Administrative Organization (NAO) form of network governance? And (2) Does problem severity, network, and community capacity—measured in terms of total homeless and veteran population, federal funding, permanent supportive housing, membership, total beds, and nonprofit organization and total support for the nonprofits—matter in choosing NAO form of network governance? Based on the institutional collective action (ICA) framework, to answer these questions, this research examines the U.S. homeless service networks, Continuum of Cares (CoCs), to eradicate the incidence of homelessness across the United States. Six additional sections organize this study, and the first two sections are the literature review about network administrative organization (NAO) and institutional collective action (ICA) framework. Based on that, the hypotheses are provided in the section of the key factors of the choice of NAO form. The other three sections are designed for the research design, analysis and findings, and conclusion and discussions.

4.2 Literature Review: Network Administrative Organization (NAO)

While the network has the potential to implement policies and provide services (Molin & Masella, 2016), a certain form of network governance is needed to effectively manage the whole network (Kapucu, & Hu, 2020). Network administrative organization (NAO) is one of the forms of network governance where an independent external entity centrally governs the entire network and activities of network participating organizations, and the key role has been understood "to coordinate and sustain the network" (Provan & Kenis, 2008, 236). At the most

general level, the network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance is the institutional arrangement established by network members for the network management design to provide public services and implement certain policies in terms of network success and goal accomplishments. As a distinct administrative entity, network administrative organizations (NAOs) focus on network management, and they are not generally one of the service providers, where they are often operating external offices (Milward & Provan, 2006). While nonprofit organizations play an important role as network administrative organizations (NAOs), government entities or even private organizations also carry out the NAO role (Human & Provan, 2000; Koza & Lewin, 1999).

One advantage of choosing the network administrative organization (NAO) form is to provide network participating organizations with an effective coordinating environment in providing public goods and services. Under network administrative organization (NAO), network members can deliver standardized services to the networks and take advantage of the involvement of network as network members such as synergy effect and economies of scale (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Braun, 2018; Hoflund, 2013; Moynihan, 2009). For example, NAOs can improve the accountability of each network member by more including active and passionate network members and excluding inactive and hostile members to the network or other network members (Hoflund, 2013). Scholars have shown that NAOs can also enhance resource allocations and allow network members to pool resources together by making common regulations and balancing powers and conflicts (Maron & Benish, 2021; Provan & Milward, 2001). While each network member can disagree with the function of NAOs and determine the continuity of their network participation, NAO is flexible enough for network

members to discuss more and make an agreement if needed.

The importance of NAOs is also dependent on invisible resources such as social capital, trust, and procedural fairness (Hoflund, 2013; Kenis & Provan, 2009; Lefebvre, Molnar, & Gellynck, 2012). The advantages of participating in a voluntary institutional arrangement may reduce transaction costs and share risks and uncertainties by repeated interactions and connections across policy or service arenas. NAOs, for instance, schedule regular meetings for the board of directors or network members and announce common agendas to members, thus making them continue their relationships in the networks and update essential data for the whole network. Such characteristics of NAOs positively influence the development of intangible resources in the network. While scholars have emphasized interactions as a precondition that chooses NAO form of network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan & Lemaire, 2012), formalized communication structure also provides the level of expectation for the behaviors of network members to accomplish network benefits.

Network administrative organization (NAO) form for network management has been increased to deliver human and social services. However, many empirical research areas have remained scantily explored. A growing number of studies documents the advantages and role related to effectiveness in the context of the provision of services and goods (Braun, 2018; Kenis & Provan; 2009; Lefebvre, Molnar, & Gellynck, 2012; Long & Krause, 2020; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Milward & Provan, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Ogunro, 2016). For instance, Lefebvre and colleagues (2012) suggest that NAOs play an important role in developing social capital in the inter-organizational networks that support network members' innovation of the food networks. Similarly, Braun (2018) studies the decision-making process for NAO to address the

problems of health care quality in the National Quality Forum (NQF). Even though the substantive and symbolic benefits of NAOs or other forms of network governance such as lead agency form and participant shared governance, extant studies provide only a limited understanding of why networks choose NAO as a form of network governance with few exceptions (Saz-Carranza, Iborra, & Albareda, 2015, Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Provan & Kenis (2008) conceptually provides three forms of network governance: participant shared governance, lead organization governance, and network administrative organization (NAO) governance, which do not provide empirical evidence. They explain the adoption and the choice of each form of network governance depending on the degree of trust, the number of network members, goal consensus, and the need for network competencies. NAO is chosen when trust is moderately dense, and goal consensus and need for network competencies are high under moderate and many network members. Regarding the power dynamics of mandated networks, Saz-Carranza and colleagues (2015) answer the question: how does power bargaining affect the NAO development of mandated networks?

Their findings indicate that power bargaining is the key factor of NAO form of network governance by comparing two mandated networks and conducting interviews. In contrast, Saz-Carranza and colleagues (2015) provide a valuable contribution to developing a study on the factor for NAO adoption. Their work focuses on the power bargaining and mandated networks in the limited number of networks. Their work did not extend to the comprehensive understanding of the choice of NAO. To fill in the gap, this research extends the works of Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda (2015) and Provan and Kenis (2008) by investigating key factors to choose NAO form of network governance depending on problems and circumstances.

4.3 Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas and Network Administrative Organization (NAO)

This section explains how institutional action problems among network members are related to the voluntary choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance. Since the importance of the NAO form is also based on invisible resources such as norms, trust, and commitment, the engagement of a voluntary institutional arrangement by the choice may outweigh the costs and risks through the frequent interactions, the agreement of the incentive structure. The institutional collective action (ICA) perspective is a theoretical framework to understand why collaborative governance structure is emerged and chosen by the degree of voluntary collaboration of local or regional community actors across sectors such as local government, public agency, private and nonprofit organizations, to find remedies for shared issues that cannot be solved by an organization alone (Feiock, 2007, 2013; Feiock & Scholz, 2010).

From the basis of actor-centered institutional perspectives (Scharpf, 1997) and institutional analysis development (Ostrom, 1990), the ICA perspective focuses on the rational behavior and action of the actors. It explains it related to the emergence of collaborative institutions. The ICA perspective basically originated from collective action dilemmas when developing the institutions and may generate uncertainties and risks. In the basic idea of the ICA framework, effective collaboration may not be accomplished due to the barriers related to the negotiation and monitoring (Andrew and Hwakins 2013; Feiock, 2013). The purpose of the ICA perspective is to find the collaborative mechanism to minimize the collaborative risks and establish the incentive structures where coordinate the behavior and action of organizations in terms of managing collective action problems (Andrew et al., 2015; Arntsen, Torjesen, &

Karlsen, 2018; Kwon et al., 2010).

The ICA perspective suggests four general factors to recognize the collective action dilemmas: "(1) nature of collective action dilemma, (2) the authorities directly or indirectly involved in the policy arena, (3) the potential risks associated with action and inaction, (4) the incentives explaining the motivation of the actors" (Feiock, 2013, 400). As the initial step, it is important to understand the collective action problems in the collaborative context embedded. The second factor, the authorities, is related to collaborative tools or purposes decided by participating organizations in the collaborative efforts. The risk and incentive are also critical factors. These are generally related to transaction costs and uncertainty as well as the motivation to bear the risk and the uncertainty and participate in the collaborative context by solving the collective action problems (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Dixit & Olson, 2000; Feiock, 2007, 2013).

The risk and uncertainty depend on the behavior and the action of organizations. For example, suppose organizations embedded in the collaborative setting do not act to accomplish collaborative benefits. In that case, other organizations can do it in the same ways as free-rider problems and the spillover effects, and the risk and uncertainty would be increased. Consistent with the risk and uncertainty, the incentive is important to adjust the endurance of the risk and the uncertainty because not every organization gets the same degree of incentives, which should be discussed, such as regulations and monitoring to solve the collective action problems (Feiock, 2009; Feiock, 2013).

From the ICA perspective, the choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance can be understood in the collective action problems. Networks have

been carried out to integrate service and good and coordinate the actor's actions in the policy and service arenas (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; McGuire, 2006; Provan & Milward, 2001).

Autonomous organizations across sectors participate in the networks to collaborate to accomplish their own purposes and collective goals. The network can be the locus of innovation and allows the network participating organizations to share resources and information and have flexible access to new technologies (Lee, Park, Yoon, & Park, 2009; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Networks can also overcome the rigidity of traditional hierarchical institutional arrangements by the flexibility of interdependency (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; O'Toole, 1997). The interdependent relationships in the networks develop mutual learning among network participants and thus enhance their capacities (Agranoff, 2006; McGuire, 2000). Under these advantages from networks, the effectiveness of service delivery and policy implementations would be prompted (Graddy & Chen, 2006; Raab, Mannak, & Cambre, 2015).

Despite various benefits, the networks have inherent limitations and collective action problems. Network participating organizations are in different sector orientations and have identifiable interests, although the network has a common goal. In this situation, network participants may concentrate more on their own preferences by using resources in networks without any contribution to achieving the common goals. This situation of uncertainty and the risk associated with the behavior and action of other network members may increase costs of building strong relationships, establishing trust and obtaining reliable information, and negotiating among network members due to the information asymmetries and trust.

The ICA framework posits that such costs pose barriers to the effective collaboration of organizations and assumes that the degree of integrating divergent interests and preferences is

critical for the strategic action in the collaborative setting because organizations may focus more on collectives, thus bettering off every entity (Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Feiock, 2013; Kwon & Feiock, 2010). When there are no effective monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, the uncertainty and collaborative risks would be high for the networks by increasing costs to maintain and develop networks. Since network participation may be voluntary in-out, excluding network members from being affected by the network benefits is challenging. In that situation, this research contends that network members are likely to make decisions about the choice of NAO form of governance based on the characteristics of NAOs, which is external and central governance entity to incentivize the network management. The next section deals with the key factors of the choice of NAOs by network participating organizations.

4.4 Key Factors of Choice of Network Administrative Organization (NAO)

This study understands the factors affecting the choice of the NAO form of network governance in relation to the transaction costs and risks that create the uncertainty. The ICA framework states that the voluntary institutional arrangement is emerged to capture their benefits by the collaboration of the regional and community organizations in the service provisions. The ICA framework indicates the characteristics of services, goods, and community influence to identify the costs and benefits. Consistent with the understanding of the transaction costs, this research argues that a choice of the NAO form of network governance rather than other forms of network governance because the NAO is an independent and external organization that exclusively focuses on network management and is less captured by other different purposes. This research identifies the choice of NAO form can be influenced by the problem severity, network capacity, and community capacity.

4.4.1 Problem Severity

Problem severity can influence the characteristics of goods and services because the efforts and the investment of handling problems may be different and influenced when the problem handled is severe. For example, in the CoC networks, when the homeless issues can be considered a serious problem, local and community entities may provide the services and goods differently than before in responding to homelessness. Local and community organizations find the way about how to provide services depending on the features of services and goods.

Scholars have identified there are two aspects of goods and services influencing transaction costs, such as asset specificity and service measurability (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Feiock, 2007). Asset specificity means whether certain investments and efforts should be applied to a service, not applied to another, and service measurability is related to the challenge of measurement of the services and of the measurement in monitoring actions to deliver services and goods (Brown & Potoski, 2003).

When problems are severe, homeless services provided by diverse organizations in the networks can be in high asset specificity because network participating organizations can be focusing on their strengths, and their efforts and investments can be targeted to the specific services. Also, problem severity can influence the service measurability because the network organizations may not directly identify the outcome of services and wonder the services of other organizations in influencing the performances. Based on the possibility of the high asset specificity and low service measurability, network participating organizations may seek to find the diverse investment and services and make sure their efforts to provide services and identify the collective efforts of other organizations.

Furthermore, in the absence of the mechanism, the problem severity may influence negotiating and monitoring costs which can be relatively high. The more severe the problem, the greater the network participating organizations face the difficulty to collaboratively act due to the high demands of problem-related services and the busy management that only focuses on the daily routine. These high enforcement costs may lead to neglecting their responsibilities as the collaborative actor in the network, unfavorable situations to exchange information and resources, and the incentive not to invest their maximized efforts in the collective outcomes. Since the preferences of network participating organizations are divergent in the situation, the costs of collaborative efforts would be expensive without the effective form of network governance. Thus, network participants can decide on NAOs as a form of network governance. To identify the problem severity in the homeless service context, this research measures the homeless population, a certain group of the homeless population (veteran), and the change of the homelessness. This research accordingly hypothesizes the following:

Hypothesis 1: Homeless problem severity is associated with the choice of NAO form of network governance

4.4.2 Network Capacity

Coordination is one of the critical problems in the collaborative arrangement (Feiock, 2007; 2013). Collaborative entities are in different service or policy areas, and joint production by collaboration should be coordinated. To collaborate each other, collaborative actors should be able to see chances for mutual gains and can be ensured in the coordinating processes. The ICA framework emphasizes that coordination issues can be solved by the capacity of the mechanism to solve the collective action dilemmas, producing collaborative costs and benefits

(Feiock, 2013). In network governance, each form of network governance has different characteristics, but how much capacities networks have been the fundamental factors to deal with the problems. When network capacity is not enough, coordinating cannot be accomplished by the resources and power of governing organization. On the other hand, when network capacity is enough, there is the possibility of effective coordination by using the capacities wisely. However, network members should know the situation of understanding of the network capacity and how the capacities would positively influence should be ensured.

A successful outcome and collaborative action of the network may not always depend on network capacity. Having many capacities does not mean the automatic accomplishment of collaborative effects. A network with high capacities may indicate that network participants can use many resources and assets, but how the capacities are distributed and shared can be the different issues in the network. Fair division for the joint productions should be agreed, and the actions of network members also should be coordinated in getting benefits by the network capacity. ICA framework posits that the disagreement and inability on the fair division, uncertainty of other entities' integrities, and uneven distribution of costs and benefits are the critical issues in coordination of the collaborative arrangement. (Feiock et al., 2009; Feiock, 2013; Hawkins, 2010). To coordinate the actions of network participants and distribute the costs and benefits in the fair manner, an effective form of network governance should be chosen by network members. This study uses multiple indicators of network capacity of the homeless service networks to measure the resources and assets of networks to pursue the NAO form: federal funding, membership, permanent housing units, and total beds.

Federal funding can be understood as the network capacity influencing the choice of the

NAO form. Network members can identify the federal funding that can be used to respond to the homeless problems. Scholars identify the government funding is the motivation of collaborative actors to establish collaborative arrangements (Andrew, 2015; Ryu, 2021). Membership can be identified as the network capacity because many network members can mean that there are diverse resources and scope of service boundaries in the networks. However, when there are a number of network members, the difficulty and the costs for the joint decisions can be high. Olson (1965) asserts that the greater number of participants, the more the possibility to shirk the responsibilities. In the aspect of resources, permanent housing units and total beds are related to the recognized tools to respond to the homeless needs. In the coordinating process, how the units and beds are allocated and used should be objectively decided in the NAO form. Thus, this study hypothesizes as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Network capacity of a homeless service network is associated with choice of NAO form of network governance

4.4.3 Nonprofit Capacity of Community

While there are different concepts of community capacity (Bowen, Martin, Mancini, & Nelson, 2000; Goodman et al., 1998; Littlepage, Gazley, & Bennett, 2012), at the general level, community capacity can be understood as "the community's ability and a set of specified assets that exist within the community." (Fawcett et al., 1995; Kretzman & McKnight, 1993). In this vein, this research understands the role and involvement of nonprofit organizations as the community capacity because nonprofit organizations are the local community-based organizations to actively provide services and respond to community needs and problems with other organizations, thus positively influencing to enhance the community ability and

community assets (Ott & Dicke, 2015). When there are many nonprofit organizations, the community may broaden the scope of the services to high quality. Literature shows that nonprofit organizations are key actors in building community capacity and sustaining long-term positive effects (Chaskin, 2001; D'Agostino & Kloby, 2011; Meenar, 2015). In the perspective of collective action problems, while not much literature is extant, scholars emphasize the role of community or nonprofit organizations in the collaborative arrangement. For example, Andrew and his colleagues (2015) identify the importance of grass-root organization as the bowl of civic engagement to facilitate collaborative efforts in the emergency planning process.

They indicate that grass-roots organizations are helpful to identify shared risks and vulnerability in broadening community resources to mitigate the collective action problems in the context of emergency management. Additionally, Frasier (2021) finds that when lowering the costs against the expected benefits, the collective benefits encourage nonprofit organizations to involve in the charter school policy process to enhance the policy effects. Jang and her colleagues (2016) emphasize the cost and benefits by conditions of nonprofit organizations to participate in the voluntary, informal collaboration. They contend that many types of collective action problems can be solved by locally voluntary collaboration involved with nonprofit organizations. The engagement and the importance of nonprofit organizations in the community apply to the network context. Diverse nonprofit organizations participate in the network and are the impelling service provider (Feiock & Jang, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008), but all community nonprofit organizations are not the network participating organizations.


To respond to community problems more actively and effectively, interactions between network members and community nonprofit organizations are essential to exchange

information and develop collaborative culture and perspectives by regular contact or meeting and through some members of representative role for the network. This research anticipates that the expertise and the involvement of nonprofit organizations within the local community can positively influence the effective collaboration among network members. Nonprofit organizations have the know-how in their service areas and their experiences and expertise are critical for the collaboration (Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Simo & Bies, 2007). Such characteristics of the community's nonprofit organizations may provide plentiful information with the network organizations, and the services can be more effectively provided, and the nonprofit organizations can increase the public trust of service areas. However, the know-how and expertise from nonprofit organizations should be integrated, and network members can approach the proper nonprofit organizations for a positive impact in their service areas.

The ICA framework posits that the high information costs can be the barrier to collaboration among community and local entities, thus requiring an effective institutional arrangement (Feiock, 2013). If there is no mechanism to integrate the information, the costs to get the information from nonprofit organizations can be high depending on each network member's limitations and different circumstances. Thus, to decrease the information cost and integrate the expertise and the know-how, the NAO can be chosen by network members. This study measures the nonprofit capacity by a nonprofit organization and nonprofit supportive revenue. Many nonprofit organizations and the financial support for the nonprofits can contribute to the networks by increasing the opportunities to make relationships with nonprofits and its sustainability by financial stability. Thus, the hypothesis is made as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Nonprofit capacity of a community is associated with the choice of NAO form of network governance

Figure 4.1: ICA Framework for Factors affecting Choice of Network Governance



4.5 Research Design

4.5.1 Research Context

This research examines U.S. Homeless Collaborative Service Networks (Continuum of Care; CoC) to identify factors relating to the choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form for network governance. Homeless issues are multifaceted and complicated, and individuals are experiencing homelessness face complex physical, emotional, and social issues. Such characteristics necessitate the collaborative efforts of diverse organizations with different strengths and service concentrations. To maximize the collaborative effects and pool resources effectively to respond to homelessness, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has designed the Homeless Services Network (CoC) Program that promotes engagement of local community entities (i.e., local government, nonprofit organization, foundation, hospital, etc.) by establishing the homeless service network to eradicate homelessness in a collaborative manner (HUD, 2012). Local entities make the CoC networks in their own ways depending on their circumstances.

The formation of CoC is not based on legal enforcement and mandates but geographic areas and circumstances. The Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act of 2009 is the federal law to formalize the planning steps of CoC, such as application and coordination process, and to lead HUD to publish the regulations and implement the CoC homeless program. HUD manages CoC network program, based on the CoC interim rule (2016), and the main purpose of the CoC program is included (CoC Interim Rule Amendment, 2015, p 2):

- Facilitate community-wide dedication to eradicating homelessness

- Financially support nonprofit providers, state, and local governments for the activities of rehousing homeless individuals and families and minimizing the trauma and dislocation.
- Facilitate the connection and effective use of core programs
- Enhance self-sufficiency the homeless individuals and families


In 2019, there exist 397 CoC homeless networks across the U.S. territories. Based on HUD data, the U.S. CoC networks have been categorized and located at largely rural, largely suburban, major cities, and other largely urban areas. Table 4.1 and figure 4.2 present that largely rural CoC networks account for 29.5% (n=117) and largely suburban CoC networks occupy 43.3% (n=172). Major City CoCs and other largely urban CoC take up 12.1% (n=48) and 15.1% (n=60). The table shows that over 70% of CoC networks are rural or suburban, and less than 30% of CoC networks are in a city and urban areas. Additionally, CoC networks cover different geographical areas such as states, counties, cities, and regional areas. Table 4.2 presents about 10% (n=40) is the state-covered and led CoCs, and about 88% (n=351) is the local and community CoC networks.

Table 4.1: Geographical Category of CoC Networks

Category	N	%
Largely Rural CoC	117	29.5
Largely Suburban CoC	172	43.3
Major City CoC	48	12.1
Other Largely Urban CoC	60	15.1
Total	397	100.0

Source: HUD

Figure 4.2: Geographical category of CoC networks



Source: HUD

Table 4.2: Coverage Area of CoC Networks

Coverage	N	%
County, city, and regional CoC	351	88.4
Statewide CoC	40	10.1
U.S. territories CoC	6	1.5
Total	397	100.0

Source: HUD

There are 567,715 homeless people in the United States. The salient characteristic in the U.S. homeless situation CoC networks faced is that over 55% of homeless people live in five states such as California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Washington. Table 4.3 shows that California has 151,278 homeless people (26.6%), and New York has 92,091 homeless population (16.2%). There are 28,328 (5.0%) homeless people in Florida, and there are 25,848 individuals experiencing homelessness in the State of Texas (4.6%). Finally, about 3.8% (n=21,577) of homeless people live in the State of Washington.

Table 4.3: Five States of Homeless Population

States	N	%
California	151,278	26.6
New York	92,091	16.2
Florida	28,328	5.0
Texas	25,848	4.6
Washington	21,577	3.8
Total	319,122	56.2

4.5.2 Data Collection and Procedure

The subject of this research is the U.S. homeless service network, and data collection was conducted from multiple sources in the four stages. During the initial stage, data of CoC network and homeless incidences was collected from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The website of HUD provides diverse annual reports and the contact information of each CoC, and this research considers 2019 CoC data, which is the most updated when collecting the data. 330 CoC networks were used in this research, whereas 397 CoC networks existed in the United States in 2019. Since this research is targeted to community and local homeless service networks, state-led CoCs (Statewide and Balance of State) were omitted as well as the CoCs of the U.S. territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico with different environments and systems. No-data CoCs are also excluded. For example, based on the sources, homeless incidences such as the total homeless population and number of veteran homeless individuals are available, and federal funding to CoCs is identified.

The data is usually provided from the reports by CoC or States, and each of CoC data should be manually downloaded and collected. The contact list of CoCs provides the information of representative people such as the name of the organization, contact number,

and address, email, etc. Under the data, websites of each CoC have been identified by using that information, and CoC websites, in many cases, provide governance charter and membership data. In the second stage, multiple demographic community data of the jurisdiction in CoC networks was collected from the website of Community Planning and Development (CPD) maps provided by HUD. The CPD maps are open for the public and allow to reach the geographical and demographic data depending on the jurisdiction of HUD programs such as Continuum of Care (CoC), Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and so on. The data reached in the CPD maps is originated from the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates by U.S. Census Bureau. Each CoC network was manually chosen in the jurisdiction on the CPD maps and get the data file. Fragmented numbers of data were moved to a new excel sheet and used in the analysis.

Collecting the form of network governance and membership data was conducted in the third stage. Each CoC was identified by googling their information and visiting the websites based on the leading network agency (known as Collaborative Applicant) and the contact list of CoC. The form of network governance was checked and collected by identifying the type of organization and the governance structure by governance-related documents and board structure. The form of network governance was based on the work of Provan and Kenis (2008): all CoC members participation of network governance (Shared), network mainly governed by an organization or some organizations as one of the service providers and consistent with the collaborative applicant (Leading Agency), external and independent type of organization (or group, association, partnership type of organization) to manage the network (Network Administrative Organization). Appendix D is shown for the code sheet by questions.

Membership data was mainly collected from the website of individual CoC networks, but about half of CoC networks (about 200) do not provide the information of their members. To get more membership data, the websites were closely observed to see meeting attendance documents, meeting minutes, governance charter, or their basic information was scrutinized in Google and other links. In the final stage, the emails were sent to about 60 CoC networks to ask their Membership politely and answered from about 80% CoCs. In the fourth stage, nonprofit data in the CoC jurisdiction was collected from the database of the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), and the 2017 data set was used because that is the most updated dataset. Using the data of the address of nonprofit organizations from NCCS, the geographical boundary of CoC networks was matched with FIPS Code.

4.6 Measurement and Method

4.6.1 Dependent Variable: Network Administrative Organization (NAO)

The dependent variable in this research is the network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance to answer the research question, "what are the key factors affecting the choice of NAO form of network governance?" To capture the NAO form of network governance, 330 CoC networks were identified for their governance structure based on the concept of Provan and his colleagues (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Milward & Provan, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008). They explain NAO form that "a separate and administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities." They emphasize that NAO is an external organization and not a network member and a service provider to coordinate and continue the network, although network members are still exchanged. NAO has the exclusive purpose of network governance. Several aspects were identified based on the role, mission statement, and

governance charter in the documents and the websites to identify the NAO form in the CoC networks.

As indicated by Provan and his colleagues, the main role of coordinating and facilitating CoC networks was crucially identified, and the service delivery was also identified. It was checked when they clarified the exclusive role by saying that they coordinate the entire CoC networks and administratively support the CoC networks to sustain their coordinated services and state no-direct-provision of services in their missions and purposes from the documents and the introduction. Those CoCs were categorized as the NAO, and additionally, the number of board of directors and their organizational type was collected. Some CoCs provide and introduce their services, but most CoCs offer the services at the level of referral, liaison, and connection with the proper service providers of the networks, which is better to categorize the NAO. Unlike the NAO, the CoCs in the Lead Organization governance tend to emphasize their service provision, and usually, the lead organizations have particular services areas such as housing, community development, health services, which is the clear distinction of the NAO. The collaborative organizations govern some CoC networks in their name of collaboration, partnership, coalition, consortium, and network. Because this type of organization was established to manage the CoCs, they were also identified as the NAO. The code sheet is attached in Appendix D.

The data was collected from the qualitative documents and evidence, and the systematic process and reliability are important. To check the data reliability, a colleague who is a Ph.D. candidate in public administration and management was educated about Provan and his colleague's three forms of network governance and was asked to differentiate randomly

picked 45 CoC networks, which is about 14% out of 330. The identification of the CoC networks by him was consistent with the initial collection by me, and he correctly identified the 43 CoC networks out of 45 ones. Considering 330 CoC networks in total, the identification from the 45 randomly picked indicates that the form of network governance has been reliably collected based on the work of Provan and his colleagues. To check the reliability of the data collection, the correlation analysis with his identification of 45 randomly picked CoC networks and the initial collection for 45 CoC networks was conducted. Table 4.4 shows the correlation result, meaning two data sets for 45 CoC networks are correlated in over 90%.

Table 4.4: Multi-coder Correlation Score

Pearson Correlation	.907**
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000***
N	45

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

NAO form of network governance is measured as a dichotomous variable: 1= NAO form of network governance, 0=others. The mean value for NAO is .56, and the standard deviation (S.D.) is 0.497. As aforementioned, the NAO form of network governance is differentiated by whether an external and independent organization governs CoC as not one of the service providers and network members. The NAO organization is a nonprofit, government agency, or unincorporated coalition (or alliance). Some CoC networks indicate their collaborative applicant (a lead agency of CoC) is one of their members with much more capacity than other network members. However, if their main role supports CoCs administratively and procedurally and decisions are still under the CoC board or council in the unincorporated coalition (or alliance), that CoCs are identified as NAO form of network governance.

4.6.2 Independent Variables

This study examines the influence of three categorizations of factors on the choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance: problem severity, network and nonprofit capacity, and community characteristics. This research uses nine independent variables in capturing the key factors. Problem severity is measured by three variables, and network capacity is measured by four variables, while two variables measure nonprofit capacity of community. Three variables, total homeless per capita, the number of veteran homeless (log), and change of homelessness are used to measure problem severity. The total homeless population of all CoC networks is summed up and divided by the total population in the CoC jurisdiction, and the number of veteran homeless individuals measures the veteran homeless population variable. The change of homeless population is calculated by the average change for three years of homeless population.

By understanding intergovernmental mechanisms in the U.S. homeless policy implementation, Lee (2016) uses the total number of homeless people of CoC networks as a proxy of the degree of problem severity, and similarly, Valero, Jang, and Jeong (2020) employ total homeless population as one proxy of homeless service demands. That can be understood the more service demands can indicate the more homeless problems are severe. In the United States, the veteran homeless people are one of critical parts in the homeless policy context because they can suffer more severe illness due to their military experiences or other exceptional experiences in the past as a soldier (O'Toole, Conde-Martel, Gibbon, Hanusa, & Fine, 2003; Pavao et al., 2013; Tsai, Pietrzak, Szymkowiak, 2021).

Network capacity is measured by four variables: Membership (log), total beds (log),

federal funding (millions of dollars), and permanent supportive housing (in thousand). In the CoC network context, the four factors are critical as the network capacity. Membership is measured by the number of CoC participating organizations, and total beds are measured by the number of total beds in networks. To standardize, two variables are logged. Federal funding is measured by the total dollar amount of federal funding in millions, and permanent supportive housing is measured by the number of permanent supportive housing units in thousand. The CoC networks having diverse members may lead to the broad provision of homeless services. Valero and colleagues (2020) use network membership as a proxy of network capacity in the homeless service context, and Andrew and Hawkins (2012) capture group size that influences the establishment of collaborative arrangements in the institutional collective action perspective.

Similarly, getting much federal funding means the CoC network has financial abilities to implement diverse, supportive programs and services and even create new ones depending on their environments and needs a governing structure to allocate resources effectively. This is consistent with the prior literature emphasizing the importance the government funding to stimulate collaborative arrangements (Ryu, 2021; Andrew, Jung, & Li, 2015). Total beds and permanent supportive housing units can be the signal for CoC network capacity because total beds imply how many staying placement CoC network provides to the homeless and unit of permanent supportive housing entails the longer-term stable housings to individuals and families experiencing homelessness, differently transitional housing, and rapid housing (HUD, 2016).

Nonprofit capacity of a community as the role and involvement of nonprofit

organizations is measured by the number of nonprofit organizations and the dollar amount of total support for nonprofit organizations, including public support and income. The variables are logged to standardize. Nonprofit data originated from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) website and was matched and merged with the geographical boundary of CoC networks in FIPS code and address of nonprofit organizations. Meenar (2015) and Norman and colleagues (2003) indicate that nonprofit organizations are important for community capacity in the context of community food systems and community development corporations. In the community, the fact that people financially support nonprofit organizations by donations or giving and people actively use fee-based services generally contributes to nonprofit organizations' performance, thus enhancing community and the quality of life in the community (Kapucu, 2012; Yarnall, 2018).

4.6.3 Control Variables

Controlling for such community and socioeconomic characteristics, five control variables were chosen, such as non-white population rate, the percentage of the elderly, poverty rate, total population of geographic areas, and the sector variable (Nonprofit). Scholars explain that such characteristics are the critical factor influencing homelessness (Bryne et al., 2013; Lee, Price-Spartlen, & Kana, 2003). Lee (2016) uses multiple communities and socioeconomic control variables in the research of the homeless collaborative context. Based on the demographic data from the community planning and development (CPD) map, the non-white population was calculated by subtracting the total white population from the total population. The percentage of the elderly was measured by the rate of over 65 aged people from the total population. The sector variable was measured by differentiating the CoC governing organization as nonprofit

organization, which is a binary variable. In contrast, the total population is calculated in ten thousand, and the poverty rate was collected from the dataset—Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 present variable descriptions and the descriptive statistics.

4.6.4 Method

The logistic regression analysis is used to test the key factors of the choice of network administrative (NAO) form of network governance. This model estimates the relationship of problem severity, network capacity, and community capacity on NAO. Logistic regression is the appropriate method to test the hypotheses since the dependent variable, the NAO form of network governance, is a binary variable.

4.7 Data Analysis and Findings

Table 4.6 presents the means, standard deviation, and the value of minimum and maximum as well as data source for a dependent variable, eight independent variables, and five control variables. Table 4.5 shows that the three different types of problem severity, four types of network capacity, and two types of nonprofit capacity of a community.

Table 4.5: Variables and Description

Variable	Description
Network Administrative Organization (NAO)	Network administrative organization (NAO) (1=NAO, 0= others)
Problem Severity	
Total Homeless Population Per 1,000 capita	Total homeless population, divided by total population and multiplied by 1,000
Total Veteran Homeless Population (Log)	Total veteran homeless population logged
Change of Homelessness	Average of change rate of homeless population for 3 years (2018-2020)

Variable	Description
Network Capacity	
Federal Funding	Dollar amount of federal funding in millions received from Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Permanent Supportive Housing	Number of permanent supportive housing in thousand
Membership (Log)	Number of network member organizations logged
Total beds (Log)	Number of total beds logged
Nonprofit Capacity	
Nonprofit Organization (Log)	Number of nonprofit organizations logged
Nonprofit supportive revenue (Log)	Dollar amount of total support revenue logged
Community Characteristics (Control Variable)	
Minority Rate	Percentage of the non-white population
Elderly Rate	Percentage of over 65 aged population
Poverty Rate	Percentage of poverty
Total Population	Number of total populations per 10,000
Sector (Nonprofit)	Nonprofit organization (1=nonprofit, 0=others)

Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	M	SD	Min	Max	Source
Network Administrative Organization (NAO)	330	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	CoCs
Problem Severity						
Total Homeless Population per 1,000 capita	330	0.00	1.86	0.20	12.60	HUD
Total Veteran Homeless Population (Log)	330	3.46	1.50	0.00	8.17	HUD
Change of Homeless Population (3 yrs)	330	2.46	10.39	-37.91	58.59	HUD
Network Capacity						
Federal Funding	330	5.73	12.66	0.00	133.61	HUD
Permanent Supportive Housing	330	0.94	2.39	0.00	32.15	HUD
Membership (Log)	330	3.55	0.67	1.39	5.52	CoCs

Variable	Obs.	M	SD	Min	Max	Source
Total beds (Log)	330	6.03	1.13	1.79	11.27	HUD
Nonprofit Capacity						
Nonprofit Organization (Log)	330	6.38	1.00	3.00	9.54	NCCS
Nonprofit Supportive Revenue (Log)	330	21.03	1.55	14.88	26.47	NCCS
Community Characteristics (Control Variable)						
Minority Rate	330	31.19	39.32	-612.13	90.86	Census
Elderly Rate	330	14.65	3.70	7.20	36.84	Census
Poverty Rate	330	15.38	5.17	4.02	40.29	Census
Total Population	330	65.63	90.00	2.98	923.13	Census
Sector (Nonprofit)	330	0.48	0.501	0	1	CoCs

Table 4.7: Logistics Regression, explaining the factors of the choice of NAO

Variables	Model1			Model2		
	Beta	SE	Exp(B)	Beta	SE	Exp(B)
Problem Severity						
Total homeless per 1,000 capita	-0.184**	0.080	0.832	-0.191**	0.088	0.813
Veterans homeless (Log)	0.339**	0.114	1.404	0.357**	0.118	1.427
Change of homeless population (3yrs)	-0.140	0.012	0.987	-0.010	0.012	0.989
Network Capacity						
Federal funding	-0.108**	0.047	0.897	-0.092*	0.049	0.907
Permanent supportive housing	0.846**	0.341	2.330	0.740**	0.348	2.054
Membership (Log)	0.349*	0.186	1.417	0.297	0.189	1.344
Total beds (Log)	0.152	0.107	1.164	0.158	0.111	1.175
Nonprofit Capacity						
Nonprofit organization (Log)	-0.229	0.261	0.796	-0.128	0.267	0.861
Nonprofit Supportive Revenue (Log)	0.009	0.150	1.009	0.062	0.157	1.076

Variables	Model1			Model2		
	Beta	SE	Exp(B)	Beta	SE	Exp(B)
Community Characteristics (Control variables)						
Minority Rate				-0.002	0.005	0.998
Elderly Rate				0.092**	0.039	1.099
Poverty Rate				0.070**	0.026	1.078
Total population				-0.275	0.929	0.760
Sector (Nonprofit)				0.215	0.252	1.239
Constant	-1.547	2.246	0.213	-5.609	2.657	0.004
Obs.	330			330		
LR χ^2	43.832			53.478		
Log-Likelihood	415.943			398.115		
Cox and Snell R2	.102			.150		
Nagelkerke's R2	.137			.210		

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

In this research, logistic regression analyses are used with two models to explain key factors influencing the choice of network administrative organization (NAO) form of network governance. Model 1 includes all independent variables without adding control variables. Model 2 includes all independent variables and the control variables. Table 4.7 presents the logistic regression results of the two models, and the log-likelihood is high, respectively (415.943 and 398.900).

Based on model 1, in terms of problem severity, this research finds that networks with many veteran homeless populations are more likely to choose the NAO form of network governance ($\beta = 0.399$; $p < .05$). On the other hand, networks with many total homeless populations are less likely to choose the NAO form of network governance ($\beta = -0.184$; $p < .05$). It can be inferred that networks with many total homeless populations may less face collective

action problems by costs and uncertainty than the specific homeless problems such as veteran and mental-ill. Thus, the network may seek the collaborative effort to actively respond to the homeless problems in caring for homeless people when they have many total homeless populations as the problem severity. These results support Hypothesis 1 partially.

In the context of network capacity, this research anticipated that if the network has various capacities, it is likely to choose the NAO form of network governance. The analysis in Table 3.6, however, suggests conflicting findings. Federal funding has a negative and significant relationship with the choice of NAO form of network governance. It seems that network with financial support from the federal government is less likely to choose the NAO form ($\beta = -0.108$; $p < .05$). It can be inferred that the less federal funding would make the network choose the form of network governance because network participating organizations can compete with each other when the network has insufficient funding amount and, in this situation, the entities in the network can opportunistically behave. Many scholars in the ICA framework have asserted that government funding is itself motivation and incentive, which promote collective actions (Ryu, 2021). On the other hand, permanent supportive housing units positively and significantly impact the choice of NAO form of network governance. This result indicates that a network with permanent housing units is more likely to choose the NAO form ($\beta = 0.846$; $p < .05$). Membership positively influences the choice of NAO form of network governance, meaning a network with many members is more likely to choose NAO form ($\beta = 0.349$; $p < .1$), whereas total beds are not significant. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is partially supported.

For the nonprofit capacity, this research expected that if a network with many nonprofit organizations and support for the nonprofit organization in the community, it is likely to choose

NAO form of network governance. However, the analysis suggests that the variables are not significant. It could imply that nonprofit organizations and total support directly improve collaboration among network members in the network rather than increasing different costs by opportunism. Thus, it can be inferred that nonprofit organizations and total support influence the collaborative environment in the community. As Andrew and his colleague indicated, the existence of nonprofit organizations has increased civic engagement and community interests, enhancing the collaborative culture and efforts. Also, total support can directly influence network organizations, and they may exert effort to be more transparent and find ways to more active community needs together. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.

This research develops Model 2 by including community characteristics as control variables such as minority rate, the elderly rate, poverty rate, total population, and rate of change of total homeless people for three years. When the community characteristics are applied for the analysis, the results in table 3.6 indicate that most independent variables are statistically significant except membership of network capacity. Analysis for control variables show that network located at the community with higher poverty rate and the elderly rate are more likely to choose NAO form network governance ($\beta = 0.075$; $p < .05$; $\beta = 0.095$; $p < .05$). Other control variables such as minority rate, total population, and change of rate of the homeless population are not significant, meaning the variables are not related to the choice of NAO form.

4.8 Conclusion and Discussion

This research is guided by two research questions: (1) What are key factors influencing the choice of Network Administrative Organization (NAO) form of network governance? And (2)

Does problem severity, network and nonprofit capacity—measured in terms of total homeless and veteran population, federal funding, permanent supportive housing, membership, and total beds, and nonprofit organization and total support for them—matter in choosing NAO form of network governance? While scholarly interests have been raised for network governance, few have studied the form of network governance, especially NAO form, in the empirical evidence. Based on the institutional collective action (ICA) perspective, this research provides empirical knowledge about the choice of network governance form, especially Network Administrative Organization (NAO) form in the context of the U.S. homeless service networks, CoCs (Continuum of Cares).

Problem severity, network, and nonprofit capacities reflect the situations that network participating organizations are faced in terms of identifying benefits, costs, and uncertainties. The findings show that given the costs and uncertainties of network interaction and communication circumstances, network participating organizations are more likely to evade potential risks from uncertain performances and behavior by other network members. In order to protect themselves from decreasing the risk and uncertainty, network participating organizations would choose NAO form as a type of external and independent organization to manage the resources and risks by making them reasonable degree and sharing it objectively. The NAO form of network governance represents an effective governance structure that is not one of the network members and focuses on managing the whole network in terms of coordinating resources and actions to provide services better and implement policies.

The logistics regression analyses indicate that the veteran homeless population, permanent housing units, and member organizations can cause high costs in the context of

homeless service networks to help the choice of NAO form of network governance. In contrast, the total homeless population and federal funding show that the factors cause lower costs or the motivation among network members, thus contributing to the opposite results. Also, the factors for the nonprofit sector show no impact on the choice of NAO form, which can be understood as the positive role of nonprofit organizations to enhance collaborations among cross-sector organizations, thus not necessitating a governance form to manage the risks. Multinomial regression analyses show similar results with the binary logistic regression which is significant for total homeless and veteran homeless people as the problem severity, federal funding and permanent housing unit as network capacity.

This research aims to assess the key factors on the choice of Network Administrative Organization (NAO) form of network governance, especially in the context of U.S. homeless service networks. The findings clarify the importance of circumstance and environment of homeless networks, as it is proven to impact the choice of NAO form in the CoC networks to manage risks and costs. Particularly, this research intends to establish whether the NAO form of network governance leads to solving the collective action problems in the service networks and whether problems and capacities faced in networks matter as well. The elements of problems and capacities are important toward effective network performances by network administrative organizations in the homeless service context. Representatives of each network organization should also endeavor to make unique ways of capturing the capacities and communicating with the network administrative organization and make their efforts meaningful and eventually contribute to the whole networks indicated by scholars (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Raab et al., 2015).

Theoretically, this research fills important gaps in the literature on institutional collective action (ICA) perspectives and network governance. Literature of ICA perspective has been captured to identify the importance of collaborative institutional arrangement in the policy arenas of challenging social and community issues (Andrew & Carr, 2012; Feiock, et al., 2012). Studies of network governance have been actively conducted for the form of network governance in the collaborative process (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Kenis & Provan, 2009). Yet, the institutional arrangement in the collective action problems has been less studied in the networks of policy areas or service delivery. Their circumstances and conditions on the choice of NAO form are empirically under-explored. Assessing the factors of choice of NAO form, this research finds that NAO form is chosen by the degree of problems and features of network and community in order to resolve the collective action dilemmas in the context of homeless policy. Therefore, this research contributes to the development of literature on form of governance in the network and the collective action situations. Additionally, the findings confirm the theoretical argument about the importance of managing opportunism and information asymmetry in terms of problems and capacities.

Despite the contributions, there are several limitations to be considered. This research is based on one policy arena, homeless service networks (COCs) in the United States. The analyses may not be generalized, meaning there is the possibility that the networks in different policy arenas or service areas can be identified and have different results. Second, this research focuses on the NAO form of network governance by measuring it the dichotomous variable that may not explain the dynamics of NAO form and other forms of network governance such as shared form and lead agency form. Third, this research focuses on only three categories:

problem severity, network capacity, and community capacity in the collective action perspective and other factors that can influence the choice of NAO form.

Thus, future research should consider the implications of other policy and service networks to broaden the general understanding of network governance by plentiful evidence. To scrutinize the NAO form more, the diverse operationalization and perspectives for the NAO form can be considered. Because many policies or service networks are implemented lead organization or shared governance forms, future studies should also examine other forms of network governance as an effective institutional arrangement. Eventually, there are many other factors, such as political impacts and civic engagement, where networks (decision by members) choose NAO form and other forms of network governance. Future

CHAPTER 5

QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW FINDINGS

This chapter includes the analysis of the interview data from the representative people of the CoC networks. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the interviews.¹ All interviewees were equitably treated and were asked to read the Informed Consent before the interviews. The interviews were conducted by 21 leading CoC networks, consisting of nonprofit organizations, government agencies, and coalitions. The previous chapters suggest the characteristics and the key factors of the choice of form of network. This chapter focuses on presenting the findings of the qualitative interviews and more understanding of the governance structure and decision-making of CoC networks. This chapter starts with the introduction of the 21 interviewed CoC networks. All interviews were conducted in the online format, and the comments were collected. The comments from the leading people of CoC networks provide important insights and interpretations. The CoC networks understand the significance of collaborative perspectives, and they also have the decision-making boards in functioning administrative roles for service delivery and the screening of the important works related to the resources in maintaining the relevant state of service providers and member organizations in the CoC networks. Diverse organizations across sectors are engaged in the CoC networks and are closely connected.

5.1 Description of Interviewed CoC Networks

In the qualitative studies, cases or sample organizations were chosen on purpose across the country or the research context. To select appropriate data, this study used data from HUD,

¹ IRB-20-608 (Approved, 11/25/2020)

providing the information of incidences of homelessness depending on each network and state. This study was reliant on the data set to identify the CoC networks and the contact list of CoC networks. The data were matched with confirmed COVID-19 cases. CoC networks with many homeless populations generally need more collective actions efforts to coordinate services and organizational actions. In the COVID-19 era, how CoC networks can respond to their difficult situations related to COVID-19 is one of the top priorities. CoC networks with more numbers of confirmed cases of COVID-19 absolutely need more governance efforts. As the purposive and convenience sampling, thirty organizations were contacted by email to request interviews. If organizations respond to accept the interviews, the schedule was set up in the following email conversations. For organizations that were not responded, the second and third emails were sent to remind and ask to respond to the interview requests.

5.2 Profile of the Interviewees of CoC Networks

Twenty-one interviews were conducted with the leaders of CoC networks, such as the CEO, director, coordinator, and manager. Each organization is a homeless service provider, delivering single or multiple services such as shelter, clinics, and food banks in the CoC networks or a management organization that mainly focuses on governing the whole network. The interviewees in this study are in diverse areas across the U.S. states such as Arizona, Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, New York, Texas, etc. The interviewed executives represent organizations or the main people with important missions governing the networks and coordinating services and activities. The type of the CoC governing organizations can be identified as government, nonprofit, and coalition. Also, over half of the interviewed CoC networks have been identified as NAO governance (13; 62%), and the rest of them are

identified as Lead agency governance (8; 38%). Table 5.1 provides the basic information of interviewed CoC networks.

Table 5.1: Profile of Interviewed CoC Networks

ID	Network Governance	Organizational Type	Interviewee's Position	Area	State
CoC A	NAO	Coalition	Coordinator	Urban	AZ
CoC B	LEAD	Nonprofit	Executive Director	Suburban	AL
CoC C	LEAD	Government Agency	System & Planning Administrator	Suburban	CA
CoC D	NAO	Nonprofit	Chief Executive Director	Metropolitan	CA
CoC E	LEAD	Government Agency	Service Officer	Metropolitan	CA
CoC F	NAO	Nonprofit	Executive Director	Metropolitan	CO
CoC G	LEAD	Nonprofit	Executive Director	Suburban	FL
CoC H	NAO	Government Agency	Assistant Executive Director	Metropolitan	FL
CoC I	NAO	Nonprofit	Vice President of Community Partnerships	Suburban	FL
CoC J	NAO	Nonprofit	Executive Director	Metropolitan	IL
CoC K	LEAD	Government Agency	Director	Suburban	MD
CoC L	NAO	Coalition	Director	Urban	NC
CoC M	NAO	Coalition	Chief of CoC	Rural	NY
CoC N	LEAD	Nonprofit	Planning Coordinator	Suburban	NY
CoC O	LEAD	Government Agency	Director	Suburban	PA
CoC P	NAO	Coalition	CoC Coordinator	Suburban	PA
CoC Q	NAO	Nonprofit	Chief Executive Director	Metropolitan	TX
CoC R	NAO	Nonprofit	CoC Director	Metropolitan	TX
CoC S	NAO	Coalition	Executive Director	Urban	VA
CoC T	LEAD	Government Agency	CoC Service Coordinator	Urban	VA
CoC U	NAO	Nonprofit	Executive Director	Rural	WV

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect data about governance structure and characteristics during the summer of 2021 (July to September). Online interviews via Zoom took 30 to 60 minutes in length and were conducted at the convenient time schedule of the interviewees. All interviews were recorded by the agreement of the Informed Consent Form via the Qualtrics Link prior to the interviews. When some interviewees missed the forms, the agreement of recording and transcribing was asked right before starting the interviews. Interview questions were designed to get information about how CoC networks are governed among many network members and, to do that, which activities are made. Interviewees were asked about the governance structure and decision-making that are made in the networks. The interviewees' information was explored for how their organization functions to govern the CoC networks to coordinate activities and manage procedures for providing various services and keeping the regulations and policies that should follow in the networks.

5.3 Analysis and Findings

The open-ended comments of interviewees were coded and analyzed in the thematic process. All comments were moved into Microsoft Word and then Microsoft Excel to code comments by emerging themes (Berg, 2008; Charmaz, 2006). By analyzing transcripts, themes and consistent patterns were identified by codes. For analysis, as indicated by Braun and Clarke (2006), the data was repeatedly read to get ideas and then produce several codes and themes from the interviews. The primary purpose of presenting the interview analysis is about how CoC leaders understand the function of governing the networks in the governance structure and the decision-making process. No features or circumstances can completely explain the network governance, and indeed the interviewees identify the different aspects of the function of

network governance. However, in the same homeless policy context, the interviewed leading people tend to explain the governance similarly. CoC governing organizations offer administrative support and funding allocations that are relevant to the effective service delivery of network participating organizations.

5.3.1 Characteristics and Function of Network Governance

Responding to the open-ended questions, "What is governance structure?" and "How does the governance work?" CoC networks in NAO and Lead Organization form have similar perspectives and experiences of their governance and the function. There are several core elements and words such as coordinate, administer. As mentioned, coordination is one of the key functions to govern the networks (Hendriks, 2008), which can be implemented in diverse phases. The behaviors of network participating organizations and services should be adjusted. Coordination is the major characteristics in the provision of service and the relationships among network members. Leaders of CoC governing organizations identified "coordination, oversight, management, support, administer, and educate" as codes that can be understood as the coordinating activities. For example, when a lead organization overlooks their CoC participating organizations in the opportunistic behaviors and the actions are adjusted, this is the effective coordinating function of network governance.

Regardless of the form of network governance, most of the interviewed leading people of CoC networks mentioned the coordinating role of the governing organizations that make spreading works of network participating organizations integrate into a coherent and organic system. One interviewee from an organization in NAO governance says, "For the most part, we're looking at ourselves as a support system for the entire continuum of care... We're looking

at how is this going to address the entire system. So that's how we're, we're looking at the function of Partners... we don't provide direct services to the clients, but we sell sub-grants out to providers...we were trying to do is we were trying to educate everybody as quickly as possible on what to be sharing with folks who are both unsheltered and sheltered." Two interviewees from two organizations in Lead Agency governance states, "We meet all those deliverables, but then we also do have some services with the CARES act money... we subcontracted out, they have to collect all the invoices put it all together, send it in, get pay, pay them back, etc.," and "Overseeing that funding coming into the, to the community and, and how we're using it... we also report to and push information out... operate all the shelters and or fund the shelters. And then we get some state money for shelter operations..."

Although the interviewed leading people have similar perspectives on governing the networks, the emphasized activities are diversely identified. One interviewee from NAO understands one of their roles for network governance is to educate network participating organizations, and she explains it in this way: "We coordinate all of those activities. We also have coordinated entry within our CoC. We are the lead for that... We are educating them otherwise. But that's what else can I tell you about our role." Also, the management of funding is a critical role of CoC governing organizations, which is connected with the oversight and overseeing the programs and activities and applying for the CoC programs to HUD. An interview says, "Applying for the HUD funding and making sure we're compliant with all of HUDs. CoC requirements. We do a full evaluation, and we monitor the COC programs. And we look at system performance... that requires a lot of report generation... we do capacity building for the CoC...manage the communications, and then all of that staffing support ... it's pretty detailed in

terms of like responsibilities."

In governing CoC networks, coordination is an important function because network participating organizations provide different services, and the needs of homeless people are also diverse and different (Jang, Jesus, & Jeong, 2020). Particular services and needs should not be concentrated, and depending on the community circumstances and demands, appropriate process and service delivery should be made. Also, in the limited funding pool, organizations can be financially fairly supported by CoC networks. Trust for the governing organizations may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations to follow the rules and provide services, which can prevent duplication of services and respond to conflicts. As indicated by comments of interviews, the CoC governing organizations coordinate in different ways by educating CoC member organizations, convening all service providers, sharing information, giving specific directions, monitoring CoC programs, or managing fundings.

The focal points of coordination in the network governance can be different, but all functions are closely connected with effective service delivery and making network members accountable in the homeless policy arenas. Furthermore, while NAO and Lead organization are mostly similar to the function of coordination in the network governance, some leaders of NAO indicate that they do not provide direct services but only focus on network management. The leader of the Lead organization form states that they have some services to provide. CoC network Q as NAO says, "We see that as helpful because the role that coordination role in all of the planning... we're providing direction, but the added benefit of that a colocation of many different partner agencies on one campus collaborating with each other... We may apply for that funding to distribute it to our partners to help fill that gap we don't provide direct service."

This is consistent with Provan and Kenis's (2008) work that the difference between both forms of network governance could be seen whether the governing organization is one of the network members or service providers.

5.3.2 Decision-Making

In addition to the function and characteristics of network governance, the decision-making process is another critical aspect that contributes to facilitating coordination of network participating organizations and service delivery. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) indicate that the core understanding of governance is “regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and service.” In other words, governance is closely related to rulemakings, decisions, and practices for effective service delivery to accomplish the goals. Particularly, Harlan Cleveland (1972) emphasizes the importance of decision-making in governance, and particularly in the horizontal situation, decision-making is more delicate, consensual, and advisory. The qualitative interviewees also point that most of decision-makings are conducted by the CoC board or the collective decision-making structure. These arrangements have been formed as a part of efforts to reflect diverse opinions and circumstances to effectively provide services in making strategic decisions for the whole network management. In the CoC Program Interim Rule (2017), HUD asks the CoC networks to have diverse social actors such as nonprofit, local government, and so on.

An interviewee leading a coalition as NAO, CoC network A, states:

All decision making, related to the continuum to the continuum of care board, with the exception of changes to the governance charter election of the continuum of care, board members, and selection of the continuum of care lead agency collaborative

outcome.... We have 20 board seats... the continuum of care board, there are then six standing committees... So, all continuum of care decisions are ultimately made by the continuum of care board.... we can't decide anything on behalf of the CoC board is respected as highly as.

In these comments, the decisions really depend on the CoC board and people from multiple organizations participate in the CoC board. From the interview, it is identified there are 50 network participating organizations and about half of network members are involved in the decision-making by the CoC board. Another interviewee corroborates the statement:

Our continuum of care, board of directors that meet the requirements of HUD... They act as the HUD Continuum of Care board that makes community wide decisions, and also as the nonprofit board of alliance so the agenda is divided between nonprofit business and community business.

CoC board plays an important role for decision-making but there are CoC networks that decisions are made by the committees. An interviewee says,

We have an executive committee that's comprised of the leadership executive... we have a housing subcommittee, a data evaluation subcommittee, an integrated services committee, an outreach education and advocacy committee... so the CoC chairs of those subcommittees also sit in our Executive Committee, ... And the executive committee is really charged with kind of rolling out supporting the implementation of our strategic plan, driving, major policy changes...for our community's response. a leadership board.... they're really charged with making some of our communities funding decisions, setting our funding priorities.

The committee-based decision-making seems different from the CoC board's one, but the leading person of each committee participate in the executive board as the leadership and decision board and still their perspectives reflect the network level decisions.

Another finding from the interviewees also indicates some CoC networks governing by nonprofits have two separate boards for the management of nonprofit and whole CoCs. One director says,

It's a standalone nonprofit with an independent board. We separated out the CoC and

the nonprofit... We have a steering committee who runs the CoC, mainly government funders and system players... the seat again two boards the CoC has 23 the board, nonprofit has 17.

In the cases that nonprofit organizations play a lead agency or NAO, they may have two boards to manage their organizational boundary and CoC as lead agency and to manage entire CoC networks and the administrative board of support as NAO.

It is difficult to differentiate the decision-making between NAO and Lead agency governance. While it seems, there are not apparent criteria, some CoC networks governed by government agency as the Lead agency governance has the different phase of decision-making. There are board of directors and decisions, and oversight of funding are made by them. However, final approval process should be in the certain works or the appointment of CoC board members are made by the political process. For example, one leading person from a government agency as lead agency states that county board of supervisors appoints CoC board members and 50 percentage of the board members is rotated and county agency also sits on the board. Another interviewee states all the service contracts should be approved by city council although CoC board oversees and implement funding. Although the approval processes can reduce the autonomy of CoCs' activities, this is interesting process as well as preventive and protective decision-making too because two structures scrutinize the parts of decision-makings.

5.4 Conclusion and Discussion

The results of this study highlight the connection to the literature and practical implication for network governance, especially their characteristics, function, and decision-making. In examining CoC networks from interviews of key persons in the network governing organizations, it is shown that the coordination of network governance is one of the important

functions in different focused actions such as education of network members, oversight of the funding and programs, and administrative support. The comments of the interviews support the studies that emphasize the importance of coordination in governance (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Fredrickson, 2005). In the CoC networks, the leaders of governing organizations clearly focus on how they can coordinate and recognize their roles in keeping good service provisions and making network organizations observance of rules and accountable. Education and oversight tend to be one of the critical roles of CoC governing organizations to continue proper services and accomplish network purposes. The different perspectives of coordination in the CoC networks are quite pronounced.

In the decision-making of CoC networks, the leaders' comments help us understand that the CoC board or the representative structure such as the executive committee or the steering committee is the primary decision-making entity. CoC boards and other representative units make important decisions such as funding approval and policy and procedures changes to function well of network and coordinate services and actions. While establishing a CoC board or the board type structure is required by HUD rules, the decision-making by the CoC board is beneficial for the networks. Since many cross-sector organizations are in the networks, it is difficult to meet each other and reflect all members' interests and preferences.

Thus, representing people from each sector or service area can be in the CoC board as one of the members. They can discuss agendas and make important decisions in reflecting collective benefits. As one leading person of CoC governing organization stated, there is the term of CoC board member and, which is rotated, thus seems the fair system of decision-making and appointment. From the literature of the board of directors of the nonprofit

organization, the benefits of the CoC board can be identified because nonprofit boards make decisions for a variety of services and community needs in the engagement of diverse people with different expertise. Studies for the nonprofit boards indicate that the board's role in overseeing and ensuring and boarding effectiveness directly influences the nonprofit performances (Brown & Preston, 2004; Herman & Renz, 2000).

This research contributes to understanding the function and characteristics of network governance in terms of coordination and decision-making. In the context of homeless service networks, the ways that network with cross-sector organizations is governed and managed are elucidated, and the importance of the board in the decision-making is identified. Homelessness is one of the difficult problems to be solved in the community, where there are related complex issues such as health, nutrition, and housing. The homelessness issues' difficulty and complexities may emphasize the collaborative efforts and the coordination of network members and services. Sharing the lively comments from the leading people helps connect with the reality and literature, thus decreases the gaps of understanding in the policy arenas.

However, several limitations should be addressed in the future. While this research seeks to understand the function and choice of network governance form, the context of the homeless service network is only focused, and the impact of the function and decision-making of network governance on collaborative outcomes is not approved. Also, the number of interviews is limited, and more numbers should be needed to create better and generalized research. As a qualitative study, the production of empirical evidence is insufficient, and future research can provide empirical logic and evidence in this context.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary of Findings

6.1.1 What are the Forms of Network Governance in Homeless Service Networks?

Based on the ICA framework, this dissertation examines the form of network governance chosen by network participating organizations in the context of the U.S. homeless service networks (Continuum of Cares; CoCs). The first research question is about identifying how the homeless networks (CoCs) are structured for governing the networks. Based on Provan and Kenis (2008), the form of network governance for CoCs is differentiated by Shared, Lead Agency, and Network Administration Organization (NAO). Each governing form of CoCs is identified by the type of the organization, such as nonprofit, government, and coalition. The descriptive analysis is conducted, and there are some findings.

CoC networks are governed by shared form (2%), lead organization form (41%), and NAO form (57%), and the forms of network governance is operated by nonprofit (48.5%), government (29.5%), and coalitional organization (22%). In detail, nonprofit organization accounts for 0.5% of shared governance form, 17.5% of lead agency form, and 30.5% of NAO form. Government agency occupies 0.5% of shared governance form, 23.5% of lead agency form, and 5.5% of NAO form. The coalition also accounts for 1% of shared governance, 21% of NAO form. The results suggest that NAO has mainly implemented CoC networks and lead organization form (98%), and nonprofits and government agencies (78%) play a critical role in governing the CoC networks.

6.1.2 What are the Key Factors Affecting the Choice of Form of Network Governance?

The dissertation examines key factors that influence the choice of NAO form of network governance in the institutional collective action (ICA) framework. Key factors on the choice of NAO form are identified in problem severity, network capacity, and community capacity. Problem severity is operationalized as total homeless population and veteran homeless population. Network capacity is operationalized as federal funding, permanent supportive housing unit, membership, and total beds. Community capacity is operationalized as a nonprofit organization and total support for nonprofits. Analyses are conducted in two ways. All variables are described in the descriptive statistics, and the relationship between the choice and the key factors are analyzed in the logistic regression.

For problem severity, findings indicate that networks with many veteran homeless populations are more likely to choose the NAO form of network governance. On the other hand, networks with many total homeless populations are less likely to choose the NAO form of network governance. It can be inferred that networks with many total homeless populations may less face the collective action problem situation, although there are collaborative risks and uncertainties. Network organizations tend to collaborate with each other, which does not need any mechanism effectively. However, network members face the collective action dilemma for responding to the specific homeless needs such as veteran and mental-ill. It can be inferred that specific demands needs.

For network capacity, federal funding has a negative and significant relationship with the choice of NAO form of network governance. It can be inferred that more federal funding would not make networks choose the form of network governance. This can be thought lots of

funding does not influence the collaborative risks and encourage the effective collaboration of organizations. Scholars of the ICA framework indicate that government funding motivates organizations in the collaborative setting (Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010). On the other hand, permanent supportive housing units and memberships positively and significantly impact the choice of NAO form of network governance, whereas total beds are not significant.

For the nonprofit capacity, findings suggest nonprofit organizations and the total support for nonprofits are not significant effects. It can be inferred that nonprofit organizations and total support themselves influence the collaborative environment among network members. As indicated by Andrew and his colleague (2015), the existence of nonprofit organizations has increased civic engagement and community interests, enhancing the collaborative culture and efforts. Other community factors are considered as control variables, and the findings suggest the elderly rate and poverty rate are positively associated with the choice of NAO form of network governance. We can simply think that the high portion of the elderly and the poor in the community need more resources, which can happen to competition among network members, thus producing collaborative risks and costs.

6.1.3 What are the Key Functions of Network Governance?

This dissertation identifies the characteristics and decision-making of network governance in the U.S. homeless service networks based on the interviews of the leaders of CoC governing organizations. In examining CoC networks from interviews of key persons in the network governing organizations, it is shown that network governance coordination is an important function in different focused actions such as education of network members, oversight of the funding and programs, and administrative support. The comments of the

interviews support the studies that emphasize the importance of coordination in governance (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Fredrickson, 2005). In the CoC networks, the leaders of governing organizations clearly focus on how they can coordinate and recognize their roles in keeping good service provisions and making network organizations observance of rules and accountable. Education and oversight tend to be one of the critical roles of CoC governing organizations to continue proper services and accomplish network purposes. The different perspectives of coordination in the CoC networks are quite pronounced.

In the decision-making of CoC networks, the leaders' comments help us understand that the CoC board or the representative structure such as the executive committee or the steering committee is the main entity of decision-making. In order to function of network well and coordinate services and actions, CoC boards and other representative units make important decisions such as funding approval and policy and procedures changes. While establishing a CoC board or the board type structure is required by HUD rules, the decision-making by the CoC board is beneficial for the networks. Since many cross-sector organizations are in the networks, it is difficult for them to meet each other and reflect all members' interests and preferences. Thus, representing people from each sector or service area can be in the CoC board as one of the members. They can discuss agendas and make important decisions in reflecting collective benefits.

6.2 Theoretical and Practice Implications

The dissertation contributes to theory and practice. Firstly, this study contributes to the literature on network governance and management regarding the choice of form of network governance. Although many studies have been conducted and have focused on network

performances and effectiveness, few have addressed the governance arrangement choice in the networks. This research shows the governance structure of service networks in the context of the homeless context and identifies the key factors of the choice of network governance form, especially network administration organization (NAO), and the function and decision-making of network governance. The choice of the form of network governance is the decision for the governance structure to effectively collaborate among network participating organizations in coordinating the behaviors and services. This study provides a thoughtful understanding of network management.

This dissertation also expands the concept and the function of collaboration, particularly by cross-sector organizations in the networks. Scholars think collaboration is necessary for solving the wicked problems in the U.S. federal systems (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Among many collaborative institutional arrangements, networks are one of the effective governance structures to respond to the complicated social issues that single organizations cannot easily resolve. Such collaboration in certain institutional arrangements is the strategic decision and is related to the expected better outcomes. However, since many organizations cannot always be successful, how the choice should be made, and which process should be considered is a critical understanding in the collaboration. Service networks in the public policy arenas are closely connected with the governments or their agencies, contributing to the collaborative governance perspectives in terms of non-state governments and their roles (Ansell & Gash, 2006).

Moreover, this research broadens the institutional collective action (ICA) framework to understanding collaboration in the network context. The ICA framework well explains the

choices and decisions of social entities to better provide public services and implement governance arrangements policies to solve collective action dilemmas. The network is one of the collaborative arrangements among the diverse community and local organizations. Because the characteristics of networks tend to be voluntary and horizontal, a specific mechanism is needed for network participating organizations to be followed. Effective service delivery and policy implementation is closely connected with how well the network is governed. Also, since cross-sector organizations have different interests and preferences in the networks, it may be more difficult to collaborate with each other rather than the organizations in the same sectors. The situations of the collective action problems can be prevalent. These dilemmas should be properly handled to accomplish the purpose of the services and policies and the goals of organizations and networks.

With few exceptions (Kim, Andrew, & Jung, 2017; Yi, Suo, Shen, & Zhang, 2018), the ICA framework has not been extensively applied to network governance and network management. This study answers the research question about why a network chooses the NAO form of network governance from one of the research questions, and the collaborative risks and uncertainty understand the factors. This research considers the NAO form of network governance as a mechanism to solve the collective action problems in the network context and elucidates the key factors in terms of problems and network and community capacity.

In the practical contribution, this research provides insight into how cross-sector collaboration is made and what should be considered in such collaborative decisions and choices of the institutional arrangements. Particularly, one can argue that community organizations should put the efforts and the time to understand their context and other

organizations for better decisions and the collaborative synergy effects. Among different forms of network governance, this research shows three forms of network governance and their characteristics, and the circumstances of the choice of network governance are also explained. This contributes to understanding the types of collaborative difficulties and finding the proper solutions. Network managers or leading people can identify which form of network governance can be effective in their own circumstances and which characteristics and organizations' roles should be emphasized in governing the whole network.

In terms of effective service delivery and policy implementation, this study categorizes three circumstantial contexts (i.e., Problem, Network, and Nonprofit) into eight variables to choose the form of network governance in handling collective action dilemmas. Public managers can consider the factors as the lens to make decisions in the governance structure and decision-making process in their policy or service contexts. For example, a local government strategically decides the governing structure by the board of directors or an external and independent organization when certain policy problems are severe. Practitioners can make strategies for effectively collaborating with network members in considering studied factors and the form of network governance, contributing to cross-sector organizational conditions. Also, practitioners can identify those horizontal arrangements like networks, and other collaborative settings still need centralized decision-making processes and structures. Practitioners can consider how they can balance the decisional procedures in the horizontal policy context.

6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study

This research has several limitations, although there are contributions to the theory and practices. First, this research only focuses on the U.S. homeless service networks, which may not apply to other service or policy arenas. Although the homeless problems entail various issues and network needs comprehensive approaches, this study was not designed to understand and compare other contexts or areas, which could be difficult to be generalized. Thus, different contexts and service areas of the network can be considered to shed light on network governance in future studies.

Also, this research conducts the descriptive analysis and logistic regression, but the analysis is in the one-time cross-sectional, which only examines one-year data in the homeless service networks. Since one-year data analysis is not enough to draw firm causal conclusions, future data can consider using the multiple-year data in conducting the time series analysis. Lastly, the choice of NAO form is conducted for identifying causality, and there is the possibility that other forms of network governance can be analyzed in the future study. And other different analyses would be conducted from the survey data, other measurements of the concepts in the context of networks.

APPENDIX A
IRB APPROVAL

IRB #: IRB-20-608

Title: Understanding the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Continuum of Care Homeless Service Networks (CoCs)

Creation Date: 10-21-2020

End Date:

Status: **Approved**

Principal Investigator: Hee Soun Jang

Review Board: UNT IRB Full Board

Sponsor:

Study History

Submission Type	Initial	Review Type	Exempt	Decision	Exempt
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Key Study Contacts

Member	Hee Soun Jang	Role	Principal Investigator	Contact	HeeSoun.Jang@unt.edu
Member	Hee Soun Jang	Role	Primary Contact	Contact	HeeSoun.Jang@unt.edu

APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT

TITLE OF RESEARCH STUDY: Understanding the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Continuum of Care Homeless Service Networks (CoCs)

RESEARCH TEAM:

Dr. Hee Soun Jang, Department of Public Administration, 940-369-76-844,
HeeSoun.Jang@unt.edu (PI)

Dr. Jesus Valero, Department of Political Science, University of Utah, 801-581-7031,
Jesus.Valero@utah.edu

You are being asked to participate in a research study. Taking part in this study is voluntary. The investigators will explain the study to you and will answer any questions you might have. It is your choice whether or not you take part in this study. If you agree to participate and then choose to withdraw from the study, that is your right, and your decision will not be held against you. You are being asked to participate in a research study that examine how Continuum of Care homeless service networks (CoCs) responds to the health and social service needs created by the COVID-19 pandemic and adapts effectively. Your participation in this study will help inform the impact of COVID 19 to homeless population and effective strategies in service of homeless in the time of pandemic.

This research is being funded by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Grant ID: 78113). You will be asked to participate in a semi-structured interview that may last 30 minutes to 1 hour. Questions will focus on your role in the Continuum of Care program, and your perception of factors explaining the effectiveness of collaboration in response to COVID-19.

You might want to participate in this if you are interested in helping our team become more informed about the impact of COVID-19 on the homeless population. You may choose to participate if you are an administrative leader of Continuum of Care and at least 22 years old. The reasonable foreseeable risks include the potential for loss of confidentiality which you can compare to the potential benefits of helping us develop a better understanding about how to better manage collaboration networks. You will be compensated for your participation.

DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: This project studies how a community-based collaborative mechanism to homeless services, namely Continuum of Care homeless service networks (CoCs), responds to the health and social service needs created by the COVID-19 pandemic and adapts effectively to improve the health and health equity of individuals experiencing homelessness. Your participation in this study will help inform the impact of COVID 19 to homeless population and effective strategies in service of homeless in the time of pandemic.

TIME COMMITMENT: Participation in this study is expected to last approximately thirty to forty minutes.

STUDY PROCEDURES: You will be asked to participate in a semi-structured interview conducted via online zoom meeting. Questions will focus on your role in the Continuum of Care program,

and your perception of factors explaining the effectiveness of collaboration in response to COVID-19.

AUDIO/VIDEO RECORDING:

- I agree to be zoom-recorded during the research study.
- I do not agree to be zoom-recorded during the research study.
- I agree that the audio and video recordings can be used in publications or presentations.
- I do not agree that the audio and video recordings can be used in publications or presentations.

You may still participate if you do not agree to be zoom-recorded.

POSSIBLE BENEFITS: We cannot promise any direct benefit for taking part in this study. However, we hope that information collected from this study will help us develop a better understanding about how to better manage collaboration networks.

POSSIBLE RISKS/DISCOMFORTS:

This research study is not expected to pose any additional risks beyond what you would normally experience in your regular everyday life. However, if you do experience any discomfort, please inform the research team

Participating in research may involve a loss of privacy and the potential for a breach in confidentiality. Study data will be physically and electronically secured by the research team. As with any use of electronic means to store data, there is a risk of breach of data security.

If you experience excessive discomfort when completing the research activity, you may choose to stop participating at any time without penalty. The researchers will try to prevent any problem that could happen, but the study may involve risks to the participant, which are currently unforeseeable. UNT does not provide medical services, or financial assistance for emotional distress or injuries that might happen from participating in this research. If you need to discuss your discomfort further, please contact a mental health provider, or you may contact the researcher who will refer you to appropriate services. If your need is urgent, helpful resources include SAMHSA's National Helpline – 1-800-662-HELP (4357).\

COMPENSATION: You will be compensated \$50 in the form of a gift card for your participation in this study. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers all payments made to research subjects to be taxable income. Your personal information, including your name, address, and social security number may be acquired from you and provided to UNT System Tax Office for the purpose of payment. If you are an employee, we will be collecting your employee ID. If your total payments for the year exceed \$600.00, UNT will report this information to the IRS as

income and you will receive a Form 1099 at the end of the year. If you receive less than \$600.00 total payments in a year, you are personally responsible for reporting the payments to the IRS.

CONFIDENTIALITY: We will keep all research records that identify you private to the extent allowed by law. Records about you will be kept locked in a filing cabinet and on computers protected with passwords. In addition, your name will be kept with your responses from the interview. In publications, your name will be removed and protected. All paper and electronic data collected from this study will be stored in a secure location on the UNT campus and/or a secure UNT server for at least three (3) years past the end of this research. Research records will be labeled with a code and the master key linking names with codes will be maintained in a separate and secure location.

Please be advised that although the researchers will take these steps to maintain confidentiality of the data, the nature of interview groups prevents the researchers from guaranteeing confidentiality. The researchers would like to remind participants to respect the privacy of your fellow participants and not repeat what is said in the interview group to others.

The results of this study may be published and/or presented without naming you as a participant. The data collected about you for this study may be used for future research studies that are not described in this consent form. If that occurs, an IRB would first evaluate the use of any information that is identifiable to you, and confidentiality protection would be maintained.

While absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, the research team will make every effort to protect the confidentiality of your records, as described here and to the extent permitted by law. In addition to the research team, the following entities may have access to your records, but only on a need-to-know basis: the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA (federal regulating agencies), the reviewing IRB, and sponsors of the study.

This study utilizes a third party software called Zoom and is subject to the privacy policies of Qualtrics noted here: <https://zoom.us/privacy/>

CONTACT INFORMATION FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY: If you have any questions about the study you may contact Dr. Hee Soun Jang 940-369-7844, HeeSoun.Jang@unt.edu. Any questions you have regarding your rights as a research subject, or complaints about the research may be directed to the Office of Research Integrity and Compliance at 940-565-4643, or by email at untirb@unt.edu.

Your signature below indicates that you have read all of the above and that you confirm you understand.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- Major challenges
 - What significant challenges did your community experience as a result of the pandemic?
- Network governance (Leadership, membership, new members)
 - Form of decision making
 - Description of leadership and authority
 - Network membership
 - Members' participation in decision making
 - Leading agencies
- Resources (Government, nonprofit, private resources)
- Services (Service adjustment, Housing related services)
 - What new services did your CoC implement in response to the pandemic?
- Data (PIT 2020, COVID 19 cases and death rate)
 - Did your community complete the 2021 PIT?
 - Is your CoC tracking COVID-19 cases?
- Crisis management (Model, Bureaucracy)
 - To what extent was your community prepared for the pandemic?
- Success & Impact
 - In what ways was your CoC successful in impacting the lives of individuals that experienced homelessness during the pandemic?
 - Any new lesson learned? (Collaboration, Communication, Resources)

APPENDIX D

CODE SHEET

Components for coding process were referred from Kenis and Provan (2009), Milward and Provan (2006), and Provan and Kenis (2008).

Network Administration Organization (NAO)
They do not provide direct services (but indirect services such as referral, liaison, etc) (Y/N)
They explain they do not provide services based on the mission and role statement, and governance charter (Y/N)
They explain their role is to coordinate and facilitate networks based on the mission and role statement, and governance charter (Y/N)
Although they register the collaborative applicant, they only support administratively or financially (Y/N)
Another name of CoC networks is existent like coalition or partnership structure? (Y/N); name?
How many boards of directors?
What is the organizational type? 1) Nonprofit 2) Government Agency 3) Others (Partnership, Coalition, Network, etc.)
Lead Agency
They are one of the service providers (Y/N)
They have the certain area of the services in the CoC networks. Which areas? (Y/N)
They explain they provide direct services based on the mission and role statement, and governance charter (Y/N)
They explain their role is to coordinate and facilitate networks based on the mission and role statement, and governance charter (Y/N)
They are registered as a collaborative applicant (Y/N)
They lead most procedures, including administrative support and managing the networks, not only as one of the networks members (Y/N)
What is the organizational type? 1) Nonprofit 2) Government Agency 3) Others (Partnership, Coalition, Network, etc.)
Shared
Are they all service providers or network members? (Y/N)
All members or most members participate in the decision-making? (Y/N)
How many board members?
The number of the board members and network members is same?
What is the organizational type? 1) Nonprofit 2) Government Agency 3) Others (Partnership, Coalition, Network, etc.)

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